

Filozofija in »interdisciplinarnost«

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Razprava analizira težaven odnos humanistike do znanstvenega mišljenja ob odsotnosti filozofskega sistema vednosti, ki bi lahko služil kot skupni okvir različnih režimov mišljenja. Ko filozofija pristane na konsenz, da ni več mogoča kot sistem, izumi različne oblike »interdisciplinarnosti«, ki ji omogočajo preseči partikularnost posameznih disciplin mišljenja.

Ključne besede: humanistika / filozofija / ontologija / estetika / znanost / interdisciplinarnost

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Uvod

Znanost se humanističnim disciplinam zastavlja kot problem, saj pri naša vztrajno negotovost glede odgovora na vprašanje, ki ga lahko po Heideggerju formuliramo takole: »Kaj je mišljenje?« Humanistika se s tem problemom praviloma sooča v skladu z eno od dveh temeljnih strategij: bodisi privzame določen ideal znanosti, po katerem naj bi se ravnala, da bi tudi sama postala znanost,¹ bodisi definira nezvedljivo specifičnost svojega načina ali objekta mišljenja, ki naj bi ga znanost ne mogla nadomestiti ali ustrezno obravnavati. To klasično alternativo med »vulgarnim« pozitivizmom in »naivnim« humanizmom dopolnjujejo poskusi njenega premoščanja: našteli bi lahko vrsto zahtev po oblikovanju humanističnim disciplinam lastne znanstvenosti, ki ne bi bila zgolj približevanje neke- mu zunanjemu idealu in s tem »posnemanje« znanstvene metodologije, temveč oblikovanje določenega načina mišljenja, ki bi se »strukturno« ujemal z moderno znanostjo. Takšna zahteva je bila posebej odmevna v althusserjevskem marksizmu in v lacanovski psihoanalizi.² Pogosto srečamo tudi mnenje, da sta sodobna humanistika in sodobna znanost morda divergentni v svojih metodah, a konvergirata v ugotovitvah: na primer spoznanja relativnostne teorije in kvantne mehanike naj bi se ujemala z novo ontološko podobo »odprtosti« ali »necelosti« sveta, ki jo prinaša humanistika. Drugo vrsto premoščanja klasične alternative povzema načelo »interdisciplinarnosti«: različne znanstvene in humanistične discipline

lahko sodelujejo pri proučevanju specifičnega objekta, pri čemer razcep med različnimi načini mišljenja postane dobrodošel, saj omogoča širše in bolj poglobljeno spoznanje.

Ob premisleku o premoščanju razcepa med različnimi režimi mišljenja se lahko vprašamo, ali se mišljenje kot problem zastavlja tudi znotraj same znanosti. Če se, če si mora tudi znanost priti na jasno glede tega, da misli (gl. Riha 97), postane vprašanje mišljenja skupno vprašanje humanistike in znanosti. Tako znanost kakor humanistika se lahko ravna po svoji želji, da misli, ali pa glede te želje popustita in se prepustita drugim vodilom, prva imperativu rentabilnosti, druga pa imperativu kulturno-ideološke koristnosti (gl. Riha 106, 111). Takšna postavitev skupnega vprašanja mišljenja bi seveda zahtevala izstop iz filozofskega konteksta, v katerem je to vprašanje zastavljeno pri Heideggerju – njemu je namreč jasno, da znanost ne misli in ne more misliti.³ Toda zakaj mora filozof znanosti odreči zmožnosti mišljenja? Škandal, ki ga znanost povzroči v območju humanistike, je v tem, da pokaže, da »*misel ni enako smisel*« (Riha 106). Po drugi strani pa humanistika vse do danes vztraja, da je prav smisel tisti proizvod, s katerim lahko družbeno upraviči svoj obstoj, na kar kaže tudi promocijsko geslo, ki ga je nekaj časa uporabljala Filozofska fakulteta v Ljubljani: »Humanistika ima smisel.«

Filozofska diskreditacija znanosti ima svoj notranje-filozofski predpogoj, ki je tesno povezan tudi s težavami premostitve prepada med nezvedljivimi režimi mišljenja. Strogo gledano se pri Heideggerju filozofija o resnici znanosti ne izreka več iz meta-pozicije filozofskega sistema, iz pretenzije filozofije po univerzalni vednosti, ampak se izreka zato, ker resnico misli po vzoru nekega drugega »partikularnega« področja mišljenja oziroma ker misli »pod pogojem« (če naj uporabimo izraz Alaina Badiouja) neke druge zunanosti filozofije, namreč umetnosti. Heideggerjeva filozofija preverja konsekvence, ki jih ima mišljenje umetnosti, predvsem pesništva, za mišljenje nasploh. Ideal mišljenja je zato ideal umetnosti, ki je prepoznan kot diametralno nasprotje ideala znanosti. Nerazmerje med tema režimoma mišljenja, nemožnost sleherne komplementarnosti med njima, je pravzaprav posledica nemožnosti metafizične filozofije, ki ni več zmožna priskrbeti meta-vednosti, ki bi mišljenju zagotavljala enotnost. Preprosto rečeno, filozofija ni več mogoča kot sistem, ki bi služil kot skupni okvir različnih disciplin mišljenja.

Naš namen ni načenjati že dodobra prežvečene teme »konca velikih zgodb« – saj filozofsko (samo)kritiko univerzalizma, kot bomo videli, dopolnjuje nič manj pomembna kritika partikularizma ločenih miselnih disciplin –, temveč prek vprašanja o problematičnem položaju post-sistemske filozofije ponuditi modele mišljenja povezav med različnimi režimi

mišljenja. Tako znanstvene kakor humanistične discipline mišljenja lahko vprašanje »interdisciplinarnosti« (v širšem pomenu besede) obravnavajo kot sekundarno, saj imajo svoj objekt in specifične metode, s katerim ta objekt proučujejo, kar pomeni, da lahko načeloma obstajajo kot samostojne. Nasprotno pa je za filozofijo, ki strogo gledano nima svojega objekta in ki naj ne bi bila več mogoča kot sistem, to vprašanje ključno, saj zadeva samo možnost njene prakse. V nadaljevanju se bomo tako ukvarjali z načini, na katere različne filozofije pojmujejo prehode in kroženje konceptov med različnimi disciplinami mišljenja.

Konec sistemov?

Filozofija je v času po Heglu večinoma pristajala na konsenz, po katerem ni več mogoča v obliki spekulativnega sistema.⁴ Zato je morala na novo definirati odnos do svoje zunanosti, se pravi, do nekega mišljenja, ki ga ne poseduje oziroma ki se ne dovrši v njej sami. Nove možnosti svojega obstoja je filozofija našla tako, da se je umestila na obrobje katere od partikularnih vednosti/praks, zato da bi ponudila premislek njihovih metodoloških temeljev in univerzalizirala njihove učinke na mišljenje. Toda to lahko privede do pojava, ki ga je Badiou (*Manifest* 101–105) poimenoval »prešitje« filozofije z enim od njenih pogojev (pozitivizem prešije filozofijo z znanostjo, marksizem s politiko ipd.) – tj. z določenim režimom mišljenja, ki ga določena filozofija prepozna kot resničnega –, kar navsezadnje vodi v samoukinitve filozofije.

A hkrati s kritiko univerzalizma filozofija v 20. stoletju goji tudi kritiko partikularizma: pogosta je kritika »privatizacije« ali »parceliranja« vednosti (predvsem humanistične in družboslovne) na posamezne jasno razmejene discipline. Četudi je ta filozofija kritična do svoje systemske metafizične tradicije, ki teži k univerzalni vednosti, naj bi bilo prepoznanje resničnega mišljenja še zmerom stvar filozofije in ne posameznih strokovnih ved. Kot smo videli pri Heideggerju, je filozofija tista, ki zatrdi, da je poetično mišljenje tudi resnično mišljenje in da se v njegovi luči znanost izkaže za nemišljenje. Z gledišča posamezni strok pa filozofija ne glede na svoj deklarativni imanentizem objekte vednosti še vedno »reducira« na koncepte, ki jih vnaprej oblikuje sama, ali pa uporablja znanstvene koncepte za svoje namene na »zgolj metaforičen« način. Dobro znano je nelagodje umetnostnih zgodovinarjev ob filozofskih komentarjih umetnin ali posmeh znanstvenikov ob filozofskih (zlo)rabah znanstvenih konceptov. Kakšna pozicija tedaj preostane filozofiji, če nasprotuje tako univerzalni in neomejeni kakor partikularni in omejeni vednosti?

Ontološki obrat

Pri Heideggerju kot najostrejšemu kritiku filozofije kot metafizike nalogo mišljenja resnice v veliki meri prevzame umetnost. V uvodu k izboru svojih spisov o Hölderlinovi poeziji (*Razjasnjenja* 9) zapiše, da ti komentari niso »prispevek k literarnozgodovinskemu raziskovanju in estetiki«, ampak izvirajo »iz nujnosti mišljenja«. V kontekstu naše razprave se zastavlja vprašanje, zakaj literarna zgodovina in estetika ne moreta zajeti te nujnosti. Prva je ne more zajeti zato, ker poezijo proučuje zgolj kot objekt, ne doseže pa bistva poezije, v katerem lahko po Heideggerju najdemo drugačno vrsto mišljenja, ki presega (metafizično in s tem tudi znanstveno) epistemološko načelo aдекватnosti med spoznanjem in njegovim objektom. Literarna zgodovina morda lahko prinese resnično spoznanje o poeziji kot o partikularnem bivajočem objektu, vendar prezre, da pesništvo prinaša novo paradigmo mišljenja biti in s tem resnice. Na drugi strani estetika kot filozofska disciplina sicer lahko obravnava pesništvo glede na pojem resnice, a ta pojem je filozofski, metafizičen pojem in ne izhaja iz pesništva samega. Šele tista filozofska misel, ki presega metafiziko in s tem estetiko, se lahko povzpne na raven pesništva in pre-misli njegovo misel. Hölderlinova poezija ni izbrana kot poljuben zanimiv objekt, ampak kot model mišljenja: ob njej bomo šele zmožni dojeti, kaj pravzaprav pomeni misliti: »Da bi to izkušanje [Hölderlinove poezije] mislili zadevi primerno, da bi prevprašali področje, na katerem igra – temu dozodajšnje mišljenje še ni doraslo.« (182) Po Heideggerju moramo bit misliti izhajajoč iz govorice, »bistvo govorice [pa je] treba razumeti iz bistva pesništva« (41). Na tem mestu nastopi Hölderlin, saj v svojih pesmih »pesni bistvo pesništva« (34). Ob Hölderlinovi poeziji torej lahko zastavimo vprašanje pesništva, ki nas vodi do vprašanja govorice in s tem do vprašanja biti.

Prav zaradi ključne vloge pesništva se Heideggerju zastavi vprašanje odnosa med filozofijo in umetnostjo oziroma med mišljenjem (*Denken*) in pesništvom (*Dichten*). Mišljenje in pesništvo sta dva načina približevanja skupnemu in vzajemnemu izvoru govorice in biti: »Vsako bistveno upovedovanje sliši nazaj v to zastrto soslišje povedi in biti, besede in reči.« (Heidegger, *Na poti* 254) In vendar je njuno sorodstvo problematično. Ta načina »bistvenega upovedovanja« nista medsebojno prevedljiva brez ostanka. Ni naključje, da Heidegger ravno s tem vprašanjem sklene svoj spis »Kaj je filozofija?«: »Med obema pa je hkrati prepad, zakaj 'prebivata na najbolj razdvojenih vrhah'.« (*Izbrane* 407) Med filozofijo in poezijo torej obstaja moment nerazmerja in zato ju ne smemo združevati v »kalni mešanici«, temveč ju moramo misliti kot vzporednici, ki »se režeta v neskončnem« (Heidegger, *Na poti* 205). Obenem pa ju ne moremo misliti

ločeno, saj je njuna bližina »sama tisto dogodje, iz katerega sta pesnjenje in mišljenje šele napoteni v lastno svojega bistvovanja« (206).

Filozofija in umetnost sta torej povezani ob vprašanju biti, ki ima po Heideggerju nalogo, da dopolnjuje vednost s smislom in usmerja človekovo delovanje. Ne gre torej zgolj za podobnost po analogiji ali za naknadno »interdisciplinarno« povezavo. Če partikularnih ved in znanosti ne povezuje temeljno vprašanje, vednost ostaja zgolj »razkrojena mnogoterost disciplin« (Heidegger, *Izbrane* 116). Filozofija se mora zato postaviti po robu množstvu partikularnih disciplin, ki jih povezuje zgolj tehnični odnos subjektov volje do objektov sveta.

Pomena umetnosti za filozofijo potemtakem ne smemo obravnavati zgolj na podlagi domnevnega jezikovnega obrata filozofije, temveč vsaj v tolikšni meri iz njenega »ontološkega obrata«. Prav ta tudi po Badiouju (*Delenze* 27) zaznamuje filozofijo 20. stoletja in utrjuje Heideggerjev pomen v njej: »To stoletje bo zagotovo znano kot ontološko. Ta usmeritev je veliko bolj bistvena kakor 'jezikovni obrat', ki mu ga pripisujejo.« To ugotovitev potrjuje tudi drugi pomemben ontološko-estetski projekt v nemški filozofiji 20. stoletja. V mislih imamo Theodorja W. Adorna, po katerem filozofsko mišljenje umetnosti prav tako pogojuje nekakšno ontološko vprašanje: vprašanje o nekem realnem, ki se v konstituciji realnosti nujno izgubi: »Mišljenje se lahko v odnos do umetnosti postavi zgolj na podlagi tega, da nekaj v realnosti – nekaj za tančico, ki jo razobeša medsebojna igra institucij in lažnih potreb – objektivno zahteva umetnost, in sicer umetnost, ki govori v imenu tistega, kar tančica skriva.« (Adorno, *Aesthetic* 24) Naloga mišljenja se je prebiti do tistega, kar je na objektu več od njega samega: »Ta 'več' mu ni vsiljen, ampak ostaja imanenten kot tisto, kar je bilo iz njega izrinjeno.« (Adorno, *Negative* 161) To zahteva tudi prekoračitev delitve med partikularnimi disciplinami, ki objekt reducirajo na to, kar zgolj je.

A v nasprotju s Heideggerjem se umetnosti in filozofiji pri Adornu vsiljuje še tretji člen: politika. Tako umetnosti kakor filozofiji je namreč skupen njun ambivalentni družbeni položaj: njuna distanca do družbe, njuna avtonomija, je po eni strani sama družbeni proizvod, posledica zmago-slavlja buržoazije in kapitalizma, po drugi strani pa nosi obljubo možnosti drugačnega sveta, v katerem bo človeštvo emancipirano od »lažnih potreb«, torej od družbenih antagonizmov. Tisti »več«, do katerega se mora prebiti mišljenje in ki onemogoča delitev na discipline, je »več« obljube emancipacije, se pravi, nekaj, kar še ne obstaja. Ta »več« je tudi tista resnica, v kateri »konvergirata« filozofija in umetnost (Adorno, *Aesthetic* 172). Resnica, ki kroži po umetnosti, filozofiji in politiki, je postajajoča resnica, ki se lahko udejanji šele z emancipacijo: »Pojavitev neobstoječega, kot da

bi to obstajalo, motivira vprašanje po resnici umetnosti. Zgolj v tej obliki umetnost obljubi tisto, česar ni; objektivno, čeprav krhko, zabeleži zahtevano, da mora biti neobstoječe – če se pojavlja – tudi možno.« (109)

Da bi mišljenje ostalo zvesto tej obljubi, se mora odreči tako univerzalizmu kakor partikularizmu, saj oboje ostaja podrejeno načelu identitete, ki ga mora filozofija po Adornu nujno preseči. Partikularizem sicer premaga hegemonijo univerzalnosti, a zapade identitarnemu fetišizmu partikularnih entitet. Obe poziciji mora zato preseči »negativna dialektika«, ki lahko misli tisto, kar je na stvareh neidentično. Negativna dialektika odgovarja na »poziv k povezovanju izjav brez sistema, ki je poziv k mišljenjskim modelom«; »negativna dialektika je skupek analiz modelov« (Adorno, *Negative* 29). Takšno mišljenje misli reči v širšem kontekstu, a jih hkrati ne podreja »splošnemu super-konceptu« (prav tam). Kar smo pravkar ohlapno poimenovali širši kontekst, je po Adornu pravzaprav vpetost reči v družbene antagonizme in njihova utopična razsežnost.

Tudi pri Gillesu Deleuzu najdemo različico takšne ontološko-politične enotnosti mišljenja. Poglavitna karakteristika biti je namreč po Deleuzu njena »enoglasnost«: »Enoglasnost biti pomeni, da je bit Glas, ki se izreka, in se izreka v enem samem 'smislu' o vsem, o čemer se izreka.« (Deleuze, *Logika* 172) Filozofska misel se mora tako prebiti do te ontološke enotnosti, vzpostaviti ravnino mišljenja, ki bo omogočala prehajanje konceptov med različnimi problemskimi polji. V knjigi *Mille plateaux* tako na primer najdemo pojmovno dvojico molarno/molekularno, ki izvira iz kemije, a ji Deleuze in soavtor Félix Guattari namenita ključno vlogo pri razpravljanju o politiki, psihoanalizi, jezikoslovju itn. Prav tako se skozi celotno knjigo pojavlja geološki pojem plasti, razvit v poglavju o »geologiji morale«. Takšno povezovanje problemskih polj je mogoče v modernem tipu knjige, v »knjigi-miceliju«, ki jo Deleuze in Guattari ločita od klasične »knjige-korenine«. Knjiga-micelij ni osredinjena okoli subjekta ali objekta, ampak katerokoli svojo točko povezuje s katerokoli drugo. Zato se ne sprašujemo več, kaj knjiga pomeni, ampak kako funkcionira in s čim se povezuje: »Ko pišemo, je edino vprašanje, s katerim drugim strojem se lahko cepi literarni stroj in s katerim se mora cepiti, da bi deloval.« (Deleuze in Guattari, *Mille* 10)

Če želimo razumeti, kaj omogoča takšno prehajanje konceptov, se lahko obrnemo na *Logiko smisla*, v kateri Deleuze definira mišljenje tako, da podobe »idealne igre« brez pravih pravil iz Carrolllove *Alice v čudežni deželi* združi z Mallarméjevim verzom »Vsaka misel je met kock.«

Idealne igre, o kateri govorimo, ne more uresničiti kak človek ali kak bog. Samo misliti jo je možno, in še to le kot nesmisel. Pa vendar je prav to sama dejanskost mišljenja. To je nezavedno čistega mišljenja. [...] Misel, ki oddaja neko porazdelitev singularnosti. To so vse tiste misli, ki komunicirajo v eni sami Dolgi misli, ki

vse oblike oziroma figure nomadske porazdelitve priredi svojemu premeščanju, povsod vdihne naključje in vsako misel razveji. (Deleuze, *Logika* 66–67).

Koncepti lahko prečkajo meje disciplin, ker obstajajo na ravni, ki je prvotnejša od teh meja. Na ravni virtualnega obstaja ena sama misel, v kateri je mogoča komunikacija med problemi in koncepti. Strogo rečeno, mišljenje ni univerzalen skupni element, ki omogoča splošno enotnost smisla. Enotnost se vzpostavi šele na ravni »nesmisla« ali »nezavednega čistega mišljenja«, ki ga lahko dosežemo šele z njegovo virtualizacijo. To mišljenje pa je obenem že neposredno politično: »Zaradi te igre, ki je samo v mišljenju in ki nima drugega rezultata kot umetniško delo, sta lahko mišljenje in umetnost dejanska in zmoreta zmotiti dejanskost, moralnost in ekonomijo sveta.« (67)

Ne smemo prezreti, da Deleuze v nasprotju s Heideggerjem in Adornom znanosti podeli digniteto mišljenja: filozofija, umetnost in znanost so njegove tri discipline mišljenja (gl. Deleuze in Guattari, *Kaj je filozofija?*). Badiou (*Deleuze* 9) mu sicer očita, da gre pri njegovi rabi znanstvenih konceptov (Badiou ima v mislih predvsem matematiko) zgolj za metafore. Toda vnaprejšnji odgovor na ta očitek najdemo na tistih straneh *Razlike in ponavljanja*, kjer Deleuze prav na primeru matematike reflektira svojo metodo prehajanja konceptov med različnimi miselnimi polji:

Tu ni nobene metafore razen metafore, ki je kosubstancialna Ideji, in sicer metafora dialektičnega prenosa oziroma 'diafore'. V tem je pustolovščina Idej. Ni matematika tista, ki se aplicira na druga področja, dialektika je tista, ki za svoje probleme, zavoljo njihovega reda in pogojev, ustoliči neposredni diferencialni račun, ki ustreza obravnavanemu področju in ki je svojstven obravnavanemu področju. (Deleuze, *Razlika* 290)

Filozofija torej ne aplicira konceptov enega področja na druga področja, temveč oblikuje »ideje«, ki svoje ime in osnovno logično matrico sicer lahko najdejo na primer v nekem matematičnem konceptu, vendar se ta ideja na vsakem področju udejanja povsem neodvisno. Deleuze na tem mestu pravzaprav loči med dvema momentoma klasične definicije metafore: *prenos* pomena loči od *načela* tega prenosa, ki je načelo podobnosti oziroma analogije. Filozofsko mišljenje, ki mora doseči »eno samo Dolgo misel« onstran delitev na discipline, prenaša ideje, toda načelo tega prenosa ni podobnost, temveč samo postajanje ideje, ki je »neposredna na vsakem področju« (314).

Od ontološke do metaforične skladnosti

Zdi, se da ima filozofija pri Deleuzu dvojno vlogo: po eni strani je ena od disciplin mišljenja, po drugi pa sama vmesnost disciplin, kraj postajanja čiste misli, manifestacija njene enotnosti. Deleuze tako lahko piše o literaturi, filmu, matematiki, geologiji, biologiji, klasikih filozofije, kapitalizmu itn., a vendar piše vseskozi o isti stvari – skozi metonimično drsenje tem in problematik se konstituira konsistenca serije konceptov, ki tvorijo Deleuzovo filozofijo. Takole njegov postopek in lastno razmejitev od njega opiše Jacques Rancière:

Deleuze po mojem spada med tiste filozofe, ki so želeli razširiti filozofijo, ji dati konstitutivno vlogo pri tem, kar obravnavamo kot njene objekte, zato da bi vstopila v – oziroma da bi v svoje osrčje postavila – svojo lastno zunanost. Določa torej bistveno orientacijsko točko za mojo namero, ki pa je, nasprotno, v tem, da filozofija izstopi iz same sebe, da njene postopke, propozicije, argumente in opise vključimo v topografijo razširjenega teritorija miselnih izumov, kjer bo srečala stavke pisateljev, montaže režiserjev, a tudi jezikovne in miselne izume, s katerimi se v misli poskušajo tisti, ki ne štejejo za mislece. (Rancière, »Politique« 174)

Lahko bi rekli, da je Deleuzova metoda »centripetalna«: filozofija se lahko poljubno širi – govori lahko o vsem, toda le zato, da bi pridobila nove koncepte, s katerimi bi potrdila svojo ontologijo. Rancierova metoda pa bi bila, nasprotno, »centrifugalna«: filozofske teze izvzame iz okrilja filozofije, da bi jih soočila z nefilozofskimi tezami. Medtem ko je po Deleuzu vsako mišljenje mogoče vključiti v filozofsko mišljenje, je po Rancieru vsako mišljenje, tudi filozofsko, mogoče odvezati od »teles«, ki ga je proizvedlo, torej od njegove eksplicitne intence, prvotnega konteksta in zmožnosti, ki naj bi avtorizirale njegovega nosilca. Vsako misel je mogoče soočiti s katerokoli drugo – to po Rancieru zahteva epistemološka predpostavka enakosti, ki pomeni tudi že specifično politiko epistemologije:

Da bi razumeli zastavek emancipacije, moramo ukiniti delitev na discipline. Ta epistemološka zahteva je tudi politična zahteva. Če misel postavimo kot nekaj, kar zanika ločitve med filozofsko argumentacijo, zgodovinsko razlago in literarno izjavo, jo tudi definiramo kot zmožnost kogarkoli. V osnovi obstajata dve logiki: ta, ki deli misel na pridržane kompetence, domene specialistov, ki jo fragmentirajo po razlikah, ki služijo kot valuta načelne neenakosti, in tista, ki vidi v misli nedeljivo zmožnost, podobno v vseh svojih izvajanjih, misel, ki jo lahko kdorkoli deli s komerkoli. Sam v filozofiji vidim predvsem zmožnost deklasifikacije in redistribucije teritorijev, dodeljenih disciplinam in kompetencam. Filozofija pravi, da misel pripada vsem. (167–168)

Rancière svojo nalogo misleca vidi v izoblikovanju diskurza, ki omogoča ohranjanje – in prispeva k nadaljnjim verifikacijam – enakosti kot predpostavke. Zato se je posvetil, kot pravi, »konstituiranju sfere inteligibilnosti za to egalitarno moč« (Rancière, »La Méthode« 515), ki deluje ne le neposredno v politiki, temveč tvori tudi meta-politiko drugih praks. Rancière se v ta namen loti raziskav na zelo različnih področjih – v politiki emancipacije, pedagogiki, estetiki, zgodovinoписju, epistemologiji –, pri čemer na isto ravnino postavlja tekste klasikov filozofije in literature, tekste sodobnih sociologov in zgodovinarjev pa tudi tekste, ki so jih napisali proletarci 19. stoletja, ki so noči namesto za reprodukcijo svoje delovne sile porabili za »kulturno« dejavnost (gl. Rancière, *La nuit*).

Če razpravljamo o odnosu filozofije do njene zunanosti, naposled ne moremo niti mimo Badiouja in njegove teorije pogojev. Četudi je Badiou znan po svoji reafirmaciji možnosti filozofije v današnjem času, ne smemo prezreti, da hkrati nadaljuje delo njene dekonstrukcije. Badiou namreč filozofiji odreče tako zmožnost mišljenja biti kakor zmožnost izrekanja resnice. Bit lahko misli le matematika (torej znanost), natančnejše, teorija množic, resnice pa se lahko dogajajo znotraj omejenega števila praks: v praksi politike, umetnosti, znanosti in ljubezni. Kakšna naloga torej sploh še preostane filozofiji? Filozofija ustvarja »poenoten konceptualni prostor«, v katerem »ima mišljenje dostop [...] do *svojega* časa« (Badiou, *Manifest* 87–88). Misli svoj čas pomeni misliti prelomne dogodke, ki odpirajo postopke resnice, ki definirajo ta čas. Filozofija tako izumlja koncepte, s katerimi je mogoče misliti »*hkratno možnost*« (87) sodobnih resnic, tj. misliti resnice kot mogoče istočasno. Te resnice tvorijo »pogoje« filozofskega mišljenja. Toda ker dogodki obstajajo le kot izginuli, eksistenca resničnostnih postopkov pa je zaradi polemične in prelomne narave resnic obsojena na negotovost, jim filozofija, s tem ko potrjuje in razglša njihovo eksistenco, nudi »zavetje« (prav tam). Naloga filozofije je dvojna: po eni strani mora izdelati koncept resnice, ki bo na ravni resnic njenega časa, po drugi pa mora afirmirati eksistenco resnic kot takšnih in s tem negirati sofistično pozicijo, za katero obstaja zgolj množstvo mnenj.

Na prvi pogled morda ni povsem jasno, zakaj Badiou poudarja, da mora filozofija misliti resnice iz različnih domen hkrati in skupaj. Za to obstajata vsaj dva razloga. Prvi je v Badioujevem prepričanju, da se mora filozofija ogniti »prešitju« s katerim od njenih pogojev, saj to ustavi »svobodno igro«, potrebno za »intelektualno kroženje med resničnostnimi postopki« (Badiou, *Manifest* 101). Pri tem moramo paziti, da »svobodne igre« ne razumemo napačno, na primer kot zahtevo po avtonomiji *domen*, v katerih so možne resnice (v smislu Lyotardovih jezikovnih iger); razumeti jo kaže kot *možnost skladnosti* med resnicami v različnih domenah. Ne gre na

primer za to, da bi morala biti umetnost načelno neodvisna od politike – nasprotno, dopustiti moramo možnost, da lahko neka umetniška in neka politična resnica konvergirata. Nasprotovanje prešitju prav tako ne pomeni nasprotovanja vsakršni naddoločenosti filozofije s katerim od njenih pogojev. Že sam pojem »pogoja« pravzaprav pomeni naddoločenost, saj si filozofija prizadeva ravno za to, da ne bi nič omejevalo učinkov posamezne resnice na mišljenje.

S predpostavko o možni skladnosti resnic smo pravzaprav odkrili tudi že drugi pomen »hkratne možnosti«. A vendarle ostaja nejasno, kako to možnost misliti. Že v zgodnejšem delu *Théorie du sujet* najdemo širok »tematski repertoar«, ki ga tvorijo politična teorija, logika in matematika, zgodovinske okoliščine, psihoanaliza, literatura in teater, bog, klasična filozofija ... V knjigi se morajo pojaviti vse našteje teme, zato da bi se lahko prebili do prenovljenega pojmovanja dialektike, osredinjene okoli kategorije subjekta. V ta namen je treba soočiti tudi avtorje, ki so vsak po svoje prispevali k dosedanjemu razvoju dialektike. Badioujev seznam mislecev, ki jih bo upošteval, je prav tako širok in se ne omejuje na filozofe: med njimi so Hegel, Hölderlin, Mallarmé, Lacan, Pascal, Rousseau, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao ... (Badiou, *Théorie* 12) Oliver Feltham metodo te knjige označi kot »dialektično pletenje« (129). Metafora pletenja označuje Badioujevo metodo, ki je po Felthamu tudi sama metaforična, ko na primer »podaljšuje metaforične substitucije, ki so že pri delu v Mallarméjevi umetnini, z dodajanjem [Badioujevih] lastnih označevalcev kot nadaljnjih metafor« (130). Filozofski označevalci označujejo dialektično matrico, ki jo Mallarmé razvije v sonetu, da bi jo lahko soočili z dialektično matrico, ki jo razvije na primer neka politična organizacija. Filozofski koncepti so morda res produkti čistega mišljenja, toda njihova produkcija temelji na izpeljevanju implikacij miselnih izumov v različnih domenah (v politiki, matematiki, poeziji ipd.) – oblikujejo prizorišče, ki omogoča prevedljivost med miselnimi presežki.

Takšen postopek Badiou ohrani tudi v kasnejši teoriji pogojev. Filozofija resnic ne povezuje v sistem, tudi zgolj našteva jih ne – filozofskim konceptom prej »ustreza metafora prostega kroženja« (Badiou, *Manifest* 88). Zaradi tega kroženja lahko matematika nastopi kot ontologija – koncepti teorije množic postanejo ontološki koncepti, vendar le ob intervenciji filozofije, ki izjavi: »matematika je ontologija«. S tem pa se kroženje še ne ustavi. Spoznanja o biti lahko srečamo na primer tudi v Mallarméjevem sonetu (Badiou, *Pogoji* 108–129). Prav tako lahko filozofija »registrira politični pogoj v skladu s parametri ontologije« (Badiou, »Očrt« 250). To kroženje omogoča »metaforična skladnost« (Badiou, *Être* 111), ki jo filozofija vzpostavlja med svojimi pogoji. V sklepu moramo zato opo-

zoriti, da v nasprotju s Heideggerjem, Adornom in Deleuzom pri Rancièru in Badiouju filozofskega kroženja konceptov ne omogoča več »enoglasnost« biti, temveč je povezava med temi koncepti »zgolj metaforična«, vendar v prenovljenem, afirmativnem smislu.

K novi paradigmi sistematičnosti

V tem pregledu smo ugotovili, da se filozofija niti tedaj, ko se odreče svoji klasični sistematični podobi, ne more odreči določeni obliki univerzalnosti svojih konceptov oziroma njihovi veljavnosti v različnih vednostih oziroma praksah. Filozofski koncepti resda niso več mesto, v katerem bi mišljenje, ki se sicer lahko začena zunaj filozofije, prišlo do svoje dovršitve. Toda ko se filozofija umesti na obrobje neke vednosti ali prakse, preverja širše konsekvence neke vednosti oziroma nekega dejanja, ki je na tem mestu oziroma ki se je to izvršilo. Preverja torej, katera spoznanja niso omejena le na objekt posamezne vednosti, ampak jih je moč »podaljšati« tudi zunaj njenih meja. Področje delovanja filozofije je torej vmesni prostor prehajanja konceptov med različnimi diskurzi. Ko se filozofija odreče sistemu, svojih konceptov *ne aplicira* več na objekte neke partikularne vednosti ali prakse, temveč *povezuje implikacije* posameznih spoznanj in dejanj, ki jih privzema kot singularne miselne modele. Da pa bi filozofija lahko izpolnila to nalogo, mora zatrditi povezljivost in prevedljivost med miselnimi disciplinami, kar pomeni, da se mora prebiti do nove paradigme univerzalnega dometa svojih konceptov.

Ta paradigma vsebuje tri momente. *Prvi* je filozofsko prepoznanje neke resnice ali nekega izjemnega primera mišljenja znotraj nekega področja, mišljenja, ki naj bi imelo širše konsekvence. Na podlagi njegovih implikacij filozofija izumlja filozofske koncepte, kar je *drugi* moment, moment »čiste« misli. Sledi *tretji* moment, eksplikacija: filozofija poskuša s svojimi koncepti pojasniti stanje na nekem drugem področju in na njem poiskati primere mišljenja oziroma resnice, ki bi bili ekvivalentni primerom z izhodiščnega področja. Tri momente prikazuje spodnja preprosta shema:

$$\text{misel}_x \rightarrow (\text{implikacija}) \rightarrow \text{filozofski koncept} \rightarrow (\text{eksplikacija}) \rightarrow \text{misel}_y$$

Pri tem pa je pomembno, da se področje, s katerega prihaja posamezna resnica, izmenično znajde tako na mestu x kakor na mestu y , tako da filozofija v nekem trenutku preverja njegove implikacije, v drugem pa mu eksplicira svoje koncepte. Brez te vzajemnosti pride do prešitja in s tem blokade filozofskega kroženja.

Opozoriti moramo, da se proces prenosa konsekvenc konceptov na druga področja razlikuje od priljubljenega pojma interdisciplinarnosti. Pri tem pojmu gre za dopolnjevanje spoznanj več strok, pri čemer vsaka pri pridobivanju svojih spoznanj ostaja v lastnih metodoloških mejah in pri lastni definiciji svojega objekta. Rezultati se zato združeni naknadno in nimajo notranje medsebojne povezave. Proces, ki smo ga skušali opisati, pa, nasprotno, prinaša intervencijo, ki lahko spremeni metodološko paradigmo neke vede in način, na katerega ta definira svoj objekt. Filozofija je po svojem bistvu »interdisciplinarna« na prav ta, radikalnejši način: na podlagi določenega miselnega modela se lahko spremenijo same koordinate njenega mišljenja.

OPOMBE

¹ Pojem »ideal znanosti« si izposojamo pri Jeanu-Claudu Milnerju, ki komentira Freudov scientizem. (Milner 39–40)

² V zvezi z lacanovsko psihoanalizo lahko navedemo Milnerjev komentar: »Kar zadeva analitično operacijo, znanost nima vloge idealne točke – ki bi bila morebiti oddaljena v neskončnost. Strogo povedano, znanost ni zunanja, nasprotno, inherentno strukturira samo materijo njenega [psihoanalitičnega] objekta.« (41)

³ »Znanost torej ne misli; s svojimi metodami v tem smislu sploh ne more misliti. S pomočjo fizikalnih metod na primer ne moremo reči, kaj je fizika. O tem, kaj je fizika, lahko mislimo le na način filozofskega vprašanja.« (Heidegger, *Konec* 139)

⁴ Mnogi avtorji so smisel filozofije videli ravno v refleksiji njenih omejitev in s tem omejitev moči mišljenja nasploh. Ugotovitev o mejah pa se lahko hitro sprevrne v zapoved: mišljenje ne le je omejeno, temveč *mora* biti omejeno. S tem filozofija najde še eno možnost svojega obstoja: postane etični diskurz kot diskurz imperativa omejitve. Etika – predvsem kolikor je poudarjen njen negativni moment preprečevanja zla – funkcionira kot niz pravil, katerega naloga je, da omejuje moč radikalnega mišljenja: filozofijo kritizira v njeni zahtevi po univerzalnosti, znanost kritizira v njenem učinkovanju na biološko realno, opozarja na zločine »totalitarnih« režimov, v katere se izteče radikalna politika, ipd. Etični diskurz je simptomatičen, ker izhaja iz kritike zunanje pozicije sistematičnega mišljenja, hkrati pa obnavlja to zunanost, ko se določenim praksam vsiljuje kot niz normativnih omejitev, ki ne izhajajo iz njih samih

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Philosophy and 'Interdisciplinarity'

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The paper analyses the problematic relation of the humanities to scientific thought in the light of the absence of a philosophical system of knowledge that could serve as a shared framework of different regimes of thought. When philosophy agrees to the consensus that it is no longer possible as a system, it invents various forms of 'interdisciplinarity' in order to surpass the particularity of individual disciplines of thought.

Keywords: humanities / philosophy / ontology / aesthetics / science / interdisciplinarity

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Introduction

To the humanities, science appears as a problem, since it brings about a persistent uncertainty regarding the answer to the question that could – after Heidegger – be posed in the following manner: 'What is called thinking?' Usually, the humanities deal with this problem according to one of the two basic strategies: they either adopt a certain ideal of science that they should follow in order to become sciences themselves,¹ or define an irreducible specificity of their own manner and object of thinking, a specificity that sciences supposedly cannot replace or treat adequately. This alternative between 'vulgar' positivism and 'naïve' humanism is supplemented with various attempts to surpass it: we could list a number of demands for forming a scientificity proper to the humanities that would no longer be a mere attempt to pursue an external ideal and thus to 'imitate' scientific methodology, but rather a manner of thinking that would 'structurally' correspond to modern science. A demand of this kind was especially noticeable in Althusserian Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis.² Then there is the frequent opinion that contemporary humanities and science may diverge in their methods, while converging in their findings: the discoveries of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are supposed to correspond to the new ontological image of 'openness' or 'non-wholeness' of the world, suggested by the humanities. And the other type of surpassing the classical alternative is summarised by the principle of

‘interdisciplinarity’: diverse scientific disciplines and the humanities can collaborate in researching a specific object, which makes the gap between different manners of thinking welcome because it contributes to an expansion and deepening of knowledge.

While reflecting on bridging the gap between different regimes of thought one can raise the question whether thinking is also a problem for science itself. If this is indeed the case, if science too has to make clear to itself that it thinks (see Riha 97), the question of thinking becomes a question shared by science and the humanities. Both can either follow their desire to think or give it up and yield to other principles: the former to the imperative of profitability, and the latter to the imperative of ideological applicability of cultural production (see Riha 106). To post such a common question means to step outside the Heideggerian framework, since it is clear to Heidegger that science does not and cannot think.³ But why does the capacity of science to think have to be denied by the philosopher? The scandal that science stirs in the field of humanities is that it shows that *‘thought does not equal sense’* (Riha 106). Nevertheless, the humanities insist that sense is the product that makes their social existence justified. This can be illustrated, say, by an advertising slogan used by the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana: ‘Humanities make sense.’

The philosophical depreciation of science has its intra-philosophical precondition, which is tightly connected to the difficulties of bridging the gap between irreconcilable regimes of thought. Strictly speaking, Heidegger’s philosophy does not speak about the truth of science from the meta-position of a philosophical system or in line with the philosophical claim to universal knowledge, but because it thinks truth in accordance with another ‘particular’ field of thinking, or – if we adopt Alain Badiou’s terminology – ‘under the condition’ of another exteriority of philosophy, namely art. Heidegger’s philosophy verifies the consequences that the thought of art and especially of poetry has for thought in general. The ideal of thinking is thus an ideal of art, which is identified as the strict opposite of the ideal of science. But the non-relation between both regimes of thought, the impossibility of any complementarity, is in fact a consequence of the impossibility of metaphysical philosophy, its incapability to supply the meta-knowledge that would ensure the unity of thinking. Simply put, philosophy is no longer possible as a system that could serve as a common framework for different disciplines of thought.

My purpose is not to reignite the worn out theme of ‘the end of grand narratives’ – since, as I will show, the philosophical (self-)critique of universalism is supplemented by an equally important critique of particularism of separated disciplines of thought – but rather to make the question

of the problematic position of post-systemic philosophy an opportunity to present models for thinking the connections between different regimes of thought. The question of 'interdisciplinarity' (in a broader meaning of the word) is secondary for science and the humanities because they have their own respective objects and specific methods of approaching them, which means that they can exist independently. Yet for philosophy, this question is crucial because philosophy does not have an object of its own and is no longer possible as a system, which means that what is at stake is the very possibility of its practice. In what follows, I will address the various manners in which different philosophies conceive of the passages and circulations of concepts between disciplines of thought.

The end of systems?

After Hegel, philosophy has for the most part accepted the consensus that it is no longer possible in the form of a speculative system.⁴ Therefore, it had to redefine its relation to its exteriority, that is, to thought that it does not possess and that does not come to completion in it. Philosophy found a new possibility of its existence in positioning itself on the margins of a particular knowledge/practice in order to support it with the reflection on its methodological foundations and to universalise its effects on thought in general. However, this can lead to what Alain Badiou (*Manifesto* 61–68) calls the 'suture' of philosophy with one of its conditions (positivism sutures it with science, Marxism with politics, etc.) – that is, with a certain regime of thought that a particular philosophy identifies as being true – which eventually results in the self-abolishing of philosophy.

However, in twentieth-century philosophy, a critique of universalism is combined with a critique of particularism: it is common to encounter a critique of 'privatisation' or 'parcelling' of knowledge into distinct disciplines, especially within the humanities and social sciences. Even though philosophy is critical towards its systemic metaphysical tradition, which claimed to possess the universal knowledge, identification of true thought is nevertheless still supposed to be a matter of philosophy and not of the particular sciences. As we have seen, Heidegger's philosophy affirms poetical thinking as true thinking in the light of which science does not think. On the other hand, from the point of view of particular disciplines, philosophy – even though it declares to be proceeding immanently – still 'reduces' the objects of knowledge to its own concepts, which it defines in advance, or uses scientific concepts for its own purposes in a 'metaphorical' way. This can be illustrated, say, by the well known discomfort of art

historians with philosophical commentaries of artworks, or by the scientists' mockery of philosophical (mis)uses of scientific concepts. What kind of a position is philosophy then left with if it resists both, the universal/unlimited and the particular/limited knowledge?

The ontological turn

In Heidegger – the most determined critic of philosophy as metaphysics – the task of thinking truth is to a large extent assigned to art. In the introduction to his collected writings on Hölderlin's poetry (*Elucidations* 21), he writes that his commentaries 'do not claim to be contributions to research in the history of literature or to aesthetics' as they 'spring from a necessity of thought'. In the context of the present discussion, the question is why are literary history and aesthetics unable to capture this necessity? To start with the former, it can only study poetry as an object, but cannot reach the essence of poetry, which according to Heidegger brings about a different kind of thought, the kind that surpasses the epistemological principle prevailing in metaphysics and hence in science, that of adequacy between knowledge and its object. Literary history can offer correct knowledge on poetry as a particular object, but it overlooks the fact that poetry introduces a new paradigm in thinking being and therefore in thinking truth. On the other hand, aesthetics as a philosophical discipline can think of poetry with regard to truth, but its notion of truth is philosophical and thus metaphysical, and is not derived from poetry itself. Only philosophical thought that overcomes metaphysics and hence aesthetics can rise to the level of poetry and re-think its thought. Moreover, Hölderlin's poetry is chosen not as a random interesting object, but rather as a model for thought – it is through this poetry that we will finally be able to grasp what thinking actually means: 'Until now, thinking has not yet been able to think this experience [of Hölderlin's poetry] properly, or to ask about the realm in which this experience is at play.' (217) For Heidegger, being has to be thought according to language, while 'the essence of language must be understood out of the essence of poetry' (58). It is at this moment that Hölderlin enters the scene, since he wrote 'poems solely about the essence of poetry' (50). Hölderlin allows us to pose the question of the essence of poetry, which leads us to the question of language and therefore to the question of being.

It is because of the key role of poetry that Heidegger poses the problem of the relation between philosophy (*Denken*) and poetry (*Dichten*) as two manners of approaching the common and mutual origin of language and being: 'All essential Saying hearkens back to this veiled mutual belong-

ing of Saying and Being, word and thing.' (Heidegger, *On the Way* 155) Yet their proximity is of a problematic character: these two manners of 'essential Saying' cannot be translated into one another without something getting lost in the process. It is no coincidence that Heidegger (*What is* 98) concludes his text 'What is philosophy?' with a statement on this very problem: 'Between both there is, however, at the same time an abyss for they "dwell on the most widely separated mountains".' There is thus a non-relation between philosophy and poetry – and that is why they should not be combined as in a 'cloudy mixture', but imagined as parallel lines that 'intersect in the infinite' (Heidegger, *On the Way* 90). At the same time, they must not be thought as separated because the 'nearness that draws them near is itself the occurrence of appropriation by which poetry and thinking are directed into their proper nature' (ibid.).

Philosophy and art are thus linked by the question of being, which according to Heidegger supplements knowledge with sense and orientates the workings of man. This link is then not a resemblance by analogy or a subsequent 'interdisciplinary' linkage; if particular sciences are not linked by this fundamental question, knowledge remains merely the 'multiplicity of dispersed disciplines', whose 'rootedness [...] in their essential ground has atrophied' (Heidegger, *Pathmarks* 81–82). Philosophy thus has to stand firm against the multitude of particular disciplines, which are linked merely by the technical relation of subjects of will to the objects of the world.

The importance of art for philosophy should therefore not be understood only on the grounds of the so-called language turn, but also on the grounds of 'the ontological turn', which according to Badiou (*Deleuze* 19) decisively marks the philosophy of the last century and confirms the significance of Heidegger: 'When all is said and done, there is little doubt that the century has been ontological, and that this destiny is far more essential than the "linguistic turn" with which it has been credited.' This statement can also be confirmed by the other major ontological-aesthetical project in German philosophy of the twentieth century, namely that of Theodor W. Adorno. In Adorno's view, too, the philosophical thought on art is determined by a kind of ontological question, a question of a certain real that is necessarily lost in the constitution of reality: 'If thought is in any way to gain a relation to art it must be on the basis that something in reality, something back of the veil spun by the interplay of institutions and false needs, objectively demands art, and that it demands an art that speaks for what the veil hides.' (Adorno, *Aesthetic* 24) The task of thought is to grasp what in an object is more than the object: 'This "more" is not imposed upon it but remains immanent to it, as that which has been pushed out of it.' (Adorno, *Negative* 161) This task is also the task to overcome the

division between disciplines which reduce the object to what it merely is.

In contrast to Heidegger, however, a third wheel is added to the company of art and philosophy, namely politics. Art and philosophy share a common ambivalence regarding their position in society: on the one hand, their distance from the society, their autonomy, is itself a product of society, a result of the triumph of bourgeoisie and capitalism, while on the other hand it is a carrier of the promise of a different world, a world of humanity emancipated from social antagonisms and the 'false needs' they create. The 'more' that thought strives for and that undermines the division of the disciplines is the 'more' of emancipation – something that does not yet exist. The 'more' is also the truth in which art and philosophy 'converge' (Adorno, *Aesthetic* 172). The truth that circulates in art, philosophy and politics is a becoming truth that can only be achieved through emancipation: 'The appearance of the nonexistent as if it existed motivates the question as to the truth of art. By its form alone art promises what is not; it registers objectively, however refractedly, the claim that because the nonexistent appears it must indeed be possible.' (109)

In order to remain faithful to this promise, thinking has to give up universalism as well as particularism, as both are subjected to the principle of identity, which necessarily has to be abolished according to Adorno. It is true that particularism can overcome the hegemony of universality, but it ends up in the identitarian fetishism of particular entities. Both positions thus have to be surpassed by 'negative dialectics', which can think what is un-identical about objects, and answer the 'call for binding statements without a system', a 'call for thought models', which makes negative dialectics 'an ensemble of analyses of models' (Adorno, *Negative* 29). Negative dialectics thinks objects in a broader context without subjecting them to a 'more general super-concept' (ibid.) What we have just inaccurately called 'broader context' is actually the object's participation in social antagonisms and at the same time its utopian dimension.

This kind of ontological-political unity of thought can also be found in Gilles Deleuze, for whom the main characteristic of being is its 'univocity': 'The univocity of Being signifies that being is Voice that it is said, and that it is said in one and the same "sense" of everything about which it is said.' (Deleuze, *The Logic* 179) Philosophy has to attain this ontological unity and establish a plane of thought that will enable the passing of concepts over different problem fields. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, for instance, we can find the conceptual double of molar and molecular, which originates in chemistry but is assigned a key role in thinking politics, psychoanalysis, linguistics, etc. Throughout the book, we can also find the geological notion of 'stratum', developed in the chapter on the 'geology of morals'. This

kind of linkage of different problem fields is made possible by the modern type of book, the 'rhizome-book', as opposed to the classical 'root-book'. The 'rhizome-book' is not centred around a subject or an object, but unobstructedly connects its various points. Hence, the question is no longer what the book is about or what does it mean, but how it functions and what it connects with: 'when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work' (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand* 5).

To understand how this passing over of concepts is possible, we must turn to *The Logic of Sense*, in which Deleuze defines thinking by combining the figure of 'the ideal game' without proper rules as introduced in Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* with Mallarmé's line 'All Thought emits a Throw of Dice':

The ideal game of which we speak cannot be played by either man or God. It can only be thought as nonsense. But precisely for this reason, it is the reality of thought itself and the unconscious of pure thought. [...] Each thought emits a distribution of singularities. All of these thoughts communicate in one long thought, causing all the forms or figures of the nomadic distribution to correspond to its own displacement, everywhere insinuating chance and ramifying thought (Deleuze, *The Logic* 60).

The concepts can pass over discipline borders because they exist on a level that precedes these borders. On the virtual plane there is only one thought that enables problems and concepts to be communicated. Strictly speaking, thought is not the universal common element that establishes the general unity of sense. The connecting element is rather the moment of 'nonsense' or of the 'unconscious of pure thought'. This kind of thinking is at the same time immediately political: 'This game, which can only exist in thought and which has no other result than the work of art, is also that by which thought and art are real and disturbing reality, morality and the economy of the world.' (Ibid.)

We should not overlook the fact that Deleuze – in contrast to Heidegger or Adorno – grants science the dignity of thought: in *What is Philosophy?* he and Guattari regard philosophy, art and science as the three disciplines of thought. Badiou (*Deleuze* 1) claims that Deleuze's use of scientific concepts (Badiou is speaking primarily of mathematics) is merely metaphorical. However, a kind of preemptive reply to this reproach can be found on those pages of *Difference and Repetition* that examine mathematics as an example of Deleuze's method of transporting concepts between different domains:

There is no metaphor here, except the metaphor consubstantial with the notion of Ideas, that of the dialectical transport or 'diaphora'. Herein lies the adventure

of Ideas. It is not mathematics which is applied to other domains but the dialectic which establishes for its problems, by virtue of their order and their conditions, the direct differential calculus corresponding or appropriate to the domain under consideration. (Deleuze, *Difference* 229)

Philosophy does not apply concepts of one domain to other domains, but rather establishes 'ideas' that can get their name and basic logical scheme from, say, a mathematical concept, yet actualise themselves independently inside a specific domain. Here, Deleuze distinguishes between two moments of the classical definition of metaphor: the *transfer* of meaning is distinguished from the *principle* of this transfer, namely the principle of resemblance or of analogy. Philosophical thinking, which strives to achieve the 'one long thought' beyond the division of the disciplines, is based on the transfer of ideas, but this transfer relies not on resemblance, but on the becoming of the idea that establishes itself 'immediately in each domain' (Deleuze, *Difference* 249).

From Ontological to Metaphorical Affinity

It seems that according to Deleuze, philosophy has a double role: on the one hand, it is one of the disciplines of thought, and on the other, it is the very 'in-between' of disciplines, the place of the becoming of pure thought, the manifestation of thought's unity. Thus, Deleuze can write about literature, film, mathematics, geology, biology, the classics of philosophy, capitalism, etc., and at the same time always about one and the same thing: through a metonymical slide of themes and problems he constitutes the consistency of a series of concepts that form his philosophy. Let us take a look at how Deleuze's procedure is described by Jacques Rancière and how the latter uses this description to delimit his own method:

In my opinion, Deleuze is one of those philosophers who tried to expand philosophy, to give it a constitutive role in what we consider its objects, so that it could enter into its own exteriority, or put it in its centre. He therefore provides an essential demarcation for my own intention, which is to make philosophy, on the contrary, exit from itself so that its procedures, propositions, arguments and descriptions can be included in the topography of a wider territory of inventions of thought, where philosophy can meet the sentences of writers, the montages of directors, but also linguistic and mental inventions introduced by those who do not count as thinkers. (Rancière, 'Politique' 174)

One could say that Deleuze's method is 'centripetal': philosophy can expand freely, it can talk about anything, but only in order to acquire new

concepts with which it could reaffirm its ontology. On the other hand, Rancière's method could be described as 'centrifugal': as taking philosophical theses away from philosophy in order to confront them with non-philosophical theses. According to Deleuze, all thought can be incorporated into philosophical thought, while according to Rancière, all thought, including philosophical thought, can be untied from the 'body' that produced it, that is, from the explicit intention, original context and capabilities that were supposed to authorise its carrier. Any thought can be confronted with any other thought – for Rancière, no less than this is demanded by the epistemological supposition of equality, which is already a form of epistemology's politics:

To be able to understand what is at stake in emancipation, the division of disciplines should be abolished. This epistemological demand is also a political one. To posit thought as something that denies the divisions between philosophical argumentation, historical explication and literary statements is also to define it as anyone's capability. Basically, there are two logics: the one that divides thought into reserved competences, into domains of specialists who fragment it with regard to differences that serve as a currency of a principle inequality, and the one that treats thought as an undividable capability, similar in all of its executions, that can be shared between anyone. I see philosophy first and foremost as the capability to declassify and redistribute the territories assigned to disciplines and competences. Philosophy claims that thought belongs to everyone. (167–168)

Rancière sees his task as a thinker in forming a discourse that would enable the preservation, and contribute to further verifications, of equality as a supposition. That is why he devoted himself to, in his own words, 'constituting a sphere of intelligibility for this egalitarian power' (Rancière, 'La Méthode' 515). This sphere not only functions in the field of politics, but also forms the meta-politics of other practices. For this purpose, Rancière undertakes research in various domains – politics of emancipation, pedagogy, aesthetics, historiography, and epistemology –, while putting on the same plane the texts of the classics of philosophy and literature, texts of contemporary sociologists and historians and also texts written by the proletarians of the nineteenth century who spent their nights engaging in 'cultural' activity rather than merely reproducing their labour power (see Rancière, *La nuit*).

Any discussion of philosophy's relation to its exteriority should also take into consideration Badiou's theory of conditions. Even though Badiou is famous for his reaffirmation of the further possibility of philosophy, we should note that at the same time he continues the work on the deconstruction of philosophy. In this manner, Badiou denies philosophy both the capability to think being and the capability to say the truth. For

him, being can only be thought by mathematics (that is, science), namely set theory, and the truths can only happen inside a limited number of practices: the practices of politics, art, science and love. What kind of task is then left to philosophy? Philosophy creates 'a general space' in which 'thought accedes [...] to *its* time' (Badiou, *Manifesto* 38). To think its own time is to think crucial events that set off procedures of truth that defined this time. Philosophy thus invents concepts with which it is possible to think the 'compossibility' (37) of contemporary truths, that is, to think truths as all being possible simultaneously. These truths are the 'conditions' of philosophical thinking. But since events only exist as something that has already disappeared, and since the existence of truth procedures is destined to uncertainty because of their polemic and interruptive character, philosophy gives them 'shelter' (ibid.) by affirming and announcing them. The task of philosophy is double: it has to produce a concept of truth that will be on the level of the truths of its time, and at once to affirm the existence of truths as such and therefore to negate the sophistic position according to which there is only the multitude of opinions.

At first sight it is not clear why Badiou places so much emphasis on thinking truths from different domains together and simultaneously. Yet there are at least two reasons for that. The first is Badiou's conviction that philosophy has to evade the 'suturing' with any of its conditions, for this would put to a stop 'the free play' necessary for 'intellectual circulation between the truth procedures' (Badiou, *Manifesto* 61). However, we should not confuse this 'free play' with the demand for the autonomy of *domains* in which truths are possible (in terms of Lyotard's language games), but see it rather as a *possibility of affinity* between truths in different domains. For example, it is not so much that art should be independent from politics, but rather that there is a possibility that an artistic truth and a political truth can 'converge'. Moreover, resistance to 'suturing' does not mean resistance to any kind of overdetermination by one of its conditions. The notion of condition itself implies overdetermination, since the aim of philosophy is to prevent any limitation of the effects of a particular truth on thinking.

With the presupposition of the possible affinity of truths, we have already discovered the second meaning of 'compossibility'. Still, it is unclear how it should be understood. In Badiou's earlier work, *Theory of the Subject*, we can find a broad 'thematic repertoire' consisting of political theory, logics and mathematics, historical circumstances, psychoanalysis, literature and theatre, god, classical philosophy ... All of these themes have to appear in the book so that it can achieve its goal of a renewed notion of dialectics centred around the category of the subject. For this purpose, it has to confront with one another various authors that have in

their own way contributed to the development of dialectics. Badiou's list of thinkers he takes into account is also very extensive and not limited to philosophers: Hegel, Hölderlin, Mallarmé, Lacan, Pascal, Rousseau, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao ... (Badiou, *Theory* xxxix–xl) Oliver Feltham designates the method of this book as 'dialectical braiding'. This metaphor does well to describe Badiou's method, which according to Feltham (130) is itself metaphorical as it attempts 'to prolong and extend the metaphorical substitutions already at work in Mallarmé's oeuvre by adding [Badiou's] own signifiers as further metaphors'. Philosophical signifiers signify the dialectical matrix developed by Mallarmé in a sonnet in order to confront this matrix with the dialectics developed, say, by a political organisation. Philosophical concepts may be products of pure thought, but their production is based on deriving implications of thought inventions in various domains such as politics, mathematics or poetry – they form a place where translatability between surpluses of thought is made possible.

This is the procedure Badiou maintains also in his later theory of conditions. Philosophy does not bind the truths together in a system, or simply list them – what it does can be better described with 'the metaphor [...] of the liberty of movement' (Badiou, *Manifesto* 38). It is because of this movement that mathematics can occur as ontology – the concepts of set theory only become ontological concepts after philosophy intervenes by stating: 'mathematics is ontology'. However, the circulation does not stop here. Thoughts on being can also be found, say, in a Mallarmé sonnet (Badiou, *Conditions* 49–67). Moreover, philosophy also record 'the political condition in conformity with the parameters of ontology' (Badiou, *Metapolitics* 72). This circulation is made possible by the 'metaphorical affinity' (Badiou, *Being* 95) that philosophy establishes between its own conditions. Finally, unlike Heidegger, Adorno or Deleuze, the philosophical circulation of concepts in Rancière and Badiou is no longer made possible by the 'univocity' of being – which is why the interconnection of these concepts is 'merely metaphorical', but in a new, affirmative sense.

Towards a new paradigm of systematicity

This overview established that even as philosophy parts from its traditional systematic image, it cannot completely make do without a certain form of universality of its concepts or of their validity throughout different fields of knowledge or practices. It is true that philosophical concepts can no longer be the place where thinking, initially rising from somewhere outside philosophy, achieves its completion. But when philosophy posi-

tions itself on the margins of a knowledge or a practice, it examines the wider consequences of a discovery or of an event that took place there. It examines the discoveries that are not only valid for the object of a certain knowledge, but that can also be 'extended' beyond the frontiers of that knowledge. The working space of philosophy is thus the middle ground of the passing over of concepts between different discourses. When philosophy refuses to form a system, it *no longer applies* its concepts to objects of a certain knowledge or practice, but *connects the implications* of particular discoveries and actions that it adopts as singular thought models. Yet to fulfil this task, philosophy has to affirm the connectivity and translatability between disciplines of thought, and therefore to forge a new paradigm of the universal reach of its own concepts.

This paradigm consists of three moments. The *first* would be the philosophical identification of a certain truth or an exceptional instance of thinking, within a particular domain, that could have wider consequences. On the basis of the implications of this thinking, philosophy invents concepts, which is the *second* moment, the moment of 'pure' thought. What follows is the *third* moment, namely the moment of explication: philosophy tries to use its concepts to explain a situation in another domain and find in it examples of thought, or of truth, that would be equivalent to those in the original domain. The three moments can be exemplified by the following scheme:

$$\text{thought}_x \rightarrow (\text{implication}) \rightarrow \text{philosophical concept} \rightarrow (\text{explication}) \rightarrow \text{thought}_y$$

However, it is important that a particular domain alternates between positions x and y , so that philosophy can both examine its implications and explicate philosophical concepts within it. Without this reciprocity a suturing, and hence a blockage, of philosophical circulation takes place.

It has to be noted, though, that the transfer of consequences of concepts onto other domains has to be distinguished from the popular notion of interdisciplinarity. The latter aims to supplement the discoveries from different disciplines with each discipline remaining within its own methodological boundaries and its own definition of its object. The results are therefore combined subsequently and do not have an interior relation to each other. And the process we have described can better be described as an intervention that can change the methodological paradigm of a discipline and the way it defines its object. Philosophy is essentially 'interdisciplinary' in a more radical sense: on the basis of a thought model the very coordinates of its thinking can change.

NOTES

¹ The notion of 'the ideal of science' is borrowed from Jean-Claude Milner and his commentary on Freud's scientism (35).

² As regards Lacanian psychoanalysis we can quote Milner: 'As far as the analytical operation is concerned, science does not play the role of an ideal point which could as well be infinitely remote. Strictly speaking, science is not exterior; on the contrary, it structures the very matter of [psychoanalysis'] object.' (36)

³ 'Science, therefore, does not *think*, in *this* sense it cannot think with its methods. For example, I cannot say what physics is with the methods of physics. I can only think what physics is in the mode of philosophical questioning.' (Heidegger, *Martin* 42)

⁴ Several authors see the sense of philosophy precisely in a reflection on its own limits and hence on the limits of thinking in general. However, acknowledgment of a limit can easily turn into injunction: thinking is not merely limited, it *has* to be limited. In this manner, philosophy finds another possibility of its further existence – it becomes an ethical discourse, the discourse of the imperative of limitation. Ethics – especially in the negative form of preventing evil – functions as a set of rules aimed at reducing the power of radical thought: it criticises philosophy in its claim to universality, and science in its effects on the biological real; it warns against the crimes of 'totalitarian' regimes as the destiny of any radical politics; etc. The ethical discourse is symptomatic: it originates in a critique of the exterior position of systemic thinking while simultaneously renewing this exteriority by forcing itself upon certain practices as a set of normative limitations not grounded in these practices

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