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Editorial introduction

What was the motivation to publish a specific volume on political crime? The reasons are both particular and general. The general reason is that political crime has been a constant and universal element of human society since the very beginning of its political organisation. A more particular reason is that we are living in quite turbulent times, and historically such a context is decidedly favourable for the flourishing of political crime. Indeed, we are witnessing its proliferation throughout the world and in various forms.

The third reason is the history of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe: these societies are still deeply marked by their totalitarian past. Any understanding of the present situation in these countries that does not include a perspective on political crime is seriously incomplete and insufficient. Many of countries in the region are currently undergoing exceedingly troubled times caused, to a great extent, by events and processes belonging to the category of political crimes. Such a situation also brings an increased possibility of different forms of political crime and violence. One of the ambitions of this volume is, therefore, to help us to better understand and reflect on what is happening today, and to develop and support prudent decisions for avoiding violence and crime.

Let us firstly briefly represent the content of the four papers of this volume, all of which deal with political crime. The first paper (Janez Juhant) situates the notion of political crime within an anthropological reflection of the main posits of modernity (e.g. technology, social isolation, economic forces). It is divided into two parts, of which the first deals with general issues regarding political crime, and the second presents the characteristics of political crime in Slovenia at the time of and after the WWII. The author argues that political crime occurs when the conditions in the society are "suitable", especially in the sense of disorder; the main characteristics of political crime are exclusion, domination and violence. His further theses are that political crime can be seen as the consequence of the rivalry nature of man (Girard), that the Slovene case of the communist revolution fits into totalitarian models of political crime, and that the fight against political crime and injustices continues to be an open challenge for the future of humanity.

The second paper (Rafal Smoczynski) considers the differences between two similar phenomena: the witch hunts which took place in Europe in early modernity, and the quite recent campaign against satanic ritual abuse in the USA. The author uses post-Gramscian theory of hegemony and the conceptual apparatus of the Essex social theory (Laclau and others) to explain and understand the differences between the two phenomena. He argues that the differences originate in the decidedly different societal backgrounds of the two phenomena.

The third paper (Bjørn Thomassen) contributes in an interesting way to the understanding of political crime. The author offers an analysis of the concepts of political

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and crime and, secondly, argues for the thesis that the occurrence of the most important European revolutions is connected with new forms of political crime that have their origin in the new forms of crowd behaviour. The author grounds his explanation on the work of classic social and anthropological science.

The third paper, which was written by me, deals with the concept of genocide. It provides a comparative analysis of genocide in relation to some other similar phenomena, such as mass killings, war crimes, totalitarianism, etc. My main thesis is that genocide is best understood as defined via the concept of social death (Claudia Card), which means that the genocidal phenomena are at their core in need of anthropological research in order to truly understand them.

The four papers of this volume take a variety of approaches, but there are common similarities. Thus, despite the difference between Thomassen's and Juhant's papers, they both deal in some way with the topic of revolution; in Thomassen's case, this is obviously true, and the same holds (in a more indirect way) for Juhant, because he deals significantly with the analysis of the communist revolution in Slovenia. Another similarity can be noted between Juhant's and Žalec's paper; both are closely relevant for the understanding of totalitarian regimes. The common characteristic of Žalec's and Thomassen's papers is that they seriously engage with conceptual analysis: Žalec mostly with the concept of genocide, Thomassen with the concepts of crime and of politics. The final similarity that I want draw attention to is between Smoczynski's and Thomasen's paper: they both emphasise the sociological dimension of the phenomena they consider.

At the end, I want to say some words about the "genesis" of this volume. My colleague and friend Janez Kolenc Gregorčič and I were preparing it. Alas, Janez unexpectedly died in May of last year. This was a truly great loss for Slovenian anthropology and sociology. I have finished the remaining editing work of this volume alone and I am sure that Janez would enjoy the volume. He was also preparing his own article for the volume; unfortunately, he was not able to finish it. However, the volume is here and at least in this part our intention has been fulfilled, and this volume will remain as one piece of Janez's valuable contribution to anthropology and the social sciences and humanities in general.

BOJAN ŽALEC

Political crime and the truth of man: The Slovene case

Janez Juhant
University of Ljubljana, janez.juhant@teof.uni-lj.si

Abstract
Political crime is the problem of the socio-political implementation of non-democratic and inhuman violent means to obtain political power over the society. Revolutions and several kinds of terror have utilised such political crime to change the political order and have created numerous victims and societal disorder. Man is an inherently competitive being and prone to rivalry, and it is extremely difficult to convert him to one that cooperates with others. Modern science, technology and the consequently increasingly competitive way of life have led to the increasing exclusion and omission of many people from societal processes. For humanity, today there remains the difficult task of overcoming totalitarian racist, communist and other, for instance, terroristic and exclusivist residues, which are mere means of obtaining political power, and to instead endorse and encourage dialogical, inclusive, and humane thinking. Without deeper spiritual insights and readiness for cooperation, the number of victims of political crime will increase, even today when the world is more sensitive towards victims.

KEYWORDS: political crime, revolution, terror, genocide, victims, dialogue, reconciliation

Introduction
The aim of this article is to illustrate the broadening of political crime in the society of modernity. Usually the problem of the abnormal functioning of a society was the cause of the amplification of political crime in all facets of the life of a society. The customary standards of the societal and political life were suspended according to Machiavellian standards, as a modern modus of political activity, within which the means could be made sacred by the political aims (and gains). The development of the modern society after Machiavelli, whose work The Prince (2003) witnessed a new political course, resulted in modernity with its use of evermore violent means in politics. This development reached its peak in the totalitarian systems of the 20th century, but remains a salient problem of the current society, now in the grip of global economic and financial crisis, which is in reality a moral one. We can say that the totalitarianisms incorporated the instrumentalist view of humanity and embraced political crimes in the highest possible measure. The article deals with these processes of modernity, with specific attention given to the analysis of the

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implementations of totalitarian methods by communists in Slovenia. Part I analyses these contents, grounds, and influences of political crime and shows it as a natural consequence of emphasising the modern scientific and competitive picture of man. The perfect, "clean", functionalistic, or untainted picture of humanity – man as a machine (Holbach 2004) – in modern ideological systems is a perfection of this scientific ideology, exploited by politicians for the broadening of political crime.

Man is a dialogical being, but the functionalist picture of man suspends this dialogical essence of man and makes him an easy object for manipulation by ideological systems. Such a process culminated in the totalitarian systems of the 20th century and persists in the technological and economically conditioned way of life of modern society. The (wo)men are involved in processes that dehumanise and humiliate them, because they are perceived merely as means of a system. They remain victims of the mechanisms behind these processes. This is a central claim made and original theoretical contribution of the article.

Part II is a case study of the political crimes performed by the communist regime in Slovenia and a comparison of it with other totalitarianisms, including the modern economic way of life, which excludes increasing numbers of people from societal processes and makes them merely a function of the economic and political processes of global society. This is the main and a highly complex source of present global crisis. A non-dialogical picture of humanity does not allow us to acknowledge that man needs the other, and it needs to take in account that inclusion, and not exclusion, is the proper path towards a complete human being and welfare of the (global) society. The contribution of this investigation is to show the fatal negative consequences of the violations of human rights, caused by the described systems of modernity, and indicate the necessity of dialogical society. This is contrasted with the case of totalitarians and an increasing problem of modern quasi-scientific technological society, which uses humanity as a mere means for the functioning of the system and degrades people to that function. This was always an excuse to commit crimes over individuals and groups, who were not in conformity with these systems. All totalitarian systems, including the communist regime in Slovenia, took power by political crime, and this inherently meant the exclusion of the so-called other from society. Unfortunately, the same is also the case – but in more sophisticated ways – in the modern global processes. Finally, we point to the necessity of reconciliation as a way toward a mutual and inclusive society.

Political crime

Ross claims that

> political crime is an important subject deserving investigation and explanation, and that a complete understanding can be achieved only when one appreciates the definitional issues, history, causes, and effects, is current, integrates cases, understands theory, and presents and evaluates relevant policy and practices (2003: 157).

Political crime[1] in a very broad sense includes the exploitation of powerless people in unordered societal conditions by diverse actions, such oppression, torture, and murder performed by official or self-proclaimed groups executing governing policies (governments) or by terror groups that strive to gain power by means of subordinating all citizens. The violation of human rights itself is usually not be the primary goal of political crime, but its main aim or aspiration is always to maintain existing political power and to exclude potential rivals from access to political power. Thus, the purpose of such actions in the eyes of those political actors are "to protect" or "to preserve" the societal order, but in many cases this actually means the total protection of the actual ruling class (nomenclature) and establishment of total political dominance. A recent case demonstrating this is the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, claiming to protect Syria. Within this perspective, the totalitarianisms of 20th century were thus in part consequences of 'the dictated rather than discussed post-war [First World War] settlements' (Snyder 2012: 7).

How political crime can be performed depends upon the constitutional order of the state. Democratic states usually preserve the political order against attempts to bring disorder (e.g. by acts of terrorism) into normal functioning of such states. However, there are several other political crimes 'committed for the ideological purposes' (Hagan 1997: 3) and these crimes are 'inspired by both ideology and the desire for personal benefit' (ibid.: 26). As a result, political crime is a tremendously complex phenomenon. In a democratic structure, such crimes can be committed with the aim to destabilise political order and make possible that a group or an individual comes to power. For these purposes, totalitarian systems use special corps or secret police, established predominantly by authoritarian regimes to protect the leading political elites. The more a given regime is authoritarian, the stronger the role and the powers of secret police within the regime are: 'In authoritarian regimes the effectiveness of secret police in deterring illegitimate violence (crime in the streets) occurs through legitimate secret police such as Hitler's Gestapo, Stalin's OGPU (later KGB), and Haiti's Tonton Macoutes…' (Hagan 1997: 26). Hagan also points out that the most dramatic examples of crimes by government is the pervasive international violation of human rights: 'Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of the Left and Right are the least tolerant to political dissent and are thus the biggest violators' (ibid.: 28). There are different kinds of these oppressions, like those performed by "death squads" (South America), "murder units" (South Africa), or massacres (China, 1990). Mass murders or genocides performed by Turks against Armenians (1915–1916), the genocides of the Soviets, Nazis, Pol Pot's Khmers, Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srebrenica 1995), and Hutu in Rwanda (1994) were unimaginably inhuman and cruel.

[1]Wikipedia defines the political crime in the following way 'In criminology, a political crime or political offence is an offence involving overt acts or omissions (where there is a duty to act), which prejudice the interests of the state, its government or the political system. It is to be distinguished from state crime when it is the states that break both their own criminal laws and public international law' (Wikipedia, s.v. Political crime). According to our understanding the problem involves both: the threat to state sovereignty (by revolutionary acts) and the breaking of the laws and human rights violations by totalitarian regimes.

All these are tragic parts of the history of 20th century. The killings were performed with highly sophisticated methods, the use of propaganda, and the equipment of modern technology. The common goal of political crime is to exclude the others who are an obstacle to the full political power of one political group. This was the case not only in totalitarian regimes but also with other groups attempting to come to political power using all methods of political crime: terror, killing, and lying to undermine democratic order in societies. The revolutions were the cruellest examples of modern political crimes because they attempted to achieve the anthropological conversion of humans.

Political crimes have been performed throughout history; they increased to mass dimensions within the competitive societies of modern times, which suspended the dialogical dimension of man and systematically caused exclusion of groups or certain individuals. In this sense, there are significant differences between democracy and dictatorship. Democracy and dictatorship are both systems to regulate the individual and societal life of humanity. Each developed techniques to control and to administer people:

> In the parliamentary democracy the rational attitude expresses itself through both discussion and vote on questions of legislation. What is good for the public weal is found by debate through a process of critical discussion that aims at casting light on the various aspects of a debated matter or measure. Parliament is supposed to present the substance of political reason… (Bramstedt 1945: 2).

> There is a general will and general reason, 'the essence of national reason' (ibid.).

> In dictatorship on the other hand, the executive is no longer subject to control by the legislature, nor is the judiciary independent. Legislature and executive are totally in the hands of a dictator and of the bodies appointed by him (ibid.).

There is no general consensus but the will of one or of a few preserving and implementing the general reason – the will of the dictator(s): 'The individual can only act as a tool of a privileged body, such as the Party or the Army, but seldom according to his own lights' (ibid.: 3).

After an introduction of the main posits of the modern competitive society, we will demonstrate how these processes of political crimes were implemented in totalitarian societies of 20th century and, in particular, in the case of Slovenia.

Societal exclusion as a sideway

According to predominating anthropological and sociological theories, man is a complex being; therefore, he cannot be fully analysed, i.e. the whole identity of his inner and outer life remains open yet can never be exhausted. Consequently, humanity should be understood as being mysterious. This represents a problem, for man as a being of reason, because he cannot accept himself as being inherently unknowable:

> Very important is our attitude towards the question: Is human being transcendent? … The awareness of transcendence questions is especially important in our age of outstanding, decided and [the] conspicuous dominance of the scientific form of consciousness (Žalec 2002: 118).

Without investigating the complex problems of transcendence in greater detail, we can say that the transcendence of man could be sustained by dialogical conditions. The complexity of man can be expressed only by way of symbols; the preeminent symbol is human language. In an open dialogue, partners in this dialogue are indispensable in implementing it and in reaching this symbolic stage, which preserves the openness of man, partnership and the inclusion of all. Such a partnership is a necessary condition to address the problem of the mystery of man and to move towards the mystery of a human person. However, man as a free being can also refuse to enter into dialogue and can suspend others, despite the fact that such rejection has negative consequences for him. A man can exclude or subordinate others by not hearing them and by not being sensitive to their needs. This is the case at the level of interpersonal relationships; on the level of society, such exclusion of one group by the other causes societal disorder and conflicts. If dialogical consensus among groups cannot be reached, preconditions for a revolution and consequently for political crime emerge, as the history of all revolutions and totalitarian regimes testifies (Hobsbawm 1996; Pipes 1995).

The total oppressions in the past were consequences of the exclusions of others who were victims of the usurpation of political power. In opposite to this, the right to express one's own opinion[2] is a ground for mutual societal exchange. In totalitarian societies, this right was reduced and limited only to selected parts or groups of the society, who did not allow others to express their feelings and needs. Given such societal exclusion, some groups or individuals are not allowed to participate in societal life. In such conditions, it is urgent to implement the ethical 'model of pluralistic universalism' (Strahovnik 2009: 214), which respects a person as a condition and a subsidiary part of the whole.

Consequently, the struggle for the truth (of humanity) is a very wearisome path towards a

> universal ethic based on sense of the commonness of human experience. That misunderstanding of man [man considered just from a partial, e.g. scientific point of view, which excludes other aspects] has generated the wrong kinds of tensions between the full acknowledgement of the plurality of peoples and their cultures and the legitimate hopes for universal ethics, and, connected with that, between ethical truth and cultural determination of ethical value (Gaita 2006: 284).

According to Gaita, it is therefore immensely important to realise that man is an imperfect being, a being that needs others and is ready to acknowledge that he has been completed by them. Gaita stresses that we have to deal with 'preciousness of each

[2]'Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression…' Art. 19 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

individual human being' (2006: 5), but adds to this the thoughts of Peter Winch remarking that 'treating a person justly involves treating with seriousness his own conception of himself, his own commitments and cares, his own understanding of his situation and of what the situation demands of him' (Gaita 2006: 59). The consistent dialogical praxis in society, which includes the mutual respect of other, is the best way to preserve the democratic order and protect people from violations and possible crimes. The question arises of how to best obtain and preserve the true picture of humanity.

The "ideal man" and rivalry

Man is a being of reason, as the Greeks said, but his knowledge is limited, and this is the core problem. According to the Old Testament, a man's cognitive ambition is to 'be like God' (Gen 3:5). Because man is not the all-knowing God and his knowledge remains limited, the acknowledgment of this limitedness is a supposition for the truth of man. This is not primarily a logical question, but a moral one, i.e. the question of acknowledging his moral responsibility to others, which includes the will to share life with the other. The unwillingness to acknowledge this fundamental openness for the truth of human reality is the cause and an impediment to the knowledge of the authenticity of human beings and thus the real humanity (Sloterdijk 2010: 135 ff.). According to Sloterdijk, Greek term epistéme epitomises this openness of man for truths and confirms man's dialogical openness to the other and to the highest Good and to God. However, modern economic and technological processes put forward an impoverished picture of the "ideal man", a man of technical perfection, which diminishes his ability to be open for the other.

The man of modern times is understood as a settled and scientific man, stimulating, guiding and governing the world and himself by means of science. He perceives himself to be great and strong, empowered by science and technique, which are perceived as his "extended organs". Given the influences of scientific innovation, man understands himself as immensely powerful, and this self-perception motivates his faith that he would master and rule the whole world. However, historical and societal limitations did not allow the modern man to fulfil this ideal picture of himself. In her work The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Hannah Arendt analysed the history of the totalitarianisms of the 20th century as an usurpation of human rights because of the implementation of this (reduced) picture of scientific-technical man. All societal life in totalitarian states is organised in such a way that it serves only the leading nomenclature, i.e. only the chosen (specific) elite citizens. They usurp to themselves all political power, and in this sense there were no differences between Nazis, Fascists or Communists of the 20th century. All others are excluded and subverted, and are only means for the first and are handed over to their mercy or judgment. As Snyder noted:

> Arendt provided enduring portrait of the modern 'superfluous man', made to feel so by the crush of mass society, and then made so by totalitarian regimes capable to placing death within a story of progress and joy. It is Arendt's portrayal of the killing epoch that has endured: of people (victims and perpetrators alike) slowly losing their humanity, first in the anonymity of mass society, the in a concentration camp (2012: 380).

Snyder asserts that this deprivation of human status was an inhumane way to deal with victims: 'As one of Grossman's (1995: 204-6) characters exclaims, the key to both National Socialism and Stalinism was their ability to deprive groups of human beings or of their right to be regarded as human' (Snyder 2012: 386). According to Arendt and to Zygmunt Bauman (1989), the holocaust would not have been possible without all acquisitions of modernity. In totalitarian societies, only those with official political authentication and confirmation (i.e. those in line with the system itself) were granted the full status and accepted as true and real humans. All others, who differed in any respect, were excluded, demonised, and considered bad. The ideas of racism, nationalism, chosen classes and races, and of "better people" prevailed. Nietzsche was also challenged by these modern tendencies and saw the solution in a strong, powerful man who could strive in the modern, strong systems, overruling them as a so-called super-man. Whereas Nietzsche's point was about an individual, moral man, i.e. the liberated and autonomous man, the revolutions and totalitarian systems implemented this idea of an ideal man, removing "all irregularities" to obtain "clean" territories (as it was the case with Turks in relation to Armenians or Serbs and Croats in relation to each other and to Bosnians). In all these cases, the picture of ideal, clean (racial or class) man was cultivated. Others were not considered to be humans in the full sense of the word. These facts are quite well known but not sufficiently clarified; in many cases, the victims would find their satisfaction in those societies remains distant. A presupposition that only this "ideal and clean" man is the right one was taken as a reason in justifying political crimes over other people who were not in this group. To understand the complexness and robustness of processes of rivalry until modern times, let us examine Girard's contribution to this question.

Mimetic theory

One of the main contributions of Girard's mimetic theory consists in pointing out the "anthropological constancy" of rivalry and the "necessity" of the victims for the preservation of societies. According to it, the other and the weak were chosen to be victimised and declared as guilty for unfortunate conditions of society. Because of innocence, harmlessness or not being a danger for society, they were chosen as victims and thus functioned as peacemakers; as bearers of new relations within a society so that the society itself did not need to change, since its 'sins' were transferred on these innocent scapegoats. In contrast with the abovementioned scientific picture of modern man, René Girard (1989) resumed the basic Judaeo-Christian picture of man: every man is a limited being, there is an "original sin", due to which there are no purely good or purely bad individuals; all are involved in victimisation and thus guilty. There are no identifiable class enemies. It is not possible to exclude and not to see the breaches of human existence. Man is a dividuum, a divided being and thus an imperfect being. To obtain this consciousness means to convert (metanoia) and be related to the other as a completeness of oneself; one must be open for real relations to the other. Without this fundamental change of mind, which means to work on oneself, individual and societal reconciliation is not possible. Anybody can change his relations to others, but nobody can do it without acceptance of

the other. This change begins in the mind. If a man is not ready to change his mind, he will persist in the (faulty) habits and customs he already has.

As already mentioned, the Greek term epistéme testifies to a dialogical openness for truths and for the higher Good and/or God. However, modern processes brought to life an economically and technologically "ideal man", who could function perfectly, without any deficits. Yet imperfection and confusion are an unavoidable part of a man's life on Earth. This increases anger, dissatisfaction and unsolved tensions in individuals and in society, and brings about a search for scapegoats, for the weak, who should help to resolve "the mimetic crisis". The modern systems attempted to achieve the perfect status of man through political "standardisations" and the oppressions of individuals and groups. On one side, there are the "proper people", those that are "ours", on the other side the "improper" and "bad", who should be or are excluded. This caused several political crimes. The history of 20th century is full of such sad examples, beginning with Armenians, Jews, Gypsies, communists, anti-communists and others victims of such crimes from Nigeria to former Yugoslavia. The exclusion of many and the preference for the few led to escalation of societal tensions of unimagined dimension we witnessed in the history of 20th century, but those are still the (growing) problems of today's global society. The victims were (and still are) millions of poor people, starving and dying because of numerous diseases. The reason for this is changes in the global society that have caused the downfall of the traditional societal order yet provided no new rules or frameworks for the protection of individuals. This process began with the establishing of a new social class of workers, who were put on the edge of the society and whom the old classes would never truly accept as a part of society. This has caused social disturbances and revolutions. Such a state of affairs has continued in different forms to today. The number of victims of these processes is increasing all over the world, including after the fall of communist systems. The Girardian theory gives an answer to the tendencies to solve the societal rivalries on account of the increasing number of innocent victims in modern society.

Truth of man and victimisation

According to René Girard's later work, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (2001), people presume that victims are necessary and because of this they systematically design frameworks to justify them. Despite this, we today express extensive (though many times merely rhetorical) care for victims, yet we cannot be proud of such expressions of care. The criminal history of the 20th century testifies that the readiness for cooperation and for reconciliation is far too minimal to resolve these complex problems of humankind. There exist new and remarkably subtle methods of victimising the innocent. We need only point to the billions of poor people condemned to starvation. After the fall and end of totalitarian regimes, new methods have appeared to victimise numerous groups and nations. We are witnessing masses of victims, and there are many political and media mechanisms to conceal these crimes. We can paraphrase Girard (2001) by saying that the old myths have been replaced by new (modern) ones – as is testified by the history of modern totalitarianisms – which are cultivated by global media decision-makers and

totalitarian tendencies in the economic world, supported by politicians (Kurz 2003). Numerous rivalries are taking place in this time of economic crisis, and the number of victims of this crisis of humanity is increasing, as Immel and Tränkel (2011) indicate. The consequence of this development is the exclusion of most people from the goods of this earth, who are these modern victims. Let us look at it from the economic point of view, in pure numbers: there are 10 million millionaires, who possess over 39 billion dollars. In contrast with this, 2.6 billion people are left with and have to share only 1.4 billion dollars (ibid.: 56).

One crucial point of Girard's theory is that we (humans) are not ready to acknowledge the whole truth of man. Instead of acknowledging the limitedness of ourselves, we are accusing others, usually those who are in no position to take revenge on us. The way to cover the truth is a myth, a violation of innocent as the way to solve the societal (mimetic) crisis. Despite the fact that today we are more open for the truth, the search for the truth presupposes a readiness for dialogue and an acknowledgement of limitedness of oneself and openness for other. As Girard (2001) sees it, prohibitions and religions are made to protect society from new outbursts of violence. Christianity, with its personal and dialogical origins, is a model for cooperation and for suspending rivalry and turning it into mutual understanding. This contrasts with the consumer society of modernity, in which enjoyment plays a crucial role. Girard especially points out the violent danger of sexuality, which has a decisive role in these processes: 'All this regulations serve to endow both sexuality and violence with the same centrifugal force. In many instances, the sacrificial deviations of sexuality and violence are virtually indistinguishable' (1979: 220).

The mimetic crisis of the society is a point of rivalry in which victims were offered. In the case of modernity, the crisis tends to be solved by total and long-term control over rivals. Political crime is obtaining new images and developing new, more fine-grained and subtle methods of control over society. The rapes of rivals' women are not only violence against them but at the same time a treading down of their dignity. They lose their own homes and property; perhaps they become pregnant and then expelled from their relatives' homes and out of their communities.

First, wartime gives men an opportunity to show their power over women, although otherwise men are dependent on women, who are actually more powerful (Creveld 2003). Second, warriors could perpetuate the dominance over the rivals through the raped women and conceived children, probably future slaves. Within such perspectives, these activities should take place collectively and ritually, so that they become a sacred value, i.e. in this sense, this is a key strategy of so-called sacred wares. It must happen in a sacred rite and as a public ceremony. A performance is perfect if a tormenter succeeds to persuade his victims to collaborate and to confess their guilt: 'The mimetic collaboration of victims with their executioners continues in Middle Ages and even into our time.… In our own times all forms of Stalinism find viperous victims who will confess far more than is asked of them' (Girard 1989: 64). Political crimes of modern totalitarianisms were apt to humiliate the people to suitable poses of obedience and to involve them to cooperate

and, to create such preconditions for political mass crimes, in which the "other" was removed. All these violent processes and rival activities of man need regulations and have ritual and sacred dimensions; through them, the old religious dimensions were replaced by ideological ones of the totalitarian systems of modernity or consumer society, which present themselves an aureole of sanctity and unavoidability; a destiny, which came upon the whole. The mythical form does not allow a rational (critical) discussion and thus shuts the door to the truth. All have to submit themselves the logic of this sacrosanct order, regardless of victims.

The Slovene case – an abnormal status

Ordinary people and experts equally agree that the communist societal status was an abnormal one. This is the case of all mimetic processes. The perpetrators of revolutionary methods can better carry out their crimes on innocent victims in such abnormal societal circumstances. The consequences of criminal methods and other negative sediments of totalitarian communist regimes are so deeply rooted in the souls of the people that they still preserve some such patterns of thinking and acting – even long after the formal downfall of the system. The change of minds is extremely difficult, because the mentioned anthropological turn was carried out; people cannot realise (or even imagine) in what kind of world they have lived: the normal traditional virtues and values were replaced by anti-virtues and values, such as killing, lying, or stealing. The Soviet revolutionary methods of totalitarian oppression and subordination were replicated in Slovenia and in other communist revolutionary regimes. The communist oppression overflowed all aspects of the life of society. The leading ideologist of Slovene revolution, Edvard Kardelj, wrote the following to the head of Yugoslav communists Tito about the methods of the so called Security-intelligence-service (Varnostno-obveščevalna služba; VOS) during World War II:

> almost every day denunciators and loyal slaves of occupiers, etc. are going down.… No police protection can save those, who are targeted by VOS. They fear VOS like the devil, in it is exactly this – besides National Safeguard (Narodna zaščita) and partisans – that establishes Liberation Front (OF) as genuine authority (Ferenc 1962: 325–6).

After World War I, Slovenes were a part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Communists increased their societal actions in the multinational Yugoslav society, burdened by unsolved inter-national and social problems. The Soviet Union presented to them a model of communist methods for taking over power in an uncertain social environment. In Moscow, they were trained to spread terror and to implement those methods at home. Circumstances like those in Russia during and after World War I appeared in Slovenia during World War II. Historians (Pipes 1995; Hobsbawm 1996) agree that the revolution in Russia could not have occurred without World War I. The same applies in the case of occupied Slovenia after 1941.

Slovenia was occupied by three totalitarian regimes. After World War I, Fascist Italians took one third of the territory the Slovenes lived on, and Fascism's crimes began in the early 1930s. In 1941, the Italians, Germans and Hungarians occupied Yugoslavia

and thus all Slovene regions. The Fascist and Nazi terror began immediately. The Nazis removed and deported many intellectuals: teachers, priests, mayors, etc. Moreover, the Fascists began to imprison Slovene activists who were resisting Italianisation.

At first, immediately after the Nazis' occupation, Slovene communists cooperated with their occupiers (because of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1940), but after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union they started a revolution. Afterwards, they – together with "left" Christian and liberal groups – slowly began to establish The Slovene Liberation Front (Osvobodilna fronta), which was a Trojan horse to carry out the revolution in Slovenia. In the part of Slovenia under the Italian Fascist authority, the communists began with revolutionary oppression over Slovenes. Several democrats, especially Christians were executed. As a reprisal for such Communist attacks, the Italian Fascist occupiers killed several Slovene activists as hostages. Some of them were denounced by the Communists. In a similar way, Christians and democratic members of the Liberation Front faced the threat of execution if they did not submit themselves to the Communist power. Priest Jože Oražem stated on the conference of priests in Novo Mesto that:

> the members of the Liberation Front were propagating mistaken principles and pursuing godless ideas.… If these usurpers endanger people's freedoms, limit their movement … then a physical self-defence against them [the communists] is permitted … as well as to organised defence of the villages and neighbourhoods from unjust tyrants (Archdiocese archives 1942: F 37).

At the deanery conferences of Ljubljana and Trebnje, priests reported numerous killings of priests and religious people and stated:

> Every shepherd of souls is doing his best, mostly by himself or in within a decidedly limited circle. There is no community any more. Even both sadly assassinated priests[3] couldn't be buried properly; they still lie in the forest in a grave dug out by themselves (Archdiocese archives 1943: F 37).

Victims of terror in Slovenia

The Slovene communists imported the revolutionary methods and implemented them in the wartime period of 1941–1945 and afterwards. The propaganda machinery worked according to Lenin's directive: 'In my opinion it is necessary to use the capital punishment for all phases of plotting' (Löw 1999: 241). Industrial development introduced substantial disproportions in the society, divided it and prepared grounds for revolutions. Workers were the bearers of the "modern development", but they received the least of its benefits while peasants lost their basis for survival.

After the war, the "real power" of a state of terror was established throughout societal life. This was a stage for political crime. Nobody was safe or free. All people were to come under the control of the Communist Party and its secret police. The Yugoslav, so-

[3] Parish priest Franc Nahtigal in chaplain Franc Cvar from Šentrupert na Dolenjskem have been forcefully taken away and murdered on June 18th 1942.

called social self-government socialism was actually a deception, because the decisions in the society were controlled and the details planned by the leading communist class. Consequently, the system needed a vast number of co-operators of secret police to control all relevant participants of the social processes. About a half of the total population was involved in this total control system (the full data is difficult to obtain, because some archives were destroyed or are inaccessible; Wikipedia, s.v. Udba.net).

Special attention was given to the Roman Catholic Church as a prime societal enemy.[4] Among Christians, the Christian socialists were also specially persecuted, since they were initially the co-organisers of the Liberation Front together with Communists. Because obedience among Slovenes was at the outset trained into them by the Catholic Church and Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Communists had a much easier task in subordinating Slovenes in these unnatural circumstances. It was possible to impose and sustain totalitarian order in Slovenia and in other similar countries because of obedient people, as Hannah Arendt (1951) and Zygmunt Bauman (1989) have emphasised.

The communists continued to terrorise people. The final number of victims of political crime in the occupied Slovenia during the World War II when revolution was carried out is not yet established. During the war, there were several thousand civilians killed or executed, some of whom were killed with the cooperation of all three totalitarian powers:

> In all this time, Nazi repressive authorities shot about 3,500 hostages, approximately 7,500 people were killed by military and police units during the cleansing and reprisals, about 2,000 died in exile, and more than 8,000 in concentration camps. The Nazis were directly responsible for the deaths of at least 32,000 people on present Slovene territory (Mlakar 2010: 124).

In addition to these Nazi victims, there were mobilised Slovene soldiers of the Wehrmacht, out of which about 10,000 died on Germans fronts across Europe and in North Africa' (ibid.).

Moreover, there were several victims of other nationalities (Jews, etc.) Many of the victims of Nazi and fascist terror were denounced by the Communists. The latter killed many Slovenes during the war as well; most of their Slovene victims were killed after the war and are listed below. These victims were Slovenes who opposed communism. After the war, members of the German-collaborating Home Guard units (Domobranci) – some of them together with their families – and other civilians were handed over by British army forces in Austria to Yugoslav communists. About 15,000 of these soldiers were killed in 1945 and buried in mass graves around Maribor, Celje, Kočevje, and Škofja Loka. In the following years, several thousand civilians were also killed in these and other places. More than 7,000 Germans living in Slovenia from before the war were expelled to Austria; their property was nationalised. More than 20,000 Slovenes went in exile: to

[4] Many priests were killed after the war as a result of show trial processes. Bishop Anton Vovk was attacked on a train on a journey to Novo Mesto in January 20th 1952; gasoline was poured over him, and he was set alight. He survived, but the attack left serious consequences for his health.

Austria, Argentina, Canada, the USA and other countries. The peasants and other land owners were expropriated, many of them imprisoned, some killed. In the territory of Slovenia, members of other national groups, German-collaborating soldiers and civilians – Croats, Serbs, Albanians, Russians, Germans, Hungarians etc. – were killed and thrown in mass graves. In Slovenia, there are nearly 1,000 mass graves left from that period, and many of them have still not been investigated. Over 100,000 people are buried in them (cf. Hančič & Podbersič 2010: 48–62). In addition, the usual terror scenes were promulgated: the people lived in constant fear for their lives; the future under communism was uncertain (Snyder 2012: 10 ff.). All people had to submit themselves under the political terror and pressure of the totalitarian dictatorship.

These perturbations of modernity, generating so many victims in Slovenia and in other places of the world could not have happened without the modern capitalistic way of life and general development of modern science and technology. They stimulated the modern system's thinking and tendencies to subordinate people to perform the societal changes on account of the most poor, who were the victims and have to bear the heaviest part of these changes. To do this, the revolutionary circumstances had to be established, and the revolutionists were well trained to do just that; therefore, modern times are the times of revolutions (Hobsbawm 1996). Most of the revolutionary states were facing societal disorder and the revolutionary terrorist's attacks established a culture of fear and pushed society into lawless state and anarchy. In all revolutionary societies the established values were replaced by violent mechanisms, so that the revolutionary government was unable to bring peaceful solutions, as in Russia after 1900 and then 1917. Pipes (1995) analyses this and shows such tensions in the Tsarist Russia, characterised by a general hostility or even hate and the lack of readiness of different societal groups to cooperate. The first revolutionary acts were in this way a logical consequence of this disorder and then provided nourishment for de facto never-ending revolution. Snyder (2012) shows the parallels between Nazi and Soviet terror against national and class enemies and subjugated peoples. Grossmann (1995) states that this period of modern revolutions, perturbations in a moment caused the destruction of all that humanity had cultivated, caressed and carefully constructed over countless millennia.

Victims of modern terror

This period of crisis and social revolutions of modernity still persists. There are modern slaves in new "democratic concentrations camps", not only in Guantanamo but in several other places in the world. The people imprisoned there do not have the freedom of movement. There are those who are sexually abused and subjected to other kinds of slavery (Kurz 2003: 180 ff.; Cacho 2011). The victim has become a phenomenon of global dimensions: from modern slaves at the beginning of the modern times, to workers, women and children as excluded classes of society. Today, these processes culminate in the status of global workers. The new political crimes are much more sophisticated. Many people are victims of the luxuries of the modern consumer society: organised trade of modern slaves (for instance women and children for prostitution), wars and drugs (Cacho 2011).

The modern victim is entangled in the wealth of modern production system, which also produces masses of them. Political terror is still implemented over Palestinians, Tibetans or people inhabiting the Nuba Mountains in Sudan, and other peoples in different parts of Africa etc.; all these today remain open problems. There are many signs that Christians in several Islamic countries are targets of attacks because unsolved socio-political problems, mostly originating from clashes of the societies with (so-called) modernity.

The problem has global dimensions. The (sometimes conscious) indolence of leaders and institutions of society (governments, aristocracy, the new class of capitalists, churches) causes revolts of poorer classes, peasants and workers, whose position is becoming increasingly unbearable. Today, these processes culminate in the status of global workers (or better people around the globe without any means for survival) and other parts of society and are among causes for the problem of terrorism. Increasing numbers of people are victims of these processes; such conditions are inhumane because they cause an increasing number of victims of modern consumer society: the majority of poor global masses, but especially starving people, children and (young) women exploited for prostitution, slave work, wars and drug production and trafficking. Such an unnatural status of society is the most deeply rooted and influential cause of the financial crisis. All these societal problems cause exploitation and crime (trafficking with people, organised prostitution, trade of arms and un-transparent financial streams).

The rival relations among individuals and groups tend towards exclusion and cause an increasing number of victims. The new myths of 'Progress' and the 'Global Market' hinder the cooperation and inclusion, and establish 'intrinsic hunting of people', 'democratic concentration camp' as 'migrant's oases', and 'zones of racism' (Kurz 2003: 202 ff.) All this is an excuse for establishing new victims, who are not accepted as human partners. The terrorist status of modern global society with different revolutionary and extraordinary global circumstances represents the preservation of the rival modern methods and is the cause of the masses of victims of modern global world. Without cooperation, mutual understanding and implementations of dialogue, no future for the global world is possible. The earth is a common place for all people, and we have to secure to them the possibility to take part in global processes and be included in the common humanity. These means that, in the Girardian sense, we have to take care that none of us will be a victim of these processes, but could instead benefit from them.

The (difficult) way of reconciliation

The way to reconciliation and the halting of victimisation is possible, because people have predispositions for good, but it is extremely difficult and possible only via the cultivation of dialogue (Ricoeur 2004: 491) and with the will for truth. Ricoeur observes that in the 'ultimate act of trust there is no recourse but to assume an ultimate paradox proposed by the Religions of Book' and which Ricoeur finds 'inscribed in the Abrahamic memory' (2004: 490).

In order to choose this way of reconciliation, we need to implement normative and ethical guidelines for the world policy (Küng & Senghaas 2003). A "consequent illumination" is necessary, which means deepening of the personal and societal (spiritual)

life and cultivation of human rights. This is a way to protect "powerless" people, to avoid their humiliation and to secure everywhere the respect of human dignity and the conditions to develop humanity of everybody. Küng and Senghaas (2003) are convinced that education systems and media have a pivotal role in the implementation of human rights in the consciousness of societies. The politicians and other influential people have a duty to genuinely consider which frameworks we should establish to overcome the consequences of the genocide of Armenians, the holocaust of Jews and other nations and groups, and eliminations of "class enemies". In Slovenia and everywhere else, the process of reconciliation is a long and difficult process, which presupposes the conversion of the mind and establishing a readiness to cooperate. The logic of revolution and of crime, based upon lies, oppression and exclusion, should be replaced by the search for truth, freedom, cooperation. The latter are proper values, but in order to implement them we need steady willingness for dialogue at all levels of society and in all individuals.

There is a need for spiritual metanoia (conversion), which is a religious category; we need to combine mystics and politics. Mysticism is, according to Leonardo Boff (2011: 68 ff.), the awareness that we all are children of God, who is our common father. This enables us to take all people as our brothers and sisters, not merely rivals. We also need readiness for political dialogue to work that way, which includes empathy for others and awareness of our interdependence. This endeavour is exceedingly difficult without any faith to see the reality deeper and to limit him/herself in order to build the open society, as Karl Popper (2003/1945) stressed. Undergirding human rights is a shared endeavour for humanity. It is impossible that only some people are bearers of the world's salvation. If we have faith in God, we have deeper reasons to see the truth and to choose the path of reconciliation. This implies an open- mindedness and readiness to dialogue in which different worldviews and religious faith are ready to exchange their point of view to come to a deeper understanding of common reality.

Raimond Gaita speaks about the "love for truth" (2006): 'The deepest values of the life of the mind cannot be taught: they can only be shown, but, of course, only to those who have eyes to see' (Gaita 2006: 231). These eyes are the eyes of the heart. Mahatma Gandhi (1987: 134 ff.; 155 ff.) stressed this in the context of the importance of the Christian teaching of Beatitudes. He actually worked out a practical synthesis of Indian doctrines of non-violence and Gospel's Sermon on the Mount (Beatitudes) of the New Testament. The Beatitudes are a forgotten chapter of Christian tradition. In short, the Spirit of Christ is a spirit of pure heart, of truth and justice, of non-possession and non-violence. There is no alternative to metanoia, to any conversion of the mind, even when it could be grounded on different religious or worldview conceptions, if we want to make changes in the crisis of this world. These changes imply the changes of mind and the readiness to meet the other in an empathic and dialogic way. Despite this seeming to be pure idealism, there are no other possible ways for solving the aforementioned problems. Nevertheless, there are many people ready to move in this way of change, in the direction of development of the world towards humanity. Vojko Strahovnik suggests 'a model of global ethics' – in a form worked out by Robert Audi (2007) – as the way to achieve this change:

> Audi combines (moral) virtue theories, Kantian ethics and utilitarianism and supplements them with moral intuitionism. Virtue theories focus on 'being a good person', developing virtues that constitute good life and happiness, and subsequently try to work out what the conduct must be like in relation to that kind of virtuous person. Kantian ethics focuses more on rules or a moral law one must follow in order to pursue the right thing. Respect and dignity of a person are important here. Utilitarianism is also a rule-based moral theory, but one which evaluates acts in relation to their consequences, especially regarding well-being, happiness and reducing suffering of persons and community as a whole (Strahovnik 2009: 213).

Christianity has worked out a concept of dignity of the human person through the discussions about the personality of Jesus Christ at the first Christian councils. The Christian idea of the person as grounded in God has dominated through the history of Christian world and influenced the modern conception of a human being as a person with his dignity and rights. This is the most influential tradition in the last two thousand years. It is a form of transcendent personalism: 'Transcendent personalism provides good reasons to tolerate many other and different views' (Žalec 2011: 113).

Respectful behaviour needs profound sources. The conversion to dialogue and to partnership is the most important "change of mind", which opens the way for dialogue to become a decisive motive of humans. Thus, respect of the Charter of Human Rights and practicing of the universal morality is possible only by supposition of orthos logos (the right reason). The metanoia (conversion) as a Christian universalistic term is not applicable in the present secular society, which thinks in racial categories (Ocvirk 2012). To make a decision for non-violent behaviour towards others and to fully respect the rights of every living being, man needs faith and hope. This faith is grounded on the supposition of a deeper insight into reality, which is usually understood as a religious act, known in different forms in several religious and other traditions.

If in the past (before modern times) there were religiously founded rules and rites to secure the societal order and to prevent the escalations of violence, this is no longer the case and it is necessary to invent new rules, probably grounded on human rights.

Today, the individual is lost in the open global world, and this groundlessness makes him vulnerable for political and other manipulations, which can lead to political crimes, performed by individuals, groups, nomenclatures or state's oligarchies. This new socio-political order – co-created by mass media – does not provide an individual with an autonomous response to this complex situation. Because of this, an individual is the victim of these processes. Post-modern man is increasingly lost in the global world, a world with weak personal ties that are unable to properly shape his behaviour. A Nietzschean ideal of man could and should be universalised in the sense that all people are invited to realise the moral ideal of man. However, this is not a man of technology, science, political (totalitarian) or consumer systems, but a humane man. Such a solution is not easy to reach. There is no 'hyper-policy' (Zimmermann 2008: 157) as an instrument of regulating this situation. This means that there is no all-pervading formula to reach the truly human social order. The only possible way to reach it is the "struggle" for dialogue,

which means the interpersonal communication (in truth and love) between people and between man and God.

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Povzetek

Politično hudodelstvo je problem socialno-politične uvedbe ne-demokratičnih in nehumanih nasilnih sredstev, da bi dosegli politično moč nad družbo. Revolucije in različne oblike terorja so s takšnim političnim hudodelstvom spremenile politični red in povzročile številne žrtve in družbeni nered. Človek je tekmec in težko ga je spreobrniti k temu, da bi sodeloval z drugimi. Moderna znanost, tehnika in posledično rast tekmovalnega načina življenja so vedno bolj vodile do izključevanj in izključitve številnih ljudi iz družbenih procesov. Težka naloga človeštva je zdaj preseči totalitarne rasistične, komunistične in druge npr. teroristične in izključevalne usedline oziroma stranpoti sodobnega mišljenja ter podpirati oziroma sprejeti dialoško in vključevalno razmišljanje. Brez globljih duhovnih uvidov in pripravljenosti za sodelovanje se bo tudi v sodobnem, za žrtve bolj občutljivem svetu število žrtev političnega hudodelstva le še povečevalo.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: politično hudodelstvo, revolucija, teror, genocid, žrtve, dialog, sprava

CORRESPONDENCE: JANEZ JUHANT, Faculty of Theology, Poljanska cesta 4, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. E-mail: janez.juhant@teof.uni-lj.si.

Persecuting witches in the Early Modern and Late Modern eras: Similarities and differences of the Sabbath myth[1]

Rafal Smoczynski
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, rsmoczyn@ifispan.waw.pl

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss the witch-hunt dynamics that emerged at the end of the 20th century in the US and Great Britain. The discussion will involve analysis of historical repeatability of the Sabbath myth that has triggered witch-hunt persecutions during periods of social dislocations (La Fontaine 1992; 1994; 1998; Philips-Stevens 1991; Heninngsen 1996; Frankfurter 1994; 2006). This paper draws attention to the fact that the persecutory dynamics of the 16th century witch craze and the 20th century Satanic panic were conditioned by a different ordering principle of the socio-political structure (the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference) that determined the emergence of distinct "anti-Satanist power knowledge" produced by institutions fighting the perceived occult menace (e.g. the Catholic and Protestant clergy in early modern Europe and the "psychotherapeutic industry" in the late 20th-century America) (Trevor-Roper 1990; Victor 1993). Following the diagnosis of Becker (1963), claiming that the emergence of a social problem is always linked to its proponents, this paper also considers the profile of the advocates of the Satanic ritual abuse (SRA) and examines how the ritual abuse problem that has been articulated by particular interest groups turned into a universal ideology, and what the mechanism for its formation and stabilisation was. To achieve this goal, I will follow a post-Gramscian perspective of hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1996; 2005) and will develop insights initially signalled elsewhere (Smoczynski 2010), showing how the hegemonic practices undertaken by particular SRA proponents were transformed into effective social control measures, which in a number of cases led to persecutions of individuals labelled as "witches" or "Satanists".

KEYWORDS: Sabbath myth, witch-hunt persecutions, Satanic panic, Satanic ritual abuse, ideology, hegemony

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Theoretical Perspective

This paper uses the Essex School social theory mainly elaborated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) as its principal interpretative framework. The proposed theoretical perspective accentuates the specificity of normative pluralism of functionally differentiated societies, which renders them radically different from the pre-modern mechanistic social bounds that were built on the same concept of substantive common good. This theory was heavily informed by the "linguistic turn" in contemporary humanities, expressed mainly by the writings of de Saussure's structuralism, analytic philosophy of late Wittgenstein, Derridian post-structuralism and linguistic psychoanalysis as elaborated by Lacan and his followers. Particularly Ferdinand de Saussure's (1955) idea that the field of language consists of negative differences, and the meaning of the word is not determined by its inherent content but by the external system of differences is of crucial importance for the proposed approach, since Laclau and Mouffe assume that the differential nature of language also applies to any field of significance, including the social field, 'insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence' (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 107). Thus, the anti-Satanist formation (SRA proponents) whose claims-making triggered the late 20th century witch-hunt was deprived of the ultimate literality; according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 98) it is impossible to reduce any social formation to the moments of its 'necessary immanence', because 'there are not two planes, one of essences and the other of appearances, since there is no possibility of fixing an ultimate literal sense for which the symbolic would be a second and derived plane of signification.' Hence, from this perspective, any social movement, including the analysed SRA proponents, has to employ a hegemonic logic in order to constitute a "contingent ground", that is, a source of legitimacy for its particular strategy, in the analysed case – a persecution of the alleged Satanists. In this sense, a witch hunt that has been carried out within the social field made up of the equal differences represented the exact political logic of hegemony in which a particular social position (e.g. anti-Satanist group) strove to exceed its particular position and assume universal social meaning resonating with the public. This transformation, which involves the effective usage of mythic structures (a revised ancient Sabbath myth), explains how a social group manages to organise a broader social coalition of differently situated subjects willing to exercise a social control over a particular social issue (e.g. a crackdown on an alleged Satanic menace). The mythic structure that has been employed in the 20th century witch hunt resonated with the traditional Sabbath theme, which contributed to transformation of contingent particular social idiosyncrasies into universal discursive structures that became the surface of inscription for differently positioned social subjects (feminist movements, social services, child-savers' movements, etc.), concerned about the perceived Satanic menace.

In line with the above-described Essex School stance, this paper argues that the sudden emergence and demise of the late modern witch-hunt persecutions were determined by the "open nature" of the post-foundational society. The fragile nature of Satanic panic is especially visible when compared with the witch craze that occurred in the feudal societies of 16th century in which hegemonic forms of articulations were minimal, and the

persecution of witches was carried out in a 'narrowed social space' with a fixed structure of subject positions governed by a simple rule of repetition (see Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 138). The juxtaposition of both types of witch hunts, which will be consequently analysed in greater detail, is meant to reveal the crucial role of the specific anti-Satanist knowledge understood as the political potential of transformation of relational identities that predetermines the possible scale of persecutions exercised by the state apparatuses and the ability of fighting back of individuals targeted as "folk devils".

20th century witch hunt

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, allegations about the Satanic organised crime penetrating society hit the public in the US and subsequently in various parts of the world (e.g. Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand) (Victor 1998; Lippert 1990; Richardson 1997; Rossen 1989; Pyck 1994; Dyrendal 1998; Guilliatt 1996). Descriptions of Satanic practices as exposed in these allegations (mostly occurring in mass media as well as in the confessions of people presenting themselves as "survivors" of ritual crime) included acts of murder, cannibalism, mutilation of infants and children, etc. Alongside the alarm of ritual child abuse cases, allegations were also revealed by adults who allegedly experienced such atrocities in childhood and later suppressed these memories (see Ofshe 1992). As a consequence of these rumours, in the United States from 1983 to 1990, more than one hundred day-care centres were subject to police investigations (Nathan & Snedeker 1995), and nearly two hundred day-care centre workers were arrested and put on trial on charges of ritual child abuse (de Young 2004). Despite the lack of tangible evidence to support these allegations, more than fifty employees were sentenced to many years of prison (De Young 2004; Charlier & Downing 1988). For example, Michelle Noble, an East Valley YMCA day-care centre worker from El Paso, Texas, was sentenced to life plus 311 years imprisonment for child abuse (Nathan 1991: 144); on similar charges Robert Kelly from Little Rascals day-care centre in Edenton, North Carolina, was sentenced to twelve consecutive life sentences (Nathan & Snedeker 1995: 3). These two cases represented the harshest verdicts of the courts in the series of ritual abuse lawsuits. Other court rulings, however, were hardly milder, e.g. Frank Fuster from Country Walk day-care centre in Miami, Florida received six consecutive life sentences (De Young 2004: 152); Gayle Dove received three consecutive life sentences and sixty years imprisonment (ibid.): Martha Felix of Felix's day-care centre received three consecutive life sentences; Francisco Ontiveros of the same centre received a life sentence (Nathan & Snedeker 1995: 208). In all these criminal cases, the defendants were accused of child abuse, manufacturing and distributing of child pornography, terrorising and abducting children; ritual motives were also present in all these charges (de Young 2004). Some of these trials turned out to be among the longest and most expensive legal processes in American history (e.g. the trials of the McMartin Day Care Center from Manhattan Beach, California cost than fifteen million dollars) (De Young 2004). In all these cases, the prosecutors failed to present substantive material evidence to corroborate the ritual abuse allegations; they were only

able to present the testimonies of ritually abused children (and sometimes their parents, who spoke for the minor victims considered too traumatised to testify), and the opinions of experts (usually sexual abuse specialists, child savers and psychotherapists) (De Young 2004: 38). Children testifying in the courtrooms evoked gruesome memories of sadistic sexual practices, trips to cemeteries and caves, etc. (De Young 2004; Jenkins 1993).

Despite the claims making of "ritual abuse survivors" (this term was commonly used as a self-presenting description of individuals who were allegedly abducted and terrorised by Satanists and managed to escape at some point from the captivity of occult organised criminals) about the existence of a vast murderous Satanic cult organisation, the police failed to find even the smallest traces of their organisational activities: written and electronic correspondence, telephone billings, bank accounts, buildings and premises in which the criminal practices were allegedly taking place, ritual tools and clothing, crematoria, pornographic films, photographic equipment, etc. (Lanning 1992; Hicks 1990; La Fontaine 1998). As La Fontaine (1998) observed, an apocalyptic vision of a criminal organisation, whose activities exceeds any known historical criminal structures (including the most powerful forms of organised criminal groups) and does not leave the slightest trace of a crime, does not withstand contemporary criminological knowledge. Mass genocide, even if done covertly, could not have gone unnoticed (according to ritual abuse claims makers Satanists only in the US murdered 150,000 children annually) (Hicks 1990). Murderous rituals were according to "survivors" – often carried out before the eyes of many members of the sect (see Smith & Pazder 1980), but not once did the "survivors" manage to provide concrete data on, for example, places and names of participants of bloody rituals, which would have allowed the police to obtain unequivocal evidence of the offense (Lanning 1992; Medway 2001).

Anti-Satanic multi-subject formation

Unlike the well-known example of the construction of social problem of consumption and distribution of drugs in the US in the 1950s, in which the crucial role was attributed to one individual moral entrepreneur, i.e. the head of the Department of Treasury's Federal Bureau of Narcotics, H. J. Anslinger (Becker 1963: 145), the ritual abuse social problem represents different logic with which it is impossible to delimit a single agency that triggered the emergence of this social problem. Anti-Satanists' articulations have been located in multi-positioned institutional settings (the mass media, interest groups, politicians, church officials, cult survivors' organisations), which affected the way public identified the enemies of the cherished normative system. These articulations have led to the emergence of a heterogenic anti-Satanist formation composed from a variety of social subjects, both secular and religious. Anti-Satanist discourse was triggered and disseminated during the conferences and seminars organised by psychotherapeutic organisations, religious communities and social services; anti-Satanist experts formulated this problem in the anti-cult movements magazines, also "children savers" organisations actively disseminated the "SRA knowledge" (Victor 1993). This discourse was structured in the form of normative statements of public officers (e.g. the police, prosecutors,

social workers), but also in the form of emotional testimonies of the alleged victims (see Kahaner 1988; Driscoll & Wright 1991). Numerous professionals were involved in dealing with this problem as (e.g. the research of Bottoms et al. (1996)) conducted among clinical psychologists; members of the American Psychological Association revealed that hundreds of psychologists admitted that they had come across a number of SRA cases.

Insofar as SRA lost its initial narrow anti-cult movement meaning, this narrative transcended into a social control discourse and, consequently, has been recognised as an important criminal problem in the broader public. This transformation was facilitated particularly by the intensive involvement of therapeutic industry, which rearticulated the idiosyncrasy of Protestant fundamentalists into specialist medical discourse (see Hill & Goodwin 1993; Gould & Cozolino 1992). According to de Young (2004), medical terminology that offered the interpretative framework of SRA – apart from anti-cult movements' expert knowledge, which as the American Cult Awareness Network or American Family Foundation in the 1980s, created special departments dealing with the occult crime – constituted one of the pillars of the professional-corporate movement of anti-Satanist formation, especially in the US (see also Victor 1993). It is also important to mention the other institutional pillar, i.e. children savers' organisations, whose activists represented a visible interest group in anti-Satanist formation (De Young 2004). Their significance in the US was partly conditioned – as Bromley (1991: 67) observed – by the macrostructural context of American society: weakened parental control, increased divorce rates, and growing influence of peer communities. The horrifying images of Satanic ritual abuse metaphorically accumulated other problems that children savers' movements have struggled with, and Satanic criminals were promptly considered as another deviant group that has been attacking innocent children (Bromley 1991: 66–9).

In addition to professional expertise, we should also mention the powerful symbolic ingredients of the anti-Satanist discourse that should be linked with the Sabbath myth (La Fontaine 1998; Frankfurter 2006). Performative power of the myth of the subversive community undermining the social and moral order was based on its resonance with previous historical articulations, which partly explains its effectiveness as social control discourse. Laclau (1977: 167) observed that the hegemonic discourses must be related to the organic bound with traces of traditional patterns of identification, which represent the irreducible residuum of historical experience; SRA thus re-defied the traditional Sabbath myth, reinforcing the strength of its persuasiveness by the performative acts of repetition and citation in a new social context.

This stage of development of the ritual abuse social problem underpinned by the complex platform of professional institutions represented the hegemonic phase, in which the anti-Satanist discourse was capable of labelling social subjects as criminal deviants and exercising social control. Hegemony understood in the Laclauian perspective as the capability of transforming a particular social problem into universal social problem was manifested with particular clarity in the practice of criminalisation of the occult deviance, and as a result, social services were taking children into custody from parents accused of belonging to the Satanic underworld, and individuals suspected of involvement in

Satanic gangster groups were arrested, sentenced and imprisoned (Jenkins 1992: 182–7; De Young 2004: 59). Naturally, the application of the anti-Satanist hegemonic ideology in late modern, pluralist Anglo-Saxon societies has not captured the entire societies but merely selected segments. Contrary to early modern European witch hunts (which will be discussed in more detail further on), the late modern anti-Satanist articulations were acting as social control strategies that were capable only of a partly hegemonised public square. Articulations of anti-Satanist formation represented in this sense, hybrid articulations, characteristic of the political polity, in which the centres of power are scattered among various institutional centres.

Following the Laclauian perspective (Laclau 1996: 43; Griggs & Howarth 2000), we should point to three historical conditions of possibility that are necessary for a late modern hegemonic formation to emerge: the availability of potential signifiers, their relevance as a means of identifying subjective positions (e.g. "Satanic deviants"), and the strategic position of social agents that are introducing the hegemonic ideology into the public sphere. Bearing in mind that the hegemonic strategy assumes the dynamics of re-articulation of the existing ontic substance (particularly effective narrative structures, i.e. relevant myths that are resonating with the public etc.) and regrouping them into new frameworks of persuasiveness (see Laclau 2000: 79-82), an analysis of the anti-Satanist formation must be placed against the socio-cultural background of the end of the 20th century Anglo-Saxon societies. When we search for the family resemblance of the anti-Satanist narrative in the broader set of social anxieties, it can be detected that the updated Sabbath myth was intertwined with the concerns regarding the moral permissiveness and the crisis of "family values" that affected significant segments of Anglo-Saxon societies. The ritual abuse problem lost its particular anti-cult connotations precisely within this extended field of social anxiety (see Nathan & Snedeker 1995: 35; Diamond 1989; Durham 1991; Smith 1994). The hegemonic practice of anti-Satanist formation consisted of incorporating "anxiety themes", particularly concerning children, into the main body of its argument underpinned by the significant portion of therapeutic and anti-cult discourse (see Smoczynski 2010).

Moral panic and social crisis

A significant number of academic publications analysing the phenomenon of SRA should be located in the current of sociological theory that accentuates the functional role of deviance determining the normative boundaries of the community (see Victor 1998; La Fontaine 1998; Bromley 1991; 1992; Hill & Barnett 1994; Jenkins & Maier-Katkin, 1992), particularly, the most compelling texts were brought by De Young (2004) and Victor (1998) explaining SRA as the events of moral panic. In contrast, Bromley (1991) argued that SRA should be inscribed in the logic of actions initiated by the anti-cult movements of the 1970s, which were subsequently supplemented with the new symbolic elements of the 1980s American social unrest. Ellis (2000; 2003), in turn, pointed to the historical continuity of SRA founded on the "informal channels" of Gothic stories and urban legends circulating especially in the fundamentalist circles. Nathan (1991a) and

Victor (1993) pointed to the conditions of the politico-economic life of early 1980s in America when the myth of the Satanic underground was being born, and Americans had to face the economic crisis, dislocation of traditional values (e.g. increasing divorce rates) and the growing "cultural conflict" between liberals and conservatives (see Harris 1987; Hunter 1991; Porter 1989). Various authors, such as Jenkins (1994), de Young (2004) and Bromley (1991) attributed the key role in the construction and distribution of the ritual abuse pattern to American fundamentalist moral crusade strategy: the 1970s and early 1980s were marked by the rise of "Moral Majority" movement, which was considered as the significant interest groups in defining and promoting the anti-Satanist myth in USA (Jenkins 1998: 173), and also as demonstrated by Jenkins (1992) and La Fontaine (1998), anti-Satanist campaign developed in the US was further "exported" through different channels of professional and cultural exchanges to the UK and (though to a lesser extent) to other English-speaking countries (Ellis 2000; Hill & Barnett 1993).

An important body of literature explored the theme of childhood in the SRA social control practices (Best 1990; 1991; Jenkins 1992; 1998). Jenkins (1992) argued that starting in the 1960s, with a changing emphasis in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the essential source of social panics in Anglo-Saxon world concerned the problem of child abuse; ritual abuse was one of the themes located in this chain of events (see also Critcher 2003; Jenks 1996).

Finally, publications comparing SRA to the Early Modern Europe witch-hunt have been produced; one of the most outstanding of which is by La Fontaine (1998) who, comparing historical similarities between these phenomena (see also Frankfurter 1994; Cohn 1975; Philips-Stevens 1991; Muchembled 1990) occurring during periods of social unrest, observed that the production of anti-Satanist imagery was occurring in the intersubjective space between the anti-Satanist expert (e.g. therapist, anti-cult activist, social worker informed by anti-Satanist ideology) and the ritual abuse survivor. The "victim" was precisely identified as a ritual abuse survivor by a myriad of biased procedures, e.g. leading questions and peer pressure (Nathan & Snedeker 1995: 141–3; De Young 2004: 67–75), in the case of early modern witch craze "devil worshipper" was often produced by means of physical coercion: the torture measures acted as a tool of imposing Sabbath myth on the arbitrarily selected victims (Cohn 1970; 1975; Ginzburg 1983; 1992). The research of clinical psychologists Ceci and Bruck (1993; 1995) examining the issue of techniques used while interviewing ritually abused children leaves no doubt: the children spoke of Satanic abuse as the result of commonly used techniques of leading questions by anti-Satanist experts, who were ready to confirm the pre-existing SRA ideology.

We must not forget about the similar phenomenon of individuals who self-identified themselves as ritual abuse survivors when an element of external coercion was lacking. This phenomenon was much more widespread during SRA; nevertheless historians also acknowledged cases of women who self-designated themselves as witches during the early modern witch hunts (see Sebald 1990; Cohn 1975).

Differences between SRA and the witch craze

Although exploring SRA reveals considerable similarities with the historical practices of witch hunting in early modern Europe, it should not, however, obscure the essential differences in both Sabbath mythical structures and dynamics of oppressive practices of witch hunters that were shaped by historically distinct socio-political systems. Following the Laclauian perspective, we may assert that SRA was conditioned by an open social field in which the subject positions and practices of articulations are not unchangeably fixed and are not ruled by a simple rule of repetition. Hegemonic practice, which should be understood as an articulatory political operation constructing collective identities out of a plurality of various social demands (Laclau 2005: 95) is possible only in the field of the social, where relational identities are not closed in their potential of transformation (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 134). To properly comprehend this insight, it is important to follow Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 129–30), who remind us that the social can be divided into two types of ordering logic: the logic of difference, which constitutes differences in the social field, and the logic of equivalence, which combines the particular differences into relational structures. This dichotomist logic of social action is modelled upon the structural linguistics' mechanism of combination and substitution, in which the logic of difference extends the syntagmatic field of language, and the number of differences can enter into relational combinations among themselves; the logic of equivalence, in turn, expands the paradigmatic field in which the differences can be replaced, and thereby reduces the number of differences that may constitute the combination of novel relationships (ibid.). This model demonstrates why the hegemonic strategy of the emergence of SRA was unfolding in the social field organised according the logic of difference, where the systems of social meaning are relatively often rearticulated through hegemonic efforts (see Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 153), and secondly why the dynamics of SRA substantially varies from the logic of oppressive witch craze of the early modern era. In the latter case, a social field open to new forms of articulation was minimal; therefore, the persecution of witches as a strategy of re-establishing the normative order of feudal society was carried out in a social field of rigidly fixed collective identities, where persecution (excluding a difference from the field structured as the chain of equivalence of static differences) did not require a hegemonic strategy (see Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 138).

Another remark concerns the symbolic substance of SRA and early modern European witch hunts. Both are structured around the basic theme of the traditional Sabbath stereotype: the ritually abused child is a "clone" of witches' victims, murderous orgies of modern Satanists are merely displaced-in-time "sexual fiestas" of witches (La Fontaine 1994, 1998). Of course, this structure does not represent the mere repetition of the stereotype. Repetition of any sign, as Derrida (1988: 53) noted, refers to the combination of identity and difference; therefore, there is no immutable consistency of anti-Satanist utterance, i.e. the myth has been structured by the repetition and re-articulation. Contingent historical implications caused a series of internal displacement of the utterances; hence the anti-witch stereotype function defined as the space of inscriptions of social control practices has gradually changed.

For example, the contemporary anti-Satanist myth removed from its structure themes that were irrelevant for modern people: Satanists do not do fly through the air on brooms, they do not kiss the toad or the tails of goats; moreover, the personal Satan has disappeared from modern scene of the Sabbath myth, who for hundreds of years personally had supervised the slaying of new-borns, burning their corpses and turning them into a poisonous ointment. In the disenchanted imagination of the late 20th century, the high Satanic priest took the place of the devil; the 20th century Satanists did not use flying brooms; instead they shoot pornographic movies on their Sabbaths. However, the structural function of the modern Sabbath stereotype maintains historical continuity with its previous variants: the 20th century coven members, like the witches of old, practiced cannibalism, transgressed sexual taboos, profaned religious symbols, murdered children, and undermined the moral foundations of human society (La Fontaine 1998: 183–4).

Conclusion

As previously mentioned, early modern feudal society was ordered according to the logic of equivalence, which comprises a narrowed social space and a fixed structure of subject positions; such a field is considerably different from the late modern society that became the arena of SRA. The Anglo-Saxon societies of the 20th century represented the logic of difference expanding the openness of the social field in which the subject positions are complex and susceptible to permanent subversion brought by counter-hegemonic articulations (see Laclau 2000: 57–8). Hence, the anti-Satanist formation of late modernity reconstructed the Sabbath myth through hegemonic operations, and its scope of social influence was limited compared with that of the early modern Europe. The latter represented the universal logic of the imaginary horizon (Laclau 1990: 61), which during the witch craze embraced the whole of feudal society: its legitimacy was unchallenged, and anti-witch discourses were distributed in both the "high" (elite) and "low" (popular) reproductory channels of cultural patterns. The presence of the Sabbath myth may be detected in all genres of literature of 15th and 16th centuries: treatises of theologians, religious chronicles, scholastic philosophy, codes authored by monarchs and royal officers (e.g. the Carolingian Code of 1532 imposed penalties on witches), Church and papal documents (e.g. *Vox in Rama*, *Summis Desiderantes* of Innocent VIII). The Sabbath myth was also distributed in popular literature and apologetic works (e.g. *Directorium Inquisitorium* by Nicolas Emeric, *Tractatus de Hereticis et Sortilegis* of Paulus Grillandusa written in 1524, which creatively reconstructed the myth of Sabbath). In 1595, the Lorraine judge Nicolas Remy wrote *Demonolatreiae*, an important piece in this current of texts, which brought graphic details of the Sabbath. In this category of literature, we should also place the notorious *Malleus Maleficarum*, by Dominicans Kramer and Sprenger, first released in 1486, which coined the idiom defining essence of the Sabbath myth operating during the early modern Europe witch craze. Of course, treaties about witchcraft were also produced in the world of Protestant communities, such as *Criminalium Practica Rerum* (1635). The last category of knowledge on sorcery involved the Inquisition textbooks, which were based on the knowledge collected during

the investigations. The imaginative edifice of knowledge on Sabbath had many closely-connected spaces; its multi-layered structure legitimised the existence of various offices, universities' expertise and religious schools' curricula; it formed a necessary foundation for implementing the regulations, which then dispersed into smaller units of social control systems. The early modern Europe knowledge of witchcraft became the principle of enforcement of power in diverse communities. Doubting the possibility of the existences of witches was for a man of the early modern Europe simply ridiculous, and the myth of Sabbath (with a few exceptions; see Henningsen 1980) has not been questioned by Europeans in the 15th and 16th centuries, regardless of changing the amplitude of the search for scapegoats in a given pre-modern period.

Exactly the opposite happened in late modern society, in which any identity of subject position can be negated and become the locus of antagonism; thus, the late 20th century societies were an arena of many antagonistic clashes of various hegemonic formations, which by definition were unstable because their position were permanently challenged by counter-hegemonic "expert knowledge". In such a complex discursive field, it is impossible to construct a central normative instance that would be able to constantly exert social control upon different fields of competitive knowledge, and that was precisely the situation through which the legitimacy of SRA proponents was successfully challenged in the mid-1990s by counter-hegemonic groups (e.g. skeptics, the police, mass media) with the result that the majority of ritual abusers were acquainted by the beginning of the 2000s and the Sabbath myth of the 20th century was largely debunked.

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Povzetek

Namen tega članka je razprava o dinamiki lova na čarovnice, ki se je pojavil ob koncu 20. stoletja v ZDA in Veliki Britaniji. Razprava vključuje analizo zgodovinske ponovljivosti sabatnega mita, ki je sprožil lov na čarovnice v obdobjih družbenega nereda (La Fontaine 1992; 1994; 1998; Philips-Stevens 1991; Heninngsen 1996; Frankfurter 1994; 2006). Ta članek opozarja na dejstvo, da sta dinamika manije preganjanja čarovnic v 16. stoletju in satanistična panika bili pogojeni z različnima urejevalnima principoma družbeno-politične strukture (logika ekvivalence in logika razlike), kar je determiniralo pojav različnega "anti-satanističnega znanja-moči", ki so ga proizvedle institucije, ki so se borile proti okultni grožnji (t. j. katoliška in protestantska duhovščina v Evropi zgodnje moderne in "psihoterapevtska industrija" v Ameriki poznega 20. stoletja) (Trevor-Roper 1990; Victor 1993). Sledeč diagnozi, ki jo je postavil Becker (1963), ki je trdil, da je pojav družbenega problema vedno povezan z njegovimi zagovorniki, ta članek obravnava tudi profil advokatov satanistične obredne zlorabe (SOZ) in raziskuje kako se je problem obredne zlorabe, ki so ga artikulirale posamezne interesne skupine, spremenil v univerzalno ideologijo in kakšen je bil mehanizem za njegovo formacijo in stabilizacijo. Da bi dosegel ta namen avtor sledi post-gramšijevskemu pogledu na hegemonijo (Laclau in Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1996; 2005) in razvije uvide, na katere je začetno opozoril že v raznih drugih svojih delih (Smoczynski 2010). Avtor pokaže, da so bile hegemonske prakse, ki so jih prakticirali posamezni zagovorniki SOZ, preobražene v učinkovite ukrepe družbenega nadzora, ki so v številnih primerih vodili v preganjanje posameznic in posameznikov, ki so bili etiketirani kot "čarovnice" in "satanisti".

KLJUČNE BESEDE: sabatni mit, lov na čarovnice, satanistična panika, satanistična obredna zloraba, ideologija, hegemonija

CORRESPONDENCE: RAFAL SMOCZYNSKI, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: rsmoczyn@ifispan.waw.pl.

Political crimes in the transition to modernity: Anthropological perspectives

Bjørn Thomassen
Roskilde University, bthomas@ruc.dk

Abstract

We live in a period heavily, and perhaps uniquely, characterised by a popular and political focus on crime. In taking up the invitation to contribute to this special issue, this article is intended as a reflection on the question: what can an anthropological contribution be to the question of political crimes? The reflection consists of three interrelated parts. In the first part, the author wishes to address what is meant when we use the words 'crime' and 'political'. In the second part, he discusses how the social sciences emerged in the late 19th century as a reflection on the nature of crime in the transition to modernity. The importance of some almost forgotten "classical traditions" is stressed. In the third part, he briefly indicates how the most celebrated political revolutions within the European tradition, including the French and the Russian Revolutions, are critically tied to the emergence of new forms of political crime originating in crowd behaviour. The framework elaborated throughout the article relies on contributions of classical anthropologists and sociologists, who, although known figures, have thus far remained peripheral within political anthropology: Ferdinand Tönnies, Gabriel Tarde, Marcel Mauss, Gregory Bateson, Victor Turner and René Girard.

KEYWORDS: political crime, transition to modernity, classical traditions, political revolutions, crowd behaviour

Do we not realise that all this is merely the prelude to the main theme which we have yet to learn?
Plato, Republic, 531d.

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He [the revolutionary] is damned always to do that which is most repugnant to him: to become a slaughterer, to sacrifice lambs so that no more lambs may be slaughtered, o whip people with knouts so that they may learn not to let themselves by whipped, to strip himself of every scruple in the name of a higher scrupulousness, and to challenge the hatred of mankind because of his love for it – an abstract and geometric love.
Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon

I stuck around St. Petersburg when I saw it was a time for a change killed the czar and his ministers Anastasia screamed in vain, I rode a tank held a generals rank when the blitzkrieg raged and the bodies stank. Pleased to meet you, hope you guess my name, oh yeah. Ah, what's puzzling you is the nature of my game, oh yeah.
Mick Jagger/Keith Richards, Sympathy for the Devil

The meaning of the words we use

I would like to start with the most general of observations: The study of political crimes, even in its detailed empirical forms, must somehow be tied to a general reflection on what the *political* is, or should be. Here lies a true challenge, as almost all of the founding fathers of the social sciences clearly perceived. Mauss ended his classic book, *The Gift* (1990), with a concluding chapter that must be read as a foundational statement on the nature of our "common life". Mauss not only summed up his analysis of gift-giving practices, but in the very last sentence reminded the reader that this study of gift-giving practices should furthermore:

> [A]llow us to perceive, measure, and weigh up the various aesthetic, moral, religious, and economic motivations, the diverse material and demographic factors, the sum total of which are the basis of society and constitute our common life, the conscious direction of which is the supreme art, *Politics*, in the Socratic sense of the word (Mauss 1990).

In this Maussian spirit, let me therefore start this essay by returning to foundations, e.g. the meaning of the words we use. In a somewhat unfashionable vein, I would like to stress that I consider etymology itself a specific type of cultural analysis, and closely linked to anthropological methodology. While etymology played a minor role to founding fathers like Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, it had vital significance to a series of "maverick anthropologists" whose foundational insights were closely linked to etymological reflexivity; this was not only the case for Marcel Mauss, but also for two of the figures discussed below, Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner. It was equally crucial to the "anthropological historian", Johan Huizinga, whose milestone work, *Homo Ludens*, approached the nature of *play* via a comparative etymological analysis, involving almost all European languages. Of course, it is not the case that the origin of words *directly* convey cultural meaning. In tracing the meaning of words, one should rather follow the

framework proposed by the Italian linguist, Mario Alinei, whose work complements the historical-semantic approach of Reinhart Koselleck (Szakolczai 2011).

The point is that words are themselves "containers" of significant information, and dense with meaning. Both the words in question, *political* and *crime*, are Greek and therefore linked to the "Greek discovery of politics" (Christian Meier 1990). Moreover, understandings of the political *always* related, in an essential way, to understandings of crime. It is almost certain the word crime developed from *krinein* (to separate, decide, judge), from the PIE base **krei-* (to sieve, discriminate, distinguish). Hence, political judgment and decision making, and crime have a shared foundation that is surely both linguistic and experiential; in this regard one must note the equally close links to the concepts of *crisis* and *critique*.

At the level of foundations, the political and crime belong together: the political was made historically *possible* in connection with a rethinking of crime, justice and punishment, linked to the emergence of the citizen and the notion of collective good. This development can be contrasted to earlier notions of crime and punishment, prior to the political reforms of Solon, for example, or prior to the democratic revolution (Meier 1990). In fact, in ancient Greece, the worst possible crime one could commit was *hubris*; it was considered so because it was destructive of social bonds and human relationships at a truly fundamental level, a fatal transgression of communally defined limits of appropriate behaviour. While other crimes could be mediated and punished, in the case of hubris there was no hope: the transgressor had to be exiled. Interestingly enough, this "fatal" method of ostracising individuals whose sheer personal essence or "soul" has come to represent a threat to the survival of the collectivity has been documented in a series of tribal or small-scale societies; the problem is, of course, that others may imitate the diseased soul.

The term political represents a remarkable continuity; it cannot be reduced to or replaced by terms like state, institutions, law or rule. This is so because the notion of politics in an essential way combines the "institutional sphere" with the qualities of human beings, our values, our ways of dealing with truth, our respect for others, our search for justice; in short, our living together in a meaningful way in some kind of meaningful community (it was Mauss' great recognition that such meaningfulness could only be based on reciprocity). The most basic sense of this point is expressed by the Aristotelian term *zoon politikon*, often translated as man being a "social animal", but which does not do full justice to the original expression, as it ignores the political dimension (see Szakolczai 2009).

Although the ancient Greek understanding of politics remained a constant reference point in Western history, it also went through radical historical transformations that altered the point of departure. The most decisive transformations in Europe happened during early modernity and have been analysed by Koselleck (1998). To put it briefly, it was the ancient Greek anthropological underpinning of the political that was seriously undermined in the transition to modernity. This happened as politics slowly became a question of order, without any reference to meaning – a development that can safely be traced back to the contract theorists of the 17th century and further back to Machiavelli. It also seems clear that it was this anthropological aspect of the political that Weber was

trying to recover in his talk, *Politics as a Vocation*, linking institutional analysis with the qualities of the human being, going to the roots of our *menschentum*: what must a human being be, that he can act in politics? Not coincidentally, Weber inferred Pericles as a historical reference point.

The human being is, of course, both social and political, but the classical notion of the political as a meaningful, active directing or orienting of one's life toward certain values and goals within a community (as Mauss insisted) was seriously neglected in the liberal-Enlightenment mentality, but, alas, also in current social/political theorising; a neglect, or erosion, which was perceptively analysed by Koselleck (1998) as a central aspect of the "pathogenesis" of modernity.

I would therefore like to suggest that the question of political crimes needs to be understood in connection with social disorder or moral breakdowns, and also with a problematic tendency toward a mechanisation of the political, which even makes a "corruptive attitude" seem desirable and "human", or where "Machiavellian attitudes" can become justified by this or that rational goal of order-achievement. The ties between the individual and the larger community are underdetermined or even negatively defined (as in the Hobbesian tradition) as the point of departure for thinking the political; according to Hobbes, it was mutual fear that made modern politics possible. If this is so, it could indicate that the apparently global spread of political crime cannot simply be overcome by invoking mechanisms of legal or social justice, "more democracy", "more equality", "more transparency", "more control" or more "people power", recasting the slogans of our revolutionary traditions that more than often turned into totalitarian nightmares (in fact, the ideal of total transparency is exactly what defines terror regimes). Nor can one look for remedies against the proliferation of political crimes at the level of political ideologies of emancipation: it seems to be the case that while totalitarian, anti-democratic states (in all their variety) constantly produce political crimes of the worst kinds, in liberal democracies other forms of political crime spread and develop, corrupting and eroding politics from within. Our discussions of political crimes ultimately have to involve a consideration of the meaning of politics in modernity; this was clearly perceived by some of the most overlooked founding fathers of the social sciences, to which I now turn.

The question of crime and the foundations of the social sciences

To ask about the "nature" of political crimes today implies awareness of a two-fold contextualisation. First, we live in a period heavily, and perhaps uniquely, characterised by a popular focus on crime. Second, the study of crime belongs intimately to the very birth of the social sciences. Therefore, to approach the question of crime from an anthropological perspective also involves, by necessity, a revisiting of disciplinary traditions.

The social sciences (anthropology and sociology alike) grew out of legal studies and philosophy. The majority of early anthropologists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries held law degrees and entered speculation about "origins" and evolution from a legal perspective. This includes figures like MacLennan, Bachhofen, Morgan, Maine,

and a multitude of others. The same can, of course, be argued about early sociologists, including founding fathers such as Tönnies, Weber and Tarde. The main empirical field of 19th century social science was, in fact, law and crime. In anthropology, this focus on crime and law held sway up until Malinowski's *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (1922). From the 1920s onward, however, the question of crime somewhat shifted to the background, whereas crime and deviance remained core themes in sociology. Of course, anthropologists never stopped considering crime to be a crucial aspect of society. Culture-specific conflict negotiation and law was a main focus within the subfield of political anthropology that developed from the 1940s onward (see Thomassen 2009). At the same time, crime (understood as a unified subfield of study) was *not* among the most dominant themes of 20th century anthropology. In the current situation, this may be considered a serious shortcoming and for a remarkably straightforward reason: in almost every corner of the world today, crime is very much what people talk about. Crime serves to define people's anxieties and identities, their fears and hopes. Crime is also an ever more dominant theme in popular literature, in crime novels and in television series, and globally so. Crime is, quite simply, an increasingly central aspect of the world in which we live. It is in this general context that questions of *security* have imploded in the social body, and now dominate both domestic and international political debates, as perceptively captured by Michel Foucault in his 1977-78 College de France lectures on *Security, Population and Territory*. Within this wider context, how can anthropology contribute to the study of crime? Moreover, what could be its particular contribution to political crimes?

We do well not to forget the debates over crime that characterised the early social sciences from the late 19th century. The underlying questions asked and the problems posed are arguably not *that* different from the issues we struggle with today. The question, 'Who is a criminal?,' was central for positive criminology. It was *the* central question for Lombroso and his Italian school of criminal anthropology, whose worst errors Gabriel Tarde was quick to point out. During the 19th century, the growing disciplines of criminology and penology came to see crime as a unified phenomenon, emerging with new vigour in the growing urban societies. Criminologists working in Europe and America noted, for example, how crime was a bigger problem in marginal areas. In line with the Chicago model of the city, this spatial marginality was often situated around the central districts of the "industrial city"; today this marginality tends rather to be found in the outskirts of the city, although marginality is often reproduced around the central nodes of transportation, e.g. train and bus stations. Therefore, the question of 'Who is a criminal?' was also tied to *where* is the crime?;' and from the very beginning, the underlying aim was policy-oriented: how could crime be prevented, and how should it be punished?

The development of a scientific *method* for the social sciences took place with reference to the systematic and comparative study of crime. There are obvious reasons for this intimate connection. The social sciences emerged in the in-between areas of law, history and philosophy. The claim to a scientific status of the social sciences hinged on the claim to have moved beyond "speculative" approaches to the study of society (philosophy) or purely formal, deductive law-like procedures (as in the legal tradition). Much of the

quantitative data that early social scientists had at their disposal to demonstrate their novel scientific procedure came from state departments working with demography, and hence also with crime. By the late 19th century, most European states had been gathering crime and suicide rates for some decades, and within different regions and cities. This allowed for longitudinal and synchronic comparison. To be sure, crime statistics were not the only kind of data readily available to early social science. However, compared to other census data on for example age, gender, language, household composition, which in the same period was being standardised across Europe (see Thomassen 2006), crime data spoke more directly to an aspect of human *behaviour*, and hence offered data on a clearly social phenomenon for which an explanation could be sought. This was, to name one emblematic example, the case for Durkheim's study of suicide (1951), which is normally seen as the first successful application of a social scientific method to a clearly delimited empirical field. The statistical data was given to him (via Marcel Mauss) by Gabriel Tarde, who was then Chief Statistician at the Department of Justice in Paris (for a critique of Durkheim's approach, see Thomassen 2012b).

The reasons for the connections between crime and the emergence of the social sciences go even deeper. The "who" and "where" of the crime became tied to a series of further questions, such as '*Why* does crime take place?,' 'What *types* of crime take place in what kind of settings?,' and hence to larger questions pertaining to social existence in the context of urbanisation and what we today would call "modernisation". The investigation of crime quickly turned into a study of the emerging "modern" world, and the urban "mass society". It is therefore no coincidence that the main diagnostic terms developed towards a capturing of modernity, grew out, directly or indirectly, from empirical studies of crime. Crime was a social fact to be reckoned with, but crime was itself undergoing a transformation or a new type of problematisation that, as Foucault would argue much later (1979), pointed towards broader social configurations. Something was happening to crime in the passage to 20th century modernity, and it clearly connected to the emergence of new community forms – or perhaps the loss of such community forms. Early social science was therefore both an attempt to understand and to regulate crime; but this attempt was intimately tied to an understanding of modernity. Our "return" to crime in the current context must, in one way or another, keep us reflexively rooted in this question.

Ferdinand Tönnies: forms of crime in Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft

A main figure in the historical debate remains Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936). Tönnies is mostly known for having invoked the distinction between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*. Tönnies made this distinction in his 1887 book of the same title. Today, we mostly mention Tönnies in order to dismantle what is routinely considered an oversimplified dichotomy. The problem is that Tönnies is rarely read today, so we do not actually know what it is we criticise. In 1909, Tönnies became the first President of the German Society for Sociology, which he founded together with, among others, Simmel and Weber, a position he held until 1933 when he was ousted by the Nazis. He is perhaps the most published German

social scientist ever, with almost 900 works listed. Evidently, crime was a central theme in his entire oeuvre. According to the excellent and extremely helpful reconstruction of Tönnies' work on crime by Mathieu Deflem (which I follow here), Tönnies published 34 works on crime (22 papers, 3 books and 9 review articles), in addition to 17 related methodological papers on criminal statistics (Deflem 1999: 88).

Tönnies tackled the question of crime prevention and punishment throughout his life. He did it perhaps most directly in his 1891 article, *Prevention of Crime*, published in the International Journal of Ethics. Here, he anticipated what would later become more widely accepted, but which was then a quite unusual thing to claim: namely, that imprisonment would have no positive reformative effects on the imprisoned; quite the contrary. However, to assess the importance of Tönnies, one must return to his most prominent work, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*.

This was not just any book: its aim was to establish the epistemological and methodological principles of the discipline of sociology. Tönnies invoked the distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as a heuristic device, or as ideal types (the German word most often used by Tönnies was *normaltypen*). Even in today's networking society with computers and satellites, and as any person who has lived in both a small village and a large city can attest, there are indeed substantial differences in forms and styles of community formation relating to scale and size of the setting. The two types are differentiated partly by their mode of communication, i.e. traditional handed-down beliefs versus public opinion that is, at least on the surface, more "rationally" and scientifically based and grows out of reflection and discussion via an emerging public sphere that comes to supplement (if not replace) interpersonal relations. Tönnies never said that one form would replace the other in a positive evolution toward a modern, rational world. Likewise, Tönnies was *very* far from simply celebrating this emerging "public" and more "abstract" and "rational" society (see here Tönnies 2003). Such a naïve attitude toward the rationality of the public sphere should rather be ascribed to Habermasian approaches, certainly not to Tönnies.

Although *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* was not primarily about crime, its main conclusions had decidedly direct implications for understanding both crime and punishment. Tönnies understood that to capture the transformation of crime in the context of modernisation, one had to approach the nature of collective behaviour. Indeed, Tönnies' book was precisely an empirical analysis of collective identity and behaviour. It was a book about what kind of cultural community forms could emerge in modernity, as indicated by the original subtitle, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Abhandlung des Communismus und des Socialismus als empirischer Culturformen.*

Something quite essential happens to crime and law when moving in between the two worlds of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The equilibrium in Gemeinschaft is achieved through various forms for social control, including morals, conformism, and exclusion. Gesellschaft keeps its (always precarious) equilibrium through police, laws, tribunals and prisons. Rules in Gemeinschaft are implicit, while Gesellschaft has explicit rules (written laws). As Tönnies writes in his conclusion:

> We have on offer two contrasting systems of collective *social order*. One is based essentially on concord, on the fundamental harmony of wills, and is developed and cultivated by religion and custom. The other is based on convention, on a convergence or pooling of rational desires; it is guaranteed and protected by political legislation, while its policies and their ratification are derived from public opinion.

Tönnies called these two forms for law "customary" and "statutory". Following a much more rigorous and empirically sustained analysis than that of Durkheim, Tönnies (I stress it again) did not see these two forms as opposites or exclusive; but he did argue that there had been a gradual evolution from common to contract law. Moreover, in line with Weber, Tönnies argued that law had almost entirely been monopolised by the state.

Tönnies further distinguished between crimes and "infractions" as two types of punishable acts. Crimes are deliberate violations of social and political rules, involving infringements on the constitution. This is a meaningful distinction also in the contemporary context. In several of his later his empirical studies, Tönnies would show that certain crimes would proliferate in urban settings while others were more typical of a "small-scale" Gesellschaft settings. Rogues formed the larger part of all criminal types, and urban natives were more likely to belong to this category. The more a crime reflected a conscious *will*, the more likely it was to be attributed to urban criminals, while rural natives were more likely to commit crimes deriving from a passion which did not serve a specific material purpose (Deflem 1999: 95). In other words, Tönnies saw that while certain crimes diminish in a modern setting, other types – the willed crime, consciously inflicting harm upon other subjects in order to achieve a personal gain – would increase in volume.

In his later works, Tönnies returned to the question concerning the new type of collectivity that characterised the early 20th century (see for example Tönnies 2003[1922]). He wrote of "the dispersed audience" and "the large public" consisting of "spiritually [rather than spatially] connected" individuals. Tönnies focused in particular on the potential of the modern press system to eviscerate national borders. Indeed, to some extent, Tönnies' work certainly has to be understood as a study of media. This is important, as today everything we think and feel about crime is so evidently produced by the media. Most human beings have little or any *direct* contact with criminal acts, yet the discourse of crime is everywhere. Competing claims and slogans to combat crime can often determine political elections. Tönnies perceptively emphasised the factors that affected audience reception of a message. He identified an embryonic concept of "opinion leaders" and he also noted the strong impact the "personality" of the message deliverer could have. His analysis of propaganda stressing slogans, the sharpening of contrasts and the importance of repetition in many ways anticipated concerns regarding the most horrendous political crimes that came to characterise the 20th century.

Tönnies also wrote of the bursting of "opinion bubbles", and noted how 'public opinion lacks a specific space and time. It spreads like a fog…' (Tönnies 2001: 247). He wrote of the stream of anti-Semitic propaganda which 'leaves its banks at times of public

election', and critically observed that 'the press is free, but not its journalists.' A century before Murdoch, he referred to journalists as "prostitutes of the intellect." Tönnies' gave depth and attention to these questions in his mature work and timely contribution on the "spirit of the modern age", which appeared in 1935; a fuller discussion of this work is however outside the scope of this article. However, his analysis bears strong resemblances with the work of another criminologist-cum-sociologist: Gabriel Tarde.

The Durkheim/Tarde debate in France

In France, the reception of the book by Tönnies led to yet another confrontation – even if at a distance – between Gabriel Tarde and Emile Durkheim. I invoke this debate for reasons that go well beyond intellectual history. First, Gabriel Tarde's work must be considered a "missing classic" within a larger tradition of political anthropology (Szakolczai & Thomassen 2011). Moreover, the positions taken by Durkheim and Tarde provide two indeed decidedly different starting points for understanding modernity and the role of crime. Moreover, to put it quite plainly, Tarde's position is endlessly more fruitful, and brings us to the core of the problem relating to crime in mass societies. Inversely, and to put it even more bluntly: Durkheim's position was not only problematic in a general sense; it also positively blocked him from understanding the problematic nature of collective behaviour. Since Durkheim is still today the most referenced authority on the social study of crime and "deviance", this needs to be further explicated.

Durkheim's own thesis, published in 1892, proposed a distinction between organic and mechanical solidarity; and much like Tönnies, Durkheim indeed exemplified this division by considering two diverging types of punishment. Durkheim had already reviewed Tönnies' work in 1889, and quite critically so (Durkheim 1889). At the same time, Durkheim's ideas and concepts could be argued to rely quite heavily on the work of Tönnies. The debate over Tönnies' work was taken up again in 1895, where Tönnies' thesis was discussed by both Durkheim and Tarde in the same issue of *Revue Philosophique* (in which Durkheim had also published his 1889 review). The book by Tönnies clearly held central importance to both thinkers: next to the empirical analysis (including a certain involvement with crime), the larger aim of the book was to lay out the foundations of sociology as a science; its methodology relied upon statistical analysis and its interpretation; the entire argument had to do with a general grasp of social life, and the transformation of power and social relationships within a larger process of mass urbanisation.

The Tarde/Durkheim commentary mostly centred on the relationship between the human "will" and society, the individual and the social. Durkheim stated his position in a short article, *Crime and Social Health*, while Tarde made his positions clear with an almost identical title, *Criminality and Social Health*. For Durkheim, "social facts" were both independent from and exert influence upon the individual consciousness, not the other way round; for Tarde, things were somewhat more complex, and he failed to see how sociological concepts could exist in total isolation from psychological factors.

Considering that social science textbooks still today position Tönnies' concepts

of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft as being similar to Durkheim's notions of mechanical and organic solidarity, it is worthwhile invoking Tönnies' own reaction to the Tarde/Durkheim dispute. Tönnies concurred with Durkheim that social facts (a term that Tönnies considered identical to his own concept of "social wills") are somehow independent from, and have a certain force over, individual consciousness. In contrast, Tönnies said, Tarde 'is absolutely right when he calls sociological concepts, which are released from all psychological foundation, frivolous and fantastic. In Durkheim, indeed, the psychological foundation is entirely missing' (Tönnies quoted in Deflem 1999: 103). Therefore, Tönnies situated himself between the extremes of "sociologism" and "psychologism", but in fact he came remarkably close to Tarde's position. Tönnies argued that the *force* of social life over individuals, so stressed by Durkheim, is only an extreme case and not at all the general rule: 'the general is the reciprocity (*Wechselwirkung*) between, on one hand, the individuals, and, on the other hand, a social will which is looked upon by them, conceived as substantially, and, therefore precisely, *created*' (ibid.).

Tönnies' position on the relationship between human will and social formations is almost identical to Tarde's focus on interdependencies and reciprocity: and rather than positing the social as a given, they both agreed that what we need to explain is exactly the *formation* of the social will. Tönnies' position, however, is simply not compatible with that of Durkheim. In fact, in his own review of Durkheim's *Rules of the Sociological Method*, Tönnies, not without an ironic twist, noted how Durkheim had proposed a binary distinction with an evolutionist view lurking behind it, when this was exactly what he had criticised Tönnies for doing; he also expressed his surprise that Durkheim's perspective led to the 'curious result, that criminality would be a normal phenomenon of social life' (Tönnies quoted in Deflem 1999: 103).

This very general point has important bearings upon how we see and approach political crimes in a modern setting. Summarising what has been argued thus far, any such understanding must be surely rooted in a deeper understanding of the relationship between individual and community and the role of crowds and publics in modernity. In the following, allow me to further elaborate this point, engaging with the contributions of Gabriel Tarde in greater detail.

Gabriel Tarde and the rise of the public and "collective crime"

> *'The true advent of journalism, hence that of the public, dates from the Revolution, which was one of the growing pains of the public…'*
> *(Tarde 1969: 280).*

Tarde's position, in contrast to Durkheim, cannot be easily summarised. Gabriel Tarde was born in Sarlat, the Dordogne, France in 1843, where he grew up to become a lawyer and *juge d'instruction*. Early on in his career, he observed that particular crimes appeared to spread in "waves" through society as if they were fashions. Therefore, Tarde's early

interests had to do with crime in a comparative perspective. It was this interest that led him toward the social sciences. Tarde sensed that the epidemiological aspect of criminal activity might be just one instance of a more general feature of the social world. From this observation, and through the publication of a series of articles and books, and in particular his main work, *The Laws of Imitation* (first published 1890), he developed this idea and outlined a general research program for sociology, one that would differ in fundamental ways from that of Durkheim.

Tarde is arguably one of the most overlooked figures in anthropological/sociological theory; as an opponent to Durkheim, he was side-lined and almost forgotten within the social sciences after his death in 1904 (see again Szakolczai & Thomassen 2011; Thomassen 2012b). This is particularly unfortunate, as Tarde's reflection on the crowd and the public should stand as central readings in any effort to understand "crowd violence" and political crimes committed by collectivities, within or beyond state legislation.

Tarde started out as a comparative criminologist before he became a sociologist, or rather, a "micro-sociologist" within what one can certainly identify as an anthropological tradition. Tarde's work was placed in the intersection between comparative criminology, sociology and psychology. Several article titles of Tarde can be mentioned here: *Les crimes des foules* (*The Crimes of Crowds*, 1892), *Foules et sectes au point de vue criminel* (*Crowds and Sects in Criminal Terms*, 1893). Most importantly, however, Tarde had highlighted the role of imitation in his *Laws of Imitation* (1903).

In Tarde's early publications, he took issue with racial and geographic theories as for example argued by Lombroso and the Italian school. Tarde instead emphasised the preponderance of social factors behind crime (Tarde 1969: 2–5). Furthermore, for Tarde, social factors meant to a high degree *socialisation* and *imitation*. Crime in general and crowd violence in particular can only be fully captured once related to imitation and the role played by imitative behaviour. Tarde argued that the tendency towards imitation is the single most fundamental drive behind the creation and development of social institutions; it is, alas, equally crucial for the study of political crime.

The starting point is that crime is highly mimetic, evidenced by such widely used terms as "crime waves" (first used in 1893) and "crime cultures". Tarde identified three laws of imitation, including (1) the law of close contact, (2) the law of imitation of superiors by inferiors, and (3) the law of insertion. Each of the three types goes some way toward describing how/why people engage in crime. First, individuals in close intimate contact with one another imitate each other's behaviour. Simply put, people have a greater tendency to imitate those with whom they have the most contact. This, however (and in contrast to Durkheim's superficial critique of Tarde) is no mere "aping". People imitate each other best in the most intimate aspects of their behaviour, which are closest to expressing the states of the soul, like their gestures and manners, or in the pronunciation and tones of their voices (Tarde1903: 204). The consumption of luxuries is more imitative than the satisfaction of basic needs, and passions are more imitative than simple appetites: drinking is more imitative than eating, while sexual behaviour is the most imitative of all

(ibid.: 194-7). Imitation, contrary to what might be expected, proceeds from the inner to the outer, starting from the "soul" (ibid.: 199).

Tarde's second law of imitation spreads from the top down: youngsters imitate older children, the poor try to imitate the rich, students imitate teachers, children their parents. Many types of crime are efforts of imitation in this sense. Tarde's third law is the law of insertion: new acts and behaviours are superimposed on old ones and subsequently either reinforce or discourage previous customs. On a related point, Tarde distinguished between two types of imitation, directed towards either *fashion* or *custom*. This distinction belongs to his analysis of the third "extra-logical" influences of imitation, the rhythm between periods when imitation mostly looks towards the past for models, and the ages of custom, and when such models are searched in the present, or the ages of fashion (Tarde 1903: 244 ff). Our modern age, as shown with etymological precision (the French word for fashion is *mode*), certainly belongs to the latter type; and the eventual victory of this modernity constantly breaking with the past seems to be secured by the very logic of rising mutual imitation. Even further, Tarde also argued that in our age, as a consequence of homogenisation, even the natural direction of imitation seems to be reversed: the central modality of imitation not only shifts from time to space, but here it is the *foreign* that gains a model status, instead of the close, the old, the tried, tested and familiar (ibid.: 247).

Imitation in the "publics" and the question of leadership

[I]nfectious epidemics spread with air or wind; epidemics of crime follow the telegraph

G. Tarde, (Tarde 2001: 340-1)

Tarde considered imitation the foundation of sociality. Far from disappearing in modern, urban societies, based on rational and autonomous individuals, it rather transforms itself with the new circumstances. In his later works, Tarde would further explore the role of imitation with respect to crowds and the emerging "public realm". He did so, for example, in his influential article *The Public and the Crowd*, in which Tarde showed appreciation for Le Bon's work, but with a difference: 'I cannot then agree with that solid writer, Dr. Le Bon, that ours is "the age of the crowd". It is the age of the public, or the publics–and that is quite different' (Tarde 1969: 281).

The distinction is crucial, and stands quite close to the ideas of Tönnies. Whereas in "crowd behaviour", imitation and contagion would happen via direct contact; the emerging "public" has different characteristics that Tarde tried to pin down. In contrast to the crowd, the public is something more intangible, a 'dispersion of individuals who are physically separated and whose cohesion is merely mental' (ibid.: 277). Imitation and contagion are still at play, but at constantly increasing distances. Tarde fully understood the ambivalence of modern city life: increasing interaction, interdependence and the spatial concentration of people went hand-in-hand with distance.

Tarde linked these observations to the role of printing (a mimetic technique *par excellence*, as Benjamin saw so well), in particular newspapers. The newspaper becomes

a focal point for "currents of opinion", but these currents do not originate in physical encounters but in an imagined or "dreamed" togetherness. The power of the newspaper lies in its novel type of bonding people: 'this bond lies in their simultaneous conviction or passion and in their awareness of sharing at the same time an idea or a wish with a great number of other men' (1969: 278). It has gone largely unnoticed that Tarde here fully anticipated Benedict Anderson's analysis (1991) of reading audiences and the role of the newspapers in the formation of "imagined communities".

Tarde recognised new forms of association as becoming still more impersonal, producing a 'transportation of thought across distance' (ibid.: 279). Whereas one can be a member of only one crowd at a time, this is not so for the public. In fact, said Tarde, there is not one public but many public*s*. This means that mimetic processes can become limitless and therefore almost explosive. The public, says Tarde from the outset of the argument, 'never ceases to grow' and its 'indefinite extension is one of the most clearly marked traits of our period' (ibid.: 277).

Who is the "director" of publics? A main instigator of the public is the journalist (as discussed by Salmon (2009) Tarde was very much reflecting on the Dreyfuss affair as he formulated these ideas). These observations, taken on their own, render clear the importance of Tarde for theorising the public sphere. Tarde would indeed talk about journalists and their capability to create objects of hate and agitate the public in uncontrollable ways; far from the "free press" being a prerequisite for modern democracy, it actually poses a problem: 'The danger for new democracies is the increasing difficulty for men of thought to avoid the obsession of the seductive agitation' (ibid.: 293). The role of the intellectual, said Tarde, is to *resist* 'the destructive and leveling effects of democracy' (ibid.: 294). Tarde traced back the emergence of the press to the 16th century, but noted how it had acquired a new and innovative importance during the events of the French Revolution – without, however, engaging with a fuller analysis.

Finally, in his psychology of crowds and publics Tarde noted that '[p]olitical crowds, mostly urban, are the most impassioned and the most furious; fortunately they are versatile, passing from execration to adoration, from excessive anger to excessive joy with extreme facility' (1969: 289). Let me end this article by suggesting that Tarde here had put together elements of an analytical framework that serves to understand the emergence and proliferation of one particularly problematic category of political crime, namely that kind of escalating crime that takes place within the context of modern, political revolutions.

'And never heads enough': Violence and the mimetic spiral in revolutions

Domestic carnage, now filled the whole year With feast-days, old men
from the chimney-nook, The maiden from the bosom of her love,
The mother from the cradle of her babe, The warrior from the field – all
perished, all – Friends, enemies, of all parties, ages, ranks,
Head after head, and never heads enough For those that bade them fall.

William Wordsworth, '...and never heads enough...'

Tarde's analysis of imitation and contagion in the modern public sphere can be complemented by the theoretical framework developed by René Girard, and his concept of "mimetic spiral". Girard has analysed mimesis and the relationship between mimesis on the one hand and violence, victimage and truth of the sacred on the other (1976). Girard focused on desire, of acquisitive mimesis (where 'two mimetic rivals attempt to wrest from one another an object because they designate it desirable to one another') and analysed what he called mimetic "contagion" or what he also termed the mimetic spiral – which is one of violence. In his latest work, Girard elaborates these ideas in the context of Clausewitz' writings on war and warfare. Girard's conclusion is that we have entered an age of limitless imitation, an age of accelerating extremities – accompanied by a general process of undifferentiation (Girard 2011). Girard's analysis here shows strong affinities with with Gregory Bateson's discussion of schismogenesis and schismogenetic processess (Bateson 1958).

The point I briefly want to invoke here (for further detail, see Thomassen 2012a) is quite simply that revolutions, defined as sudden ruptured in the institutional make-up of society, can be considered archetypical examples of what Victor Turner saw as "social drama". Turner himself came to recognise that his analysis of performance and liminality bore strong resemblances with human behaviour in the context of political revolutions. However, Turner very problematically paid little attention to the utterly negative and dangerous aspects of liminal behaviour. The second point is therefore that political revolutions are inherently prone to political violence. The most celebrated political revolutions within the European tradition, including the French and the Russian Revolutions, are critically tied to the emergence of new forms of political crime originating in crowd behaviour.

As is well-known, the concept and practice of state "terror" has its origin in the French Revolution and its aftermath. Some of the most horrendous crimes committed during and after the revolution were imitated and took on new proportions with the "red terror" of the Bolsheviks. Such crimes were ignited as acts of group violence outside the legal framework of the state, in what I argue can be understood as "liminal moments" (Thomassen 2009; 2012a), but were then continued within the framework of the new, centralised state, before propelling outwards toward external aggression and warfare. It does seem the case that we still have to come to terms with what might be identified as an *inherently* problematic nature of modern politics, and its reliance on what one might claim to be a "revolutionary epistemology", shared by both Liberal and Socialist regimes.

Girard's analysis, together with Mauss' perceptive account of the Bolsheviks (see Thomassen 2012a), helps us to realise the importance of Turner's insights concerning ritual process; however, they also help us to realise the problematic nature of such process. This public liminality is also what Turner calls "public subjunctivity": 'For a while, anything goes: taboos are lifted, fantasies are enacted, indicative mood behaviour is reversed, the low are exalted and the mighty abased.' However, in contrast to "classical" ritual passages, revolutionary settings are characterised by an absence of ceremony leaders or elders who have been through the passage before; hence, they are marked by a crisis in leadership and a total loss of trust in existing institutions or persons. This creates a setting that allows for imitative behaviour to spread like wildfire, an unleashing of social forces that can easily spiral

out of control. It is no coincidence that the three most imitative types of human behaviour are exactly the ones that tend to roll like an avalanche in revolutionary moments, and often in some tragic form of combination: violence, sexuality and laughter. I hasten to add that the laughter in question is of course not the angelical one we can enjoy on a child's face, transmitting us a primordial, sheer joy of existence; what spreads is something quite different: the demonic, mobbing laughter which is ritually aimed at denigrating or ridiculing others, in public, and very often as a part of mob violence toward designated victims (Baudelaire' reflections on the essence of laughter went far toward capturing these dimensions). Turner himself arguably downplayed these destructive, mimetic forces; after all, he liked to think of liminality as a refreshing cultural force. This might be so, but revolutionary dynamics can easily create a downward spiral toward the murderous grotesque.

The question is then who and what one imitates in a moment where stabile reference points are absent. Revolutionary leaders have often been "outsiders" or marginal figures, often travelling from place to place waiting for their moment to play their game. Far from being charismatic and therefore "gifted", they were rather genuine human failures and outcasts who in highly liminal moments *somehow* captured power. Crowd leaders, wrote Le Bon in 1895, 'are especially recruited from the ranks of those morbidly nervous, excitable, half-deranged persons who are bordering on madness.' I don't think political scientists have really been able to capture this process, and there are very serious reasons why we need to rethink our established notions of political dictators from Robespierre to Mussolini as being "charismatic" (Horvath 1998; 2013).

Revolutionary leaders in history resemble trickster figures. Tricksters are trained in upsetting the social order by reversing values and via their rhetorical and theatrical skills. As noted by Weber, in moments of radical social or political change, in "out-of-the-ordinary moments", we see the emergence of charismatic leadership – but what Weber failed to notice is that in such moment, when, as Shakespeare put it, "degree is shaken", we also see the emergence of a whole series of other sinister figures.

In other words, revolutions represent perfect scenes for different sorts of self-proclaimed ceremony masters who claim to "have seen the future", but who in reality establish their own position by perpetuating liminality and by emptying the liminal moment from real creativity, turning it into a scene of mimetic rivalry (see again Szakolczai 2000: 218). This is exactly what Girard argued in *Violence and the Sacred* (1976). According to Girard, once a process of undifferentiation unfolds, the process of doubling threatens to spread, and can only be brought to a halt via sacrifice. In the final years of his life, Victor Turner came to recognise the importance of Girard (see for example Turner 1988: 34), and in the precise context of the ritual structure: crisis is contagious, like a plague, and sometimes the 'redressive machinery… fails to function' (ibid.: 35), leading to 'a reversion to crisis.'

Modern revolutions, far from simply providing freedom and rights, actually most often lead to *more* state centralisation, and very often to more violence. The mob violence that unravels in the revolutionary turmoil continues within the new power mechanisms of the centralised state – in fact, modern state institutions develop *with* violence. And finally, in terms of effective history, this almost systematic outbreak of internal violence will often take an outward dimension, propelling the revolutionary movement and the singling out of

enemies into external warfare. The Bolsheviks, after all, did have a model to imitate. As Kropotkin wrote in 1909, 'What we learn from the study of the Great [French] Revolution is that it was the source of all the present communist, anarchist and socialist conceptions.'

Conclusion

This paper has attempted, via the works of Tönnies and Tarde, and aided by maverick anthropologists, such as Victor Turner and Gregory Bateson, to reflect upon crime in a general way, and upon the outbreak of violence as a political crime in the more specific setting of political revolutions. A general understanding of political crimes must insert itself within a larger understanding of the transition to modernity. This was clearly understood by some of the "founding fathers" of the social sciences, including Gabriel Tarde and Ferdinand Tönnies, whose works remain valuable resources in the contemporary context. I think such a reflection is useful for a general, anthropological understanding of two broad types of "political crime": crimes committed by modern states against their own citizens (especially by totalitarian regimes but not only) and crimes committed by individuals and crowds in revolutionary moments, in ritual liminality.

The 20th century was marred by political crimes on a scale unprecedented in human history, involving the systematic mass-elimination of "undesired" human beings. As understood by thinkers such as Eric Voegelin and Hannah Arendt, and as also analysed by Zygmunt Bauman, this escalation of violence must be placed within the unfolding of political modernity, rather than being explained away as irrational hick-ups of the pre-modern. From the French Revolution onwards, modern revolutions, far from simply providing freedom and rights, actually most often lead to *more* state centralisation, and very often to more violence. As always stressed by Eisenstadt, the "Jacobin" elements of the French revolution is an inherent part of modernity, and belongs to the core of our revolutionary tradition, hence cannot simply be cast aside as an unhappy side-consequence of otherwise healthy principles. It is also on this particular question that the anthropological traditions of ritual and violence can throw new light on political crimes in the transition to modernity.

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Povzetek

Živimo v obdobju, za katerega je močno in morda edinstveno značilno popularno in politično osredotočanje na zločin. Ko sprejema povabilo k tej posebni številki, je namen tega članka podati refleksijo vprašanja: Kakšen je lahko antropološki prispevek k vprašanju političnih zločinov? Refleksija je sestavljena iz treh medsebojno povezanih delov. V prvem delu se avtor želi ukvarjati s pomenom besed, ki jih uporabljamo, ko govorimo o "zločinu" in "političnem". V drugem delu razpravlja o tem, kako so se družbene vede pojavile v poznem 19. stoletju kot refleksija o naravi zločina v prehodu v moderno. Poudarjena je pomembnost neke skoraj pozabljene "klasične tradicije". V tretjem delu avtor na kratko nakaže, kako so najbolj slavljene politične revolucije znotraj evropske tradicije, vključno s francosko in rusko revolucijo, kritično povezane s pojavom novih oblik političnega zločina, ki izvira iz vedênja množice. Okvir, ki je izdelan v članku, se opira na prispevke klasičnih antropologov in sociologov, ki so, četudi znani kot ključne figure, do sedaj ostali obrobni znotraj politične antropologije: Ferdinand Tönnies, Gabriel Tarde, Marcel Mauss, Gregory Bateson, Victor Turner and René Girard.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: politični zločin, prehod v moderno, klasična tradicija, politične revolucije, vedênje množice

CORRESPONDENCE: BJØRN THOMASSEN, Roskilde Universitet, Institut for Samfund og Globalisering, Universitetsvej 1, 23.1, DK-4000, Roskilde, Danmark.
E-mail: bthomas@ruc.dk.

Genocide as social death: A comparative conceptual analysis

Bojan Žalec
University of Ljubljana, bojan.zalec@teof.uni-lj.si

Abstract

This article explains the concept of genocide by means of the concept of social death. Its central findings are that genocide is an extreme form of social death; the intentional causing of social death is the central evil of genocide; social death is what distinguishes genocide from mass killings; the physical killing of the members of the target groups is not essential for genocide; there are more sophisticated forms of genocide by which the members of the target groups are not killed physically, but instead "only" particular ties, relationships and social structures, which are of vital importance for the survival of the target groups as such, are destroyed. This article also explains what kind of groups are targets of genocide, the claim that genocide is an ethically laden concept, and some implications of this fact. On this basis, it provides a comparative analysis of some phenomena closely connected with genocide: crimes against humanity, totalitarianism, terrorism and ethnic cleansing. It reflects also upon the genocidal effects of military mass rapes. *What is genocide?* is a crucial question. Consequently, sharpening our minds for the recognition of genocide, including by providing an adequate definition that is appropriately tested, is a vital task. Providing such a definition is the main aim of this article.

KEYWORDS: genocide, targets of genocide, social death, ethnic cleansing, mass rapes, Claudia Card

Introduction

In this paper, I deal with the concept of genocide. My main aim is to contribute to a better or clearer understanding of this important concept. I will attempt to do so by means of the concept of social death, following (in this respect) a substantial part the ideas elaborated by Claudia Card (2010).

The explicit understanding and definition of genocide are essential in order to determine whether a particular phenomenon is a genocide or not, and for a better understanding of its relationship to some other related phenomena belonging to other concepts: war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, totalitarianism, mass killings, mass (and systematic) sexual violence, etc. For that reason, I will attempt to discern the concept of genocide from those concepts.

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In the major part of the paper, I deal with a conceptual analysis and conceptual distinctions. Those distinctions significantly enrich and enlighten our discussion. They enable us to perceive the salient aspects of our topic that would otherwise remain hidden. Any debate without knowledge about those distinctions and taking them into account is inherently inferior.

The main method I use in the paper is therefore a (comparative) analysis of the concept of genocide. I use relevant (contemporary) literature on genocide, and I test findings and hypotheses in the light of concrete historical and contemporary phenomena. Of course, I take into account also the legal texts that deal with the concept of genocide and other relevant concepts.

My own general and basic view, which provides the background of all my consideration in this paper, can be best described with the term *solidary personalism*. Solidary personalism can be perhaps best understood in comparison to nihilism and instrumentalism, which form its antipode (cf. Žalec 2011a). Nihilism is a condition of an individual, a group, a society, culture in which all experiential and intellectual horizons are completely levelled. A nihilistic subject cannot honestly experience one thing or being as more valuable than any other. As nihilism is practically impossible, it is usually transformed into some kind of instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is the attitude that does not regard a particular person as a goal, but (at best) just as a means. To the contrary, for a personalist, every person is always a goal. The main aim of a personalist is the flourishing of every person. Nihilism and instrumentalism are the fundamental problems (of our age). They seriously hinder or even halt the cultivation of dialogue, solidarity, tolerance etc. All mentioned goods and their relatives are essential moments of personalist attitudes, ethics, relationships and existence. The fundamental (ethical) task (of our age) consists in (finding ways for) the sufficient and adequate diminishing or limitation of the scope of the instrumentalist reason and practice.

The most appropriate attitude towards (cultural) identities might be called (using epistemological terms) "critical realism" (cf. Žalec 2011b: 112). Neither the attitude that takes identities as untouchable or overestimates their importance or superiority – nor the stance that diminishes their importance or even considers them as something that should be destroyed or eliminated because they are only used for some bad aims, to instrumentalise people's attachments, affections, emotions for certain goals (political, economic, etc.) – are proper. Neither the subordination of some individual concrete persons to some (collective) identity nor the "nihilistic" attitude to identity are acceptable. Collective or moral identities[1] are necessary for the flourishing of persons; they have their irreplaceable value that should be respected yet they should also develop and transform themselves. Their good and acceptable elements should be accepted, and some other parts should be discarded or modified.

One of the most central and basic background premises in this article is that genocide (and other related phenomena with which I deal, e.g. crimes against humanity, mass murders, mass sexual violence, war crimes, totalitarianism) represents

[1] For further elucidation of the concept of moral identity see Strahovnik 2011, pp. 69–72.

a violation of the ethics of solidary personalism. Hence, the negative/positive factors of solidary personalism are *eo ipso* positive/negative factors of genocide and of other abovementioned crimes. A similar thesis may be asserted *mutatis mutandis* regarding the correlations between nihilism and instrumentalism on one hand, and genocide and its cognates on the other. Consecutively, we may say that factors of solidary personalism/nihilism/instrumentalism may be considered as important factors and signs or indicators of genocide (or its cognate phenomena). Unfortunately, this article would be far too long if we also dealt with the factors of genocides.[2]

There are two further topics that are very important for increasing knowledge about genocides. The first is the sources of information about genocides.[3] The second is (the elimination of) the (common) prejudices[4] about the factors, agents or elements of genocide(s). Neither of those two themes will be discussed in this article. The reason is the same as in the case of the factors of genocide.

Definitions of genocide

UN Convention definition

First introduced by Raphael Lemkin in the 20th century, the term *genocide* is not very old. The international legal definition of genocide is given in the second and third articles of the (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide from 1948.[5] The second article describes the psychical and the physical element of genocide. Both elements must be present for a crime to be described as genocide. The psychical element is the intention to destroy (completely or partially) a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such. The physical element comprises five types of actions: a) killing of the members of the group (of a certain nation); b) causing severe physical or psychical damage to the members of the group; c) intentional exposure of the group to such life conditions that lead to its complete or partial destruction; d) establishing of measures with the intention to prevent new births in the group; e) forcibly transferring of children from one group to another. The destruction of groups, which is the aim of genocide, therefore does not mean only killing, but also the destruction of the life conditions or factors of the group on economic, political, territorial, cultural and other levels or areas.

The third article of the convention enumerates five types of criminal actions: a) genocide, b) a plan for the execution of genocide; c) direct and public promotion of the execution of genocide; d) an attempt of genocide; e) participation in genocide.[6]

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[2] For the factors of genocide see for instance Heidenrich 2001, pp. 73-85, Jones 2011, ch. 16. I dealt with them in Žalec 2011c, p. 302 and the following.

[3] The sources of the information of genocide are considered in Heidenrich 2001, pp. 74–9. Cf. also Žalec 2011c, pp. 306-7.

[4] About prejudices and mistaken conjectures regarding genocide see Heidenrich 2001, pp. 80–5, also Žalec 2011c, pp. 304–5.

[5] The Convention is available on http://preventgenocide.org/law/convention/

[6] http://www.preventgenocide.org/ba/pravnadefinicijagenocida.htm

It is also important to take into account the following words written by Claudia Card:

> So worded, the definition does not require that the intent succeed in destroying a group, even in part. Yet intolerable harm can be done if any of the enumerated acts is carried out. Any committed with the requisite intent is sufficient to ground a charge of genocide. The definition does not say explicitly that these are the only acts that might ground the charge. But neither does it provide a general principled way to identify other acts that might do so (Card 2010: 6368–77).

However, the definition of genocide from the UN Convention is deficient and insufficient. We can agree with the following citation from the journal *Zaveza:*

> As it can be seen from the definition formulated by the Convention of the UN, genocide means destruction of certain national, ethnical, racial or religious groups of people. Some think that political, economic and cultural groups are excluded since the Convention does not speak directly about them (compare the 2nd article). Anyway it is worrying that political, economic and cultural genocides are not taxatively enumerated, because there are not enough other international legal mechanisms which would protect from different regimes and repression those who think differently. Partly this gap was filled with the European convention about human rights[7] from 4th of November 1950 which is limited mostly to the European countries and therefore without real impact on the World situation.[8]

The need for a broader definition of genocide

I also agree with Leo Kuper (1981; see also Jones 2011: 16–7) that the definition of genocide in the Convention of the UN is not fully adequate, and that its greatest deficiency is that political groups are not on the list of those groups that are protected, since political differences are one of the most important reasons for genocides (besides racial, national, ethnical or religious).[9] Genocides against racial, national, ethnical and religious groups are (at least in many cases) the results of political conflicts or they are at least closely connected with them. Nevertheless, Kuper thinks that it is inappropriate to change the meaning of the term that is internationally adopted and used. However, because such a definition of the term does not enable properly discussing the problem, Kuper has decided to use the term *liquidating or exterminating actions* against particular groups. I consider

[7] Available at: http://www.media-forum.si/slo/pravo/pravni-viri/evropska-konvencija.pdf

[8] http://www.zaveza.si/index.php/revija-zaveza/92-zaveza-t-04

[9] Furthermore, Chirot and McCauley (2010) wrote that the biggest genocides of the 20th century were ideological, not ethnical. I agree with this, yet we should acknowledge that things are very complex and that they are changing and that we should bear in mind also some other important facts as the following: 'After the Cold War, ethnicity and religion came to be more important causes of conflict than ideology. Additionally, most post-Cold War conflicts were intrastate affairs involving some issues of autonomy for certain regions or groups. In a period of changing conceptions of national identity, many people involved in violent conflict began to identify with something closer to their daily experience than the nation, such as clan, ethnicity, or region, leading to a breakdown of centralized authority. Collective violence was characterized by factionalization and diffusion of power. Conflicts of this period did not in general lend themselves to mediation by existing formal and government mechanisms, including international law or precedent (based as it was in the state system)' (Lorey & Beezley 2002: xii).

this term to be inappropriate because it is too loose. Therefore, I will use the word *genocide* in the present text as referring also to the destruction[10] of political groups and classes. At the same time, I would like to add that we should consider the reason that the definition in the Convention of the UN is so deficient. Perhaps simply because it is true that political and class differences are so basic and allow the perpetrators of genocide to avoid the charge of genocide by claiming that they did not carry out genocide, but rather murdered people on the basis of political and class affiliation and not on the basis of those which are enumerated in the definition of genocide in the Convention of the UN.

Lemkin's definition

In his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944), Lemkin defined the term *genocide* as denoting: 'a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves' (Lemkin 1944: 79; quoted by Card 2010, loc. 6397–403).

We can agree with Card that there is a certain – not unimportant – difference between Lemkin's definition of genocide and the one we find in the UN convention:

> Unlike the convention, Lemkin does not understand genocide as consisting in any of a set of enumerable acts, *each* of which might have the intent to destroy a group "in whole or in part." Rather, Lemkin understands genocide as an overarching *plan*, and it is to the plan, rather to the specific kinds of action taken to implement it, that the requisite intent attaches. If the plan and its implementation are collective, so is the relevant intent… Activities that further such a plan take their genocidal character from that of the plan to which they contribute (Card 2010: 6403–13).

Forms of genocide

There are several forms of genocide. In the literature, many terms can be found (cf. Jones 2011: 26–9): classicide, democide, ecocide, eliticide, ethnocide, femicide/feminicide, fratricide, gendercide, judeocide, linguicide, memoricide, omnicide, politicide, poorcide and urbicide.

Therefore, for instance, the mass killings in Slovenia in spring 1945 were classicide – the term used by Mann (2005: 26) – or politicide[11] – the term used by Harff and Gurr (cf. Harff 2003).[12] Politicide is an intentional action in order to destroy a particular

[10] For completion of the survey of the accounts regarding the question 'What is destroyed in genocide?' see Jones 2011: 29–33.

[11] Socialist Yugoslavia signed the Convention and ratified it. Its Legal Code defined genocide as a punishable and imprescriptible crime against humanity. Furthermore, in the Legal Code of the Republic of Slovenia genocide is included and penalty prescribed for it.

[12] Alas also in the modern Slovene liberal democratic state a large group of people (more than 25,000) was "condemned" to some form of social death. This is a group of the so-called erased citizens who were erased from the civil registry of the Republic of Slovenia in February 1992. In July 2012, the Great Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its decision finding Slovenia in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Cf. Sebastian Kohn, Victory for Slovenia's erased citizens at the European Court of Human Rights, available at: http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/victory-slovenias-erased-citizens-european-court-human-rights and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Erased. For a more detail consideration of the case of the erased see Beznec (2007) and Kogovšek Šalomon (2012).

political social group. Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr think that revolutionary one-party states are the most frequent perpetrators of politicide (cf. Jones 2011: 28).

When researching genocides, it is very important to take into account structural aggression or violence, i.e. destructive relationships that are part of economic or social systems (cf. Jones 2011: 47). An example of such structural violence is "poorcide" (this term was first used by Udayakumar (1995) to describe the genocide of poor people through structural poverty) which is carried out through neoliberal globalisation. Regardless, researching genocide should include the understanding of structural violence as a genocide mechanism. A large part of structural violence is a part of societal *background.* And this is exactly what we will do in the following part of the article. We will focus our attention on the conditions of the vitality of groups. The destruction of those conditions is the aim of genocide.

Genocide as social death

A very important contribution to the understanding and defining of the concept of genocide has been given by the philosopher Claudia Card. The central role in her definition of genocide is played by the concept of social death: 'Social death is not necessarily genocide. But genocide is social death' (Card 2010: 5559–61).

In this article, I will follow the understanding of the term social death as found in Card's book. Let us read the following quotation in order to better understand the way she uses the term *social death* and its implied opposite *social vitality*:

> Social vitality is interpersonal. An individual can experience social death without others experiencing it, too. But for an individual to have social vitality, others must have it. I borrow the concept of social death from Orlando Patterson's work on slavery (Patterson 1982: 5–9). Patterson argues that slavery, as historically a substitute for slaughter of the conquered in war, simply substituted one kind of death for another, social death for mass homicide. Slaves in the Americas who descended from kidnapped Africans were born socially dead, cut off from intergenerational social connections in both directions, past and future. They were, as he put it, natally alienated. In genocides, survivors experience social death, to a degree and for a time. Some later become revitalised in new ways; others do not. Descendants of genocide survivors, like descendants of slaves who were kidnapped, may be "natally alienated" no longer able to pass along and build upon the traditions, cultural developments (including languages), and projects of earlier generations (Card 2010: 6090–100).

Social death can have several different origins (slavery, illness, banishment, self-chosen isolation, etc.). It is not always something bad, but in the case of genocides we are dealing with social death, which is evil. As Card put it:

> Genocide is an extreme of social death. The intentional production of social death in a people or community is the central evil of genocide. That is not only when genocide is mainly cultural but even when it is homicidal on a

> massive scale. Social death distinguishes the evil of genocide, morally, from the evil of other mass murders. Even genocidal murder can be understood as an extreme means to the primary goal of social death. Social vitality exists through relationships, contemporary and intergenerational, that create contexts and identities that give meaning and shape to our lives (Card 2010: 5567–72).

These relationships may be of more private nature (with relatives, co-workers, etc.) or less personal and mediated by social institutions (educational, religious, political etc.) (Card 2010: 5570–4). Loss of social vitality is a deep loss. Not all mass murders or killings have as its aim such a loss. Card cites as an example the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh: 'It was an atrocity, but not a genocide' (2010: 5574–7). And of course not all mass murders that have as their goal the loss of social vitality of individual victims are successful in really carrying out their aim. Here is Card's example, which confirms this thesis:

> The Czechoslovakian Jews of Terezin from the "family camp" at Auschwitz who walked into the gas chambers singing the Czech national anthem and the *Hatikva* clung to their social as well as spiritual vitality to the very end … Nevertheless, the Nazi genocide robbed them of descendants who might have shared it (Card 2010: 5577–85).

Taking into account the centrality of social death for genocide, we realise that killing of the members of a target group is not essential for genocide. There are (more sophisticated) forms of genocide that do not physically kill the members of a target groups, but "only" destroy certain ties, relationships and social structures which are of vital importance for the survival of target groups:

> Forcibly sterilizing the women or the men of a target group, or forcibly separating children from their parents for re-education to assimilate them in another group, can be genocidal in both aim and effect (Card 2010: 5584–90).

What kinds of groups are targets of genocide?

Genos in genocide is today widely understood as people (Card 2010: 5773–6), but what kind of people? In order to answer this question, Card uses the conceptual distinctions between aggregate, structural group and social group. These distinctions are based on the work of Iris Marion Young.[13] People are not just an aggregate, nor just a structural group. A structural group is 'a serial[14] collectivity united by the relationships of members to externals, which gives them common interests' (Card 2010: 5774–80).

[13] Cf. Card 2010, Part I, Ch. 1, subchapter 3, 4 and Part II, Ch. 9 (especially subchapter 3).

[14] The term *series* for a kind of social group was first used by Jean-Paul Sartre (1976). His example is people listening to the radio. Young used the term *serial collectivity.* Her example is women (see Young 1997). Serial collectivities are unified by externalities. In the case of women, such externalities are – according to Young (1997) – the sexual division of labor and enforced institutionalised heterosexuality (Cf. Card 2010: 1929–32).

Thus, as Cards noticed, the occupants of the Twin Towers on 9/11, for instance, were not a people. Rather

> a people is a *social group* in Young's sense, that is, a collectivity united by internal relationships and traditions, such as a common language and practices. Relationships that constitute a people include connections in kinship and citizenship as well as cultural and social relationships created by such things as a common literature, cuisine, humor, and by sharing in the creation and maintenance of laws and traditions. These practices and relationships create the social vitality that gives meanings to the lives of members of peoples (Card 2010: 5782–7).

Therefore, one might conclude that social groups are the proper targets of genocides. However, the matter is not so simple. Today, it is the Holocaust that is taken by the majority as the main paradigm of genocide. However, what kind of group did the Jews, as the target group of the Holocaust, constitute? Certainly not a social group, but rather a biological group:

> [T]he target of the Nazi genocide was not defined consistently as either a social group (united by internal relationships) or a structural group (united by relationships to externals) but was something of a hybrid in that it included both people who self-identified as Jewish and people who did not although they bore a variety of relationships to people who did. The apparatus of the Holocaust targeted more than Jewish people when it defined "Jewish" at least partly in terms of biological ancestry, rather than cultural heritage. A biological group is not a people (Card 2010: 5792–7).

We may further illuminate the nature of genocide if we compare different groups and events: the terror over gays and the extermination of gay communities in the Third Reich, the massacre in Columbine High School in 1999, and the destruction of the Ku Klux Klan. Card argues that we are dealing with genocide in the first case, and not in the third. What are her reasons for such a claim?

In the first case, the Nazis forced gays to wear discriminatory pink triangles, and they put them in the concentration camps. Thus, they detached gays from their communities and relationships that gave meanings to and shaped their lives. That was enough to cause the social death of gays. Of course, those gay communities were not solid, stable, multigenerational and multi-layered in other respects (as, for instance, in the case of the Jewish communities), but still they performed the function of shaping and giving meaning to lives of gays, the function of social vitality, so we may speak about a sort of genocide in the case of gays' destiny in the Third Reich.

Regarding the second example, Card does not give a definitive and explicit answer, but rather an answer by formulating a necessary condition of genocide. The correct answer to this question 'depends on the nature, extent, and depth of the social vitality created by the ties uniting those who spent so much time in that high school. What contribution did that vitality make to the meanings of their lives?' (Card 2010: 5892–34).

Genocide is an ethically laden (and therefore in a sense relative) concept

What about the Ku Klux Klan? Why is the destruction of Ku Klux Klan communities not genocide? They create the identities of people; they shape people's lives and give meaning to them: the lives of some people wither (in a sense) after the destruction of those communities. The justification for the negative answer in the case of the Ku Klux Klan can be put succinctly: 'Forcibly imposed social death of a group is not genocidal if the group itself is an evil' (Card 2010: 5856–8).

Whether we are dealing with genocide or not in the case of social death of a particular group, it depends on whether the group in question is evil in itself, whether its basic principles, code, ethics as such promote evil:

> The judgment that a group is an evil must be understood as the judgment that what basically defines the group is evil, that evil practices are so essential to it that they could not be eliminated without eliminating the group (Card 2010: 5856–1).

Still another aspect of the evil of genocide, from the perspective of the prosperity of civilisation and humanity:

> A presupposition of the evil of genocide might be that ethnic, racial, national, religious, and relevantly similar groups need to be protected in order to secure the potential for development of the goods of civilization of humanity. There is no such need to protect evil organizations such as Murder, Inc.

A similar thought is found in Lemkin's *Axis Rule* (Op. cit., 5906–11). Card concludes:

> In sum, if social death is central to genocide, the concept of genocide does capture something that was not already captured by existing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Relationships internal to a group – cultural, political, educational, familial, linguistic, religious – that turn what might otherwise be an aggregate into a community are destroyed or seriously degraded. The harm members suffer is a loss of context and identity that give meaning and shape to their lives and would have given meaning to their deaths. That loss is not captured by previously existing war crimes or crimes against humanity. There is, further, a loss to humanity in the destruction of human potential (Card 2010: 5923–1).

It follows from the above that the concept of genocide is ethically laden. In the last instance, ethics decides what genocide is and what it is not. Now we can understand why people refuse to accept the use of the term genocide to denote their activities even when they themselves describe the activities as extermination. Genocide is already by definition something bad, evil, while extermination is not. Extermination can be even something morally good in the case of extermination of something bad.

There are two losses that are specific for genocide (comprehended as essentially

involving social death): 1) the loss of the context or community which gives meaning and form to the lives of the people who are victims or targets of genocide; 2) the loss of humanity because of the loss of (particular) human potential.

Whether a particular activity is interpreted as genocide or not depends on the moral evaluation of community that is the target of the activity: whether the community in the case is itself evil, whether it can be converted, whether it has in itself the potential for good or evil, whether it should be protected or destroyed in order to cultivate or protect creation, production and development of the goods of humanity and civilisation. Yet what people see as good or bad (in these regards) is (or may be) relative, their judgment and estimation differ. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the views and judgments on whether particular activities and processes are genocides also differ.

Thus for instance the extermination of class enemies for communists was not a genocide, many of the Christians of the Middle Ages would not have said that the extermination of pagans or heretics was immoral (and thus was not a genocide), and for the Nazis the extermination of the Jews was not a genocide. Thus, also in the cases of the extermination in the Old Testament according to many Jews and Christians are not genocide because that extermination was commanded by God. What God commands cannot be morally wrong. Moreover, what God commands is morally good and obligatory; not obeying God's command is wrong. Keeping those people alive would mean disobeying God's command and would be therefore morally wrong. Of course, somebody can stubbornly insist on ethically neutral definition of genocide, but this is not in accordance neither with our intuition (genocide is wrong by definition) nor by the legal definition of genocide which defines it as a crime.

Let me at the end of this chapter summarise my view, based on Card's reflections, concerning the relationship between the concepts of social death, genocide and evil. Such a summary is needed in order to avoid some possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations.

In short, I think that an activity directed to a social group aiming at social death of the members of this group is evil and (hence) genocidal if the group in the case is not evil in itself (in Card's sense of the word) and/or if the protection of the group is necessary for the prosperity of humanity. Furthermore, I think that if the group in the case is evil in itself then social death carried out against it is not evil and (hence) not genocidal. However, from all that it does not follow that if a group is not necessary for the prosperity of humanity then social death against it is not genocidal. Only the "fact" that a group is not necessary for the prosperity of humanity is not a sufficient reason for claiming that social death against it is not genocide. Moreover, I think that the fact that a group is evil in itself is not only sufficient but also a necessary condition for claiming that an activity directed against it, aiming at the social death of this group, is not genocidal. Neither legal definitions nor moral intuitions – both suggesting that genocide is necessary morally wrong – force us to accept some other (additional) necessary conditions for social death being genocidal. It follows that any activity directed at the social death of a group is genocidal if the group in the case is not evil in itself. This last proposition implies that no group that should be protected for the sake of the prosperity of humanity is evil in itself.

I have established that the concept of genocide is ethically laden concept. This in itself does not mean that what genocide is and what it is not is relative, since it does not imply that which is ethical and that which is not ethical are relative. However, it is a fact that very often the same activity (aiming at social death of the members of a group) is ethically differently perceived: some people find it moral and others find it immoral. From our definition of genocide, it follows that some people think that this activity is genocide and some other that it is not. Thus, I am only claiming that what genocide is and what it is not is relative in this epistemological sense. I am not claiming that what is moral and what is not moral is relative in some objective sense and hence that what genocide is and what it is not is relative from some objective point of view. In fact, I think that it is not but this question is not of my concern in this paper.

Genocide and some concepts related to it

Crimes against humanity, terrorism, auto-genocide

By certain measures, the extensions of the concepts of crime against humanity and genocide overlap. However, there is a difference: the aim of crimes against humanity is not to destroy (totally or in part) a particular group, as it is put in the Geneva Convention from 1948, but rather to perform extensive and systematic offences against the target group. Genocides differ from war crimes in that they are not limited only to war time; they can take place also before and after a war, therefore also in times of "peace" (Cf. Bassiouni 2003: 536).

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, but there is some wide consensus about its characteristics. Terrorism has social and political aims. The goal of unpredictable terroristic violence is to undermine the norms of behaviour, laws and ways of fighting, to frighten, destabilise, dehumanise, humiliate, demoralise etc. There are always three parts involved in terroristic attacks: attackers, victims of the attacks, and the third party for which the attacks are meant in order to frighten, destabilise etc. it (cf. Schmemann 2003).

In the case of genocides, there is no such third party. Quite to the contrary, in fact: public knowledge about genocides is not desired; perpetrators of genocides want to keep their deeds secret. Perhaps the best example demonstrating this thesis is Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. First, they banished all the strangers and closed the country, almost hermetically.[15] Then the genocide could start, and indeed it did start, taking dimensions and forms which are almost beyond imaginable.

The events in Cambodia provide an interesting case for the conceptual analysis of genocide. Some experts think that we should not denote them as genocide

[15] Cambodia, Rwanda, Turkey (genocides of Armenians), mass killings immediately after the World War II in Yugoslavia, Darfur etc. provide the evidence for the thesis that too low or inadequate support provided by the international community is an important positive factor of genocide (cf. Heidenrich 2001; Žalec 2011c; 304). This is also the reason that the authorities that perform genocide usually try to close the country as much as possible – though they are never totally successful and there is always some information which overcome the barriers (cf. Heidenrich, op. cit.).

taking into account the fact that the Khmer were killing other Khmer. The perpetrator was not somebody else who tries to destroy other nation, ethnical or religious group or community, i.e. the definition of genocide according to international law. However, such a position contradicts to common reason and also to our understanding of genocide. The Khmer Rouge were performing not only massive killings among their own people but also the destruction of the foundations of Cambodian culture: family, religion (Theravada Buddhism), and village. They caused not only physical death of around one fifth of the Cambodian population but also the social death of many others who survived. Primo Levi (2003) used the word *auto-genocide* in the case of Cambodia, which I find highly appropriate.

Totalitarianism

Totalitarianism and genocide are closely connected because totalitarian regimes as a rule carry out genocides. This fact suggests a conjecture that the connection between the two phenomena is not coincidental. In this chapter, I will present the explanation why totalitarianisms are genocidal.

There is a little agreement among theorists about the answer to the question what totalitarianism really is (cf. Maier 2004; Martinjak 2010).[16] Nevertheless, we generally may say that the term denotes social systems in which the rulers control all areas of life in society and where no sphere of society is autonomous. The Soviet Union (especially under Stalin) and Nazi Germany are usually taken as examples of a totalitarian regime. Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge is another good example.

As said above, totalitarian regimes as a rule perform genocide, and our three examples provide much engaging evidence for this thesis. Therefore, we may reasonably conjecture that the relation between totalitarian societies and genocides is not just accidental, but how can this be explained?

A convincing explanation can be provided by using the theory of Franz Neumann (cf. Neumann 1964), which I apply in the explanation that follows. To understand every societal phenomenon, we must take into account three factors or elements: economic, social and psychological; they must be considered in their mutual interaction and interdependence and always regarding their concrete historical situation. If we take the examples of Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, we must be aware that in both cases there was a great need to integrate citizens to smooth over tensions and conflicts in society and to create some identity that would strengthen the dictatorship. In both cases, we may say that there were no economic interests that could integrate a sufficient part of population (and enable the other two goals) nor were there any such social relations. Nazis used the ideology of folk community, and Bolsheviks that of a classless society. They were actually both delusions, yet they both worked. In order to explain their efficacy, we must deal with the psychological explanation in which the emotion of fear plays the crucial role. Fear was directed to some more or less imaginary enemy, and concrete people were then denoted as concrete examples of that enemy. In Nazi Germany, the enemy was

[16] About the basic and general characteristics of totalitarian thinking see Juhant 2002: 42–3.

called "Jews" and in the Soviet Union (and in communist countries in general) "a class enemy". The Nazi movement activated fear of certain groups in society and directed it to destructive actions that were legitimised by the identification with the *Führer*. Similar things happened in Stalin's Soviet Union. The consequence was genocide or classicide. Therefore, we have the following elements that lead to genocides in totalitarian systems: the need for integration of citizens, smoothing away the tensions and conflicts in society and creating of some identity that could strengthen the dictatorship; the lack of sufficient economic or social factors for achieving of those goals; the presence of fear from social enemy (which is intentionally and systematically created and cultivated by the rulers); the identification with the leader that legitimises the crime of genocide.

The paradox of these totalitarian systems is that while they were not able to survive without enemy (which performed the integrating and other two functions), they simultaneously attempted to eliminate this enemy by any means necessary. However, this is not the only paradox connected with genocide. Let us turn to another one known from the more recent history.

Genocide, ethnic cleansing, and systematic mass rapes: Sperm as a biological weapon

Ethnic cleansing is the use of force, terrorisation or intimidation in order to chase away the adherents of some ethnical, religious or other group from a particular territory. Its aim is (by means of killing, destruction, threats and humiliation) to render return or restitution impossible. Thus, for instance, in the time between April and August 1992, Serbs banished more than 700,000 Muslims from 70 percent of Bosnian territory. However, such massive migrations and deportations are not new phenomena: Greeks were banished from Turkey and Turks from Greece, Serbs from Croatia between 1941 and 1945, Germans from Czechoslovakia, Palestinians from the occupied areas, etc. (Cf. Cohen 2003: 123).

Ethnic cleansing is a wide concept that does not refer only to one but to more criminal acts or procedures (ibid.: 124). In January 1993, the UN Commission of Experts handed over to the UN Security Council a report in which ethnic cleansing is defined as: 'rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area' (Cf. Card 2010: 6338–41).

It is known that in former Yugoslavia ethnic cleansing was carried out by means of killings, torture, arbitrary arrests and imprisonments, extrajudicial killings, rapes and sexual aggression, imprisoning of the civil population, intentional military attacks on civilians and civil areas, non-human destruction of property. The final report of the Commission from May 1994 also adds the following crimes: mass killings, maltreatment of civil and war prisoners, use of people as a shield, destruction of cultural heritage, robbery of private property, attacks on hospitals, medical personnel and places marked by a red cross or red crescent (Cf. Cohen 2003: 124).

James W. Nickel (2001) distinguishes between genocidal and non-genocidal forms of ethnic cleansing. However, what is the criterion of ethnic cleansing being genocidal? According to Nickel a policy is not genocidal if it does not aim at mass killings.

(Cf. Card 2010: 6334–6) But this criterion is not sufficient. As Card wrote:

> a policy is genocidal if it aims at destroying (or foreseeably destroys) an ethnic, national, religious, or other appropriately defined group. If that can be done without mass killing, then ethnic cleansing by means of expulsion can, in principle, also be genocidal (Card 2010: 6336–8).

Further, I agree also with the following sentences:

> Removal of an ethnic group from a territory need not be genocidal if there is a decent chance that those expelled will survive to become re-established as basically the same group at other locations (ibid.: 6341–4).

In this article, I will not enter into a thorough discussion regarding in which concrete cases there really was such a "decent chance". I would note, however, that in the case of Muslims from Bosnia I think that there was no such decent chance.

Let us now turn our attention to mass rapes as a means of genocide. In the last war in Bosnia, many Muslim women were victims of rapes committed by Serbs. Those rapes were massive and systematic. They took at least three forms: 1) Serbs came, they publicly raped Muslim women and killed them; 2) Serbs came, they publicly raped Muslim victims and left. The next day they came back and offered Muslims the opportunity to safely leave the territory; 3) rapes took place in special rape camps where Muslim women were regularly and systematically raped, for a longer period of time, by many different men. They were raped with the intention of making them pregnant. The victims were raped even after they conceived, to the time when the abortion was no longer possible. Then the victims were released, often accompanied with the words: 'Go and give birth to a Serbian child.'

Some authors (cf. Card 2010: 6363–6) think that all three forms of military rapes are genocidal. I am interested particularly in the third kind of rapes. The "paradox" by this kind of rape consists in the fact that the increasing of the members of a group was used as a means to contribute to the realisation of genocide over this group. The following question arises: Are those rapes genocidal and what are the reasons for an affirmative answer? I say in advance that I think that the correct answer on this question is 'Yes'. However, what are the reasons?

As first, I think that we should recall some of the characteristics of genocide that we have mentioned above. The first is that mass killings are not necessary for genocide to take place. It is enough that one destroys or attacks the life conditions or foundations of the group. These foundations can be of political, social, economic, biological, physical, religious or moral nature (cf. Card 2010: 6421–4). Second, an action or a procedure is genocidal if it aims to destroy some group or if it foreseeably destroys it. Thirdly, (according to Lemkin's definition) in the case of genocide there is a plan to annihilate the target group. Let us now consider our question according to these characteristics of genocide.

Due to the work done by some Italian journalists, providing the data from the meeting of the Serb army officers in a Belgrade suburb in 1991, we know that the Serb army officers devised a plan to banish Muslims from Bosnia, i.e. how to carry out an

ethnic cleansing. After the analysis, they established 'that the morale, will, and bellicose nature of their groups can be undermined only if we aim our action at the point where the religious and social structure is most fragile' (quotation from the minutes of the meeting, quoted by Card 2010: 6287–91).

They realised that they could achieve that most effectively by directing their damaging action to Muslim women (especially adolescent ones) and children.

> Decisive intervention on these social figures would spread confusion among the communities, thus causing first of all fear and then panic, leading to a probable [Muslim] retreat from the territories involved in war activity (another quotation from the minutes of that meeting, quoted by Card 2010: 6290–4).

Clearly there was a plan for achieving ethnic cleansing. Part of this plan was intentional pregnancies caused by rapes in rape camps. However, as we see above, ethnic cleansing as such is not yet genocide. At this point, the concept of foreseeable consequences becomes relevant. It was quite clear that the group of Bosnian Muslims could not survive outside of Bosnia; therefore, the rapes were also genocidal. The immediate aim was ethnic cleansing. However, it was clearly foreseeable that the group of Bosnian Muslims could not survive such ethnic cleansing. Therefore, it was foreseeable that achieving ethnic cleansing *de facto* means achieving genocide.

There is another interesting (novel) element in this horrific story: sperm used as a biological weapon. As Card (2010) explained, this weapon has important advantages compared to some other biological weapons (bacteria, viruses). For instance, it does not contaminate the territory as viruses or bacteria do.

Conclusion

At the end, let me summarise what we have done in this essay. We have explained the concept of genocide by means of the concept of social death; its opposite is social vitality. Genocide is an extreme form of social death; intentional causing of social death is the central evil of genocide. Social death is what distinguishes genocide from mass killings. The physical killing of the members of the target groups is not essential for genocide. There are more sophisticated forms of genocide by which members of the target groups are not killed physically, but there are rather destroyed "only" particular ties, relationships and social structures that are of vital importance for the survival of the target group as such. We have also explained what kind of groups are targets of genocide, as well as the claim that genocide is an ethically laden concept, and some implications of this fact. On this basis, we have provided a comparative analysis of some phenomena closely connected with genocide: crimes against humanity, totalitarianism, terrorism and ethnic cleansing. We have also reflected upon the genocidal effects of military mass rapes.

What is genocide? is an important question, and we need an adequate definition to help us to recognise it. It has many different manifestations, many various faces; it takes many different forms; it is directed to many different groups, and it uses different excuses, different masks and guises. It is rarely openly admitted by its perpetrators as

genocide. Such varieties of genocide and their similarity to some other phenomena (which are not genocide, however) are also the reason that an integral and comparative approach to genocide is needed in order to obtain the correct definition of it and to test it sufficiently. I consider the outline of such an integral approach to be the main achievement of this essay. Another important aspect of the recognition of genocide is caught in the question of whether the agents of genocide themselves recognise (or are able to recognise) genocide in their own actions. This is much more difficult, because genocide is a negatively ethically laden concept. The importance of a correct definition of genocide for legal purposes is obvious.

The roots of genocide are vast and deep in society. They are difficult to recognise because they mask themselves with some honourable values, with the directing of people's attention to outer enemy, etc. Consequently, it is very important to sharpen our minds for the recognition of genocide, also by providing an adequate definition of it, which is to be appropriately tested. The latter is the main aim of this article.[17]

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[17] My thanks go to Natalija Žalec for her comments of a version of the present text.

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Povzetek

Članek pojasnjuje pojem genocida s pomočjo pojma družbene smrti. Njegove osrednje ugotovitve so naslednje: Genocid je skrajna oblika družbene smrti. Namerno povzročanje družbene smrti je osrednje zlo genocida. Družbena smrt je tisto, kar razlikuje genocid od množičnih pobojev. Fizično ubijanje članov tarčnih skupin ni bistveno za genocid. Obstajajo bolj prefinjene oblike genocida, s katerimi se članov tarčnih skupin ne ubija fizično, ampak se uničujejo "samo" določene vezi, odnosi in družbene strukture, ki so življenjskega pomena za preživetje tarčnih skupin kot takih. Članek pojasnjuje tudi, kakšne vrste skupin so tarčne skupine genocida, trditev, da je genocid etično obložen pojem, in nekatere implikacije tega dejstva. Na tej osnovi podaja primerjalno analizo

nekaterih pojavov, ki so tesno povezani z genocidom: zločin proti človeštvu, totalitarizem, terorizem in etnično čiščenje. Reflektira tudi genocidne učinke vojaških množičnih posilstev. *Kaj je genocid* je pomembno vprašanje. Zato je pomembno, da izostrimo naš um za prepoznavanje genocida, tudi tako, da podamo primerno definicijo, ki je ustrezno preverjena. Zadnje je glavni namen tega članka.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: genocid, tarče genocida, družbena smrt, etnično čiščenje, množična posilstva, Claudia Card

CORRESPONDENCE: BOJAN ŽALEC, Faculty of Theology, Poljanska cesta 4, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. E-mail: bojan.zalec@teof.uni-lj.si.

BOOK REVIEWS

Virtanen, Pirjo Kristiina. 2012. Indigenous Youth in Brazilian Amazonia: Changing Lived Worlds. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 272 pp. Hb.: £55.00. ISBN: 9781137265340.

This engaging and thoughtfully written monograph follows the lives of young members of the Manchineri of Brazilian Amazonia, a people located in the state of Acre (Western Brazil), numbering approximately 1,000, who lived in isolation until the 1990s (p. 135). Virtanen outlines in the Introduction her intention to give voice to youth Manchineri, since despite being the subject of studies on sociality, kinship and rites of passage, they have only been discussed as passive agents, and hardly given a voice. She proposes to introduce the youth's points of view, recasting them as active participants rather than inert characters, in their various ways of engaging with otherness.

When discussing the Manchineri, the author situates herself in their context, explaining how her non-Indian (payri) status did not change despite being eventually allowed to share meals: a fundamental way of constructing and maintaining social relations in Amazonia. This contributes to a clearer vision of how her presence elicited reactions and discourses on otherness. Virtanen also uses the methodological device of asking the youth to illustrate their experiences through drawing pictures, several of which are included in the book, or geographical maps, thus eliciting alternative, visual information perhaps more explicit than oral testimony.

The first part of the book depicts the young Manchineri's geographical and social landscape as it unravels in the forest, the gendered tasks expected of each individual, and ways in which correct performance of these duties shapes and develops social relations. In parallel, readers encounter those Manchineri youths (a minority) who for various reasons live in urban areas, learning how their habits and social life differ from those living in the reserve. A comparison between the two lifestyles is drawn; the city's social sphere is one 'in which everyone is parallel to everyone else, rather than complementary to them' (p. 33) by contrast with the reserve, where everyone is known by name and personal qualities.

Various facets of Manchineri life are seen from the perspective of younger members of the community: Virtanen describes local practices, values and beliefs as she learnt of them through conversations with young people. The ethnography explores a range of subjects concerning everyday life, cosmology and ritual, education, political engagement and inter-generational and inter-ethnic relations.

Through the detailed ethnographic description coupled with historical and theoretical contextualization, we access the discourses of today's Manchineri youth as well as those of their parents and grandparents. This frame of reference, combining current shifting realities with traditions of the recent past, provides compelling material for analysing how historical-global changes affect indigenous communities, and how some of these respond to these changes and relative challenges. The communities are not pictured as victims or passive actors in a process beyond their control; on the contrary, the author stresses their capacity to creatively seize opportunities for growth of knowledge – of themselves, of their ethnic-cultural traits, of the white urban society and the Brazilian welfare provision, and to expand their relationship networks.

Importantly, the book captures the tension between life in the reserve and life in the city, and the way young Manchineri relate to urban life and the opportunity it holds. Ambivalence toward the city – viewed as attractive, but also dangerous and impossibly expensive – is effectively portrayed. If on one hand young Manchineri appreciate urban areas for their transformative potential (knowledge and skill acquisition, negotiation with the state, abundant commodities), it is apparent on the other hand that the metropolis accommodates only those individuals whose families have already settled there. Due to high costs and difficult transportation, long and often wearing trips to the city are painful obligations required to draw a state pension. The impersonal relations characterising urban communication contrast starkly with the conviviality of the reserve. The racism and marginalisation suffered by indigenous people in urban areas is discussed, highlighting how prejudice may threaten cordial inter-ethnic relations.

The book also demonstrates how indigenous politics have shifted from personalised relations and negotiation between indigenous and non-indigenous, human and non-human entities in the forest environment, towards the dynamic involvement of Manchineri youth with local government and indigenous organisations and associations. Schooling, literacy and learning skills related to urban life are seen as instrumental to gain autonomy and symbolic capital useful when confronting both the state and Brazilians, as well as the Manchineri community. The wish for schooling illustrates the aspiration to acquire the appropriate knowledge to engage with white people, mastering the Portuguese language and the social skills needed in urban contexts. Once secured, this new knowledge earns young Manchineri social prestige and special status within their village.

Although the reader gathers the general impression of balanced harmony amongst the Manchineri, Virtanen does introduce some data on conflictive areas, mainly associated with positions of prestige and leadership, whenever those in charge fail to fulfil the community's general expectations. Sensitive subjects also include the frustrating experiences that schooling often offers, and the gradual loss of traditional knowledge. If young Manchineri wish to learn intellectual skills for the empowering knowledge they yield, multicultural education is still problematic in the reserve. Books are scarce and often addressed to the general student body, offering pedagogical and practical methods that hardly fit Manchineri views on learning. Young Manchineri are also caught in the paradox of having to learn 'how to be a good Indian' from urban Manchineri teachers who have long forgotten the language. The young are also depicted facing cultural dilemmas, such as realising their limited knowledge of their oral history and traditional practices and songs; this awareness is ironically often prompted by non-native teachers during training courses on documenting and transmitting indigenous traditional knowledge.

In sum, this book is a brilliant ethnographic record of a neglected portion of the native population, followed in their pursuit to find, maintain and accommodate their identity as natives while simultaneously adapting to the shifting realities of life in Brazil, dynamically and strategically incorporating into their everyday lives new practical and intellectual resources.

GIOVANNA BACCHIDDU
Pontificia Universidad Católica and ICIIS (Chile)

Kligman, Gail and Katherine Verdery (eds.). 2011. Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. xix + 508 pp. Pb.: $39.50 / £27.95. ISBN: 9780691149738.

There are books that, as soon as they are published, become classic studies, so to speak, must-reads for everyone interested in that particular field of studies. Already well-known for their excellent and highly inspiring work, Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery have written a book that belongs to that category and represents one the finest achievements in the field of studies on peasants' life in central and south-eastern Europe. The truth of such a statement finds a clear proof when one is confronted with the prizes and recognition this book has already received in the USA, and most importantly in Romania. As the title indicates, the book focuses primarily on the 1949–1962 period, when collectivization was implemented in Romania. However, Kligman and Verdery also refer to pre-WWII realities and provide insight on the ways the collectivization process was treated after 1962 in communist Romania and on how these events are remembered today. Reading this book brings to mind the works of Moshe Levin, Jozo Tomasevich, Keneth Jowitt, Lynne Viola and Sheila Fitzpatrick, to whom the authors refer and pay tribute. However, as Kligman and Verdery state in the introduction they 'treat the collectivization process as instrumental in establishing the nature of the new Party-state itself and of its subjects' (p. 6) and, in doing so, they offer a new and highly inspirational methodological shift in the research on communist regimes in Europe. Moreover, by combining well-documented historical research with in-depth ethnography and the study of mnemonic practices, Kligman and Verdery's achievement opens new paths in studying and understanding not only the communist past, but also the post-communist present.

The book is divided into three parts, followed by the conclusion and three annexes containing information about the research project and the researchers, methodology of research, and a list of interviewers and respondents. The first part is entitled Laying the groundwork and contains three chapters. In the first one (The Soviet Blueprint) Kligman and Verdery elaborate on the influence of Soviet models and ideas on the collectivization process not only in Romania, but in a broader context comprising almost all countries that belonged to the then-communist bloc. The second chapter (The Village Community and the Politics of Collectivization 1948–1962) offers a contrast of socio-cultural mechanisms and models that defined the social life of Romanian village before collectivization with events that took place during the implementation of this process. It leads thus to the third chapter (Creating Party Cadres), which explains how the violence that often accompanied collectivization efforts was not only a result of the incompatibility of dominating Soviet models with the ways of life of Romanian peasantry alongside, but also a "school" for new Romanian communist cadres.

The second part entitled Pedagogies of Power: Technologies of Rural Transformation offers an inquiry on strategies and mechanisms used by Party leaders in order to implement, or better, impose collectivization on Romanian peasants, and on the responses the former received from the later. These issues are analysed in three consecutive chapters. Chapter Four (Pedagogies of Knowledge Production and Contestation) analyses the ways

and methods Party cadres sought to gain social supports for their collectivization project. In practical terms, this production of knowledge was associated with a series of persuasion strategies, which are the object of analysis in the next chapter (Pedagogies of Persuasion). Finally, the sixth chapter (Fomenting Class War) scrutinizes the ways the Party imposed its will on those who contested the collectivization process, trying simultaneously to legitimize not only these measures, but in fact also its own power.

The third part – Outcomes – analyses the aftermath of collectivization. The seventh chapter (The Collectives are Formed) brings into focus, as authors states, the variability rather than a general pattern of collectivization in Romania. Still, this chapter contains a valuable analysis that shows that neither in Romania, nor elsewhere in former communist countries, was the Soviet blueprint entirely fulfilled. The final chapter of the book (The Restratification and Bureaucratization of Rural Life) leads to even more significant conclusions. Contrary to the general assumption that in Romania people did not show similar sign of resistance as in Poland or Hungary, Kligman and Verdery argue that the history of Romanian collectivization proves the opposite.

In addition to the information included in the preface and acknowledgments, the authors present a full view of, so to speak, 'behind the scenes' of their research project. In particular, the part on methodology is extremely valuable not only for students, but also for more experienced scholars. This book is the result not only of the cooperation between Kligman and Verdery, but indeed the effect of the work of a group of researchers, who conducted interviews and fieldwork. Finally, as much as on group efforts, the success of this project depended on the respondents, on those who went through collectivization. It is to them that above all this book pays a great tribute.

Scholars from a wide range of research areas and disciplines will cherish from this book, but obviously those, who focus on Romania, the Balkans and communism will find it at most valuable. Undoubtedly through the abundance of material gathered and analysed in the book, the interdisciplinary approach and the innovative methodology applied by Gail Gligman and Katherine Verdery make this work not only a powerful intellectual achievement, but indeed a landmark in the field of studies on communist regimes in Europe.

RIGELS HALILI
Nicolaus Copernicus University of Toruń, and
University of Warsaw (Poland)

Miller, Daniel. 2012. Consumption and Its Consequences. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press. x + 205. Pb.: £15.99 / €18.30. ISBN: 9780745661087

Studying consumption has been neglected in humanistic studies mainly because of the belief that it is simply not worthy of being taken seriously since it is a part of everyday life, mainly connected with women's work, and also because of the fact that consumption has always been considered immoral in comparison with production. This book represents a significant contribution to the anthropological analysis while turning away from the aforementioned biases and raises the basic questions: what is consumption and why do we consume? The book reveals the clear fact that the answer to this question is considerably complex, ambiguous and offers a profound way of challenging what we know about consumption. This is of fundamental importance, since consumption currently potentially represents one of the main causes for the annihilation of our planet. The author shows that consumption has a poor direct relation with the planetary environment but is strongly connected with the production and distribution of the global economic system.

Miller's theoretical point of view is that consumption is 'not just buying things', but is strongly connected with 'the way we subsequently transformed the goods that we had purchased – a much more active process' (p. 64) while noting a key finding that if you truly want to understand shopping, you need to engage with people while they shop, and you also have to get to know them in their domestic environment. Importantly, Miller examines everyday household provisioning and tries to understand how shopping is used as a technology for expression and the establishment of love within households to which he applies his main argument that goods become our expression of core relationships with people closest to us, such as relatives and friends. 'Shopping as a sacrifice is not experienced as a religious rite, but it is saturated with the devotion we associate with love' (p. 85) for those around us whom we care the most for, and it is not merely an act of duty.

Motivated by the argument that 'social relations are the primary cause of consumption' (p. 184), this book strives to resist complying with an overly simplistic understanding of the left-wing critics who believe that 'consumption is largely fostered by advertising and demand is created by commerce' while goods 'contribute to practices of status emulation, which in turn can be related back to capitalism's other consequence in fostering of class and social inequality' (p. 182). The author is mainly focused on providing us with insight into how people actually struggle to become ordinary, which is successfully portrayed in the chapter about the common wearing of blue jeans.

Miller tends to explore the question of how the cosmological ideas are manifested through the order of things, such as the celebration of Christmas, where he examines the local symbol systems based on the divisions of ethnicity, class and gender. He questions the common belief that Christmas has entirely lost its religious origins while being devoted to consumption needs and provides evidence based on his fieldwork in Britain and Trinidad that Christmas has actually been re-connected with the transcendent through the deep association with materialism 'not because it is an expression of materialism, but rather because it has been recast as a festival for the suppression of the antisocial aspects of modern materialism' (p. 61). Miller adopts a view that opposes the dominant arguments, which dismiss consumption as a loss of authentic culture from the early times.

While performing fieldwork in Trinidad, Miller discovers that Coca-Cola had to adapt to the specific concept of what it means to be a contemporary Trinidadian and questions the general opinion that US cultural imperialism causes losing cultural specificity. 'The more consumer culture grew in Trinidad, the more values and the logic of cosmology were objectified in material things rather thorough categories of people' and 'objects took over something of this burden as the idiom of objectification' (p. 51).

What genuinely attracts readers is Miller's style of providing arguments through a dialogue between three fictional characters that are constantly in dispute with each other in the first and the last chapters of the book. In this way, the author manages to include some of the most notable findings from the field of consumption studies into the text in a sophisticated and more accessible way. While he deserves praise for his tendency to write in an accessible manner, it has to be acknowledged that he does not succeed completely, as only well-educated readers will be able to follow his writing.

Mike is an environmentalist and a supporter of the green economy who would like to see consumption downsized; Chris is a sociologist, deeply concerned about welfare; and Grace is a Filipino anthropologist who strongly feels that consumption should increase because she comprehends consumption in the context of basic services, such as health and educational systems, and thinks that extra-consumption is not going be derived from the provision of these basic services, which the world today regards as basic human rights, justice and equality. Grace also disagrees with the opinion that reduction of consumption is beneficial for people but she does feel that it is beneficial for the planet since almost everything people should give up can directly benefit the human welfare and is imperative for the reduction of poverty and inequality.

With the help of these characters, the author conveys disagreement with the premise of 'the greens' that consumption is connected to materialism and thus gives them a moral ground for condemning consumption with the intention of saving the planet. Miller agrees that by purchasing eco-products, one cannot buy in a rational and economical manner that would save money, since ethical shopping is more expensive than purchasing regular goods. The reason consumers do not buy ethically is not because they are 'hedonistic, individualistic and materialistic, but precisely the opposite', 'because they are thrifty and moral' (p. 89). More importantly, this argument questions the popular representations of consumption as wasteful, immoral and hedonistic.

Miller's book is undoubtedly a tremendously valuable contribution to establishing the understanding of consumption as one of the central interests of contemporary anthropological studies, which deserves a more comprehensive exposure. Since the majority of the chapters are a summary of Miller's previously published works in which he explains basic theoretical ideas about consumption, this engaging book will not represent any radical new findings for his regular readers; however, it is a suitable start for readers who are just getting to know him. They can find all the basic findings from his opus of published works summarized here. Furthermore, this book proposes an intriguing framework for a starting point for our engagement in understanding the most significant current problems connected with climate changes, pollution and consumption.

POLONA SITAR
Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts
(Slovenia)

Hall, Alexandra. 2012. Border Watch. Cultures of Immigration, Detention and Control (Anthropology, Culture and Society Series). London: Pluto Press. vii + 199 pp. Pb.: £17.50. ISBN: 9780745327242.

The so-called Locksdon, is an immigration removal centre (IRC) that always smells the same way: disinfectant, bleach, institution; the book Border Watch: Cultures of Immigration, Detention and Control is the result of one year of ethnographic studies conducted inside of it, started by Alexandra Hall in 2002.

Through an acute and well-structured examination of everyday life and daily practices of the immigration detention system and mostly through a dispassionate and attentive observation of those who act professionally inside of it, dealing with detainees, i.e. the Locksdon's officers, the author cleverly shows us how detention is a governmental and symbolic place or non-place where undesirability is managed and controlled.

In Hall's words: 'detention crystallises the problematic relationship between certain kinds of movement and projects of security. I am concerned with security as a social and cultural category, expressed and experienced within daily life in the IRC' (p.5). The officers' self-presentation and re-presentation in everyday life, with its speeches, tones, inner workings and clichés, makes hierarchies and divisions clearer. Using words through their banal decisions, taken within discretionary judgements, they suspend the normal regime in favour of punitive and retaliatory action. It is in the banal encounters between officers and detainees that the national boundary between inclusion and exclusion emerges. The language then, as a first practice of power reproduction.

Alexandra Hall argues that the legal and arbitrary system that governs and organizes (read as to lock in and to confine) mobility is an "experimental machine" and detention is one of the ways through which the security State "writes itself", defending territorial borders and saving national identity. In fact, on the basis of liberal principles, States act in an authoritarian way.

The book consists of six chapters. Each stands independently but is linked to the others with great explanatory pragmatism and with constant references to interdisciplinary literature on detention, control, defiance from across the social sciences. The biopolitical frame on the background of the whole book is undeniable (let us say indispensable).

In the second chapter, Visual Practice and Secure Regime, Alexandra Hall introduces the phenomenon of "bodywatching", as a special way in which each detainee becomes only a body, a bare life. Each detainee's singularity turns into the unidentified throng. Detainees become indistinguishable: one "body" among many others. They are dragged under the panoptical gaze of observation and control. For example, the incitement to use the prison's uniform (Chapter 4), which is not an obligation, means to make men equivalent, a stigmatic action upon the body which is crucial to visual serialisation and training. And suspicion is often the dominant attitude of the regime's staff.

In a male officer's words: 'These people [detainees] could be anyone. We have no idea who they are and what they are doing here .... Once they're here they just give a name, and we have no way of knowing who they are. Immigration don't know' (p. 28). So, the practice of "bodywatching", as a set of embodied visual habits, put into practice

by the "layers of the body", which constantly "read" the detainee's body as a site 'where intent and proclivity could be discerned ahead of time, and where control could be inscribed' (p. 29).

The fourth chapter is even more fascinating, 'Compliance and Defence: Contesting the regime' in which Hall analyses the body as a space of resistance, rebellion, struggle. Both time and space are the places where discipline is eluded by detainees through those clever tactics of refusing the demands made to them by the Locksdon regime. In this sense, for example, refusing food is a significant method to protest against the secure but humane detention regime.

The act of "taking subjectivity" done by the detainees, subverting the idea of "victimlike refugee" (p. 111), is the enactment of political equality and a concrete act of citizenship. Unlike a rhetoric that often labels them as undisciplined criminals, illegal outsiders or guests with obligations and moral indebtedness, through their bodies, the detainees can become political subjects, demanding to be heard, refusing to be ignored, repudiating the norms of afternoon regime, seizing the initiatives, claiming their rights (the right to protest, firstly), seeking to be recognised as 'something other than bodies to be administered' (p. 110).

In the last chapter "Ethics and Encounters", Locksdon opens, however, some little and fragile spaces of humanity, in the sense of 'unmediated recognition and generous actions without calculation' (p. 151). The episodes described, such as the one involving a receptionist who decided to break protocol by allowing a man to call his girlfriend, or another one in which Tom tried to save a detainee from committing suicide, are qualitatively different kind of engagements. Using Hall's words 'the shared witnessing of the man's death produced in detainee and officer alike a disturbed sense of being in the detention centre, once were previous certainties and entrenched judgements one another fell away' (p. 155). In this last moment of pure violence, they share a deep sense of common humanity through the deletion of role barriers.

The value of Border Watch is the highlight that all those Western and liberal practices, splurged by democratic States, create a "wasted lives" control system. Under the law (the 1971 Immigration Act), detention is a crucial and necessary part of a robust national border.

So Locksdon is a border zone and Border Watch discusses the life of this 'thickened space", offering critical sparks and deep reflections. If freedom of movement is a real European value, and if we want to understand why people who have not committed a crime, nor have been sentenced in court, are detained, then this book is a starting point and a useful tool to attempt an answer.

ELENA RICCI
Università degli studi di Teramo (Italy)

Wright, Katie. 2012. International Migration, Development and Human Wellbeing (Rethinking International Development Series). Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan. xi + 155 pp. Hb.: £55.00. ISBN: 9780230248281.

The main focus of this book is human wellbeing during migration. A conceptual shift from coping strategies to "living well" is a promising approach, and Katie Wright does present her research very convincingly. The book starts with a foreword by Willis, and I cannot agree more that this nuanced research is a significant contribution to both development and migration studies. Moreover, it is rich in theory background and data, thought-provoking and yet easy to read.

In six chapters, Wright proves step-by-step that a wellbeing approach provides concepts and tools to shift away from the limited focus of what people lack to the much broader view of what they need and how they individually and collectively construct what it means to "live well". Let us take a closer look how this approach in combining with migration and development literature unfolds in a study of migrants from Peru in two European cities, London and Spain.

In the Chapter 1 (Introduction), the author outlines the main functional and psychosocial dimensions of wellbeing and argues for a need to focus on the interplay of these dimensions. A small drawback is that in parts of the introduction and the theory chapter the authors overemphasise the need to move away from focus on survival and coping strategies among poorly paid migrants and repeats herself several times.

The theory chapter (Migrating For a Better Life?) provides a constructive critique to limits of the capabilities approach and demonstrates how the focus on wellbeing diverges from it. Wright skilfully synthesises how various disciplines – psychology, gender and cultural studies, to name among others – contribute to wellbeing approach. The author underlines that researching what people need is also less stigmatising; the wellbeing approach see migration as an active choice to improve life. She lays out strong theoretical points to analyse more deeply how gender and age as nonmaterial aspects of inequality shape whether people can achieve their own goals or believe they can enhance better life for their children. In order to demonstrate how wellbeing is constructed dynamically, Wright theorises how subjective constructions of wellbeing travel and transform themselves over time and across boundaries. Altogether, she provides strong analysis for joining wellbeing with development and migration.

In Chapter 3, the author describes the history of migration regimes in London and Madrid and introduces the research sample. Data comprised of 99 semi-structured interviews in both European cities and 10 in-depth in Peru with relatives and friends. In Chapter 4, the functional and psychosocial needs of migrants are analysed in dynamic interaction. She distinguishes what these dimensions are in specific places and then demonstrates how some of them, e.g. legal documents, are universal needs for migrants, while language skills are seen as a functional need in London but not in Spanish-speaking Madrid. Employment and regular income, not only economic needs but also needs to realise one's potential, should be understood in the interplay between functional and psychosocial needs. This chapter provides a novel focus of time and money management as a functional need in both locations. It is importantly related to a need for developing competence and managing ones' own lives to achieve wider goals. Among important psychosocial needs,

"relatedness" and "understanding social norms" are highlighted as of special importance. Both of them transform over the life-course and migration stages. The latter also transform attitudes and values of Peruvian migrants who see the need to become more "orderly" and "methodological" in the new socio-cultural environment and also when returning to Peru.

Although Wright draws attention to frictions between multicultural models and reality in which a migrant should "fit in" a new environment, my reservations are that the author may be slightly uncritical about the internalised management language used by informants themselves. Resistance and challenging of these needs are partly revealed in shared narratives. Stronger contextualisation of individualism and capitalism relations may have helped deepen more critical analysis about instrumental necessity to fit into a society in particular ways, for example, according to roles ascribed to low income migrants of a particular ethnic or regional origin. This could be taken further in future research, for example, how these needs are recognised as stemming from particular migrant status and whether they are challenged and transformed by middle class, highly skilled migrants or the second generation.

Chapter 5 provides a valuable analysis of global interconnectedness of human wellbeing and how constructions of a better life travel between London, Madrid and Peru. Her data from three locations provides a solid basis to unpack discourses of "good" and "bad" migrants, and how Peruvian migrants actively challenge perceptions of relatives and friends about life abroad. Wright convincingly proves that Peruvians back home are not just passive recipients of "patchy" information, but they choose to believe certain versions of how a migrant can achieve wellbeing goals abroad. She demonstrates that values of individualism, respect to neighbours, practices of food-making and recycling travel relatively easy. However, a need for personal privacy might get misinterpreted as coldness and cause resentment. Thus, bridging understanding about migration reality and some of the acquired psychosocial needs do not always travel well.

The last chapter contains conclusions and implications for policy. Although the contribution to policy making was promised in the beginning, suggestions are outlined in just the two last pages. The author draws attention that policies that aim to promote development and return usually fail because they are not grounded in understanding of how wellbeing is constructed by migrants themselves. She urges moving the policy focus away from governance to assessing intersubjective impacts of migration. These suggestions for policy makers are well justified in her data. However, I was struggling with the two other suggestions: Wright underlines that states should encourage circular migration and to support grass-roots migrant associations 'that play a vital role in offering material and psychosocial support to enhance migrant wellbeing' (p 135). Even if this may sound logical, these suggestions are not derived from her analysis presented in this book and need more empirical justification.

Having said this, including some criticism I spelled out, I reiterate that this is a tremendously valuable book, which hopefully will encourage researchers from various disciplines to take the wellbeing approach further in research of culturally and socially mediated understandings of the good life and greater good for migrants themselves as well as their relations and friends.

AIJA LULLE
University of Latvia (Latvia)

Rademacher, Anne M. 2011. Reigning the River. Urban Ecologies and Political Transformation in Kathmandu. Durham: Duke University Press. xviii + 245 pp. Pb.: $22.95. ISBN: 9780822350804.

Rademacher's comprehensive book thoroughly examines a conflict over the environmental restoration of the Bagmati and Bishnumati rivers, which flow in the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal. This monograph is put in the context of study of global South cities facing dangerous environmental problems. Because of an unprecedented "urban explosions", Kathmandu has experienced difficulties: the extreme poverty of inland migrants, a rapid growth of city's slums, and the degradation of nature. The last facet is an obvious embodiment of crisis in Kathmandu at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The main subject of the book is urban ecology as a social practice made by three relevant groups involved in the efforts of the rivers restoration: 1) state experts and development experts who elaborated plans to improve rivers' environmental conditions, 2) cultural heritage activists anxious to restore river-centred religious practice, and 3) housing advocates defending the rights and interests of poor migrants. Tracing the contest between these actors, Rademacher describes how they reassert and proclaim their own understanding of urban ecology in Kathmandu.

In an extensive introduction, the author develops theoretical frameworks and an approach to urban ecology. Besides the historiography of global South cities, Rademacher keeps her research within the purlieus of global urbanisation and urban ecosystem studies. The issue of the environmental crisis of cities is understood by the author in terms of struggles over power, knowledge, and governance. Rademacher departs from an influential tradition of scholarship that has regarded Himalayan moral and social order via sacred landscape studies. Instead of that, she follows developmentalist logics of morality that emphasises collision of varieties of views of actors who re-examine the meaning of the rivers' environmental restoration.

The first chapter depicts the formation of a national state in the Kathmandu Valley. According to Rademacher, mandala is the core of local polity. The concernment of mandala is made through spatial practices and performances of citizenship that determine attitudes to urban ecology. Mandala assisted to fix a political power and made a social order in Kathmandu. The latter was the subject matter of reflection and struggle in the era of political transformation in the 1990s, which was the time the environmental concern became the tool of the groups that upheld their views of the past, present and future of Nepal.

In the second chapter, Rademacher explores three narratives of the pollution of Kathmandu rivers from the perspective of river-focused actors. The first narrative represents an official view on the rivers' degradation. This frame is proved by scientific data and policy plans, linking the main reason of deteriorating of water quality as a result of human encroachment into the rivers system. It contradicts the second narrative, which foregrounds negative outcomes of the river management plans for thousands of landless poor (sukumbasi). Housing advocates pointed out the use of cultivation of the rivers system by migrants. The third narrative represents a specific view on the rivers degradation as a cultural and historical problem. An indefatigable spokesman of cultural restoration

of the urban ecology, Huta Ram Baidya, rejects these two narratives, since he is for the restoration of the entirety of the rivers through a return to the roots of the Bagmati civilisation. This approach condemns the modern development of Nepal as the main threat of the riverscape's cultural integrity.

The third chapter analyses the impact of the significant political events on the efforts in renewal of the Bagmati and Bishnumati rivers in 2001. The fusillade of the royal family by Crown Prince Dipendra on 1 June 2001 with the subsequent accession of a new King Gyanendra to the throne abrogated both the democratic transition and the uncertainty of the building of the diversion tunnel that partly cleared the Bagmati. A new period of unsettled emergency solved the problem of sukumbasi settlements. The sudden expulsion of poor migrants from the riverbanks was unanimously treated as a necessary measure to save the river. In comparison with the loss of moral authority of the royal family, a more dire threat to Kathmandu citizens was the rebellion army of Maoists that had a strong support in Nepali countryside. In such a complicated political situation, new clean facilities of the Bagmati River constructed without foreign assistance reinforced hope for restoration of royal power and the Nepali nation state.

The fourth chapter dissects the environmental development in Kathmandu under King Gyanendra. Disbelief in democracy induced actors to appreciate overnight beautification campaigns on the eve of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation summit in Kathmandu. Rademacher points out that in post-andolan democracy era, emergency ecology reserved and muted controversies among the main actors for the sake of the authoritarian efficacy of environmental management.

In the fifth chapter, the author traces alterations in state and public representations of Kathmandu's sukumbasi population after their forced resettlement in the winter of 2001. In the condition of the city's crisis, the landless poor were responsible for the river degradation. Rademacher argues that coherence of political, ecological, and economic moralities of the emergency period and the uncertain status of sukumbasi were the reasons for their resettlement to the outskirts of Kathmandu. The developmentalist view on restoration of the Bagmati and Bishnumati rivers represented by the state and development officials legitimised the decision concerning the relocation of landless migrants whose presence on the riverbanks hampered the beautification campaign.

In the sixth chapter, Rademacher elucidates 'the ways that river-focused identity and global connections were strategically invoked or rejected' (p.155). The actors formulate their vision of symbolic significance of the river stewardship through a range of their attitudes to the meanings of urban ecology. The narrative that connects the contemporary Nepali national identity with the international community is opposed to a view on global development as the main threat to the cultural legacy of the Bagmati and Bishnumati rivers. Both approaches failed to find a common ground for joint efforts in spite of shared ultimate goals. As a result, the Nepali state plays a key role in fulfilling topical ecological aims.

In conclusion, the scholar contemplates the importance of urban ecology for the Kathmandu case. Environmental expectations of different actors concurred with political transformation of Nepal when urban ecology was emancipatory and anticipatory. Above all, the transformation of environment urban ecology in Kathmandu revealed the weight

of moral order, while actors tried to '(re)make the state, re(map) urban space, and re(order) urban social life itself' (p.178).

Has this laconic, well-defined book by Rademacher convincingly answered the delivered question of what urban ecology means? Focusing on the processes of urban development and political transformation, the author embeds urban ecology in a developmentalist environmentalism discourse. This lets the reader understand the process of rivers restoration in dynamics as well as see political alterations that have influenced the environmental transformations in Kathmandu. This book could be regarded as a notable contribution to South Asia and Himalayan studies, while the approach itself might be valuable to explore other areas in which the process of environmental renewal is consonant with unpredictable political changes.

DMITRY NECHIPORUK
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia)

Okely, Judith. 2012. Anthropological Practice. Fieldwork and the Ethnographic Method. London, New York: Berg / Bloomsbury Publishing. xii + 200 pp. Pb.: £16.19. ISBN: 9781845206031.

The book Anthropological Practice. Fieldwork and Ethnographic Method is dedicated to Edmund Leach, who introduced its author to Social Anthropology. Research and methodology have always been a quest in itself for any subjects and anthropology is not an exception. As stated by the author, the book concentrates on aspects of the unique field practice of anthropology.

The book is divided into seven chapters apart from the Preface and Acknowledgement, Questions for the Anthropologist in an appendix, as well as notes, references and Index. It begins with the preface and acknowledgement in which the author states that it is an outcome of years of research, lecturing, thinking and writing, and exposures to the different lectures and conferences the author had presented, including the University of Edinburgh as a visiting professor.

The first chapter, Theoretical and Historical Overview, begins with the line 'Anthropological fieldwork is the subject in practice' (p. 1). It describes the development of anthropology from armchair to the veranda. Okely argue that when a verb "to conduct" is used in relation to fieldwork, which implies that fieldwork is managed and pre-directed. According to the author, the more satisfactory verb is "to experience". She continues that author has aimed to explore the total context whereby the anthropologist acquires knowledge through experience. The chapter focuses on discusses about the methodological silence, demand for methods, hypothesis, definition of ethnography, etc. It is an analysis of the total concept and holism of anthropology as a subject citing different scholars, including Malinowski, who spent hours reading novels in the field and later mentioned this in his publication.

The second chapter deals with the choice of the location of fieldwork and the concept of isolation of the people under study; the author presents an account of working among Roma and the choice of location, which (according to the author) includes both deliberate and unconscious factors.

The third chapter, Choice or Change of Topic, discusses topic and its change later in the field or in between the research, by quoting different scholars and their fieldwork such as Morris's shift in his focus from classification, Howell's initial knowledge about the people under study through library, Parry's responses to the interests and concerns of the people whom he encountered, McLeod's choice of Ghanna through mishearing and many other scholars. This chapter confronts the preconceived notion for people to be studied and the subsequent change in the topic after being in the field.

Participant Observation: Theoretical Overview examines the merits behind the claims of anthropologists regarding participant observation as a method. In the history section, the author clearly denotes the definition as given by Chicago sociologists in the interwar period, though Malinowski had been using the method without being aware of the term. The author also mentioned sociologists considering participant observation as a continuum with observation.

The following chapter on the Participant Observation cities examples from different scholars, such as Wright, McLeod and Herzfeld, who revealed in different contexts the value of going with the flow of local culture.

The sixth chapter, Fieldwork Embodied with sub-themes such as body with mind, the body and embodied knowledge, arrivals as sexed and racialised others, etc. The chapter describes the experience of being a part of the people under study. The last chapter focuses on ethnic differences, gender sexuality, and intellectual exchange. The book concludes by describing the anthropologist's adaptability to change in time instead of following some formulaic agenda.

Anthropological Practice. Fieldwork and Ethnographic Method is a book that can be used as a reference. The essence and richness of the book lies in the fact that the author has cited a vast amount of the work of anthropological scholars. The 'Reference and Further Reading' section runs from page 167 to 188. One can easily conclude that indeed the author has done admirable research on anthropological fieldwork methods and the contribution of different scholars. However, there is no chapter on conclusions, leaving readers to wonder "What then should be the correct methodology?". Okely has worked among the Roma and had mentioned and cited about the Roma, without offering any conclusion about her work. The book is therefore lacking in the area of conclusion.

The book is a rich anthropological work and it is worth praising for citing so many anthropological works with such an immense exposure to the great many scholars of anthropology. Name any renowned anthropologist and his/her work will be cited here. If any young anthropologist or someone new to the field is looking for books on research methodology, this work may disappoint, but for someone aware of the richness and beauty of anthropology and looking for critiques to the works of anthropology, this is the right book. On the whole, this reviewer recommends the book to scholars and researchers who are at higher levels of understanding anthropological research.

RIMAI JOY
Amity University (India)

CORRIGENDUM

Anthropological Notebooks 19(1): 5–24.

Irit Eguavoen: *Climate change and trajectories of blame in Northern Ghana*

Page 22:
Kemausuor, Francis, Ernest Dwamena, Paul L. G. Vlek & Ahmad M. Manschadi. 2011. Farmers perception of climate change in the Ejura-Sekyeredumase district of Ghana. *ARPN Journal for Biological and Agricultural Sciences* 6(10): 26–37.

The correct reference:
Kemausuor, Francis, Ernest Dwamena, Ato Bart-Plange & Nicholas Kyei-Baffour 2011. Farmers perception of climate change in the Ejura-Sekyedumase district of Ghana. *ARPN Journal for Biological and Agricultural Sciences* 6(19): 26–37.