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Leopold Blaustein's Unique Phenomenological-Psychological Thought

The Psychological Perspective

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Abstract

The article focuses on several selected aspects of Leopold Blaustein's philosophical and psychological thought, which have a unique significance in the context of the Lvov–Warsaw School and could be an essential voice in the contemporary discourse on mental phenomena. This concerns: firstly, Blaustein's proposal to combine descriptive psychology with phenomenology; secondly, humanistic psychology as a unique proposal encompassing an originally understood subject matter of research

and a comprehensive methodology; thirdly, the underestimated role of perception in shaping various types of experiences and attitudes (aesthetic, religious, etc.). Although Blaustein was primarily a philosopher, his works were also directly concerned with psychology, and from this perspective, I try to understand the selected aspects of his thought. Despite the passage of time, these are achievements of great importance for philosophy and potentially for contemporary psychology.

Keywords: humanistic psychology, mental phenomena, theory crisis, phenomenological psychology, Brentano school.

Edinstvena fenomenološko-psihološka misel Leopolda Blausteina. Psihološka perspektiva

Povzetek

Članek se osredotoča na več izbranih vidikov filozofske in psihološke misli Leopolda Blausteina, ki imajo edinstven pomen v kontekstu lvovsko-varšavske šole in bi lahko predstavljali bistven glas v sodobnem diskurzu o mentalnih fenomenih. To zlasti zadeva: prvič, Blausteinov predlog povezovanja deskriptivne psihologije s fenomenologijo; drugič, humanistično psihologijo kot edinstven zasnutek, kakršen vključuje izvirno razumljeno vsebino raziskovanja in vsestransko metodologijo; tretjič, podcenjeno vlogo zaznavanja pri oblikovanju različnih tipov izkustva in zadržanj (estetskih, religioznih itd.). Čeprav je bil Blaustein prvenstveno filozof, se njegova dela tudi neposredno dotikajo psihologije in s tovrstne perspektive skušam razumeti nekatere vidike njegove misli. Kljub minevanju časa gre za dosežke izrednega pomena za filozofijo in morebiti tudi za sodobno psihologijo.

Ključne besede: humanistična psihologija, mentalni fenomeni, kriza teorije, fenomenološka psihologija, Brentanova šola.

Introduction

The main purpose of this article is to present the most important theoretical achievements of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Kazimierz Twardowski (founder of the Lvov–Warsaw School), as well as their uniqueness, particularly in the context of contemporary psychological thought. Blaustein's philosophical interests primarily encompassed issues at the intersection of psychology and philosophy, including phenomenology, perception, judgement, and aesthetic experience.

In the first part of the text, I discuss Blaustein's position within the Lvov–Warsaw School with regard to the evolving views of its representatives and the wide spectrum of theoretical perspectives. This section also explains why Blaustein and his works enjoyed interest primarily among Polish philosophers and to a lesser extent among Polish psychologists. I then present his key achievements, such as the proposal for a descriptive psychology combined with a phenomenological approach, his original proposal for a humanistic psychology, and the importance of perception in aesthetic experience. I attempt to demonstrate that Blaustein's works, despite the passage of time, still represent an attractive conceptual device that could enrich theoretical and philosophical discourse on the border of psychology and phenomenology.

I also hope that this article will fill a gap in the presentation of the psychological branch of the Lvov–Warsaw School, which remains underappreciated in world literature (usually dominated by the school's philosophical-logical tradition). This gap also applies to Polish literature, where Blaustein is unfortunately often overlooked. It is worth emphasizing that, as one of the few representatives of Twardowski's school, he advocated combining the philosophy of Franz Brentano and phenomenology with psychological issues. Blaustein's philosophy reveals not only the complexity of descriptive psychology that was then developing in Poland (as well as in Central and Eastern Europe), but also its vitality.

Blaustein and the Polish school of psychology

Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942/44?) belongs to the third generation of students of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov–Warsaw School, as a result of which he was influenced by his most mature and formed philosophical views

(Płotka 2024). He joined Twardowski's school after a period of major disputes concerning psychologism in logic, rejected by Edmund Husserl in *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900–1901), whose work changed the approach to psychology among many students of the Polish school. However, this does not mean that, in the later period, the philosophical beliefs in the Lvov environment were shared by everyone in the same way; the reality was quite the opposite. In the interwar period (1918–1939), Twardowski's school experienced its greatest flourishing and development (Lapointe *et al.* 2009; Woleński 2018). It was a mature formation with recognized scientific achievements in Europe. This is evidenced not only by international publications, but also by the fact that just before (or during) the outbreak of the Second World War, many of them moved to other universities in the world.[1] Considering the peripheral location of Lvov within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and to the great centers of philosophy in Western Europe, this is evidence of the relatively high position of the Polish philosophical environment, in which Blaustein studied (Brożek *et al.* 2015).

During his studies at the Faculty of Philosophy of Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov (1923–1927), Blaustein attended lectures by professors representing various trends of thought within the Twardowski school. His most significant teachers were Twardowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Roman Ingarden. It was mainly due to them that Blaustein became interested in analytical philosophy, psychology, and phenomenology, which later constituted a common area of his research, including aesthetic experience. However, the inspirations and sources of Blaustein's scientific formation went far beyond the Polish environment. In 1925, he went to Freiburg for one semester to study phenomenology with Husserl. After obtaining his doctoral degree in 1927, he went to Berlin on a several-month scholarship, where he participated in research and lectures by, among others, Carl Stumpf and the founders of Gestalt psychology: Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Köhler. Blaustein sought

1 Alfred Tarski became a professor of logic at Berkeley University, Jan Łukasiewicz moved to the Royal Academy of Science in Dublin as a lecturer in logic, Edward Poznański went to Hebrew University, Józef Bocheński went to the University of Freiburg, Henryk Hiż became a professor of linguistics at Pennsylvania State University, Henryk Mehlberg went to the University of Chicago taking over the philosophy department after Rudolf Carnap.

to establish closer cooperation between them and the Lvov philosophical community, debating with German scientists and providing them with important Polish scientific works (e.g., Twardowski, Jan Łukasiewicz) (Płotka 2020b, 2023; 2024).

The Lvov–Warsaw School is not a uniform entity; it is not distinguished by one leading theory shared by all or most of its representatives. The distinguishing feature was how to conduct philosophical research, within which various theories (philosophical, logical, sociological, psychological) could be formulated (Woleński 1989). Blaustein's scientific image within the Lvov–Warsaw School can, therefore, be assessed differently depending on the point of reference. Regardless of this, his position among philosophers is unquestionable, while his position among psychologists of the Twardowski school reflects the problems that this branch of the school faced in the history of Polish humanities (Rosińska 2005; Rzepa 1992; Woleński 2019).

In Polish literature, such representatives of psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School as Władysław Witwicki, Stefan Baley, Stefan Błachowski, Mieczysław Kreutz, Andrzej Lewicki, and sometimes Tadeusz Tomaszewski (Rzepa 1997; 1998), are usually mentioned. However, Polish psychology overlooked Blaustein for many years. This is due to at least three reasons.

Firstly, after Husserl rejected psychologism and Twardowski's students accepted his position, the Polish school substantially revaluated the subject matter of philosophical research. Initially, Twardowski, following Brentano, treated the new empirical psychology as a chance to legitimize philosophy, including logic and the theory of knowledge (Rzepa and Stachowski 1993). Twardowski's first works were philosophical and psychological in nature, and he never abandoned these interests. His first doctorate was promoted by W. Witwicki, a psychologist. In 1904, he visited scientific centers in Europe (Paris, Prague, Berlin, Göttingen, Giesen, Graz, Würzburg, Halle, and Leipzig), and, in 1907, he established a laboratory of experimental psychology at the University of Lvov. He taught both disciplines and educated the first generation of Polish psychologists who took over post-war Poland's most important psychology departments.[2] However, the anti-psychological turn

2 Witwicki at the University of Warsaw from 1919 (S. Baley joined him in 1934),

weakened interest in psychology, and the school's philosophers turned mainly toward logical and phenomenological research. On the other hand, despite their initial connections with philosophy, the psychologists mentioned above increasingly turned toward the world of empirical psychology, dominated by experiment, measurement, and observation (Citlak 2023).

Secondly, the transformation of psychology in the USA additionally strengthened this process. The strong position of behaviorism, progressive reductionism, the atomization of research, and the focus on seemingly "hard" empirical data did not favor the development of descriptive psychology, pushing it more and more into subjective research of (seemingly) lower scientific value (Pickren and Rutheford 2010). Even such a large and significant research programs of psychology of the time as was Wilhelm Wundt's program of two-way psychology (experimental and historical-cultural) did not develop among American psychologists, and was forgotten in Europe (Greenwood 2003, 2003a; Jovanović 2021).

Thirdly, the shape of the humanities and science (including psychology) in Poland after 1945 was influenced by the new Soviet government, which marginalized Twardowski's school as a relic of the bourgeoisie (Kuliniak *et al*. 2018). Unfortunately, it almost eliminated the achievements of the Lvov–Warsaw School psychology from the public discourse. One of the painful examples was the attitude of T. Tomaszewski, a student of M. Kreutz (a student of Twardowski), who, after taking over the department of psychology in 1948 at the University of Warsaw, became an active opponent of the old school and a propagator of the ideologization of psychology (Stachowski 2010). The sharp edge of criticism was directed, among other things, against introspection, praising the Soviet physiological psychology and psychology of work (Koczanowicz and Koczanowicz-Dehnel 2021). Blaustein's proposals did not fit these trends, so they found no followers among Polish psychologists. Moreover, the fact that his works were philosophical in nature meant that it was more difficult for Polish psychologists to perceive him as a psychologist.

Kreutz at the University of Wrocław after World War II, Błachowski at the University of Poznań from 1919, Czeżowski at Stefan Batory University in Vilnius (now Lithuania) and at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń after WW2.

Unfortunately, in addition to the profound changes in Polish psychology after 1989, its Westernization did not weaken, but only gained in strength. After a period of censorship and control by the communist authorities, Polish psychology applied the standards of Western psychology with great commitment, without paying much attention to its own scientific heritage in this area (Citlak 2023a). Excessive optimism and a lack of criticism toward scientific novelties—criticism typical of the representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School (Rzepa 2019; Rzepa and Stachowski 1993)—significantly contributed to the Americanization and "colonization" of Polish psychology after 1989, to which other countries of Eastern and Western Europe also succumbed (Dobroczyński and Rzepa 2019).

Paradoxically, however, Blaustein's thought fits well into a certain space of contemporary—not only Polish—psychology, which for some time now has been demanding new proposals in the theory and philosophy of psychology. Contrary to appearances, Blaustein's thought is in some respects more relevant today than it was a hundred years ago.

Relevance of Blaustein's descriptive psychology

The value of psychology as proposed by Blaustein can clearly be seen against the background of difficulties that contemporary psychology is struggling with. One of its most significant dilemmas is the problem of research replication. This applies even to recognized psychological theories with empirical support. In 2015 and 2018, two international projects tested the chances of replicating previously obtained research results (Nosek *et al.* 2018). In the first case, the replication coefficient was about 30%, and in the second, it was about 50%. For an empirical science that prides itself on experiment and measurement, this is a poor result that no scientific discipline would like to achieve. However, the problem is not new; it has been identified before, although only the current accumulation and widespread availability of research published in international journals has shown the deep problems of empirical psychology. The first reaction of its representatives was to correct the statistical methods, which were considered to be imprecise (Wasserstein *et al.* 2019). It quickly transpired that the problem lies deeper, namely in constructed theories. The weakness is not

so much statistics, but the theory and philosophy of psychology (Fiedler 2017; Morawski 2019). Often, there is no strict logical connection between theories and the hypotheses derived from them, which means that the obtained results only partially support or contradict the adopted hypotheses (it is not known to what extent). Moreover, the main variables of various theories also have unclear or imprecise definitions. A common problem is combining variables with completely different ontological statuses and then trying to explain the connections between them using definitions or entire theories taken from other scientific disciplines. Conceptual frameworks for psychological research were/are very often provided by psychiatry, sociology, and currently also neuroscience (Coltheart 2006; Wann 1964). Of course, this does not have to be a mistake, but taking over conceptual instruments from other sciences leads to profound semantic shifts and to focusing on problems of a slightly different type than would result from the nature of the phenomenon being studied.

The problem is particularly acute in the case of mental phenomena, the ontological status of which does not allow for an uncritical acceptance of the methodology and conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences (Brandl 2021; Taieb 2023; Uher 2019). At the end of the 19th century, Franz Brentano and Wilhelm Wundt presented two different conceptualizations of mental phenomena: Brentano in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) and Wundt in *Physiological Psychology* (1874). Wundt was convinced that mental phenomena, in addition to their temporality, also have a feature of intensity that can be measured and expressed using the language of mathematics, ensuring psychology a strong place in science. Brentano indicated intentionality as the main feature without being overly concerned with the measurement problem. Wundt created a bridge between psychology and the natural sciences, while Brentano opened up a field of research that went beyond the paradigms of the natural sciences, allowing emerging psychology to create its language and original definitions. The subsequent history of this discipline showed that the approach of Wundt turned out to be more attractive, and Brentano was marginalized as a philosopher more than the true founder of empirical psychology (Meyer *et al.* 2018). But the problem of such a one-sided approach was signaled many times, especially since the idea of measurement, based on the principle of isomorphism (mathematical quantities and the relationships

between them represent/correspond to psychological quantities and the relationships between them), had very weak theoretical foundations (Michell 2021). The research results generated in this way, i.e., based on the definitions of variables often taken from other sciences, plus the measurement mentioned above, were destined to lead to a general crisis sooner or later.

I devote more space to this problem, because Blaustein's proposals fit perfectly into the theory crisis despite the passage of more than a hundred years. It is worth mentioning that in international discourse, it has been proposed to overcome the crisis by, for example, adopting capacious theories, i.e., those covering the largest possible group of variables that the accepted paradigm would explain. In one of the more discussed proposals, Michael Muthukrishna and Joseph Henrich suggest an evolutionary paradigm covering beliefs, convictions, emotions, behavior, etc. (Muthukrishna and Henrich 2019). In turn, Klaus Oberauer and Stephan Lewandowsky, analyzing psychological theories, claim that one of the solutions would be the mathematical and logical modelling of theories, which would increase their coherence and connection with possible hypotheses (Oberauer and Lewandowsky 2019). However, even these proposals do not consider the different ontological statuses of variables that cannot be explained in a similar manner. Furthermore, the logical/mathematical modelling of the theory still leaves open the problem of the nature of these variables. In other words, the fundamental problem concerns the insight into the essence of psychological phenomena and the possibilities of their definition (Green 2021).

In the case of mental phenomena, and therefore psychology *par excellence*, the main source of reaching them invariably remains introspection, understood as *innere Wahrnehmung*. Given the difficulties outlined above, Brentano's main statements regarding descriptive psychology are applicable, and should be used in building a conceptual base that could be applied to build hypotheses and theories and, at a later stage, to design research. Among Twardowski's students, Blaustein was one of the most interested in using descriptive psychology to analyze specific phenomena, such as aesthetic experience like the perception of a radio play or film. The use of descriptive psychology, as proposed by Blaustein, is fundamental to the definition of mental phenomena (Citlak 2025). In its basic assumptions, it remains consistent with Brentano,

Twardowski, and Dilthey (although he used their works, while at the same time maintaining a critical attitude; Płotka 2020). This type of psychology allows us to identify, describe, classify, and distinguish types as well as to capture the components of phenomena. This is indisputably the starting point for any further research. Blaustein, moreover, slightly broadens the scope of research by including products as an additional source of empirical data, as was proposed by Twardowski (Twardowski 1912). Furthermore, Blaustein fully accepts experimental research, which he treats as an extension of the achievements of phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology. We then obtain two separate "methods" or two separate "phases" of research, although complementary to each other (Blaustein 1930, 5). Both of these have different goals, i.e., description and explanation. Descriptive psychology does not go beyond the obvious/evident data from introspective experience (Płotka 2023).

An additional advantage of his proposal is the inclusion of the findings of phenomenology, which, despite a rather critical assessment (Płotka 2024), he treated as an essential tool of his research. Blaustein was more in favor of the analysis of the content and types of empirical consciousness, the empirical subject and its experiences, than—as Husserl wanted—the analysis of pure consciousness, the essence of experiences, going beyond the empirical subject (Husserl 1925/1968). Descriptive psychology should be an empirical psychology and a development or extension of phenomenology; it was to be a descriptive psychology with a phenomenological tinge, close to Husserl's phenomenological psychology from 1925. Leaving aside the differences between them, the very fact of including phenomenology in psychological empirical research brings Blaustein, to some extent, closer to the phenomenological psychology that developed after Husserl's death (Miskiewicz 2009; Płotka 2017).

Blaustein's research proposal, which focuses on the experiences of the empirical subject, corresponds well with the problems I mentioned above. The theoretical and definitional deficiencies of 21st-century psychology are currently so visible that for some time, it has been explicitly postulated to accept the phenomenological approach as an essential condition for experimental research. Both descriptive and phenomenological psychology

can provide basic (still missing) knowledge about the specificity of many studied variables, their features, structure, quality, etc., and thus knowledge necessary for the correct planning of cause-and-effect research (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012). However, these are not obvious or universally accepted explanations and proposals. This problem is deepened by the multi-layered nature of some variables, not to mention certain "wholes." Blaustein says: "Elementary psychic experiences are originally given in wholes of a higher order. Only the psychological analysis of these wholes reveals to us the elementary experiences that are part of them." (Blaustein 1935, 36.) Unfortunately, grasping these wholes is becoming increasingly difficult due to the increasing atomization of research.

The only way to order these problems is through descriptive psychology based on subjective experience and the phenomenological approach, which is focused—as Blaustein postulates—on consciousness/empirical subject. Followers of the phenomenological approach in psychology propose, among other strategies, research on people trained in phenomenological reduction so that they can provide introspective reports without unnecessary, stereotypical interpretations of this experience (Gallagher 2003; Lutz *et al.* 2002; Varela *et al.* 2001). In order to increase the objectivity of introspective reports, they propose procedures that allow for the transition from the first-person perspective to the third-person perspective, such as the mathematization and formalization of the language of the utterances (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012; Marbach 1993).

In other words, Blaustein's proposals indicated a possible direction of research, not only philosophical, but also psychological, almost a hundred years ago; unfortunately, this was a direction forgotten or at least underestimated. As I mentioned, Blaustein is not the only figure in the Lvov–Warsaw School who was close to this project. However, Blaustein explicitly combines two traditions and focuses on the empirical subject, integrating the descriptive and the phenomenological approaches with further experimental research based on causal explanations. In light of the problems with defining mental phenomena and suggestions formulated by phenomenological psychologists, descriptive psychology with Blaustein's phenomenological tinge seems, therefore, not only relevant, but interdisciplinary, reminding us that a real and adequate study of mental phenomena cannot give up its philosophical background.

Uniqueness of Blaustein's humanistic psychology

One of Blaustein's more interesting projects is the proposal of humanistic psychology, which he derived to a large extent from Wilhelm Dilthey's *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie* (1894) and the works of his student Eduard Spranger. However, Dilthey was interested in legitimizing historical and humanistic sciences by using psychology, and this proposal of humanistic psychology should be read in the light of a broader hermeneutical program, rather than as a proposal of an independent psychological project. Such legitimizing foundations were to be provided by the analysis/understanding of man's inner experience and thus by combining *verstehende Psychologie* with the hermeneutics of cultural life and descriptive psychology (Przyłębski 2012; Bollnow 1980). Dilthey emphasizes man's cultural and social embeddedness, which eludes atomistic analysis or isolated cause-and-effect relationships. Religion, customs, art, and language, together with the individual subject, create *Strukturzusammenhang*, which should be studied holistically, not reduced to simplified explanatory mechanisms. However, the abstractness and generality of Dilthey's claims, and the saturation with a certain kind of metaphysics, were met with sharp criticism by Hermann Ebbinghaus who accused him of misunderstanding empirical psychology (Ebbinghaus 1896; see also Galliker 2013). It is hard not to agree with at least some of Ebbinghaus's accusations, especially since a certain kind of distancing can also be seen in Blaustein's proposal for humanistic psychology from 1935 (distance from metaphysics, excessive abstraction, ambiguity). Nevertheless, Dilthey's proposal to include such psychology in the humanities became a lasting conviction of the Polish philosopher who gave it an original and unique meaning.

There are a few features that distinguish Blaustein's humanistic psychology. Firstly, according to him, humanistic psychology provides the humanities with "a basis for understanding a specific person," "it is an auxiliary science of the humanities," and creates "psychological foundations for the humanities" (Blaustein 1935, 51). The matter at stake is not so much the legitimization of the humanities as obtaining psychological foundations for them. Secondly, such psychology as an object of study has "an individual psyche […] not some mystical collective psyche." It concerns primarily the specific, empirical

research rooted in subjective experience. Thirdly, this psychology focuses on the subject embedded in relations with the social environment (other people, groups) and—similarly to Dilthey—the symbolic, cultural environment (i.e., the physical or psychophysical products, as Twardowski would say). It encompasses the space of an individual creating reality and embracing it. Fourthly, contrary to Dilthey, Spranger, and others, Blaustein postulates the adoption of such methods as understanding, interpretation, analysis, and introspection as well as observation, experiment, survey, and statistics, i.e., methods typical of explanatory/subjective/genetic psychology. Such an extensive methodology results from the belief that humanistic psychology "examines the psyche of a person living within the humanistic reality," which "is identical to the natural reality." This reality includes the human world, but is studied from an "anthropocentric point of view […]; it consists in the fact that the humanities are interested in the world, only insofar as it is a person, his creation, the space, in which he creates" (44). The perspective of Blaustein—a thoroughbred empiricist—may be somewhat surprising, considering that he was, after all, a phenomenologist. But this, among other points, testifies to the originality of his humanistic psychology.

The uniqueness of Blaustein's humanistic psychology, however, goes much deeper and concerns an aspect that has not yet, to my knowledge, been considered in literature. Namely, the fact that the phenomenological perspective allows him to not only go beyond reductionist tendencies, but, in combination with the theses contained in the text from 1935, also allows him to conduct research in a style that is reminiscent of the contemporary so-called indigenous approach, and can be, thus, considered as a research proposal leading to the formulation of grounded theories. This is possible, if the researcher considers a broad methodological spectrum, including methods of natural sciences; and this is something that Blaustein does. In indigenous psychology (Allwood and Berry 2006; Kim and Berry 1993), the local, geographical, and ethnic nature of psychological processes is taken into account. The world of the subject's experiences always remains part of a broader spectrum of connections as a unique system of variables conditioned by such a dynamic and original network of dependencies that one cannot expect their exact replication in another place or time. Indigenous psychology/psychologies offer original, local explanations

and theories of psychological phenomena, they may be similar, although they are not identical. Indigenous psychology is currently an essential voice in cultural psychology (Kim *et al*. 2006) and, above all, in postcolonial discourse, in which marginalized and previously unnoticed important and original conceptualizations come to the fore (Hwang 2005). They force us to verify some theories developed in Western culture (mainly Western Europe and the USA) and promoted as mental or discursive calques for an allegedly fuller understanding of "other social entities" (Ting *et al*. 2025). Interpreting locally/geographically embedded empirical data in light of psychology understood in this way gives voice to real experience, which only then becomes more understandable. This approach is close to grounded theories, which arise when the research derives its claims solely from the subject of the study, without apodictically imposing foreign concepts and taking over their definitions, for example, from other ready-made theories. In the analysis process, concepts should somehow emerge on their own; the researcher reads them and does not construct them.[3] Blaustein sees it as being similar to this:

> In mental life, we encounter various experiential wholes of a higher order, which include elementary experiences. […] Observing mental life, a psychologist *finds these wholes*, analyses them, and detects their components but *does not construct them* from elements. (Blaustein 1935, 38 [italics added by A. C.].)

A little earlier, Blaustein writes: "Elementary mental experiences are originally given in higher-order wholes." (38.) "These experiential wholes stand out against the background of the whole of mental life as something separate in a quite distinct way." (39.) This is a complex of experiences that is

3 An example close to Blaustein and the Lvov–Warsaw School could be the analysis of the work of the Polish-Jewish Galician artist Bruno Schulz. For decades, he was attributed with a masochistic disorder and destructive masochism, using conceptual categories of Western European psychology and psychiatry from the beginning of the 20th century. However, his masochism looks different in light of the psychological theory derived from Twardowski's school, established in Galicia at that time: it is a positive and constructive masochism, which could have been the source of Schulz's inner strength and balance, and is much closer to the categories of contemporary cultural psychiatry (see Citlak 2025a).

not distinguished, using some separate abstraction, but it is a "natural" whole, "originally found" (34). Mental wholes are the cause of behavior, tendencies, and skills, and lead to the creation of mental, psychophysical, and physical products as well as being responsible for social relations, etc. Their feature is intentionality (in the sense of intention), as well as teleology, similar to, for example, Adler, for whom—claims Blaustein—the purposefulness of behavior can be seen in light of a person's life plan (striving to increase the sense of life power). Analysis of the components of larger wholes should not separate the former from the latter, because they lose their meaning. When describing, for example, the components of an experience, it should be remembered that they are always "originally given in higher-order wholes. Psychological analysis of these wholes reveals to us the elementary experiences that are part of them." (36.) Such an approach minimizes reductionist tendencies and places the interpretation of psychological facts considering broader conditions. Firstly, this appertains to subjective conditions (psychological experiences are always subjective, not anonymous); otherwise, the study may indeed lead to "the discovery of important and interesting laws, but this study deals with psychological life as if artificially created, stripped of any specific connection with the surrounding world" (36). And secondly, it places the interpretation of psychological facts under the viewpoint of extra-subjective, situational, and complex conditions, because "each time the difference in the situation and intentional object causes the difference in experiences" (36). Certainly, the phenomenological attitude and respect for the object of study without first imposing ready-made categories helped Blaustein formulate the abovementioned statements. His proposal undoubtedly paints a picture of psychology practiced in a way that is close to the indigenous tradition. Furthermore, it seems to create appropriate foundations for formulating theses typical of grounded theories, in which existing empirical data can "speak" without first applying ready-made concepts or theories.

It is also worth mentioning that Blaustein's humanistic psychology from 1935 is also clearly different from the humanistic psychology we know from the works of the classics of this trend, e.g., Abraham Maslow or Carl Rogers. On the one hand, there are mutual similarities (Nawrocki 1996), such as the focus on human subjectivity, going beyond the determinism of psychoanalysis

and behaviorism, focusing on the current experience of the subject, and to some extent also accepting the phenomenological attitude in the analysis of the experience itself. On the other hand, however, it is anthropocentric in nature with an emphasis on man's cultural and social embeddedness. Compared to Maslow or Rogers, Blaustein's conceptual apparatus is—to put it mildly—different. Let us take, for example, the flagship concepts of humanistic psychology, such as self-actualization, the actualization of individual potential, the good nature of man, self-growth, the focus on human needs, or self-esteem. They are simply absent in Blaustein. He also does not use as a foundation or background for psychological claims any particular vision of human nature, as in American humanistic psychology, in which elements of Far-Eastern philosophy play an important role, including the belief that man is good by nature and so are his motivations (DeRobertis 2013). This thesis has significantly influenced the shape of humanistic psychologists' theory and therapeutic activity; it is not just an addition to the whole (Cain 2003). Blaustein lived in a different time, in another culture, and his proposal for humanistic psychology should be assessed for what it is: an indigenous proposal for humanistic psychology, just as the version of the American humanistic psychology of Maslow, Rogers, Perls, and others is indigenous (geographically and culturally limited). However, the American project found followers and funds, while the Polish did not. The popularity and scope of the former's influence do not yet prove its greater credibility, especially since its immanent features are a priori statements, taken from the "outside," which the Polish researcher avoids, relying on the data of empirical experience. Blaustein tries to create a strictly scientific project and, to a much lesser extent, a model supporting therapeutic goals (it is not a result of the therapist's reflection). He treats humanistic psychology as a science that creates psychological foundations for the humanities, foundations for understanding human functioning, which the humanities also deal with, although in their typical way. It is an "auxiliary science of various humanities" (51). It somewhat resembles something that in psychology is called psychological humanities complementary to psychological science (Teo 2017), with the difference, however, that Blaustein's proposal also includes methods used in psychological science—and this makes his project even more unique.

The forgotten role of perception

Finally, I want to draw attention to (or rather signal) an interesting aspect of Blaustein's thought, namely the importance of perception in shaping attitudes. It takes up a lot of space in his works (Blaustein 1930, 1930, 1931a, 1936, 1938; Płotka 2020b), so out of necessity, I will focus only on a narrow aspect of this issue. Perception's role in shaping attitudes is one of the more neglected topics in favor of research regarding emotions and beliefs/judgments. In practice, attitudes are usually analyzed with respect to these two dimensions (emotions and judgments) plus behavior. In scientific discourse (psychological, philosophical, sociological), perception takes up a relatively marginal place, which is unfortunate because, as Blaustein shows, it can determine attitudes in a very subtle way. Furthermore, its analysis could provide explanations not present from the perspective of emotions or judgments. In the "Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym [The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience]" from 1936, Blaustein emphasizes that the central part of aesthetic experience is the emotionally tinged perception of the object of the experience. Perception and emotions are the main components of such an experience, while judgments and will play a somewhat secondary role (although also important). The content of the aesthetic experience and its course depend on the type of perception, and it is not only about whether it is long-term (perception of a play) or momentary (perception of an image at a given moment). It is about distinguishing the quality and type of perception: perceptive, imaginative, and significative (i.e., using a sign, e.g., linguistic, while reading a literary work). In each case, perception includes other elements: a) perceptions, b) perceptions and imaginative representations based on them, c) perceptions and significative representations based on them. In the case of a), such objects, as architecture or a natural phenomenon, are given; in the case of b) and c) in addition to the perceived object, an object presented indirectly is also provided, i.e., imaginatively or significatively.

Perception is undoubtedly one of the important factors responsible for the formation of an emotional attitude toward an object. This happens, Blaustein claims, not only when judgments are formed in this process, e.g., concerning the meaning of the work or the intention of the author of the work. This also

happens when only impressions and feelings arise. In addition, "in imaginative perception […] and significative perception directed at fictional objects, suppositions, and quasi-judgments occur" (Blaustein 1936, 139). Whether we perceive the real or fictional world is not so important at this point. However, it is essential that perceptual processes underlie the attitude toward the object of perception, and the attitude does not have to be related to forming a judgment. Moreover, perception itself influences how the object will be shaped in the aesthetic experience. "The number and type of features that reach the consciousness of the person who knows them depend not only on the objective properties of the object, but also on the course and type of perception." (141.) The creative nature of perception is clearly visible, for example, in imaginative representations, without which it is impossible to properly understand not only aesthetic experiences, such as the reception of art, but many others, such as religious experiences (Blaustein 1930, 6). Religious experiences include a set of various feelings closely related to imaginative perception, which usually concerns either the visual religious art or facts that cannot be captured by an image, but in representations as kinds of mental representations. Religious experience is one of the most complex mental experiences, in which representations and imaginative perception play a vital role. It is difficult to say at present, however, how the specificity or strength of religious attitudes is shaped based on this type of perception, because apart from the general theoretical outline, Blaustein's works have not been developed in this respect, much less transferred to empirical practice. However, already based on the theoretical foundations themselves, it is clear that the significance of the types of perception can determine the strength of religious attitudes and the accompanying emotions arising as a result of religious experience, which is often connected with aesthetic experience or is simply an aesthetic experience at the same time.

In this context, it seems particularly interesting to me that Blaustein articulates not only the diverse feelings of experiences that are aesthetic, religious, etc. (including quasi-feelings; Blaustein 1931a), but also the diverse nature of beliefs, such as judgments and quasi-judgments/suppositions arising as a consequence of different types of perception. This opens up an interesting and, above all, an important area of theoretical and empirical

exploration concerning the sources (or causes) of the durability of attitudes based on quasi-judgments/suppositions (also on quasi-feelings). The proposed perspective indicates an extensive area of psychological phenomena that has no proper place in contemporary empirical or theoretical psychology; to put it bluntly, it practically does not exist, because the entire tradition of Brentano's psychology and his followers with a rich conceptual instrumentarium concerning judgments or representations has been pushed to the margins, while the available and dominant conceptual apparatus is too poor to analyze this issue in detail. Witwicki empirically demonstrated the importance of a very similar issue in the Lvov–Warsaw School, when he analyzed religious beliefs using the concept of supposition (Witwicki 1939/1959): suppositions can constitute a permanent component of religious attitudes, which can dominate logically justified and coherent judgments while being the basis of illogical beliefs and even permanent religious attitudes (this also applies to aesthetics and ethics). However, Blaustein's works deepen the subtlety of distinctions and link attitudes with the type of perception itself. I believe that the analysis of perception and aesthetic experience in this light allows us to assume that different types of perception can also play an essential role in other areas of our lives, including experiences that are religious, political, etc. The conceptual apparatus could promote a better understanding not only of the nature of these phenomena or the distinguishing of their components, but also help identifying possible sources of the durability of some attitudes, their excessive rigidity and resistance to change, which is closely related to such problems as radicalism, uncritical attitudes, and beliefs. However, this would require the continuation of theoretical considerations initiated by Blaustein and the verification in empirical practice. Their explanatory and predictive potential seems significant, especially today, in a pictorial reality when social attitudes increasingly emerge independently of the logical coherence of beliefs and judgments.

Conclusions

Leopold Blaustein belongs to the third generation of the students of Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov–Warsaw School. He expressed one of

the most representative research positions of this school's psychology at the beginning of the 20th century. He combined descriptive psychology with phenomenology, which played a key role in studying mental phenomena in Twardowski's school. Among the psychologists of this school, such as Witwicki, Baley, Błachowski, Kreutz, and Lewicki, it is not easy to find a figure with such an apparent involvement in both trends, especially since he did it in an original way. The intellectual formation of the Polish researcher also had a broader context, resulting from the influence of Husserl, Gestalt psychologists, and Dilthey. However, what distinguishes Blaustein is his critical stance toward his masters.

Blaustein's works not only testify to a very original approach to such problems as combining psychology with phenomenology or the analysis of aesthetic experience, but also reveal the extraordinary erudition and intuition of the Polish philosopher, which allowed him to create several still relevant theoretical proposals in both philosophy and psychology. Blaustein's thought remains relevant despite the passage of almost a hundred years. I have presented it in three areas of contemporary psychology, which, due to the marginalization of the descriptive and the phenomenological approach, is currently struggling with difficulties that require at least referring to the basic assumptions of this discipline present in Brentano's tradition. Brentano and his students (including Husserl and Twardowski) represent a position that is more or less directly discussed today in psychological science in the context of the problem of theory and identity of psychology, including the study of mental phenomena. These problems could be solved (at least to some extent) with the help of descriptive psychology combined with phenomenological methodology.

Blaustein's psychological-phenomenological approach also allowed him to present an original project of humanistic psychology, one of the most characteristic features of which is the combination of the methodology of the humanities with the methodology of the natural sciences. The project inspired by Dilthey's work, in Blaustein's implementation, offers wider descriptive and explanatory possibilities. All the more so, because Blaustein understands the reality of human activity and nature as the subject matter of his psychology. This project also has clear features of indigenous psychology and could serve—after appropriate development—as a philosophical-theoretical substantiation

of research typical of grounded theories. Despite its similarities to American humanistic psychology, it is ultimately an innovative, original project that constitutes an interesting, although forgotten, alternative to already known theories in this field.

An equally interesting (and the most extensive) area of Blaustein's research is aesthetic experience. In this article, I have only drawn attention to a particular aspect of this problem: the significance of perception in shaping aesthetic experience. Blaustein's main claims in this area allow us to assume that a thorough analysis of perception could provide valuable information or theoretical foundation for empirical research on the significance of perception in other experiences, including shaping social attitudes (religious, ethical, political). Contemporary psychological or sociological theory does not have an adequately precise conceptual background that would allow for detailed analyses of this problem. However, the conceptual apparatus concerning perception, representations, and judgments is still available in the Brentano school, which Blaustein also represented (despite modifications and a critical attitude).

In summary, I would like to emphasize that the Lvov–Warsaw School derived from Twardowski or the phenomenological psychology stemming from Husserl, despite the passage of time, still offer important theoretical propositions, especially today, when the problem of mental phenomena demands moving beyond the methodological paradigms limited mainly to the natural sciences.

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

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

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