

PARADIGMA NOVEGA EVROPSKEGA VARNOSTNEGA SISTEMA

PARADIGM OF THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

Professional article

Povzetek V prispevku je predstavljena nova varnostna paradigma v Evropi. Avtor izhaja iz predpostavke, da se je namesto Velike Evrope v zadnjih dvajsetih letih v Evropi vzpostavil regionalni bipolarni varnostni sistem. Sistem predstavljajo na eni strani Nato in Evropska unija ter na drugi strani, pod vodstvom Rusije, CSTO in SND. Takšen regionalni bipolarni sistem ne bo obstal dolgoročno, temveč ga je razumeti kot prehod v homogen ali heterogen sistem. V takšnem bipolarnem varnostnem okolju ima Ukrajina majhne možnosti, da ohrani svojo neodvisnost in suverenost.

Ključne besede *CSTO, Evropski varnostni sistem, širitev EU in Nata, širša Evropa, regionalna varnost, varnostni vakuum, Rusija, Ukrajina.*

Abstract The paper presents the new paradigm in Europe. The author's view is based on the assumption that in the last twenty years, instead of Wider Europe on the European continent the bipolar system of European security on the regional level was formed. This system is represented by NATO and the EU, on the one side, and CSTO and CIS led by Russia, on the other side. Such regional bipolar system will not remain in the long term, therefore it should be considered as transitional towards a homogeneous or heterogeneous system. Under such regional bipolar system Ukraine will have feeble chances to preserve its independence and state sovereignty.

Key words *CSTO, European Security System, EU and NATO enlargement, Wider Europe, regional security, security vacuum, Russia, Ukraine.*

Introduction The end of the Cold War was a historical chance for the European nations to create a secure and united continent. The idea of a "Wider Europe" in the 1990s seemed close to reality. The Helsinki process, which started in the 1970s, laid the foundation for such a Europe, grounded in common values, European identity, indivisibility

of security, inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, absence of dividing lines and spheres of influence. In order to build such a foundation for a “Wider Europe”, a special institution, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was established, which afterwards grew into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE successfully managed to overcome the confrontation between East and West, which eventually resulted in the end of the Cold War. The OSCE proved to be effective in establishing trust between two ideologically hostile parts of Europe—democratic West and communist East. Mainly, due to the OSCE initiative the military machine with enormous weapon potential – a material basis of the Cold War was successfully dismantled. The OSCE managed to introduce the methods of military trust between countries from the opposing politico–military blocks. After the end of the Cold War the OSCE faced huge new tasks namely: the development of common European security system and Wider Europe which were grounded in shared democratic values.

Thus, the Paris Charter for Europe adopted at the summit in Paris served as the main plan for development of this system. It included the set of shared values which European countries should adhere to in their relations, while there was no confrontation and divisions of spheres of influence between the blocks. This system had to be based on the principle of ‘indivisibility of security’ and dependence of one country’s security from the safety of others. Thus, the OBSE/CBSE managed quite successfully the consequences of the Cold War and prepared the ground for the building of new Europe.

However, the implementation of the “Wider Europe” project appeared to be very different from the initial plan.

1 INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF “WIDER EUROPE” SECURITY PROJECT FIASCO

As it turned out building of this new Europe, both on the West and East edges of large European continent was impossible. The introduction of democratic values in post–Soviet and post–communist countries was stifled by authoritarian consciousness, deep social stratification and the dominant post–communist elites.

As a result of such economic and political transformations the states in this region sank in deep economic downturn and social chaos. Profound disintegrating processes and ethnic conflicts broke out in some of these countries. Post–communist countries found themselves in a security vacuum. Russia suffered from particularly destructive processes in this period. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty was perceived by it as a huge geopolitical defeat. Russians developed a complex of ‘loss of country greatness’ which reached the edge of

breakdown under the influence of these deep-rooted and radical transformational processes. This complex is, in fact, a complex of 'state status' loss, which turned out to be the main value for the Russians, unlike the Western Europe with the democracy as its fundamental value. On the background of a great sense of 'status loss' the Russians started perceiving democracy as alien and hostile to their values. Thus, Russian society felt the need to restore 'country greatness' and authoritarianism. Russia and Europe were once again divided. Fundamental European values of democracy, which had to serve as a foundation for Wider Europe, have not taken root in Russia and in the majority of former Soviet countries. Thus, the project to develop a "Wider Europe" failed.

These circumstances, building a united Europe started through dissemination of Western European values in Central and Eastern Europe in the form of NATO and the EU enlargement, as well as through involving of post-communist countries in joint programs in security, humanitarian and economic development. With regard to the security, a NATO programme "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) appeared to be the most successful. Through this program, the North Atlantic alliance has managed to build a system of partnerships between European countries in the field of security. In addition, the program has prepared an appropriate ground for Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO. Therefore, NATO acted as the main integrator of the efforts to build a common security system in Europe in the '90s and 2000. NATO enlargement to the East has formed the necessary security and political framework for EU enlargement. The latter served as a model of political and economic integration for Western and Central-Eastern Europe.

So, after the last twenty years of post-bipolar period a new united Europe with shared values, common economic, political and security space came into existence. The other Eastern part of this continent stayed outside this united Europe.

Thus a security vacuum was formed in Europe, which revealed itself as internal instability of the countries located in this part of the continent, through the threats, instability and conflicts. On the other hand, Russia got a chance to establish its dominance in East Europe and to claim it to be its 'zone of privilege interests' due to such a division of the European continent into the areas of security and uncertainties, stability and instability. This perspective allowed Moscow to take revenge and to restore its statehood on the former Soviet Union territory and to include it into Eurasia (Russian) civilizational space with authoritarian values.

Therefore, instead of Wider Europe on the European continent the bipolar system of European security on the regional level was formed, being incarnated on the one hand by NATO and the EU, on the other – SCTO and the CIS under the Russian leadership. This trend has intensified while the American leadership got weaker and international relations have undergone transformations from unipolar into multi-polar system.

2 EUROPEAN BIPOLAR SYSTEM OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN TERMS OF MULTI-POLARITY

Ebbing of U.S. role in the world is the main characteristic of such transformation. More and more the U.S. experience a lack of its foreign policy resources in order to implement their global geopolitical interests. The U.S. is losing their allies in the international arena. The Iraq war did not bring the desired success for the United States. Moreover, it destroys international image of this country as a world leader and sole superpower, eroding its economic, military and socio-political potential. In this sense, the war in Iraq destroys U.S. leadership the same way the war in Afghanistan destroyed the Soviet Union as a superpower.

On the other hand, through the easing of U.S. global leadership one can observe the emerging of new centres of power such as China, Russia and the EU. The development of these powers has been accompanied by an increase in their geopolitical ambitions, leading to increased regional confrontation between them. The emergence of these regional centres of power is also a challenge to U.S. global dominance and their unipolar world order. As a result, such global tendency is accompanied by deterioration of the international security climate. Weakening of transatlantic ties and increasing geopolitical ambitions of the EU is a serious challenge for European security in general and the national security of Ukraine in particular. Weakening of transatlantic ties leads to disability of the North Atlantic Alliance to provide the highest level of security and defence in Europe. This will also undermine the EU security as it has no defence structure and needed resources, and therefore is unable to protect its members. Thus, due to the development of such negative trends in relations between the U.S. and EU, Ukraine will lose the chance join both the EU and NATO.

The emergence of new centres of power will certainly lead to a dramatic struggle between them for spheres of influence, as well as the renewal of old conflicts. This struggle will end with the distribution of spheres of influence in Europe.

Following such international developments, the regional security will undergo great destruction. Threats and challenges to international security in a multipolar world will shift from global to regional level. In fact, the security climate in Europe formed in the post-bipolar period after the Cold War has already suffered from a very substantial erosion.

Military or severe threats will become again the most relevant issue in regional security. This will lead to the restoration of military rivalry and an arms race on the regional level.

Thus, the tendency to multi-polarity causes formation of bipolar regional security system in Europe. What role can European security institutions play in such a bipolar system and what kind of relations can develop between its two parts?

NATO and the EU will belong to European part of it. The existence of NATO allows the U.S. to maintain a presence in Europe. And therefore, U.S. possesses considerable resources and strategic advantages over the Eastern, the Eurasian part of the system presented by Russia with its satellites combined in such structures as the CSTO and the CIS.

Russia is interested in such a bipolar system because it allows it to restore itself on this territory outside the united Europe as a great power and one of the world power-centre. Obviously, Russia will seek to renew such a bipolar system of European regional security. What is important for Russia in development of such a system?

First of all, to keep a status quo as one of the two main power-centres in Europe.

Secondly, to hold the right to exclusive possession of the part of Europe not covered by NATO and the EU. In its turn, Russia is ready to recognise relatively similar rights of NATO and the EU in regards to their members, and not to interfere in the processes occurring inside these organisations in the area of their geo-strategic responsibility.

Thirdly, to achieve a certain balance of power in relations with the opposite part of the system, which would be characterised by strategic parity in order to shift the relations with the West from the asymmetric into symmetric relations plane. The vast majority of Russian President D. Medvedev's points regarding the signing the Treaty on European security was actually dedicated to achieving these goals. In addition to reciting the principles of international security enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, D. Medvedev emphasized the following principles of the future treaty: "not to ensure own security at the expense of others; not to allow actions within military unions that will weaken the unity of shared security space; focus should be placed on military-political issues, because the so-called "hard security" plays a crucial role today; common "rules of the game" for all multilateral institutions, including the European Union, NATO, OSCE, CSTO, CIS; an effective interaction between Russia, NATO and the United States could become the main structure of political unity in Euro-Atlantics"¹

In fact, it is all about the establishment of common rules of the game for Russia, CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the one side, and the United States, NATO and the EU on the other side. Besides, these rules should be enshrined by a legally binding document. According to the above-quoted abstract this means that countries can not join, for example, the North Atlantic Alliance without Russia's consent, because such accession could be regarded as a threat to its national security. This means that NATO can not expand, because such an extension may weaken the unity of a common security space. Besides, key issues of European security regarding many European countries are now suggested to be addressed on the level of triumvirate NATO/Russia/United States. This proposal disguises Russia's attempts to raise

¹ D. Medvedev's speech at Helsinki University, and answers to questions from audience on 20.04.2009. / <http://www.ruvek.ru/?page=news&grpID=13&newsID=847>.

its international status and to have a decisive influence on all the security processes in Europe as well as to play a key role in problem-solving of European security.

Another intention seen in D. Medvedev's initiative is an effort to put the CSTO and NATO on one level in new the European security system of and to establish equal partnership between them. Thus, through the realisation of this intention Russia gains the opportunity, on the one hand, to balance relations with the West and to achieve institutional parity and, on the other hand, to deeper integrate and mobilise post-Soviet countries around itself. In this case, Russia is entitled to form its part of the bipolar system according to symmetric conditions uniting former Soviet states in the Russian camp, grounded not in the European democratic but Eurasian authoritarian values. Countries which happen to join this camp are denied any opportunity to integrate into the European community.

Moreover, in reaching the rules, which would include non-intervention of NATO and the EU in conflicts with third countries other than their members, Russia gets *carte blanche* to resolve military conflicts in the post soviet countries, which conduct policy that diverges with Russian interests. In this case, for example, democratic regimes in Georgia and Ukraine would immediately be confronted with the threat of Russian military occupation as happened with Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

Another important question: 'what kind of relations would develop between the two parts in the conditions of such regional bipolarity? No doubt that neither the West nor Russia is willing to restore military confrontation. However, the West wants to build relations with Russia grounded in shared values, while Russia wants to build equal relations with the West based on their interests. Obviously, the consensus between the two sides of the bipolarity will depend on whether Europe, especially the EU, is ready to exchange values for the interests of certain leading EU countries, as well as on what is Russia's ultimate goal of its policy in Europe: European security or sphere of influence. It is obvious that today the EU is not ready to barter away democratic values for the selfish interests of some EU countries, and Russia is not ready to change its 'spheres of influence' thinking. In such a situation, reproduction of 'Helsinki+' process, which is also a part of President of Russia D. Medvedev's initiatives, can only be viewed with a high level of conditionality.

What will Russia seek to gain from the 'Helsinki+' process?

1. Respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders in the light of new subjects of international law, including Kosovo as well as Abkhazia and North Ossetia.
2. Adherence to fundamental principles of arms control that would enable NATO and the CSTO to achieve military parity, confidence, moderation and reasonable sufficiency in military development².

² Medvedev presented to Europe a project proposal on Collective Security Treaty. 08.10.2008 17:55 /<http://www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.142433.html>.

3. Setting common “rules” in a legally binding document to ensure common security guarantees. Provide the OSCE with decision legally binding status³.

What is the West interested in regards to ‘Helsinki+’ process?

1. Implementation of Helsinki ‘third basket’—shaping new Europe based on democratic values.
2. The principle of openness, partnership, cooperation and free competitiveness among systems, organizations and countries.

Zbigniew Brzezinski in “Foreign Affairs” magazine has written about forming bipolarity in Europe on such principles, suggesting to sign ‘an official pact’ between NATO and the CSTO. According to his estimation, Moscow has recently shown interest in achieving such an agreement, however NATO, by contrast, showed no inclination to such ‘an official pact’ as it would mean “military and political symmetry between the two organizations”. Brzezinski justifies the importance of signing this Covenant provided there is a provision in it giving the right for non-member countries of either NATO or CSTO to join in any of these organisations⁴.

Of course, due to the implementation of these principles the West would have multiple strategic superiority over Russia, that would result in the European Community and Euro–Atlantic system of shared security to be joined by Western Independent States, and in Russia’s loss of sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. Thus, Russia may end up as the USSR did as a result the Helsinki process. History might repeat itself. It is no mere chance that the official representative of Russia to NATO Rogozin D. hastened to call Brzezinski’s proposal ‘nicely wrapped candy’ used to remove Russia’s objections against the involvement of new NATO members⁵.

Obviously, with such different priorities and principles regarding development of new European security, a compromise between the two sides is unlikely. However, it is clear that the only type of relations between the two sides can be built on the principle of relations of peaceful coexistence of two systems with different political structures and different ideological values.

Signing the **Treaty between NATO and CSTO on non-aggression and renunciation of the information and propaganda war** aimed at discrediting the parties would be an important step in strengthening the stability of relations between the two sides of bipolar system and European security in overall. In this respect, Z.Brzezinski’s idea of “Official pact” is grounded in rational thinking. Another important set of questions in regards to the development of such regional bipolarity in Europe is about the future role of NATO, EU, OSCE and the future awaiting for Ukraine in such a European security system.

³ The same source of info.

⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski. *An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web*. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2009. /<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65240/zbigniew-brzezinski/an-agenda-for-nato>.

⁵ Artur Blinov. *OSTO into NATO// Independent newsletter*. – 2009. – September, 3rd.

NATO. It is obvious that with the predominance of hard threats and regional bipolarity, NATO will remain, as in the Cold War, the main pillar of European collective security and defence. In comparison with the unipolar world, when NATO had to respond to global threats, and thus, to assume the functions of the global security structure. In a multipolar world it will be forced to return to the traditional regional responsibility enabling NATO to respond to specific global challenges. However, despite returning to the traditional functions and objectives in such a system of regional bipolarity, NATO will face a new challenge. Tentatively it can be called - *a dilemma between global strategy of cooperative security and regional strategy of holding Russia back*. Without the implementation of such functions bipolar system of European security will be fragile, unstable and inefficient. Obviously, to fulfil such functions, NATO will be forced to resort to limit their missions, particularly in Afghanistan and to direct its resources into the key and most promising areas.

EU. EU will serve as the second pillar in given system and play the role of second riddle in ensuring security to the European Community. The EU will focus their efforts in the security area on neutralizing the soft threats to European security in close correlation with NATO and cooperation with Russia. Such distribution of duties will enable the EU to save on military expenditure and concentrate its resources on the economic and political modernisation within European community.

OSCE. The role of this organization will be reduced to a mediator between the two sides of bipolar security system and a common regime of arms control.

Ukraine. In a bipolar system of regional security, Ukraine will remain in the grey or "buffer zone", which is characterized by internal and external instability, an adverse and sometimes dangerous foreign environment. Unable to integrate into the European system, and not wishing to join the Russian bloc, Ukraine will formally remain non-aligned country with a large deficit of its own national security. The perspective of neutrality for the countries in the grey zone, foreseen by D. Medvedev's initiatives, seems unlikely for Ukraine. With the lack of its adequate defense resource base, Russian military presence, powerful external influences and the split of Ukrainian society and political elites, such guarantees of neutrality may be fictitious and only seen as obstacles to NATO.

However, such a fictitious neutrality or non-membership status will not save Ukraine from external interference by Russia into internal affairs in order to re-structure the political system of the country into the Russian system. Thus, in such regional bipolar system, Ukraine has very little chances to maintain its independence and state sovereignty. However, such bipolar regional security system in Europe would not last long.

3 SCENARIOS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

If even during the Cold War bipolar system lasted for nearly 40 years, it is clear that regional bipolar system will last less than half. Instability and transience of the system will be stipulated by the dynamics of its basic components and by the change of power balance between them. That is why it would be appropriate to regard this regional bipolar system as a transition to homogeneous or heterogeneous system. Depending on the change of the balance of power, one can expect two possible scenarios.

The first scenario, where Russia succeeds in developing its geopolitical offensive in Europe and achieves its geopolitical interests for establishing dominance on the European continent. This script can be called a “*scenario of the European concert*”. This phenomenon was typical for European policy in the 18th, 19th and first half of the 20th century, when the development of international relations in Europe was determined by five major powers, including Russia. Other European and non-European states were looked on as policy objects of those leading European countries. Commonality of interests of these states was stipulated by external threats to European security.

However, within Europe the relations between those leading countries were built on the principle of maintaining the balance. Responsibility for maintaining internal European balance relied on large countries, which concluded various interim military-political alliances between themselves. Due to its participation in maintaining a balance, Russia played a key role in solving many problems of European security. Russia is longing to re-gain this role today. Medvedev's initiatives include stories about multi-polarity, multi-ateralism, the mechanism of between Russia/NATO/EU interaction – a key element of security etc⁶.

The security system built on the principles of “European concert” would be the most acceptable for the geopolitical ambitions of Russia and for its transformation into truly influential world power.

The main terms and conditions of Russian in order to build such a European security system are:

1. Removal of U.S. from Europe.
2. Liquidation of NATO as a military and political organization.
3. Split of European Union.
4. Forming geopolitical axis Paris/Moscow/Berlin.

Russia started building such a system in Europe when Vladimir Putin came to power. The reduction of U.S. influence due to Russia's efforts was supported by such EU countries as Germany and France through their resistance to U.S. policy, stirring up widespread anti-American hysteria both in Russia and abroad; intentions to unite anti-American alliance with countries like China, Iran, as well as India;

⁶ *Constructive Agenda for the European security. June, 4th 2009/ <http://www.kremlin.ru/articles/217262.shtml>*

displacement of the U.S. economic, political and military presence in Central Asia and the former Soviet Union territory. The most successful of Russia's strikes related to U.S. interests can be considered Russia's victory in the war with Georgia, its severe approach to relations with the countries seeking to develop close ties with the United States, Kyrgyzstan's decision under Russian pressure to close U.S. military base in Manas, Russia signing an agreement with Tajikistan on the RF Ministry of Defence military taking control over Hyssar airport including the space observation station.

By displacing the U.S. presence in the former Soviet Union and decreasing Washington's influence in Europe, Russia is trying to build an equal relationship with the U.S. based on a power balance as equals in geopolitical power. Putin believes that terms and conditions for such parity relations with the U.S. would be as follows: the U.S. dispense with deployment in Europe, Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, the acceptance by the U.S. and EU of their mistake supporting 'colors' revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia⁷.

Obviously, for Ukraine such Russian claim in relations to the United States means to give up on the idea of NATO membership, as well as strategic partnership relations between Ukraine and the United States. As for Ukraine in this context of relations with the U.S., Russia's policy is aimed at isolating Ukraine and convincing the U.S. to stop supporting the sovereignty of Ukraine and its democratic development.

The second Russia's strategic offensive towards the West was directed against NATO. Supported by Germany and France, Russia managed to block granting Membership Action Plan to Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest summit in April and at the summit of NATO Foreign Ministers in December 2008. Having restored their control over the Caucasus after the Russian-Georgian war, creating a military base in Tajikistan and the CSTO military group in Central Asia, Russia has put at risk the logistical support corridor for NATO's mission in Afghanistan. Thus, Russia has got an opportunity to push against the Alliance's weakest point bringing it to the edge of defeat in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to the representative of the Russian Federation to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, in the context of the current official position (Moscow – author) U.S. presence in Afghanistan only contributes to instability in the region⁸.

Russia's third geo-strategic offensive was launched towards the EU. Russia's growing geopolitical ambitions, energy resources, demonstration of military force, occupation of Georgia during the war there in 2008 as well as the intention to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad region against Europe was its main striking force while attacking the European Union. Russian President D. Medvedev has repeatedly de-

⁷ *Putin is happy that Obama is in no mood for Ukraine.* // TCH. ua. 2009, January, 26th, 12:37.

⁸ *Ioshua Kucera. Kyrgyzstan shows US the door* // *Guardian*, 2009, 5 February // www.guardian.co.uk/2009/Feb.10h.15:00.

monstrated the willingness to restore Cold War relations with Europe⁹. However, major European powers, especially Germany, France and Italy are not interested in confrontation with Russia. Neither are they interested in military confrontation between Russia and the United States, which could destroy the entire security of Europe (the foundation for the European Union). Therefore, the EU fears renewal of Cold War relations even more than Russia.

On the other hand, the integration concept used by the EU to integrate Russia into Wider Europe has totally collapse. Therefore, the EU no longer requires democratic values from Russia and is ready to recognize Russia's right to determine the fate of post-Soviet countries. Russia's strategy aimed at splitting the European Union has succeeded. Following this strategy Russia prefers bilateral relations with the leading EU countries such as Italy, Germany and France ignoring the interests of other EU countries. Thus, Russian policy towards the EU causes inconsistency of the European countries' policy towards Russia.

Lack of common consolidated position towards Russia makes the EU weak and unable to resist the Russian geopolitical offensive. The manifestation of inconsistencies and uncertainties of EU policy toward Russia is seen through two fundamentally different approaches. According to one of them, Russia is a threat that must be gently restrained. Mainly countries of Central - Eastern European - new EU members - stick to this approach. Meantime the old EU members – Western European countries – regard Russia as a potential partner, willing to integrate it in the European system. Some are developing strategic partnerships with Russia, while others are trying to openly oppose its geopolitical offensive in Europe.

However, Russia has lacked adequate resources and international influence in order to implement such a plan of the European security system development. Russia's war against Georgia, the impact of the global financial crisis and the gas conflict, which involved the EU as well as the election of Barack Obama as New U.S. president have consolidated Europe to some extent and made it share the United States attitude. President Dmitry Medvedev could already sense such changes of the West' position during the meeting in Evian in 2008, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that "any agreement on security from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" should be based primarily on NATO and invited the Russian President for closer cooperation with already existing institutions and mechanisms such as the Council of Russia-NATO, European Security and Defence Policy of the EU¹⁰.

So, Medvedev's first initiatives aimed to exclude NATO from a new European security system, the new version, as he noted in his interview for the program "News

⁹ Dmitry Medvedev: *Russia does not fear the Cold War*. /PBK, 2August, 27th 2008, 10:15AM. http://www.e1.ru/news/print/news_id-292043.html.

¹⁰ Medvedev and a new European security architecture. Commentary by Bobo Lo, the head of Russian-Chinese programmes of the Centre for European Reform. September, 3rd 2009./<http://www.polit.ru/institutes/2009/09/03/bezopasnost.html>.

on Saturday,” on May 15th, 2009: “New agreement on security in Europe, which Russia has an intention to sign, should not be directed against NATO¹¹.”

Thus, now new version of Medvedev’s initiative actually seeks to build regional bipolar security system in Europe. However, Russia is again facing the problem of balancing geopolitical ambitions and interests with available resources. Asymmetry of the latter in comparison with the West remains impressive.

The second scenario of the system of European security will be realistic in the case of a substantial reduction of Russia’s positions and a change in the balance of power in favor of the West. In this case, the formation of homogeneity of European security will continue. This will be manifested through continuing NATO and the EU enlargement to the East and joining of independent states into the Western system; through erosion of an authoritarian regime in Russia and other former Soviet states. According to this scenario, Russia will be forced to

integrate into the European security system based on the principles of cooperative security, convergence of economic and political system of Russia and the European Community.

Obviously, that such a scenario of building of the European security system is possible on the base of **convergence of functions of NATO and the EU**. The arrangements in the joint document of the EU and NATO “Berlin Plus” became the first feature of this trend. They enabled the European Union with NATO to start building security system in Europe. The convincing factors that reinforce this trend are: consensus by Member States of the EU and NATO concerning coordination of activity in the security and defense sphere; new dynamics of development of NATO, which has been reflected in the new Alliance strategic concept; the development of the operational capacity of the EU. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the states which are members of both the EU and NATO will take part in this system.

An important feature of formation of the European security system is strengthening of the institutional and operational cooperation between the EU and NATO. Since early 2001 NATO and the EU have been conducting multilevel regular meetings, particularly at the level of Foreign Ministers and Heads of Staffs. On March 14, 2003 NATO-EU agreement on security of information exchange was signed in Athens.

Today the challenging trend for the EU and NATO is the coordination of authority by functional principle. Particularly, NATO members are eligible to participate in any EU operation, which involves the Alliance means and may be invited to missions which use only means of the EU. NATO members – non-members of the EU, contributing considerably to the operations, take part in the work of key bodies

¹¹ Medvedev: *Agreement on security in Europe should not be directed against NATO.* <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/05/15/640726.ht>.

of Common European Security and Defense Policy on a level with the EU Member States, although the decision about start using force to be made only by the European Union.

With reference to the mentioned trends it may be concluded that today the formation of the European security on a common basis of the EU and NATO would be the most acceptable option. Despite some contradictions and differences between two organizations, there is much in common, that unites the EU and NATO in efforts to create a reliable security outpost within the territory of Europe.

In view of the weakness of the European Union in formation of the security area, which shows itself in the insufficient resource, technical, technological and even conceptual bases, today it will not be able to create by itself a reliable and powerful security system in Europe. Just these flaws of the EU can be compensated by the potential of the North Atlantic Alliance. Russia may join this tandem through participation in the implementation of those functions of NATO and the EU, which are of great interest for its.

Conclusions Observations of the author presented in this publication lead him to the conclusion that over the last twenty years instead of the Great Europe a regional level bipolar security system has started to take shape in the European continent. This system is represented by NATO and the EU, on the one side, and CSTO and CIS led by Russia, on the other side. This trend significantly strengthened in light of weakening American leadership and transformation of international relations system from unipolarity towards multipolarity. As a result, this global trend is leads to *worsening of international security climate*.

The existence of such bipolar system corresponds to strategic interests of Russia, since it enables Russia to restore itself (in the space outside the boundaries of unified Europe) as super power and one of the world centers of power. What is important for Russia during the formation of such system? First, to reserve for itself status quo as one of the two major centers of power in the European continent. Second, to reserve for itself an exclusive right to dominate over the part of Europe, which is not covered by NATO and the EU. In its turn, Russia is ready to recognize similar rights for NATO and the EU with regard to their members and not interfere with the processes that take place within these organizations and within the zone of their geo-strategic responsibility. Third, to achieve certain balance of powers in relations with the opposite part of this system, which would be characterized by strategic parity in order to modify its relations with the West from asymmetric to symmetric relations. Most of points in the initiative of the President of Russia, D. Medvedev, on signing the Treaty on European Security are aimed specifically at achieving these objectives. Actually it is about establishing common rules of the game between Russia, CSTO and CIS on the one hand, and USA, NATO, and the EU, on the other hand. Moreover, these rules of the game must be stipulated in a legally binding form.

Under such regional bipolar system Ukraine will have feeble chances to preserve its independence and state sovereignty. Moreover, such bipolar regional security system in Europe is unlikely to be long-lasting. Instability and short term nature of this system will be predetermined by the development dynamics of its key constituent elements and resulting change in the balance of powers. Therefore, this regional bipolar system should be considered as transitional towards homogeneous or heterogeneous system.

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