Ragnar Leunig
THE CHALLENGE
OF EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP
The example of Irish experience
with former accession to the European Union
ABSTRACT
Earlier experience with accession to the EU is examined with special
regard to the cases of Ireland and other small states . The article reviews
the original motives of the six EU founding members, and presents the
factors affecting the success of new candidates . The inclusion of new
members will make EU foreign policy more complicated and it will generate
fear of migrant workers . While the political and economic position of the
small states has been strenghtened strongly, this may not hold to the same
extent once the EU becomes a grouping of 25 states . Unless they act as a
group of small states they may find themselves neglected although their
economy and democracy will nevertheless be strengthened.
Key words: EU integration, Ireland, late-comer members, small states
When you look at the development of European Integration in the past four decades
it seems to be a history of permanent success: Starting with six member countries in
1958, an enduring stream of applications for membership was flowing . Since 1995 the
European Union has 15 member states, eleven European states being applicants .' At the
same time only three states withdrew their application for EU membership (Norway twice
in 1972 and 1994, Switzerland in 1992, and Malta in 1997) . None of the members ever left
the European Union, with the exception of Greenland, being an autonomous region of
Denmark .
Looking at the European Union we can also state the fact of an acceleration of the
accessions of new member states . It took the time of 15 years between the start of the
European Union in 1958 and the entering of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark in
1973. This period has been prolonged by the French President de Gaulle's veto against
the entry of Great Britain to the European Union . Eight years passed until Greece became
a member in 1981, five more years until Spain and Portugal entered the European Union
(1986). The unification of Germany in 1990 also has to be seen as an enlargement of the
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Union and five more years went by until in 1995 Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the
European Integration .
It is also interesting to note the years from the application to the accession of an
applicant. The time for Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark from 1961 until 1973 was
extremely long due, to de Gaulle's intervention . The application time for Greece lasted
6 years, for Spain and Portugal 9 years, because of the difficult negotiations comparable
to the negotiations with the Central and Eastern European countries . Shorter was the
application time for Austria (6), Sweden (4), and Finland (3) because not so many politi-
cal, economical and financial obstacles had to be overcome . This enlargement was also
seen as a preparation for the new wave of applications of Central and East European
states after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakdown of the Soviet Union .
After all Western European states with the exception of Iceland, Norway, Switzer-
land and Malta had become members of the European Union, all Central European and
many East European countries had applied for membership, the European politicians
had to think about the borders of the European Union, geography only partly being a
help. It was clear, since Marocco had been asking for membership, and had been rejected
by the European Union, that the EU saw the Mediterranean Sea as the rim of its direct
influence in the South .
In the South East, Turkey since its association to the European Union (1963) has
been a very special case . When Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987 the prob-
able migration of Turkish workers to the industrialized countries of the EU was sup-
posed to be the main problem, replaced in the following years by the questions of
human rights, the Turkish attitude towards the minority of the Kurds and finally the
fear of the growing Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey .
It is common opinion among the leading European politicians that the European
Union should end at the borders of the Community of Independent States (CIS) . The
Russian President Yeltsin spoke in 1997 of a future membership of Russia in the
European Union, but this statement did not receive a positive response inside the EU,
in view of the political, social, economic and financial difficulties of the Eastern state .
One of the CIS States is approaching the West and the EU, i .e. Ukraine, and there may
be a future discussion about an application of this country . It is clear that some forms of
closer cooperation with the EU have to be found for states like Turkey and Russia that
have no chance for a membership in the near future : One might think of two concentric
circles, the inner one for the members of the EU, and an outer circle for those states in a
close connection to the integration process, but with less rights and duties than a
member state .
When you try to evaluate the influence of the accession of new member states to the
European integration process you have to think about the original motivation of the six
founding members in forming the European Union :
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The example of Irish experience with former accession to the European Union
1 . European integration as alternative to the disastrous .
2. Developments - stemming from nationalism - in the years until 1945 .
3. Including Germany into the integration process, thus preventing a fallback of Europe's
central country into old mistakes .
4. Securing peace in Europe and hampering a further expansion of the Soviet Union .
5 . Formulating a stronger position of Europe towards the Soviet Union, but also the
United States of America .
6. The economic reconstruction of Europe .
The six member states agreed upon a supranational form of integration and ex-
pressed and showed their willingness to give up certain sovereign rights for this new
institution . We have to ask whether the newcoming members also had the same moti-
vation and willingness, and if not, how their different motivations in joining the Union
might have altered the integration process .
Former experiences with the EU membership -
the example of Ireland
It has often been asked whether the applicants in Central and Eastern Europe have
the political and economic ability to be part of the European integration process and
fulfill all the regulations of the acquis communitaire . It may be therefore very interesting
to look at a country that started its membership in the European Economic Community
(EEC) at a very low economic basis in 1973 and has in the meantime the experience of 25
years in the European Union . 2
Up to the end of the 1950's the Irish government followed the path of autarchy to
industrialize the country, which proved to be a failure. Along with Great Britain, Den-
mark and Norway, Ireland applied for membership in the EEC, mainly out of economic
reasons, in 1961 . Membership was seen as an immense challenge. The long period between
the application and the final membership in 1973 was used to further industry, bring
down protection and enhance the competitiveness of the Irish industry . The goal of
Irish policy was it, to reach full employment, bring down the endless emigration and
strengthen the living standard of the Irish population up to the level of the neighbours
in Western Europe 3 But membership was also seen as an option, to minimize the political
and economic dependency from Great Britain .'
But the first fifteen years of Irish membership in the EU were no success . In spite of
all the preparation, the free market economy proved to be a shock to Irish industry.
Irish economic policy felt huge difficulties in adapting itself to European standards .
The lacking competitiveness of Irish industry forced the Government to bring export
oriented foreign companies into their country by subventions .
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The gross national product per capita rose from 58% of the EU average (1973) to 64%
(1988). This may be seen as a slight progress. But the high growth rate of the Irish
population brought the unemployment up to 18% in 1985 . Inflation rates were high, and
so was the indebtedness of the state (116% of the gross national product in 1986). The
economic results of Ireland after 15 years of EU membership were not favourable at all .'
Then the end of the 1980's marked the turn of the tide . The inflation rates went down,
their states debts shrunk . Foreign investment began to rise, the help of the EU regional
funds amounted to 2 .5 % of the Irish gross national product, together with the agricul-
tural fund summing up to 7 .2% of the Irish gross national product (1993) . 6 At the end of
the 1990's Ireland is one of the countries in Europe with the highest growth rates (7% in
1997). More than 70% of the Irish export is sold into EU countries . The unemployment
rate went down to 9.8% (12.97 7 , and Ireland has reached 98% of the EU average living
standard (1996) . There are only few countries that fulfill the criteria of the European
Monetary Union as well as Ireland (budget deficit + 0 .9, state debts 66.3, inflation rate
1 .4) . 8
This remarkable turn in the economic situation of Ireland is due to the fact, that since
the 1980's the Irish government saw a pivotal point in their relation to the European
Union. Not having used enough the time since 1973, the Interior Market and the European
Monetary Union were seen as a second chance for Ireland : Regional funds of the EU
were used in accordance with the European Commission . Everything was done to
synchronize the own economic policy according to the developments inside the European
Union.' In the case of Ireland it is true to say that a smaller country - for a long time
dependent on British economy - has got the chance by the European Union to become
a respected, successful and important partner in the integration process .
What is to deduce from the Irish case? Membership alone is by no means a guaran-
tee for success in the European Union . Ireland - a long waiting applicant - had only seen
the membership as a goal and not sufficiently drawn a parallel between its own economic
policy and the politics of the EU . This is the reason, why the transition period lasted so
long. But though the results of the EU membership were not sufficient, the consent
among parties and population remained - apart from the small Labour Party and the trade
unions in the beginning - that there was no reasonable alternative to the EU . 10 Another
deduction can be made . Information policy can not end with the accession of a country
to the European Union .
Setbacks are going to come as other obstacles have to be surmounted in the process
of integration . Informing the people is a necessity, if not social unrest should arise
after a difficult transition period in a new member country .
But besides the willingness of the people and the parties, a capable decision-making
system, government and administration are needed to formulate and implement EU policy .
Many meetings have to be prepared, being in charge of the EU presidency regularly is a
great task also for the greater EU countries .
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Ireland has a small but competent, well trained and motivated core of civil servants,
giving the possibility of personal contacts among each other . Their flexible and prag-
matic approach had not always taken into account that for instance in the field of
agriculture, long time disadvantages were more important than short-time advantages ."
The politicians, being more of the type of local politicians, the parties, and the Parliament
had only a small influence on the Irish EU policy, which was mainly formulated and
executed by the administration and well accepted by the people .
A disadvantage for Ireland is the extreme centralization of the political system,
which makes it difficult for political and administrative decision-makers to fulfill all
the tasks connected with EU membership .
Another problem is the differentiation in Irish politics between economic and political
integration . When Ireland applied for membership in the EU in 1961, the Irish Prime
Minister of the time, Lemass, knew also about the political implications of the EU
membership. But when Ireland finally entered the EU in 1973, political integration was not
on the agenda of the European Union . 11 So Ireland is rather reluctant, when the deepening
of the European Union is discussed, also is very cautious in the field of a common
foreign and defence policy very cautious, due to its neutrality during World War II .
Thus, Ireland is an example of a country that saw its economic chance by joining a
successful Union, not having the supranational and federal fundament of the founding
members .
Factors influencing the success of latecoming members of the EU
Time is naturally a very decisive factor: When the time of application is very long,
there is a danger of changing opinion towards the European Integration among the
political parties or the people . A good example for this factor is Greece . In 1981 - the
year of accession - the PASOK - a party opposing EU membership came into power, with
Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister. ' I
Greece did not leave the European Union . But the missing conformity of the reigning
party and EU integration made adaptation to EU policy difficult for Greece, which was
substantiated by the missing positive economic results in the Southern country .
We saw in the case of Ireland that economic developments may be stagnant for
quite a long time . Disappointment can grow among politicians or the people, as we see
it in the case of Austria 14 or Sweden, 15 after the accession to the EU . It is important that
an efficient information policy does not end with the accession, but is continued .
An accession also may come too early, as we can see in the case of East Germany .
In October 1990, East Germany came into the EU as part of the unified Gerrnany. This
region of Germany had no transition period as all the other newcoming members. East
Germany lost not only all its export markets in the East . At the same time West German
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and competition of the other European countries came in, though East Germany had no
chance to reconstruct its non competitive industry . Most of East German industry dis-
appeared . Only the agriculture has partly a good chance to be competitive in the EU,
because of the size of the farms . The example of East Germany is a warning for the East
Central European states not to shorten the time of application, that is needed, for the
adaptation of its economy, administration and society .
We have seen in the case of Ireland that the efficiency of the decision making
process in a country, its capacity and willingness to draw a parallel between its own
policy and the policy of the European Union is decisive for the success of the economic
policy of a member that is coming late into the EU . Greece showed not to be efficient
enough . Better results were shown by Spain and Portugal and especially Ireland .
Some of the new members were mainly dominated by economic interests in joining
the EU, like Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland . Others were more open to the politi-
cal goals of the EU, like Spain . Countries where the membership in the EU was highly
disputed, remained difficult partners, e .g . Greece or Great Britain . Norway, because of
the inner discussions, would have been a complicated partner, also . Such specific political
traditions may hamper the co-operation of the political decision makers with the EU, as
in the case of Great Britain . 16
The integration process may be hindered (Ireland, Great Britain, Greece) by central-
ization, or impeded by geography as in the case of Greece, which has no directbordering
EU partners . Industrialization is turning into a good direction, bringing down unemploy-
ment, like we can see in Ireland . Industrialization is very difficult for a country like Spain,
where the change from agriculture to industry forced huge masses into the
unemployment, with the eventual result of social unrest, in the case of an unstable
democracy . Such a change may be foreseen for a country like Poland, where the small
agriculture is dominating until now .
But also the developments inside the EU are hindering an easy integration for new
and latecoming members . The rules of co-operation have been set up by the old mem-
bers since long a time . These countries feel 'more European' than the others, which
results in a push back effect to new members, that have not adapted to the used code,
yet (Great Britain, Greece) .
The question has been brought up, whether the accession of new member states
accelerated or slowed down the integration process with the effect of a renationalization
of Europe. The first accession wave in 1973 was no aid for the supranational integration
process, because the new members, Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark were mainly
economically dominated in their pro EU decision, and by their presence weakened the
old fundament of the founding members .
Not the accession of Greece - which was an exception in every respect, but the
applications of Spain and Portugal strengthened the integration process, because
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especially Spain was interested in integrating not only the economic but also the political
sector. East Germany's accession was only the consequence of the breakdown of the
Soviet Union's satellite system and finally the disappearance of the Soviet Union . It
highly motivated the EU politicians to accelerate the integration process (Maastricht
Treaty) .
The accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria has not facilitated the integration
process, but strengthened for example the European Environmental policy . With the
financial capacities of those countries the new wave of accession of the East Central
European states was rendered possible . To sum up: The accessions of new member
states in the last decades have not eased the integration process . But for the often
claimed renationalization process in the EU the new members are only partly responsible .
These countries very often did not agree with the supranational ideas of the original six .
But the integration process is still going on .
Other comparative remarks to the former
enlargement developments
It is obvious that the accession of new member states is also influencing the posi-
tion and situation of the existing members . The first enlargement of Great Britain,
Ireland and Denmark was blocked by the French President de Gaulle, because of his
vision of a European Union built on a French-German axis, where Germany would not
hinder a French superiority. The Southern Enlargement, including Greece, Spain and
Portugal was in the French . interest, because it stressed the European Mediterranean
policy.
On the other hand the German unification and also the entry of Sweden, Finland and
Austria in the eyes of the French politicians strengthened Germany's position in the
center of Europe, at the same time diminishing the political influence of France . The
coming accession of the East Central European states will - looking from the French
point of view - again enhance the economic and political position of Germany . So French
position was it to force rather the deepening - meaning structural reforms - than the
enlargement of the European Union, while Great Britain under Conservative Govern-
ments supported an early and broad enlargement, thus hoping to retard the integration
process. In the German interest was the finally accepted formula of deepening and
enlarging the European Union .
With an enlargement of the European Union new regions come into the view of the
EU. The new members bring in good relations with their neighbours, but also the prob-
lems they may have with bordering states . It was positive for the European Union that
Spain and Portugal have good relations to African states and South America . Since
Greece is member of the EU, the Union is also confronted with the problems that Greece
has with its neighbours Turkey, Cyprus and Macedonia . What does it mean for the
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future development of the EU that the new member Finland has a long borderline with
Russia." Will there arise conflicts one day between the EU and a future member like
Poland, that has a neighbourship with the region of Kaliningrad (Russia), with Belorussia
and the Ukraine? Will the same happen with Hungary and its neighbour Yugoslavia,
with Romania because of its close connection to Moldavia? Obviously, enlargements of
the EU also enlarge its field of interest, but at the same time makes foreign policy of the
Union more and more complicated .
The former Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, expressed the view that his coun-
try could join the European Union alone, not in line with Hungary and Poland because
of the advanced position of the Czech economy and democracy . When you look back
at the former enlargements of the EU, with the only exception of Greece, all accessions
to the European Union were in a group . The European Union was negotiating with the
individual state, but is interested in the co-operation of the applicants (for instance the
Visegrad states - Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) . Also because of the
ratification process, the EU is interested that several states join in a group .
Very often the fear is expressed that an accession of new members may bring a
wave of migrant workers of this country to the European Union (for exarnple Poland) .
When we look at the development of the EU this argument can not be justified . First the
freedom of workers to move can be postponed as in the case of Spain (Spain entered
into the EU 1986, freedom of movement 1991) . It can be stated also, that after the workers
had the permanent right of migration and the economic situation in their respective
countries was improved due to membership in the EU, more migrant workers went back
to Spain or Greece than migrated to the North .
We have confirmed before, that the political and economic position of the srnaller
states was extremely strengthened when joining the EU . The best examples for this
statement are Luxembourg and Ireland . These countries have been for long only ob-
jects of international relations . The European Union gives these states the possibility to
play an active role in the European integration process . Already two Luxembourgers
have been or are Presidents of the European Commission .
This may happen to the applicants from East Central Europe one day too, that have
been oppressed for so long by their greater neighbours . But this may change to a certain
extent after the EU forms a group of 25 states. Without acting as a group, the smaller
states may find themselves neglected (plans exist of giving a vice Commissioner only to
the smaller states, instead of one Commissioner for every state in the European
Commission, to counteract such an outcome) .
When the Southern integration was discussed, the European Commission wrote a
report, in 1979, that Greece, Spain and Portugal did not have by far the economic standard
of the EU countries and thus were not fit for the European Union . These countries were
accepted by European politics because political stabilization, but also the economic
progress were the main factors behind the enlargement, after those countries had just
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overcome dictatorship . It was the integration into European politics, economy and military
institutions, the permanent exchanges of elites, that strengthened the democratic
developrnent in those Southern countries (e .g . failure of an attempt of a coup d'état in
Spain in 1981), as it helped Ireland to overcome its dependency on Great Britain . The
same idea is underlying the accession of the East Central European states : the integration
of those states into the European Union will strengthen their economy and democracy .
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" Ibidem, 320 .
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