

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, EMIGRATION AND LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST EMIGRATION IN EUROPE

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INTRODUCTION

The most well known generalization of the demographic transition postulates: *»In traditional societies fertility and mortality are high. In modern societies fertility and mortality are low. In between, there is demographic transition.«* (Demeny, 1968). There are hardly any more important objections between demographers to this generalization. It is obvious, from the Demeny's generalization as well as from the original papers of the formulators of the theory of demographic transition (Thompson, 1929; Notestein, 1945; Notestein, 1953), that the theory speaks about mortality and fertility of the population, their interconnections, and the very complex set of factors which determine the process of demographic transition.

The theory of demographic transition was severely criticized for neglecting to consider migration as a part of the demographic change. (Friedlander, 1969; Goldscheider, 1971). It was argued that population change should be studied in terms of all its demographic components. This argument was based on the Davis's theory of the *»multiphasic demographic response«*. K. Davis suggested in his theory that in modernizing societies *»faced with a persistent high rate of natural increase, resulting from past success in controlling mortality, families tended to use every demographic means possible to maximize their new opportunities«*. (Davis, 1963, 362). There are six main responses which can be listed as follows: celibacy, the rise of age at marriage, the use of contraceptives, abortion and sterilization, external migration and population redistribution, mostly rural-urban migration. Critics of the theory of demographic transition simply demand an overall and complex theory of demographic change or, even better, of population development of the

»open« population. This request is hardly new to the discipline. However, at present it seems too unreal and ambitious.

In my view, the above criticism of the theory of demographic transition is unacceptable. It has never intended to be able to explain all four components of population change: mortality, fertility, immigration and emigration. In spite of the weaknesses of the theory, it represents very good explanation of the change in the natural components of population development during the process of modernization and long-term economic development. It focuses on the most important changes at the family and individual levels as the basic levels for reproductive decision making which are developed during the process of modernization. Disregarding of the formulation of a simplified theory of the demographic transition in terms of crude mortality and natality rates and notwithstanding the inclusion of the influences of religious doctrine, popular beliefs and community sanctions, the theory of demographic transition concentrates on the family and on the individual inside the family. If we take, for example, A. Coale's three general prerequisites for the fall in marital fertility - *»1. fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice; 2. reduced fertility must be advantageous; 3. effective techniques of fertility reduction must be available.«* (Coale, 1973) - we can see that the first and the second prerequisites are completely confined at the individual and family levels and that even the third prerequisite becomes operational at the same levels.

Migrations, on the other hand, are only partially and indirectly connected to population reproduction, especially if we concentrate on the family level. What does »multiphasic demographic response« in the form of external or internal migrations mean for the family? From the decision making point of view it is possible to say that parents do not consider migrations of their children. The time lag between the birth and migration of the adult child is too long. Parents do not »produce« children for migration and even less for emigration. Grown up children usually leave the household of their parents when they marry. Migrations, internal or external, in a period of demographic transition are the consequence of other factors, mostly economic, social and political.

In sum, the present state of development of demographic theory, in general, and of the theory of demographic transition, in particular, does not allow all four components of demographic

change, namely mortality, fertility, immigration and emigration, to be included in one general theory of population development.

However, internal and external migrations during the period of demographic transition should be studied. Thus far, there is a lack of such studies in the demographic literature. Especially rare are studies of the interconnections between demographic transition and large-scale emigration.

In this paper demographic transition, emigration, and long-term economic development, with special reference to the countries with the highest emigration in Europe, will be analyzed. Special attention will be devoted to the connections between the process of demographic transition and overseas emigration in selected European countries. At the end of the paper the importance of long-term economic development and emigration in Europe will be outlined.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN EUROPE - SOME GENERAL REMARKS

The demographic transition in Europe as a whole and in particular countries has been very broadly studied. It is well known and need not to be elaborated in this paper. Therefore, only remarks which are important for the connections between demographic transition and major emigrations will be mentioned.

European demographic transition began with the fall of mortality in the most developed countries of the continent in the second half of the eighteen century. The mortality decline destroyed an equilibrium between the birth and death rates which had prevailed in the pretransitional environment. Fertility decline accompanied the decline of mortality only in exceptional cases. France is the best known example of this development. At the national level, fertility in most of Europe did not fall until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Gradual decline in mortality led to the gradual natural increase of the population. In Northern and Western Europe both death and birth rates reached low levels in the 1930's.

Historically, Europe is the cradle of demographic transition. From Western and Northern Europe the process has spread all over the world. The decline of mortality and fertility in Southern and Eastern Europe was delayed. The mortality decline in these regions

usually started during the nineteenth century and the fertility decline began somewhere in the end of the nineteenth or at the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The end of the transition was extended, too, into the 1950's or 1960's. In a few cases the transition is not finished yet, for example, the national populations of Albanians, Turks and Gypsies.

The process of demographic transition in Europe was relatively slow. It was entirely the result of domestic modernization. The period of transition was longer in Western and Northern European countries than in the Southern and Eastern Europe.

If we define the period of demographic transition in Europe as the beginning of the decline in mortality until the time when low levels of mortality and fertility had been reached, it can be said with slight simplification that it was the period from 1800 to 1940. In Eastern Europe and in some parts of Southern Europe it should be extended to the 1950's or 1960's. So, we can see that the period of demographic transition coincides with the period of the highest emigration from Europe during the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries. In the remainder of this paper connections between the transition and the emigrations will be studied.

EMIGRATION FROM EUROPE DURING THE PERIOD OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

Colonial emigration from Europe will not be discussed in this paper. In principle, it is not easy to determine the end of colonial period, because it differed for different colonies. It varied from 1783, when the treaty of peace was signed between England and the United States, to the 1950's for some African states. However, the end of colonization of the United States coincided, generally speaking, with the beginning of mortality decline in Western and Northern Europe, and the United States was the most important for European emigration.

The period covered in this study is very long, about one and a half centuries, from 1800 to 1940. The relative importance of different parts of the period varies a great deal. On the whole, it was the period of acceleration of economic and social development in Europe as well as in many other parts of the world. Huge political transformations in Europe were marked by wars and revolutions,

unifications and separations of the states, and with frequently changing state boundaries.

Both internal and external migrations took place in Europe throughout period. The distinction between external and internal migrations depends largely on the existence of sovereign states. Several times changing boundaries caused transformations of internal into external migrations and vice versa. It is obvious that this presents serious statistical problems.

In this paper only external or internal migrations will be studied, with an emphasis on intercontinental migrations. Problems with statistical data for these migrations are immense. The data are scarce, incomplete and unreliable. Statistical sources are mostly indirect, connected to the port and passenger statistics which usually did not distinguish between passengers, emigrants and return migrants. Countries of emigration, of transit and immigration should be taken into account as well as return migrations. Population censuses are very important; however, in many countries they only began to appear in the second half of the nineteenth century.

An important question arises as to whether to study the state or national population. In Europe, the process of national emancipation also coincided with the period of demographic transition. However, complete emancipation with the establishment of a national state was accomplished only by larger nations. Many smaller nations have not yet created their own state. Some of them have been almost completely assimilated, while others have been given certain kind of autonomy. Nevertheless, even today in Europe there are some *»scattered«* nations (Gypsies or Jews) and nations not acknowledged by their neighbours (Macedonians). In the study of a state's populations, many problems arise with respect to changing boundaries, the disappearance of some states and the establishment of others. The problems with missing data for nations without their own state or for many small nations are the most serious.

In the century and a half of demographic transition in Europe very important changes in the nature of external migrations took place. Free individual migrations, mostly transatlantic, were transformed into migrations subject to governmental intervention and immigration policy. Mass movements of the nineteenth century and of the beginning of the twentieth century became quality migrations after the Second World War.

With all these problems one can hardly be surprised that demographers have not been successful in their effort to build a comprehensive theory of population development, a theory which would include all four components of population growth and which was claimed by some demographers in their criticism of the theory of demographic transition.

Any presentation of the emigration from Europe during the period of demographic transition must consider the problem of scarce and unreliable data. For the period as a whole only estimates can be used. The scarcity and unreliability of the data increase for the older time periods. Only a very brief outline of the emigration from Europe during the period 1800-1940 can be presented here. The main task of the paper is to focus on selected countries with the highest emigration during the period of demographic transition.

D. Kirk estimated that more than sixty million Europeans emigrated overseas from the beginning of the colonization movements till the outbreak of the Second World War (Kirk, 1946). With slight modification we can say that the emigration from Europe during the period 1800-1940 was about sixty million. In almost the same period, the population of Europe increased from 187 million in 1800 to 519 million in 1933, a total of 332 million (Carr-Saunders, 1936). The estimated number of overseas emigration represents about one fifth of Europe's population increase during the period of demographic transition. In some shorter periods during the second half of the nineteenth century or at the very beginning of the twentieth century the loss was much bigger in relative terms.

The process of emigration from Europe is a natural continuation of the European colonization of overseas countries. For obvious geographic, economic and political reasons Great Britain and some other Western European countries had been leading colonial powers. Therefore, it is quite understandable that Western and Northern European countries represented the most important European emigration regions during most of the nineteenth century. This period of European emigration history is known as the period of *»old emigration«*. Later, emigration moved toward Southern and Eastern Europe. The period after this move is called the period of *»new emigration«*. According to immigration statistics of the United States the change can be placed in the year 1890 (Davie, 1936). However, the move eastward only reached the line between the

Finnish Bay and the Black Sea. People from more eastern regions have always migrated in the opposite direction, mainly to Siberia.

Factors affecting emigration have been studied broadly, in general, and for Europe, in particular. Most analyses acknowledge economic factors as the most important underlying motives (Davie, 1936; United Nations 1973; Schultz, 1978). Many non-economic factors have been pointed out as well. It is not necessary to repeat this well known story here. However, it has rarely been stressed that the mass emigration from Europe coincided with the period of demographic transition which caused unprecedented population growth in the history of human populations. Without the demographic transition and higher population growth in Europe in the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries there simply would have not been so many people for emigration and to meet the growing demand of a labour force for domestic industrialization as well. The demographic situation in Europe during the period 1800-1940 influenced mass emigration by increasing population pressure on scarce and limited land and capital. On the other hand, large emigrations influenced the process of demographic transition in different parts of Europe (Knodel, 1974; Levi-Bacci, 1971 and 1977). The nature of the demographic change differs a great deal from the nature of emigrations. Mortality and fertility declined more or less smoothly, while emigration was one of successive waves caused primarily by business cycles in countries of emigration and immigration (Jerome, 1926) as well as some other factors (wars, revolutions, etc.).

COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST EMIGRATION DURING THE PERIOD OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN EUROPE

In absolute terms, the most important countries of emigration from Europe during the period of demographic transition were the British Isles, Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary. According to United States statistic over the period 1820-1940, Germany provided over 6 million immigrants and Italy, Ireland, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary each had between 4 and 5 million (United Nations, 1973). Out of about 60 million European emigrants during the period of demographic transition nearly 60 per cent went to the United States, 11 per cent to Argentina, about 8,5 per cent to Canada, 7,5 per cent to Brazil, 5 per cent to Australia, 1,5 per cent to South Africa and 1 per cent to New Zealand (Isaac, 1947).

However, for several reasons it is much more important to consider the ranking of the countries with the highest emigration relative to the country's population. The effect of the population number should be excluded from the comparison. This is the only way the smaller countries can be included in the analysis.

In Table 1 net annual average migrations per 100,000 inhabitants for European countries with the highest emigration for the decades of the period 1841-1940 are shown. The early period of the nineteenth century is not covered in the table because of the lack of data. For the period covered in Table 1 net migrations have been selected with the exception for some decades and some countries where only data for emigrations are available. Net annual average migrations were negative for almost all countries included and over the entire period taken. In principle, intercontinental and continental external migrations are covered where data are available. However, in many cases the coverage is incomplete and the data are unreliable. Therefore, only the most general conclusions can be derived from the data in Table 1 (see page 190).

The nineteenth century data in Table 1 are based on the calculations of G. Sundbärg, the Swedish statistician, with some minor additions for Portugal and Slovenia. The data for the twentieth century are collected or calculated from the sources indicated at the end of the table. In the calculation, the mid-period population was taken into account. For obvious reasons some more important notes are indicated at the end of the table.

European countries with the highest emigration are divided into two groups. The group of *»old emigration«* covers Ireland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Germany. For the nineteenth century the United Kingdom includes Great Britain and Ireland, and for the whole period England and Scotland are also separated. The difference between these countries and the countries with low emigration in Western Europe is clear. Therefore, it is easy to select the countries with the highest emigration in this group. Selection of the group of *»new emigration«* is much more complicated. In this paper Italy, Portugal and Slovenia have been chosen as the representatives of the South and East European countries. It is simply impossible to get statistical data for migrations for many of the East European countries. Some of them were divided between different states, and others were included as

provinces in the major empires during period considered. Therefore, Slovenia has been chosen to represent the group of Eastern European countries. Slovenia was a part of Austria-Hungary until the end of World War I, and it was divided mostly between Yugoslavia and Italy in the interwar period. It is also a good example of a small country with high emigration.

The first four decades of the nineteenth century are not included in Table 1 due to the lack of reliable data. During this period emigration from Europe was relatively low compared with later periods. In the decades 1820-30 and 1830-40, according to United States immigration statistics, 106,508 and 495,688 immigrants were admitted from Europe to the United States, respectively. Almost all of them (98.5 per cent) were from Western and Northern Europe (Davie, 1936, 53). Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics for particular European countries and have not been able to include the data in Table 1.

Mass emigration from Europe, in general, and from European countries with the highest emigration, in particular, during the period 1841-1940 is the first and most important conclusion from Table 1. Although it is impossible to analyze the situation in particular countries in the table in detail, the most important features of the European emigration are summarized below.

The second conclusion of Table 1 is the exception of the case of Ireland. It should be mentioned here that this concerns Catholic Ireland which was established as a republic in 1925. Population growth was very high in Catholic Ireland during the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. Ireland's population increased from about 1.25 million in 1700 to 8.295 million in 1845 when it reached a maximum and decreased steadily thereafter to 2.9 million in 1938 (Davie, 1936 and Reinhard, Armengaud and Dupaquier, 1968). The population decline was caused by the flood of emigration as a result of the relation of population to land and, consequently, ever-present food shortages and, especially, potato famine during the second half of the 1840's. Isaac concludes that for Ireland emigration was so advantageous and overwhelming that its possible disadvantages were of no importance (Isaac, 1947, 143). In Ireland, emigratory movement released population pressure caused by the early stages of demographic transition and an unfavorable economic situation. The case of Ireland is, probably, the only one in which population declined during the demographic transition.

Table 1: Net annual average migrations per 100,000 inhabitants for European countries with the highest emigration for the decades of the period 1841-1940.

Country	1841-50	1851-60	1861-70	1871-80	1881-90	1891-1900	1901-10	1911-20	1921-30	1931-40
11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
A. Countries of »old emigration«										
Ireland ¹	-2097	-1939	-1497	-1307	-1552	-1067	-698 ^e	435 ^e	-727	29
Norway ²	-92	-189	-509	-395	-971	-272	833 ^e	248 ^e	-252	192 ^e
Sweden	-12	-74	-386	-316	-374	-365	-330	-74	-110	63
UK ³	-596	-608	-394	-300	-442	-150	-345	-248	-231	40
Scotland	81	-721	-365	-263	-564	-122	-570	-500	-800	-80
England	26	-164	-109	-86	-225	-18	-190	-160	30	240
Germany ⁴	-173	-250	-246	-162	-280	-69	-179	32 ^e	43	128
B. Countries of »new emigration«										
Italy	-	-	-88	-97	-288	-455	-606	-271	-294	-37
Portugal	-	-	176 ^e	286 ^e	385 ^e	-265	569 ^e	703 ^e	-235	-99
Slovenia	-	-370	-270	-210	-380	-590	-640	-420	-460	-440

Notes:

^a emigration only;

^b for the last two decades data for 1924-30 and 1931-39, covering outside Europe and Mediterranean;

^c 1921-27 instead of 1921-30;

^d for the period 1841-1900 Great Britain plus Ireland;

^e 1910-14 instead of 1911-20 and 1931-40 instead of 1931-40;

^f 1846-57 instead of 1851-60 and 1857-69 instead of 1861-70.

Sources: For the period 1841-1900 Sundbärg's data, with the exception for Portugal 1861-90 and for Slovenia, cited from Erickson, 1976; United Nations, 1953; Wilcox and Perenzi, 1929 and 1931; Carothers, 1929; Thomas, 1972; Vogelnik, 1965 and Retifard, Armenagaud and Dupacquier, 1968.

For other countries of *»old emigration«* it can be said that the basic reason for emigration was a desire for social betterment. Economic factors have always been the most important. They include general industrial and technological development, an influence of business depressions, a crop failure in agriculture, push of land scarcity and pull of virgin land, development of transportation facilities, a lack of profitable employment and labour redundancy at home and employment opportunity abroad, etc. However, they should be combined with non-economic factors as well. It is necessary to mention political conditions, the inducement of emigration by propaganda and voluntary organizations, kin group and chain migration, the promotion of emigration by private and semi-private assistance, and sometimes even a government action facilitating emigration as in case of the Great Britain.

In the second half of the nineteenth century industrial developments in England and Germany led on the decrease of emigration. Industrialization required a much larger labour force. It was the first sign that emigration from Europe would end. The end of emigration from Western and Northern Europe, represented by positive net migrations, came in the inter-war period. It was caused by general economic development, social and economic protection in the homeland, a declining birth rate as well as by the restrictive immigration policy in the traditional countries of immigration.

Western and Northern European countries had developed their own economies by the end of the demographic transition and were able to give work to their labour forces. In fact, these countries became the countries of immigration for the populations of Southern and Eastern Europe and after World War II even for the non-European immigrants as well.

The countries of *»new emigration«* took the lead in emigration from Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. The majority of these countries were much more backward and underdeveloped than Western and Northern Europe. Emigrants were predominantly unskilled and sometimes even illiterate workers. However, the causes of emigration were similar to the causes in Western and Northern Europe.

The basic difference between the two groups is probably the fact that South and East European countries had not developed enough prior to the inter-war period to be able to employ their populations

properly. Emigration from these countries did not end in the inter-war period. It simply shifted direction, and continental emigration from these countries became prevalent.

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EMIGRATION

Demographic transition in Europe coincides with unprecedented long-term economic development. The connections between the two processes are not only direct but operate through intermediate variables as well. Social institutions are the best examples of such variables. Industrialization has been the most important change in production structures of the economy. However, the key factor lies in the marked rise in labour productivity in agriculture (Kuznets, 1975). Rapid changes in production structures have been connected to successive technological innovations, economic scales of production and enterprise, occupational changes of the labour force, geographical location of the population, and the shifts towards the service sectors of the economy. S. Kuznets pointed out that the growth of consumption per capita was as great as that of total product per capita (Kuznets, 1975).

Modern technology and economic growth led to high levels of urbanization. Structural changes within the economy could not have taken place without internal and external migration as well. The migrations helped to break the ties between the participant in economic activity and his family origins. The migrant became more receptive to economic opportunities (Kuznets, 1975).

Demographic transition has always represented great challenge to society. It creates population pressure from higher population growth. Europe as a whole and European countries with the highest emigration, in particular, were fortunate to have the opportunity to relieve at least part of this pressure through emigration, mostly across the Atlantic Ocean. Today's underdeveloped countries do not have such an opportunity. Free mass emigration is no longer possible in spite of much greater population pressures in the majority of today's underdeveloped countries than ever existed in Europe. Quality migrations which mostly represent today's emigration from underdeveloped to developed countries are too small to have any larger effect on population pressure. Their influence on the economic development of backward countries is even negative because they represent a loss

of the educated labour force needed for the development of domestic economy.

What are the most important features connecting long-term economic development in Europe and its emigration? First of all, a great majority of European countries with the highest emigration as well as many other European countries have been transformed after substantial development into the countries of immigration. European historical evidence shows that the processes of modernization, economic development and social advancement transform emigrational countries into countries of immigrants. However, the nature of immigration can be and usually is changed.

Secondly, European experience also indicates that the process of emigration does not start in the most backward and isolated regions. Emigration gains momentum only if a certain level of development has been achieved. At the beginning, emigrants come from areas in earliest contacts with urban and commercial life (Erickson, 1972).

Thirdly, in many European countries rural-urban migrations preceded the emigration abroad. It was a kind of chain migration. In the first stage a rural migrant went to a town or city and after a certain time period, in the second stage, emigrated abroad.

Fourthly, skilled workers represented a significant proportion of emigrants from Western and Northern Europe. In a way, they set the precedent for today's brain drain.

CONCLUSION

It was argued in the paper that the criticism of the theory of demographic transition for neglecting to consider migration in demographic change is unacceptable. The theory of demographic transition focuses on the changes at the family and individual levels as the basic levels for reproductive decision making which developed during the process of modernization. It was never intended to explain migrations. However, the study of internal and external migrations during demographic transition is very important and should be given attention.

In Europe, the period of demographic transition coincides with the period of mass overseas emigration. About sixty million Europeans or roughly one fifth of the population increase emigrated overseas during the period 1800-1940. The highest

relative emigration was from Ireland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia. The basic reason for emigration was a desire for social betterment. However, in some cases emigration was the only way to survive. The end of emigration from Western and Northern Europe came in the inter-war period as a result of general economic development, social and economic protection in the homeland, a declining birth rate, and restrictive immigration policies in the traditional countries of immigration. The end of emigration from the Southern and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, was postponed until the period after World War II.

Demographic transition in Europe is mostly the consequence of unprecedented long-term economic and social development. Furthermore, long-term economic development transformed a majority of Europe into the region of immigration. European historical experience also indicates that the process of emigration did not start in the most backward and isolated regions; instead rural-urban migrations usually preceded emigration abroad, and skilled workers represented an important proportion of the emigrants from Europe.

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POVZETEK

**DEMOGRAFSKI PREHOD, EMIGRACIJA
DOLGOROČNI EKONOMSKI RAZVOJ:
DRŽAVE Z NAJVEČJO EMIGRACIJO V EVROPI**

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Teorija demografskega prehoda je bila pogosto kritizirana zaradi zanemarjanja notranjih in zunanjih migracij tekom demografskega prehoda. Kljub temu, da je ta kritika neupravičena, saj je osnovni namen teorije prehoda pojasniti spremembe naravne reprodukcije prebivalstva v času prehoda, mora znanost posvečati študiju migracij v obdobju demografskega prehoda potrebno pozornost.

Redkost študij, ki bi povezovale problematiko demografskega prehoda in mednarodnih migracij, je avtorja vodila, da se je lotil študija povezanosti med demografskim prehodom, emigracijo in dolgoročnim ekonomskim razvojem na primeru evropskih držav z največjo emigracijo. Besedilo se ukvarja z obdobjem 1800-1940, statistični podatki pa se večinoma omejujejo na stoletje 1841-1940. Kljub ogromnim statističnim problemom je danes vsaj v grobem mogoče rekonstruirati podatke o emigraciji iz Evrope v obdobju demografskega prehoda njenega prebivalstva. V delu so prikazani podatki o povprečnih letnih neto migracijah na 100.000 prebivalcev za evropske države z največjo emigracijo in med njimi tudi za Slovenijo.

V Evropi običajno razlikujemo v obravnavanem obdobju države stare in države nove emigracije. Njihove zgodovinske izkušnje pa nas vodijo do naslednjih pomembnejših sklepov. Prvič, velika večina evropskih držav z največjo emigracijo je bila spremenjena po znatnem ekonomskem razvoju v države imigracije. Evropski primer kaže, da modernizacija, ekonomski razvoj in družbeni napredki spremenjajo državne emigracije v države imigracije. Drugič, evropske izkušnje kažejo, da se proces emigracije praviloma ne začne v najbolj zaostalih, omejenih in odročnih regijah. Za njegov začetek je potrebna določena raven razvitoosti. Tretjič, v mnogih evropskih državah so migracije iz vasi v mesta ustvarile osnovo za kasnejše emigracije v tujino. Četrtič, kvalificirani delavci so zavzemali pomemben delež emigracij iz Zahodne in Severne Evrope.

Kljub vsemu navedenemu pa evropski primer ne more biti zgled za reševanje problemov povezanih z demografskim prehodom v današnjih nerazvitih državah sveta. Ne glede na mnogo večjo prenaseljenost današnjih revnih nerazvitih držav, preprosto danes ni na svetu držav, ki bi bile pripravljene sprejeti omembe vredno količino imigrantov. Hkrati pa so tudi številke o obsegu prebivalstva nerazvitih držav tako velike, da mednarodne migracije ne morejo pomembnejše zniževati prenaseljenost v teh državah.