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## TRANSFORMATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN THE EX-YUGOSLAV COUNTRIES – MATERIALIST, IDEALIST, AND INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES ON REPRODUCTIVE TRENDS

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### ABSTRACT

*Against the background of low and declining fertility in Europe, this paper reviews trends in fertility and family formation in ex-Yugoslav countries which have not yet been subject to a comparative analysis of family and fertility trends. On the basis of the popular explanatory framework of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT), we first review some basic indicators of changes in fertility and family formation in these countries. This is complemented by a descriptive review of relevant institutional, material, and ideational changes that might operate in the background. Finally, a logistic regression with data from the EVS/WVS 1999/00 is calculated in order to test some of the main assumptions of SDT fertility outcome (approximated by means of un/realised parenthood) concerning the interrelation of relevant factors. Somewhat surprisingly, the findings suggest that the value dimension emphasized by SDT is not relevant in these countries.*

**Key words:** Balkan, (ex-)Yugoslavia, Second Demographic Transition, fertility, parenthood, childbearing

## TRASFORMAZIONI E CAMBIAMENTI DEMOGRAFICI NEI PAESI DELL'EX JUGOSLAVIA – APPROCCI MATERIALISTICO, IDEALISTICO E ISTITUZIONALE NELL'ANALISI DEI TREND RIPRODUTTIVI

### SINTESI

*Partendo dalla bassa e decrescente natalità in Europa, l'articolo analizza in forma comparativa le intenzioni riproduttive e i ruoli familiari nei Paesi dell'ex Jugoslavia. Basandosi sul principio della "seconda transizione demografica" analizza gli indicatori di base dei cambiamenti nel comportamento riproduttivo, nella formazione della famiglia e nel rapporto di coppia. Questo aspetto viene completato da un'analisi descrittiva dei rilevanti cambiamenti registrati a livello istituzionale, materiale e valoriale e la regressione logistica attraverso i dati di EVS WVS 1999/00 che verifica i presupposti principali su cui si fonda il concetto di "seconda transizione demografica". Contrariamente alle aspettative i risultati della regressione logistica indicano come i fattori valoriali non rivestano alcun ruolo nei risultati relativi alla natalità.*

**Parole chiave:** Balcani, (ex) Jugoslavia, seconda transizione demografica, genitorialità, natalità

## INTRODUCTION

Low and declining fertility in Europe is a highly politicised source of concern of both national governments and supranational organisations (European Commission, 2005; UNECE, 2009). In general, these changes, and especially the dramatic changes in the Central and Eastern European countries with a state-socialist past, are well documented and investigated from numerous perspectives and disciplines, and so are the diverse, long-lasting and also short-term factors in the background (Billari et al., 2006; Frejka, 2008; Morgan, Berkowitz King, 2001; Sobotka, 2004; Sobotka, 2008). In Western European nations more recent changes to marriage and family formation behaviour were first observed in the mid-1960s. However, the countries of the so-called Western Balkans, i.e. the former Yugoslav Federal Republics<sup>1</sup> have not yet been subject to a comparative analysis of family and fertility trends. Only a few ex-Yugoslav countries have been investigated individually and the empirical evidence is scarce (e. g. Slovenia: Črnič-Istenič, 1998; Ule, Kuhar, 2003; Ule, Kuhar, 2008; Stropnik, Šircelj, 2008 for Slovenia; Serbia: Bobić, 2003, Bobić, 2006; Tomanović, 2006; Croatia: Mrđen, Friganović, 1998; Macedonia: Dragović, 2003). Altogether these countries are largely blank spots on the map of European demographic and sociological research into these issues. As all ex-Yugoslav countries face historically low or decreasing fertility as well as postponed transitions to childbearing and parenthood this article intends to set the stage for further comparative and national analyses of family formation and child-bearing

patterns in the region. Its main purpose is the review and analysis of available comparative data for ex-Yugoslav countries. This is done by means of a multi-layer approach using data from official statistical sources (UNICEF, ILO, CoE) and the World Values/the European Values Survey 1999–2001.<sup>2</sup>

The overall argument is developed following the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory proposed by Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (Van de Kaa, 1987; Lesthaeghe, 1995; Lesthaeghe, 2001). SDT is one of the dominant theoretical approaches in demography to recent changes in family formation and fertility. On the one hand, this paradigm provides a coherent set of guidelines and criteria to explore the relevance of certain factors influencing changing family formation and child-bearing patterns. On the other hand, the specific, and apart from a few exceptions relatively un-researched context of post-state socialist transformation provides an opportunity to test the validity of the SDT theory itself.

According to the original SDT<sup>3</sup> concept, large-scale changes in family and reproductive behaviour are the consequence of cultural and ideational changes (e.g. a shift towards secular individualism and an orientation towards personal self-fulfilment) driven primarily by economic affluence (Van de Kaa, 1987). Following this conceptualisation, our article tries to uncover whether the changing outcomes in reproductive behaviour (i.e. decreasing fertility rate and postponement of childbearing) in the ex-Yugoslav countries evolve in parallel (i) to the overall changes in family behaviour (e.g. pluralization of family forms, increasing cohabitation, increasing level of divorce etc.) and (ii) to values shifts (from more traditional towards more modern (post-materialist) val-

- 1 The former Federative Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved leaving the present-day independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and also Kosovo. Political and economic transition has been relatively smooth and without a number of serious and complicated problems only in Slovenia. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was accompanied by the wars in Croatia (1991–1995) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995) and by systematic violence in Kosovo (1998). Yugoslavia was a very heterogeneous country in terms of the standard economic, sociological, and demographic indicators. But these countries shared a common state period with a distinctive self-management type of socialist regime which contributed to the specific situation of Ex-Yugoslav republics in comparison with other former socialist states. For example, unlike the citizens from the countries of the Warsaw Bloc, Yugoslav citizens were free to travel to the West and communicate with foreigners with absolutely no restrictions. This was of particular importance for Slovenia, sharing borders with Austria and Italy, and Croatia, with a coastline frequented by Western tourists every summer. An important distinctive characteristic was also a relatively high level of economic liberalization: small private businesses and private farms were already allowed and promoted during socialism.
- 2 The EVS/WVS 1999–2000 covering altogether thirty-three countries is the last one of its kind that includes this region and can be used for our purposes. In each case, a single questionnaire was used and rigorous procedures and checks were applied to secure the equivalence of questions after translation. In each country a probabilistic sample of the 18+ population was polled, and all country samples consisted of at least 1,000 respondents. The data stem from the following years: Slovenia (1999), Croatia (1999) (European Values Study 1999–2000), Serbia (2001), Montenegro (2001), Macedonia (2001), Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001), Republic of Srpska (2001) (World Values Survey 1999–2000). The national samples are as follows: Slovenia (352), Croatia (369), Bosnia and Herzegovina (410), Serbia (304), Montenegro (291), Macedonia (356). The data stem from the following years: Slovenia (1999), Croatia (1999) (European Values Study 1999–2000), Serbia (2001), Montenegro (2001), Macedonia (2001), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001) (World Values Survey 1999–2000).
- 3 The basic idea behind the theory of the Second Demographic Transition is that industrialized countries have reached a new stage in their demographic development: a stage characterized by extensive control over fertility (Van de Kaa, 2002, 1–2). As couples tend to have no more than one or two children, fertility declined below replacement level, and as well, childbearing is being postponed. This trend leads to demographic imbalance and generates migration (ibid.). New developments bring also a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage and the disconnection between marriage and procreation (Lesthaeghe, 2007).

ues), or (iii) whether they are more or less determined by the rapid and radical socio-economic changes (and military conflicts) since the beginning of the 1990s.

This paper is organised in the following sections: *First*, we review basic indicators of our *dependent variable* of changes in (a) reproductive behaviour and (b) family and partnership formation. The *second* part is dedicated to three clusters of *independent variables*: (a) the institutional collapse and transformation in the course of socio-economic transformation; (b) the material deterioration of opportunities especially due to mass unemployment; (c) and the ideational changes in relevant value orientations in the region. On the basis of this descriptive information that also has the purpose of taking stock of comparative secondary data available for these countries, the *third* part estimates the *relative impact* of socio-economic characteristics (such as education level, employment, income, housing status) on the one hand and value orientations on the other on (the postponement of) childbearing in former Yugoslav countries.

#### THE TRANSFORMATION OF PATTERNS OF REPRODUCTION AND PARTNERSHIP

How did fertility and relationship patterns in the former Yugoslav countries evolve over the last decades? Was the development after the collapse of socialism particularly distinct, or had the main trends already started previously? The following overview concerning the *dependent variable* of changes in fertility and partnership includes selected key-indicators for the four

decades from 1960 to 2000. The comparison of change during the ten years before and after the critical year of 1990 is particularly revealing regarding information about the relative impact on the more recent changes compared to the years before.<sup>4</sup>

#### Changes in Reproductive Behaviour and Fertility

From 1960 to 2000 fertility declined considerably below replacement level in all former Yugoslav countries; with a more than 50% decline of the total fertility rate it was most dramatic in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (TFYRM; hereafter referred to as 'Macedonia'). However, change was very uneven in these countries and the impact of the first ten years of transformation is anything but equal. For instance, while the major part of the fertility decline in Slovenia had already taken place well before and especially in the last ten years before the collapse of socialism, it is a very different case for Serbia and Montenegro. The latter, where decline was altogether least pronounced, was particularly affected by the transformation and disintegration of Yugoslavia. Interestingly, the trajectories of decline are most dissimilar in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, both starting from a high fertility rate of four in 1960. The latter witnessed a steep decline, the steepest of all former Yugoslav countries, during the ten years of transformation, while in the former the recent decline was least pronounced and rather consolidated already before the year 1990 (Table 1).

**Table 1: Total fertility rate.**<sup>5</sup>

**Tabela 1: Celotna stopnja rodnosti.**

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	% change		
											1960–2000	1980–1990	1990–2000
Slovenia	2,18	2,46	2,12	2,17	2,10	1,71	1,46	1,29	1,26	1,26	-42,2	-30,5	-13,7
Croatia	2,20	2,21	1,83	1,92	1,92	1,81	1,60	1,50	1,40	1,42	-36,4	-16,7	-12,5
Bosn./Herz.	3,95	3,50	2,71	2,38	1,93	1,89	1,71		1,28	1,20	-67,6	-11,4	-25,1
Serbia/ Mont.	2,57	2,53	2,30	2,33	2,29	2,22	2,10	1,89	1,66		-35,4	-8,3	-21,0
TFYRM	4,11	3,71	2,98	2,71	2,47	2,31	2,06	2,13	1,88	1,46	-54,3	-16,6	-8,7

Sources: CoE (2005); 2005: UNICEF (2009).

4 Data for 2005 is included in the table but was not used as a reference year for comparison due to the missing joint indicator for Serbia and Montenegro. Probably due to Montenegro's independence in 2006 the indicator was not calculated.

5 The order of the countries in the tables with indicators of reproductive behavior reproduces their geographical location along the north-south axis.

**Table 2: Mean age of women at first birth.**  
**Tabela 2: Povprečna starost žensk ob rojstvu prvega otroka.**

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	% change		
											1960–2000	1980–1990	1990–2000
Slovenia	24,8	24,2	23,7	23,0	22,9	23,1	23,7	24,9	26,5	27,8	+6,9	+3,5	+11,8
Croatia	23,4	23,4	23,1	23,1	23,4	23,6	24,1	24,8	25,5	26,5	+9,0	+3,0	+5,8
Bosn./Herz.	23,2	23,2	23,0	23,0	23,3	23,6	23,6		24,4	24,4	+5,2	+1,3	+3,4
Serbia/ Mont.	22,7	22,9	22,7	22,8	23,3	23,6	23,9	24,5	25,0		+10,1	+2,6	+4,6
TFYRM	23,2	23,4	23,0	22,9	23,2	23,3	23,4	23,7	24,3	25,0	+4,7	+0,9	+3,8

Sources: CoE (2005). Figure for Bosnia/Herzegovina 2000: UNICEF (2009). 2005: UNICEF (2009).

**Table 3: Extra-marital births (per 100 births).**  
**Tabela 3: Izvenzakonska rojstva (na 100 rojstev).**

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	% change		
											1960–2000	1980–1990	1990–2000
Slovenia	9,1	9,2	8,5	9,9	13,1	19,1	24,5	29,8	37,1	46,7	+307,7	+87,0	+51,4
Croatia	7,4	6,0	5,4	4,9	5,1	5,9	7,0	7,5	9,0	10,5	+21,6	+37,3	+28,6
Bosn./Herz.	6,2	5,3	5,3	5,6	5,4	6,0	7,4		10,3	11,2	+66,1	+37,0	+39,2
Serbia/ Mont.	11,7	11,6	11,7	9,9	10,1	10,7	12,7	16,4	20,4		+74,4	+25,7	+60,6
TFYRM	5,1	5,7	6,2	6,6	6,1	6,6	7,1	8,2	9,8	12,4	+92,2	+16,4	+38,0

Sources: CoE (2005). 2005: UNICEF (2009).

Correspondingly, the age at which a woman gives birth to her first child is postponed well into the mid-twenties and beyond. Here, the rate of change was in all countries higher in the ten years after 1990 compared to those before; it was most pronounced in Slovenia, which had the lowest mean age at first birth in 1980 (but the highest one in 1960). (Table 2) The decline in fertility is most dramatic among young women between twenty and twenty four years; and the development in older cohorts cannot compensate for this comprehensive trend towards postponement of childbearing.<sup>6</sup>

In line with the concept of SDT, extra-marital fertility is rising also in the ex-Yugoslav countries. The trend is most pronounced in Slovenia where the rate of extra-marital births more than tripled over these four decades: in 2000, more than one out of three children was born out of wedlock, in 2005 the share was close to 50%. Yet the comparison of the development before and after 1990 shows that only in Serbia and Montenegro as well as in Macedonia this development was accelerated by the post-socialist turmoil (Table 3). The increasing share of extra-marital births (see Table 3) does not necessarily imply an increasing trend of cohabitation. With the ex-

ception of Slovenia where relatively high level of cohabitation is a norm, according to the EVS/WVS 1999/00 shares of young people in cohabitation is less than 4% for the other ex-Yugoslav countries. The share of cohabitating partners is that low although cohabitation used to be legally equal to marriage during the socialist era (e.g. in Slovenia since 1. 1. 1977 with "Law on conjugal union and family relationships").

Altogether, while trends in fertility and reproductive behaviour evolve in similar directions in all former Yugoslav countries, the national trajectories are considerably heterogeneous. The impact of the transformation is especially ambiguous and requires an in-depth analysis of the changes in individual countries.

### Changes in Relationship Patterns

The fact that an increasing share of children is born out of wedlock strongly indicates an underlying transformation of relationship patterns in the area. For instance, age at birth increases together with the mean age of women at first marriage; the coincidence of motherhood and marriage – at least for the decreasing number

<sup>6</sup> It is important to emphasise that this trend towards postponing childbearing does not imply that young people do not want children. On the contrary, according to the WVS 1999/00 the vast majority considers two or three children ideal.

**Table 4: Mean age of women at first marriage (below age 50).****Tabela 4: Povprečna starost žensk ob prvi sklenitvi zakonske zveze (pod 50 let).**

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	% change		
											1960–2000	1980–1990	1990–2000
Slovenia			23,1	22,5	22,5	22,8	23,7	25,1	26,7	28,2		+5,3	+12,7
Croatia	22,4	22	21,4	21,7	22,1	22,5	23,1	24,1	25,3	26,3	+12,9	+4,5	+9,5
Bosn./Herz.					22	22,4	23,3		24,3	24,6		+5,9	+4,3
Serbia/ Mont.	22	22,2	22	22,1	22,5	22,8	23,4	24	25,0		+13,6	+4,0	+6,8
TFYRM	22,1	22,3	22,2	22	22,2	22,6	22,6	23,0	23,6	24,5	+6,8	+1,8	+4,4

Source: CoE (2005). Figure for Bosnia/Herzegovina 2000: UNICEF (2009). 2005: UNICEF (2009).

**Table 5: Crude marriage rate (per 1000 population).****Tabela 5: Sklenitve zakonskih zvez na 1000 prebivalcev.**

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	% change		
											1960–2000	1980–1990	1990–2000
Slovenia	8,8	9,2	8,3	8,5	6,5	5,4	4,3	4,1	3,6	2,9	-59,1	-33,8	-16,3
Croatia	8,9	9,0	8,5	8,0	7,2	6,6	6,0	5,1	4,8	5,0	-46,1	-16,7	-20,0
Bosn./Herz.	10,1	9,3	9,3	9,0	8,5	8,1	6,7		5,8	4,9	-42,6	-21,2	-13,4
Serbia/ Mont.	9,0	8,7	9,2	8,2	7,6	6,9	6,3	5,7	5,5		-38,9	-17,1	-12,7
TFYRM	8,6	9,0	9,0	8,9	8,5	8,1	8,3	8,0	7,0	7,1	-18,6	-2,4	-15,7

Source: CoE (2005). 2005: UNICEF (2009).

**Table 6: Crude divorce rate (per 1000 population).****Tabela 6: Razveze zakonskih zvez na 1000 prebivalcev.**

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	% change		
											1960–2000	1980–1990	1990–2000
Slovenia	1,0	1,1	1,1	1,2	1,2	1,3	0,9	0,8	1,1	1,3	+10,0	-25,0	+22,2
Croatia	1,2	1,3	1,2	1,3	1,2	1,2	1,2	0,9	1,0	1,1	-16,7	0,0	-16,7
Bosn./Herz.	1,0	0,8	0,8	1,1	0,6	0,7	0,4		0,5	0,4	-50,0	-33,3	+25,0
Serbia/ Mont.	1,4	1,3	1,1	1,2	1,2	1,2	1,0	0,8	0,8		-42,9	-16,7	-20,0
TFYRM	0,7	0,5	0,3	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,7	0,8	0,0	-20,0	+75,0

Source: CoE (2005). 2005: UNICEF (2009).

of people who decide to marry (Tables 4 and 5) – however, continues to be the norm. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the scope of change was higher in the decade after 1990 than before; Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia seem to have been most affected (Table 4).

With age at first marriage rising, less and less people marry altogether (Table 5). Once again, this development is most distinct in Slovenia; it is least dramatic in

Macedonia where marriage remains at a high level. The transformation appears to have slowed down the decline in marriages in Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro; or, to put it differently, the major changes towards fewer marriages took place already before. Finally, with regard to divorce, change was slow over the last four decades with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro (Table 6).

## THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETIES AND VALUES

After surveying some indicators providing a comparative perspective of the scope of changes in fertility and partnership formation in ex-Yugoslav countries, let us now take a brief look at possible causes and *independent variables* for this development. Approximately three positions can be distinguished in the literature: an institutionalist, a materialist, and an idealist one (Reiter, forthcoming 2009). In the following, each one is illustrated with selected indicators.<sup>7</sup>

### The Institutional Root cause of Fertility Decline

The global, *institutional* 'root cause' (Frejka, 2008) of demographic changes that Central and Eastern European countries share is the replacement of state socialist economies by market economies and related institutions. According to this interpretation it was the overall societal transformation and the severe economic crisis that profoundly disturbed fertility patterns in these countries.

However obvious and simplistic it may appear, the replacement of the state socialist regimes by market economies and by fledgling democratic institutions of governance is the root cause of the demographic changes and trends during the transition period and beyond. The crux of the matter is that the economic and political infrastructure of contemporary capitalism is being adopted (Frejka, 2008, 160).

The Yugoslav wars (1991–1999) accompanying the socio-economic transformation need to be added to the aggravating circumstances with regard to many ex-Yugoslav countries; their impact is hardly quantifiable in a comparative way.<sup>8</sup> The individual country's trajectories were very different: while, largely unaffected by the ex-Yugoslav wars, the Slovenian path to EU membership was smooth, most of the other countries went through more than one decade of chaos, violence, and 'nation-building'. The two standard indicators of development, i.e. the GDP and the GINI-coefficient (Tables 7 and 8) are able to underline the heterogeneity of the former Yugoslav countries already in the mid 1990s.

**Table 7: Real gross domestic product, PPP\$ per capita.**

**Tabela 7: Bruto domači proizvod na prebivalca po kupni moči, v USD.**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Slovenia	9.976	12.500	13.200	14.100	14.293	15.977	17.367	17.130	18.540	19.150	20.939	22.273	25.021
Croatia	3.960	3.972		4.895	6.749	7.387	8.091	9.170	10.240	11.080	12.191	13.042	14.309
Bosn./Herz.								5.970		5.967	7.032	7.032	6.801
Serbia													9.468
TFYRM	3.965	4.058	4.163	3.210	4.254	4.651	5.086	6.110	6.470	6.794	6.610	7.200	7.921

Source: WHO (Internet).

**Table 8: Distribution of income: Gini coefficient.**

**Tabela 8: Porazdelitev dohodka: Ginijev količnik.**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Slovenia	0,25	0,26	0,25	0,24	0,24	0,25	0,25	0,24	0,24	0,24		0,24		
Croatia					0,35									
Bosn./Herz.											0,45			
Serbia										0,40	0,39	0,39	0,39	0,37
TFYRM	0,27	0,30	0,31	0,29	0,31	0,31	0,35	0,33	0,33	0,32	0,36	0,39	0,39	0,39

Source: UNICEF (2009).

7 The figures are indicative; this is for reasons of space, but also due to lacking indicators that would provide a comparison of these countries over time.

8 There is no agreement over war casualties and the discussion is characterised by alternative views (MacDonald, 2003). Estimations are rare. For instance, Leitenberg (2006) estimates 300.000 deaths during the 1991–1996 civil war on the territory of former Yugoslavia involving Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.

Slovenia, only marginally affected by the Yugoslav wars<sup>9</sup> and an EU member since 2004, clearly took the lead in terms of development while other countries struggle with both GDP-development and considerable income inequality. Yet explanations or even the isolation of single causal elements on the most general institutional level are difficult. The two other perspectives discussed in the following section are closer to individual choices and behaviour.

### Mass Unemployment and the Changing Material Condition

A further, *materialist* cluster in the background of changes in fertility and partnership consists of aspects determining both living conditions and life choices and options. Apart from the two general indicators for development and inequality, the development of the unemployment rate is a good indicator for life chances in work societies that both socialist and post-socialist countries are. And, as Yugoslavia was the only European state socialist economy allowing for (and registering) unemployment (Woodward, 1995) the data go back in to the 1980s. Clearly, the scope of post-state socialist unemployment, and with it the impact on individual lives, is incomparably more problematic (Table 9). Apart from Slovenia, where the youth unemployment problem is comparatively low (but still dramatic enough), youth unemployment rates skyrocketed to a maximum of 74% in Macedonia in 1997. In other words, on average, one to two out of three young people ready and willing to work could not find a job, not even in 2007.

### Changes in Value Orientations?

A third, *idealist* perspective on changes in fertility suggests a shift in values and norms towards post-materialism and individualism as being the driving force in the background. As already mentioned, the popular concept of the SDT argues that the most important determinant for fertility changes is value change (Van de Kaa, 1987; Van de Kaa, 2002). This claim overlaps with Inglehart's notion of the "Silent Revolution" in the mid-1960s with value orientations transforming from modern to post-modern ones (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart 1997). To be precise, this argument does not claim that other determinants, such as economic ones are not important. However, it suggests that people's behaviour is mainly determined by their individual value orientations, which constitute the rather stable normative backbone of behavioural articulations. This section of the paper will take a descriptive look at differences and communalities in the general value climate of the former Yugoslav countries.

We briefly present the value orientations of young people (18–34 years old)<sup>10</sup> in the ex-Yugoslav countries on the basis of the EVS/WVS 1999/00. We calculated the values of the so called two dimensions of cultural variation found by Inglehart and Baker (2000) - known as "traditional vs. secular-rational" and "survival vs. self-expression" - for the individual countries.<sup>11</sup> The first value dimension (traditional vs. secular-rational) differentiates between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not. Besides, the label "rational" refers to Weber's idea of a comprehensive "rationalization of all spheres of society". A wide range of other orientations is closely linked with this dimen-

**Table 9: Youth unemployment rate (15–24).**

**Tabela 9: Stopnja brezposelnosti mladih (15–24).**

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Slovenia	24,0	22,9	18,9	19,2	17,5	18,1	17,9	16,4	15,4	15,2	14,7	15,4	13,4	14,0	8,7
Croatia				26,7	28,5	31,0	39,2	43,1	41,7	34,4	35,8	33,8	32,0	29,0	24,0
Bosn./Herz.														62,4	58,6
Serbia												48,1	47,7	47,8	43,7
Montenegro													58,1	59,5	38,3
Macedonia				69,5	74,2	70,9	62,9	59,9	56,1	58,4	65,7	64,8	62,6	59,8	57,7

Source: UNICEF (2009).

9 Direct military operations in Slovenia lasted only ten days.

10 We restricted ourselves to the age group of the 18–34-olds in order to meet the target group as well as minimum sampling criteria.


11 These two dimensions have values below or above 0. Values above 0 show, correspondingly, secularized-rational and self-expressive value orientations; values below 0 show traditional and survival orientations. The higher/lower the value, the more accentuated the orientation.

sion.<sup>12</sup> The second value dimension (survival vs. self-expression) reflects the priority shift away from an emphasis on economic and physical security towards subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life once survival can be taken for granted.<sup>13</sup>

Slovenia and Montenegro seem to have quite secularized-rationalized values systems. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, on the other hand, score lower on this dimension reflecting traditional orientation towards religion, family values, parent-child ties and abortion (Figure 1). Regarding the second dimension, only Slovenia shows a trend towards self-expressiveness, while also in Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina especially in Montenegro the emphasis is still on survival. This underlines the above-indicated difference in economic development and material uncertainty in these countries. For Croatia,<sup>14</sup> these two dimensions cannot be calculated due to a lack of data; instead, we calculated only one – existing – indicator from each of

the two dimensions: materialism/postmaterialism index (from "survival vs. self-expression" dimension) and subjective importance of God (from "traditional vs. secular-rational" dimension).<sup>15</sup>

Since comprehensive progressive attitudes are a precondition of the fertility development predicted by SDT, only Slovenia should fully qualify for this trend. Even before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Slovenia was the most developed republic with a per capita GNP of more than one third beyond the Yugoslav average. Partially due to its history - unlike the other former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia (and Croatia) were under Habsburg and not Ottoman rule - and partially due to its economic development and proximity to the West, Slovenia was the most west-oriented of the former Yugoslavian countries (Štiblar, 2007). The other countries were already shown to be marked by more traditional values before the regime change, as an all-Yugoslav survey among young people in the 1980s indicated (see Vrcan, 1986).



**Fig. 1: Two dimensions of cultural variation (EVS/WVS 1999/00).**

**Sl. 1: Dve dimenziji kulturne variacije (EVS/WVS 1999/00).**

12 This dimension is measured by the following variables: 1. God is very important in respondent's life; 2. It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination; 3. Abortion is never justifiable; 4. Respondent has strong sense of national pride; 5. Respondent favours more respect for authority.

13 The indicators of this dimension are: 1. Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality-of-life (=materialism/postmaterialism index); 2. Respondent describes self as not very happy; 3. Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition; 4. Homosexuality is never justifiable; 5. You have to be very careful about trusting people.

14 The questions in European Values Study and in World Values Survey partly differ – not the same questions are being asked in the individual countries even under each of these two studies which represents a disadvantage for comparative analyses.

15 In Croatia, the materialism/postmaterialism index shows that the percentage of 'post-materialists' (26,9%) among 18-34-olders is considerable and even higher than the EU15 average (22,1%). However, and similar to most of the other former Yugoslav countries, religion remains relevant also in Croatia: the average rating of the subjective importance of God among 18- to 34-year-olds of 7,0 (on a scale from 1 to 10) is quite high (e.g. in Slovenia this amounts to 4,2 in the same age group).



According to the findings from this youth survey, the Yugoslav youth population was already characterised by large differences and gaps even then. Most importantly, these differences could not be explained by the usual variables such as social status, class, political or religious affiliation, or the social activities of the respondents. Instead, differences largely correlated with national (i. e. Yugoslav republican) affiliation. Slovenian youth turned out to be ideologically, politically, and culturally the most individualistic, open and libertarian and the least traditional (Radin, 1986). Individualist orientations could be found also in Croatia (but not in all cities), and in selected Serbian cities (Belgrade, Novi Sad). The rest of the Yugoslav youth surveyed scored high on the traditionalism and authoritarianism indices. Ule's (1988) interpretation was that these differences resulted from the varying levels and qualities of modernization across the main nationalities (republics) in Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately, there is no additional comparative data on value orientations in these countries on the basis of which we could strengthen the argument of the comprehensive persistence of traditional, non-self-expressive values over time. However, contrary to the findings regarding structural indicators that seem partly to support SDT theory (at least as regards the delay of union formation and childbearing) there seems to be no significant shift in terms of values towards post-materialism (with the exception of Slovenia and partly Croatia).

The descriptive review of available secondary data is able to underline the significance of changes in fertility and family patterns as well as national differences. It is obvious that material and institutional changes were massive, while changes in values and attitudes provide an ambivalent picture. Against this background of ambivalent descriptive findings, is it actually possible to tentatively estimate the influence of various factors on having children or not? The following does exactly that by bringing some of these indicators together in a logistic regression model.

#### **SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OR VALUES? TENTATIVE ANSWERS TO THE PUZZLE OF FERTILITY DECLINE IN FORMER YUGOSLAV COUNTRIES**

Following the theory of the SDT, childbearing behaviour is not sufficiently explained by the socio-economic transformation but also, and essentially, depends on an ideational change continuously operating in the background of the historically 'short' experience of the societal transformation. The model that we wish to test – and that we can test on the basis of available data for the ex-Yugoslav countries – thus links child-

bearing to (a) value orientations and to (b) individual socio-economic indicators. We test whether dramatic changes in childbearing may have their causes (also) in a profound shift in value orientations. In this way we would like to assess the validity of SDT theory in the ex-Yugoslavia. More specifically, and on the basis of the available data, we hypothesise that there is a significant negative effect of post-materialist (i. e. rational-secularized, self-expressive) value orientations on childbearing in ex-Yugoslav countries and that it is higher than that of unfavourable structural factors.

To date, there is only one data set covering all the former Yugoslav countries that could be used to test this hypothesis – already described EVS/WVS 1999/00. For the purpose of secondary analysis fertility, the *dependent variable*, is operationalised by means of a binary variable informing about whether the person has a child or not. As *independent variables* we included two sets of variables. A first set measures socioeconomic and ideational factors in the national samples, namely: level of education, employment (employed, inactive, or unemployed), living with parents (binary proxy for independent housing). A second set measures two dimensions of cultural variation following Inglehart and Baker (2000): shift from survival to self-expression, and from religiosity to secularity-rationality. Correlations between independent variables show no sign of collinearity. Our hypotheses are straight forward. Following SDT theory we expect that the more secularized-rationalized and also the more self-expressive value orientations an individual has, the lower the probability of having a child; and reversely, the more traditional and more survival-oriented and individual is, the higher the probability of having a child. Additionally, if the SDT theory is valid in our case, socio-economic background, here operationalised by means of employment, education and housing should not be the only significant source of variation.<sup>16</sup> Due to the restrictions in the binary dependent variable the relationships were tested in a logistic regression model.

In view of the available data several qualifications have to be made. First of all, we could not make calculations for the individual countries since the numbers of cases (in the 18–34 age period) were not sufficient for such an analysis. For this reason we decided to make calculations for the ex-Yugoslav countries together but without Slovenia and Croatia. Croatia was excluded due to the lack of comparative measurements on the two dimensions of value orientation (see above). The main reason for excluding Slovenia (and partly also Croatia) consists in the remarkably different value orientations of young people in these countries in comparison to the other ex-Yugoslav countries that would have introduced

16 Especially education could also be an indicator of certain values. However, here it is used as structural indicator like in classical social mobility or stratification research.

a considerable bias. Both Slovenia and Croatia have a comparatively higher socio-economic standard and are characterised by a higher degree of post-materialist values; therefore it is more probable that the SDT theory is valid for them. Additionally, the phenomena of fertility and family trends have been analysed more frequently for these two countries, while there has been hardly any research done on the others.<sup>17</sup> Another qualification results from the cross-sectional character of our data. We investigate the interrelationship between the variables at only one point in time – in year 2001 when the WVS was conducted in BiH, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. What is more, we do not have information about the year of birth and cannot distinguish parenthood before the onset of the transformation, and we cannot link this past event to any values at that time. Finally, we have no information about the actual values directly related to children, family etc., since Inglehart and Baker's (2000) two dimensions do not directly include such questions.<sup>18</sup> The long-term development of fertility in

the respective countries indicates that some of the changes started well before the 1990s.

The results of the logistic regression<sup>19</sup> show that independent housing has the biggest influence on child-bearing: 18–34-old respondents who do not live with their parents anymore have an 8,9-times higher probability of having a child. Education has the second highest influence on childbearing: the lower the education the higher the probability of having a child. Respondents with low education have 7,0-times higher probability of having a child compared to those with high education; this probability is 3,1-times higher for medium level education. Employment also has a significant influence, but lower in comparison to housing and education. If a person is unemployed, the probability of having a child is 0,5-times lower in comparison to employment status (full time, part time or self-employed). If a person is inactive in the labour market (for example still a student) the probability of having a child is also 0,5-times lower in comparison to those who are employed (Table 10).

**Table 10: Loglinear regression: influence of socio-economic and ideational factors on having a child, 18–34-olders, countries into regression analysis – F BiH, RS, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia.**

**Tabela 10: Loglinearna regresija: vpliv družbeno-ekonomskih in idejnih dejavnikov na odločitev za otroka, stari 18–34 let, države zajete v analizi regresije – F BiH, RS, Srbija, Crna gora, Makedonija.**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Education			17,40	2,00	0,00			
Education(low)	1,94	0,49	15,79	1,00	0,00	6,96	2,67	18,13
Education(middle)	1,13	0,45	6,24	1,00	0,01	3,08	1,27	7,45
Employment			9,01	2,00	0,01			
Employment(unemployed)	-0,81	0,28	8,35	1,00	0,00	0,45	0,26	0,77
Employment(inactive)	-0,66	0,34	3,72	1,00	0,05	0,52	0,26	1,01
Housing(not independent)	2,18	0,25	76,60	1,00	0,00	8,88	5,45	14,48
Ex-Yu countries (without Slo and Cro)			6,26	3,00	0,10			
Ex-Yu countries (without Slo and Cro)(BiH)	0,25	0,35	0,52	1,00	0,47	1,28	0,65	2,53
Ex-Yu countries (without Slo and Cro)(Montenegro)	-0,19	0,42	0,20	1,00	0,65	0,83	0,36	1,88
Ex-Yu countries (without Slo and Cro)(Macedonia)	0,72	0,36	4,04	1,00	0,14	2,05	1,02	4,15
Traditional - rational/secular dimension	-0,17	0,15	1,37	1,00	0,24	0,84	0,63	1,12
Survival - self-expression dimension	-0,13	0,15	0,81	1,00	0,37	0,88	0,66	1,17
Constant	-2,16	0,53	16,58	1,00	0,00	0,12		

Nagelkerke R Square: 0,397; % of correctly classified cases: 80,8 for those not having a child and 73,1 for those having a child

17 This decision is underlined by tentatively including Slovenia into the regression. The analysis shows that Slovenia is significantly different in the context of the respective independent variables from the other ex-Yugoslav countries while there were no statistically significant differences among the other countries indicating their relative homogeneity. The final model demonstrates no statistically significant differences between the remaining countries which justifies the common calculation for these countries as a cluster.

18 Even more, many authors have already been criticizing this approach, e.g. Haller (2002) pinpoints that traditional-secular/rational dimension actually measures only (non-)religiosity, while survival to self-expression measures 'only' civic sense.

19 R-square and the percentages of the correctly predicted cases are satisfactory.

While the influence of socio-economic background indicators on childbearing are significant or highly significant (except for inactivity), none of the value indicators is. Contrary to our expectations and the assumptions of the SDT, neither of the value dimensions has a significant influence on having a child. In other words, non/post-materialist value orientations, which play a prominent role within SDT theorising, are not among the important predictors of childbearing. Instead, the findings indicate that material conditions and socio-economic status are relevant. What are the implications of these findings in addition to the descriptive statistics for a preliminary assessment of the fertility decline in former Yugoslav countries? Our concluding discussion reviews the argument and indicates issues for further in-depth research.

### DISCUSSION

Change in fertility and family patterns, both before and after the critical year of 1990 is considerable, even dramatic in some countries of former Yugoslavia; and so is between-country variation. Even without applying advanced statistical methods, the significance of this change in what are indicators of the *dependent* variable in this paper is obvious. Yet some of the decline (in some of the countries) started well before 1990 and is thus indeed probably 'independent' of the post-socialist transformation. Furthermore, there is indication that union and family formation are first of all postponed but without the patterns necessarily pluralizing at the same time. Besides, in terms of average age, first birth and marital union are synchronised (among those women who marry). Also the upward trend in extra-marital births cannot easily be attributed to the transformation experience. For instance, in Slovenia where out-of-wedlock births are common, the development started already in the 1980s.

Altogether the general picture only partly corresponds to the concept of SDT that was used in order to frame the discussion. SDT claims are supported by: (i) low level of total fertility rate, (ii) increasing proportion of women marrying and having their first birth at later age at the birth cohort level. But, patterns of family formation still exhibit uniform patterns, e.g. the levels of out-of-wedlock births, the levels of cohabitations, and the divorce rates are relatively low (with the exception of Slovenia).

However, a preliminary descriptive review of possible institutional, material and ideational causes, all potential *independent* variables, of this development does not arrive at clear priorities for certain interpretations of how changes in fertility and family formation may be intertwined with transformations in society, economy, and the value system. In particular, SDT's claim of the key role of values framing fertility and family changes

does not seem to be verified. With the exception of Slovenia and partly Croatia (where the economic situation is comparatively more favourable than in the other former Yugoslav countries), young people in these countries are (still) traditional and anything but post-materialist. Only few seem to pursue self-realisation and individual autonomy, at least when measured in the conventional way.

In view of the overwhelming economic and institutional changes as well as the ambiguous findings concerning post-socialist values it is difficult to see that the strong emphasis of SDT on value change should materialise in the case of former Yugoslav countries. Instead, it is not obvious from the descriptive review of indicators of trends in two cultural domains that the population in these countries is particularly secular and liberal, or anywhere 'beyond' material concerns. On the contrary, the descriptive findings seem to suggest that some SDT assumptions do not play a role in post-socialist family and fertility patterns in the majority of former Yugoslav countries; with the obvious exception of Slovenia. Furthermore, important structural and context factors that likely played a role in post-socialist fertility and family patterns like, for instance, the experience of war, emigration, and family disruption could not even be considered here.

The descriptive account was supplemented by the systematic analysis of the potential significance of single indicators. This was done by feeding both socio-economic background indicators and values into a logistic regression model with un/realised parenthood as the outcome variable. In view of the ambivalent descriptive findings and especially the considerable changes in reproductive behaviour (especially the changes in age specific birth rates) we still expected values to be somehow relevant predictive categories in the equation, in line with the popular SDT and its strong assumptions. By removing Slovenia and Croatia from the analysis we consciously reduced the chance for this to come out; yet in this way, the findings now seem sufficiently robust for all the other former Yugoslav countries.

Parenthood is shown to be most importantly predicted by the availability of independent housing, even more strongly than by education and employment. This finding underlines the significance of housing in youth transitions in general and in Eastern Europe in particular where housing privatisation policies lead to a substantial housing crisis for young people (Roberts, 2009). It is still not clear in which way causality runs. Do couples/people have children because they have their own homes? Or are they assisted into their own homes by their families because they have children? Further research needs to complement very few studies available (Petrović, 2004 for Serbia). Low education is another indicator for a higher probability to parenthood at this age. The most

striking finding, however, is that the conventional indicators measuring self-expression and secularity/rationality did not show any significant relationship to parenthood. Even if the data set available for this analysis asks for a few qualifications this non-significance comes as a surprise. Possibly, it is the wrong values/orientations to action that are being measured. So the question remains; why do young adults in different countries and individuals in the same countries make different decisions?

On the basis of our findings we might ask: is SDT (a) altogether wrong; (b) wrong regarding post-socialist societies; or (c) simply not elaborate enough to grasp also less 'conventional' features of social change in modern societies such as, for instance, war, (ethnic) violence and its aftermath? Long answers to these questions could be given. A short answer could be: while being an extremely useful umbrella concept for analyzing changes in fertility and family formation SDT remains a contested concept/theory in general and regarding rapidly changing post-socialist European countries in particular. For the latter, "...SDT is too fuzzy as a theory when scrutinised on a finer level" as Sobotka (2008, 213) concludes (see also Frejka et al., 2008). Furthermore, as Sobotka (2008, 212) discusses – on one hand, some countries (e.g. France, USA) are a proof that SDT does not necessarily lead to sub-replacement fertility (what is one of the main theory's features) while on the other hand, low fertility countries might show that SDT is uncompleted (as reflected in persistence (non-pluralization) of family and

partnership behaviours) due to the demographic persistence of the traditional family norms and expectations, the continuation of family policies tailored to support the 'male breadwinner model,' and the persistence of marked gender inequality within the family. Even more, Inglehart and Norris (2002, 5) admit that the material base and level of economic development for post-materialist values to emerge are not yet available; and most countries in the world, among them post-socialist ones, are not yet post-industrial. It seems that first of all the rapidly changing socio-economic context affects family formation decisions by adding to a cocktail of fear and 'biographical uncertainty' (Reiter, 2010) in the region where the rupture in societal development undermines the capacity to plan.

What can be added from the analysis of ex-Yugoslav countries? SDT changes in most of these countries seems to be blocked due to lack of general material well-being, economic and societal growth, existential security and female emancipation – features which are not a suitable basis for development of post-materialist values and individualism expansion (compare Bobić, 2006). But since at least some features of SDT are missing out in most of the countries (sub-replacement fertility in most of the North countries, France and USA, pluralization of family forms in most of the other European countries with lack of values changes in ex-Yugoslav countries) the validity of SDT as the most propulsive concept describing demographic change on general seems to be urgently put into question.

## TRANSFORMACIJA IN DEMOGRAFSKE SPREMEMBE V DRŽAVAH NEKDANJE JUGOSLAVIJE – MATERIALISTIČNI, IDEALISTIČNI IN INSTITUCIONALISTIČNI POGLEDI NA REPRODUKTIVNE TRENDE

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### POVZETEK

*Nizka rodnost in prelaganje rojevanja so zelo razširjeni fenomen v Evropi, še posebej pa v jugovzhodnih post-socialističnih evropskih državah. Članek obravnava dejavnike, ki vplivajo na ustvarjanje družine in na rodnostne vzorce v državah bivše SFR Jugoslavije v obdobju tranzicije. V ta namen uporablja večplastni pristop – dostopne statistične podatke in podatke iz raziskav World Values Survey (WVS, Svetovna raziskava vrednot) in European Values Survey (EVS, Evropska raziskava vrednot) 1999/00. Članek izhaja iz koncepta 'druge demografske tranzicije'. Konkretno, naslavlja spremembe v reproduktivnem obnašanju in ustvarjanju družine in partnerstev. To je dopolnjeno*

z deskriptivnim pregledom relevantnih institucionalnih, materialnih in vrednotnih sprememb: (a) institucionalnim kolapsom in družbeno-ekonomsko transformacijo, (b) materialnim poslabšanjem življenjskih možnosti predvsem zaradi množične brezposelnosti, (c) vrednotnih sprememb v relevantnih vrednotnih orientacijah. Poleg tega sva izvedla logistično regresijo s podatki EVS/WVS 1999/00, s čimer sva ocenila relativni vpliv družbeno-ekonomskih značilnosti (npr. stopnja izobrazbe, dohodek, stanovanjski status), in vrednotnih orientacij na odlašanje z rojevanjem v bivših jugoslovanskih državah.

Deskriptivni del kaže, da družinske in rodnostne spremembe v analiziranih državah le delno ustrezajo konceptu druge demografske tranzicije. Postavke tega koncepta podpira nizka stopnja celotne rodnosti in naraščajoča starost pri prvi poroki in prvem rojstvu na kohortni ravni. Ampak vzorci ustvarjanja družine, z izjemo Slovenije in delno Hrvaške (kjer je ekonomska situacija v primerjavi z drugimi analiziranimi državami ugodnejša), še vedno kažejo uniformne trende; in sicer glede: stopnja izvenzakonskih rojstev, stopnja kohabitacije in ločitvena stopnja so relativno nizke. Analiza je v večini držav poudarila razkorak med spremenjenimi (odloženimi, ne pa pluraliziranimi) vzorci ustvarjanja družine in rojevanja po eni strani ter še vedno tradicionalnimi (sploh ne-postmaterialističnimi) vrednotnimi orientacijami po drugi strani. Logistična analiza ni potrdila osrednje postavke koncepta druge demografske tranzicije, da imajo vrednote osrednjo vlogo pri družinskih in rodnostnih spremembah.

**Ključne besede:** Balkan, (nekdanja) Jugoslavije, drugi demografski prehod, starševstvo, rodnost

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