A dvances in Metho dology and Statistics , 2023, 20 (2), 147–172. https://doi.org/10.51936/ilpg5900
A maze of r esp onsibility
Vito F laker
Univ ersity of Ljubljana, Faculty of So cial W ork, Ljubljana, Slo v enia
Abstract
This pap er is an attempt to de construct, formally de co de the notion of r esp onsibility fr e-
quently app earing in the pr o cess of deinstitutionalisation and long-term car e pr o vision.
It is a K afkian pr e dicativ e categor y of sub or dination. Its value is determine d by its tw o
obje cts. “For what” w e ar e r esp onsible constitutes the substance of r esp onsibility , “to what”
constitutes its form and sense . By e xamining the substance of r esp onsibility—for acts, things
and p e ople , w e hav e deriv e d the basic parameters, conditions constitutiv e of r esp onsibility:
loss (negativ e conse quences), alienation, r eification, r emo val of will and ascribing. Inv esti-
gating the form of r esp onsibility , of that to which w e ar e r esp onsible , w e hav e schematically
divide d instances of r esp onsibility into hierar chic and horizontal, as w ell as into r efle xiv e
and transient. Intricacies of r esp onsibility to authorities, public, community as w ell as to
near ones and the self ar e e xplor e d in their action and contemplativ e pr op erties. Deinstitu-
tionalisation on the one hand r estor es civic r esp onsibility to the ser vice users, on the other
it transmutes its v er y conditions. The imp erativ e is to r estor e their will capacity , not to
ascrib e acts to stigma, allo w r eappr opriation and humanisation and to put the emphasis
on achie v ement and success. In the case of the ke y w orker , w e demonstrate a ne w pattern
of pr ofessional r esp onsibility , in which acts ar e actors’ r esp onsibility , while help ers ar e
r esp onsible for ser vice deliv er y , their o wn acts and for teamw ork that will uphold the
user’s emancipation. In the transition to community , sub or dinativ e r esp onsibility is b eing
transforme d into e v er y day r esp onsiv eness and common r esp onsibility for humanity .
K e y w or ds: r esp onsibility , deinstitutionalisation, ke y w orker , guar dianship , r esp onsiv eness
1. An institutional ke y w or d
Resp onsibility is an imp ortant issue ( often a “hot topic”) in any formal organisation. The term
is also an imp ortant curr ency in e v er y day e xchanges. Usually as an act of r eprimand, turning
the other’s attention to her or his obligations, duties. In car e organisations or institutions
this topicality is y et mor e imp ortant, since ther e is an implication of at least some sort
of guar dianship o v er users, r esidents. This pr e o ccupation is e v en mor e pr onounce d in
institutions for p e ople with intelle ctual disabilities. It is an utterance at the end of any
meaningful discussion. It is a ke y that op ens ( or rather , lo cks) many do ors.
Email addr ess: vito .flaker@fsd.uni-lj.si (Vito F laker )

148 F laker
The gr eater imp ortance of this concern in such institutions, compar e d with other facili-
ties, w e can attribute to thr e e clusters of momenta—the lab el and car e er of the r esidents, the
concern of the p e dagogical pr ofession and to the commitment of r elativ es . The r esidents
of such institutions acquir e their de viant lab el at a v er y tender age . Contrar y to p e ople
lab elle d with “mental illness” , whose liv es ar e b eing turne d upside do wn later in their life ,
often by a dramatic life e v ent, the car e er of r esidents with the lab el of intelle ctual disability
b egins in childho o d, mainly by r e cognition of the de viation fr om normalcy . This in itself
is a ruptur e , a life e v ent, ho w e v er , mor e of par ents and not as a cause of the car e er but its
initial dramatic effe ct. The guar dianship in the par ents’ car e er is usually not installe d as a
denial of legal capacity but as a pr olongation of par enting.
Some of these institutions w er e initially set up for childr en and only later starte d to
“host” adults. Although childr en ar e no w a minority in such institutions, the legacy of
p e dagogical orientation r emains. The p e dagogical, sp e cial e ducation or “ defe ctological”
( as terme d until r e cently ) mo del is akin to the me dical one in the pr esumption that the
pr ofession kno ws b etter what “pupils” must achie v e , and ho w the y must b ehav e; what is
right and what is wr ong. This patr onising stance is pr ominent in the p e dagogic subsp e cies
of the “me dical mo del” (it is ab out the kids!).
The affinity of the tw o mo dels is genealogical, functional and institutional. In Slo v enia,
psy chiatr y was activ ely inv olv e d in the establishing of “ defe ctology” . Dr . Marjan Boršt-
nar was the founder of the first such institution (in Dornava), as w ell as an initiator of
“ defe ctology” studies at the le v el of higher e ducation (K ostnapfel, 1996 ). In b oth me dical
and general e ducational mo dels, the tr eatment of p e ople is funnelle d accor ding to pr e-set
values, and de viations fr om them. If a “pupil” or a “patient” do es not attain set norms, the
fault is theirs. The fault , a deficit is pr e cisely what joins the tw o mo dels into essentially
one . While p e dagogy defines what a p erson ne e ds to kno w , me dicine classifies the p erson’s
( biological, psy choso cial) incapacity to do so . The so cial mo del, on the other hand, places
the emphasis on so cial barriers, which disable the p erson—in attaining his or her goals.
Perhaps e v en mor e imp ortantly , it str esses that it is the p erson who articulates the goals,
not some sup erior agency .
In the institutional r eality the differ ence b etw e en the tw o mo dels is almost negligible
since such facilities function as total institutions. The noticeable differ ence is that some
war ds ar e run by nurses, some by e ducators. In other w or ds, while sp e cial e ducational
facilities hav e establishe d a limite d autonomy to war ds me dicine , in the sense of mo delling
the life in them, the y hav e r emaine d the same . The scho ol mo del is as institutional as the
hospital one . Differ ences ar e in the nuances, as for instance the sour ce and quantity of
funding.
Artificially pr olonge d childho o d and its concor dant p e dagogic set, amplify the pr esence
of the par ents and r elativ es. In comparison with other (mental health, corr e ctional) facilities
wher e the r esidents ar e often “written off” by their kin, in the institutions for intelle ctual
disability the par ents ar e mor e likely to b e engage d and committe d to the w ellb eing of
their offspring. The lab el of b ehavioural or mental disor ders often implies (pr ejudices) a
“ dysfunctional family” , wher eas the lab el of intelle ctual disability , diagnosis fr e quently ( and
mor e p otently ) confirms the organic natur e , thus r elie ving the par ents of guilt. Regar dless
of the validity of such an assumption, it affe cts the attitude and interaction patterns of staff
in e xchanges with family memb ers. In the e ducational facilities the staff ar e conv ersely
mor e pr one to b e attentiv e to what r elativ es hav e to say and ar e mor e r eady to co op erate
with them. Ho w e v er , ther e se ems to b e a “ class” differ ence b etw e en the typ es of institutions.
Sp e cial car e institutions se em to b e mor e r e ceptiv e to p e ople of an une ducate d family

A maze of r esp onsibility 149
backgr ound, who ar e without any meaningful so cial p o w er , the y ar e dep ots wher e p e ople
who hav e lost their place in the so ciety ar e parke d. Educational facilities (“training centr es”),
on the other hand se em to b e mor e in use for those who hav e mor e so cial p o w er , mor e
este em ( and the y do not want to lose it by not caring for their childr en). The division of
r esp onsibility b etw e en the institution and r elativ es is mor e akin to the one in scho ols, wher e
teachers ar e r esp onsible for that part of a child’s life which it sp ends in the scho ol, and
par ents ar e r esp onsible for the part outside the scho ol. In such an arrangement ther e is
mor e opp ortunity for b oth—of r elegating the r esp onsibility ( a moral “ping-p ong”) and for
co op eration. Regar dless of whether it is ab out conne cting or dividing, this kind of dynamic
raises the value of r esp onsibility .
1
1.1. Ho w to de construct r esp onsibility
The b est way of de construction of the notion of r esp onsibility is by activ ely testing ( and
contesting) it in the r eality—to emp o w er r esidents or users to r esume their r esp onsibility in
civil way and to make it mor e a p ersonal, interactiv e item rather than an institutional issue .
Ho w e v er , at some p oint, such a simple negation do es not suffice . W e ne e d to se e what ar e
the multiple meanings of the term originating b e y ond the interaction at hand.
In this pap er , w e se ek to de construct the notion of r esp onsibility , which springs out so
p otently in total institutions and in the interactions go v erne d by me dical and e ducational
mo dels. W e will do this primarily by a formal conceptual analysis. W e will de co de the notion
of r esp onsibly , firstly by e xploring its le xical, dictionar y meaning. Fr om this, w e shall deriv e
its syntactic p otential and its ramifications. Although it must b e maintaine d that syntax of
w or ds ( language and sp e e ch) differs essentially fr om syntax of de e ds, on the le v el of formal
analysis, this do es not app ear to b e an issue , since w e will e xamine the virtual pr op erties of
the r esp onsibility , not the actual doings. These ar e mor e of a linguistic natur e rather than
of the r egistr y of the actual doing. The r e v eale d syntactic structur e will enable e xploration
div erse formal semantic determinants of the term. It will unco v er the pr oblematic knots of
the conceptual mesh spr eading fr om the v er y term. Fr om these w e will de co de the conditions
of r esp onsibility , as w ell as the structur e of instances of r esp onsibility , their placement in
the various sets of such structur e , their hierar chic or horizontal r elations and r efle xiv e
or transient pr op erties, thus de co ding the se emingly r efle xiv e natur e of the term. The
conditions pr o vide the substance of the term, the p osition in the mesh of r elationships its
form and its sense .
In the se cond part—p erhaps with to o hastily , without r ounding up pr op erly the discussion
of the term itself—w e e xamine the transformation of the notion of r esp onsibility in the
frame of deinstitutionalisation. Ther e , the r esp onsibility has to b e negate d as a form of
sub or dination, y et affirme d as an e xpr ession of emancipation. W e topple deriv e d conditions
of r esp onsibility , by double negation w e elicit the imp erativ es of emancipator y action.
Similarly , by the negation of r esp onsibil ity to the mesh of instances w e pr o vide indicators for
incr easing the r efle xivity of the term, transforming the imp ersonal to p ersonal, establishing
it as interactional notion rather than a one of institutional axiomatics.
The analysis emplo y e d is of ab ductiv e kind. Fr om the e vidence w e tr y to ab duct, disco v er
its cause; appr opriately to the r esp onsibility discourse—“w e tr y to find the culprit”—what
1
In fact, this article was spurr e d by author’s inv olv ement in training for deinstitutionalisation in one of
such institutions—situate d in Črna na K or oškem, Northern Slo v enia, adjacent to the A ustrian b or der . The
issue of r esp onsibility “p opp e d-up ” whene v er ther e was some kind of obstacle for doing things differ ently .
This r e quir e d a thor ough thought ab out the v er y notion.

150 F laker
pr o duces the p o w er of r esp osibilisation. W e use r ele vant the or etical concepts and practical
e xamples to unearth it. Among the or etical concepts, most valuable se em to b e of the
Goffmanian tradition—the y ar e pr o ductiv e in such a de construction of interaction, b oth in
institution as w ell in public spaces. W e also emplo y Castel’s ( 1976 ) tr eatise of guar dianship
and Deleuze and Guattari ( 1972 , 1980 ) notions of machinic assemblages and stratification of
action.
On the other hand, the discussion is anchor e d in the r eality of institutions and deinstitu-
tionalisation. It draws fr om it and fe e ds in it. Examples form institutional life , community
car e and also fr om e v er y day life ar e use d sometimes just as illustrations, but often also
to test the validity of abstract conceptual considerations. In this, the e xamples ar e also
instructiv e—the y pr o vide the idea ho w to organise the issues of r esp onsibility in situations
of teamw ork, p ersonal planning and of ke y w orkers. This giv es a complementar y pr ogram-
matic dimension to other wise critical discussion. Hence , also the tone of the pap er , which,
although analytic, often mo v es into essayistic mo de , pr o viding some r elief and amusement,
but also bit of fr e e dom to e xplor e , e xpr ess and play . Aphorisms encourage meaningful
action.
2
2. Resp onsibility with no r esp onse
Resp onsibility is primarily a function of formal organisations. Ho w e v er , it is also a notion
app earing in the e v er y day interactions. In the first instance it is ab out tasks, r oles, com-
p etences, etc., in e v er y day life this w or d is often utter e d as a r esentment, r epr oach for not
p erforming something (in the right way ), for not fulfilling the other party’s e xp e ctations
as the y ar e , although implicitly , define d in a kinship , partnership , friendship or w ork r e-
lationship . The y ar e v oice d as a warning—usually ab out the fact that in an interaction in
hand other issues hav e to b e obser v e d apart fr om those happ ening then and ther e . When a
wife , for e xample , complains to her husband that he is not a “r esp onsible father” , she is not
mer ely bringing attention to a concr ete mishap , but is e v oking, although indeterminate , a
general notion of what a father should b e .
Always, when w e encounter the notion of r esp onsibility—b e it in the institutional
dealings, interaction of staff or in interaction with r esidents and their r elativ es—a tr ouble
of a K afkaesque sort arises. The r esp onsibility is namely a v er y comple x concept, with a
multitude of meanings, mostly such that pr esupp ose some virtual instance , usually a set of
them, that w e ne e d to obser v e in our conduct. W e kno w that some one in a certain situation
e xp e cts something, but w e do not kno w who (to whom w e ar e r eally r esp onsible) as w e do
not kno w what e xactly is e xp e cte d. The notion of r esp onsibility se emingly pr o vides clarity ,
but in fact nests confusion.
T o assume that r esp onsibility means, what the w or d could imply—a “ capacity or aptitude
to r esp ond” w ould not b e corr e ct. Ho w e v er , ther e w er e attempts to r e define the term in
this way , for instance , in the humanistic psy chology (Frankl, Perls). A scribing the meaning
2
The pap er do es not follo w the standar d article form; ho w e v er , it do es not de viate fr om it v er y much. It
do es establish a line of thought, but not in a linear fashion. It starts with e xp osition—pr o viding the conte xt
(institutions and deinstitutionalisation) and rationale of it (r emo ving the r esp onsibility as an obstacle for
meaningful action). The main te xt is split into tw o parts. First is de dicate d to scrutinisation of the term, it
is analytic and critical. The se cond, in part maintains such a p ersp e ctiv e , but simultane ously mo v es into a
mor e de ontological dir e ction of transformativ e practice . Thus, w e do not arriv e at some final summarising
conclusion but se ek to pr o vide dir e ction of change ranging fr om a v er y concr ete engagements of a ke y w orker
to the general imp erativ es of action. W e want to stir and ste er the action, and not mer ely stake the territor y
by defining its meaning.

A maze of r esp onsibility 151
of “r esp onse-ability” should b e se en as an attempt to subv ert the meaning of the concept
that is r eally a concept of dominance , as a r esistance to an indeterminate authoritarianism.
Ho w e v er , this attempt is also a psy chologization of this other wise so cial and legal categor y .
A s a pun or a psy chological e xp eriment, although misplace d, it could b e pr o ductiv e . It r esists
the “ dep ersonalisation” that the term other wise implies—mainly in delegation, r elegation,
undertaking r esp onsibility and forming endless chains of it. A notion that is other wise
in K afka’s way subje ct-less, in this way r estor es the subje ctivity of the actor , at least for
a moment. Although only as an illusion, it fr e es the actor fr om the sub or dination to an
indeterminate will of the other .
The act of r esp onding automatically intr o duces a syntax of sub or dination. The one
asking has the initiativ e , as the white pie ces do in chess. Simultane ously , it also means
that the sub or dinate d should not “answ er back” , meaning that he or she should not hav e
an opinion of her or his o wn, should not contest the authority . T o “r esp ond” is ther efor e
an offence against the r esp onsibility . But to b e Black is OK, says A dorján ( 1989 ), a famous
Hungarian chess play er , kno wn for his victories with black pie ces. For him, this also means
the struggle against apartheid, including the one he e xp erience d himself and fought against
as an activist for the rights of users of psy chiatr y .
The v erb “to r esp ond” is usually understo o d as a sp e e ch act when some one p oses a
question, or an act, a mo v e that follo ws an act or a mo v e of the other (r esp ond to a phone
call); sometimes it e v en r efers to a r eb ellious gestur e by one sub or dinate d. The meaning of
a duty or an obligation: “to b e r esp onsible ” for someb o dy or something and to someb o dy or
something comes only se condarily . The dictionar y defines the noun “r esp onsibility” with
no r efer ence to the basic meaning of the v erb “to r esp ond” or to the noun “r esp onse ” .
The common denominator of dictionar y definitions of “r esp onsibility” (Inštitut za slo v en-
ski jezik Frana Ramo vša, n.d. ; Merriam- W ebster , n.d. ) is in fact an absence of pr e cisely the
act of r esp onding (to a question, a mo v e). This basic meaning in the Slo v enian dictionar y
is substitute d by e xplanations base d on r elations to norm, obligation, conse quences (neg-
ativ e), accountability , car efulness and obligation; it cites it as a synonym for “task” and
“ obligation” .
3
In the concept of r esp onsibility Slo v ene language ( as English and others)
takes away , subtracts fr om the act of r esp onding the v er y essence of such an action, its
imme diate and actual r efle xivity—r esp onsiv eness to concr ete de e ds, e v ents. Refle xivity of
categor y of r esp onsibility is only indir e ct and virtual. It r efers to the norms, demands and,
e v en when it is “ one ’s o wn” or a p ersonal r esp onsibility , to the p otential conse quences,
that will only subse quently app ear . It is a “r eaction of the self” to something that do es not
y et e xist ( conse quences) or to indeterminate and incorp or eal instances, which e xp e ct, or
usually demand, something due to the norms ( and not deriv e d fr om one ’s o wn acts). Besides
the (pr escrib e d) acts it demands fr om its subje ct (the obje ct subje cte d to it) an ap ologetic
r eaction, justification, concern and car efulness.
4
The notion of r esp onsibility as it is define d in the dictionar y ther efor e establishes a
virtual domain (that plugs the b ear er of the r esp onsibility into the abstract disp ositiv es
of sub or dination) and puts a p erson into a priori subje cte d p osition. A s such, the notion
3
The English offer of synonyms is e v en mor e brutal: it is synonymous with either “blame ” ( accountability ,
liability ) or “ obligation” ( duty , ne e d, bur den, commitment; Merriam- W ebster , n.d. ).
4
The latter part of the e xp e cte d or demande d usually takes place in a form of an inner , silent dialogue with
the instance of authority . It b e comes loud when it is a r e v olt against such an instance , a dissent – that b e comes
authentic r esp onding, challenging the p o w er—or , when the sanctions ar e p ending, when a dormant authority
sends its env o ys or valets and demand—a r esp onse . In this moment r esp onsibility r emains still virtual, but the
actual cir cumstance radically change—as it is in the case of prison conviction or placement in an institution.

152 F laker
of r esp onsibility is not primarily a concept of a—psy chological, so ciological or so cial—
interaction, but primarily a p olitical, legal or legal-e conomic categor y .
Resp onsibility is a pr e dicate categor y in the sense that it determines acts or qualifies
e v ents. It is determine d as such by its tw o de dicate d obje cts—and not by the syntactical
subje ct, which w e hav e sho wn to b e just a simulacrum—primarily to whom or to what ,
and also for whom or for what w e ar e r esp onsible . Ther e is no par ental r esp onsibility if
ther e ar e no childr en. Ther e is no r esp onsibility of a ke y w orker if ther e is no r esp onsibility
for the user’s w ellb eing, for accomplishing the goals set by the user and for the effort for
ackno wle dgement of the user’s will. Ho w e v er , the obje ct for which ( or whom) w e ar e
r esp onsible , establishes only the basis of a typ e of r esp onsibility . Its finality is determine d
by the instance that w e ar e r esp onsible to . This is the pr e dicate value of r esp onsibility . A s
par ents w e ar e r esp onsible principally to the childr en ( and r efle xiv ely to ourselv es as par ents),
ho w e v er , concurr ently w e ar e r esp onsible to the health authorities—to bring childr en for
vaccination, scho ol authorities—for childr en to learn a song and do their home w ork, etc. A s
ke y w orkers w e ar e in the first place r esp onsible to the user , but w e ar e r esp onsible also to
our team—not to adapt the user’s conduct to the demands of the team, but to adv o cate the
user’s will, amplify her or his v oice so it gets hear d. The first obje ct—for whom or what w e
ar e r esp onsible—pr o vides the basis ( substance) of r esp onsibility , the se cond—to whom or
what w e ar e r esp onsible—pr o vides the form and the sense , dir e ction.
3. For whom or what ar e w e r esp onsible?
3.1. A cts
In e v er y day thinking, w e usually think, accor ding to the spirit of capitalism (W eb er ), that
w e ar e taking r esp onsibility for our acts. Mainly and ideally , for the acts that ar e a r esult
of conscious de cisions— conscious acts . This op ens tw o strings of questions, one is on the
differ ence of the de cision and the act, the other on the issue of a “ conscious act” .
The de cision can schematically and ideally b e describ e d as a choice of tw o or mor e
alternativ e conducts. The de cision is an act—of de ciding. Ho w e v er , it is an inner act, not
y et dir e ctly changing the outer r eality , a virtual act that is only to b e follo w e d by an actual
conduct. The de cision to make a pur chase is not y et a pur chase , a de cision to visit some one
is not y et paying the visit.
A de cision, as an inner act, is always negativ e—as the literal meaning of the w or d
“ de cision” implies—it negates, cuts off the unchosen alternativ es. When a de cision b e comes
an actual act, its negativ e , e xcluding pr op erty b e comes de cisiv e . The fact is, that w e can b e
so v er eign in our de cisions only when w e de cide to not do something. For de ciding to do
something, w e ne e d co op eration, inv olv ement of others. A s individuals, w e can only de cide
not to hav e a baby , to hav e one w e ne e d a partner ( or alternativ ely , an adoption ser vice or
me dical r epr o duction supp ort); w e can only de cide autonomously not to go to a party , for
going to a party ther e ne e ds to b e a party . Ev en for solitar y acts like solitair e w e ne e d car ds,
for writing a p en or a computer; e v en for se emingly totally autonomous acts like taking a
walk, w e ne e d some wher e to take it, which is for an inmate of an isolation cell or tie d to the
b e d only a thinkable luxur y .
De cision making is a rational act. Ho w e v er , as a pur ely rational act ( of thinking), it
could ne v er b e transforme d into an actual action. One may de cide on the alternativ es, then
de cide to enact the de cision, then to enact it r eally , then to do it in the near futur e , then to
do it e v en so oner etc. T o bridge , to jump o v er this infinitesimal gap , to do it no w , ther e must
b e an act of v olition, the will. So , is it the will that pr op els the de cision and its enactment,
wher ein the r esp onsibility lies?

A maze of r esp onsibility 153
Another way of staging acts consciously is planning ( a matter of utmost imp ortance
in car e pr o vision). P lanning is, as opp ose d to mer e de cision making, an activity full of
the intention and will. It also takes place in a ho dological space (Le win, 1951 ) in a rather
rhizomatic manner (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980 ) in contrast to arb or escent binar y de cision
on a se emingly homogenise d plane . In the practice of p ersonal planning, that w e hav e
de v elop e d (Brandon & Brandon, 1994 ; F laker et al., 2013 ; O’Brien & O’Brien, 2000 ; Rafaelič
et al., 2013 ; Škerjanc, 1997 ) setting goals is the basic, piv otal featur e , the hinges, on which
the activity of planning r e v olv es.
One of the main differ ences b etw e en de ciding and setting goals is that de ciding is a
r eactiv e de e d and setting goals pr oactiv e . De cision making do es not cr eate anything ne w .
It is primarily a r esp onse to e xisting options, a choice of pr e-e xisting e xistence . Setting
goals is mor e than cho osing alternativ es, it is their cr eation. It is a pr o duct of desir e and
not primarily of r eason (r eason without the desir e is just a contemplation of the w orld;
r easonable conduct is mor e-or-less a r efle ction of the supp ose d “r eality”). In this, the desir e is
not b e something that is situate d b efor ehand just in a p erson, an individual, but in machinic
conne ctions with other( s) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 ).
In e v er y day life , de cision making and goals setting ar e interlace d—but still not the same .
Ho w e v er , it is clear that the issue of r esp onsibility in setting the goals do es not arise as
bluntly as in de cision making. The o wner of the plan do es, with the act of planning, in fact
assume the r esp onsibility for his or her life and its course (not so much for single acts). This
r esp onsibility is an e xistential one . A ctual r esp onsibilities, in the ambiance of the plan, lie
with those who take up the tasks liste d in a p ersonal plan. Hence , the y ar e , for their o wn
acts, tasks, r efle xiv ely r esp onsible to the o v erall scheme (not the o wner ). For setting up
the plan r esp onsibility is with the o wner and his or her will, for enacting it is a colle ctiv e
r esp onsibility of all inv olv e d.
Wher e ther e is no , at least partially , conscious de cision, then it not an act but rather an
e v ent . Ev ents happ en, the y ar e not b eing done ( but w e can cr eate them?). Natural e v ents,
for which w e do not b elie v e to b e the making of deities, ar e no-one ’s r esp onsibility . An
inv oluntar y (mind-less) action has a similar status—ther e is no crime if ther e is no subje ct
of a criminal act. This lack of subje ctivity is classically fille d in by psy chiatr y (Castel, 1976 ;
T or esini, 2014 ). In e v er y day minor “natural e v ents” , such as hiccups, sne ezing, farting, etc.
the r esp onsibility for them is she d by ap ologising and distancing fr om embarrassing acts,
inserting a differ ence b etw e en the (natural) e v ent and the p erson (Goffman, 1963a ); or by
co v ering the act ( like in the childr en’s game of “taxi” Sluckin, 1981 ). Betw e en the conscious
acts with consciously intende d conse quences and the “natural” e v ents ther e is whole gr e y
zone of what could b e terme d accidents, with unintende d conse quences for which w e could
b e calle d r esp onsible .
In terms of acts, the notion of r esp onsibility is usually , tie d to task and duties—ther efor e
to the acts that hav e b e en commissione d, or der e d, the acts that w e ar e not subje cts of, only
agents, e xe cutors of. This leads to the se cond question of “T o whom or to what ar e w e
r esp onsible?” (T o b e dealt with a little later .)
3.2. Things
The se cond class or r egister of what w e can b e r esp onsible for ar e things and p e ople . (It is
still ab out acts—ab out what w e do with the things and the p e ople). Obje cts of a corp or eal e x-
istence ( spatially determinable and finite b o dies), w e can manipulate and, mor e imp ortantly ,
appr opriate and o wn. Appr opriation could b e se en as one of the constitutiv e elements of
the r esp onsibility , as the notion of pr op erty is b eing constitute d primarily as a r esp onsibility

154 F laker
to the other .
If an obje ct is meant for p ersonal use only , i.e ., has only the use value and is a p ersonal
pr op erty , parado xically , the o wnership of the obje ct absolv es the o wner of r esp onsibility
to the other and also to the obje ct. What one do es with such an obje ct is e xclusiv ely a
p erson’s pr er ogativ e and is not anyb o dy else ’s concern. Ho w e v er , in the consumerist,
hyp er-pr o ductiv e so ciety w e hav e b e come r esp onsible e v en for the obje cts that w e do not
o wn any mor e—for the waste and se wage .
Resp onsibility for an obje ct app ears when an e xchange value is ascrib e d to it. Pr o ducer
and v endor ne e d to pr o vide warranties for the obje ct the y offer on the market. In such a
case , the pur chaser’s r esp onsibility is in the corr e ct handling of the obje ct (for making a
warranty claim)—or the r esp onsibility is a r e quir ement of an e xternal authority—a motor
v ehicle must b e te chnically imp e ccable to b e use d on the public r oads.
External r esp onsibility to the other ther efor e arises when w e use , handle or in any
way disp ose of the pr op erty which is subje ct to a certain claim by others. The categor y of
r esp onsibility arises fr om the ne cessar y conditions of alienation and pr op erty .
When r esp onsibility is ab out the issues that do not hav e a corp or eal e xistence , such
as: a state of things, situations, r elations, w e ar e in strife . On one hand ther e is no doubt
that w e ar e at least partially r esp onsible for situations and r elationships, in which w e take
part, on the other the v er y incorp or eality of these “ entities” pr e v ents their handling and
determinate appr opriation. T o b e able to do so , w e ne e d to r eify , obje ctify them in one way
or another . Reification or obje ctification is thus a subse quent condition of generating the
r esp onsibility . The incorp or eal obje cts ar e obje ctifie d primarily by w or ds, but also other
designations and signs that enable the metonymy of an act, a constellation or a r elationship .
T ransp ort is not a thing, but it can b e transforme d into an e xchange value obje ctifie d by the
kilometr es driv en, or ticket issue d, which will r epr esent or e v en measur e it.
Resp onsibility for acts, and also situations, r elations and states, is deriv e d fr om their
effe cts. Ho w e v er , the r esp onsibility is a measur e of their negativ e effe cts or conse quences of
the acts. Negativ e—either when the y ar e concerne d to b e “bad”—for us and e v en mor e so
for others—or b e cause of the absence of e xp e cte d acts and their outcomes. For pr o ducts,
victories, achie v ements and successes w e ar e praise d, while for failur es, losses and defeats
w e ar e r esp onsible . Resp onsibility is thus an antipr o ductiv e , a losers’ categor y—and the
loss ( or hazar d of a loss) is its subse quent condition. (Resp onsibility , arising b efor e the
unwante d e v ent, intr o ducing the p otential loss, is a warning of loss. It pr e v ents the loss and
so us fr om b e coming losers. Ho w e v er , the antipr o ductiv e note of r esp onsibility lies in its
defensiv eness—w e ar e so scar e d of losing that w e cease to b e inter esting in winning.)
3.3. Pe ople
When the issue of r esp onsibility is ab out p e ople , all these transp ositions liste d—r eification,
alienation and pr op erty , loss or negativ e conse quences ne e d to b e p erforme d. Pe ople hav e
their b o dies, but also hav e their o wn will. Re duction of p e ople to things thus implies a
r emo val of their will or subje cting their will to the will of the one who takes r esp onsibility
o v er them. Loss of the will also constitutes the condition of r esp onsibility .
The condition of will-lessness is ne cessar y in taking r esp onsibility for p e ople , but it is
valid also in the other domains constituting the r esp onsibility liste d ab o v e . In situations and
r elationships, the will e xists. A situate d will is b eing assemble d—not only as a r esultant for ce
of wills of participants, but also fr om the contingencies, materials, schemes that op erate
in them. Things that hav e their o wn (p otential) for ce and p o w er , in contact with a human
b eing, acquir e something like will, intention and p o w er—this is obvious in machines. A

A maze of r esp onsibility 155
car has the intention and p o w er of fast mo v ement. A s a de vice , it is also “r esp onsible ” for
an accident r esulting fr om e xcessiv e sp e e d. Ho w e v er , w e do not ascrib e the r esp onsibility
for an accident to a car , but to the p erson b ehind the ste ering whe el. When the issue of
r esp onsibility arises in machinic assemblages, legal discourse ne e ds to find the r esp onsible
subje ct (usually human, individual). If the subje ct is not found, the accident is describ e d
then as an e v ent and not an act. It is not a criminal act or an offence , it is an accident. This
could b e the case of r elie ving anyb o dy of the r esp onsibility . In the institutionalise d settings
though, this is a case for installing guar dianship . Guar dianship , a surr ogate r esp onsibility ,
ho w e v er , do es not r elie v e the pr otégé of the r esp onsibility , it doubles it in a Catch 22 like
fashion. Both compliance with rules and e xp e ctations or transgr ession of them confirm the
ne e d of a guar dian.
5
The Figur e 1 depicts the ramifications of the pr op ositions of “for whom or what” of
r esp onsibility . In this constellation ther e ar e also dynamic items pr o viding interaction
b etw e en the div erse typ es of r esp onsibilities (their effe ct is marke d with the r e d arr o ws). The
“acts” pr o vide the notion of negativ e conse quences, which fe e ds into also in the r esp onsibility
for “things” ( b o dies). These , in turn, ar e effe cte d by the obje ctifying for ce stemming of
obje cts and affe cting the transformation of the p e ople and situations into obje cts.
Figur e 1. For what or whom r esp onsibility
These tw o for ces effe ct the “r esp onsibility” under certain conditions that w e hav e found
in each element of b eing r esp onsible for . When considering r esp onsibility for acts, w e
found loss (negativ e conse quences), with things w e found alienation, in situations and
r elationships r eification, in r esp onsibility for p e ople r emo val of will, and e v ents hav e le d us
to the issue of ascribing.
W e hav e e xtracte d liste d conditions of r esp onsibility fr om individual elements of “r esp on-
5
Heller’s ( 1961 ) classic no v el, Catch-22, humor ously e xplor es the pr e dicaments and absur dities face d
by a gr oup of militar y airmen during W orld W ar II. Within the stor y , a “Catch-22” r efers to an imaginar y
militar y r egulation that, thr ough its contradictor y logic, all ser vice memb ers ar e comp elle d to follo w . The
term “Catch-22” has since b e come widely kno wn, symb olising a no-win situation characterise d by illogical
and cir cular r easoning.

156 F laker
Figur e 2. Conditions of r esp onsibility
sibility for” (Figur e 2 ). Ho w e v er , w e can state , at least tentativ ely , that these ar e univ ersal
conditions ne cessar y for constituting r esp onsibility for anything ( and any one). In other
w or ds, to constitute r esp onsibility ther e ne e ds to b e a thr eat of a loss, the item has to b e
alienate d at least so it concerns others, it has to acquir e characteristics of a thing at disp osal,
has to hav e its will r emo v e d and has to pr o vide a p ossibility for r esp onsibility to b e ascrib e d
to someb o dy .
Such a constellation of serial conditions of r esp onsibilisation can b e illustrate d by a
typical e xample of a p erson missing fr om an institution. The act of walking out is se en
as a “loss” . The assumption is that the walker-out will get lost, hence installing the loss
in his act literally ( and emphasising the negativ e conse quences such as p otential abuse ,
getting cold)—and negle cting the achie v ements of such an act as, for instance enhancing
autonomy , getting to kno w the envir onment, ne w p e ople , b eing able to ask for help . By
pr o claiming it as a “non warrante d leav e-taking” it is alienate d fr om the actor ( b e comes
the matter to b e attende d by others) and the situation is b eing r eifie d, transforme d out of
an or dinar y de e d of e .g. “going to do shopping” , “getting some fr esh air” into a thing, an
obje ct r e quiring r eaction of the authority . By ascribing this e v ent to p erson’s fallacy ( by
naming it “ dementia” , “pr ofound intelle ctual disability” , etc.) the human walking out ( e xit)
will is negate d and r emo v e d and the guar dianship o v er it str engthene d ( and the walker in
fact punishe d by further curtailment of his fr e e dom).
6
4. T o whom or what ar e w e r esp onsible?
This question has many mor e answ ers to it than the pr e vious one . The y ar e , as w e can se e
in the figur e b elo w , also mor e comple x ( complicate d by taking up , r elegating and accepting
r esp onsibility ). On the other hand, the y ar e mor e easily simplifie d, r e duce d to typical
r elations of r esp onsibility . The y can b e r e duce d to b eing r esp onsible to us or to others ,
that r esp onsibility is distribute d do wn and up the hierar chic ladders (the later division is
6
N.B. the or der or app earance of the conditions is usually not as linear as the telling of it. It is mor e cir cular
or e v en rhizomatic—enhancing each other . For e xample , ascribing the walk out to dementia transforms the
act into e v ent, automatically r emo ving the p ersons will and making it amenable to r eification and alienation.

A maze of r esp onsibility 157
r epr esente d in the Figur e 3 by a pr o visional r e d cutting line).
Figur e 3. T o whom or what w e ar e r esp onsible
When w e ar e r esp onsible to sup eriors, ther e is a differ ence b etw e en the r esp onsibility
w e b ear to concr ete b osses and to imp ersonal instances. This differ ence establishes a
qualitativ e differ ence in the character of r esp onsibility—of b eing p ersonal or imp ersonal.
This significantly affe cts the natur e of inter change b etw e en the b ear ers of the r esp onsibility .
If it is a p ersonal one , it is easier to contradict, complain or e v en defy it. Imp ersonal instances
ar e the way to make r esistance sterile . When sup eriors quote ruleb o oks, insp e ctions, higher
authorities, etc., the y mask their actual e xp e ctations or demands that the y ar e imp osing
by such claims. The victims of r esp onsibilisation ar e , by this mano euvr e , pr e v ente d fr om
activ ely contesting the actual inter est of the sup erior .
In the public ser vices and r egar ding public matters w e ar e r esp onsible to the public—not
only in p olitics, always when w e do something in the public inter est. Ho w e v er , the public

158 F laker
is to o general a term, not easy to define . It is a general abstraction, but also a concept
describing an infinite happ ening. The public is ne v er a finite numb er of p e ople , ther e is
always a ne xt memb er of the public who may join. It is akin, if not identical, to the notion of
a “sublime community” that w e found ne cessar y to affirm the imp erativ e of non-e xclusion
(F laker , 2016a , 2016b ).
Although ther e may b e a sense of public b eing sup er or dinate d, it is not so in principle .
The public is a demo cratic concept, it is an egalitarian set and setting for e v er yb o dy . Ho w e v er ,
in it, in the concept and the r eality , ther e tend to app ear endorse d r epr esentativ es of the
public. The r epr esentation striates an other wise smo oth space , it cr eates virtual segments
o v er the r eal public surfaces, alco v es hiding the doings of r epr esentativ es—fr om the public
vie w . A court, a tribunal is a major such r epr esentativ e of the public inter est, sp e cialise d in
the issues of r esp onsibility . And, it is “ e xtraterritorial”—it cr eates a territor y outside the r eal
public space and separate d fr om other branches of authority .
A s a r epr esentation of public, community is a mor e concr ete , y et still v er y abstract
notion. In small to wns, for instance , e v er ything happ ens “in the public gaze ”—a limite d set
of audience figur es as a univ ersal public. A community can b e define d either as a commu-
nion —p e ople coming together for common matters—or as an audience —just happ ening to
watch—a sho w that is stage d for them. The deinstitutionalisation should bring these tw o
asp e cts of the community together , into a double and mutual r esp onsibility of a community
and an institution situate d in it b e coming one and the same instance , b e coming an actor
and an audience . T o the community w e should b e r esp onsible not only v ertically—also
horizontally .
Opp osite to sup er or dinate d so cial structur es ar e lo cate d those , which ar e the base of our
action, those which delegate r esp onsibility to us, for something to b e done for them and, by
this, b eing r esp onsible to them—like functionaries ar e in the first place r esp onsible to the
memb ers of an asso ciation. In the issue of r esp onsibility , w e ne e d to distinguish b etw e en
the base , in which r esp onsibility is solidar y , ther efor e colle ctiv e and undivide d,
7
and the
base , in which r esp onsibility is individual ( and chain-serial), as it is a case in the ser vice
r esp onsibility . Both b eing of substantial imp ortance for our discussion.
On one side , it is imp ortant that our w ork has a mandate fr om the community , that w e
ser v e it and not some alienate d so cial segment, its authority . On the other side it is also
imp ortant that w e pr eser v e the v er y basic and essential element and moment of w orking
with p e ople , which is base d on the ser vice mo del , in which the r esp onsibility is forme d
primarily in r elation of the pr ofessional to the ser vice user (Goffman, 1961 ), in the classic
ser vice parlance—a client.
When the r esp onsibility is mo delle d in ser vice manner it is a double r esp onsibility—
sp e cifically , w e ar e r esp onsible to a user , who is also a commissioning instance; generally , as
pr ofessionals, w e ar e r esp onsible to the pr ofession. Pr ofession is not a “ calling” ( v o catio ) fr om
ab o v e , as in e cclesiastic, r eligious callings. In “lib eral” pr ofessions it is a v o w (“pr ofess”)
to ser v e the community accor ding to the ethics of the pr ofession (F laker , 2006 ). This
v o w functions also as a warranty for the user that pr ofessionals will p erform their w ork
pr ofessionally , in accor dance with the pr ofessional ethics. Also , that the y ar e op erating
on the basis of the “tariff system” and do not charge for their ser vices on the basis of the
market logic of offer and demand (not e xploiting the user’s distr ess to raise the ser vice fe e).
7
Solid, indivisible is the linguistic r o ot of the term solidarity , which was originally a legal term addr essing
the issue of colle ctiv e r esp onsibility , and only then transp ose d by the w orking-class mo v ements in to a so cial
and p olitical concept ( later taken up also by the chur ch and the state).

A maze of r esp onsibility 159
Betw e en the solidar y community and serial client base r esp onsibility ther e is a com-
plementar y , but also conflictual r elation. The conflict can app ear b etw e en the gr oup and
individual desir es, as it is often addr esse d in teamw ork (F laker , 1996 ), wher e a r ole of ke y-
w orker can surmount the contradiction b etw e en what is go o d for the gr oup and what is
imp ortant for a p erson. Fr om the p oint of vie w of the ser vice mo del (Goffman, 1961 ) the
r esp onsibility of the pr ofessional to the community can b e a hindrance ( de viation) to the
ser vice r elationship . A s it often happ ens when r elativ es, neighb ours e xert pr essur e on the
ser vice and ar e thus actually commissioning the pr ofessional w ork—to b e p erforme d up on
the user . The tw o settings of the pr ofessional r esp onsibility can b e come complementar y for
the most part ( and p erhaps only in this case) when the pr ofessional assumes an adv o cacy
r ole , that is, when the user defines the ser vice as a to ol for changing the so cial tissue of the
community .
4.1. T o b e r esp onsible to oneself?
Re vie wing the sup er or dinate d instances to which w e b ear r esp onsibility w e encounter e d a
(K afkaesque) difficulty of obscurity of instances and general natur e of categories. When w e
take up the question of the r esp onsibility to oneself , our torment is of the same intensity . The
concept of the self is actually v er y concr ete in its manifestation, is still a labyrinth—har d to
get ar ound.
Resp onsibility to oneself can b e ( and it is) r esp onsibility to one ’s o wn values—b e it our
principles, like no wadays Health, pr ofessional ethics and stance—or some other matter .
Ho w e v er , it is usually ab out the transmitte d values, the matters transcending the actual
situation, in which w e act. This transcendence negates the r efle xivity of the situation at
hand, and by this also the virtue of the self. Internalise d values may form our p ersonality ,
p ersona, character , but not ne cessarily affe ct our selv es —what w e actually e xp erience w e ar e .
The r esp onsibility to oneself can b e rather sought and found in the consistency of action,
this effe ctiv ely mirr ors our values and r eally r efle cts the situational challenges.
The fact that r esp onsibility to the self is r efle cte d and e v en e xpr esse d in the interaction
with others, brings us on the track of r esp onsibility to near ones—fello w memb ers of a
household, kinship , friendship . In terms of pr o ximity , these ar e close to each other and
connate , ho w e v er , their milieu is differ ent. In households the r esp onsibility is e xpr essly
one of solidarity . All memb ers ar e r esp onsible for e v er ything b elonging to a household,
o wnership is communal. (Pr e cisely this constitutes pr oblems of r esp onsibility in gr oup
homes, since the communally use d pr op erty is not o wne d by its memb ers but by the
organisation running it—it is not a common pr op erty , o wne d by the r esidents.
8
)
Kinship , not b ound to the same household anymor e , has, ho w e v er , inherite d some
of this kind of logic. But its solidarity is not as compact and is also , not unlike feudal
r esp onsibility , segmente d. The household e xp erience is situational, b ound to a common
space , the kinship e xp erience is b ound to the netw ork of r elativ es and lineages and our
place in it. Resp onsibility to the friends is not b ound neither to the space nor to the
pr e establishe d ties—it is a luxur y of r esp onsibility . It is simultane ously an e xceptionally
8
Her e , w e r efer to the practical, actual o wnership , which is not ne cessarily a legal one . For e xample ,
tenancy , lease , r enting ar e instruments that warrant temp orar y use-o wnership , although the nominal o wner
of the pr op erty r emains the legal holder of the pr op erty right. Ho w e v er , the gr oup home r esidents do not
enjo y such a right. The y ar e not tenants in the flat, the y ar e guest, just r esidents, users. Practically , this means
that cannot use the space ( and what b elongs to the space) fr e ely within a lease contracts, but ar e subje cts to
continuous r egimentation of the o wner of the place (the organisation running it).

160 F laker
str ong r esp onsibility and a less binding one . Bound to the will of participants—not by a
contract—but by a friendship commitment, co v enant.
Resp onsibility to the close ones is, of course , a r esp onsibility to the other , but a r efle xiv e
one . By this r efle xiv e virtue , it b e comes r esp onsibility to oneself. It is r efle xiv e in the
construction of a self. In the inter- a ction , mutual action, w e e xp erience ourselv es as an
activ e agent ( a subje ct of action). The manifestation of r esp onsibility is in the imme diate
e xp erience of acting, doing ( and e xisting). This e xp erience is enable d by the matter that w e
act up on (fe eling of mo v ement, emotion, thought, etc.) as w ell as in the r e cognition of the
v er y action, de e d as our o wn.
9
The tragic virtue (pr op erty ) of the r esp onsibility is that at
the end y ou ar e always r esp onsible to y our o wn self.
Thus, w e can contend that r esp onsibility is a categor y of action. Ev en when it is ab out
things the notion of r esp onsibility intr o duces the p ossibility of handling, disp osing of
something, i.e ., doing something with things. Ho w e v er , it is e v en mor e so a contemplativ e
categor y . The r esp onsibility must b e discerne d and app er ceiv e d; often so that it is like wise
app er ceiv e d by others and r eturne d to the actor as something, a thing ( effe ct, r eifie d action
or situation), a matter of his or her r esp onsibility . This r eturn, r efle xion has a p erformativ e
p ostulate—a moral demand that w e must do something with this thing. The demand is not
deriv e d only fr om the situation at hand, fr om an encounter of tw o p e ople , it is a double
e v o cation, r efer ence to—outer authority , e .g., r elativ es of a r esident, insp e ctorate , guar dians;
and, to the p ossibility of a loss, a failur e .
This double r efer ence instigates a conduct, which is not r esp onding the situation at
hand, and is ther efor e constitute d away fr om the actual r esp onsibility in the encounter;
additionally , it can e v en susp end the r esp onsibility which the actor legalistically b ears. For
e xample , a legal guar dian ( and other participants in the situation) should, e v en though the y
ar e r esp onsible for de cisions, take into account ( b e r efle xiv e to) the will and desir es of the
pr otégé . Ho w e v er , this imp ortant, major part of r esp onsibility fades away in the face of
such r eferring and e v o cation—in fact, the r esp onsibility is defensiv e and r eactiv e to the
pr esume d, often implicit, authorities and negativ e conse quences.
9
Dr eams, as a way of thinking and fe eling, ar e also w ork ( dr eamw ork). In dr eams, w e do things, w e me et
p e ople , e xp erience them. When the y ar e intense , the y fe el imp ortant. Ho w e v er , in the contemp orar y rational
( Cartesian) civilisation, e v en though w e hav e dr eame d them, cr eate d them, w e hav e no sense of r esp onsibility
for them, for the e v ents in them, e v en for the actions that w e ourselv es hav e committe d in our dr eams. When
our dr eam action is not in line with our values, w e may hav e “a bad conscience ” ( or , on the contrar y , w e can b e
pr oud or happ y to hav e succe e de d in something), but w e do not she d the slightest notion of b eing r esp onsible .
Firstly , b e cause w e do not r egister dr eams as an act, but as an e v ent. Dr eams, including actions w e attribute
to ourselv es in them, happ en to us. W e ar e absolv e d of the r esp onsibility for the dr eams y et mor e by the
assumption that dr eams hav e no effe ct in e v er y day , interp ersonal r ealities. This assumption is quite justifie d,
but not entir ely . Certainly , it is not valid in the case of Martin Luther King’s “ dr eam” . His dr eam of e quality is
to b e understo o d primarily as a metaphor , but not only as such.
The r esp onsibility for dr eams is, ho w e v er , b eing taken in psy choanalysis when w e v erbalise ( and thus r eify )
and interpr et them. Ev en mor e radical, but also mor e fun, is taking r esp onsibility for dr eams in pr o cessing them
in the manner of Gestalt therap y or psy cho drama. In these practices, w e stage dr eams and thus “appr opriate ”
the parts of a dr eam that, in the v er y dr eams, w e hav e attribute d to others. In doing so , w e take r esp onsibility
for them—to ourselv es ( and the audience of the staging)—but still not in the r ealities of e v er y day life . A
step for war d, but in the opp osite dir e ction, is the cr eation of dr eams, a pr oactiv e attitude to war ds them. In
psy chosynthesis and similar orientations, as w ell as in some indigenous practices, dr eams hav e , most likely
justifiably , a colle ctiv e e xistence and ar e op en to a conscious action. Of course , in this r eality , which differs fr om
an e v er y day one , r esp onsibility is structur e d differ ently and is far fr om the concept of r esp onsibility addr essing
the r esp onsibility to others in the frame w orks of so cial hierar chy and the imp erativ e of r esp onsibility to war ds
the public discusse d ab o v e .

A maze of r esp onsibility 161
T o the sp e cific r esp onsibility , determine d by the frame of interaction with the close
ones, a general r esp onsibility to the fello w human b eing must b e adde d. Apart fr om a fuzzy ,
not pr o ductiv e and abstractly general p ostulate of humanity , this can b e an inv oluntar y ,
sp ontane ous r eaction to a p erson’s distr ess, as, for instance , when w e inter cept someb o dy in
the moment of falling. This is an imme diate r esp onse , b e y ond the conditions of r esp onsibility
liste d ab o v e . Hence , such acts should b e mor e appr opriately designate d as r esp onsiv eness ,
e v en though w e trace in them a “pr oto r esp onsibility” , a germ of r esp onsibility . Such a
r esp onse in ne v ertheless a moral one; e v en if inv oluntar y , or e v en unconscious, springing
out of mer e pr esence and not fr om any other r elation to a fello w human. But it is app er ceiv e d
as such only r etr osp e ctiv ely—w e ar e r esp onsible b e cause w e p erforme d the act, and w e did
not act b e cause w e ar e r esp onsible .
Discussing the issue of “to whom or what ar e w e r esp onsible ” , w e r oame d fr om the
r esp onsibility that w e b ear to those ab o v e to the one that w e r e ceiv e fr om b elo w . In the
latter , w e hav e identifie d the differ ence b etw e en the r esp onsibility to others and to oneself.
T w o basic r egisters of r esp onsibility hav e b e come appar ent. Resp onsibility is p er ceiv e d and
r e cor de d in the frame w ork constitute d by some e xternal, institutional system of rules, values,
so cial demands and r esp onses ( sanctions), which e xists indep endently fr om imme diate
e xchanges, ne v ertheless still setting them. Resp onsibility is b eing forme d r efle xiv ely also
on the plane of imme diacy , as an interactional phenomenon. If it is not sp onsor e d by
the interfaces of the former , w e can say that it is principally ab out r esp onsiv eness ( which
indicates the semantic differ ence b etw e en ho w w e le xically define “r esp onse ” , “r esp onding”
and the dictionar y meaning of their derivativ e—“r esp onsibility”). In the e v er y day interaction,
ho w e v er , the r egime of r efer ence of the r esp onsibility is mixe d. In r eferring to their o wn
or contesting the r esp onsibility of others, participants e v oke , as a token of imme diate
interaction, an e xternal frame , something that in fact in not an imme diate pr op erty of the
interaction at hand.
5. Deal with the de vil?
The r esp onsibility constitutes in part the contractual r elationship . The quid pr o quo —the
e xchange of go o ds and ser vices—something is giv en, and something r e ceiv e d in e xchange—
is the basis of such a r elationship . Since a contract is only y et a virtual e xchange , it has to
contain the r esp onsibility that the matter of the contract will b e r ealise d ( an d effe cte d in the
pr op er way , as the parties hav e had agr e e d).
A contractual r elationship is a basic one in the b ourge ois or der . While contractual
r elations ar e , in feudal or der , o v er co de d by the r esp onsibility in the hierar chy of r elationships,
the capitalistic so cial arrangement demands and enables, cr eates e quality of the participants
in such a r elationship . A dditionally , it giv es gr ound to the axiom of univ ersal r esp onsibility
of one ’s o wn action.
Still schematically , w e encounter tw o sets of difficulties. First, not all the r elations ar e
contractual—quite on the contrar y most of human interaction happ ens outside such a frame .
The se cond is that w e can form a contract that negates the v er y contractuality—a deal with
the de vil.
Among the r elations that escap e the frame of contractual r elations ther e ar e tw o cate-
gories r ele vant to our discussion. Ev er y day interaction or der in a public space (Goffman,
1963a , 1983 ) is base d on similar assumptions of e quality of p e ople and, of b ona fide , with
go o d faith to fello w humans that w e encounter . Ho w e v er , the e xchange is not prima facie
an e conomic one ( of e xchanging go o ds and ser vices), but one of e xchange of mutual r esp e ct
and ackno wle dgement of the other’s p ersonality , p ersona. Exchanges ar e of a cer emonial

162 F laker
kind and do not ne cessarily hav e an instrumental character .
Quite on the contrar y , pr onounce d instrumentality in r elationships like friendship ( a
higher and conv entional form of this kind of r elations), corrupts, damages the essence of
such a r elationship . The ne cessity of naiv ety and of go o d faith in an encounter e d human
b eing ar e p ertinent to the conception of interaction in a public space . Ho w e v er , it is amply
use d for their o wn gain by b eggars, str e et v endors and those chatting up girls ( or b o ys).
Mostly this is e xp erience d as an atavistic nuisance to the urban pacific, e v en though the
mo dern, b ourge ois public most pr obably e v olv e d out of me die val bazaars, which had skilfully
emplo y e d the mixtur e of familiar , public and e conomic natur e of human e xchanges.
On the other side , w e hav e a heap of asymmetric r elations that Tönnies ( 2002 ) describ es
as the basis of the community ( Gemeinschaft ) against the so ciety ( Gesellschaft ), which in
turn is base d on contractual r elations. A paradigmatic case of such r elations is the r elation
of par ents and childr en, in which some ar e giving and others getting. Such a guar dian,
custo dian r elation is notable , with, for our discussion, inessential variations, for all the
r elations of help and assistance .
Such r elations, as asymmetrical as the y ar e , still pr o vide gains for the parties inv olv e d.
For instance , w e could maintain that par ents get out of par entho o d e v en mor e than the
childr en (in the way of status, emotions, e v en materially ). Ho w e v er , the gains do not come
dir e ctly fr om the actual e xchange , the y ar e a calculus, differ ential of the r elation, a se condar y
b enefit deriv e d fr om the status differ ence . The intergenerational solidarity ( or e xchange)
establishes a corr e ction of such asymmetr y , but only indir e ctly , it is not an imme diate , actual
contractual r elation.
The stigma, which is define d by Goffman ( 1963b ) as a discr epancy b etw e en the virtual and
actual identity—b etw e en what a p erson should b e and what he or she actually is, is a notion
that conjoins b oth categories of r elations that escap e contractuality . It is a warning that a
p erson w e ar e dealing with is not capable of a symmetric interaction which the interaction
or der , although v er y lo osely , demands. In this, it automatically places the interactant into
a class of those , who should b e under some sort of guar dianship , sp onsorship . This, at
least partially , pr o vides a p ossibility to link to the r egister of contractual r elationships. By
disqualifying and discr e diting it pr ote cts the essence of the contractual r elationship , while
it pr o vides the discr e dite d with an indir e ct entrance via his or her r epr esentativ e , a patr on.
In the actual act of stigmatisation, the disqualification is a r eal act and effe ct, while
the option of indir e ct linking r emains a p otential outcome . So cial or der takes car e that
this happ ens almost automatically , that guar dianship o v er the discr e dite d is an automate d
so cial r esp onse . The outcast cannot e xist in the b ourge ois or der , in the conditions of global
capitalism ther e is no “no man’s land” , wher e lep ers could build their colony ( although
ther e ar e cracks in this or der which can b e inhabite d by a mo dern outcast—or mayb e b etter
p o dcasts; F laker , 1998 ).
The ne xt discor dant issue in entering into contractual r elationships is that it is often,
b esides the contract of tw o e qual parties, also a contract with the de vil—with some one , or
b etter something, that w e cannot b e e qual to . The app earance of an emplo yment contract
or of an agr e ement for ( v oluntar y ) placement into an institution is a contractual one—for
a certain amount of w ork I will b e getting a certain salar y , for a fe e I will get a r o of o v er
my head and some ser vices. Ho w e v er , by signing such a contract w e hav e signe d also to
a transmutation of a fr e e and e qual subje ct into a subje cte d one , one that has to ob e y the
house rules, submit to a hierar chy that p er vades such an inegalitarian space .
A ctually , such so cial spaces ar e e xce e dingly plentiful in comparison to those , in which
w e ar e actually e qual and fr e e . Spaces, in which pur e contractual r elations ar e p ossible ,

A maze of r esp onsibility 163
can b e found in the pur ely e conomic segment of so ciety . The e quity of r eal public spaces
( surfaces) do es not establish the contractual r elations. Ev en p olitical space , supp ose dly
demo cratic, is structur e d une qually and r e duces “the contract” to p erio dic ele ctions. The
e xisting safety fuses, me chanisms to pr e v ent a total withdrawal of contractual subje ctivity ,
can ne v er pr e clude at least “partial r emo val of contractual capacity” that ine vitably happ ens
up on entrance into so structur e d a space . This capacity can b e r einstate d completely only
by e xiting such an arrangement, by signing out. This in turn usually means that w e will go
and hir e out our lab our to y et another “ de vil”—or “to go on our o wn” .
Deinstitutionalisation can b e se en as an option for an e qualising e xit. It is a utopia of
p ossible so cial spaces, in which fr e e dom and e quality ar e p ossible and doable , in which the y
do not halt at the do orstep .
6. Deinstitutionalisation—negation of the negation of the r esp onsibility
Perhaps a little t o o hastily , w e will hav e a lo ok at the issue of r esp onsibility in the frame of
deinstitutionalisation. A first r efle x could b e to deinstitutionalise the r esp onsibility itself,
to negate its binding p o w er . In the same br eath w e will claim that deinstitutionalisation is
a pr o cess, in which p e ople finally r esume their r esp onsibility , lost by commitment to an
institution ( and often by concurr ent loss of legal capacity , by r elegation of r esp onsibility
to the legal guar dian). In other w or ds, the less a p erson can de cide on his or her actions,
disp ose of her things, b e an e qual participant in a situation, e xpr ess his or her will, the mor e
things ar e happ ening to her , the mor e she is pr e v ente d fr om doing, cr eating themself, ther e
is less opp ortunity to b e “r esp onsible ” ( or “ co-r esp onsible ”). Emancipation is a pr e condition
for taking up r esp onsibility .
When w e want to affirm r e-o wning of the r esp onsibility ther e is a surprising turn. W e
ne e d to negate all the conditions of r esp onsibility outline d ab o v e (Figur e 2 ):
A ct loss achie v ement, success
Thing alienation r eappr opriation, accent on the use value
Situations r eification humanisation
Pe ople r emo val of will e xpr ession of will
Ev ents ascribing describing ( destigmatisation—de dramatisation,
inter est).
A chie v ements and accomplishments ne e d to b e counterp ose d to the losses ( harm, danger
in the parlance of risk). Reappr opriation and insistence on the use value ne e d to contest
the alienation: humanisation must counter r eification ( of situations, a p erson). Remo val of
some one ’s will ne e ds to b e r eplace d by its e xpr ession. A scription of vile traits to p e ople ne e ds
to giv e way to destigmatisation—either banalisation, de dramatisation of the e v ent or genuine
inter est in it—hence a phenomenological appr oach ( ep o ché—bracketing of pr ejudices and
pr e compr ehension, describing instead of e xplaining and horizontal e quivalence of the
describ e d).
Another step that deinstitutionalisation ne e ds to take on the issue of r esp onsibility is a
shift fr om the virtual to the actual r esp onsibility (fr om its K afkaesque to a Po ohesque form of
e xpr ession). Fr om the r esp onsibility to virtual, sup er or dinate d instances to a r esp onsibility
to one ’s o wn base . The step ne e ds to b e taken to war ds r eaffirmation of the ser vice mo del so
that it b e comes fr e e , emancipate d fr om institutional schemes and mo v es fr om r epairing to
cr eating and enabling. This v er y emphasis on the cr eativity of a pr ofessional enables the
shift fr om the notion of r esp onsibility to r esp onsiv eness.
Affirmation of r esp onsibility in the frame of deinstitutionalisation is a parado x, but a

164 F laker
diale ctic one . It is a negation of the conditions of r esp onsibility , but in this, a negation of a
negation. The conditions of r esp onsibility de cipher e d ab o v e , ar e namely transformativ e—by
intr o ducing the significance of the negativ e conse quences the y transform acts, situations
and p e ople into ( quasi)corp or eal entities and thus negate their essence . The intention of
the deinstitutionalisation is ther efor e: r eanimation of these qualities, inspiring the soul
into things that hav e had lost it, humanisation and r eappr opriation of situations, making
e v ents or dinar y , e v er y day-like and, cr eation of a ne w , de cide dly mor e machinic, assemble d
subje ctivity . It is ther efor e a shift fr om abstract p ostulates to concr ete challenges, a diale ctic
mo v e that transmutes the elements of the classic r esp onsibility to b e come closer to e v er y day
life , mor e human, emp o w ering the p erson. Such an affirmation and transformation of
r esp onsibility ab olishes it as a disciplinar y me chanism, as a le v erage of contr ol—to the p oint
that it is b e coming questionable whether w e ar e still considering a r esp onsibility .
6.1. Resp onsibility of a ke y w orker
In the first place , a ke y w orker is r esp onsible for w ellb eing, w elfar e—a b etter life of a user .
What is in principle always true when w orking with p e ople , b e comes a leading imp erativ e
in the r ole of a ke y w orker . A s a general principle , it can b e arbitrarily moulde d by any
pr ofessional. Usually so that their r ole and r elation to the user ke ep b e coming mor e and
mor e custo dian and less and less adv o cating—since a mandate delegate d fr om ab o v e p ermits
the r ole definition, in which the pr ofessional “kno ws b etter” what is “go o d for the user”
and that the pr ofessional r esp onsibility to a user is understo o d in such a way . A ke y w orker
should not hav e such a wide space of mano euvr e .
For a ke y w orker , the mandate fr om a user is essential. It is usually accor de d in a p ersonal
plan. But this is not enough. A p ersonal plan is chiefly a matrix of thought dir e cting the
joint effort; it pav es a shar e d path. It is also an e xpr ession of the user’s will, ho w e v er , only a
do cument of it. A s such, it r emains virtual, something that has only to b e accomplishe d in
the actuality . The actual mandate has to b e cr eate d in an actual encounter of tw o p e ople;
in a mutual trust, r esp e ct, b ond, e v en a plot. Practically this means sincerity , quest and
cr eation of common values, which pr o vide the base for attachment. It means also the testing
of a ke y w orker—a user ne e ds to kno w that his or her ke y w orker is r eady to take a risk
gr eater than just doing her or his job , that he or she means something to the w orker as an
actual p erson and that he or she is r eady to “put in something e xtra” .
The main w ork that a ke y w orker ne e ds to p erform is the organisation of car e ( a p erson
centr e d one), to implement the p ersonal plan. The plan is a r esp onse to the p erson’s life
situation, but the r ole of the ke y w orker is also to r esp ond to sp e cific life situations, the
ne cessities that happ en while effe cting the plan and b e y ond. This is a differ ence b etw e en
a ke y w orker and a planner . The plan is a compr ehensiv e ( holistic) r esp onse to a p erson’s
situation. It is this virtual natur e of the plan that enables such compr ehensiv eness. Carr ying
out the plan, the task of a ke y w orker , ho w e v er , implies coping with an actual situation at
hand. This inv olv es the diale ctics b etw e en the imagine d and the r eal, it is testing the r eality ,
which always unearths issues that the ( virtual) plan did not nor could not hav e for ese en.
The w ork of a ke y w orker—the organisation and co or dination of all the tasks and
pr o viders the plan enlists, can b e se en as a ser vice—w ork done on the basis of user’s
commission ( as “ser vice ” is define d in Slo v ene language , cf. F laker , 2015 ). Ho w e v er , this
ser vice is one of an adv o cacy typ e . It is define d as such in its kernel by the user-w orker
r elationship , in the actuality by common effort to o v er come obstacles while implementing
the plan—an unav oidable certainty due to the so cially difficult p osition and status of users.
The task of a ke y w orker is thus to enable the user to do and make things in his or her

A maze of r esp onsibility 165
life , which he or she desir es. So , the basic r esp onsibilities of a ke y w orker ar e ther efor e
de e ds. In the first place , for their o wn actions, but also for the joint action, and in this
way also for the action of the user . Ho w e v er , a ke y w orker is not r esp onsible for what the
user do es, his or her r esp onsibility lies in enabling the action. For his v er y de e ds the user
himself is r esp onsible . The r esp onsibility of a ke y w orker is not only in ackno wle dging such
user’s r esp onsibility and to supp ort it, but also to p er ceiv e the user ( and his or her de e ds)
thr ough the “str engths p ersp e ctiv e ” and to pr esent them to others as an accomplishment
and success. (The immanent, situational definition of our de e ds is usually that w e p erform
them for our use , pleasur e or jo y . The negativ e conse quences that might happ en as w e do
something, ar e in e v er y day life consider e d as an accident, an e v ent. The y ar e se en as a
se condar y , accidental and unwante d side of our de e d.)
The r esp onsibility of a ke y w orker lies also in constant alertness to and r e v ersal of sets
opp osite to the str engths p ersp e ctiv e . In the w or ding of the conditions of r esp onsibility , it
is of the utmost imp ortance to fight against “ascribing” r esp onsibility for e v ents to users
and their stigmata. Slips, mistakes and other undesir e d e v ents ar e not to b e ascrib e d to
the user’s stigma. In the first place , b e cause stigma is not an action, a truly pr e dicativ e
categor y , it is neither a cause nor a motiv e of an action. In the case of the “self-fulfilling
pr ophe cy” , for instance , it may se em that someb o dy p erforms an action b e cause of his or
her se condar y de viation—he or she has nothing to lose , has got the lab el any way . Ho w e v er ,
the so cial r eaction marking a p erson has b e en an activ e part of a constellation and had
trigger e d the action. In the se cond place , b e cause stigmatise d effe ct is not a wilful action,
but something that o ccurs in effe cting some other intention, it is an unfortunate e v ent, an
accident. And not least, b e cause such an understanding of a p erson’s action disables the
flo w of interaction, disqualifies the p erson and susp ends the desir e d action. A ke y w orker
has, for his o wn sake and for the audience , tw o w eap ons of r esistance to such tendencies.
Negativ e asp e cts or conse quences of the action can b e banalise d, liste d in the class of e v ents
of non-imp ortance , negligible or situationally irr ele vant acts that can happ en to absolutely
any one . On the other hand, instead of ascribing such de e ds to stigma, tr ying to r eally grasp
them—no w as a virtue and not a flaw—and to pr esent them as such to the audience .
The joint w ork of the user and a ke y w orker is to cr eate conditions that will enable
the attainment of the goals of the p ersonal plan ( and also minor desir es and wants that
spring up by the way along with fulfilling the plan). It is a continuation of the w ork that
has starte d by planning ( with a planner ), it is animating the letters on pap er . Their joint
task is ther efor e to establish and maintain the machiner y that w ould pr o duce the outcomes
for ese en in the plan.
The r esp onsibility of a ke y w orkers for their o wn doing is in the first place ser vice-like .
Inter alia , this means that their desir es, and mor e imp ortantly inter ests, as w ell as tasks
delegate d by the milieu ar e brackete d, sub due d to the commission ( will) of the user . This is
the e xpr ession of the pr ofessionalism of a ke y w orker .
This, ho w e v er , do es not imply that a ke y w orker should b e come a r ob ot who will p erform
her or his w ork accor ding to “instructions” containe d in a p ersonal plan. Quite the contrar y ,
he or she must cr eate p ossibilities for authentic encounters with the user . Ther e ar e at
least thr e e implications of this. The encounter ne e ds to take place in the frame of w orking
together—by common goals, common obje ct of w ork and on the basis of common values.
Ho w e v er , almost contrar y to the instrumental natur e of ser vice r elationship , a ke y w orker
ne e ds to hav e a r eal, authentic inter est in this pr o cess. A ke y w orker’s o wn inter ests can lie
in at least thr e e dir e ctions. Most obvious is pr ofessional, w ork emancipation. A ke y w orker
has an opp ortunity , pr e cisely b e cause of the primar y imp ortance of the user’s mandate , for

166 F laker
an indep endence and critical autonomy fr om the structur es other wise dir e cting her or his
w ork. This op ens the p ossibility to r eally do something for the p erson. A ccor ding to the
principle of e xchangeability (“I could easily find myself in such a p osition”), w orking for the
user is also w orking for oneself. This constitutes the basis of solidarity . The thir d dir e ction
is the dir e ction of identification with the user , doing the same thing. Numer ous situations
pr o vide p ossibilities for a ke y w orker to attain his pur ely p ersonal goals. If I accompany a
user to a shop , I can buy something to o .
The w ork situation ne e ds to b e taken by all parties as a frame—not only for w orking
together but also in which to encounter each other . Major opp ortunities for such encounters
ar e moments, when pr o ducing an outcome , a r esult is not at the for efr ont, e .g., in the pr o cess
of initially getting to kno w each other or in a celebration of success or in moments of r est,
when w e ar e , as Camus’s Sisyphus, smilingly r eturning to the fo othill. The encounters can,
ther efor e , happ en in the human cracks of a common undertaking. The natur e of joint w ork
is not in the first place contractual, it is conspirator y .
A ke y w orker must unfailingly follo w the moto of user mo v ements: “Nothing ab out us
without us!” . The r esp onsibility is to make sur e that the user is pr esent in all the delib erations
that concern her or him. When this is not p ossible or sensible (this sensibility ne e ds to
b e r e cognise d concor dantly with the user ), a detaile d r ep ort is due as to enable the user
to contr ol the course of e v ents, or adv ertently to app eal or e v en v eto (in the w or ding
of interaction or der , to hav e a p ossibility of “r eme dial actions”). The notion of r eme dial
interaction is esp e cially imp ortant for unplanne d conv ersations that happ en “by the way” ,
wher e a user’s pr esence and imme diate contr ol could not hav e b e en assur e d. The ke y w orker
must r ep ort to the user these mentions, chats, but also conv e y to participants during the
v er y e xchange that he will do so and assur e the p ossibility for corr e ctions that the user
might want—appr o ximately in the same manner as it happ ens when w e talk ab out a friend.
Namely , if some one says something ab out our friend, the sp eaker assumes that w e will
r elate this to our friend. The assumption usually r emains implicit, though ther e may b e
an e xplicit r e quest “not to tell this” to the friend b eing mentione d. When w e inhabit the
r ole of a ke y w orker ( or any other confidential pr ofessional r elationship) this r e quest will
b e de cline d, naturally , often also e xplicitly alerting the collo cutor that w e will r elate the
content of the conv ersation to the user .
The p ersonal plan r esembles a testament as an act of e xpr essing a p erson’s will. Ob-
viously , it radically differs in the fact that the p erson is still aliv e . Mor e so , it is a to ol of
r e viving some one—pr e cisely the user’s will. The r esp onsibility of a ke y w orker is ther efor e
affirmation of the user’s will—always and e v er y wher e . In doing so , a p ersonal plan is the
frame and the fo oting, up on which a ke y w orker can r efer . A ke y w orker is a living r eminder ,
a memento of the user’s will. A s a lighthouse , he has to r emind e v er yb o dy inv olv e d in the
car e that the y must sail in the dir e ction set by user .
A ctually , this is the r esp onsibility a ke y w orker has to others. A s for the user , a ke y w orker
ne e ds to , at least for that moment, leav e other r oles: of a car er , a nurse , habilitator , animator
or any other , and b e principally a ke y w orker . His or her r ole in a team and r esp onsibility to
the team-mates is pr e cisely in taking up this r ole and adv o cacy stance . It is a corr e ctiv e ,
which p erson centr e d car e demands in the conditions of colle ctiv e p erformance of tasks,
a corr e ctiv e of a p erson against the gr oup . If a gr oup is planning a trip , the ke y w orker
will draw attention to pr oblems that the p erson has with walking, if the y ar e pr eparing a
pudding for a party , he will r emind them that the user has diab etes, etc. When ke y w orkers
r emind a team of such shortcomings of the gr oup de cision, the y must not b e se en by a
team as “party p o op ers” , sp oilers of the game that the team is supp ose d to play . On the

A maze of r esp onsibility 167
contrar y , a ke y w orker must b e se en as an official “ de vil’s adv o cate ” , who will, pr e cisely by
this “r esp onsible ” opp osition, impr o v e the team p erformance . The team ne e ds to conv e y
this to a ke y w orker fr om the v er y start, and grant him or her the right, e v en obligation, to
do pr e cisely that.
6.2. Metamorphosis of the r esp onsibility
Deinstitutionalisation or metamorphosis of the “r esp onsibility” thus takes various r outes,
on various le v els. The most obvious and celebrator y shift is r estoring the r esp onsibility to
users . The shift is fr om institutional, hierar chic and custo dial to civil r esp onsibility . Civil
r esp onsibility pr esupp oses that e v er y one is r esp onsible for his or her o wn acts and that
nob o dy can take o v er the r esp onsibility for the acts of others—who ar e just like him or her
r esp onsible for their acts. On the de clarativ e le v el this shift is taken for grante d, as it stems
fr om the basic so cial arrangement w e inhabit. On the practical le v el though, at least in the
spher e of car e , this app ears so radical that it is often v er y har d for actors to grasp and put
into practice . A small step for humankind, a big step for a man.
The main r eason for this difficulty is not p otential “learne d” nor innate helplessness
of users, the r easons lie on the other side—in the classic orientation, the mind-set of the
pr ofessionals and other help ers, as w ell as so cial arrangements (usually on the micr o le v el)
that demand it. When a p erson in a whe elchair with his escort enter a disp ensar y , shop
or e v en in a str e et encounter , the do ctor , shop attendant or a passer-by will addr ess the
escort—and by doing this take the r esp onsibility away fr om the p erson in the whe elchair ,
in the v er y literal and basic sense—capacity to r esp ond. One of the pr oblems namely is
general distribution of r esp onsibility , which is not in fact, as it w ould b e commande d by the
fundamental principles of the b ourge ois so ciety of the e quals. W e actually sp end a smaller
p ortion of our liv es in spaces and r elations that ar e not hierar chical and condescending.
Pe ople marke d by stigma, esp e cially with institutional stigma, cannot e vade such patterns
in e v er y day situations without huge effort and ingenuity .
The r esp onsibility of an escort at this p oint is to dir e ct the interaction to the right addr ess.
Such r e dir e ction, attention to wr ongly targete d, misplace d interaction and r eme dial action
on them is pr obably one of the main characteristics of the “pr ofessional r esp onsibility” in
the conditions of the transition to community car e . The r esp onsibility of the “help ers” is
not only in pr o viding ser vices ( or in fav ours and courtesies in informal car e), but also in
r e dir e cting the p ersp e ctiv e and emp o w ering users in the pr esence of wider audiences.
A help er , though, ceases to b e r esp onsible for the de e ds of the help e d. The transition to
the community has taken the help er out the space and the r ole , in which one has to assume
the r esp onsibility for the action of the other . He still ne e ds to struggle with the r efle x of
the pr e vious r ole , but is r elie v e d of such a r ole (no matter ho w hefty this r elief is). This,
ho w e v er , do es not imply that he is completely absolv e d fr om the pr ofessional r esp onsibility .
It is just set and structur e d differ ently .
The primar y pr ofessional r esp onsibility is no w to pr o vide quality ser vices. Namely
car e that will b e mor e user centr e d and tailor e d, and that will b e pr o vide d by the highest
standar ds of the pr ofession ( and of the transition to the community ). By b eing r elie v e d of
the r esp onsibility for the acts of users, a pr ofessional help er has mor e r o om to de dicate to
his or her r eal w ork. The pr e vious, guar dian r ole not only to ok time and energy to maintain,
the r esp e ctiv e r oles of a guar dian and a pr otégé sp oile d what could b e an encounter of tw o
fr e e human b eings into a pr eforme d r elation of submission. T rust ne e de d in an accidental
encounter or confidence r o ote d in a friendship , kinship and comradeship that was pr e viously
r eplace d by the hypnotic trance of submission ( sic psy choanalysis), no w has r o om to de v elop .

168 F laker
Quality b e comes a shar e d r esp onsibility . The ser vice it is not mo delle d any longer as
r epairing an appar ently close d system, but as cr eating ne w solutions, arrangements, etc., as
enabling attainment of the user’s goals, pr oje cts. This r e quir es the co op eration of a numb er
of help ers, who , in contrast to the r epair mo del, ar e not pr esent in the same space—an
institution, a w orkshop , and ar e not ser ving the same master . Shar e d r esp onsibility spills
o v er an op en space and is structur e d horizontally and rhizomatically .
A s w e hav e demonstrate d the imp ortant shift in the ne w conception of r esp onsibility is
also a shift fr om the r esp onsibility for things ( or r eifie d acts, situations and r elations) to the
r esp onsibility for acts. Unv eiling the figment ( and compulsion) o f individuality , it b e comes
clear that w e cannot b e (individually ) r esp onsible for r elationships, situations and things
( se e the discussion ab o v e). Conditionally , w e can b e r esp onsible for our o wn acts. Those w e
can ascrib e to ourselv es; alb eit, not entir ely ( b e cause the y ar e , inter alia , r esp onses to the
acts of others). The acts of car e , ar e almost always tie d to acts of others, joine d in a common
effort, action. Hence , the r esp onsibility of the help er for his acts, ser vices, is always also a
r esp onsibility for co op eration, conne cting—for teamw ork.
The latest trump car d pulle d out of their sle e v e by pr ofessionals as the y bid far e w ell
to the r esp onsibility of the old kind is to ask: “What to do when a user do es something
danger ously?!” This by no means r emains the help er’s pr e-emptiv e r esp onsibility . Resp on-
sibility in advance , the anxiety , the appr ehension paralyses the action—for the patr onage
all the mor e so . Ther efor e , e v en when it comes to futur e planning actions, w e must, in the
risk-w eighing pr o cess, put safety in the se cond place . First, w e plan an act, mor e pr e cisely
its goal, the purp ose of the action, only then the safety of the pr o ce e ding.
Ho w e v er , a help er must r esp ond to a danger , but in the same way as anyb o dy else—no
matter whether an accidental passer-by , a friend, neighb our or br other . A pr ofessional
help er has one r eason mor e to r emain in the situation of danger and to do something
that will diminish it, r e duce the risk or mend the damage . Not to abandon helping is ( as
in the Hipp o cratic Oath) a sacr osanct pr ofessional duty . The Alpine Rescue Ser vice will
help any one who is in tr ouble , e v en if r escuers will nag ab out r e cklessness, e quipment
inade quacy and a similar lack of caution and safety measur es by the one the y ar e saving.
The r esp onsibility of a pr ofessional help er in a danger ous situation is ther efor e—situate d,
r efle xiv ely human, not aprioristic nor custo dian. When it comes to pr ofessional help ,
also r eliable and available .
10
In the institution the r esidents ar e available to staff, in the
community the staff ne e ds to b e available to users.
6.3. Joint r esp onsibility of b eing human
Help ers ( and users with them) hav e , on account of w orking together , an imme diate r esp on-
sibility to others participating in the “singular pr oje ct of help ” or in accomplishing the goals
of a p ersonal plan or some other such doing. This kind of r esp onsibility is r eminiscent
of Durkheim’s organic solidarity . It is an awar eness that if e v er yb o dy do es not do his or
her shar e of joint w ork, the w ork will not b e done—also by the one who has done his bit.
Although it may se em that joint w ork is r egulate d mainly by an agr e ement of co-w orkers
10
In so cial car e this is a r ole of crisis mobile teams and inter v entions. Their pr esent insufficiency is felt
mostly by users—the y ar e either not getting help when it is most ne e de d, or the y ar e lo cke d up “in a safe place ”
to pr e v ent danger . A mountain r escue ser vice can b e se en as a connivance to r e cklessness in the mountains,
ho w e v er , w e could not imagine ab olishing it, e v en less, lo cking mountaine ers in institutions wher e the y
could safely climb artificial slop es ( or p e el p otato es for punishment). In fact, the se curity pr omise d ( but not
deliv er e d) by institutions encourages pr ofessional help ers not to go out, e v en if the situation on the gr ound is
significantly less menacing than that face d by mountain r escuers.

A maze of r esp onsibility 169
on the division of w ork—b e it formal or not—the unutter e d, e v en nonv erbal contingencies
of joint w ork might b e mor e imp ortant. Among them, the w ork rhythm of w orking together
and me chanisms of mutual pr oje ctiv e identification—when w e assume what co-w orkers will
do while w e ar e doing something else , what the y e xp e ct fr om us, still mor e , what w e e xp e ct
that the y e xp e ct that w e e xp e ct fr om them. When w e list and analyse these assumptions,
w e may hav e an impr ession that collab oration w ould b e quite complicate d ( and so it is),
but the y happ en in an instant, in nanose conds and often, just as an atmospher e , as gr oup
assumptions and mentality the y p er vade a gr oup entir ely (Bion, 1961 ; F laker , 2022 ).
The vision, goals of a w ork gr oup can r epr esent the gr oup ’s inner and actual desir e ,
something the y want to accomplish, or it can come fr om outside—as a car e plan on the p er-
sonal le v el, or mor e generally as some kind of a binding do cument as any formal de claration,
conv ention, strategy , etc. The latter was not available to pione ers of deinstitutionalisation,
their vision was their gr oup desir e for change , e quality , emancipation. With deinstitu-
tionalisation as a global platform, which actually commands such a desir e , the activists of
the transition obtaine d the legal basis—a so cially agr e e d foundation of their action. In the
b eginning, the issue was ho w to legitimate desir e of a gr oup , make it a legal b o dy; no w , the
issue is ho w to actualise a historical desir e , cr ystallise d in a do cument, ho w to transform it
into an actual desir e of those affe cte d.
Ho w e v er , a de clarativ e vision is just a frame of the action—an accessor y for the pr o duc-
tion of desir es of participants in a situation and their r ealisation. The institutional desir e
is, in the first place , a frame for co op eration, joint w ork, which pr o vides the institutional
basis and sets the dir e ction of joint w ork. It is not y et the w ork itself, the actual desir e . This
ne e ds to happ en, arise among the p e ople , it ne e ds to r esp ond to their e xistential questions,
and to b e soake d by “blo o d, sw eat and tears” (F laker , 2017 ).
Y et, e v en if such a desir e of a de clarativ e kind has institutional flair , it is not an axiom,
a p ostulate r egulating p e ople ’s actions, it is a generativ e ethic imp erativ e ( of lib eration).
It is not a de vice for maintaining and justifying an e xisting or der , it is for changing it so
that it will enable the e xpr ession of desir es of p e ople and op en the p ossibilities of their
attainment. A system base d on axiomatics is by definition a close d one , the one base d on
ethical imp erativ es is op en—to imagination, inv ention and surprise .
The commitment of those who ar e to lead the transformation—b e the y a ke y w orker , team
leader , leadership of an institution or leaders of the r eform on the national or supranational
le v el—is to the ethical imp erativ e of non-r estraint, enabling and self-determination. The
leaders of the transition to community car e ar e to b e confirme d champions of deinstitution-
alisation (Eur op ean Exp ert Gr oup on the T ransition fr om Institutional to Community-base d
Car e , 2012 ).
The r esp onsibility of leaders is gr eat and multifacete d. On one hand, their r esp onsibility
is pr e cisely to the quote d imp erativ es, on the other hand, the r esp onsibility is to maximise ,
p ermit, e v en instigate cr eativity , fr e e dom and initiativ e of e v er yb o dy inv olv e d. In other
w or ds, the leader ne e ds to allo w , e v en stimulate p oly v o cality , multiplicity of meaning,
initiativ es and r esp onse . But the y must insist on b esto wing the criterion of users’ eman-
cipation, of their rights, as a main measur e of success. The r esp onsibility of a leader is
not to charge others with r esp onsibility , to issue or ders, delegate tasks, etc.; but to trust
co-w orkers, instigate their initiativ e , allo w them to lead various pr o cesses, phases, teams,
etc. In doing that, the leader’s r ole is one of a “midwife ” , of enabling. Ho w e v er , the y must
r eact energetically to those acts of help ers, which ar e , e v en under the pr etence of lib eration,
indep endence and transition to the community , setting the way of axioms that ne e d to b e
sup erse de d.

170 F laker
The knots of r esp onsibility in the p ost-institutional practice ar e not, it se ems, much less
complicate d than K afkian blunders of the institutional system. The differ ence is that in the
transition to the community , the y ar e b eing slo wly unknit, ease d, while in the institutional
frame each mo v e makes them tighter . Ho w e v er , the notion of r esp onsibility in the transition
transmutes to the degr e e that it is questionable whether w e r efer to r esp onsibility in the
original sense of the w or d. W e will r esp ond affirmativ ely , when w e will b e r estoring users’
r esp onsibility for their o wn acts—this w e will e v en applaud. W e will applaud also when the
“r esp onsibility” will migrate , when its r elations will b e b e coming mor e horizontal and when
it will b e a r esp onse to an actual life situation, distr ess and tr ouble of a fello w human b eing,
and not a r esp onse to general demands, usually deriv e d fr om the axiomatics of p o w er . T o
distinguish b etw e en one and the other pr obably gr eater pr e cision of designation w ould b e
ne e de d. For the r esp onsibility to oneself and the close ones it might b e mor e conv enient to
use terms like: r esp onsiv eness, tactfulness, thoughtfulness, courtesy , p oliteness, r esp e ct—on
the le v el of the interaction or der , or plainly solidarity (mutual and univ ersal r esp onsibility to
each other , b e cause w e ar e all in the same b oat). For the r esp onsibility to the sup er or dinate d
w e might pr efer such terms as duty , obligation, task, commission or e v en command in the
r egistr y of formal organisations, on the le v el of interaction then: humility , ob e dience and
domination, arr ogance , etc.
Rules that intr o duce ne w kinds of r esp onsibility ne e d to b e use d to facilitate contacts,
encounters and joint w ork, the y must ser v e this, the y ne e d to b e accessories for living
together and not its fetish. Mayb e all of y ou will not agr e e that an empty str e et has to b e
cr osse d in spite of the r e d p e destrian light, but most pr obably y ou will all agr e e that it is
stupid, when ther e is no traffic, to wait for the gr e en light (F laker , 2019 ).
A ckno wle dgment
This pap er was pr epar e d with financial supp ort of the Slo v enian Resear ch And Inno vation
A gency within the r esear ch cor e founding So cial W ork as the Bear er of the Pr o cesses
of So cial Justice and Inclusion in Slo v enia ( Grant No . P5-0058) and the r esear ch pr oje ct
Long-term Car e of Pe ople with Dementia in So cial W ork The or y and Practice ( Grant No .
J5-2567).
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