in co ri o a (n" Sh V a o; QO IH «3 U Pi a ,o Volume 18 Number 2 June 1994 ISSN 0350-5596 Informatica An International Journal of Computing and Informatics Profile: Branko Souček Brain Windows Dynamic Conceptual Mapping ^Informational Being-In Neural Networks Machine Learning The Slovene Society Informatika, Ljubljana, Slovenia Informatica An International Journal of Computing and Informatics Basic info about Informatica and back issues may be FTP'd from ftp.arnes.si in magazines/informatica ID: anonymous PASSWORD: FTP archive may be also accessed with WWW (worldwide web) clients with URL: ftp://ftp.arnes.si/magazines/informatica Subscription Information: Informatica (ISSN 0350-5596) is published four times a year in Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter (4 issues per year) by the Slovene Society Informatika, Vožarski pot 12, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. The subscription rate for 1994 (Volume 18) is - DEM 50 (USS 34) for institutions, - DEM 25 (US$ 17) for individuals, and - DEM 10 (US$ 4) for students plus the mail charge DEM 10 (US$ 4). Claims for missing issues will be honored free of charge within six months after the publication date of the issue. KO^ Tech. Support: Borut Žnidar, DALCOM d.o.o., Stegne 27, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Lectorship: Fergus F. Smith, AMIDAS d.o.o., Cankarjevo nabrežje 11, Ljubljana, Slovenia. Printed by Biro M, d.o.o., Zibertova 1, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Orders for subscription may be placed by telephone or fax using any major credit card. Please call Mr. R. Murn, Department for Computer Science, Jožef Stefan Institute: Tel (+386) 61 1259 199, Fax (+386) 61 219 385, or use the bank account number 900-27620-5159/4 Ljubljanska banka d.d. Slovenia (LB 50101-678-51841 for domestic subscribers only). Accordiiig to the opinion of the Ministry for Informing (number 23/216-92 of March 27, 1992), the scientific journal Informatica is a product of informative matter (point 13 of the tariff number 3), for which the tax of traffic amounts to 5%. Informatica is published in cooperation with the following societies (and contact persons): Robotics Society of Slovenia (Jadran Lenarčič) Slovene Society for Pattern Recognition (Franjo Pernuš) Slovenian Artificial Intelligence Society (Matjaž Gams) Slovenian Society of Mathematicians, Physicists and Astronomers (Bojan Mohar) Authomatic Control Society of Slovenia (Borut Zupančič) Slovenian Association of Technical and Natural Sciences (Janez Peklenik) Referees: Guido Belforte, David Duff, Pete Edwards, Mohamed El-Sharkawi, Tomaž Erjavec, Thomas Fahringer, Doris Flotzinger, Hugo de Garis, David Hille, Tom loerger, Yves Kodratoff, Peter Kopaček, Gabriele Kotsis, Ockkeun Lee, Rich Maclin, Raymond Mooney, Peter Pachowicz, Petr Pivonka, Aswin Ram, Borut Robič, Paola Rossaro, Alberto Rovetta, Lorenza Saitta, Jude Shavlik, Derek Sleeman, Jure Šile, Miroslav Šveda, David Wilkins, Bradley Whitehall, Jianping Zhang, Hans P. Zima, Jan Žižka The issuing of the Informatica journal is financially supported by the Ministry for Science and ^Technology, Slovenska 50, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. PROFILES The readers can observe substantial differences existing between the contents concerning concrete profiles of editors of Informatica. In some cases the scientific achievements of the profiled editor are in the foreground, in other cases, the brilliant career seems to play the decisive role. Commonly, both achievement and career give the reason for the decision to put someone into the Informatica's profile collection. However, this does not mean that a critical amount of the scientific achievement and career must not be present. The work of Professor Branko Souček fulfills both conditions. As a challenge to the Japanese fifth generation computer systems, he launched the term of the six generation computer systems, although at first through his editor function of a dedicated Wiley book series. In this series, he is not only the editor but also the leading author as it can be recognized from the list of Wiley's books which follows. Dr. Souček is one of the earliest editor of Informatica. Today, his research is in 1. the brain windows evoked potentials and the holographic network for neurological diagnoses; 2. the holographic fuzzy learning for credit scoring; and in 3. IRIS-FEED, Integrated Reasoning and Informing Service—Federated ExEcutive Database. The reader wiU get an impression of his research work on the next pages of Informatica, in the paper entitled Neurological Diagnoses Based on Evoked Brain Windows and on Holographic Learning which is a result of years of the interdisciplinary research. By these introductory notes and the short curriculum vitae which follows many other matters of primary and secondary importance cannot be entirely embraced and recognized by those who do not know the style of work and life of Professor Souček. It is a lot more which could be reflected into detail of his innovative research, technological design, teaching experience editorial work and academic career. Branko Souček Branko Souček is a professor of electronic computer engineering and holds a B.Sc. and Ph.D. in electrical engineering (University of Zagreb, in 1955 and 1963, respectively). He has divided his time between research and teaching at several institutions as: - Institute "Rudjer Bošković", Zagreb, Croatia; - Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, N.Y., U.S.A. - Department of Mathematics and Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Zagreb, Croatia; - State University of New York, Stony Brook, N.Y., U.S.A.; - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Arizona, Tuscon, Arizona, U.S.A.; and - IRIS International Center, Bari, Italy. Professor Souček has been the manager in large information technology projects and lecturer/consultant for multinational corporations, including: - IBM, Boeblingen, Germany; - Siemens, Munich, Germany; - Schering, New Jersey, U.S.A.; - Lockheed, Palo Alto, Ca., U.S.A.; and - NASA, Newport News, U.S.A. Dr. Souček experience ranges from the world's first Associative, million channel, real-time data acquisition system, to the original Brain-window theory. He has published more than 100 scientific/technical papers, and has served as invited and tutorial speaker on many informational conferences. Dr. Souček has served as lecturer/consultant for - Integrated Computer Systems, Los Angeles, Ca., U.S.A.; - Software Research Corporation, St. Louis, U.S.A.; and - Infotech, London, U.K. He serves as an expert in United Nations agencies IAEA and UNIDO. His books on mini, micro, neural, and real-time computing have been published in U.S.A., Canada, Europe, Russia, China and Japan in over 100,000 copies. Souček's Book Series Concerning the Sixth Generation Computer Technology Presently, Professor Souček is an editor of Series of books in "The Sixth Generation Computer Technology", published by John Wiley, New York, U.S.A. The books published during 19881994 are the following: 1. B. Souček and Marina Souček: Neural and Massively Parallel Computers, J. Wiley, New York, p. 450, 1988; 2. B. Souček: Neural and Concurrent RealTime Systems, The Sixth Generation, J. Wiley, New York, p. 387, 1989; 3. B. Souček and the IRIS Group: Neural and Intelligent Systems Integration: Fifth and Sixth Generation Integrated Reasoning Information Systems, J. Wiley, New York, p. 650, 1991; 4. B. Souček and the IRIS Group: Fuzzy, Holographic, and Parallel Intelligence, J. Wiley, New York, p. 350, 1991; 5. B. Souček and the IRIS Group: Dynamic, Genetic and Chaotic Programming, J. Wiley, New York, p. 550, 1992; 6. B. Souček and the IRIS Group: Fast Learning and Invariant Object Recognition: The Sixth Generation Breakthrough, J. Wiley, New York, p. 270, 1992. 7. T. Hrycej: Modular Learning in Neural Networks: A Modularized Approach to Neural Network Classification, J. Wiley; 8. R. Sun: Integrating Rules and Connection-ism for Robust Commonsense Reasoning, J. Wiley; and 9. V.L. Plantamura, B. Souček, G. Visaggio: Frontier Decision Support Concepts, J. Wiley. Current Activities Professor Souček offers consulting, teaching, projects and studies in: - Help Desk. Supports the person in complex but routine decision making, customer service and support, maintenance and troubleshooting, software development and use, information retrieval, product support. - Media Decision Support. Supports the information systems and software packages in their work. This includes intelligent data bases, pattern base, deductive hypermedia, association maps, decision support in EDI. - Process Decision Support. Supports real-time process control systems. It oflFers the features of production surveillance, object and pattern recognition, product evaluation, adaptation and learning, robot support. - Integration of Reasoning, Informing and Serving, IRIS - The Business Process Reengeneering, BPR - Intelligent Business Networks, IBN - Frontier Decision Support Concepts, Wiley, New York, 1994, ISBN 0-471-592560-0 Address: Prof. Branko Souček STAR Service; IRIS Via Amendola 162/1 70126 Bari, Italy fax: 3980-5484556 phone: 3980-5484555. Edited by A.P. Železnikar NEUROLOGICAL DIAGNOSES BASED ON EVOKED BRAIN WINDOWS AND ON HOLOGRAPHIC LEARNING Branko Souček STAR SERVICE S.p.A., Via Amandola 162/1, 70126 Bari, Italy Phone: 3980.5484555 Fax: 3980.5484556 Keywords: Brain-windows, evoked potentials, holographic learning, diagnoses, neurology Edited by: Rudi Murn Received: November 20, 1993 Revised: April 20, 1994 Accepted: May 25, 1994 The evoked potentials have been generated in response to auditory stimuli to a person, and light stimuli to insects, resulting in two datasets, HUMAN and INSECT. In both datasets the responses are composed of several peaks with variable latencies. The brain-window logic is used to explain the evoked responses. Brain-windows are generated through mutual coupling of biological oscillators, and modulated by the memory that stores the past history and the present behavior. Latencies of the peaks provide necessary information to discriminate between normal subject and pathological states resulting from injury, tumor or multiple sclerosis. The holographic neurai network classifies the subjects, based on the peak latencies. Combining brain-window theory with the holographic learning opens new possibilities for neurological diagnoses, as well as for a new kind of fuzzy neural networA's. 1 Introduction held photomultiplier, the output of which was fed into a tape recorder. For details see [1,2]. Evoked potentials are frequently used in the HUMAN. Brainstem Auditory Evoked Poten- brain research. Souček and Carlson [1,2] have tials (BSAEPs) are generated in response to a found that insect brain generates special kind of brief auditory stimuli with seven peaks appear- evoked time sequence: brain-windows. The brain- ing within 10 ms following the stimulus in nor- window theory is used here to explain the human mal subjects. Pathological states resulting from evoked potentials. Two datasets have been used, head injury, acoustic tumors and multiple scle- called INSECT and HUMAN. roses give rise to delays in the transmission of INSECT. A firefly flash is a brilliant burst electrical signals and consequently the peaks are of Ught which serves as a signal in a dynamic abnormaUy located. The BSAEPs were obtained courtship communication system between males Vertex-left mastoid. Vertex-right mas- and females. Because it is possible to observe and ^oid electrode locations on the scalp employing recored firefly flashes from a distance and to com- ^ ^ivolet Pathfinder II system. Details can be municate with firefly using artiflcal flashes, these [3,4,5]. animals provide ideal material for the analysis of insect brain functions. 2 The Brain Windows The fireflies Photuris versicolor were courted using artificial flashes provided by a flashlight. The theory that explaines the HUMAN and IN- The flashlight was driven with a relay controlled SECT datasets is based on fuzzy, adjustable logic stimulator. The duration of the flashes varied be- called "brain windows". The logic is supported by tween 0.1 and 0.2 seconds. The artificial flashes a network of coupled nonlinear oscillators. Upon and female responses were recorded using a hand- receiving stimulus, the brain generates a sequence 110 Informatica 18 (1994) 109-114 Branko Souček of time windows of different widths. Receiving and sending windows are interleaved in the sequence. Each receive window recognizes a particular subgroup of stimulus intervals. Each sending window determines the latency of the response from the brain. The windows are arrayed in priorities and controlled by the memory. Memory stores the past history. Brain windows are generated through mutual coupling of the primary oscillator, answer oscillator, and window generator, see Figure 1. Hence, the brain windows are directly related to the inherent biological oscillators and to the memory. The oscillator generates a primary waveform P{t) with a period Ti. Upon receiving a stimulus, the memory Mi is charged and slowly discharges back toward zero (Figure la). In this way. Mi modulates the primary waveform (Fig. lb). Hence, Mi{t) is equivalent to the phase-response curve (PRC). The positive and negative phases of the primary waveform designate receive and send wondows. Receive windows, defined by the positive phase of P{t), are periods during which a second stimulus can command an answer. Send windows, during which a response can actually be generated by the brain are defined by negative phases of P{t). A second memory, M2, recalls the past history of stimulation. Depending on the past history, M2 can take any value in the range — 1 < M2 < 1. The intersection of the memory M2 and the primary waveform P{t) defines the sequence of the receive-send brain windows. Figures lc,d,e show three receive-send windows sequences for the memory values M2, Mj , M2 , respectively. The basic carrier of information is the interval I between two stimuli. The second stimulus is matched against the train of receive windows. Each receive window recognizes a particular group of intervals. In this way, the brain receives and analyzes the stimulation interval I. This interval can be considered as a question in the communication. The logic of the brain generates the answer to the received question. The answer information is coded in the latency L of the response. The latency is matched against the train of send windows. Each send window defines a particular group of latencies as a group of legal answers. Hence, the receive interval I (question) will produce the answer with the latency L only if I matches one of the receive windows and L matches one of the send windows. The brain windows operate with external, as well as with internal stimuli and responses. 3 Holographic Network for Neurological Diagnoses Holographic networks are a new brand of neural networks, which have been developed by Sutherland [6,7]. This type of networks significantly differs from the conventional back-propagation layered type. The main difference is that a holographic neuron is much more powerful than a conventional one, so that it is functionally equivalent to a whole conventional network. Therefore there is no need to build massive networks of holographic neurons; for most applications one or few neurons are sufficient. In a holographic neurons there exist only one input channel and one output channel, but they carry whole vectors of complex numbers. An input vector S is called a stimulus and it has the form: An output vector R is called a response and its form is: AU complex numbers above are written in polar notation, so that modules are interpreted as confidence levels of data, and phase angles serve as actual values of data. The neuron internally holds a complex n x m matrix X, which enables memorizing stimulus-response associations. Learning one association between a stimulus S and a desired response R reduces to the (noniterative) matrix operation X-}- = S^R. Note that aU associations are enfolded onto the same matrix X. The response R* to a stimulus is computed through the following matrix operation: R* = -S*X. c* Here c* denotes a normalization coefficient which is given by c* = A^. The response R* to a stimulus S* can be interpreted as a vector (i.e. a complex number) TABLE 1 TABLE 2 Normal Abnormal (Multiple Sclerosis) Total Training Set 30 23 53 Testing Set 46 34 80 composed of many components. Each component corresponds to one of the learned responses. If S* is equal to one of the learned stimuli S, then the corresponding response R occurs in R* as a component with a great confidence level (« 1). The remaining components have smaU confidence levels (c 1) and they produce a "noise" (error). It is believed that the BSAEP latencies provide necessary and sufficient information to discriminate between normal and pathological states. The experiments have shown that the 2nd, 3rd and the 4th peak latencies are the optimal features for classification. Ho et al [5] have collected a total of 133 BSAEP patterns from patients of which 53 are used for training and the rest were used for testing. Table 1 shows the number of normal and abnormal BSAEP patterns in the training and testing sets. Holographic Neural Technology [6,7,8] is a relatively new artificial neural system paradigm that resembles to a class of mathematics found within optical holograms. An element of information within the holographic neural paradigm is represented by a complex number operating within the phase and magnitude. The input BSAEP patterns S = {s(0),5(1),5(2)} (the 2nd, 3rd and 4th peak latencies) and output class R = {r-} (r = —ve (Normal) and r = -\-ve (Abnormal)) were converted from real values to the complex representations in the neural system by sigmoidal preprocessing operation s{k) -> Xke''" ti-s(k) . 27r(l + where /i is the mean of distribution over S,k — 0,1,2, a is the variance of distribution, and Xk is the assigned confidence level. The above transformation maps the above input BSAEP patterns to corresponding sets of complex values. The experiments with the holographic network show that the number of higher order terms determines not only the learning time, but also the Ref. diagn. Abnormal Ref. diagn. Normal Classif. res.: Class A 31 0 Classif. res.: Class N 3 46 Overall Performance: 96,25 % Number of Ephocs: 1 Training Time: 1 sec classification accuracy [5]. The optimal number of the higher order product terms are 50. The results of using holographic network in classification of BSAEPs after the first learning trial are presented in Table 2. 4 Results The brain window concept has been used to explain the evoked patterns in HUMAN and INSECT datasets. The experimentaly observed evoked potential and behavior waveforms follow the theoreticaly predicted primary oscillator waveform, as presented in Figure 1. In other words, the waveforms are generated through mutual coupling of biological oscillators and modulated by the memory that stores the past history and the present behavior. Holographic network classifies BSAEP peak latencies and discriminate between normal and pathological states, with 96% accuracy. Experiments show that holographic learning of HUMAN dataset takes 1 second, while backpropagation learning takes 20 seconds. 5 Conclusion The brain window concept has been used to explain the evoked patterns in HUMAN and INSECT datasets. The experimentaly observed evoked potential and behavior waveforms follow the theoreticaly predicted primary oscillator waveform, as presented in Figure 1. In other words, the waveforms are generated through mutual coupling of biological oscillators and modulated by the memory that stores the past history and the present behavior. The memory stores the internal context. Memory adjusts the sequence of receive-send windows. The stimulus interval I presenting the sensory pattern is matched against the train of receive windows. The response latency L, presenting the answer or decision, is matched against the train of send windows. The language is directly related to the physiological findings: biological oscillators and pulses (flashes). Brain-window language is in excellent agreement with experimental data measured on Pho-turis versicolor female fireflies stimulated by artificial flashes. Computer analysis of a large volume of experimental data reveals the fact that data points are clustered into islands of dialogues. INSECT dataset is explained with one level of oscillator-pulse interaction. This concept can be extended to the hierarchy of osciUator-pulse levels. Each level has its sequence of receive-send windows, and its memory (context). The sensory patterns and the decisions or commands pass through the hiearchy in opposite directions. The HUMAN data set keeps the BSAEPs generated in response to a brief auditory stimuli with seven peaks appearing within 10 ms following the stimulus in normal subjects. The latencies of the initial five peaks of BSAEPs are highly stable in healthy normal subjects under a wide variety of physioloigical conditions such as sleep, wakefulness and anesthesia. However, in pathological states resulting from head injury, acoustic tumors,autistic disorders and multiple sclerosis the peaks are abnormally located. One explanation is the change of delays in transmission of electrical signals. According to Chiappa [10], there is no strong primary evidence in humans to define the presumed generator sources of BSAEP waveforms. The suggested generator sources are as follows: wave I-distal eighth nerve; wave Il-proximal eighth nerve or cochlear nucleus; wave Ill-lower pons (possibly the superior olivary complex); wave IV-mid or upper pons (possibly the lateral lemniscus tracts and nuclei); wave V-upper pons or inferior coUiculus. It is not known whether BSAEPs are being generated at synapses in gray matter nuclei or by volleys in white matter tracts, or by the result of summation of electrical activity from more than one nucleus. Because exact generator sources of BSAEP waveforms are not known (synaptic versus tract potentials or both), the pathophysiology of abnormalities is also speculative. In experimental animals, unilateral and bilateral focal brain stem cooling produced BSAEP amplitude and latency abnormalities, respectively. However, the variety of diseases in which BSAEP abnormalities are found suggests that multiple factors can be involved, presumably including segmental demyeli-nation and axonal and neuronal loss, and modification of the brain-window hierarchy. The brain-window hierarchy is modulated by the memory that stores the past history and the present behavior. Hence in pathological states, the memory disturbance dictates the abnormal location of the response peaks. If this is so, than the subject treatment could be also oriented in the direction of the memory and its contents. The diagnoses might include the stimulation of the subject with the pairs or trains of auditory, light or electrical stimuli. The pattern of the train should coincide with the brain-window sequence. Further experiments, both with simple animals and with human, are needed to clear out remaining questions. The experiments include the use of anesthetic on human, and of ethanol on firefly lu-ciferase. Combining Brain-windows with holographic learning opens new possibilities: a) explanation of other brain codes, languages and signals; b) design of a new class of fuzzy neural networks; c) new kind of neurological diagnoses; d) adaptation of holographic learning for large training and testing sets found in pattern recognition, speech and vision; e) Brain-window concept for natural language processing, reasoning and language-knowledge archives; f) interaction among the fuzzy Brain-windows representing the symbol, word, schema, frame, association map or cognitive map; g) diagnoses: Parkinson, Huntington, Wilson, Infarcations, Ischemia, Hemorrhages, Coma, Epilepsy, Hysteria, Meningitis, Surgery, etc. References [1] B. Souček, A.D. Carlson, Brain Windows in Firefly Communciation, Journal Theoretical Biology, 119, 47-65, 1986 [2] B. Souček, A.D. Carlson, Brain Window Language in Fireflies, Journal Theoretical Biol- ogy, 125, 93-103,1987 [3] R. Ho, A Neural Network System for Recognition of Evoked Potentials, M. Sc. Thesis, Dept. Computer Science and Systems, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, 1990. [4] M.V. Kamath, S.N. Reddy, A.R.M. Upton, D.N. Ghista, M.E. Jernigan, Statistical Pattern Classification of Clinical Brainstem Auditory Evoked Potentials, Int. J. Biomed. Comput., 21, 9-28, 1988 [5] R. Ho, J.G. Sutherland, I. Bruha, Neurological Fuzzy Diagnoses: Holographic vs Statistical vs Neural Method, in Ref. 9 [6] J. Sutherland, A Holographic Model of Memory, Learning and Expression, Int. Journal of Neural Systems 1,3,259-267, 1990 [7] J. Sutherland, The Holographic Neural Method, in Ref. 8 [8] B. Souček and IRIS Group, Fuzzy, Holographic and Parallel Intelligence, J. Wiley, New York, 1992 [9] V.L. Plantamura, B. Souček, G. Visaggio, Frontier Decision Support Concepts: Help Desk, Learning, Fuzzy Diagnoses, Quality Evaluation, Prediction, Evolution, J. Wiley, New York, 1994. [10] K.H. Chiappa, Evoked Potentials in Clinical Medicine; Chapter 5; Raven Press Ltd, New York, 1989. Branko Souček 0 1 : 3 ^ 6 ' M ! ^ Phase responso Curve (PRC) / Prir'K^fv wavplofm tbJ Icl Id) (e) «1 Si Ri S, «3 S3 Si /fj Sj «3 Sj Receive-S«nd Windows Mi Mi Mj Figure 1: Brain-windows in evoked potentials and time sequences, (a) Phase-response curve (PRC). The simulus flash charges the memory (Mi) which decays with time, producing the PRC. (b) Primary waveform defined by the PRC. As the PRC declines toward zero, the period of the primary waveform increases towards the resting value. Memory levels caused by previous flashes {M2) are shown as horizontal lines intersecting the primary wavefarm. These memory levels define the receive-send windows. (c,d,e) Receive-send window periods defined by memory levels (M2): (c) highly positive memory level (M2); receive windows narrow, send windows wide; (d) memory at zero level (M2); (e) highly negative memory level (M2); receive windows wide, send windows narrow. Approximating Knowledge in a Multi-Agent System Miroslav Kubat* and Simon Parsonstì *Ludwig-Boltzmann Institute of Medical Informatics and Neuroinformatics, Department of Medical Informatics, Institute of Biomedical Engineering Graz University of Technology, Brockmanngasse 41, A-8010 Graz, Austria email mirek@dpmi.tu-graz.ac.at tAdvanced Computation Laboratory, Imperial Cancer Research Fund, P.O. Box 123, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PX, United Kingdom, email sp@acl.lif.icnet.uk ^Department of Electronic Engineering, Queen Mary and Westfield College, Mile End Road, London El 4NS, United Kingdom. Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, abstraction, granularity of knowledge, dl-cut, rough concepts Edited by: Matjaž Gams Received: August 26, 1993 Revised: May 4, 1994 Accepted: June 9, 1994 This paper is concerned with establishing a common language that can be used to communicate between the different members of a multi-agent system. We suggest that this may be done by successively approximating the concepts that each agent in the system deals with, and the paper gives algorithms which make this possible. Along the way we introduce the notion of a description language cut, or dl-cut, which is an abstraction to which a rich class of languages may be mapped. The idea of a dl-cut is then used to introduce rough concepts— rough descriptions of the concepts used by the agents. Finally we discuss the way in which rough concepts can be logically combined and used in deductive reasoning, also debating the scope of the validity of inferences using the concepts. 1 Introduction that of a human exp ert would, and it is difficult to ensure that they are consistent. Over the last twenty years, techniques from artif- A number of solutions have been suggested to cial intelligence have been successfully applied to remedy these ills, each stemming from a major reproblems ranging from factory scheduling [23], to search effort. One is to try to ensure consistency process control [15], and the diagnosis of faults in by constructing intelligent systems in a more rig-complex systems [12]. Expert systems have been orous way, structuring the knowledge that they developed which can replicate or exceed the accu- contain and ap plying techniques from software racy of human experts [3], and which have bodies engineering. This work is typified by the KADS of knowledge that make them as knowledgeable project [22] and has led to interesting develop-as the best informed human expert [16]. With ments in areas such as the formal specification of the increasing power and sophistication of these knowledge-based systems [5]. systems have come a number of well-documented A second approach is to reduce brittleness by problems — in general intelligent systems do not building intelligent systems around a vast body scale up easily, they tend to be brittle so that their of commonsense knowledge that approximates the performance breaks down as they leave their do- kind of knowledge that people use in their intermain of expertise rather than degrading slowly as actions with everyday situations. This, in the- ory, will allow such intelligent systems to fall back on more general ideas when their specific expert knowledge fails. For instance, when a medical diagnosis system is queried about the ailments suffered by someone's car it should be able to transfer some of its basic knowl edge about diagnosis and use this with commonsnese knowledge of how cars work to attempt an answer. The CYC project [14] which aims to do precisely this has recently released the first version of its knowledge base, and it will be int eresting to observe whether the claims made for it are justified. A third approach, and the one that we will consider in this paper, is to build communities of small, and therefore more manageable, systems. Because the individual systems contribute different skiUs and knowledge, together they are capable of handling pr oblems that are beyond the scope of a single system. This is the approach of the ARCHON project [11] which has proved itself in the area of industrial process control in general, and in the construction of a co-operative system for elect ricity distribution management [4] in particular. Now, one of the most interesting things about the ARCHON system is that it provides a framework for combining together existing systems. The motivation for this is the promotion of code and resource reuse, which is clearly a worthy aim, but in doing so raises a new and difficult problem. Different systems developed at different times may use different languages for knowledge representation. If this is the case, how should they be combined? Work on ARCHON understandably stopped short of providing an answer to this question, and it seems that little has yet been published on general solutions to the problem, though there has been some work on translating between different uncertainty handling formalisms in this context [19, 25]. However, some preliminary work has been published on related subjects. Huhns et al. [9] describe ways of integrating different information models of businesses, that is they discuss the problems of relating such models and resolving incompatibilities between them. To do this they make use of the CYC ontology, which is postulated to be of sufficient extent to encompass any notion in any business model, and integrate different models by integrating them into CYC. The re- sult of this work is a system called Carnot, which provides an architecture and tools for integrating the information models of large businesses. Neches et al. [17] make a similar suggestion but from the more general perspective of integrating knowledge representation systems irrespective of domain or interpretation. To do this they suggest the idea of an "interlingua" which is a general language for knowledge interchange. At first blush, such a language certainly seems to be a good idea, but, as Ginsberg [6] argues, there are reasons why the definition of a standard interlingua seem premature. This work on interlinguae assumes that there will be some underlying ontology, some basic set of concepts and their inter-relations, that is understood by all systems. Now, while such ontologies exist in some domains [17], they are far from universal, so there are domains in which the approaches discussed above will founder. In this paper we present some initial ideas about the way in which a model that is common to a number of intelligent systems that do not have a known common ontology might be constructed automatically from the models of individual agents within the group. 2 Basic concepts Our inspiration to develop methods to obtain a common interpretation of knowledge from multiple sources stems from the domain of multistrat-egy learning, first proposed by Brazdil [1]. The ability of this principle to improve performance was demonstrated by Brazdil and Torgo [2], and by Torgo and Kubat [24]. In the particular case we wiU consider here, the problem involves several agents and a central system. The agents possess knowledge which is expressed in a particular language and the task of the central system is to combine the knowledge into a general structure. The problem in doing this is that the language used by any agent may be different to the languages used by any other agent, and, if this is the case, the central system will need to translate the information obtained from the individual agents into some common basis which we wiU refer to as the central language CL. Figure 1 illustrates the situtation we wiU con- agent 1 concepts formulae agent n concepts formulae CL context Figure 1: The system under consideration X r 1 ^ X C {«,6},r/ = cz C {e,/,5} Figure 2: Roughly described concepts a;, y and z sider. Each agent has a language which expresses a set of concepts and a set of logical formulae concerning those concepts. The central system contains the context of the overall system which plays an important role in any application of the knowledge of the multi-agent system since the kind of concepts with which the system will deal have connotations which vary widely according to the context. Thus, for instance, the concepts 'fertile land' and 'warm day', have widely different meanings in Central Africa and in Sweden. Note also that in this case, unlike the agents, the central system has no direct access to the environment, however there is no theoretical reason why the central system should not have access, nor, for that matter why there should be a "central" system with a distilled common language. Instead the common language could be replicated in each agent, producing a group with no central focus, but whose members could aU understand each other. Now, when the system of agents is initially set up, the central system has no understanding of the languages used by the various agents. However, it is possible that it can establish a common language by approximation. That is, it is possible for each agent to describe its knowledge to the central system in terms of its set of concepts. Depending upon the wealth of concepts available to the agent this may be a very precise or a very coarse description of its knowledge so that there is no guarantee as to the precision of the translation that is possible between the agent and the central system. When all the agents do this the central system wiU end up with a language which can deal to some degree with all of the knowledge dealt with by all the agents, and so is broader than that of any single agent. In addition, due to the intersection between concepts, it may be more detailed than that of any agent. What we propose in this paper are some thoughts as to how this might be achieved within the framework of rough concepts which we have developed [13] from ideas on rough sets [21]. A few informal definitions are needed to clarify some of the notions that we will operate with. A language, often called a description language, is understood as a set of weU formed formulae (wff). We wiU only deal with languages with a finite number of wffs. Each lyjO*^ represents a concept captured by the language. Each concept, in turn, is interpreted as a set of relevant objects assigned to it by its context. Thus, when speaking about students, we usually do not mean all students in the world. Rather, we implici tly constrain ourselves to the students of our university, students of Computer Engineering, students from the secondary school in the neighbourhood, and the like. The context represents additional information common to all concepts, and in this case we a ssume that the context is common to all agents. Figure 2 presents a graphical representation of possible relationships between CL and concepts known by an agent. Each segment a through g stands for one wff of a simple CL, and consists of objects that cannot be further discerned in CL. Each wff is true for one or more objects. The lozenges x, y and ^ are concepts known by an agent. Note that, due to the different languages used by the agent and the central system, the boundaries of x do not coincide with those of the wffs of CL so that x is not described as precisely by CL as by the language of the agent. However, without any additional information, the classification of the objects from the segment b as positive or negative instances of x is completely unknown and cannot be quantified by a probability or a fuzzy degree of membership, so that this imprecise classification is still very useful. In addition, as concepts y and -z illustrate, CL may be able to precisely distinguish the concepts of an agent, or even some subsets of some the concepts understood by an agent. This issue is closely related to work on granularity such as that by Hobbs [8] who defined an indistinguishability relation for unary predicates and Imielinski [10] who extended Hobbs work so that the idea can be applied to approxima te rea- soning. Our proposal also has notions in common with Carnot [9] which uses the idea of finding the best generalisation of a given concept, and with Ginsberg's [6] discussion of KIFs in which he proposes discarding details s uch as probabilities in order to facilitate interchange between agents that quantify their knowledge and those that do not. For simplicity, we assume that the information possessed by the agents is noise-free and relevant. Readers interested in a method for pruning out noisy and irrelevant knowledge can find details in work by Brazdil and Torgo [2]. Thus the task that we will address is defined as follows: Given: A definition of the central language CL] The general context expressed either as a set of constraints on the set of objects with which the multi-agent system will deal (such as the set of all types of car manufactured in Europe), or as a list of possible objects (such as Rover Metro, Nissan Micra, Ford Escort, ...); For each agent, the descriptions of concepts and formulae in the agent's language which allow the agent to classify objects in terms of the concepts; Find: The description of all concepts in CL] The scope of validity of the old as well as newly inferred propositions in CL. The essence of this translation process is abstraction, a phenomenon that has been widely studied in artificial intelligence. A comprehensive analysis is provided by Giunchiglia and Walsh [7] where three types of abstraction are defined, depending on the ability of the source language Li and the object language L2 to distinguish objects. Informally, an abstraction is constant if both languages discern the same objects; an abstraction is decreasing if L\ is able to distinguish the same objects as L2 and possibly some more; an abstraction is increasing if L2 is able to distinguish the same objects as L\ and possibly some more. The preceeding discussion makes it clear that, depending upon the exact concepts available, our method may give any of these types of abstraction, and indeed may give a mixture of different types for different agents in the same system. 3 Translating into C L In this paper, no strong requirement is made on the syntax of the well-formed formulae— we use a logic-like notation to describe the attributes of the objects which exemplify the concepts the various agents deal with. However, this notation is used purely for convenience since it allows us to write down ideas such as "the shape of a certain class of object is either a cube or a pyramid" in a concise way as, for instance: / \ / \ shape{x) = cube V shape{x) = pyramid \ / \ / or: shape{x, cube) V shape{x, pyramid) and it should not be seen as a fundamental limitation on the approach— the results presented in the paper hold whatever form the wffs are written in. To get an idea of the motivation for the dl-cut and rough concepts, consider a simple example. Example 1, Let a set of toy blocks be described by their shape: cube, pyramid, ball, and prism. The Ci^-language capable of describing the shape by means of these terms decomposes the set into four disjoint subsets, each of which is represented by at least one object. Suppose the concept to be translated into CL is 'stable in an earthquake.' Cubes and pyramids are stable, balls are not stable, and the stability of a prism depends on the ratio of its base area to its height. Since no distinction is made between the different types of prism, CL cannot discern short, fat prisms (stable) from tall, thin prisms (unstable). If no additional information is available, the concept 'stable in an earthquake' can only be approximated by its lower bound (sufficient condition) and upper bound (necessary condition): lower bound: Va; siable(x) = shape(x, cube) V shape(x, pyramid) upper bound: Vx siabie(x) = shape(x, cube) V shape(x, pyramid) V shape(x, prism) □ The lower-bound description (core) is true for cubes and pyramids, whereas the upper-bound description (envelope) is true for cubes, pyramids, and prisms. Obviously, the 'distance' between the core and envelope depends on the language CL. Co ncepts expressed by the pair [core, envelope] are called rough concepts. The notion of a dl-cut, defined below, will facilitate the formahzation of the approach that we have just outlined. In the following definition, the universe U is the set of aU objects seen by the central system. Definition 3.1 (dl-cut) Denote by Dl the set of all wffs of a language. A subset dl C Dl is called a dl-cut iff it decomposes U into a system of pair-wise disjoint sets such that each set is assigned precisely one wff f ^ dl that is true for all elements of this set. Thus in the "simple system from Example 1, the universe of all blocks can be decomposed into four disjoint sets each of which is assigned one of the following predicates: shape(x, cube), shape(x, pyramid), shape(x, ball), shape(x, prism) Each predicate is a wff and the set of four predicates is a dl-cut. In general there is not a unique dl-cut for a given universe. In this case, an alternative dl-cut is made up of the following three wffs: shape(x, cube) V shape(x, prism), shape(x, pyramid), shapefx, ball) The elements {wffs) of a dl-cut are description items or generic concepts which may be distinguished by the central system, and may be used by it to approximate the concepts handled by the various agents with which it communicates. Knowing th at any disjunction of description items can be considered to be a concept, we can discern, by means of the dl-cut, different concepts, where N is the number of wffs in the dl-cut. The notion of a dl-cut facilitates a mapping of a rich class of languages onto easy-to-handle boolean expressions (for a deeper analysis, see [13]). Basically, there are two possible approaches to the construction of a dl-cut from the underlying language— a naive approach, and a concept-oriented approach. We only cover the naive approach in detail, contenting ourselves with liinting mammal ^ ^ reptile ^ T bird ( eagle ) ( lark ) Figure 3: Example of a generalization tree at how the concept-oriented approach can be employed. The naive method uses a hill-climbing search technique. The initial state is the empty set of wffs, the final state is a set of wffs that form a dl-cut, and the search mechanism is to augment the current set of wffs with a ivffthat does not ov erlap with any previous wff. Obviously, an exhaustive search would reveal many different dl-cuts whose capacity to model concepts varies. Hence, the search must be made heuristic by adding some criterion for selecting which wff to add to the dl-cut. To be useful, this criterion should reflect the ability of the dl-cut that results from the addition the wff to model concepts. This approach leads us to propose Algorithm 1. The prerequisite for this algorithm is the availability of a generality criterion which gives some idea of the quality of a dl-cut, and of a mechanism for a subsumption test to establish if one wff can replace another. The generality criterion in a system such as ours which is based upon the manipulation of attributes naturally reflects the number of literals in an expression since each of these corresponds to an attribute of the domain. Thus A is more general than AaB and A V 5 is more general than A. The subsumption test cari be based on knowledge of the domain, so that 'bird' subsumes 'eagle' as in Figure 3 or on the explicit listing of the concepts represented by a wff. Thus if aU objects representing concept A also represent concept B, then B subsumes A. By convention, we write p C q if q subsumes p, and p^ q if p subsumes q. A similar notion to subsumption is that of over- lapping. Two wffs li and I2 are said to overlap if /1 = /11 V /12 V ... V kn, /2 = /21 V /22 V ... V hm, and Ili = hj for some i and j. Finally, the language CL is assumed to be sufficiently rich that at least some of its wffs /,• must be subsumed by some concepts Sj, that is C s j, and for each object Uk £ U, a. wff Ip can be found such that Ip is true for Uk ■ The input to the algorithm is the set S of all concepts, the context which defines the extent of the universe U, and CL, which when the first dl-cut is constructed will be empty, but for other dl-cuts wiU be a set of wffs. Further, let ilCi) = .. .,/n} be the list of wffs from CL, in descending order according to some generality criterion so that for li, I j £ if i < j, I j is not more general than li. The algorithm terminates when S is empty or when the ability of to discern concepts can- not be increased without backtracking from the current state. Algorithm 1 1. Let = 0; 2. Starting with li, search for the first /; e such that an Sj G 5 can be found for which Ij C Sj. If no such li can be found, go to 5; 3. Let dl^^^^ = Discard all Ij G L^^^") overlapping with U ; 4. Delete from S all concepts Si such that s,- C d j where dj is any disjunction of wffs from If S is not empty, go to 2; 5. Find a Wjg'that is true for the rest of the universe U, add it to and siop. Of course, many different procedures using more powerful heuristics and search techniques can be proposed, and their detailed analysis is an open research topic. The algorithm we have presented can serve as a guideline. Before we proceed to the illustration of the algorithm by a simple example, a few comments are necessary. Firstly, an additional requirement in step 2 can demand that the concept s j subsuming li is not allowed to subsume any other concept Sk. This requirement makes sense if agents are able to order their concepts by subsumption. Secondly, since the explicit storing of would limit the utility of the procedure to very smaU languages, the list is intended to be implicit. Thus in the language based on conjunctions of unary predicates, the algorithm would begin with single predicates, then, when the ability of the predicates to describe concepts has been exhausted, proceed to conjunctions of pairs of predicates selected by a suitable heuristics. It is also possible to derive an alternative algorithm driven by the concepts s/ instead of the wffs. This is the 'concept-oriented' approach hinted at above. Finally, it should be noted that, in general, sub-sumption checking is NP-hard for first-order logic and must be assisted, in realistic applications, by background classification information based on notions of generality of concept, such as that depicted in Figure 3. A similar problem can arise with the discarding of overlapping wffs in step 3. Example 2. Consider once again the blocks world of Example 1 which is extended so that the blocks can be described in terms of the material from which they are made as weU as their shape— all cubes, prisms, and pyramids are metallic while balls are wooden. The agents understand the concepts 'stable' and 'belongs to Tom', and are able to classify the objects in U as positive and negative examples of the concepts. In the first step, the central system picks the unary predicates one by one until one of them turns out to be subsumed by any of the two concepts. Suppose that the concept 'stable' subsumes the predicates shape(x, cube) and shape(x, pyramid) while 'belongs to Tom' subsumes shape(x, pyramid). The system selects shape(x, pyramid) as the first wffof dl^'^^h From now on, all predicates overlapping with shape(x, pyramid) will be discarded so that only the predicates shape(x, cube), shape(x, prism), shape(x, ball), material(x, wood) and their conjunctions are allowed to appear in any of the future wffs. Thus we might end up with being: shape{x,pyramid), shape{x, cube), shape{x, ball) A material[x, wood), shape(x, prism) □ Now, we can define the important notion of a rough concept. Definition 3.2 (rough concept) Let x^{dl) = [x'^{dl),x^{dl)] be a rough set. A rough concept is the pair [des{x^),des(x^)], where des{x'^) is the description of the core of x in Dldi and des(x^) is the description of the envelope of x in Dldi- Note that the core description does not apply to any negative instance of x, the envelope description applies to all positive instances of x, and the complement of the envelope applies only to negative instances of x. Beware, however, that any pair [core,envelope] pertains to a particular dl-cut. Different dl-cuts tend to imply different rough concepts since the core and envelope are wffs from dl^^^^. In this respect, the idea of rough concepts departs from Pawlak's rough sets [21], Even though a wff can be understood as a set of objects for which it is true, the symbolic interpretation of an approximation of a concept is dominant. The next algorithm translates the concepts from the agent's language into CL. The input is formed by dl^'^^^ and by the concepts to be translated into CL. As output, the algorithm produces rough concepts in CL. Algorithm 2 For each concept C of an agent, and for any rfc,, £ 1. If dc, is subsumed by C, then d^ belongs to the core; 2. If dej overlaps with C, then de^ belongs to the envelope; 3. The core (respectively, the envelope) is the union of all items d^ (respectively, dg.), so that C^ = U,- dci, (respectively, C^ = (J; d,^). Example 3. Thus in our running blocks world example, we can write down the rough description of the concepts "stable" and "belongs to Tom". Applying Algorithm 2 we find that for the dl-cut described in Example 2: stable{x)^ = {shape{x, cube), shape{x, pyramid)} stable{x)^ = {shape(x, cube), shape{x, pyramid), shape{x, prism)} Thus: stable{x)"- = {shape(x, cube), shape{x,pyramid)}, {shape{x, cube), shape{x,pyramid), shape{x, prism)} Similarly since the only objects that are known not to belong to Tom are prisms, we have: belongsJo-Tom^x)'^ = {shape{x, ball) A material{x, wood), shape{x, pyramid)} belongsJoJrom{x)^ = {shape{x, ball) A material{x, wood), shape{x,pyramid), shape{x, cube)} Thus: belongs Jo jrom(x)^ = {shape{x, ball) A material{x, wood), shape{x, pyramid)}, {shape{x, ball) A material{x, wood), shape{x, pyramid), shape{x, cube)} □ 4 Reasoning with Rough Concepts The work presented in previous sections makes it possible translate concepts from the languages of various agents into CL. If we consider that the central system that uses CL will need to reason with these concepts, a natural question arises— how can one logically manipulate rough concepts? Well, if we take x and y as concepts roughly defined in by means of cores and envelopes it can be easily shown that for the cores and envelopes of their disjunction, conjunction, and negation, the following relations hold where the dl in the parentheses is a shorthand for and V is the set of all wffs in the language CL: (x V (a; V y)^idl) {x A y)^{dl) {x A y)^{dl) 2 c x^{dl) U y^{dl) x^idl) U y^{dl) x^(dl) n y'^idl) x^ldl) n y^ldl) V-{x^){dl) V - ix^)idl) For instance, the envelope of a disjunction of two concepts is equal to the union of the envelopes of the individual concepts. The envelope is understood as a subset of V and is subject to unions, intersections, and subtractions; the concepts themselves are subject to disjunctions, conjunctions, and negations. The relation of implication can easily be defined by means of the partial ordering < imposed on the space of all wffs such that for wffs li, I j and k: U < I j iff I j = /,• U Ik and /,■ < Ij iff li < Ij or = Definition 4.1 (implication) Let x^ = and y^ = be rough concepts. The operation of implication is defined as follows: ^[(x^ X] [M RVip) false roughly false unknown roughly true true Table 1: Rough truth values (0 C X C F) correspond to p. More precisely: R{p) = where p-'^ Is the lower bound on the core of jp and p-^ is the upper bound on the envelope. Example 4. To delve a little further into our blocks world example,consider the compound concept p which represents stahle{x) V belongsJoJTom(x). Now: stable(x)^ - {shape{x, cube), shape(x,pyramid)}, {shape{x, cube), shape(x, pyramid), shape{x,prism)} belongsJoJTom^x)^ = {shape{x, ball) A material{x, wood), shape{x, pyramid)}, {shape{x, ball) A material{x, wood), shape{x, pyramid), shape{x,cube)} so that: {shape{x, ball) A material(x, wood), shape{x, cube), shape(x,pyramid)}, {shape(x, ball) A material(x, wood), shape{x, cube), shape{x,prism), shape{x, pyramid)} □ One way of interpreting the rough measure of an element p € C{V) is the degree to which p is true in the universe of rough concepts. That is how universally it is true amongst the rough concepts. Obviously, for = p^ = C{V), the proposition is always true and we define the rough truth measure RV{p) = true{t). For p'^ = p^ = % the proposition is always false. Three other important truth values of R{p) may be posited, and these are summarized in Table 1 (for mòre detailed discussion, see Parsons et ail. [20]). The symbolic values in Table 1 indicate to what degree a proposition is true in V. However, the pair R{p) = [p^ can also be understood as a more general measure since it explicitly determines in what part of the universe of rough concepts the proposition is true, roughly true and so on. More specifically, the expression R{p) = says that p is true in p'^ and roughly true in p^. Similar considerations enable us to define a truth-ordering on the set of propositions. Definition 4.2 (truth ordering) Letpi andp2 be propositions. We say that pi is more true than P2 ijfPi 2 P2 andpf 2 pf- By now this section has introduced a rough measure of truth, a set of basic symbolic truth values, the scope of validity of a proposition, and the ordering of propositions based on their truth value. With this background, we can study what happens with the truth measure if we subject the formulae of C(V) to rules of inference. This is expressed by Theorem 4.1 which is proved in the Appendix: Theorem 4.1 For formuale p, q and r G C,{V), variable x and a constant symbol a, modus po-nens (a), modus tollens (b), resolution (c), syllogism (d), and universal instantiation (e) have the following effect on rough descriptions: a) Rip ^ q) = [«,/?] R{p) = [7,5] R{q) = 1 [anr,/?] b) R(p^q) = [c^.ß] RH) = [T,Ö] R{-p) = [a nT,/?] c) Rip^q) — Ri^p V r) = [t, <5] R{q V r) _ a 0 7,/3 U 6] d) Rip-*q) R(q - r) - [7,S] Rip-^r) [a 0 7,^9 U 5] e) Ä(VxP(a;)) = R{P{a)) natural ^ wood J stone Figure 4: A classification tree For instance, for modus ponens the theorem reads as follows: If the implication p qis true in a C F and roughly true m ß C V, and if the formula p is true in 7 C F and roughly true in 6 C y, then q is true in 007 and roughly true in ß. In this respect, the theorem gives truth-preserving inferential rules for automated reasoning and says in what part of the universe described by CL the rules are reaUy deductive. Example 5. Suppose that the dl-cut obtained from CL by Algorithm 1 consists of the following four predicates: material{x,'wood), material(x, stone), material{x, metal), and material(x,plastic). Furthermore, let the background knowledge contain the decision tree from Figure 4 (see overleaf). After simplification with respect to an agent that understands the concepts interesting and tedious and whose knowledge is summarised by Figure 5 (see overleaf), the dl-cut becomes material{x,natural), material{x, metal), and material(x,plastic), because the background knowledge says that natural material in our universe is either wood or stone and because this simplification does not interfere with the system's ability to discern the concepts interesting and tedious. The concepts interesting and tedious are then translated into CL as follows: {maierial{x, natural)}, {maierial(x, natural), material(x, metal)} tedious{x)'^{dl) = {material{x, metal)}, {material{x, metal), material{x, plastic)} Thus: -'interesting(x)^{dl) = {maierial{x, plastic)}, {material{x, plastic), material(x, metal)} and: {-tinteresting{x) tedious{x))^{dl) = {material{x, natural), material(x, metal)}, V If some piece of knowledge says that, with the exception of metal objects, it is always the case that interesting{x) foobar{x) (where foobar{x) is a concept unknown to the agents) so that (interesting{x) foobar(x))^{dl) = [{material{x, natural), material(x,plastic)}, material(x, natural), materialfx, plastic)}], then it is possible to conclude, using Theorem 3.1 (a), that foobar(x)^{dl) = {material(x, natural)}, {material{x, natural), material{x, plastic)} inter esting{x)^{dl) = agent's proposition: -^interesting —> tedious tedious interesting _ I 1 I I I wood stone metal plastic ^^_; natural CL Figure 5: Translation of interesting and tedious into CL 5 A larger example In this section we give a more extensive example than any so far in order to bring together all the ideas introduced in the paper. We will consider the construction of a common language from the knowledge of two simple agents. In doing so description language cuts are built from both sets of concepts and their exemplary objects. We will then use the overall language CL which understands the concepts known to both agents to build rough descriptions of all concepts, and show how these might be combined in the central system to learn things that were not apparent to the individual systems. The example is kept simple to make it easy to follow, and aims to elucidate new features of our work rather than duplicate previous examples. Since both Huhns et al. [9] and Pawlak [21] have used similar examples, it seems entirely appropriate that the agents we consider should be concerned with motor vehicles. The first agent understands three concepts, small-car[x), fast-car(x), and s/ou;_car(a;)which are described in terms of the objects in Table 2 (see overleaf) where the table should be read as saying, for instance, that a Rover Metro is an example of both a smaU car and a slow car. The second agent also knows about slow cars, but also understands the concepts familyjc,ar{x) and van{x)^ defining these with the examples in Table 3 (see overleaf). The context of this example is precisely the set of vehicles known by both agents, so that between them they know of every object in U. The set of concepts and objects gives us a deliberately simple dl-cut with which to construct CL in the hope of making the example reasonably transparent. Applying Algorithm 1 to the knowledge possessed by the first agent, we initially have = 0. Then, one by one we add wffs, each of which in this case is a simple term such as rover jmetro{x). Since each wffis this simple, dl^'^^^ increases with each iteration: iteration 0 = 0 iteration 1 ^l(CL) _ ^rover.metro(x)} iteration 2 dliCL) _ ^TOverjmetro{x),austinjmini{x)} iteration 6 dliCL) _ ^rover-metro[x),austin.mini{x), ford-escort{x), vw-golf(x), reliantjrobin{x), lotus-eclat{x)} This is a dl-cut that is suitable for describing all the concepts known to the first agent. We then apply the same algorithm to the wffs that are formed by the objects known to the second agent. All this second application of the algorithm does is to extend at every iteration, with the exception of the time the wff fordjescort{x) V ford.cortina{x) is considered since this subsumes and thus replaces ford-escort(x), and the time that roverjmetro[x) is considered since it is already in dl^'^^h Thus we have: iteration 7 dliCL) _ ^rover.metro{x), austin-mini(x), ford.escort[x) v ford-cortina(x), lotus-eclat{x), reliant.robin[x), vw-golf(x)] small.car{x) fast.car{x) slow.car{x) rover.metro{x) austin.mini{x) ford.escort{x) lotus.eel at{x) reliant.T obin{x) vw.golf{x) ★ * ★ ★ * ★ Table 2: The concepts known by the first agent family.car{x) van{x) slow.car{x) ford.escort{x) V ford.cortina{x) toyota.coTTola[x) ford.transit{x) vauxhalljastra{x) rover.metro{x) nissan.micra{x) ★ ★ * ★ ★ ★ Table 3: The concepts known by the second agent iteration 15 j^/CCi) _ ^roverjmetro{x),austin.mini{x), ford.escort{x) V ford-cortina{x), lotus-eclat{x), reliant-robin{x), vw-golf{x),toyota-Corrolla(x), ford.transit{x), vauxhalLastra{x), nissan-micra{x)] Given this dl-cut, we can then use Algorithm 2 to build rough descriptions in CL of the concepts known by the two agents. In this case the concepts are quite precisely known, and we have: s/oio_car(x)^ = {rover jmetro[x), austin.mini{x), reliant-.robin{x), nissan-micra{x)}, {rover-metro{x), austin.mini{x), reliant.robin{x), nissan.micra{x)} fast.car{x)^ = {lotus.eclat{x), vw.golf{x)}, {lotus-eclat{x),vw-golf{x)} van{x)^ — {ford.transit[x), vauxhall.astra{x)}, {fordJransit{x), vauxhalLastra(x)} family.car {x)^ — {ford.escort{x) V ford.cortina{x), ioyota.corrolla{x)}, {ford.escort{x) V ford.cortina{x), toyota.corrolla{x)] small.car{x)^ — {rover.metro(x), austin.mini{x)}, {rover.metro{x), austin.mini{x), ford.escort{x) V ford.cortina[x)'} which neatly illustrates the point made in Section 2 about the nature of the abstraction attainable by the use of rough sets. CL contains knowledge of more concepts than either of the agents, it can define most of them as precisely as either agent, though it has a coarser knowledge of what constitutes a small car. However, it has more precise knowledge of the kinds of slow car than either agent. Having established CL we can of course use the results of Section 4 to manipulate the rough concepts. For instance, we can evaluate the validity of the idea that aU cars known to the system are either fast or slow. That is we can find the rough measure R{fast.car(x) V slo'w.car{x)), which is: R(fast.car(x) V slow.car(x)) = {rover.metro{x), reliant.robin(x), lotus.eclat{x), austin.mini{x), vw.golf(x)}, {rover.metro{x), austin.mini{x), lotus.eclat{x), reliant jrohin{x), vw.golf{x)} SO that the proposition is completely true in that part of the universe known to the central system that does not include vans or family cars, since the rough description of fasi.car{x) V slow.car{x) does not overlap with the rough description of family-car{x) V van{x). However, there is an overlap between the rough descriptions of fast-car{x) V slow.car{x) and smalljcar{x). Indeed, we can test the hypothesis that slowjcar{x) <-»• small .car [x), taking this to mean that: slow.car{x) small.car{x)K smalLcar{x) —► slow.car(x) Now, (slow.car(x) small.car(x))^ — {rover.metro{x), austin.mini{x), ford-escort{x) V ford.cortina{x), lotus.eclat{x), vw.golf{x), toyota.corrolla{x), ford.transit{x), vauxhall.astra{x)], {rover.metro{x), austin.mini{x), ford.escort{x) V ford.cortina{x), lotus.eclat(x), vw.golf{x), toyota.corrolla{x), f ord.transit{x), vauxhall.astra{x)} and: (small.car{x) —> slowjcar(x))^ = {rover.metro{x), austin.mini{x), lotus-eclat{x), reliant.robin{x), vw.golf{x),toyota.corroUa{x), ford.transit{x), vauxhalLastra{x), nissan.micra{x)}, {rover.metro{x), austin.mini{x), f ord.escort{x) V ford.cortina{x), lotus.eclat{x), reliant.robin{x), vw.golf{x), toyota.corrolla{x), ford.transit(x), vauxhall.astra{x), nissan.micra(x)} SO that: {rover.metro(x), austin.mini{x), lotus.eclat{x), vw.golf{x), toyota.corroUa{x), f ord.transit{x), vauxhalljastra{x)], {rover.metro{x), austin.mini{x), ford.escort{x) V ford.cortina{x), lotus.eclat{x), vw.golf{x), toyota.corrolla{x), f ord.transit{x), vauxhall.astra(x)} which implies that the proposition is less than roughly true, and less true than the proposition that being a small car implies being a slow car. 6 Conclusion The primary goal of this work was to develop the basis of a method of translating concepts and propositions from different languages used by a set of agents. This goal was achieved with the introduction of the notions of a dl-cut and a rough concept which allow the common language to be established as a dl-cut of all the different languages used by the various agents, and this dl-cut to be used to specify the rough concepts that may be used to express the concepts manipulated by the agents. Two simple algorithms have been provided that make it possible to establish dl-cuts and rough concepts. We also addressed the problem of reasoning with the dl-cuts once they were established, giving results describing how logical reasoning may be performed with the concepts. Future research in this direction should concentrate on the heuristics needed for the development of more efficient algorithms constructing dl-cuts from description languages. The main issues are, in this respect, the need to minimize the amount of information lost in the process of translation and the complexity of the subsumption checks and tests for overlapping wffs. 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(1991) Enabling technology for knowledge sharing, AI Magazine, Fall. [18] Parsons, S. and Kubat, M. (1994) A first order logic for reasoning under uncertainty using rough sets. Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing (to appear). [19] Parsons, S. and Saffiotti, A. (1993) Integrating uncertainty handling formalisms in distributed artificial intelligence. Proceedings of the European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty, Granada. [20] Parsons, S., Kubat, M., and Dohnal, M. (1994) A Rough Set Approach to Reasoning under Uncertainty. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence (to appear) [21] Pawlak, Z. (1982) Rough Sets. International Journal of Computer and Information Sciences 11, 341-356 [22] Schrieber, G., Wielinga, B., and Breuka, J. (1993) KADS.- A Principled Approach to Knowledge-Based System Development, Knowledge-Based Systems, Volume 11, Academic Press, London. [23] Smith, S. F., Fox, M. S. and Ow, P. S. (1986)' Construction and maintaining detailed production plans: investigations into the development of knowledge-based factory scheduling systems, AI Magazine, 7, 4. [24] Torgo, L. and Kubat, M. (1991) Knowledge Integration and Forgetting. Proceedings of the Czechoslovak Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Prague, Czechoslovakia. [25] Zhang, C. (1992) Cooperation under uncertainty in distributed expert systems, Artificial Intelligence, 56, 21-69. Appendix Proof of Theorem 5.1 a) Modus Ponens 2 R{p^q) = Ä((-'pVg)Ap) = [ani,so the lower bound on the core is 0:07. In addition, [a,ß] = R{-'p\/q) D R{q), so the upper bound on the envelope is ß. Hence R{q) = [00 7,/?]. □ b) Modus Tollens R{-^p) D R{-,p n -.gr) = R{{-^p V 9) A -ng) = [a n 7, /3 n é], so the lower bound on the core is a fl 7. In addition, [a,ß] = R{^p V q) 2 R^p), so the upper bound on the envelope is ß. Hence iž(-ip) = [an 7,/?]. □ c) Resolution We know that R{q V r) = R{{p V g V r-) A (-.p V g V r)) = [((pVgVr)<^n(-.pVgVr-)<^),((/>VgVr)^n(-.pV (/Vr)^)]. Now, (pVqVr)^ D (pVg)^Ur^ = aUr^ and ("ip V g V r)^ D (-.p V r-)^ U = 7 U so the lower limit on their intersection is a Similarly, (p V g V r)^ = (?> V g)® U r^ = /3 U r^ and (-ip V qy r)^ = {->p V r)^ U = 7 U q^. Now, the upper limits on r® and q^ are S and ß, respectively, so the maximum size of the envelope is /3 U <5. □ d) Syllogism This foUows immediately from the resolution result. We have R(->py q) = [a,ß] and V r) = [7,^]. Resolving these together gives R{->p\/ r) = [a n 7,/3 U <5] and the result follows. □ e) Universal Instantiation R(yxiP{xi)) = R{P{a)) A R{Pib)) A ... A RiPin)) = [P{af n P{bf n ... n P{nf, P{a)^ H P(6)®n...P(n)^]. Thus P{af D (VxiP(xi)f and P(a)^ D (VxiP(xi))^, so R(P(a)) = [a,U]. □ THE THEORY OF DYNAMIC CONCEPTUAL MAPPINGS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR EDUCATION, COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Vladimir A. Fomichov Moscow State Institute of Electronics and Mathematics (Technical University) Moscow State University, Bolshoj Vuzovsky pereulok, 3/12 109028 Moscow, Russia root@onti.miem.msk.su (to V. Fomichov) AND Olga S. Fomichova Moscow Children and Teenagers Palace for Creative Work Russia Keywords: artificial intelligence, cognitive science, theory of teaching, dynamic conceptual mapping, teaching children foreign languages, emotionally-imaginative teaching English, intelligent tutoring system, knowledge archives Edited by: Anton P. Zeleznikar Received: February 1, 1994 Revised: March 20, 1994 Accepted: March 23, 1994 Important advancements in the theory of teaching and practical teaching young children foreign languages are described and discussed in a broad context of ßnding the most effective ways of conveying information in various areas of human activity. It is reported about the development of a new theory of teaching called the theory of dynamic conceptual mappings (the DCM-theory). The basic principles of the DCM-theory are set forth, and its composition is shortly described. The DCM-theory may be characterized as a theory of bridging gaps between conceptual systems of a teacher and a learner. It became the ground for creating new, highly effective methods of teaching young children and teenagers to read and communicate in English. These methods are called the methods of emotionally-imaginative teaching (the EIT-methods) and are based on ideas of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. The new methods permitted to make a decisive hundred children of the age from 4 to 16 years, breakthrough in solving the actual problem of di- A number of ideas important for achieving this minishing the starting age for teaching children success is described. to read and communicate in a foreign language. The opportunities of applying obtained results The effectiveness of the DCM-theory and BIT- to constructing intelligent tutoring systems with methods is proved, first of all, by considerable di- friendly interfaces are pointed out. The signifi- minishing the starting age for teaching Russian- cance of results for education, cognitive psychol- speaking young children to read and communi- ogy, cognitive linguistics, artificial intelligence, cate in English. The new methods enabled to and applied epistemology is analyzed. In partic- teach 5- and G-year-old children to read and to ular, a concrete recommendation concerning the discuss fluently complicated texts in English writ- realization of the Knowledge Archives Project is ten in Simple Present Tense or Simple Past Tense. formulated. It is reported that the EIT-methods have been successfully tested in teaching approximately two 1 Introduction The stormy progress^ in constructing computers has contributed very much to the stunning extension of possibilities to convey and to receive information of various kinds. The most striking illustration of these new possibilities is the grandiose project of the Knowledge Archives launched in 1992 by three Japanese research institutes. The intention consists in developing a very large-scale knowledge informational system which is to become the most universal of all application systems. This future Knowledge Archives is to acquire, to store, and to unite diverse knowledge about sciences, technologies, cultures. Thus this system should become the most universal expert system (Knowledge, 1992; Zeleznikar, 1993a). The Knowledge Archives Project is one of the most bright indications of the gradual transition in studies on artificial intelligence (AI) to a new orientation which may be called, according to Zeleznikar, A. P. (1993b), informational orientation. The goal of conveying information is its effective perception by some recipients. That is why the transition to the informational orientation in studies on AI should imply the increase of attention to investigating the mechanisms of mastering new information by intelligent systems in order to find the most effective ways to convey information. On the one hand, one feel the need of studies with the use of formal means aimed at modelling general regularities of conveying and perceiving information by intelligent systems (Zeleznikar, A. P., 1988, 1992, 1993c). On the other hand, it is important to investigate experimentally the regularities of perceiving information by people. Teaching may be considered as systematic con- ^This paper is a private authors' work and no part of it may be used, reproduced or translated in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles. Correspondence to: V. A. Fomichov, Division "Math. Provision of Information-Processing and Control Systems", Moscow State Institute of Electronics and Mathematics, Bolshoy Vuzovsky pereulok, 3/12, 109028 Moscow, Russia. Tel.: -1-7(095) 930 98 97. E-mail: root@onti.miem.msk.su (to Prof. V. Fomichov). Fax: -f7(095) 227 28 07 (to Prof. V. Fomichov). veying information from one person (persons) to other persons or person (learners or learner) with the aim to enable learners (a learner) to carry out some activities. These activities, in particular, may consist in further conveying information as in case of preparing future teachers of primary and secondary schools. Hence a noticeable advancement in some specific area of education may cause an essential progress in solving diverse tasks of effective conveying information, if this advancement is achieved due to a more deep penetration into complicated cognitive mechanisms of human thinking. It seems that just such a point of view is the most appropriate for considering the present article. Reporting about the development of a new cognitive theory of teaching and, as a consequence, of new, highly effective methods of teaching very young children foreign languages, this article expresses the ideas going far beyond the limits of school education and important for increasing the effectiveness of conveying information in diverse spheres of human activity. As it is well known, for the success of teaching the learners should have some initial positive motivation. If this condition is satisfied, then the success of teaching strongly depends on the lack or the availability of difficulties in understanding teaching materials. When a learner (especially a child) masters some new information easily, his or her interest in studies grows, and this contributes to achieving new successes in learning. On the contrary, great difficulties tied with the learning of some new information are usually the cause of the decrease (and even the disappearance) of initial positive motivation. Numerous difficulties in studying school disci-pfines felt by many pupils are the sad reality of education in varied countries. Such difficulties strongly influence the psychology of pupils, diminish their self-respect, and contribute usually to the emergence of the psychology of a failure (Glasser, W., 1991; Maclntyre, P. D., & Gardner, R. C., 1991). That's why the problem of finding methods making easier the learning of diverse disciplines has highly great social significance and attaches the attention of many researchers. Obviously, fundamental problems of teaching are to be solved with respect to the progress in cognitive science. Pitrat, J. (1992) argues the experience of using the results of the artificial intelligence theory for carrying out studies in cognitive science. He supposes that the study of AI wiU help to look at the natural intelligence from a new angle. Continuing this thought, one can hope that taking into account the achievements of the AI-theory may contribute to the progress in the theory of teaching. A similar opinion is expressed also by Schank, R. and Slade, S. (1991, p. 106) believing that "the study of learning within the framework of artificial intelligence wiU have a significant impact on science, technology and education". Our experience confirms the fruitfulness of this idea. Achievements of the theory and practice of natural-language-processing systems (NLPSs) together with the data of cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics allowed us to look from a new side at the problems of teaching. As a result, a new theory of teaching has been developed called the Theory of Dynamic Conceptual Mappings (the DCM-theory). Many basic ideas of this theory are stated in Fomichov, V. A., & Fomi-chova, 0. S. (1993). In Section 2 the interrelations of teaching and of regularities of natural language understanding are analyzed. Section 3 shows the actuality of diminishing the starting age for studying foreign languages by children. In Section 4 main principles and composition of the DCM-theory are set forth. In Section 5 the use of dynamic conceptual mappings for explaining the rules of reading English letters to very young children is illustrated. Section 6 describes the successful results of using the methods of emotionally-imaginative teaching elaborated on the basis of the DCM-theory at lessons of English destined for children. First of aH, the elaborated methods permitted to teach 5- and 6-year-old children to read and to discuss complicated texts in English in Simple Present Tense or Simple Past Tense. In the most countries and in the most schools children are able to do this being 12 or 13 years old. In Section 7 the significance of the DCM-theory for education is analyzed. Section 8 is devoted to describing the significance of obtained results for cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and ap- plied epistemology. In particular, large possibilities of designing new intelligent tutoring systems are pointed out. 2 Teaching and Regularities of Natural Language Understanding 2.1 The role of natural language in teaching It is clear that a good carpenter is able to teach somebody his handicraft using a few of words or even without words. However, natural language (NL) is the chief instrument of teaching diverse theoretical disciplines. Although the set of teaching materials may include photographs, diagrams, objects like patterns of rocks, artificial constructions like models of molecules, etc., the destination and meaning of these materials, their interconnections are explained by means of NL. It is widely accepted that a text-book may be written by means of a "good language" or a "bad language". In the first case we mean that the materials of the text-book may be easily understood, and in the second case it is difficult for learners to master the information provided by the textbook. That's why it seems that theories of teaching should take into account the knowledge about the regularities of natural language understanding given by the modern science, and that a more deep attention to such regularities may contribute to the progress in education. 2.2 The role of knowledge about reality in natural language understanding The regularities of NL-understanding were studied intensively during the seventies and the eighties by specialists on constructing natural-language-processing systems (NLPSs), on cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics. As concerns NL-understanding by people, a highly important role in building mental representations of NL-texts is played by diverse cognitive models accumulated by people during the life: semantic frames, explanations of meanings of notions, prototypical scenarios, social stereotypes, representations of general regularities and area-specific regularities, and other knowledge of varied sorts determining, in particular, the use of metaphors and the creation of commitments for mutual orientation of dialogue participants (Johnson-Laird, P., 1983; Fauconnier, G., 1985; FiUmore, C., 1985; Seuren, P.A.M., 1985; Wino-grad, T. & Flores, F., 1986; Johnson, M., 1987; LakofF, G., 1987; Chernov, G.V., 1987; Fomi-chova, O.S., 1989, 1990). The experience of constructing NLPSs allows us to draw a similar conclusion about the role of knowledge about reality in NL-understanding. Nowadays it is widely accepted that a NLPS should contain a knowledge base and use diverse knowledge about reality for the processing of NL-texts. This may be necessary for finding the referents of personal and possessive pronouns in discourses, for reconstructing the meaning of incomplete (elliptical) phrases being fragments of discourses, for picking out one of several meanings of a word, for understanding metaphors and syntactically irregular phrases, etc. The role of knowledge about the world is especially high in interpreting the oral speech, since such a knowledge helps to divide the utterances into the fragments corresponding to lexical items. The mentioned ideas were the starting point for creating the DCM-theory and methods of emotionally-imaginative teaching. Besides, an important role was played by the approach of Pavilionis, R.J. (1985) to interpreting the mechanisms of NL-understanding. This approach belongs to the philosophy of language. The central place in the approach of Pavilionis occupies the notion of a conceptual system (CS) of a person. This is a system of interrelated information fragments reflecting the cognitive experience of an individual on different levels (including preverbal and non-verbal ones) and as concerns different aspects of cognition. The most abstract concepts of such systems are tied continuously with the concepts reflecting our every-day experience. Each subject of cognition has a CS including the knowledge and beliefs about real and possible states of affairs in the world. Every language expression is built in the framework of some CS. Analyzing texts, a recipient interprets them forming the conceptual pictures and using the available information. It should be taken into account that a recipient is able to assign meanings only to such texts which can be "inscribed" into his or her CS. It should be added that the approach of Pavilionis develops many ideas of the theory of speech acts proposed in the fifties-sixties by J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, and J. R. Searle. 3 The Problem of Diminishing the Starting Age for Teaching Children Foreign Languages In the modern world, the knowledge of foreign languages (FLs) is one of the important preconditions of the successful work in many areas of human activity. Nevertheless, studying FLs in schools is difficult for many pupils in diverse countries. That's why one of the actual problems of the theory of teaching is the development of methods making easier learning FLs by children. As it is noted in Rixon, S. (1992), fifteen years ago and until recently the dominant approach to teaching children FLs in schools was as foUows: FLs were studied in secondary schools beginning with the age 11 or more years. There are data showing the benefits of learning a FL in primary schools (see, in particular, Dabène, L. (1991)). First, children extend the time for attaining fluency and competence in a FL or FLs. Second, children have less disciplines to study and are able (if it is interesting for them) to give more efforts and time to learning a FL. That is why the problem of "early" language learning has been emerged in recent years and is being considered as a highly actual one in many countries of Europe, in U.S.A. and Canada. This problem is treated in different manners in diverse countries. In the context of the French educational structure, "early" language learning is starting to study a language one or two years before the beginning of secondary education (Dabène, L., 1991). In several other countries of Western Europe, during a number of years the initial ages for learning English have been as follows: The Netherlands - 10 years (since 1985), Denmark -9 years, Austria - 8 years (Rixon, S., 1992). In such countries as Spain, France, Italy, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, experimental projects have been realized aimed at teaching aU children of primary age a FL. The starting age in Israel is 10 years and the possibility exists to begin learning a FL being 9 years old in many schools (Rixon, S., 1992). In Russia in the most schools, pupils learn a FL beginning with the 6th grade being 11 or more years old. In big cities there are also the so called specialized schools, where the starting age for learning a FL is 7-8 years. One can observe a considerable interest to diminishing the initial age of learning a FL in U.S.A. In 1990, the programmes on studying a FL were offered by 22 % of elementary schools in U.S.A. (Met, M., & Rhodes, N., 1990; Arendt, J. D., & Warriner-Burke, H. P., 1990). However, the problem of teaching aU children a FL in primary schools is not easy. It is felt the lack of adequate text-books, curricula, and well-trained teachers. Especially difficult is to teach a child to master the rules of reading and the grammar of a FL because a child doesn't know sufficiently well even the grammar of the native language. Likely, due to these main reasons the starting age for teaching English in Germany in 1991 stayed 10-11 years, and the starting grade was the first grade of secondary education (Brusch, W., 1991). Thus, in many countries of Europe, in U.S.A., and in some other countries the problem of creating new methods of teaching FLs enabling to diminish the starting age for learning FLs and making easier and more interesting learning by children a FL is being considered as a highly actual one. 4 The Theory of Dynamic Conceptual Mappings: Main Principles and Composition 4.1 General characterization The Theory of Dynamic Conceptual Mappings (the DCM-theory) is a new theory of teaching and may be shortly characterized as a theory of bridging gaps between the conceptual systems (CSs) of a teacher and a learner. The central notion of the new theory of teaching is the notion of a dynamic conceptual mapping (DCM). We'll say about a mapping of the kind when a useful (from the standpoint of goals of teaching) correspondence is established during a lesson or in the course of reading a text-book between components of some fragment Fl and components of some other fragment F2 of the inner (or mental) world's picture of a learner. The following three types of mappings are considered in the theory as playing chief roles in teaching. First, mappings transforming some fragment of a material to be studied into more general mental representation (MR). Second, mappings transforming some fragment of the world's picture of a learner into more general MR. Third, isomorphic correspondences between generalized MR of a fragment of the inner world's picture of a learner and a generalized MR of a knowledge portion to be learned at a lesson. Thus, the DCM-theory pays a peculiar attention to the use of analogy in teaching. The central component of the DCM-theory is the description of a number of conceptual mappings realized for learning English. The following distinctive features of the DCM-theory should be underlined: (a) a great number of invented useful analogies; (b) the high complexity and originality of many invented analogies; (c) the unusual small age of learners successfully understanding these analogies: the children are 5 or 6 (and even in many cases 4.5) years old. 4.2 Main principles The DCM-theory is based on the following chief ideas: 1. On condition that the learners have some initial positive motivation to study a discipline, in developing a stable, strong positive motivation of learners a decisive role is played by regular repeating the feeling of success. 2. The collection of methods used by a specialist to teach some discipline may be interpreted as an algorithm of enriching conceptual systems, or inner world's pictures, of people by means of establishing dynamic cor- respondences between fragments of the inner world's pictures of a teacher and a learner. 3. The opportunity to establish such dynamic correspondences is afforded by the existence of some common part of teacher's and learner's C Ss. This common part is composed by mental representations of every-day situations, pictures of the nature, etc. The size of such a common part of knowledge may considerably vary and this greatly influences the results of teaching. Huge gaps between a CS of a teacher and a CS of a learner are the chief reason of difficulties in studying diverse disciplines. 4. If differences between CSs of a teacher and a learner are rather great (for instance, in the situation of studying the grammar of a foreign language by a child), new fragments of information should be introduced through special "channels" being the most close to the life experience and knowledge of a learner in order to be effectively understood (i.e., "inscribed" into a CS of a learner). The number of such special "channels" for introducing new difficult information may considerably vary for learners of diverse ages, professions, and cultures. In particular, young children have usually only the following channels: (a) fairy-tales and tales based on well known postulates of behavior; (b) situations of every-day life (including games). 5. Let's agree that the term "a teacher" may designate a school teacher, or a professor at a university, or an author of a text-book, etc. Then the process of entering new portions of information through special "channels" may be explained as follows. In such situations when the existence of a considerable gap between CSs of a teacher and a learner is obvious as concerns introducing new information, a teacher is to go beyond the set of notions used traditionally for explaining the information of the kind and is to invent (preferably, preliminarily) some new ways of explaining the material to be studied. Searching these new ways, a teacher is to take into account the knowledge about the full conceptual system of learner. A teacher must try to find in the learner's conceptual picture of the world such fragments which reflect situation similar (or isomorphic) in some generalized sense to situations taking place in teaching materials to be mastered by the learner. As a rule, this is possible to do. If such similar situations are discovered, a teacher must invent the ways understandable for the learner (the learners) and enabling to establish the correspondences between each such generalized situation and the situation expressed by the teaching material. Then a teacher should select such an analogy which seems to be an optimal one from the standpoint of introducing a new fragment of information pertaining to the studied discipline. The realization of this principle is explained in detail in the next section. 6. The inner content of the teaching process as a systematic directed realization of dynamic conceptual mappings determines the form of teaching from the point of view of people who are present at lessons. This form may be characterized as emotionally-imaginative teaching (this applies both to children and to adults). The main distinguished feature of this form is creating the feeling of success due to the use of numerous comparisons of studied theoretical situations with such situations which are well known to the learners. E.g., for children such a role is played by fairy-tales and games, for programmers—by algorithms and structured diagrams. 7. The students of higher educational establishments intending to work in the future as teachers are to master the methods of inventing effective mappings between CSs of a teacher and a learner. Besides the deep knowledge of special disciplines, this is the chief prerequisite of the successful work of a teacher. That's why it appears to be expedient to use for teaching such students special expressive means permitting to represent visually the fragments of conceptual systems of a teacher and a learner and correspondences between fragments of C Ss. In cases when the lack of such means is felt, it is expedient to develop new effective means of visual representing the fragments of conceptual systems and the correspondences between such fragments. 4.3 The composition of the DCM-theory The DCM-theory includes the following chief components: 1. Main principles. 2. Theoretical basis of highly effective teaching very young children (4-6 years old) the rules of reading English words. 3. Theoretical basis of highly effective teaching very young children (4-6 years old) chief constructions of English grammar (Simple Present Tense, Simple Past Tense, general and special questions). 4. Theoretical basis of improving the skill of young children and teenagers to read and communicate in English (see, in particular, Fomichov, V. A., & Fomichova, 0. S., 1993). This basis is mainly transportable as concerns teaching other FLs. 5. Theoretical basis of teaching Russian-speaking students and post-graduates to find implicit assessments of facts and hypotheses in papers in English on science and technology while translating or abstracting these papers (Fomichova, 0. S., 1989, 1990; Fomichov, V. A., & Fomichova, 0. S., 1993). This basis is transportable as concerns the other pairs of languages besides the English and the Russian. 6. New ways of visual representing diverse cognitive structures in order to teach students of higher institutions of learning to establish effective dynamic mappings between CSs of a teacher and a learner. The mentioned cognitive structures may be semantic representations of sentences and discourses (if it is needed, generalized representations), formal descriptions of notions, and other fragments of knowledge. The ground for these new ways is provided by Integral Formal Semantics (IFS)—a new, very powerful and flexible approach to the formalization of NL-semantics and NL-pragmatics. The basic ideas of IFS are described, in particular, in Fomitchov, V. A. (1984), Fomichov, V. (1988, 1992, 1993a, 1993b,1994). The main new visual means of the DCM-theory as concerns describing conceptual structures and conceptual mappings are based on the theory of K-calculuses, algebraic systems of conceptual syntax, and K-languages (see Fomichov, V., 1992) being the central constituent of IFS. These means are the strings of standard K-languages and oriented labeled graphs (K-graphs) equivalent to such strings. K-graphs provide a number of important advantages from the standpoint of representing semantic structure of sentences and discourses and representing knowledge blocks in comparison with traditional semantic nets and with conceptual graphs of Sowa, J. F. (1984). It should be noted that the expressive possibilities of standard K-languages are close to the expressive possibilities of NL. The task of describing these new ways of visual representing cognitive structures goes far beyond the scope of the present paper and wiU be the subject of future research work. 5 About Dynamic Conceptual Mappings for Teaching Very Young Children the Rules of Reading English Words Teaching very young, non-English-speaking children (4-6 years old) to read English words is a complicated problem. The principal difficulty consists in explaining why some letters or combinations of letters correspond to different sounds in some situations. Besides, most often the children of this age do not read quite well in a native language. The impossibility to overcome the mentioned difficulty is one of the main reasons of the situa- tion when all text-books on English published by 1992 in United Kingdom and destined for non-English-speaking children under seven years are oriented to the prereading stage of learning En-gUsh (Rixon, S., 1992). Let's illustrate the approach of the DCM-theory to solving this problem in teaching Russian-speaking young children. Consider the way of explaining the rule of reading the letter "Y" proposed by the DCM-theory. The discussed difficulty consists in explaining in a manner understandable for 4-6-year-old children why different letters "I" and "Y" denote the same sound in the words "time", "ice", "cry", "fly", etc. (suppose that children know already the rule of reading the letter "I"). Taking into account the age of learners, to find an appropriate approach to this problem is not easily. The DCM-theory suggests the following solution proved to be highly effective. A possible mental representation (MR) of the knowledge portion which is to be understood by children may be depicted visually by the semantic net on the Figure 1. Let's mark this MR by the expression 1-T, where the symbol "T" corresponds to the word "a teacher". The MR 1-T is a fragment of the conceptual system (CS) of a teacher. One can formulate the following generalization of the discussed situation: "The letters XI and X2 are not alike, but on some conditions the letter X2 may sound as the letter XI." Hence it will be quite natural for a teacher to transform the MR 1-T into a more general MR corresponding to the meaning "The entities XI and X2 are not alike, but on some conditions the entity X2 possesses a property coinciding with some property of the entity XI". When such a transformation is realized, we start to recall the fairy-tales and games where the same generalized situation may be discovered. We map the fairytale and game situations into diverse generalized MRs. The fairy-tale "The Wolf and the Seven Little Kids" is widely known. That's why we can discover quickly that this fairy-tale includes a situation similar to the generalized MR of a situation relating to the pronunciation of letters "I" and "Y" Figure 1: The semantic net depicting a fragment 1-T of the conceptual system of a teacher; "Ent" means "Entity", "Pr" means "Property", and "Cond" means "Condition". The Figure 2 depicts visually in the form of a semantic net a possible MR of one of situations described in the considered fairy-tale. Recalling this fairy-tale is a success: it is clear for us that an isomorphic correspondence can be established between MRs 1-T and 2-T. The ground for establishing such a useful correspondence is given by the mapping assigning to the Wolf-Deceiver the letter "Y" and to the Mummy Goat the letter "I". Let's say that the mappings of the kind are analogy-forming conceptual mappings. The mentioned mapping determines a more large conceptual mapping assigning to the elements of the fragment 2-T the elements of the fragment 1-T. A a consequence, a correspondence is established between MRs 2-T and 1-T. A teacher knows that the CS of a child includes a fragment 2-L identical to the fragment 2-T of the teacher's CS. Hence a teacher should contribute to creating in the CS of each learner a fragment 1-L identical to the fragment 1-T . In order to do this, a teacher invents some thrilling form (preferably, a fairy-tale-like form) adequate to the CS of a learner. As a result, a correspondence between fragments 2-L and 1-L will be established similar to the correspondence between fragments 2-T and 1-T. Due to this correspondence, a child will be able to understand and remember the rule of reading the letter "Y". For example, a teacher may teU the following story: The letter "Y" wanted to be alike the letter "I". I suppose that the letter "Y" liked the cap of the letter "I" very much. But "Y" quite understood that she wasn't alike "I". However, she remembered a fairy-tale "The Wolf and the Seven Little Kids". It was clear for the Wolf that he didn't resemble the Mummy Goat and the only way out was to change his voice. So he did, and Seven Little Kids confused him with their Mummy Goat. So did the letter "Y". She started to sound like the letter "I" in all positions except one. In the beginning of the word the letter "Y" sounds like herself [j], but her voice begins to sound not so lovely because she always tries to resemble "I" and forgets about her own voice. Be careful, children, try not to resemble some- Figure 2: The semantic net visually representing a fragment 2-T of the conceptual system of a teacher; "Ent" means "Entity", "Pr" means "Property", and "Cond" means "Condition". body but yourself. And in this situation I'm sure your voice will be the most beautiful. The experience shows (see the next section) that children listen to this story with great delight and discuss it cheerfully. They identify the letters "I" and "Y" with the Mummy Goat and the Wolf-Deceiver, respectively. As a consequence, they remember easily the rule of reading the letter "Y". A number of other dynamic conceptual mappings is invented for effective teaching young children to read English words. 6 The Methods of Emotionally-imaginative Teaching English The ideas of the DCM-theory enabled us, in particular, to develop new, highly effective methods of teaching English called the methods of emotionally-imaginative teaching (the EIT-methods). These methods have been successfully tested during four years in teaching approximately two hundred young children and teenagers (4-16 years old) in experimental groups in the Moscow Children and Teenagers Palace for Creative Work on Vorob'yovy HiUs by Doctor of Philology Olga Fomichova. Naturally, the EIT-methods are differentiated in accordance with the age of children. Shortly the results may be described as follows. The starting age for studying English is five, or six, or in many cases four-and-half years. Children of one group may be of different ages. After the first year of studying English in experimental groups 5- or 6-year-old children know theoretically Simple Present Tense and Simple Past Tense, can use these tenses in dialogues, know special and general questions. For instance, children are able to read and to discuss quite well the fairy-tale about Cinderella in Simple Past Tense containing approximately 300 words (see the Appendix 1). Children also like to compose their own fairytales (see the Appendix 2). The EIT-methods have permitted to make a discovery in teaching young children foreign languages: it has been turned out that the preread-ing stage is not necessary for children under 7 years (despite of the widely accepted opinion ex- pressed in Rixon, S., 1992). Really at lessons of 0. S. Fomichova children begin to read after four lessons being acquainted with all English letters. Children who have been studying English during two years compose their own scripts of the Christmas party in English. During the first three months of the third year of studies children read and discuss unadapted edition of "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland", speak fluently on topics of every-day life. Thus, new methods of teaching give a growing from year to year educational success. One of interesting results is as follows: the children begin to read in native (Russian) language. It should be added that: (1) children don't visit English-speaking countries; (2) the duration of lessons twice a week is only 45 minutes (each group consists of twelve children); (3) children of the first year don't attend schools and have no experience of the work at lessons. The EIT-methods provide the possibility not only to teach effectively English but also to influence positively the development of the personality of a learner. The new methods develop creative capabilities of children, the feeling of success, the capability to master actively the knowledge (in particular, to work independently with a text-book and with other teaching materials), the confidence of own forces. AU children of very different ages (from 4 to 16 years) go to lessons of English with a great joy. After 5 months of the third year of studies children are able to describe pictures of the nature, their feelings relating to the nature, and, as a consequence, to describe landscapes. They can not only penetrate the vision of artists but also describe their feelings in a very poetical way. Consider the examples of such descriptions. Example 1. "I see the beautiful winter landscape. The sky is deepest blue, as blue, as the water of the sea. The snow like carpets covers the ground and is gleaming in sunshine. Far away deep woods are lucent and serene. The forest stream dreams under the ice, which gleams with silver. I see a birch in the middle of the glade near the road leading down to the river. The air is frosty and lucent." (Andrey Todua, the 3rd year of studies, 9 years old.) Example 2. "Stars twinkle and glimmer; they flame in the sky, The moon gets yellow in the heaven's high. The wood is soft-murmuring in the gloom of the night, And everything dreams in the magic light." (Natasha Loseva, the 3rd year of studies, 8 years old.) Example 3. "The sky is aglow with the stars And I'm sitting on the grass. The moon is yellow as brass And cats are singing in the cars." (Katya Safonova, the 3rd year of studies, 11 years old.) It was their home task, but children are able to speak about landscapes and portraits just on the spot, without a preliminary work. They can not only feel but also express their feelings looking at the picture. An original way of achieving such a successful result of teaching English is explained in Fomi-chov, V. A., k Fomichova, 0. S. (1993). This way is based on realizing in the course of teaching DCMs of kinds not considered in the present paper. Thus, lessons of English permit not only to learn a FL but also to bring up a child to love the nature. A part of EIT-methods is destined for working with teenagers being 12-16 years old. The elaborated methods enable not only to teach English but also to teach teenagers to understand other people (in particular, to understand their parents), to understand how other people see them; to develop the feeling of beauty, the feeling of success, the feeling of a leader, and the interest to studies. As experience shows convincingly, aU this soothes considerably the difficulties of the transitional age, positively influences the interrelations between teenagers and their parents, between one teenager and the other teenagers, contributes to the future successes in studies. The successes of young children have enabled the second author to teach them during the 4th year of studies not only, English, but also German as a second FL. For teaching German two languages are being used: English (as the main language) and Russian. The progress of children (8-10-year-old) in German is very quick because they have a good linguistic basis. 7.1 The Significance of the Theory of Dynamic Conceptual Mappings for Education Teaching very young children foreign languages The obtained results show that a decisive breakthrough is made in diminishing the starting age for teaching children to read and communicate in English. In the most countries and in the most schools the starting age for learning a foreign language (FL) is 11 years. Children studying in experimental groups read quite weU and discuss complicated texts in Simple Present Tense or Simple Past Tense being five or six years old. Hence the EIT-methods have afforded the opportunity to gain at least 5 years or even 6 years in learning English. The same methods may be used, for example, for teaching French-, German-, Dutch-, Greek-, Italian-, Spanish-speaking children to read and communicate in English. The developed new effective methods may be used not only for teaching English, but also, after some adaptation and transformation, for teaching a number of other languages. 7.2 Teaching English-speaking young children to read fluently in native language There are weighty grounds to believe that the elaborated EIT-methods may be successfully applied to the speeded-up (in comparison with traditional methods of primary school) teaching English-speaking children (the age from 4 to 6 years) to read fluently in native language and to express their thoughts. The accumulated data allow us to conjecture that this will positively influence the development of the personality of a child and create excellent preconditions for the successful study in primary school. 7.3 Teaching children mathematics and other disciplines The ideas of the DCM-theory are helpful not only for teaching FLs or native language. On the basis of the DCM-theory, one of the authors of this paper developed methods of emotionally-imaginative teaching young children mathematics and tested these methods in two experimental groups of a primary school. One group consisted of 6-year-old children, the other—of 7-year-old children. Due to invented dynamic conceptual mappings, children mastered easily, with joy, very quickly the mathematical notions relating to arithmetics, algebra, and set theory. According to traditional methods, one learn some of these notions being much older (in particular, 4 or 5 years older). It seems that the successful experience of applying the ideas of the DCM-theory to teaching such distinct disciplines as foreign language and mathematics indicates large opportunities of using the DCM-theory in teaching diverse disciplines. 7.4 The significance of obtained results for education as a whole The EIT-methods elaborated in Moscow have permitted to achieve an extremely great progress in solving the actual problem of diminishing the starting age of learning English. The basis for this progress is provided by the DCM-theory. Numerous invented conceptual mappings realized by means of both known and specially composed fairy-tales have permitted to find a key to the rich inner world of children, to "switch on" their vivid fantasy in order to create the preconditions for understanding complicated rules of reading and English grammar. It should be mentioned that the complexity of DCMs invented for explaining the use of Simple Present Tense and Simple Past Tense is higher than in case of explaining the rule of reading the letter "Y". Nevertheless, 5- and 6-year-old children master quite easily the use of these tenses due to the thrilling form of explaining grammatical constructions. The significance of the DCM-theory and EIT-methods goes far beyond the limits of teaching children FLs (although this direction of applying results is highly actual). In fact, it is discovered that the educational potential of children is very high, much higher than it is widely accepted to suppóse. Children, and even very young children, may master complicated teaching materials quickly and (what is the most important) with joy, without excessive straining their forces, without the damage for own health but with great benefit for the development of the own personality. That's why it appears that the DCM-theory and EIT-methods create the prerequisites for the emergence of a new wave of investigations in education with the following aims: (a) to find and distinguish such fragments of knowledge described in school text-books and pertaining to diverse disciplines which are the most difficult to understand for pupils; (b) taking into account peculiarities of conceptual systems of children from varied age groups and countries, to invent special DCMs for overcoming such difficulties in learning school disciplines; (c) to write new experimental text-books and to develop new syllabuses for using in the course of teaching special DCMs making easier studying various disciplines; (d) to apply these new experimental text-books and syllabuses to teaching children in schools, to correct (if it is necessary) these new text-books and syllabuses, and to elaborate text-books and syllabuses for the wide use. Our results allow us to hope that very many pupils and, as a consequence, their parents in varied countries wiU benefit from investigations of the kind. 7.5 The visual means of the Artificial Intelligence Theory and teachers preparation Basic ideas of the artificial intelligence (AI) theory stimulated the birth of the DCM-theory. The example in Section 5 shows that the use of semantic nets provides the possibility to represent highly visually the correspondences between fragments of people's conceptual systems interpreted as DCMs. That's why one can draw the conclusion that it will be worth while to acquaint students intending to work in the future as teachers with basic ideas of the Al-theory and with the visual means of representing semantic structures of NL-texts, structures of conceptual memory, knowledge blocks (modules). As it is widely known, the inventory of such means includes, in particular, semantic nets, frame-like knowledge representation languages, conceptual graphs of Sowa, J. F. (1984). Besides, very large opportunities to build semantic representations of sentences and discourses and to describe knowledge blocks are provided by strings of standard K-languages (see Fomichov, V., 1992, Sections 6-9) and by oriented labeled graphs (K-graphs) equivalent to such strings. The study of visual means of the Al-theory by the future teachers should be subordinated to the task of learning how one can invent DCMs making essentially easier the understanding of difficult knowledge portions by children. It may be presumed that the use of visual means of the Al-theory for representing diverse cognitive structures will be of considerable benefit from the standpoint of teaching how to invent effective DCMs. 8 The Significance of Obtained Results for Cognitive Science, Artificial Intelligence, and Applied Epistemology 8.1 The significance for Cognitive Psychology The success achieved in teaching very young' children to read and communicate in English on the basis of using numerous fairy-tale-like analogies shows that children have a great cognitive potential, which has been often underestimated before. Hence the obtained results in teaching children English may be interpreted as raising a new voluminous task before cognitive psychologists: the task of investigating (jointly with teachers) the manners and effectiveness of using diverse dynamic conceptual mappings for teaching children (possessing diverse capabilities and belonging to diverse age groups) various disciplines. It seems that such investigations may considerably contribute to solving the problem of elaborating new, unified theories of cognition posed by NeweU, A. (1990). consider the language "as an instrument for organizing, processing, and conveying information... The formal structures of languages are studied not as if they were autonomous, but as reflections of general conceptual organization, categorization principles, processing mechanisms, and experiential and environment£il influences" (Geeraerts, D., 1990, p. 1). The successful results of emotionally-imaginative teaching young children English give a new powerful confirmation of the truth of at least one basic idea of cognitive linguistics. This is the idea that there exists no syntax as an autonomous subsystem of language system. Syntax should depend on descriptions of cognitive structures, on semantics of NL. NL-understanding by people doesn't include the phase of constructing the pure syntactic representations of texts. The transition from a NL-text to its mental model is carried out on the basis of various knowledge and is of integral character (Johnson-Laird, P., 1983; Seuren, P. A. M., 1985; Lakoff, G., 1987; Chernov, G. V., 1987; Caron, J., 1989; Langacker, R. W., 1990). Children taught according to the EIT-methods do not study the syntactic structures of English phrases, the use of Simple Present Tense and Simple Past tense in a manner widely accepted in schools (most often, in secondary schools). These rules are successfully introduced due to invented DCMs based on specially composed fairy-tales and on every-day experience of children. This is the main reason of unusual effectiveness of the DCM-theory and EIT-methods as concerns teaching children English as a FL. There are grounds to believe that a more detailed analysis of the DCM-theory and EIT-methods may allow us to establish a number of additional interrelations with the ideas of cognitive linguistics. With respect to obtained results, it may be supposed that cognitive linguists are able to contribute greatly to making easier the study of foreign and native languages at schools. 8.2 The significance for Cognitive Linguistics During the second half of the eighties in linguistics the formation of a new branch was completed called cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguists 8.3 Education, the Artificial Intelligence Theory, and Applied Epistemology Taking into account our experience, we believe that the specialists on AI and on applied episte- mology may make an important contribution to solving a number of actual problems of education. Let's restrict now to the following two aspects. First, they may acquaint students—future teachers with the existing visual means for representing diverse cognitive structures (see also Subsection 7.5). Second, such specialists dealing during many years with semantic representations of NL-texts, structures of conceptual memory, knowledge blocks, etc. may use their professional knowledge for inventing effective dynamic conceptual mappings destined for studying diverse disciplines. 8.4 The design of new Intelligent Tutoring Systems In the end of the eighties the principles of a new paradigm for constructing intelligent tutoring systems (ITSs) were formulated by Self, J. (1988) and were realized in the works of a number of researchers. The distinguished features of the new paradigm are the help to a learner in carrying out an independent research work, in enriching the knowledge and the skill as concerns studied disciplines, and in developing general creative capabilities of learners. For this, amicable (friendly) interfaces of ITSs are to be built. Johnson, W. L. (1991, p. 129) notes that "a key concern of current tutoring systems is how to relate the expert knowledge that the student will acquire to the commonsense knowledge that he or she already knows". That's why the new paradigm for building ITSs excellently harmonizes with the key ideas of the DCM-theory and elaborated EIT-methods. These methods are based on (a) numerous invented conceptual mappings permitting to compare studied fragments of a discipline with situations weU known to learners, (b) special kinds of tasks developing the creative potential of learners. The accumulated rich teaching materials can be successfully used for constructing ITSs destined to master (a) English as a FL by children or by adults, (b) the rules of reading and writing in English by English-speaking young children. In Fomichov, V. A., & Fomichova, 0. S. (1993) the idea is stated about working out some special sorts of ITSs for learning FLs. Such ITSs are to have an amicable NL-interface aiding to study the language means for describing the nature, the feelings evoked by nature. The means of the kind are necessary both for carrying out various activities on the nature and for understanding lectures on art, discussing landscapes. Additionally, the DCM-theory and EIT-methods may stimulate the elaboration of ITSs in accordance with the modern paradigm for learning other FLs, besides English, and other disciplines, besides foreign language (for example, mathematics). The obtained experience of highly effective teaching very young children to read and communicate in English as a FL enables us to formulate a simple, but important recommendation concerning such an unsimilar, at first sight, scientific problem as the realization of the Knowledge Archives project. As it is mentioned in the introduction, one of the tasks to be solved by the Knowledge Archives is to unite the knowledge about diverse cultures. The difference between two cultures may be very considerable, not less than the difference between conceptual systems of a young child and of adults belonging to one culture. That's why we propose to develop and to include into the Knowledge Archives special intelligent interfaces (they may be called culture interfaces) enabling the carriers of one culture to perceive effectively the peculiarities of studied another culture, to overcome gaps between the native and studied cultures. For instance, some special electronic course describing the every-day life and even the meaning of diverse gestures in Russia of the 19th century might make easier for a Japanese or an Indian the understanding of the Russian literature of this period. On the contrary, practical ignoring the existence of huge gaps between many pairs of cultures will highly diminish the élfectiveness of interchanging information between such cultures. 9 Conclusions The methods of emotionally-imaginative teaching based on the theory of dynamic conceptual mappings have permitted to discover that the educational potential of very young children (4-6-year-old) is very high, considerably higher than it is widely accepted to believe. The residts de- scribed above open many new important possibilities for the joint effective research work of teachers, university specialists on education, cognitive psychologists, cognitive linguists, specialists on AI and applied epistemology. As a consequence, this promises to enlarge essentially the opportunities of children to learn with joy. Besides, we expect that the ideas expressed above will be of considerable use for building more effective Intelligent Tutoring Systems destined for adults and for the realization of the Knowledge Archives project. APPENDIX 1 The full text of the fairy-tale which is fluently read and discussed by aU 5- and 6-year-old Russian children after the first year of studying English in experimental groups of 0. Fomichova in the Moscow Children and Teenagers Palace for Creative Work on Vorob'yovy Hills. CINDERELLA Long ago, in a land far away, there lived a man. He had a kind and beautiful daughter. His wife died and he married again. The stepmother was cruel and unkind. Each night the girl sat among the cinders by the hearth, staring sadly into the fire. Her stepsisters noticed this and called her Cinderella. In the day time she washed dishes, swept the floor, kept the house clean, worked in the kitchen-garden, watered the flowers, cooked the meal. One day the King's son made up his mind to hold a ball. Everyone went to the ball except Cinderella. But suddenly a bright light lit up the dark kitchen. It was a fairy. The fairy went into the garden and waved her wand over a large pumpkin and it immediately turned into a beautiful golden coach. Then she turned six white mice into six fine horses. A fat rat became a coachman and two lizards became fine footmen. She gave Cinderella a beautiful gown and shining glass slippers. In the Palace Cinderella was the most beautiful girl. She danced much and was happy. But suddenly she remembered about fairy's warning. At twelve o 'clock Cinderella ran off through the garden. The Prince ran after her and found a glass slipper. When Cinderella reached home, the golden coach had disappeared and instead of her beautiful gown she wore her old dress again. Next morning the Prince announced that he was in love with the mysterious girl and would marry the girl who could wear the tiny slipper. The Prince's servants travailed through the town and asked each girl to try the slipper on. Cinderella tried the slipper too. It fitted perfectly. Stepmother was outraged. Cinderella became a Prince's bride. They were married just a few days later and the whole kingdom was happy. APPENDIX 2 Here there is an example of the tale composed by Anya Orlova in the end of the first year of studies. She is five years old. THE FAIRY-TALE ABOUT TWO KITTENS Long ago, in a land far away, there lived two cats. They had two kittens. One of them was white and one of them was black. Their names were Murka and Barsik. Every night the kittens sat among the toys staring sadly into the window, because they wanted to go to their grandmother. In the day time they helped their mother: watered the flowers, kept the house clean, worked in the kitchengarden, swept the floor, cooked the meal, washed dishes. One day the mother made up her mind to send the kittens to the grandmother. Everyone went except the father. But suddenly the mother decided to send the kittens alone. The kittens went alone. While the kittens went through the forest, they picked the flowers. The grandmother was a fairy. She waved her wand over the flowers and they immediately turned into two little puppies sleeping in the basket. Next day the kittens and the puppies went to the cinema. The film was very interesting. It was about Mutroskin cat. The kittens and the puppies were happy. But suddenly they remembered about grandmother's warning: not to be late at home. The kittens and the puppies ran off through the street. The grandmother cooked their favorite dish. It was an apple-pie. They ate it with pleasure and thanked the grandmother. Next day they returned home. The mother and the father were happy. They presented to them five interesting books and promised them to send kittens to the grandmother next summer. It should be added that twenty from twenty four 5- and 6-year-old Russian children studying in experimental groups of 0. S. Fomichova in Moscow during one year (eight months) can compose the tales of the kind. The other four children are able to compose simpler tales. Besides, if the children listen for the first time to a tale of the same volume composed by a girl or a boy from their group, they remember quite well this tale and can reteU it actively just on the spot. This proves the high effectiveness of elaborated methods of emotionally-imaginative teaching children English and positive influence of these methods on the development of the personality of a child. References [1] Arendt, J. D., Warriner-Burke, H. P., 1990, Teaching all students: reaching and teaching students of varying abilities, Foreign Language Annals (New York), Vol. 23, No. 5, 445-452. 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P., 1992, Towards an Informational Language, Cybernetica, Vol. XXXV, No. 2, 139-158. [36] Železnikar, A. P., 1993a, Mission and Research Reports, Informatica (Slovenia), Vol. 17, No. 1, 81-100. [37] Železnikar, A. P., 1993b, Towards an informational orientation, Informatica, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 1. [38] Železnikar, A. P., 1993c, Metaphysicalism of informing, Informatica, Vol. 17, No. 1, 65-80. INFORMATIONAL BEING-IN Anton P. Železnikar Volaričeva ulica 8, 61111 Ljubljana, Slovenia anton.p.zeleznikar@ijs.si Keywords: abduction, Being-in, Being-in-the-world, circularity, decomposition, deduction, external-ism, informational includedness (involvement, embedding), induction, inference, informational modi (ponens, toUens, rectus, obliquus), internalism, metaphysicalism, parallelism, phenomenalism, reasoning, serialism Edited by: Oliver B. Popov Received: February 8, 1994 Revised: April 18, 1994 Accepted: April 28, 1994 In this paper the phenomenon of informationa,! Being-in, that is, includedness is studied in a formally recursive (informational) way, dealing with basic definitions of includedness (informational in-volvement, em-bedding) and their consequences. It seems that the informational includedness is a phenomenon of informational entities, which involves them in a perplexedly recursive way and offers the richness of the informationally spontaneous parallelism, serialism, and circularity. In this respect, together with its informational openness and recursiveness, informational Being-in can come semantically as close as possible to its philosophical notion (concept) [2, 1]. Some includable structured phenomena of inference or reasoning (deduction, induction, abduction, modus ponens, tollens, rectus, and obliquus) are shown in a formal manner. The disposed formal apparatus enables an unbounded and even deepened philosophical investigation of the phenomenon of Being-in and its consequences. So, a formalistic investigation of informational Being-in can enrich its philosophical understanding. 1 Introduction Being-in is the original term coined by Heidegger (in German, In-Sein or In-sein, in English, inhood) [2]. Informational Being-in^ belongs to the most significant existentiales of the informational. "When someone calls our attention to the fact that 'in' also has an existential sense which expresses involvement, ...we tend to think of this as a metaphorical deviation from physical inclusion." (Dreyfus in [1], p. 41.) Informational 'in' means informationally involved, distributed and, for example, being dual in the sense of energy and information (Šlechta in [5], the Hamiltonians Hei and Hie in equations 14 and 15, respectively). "Grimm goes on to argue that the preposition 'in' is derived from the verb, rather than the verb from the preposition." ([2], p. 80.) This conclusion is ^This paper is a private author's work and no part of it may be used, reproduced or translated in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles. essential, for Being-in in the informational has an active (verb-like, operational) role. Being-in belongs to primordial situations concerning informational entities. It is a consequence of informing of entities and vice versa. In this paper, the basic informational properties of the phenomenon, state, or process termed Being-in wiU be studied. Instead of the philosophical term Being-in, the term includedness (or informational includedness) wiU be frequently used, which comes closer to the formal terminology in traditional mathematics (e.g., the notion of a subset), but is essentially different in its existential (in-formingly arising) nature if compared with the categorical (reductionistic) relation of inclusion. Informational includedness is a new term, determined in an informationally recursive way (circularly) and, in this respect, extending the structure of informational includedness boundlessly in an includable way. Being-in is an informational existentiale, a for- mal existential expression, which concerns Being-in-the-world (informational realm of the exterior) as its essential state. An informational entity (thing, matter) informs as the entity in the world (its environment, informational region, within itself). The world is the synonym of that in which an entity informs, that is, the informational entity embracing informational realm. The question is, how can this general view (an entity's informational openness, interweavement, or connectedness) be considered in its informational entirety. When an informational formula occurs as part of a larger formula, it is said to be in included position (see [13], included ppl. a.); otherwise it is said to be in absolute position and to constitute an informational entity. Some morphemes occur in included position, either partial or complete. In some sentences there are devices that signal the inclusion of two or more separate sentences. The included position is that had by a word, phrase or other linguistic form when it is part of a larger form. All of these forms of in-cludedness are classical and do not embrace con-ceptualism of the informational includedness as, for instance, a distributed involvement of an entity within an informational realm. The task of the present study is to develop and formalize a general concept of the Being-in of an informational entity, where this concept can be particularized according to the specific informational needs and occurring circumstances. 2 Being-in qua Informing A philosophy of informational includedness roots in the philosophical notion of Being-in (for example, [2], fl2) as an informational (philosophical) phenomenon which concerns the entity's Being. As we shall see, Being-in of something can meaningly never be exhausted, it simply does not come to an end because of its recursively open informational nature. So we have to present this informational virtue, faculty, or property of something in a strict formal way, that is, by systems of informational formulas describing the phenomenon of Being-in. The informational includedness means something essentially different in respect to the set-theoretical inclusion in mathematics, although the symbols C and D (the alternative to c) are used to mark both phenomena. How does Being-in, that is, informational includedness inform? As a property of something which informs in a broader realm, it must be expressed as includedness, that is, as something concerning the informational operator (for example, Nin, Hinciude or, simply, C, which read 'is in', 'is included in' or 'is an informational part of, respectively). Informational includedness means functional involvement of an entity into the informing of the other entity and itself. The Being-in as such always concerns an entity, that is, something, marked by a. As a phenomenon, the Being-in is involved in something in an informational way. According to [9], we introduce the following four modes of the informational existentiale concerning something a in an includable way: a C C a a C a \ a C; C a reads as: a informs includingly; a's externalism of including; a is/are included (in); reads as: a is informed includingly; a's internalism of including; a include(s); reads as: a informs includingly itself and is informed includingly by itself; a's metaphysicalism of including; a includes and is included in itself; reads as: a informs includingly and is informed includingly; a's phenomenalism of including; a includes and is included To fulfill the existential criteria of includedness, evidently, entity a informationaUy includes (involves) some informing entities and is informationaUy included in (involved by) some informing entities. In this point of the study, the question arises, what could the meaning (interpretation) of the formalized forms of informational includedness of something be? The formalized externalistic interpretation of includedness could be the following: («C) (aH C) \ where E(a C) is an element of the informational power set (symbol V) with 16 elements (including the empty set 0), that is. / C) € P \ («h)c, (h ") C a, (a 1=) C a In general, an informational set {0:1,02, • • •, a^} is interpreted as the parallel system (array) of entities, that is, {"1, "2, • • ■, "n} ("i; 02; • • • ; a„) The formalized internalistic interpretation of in-cludedness is, for example. (C a) fa\=; N h«; H(C a)eV (a (N a) C a, (N«)c (a C a) ^a^a; ] I S(a C a) where E{a C a) e V{{a \= a}) and the phenomenalistic case (a C;C a) N"; H(a C); \E{Ca)) previously shown examples (includable external-ism, internalism, metaphysicalism, and phenomenalism). Definition 1 [Informational Includedness] Let entity a inform within entity ß, that is, a C ß. This expression reads: a informs within (is an informational component or constituent of) ß. Let the following parallel system of includedness (Being-in) he defined recursively: (a C ß) ^Def (ß\=a-, \ a h/5; {E{aCß)J where E!(c a) is an element of the power set, that is. where for the extensional part !E!(a C ß) of the includedness a C ß, there is, S(a cß)ev {ß\=a)c (/Ö N ") C o, \[{a\=ß)ca The metaphysicalistic case of includedness interpretation could be The most complex element of this power set is denoted by C /3) (/3^0) C/3, of \{a\=ß)cß,a ^ These are initial cases of includedness and each of them speaks in its own way, so various interpretations are possible. 3 A Definition and Consequences of Informational Includedness Let us introduce the basic definition of informational includedness which will cover also the four Cases, where E{a C /3) ^ 0 and 0 denotes an empty entity (informational nothing), are exceptional (reductionistic). □ Consequence 1 [An Extension of Informational Includedness] Let us introduce the following markers: m = m = f e N N . e G iß,a} Then, the cases of includedness within E-elements in Definition 1 induce, evidently, P h«) C O ^ {ia\=ß)cO - {iß\=a)Cß,a) ^ ((ah/3) C/3, a) ^ where E{ia\=ß)cß,ay. a ( 0(0; E{{ß t= a) C O) mi ] H((a h iS) C o) (m-, 0(a); [E((ßl=a)cß,aJ fm; é(a); [E((a^ß)Cß,aJ ( Eiiß h a) C ßy\ [E{{ß h «) C a) j [Eiiß N «) C a) j (a C ß) ^Def Eiiß ^a)Cß)£V iß^iß\= «)) C ß, {ß\={ßh «)) C a, ((/? N «) N C a J the second one 5((a ^ ß) C ß) e V the third one Eiiß N C a) € P and the fourth one Eiia ^ß)Ca)eV N h ß)) C ß,^^ ((a \=ß)\=ß)cß, iß\=ia^ß))Ca, iia^ß)^ß)Ca (a 1= (/? t= a)) C ß,^^ iiß \=a)^a)cß, ia\=iß\= a)) C a, [iiß\=a)]^a)Ca (a h (a N ß)) C ß,] iia\=ß)^a)cß, (a t= (a N ß)) C a, Ha ]=ß)\=a)Ca a Instead of proving this consequence, let us extend recursively Definition 1 one step deeper. Consequence 2 [A Further Extension of Informational Includedness] According to the basic definition of includedness, there is recursively, (ß^a-, C /?) ^ (ß^iß\=a)-, \ (/? N «) h ß\ Eiiß N «) C /3); iö N (« h ß)\ ia^ß)\= /3; Eiia \=ß)C ß); a\=iß\^ a); N «) N Eiiß N «) C a); (a N /?) N \\Eiia\=ß)Ca)J) where, for instance, the first extensional part is Within this consequence, the circular structures of the form iiß h a) N ß); iß^ia\= /3)); Ha \=ß)\= a); N (/? N «)) belonging to the first, second, third, and fourth extension will become significant in the context of entity metaphysicalism. Let us explain in short the meaning of informational operators ^Defj C, G, = and, through this explanation, point out the difference regarding the equally marked mathematical operators and relations. Let have the following interpretation: ^ mean(s), informs meaningly; ^Def mean(s) by definition; C informs within (includingly); G is an element of informational set of entities, informational lumps; = is a marker for, is the same as; The meaning of an informational operator correlates with the meaning of the meaningly adequate verbal phrase which expresses an informational activity, happening, occurring, state, position, attitude, etc. The meaning of a mathematical operator concerns solely the mathematically weU-defined abstract objects. 4 Informational Consequences of Includedness The most characteristic consequences of informational includedness are circular forms of parallelism and seriaUsm. 4.1 Parallelism and Serialism of Includedness The includedness of an informational entity in concern to an informational entity induces a certain phenomenon of parallelism and serialism. More precisely, includedness generates informational circularity in the form of parallel and serial cycles which are of essential significance in emerging of the so-called metaphysicalism. Metaphys-icalism shapes the background for the arising of cognitive and intelligent information, by mixing of intelligent informational lumps and composing them by intelligent selection into informational structures performing understanding, generating meaning, that is, cognizing. The parallelism of a C /? is already observed in Definition 1, where a C /3 is a parallel structure of transitions ß \= a, a \= ß, and extension B(q: C ß). This structure is circularly-parallel in components ß |= a; a |= /3 in respect to ß via (implicitly) a, that is, in a parallel transitive way. On the other hand, the extensional part of informational includedness E!(q; C ß) in Definition 1, can be chosen, for instance, as C /3) ^ (/3 N a) C ß-} (a N /?) C /3 , This structure is circularly serial in respect to ß via a, etc. [e.g., C ß) is circularly serial also in respect to a via ß]. 4.2 Parallelism of Includedness In some respect, the parallelism of includedness is straightforward, that is, informationally transparent. As we shall see, the parallel includedness can be defined in a common way (a mathematical fashion), moving from one 'relation' of includedness to the other. Consequence 3 [Transitivity of Parallel Informational Includedness] Let for informational entities ai, aj, and a k be ai C oij\aj C «A;- Then, the implication pertaining to the includable transitivity, {ai C aj;aj C ak) (a,- C ak) is informationally righteous. □ Proof. The intuitive proof of the consequence belongs to the semantics of a language (speech). If ai informationally involves aj and if aj informationally involves ak, then, in a language-logical sense, ai involves ak informationally via entity aj. Another, more formalistic proof of the consequence follows from the axiomatic concept of the informing of entities. Informational operator C has to be comprehended as a particular case of operator |=. In case of parallel informing a 1= /3; /3 ^ 7, there follows a |= 7. Q.E.D. Consequence 4 [Parallelism of Informational Includedness] Let for informational entities ai, «2, • • •, a„ be Oli C ai+i; i = l,2,---,n- 1. This formula depicts a parallel system of includedness, that is, C «2; 0:2 C «3; a„_i C a„ which is transitively includable and parallel straightforward. There is. oii+i \= Qi; Ö.- 1= "i-t-i; E{ai C ai+i) i = l,2,---,n- 1 This parallel system implies the parallelism of different elementary informational forms of entities «1, «2, • • •, a„ in a parallel descending, ascending, and also circular order regarding index i and the system's structural dependence on the includable extensions E{ai C Oi-i-i) (i = 1,2, • ■ •, n — 1). □ Proof. Let us look the parallel elementary structures, that is, parallel components of the parallel included system. There is fai C as; ^ «2 C as; V«n-1 C On/ /«n h "n-i; 1= "2; H(ai C 0:2); : «2 1= «a; 5(a2 C 03); "3 \= 0i2\ : : «i; a„_i 1= a„; S;(a„_i C a„) j Different forms of H's are possible, conditioning the nature of the elementary circularity between a-entities. Different types of circularity will be shown in the subsequent consequences. Q.E.D. Consequence 5 [Manifold Parallelism of Informational Includedness] The implication concerning the manifoldness of parallel structured includedness follows directly from Consequence 3 in the form (a,- C = 1,2, • • •, n - 1) '«j C ak-.j < The parallel manifoldness of includedness will become the basis for the manifoldness of the circular parallelism. □ The last consequence means that there are parallel groups of parallel includable cases of length ^ (2 < £ < n - 1) of the form «il ca.-,; ì iC/3))C7,sg;>C/3);\ V(=?;>C/3)N7)C7,H?;>C/3)J A.P. Železnikar We see how the complexity of informational in-cludedness rapidly grows by the number of involved entities. That which has to be clearly kept in mind is ((a C/3) C 7) C 7) for only the process a C ß is included in 7, but not a and /? (a property of non-transitivity in case of informational includedness). Another informational property which follows from extensions |= a) c 7) and 1= /?) C 7) is a consequent descending and ascending circularity in respect to 7, that is, (7 N (/3 N «)) h 7; 7 N P N «) N 7); (7 N (« N ß)) h 7; 7 N ((« N /3) N 7) respectively. Other, mixed cycles, are also evident. □ Consequence 7 [A Consequence of Serial-ism of Informational Includedness Concerning the Informing] A consequence of Definition 4 is simply the following: where for a number n>2 of involved entities "n) •••)))); ((ai h «2) h* (a3h(---(an-i|= «n) •••))); (((•■■((ai ha2)N«3)---)N«n-i)K «n) and adequately (a„ 1=* (a„_i 1= {an-2 1= (• • -(aj |= «1) ■■•)))); «1) ••■))); (((... ((a„ h "n-l)N«n-2) ai) •) N «2) N* is the ascending and descending (counterascend-ing) serial sequence of informing in respect to the greatest subscript n. □ Proof. The last consequence considers only the ascending and descending sequences of entities ai, 0:2, •••,a„ in respect to the subscript n. Informational entities 0:2, ■ • ■, a«) and a„_i, • • ■,ai) are evident consequences of entity 02, ■ • •, There exists even a stronger consequence of Definition 4, as presented by the next consequence. Q.E.D. Consequence 8 [A General Consequence of an Ordered Serialism of Informational Includedness] The following implication represents the most general system of the ordered serial includedness: 1 < i; i< j; j < n; i= 1,2,•■•,71- 1; \3 = where {i,i and {j,j — is an ascending and descending interval (of natural numbers), respectively, and the length a,+i, • • •, aj)) is between 2 and n. □ Proof. Except by the consequence determined serial sequences, there exist other, 'non-ordered' sequences as can be easily recognized from the previous example. That is, besides the (alphabetically, numerically) 'ordered' sequences, proceeding from $^(o:,/3,7) for ^ = 3, that is. {a\=ß)\=r, 7); 7 h N «); (7 N /3) N « there are 'non-ordered' sequences (/3 h 7) 1= a; /3 h (7 N «); (/? h «) N 7; /3 N (« h 7); (7 N «) N /3; 7 h (" N /3) etc. and infinitely many others, recursively arising serial sequences. In this respect, a2, • • •, «n) symbolizes the possible appearance of all 1=-serial formulas concerning operands ai, a2,---, «n- Therefore, symbol => is used instead of in the last definition and consequences. Q.E.D. 4.5 Circular Serialism of Includedness Circularity belongs to the most significant faculties of informational serialism. By circular informational formulas the most complex and various phenomena concerning cognitive, intelligent, and understanding processes and entities can be not only conceptualized, but brought into positions and attitudes of informational arising (informational autopoiesis, self-reference, consciousness, etc.). This level of circularity, caused by cyclic informational includedness, reaches its highest point within the circular metaphysicaiism. Definition 5 [Circular Serialism of Informational Includedness] Let us introduce the markers of circular serialism concern- ing the informational includedness of entities tti, 0:2, ■ • ■, ön in cyclic respect to entity «i and mark them as follows: (cyclic informer) and the observing (cyclic observer) part of cyclically structured expression are meant. □ Consequence 9 [A Consequence of Circular Serialism of Informational Includedness Concerning the Informing] A consequence of Definition 5 is simply the following («1 C* (aa C («3 C (• • -(a^ C ai) • • •)))); öl) — ((ai C 02) C* (aa C (• ■ -(a^ C ai) • • •))); C:a2)Ca3)---)Ca„)c* ai) ^ By the asterisk marked operators of includedness (C*) the main separators between the informing $§(ai,a2,---,a:„,ai) where for n >2 öl) («1 h* (a2^(a3h(---K-i|= (a„ h «1)) •••)))); (a„|=ai))-..))); (((•••((aih«2)N«3)---)l=«n-l)N «n) h* «1) and adequately • - ,01) («1 N* ("n N ("n-1 N (o:„_2 \= (• • -(aa t=«i) •••))))); ((ai \= an) h* |= (o;„_2 |= (• • •(0:2 Nai) •••)))); (((•••(((aihaON"n-i)h«n-2)---)) N "2) K "l) / is the ascending and descending (counterascend-ing) circularly serial sequence of informing in respect to circular subscript 1. □ Proof. The cyclicity in respect to entity a is in the ai's property to be in the position, together with other entities or alone, of the informer (left of operator |=*) and the observer (right of operator [=*), simultaneously. As we see, the cyclicity for other entities than ai can not be derived merely from the premise $0(0:1,0:2, • ■ •, On, Oi)- The last consequence considers only the ascending and descending circular sequences of entities ai, 0:2, • • "j^n in respect to entity ai. Entities $ü(ai,a2,-• •,a„,ai) and a„_i, • • •, ai,ai) are evident consequences of entity $§(ai,a2,---,a:„,o:i). But, there exists a stronger circular and non-circular (linear serial) consequence of Definition 5, as presented by the next consequence. Q.E.D. According to Consequence 8 it is possible to deduce a similar consequence concerning the ordered cyclical serialism of informational included-ness, where complex circular informational entities (operands), considering a,- C a.j, come to existence. The second formula can be viewed as a countercycle of the first formula, that is, where the difference is in Ü and Ü subscript operator, respectively. Consequence 10 [A General Consequence of an Ordered Circular Serialism of Informational Includedness] The following implication represents the most general system of the ordered circular serial includedness: 1 < « < j; j < i = 1,2,-•-,71- 1; where (i, ž 1, • • ■, j, i) and {j,j - 1, • • ■, i,j) is an ascending and descending circular interval (of natural numbers), respectively, and considering Oli C aj. □ A Comment. Circularly serial informational includedness causes an infinite number of possible cycles and subcycles of involved entities. This fact offers the possibilities of choice in a particular case and enables the syntactic and semantic diversity of arising informational cases. 4.6 Externalism, Internalism, and Phenomenalism of Includedness Let us interpret additionally the appearance of includable externalism, internalism, and phenomenalism with the sense of their introduction into informational discourse. Informational externalism of includedness concerning an entity says that the entity is a subunit of as yet undetermined informational unit (a C). The question of the subunit embracing unit is left open and the identification of an adequate unit wiU appear as the consequence of the happening circumstances (e.g., within an arising formula system). Usually, on the most general level, we have the informational externalism (marked by a |=). We arrive to the includable externalism through particularization of operator |=, replacing it by operator C. But, as we have recognized (Definition 1), the includedness (characterized by operator C) is a recursively and complexly determined form of informationalism (characterized by operator |=). Informational internalism of includedness concerning an entity is a 'reverse' problem to informational externalism and says that the entity is a unit of as yet undetermined informational sub-unit(s) (C a). The question of the unit including subunit(s) is left open and the identification (decomposition) of an adequate subunit wiU appear as the consequence of the happening circumstances (e.g., within an arising formula system). Usually, on the most general level, we have the informational internalism (marked by |= a). We arrive to the includable internalism through particularization of operator |=, replacing it by operator C. Informational phenomenalism of includedness concerning an entity is an informational system of includable externalism and internalism and says that the entity is simultaneously a subunit of as yet undetermined informational unit(s) and a unit of as yet undetermined informational subunit(s) (a C;C a). The questions of the subunit em- bracing unit(s) and the unit including subunit(s) are left open and the identification (composition and decomposition) of adequate unit(s) and sub-unit(s) will come to the surface as a consequence of the happening circumstances (e.g., within a complexly arising formula system). Usually, on the most general level, we have the informational complex of externalism and internalism (marked by 1= a; 1= a). We arrive to the includable phenomenalism through particularization of operator types |=, replacing them by operator types C. 4.7 Metaphysicalism of Includedness Includable metaphysicalism concerns informational parallelism and serialism of several distinguished entities and is a consequence of the general metaphysical structure belonging to an informing entity. To understand the includable metaphysicalism, we have to show the circular parallel and serial schemes (metaphysical shells, structures) of very particular subentities behind (within) the informing entity. The metaphysical informing of an entity—its metaphysicalism—is constituted by its subentities, which are pragmatically classified as informing, counterinforming, and informational embedding. It is understood that each of these entities has two components: an entity as an informational operand and its explicitly informing (acting) component. Thus, the entire entity a has its specific informing component in the sense of la C Oi. Furthermore, informing of entity a infor-mationally includes the so-called counterinforming of a, marked by Ca- This fact is expressed by the includable formula Ca da- Counterinforming as an active component produces the counter-informational entity 7„, which is through counter-informing arisen counterinformation. It has to be informationaUy connected (included) to the frame informational entity a through a distinguished component of informing, called informational embedding and marked by It is understood that this embedding component is a consequence of the counterinformational entity in the sense ^a C 7a. Informational embedding as an active component of a produces the 7^-connective informational entity in respect to the frame entity a. This component is marked by Ea and the corresponding formula of includedness is e a C £a- Last but not least, the embedding informational prod- uct Sa includes a through a C e. By this, the includable cycle of a's metaphysical components comes into existence. Metaphysicalism of includedness pertaining to an informing entity can unite the metaphysical parallelism and serialism within the entity. This metaphysical complexity of includedness ensures the most powerful and perplexed informational spontaneity (arising) and circularity. By a pragmatical way of filling the complex metaphysical shell, intelligent informational entities can come into appearance. 4.7.1 Metaphysical Parallelism of Includedness That which we have intuitively described as a basic metaphysical system of an informing entity is, according to Consequence 6, a circular parallelism of informational includedness. Definition 6 [Metaphysical Parallelism of Informational Includedness Pertaining to an Entity] Let entities la, Ca, 7a, Sa, and be metaphysical components of entity a, called as informing, counterinforming, counterinformational entity, informational embedding, and informational embedding entity, respectively. Then the following metaphysical, that is circular includable parallelism of the form entity a a C £a C Sai Sa C 7ai la C Ca Ca C Xa\ la C a a's embedding a's counterinforming a's informing exists. This kind of includedness is called the complete includable parallelism. □ Consequence 11 [Metaphysical Parallelism of Informing Pertaining to an Entity] A consequence of Definition 6 is the following: la c £a; ^ £a ci sa-i Sa C 7a) 7a C Ca'i ca c ia\ \IaCa ) ^a Sa] Ta Ca", Sa N 7a) Ca ^ 7a) 7a h 7a h Sa'., Ca H Sa £a'i \Ta 1= a; 1= a The columns right of are parallel metaphys- 4.7.2 ical cycles and, simultaneously, they constitute a so-called double metaphysical cycle with its first (left column) and second (right column) transition. These cycles are countercyclical to each other. □ Metaphysical Serialism of Includedness ^SQI C Soi',^ C 7ai la C Ca, Coi C la'ì Via C a The validity of the last consequence is evident and can be derived from Definition 1 and Consequence 3. Consequence 12 [A Weak Metaphysical Parallelism of Informing Pertaining to an Entity] For the consequent of Consequence 11 even a weaker (more natural) condition suffices, that is, /a|=e„; a |= \ M ^O) ^oc Ca', Sah la] ^a la N Ca] la N ^a] Ca N ^a] Set N Sai \la N ö; £a N « This consequence does not require the explicit condition a C £a which closes the includable meta-physicalism in a circular manner. □ Proof. Because of the transitivity of informational includedness (Consequence 3), there is If r f -X Ca t'o?) C 7ai 7a C Ca] (£a C a) Ca C Ta] \Ia COL ) This consequence yields (Definition 1) (ah Sa] ' {£a COl)^ £a\=a] \E{ea C a)) Thus, the necessary transitions a |= and N a exist. Q.E.D. Consequence 13 [A Further Metaphysical Parallelism Pertaining to an Entity] A fur, ther useful consequence of the parallel metaphysical includedness is £ a ) Sa ) la ) Ca C Ta J £ a ) Sa ) la C Ca i £ a ) Sa C la ! ' Sa C Sa'^ 1 Sa C 7ai la C. Ca] Ca C Ta] \Ta ca j \ In parallel to metaphysical parallelism of informational includedness there exists the metaphysical serialism of informational includedness which can offer the cyclically most perplexed, interwoven, and involved possibilities, by which intelligent, understanding, or cognitive scenarios (processes, entities) can be constructed. Definition 7 [Partial Metaphysical Serialism of Informational Includedness Pertaining to an Entity] Let entities T-a > Ca I la i £a, and be metaphysical components of entity a, called a's informing, counterinfarming, coun-terinformational entity, informational embedding, and informational embedding entity, respectively. Then, for example, the following metaphysical and reverse metaphysical, that is circular includable serialisms of the form metaphysical informing of a as a whole ' N A ja C Ta) C Ca) C 7a) C Saj C C a informing counterinformins"" embedding and reverse metaphysical informing of a as a whole I g C gg) C gg) C la) C Ca) C la j C a v'___' >--6 . / r—embedding r-coimterinforming r-informing which follows directly from Consequence 3. □ can exist, respectively. This kind of includedness is called the partial includable serialism. In the second formula, r-embedding, r-counterinforming, and r-informing mark reverse embedding, reverse counterinforming, and reverse informing, respectively. □ Definition 8 [Multiform Metaphysical Serialism of Informational Includedness Pertaining to an Entity] According to Definition 7 for two basic forms (ascending, marked by TQ(a), and descending or reverse includable metaphysical cycle, marked by T§, of an entity a), the multiform metaphysical serialism is obtained by considering of all possible positions of the parenthesis pairs, that is, Tg(a) - ^(((((a C la) C Ca) C 7a) C Sa) C Sa) C* a;^ ((((a C la) C Ca) C 7a) C Ea) C* [Sa C a); (((a C la) C C„) C la) C* C (èa C a)); ((a C la) C Ca) C* (ja C (Sa C (Sa C a))); (a C la) C* (Ca C (Ta C (Sa C (Sa C a)))); V" C* (la C (Ca C (la C (Sa C (£„ C a))))) , and Tg(a) ^'(((((a C e«) C Sa) C 7a) C C C* a;^ ((((a C Sa) C ^a) C 7a) C Ca) C* (la C a); (((a C £„) C Sa) C 7a) C* (C„ C (la C a)); ((a C Sa) C ž:«) C* (7 C (la C a))); (a C ea) C* (Sa C (7a C (Ca C (X« C a)))); V« C* (£a C (^a C (7a C (Ca C (la C a))))) y/ Such an includable system enables that all possible serial metaphysical cycles of both informing (informer) and observing (observer) come into existence. Thus, in the first formula, a is the main (operator C*) metaphysical observer, while in the last formula it is the main metaphysical informer. □ Which are the consequences of includably embedded entities (operands) in a metaphysical case? The reader can construct the answers to this question taking into account the consequences pertaining to circular serialism of includ-edness (Consequence 9 and 10). There are infinitely many serial and circular-serial metaphysical consequences originating in entities Tq(q;) and Tg(a!) of the last definition. Let us see only some of the most interesting. Consequence 14 [A Short-sized Metaphysical Serialism Pertaining to an Entity] By introspection of Definition 8, one can prove the following implications concerning the short-sized forms of inclusiveness and informing in a metaphysical case: and Tg(a) / \ a C Sa, la C a cause implications and (la N a 1=1«; a ^ Ea] \ea\=Oi ) (ea N a 1= a 1= la\ \la\=a) The last two consequences of short-sized informing pertaining to Tg(a) and Tg(a) have equal consequents, evidently. □ Of course, the so-called includable extensions have been not considered. Consequence 15 [A Medium-sized Metaphysical Serialism Pertaining to an Entity] By introspection of Definition 8, we can prove the following implications concerning the medium-sized forms of inclusiveness and informing in a metaphysical case: Tg(«) and ■0 ((a da) C Ca-, ((a C la) C Ca) C Ja] (((a C la) C Ca) C 7a) C Sa] (((a C la) C Ca) C Ja) C Sa) C Sa C (Sa C a); la C (Sa C (Sa C a)); Ca C (7a C (Sa C (Sa C a))); \la C (Ca C (la C (Sa C (Sa C 0))))^ Tg(a) 'O ^(aCea)cSa; ((a C Sa) C Sa) C la; (^a C Sa) C Sa) C la) C Ca\ ((((a C Sa) C Sa) C 7a) C Ca) C la] Ca C (la C a); la C (Ca C (la C o)); Sa C (la C (Ca C (la C a))); C (fa C (7a C (Ca C (la C a)))) cause implication Ca N (^a N "); ((a h J„) h Ca) 1= 7«; 7a N (C. N N ")); Ca N (7a N (Ca N (^a N «))); Sa N (^a h (7a t= (Ca N (^a N «Ii Sa N {Sa N «); (a 1= Sa) N Sa\ la h {Sa N {ea |= Oi))\ ((a 1= Sa) N Sa) t= 7a; Ca h (7a h {Sa N (^a 1= "))); (((« h Ea) N Sa) t= 7a) N Ca\ la N (Ca N (7a N {S. N (^a N «Ii V((((ah=£a)h^^a)N7a)NC„)N2:a Consequents of T§(o;) and Tg(a) coincide, evidently. □ Consequence 16 [A Long-sized Metaphysical Serialism Pertaining to an Entity] By introspection of Definition 8, we can prove the following implication concerning the long-sized form of inclusiveness and informing in a metaphysical case: T§(a),Tg(a)=^ [{{{{{a h la) \= Ca) h 7a) N Sa) N ^a) «i^ a |=* (£„ h {Sa N (7a h {Ca N (^a N «))))); ((((a f= la) N Ca) N 7a) N Sa) f=* (^a N "); (a ^ [=• (E^ t= (7a N (Ca N (la N ")))); {{{a h la) N Ca) N 7a) N* (^a N (^a t= «)); {{a h Sa) N Sa) (7a N (Ca N (^a N «))); ((a h W N Ca) N* (7a N {Sa N (^a N «))); (((a [= Sa) f= Sa) N 7a) N* (Ca N (^a h «)); (a h la) N* (Ca N (7a N {Sa N (^a N ")))); ((((a 1= £a) N Sa) h 7a) N Ca) K (^a h «); a h* (la N (Ca N (7a N {Sa N (^a N «))))); \(((((« N £a) h Sa) h 7a) N Ca) N la) « / • For the listed long-sized metaphysical forms of informing only one of entities T§(a) and Tg(a:) must be given. □ 4.7.3 A Mixed Parallel-serial Metaphysical Case The most complex case of an entity metaphysi-calism can be achieved by the mixture of both principles, the parallel and the serial one, at any point of the metaphysical informing, as a consequence of the parallel, serial, and metaphysical informational includedness. One can easily and in an arbitrary manner construct such cases. 4.7.4 A Pragmatic Filling of the Parallel and Serial Metaphysical Shells The basic question is, how can a metaphysical sheU be filled to achieve, for example, intelligent functions of an informational entity. Candidates fof such a filling of the metaphysical shells are principles of reasoning and understanding, by which reason and meaning are informed, respectively. A mode of reasoning producing reason can be seen as a counterinforming component, while a mode of understanding producing meaning can be seen as an embedding component for that which has arisen by reasoning. Thus reason is embedded into the existing informational entity by meaning, which is the connecting information between the arisen reason and the informational content of the informational entity. Definition 9 [Reasoning and Understanding Components as an Informational Entity Includedness] Reasoning 72. and understanding U are attributes of an intelligently informing entity L, which can demonstrate its reasonable informing through an adequate filling of its metaphysical shells by intelligently informing, reasoning, and understanding components as counterparts to informing, counterinforming, and embedding, respectively. Let us define the following parallel arrays: ^{0 are the parallel arrays of intelligent intelligent entity components and its informing components of I" concerning an exterior or interior (also complex) entity, marked by A pair of reasoning components of the form (m] ; UO - .''-HOj m) rpKO;\ nm, ; PKO-, : depicts the reasonably informing components TZK^) together with the reason components At last, (my] m) - my ; M.(0 ^ \Mi-iO) are understanding components o^nd mean- ing components /if(0 concerning entity □ Let us show the filling of metaphysical shells in Consequence 16, representing the long-sized, that is, serially the most complex loops of informing, however expressed in the informationally includable form and, thus, giving the implemented filling of shells a choice of an infinite number of all possible extensions (symbols of indexed H). The filling of the shells can be understood as a particularization (decomposition) process by which several substitutions of symbols take place. These substitutions are as follows: (1) Shell entity a is replaced by intelligent parallel array t(^); (2) shell's informing is replaced by intelligent parallel array It(^); (3) shell's counterinforming Ca is replaced by reasoning parallel array (4) shell's couhterinformational entity fa is replaced by reason parallel array (5) shell's embedding €a is replaced by understanding parallel array (6) shell's embedding informational entity £a is replaced by meaning parallel array /it(Oi (7) shell's operators |= are replaced by specifically complex (universal) operators C. Consequence 17 [Filling the Shell of a Long-sized Metaphysical Includedness] Let us have the following metaphysical shell filling when entity l observes entity /((((mci.(0)c7Z.(0)cp.(0)c\ m)) C C* <0; 1(0 C* ifi^iO C mo C C mo C iuo C i{o)m (((WO ci.(O) C 7^,(0) c MO) C m)) c* c KO); {i{0 c /x.(e)) c* mo C (p.(e) c (MO C iUO C .(0)))); (((<0 ci.(e)) C 7^.(0) C MO) C* mo C (M.(0 C <0)); {{i{Oc^iM))cm)) c* (MOc mo c (1.(0 c <0))); («0 ci.(O) c 7^,(0) c* (MOc mo c (M.(0 c <0))); m)cMO)cm))cp.{0) c* mociuoccm-, m C 1.(0) C* {KiO C (p^O C mo C if^.iO C <0)))); ((((^(0cm.(0)CW.(0)CM0)C 7^,(0) c* (1.(0 c <0 C* (I.(e) C (7^,(0 c (p.(0 C mo C (/i.(0 C .(0))))); (((((^(Oc/x.(0)cw.(0)cp.(0)c ^ 7^.(0)cI.(0)c*<0 The listed long-sized metaphysical forms of intelligent informing, reasoning, and understanding constitute a parallel system of serial parallel formulas for L 's observing of □ 5 Includedness as a Logical Contradiction The traditional (mathematical, logical) understanding of includedness (inclusion, inclusiveness) may seriously contradict the understanding of informational includedness (Being-in, involvement, interweavement, interrelation, interconnection of informational components, etc.). In the first case, the accent is given to the word in, while in the second case, the word inter (as inferiority) is emphasized. Informational includedness expresses the inner character or the inward nature of informational something within informational something. For example, the so-caUed problem of internal representation [3, 11] concerns the problem of includedness. On the other hand, the philosophical Being-in seems to cover the substantial 164 Informatica 18 (1994) 149-173 A.P. Železnikar part of the broadened realm of informational in-cludedness. Subjectivity and interiority are the notions acquired by the human mind (W. James, 1890 [13]). Let us see the controversial notions which may substantially touch the first and the second understanding of includedness. The difference between the traditional and informational understanding of includedness comes to the surface in case ß N (a C /3) ^ U N /9; -, ßca where for includable extensions S(a C '^{ß C a), there is /3 1= a; \^{ßCaJ ß) and E{a C /3), S{ß C a) e V (/3 N «) C /3,]^ (« h C /3, (/3 1= a) C a, (a h /3) C a and,thus. = K'l'ßiß C a) This case does not deliver a difference between includednesses a C ß and ß C et and is to this extent contradictory. But, the difference becomes quite senseful in case of C /3) C a) A/3N«)C/3;V ({a^ß)C [iß\=a)Ca) where, in the first case, ß is the dominant entity possessing the informing control over the transitions ß a and a |= /3, while in the second case this role belongs to a. The contradictory case to the traditional understanding concerns the extensional example C ß) since simultaneously the control of the dominant, /3, and the inclusively subordinated component, a, is requested. But, this contradiction may appear as a (clear) prejudice in the realm of informational. Similar situation appears at the serially circular (e.g., metaphysical) includedness, which enables the serially circular informing in one^and the other direction (e.g., (((((t C I.) C 7^o c pj C U.) C M.) c*. as an intelligently, that is reasonedly and under-standingly structured informational shell). It is clear that in this case a serially embedded includedness and, at the end, circularly closed includedness must take place. The traditional doubts of this sort show how a spontaneous and circular informational phenomenalism can not only surpass but can also make the notional obstacles of such kind informationally (intelligently) productive and senseful. 6 Includedness and Reasoning (Inference) Includedness (informational Being-in) and reasoning are essentially related informational entities. Reasoning (or inference) is possible only within a context of relatedness between a reason (cause, informational motive) and a certain informational consequence pertaining to the reason as a legalized fact. Historically, three basic ways of inference can be distinguished: deduction, induction, and abduction. All of them are philosophically and scientifically well-determined in respect to their formalistic power and practical disadvantages (reductionism, simplification, scientific straightforwardness, etc.). Within the discussion, their connectedness with the concept of informational includedness, that is, as an includable inference processibility, cannot be denied. The includable informational modi presented are more concretized formulas of reasoning in one or another way (deductively, inductively, and/or abductively). For example, modus ponens is usually meant as a strict deductive principle, while modus toUens inclines to be inductive and modus obliquus abductive. Includable informational modi are typical scenarios (formulas) of informational inferring. 6.1 Includable Deduction How does the informational Being-in concern the so-called deduction and what does the includable deduction mean? Does there exist a substantial connection between the Being-in as an informational phenomenon on one side and the deduction as a logical (inferential, derivative, conclusive) principle on the other side? Includable deduction seems to be our everyday principle of 'common- sense' inference of which we are not being always suiRciently aware. Let us keep in mind the following facts concerning the processes of deduction: deduction means inference by reasoning from generals (universals) to particulars. E.g., particularizing in-formationai operands and especially operators is a kind of 'hidden' (unconscious) deduction. Deducing (or deriving) theorems (conclusions, consequences, lemmas, etc.) from systems of axioms (definitions, hypotheses, etc.) is a characteristic deductive procedure in abstract theories (systems, mathematics, abstract sciences). Deduction opposes induction by reduction, if reduction is meant to be particularization (derivation from universals). The principle of conditionaliza-tion (known as 'deduction theorem') was already taken for granted by Aristotle. At the beginning, let us list three 'deductive' informational operators: By Definition 1, the Being-in operator C is defined complexly in regard to the general (yet non-particularized) operator |= and to the operands a and ß. Thus, we have the following consequence when particularizing of operator |= to operator => is taking place. Consequence 18 [Deduction Concerning Informational Includedness] According to Definition 1, when implicatively particularizing operator |=, that is, is equivalent to there is > is the most common deductive operator and its meaning is the following: a =J> ß means if entity (operand) a is given (information-ally existent), then it is permitted to transit to entity (operand) ß. (or D ) is a narrower deductive operator and its meaning is: a —^ (or a D ß) means if entity (operand) a, then ß. We rarely use this type of deductive operator. (or -«;) denotes a complex and to some extent informationaUy precise deductive operator, which meaning is: ^ [oi a ■< ß) means from a there follows ß (or a precedes ß, also a implies ß.) Entity (operand) a usually denotes a complex (parallel) informational system. In which way do the listed deductive operators concern informational includedness (informational operator C)? In an experiential situation, deduction does not already concern the truth, but proceeds from a hypothetical informational entity (situation) to the prognostic informational entity. Also, weaker logical deduction rules can exist, for instance, those of the form o; {ay ß) or (a, -la) 7, where 7 is an arbitrary entity (from the false, -ia, an arbitrary formula can be logically deduced). (a ß) -Def a; (ß = a=> ß] \E{a C^ ß)J where for the extensional part E(a C=> ß) of the includable deduction a C^ ß, there is, ({ iß^a) c=> ß,]\ [a ß) /3, iß a) a, (a ^ ß)c^ a The most complex element of this power set is denoted by 4'> ß) f(ß [(a a) C^ß,a-, ß) C^ ß,oc Cases, where H(a /3) ^ 0 and 0 denotes an empty entity (informational nothing), are exceptional (reductionistic). □ To get even a more transparent impression what is going on with the last consequence, we can write definiens of definiendum in Consequence 18 by sample formulas ( ß a a; ß-, and C^ ß)J t 3 a \ a f We can now discuss the deductive character of the operation of informational includedness (operator C in a universal or particular form) and vice versa. Where lies the deductive point of informational includedness? Deduction by itself is nothing else than a kind of informational involvement. Otherwise, the concept of deduction (coming from the Latin 'deducere', the German 'herabführen', and the English 'lead away' or 'trace the course of) would not be possible. To deduce something informationaUy means to extract it informationaUy (in German, abtrennen) out of something, certainly not in an informationaUy total (strictly including), but also in an initiaUzing or initially arising (involving) informational way. Includable deduction is an arising informational phenomenon, emerging out of a deductively happening (intentional) situation. Within this iUumination we have to explain the connection existing between the definition of informational includedness and the principles of deduction, expressed in the form of the so-called deductive rules. We should also make a clear distinction between deductive and inductive nature of the inference rules. The deductive always roots in previously strict causes and arises as a clear and constructively structured consequence. The inductive makes an intuitive jump from the particular to general and afterwards proceeds deductively. The question is if this jump is deductively legal. Consequence 19 [A Primitive Circular Structure of Deduction Concerning Informational Includedness] Considering the most complex extensional element in Consequence 18, ß), there is, {a^ß) C^ß,a ^ «) c=> /3); OL {ß a); {ß a) a; ß^(a=> ß); (a=^ß)=^ ß; c=> ß); a (a ß); (a /3) a; The most interesting cases of circular implication are ^ a=>iß=^ a); ß); (a^ ß)^a where, in the first case, ß involves a and, then, this involvement involves ß again, etc. In this way the process of involvement (informational includedness) proceeds (e.g. deductively improves in an implicative manner) circularly. □ 6.2 Includable Induction A strict separation between deduction and induction seems to be probably impossible. For instance, induction concerns derivation from something similarly as deduction. Induction does not mean bringing something into existence from nothing—at least not in the traditional sciences. Within informational theory, induction (as weU as deduction) concerns informational arising, for example, counterinforming and informational embedding of the arisen informational entities. Our question remains, how does the informational Being-in concern the so-called induction and what does the includable induction mean? We have to repeat the foUowing questions: Does there exist a substantial connection between the Being-in as an informational phenomenon on one side and the induction as a logical (intuitive, inferential, derivative, conclusive) principle on the other side? Includable induction is a deeply implanted everyday intuitive principle of common sense and of the informational nature of things (discourses, speech acts, behaviors). Let us keep in mind the foUowing facts concerning the processes of induction: induction is the informational action of introducing and initiating in (arising, counterinforming). It is, for example, introduction and initiation of knowledge of something, that which leads to something (new). It is the initial step in logical (informational, also intuitive) understanding (undertaking). In this sense, induction is a process of inferring a general law (principles, axioms, hypotheses) from the observation of particular instances (e.g., èirajujj'q in Greek, means a bringing on, an advancing). Induction is a wider (transitive) sense of inference. If a theorem is true in one case, it is true in another case which may be caUed the next case. The prove is made by trial [13]. Induction also means inference by reasoning from particulars to generals (universals). E.g., universaUzing (generalizing) informational operands and especiaUy operators is a kind of 'hidden' (unconscious) induction. Inducing (or in- tuitively deriving, introducing) systems of axioms (definitions, hypotheses, etc.) with the intention to deduce theorems (conclusions, consequences, lemmas, etc.) is a characteristic inductive procedure in abstract theories (systems, mathematics, abstract sciences). Induction opposes deduction by generalization, if generalization is meant to be universalization (intuitive derivation from particulars). Thus, three 'deductive' informational operators, —and can function also inductively because of the informational-arising nature of informational entities. Circular and particularly metaphysical scenarios of informing are inductive in the sense of introducing new entities into informational cycles and, in parallel, initiating the interpreting formulas for already existing entities. In this sense, induction is a substantial phenomenon of informational decomposition and composition [9]. Informational Being-in offers opportunities which can be taken into consideration. These opportunities have their roots in the recursive character of informational includedness and in the additional possibilities of pragmatic nature of decomposition and composition of informational entities and systems (formulas). The concept of informational inclusivism conditions the concept of inductivism, being an informationally inclusive phenomenon, proceeding, for instance, from granted particularities to certain universalities, being informationally involved by the first ones. A radical initial intuitive step is the introduction of the so-called informatio prima (the first of informational axioms) [10]. 6.3 Includable Abduction Abduction is a special (in traditional science, illegal) way of deduction which may include elementary induction too. In the similar way as deduction and induction, abduction as such concerns informational includedness. It means a leading away in the informational sense. For instance, it can represent a syllogism, of which the major premise (antecedent) is certain, and the minor only probable, so that the conclusion has only the probability of the minor [13]. But, this view of abduction does not embrace its entire informational realm, which can consider an initial (introductory) entity and then proceed away (e.g., counterinformationally) to another possible (probable) entity by a degree of similarity, spo-radicalness, relatedness, etc. This is a characteristic phenomenon of abduction, a progress from one informational situation (attitude) to another, when the first being once informationally legalized (demonstrated, approved) and afterwards employed to the proving of other situations (attitudes). Abduction may represent an indirect proof, like the apagoge, which means syllogistic reasoning, by which a thing is not directly proved, but shows, for example, the absurdity or impossibility of denying the thing in a certain, particularly informational way. Sometimes, it is called reductio ad absurdum. A good example of abductive reasoning is perhaps the so-called informational modus obliquus (see later). 6.4 Includable modus ponens Includable modus ponens is an informational inference rule constructed in the sense as it is known in symbolic logic. This rule uses a true conjunction of an affirmative (true) statement and a true implication of the affirmative and some other statement. In this situation the truth can be decided for the other statement. In our case, instead of truth, we have a certain value of including informing, conjunction is replaced by an informational operator of parallelism (e.g., semicolon 'j'j symbol ||, or a proper parallel informational operator 11= ). We also introduce the informational operator of implication ==i> with the meaning 'implies/imply'. Inference Rule 1 [Includable modus ponens] Informational modus ponens can be expressed in terms of informational externalism, in-ternalism, metaphysicalism, and phenomenalism giving 16 basic inference rules concerning an entity a's includedness. We list only four characteristic cases. The rule for an externalistic inference on including externalism ß C from externalisms a C and ß \= is a c; ((g c) iß N)) C ßc A similar rule for an internalistic inference on including internalism C ß from internalisms C a and ß is ca; C((C a)=>i^ß)) Cß Trivially seems to be the rule for a metaphysicalis-tic inference on including metaphysicalism ß C ß from metaphysicalisms a C a and ß \= ß, where /a C a] ' ((a c a) (/3 1= ß)) C I, {{a C a) iß \= ß))) ßcß At last we have a case of the rule for a phe-nomenalistic inference on including phenomenalism (ß C, C ß) from phenomenalisms (a C; C a) and (/? |=; 1= ß), where ({a C;C a); |aC;Ca)=>(/3N;h^)) C; {ßc-,cß) The last rule means to infer phenomenalistically by modus tollens in the sense of includedness upon a phenomenalistic case of informing. □ The listed informational rules of modus po-nens are only the most characteristic ones. We did not present any of the possible cross-modal rules, that is from externalistic-internalistic to phenomenalistic-metaphysicalistic ones (additionally, 12 possible cases). The rules of modus ponens belong to the most obvious (normal, generally agreed) rules of inference primarily because of their categorical value. However, within the informational logical realm, the rule of modus ponens is certainly only one of possible rules of inference. Applying only this kind of rules would mean to infer in a particularly reductionistic and informationally unidirectional way. 6.5 Includable modus tollens The informational modus toUens pertaining to informational includedness is a good example of the difference arising from the positions of categorical reasoning on one side and the informationally phenomenological reasoning—for example, includably-as-in-the-informationally-in-volved-way—on the other side. Includedness as an informational in-volvement must not be comprehended categorically, since reasoning in this way would lead to the categorical nonsense, traditional-logic controversy, and 'common-sense' (say, occurrent, in German, vorhanden) absurdity. From another point of view, the informational Being-in represents the most general term concerning the 'In', which at a given situation or attitude speaks for a particular situation or attitude. In this sense, informational Being-in is always particularizes and if not, the empty place in its whole meaning only waits to be complemented. Inference Rule 2 [Includable modus tollens] Some cases of informational modus tollens can again be expressed in terms of the pure informational externalism, internalism, metaphysicalism, and phenomenalism concerning an entity a's includedness. The modus tollens rule for an externalistic inference on non-including externalism a from externalisms ([a |=) (ß |=)) C and ß ^ is {{a h) iß N)) C-,ß