J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROLE OF OPPOSITION IN CONTEMPORARY 
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES – THE CASE OF 
SLOVENIA 
 
Drago ZAJC
1
  
…………………… …………… …………………… …………… …. … … … … …… … … … … …… … … 
 
While the role of institutionalized parliamentary opposition in 
legislative and wider political processes is most important for the 
quality of parliamentary democracy, opposition has been 
inadequately researched and the actual behaviour of opposition in 
a particular country or a set of countries has not been properly 
explained. Traditional functions of parliamentary opposition – to 
propose, oppose, expose and depose have been in highly politicized 
circumstances in post -Socialist countries frequently intended to 
block the government's proposals and to delegitimize coalit ional 
government. The paper presents the particular model of 
government -opposition relation in Slovenia where opposition was 
using constitutionally designed means of control, being at the same 
time over equipped with possibility to demand a referendum on 
m atters which have been decided in the parliament what made the 
legislative process controversial and futile. After the change of 
constitution in 2013 the opposition has had to change its strategies 
and adopt a more cooperative attitude. 
 
Key words : opposition; traditional functions; parliamentary 
means of control; extra -parliamentary means of direct 
democracy; model of government -opposition relations. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Political opposition is an essential feature of modern democracy and of 
contemporary parliamentary systems. According to Robert Dahl political 
opposition with legally existing political parties is not only modern, but also one 
of the greatest social discoveries (Dahl 1969, 17). As von Beyme noted in 1973 
opposition can develop only in a constitutional state where decisions are taken 
on the basis of majority vote and certain rights are granted to the members of 
representative bodies (Beyme 1973, 157). Without a working opposition, there 
is neither political democracy nor rationa l management in a modern state.
 
Though there are only few studies of the repositioning of the opposition and 
                                                 
 
1
 Drago ZAJC , PhD, is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of 
Ljubljana. Contact: drago.zajc@fdv.uni -lj.si. 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     20 
 
 
there is no systematic analysis of the powers of opposition in advanced 
democracies (Helms 2004, 25).  
 
The concept of opposition has been particularly useful for the explanation of the 
dramatic changes, which have taken place in a number of countries in East 
Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of democratization and transition. 
While the events in 1 989 and 1990 in East Central European countries have 
been interpreted in various and often contradicting ways, the basic explanation 
lays actually in the fundamental repositioning of the opposition – the critical 
and dissident elements of social forces tra nsformed themselves into important 
political players changing positions from outside or periphery of political 
system to the centre of political decision making (Lewis 1997, 614). It proved 
that	 oppo s i t i on	 c o ul dn ’ t	 b e	 c onn ec t ed	 with 	 h ate	 an d	 des tru c ti on	 b ut considered 
as means for peaceful solving of political conflicts including the conflicts with 
the replacement of political elites. The repositioning of opposition means also 
alternation between government and opposition.  
 
 
2 C APACITY OF NEW OPPOSITIONS I N THE ECE COUNTRIES  
 
The new post -socialist oppositions in ECE countries found themselves in a 
political situation characterized by institutional fluidity, relatively weak 
parliaments with dominant executives, and unstable party systems (Kopecky 
and Spiro va 2008, 136). Though inexperienced, the new post -socialist 
oppositions in ECE countries had to adapt to the new standards of effective 
parliamentary oppositions and to take over particular traditional functions 
(B i b i č 	 19 93, 	 67). 	 By 	 per f orm i n g 	 the s e 	 fu n c tions they helped to consolidate and 
deepen democracy. The first function of opposition has been from the very 
beginning to criticize the government by pointing to its weaknesses and failings 
and to present sound arguments contributing to the rationality of political 
debate. Performing this function altogether with the second - providing 
alternatives to government's plans and proposals is considered to be in the best 
interest of the citizens. The third important function of the new oppositions has 
been transf orming hidden and marginalized issues into foci of political interest 
taking in account that the gate -keepers of political system do not allow all the 
interests to be equally represented (Offe 1985, 99). Even more important 
function of an opposition is to control the executive whether it is operating 
within the legal and legitimate limits. In the modern parliamentary systems 
there are several means of control, which have to be cautiously used like 
parliamentary questions, interpellations and (no)confidence motions. By 
performing these functions strategically every opposition increases its visibility 
and legitimation in the public, proving at the same time its operational capacity 
to take over the government's responsibility during the electoral term or on 
ne w parliamentary elections. Winning the next elections is the primary goal of 
every opposition (Glazer 2007, 2), while minimizing the incumbents chances to 
be re -elected. However, opposition does not necessarily adopt a negative stance 
towards the governmen t and may develop also a constructive approach (Norton 
2008, 240). 
 
Performing these traditional functions has been a difficult job for new post -
socialist oppositions, which were frequently week, fragmented and unstable in 
comparison with most of the oppos i ti on s 	 i n 	 We s ter n 	 c ou n tr i es 	 (B i b i č 	 19 93,	 7 2). 	
Various deficiencies in the realization of their functions have strongly 
influenced their practical and strategic behaviour. Political parties in opposition 
have frequently felt to be undesired, brought into di s c red i t	 (L ukš i č 	 19 90,	 23) 	 or 	

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     21 
 
 
unjustly deprived of the means of real influence. They considered themselves to 
be marginalized in the sense of being left without due information about 
government's intentions and excluded from the decision -making since the 
government's majority in the parliament could easily outvote the opposition. 
Sometimes they considered themselves to be manipulated by the strong parties 
in coalition or by the networks of the 'old boys' of the former system limiting 
their chances to compete on the next elections. Their behaviour was frequently 
inconsistent and varied from cooperation and passive resistance to active 
obstruction of the government. While previous research in Western European 
countries shows surprisingly high level of cooperati on between the government 
and opposition and the dominant pattern of behaviour is consensus seeking 
(Mujica and Sanchez -Cuenca 2006, 86), the consensus and cooperation between 
opposition and government in ECE countries seem to be almost exceptional, 
while the model of competitiveness prevail. These are the countries where basic 
disagreements exist over some ideological issues and even over some basic 
rules of political game. 
 
Taking in consideration great challenges in front of the new parliaments, 
overburdened with the issues and problems and dealt by inexperienced 
political actors in the parliamentary arena - coalition and opposition, one might 
suppose that cooperative style of behaviour and consensus voting cannot be 
achieved easily and might be influence d by particular internal and external 
factors.  
 
According to Franco Cazzola (1974, 17) and Mujica and Sanchez -Cuenca (2006, 
96) these behavioural variations are depending on particular factors like 
institutional context and the electoral system with parti cular effects on the 
stability of a coalitional government. The electoral system and fragmentation of 
political parties might be recognized as an 'Achilles heel' of any model of 
political opposition. The electoral system determines the number of political 
parties and the way of forming the majority in the parliament while the 
opposition might be composed of a number of parties with similar or even 
different political programs. The second factor is the institutional context 
determining the mode of the incorp oration of opposition within the system - 
how and where in the parliamentary structure the opposition is involved and 
what kind of veto powers actually has in its hands against the government. The 
third factor is the nature of party system and ideological positions of political 
parties on the left -right axis (Sartory 1976, 113). If these positions are 
predominantly ideological and the distances are strictly observed the parties 
will lack the potential of consensus building. One of the typical components of 
such discussion is 'personalization of conflicts' (Olson 1997, 120). The fourth 
factor is the predominant political culture determining the way of political 
participation. If political culture is tending towards authoritarian model of 
leadership the partic ipation might be constrained or even replaced by populist 
means of direct democracy simplifying political issues and limiting real options. 
These factors help to explain the behaviour of opposition from 1989 on in 
comparison with the oppositions in the cou ntries of East Central Europe or of 
their West -European counterparts (Lewis 1997, 628). The variety of these 
factors is determining also the capacity of opposition to function parallel or 
consecutively on various instances or levels – in the parliament, wi thin the civil 
society, through media, etc. 
 
In this paper we will try to answer three elementary questions - the first is how 
important is the development of constitutional opposition for the 
democratization of formerly socialist country and consolidation of democracy. 
The second question is which a re the main factors and other conditions like 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     22 
 
 
historical legacies which have been determining the relation between 
opposition and coalition in Slovenia and what has been the role of opposition in 
Slovenia in the period before and after the accession to EU. And the third 
question is how efficiently has the opposition used the main parliamentary 
means of control over the government altogether with the extra -parliamentary 
means. 
 
 
3 P ATTERNS OF OPPOSITIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN SLOVENIA 1990 –
2014 
 
In our study of oppo sitional behavioural patterns in Slovenia we will take into 
consideration some already existing statistical and other research data on the 
transition of Slovenia revealing the legalization and institutionalization of 
opposition after 1989 (Jambrek 1992, 93 ) when an amendment to the 
constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia of 1974 was passed by the 
Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia allowing for the first time after the 2nd 
WW free political organization. A number of newly formed political partie s 
under the label of DEMOS were later incorporated into the structure of the new 
freely elected Assembly in April 1990 altogether with the renewed parties of 
the former system and the later for the first time after the second WW acquired 
its own internal o pp o s i t i on	 (B uč a r	 199 0,	 3). 	 Howe v er,	 the	 r ole 	 of	 opp os i ti o n 	 i n 	
this preliminary period was conceived as primarily constructive and loyal to the 
government what was close to the two party model, which had little relevance 
for the new Slovene multiparty syste m.
2
 
 
The final institutionalization of parliamentary opposition was made by the new 
Constitution of Slovenia of 1991, the Law on the Deputies of 1992 and the new 
Standing Orders in 1992 (renewed in 2002). We will present some ways and 
levels of competition between the opposition and the government in six 
consecutive legislative terms and try to determine the factors, which explain the 
oppositional behaviour and its variations starting from the fact that the 
proportional electoral system with 4% threshold ha s been almost regularly 
allowing seven parties to enter the National Assembly.
3
 To the difference of 
other ECE countries where the number of parties has been radically declining 
every year, Slovenia still has a rather fragmented or dispersed party system 
(Olson and Ilonszki 2011, 238). The parliamentary opposition has been 
therefore regularly composed of several even quite different parties, while a 
number of parties with rather similar programs constituted the coalition 
government.
4
 Majority of parliamenta ry parties, including the Democratic Party 
                                                 
2
 Based on such concepts a 'shadow government' was formed in 1990 by the new opposition 
P a rt y	 of 	 D e m ocra t ic	 R e n e wa l 	 ( S D P ) , 	 wit h out 	 ch a nce s 	 t o	 t a k e 	 ov e r	 t h e 	 gov e rnm e nt	 ( L u k š ič 1993, 
155). 
3
 T h e 	 Na t io na l 	 A s s e m b l y	 ( D rža v ni 	 zbor) 	 con s ist in g	 of 	 9 0 	 d e p u t i e s 	 ( 8 8 	 elected from party lists and 
two representatives of national minorities) is the main chamber of two chamber national 
parliament established by the Constitution of 1991. The second chamber – National Council 
( D rža vn i	 s ve t ) 	 is	 re p r e s e nting	 f u nct io na l 	 a nd 	 t e rrit ori a l 	 in t e re s t s 	 h a vi ng	 no 	 d ire ct 	 in f l u e nce 	 on 	
the legislative proces in the National Assembly . According to its prerogatives it may veto a bill 
passed in the National Assembly, propose a new bill, or demand an investigation in the matters 
of public importance.  
4
 Among the right -wing and centre -right wing parties are Slovene Democratic Party (SDS) , 
Slovenian People's Party (SLS) which disappeared in 2014, the New Slovenia (NSi) and Slovene 
National Party (NSI) which disappeared in 2011. Among the centre -left and left parties have 
been Liberal Democracy (LDS) which disappeared in 2011, Zares, which disappeared in 2011, 
Party of Slovene Pensioners (DeSUS), Civic List (DL) which disappeared in 2014, the Social 
D e m ocra t s 	 ( SD) , 	 P osit iv e 	 Sl ov e ni a 	 ( P S), 	 wh ich 	 d is a p p e a re d 	 in 	 2 0 1 4 , 	 A l l ia nce 	 of 	 A . 	 Bra t u š e k 	
(ZaAB), Party of Modern Centre (SMC) and the United L eft (ZL). 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     23 
 
 
of the Slovene Pensioners (DeSUS), were willing to enter coalitions or to join 
opposition regardless of their strength. Only the right -wing Slovene Democratic 
Party (SDS), due to its perception of politics, has ta ken a strong opposition 
attitude if it was not able to have the leading position in the coalition 
government. 
 
T ABLE 1: TYPES OF COALITIONS AND OPPOSITIONS IN SLOVENIAN NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY (1990 –2014) 
 
Source: Electoral Commission of the RS, Statistical Rep orts on the Elections in 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2011 and 2014.  
*The transitional National Assembly composed of three chambers – freely elected in April 1990 and dissolved 
after the first elections to the new National Assembly in December 1992 . 
** The first part of the mandate ended by the constructive no -confidence vote. 
*** Second part of the mandate ended by the resignation of the Prime Minister. 
 
We will analyse the behaviour of parliamentary opposition as it has been 
demonstrated in variou s ways and forms - by consensual or adversarial voting 
and by the use of various parliamentary means of control over the government 
– parliamentary questions, interpellation and constructive vote of no -
confidence. Finally we will investigate also the use o f extra -parliamentary 
devices like the means of direct democracy.  
 
3.1 Voting and voting cohesion 
 
As much as the voting for and against the government proposed bills in the 
parliament is important part of the behaviour of opposition, the cohesion voting 
in the modern parliaments is considered to be the best indicator of the 
cooperative behaviour. Taking in consideration previous models of oppositional 
behaviour it depends to a great extent on the level of inclusiveness of 
opposition into the parliamentary structure and procedure (Helms 2004, 30) 
where members of opposition have particular rights and duties. 
 
Opposition parties in parliamentary systems with proportional electoral 
systems are usually highly involved in the decision -making. Though the 
legisla tive initiative has been mostly with the government, the opposition 
parties in the Slovene National Assembly have certain co -governing powers 
since they are included in the agenda setting process taking place in the 
advisory body to the Speaker (Kolegij) a nd in the standing committees, enjoying 
even certain priorities (leadership of certain supervisory committees). Like in 
the other post -communist parliaments in the ECE countries political parties are 
proportionally included in the standing committees with deliberative working 
style and assigned a proportion of the chairmen positions in these committees 
(Mansfeldova 2011, 141). The distribution of these positions has been 
sometimes a matter of institutional conflict (Khmelko 2011, 209). The whole 
committee s tructure and composition of the committees undoubtedly favour 
consensual pattern of government -opposition relation rather than adversarial 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     24 
 
 
style of behaviour of both actors. It is in the committees where the opposition 
can present its opinions and disagree ments on the topical or 'ad hoc' policy 
choices presented by coalitional government or even negotiate with the 
coalition majority. By delaying the process in different stages or threatening 
with the use of other devices like demanding the Constitutional Co urt to rule 
over the constitutionality of the passed bill, the opposition in the National 
Assembly may force the government to make concessions and come to 
consensual solutions. It may also put pressure on the government to accept its 
positions by using it s veto power since any change of constitution or change of 
particular bills on electoral system etc. and Standing Orders (renewed in 2002) 
requires a two -third majority. A significant number of decisions could have 
resulted from such negotiations and deals . Though such consensual working 
pattern which could promote co -operational behaviour and lead to the 
consensus voting has been hardly realized in practice. 
 
The data on the voting in the Slovene National Assembly show that the con -
sensual voting does not meet the level of consensual voting in other 
parliaments. Comparative data collected in the parliaments of Germany, Great 
Britain and Italy show surprisingly developed cooperation between opposition 
and government and in some parliamentary terms high level of consensual 
voting (Rose 1980, 80). In German Bundestag a unanimous decision -making 
style was even discovered and only about ten per cent of legislation was a 
matter of different voting (Saalfeld 1990, 77). Similar patterns of cooperative 
behaviour have been discovered lately in the Spanish parliament (Mujica and 
Sanchez 2006, 87). A similar analysis in the U. S. A. Congress on the roll -call 
voting on 742 most important pieces of legislation from 1967 -2004 showed 
that the index of cohesion voting at the end of the 60s and the beginning of the 
70s was around 33 per cent, while in the early 2000s it more than doubled 
(Theriault 2005). 
 
In order to establish the level of cohesion voting in the Slovene National 
Assembly we may use the data on the roll call vo ting of the deputies in the 
period of 1994 -2008.
5
 For their analysis the agreement index (AI) was applied 
measuring the level of agreement of the deputies between the values 0 – total 
disagreement or no -cohesion and 1 - total cohesion (Hix et al. 2005, 216).
6
 Our 
analysis of voting patterns showed some important changes in time - the 
cohesion was actually low before the 1997 and augmented after when 
Slovenia's process of joining the EU was intensified and the political parties 
signed 'Agreement on the Co operation in the Process of Joining the EU' 
demanding high level of consensual behaviour.
7
 The deputies were voting 
strategically in the common interest, which did not contradict the interest of the 
parties (the only exception was the Slovene National Part y - SNS). Cohesion 
voting diminished again after 2004 when the strategic goals of the country were 
achieved by entering the EU and NATO. At the same time we can explain the 
return to low level of cohesion and an increase of oppositional voting also by 
the fact that defeated parties of the left centre demonstrated openly their 
dissent with the right -wing winners leaving little room for negotiations and 
                                                 
5
 The data were gathered within the first parliamentary research of cohesion voting in the 
Slovene National Assembly taking the record of 1 0 . 5 1 2 	 vo t in gs 	 ( D e že l a n	 e t 	 a l . 	 2 0 0 9 , 29). 
6
 The index was calculated according to the formula taking into ac count Y (number of deputies 
inside the National Assembly voting for) and N (number of deputies voting against) . 
7
 In this period some most important acts were adopted in the Slovene National Assembly - the 
Pre -accession strategy, the Constitutional Law on the change of Art. 68 of Slovene constitution 
allowing the foreigners to purchase land property, Government's Strategy of Joining the EU etc. 
The intensive process of harmonization of Slovene legislation with the EU legal system from 
1999 to 2002 also dema nded high level of political consensus and voting cohesion.  

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     25 
 
 
search for pragmatic solutions. It is evident that the influence of European 
integration process on the opp ositional behaviour was not long lived and the 
patterns of political competitiveness and antagonism reappeared, diminishing 
again the voting cohesion. The oppositional voting increased in spite of the new 
agreement 'Partnership for development' signed in 2 006 by some left - and 
right -wing political parties. The experiences with the integration did not make 
the	 q ua li t ati v e	c ha n g e	 of	 t he 	 poli t i c al	 n orm s 	 and 	 b e ha v i o ur	 (Dež ela n 	 et	 al. 	 20 09, 	
35). Voting cohesion has not increased as was expected even in the 2008 when 
Slovenia was presiding the EU showing that the deputies in opposition 
considered presidency as a government's project. Though we lack exact data for 
the period after 2008 elections we may suppose that the behaviour of political 
parties in National Ass embly after these elections and especially after 2011 and 
2014 early elections has not changed and the cohesion voting might even be 
lower (a new research of cohesion voting has not yet started). Though there are 
also surprising examples of cohesion voting because of the impact of economic 
crisis on the strategies of political party groups.  
 
3.2 The Use of the Parliamentary Means of Control over Government  
 
Besides the active participation in the legislative process and voting the 
opposition in post -socialist countries can challenge the work of the government 
also by using different means of control. Constitutionally designed means of 
control like questions, interpellations and confidence votes represent special 
opportunities for every opposition to demons trate its strength vis -a-vis the 
government and its capacity to secure its continuous responsiveness or even to 
take over the governmental position.  
  
Among various means of control the parliamentary questions have become a 
regular way of communication of opposition with the government in the 
parliaments of democratic countries. Though they are primarily the means by 
which parliamentary opposition is demonstrating its legitimate existence and 
importance in the democratic process. Parliamentary questions wh ich are 
constantly addressed to individual ministers and the government may be very 
differently motivated (Rasch 1992, 14). An increase of parliamentary questions 
in Western European Parliaments is a common reaction to the growing powers 
of the executive. In East Central European parliaments (Hungarian, Czech, 
Polish, Slovene or Croatian) it is also a demonstration of the growing critical 
potential of these parliaments. Parliamentary questions are not only intended 
to allow the criticism of opposition to be openly expressed, they may also be 
pointing to the issues and dilemmas which were disregarded by government in 
the preparatory stages of some bills or appeared during their implementation 
(Norton 1993, 112). They are even most appropriate means for promot ion of 
opposition since the work of oppositional deputies in standing committees is 
mostly hidden from the eyes of the public. The governments in post -socialist 
countries seem to be even more sensitive to oppositional question and 
sometimes even want to ov ertake them (Zajc 2004, 218). As some preliminary 
research in Slovenia shows critical question of opposition contribute to the 
more responsible and accountable work of the ministers and of entire 
governments. If a minister cannot explain its activity or ce rtain action in a 
credible and trustworthy way, his position may be endangered also from the 
inside of the coalitional government.  
 
The growth of parliamentary questions in the Slovene National Assembly in the 
period 1992 -2014 demonstrates the relative in crease of the capacity of 
opposition in the Slovene National Assembly to establish efficient control over 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     26 
 
 
the government. Opposition was strategically using questions in order to obtain 
information over government's activity, trying at the same time to exp ose some 
inconsistencies in the policy implementation or mistakes of responsible 
ministries and members of cabinet. A small number of questions were 
addressed to the government and responsible ministers by the deputies 
belonging to the majority parties in order to promote government's policies.  
 
T ABLE 2: NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS IN THE SLOVENE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY BY LEGISLATIVE TERM 
 
Source: National Assembly of RS, Regular Reports - 2006, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2014.  
*Data not available 
 
A ca reful examination of the content of the parliamentary questions also reveals 
main confrontation line between the opposition and coalitional government and 
exposes a number of evident conflicts on particular policy fields where both 
sides have taken entirel y adversarial and uncompromising positions. Only 
minority of questions put by opposition parties actually had an effect on the 
practical directions of the government or the activity of a minister or helped to 
solve some problem in a consensual manner. What we could count as an evident 
gain from the regular question time was an open exposure of most important 
political and other issues, which the coalition government disregarded have 
been brought to public attention and served as means of political mobilizat ion 
of the voters.  
 
To the difference of parliamentary questions, interpellations are determined by 
constitution as means of control over individual members of government or the 
whole government, which may lead to a sanction. Parliamentary interpellations 
are variously determined by constitutions, so comparisons are difficult. The real 
effects of interpellations in contemporary parliaments are not necessarily in the 
resignation of a minister or government, but in a critical debate on the 
particular important issues. Since the number of deputies necessary for 
initiating an interpellation is relatively low (the Slovene Constitution in the 
article 118. stipulates that at least 10 deputies may initiate an interpellation), 
the opposition may use it even if it is weak and small in number. As in other 
transitional countries the coalition govern ments in Slovenia have been in all 
cases with few exceptions unified and sufficiently strong to support the 
ministers and vote down the interpellation. In the past 6 terms of National 
Assembly there 36 interpellations were initiated against individual mini sters or 
against the government of RS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     27 
 
 
 
T ABLE 3: INTERPELLATIONS IN THE SLOVENE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY 
LEGISLATIVE TERM 
 
Source: National Assembly of RS, Regular Reports - 2006, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2014. 
 
Interpellations in the Slovene National Assembly were initiated by oppositional 
party groups or various groups of oppositional deputies. Only two 
interpellations against individual ministers were successful and the ministers 
were forced to resign (Minister for foreign affairs Z. Thaler in 1996 and Minister 
for internal affairs M. Bandelj in 1999). Three ministers resigned after the 
interpellation was introduced and before the final voting. Six of the introduced 
interpellations were not put on the agenda because the term has expired. 
Init iating an interpellation has in the past years also become more demanding 
for opposition and it did not want to take chances and blame itself since the 
public opinion was reacting negatively to precipitated interpellations, which led 
to excessive accusatio ns and unproductive quarrelling. It is therefore not 
surprising that the number of interpellations dropped after 2000 when 
coalitional governments became stronger and internally more cohesive. A new 
rise of interpellations initiated in the sixth (2012 –2014 ) mandate may be 
attributed to the effects of economic crisis which opened new conflicts between 
the left - and right -wing parties regarding the social functions of the state etc.
8
 
                                                 
8
 In the first 1992 -2006 term eleven interpellations were introduced - against Minister for Justice 
(Miha Kozinc), Minister for finances (Mitja Gaspari), Minister for education and sport (Slavko 
Gaber), Minister for culture (Sergij Peljhan), Minister for environment (Pavle Gantar), Minister 
f or	 d e f e nc e 	 ( Je l k o	 Ka cin ) , 	 Mini s t e r	 f or	 Ju s t ice 	 ( M e t a 	 Z u p a nčič) , 	 Mini s t e r	 f or 	 e con om ic 	 a ct iv itie s 	
( Ma k s 	 T a jni k a r) , 	 Mini s t e r 	 f or	 f ore ign 	 a f f a irs	 ( Z ora n	 T h a l e r) , 	 Mini s t e r	 f or	 h e a l t h 	 ( Bo žid a r	 V o l jč) 	
and against the Government of RS. 
In the second 1996 -2000 te rm there were seven interpellations introduced - against the 
Go ve rnm e nt	 of 	 R S	 a n d 	 a ga i nst 	 Mini s t e r	 f or	 d e f e nse 	 ( A l oj z	 Kr a p e ž),	 Mini s t e r	 f or	 e d u ca t io n	 a n d 	
sport (Slavko Gaber), Minister for internal affairs (Mirko Bandelj), Minister for Agriculture (Ciril 
S merkolj), Minister for finances (Mitja Gaspari) and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Alojz Peterle).  
In the third 2000 -2004 term there were four interpellations introduced - against Minister for 
e nv iro nm e nt	 ( Ja ne z	 Kop a č ) , 	 Mini s t e r	 f or	 in t e rna l 	 a f f a irs	 ( R a d o	Bohinc), Minister for health 
( D u š a n	 Ke b e r) 	 a nd 	 a g a in s t 	 t h e 	 Go ve rnm e nt	 of 	 R S. 
In the fourth 2004 -2008 term there were three interpellations introduced - against Minister for 
cu l t u re 	 ( V a s k o	 Sim on iti) , 	 Mini s t e r	 f or	 p u bl ic	 h e a l t h 	 ( A nd re j	 B ru ča n) 	 a nd 	 Mini s t e r	 for internal 
affairs (Dragutin Mate). 
In the fifth 2008 -2011 term there were four interpellations introduced - against Minister for 
e d u ca t io n	 ( I gor	 L u k š ič) , 	 Mini s t e r	 f or 	 a gricu l t u re 	 f ore s t ry	 a nd 	 f oo d 	 ( Mil a n 	 P og a čnik) 	 a nd 	 t wo 	
interpellations against Minister for internal affairs (Katarina Kresal).  
The sixth 2012 -2014 term may be divided on two parts – after the first early elections at the end 
of 	 2 0 1 1 	 t h e 	 righ t 	 win g 	 coa l itio n	 gov e rnm e nt	 u nd e r 	 t h e 	 l e a d e rs h ip 	 of 	 J. 	 J a nša 	 w a s 	 e s t a bl ish e d , 	
while the left -wing opposition introduced in 2012 two interpellation against the minister for 
I ntern a l 	 A f f a irs	 V in k o	 Go re n a k 	 a nd 	 Mini s t e r	 f or	 H igh 	 e d u ca t i on 	 a nd 	 Sc ie nce 	 Ž ig a 	 T u rk . 	 Wh e n 	
A l e nka 	 Bra t u š e k 	 wa s 	 e l e ct e d 	 f or	 ne w	 P rim e 	 Mini s t e r	 by	 con s t ru ct iv e 	 no-confidence motion on 
27. February 2013 and new left -wing government was established, the right -wing opposition 
introduced five interpellations – a ga in s t 	 Mini s t e r	 f or	 f in a nce s 	 U roš	 Č u f e r, 	 Mini s t e r	 f or 	
infrastructure Samo Omerzel, Minister for public administration dr. Grega Viran t (twice) and 
against Minister for education dr. Jernej Pikalo. 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     28 
 
 
 
The vote of confidence is a particular means of opposition designed in mode rn 
constitutions for challenging the government. At the same time it may be used 
also by the government for testing the unity of the partner parties. In some ECE 
countries the opposition has excessively used this instrument but 
unsuccessfully (Kopecki and Spirova 2008, 149). In practice the confidence vote 
proved to be efficient means for strengthening the discipline among the partner 
parties at the time of the passing the bills which were met with objections 
within coalitional government. The motion of con fidence has been a practical 
device used by governments in several countries.
9
 Though the confidence vote 
does not necessarily help the coalition government to continue its term since 
opposition may vote it down being helped by some defecting parties or groups 
of MPs.  
 
The simple vote of confidence determined by the Slovene constitu tion (Art. 
117) may actually be introduced only by the Prime Minister binding the 
confidence vote either to the passing of a particular proposal of the bill or to the 
proposal of the candidates for new ministers replacing the ministers belonging 
to the par ties deserting coalition. Such attempts to strengthen the unity of the 
coalition partners were opportunities for opposition to vote against the 
government's proposal with intention to overthrow the government. In the 
period 1992 –2014 the confidence vote wa s introduced four times. In 2000 the 
fi rs t	 c onf i den c e	 m oti on	 i n troduc ed	 b y 	 the	 Pr i m e	 Mi n i s ter	 dr.	 J.	 Drn ov š ek	 wa s 	
voted down and the opposition turning into majority with only a few additional 
votes later elected new Prime Minister. The second time it was introduced in 
2007	 b y 	 Pr i m e	 M i n i s ter	 J .	 Jan š a, 	 b i n d i n g 	 i t	 to 	 the 	 prep arati ons 	 of	 t he 	 S love n e 	
Presidency of the EU. In 2011 the confidence motion introduced by Prime 
Minister B. Pahor was voted down, National Assembly was dissolved and new 
elections were ca lled. The fourth time the confidence motion was introduced on 
14th	 N ove m b er	 20 13	 b y 	 Pr i m e	 Mi n i s t er	 A .	 Br at uš ek,	 when	 s he 	 b ou n d	 t he 	 v ote 	
to the passing of the 2014 budget and new law on taxation of property.
 
 
 
Opposition has only rarely used the constructiv e no -confidence vote , determined 
by the Slovene constitution (Art. 116) according to the German example 
(similar system of binding confidence vote on government to the proposal of 
possible successor to the Prime Minister is known also in Spain and Israel). The 
first constructive no -confidence motion after the independence of Slovenia was 
introduced in spring 1992 in the transitional National Assembly (a few months 
after the modern constitution was adopted in December 1991) by the liberal 
and mostly left -win g parties. In the third attempt the candidate for new Prime 
m i n i s te r	 dr.	 J.	 Drn ovš ek 	 was 	 el ec te d	 and 	 th e	 fo rm er	 g overn m ent 	 l ed	 b y 	 A . 	
Peterle was dismissed. The constructive no -confidence motion was introduced 
again on 27. February 2013, when the right -wing coalition was dissolved and A. 
Br atuš ek	 was 	el ec te d	 for	 n ew	 Pr i m e	Mi n i s ter ,	repla c i n g 	J .	J anša .	 
 
An additional important means by which the opposition can exercise control 
over the government is parliamentary investigation. Taking the opportunity to 
launch an investigation the opposition exercises the right of every parliament to 
be fully informed about any matter dealt by the executive. Though the right to 
initiate an investigative committee can be used also by the parties of coalition 
                                                 
9
 The Czech government lost vote of confidence midway through the Czech presidency of the EU 
a nd 	 t h e 	 re m a in in g	 t im e 	 of 	 p re s i d e ncy 	 wa s 	 a d m in ist e re d 	 by	 a 	 ca re 	 t a k e r	 gov e r nm e nt	 ( Špi ca ro v a , 	
St a š k ova and Mansfeldova, 2009: 87). In the recent time it was frequently used by Silvio 
Berlusconi, Prime Minister in the former Italian government in order to secure sufficient votes 
among coalition composed of a number of different parties for passing the gov ernment's bills in 
the two chamber parliament. 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     29 
 
 
government it is t he opposition which is mostly interested to control the actions 
of the government when dealing with the matters of particular importance and 
to investigate the political responsibility public officers.  
 
The right of the National Assembly to launch an inve stigation is determined in 
the Slovene constitution (Art. 93) and by the law on parliamentary inquiry, 
adopted in 1993. There were sixteen committees of inquiry established in 
different mandates in the period 2000 -2014, ten of them on the initiative of 
opposition parties or groups of MPs belonging to these parties. Six 
investigations were introduced by coalition parties or groups of MPs, some 
intended to deal with the responsibility of the former government. While the 
establishment of the committees of inqu iry attracted great deal of 
parliamentary and public attention, a number of committees have not finished 
their work or prepared the report before the end of particular mandate for 
various reasons (demanding and time -consuming work, lack of specialized lega l 
knowledge etc. The results of parliamentary inquiries introduced by opposition 
or coalition parties neither impacted seriously the relations of power between 
the coalitions and oppositions nor the prospects of particular parties on the 
next elections. 
 
3.3 The use of extra -parliamentary means - calls for referendum 
 
Besides the possibilities to participate in the parliamentary legislative process 
and large opportunities to use constitutionally designed means for controlling 
the government, opposition rare ly has opportunity to challenge the policies of 
the government by using extra -parliamentary devices like referendum. Such 
instruments are not recognized as genuine devices of political opposition nor 
they can be found in countries where the emphasis is on the representative 
democracy. The use of referendum is excluded in the political systems with 
parliament -centred opposition with no veto and/or co -governing devices for 
minority parties (United Kingdom) or in the systems with strong co -governing 
devices an d parliament -centeredness of institutional means of political 
opposition (Germany). The use of abrogative referendum worked in Italy as a 
catalyst of the regime change (Helms 2004, 54). Optional referendum is 
considered as an exceptional device and not as a complementary means to the 
legislative decision -making.
 
Frequent calls for referendum in the cases when a 
decision was already taken in a parliament would contribute to the misuse of 
the means of direct democracy and harm the authority of the parliament. Even 
in the countries of ECE where such constitutional arrangements exist (Hungary, 
Bulgaria) they are quite restrictive and the opposition is not able to use them 
(Kopecky and Spirova 2008, 153). A particular exception is Switzerland where 
referendum is driving force of gradual co -optation of the major opposition 
parties into oversized coalition government (Helms 2004, 48).
10
  
  
Opposition in Slovenia was one of the rare oppositions, which could with no 
particular restrictions resort to the instruments of direct democracy 
incorporated in the Slovene democratic model. Constitutional regulation of 
direct democracy in Slovenia was determined in the 1991 Slovene Constitution 
in a very broad way. According to the Constitution (Article 90) National 
Assembly could call a referendum on any issue, which was the subject of 
regulation by statute. A referendum could be called on its own initiative, but 
                                                 
10
 According to the experiences of the country with long time practice of referenda, referendum is 
considered as an important strategic device to achieve certain policy goals for opposition and 
also coalition parties. Negotiations between the opposition and t he government may be carried 
on until a compromise is reached or a referendum may be called.  

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     30 
 
 
obligatorily if it was demanded by no less than one -third of all the deputies, the 
National Council or by no less than 40.000 voters. Referendum was more 
specifically regulated by the Law on Referendum and People's Initiative 
adopted in 1994 (amended in 2005) determining that voters may on a 
referendum decide in advance on particular matter to be regulated by law or 
decide about the law already passed. No quotas of voters were needed for 
validation of referendum. If National Assembly considered that a demand for a 
referendum was not in compliance with constitution it could demand the 
Constitutional Court to decide upon. 
  
Referendum proved to be an important and frequently used instrument of 
direct democracy from 1996 on when the first referendum on the electoral 
system took place. There were altogether 19 referendums until 2013. Their 
number increased after 2000 when the l eft -wing coalitional government won 
amazing majority and the right -wing opposition was reduced to one -third of the 
deputies. A surprising drop of referendums in the fourth legislative term (2005 –
2008) was a consequence of the small capacity of left -wing parties, finding 
themselves for the first time in opposition, to mobilize voters against the new 
measures of financial austerity brought by right -wing coalition government and 
of the growing disagreements on the strategies of opposition in the new 
situation.  
 
The number of referendums increased again during the fifth legislative term 
(2008 –2011) when the right -wing opposition took again an extremely 
uncooperative attitude combined with attempts to undermine by all means the 
legitimacy of coalition government . Opposition had several times used other 
actors like different civic organizations and voters to bring forward the formal 
demand for a referendum and supported certain issues from behind. The 
differences in the number of referendums between the electoral terms 
demonstrate that they have become an important device of right -wing 
opposition in the period overburdened by the economic crisis.  
 
While the referendums called in previous legislative terms served mainly for 
rallying the supporters of opposition and had no particular effect on the 
stability of government, the referendums in the legislative term 2008 –2011 had 
not only aggravated the problems brought by the economic problems but have 
destabilized the whole political system. In 2011 the right -wing oppos ition 
supported referendums on two most important bills regulating the job market 
and pension system. The new left wing coalitional government established after 
the 2008 elections attempted to cope with the crisis and to modernize part of 
the job market ai ming to achieve greater transparency and stimulation of 
students to finish their studies in due time (the actual regulation allowed for the 
students to compete on the job market). The new Bill on the 'Small Work' was 
passed in the National Assembly on Octo ber 26th, 2010 with sufficient majority 
of the coalitional deputies while all the deputies of oppositional parties voted 
against. The veto introduced by the National Council was rejected on the second 
voting in National Assembly on November 11th. Soon afte r the demand for a 
referendum on the bill was introduced by the Union of the Free Trade Unions 
and student organizations supported by opposition. On the referendum taking 
place on 10. April 2011 almost 80 per cent of the voters voted against (the turn -
out was 33.9 per cent).  
 
 
 
 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     31 
 
 
 
T ABLE 4: REFERENDUMS BY LEGISLATIVE TERM AND TYPE OF OPPOSITION  
 
Source: National Assembly of RS, Regular Reports - 2006, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2014. 
 
The second Bill on the Pension Reform was bringing a complete reform of the 
system endangered from the demographic developments and effects of 
economic crisis. It was passed in the National Assembly on December 14, 2010 
with the votes of most of coalitional deputies and against the votes of 
opposition. A week later the Nationa l Council vetoed the bill, but the National 
Assembly immediately rejected the veto and confirmed the bill. In the politically 
most delicate circumstances oppositional parties did not take the risk to call a 
referendum but gave again their undivided support to the initiative of the Union 
of Free Trade Unions to collect the 40.000 signatures of the voters. After the 
signatures were collected and the ruling of Constitutional Court that the 
referendum on the pension bill would not be unconstitutional, the refer endum 
was finally called and the bill was rejected on 5. June 2011(the turn -out was 
40.4 per cent).  
 
The rejection of both bills - the bill regulating the job market and the bill on 
pension system was in fact a popular no -confidence vote to the government. In 
the harsh economic circumstances the right -wing opposition took the most 
adversarial style of beh aviour and increased its pressures on the government 
divided by internal conflicts. Coalition government started to disintegrate – 
several parties withdrew from the coalitional government in 2011 (DeSUS and 
the liberal Zares) turning the government t into minority government. Prime 
Minister B. Pahor tried to replace the ministers who stepped out of the 
government binding his proposal of five new candidates to the vote of 
confidence. The negative confidence vote on September 20th was a new victory 
for opposi tion (36 MPs voted for and 56 against). President of Slovenia D. Turk 
for the first time in the parliamentary history of Slovenia dismissed the National 
Assembly and called for the preliminary elections on the 4th of December 2011. 
Though the new left -wing party Positive Slovenia won greatest share of the 
votes, the coalition government was finally composed of the right -wing parties 
and 	DeS U S 	un d er	t he 	l ead ers h i p	 of	J.	 Jan š a.	 
 
While the proposals of various initiators (individuals, groups of MPs, Trade 
Unions) for calling referendums augmented again only one referendum on the 
Law on the Family took place on 25 March 2012. On this referendum with 
30,1% turnout a majority of 54,5% voted against the provisions determining 
equality of the same -sex partners rega rding adoption of the children.  
 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     32 
 
 
In the Slovene parliamentary system the instruments of direct democracy could 
not force the opposition and government to compromise but served primarily 
as a means for deepening the differences and undermining the stabilit y of 
government. The use of these instruments has not proved to be a democratic 
device in most cases. By resorting to referendum the adversarial or even hostile 
right -wing opposition wanted not only to discredit the government but to 
mobilize its voters in order to block certain reforms. The use of referendums 
had its price also in the exceptionally high time costs of policy making or 
implementing structural reforms needed for consolidation of the state finances 
and countering the economic crisis. At the sa me time the organized and 
financially powerful interest groups and different Trade Unions managed to 
influence the referendum options and timing to their advantage. It was 
considered by more and more political parties on both sides that the 
incorporation o f the means of direct democracy in the political system of 
Slovenia meant an over -equipping of the opposition and that its extra -
parliamentary veto powers frequently block the urgent reforms.  
 
The only solution in the present situation of economic crisis was limiting the 
possibilities for misuse of referendums by the changing the Constitution of RS 
(Articles 90., 97. and 99.). The change, proposed by the left -wing government, 
adopted on 24 May 2013 without a vote against has abolished the right of the 
one third of the deputies and of the State Council to demand a referendum (the 
same right remained only with 40.000 of the voters). It can not be called also on 
the laws on the taxation, customs, duties and other obligatory charges and on 
the law adopted for t he implementation of the state budget As well it cannot be 
called on the laws eliminating the unconstitutionality in the field of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms or any other unconstitutionality. In addition a 
quorum for the validity of results on re ferendum has been introduced – the law 
may be rejected by majority of the voters who have cast valid votes under 
condition that at least one fifth of all qualified voters have voted against the law. 
The change of Constitution may be considered as one of th e most important 
examples of non -conflict behaviour and consensual voting in the history of 
National Assembly.  
 
The new constitutional arrangements on referendum have soon proved to have 
multiple effects. The first referendum called under new restrictive regulation 
was proposed by the right -wing opposition demanding to open the files of the 
secret police gathered in the period before democratization. The referendum -
taking place on 8 June 2014 failed (the turnout was 11,68%). Though the 
question of the acce ss to these files was connected with the dark side of the 
Slovene history the mobilization potential of the initiators of referendum in the 
period of harsh economic crisis turned to be weaker than expected. After a new 
Law on the Family was adopted by coal ition majority in the new National 
Assembly on 3 March, 2015 (with 51 votes for and 28 against) establishing the 
rights of adoption of children by same sex couples, another initiative for a 
referendum came from the side of civil activist group 'For the sak e of the 
children'. The group collected the required number of citizens' (40.000) 
signatures as required by the constitution for a demand for referendum with 
intention to invalidate changes. Though the coalition majority in the National 
Assembly again on 2 5 March, 2015 voted down the demand for the referendum 
(53 votes for and 21 against) claiming that the new constitutional provisions do 
not allow referendums on the laws abolishing the unconstitutionality of the 
matters connected with human rights.  
 
 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     33 
 
 
 
4 C ONCLUSION 
 
In Slovenia the major principles of democratic political and economic 
transformation have been to a greatest degree accepted and the replacement of 
one ruling group of parties by an opposition has become a standard of normal 
everyday political l ife. Though Slovenia constitutes a good example of extremely 
competitive and adversarial type of politics where cooperation and consensus 
among the parliamentary parties has not yet become the normal pattern of 
political behaviour. In the time when the par liamentary rules have not been 
successfully interiorized the parties of coalition and opposition entered into 
fierce disputes (Zajc 2008, 75). Predominant type of the Slovenian 
parliamentary party behaviour still reflects strong and clear divisions between 
the	g overn m ent 	an d	 oppo s i t i on	 (De žel an	 and 	S ever	 2007,	46) .	 
 
Among the factors, which have influenced the opposition, parties' behaviour in 
Slovenia from 1990s on is on the first place the proportional electoral system 
with low threshold allowing a numbe r of political parties to enter the National 
Assembly. The electoral rules allowing for a very fragmented party system are 
not only rendering difficult the building of stable majority coalitions but also 
affecting the forming of strongly connected and effi cient oppositions. The 
second institutional factor seems to be less relevant since the involvement of 
opposition in the parliamentary structures and its co -decisional powers have 
not brought the expected results in the form of more negotiated solutions and 
consensus voting. The decisive factor is the third - political parties 
overburdened with ideological issues combined with unresolved dilemmas 
about Slovenes' history are maintaining strong perceptions of other political 
groups and parties as bitter advers aries, what may be considered as persistence 
of	 s om e	 c l i c hé s 	 of 	 the	 f orm e r	 s oc i al i s t	 p eri o d.	 T h i s 	 adv ers ari al	 pattern 	 of 	
behaviour is evident from the data on the cohesion voting in the National 
Assembly and also from the data on the use of parliamentary m eans of control 
over the government - questions and interpellations. One could also see an 
extremely adversarial behaviour in the introduced constructive no confidence 
motions and in the voting against confidence motions introduced by Prime 
Ministers. It i s supposed that the constructive no -confidence vote protected also 
opposition from taking hazardous steps in overturning the governments 
without being sufficiently organized and prepared to take over government's 
responsibilities. While the opposition was successful in both attempts to replace 
the Prime Minister by own candidate by constructive no -confidence motion, its 
votes against the introduced confidence motion contributed to the dissolution 
of coalition government in two of the four cases.  
 
In additi on the Slovene parliamentary opposition has been quite frequently 
resorting to extra -parliamentary means of direct democracy, which were 
incorporated in the political system of Slovenia. The referendum which turned 
to be until 2013 one of opposition's most efficient tools intended to delegitimize 
the coalition governments helped to simplify some political dilemmas but did 
not contribute to the establishment of the more authoritarian type of 
democracy. However the relatively free access of to the means of di rect 
democracy in the highly conflictual political context overburdened by the 
economic crisis has been limited in 2013 by the change of constitution. The 
opposition has from now on to reconsider its parliamentary strategies and 
adopt more consensual behav iour, which is more common in parliamentary 
democracies with longer tradition.  
 

J OURNAL OF C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS     34 
 
 
Taking into account these factors, we can see some differences in the behaviour 
between the right -wing and the left -wing oppositions, the first using the 
referendum as a popul ist means to rally supporters, while the left -wing political 
parties when in opposition showed smaller capacities to mobilize voters. 
Variations also occurred especially under the influence of foreign factors and 
pressures to join the EU or to harmonize th e legislation with the EU legal order 
and later because of the impact of the economic crisis (Zajc 2015, 191). At some 
instances it has been possible to reach agreements between government and 
opposition on the issues of Slovenia's position in the EU, fore ign policy or 
terrorism. Those bills which were ideologically free have had more chances to 
get full consensus than ideologically loaded or contaminated. As in the case of 
some other countries (Italy, Czech Republic) the dissent is still dominant in the 
case of the bills dealing with basic rights and liberties, evaluation of the recent 
history, privatization and the means intended to alleviate poverty of large 
population strata as a consequence of economic crisis.  
  
The analytical approach used in the anal ysis of the oppositional behaviour in 
Slovenian National Assembly is to some extent similar to the approaches used 
in other parliamentary democracies. Though we could not explain entirely all 
the factors influencing the behaviour of opposition we can resor t to the 
conclusion that enlarging cooperation with other European countries and 
engagement in the policy making process on the level of the EU will force the 
political actors to adopt more consensual patterns of behaviour. Further 
comparative research is necessary to confirm the validity of this hypothesis. 
 
At the end one should also try to answer the question what is the job of 
opposition in the present circumstances globalization. Past and present trends 
of globalization have narrowed the capacities of national states to act 
autonomously and contributed to some uniformity in policy making. We may 
unfortunately expect that these trends will also reduce the ability of oppositions 
to come up with viable alternatives or to express critical stands with regard to 
the proposed or adopted policies. On the other side the traditional notion of 
parliamentary opposition seem not to be directly applicable to the EU. Perhaps 
modern democracies need representation of differences in the sense of 
innovations but may less need a strong opposition. However, we have remained 
curious and critical with regard to the EU institutions where the opposition has 
not yet taken a recognizable shape. 
 
 
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