The Entruder : '■ 1 l \ • i . * . ' > r ' ‘ \ ‘ v ' ■ - * V ' The Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, Ljubljana, Slovenja, Year II, No. 6, November 1992 EDITORIAL 1 '" • * *• FORMER YUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY An European Dream - Bosnian Nightmare By Tomaž Mastnak 3 The So-Called "Intervention in Bosnia" or "MiToševičism" on the Left and on the Right By Tonči Kuzmanič 6 The Great Fiasco of "VVestern" Peace Thought "Think Locairy f Act G lobally" By Marko Hren 8 Voivodina the Forgotten Province. Vukovar the Modern Day Dresderv. By Brendan Keaveney 12 ' e ’■ *ACTIVmES News from The Antivvar Campaign Croatia By Vesna Teršelič 15 Don't Count on Us 16 The 2nd Semminary for Peace Education in Alpe-Adria Region By Sašo Gazdič 16 ' Seminar Report By Doroteja Lešnik 17 REFUGEES The Banality of EviI / The Intervievv with Silva Mežnarič By Melita Zajc 18 Netvvork for Refugees By Gorana Flaker 22 Reflection on Refugees Trauma By David 26 Refugee from Sarajevo By Azra Drakuiič - Hamzabegovič 28 * 'S x i v SW!TZERLAND VUITHOUT AN ARMY ADDRESSES * The Photo on the Cover Page by Jože Suhadolnik © . EDITORIAL 4 31 4 01 is the last issue of the Intruder. More than that: in September, we dissolved ourselves as the Ljubljana Peace Group. This is the end of a long story. Our peace group came into existence a decade ago. From the begining it was intimately connected to the democrati- zation process in Slovenia and played an important role in it. The democratization in our country was initiated by the new social movements among whom the peace movement was, for some years, the most articulated and publicly expo- sed. In tandem with environmentalists, gays, feminists, youth subcultures, human rights groups and other civic initi- atives that emerged in the mid-eighties, we started gradually to create a demo- cratic civil society and a new political culture. The other aim of our activity, as a part of this civil society, wasto establish a plura- list political society and a legitimate and accountable State, a State respecting and guaranteeing human rights, and bound by law. Ali this was effected, sometimes in unpredicted ways and often falling short of ideal Solutions. As result of the achievements of the democratization process in the eighties, the fall of the communist rule in Slovenia was not a shock but a rather smooth transition. Our activity contributed to such a favou- rable development. As a peace movement, we not only struggled for general democratic aims. This Is not hovv it vvorked. One of the differences betvveen the struggle for de- mocracy in Slovenia and the other Cen¬ tral East European countries was that, in Slovenia, we lacked a general democratic movement, a sort of democratic head- quarters, vvhich would then pay atten- tion to particular issues and concerns; we did not deduce our movements and initi- atives from a general idea of democracy. On the contrary, it was a plurality of struggles for a number of concrete, everyday, particular, specific issues and concerns vvhich fonstrued the general democratic interest. As a peace movement, our main concern was to create a culture of peace and nonviolence. First of ali, we had to reha- bilitate the idea of peace, for "peace" was, as elsevvhere in Eastern Europe, a word abused by the official ideology. More specifically, vve ran lectures and » The Intruder - november 1992 EDITORiAL discussions, held staIIs, vvrote petitions, protests and statements, campaigned against war toys, organized workshops for children, demonstrated against the last parade of the Yugoslav People's Army and against the Yugoslav arms trade. The action which attracted most attention, official fury and public sup- port, was our campaign for the recogni- tion of the right to conscientious objec- tion and for the introduction of an alternative to military Service. We ques- tioned, vvithout even intending to be radical, the central and most sacred institution of the Yugoslav old regi me, the People's Army, vvhich precisely in 1985 began to effectively take over control of povver in Yugoslavia. In reply to the Army's most unreasonable reac- tion, we focused more and more on the problems of militarization and demilita- rization of society. Together with feminists, vve opposed the plan to extend military Service to vvomen. When a show military trial vvas staged in Ljub¬ ljana, in the Summer of 1988, vvhich vvas understood as an attempt to crush the democratization movement in Slovenia, vve helped to organize a successful social resistance vvhich gave the impetus to the transition to a democratic system. From the beginning of our activity, vve participated in the international peace movement. We established contacts with peace groups in the Alpe-Adria region; our representatives vvere sent to END conventions and vve involved ourselves in the European Netvvork for East-West Dialogue. We took advantage of being able to travel freely to Eastern Europe and, in the mid-eighties, started to vvork on an East-East peace dialogue. Our representatives took part in the "histo- •ric" seminars in VVarsavv, Budapest and Prague. In this netvvorking, vve insisted on the link betvveen peace and human rights and stressed the importance of the creation of a democratic civil society for any lasting and meaningful peace. This of course is history novv. The continuing war in former Yugoslavia has changed our lives. None of us has the illusion that it is possible to continue to vvork in the ways vve us^d to vvork. This vvould not be logical any more. The situ- ation in Slovenia has changed. Many of the aims of our movement have been achieved. Hovvever, those forms of action vvhich vve developed under com- munism are of little use today. One cycle of the nevv social movements has defini¬ tiven come to an end. Our attempt to get a representative of the social move¬ ments elected to the nevv Parliament failed. The popularity of the project to demilitarize Slovenia suffered a set back after the short vvar of independence in Summer 1991. What seemed to have been vvithin reach before the Yugoslav military intervention, can novv only be sustained as our long term goal. With the influx of refugees first from Croatia and novv from Bosnia, the greater part of nongovernmental social activity has shifted. Its principal aim novv is to pro- vide help and support for the refugees. The events in Croatia and Bosnia have had a profound impact on us. The vvar by far exceeds our vvorst expectations of vvhat could happen and the boldest ima- gination of vvhat is possible in human society. Hovvever, as horrifying as the vvar is, for us as a peace movement, an even more shocking thing vvas the reac- tion of the international peace moveme¬ nt to it. A couple of exceptions aside, it failed completely. It failed first to recog- nize and acknovvledge the danger of vvar in Yugoslavia and then to do anything vvithin its povver to avert it. We feel ali the more bitter about this as vve, from the Spring of 1988 on, toured Europe trying to explain vvhat vvas going on in Yugoslavia and sanding vvarnings, but nobody listened. When vvar finally broke out, it vvas in the nature of things that the peace move¬ ment could not do much to stop it. Yet there vvas, in those years, much hectic activity. While old netvvorks started to dissolve, their remnants continued to be active and some of them formed nevv organizations. We are afraid that ali the vvork has not brought about much good. We must say that vve are concerned that some of these international organiza¬ tions lack a democratic basis; vve ques- tion their right to present themselves as representative of international civil society; and vve are deeply concerned at vvhat appears to be an inappropriate and vvasteful use of resources on actions and conferences that do little to challenge the fundamental basis of this vvar or relieve humanitarian suffering, but rather generate confusion and misunder- standing, nationally and internationally. We are convinced that the real problem lies with the ideas that determine the framevvork of much of VVestern peace activity. We have begun to be more and more concerned vvith the insufficiencies of the ideas and ideals, of the conceptual basis of the Cold War peace movement (vvhich are, again, imbedded in the VVest¬ ern peace tradition.) They seem to be conduciveto a blind and blinding activism that engulfs us in almost as da- maging ways as the vvar. VVe have resol- ved not to participate in such an activism any more. VVe have decided to seriously think through the vvar and to rethink the ideas and concepts on vvhich our peace movement vvas based, and the interna¬ tional peace movement of vvhich vve vvere a part. In our vievv, this is a neces- sary condition on vvhich alone it may be possible in the future to formulate nevv strategies for peace. We are not abettors of the idea of "starting anew" for its ovvn sake. Nevv things are not necessarily better than those they have succeeded or replaced. We are convinced, hovvever, that it is time to part vvith ways vvhich lead novvhere. Just because of the hor- rors of this vvar vve feel that vvhat is needed is clear thinking and analysis, not the unthinking continuance of a "knee j e r k " activist response. That is why the decision to dissolve our peace movement vvas complemented by the decision to continue to vvork as the Ljubljana Peace Institute. Our hope is that in the years to come a netvvork of people vvill be created vvho recognize the need to rethink and reevaluate the VVestern traditions of peace thought and action, and to search for ways in vvhich peace and nonviolence could be concei- ved of and asserted in the 'nevv vvorld order.’ These are the people vve vvould like to vvork vvith. Ljubljana, October 1, 1992 ■ 2 The Intruder- november 1992 FORMER VUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AN EUROPEAN DREAM BOSNIAN NIGHTMARE By Tomaž Mastnak the Yugoslav Peo- lflf I I I I ple's Army inter- vened in Slovenia and the war broke out in Croatia, I stili tried to understand the attitude of the West towards what was happening here as one of, basically, "honest stupidity." Yet the slaughter in Bosnia has lifted the veil and these wo- rds of a great English vvriter proved to be inapplicable. Undo-ubtedly, there is much stupidity involved on the part of the West, but no honesty. And I do not mean this in moral terms solely. The dis- honesty I particularly have in mind is in- tellectual. The whole in-tellectual end- eavour of VVestern governments and NGOs alike, vvith very few ex-ceptions, was, and continues to be, a struggle to uphold their racist prejudices, ideological dogmas, selective political blindness and cosmopolitan parochialism, and to culti- vate an intense "psychic numbing." Ali this made it possible for them not to act in any way which might have stopped the killing and destruction. A customary illusion has been that the West does not have sufficient, or reliable enough, information about the events in ex-Yugoslavia. Yet ali the information needed to comprehend the situation cle- arly (and possibly act differently) have been, and stili are, easily available. The VVesterners do not want to take note of them and many are not published by their media (and stili others, like reports on the Serbian concentration camps, happened to be hidden in dravvers of pro-Serbian high UN officials - of Europe- an origin, I guess.) The VVesterners have struggled heroically to remain igno-rant. VVith brilliancy to be admired they have refused to know. It is, of course, true that at the "end of history" every demo- crat has the right to freely chose such an attitude, and VVesterners are povverful enough to be ignorant. Their povver stands for knovvledge. This povver is ali that counts and to preserve it is ali that matters. Any different view of the slaug¬ hter in Bosnia vvould necessarily either presuppose, or result in, a change of Out¬ look on the part of the VVest. Any diffe¬ rent understanding of vvhat is going on in Bosnia vvould imply a questioning of the VVest itself, vvould call into question its innermost identity. Two things, more than anything else, de- termine the behaviour of the VVest in the Bosnian war. One is fascism and the other Islam. Fascism. The VVest has never been able to effec- tively confront fascism. In VVorld War II, at a very late stage, it defeated it mili- tarily. Yet it has never deconstructed and destroyed fascism symbolically. This is why fascism continues to exist in the VVest, lingering in its petty and humble forms in everyday life or making more dramatic appearances in election campa- igns, public demonstrations and Street violence. Faced vvith Serbian fascism, the VVest seems to be paralyzed. Reasoning, if there is any, is used to deny that the povver vvhich had designed this war, im- posed it (so far) on Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, and is carrying it out as a war of extermination, is a fascist povver. There is a refusal to recognize this. The cant about Serbian "communism" and "bol- shevism" is much more comfortable. This cant is a real consolation, for vve knovvthat communism has historically collapsed and is bound to die off in Ser- bia, too. The mission of those in the VVest who flatter themselves that they think about vvhat is happening in Yugo- slavia (this notion has not been given up) appears to be to suppress the specificity of Serbian rule. The light of their reason is creating the night in vvhich ali covvs are black. It is consolatory to righteously distribute the blame for the vvar among ali the parties involved. A special intellectual achieve- ment is to convincingly blame the victim. Flovvever, as the idea of equal justice has 0 its limits, one has not oniy to distribute, but to displace, the blame and detect fa¬ scism not in Serbia but in Croatia and, possibly, Slovenia. And so the just and povverful are looking for shivers in Slove- ne, Croatian and Bosnian eyes in order not to see the beam in the Serbian - and not to realize that they themselves are blind. Croatian fascism is a child of serb and gr- andchild of european Everything has been done not to confront Serbian fasci¬ sm as fascism. Consequently, Serbia has not been really confronted at ali. For Bri- tain vvho novv has the lead in Europe, Chamberlain & FHalifax and their peace- making vvith FHitler seem to have become a customary law. As for Chamberlain, to find a just modus vivendi vvith fascism appears to be the leading idea of Euro¬ pean policy tovvards "Yugoslavia." And as Chamberlain could declare that he had "a clear conscience," so vvill his heirs today for they have done ali that Euro¬ pean countries could do to establish pea- ce. Indeed, they have taken some mea- sures to appease the conscience of the public in their home countries, and they have not taken any measures vvhich mig¬ ht have been a threat to the establish- ment of peace - vvith Serbian fascism. As seen from the inside of the parts of ex- Yugoslavia vvhich are not dominated by the Serbs, the VVest has, so far and de facto, acted as a society for the promo- tion of fascism. Not only is the VVest as far as ever from the symbolic destruction of fascism: it novv even lacks the vvill to defeat it mili- tarily. This may become one of the mes- sages of the "Yugoslav War:" fascists only have to make vvar and theirs vvill be kingdoms on earth. The Making of Muslims One reason for not confronting Serbian fascism is that any confrontation vvith it on the side of the VVest vvould necessar-» 3 The Intruder - november 1992 FORMER VUGO AMD iMTERMATSONAL COMIVIUMSTV ily require the confrontation with the fasci- sm in the VVest, and with the fascism of the West. The other reason for not confront- ing Serbia effectively is that Serbia isfight- ing an European war, to be precise: the European war. Since Europe existed as a self-conscious entity, war ag-ainst muslims has been its permanent concem and obses- sion. Europe has never been able to cons- true its identity autonomously, positively, relying on, and referring to, its own powers and potentials. It could onlyform its iden- tity in opposition to an external enemy, and it could only exercise its powers and develop its potentials against such an enemy. Moreover, vvhenever Europe sear- ched for unity, whenever it tried to "inte- grate," it needed a war on its margins, a war against the enemies of Christianity, cul- ture and civilization. Muslims are the Inbe- griff for the enemies that Europe kept inventing in order to be able to be Europe. Muslims represent the symbo!ic enemy of Europe, the Other whom Euro-pe has only known to d§stroy. The most enlightened and liberal European minds dreamt about "chasing muslims out of Europe" ("et mme de l'Asie et de l'Afrique," as the meek abbe de Saint-Pierre was inclined to add.) This dream is stili very much at work in the European unconscious. Serbian fascists are fulfilling the European dream. If the dream is too dreadful for Europeans to live it themselves, it is never- theless their dream. If it is coming true with the help of Serbian fascists, this only gives to Europeans a double pleasure: the pleasure of the fulfillment of the dream and the pleasure of not having the blood on their own hands. They have the plea¬ sure of realizing their b arbarity and, in the face of it, preserving their civility. While their vvildest political imagination is set on work, they can at the same time sustain the position of horrified critics of this wild life. Their racism can, in this way, take a sublime and respectful turn: they condemn the wild Balkan tribes. Hovvever, no condemnation has yet been strong enough to cut off the communication with the leaders of Serbian fascism. The role given to the Serbian Fuh- rer in Bosnia, Karadjic, is symptomatic. VVhatever happens on the ground there, Karadjic is asked by Western media to give a statement or make a comment. And yet I am not surprised that this war criminal has been given the publicity which far exceeds the one given to the legal Bosnian govern- ment. He is speaking out precisely what the VVest desires to hear. He is not so much the spokesperson of the rebel Bosnian Serbs as the spokesman of the European unconsci¬ ous, the herald of the European truth. The fact that this vvarmonger is a psychiatrist equips him well for the role he is destined to play: he is the Fiihrer, not because peo- ple in Bosnia have gone mad, they have not, but because he is clever enough to successfully makefools of VVestern leaders and much of the public. He cannot be reproached with neglecting his clients vvhile making war for he has made the VVest his Client. Hovvever, the impression that it is Serbian fascists who are carrying out ali the dirty business for Europeans vvhile these are standing passively by the side, vvould be misleading. It was VVestern politicians and media who made "muslims" out of Bosni-ans. First of ali, the European Community invented the "cantonisation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina and imposed it as the solution on the legal and legitimate government. The European political elite instituted the ethnic division of the country as the leading principle and thereby authorized the Serbian war against Bosnia. Up until very recently, the EC had been offering, as the peaceful solution, the very same model that Serbian military and paramilitary have been putting in practice by a genocidal war. Serbian fascists have at least been honest and clear about what they have been doing, and continue to do, vvhile Europeans talked peace and Croatian extremists were sneakingly taking for themselves the part of Bosnia and Herzegovine they vvere offe-red by the VVest. As soon as Bosnia and Her-zegovina vvas ethnically divided by the VVestern diplomats vvhose alleged aim it vvas to prevent "ethnic war," the legal go¬ vernment vvas, for them and by them, dis- solved. They treated Bosnian Croats who vvere represented by that government, and active in it, as a separate entity. In this way, the government could be declared a mus- lim government, for Serbian vvarmongers had previously vvithdravvn from it. (After they had lost the political battle they deci- ded to fight the legal authorities by terror- ism and war.) The Bosnian government vvas thus, by the VVest, made a non-government and a mere representative of Bosnian mus¬ lims. The elected government vvas set on equal footing vvith the self-styled Croatian leaders, and both vvith Serbian terrorists and war criminals. Instead of treating the latter as outlavvs, the VVest started to treat the government as a "vvarring faction." Again, the plans of VVestern diplomacy and Serbian fascists coincided. The former vvere destroying the legal government ideaIly, in their heads, the latter materially, on the ground, both treating it as a vvarring ethni- city: as vvarring muslims. No serious attem- pt vvas made in the VVest to explain that Bosnian musims are ali but islamicfund- amentalists; that Bosnian society vvas a lar- gely secularized society; that Bosnian tovvns vvhich are falling victim to the urbocidal Serbian mob vvere historical centres of cultural pluralism and tolerance. On the contrary, what vvas generated by the joined European and Serbian political forces and by the Goebbelsian Belgrade media and "objective" VVestern journalism alike, vvas precisely the image of the vvarring muslim, this original fear, the Urangst, of the Christian, cultured and civilized VVest. The New Worid Order The two moments: the inability of the VVest to fight fascism, and its inability to cease fighting the imaginary muslim enemy, may help to explain the nature of the war in Bosnia and of the VVestern reluctance, or rather refusal, to stop it. Apparently, the war contradicts the central values and achievements of the VVestern civilization (and European integration.) Serbs who fight this war - from the leading Belgrade intellectuals who designed it, to the political povver elite vvhich adopted the design, the people who support it, the military establishment who executes it, and the brigands vvho do the slaughter - are hostes humani generis, the enemies of hu- mankind. It is not only that they have cho- sen not to resolve disagreements and con- flicts by civil and political means but rather resorted to war. They have, moreover, tres- passed everything vvhich has since the early modern times been declared the "lavvs of war."There seems to be no war crime known from history vvhich has not been commited in this vvar, and nevv ones have been added to the list. This is not a vvar properly speaking, it is an unbounded killing, plunder, torture and destruction. ("Latrones bellum non geruntl") This is a vvar vvhich tears apart the very fabric of the international order. This is a vvar vvhich pur- posefully and systematically annihilates culture and civilization them-selves. And yet, the engineers of the vvar are regarded as, basically, equal members of the interna¬ tional community, and they are held in higher esteem than their victims. Most res- pectable VVestern diplomats keep shaking the hands of men vvho have already been identified as vvar criminals, thereby soiling their ovvn hands vvith blood. There are two alternatives: either the VVest has lost the ca- pacity to make peace and vvar, or it is com- plaisant vvith the ideas and action of Belgrade based fascism. As the VVest has recently demonstrated that it is able to make vvar, the latter possibility is more likely to be true. If this is so, the vvar in Bosnia does not contradict the vvorld order shaped by the VVest, but actually contributes to the creation of the "nevv vvorld order." Serbian fascists are the architects of our common future, and the nevv Europe is based on genocide and destruction. ■ 4 The Intruder - november 1992 Photo by Jože Suhadolnik © I pl'• ■ *> FORMER YUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THE SO CALLED "INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA", OR "MILOŠEVIČISM" ON THE LEFT AND ON THE RIGHT the eyes of international observers, specially those who affirm to be *seriously interested in the future fate of this part of the world, which used to be called Yugoslavia, the question of Bosnia arises only as a question of the so called intervention. It seems that different subjects break a lanceforthe intervention and Bosnia and its inhabitants remain in the role of "non- existing" subjects or, even better, in the role of "experimental rabbits", on vvhich the operation of the intervention should be exercised or not. Nationalism, Fascism, ... Cubism Hovvever, the arguments of the pro and contra intervention sides are well knovvn, so my intention is only to show a small part of the background to the present situation vvhich is, in my opinion, the resuit of the relatively long pro-cess of Yugoslav disinte- gration. In this regard at the very begining I vvould like to put four basic points: 1 . Quite uniform, almost vvorldvvide (American, Soviet, left, right...) the domi¬ nant standpoint from the very beginning was that the status quo and Yugoslav- statehood shouid be preserved. It is, of course, selfunderstandable that, also in politics, inertion in a way use to play a sort of the "basic law of gravitation". But quite surprisengly vvas the fact that approach to the concervation of the previous Yugoslav State vvas so strongly emphasised that during last year very often one could hear statements such as : "Yugoslavia should be _preserved at any cost"! Exactly from that "analytical" starting point ali other, more or less, simplistic vievvs that I am going to put in a form of short chronological way, can be taken. 2. First, there vvas " The Slovenian čase". In accordance vvith the already mentioned By Tonči Kuzmanič 1 presumption that the status quo should b% preserved in Yugoslavia (more precisely, that Yugoslav territorial integrity must be preserved), the general understanding of the Slovenian situation can be approxima- telly described as: There is nationalism vvith the light elements of fascism in Slovenia. From the state-forming standpoint it is, in fact, the classical čase of separatism. Slove- nians, vvho identified themselves vvith their State (ail Slovenes vvere identified as natio- nalists, the Slovenian regime has become the same as the Slovene State as such...), vvere told by the international observers, that they should examine ali the possible consequences of their secession from Yugoslavia, since several forces, led by the Yugoslav Peoples Army, promised to defend Yugoslav-statehood. In thatsense it vvas said to Slovenes : "If you vvant to dance vvith the devil, you will have that dance, but you wili dance alone!" 3. In the second, "Croatian čase", the diagnosis of the observers vvas quite similar, but simultaneously reversed at the very decisive point: it is the čase of fascism (regime, Croats, and Croatia under Tudjman became the same!), vvhich can be hardly hidden behind the "nationalistic rebirth" cover. In this regard, Croatians desire to be bitten by the Army since it is at the same time the defence of the Europe and World against fascism. 4 . In the, for novv, last case-Bosnia (if we do not count Albanians in Kosovo, Muslims from Sandjak and other Non-Serbs in Vojvodina, Montenegro...), the vvorst possible combination happened. First, there vvas the nationalistic: Slovene element" in the form of stili "not-fascist" Croatians, "non-extremist" Serbs and "honest" Muslims-. Then, secondly, other subjects appeared: different fascist organizations and groups, like Paraga‘s HOS, Šešelj or Arkan's groups,... and, finaly, the Muslim mudjahedins. Whatfollows is the commu- nist army of the last communist Mloševič. Last but not least, Turks and islam play another specific and actualy the most im- portant, role. Exactly "the Islamic danger " took a decisive matrix of "thinking". Namely, it vvas that element vvhich gave to ali prior elements (nationalism, fascism, communism ...) a certain ideological sense in the meaning that ali of them together started to play a quite knovvn "historical" (racist) role, vvhich can be in its ideological and historical potentials understood only in the terms of European traumatic history. European "Bosnian Bestial Games" The "vvorld meditation" around the Bosni¬ an picture is stili going on. In this picture ali the bogeymen of Europe, America, the old and the nevv vvorld ... , are finally boiling in the same, hellish Bosnian pot. Here, in this bestial game, ali animals are caught: Nationalisms, Fascisms, Communisms, Fun- damentalisms, Islamism, and the "Turkish danger" are present ing again... In other vvords, why not leave them ali in the boil¬ ing pot, and ali these infernal seed vvould be finally boiled and destroyed for ever. What could be more useful that to leave ali of them, to allovv selforganization of their self-killing, to destroy their "evil seed"? It seems, in short, that America and Europe have finally got a splendid opportunity to get rid of ali Evils from their common historical past. Miloševič's Perspective of Democracy? From the short skech of the dominant ma- trix of understanding of existing situation in Bosnia, a slightly catious reader could make a quite simplified and vvrong conclu- sion. Namely, that ali these pictures and interpretations cames from the "vvestern vvorld", from the side vvhich, by definition, could not understand the "real problems" 6 The Intruder - november 1992 FORMER YUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY of the Balkans. But that sort of conclusion could be a wrong one. Why? There is no serious doubt that Miloševič is one of the essential ingredient of the Bosnian boiIing pot but nevertheless, his policy and totali- tarianism can be taken as the basis froim which comes any of the mentioned ideas about ex-Yugoslavia already referred to. ad. 1. Is it not the čase that "nationalism with light elements of fascism" vvhich is primary a cover for "secession from the sovereign State in the Slovenian čase", is taken exactlyfrom Miloševiči ideological arsenal and repeated by Europeans, Americans ...? Namely, speaking vvithin the European language, it was the same movement for secession in Slovenia as in the Basque country, Ireland, Scotland, North ltaly and Corsica. And, it is, of course, legitimate to stop such separatisms, even by force, is it not? In this sense Miloševič is implicitly doing a good thing, perhaps solely with a some "little exaggeration". ad. 2. Do not they, both - Miloševič and "the West" - see Croatia as a fascist sta-te, vvhich tries to hide itself behind the cover of legitimate nationalism? So, then is it not right and legitimate to bomb, destroy, occupy and abolish fascism? And, finaIly, who invented a slogan that Croats are by their blood and genes fascists, if not Miloševič? ad. 3. Further, where did an idea about "Bosnian Vietnam" or "Afghanistan", vvhich could happen after the intervention in Bosnia to American or European soldiers, comefrom if not from Miloševiči and Ka- radžič? Was not Bosnian soil in this context marked as Miloševiči "hunting territory"? What could be dravvn from the vvhole picture at the end? At least one conclusion. Most of the "VVestern" manner of thinking (official or oppositional, right or left) about Bosnia was in fact produced in Eastern Eu- rope, more precisely, in Serbia itself. Bush-the Leftist and the Pacifist To put in a language of "symbols" one could also underline that president Bush has for more than one year been Miloše¬ viči spokesman and Lautsprecher of his post-imperial policy. This is not such a sur- prise for many of those, who are dealing with such issues. It is much more surprising that the so called "European left" and "European peace movements" see also in President Bush as their Lautsprecher and "order-giver" at the same time. But hovv does one sustain that argument? I wi11 not speak about Yugoslavia and its disintegration as a basic problem since it is clear that the traditional left simply can not accept it as such. Yugoslavia just functioned as the last left European utopia, and it looks like that it is very hard for the so call¬ ed left to survive vvithout any serious help from a "concrete utopia". Defending their ovvn "concrete utopia" (Yugoslavia as idea and possibility of freedom but first of ali as a compact territoty), both, the left and tho¬ se on the peace scene therefore helped to create an argumentation in the Slovenian čase for Miloševiči policies. It was even vvorse in Croatia. Namely, the defence against fascism and nationalism was quite "obvious" in the Croatian situation. In re- gard to Bosnia ali analyses of the left or of the peace tradition were anyway identical vvith Bushi arguments, including the ideo- logy of Non-interventionism in that region! War is Peace Is there any common point in these almost unified ideas and vievvs on Bosnia, vvhich can be recognized betvveen so diverse ele¬ ments or subjects: Miloševičism, Bushi poli¬ ca UN and EC actions to the great extent and on the so called European left and Eu¬ ropean Peace-makers? Space dictates that a relatevely simplistic ansvver has to be fur- nished. It is such a point, vvhich can be na- med WAR. The core point of ali "observers" is namely the fact that they do not dare to combine two vvords : YUGOSLAVIA and WAR. They rather speak about conflicts, fights, ethnically cleaned territories ... And when it comes to the point, under the pressure of everyday's facts, and they are forced to admit that a war is going on, they add immediately that "it is not a true war". For this at least two reasons can be given. The first one is taken from the historically determined vision of the war as a frontal one and the second one was produced after the "skirmish" war in Slovenia, when it became clear that it was rather a skirmish than a true war. Flovvever, ali these findings do not mean a lot to Bosnian people, who are playing the horifing role of the object of genocide. The Serbs who make up around 30% of the Bosnian population now occupy more than 70% of the territory of the internationally recognized sovereign State! Serbia vvith its serfs in Bosnia, has at the moment its east¬ ern border less than four kilometers from Sarajevo, not to mention even many of the zones or "Krajinas", placed little more than ten kilometers from Zagreb. From the data, availabie at the moment we can draw a conclusion, that for each vvounded or killed Serb, there are ten Muslim or Croat casul- ties (mostly civilians), not to speak about refugees, almost ali of them Muslims. The World Turned Upside D ovvn Flow it is possible to accept ali these hor- rific things, happening in Bosnia, including concentration camps, vvhich no doubt remain us of the Flitler era? Probably quite easily vvith the slogans as: Peace, Brother- hood, Coexistence, One State, Yugoslavia, and so called non-lntervention. Ali observ¬ ers have the same view, namely that intervention vvould produce vvar in Bosnia! For them it seems that in Goražde, Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo, Kakanj, Tešanj, Mostar, Vlasenica, Višegrad, Jajce ... at the moment Peace exists. It is therefore not the question and the Sta¬ te of (Non)lntervention but the State of the genocide over the Bosnian people. Discus- sion about intervention is only a good co¬ ver or excuse vvhich seems to mobilize only the left and the peace movements. In real- ity it is clear to every-body that such sterile discussions only help to remove ali traces of blood in Bosnian total destruction. If we are allovved to judge things, that happened until now, it seems quite possible that Intervention will eventually occur, but that will only happen when it becomes clear that the Bosnians are able to take the initi- ative in their liberation vvar against the aggressor. A clear need wi11 be born, name- ly that they should be buryed and abolish- ed finally and completely. In that sense, the situation will remain the same for the Bosnian people. As Non-lnter¬ vention at the moment means damnation for them (international prohibition to seli vveapons to Bosnia is, of course, an inter¬ vention par exellence and it has existed from the very beginning of the conflict) since they have no means to defend them- selves. The ultimate coming of it (Interven¬ tion) wi11 mean the same - the final destruc¬ tion of Bosnia. Why? The ansvver is simple, al-though it is not easy to understand it. Such Intervention vvould be directed agai¬ nst Bosnians because they vvill be finaIly able in the not too distant future to fight, defend and liberate themselves. ' Political scientist, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana, Slovenia. ■ 7 The Intruder - november 1992 FORMER VUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITV THE GRE AT FIASCO OF "VVESTERN" PEACE THOUGHT "THINK LOCALLY, ACT GLOBALLY" By Marko Hren this paper I want to argue the following: 1- the principles of sovereignty of States and inviolability of borders must not only seriously be challenged but should be ob- served as potentially the main bias which contributes largely to conflicts, wars and human suffering. 2- in the analysis of the Yugoslav crisis, we seldom find an analysis of military power. Military industry and military institution are main causes of the war itself. VVithout taking military power - a core institution of a "sovereign" State - seriously in consideration we can not approach any discussion about more peaceful world order. The discourse of nationalisms and national interests in the čase of Yugoslavia is not suficient and is even misleading. The lack of anti- militaristic type of analysis contributed largely to the failor of international diplomacy in Balkans. Yugoslav Army was a 7th republic of Yugoslavia. A power on its own and a main actor in ali Yugoslav wars. 3- vvestern civiiization and "Western peace thought" have to be reconsidered. Europe has to admit that it is not and should not play a leading role in human civiiization. Imperialism, military indus- trial complexes, exploitation, racism, ecological destruction - the main prob- lems of humanity are ali children of this very vvestern civiiization vvhich pretends to be enlightened and Progressive. The 500 years celebration of Columbus, the most perverse wars in Southern Europe, grovvth of racism and apathy concerning the hunger in Somalia are enough reasons to rethink vvestern civiiization. The conclusions that could challenge the minds of the reader vvould be: Ad. 1. The international lavv should be based on the principle of sovereignty (protecting States) only and only until the very sovereign State respects human rights. When human rights are violated, international community should protect the sovereignty of the people. Ad. 2. The drastic demilitarization, abolition of national armies, conversion of military industries and international control over national armies should be most seriously put on the agenda. Ad. 3. VVestern civiiization has to bow before Islamic, Arabic, American - indigenous, Afričan, far-eastern etc. civilizations in order to be able to learn, share, tolerate and cooperate beyond the imperial attitude of "help" and "teach". No Comment "We have probably reached a stage in the ethical and psychological evolution of VVestern civiiization in vvhich the massive and deliberate violations of human rights will no longer be toler- ated". This is vvhat at-that-time UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar declared only fevv months before "intol- erable" manifested on the crossroad betvveen Bruxelles, Rome, VVienna, Budapest and Athens... And vvhen "intolerable" already happened, the very same Secretary General declared "I have no comment", vvhen asked about events in former Yugoslavia in August 1991. "No comment - this is an inner-Yugoslav problem" vvas a general view during pre- destruction period of Yugoslavia. Yet, there are observers vvho vvould vichemently announce that the recogni- tion of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia successively led to destruction and vvars. They are particularly vvaried about the role of Germany in this process. It could be argued the contrary - the absence of the recognition of the right for self- determination triggered vvars in Slovenia and Croatia (the čase of Bosnia is differ- ent for many reasons, since a lot of it has to do with the moment of inertia after the vvar spread over Croatia and the YA had to "escape" to Bosnia). Today, the principle is challenged on the čase of Kosovo - an inner affair of Serbia, or a possible trigger for Balkan vvars. The secret principle of State sovereignty has ruled over human rights in the illumi- nated VVestern political thought. The attitudes of ignorance and biased support of The Yugoslav State by ali international bodies vvere vvithout doubt amongst key elements leading to vvars in former Yugoslavia. VVhen Mr. Eagelbufger, the author of US policy tovvards Yugoslavia has recently declared that he "vvas mislead by Belgrade politicians" such confession seems real and honest but yet it tries to mislead a naive reader. Mr. Eagelburger vvas not mislead (confessing vvould mean that he is not mislead any more). Mr. Eagelburger vvas led very vvell by the interests of his ovvn and of his State. The principal interest of US and Europe vvas to keep stability in Balkans. Mr. Markovič - a former Yu-prime minister - vvas offering štability and gradual reform. Mr. Markovič vvas given full trust and support - and ali other political options vvere ignored. When the federal army under the auspices of federal govern- ment acted in Slovenia (June 1991) the chain reaction of the involvement of military started. Today the story of "misleading" repeats. Belgrade regime and the associated armies involved in Bosnia and Hercegovina had vvon additional time to perform in peace their scenarios of ethnic cleansing, just be- cause ali hopes are invested into Mr. Panič, a new prime minister of nevv federal Yugoslavia. S The Intruder - november 1992 FORMER YUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY International law grants a right tor Self determination for ali nations, renounces genocide and apartheid and brings clear standards for human rights. Yet, people in former Yugoslavia suffered denial of the right of self-determination, suffer genocide, suffer apartheid, suffer violations of human rights on largest scale possible. Slovenes were left alone during desperate negotiations with federal government in Spring 1991, Bosnians - the most innocent ones - found locked in genocide and are even deprived the right to defend themselves, Albanians are told today, that nobody vvould support "sovereignty option”. Too often, VVestern observers - and peace-politicians and peace activists - are locked in neutral stand, deriving from theories of conflict resolution which are supposed to exclude "taking sides". Too often VVestern observers get self- sattisfaction accepting the thesis of "civil war", inter-tribal, inter-ethnic, inter- nationalists vvarfare. Too often the same people find themselves more concerned about Germany playing a leading role (recognizing republics) then about Belgrade regime performing most terrible crimes. Too often even antimilitarists fail to understand that the most real and most simple-to-describe is the unequal confrontation betvveen militarists (totalitarians, generals, mad- man, criminals from ali over the vvorld, war profiters etc.) and povverless people. Finally the fiction of inter-ethnic and inter-religious vvarfare will become true - after a drill vvill prove successful - and the real responsible vvill be hidden away. VVhile the 'International lavv on vvar crimes is clear, vvhile vvar crimes have widely been proven in Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Hercegovina, the vvar criminals - many of their names have been listed by Helsinki VVatch - keep being invited to talks in Rome, Pariš, London, Bruxelles etc. instead of being put on trial. They have cynically violated dozens of "peace treaties", "cease-fires", promises and agreements and are repeatedly invited to sign new ones. War criminals are - vvith such attitude - only given time and recognition. This is why a short insight into the role of military institutions vvill be given in the next part of the paper. A Peace of a Story The conflicts in former Yugo have often been reduced to Serbs- Croats pattern or lately to Serbs - Croats - Muslims pattern. The declaration of independency of Slovenia and the aggression of YA in Slovenia late June 1991 are important for at least tvvo reasons and since the čase of Slovenia is often kept forgotten it might be useful to repeatthe follovv- ing: 1. the declaration of Slovenian inde- pendency ( after ali negotiations vvith federal institutions and particularly vvith Serbian leadership failed in Spring 1991) did put the issue of sovereignty of former Yugoslavia most clearly on the agenda. 2. Yugoslav Army (YA) openly became active and could never stop since. The aggression of YA in Slovenia in June 1991 vvas a result (and the conclusion) of a decade long intense involvement of YA against the democratic movement in Slovenia. Even more. YA vvas a main mover of anti-Slovenian attitude of the regime in Belgrade. The collapse of federal institutions (the collapse of Yugoslav sovereignty) and the YA vvhich became vvild and on its ovvn, should alarm international commu- nity at least after the vvar in Slovenia. If the freeze of air space vvould have been agreed in July 1991 most of destruction could have been avoided. It is to stress at this point that the low-intensity vvarfare and terrorism vvas inevitable - and this vvas clear already after elections in Croatia in Summer 1990. But the vvarfare vvould be limited and localized if the federal army vvould be put at least under partial control. Let us, at this point have a little -tel- egraphic style - insight into the role of YA during 80ies in Slovenia: -1980 - military intelligent Services follovvs closely the appearance of youth subculture and alternative movements; they tend to discredit them as fascists; -in Slovenia peace movement campaigns against military parades, against recruit- ment of vvomen, for the right of CO, against vvar toys and vveapons trade etc. gain bigger and bigger public support; -1984, 1985 military intelligent Services report to their authorities about counterrevolution going on in Slovenia. As protagonists of counter-revolution one can find the antimilitary movement on the top of the list.; -during those years several authors expressing criticism of YA are threatened to be put on court or even prosecuted . Amongst them Janez Janša (present defence minister of Slovenia) and later Tomaž Mastnak. In both cases the public pressure vvas strong enough for the verdict to be removed or the investiga- tion interrupted; -follovving the reactions of YA political branches, the movements in Slovenia lunch discussions including issues of demilitarization, role of civil society versus the State, democracy, demilitariza¬ tion of political institutions, deideologisation of miiitary and similar; -1987, military makes plansto suppress the democratic movement; -1988, democratic movement in SLovenia gets into possession of secret plans according to vvhich (estimated about 170) core activists vvould be executed; YA envisaged large peaceful demonstrations in Slovenia - as a reaction to persecutions - and issued orders to prepare military units to act accordingly in order to "defend constitutional order and the property of the m ilitary"; -at the same time slovenian democratic movement express solidarity vvith Kosovo Albanians. Particular issue vvas a request to bap the involvement of Slovenian police troops in Kosovo; this provokes massive anti-Slovenian demonstrations - rallies - in Serbia, led and supported by Miloševič companions; -Slovenian democratic movement is getting its shape - a netvvork betvveen diverse groups involved is being created through the process of drafting the Declaration for Democracy; -May 1988; 4 activists imprisoned in Ljubljana, amongst them Janez Janša, vvho vvas a core liaison person of the Declaration. HR movement in SLovenia unifies hundreds of institutions, move¬ ments and thousands of individuals. The main point is that the imprisonment vvas directed from Belgrade and performed vvith a support of Slovenian hard liners. 4 prisoners vvere delivered immediately to military authorities and put in solitary confinement in a military barrack in Ljubljana; -August 1988- military trial starts in Ljubljana; Slovenian population is homogenised around the issue. The movement is led by Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, vvherethe representatives of cultural, students, social, educational, media and other institutions participated and consciously run a non-violent resistance campaign. The trial "Against Four" proved that the YA is able to violate ali basic human rights - even in front of the international public. The trial vvas under veil of secrecy, no right for civil attorney vvas granted, civilians vvere put on military court and under military jurisdiction. A clear cut human rights čase; -Military trial vvas held in Serbian lan- guage in the middle of Ljubljana (official languages in Slovenia vvere - and stili are - Slovenian, Italian and Hungarian). This triggered a national dimension of the problem. The movement - vvhich until 9 The Intruder - november 1992 FORMER YUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY then was predominantly human rights and democracy oriented - turned in- stantly to a movement for national liberation; -1989 democratic movement wins; slovenian CP decides to step on the side of local population, they get rid of the hard-liners vvithin Slovenian CP and vviden the gap with Belgrade. CP in Slovenia declares democratic elections for 1990 and decides to compete on free elections. CP in Slovenia survived the "betvveen the hammer and the anvil" deciding to identify with the anvil. The reflection of this decision we found today in the person of the president of Slovenia - at-that-time a president of Slovenian CP, Mr. Milan Kučan; CP is the first federal institution to collapse. Yugoslavia is dead. The špirit is disassociated butthe flash struggles for survival. Threats are coming mainly from YA officials. In Sarajevo, the group Nadrealists (Surrealists) composes a video about Sarajevo wall (when Berlin wall falls, the Sarajevo wall was simultane- ously visualised), in Slovenia, The Mladina journal shovvs a map of North¬ ern and Southern Yugoslavia. Sarajevo is found on the borderline. The process displayed here is unique in Slovenia. Nothing simmilar vvould happen elsevvhere in Yugoslavia. -Elections in Slovenia are held in April 1990 and democratic coalition wins the government. But the CP wins a presiden- tial seat on direct elections for the president. The government in Slovenia starts adopting and performing the measures vvhich vvould enable sovereign governing on the territory of Slovenia. The conflicts with Belgrade are bigger and bigger. Late 1990 Miloševiči party wins elections in Serbia. The interests of Miloševič (to keep in povver), YA (to keep the control over territory in order to feed their privileged needs) and Serbian extremists (to perform a great Serbian plan) come together. The regime in Belgarde - encouraged by Interna¬ tional community vvhich keeps a blind eye on developments in Yugoslavia - decides to keep control over Slovenia for any priče. It is not vvilling to negotiate let alone to compromise. A first incident happens in October 1990 when federal troops occupied the headquarters of Slovenian Territorial Defence Units. The issue of defence was the hot issue in 1990 in Slovenia. There was an absolute agreement that Slovenia should decide about its defence as a sovereign country. On one hand there was a large public and political support (including president Milan Kučan and several political parties) for the idea of SLovenia VVithout an Army, on the other hand the Governe- ment was getting ready for the final confrontation with Belgrade regime. The first training of Slovenian Territorial De¬ fence troops started in May 1991 and the reaction of federal military vvhich surrou- nded the Slovenian training center vvith tanks, led to a first victim - a civilian smashed by a tank. Attention! At that time we stili speak of Yugoslav Army (the institution of former Yugoslav State) and nobody vvould speak of Serbian (national) army. Hope enough keys were given here to make the reader think about the neces- sity to think about the vvars in former Yugo also from an anti-militaristic perspective. What was the Role of UN UN is a union of sovereign governments and not a union of nations. It should be renamed to United States or should change radically its structure. Despite of the fact, that the right for self determi- nation can be found in the preambule of ali fundamental documents ratified by member States, the one protected is a sovereign State and not the nations. This is symbolised by the already-mentioned "no-comment" made by Mr. Peres de Cuellar as late as in August 1991, after the aggression in Slovenia and after the war in Croatia has already spread. When even "nevv" Yugoslavia did chan¬ ge symbols already in May 1992, after not being recognised by any internatio- nal GO or by any other body, the flag of former Yugoslavia vvaved in front of the UN palače in NY as long as until late Sep¬ tember this year. We can not speak about any active role of UN in Yugoslav crisis. Ali activities (peace keeping in Sla- vonia, humanitarian aid in Bosnia, sancti- ons against Serbia and Montenegro) were a very late reaction to fait-accomp- lis. It is not possible to accept the very common argument that UN has acted according to its charta - giving priority to regional organization (in this čase CSCE and EC). Besides ali other arrangements and principles, the Article 14. of The UN Charter allovvs "General Assembly to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin,...". CSCE and EC possesses no such provision. The UN has much more povver to intervene then any regional interGO institution. To transmit ali activi¬ ties to European institutions was a great mistake of UN. Daniel VVarner; Geneva Institute for International Studies defined a problem during the Conference on The Challenge to Intervene- A Nevv Role of UN" organ- ized by Upsalla Life and Peace Institute: "There is a lack of an effective mecha- nism to decide vvhen and how to take over certain functions for governments vvhich are unable or unvvilling to do them." Elizabeth Ferrisfrom life&Peace Institute in Upsala continues: "The question is notvvhether intervention is good or bad, or vvhether it should or should not take plače, but rather vvhether the time has come for interven- tions to be regularized, codified, moni- tored, evaluated, and recognized as a perhaps inevitable consequence of living in an interdependent vvorld." Is there any additional story needed to argue such approach besides the story of former Yugo. The Intruder. did bring quite some artic- les on interventions. In particular, it was campaigning for an early stage - active - intervention as opposed to "too-late" reactive intervention. What did really make me think during the past months was the banality of discussions about interventions. Most of discussions vvere locked in polarity betvveen pro and against military intervention. The con- text of intervention is much much vvider. Recent Helsinki VVatch report on Bosnia provides a good overvievv on the issue - vvithout even mentioning military inter¬ vention. Interventionism of course rčquests taking sides and this is vvhere most of observers failed. The main problem - as I can see - for undecisive- ness concerning clear taking-sides is that the problems in former Yugoslavia vvere interpreted in very subjective language using group-identities (ethnic groups) as a framevvork. It vvould be much easier to achieve agreement if military-power holders vvould be targeted (i.e. Milose- vičs regime in Belgrade, paramilitaries of Arcan, Karadjič etc . in Bosnia) as oppo¬ sed to novv-prevailing generalized image of "Serbian" troops. About the Role of NGOs In general, the attitudes of NGOs abroad vvere very vague (trying to be neutral), abstract ("we oppose war") and solluti- on-less (because of very low level of understanding the complexity of Yugo- slavia). An outstanding positive example is the recent report of Helsinki VVatch (American branch of Helsinki federation for human rights) on Bosnia and Herce¬ govina. This is a detailed analysis of situ¬ ation, resulting in clear and necessary 10 The Intruder - november 1992 FORMER YUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY "taking sides" and finally in a number of concrete activities to be undertaken. Ali those who want to lobby, watch-dog and do pressure work should get them- selves a copy. The power of NGOs after the crisis happens is of course very limited and the priority action-field is on GO level for several reasons. 1. GOs are permanently involved in mutual relations (and interventions on different levels, i.e. economy, diplomatic talks...); 2. civil societies in the areas of crisis are usually week, low-option, desorganized and with little maneuver space. Even if civil societies abroad would mobylize, they would not find a relevant (povver- ful) partner in the areas of crisis to work with.; 3. crisis itself generates a need for specialized NGOs locaIly and it is normal, that NGOs needed in crisis do not exist or exist in a very week and insignificant level; 4. The civil population in former Yugo was confronted to strongly armed military institutions, wild and out of any civic control. No peaceful demonstration of force could stop them. This is why it vvas not to expect that NGOs could play a major role in order to stop the vvar in Croatia and Bosnia. The main role NGOs abroad could play vvould be three-fold: 1to help the creation and the develop- ment of local NGOs appearing as a reaction to the crisis; this is of course very marginal activity vvhich proofs results only in course of time. Many ambitious NGOs do not possess suficient patience and energy for such involve- ment. 2. - to lobby and vvatchdog their own governments; a lot of knovvledge is requested for such work and most NGOs did not possess one. 3. - to cooperate in humanitarian aid. NGOs from abroad former Yugo vvere largely involved in this activity since it allovvs neutral position. But the fact again is, that the needs are so enormous that GO intervention is absolutely essential in the field of humanitarian help and it vvould be necessary for NGOs to press their GOs to supply humanitar¬ ian aid parallel to the efforts to provide aid in their ovvn, usually very limited capacities. The Great Fiasco The fiasco of VVestern peace thought on the čase of former Yugoslavia manifests clearly in the fact that there is no sense of unity betvveen "peace" groups. If in reaction to cold vvar a solidarity slogan "peace and human rights are indivisible" unified movements in the East as vvell as in the West - there is no single word that vvould appear as a reflection of common understanding or common attitude to- vvards the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Is it because vve used to live in a glamour of 1989 successes? Is it because European thought is far too limited to react to experiences that go beyond its borders? Or is it simply because the analysis in 80- ies vvas just too weak? Something is cle- ar, vve vvere used to simplify and gener- alize. The issue of human rights and democracy seemed to us universal. Now it is clear that the human rights norms and the principles of democracy might be universal butthe application of both vary due to complexities of particular micro-cosm. In the Yugoslav crisis a great part of "VVestern" mind could not escape the old habit of "generalyzing" and "overall Solutions", vvhile understanding a very narrovv angle of perception. It seemed as if the good old new age slo¬ gan got converted into "think locally act globally". Seminars are held aboutthe New VVorld Order, vvhile the mind got completely stuck on the Balkan čase re- presenting a hologramic structure of the VVorld disorder and injustice. We are Living, We are Dying The peace movement in Slovenija collap- sed because it could possibly not satisfy the (local and global) demands of time. The expectations vvere high (locally and globally) our methods and knovvledge far too limited. The movement had to dissolve in order to allovv necessary chan- ge in approach. Last but not least, the discontinuation of lifes of beloved Petra Kelly and Gert Bas- tian personalyses the controversies of VVestern pacifism. The period of creativ- ity and active-enthusiasm of eco-pacifism in Europe is over. Chief Seattle declared once "The real life is over now. The struggle for survival begins!" Petra did not survive the difficult transition betvveen Creative (global) mind and painful, patient (local) struggle on the margins of public eye. She did not sur¬ vive the transition betvveen articulation and manifestation of the ideas. Sponta- neously, vve vvould vvish Petra vvas murd- ered by racist terrorists. Then vve could think it as a heroic, victorious sacrifice of "our" struggle. But there is no "our" struggle at the moment. There is no "VVestern", no "European" cause. Petra died in privacy, vvithout any public me- ssage. No declaration, no final vvord. Our minds are ieft free to contemplate and think about vvhat does that mean for ali of us. I feel Petra died vvithin each one of us. Petra, great idealist, protagonist of "think globally act locally", Petra trying to get involved a little bit everywhere - finally faced vvith incredible difficulty to remain active in Germany, in her party, in her very close, local environment.. I can feel Petra has died to remind us, vvhat has to be buried in order to survi¬ ve. Let her soul rest in peace. Hope many others vvill survive. Many pe- ople come to the region of former Yugo and do a silent, modest, valuable job that hardly some people knovv about. They don't have neither time nor inten- tion to seli their story to the media or to self-promote themselves. Yet, many peo¬ ple stili play the game of media-campa- igns and promotion. In the čase of form¬ er Yugo the difference betvveen the effectivity of both is evident. ■ 11 The Intruder - november 1992 FORMER VUGO AMD INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY VOIVODINA THE FORGOTTEN PROVINCE VUKOVAR THE MODERN DAY DRESDEN By Brendan Keaveney Mr. Brendan Keaveney is a fellovv researcher at the Peace Institute, Ljubljana coming from the University of Ulster, Northern Ireland the topič of frag- II a9 H i H B menting Yugoslavia arises much is hea- rd about Bosnia and Croatia how- ever Voivodina ten- ds to be largely ignored. My introduction to Voivodina came when I took part in a peace camp in Subotica organized by The Hungarian Peace Association in August. Knovving nothing of thearea I arrived (like the others who were drawn from many countries) with a host of questions, vvhich included such as 1 is ethnic cleansing occuring? 2 are minorities catered for? 3 do ali join the YNA? 4 if not how do they resist and at what consequences and finally as Vukovar lies close to Voi¬ vodina, being in fact if not in law, un-der Serbian control I was determined to use the visit to see for myself the ex-tent of the carnage it had suffered as a result of the long siege. Despite conflicting cla- ims the ansvvers to questions 1 and 2 were gleaned through meetings held with the areas political parties and the federal justice minister. MINORITIES AND ETHNIC CLEANSING At our first meeting The Democratic League Of Croats (hereinafter DLCV) began by giving their numerical strength in the area, vvhich according to church figures total some 160,000 or 10% of the population, although official statistics put the figure at 74,000 or 5%. in Subotica they say that vvhile officially they number 16.000 the real figure is 33,000 (again church, figures). The discrepancy arises as many are afraid to declare themselves. They produced docu- mentation vvhich detailed attacks on Croats going back to 1988 and they cited a čase (3-8-1992) vvhere two of their number were murdered.17,000 Croats they State had fled in the last year. This if true represents a loss of 22. 5% in their number. Croats they say suffer in the cultural and educational spheres as a result of the loss of the statute of autonomy(1990). They stated they and others have seen their cultural institutions abolished. Since 1990 ali organs of the media, are in Serbian hence in the print media, difficulties arise for Croats, who will have to adjust to the unfamiliar official Cyrillic script. Further in public employment ali corre- spondence is in CyriIlič, hence Croats that wish to gain employment are also dis- advantaged. In education Croats are now being taught Serbian history/ culture as Croat schools are now closed. The DLCV stress that their goal is not one of union with Croatia, their aim is simply one of obtaining cultural rights, they stress that they are loyal to the State. Hovvever as long as cultural genocide and ethnic cleansing continue they fear their position wiII deteriorate further. Ethnic cleansing they say not only means the loss of many Croats it also means a corresponding influx of Serbs. In our talks with the Socialists we found that they could provide fevv ansvvers to Croat claims. VVhat it did provide was the information that in Subotica no group vvas in a majo- rity (numerically speaking). We were told that the areas population vvas 160,000 and that Hungarians composed 42% of that figure. If one accepts the official fi¬ gures it can be seen that the Croats (16,000) represent 10% of the total, this means that ali ethnic groups in Subotica are indeed minorities. The spokesman stated that his party vvas cross- ethnic (he being a Serb), when pressed on this, and asked to give an ethnic breakdovvn of the membership he refused. Regarding inter-ethnic relations he said that there vvas no ethnic cleansing. Eth¬ nic co-habitation continued as before. Terrorist acts he stated vvere the work of ethnic Croats. In an effort to justify his claim he stated that they had recently carried out a number of attacks in the area. Hovvever he conceded (on hearing that some of us knew different) that the attacks vvere the work of the Croatian army. 12 The Intruder- november 1992 FORMER VUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Asked about other minorities he said that in the transition period the State was learning about democracy. He did not concede that the group lacked cultu- ral protection. He clung to the fact that Croats and Serbs use the same language, and he seemed unaware that the use of different Scripts could lead to Croats en- countering problems. As for education he stated that Croats and Serbs shared the same history and that there should therefore be no problem. When confron- ted with the Croat documentation of alleged attacks he without looking at them dismissed them as propaganda. We felt at the end of this meeting that many questions had been evaded, and that so- cialists were more interested in casting Croats in the role of a disloyal element than in anything else. The ethnic Hungarians upheld much of the Croats claims. They stated that a po- licy of ethnic cleansing was ongoing vvhich to date (12-8-1992) had resulted in an exodus of some 30,000 Hungarians (this claim repeated on Croatian Televi- sion (3-9-1992).The manner in vvhich this cleansing took plače vvas similar to that pursued against Croats, in that Hungar¬ ians vvere "invited" to enlist in the YNA. This left them vvith the same option ie enlist or flee, given this choice many op- ted to go leaving the door open for eth¬ nic cleansing. As for education they stated that many of their schools had been closed by the authorities as a result of a policy of Serb- ianisation. (Later verified vvith the Hun¬ garian ministry for ethnic Hungarians, who say that the number of Hungarians not being taught in their language had risen to 47% since the 70”s), this lends credence to Croat claims and vvould en- tail similar consequences for the preser- vation of Hungarian culture Dovvngrad- ing of the language 23-7-1991 also they felt wiII have an effect, and vvill mean that many seeking public sector employ- ment vvill have to comprehend Cyrillic. Indeed some made the point that in pla- ces Street names now appear in Cyrillic only, vvhere before this vvas not the čase. Our last meeting vvas vvith the minister for justice Mr. Varady (ethnic Hungar¬ ian). Hovvever the minister a lavv gradu- ate knevv his onions. Thus although con- ceded that the killings that the Croats alleged had occured and that other atta¬ cks also took plače, he said these vvere isolated cases. What else he did concede vvas the belief that future legislation concerning minorities vvould have to be meaningful, as at present this vvas not the čase, although he reminded us that minorities as such vvere not his concern. He also informed us that he vvished to see legislation introduced that vvould provide amnesty for draft dodgers, (this he hoped to see become lavv in Septem¬ ber, this hovvever has been delayed) On the issue of vvhether ethnic cleansing occured, he stated that no such policy vvas being pursued. We left the meeting vvith the opinion that the minister had simply endorsed Croat claims. Although I have not given a verbatim account of the meetings it is true to say that vve had begun to conclude the Croat and Hungarian arguments vvere the most believable. They unlike the Socialists spoke to not at us, they endea- vored to ansvver ali our questions in a constructive fashion, and evasive they vvere not. Further the Croats had provi- ded us vvith vvritten allegations that vvere they incorrect could have easily been refuted, and despite the contempt- uous attitude they received from the So¬ cialists they vvere in large measure veri¬ fied by Mr. Varady. Furthermore Mr. Varady conceded that present minority lavvs are far from perfect. Finally vve did not get the impression that the Croats and Hungarians vvere trying to mislead us or that they vvere economical vvith the truth, the same could not be said about the socialists, or indeed as vve vvere to find the mayor of Vukovar. For these and other reasons it vvas hard for us not to conclude that minorities vvere suppres- sed, and that ethnic cleansing (although subtlety applied) did occur. If such con- clusions are correct it means that the Croat and Hungarian population of Voivodina has fallen by some 47,000 in the last year, this in turn vvill obviously alter the political balance in the area. These conclusions hovvever did not begin to form only as a result of the meetings, they vvere strengthened by talks vve had vvith others. In vvhich some individuals made it clear that many Hungarians and Croats did flee rather than face the pro- spect of armed Service. We vvere told that usually the draftee vvould depart prior to his enlistment papers arriving. I learned of one čase vvhere an individual expecting his papers soon and had plan- ned his "escape" accordingly. Another individual stated that many enlisted vvere ethnic Hungarians and members of that groups political party. TRESNJEVAC Having gained ansvvers to the first ques- tions it vvas time to find vvhat are the consequences for those that refuse to join up but stay in the province? Is there an alternative to gaol? The villagers of Tresnjevac (Hungarian) found that on May 5th some 200 (10% of the population) received their call-up. The village vvomen regardless of their fear of the police decided that some- thing had to be done. Thus they organ- ized a protest demonstration for the 10th and the police vvere informed. The demonstration took plače in the yard of a local pub vvhere the men, their families and friends gathered (1400 in ali) and determined to stay until the call-up vvas aborted. The police did not intervene, and it vvas left to the military to enforce the lavv. This they attempted to do by shovving their teeth. On the second the villagers found that they vvere encircled by 92 tanks. The amazing thing vvas that they took no action and, after tvvo days they svviveled their turrets vvhich had been trained on the tovvn and left. The demonstration lasted for 62 days, during vvhich ali the protesters stayed except four vvho left after 3 vveeks. It has to be said that the protesters received help from surrounding Serbian villages. Later the draftees reported to the military sta- ting that they vvere not going to join and to date they have encountered no harassment. One might ask why this is so? It might have to do vvith the fact that BBC radio vvas quickly onto the story, or it might have been that the authorities vvere wary of evoking sympathy for the pro¬ testers among local Serbs. Most likely hovvever it vvas a combination of both. Also it vvas the first time the authorities had been defied in such a fashion. What- ever the reason the protest proved that vvhen people stand on their hind legs they can defeat tyranny. VUKOVAR Even though my prime concern vvas in Voivodina, and in gaining an insight into hovvthe first four questions posed could be ansvvered, I vvas determined being this close to Vukovar to see the city for myself. Could ali the Croat claims and ali the TV footage I had seen last autumn really be true? During the course of our visit vve vvere given the chance to gain the ansvver to that question vvhen a trip to the tovvn vvent ahead, and I found that Osijek by comparison must have 13 The Intruder - november 1992 FORMER YUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY been only a tea party, and that no am- ount of TV footage could even begin to adequately describe the scaie of the carnage. On the way to Vukovar we continually scanned the countryside to see if the war had left its mark. Little hovvever seemed amiss. The only sign that something was vvrong was the obvious absence of traffic and humanity along the route. Other- wise tranquillity and normality seemed to reign, the military, apart from an UNPROFOR presence at a bridge near Vukovar, was noticeable only by its absence. Once Vukovar was sighted the sense of normality was eroded. Everywhere des- truction seemed to reign. Our route into town took usthrough a residential area, and nothing it seemed had been spared. Where once apartment blocks had stood now only blackened and burnt out hulks bearing the marks of both small arms fire and the effects oj long range bom- bardment remained.ln many cases the apartment blocks had been leveled. It was hard to believe people stili lived in these shells of what had been once proud buildings. The full impact of what the war had meant for the town hovv¬ ever stili avvaited us. As we progressed to the hospital it quickly became clear that Vukovar had been decimated, over 85% of the housing stock had been destroy- ed, and that vvhich remained was in vari- ous States of repair, and what could be repaired had been marked. Vukovar once a thriving industrial city is the Dres¬ den of the 1990's. None of the industrial infrastructure remains, everywhere there is only destruction. Shops, houses, the harbor, the train terminal ali to some degree bear the scars of war. In this town once home to 84,000 souls, it is probable that no more than a few thou- sand now remain. The only sign of nor- mality was the presence of two boys amid the rubble (vvhich lay everywhere) carrying a fishing rod tovvards the river. When addressed by the mayor ( a Serb), he conveyed to us facts that were at best misleading. Vukovar he said was 53% serbian, with Croats, and others making up the remainder. This runs counter to figures supplied by Croats who State that they were the largest group, composing 43.7% of the total, and the figure they give for Serbs is 37.4%.(1991 census). The mayor also said that the destruction was the responsibility of Croats whom he stated flouted their national aspirations in the face of Serbs and had started the affair, and they had undermined genera- tions of inter-ethnic harmony. As to alle- gations that ethnic cleansing occured he insisted that this was not so, he stated that Croats that had left had done so from choice. If hovvever returning to the figures we accept that he was refereeing to the present then one has to ask what became of the Croats? Surely they did not optto leave collectively, could ethnic cleansing be a cause? He also said that Croats found in the hospital were well treated, this is at odds with the claims of Amnesty International (1992) The mayor continued to feed us many facts mostly about the repairs that were being carri- ed out at the hospital vvhich also had failed to escape the effects of the siege. Hovvever when confronted with awk- ward questions he shunted them aside with haste if not with tact. His demeanor was one of a man cornered looking for an exit, and to be honest he was far from convincing. Vukovar as already stated resembles Dresden at the close of the war, the unfortunate thing is that vvhile last year it was unique in doing so, today one can find many Dresdens in the Balkans. The dogs of war have been unleashed and it wiII be no easy task to cage them once more, hence it seems many more Vukovars will occur. In the interim, it matters little if the Serbs hold Vukovar or if the Croats regain their terra irredenta, what is there to hold or regain but rubble? Much more could and should be vvritten about Vojvodina and Vukovar, hovvever space dictates othervvise. Hopefully othe¬ rs vvill fill in the ali to many gaps that I have left and furnish ansvvers to ques- tions such as are the sanctions biting and victimizing further the people of Voivo- dina, many of vvhom vvant no part in the vvar. It hovvever should be clear why we formed the impressions we did. Ethnic cleansing is occuring, minorities are sup- pressed, Vukovar to ali intents and pur- poses is no more, a pyrrhic victory if there was one. The people of Voivodina are as much victims of vvar as are the Croats, Bosnians etc, unfortunately this is a fact that is often overlooked. Tresnje- vac proved to be the one ray of light, it can only be hoped that sufficient vvill follovv that lead and help end the madness. . ■ 14 The Intruder- november 1992 ACTIVITIES NEWS FROM ANTIWAR CAMPAIGN CROATIA By Vesna Teršelič Osijek Centre for Peace, “ ® Nonviolence and Human Rights has been busy with organizing several vvork- shops for nonviolent con- flict reso-lution. During the summer and autumn vvorkshops ha- ve been given by Adam Curie ("Quakers, Peace and Service") and Katarina Sand- ers ("Bund fur Soziale Ver-taidigung"). With the help of Herb VValters from "Ru- ral Southern Voice for Peace", U.S.A., ac- tive listening project have been started, dealing with such burning issue as ten- sions betvveen the peoples who stayed in the city during the war, and the ones who left. Osijek a city with a prevvar po- pulation of 115.000 now sees only 80,000 remaining / returning. At the hight of the siege hovvever only 10-15,000 choose to remain. A relative small group of "he- roic defenders" are now making iife very hard for ali those "frightened refuge- es"(who fled) coming back into the city. The smoothening of tensions betvveen these two groups is one of the very im- portant long term tasks for the Osijek Center. The active "peace brigades" began work with frightened people. On the call of person being in the fear of violent attack "peace brigades" are coming and sitting with the frightened ones during critical stages. There are so many calls asking for support that the group is not able to support everybody in their need. In July and August the first vvorking cam- ps for playing vvith refugee children were organized by the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights in coope- ration vvith Service Civil International. Croatian and international volunteers pl- aying cooperative games brought some fun to the refugee centres at Savudrija, Pula and Gašinci. The first camps have been sucessful in helping children to overcome horiffic war experiences. The interest for such work in Croatian refu¬ gee centres seemed to be enormous. Therefore a decision to organize more camps has been taken. In September the Sunflovver Center was established vvith the aim of devoting much time to vvork¬ ing camps and other activities for suppo¬ rt of refugees. Volunteers coming from different European countries are novv finding a plače in a beutiful house on the brinks of Sljeme mountain. The Sun¬ flovver centre is overcrovvded vvith vvork, running three parallel vvorking camps in three different refugee centres every moment, but it stili far from fullfiling the urgent needs for the majority of childr¬ en. Children make up a large part of more than 600.000 refugees and displa- ced persons living in Croatia. Their living conditions differ very much from one re- fugge center to another. Some children are even not going to school. "Sunflo¬ vver" is trying to organize regular lessons for them. At present about 160 Croatian volunteers and 200 international ones try to make the children Iife a bit easier. Many more vvould like to take part in ac¬ tivities but at the moment it is not possi- ble to organize more parallel vvorking camps because of logistic problems. The Zagreb Centre for Peace and Nonvio¬ lence and Human Rights is curently as of novv turning its attention to the issue of human rights and its dysfunctionality ovving to the present situation. It is the intention of the Center that ali human rights violations should be catalogued, studied, and forvvarded to relevant au- thorities and international organisations. It is further the intention of the Center to support a people vvhose rights have been violated and offer the help to ones vvho fear for their rights. In September have been established a team of professionals giving support to educating the first Croatian traininers for nonviolent conflict resolution. The team began translating and editing some peace education handbooks. The Center is also searching for possibili- ties to establish a satelite telephone line for the citizens of Sarajevo. About 300.000 people surrounded in Sarajevo are searching for the communication vvith the outside World. They can not use any of the lines instaled so far. The Rijeka Movementfor Peace has been occupied vvith activities in refugee centres on the Istria peninsula. During the summer group organized many activities to support the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. gg The addresses Antivvar Campaign Croatia (Vanja Nikolič) (Netvvork of organizations promoting nonviolence) Tkalčičeva 38, 41000 Zagreb, Croatia Tel: +38 41 422 495 Fax +38 41 271 143 Center for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Zagreb (Vesna Jankovič, Vanja Nikolič) (Local peace organization) Tkalčičeva 38, 41000 Zagreb, Croatia Tel: +38 41 422 495 Fax +38 41 271 143 Center for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek (Katarina Kruhonja) (Local peace organization) Sunflovver Center (Nina Pečnik, Wam Kat) (Organization vvorking vvith Refugees) Grebenščica 16, 54000 Osijek, Cro Tel. + Fax. +38 41 439 928 Movement for Peace Rijeka (Šuhreta Dumanič) (Local peace organization) Tel.+ Fax +38 51 713 291 15 The Intruder - november 1992 ACTIVITIES DON'T COUNT ON US! THE 2nd SEMMINARY FOR PEACE EDUCATION IN ALPE-ADRIA REGION By Sašo Gazdič who colour gray with gray; who turn classrooms into torture chambers; who boast they don't know how to work but know how to fight; who turn platforms into loop- hoies; who make winners the losers, turn rivers into sevvage systems and garbage cans into shops; vvhoturn ice-cream parlours into military headquarters, streets into shooting lots, villages into ashes and the vvhole country into a killing field; who deliver out loved ones only from the mortuaries — let ali of them know we shall not be silent and peacefully suffer their crimes. We know who are the ones who are out to get us. We clearly see who are the ones who lie, loot, beat and kili; who force the unarmed civilians into shelters and send the armed ones to the front; vvhoturn the frightened into refugees. We clearly see who has pushed us into conflictwith our neighbours, other nations and the vvhole vvorld. We know who are those who want to turn us into a mindless mass, compliant herd and cannon fodder — ali in the name of universal Serbian salvation. We are SICK of those "saviors" and "liberators" of ours! Let the messengers of death hear our sorrovv and anger, let them listen to our mušic and remember our vvords. Let the uniforms see our bright colours. let Beograd, Serbia and the rest of the vvorld see our devotion to life and liberty. We count on ourselves! Beograd, April 22 1992 Center for Anti-War Action Centar za antiratnu akciju g friendship among differ- ent peace groups from Austria, ltaly and Slovenia vvhich have been acknovvl- edged on the many years lasting process of personal contacts, official meetings and peace camps, finally brought to the common educational project. The necessity of superstructuring the influence of initia- tives and ideas (developed vvithin and among peace groups) by institutionaliza- tion and their introduction in schooling systems brought to organization of the 1 st Peace Seminary in the year 1991. ACLI-CEPAS from Udine, Alpen Adria Alternativ from Villach and Peace Insti¬ tute from Ljubljana dravved this year to organization of the 2nd International Se- minary for Education for Peace. also some individuals from Chroatia. The seminary vvas held in Koper-Capodis- tria from the 19th to the 25th of July 1992. 66 participants from 4 countries and of 6 nationalities had an opportu- nity to learn much about their common characteristics and problems, about dif- ferences betvveen them and about the ways of they could come together. The Mediterranean environment of Koper- Capodistria vvas a perfect area for such a discovery. The idea of multiculturalism, vvhich vvas one of the basic ideas vvhen we have initiated the process of peace education in the Alpe-Adria region, fou- nd in the natural, cultural and political situation of this area a perfect ground for its further grovvth. Devastation of nature, as a common pro¬ blem, vvas the reason for several partici¬ pants for vvorking together on exploring possibilities for the use of alternative sources of energy. VVorkshop on ecology vvas exemplary for joining people of different nationalities and cultures in solving their common problem. VVork¬ shop on cooperative games shovved techniques for overcoming (psychologi- cal, linguistic, cultural...) differences and misunderstandings by listening to man's inner nature. The other source for building up confi- dence vvas found in children's approach to the vvorld. In the vvorkshop named Peace Values of the Youth Croatian children's thoughs from their short compositions about their Vision of the future vvere presented and the vvork on further analyze of their values vvas pledged. Another vvorkshop tried and succeeded to produce understandable massage for children. Making a chil- dren's book vvas named the effort to combine impressions of disbalanced relation among a men and a nature (from the journey) on one hand and Creative and cooperative techniques on the other in order to produce the book for children. One story for children vvas dravvn and vvritten in four colors and languages. Generally, large attention vvas paid to the problem of language. We tried to respect ali languages of the participants equally and to use English only in cases vvhere there vvas no other possibility. This principle vvas also one of our basic goals vvhen we have started the process of peace education. Equal right of using the language vvas considered from other points of vievv too. The commune of Koper-Capodistriavvith it's bi-lingua! model, inhabitants of four nationalities (Slovenes, Italians, Croats and Muslims) and neighborhood of two State borders vvas a perfect starting point for discus- sion about possible Solutions for this problem. 16 The Intruder - november 1992 ACTIVITIES Aurelio Juri (the mayor of Koper-Capod- istria) and Augusta De Barbina (member of Friulli's parliament) have spoked to participants aboutthis and other prob- lems concerning peace in our region. The problem of refugees appeared as one of them. A special vvorkshop have vvorked on it. The situation was presented by dif- ferent speakers and the vvorking gro-up, the largest on this seminary, visited the refugee camp where some personal and official contacts were made in order to help in finding a solution to this prob¬ lem. It must be said thatthe participants were mostly teachers or pedagogical vvorkers. Therefore they were also able to prolong the work started last year - comparation of school systems of their countries and possibilities for introducing Peace Educa- tion in these systems. One of the impor- tant successes of a process is surely a big interest of school authorities of Slovenia for practical application for Peace Educa- tion in their schools. Such seminaries are also of the essential meaning for an ex- change of ideas and knovvledges among teachers. Therefore it would be very good if next years seminary wi11 really take plače in Croatia, as it was offered by Croatian participants. There was one more important group of participants although not so numerous - children. It is not significant only because of friendships they made and things they learned about each other, but also beca¬ use of their specific contribution to the work in vvorking groups. Their involve- ment in the work of the seminary is a result of successful cooperation with the so called "Peace Kindergarten" vvhich was developed in previous years vvithin the frame of the Movement for the Cul- ture of Peace and Non-Violence. There were some other interesting and more or less spontaneous activities, like an evening of the Theater of the Op- pressed or an evening of anti-war poet- ry. But even if ali spontaneous are not mentioned, I surely forgot some, the main conclusion of this seminary must not be forgotten. It is: Peace Education is the joy of discovering of the common in the different. For teachers as well as for children. ■ SEMINAR REPORT Peace Institute Ljubljana and EPU Schlaining By Doroteja Lešnik Vojvodina, Serbia Anti-\Var Center of Novi Sad c/o Nenad Nlirovič Narodnog Fronta 43 s 1000 Novi Sad Vojvodina, Serbia +38 - 21 363-302 +38 - 21 57-797 fax European Civic Center for Conflict Resolution s c/o Vedran Vučič Trg Car.a Jovanp Nedanda 15' 24000 Subotica Vojvodina, Serbia +38 - 24 24-600 +38-24 37-116 (fax) . f . Peace Movement Vojvodina c/o Blavenka Ljubic Maksima Gornog 10/111 21000 Novi Sad Vojvodina, Serbia +38-21619-019 ’ ^omen In Black Biljana Regodič i » Vojvodanska 53 26000 Pančevo +38- 13 512-641 Peace Movement of Pančevo c/o' Saša Marinkovič ' Br Jovanoviča 62a •26000 Pančevo Vojvodina, Serbia a-38 - 1? 38,82 +38+ 13 41 735 Monte/iegro Študentski Forgm c/o Nebojša' Medojevič, J. Tomaševiča B-B 81000 Podgorica / Montenegro i +38 i 81 45-549 alsofax +38 - 81 15-095 home' Citizen's Comittee for Peace , Hercqgovcka 15 - 1000 Podgorica (ex-Titograo; Montenegro +38-81 419-14 (alsofax) Forum for Human Rights Macedonia c/o Meto Jovanovski St. P. Zografski ; 51 91000 Skopje Macedonia +38 - 91 219-067 League for Democracy ' Djordji Marjanovič +38-91 515-589 fereen Action Skopje-- c/o Jovan Nansilevski- +38-{91 213-966 +38'- 91 201,-75 Fax Women for Peace, Skopje +38-91 210-627- +38 - 91 236-856 Fax Kosova Democratic League of Kosova +38 - 38 24-234 +38 - 38 27-660 fax- ' ' V Slovenia ) Peace Institute Mestni Trg 13 61000 Ljubljana) Slovenija’ 1 +38 -'61 224-666 (dlso fax) email: mi+ovniki@uni-lj.ac.mail.yu Assotiation for Preventive and Voluntary Work, Ljubljana y c/o (joga Flaker - Tel. & fax. +38-6T- 226785, tel. +38-61- '•129141 ext 356 • V, Few International Addresses - v , i Mi za Mir, PO Box 49?0 1009 AX Amsterdam, Netherlands +31-20-66524 22 Fax’ \ - / - • Zerje za mir c/o'Martin-Niemdeller-Haus Pacelli^lee 61 D-W-1000 Berlin 33, Germany (Women; all.nationalities) Di YU log for Peace 3411 W. Diversqy Parkway ' ChicagolL 6064jT +1-312.384 85 44 384 39 04 Fax