University of Ljubljana
FACULTY OF ARTS

ASIAN STUDIES

BUSHIDŌ IN TRANSFORMATION

Volume VI (XXII), Issue 2
Ljubljana 2018

ASIAN STUDIES, Volume VI (XXII), Issue 2, Ljubljana 2018

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All articles are double blind peer-reviewed.
The journal is accessable online in the Open Journal System data base: http://revije.ff.uni-lj.si/as.

Published by: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani/Ljubljana University Press, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana
For: Oddelek za azijske študije/Department of Asian Studies
For the publisher: Roman Kuhar, Dean of Faculty of Arts
Ljubljana, 2018, First edition
Number printed: 100 copies
Graphic Design: Janez Mlakar
Printed by: Birografika Bori, d. o. o.
Price: 10,00 EUR

ISSN 2232-5131
This publication is indexed in Scopus, DOAJ and Cobiss database. This journal is published two times per year.
Yearly subscription: 17 EUR
(Account No.: 50100-603-40227)
Ref. No.: 001-033 ref. »Za revijo«

Address: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za azijske študije, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
tel.: +386 (0)1 24 11 450, +386 (0)24 11 444, faks: +386 (0)1 42 59 337

This journal is published with the financial support from the Slovenian Research Agency in the framework of the research core funding No. P6-0243



CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji
Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana

930.85(520)(082)
179.6(520)(082)
355.01(520)(082)

BUSHIDO in transformation / [editor-in-chief Jana S. Rošker]. - 1st ed. - Ljubljana : Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete = University Press, Faculty of Arts, 2018. - (Asian studies, ISSN 2232-5131 ; vol. 6 (22), issue 2)

ISBN 978-961-06-0086-2
1. Rošker, Jana S.
295552256

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Guest Editor's Foreword

Luka CULIBERG[*]

> The Japanese have another cult: the religion of the Samurai. Most of the officers belong to this caste. This religion is codified in the code of honour called Bushido. It is the soul of the Japanese Army, and it causes that fanaticism which the Japanese soldier exhibits on the battlefield. This code is the cause of so many suicides of Japanese soldiers on the battlefield, because they believe they would be dishonoured if they were to be taken prisoner.[1]

This is how a Slovene daily newspaper *Edinost* (*Unity*), published in Trieste, described the notion of *bushidō* to the Slovene language readers while reporting on the progress of the Russo-Japanese War in its December 1st issue of 1904. The sympathies of Slovene press at the time were firmly on the Russian side on the conflict, and the Japanese were not described in favourable terms. This mysterious "code of honour" was derided as a "cult" and was recognised as a cause of Japan's militant fanaticism and later on its imperialism.

At approximately the same time, the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt was allegedly purchasing numerous copies of *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, a book written in English by Nitobe Inazō, to distribute among his friends. Though Japanese victory over Russia was received with mixed sentiments in the United States due to the ever growing fear of the "Yellow Peril", Nitobe's *Bushido* nevertheless managed to draw enough enthusiasm so that within a decade there appeared nine more editions in English in both the United States and Britain, as well as seven translations into other languages, as William M. Bodiford points out in his paper in the present issue.

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1 »Še en kult imajo Japonci: vero Samurajev. Tej kasti pripada večina oficirjev. Ta vera je določena v častnem kodeksu Bušido. Ta je duša japonske armade in povzroča tisti fanatizem, ki ga kaže japonski vojak na bojišču. V tem kodeksu je vzrok tolikim samomorom japonskih vojakov na bojišču, ker menijo, da bi bili onečaščeni, če bi jih sovražnik ujel.« *Edinost*, vol. 29, no. 333, December 1st, 1904, p. 2.

The oscillation between fascination and derision directed toward *bushidō* in the last hundred or so years, both in Japan and abroad, is just one characteristic aspect of this ambiguous "samurai code of honour". Ever since the notion of *bushidō* took the centre stage in the discourse on Japanese culture and national character in the Meiji period (1868–1912), various thinkers imbued the notion with the whole gamut of ideological interpretations, seeing in it everything from ultimate evidence of Japanese uniqueness on one end, to recognising in *bushidō* the symbol of Japanese civilized status by virtue of the universality of its ethical postulations on the other. Moreover, this vague and elusive idea of "samurai honour" continues to function as an empty shell for whatever ideological content wishes to occupy its place.

The aim of the present issue of the *Asian Studies* journal is thus to approach the notion of *bushidō* from as many aspects as possible in order to further unveil some of the mystery informing this notion. The seed that bore fruit in the form of present issue was planted back in the summer of 2017, when The National Museum of Slovenia featured an exhibition, titled *The Paths of the Samurai*, displaying samurai warrior equipment and related paraphernalia. Among the numerous events accompanying the exhibition, the Department of Asian Studies at the University of Ljubljana, in cooperation with the National Museum, hosted a symposium with the aim to rethink, discuss and further elucidate the tenets that underlie the notion of the so-called "way of the samurai". The majority of contributions in the present issue are based on papers presented at that symposium. At this point I would first like to express our gratitude to all who came to Ljubljana from abroad to share their valuable insights on the subject; and second, I would like to thank everyone who submitted their contributions, thus making this journal issue possible. I am more than convinced that the final result will serve as a valuable resource not just for the scholars of Japanese history, but for a much wider readership interested in the workings of ideology in general.

This is all the more so because this ambiguous and popular notion of *bushidō* seems to have drawn until recently only very limited interest among historians and other scholars focusing on Japan (see Bodiford in the present issue), and only very few academic works have been dedicated to the topic.[2] Conversely, it is precisely this "samurai honour" which has the power to fascinate the wider public, giving free reign to the popular imagination.

Bushidō, written in Japanese as 武士道, and usually translated into English as "the way of the warrior", is a word which was practically non-existent until the late

2 One recent notable exception is the book *Inventing the Way of the Samurai* (2014, Oxford University Press) by Oleg Benesch, who unfortunately could not participate at the symposium, however his work is often referenced in numerous articles in the present issue.

19th century. *Bushi* was a general term denoting the samurai or the warriors, while *dō* is a Daoist concept of "the Way". There has never been any "Bible of *bushidō*", any written code, but there had been isolated texts in the 17th and 18th centuries referring to the idea, most notably by Yamaga Sokō, Yamamoto Tsunetomo and Daidōji Yūzan. However, even though texts by these authors are read nowadays as part of the *bushidō* canon, they were not widely influential in their own time. For example, Yamamoto's *Hagakure* was limited to a very small readership of a few local samurai of the Nabeshima clan in a manuscript form. It had been completely unknown to the general samurai population, and was published for the first time only in the 20th century when the samurai were already a thing of the past. Such texts had therefore extremely limited effect until the early 20th century when they were "discovered" and adopted as the part of new martial ideology of the Imperial Japanese Army.

The authors writing about *bushidō* during the Edo period (1600–1868) were either producing nostalgic accounts about the samurai of old when the country was still at war, or, conversely, trying to establish and legitimize "the new way of the warrior" suitable for the times of Tokugawa peace. Though members of the samurai class still defined themselves as "warriors" during the Edo period, the majority of them did not witness any serious armed conflict. Moreover, while the samurai had fought battles and wars during the previous centuries, their primary goal was to survive and prevail. In those times martial skills, tactics and cunning mattered most. When the circumstances transformed them from fighters into administrators of the state, the focus switched to the idea of the samurai ruling by the virtue of their moral example. The idea of samurai *honour* thus came to the fore. Yet honour is a much more elusive notion than practical martial skills.

Only a few months before Tokugawa Ieyasu set the future course for the country and consequently established the new paradigm for the social role of the samurai class with his victory in the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, far away in London the earliest recorded performance of Shakespeare's *Henry IV, Part 1* took place. This story of medieval knights and their feuds features, among others, Sir John Falstaff, a fat, corrupt and drunk knight, who instead of a chivalrous expression of fealty to his liege lord feigns his own death in order to avoid combat. Moments before this "dishonourable" act, he lets the audience in on his thoughts about the notion of honour. After asking rhetorically, whether honour can set a broken leg, take away the grief of a wound or perform a surgery, Falstaff declares that honour is just "a word", and that a word is nothing but air.

Honour, as Karl Friday observes in his article in the present issue, is indeed a knotty construct. According to Friday, honour represents a ubiquitous value in

the sense that a great many cultures entertain some sort of corresponding ideal, but the substance of honour—the specifics of what behaviours are and are not held to be "honourable"—are peculiar to individual times and places. Honour as an abstract concept represents qualities that are deemed respectable and worthy of admiration, but these qualities are culturally specific, as well as subject to intra-cultural negotiation.

For example, in an episode of the TV series *House*, the doctors treat a patient who had been charged with treason for exposing the details of the U.S. Army killing civilians. A discussion revolves around the issue whether his act of whistleblowing was honourable or treasonous. The soldier betrayed his country, because he believed that exposing the truth was honourable, and therefore he accepts the consequences—the charge of treason. However, the protagonist of the series, Dr. House, takes a position much closer to Sir John Falstaff. He believes that pleading guilty is not honourable, but stupid, and so, in a manner quite reminiscent of Shakespeare's character, says: "What is honour? Dying for your country? Getting straight A's? Killing your daughter because she had the audacity to get raped?"[3]

Dying for one's country or exposing that country's dark secrets, killing an enemy in battle or killing one's daughter because she was "dishonoured" by getting raped, people hold diverse or even opposite views on what is honourable. Generally, however, people would sooner denounce a certain deed, e.g. killing one's own daughter, as not being honourable at all, rather than questioning the idea of honour itself. The cynical approach to honour in the manner of Falstaff or Dr. House is certainly not the usual reaction. We still tend to praise this or that deed or person as "honourable". Honour, as Falstaff observes, might be merely a word, thin air, something that won't set a broken leg or perform surgery. What he doesn't realize is that *words* as bearers of ideologies are nevertheless powerful, and throughout history a word such as honour has had very tangible and material consequences.

"Samurai honour", as is generally understood nowadays, is an invented tradition from the time when the samurai themselves were already a thing of the past. But, as Andrew Horvat notes in his article, the effectiveness of ideologies does not depend on their historical accuracy. If samurai intellectuals during the Edo period were formulating their first ideas about *bushidō* in order to situate the samurai class firmly in its ruling position within the hierarchical structure of society, the *bushidō* of a Christian intellectual such as Nitobe Inazō, writing at the beginning of the 20th century, was something completely different. *Bushidō* in Nitobe's version was no longer just an ethical code belonging to a small samurai elite, but was transformed into "the soul of Japan", ingrained into the fabric of society as a whole

3 *House, Episode 15, Season 8.*

and forming its cultural and ethical foundation, analogous to Christianity in the West. Nitobe explicitly aligned *bushidō* with the European notion of "chivalry".

If Nitobe's attempt was to draw parallels between *bushidō*, chivalry and Christianity in order to show the world that Japan should be viewed as a civilization on par with the Christian colonial powers, thinkers like Inoue Tetsujirō saw in *bushidō* a marker of Japanese uniqueness, separating it from the rest of the world and positioning it above all others. The interpretations overseas were also dependent on the ideological contexts in which *bushidō* performed its perceived role. In the early 20th century, at the time when Japan was embarking on its colonial enterprise, there had been many negative assessments, as we have seen in the case of the Slovene newspaper, as well as positive ones, like the reception of Nitobe's book in the U.S. Later on, particularly during the Pacific War, *bushidō* was identified worldwide as the cause of Japanese militarism and belligerent fanaticism. However, after the war and in the context of Japan's incredible economic development, *bushidō* was reassessed and reinterpreted, this time as a convenient tool for explaining the Japanese work ethic and loyalty of employees to their employer.

Historical samurai did of course possess a certain concept of honour, but it was not codified or understood as *bushidō*. "Honour" was, just as is true for ideological notions today, a much more fluid and elusive idea, enabling a plurality of ideological interpretations. The ritual suicide of the 46 "loyal retainers"[4] became the most iconic canonical narrative of samurai honour, yet the aforementioned author of the "*bushidō* classic" *Hagakure* as well as many other scholars at the time were actually extremely critical of the conduct of the so-called *Akō rōshi*. Was the vendetta of the 47 masterless samurai the epitome of *bushidō*, or, as Yamamoto would have it, were they completely lacking in it? Was Sasaki Takatsuna's deception, when he tricked his rival Kajiwara Kagesue in his race to the battlefield across the river Uji, which Naama Eisenstein describes in her article, honourable? Was that *bushidō* or not? Even though historical samurai did not have a codified ethical manual, they certainly believed in the idea of honour. There were those samurai who would not hesitate to recognise modern *bushidō* as their ethical guide, as there were those who held views much closer to those of Sir John Falstaff, and there were all those in between. The present issue of *Asian Studies* offers important, revealing and fascinating research, studies and analyses, which will hopefully clarify many such mysteries surrounding this notion.

The issue is divided into four sections. The first section, *Defining Bushidō,* brings together articles dealing with the concept of *bushidō* itself. Karl Friday looks at *bushidō* and the samurai behaviour in historical context, discussing the notions of

4 There were 47 *rōnin* involved in the plot, but only 46 of them performed the ritual suicide.

honour and loyalty based on written sources, from the *Akō vendetta* through numerous other historical events and war stories, showing that *bushidō* was far from an unchangeable and enduring code of behaviour and illustrating the complexity of samurai thought and early modern ideals concerning honour and loyalty. William M. Bodiford takes the "perspective from overseas", discussing lives and afterlives of the notion, which all together add to the construction of the *bushidō* narrative. He does not simply treat it as a term within this or that discourse, but is concerned with the many "lives" of *bushidō* as an interpretive concept, deriving its meaning from its relative position within theoretical frameworks, which are constantly shifting. In explaining the elusiveness of *bushidō*, Bodiford employs the term "traveling concepts". Masaki Shiraishi, on the other hand, describes *bushidō* as a hybrid notion, constructed through the process of "transculturation". He shows how since the Meiji Restoration it was necessary for the new modernized regime, in order to be maintained, to establish its legitimacy by relying on so-called cultural traditions. This ideological agony in the face of modernization is in Shiraishi's view apparent in *bushidō*, which fluctuates between universalism and particularism. In the wave of Western modernization, it was not enough to hold fast to uniqueness of Japanese own cultural traditions. It was necessary to find universally valid criteria or values in Japanese culture.

The articles in the second section titled *Historical Backgrounds* approach *bushidō* in its historical manifestations and metamorphoses from the perspectives of archaeology, history and art history. Takamune Kawashima focuses on the archaeological remains and landscape around the Kashima Grand Shrine, where the oldest evidence of martial arts in Japan can be traced. This region, Hitachi-no-kuni, was the border between the centralized *ritsuryō* state and the regions that lay beyond its control in the early eighth century, and was thus an important location where battles against northern tribal groups took place. According to Kawashima, though Kashima itself was apparently not the place for weapon production, it was, in a sense, the birthplace of martial arts in Japan. Based on *shintō* beliefs the Kashima Grand Shrine took the initiative for warfare in the ideological and spiritual senses too, heralding the beginning of so-called samurai values. The second article by Maria Paola Culeddu takes us on a long journey in search of the earliest traces of "the way of the samurai" in ancient and premodern writings, from ancient chronicles of Japan, war tales, official laws, letters, to martial arts manuals and philosophical essays. By highlighting some of the *bushidō* values, Culeddu attempts to answer the questions as to how and why the representation of the *bushi* changed through history, acknowledging that the samurai were generally not represented as they actually were, but as historical circumstances imagined them to be. In the final article in this section, Naama Eisenstein, on the other hand, focuses on

visual representations of samurai behaviour. She takes the example of the famous episode from the Genpei War (1180–1185) as described in the *Heike monogatari*, and explores how the meaning of this commonly depicted episode changed over time. By analysing visual representations, she proposes possible explanations for the immense popularity of the story, which in our understanding is certainly not one of honour, but rather one of deception.

The third part, *Modern Tranformations* features four articles focusing on modern echoes and representations of *bushidō*. Danny Orbach traces the *bakumatsu* "men of high spirit" or *shishi* and their ideology of "purity of the spirit" as a legitimate motive for illegal acts, and follows its transformation and application in judicial practice during the Taishō and Shōwa periods. He argues that the relative judicial leniency to right-wing terrorists in the early 1930s was interlinked with the deep-rooted ideology of subjectivism. This ideology, based on the mythologization of the *shishi*, had, according to Orbach, three main tenets: spontaneity, sincerity and pure motives, defined as an intention to serve the emperor, the country and the public good. In the second article of this section Nathan H. Ledbetter focuses on the production of *Military History of Japan* (*Nihon Senshi*) by the Imperial Japanese Army as an attempt to tie the new military institution to the samurai tradition—a process of inventing tradition, similar to the one of creating the modern *bushidō* ideology itself. The interpretations contained in *Nihon Senshi*, according to Ledbetter, influenced military thinkers and propagated a version of premodern military campaigns that placed regional military forces as national sources of pride. The third article, by Simona Lukminaitė, turns its attention to the development of modern education system and examines how *bushidō* and martial arts were employed in the education of women in the Meiji period. In its quest for recognition of Japan as a civilized and modern state, the Meiji government realized the role of women had to be redefined as well, and many intellectuals argued that women's education was one of the shaping-factors to the physical and mental development of future generations. Women thus required an upbringing that would address this issue. Physical education was a means to, first of all, liberate women's bodies by allowing physical and mental expression and confidence, in addition to assuring their health and thus ability to contribute to society. At the same time, it was understood as a means for moral and mental training that would ensure good character, especially in the case of martial arts that were seen as capable of balancing the overemphasis of Western learning in the education of women. Finally, Andrew Horvat searches for the legacy of "samurai values" and *bushidō* in contemporary Japanese journalism and higher education. This legacy, according to Horvat, is not necessarily rooted in actual samurai behaviour, but this in no way diminishes the power of ideological perception regarding samurai behaviour. For

example, the part of *bushidō* Horvat focuses on in his paper is the moral and ethical teachings emphasizing *jinkaku* or superior character, which Edo era educators hoped to inculcate into generations of peacetime "warriors-turned-bureaucrats". The expected exemplary behaviour among modern day Japanese journalists working for Japan's "serious press", and the stress on the development of *jinkaku* in contemporary Japanese education are, according to Horvat, evidence enough that these values remain very much alive today.

The final section, *Alternative Approach*, features a paper by authors we could call "the practitioners" of modern *bushidō* in martial arts. The paper is written by G. Björn Christianson, Mikko Vilenius and Humitake Seki, the 19th generation headmaster or *shihanke* of the Kashima Shinryū, a Japanese *koryū* martial arts school. It presents a point of view which situates martial arts and *bushidō* firmly within Japanese mythology, focusing on a tale about the bestowal of a mythical sword *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* to the legendary first Emperor, Jinmu tennō. The article combines archaeological evidence with mythological narratives, taking them at face value, and proposes a theory of the development of a longer, outwards-curving sword configuration suitable for a style of two-handed usage which became part of the *kōmyō-ken* curriculum within Kashima Shinden Bujutsu, in which the authors recognise one of the earliest of the interactions between technology and technique that was driving the evolution of *bushidō* culture.

It is our hope that the present issue of *Asian Studies* will contribute to the recent revival of academic interest in *bushidō*, and that it will offer readers informative contents with many fascinating insights. I wish you an enjoyable reading.

Luka Culiberg, Guest Editor

Defining Bushidō

The Way of *Which* Warriors? *Bushidō* & the Samurai in Historical Perspective

Karl FRIDAY[*]

Abstract

Modern commentators have too often attempted to treat *bushidō* as an enduring code of behaviour readily encapsulated in simplistic notions of honour, duty, and loyalty. The historical reality, however, is anything but simple. Samurai ethics and behavioural norms varied significantly from era to era—most especially across the transition from the medieval to early modern age—and in most cases bore scant resemblance to twentieth-century fantasies about samurai comportment.

Keywords: *bushidō*, samurai, honour, duty, loyalty, war stories

Pot *katerih* bojevnikov? *Bushidō* in samuraji v zgodovinski perspektivi

Izvleček

Številni komentatorji so v modernem času pogosto obravnavali *bushidō* kot trajen kodeks obnašanja, ki ga je mogoče zlahka zaobjeti s poenostavljenimi pojmi, kakor so čast, dolžnost in zvestoba. Zgodovinska resničnost pa je vse prej kot preprosta. Samurajska etika in norme obnašanja so se močno razlikovale od obdobja do obdobja – še posebej na prehodu iz srednjeveškega v zgodnje moderno obdobje – in so v večini primerov le bežno spominjale na fantazije o samurajskem obnašanju, ki so se oblikovale v dvajsetem stoletju.

Ključne besede: *bushidō*, samuraji, čast, dolžnost, zvestoba, vojne pripovedi

On the fourteenth day of the third (lunar) month of 1701, Asano Naganori, the young and recently named *daimyō* of the Akō domain (in modern-day Hyōgo prefecture), was serving in the castle of the fifth Tokugawa *shōgun*, Tsunayoshi. Engaged in arranging a reception for envoys from the imperial court, Naganori had somehow run afoul of Kira Yoshinaka, the ranking master of protocol assigned to instruct him, with the result that Yoshinaka had endeavoured to humiliate him publicly on several occasions. Naganori, who was apparently driven

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more by youthful righteous indignation than pragmatism and sound judgement, ambushed Yoshinaka in the halls of the castle, wounding him—albeit not fatally—with his short sword. Shogunal law on such matters was both clear and strict: drawing a weapon within the confines of the *shōgun*'s castle was a capital offense, whatever the motivation behind it. Accordingly, Naganori was ordered to commit *seppuku* (ritual suicide), and his domain was confiscated.

In the aftermath of this decision by the shogunate, retainers of the now-defunct Asano domain met to discuss their response. Led by the chief retainer, Ōishi Kuranosuke Yoshio, they devised a complex plan for revenge on Yoshinaka, whom they blamed for their master's demise. In order to allay the suspicions of either the Kira house or the shogunate (who would naturally have been expecting a vendetta), the Akō warriors agreed to scatter and lay low for some time, reassembling nearly two years later, after Yoshinaka had long since relaxed his guard.

On the fourteenth night of the twelfth month of 1702, they struck. Forty-seven former Asano retainers attacked and killed Yoshinaka in his home in Edo, delivered his head to Naganori's grave, and then surrendered themselves to shogunal authorities for judgement. After a lengthy debate, they were ordered to commit suicide.

The story of the *47 Akō rōnin* ranks among the best-known, and best-loved tales about the samurai. But while the *rōnin* have long been popularly acclaimed as the ultimate examples of samurai loyalty and honour, the events and the actions of the principals were actually much more controversial at the time than most people realise. Far from representing a straightforward, edifying account of samurai virtue, therefore, the Akō Incident actually illustrates the complexity of samurai thought, and early modern ideals concerning honour and loyalty.

The shogunate's decision notwithstanding, public sentiment at the time and since has come down heavily on the side of the *rōnin*. The story was fictionalised into a stage drama (*Chūshingura*, or *A Treasury of Loyal Retainers*) and subsequently served as the plot of a half-dozen or more movies. In like manner, the militarists of the early twentieth century saw the Asano retainers as the very embodiment of samurai virtue.

But evaluations of the incident varied widely among the early eighteenth-century "authorities" on proper samurai comportment. There was, to begin with, a great deal of debate within the shogunate itself. Ogyū Sorai, Dazai Shundai and several others censured the *rōnin* for placing their personal feelings above their higher duty to uphold shogunal law and protect the public order. In contrast, Hayashi Nobukatsu, Miyake Kanran, among others, praised them for their purity of

motive and the selfless nobility of their actions.[1] But perhaps the most significant condemnation of all came from Yamamoto Jōchō, the author of *Hagakure*, which ranks among the two or three best-known and most celebrated expositions of Tokugawa period *bushidō*. Jōchō judged the *rōnin* to have been too calculating and rational, and was particularly bothered by their decision to wait to carry out their vendetta, stating that they should instead have rushed to attack Yoshinaka immediately, without concern for the outcome:

> What if [their intended victim] Lord Kira had died of illness in the interim? It would have been a terrible shame. Warriors of the Kamigata region are clever and shrewd in finding ways of being showered in praise [...] they are unable to override the shackles of rational judgement. (Yamamoto 2014, 70–71)

All of this points to an important truth: While both scholarly and popular accounts of samurai ethics and values frequently presume or imply the existence of a relatively unified and well-defined code guiding warrior behaviour throughout samurai history and beyond, this notion is terribly misleading. The function of warriors, their place in Japanese society, and the purpose and conduct of war evolved and changed many times over the nearly millennium-long epoch between the birth of the samurai and their abolition in the late nineteenth century, giving rise to substantially different visions of proper warrior behaviour from one era to the next. Moreover, ideas *about* samurai values have been reshaped multiple times during the modern era.[2] The "way of the samurai" is not one construct, but many.

The difficulties involved in elucidating the essence of "*bushidō*" begin with the term itself. Scarcely used at all before modern times, the word was so unusual that Nitobe Inazō, whose 1899 tract, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, probably did more than any other single book to popularise the trope in both Japan and the West, was able to believe that he had invented it himself (Hurst 1990, 512–3; Nitobe 1969).

Even as a kind of historiographic term—a modern label for warrior ideology—*bushidō* is a problematic construct, one that has long provoked much pontification but very little agreement concerning substance. In practical terms, *bushidō* is perhaps best understood as belonging to the same class of words as terms like "patriotism", "masculinity", or "femininity". That is, most people allow that

1 A complete translation of the shogunate's debates appears in Hiroaki Sato's *Legends of the Samurai* (1995, 304–38).

2 For details, see Benesch 2014.

these are desirable qualities to manifest, but few agree on what they actually involve: Are Edward Snowden or Daniel Ellsberg true patriots, or does that label more appropriately fit Oliver North or Geert Wilders? Is Angela Merkel more or less feminine than Marilyn Monroe?

There was, in fact, very little written discussion of proper warrior behaviour prior to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, marking the concept of a code of conduct for the samurai as a product of the early modern Pax Tokugawa, not the medieval "Age of the Country at War". The significance of this timing cannot be over-estimated, for the early modern era was marked by two dramatic changes to the lives of warriors—in addition to the end of the fighting that had hitherto been the defining feature of their existence.

First, the samurai became—for the first time in their history—a legally-defined social order. That is, warriors were transformed from an occupational group demarcated mainly by possession of certain skills to a socio-political class in which membership was almost purely hereditary. And second, warriors were moved off the land. This process began in the waning decades of the medieval epoch, as *daimyō* experimented with ways to make their armies more efficient and their retainers less independent, and continued through the early 1600s. By the mid-seventeenth century, most samurai were living in castle towns, subsisting on stipends from their overlords (rather than rents and taxes from villages they controlled in the manner of their medieval forebears). By 1700, more than 90 percent of the samurai were living in this manner.

These developments radically altered the relationship between lord and vassal. Obligations that until then had been reciprocal became one-sided, and characterised by vassal dependence. The bonds also became less personal, directed toward the position of the domain lord, rather than to the man himself. *Daimyō* rapidly came to be seen not as warlords who attracted and held followers by means of personal qualities and achievements, but as the titular heads of the bureaucratic organisations in which retainers were now employed. Loyalty became directed to the domain, as symbolised by the *daimyō*, marking the beginnings of something more akin to modern patriotism than to traditional feudal loyalty.

Under these conditions, ideas about warrior honour and behavioural norms became formalised and often quaint. The role of the warrior became a major philosophical problem for the samurai, inasmuch as they had stationed themselves at the top of the socio-political hierarchy, and yet had effectively lost their original function. Most samurai of this period were sword-bearing bureaucrats and administrators, descended from, but only nominally identifiable as, warriors. Accordingly, the motivation held in common by all those who wrote on the "way of

the warrior" was a search for the proper role of a warrior order in a world without war. The ideas that developed out of this search owed very little to the behavioural norms of earlier times.

Honour, Anachronism & Ethnocentrism

Honour is a knotty construct. While analogous concepts are widespread across time and space, "honour" represents a ubiquitous value only in the sense that a great many cultures entertain some sort of corresponding ideal. But the substance of honour—the specifics of what behaviours are and are not held to be "honourable"—are peculiar to individual times and places.

When we speak of "samurai honour", therefore, we must take care to define our terms—and our times. Indeed, even the terminology employed to label the construct of warrior honour varied across time, and multiple terms were often bandied about during a single age. The words foreign or modern observers have translated as "honour" include *na* (literally, "name"), *menmoku* ("face"), *eiyō* ("praiseworthy"), *giri* ("duty"), and a host of others, each slightly different in nuance and connotation.

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that throughout the classical, medieval and early modern epochs, honour and reputation lay at the heart of a warrior's self-perception, and provided the context within which warrior behaviour must be evaluated. A samurai's reputation, honour and pride were almost tangible entities that took precedent over all other obligations. As a thirteenth-century commentary enumerating the "seven virtues of a warrior" concludes, "to go forth to the field of battle and miss death by an inch; to leave behind one's name for myriad generations; all in all, this is the Way" (*Kokon chomonjū* 9.12.333).

Slights to reputation or honour were often catalysts to belligerence and bloodshed. Breaches of etiquette and failure to show proper respect could lead to violent consequences. Anecdotes in the twelfth-century didactic tale collection *Konjaku monogatarishū*, for example, tell of a warrior who was shot for failing to dismount from his horse in the presence of a higher-ranked samurai, and of another samurai lord ordering the death of a warrior for being rude. *Nihon kiryaku*, a court-sponsored history, relates that in 989 two warriors in the capital got into a quarrel over drinks and "went to war", in the process shooting down several of the officers sent to quiet them (*Konjaku monogatarishū*, 25.4, 25.10; *Nihon kiryaku*, 989 11/23).

Azuma kagami, the first shogunate's didactic record of its own history, describes even more colourful incidents, such as one that began when Miura Yasumura

and some of his relatives were having a drinking and dancing party in a "lascivious house" near Shimoge Bridge in Kamakura, while warriors of the Yūki, Oyama and Naganuma households were having a similar party near the other end of the bridge. At some point during the festivities, Yūki Tomomura took it into his head to practice long-distance archery, and began chasing and shooting at a dog outside the house. Unfortunately, one of his arrows went wild, and ended up in a screen in the house in which the Miura were gathered. Tomomura sent a servant to fetch the arrow back, but Yasumura refused to give it to him, berating Tomomura for his rudeness. An argument quickly ensued, and before long both sides had assembled mounted troops and launched a full-scale battle (*Azuma kagami*, 1241/11/29).

Malicious gossip carried between warriors by third parties could also prompt samurai to take to the saddle.[3] The seriousness with which gossip and personal insults were taken is reflected in the language of shogunal laws:

> Battle and killing often arise from a base of insults and bad-mouthing of others. In momentous cases the perpetrator shall be punished by exile; in lighter cases, he shall be punished by confinement. If, in the course of judicial proceedings, one party should bad-mouth the other, the dispute shall be settled in favour of his opponent. Further, if his argument is otherwise without merit, he shall have another of his holdings confiscated. If he has no holdings, he shall be punished by exile. (*Goseibai shikimoku*, 358–9)

Honour—or conversely, shame—could reach beyond the warrior himself, and even beyond his lifespan. Samurai could prosper through the inherited glory of their ancestors or suffer the stigma of their disgrace. Filial piety and familial honour were, in fact, often a cause of private warfare.[4] Large-scale vendettas were surprisingly rare, but attempts to avenge slights against family members were common and troublesome enough to merit specific mention in Kamakura law:

> Furthermore, in the case of a son or grandson who kills the enemy of his father or grandfather, said father or grandfather shall also be punished for the crime, even if he protests that he had no knowledge of it, because the father or grandfather's enmity was the motive that gave rise to the act. (*Goseibai shikimoku*, 358)

3 See, for example, *Konjaku monogatarishū* 23.13, 25.3, and 25.5.

4 See, for example, *Suisaki* 1079 8/30; *Shōmonki* (Hayashi 1975, 65); *Mutsuwaki* 23; *Heian ibun* doc. 2467; *Konjaku monogatarishū* 25.4, 25.9; *Shōyūki* 989 4/4; *Azuma kagami* 1219 1/27.

Medieval warriors might also refuse orders from their superiors, risk the loss of valuable retainers, and even murder men to whom they owed their lives, all for the sake of their reputations. Even a warrior's life could be of less consequence to him than his name and image, and we find in accounts of early battles numerous sketches of warriors choosing to sacrifice themselves in order to enhance their reputations or those of their families.[5]

Be all that as it may, the key—and all-too-often-overlooked—point to be born in mind is that medieval samurai honour, early modern samurai honour, and modern ideas about samurai honour, were all distinctly different things. We must, therefore, resist anachronistic or ethnocentric assumptions about the nature of "honour", or about the sort of conduct it might be expected to have engendered.

For while honour and shame were central to samurai's self-perception throughout their history, in the premodern age, both turned on a warrior's military reputation, which turned first and foremost on his record of victories. Medieval Japanese concepts of honour and of honourable conduct in battle were flexible, and permitted successful warriors to rationalise a variety of behaviour that would have been met with considerable chagrin by Tokugawa-era *bushidō* pundits or twentieth-century proponents of "samurai values". While some aspects of medieval warrior ethics are very much in harmony with notions of honour, as modern (or Western) audiences understand this construct, others seem shockingly "dishonourable" by contemporary lights. For most of the first seven centuries of their existence, Japanese warriors were far more concerned with expediency, self-interest, and tactical, strategic or political advantage than abstractions.[6]

Some War Stories

One of the most famous stories about early samurai behaviour concerns a conflict between two tenth-century warriors, Minamoto Mitsuru and Taira Yoshifumi, recorded in *Konjaku monogatarishū*.[7] In this account, gossip carried between the two ignites a quarrel, resulting in a challenge to combat. The two sides issue

5 See, for example, *Konjaku monogatarishū* 25.6, 29.5; *Kokon chomonjū* 9.13.347, 9.12.333; *Mutsuwaki* 23, 25–6; *Azuma kagami* 32-33; *Azuma kagami* 1180 8/26, 1184 4/21 1205 6/22, 1221 6/6 1241 11/29.

6 Matthew Strickland observes that, "despite drawing on established concepts, honour [is] ultimately a personal issue [...] governed by the conscience and self-esteem of the individual" (Strickland 1996, 125–31).

7 The tale appears in *Konjaku monogatarishū*, 25.3.

invitations to meet at a designated place on a specified day, and then set about putting their troops in order and preparing to fight:

> On the agreed upon day, the two warbands set forth, coming to face one another across the designated field at the hour of the serpent.[8] [...] While all prepared their hearts, readying to cast aside their bodies and disregard their lives, they planted their shields in rows, facing one another at a distance of about one *chō*.[9]
>
> Each side then sent forth a warrior to exchange written challenges. As those stalwarts returned to their ranks, there began, as was customary, a flurry of arrows. The warriors did not look back or even hurry their horses forward, but returned quietly—thus displaying their bravery. After this, both sides moved their shields closer together and were about to begin shooting, when Yoshifumi called to Mitsuru.
>
> To simply set our respective troops discharging arrows at one another does not serve the interest of today's battle. Let only you and I learn of each other's skill. Instead of having our troops engage, how about if only the two of us ride at one another and take our best shots?

Mitsuru concurs and, after cautioning his men to stay out of the fight, even should he lose, rides out to engage Yoshifumi alone. The two make several passes at one another, but neither is able to land a decisive shot. At length they agree to call the matter a draw and, having settled their quarrel, spend the remainder of their lives amicably.

The behaviour of Mitsuru and Yoshifumi in this tale accords well with the received wisdom concerning classical samurai warfare, and is, in fact, the principal source cited in support of several key points thereof. But it contrasts vividly with another account, in the same text, about two later tenth-century warriors, Taira Koremochi and Fujiwara Morotō.[10]

As in the Mitsuru and Yoshifumi story, a dispute over a piece of land festers, fuelled by gossip, until at length a challenge is issued and date and place agreed upon. As the day of battle approaches, Morotō finds himself outnumbered nearly three to one and, apparently determining discretion to be the better part of valour, flees instead to a neighbouring province. The narrator of the tale informs us that "Those who spoke between the two warriors pronounced favourably on this."

8 9:00–11:00 AM.

9 One *chō* is approximately. 110 meters.

10 Recounted in *Konjaku monogatarishū* 25.5.

Koremochi, upon receiving this news, determines things to be safe and demobilises his men, who have been pestering him to allow them to return to their homes. But shortly thereafter, Koremochi and his household are startled from their sleep by Morotō, approaching with a sizeable force. Morotō's men surround Koremochi's compound, set fire to the buildings, and shoot down anyone who emerges. When the fire has burned itself out they search the ashes, "discovering men of high and low rank, children and the like—all told more than eighty persons—burned to death."

En route home, Morotō pauses near the home of his brother-in-law, Tachibana Yoshinori, to give his troops a rest, whereupon the men celebrate their victory by gorging themselves on food and *sake*, until they pass out. Unbeknownst to them, however, Koremochi is not dead. He had escaped by seizing a robe from one of his serving women, and slipping past the attackers under the cover of the smoke [11]

"Dropping into the depths of a stream to the west, he carefully approached a place far from the bank where reeds and such grew thickly, and clung there to the roots of a willow", hiding until the fighting was over and Morotō's troops had withdrawn. Some of his own troops who had not been in the house later find him, and re-supply him with clothing, weapons, and a horse, while he explains what had happened, adding that he had chosen not to flee into the mountains at the beginning of the attack because he feared that "this would have left behind the reputation of one who had run away." His men counsel him to wait and reassemble his forces before going after Morotō, whose troops still outnumber them five or six to one. But Koremochi shakes off this advice, arguing:

> Had I been burned to death inside my house last night, would my life exist now? I escaped in this manner at great cost, yet I do not live. To show myself to you for even one day is extremely shameful. Therefore, I will not be stingy with this dew-like life. You may assemble an army and fight later. As for myself, I will go [on to attack] alone. [...] No doubt I will send off [only] a single arrow and then die, but to choose otherwise would be a limitless shame for my descendants. [...] Those of you who begrudge your lives need not come with me; I will go alone.

Koremochi and his men thereby fall upon Morotō's troops, taking them completely by surprise. Drunk and sated, Morotō's side is able to offer only a half-hearted defence, and is soon utterly destroyed. After taking Morotō's head, Koremochi moves on to his home, which he puts to the torch.

11 *Azuma kagami* 1184 4/21 recounts a similar incident involving a warrior escaping danger disguised as a woman, and even getting a friend to impersonate him and draw off pursuers.

The protagonists' obsession with their reputations throughout this tale is noteworthy, but also complicated. The challenge to fight, the agreement on time and place, Koremochi's refusal to run away at the outset of Morotō's attack, and his speech to his men after they find him on the morning after all fit well with modern expectations of "honourable" samurai behaviour. But his method of escape from the burning house, his counter-attack, his gratuitous destruction of Morotō's home, Morotō's decision to run rather than face Koremochi at the agreed-upon time, and other incidents are a far cry from popular notions of samurai honour.

Moreover, in spite of very similar beginnings, the conflicts between Yoshifumi and Mitsuru, and between Morotō and Koremochi proceed in such stark contrast to one another that readers are left wondering if perhaps there could have been two competing warrior ethea during the tenth century. A second possibility is that confrontation between Yoshifumi and Mitsuru, which would had to have occurred about 150 years before the text that records it was compiled, may simply represent a kind of creative nostalgia—an idealised image—of earlier warriors on the part of twelfth-century litterateurs.

In any event, two points demand our attention here: First, there is no disregarding the fact that the tale was calculated to impress the very same audiences who regarded Koremochi as heroic. And second, Yoshifumi and Mitsuru's handling of their feud was clearly exceptional. In other sources, the aplomb with which the early samurai engaged in deceit and subterfuge is striking. The acceptance of both warrior and non-warrior audiences of this sort of behaviour is still more so.

Another incident related in the same text, for example, describes the tactics employed by Taira Sadamichi, a retainer of Minamoto Yorimitsu (944–1021), in hunting down another warrior (*Konjaku monogatarishū* 25.10). Commanded by Yorimitsu's illustrious younger brother, Yorinobu (968–1048), to take the head of a certain warrior from a nearby province, Sadamichi initially disregards the order, which was issued publicly, in the midst of a drunken party, and by Yorinobu, with whom Sadamichi had no prior relationship. But some three or four months later, having completely forgotten the whole affair, Sadamichi chances to meet the very man he had been ordered to kill.

The two ride along together, engaged in friendly conversation for some time, until the would-be victim, having heard the story of Yorinobu's order, asks Sadamichi about it. Suddenly recalling the incident, Sadamichi laughs and explains that he has chosen to ignore the command, which he believes to have been foolish and unreasonable. The other warrior relaxes, thanking Sadamichi

for his generous attitude. He adds, however, a note of caution lest Sadamichi change his mind, warning him that he would not be an easy man to reckon with. This bit of arrogance induces Sadamichi to do exactly that. Quietly parting from the man, he rides out of sight to don his armour and prepare himself, only to return minutes later to catch his hapless victim riding along on a spare horse, unarmoured, and shoots him down before he can even reach his weapons.

In yet another tale from that text, a warrior slays the man who killed his father by disguising himself as a servant bearing food, sneaking into the man's room (while he rested in the home of the samurai's master), and slitting his throat as he slept. And *Azuma kagami* recounts how the first Kamakura *shōgun*, Minamoto Yoritomo, had one of his men executed for treason by summoning him to his quarters and entertaining him with food and drink, in the midst of which another of Yoritomo's men, Amano Tōkage, stepped forward with a sword to lop off the unfortunate man's head. In none of these accounts is there any suggestion that this sort of conduct is improper (*Konjaku monogatarishū* 25.4; *Azuma kagami* 1185 6/16).

The prominent role of deception, ambush and surprise attacks in these anecdotes seems discomfortingly unheroic to modern audiences. But such behaviour is, in fact, one of the enduring themes of Japan's martial legacy, and can be seen as far back as the *Kojiki*, in the exploits of Yamato Takeru no Mikoto, and at least as recently as the Pacific War.

Artifice and subterfuge in war are not, of course, by any means unique to Japan. Medieval European lords also happily built on tactics of betrayal and deception to secure victory. Matthew Strickland points, for example, to the 1118–1119 campaigns between Henry I and Louis VI, fought principally in Normandy, which demonstrated the repeated use of guile in almost every aspect of the fighting. And yet, argues Strickland, few of these acts provoked reproach from the pens of those who chronicled them. On the contrary, knights applauded cunning, guile and surprise, even in tournaments, and acknowledged them as fundamental and ubiquitous elements of war (Strickland 1996, 128–31).

Even so, the Japanese attitude toward this issue stands out. For in medieval Europe, betrayal and deception were restricted by conventions of war that sought to regulate fighting to the mutual benefit of both sides in any struggle. They were legitimate only because of legalistic loopholes arising from formalised conventions of oaths, truces, declarations and challenges. Knights could exploit surprise and guile without setting precedents that undermined the conventions only when their actions violated no specific promises or agreements. And such tactics were

successful mainly when careless enemies failed to take note of the absence of any such prior agreements[12] (Strickland 1996, 42–43, 128–31).

Japanese custom lacked all such qualifications. Promises and truces were violated with impunity, as Minamoto Yoritomo demonstrated in his destruction of Satake Yoshimasa, in 1184: Using Taira Hirotsune, a relative of the Satake, as an intermediary, Yoritomo persuaded Yoshimasa to meet him alone, at the centre of a bridge leading to Yoshimasa's home. When Yoshimasa arrived at the meeting point, however, Hirotsune abruptly cut him down, causing many of Yoshimasa's followers to surrender and others to turn and flee (*Azuma kagami* 1180 11/4).

Medieval audiences considered surprise attacks so utterly normal and fair that an early eleventh-century text begins a description of the archetypical samurai, "the greatest warrior in the land", by informing us that, "he was highly skilled in the conduct of battles, *night attacks*, archery duels on horseback, and *ambushes*" (emphasis added) (*Shin sarugakki* 138).

The foregoing points notwithstanding, we need to guard against censorial judgments of early medieval warriors based on ethnocentric or anachronistic standards for behaviour. Measured against the war conventions of their own time and place, early samurai tactics were no less noble or heroic, and no more treacherous or underhanded, than those of their European contemporaries. Early medieval Japanese rules of engagement demanded that warriors concern themselves only with the most efficient ways to bring about the desired result, with the ends justifying almost any means. The notion that certain sorts of tactics might be "fair" while others were "unfair" was not only inapposite to such deliberations, it was all but extraneous to samurai culture.

Shades of Loyalty

A second popular theme among modern commentators on *bushidō* concerns the absolute fealty that warriors are alleged to have displayed toward their overlords. Samurai loyalty is described as unconditional and utterly selfless, extending even beyond the deaths of the principals. And indeed, that *is* the lesson of *Chūshingura*, *Hagakure*, and numerous other early modern parables and harangues about samurai values.

12 Brunner (1992, 65) notes that, "The *Summa legum* of Raymond of Wiener Neustadt contended that to kill someone 'without a challenge, without open enmity' (*sine diffidacione et sine manifesta inimicitia*) was just murder." But Strickland (1996, 128) qualifies, "Where no prior agreement was involved, however, surprise and guile might be considered perfectly legitimate. Low cunning was not itself dishonourable; what brought shame was perjury of an oath promising to abstain from such acts."

But the Tokugawa period was, as we noted earlier, a brave new world, in which on-going peace, shogunal regulations limiting the size of *daimyō* retainer bands, and fixed tax rates and *daimyō* incomes rendered the employment market for warriors all but non-existent. Under these circumstances, *daimyō* could and did demand unqualified loyalty from their retainers. In earlier ages, however, selfless displays of loyalty by warriors are conspicuous in the Japanese historical record mainly by their absence.

From the beginnings of the samurai class and the lord/vassal bond in the tenth century through the end of the "Age of the Country" at War in the late sixteenth, the ties between master and retainer were contractual, based on mutual interest and advantage, and were heavily conditioned by the demands of self-interest. Medieval warriors remained loyal to their lords only so long as it benefited them to do so; they could and did readily switch allegiances when the situation warranted it. In fact there are very few important battles in Japanese history in which the defection—often in the middle of the fighting—of one or more of the major players was not a factor.

Loyalty was, to be sure, also a common trope in shogunal regulations and the house laws formulated by late medieval *daimyō*. But there are at least two problems involved in interpreting from this that constancy was a fundamental part of medieval warrior character.

To begin with, the idea that subjects owe their rulers unrestricted allegiance is a basic tenet of Confucianism and derives little or nothing from any military tradition per se. Japanese government appeals for loyalty began long before the birth of the samurai—as seen, for example, in the "Seventeen Article Constitution" of Shōtoku Taishi, promulgated in 603. The concept predates even the existence of a Japanese state by hundreds of years, and traces back to the Chinese Confucian philosophers of the sixth to third centuries BCE. Japanese warlords who called upon those that served them to render unflinching loyalty were not so much defining proper samurai behaviour as they were exhorting their subjects on a traditional and general theme of government. Moreover, attempting to deduce norms of actual behaviour from formal legal and moral codes is a treacherous business. Laws and exhortations reflect *desired*, not actual, behaviour, and attempts of this sort to formulate normative standards often appear in inverse proportion to the prevalence of the behaviour in the real world (Hurst 1990).

The standout feature of warrior alliances in this formative age for the samurai was their fragility. While earlier generations of scholars sometimes drew analogies between warrior networks and the land-commendation process through which

estates (*shōen*) were formed,[13] the two processes were fundamentally different. For, unlike land commendation arrangements, the bonds between warriors were not supported by written contracts. Commendation instruments exist in abundance, but one searches in vain for a single document formalizing a military alliance prior to the agreements issued by Minamoto Yoritomo in the 1180s.[14]

This absence of legal paperwork regulating early warrior alliances was a reflection of the amorphous nature of the lord-vassal bond during the era. Formal arrangements under which specified benefices were offered in return for defined military services were slow to develop in Japan, because the ability of warrior leaders to manipulate any forms of carrot or stick in order to recruit, maintain or control followers was closely circumscribed by their relatively weak political circumstances until well into the early medieval period. For even the most eminent samurai of the classical age occupied only intermediate positions in the socio-political hierarchy, and were dependent on connections with the higher echelons of the court to maintain their political and economic positions.[15] Their autonomy in matters of governance and land-holding was limited, which meant that they lacked the right—and therefore the means—to reward or punish their own troops directly.

Warrior allegiances were further circumscribed by the multi-tiered, hierarchical structure of the military networks to which they belonged. Warriors in the organisations of prominent samurai frequently had vassals of their own, and many of these, in turn, had followers. The loyalties of lower-ranking figures in this complex hierarchy to those at the top were tenuous at best, being buffered at each interceding level by the allegiances of their higher-ups.

Nor were ideological constraints of much value in holding early warrior alliances together. Literary war stories like *Heike monogatari*, which purport to describe events of the early medieval period, are filled with edifying tales attesting to the fierce loyalty displayed by the warriors of the age. And earlier, more reliable sources do give some hints that the fighting men of this time were not entirely oblivious to the concept of fealty as a virtue. But the real effect of this notion on samurai behaviour was minimal.[16]

13 See, for example Yasuda 1962, 12–78.

14 As in the case of patron/client relationships between court nobles, a warrior entering the service of another presented his new master with his name placard (*myōbu*). There is, however, no evidence that the junior party to the arrangement ever received any written confirmation in exchange. For examples of warriors offering *myōbu* as gestures of submission, see *Heian ibun* doc. 2467 or *Konjaku monogatarishū* 25.9.

15 On this point see Mass 1974, 33–35, 45–54.

16 See, for example, *Shōmonki* 79, 125–9; *Konjaku monogatarishū* 25.9; *Mutsuwaki* 23–24; *Chōya gunsai* 284 or *Chūyūki* 1114 5/6.

Consequently, the integrity of the lord-vassal bond in classical and medieval times tended to be only as strong as the adherents' perceptions that affiliation worked to their advantage. Warrior leaders could count on the services of their followers only to the extent that they were able to offer suitably attractive compensation—or, conversely, to impose suitably daunting sanctions for refusal. For the most part, medieval warriors viewed loyalty as a commodity predicated on adequate remuneration, rather than as an obligation transcending self-interest.

In the fourteenth century, expectations concerning commitments and fealty became closely bound up with distinctions between warriors of varying levels of autarky, which, in turn, hardened into hereditary social categories. Thus warriors of means came to be styled *tozama* ("outsiders"), while those who maintained strong dependent ties to greater lords were called *miuchi* ("insiders"). *Tōzama* were ideologically, as well as economically, autonomous. They chose their battles and leaders according to narrowly-defined personal interests and circumstances of the moment, and were more than ready to desert to other employers whenever they thought they might better their situation by doing so. Only warriors without substantial holdings of their own—whose fortunes were therefore inseparable from those of their lords—behaved loyally (Conlan 1997, 42–44).

Nevertheless, the bonds between *tozama* and their *miuchi* vassals—and to some extent, the categories themselves—were inherently unstable, inasmuch as they hinged on a disparity of resources that kept the vassals unable to challenge their lords. Much like their Tokugawa period descendants, medieval warriors were reliable only in proportion to their dependence. Those with minimal holdings often displayed striking loyalty to their overlords; those who possessed, or were entrusted with, extensive lands and followers could—and did—condition their service, and compel greater rewards. Beyond a certain point, retainer dependence—and therefore *daimyō* control—became nominal. Accordingly, a warrior's military forces grew less and less cohesive as his power and size increased, and his vassals also became landholders of means.

Tozama loyalties and military obligations to those above them were even more fluid and contingent. For while *miuchi* faithfulness might be demanded as an obligation born of dependency, *tozama* autonomy in military affairs was normative, and *tozama* services had to be bought. Presumption of autarky freed *tozama* from any transcendent duty to fight or serve, shifting the burden of responsibility for maintaining allegiance from the warriors called, to the armies that sought to hire them (Conlan 1997, 46–48).

At the same time, competition for *tozama* services whittled away at the very authority it manipulated. The existence of rival emperors, each claiming identical—and exclusive—authority, throughout the fourteenth-century Northern and

Southern Courts (*Nanbokuchō*) epoch, offered warriors a choice of customers to whom to market their support, and thereby sustained the premise that military services had to be purchased from rightfully autonomous contractors, rather than demanded of obedient subjects or vassals.

The long-term effects were revolutionary: central authority all but ceased to exist other than in name, leading to the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century world of *gekokujō* ("the low overthrow the high") and *jakuniku kyōshoku* ("the weak are meat; the strong eat"). The instability of this "Age of the Country at War" eventually inspired the restructuring of *daimyō* rule, which then led to the early modern polity and changes to the warrior order that I described at beginning of this essay.

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To sum up, then: although modern commentators have too often attempted to treat "the way of the warrior" as an enduring code of behaviour readily encapsulated in simplistic notions of honour, duty, and loyalty, the historical reality is anything but simple. Samurai ethics and behavioural norms varied significantly from era to era—most especially across the transition from the medieval to early modern age—and in most cases bore scant resemblance to twentieth-century fantasies about samurai comportment. Even in the early modern period, when *bushidō* became a topic for written pontification, pundits disagreed on the most basic tenets of what it meant to be a proper warrior. Any discussion or exposition of *bushidō* must, therefore, begin with the question, "the way of *which* warriors?"

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Lives and Afterlives of *Bushidō*: A Perspective from Overseas*

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Abstract

Bushidō has had many different lives in many different places around the world. These transformations and afterlives constitute valuable witnesses that offer competing narratives of Japan's modern development and of its changing roles in the world. Beyond Japan they speak to the multiple ways that the country both inspires and (sometimes) displeases other nations. These lives and afterlives also serve to illustrate the myriad ways that intersections of the local and translocal, the past and present, refract perspectives. *Bushidō* is not unique in its ability to assume divergent connotations and implications in accordance with the contours of the frame within which it is placed. Its elusiveness exemplifies the amorphous characteristics of our global world's nomadic lexicon.

Keywords: *bushidō*, Nitobé, invention of tradition, nomadic concepts

Bushidō kot hibrid: hibridnost in transkulturacija v diskurzu o *bushidōju*

Izvleček

Bushidō je imel v različnih krajih po vsem svetu različne izpeljave. Njegove preobrazbe in zapuščina so dragoceno pričanje o medsebojno konkurenčnih pripovedih o sodobnem razvoju Japonske in njenih spreminjajočih se vlogah v svetu. Zunaj Japonske med drugim pričajo o različnih načinih, na katere Japonska navdihuje in (včasih) tudi razočara druge države. Ta življenja in zapuščine služijo tudi za ponazoritev neštetih načinov, na katere križanja lokalnega in translokalnega, preteklosti in sedanjosti na novo vzpostavljajo perspektive. *Bushidō* ni edinstven v svoji zmožnosti, da privzema različne konotacije in implikacije znotraj okvirja, v katerega je umeščen. Njegova izmuzljivost kaže na brezobličnost nomadskega besedišča današnjega globaliziranega sveta.

Ključne besede: *bushidō*, Nitobé, izumljanje tradicije, nomadski koncepti

* Revised from a presentation at the University in Ljubljana, 2017, international symposium on Bushidō in Transformation. I wish to thank Professor Nataša Visočnik for making this event possible.

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Essay

Bushidō has never been more popular than it is today. Popularity is difficult to measure, but we can gain a rough idea simply by looking at the number of books published in Japan with the word "*bushidō*" 武士道 as part of their title, which has increased dramatically over the past decade (see Table 1). During the early twentieth century, after Nitobé Inazō[1] 新渡戸稲造 (1862–1933) first popularized the concept of "*bushidō*" as "the Soul of Japan" (as he translated the word in the title of his bestselling book), Japan saw a similarly large number of books on the topic, although thereafter the number declined. After the end of the Pacific War the Japanese public ignored *bushidō*, and from 1945 to 1959 only about seven books with the word "*bushidō*" in the title were published in the country. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s some interest returned, with an average of about 32 titles published in each decade. Beginning in 2010, however, publishers in Japan began to release an ever rising number of books on *bushidō*, publishing more than 150 different titles in the space of just seven years. This might simply be due to the advent of online publishing, which has lowered the cost of production. But even inexpensive books will not be published if readers do not wish to purchase them.

More important is the fact that interest in *bushidō* has increased not just inside Japan but throughout the world. Some indication of this can be seen by looking at the number of times that Nitobé's original English-language book was reprinted in other countries or translated into the languages of those nations (see Table 2). Nitobé published the first edition of his book in Philadelphia, USA, in 1900. Within that same decade there appeared nine more editions in English in both the United States and Britain as well as seven translations: German (1901) by Kaufmann, Czech (1904) by Karel Hora, Polish (1904) by H. Altenberga, Norwegian (1905) by Hans Brekke, Russian (1905) by A. Salmanovoj, Japanese (1909) by Sakurai Ōson 櫻井鷗村 (1872–1929), and Spanish (1909) by Gonzalo Jiménez de la Espada. No other Japanese author had enjoyed success on this scale, not just in United States or Britain, but across Europe. Thereafter Nitobé's explanation of *bushidō* declined in importance, and was all but ignored until the 1980s, when six new translations appeared: Italian (1980) by Rinaldo Massi, Chinese (1982) by Su Guizhen 蘇癸珍, Japanese again (1983) by Naramoto Tatsuya 奈良本辰也 (1913–2001), German (1985) by Rinaldo Massi (again), Malay (1986) by Wong Seng Tong, and Spanish again (1989) by Esteve Serra. Since then its reprinting and translation have continued every decade, and Nitobé's book has never been so widely read as it is today.

1 I spell Nitobé with an accent in accordance with the way it appears on the cover page of his book.

Nowadays even academic researchers show interest in *bushidō*. Previously scholars of Japan had mostly ignored *bushidō* or dismissed it as a loose popular construct without analytic value. Their disregard was not unreasonable. Authors writing for the general public had used the word "*bushidō*" in reference to such disparate phenomena that its use in scholarly writing could too easily invite confusion. One rough indication of this lack of interest can be seen by searching for its use in scholarly databases. The widely used academic repository JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/), for example, currently boasts that it provides on-line access to more than 10 million academic journal articles (most of which are published in English) across seventy-five scholarly disciplines. A search for the title-word "*bushidō*" yields only five results (one in the 1980s, two in the 1990s, and two since 2000). In contrast, a search for the title-word "samurai" (another rather vague term) results in 69 publications, more than twelve times as many.

This academic neglect ended in 2014 when Oleg Benesch published *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan* (Oxford University Press). Benesch presents a masterful overview of the complex modern history of the term *bushidō* and all the debates in Japan over its meaning and significance. His book is essential reading for scholars of modern Japanese history and culture. Benesch's study focuses exclusively on the intellectual history of *bushidō* within Japan, not its influence elsewhere in the world. He demonstrates that Japanese intellectuals began articulating various interpretations of *bushidō* even before Nitobé's English-language book appeared, and that, contrary to our previous understanding, Nitobé contributed little to their debates. According to Benesch, Nitobé's exposition of the "Soul of Japan" failed to exert much influence within Japan, even after it was translated into Japanese. People who want to better understand how most Japanese have understood *bushidō* and the role that it played in pre-1945 nationalism, must therefore look beyond Nitobé's account. For this purpose, Benesch's work is invaluable.

Benesch presents *bushidō* as an invented tradition of modern Japan. The concept of invented tradition does not refer to the re-invigoration of an existing tradition or the revival of a dormant one. It refers, rather, to the ways that "the modern"—especially modern social organisations and modern ideologies—will harken back to romanticized pristine and timeless past precedents as a mechanism to strengthen group cohesion and forge new identities. Eric Hobsbawm (1983a; 1983b) helped popularize this concept in his analysis of the emergence of nationalism during the period 1870 to 1914 in Europe. Subsequent historians demonstrated its applicability to many aspects of modern culture. Numerous Japanese examples serve as case studies in *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, a volume of essays edited by Steven Vlastos (1998).

Benesch analyses how educators and public intellectuals transformed the previously obscure term *bushidō* into an all-purpose label for a wide variety of traits that they linked to a shared national identity, loyalty to the imperial cause, and an ethic of self-sacrifice. His explanation of *bushidō* as an invented tradition is especially convincing with regard to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when advocates of *bushidō* first grappled with the contradictions of modernity and presented diverse and even contradictory interpretations as they struggled to forge a broad cohesive vision for society. This process of invention was recognised and debated at that time. As early as 1912, for example, Basil Hall Chamberlain (1859–1935) famously dismissed *bushidō* as part of *The Invention of a New Religion*. This analysis of *bushidō* as an invention proves less successful in Benesch's discussions of the new and diverse contexts in which *bushidō* discourse has reappeared in recent decades (which Benesch, p. 2, lists as popular culture, politics, sports, economics, business, and natural disasters), when the social and political conditions within and outside Japan changed greatly from those seen when *bushidō* was invented. The invention of tradition cannot account for the remarkably long-lasting resilience, multi-faceted connotations, and persistent cultural relevance of *bushidō* as both a term and concept.

To better understand these afterlives of *bushidō* we must examine it not just as a term within this or that discourse, but also its many lives as a concept. While terms typically begin life by referring to concrete references within an identifiable context, they also can assume afterlives as abstract concepts which scholars then use as active interpretive agents of analysis (Hall 1983, 3–4). Interpretive concepts derive their meaning or significance less from their context than from their relative positionality within theoretical frameworks, the boundaries of which can shift as individual writers frame topics differently or extend their explanations in new directions. Concepts increase in usefulness by acquiring new theoretical connotations to facilitate intellectual exploration. As new connotations accrue to the same underlying term (*bushidō*, in this case), this conceptual expansion invites lexicographical dissonance. Readers who lack awareness of the author's interpretive framework can easily misunderstand his or her assertions.

Bushidō is not unique in its ability to assume divergent connotations and implications in accordance with the framework within which it is placed. Its elusiveness exemplifies the amorphous characteristics of our global world's nomadic lexicon, not just in the humanities but also in the sciences and social sciences. There exists, for example, a growing literature on "traveling concepts" (e.g., Bal 2002; Forsdick 2001; Karp 1997; McGuckin 2005; Saïd 1982 and 1994) and on "nomadic concepts" (Braidotti 1993; Joris 1998 and 1999; Stengers 1987). Olivier Christin (2010; also see 2017) in his *Dictionnaire des concepts nomades en sciences humaines* compiled a lexicon of common terms (such as: administration; avant-garde;

borders; humanitarian; intelligentsia; labour; public opinion; secularize; the West; etc.) that seem simple but convey such conceptual weight so as to pose difficulties for effective communication.[2]

In a world in which even ordinary words complicate understanding, can it be surprising that *bushidō* has acquired so many different nuances within and outside Japan? In this essay I will focus on the overseas afterlives of *bushidō* as a concept. In focusing on its conceptualization, I want to exclude from consideration the roles of *bushidō* in *budō* (i.e., Japanese martial arts). Its embodiment in regimes of discipline and performance—the *bushidō* that Alexander Bennett (2013) says the Japanese people do not know—raises too many complex issues for consideration here.[3] Before exploring the myriad permutations of *bushidō*, first I will provide some simple examples of how concepts travel and become nomadic. My examples concern the term "religion". This word is a good place to start, because Chamberlain already implicated it in the invention of *bushidō*, and because it is well known and widely used, although most people have only vague ideas about it, while scholars of religion employ it in rather complex and contradictory ways. Moreover, "religion" itself is a concept of rather recent invention (Smith 1998; Masuzawa 2005). Its invention and evolution illustrates how shifting frameworks allow concepts to become more useful: successful concepts perform the intellectual work of revealing relationships which otherwise pass unnoticed, while facilitating the construction of new social realities which would otherwise lack coherence.

Jonathan Z. Smith (1998, 269) identifies a key characteristic of religion as follows: "it is a category imposed from the outside"—usually by Europeans on other cultures they encounter and subjugate. It is a concept that thus travelled from Europe to the rest of the world. In the case of Japan, it was not just imposed from abroad, but also—as demonstrated by Jason Josephson in his masterful *The Invention of Religion in Japan* (2012, 195–6, 225ff)—became a tool of the Japanese governing elites, who imposed it from above onto their countrymen below. Josephson's account charts not just how the invention of religion played a key role in the creation of modern Japan, but also how the concept of religion opens a discursive space populated by fellow travellers who provide it with its conceptual, social, and legal power. A précis of a few of his points follows.

First, as a conceptual category religion makes it possible to admit the existence of more than one kind of Christianity (i.e., Christian religions as opposed to

2 In their original languages these entries are: administration; avant-garde; frontiere; humanitaire; intelligencija; laïcite; travailt; opinion publique; occident.

3 Regarding this topic, see the works of Gainty 2013, Inoue 1998 and 2004, Shooklyn 2009, and Yuasa 2001, as well as the other essays in this volume.

the one religion of Christ). Over time this ecumenicalism would be expanded to admit the existence of religions (plural) as a generic category, within which Christianity could be but one example (even if it always occupies the position of the best example; pp. 15–16). In short, the conceptualization of the term entails the admission of multiple iterations of its referent. Second, this conceptualization forces the imposition of boundaries, as efforts to refine the concept generate debates over what it includes or excludes. The boundaries of religion necessarily entail creating opposing concepts, such as the non-religious (secular), superstition, and pseudo-religion. It seems only natural, therefore, that early theories of secularization imagined it as a process of disenchantment in which religion would gradually become confined to personal beliefs, while politics, industry, and society, being freed of religious confinement, would follow the march of rational, scientific progress (pp. 95–96; see Figure 1). Third, concepts become nomadic by crossing boundaries and co-opting their opposites.[4] Modern societies do not, in fact, see a decline in religious thinking, but instead imbue politics and science with a "regime of truth" expressed by symbols, slogans, ceremonies, and specific ideologies that are all but indistinguishable from the so-called religious (pp. 135–6; see Figure 2.1). Likewise, religions ally themselves with science, reason, and the secular state to work against the superstitious, the pseudo-religious, cults, extremism, radicalism, or anything else deemed to be dangerous (136, 224ff; see Figure 2.2). These diverse nomadic qualities of religion as a concept (as opposed to the fixed dogma of a given religion) testify to its analytical and social usefulness.

Can the same be said of *bushidō*? What intellectual work does it facilitate?

Nitobé's conceptualization of *bushidō* certainly had a purpose. He published his English-language book in 1900, a turbulent time halfway in between Japan's 1895 war with the Qīng Empire of China and its 1905 war with Czarist Russia. Japan was just then beginning to assert itself on the world stage, and sought to escape from the unequal treaties that had been imposed on it by the Americans and European powers. According to his preface, Nitobé (1900, v) wrote *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, to answer this simple question: How can the Japanese impart moral education without religion? When Nitobé first encountered this question, Europeans and Americans regarded any society without religion as immoral, uncivilized, and dangerous (Josephson 2012, 202–3), and Nitobé thus sought to assuage their fears. He argues that Japanese society rests on a firm moral foundation, which he identifies as *bushidō*. He describes it in terms of Chinese Confucian virtues, which he explains through examples drawn primarily from European literature (Powles 1995, 109). In this way *bushidō* serves to bring Chinese and European ethical

4 Josephson uses the Hegelian term sublation (*aufhebung*).

ideals into conversation with one another through the crucible of Japan. *Bushidō* always remains Japanese in character even as it exemplifies the best qualities of Chinese and European civilizations. Nitobé gave life to *bushidō* as a nomadic concept, which looks back to Japan's historical past to provide moral direction for its future development, thus addressing the concerns of religious thinkers, but without commitment to any one religious dogma. Its inherent elusiveness allowed readers to flesh out its contours based on their own ideals and expectations of what kinds of teachings would be most suitable for such a moral system.

Moreover, through *bushidō* Nitobé turned Japan's lack of religion (i.e., Christianity) into an advantage. He performed intellectual jujutsu, in which the weak succeed by relying on the strength of their opponent (Hearn 1985, 187, 193). Through his pen the moral sentiments of Japan's overseas critics not only appeared on Japanese soil, but also travelled back to America and Europe in a secular guise that in the eyes of many rendered them more suitable for modern societies, precisely because they had shed their ties to particular religious' affiliations. Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), the President of the United States from 1901 to 1909, wrote that he was "most impressed by [Nitobé's] little volume on Bushido," from which he especially learned how the samurai spirit "has been and is being transformed to meet the needs of modem life" (Burdick 1999, 82). In 1904 Beatrice Webb (1858–1943), the founder of the Fabian Society (an influential British socialist organisation dedicated to progressive democratic reforms) lauded Japan as a model of a socially responsible nation and described the country as "a rising star of human self-control and enlightenment" (Holmes and Ion 1980, 320). These statements reveal a major shift in the sentiments of Western leaders and their publics alike. Whereas just a few decades earlier they had regarded the samurai as primitive two-sworded assassins who attacked foreign visitors in cold blood, they now praised the samurai spirit as the animating force behind Japan's transformation into a modern nation (Lehmann 1984, 765–7). People in the West and around the world began to see Japan—and *bushidō*—as a model of how to harness local cultural ethos to build a successful modern state.

This image of *bushidō* as the successful combination of the East and West found favour not just in Europe but also, and especially, in Asia, where European domination in the form of unequal treaties (China) or colonialization (elsewhere) was still the norm. Many Asian intellectuals and local leaders saw *bushidō* as the key to Japan's success in defending itself against the West. One of the earliest non-Japanese advocates of *bushidō* in Asia was Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), a Chinese reformist who had been exiled from the Qīng Empire of China (and who lived in Japan ca. 1898–1911). In 1904 he wrote (and published in Shanghai) a book titled *Bushidō for China* (*Zhongguo zhiwushidao* 中國之武士道). Liang did not advocate importing

bushidō from Japan, but rather advocated that people in China must celebrate their heritage and honour Chinese military heroes to promote their own military ethos (Chen 2010; Liang 1904; Tsai 2010). The fact that the exact same logograms (i.e., 武士道) used to write *bushidō* in Japanese also are used to write *wushidao* in Chinese helped Liang to universalize *bushidō*, and free it from its Japanese context.

Eventually similar efforts would appear across Southeast Asia. For example, in 1938 Manuel Quezon (1878–1944), the President of the Philippines, ordered all schools to teach *bushidō*. He stated that four centuries of colonial rule under the Spanish and Americans had eroded the national character of the Filipino people. They needed something like *bushidō* to instil moral character, vocational efficiency, and an awareness of the duties of citizenship (Goodman 1987, 62). That same year Luang Phibunsongkhram (1897–1964; a.k.a. Phibun or Pibul), the Prime Minister of Thailand, promulgated a national code of valour, which he called *wiratham*, and which he had formulated as a Thai equivalent to *bushidō* (Thamsook 1978, 240). In Spain, José Millán-Astray (1879–1954), the founding commander of the Spanish Foreign Legion and a veteran of Spain's military campaigns in the Philippines, published his own translation of Nitobé's book (based on the French translation of 1927) with instructions that it be distributed for free to Spanish youth. In the preface to his translation, Millán-Astray states that the Legionnaire Code of Honour (*Credo Legionario*), which he composed, had been inspired by Nitobé's book (Beeby and Rodríguez 2009, 222–5). In Southeast Asia, Nitobé's book was translated into Burmese (in 1942 by Ū Bha Son‘) and into Indonesian (in 1944 by Tun Sri Lanang). Significantly, the post-war leaders of these two countries—Ne Win (1911–2002) of Burma (now Myanmar) and Haji Suharto (1921–2008) of Indonesia—were veterans of local military units organised, trained, and directed by their Japanese occupiers (Lebra 1975).

The Pacific War gave the world a new vision of *bushidō*. In association with Japanese military aggression it caused the image of "human self-control and enlightenment", once praised by Beatrice Webb, to give way to tales of inhumanity. After 1945 Nitobé's book fell out of print. It was supplanted by works with titles like: *Bushido: The Anatomy of Terror* (by Pernikoff, 1943), *Knights of Bushido: A History of Japanese War Crimes* (by Russell, 1958; reprinted 2002), *Beasts of Bushido* (by Owen, 1967), or *Under the Heel of Bushido* (by Sugarman, 2014). As indicated by Russell's subtitle, these books focus on tales of war crimes and atrocities committed by the Japanese military during the Pacific War. Aside from their contents (which cannot be ignored) these works have at least two noteworthy features. First, they provide no description or conceptualization of *bushidō*. While all of them use the word "*bushidō*" in their titles, none of them discuss the term or explain the role it would have played in these episodes. It seems that the authors of these books (and their

audiences) regarded *bushidō* as something obviously loathsome and repulsive, something that did not require any explanation or contextualization. This negative evaluation helps explain why almost no books about *bushidō* were published in the immediate post-war period. The second key feature of these books about the horrors of *bushidō* lies in their chronology. They have been published regularly: in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 2000s. Even nowadays when people around the world express a resurgence of interest in the positive image of *bushidō* presented by Nitobé, the demonic negative image of *bushidō* still persists. As a nomadic concept it occupies the opposing positions of the civilized and barbaric.

Among Japan's Asian neighbours, at least, the end of the Cold War seems to have given new life to *bushidō*. Since the 1980s, there has been a remarkable renaissance of interest in Nitobé's work, and his original English account has been translated ever more often. Library catalogues list at least seven modern translations into Southeast Asian languages: Thai (in 1965 by Sathīan Phantharangsī), Malaysian (in 1986 by Wong Seng Tong), Filipino (in 1990 by Buenaventura Medina, Jr.), Indonesian twice (in 1992 by Yayasan Karti Sarana; and again in 2008 by Antonius R. Pujo Purnomo), and Vietnamese twice (in 2006 by Trung Quốc and Nguyễn Hải Hoành; and in 2011 by Le Ngọc Thao). There exist at least eight recent translations into Chinese: in 1982 by Su Guizhen 蘇癸珍; in 1992 by Zhang Junyan 張俊彥; in 2003 by Wu Rongchen 吳容宸; in 2004 by Fu Songjie 傅松洁; in 2006 by Chen Gaohua 陈高华; in 2006 by Zong Jianxin 宗建新; in 2009 by Zhiu Yanhong 周燕宏; and in 2012 by Xu Ying 徐颖. And there are at least two recent translations into Korean: in 2002 by Lee Man-Hee and in 2010 by the Ilbon Go Jon Yongu-ho (i.e., 日本古典研究會).

It is too early to tell how Japan's neighbours will reconcile the negative images of wartime *bushidō* with the *bushidō* of timeless optimism depicted by Nitobé. Yet it is safe to say that one of the key features of *bushidō* lies in its nomadic ability to embody opposing values simultaneously. While this essay focuses primarily on the afterlives of *bushidō* outside Japan, its conceptualization tends to collapse the dichotomy between inside and outside. Or, rather, in a process that Yoshioka Hiroshi 吉岡洋 of Kyōto University describes as a kind of "self-colonization" of the Japanese imagination, it facilitates the creation of a new discursive space located in between the inside and outside. While the Japanese escaped the harsh realities of being colonialized (e.g., partition, displacement, or slavery), they nonetheless crafted a quasi-colonial subjectivity in response to the rapid pace of social, political, and industrial transformations. According to Yoshioka's analysis, Japanese created a two-fold "othering" of themselves. On the one hand, they crafted a cultural stereotype of the samurai warrior, which they could see as authentically Japanese while also distancing themselves from it as something other, not themselves. This

cultural stereotype can then be examined and debated as made up of either positive or negative examples of traits to be emulated or avoided. Simultaneously, the Japanese have become masters of various technologies, sciences, and arts from all regions of the world, especially Europe. They can thus see themselves as exemplars of Western learning and accomplishments. These exemplars are at once Japanese yet not Japanese. They likewise can be examined and debated as either positive or negative examples of traits to be emulated or avoided.

Yoshioka's analysis shows how the conceptualization of *bushidō* helps create new discursive spaces for the nomadic identities of traditional versus contemporary, of native versus international, to be examined and negotiated. Perhaps the renewed popularity of Nitobé's *bushidō* reflects the growing need among its admirers and critics around the world to engage in similar negotiations.

Appendix

Table 1: "Bushidō" editions published: Editions (first imprints and subsequent reprints) of books with the word "bushidō" 武士道 *in their titles available in Japan, arranged chronologically by date of publication and counted by decades.*[5]

1890s	= 3
1900s	= 87
1910s	= 137
1920s	= 9
1930s	= 53
1940–44	= 56
1945–49	= 1(written by a non-Japanese)
1950s	= 6
1960s	= 27
1970s	= 36
1980s	= 34
1990s	= 64
2000s	= 19
2010–17s	= 151

5 Based on a title search via the CiNii Database (http://ci.nii.ac.jp/) for Citation Information provided by the Japanese National Institute of Informatics (Kokuritsu Jōhōgaku Kenkyūsho 国立情報学研究所): http://ci.nii.ac.jp/books/ search?advanced=true&count=20&sortorder=3&type=0&title=武士道&include_utl=true&update_keep=true . This list includes only works written in Japanese with the exception of English-language editions of *Bushido: The Soul of Japan – An Exposition of Japanese Thought* (1900) by Nitobé Inazō 新渡戸稲造 (1862–1933) as well as translations of that work in to Japanese and other languages.

Table 2: Nitobé editions published

	English	German	Czech	Polish	Russian	Japanese	Spanish	Italian	French	SEA-sian	Chinese	Korean	Slovenian
1900s	9	1	1	1	1	1	1						
1910s	4	2						1					
1920s									1				
1930s	3	1				3							
1940s							1			2			
1950s													
1960s	1					1				1			
1970s	2					1							
1980s		1				2	1	1		1	1		
1990s	2	1				5	2	1		2	1		
2000s	9	5		1	2	14	2	1	1	2	5	1	
10-17	4				1	9				2	1	1	2

Table 3: Editions and translations of Nitobé's Bushido: The Soul of Japan published each decade

1900s = 16

English original	9
German trans	1
Czech trans	1
Polish trans	1
Norwegian	1
Russian trans	1
Japanese trans	1
Spanish trans	1

1910s = 7

English original	4
German trans	2
Italian trans	1

1920s = 2

French trans	1
Romanian trans	1

1930s = 7

English original	3
German trans	1
Japanese trans	3

1940s = 3

SEA Burmese	1
SEA Indonesian	1
Spanish trans	1

1950s

—0—

1960s = 3

English original	1
Japanese trans	1
SEA Thai	1

1970s = 3

English original	2
Japanese trans	1

1980s = 8

German trans	1
Japanese trans	2
Spanish trans	1
Italian trans	1
SEA Malay	1
Chinese trans	1

1990s = 14

English original	2
German trans	1
Japanese trans	5
Spanish trans	2
Italian trans	1
SEA Filipino	1
SEA Indonesian	1
Chinese trans	1

2000s = 44

English original	9
German trans	5
Polish trans	1
Romanian trans	1
Russian trans	2
Japanese trans	14
Spanish trans	2
Italian trans	1
Danish trans	1
SEA Indonesian	1

SEA Vietnamese	1
Chinese trans	5
Korean trans	1
2010–17 = 24	
English original	4
Polish trans	1
Russian trans	1
Japanese trans	9
Spanish trans	1
French trans	2
SEA Vietnamese	1
Chinese trans	1
Korean trans	1
Finish trans	1
Slovenian trans	2

		Premodern societies	Modern societies	
Public policies	warfare	religious	rational / scientific	= secular
↑	government	„	„	(disenchanted)
⋮	economics	„	„	
⋮	art	„	„	
⋮	work	„	„	
⋮	friends	„		
⋮	family	„	religious	= limited sphere
⋮	individual habits	„	„	
↓	belief / values	„	„	
Private values				

Figure 1. Early theories of secularization

		Premodern societies no religion / no secular	Modern societies both religion & secular	
Public policies		customs + innovations	secular	= religion as unreal (re-enchantment)
↕	warfare			
	government	„	„	
	economics	„	„	reinforced by
	art	„	„	religious
	work	„	„	symbolism / motifs
	friends	„		
	family	„	religious	= religion as real
	individual habits	„	„	reinforced by
	belief / values	„	„	group practice and individual faith
Private values				

Figure 2.1. Secularization reexamined

		Premodern societies no religion / no secular	Modern societies both religion & secular	*and*	Modern societies elimination of the irrational or dangerous
			purification		
Public policies		customs + innovations	rational secular = mandatory		*called:*
↕	warfare				
	government	„	„		unscientific = violates policy
	economics	„	„		old-fashioned
	art	„	„		superstitious
	work	„	„		barbaric
	friends	„			
	family	„	rational religious = optional		*called:*
	individual habits	„	(i.e., freedom)		cults = illegal radical
	belief / values	„	„		
Private values			work together against the irrational		terrorists

Figure 2.2. Religion reexamined

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Bushidō as a Hybrid: Hybridity and Transculturation in the *Bushidō* Discourse

*Masaki SHIRAISHI**

Abstract

Since Hobsbawm and Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition*, many of traditions have been exposed as invented or reinvented in modernity. *Bushidō* is no exception. Many have argued for its modernity and constructedness, and some even for its hybridity. The present paper takes modern constructedness of *bushidō* as a starting point, and focuses its analysis on the process of hybridisation. In the *bushidō* theories I take up in this paper, *bushidō* is constructed as a hybrid right from the start, and their attempts to legitimatise *bushidō* and Japanese tradition inevitably involve its hybridisation. To shed light on what happens when *bushidō* is hybridised, I adopt the concept of transculturation. Transculturation helps us to analyse the mediation process and cultural change involved with hybridisation. Eventually, I contend that it is not because of its purity but its hybridity that *bushidō* has appeared so persuasive and attractive.

Keywords: *bushidō,* hybridity, transculturation, modernity, tradition

Bushidō kot hibrid: hibridnost in transkulturacija v diskurzu o *bushidōju*

Izvleček

Vse od Hobsbawmovega in Rangerjevega vplivnega zbornika *The Invention of Tradition* so bile številne tradicije prepoznane kot izmišljene ali ponovno odkrite v modernosti. *Bushidō* ni pri tem nikakršna izjema. Številni so dokazovali njegovo modernost in konstruiranost, včasih tudi njegovo hibridnost. *Bushidō* kot modern konstrukt v tem prispevku služi kot izhodišče za analizo procesa njegove hibridizacije. V obravnavanih teorijah *bushidōja* je ta koncept zgrajen kot hibrid že v izhodišču in njihovi poskusi legitimizacije *bushidōja* in japonske tradicije nujno vključujejo hibridizacijo. Da bi prikazal, kaj se zgodi, ko se *bushidō* hibridizira, uporabljam koncept transkulturacije. Tako lažje analiziramo procesa mediacije in kulturne spremembe, ki sta povezana s hibridizacijo. Na koncu sledi poudarek, da *bushidō* ni prepričljiv in privlačen zaradi svoje izjemnosti, temveč prav zaradi svoje hibridnosti.

Ključne besede: *bushidō*, hibridnost, transkulturacija, modernost, tradicija

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Transculturation and Hybridity of *Bushidō*

The discourse on *bushidō* in the late Meiji period shows the entangled needs of traditional societies in the face of inevitable modernisation. On the one hand, the project of modernisation requires the modernising societies to be cut off from their premodern traditions. On the other hand, for the new modernised regime to be maintained, it is necessary to establish the legitimacy of the new order by relying on continuing cultural traditions. This is especially true in the case of countries like Meiji Japan, where the modernising forces were mostly seen as foreign and the dominant elites were overwhelmingly constituted by the former ruling class. Another ideological agony in the face of modernisation is apparent in *bushidō,* which fluctuates between universalism and particularism. In the wave of Western modernisation, it was not enough for Japan to hold fast to the uniqueness of its own cultural traditions. It was necessary to find universally valid criteria or values in Japanese culture. The discourse on *bushidō* can thus be seen as a response to this ideological necessity. In *bushidō,* supposedly incongruous elements such as the West and Japan, or tradition and modernity, are interdependent upon and interconnected with each other in a process of mutual construction. *Bushidō* is both traditional and modern, national and international, and particular and universal. In a word, *bushidō* is a hybrid. I would insist that this hybrid character of *bushidō* is not adequately focused upon in the previous literature on *bushidō,* and this is because most of these arguments centre around unearthing its modern constructedness.

Many *bushidō* researchers (Suzuki 2001; Kanno 2004; Saeki 2004; Taniguchi 2007; Benesch 2014) agree upon its modern invented character. In fact, this was first pointed out by a contemporary of Nitobe. B. H. Chamberlain (1912) claimed that *bushidō* was a newly invented word. It was only after the Sino-Japanese War that the word *bushidō* became in vogue and started to be used widely. Until around the start of the twentieth century, *bushidō* remained an unusual term. It is also stressed in the literature on *bushidō* that the modern usage of the word is almost unrelated to the actual deeds and ethics of the samurai in the Middle Ages. For example, in arguing about Nitobe's *Bushido,* Ota (1986, 68) clearly refers to the "ahistorical character of *bushidō*", and claims that "what he named *bushidō* was fairly different from the historical values of samurai". Such analysis does not, however, provide a sufficient account of how *bushidō* was ideologically reconstructed, because they tend to see Meiji *bushidō* as a mere modern myth, rather than a hybrid between modernity and tradition. This is the flip side of the same coin of traditionalism. Modern constructionists tend to see *bushidō* as simply a product of modernity, while traditionalists see it as cultural essence rooted in the national past. One way or another, *bushidō* is constructed as purity.

To grasp what escapes from sight, I turn to Mary Louise Pratt's discussion (1992) about transculturation. Transculturation is a concept that was elaborated through her in-depth examination of European travel writings on the African and American continents. She devoted a chapter on Alexander von Humboldt's famous trip to the new continent. In this, she criticised a traditional account of that trip that explains Humboldt's conception of the American continent as prime nature in terms of the influence of Romanticism. For her, this kind of argument does not really theorise encounters between different cultures. In this scheme, the arrow of influence points in one direction only. In other words, agency is only allowed for the side that brings about change. The other side, stripped of any capacity of meaningful action, is merely waiting to be influenced and changed.

Accounting for the image of the American continent as prime nature through transculturation enables all the elements in the scheme to have agency. Pratt's following statement clearly shows this:

> [...] to the extent that Humboldt "is" a Romantic, Romanticism "is" Humboldt; to the extent that something called Romanticism constitutes or "explains" Humboldt's writing on America, those writings constitute and "explain" that something. (1992, 134)

It is in this sense that Pratt stressed the importance of "travelees", who are usually not represented as influential figures in the written text but nevertheless leave traces in the discourse. As she notes, "(s)uch traces of the everyday interaction between American inhabitants and European visitors suggest the heterogeneous and heteroglossic relationships that produced the European's seeing and knowing" (ibid., 132). She also points out that creole intellectuals had already started to glorify wildness and the sublimity of great nature in the Americas. The image of Latin American prime nature should be regarded as a product of a heteroglossic moment[1] that emerged in Humboldt from his encounter with at least three different agents: European Romanticism, Latin American intellectuals, and the natural scenery of the new continent. In other words, it was a hybrid.

There is an analogous interpretative scheme in the discussion about the constructedness of *bushidō*. The air of militarism and fervent nationalism that was so prevalent in the Japanese empire is often referred to as a main explanatory factor. Kanno's argument (2004) exemplifies this. After depicting the practical ethics of the samurai through a closer look at the historical materials of the Middle Ages and early modernity, he concludes that Meiji *bushidō* was in fact false *bushidō*

1 "Heteroglossia" is a concept of Mikhail Bakhtin that refers to a condition of encounters and conflicts between different social languages. See Bakhtin (1981).

in the sense that the core of the samurai spirit was removed from it. Moreover, *bushidō* was remodelled to satisfy the military needs of the Meiji government to build its national army.[2] In this scheme, *bushidō* theory is exhaustively explained by the nationalistic motive behind it. Agency is taken away both from *bushidō* theorists and the concept of *bushidō.* If we take nationalism as the only or final cause, both nationalism and *bushidō* become a Latourian black box (Latour 1987), a transparent intermediary that just passes agency from one side to another. The hybridity of *bushidō* thus disappears. There is also the reverse-side risk. Modern constructionists like Ota tend to explain Meiji *bushidō* theories, especially those of Nitobe, as made up by Western influences, as if it was conjured up from thin air.

It is thus necessary to build a theoretical framework focusing on intercultural encounters in and hybridity of *bushidō.* This framework needs to go somewhat beyond Hobsbawm and Ranger's famous theory of "the invention of tradition" (1983), which tends to focus on exposing the modernity and constructedness of supposedly continuing and unchanging traditions. It is necessary to examine what happens when tradition is invented in modernity. As such, the invention of tradition in modernity is not the goal of this discussion. It is rather the starting point of our analysis. It is necessary to examine by what logic the *bushidō* theorists of the time invented a new tradition, and through what rhetoric they justified their act of the invention. As I demonstrate in the following discussion, a key to understanding their invention is the hybridity of *bushidō.* It is hybridity rather than purity that authorises and provides discursive force to their argument.

To bring *bushidō*'s hybridity to light, it is necessary to examine how it is made hybrid. To put it differently, our analysis needs to be focused on the process of hybridisation. This enables us to see why *bushidō* had to be constructed as a hybrid rather than a pure entity. It is necessary to point out here that hybridisation and transculturation are in some sense overlapping concepts, rather than two neatly separated categories. I thus utilise both concepts in the following discussion because they have different but interrelated analytical focuses. While the concept of hybridisation centres around the issue of how the supposedly fixed boundaries are dissolved and the supposedly pure entities are intermingled, the concept of transculturation concentrates its analysis on the process of mediation and cultural change.

Pratt's concept of transculturation is a useful analytical tool to dig more deeply in the process of hybridisation. Its conceptual efficacy rests on its focus upon the

2 Following this perspective, Harada (2017) demonstrates the connection of the Meiji *bushidō* with militarism in light of the rescripts to soldiers. Ota (1986, 61–2) more clearly states that "most of the *bushidō* literature of the time seems to be written in support of the universal conscription system when the military draft was obligatory". Exceptional to this trend is Kasaya, who searches for the intellectual roots of *bushidō* in the *bushidō* literature of the Edo period, which seems closer to the conventional view.

mediation process. In the *bushidō* discourse analysed below, the supposedly different entities are connected. For this connection to be made, there has to be mediators which reconcile difference. Through identifying these mediators and how they function, we can understand the processes and consequences of intercultural encounters. To analyse the cultural change resulting from an intercultural encounter, I add an Ortisian dimension to transculturation. Fernand Ortis was the Cuban anthropologist who coined the term transculturation (1940). Ortis's original intention behind inventing a new word for analysing cultural transformation was simple: to counter the then-dominant discourse of acculturation that emphasised assimilation and integration. He submitted a new concept to grasp cultural change more comprehensively. He did not deny acculturation, but rather subsumed it under transculturation with two additional moments: "deculturation", or uprooting from its original context; "neoculturation", or the creation of new cultural phenomenon. Identifying these three moments helps us to better understand the dynamics of cultural change through decomposing the complex process of transculturation.

In the analysis that follows, I focus on the *bushidō* articles that were written in the late Meiji period. It was not only a time of "*bushidō*'s boom", in which discourse on *bushidō* spread, but it was in this period that the incongruities between modernity and tradition were very acutely felt. It should also be noted that I take up only some of the authors on Meiji *bushidō.* I selected them among many others because their arguments, in different ways, are best able to demonstrate *bushidō*'s hybridity. I admit that this selection excludes several important works on *bushidō*, such as Adachi Ritsuen (1901), although it is one of several books in the Meiji era devoted to this subject. The selection was made for the sake of clarity. I must add that my contention is not that all the *bushidō* theories are hybrid, but that *bushidō* was constructed as a hybrid in some, though important, contexts, and that this hybridity is one of the crucial reasons why it seemed so attractive and persuasive.

Legitimatising the Traditional through Hybridisation and Transculturation

Entangled and sometimes contradictory ideological needs are clearly observable in *bushidō* theorists' search for the equivalent in Western culture. Among the most eloquent speakers about *bushidō* in this respect were Japanese Christians[3], including Uemura Masahisa (1858–1925) and Nitobe Inazō (1862–1933),

3 Although Ukita Kazutami (1859–1946) and Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930) are Japanese Christians who were also eloquent about *bushidō,* I do not have space here to examine their arguments. Regarding these, see Benesch (2014).

whom I take up in this section and the next, respectively. During the 1890s, Uemura delivered a series of articles on *bushidō* to a Christian newspaper (*Fukuinshinpō*), which he founded himself. His aim was to relate *bushidō,* in his fundamental argumentation, to the foreign religion that he followed. This intention is quite apparent in the titles of two of these articles, "Kirisutokyō to *bushidō*" (Christianity and *bushidō*), and "Kirisutokyō no *bushidō*" (*Bushidō* of Christianity). In the following discussion, I focus on the first of these, in which the hybridity of *bushidō* is more clearly seen.

To connect these two seemingly alien systems of belief, Uemura not only finds *bushidō*'s counterpart in the West but also simplifies both concepts. On the one hand, he reduces the concept of *bushidō* to the point of being devoid of any meaningful cultural content other than willingness to protect one's honour through the exercise of martial actions. This simplification separates *bushidō* from the complex whole of the samurai's lived experience, from which practical lessons and ethics are drawn, and turns it into a theoretical philosophy governed by a set of principles, thus giving it universally valid criteria. This theoretical manoeuvre makes it easy to identify *bushidō* with analogous deeds and values that can be found in the tradition of Western culture. On the other hand, he invokes the image of European chivalry, depicting it as "holding a sword in the right hand and Bible in the left." In other words, its essence lies in martial deeds on the one hand and religiosity on the other. This simplified image of a knight is easy to identify with that of a samurai, who was supposedly also pious.

Finding its equivalent in and establishing similarities with Western culture is a common and useful tactic for valorising *bushidō* in Meiji Japan. In an article titled *Shinshi* (*On Gentlemen*) published in 1888, Ozaki Yukio (1858–1954) made an analogy between being a gentleman and *bushidō.*[4] Ozaki presented several characteristics that were supposed to be common to *bushidō* and gentlemanship: *bushi* and gentlemen "do not neglect one's duty in search of self-interest", "value honour and do not speak coarsely nor behave meanly", "do not submit to the strong nor contempt the weak", "keep promises and devote oneself to the public", and find "glory in honourable poverty". He did not forget to add at the end that "if we count commonalities, the list could go on and on" (Ozaki 1955, 746).

Even though the characteristics recounted by Ozaki are more numerous than those of Uemura's discourse, their ways of valorising *bushidō* are same: by reducing a complex ethos of one particular class to a set of universal principles through abstraction. The commonalities of their argumentation go further. They both saw in

4 Ozaki seemed to like the analogy of *bushidō* with gentlemanship and repeated it afterwards in his speeches and writings. See Ozaki (1913).

bushidō an ideal past totally distinct from contemporary Japanese society. Uemura lauded *bushidō* as "a beautiful flower and a fruit nourished by Japanese people for several hundred years", and lamented that it perished overnight (1966, 395). He argued that contemporary society was deeply affected by materialism, partisanship, the pursuit of self-interest, and momentary pleasure. His argument is characterised by grief over the lost soul of an idealized society that supposedly existed until it was modernised. Similarly, Ozaki lamented how different *shinshi* were in Japan from gentlemen in England, although the term *shinshi* was a Japanese translation of the English "gentleman". He poignantly remarked that in Japanese *shinshi* was just another name for a rich person whose deeds were characterised by immorality. In this respect, it was not appropriate for Ozaki to parallel Japanese *shinshi* with English gentlemen. In a similar vein to Uemura, Ozaki regarded this as a sign of spreading moral degradation in Japanese society. In contrast, an English gentleman was supposed to be defined not by his wealth, but by his moral behaviour. He "does not fear the strong nor contempt the weak" and "values honour and trust so that he does not deceive his conscience" (Ozaki 1955, 745).

Uemura's and Ozaki's arguments thus show a remarkable resemblance in their rhetoric: poignant criticism of contemporary society as excessively materialistic and morally degraded; praise for orthodox Western cultural tradition as honourable and righteous; the characterisation of chivalry and *bushidō* in terms of their feudal origins; and clear nostalgia for the lost tradition. This kind of search for an ideal in a historical past is far from unique. Bringing up the idealised past to criticise the present is one of the most typical strategies intellectuals adopt when they face inevitable modernisation. We can call it Romantic, "modern traditionalist",[5] or just conservative. However, their discourse about *bushidō* was not solely framed by a Romantic traditionalist thinking that praises a purely endogenous tradition. What is not typical is that this idealised past was connected to the foreign. The endogenous tradition itself, even in the purified form, was not enough to legitimise their argument. This partly explains why they established the equivalence of *bushidō* with something in the Western orthodoxy.

But their aim seemed not to be legitimising *bushidō* itself. Their more apparent intention was to attack the moral degradation of a modernising society from both sides, from the idealised past extracted from the endogenous tradition on the one hand, and the idealised foreign that leads to civilisation and modernity on the other. In this attempt, *bushidō* was identified and amalgamated with the foreign. *Bushidō* was, in other words, constructed as a hybrid. It is at once

5 I use this oxymoronic term to point to the modern character of traditionalist thinking. We can simply call it "traditionalist" as Levenson (1958) does.

Japanese and European, endogenous and foreign, and traditional and modern. This hybridity is produced through blurring supposedly fixed boundaries at a highly abstract level. It is for this hybridity that *bushidō* appeared attractive to Uemura and Ozaki, and this also gave a critical edge and persuasive power to their argument, even if they were not conscious of this at all. If it were constructed as a purely endogenous tradition, *bushidō*'s power would be rather limited as the feudal tradition became more and more powerless in the context of civilization and enlitenment (*bunmei kaika*).

While *bushidō* plays the role of a powerful critical tool in their discourse, it also functions as a versatile mediator. In Uemura's discourse, *bushidō* mediates Japanese cultural tradition and chivalry which is deeply connected with Christianity ("holding a sword in the right hand and Bible in the left"). In Ozaki's argument, it mediates Japanese tradition and being a gentleman, which is considered as an honourable tradition of a renowned civilisation. *Bushidō* and chivalry, or gentlemanship, are mediated through universal principles at the abstract level. In this schema of mediation, Uemura's and Ozaki's arguments look almost identical. Through *bushidō*, the advanced modernity of the West and belated modernity of Japan are connected. Therefore, recovering the supposedly lost tradition paves the way for future modernisation. This transculturation of *bushidō* subsuming three moments constitutes an Ortisian conception. *Bushidō* was uprooted from the real lives of samurai through abstraction, acculturated into Euro-American cultural language by analogy, and neoculturated as a hybrid between Japan and the West. In all those moments, *bushidō* undergoes a change, and these changes are produced by the other mediators.

In sum, by the power of hybridisation and mediation, *bushidō* is transculturated and revived as a powerful cultural ideal that can serve as the basis for criticism about the moral degradation of Japanese society, and as a key to its future improvement. Through finding *bushidō*'s equivalent in Western cultures and recognising that they have simplified principles in common, not only is the civilisational status of Japan elevated to equal to that of the West, or rather, to a level of universality, but its uniqueness is also protected by being seen as valuable. Moreover, the continuance of an endogenous cultural tradition is legitimised and assured, and Japan's potential for future modernisation is apparently demonstrated.

Yet, to attain this acrobatic valorisation, it was necessary to assume *bushidō*'s general validity to the Japanese nation as a whole. Since *bushidō* was originally a class ethic only valid for a minority of the samurai class, some sort of rhetorical device was demanded to make this assumption plausible. In the fourth section, we will see an oblique solution to this problem in the *bushidō* discourse of Inoue.

Encounter between Japan and the West and Transculturation of *Bushidō*

The invocation of images from Western cultures is a widely used tactic in Nitobe's famous book *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*. Nitobe's work is outstanding in the *bushidō* discourse not only due to its long-standing popularity and international fame, but also due to its systematic composition and the experiential fertility generated by its numerous impressive tales and legends. The first edition of the book was published in English in 1900, reflecting the fact that it was written for Euro-American readers from English-speaking countries. This supposed addressee is a sign of the fundamentally transculturating character of Nitobe's book. In fact, references to Western cultures can be found all over his work. Analogies that liken Japanese culture to Western cultures are frequently utilised and established. By this, I do not just mean that he was using these references and analogies to translate and recount "the Soul of Japan" for those who were not familiar with it. But instead I contend that this process of translation involves transculturation and hybridisation of *bushidō.*

This is exemplified by Nitobe's treatment of the famous warlord Uesugi Kenshin's tale. Uesugi sent salt to his long-time rival, Takeda Shingen, and thus saved him from his plight, saying, "I do not fight with salt, but with the sword". This legend is likened to Marcus Furius Camillus' famous phrase "we Romans do not fight with gold, but with iron", and then to Nietzsche's words "You are to be proud of your enemy; then, the success of your enemy is your success also" (Nitobe 2008, 24). Especially in terms of honour, the correspondence between *bushidō* and the European knightly tradition was so obvious to Nitobe that he wrote:

> It is indeed striking how closely the code of knightly honour of one country coincides with that of others; in other words, how the much-abused oriental ideas of morals find their counterparts in the noblest maxims of European literature. If the well-known lines "Hae tibi erunt artes—pacisque imponere morem, Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos," were shown a Japanese gentleman, he might readily accuse the Mantuan bard of plagiarising from the literature of his own country. (Nitobe 2008, 27)

Clearly, the fact that Vergilius, the "Mantuan bard", had written this poem far before the time of samurai did not bother Nitobe, for his intention was not to point out plagiarism but to stress that such similarity existed between Japanese and Western cultural traditions, and that a famous phrase of the renowned Roman poet would have sounded very familiar to the Japanese.

A notable example in this respect is Nitobe's interpretation of the tale of Ōta Dōkan, a warlord in the Muromachi period, who, while mortally wounded, added his lines to the couplet cast by his enemy. "Ah! How in moments like these, Our heart doth grudge the light of life", asked his enemy. Dōkan replied, "Had not in hours of peace, it learned to lightly look on life". Nitobe interpreted this tale as showing "a sportive element in a courageous nature" for "[t]hings which are serious to ordinary people, may be but play to the valiant" (ibid., 23). Bloody life-and-death situations were thus reread as being merely "sportive". This interpretation is made plausible by finding commonality at the most abstract level: the playfulness and necessity of a capacious mind and courage. At the same time, the word "sportive" is vested with connotations that are in accord with this context. It is not only courage but also playfulness that is related to fearlessness in the face of a life-or-death fight. The capacious mind is coloured with its readiness for death. This sort of analogy with sport is in a certain sense fundamental to Nitobe's *bushidō* theory. In the last paragraph of the first chapter, titled "Bushido as an Ethical System", he takes up Tom Brown's words, seeing the spirit of fair play in them, and asks: "Is it not the root of all military and civic virtue?"

However, a closer look into *bushidō* eventually leads to the discovery of difference. Nitobe admits that there are some elements in *bushidō* and the Japanese cultural tradition which seem odd or grotesque to the eyes of Europeans and Americans. Especially important in this respect are *seppuku*, *kataki-uchi* (revenge), and the social position of women. He allots two chapters to account for these subjects and reconcile the differences. Reflecting the difficulty of such a reconciliation, these are the two longest chapters in *Bushido.*

Because of its barbarity in conduct and incompatibility with the Christian injunction against suicide, *seppuku* certainly appeared as a pressing issue for Nitobe. He made a two-step argument to overcome its uncivility. Firstly, he neutralizes the brutality and bloodiness of *seppuku*. He starts this by citing Brutus's words from Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*: "Thy (Caesar's) spirit walks abroad and turns our swords into our proper entrails" (ibid., 56). In this citation, Nitobe establishes equivalences between the samurai's conduct in reality and an epic act of Ancient Roman in the theatrical spectacle. Through this equivalence, the brutality of *seppuku* that constitutes and symbolizes *bushidō* is aesthetised. Nitobe then goes on to spiritualise *seppuku* by referring the traditional belief of seeing the human abdomen as "the seat of the soul and of the affections". The bloody image of stabbing and cutting through one's belly with a dagger is thus transformed into the symbolism of the following sentence: "I will open the seat of my soul and show you how it fares with it" (ibid., 57). The aesthetisation and spiritualisation introduced here cleanse the bloodiness of *seppuku* and *bushidō.* Secondly, Nitobe attempts to

justify the suicidal logic of *seppuku*. Given his strong faith in Christianity this is utterly surprising, and it seems that he made much effort to argue the point here. Here again, bringing up the cases of honourable suicide from Western history and culture works as an effective tactic. Nitobe thus refers to Cato the Younger, Petronius and Socrates, besides Brutus, all of who died in legendary tragedies and whose suicides have been repeatedly and vividly described in drama, paintings, literature, history books, and so on. Nitobe also compares Japanese suicides to Christian martyrs. However, it is only after *seppuku*'s bloodiness is cleansed that its oddness and incompatibility with Christian faith are mitigated through identifying commonalities like these.

Through these tactics, Nitobe reconciles differences and justifies the conduct of Japanese people that would have been despised by, or at least appeared odd to, the Europeans and Americans of the day. Although the difference between Japan and the West is manifestly stated, this is neutralised in the next instance. This is accomplished by several different tactics: aesthetisation, spiritualisation, identifying commonality and establishing equivalence at the abstract level. Through these approaches, the barbarousness of *bushidō* is neutralised and its access to the civilised world is secured. In other words, it is translated into Euro-American cultural language and becomes connected to the foreign.

Nitobe's entire book is engaged with the same task as the articles of Uemura and Ozaki—that is, the task of legitimising Japanese cultural tradition and accounting for it from two contradictory points of view: its particularity as well as excellence on the one hand, and on the other, its similarity to Western cultural tradition and, in cases where it seems plausible, its universality. What can be more clearly seen in Nitobe's discourse is that achieving this seemingly impossible goal involves not only accounting for Japanese cultural traditions according to Euro-American cultural language, but also in rereading the latter in relation to the former. In other words, the terms and concepts that are of Euro-American origin are reinterpreted in the light of Japanese narratives and cultural frameworks.

The analogies referred to above are just a small part of the whole. If we enlist the many figures and things from Western culture that Nitobe raises, the list could go on and on. In other words, Nitobe's argument is full of cultural mediators. These mediators are more varied and the mediation they perform is more complex than seen in Uemura's and Ozaki's arguments. The mediators here are not historical figures or notable intellectuals from Europe, like Nietzsche or Vergilius, but rather their words and anecdotes, since equivalences are established between the latter. The mediators sometimes take the form of concepts of Western origin, such as "sport" or "fair play". Either way, they function as mediators for *bushidō* and transculturate it in a way that

sounds familiar to a Euro-American public. Mediating between outright difference needs complicated processes. As shown in the case of *seppuku*, the reconciliation of difference involves a neutralising process like spiritualisation or aesthetisation. Only after being mediated through such a process is the bloodiness of *seppuku* cleansed. *Bushidō*, composed of brutal behaviour, is thus transculturated in a civilised fashion. Here again, we can identify three moments but in a rather different way than we have seen in Uemura and Ozaki. In the process of the aesthetisation of *seppuku*, these three moments appear simultaneously. *Bushidō* is deculturated by erasing its bloodiness and being disembodied,[6] acculturated to a Euro-American cultural context through being overlaid on the image of a Shakespearean drama, neoculturated as a hybrid that appears familiar and attractive to the foreign public. The hybridity of *bushidō* is useful to make it more persuasive to Western audience. In this respect, Nitobe was not only "a bridge across the Pacific", as he himself wished to be, but also a transculturator, as Pratt called Humboldt.

Purification by Separation and Selective Hybridisation

Nitobe recognised that *bushidō* was a product of "an organic growth of decades and centuries of military career", and admitted "its intricate nature" (Nitobe 2008, 26). This makes *bushidō* ambiguous, because being a product of something organic logically suggests its premodern character, while *bushidō* theorists demanded that it be a representational virtue of modern Japan. The ambiguity of *bushidō* was worsened by the permeation of Euro-American cultural elements, for which Nitobe himself was responsible by playing the role of cultural mediator. In this case, the purity of *bushidō* as a Japanese cultural tradition, not its capacity to be modern, was threatened. It is no wonder then that uncertainty and discontent about what the word *bushidō* signifies were still openly manifested in 1905. One of the elder statesmen of the Meiji Restoration, Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922), claimed: "the word *bushidō* is really queer" (Ōkuma 1905, 7). For him, *bushidō* was a term that was groundlessly coined by the scholars of Han learning, irredeemably Chinese in nature, and coming into vogue due to the military fervour of the Russo-Japanese war. To him, what everyone saw as the spirit of *bushidō,* valuing righteousness (*gi*) and courage (*yū*), was actually a common characteristic of all Japanese people, and not restricted to the minority warrior class (just four hundred thousand among forty million, by his estimate). Ōkuma claimed that popular samurai tales like *Chūshingura* (*The Treasury of Loyal Retainers*) had played the role

6 It is probably interesting to think of *bushidō* as "disemboweled" by aesthetisation and spiritualisation.

of national instruction for the Japanese people, implicitly teaching them the values of righteousness and courage. For him, the very popularity of these tales was evidence that the Japanese people had long respected these values.

Ōkuma's article shows the strong demand for a double separation: separation from the Chinese tradition on the one hand, and from the *ancien régime* tradition of Tokugawa Bakufu on the other. This double separation purifies *bushidō* by removing it from the alien others who, in reality, directly influenced it. Thus purified, *bushidō* supposedly becomes capable of representing the new nation of Meiji Japan.

Although Ōkuma himself is not regarded as an ultra-nationalist, the demand for separation and purification seen in his argument is one of the key drives behind the ultra-nationalistic discourse on *bushidō.* This drive can be regarded as a response to the uncertainty and ambiguity of *bushidō. Bushidō* could have been regarded as a legitimate manifestation of Japanese particularity only after the traces of foreign influence, which were contaminating its cultural purity, were wiped away. As shown in Ōkuma's article, contaminating remnants were regarded as having a two-fold origin: on the one hand, from the feudal past that binds it to the fallen class, and on the other, from the Chinese cultural tradition that had more or less dominated the intellectual field before the waves of Westernisation came to Japan. In both cases, *bushidō* is not only contaminated and thus somewhat unqualified, but is also related to the premodern past that would foreclose the modernisation of Japanese society. We can see the oblique resolution of this problem in the *bushidō* discourse of Inoue Tetsujirō (1856–1944), the first Japanese professor of philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University.

Given his position as a major exponent of ultra-nationalist *bushidō,* it is curious that Inoue showed recognition of its shortcomings in his 1901 article. These are said to be *kataki-uchi* and *seppuku*, upon which "all the civilised people frowned" (Inoue 1905a, 60). However, he immediately dismissed these practices as mere formal superficiality. To Inoue, these practices were just misdeeds despite the fact that they were historically held as essential values for the samurai class. According to Inoue, what was significant was not *bushidō*'s formality but its spirit, and its spirit lies in the disposition of the Japanese people, as recently proven by the military accomplishments of the Japanese army in the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Rebellion. This identification of *bushidō* with the entire nation of Japan was justified as follows: "*Bushidō* did not originate from an individual advocator, but is a product of the Japanese nation" (ibid., 60).

It is also curious that Inoue's discourse looks very similar to Nitobe's when we observe some uses of the cultural traditions of the West. *Bushidō* was likened to Stoic

philosophy and chivalry. However, Inoue differs from Nitobe in that he quickly noted *bushidō*'s distinctiveness from these traditions. *Bushidō* is different from Stoicism since it is "not theoretical, but decisive in execution", and from chivalry because it "does not worship women" (ibid., 59). It is clear from this statement that the Western cultural traditions were referred to not to identify *bushidō* with them, but to stress its uniqueness.

Both instances show a fast change in logic, which is a characteristic of Inoue's form of argument. The rather abrupt change suggests that *bushidō*'s shortcomings and its equivalents in Western culture are brought up as a rhetorical device to balance his argument and, more importantly, to clarify *bushidō*'s essence. This is one of the distinctive characteristics of Inoue's discourse that separates him from the other *bushidō* theorists discussed above, who sought similarities between *bushidō* and the orthodox traditions of Western culture. Negating certain actions that had been thought to be a part of *bushidō*'s distinguishing marks and differentiating it from similar cultural traditions are useful tools for extracting *bushidō* in its purest form. From this pure form, it is distinguished from equivalents in Western culture, and the deeds and thoughts of the samurai are also thus differentiated.

The double separation that Inoue made here is not the same as that demanded by Ōkuma, and the difference is not slight. Both made attempts to separate *bushidō* from its feudal past, and did so by identifying it with the spirit of the Japanese nation as a whole. Inoue's argument differs from Ōkuma's in that he did not resort to concrete evidence. Instead, he relied on the philosophical distinction between form and content, or the superficial and the essential. This categorical manoeuvre allowed Inoue to construct an idealized *bushidō* in which the deeds of the samurai are no longer relevant, since they are not essential. It gave him the absolute cognitive capacity to negate any of the deeds of the samurai.

Inoue's discourse is also different from Ōkuma's in that Chinese influences were almost completely disregarded, because the logic he deployed precludes the possibility that such influences contaminated *bushidō* 's essence. This is seen in perhaps the most remarkable part of his article. Here, Inoue insisted that Western moral theories like Kant or Hegel's philosophy should be "grafted" onto *bushidō.* To him, the Japanese spirit lies in "its power of assimilation which had always absorbed foreign thoughts" (ibid., 62). It was in this context that he claimed that the "future purpose of our nation should be a consequence of conjugation between Western and Eastern moralities like these" (ibid., 63). This sentence does not sound like that of a parochial ultra-nationalist, in that it highly regards foreign values. He was quick, however, to add that selecting the most valid among them is necessary to avoid contradiction with Japanese values.

Inoue did not present the Western values that he thought would be most valid nor did he propose selection criteria. Still, his intention behind the proposed selection is clear in the latter part of the article, which is devoted to criticism of "Yasegaman no setsu", an article written by the founder of Keio University and one of the most influential intellectuals of the era, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901). Inoue's criticism was not about the content of the article itself but about Fukuzawa's way of life in general. He accused Fukuzawa of too much Westernisation and the abandonment of his own traditions. Inoue poignantly remarked,

> once exposed to Western moralism, Fukuzawa renounced all traditional moralism and became a promoter of Western values [...] We cannot find any independence in his thought. If one valued *bushidō* highly, he would have known that the historically developed thought of the nation should never have been easily discarded. (ibid., 65)

The problem for Inoue was not Westernisation, but discarding one's own tradition all together. These two things were clearly differentiated in his mind. While the latter attitude eliminates the possibility of retaining one's national identity, the intention of adopting the former, if done carefully, would certainly maintain that possibility. Words like assimilation and graft are an effective rhetoric in this respect, since anything imported from outside can be regarded as "only branches, not the tree itself".

In this respect, the logical structure of Inoue's discourse closely resembles the national slogan of the time, *wakon yōsai* (Japanese soul with Western competence). The soul of the Japanese nation could have been kept intact even if it imported and grafted onto itself things and ideas of Western origin. For the soul was regarded to reside in an inner area which should be untouched by the outside influences of the technological change and institutional shifts brought about by Western modernisation. By the same token, *bushidō* was constructed in Inoue's discourse as essentially and unchangeably Japanese despite its absorption of outside influences. Even if *bushidō* became hybridised by grafting Western moral theories onto it, it still retains its purity since such foreign thoughts or values were "only branches, not the tree itself". Inoue clearly states in another article about *bushidō* (1905b, 135) that

> however much is learned from the (Western) theories of ethics, they are executed by the Japanese spirit. By the same token, the Japanese soldiers in the Russo-Japanese war won not only by using machines. If the machines alone had won, the achievements of victory belong to the machines, not to the soldiers. These machines are, however, operated by the spirit of the Japanese nation. Elaborated theories of ethics are the same

> as delicate machines. They are operated by the Japanese people. The spirit of their operation must rely on *bushidō.*

It is no wonder then that Inoue was ready to admit the influence of Confucianism on *bushidō.* It was regarded as a constitutive element of *bushidō* that was absorbed into the Japanese national consciousness, whose essence remains intact in the very act of absorption.

In Inoue's discourse, questions about the ambiguity of *bushidō* that had been manifested in Ōkuma's work were settled, or rather, made meaningless, through its purification and by establishing the Japanese national spirit as the subject of hybridisation. By the same token, the double separation that Ōkuma considered necessary was made irrelevant. On the one hand, *bushidō*'s continuity with the feudal tradition of the Tokugawa Bakufu was unproblematised through Inoue's distinction between superficial formality and essential spirit. On the other hand, foreign influences from China were incapacitated by the power of assimilation. They were regarded as absorbed into the Japanese spirit. The uncertainty of *bushidō* was fixed, and the ambiguity clarified. Conceptual operations like these essentialise *bushidō* and thus confer onto it the potential for becoming a national ideology. We shall not forget, however, that this was all done by admitting the hybridity of *bushidō* and the national spirit.

In a certain sense, Inoue's theory of *bushidō* makes a sharp contrast with Uemura's and Ozaki's arguments. Their logic goes inversely. While Inoue consciously hybridises *bushidō* and then renders its hybridity meaningless through the power of assimilation, the other two theorists purify *bushidō* and then hybridise it by identification with the foreign. Conversely, their conceptual manipulations are quite similar, and the only difference is their sequence. Inoue's argument also seems to be contrasting with Nitobe's discourse. While Inoue argues nationalistically for pure tradition and tries to make *bushidō* as nationalistic as possible, Nitobe presents *bushidō* for an international public and translates it into Euro-American cultural language. If we pay closer attention to the legitimatisation process, however, their arguments are not so dissimilar either. Inoue explicitly hybridises *bushidō* to legitimatise it as a purely Japanese tradition. Nitobe hybridises *bushidō* to make it valid and acceptable to the Western cultural context. Consciously or unconsciously, they thus both legitimatise *bushidō* through hybridisation.

Ideological Function and the Hybridity of *Bushidō*

Bruno Latour (1993) revealed a profound paradox that the "modern constitution" has long had. According to him, the modern constitution rests on two

types of completely different practices: purification and translation. The first "creates two entirely distinct ontological zones" (Latour 1993, 10). The second, which can also be called hybridisation, mixes these supposedly distinct zones and creates hybrids. Purification has been openly manifested while hybridisation has been hidden, since modernist thinking does not tolerate such chaos of classification. The paradox between these practices is that "the more we forbid ourselves to conceive of hybrids, the more possible their interbreeding becomes" (ibid., 12). Therefore, purification and hybridisation are two sides of the same coin, and in modern history have developed hand in hand. It is in this sense that "we have never been modern".

Even though Latour's main aim is to problematize the nature-society divide and the corresponding nonhuman-human divide, and to show that such divides are and have always been a deceit, the core insight of the quotation above is applicable to our discussion here. The same rule can be applied to the tradition-modernity divide. The more we try to provide it with an outlook of pure tradition, the more modern it becomes. The *bushidō* discourse is a remarkable example of this. To make *bushidō* look like a pure tradition, some theorists have used the strategy of separation, and many have resorted to abstract simplification. One even openly attempted to purify *bushidō* by hybridising it. Their very act of purification approximates *bushidō* to a constructed modern tradition. The more they idealise *bushidō* by simplification, the more it becomes distant from the samurai way of life. The more they try to make *bushidō* suitable for contemporary Japanese society, the more it loses its traditional roots in the real lives of samurai. The more they try to purify *bushidō,* the more its hybridity becomes undeniable.

This obliqueness of *bushidō* discourse reflects the contradictory situation that Japanese society of the Meiji era found itself in. In the mid-Meiji period, the rapid pace of modernisation and Westernisation had already deeply changed Japanese society, creating a Romantic nostalgia for the time before the great transformations. This situation would easily arouse moral resentment against contemporary society, as most of the texts on *bushidō* are decorated with images of grief over materialism and moral degradation. In this situation, what was called upon was a cultural discourse capable of at once sustaining its own culture and universalising it, simultaneously protecting tradition and making it adaptable to modernisation. Japanese society had to modernise itself while maintaining its traditions. In order to modernise, it had to accept foreign influences against which moral resentment was aroused while constructing a national identity based on its own uniqueness. The intellectuals of the time would have faced inescapably paradoxical ideological needs. Driven by these, the *bushidō* theorists made an attempt to modernise *bushidō* while simultaneously attempting to turn it into a pure tradition.

This ideological necessity is acutely manifested in the discourse on *bushidō*. All the *bushidō* theorists discussed here would have fulfilled this ideological function, but their logic and rhetoric differed. In Uemura, Ozaki, and Nitobe's discourses, *bushidō* was universalised by demonstrating *bushidō*'s similarity to its Western counterparts. Due to this type of universalisation, the traditional outlook of Japanese society was sustained while also showing its potential for future modernisation. However, in this mostly unconscious act of translation and transculturation, two changes were made to *bushidō*: it was disconnected from the complex whole of the lived experiences of the samurai and simplified and reduced to its principles, and it was reinterpreted according to Western cultural language.

While valorising *bushidō,* the question of the uniqueness of the Japanese nation was overlooked. Separated from the ways of the samurai that certainly included rules of conduct incomparable with the modern principles, it was made comparable to other cultural traditions in the West. *Bushidō*'s ideological status in the civilised world was clearly elevated. In turn, however, *bushidō* became something indistinguishable from certain Western cultural traditions. *Bushidō*'s capacity to represent the particularity of Japanese culture was thus ruined. In Inoue's discourse, *bushidō* fulfilled its role as a truly national ideology. Inoue purified *bushidō* through the distinction between superficial formality and the essential spirit. This distinction made the deeds of the samurai irrelevant. The use of vocabulary such as "assimilation", "absorption", or "graft", on the other hand, made foreign influences meaningless. This was much more of a complete separation than Ōkuma had wanted. This purified cultural tradition was, however, in an essential sense a hybrid since it "grafted" foreign cultures onto it, and integrated them as its own constitutive elements. By this logic, *bushidō* attained its legitimate position as a tradition capable of "absorbing" modern advanced thoughts and technologies from the West.

How shall we understand this oblique hybridity of *bushidō*? A conventional account would posit that the *bushidō* theorists represented the real way of the samurai on the assumption that *bushidō* is a historical substance. A critical analysis would disclose that *bushidō* was made up from nowhere, merely reflecting Western influences and driven by the fervour of military nationalism. Although both accounts are somewhat true, and the first account is much more naïve and the second much more sophisticated, both overlook something important. For in both cases *bushidō* is postulated as a transparent intermediary. Our analysis so far has clearly shown that the *bushidō* theories taken up here are neither puppets nor transparent intermediaries. They are the meeting points where different agencies encounter each other and mediators in which hybrids interbreed.

As I have shown above, the hybridity of *bushidō* is what makes it persuasive, acceptable, and attractive. As such, hybridity would presumably be a key to its survival in modern Japan, where its original bearers have long vanished. If *bushidō* had continued as a pure ethic of the traditional samurai class it could not have lasted in modern society. In this respect, *bushidō*'s resilience, which Benesch (2014) points out as one of its key characteristics, comes from its hybridity. Implicitly or explicitly, *bushidō* has been a useful vessel capable of containing under the same banner different and often contradictory moments: martial values and literacy (文武両道), universality and particularity, nationalism and internationalism, the West and Japan, and modernity and tradition.

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Historical Backgrounds

Proto-historic Background of Martial Arts Schools in Eastern Japan

*Takamune KAWASHIMA**

Abstract

Kashima city is best known for having the oldest martial arts schools in Japan. While some of its martial arts schools, such as the Kashima Shinryū, were officially established in the latter half of the medieval period, there was already a long tradition of martial arts in Kashima region since the Kofun period (the fourth to the seventh centuries AD). This paper focuses on archaeological remains and the landscape around the Kashima Grand Shrine, to clarify the significance and influence of the Kashima Grand Shrine in managing the eastern part of the territory of ancient Japan. This paper examines some characteristics of the region, such as its coastal location that enabled the transportation of materials and soldiers. Another specific aspect of the place could be the advanced metal production evident in the giant sword of the Kashima Grand Shrine made in the early ancient period. Ancient workshops for metallurgy were found at the former local government office in Hitachi-no-kuni, the area of today's Ibaraki Prefecture. It thus seems no coincidence that Kashima was chosen as a kind of military base. The archaeological findings that have been made in this location provide many reasons why the lineages of various martial arts schools, including the Kashima Shinryū, derived from this city, which led to the formation of later *bushi* groups in the medieval period of eastern Japan.

Keywords: ancient history, Kashima, archaeology, martial arts, logistics

Proto-zgodovinsko ozadje šol borilnih veščin na vzhodu Japonske

Izvleček

Mesto Kashima je znano po najstarejših šolah borilnih veščin na Japonskem. Nekatere šole borilnih veščin, kot je Kashima Shinryū, so ustanovili šele proti koncu srednjeveškega obdobja, vendar v kašimski regiji tradicija borilnih veščin sega vse do obdobja Kofun (od četrtega do sedmega stoletja našega štetja). Prispevek obravnava arheološke ostanke in pokrajino z glavnim svetiščem Kashima v središču in pojasnjuje vpliv tega svetišča na upravljanje vzhodnega ozemlja antične Japonske. Opozori tudi na nekatere značilnosti regije, na primer na bližino obale, kar je omogočalo prevoz materiala in vojakov.

Še ena pomembna značilnost tega prostora je napredna kovinarska proizvodnja, ki se med drugim kaže v velikanskem meču velikega svetišča Kashima iz zgodnjega antičnega

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obdobja. Starodavne delavnice za metalurgijo so našli v nekdanjih uradih lokalnih vlad v Hitachi-no-kuni na območju današnje prefekture Ibaraki – zato verjetno ni naključje, da je bila Kashima izbrana za vojaško bazo. Arheološke najdbe s tega območja ponujajo odgovore na številna vprašanja, na primer zakaj so prav v tem mestu nastale različne šole borilnih veščin, vključno s Kashima Shinryū, kar je pripeljalo do nastanka poznejših skupin *bushijev* v srednjeveškem obdobju na vzhodu Japonske.

Ključne besede: antična zgodovina, Kashima, arheologija, borilne veščine, logistika

Introduction

Kashima is best known as the birthplace of martial arts in Japan. While martial arts schools such as Kashima Shinryū were officially established in the latter half of the medieval period, there was already a long tradition of such schools in the Kashima region, starting in the Kofun period (Table 1). This paper focuses on archaeological remains and the landscape around the Kashima Grand Shrine, to clarify its significance and influence in managing the eastern part of the territory of ancient Japan. I will examine some characteristics of the region, such as its coastal location that enabled the transportation of materials and soldiers. Another specific aspect of the place could be the production and working of metal, as represented by the legendary giant sword associated with this location. Ancient workshops for metallurgy have been found near the former local government office in Hitachi-no-kuni, the area of today's Kashima. Such archaeological findings indicate the possible reasons why the lineages of various martial arts schools, including Kashima Shinryū, originated from Kashima, which might have led to the formation of *bushi* of the eastern Japan, i.e. *tōgoku bushidan* in the medieval period.

Table 1 Brief chronology in eastern Japan mentioned in the text

Period	Date
Kofun	ca. AD 300–600/700
Nara	710–794
Heian	794–1,185

While the accounts on the origin of martial arts schools in Japan appear in historical texts, the description of Kashima as the "birth place of martial arts in Japan" was mostly based on legendary records. To clarify the Kashima's connection to martial arts, I examine its geographical position and distribution of archaeological sites, which were involved in military action in the pre- and proto-historic periods (the fifth to the ninth centuries AD), and then reflect on the existing regional historical records.

Eastern Japan in the Ancient Period

Geographically, Kashima is located by the Kasumigaura Lake, which enabled transport to inland areas such as the governmental office of Hitachi-no-kuni in the city of Ishioka (Figure 1). In the ancient period, Kasumigaura Lake was an inner bay, which was connected to important rivers such as the Kinu which runs through the northern Kantō Plain. This inner bay and rivers functioned as routes for the transportation of goods between inland and coastal areas.

The political centre during the Kofun and Heian periods (the third to the twelfth centuries) was in the Kinki area around Nara and Kyōto. In the seventh century, because of the newly centralised political system influenced by Chinese laws, there were only a few mounded tombs constructed in the Kinki area. On the other hand, in the northern part of the Kantō Plain, which was under the control of the central government in Kinki, the construction of large-scale mounded tombs was at its highest. In such tombs many grave goods relating to military power, such as long swords, have often been found.



Figure 1: Shrines and archaeological sites mentioned in this article (modified from GSI Tiles; bathymetric contours are derived from data produced by JHOD)

Two large-scale mounded tomb clusters are known around the Kashima Grand Shrine: Kyūchūno (Ishibashi et al. 2006) and Oou (Itakochōshi hensaniinkai

1996). The Kyūchūno mounded tomb cluster is two kilometres north from the Kashima Grand Shrine, consisting of 127 mounded tombs, which were constructed from the end of the fourth to the middle of the seventh centuries (Itokawa 2017) (Figure 1). A typical keyhole-shaped mounded tomb, a symbol of a powerful chief, was also included in this cluster. Meotozuka Kofun, constructed in the latter half of the sixth century, is 107.5 m long and 34 m wide, with a circumferential ditch, which was one of the largest mounded tombs in the Late Kofun period. In the first half of the seventh century, a 97 m long scallop-shaped Ōtsuka mounded tomb was constructed.

The mounded tombs of the eastern area were rich in weapons and horse harnesses as burial goods, which suggests that powerful local families were engaged in conflicts, especially with the tribal groups from northern Tōhoku, called Emishi (Figure 2). One such family was the Nakatomi clan, which is considered the founder of the Kashima Grand Shrine. According to historical texts, such as *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki* from AD 721, (Akimoto 2001; Aoki 1997), the Nakatomi clan had extended their political power to the area of Kashima. The famous founder of Japanese martial arts, Kuninazu no Mahito (Seki 2015, 2), is thought to have belonged to the fourth generation of the Nakatomi family after their occupation of Kashima. According to the Nakatomi family tree, Kuninazu no Mahito could have lived around 500 AD, from the end of the Middle to the beginning of the Late Kofun period, which means that he might have been buried in a mounded tomb of the Kofun period. While there are no Middle Kofun mounded tombs in the Kyūchūno mounded tomb cluster, and it is not clear if the Kyūchūno mounded tomb cluster was constructed by the Nakatomi family, archaeologists assume that the family or others in their lineage made them. Although the descriptions in the historical texts such as *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki* need to be critically assessed, the general trends mentioned above, such as establishment of shrines and development of metallurgy, are supported by the archaeological evidence. Overall, the method used in this research mainly relies on considering the archaeological remains.

The Establishment of the Kashima Grand Shrine

As mentioned above, in contrast to Kinai region, where large mounded tomb construction faded, in the Kantō region such tombs were still built in the seventh century. However, the use of mounded tombs as a symbol of a particular lineage were soon replaced by temples, which became new symbols of political power. Temples were built in local capitals in each area and became symbols of state formation, i.e., the *ritsuryō* system. As no remains or workshops related to military equipment



Figure 2: Major ancient castles in eastern Japan (modified from GSI Tiles; bathymetric contours are derived from data produced by JHOD)

have been found at these ancient temples, it is assumed that they were established for the purpose of spiritual protection of the nation. In contrast to Buddhist temples, Shintō shrines associated with various myths seem to have been connected to the military, especially during their foundation.

In the seventh century, the central government in Kinai was established and could control most areas in the Japanese archipelago, except Hokkaidō, Tōhoku and the Ryūkyū islands. In spite of the distribution of the mounded tombs in the Tōhoku region, most of the area was not under control of the central government. The government expanded its territory northwards, which led to conflict with the northern groups (Friday 1997). In fact, several important fortresses were constructed in the eighth century on both the Pacific and the Japan Sea sides of the nation (Figure 2).

The border of the central government's territory was the southern edge of the present Tōhoku district, so the Hitachi-no-kuni, including Kashima, was located on the front line. Although Hitachi-no-kuni accepted the new political system with Buddhist temples, there were some regional differences in the locations used for building temples in Hitachi-no-kuni (Inada and Sasaki 2013). The distance between temples and mounded tombs could represent local powerful families' attitudes towards building temples. While some district offices were located apart from the mounded tombs of former powerful families in the sixth century, the Kashima and Daiwatari temples and district offices were built relatively nearby mounded tombs. Both areas are facing the Pacific Ocean and located at the mouths of large rivers, which implies that such geopolitically important locations were controlled by political powers connected with the central government. As noted above, while temples were usually built in each district, in Kashima, on the other hand, the Kashima Grand Shrine was constructed as one of the important shrines.



Figure 3: Pottery with ink writing at Kanomukai (modified from Honda 1994, Figure 6)

The Nakatomi family initiated the central government's decision in 649 AD to dedicate a wide area surrounding the present Kashima Grand Shrine and the Kyūchūno mounded tomb cluster as the *kamigoori*, special land for a shrine. Although it is not clear if the clan who made the mounded tombs was also directly involved in the establishment of the Kashima Grand Shrine, we may assume that they played an important role as they were governing the *kamigoori* area. According to *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki,* the *kamigoori* in the Kashima area was

established at almost the same time as in the Katori Shrine area. This means that the tax from Kashima area was dedicated to the shrine, which led to the official establishment of the Kashima Grand Shrine. These dates are supported by the archaeological remains from the latter half of the seventh century found at the Kashima Grand Shrine (Itokawa 2017). According to descriptions about the *kamigoori* in *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki*, we know that at least one shrine building existed in this area, and thus the origin of the Kashima Grand Shrine was established already in the first half of the seventh century. After the eight century, the shrine developed into its present appearance. In Kashima, the Kanomukai site was regarded as Kashima district office (*gūke*), 1.5 km south from the Kashima Grand Shine, which was relatively large, compared with other district offices (Kashima City Board of Education and Culture and Sports Kashima City Promotion Foundation 2016). Excavations have found pottery with ink writing, which suggests the presence of a shrine (*jingū*), priest (*hafuriya/hafurike*) and kitchen (*kuriya*) (Figure 3).

Distribution of Military Workshops

Iron Workshops

Governmental iron workshops were established near Hitachi-no-kuni provincial office, the Kanoko C site in Ishioka, Ibaraki. The size of the site is assumed to be 240 m by 240 m, containing regularly arranged postholes for buildings, pit buildings as various workshops for making weapons, and lines of fences (Kawai 1985; Kawai and Satō 1983). Most features were made around 900 AD. The site had one of the largest iron workshop complexes at that time. According to the size and the location, Kanoko C seems to have functioned as a governmental iron smelting workshop (Kawai 1985).

On the other hand, perhaps because there have been fewer excavations, only a few iron workshops from the eighth century have been found in Kashima (Akutsu 1985), although it is possible to find some from this time (Figure 4).

Based on the description of iron smelting in *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki*, there were more than 20 iron workshops around Kashima. At the construction of the office building of the Kashima Grand Shrine, iron workshops which operated in the latter half of the eighth century were found (Itokawa 2017). In spite of plentiful, iron sand and forests for fuel that were in the area, according to *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki*, it was prohibited to collect iron sand and pine trees around the Kashima Grand Shrine.



Figure 4: Distribution of ancient iron workshops around Kashima (blue circles) (modified from GSI Tiles; bathymetric contours are derived from data by JHOD)

Salt Production

Another important military supply was salt, which was derived from seawater in Japan. Until the 11th century, salt pottery was mainly used for boiling down brine to obtain crystalized edible salt. In the *Manyōshū* a number of areas are mentioned for salt-making, such as Ukishima, also known as the place where salt was first produced in the Jōmon period (Kawashima 2015; in press). However, the Final Jōmon salt pottery has not been found around Kasumigaura Lake or Ukishima, which contradicts the description in *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki*. This can probably be explained by the introduction of the iron pan (Tao 2009, 314). Iron salt making pans appeared in texts written in the early eighth century, such as *Suō-no-kuni Shōzeichō* and *Nagato-no-kuni Shōzeichō*. Although there is no mention of iron pans in *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki*, the use of such pans should be considered as explaining why no such pottery has been found here.



Figure 5: Major areas for ancient salt making in eastern Japan (modified from Kawashima (in press) and Tao 2009, Figure 11)

On the other hand, in the northern part of Ibaraki Prefecture, salt pottery could have been used for salt-making in the eighth to ninth centuries, while most pottery shards were found in houses and thus such objects were probably related to the culinary uses (Kawamata 2014). This pottery has similarities in its shape to that used around the Tagajō fortress in Miyagi prefecture (Figure 5), which implies a continuous relationship between the Miyagi and Ibaraki coastal areas. However, in spite of the local salt production in both Ibaraki and Miyagi prefectures, the amount of salt produced seems insufficient to fully supply the Tagajō fortress (Tao 2009, 314). As the salt made in Miyagi prefecture was almost entirely consumed by the local people, salt as military supply had to be transported from western and central Japan.

Considering the amount of salt produced and the similarity in salt pottery between Miyagi and Ibaraki prefectures, the demand for salt in the northern frontier, Kashima, could have been connected to the supply in northern Japan.

Location of Ancient Kashima

These military supplies were especially needed in the period from the end of the eighth to the beginning of ninth centuries (780–811). Kashima was connected by the Kinugawa River to Hitachi provincial office and Kanoko C, a large workshop site by Kasumigaura Lake and to other major places in Hitachi, such as Shimōsa and Shimotsuke. The former path of the Tone River, which ran near the Kinu River, could be used for the transport of supplies and soldiers. Thus Kashima's location was favourable for transport and production. The biography of the Shiogama Shrine, which is close to the Tagajō fortress, describes the relationship between Kashima and Shiogama. Shiogama Shrine worships a deity Shiotsuchi-no-oji, who according to the *Nihon shoki* and *Kojiki* was believed to have given important advice to other deities and early emperors. Shiotsuchi-no-oji was said to have guided Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto and Futsunushi-no-mikoto from the Kashima and Katori areas to northern Japan. As Shiotsuchi-no-oji is regarded not only as a deity for salt-making, but also as a maritime one, transportation by ship could have played a strategic role in controlling northern Japan. As Yamaji (2017) asserted, in the latter half of eighth century the central government could have recognised the importance of maritime transportation and the logistical advantages of the area of Kashima and Katori.

Conclusion

Most ancient provinces were organised based on the land ruling system from the end of the Kofun period. However, Kashima *kamigoori* established in the seventh century was strongly connected with the central government and the Nakatomi family. As seen in the abundant military grave goods buried in mounded tombs constructed in the seventh century, Hitachi-no-kuni was an important area from the viewpoint of military operations. This was because military supplies such as iron and salt were needed in battles against northern tribal groups.

Kashima has long been famous for the abundance of iron sand and pine trees that were used for fuel, as written in *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki*. However, while some traces of iron smelting from the eighth century were found in the Kashima Grand Shrine, large-scale iron workshops were found at Kanoko C around the Hitachi district office in Ishioka. Kanoko C provided weapons for combat

against the northern tribal groups, especially from the end of eighth century to the early ninth century.

The archaeological evidence and historical records, such as *Hitachi-no-kuni Fudoki*, suggest that Kashima was not a place for weapons production. Instead, Kashima has long been seen as the birthplace of martial arts of Japan. Considering the function of early Buddhist temples in Japan and the character of the worshipped deity Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto at the Kashima Grand Shrine, the shrine took the initiative with regard to warfare in both ideological and spiritual ways.

The location of shrines was very important for logistics. Therefore, the Kashima Grand Shrine was built at the river mouth of Kasumigaura Lake. Besides the Kashima Grand Shrine, the *kamigoori* for the Katori Shrine was established on the southern side of the Kasumigaura Lake. The deity worshipped at the Katori Shrine was also related to martiality, and was described in the *Nihon shoki* and *Kojiki* as having a strong connection to Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto. The two shrines established by the central governmental power could control the entrance of the bay, which enabled the central government to transport military supplies from the Kantō to the Tōhoku region by ship.

As the Shintō shrines played an important role in providing the religious and philosophical base for establishing the system of martial arts in proto-history, it might be possible to say that some of the earliest formations concerning the values and the right conduct of *bushi* were originally invented in the Kanto region, especially in the area around Kashima.

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The Evolution of the Ancient Way of the Warrior: From the Ancient Chronicles to the Tokugawa Period

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Abstract

The term *bushidō* is widespread today and involves history, philosophy, literature, sociology and religion. It is commonly believed to be rooted in the ancient "way" of the *bushi* or samurai, the Japanese warriors who led the country until modern times. However, even in the past the *bushi* were seldom represented accurately. Mostly, they were depicted as the authors thought they should be, to fulfil a certain role in society and on the political scene. By taking into account some ancient and pre-modern writings, from the 8th to the 19th centuries, from the ancient chronicles of Japan, war tales, official laws, letters, to martial arts manuals and philosophical essays, and by highlighting some of the *bushidō* values, this article attempts to answer the questions how and why the representation of the *bushi* changed from the rise of the warrior class to the end of the military government in the 19th century.

Keywords: *bushidō*, samurai, shogunate, Japanese literature, history of Japan, *gunki monogatari*, legal codes, transformation.

Razvoj starodavne poti bojevnika: od antičnih kronik do tokugavskega obdobja

Izvleček

Izraz bushidō je danes zelo razširjen in ga najdemo v zgodovini, filozofiji, literaturi, sociologiji in religiji. Navadno velja, da izhaja iz starodavne »poti« *bushijev* oz. samurajev, japonskih bojevnikov, ki so državo vodili vse do modernega časa. A tudi v preteklosti so bili *bushiji* le redko predstavljeni realistično. Najpogosteje so jih avtorji prikazovali take, kakršne so si jih zamišljali v njihovi vlogi v družbi in politiki. Ta prispevek bo poskušal s pomočjo nekaterih antičnih in predmodernih spisov iz obdobja od 8. do 19. stoletja, od antičnih japonskih kronik, vojnih zgodb, zakonov, pisem, priročnikov za borilne veščine do filozofskih esejev, in s poudarkom na nekaterih vrednotah *bushidōja* odgovoriti na vprašanji, kako in zakaj je od vzpona vojaškega razreda do njegovega zatona v 19. stoletju prihajalo do sprememb pri predstavah o *bushijih*.

Ključne besede: *bushidō*, samuraji, šogunat, japonska literatura, zgodovina Japonske, *gunki monogatari*, pravni kodeksi, preobrazba

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I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Editorial Board of *Asian Studies* for giving me the opportunity to publish this paper, to Prof. Valdo Ferretti, Gen. Giovanni Culeddu and the peer readers for their valuable suggestions, and to Kerry and Julian Flewitt for their diligent proofreading of this article.

Introduction

In writing about *bushidō* 武士道, one should first define the word itself. However, this is a difficult task, as the term is widespread today and is not univocal. It actually includes a long series of meanings and aspects. The term can refer to the conduct code of the samurai 侍 or *bushi* 武士,[1] or to a specific mentality held by the Japanese people from the Meiji period on to the post-war Japanese business system, or to martial and some visual arts. Therefore, it involves not only history, but also philosophy, literature, sociology and religion.

Literally, *bushidō* is a conceptualisation of the lifestyle and mind-set of the earlier warrior class in Japan. However, in today's collective imagination we are offered a simplistic, stereotyped, romanticised and folkloristic view of the Japanese samurai, who is seen as "frozen" and unchanged through time and history. What we are actually given is an image of a warrior who faces battle and death without hesitation, who wears fearsome masks and combat helmets and instills fear in his enemies, in peasants and city dwellers, who never shows his feelings and hides his pain, who longs to die in battle or for his Lord, who trains every day in martial arts and Zen meditation. His thought is always translated into action, and he follows a code of conduct resting on the principles of honour, loyalty to the Lord, and filial piety.

In recent years many authors have shown that *bushidō,* as represented today—and consequently the modern depiction of the ancient samurai, is an "artificial" tradition, "entirely invented in the 19th century" (Saeki 2008, 894), and "dependent on political and cultural currents relating to Japan's modernization and the nation's attempts to redefine itself in the face of foreign 'others'." (Benesch 2011, ii). From the last decades of the 19th century, the authors of modern *bushidō* constructed a "new" martial ethic, which was ideally rooted in the ancient customs and mind-set of the samurai, and which later became the pillar of the creation of the modern Japanese identity, nationalism, modern business system and society.[2]

As a historian, I will treat *bushidō* precisely in its literal meaning of the "Way of the *Bushi*", the lifestyle, mind-set and conduct code of the earlier warrior class in Japan, or rather, the *representation* of the lifestyle, mind-set and conduct code of this class.

1 The word samurai originally referred to armed servants at the Imperial Palace or of a court noble in the Heian period, but in later and modern times it indicates Japanese warriors. In this essay, it is used in an interchangeable way with the term *bushi*.

2 Benedict Anderson defines a nation as "an imagined political community", and explains: "It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion". He also points out the objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists. (Anderson 1991, 5–6)

Actually, the word *bushidō* only appeared in the Tokugawa period (1600–1868).[3] But what it originally indicated originated much earlier. For example, in the ancient past of Japan, various expressions were used; "the way of the warrior" (*tsuwamono no michi* 兵の道 and *mononofu no michi* 武士の道), "the warrior's practice" (*musha no narai* 武者の習い), "the practice of those who hold the bow and arrow" (*yumiyatoru mi no narai* 弓矢とる身の習い), "the way of the bow and horse" (*kyūba no michi* 弓馬の道), "the way of loyalty" (*chūgi no michi* 忠義之道), "the spirit of the warrior" (*bushi no kokorogiwa* 武士之心際), and so on.

The aim of this paper is an attempt to answer three questions: How was the "Way of the Warrior" recorded trough time? How did it change in connection with historical events, from the period before the establishment of the military government to the modern era? And why did it change?

After a brief historical introductory note, centred on the rise and power of the warrior class, I will show a selection of the main features of *bushidō* as were expressed in writings from ancient literary works by courtiers and nobles, to some works issued in the pre-modern era.

I will then try to clarify how the original "Way of the Warrior" was "adjusted" and how the selection of values occurred during this transformation.

A Brief Historical Outline

The social stratification within the local structures and among the various clans (*uji* 氏) in pre-historic and proto-historic periods, and the struggles among various families, led to the rise of the Yamato court and the founding of an Imperial State around the figure of an Emperor of divine origins. Following Prince Shōtoku Taishi's "Constitution" (604), the first extant document in Japan relating to the sovereignty of a unique Emperor,[4] the Taika Reform (646–) was based on the political and administrative structure of Tang China (618–907). It founded the Japanese government system under an Emperor and increased the Imperial Court's power at the expenses of the clans' (*uji*):

> In Heaven there are not two suns: in a country there are not two rulers.
> It is therefore the Emperor alone who is supreme over all the Empire,

3 The most ancient written record where the word *bushidō* is found is *Kōyō gunkan* 甲陽軍鑑 (1616), a chronicle of the military deeds of the Takeda family (Kasaya 2014, 5).

4 Shōtoku Taishi's (574–622) "Constitution" dates back to 604 and is composed of 17 articles. Of Confucian and Buddhist influence, it sanctions the authority of the Emperor and encourages government functionaries and imperial subjects to follow moral virtues and carry out their specific duties.

> and who has a right to the services of the myriad people (*Nihongi*, transl. Aston 1896, 217).

However, during the Nara (710–784) and Heian (794–1185) periods, particularly the latter, the Emperor was "supreme over all the Empire" in name only. Power was actually held by some court families, monastic institutions or retired Emperors.

Between 690 and 702, a national military service, the Regiment system (*gundansei* 軍団制), was established within the centralisation policy. The Regiments were progressively reduced or eliminated in all the provinces except at the frontiers in 792, and substituted by an elitist chivalry corps (*kondei* 健児, "Stalwart Youth") subject to the provincial governors. The process of military decentralisation continued in the Heian period (794–1185), with the *shōen* 荘園 properties being developed into private lands, and exempted from central control or taxation (from the 10th century). Provincial officials and rich residents provided themselves with armed followers and acquired military skills themselves. The privatisation of the use of military skills, and the connections among different segments of the Court aristocracy and the local nobility in the provinces, led to the rise of military alliances, guided by the Warrior chiefs (*bushi no tōryō* 武士の統領). The process leading to the rise of the *bushi* class on the Japanese political scene[5] and to the wars of the 12th century resulted in a final struggle (*Genpei kassen* 源平合戦, 1180–1185) between the military alliances, led by the Taira and Minamoto clans, and in the creation of the *bakufu* 幕府—the military government based in Kamakura (1192–1336)—led by the *shōgun* 将軍 Minamoto Yoritomo. The warriors were placed under a unique military authority and officially became the rulers of the country.

The Kenmu Restoration by Emperor Go-Daigo (r. 1318–1339) put an end to the first military government, which was followed by the Ashikaga *bakufu* (1338–1568) based in Kyōto. However, the Ashikaga *shōgun* could not stop the process of regionalisation caused by the provincial Governors (*shugo* 守護) and their retainers' ambition for autonomy. Their disinterest in and inability with regard to state administration, the weakening of the *shōen* system and the inheritance disputes that arose over land and property contributed to this process, and the Ashikaga thus progressively lost control of the provinces. In the 15th century, a hundred-year civil war (the Sengoku period, from 1467) saw the appearance of new figures on the political scene—the *daimyō* 大名, who mainly came from various parts of the warrior class, and soon became the highest and only recognised authorities in their dominions (*han* 藩).

5 On the rise of the *bushi* class in detail, see Friday 1992 and Duus 1969.

In the middle of the 16th century, after the Portuguese brought firearms into Japan, the use of arquebuses (the so-called *tanegashima* 種子島) and cannons accelerated the process of stratification of the various *daimyō* in terms of strength and power, and the fighting strategies changed accordingly. Armies of foot soldiers (*ashigaru* 足軽) composed of peasants and guided by *bushi* were employed, and elaborate fortifications and stone castles were built in the place of simple wood fortifications and clan residences. The *bushi* were separated from the populace and bound to live in castle-towns with the clan head and his family.

By virtue of his military and diplomatic ability, the *daimyō* Oda Nobunaga was able to conquer half of the country and, after his death, the unification was completed by his General Toyotomi Hideyoshi (Momoyama period, 1568–1598). This paved the way for a new, highly centralised *bakufu* established in Edo (1603–1868) by Tokugawa Ieyasu. The process of separating the warriors from the populace started with Oda and Toyotomi, who enacted the "Sword Hunts",[6] and was achieved during the Edo period with the establishment of a rigid caste system (*mibunsei* 身分制), which divided the population into four classes, with the samurai as the unquestioned rulers. They were a minority within the population (from 5 to 8%), and the only group allowed to carry swords. They received an annual salary from the *shōgun* or their *daimyō* for their service, and in the Edo period became bureaucrats within a structured political organisation.

After two and a half centuries of peace, Commodore Perry reached the Japanese coast in 1853, with the intention of opening its ports to trade with the United States. The following events led to the fall of the *bakufu* (*Bakumatsu* 幕末), and became fertile ground for the restoration of power to the Meiji Emperor in 1868.

Japanese Warriors in Written Records, 8th to 19th Centuries

Ancient Chronicles, Court Diaries and Tales

From a literary point of view, warrior figures first appeared in the two oldest written Japanese chronicles, the *Kojiki* 古事記 (712) and *Nihonshoki* 日本書紀 (720).[7] The warriors are depicted as deities, or described as superhuman figures

6 The Sword Hunt Decrees (*katanagari* 刀狩) prohibited farmers from possessing weapons.

7 The chronicles described in an epic form the creation of the sacred land and islands of Japan by the deities and the descent of the first Emperor from the Sun Goddess, thus establishing a *shintō* pantheon and endorsing the concept of the Japanese sovereign's divinity and supremacy over the heads of the other clans (*uji* 氏).

with mythical features. Their behaviour does not seem to respect any moral code, and they often succeed by means of their cunning.

In the first book of the *Kojiki* (1.18), Susanoo, "His-Swift-Impetuous-Male-Augustness", indomitable God of Sea and Storms, elder brother of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu ōmikami, arrived in the land of Izumo. Once there, he decided to help an old couple, whose seven daughters were devoured by the "eight-forked head and eight-forked tail" serpent, and their remaining daughter. He asked the couple to brew a strong *sake* and had the beast drink it. After the serpent fell asleep, he easily killed him.

Two aspects should be noted here. Firstly, Susanoo helped the old couple after asking them for their daughter in marriage in return, and thus he was moved by self-interest. Secondly, his treacherous deed resulted in a positive outcome, as in one tail of the beast he found the sword (*Ama-no-murakumo-no-tsurugi*), which later became one of the three symbols of Imperial power.

In another passage, young Prince Ōsu (then Prince Yamato Takeru) was sent off by his father, Emperor Keikō, to the "unsubmissive" Kumaso brothers (2.80.1–15).

> Having combed down after the manner of girls his august hair which was bound up, and having put on his aunt's august [upper] garment and august skirt, he looked quite like a young girl. (transl. Chamberlain 1919, 256–7)

Disguised in such way, he was invited to join the Kumaso during a feast and then killed them. Before being hit, the younger Kumaso brother had time to show his admiration for the Prince, and offered him his own name:

> […] There are no persons in the West so brave and strong as we two. Yet in the Land of Great Yamato there is a man braver than we two,—there is. Therefore will I offer thee an august name. From this time forward it is right that thou be praised as the August Child Yamato-take. (transl. Chamberlain 1919, 257)

Court diaries and novels flourished during the Heian period (794–1185), which show the customs, traditions and lifestyle of the nobles in Kyoto. Such diaries did not focus on samurai figures, but in some cases warriors were described, particularly in the diaries written by Court ladies. The *bushi* in the provinces were scorned for their bloody and violent actions. The samurai in service at the Imperial Palace were seen as physically powerful, but were despised for their rudeness and being far removed from the elegance and sophistication of the Court life. Generally they were considered to be servants, and enjoyed very low prestige among the Heian courtiers.

The perception of the samurai figure partly changed after the establishment of the first *bakufu*.

The *war tales* (*gunki monogatari* 軍記物語, or *senki monogatari* 戦記物語),[8] a new literary genre by the *bushi* themselves or court nobles, were written by various authors, mostly anonymous, in a mix of Japanese and Chinese. They collated tales which were previously transmitted orally by blind priests (*biwahōshi* 琵琶法師) as forms of rituals and for entertainment. The numerous versions differ as sections or episodes were added or eliminated over time. The warrior tales illustrated events which occurred from the second half of the 12th century onwards, sometimes with hyperbole and a celebratory tone, and described in detail battles, wars, the rise and fall of entire clans, deeds of uncommon warriors, and powerful weapons. The characters were sometimes stereotypes, but historical individuals were recognisable. The descriptions of their clothing, armour and horses provide us with valuable information on the customs of the time, and on the identities of the warriors themselves.

The greatness of the *bushi*'s skills, their superior physical strength and courageous attitude were often described. Some could handle "extra-ordinary" weapons.

> Yet an enemy warrior called Saji Magoro, a resident of the province of Tamba, brought his horse up sideways in front of the west gate and easily slashed the bellies of three enemies with his five-foot sword, such a long sword as had never before been seen. (*Taheiki*, transl. McCullough 1959, 258)

An uncommon bravery characterised the heroes of war tales, who faced struggles without hesitation and with contempt for death.

> Then Musashi-no-Saburoemon Arikuni of the Heike […], having penetrated very deeply into the ranks of the foe, had his horse shot under him,

8 Among the *gunki monogatari*, some excel, such as *The Tale of Hōgen* (*Hōgen monogatari* 保元物語, about 1320), on the rebellion in 1156, *The Tale of Heiji* (*Heiji monogatari* 平治物語, 13th century), on the rebellion in 1159–1160, *The Tale of the Heike* (*Heike monogatari* 平家物語, *ante* 1330), on the struggle between the Taira and the Minamoto clans, and its extended version, on the years 1161–1185, the *Tale of the Rise and Fall of Taira and Minamoto* (*Genpei seisuiki* 源平盛衰記, early Kamakura period). The Kamakura *bakufu* events (years 1180-1266) are recounted in the *Mirror of the East* (*Azuma kagami* 吾妻鏡/東鑑, post 1266) and in the *Jottings of a Fool* (*Gukanshō* 愚管抄, circa 1219–20). Some *gunki monogatari* were also written in the Ashikaga period, such as the *Chronicle of Great Peace* (*Taiheiki* 太平記, circa 1370), recounting Emperor Go-Daigo's (r. 1318–1339) ascent and restoration of the power and the Nanbokuchō period (1336–1392), and the Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga (*Shinchōkōki* 信長公記), a record of the Oda clan from 1544 to Nobunaga's death, while records of the exploits of military clans, such the Takeda's (*Kōyō gunkan* 甲陽軍鑑), and biographies, such as Hideyoshi's (*Taikōki* 太閤記), were issued in the Tokugawa period.

> and then, while he was fighting on foot, his helmet was struck from his head, so that he looked like a youth fighting with his long hair streaming in all directions. By this time all his arrows were exhausted, so he drew his sword an laid about him mightily until, pierced by seven or eight shafts, he met his death still on his feet and glaring fiercely at his enemies. After their leader had thus fallen his retainers gave up the fight and fled. (*Heike monogatari*, transl. Sadler 1918, 264)

A Buddhist influence "wrapped" the existences of these noble warriors with a sense of impermanence and a karmic logic of retribution for their actions. The war tales also recounted falling warriors and families, of their unhappy fates and their "humanity". The *Chronicle of Yoshitsune* (*Gikeiki* 義経記), composed at the turn of the 15th century, told the story of Minamoto no Yoshitsune running away from his brother Yoritomo's warriors after helping him defeat the Taira and gaining power. The *Tale of the Heike* (*Heike monogatari* 平家物語) recounted the greatness of the Taira and the dramatic evanescence of their power and prosperity.

Additionally, values such as loyalty, filial piety and sense of honour are recorded for the first time in the war tales.

In such a context, repaying a debt was considered a major obligation.

> I have no words to speak of your loyal hearts, who have cleaved to me thus far, not unmindful of your honour as warriors nor forgetful of past kindnesses, though it is known to you that the prosperity of the military is ended and my family is soon to be destroyed utterly. Profound indeed is my gratitude! How may I reward you, now that adversity overwhelms my house? I shall kill myself for your sakes, requiting in death the favours received in life. (*Taheiki*, transl. McCullough 1959, 310)

The importance of having a connection with the Court was a fundamental distinguishing feature. Many scenes described noble samurai announcing their name, title, and the deeds accomplished by them and their familiars (*ujibumi yomi* 氏踏み読み), prior to facing the enemy in an individual struggle.

As mentioned before, some authors were Court aristocrats, and various passages still reflected a certain degree of disdain, especially for the lower level *bushi*, and for the samurai's absolute lack of literary culture and for their lifestyle, which included the killing of others.

But in the end, the image arising from the *bushi*'s extra-ordinary deeds, their daily facing of death, and austere lifestyle, especially in the later versions of the tales,

raised the warriors above the common people in terms of prestige and respect. From this perspective, the battles in war tales were seen as noble endeavours, and even killings were not condemned, some of them being seen as honourable. For example, the practice of taking an enemy's head on the battlefield, especially if he was a high-ranking samurai or General, was common, as testified in the *Gukanshō* and the *Azuma kagami*.

Law Codes

After the *bakufu* was established, law codes and regulations were issued for the ruling warrior class. The law codes provide modern readers with valuable information on the military aristocracy (*buke* 武家) and the lifestyle samurai were asked to follow. These documents were of two different kinds: the official codes by the shogunate, and the official local codes by the Regional Barons (since the Sengoku period).

The Formulary of Adjucations (*Goseibai shikimoku* 御成敗式目, 1232) was enacted by the Hōjō regents during the Kamakura shogunate (1192–1333). Composed of 51 articles, it was aimed at making the *bushi* understand the principles of the law with regard to crime and punishment, inheritance and land rights.[9]

Two years before establishing the Muromachi shogunate (1338–1573), Ashikaga Takauji issued a second Code, the *Law Code of the Kenmu Era* (*Kenmu shikimoku* 建武式目, 1336), supplemental to *Goseibai shikimoku*, where he declared that "virtue resides in good government", which is "making people content", and claimed the right to defend the oppressed population from the Kenmu government and the Court nobles' abuses. The 17 articles of the Code were a sort of behavioural guidelines for the ruling samurai and recommended practicing frugality and rewarding men of integrity, righteousness and honour.[10]

During the Edo shogunate (1603–1868), the *Various Points of Laws for Warrior Houses* (*Buke shohatto* 武家諸法度, 1615, from hereon BSH) was enacted by Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), in thirteen articles. The *Buke shohatto* were reissued in 1629, 1635, 1663, 1683 and 1710,[11] and provide us with important evidence of specific behavioural standards and etiquette, and of an ethical ideal rooted among the samurai rulers.

9 Also, it set *shugo* and *jito*'s duties, recommended respect for religious institutions and set up legal conflicts between the samurai and the Court nobility. On the *Goseibai shikimoku* see Hall and Mass 1974; Hall 1906.

10 On *Kenmu shikimoku* see Lu David J. 1997, 155–6; Mass 1998, 211–3.

11 On the *Buke shohatto* see Hall 1910, 286–319.

The *Buke shohatto* opened with the importance of being culturally educated and practicing martial arts (*bunbu* 文武), even in times of peace (Art. 1). In the Nara and Heian periods being both literary and martial were considered fundamental in order to govern successfully. In this context *bun* was given priority over *bu*. During the first *bakufu*, *bun* and *bu* reflected the two different worlds of the court aristocrats and the warriors, respectively, while during the second *bakufu bun* was considered necessary to run a government. During the turmoil of the Sengoku war, in particular, it became essential for survival. Finally, in the Edo period the two aspects were inseparable, with priority being given to *bu* over *bun* (see Benesch 2014, 28 and below).

A clear Confucian influence appeared in the BS1635, formulated in collaboration with the Neo-Confucian Hayashi Razan, and in the BS1683. Here, loyalty and filial piety, ceremonial *decorum* and rectitude, are considered essential to a good ruler, along with martial skills. The BS1635 stated that he who did not behave in accordance with filial piety had to be subject to the Criminal Code.[12] Moreover, samurai had to practice frugality and limit their gambling and parties.[13]

Loyalty to the *shōgun* included strict control over the *daimyō* and service in the Edo period,[14] and any disloyal behaviour had to be reported to the authorities.[15]

A ruler needed to select men of capacity for office and to distribute rewards or reproofs according to his subjects' actual merits.[16]

During the Edo period the practice of following one's Lord in death (*junshi* 殉死) was widespread among the vassals. The same day the BSH1663 was promulgated, this practice was verbally condemned, while a written prohibition appeared twenty years later,[17] and was reinforced in 1710.[18]

One's clothing also had to reflect the distinction between lord and vassal, and one's social position (art. 10).[19]

12 BSH1635, art. 20. Hall 1910.

13 BSH1615/1629, art. 2. Hall 1910.

14 BSH1615, art. 9, and art. 2 of BSH1635 and BSH1663. Hall 1910.

15 BSH1615/1629, art. 7. Hall 1910.

16 BSH1615, art.13. Hall 1910.

17 BSH1683, art. 12. Hall 1910.

18 BSH1710, art. 16. Hall 1910.

19 Some other matters are also dealt with, such as weddings, the reparation of castles, or the importance of preserving the peculiarities of a domain not reporting secrets to people of other domains, and, from the BSH1635, with vessels, shrines and temples, roads maintenance, and the prohibition of the Christian sects.

At a lower level, the Tokugawa *shōgun* also enacted the *Laws for the Hatamoto* or *Laws for the Gentry* (*Shoshi hatto* 諸士法度, 1632, 1636 and 1663, from now SH).[20] Provisions were given on various matters, such as house construction, military weapons, wedding celebrations, quarrels, disputes between farmers, hereditary succession and clothing. Particular emphasis was placed on the specific duties of one's service and office, to be performed without negligence, and on social position.[21] Loyalty and filial piety were listed as necessary matters of cultivation at the beginning of the 1636 edition, together with the *bunbu*.[22] Any opposition to governmental authority had to be avoided.[23]

Luxury was condemned,[24] as well as personal disputes or disputes arising in the shogunate palace, which had to be firmly put down.[25]

In the turmoil of the Sengoku period, Law Codes were issued by the *daimyō* within the domains at war, with similar content, under the titles of Laws (*hatto* 法度), Domain Laws (*kokuhō* 国法) and House Laws (*kahō* 家法), or also "Written on Wall" (*kabegaki* 壁掛), to assert their official character.[26]

Family Letters

Fundamental information on samurai rulers is provided by the "family precepts" (*kakun* 家訓). Directly addressed to sons or successors, these were private letters written by Provincial Governors (*shugo* 守護), wartime Regional Lords (*sengoku daimyō* 戦国大名) and Tokugawa Regional Lords (*daimyō* 大名) for didactic purposes and as a form of spiritual inheritance.

Exhortations to wise and rightful service and administration were given by the authors of the *kakun*. Heirs were encouraged to carefully examine and reward the virtuous behaviour of their subjects and to punish their wrong actions. They were also strongly advised to avoid the recommendations of untrustworthy men at their service. These letters also showed disapproval for a superficial behaviour, while they stated that the emulation of upright companions was essential.

20 On the *Shoshi hatto* see J.H. Wigmore 1975; J.W. Hall e M.B. Jansen 1968, Hall 1910.

21 SH1632, art. 1, 2 and 9. Hall 1910.

22 SH1636, art. 1. Hall 1910.

23 SH1636, art. 19. Hall 1910.

24 SH1636, art. 2 and 9. Hall 1910.

25 SH1636, art. 9 and 10. Hall 1910.

26 The *Jinkaishū* (塵芥集, 1536) by the Date clan of Mutsu domain and the *Chōsokabe-shi okitegaki* (長宗我部氏掟書, 1597) by the Chōsokabe clan of Tosa domain are examples of local laws codes.

A personal tone was used in the letters. At the beginning of the 15th century Imagawa Ryōshun powerfully criticised his younger brother Nagaaki, for being ungrateful to his Lord and parents, and absolutely disinterested in the virtues a leader should possess.[27]

> You have minor offenders put to death without trial. But out of favouritism you pardon grave offenders. (*Imagawajō*, transl. Steenstrup 1973, 301)
>
> You live in luxury by fleecing the people and plundering the shrines. In your actions you disregard the moral law by evading your public duties and considering your private benefits first. (*Imagawajō*, transl. Steenstrup 1973, 301)

Disheartened by being replaced in his office by the *shōgun*, Ryōshun disapproved of the shameful attitude of Nagaaki, and aimed at convincing him to correct his behaviour in order to comply with the duties of his new post, often repeating the same points several times.

In contrast, there was no complaint in the letter written in 1673 by Itakura Shigenori, *daimyō* of the Karasuyama domain. His writing was composed of a series of suggestions and exhortations to Shigemichi, his "honest", "sound" (*kenjitsu* 堅実) son.

> Since you are honest, you will find that there are a lot of wrong things. Make friends with the people around you and ask for their opinion often, treat your subjects and the common people on friendly terms […], discover their wisdom and potentials. (*Itakura Shigenori Shigemichi e no isho*, transl. Culeddu 2008, 192)

The authors of the *kakun* reflected in their letters the official Law's point on the fundamental nature of loyalty and filial piety, and on the need to reward men of good qualities, for "only a devoted and skilled warrior can be useful to his Lord" (*Imagawajō*, in Steenstrup 1973, 301). Filial piety was strictly connected to loyalty to one's Lord. Itakura Shigenori started his letter by writing of *chūkō* 忠孝. *Chū* is the character for "devotion to one's Lord" and *kō* the character for "the loyalty to one's parents". Shigenori equated the two virtues, and maintained the absolute importance of both as the underlying principles of a virtuous behaviour.

Equally, they highlighted the importance of cultivating the martial arts together with learning of Confucian classics and military literature.[28]

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27 Imagawa Sadayo (Ryōshun, 1326–1420) was a Military Governor (*shugo* 守護) and Military Deputy (*tandai* 探題) who served the *shōgun* in Kyūshu. His letter is addressed to his brother Nagaaki (then adopted, and addressed to as "son" in the letter), who replaced him by decision of the shogunate.

28 *The Four Books and Five Classics* texts of Confucianism are the *Shisho gokyō* 四書五経, while the *Seven Military Classics* are the *Bukei shichisho* 武経七書.

> It appears clearly from the Four Books, the Five Classics, and the Military Literature that he who can only defend his territory but has no learning, cannot govern well. (*Imagawajō*, transl. Steenstrup 1973, 307)
>
> As you do not understand the Arts of Peace, your skill in the Arts of War will not, in the end, achieve victory. (*Imagawajō*, transl. Steenstrup 1973, 299)

Being lettered was not (or not only) a means to improve oneself mentally, but also met a practical need, the need to have administrative ability. As noted above, the importance of the *bunbu* (文武) was particularly stressed in the Tokugawa period. Indeed, just as in the BS, Itakura Shigenori expressed this concept in the first lines of his letter:

> A Lord will find difficulties in ruling without culture. (Itakura, repr. 1974, 34)
>
> Learn in detail the Four Chinese classics, the Five books of Confucianism and the Seven texts of military art, and if you do not know the ideograms, ask someone to read them for you. (*Itakura Shigenori Shigemichi e no isho*, transl. Culeddu 2008, 192)

And:

> Put literature on your left side, military art on your right. (*Itakura Shigenori Shigemichi e no isho*, transl. Culeddu 2008, 194)

But Itakura Shigenori also points out an additional element:

> No matter how many books you read, you will not obtain any advantage if you do not control yourself. (*Itakura Shigenori Shigemichi e no isho*, transl. Culeddu 2008, 194)

Learning did not have to be a sterile knowledge, but the teaching in books had to be internalised. Only in this way could a samurai ruler take advantage of it.

More Written Works about the Military Elite in the Tokugawa Era

Literature on and by the *bushi* is not limited to *gunki monogatari*, laws and regulations and *kakun*. In the Tokugawa period, when the country was at peace, other works were composed, aimed at exploring and explaining the concepts and ethics connected with the "Way of the Warrior", and clarifying why the warrior class should rule in a pacified society. Yamamoto Tsunetomo's (1659–1719)

Hagakure 葉隠 (*Hidden by the Leaves*, 1716),[29]for example, is a series of moral teachings and anecdotes about the Lords and retainers of the Nabeshima clan, collected with the purpose of illustrating and explaining the Nabeshima samurai the various aspects of *bushidō* and good service. Daidōji Yūzan's (1639–1730) *Budō shoshinshū* 武道初心集 (*Collection for Beginners in Budō*, around 1730)[30] is similar in scope, even if not anecdotic. Both books started defining the true meaning of being a samurai:

> *Bushidō*, I have found out, lies in dying. When confronted with two alternatives, life and death, one is to choose death without hesitation. There is nothing particularly difficult; one has only to be resolved and push forward. (*Hagakure*, transl. Mukoh 1980)
>
> One who is a samurai must before all things keep constantly in mind, by day and by night, from the morning when he takes up his chopsticks to eat his New Year's breakfast to Old Year's night when he pays his yearly bills, the fact that he has to die. That is his chief business. If he is always mindful of this, he will be able to live in accordance with the paths of loyalty and filial piety. (*Budō shoshinshū*, trans. Sadler 1988)

Firstly, the constant thought of death was far from being a desperate desire to die. Preparing to die and then being prepared to die were considered the source of loyalty and filial piety and of all the values of *bushidō*. This concept is well reflected in the ancient Latin saying *sine spe, sine metu* ("without hope, without fear"). Literally, it expressed a mental condition where there is no hope of survival and therefore no obstacle created by the thought of preserving one's own life. But *de facto* it didn't stick to death specifically, as it was also related to everything involved in duty, such as work, labour, inconveniences, commitment, responsibility, and the correct behaviour till death (if required). It stated that all of the above must be achieved, not in the expectation of receiving a reward or avoiding punishment, but because such behaviours were connected to a state, and perceived as adherence to some specific principles in an ethical sense. This is precisely the meaning of the above sentence from the *Budō shoshinshū.* Only with such a mental attitude could a samurai be able to act in compliance with his service and role, and consequently serve his Lord faithfully.

Secondly, it is worth noting that in the *Budō shoshinshū* the "Way of the Warrior" was primarily referred to as the Way of Loyalty and Filial Piety. Indeed, the latter appeared to be the "peaceful" side of *bushidō* in a pacified country.

29 The *Hagakure* is translated and known worldwide today. Originally called *Nabeshima rongo* 鍋島論語 (*Nabeshima Dialogues*), it was kept within the Saga domain until the Meiji period.

30 Daidōji Yūzan was a military strategist and samurai.

In the *Hagakure*, the bond between a Lord and retainer was considered so strong, that the term "love" was used to explain it.

> The lord-retainer relationship, I believe, is similar to love. That is the fundamental spirit of retainer service far beyond logical reasoning. (*Hagakure*, transl. Mukoh 1980)

Another text is the *Gorinsho* 五輪書 (*A Book of Five Rings*, written towards 1640–45), by Miyamoto Musashi (1584–1645). Musashi spent some of his life apart from society as a *rōnin* (a samurai without lord), and devoted himself to perfecting his martial skills until he felt that he had found enlightenment in the "Way of Strategy". After fighting against Tokugawa Ieyasu at Sekigahara in 1600, he wandered over the country and won over sixty duels. His *Gorinsho*, on the "Way of Strategy", contained practical teachings to get victory over an enemy and showed the mental attitude of a successful samurai, and the thought behind this attitude, of Buddhist Zen inspiration. But even here the association of the concepts *bun* and *bu*, already treated in the above paragraphs, was held as necessary.

> *Bushi* follow the two ways of literature and war.[31] (*Gorinsho*, Miyamoto, 49)

Other writings on *bushidō* in this period are some essays of Zen inspiration, dealing with various matters.

In the *Reiroshū* 玲瓏集 (*The Clear Sound of Jewels*), the samurai and Zen monk Takuan Sōhō (1573–1645)[32] faced the issue of how to reconcile devotion to one's Lord with serving his successor after his death. As the practice of following one's Lord into death was forbidden by the *bakufu*, and since it was undoubtedly difficult in a pacified Japan to find occasions to sacrifice one's life for one's Lord, he found a solution in loyalty not to a specific master, but to "the Lord" as a concept (*Reiroshū*, 136), thus achieving the "Way of the Lord".

A Change in the Tradition—From the Ancient Chronicles to the Neo-Confucian *Bushidō*

When the country was ruled by the Emperor and Court, the predecessors of the *bushi* were described as strong mythical figures in the *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki*, and appeared as rude palace guards or provincial warriors in the Heian Court diaries

31 The exact verb used here is *tashinamu* (嗜む), usually translated with "have a taste for."

32 Takuan is also the author, among the other works, of *Fudōchi shinmyōroku* 不動智神妙録 (*The Mysterious Records of Immovable Wisdom*) and *Taiaki* 太阿記 (*Annals of the Sword Taia*).

of the 10th century. After the *bakufu* was established and they became the rulers of the country, samurai started producing written documentation about their deeds, their political role and lifestyle after centuries of unwritten self-assertion of the "Way of the *bushi*", providing us with an energetic and complex self-view. Through time, the samurai's lifestyle, needs and principles changed along with the events that occurred over a time span of more than six centuries of warrior rule, and their literary representation changed accordingly.

The Taika reforms (646), based on the Tang Chinese model and aimed at creating a centralised state under Yamato Court rule, were enacted little more than fifty years before the Court permanently established itself in Nara (710). Prior to these reforms, the Yamato Emperor was a sort of *primus inter pares* and had to fight to impose his authority on the other *uji* heads. In search of legitimacy, the Court issued the *Kojiki* (712) and the *Nihonshoki* (720), epic chronicles recounting the creation of Japan and its Empire. The heroes in these chronicles asserted their right to supremacy by their extraordinary and lawless deeds, in a world where only the strongest could succeed and seize power, and some passages illustrated fallen heroes praising their treacherous enemies, as in the case of the Kumaso brothers.

During the rise of the *bushi* class the Court diaries mentioned samurai figures. These warriors were not superhuman heroes, but nonetheless the Court ladies depicted their strength and unrefined behaviour. Meanwhile, the military elite in the provinces orally transmitted its fundamental rules of conduct, within the warrior social class, from generation to generation.

During the wars of the 12th century, the supremacy of individuals and families arose from military ability in battle and successful endeavours. After the establishment of a military government, the *bushi* of the whole country were unified for the first time under a single commander, and acquired their own identity. Before receiving the title of *shōgun,* Yoritomo had adopted Hachiman[33] as patron deity of his family. Hachiman was later venerated as the protector of the whole samurai class. When a measure of order was restored, there was a need to establish its ethical legitimacy. Within this view, the *gunki monogatari* celebrated the heroic actions of *all* the samurai (not only of Minamoto's allies but also its enemies), with their strength and fighting ability.

The heads of the military alliances of the 12th century were aristocrats connected with Court nobles by blood ties, trained in martial arts and with armed followers and troops. They fought to increase their power and lands in the provinces and

33 In *shintō* Hachiman was identified with the mythical Emperor Ōjin (270–310), who is considered as an ancestor of the Minamoto clan.

their influence at Court. The blood ties with courtiers were a source of distinguishing features, as I previously stated, but, again, these were seen more as a means to increase one's authority in the provinces or obtain posts in the capital, than an ideological legitimation in a period where the sanction of power was only given by success in battle. Indeed, in the *gunki monogatari* a sort of determination can be seen to distinguish oneself from the Court noble families (*kuge* 公家). This purpose was asserted in the different guiding principles (such as the sense of honour) and in the totally different lifestyles the two groups adopted.

Though some samurai behaviour is condemned in various episodes, the warrior tales claimed their moral superiority over the common people. This positive perception is rooted in the character of "necessity" guiding *bushi*'s actions. The ancient samurai were strictly connected to the land. (See Kanno 2006) At a medium and lower level the *bushi* in the provinces were based on their small plots of land, and success in battle meant survival for themselves and their families. Saeki Shin'ichi (2008) explains that the warriors in war tales fought for "fame". Being considered as a valiant samurai by one's Lord was the only means to get a reward, such as land, and therefore ensure prosperity for oneself, family and posterity. In this context, the "sense of honour" was rooted in a practical need. Indeed, while in some passages of the war tales betrayal was condemned (especially in some sections which are believed to have been added later), even actions clearly moved by self-interest and episodes of treachery were admired, as seen in the ancient chronicles.

For all the above reasons, a "fierce" and "wild" *bushidō* is shown in the war tales, where fallen enemies were beheaded on the battlefield, and defeated samurai died wishing for revenge. Even if some of the heroes of the *gunki monogatari* appeared to follow some sort of code of ethics, these literary works recounting recent and violent historical events were far from being composed to explain the way of the *bushi*. Instead, they worked to legitimise the authority of the "new" rulers, who took power by virtue of their strength and cunning.

The Law Codes issued by the Hōjō regents and Ashikaga Takauji were a useful tool with regard to legal matters and guidelines for correct behaviour among the samurai, and the basis for the future codes of laws and regulations. As illustrated above, they also set a clear line between the excesses of Court nobles and religious institutions on one side, and the "right conduct" of the warrior class towards the population on the other, thus also giving legitimacy to the new rulers from a Confucian point of view.

During the Sengoku period (1467–1568), the imperial capital was destroyed and power was entirely decentralised, in favour of the local authority of the *daimyō*. Many similarities can be found with the situation in the wars of the

12th century, in terms of violence and the constant struggle for survival, the forming of alliances and sudden betrayals. In one hundred years the battles among the domains led to the disappearance of many powerful military clans from the political scene, while some lower and medium rank samurai rose to power. Armed peasants were the norm, and many *rōnin* wandered the country. Nonetheless, during the Sengoku wars the domains became self-sufficient political, administrative and economic entities. House Laws based on the ancient *bakufu* laws and letters of *sengoku daimyō* to their heirs were composed, and testified the domains' solidity and autonomy.

When Ieyasu came to power in 1600 and instituted a "confederation" of domains under the Tokugawa (the third *bakufu*), the local House Laws were not abolished, but kept as internal regulations, while the *Buke shohatto* were issued at a centralised level. The aim of the *daimyō*'s spiritual inheritance letters and of the local and central laws and codes was a practical one. They were to be functional with regard to domain administration, and show a ruler and samurai how he should act and what his mental attitude should be in times of peace. In those writings the neo-Confucian inspiration is evident. They illustrated a *bushidō* where the literature was combined with martiality, where strong disapproval is expressed for superficial and careless behaviour, where a good ruler is able to select men of capacity for office and to fairly distribute rewards and punishments according to worthy or unworthy behaviour. As such, and as shown in laws and letters, *bushidō* corresponds to how a samurai and ruler should be.

During the Tokugawa period, with the crystallisation of society into separate classes and the transformation of warriors into salaried bureaucrats, the *bushi* needed instructions to face a new reality where they themselves were a transformed element in society. Even if most *bushi*'s lifestyles did not correspond to the one of the ideal figures depicted in the laws and *daimyō*'s letters, and even if these were issued for a practical purpose, these writings contributed to give ideological legitimacy to the privileges acquired with difficulty by the "new" samurai rulers, arisen from the Sengoku wars. From a Confucian point of view, the highest principles of *bushidō* were the ideological reasons why the samurai were allowed to hold power (and swords).[34]

34 Nonetheless, the discourse on the legitimation process involves another aspect, deeply rooted in Japanese culture. As mentioned above, in the *gunki monogatari* noble warriors used to announce their genealogy and the deeds of their ancestors prior to engaging in a struggle with other high ranking samurai (*ujibumi yomi*). As it was in the past, also in pre-modern Japan blood ties were considered essential and were a necessary "guarantee" of a samurai's valour. Many samurai arisen to power during the Sengoku period surely "invented" or provided themselves with a "higher" genealogy than their actual one. Hideyoshi provided himself with the noble genealogy of the Toyotomi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu claimed descent from the Minamoto family. This descent allowed him to get

During the Tokugawa period, the samurai kept training daily in martial arts and practicing Zen meditation and various arts, such as calligraphy, the tea ceremony and poetry. For a ruler the learning of his domain's history and of military and Confucian literature became essential to the land's administration. A wild *bushidō* was thus substituted by a Confucian and interiorised *bushidō*.

The *bushi*'s "moral" superiority was considered absolute. Nonetheless, over time many merchants became wealthier than the samurai, many *bushi* became heavily indebted, and dissatisfaction against rulers spread in rural areas due to the peasants' hard lives.[35] In this context, the role of the *bushi* forced to "live at peace" was questioned by some intellectuals of the time, most of whom were samurai themselves. They objected to most samurai's behaviours and lifestyles being distant from the ideal figure of a *bushi* ruler, noted the need to justify their role in society, and encouraged the warriors to stick to their "traditional" guiding principles, although what was highlighted did not belong to the first *bushidō*.

A debate on Confucianism arose in the Tokugawa era,[36] focusing on *bushidō* as the "Way of the Rulers".

All these elements contributed to the systematisation of *bushidō* that took place in the Meiji era (1868–1912), and is the focus of many scholars today (see, for example, Benesch 2014). After the struggles following the signing of unequal treaties with Western countries and the fall of the *bakufu* (1868), political power was restored to the Emperor's hands. The main aims of the new Japan were to free the country from foreign control by means of rapid modernisation, and to pursue an imperialistic policy towards other Asian countries. All the Emperor's subjects were necessary to this task, and, although the *bushi* disappeared as a class, a renewed *bushidō* was taught to the Japanese people and presented to foreign countries. This new "Way of the Warrior" was presented as traditional, but was actually based on the Tokugawa philosophy and Western thought in terms of its values.

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the title of *shōgun*. Also, legitimation was sought in the continuity with the past, which constitutes another typical trait of Confucian inspiration. The oath to Ieyasu, taken by the *daimyō* at Nijō castle in Kyōto, was a direct reference to the first *bakufu*: "We will loyally respect the institutions of the Shogunate (*Kubo*) as established for generations since the time of the General of the Right (Yoritomo); out of regard for our own interest we will strictly obey any regulations which may hereafter be issued to us from Yedo" (Hall 1910, 286).

35 The peasants rose up more than three thousand times to ask for better living conditions in the Tokugawa period (Scheiner 1978).

36 The debate revolved around different interpretations of Confucianism by thinkers such as Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), Ishida Baigan (1685–1744) (Lidin 1970 and Bellah 1978), and Yamaga Sōkō (1622–1685), while others, like Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843), rejected ideological systems imported from outside (primarily from China) and supported supposedly indigenous traditions (*kokugaku* 国学).

Conclusion

The representation of the "Way of the *Bushi*" in Japanese writings has changed constantly over time. The various descriptions reflected specific needs, which included purposes of legitimation, teaching, guidance and entertainment.

Bushi were seldom represented accurately in such texts, and mostly they were depicted as the historical *milieu* required them to be at that time, and thus as the authors believed they should be, in order to fulfil a certain role in society and on the political scene. Since violence and strength were requirements in times of crisis and war, they became values within a wild *bushidō* that described superhuman warriors, whose deeds arose from the need for survival, and that sanctioned non-chivalric endeavours such as treachery and murder. In contrast, since learning and respect for rules were requirements in times of peace, an interiorised *bushidō* described excellent administrators.

Similar paths of changing figures can be found in representations of the Medieval knights in the West. From soldiers on horseback with a fighting role within a single group, they became loyal servants of a Lord who rewarded them with feudal lands, guardians of the weak and damsels in distress, or members of monastic orders who fought and killed in the name of a God that preaches love.

As many scholars assert today, during the Meiji period (in particular in the years from 1880) a process of systematisation was performed by the government, which resulted in a "newly created" ethical code of conduct that they called *bushidō*, and which they believed to be rooted in the "traditional" "Way of the Warrior". As we can see from the events outlined in this paper, the process of systematisation started much before the modern era. But in the Meiji period there was a specific and conscious effort to build a value system for the Japanese people and to show to foreign countries, for political and state reasons. However, such goals were not the case in the previous periods.

Furthermore, it can be said that the representation of the "Way of the Warrior" reflected a need of the rulers, in terms of what image should be provided (more or less unconsciously) in order to give an explanation (faithful or completely invented) of the historical reality of the time. Over time, the literary means for this transmission changed. The chronicles became codes, laws, private letters, anecdotes and stories, essays, manuals and so on.

Nevertheless, the transformation of *bushidō* was a result of a more or less conscious strategy for the selection of values, necessary for the creation of the identity of the samurai class in ancient and premodern times, and of the nation in modern times.

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Poetic Deception: The *Ujigawa Senjin* Episode Between Court and Warrior Traditions

*Naama EISENSTEIN**

Abstract

The story of Kajiwara Kagesue and Sasaki Takatsuna's race across the River Uji is one of the most commonly depicted episodes from the *Heike monogatari*. During the Tokugawa period this tale of deception and wit was presented in a wide variety of formats, yet the context in which these art works were made differed greatly from the original twelfth-century setting of the story. This article examines how the meaning of the *Ujigawa senjin* episode changed over time and suggests that its immense popularity in Tokugawa imagery was based more on its ability to fit with poetic associations than its content as a war story.

Keywords: Genpei war, *Heike monogatari*, Tokugawa art, Uji, warrior ideals

Poetična prevara: zgodba *Ujigawa senjin* med dvorno in bojevniško tradicijo

Izvleček

Ena najbolj priljubljenih zgodb v *Heike monogatari* je, kako sta Kajiwara Kagesue in Sasaki Takatsuna tekmovala pri prečkanju reke Uji. V tokugavskem obdobju je bila ta zgodba o prevari in iznajdljivosti zelo priljubljena in se je pojavljala v številnih oblikah, pri čemer pa se je kontekst, v katerem so nastala ta umetniška dela, zelo razlikoval od prvotne različice iz 12. stoletja. Članek proučuje, kako se je pomen zgodbe *Ujigawa senjin* sčasoma spremenil, in ugotavlja, da njena velika priljubljenost v tokugavskem imaginariju temelji na njeni zmožnosti prilagajanja poetičnim asociacijam, ne pa na njeni vojni vsebini.

Ključne besede: vojna Genpei, *Heike monogatari*, tokugavska umetnost, Uji, bojevniški ideali

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Introduction

Late in the first month of 1184 the River Uji, known for its ferocious current, was teeming with warriors.[1] The famous bridge crossing the river was stripped of its planks in an attempt to stop the charging force, but this only succeeded in slowing it, as hundreds of armoured men advanced towards the water, on horseback or foot. From this mass of activity two figures stood out, pushing their horses forward, determined to win the honour of being the first on the battlefield. They were Kajiwara Genda Kagesue (梶原源太景季, 1162–1200) and Sasaki Shirō Takatsuna (佐々木四郎高綱, ?–1214). As they separated from the crowd it was clear that Kagesue was in the lead, but then Takatsuna called out to him: "This is the biggest river in the west. Your saddle-girth looks loose, tighten it up!" (McCullough 1988, 287).[2] Kagesue stopped his mount, quickly realising that he has been deceived—the girth was fine, but it was too late and he already lost his lead. Soon Takatsuna stood on the other bank, declaring in a mighty voice that he was the first to cross the River Uji, and was written down in history as the first on the battlefield.

This seemingly simple story presents something of a riddle for the contemporary reader. How could Takatsuna win the honour of being the first on the battlefield when he used dishonourable methods to gain it? The straightforward answer lies in the changing perspectives of what is considered "honourable", a topic that has already been discussed by several scholars.[3] But this episode, usually known as *Uji-gawa senjin* (宇治川先陣), presents another riddle.[4] It is one of the most prevalent images coming out of the Genpei War (源平合戦, 1180–1185) and during the Tokugawa period (also called the Edo period, 江戸時代, 1603–1868) it was depicted in a remarkably wide variety of formats. These include both elite ones such as folded screens (屏風) and illustrated handscrolls (絵巻), as well as popular formats

1 In the traditional Japanese dating system this battle occurred on the first month of the third year of the Juei (寿永) era. Official records do not state the exact day of the crossing of the River Uji, yet the *Azuma kagami* specifies the twentieth of the month as the day Noriyori (源範頼, ?–1193) and Yoshitsune (源義経, 1159–1189) entered the capital, as well as the day Kiso Yoshinaka (木曾義仲, 1154–1184) was killed, therefore it can be assumed that the Seta-Uji battle occurred on the same day. (Masamune 1926, 102)

2 The Japanese reads: 「此河は西国一の大河ぞや。腹帯ののびて見えさうは。しめ給へ」 (Ichiko 1973, 184).

3 The notion of honour in Japanese warrior culture and its change over time has been discussed by several scholars, including John W. Hall, Jeffrey Mass, Cameron Hurst, Karl Friday and Oleg Benesch.

4 *Ujigawa senjin* is the title of this episode in the *Kakuichi-bon* of the *Heike monogatari* variant, other variants use different titles. However, the *Kakuichi-bon* title became widespread already in Tokugawa times as it often appears on prints depicting this story. There are several English translations of the *Kakuichi-bon* that offer slightly different variations of the title, but to avoid confusion I chose to use transliteration of the Japanese.

such as woodblock printed picture prints, commonly called *ukiyo-e* (浮世絵), and illustrated books (絵本). The immense popularity of *Ujigawa senjin* in Tokugawa material culture begs explanation. Genpei war tales were more than history by Tokugawa times, they were part of an intricate web of cultural meanings and imagery. This allowed Genpei stories like *Ujigawa senjin* to be used in various ways and by various groups in society. This paper is part of a wider research, and offers only a few considerations with a focus on elite art. I suggest that for the warrior elites of Tokugawa times *Ujigawa senjin* offered a unique mix of warrior and courtly associations that fit well with their self-image of warriors in peaceful times.[5]

Ujigawa senjin: Background and Sources

Genpei war tales come to us in numerous versions. To begin with, the *Heike monogatari* (平家物語) that famously chronicles the war has close to a hundred variants that differ in length, detail and approach (Oyler 2006, 1–2). The best known of the variants today is the *Kakuichi-bon* (覚一本), named after its assumed composer, Akashi Kakuichi (明石覚一, c.1300–1371), a blind reciter of the *Heike monogatari* that had his own—immensely successful—version of the tale written down before his death. The *Kakuichi-bon* was meant for oral recitation and is thus relatively short and more stylised than other variants. The longest variant, the *Genpei jōsuiki* (源平盛衰記), includes far more detail and often offers additional insight to the characters' opinions and motivations (Oyler 2006, 14–16). Both the *Kakuichi-bon* and the *Genpei jōsuiki* were published in print in the early seventeenth century, making them available to readers of all social strata (Watson 1993, 17; Gunji 2017, 5–6). More importantly for this study, both variants have affected the iconography of Genpei images, or *Genpei-e* (源平絵), making them particularly relevant for the research of Genpei art.[6] The majority of the frequently painted Genpei stories also have famous adaptations to the stage. *Ujigawa senjin* stands out as a popular image that does not have a source in drama, accentuating the importance of *Heike monogatari* variants as its source.[7]

5 This paper is part of my doctoral degree research and an earlier version of it was presented in the *Bushidō in Transformation: Japanese Warrior Culture and Martiality* conference organised by the Department of Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, 25–26 August 2017. I would like to thank the organisers for the wonderful opportunity to share some of my ideas.

6 For example, many depictions of the race show Kagesue holding his bow in his mouth to free his hands while retying his girth. This detail is unique to the *Genpei jōsuiki*, making it an undoubtful source for Genpei iconography.

7 There is only one *nō* play (謡曲) that relates to *Ujigawa senjin* in any way. Titled *Sasaki* (佐々木), this play focuses on Takatsuna's interview with Yoritomo before setting out to battle and his confrontation with Kagesue. The concluding lines describe Takatsuna's victory but add nothing to the visual description of the race. The text of the play can be found in Chishin 1911, 178–81.

Visualisations of the *Ujigawa senjin* episode focus on the river crossing, usually showing Takatsuna and Kagesue galloping toward the river or already in mid-stream, their horses immersed to their bellies (Fig. 1). As is often the case, textual descriptions of the story include much more detail. For one, the episode includes several more stories of warriors attempting to cross the river's current, yet depictions of those are rare, and the racing figures of Takatsuna and Kagesue are usually isolated from the greater battle scene that surrounded them.[8] More importantly to the understanding of *Ujigawa senjin*, however, is the background given in an earlier episode titled *Ikezuki no sata* (生ずきの沙汰).[9]

Figure 1: Depiction of Takatsuna and Kagesue racing from the Ujigawa senjin episode. Heike Monogatari Picture Scrolls (平家物語絵巻). Set of 36 scrolls, attributed to the Tosa School, mid-17th c., colour and gold on paper; H. 35.2 cm, Hayashibara Museum of Art, Okayama, Japan.

8 Other stories included in the *Ujigawa senjin* episode are those of Hatakeyama no Shōji Jirō Shigetada (畠山の庄司次郎重忠, 1164–1205) and Ōkushi Jirō Shigechika (大串次郎重親, years unknown) in the *Kakuichi-bon*. Other variants, like the *Genpei jōsuiki*, also include a story of how Kumagai Naozane (熊谷直実, 1141–1207) and his son Naoie (熊谷直家, 1169–1221) tried to cross the bridge by walking its beams, among others.

9 The name Ikezuki is written differently in the assorted variants, usually 生ズキ, 生飡 or 池掬. The title *Ikezuki no sata* comes from the *Kakuichi-bon* but seems to have been less commonplace than *Ujigawa senjin*, and the story appears under different titles. It is interesting to note that in the *Heike monogatari emaki* set of scrolls held in the Hayashibara Museum, which follows the *Kakuichi-bon* structure, this story was combined with the *Ujigawa senjin* storyline under the title *Ujigawa no koto* (宇治川のこと).

Ikezuki is the name of the horse ridden by Takatsuna in *Ujigawa senjin*, which belonged to Minamoto no Yoritomo (源頼朝, 1147–1199) and was famed as the best horse in the land. Before setting out to battle, both Takatsuna and Kagesue stopped in Kamakura to pay their respects to their lord, Yoritomo. Kagesue took this opportunity to request Ikezuki for the battle, but was refused and offered another celebrated steed, the black Surusumi (磨墨), instead. Kagesue's disappointment turned into rage when, upon arriving to the battlefield at Uji, he recognised the chestnut-coloured Ikezuki at the hands of Takatsuna. Humiliated and furious he confronted Takatsuna, planning to kill the man. But Kagesue's fury vanished as Takatsuna explained that Ikezuki was not a gift, that he stole the horse knowing full well that Yoritomo will refuse a request to lend it. Kagesue was pleased by this story, satisfied that their lord, Yoritomo, did not favour Takatsuna. However, the story of the theft was a lie, concocted by Takatsuna to avoid fighting Kagesue. The text makes clear that Yoritomo did bestow Takatsuna with Ikezuki, and even warned him that some hostility could occur because others wanted the horse (Ichiko 1973, 177–82; McCullough 1988, 282–6; Mizuhara 1989, 272–3).

Kagesue's visit to Yoritomo and his confrontation with Takatsuna are often added to the depiction of the *Ujigawa senjin* chapter in formats such as handscrolls and painting albums (画帖) that allow multiple images for each chapter. The choice to illustrate this information, and not the stories of other warriors crossing the river, was probably made because the visit and confrontation scenes are the background of the iconic race scene, thus creating a more complete visual setting for the episode. At the same time, this choice highlights the importance of Takatsuna's and Kagesue's story. The choice to focus on the Takatsuna-Kagesue storyline is especially clear in elite art formats, while woodblock prints often include other episodes instead. A good example is illustrated printed books, which were sometimes structured similarly to picture scrolls with several images for each episode. Other illustrated books included only one image for each chapter, and condensed in it much more of the activity described in the text (Fig. 2). *Ukiyo-e* picture prints mostly follow the second option and show a combination of storylines. Thus, printed illustrations of *Ujigawa senjin* seem more interested in conveying the chaos and vigour of war than any specific storyline, while elite depictions of the episode clearly focus on Takatsuna and Kagesue.

The *Genpei jōsuiki*'s version of Takatsuna and Kagesue's story expands on the men's visits to Yoritomo, but does not offer much more explanation as to why Yoritomo gave Ikezuki to Takatsuna. Both men are deemed worthy of the horse in Yoritomo's eyes. Indeed, he considers Kagesue's request favourably and only refuses because many have already asked for Ikezuki and he worries that gifting

the horse could cause disputes. Yet when Takatsuna is in need of a horse Yoritomo gives Ikezuki away after all.[10] Perhaps because Yoritomo's favour is clear Takatsuna leaves with a promise to show his worth by being the first to cross the River Uji.



*Figure 2: This depiction of the Ujigawa senjin story shows Takatsuna and Kagesue on the right page, but includes other storylines from the episode. Genpei Jōsuiki zue (*源平盛衰記図会*), Akisato Rito (*秋里籬島*), Nishimura Chuwa (*西村中和*) and Oku Bunmei (*奥文鳴*), 1843, Set of six illustrated books, Waseda University.*

10 In the *Genpei jōsuiki* Yoritomo mentions Kagesue specifically, as well as his brother Minamoto no Noriyori, as men who requested Ikezuki and could be angered by Takatsuna's possession of the horse. (Mizuhara 1988, 270–4). The *Kakuichi-bon* does not offer a reason for Yoritomo's sudden agreement to give Ikezuki away, but the *Genpei jōsuiki* seems to imply that he simply did not have any other good horse to give. One variant that does give a reason for Yoritomo's favouritism is the *Engyō-bon* (延慶本), in which a brash and discourteous Kagesue is contrasted with a polite and filial Takatsuna. See Franks 2009, 54–86.

He even goes as far as saying that only death will stop him from being first (Ichiko 1975, 179; McCullough 1988, 284; Mizuhara 1989, 273). It is this promise that makes his competition with Kagesue a matter of life and death, and perhaps even more important at the time, a matter of honour.

Deception in the Name of Honour

A warrior's honour and reputation were his most prised possessions in pre-modern Japan. Gaining repute was not only for oneself, it passed down the family line, granting one's descendants status and often monetary rewards. In the same way, a tarnished name could harm a family for generations. The main currency for a warrior's reputation was success on the battlefield, and while numerous stories tell how warriors willingly sacrificed themselves to gain fame, just as many tell of those fighting tooth and nail to live to tell the tale. After all, reputation cannot be made without witnesses (Friday 2009, 56–58). The *Ujigawa senjin* story does not include a battle to the death, but Takatsuna would have considered it a great shame to lose, especially given his promise to Yoritomo, and was thus willing to use any means to achieve victory. The use of deception in a battle of honour may seems contradictory, but the notion of honour is a rather ambiguous one and differs over time and between cultures.

Medieval Japanese war tales show that deception was an acceptable means on the battlefield. From warriors donning women's clothing to escape death to hiding the small numbers of your force by creating a racket, there are ample examples of deception on the battlefield. The term *damashi-uchi* (だまし討ち), which translates as "striking down by deception" or "deception kill," is often used for one-on-one confrontations that demonstrate the use of wit to win. There was no dishonour in distracting your foe in order to kill him, quite the contrary, the victim of the deception was criticized for not being on his guard while the victor was hailed for quick wit and resourcefulness (Saeki 2004, 14–29; Franks 2009, 62). *Ujigawa senjin* is an example of deception on the battlefield and fits with the logic of *damashi-uchi*, but it is certainly not its most straightforward example.

The best known example of *damashi-uchi* is probably the story of Taira no Moritoshi, also known as Etchū no Zenji (平盛俊, 越中前司, ? –1184), which took place in 1184 during the aftermath of the Battle of Ichinotani (一の谷の戦い). The Taira fort in Ichinotani was burned and the the Taira were escaping to their boats, chased by Minamoto warriors searching for glory. Inomata no Koheiroku Noritsuna (猪俣小平六則綱, ? –1192), who fought on the Minamoto side, rode to attack Moritoshi, tackled him and they fell to the ground. Both men were strong, but Moritoshi was stronger and succeeded in pinning Noritusna down.

Moritoshi was ready to make the final strike when Noritsuna called him out, saying that without an exchange of names the killing would be worthless. Moritoshi relented, and the two introduced themselves. Noritsuna then continued to suggest that Moritoshi surrendered, the Taira were lost but he, Noritsuna, could help Moritoshi and recommend him to the Minamoto leaders. Moritoshi was reluctant, but was finally convinced to accept the offer and the two sat down by a rice paddy. As they rested, another Minamoto warrior approached. Moritoshi tried to keep an eye on both Noritsuna and the new arrival, but Noritsuna used a moment of distraction, attacked and killed Moritoshi (Ichiko 1975, 238–41; McCullough 1988, 312–3; Mizuhara 1991, 77–80). Moritoshi's story is a perfect example of *damashi-uchi*. Noritsuna was not as strong or skilled a warrior as Moritoshi, but managed to turn the situation by outwitting him.

Figure 3: Noritsuna and Moritoshi resting by the rice paddy, Noritsuna is already moving to attack the unsuspecting Moritoshi. Heike Monogatari Picture Scrolls, Hayashibara Museum of Art, Okayama, Japan.

The story of Moritoshi's death is a very well-known episode, and is depicted in Genpei art. The iconic image of this scene shows the two warriors sitting by the

rice paddy, a moment before Noritsuna's attack (Fig. 3). There are quite a few depictions of this story, although they do not stand on their own. Moritoshi's story appears in handscrolls, albums and battle screens of Ichinotani, but it is not found as the solitary topic of an artwork. This is very clear in elite works, but even in printed popular art Moritoshi's tale is uncommon. It appears in illustrated books of *Heike monogatari* and *Genpei jōsuiki*, as well as some painting manuals and collections of warrior images, but it is very rarely the topic of a picture print.[11] In fact, I only found one example, an 1857 print by Utagawa Kuniyoshi (歌川国芳, 1797–1861) that shows the two men's struggle (Fig. 4).[12] This print, however, is not a standalone image. It is from a thematic series titled *Heroes Matched to Five Colours* (英勇五色合). Moreover, the image does not include a textual description of the story, and because the common iconography is not used the characters are only recognised by the name cartouches. However, considering how rare depictions of this story were, the lack of explanatory text suggests that it was known.

Figure 4: Blue: Inomata no Koheiroku Noritsuna, Etchu no Zenji Moritoshi from the series Heroes Matched to Five Colours. Utagawa Kuniyoshi, 1857, multicoloured woodblock print, ōban tate-e. The British Museum Collection, gift of Prof. Arthur R. Miller to the American Friends of the British Museum. Photograph © The British Museum

11 The appearance of Moritoshi's story in painting manuals is interesting considering the relative rarity of the image. Jenny Preston suggests that the scene was often used with no relation to the original context, instead building on the general familiarity with the story for puns and for conveying socio-political messages (Preston 2013, 163–71).

12 Since Moritoshi and Noritsuna were well-known figures, their names are included in some Genpei War picture prints that depict other scenes, but their confrontation is not painted.

This in turn implies that its unpopularity in visual art was not based in the unpopularity of the story itself, but perhaps in its message, which by Tokugawa times was seen as problematic.

What we call *damashi-uchi* springs from the experience of war and the realities of the battlefield. Winning and surviving the battles were important, and when a warrior presented the head of his defeated foe it is doubtful that his methods were questioned.[13] However, as the battles of the sixteen-century faded into the Tokugawa period, new ideas regarding appropriate warrior conduct formed. These ideas were based on ideals rather than on experience, and tended to be far more fixed and in a way deadlier.

Death on the battlefield was now hailed as heroic, especially at the hands of a worthy foe, and while *damashi-uchi* was still accepted as a battle strategy it was no longer admired. The use of deception on the battlefield was now considered shaming, but the fact that it was still discussed kept the option open. For example, an anonymous text from the early Edo period, titled *Annotations to Heike monogatari* (平家物語抄), praises Noritsuna's resourcefulness but also cautions that such tactic brings shame that will last for generations (Saeki 2004, 176). It is probable that in the minds of many Tokugawa warriors Noritsuna should have accepted death at the hands of the famed Moritoshi. This change in perspective might be the reason for the low number of visualisations of this scene. However, if indeed deception was no longer accepted as battle conduct, the popularity of the *Ujigawa senjin* episode is curious. On the one hand, it could be claimed that Takatsuna's deceit was not as immoral as Noritsuna's, since it did not lead to death. But on the other, resorting to trickery in a competition against your ally could be deemed even lower. Since deception was no longer an admired battlefield strategy in Tokugawa times, *Ujigawa senjin* had to offer more than this controversial discussion to be so widespread. I would like to suggest that the popularity of the scene had less to do with the story of the race itself, and more with details around it.

The River Uji and the Lord of Kamakura

One possible reason for the popularity of *Ujigawa senjin* is Takatsuna's promise to Yoritomo that he would win the race. *Heike monogatari* variants show this promise in different light, in the *Genpei jōsuiki* Takatsuna seems genuinely touched by his lord's gift of Ikezuki and the promise a gut reaction, while in the *Kakuichi-bon*

13 It is possible that the idea of challenging a "worthy foe" was helpful in this aspect. Defeating a high rank or famed enemy was effective for receiving rewards, but can also be seen as a reason to use any means to win.

Takatsuna's promise raises eyebrows, and some criticise it as boastful (Ichiko 1975, 179; McCullough 1988, 284; Mizuhara 1989, 273–4). Either way, Takatsuna's promise to win the race across the River Uji creates a direct connection between him and his victory and Yoritomo, the high lord of Kamakura.

Yoritomo was the leader of the Minamoto during the Genpei War, but for the most part he was not on the battlefield. More concerned with establishing and stabilizing his warrior government in Kamakura, Yoritomo usually relied on his brothers, Noriyori (源範頼, ?–1193) and Yoshitsune (源義経, 1159–1189), to lead forces in battle. Therefore, very few of the examples of lord-retainer relationships and loyalty in Genpei stories mention Yoritomo, making *Ujigawa senjin* a rather rare example of a warrior acting in direct loyalty to Yoritomo.[14] Considering that the Tokugawa, like preceding shogunal lines, related themselves to the first shogun, Yoritomo, Takatsuna's promise could certainly be a reason for the episode's popularity among warrior elites.[15] However, not all audiences were necessarily interested in highlighting connections to the shogunate. *Ujigawa senjin* was a common topic in prints as well, and while popular art could not openly criticize the Tokugawa regime, it rarely endorsed it. Moreover, Yoritomo is only in the background of the story, especially since its iconic scene is the race itself and does not include Yoritomo. Indeed, some depictions of *Ujigawa senjin* include Yoshitsune as the field marshal of the battle, which greatly reduces the Yoritomo connection. Furthermore, there are several painting themes depicting Yoritomo directly, thus the connection with Yoritomo may have added to the popularity of *Ujigawa senjin*, but it is doubtful that it was the main reason for it.

Ujigawa senjin appears in a wide variety of formats, and, to my knowledge, is the only Genpei story to appear on lacquer writing boxes (Fig. 5). I have only seen three examples of writing boxes with an *Ujigawa senjin* theme, but even without assuming that more exist, the fact that this is the only Genpei scene to appear on writing boxes is intriguing. To begin with, writing boxes are not associated with warrior culture. Warriors owned them, of course, but being an item related

14 It should be noted that Yoshitsune is often described as loyal to Yoritomo, in *Heike* variants and in other texts. However, considering the bitter end of the brothers' relationship it would have been hard to use Yoshitsune as a model of loyalty to the Kamakura lord.

15 The importance of Takatsuna's promise to Yoritomo can be understood from an anecdote mentioned in the eighteenth-century *Jōzan kidan* (常山記談), written by Yuasa Jōzan (湯浅常山, 1708–1781). He describes how a warrior named Sano Fusatsuna (佐野房綱, 1558–1601) was moved to tears upon hearing a recitation of the *Ujigawa senjin* and *Nasu no Yoichi* episodes of the *Heike Monogatari*. When asked why he was so touched by these stories, both of which describe a battle of honour, Fusatsuna explained that it was Takatsuna's and Yoichi's determination to die if they could not fulfil their promises to their lord that moved him so (Yuasa and Suzuki 1965, 28–29; Gunji 2017, 7).

to literary skills they were more associated with courtly traditions, and usually decorated with poetic themes. Secondly, the *Heike monogatari* includes numerous poems and mentions of poets that seem better related to literary traditions. The choice of *Ujigawa senjin* seems odd, except for the fact that the story took place in Uji.

Figure 5: Suzuri-Bako (Writing Box), Iizuka Toyo and Chobei Tatsuke, 1700s, wood, lacquer, gold, silver, and stone; 20 x 19 cm. Denver Art Museum Collection, gift of Mr. and Mrs. George A. Argabrite, (1975.102.) Photograph © Denver Art Museum.

Uji is one of the earliest famous places, or *meisho* (名所), in Japan; it was mentioned in numerous poems and literary works, it was also one of the earliest Japanese *meisho* to be depicted in painting.[16] Uji had many associations, but in painting its first and foremost icon was the Uji Bridge. The bridge was intricately

16 Before turning to local Japanese *meisho*, Japanese artists depicted Chinese famous places that had an important place in the Japanese poetic imagination. Uji is one of the earliest Japanese locations to be depicted as part of the development of the *Yamato-e* painting style. (Murase 2000, 202–3)

connected through poetry with the image of women abandoned by their lovers, making weeping willows, whose long branches were associated with the tangled hair of an unkempt woman, its perfect companion.[17] The fast current of the River Uji was associated with the turning of the wheel of the Dharma, which was marked in painting by the inclusion of a waterwheel (Screech 2000, 247). The Uji bridge became an *utamakura* (歌枕) and continued to be a popular theme over the years both in literary works and visual art. From the Momoyama period (桃山時代, 1573–1603) alone at least ten folding screens showing the bridge survive today, suggesting the existence of more examples (Munsterberg 1955, 107).[18] The details and finishing of Momoyama Uji Bridge screens differ, but they generally include willows and a waterwheel (Fig. 6).

Figure 6: Willow Bridge and Water Wheel (Uji Bridge), left of a pair
Unknown artist, second half 16th century, Six-panel folding screen, ink, colour, gold, and silver on paper, 142.88 x 335.76 cm. Minneapolis Institute of Art, The Putnam Dana McMillan Fund and gift of funds from the Mary Livingston Griggs and Mary Griggs Burke Foundation (2004.178.1) Photograph © Minneapolis Institute of Art

17 The association of the River Uji and its bridge with women's plight in love was already well established in the Heian period (平安時代, 794–1180). The tenth-century *Kokinwakashū* (古今和歌集) includes a poem describing a woman, known only as Hashihime (橋姫), the Lady of the Bridge, who awaited her lover with no avail. Uji and the Uji Bridge continued to appear in *Genji monogatari* (源氏物語) as backdrop to Lady Ukifune's suffering in love. (Shirane 1987, 156; Screech 2000, 247). Tangled and unkempt hair was a signifier of either a poor or abandoned woman in Heian literature. Well-kept hair was the symbol of a dignified court lady, while wild hair could symbolise the loss of social position, peace of mind or connection with society. For a discussion of the use of hair in the representation of women in mediaeval Japan see Pandey 2016.

18 The latest edition of Munsterberg's book, published 2011, still counts ten examples of Uji Bridge screens from the Momoyama.

Figure 7: The Battle at Uji River, Anonymous, first half of the 17th century, single six-fold screen, colour on paper and gold leaf, 152.1 x 349.4 cm. Photograph © Victoria and Albert Museum

The fact that several battles took place at the Uji Bridge was usually kept separate from the place's poetic associations. Visual depictions thus tended to focus on either the poetic-literary tradition or war tales and battles. However, the placing of the *Ujigawa senjin* scene on a writing box connects the two threads in one object. An even clearer connection was made in an *Ujigawa senjin* folding screen held in the Victoria and Albert Museum (Fig. 7). At first glance this exquisite screen seems like other *Ujigawa senjin* depictions, with Takatsuna riding Ikezuki into the water and Kagesue on the black Surusumi trying to catch up. However, this screen includes elements of the poetic tradition of Uji, a waterwheel in the right bottom corner and weeping willows planted at the base of the bridge. The bridge itself has the same compositional presence as in most Momoyama Uji Bridge screens, only that its planks have been removed, exposing the skeleton of its flowing form. The screen balances poetic and warrior traditions beautifully, melding them into one. Although we do not have information on the production of this screen, it is probable that its patron was a warrior that wanted to associate himself with court traditions. The dating of the screen to the first half of the seventeenth century fits with the attempt to combine the traditions, as warrior elites settled into the new peace and their new position in it.

The Victoria and Albert screen is a unique case, but it is plausible that the poetic association of Uji had contributed much to the popularity of *Ujigawa senjin* in early modern art. Other famous battles took place at Uji, but they were violent and perhaps not fitting with the new peace of Tokugawa. The relative

light-heartedness of the *Ujigawa senjin* scene, showcasing a battle of wit instead of a battle to the death, made it more compatible for the amalgamation of poetic and warrior traditions. Takatsuna's conduct could be seen as dishonourable, but the promise he gave his lord, Yoritomo, made it acceptable. For the warrior elites of Tokugawa times *Ujigawa senjin* was a window to past glories of their class as well as a connection to the ever-important court traditions through the poetic associations of Uji. Connecting warrior history and poetic tradition was a statement of the new self-image of warriors in Tokugawa times, strongly rooted in the history that gave their rule legitimacy, but also well educated and cultivated. Artworks depicting *Ujigawa senjin* were an embodiment of this self-image and, as the number of extant folding screens that depict this scene suggest, proudly decorated the homes of numerous warriors.

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Modern Transformations

Pure Spirits: Imperial Japanese Justice and Right-Wing Terrorists, 1878–1936

*Danny ORBACH**

Abstract

Why was the legal system in 1930s Japan so friendly to right-wing offenders, even when they tried to assassinate leading statesmen and generals? The answer is intertwined with a cultural narrative defined here as "subjectivism", that assigned vital importance to a criminal's subjective state of mind when evaluating his or her transgressions. Though influenced by Western thought, this narrative was indigenous to Japan. It originated in the late Edo period, shortly prior to the establishment of the Meiji State in 1868, under specific historical circumstances and was later reinforced by the policy of the early Meiji State. Consequently, it pervaded education, politics and popular discourse alike, in the civilian sphere and even more so in the army.

Until the early 1920s, this trend had a relatively modest influence on the Japanese justice system. It then began to gain traction in military courts dealing with political crimes of army personnel. From 1932 it influenced civilian courts as well, though civilian judges were relatively more reluctant to accept it than their military peers. After a peak in the mid-1930s, it again receded into the background, following the abortive coup d'état of February 26, 1936.

Keywords: Modern Japan, Japanese law, legal history, subjectivism, political terrorism

Nepokvarjeni duhovi: pravosodje v Japonskem cesarstvu in desničarski teroristi med letoma 1878 in 1936

Izvleček

Zakaj je bil japonski pravni sistem v tridesetih letih 20. stoletja tako prizanesljiv do desničarskih prestopnikov, tudi tistih, ki so poskušali izvesti atentate na vodilne državnike in generale? Odgovor lahko najdemo v ideološkem diskurzu, ki ga tu definiramo kot »subjektivizem« in ki je pri obravnavanju kršitev za najpomemnbejši faktor prepoznal subjektivno stanje duha kriminalcev. Čeprav je bil prežet z zahodno miselnostjo, gre za domoroden japonski diskurz. Izvira iz posebnih zgodovinskih okoliščin poznega obdobja Edo, tik pred ustanovitvijo mejdžijevske države leta 1868, ki ga je s svojo politiko pozneje utrdila. Zaradi tega je imel ta diskurz velik vpliv v civilni sferi in še bolj v vojski, pri čemer ga lahko prepoznamo v izobraževanju, politiki in popularni kulturi.

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Do začetka dvajsetih let 20. stoletja v japonskem pravosodnem sistemu ta trend ni imel večje vloge, nato pa je postajal vse bolj izrazit na vojaških sodiščih, ki so obravnavala politično motivirana kazniva dejanja vojaškega osebja. Od leta 1932 se je v manjši meri razširil tudi na civilna sodišča, četudi so bili civilni sodniki bolj zadržani. Vrhunec je trend dosegel sredi tridesetih let, nato pa se je po neuspelem državnem udaru 26. februarja 1936 ponovno umaknil v ozadje.

Ključne besede: moderna Japonska, japonsko pravo, pravna zgodovina, subjektivizem, politični terorizem

In October 1931, the Japanese Imperial Army uncovered one of the most dangerous plots in the history of pre-war Japan. Teams of military policemen, accompanied by newspaper reporters and camera crews, surrounded a pub and arrested a group of officers within. This cabal, the inner circle of an underground organisation called the *Sakura-kai* (Cherry Blossom Society), had plotted to wipe out Japan's civilian and military leadership with machine guns, naval bombers and poisonous gas. After this bloodbath, the group had planned to install as prime minister General Araki Sadao, the leader of the radical-reformist "Imperial Way Faction", and to launch the "Showa Restoration": a reform plan encompassing social justice at home and relentless imperial expansion abroad.

After the arrest of the ringleaders, the chief of the Military Police declared that he would treat them "according to the spirit of *bushidō*", the Japanese way of the warrior. Accordingly, the plotters received a "punishment" of ten days detention in a luxurious inn, with alcohol and geisha. Some of them were quietly released from the army, while others resumed their military careers as if nothing had happened (Orbach 2017, 215, 218–9).[1]

In the interwar period, Japan was not unique in treating right-wing terrorists with such leniency. In Weimar Germany, terrorists from the right received far milder sentences, on average, than those associated with communist and socialist parties. In the 1920s, the German judicial system was a holdout of the previous Imperial Regime, and many judges looked at the Republic's government with open hostility. The judiciary, especially in the early and late years of the Republic, was a right-leaning oppositional force and naturally sympathised with right-wing defendants.[2] In other countries, such as interwar Poland, the courts showed leniency

1 This article is based in part on my research for the aforementioned book. I would like to thank the Azrieli Foundation and the Harry S. Truman Institute in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, for their generous financial assistance for the duration of this project.

2 One of the newest studies on this subject is: Anthony McElligott's *Rethinking the Weimar Republic* (2014, 99–101). For comparative statistical data on the punishment of left- and right-wing political murderers in the early years of the Weimar Republic, see Emil J. Gumpel's classic work *Vier Jahre politischer Mord* (1922, 81).

to rioters who carried out violence against minorities.[3] Such an approach may seem unfair from our point of view, but it is relatively straightforward to explain.

In Japan, however, this leniency is not as easy to comprehend. The judiciary did not sympathise with any oppositional force, as in Weimar Germany. In fact, it was strictly loyal to the Imperial Regime. And yet, the *Sakura-kai* received a mere slap on the wrist for planning to wipe out the cabinet. Then, in May 1932, the murderers of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi received jail sentences of three to 15 years instead of the death penalty. Indeed, this is one of the most intriguing questions in pre-war Japanese history: why did leaders, politicians, officers and jurists treated with such leniency the very people who tried to kill them, or at least overthrow the regime they represented?

This problem was recently tackled by John D. Person in his study on the policing of far-right groups during the 1930s. In his analysis, Person (2017, 289–319) explains the relative failure of Japanese law enforcement agencies to neutralise right-wing terrorist groups, even though senior police officers understood how dangerous they were. Person's analysis clearly shows that officers in organs charged with fighting such groups, such as the Justice Ministry, the Special Higher Police and the Military Police, did so with great reluctance and circumspection, and not without emotional difficulty. In a speech to younger officials, given in October 1938, veteran procurator Sano Shigeki confessed that his relentless struggle against right-wing terrorists had made him and his colleagues "battle weary, and at times we would like to pass on the baton [...] sooner rather than later" (Person 2017, 290). Even after right-wing terrorists assassinated national leaders in the early 1930s, the law enforcement agencies had to apply soft methods of control. When the police finally decided on a crackdown in May 1935, it had to mask the arrests of right-wing activists under the aegis of a general campaign against criminal violence (this approach was possible because many nationalist groups were also engaged in extortion and other non-political crimes) (Person 2017, 299, 313)[4].

Person offers several explanations for the laxity of Japanese law enforcement in controlling right-wing violence. Some of them are organisational, such as the failure of the various agencies to coordinate with one another. Others are more ideological. The state, he argues, found it difficult to deal with right-wing nationalism because it was a radicalised version of official state ideology (Person, 293–4, 307, 318). Wagatsuma Sakae offered a very similar explanation, focusing on the difficulty of punishing transgressors who expressed loyalty to the Emperor, to

3 See for example: Cooper 2000, 68.

4 Richard H. Mitchell's (1922) thorough study of political justice in Japan focuses mainly on communist defendants, and hardly touches the question of their motives as a factor in sentencing.

whom law enforcers felt more committed than to the letter of the law (Wagatsuma 1968–70, 453–63).

Yet *why* did the state put such a strong emphasis on the ideas of political terrorists rather than on the consequences of their criminal actions? The source of this emphasis, I will argue in this paper, went back decades, and was intertwined with an often-overlooked cultural narrative that was prevalent in pre-war Japan. This narrative, which I will call "subjectivism", assigned vital importance to a criminal's subjective state of mind when evaluating his or her transgressions. Though influenced by Western thought, this narrative was indigenous to Japan. It originated in the late Edo period, shortly prior to the establishment of the Meiji State in 1868, under specific historical circumstances and was later reinforced by the policy of the early Meiji State. Consequently, it pervaded education, politics and popular discourse alike, in the civilian sphere and even more so in the army.

Until the early 1920s, this trend had a relatively modest influence on the Japanese justice system. It then began to gain traction in military courts dealing with political crimes of army personnel. From 1932 it influenced civilian courts as well, though civilian judges were relatively more reluctant to accept it than their military peers. After a peak in the mid-1930s, it again receded into the background, following the abortive coup d'état of February 26, 1936. Why this was the case is our concern for the remainder of this paper.

Ideological Genesis: Subjectivism and the Ideals of the *Shishi*

The Imperial Meiji regime (1868–1945) was created by a group of revolutionary samurai who fought against the Tokugawa shogunate during the 1860s. Many of these people, widely known as *shishi* (warriors of high aspiration), began their careers as terrorists who attacked foreigners and shogunate officials under the slogan *sonnō jōi* (Revere the Emperor and Expel the Barbarians). As scions of low- and middle-ranking samurai families, they felt underprivileged by the regime, by the worsening living conditions of their class and by a series of economic crises that hit the country in the nineteenth century. In 1853, when the shogunate was coerced by the Americans into opening Japan up to foreign trade, such samurai found xenophobic rage a convenient outlet for their multiple frustrations. They rallied against the *shōgun* who failed to protect the country from the "foreign barbarians". At the same time, influenced by the ideology of "national studies" (*kokugaku*), they revered the distant Emperor in Kyōto, hitherto only a powerless nominal ruler (Huber 1982).

Throughout the 1860s, some leaders of the *shishi* movement gradually shed their original xenophobic ideas, cooperated with representatives of Western powers and adapted themselves to pragmatic power politics. In January 1868, backed by the military power of the Chōshū and Satsuma domains, they led a revolutionary alliance against the shogunate. Seizing power after a short civil war, the new leaders launched radical Western-style reforms in a volte-face from their original xenophobic platform.[5]

One idea popular among the *shishi*, including people who became national leaders after 1868, was an emphasis on the subjective state of mind of an individual above and beyond the consequences of his or her actions. According to this ideology of subjectivism, the state of mind of an ideal *shishi* had to include several components:

1. *Spontaneity* – The *shishi* was expected to act violently when feeling righteous indignation, because spontaneous outbursts of emotion showed the purity of one's feelings and intentions. Lack of planning and calculation was an important part of this ideal (Harutoonian 1970, 193; Jansen 1994, 98–99, 136; Satow 1998, 71).
2. *Sincerity* – In *shishi* circles, terms such as madness (*kyō*) and folly (*gu*) were positive markers, denoting an individual's sincere readiness to sacrifice his life (Harutoonian 1970, 221–2)[6]. In 1860, when a contingent of *shishi* from the Tosa domain made their way to Edo, some of them wanted to disembowel themselves "to push the others to greater heroism", and were dissuaded "only with great difficulty" (Jansen 1994, 136). Such a move made no personal sense: it was only an extreme way to display a sincere readiness to die for the cause.
3. *Pure Motives* – A *shishi* may be mistaken, may do harm and even fight on the wrong side. Yet he had to have proper motives. A pure-hearted *shishi* was not only spontaneous and sincere, he also had to intend to fight for the realm and the Emperor—not for private gain, nor for any particular group in society. Of course, many *shishi* were brimming with private desires, and highly concerned with personal honour and interest groups (such as their feudal domains), but in order to be taken seriously they had to create an impression that they worked for the Emperor, the realm and the public good. It is crucial to note here that the public good was always associated with the Japanese monarchy. It was next to impossible to be a *shishi* without being an imperial loyalist (Orbach 2017, 13).

5 For a thorough study of the Meiji Restoration, see Beasley 1972.

6 See also Walthall 1998, 183; Sasaki 1984, 124–5. For the observations of a leading Japanese statesman regarding the difference between madness, or foolhardiness, as a virtue, and madness in the normal sense of the word, see: Ōkuma 1969, 269.

Shishi subjectivism was a homegrown ideology, and at that time still uninfluenced by similar ideas common in the West (for example, among German romanticists). It sprang from indigenous ideological sources, including philosophical schools who influenced some of the *shishi* as youths (Morris 1988, 191–3, 215, 235–6; Harutoonian 1970, 221–4, 387). Psychological reasons were also paramount. The *shishi* lived in a confusing, constantly changing world, where one could have little clue what consequences one's action would bring. The arrival of the foreigners in Japan, the chaos in the shogunate, the general crisis in the country and inside many domains, had cast doubts on accepted values and vested sources of authority. To paraphrase Jean-Francois Lyotard, the upheavals on the 1850s and 1860s were akin to an earthquake that destroyed not only lives and buildings, but also the tools used to measure earthquakes (Lyotard 1988, 56). In the confusion, many *shishi* felt the only thing they could rely on was the purity of their own motives. It therefore made sense to fetishize one's state of mind and to minimise the importance of consequences (Orbach 2017, 13–14).

Myth of the *Shishi*: Subjectivism and Commemoration in the Meiji Period

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, subjectivism did not disappear. Instead, it was gradually reinforced by two subsequent developments: The need to explain the reformist policy of the new leaders, and the commemoration policy designed to revere the heroes of the Meiji Restoration.

The leaders of the Restoration, many of them former *shishi*, had gained power from a xenophobic platform, vowing to "revere the Emperor and expel the barbarians." And yet, they embarked on an unprecedented, ambitious project of Western-style reforms. Many of their followers were obviously disgruntled. In such a situation, it was expedient to argue that the Meiji leaders' state of mind was subjectively pure. Whether they advocated expelling the barbarians or opening the country wide to Western influence, they were moved by imperial loyalty and sincere patriotism. The premium placed on spontaneity, responding instantly to the needs of the moment, was yet another good way to explain their volte-face. Itō Hirobumi, a rising star in the Meiji leadership and a former *shishi* from the Chōshū domain, explained his clique's change of policy in the following words: "When you look back on the things that happened then, they are impossible to understand. But emotionally, it had to be that way" (Craig 1961, 189).

The formal commemoration policy had also played an important role in the growth of subjectivism as a cultural narrative. When the Yasukuni Shrine was

established in 1875 to honour those who had fallen in the Restoration Wars, the government decided to commemorate *shishi* who fell prey to the enforcement of shogunate law during the 1860s (Takata 2012, 43–52, 67–68). Many regional officials sought to maximise the number of local heroes, and petitioned to honour even *shishi* who were executed by the Meiji Government itself, such as those who illegally killed French sailors in the infamous Sakai Incident (1868). Such requests included conventional justifications for the applicants' transgressions (such as self-defence) but were almost always grounded also in their pure motives and sincerity (*sekisei*). Even if they were wrong, these *shishi* sincerely believed they were serving the Emperor (Takata 2012, 50–52).

The government often refused to honour such requests, but sometimes conceded in the long term. In 1913, it finally agreed to enshrine as *shishi* even samurai who had fought against the founders of the Meiji regime, as long as they sincerely believed they had followed the Emperor's will. However, those whose actions were "completely" against the imperial cause, those who knowingly disregarded the Emperor's will, would not be recognised. One's subjective state of mind thus became the most important determinant of commemoration (*Jungoku Shishi* 1913).

Shishi, Subjectivism and Political Assassinations

By commemorating the *shishi*, the government helped to create a subversive narrative. Already in the 1870s, assassins and rebels who worked against the new regime identified themselves implicitly or explicitly with *shishi* traditions, including the ideal of subjectivism. The gang of former samurai who tried to kill Iwakura Tomomi, the minister of the right, in 1874, saw themselves as spontaneous, sincere *shishi* who attacked government officials in order to save the Emperor and the country.[7] The ringleaders of the Saga Rebellion (February to April 1874) denounced the Meiji Government as a "new shogunate", and used the *shishi* as explicit role models.[8]

Saigō Takamori, the most dangerous rebel leader in the 1870s, highly valued sincerity and purity of motives. Prior to his Satsuma Rebellion (1877), he reportedly said that "It is difficult to control a man who neither cares about life, status, wealth or honour. Without such unmanageable people, everyone has to suffer and it is impossible to do great things for the country" (Sagara 1978, 13). Saigō's disciples

7 Iwata to his parents, 28.3.1874, in Fukushima 1927, 121.

8 Testimonies of Takaki Hidetomi and Etō Shimpei in Matono Heisuke (*Etō Nanpaku* 1914, 411–2, 559–60), and the account of the conversation with Itagaki in Matono, *Etō Nanpaku* 1914, 2:409–10 Etō's statement in Matono, *Etō Nanpaku* 1914, 559–60.

and successors, who established nationalist societies such as the *Genyōsha* (Society of the Narrow Sea) and the *Kokuryūkai* (Amur River Society), presented a propaganda narrative of direct continuity between the *shishi* of the 1860s, rebellions during the 1870s and political violence in the 1880s.[9] Members of such societies frequently used the term *minkan shishi* (*shishi* of the people) or other synonyms, such as *yūshi*, *dōshi* or *kokushi*. (Kikuchi 1896, 503; Kuzu 1933–6, 1: 517; Chae 2001, 440, 45–7)[10]. They tried to imitate the behaviour of their role models in various ways, including by adopting subjectivist narratives. Members of patriotic societies and other violent political actors in the Meiji period and beyond boasted values such as spontaneity, sincerity and pure patriotic motives, even when they were busy profiteering from regular crime (Byas 1942, 226; Siniawer 2008, 108–9; Sekigawa 2014, 100–1, 106, 125; Kingsberg 2014).

The activity of such people sometimes resulted in murderous violence against government officials. On February 12, 1889, ultranationalist activist Nishino Buntarō stabbed the Education Minister Mori Arinori to death because he felt Mori had shown irreverence to the Sun Goddess during his visit to the Ise Shrine. While the government strongly condemned the assassination, large parts of the press extolled Nishino as a hero, and folk songs about his bravery became common and popular (Hall 1973, 3–5; Plutschow 2002, 144).

A few months later, Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu was gravely injured when a bomb was thrown into his carriage. The perpetrator, Kurushima Tsuneki, a member of the nationalistic society *Genyōsha*, wanted to protest Ōkuma's "softness" in the negotiations to revise the unequal treaties with the Western powers. The assailant committed suicide, after bowing three times towards the Imperial Palace (Norman 1944, 270).

In accordance with the ideals of subjectivism, even Ōkuma voiced admiration for his would-be murderer. "I don't think he was a madman or a loathsome person [...] comparing him with the weakling youngsters of today, who worry about bread, sob and cry abundantly for women [...] he is truly a wonderful person. I am touched by the bravery, even foolhardiness, of throwing a bomb at myself, the foreign minister, thereby upsetting public opinion [...] It will not do, if young people don't have a vigour that knows no boundaries, strong enough to swallow the entire

9 The narrative of such continuity is strongly expressed in the account of the *Kokuryūkai* on its own history. It often invokes the *shishi*, begins with the Restoration and the rebellions of the 1870s, and goes on to extoll the activities of the *Genyōsha* and the *Kokuryūkai* in later years. See: Kuzu (1933–6).

10 Kobayakawa Hideo, an activist who participated in the assassination of the Korean Queen in 1895, used the terms *dōshi* (brethren), *yūshi* or *minkan shishi* to describe his friends. See: Kobayakawa 1900, 41, 52, 75, 88, 91–2.

world." Ōkuma even transferred regular payments to his assailant's bereaved family (Ōkuma 1969, 1:269, 271; Lebra 1973, 89). By imitating the foolhardiness, sincerity and pure motives of a *shishi*, the assassin pushed the right emotional buttons, winning over even the heart of his victim.

A Dormant Trend: Subjectivism in Political Assassination Trials until the Early 1920s

The *shishi* myth and the related ideal of subjectivism had great impact on right-wing political terrorists, as well as some leverage as a cultural narrative. They had strong currency among the activists of nationalist societies and even among leaders who were targeted by right-wing terrorists, such as Ōkuma Shigenobu. Their practical influence on the judiciary, however, was relatively modest until the early 1920s.

This tendency owed, at least in part, to the legal theory of the time. Throughout the history of modern Japan, Japanese jurisprudence was significantly influenced by Western ideas. From the early Meiji period and until the enactment of the new penal code in 1907, and to some extent well into the 1920s, the foreign legal theory most popular in Japan emphasised deterrence and retribution, and thus focused more on a defendant's objective violation of the law rather than on his motives and state of mind. Therefore, the judiciary was relatively immune to the influence of *shishi* subjectivism (Kenzo 1963, 15–18).

The trials of political assassins from 1877 to 1916 reflected this prevailing theory. After the government defeated the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, right-wing assassins made several attempts to kill major national leaders. In 1878, a vengeful former samurai assassinated the Home Minister Ōkubo Toshimichi. 1882 saw a failed attempt to kill Itagaki Taisuke, the leader of the oppositional Movement for Freedom and People's Rights. In 1889, as we have seen, Mori Arinori was killed, and Ōkuma Shigenobu was injured. In 1916, there was yet another failed attempt to kill Ōkuma Shigenobu, who by then was prime minister.

Only in the attempts to kill Ōkubo in 1878, Itagaki in 1882, and Ōkuma in 1916, were the assassins caught alive to face trial. Ōkubo's assassin was sentenced to death and beheaded relatively quickly, as was usually the case with rebels in the 1870s. Though Itagaki's assailant tried to present himself as a spontaneous and sincere patriot with pure motives, this did not play a significant role in his sentencing. The procurator warned that if political assassinations "for the public good" were condoned, society would be flooded with political violence, and the public good would suffer. The judges agreed with the prosecution's anti-subjectivist

stance, and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without considering his pure motives as mitigating circumstances (NSSS 1:528, 531–2).[11] In the trial of Ōkuma's assailant in 1916, the motives of the assassin were not really brought up as an argument in his favour, not even by the defence (NSSS 3:135–67).

Still, even in these trials, as in all political trials in the period, the sentences almost always began with a lengthy description of the defendant's motives. This did not really help the accused in the aforementioned cases. And yet, if they wanted, judges could show leniency to criminals with pure and patriotic motives. The prevailing legal doctrine in Japan allowed the judiciary to treat some offenders leniently according to their [the judges'] discretion. Since the 1880s, it was possible for a judge to use common sense (*dōri*) when sentencing a defendant. In other words, judges had great leeway in evaluating the evidence and mitigating circumstances in any given case.[12] In addition, article 165 in the Meiji Code of Criminal Procedure endowed judges with a sweeping power to acquit a defendant whenever they believed that the evidence for the case was inadequate (*Keiji Soshohō* 1890–1, 50).

As I have argued in my recent book, there is some reason to believe that this judicial flexibility helped the defendants in the Queen Min assassination incident of 1895. In that year, the Japanese envoy in Korea, Miura Gorō, and his associates, were accused of murdering the Queen of Korea in clear defiance of the Japanese government's policy. They were all acquitted based on article 165, despite overwhelming evidence against them. The sincerity and pure motives of the defendants were explicitly mentioned in the sentence of the Hiroshima Court of Preliminary Enquiries that tried the civilians. The secret correspondence of the military tribunal that judged the soldiers betrayed similar sentiments. It is possible that such sentiments played a role in the otherwise inexplicable decisions of both tribunals[13] (NSSS 2:231; Orbach 2017, 122–4).

In the High Treason Incident, the plot of an anarchist group to assassinate the Meiji Emperor in 1910, subjectivism played a discernible, though limited, role. During the trial, the defendants' state of mind and motives for the crime were repeatedly mentioned. After a short description of the suspects' immersion in anarcho-communism, the verdict explained their intention to assassinate the Emperor as a natural outgrowth of their ideology. "The defendants, as people deeply devoted to anarcho-communism,

11 Verdict against Aihara Naobumi, 28.6.1882, reproduced in NSSS 1:531–2.

12 John Haley (1991, 85) argues that "common sense" was often used to adapt the letter of the law to existing values.

13 The sympathy of the military tribunal towards the motives of the defendants was more implicit than in the civilian court, and the discussion here was intertwined with debate on obedience to illegal orders. See: Ichikawa 1953, 228–30, 248–9.

wanted to destroy the authority of the state. In order to do that, they had to first remove or eliminate the head of state towards whom all subjects of the empire are obliged, to extinct the world-unique majesty of the *kokutai*, whose sacred blessing and virtue shines over the four seas. They plotted historically unprecedented, crooked treason against the inviolable body of the holy Emperor."[14] People who worked against the Emperor could never be sincere, and were crooked by definition.

As every defendant shared the anarcho-communist ideas of his peers, it did not matter whether he actually did anything wrong. His motives, deemed evil by definition, already doomed him to capital punishment. Indeed, according to later evaluations, at least some of the defendants were sentenced to death based on extremely weak and tenuous evidence. As purity of motives was one and the same with imperial loyalty, the motives of anarchists were *ipso-facto* impure. Their condemnation followed this basic assumption.[15]

Notwithstanding these examples, *shishi* subjectivism still had a very limited role in civilian jurisprudence in the early 1920s. At the same time, however, it gained traction in the radical right, the Imperial Army and the military justice system.

The Upsurge of Subjectivism: Sea Change in the Early 1920s

In the 1910s and 1920s, the *shishi* cult enjoyed especially high currency in the Japanese Imperial Army. Since the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, generations of Japanese military thinkers put an increasing emphasis on the "military spirit" of brave warriors who fight and persevere against materially superior enemies. Unlike military thinkers of prior generations, who modelled themselves on Western armies, the proponents of "spirit" looked back to an imagined Japanese past (Humphreys 1995, 12–13). As Oleg Benesch has written, the ideology of *bushidō*, the way of the warrior, invented as an ethical system in the late Meiji period, was readily adopted by the army to fit the new model of military spirituality.[16]

In addition, the tactical doctrine of "operational discretion" (*dokudan senkō*), an import from German military thought, gave junior officers the right to make tactical decisions in the field, even against orders. That doctrine quickly expanded in the 1910s and 1920s, when the army became busy in small military operations on the Chinese mainland. The secret and sensitive nature of such operations demanded

14 Verdict against Kōtoku Denjirō and 25 others, 18.1.1911, reproduced in NSSS 2:560.

15 Verdict against Kōtoku and others, in NSSS 2:560, 566; Mackie and Yamaizumi 2013, 1–4; Hirano 292–3).

16 Benesch 2014, see especially 10–15, 103–11, 118–22.

quick decisions from junior officers, and doctrine developed accordingly (Jōhō 1973, 229; Suzuki 1971–4, 1: 299).

Japanese military leaders often associated operational discretion with older *shishi* archetypes of spontaneity, sincerity and pure motives. General Ugaki Kazushige, the Army Minister from 1924 to 1927, wrote that operational discretion was "the basis for the soldier's spiritual life". In any case, a soldier must never hesitate. Whether he obeys or disobeys, that has to be spontaneously decided in an instant, according to the requirements of the moment (Tsunoda 1968–71, 1: 667). It is therefore unsurprising that by the early 1920s, glowing descriptions of the *shishi* were appearing in military textbooks.[17]

By the early 1920s, the currency of *shishi* ideals among officers was also influenced by civilian nationalist agitation. A new generation of nationalist rabble-rousers blamed the "privileged" classes—old feudal cliques, corrupt politicians, rapacious businessmen, cunning court nobles—for robbing and mistreating the Japanese people at home, while grovelling before foreigners abroad. In a stream of inflammatory pamphlets, right-wing groups called to imitate the *shishi* and kill members of the "privileged classes" without prior planning. In April 1920, an army officer named Asahi Heigo responded to such calls and killed the business magnate Yasuda Zenjirō. Asahi committed suicide, leaving behind a manifesto denouncing the privileged classes and calling for a new Restoration. The killing of Yasuda, said to be wicked profiteer, was a "divine punishment" (*tenchū*) and a spontaneous act of "folly" (*gu*). Using these two terms, closely associated with the historical *shishi*, Asahi described himself and his friends as follows:

> My fellow young idealists [*shishi*]! Your mission is to bring about a Taishō restoration [...] Do not speak, do not get excited, and do not be conspicuous. You must be quiet and simply stab, stick, cut and shoot. There is no need to meet or to organize. Just sacrifice your life. And work out your own way of doing this. In this way you will prepare the way for the revolution. The flames will start here and there, and our fellow idealists [*dōshi—a common synonym of shishi*] will band together instantly. So forget about self-interest, and do not think about your own name or fame. Just die, just sleep. Never seek wisdom, but take the road of ignorance and come to know the height of great folly [*tai-gu*].[18]

17 See for example: Matsumoto 1937, 2: 7–9 (private collection of Prof. Carter Eckert, courtesy of Carter Eckert). See also Yamashita Fumio's essay in the same collection, 2: 13.

18 The translation is taken from *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, Ryusaku Tsunoda et. al, 1958, 768–9. The term "divine punishment" (*tenchū*) appears in the title of the document, which was not translated in *Sources of Japanese Tradition*. For the full Japanese original see: Shinkoku.exblog 2008.

Asahi's call influenced civilian nationalists as well. After the railroad switchman Nakaoka Kon'ichi stabbed Prime Minister Hara Takashi to death on November 4, 1921, he repeated in his trial ideas very similar to Asahi's. Nakaoka and his defence counsel tried to present him (Nakaoka) as a modern *shishi*. The assassin told the court that he was an ardent reader of *shishi* stories. His father used to praise the terrorists who killed Education Minister Mori Arinori and badly wounded Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu in 1889. In 1920, Nakaoka decided he wanted to become a *shishi* himself and inscribe his name in history as a national hero through the assassination of Prime Minister Hara, the leader of the privileged classes (NSSS 3:313–9, 324–5).

Initially it seemed that Nakaoka had main the right emotional claim. The judge in the court for preliminary enquiries confirmed the indictment against him, yet remarked that "he holds the ideal of loyalty to the Imperial House. Such people are rare today." When the defendant elaborated on his motives, the judge was deeply touched and cried along with him (NSSS 3:326). In the main trial that followed, however, the procurator was not impressed and asked for the death penalty. Predictably, the defence attorneys asked for leniency based on the defendant's motives. There are so many bogus *shishi* and patriots in today's Japan, they said, that it would be a pity to execute a true patriot such as Nakaoka.

The judge finally sentenced Nakaoka to life with hard labour but refused to consider the defendant's motives as mitigating circumstances. In the verdict, the word *shishi* was mentioned only in reference to Nakaoka's self-perception, but the judge described him, and Asahi Heigo, his main source of inspiration, not as *shishi* but as criminals, murderers or *sōshi* (thugs).[19]

The Amakasu Incident: Subjectivism in the Military Justice System

The civilian justice system, as we have seen, was relatively immune to the influence of subjectivism. Military courts, however, shared the culture of the armed services, including adoration of the *shishi* and their ideals. It also mattered that most judges in court martials were officers without formal training in law, and thus more susceptible to emotional arguments and pressure from their peers. A law from 1921 gave the military justice system exclusive jurisdiction on soldiers, even when they wronged civilians, or committed civil crimes such as murder. Since the early 1920s, an increasing number of right-wing political terrorists were military officers, and therefore that law had crucial repercussions. It ensured that

19 Verdict against Nakaoka Ryōichi and Hashimoto Eigorō, 12.8.1922, reproduced in NSSS 3:334–5.

many political terrorists received at least some leniency, as long as they skilfully applied the ideals of subjectivism. The courts could show leniency, because the Penal Code of 1907 gave them enormous discretion in sentencing. Sometimes they could choose anything between three years in jail and life imprisonment for the same offence.[20]

The first important example was the Amakasu Trial. On September 16, 1923, during the havoc that followed the Great Kantō Earthquake, a team of military policemen led by Captain Amakasu Masahiko murdered the anarchists Ōsugi Sakae and Itō Noe, along with Munekazu, Ōsugi's six-year old nephew.

The court proceedings were influenced by the general political climate of the time. Large segments of the public detested communists and anarchists and adored the Japanese Army, to which the defendants belonged. The image of the army, which was at a nadir at the beginning of the decade due to the failed Siberian Intervention (1918–1922), greatly improved as a result of the Great Kantō Earthquake. As Leonard A. Humphreys notes, large segments of the public were grateful to the army due to the effective assistance it gave to the population after the disaster (Humphreys 1995, 52–53). Such a climate certainly helped Amakasu and his accomplices. On the other hand, many people, including Prime Minister Yamamoto and Army Minister Tanaka, were aghast by the murder of three Japanese citizens, including a small child (ibid. 57–58; NSSS 3:424–5, 429).

During their trial, Amakasu and his defenders tied the murder to soldierly duties, and ultimately to the *shishi* ideals of spontaneity, sincerity and pure motives. Amakasu's lawyers argued that national law notwithstanding, the accused spontaneously decided to kill the traitors Ōsugi Sakae and Itō Noe out of an irresistible urge to protect the country. Even the killing of the child could be justified, because it was done for the public good and not for personal interests. The crowd in the courtroom sympathised with such sentiments, and spectators loudly called Amakasu a "hero" (*kokushi*) during the proceedings, yet another term strongly associated with the *shishi* in the parlance of the time. The judge did nothing to prevent such interferences from the audience (NSSS 3:428–9).

Amakasu and his lawyers had made a strong emotional appeal here, and while the military procurator rejected their approach he had to compromise with its persuasive power. "It is inadmissible," he said, "to violate the law through direct action." And yet, he said, implicitly recognising the *shishi* metaphor, Amakasu's crime was a result of excessive enthusiasm in carrying out his duty to protect the country. His motives were pure. He did not act for selfish reasons or for personal interests.

20 "Rikugun Gunpō Kaigihō", 26.4.1921, *Kanpō* 63, 26.4.1921; Sneider 1990, 14–17.

The procurator even stated that Amakasu's patriotism "brought tears into one's eyes". For the murder of three defenceless Japanese citizens, one of them a small child, he demanded only 15 years of imprisonment with hard labour for Amakasu, and lesser punishments for the other defendants. The judge gave an even more lenient sentence: only 10 years with hard labour for Amakasu, and three years for the sergeant who murdered Munekazu, the child. The soldiers were acquitted for obeying orders or for lack of evidence[21] (NSSS 3:427).

This was an extremely light punishment considering the circumstances, but the convicted murderers did not serve even half of it. Almost immediately after the trial, a boisterous public campaign for Amakasu's release began to gather steam. His supporters called him a "patriotic *shishi*" (*yūkoku no shishi*) and petitioned for his release with no less than 650,000 signatures. Eventually, Amakasu's sentence was commuted for the occasion of the Crown Prince's marriage, and he did not serve even three years (NSSS 3:422, 433).

In other cases, the army and its supporters in the political system strictly refused to punish soldiers who committed political crimes, and subjectivism played an important role in these decisions as well. In October 1931, as described in the introduction to this paper, the military terrorist organisation *Sakura-kai* plotted to wipe out the Japanese cabinet with naval bombers, poisonous gas and machine gun fire. After their arrest, the chief of the military police gave them extremely lenient treatment—a short detention in a luxurious inn. As noted above, he explained that such generous treatment was in accordance with the "spirit of *bushidō*" (Orbach 2017, 218).

That statement makes sense only in the context of subjectivism. The imagined way of the samurai was one and the same with the *shishi* ideals of sincerity and purity of motives (spontaneity was not a feature in the highly-detailed plan of the *Sakurai-kai*). As one general told a high court official, "though they had to be punished according to the Military Penal Code, the fact that most of them repented and reflected on the error of their ways, and in consideration of their motives, their patriotic spirit and the prestige of the army, they were dealt with in an administrative manner" (Ogata 1984, 100; Oka 1966, 2: 148).

Dark Valley: Assassination Trials and Pure Motives in the 1930s

In the years 1930–1933 there were three high-profile assassination incidents in Japan: Prime Minister Hamaguchi's assassination, the *Ketsumeidan* Incident and

21 Verdict against Captain Amakasu Masahiko and four others, 8.12.1923, in NSSS 3: 434–7.

the May 15, 1932 Incident. The three trials were partly concurrent and had a strong influence on one another. Together, they mark the peak of subjectivist influence on the Japanese legal system.

On 14 November 1930, a civilian named Sagoya Tomeo shot and badly injured Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi. Nine months later, in August 1931, Hamaguchi died as a result of medical complications. Sagoya targeted Hamaguchi because he had signed the London Naval Treaty in face of the Imperial Navy's objections, thus violating the prerogative of the armed services to advise the Emperor in matters of national security.[22]

In February and March 1932, three other spectacular assassinations followed. Members of the *Ketsumeidan* (Blood Pledge Society), a radical right-wing organisation, murdered former Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke and the business magnate Dan Takuma. That was part of a larger plan to kill 20 leading figures in the realms of business and politics.[23] Finally, on May 15 of the same year, naval officers (with civilian and army accomplices) shot Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi to death (Sneider 1990, 3–9; Large 2001, 552).

The three ensuing trials were similar in a sense. All three of them (but especially the *Ketsumeidan* and May Incident Trials) drew intense media attention, and all dealt with questions of patriotism, imperial loyalty and right-wing terrorism. The Hamaguchi and *Ketsumeidan* tribunals were civilian, while the defendants in the May Incident trial were judged by three different courts according to their affiliation: naval, military and civilian.

At that time subjectivism also gained some traction in Japanese jurisprudence due to growing popularity of new Western legal theories. Since the enactment of the revised penal code in 1907, but especially in the 1920s, a new school of criminal jurisprudence gradually took hold in Japan (Takayanagi 1963, 18; Sneider 1990, 16). It emphasised rehabilitation rather than retribution, and therefore put a greater emphasis on the motives of defendants, as those with pure motives could be reintegrated more easily into the national community. The ideas of this new Western school, which were still in dispute among Japanese jurists in the early 1930s, corresponded well with the indigenous narrative of subjectivism. Therefore, subjectivism was brought up by the defence in all trials, but each court dealt with it in a different manner.

22 Verdict of the lower court against Sagoya Tomeo and Matsumoto Yoshikatsu, 22.4.1932, reproduced in NSSS 4:379–81.

23 For a study of this incident see Large 2001, 533–64. The name *Ketsumeidan* was given by the prosecutor and has been used in historiography ever since, but was not the formal name of the group. It had none.

The Hamaguchi Trial

Sagoya Tomeo, Prime Minister Hamaguchi's assassin, was first charged with attempted murder in a lower court. After the prime minister died in August 1931, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Subjectivism was neither mentioned nor considered in the verdict.[24] Sagoya's lawyers, who appealed to the Tokyo District Court, argued that there was no direct causality between the assassination and Hamaguchi's death. The District Court accepted this argument, but still refused to commute the death sentence (NSSS 4:373–6).

The lawyers then appealed again, this time to the Supreme Court. Here, they made extensive use of *shishi* archetypes, using all possible clichés of subjectivism related to spontaneity, sincerity and pure motives. Most probably influenced by the concurrent *Ketsumeidan* and May Incident trials, they argued that Sagoya was "a patriotic *shishi*" motivated by "disinterested anger over public affairs." As the military and its *bushidō* ideology were the mainstays of subjectivism at the time, the lawyers connected Sagoya's motives with the ideals of *bushidō* as well. They insisted accordingly that Sagoya had "our country's ancient, pristine and laudable self-sacrificing spirit of *bushidō*." Thus, from the point of view of Japanese morality, he should not receive a punishment but rather a reward (NSSS 4:376).

That line of defence was based on the most extreme version of subjectivism, and unlike previous tribunals, the Supreme Court could not ignore it. In partial recognition of the new school of criminal jurisprudence, the court conceded that a defendant's sentence had to consider his motives, character and subjective state of mind, but also other factors which were just as important, such as the position of his victim, the repercussions on the legal order, deterrence of future criminals and other objective and subjective circumstances particular to the case. Sagoya's motives were pure, the court conceded, as the assassination was motivated by patriotism and concern for the public good. Theoretically, such pure motives should serve as mitigating circumstances.

However, the court refused to commute the death sentence. The prime minister was a vital organ of the state, one of the Emperor's chief advisors. To try and replace such a person with violence is not the way of a loyal Japanese subject. The problems of the realm are extremely complicated, and there are different viewpoints. All of them may be patriotic and sincere, but if differences of opinion are settled with violence, the consequences for society might be intolerable.

The court also assailed the *shishi* ideal of "folly", closely related to sincerity. It is astounding, the judges ruled, that such a politically-ignorant person as Sagoya

24 Verdict against Sagoya Tomeo and Matsumoto Yoshikatsu, 22.4.1932, reproduced in NSSS 4:379–82.

took on the responsibility to solve the complicated problems of the realm through an illegal act of violence. This was not only criminal, but also incompatible with the ideals of *bushidō*. Instead of fully rejecting the ideals of subjectivism, the court wisely tried to partly criticise and partly accommodate them. But the bottom line was clear: pure motives should not excuse right-wing terrorists (NSSS 4:377–8). Sagoya was finally condemned to death. Despite this, he received an imperial amnesty almost immediately, and had his sentence commuted to life imprisonment. Prime Minister Hamaguchi's murderer then received an amnesty and was finally released in 1940.

The *Ketsumeidan* Trial

The trial of Inoue Nisshō, leader of the *Ketsumeidan*, and his disciples was opened on June 28, 1933, in the Tokyo District court under Justice Sakamaki Teiichirō. In that trial, subjectivism and the ideals of the *shishi* were explicitly contested in heated debates between the tribunal and the defence team, headed by Amano Tatsuo.

The trial began with a strong denial of subjectivism. Inoue and his disciples, who admired the *shishi* and saw themselves as their heirs, wanted to elaborate on their motives. However, Judge Sakamaki and his associates refused to listen. In accordance with the old school of criminal jurisprudence, they ordered the defendants to concentrate on the facts of the case. The court's concern was only whether they were guilty as charged, nothing else (NSSS 4:415; Large 2001, 541, 557–8).

In response, Amano and his colleagues launched a concentrated attack on the bench. They lodged several complaints against the judges in the Tokyo Court of Appeals and formally asked for their removal from the case. One of the judges, they argued, was sympathetic to communism and held "anti-Japanese views", because in another case he had refused to sentence communists to death. He judged only in accordance with the evidence, and failed to evaluate defendants according to their spirit and subjective state of mind. Such "anti-Japanese views" were also manifested in the bench's refusal to let Inoue and his friends expound on their motives, loyalty to the Emperor and the Japanese spirit (NSSS 4:418–9).

In fact, the defence accused the tribunal of violating the tenets of subjectivism. If one applied the objective test of evidence, then it is does not really matter whether a defendant was a communist or a pure-hearted adherent of the Emperor. But if the test was subjective, based on state of mind, sincerity and purity of motives, then communists should be executed regardless of what they have done, while patriotic criminals should be exonerated (NSSS 4:409–11).

The appeals to remove the judges were ultimately rejected by the higher courts, but they shocked Judge Sakamaki to the core, and he delayed the trial indefinitely. This cannot be understood in isolation from the general political climate, the relentless public relations campaign staged by the defence, and the media attention given to this sensational trial. On August 16, Sakamaki took the very unusual step of visiting Inoue in jail to ask for his advice. Inoue treated his judge with contempt, telling him that he [Sakamaki] had indeed learned something, but his "spirit has not yet developed". Sakamaki, clearly shocked and mentally exhausted, declared himself unfit to preside on the tribunal. He delayed the trial again and again, and finally submitted his resignation in November. In an interview, he wearily confessed that legal principles such as proper procedure were not understood "by people not proficient in jurisprudence", and he could not withstand the tide. In a direct clash, subjectivism prevailed over conventional criminal procedure, the new school of criminal jurisprudence over the old[25] (NSSS 4:415, 419–21, 423–4).

The new judge, Fujii Goichirō, an admirer of the *shishi*, permitted the defendants to speak about their motives to their heart's content. Even the procurator, who still demanded the death penalty for two of the defendants, could not hide his sympathy for their pure motives. He said that he was compelled to ask for the death penalty, hinting that the prosecution would not object to a more lenient verdict. Indeed, Judge Fujii offered a long and sympathetic description of the defendants' pure motives and their love for the Emperor. He showed some leniency, but to a limited extent. He did not apply the death penalty, and sentenced Inoue and the two murderers to life imprisonment, and the others to varying prison terms. Finally, he expressed hope they would soon be released with an imperial amnesty[26] (Large 2001, 561; Ōkura 1971, 71; Fujii 2010, 106). The prosecution decided not to appeal, partly out of sympathy with the defendants' motives, patriotic spirit and the fact that they were not "ordinary murderers". The strong public sentiments in favour of the defendants were another important argument against such an appeal (NSSS 4:427–31).

The May 15 Incident Trial

The trial of the naval officers who murdered Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, as well as their army and civilian accomplices, was strongly influenced by the sensational events of the concurrent *Ketsumeidan* trial. Many media outlets were sympathetic to the motives of the perpetrators, who openly presented themselves as *shishi*, and published their statements almost without alteration. The presiding

25 The quote from the interview is on p. 424.

26 Verdict against Inoue Nisshō and 13 others, 22.11.1934, reproduced in NSSS 4:440–3.

judge in the navy tribunal wanted to avoid the fate of Sakamaki, and therefore decided to permit the defendants to speak at length about their motives (NSSS 4:425; Sneider 1990, 9–11).

The army leaders were quick to ride this wave. When the perpetrators were arrested, the chief of the military police ordered that they be treated "as patriots". Army Minister Araki publicly mourned the fate of the pure, naïve and sincere officers who acted selflessly for the country. His naval counterpart, Admiral Ōsumi Mineo, lamented the fate of his officers in similar terms. That sentiment was reflected in the policy of both armed services. Unlike the civilian defendants, who were charged with murder and attempted murder, the soldiers were charged with rebellion. The army and the navy saw them as misguided patriots, not as ordinary criminals (Sneider 1990, 9, 12, 19–20; Fujii 2010, 112).

The defence lawyers (one of whom represented Amakasu in 1923) made full use of such sentiments. When faced with such noble motives, they said, the court had to refrain from applying the law, acknowledging instead the purity of the defendants, their character, and the revolutionary momentum engulfing Japanese society. They went on to elaborate on the precedent of the *shishi*, concluding that pure-hearted loyalty to the Emperor was the spirit of the law, a mysterious sentiment that only Japanese subjects could understand. Judging the defendants severely would undermine that lofty spirit, destroying the very basis of the Japanese national polity. This extreme version of subjectivism went much further than even the new school of criminal jurisprudence. In fact, it went beyond the confines of jurisprudence altogether, venturing to the realm of romantic mysticism (Sneider 1990, 32–7).

In response, Navy Procurator Yamamoto Kōji attacked not only the defendants, but also the ideology of subjectivism they were utilising to get themselves off the hook. Sticking to the old school of criminal jurisprudence, the procurator emphasised that political violence should be punished mercilessly regardless of the perpetrators' motives, patriotism or alleged loyalty to the emperor. A pure motive cannot whitewash an illegal action, especially not by soldiers. Army and navy personnel should avoid politics and stick to the law as prescribed in the Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors and the military penal codes. Otherwise, he warned, political violence would plague and ultimately imperil the nation. Yamamoto, who rejected subjectivism *in toto*, paid dearly for his bravery. A tsunami of public censure forced him to resign from the navy, practically destroying his legal career.[27]

The naval judges rejected Yamamoto's view, elaborating instead on the pure-hearted patriotism of the defendants. Accordingly, the punishments for the main

27 See Yamamoto's plea, fully reproduced in Tomioka 1933, and especially pp. 289–94. For analysis see: Sneider 1990, 28–32, 40–1.

offenders were relatively lenient: fifteen years in jail, instead of the execution and life imprisonment demanded by the prosecution. "Although their [the defendants'] criminal culpability is truly significant," ruled the president of the court, "the depth of their patriotism must be acknowledged" (Sneider 1990, 38).

The army court was even more lenient, and its emphasis on the defendants' purity of motives was significantly more pronounced. The civilian court agreed to listen at length to the motives of the defendants, but it was the strictest of the three. The presiding judge sentenced the two main defendants to life imprisonment, and did not emphasise their motives in the verdict. That strictness was, however, superficial. In private, the judge expressed sympathy with the ideals of the defendants, though not with their violent methods, and made sure the sentence would be proclaimed on time for the upcoming imperial amnesty. Three of the defendants appealed to higher courts, where their motives were more explicitly acknowledged and their sentences significantly reduced (ibid. 24–5, 37–47).

The Crescendo and Decline of Subjectivism: The Nagata and February 1936 Incident Trials

On August 22, 1935, Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa Saburō, a military fencing instructor, responded to what he later called a spontaneous "impulse from on high". He assassinated Major General Nagata Tetsuzan, a leader of a rival military faction whom he denounced as "the headquarters of all evil". According to Aizawa, his victim was a member of the privileged class and a traitor who showed disrespect for the Emperor by purging ultra-nationalistic officers (NSSS 5:153–4; Byas 1942, 95, 111).

Aizawa's court martial followed the same pattern as the May 1932 Incident trial. Knowing full well that there was no possible legal way to dismiss the murder charges against his client, defence counsel Lt. Col. Mitsui Sakichi used the same strategy which had worked so well in previous proceedings—making an emotional appeal to subjectivism. Aizawa was thus presented as sincere and pure, and his burning love of Emperor and country had forced him to act spontaneously against a person he saw as an enemy from within. "The young officers are pure as water, innocently flowing forward," Mitsui said, "if there is a wave, it is caused by the wind."[28]

Following the example set by Inoue Nisshō in the *Ketsumeidan* trial, Aizawa yelled at the judge from the witness stand. His defence team also presented bountiful

28 See Mitsui's written plea in *Niniroku Jiken Hiroku*, edited by Hayashi Shigeru (1971–2, 1: 26–29). The quote is from p. 26.

letters of support from the public, including one written by high school girls in their own blood, as well as a jar containing a chopped finger, signifying the senders' sincere readiness to die in place of the defendant. A Soviet diplomat who attended the trial was astounded that junior officers dared to publicly insult the Emperor's closest advisors. The trial, he reported, was crazy enough to offer rich research material for psychologists and even psycho-pathologists.[29]

However, while Aizawa's trial was unfolding rebellious officers unleashed the largest military uprising that Japan saw in the twentieth century. On February 26, 1936, they mobilised more than 1,400 troops in Tokyo, and assassinated two civilian leaders and two senior officers. Others, such as Prime Minister Okada Keisuke, had a narrow escape or suffered serious injuries. In the beginning, the army leaders dragged their feet, but Emperor Hirohito's direct intervention forced them to move against the rebels. The mutiny was finally crushed on February 29, but its echoes reverberated far and wide. The entire top-tier of the army abdicated, and the succeeding military leadership took some stringent measures to restore discipline.[30]

The ringleaders of the incident, all of them young lieutenants, captains and majors, believed that they would enjoy the benefits of subjectivism, like their naval peers in 1932. In their own self-perception they were modern *shishi*, committed to the ideals of spontaneity, sincerity and purity. Many of them were educated in specialised military institutions, and grew up on *shishi* stories. They acted spontaneously, without thorough planning, out of righteous indignation towards the privileged classes, and did so for the nation, the emperor and the entire world. Needless to say, they were more than ready to die for their cause.[31]

But the February 1936 rebels had a very unpleasant surprise. The magic of subjectivism had stopped working. Their court martial was held behind closed doors, blocking the flow of media attention that helped their predecessors during the May 1932 and *Ketsumeidan* trials. They were allowed to speak about their motives, but the judges were unsympathetic. In fact, the defendants' purity counted for nothing. All the ringleaders and many other participants were sentenced to death,

29 Yurenev to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 25.4.1936, *Arhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiskei Federatsii* (1936, 154(4)–5(3)). The British journalist Hugh Byas had a similar impression. Though, as an old Japan hand, he was much less surprised than Yurenev. See: Byas 1942, 99–100.

30 For a detailed account of the February Incident, see Orbach 2017, 225–57.

31 Kurihara's Interrogation, Nakahashi's Interrogation, Hayashi's interrogation, Suzuki's Interrogation, Ikeda's interrogation, Muranaka's interrogation, Isobe, "refutation", *NRJH*, 135, 157–8, 177, 189, 208, 255, 4:19; Isobe 1971, 314; 1961, 111, 258, 126–7; Isobe 1972, 54; Suzuki 1971–1794, 136; Shillony 1973, 214.

and no imperial pardons were given. Aizawa Saburō, General Nagata's assassin, was executed as well (Orbach 2017, 251–2).

Emperor Hirohito's direct intervention against the rebels had drawn all oxygen from their subjectivist balloon. According to subjectivist ideology, spontaneity, sincerity and pure motives were a necessary but not a sufficient condition. One had to be first and foremost an imperial loyalist. As long as the Emperor was silent, as was usually the case, even rebels could present themselves as imperial loyalists. But when the Emperor directly intervened against them, such arguments became null and void. Subjectivism, it seemed, stood on one *objective* pillar: imperial silence. When that was broken, right-wing terrorists could not use subjectivist defences. The events of February 1936 proved that the weak position and non-intervention policy of the Emperor were essential for the leniency that right-wing terrorists, especially from the armed services, enjoyed up to that crucial year.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that the relative judicial leniency to right-wing terrorists in the early 1930s was interlinked with the deep-rooted ideology of subjectivism. This ideology, based on the mythologization of the *shishi*, had three main tenets: spontaneity, sincerity and pure motives, defined as an intention to serve the Emperor, the country and the public good. Up to the 1920s, this ideology had strong currency as a cultural narrative, but its influence on the justice system was relatively modest.

Since the assassination of Yasuda Zenjirō in 1920 and the subsequent murder of Prime Minister Hara Kei in 1921, subjectivism played an important part in the arguments of the assassins, their defence lawyers and supporters in the public and press. However, up to the early 1930s, civilian courts were by and large unimpressed.

The situation was very different, however, in military courts. Since 1921, these had exclusive jurisdiction with regard to military criminals, even murderers who killed civilians. Echoing the relative strength of *shishi* myths in military culture, court martials were much more attentive to subjectivist arguments, such as during the Amakasu trial in 1923. The proceedings against the *Ketsumeidan* defendants between 1932 to 1934 had shown that subjectivism overflowed to the civilian justice system as well, perhaps abetted by the growing popularity of a new school of criminal jurisprudence. The sensational events of the *Ketsumeidan* trial, in turn, reinforced these notions in the military justice system in a process of positive feedback. Following the Incident of May 1932, the navy and the army court martials showed relative

leniency to officers who committed the grave political crime of assassinating the prime minister. The same tendency continued in the trial of Aizawa Saburō, who murdered Major General Nagata Tetsuzan in 1935, but was reversed after the Incident of February 26, 1936. The direct intervention of the emperor nullified a crucial tenet of subjectivism: pure motives, which were identical with imperial loyalty.

Although subjectivism was important as a cultural narrative throughout the history of modern Japan, its influence on political justice was limited to a relatively short period, and even then, mostly to military and naval court martials, although its historical repercussions were significant. The leniency shown to military rebels such as the ringleaders of the *Sakurai-kai* and the assassins of the May 1932 Incident encouraged copycats, finally making the seminal events of February 1936 possible. The February coup, though abortive, convinced the civilian leadership of Japan that the army had to be accommodated in order to prevent such occurrences in the future. As a result, it led to growing dominance of the army in national politics (Orbach 2017, 255–6). As the journalist Hugh Byas maintained, "The army installed itself in power with the concurrence of a docile nation intoxicated by foreign war, its civilian leaders terrorised by assassination" (Byas 1942, 39). The ideology of subjectivism, which helped to encourage such assassinations, thus has to be considered as one of the factors that pushed Japan towards militarism, unmitigated aggression, the war against China and finally the Pacific War.

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Invented Histories: The *Nihon Senshi* of the Meiji Imperial Japanese Army

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Abstract

Nihon Senshi (*Military History of Japan*) was part of the new Imperial Japanese Army's attempt to tie itself to examples from Japan's "warring states" period, similar to scholars who created a feudal "medieval" time in the Japanese past to fit into Western historiography, and intellectuals who discovered a "traditional" spirit called *bushidō* as a counterpart for English chivalry. The interpretations of these campaigns, placing the "three unifiers" of the late sixteenth century as global leaders in the modernization of military tactics and technology, show the Imperial Japanese Army's desire to be seen as a "modern" military through its invented "institutional" history.

Keywords: Imperial Japanese Army, military history, invented tradition, Meiji period, *bushidō*.

Izumljene zgodovine: *Nihon senshi* Japonske cesarske vojske v obdobju Meiji

Izvleček

Nihon senshi (*Vojaška zgodovina Japonske*) je del prizadevanj nove Japonske cesarske vojske, da bi se povezala s primeri iz obdobja vojskujočih se dežel, podobno kakor so zgodovinarji ustvarili japonski fevdalni »srednji vek«, da bi se ujemal z zahodnim zgodovinopisjem, in kakor so intelektualci odkrili »tradicionalni« duh imenovan *bushidō*, ki je ustrezal pojmu angleškega viteštva. Interpretacije teh vojaških spopadov, ki so predstavile »tri združevalce« poznega šestnajstega stoletja kot globalne voditelje pri modernizaciji vojaških taktik in tehnologije, razkrivajo željo Japonske cesarske vojske, da bi jo s pomočjo izumljene »institucionalne« zgodovine obravnavali kot »moderno« vojsko.

Ključne besede: Japonska cesarska vojska, vojaška zgodovina, izumljene tradicije, obdobje Meiji, *bushidō*

Over the thirty-one years from 1893 to 1924, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) General Staff's historical division produced thirteen volumes, each covering a battle from Japan's "warring states" (*sengoku*) period, in a series entitled *Nihon*

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Senshi (日本戦史; *Military History of Japan*). Section 9 of the 4th division of the General Staff Office, headed by a colonel with a staff of three, was responsible for producing these historical analyses of the past Japanese battles (*Nihon Rikugun Ga Yoku Wakaru Jiten* 2002, 324). *Nihon Senshi*, despite the implication of the name, is not a comprehensive history of warfare throughout Japan's history. The thirteen volumes cover significant campaigns by Japan's "three unifiers", Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, in the mid-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, beginning with Tokugawa's campaigns to secure hegemony in 1600 and 1615, then circling back to the beginning of Oda Nobunaga's rise and moving forward through the major campaigns of his and Toyotomi Hideyoshi's career. The following table shows the focus and publication date of each volume:

Table 1: Focus and publication date of each volume of Nihon Senshi

Volume	Focal Campaign or Battle	Year(s) of Campaign	Year of Preface	Year of Publication
1	Sekigahara	1600	1893	1893
2	Osaka Summer & Winter	1615	1896	1897
3	Okehazama	1560	1898	1902
4	Anegawa	1573	1899	1901
5	Mikatagahara	1574	1901	1902
6	Nagashino	1575	1902	1903
7	Chugoku (Western Japan)	1576-82	1903	1911
8	Yamazaki	1582	1903	1920
9	Yanase (Shizugatake)	1583	1903	1907
10	Komaki (Nagakute)	1584	1908	1908
11	Kyushu	1587	1910	1911
12	Odawara	1590	1913	1893(?)[1]
13	Korean Invasions	1592-98	1923	1924

In the secondary scholarship of late medieval and early modern Japanese warfare, certain battles are treated as iconic—the "*kessen*", or decisive battles of the *Sengoku jidai*, the Warring States period. Not merely representative of sixteenth-century warfare, these battles define it, in popular history books, on movie and television screens, and in video games.[2] Meanwhile, battles such as Funaokayama in 1511,

1 I have been unable to find a suitable explanation for why the Odawara volume lists 1893 as its date of publication, but has a preface dated 1913. Given that it is the twelfth volume of thirteen, I feel confident in assuming the publication date is a misprint on the part of the publisher of the 1978 reprint, Murata Shoten.

2 The director Akira Kurosawa's masterpiece film *Kagemusha* concludes with a climactic, though historically inaccurate, recreation of the Battle of Nagashino; video game titles available worldwide that include battles from this list include the *Kessen* series and the *Nobunaga's Ambition* series by Koei.

between two Ashikaga claimants to the title of *shōgun* and their powerful *daimyō* supporters, or the 1578 Battle of Mimigawa, a decisive clash between rival warlords in western Japan, are given minor consideration. It is not important at this time to debate the merits of one battle versus another in any list of major samurai conflicts. However, it is instructive to think about why some battles have achieved a certain status in both military history and popular culture. Academic historians are not the only ones who fashion "history". I contend that the Imperial Japanese Army historical section chose to include these victories by the "three unifiers" of Japan because they assessed them as the beginning of a "modern" and "Japanese" military history. These battles provided tactical and strategic lessons, but in addition could be shaped to show historical antecedents for the IJA itself to claim.

This paper is thus an exploratory attempt to situate the production of these histories as an institutional microcosm of a larger discourse of national identity formation ongoing within the Meiji and Taishō state. Due to space limitations, this paper will not include a comprehensive analysis of each volume and how well (or poorly) each battle is portrayed. Rather, I will focus on why these histories were written at this time; why these particular battles were chosen as representative examples of a Japanese "military history"; and the transnational intellectual currents and political events that encouraged and shaped their production. Comparison with contemporary Japanese intellectual and institutional "invented traditions" that attempted to negotiate the complexities of the nation's emerging modernity suggests that *Nihon Senshi* was one manifestation of the IJA's same reconciliation between the conflicting identities of a "Japanese" and a "modern" or "Westernized" institution.

Yamagata Aritomo, the primary architect of the Imperial Japanese Army of the Meiji period, faced several considerable challenges as he attempted to turn an army of rebellious provincials into a modern, professional force.[3] The early Imperial Japanese Army was a hodgepodge of former samurai and conscripted peasants, led by an officer corps divided by regional factionalism. The 1877 Seinan War, when Imperial forces defeated the rebel Satsuma army of Saigō Takamori, revealed the limitations of conscripted peasants thrust into the role of soldier. Even seemingly simple matters like adjusting to modern European-style uniforms caused

3 Yamagata started as a military leader during the Boshin War which put the Meiji government in power, and led Imperial forces during the Seinan War; during the Meiji period he was variously the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army (both of these multiple times, and sometimes concurrently), Home Minister, and Prime Minister twice. Of the "Meiji oligarchs" he had the most influence over the IJA, and regardless of what his specific title was at any given point during the time examined in this paper, it is safe to say he was the driving force behind the shaping of the IJA, either directly or through his disciples.

considerable consternation for both commoners and samurai, unused to "uncomfortable" Western-style dress (Drea 2009). The samurai-led rebellion demonstrated that excessive ties based on regional affiliation and the privileged class consciousness of samurai within the ranks drew loyalty away from the central Meiji state and the Imperial Japanese Army itself. Samurai prior to the rebellion were often looked on as old-fashioned and even parasitical; after the rebellion, they were a danger (Benesch 2014, 44–45). At the same time, the superior performance of the smaller samurai forces against larger and better equipped conscript units showed a need to indoctrinate the new army with samurai esprit and loyalty, directed not to a feudal lord but to the IJA command and, ultimately, the emperor.

The Seinan War also exposed the IJA's inadequacy at planning and executing large operations (Matsushita 1963, 51). Until 1877 the IJA relied on French officer advisers, who focused on teaching lower level unit tactics at the expense of large-scale operations. American military texts on the U.S. Civil War were popular with Japanese officers, as were the formulaic "principles of war" devised by the French officer Antoine de Jomini; these simple and easy to remember "rules" were easily understood in translation. The German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz, on the other hand, was deemed "overly complex" and largely ignored (Drea 2009, 27-28). The overemphasis on small unit tactics correspondingly led to poor performance with regard to large unit manoeuvres and logistics, and if the IJA found it difficult to move troops from central Japan to southern Kyūshū, projecting military power outside of the country would be impossible. Yamagata realized that the IJA needed to improve its tactical and operational capabilities to be taken seriously as a modern military force by the outside world, primarily the West, but also its closer rivals the Chinese and Korean courts.

Yamagata and his fellow army leaders thus needed to find both a way to instil an institutional consciousness in the "hodgepodge" of former samurai and peasant conscripts, and models which the IJA could use as instructional ones in training the staff officers and commanders responsible for creating an expeditionary force. The 1880s saw the IJA reorganise to become a foreign expeditionary force (Ōe 1985). Edward Drea (2009) asserted that historical circumstances shaped Japan's first modern army, while international pressures determined the pathways forward available to it. For Japan to be a first rank nation, the Meiji leadership believed, they must have a first rank army, one capable of projecting the emperor's will and Japanese power outside of the nation's borders (Kurono 2004). Yamagata and the IJA leadership believed that failure to project power overseas would doom Japan to second-class status. This is the traditional reading of "international pressures" as Drea (2009) frames it. However, the IJA exercised agency in choosing which pathway to take forward. Yamagata initially chose to use foreign models, as I shall

discuss shortly, but grounded them in an idealized Japanese traditional "history"; this synthesis of a "modern" military with a "historical" tradition is shown clearly in the campaign histories of the IJA General Staff's historical department.

To create a sense of common military ethos that melded commoners and ex-samurai together, Yamagata appealed to an idealized samurai tradition: not from the Edo period, whence the warrior class had stagnated as indigent bureaucrats, but from the greatly romanticized medieval *chūsei* age of war tales. Drea (2009, viii) notes that from the start the IJA attempted to find instructional examples for its core values of loyalty, service, and personal sacrifice to the emperor in "real or imagined precedents". By highlighting figures like Kusunoki Masashige, lauded as the loyal retainer of Emperor Go-Daigo who heroically resisted the military government on Go-Daigo's behalf in the 1330s, the Meiji leaders redirected the loyalty of the samurai retainer away from a feudal lord and towards the Emperor and broadened it to the entire army and Japanese population at large. In this manner, Yamagata created a history for the IJA, to give its soldiers a unifying focus of loyalty (the emperor) that transcended class and regional divisions.

It should be noted, however, that while the historical precedents chosen were uniquely Japanese, the process was not; Western countries, especially Yamagata's favoured model of Germany (which, it should be noted, officially united as a nation-state three years after the start of the Meiji Restoration) were also creating their own "traditions" for the same purposes. Through the Meiji Emperor's participation in Western-style military ceremonies and the 1882 Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, the soldiers' "traditional" bond to the emperor was codified and strengthened in very "modern" ways (Drea 2009; Harries and Harries 1991). Eric Hobsbawm called the period from 1870 to 1914 one of the "mass production of tradition" in Europe. According to Hobsbawm, traditions are invented "more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which 'old' traditions had been designed." The period referenced was one of significant change worldwide, as societies the world over tackled the challenges presented by industrialized modernity (Hobsbawm in Benesch 2014, 6, 10). Meiji Japan provides an interesting case for observation of this phenomenon, as the transformation from a feudal to "modern" society was abruptly imposed by the new Meiji government, with the majority of these changes involving the importation of an alien, Western product or concept. Japan had to adapt and modernize to prevent the fate of colonization and Western domination seen in much of the world. The late nineteenth century was divided into "first rank" nations that colonized, and the rest of the world who were the victims of such imperialism. Japan had to propel itself into that first rank tier; yet at what point would that change the nation so much that it ceased being "Japan"?

The IJA was thus but one significant participant in the overall struggle of Japan to invent itself as a modern country, one that by definition has a "past"; this struggle not only occurred in other "modern" countries of the time, but was a necessary condition for modernity. Stefan Tanaka (2004, 29) asserts that this "discovery and separation of the past" is one of the central components of the Meiji period. "One of the constituent parts of modernity is the separation and denigration of the past, as something to move away from." The idea of "history" in Japan had up until this time generally followed a cyclical Confucian narrative, with imperial reign dates as the standard unit of demarcation: the Emperor reigned, the events of the reign were recorded, the Emperor died and a new Emperor reigned, the cycle repeating itself. In contrast, nineteenth-century Western historical theory saw history as a linear narrative of national development; events that caused change demarcated one era from the previous one (Keirstead 1998).

Meiji thinkers, like Fukuzawa Yukichi, recognised this difference: Fukuzawa bemoaned that Japan had 2,500 years of "stagnation" as opposed to "progress", and therefore could not be said to have a "history". For Japan to be modern in the present, the past would have to be separated from it as different, then constructed into a usable history. Tanaka (2004) identifies the 1871 order for preservation and inventory of the Shōsōin storehouse and other repositories of artefacts as the beginning of Japan's "discovery" of its past, as such cataloguing imbued a collection of items with meaning as having "historical" value, where the previous fervour for the "new" and "modern" ignored and even destroyed such items as old and useless. This interest in preserving objects from the Japanese past was much driven by transnational ideas of each nation having a past worth preserving. Cultural and historical exhibitions were, at this time, an "international phenomenon", and in fact one impetus for the Shōsōin survey was to find suitable objects that would represent Japanese history and culture at the 1873 World's Fair in Vienna. At a time when Japan struggled to keep its identity while striving to be more and more like the West, artefacts imbued with this historical value provided that anchor to its unique past.

Indeed, if history was to be understood as a linear progression, then for a country to be "modern" it necessarily required a "past" from which it had evolved. In 1889 the Ministry of Education directed prominent historians to come up with a standard periodization of Japanese history, along the Western historiographic model. The Japanese past was thus reconfigured to demonstrate progression of events from one era to the next. The historian Nishi Amane coined the term *chūsei* as an analogue for the medieval period of Europe; Nishi and other historians like Hara Katsurō, armed with training in European historiography, found parallels between Japanese and Western (European) institutions (such as the European

medieval manor and the Japanese *chūsei*-era *shōen*) that allowed the Japanese past to be divided with the same ancient-medieval-modern structure. Conscious of European historiography (Marxist or otherwise) that saw a feudal medieval era as a necessary stage of development for the modern nation, historians like Nishi and Hara understood the implications for Japan. A *chūsei* period in Japanese history, as the temporal locus of national identity, placed Japan with the "gifted few" first-rank countries that could lay claim to a history with modernity as its end state (Keirstead 1998).[4] In addition to external recognition by the community of "modern nations", this broadened the past from a succession of imperial reigns to a "national" history for all Japanese, a critical step in the project of building a national consciousness. Keirstead asserts that this location of a historical origin of modernity in the middle ages (like Europe) solved the riddle of whether or not modernization meant the sacrifice of a uniquely Japanese identity. By identifying an analogous starting point for progress and a parallel trajectory similar to Europe's, Japan could embrace both a modern present and traditional past.

In this way, history is an "invented tradition", providing a departure point from which the modern Japanese nation evolved. As Hobsbawm suggested, the Meiji period was a time of continuous invention and reinvention of tradition, as the Japanese struggled to define what it meant to be "Japanese". Meiji period Buddhists cited medieval religious works and figures to give historical credence to their responses to modern issues (Keirstead 1998). In his 2014 book *Inventing the Way of the Samurai*, Oleg Benesch impressively describes the Meiji period invention of a *bushidō* "warrior ethic" tradition. *Bushidō* had no coherent expression prior to the nineteenth century. Initially it was proposed by Ōzaki Yukio in articles in 1889 and 1891 as a possible Japanese counterpart to the English chivalric tradition, which he felt was responsible for Great Britain's imperial success. Christian intellectuals like Uemura Masahisa and Nitobe Inazō also identified *bushidō* with the medieval, but a specifically Christian chivalry. Nationalist scholars Suzuki Chikara and Inoue Tetsujirō located *bushidō*'s roots in the martial and masculine *chūsei* medieval era, the same period in which contemporary historians had located Japan's modern origins, as described above. Thus an idea invented as a native analogue to a European concept, shaped around Edo period literature, was collectively presumed to have nostalgic antecedents in the age of martial heroes from the twelfth through sixteenth centuries (Benesch 2014).

Though the precise nature of any connection between the periodization of a Japanese *chūsei* period by historians around 1889 and the selection of the thirteen

4 Keirstead (1998, 51–56) also notes that Hara was one of several prominent historians that were products of the Tokyo Imperial University history department, organised under the direction of Ludwig Riess, a German historian who had once been research assistant to Leopold von Ranke.

campaigns studied by the IJA military history section beginning in 1893 is unconfirmed at this time, the reasoning in selecting battles from the transition period between the "medieval" and "early modern" appears consistent: if Japan had a "medieval" *chūsei* period, then warfare, as expressed by the campaigns of Japan's "three unifiers", must surely have been a major catalyst for the nation's movement into the "early modern" *kinsei* period. Yamagata certainly drew inspiration from the entire *chūsei* period—the prominence of Kusunoki Masashige, as previously mentioned, attests to that. Yet the battles of Kusunoki against the Hōjō and Ashikaga are not found in the campaign studies. Nor are the Minamoto and Taira in the 1180s, or the Ōnin War of the late 1400s. While those conflicts could provide IJA soldiers with tales of heroism and sacrifice to train their spirits, they lack the critical component of modernity necessary to be worthy of detailed analysis at the operational and tactical levels for use in training IJA officers in how to wage modern war. Whereas Western militaries could look over the previous two hundred years to Lee and Grant, Napoleon and Wellington, Washington, the Duke of Marlboro, and Vauban, Japan's peaceful Edo period left them with few recent examples of military action. The 19th century Boshin War and the Seinan War were not only too recent to lend any "historicity" to the IJA, but were fought between the very conflicting groups Yamagata was trying to integrate into a cohesive force. The campaigns of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, in the standard periodization narrative, brought Japan out of the *chūsei* and into the early modern *kinsei*. These battles were far enough back in time to be "history", but "modern" enough to be useful examples, firearms having been introduced as a significant battlefield presence in the decades before the first chronological campaign (Okehazama in 1560, volume 3). As such, by locating the "roots" of the IJA's military tradition in the transition between the *chūsei* and the *kinsei*, the IJA staked a claim to a trajectory of military modernity similar to its aspirational "first-rank" Western peers.

If these thirteen campaigns were chosen in part because they were the "highlight" battles at the beginning of Japan's "modern" age, they were also chosen as specific tactical and operational examples to train the Meiji IJA as a modern expeditionary force. Again, IJA leaders initially looked for models on how to instruct their staffs outside Japan. By the early 1880s, the IJA leadership turned to Germany for help in professionalizing its officer corps. Yamagata had studied in Prussia, and the Prussian victory over the French in 1870 cemented the Prussian General Staff's reputation as the pinnacle of military science. Yamagata's protégé Katsura Tarō and Army Minister Ōyama Iwao led a delegation to Germany in 1885 to request an instructor for the newly established General Staff College. At Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke's personal direction, Major Jakob Meckel, an experienced

instructor and staff officer, was sent back with the Japanese as a military instructor (Drea 2009; Kurono 2004; Ōe 1985). Originally another officer was recommended to Moltke by Schlieffen, but Moltke strategically chose to send the more capable officer to Turkey to help rebuild their army and counterbalance the Russians, Turkey having been defeated by the Tsar's forces in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 (Kurono 2004; Ōe 1985).

The assignment of the more "administrative" and less tactically-gifted Meckel instead would have significant ramifications for the IJA. Meckel instituted an educational program based on the Prussian model, more focused on the theory of military art and science than his French predecessors' teachings on small-unit tactics. To teach the application of theory, he took his students to study and practice military manoeuvres on terrain models and in the field, similar to the staff rides military officers engage in today. Meckel also introduced military history to the IJA curriculum through the study of historical campaigns to illustrate tactical and operational lessons, clearly setting a precedent for the IJA General Staff's campaign studies (Drea 2009, 58).

Meckel's practical program of instruction, though he was only in Japan three years (1885–1888), won over even officers from factions that had preferred the French approach, and earned him high praise (Kurono 2004). However, his influence, both good and bad, would be seen more clearly in the IJA's performance in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. Meckel, not the most imaginative or intellectual staff officer, preached action over thought: his heavy emphasis on infantry manoeuvres influenced the massive, casualty-intensive infantry charges of the Russo-Japanese War, and would continue to predominate in Japanese planning through World War II. Ōe (1985) observes that Meckel's instruction focused on the tactical and operational levels of warfare, ignoring the strategic lessons of Clausewitz, possibly because he felt they were too difficult to teach through interpreters, but it is just as likely that Meckel simply cared less for strategic thinking. Ōe contends that this lack of strategic instruction would become a systemic problem in the IJA, leading to the misguided and haphazard strategies seen in China and the Pacific War. Ōe believes that Meckel's study of history, from which an understanding of strategy is derived, failed to take root in Japan. However, the IJA did study history, but Meckel's emphasis on tactics and operations at the expense of strategy would influence not only the case studies chosen for the IJA's own analysis, but also the ways in which Japanese military planners for several generations would interpret these as templates for execution.

Unfortunately, at the present time I have yet to find the names of the individuals assigned to the IJA Staff Historical Office in 1893, and cannot confirm they

were actually in Meckel's classes. Further research will hopefully yield these results and a more direct connection. However, Meckel's influence is evident in the selection of individual battles and campaigns, as a closer examination of the specific volumes shows a preference for decisive tactical battles. Only three volumes (Western Japan, 1911, Kyūshū, also published in 1911, and the Korean invasions, 1924) examine extended campaigns. Causation is difficult to determine here, but whether the selection of these battles as instructional models shaped Japanese army attitudes, or it was merely reflective of a preference already present (perhaps introduced by Meckel), the line-up is consistent with the later IJA doctrine that sought a "decisive battle", where the spirit of the Japanese soldier would overcome even a more technologically advanced or materially equipped enemy. The next section will look at the volumes in relation to the events and currents at their time of publication; I will highlight four (Sekigahara, Okehazama, Nagashino, and the Korean Campaign) in particular as indicative of the sorts of messages and lessons the IJA wanted its officers to internalize.

The IJA staff's first volume of military history was published just before their first real test as an institution—the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War—and Japan's career as an imperial power began (Harries and Harries 1991). While completed in 1893 before the beginning of hostilities, I believe the publication to be significant as an academic expression of the IJA's growth; victory versus the Qing would be a confirmation of that growth. As the reprinted introduction states, Sekigahara is a quintessentially representative (*daihyōteki* 代表的) campaign, likely the most famous and possibly most important battle in Japanese history prior to the Meiji period (*Sekigahara no Eki*, *Nihon Senshi* vol 1, 1893). For an IJA staff trained by Meckel through studying the decisive battles of the Napoleonic and the Franco-Prussian wars, Sekigahara was an obvious place to begin, as the key battle that ended the period of endemic warfare known as the "Warring States" period, leading to 250 years of peace under the Tokugawa. Though it was not until 1615, fifteen years after Sekigahara, that the Winter and Summer Osaka campaigns finally destroyed the Toyotomi family that opposed the Tokugawa (covered in volume 2 of *Nihon Senshi*), it was victory at Sekigahara that secured control of Japan for Tokugawa Ieyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate. Sekigahara was the closest Japanese equivalent to studying the decisive battles of the West, like Waterloo or Sedan. The thick book is filled with 393 pages of narrative, followed by 249 pages of supplementary analysis and 103 pages of reprinted source materials, including both narrative and documentary sources. Additionally, supplementary maps and order of battle charts very clearly display the strategic and tactical contexts visually, as well as the economic strength of the combatants which made up each side (in terms of domain tax values). As a first effort for the IJA military

history office, it is a very thorough "Western"-style campaign analysis; the quality of the maps and charts especially would not be out of place in any academic campaign history produced throughout the twentieth century. The IJA staff thus demonstrated that the lessons learned from Meckel could be applied to their own military history.

Japan's victory over China gained it (and the IJA) a measure of respect; it had broken away from the backwardness of non-Europeans, and joined the club of modern, advanced, "first rank" nations capable of imposing their will on weaker neighbours (Harries and Harries 1991, 59–60). Success in Japan's first "national" war accelerated interest in "native" subjects in general, as the Japanese regained a measure of confidence and sense of equality with the West. Consistent with this cultural trend, the IJA increased their production of battle histories (Benesch 2014). After all, first rank militaries needed deeper investigations into their histories. The complete lack of institutional connection between the sixteenth-century forces of the Tokugawa, Oda, and Toyotomi to the IJA was irrelevant; the victories of specific samurai family armies over other specific family armies displayed a "Japanese" history of tactical and operational success, regardless of the fact that the losers in these campaigns were also Japanese.

Five more campaign histories were completed prior to the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War; three more were begun in 1903, based on the dates listed in the prefaces, but the actual publication dates were 1907 (Yanase), 1911 (Western Japan), and 1920 (Yamazaki). My assumption, as the publisher lists no explanation, is that the Russo-Japanese War, and the strain it put on the IJA General Staff, redirected even the military history section's efforts. Two of this group of campaign histories require additional comment.

The volume on Okehazama, the third study begun and published in 1902, examines the 1560 battle that launched Oda Nobunaga from being a petty warlord onto a twenty-two year path towards national political pre-eminence and started the process of unification. Nobunaga, leading a force of less than 3,000 troops, used superior tactics and the element of surprise to destroy Imagawa Yoshimoto's vastly superior force of 25,000. Ōe (1985) notes that this battle, an example of a smaller opponent defeating a much stronger one through superior cunning and surprise, was a favourite historical model for the Japanese military; the defeat of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1904 and the attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941 were naval operations that drew heavily on the principles displayed at Okehazama. However, one wonders if this example was over-emphasized, with disastrous results for the nation: while there were certainly additional cultural influences, the prominent example of a smaller yet dedicated force

overcoming insurmountable odds is certainly consistent with Japanese military decisions at both the strategic (challenging the United States despite the clear understanding of how overmatched Japan would be) and tactical (Japanese units continuing to fight losing battles in the field well after it would have been prudent to retreat and regroup) levels.

Volume 6, the Battle of Nagashino, published in 1903, attempts to place a Japanese battle at the forefront of early modern military developments. Based largely on the Oze Hoan's *Shinchōki* account of the battle between Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu against Takeda Katsuyori, the IJA assessment makes the case that Nobunaga used 3,000 arquebusiers in a rotational formation to destroy the charge of the Takeda cavalry (*Nagashino no eki, Nihon Senshi, vol. 6,* 1903). Like the 1912 account of Nagashino by Lt. Gen Oshiage Morizō, the IJA staff account posits that a Japanese military force was using revolutionary tactics with the "new" technology of firearms, contemporary with similar developments by armies in early modern Europe (Oshiage 1965). As Oshiage does not provide a bibliography for his 1912 publication, asserting definite influence by the *Nihon Senshi* volume on Nagashino would be conjecture. Oshiage's argument stems largely from his position as IJA chief of weapons procurement during the Russo-Japanese War; it could even be interpreted as an argument internal to the IJA for advanced weapons technology by the chief of the office responsible for such. While it would stand to reason that Oshiage would be familiar with the volume produced by the IJA, the larger point is that influence or not, multiple military officers within the IJA were making claims to advanced, even "modern" antecedents in their invented institutional histories.

Recent scholarship demonstrates that this interpretation, especially the image of the "rotating volley fire" as derived from the *Shinchōki*, is significantly flawed. Oze Hoan was not present at the battle, and though the work is a hagiography of Oda Nobunaga, his discussion of Nagashino concentrates almost entirely on the forces of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the junior commander to Nobunaga at the battle but the *shōgun* of Japan at the time of Oze's writing in 1610 (Oze 1981). However, the IJA account in *Nihon Senshi* was uncritically used by historians and gained traction in the popular media. Sir George Sansom relies on the account for his description of Nagashino in his 1963 *A History of Japan, Volume II, 1334–1615*; Geoffrey Parker cites Nagashino in his 1988 *The Military Revolution*, going so far as to call Akira Kurosawa's depiction in the 1984 movie *Kagemusha* a "credible reconstruction". (Parker 1988, 140). The best recent works that shed light on the popular image of Nagashino and its flaws are the section on the topic in Thomas Conlan's 2008 book *Weapons and Fighting Techniques of the Samurai Warrior, 1200–1877 AD* and Fujimoto Masayuki's 2010 *Nagashino no Tatakai: Nobunaga no Shōin, Katsuyori no*

Haiin (*The Battle of Nagashino: Sources for Nobunaga's Victory, Sources of Katsuyori's Defeat*). Fujimoto should be credited in earlier work with bringing forward the *Shinchōkōki*, by Ōta Gyūichi, Nobunaga's personal secretary and a participant at the battle, as a more credible account.[5]

After a hiatus during and for a short time after the Russo-Japanese War, production of campaign histories resumed in 1908. Victory over the Russians changed the IJA's self-narrative. Whereas victory against the "backwards" Qing in 1895 was attributed to Japan's superior ability to industrialize and adapt to advanced modern warfare, the victory over Russia was attributed to a uniquely "Japanese" spirit of bravery and self-sacrifice (Benesch 2014; Drea 2009). The government and press played up the bravery and sacrifice of the Japanese soldiers and sailors who gave their lives for the emperor in Manchuria, rhetorically making individual sacrifice the key to victory. This unintentional encouragement of reckless attacks against prepared positions was observed against the Russians and extended into the famous "*banzai*" attacks seen against U.S. forces in World War II. Meckel's admonitions to his IJA students to "act instead of think" certainly influenced this mentality, though clearly as a part of a greater confluence of discourses. Benesch (2014) demonstrates that a discourse about a "traditional" value labelled "*bushidō*" provided a philosophical justification for self-sacrifice for the Emperor. The military's educational curriculum reflected this shift, as *bushidō* became a formal part of the service regulations in 1909 (Harries and Harries 1991). Likewise, Orbach (2017) shows that the "three unifiers" were not the only models for military action; the *shishi*, the young samurai who propelled the Meiji Revolution of 1868, were the very personification of "reckless action in the name of the Emperor" as a successful model. The teachings of Meckel gave an external corroboration to this prioritization of action over deliberation, coming from the leading global military power of the time.

The IJA began distancing itself from European advisers in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, for two reasons. First, Japan had just beaten a European (if somewhat weakened) power, through her subjects' inherently superior spirit; what

5 My own analysis of Nagashino, based on extensive analysis of the terrain around the site and the force composition of each army, indicates that while Oda Nobunaga's guns were important, they were neither revolutionary nor decisive; Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu's use of obstacles and terrain, along with a deception plan to entice their Takeda opponents into attacking their much greater-size force, were the primary reasons for victory. Nagashino was the topic of my MA research at the University of Hawaii, and a project to which I will return at some future point. While I disagree with Fujimoto's over-emphasis of the competing *Shinchōkōki* narrative account as a source, he ably demonstrates that however many guns Nobunaga may have had at Nagashino, they were not as central to the victory as commonly believed. A recent translation of the *Shinchōkōki* by Jeroen Lamers and Jurgas Elisonas is also worth consideration.

need did she have to learn from the West anymore? Second, the less-favourable-than-expected settlement, with no indemnity paid by Russia through the intervention of other Western powers in the negotiation process, somewhat soured the Japanese on the West; Though it continued in alliance with Great Britain, the Japanese military appears to have believed it had graduated to a more equal level with its former European teachers (Benesch 2014). The histories produced from 1908 to 1913 (Komaki, Kyūshū, and Odawara[6]) finish the campaigns of Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi to unify Japan in the 1500s. None of these analyses are individually remarkable, but the symbolism of the nation unified under military leadership through these campaigns should not be ignored.

From 1913 until 1924, no new volumes of *Nihon Senshi* were published (Volume 8, covering the Yamazaki campaign of Hideyoshi, was published in 1920, after having been delayed during the Russo-Japanese War. The length of this delay likely indicates where it fell on the priority list). Over the intervening decades, Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and participated on the winning side in World War I. However, international challenges to Japan's claims of sovereignty over Korea, plus the manner in which Japan was treated with minimal respect by its European and American allies at the Versailles Conference in 1919, followed by the U.S. and Britain forcing limitations on the number of ships the Imperial Japanese Navy could have at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference, resulted in Japan's disillusionment with the West growing stronger. Military academy history education at this time, according to a British observer, consisted of the Russo-Japanese War and medieval examples of bravery and sacrifice designed to instil national confidence and pride, with little to no study of tactical lessons (Harries and Harries 1991, 144). Rather than Western-based tactics, it appears, military leaders placed confidence in "Japanese spirit" to overcome the enemy.

Despite this seeming lack of interest in the study of operations and tactics, however, in 1924 the last volume in the IJA campaign series, on Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea in the 1590s, was released. The largest book of the entire series, with 449 pages of main narrative followed by 168 pages of supplementary narrative, 258 pages of reprinted primary documents, and a final 255 pages of biographical essays, it is massive. It also has the largest set of maps and supplementary documents. The temporal separation is noteworthy. The right-wing thinker Suzuki Chikara had pointed to Hideyoshi's Korean expedition as a precedent for Japanese intervention on the peninsula in his 1893 work *Kokumin no Shin Seishin* (*New Spirit of the Japanese Race*) (Benesch 2014, 67). In 1919 a rebellion in Korea

6 The Odawara volume (vol. 12) is problematic; the preface is dated 1913, but the publication date is listed in the reprint as 1893. In the absence of other evidence, I am considering this an error on the part of the reprint publisher.

had to be suppressed after nine years of colonial rule. I interpret the IJA General Staff Historical Section's choice to compile and release a volume on a Japanese invasion of Korea to be a significant attempt to tie contemporary policies to a historical past. As has been mentioned, there was no actual historical link from Hideyoshi's armies to the IJA. However, as the IJA studied the operational and logistical needs of maintaining forces stationed in Korea, a historical presentation of early modern Japanese troops performing the same sorts of duties in a conquered Korea provided a sense of historical legitimacy and ties to the past, not the least of which would be a sense that the current situation was rectifying Hideyoshi's failure to defeat the Koreans and Chinese in 1598.

The thirteen volumes of *Nihon Senshi* were produced over a period of significant change for the Imperial Japanese Army. By tying the military institution of modern Japan to examples on the border of the medieval and early modern, the IJA staff participated in the same process of history creation as those historians who created a feudal "medieval" era in Japan's past or thinkers who invented a "traditional" Japanese spirit called *bushidō*. Like those instances of the invention of tradition, the IJA's codification of Japanese military history had transnational origins as well, as Major Jakob Meckel's German influence on the tactical and operational levels of warfare shaped the focus of the IJA General Staff in both their choices of history to study and their conceptions of future military planning. The IJA Staff interpretations contained in *Nihon Senshi* not only influenced military thinkers, but propagated a version of these campaigns that place regional military forces as national sources of pride and international leaders in military tactics and technology.

This essay is far from a comprehensive review of *Nihon Senshi*. However, it is clear that further analysis of these texts will not only serve as useful for the scholar of medieval Japan to see the transmission of battlefield historiography, but also show that the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff, even in a minor bureaucratic section such as the Military History Office, was an active participant in Meiji and Taishō era discourses framing Japan and Japanese institutions against the backdrop of emerging modernity.

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Women's Education at Meiji Jogakkō and Martial Arts

*Simona LUKMINAITĖ**

Abstract

The topic of *bushidō* in education has recently been explored by Gainty (2013), Benesch (2014), and several Japanese historians in Japan, such as Sōgawa (2017). However, martial arts and *bushidō*, as found in the education for women, remains a largely untreated issue, despite the great attention women and their physical education received in the discourses regarding the creation of a healthy modern nation that took place during and after the Meiji period (1868–1912).[1] By looking at numerous primary sources, this paper, building upon Lukminaitė (2018), focuses on Meiji Jogakkō's[2] instruction of *budō*[3] as a modern means of physical education (PE). It aims to provide new insights into how *budō* was perceived, treated in writing, and functionally put into practice.

Keywords: Meiji Jogakkō, Iwamoto Yoshiharu, Hoshino Tenchi, *budō*, *ryōsai kenbo.*

Izobraževanje žensk v Mejdžijevski dekliški šoli in vloga borilnih veščin

Izvleček

Bushidō v kontekstu izobraževanja so v svojih nedavnih delih obravnavali Gainty (2013), Benesch (2014) in nekateri japonski zgodovinarji, na primer Sōgawa (2017). Vendar je pomen borilnih veščin in *bushidōja* v izobraževanju deklet še vedno precej neraziskano področje, čeprav so ženskam in njihovi telesni vzgoji v diskurzih o ustvarjanju zdravega modernega naroda v obdobju Meiji (1868–1912) in po njem posvečali veliko pozornosti. Ta prispevek se na podlagi številnih primarnih virov, upoštevajoč Lukminaitė (2018), osredotoča na poučevanje *budōja* oziroma borilnih veščin kot sodobnega načina telesne vzgoje (PE) na Mejdžijevski dekliški šoli. S tem želi ponuditi nov vpogled v to, kako so borilne veščine zaznavali, o njih pisali in jih uporabljali v praksi.

Ključne besede: Meiji Jogakkō, Iwamoto Yoshiharu, Hoshino Tenchi, *budō, ryōsai kenbo*

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1 A valuable contribution has been made recently: Kakemizu Tōko 掛水 通子, *Nihon ni okeru Joshi Taiiku Kyōshishi Kenkyū* 日本における女子体育教師史研究 (Tokyo: Ozorasha 大空社, 2018). Kakemizu explores the history of modern physical education of women in Japan, yet mentions Meiji Jogakkō only in passing.

2 明治女学 (1885–1909). The English title used by the school was Meiji Girls' School.

3 武道, in the meaning of martial arts as modern physical education. *Budō* will be used interchangeably with martial arts within the text.

Introduction

With the Meiji Restoration (1868), the reforms that followed soon after, and the increased exposure to the cultural influence of foreign nations, various issues regarding girls and women gained urgency. To be recognised as an independent and advanced state, the government undertook many reforms under which the citizens of Japan were perceived as assets of the nation. The issue of females as cultural representatives of modern Japan was painfully perceived by various intellectuals, who, partially inspired by Spencer and the theories of eugenics, argued that women's education was one of the shaping-factors to the physical and mental development of future generations. Women thus required an upbringing that would address this issue. However, while the topic was deemed urgent, there were also the deeply-set customs, and thus there was very little consensus and very little action over words. By the 1890s, with the government settling on a *ryōsai kenbo* 良妻賢母 (good wife, wise mother) style model, efforts were finally made with regard to standardising the education of women.

This paper examines the activities of independent Japanese educators, who were willing to take the issue to hand and provided an example of an original interpretation of modern education for women parallel to government's efforts.

Meiji Jogakkō's Model of Education

After the legal ban on Christianity was lifted in 1873 and Christians, or Christian-inspired intelligentsia, became active during the years of early Meiji, they also started promoting modernisation/Westernisation through education. With primary education becoming compulsory for girls in 1872, the Christian involvement in female education gradually became a tangible presence, and by the end of 1880s numerous private academies were established. Meiji Jogakkō can be said to have been the first successful enterprise of the Japanese Protestant community (Kischka-Wellhäußer 2007, 132).

Meiji Jogakkō was a noteworthy institution for a variety of reasons. First, rather than trying to gain support by maintaining affiliations, it did not define itself by following a clear-cut model as other schools did (that could have been identified as missionary, government, or one-teacher private), and devised an original approach to education under an independent banner of a network of intellectuals who, reflecting their own education, combined in their practices various ideas stemming from within and outside of Japan. In addition, it attracted students with its flexibility and variety of higher-education courses, serving as a bridge between

classes and religious inclinations, and taking in students regardless of their social and religious backgrounds.

Meiji Jogakkō's declared goal was to educate women in order to strengthen and improve the society at large. To achieve this, it took a twofold approach. First, it catered for a variety of educational needs and offered high-quality training to find employment, carry out research, or supervise a modern household as independent and confident modern women. This approach translated at the school into the encouragement of student autonomy, promotion of critical thinking, self-, peer-, and group-assessment, and the emphasis on extracurricular learning. The school also strove to enlighten the masses about the potential and needs of girls and women, subsequently aiming to create an environment in which they could function with more ease. This approach was enforced by publishing activities. Most importantly for the argument of this paper, however, it was a place where a variety of theories and schools of thought were melded together, resulting in a school for girls that intentionally went beyond being just Christian, encouraged students' own interpretation of religion and its values, placed great emphasis on literature as a means of education, and instructed girls in martial arts when very few other schools found PE appropriate or necessary.

In 1890, Meiji Jogakkō started instructing its students in martial arts. The physical and intellectual (*bunbu* 文武) training was carried out by Hoshino Tenchi 星野天知 (1862–1950), who combined Christian religion, literature, and ideas on psychology and martial arts in his practices as an educator. His course attracted 50 students. The martial arts education at the school experienced its ups and downs, especially after Hoshino left in 1897 in order to concentrate on his literary career, yet support for teaching martial arts to girls could still be seen in publications by the school until 1904, and was most likely being carried out on some level until its closure in 1909.

To promote martial arts by emphasising its benefits for female students, the school's staff used *Jogaku zasshi* 女学雑誌[4] (1885–1904) and *Jogakusei* 女学生 (1890–92)—two magazines for girls and women with strong links to the school. Moreover, when the need was felt to represent the education carried out at the school to the public (when receiving visitors, participating in charity events, or hoping to publicise the school to attract more students), fierce *naginata* duels were chosen as most appropriately descriptive of the benefits to be obtained from the Meiji Jogakkō's special form of education.

4 The English title *The Women's Magazine* was applied by *Jogaku zasshi* itself, while *Jogakusei* can be translated as "The Girl Student".

Ryōsai Kenbo and PE: Meiji Jogakkō's Version

While there was at first much resistance to PE (*taisō*) for girls and women, as promoted by the government, after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) the government tied the *ryōsai kenbo* ideal to sports to promote the strong physical bodies of women who could: 1) protect Japan when the husbands were away; 2) unify the mentalities of the women *vis-à-vis* the foreigners, whose presence in Japan was increasingly felt; and 3) create the skilled workers that were necessary in the developing economy, especially in factories (Tanigama 1989, 721–22). Exercising thus became a responsibility of girls and women to the nation. However, while *ryōsai kenbo*, or "good wife, wise mother", thought is often believed to have started in Japan in the 1890s and has been created by the government[5], as Koyama Shizuko (2013) and others have pointed out, it began with the influence from the West. Following the example of scholarship that accepts the divide between *ryōsai kenbo* as an "ideal of the 'civilisation and enlightenment' phase of the early Meiji period [...] and the 'nationalistic,' 'patriarchal,' 'Confucian' version at the turn of the twentieth century" (ibid., 1), this paper places Iwamoto Yoshiharu in the former category. Importantly, he was critical of the latter. Thus, just as the modern *bushidō* ideas were first popularised by the Christian intelligentsia, so was the *ryōsai kenbo* ideal.

The term *ryōsai kenbo* was not fixed, and had been in use in several versions before it was "standardised" in the 1890s. However, it was most likely coined by Nakamura Masanao 中村正直 (1832–91) who popularised it via *Meiroku zasshi*[6] 明六雑誌 (1873–74), yet started using the word earlier, when he was serving as the principal of Tōkyō Joshi Shihan Gakkō (Patessio 2011, 27–30). Both Nakamura and the magazine influenced Meiji Jogakkō and its policies through the principal Iwamoto Yoshiharu 巌本善治 (1863–1942).

Iwamoto's understanding was that *ryōsai kenbo* had a dual implication: literal and metaphorical. He applied it to the actual families and women who wished to marry, in addition to women who sought to become professionals and carry out their roles as "mothers to the nation" or "mothers to the world".

5 E.g., Horiguchi, *Women Adrift*.; Pamonag, *Promoting Japanese Womanhood*, 6-7, points out that the previous study on *ryōsai kenbo* concentrated on "the role of the state as the major, if not the sole, formulator and implementor of this gender ideology", marginalising the dissonant voices of non-state actors.

6 Issue 33 carried "Creating Good Mothers" by Nakamura Masanao, available in English in Meirokusha, *Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1976), translated by William Reynolds Braisted, assisted by Adachi Yasushi and Kikuchi Yūji.

> I do not educate women to get them ready for marriage. However, to get them ready as mothers and wives, I believe it is important to develop their "inner qualities" (*tensei* 天性). I do not believe that mothers and wives are to be limited to one household and one spouse—depending on how one realizes one's talents (*sairyō* 才量), one can become a mother and a wife, or a mother to the whole nation. Queen Victoria is a mother to the whole of Britain, Ms Willard became a wife to the world, Hannah More became a mother to the poor, Héloïse became a beloved wife for a single man.
>
> That is why, the curricula for women's education, while covering all the various fields that today's women should have a thorough understanding of, should emphasise the courses of arts (*bijutsu* 美術), professional training (*shokugyō* 職業), and morals (*dōtoku* 道徳). However, the goal of such education should be not to become a wife in a household, but instead to become a true and an all-round woman.[7] This way there will appear not only the women who will become good wives and wise mothers of single households, but those who will become mothers of millions.[8]

Along the same lines, Iwamoto argues the following in "A new plan to promote woman's Education in Japan"[9], where he reemphasised that educating girls to become *ryōsai kenbo* was but half of the picture.

> There are two ways of action that need to be taken to facilitate the growth of female education currently. The first one is to provide universal education to the general population, and thus allow the girls to become cultured and to give them a chance to better fill the roles of modern wives and mothers; the second is to provide a yet higher level of education to the brightest, and thus boldly strengthen the basis on which the female education stands, in order to clear the path for further free development.

According to the text, the first method will create numerous *ryōsai kenbo*, who will change Japan one home at a time, make the husbands better (*ryōjin ga daijōbu to naru* 良人が大丈夫となる), raise wise children (*kenji* 賢児), and thus benefit the whole country. With the second method, the prodigies with the initiative to lead by

7 Iwamoto's ideas here are close to those espoused by Tsuda Umeko 津田梅子 (1864–1929) and other female educators, such as Hani Motoko 羽仁もと子 (1873–1957), both having experienced Meiji Jogakkō's educational model.

8 *Wagatō no joshi kyōiku*, "An Address to the Meiji Jogakkō Pupils. The Present Educational System", 10.

9 *Wagatō no joshi kyōiku*, 207–8, based on *Jogaku zasshi* no. 280, July 29, 1891. "*Jogaku Fukyū no Keirin*" 女學普及の經綸.

example and educate (*yūdō keimō* 誘道啓蒙) their own sex would emerge, spreading throughout the country and becoming great teachers, invigorating *jogaku* 女学.[10] The goal of education for women was thus to invest in individuals who could be cultivated, assuring the spread of knowledge in both public and private spheres. The impact of these efforts was perceived as shaping the present and future of the nation.

If Iwamoto saw education as a means of enlightenment and social activism, what role was PE meant to play in it?

Iwamoto Yoshiharu's Understanding of Body and Mind

Iwamoto, who served as the principal of Meiji Jogakkō for seventeen years (1887–1904) and was involved in the running of the school in the years before and after that, was an active supporter of PE for women. Exposed to the Western understanding of physical training, and due to Japan's militarisation and national conscription (*chōheisei* 徴兵制, since 1873), the bodies of citizens became classifiable and comparable to each other (and foreigners) in terms of health, strength, and usability. Iwamoto, like many others, wrote about the differences between Western and Japanese women's physiques. In *Jogaku zasshi* no. 79[11], for example, by comparing Western ladies to their Japanese counterparts, Iwamoto drew attention to the stark contrast: to him, women in the West were out of the home and working, striving to receive an equal salary to that of men, while in Japan being sickly and weak was considered a sign of beauty.[12]

The martial arts, however, were more than physical exercise or Western PE; they were a means for training both body and mind.

"The Martial Arts of Old, *Taiiku* of Present—Reflections on the Current Discourse on *Taiiku* for Women"[13] starts as a response to Spencer's "Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical" (1861), Iwamoto naming the three corresponding categories of education, *chiiku* 知育, *tokuiku* 徳育, and *taiiku* 體育,

10 According to *Jogaku zasshi* no. 111, "Jogaku (The Study of Women) Defined" 女学の解, May 1888: "[*Jogaku*] is an academic discipline that deals with the principles behind anything to do with women: their heart and soul, past, rights, position, and the various matters regarding what is necessary to them in the present." For more information on Iwamoto Yoshiharu and his *jogaku* ideology, as well as his understanding of *ryōsai kenbo*, see Lukminaitė (2016).

11 Editorial "Woman and Literary Work: No. I." 女子と文筆の業（第一）, October 8, 1887.

12 Around this period Iwamoto advocated for any type of PE, as long as women were allowed to exercise. Rather than delving into details, he wished to change the understanding that PE was unfeminine and unnecessary for women.

13 古の武育、今の體育　女子體育論を評す, *Jogaku zasshi* no. 497, October 10, 1899.

and admitting the influence Spencer's treatise had in Japan. While he agrees that there are lines of division between the categories of education, Iwamoto criticises those who see the three as independent from each other, and laments the fact that in recent years more people have started to think that it is possible to carry out education in only one direction. Iwamoto states that in a living human being it is impossible to treat intelligence or morality in a singular fashion. The body is also closely tied to the condition of the heart/soul (*kokoro* 心), and it is hard to tell what are the workings of the physical (*yūkei no kokoro no hataraki* 有形の躰の働き) and what are the workings of the spiritual/emotional (*mukei no kokoro no hataraki* 無形の心の働). As this is the case, a person should be treated as a whole living being who needs to receive an education that is well balanced on both physical and spiritual levels.

Explaining the current state of affairs in Japan, Iwamoto mentions that there are people (*yakara* 族) who disregard this need for well-roundedness in education, and wish to spread a novel (Western) type of PE as they believe that none is to be found in Japan. While zealous, they run the risk of doing a poor job by failing to acknowledge the traditional values regarding *taiiku* extant in the country. Iwamoto admits that the ideals of physical education in Japan are not well-formed, pointing to the lack of organisation or standardisation in educational practices. At the same time, he wonders how it is at all possible to perceive Japan as a country with no *taiiku* when it is common knowledge that there were many people physically ready to resist the opening of the country. He claims that if there were no *taiiku* in Japan, no children would have been born or raised to adulthood, and Japan is well-known to have a growing population. To him, the Japanese are not physically weaker than Westerners.

Iwamoto goes on to lament that there are people who disregard the fact that *taiiku* for women already exists, and had existed in Japan before the Western concept of PE was introduced. From martial arts (*bugei* 武藝) to dances (*odori* 踊り) there is a great variety of examples of taiiku in Japan, yet the "female etiquette"—*jorei* 女禮—is the very embodiment of it. By not seeing it this way, teachers are risking corrupting the ideal already set in place. In explanation, the editorial continues by stating that as *chiiku* develops intellect and *tokuiku* morality, *taiiku* is then responsible for completing the physical development of a human being. That is why *taiiku*'s influence is primarily on the physical body; nevertheless, it reaches to the heart/soul. On the other hand, it is also necessary to involve the heart/soul into physical self-cultivation.

To Iwamoto, the body and soul/heart are like a married couple, i.e. complementary and having a great influence upon each other. He points out that it is common for a person to spoil their physique, however strong he or she is, due to emotional issues. In this case, they will probably get told that it is due to lack of proper

nutrition or exercise, poor circulation of the blood, or that they should look at the Westerners who are so tough and eat more meat, etc. Such current ideas regarding health (*eiseiron* 衛生論, lit. discourse on hygiene) are often causing people to grow weaker instead of becoming stronger. Just as the moral or intellectual education can backfire by making a person too much of an idealist because of standards which are too high or too doubtful due to having the horizons widened too far, the discourse regarding the physical education has made few people stronger permanently, as it has failed to find its foothold in the everyday lives of the people.

By referring to physiology, adequate diet, and over-exertion as detrimental to the physical state of the students, Iwamoto is on the same page as Spencer. However, Iwamoto takes the connection further by speaking about emotional stress and its effects on the body. His aim here is to pacify the conflict between two camps: those who are promoting native forms of PE and rejecting Western influences, and those who do the opposite.

Once more, bodies are compared: Japanese women's with men's, and then with Western women's. In terms of how frequently they get ill, their endurance, and the length of life, Japanese women are superior to Japanese men. When compared to Western women, they are not necessarily worse off either. The issue lies in comparing the women who come to Japan crossing the ocean to the women who lead peaceful lives in the inner chambers. If women of the same social standing were to be matched, he believes, it would become clear that there were not that many differences between them. Thus, it is misleading to make arguments regarding PE based on inadequate comparisons.

Taking the readers back to Spencer's ideas, the editorial states that it is a good balance of hours spent on physical and intellectual education that is of utmost necessity, and that it is around such topics that the discourse regarding PE in Japan should revolve. The first issue that needs to be resolved is the insufficient time allocated to PE. In addition, "as long as the conditions and customs allow, step by step, *taiiku* should be improved by being taken outdoors, carried out in groups, and made fun/recreational. In Meiji Jogakkō, the most developed types of PE so far are the *jorei*, *jūdō* and labour." *Jorei*, *jūdō*, and labour are thus the types of PE that Meiji Jogakkō was proud to present as its most developed, "outdoor, grouped, and fun" forms of PE in 1899. While *jorei* seems to have been present at the school throughout most of Iwamoto's leadership, it is not known who and when instructed *jūdō*. Likewise, it is unclear what exactly was implied here by labour, but it is likely it meant manual tasks at the school: cleaning, preparing the food, working in the garden, etc., thus building upon Spencer's argument of promoting natural forms of movement, yet including a nuance of practical application rather than recreation. The aspect of PE

as accomplishment or means to socialize found in the Western pastimes is treated as a factor that the Japanese PE could benefit from, yet, while PE provides a way to escape mental strain, it should not be unorganised or unproductive.

The above quote is surprising in promoting *jūdō* and not *naginata*—a martial art that represented the martial instruction and PE at the school from 1890 to 1897, around the time Hoshino Tenchi, the mastermind behind the *naginata* classes, left Meiji Jogakkō. Fujita (1983, 8) writes how in addition to *naginata* and *jūdō*, the students were instructed in *kendō*, *bōjutsu*, and *kusarigama*, yet the exact periods are unclear. Kanō Jigorō's 嘉納 治五郎 (1860–1938) work to introduce his *Kōdōkan jūdō* to police and military training programs, and as an activity at various educational institutions, might have been at play in choosing it over other martial arts at the school.

The conclusion of the editorial summarises the stance of the school, providing an insight into how important PE was to Iwamoto.

> What is truly important are the ideals behind the physical education. *Taiiku* is not a set of drills on the body that ignores the mind; it is not a playful pastime either. It is an indispensable part of comprehensive, high-level education that starts from the body. The ideal would be to have such PE that is capable of developing a human being fully just by itself. Intellectual education corresponds to *bun*—the civil arts, physical education corresponds to *bu*—the martial arts. Thus, the physical education of now is the martial education of old. As the two were taught as inseparable in the past (*bunbu funi, bunbu itto*), it is thus a retrogression and a loss in the progress of education to forget such experience from the past, instead of building up on it, and to concentrate only on the material aspects of PE and the body.

Iwamoto kept Meiji Jogakkō together and running according to his vision by concentrating his efforts on employing the right teachers. Having learned about Hoshino Tenchi and his ideas on martial arts in the education of women, Iwamoto invited him to become the instructor of these at the school.

Hoshino Tenchi's *Budō* and Literature

In 1890–97, Hoshino taught Martial Arts, Eastern Philosophy (*tōyō tetsugaku* 東洋哲学), Psychology, Western and Chinese Literature and ran a Christian Sunday class. All of these complemented each other in his writing, and were constituents of the mental training (*seishin shūyō* 精神修養) he saw himself employed to carry out

at the school. Combining his passion for literature and martial arts, Hoshino contributed a variety of texts aimed at girls and women that used the theme of martial arts. The examples can be found in a variety of forms. *Jogaku zasshi* ran his writing in the miscellaneous section (*zatsuroku* 雑録) that covered martial topics, such as "The Comments on the 'The Art of Testing *Naginata*'"[14] (October 1890), alongside his ideas on the study of Chinese Classics[15] (February to March, 1891), which went beyond classical Chinese and referred to English literature as well. He also contributed to the leading articles (*ronsetsu* 論説) in the magazine, being given the honour of opening various issues. Examples of such writing are "The Origin of Military Spirit"[16] (1892) and "Joshikyōiku to Budō"[17], which could be rendered in English as "Education for Women and Martial Arts" (serialised from 1893 to 1894). While he reviewed the writing of others in a literary criticism section (*hihyō* 批評), such as in the article "Budō Hitsuketsu Aiki no Justu" 武道秘決合気之術[18] (1890) that discussed the underlying principle of negating or redirecting an opponent's power (*aiki*), he also contributed his own original fiction (*shōsetsu* 小説). Hoshino's "Musōken" 無想剣[19] ran in 1891 in *Jogaku zasshi* no. 286–90, after it had been published in *Jogakusei* no. 16 in the same year, as an appendix, signed by Ankōko 暗光子 in both cases[20]. It was around 20 pages long, which shows the considerable attention and effort were made. Another one of Hoshino's attempts at female-student-oriented martial fiction is seen in *Jogakusei* no. 20.[21] The work titled "Tachikizu" 太刀創, translatable as "Scars on the Sword" and also signed by Ankōko 暗光子 was approximately five pages in length, a special New Year addition to the magazine. As both of these work appeared in *Jogakusei* first, it is clear that they were aimed at female students as an audience.

Jogakusei, which Hoshino was the main editor of, must have been to him a perfect means to relate the contents of his lessons at Meiji Jogakkō to audiences beyond the school. He established a section titled *kōburan* 講武欄 which dealt

14 "'Naginatajutsu' wo yomu" 「薙刀術」を読む, signed by Hoshino Shin 星野慎 in *Jogaku zasshi* no. 233.

15 *Jogaku zasshi* no. 253-55, "Kangakuben" 漢学弁, signed as Tenchiko 天知子, one of Hoshino's pennames.

16 "Budō no Hatsugen" 武道の発源 in *Jogaku zasshi* no. 331–33, published from November to December, and signed by Tenchiko.

17 女子教育と武道, *Jogaku zasshi* no. 359–61, signed by Hoshino Shinnosuke 星野慎之輔.

18 *Jogaku zasshi* no. 239, signed as Hoshino Shinnosuke.

19 The title is hard to render into English and was left as "Musōken" in the English list of contents.

20 For a list of Hoshino's pennames and contributions, refer to Noheji and Matsubara (1970). The reason behind such a variety of names was possibly twofold: to mask the fact that the magazine was run by mostly Hoshino alone, and to provide a certain freedom of expression, by signing under a name that would suggest that the author is a female, and, most likely, of similar age and status to the reader.

21 Dated January 23, 1892.

with detailed instructions on how to carry out practical and theoretical part of *budō*, such as in his "Jokai no Budō" 女界の武道,[22] "Budō no Shinka" 武道の眞價, "Bugi no Kōen" 武技講演 and "Naginata Jutsu" 薙刀術.[23] "Naginata Jutsu" included images and continued into no. 6.[24] No. 6 carried a new column titled *burinrin* 武凛々 that changed into no. 7–8's[25] *burindan* 武凛談, and depicted brave male and female characters. For instance, there were such titles as "Miyamoto Mushashi no Kettō" 宮本武蔵の決闘, "Tanryoku wo fukikomu" 胆力を吹込む in no. 6. No. 7 had "Monzen no Kawara" 門前の瓦 and "Matsukaze no Kiai" 松風の気合ひ, while no. 8 carried "Budō wa Shinkō nari" 武道は信仰なり.[26]

Jogakusei no. 14[27] carried "Budō no Kaiku" 武道の化育, "Bushi no Kifū" 武士の気風, "Bunbu itto" 文武一途 and "Tokuseijō no Budō" 特性上の武道.[28] All were written with a direct link to Meiji Jogakkō, a fact illustrated by the presence of a short reflection regarding the *naginata* performance by the school's students in the same issue, titled "Meiji Jogakkō Ongakukai ni Naginatajutsu wo mite" 明治女学校音楽会に薙刀術を見て[29], signed by Nobu のぶ, yet was possibly written by Hoshino himself.

Predating similar columns in magazines like *Butokushi* 武徳詩 (1906–09) that serialised "Bushidō Jokunmyō" 武士道女訓妙 and "Bushidō Kakunmyō" 武士道家訓妙, or Bushidō Teachings for Women and Home, *Jogakusei* no. 17 carried "Budōkakun" 武道家訓[30], or the martial teachings for the home, that raised such topics as determination (*kakugo* 覚悟), being on guard (*muyudan* 無油断), emotional strength (*shinkiryoku* 心気力), and observation skills (*kansatsuryoku* 観察力) to be learned by the women of the household. No. 18 carried "Gisonben" 義

22 An equivalent in English would be along the lines of "Martial Arts in the Lives of Women". No 1., May 21, 1890, signed as Tenchiko.

23 All from no. 2, June 23, 1890, signed as Tenchiō 天知翁. Since no. 3., a new penname, Fūryūsai 風流斎, becomes visible. The titles could be translated as "The True Value of Martial Arts", "Performing Martial Arts", and "Naginata Techniques".

24 Dated October 21, 1890.

25 November 21, 1890 and December 21, 1890 respectively.

26 Running the risk of oversimplification, the translations for the titles would be "Miyamoto Musashi's Final Battle/Duel", "Inspiring with Courage", "The Tile in front of the Gate", "The Spirit of the Wind in the Pines", and "Martial Arts as a System of Beliefs".

27 June 23, 1891, all signed as Hoshino Shin, his professional name.

28 Again, simplified translations: "The Transforming Power of Martial Arts Education", "The Character of the Samurai", "The Harmony between Martial and Civil Arts", and "Characteristics of Martial Arts".

29 "Impressions from the *Naginata* Performance at the Recital at Meiji Jogakkō", signifying the fact that the authorities of the school were open to displaying martial arts to the public.

30 October 21, 1891, signed by Tenchiko.

損辨,[31] or the ideas on sacrifice, along with "Neo no Tani ni Bu wo Arasou" 根尾の谷に武を争う, or "A Fight at the Valley of Neo", while no. 19 included[32] "Gōtō ni Aishi Yo" 強盗に遇ひし夜, or "The Night We Were Robbed". In the leading article of no. 21 that spoke of Sen no Rikyū and the tea ceremony, appeared a section on "Bunbu oyobi Zendō no Tanren" 文武及び禅道の鍛錬, or "The Training in *Bun*, *Bu*, and Zen" making the connections among martiality, Zen Buddhism, and literature/art apparent in Hoshino's thought and, consequently, in his practices at Meiji Jogakkō, which can be exemplified by the fact that he signed these texts using his professional name, Hoshino Shin. Likewise, under this name he continues to write on education in no. 22[33], running such articles as "Gunji oyobi Heisho" 軍師及び兵書, "Sengoku no Kyōikuka" 戦国の教育科, and "Jinbutsu Shūyō" 人物修養, speaking of soldiers, military treatises, education in the Warring States period, and how to cultivate an individual. All these were written with a bend towards the practical nuances in education. No. 24[34] carried a passage on chivalry, "Kyōki" 俠気, again signed by Hoshino Shin, and no. 27[35] had "Fugū no Eiyū wo Kyūjo seyo" 不遇の英雄を救助せよ by Tenchiko, asking to save the hero in trouble.

Comparison with the Western Understanding of PE and Martiality

In his memoirs Hoshino reflected how the *naginata* performances were received around 1891.

> Presentation at the Imperial Hotel
>
> Once, we had a performance at Shiba no Yayoi (芝の彌生館). At the time, the students were all beginners and we had no issues. However, when the *Aikoku Fujinkai* 愛国婦人会 sponsored an event at the Imperial Hotel in Tsukiji, we saw some reaction. The newspaper reviews still lacked reference to the connection between education and martial arts, and only seemed to have spared us the openly harsh criticism. The foreign journalists still spoke of magic tricks. [...] The match was quite fierce.[36]

31 November 30, 1891. The former by Hoshino Shin, the latter by Ankōko 暗光子.

32 December 26, 1891, by Ankōko.

33 March 22, 1892.

34 May 21, 1892.

35 September 22, 1892.

36 Hoshino, 201. The performance at the Imperial Hotel must have taken place on June 20, 1891. It is the same one that was observed by Nobu in *Jogakusei*.



Figure 1 "Naginatajustu", Jogakusei no. 2.

Few seem to have been praising the performances, yet it was still seen as worth sponsoring and thus the situation may not have been as bad as Hoshino portrays it. However, Hoshino's writing that the Western journalists saw the students' performances as tricks and magic can be backed up by how martial arts, such as *jūjutsu* 柔術, were being experienced abroad.

Kanō Jigorō brought *jūdo* 柔道 to the U.S. for men, while his student's wife, Yamashita Fude (c.1878–?), instructed women (Rouse and Slutsky, 2014). The British suffragettes employed *jūjutsu* as a method of self-defence (Hashimoto 2011), and in New Zealand it was used as a performative art, in a more of an entertaining, yet still gender-boundary challenging way (Looser 2010). Rouse (2015) points out how it was easier for women to turn to such imported and exotic methods to educate themselves physically. According to her, the Japanese martial arts, the appeal of which was found in the concept of *aiki*, or a person of lesser build overthrowing a larger opponent with apparent ease, was a threat to sports, especially boxing and wrestling, and the ideals of Western masculinity, physical superiority, and race. And thus, while partially appropriated in Western physical culture, martial arts were simultaneously discredited as unchivalrous trickery, performance, and, subsequently, feminine. It is thought provoking that martial arts, that were mostly not permitted

to Japanese women until decades later,[37] were being practiced by Western women since around 1900 via the leadership of Japanese women themselves. Martial arts, thus served as a way to express and defend one's femininity, in addition to forging international bonds among women practitioners.

Conclusions

To Iwamoto, who was developing his arguments from the position of education as a means of enlightenment and social activism, PE was a means to, first of all, liberate women's bodies by allowing them physical and mental expression and confidence, in addition to assuring their health and thus the ability to contribute to society. At the same time, it was understood as a means for moral and mental training that would ensure a good character, especially in the case of martial arts that were seen as capable of balancing the overemphasis of Western learning in the education of women.

Hoshino's writings in girls' magazines comes as surprising in its choice of martial topics, which were backed up by discussions on Chinese Classics, Zen Buddhism, and Christianity. However, these topics found their way into the magazines with such ease due to the fact that they did constitute a part of the education of women provided at Meiji Jogakkō.

In their writing and teaching methods, both of the educators seem to have been seeking a balance among the 1) traditional and modern, 2) intellectual, moral, and physical, and 3) feminine and masculine aspects of education. The understanding of education as multilateral and necessary to mould an individual on a variety of levels, allowing free expression of thought and in movement, is also an idea that underlined the education provided for girls anwd women at the school. It is this idea that might have seen the instruction in martial arts as liberating, while also protecting the students, both physically and against criticism directed at students receiving Christian and Western education.

37 In order to exemplify how ahead of time Meiji Jogakkō was, let us look at the historical developments of martial arts in education. In 1898, the Ministry of Education permitted martial arts as extra-curricular activities. In 1910, a national meeting of normal school principals agreed for *kenjutsu* and *jūjutsu* to become regular school subjects, while female participation in *naginata* and *kyūdō* was encouraged. I.e., martial arts became an elective course, yet the area of instruction was restricted. In 1911, the Ministry of Education officially authorized *kenjutsu* and *jūjutsu* in schools, although in actuality martial arts (*bujutsu*) remained elective for a few more years. In 1912, males were officially permitted to study *kenjutsu* or *jūjutsu*. In 1923 Kōdōkan started *judō* classes for women and children. In 1931, reflecting the change of educational climate in pre-war Japan, *kendō* and *judō* became compulsory subjects at normal and middle schools for boys. Finally, in 1936, boys were permitted to study *kyūdō*, and girls became authorized to study *kyūdō* and *naginata* at schools. (Benett, 2011, 296-300) The early example of Meiji Jogakkō thus provides an important glimpse into the early development of physical and martial arts education.

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Bushidō and the Legacy of "Samurai Values" in Contemporary Japan

*Andrew HORVAT**

Abstract

Though difficult to define as a clear set of moral precepts, aspects of so-called "samurai values", the combination of orally-transmitted Confucian and Buddhist lore to which Nitobe Inazō refers in his *Bushido*, can clearly be discerned in Japanese society today. As evidence for the influence of "samurai values", I have provided examples from two fields with which I am personally familiar: journalism and education.[1] Although in recent years several academic works have exposed historical anomalies in widely-held beliefs about actual samurai behaviour, I argue that the effectiveness of ideologies does not depend on historical accuracy. For example, justification for the right of newspapers to criticise governments in Japan does not stem from inalienable rights originating with European Enlightenment philosophers. Instead, it is linked to the view that the former samurai who in the 1870s became Japan's first news reporters could be trusted intermediaries between the government and the people, because as samurai they possessed higher standards of morality. That expectations of superior moral conduct continue to justify in the eyes of the general public the right of newspapers to speak truth to power can be seen by mass cancellations of subscriptions of newspapers whose staff betray these expectations through involvement in scandal. Likewise, the emphasis on "character building" (*jinkaku keisei*) in Japanese higher education is another link to perceived "samurai values." Some of Japan's leading private universities were founded in the late nineteenth century by former samurai. As in the case of journalism, the maintenance of superior moral conduct helps strengthen the claim to legitimacy of educational institutions in Japan. Finally, I will present a picture of Nitobe as an example of a former samurai who long after his passing continues to be revered for having adhered to the "samurai values" he both defined and embraced.

Keywords: *bushidō,* ethics, Nitobe, journalism, education

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1 The author spent the better part of three decades as a Tokyo-based reporter, working initially for the *Mainichi* and *Asahi* newspapers, moving later to the Associated Press, the *Los Angeles Times* and other international media; from 2005 to the present, he has taught at three Japanese universities; from 2008 to 2013, he directed Stanford University's undergraduate program at Dōshisha University in Kyoto.

Bushidō in zapuščina »samurajskih vrednot« v sodobni Japonski

Izvleček

Četudi bi jih težko opredelili kot jasno določeno zbirko moralnih predpisov, lahko vidike tako imenovanih »samurajskih vrednot«, skupka konfucijanskih in budističnih ustnih izročil, na katere se sklicuje Nitobe Inazō v svoji knjigi *Bushido*, kljub vsemu zaznamo tudi v današnji japonski družbi. Vpliv teh vrednot v prispevku dokazujem s primeri s področij, ki ju dobro poznam: novinarstvo in izobraževanje. V zadnjem času več znanstvenih del razkriva zgodovinske zmote glede dejanskega vedênja samurajev, vendar v prispevku zagovarjam tezo, da učinkovitost ideologij ni odvisna od njihove zgodovinske resničnosti. Tako na primer utemeljitev pravice časopisov, da kritizirajo vlado na Japonskem, ne izvira iz neodtujljivih pravic, ki so jih utemeljevali evropski razsvetljenski filozofi, temveč je povezana s stališčem, da je nekdanjim samurajem, ki so v sedemdesetih letih 19. stoletja postali prvi novinarji na Japonskem, mogoče zaupati vlogo posrednika med vlado in ljudstvom, saj so kot samuraji imeli višje moralne standarde. V očeh javnosti pričakovanje moralno superiornega vedenja še vedno upravičuje pravico časopisov, da opravljajo vlogo nadzornika oblasti, kar se kaže v primerih, ko bralci na primer množično odpovedujejo naročnino na časopis, če se njegovi ustvarjalci zapletejo v kakšen škandal. Podobno je z domnevnimi »samurajskimi vrednotami« povezano japonsko visoko šolstvo, v katerem se poudarja »krepitev značaja« (*jinkaku keisei*). Več vodilnih zasebnih univerz na Japonskem so na primer v poznem devetnajstem stoletju ustanovili nekdanji samuraji. Tako kot pri novinarstvu je ohranjanje superiornega moralnega vedênja osnova za legitimnost izobraževalnih ustanov na Japonskem. Na koncu predstavim še portret Nitobeja kot primer nekdanjega samuraja, ki še dolgo po svoji smrti uživa spoštovanje, saj se je ravnal po »samurajskih vrednotah«, ki jih je opredelil in sprejel.

Ključne besede: *bushidō,* etika, Nitobe, novinarstvo, izobraževanje

Introduction

It is the position of this paper that vestiges of so-called "samurai values", namely the combination of orally transmitted Confucian and Buddhist lore which Nitobe Inazō refers to as *bushidō* in his book of the same name,[2] can be found in various aspects of Japanese social behaviour today. As evidence for the lasting legacy of the system of ethical behaviour ascribed since the Edo period (1600–1868) to samurai, I have provided examples from journalism and education, fields with which I am personally familiar. In both cases I combine references to academic literature with my own experiences to make the point that these traditional values—whether historically accurate or constructed—continue to function as social norms, the benchmarks by which correct behaviour is judged.

In searching for traces of *bushidō* thought in contemporary Japan one is faced with a number of questions. What kind of behaviour is consistent with samurai

2 In this paper, Nitobe's book is referred to as *Bushido* while "samurai values" are *bushidō*.

values? Is Nitobe's *Bushido* an accurate representation of *bushidō* as practiced in premodern times, prior to the abolition of feudalism? What allows us to link the humourless moralism of Japan's mass circulation national dailies to Tokugawa samurai culture? Likewise, what aspects of samurai education can be found in practices at Japanese universities today? What about Nitobe as an interpreter of "samurai values"? What are we to make of recent scholarship that calls into question the key concept of "samurai loyalty"?

Not all the above questions have precise answers. But some do. Although there is no single definition of samurai values, there is a remarkable convergence in popular thinking on the image, though not necessarily the reality, of the noble samurai. We know that Japan's early news reporters were former samurai, and it does not take much effort to discover that the founders of some of Japan's most prestigious private universities were ex-samurai, some of whom had converted to Christianity. Although Nitobe never established an institute of higher learning, he became the president of two universities, professor at three of Japan's most prestigious schools, and in that last capacity, came to be regarded highly for having nurtured a generation of leading public intellectuals.[3]

Bushidō—Does It Give Us an Accurate Picture of Samurai Values?

Lauded abroad as the most authentic guide to the Japanese character when first published in 1900, Nitobe's *Bushido* has been criticised for having far more references to Christianity and classical European tradition than to Japanese or Chinese sources.[4] Nitobe himself is vague about just what constitutes *bushidō* thought. He writes, "It is not a written code; at best it consists of a few maxims handed down from mouth to mouth [...]" (Nitobe 1936, 5). However, as the descendant of a samurai family with a record of distinguished service to the Nambu fiefdom (an area in northeast Honshū, straddling present day Iwate and Aomori prefectures), Nitobe can be said to speak with some authority on samurai values, at least in the manner that they were explained to him in his youth. Nitobe's wife, Mary Elkinton Nitobe, was convinced that her husband's samurai origins held the key to the "make-up of his [...] character" (Howes 1995, 27).

3 Nitobe taught political economy at Kyoto University, colonial administration at Tokyo University and became president of Tokyo Woman's Christian University and principal of the Dai-Ichi Higher School, which though not called a university corresponds almost exactly to three-year undergraduate studies under the Bologna system in Europe today.

4 Kanno Kakumyō writes: "In the index of the Iwanami edition of Nitobe's *Bushido*, of 157 personal names listed, a mere 20 are Japanese. Of these just 17 are samurai or former samurai such as Saigō Takamori" (*Bushidō no gyakushū* 2004, 17).

Writing in 1934, a year after Nitobe's passing, she recalled, "My husband sometimes pained me by saying, 'I have not been loyal to my ancestors in suffering more'" (ibid.).

In a collection of personal reminiscences of his childhood collected and published in 1934, Nitobe reveals just how seriously his family took its samurai origins and how his mother expected him to show through his life and works that he was worthy of the status into which he was born. Nitobe summarises the content of a letter his mother sent together with two yen, young Inazō's share of a gift of money to the Nitobe family from the Meiji Emperor in recognition of the contribution made to agriculture by Nitobe's father and grandfather, both of whom had directed reclamation projects that had increased rice production by bringing new land under cultivation. Nitobe's name Inazō, literally "producer of rice plants", is a reference to this achievement for which the family had been honoured. Nitobe quotes his mother as having written him, "Your grandfather had been a famous man and so was your father. If you do not attain to greatness, people will laugh at you and say that you were only your mother's child and not your father's. If you disgrace yourself, you will drag me down, too. Strive for renown" (ibid., 33). In the preface to *Bushido*, Nitobe insists that he wrote his book in order to explain to foreigners that Japanese people can act with moral rectitude even if their children are not given religious instruction in schools. But, judging from Nitobe's reminiscences, one cannot help but think that the author may have been motivated by personal reasons as well, perhaps a desire to put down on paper some of the moral values that he saw as being the driving force in his own life. The above passage would seem to correspond neatly to the concept of honour which Nitobe deals with in his book. In other words, *Bushidō* may be historically inaccurate and it may have been written as propaganda, but neither of these points are sufficient to argue that the author did not sincerely believe that what he wrote about samurai morality was true.

Bushidō as Invented Tradition

In searching for authenticity in *Bushido* (not just the *Bushido* of Nitobe, but *bushidō*, the way of the samurai in general) one needs to deal with a new scepticism in scholarship about national traditions in general, initiated in the 1980s by the historians Eric Hobsbawm, Hugh Trevor-Roper and others who demonstrated in their writings that what citizens of modern nation states believe today to be the age-old traditions that define their national identity are often of relatively recent origin, and were in many cases consciously invented in order to inspire patriotic feelings. Trevor-Roper's essay proving that the Scottish kilt was invented by an

English merchant, that tartans did not originate with clans but with the easy availability of commercially woven cloth, and that the highland epic poet Ossian and his works were an elaborate hoax perpetrated by two patriotic clergymen is a case in point (Trevor-Roper 1983, 15–41). The periodic reinvention of samurai values, first during the Edo period and then in the middle of Meiji (1868–1912), would seem to fit into the above pattern.

Even a cursory reading of recently published books and papers indicates a sizeable gap between the conclusions of scholars and popular perceptions regarding samurai behaviour, real and invented. For example, research by Henry Smith and Bitō Masahide strongly suggests that the conspiracy in 1702 by 46 of Lord Asano's 47 loyal retainers to avenge the death of their master, the subject of one of Japan's most popular Kabuki plays, *Chūshingura*, represented anachronistic behaviour even by the standards of its day. Loyalty came to be stressed as a samurai virtue as part of an attempt to create a peacetime role of absolute submission to authority for the samurai, and had nothing to do with dying for one's lord in battle.[5] In fact, during the war-torn sixteenth century real life samurai were known to switch sides in the most opportunistic manner.[6] But for the purposes of this paper, what matters is not what was historically accurate but how people at the time thought samurai should behave. There have been many interpretations for the motivation of the 46 "loyal retainers" and whether pure unalloyed loyalty was one of them has been called into question.[7] However, that the actions of the 46 came to be interpreted later as "pure loyalty" can be assumed from the virtually uninterrupted popularity of stage and film performances with the name *Chūshingura*, literally, "a treasure house of loyalty". While historical research points to the fact that the behaviour of the 46 was anachronistic, it should be clear that what matters is not whether the act to avenge the death of their lord was historically accurate but the fact that Japanese audiences for generations have come to take for granted that samurai should show loyalty to their lord even beyond the grave. I would like to argue that the existence of anachronism in *bushidō* thought should in no way call into question the attachment large numbers—perhaps the majority—of Japanese

5 Bitō points out that the virtue of samurai loyalty was invented in the Edo period in order to turn unruly warriors into submissive bureaucrats in keeping with the needs of the Tokugawa shogunate (see Bitō 2003).

6 For a very thorough treatment of the subject of samurai disloyalty, see (Archer 2018).

7 Bitō makes the point that the initial interpretation both by the shogunate and the general public was that the assassination of Lord Kira, the man who had caused Asano to draw his sword in the Tokugawa Palace, was an act of protest against the shogunate for having punished only the Asano side. Henry Smith, in a separate paper, states that the first dramatization of the Akō Incident took place in 1748, nearly half a century after the event. It was only then that the incident came to be spoken of as an act of loyalty (see Smith 2003).

people continue to show to what they regard as moral principles exemplifying the best in Japanese culture.

Bushidō, not only Nitobe's but the many books that used the word in their titles published in Japan at the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries, do fit into the category of "invented tradition". Nitobe's claim that *bushidō* "was an organic growth of decades and centuries of military career" (Nitobe 1936, 5) has been called into question most recently by Oleg Benesch who places the emergence of *bushidō* thought firmly in the last decade of the nineteenth century (Benesch 2014).

The moral philosopher Kanno Kakumyō states that during the revival of *bushidō* in mid-Meiji ordinary Japanese did not rely on the works of scholars to define exemplary samurai behaviour for themselves: "Their source material consisted of historical novels" (Kanno 2004, 11) and so it is today. For example, the film director Kurosawa Akira, descendant of a samurai family, did much to project an idealised vision of the noble, self-effacing, superior *rōnin* (masterless samurai) in his period films, especially in *Seven Samurai*.[8] As the film is set during the century of war immediately prior to the Edo period, Kurosawa's image of samurai willing to lay down their lives to protect farmers against bandits has to be seen as pure fantasy. However, Kurosawa is not alone in creating popular culture samurai heroes with overwhelmingly positive traits. The list of period films and television programs with samurai superheroes whose only purpose in life is to protect the poor and exploited from greedy merchants and venal officials is virtually endless. However, it is not entirely correct to say that directors such as Kurosawa somehow invented these samurai heroes. On the contrary, they responded to pre-existing popularly held images.

The transformation of sixteenth century ruffian samurai (portrayed realistically in director Mizoguchi Kenji's film *Ugetsu Monogatari*) into protectors of the people took place in the Edo era, when Confucian scholars in the service of the Tokugawa shogunate, (Yamaga Sokō, Ogyū Sorai and others) sought to harness Chinese political philosophy to transform the warrior retainers of a century earlier into scholar administrators who—it was hoped—could win the trust of the lower classes and legitimately claim the right to occupy the highest position in the Tokugawa social hierarchy through displays of moral rectitude. In this regard the samurai had little choice; they had to acquire positive traits in order for the Tokugawa to achieve their goal of a peaceful, stable society after a century of bloodshed. Thus, even though, as Benesch and others have pointed out, samurai

8 Other Kurosawa films with samurai heroes are *The Hidden Fortress, Yōjimbō*, and *Tsubaki Sanjūrō*.

values were not referred to as *bushidō* during the Edo period, and even though what constituted such values remains the subject of debate, this does not mean that such values did not exist or that they were the complete invention of a later era. For example teaching of Confucian morality in fief schools to young samurai was almost exclusively conducted by samurai of middle or lower rank, indicating that samurai values were passed on from older to younger generations of samurai. While Nitobe was incorrect to describe *bushidō* as an exclusively oral tradition (since samurai teachers were known to have conducted classes using texts), Nitobe was not just making things up. Also, while it was historically inaccurate on Nitobe's part to use the word *bushidō* to refer to samurai values, as Martin Collcutt mentions in his essay "The Confucian Legacy in Japan", Nitobe was right to see strands of Confucian, Buddhist, Shinto and folk elements in Japanese thinking about morality (Cullcutt 1991).

All the same, samurai pop culture heroes are useful: they not only gauge popularly held views of the samurai, but they also provide examples of the virtues which the general public considers to be typical of the noblest traits of the former warrior class. In this regard, Nitobe's *Bushidō* does offer a useful list of positive attributes. For the purpose of this paper, perhaps the following traits might offer a sampling of what ordinary individuals would demand of an elite class: Benevolence (to the weak), Loyalty (not to the death but in service), Rectitude, and Sincerity.

Journalism

Journalism offers an excellent sampling of samurai-linked ethical standards—both observed and broken—since the founding of Japan's major dailies in the first decades of Meiji. I am indebted to two reporters-turned-scholars, Albert Altman and James Huffman, whose work linking the early Meiji press to the samurai class has sadly received insufficient attention. In contrast, to this day both academic and popular works on the Japanese press published in the West heap criticism on the Japanese news media and its practitioners for their alleged failure to fulfil the role of a Fourth Estate in a democracy.

For example, veteran Tōkyō reporter Richard Halloran wrote in 1969, "… [A]n English or American newsman today often has a hard time recognizing the connection between Japanese journalism and his own craft"[9] (Halloran 1969, 160). Halloran, who would later become Tōkyō bureau chief of the *New York Times*, argued that Japan's news media was "regulated" and that it was "not a mirror but

9 Halloran wrote, "[The Japanese press] dispenses the decisions of the Establishment and assists in persuading the public to follow."

a molder of public opinion on behalf of the Establishment". Halloran's strongly critical ideas of the Japanese press were echoed in more strident tones in 1989 by Dutch journalist Karel van Wolferen in his best-selling *Enigma of Japanese Power,* in which he called the Japanese news media a "house-broken press" (Van Wolferen 1989, 123) and accused its practitioners of "help[ing] to keep secret the details of how the administrators actually run Japan" (ibid., 126). A similarly critical approach was adopted by Laurie Anne Freeman in *Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan's Mass Media*, in which she blamed "institutional constraints" for preventing the Japanese news media from providing the public "all the news that's fit to print"[10] (Freeman 2003, 178).

What the above critics failed to see, but Altman and Huffman did, was that Japanese journalism was never intended to fully function as a Fourth Estate. It was founded by the samurai who won the Boshin Civil War that brought Meiji leaders to power, and it was written (at least initially) by samurai who had been on the losing side. It is its origins during an era of rapid nation-building and the indebtedness of its practitioners to a tradition of Confucian morality that sets the Japanese media apart from counterparts in countries where the press earned its right to speak freely through a struggle against entrenched authority. In the Japanese case, the news media was in part a creation of the new state; the first journalists shared the same samurai class origins—if not always the same political views—as the founders of the modern Japanese nation. They did not ask for unfettered freedoms to which they themselves did not feel entitled; rather, as members of the elite who lost out in the struggle for power, the early journalists vied to share in it. To do that, they simultaneously collaborated with their former adversaries in helping to convince the public of the need for radical reforms, and at the same time competed against those in power through demonstrations of high moral principles and passionate patriotism. In other words, the Japanese press did not enter the modern era as a permanent adversary of political power. Unlike in the West, in Japan the expression "the Fourth Estate" is rarely if ever used to describe the press.[11]

One of very few foreign news correspondents to have shown a nuanced understanding of the work of his Japanese counterparts was the late Frank Gibney. As Tōkyō correspondent of *Time*, he wrote the following in an article in 1949 about the *Asahi Shimbun*: "To an American it is a bewildering combination of

10 On the same page Freeman concludes that the Japanese media provides an "informationally inferior product".

11 Readers interested in a more detailed treatment of the contemporary Japanese news media's collaborative role with government may wish to access the author's essay, "Japan's News Media—How and Why Reporters and News Organizations Influence Public Policy" (Kotler 2016, 95–133).

sense-making progressiveness and technical efficiency with stuffy unwieldy Japanese orthodoxy, but unquestionably it should take rank as one of the world's great newspapers" (Gibney 2001, 274). Gibney should be given credit for being among very few foreign observers to notice the "stuffy unwieldy orthodoxy" aspect of Japanese newspapers, since it is the key to the basis of their legitimacy.

For example, in Japan no newspaper has a humour column. It is rare to see a pun in any headline. None publish any letters from readers that contradict or complain about any article or editorial appearing on their pages. None accept or commission op-ed pieces that take positions different from the political orientation of the newspaper: left in the case of the *Asahi, Mainichi* and *Tokyo Shimbun*, and right in the case of the *Yomiuri* and *Sankei*. It is a rare day that a Japanese newspaper prints a correction. In Japan the line between reporting and opinion, so clearly drawn by the American news media, is hardly perceptible. Papers do not allow themselves to be contradicted because they do not merely report facts which can be challenged, they take positions which carry moral weight and therefore ought to be unassailable. In other words, they are not a marketplace of competing ideas; they offer a package of policy positions and they defend them much the way that a political party might stand behind its platform, or in the case of the idealised samurai, the honour of his lord.

All one has to do to see the difference between the self-perception of Japanese versus Western journalists is to compare the statements of core values of the *New York Times* with those of the *Asahi* or *Yomiuri*, Japan's two national dailies with the largest circulations:

> "The Company's core purpose is to enhance society by creating, collecting and distributing high-quality news, information and entertainment." Core values statement on *The New York Times* company website.
>
> "From a consistent and unbiased standpoint, making full use of the right of free speech, contribute to the development of a democratic state and to the establishment of world peace…." From *Asahi Shimbun*'s basic principles (1952).
>
> "Contribute to the peace and prosperity of Japan and the world…" From *Yomiuri Shimbun*'s basic principles (2000).

These quotes from the core value statements of Japan's two leading papers are the "stuffy unwieldy Japanese orthodoxy" that Gibney described and which represent the strong moralistic streak of the Japanese media. It is not the "public's right to know" that justifies the newspaper's privilege to publish information, but rather the

news media's claim to high moral standards, which reporters are expected to uphold, that confers upon them the privilege of offering advice to government. It is because of the existence of this norm that another national daily, the *Mainichi*, lost some 400,000 subscribers in a few months in 1972 when in the course of a trial it came to be known that a *Mainichi* political reporter had slept with one of his sources, a married female employee of the Foreign Ministry (Kawachi 2007, 22). The *Asahi* faced a similar drop in subscriptions in the fall of 2014, when its management made a tactical mistake by admitting that there were errors in a series of stories, the last of which the paper had published some 22 years earlier (Horvat 2016, 100).

In the case of the *Mainichi*, the public prosecutor reading out the list of charges, used a particular phrase that was clearly designed to characterise the reporter, Nishiyama Takichi, as lacking in character, or what the Japanese call *jinkaku*. He described the reporter as taking advantage of a woman, an act unbecoming of a gentleman. The words he used were, *jō wo tsūjite*, literally "through emotions", effectively accusing the reporter of being both "insincere" and taking advantage of the weak. At the time I was a cub reporter working for the English-language *Mainichi*, and I recall my Japanese colleagues freezing on hearing the prosecutor's phrase. The fact that the evidence Nishiyama had obtained clearly proved that the Foreign Minister, Fukuda Takeo, had lied in Parliament—which should have destroyed his political career—was quickly forgotten and all attention was focused on the "morally unbecoming behaviour" of the reporter. The outrage felt by the general public toward Nishiyama extended to his employer. In other words, Nishiyama's insincerity and his caddish behaviour—in the eyes of the public—removed the claims to superior ethical standards that the *Mainichi* needed in order to justify its work as a newspaper. To understand the reasoning for the public's negative reaction, one needs to keep in mind that newspapers began in Japan as vehicles by which to disseminate official information during the period of rapid modernisation, so-called *bunmei kaika* or civilization and enlightenment. Part of their mission was to enlighten, i.e. to explain and by extension educate the general public on policies that they needed to understand in order to keep up with an era of rapid changes, such as the introduction of railroads, the telegraph, military conscription and so on. Far from challenging the government, the early newspapers acted as interpreters of official policy. In other words, the newspapers shared certain qualities with the new Japan's educational system—they served the state by informing and educating, and through their editorials encouraging correct moral conduct.

As mentioned above, the conflation of samurai values and journalistic ethics in Japan is no accident: the founding of the modern Japanese press was accomplished almost entirely by former samurai. The best-known example of a samurai turned

reporter is that of Fukuchi Gen'ichirō, first editor of the *Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun* (the present day *Mainichi Shimbun*). An incident involving Fukuchi, often referred to as the "father of modern Japanese journalism", serves to illustrate that Japanese news reporters at the time when the first papers were established were fully aware that they had no "inalienable rights" to publish anything. In 1869 Fukuchi became the first Japanese journalist to be jailed for breaking the Newspaper Regulations promulgated that year. But instead of fighting the government, he submitted an abject apology for his misbehaviour. Albert Altman wrote:

> None of the editors of the civil-war newsbooks [early newspapers], during the ten months between July 1868 and the promulgation of the [Newspaper] Regulations, appears even to have suggested that he had the "right" to publish his views in print. Neither has any evidence been offered that these same intellectuals were censorious of the Regulations on the ground that the government attempted to control the contents of the newspapers it was allowing to come into legal existence. [They] were all Tokugawa intellectuals committed to the accepted ethic which emphasized responsibility and obligations rather than rights.[12] (Altman 1976, 56)

Most other journalists active during the Meiji era, both on the pro-government and the popular rights movement, traced their family origins, and education, to the samurai class. State-media relations in Meiji were definitely marked by samurai ethics. Reporters served the state (loyalty) and educated the public (with feelings of benevolence). Although less overtly today, the Japanese media continues to spend much time explaining government policies to readers and viewers, and in spite of a dent in their earnings, Japanese media conglomerates engage in educational, cultural, and charity activities that are part good publicity, but also "noblesse oblige".

The "stuffy unwieldy orthodoxy" noted by Gibney extends to demonstrations of activities for the public good. Suffice to say that one newspaper, the *Yomiuri*, maintains its own symphony orchestra, a cultural activity which in the United States would be undertaken by a tax-exempt foundation. The *Asahi* runs cultural centres which offer a wide range of self-improvement courses, much the same as a university extension department in North America. The *Asahi, Mainichi* and *Yomiuri* all bestow annual prizes for literary and artistic achievements. Both the *Asahi* and the *Mainichi* promote month-long nation-wide high school baseball

12 Altman discusses the *kawaraban,* the pre-Meiji single page woodblock printed news sheets which provided a combination of advertising and entertainment, but which were prohibited from reporting or commenting on political events.

tournaments, which have achieved the status of national institutions. Not to be outdone, the *Sankei* maintains a charitable foundation which awards scholarships to needy students throughout Japan.

Such cultural and educational activities of Japanese news organisations need to be seen not as additional activities, but as work integral to their *raison d'être*. Unlike their British and American counterparts, which were able to draw on ideas originating with the Enlightenment and which were later interpreted by American revolutionaries as giving individual citizens "inalienable rights" including participation in politics and government, Japanese news organisations had to earn the privilege to criticise their leaders through demonstrations of exemplary moral behaviour. It should be remembered that until the Meiji revolution publications in Japan were prohibited from reporting on real political events.

The elite status of news reporters is also linked to the "stuffy unwieldy orthodoxy" Gibney so astutely observed. The idea that one needs to demonstrate a high level of education by graduating from one of half-dozen elite universities, and to be working for a news organisation with a proven track record of contributing to the moral improvement of society—concepts that can be traced to the Confucian values modern Japan has inherited from the Tokugawa shogunate—continues to function as the non-stated norm of Japanese journalism. And it is this same "stuffy unwieldy Japanese orthodoxy" that on the one hand fails to grant the Japanese news practitioner an "inalienable right" to criticise government, while on the other allows him or her to move freely between the ranks of the governors and the governed, having earned that right through a demonstration of moral worth. This may explain the absence of a strict line of demarcation between reporters for Japan's elite news organisations and the elites whom they cover, and the existence of such an invisible barrier between reporters of the elite national dailies and the largely non-elite freelancers who write for the salacious weeklies, equivalents of Britain's tabloids.

To sum up, in Japan a news reporter working for one of the two national news agencies, five major dailies, 40 odd regional newspapers, as well as their affiliated television stations, derives the right to ask questions and make the answers publicly known from proven moral worth, consisting of a combination of high educational attainment and the daily demonstration of morally correct behaviour. Incidentally, the Japanese news media displays a far greater commitment to public service in its reporting than does its Western counterpart. We see this in the awarding of prizes for long, team-reported special projects, such as a six-month series by a local paper in Tochigi Prefecture on child poverty, or another lengthy series by a regional newspaper in Kyūshū on the deterioration of grazing lands on the slopes of Mt Aso as a result of population aging among dairy farmers.

Education

For the influence of "samurai values" on Japanese higher education one need not look very far. As in the case of the Japanese mass media, there is a tendency to emphasise morally exemplary behaviour. In the case of many private universities, the legitimacy of the university is linked to the accomplishments of a historically prominent founder. Among ex-samurai founders of private universities are Fukuzawa Yukichi of Keio, Okuma Shigenobu of Waseda, and Niijima Jō of Dōshisha. The founder's life as well as his or her sayings are studied and sometimes included in the curriculum. Some epithet of the founder may become the school motto, which is invoked at school ceremonies (of which there are many at Japanese private universities) or when exhorting students to do their best. The professor is a "sensei" (master) who acts both autocratically and with "benevolence". The professor's job is not just to teach academic subjects but to impart a sense of moral rectitude in his or her students. Moreover, in a pattern that harkens back to Edo days, the teacher's responsibility for the welfare of a student extends beyond graduation. Much has been made of the job-placement role of Japan's private universities, but there is plenty of evidence that this too is part of the Edo legacy of higher education in Japan.[13] Incidentally, Edo era terms such as *monkasei*, literally students from the same gate, a reference to the wooden gates of the Confucian academies, continue to be used to denote any group of alumni who studied with the same professor. Referring to Tokyo University as the "red gate" also harkens back to Edo times.

The link between higher education and morality in Japan was the result of a practical need for "men of character" during Edo. As mentioned earlier, the shogunate saw it in its interests to turn warrior samurai into scholar officials as a means to achieve long-term stability. In later years, as the feudal system came under stress, shogunate and local fief leaders came to see a need to nurture talent. As educational historian Kobayashi Tetsuya has written, in Edo

> [G]overnment was still simple enough so that the wisdom of the sages taught in the Confucian classics had practical meaning. When leadership

13 A well-documented case of an Edo period job placement by a *sensei* of his *deshi* (pupil) is that of the Kyōto Confucian scholar Kinoshita Jun'an recommending Amenomori Hōshū to serve as adviser to the Sō fiefdom on the island of Tsushima in 1692. The Sō acted as intermediaries in diplomatic relations between the Tokugawa shogunate and Korea. In his capacity as adviser to the Tsushima fiefdom, Amenomori played a leading role in Japan-Korea relations for the best part of the following six decades. Incidentally, Kinoshita was the mentor of Arai Hakuseki, who went on to act as policy adviser to the shogunate. Although Arai was of samurai stock, neither Kinoshita nor Amenomori appear to have been. However, all three functioned as educators and advisers of samurai.

> depended primarily upon the moral quality of individuals, the study of Confucianism was through its moral instruction, a practical preparation of administrators. (Kobayashi 1965, 292)

Unlike in the West, where morals were closely linked to religion and where religious instruction came to be separated from secular education, often after bitter struggle between church and state, in Japan morality was not clearly identified with any one established religion, so its presence in education was not seen as objectionable. On the contrary, a claim to morally superior behaviour tended to reinforce the legitimacy of educational institutions. Perhaps one can see in the excessive emphasis at some schools on ceremony as a latter-day outcropping of "rectitude", a virtue inherited from Confucian rites as yet another way to confer legitimacy on universities which fail to provide much by the way of real academic content. These school ceremonies are highly choreographed and invariably involve the shouting of orders for students to "rise", "bow heads", and "be seated". Depending on the university's zeal for ritual, there can be as many as four commencement exercises per year plus several unveilings of plaques, anniversary events and so on, all of which must be attended by all faculty.[14] In his classic study of Japanese high schools, Thomas Rohlen argues that the tendency to stress school ceremonies is rooted in Japan's Confucian influenced past. Rohlen writes,

> School events and ceremonies [in the United States] are readily changed and abandoned if student support lags. Japanese school events, on the other hand, appear uniform and constant [...]. The Confucian appreciation of formality in ritual as expressive of the moral order lingers in Japan [...]. (Rohlen 1983, 167)

One might argue that these Confucian legacies may not necessarily indicate a samurai connection, but as has been mentioned before, Confucian morality constituted a large part of samurai education so it is very difficult to separate the two. Since emulating one's betters is a behaviour pattern common to all societies, it should come as no surprise that public schools have adopted the moral values of a long defunct elite class.

Another example of the high value attached to moral exhortations at Japanese universities is the prominence given to school mottos. Unlike at most universities in the West, where little attention is paid to the university motto, except perhaps when

14 For criticism of the tendency at many Japanese private universities to emphasize ritual, see McVeigh 2015. The chapter titled "Japanese Higher Education as Simulated Schooling" (123–47), specifically deals with the heavy emphasis on ceremonies at many Japanese private universities.

it is part of a design printed on franchised sportswear, in Japan virtually all tertiary institutions provide detailed explanations of the origins and meaning of their mottos in pamphlets, and lately on websites under the heading of *kengaku no seishin* or, the "spiritual foundations of our school". Although some schools have modernised their slogans to take into account the new role of universities as producers of global human resources, in a recently accessed list of leading private institutions about one in three professed to adhere to the moral exhortations of their founders compressed into a few syllables. Dokkyo University's is: *gakumon wo tsūjite ningen keisei* (character building through learning).[15] Jōsai University's is almost identical, and means the same thing: *gakumon ni yoru ningen keisei*. A women's university in Kamakura promises to "mould individuals who devote their lives to service and gratitude". Japan Women's University's motto, which is in English, carries a similar message: "Bloom as a leader". What all of these "bon mots" (and many, many others) convey is a promise that the university will seek to improve the student's personal character, or *jinkaku*.

We can also see vestiges of samurai ethical influence in the contrast between the image of the ideal Japanese university professor and his or her counterpart in the West. In the West it is sufficient for a university instructor to excel in an academic field, or at least to have a reasonable command of it. In Japan, other than being a professional the *sensei* must also be a person of integrity and high moral character. We know this because the news media reports on the slightest infringements by teachers and instructors. Causing a traffic accident is enough to result in a forced resignation.

Incidentally, the Japanese Ministry of Education encourages universities to offer courses on the life, times and accomplishments of their founders, so that students can learn from their exemplary behaviour.

Although one might argue that the continued emphasis on "character building" at Japanese universities is intended as little more than a veneer designed to impart legitimacy by linking the school to age-old educational traditions, it is not entirely a case of all show and no go. When Matsushita Kōnosuke, founder of the Panasonic business empire, decided to establish a graduate school to train future political leaders, he chose to call it *juku* as a homage to the private Confucian academies of Edo times. The Matsushita Seikei Juku (Matsushita School of Government and Management) has so far sent more than 50 of its graduates to the Japanese Parliament as members of both ruling and opposition parties. Former Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko is an alumnus, as is the present Minister of Defence, Onodera Itsunori, and the former head of the Democratic Party of Japan, Maehara Seishi.

15 For a list of the mottos of Japanese private universities and explanations of the school's "founding philosophies" see Dokkyo Daigaku 2018.

Not surprisingly, a significant part of the school curriculum consists of studying the thoughts, sayings and moral principles of the founder, Matsushita.[16]

Nitobe Inazō as a Latter-day Educator Samurai

But perhaps no example of *jinkaku* as a samurai value is clearer than in the case of Nitobe himself. It should be clear from the extraordinary accomplishments of Nitobe that he sincerely believed in the key role to be played in modern Japan of the "superior" man whose position of leadership is based on the high moral standards which he enunciated in *Bushido.* We also know that he personally struggled to achieve the high standards that he set for himself.

The very name Inazō—producer of rice crops—mentioned above, links him to a tradition of service. It is no accident that Nitobe himself would become an agricultural economist and colonial policy advisor, credited with having laid the foundations of the Taiwanese sugar industry, the reorganisation of which, thanks to Nitobe's advice, made Japanese colonial rule of the island a paying proposition. To describe Nitobe as multi-talented would be to understate matters. Nitobe, by most accounts, was someone we might call today a manic depressive, except for the fact that he worked furiously even during his periods of deep self-doubt. Advised by his German doctor to rest at a hot spring as a cure for depression, Nitobe withdrew in 1898 to Ikaho in Gunma, where he wrote *Nōgyō Honron* (*Basic Principles of Japanese Agriculture*), a 461-page treatise for which he received a doctorate in agriculture, the first to be awarded in Japan. In 1890, while studying in Germany, he wrote a thesis on the Japanese system of land tenure in German. It was while still recovering from depression that Nitobe (again on the advice of his doctor) moved to a hotel in Monterey, California, where instead of resting he wrote *Bushido* in English. Cured of depression, he started his consulting work on the Taiwanese sugar industry in 1901.

Author, educator, agricultural economist, colonial policy advisor, in 1901 Nitobe was not yet 40. He would go on to hold a chair at Kyoto University, serve as president of Tokyo Woman's Christian University, principal of the elite Dai-Ichi Higher School and then start a separate career as the first deputy secretary general of the League of Nations, where he founded a committee which after World War II would become known as UNESCO. Retiring from the League in 1926, he became head of the Japanese national committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a track two organisation where he became known as a defender of Japanese

16 As a former outside adjudicator of student graduate presentations, the author is personally familiar with the teaching style and content of the Matsushita school.

interests in China, a position that he would come to regret after the Japanese military's expansionist policies in Manchuria (Howes 1995; Nitobe 1936).

It should be clear by now that Nitobe was probably far more successful as a latter-day samurai than he was as a historically accurate interpreter of samurai values. The point here, however, is that both in his multifaceted career and as an educator he adhered to the values that he set forth in *Bushido*. In this regard, he has had a lasting impact on education, linking "character building" and "education" by personal example in the minds of leading Japanese educators and public servants. It is not by accident that his likeness graced the ¥5,000 banknote for 23 years.

Allow me here to describe the "participant observer" role I had the opportunity to play in the middle of the last decade as a member of an informal organisation called the Nitobe-kai. At the time I was the Japan representative of the San Francisco based Asia Foundation, where my mission included reaching out to Japanese civil society, educational institutions and a wide range of Japanese activists and individuals, with the aim of promoting some of the loftier goals of U.S. foreign policy at the time, such as human rights, empowerment of women, and historical reconciliation in East Asia. The Nitobe-kai, though informal in nature had half dozen members, including Japan's then chief public prosecutor, the presidents of two Tokyo area private universities, and a senior executive of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, who would leave the group when he was named bank president.

Why Nitobe Now? This was the question posed on the poster of an event our Nitobe-kai held at the main hall of the United Nations University in Shibuya, in 2005. The conference took place in the UNU's largest hall and was filled to capacity. Each of the Nitobe-kai's illustrious members spoke on one particular aspect of Nitobe that they felt had influenced their lives. Among the many events we convened—in Sapporo, where Nitobe had attended university, in Ikaho, Gunma, where he had written his first monumental work, and at Morioka, Nitobe's birthplace—the one subject that never directly came up for discussion was *Bushido*, the book. Though "samurai values" by name were never mentioned, all speakers discussed at length some positive aspect of Nitobe's "superior character". Japan's chief public prosecutor focused on Nitobe as a *kokusaijin*, the kind of cosmopolitan—citizen of the world—that he felt Japan lacked. For the president of Takushoku University, an institution founded to promote the economic exploitation of Japan's growing number of colonies, Nitobe's legacy as an early advocate of economic development of Asia had meant the most. For the president of Tokyo Woman's Christian University, Nitobe's conversion to Christianity and his concern for women's education figured greatly. The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi

executive enjoyed Nitobe the author. As for me, attempting to implement public policy programming, I was struck by Nitobe's influence as moulder of men, the master, the *onshi* (respected teacher) of an elite corps of dedicated servants of society and the nation.

Nitobe was a teacher before the days of mass higher education. He must have been a deeply inspirational individual, because the names of his students read like a twentieth century Japanese intellectual *Who Is Who*. Among this illustrious group was Yanaihara Tadao, who would later be forced to resign as professor of colonial policy at Tokyo Imperial University because of his pacifist views. Yanaihara had been a student at Dai-Ichi Higher School (equivalent to present day undergraduate studies) when Nitobe was its principal. That it is a mistake to look for militaristic instruction in Nitobe's *Bushido* is in some ways obvious, given the fact that Yanaihara was one of its translators into Japanese and that both the author and Yanaihara were Christian pacifists.

Who were the other Nitobe disciples of note? Let me just mention two: Maeda Tamon, who became Japan's first post-war Minister of Education, and Matsumoto Shigeharu, correspondent of *Dōmei News* in Shanghai at the time of the Nanjing Massacre. What distinguishes these people is that they were leaders in both pre- and post-war Japan. But Matsumoto was clearly Nitobe's star pupil. He re-emerges after WWII working with the Institute of Pacific Relations, but then when that organisation becomes the target of an anti-communist witch hunt in the United States, his friendship with John D. Rockefeller III paves the way for his appointment as the first director of International House in Roppongi, which becomes the centre of post-war intellectual exchanges and U.S.-Japan reconciliation. It should come as no surprise therefore that the International House of Japan has a series of Nitobe lectures and offers scholarships in his name.

Conclusion

The few examples of contemporary Japanese expectations of moral behaviour presented above should demonstrate the lasting influence of so-called "samurai values", referred to as *bushidō*, which Nitobe Inazō attempted to introduce to Western readers in 1900, in part with a view to obtaining a favourable understanding of Japan in the West. The part of *bushidō* that forms the topic of this paper is the moral ethical teachings emphasizing *jinkaku* or superior character, which Edo era educators hoped to inculcate into generations of peacetime "warriors-turned-bureaucrats". It should be evident from the examples of expected exemplary behaviour among modern day Japanese journalists working for Japan's "serious press",

the stress on the development of *jinkaku* in contemporary Japanese education, and the respect which leading members of Japan's ruling establishment continue to show to Nitobe himself, that these values, passed down both orally, as Nitobe has written, and through formal Confucian-influenced educational institutions catering to samurai during the Edo period, remain very much alive today.

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Alternative Approach

Role of the Sword *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* in the Origin of the Japanese *Bushidō* Tradition

*G. Björn CHRISTIANSON, Mikko VILENIUS, Humitake SEKI**

Abstract

One of the formative narratives in Japanese martial arts is the bestowal of the mystical sword *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* upon Emperor Jinmu, the legendary founder of Japan. Within the Kashima Shinden Bujutsu lineage, this bestowal is attested as a critical event in the initiation of the principles of *bushidō* martiality. However, the practical reasons for its significance have been unclear. Drawing on historical and archaeological records, in this paper we hypothesise that the physical conformation of the legendary sword *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* represented a comparatively incremental progression from the one-handed short swords imported from mainland Asia. These modifications allowed for a new, two-handed style of swordsmanship, and therefore it was the combination of the physical conformation of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* and the development of appropriate techniques for wielding it that formed the basis of the martial significance of the "Law of Futsu-no-mitama". We also argue that this new tradition of swordsmanship was the nucleus around which the Kashima Shinden Bujutsu lineage would develop, and therefore represented a critical first step towards the later concepts of *bushidō*. We also present a working model of what the techniques for usage of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* might have been, and provide an account of an experiment testing its application.

Keywords: *bushidō*, Kashima Shinden Bujutsu, Japan, archaeology, sword

Vloga meča *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* na začetku japonske tradicije *bushidōja*

Izvleček

Ena od temeljnih pripovedi v kontekstu japonskih borilnih veščin je podelitev mističnega meča *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* cesarju Jinmuju, legendarnemu ustanovitelju Japonske. V tradiciji Kashima Shinden Bujutsu je ta podelitev pomemben dogodek na poti do uresničevanja načel *bushidōja*. A njegov velik pomen ni bil nikoli v resnici pojasnjen. Upoštevajoč zgodovinske in arheološke zapise v tem članku podajamo hipotezo, da je

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končna podoba legendarnega meča *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* nastala s postopnim razvojem enoročnih kratkih mečev, ki so prišli s celinske Azije. Ta razvoj je pripeljal do novega, dvoročnega sloga mečevanja, za katerega so nastali meč *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* in ustrezne tehnike za njegovo uporabo, ki so postale podlaga za tako imenovani »Zakon Futsunomitame«. Prav tako zagovarjamo trditev, da je omenjena tradicija mečevanja predstavljala jedro, okoli katerega se je razvila tradicija Kashima Shinden Bujutsu, z njo pa pozneje koncept *bushidōja*. Vključimo še model morebitnih tehnik za uporabo meča *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* in analiziramo poskus njegove uporabe.

Ključne besede: *bushidō*, Kashima Shinden Bujutsu, Japonska, arheologija, meč

One of the formative narratives in Japanese martial arts is the bestowal of the mystical sword *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* upon Emperor Jinmu, the legendary founder of Japan. Within the Kashima Shinden Bujutsu lineage, this bestowal is attested as a critical event in the initiation of the principles of *bushidō* martiality. What is unclear, however, is just why this was a pivotal event. If the story of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* is intended to capture a military innovation, then it should consist both of a technological improvement or refinement, and of a change in strategic or tactical thinking that enabled full use of the new technology. Given that the evolution of weapon design in the Japanese archaeological records is a well-developed field, and that there are no major theories arising as to the nature of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*, our hypothesis is that the story has its roots in at most a modest refinement of military technology, and thus must have been mostly a revolution in tactics or strategy. That being the case, insight into the nature of that refinement may be sought in the curriculum and history of the martial lineages which associate themselves with the mythology of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*.

In this paper, we explore this hypothesis in two parts. In the first, using archaeological and historical records, we compare a sword design linked to the *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* narrative with other contemporary sword designs. Based on this, we argue that the confirmation of a physical manifestation of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* would have been an incremental progression towards a longer sword more suitable for two-handed use, with a change in curvature towards an *uchizori* design.

To make the case that these changes were significant beyond an aesthetic sense, in the second part we develop the idea that the corresponding tactical revolution was a new tradition of swordsmanship, which became the nucleus around which the Kashima Shinden Bujutsu lineage would develop. By analysing the traditions and kabala of the Kashima Shinryū, we can then present a working model of what the techniques for usage of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* might have been, and provide an account of an experiment testing its application.

The Tradition and the True Form of the Mystical Sword *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*

The Kashima Shinden Bujutsu are those martial traditions that date their origin back to *Kashima-no-Tachi*, the martial art revealed by the deity Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto to Kuninazu-no-Mahito, the head priest of the Kashima Grand Shrine during the fifth century (Seki 2009). The lore of the Kashima Shinden Bujutsu states that it realises its divine nature by virtue of being derived from the "Law of Futsunomitama". Meanwhile, the *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* (sometimes translated as the "cross sword") is a divine sword described in both the *Kojiki* (1963) and the *Nihon Shoki* (Kuroita 1943). They recount (e.g., the description in the *Kojiki*; Fig. 1) that its origins arose during the Eastern Expedition of Kamuyamato iwarehiko-no-mikoto (the name of Emperor Jinmu before taking the throne; Fig. 2), when according to those accounts he fell into trouble at Kumano in 663 BC (Urabe Kanenaga, transcribed 1522). At this point, Amaterasu-ōmikami (Fig. 3) and Takami-musubi-no-kami (the divine ancestors of the Imperial family) dispatched Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto to rescue him. Upon considering the situation, Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto judged that the Imperial progenitor's mission of the pacification of the nation could be achieved simply by depositing *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* in the treasury of one Takakuraji (the progenitor of the Mononobe clan, or Weapons Ministry of the Imperial Court), and then allowing Takakuraji to pass it on to Kamuyamato iwarehiko-no-mikoto.

The *Sendaikujihongi* (Urabe 1522), the historical records of the Mononobe clan, expands further on the circumstances. It recounts that the army led by Kamuyamato iwarehiko-no-mikoto had attacked and subdued the Nishikitobe clan, who had been ruling the entirety of the coastal region around Arasakatsu in Kumano, at which point the Earthly Deities (who opposed the conquest of the land by the imperial progenitors) spread a "poisonous vapour" which caused all of the Imperial Army to lose their fighting spirit. In the *Kojiki*, this loss of fighting spirit is described using the character 惑, meaning "beguiling" or "perplexing". In the natural order of things, having defeated the armies of the Nishikitobe clan, the Imperial Army should have been in high spirits. However, the *Nihon Shoki* similarly documents this poisonous vapour sapping the martial spirit of the entire army, and it is not implausible to interpret these "poisonous vapours" as being wild and baseless rumours aimed at shaking the spirit of the army. As outlined above, Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto's response to this was to deliver *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* to Kamuyamato iwarehiko-no-mikoto, with Takakuraji as the agent. According to the *Sendaikujihongi*, as the sword *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* was both symbol of the legitimacy of the August Deity's army and evidence of advanced military

technology, the Imperial Army regained its martial spirit and willingness to fight. For this, the sword *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* was recognised as a "sword with the power to pacify the angry deities" upon the commencement of Emperor Jinmu's reign. Yet there are no records that identify exactly what property of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* made it such a powerful, advanced weapon technology for those times.

Later, in the reign of the Emperor Sujin, *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* the sword was enshrined as a deity itself (Futsunomitama-no-ōkami) at Isonokami Shrine. In 1874, Kan Masatomo, the head priest of the Isonokami Shrine at that time, was granted permission to conduct an excavation in the *kinsoku-chi* (forbidden area) behind the front shrine, and found a sword buried there (Fig. 4). In a report dated August 24th 1874, to Shishido Tamaki, a deputy minister of the Ministry for Religious Education, Kan described the form of the sword found in the shrine as an *uchizori* (inward-curving) ring-pommelled iron sword, with an overall length of 84.55 cm, a blade length of 66.18 cm, a width of 3.64 cm, an inner curvature of 1.21-15.2 cm, a hilt length of 12.73 cm, and a pommel diameter of 3.64 cm. According to this report (Ueda and Saeki 1989), the sword was archaeologically determined to date sometime between the Yayoi and Kofun periods (between the 4th century BC and the 3rd century AD). It is therefore plausible to assume that this sword, if not the historical *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* itself, is based on its form. We can thus compare the properties of this *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* to those of other contemporary swords, to try and identify the characteristics that set it above its rivals.

Incidentally, much later in 622 AD, Fujiwara-no-Kamatari (the founder of the Fujiwara or Kuninazu clan, with the familial deity of Amenokoyane-no-mikoto) decapitated Soga-no-Iruka using a short *uchizori* sword of almost the same shape as *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* as part of the Isshi Incident (Fig. 5). The demands of propriety would have forced Fujiwara-no-Kamatari to carefully choose a weapon that would demonstrate respect for Soga-no-Iruka, who was his superior at court, and this emphasises that *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* remained a weapon with divine and mystical associations at this time. The incident is credited as the trigger of the Taika Reform conducted by Naka-no-ōe-no-Ōji (the name of Emperor Tenchi before enthronement) and Fujiwara-no-Kamatari.

From what is known of the diffusion of swords in Japan, *hosogata-dōken* (narrow bronze swords) were imported from Korea sometime near the end of the first part of the Yayoi period, with Japanese manufacture of bronze swords commencing sometime around the middle of the same period. Excavation of bronze swords with distinct regional markers from various sites makes clear that production was

thriving in northern Kyūshū, as well as locations including the Seto Inland Sea and the coast of Ōsaka Bay. While these bronze swords are considered a hallmark of the Yayoi period, it has been established that the middle of this era also saw the spread of iron weapons from China. Consequently, it is difficult to imagine that the defining property making *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* an advanced weapon was the fact that it was made of iron. There is a distinct possibility that the army opposing Kamuyamato iwarehiko-no-mikoto would have been armed not just with bronze weapons, but iron swords as well. For example, an iron ring-pommelled sword was excavated from a group of tombs found in Saga Prefecture and dating to the last part of the first half of the Yayoi period (now an important cultural property of Saga Prefecture). The first part of the tip of the sword is missing, but its remaining overall length is 50.25 cm.

However, nearly all of these iron swords are *Uchizori* swords introduced from the early to later Han Dynasty, and are short swords which appear to be intended for one-handed use in cavalry fights on the Asian continent. Indeed, the traditional academic hypothesis for this kind of ring-pommelled sword was that it was suitable only for one-handed techniques. In contrast, *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*, with its overall length of 84.55 cm, is considerably longer than other known specimens. The hilt portion itself, at 12.73 cm, seems suitable for two-handed use: if one were to take the hilt in the right hand, the pommel would fall naturally into place within the palm of the left hand using the grip prescribed within the Kashima Shinden Bujutsu. At this point, the distance spanned by the hands (16.37 cm) would be appropriate for the sword's blade length, allowing free use of the spiral movements of Kashima Shinden Bujutsu.

The second feature of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* is the fact that it is an almost straight ring-pommelled sword, with only slight inner curvature. Japanese *uchizori* swords completed in the Heian period are extremely rare, but stone and bronze swords have been excavated from many ruins dating from the Jōmon period through to the Kofun. A bronze sword, excavated from the "Misakiyama A ruins" in Yamagata Prefecture, serves as a representative example. Sato (1996) describes this small bronze sword (now in the possession of the Tokyo National Museum) as measuring "26 cm in total length, with a blade length of 16.6 cm and maximum blade width of 3.2 cm. The shape has a gentle arc from the hilt to the back of the blade, with the blade entering the hilt portion in a straight line. The blade portion is inwards-curving, with some remnants of the blade remaining visible and sharp." Again, in comparison this emphasises the two key distinctions of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*: a length suitable for two-handed usage, and an inwards-curving iron blade with a reduced curvature compared to other extant examples.

The Spiritual Transmission of Martial Arts for Usage of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*

Support for the idea that the style of usage of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* was linked to Kashima Shinden Bujutsu is found in the seventh volume of the *Sendaikujihongi*, which references a "Heaven above and Heaven below" purification ritual specifically linked to Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto. This ritual, imparted to Kuninazu-no-igatsu-omi-no-mikoto (Fig. 6), references the *Hasshinden* (hall of eight deities) which is a feature of the *ōhara'e* ritual of the Kashima Grand Shrine (Seki 1976). The *Sendaikujihongi* notes that in this ritual the "Heaven above" references its religious applications, while the "Heaven below" references its military ones (Fig. 7). With the common connection to Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto, it is reasonable to conclude that *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* and the techniques bequeathed to Kuninazu-no-igatsu-omi-no-mikoto were related. Just as when performing the Great Purification Ritual of the Nation of Japan, the spiral motion of the "Law of Futsunomitama" through the eight divine attitudes of the Hasshinden can be executed with a unified motion used for drawing a circle (characterised by wave equations, as used in, for example, the Schrödinger equation). Accordingly, the "attitude of warriors" performing divinely-transmitted martial arts will become "totally devoted" to the "attitudes of the divinities".

Kuninazu-no-igatsu-omi-no-mikoto was at the time head of the Nakatomi clan, responsible for the maintenance of this ritual, and in the accounts referenced above was later appointed by Emperor Jinmu as the chief officiant at the Kashima Grand Shrine soon after Emperor Jinmu took the throne, i.e., in 660 BC (Urabe Kanenaga, transcribed 1522). Given this, and the similarities previously noted between the descriptions of the ritual and what is now practiced at the Kashima Grand Shrine, it is not a stretch to assume that this style of swordsmanship would have served as the prototype of Kashima-no-Tachi. Within the Kashima Shinden Bujutsu, techniques can broadly be divided into one of two categories: *shinmyō-ken* (techniques which aim to defeat the opponent without blocking or striking their sword) or *kōmyō-ken*. As *shinmyō-ken* is specifically credited to a divine inspiration granted to Kuninazu-no-Mahito (Fig. 8) in the fifth century, the dynamics of the usage of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* must be based exclusively on the principles inherent in *kōmyō-ken*. From this, the prediction would thus be that the soldiers of the Imperial Army, as led by Kamuyamato iwarehiko-no-mikoto, would have charged towards the enemy in either the *shimo* (lower) or *kami* (upper) *hassō kamae* of the Kashima Shinden Bujutsu, and one step outside the opponent's reach would, as an opening gambit, strike towards the enemy's neck along a parabolic arc with a locus just in

front of their midline. Should the enemy be unable to counter this, *sen-no-sen* victory would be achieved, with the *uchizori* blade decapitating the enemy as if it were a sickle being used to reap the heads of rice.

A skilled enemy, however, might seek to defeat this attack by cutting into and binding up the initial strike. At this point, the inwards-curving blade of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*'s design becomes relevant. The mechanical principles of cutting in Kashima Shinden Bujutsu mean that at the point of transition from the "backswing", or beginning of the parabolic arc, to the striking forward motion, there is a point where even if one were to release the sword entirely, it would fly forward directly towards the opponent. At that point, when holding the sword in two hands, one can rotate the pommel inside the left hand so as to twist the whole sword around, meaning that one would transition from cutting with the sword to striking with the *Shinogi* (ridgeline) at the very peak of its outwards curvature. The enemy's sword can then be struck and broken using the *kurai-tachi* technique, with the enemy's attack being deflected away to the rear and left. The outwards curvature of the Shinogi serves to concentrate the force of the impact, and as the impact does not occur on the blade itself, swords modelled on *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* used in this way will not chip. However, a more pronounced curvature would make the rotation of the pommel in the left hand difficult to execute. From here, so long as the movement of the technique is not stopped, the sword will continue through its parabolic motion and cycle around. By then reversing the rotation of the pommel to its original position, the enemy would then be struck down, as in the case of the *sen-no-sen* victory.

The following is an account of an experiment validating the practicality of this Kashima-no-Tachi (a technique of *kōmyō-ken*) method of striking with the *shinogi* (tested using *bokutō*, by Seki Humitake as *shitachi* (performing) with Sekiya Ryoichi as *uchitachi* (attacking), at a special instruction session of the Kashima Shinryū Federation of Martial Sciences, December 20, 2006:

> [previous section omitted] in the case where *uchitachi* uses a battlefield cut [suitable against armoured opponents] and *shitachi* uses [*kurai-tachi*], it should be mechanically feasible to introduce a strike with the *shinogi*. Sure enough, the battlefield cut was deflected and disposed of using the *shinogi* strike. Furthermore, if without advance notice *uchitachi* used the principle of *teppa* (iron breaking) in the battlefield cut, then at the moment of the *shinogi* strike *uchitachi*'s *bokutō* would violently shake. This shaking *bokutō* felt as if it were a burning fire thong: the right hand would spontaneously release the hilt, and the back portion of the hilt produced a peculiar tactile sensation. A crack appeared at the *tsuba* expanding towards the

> rest of the hilt. Following this, when repeating the *shinogi* striking several times, on each occasion the crack expanded towards the hilt. The fact that the cracking started from the base of the *tsuba* can be understood as strong destructive power being applied to a discontinuity in the *bokutō*'s structure. And so, despite cutting together at the *monouchi* (cutting portion) of the swords, this demonstrates that the recorded breaking of even high-quality swords just above the *tsuba* may be caused by the destructive potential of this phenomenon in some cases. (Ryūtei n.d.)

Conclusion

In summary, by combining archaeological and historical evidence with the curriculum of the Kashima Shinryū, we advance here a thesis in which the "bestowal of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*" reflects the development of a longer, outwards-curving sword configuration suitable for a style of two-handed usage which became part of the *kōmyō-ken* curriculum within Kashima Shinden Bujutsu. This represents one of the earliest of the interactions between technology and technique that drives the evolution of *bushidō* culture. Certainly, it would not have been the last such refinement.

As mentioned previously, after the enthronement of Emperor Jinmu, Kuninazu-no-igatsu-omi-no-mikoto was appointed as the first head officiant of the Kashima Grand Shrine. At that time, the eastern part of the Japanese archipelago was controlled by the Emishi (alternatively, Ebisu or Ezo), who violently resisted the eastwards expansion of the Yamato court. Given the role of the Kashima Grand Shrine in the eastern military campaign, it can be expected that the Kuninazu family would then have taught *kōmyō-ken* to the soldiers fighting against the Emishi, who in turn might have imitated and stolen *kōmyō-ken* techniques themselves. Substantiating this, there are dozens of family tombs throughout the Kantō and Tōhoku regions which are noted as having extracted from them iron swords with a configuration similar to *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi*, examples of which include Maebashi Tenjinyama Kofun in Gunma Prefecture, Ōyasuba Kofun and Aizu Ōtsukayma Kofun in Fukushima Prefecture, and the Mushazuka Kofun complex in Tochigi Prefecture.

As victory over the Emishi ebbed back and forth, it can be expected that there was pressure to refine and develop *kōmyō-ken*. This culminated in the divine revelation granted to Kuninazu-no-Mahito, where in Hōjō Tokichika's account he initiated the marvellous techniques called *hitotsu-no-tachi*, and exerted his ingenuity to receive the revelation of the "Law of Futsunomitama" (Seki 2013). Thus, the physical

refinements of swords in the style "Heaven below" of *Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi* enabled a new and powerful style of swordsmanship, which was itself then further refined and expanded (building on yet further innovations in the development of sword technology) to provide a part of the conceptual framework of Kashima Shinden Bujutsu, an enduring part of Japan's *bushidō* culture.

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Appendix

Glossary

English (Japanese)

Aizu Ōtsukayma Kofun (会津大塚出古墳)
Amaterasu-ōmikami (天照大神)
Amenokoyane-no-mikoto (天児屋命)
attitudes of the divinities (神々の立場)
attitude of warriors (武人の境地)
bokutō (木刀)
cross sword (横刀)
Emishi (蝦夷)
Emperor Jinmu (神武天皇) 711-585 BC (traditional)
Emperor Kenzō (顕宗天皇) 450-487 AD (traditional)
Emperor Ninken (仁賢天皇) 440-498 AD (traditional)
Emperor Sujin (崇神天皇) 148-30 BC (traditional)
Emperor Tenchi (天智天皇) 626-672 AD
Fujiwara-no-Kamatari (藤原 鎌足) 614-669 AD
Futsunomitama-no-ōkami (布都御魂大神)
Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi (布都御魂釼)
Great Purification Ritual of the Nation of Japan (大祓儀式)
Han Dynasty (漢王朝) 206 BC – 220 AD
Hasshinden (八神殿)
hassō kamae (八相構)
Heian period (平安時代) 794-1185 AD
hitotsu-no-tachi (一太刀)
hosogata-dōken (細形銅剣)
Isshi Incident (乙巳の変) 645 AD
Isonokami Shrine (石上神社)
Jōmon period (縄文時代) circa 4,000-300 BC
Kami (上)

Kamuyamato iwarehiko-no-mikoto (神倭伊波禮毘古命)
Kan Masatomo (菅 政友) 1824-1897 AD
Kashima Grand Shrine (鹿島神宮)
Kashima-no-Tachi (鹿島之太刀)
Kashima Shinden Bujutsu (鹿島神傳武術)
kinsoku-chi (禁足地)
Kofun (古墳時代)
Kojiki (古事記)
kōmyō-ken (功妙劍)
Kumano (熊野)
Kunii Genpachirō Minamoto no Kagetsugu (國井 源八郎 源 景継)
Kuninazu-no-igatsu-omi-no-mikoto (國摩伊賀津臣命)
Kuninazu-no-Mahito (國摩真人)
kurai-tachi (位太刀)
Law of Futsu-no-mitama (韴霊之法則)
Maebashi Tenjinyama Kofun (前橋天神山古墳)
Maita Shime (蒔田志米)
Misakiyama A ruins (三崎山A遺跡)
Mononobe clan (物部氏)
monouchi (物打ち)
Mushazuka Kofun (武者塚古墳)
Naka-no-ōe-no-Ōji (中大兄皇子)
Nakatomi clan (中臣氏)
Nihon Shoki (日本書紀)
Nishikitobe (丹敷戸畔)
ōharae ritual (大祓儀式)
ōmuraji (大連)
Ōshū Shirakawa-go Shirasaka (奥州白川郷白坂)
Ōyasuba Kofun (大安場古墳)
Phenomenal World (現象界)
Reality World (実相界)
Sendaikujihongi (先代旧事本紀)
sen-no-sen victory (先之先勝)
shimo (下)
shinmyō-ken (神妙劍)
shinogi (鎬)
Shishido Tamaki (宍戸 璣) 1829-1901
shitachi (仕太刀)
Soga-no-Iruka (蘇我 入鹿) d. 645
Sōryōshiki Lord (総領職)

Taika Reform (大化の改新)
Takakuraji (高倉下)
Takami-musubi-no-kami (高御産日神
Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto (武甕槌尊)
teppa (鉄破)
totally devoted (一向専念)
tsuba (鍔)
uchitachi (打太刀)
uchizori (内反り)
Yamato court (大和朝廷)
Yayoi (弥生時代) circa 300 BC-300 AD

Figures and tables



帝阿理祁理。此十一字以音。我之御子等不平坐良志。此二字以音。其葦原中國者專汝所言向之國故。汝建御雷神可降。爾答曰僕雖不降。專有平其國之横刀。可降。此刀名云佐士布都神。亦名云甕布都神。亦名布都御魂。此刀者。坐石上神宮也。降此刀狀者。穿高倉下之倉頂。自其墮入。故建御雷神教曰。穿汝之倉頂。以此

於天神御子之伏地而獻之時。天神御子即寤起。詔長寢乎。故受取其横刀之時。其熊野山之荒神。自皆爲切仆。爾其惑伏御軍悉寤起之。故天神御子問獲其横刀之所由。高倉下答曰。己夢云。天照大神高木神二柱神之命以。召建御雷神而詔葦原中國者。伊多玖佐夜藝

Fig 1: Text from the Kojiki describing the divine sword Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi bequeathed to the treasury of Takakuraji (Motoori 1803).

Fig 2: Emperor Jinmu, drawing by Gyokuransai Sadahide. (Ryūtei Tanehide, latter period of the Edo era).

Fig 3. Amaterasu-ōmikami, the 8th August Deity. A part of wood-cut-print scroll Amaterasu-ōmikami, published by Maita Shime with the permission of the Ise Grand Shrine in February of 1880.



Fig. 4: The whole picture and the pommel and hilt of the mystical sword Futsunomitama-no-tsurugi as excavated from Isonokami shrine.



一第卅六皇極天皇女帝也治三年敏達曽孫茅
障渟王女也此帝舒明后也帝失玉テ後即位玉
明日香河原宮ニ御之天豊財重日足姫共申又ハ
室皇女ト云ヘリ此時蘇我入鹿大臣聖徳太子ノ御子
孫共ニ三人ヲ奉失トテ兵ヲ起シ斑鳩宮ヲ奉囲ニ太子ノ御
子大兄王ト申セシ廻計ヲ迯玉テ雲ニ乗天人ノ像ヲ顕シ放光ヲ
西ヘ飛去玉キ異香紫雲聳リ此時入鹿ノ大臣国政ヲ我
任ノ天下ヲ蔑セシカハ中大兄皇子鎌子ト廻計ヲ入鹿カ頸ヲ鎌ヲ
カキ切ケリ入鹿カ屍ヲ又豊浦大臣カ許ヘ遣ス大ニ怒テ火中ニ

Fig. 5. The Isshi Incident in 622 AD (Hanawa edited, 1793–1819).

Fig. 6: Amenokoyane-no-mikoto, ancestral deity of Kuninazu-no-igatsu-omi-no-mikoto, is the most loyal deity serving the August Deity "Amaterasu-ōmikami". A part of wood-cut-print scroll Amaterasu-ōmikami published by Maita Shime with the permission of the Ise Grand Shrine in February of 1880.



Fig. 7. An example of "Heaven Below" of the Ōharae Ritual of the Kashima Grand Shrine to achieve its military application, with a visual setting for "the Phenomenal World and the Reality World" through the "Hasshinden sphere" upon jūjutsu combat of divine martiality.



Fig. 8. The first historical documentation on "bushidō martiality" was granted directly from the deity Takemikazuchi-no-mikoto to the head priest Kuninazu-no-Mahito of the Kashima Grand Shrine. Kuninazu-no-Mahito held concurrently the portfolio for Minister ōmuraji by the appointers of Emperor Kenzō (485–487) and Emperor Ninken (488–498) .

This document is a part of the memorandum originally given in the early 1540's to Kunii Genpachirō Minamoto no Kagetsugu (Sōryōshiki Lord of the Ashikaga Shogunate of the Domain Ōshū Shirakawa-go Shirasaka) by Matsumoto Umanosuke Masamoto (a priest serving the Kashima Grand Shrine on a hereditary basis [the 1st headmaster of Kashima Shinryū]). The memorandum was incorporated into the historical description in the scroll of menkyo-kaiden of Kashima-Shinryū martiality, when it was first transcribed by Kunii Taizen (1780s), and re-transcribed by Kunii Zenya (1960s).

Table 1. Attitudes of the Hasshinden's Eight Divinities

POSITION	DIVINITY	FUNCTION OF SPIRITUAL ENERGY
First Seat[#1]	*Takami-Musubi* （高御産日神）	"crushing evil and exhibiting justice (*haja kensei* 破邪顕正)"
Second Seat[#2]	*Iku-Musubi* （生産日神）	"praises the activity of generative energy (*musubi* ムスビ)"
Third Seat[#3]	*Taru-Musubi* （足産日神）	"brings an activity to its peak, overflowing capacity"
Fourth Seat[#4]	*Tamatsume-Musubi*（玉積産日神）	concentrates spiritual energy within the body "thou shall not kill"
Fifth Seat[#5]	*Kami-Musubi* （神産日神）	"killing one harmful person for saving the lives of many" (*issetsu manshō* 一殺万生)"
Sixth Seat[#6]	*Kotoshironushi*（事代主神）	"receptivity to spiritual oracles and inspiration"
Seventh Seat[#7]	*Miketsu*（御食津神）	"a divinity of food: i.e., energy supply"
Eighth Seat[#8]	Ōmiya-no-Me（大宮売神）	"harmonious fusion of human minds (*jinshin yūwa* 人心融和)" & "activity of origination and manifestation as one (*kihatsu ittai* 起発一体)"

Asian Studies in Slovenia

Ulice kot prostor skupnostnega povezovanja: primer urbane regeneracije soseske Samdeok v Seulu

*Blaž KRIŽNIK**

Izvleček

Ulice imajo za vsakdanje življenje v mestih izrazito večplasten pomen, ki pa se je v zadnjih desetletjih močno spremenil. Južnokorejska prestolnica Seul v tem pogledu ni izjema. Ulice so bile nekdaj središče družbenega in gospodarskega življenja v mestu in so pomembno zaznamovale njegovo prostorsko ureditev in identiteto. Zaradi hitre rasti motoriziranega prometa in tržno naravnanega urbanega razvoja so se ulice postopoma spremenile v prometne koridorje in večinoma izgubile nekdanjo vlogo pri oblikovanju in ohranjanju skupnostnega življenja v lokalnem okolju. Vendar so se nedavno okrepila prizadevanja tako seulske mestne uprave kot civilne družbe za izboljšanje hodljivosti in ponovno oživitev ulic kot dela javnega prostora v mestu. Urbana regeneracija soseske Samdeok v Seulu predstavlja primer takšnih prizadevanj, kjer naj bi prenova uličnega prostora izboljšala kakovost bivalnega okolja in pripomogla k skupnostnemu povezovanju. Študija primera soseske Samdeok želi prispevati k boljšemu razumevanju ulic kot prostora skupnostnega povezovanja ter vloge, ki jo imajo pri tem skupnostno opredeljena urbana regeneracija in različni deležniki. Izsledki študije kažejo, da se je zaradi urbane regeneracije skupnostni pomen ulic v soseski Samdoek povečal, na kar pa je bolj kot prenova uličnega prostora vplivalo vključevanje javnosti v odločanje o prenovi. Partnerstva, ki se tako oblikujejo med javnimi ustanovami, civilno družbo in prebivalci, bi lahko dolgoročno pomembno prispevala k uveljavljanju družbeno bolj vključujočih, pravičnejših in vzdržnejših oblik urbanega razvoja v Seulu in širše.

Ključne besede: Koreja, prenova uličnega prostora, skupnostno povezovanje, urbana regeneracija, vključevanje javnosti

Streets as Spaces of Community Building: A Case Study of Urban Regeneration in Samdeok Maeul, Seoul

Abstract

Streets play rather diverse roles in the everyday lives of cities, which have changed considerably in recent decades. The South Korean capital of Seoul is no exception in this regard. Streets once used to be traditional centres of social and economic life, which thus affected

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the urban structure and identity of the city. The rapid growth of motorised traffic along with market-driven urban development gradually transformed the streets into traffic corridors, with a very limited role in reproducing and maintaining the communal life in localities. The Seoul Metropolitan Government and civil society, however, recently increased their efforts to improve walkability and recover streets as a part of public life in the city. The urban regeneration of Samdeok Maeul is an example of these efforts, where street renewal was carried out with of an aim of raising the quality of the living environment as well as enhancing community building. The case study of Samdeok Maeul can in this regard contribute to a better understanding of streets as spaces of community building as well as community-based urban regeneration, and the role of different stakeholders in it. The research results show that urban regeneration strengthened the communal importance of streets in Samdeok Maeul, which was mainly a result of civic participation in urban regeneration rather than the actual street renewal. Partnerships, which are in this way established between public institutions, civil society and residents, could lead towards socially more inclusive, just and sustainable urban development in Seoul and beyond.

Keywords: community building, South Korea, public participation, street renewal, urban regeneration

Uvod

Ulice imajo za vsakdanje življenje v mestih izrazito večplasten pomen. Poleg prometne so imele ulice od nekdaj tudi pomembno družbeno in gospodarsko vlogo kot prostori srečevanja med različnimi družbenimi skupinami, živahnega trgovanja in medkulturne izmenjave. Ulice kot del javnega prostora v mestu so hkrati prizorišča družbenih bojev, kjer državljani izražajo svoja mnenja, nasprotujejo uveljavljenim družbenim razmerjem in uveljavljajo skupno pravico do mesta (Douglass, Ho in Ooi 2010; Harvey 2012). Lynch (1960) je pokazal, da imajo ulice tudi ključno vlogo pri oblikovanju mentalne podobe mesta. Ulice so tako pomemben simbolni prostor, ki oblikuje ne le posameznikov, ampak tudi skupni spomin in identiteto mesta (Hebbert 2005). Zaradi izrazito večplastne družbene, gospodarske, politične in simbolne vloge je Jacobs (1961, 37) ulice označila za »najpomembnejši javni prostor v mestu in najvitalnejši del mestnega organizma«. Vendar se je v zadnjih desetletjih nekdaj večplastna vloga ulic v mestih zaradi izrazitega povečevanja motoriziranega prometa ves čas zmanjševala. V številnih mestih so bolj kot pešci prevladali avtomobili, kar močno omejuje pomen ulic kot prostora skupnostnega povezovanja (Jacobs 1961; Appleyard 1982; Mehta 2013).

Seul, desetmilijonska prestolnica Republike Koreje (dalje: Koreja), v tem pogledu ni izjema. Ulice so bile nekoč središče družbenega in gospodarskega življenja korejskih mest (Han 2013). Sredi prejšnjega stoletja pa so v času hitre industrializacije in urbanizacije postale prometni koridorji, ki so služili predvsem hitro

rastočemu motoriziranemu prometu (Hae 2003; Kim, Lee in Seo 2014). V zadnjem desetletju se je okrepila tudi privatizacija javnega prostora, kar je dodatno zmanjšalo nekdanjo družbeno in gospodarsko vlogo ulic. Kot odgovor na takšen motoriziranemu prometu pretirano naklonjen in tržno usmerjen urbani razvoj so se že sredi devetdesetih let okrepila prizadevanja civilne družbe za izboljšanje hodljivosti in ponovno oživitev ulic kot dela javnega prostora v mestu (Kahng 2005; Kim in drugi 2012). Tudi zato je Seulska mestna uprava (서울특별시청, SMG, dalje: mestna uprava) znova prepoznala pomen ulic pri izboljšanju kakovosti bivanjskega okolja v mestu kakor tudi pri spodbujanju skupnostnega povezovanja (마을만들기) (SMG 2015a; SCSC 2016). Skupnostno opredeljena urbana regeneracija je pri tem postala eno izmed glavnih orodij mestne uprave za doseganje omenjenih ciljev (SMG 2011, 2013, 2015c).

Študija primera skupnostno opredeljene urbane regeneracije soseske Samdeok (삼덕마을) obravnava ulice kot prostor skupnostnega povezovanja v Seulu. Po mnenju mestne uprave predstavlja soseska Samdeok uspešen primer sodelovanja med mestno upravo, nevladnimi organizacijami in prebivalci v okviru Projekta upravljanja bivalnega okolja (주거환경관리사업, REMP) (Nanumgwamirae 2015; SMG 2016a). Prenova uličnega prostora naj bi pri tem imela pomembno vlogo ne le z vidika izboljšanja kakovosti bivalnega okolja, ampak tudi skupnostnega povezovanja (Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015a, 2015b). V tem pogledu skuša študija urbane regeneracije soseske Samdeok prispevati k boljšemu razumevanju ulic kot prostora skupnostnega povezovanja, pa tudi vloge, ki jo imajo pri tem urbana regeneracija in različni deležniki. Študija s tem posredno prispeva tudi k boljšemu razumevanju pomena skupnostnega povezovanja in vključevanja javnosti za širšo družbeno, prostorsko in institucionalno preobrazbo Seula kot najpomembnejšega korejskega mesta, ki je v preteklosti pomembno vplivalo na razvoj in preobrazbo korejske družbe nasploh (Kim in Yoon 2003; Cho in Križnik 2017). V tem pogledu lahko študija predstavlja pomemben prispevek na področju korejskih študij. Boljše razumevanje vključevanja javnosti v prostorsko in skupnostno načrtovanje, s tem pa še posledic skupnostnega povezovanja na vsakdanje življenje, lahko prispeva tudi k razvoju urbanih študij nasploh. Prav skupnostno povezovanje namreč pridobiva vse pomembnejšo vlogo pri blaženju negativnih učinkov gospodarske in politične krize in pri oblikovanju družbeno bolj vključujočega, pravičnejšega in vzdržnejšega razvoja mest v Koreji in širše (Dempsey 2008; Douglass, Ho in Ooi 2010; Colantonio in Dixon 2011; Cerar 2014).

Avtor študije je med letoma 2015 in 2018 sam ali s sodelavci sodeloval v več raziskavah, ki so vključevale opazovanje, sodelovanje in intervjuje z udeleženci projekta REMP v soseski Samdeok (Križnik, Cho in Lee 2018; Križnik in Kim 2018). Glavni namen omenjenih raziskav je bil razumevanje vključevanja javnosti

v načrtovanje in izvajanje urbane regeneracije in vloge različnih udeležencev, ki so pri tem sodelovali. Pri tem je avtor pozornost namenil zlasti vlogi, ki jo imajo ulice kot prostor skupnostnega povezovanja. V intervjuje so bili vključeni prebivalci, sodelujoči v Upravnem odboru skupnosti prebivalcev soseske Samdeok (삼덕마을 주민공동체 운영위원회), uslužbenci Socialnega centra okrožja Jeongneung (정릉종합사회복지관), aktivisti nevladne organizacije Nanumgwamirae (나눔과미래), uradniki uprave okrožja Seongbuk-gu (성북구청), pa tudi strokovnjaki s področja urbanističnega in skupnostnega načrtovanja. Rezultate intervjujev je avtor na podlagi vladnih dokumentov, raziskovalnih poročil in zapisov v množičnih medijih dopolnil tudi z analizo urbanistične politike in politike skupnostnega povezovanja mestne uprave. Članek je razdeljen na pet delov. Uvodu sledi teoretska in zgodovinska obravnava ulic kot skupnostnih prostorov v Seulu. Osrednji del nato obravnava urbano regeneracijo soseske Samdeok in poleg predstavitve institucionalnega okvirja urbane regeneracije v Seulu vključuje tudi pregled in analizo projekta REMP v soseski Samdeok ter njegovih posledic na vključevanje javnosti. Sledi razprava o vlogi projekta REMP pri oživljanju ulic kot prostora skupnostnega povezovanja in njihovem vplivu na vsakdanje življenje. V sklepu so povzeti izsledki študije ter njen pomen za razumevanje skupnostnega pomena ulic in odnosov med različnimi deležniki, vključenimi v urbani razvoj Seula.

Ulice kot skupnostni prostor v Seulu

Ulice imajo za mesta pomembno in izrazito večplastno družbeno, gospodarsko, okoljsko, politično in simbolno vlogo. Jacobs (1961) je menila, da so pešcem prijazne ulice ključnega pomena za vključevanje prebivalcev v vsakdanje življenje in varnost v soseskah kot tudi za vzdrževanje medsosedskih stikov. Ulice kot družbeni prostor pomembno prispevajo k oblikovanju in ohranjanju skupnostnega življenja in skupnih identitet, kakor tudi k družbenem nadzoru, medsebojnemu zaupanju in krepitvi družbene povezanosti v mestih (Forrest in Kearns 2001; Hebbert 2005; Dempsey 2008). S tem ulice pomembno vplivajo na večjo družbeno vključenost in demokratizacijo vsakdanjega življenja, pa tudi na oblikovanje vključujoče in bolj demokratične družbe. Ulice kot prostor skupnostnega povezovanja so hkrati pomemben del skupnega dobrega oziroma tistega vidika bivalnega okolja, ki je ključen za obstoj in razvoj posamezne družbene skupine (Sorensen 2009; Douglass, Ho in Ooi 2010; Harvey 2012). Vendar se je nekdaj večplastna vloga ulic v zadnjih desetletjih ves čas zmanjševala. Jacobs (1961, 115) je opozarjala, da predstavlja prevladovanje motoriziranega nad preostalimi oblikami prometa enega izmed glavnih razlogov za zmanjševanje »varnosti, vitalnosti in stabilnosti mestnih ulic«. Appleyard (1982) je ugotovil,

da so družbena omrežja v soseskah z več motoriziranega prometa šibkejša kot v soseskah z zmernejšim prometom. Poleg prometa ima na zmanjševanje skupnostne vloge ulic pomemben vpliv tudi privatizacija javnega prostora. Javni prostor, oropan zgodovinskega in simbolnega pomena, namreč vse bolj postaja potrošno blago, ki naj bi v mesta privabljal vlagatelje in turiste (Križnik 2011). Posledice takšnega tržno naravnanega razvoja mest so razlaščanje in razseljevanje prebivalcev, gentrifikacija, propadanje lokalnega gospodarstva ter izginevanje skupnostnega življenja in skupnih identitet, s čimer se zmanjšuje pomen ulic kot skupnostnega prostora (Smith 2002; Douglass, Ho in Ooi 2010; Harvey 2012, Shin in Kim 2016; Cho in Križnik 2017).

Seul pri tem ni izjema. Mesta se je zaradi hitre in uspešne gospodarske rasti, ki je v glavnem temeljila na obsežni industrializaciji in urbanizaciji, prijelo ime *čudež na reki Han*. Ta je med drugim zahtevala gradnjo učinkovite prometne infrastrukture. Kljub neprestani širitvi so zaradi rastočega motoriziranega prometa in zgoščevanja grajenega okolja ceste in ulice v Seulu z leti postale vse manj pretočne. Stalne prometne zastoje naj bi rešili decentralizacija in gradnja novih naselij v širši okolici Seula, a je takšen pristop zaradi nastalih dnevnih migracij prometno gnečo v mestu le še povečal, saj je večina delovnih mest ostala v Seulu (Hae 2003). Izjemna rast motoriziranega prometa v mestu je razvidna iz povečanja števila registriranih motornih vozil in prebivalcev na osebni avtomobil (Tabela 1). Leta 1961 je bilo v Seulu registriranih 7818 motornih vozil, med katerimi je bilo le 15 % osebnih avtomobilov. Leta 2016 so ti predstavljali kar 93 % izmed 3.056.588 registriranih motornih vozil v mestu. Če je prišlo leta 1965 na en osebni avtomobil kar 2131 prebivalcev, je bilo leta 2015 teh le še 3,4 (SMG 2015b). V tem pogledu ne preseneča, da so postali prometni zastoji del mestnega vsakdana, kljub boljši prometni infrastrukturi in širitvi omrežja javnega prometa.

Prevladovanje motoriziranega prometa v Seulu je močno spremenilo nekdanjo skupnostno vlogo ulic, zlasti stranskih uličic, poznanih kot *golmokgil* (골목길). Te so nekoč predstavljale središče vsakdanjega družbenega in gospodarskega življenja v mestu in prostor, kjer se je oblikovalo in ohranjalo skupnostno življenje in skupne identitete. Im (2007, 76) je golmokgil, denimo, opisal kot prostor, kjer »medosebna povezanost, vzajemna pomoč in prijateljstva prevladujejo nad učinkovitostjo in preračunljivostjo urbanega življenja«. Poleg tega so stranske uličice še v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja pomembno zaznamovale prostorsko ureditev in identiteto večine korejskih mest (Hae 2003; Han 2013). Zaradi rasti števila osebnih avtomobilov so se v devetdesetih letih te ulice spremenile v parkirišča, pogosto omejena z visokimi zidovi med uličnim prostorom in zasebnimi hišami, kar je onemogočilo oblikovanje in ohranjanje skupnostnega življenja, nekdaj značilnega za golmokgil (Kim, Lee in Seo 2014).

Tabela 1: Število prebivalcev in motornih vozil v Seulu. Vir: stat.seoul.go.kr.

	1965	1975	1985	1995	2005	2015
Prebivalci	3.470.880	6.889.740	9.645.932	10.595.943	10.297.004	10.331.847
Motorna vozila	16.624	85.407	445.807	2.043.458	2.808.771	3.056.588
Prebivalci na vozilo	209	81	22	5	4	3

Drug, morda še pomembnejši razlog za izginevanje uličic v Seulu, je neposredno povezan z urbanim razvojem, značilnim za čas hitre gospodarske rasti. Zaradi visokih dobičkov, ki so jih prinašala vlaganja v gradnjo novih blokovskih naselij, je od sredine osemdesetih let v Seulu prihajalo do množičnega rušenja in uničenja starejših stanovanjskih sosesk (Kim in Yoon 2003; Shin in Kim 2016). Slednje so zamenjali tako imenovani *apateudanji* (아파트단지), ko so namesto ulic prostor med stanovanjskimi bloki zapolnili velikanski prazni prostori, namenjeni parkovnim in zlasti parkirnim površinam. Takšna oblika gradnje je pogosto onemogočila oblikovanje skupnostnega življenja in skupnih identitet v blokovskih naseljih. Do sredine osemdesetih let so bila blokovska naselja redka in so predstavljala manj kot 35 % vseh stanovanjskih zgradb v Seulu. Od sredine devetdesetih let pa so apateudanji postali ne le prevladujoča oblika stanovanjske gradnje, ampak tudi pomemben del potrošnje in množične kulture. Tako so močno spremenili prepoznavnost kot tudi vsakdanje življenje v mestu (Gelézeau 2007). Leta 1975 je bilo v blokovskih naseljih 156.297 stanovanj. V naslednjih desetletjih se je njihovo število povečalo za desetkrat in je leta 2015 doseglo 1.636.896 stanovanj, oziroma kar 59 % vseh stanovanj v Seulu (SMG 2015b).

V zadnjem desetletju se je znova povečalo zanimanje za ulice kot prostor družbenega in gospodarskega življenja v mestu, zlasti zaradi prizadevanja dela civilne družbe za izboljšanje hodljivosti in ponovno oživitev ulic kot dela javnega prostora v mestu (Kahng 2005). Pomembno vlogo pri tem je odigrala Državljanska pobuda za hodljiva mesta (걷고싶은도시만들기시민연대), ki je konec devetdesetih let sodelovala pri prenovi ulic Insadong in Noyu v Seulu ter Ulice kulture v bližnjem Bupyeongu (Lee 2009; Kim in drugi 2012). Uspešna preobrazba teh nekdaj močno prometnih trgovskih ulic v pešcem prijazne večnamenske javne prostore predstavlja tudi zgodnje primere vključevanja javnosti v urbani razvoj. Omenjeni primeri so postopoma spremenili pogled mestne uprave na pomen ulic za izboljšanje kakovosti bivanjskega okolja v mestu, kakor tudi za spodbujanje skupnostnega povezovanja. Od leta 2000 je mestna uprava s tem namenom preuredila več javnih trgov v središču mesta, medtem ko naj bi prenova potoka Cheonggye, ki je nastal na mestu nekdanje avtoceste, tudi na simbolni

ravni zaznamovala preobrazbo Seula v okoljsko ozaveščeno in pešcem prijazno mesto (Križnik 2011).

Hkrati z velikimi mestnimi projekti se je spremenjen odnos mestne uprave odrazil tudi v novem pristopu k urbani regeneraciji stanovanjskih sosesk, kjer so ulice kot sestavni del bivalnega okolja pridobile veljavo ne le zaradi svoje prometne, ampak tudi skupnostne vloge (Kim, Lee in Seo 2014). Prvi primer takšne urbane regeneracije sega v leto 2001, ko je skušala mestna uprava v okviru revitalizacije soseske Bukchon zaščititi in prenoviti redke, a še ohranjene tradicionalne uličice (SMG 2001). Skupnostna vloga ulice je bila v ospredju tudi pri urbani regeneraciji soseske Seowon leta 2008. Prebivalci so v sodelovanju z mestno upravo podrli zidove, ki so ulice ločevali od zasebnih vrtov in hiš, omejili promet in na ulicah prepovedali parkiranje, izboljšali hodljivost in prometno varnost v soseski Seowon ter ulice namenili skupnostnim dejavnostim (SMG 2011; Yu 2012; CLC in SI 2017). Izkušnje, ki so jih pri tem pridobili mestna uprava in načrtovalci, so dolgoročno vplivale na oblikovanje nove strategije urbane regeneracije v Seulu (Cho in Križnik 2017). Poleg tega je mestna uprava leta 2016 v okviru Centra za podporo lokalnih skupnosti v Seulu (서울특별시 마을공동체 종합지원센터, SCSC) predstavila pobudo, imenovano Oblikovanje veselih uličic v naši soseski (우리동네 행복한 골목만들기), ki se v nasprotju z urbano regeneracijo nanaša na prenovo posameznih uličic s ciljem krepitve skupnostnega povezovanja. Pobuda temelji na dejavnem vključevanju prebivalcev v pripravo in izvedbo prenove uličnega prostora (SCSC 2016). Soseska Samdeok, ki jo obravnavamo v nadaljevanju, po mnenju mestne uprave predstavlja uspešen primer pobude, kjer naj bi prenova uličnega prostora pomembno izboljšala ne le kakovost bivalnega okolja, ampak hkrati okrepila tudi skupnostno povezovanje (SMG 2016a).

Študija primera: urbana regeneracija soseske Samdeok

Skupnostno povezovanje in urbana regeneracija v Seulu

Seul se je v zadnjem desetletju soočil z občutno upočasnitvijo gospodarske rasti. Če je na letni ravni povprečna rast bruto regionalnega domačega proizvoda med letoma 1985 in 1995 dosegla 16,8 %, se je med letoma 1995 in 2005 zmanjšala na 7,3 % in je po letu 2005 v povprečju dosegla le še 4,5 % (SMG 2015b). Upočasnitev gospodarske rasti ni vplivala le na nazadovanje gospodarstva in povečevanje brezposelnosti oziroma začasne zaposlenosti, ampak je vplivala tudi na rastoče dohodkovne neenakosti, družbeno razslojevanje, rastočo revščino in družbeno izključenost. V individualizirani in tekmovalni družbi so se prebivalci mesta počutili vse bolj osamljene in izključene (OECD 2015). Znižala se je stopnja

medosebnega zaupanja in zaupanja v javne ustanove. Leta 2010 je 47,6 % sodelujočega v raziskavi Seoul Survey trdilo, da zaupa svojim sosedom. Pet let kasneje je sosedom zaupalo manj kot 40 % sodelujočih (SMG 2016b). Število sodelujočih, ki so zaupali javnim ustanovam, se je prav tako zmanjšalo z 41,7 % leta 2010 na 32,2 % leta 2015. V tem času se je skoraj podvojilo število tistih, ki javnim institucijam niso zaupali (SMG 2016b). Zaradi negativnih družbenih in gospodarskih smernic se je znižala stopnja družbene povezanosti v mestu. Mestna uprava je tako krepitev skupnostnega povezovanja prepoznala kot eno ključnih nalog za krepitev družbene povezanosti in izboljšanja kakovosti bivalnega okolja v mestu, kakor tudi za »opolnomočenje prebivalcev za soupravljanje lokalnih skupnosti ter krepitev sodelovanja med državljani in mestno upravo« (Križnik 2017, 92). Na ta način naj bi prebivalci s časom prevzeli pobudo in soodgovornost za razvoj na lokalni ravni (SMG 2012). Mestna uprava je leta 2012 pripravila in sprejela Projekt razvoja lokalnih skupnosti v Seulu (서울시 마을공동체 사업, SNCP) in ustanovila SCSC, katerega glavna naloga je načrtovanje, upravljanje in usklajevanje SNCP z drugimi ukrepi na področju skupnostnega povezovanja (SMG 2015a; SCSC 2017). Do leta 2016 je bilo v različne projekte v okviru SNCP vključenih 129.584 prebivalcev mesta. Sodelujoči v projektu SNCP so izrazili večje zadovoljstvo s kakovostjo življenja, močnejšo družbeno povezanost ter večjo pripravljenost na sodelovanje kot tisti prebivalci Seula, ki v omenjenem projektu niso sodelovali (Ahn, Wi in Yu 2016).

Hkrati z oblikovanjem SNCP je mestna uprava namenila več pozornosti vključevanju javnosti v proces odločanja o urbanem razvoju, kot tudi v načrtovanje in urbano regeneracijo stanovanjskih sosesk (CLC in SI 2017). Skupnostno opredeljena urbana regeneracija je tako pridobila pomen ne le zaradi okoljske in družbene preobrazbe degradiranih urbanih območij in oživljanja gospodarstva v mestu, ampak tudi zaradi pomembne vloge pri krepitvi skupnostnega povezovanja. Izboljšanje družbene povezanosti in medosebnega zaupanja, krepitev družbenih omrežij, oživljanje skupnosti in oblikovanje skupnih identitet so tako postali ključni cilji urbane regeneracije v Seulu (SMG 2015c). Ta se pomembno razlikuje od tržno usmerjenih pristopov v preteklosti, ki so temeljili na špekulativni urbani prenovi in niso namenjali pozornosti njenim družbenim in okoljskim posledicam na vsakdanje življenje v mestu. Urbana prenova, ki je v preteklosti potekala v okviru Projekta skupne prenove (합동재개발사업) ali Projekta razvoja novih sosesk (뉴타운재개발사업), je v nasprotju z urbano regeneracijo družbeno razslojevanje na lokalni ravni le še povečala (Shin in Kim 2016; Cho in Križnik 2017).

V nasprotju z omenjenimi projekti urbane prenove je bila urbana regeneracija od leta 2008 dalje osredotočena na preobrazbo manjših stanovanjskih sosesk z

eno- ali večdružinskimi hišami, slabo razvito infrastrstrukturo in pomanjkljivimi družbenimi dejavnostmi (SMG 2011). Leta 2012 je mestna uprava na osnovi dopolnjene nacionalne zakonodaje uveljavila nov pristop k izboljšanju bivanjskega okolja v stanovanjskih soseskah. Glavni namen projekta REMP je izboljšati »bivalno okolje v soseskah z nizkimi dohodki, slabo ali izrabljeno infrastrukturo ter grajeno strukturo v nadpovprečno slabem stanju« in hkrati okrepiti vključevanje javnosti v načrtovanje bivalnega okolja (MOLIT 2012). Od leta 2010 do oktobra 2015 je bilo v urbano regeneracijo v Seulu vključenih 63 sosesk, med katerimi je velika večina sledila projektu REMP. Slednji se je v tem obdobju zaključil v 13 soseskah, medtem ko se je načrtovanje projekta REMP zaključilo v 22 soseskah (Maeng, Jang in Baik 2016). Glede na razmeroma uspešno izvedbo projekta REMP Kim (2013, 139) poudarja dolgoročni pomen urbane regeneracije za »prehod urbanistične politike od rušenja k prenovi in od zasebnega k na javnem interesu zasnovanega načrtovanja urbanega razvoja«.

Projekt upravljanja bivalnega okolja v soseski Samdeok

Soseka Samdeok leži v okrožju Jeongneung-dong, Seongbuk-gu (성북구 정릉동) na severu Seula. Ime je dobila po bližnjem stanovanjskem kompleksu Samdeok. Čeprav kompleks ne leži neposredno v soseski, so prebivalci prevzeli njegovo ime, a mu hkrati spremenili pomen.[1] Leta 2014 je v soseski živelo 466 prebivalcev v 178 gospodinjstvih (Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015a). V nasprotju z nekaterimi bližnjimi soseskami je soseska Samdeok mirno bivalno okolje, kjer večinoma živijo višje izobraženi prebivalci z razmeroma dobrimi dohodki (Slika 1). Številni med njimi prebivajo v velikih in dobro vzdrževanih eno- ali večdružinskih hišah, zgrajenih v sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja (Nanumgwamirae 2015). V tem pogledu bi sosesko težko označili za degradirano urbano območje. Kljub temu pa so številni prebivalci želeli povečati vrednost nepremičnin, zaradi česar je bila soseska Samdeok v preteklosti predvidena za Projekt stanovanjske prenove (주택재건축사업) (MOLIT 2012). Uresničitev slednjega bi najverjetneje pomenila rušitev sedanje soseske. Vendar zaradi strogih urbanističnih pogojev, ki so veljali za sosesko Samdeok in bi negativno vplivali na dobičkonosnost stanovanjske prenove, do njene rušitve ni prišlo. Zato so se lastniki nepremičnin leta 2013 večinsko odločili, da projekt prekličejo in poiščejo drugačen način za izboljšanje bivalnega okolja in povečanje vrednosti nepremičnin (intervju s P., 8. 5. 2017).

1 Ime Samdeok (삼덕) predstavlja tri (삼, 三) vrline (덕, 德), ki jih prebivalci povezujejo s sosesko – spoštovanje družine in starejših (효덕, 孝德), dobroto med sosedi (선덕, 善德) ter čisto in okolju prijazno sosesko (청덕, 淸德) (SMG 2016b, 15).

Slika 1: Soseska Samdeok v Seulu. Vir: avtor, 31. 10. 2017

Soseska Samdeok je bila oktobra 2013 tako izbrana za urbano regeneracijo v okviru Projekta upravljanja bivalnega okolja, REMP. Glavni cilji urbane regeneracije so bili izboljšanje infrastrukture in družbenih dejavnosti, prenova zasebnih hiš in krepitev skupnostnega povezovanja (Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015a). Medtem ko je bila prenova hiš prepuščena njihovim lastnikom, je bila mestna uprava osredotočena na skupnostno povezovanje in še zlasti na prenovo uličnega prostora in gradnjo nove infrastrukture. Ključno vlogo pri tem sta imela sprejetje in uveljavitev novega urbanističnega načrta, kjer so poleg mestne uprave in prostorskih načrtovalcev sodelovale tudi nevladne organizacije in prebivalci. Pri njegovem oblikovanju so deležniki precej pozornosti namenili prometni ureditvi in s tem povezani oživitvi ulic kot prostora skupnostnega povezovanja (Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015a). Prav neurejen promet se je pokazal za enega izmed glavnih problemov v soseski. Čeprav ima večina hiš garaže, so te majhne in težko dostopne. Prebivalci avtomobile večinoma puščajo na ozkih ulicah, ki so zaradi hribovitega zemljišča obdane z visokimi ograjami in podpornimi zidovi stanovanjskih hiš. Zaradi takšnih omejitev je bilo v preteklosti težko pričakovati, da bodo prebivalci ulice uporabljali za skupnostne dejavnosti (Slika 2).

Končni urbanistični načrt je vseboval 20 ukrepov, s katerimi so želeli načrtovalci izboljšati kakovost bivalnega okolja v soseski Samdeok. Številni med njimi so se

Slika 2: Ulični prostor pred (zgoraj) in po (spodaj) urbani regeneraciji soseske Samdeok. Vir: avtor, 10. 9. 2016, 26. 11. 2017

nanašali prav na prenovo uličnega prostora, vključno z novim tlakovanjem in preplastitvijo prometnih površin, preureditvijo in ozelenitvijo površin za pešce, novima žepnima parkoma in vhodom v sosesko, ureditvijo novega stopnišča, povečanjem prometne varnosti s pomočjo varnostnih ograj, javne osvetljave in namestitvijo nadzornih kamer ter z ureditvijo novih javnih parkirišč (Slika 2) (Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015a). Načrtovalci so poleg tega pozornost namenili preoblikovanju prostora med ulicami in stanovanjskimi hišami, s čimer so želeli tesneje povezati javni in zasebni prostor ter tako okrepiti skupnostno vlogo ulic (intervju z Y., 12. 9. 2016). Na eni strani je želela mestna uprava z ugodnimi posojili lastnike nepremičnin vzpodbuditi k njihovi prenovi in zlasti k preureditvi garaž in kletnih prostorov v manjše trgovske in gostinske lokale, s čimer naj bi v sosesko pritegnili nove gospodarske in družbene dejavnosti. Na drugi strani je nov urbanistični načrt predvidel tudi javno sofinanciranje obnove podpornih zidov, ograj, hišnih pročelij in garaž in tako vzpostaviti pešcem bolj prijazen ulični prostor (Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015b).

Vključevanje javnosti in skupnostno povezovanje

Vključevanje javnosti v načrtovanje in odločanje je sestavni del projekta REMP, s čimer želi mestna uprava zagotoviti ne le večjo kakovost in legitimnost urbane regeneracije, ampak hkrati povezati prebivalce in jih opolnomočiti za soupravljanje soseske (SMG 2013, 2016a; Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015b). V tem pogledu se soseska Samdeok ne razlikuje od podobnih primerov urbane regeneracije v Seulu. V nasprotju s primerljivimi stanovanjskimi soseskami pa je bila za sosesko Samdeok v preteklosti značilna razmeroma slaba družbena povezanost. Prebivalci so povedali, da so svoje sosede pred urbano regeneracijo slabo poznali, čeprav so številni med njimi vrsto let živeli v isti soseski (intervjuja s K., 11. 9. 2017 in R., 21. 9. 2017). Lee (2016) podobno ugotavlja, da so prebivalci v preteklosti bolj kot skupne vrednote cenili zasebnost, zaradi česar se med njimi niso oblikovale trajnejše medosebne vezi. Slaba povezanost in nezaupanje prebivalcev naj bi bila med razlogi, da je bila v urbano regeneracijo soseske Samdeok poleg javnih ustanov, načrtovalcev in prebivalcev vključena tudi nevladna organizacija Nanumgwamirae (intervju z Y., 12. 9. 2016). Slednja je imela skupaj s Socialnim centrom okrožja Jeongneung ključno vlogo pri vključevanju javnosti v načrtovanje in odločanje (Lee 2016). Njeni aktivisti so prebivalce obveščali o pomenu, ciljih in poteku urbane regeneracije, izvedli anketi, s ciljem boljšega razumevanja njihovih potreb, ter jih usposabljali za delo v skupnostnem odboru. Poleg tega so med februarjem in septembrom 2014 organizirali devet skupnih delavnic, na katerih so z javnimi uslužbenci, načrtovalci in prebivalci spregovorili o prihodnjih izzivih in razvojnih

priložnostih, načrtovanih urbanističnih ukrepih, pa tudi o primerih dobre prakse v Seulu (Tabela 2). Skupaj so načrtovali nov skupnostni center in se usposabljali za njegovo upravljanje. Rezultati skupnih delavnic so na koncu pomembno prispevali k oblikovanju novega urbanističnega načrta (Nanumgwamirae 2015; Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015a).

Tabela 2: Pomembnejše skupnostne dejavnosti v soseski Samdeok v času projekta REMP. Vir: Križnik in Kim, 2018

	Dejavnosti v okviru projekta REMP	Druge skupnostne dejavnosti
2013	Izbor soseske za projekt REMP	
2014	Skupne delavnice (9x), anketi prebivalcev (2x), izbira lokacije skupnostnega centra, sestanki začasnega in ustanovitev stalnega upravnega odbora (22x)	Ulični festival (2x), skupne večerje (2x), delavnice DIY
2015	Sestanki upravnega odbora (18x), sestanki z mestno upravo	Ulični festival (4x), skupne večerje (4x), delavnice DIY, kuharski tečaji
2016	Začetek infrastrukturne prenove in gradnje skupnostnega centra, sestanki upravnega odbora (20x), sestanki z mestno upravo	Skupne večerje (2x), delavnice DIY, kuharski tečaji, obiski drugih sosesk
2017	Končanje infrastrukturne prenove in odprtje skupnostnega centra, sestanki upravnega odbora (14x), sestanki z mestno upravo	delavnice DIY, kuharski tečaji, akcija zbiranja sredstev, sodelovanje na festivalih (4x), vodeni ogledi soseske, obiski drugih sosesk

Na začetku je na skupnih delavnicah sodelovalo razmeroma malo prebivalcev, kar je sicer pogosta težava urbane regeneracije v Seulu (Maeng, Jang in Baik 2016). V organizaciji Nanumgwamirae so slab odziv pričakovali, zato so skušali prebivalce na različne načine pritegniti k sodelovanju. Aktivisti so obiskali večino gospodinjstev in prebivalcem razložili cilje projekta REMP ter namen skupnih delavnic. S pomočjo družbenih omrežij in tiskanih medijev so promovirali urbano regeneracijo in predstavljali rezultate skupnih delavnic, kar je vplivalo na boljše vključevanje javnosti. Prebivalci so v intervjujih povedali, da je na skupnih delavnicah sprva sicer sodelovalo manj kot 20 udeležencev (intervjuja s K., 18. 3. 2017 in P., 8. 5. 2017). Vendar so prav ti udeleženci ustanovili začasni skupnostni odbor, ki se je decembra 2014 preoblikoval v Upravni odbor skupnosti prebivalcev v soseski Samdeok. Po zakonu upravni odbor zastopa interese prebivalcev in je odgovoren ne le za nadzor nad projektom REMP, ampak tudi za upravljanje z načrtovanim Skupnostnim centrom soseske Samdeok (삼덕마을회관) (SMG 2016a). V tem pogledu so imele skupne delavnice ključno vlogo pri skupnostnem povezovanju v soseski Samdeok.

Opogumljeni z dobro izkušnjo skupnih delavnic so člani začasnega skupnostnega odbora s pomočjo organizacije Nanumgwamirae in Socialnega centra okrožja Jeongneung organizirali prvi ulični festival (시끌시끌골목축제), s katerim so želeli promovirati skupnostno povezovanje v soseski Samdeok (Nanumgwamirae 2015). Enodnevni ulični festival je potekal maja 2014. Pred začetkom festivala so prebivalci z ulic umaknili vse avtomobile. Namesto avtomobilov so sosesko napolnili obiskovalci, ki so na ulicah prodajali in izmenjevali rabljene stvari, delili hrano, sodelovali v različnih delavnicah in kulturnih dogodkih, se igrali z otroki, obiskovali starejše ali enostavno klepetali o vsakdanjem življenju v soseski. Ulični festival se je zaključil s skupno večerjo udeležencev. Po navedbah intervjuvancev naj bi na dogodku sodelovalo več kot 200 udeležencev, kar so številni prepoznali kot velik uspeh (intervju s K., 11. 9. 2017). Na eni strani je ulični festival povečal zanimanje za urbano regeneracijo, saj številni prebivalci projekta REMP niso poznali. Aktivistka organizacije Nanumgwamirae je v intervjuju povedala, da se je število udeležencev na skupnih delavnicah po uličnem festivalu precej povečalo (intervju s P., 8. 5. 2017). Na drugi strani je imel ulični festival pomembno vlogo tudi pri nadaljnjem skupnostnem povezovanju. Ena izmed prebivalk je v intervjuju priznala, da nekaterih udeležencev prej sploh ni poznala (intervjuji s K., 18. 3. 2017). V času festivala so se prebivalci tako bolje spoznali in se zavedli skupnih interesov in identitete. Tako se je povečalo tudi število skupnostnih dejavnosti, na katerih naj bi po navedbah intervjujancev sodelovalo okrog 100 udeležencev (intervju s K., 18. 3. 2017). Lee (2016, 225) ugotavlja, da se je »s pomočjo skupnostnih dejavnosti identiteta soseske preoblikovala iz geografskega prostora s fizičnim mejami v skupnostni prostor medsebojne izmenjave«.

Ulice kot prostor skupnostnega povezovanja v soseski Samdeok

Ulični festival, ki so ga sicer organizirali še petkrat, je odigral ključno vlogo pri skupnostnem povezovanju v soseski Samdeok in med prebivalci spremenil odnos do ulic. Ti so prepoznali njihovo skupnostno, in ne le prometne vloge. K temu so pomembno prispevale tudi skupne delavnice v okviru projekta REMP, kjer so udeleženci opozorili na neurejeno parkiranje skupaj s pomanjkanjem skupnostnih prostorov kot dve glavni težavi v soseski. Poleg tega je po mnenju enega izmed intervjujancev prav razprava o uspešnih primerih prenove uličnega prostora v Seulu udeležence skupnih delavnic spodbudila k organizaciji uličnega festivala v soseski Samdeok (intervju s P., 8. 5. 2017). Med pripravami na dogodek so organizatorji bolje spoznali preostale prebivalce, jim razložili cilje in pričakovanja glede festivala in od njih dobili zagotovilo, da na dan festivala na ulicah ne bo avtomobilov (Nanumgwamirae 2015). Organizatorji so, kot kaže, dobro opravili svoje delo. Na

dan uličnega festivala so si prebivalci prilastili ne le ulični prostor, ampak so za obiskovalce odprli tudi svoje zasebne vrtove in nekatere hiše, ki so skupaj z ulicami začasno postale del skupnostnega prostora v soseski (Slika 3). Prostorska načrtovalka z dolgoletnimi izkušnjami na področju skupnostno opredeljene urbane regeneracije v Seulu je povedala, da je bila uspešna organizacija festivala resnično velik dosežek za malo sosesko brez predhodnih izkušenj s skupnostnim povezovanjem in razmeroma šibko družbeno povezanostjo (intervju z Y., 12. 9. 2016).

Slika 3: Ulični festival v soseski Samdeok, 2014. Vir: Upravni odbor skupnosti prebivalcev soseske Samdeok, 17. 5. 2014

Čeprav so se avtomobili kasneje vrnili na ulice, so imeli prebivalci med uličnim festivalom priložnost, da spoznajo ulice brez avtomobilov, s čimer so se bolje zavedli njihovega večplastnega pomena za vsakdanje življenje v soseski. Spremenjeno zavedanje o ulicah kot skupnostnem prostoru se je potrdilo tudi v intervjujih, v katerih so intervjuvanci slednje opisovali kot prostor medsebojnega srečevanja, pogovorov s sosedi, sprehodov ali otroške igre (intervjuji s Y., 12. 9. 2016; K., 18. 8. 2017; K., 11. 9. 2017). Po mnenju uslužbenke socialnega centra naj bi se v tem pogledu položaj v soseski pomembno spremenil, saj prebivalci v preteklosti niso kazali veliko zanimanja za sodelovanje in druženje s sosedi (intervju s K., 18. 3. 2017). Kaže, da je bilo večje zavedanje o pomenu ulic za skupnostno povezovanje prej posledica vključevanja javnosti v skupne delavnice, uličnih festivalov

in drugih skupnostnih dejavnosti kot pa prenove uličnega prostora. Prenova in gradnja nove infrastrukture sta se namreč začeli šele leta 2016, ko so bile skupnostne dejavnosti v soseski že utečene (Tabela 2). Poleg tega je bila prenova uličnega prostora na koncu izvedena v manjšem obsegu, kot je bilo predvideno (Uprava okrožja Seongbuk-gu 2015b), kar potrjuje, da je imela slednja na zavedanje prebivalcev o pomenu ulic za skupnostno povezovanje razmeroma omejen vpliv.

Poleg tega je ena izmed načrtovalk opozorila, da je lahko zaradi danih prostorskih omejitev v soseski Samdeok skupnostna vloga ulic razmeroma majhna. Zato je bilo po njenem mnenju treba v okviru urbane regeneracije poiskati druge trajnejše oblike skupnostnih prostorov, in ne zgolj prenoviti ulični prostor (intervju z Y., 12. 9. 2016). Prav s tem namenom projekt REMP predvideva gradnjo skupnostnih centrov kot osrednjih skupnostnih prostorov v soseskah (SMG 2013). Velik pomen skupnostnega centra za povezovanje prebivalcev v prihodnje so poudarili tudi številni intervjuvanci. V primeru soseske Samdeok so se prebivalci skupaj z načrtovalci in mestno upravo odločili za prenovo starejše stanovanjske hiše v Skupnostni center soseske Samdeok, pri čemer so prebivalci v okviru skupnih delavnic sodelovali pri načrtovanju prostorov in dejavnosti v novem skupnostnem centru. V tem so predvideli večji večnamenski prostor, kuhinjo z manjšo kavarno, telovadni prostor, teraso in več manjših prostorov za različne skupnostne dejavnosti mladih in starejših. Nov skupnostni center so odprli konec oktobra 2017, s čimer se je urbana regeneracija soseske Samdeok formalno zaključila. Center je v upravljanje prevzel upravni odbor, ki bo v novih prostorih organiziral različne skupnostne dejavnosti in s tem nadaljeval skupnostno povezovanje, ki se je začelo s skupnimi delavnicami in uličnimi festivali (SMG 2016a).

Sklep

Študija primera skupnostno opredeljene urbane regeneracije soseske Samdeok v Seulu je pokazala, da se zavedanje o pomenu ulic kot prostora skupnostnega povezovanja povečuje ne le v mestni upravi in delu civilne družbe, ampak tudi med prebivalci. Pomembno vlogo je pri tem imela prenova uličnega prostora, ki je izboljšala njegovo hodljivost in ulice oživila kot del javnega prostora. Hkrati so v okviru projekta REMP potekale tudi skupne delavnice, ki so omogočile vključevanje javnosti v prenovo uličnega prostora in prebivalce spodbudile k pripravi prvega uličnega festivala. V času festivala so si prebivalci prisvojili ulice kot skupnostni prostor in tako spoznali njihov večplastni pomen za vsakdanje življenje v soseski. Izsledki študije kažejo, da so na večje zavedanje o pomenu ulic kot prostora skupnostnega povezovanja bolj kot prenova uličnega prostora

vplivale prav skupne delavnice, ulični festivali in druge skupnostne dejavnosti v soseski. Te so vplivale tudi na krepitev medsebojnega zaupanja med prebivalci ter zaupanja med prebivalci in mestno upravo. Ključno vlogo pri tem sta odigrala nevladna organizacija Nanumgwamirae in Socialni center okrožja Jeongneung, ki sta prispevala k uspešnem vključevanju prebivalcev v odločanje o prenovi in k njihovemu opolnomočenju za soupravljanje soseske. Kljub temu pa ostajajo javne ustanove močno vpete v skupnostno povezovanje v soseski Samdeok, kar postavlja pod vprašaj njegovo dolgoročno družbeno in gospodarsko vzdržnost. Prebivalci se po koncu urbane regeneracije namreč srečujejo s številnimi finančnimi in institucionalnimi omejitvami pri upravljanju skupnostnega centra, ki so težko rešljive brez sodelovanja z mestno upravo. Prav vprašanje dolgoročnega sodelovanja med različnimi deležniki pa bi lahko bilo tudi predmet nadaljnje študije, saj lahko partnerstva, ki se na ta način oblikujejo med javnimi ustanovami, civilno družbo in prebivalci, v prihodnje pomembno prispevajo k uveljavljanju družbeno bolj vključujočih, pravičnejših in vzdržnejših oblik urbanega razvoja v Seulu in tudi drugod.

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Zahvala

Za študijo je avtor prejel sredstva Ministrstva za izobraževanje Republike Koreje in Korejske nacionalne raziskovalne fundacije (NRF-2017S1A5A80221252). Za pomoč pri raziskavi se avtor zahvaljuje Kim Su, Han Su-kyoung in Park Hayeon. Del članka je bil leta 2016 predstavljen na simpoziju Great Asian Street Symposium na Nacionalni univerzi v Singapurju.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2017S1A5A80221252). The author wishes to thank Kim Su, Han Su-kyoung and Park Hayeon for their help in conducting this research. A part of the work was presented on the 2016 Great Asian Street Symposium at the National University of Singapore.

Relacijsko sebstvo in moderni subjekt v klasični in sodobni kitajski filozofiji: od etike vlog do transformativnega sebstva*

*Jana S. ROŠKER***

Izvleček

Članek izhaja iz predpostavke, da sta razsvetljenska koncepta avtonomnega subjekta in humanizma v sedanji obliki zastarela in neprimerna za idejno osnovo sodobnega časa. Svobodna volja posameznika nima več opore v etičnih maksimah, saj te znotraj visoko diferenciranih socialnih in tehnoloških kontekstov sodobnih družb ne morejo več služiti kot zanesljivi kriteriji realizacije moralnih imperativov. To pa pomeni, da je ogrožena tako moralna kot tudi politična avtonomija posameznika. Avtorica izhaja iz predpostavke, da sodijo tovrstne ideje po drugi strani k najpomembnejšim kulturnim in filozofskim dediščinam Evrope in da je zato treba ta koncepta postaviti v plodno kontrastivno, poliloško in dialektično razmerje s sorodnimi dediščinami neevropskih kultur. Sinteza različnih tradicij humanizma namreč ni samo mogoča, temveč tudi nujna. Članek se pri tem osredotoča na pregled subjektu sorodnih konceptov znotraj kitajske filozofije, pri čemer poudari tradicionalne osnove ter specifično kitajsko razumevanje pojma sebstva.

Ključne besede: Subjekt, subjektnost, avtonomija, relacijsko sebstvo, medkulturne sinteze, klasična kitajska etika

Relational Self and Modern Subject in Classical and Contemporary Chinese Philosophy: From the Role of the Role to the Transformative Self

Abstract

This article follows the presumption that the Enlightenment concepts of the autonomous human subject and humanism are outdated in their present form. Therefore, they can no longer serve as the ideational basis of contemporary globalised and highly differentiated societies. The individual's free will can no longer rely on ethical maxims, for in the highly differentiated social and technological contexts of contemporary societies, the latter can no longer serve as reliable criteria for categorical imperatives. This means that both the moral and political autonomy of the individual are endangered. On the other hand, these

* Pričujoči prispevek je sofinancirala Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije iz državnega proračuna v okviru raziskovalnega programa št. P6-0243.

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ideas belong to the most important cultural and philosophical legacies of Europe. Therefore, they must be placed into a contrastive and dialectical relation with similar legacies of non-European cultures. A synthesis of different humanistic traditions is thus not only possible, but also urgently needed. The article focuses on a survey of the subject-related concepts within Chinese philosophy, and exposes their traditional bases as well as the specific Chinese understanding of the notion of the self.

Keywords: subject, subjectivity, autonomy, relational self, intercultural syntheses, classical Chinese ethics

Uvod

Članek izhaja iz problematiziranja razsvetljenskih konceptov avtonomnega subjekta in humanizma oziroma njune vloge v današnjem globaliziranem času. Osvetlitev debate o kitajskih relacijskih modelih sebstva in njihovih umestitvah v okvire t. i. transformacijskega ali celostnega subjekta, ki poteka tako znotraj tradicionalne kot tudi znotraj sodobne kitajske filozofije, lahko nakaže nove možnosti revitalizacije in rehabilitacije tovrstnega »postmodernega« subjekta, katerega avtonomija zaradi njegove lastne razpršenosti kontinuirano in nepreklicno razpada. Osredotoča se tudi na politični in etični pomen novih paradigem subjektnosti, ki imajo potencial za rekonceptualizacijo idejnih osnov sodobne politike vključevanja in novih oblik demokracije.

V članku se termin subjekt večinoma nanaša na kantovski koncept subjekta, ki je plod specifičnega *zeitgeista* in sovpadajočih idej evropskega razsvetljenstva in zato predstavlja pojem, ki je tipičen za razvoj evropske miselne tradicije. Ta pojem vsebuje vrsto jasno zamejenih epistemoloških in ontoloških konotacij, ki niso predmet podrobnejših elaboracij znotraj razvoja kitajske idejne tradicije. Konotacije so večinoma povezane s temeljno zasnovo evropske filozofije, ki je zasnovana na jasni ločnici med transcendenco in imanenco; ta v avtohtoni kitajski filozofiji sicer obstaja, vendar ni fiksna, temveč se kaže kot dinamična in fleksibilna spremenljivka. Zato za opis subjektu, subjektivnosti in subjektnosti sorodnih konceptov, ki so se razvili znotraj tradicionalne kitajske filozofije, uporabljam pomensko širši termin sebstva, ki se tukaj nanaša na splošno (tj. objektivno) in samo-refleksivno (tj. subjektivno) konceptualizacijo človeka kot osebnosti (*personhood*). Specifično kitajske konotacije zasnove človeške osebnosti je namreč veliko lažje obravnavati v sklopu širše zastavljenega pojma sebstva kot v sklopu koncepta subjekta, ki je v tem smislu tipičen za evropsko idejno tradicijo. Že sam pojem relacijskega subjekta, denimo, bi bil problematičen, če bi ga uporabljali v povezavi s subjektom, ki je koncept, tesno povezan s specifičnimi konotacijami evropskega individualizma. Iz podobnih razlogov v članku ne uporabljam pojma jaza, saj so njegove filozofske in psihološke konotacije

v obeh obravnavanih tradicijah preveč različne, da bi omogočale dosledno in metodološko neoporečno primerjavo. Kar zadeva moderno in sodobno kitajsko filozofijo, pa gre za diskurz, ki je bil v veliki meri oblikovan prav skozi soočanja kitajskih teoretičark in teoretikov z moderno zahodno filozofijo. Zato pojem subjekta in njegove transformacije ter njegovih sintez s specifično kitajskimi, tradicionalnimi vidiki sebstva predstavlja pomemben segment modernizacije kitajske filozofije.

Medkulturna interpretacija subjektnosti in na kontrastivni analizi temelječa spoznanja o možnostih sinteze med evropsko in kitajsko konceptualizacijo na avtonomiji temelječe subjektnosti niso pomembni zgolj znotraj ozkega področja sinologije, saj takšne raziskave sodijo k osnovnim in osrednjim problemom sodobne filozofije.

Pri tem moramo najprej kritično prevprašati evrocentrične in hegemonistične poglede na koncept subjekta, ki zanikajo možnost obstoja sorodnih konceptov v kitajski miselni tradiciji, saj to dojemajo izključno kot monistično in statično ideološko podlago tradicionalnega imperija in avtokratskih absolutizmov. K takšnim izhodiščem sodi na primer tudi pojem tako imenovane »orientalske despotije« (gl. Wittfogel 1957), ki temelji na ideoloških orientalističnih osnovah. Vrsta sodobnih sinoloških raziskav je že nazorno pokazala, da gre pri tovrstnih kategorizacijah za mitologizirane posredne rezultate kolonialnih diskurzov (gl. npr. Ames 2001; Chaibong 2000; Defoort 2001; Feng Yaoming 1989; Jing 2005 itd.). Toliko pomembnejše je opozoriti na osnovne parametre, ki zakoličujejo specifično kitajske poglede na pojma subjekta in subjektnosti in temeljijo na tradicionalno kitajski paradigmi humanizma, tj. (so)človečnosti (*ren* 仁).

Problematika post-razsvetljenskega subjekta in ne-evropski koncepti avtonomnega sebstva

Domnevna univerzalnost človekovih pravic, ki je bila utemeljena prav v razsvetljenski, na pojmu univerzalne nujnosti temelječi konceptualizaciji subjekta, se je zaradi ekonomskega, tehnološkega, etičnega in političnega razvoja, ki so zaznamovali konec drugega tisočletja, izkazala kot nerealna, porozna in neustrezna za reševanje prekarnih problemov ekološke, politične in socialne narave, ki se kažejo v globaliziranem svetu. Na individualni ravni se ta izguba napetosti med kontinuiranimi in diskontinuiranimi vidiki sebstva, torej razpršitev sorazmerja med njegovo odvisnostjo in avtonomijo, kaže kot problem vzpostavljanja in ohranjanja osebne identitete, na intersubjektivni ravni pa kot odtujenost, ki ni zgolj alienacija od produktov lastnega dela v klasičnem marksističnem smislu, temveč je tudi rezultat njegove ločenosti od zunanje in notranje narave ter pomanjkanja splošno integriranih in sprejetih vrednot znotraj družbe.

Ker pa sodita prej omenjena ključna koncepta evropskega razsvetljenstva k najpomembnejšim idejno-kulturnim dediščinam človeštva, ju je treba revitalizirati, posodobiti in na ta način prilagoditi potrebam sodobnega časa.

Pri tem je pomembno dejstvo, da sta razsvetljenska koncepta avtonomnega subjekta in humanizma v sedanji obliki preživeta in zato ne moreta več služiti kot idejna osnova sodobnih tehnološko in socialno visoko diferenciranih ter globaliziranih družb (Pippin 2005, 4–6). Na pragu tretjega tisočletja je ideja avtonomnega subjekta, ki se je oblikovala v Evropi 17. stoletja v razvoju razsvetljenske miselnosti, doživela stečaj; njegova svobodna volja nima več opore v etičnih maksimah, saj te znotraj visoko diferenciranih socialnih in tehnoloških kontekstov sodobnih družb ne morejo več služiti kot zanesljivi kriteriji realizacije moralnih imperativov. To pa pomeni, da je ogrožena tako moralna kot tudi politična avtonomija posameznika.

Po drugi strani pa sodijo ideje subjektnosti in humanizma k osrednjim aksiološkim temeljem modernizacije in predstavljajo pomemben del evropske idejne dediščine, na kateri so še vedno utemeljene tako miselne kot tudi pravne in ideološke paradigme sodobnih družbenih sistemov.

Zato obstaja nevarnost, da bodo tudi tisti vidiki humanizma, avtonomije in svobodnega subjekta, ki so v teku zgodovinskih razvojev dokazali svoj pozitivni in napredni naboj, utonili v poplavi neoliberalnih teoretskih diskurzov, ki zaradi vse obsežnejše razpršenosti koncepta subjekta toliko lažje postavljajo materialne zakonitosti tržnih razvojev pred integriteto in dostojanstvo človeka kot posameznika, ki je po svoji biti vpet v družbeno skupnost in v svoje naravno okolje (Dirlik 2003, 276–7). Tako humanizem kot tudi avtonomija subjekta sta aksiološka predpogoja za ohranitev, nadgradnjo in razvoj egalitarnih družbenih sistemov, temelječih na uravnovešenem sorazmerju človeka in narave. Prav egalitarni, na strukturi socialne pravičnosti temelječi družbeni sistemi in ekološka ozaveščenost sta namreč temeljni predpostavki, ki omogočata tovrstno integriteto in kakovost človeškega življenja (Böhme 2008, 23). Zato je koncepte, ki takšno integriteto in kakovost ohranjajo in razvijajo, treba revitalizirati, aktualizirati in jih prilagoditi potrebam sodobnega časa. V sodobnem globaliziranem svetu jih je v ta namen treba postaviti v plodno relacijsko, dialoško in dialektično razmerje s podobnimi in sorodnimi dediščinami ne-evropskih kultur.

V tem okviru se moramo najprej osredotočiti na raziskovanje kitajske miselnosti, in sicer predvsem na analize in interpretacije tradicionalnega kitajskega pojma sebstva ter specifično kitajskih oblik konceptov avtonomije in humanizma. V tem kontekstu so torej pomembni alternativni koncepti sebstva oziroma osebnosti, ki so sorodni evropski ideji subjekta oziroma so z njo primerljivi. Pri

tem gre za koncepte, ki ne izvirajo iz evropske idejne tradicije, temveč so rezultat drugačnih, a enako plodnih in relevantnih diskurzov. Tukaj velja opozoriti na osnovne parametre, ki zakoličujejo specifično kitajske poglede na pojma subjekta in avtonomije ter temeljijo na paradigmi tradicionalnega kitajskega humanizma, tj. (so)človečnosti (*ren* 仁).

Tako sinteza različnih tradicij humanizma ni samo mogoča in relevantna, temveč tudi nujna (Mall 2000, 23–31). Medkulturne interpretacije posamičnih konceptov, pojmov in paradigem in na kontrastivni analizi temelječe raziskave možnosti povezovanja in vzajemnega nadgrajevanja evropskih in kitajskih zasnov na avtonomiji utemeljene subjektnosti tako niso pomembne zgolj znotraj ozkega področja sinologije, saj sodi ta predmet raziskave k osnovnim in osrednjim problemom sodobne filozofije.

Pri tem smo soočeni s problemom nesorazmerja v vzajemnem poznavanju obeh obravnavanih idejnih tradicij. Medtem ko je vsako filozofsko pomembno in vplivno delo, ki izide v evro-ameriškem prostoru, kmalu po objavi prevedeno v kitajščino, pa v obratni smeri to ne drži, saj ogromna večina osrednjih in najvplivnejših del kitajske teorije na področju humanistike še vedno ni prevedena v indoevropske jezike. To neravnovesje produkcije znanja v sodobni filozofiji evro-ameriškega prostora nastaja zaradi nepoznavanja referenčnih okvirov ter paradigmatskih osnov kitajske filozofske teorije. Rezultat tovrstnega pomanjkanja stikov so stališča, utemeljena na predsodkih in stereotipih. Takšni predsodki in stereotipi so privedli tudi do na zahodu precej razširjenega (čeprav povsem neutemeljenega) dvoma v obstoj kakršnihkoli konceptu »subjekta« sorodnih idej znotraj tradicionalne kitajske filozofske miselnosti, s tem pa tudi do stališča, po katerem kitajska filozofija kot specifična teoretska disciplina sploh ni mogoča (gl. npr. Weber 1951; Hegel 1996, 112ff; Derrida 1994, 49ff itd.). Prav osvetlitev debate o kitajskih relacijskih modelih sebstva in njihovih umestitvah v okvire t. i. transformacijskega, integrativnega ali celostnega subjekta, ki poteka tako znotraj tradicionalne kot tudi znotraj sodobne kitajske filozofije, nam namreč lahko nakaže nove možnosti revitalizacije in rehabilitacije postmodernega subjekta, katerega avtonomija zaradi njegove lastne razpršenosti kontinuirano razpada. Pri tem so zelo pomembne tudi raziskave političnih in etičnih pomenov tovrstnih inovativnih paradigem subjektnosti,[1] saj imajo te zagotovo precejšen potencial za rekonceptualizacijo idejnih osnov sodobnih politik vključevanja in novih oblik demokracije.

1 Na področju raziskovanja kitajske filozofije se pri tem lahko opremo na rezultate vrste že izdelanih delnih raziskav (gl. npr. Zhao Tingyang in Yan Xin 2008; Zhao Guping 2009, 2012; Wong 2004; Yan Xin 2008; Metzger 1991; Lai 2016; Heubel 2013; Ames 2001, 2016 itd.), celostna študija te problematike pa je načrtovana v sklopu specializiranega raziskovalnega projekta na temo specifičnih paradigem subjektnosti znotraj kitajske idejne tradicije.

Pri tem je pomembna dosledna uporaba novejših izsledkov metodologije medkulturnih raziskav v sinoloških študijah. Ta izhaja iz ozaveščanja dejstva, da je soočanje in razumevanje tako imenovanih »tujih kultur« vselej povezano s problematiko različnih jezikov, tradicij, zgodovin in socializacij. Interpretacije različnih vidikov in elementov »neevropskih« kultur so vselej povezane z geografsko, politično in ekonomsko pozicijo subjekta, ki jih interpretira, kot tudi s pozicijo interpretiranega objekta. Medkulturne raziskave torej na vsak način vključujejo problematiko prevajanja; pri tem ne gre zgolj za jezikovno, temveč tudi in predvsem za diskurzivno prevajanje, ki vključuje tolmačenje posamičnih besedilnih in jezikovnih struktur, kategorij, konceptov in vrednot v različnih historično-lingvističnih, kognitivnih in sociokulturnih kontekstih. Pri tem pogosto prihaja do nasprotovanja med enakim etimološko-semantičnim pojmovanjem določenega izraza in včasih popolnoma drugačnim, funkcionalnim dojemanjem istega izraza na ravni splošnega, družbeno veljavnega socialnega konteksta v obeh obravnavanih družbah.

Tukaj se pokaže potreba po revitalizaciji klasičnih kategorij in konceptov tradicionalne kitajske filozofije in klasične semantične logike nomenalistične (Ming jia 名家) ter moistične (Mo jia 墨家) šole. To pa zahteva medkulturno relativizacijo vsebin, kjer je poleg poglobljenega poznavanja zgodovinskega, idejnega in filozofskega ozadja nujna tudi striktna uporaba metodoloških pristopov, ki ustrezajo specifiki proučevanja kitajske in transkulturne filozofije. Tovrstni pristop je osredotočen na celovito ohranjanje teoretskih posebnosti tradicionalne kitajske filozofije ter na ohranjanje in razvoj avtohtonih tradicionalnih metodoloških principov. To pa seveda nikakor ne pomeni negacije potrebe po soočanju z zahodno (in svetovno) filozofijo. Svetovna (zlasti evropska in indijska) filozofija vsebuje veliko elementov, ki jih v kitajski tradiciji ne najdemo.[2] Raziskovanje in uporaba teh dejavnikov nista nujna zgolj kot dragoceno orodje oplajanja novih idejnih sistemov; kontrastivni in korelativni vidik je pomemben tudi za boljše razumevanje lastne tradicije. Vendar velja pri tem paziti na to, da v kontrastivnih postopkih upoštevamo nesoizmerljivost (inkomenzurabilnost)

2 Večina teh elementov izhaja iz drugačne zasnove samih paradigmatskih temeljev referenčnega okvira, v katerem se vzpostavljajo njuni diskurzi. Pri tem velja omeniti predvsem koncept normativne razmejitve transcendence in imanence, dualizme, ki temeljijo na protislovju in vzajemnem izključevanju binarnih opozicij in statično konceptualizacijo *biti*. Vsi ti elementi merodajno vplivajo ne zgolj na specifična izhodišča, iz katerih se diskurzi evropske in indijske filozofske tradicije lotevajo obravnave partikularnih filozofskih vprašanj, temveč tudi na same koncepte, ki nastajajo v tovrstnih obravnavah. Tako določenih temeljnih konceptov evropske filozofije, kot so koncepti biti, ideje, ali razmerja med splošnostjo in nujnostjo, v kitajski tradiciji ni najti. Seveda pa velja tudi obratno – v evropski in indijski filozofiji – z redkimi izjemami – ni zaslediti večine osrednjih pojmov, ki opredeljujejo kitajsko filozofijo, ki je po svoji naravi procesna, npr. binarnih kategorij, transcendence v imanenci, dinamičnih konceptualizacije bivanja v smislu premene ipd.

številnih obravnavanih paradigem in da ne uporabljamo vprašljivih metod, ki se raziskovanja filozofskih virov kitajske idejne zgodovine lotevajo skozi optiko zahodnih konceptov in kategorij.

Na osnovi poznavanja rezultatov kontrastne analize samih referenčnih okvirov obravnavanih teorij (gl. Rošker 2018, 217) se bomo lahko dokopali do osnov korelativne interpretacije različnih konceptualizacij subjektnosti, kot so se razvile v moderni in postmoderni evropski ter kitajski teoriji. Pri tem se velja izogibati uporabi metod klasične primerjalne filozofije, saj se je že večkrat pokazala kot teoretsko neprimerna, ker temelji na enotnih kriterijih primerjave, katerih vzpostavitev se ob upoštevanju različnih paradigem in referenčnih okvirov izkaže za neizvedljivo. Zato bomo v kontrastivnem delu članka uporabljali predvsem metodo intrakulturnega in transkulturnega raziskovanja.

Razjasnitev zgoraj orisanih problematik ni pomembna samo za izboljšanje in obogatitev sodobne medkulturne teorije, temveč tudi za boljše poznavanje in razumevanje sodobne LR Kitajske; kritično bo namreč predstavila vrsto alternativnih idejnih sistemov, ki niso omejeni na ozek nabor ideološko sprejemljivih in uporabnih predstav, ki so del propagandnih mehanizmov sodobne kitajske vlade. Vendar kitajska teorija v obravnavanem kontekstu ni pomembna samo zato, ker sodi Kitajska med ekonomske in politične velesile sodobnega sveta, temveč tudi zato, ker lahko njena kulturna dediščina znatno obogati evro-ameriško etično in politično teorijo, saj so etično-moralni vidiki sebstva in njegove avtonomije vselej predstavljali jedro razvoja klasične kitajske filozofije.

Sodobna kitajska filozofija pa se je po drugi strani razvila kot medkulturni fenomen, saj so se idejne osnove kitajske modernizacije vzpostavile preko dialoga lastne idejne tradicije z moderno »zahodno« filozofijo. Zato sodobne kitajske filozofije ne moremo razumeti brez poznavanja moderne evropske miselnosti (zlasti nemške klasične filozofije) na eni in razumevanja ter obvladanja kitajske idejne zgodovine in klasične filozofije na drugi strani. Obratno pa »zahod« – v svojo škodo – še vedno ne pozna in ne razume pomembnih teoretskih premikov in doprinosov klasične in sodobne kitajske filozofije. Tukaj se ponuja možnost sinteze dveh različnih konceptualizacij subjektnosti, ki trenutno predstavlja eno najbolj aktualnih in težkih problematik sodobne teorije na globalni ravni. Izdelava takšne sinteze bi lahko pomenila dragocen doprinos k reševanju aksioloških, s tem pa tudi družbenih in političnih kriz sodobnega sveta, k zbliževanju navidezno oddaljenih kultur in tradicij ter k takšnemu strukturiranju intersubjektivnosti ter odnosa med posameznikom in družbo, ki bo temeljilo na novi, solidarnostni konceptualizaciji (so)človečnosti ter bo hkrati upoštevalo osebno dostojanstvo in integriteto posameznika.

Dolga pot teorije do novega dialoškega razmerja med razpršenim subjektom in relacijskim sebstvom

Sodobni diskurzi evro-ameriških teorij subjekta tako na področju filozofskih kot v okviru antropoloških, kulturoloških, psiholoških in literarnih študij postmoderni zahodni subjekt opredeljujejo kot razpršen in decentraliziran, kot delokalizirano ogrodje libidinoznih navezanosti ali kot efemerno funkcijo različnih aktov potrošništva, medijskih izkušenj, trendov ali mode (gl. npr. Rekwitz 2006; Müller 2003; Spiro 1996; Lovlie 1990). V zadnjih letih so številni zahodni teoretiki (na primer Žižek 2010; Pippin 2005; Heartfield 2002; Zima 2010) tovrstna vprašanja obravnavali skozi prizmo različnih vidikov dejstva, da se izguba napetosti med kontinuiranimi in diskontinuiranimi vidiki sebstva, torej razpršitev sorazmerja med njegovo odvisnostjo in avtonomijo, na individualni ravni kaže kot problematična za vzpostavljanje in ohranjanje osebne identitete, na intersubjektivni pa kot odtujenost, ki ni zgolj alienacija od produktov lastnega dela v klasičnem marksističnem smislu, temveč je tudi rezultat njegove ločenosti od zunanje in notranje narave ter pomanjkanja splošno integriranih in sprejetih vrednot znotraj družbe. Vzroke in posledice te problematične situacije je v evro-ameriškem prostoru obdelovala vrsta teoretikov frankfurtske šole (npr. Adorno 1996 in Horkheimer 1947), postrukturalističnih piscev (npr. Baudrillard 1994; Foucault 1982) ter predstavnikov ameriškega pragmatizma (npr. Peirce 1931–58 in Dewey 1930).

Na zahodu veliko manj znana pa je kitajska produkcija znanja na tem področju, čeprav so koncepti avtonomije in subjektivnosti vseskozi predstavljali pomemben del kitajskih raziskav na področju humanistike. Presenetljivo je dejstvo, da je velik del izjemno zanimivih in pomembnih virov, ki obravnavajo te koncepte, nastal v obdobju med petdesetimi in sedemdesetimi leti dvajsetega stoletja, tj. v »svinčenem obdobju« stroge in avtokratske vladne cenzure, v katerem so bile na področju humanističnih raziskav dovoljene zgolj teoretske inovacije, povezane s sinizacijo marksizma (Rošker 2018, 218ff).

Raziskovanje konceptov, sorodnih evropski ideji subjekta oziroma subjektnosti pa je v zadnjih desetletjih postalo tudi osrednji predmet sodobnih sinoloških in kitajskih raziskav s področja kitajske filozofske teorije in idejne zgodovine. Tovrstne razprave v glavnem izhajajo iz predpostavke, da je avtonomija posameznika aksiološka osnova, ki tvori tako jedro izvorne konfucijanske relacijske etike[3] kot tudi

3 Pri tem velja opozoriti na vrsto raziskav, ki jih lahko štejemo med klasike tovrstnih diskurzov in imajo izjemen vpliv na študije tega področja, četudi so njihovi izsledki v okviru raziskovanja kitajske filozofije že splošno znani. Sem sodijo na primer naslednja dela: Ames 2011 in 2016; Feng Yaoming 2000; Huang Chun-chieh 2009; Jung Hwa Yol 1996; Lee Ming-huei 2001; Metzger 1991; Morton 1971; Rosemont in Ames 2016; Tang Junyi 1985; Tu Wei-ming 1985, 1996, 1998; Wang Qiong 2016; Zhao Guoping 2009; Zhao Tingyang in Yan Xin 2008.

podlago daoističnih in drugih tradicionalnih teorij intersubjektivnosti (gl. npr. Gu Ming Dong 2013; Heubel 2013; Lai Karyn 2016; Lai Xisan 2013; Slingerland 2004; Tang Junyi 1986; Wong 2004; Xu Fuguan 1987 ter Zhao Guoping 2012, 2015). Omenjene študije analizirajo tovrstne specifično kitajske zasnove konceptov avtonomije, subjektnosti in humanizma predvsem v klasičnih virih kitajske antike in kitajskega srednjega veka.

Takšni diskurzi temeljijo na prepričanju, da sodobnih ekonomsko-političnih problemov ni mogoče trajnostno reševati zgolj s tržno usmerjenimi, utilitarnimi študijami s področja ekonomije, prava, politologije in drugih disciplin, ki se raziskovanja družb v veliki meri lotevajo z uporabo kvantitativnih metod, temveč je treba v ta namen vključevati tudi raziskave moralno-etičnih, epistemoloških in ontoloških osnov družbe.

Pomembna problematika znotraj tega vsebinskega okvira je med drugim povezana z vprašanjem medkulturnih dimenzij modernizacije, saj predstavlja pojem avtonomnega, dejavnega subjekta in njegove svobodne volje osrednji element idejne zasnove modernizacije, ki se je v Evropi oblikovala kot produkt razsvetljenskih diskurzov. V nasprotju s tem na Kitajskem razsvetljenje v smislu širitve ideološke prevlade razuma, ki je bilo razumljeno kot esencialna predpostavka modernizacije, svojega dinamičnega in družbeno modifikacijskega potenciala največkrat ni črpalo iz osnov lastne idejne zgodovine, temveč – zaradi objektivnih pogojev, ki so opredeljevali kolonialno zgodovino – iz prevzemanja zahodne racionalne tradicije. V tem smislu je kolonialna preteklost Evrope – čeprav ne povsem neposredno – merodajno opredelila procese kitajske modernizacije. Seveda je po drugi strani jasno tudi dejstvo, da je bila Kitajska v 18. in 19. stoletju soočena z globoko notranjo krizo, katere razsežnosti so bile precej večje in so precej globlje posegale v tradicionalni ustroj družbe in države, kot je bilo v dotedanji paradigmi cikličnih vzponov in propadov dinastij običajno. To pomeni, da bi bila radikalna prenova vrednot, proizvodnih načinov in ekonomsko političnega sistema v tistem času nujna tudi brez stikov z zahodom. Takšna prenova zagotovo ne bi bila primerljiva z modernizacijo »zahodnega« tipa in samo ugibamo lahko, kakšna bi bila Kitajska danes, če bi to prenovo izvedla »iz sebe same« – torej zgolj na osnovi črpanja lastnih gospodarskih, političnih in idejnih virov. V tem okviru se jasno pokaže, da je modernost pojem, ki ne vključuje zgolj univerzalnih, temveč tudi kulturno pogojene konotacije (gl. npr. Rošker 2013, 57ff, 2014, 100–102; Wang 2000, 40ff.).

Po drugi strani smo bili v zadnjem stoletju priča ponovnemu razcvetu kitajske zgodovine in preteklosti, ki ju je vlak modernosti navidezno že povozil in ju odvrgel na smetišča preživelih ideologij. Ta razcvet se ne kaže kot zanikanje modernosti, temveč se dogaja pod njenim praporjem. Tako sodobni kitajski teoretiki ne

zagovarjajo vrnitve v predmoderno obdobje in v globalizaciji večinoma ne vidijo več zmage ali prevlade evrocentrične modernosti, temveč izziv za njeno historizacijo. Takšno zgodovinsko in historiografsko umestitev pojmov avtonomije, sebstva in različnih tradicionalnih modelov osebnosti ter refleksijo idejnih prenov, povezanih s tovrstno historizacijo, je obdelala vrsta novejših kitajskih (gl. npr. Feng 2007; Li 1994; Mou 1991; Tang 2000; Wang 1996; Wang 2000; Zhang 2007, 22–30 in Zheng 2001, 61–70) in evro-ameriških (gl. npr. Dirlik 2002, 16–39; Elstein 2010, 427–43; 2014; Geist 1996, 31ff; Lee 2003, 27–42; Wheeler 2005, 23–24 itd.) teoretikov, ki so v svojih raziskavah jasno pokazali, da je tovrstna historizacija nujna za izdelavo nove transkulturne etike, ki bo morala predstavljati pomembno aksiološko osnovo za trajnostni razvoj globaliziranih družb.

Od »orientalske despotije« do relacijskega sebstva

Pri iskanju novih paradigem transkulturnega pojmovanja sebstva in subjekta je nujno ovreči vrsto evrocentričnih in hegemonističnih pogledov na koncept subjekta, ki zanikajo možnost obstoja sorodnih konceptov v kitajski miselni tradiciji, ki jo dojemajo izključno kot monistično in statično ideološko podlago tradicionalnega imperija in avtokratskih absolutizmov. To vključuje razkritje ideoloških in orientalističnih osnov pojma tako imenovane »orientalske despotije«, ki ga je na pragu druge polovice dvajsetega stoletja uvedel Karl A. Wittfogel (1957) in ki predstavlja mitologizirani plod kolonialnih diskurzov, nepoznavanja zunajevropskih zgodovinskih procesov in nerazumevanja diferenciacij med razvoji filozofskih in ideološko-političnih tokov kitajske tradicije.

Šele na tej osnovi se lahko posvetimo raziskavam antične, klasične in predmoderne konceptualizacije kitajskega sebstva, katerih cilj je razjasnitev idejnega, političnega, ekonomskega in zgodovinskega ozadja specifično kitajskega »relacijskega sebstva« (*guanxi ziwo* 關係自我), ki se kaže v družbenem sistemu relacionizma (*guanxizhuyi* 關係主義) (Li 1996, 127–31) in je opredeljeno s t. i. »etiko vlog« (Ames 2011, 23ff).

Vse te koncepte je mogoče strukturno povezati z razmerjem med transcendentalnim in empiričnim subjektom, ki se je znotraj kitajske idejne tradicije manifestiralo v tradicionalni komplementarni interakciji med t. i. »zunanjim vladarjem in notranjim svetnikom« (*neisheng waiwang* 內聖外王) in tudi znotraj koncepta dvojne subjektnosti (*shuangchong zhutixing* 雙重主體性). Medtem ko sta bila omenjena pojma vzpostavljena in razvita v sklopu sodobne filozofske struje modernega konfucijanstva, velja posebno pozornost posvetiti tudi daoističnim filozofskim diskurzom in njihovim interpretacijam celostnega (*zhengti zhuti* 整體主

體), transformativnega (*zhuanhua zhuti* 轉化主體) oziroma energetsko-korporalnega (*qi lun zhuti* 氣論主體) subjekta (Ott 2017, 65). Pri tem se pokaže, da je mogoče tovrstna tradicionalno kitajska razumevanja tvorno povezati s sodobnimi kitajskimi teorijami, zlasti s konceptom subjektnosti (oziroma subjektalnosti, *zhutixing* 主體性), kakršnega je v svoji teoriji ontologije subjekta izdelal sodobni kitajski teoretik Li Zehou (Gl. Li 1994, 2010, 2011, 2016).

Razumevanje tovrstnih re-konceptualizacij je povezano s poznavanjem različnosti referenčnih okvirov moderne evropske oziroma klasične kitajske filozofske teorije (gl. Rošker 2018, 212), ki temelji na razlikah med zunanjo transcendenco in transcendentno imanenco, pa tudi na paradigmah statike oziroma dinamike. Poznavanje te osnove nam omogoči izdelavo kontrastivne analize konceptov intersubjektivnosti v obeh obravnavanih diskurzih. Ta se posebej osredotoča na razlike in vzporednice med normativno-dogovorno paradigmo in paradigmo relacijske intersubjektivnosti, ki tvori podlago klasičnega kitajskega koncepta (so)človečnosti (*ren* 仁).

Vsekakor moramo pri razjasnitvi transkulturne narave pojmov subjektnosti upoštevati tudi razmerje med univerzalnimi in kulturno pogojenimi vidiki modernizacije. Pri tem velja najprej kritično osvetlili problematiko topoglednih postmodernih konceptov, h kakršnim sodi, denimo, koncept »raznovrstnih modernosti« (*multiple modernities*) Shmuela Noaha Eisenstadta (2000). Čeprav je vzpostavitev tega koncepta utemeljena na tezi, po kateri modernizacija ne-evropskih družb ni enaka njihovemu pozahodenju, se ob podrobni analizi pokažeta problematičnost in konservativnost tovrstnih teorij, ki interpretacije različnih oblik modernizacije in modernosti postavljajo v kontekst afirmacije globalnih razmerij oblasti, pri čemer njene različne modele umeščajo v okvire različnih držav, narodov in »kultur«, ki so videne kot njihova razločevalna posebnost. V tem okviru velja namreč poudariti, da je klasični model modernizacije na globalni ravni privedel do situacije, v kateri problemi, ki jih prinaša, niso več zgolj problemi t. i. »ne-evropskih«, temveč tudi evro-ameriških družb. Potreba po spoznavanju »alternativnih modernosti« je torej izziv tudi za zahodne kulture modernizacij, saj na novo vzpostavlja njihove meje oziroma se vprašuje o lokaliziranju modernosti kot take.

Ideja subjektnosti, ki je v središču idejnih paradigem modernizacijskih procesov, je prav zaradi tega zanimiva tudi v kontekstu medkulturnih raziskav. Osrednji problem pri vzpostavljanju subjekta in subjektnosti znotraj avtohtone kitajske teorije namreč nikakor ni v odsotnosti dejavnega subjekta znotraj tradicionalne Kitajske oziroma konfucijanske idejne zgodovine, čeprav je ta predpostavka še vedno zelo razširjena.

Aksiološko vlogo, ki jo je v procesih modernizacije na zahodu prevzel koncept avtonomnega subjekta, lahko namreč v okviru azijskih modernizacij prevzame koncept moralnega sebstva (*daode ziwo* 道德自我), kakršen se je vzpostavil v

diskurzih modernega konfucijanstva. Čeprav ti diskurzi še zdaleč niso homogeni, se vprašanj o vlogi tega koncepta večinoma lotevajo s pomočjo redefinicij razmerja oziroma razlike med transcendentalnim in empiričnim subjektom znotraj kitajske idejne tradicije.[4]

Individualizem vs. relacionalizem

Osrednji problem, ki v tem pogledu razmejuje tradicionalne kitajske koncepte od tistih, ki so merodajno sooblikovali idejno panoramo evropske moderne, se je pokazal predvsem v tistih razsežnostih pojmovnih konotacij subjekta, ki so bile v specifičnem ustroju evropske idejne zgodovine nujno in neobhodno povezane s konceptom individuuma. Zato tradicionalno kitajskega koncepta moralnega sebstva ne moremo razumeti, če ne poznamo razlike med prevladujočim dojemanjem posameznika v evropski oziroma kitajski idejni zgodovini. Tako velja opozoriti tudi na posebnosti procesa vzpostavljanja in razvoja tega koncepta znotraj obeh obravnavanih tradicij.

Pri tem je pomembna predpostavka, po kateri predstava individuuma, kakršen se običajno uporablja v zahodni politični teoriji, ni nekaj, kar bi bilo človeškemu obstoju »apriorno dano«, temveč gre prej za nadvse kompleksen konceptualni konstrukt, ki izvira iz specifičnega tipa družbenega izkustva, namreč izkustva socialnega razkroja tradicionalnih družb. Individualizem v tem pomenu je esenca evropske modernizacije. Ker so sile liberalne demokracije dolga desetletja širile in poudarjale idejo in pozitivni pomen individualizma, je bilo treba iznajti druge, opozicionalne konstrukte (h kakršnim sodi, denimo, popolnoma zgrešeni koncept »kolektivizma«), ki so služili predvsem označevanju družbenih pojavov in gibanj, proti katerim je bila liberalna demokracija usmerjena. Njeno čaščenje enkratnega posameznika je bilo v nasprotju s predstavo o uniformnih množicah, ki naj bi kot razčlovečeni regimenti korakale v vrstah brezpogojne poslušnosti vladarju, družbi oziroma državi.

Osvetlitev novejših interpretacij strukturnih osnov tradicionalnega kitajskega družbenega sistema je pokazala, da gre pri tovrstnih konceptualizacijah bolj za karikature kot za rezultate dejanskih in verodostojnih analiz. Tovrstni pristopi obravnavano problematiko prej dodatno zamegljujejo, kot da bi jo dejansko razjasnili. Koncept relacionalizma, kakršen se je razvil v sodobni kitajski teoriji (gl. na primer Li 1979, 16–17), ki temelji na relacijskem, korelativnem in

4 Kot že omenjeno se je to razmerje oziroma ta razlika v konfucijanski tradiciji največkrat manifestirala kot problem razmerja med »notranjim svetnikom in zunanjim vladarjem (*neisheng waiwang* 內聖外王)«.

komplementarnem pojmovanju razmerja med družbo in posameznikom, razmerja med posamezniki in tudi samorazumevanja posameznikov, je pokazal, da je individuum v kitajski družbi sicer dojeman na način, da se konstituira skozi odnose, v katere je vpet, vendar je vsekakor prisoten in vpliven faktor vsake skupnosti. Idejni konstrukt koncepta kolektivizma pa po drugi strani posameznika kot takega sploh ne priznava.

Osrednja razlika med liberalnim in starogrškim pojmom posameznika, denimo, se pokaže prav v njunem različnem dojemanju sebstva. Polis ni bil nič drugega kot skupnost meščanov/državljanov, a tudi ti niso bili nič drugega kot del polisa. Pri tem gre za komplementaren odnos, kakršen se je vzpostavil tudi v idejah izvornega konfucijanstva, ki je nastalo v obdobju Vojskujočih se držav (Zhan guo 475–221 pr. n. št.), torej še pred združitvijo vsekitajske države pod žezlom prvega cesarja dinastije Qin (221–206 pr. n. št.). David Hall in Roger Ames (1989) povezujeta tak tip individuuma s prej omenjenim razmerjem med transcendentnim in empiričnim subjektom oziroma med »notranjim« in »zunanjim« sebstvom. Takšen individuum lahko dojamemo kot izhajajoč iz tega, kar McCormick imenuje »agonalno sebstvo« (1797, 692). Zato so argumenti, ki temeljijo na prepričanju, da kitajski pojem sebstva ni imel močnih »individualističnih« konotacij, večinoma esencialistični in posplošujoči. Kot smo videli zgoraj, je tudi zahodni pojem izoliranega, razmejenega in popolnoma samostojnega individuuma v veliki meri produkt ideologij modernizacije.

Zato je treba pri razumevanju tradicionalnega kitajskega koncepta sebstva vsekakor ostati pazljiv tudi glede obravnavanja oziroma razumevanja kitajskega pojma samo-uresničitve sebstva, saj tisti, ki smo bili socializirani v diskurzih zahodne moderne, ta termin prevečkrat samoumevno enačimo s samo-uresničitvijo individualne eksistence v tem, slednjem smislu. Tovrstnim pastem, ki so povezane s pomanjkanjem medkulturne senzibilnosti in refleksije različnih referenčnih okvirov, se je mogoče izogniti zgolj z doslednim upoštevanjem paradigem in postopkov novejših izsledkov in teoretskih temeljev metodologije medkulturnih raziskav.

Zaključek

Različne zgoraj obravnavane konceptualizacije avtonomije subjekta in človeškega sebstva predstavljajo prvi korak k izdelavi medkulturnih sintez na področju dojemanja avtonomije, človečnosti, humanizma in samorefleksije človeka. To je pomembno že zaradi izrazitega zgoraj omenjenega nesorazmerja v vzajemnem poznavanju obeh obravnavanih kulturno-jezikovnih krogov. Medtem ko kitajski akademski svet budno spremlja vse novosti na področju zahodne teorije in je

vsako pomembno teoretsko delo v nekaj mesecih po izidu prevedeno v kitajščino, zahodni teoretiki še vedno ne razpolagajo niti z osnovnim poznavanjem kitajske teorije. To velja posebej za predmoderno, moderno in sodobno kitajsko filozofijo; osrednji in najvplivnejši antični klasiki so prevedeni v večino indoevropskih jezikov, medtem ko novejše in sodobne teoretske kitajščine, v kateri raziskujejo in pišejo sodobni kitajski akademiki, velika večina zahodnih filozofinj in filozofov (in celo večina sinologinj in sinologov) ne obvlada.

Sodobna teoretska kitajščina je namreč strukturno in terminološko izjemno specifična in se močno razlikuje od drugih funkcijskih zvrsti tega jezika, saj hkrati vključuje elemente klasične kitajščine in sinizirane abstraktne tujke. Za obvladanje tega specifičnega jezika je nujna dolgoletna specializacija tako na področju moderne in sodobne zahodne kot tudi klasične ter sodobne kitajske teorije. Razumevanje kitajske teorije predpostavlja tudi poznavanje paradigem, ki so utemeljene v specifičnem referenčnem okviru, kateri se razlikuje od evro-ameriških.

Vse to seveda še dodatno otežuje nadaljnje raziskave tega aktualnega in družbeno relevantnega področja. Ker pa se metodologija sinologije, ki je prvotno zrasla iz korenin orientalističnih disciplin, v zadnjih desetletjih pospešeno razvija v smeri specializacij znotraj širšega območja te krovne vede, ki ji je skupno samo osnovno posredovanje kitajskega jezika in pisave, smo lahko glede bodočih razvojev tovrstnih raziskav razmeroma optimistični.

Okviri tovrstnih nadaljnjih razvojev in raziskav na tem področju morajo biti torej osnovani na poznavanju temeljnih razlik v referenčnih okvirih in paradigmah. Šele na tej osnovi in znotraj takšnih okvirov bo mogoče izdelati sistematično analizo in interpretacijo omenjenih filozofskih zasnov skozi optiko razvoja ideje subjektnosti. In konec koncev se bomo šele na tej osnovi morda le dokopali tudi do najprimernejše metode za plodno in razumno umestitev te ideje v aktualne teoretske tokove na globalni ravni.

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