103 
© Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 2024 – 26/št. 1
Contemporary Military Challenges, 2024 – 26/No. 1
Kvalitativna ocena konvencionalnega vojaškega ravnovesja med Natom in Rusijo 
je lahko podlaga za morebitne sporazume o nadzoru nad konvencionalnimi silami 
(CAC) v Evropi. Članek obravnava metode za ocenjevanje zmogljivosti sil in 
vojaškega ravnovesja; sledijo predlogi za posodobitev metod, ki izhajajo iz spoznanj 
o nedavnih spopadih, trendih in razvoju vojaških zmogljivosti. Pri tem predstavlja 
model ponderirane statične analize sil za oceno vojaškega ravnovesja, ki se lahko 
uporabi za sporazume CAC, t. i. kvantitativni pristop k nadzoru nad konvencionalnimi 
silami (QuACAC). Ta lahko pripomore k zmanjšanju nesoglasij med pogajalskimi 
stranmi in omogoči prilagajanje sporazumov CAC.
Vojaško ravnovesje, nadzor nad konvencionalnimi silami, rusko-ukrajinska vojna, 
pokonfliktni sporazumi. 
A qualitative assessment of the conventional military balance between NATO and 
Russia may form a basis of any potential conventional arms control (CAC) agreement 
in Europe. Article discusses methods to assess force capability and military balances, 
and then suggests updates to the methods based on insights from recent conflicts, 
military capability trends and developments. The article offers a weighted static force 
analysis model to assess military balances, that can be used for CAC agreements, 
called the Quantitative Approach to Conventional Arms Control (QuACAC). This 
approach may help narrow areas of disagreement between negotiating parties, and 
provide a basis for CAC agreement adaptation.
Military Balance, Conventional Arms Control, Russo-Ukraine War, Post-Conflict 
Agreements. 
VOJAŠKO URAVNOVEŠENJE ZA PRIHODNJE 
SPORAZUME O KONVENCIONALNIH SILAH V EVROPI
William Lippert
MILITARY BALANCING FOR FUTURE 
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL 
AGREEMENTS IN EUROPE
DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0007
Povzetek
Ključne	
besede
Abstract
Key words
 104 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
The Russo-Ukraine War is the most significant and cataclysmic event in post-Cold 
War Europe. While there are numerous causes, one of them is likely the failure of 
conventional arms control (CAC) agreements in Europe (Lippert, 2024). Specifically, 
Russia invaded Ukraine in part because it was dissatisfied with the relative balance of 
conventional military power between it and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and Moscow’s efforts to address this through CAC agreements had failed. 
While an agreement between Russia and Ukraine might bring an end to that conflict, 
a bilateral agreement may not successfully address the war’s structural causes. 
Rather, a broader, European-wide CAC agreement is more likely to resolve Russia’s 
long-standing complaints and establish a more stable, secure military balance, which 
may in turn prevent another major conflict in Europe.
Military balance is an important concept for states’ assessments of their own relative 
power (Levy, 1998; Van Evera, 1999); it determines states’ interests in entering 
CAC agreements, and is often a principle consideration for the agreements’ design. 
Military balance is the comparison of states’ or blocs’ conventional military forces, 
based on their military equipment, personnel, readiness, logistics, command, control, 
and communications (C3), intelligence, and other relevant factors (Skypek, 2010; 
Zanella, 2012). While military balance is an important determinant of power and a 
driver of CAC agreements, the question of how to measure military balance remains. 
During the Cold War, for example, NATO and the Soviet Union entered into an 
open dispute about their military balance, with each side accusing the other of being 
more threatening. While imprecise assessments of one another’s military balances 
may be sufficient for the purposes of strategic planning or public communications, 
CAC agreements require a greater precision, because most CAC agreements result 
in specific, quantitative limitations (including prohibitions, or quantities of zero). 
This article discusses several methods for quantitatively assessing military balance 
and proposes a specific methodology for CAC agreements. This methodology, the 
Quantitative Approach to Conventional Arms Control (QuACAC), is not intended to 
predict conflict outcomes. Rather, it is a tool to assess and calculate military balances 
to determine which mixes of forces could be reduced, limited, or prohibited to reach 
a CAC agreement. 
	 1	 STATIC	AND	WEIGHTED	MEASUREMENTS	COMPARISONS
Two commonly used methodologies to compare military power are static counts 
and weighted static counts (Rohn, 1990, tbl. S1). Each offers advantages and 
disadvantages for CAC. 
Static measurements generally divide military equipment into categories and count 
personnel as equal. A basic count could consider that a second-generation fighter 
aircraft may be counted the same as a fifth-generation aircraft, and a 105 mm World 
War Two-era towed howitzer could be counted the same as a precision-munition 
firing 155 mm self-propelled cannon. To what extent one separates the categories 
William Lippert
Introduction
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– for example, air superiority aircraft from ground attack aircraft, or wheeled 
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) from tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) – 
will vary from one report or analysis to another. Static measurements can also divide 
comparisons into within-equipment type categories, for example by aircraft or tank 
generation, artillery type (tubed versus rocket), and short versus long-range surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs). Personnel tend to be counted equally as one equal unit per 
person.
There are two advantages to static count approaches for CAC: the counting requires 
few subjective judgements, and it can be done relatively quickly, provided that 
the necessary information is available. At the same time, static approaches fail to 
capture important differences. While many military vehicles fall into generations, 
the evolution is more continuous and iterative than incremental; thus, there may be 
different assessments as to whether or not a given system falls into one or another 
generation. Categorizing by performance capability poses similar challenges, as the 
“dividing line” between categories can be arbitrary. For example, the definition of 
short, medium, or long range for artillery or SAMs is arbitrary; or in the case of 
naval ships, the number of vertical missile launch tubes may be more relevant than 
the size (water displacement) or named class (frigate, corvette, destroyer, aircraft 
carrier, etc.).
A third complication may arise from weapon systems that straddle multiple 
categories, such as a wheeled vehicle with a large cannon (such as the US Stryker-
based M1128 Mobile Gun System). Static measures do not account for any qualitative 
differences between weapon systems which could be similar in key physical aspects. 
For example, an M1-A1 Abrams tank with thermal sights, advanced targeting 
capabilities, and thicker armour would be counted the same as a T-72 which lacked 
thermal sights, had a comparatively poorer targeting system, and thinner armour 
– even though these differences were decisively significant in the 1991 Gulf War 
(Zaloga and Laurier, 2009). Military personnel are treated equally regardless of 
differences in training and equipping.
Thus, a static count minimizes the number of subjective analyses and permits rapid 
assessment, but it ignores important details, particularly qualitative differences. One 
important consideration of static counts is that most CAC agreements apply static 
limitations (rather than weighted or qualitative). For example, the 1990 Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Adapted CFE (A/CFE) Treaties designated all 
weapons systems within the 5.5 categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 
artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters; collectively referred to as treaty limited 
equipment (TLE), and armoured vehicle-launched bridges (which are not considered 
a major TLE category) as equal for counting purposes. Whether a tank was produced 
in 1955 or 1990 did not matter from the treaty’s compliance perspective.
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	 2		 WEIGHTING	FORCES
A weighted value is the assigned value of an item relative to other items being 
calculated or compared in the same context. For assessing military capabilities, and 
particularly CAC, this means that one tank does not necessarily have the same value 
as another. A modern MBT has a higher value or score than a 1950s tank, because a 
modern MBT has a number of advantages and improvements in comparison. There 
is no single, accepted, and accurate method to weigh military forces, in part due 
to inherent subjectivity. However, as most CAC agreements focus on personnel 
and equipment rather than units (due to the difficulty of measuring a unit and the 
wide variety of unit compositions), this section will discuss some of the factors and 
issues to consider in weighing the capability points of various military systems and 
supporting capabilities. The Russo-Ukraine War provides important insights – but 
these are all tentative as the data is incomplete and unverified. As a launching point, 
this article will discuss the five major CFE TLE categories. Whether or not these 
would again be the focus of a CAC agreement, these systems remain the backbone 
of NATO and Russia’s militaries, and could still be credibly considered offensive 
in nature because of the ability to mass them, and their battlefield affect when 
massed. The QuACAC methodology uses a rhetorical standard infantry soldier as 
the baseline, with a military capability score of 1.
Main battle tanks, often over fifty metric tons of steel sporting a 120 mm cannon 
or larger, remain relevant and likely remain a key enabler of offensive, manoeuvre 
operations, although the Russo-Ukraine War suggests that they enjoy less freedom 
of movement than in the past (Zabrodskyi et al., 2022). Tanks’ qualitative differences 
may include the quality of thermal sights, data connectivity, and possibly the 
possession of active defences, artificial intelligence (AI), optionally manned 
configuration, and drone integration. Some of these technologies are emerging and 
unproven, although the quality of thermal sights and gun accuracy may be among the 
tank’s most important features. 
Artillery has seen less development than tanks in the past several decades, with the 
greatest advances being in guided munitions. The guided rockets fired by MLRS/
HIMARS have proven their effectiveness in Ukraine, striking logistics nodes, 
command and control centres, and bridges, among other targets. Computing and 
drones add significant capability to artillery accuracy, and integrated targeting 
systems on an otherwise half-century old artillery system can significantly improve 
its performance. Artillery comes in several different configurations or types, including 
towed, self-propelled, tube and rocket. Each has their advantages and disadvantages, 
with capability points likely being determined by a combination of accuracy, range, 
and explosive power.
Armoured combat vehicles include wheeled armoured personnel carriers and 
tracked infantry fighting vehicles. These vehicles are often primarily designed to 
transport infantry, and it is generally accepted that these vehicles are essential for 
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conducting a major offensive in a large-scale modern conflict because the armour 
offers some protection compared to a civilian or unarmoured military vehicle, 
attacking solely by foot is nothing short of suicidal, and infantry need to keep up 
with tanks in order to provide mutual, combined arms support.  Many armoured 
combat vehicle models evolved to serve a variety of missions, with some vehicles 
such as the US M114, the US Stryker, the Soviet/Russian BMP-2, and the Soviet/
Russian BTR-80 modified over time to incorporate additional functionality such as 
carrying large mortars, rockets, lasers, SAMs, anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft 
guns. The simplest and cheapest versions tend to have minimal weapons but are 
sufficient to transport soldiers to the combat area, if not to provide direct fire support. 
With greater firepower they can inflict greater damage, although sometimes at the 
cost of troop-carrying capability, at some financial cost, and potentially presenting 
themselves as a more vulnerable target depending on how they are used. Capability 
points would likely be based upon some combination of armour, wheeled vs. tracked 
(with tracked being more valuable), and firepower.
Attack helicopters are generally more similar to one another than armoured combat 
vehicles or tanks, making comparisons much simpler. Examples of this weapon 
category include the US AH-64 Apache and the Russian Mi-28 Havoc. Attack 
helicopters are usually armed with a variety and mix of rockets, guided missiles, 
and guns. Capability points would likely be based on the weapons that the helicopter 
could employ, the number of weapons, targeting capabilities such as long-distance 
thermal imaging and data sharing, range, and speed.
Aircraft are complicated to assess, and the CFE approach was to simply count any 
kind of combat aircraft as a single unit subject to TLE, despite their differences. For 
example, an A-10 Warthog, an F-15A Eagle, and an F-111B bomber have little in 
common with one another (close air support, air superiority, and medium bombing, 
respectively). This presents a significant challenge in assessing capability values. 
For example, in the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, air superiority aircraft were of 
marginal utility when the enemy no longer had aircraft to fly. Similarly, the viability 
of dedicated ground-attack aircraft in airspace denied by enemy fighters and anti-
aircraft weapons is uncertain. As most of the US’s adversaries have learned in recent 
conflicts, most types of aircraft have no value due to US air superiority. Aircraft may 
also vary significantly in cost and age. One might argue that an old, inexpensive land 
vehicle may still be useful in combat, either as a static defence or, in the case of a 
personnel carrier, still able to perform that role; but an outdated aircraft will have 
little utility in a conflict, being vulnerable to SAMs and superior fighter aircraft.
Counting military personnel can be complicated. First, there is the question of whether 
to count all military personnel, combat personnel only, or combat and combat support 
personnel (logistics, communications, etc.). For example, personnel in an education 
or diplomatic setting might not be counted. Second, there is the question of whether 
or not to limit the applicability by service. CFE-1A, for example, only limited ground 
and air – not naval – personnel. Finally, today many military functions that were 
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once performed by uniformed personnel are carried out by contractors, including 
cooking, guard tasks, construction, and rear area facility security. NATO forces do 
not use private military companies (PMCs) for major combat operations, such as 
combined arms operations, although Russia uses the PMC Wagner Group for tasks 
traditionally conducted by uniformed forces (Axe, 2022). 
Most naval forces were not included in the CFE or A/CFE Treaty, although there are 
some restrictions on naval ships entering the Black Sea as part of the 1936 Montreux 
Convention. There are several reasons why naval forces were not limited in the 
CFE or A/CFE Treaties despite the Soviet Union’s desire to include them in the 
CFE Treaty due to a perception of NATO’s naval superiority, including the ease 
with which naval forces could move, which could make verification difficult, and 
NATO’s view that naval forces were essential to secure the Atlantic sea route vital to 
European defence (Wilcox, 2020).
Naval forces pose several problems for calculating capability points, aside from 
verification. The first is when to count them in the Area of Application (AoA). While 
a fully equipped mechanized brigade may require days to weeks to move several 
hundred or thousand kilometres (Shurkin, 2017; Gustafsson et al. 2019; Hodges 
and Lawrence, 2020; CEPA Task Group, 2021), naval vessels can make the journey 
much quicker, fully equipped and prepared to fight. This is especially true of NATO 
naval forces, which operate around the world outside the existing CFE AoA. On 
the other hand, certain naval forces outside the AoA may play a marginal role in 
certain conflict scenarios such as surprise attacks. On the other hand, calculating 
naval forces’ capability scores with the ship as the central counting unit should pose 
less of a problem. Ships can be categorized by mass (water displacement) and class, 
with ships of the same mass and class and of approximately the same age tending 
to have similar capabilities. Ships may have a specialization such as air defence, 
ballistic missile defence, or anti-submarine warfare (ASW), but these can still be 
equally countable capabilities. Moreover, most ships above a certain size (corvette 
and larger) can perform multiple missions even if they are more capable in one area, 
and the mission focus can be modified with changes to missile loadout. The number 
of vertical launch tubes is one way to count and compare many types of combat 
vessels. Aircraft or assault troops carrying capacity is another basis of calculation 
for these types of vessels.
Heavy bombers were not limited in the CFE or A/CFE Treaties, although some 
of them are or were controlled by US-Russian nuclear arms control agreements, 
and Russia sought to impose limits on the aircraft in its 2021 proposal to the US 
(Russian Foreign Ministry, 2021). Another reason not to limit heavy bombers is that, 
as with naval vessels, heavy bombers can travel long distances relatively quickly, 
complicating compliance. Some aircraft are also capable (with in-flight refuelling) 
of flying almost halfway around the world, dropping their payloads, and returning to 
their base of departure without ever landing (Tirpak, 1999). For Russia and the US, 
William Lippert
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for example, this means they could keep their heavy bomber forces far out of range 
of most enemy weapons and potentially outside the AoA.
Some of the differentiating characteristics of heavy bombers include speed, stealth, 
payload, and range.  Experience with stealth aircraft since the 1991 Gulf War suggests 
that stealth may be the most important feature for a heavy bomber, enabling it to 
fly into contested enemy airspace with a high chance of survival, especially when 
other measures, such as the suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) and other 
counter-radar operations, are taken. Heavy bombers have relatively large payloads 
(compared to fighter-bombers), and can, in certain circumstances, account for a high 
proportion of air-dropped munitions (Tirpak, 1999; Butowski, 2022).
Given their speed and range, it is not unreasonable to include a state’s entire heavy 
bomber force in any capabilities scoring. The highest points would be assigned to 
stealth bombers, with other characteristics being considered. Heavy bombers are 
higher-cost aircraft produced in lower quantities, making them more valuable than 
fighter aircraft and thus reasonably credited with a higher capability score. 
This section has only analysed some categories of weapons and weapon systems, 
due to space limitations (for example, SAMs have not been included). The QuACAC 
methodology, however, enables the inclusion of any weapon system. There are other 
approaches to both weighing and comparing military forces and modelling conflict 
outcomes to determine the impact of CAC agreements. These are summarized in 
Table 1.
Name/Source Methodology	Type Advantages	 Disadvantages
QuACAC Weighted 
Static
Accounts for and calculates 
weapons, personnel, and 
overall systems in great 
detail.
Substantial subjectivity in the 
scoring.
Meisel et 
al. Military 
Equipment 
Index (MEI) 
(Meisel, Moyer 
et al, 2020)
Weighted 
static
Scores weapon systems. Does not account for force 
enhancers or detractors, 
and it is not clear whether 
it accounts for differences 
within models such as minor 
upgrades, as its focus is on 
generations. No inclusion of 
personnel.
Global 
Firepower 
(Military 
Strength 
Comparisons 
for 2022, no 
date)
Multi-method Calculates an overall power 
score to compare between 
countries.
Includes population, 
economy, and other variables 
that are not relevant to CAC.
Table 1: 
Methodology 
Comparison
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Name/Source Methodology	Type Advantages	 Disadvantages
Lowy Institute 
Asia Power 
Index (Lowy 
Institute Asia 
Power Index, no 
date)
Weighted 
static
Includes quantified 
qualitative variables such as 
training, readiness, command 
and control, number of 
military personnel, and 
weapons and platforms. The 
data provided goes down to 
medium detail, e.g. for land 
warfare firepower it counts 
the number of armoured 
vehicles, but aggregates 
tanks and IFV; and for aircraft 
it seems to merely provide 
a raw count. In the category 
of “signature capabilities” 
it includes intelligence and 
cyber, as well as some 
weapons. It is unclear how 
the sub-measures are 
aggregated or calculated 
to determine a military 
capability score.
Limited to Asia, and may 
overly aggregate some areas. 
US weapon 
effectiveness 
index/weighted 
unit value (WEI/
WUV) (Watts, 
2017)
Weighted 
static
Based on micro-level 
firepower and the capabilities 
of individual systems.
Does not account for 
personnel nor for non-
lethal force enhancers such 
as command and control 
systems.
Forward Edge 
of the Battle 
Area (FEBA) 
Attrition Model 
(Posen, 1984)
Dynamic 
Conflict Model
Attempts to calculate 
advance rates based on 
several variables such as 
force size, force quality, 
airpower, and reinforcement 
rates.
While it can be useful 
to assess the potential 
of a surprise attack (its 
application during the Cold 
War), it only applied to a 
single scenario of a surprise 
attack along a straight 
front. Some, if not many, 
of the variables are highly 
subjective, such as Armoured 
Division Equivalents (ADEs).
	 3	 FORCE	MULTIPLIERS	AND	SUBTRACTORS
Force multipliers are “a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat 
force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances 
the probability of successful mission accomplishment” (Joint Publication 3-05.1: 
Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 2007). In a NATO-Russia conflict, 
these could be command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C3ISR), logistics, transportation infrastructure, morale, medical 
William Lippert
 111 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Name/Source Methodology	Type Advantages	 Disadvantages
Lowy Institute 
Asia Power 
Index (Lowy 
Institute Asia 
Power Index, no 
date)
Weighted 
static
Includes quantified 
qualitative variables such as 
training, readiness, command 
and control, number of 
military personnel, and 
weapons and platforms. The 
data provided goes down to 
medium detail, e.g. for land 
warfare firepower it counts 
the number of armoured 
vehicles, but aggregates 
tanks and IFV; and for aircraft 
it seems to merely provide 
a raw count. In the category 
of “signature capabilities” 
it includes intelligence and 
cyber, as well as some 
weapons. It is unclear how 
the sub-measures are 
aggregated or calculated 
to determine a military 
capability score.
Limited to Asia, and may 
overly aggregate some areas. 
US weapon 
effectiveness 
index/weighted 
unit value (WEI/
WUV) (Watts, 
2017)
Weighted 
static
Based on micro-level 
firepower and the capabilities 
of individual systems.
Does not account for 
personnel nor for non-
lethal force enhancers such 
as command and control 
systems.
Forward Edge 
of the Battle 
Area (FEBA) 
Attrition Model 
(Posen, 1984)
Dynamic 
Conflict Model
Attempts to calculate 
advance rates based on 
several variables such as 
force size, force quality, 
airpower, and reinforcement 
rates.
While it can be useful 
to assess the potential 
of a surprise attack (its 
application during the Cold 
War), it only applied to a 
single scenario of a surprise 
attack along a straight 
front. Some, if not many, 
of the variables are highly 
subjective, such as Armoured 
Division Equivalents (ADEs).
	 3	 FORCE	MULTIPLIERS	AND	SUBTRACTORS
Force multipliers are “a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat 
force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances 
the probability of successful mission accomplishment” (Joint Publication 3-05.1: 
Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 2007). In a NATO-Russia conflict, 
these could be command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C3ISR), logistics, transportation infrastructure, morale, medical 
support, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, space-based capabilities, and other 
factors.
A force subtractor is a characteristic of a military force which could decrease its 
force effectiveness, including low morale, poor integration between units (such as 
in a coalition environment where units are not used to working together), and a poor 
command structure (such as a multinational command structure like NATO where 
there are multiple and conflicting lines of command).
The methodology can work with a given capability being accounted for only on one 
side as a net advantage (for example, if NATO is considered as having better logistics 
it could be given a ten-percentage point advantage); or each side could account for 
the capability (for example NATO might get an increase of five percentage points, 
while Russia gets a decrease of five). The advantage of the latter approach is that 
capability changes are easier to incorporate and calculate.
	 4	 THE	QUACAC	EQUATION
The QuACAC methodology uses a single soldier as the baseline for military 
capability to simplify the equation, which aggregates equipment and personnel. 
From a single soldier (for example, a standard US dismounted infantryman) having 
a baseline score of one, other weapon systems are assessed against this baseline. The 
equipment does not need to have a weapon to count; rather, the score considers its 
contribution to the battlefield. For example, an unarmed transport vehicle such as 
an unarmed Humvee may be given a score of 5, as it contributes to the battlefield 
as a general utility vehicle. The advantage of this approach is that having a single 
baseline simplifies calculations (compared to having a baseline score for each 
category of weapon systems). The disadvantage is that there is a significant arbitrary 
and subjective judgment in comparing a battle tank with rocket artillery or a soldier 
with a naval surface combatant. 
This article proposes the following equation to calculate force capability for CAC, 
and is equally applicable to a single or a group of states, or an entire alliance such as 
NATO (see Table 2 for explanation of the variables).
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Abbre-
viation Variable	name Explanation Method	of	determination
T Total capability 
points
This is the total military 
capabilities score which reflects 
one state or alliance’s net, 
calculated military capability.
This calculation is a real 
number determined by the 
equation which measures 
personnel and equipment.
E Military 
equipment 
capability total 
score
This is the sum capability of all 
military equipment, including 
logistics vehicles, command and 
control, and combat systems.
This is obtained by determining 
a score for each piece of 
relevant equipment (as 
determined by agreement), 
and then adding up all the 
individual points. The baseline 
of the score is a single, generic 
infantry soldier.
Em Equipment 
force multiplier 
(percentage)
This is the total equipment 
force multiplier, which might 
consider intangible factors such 
as maintenance levels, supplies, 
and interoperability. 
A percentage is determined 
by considering to what extent 
the equipment is more than 
the sum of its individual 
components. Some possible 
contributors to assigning a 
positive percentage could 
include good maintenance 
records, close interoperability, 
relatively uniform equipment, 
and substantial support from 
outside the area of application 
(such as satellites). 
Es Equipment force 
subtractor or 
disadvantage 
(percentage)
This is a calculation of 
detracting factors for all 
equipment, such as low 
maintenance, poor supply 
chain, and non-interoperability.
A percentage is determined 
by considering to what extent 
the equipment is less than 
the sum of its individual 
components. This might be an 
overly burdensome variety of 
weapons, poor maintenance 
and logistics support, non-
interoperability of weapon 
systems, or lack of munitions.
P Personnel 
(quantity)
This is a calculation of the 
number of relevant military 
personnel.
This can potentially include 
contractors, especially if 
these contractors perform 
traditionally uniformed roles 
and/or the roles are performed 
and counted for other states 
and alliances when performed 
by government personnel.
The number of personnel are 
added up with a relatively 
simple one person equals one 
point. However, a person may 
count for less than one if, for 
example, they are a reservist 
with infrequent training.
Abbre-
viation Variable	name Explanation Method	of	determination
Pm Personnel 
multiplier 
(percentage)
This modifier accounts for 
e.g. high morale, high quality 
training, longer periods of 
service, combat experience, and 
level of individual equipping 
(kit). 
A percentage is determined 
by considering to what extent 
the personnel are more than 
the sum of the individuals. This 
could include very modern and 
expensive personal equipment 
such as night vision devices 
and digitally aimed rifles, high 
quality training and readiness, 
and a high average number of 
years of service. 
Ps Personnel 
subtractor or 
disadvantage 
(percentage)
This modifier accounts for 
factors that reduce the 
capabilities of the personnel, 
such as low morale, poor 
health, poor training, language 
barriers, internal political 
problems, and interoperability 
issues (e. g. substantial 
differences between alliance 
members).
A percentage is determined 
by considering to what extent 
the personnel are less than 
the sum of the individuals. This 
could include linguistic barriers 
between units or alliance 
members, poor training, low 
quality personal equipment. 
100+Em-Es
100
100+Pm-Ps
100
E × P ×+T=
While the equation is simple, its implementation admittedly faces many challenges. 
First, an accurate assessment of each variable requires a large dataset of information. 
Second, scoring each model and version of equipment and assessing troop quality 
requires in-depth knowledge and subjective judgment. One person could assess a 
Russian T-14 Armata tank as being worth 105 points, while another would assess 
them as 125. Similarly, different analysts may give different weights and make 
different judgments about morale, political unity, command unity, logistics, and so 
on. Third, the workload to inventory every piece of relevant equipment is substantial. 
Fourth, which capabilities to include or exclude could be a substantial area of dispute 
(Kulesa, 2018).
	 5	 QUACAC	AND	CAC	AGREEMENTS
This methodology is not intended to predict conflict outcomes, but can be used 
throughout the CAC lifetime from conception through negation to implementation. 
Prior to any negotiations, this tool permits scholars and practitioners to quantify the 
military balance and determine what the needs for CAC may be and what goals any 
CAC may have. During CAC negotiations, this methodology is a way for parties to 
discuss one another’s existing military capabilities, develop proposals by quantifying 
trades, and aim for a common end-state. The methodology can suggest possible 
trades of different weapons systems, such as Russia agreeing to a limit of 1500 tanks 
Table 2: 
QuACAC 
Variables
William Lippert
 113 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Abbre-
viation Variable	name Explanation Method	of	determination
Pm Personnel 
multiplier 
(percentage)
This modifier accounts for 
e.g. high morale, high quality 
training, longer periods of 
service, combat experience, and 
level of individual equipping 
(kit). 
A percentage is determined 
by considering to what extent 
the personnel are more than 
the sum of the individuals. This 
could include very modern and 
expensive personal equipment 
such as night vision devices 
and digitally aimed rifles, high 
quality training and readiness, 
and a high average number of 
years of service. 
Ps Personnel 
subtractor or 
disadvantage 
(percentage)
This modifier accounts for 
factors that reduce the 
capabilities of the personnel, 
such as low morale, poor 
health, poor training, language 
barriers, internal political 
problems, and interoperability 
issues (e. g. substantial 
differences between alliance 
members).
A percentage is determined 
by considering to what extent 
the personnel are less than 
the sum of the individuals. This 
could include linguistic barriers 
between units or alliance 
members, poor training, low 
quality personal equipment. 
100+Em-Es
100
100+Pm-Ps
100
E × P ×+T=
While the equation is simple, its implementation admittedly faces many challenges. 
First, an accurate assessment of each variable requires a large dataset of information. 
Second, scoring each model and version of equipment and assessing troop quality 
requires in-depth knowledge and subjective judgment. One person could assess a 
Russian T-14 Armata tank as being worth 105 points, while another would assess 
them as 125. Similarly, different analysts may give different weights and make 
different judgments about morale, political unity, command unity, logistics, and so 
on. Third, the workload to inventory every piece of relevant equipment is substantial. 
Fourth, which capabilities to include or exclude could be a substantial area of dispute 
(Kulesa, 2018).
	 5	 QUACAC	AND	CAC	AGREEMENTS
This methodology is not intended to predict conflict outcomes, but can be used 
throughout the CAC lifetime from conception through negation to implementation. 
Prior to any negotiations, this tool permits scholars and practitioners to quantify the 
military balance and determine what the needs for CAC may be and what goals any 
CAC may have. During CAC negotiations, this methodology is a way for parties to 
discuss one another’s existing military capabilities, develop proposals by quantifying 
trades, and aim for a common end-state. The methodology can suggest possible 
trades of different weapons systems, such as Russia agreeing to a limit of 1500 tanks 
MILITARY BALANCING FOR FUTURE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN EUROPE
 114 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
and 200 combat aircraft for a NATO limit of 700 tanks and 400 aircraft. Such an 
agreement would not just be based on the number of TLE, but on their quality. This 
methodology can also deal with vehicles which do not comfortably fall into a single 
category, such as armoured combat vehicles with a heavy gun, or a vehicle which 
takes on the characteristics of artillery and a tank. The methodology can also support 
ratio-based treaties, wherein military systems are limited at a certain ratio while 
taking into account qualitative differences.
The methodology allows interested parties to observe changes in the military balance, 
which may be necessary throughout the implementation phase, as any number of 
factors, including major shifts in force structure, technology advances, equipment 
upgrades, and alliance changes, could affect the military balance. Geopolitical and 
other changes, for example, clearly altered the military balance following the CFE 
Treaty’s signature, but the treaty itself was unable to adjust to take the wave of changes 
into account. Another advantage of this methodology is that it can relatively easily 
consider changes in blocs and alliances by adding or subtracting states’ capability 
points and adjusting the force multiplier and subtractor variables as necessary.
By quantifying, however imperfectly, the military balance using the QuACAC, 
negotiating sides can have a dialogue based on concrete, quantitative assessments 
rather than opaque simulations, intuition, or a complicated series of mathematical 
models. This can serve to narrow differences by establishing a common understanding 
of the military balance, potential TLE, and prohibited systems.
Symmetric or proportional CAC agreements may have many approaches and 
outcomes. If the goal is merely to have some agreement, in the belief that some 
agreement is better than none, then choices and negotiations may not be difficult, 
because such an approach is not likely to impose substantive restrictions. An 
example of this might be the prohibition of forces in a small geographical area. 
Yet a sweeping agreement which seeks to resolve major instabilities in a security 
relationship, especially between NATO and Russia, are likely to require substantial 
CAC measures. Ideally, measures should increase stability by resolving the security 
dilemma, preserving deterrence, and promoting defensive capabilities while 
hampering offensive capabilities. At the same time, NATO and Russia need to 
establish and preserve a military balance that is mutually acceptable least one side 
or both feel threatened, resulting in a cycle of arms racing, mistrust, threats and 
accusations, and ultimately conflict.
It is uncertain whether it is possible to have a CAC agreement between NATO and 
Russia in which deterrence is preserved, the security dilemma is resolved, defensive 
capabilities are superior to offensive ones, and there is a harmonious military 
balance. One side or both may have to accept compromises in these areas, but this 
methodology helps to lay out clearly what is being agreed to, and can serve as a 
common metric for substantial changes in the military balance and international 
security environment, possibly by a dedicated, neutral international organization 
Conclusion
William Lippert
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(IO) which is charged at the least with monitoring and assessment, but which may 
also have a substantial inspection role on a par with that of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) (Lippert, 2023). 
The creation of a new IO focused on a new Europe-wide CAC agreement which 
applies the QuACAC methodology could go a long way towards increasing the 
likelihood of any agreement succeeding, as some data suggest that the more states 
delegate authority to a CAC agreement executor, the more likely the agreement is to 
succeed. Recent successful agreements with a high delegation to IOs include the 1996 
Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement for the Balkans (a Balkans CFE Treaty), 
which had the close involvement of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), and the 2008 Six-Point Peace Plan for Georgia, which was 
implemented in large part by the European Union. However, the 2015 Minsk 
Agreements were an abject failure, despite a massive effort on the part of the OSCE 
(Lippert, Forthcoming). Another approach to increase the probability of agreement 
success is the inclusion of third-party states as signatories and/or implementers. In 
brief, third-party states may serve as neutral, objective arbiters in negotiations and 
implementation, and they may raise the diplomatic cost of violations and defection 
(Lippert, Forthcoming).
In the near-term, a QuACAC-based CAC agreement could lock in the existing military 
balance between NATO and Russia when the Russo-Ukraine War ceases, or the two 
sides could negotiate an agreement which takes other approaches, such as holding 
one side’s levels at the current state (which would likely mean a relatively weak 
Russia due to significant losses), or holding one side’s forces in the present state while 
the other decreases or is permitted to increase up to a ceiling as applicable. Russia 
may seek security guarantees from NATO through CAC if Moscow seeks to retain 
its post-Russo-Ukraine War military at the levels and capabilities at the cessation 
of hostilities, perhaps because of a desire to avoid an expensive rearmament or due 
to a change in leadership. This would echo the impetus for the CFE Treaty wherein 
then-General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev sought to lock in force reductions with 
NATO linked to the unilateral Soviet force reductions motivated in part by the desire 
to improve the Soviet economy and decrease tensions with the West (Foerster, 2002, 
p 43). 
The Russo-Ukraine War began in part because of disputes and interpretive 
misunderstandings about the military balance between NATO and Russia. First, 
Russia viewed NATO’s military capabilities as threatening, while NATO did not 
view itself as threatening. Second, neither side could agree on what a stable balance 
should be – which was manifested in the failure to maintain the existing and establish 
new CAC agreements. The QuACAC methodology is a tool which could assist in 
resolving some of the issues which drove the dispute. First, it can offer states a 
yardstick to measure one another’s military capabilities to see to what extent there is 
or is not parity or, at least, a mutually perceived fair distribution of military capability. 
With a transparent tool that, ideally, both sides could use to measure force capability, 
MILITARY BALANCING FOR FUTURE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN EUROPE
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the path is open to a CAC agreement like the CFE Treaty. An arms control agreement 
based on and then managed by the QuACAC methodology would reduce the risk of 
conflict, because state parties and blocs would have a means to both negotiate and 
fix relative power at a certain ratio. At the same time, it offers states a tool to assess 
and potentially adapt to changes in military system capabilities and alliances (unlike 
the CFE Treaty).
The Russo-Ukraine War is the most destructive and calamitous event in Europe since 
World War Two, although it is only a sample of the destruction that could rain upon 
Europe were a conflict to erupt between NATO and Russia. CAC may be one of 
the key instruments to prevent such an outbreak of annihilation. Preventing such a 
war, which the QuACAC methodology can contribute to through CAC agreements, 
is imperative. While the obstacles to drafting a mutually acceptable agreement are 
substantial, the high costs of conflict of which we are daily reminded of may compel 
parties to overcome resistance to cooperation.
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email: w.e.lippert@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
ORCID: 0000-0001-6546-6109
MILITARY BALANCING FOR FUTURE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN EUROPE