The Possibilities of Intercultural Education in European Society

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This paper presents an analysis of theoretical ideas and models that could serve as the basis of intercultural education in the current European society. Initially, it presents the importance of interculturalism for education that is based on research data from Slovenia. Interculturalism is one of the most important educational initiatives in addressing the problem of inequality in education. Further in the text, in the absence of a theoretical basis of intercultural education, four possible theoretical models are analysed and described: the *global ethic model* based on Hans Küng project of Global Ethic; *distance to the Other model* based on Slavoj Žižek's research on violence; *constitutional loyalty model* based on the theory of Jürgen Habermas; and *recognition model* based on the theory of recognition.

Key Words: education, interculturalism, multiculturalism, multiculturality

INTRODUCTION

Previous research at both, national and international levels has shown that modern plural societies are either multicultural or they are becoming so. Multiculturality is an empirical fact, and the term describes the reality of contemporary plural societies. Both, theoretical discussions and the social reality of Europe substantiate these findings; however, the definition of a plural and multicultural society is problematic.

In theoretical terms, the equitable social regulation of today's plural society is defined as a 'clash' between liberalism and multiculturalism. These notions emphasize different factors and approaches that seek to provide an answer to many problems, such as respect, acceptance, and the integration of cultural differences into the social sphere (Kymlicka 2003; 2007; Raz 1994; Modood 2007; Parekh

2000; Young 1990). These theoretical discussions are accompanied by debates in the media and among political parties, as well as in public statements by the most eminent European leaders, whose opinions regarding multiculturalism and differences in Europe are
[44] extremely negative. An example of this is the statement by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in October 2010, saying that the *'multikulti' has utterly failed* in Germany – this strongly resonated in most European countries. At the beginning of 2011, Merkel's statement was followed by similar remarks made by David Cameroon, the British Prime Minister, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the then president of the French Republic. However, what has really failed utterly, is the emergence of parallel societies in Europe, which has led to the social alienation of racially marked, lower class immigrants, who are on the verge of society and face social exclusion. Therefore, the experience of multiculturalism in Europe has never been one of inclusion. Instead, it has been characterized by exclusion (Kymlicka 2007), as reflected by the motto, *It is about our country; you will love it or otherwise get out of it* (Žižek 2007).

In the context of recent social events in Europe and European-Mediterranean region, it seems that the metaphor of a foreigner who lives on the backs of others and threatens the lives and livelihoods of the domestic population has re-emerged. This has been manifested in the characters of the *Muslim* and *Greek* (i.e. the symbol of the Mediterranean states) (Salecl 2004). It could be interpreted that these images and the social conditions of Europe have rekindled nationalist discourse and hate literature.

In this article, by using an analytical-interpretive research method, we shall discuss the importance of interculturalism for education and society and focus on the analysis of possible models that may serve as a theoretical basis of intercultural education. The article shall discuss these issues in three different sections. In the first section we shall present the importance of intercultural education that may address the problem of inequality in education. This is presented on a basis of research data from Slovenia considering the fact that Slovenia is described as a multicultural society in which education is recognized as a main driving force in establishing 'a new mul-

ticultural discourse' (Klemenčič, Štremfel, and Rožman 2011, 199). In the second section, four possible models of intercultural education in literature – *global ethic, distance to the Other, constitutional loyalty,* and *recognition* – are presented, analysed and discussed from an intercultural perspective. The third and the last section shall present [45] the main conclusions regarding intercultural education comprising relevant issues for the European-Mediterranean region.

THE MEANING OF INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION

Within the paper, *multiculturality* is defined as a both, a value-neutral term describing a social reality (i.e., related to the migration process and the ethnical heterogeneity within a given territory) and a positive term (as a movement for changing hierarchical relations between majority and minority groups). The term *interculturalism* is related to the understanding of cultural differences and similarities, which ensures the co-existence of different cultures and in which co-existence is an opportunity and not a problem (Skubic Ermenc 2003, 15–18). Both terms are described in a similar way in EU educational policy documents (Commission of the European Communities 2008; Council of Europe 2008). Interculturalism is expressed as *intercultural dialogue,* which is understood as an 'open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect' (Council of Europe 2008, 10). Interculturalism and intercultural dialogue are therefore recognised as major tools for living together in a diverse society as 'equals in dignity' (p. 10), which are as well present within the European-Mediterranean region (Pavan 2009; Perini 2010).

The idea of interculturalism in education is important on many levels. On the macro-level, it is one of the most important educational initiatives tackling the problem of inequality in education (Gundara and Portera 2008), which reflects the unequal distribution of goods and resources (economic equality), unequal status (status equality), and inequality in decision-making (power equality) (Lynch and Lodge 2002).

The micro level includes the following three aspects of intercul-

turalism. The first one is the realization of interculturalism in the regions with mixed nationalities. In Slovenia, three ethnicities have a recognized minority status: Italian, Hungarian, and Roma. Their rights are defined by the constitution and other legal provisions.
[46] Only the Hungarian and Italian minorities living in regions of mixed nationalities have the right to learn their mother tongue in school, and the Roma people have a right to receive support in learning the Slovene language as a second language. In addition to these recognized ethnic groups, there are larger ethnic groups that stem mostly from the territory of ex-Yugoslavia and do not enjoy any special rights or legal protection[1] (Kroflič 2011; Skubic Ermenc 2003).

Secondly, interculturalism involves all school and educational activities (Mlinar 2007). Research conducted in Slovenia (Skubic Ermenc 2007) found that primary school curricula do not include current racial problems or ethnic discrimination, but instead present a Europe-centric worldview. 'It is as if our state aimed at teaching our children to live in a single-cultural and monolith society, in which persons belonging to other cultures have to assimilate if they wish to be accepted and equal members of the society' (p. 71). Hence, in the absence of educational politics on the state level, learning about respect for otherness and non-discrimination is left to the initiative of individual teachers.

Thirdly, interculturalism is manifested in social movements that have an educational-transformational potential (Hall et al. 2011; Sandlin and Walther 2009). In social movements that aim to act downwards against the existing system of oppression (e.g., against the multicultural politics practiced by the multinational corporations that consider immigrants as 'ideal' workers in the global labour market), it is important to consider the situation within different social groups. Hence, the *Invisible Workers of the World* movement was established in Slovenia, which aims to fight against the social exclusion of immigrants, marginalization, and the invisibility of worker-immigrants (Medica 2012, 40–43). The social movement's message to educators is that educators are not a constituent base of intercultural education but are activists and allies of oppressed groups of children, adults, and communities (Sleeter 1996, 242).



FIGURE 1 Theoretical Models of Intercultural Education

However, despite the meaning attributed to interculturalism in education, it should be noted that interculturalism has one basic problem. Interculturalism itself never developed its own theoretical basis beyond its humanistic tradition on which it could rely (Coulby 2006; Gundara and Portera 2008). We present four models from the written sources against this background, which may serve as a theoretical basis of intercultural education. These models are as follows: *global ethic, distance to the Other, constitutional loyalty,* and *recognition*. The models are discussed from an intercultural perspective, which Skubic Ermenc (2006) defined as a pedagogical principle that promotes the following: the establishment of fair relations with others/ethnicities; perceiving the other as equivalent and not as deficient; conducting pedagogical processes that are oriented to the real success of minorities; and the development of common values (p. 153).

POTENTIAL THEORETICAL MODELS OF INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION

Theoretical models of intercultural education can be divided according to their central approaches, that is, whether they accept the need for common values or emphasize mutual differences, or whether they present a way of comprehending the rights and freedoms of individuals and social groups. These are illustrated in figure 1.

Global Ethic

In his work, *Clash of Civilizations,* Huntington (2005) provided a thesis that culture and cultural identity define global models of connecting and breaking-up after the World War II. According to

Huntington, culture, not economy or ideology, is the central driving force of the world, because alliances between countries are based on both, cultural closeness and cultural differences. Huntington thus rejects the idea of a unified world society (universal world civilization) based on mutual principles and the values of freedom, equality, and human rights. In this respect, he replies to Fukuyama's (1992) thesis in *The End of History and the Last Man*.[2]

[48]

According to Huntington (2005), the core problem is that there is no 'universal civilization' with a universal culture, mutual values, beliefs, practices, and institutions. It is true that people in all societies share certain defined mutual values (e.g. murder is wrong) and fundamental institutions (e.g. family) and a 'minimal' morality based on fundamental concepts, such as right and wrong. However, this is far from the idea of a mutual universal civilization. In his opinion, this idea is a product of Western civilization, according to which it has justified the domination of Western culture over other societies, and of the need of other societies to imitate Western practices and institutions (p. 78).

Where does Huntington find a solution to the scenario that he illustrates in the clash of different cultures and civilizations? He finds it in the abandonment of the universal principles of one civilization, followed by the acceptance of differences and the search for mutual values of all civilizations. The author emphasizes three rules, among which the third rule refers to the idea that people in all civilizations search for and try to spread values, institutions, and practices that are common to people in different civilizations (pp. 406–411). In the 1990s, this rule was developed by the Swiss theologian Hans Küng to further the *Global Ethic* project.

The purpose of the Global Ethic project is to realize a consensus of mutual values and ethical norms for all people, irrespective of their religious, ideological or national origins. The project's goal is not to achieve and discover new ethical norms, but to consider the values that all people find in their own cultural traditions. In *Declaration Toward a Global Ethic* Küng (2008) argues that there is a global ethic in the sense that its principles can be accepted by people of different ethical principles, whether they are religious or not. He believes that

there is a fundamental agreement about binding values and moral beliefs among different religions, which can serve as a basis for the global ethic. He also underlines that the global ethic does not refer to a global ideology, new religion, or the dominance of only one religion. Instead, it refers to a general agreement of values without the [49] presence of which all communities would suffer the dangers of chaos and dictatorship (pp. 6–8).

So what is global ethic? It is composed of two basic principles: the first is the principle of humanity (all people, irrespective of their sex, color, and economic status, should be treated humanely) and the golden rule principle (do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you). The second are four guidelines, which demand that everyone is responsible for the following: a culture of non-violence and respect for everyone's life; a culture of solidarity and a fair economic system; a culture of tolerance and real life; and a culture of equality and partnership between men and women (pp. 191–192). The Slovenian philosopher Tine Hribar (2008) developed a similar approach. According to Hribar, in all world religions, four basic ancient values of humanity define the global ethic: the sanctity of life; the veneration of the dead; the dignity of humanity; and the golden rule (p. 290). Values as a common global denominator of humanity are not subject of philosophical concepts, but they are a universal heritage to all civilizations (the golden rule present in all religions is a proof of this). The global ethic can be universal because it is derived from all parts of the world. It is a minimal global denominator of Europeans, Chinese, Indians, Muslims, and Americans, as well as of Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, Judaism, and Christianity. Hence, the global ethic does not derive from an intercultural dialogue but from the assumption of such a dialogue.

The question that arises is the following: Are not all these values common to humanity already defined as the humans rights (United Nations 1948)? We make two arguments against the adequacy of human rights with regard to the issue of intercultural education. The first argument concerns *legal process*. The relations between individuals can be addressed only on a formal level and not on a level of interpersonal relations, as ethics is defined as responsibilities and

obligations of one individual to another (Kroflič, Klarič, and Peček Čuk 2009, 15; Medveš 2007, 13). The second argument concerns *cultural determinacy*. Human rights often do not encompass various anthropological notions of humanity, which is evident from cultural
[50] conflicts that arise because of different perspectives on basic values (Badiou 1996; Rorty 1996). Let us consider two examples: the cultural conflict of the Muslims and the moral-political standards of secular Europe, which prohibited wearing headscarves in France, and the prohibition against publishing the Muhammad cartoons in a Danish newspaper. In Europe, both symbols are usually perceived as an attack on human rights. Wearing headscarves is interpreted as a symbol of inferiority and evidence of gender inequality in Muslim cultures. However, in some Muslim cultures, many women decide to wear headscarves on their own initiative in order to protect themselves from being perceived as sexual objects. The cartoons of Muhammad published in a newspaper were perceived in Europe as an encroachment on the freedom of expression, whereas in the Muslim countries these were considered insulting and viewed as hate propaganda (Kroflič 2009a, 10).

These examples show that human rights can be exercised on different cultural levels and that even legal reasons expressed in the examples reflect a conflicting nature of legal language, which cannot be a basis for developing deeper intercultural relations. With regard to a global ethic, even though this model is based on an affirmative idea that embodies the principle of *justice* (Kant 1998; Rawls 1971) and the principle of *humanity,* which appreciates the dignity of all people, irrespective of their origin, we are still left with the question of whether the global ethic could shed its religious nature, embracing atheists and people with other world views?

Distance to the Other

In the autumn of 2005, a significant number of public outbursts of violence that were related to the issue of multiculturalism occurred in French suburbs. A certain social group perceived itself excluded from the French political and social sphere, although they lived in France. According to Slavoj Žižek (2007, 73), the purpose of the riots

was to draw public attention to their existence and to inform people that although they were French citizens, they were not recognised as such:

> [T]he message of the riots was not the protesters' idea that the French republican universalism threatened their ethnical-religious identity, but it was completely the opposite-that they were not included in this universalism and they were on the completely other side of the Wall, which separated the visible part from the invisible republican sphere. [51]

According to Žižek, the public reactions to the protests can be divided into two groups. The first group represents the clash of civilizations. Immigrants should not abuse the hospitality of the French people, and as guests they should have respect for French culture; there is no excuse for their violent behaviour and young immigrants need discipline and hard work. The other group opposed the idea of social programs and integration, because they deprive the young immigrants of an economic and social future, which led them to organise violent protests. Žižek agrees with neither opinion because according to him, both are equally bad. He seeks affirmation by asking the following question: Today, why are we witnesses to the fear of presence of the Other? Is it a reaction to the decay of the protective symbolic walls by which others were kept at a distance in order to protect us from the encroachment of the others (p. 54)?

The second wave of protests happened in the same year, but it took place in Arabic countries. These protests were characterized by huge, violent demonstrations that reacted to the offensive cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, published in a Danish newspaper. Why did something that was published in a Danish newspaper with a low circulation provoke violent reactions in distant Muslim countries? It is not as if Denmark and Syria were neighboring countries. The reason is that the Other is an intruder and satisfies his needs in another way (i.e. perceives himself in his own social practices and rituals), and this annoys us. His presence threatens our way of life, which may provoke us to act aggressively in order to elim-

inate the disturbing intruder. Žižek therefore argues that we have to supplement the attitude of mutual understanding with the attitude of mutual avoidance by 'keeping an appropriate distance, with the new code of "discretion"' (p. 55). According to Žižek, European
[52] culture has already embedded distance from the Other in its social structure. Hence, it is usual for me to ignore the Other although we live together. When interacting with the Other, I apply certain externally defined rules, without sharing their inner world: '[P]erhaps the lesson to be learned is that a certain dose of alienation is definitely required for a peaceful co-existence of different living styles. The alienation sometimes does not present a problem, but a solution' (p. 55).

The Other is acceptable if his presence is not intrusive – in other words, if he or she is not actually an African, Muslim, or Chinese Other but is a *good* Other, just like us (comp. Badiou 1996, 23; Galeotti 2009, 168; Habermas 2007, 13; Kymlicka 2005, 457). In this context, tolerance gains another meaning. Tolerance of the Other means that I should not get very close to the Other and interfere with his or her personal space. Therefore, I keep the Other at a distance.

Žižek's conclusion is that sometimes a dose of alienation is necessary for the peaceful co-existence of different living styles and that the distance within the 'antinomy of the tolerant mind' (Žižek 2007, 97) is a solution not a problem in the practical social context or in educational practice. Certain examples should not be ignored. However, we do not think that the concept of *distance to the Other* could serve as a basis for developing a broad intercultural educational policy. Instead of establishing 'bridges,' this concept leads to the establishment of parallel worlds and 'separated lives.'

Constitutional Loyalty

Jürgen Habermas's (2007) concept of constitutional loyalty begins with an assumption that the constitution of a liberal democratic state should be sufficient, which means that its legitimacy rests in the cognitive assumptions that are independent from religious and metaphysical traditions. The democratic constitution (the basis of

fundamental rights) should legitimately fill the gap resulting from the neutralization of the worldviews of national authorities. With regard to the constitution, all individuals should respect each other as equal members of the political community, despite dissenting world views and religious beliefs. In a pluralist society with a liberal [53] constitution, tolerance is understood as the rational consideration of the possibility of dissent in communication among believers and unbelievers (pp. 79–81).

In Habermas' view, the legal definition of the problem of tolerance requires a distinction between the things that should be tolerated and the things that should not be tolerated. The secular state guarantees tolerance if it ensures that the global concept of pluralism based on mutual respect is developed in the public sphere. Whether the state respects the principle of neutrality and whether the legal and judicial authorities in the state correctly institutionalize tolerance, is evident in their reasons for excluding intolerant behaviour. Numerous legally disputable examples in some countries represent the idea of distinction between the practices and laws of the major religion and culture on one hand and the aspirations of the religious minorities on the other hand. For example, the demands of the religious minorities in Germany are made in the name of the freedom of religion and can be divided into demands for equal or special status (e.g. permission for Sikh people to wear turbans, for Jewish people to be served kosher food, for Muslims to pray during working hours) or demands for public services (e.g. learning the mother tongue in public schools). In such cases, it is for the court to decide (Habermas 2007, 200)

> who should reconcile with the other's ethic: Christian peasants with the muezzin's call to prayer? Domestic animal protection organization with the ritual slaughtering of animals? Unconfessional students or students of another religion with a headscarf of the Mohammad's teacher? A Turkish parent with the co-educational sports class of his daughter?

The freedom of religion puts the neutrality of the country's

democracy to the test. It is often endangered by the status of the majority culture as it abuses its power to determine what is to be defined as a binding political culture. The essence of cultural rights is that they ensure the same access to the practices and rituals that
[54] are essential for defining and maintaining the identity of a certain community.

This is not to be understood as a cultural self-realization of the communities within their own identity. It requires the integration of the citizens within the frame of the political culture that is common to all (p. 202). The basic idea of constitutional loyalty should serve as a solution to the dual problem of tolerance: constitutional loyalty expects the 'majority' to be tolerant in matters permitted by the constitution; at the same time, it expects the 'minority' to abandon the cultural practices that do not comply with the constitution. The regulations given in the organizational part of the constitution (e.g. allocation of special rights to cultural minorities) and multicultural practices for the protection of discriminated groups (e.g. giving grant resources for linguistic programs and educational curricula) are preventive measures against the exclusion of minority groups.

According to Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (2009), the limitation of the model of constitutional loyalty is its ignorance of differences. In the public sphere, the model frees individuals from their differences, giving equal political power to all citizens; however, it does not treat citizens as separate individuals, and thus it denies the public the importance of their identities. Because the principle of tolerance is already included in the constitutions of liberal democracies and is translated into the system of rights, it is irrelevant to refer to tolerance as to a definition of the individual's choices with regard to religious, moral, and esthetical values (pp. 24-33). In other words, why does the chador present a problem in France and other liberal democracies, when freedom of religion and freedom of expression are already set forth in their constitutions? Is it possible to define the 'limit of the permitted' precisely by the constitution or to define cultural independence logically within the legal discourse of the constitution?

Recognition

Recognition has become a key term. It is an 'old' concept in Hegel's philosophy and was revived by political theorists in order to conceptualise today's battle with identity and difference. Hegel's concept of 'struggling for recognition' in the world of global capitalism, promoting intercultural changes and pluralism of values, and politicalising identities and differences has gained a new value (Fraser and Honneth 2003). [55]

In particular, the term 'recognition' relates to the Hegelian (1998) phenomenology of spirit. Recognition means an ideal relation between both subjects (master and servant), in which both see the other as equal and separate from the other. This relation is essential for understanding subjectivity, because one becomes an individual subject only by virtue of recognizing and being recognized by the other. A Hegelian thesis lurks behind this model of recognition, according to which social relations are prior to individuals and inter-subjectivity is prior to subjectivity. Contrary to redistribution (Rawls 1971), recognition is closer to ethics in that it promotes substantive goals of self-realization, unlike morality which promotes justice. It was because of neo-Hegelians, such as Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, that recognition became a central term in social philosophy favoring 'the politics of difference' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 10).

The general assumption that social battles related to race, gender, and sexuality are actually battles for recognition, has prevailed for several decades. The thesis that all identities are worth being recognized is based on this assumption, as each individual is worth dignity (Bingham 2006, 235). The folk paradigm of recognition sees injustice as the un-recognition of people, which is a denial of individual dignity. The individual is not recognized in the larger community and the practices of inadequate recognition are applied to them, creating a tendency to assimilation, invisibility, and malevolence. The politics of recognition looks forward to a world that is keen on differences and where assimilation to the majority or the dominant cultural norms is not necessary for gaining equal respect (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 7).

Today, the relevance of the theory of recognition is that it could be used to supplement Rawls' concept of distributive justice with regard to social injustice. Moreover, it can theorize the concept of tolerance beyond its liberal definition (as a moral and social strength)
[56] to the demand for public recognition of the collective identities of marginalized social groups (Galeotti 2009, 24).

The concept of recognition is present in education as well. It refers to three important areas in education: ethics, politics, and epistemology (Kroflič 2010). Ethical theories relate to the demand that the other should be treated and accepted just as he or she is or will become. Political theories present the idea that the identity status of the individual in society should not be an obstacle to achieving his or her social goods, and the individual should have a possibility to realize his or her position and identity (e.g. immigrants and people with different sexual orientations) in the public sphere. Epistemological theories consider the mental horizon of the other, which leads to the recognition of a deeper reality of the phenomenon (p. 8).

Recognition on one hand can be seen as a political tendency toward equal treatment of the individual's social status, and on the other hand as the ethical demand for recognition of the individual's identity, which is a necessary part of the optimal pedagogical relation. Three aspects are relevant for the process of recognition within the educational sphere: personal recognition of the student; acceptance and respect of the student as a socially and cognitively capable being; and a mutual relation between the student and the teacher, which is necessary for both, because the student needs the teacher as the teacher needs the student for the recognition of professional and personal identity (Kroflič 2009b, 115). These views are reflected in practices of interculturalism at school. The task of teachers is neither to reduce the diversity nor to stand still and watch diversity grow, but to 'engage' in a dialogue with the students. The point is not to know about someone else's culture, but to help construct an individual understanding of it. Immigrant children may discuss their identities at home or with their friends; however, if they do not talk about their identity at school, then it does not exist at school. When

teachers only listen to discussions about a student's identity (i.e. another cultural identity) and do not speak to the issues of identity, they deny an important part of that student's identity. Thus, when students present their culture to teachers, the latter should to reply with their own cultural attitudes, while staying open to arguments resulting from different cultural positions (Sidorkin 2002, 96). [57]

The demand for recognition does not mean that a different life style needs to be recognised, but it should be publicly accepted as a part of 'normal' possibilities. These personalities should not be labelled with a collective identity and stigmatised by exclusion (e.g. cultural difference, different sexual orientation, etc.). Recognition requires the public visibility of differences and their positive realization, the development of mutual roles, and intolerance of all behaviours that are humiliating to weak identities. In this regard, we see the affirmation of recognition. It defines otherness as a demand for the public recognition of the collective identities of marginalized social groups, which is particularly reflected in intercultural education.

CONCLUSION

We defined intercultural education as one of the most important educational initiatives to address the problem of inequality in education. This initiative is presented on three levels. On the level of the just distribution of goods, interculturalism is realised in the forms of compensational programs, through the principle of equal starting possibilities (redistribution). On the level of the just treatment of the individual's social status and the acknowledgement of the individual's identity (recognition), interculturalism promotes the equal relation to other cultures and therefore equally addresses all participants in education. On the level of equal representation in the processes of decision-making (representation), interculturalism can redistribute power by confronting power relations, such as when a dominant group has the power to define inclusion and exclusion.

Regardless of the importance of the intercultural education, one issue remains open for debate. Intercultural education has not developed a theoretical basis to which it can refer. Therefore, we de-

scribed four possible theoretical models of intercultural education, which are by no means the only possible ones, and discussed their advantages and disadvantages. The model of a global ethic promotes the development of common values by embracing the principles of
[58] justice (the golden rule) and humanity (the Other as equal and not deficient). However, the question of religious disposition remains open. In contrast, the model of distance to the Other hinges on the distance, alienation and non-interference with the Other's space. It is based on the opposite characteristics of interculturalism as a pedagogical principle. The model of constitutional loyalty favors the equal access to traditions and practices by all citizens, overtaking the principle of justice in compensational (linguistic) programs, while denying the public recognition of the identities of others. The latter is an aspiration of the recognition model; it promotes equal treatment of other cultures, strives for the principle of humanity (dignity), and addresses all participants in education.

In this sense we recognize intercultural education seeking to combine the principle of justice with the principle of humanity or constitutional loyalty with recognition model as a strong driving force towards establishing European and European-Mediterranean path of mutual understanding and respect of otherness; a way of achieving European-Mediterranean community based on intercultural dialogue and a society where we can 'live together as equals in dignity.'

NOTES

1 According to the census in 2002, the total population in Slovenia was 2 million: 12.3% of the population do not consider the Slovene language a mother tongue. This percentage includes 2258 Italians, 6242 Hungarians, 3246 Roma people, 21,542 Bosniaks, 35,642 Croats, 10,467 Muslims, 38,964 Serbs and others (Kroflič 2011, 164).

2 The author discusses the end of history and the prevalence of the liberal democracy as a universal form of governance.

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