ANNALES

ANNALES

Anali za istrske in mediteranske študije
Annali di Studi istriani e mediterranei
Annals for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies

VSEBINA / *INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS*

Anali za istrske in mediteranske študije - Annali di Studi istriani e mediterranei - Annals for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies

EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE: A CASE FOR HUMILITY

Mateja CENTA
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Theology, Poljanska 4, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: mateja.centa@teof.uni-lj.si

Vojko STRAHOVNIK
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Theology, Poljanska 4, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: vojko.strahovnik@teof.uni-lj.si

ABSTRACT

The paper aims to highlight the role of humility as an epistemic virtue in interreligious dialogue. In particular, the paper focuses on the relationship between humility and epistemic justice and investigates it from the perspective of the religious identity (of both individuals and groups) as a possible impediment in dialogue or source of prejudice and misunderstandings. It establishes the legitimacy of humility both as a virtue as well as a form of moral and epistemic thought.

Keywords: interreligious dialogue, humility, epistemic virtues, epistemic injustice, religious identity

VIRTÙ EPISTEMICHE E DIALOGO INTERRELIGIOSO: IL CASO DELL'UMILTÀ

SINTESI

Il testo si propone di evidenziare il ruolo dell'umiltà come virtù epistemica nel dialogo interreligioso. In particolare, il lavoro si concentra sul rapporto tra umiltà e giustizia epistemica, analizzate dal punto di vista dell'identità religiosa (sia degli individui che dei gruppi) come possibile fonte di ostacolo al dialogo o fonte di pregiudizi e incomprensioni. Intende dimostrare la legittimità dell'umiltà sia come virtù, sia come forma di pensiero morale ed epistemico.

Parole chiave: dialogo interreligioso, umiltà, virtù epistemiche, ingiustizia epistemica, identità religiosa

INTRODUCTION[1]

One of the basic research challenges regarding the issue of interreligious dialogue is an appropriate understanding of the factors (positive and negative) of such a dialogue. Addressing selected aspects of this problem is one of the pivotal points of this paper, with specific focus being on research questions, which are at the forefront of contemporary discussions in philosophy and theology. In particular, the paper focuses on the question about the role of epistemic or intellectual virtues (virtues like for example intellectual honesty, truthfulness, persistence, open-mindedness, intellectual humility, etc.) in interreligious dialogue. The short answer to this question would be that since epistemic virtues are, by definition, something that either constitutes or contributes to our epistemic endeavours, goals, and values (e.g. truth, knowledge, justification, understanding, wisdom, insight, intellectual integrity, etc.), epistemic virtues thus also contribute to dialogue, since it is one of our important epistemic undertakings as well as goals in the sense that it can lead to increased mutual understanding. Besides to this epistemic goal, interreligious dialogue also has moral goals, the latter being often framed in terms of mutual respect, building of peace, etc. That is why dialogue must proceed from our genuine commitments (beliefs, attitudes, values, etc.), not only for the parties to be sincere but to actually enable the other side a proper understanding. As an example, one can point to Socrates and Socratic dialogue. For Socrates (and Plato), dialogue requires us to present and hear at least two different points of view, which are held sincerely. The participants in the dialogue must discuss and express what they really think or are truly convinced of (and not merely speculate on different points of view; cf. *Protagoras* 331b–331d). Socratic dialogue is therefore formed out of personal and engaged assertions or commitments that are closely related to the beliefs, stances and lives of the partakers in dialogue (Seeskin, 1987, 2). Based on this, one can appreciate how epistemic virtues such as sincerity and open-mindedness are important for dialogue as a cooperative endeavour in search of the truth.

The recent renaissance of interest in virtue epistemology has been followed by the exploration of the individual strengths of this approach, including those that enable addressing important challenges of the contemporary society like the question of so-called epistemic injustice. One form of epistemic injustice occurs where particular epistemic viewpoints are marginalized or discriminated against. Interreligious (as well as intrareligious) dialogue could be and actually is often

a venue where such phenomena arise. In the framework of the paper, an analysis of an apt understanding of epistemic virtues is put forward as well as an emphasis of their interconnection with moral virtues and their role in interreligious dialogue. Another included perspective of the analysis is how religion and religious traditions understand and can contribute to the development of these virtues, especially those that are key to tolerance, peace, and dialogue (e.g. intellectual or epistemic humility, openness, intellectual courage, etc.).

The paper particularly focuses on the virtue of humility and uses it as a paradigm to demonstrate the mentioned importance and role of epistemic virtues in interreligious dialogue. Some of the addressed research questions are going to be the following. How humility can be understood as an epistemic virtue? Does epistemic humility play an important role in identifying, abolishing, or overcoming biases in dialogue? Is epistemic humility compatible with a firm and robust or even resolute and vigorous religious beliefs and religious commitments? Preliminary one can say that intellectual or epistemic aspects of humility include the belief or experience of oneself as a limited, imperfect and fallible being (in the epistemic sense), who is part of a larger creation and thus has a limited and incomplete viewpoint and perception of reality as a whole. This belief or experience about our limitations can also be mediated and formed in the context of spiritual connection with God or the experience of a living connection with nature or cosmos as a whole. The role and importance of intellectual humility in the interreligious dialogue are also established by results of empirical research, e.g. a recent study of the relationship between intellectual humility and religious tolerance has confirmed that individuals with a high degree of intellectual humility (especially in relation to religious beliefs) exhibit a high degree of religious tolerance to different religious beliefs and believers (Hook et al., 2017). In order to understand intellectual humility fully, the paper will also point out how we can understand it not merely as an epistemic virtue but as a form of epistemic thought, which defines how we share epistemic space with others. This will then enable the argument for intellectual humility as being conducive to establishing and securing epistemic justice and the relation of all this to interreligious dialogue.

HUMILITY AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

The section consists primarily initial thoughts on how we can understand intellectual humility. Starting from a general perspective, humility might be understood as one of fundamental moral and epistemic

virtues. Humility is an exceedingly multi-faceted term and proves to be hard to define. Kellenberger, discussing the so-called general humility, ascertains seven elementary dimensions that we generally associate humility with (some of these are more aligned with the proposal about humility being a virtue than others). These are: (i) having a low opinion of oneself, (ii) having a low estimate of one's merit, (iii) having a modest opinion of one's importance or rank, (iv) lack of self-assertion, e.g. in cases where one has made a contribution or bears merit, (v) asserting or requesting little desert, (vi) having and/or demonstrating awareness of one's defects or proneness to mistakes, and (vii) not being (too) proud, haughty, condescending, or arrogant (Kellenberger, 2010, 321–322). The subsequent discussion of humility as a virtue will be framed predominantly within the sixth and seventh dimension. Since this aspect of humility concerns primarily how we position ourselves in relation to others it is often labelled as relational humility. Such relational humility can be defined as consisting of four elements, namely *"(1) other-orientedness in one's relationships with others rather than selfishness; (2) the tendency to express positive other-oriented emotions in one's relationships (e.g., empathy, compassion, sympathy, and love); (3) the ability to regulate self-oriented emotions, such as pride or excitement about one's accomplishments, in socially acceptable ways; and (4) having an accurate view of self"* (Davis et al., 2010, 248). As such, humility and humble comportment are closely associated with behaviour within relationships with others where we have an accurate perception or evaluation of ourselves and, in being humble, we are other-oriented in the sense that we consider the wellbeing others on par with our own, and this subsequently prompts trust.

Now, let us move the discussion to epistemic or intellectual aspects of humility, i.e. to intellectual humility.[2] Intellectual humility includes us having an apt, realistic and non-haughty view on our own intellectual capabilities and strengths. It also involves manifestation of an ability to properly assess and evaluate different ideas and views in a way that includes respect for others that e.g. do not agree with us, etc. Cole Wright and colleagues (2017) define humility as a particular psychological positioning of oneself, and in relation to its epistemic or intellectual aspects, such positioning concerns a sort of epistemic alignment. This alignment includes that we do not privilege our own viewpoints, beliefs, and values, as well as our mental capabilities and skill as "special" in a way and thus deserving acclaim, status and praise because they are ours (and not for other reasons that may e.g. mandate such appraisal). From an epistemic point of view,

this also means formed understanding and unpretentious experience of ourselves as a limited and fallible beings, who are part of a larger creation and thus have incomplete and curtailed perspective of reality.

In this sense humility can be characterized as a second-order intellectual virtue, meaning that it does not primarily concern our beliefs, but the attitude we take toward ourselves as knowers (Spiegel, 2012). Such a humble stance can be mediated by or formed within the framework of a spiritual connection with God or a profound existential connection with nature or cosmos. Humility also restricts our tendency to experience exceptionality, or superiority, as well as restricting propensity to prioritise our own beliefs. It also restricts the claims of special recognition or commendation and the establishment of inapt epistemic supremacy over others. Intellectual humility is thus both a virtue and a stance that involves having appropriate, modest, and non-haughty view of our intellectual abilities (Hook et al., 2015, 499–506; Davis et al., 2016, 215–224). Given this, we can again reaffirm its role as a positive factor in interreligious dialogue, as it is also evidenced by empirical research.

Inquiry into the relationship between intellectual humility and religious tolerance confirmed that individuals who have a high degree of intellectual humility (especially in relation to religious beliefs) also exhibit a high degree of religious tolerance regarding different religious beliefs (Hook et al., 2017). Intellectual humility is a good predictor of religious tolerance of individuals, a predictor which is fairly independent of the strength of religious commitment and conservatism of their religious beliefs; it also weakens excessively defensive posture towards others, who do not share our religious beliefs. The attributed intellectual humility is likewise a positive factor of forgiveness (Zhang et al., 2015; Hook et al., 2015), in the sense that if the "victim" perceives the "perpetrator" as humble that makes it easier to forgive wrongful behaviour (Zhang et al., 2015). Intellectual humility is important for establishing, maintaining and restoring interpersonal and social bonds in a non-selfish and solidary manner. *"A high level of intellectual humility is an important virtue, especially for those individuals who are within their communities perceived as someone who has significant intellectual influence"* (Hook et al., 2015, 504). In conjunction with truthfulness, humility leads to increased levels of integrity, sincerity, and loyalty, to collaborative and responsive behaviour and reduces the level of vindictiveness and manipulation. Humility is also related to (social and civic) responsibility, gratitude, compassion, benevolence

---

2   It might well be likely that humility is a genuinely a hybrid virtue in the sense that its moral and epistemic elements cannot be split up into two completely separate virtues. Nevertheless, the paper proceeds here by focusing primarily on epistemic aspects of humility and leave the question about separability open.

and mindfulness, openness to others and hope (Cole Wright et al., 2017, 5-6). Secure attachment in the context of our relations to God is positively correlated with dispositional humility (Jankowski & Sandage, 2014, 80). Intellectual humility has a critical role in the formation of religious tolerance in a way that simple exposure of different religious beliefs and religions (religious diversity) does not. Therefore, "*if religious tolerance is a goal, it may be important to promote religious intellectual humility in religious individuals,*" (Hook et al., 2017, 6) which is especially important in the broader picture of contemporary the world where religious differences often lead to tensions, conflicts and even violence.

Humility includes both intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions. It enables us to establish an apt relationship to ourselves as epistemic agents, which inter alia includes an openness to new facts and insights, ability to integrate new knowledge into our existing knowledge, ability to assess the relevance of this knowledge, etc. At the same time, it puts us into an epistemic space with others (as epistemic agents) in a way that nurtures non-haughty, non-condescending, and solidary participation in the common pursuit of truth (Strahovnik, 2018).

HUMILITY AS A MODE OF MORAL AND EPISTEMIC THOUGHT

In this section, we will take the discussion about intellectual or epistemic humility a bit further. After putting forward a view that understands (moral) humility as a form of moral thought (and not merely a moral virtue) we will draw an analogy with intellectual humility and present a conception of intellectual humility as a form or mode of epistemic thought.

For the first part of this task, we employ the work of Raimond Gaita (2011) that develops a deepened understanding or conception of humility. Gaita begins by turning to his own experiences and autobiographical reflections and uses them to highlight how the notion of full humanity — in the sense of recognizing the other as fully human and in this regard just like ourselves, even if the circumstances of such a recognition are somewhat averse to it — is a prerequisite for any moral thought at all. This could be referred to as a sort of status justice where recognizing a moral status precedes any considerations about moral rightness or rights. Gaita similarly uses the notion of full humanity, in particular the recognition of full humanity to develop the idea of "justice beyond fairness" (*pace* Rawls and his justice as fairness). According to this conception of justice, distributive justice is not and cannot be primary, since we must first establish the domain of those that are even considered as beneficiaries of just distribution.

A concern for justice in community should be, in critical part, a concern that its institutions enable and encourage us always to see, and in seeing to be responsive to the full humanity in each of our fellow human beings. That is why this kind of concern is called a concern for social justice and it is why it is so often connected with compassion (Gaita, 2000, 84).

Such a conception of justice "*involves the acknowledgement of the depth and complexity of human experience,* [...] *the willingness and ability to see the other as a fully human as oneself and as a genuine limit upon one's own will*" (van Hooft, 2007, 313). Such a fundamental attitude of acknowledgement is marked by the absence of superiority or condescension and a full and humble recognition of the humanity of the other.

Gaita also appeals to the notion of saintly love (in relation to the sanctity of life and the dignity of a human being) and the mode of moral vision that are not to be understood at the level of virtues, but they reach beyond them. The absence of condescension is humility, and the means towards forming such humility is compassion, which enables a mode of (moral) seeing, including the actions of saintly love and the language of love.

The nature of charity or compassion depends on the concepts under which one sees those towards whom one responds charitably or compassionately. The concepts under which my father and Hora saw Vacek [Gaita is referring here to one of his above mentioned autobiographical examples of Gaita's father and his friend Hora recognizing and interacting with Vacek, a homeless and somewhat troubled individual, that lived on their land; note authors] were historically constituted, I believe, by the works of saintly love, by the language of love that formed and nourished those works and which was, in its turn, enriched by them (Gaita, 2011, 6).

One level is the attitude of the individual and the other level is the background or tradition that enables such an attitude. What is at play here is compassion without condescension and with humility, with humble attention to the other. Gaita thus speaks about two fundamental views on morality. The first is framed as a system of concepts such as autonomy, integrity, courage, honour, flourishing, and heroism, including heroic virtues, while the other is focused on the good as a central concept and emphasizes the importance of our sensitivity to vulnerability and adversity, the meaning of renouncement, sacrifice, and the recognition that we are all made in the image of God. This

latter understanding also implies the concept of an ethically necessary response (in terms of moral necessity), for example, in the form of compassion that goes beyond the emotions you can choose, form, try to stop, redirect, etc. insofar as one judges that the other is not deserving compassion or moral attention (cf. Centa, 2018). This now opens up space for a deeper understanding of moral humility. In the first sense, it can be understood as our response to recognition and understanding of our flaws or mistakes as causes of our moral wrongdoing or false beliefs. A deeper understanding sees humility as one of the forms of moral thought, which establishes a special space of meaning, in which moral actions are initially made possible. Not being humble in this sense is not seen as a cause of an error but as a form of error. By analogy, we can now recognise such a double role also for intellectual humility. On the one hand, it can be seen as an epistemic virtue along the lines sketched above. On the other hand, it is something that positions us and others in a common epistemic space that enables both cultivation and practice of epistemic virtues. It facilitates mutual participation in the search for truth and other epistemic goals, and this includes such a search in dialogue.

THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY IN ESTABLISHING EPISTEMIC JUSTICE

One of the challenges for interreligious dialogue (as well as for contemporary world in general) is the problem of epistemic or intellectual injustice.

Epistemic injustice refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. These issues include a wide range of topics concerning wrongful treatment and unjust structures in meaning-making and knowledge producing practices, such as the following: exclusion and silencing; invisibility and inaudibility (or distorted presence or representation); having one's meanings or contributions systematically distorted, misheard, or misrepresented; having diminished status or standing in communicative practices; unfair differentials in authority and/or epistemic agency; being unfairly distrusted; receiving no or minimal uptake; being coopted or instrumentalized; being marginalized as a result of dysfunctional dynamics; etc. (Kidd et al, 2017, 1).

To put this in more abstract terms, epistemic injustice is a set of phenomena characterized by distinctively epistemic kind of injustice, which befalls an individual or a group in their capacity as epistemic agents, e.g. when such injustice wrongs them in their capacity as

a subject of knowledge (Fricker, 2007; 2003). One of the aims of the paper is to argue that humility is itself an important dimension of epistemic justice and to, furthermore, demonstrate how epistemic humility is thus a vital part of interreligious dialogue.

As elaborated above epistemic injustice is a uniquely epistemic kind of injustice and thus not simply a form of moral injustice (e.g. the unequal and unjust distribution of wealth leading to significantly diminished educational opportunities for those at the lower end of the distribution). It can be best considered as a specific form of wrong(ness), which is a distinctively epistemic (Fricker, 2007, 5) and can impede self-development of the individual or even prevent one of becoming who they are. Such epistemic wrongs or harms can be generalized to the level of groups, including religious communities if they face epistemic injustice. In order to appropriately comprehend epistemic injustice, we must direct our attention to epistemic practices of epistemic agents as situated within the community, on social relations, distribution of power and social identity.

Fricker distinguishes between testimonial and hermeneutical epistemic injustice. The former is a type of injustice that symptomatically arises in situations someone gives the speaker less credibility then merited, usually as a consequence of prejudice or bias. A representative example of such injustice is dismissing an otherwise credible testimony, recommendation, advice, etc. merely on the basis that it comes for a person that is of the "wrong" race, gender, religion, social class, etc. The latter, i.e. hermeneutical injustice, is a type of epistemic injustice that stems from a gap in (collective) hermeneutical resources or shared tools of social interpretation. In other words, disadvantaged members or whole groups are

hermeneutically marginalized, that is, they participate unequally in the practices through which social meanings are generated. This sort of marginalization can mean that our collective forms of understanding are rendered structurally prejudicial in respect of content and/or style: the social experiences of members of hermeneutically marginalized groups are left inadequately conceptualized and so ill-understood, perhaps even by the subjects themselves; and/or attempts at communication made by such groups, where they do have an adequate grip on the content of what they aim to convey, are not heard as rational owing to their expressive style being inadequately understood (Fricker 2007, 6–7).

Victims of such epistemic injustice are prevented from making sense of (their own) experience which it is (strongly) in their interests to render intelligible. In this regard, the victim is wronged in the capacity as a sub-

ject of social understanding. The current state of the art of discussions on these topics sometimes goes beyond these two types or forms of epistemic injustice and has identified several others, but this framework suffices for our purpose of demonstrating how epistemic humility could be understood as an effective response to such injustice.

The proposed answer to the challenge of epistemic injustice is epistemic justice or, more specifically, the cultivation of epistemic justice as a virtue. The latter is conceptualized as a hybrid virtue or a set of virtues that enables us to overcome epistemic injustice on our part, e.g. as the receivers of information in the case of testimonial injustice. Testimonial justice is this an epistemic, or better, hybrid (epistemic and ethical) virtue that enables the hearer to be in a shared epistemic space in such a way that the influence of identity prejudice on the hearer's credibility judgement is detected and corrected for. Fricker emphasises testimonial sensibility as a form of rational sensitivity. We can develop it through attention to testimonial practices, adequate or reliable attribution of credibility, careful perception and perception of cognitive status, etc.

> If we ask what is the immediate end of testimonial justice considered as an intellectual virtue, the answer is 'neutralizing prejudice in one's credibility judgements', and its ultimate end will be truth. For neutralizing prejudice is necessary for achieving the appropriate openness to truth that the subject is ultimately aiming at—if the hearer allows prejudice to influence her credibility judgement, she is liable to miss out on a truth. If we now ask what is the immediate end of testimonial justice considered as an ethical virtue, the answer is, once again, 'neutralizing prejudice in one's credibility judgements', and its ultimate end will be justice. For neutralizing prejudice is the necessary means to avoiding doing one's interlocutor a testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007, 122).

The individuating motivations of the epistemic and ethical aspects thus coincide, although their ultimate ends, truth and justice respectively, are different. Next, hermeneutical justice is also a hybrid virtue that enables the hearer to exercises a reflexive critical sensitivity to reduced intelligibility incurred by the speaker, owing to a gap in collective hermeneutical resources.

> The form the virtue of hermeneutical justice must take, then, is an alertness or sensitivity to the possibility that the difficulty one's interlocutor is having as she tries to render something communicatively intelligible is due not to its being a nonsense or her being a fool, but rather to some sort of gap in collective hermeneuti-

cal resources. The point is to realize that the speaker is struggling with an objective difficulty and not a subjective failing. Such a sensitivity involves, once again, a certain reflexive awareness on the part of the hearer, for a speaker whose communicative efforts are hampered by hermeneutical injustice may seem to be making no sense at all to one hearer (as when Marge expresses her suspicions to Herbert Greenleaf in an emotional or intuitive style), while to another hearer (perhaps another woman) she may seem to be making a manifestly reasonable point. The virtuous hearer, then, must be reflexively aware of how the relation between his social identity and that of the speaker is impacting on the intelligibility to him of what she is saying and how she is saying it (Fricker 2007, 169).

After outlining dimensions of epistemic justice one can now appreciate, how epistemic humility actually is an aspect of such an overarching hybrid virtue. Humility enables us to be attentive both to our failings and limitations in the discursive sphere, as well as to be sensitive to the status that we are attributing to others in this shared epistemic space. This first of the mentioned aspects includes our sensitivity to our own prejudice and bias, while the second aspect is aiming at how we set, position and understand the other's epistemic status (testimonial justice) and how we design and structure the shared epistemic space, e.g. the space of dialogue (hermeneutical justice).

CONCLUSION: EPISTEMIC JUSTICE AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

In this concluding section of the paper, the relationship between epistemic justice and interreligious dialogue is laid out in a way that additionally reveals the importance of intellectual humility. The connexion between epistemic (in)justice and interreligious dialogue is multidimensional. One of the key aspects that enable us to understand it is religious identity. Such identity is necessary a part of interreligious dialogue if such dialogue is to be genuine and committed. Kidd delineates the mentioned multidimensionality of the relationship as follows.

> [R]eligious persons and groups can be perpetrators and victims of epistemic injustice. Religious persons and communities can commit, or can suffer, epistemic injustices. [...] A religious identity can invite others' prejudice and entail activities and experiences that others might find difficult to make sense of, while also shaping a person's epistemic sensibilities. The practices of testifying to and interpreting experiences take a range of distinctive forms in religious life – for

instance, if the testimonial practices require a special sort of religious accomplishment or if proper understanding of religious experiences is only available to those with authentic faith. But it is also clear that religious communities and traditions have been sources of epistemic injustice – for instance, by conjoining epistemic and spiritual credibility in ways disadvantageous to 'deviant' groups (Kidd, 2017, 386).

Religious identity – of both, individuals and groups — can be linked with prejudices leading to both testimonial injustice and to practices of understanding that can create or maintain gaps that can lead to hermeneutical injustice. Aspects of particular identity are deeply interconnected with religious individuals and groups and cannot be simply set aside in interreligious dialogue and in dialogue with non-believers (cf. Žalec, 2019). Religious life often presupposes some special testimonial practices and hermeneutical resources embedded deeply into religious traditions, and thus religions can be sources of epistemic injustice (Kidd, 2017, 388). The religious aspect of one's identity (or its absence) is thus in no way exempt from the domain of epistemic injustice. In its most straightforward form, it can be expressed or reflected in the distinction between "true" believers or "genuine" witnesses of faith and all the others that do not qualify as such. The shift from polytheism to monotheism also, by its very nature, pushes or exhortes certain testimonial religious views and practices outside of the dominion of the "true or right" wisdom. A similar phenomenon can transpire even in the context of traditional monotheism where certain types or practices of spirituality can be excluded (for example, relegation and marginalisation of particular feminine forms of spirituality, etc.). The threat of epistemic injustice also concerns secularism (in relation to religious groups). Kidd in this regard highlights several open questions, including the questions of whether secular societies and their educational systems commit hermeneutical epistemic injustice by not providing members of these societies with resources and sensibilities needed to make sense of people's religious beliefs, attitudes, and experiences (Kidd, 2017, 394).

Intellectual humility is one way of overcoming such epistemic injustice, since it stands in opposition to pride, arrogance, self-glorification, and haughtiness.

Honest and respectful dialogue nurtures humility and offers a corrective to the excesses of our own traditions. Dialogue can create trust and imbue a sense of security to help overcome the suspicion and fear our traditions have often instilled about the other. By forging

bonds of support and solidarity across religious boundaries, people of religious good will can help overcome ethnic and national xenophobia (Lander, 2011, 150).

At the same time, religious traditions and religious thought are the ones that help us to cultivate such humble moral perception, since religious depth and authenticity allow for such moral vision and understanding. It empowers us to overcome the shallowness and superficiality, and by following the exemplars (in Christianity, for example, Jesus and the saints) some depths of religions are spaces of meaning which enable such moral vision. The key is to direct our attention to the potential of religions, religious traditions, and religious communities to foster and exhibit humility (instead of e.g. absolutism, exclusivism, or fundamentalism), both in terms of understanding as well as practice. "*There can truly be no peace among humanity until and unless there is peace among the religions of humanity. That peace cannot emerge without profound dialogue, exchange, humility, and learning from one another*" (Safi, 2011, 305). We agree with Gaita, who argues that, in connection with such a view, religion actually constitutes such a framework of meaning. "*Think of how much of our sense of religious depth and authenticity is a function of our appeal to things in which we believe that form and content cannot be separated – art of course, but also prayers, hymns, religious rituals and so on. Appeals such as these and reflection upon them occur in what I have called 'the realm of meaning'.*" (Gaita, 2011, 12) For Gaita, the meaning of concepts such as human dignity, inalienable dignity, the inner value of persons and the unconditional respect can only be understood on the basis of a deeper background created by the aspect of common humanity and revealed by the aforementioned saintly love and the related acts of love. A humble attentiveness toward the truth as the overall epistemic aim also helps us to overcome violence (Petkovšek, 2015, 249). In this light, we can see the moral relevance of humility, which can enable us to cultivate an open, humble, tolerant and responsive dialogue. Religious communities and religions, in general, are important agents of global justice. Religions thus have a vital role in establishing justice and fostering dialogue by creating a context of sympathetic imagination, humility, and respect. Humility is a basis for stepping out of our ego and enter into the world of the other, and in this way, we can avoid the phenomenon of "invisible other(s)" (Nussbaum, 2012, 139–140). Humility, inclusive imagination, and sympathy represent only one aspect of compassion and care, but they are crucial because they are moving us in the opposite direction as fear, that is in the direction of the other. Narcissism misleads us when it persuades us that we can go through our life with

other people, not to make any efforts in the domain of imagination, sympathy, and care, and this is one of the main forms of moral error (Nussbaum, 2012, 169). Such errors could also be characterized as overlooking of the full humanity of another as the cornerstone of any justice.

> *Treat me as a human being, fully as your equal, without condescension – that demand (or plea), whether it is made by women to men or blacks to whites, is a demand or a plea for justice. Not, however, as justice conceived as equal access to goods and opportunities. It is for justice as equality of respect. Only when one's is humanity is fully visible will one be treated as someone who can intelligibly press*

claims to equal access to goods and opportunities (Gaita, 2000, xx–xxi).

Compassionate empathy and imagination are able to overcome such tunnel vision or blind spots, and do that in a way that mere arguments can-not, because the former includes experiential participation (solidarity; cf. Žalec, 2019, 419) with the other, but it also goes beyond it, since it evaluates, criticizes and explores the values that are embedded in the situation, and to dismantles hierarchies, stigmatization, and undeserved suffering. Humility, both intellectual and moral, plays an important part as a virtue here. It orients us towards the other, fosters positive other-oriented emotions, and enables us to overcome egoism, arrogance, and the feeling of superiority.

SPOZNAVNE VRLINE IN MEDRELIGIJSKI DIALOG: PRIMER PONIŽNOSTI

Mateja CENTA
Univerza v Ljubljani, Teološka fakulteta, Poljanska 4, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
e-mail: mateja.centa@teof.uni-lj.si

Vojko STRAHOVNIK
Univerza v Ljubljani, Filozofska fakulteta, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
Univerza v Ljubljani, Teološka fakulteta, Poljanska 4, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
e-mail: vojko.strahovnik@teof.uni-lj.si

POVZETEK

Eden temeljnih raziskovalnih izzivov v zvezi z medverskim dialogom je ustrezno razumevanje dejavnikov takega dialoga. Članek se osredotoča zlasti na vprašanje vloge spoznavnih ali intelektualnih vrlin (npr. intelektualne poštenosti, resnicoljubnosti, vztrajnosti, odprtosti, intelektualne ponižnosti itd.). Prispevek se posebej osredotoča na ponižnost in jo uporabi kot primer za prikaz pomena in vloge vrlin v medverskem dialogu. Intelektualna ponižnost vključuje, da imamo ustrezen, stvaren in nenadut pogled na lastne intelektualne sposobnosti ter da izkazujemo sposobnost pravilnega ocenjevanja različnih idej in pogledov na način, ki vključuje spoštovanje drugih. Omogoča nam, da vzpostavimo primeren odnos do sebe kot spoznavnih akterjev in nas postavlja v spoznavni prostor z drugimi na način, ki omogoča nesamovšečno, nevzvišeno in solidarno sodelovanje pri skupnem iskanju resnice. Intelektualna ponižnost je tudi način za premagovanje spoznavne nepravičnosti, vključno s konteksti, v katerih je verska identiteta možen vir ali tarča spoznavne nepravičnosti in krivic.

Ključ**ne besede:** medreligijski dialog, ponižnost, spoznavne vrline, spoznavna nepravičnost, religijska identiteta

SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Centa, M. (2018): Kognitivna teorija čustev, vrednostne sodbe in moralnost [Cognitive Theory of Emotions, Value Judgments, and Morality. Bogoslovni vestnik/Theological Quarterly, 78, 1, 53–65.

Cole Wright, J., Nadelhoffer, T., Perini, T., Langville, A., Echols, M. & V. Kelly (2017): The Psychological Significance of Humility. Journal of Positive Psychology, 12, 1, 3–15.

Davis, D. E., Rice, K., McElroy, S., DeBlaere, C., Choe, E., Van Tongeren, D. R. & J. N. Hook (2016): Distinguishing Intellectual Humility and General Humility. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 11, 3, 215–224.

Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L. Jr & J. N. Hook (2010): Humility: Review of Measurement Strategies and Conceptualization as Personality Judgment. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 4, 243–252.

Fricker, M. (2003): Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing. Metaphilosophy, 34, 1/2, 54–73.

Fricker, M. (2007): Epistemic Injustice. Power and the Ethics of Knowing. New York, Oxford University Press.

Gaita, R. (2000): A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice. Abingdon, Routledge.

Gaita, R. (2011): Morality, Metaphysics, and Religion. In: Carlisle, J., Carter, J. & D. Whistler (eds.): Moral Powers, Fragile Beliefs: Essays in Moral and Religious Philosophy. New York, Continuum, 3–28.

Hook, J. N., Davis, D. E., Van Tongeren, D. R., Hill, P. C., Worthington, E. L., Farrell, J. E. & P. Dieke (2015): Intellectual Humility and Forgiveness of Religious Leaders. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 10, 6, 499–506.

Hook, J. N., Farrell, J. E., Johnson, K. A., Van Tongeren, D. R., Davis, D. E. & J. D. Aten (2017): Intellectual Humility and Religious Tolerance. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 12, 1, 29–35.

Jankowski, J. P. & S. J. Sandage (2014): Attachment to God and Humility. Indirect Effect and Conditional Effects Model. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 42, 1, 70–82.

Kellenberger, J. (2010): Humility. American Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 4, 321–336.

Kidd, I. J. (2017): Epistemic Injustice and Religion. In: Kidd, I. J., Medina, J. & G. Jr. Pohlhaus (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. New York, Routledge, 386–396.

Kidd, I. J., Medina, J. & G. Jr. Pohlhaus (2017): Introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. In: Kidd, I. J., Medina, J. & Jr. G. Pohlhaus (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. New York, Routledge, 1–9.

Lander, S. L. (2011): Supernatural Israel: Obstacles to Theological Humility in Jewish Tradition. In: Heft, J. L., Firestone, R. & O. Safi (eds.): Learned Ignorance. Intellectual Humility among Jews, Christians, and Muslims. New York, Oxford University Press, 149–169.

Nussbaum, C. M. (2012): The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age. Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press.

Petkovšek, R. (2015): Demonično nasilje, laž in resnica [Demonic violence, lie and truth]. Bogoslovni vestnik/Theological Quarterly, 75, 2, 233–251.

Safi, O. (2011): Epilogue: The Purpose of Interreligious Dialogue. In: Heft, J. L., Firestone, R. & O. Safi (eds.): Learned Ignorance. Intellectual Humility among Jews, Christians, and Muslims. New York, Oxford University Press, 304–307.

Seeskin, K. (1987): Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in Socratic Method. Albany, State University of New York Press.

Spiegel, J. S. (2012): Open-mindedness and Intellectual Humility. Theory and Research in Education, 10, 1, 27–38.

Strahovnik, V. (2018): Spoznavna (ne)pravičnost, krepost spoznavne ponižnosti in monoteizem [Epistemic (In)justice, the Virtue of Epistemic Humility and Monotheism]. Bogoslovni vestnik/Theological Quarterly, 78, 2, 299–311.

van Hooft, S. (2007): Cosmopolitanism as Virtue. Journal of Global Ethics, 3, 3, 303–315.

Zhang, H., Farrell, J. E., Hook, J. N., Davis, D. E., Van Tongeren, D. R. & K. A. Johnson (2015): Intellectual Humility and Forgiveness of Religious Conflict. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 43, 4, 255–262.

Žalec, B. (2019): Between Secularity and Postsecularity: Critical Appraisal of Charles Taylor's Account. Bogoslovni vestnik/Theological Quarterly, 79, 2, 411–423.