ROBERT GARY MINNICH*

Citizenship and the politicization of ethnicity as aspects of state-making in marginal Southcentral European communities**

Taking the liberty that uniquely belongs to an anthropologist, I shall start this excursion to Southcentral Europe with a stopover among the Nupe of Central Nigeria. But I must admit it is not Nupe-land itself, but rather the manner in which it was described by Sigfried Nadel in 1935, that has caught my attention.

The title of this fascinating sketch of political integration is: *Nupe State and Community* (Nadel 1967 [1935]). Nadel bases his use of the terms *community* and *state* upon what at the time was a fresh conceptualization of complex society, namely, Ferdinand Tönnies' (1961 [1926]) distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (community and society). Most importantly Nadel acknowledges that this dichotomy is analytically useful not because of its allusion to social evolution, but rather because of the distinction it draws between dissimilar yet simultaneous processes of social integration both of which he perceives in terms of the maintenance of social control. He stresses that not only the state, but also the local community, each with their distinctive type of integrative mechanisms, promote social order.

Nadel portrays state-making in terms of the simultaneous adaptation of all the subpolities – levels of governance – loosely incorporated by the historical Nupe kingdom. And this process is outlined with reference to its furthest ranging systemic consequences which ultimately involve adaptation to the imposition of Indirect Rule by the British, to earlier conquest by the Fulani and to the Islamic ideology and institutions which the latter introduced among the Nupe. We are presented with a complex portrait of political processes which accounts for both the dynamics of local communities and changing contingencies in the large scale political structures of which they are a part. As Nadel says (1967: 299), "In Nupeland, as in our modern society, the unit of kin and place, the community of languages or religion, holds its own within, and often against, the framework of state."

Nadel initially demonstrates the complexity in Nupe society by recounting the collective self-images which Nupe hold of themselves. These images demonstrate levels of alterity, ranging from the family, ward and village to tribal sub-sections and the Nupe Kingdom. And the Nupe accentuate these levels of alterity through consistent use of titles when referring to one another, titles which reflect the hierarchical organization of their society, stretching from local wards to royal compounds in the largest urban centers.

The ideological integration of the Nupe kingdom is founded upon a myth of common origins related to its supposed founder, *Tsoede*, and through veneration of a common sky god, *Soko*. At the progressively less inclusive levels of integrati-

* dr. Robert Gary Minnich, profesor v Bergnu, Švedska.

** An unabridged version of the first of two public lectures delivered on June 10, 1993, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the *Dr. philos.* degree at the School of Social Sciences, University of Bergen.

on, the sub-tribe, town, ward and village, other religious cults and ancestors demarcate the focus of worship and loyalty. And this ideological superstructure reflects in terms of social integration a hierarchy of groups where social position is defined in terms of kinship and ritual observance; this is the integration of face-to-face society founded essentially upon ascribed statuses which can be called *Gemeinschaft*. As I suggest below, this *mode of social integration* reflects an ethnic model of human consociation.

But Nadel also describes the consolidation of central authority among the Nupe in terms of social integration based upon contractual relations whereby the individual becomes a legal subject. The rudiments of *Gesellschaft* among the Nupe are thus manifest in the administrative and bureaucratic institutions which have under the auspices of expanding central authority in urban centers ever more pervasively intervened in the political life of local communities. However, as Nadel stresses, this is far from a one-way process; he illustrates convincingly the potential of local polities to challenge central authority.

Thus, in a rudimentary yet complex manner Nadel alerts us to a dual dynamic in the process of state building which is central to my further considerations.

* * *

Before we set foot upon the terra firma of Southcentral Europe, I feel it necessary to outline my intentions when using that most contentious of terms – *ethnicity*. In my estimation it is essential that the anthropology of Europe employs models of ethnicity which facilitate the comparative analysis of the historical formation of ethnic groups. Although this has been a theme of anglophone anthropology conducted in Europe since the early 1970s (cf. e. g., Beck & Cole 1981; Cole & Wolf 1974; Verderey 1983, 1985), it has in no significant measure prevailed on the curriculum of anthropology students in Bergen.

In this lecture I rely heavily upon a historical model advanced by Anthony D. Smith (1986) in his treatise on the *Ethnic Origins of Nations*. He portrays ethnicity in terms of what he calls *ethnie* – a term which he loans via French from the Greek *ethnos*. Ethnie (p. 22) conveys according to Smith a "sense of history and the perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders." Smith's model of *ethnie* is conceived in terms of 6 dimensions (pp. 22–31): a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory, and, a sence of solidarity. This working definition of ethnic groups allows Smith (p. 32) to show that "ethnicity has remained as a socio-cultural 'model' for human organization and communication from the early third millennium B. C. until today, ..." My project is much more modest, it is confined to that period of modern history when *ethnie* – ethnic collectivities – have been subjected to politicization during the consolidation of the bureaucratic territorial state in Europe.

It is important that I share further assumptions even though they may represent "givens" for many of you. Ethnicity becomes a model for social organization only when two or more groups or collectivities are mutually aware of one another as counterparts. Hence ethnicity is contingent upon social contact and cultural contrast. It is, as we all are aware in Bergen, tantamount to self-ascription and ascription by others manifest in social interaction.

The approach to ethnicity formulated by Fredrik Barth in his Introduction to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) emphasizes discovery of the contingencies of boundary maintenance as they are manifest in social relations where ethnic difference is relevant for action and categorization. The work of Anthony Smith, John Armstrong (1982) and other ethno-historians has another emphasis, namely, elucidation of the multitude of historically situated and evolving contingencies facilitating the creation of an ethnic mode of collective self-awareness and organization. These scholars excel in demonstrating the diversity of social and cultural dynamics which render examples of ethnicity with form and content.

Smith writes (1986: 57) that "at the centre of every ethnie . . . stands a distinctive complex of myths, memories and symbols with peculiar claims about the group's origins and lines of descent. These claims and this complex provide the focus of a community' identity and its *mythomoteur*, or constitutive political myth." From the foregoing Nupe material we can see that *Tsoede*, the assumed common ancestor of the Nupe, is a central figure in that kingdom's mythomoteur. Implicit to this perspective on the historical phenomenon of ethnicity are several essential considerations: Phenomenologically ethnicity most closely approximates the organization and cultural dynamics of the family; it emphasizes common descent and a common cultural heritage which Joshua Fishman (1985: 24–29) formulates in terms of the shared subjective experience of "paternity" and "patrimony". However, ethnie becomes a model for human consociation first when the integration of society is no longer resolved through the rudimentary kinship ideology and the simple division of labor integrated within households and through highly localized and isolated non-monetary economic systems. Self-aware ethnic collectivities reflecting varying degrees of sociocultural integration arise when society is stratified and some form of institutionalized leadership with an attendant elite is established. The myth-symbol complex at the centre of an ethnie is commonly maintained by specialists, priests, scribes or others who promote the tradition of cultural distinctiveness, the myths of common origins. And this maintenance of cultural distinctiveness is contingent upon the persistence of an experienced boundary with counter-part groups.

The way is now open to cross over into Southcentral Europe.

Citizenship and state-making

In the monograph (Minnich 1992), *Homesteaders and Citizens*, which provides the occasion for me to address you today, I provisionally investigate citizenship and the politicization of ethnicity as they have intervened into the everyday lives and influenced the collective self-image of marginal Slovene speaking villagers who reside as neighbor on either side of the Austro-Italian border.

The above book portrays state-making in an admittedly simplistic manner by considering this complex process essentially with reference to the construction of social persons. My portrait of the state is founded, namely, upon a historical account of the extension, to these villagers, of those right and obligations which we normally attribute to citizenship.

Attention is thus drawn toward a uniquely modern development in Europe which for lack of a better term we can call, along with Sylvia Walby (1992), "the citizenisation of society". "Historically the concept of citizenship is bound up with the development of the city-state in the classical world of Rome and Greece."

(Turner 1990: 201). But the extension of these rights to the overall populace of a given polity, which is our concern here, has followed more or less in the wake of the French Revolution. The extension of citizenship is tantamount to the expansion of state sovereignty over its subjects (Giddens 1985). Hereby the modern state, through the instrument of a dependent bureaucracy, increasingly defines the terms of membership in the political community which it organizes and controls.

T. H. Marshall (1973), who is considered the modern founder of citizenship theory (cf. Held 1989, Mann 1987, Turner 1990), has identified three major bundles of citizenship rights, calling them civil, political and social rights. And as Bryan S. Turner (op. cit.: 192) notes, these bundles of rights find their respective institutional counterparts in contemporary society: law courts, parliament and the welfare system. Evoking Marshall's theory of citizenship we can say that the citizenisation of modern society has been the result of social struggle. And this he conceives in terms of a fundamental contradiction between the principles of organization rooted in citizenship and in class, where the former stresses a public ideal of equality and the latter manifests inequality founded in the private ownership of property. Extension of this basic civil right to own private property facilitated not only the creation of structures of inequality through the instrument of capitalism. Paradoxically, it also contributed to the demise of the "Old Order" of bondage in rural Europe (Blum 1978), thus opening the path to equality.

In grossly oversimplified terms, one can say that Marshall postulates the following: Once the basic civil rights guaranteeing the liberty of the individual, the right to own property and full and equal justice before the law were established, they provided a platform for the struggle to gain political rights which in turn set in motion the drive for social rights.

It is misleading, however, to consider this historical model as synonymous with general evolutionary stages in the advancement of citizenship (Mann 1987). The empirical foundation of Marshall's theory is decidedly anglocentric. The extension of citizenship rights is not invariably democratic, involving the participation of individuals in the determination of the terms of their own association in a polity – nor, does it necessarily follow the progression suggested by Marshall. Citizenship rights can be the reserve of a single social class and they are not inevitably the product of social struggle or democratic forms of participation in a given polity; they can be conditionally extended by a monarch, oligarchy or dictaror to their subjects in order to consolidate and legitimate central authority.

In the Greek city-states of antiquity citizenship was the exclusive domain of slave-holders and an instrument for their collective domination over a dependent population. And up through European history to modern times, the vestiges of citizenship were confined primarily to urban centers and towns where the term citizen first gained currency by designating individuals as the free residents of a town. And in a more recent epoch, the pervasive extension of social rights by former socialist governments in Eastern Europe through well developed state sponsored welfare systems was accompanied by a highly restricted system of civil and political rights. Today the successor governments in these countries are forced as much by the preconditions set by potential western supporters as by their own constituencies to fully institutionalize civil and political rights. In the meantime their constituencies are emphatic about retaining existing state sponsored welfare systems which mediate social rights. These recent developments seem in fact to have turned Marshall's assumptions about the progression and origins of citizenship rights on their head.

David Held (1989: 190) summarizes Marshall's general position by observing that citizenship "is a stuatus which bestows upon individuals *equal* rights and duties, liberties and constraints, powers and responsibilities." In so far as citizenship means that the individual is a free and equal agent and active participant within a polity, it is as an institution which Bryan Turner (1990: 189) says is "constitutive of the societal community". Or, recalling Nadel's discussion of Tönnies' dichotomy (cf. above), the institutionalization of citizenship can be seen to represent essentially a *gesellschaftlich* mode of social integration which may be coterminous with a *gemeinschaftlich* social order.

The extension of citizenship rights thus represents a documentable and universal historical process which readily affords us an empirical focus for comparing uniquely localized political adaptations to central authority. And within each historical polity regardless of its dimensions this process follows a unique order and assumes a form specific to the social and cultural environment in which it occurs.

As I shall later argue, citizenship is not the exclusive reserve of the state, it can both precede the state and manifest itself in local polities which comprise the former. But in the context of modern and postmodern society I would note that it is in the capacity of one's citizenship in a particular state that we discover an essential setting for investigating what John Borneman (1992: 338–339) has called "nationess" – "the praxis of belonging to the state" ([. . .] by author). As Borneman points out, this domain of everyday praxis is quite a different matter than nationalism, that is, situationally provoked expressions of one's loyalty to the state which may, but do not inevitably, refer to membership in an ethnic group.

* * *

Regardless of its theoretical orientation, scholarship on citizenship emphasizes that the extension of universal suffrage – the guintessential political right – has been fundamentally important to the citizenisation of society. By extending the right to vote to virtually all adults vast segments of formerly subject populations became a relevant source of support in the conduct of politics at the rapidly growing administrative centers of Europe's modern states. In terms of citizenship theory, previously disenfranchised subjects of the state, who were only weakly integrated in the political community organized by the state, became participants in the political process which determined the conditions of their association in that community (Marshall 1973). And if we think ahead to contemporary welfare states, it is self-evident that the state sponsored extension of social rights has much more thoroughly integrated citizens into the political community of the state by politicizing social institutions which formerly were relegated to autonomous locally incorporated groups. Within today's welfare societies the "praxis of belonging to the state" has become fundamental to the lives of most everyone.

Once the franchise was finally extended to the under classes and outermost peripheries of Southcentral Europe, ethnic identity had already become a potent symbol of membership in imagined communities – imagined communities which burgeoning cultural and political elites had not only conceived but which they increasingly nurtured in their quest for support and legitimacy as actors in the modern political arena. In this way the institution of citizenship and the politicization of ethnicity in this part of Europe have played into the hands of one another through the ever increasing consolidation of authority in the modern bureaucratic state.

The uncomfortable amalgamation of these two phenomena – citizenship and politicized ethnicity – in the political adaptations of marginal communities, which is quite a different matter than their often cosy coalescence at the centers of power, is the ultimate destination of this talk. First, however, I shall clarify my intentions with the term "state-making". I do this by reverting to previous fieldwork and the foreign affairs pages of today's newspapers. Ours topics are state, nation and nationalism.

State, nation and nationalism in Southcentral Europe

While the extension of citizenship rights to my Alpine homesteaders is a gauge of their integration into the political community organized by the state, this increasing inventory of rights and obligations is by itself a very incomplete portrait of their overall encounter with the institutions imposed upon them by that modern bureaucratic order. Ever since they became politically enfranchised they have been repeatedly coerced into declaring their loyalty to one or another of the so-called nations whose leaders have sought political domination over their little corner of the Alps. This historical zone of contact between the Germanic, Romance and Slavic language traditions is an area that was fated by geo-politics to become the *Three Country Region.* After centuries under Habsburg dominion, the Great War tore this Alpine crossroads asunder creating a frontier zone partitioned by three states – Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia, where on June 25, 1991 the latter was succeeded by Slovenia.

* * *

The plurilingual population indigenous to this borderland has been subjected to campaigns, conducted by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which set an unfortunate precedent for what is currently called "ethnic cleansing" in the heart of the Balkans: Bosnia-Hercegovina. A few weeks before unleashing the *Blitzkrieg* on Poland, Hitler called Mussolini to Berlin where they decided to impose a mandatory "Option" upon the plurilingual population of the South Tyrol and Val Canale – the latter is the Italian segment of the Three Country Region. The natives of these contested frontier regions were forced to identify themselves in terms of imposed ethnic categories and declare their preference for either Italian or German citizenship. Those opting for the German nation – including a significant portion of Val Canale's Slovene speakers – consented *ipso facto* to "voluntary" resettlement in the Third Reich which by that time had been extended through the Austrian *Anschluß* to nearby Carinthia. For Slovene speakers of Val Canale who for nearly two decades had endured Mussolini's fanatic program of Italianization,[1] the alternative of returning to their cherished historical province, Carinthia, was appealing. In 1939 the Nazi campaign to Germanize multi-ethnic Carinthia was still in its nascent stage. It is said, however, that Slovene speaking Val Canale villagers who had opted for the Third Reich were eventually offered resettlement, a few years later, on the vacated farms of Carinthian Slovenes who had been rounded up and deported by the Gestapo. Such is the irony and inevitable outcome of ethnic cleansing.

[1] The hellenization of minority groups (Turks, Macedonians and Albanians) in Greece today appears to replicate in some detail this all too familiar program.

Aware of the credibility of historical precedent in this part of the world and acknowledging the current inertia of peace negotiations in Bosnia, perhaps we should anticipate that today's arch conservators of state sponsored ethnic nationalism, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman, will make a similar magnanimous offer to the so-called nations of Bosnia. Ironically, if the Vance-Owen-Stoltenberg Plan should against all odds be implemented, the result will likely be much the same, with the exception that the remaining Muslims may be invited to settle voluntarily in U. N. rather than Serbian and Croatian guarded internment camps. If one adopts an appropriately cynical tone, it is indeed possible to suggest that the U. N. plan has also been inspired by the infamous *Berliner Verienbarung* signed by *der Führer* and *Il Duce* on June 23, 1939. The ethnic model of the nation-state which has inspired some of our truly great wars is alive and well in civilized Europe.

* * *

The above form of coercion alludes not only to a special formula for making states. Our attention is also drawn to the legitimation of authority in all modern states.

The authority of Europe's modern states has depended in large measure upon the propagation and popular acceptance of parochial secular ideologies which legitimate these arbitrarily delimited territorial polities as more or less inevitable human collectivities. I refer, namely, to what we all know as *nationalism.* Without telling the whole story, Ernest Gellner's (1983: 1) depiction of nationalism as "a theory of political legitimacy" alludes to my intention here. Assuming the posture of what Anthony D. Smith (1986: 9–11, 16–18) calls a modernist in these matters, I maintain, namely, that nationalism is manifest in all manner of modern bureaucratic states, whether they be despotic or democratic, socialist or capitalist, the make-shift progeny of countless wars such as in the Balkans and Central Europe, or the residue of the long term political and socio-cultural integration of a given territory such as Britain or France.

In the following it is essential that we distinguish between what Anthony Smith (1986: 149ff.) calls the *"civic-territorial"* and *"ethnic-genealogical"* orientations which to varying degrees are inevitably manifest in specific examples of nationalism. We need only imagine the state sponsored ideologies of Germany and Japan during the first half of this century in relation to their American, British or Australian counterparts to appreciate the relative importance of ethnic and civic self-images affecting loyalty to these states. It is in the latter group of countries that Marshall's concept of citizenship attains the status of a public ideal. As a proposition about fundamental equality in the face of social and cultural diversity and as a mandate to participate in the public domain of life, citizenship in these countries bolsters, both as an institution and as a symbol of membership in the societal community, the civic orientation of nationalism. It is in countries such as Britain and the United States that the terms "citizenship" and "nationality" have been popularly understood as synonymous.

In that part of Europe which concerns us here, which I would stress is a zone of relatively new and transient territorial states, the ethnic variant of nationalism has prevailed. Already towards the conclusion of the last century ethnic identity – promoted by a rash of locally situated voluntary organizations and popularized written accounts of the exclusive cultural heritage and origins of supposedly distinct

peoples (cf. Moritsch & Baumgartner 1992) – became a preeminent vehicle for eliciting support for aspiring nations. But upon the demise of the explicitly multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires the populations identified by these national movements as ethnic nations were more or less arbitrarily incorporated into a new generation of smaller successor states which in fact were also multi-ethnic in composition. And in recent years the same sort of ethnic nationalism once again inspired support for the partition of the larger successor states to the Habsburgs and Ottomans – Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Ironically, after generations of national aspiration, the new third generation of mini-states all still remain multi-ethnic. The only consolation for ethnic nationalists coming from all this state-making is perhaps that ethnic minorities have become majorities within the confines of ever smaller and increasingly impracticable territorial states. After a stout and protracted dose of nationalist intoxication these Lilliput countries are all now suffering, without exception, a severe and probably equally protracted economic hangover.

Regardless of the multi-ethnic composition of each of these new states, the historical experience of a single ethnic group remains an essential symbolic resource for cementing together the ideological amalgamation that renders each of them with legitimacy. And in the case of Croatia and Serbia, this ethnic self-awareness has been relentlessly fostered by self-declared "national" leaders as an emotional fountainhead from which to mobilize their followers in the redemption of lost territories. This is a region where recent generations of people, regardless of their changing citizenship in a succession of different states, have been effectively led to believe through the demagoguery and coercion of self-interested and dependent elites that they are members of a historical ethnic community (cf. Smith 1986). The myth of common origins and shared culture requisite to a sense of belonging in an imagined community is oriented toward a given people, rather than toward a given territory and the political institutions which have controlled and organized the populace of that territory.

In terms of identity formation we can say that the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in the one case inevitably revolve around the ambiguous category of a people; whereas in the other case they articulate with reference the historically legitimated territory and civil institutions of a particular state.

In sum, the making of modern states in this corner of Europe has been intimately related to what Anthony D. Smith (1986: 154ff.) has called "the politicization of ethnie."[2] But as we have seen the politicization of ethnicity does not produce states; rather it generates in some but not all cases aspirations for national autonomy. And these national movements involve people in quite diverse ways depending upon their position at the center or periphery or in the upper or lower classes of a society where social order is maintained by a bureaucratic state.

* * *

It is important that we distinguish clearly our use of the terms: *nation, state* and *nationalism* (cf., Walker Conner 1978: 381 Gellner 1983, Grillo 1980, Tilly 1975). According to Walker Connor (op. cit.) the essence of a nation is intangible and

[2] While R. D. Grillo's distinction between the "politicization of ethnicity" and "ethnicization of polity" in the introduction to a standard anthropological anthology of articles on the nation and state (1980: 7ff) appears similar, it unnecessarily assumes in contrast to A. D. Smith that national ideology is essentially ethnic.

based upon self-definition,[3] while the essence of a state can be objectified – it is "other-defined". Or, rephrased somewhat moer precisely by Ernest Gellner (1983: 4–7), "the state is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order," whereas "nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities."

It is not surprising that we encounter the term *nation-state* as a standard designation of the world's acknowledged territorial political entities. Engaging the sarcasm which often earmarks his better polemics Ernest Gellner writes (ibid.) that an essential tenet of nationalism is that nation and state "are destined for each other, that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy." Regardless of whether or not the hyphenated term, nation-state, is generic to nationalism, it is in any case an appealing rhetorical device for capturing the dynamic tension between the subjective experience of belonging to what Benedict Anderson (1983) has characterized as extensive imagined communities of largely anonymous individuals and membership in the de facto social group objectively defined as the citizenry of the jural-political territorial entities we know as modern states.

Let me adopt, for the sake of clarification, an excessively rigid definition of terms and claim along with Walker Connor (1978:389) that 'a nation is a self-aware ethnic group' *and* that it is not an objectively defined populace enjoying common citizenship in a territorial state.[4] This proposition leads to the deduction that our use of the term nation-state is in most cases a misnomer. Few, if any, contemporary states are coterminous with a single self-aware ethnic group; most are in fact multi-ethnic. And if we focus attention on the ways in which to word nation is compounded in common parlance, Connor alerts us to further inconsistencies. Consider the actual meaning of *international* in phrases such as *international relations, The International Monetary Fund* and *The International Court of Justice.* All these terms in fact refer exclusively to the conduct of relations between the formally recognized jural-political entities we know as states.

* * *

Returning to my assertion that nationalism should be understood as a manifestation of all societies incorporated by modern states, it then follows that the political legitimacy of these polities is founded upon parochially conceived ideologies which most commonly accommodate an ethnically heterogeneous citizenry. And, it is exactly here in the majority of cases where states, and especially new states, are not nations in the ethnic sense of the term, that the institution of citizenship becomes an essential strategic vehicle for implementing policy and formulating ideology which legitimates the state.

This state of affairs is quaintly demonstrated through the manner in which the former president of Austria, Rudolf Kirschschäger and the current Slovene president, Milan Kučan, have addressed their respective constituencies on the occasion of their annual New Year's speech; they began in both cases with the words, "fellow citizens", rather than "fellow Austrians" of "fellow Slovenes". In a region

[3] The suggestion that nations are "self-defined" obscures the complex social reality which lies behind the formation of large-scale imagined communities, a reality which implies hierarchy and the presence of a cultural and/or political elite which propagates such a collective self-understanding (see below).

[4] In contrast to Walker Connor, Gellner treats the term nation with greater retrospect and avoids associating it exclusively with ethnicity.

where claims for ethnic self-determination are more or less endemic to intra-state politics, it is in terms of citizenship rather than ethnic nationality that it is possible to address the residents of these countries as equals.

Regardless of their symbolic orientation nationalisms evoke the sentiments which Shils (1957), Geertz (1963) and others have attributed to primordiality. We all know that great wars have been fought for blood and territory. But they have also been fought to "make the world safe for democracy," or, "to stop the spread of Communism". Nationalisms producing the latter sentiments tend to sanctify the territorial political community of citizens, rather the ethnic community of a people. And the capacity of nationalism to mobilize people for war, regardless of its symbolic orientation, can be attributed to its status as an expressly secular and parochial religion which, according to Michael Herzfeld's (1992:34) rephrasing of Bruce Kapferer (1988), "demands the reification of an immanent and encompassing entity as the sole object of ultimate veneration."

I hold with Anthony D. Smith (1986) and Ernest Gellner (1983) that nationalism should be clearly distinguished from the concepts of nation and state. And I agree with them that nationalism is contingent upon the formation of the European bureaucratic state. But in contrast to the position which I share with Gellner, Smith (1986: 129ff.) conceptualizes the process of state-making in Europe as the "formation of nations" where ethnic self-awareness through its cultural manifestations is a component of the institutional and ideological transformation of historical polities into modern bureaucratic states. By attributing to the term nation both the empirical process of state-making and the subjective dynamics of affiliation with imagined communities that are rooted in some form of ethnic heritage, the perspective adopted by Smith and other ethno-historians (cf. e. g. Armstrong 1986, Hutchinson 1987) is phenomenologically closer to the European experience – an experience which is manifest in the popular usage and common understanding of the terms *nation-state* and *international* – terms which I, with the support of another North American, Walker Connor, rather artificially criticize above.

It is not the case – as past generations of historians, romantic scholars and certain contemporary Balkan leaders would have us believe that some ethnic groups are simply destined to become nations and that statehood is somehow mystically included in the bargain. As a de facto record of state-making, the current political map of Europe amply demonstrates great disparity between the geographical territories with which self-aware ethnic groups identify themselves and the de facto boundaries of the states within which they are in fact situated. Ethnic self-awareness under the tutelage of committed elites culminates in political movements (e.g., ethnically inspired regionalism) and nationalist parties, leads to the adoption of inter-state conventions protecting the rights of minorities and even propels successful campaigns for secession. But in virtually all cases the politicization of ethnicity in Southcentral Europe has not produced nation-statehood in the strict ethnic sense of the term.

It is essential that our model of state-making in this part of Europe build upon the received knowledge of cultural and social history. It is self-evident to most of us that the state first became an evolutionary option for the centralization of authority once a social division of labor had been achieved through the effective integration of relatively large sedentary agrarian populations (Gellner 1983). It is indeed ironic that the *mythomoteur* – the myth of political constitution – of many Balkan ethnic nations predates such a development, dating from a period of highly unstable nominal kingdoms and tribal alliances when the territorial state we know

today was unthinkable. The consolidation of modern bureaucratic state societies – or, the formation of nations, in the terms of Anthony Smith (1986: 129) – and with them the advent of nationalism are all contingent upon several pervasive changes in the social, economic and political integration of European society, changes which we normally associate with modernity.

In his book (1983), *Nations and Nationalism,* Ernest Gellner associates this transformation of European society with the relatively recent introduction of the industrial division of labor and its requirements for the standardization of language and culture through the introduction of inversal compulsory education with a curriculum espousing rationality and economic growth. Anthony Smith associates this fundamental change with a wider range of variables and with a longer period of history during which a "triple revolution" (1986: 131 ff.) occurred – unevenly, and with differing emphases in different parts of Europe. This has involved introduction of a specialized division of labor brought forth by capitalism, the radical effectivization of the administrative-military means of control and a cultural and educational revolution whereby the former preeminent role fo the church in these matters was taken over by the state which introduced institutions that stressed the standardization of language and culture according to the tenets of a secular "rational" bureaucracy.

Citizenship and politicized ethnicity in marginal communities

We can approach the way in which citizenship and politicized ethnicity manifest themselves in marginal communities by examining the current instability and disarray of central authority in war-torn Bosnia.

In a situation where the authority of civil government within the confines of the Bosnian state has been contravened by military coercion and outright terror, the politicization of ethnicity has been transformed into ethnic nationalism – movements for nation-statehood – which has violently gained a free hand in the formulation of politically relevant issues. And in the process – as is the case in all combat zones the guarantee and enforcement of basic civil and political rights have been more or less dismantled. The dual orientation of modern nationalism as both a civic-territorial and an ethnic legitimation of the state has been utterly reduced to emphasize the latter; the civilly inspired model of a multi-ethnic state lies under siege in the city of Sarajevo and other multi-ethnic centers.

While the transformation of politicized ethnicity into blatant ethnic-national military campaigns is dependent upon the consolidation of central authority in quasi-states, the status of citizenship is confined to situations and settings where military priorities do not prevail. When civil and political rights can no longer be enforced by the state, citizenship is reduced to a model for civil behavior in demilittarized settings and situations. A report from besieged Goražde during the winter of 1992–93 illustrates this point. It documented the capacity of the remaining townspeople to put in place an effective civil administration to cope with human and material devastation; in spite of the obvious chaos visited upon them these townspeople demonstrated that sense of public responsibility which we attribute to citizenship.

Countless multi-ethnic local communities in Bosnia have been arbitrarily consigned, through military conquest and coercion as well as by the terms of so-called peace proposals, to one or another of three quasi nation-states. The status of

citizen in these communities has been radically subordinated to imposed ethnic statuses.

It is my impression that the instigation of inter-ethnic terror within small face-to-face multi-ethnic Bosnian villages can be attributed in the vast majority of cases to the intervention of anonymous outsiders – in clear text, the invasion of foreign militiamen. It is not the case as tabloids and even statesmen would have us believe that ethnic hatred has been reawakened in these small communities. The Balkan interior may be the historic setting of blood vengeance, but ethnic hatred is something which only well protected elites and leaders can afford to foster. Rather these local populations have been forced at gunpoint to orient their behavior according to imposed and absolute ethnic categories which are alien to their everyday lives where their strongest sense of loyalty is most surely toward their families and local community, both of which are often multi-ethnic in composition. Ethnic nationalism is, I claim, fundamentally alien to such small scale communities and to their countless multi-ethnic conterparts situated virtually along every inter-state border dissecting the territory of Southcentral Europe.

* * *

Thus far I have emphasized the making and unmaking of states from the perspective of political scientists, historians and political sociologists. The relative importance of states and nations in the everyday lives of most people is in fact quite distorted by the massive scholarly attention devoted to them. While states and self-aware ethnic groups come and go, the villages, towns and cities where their flesh-and-blood constituencies live, survive them. These lesser polities, which in modern times have had no pretensions to be nations unto themselves, are the habitat of the primary processes of social and cultural reproduction which are the foundation of the state and of ethnic and civic national self-awareness. It is here, in the local communities and polities where people live out their lives in direct contact with one another and where participation in the public domain is the source of personal experience, that citizenship and politicized ethnicity become contingent to the conduct of their everyday affairs and to the pursuit of individual, family and local interests.

Citizenship relies upon the political institutions which organize such rights and obligations, whether they be a local commune or municipality, a kingdom or state, a federation or the International Convention on Human Rights (cf. Held 1989). Citizenship is not confined to the domain of state polities; rather, it is I suggest potentially manifest in the public domain of any politically incorporated group.

The institutionalization of citizenship during the course of modern state-making is thus not merely a matter of initiatives taken by elites at the centers of power or the result of social struggles perpetrated by newly enfranchised masses; it implies the accommodation of existing traditions of citizenship founded at varying levels of political incorporation which pre-date the institution of bureaucratic states. In contrast to nationalism which many argue is the creation of elites who are dependent upon the graces of those holding power at the center and the support of an enfranchised and dependent citizenry, citizenship is a manifestation of the public domain in political affairs wherever it has attained legitimacy in the conduct of the affairs of a political corporation. This may be a village or communal council, or organizations administering collective interests of one kind or another.

The long history of civic instutions in Alpine communities, such as those of the Three Country Region, has in fact led numerous anthropologists (e.g., Burns 1963) to refer to them as republics in miniature.

When local traditions of citizenship pre-date or evolve parallel to the introduction of modern state institutions a situation for political accommodation arises which provides an opportunity for consolidating the legitimacy of the state in terms of citizenship rather than ethnicity. In my own material from the Three Country Region (Minnich 1992) I have argued that this ideological accommodation succeeded in Slovene speaking villages of Carinthia, Austria, but failed, in their Italian counter–parts in nearby Val Canale. But my argument does not rest merely with the formal organizational accommodation of local and state institutions promoting citizenship and the local populace's positive evaluation of this fusion. Rather, I allude to the duality of social and cultural integration pointed out by Nadel among the Nupe. The integration of modern bureaucratic society, in contrast to the traditional Nupe state, is utterly dependent upon the standardization of codes for communication – the introduction of codes for communication and "rational" behavior which facilitate participation in a universe of discourse founded upon role specific and contractual relations which we associate with a *gesellschaftlich* social order. When localized processes of socialization persist which perpetuate a *gemeinshaftlich* social order then questions arise as to whether the citizens of such marginal communities have also succeeded in acquiring the interaction skills and adopted the values requisite to effective participation in state institutions. The citizenisation of society is not simply the institutionalization of rights and obligations within the polity of a state; it is also contingent upon socialization into a universe of discourse through which the institutions of state encounter its citizenry.

It is at the interface of social interaction and communication where citizens encounter state institutions in local life and engage in "the praxis of belonging to the state" (Borneman 1992) that I anticipate anthropological field research can provide insight into the ways in which the politicization of ethnicity and the citizenisation of society coalesce in the integration of collective self-images. For example, the manifestation of state bureaucracy in institutionalized encounters drawn from the context of everyday life has provided Michael Herzfeld (1992) with very fertile ground for exploring the symbolic roots of western bureaucracy and what he calls "the social production of indifference." While pursuing other arguments he ably demonstrates the coalescence of an ethnic model of human consociation within that institutionalized universe of social discourse where state sponsored citizenship rights and obligations are formally organized. Herzfeld thereby discredits the popularly held Weberian perception that bureaucratic institutions are impartial and rational, that they are a manifestation of a *gesellschaftlich* social order. In terms of symbolic interaction Herzfeld captures within the context of an apparently bureaucratic social order the dual dynamic of sociocultural integration alluded to by Nadel in his more purely functionalist presentation of an essentially pre-bureaucratic society.

* * *

It has been my intention in this talk to draw attention to both locally founded and centrally supported processes of sociocultural integration which underlie the making of bureaucratic states in contemporary Southcentral Europe. This dual

process has been conceptualized in terms of a contrast drawn between macro oriented theories of citizenship and politicized ethnicity. I have thus proposed a frame of reference against which it is possible to compare the political adaptation of marginal small-scale communities to supra-local institutions and ideology which organize the state in contemporary Europe. Finally, I suggest that the methodological predeliction of social anthropology for intensive micro-studies uniquely qualifies practitioners of our discipline for investigating institutionalized settings of communication and social interaction within both primary and secondary groups where citizenship and ethnicity coalesce in the construction of social persons and mediate the self-realization of individuals situated in the margins of contemporary bureaucratic society where patent collective self–images of either a civic–territorial or ethnic nature are usually confounded by local loyalties and predispositions.

Postscript:

I can think of few better reasons for sorting our the two phenomena which represent the dual focus of this talk – citizenship and politicized ethnicity – than an attempt to clarify some muddled representations of the Bosnian tragedy which we encounter daily in the media and in the so-called international political fora designated to cope with it. In the following commentary I rely heavily on Mark Thompson's excellent account of the ending of Yugoslavia (1992) – A Paper House.[5]

The perpetrators of death and destruction within the territory of former Yugoslavia identify themselves, for the most part, as morally upright men and women pursuing the justified territorial ambitions – the sacred mission – of their respective "nations." Perhaps not so much through their Balkanese way of saying things as through their dastardly deeds these truly diabolical figures have very successfully defined for the rest of world the nature of Yugoslavia's violent demise. It is the epic struggle of historic nations in quest of their own state; these "nation-statesmen" pursue no more and no less than that sacred right placed on the secular inter-state agenda by Woodrow Wilson: the right of *their* people to self-determination. During Bosnia's devastation over the past year we have been daily reminded through relentless sound bites in the international media that we are witnessing an intractable conflict of the *"Blut und Boden"* variety where, as Radovan Karadžić endlessly reiterates, "outside intervention would only increase the loss of human life."

The statesmen commissioned to resolve the Bosnian mess have drawn this "definition of the situation" to their bosoms. And this is understandable; it conforms so well with the stereotype of Balkan politics which underlies their professional training. Absorbed by the lessons of history (which inevitably reflect personal ties and the parochial national interests and historical Balkan alliances courted by their home countries), it seems to me that they have utterly dismissed the fundamentally new and objective reality of Bosnia's internationally acknowledged status as a sovereign state. Ever since the first shots were randomly fired into mass demonstrations convened in the streets of Sarajevo – demonstrations in support of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state – U.N. and Common Market peace envoys have failed to formulate a framework for negotiations which clearly acknowledges Bosnia's constitution and government as *the* only legitimate vehicles for promoting

[5] The following is a commentary composed during May, 1993, while working on the above lecture.

civil order. Inter-state conventions which assure the integrity of Bosnia's borders and prohibit armed intervention by foreign powers have been flagrantly violated while negotiations are lamely allowed to continue. Both the Carrington and the Vance-Owen-Stoltenberg proposals have been conceived *essentially* in terms of ethnic accommodation rather than as plans for implementing civil order within a multi-ethnic society. Efforts at mediation are formulated on the premise that Bosnia is constituted of apparently irreconcilable ethnic groups. – Have the British lords of peace really forgotten that the vast majority of Bosnians are not out to slit each other's throat, that the citizens defending Sarajevo represent a plurality of ethnic groups without parallel in former Yugoslavia? – Even though the organizations which have commissioned the peace negotiators formally acknowledged Bosnia's sovereignty before the onset of violence, the latter have themselves failed utterly to make this international legal reality the fundamental precondition for settlement of the conflict.

Many would have us believe that we are witnessing a civil war in Bosnia. If this is the case then at least the mediators of peace should insist that the parties to this conflict acknowledge their common subordination to some form of overarching state polity. This is not the case. These emissaries have chosen rather to negotiate with and placate individuals who through the undivided support of foreign regimes have attained at the barrel of a gun status as representatives of Bosnia's apparently self-declared nations. Only one of these representatives, the elected president of the Bosnian republic who most commonly is referred to as "the leader of the Muslims," is formally committed to the preservation of Bosnia as a sovereign multi-ethnic state. These international peace envoys, whose fundamental mandate is to promote stability within and among internationally recognized states, have quite incredibly recognized as legitimate partners to negotiation men who are explicitly committed to the destruction of the Bosnian state. From one day to the next they give a "fair and equal hearing" to violators of Bosnia's integrity as a sovereign republic, rather than make negotiations conditional on the combatants' respect for the civil order postulated by that state. Negotiation based upon the tangible entity of a state and relations between states has been forsaken in favor of dithering accommodation of the representatives of intangible nations. At a point in European history when a clear distinction between nation and state is called for, the comfortable convention of hopelessly confusing the two has conveniently prevailed.

As I have noted, the leaders of aspiring nations in this part of Europe have been ultimately forced to reconcile their ambitions with the political territorial reality of states which circumstances beyond their control have imposed upon them. If the constitutionally defined civil order of a Bosnian state, which is conceived to accommodate a multi-ethnic citizenry, fails to form the precondition for peace negotiations, this tragic land is destined to perish under the reign of nationalist terror. And once the blood is let, the formalized territorial partition of this combat zone will most surely fail to correspond with the de facto ethnic distribution of the remaining populace. The result will be imperfect vessels – multiethnic states.

In all fairness to the international envoys whom I unreservedly criticize, I acknowledge that their mandate to formulate and especially to enforce policy has been hopelessly constrained by the intransigence and utter cynicism of those bastions of Occidental civilization which appointed them. Furthermore, in order to make a point relevant to the topic of this lecture, I have greatly simplified the

complex contingencies which define their scope of action. By itself, the arena of inter-state politics, especially with regard to the unstable situation in the nuclear repository of Russia, has severely inhibited the formulation of a concerted inter-state plan for action – a plan which would placate those millions of TV viewers who call for termination of the bestiality visited upon Bosnia. While the media raise our indignation, they also unwittingly perpetuate the irrational dynamic of the conflict by making credible the Pol Pots of the Balkans. I cringed on May 8 when one of these merchants of death who daily entertains the international media with his pathological lies was respectfully portrayed in a Bergen newspaper (*Bergens Tidende,* May 8, 1993) as a poet and man of science.

REFERENCES

ANDERSON, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verson.

ARMSTRONG, John A. 1982. Nations before Nationalism. Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press.

BARTH, Fredrik. 1969. Introduction. In Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference. Edited by Fredrik Barth. 9–28. oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

BECK, Sam, and John W. Cole. 1981. Ethnicity and Nationalism in Southeastern Europe. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.

BLUM, Jerome. 1978. The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe. Limited Paperback Editions. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

BORNEMAN, John. 1992. Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation. Edited by E. Gellner, J. Goody, S. Gudeman, M. Herzfeld and J. Parry. Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

BURNS, Robert K., Jr. 1963. The circum-alpine culture area: A preliminary view. Anthropological Quarterly 36(3): 130–155.

COLE, John W., and Eric R. Wolf. 1974. The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley. New York: Academic Press.

CONNOR, Walker. 1978. A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a . . . Ethnic and Racial Studies 1(4): 377–399.

CONNOR, Walker. 1991. From tribe to nation? History of European Ideas 13(1/2): 5–18.

FISHMAN, Joshua A. 1985. The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival. Amsterdam: Mouton.

GEERTZ, Clifford. 1963. The integrative revolution: primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states. In Old Societies and New States. Edited by C. Geertz. New York: The Free Press.

GELLNER, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

GELLNER, Ernest, and John Waterbury. 1977. Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies. London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.

GIDDENS, Anthony. 1985. The Nation-State and Violence. London: Macmillan.

GRILLO, R. D. 1980. Introduction. In "Nation" and "State" in Europe: Anthropological Perspectives. Edited by R. D. Grillo. 1–30. London: Academic Press.

HELD, David. 1989. Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

HERZFELD, Michael. 1992. The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy. Edited by B. Kapferer and J. Gledhill. Global Issues. Oxford: Berg.

HUTCHINSON, John. 1987. The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State. London: Allen & Unwin.

KAPFERER, Bruce. 1988. Legends of People, Myths of State. Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.

KEANE, John. 1988. Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives. London: Verso.

MANN, Michael. 1987. Ruling class strategies and citizenship. Sociology 21(3): 339–354.

MARSHALL, T. H. 1973. Citizenship and social class. In Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. Edited by T. H. Marshall. Westport, CN.: Greenwood Press.

MINNICH, Robert Gary. 1992. Homesteaders and Citizens: An Ecology of Person and Self-realization Among Slovene Speaking Villagers on the Austro-Italian Frontier. Dissertation submitted on Dec. 8, 1992, to the School of Social Sciences, University of Bergen, as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Dr. philos. degree. 268 pp.

MORITSCH, Andreas, and G. Baumgartner. 1992. The process of national differentiation within rural communities in Southern Carinthia and Southern Burgenland, 1850–1940. Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups, 1850–1940 8: 99–143.

NADEL, S. F. 1967. Nupe state and community. In Comparative Political Systems: Studies in the Politics of Pre-industrial Societies. Edited by R. Cohen and J. Middleton. 293–337. New York: The Natural History Press.

RUSINOW, Dennison. 1988. Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism. Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Press.

SCHWARTZ, Theodore. 1978. The size and shape of culture. In Scale and Social Organization. Edited by F. Barth. 215–252. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

SHILS, Edward. 1957. Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties. British Journal of Sociology 7: 113–145.

SMITH, Anthony D. (ed.) 1992. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

SMITH, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

SWARTZ, Marc J. 1969. Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives. London: University of London Press.

TESTER, Keith. 1992. Civil Society. London: Routledge.

THOMPSON, Mark. 1992. A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. London: Vintage.

TILLY, Charles. 1975a. The Formation of National State in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

TILLY, Charles. 1975b. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. In The Formation of National State in Western Europe. Edited by C. Tilly. 3–83. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

TÖNNIES, Ferdinand. 1961. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. In Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory. Edited by T. Parsons, E. Shils, K. D. Naegele and J. R. Pitts. 191–201. New York: Free Press.

TURNER, Bryan S. 1990. Outline of a theory of citizenship. Sociology 24(2): 189–217.

VERDERY, Katherine. 1983. Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic and Ethnic Change. Berkeley: University of California Press.

VERDERY, Katherine. 1985. The Unmaking of an Ethnic Collectivity: Transylvania's Germans. American Ethnologist 12(1): 62–83.

WALBY, Sylvia. 1992. Women and nation. In Ethnicity and Nationalism. Edited by A. D. Smith. 81–100. Leiden: E. J. Brill.