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CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS FOR PEACE

In spite of the first impression evoked by the title, the intention of this article lies not in political practice itself but in the purely philosophical theorization of the “peace problem.” Today we have been plunged into the most developed stage of technology in the history of mankind. In this age we can hardly declare that the future of mankind will be bright; on the contrary, we are undeniably thrown into the most critical situation that our human race has ever experienced. Therefore we must first of all inquire into the kind of crises with which we are now confronted: what matters most is to recognize and grasp the present situation as it is. Our next problem will be to investigate the origins of such a crucial situation. By elucidating conceivable causes, the way to overcome this human difficulty will be opened up. Our final task, consequently, will be to consider how to overcome the difficulties we now face.

Therefore my discussions will develop in the following three steps:

1. Diagnostic Considerations: to recognize and grasp the difficulties mankind faces today as the crises of the whole of human beings.
 2. Etiological Attempts: to clarify the causes that induce these difficulties.
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3. Therapeutic Solutions: to find the way to extricate ourselves from this crisis and to provide for the further survival of mankind.

1. DIAGNOSTICS

“Mankind is now moaning, half-squeezed under the weight of the progress he has made himself”¹ — so wrote Bergson in 1932, in the last paragraph of the last chapter in his last book, *Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*. It is indeed a paradox that Bergson seems

to have predicted the contemporary situation of human beings, for he had maintained the impossibility to predict the future according to his original theory of time (*la durée*).² More than half a century has passed since Bergson’s prediction. And today his “prophecy” is ironically gaining reality and importance.

6 These days we are continually plagued with worsening environmental pollution: automobile exhaust, radioactive contamination, industrial waste water, mercury poisoning causing Minamata-disease, cadmium contamination and so forth. Besides, we have seen not a few instances of deformed monkeys. One of the most shocking events in the recent world is the appearance of a deformed cow with two heads and three eyes. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki many people are still suffering because of the acute aftereffects of the Atomic Bombings in 1945: the exposure to radioactivity either directly or indirectly induces mortal diseases such as cancer at a high rate. Nevertheless, this over-developed technology seems to contain in itself neither controlling faculties nor controlling facilities. This means that newer and newer nuclear weapons will be developed in the future.³

¹ Henri Bergson, *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, Alcan, Paris 1932; P.U.F., Paris 1962, p. 338.

² In his theory of time, *la durée*, the essence of time is regarded as “the progression of the organizing unification of present time and past time.” For Bergson “time future” is something inscrutable and unpredictable since prediction is supposed to belong to present time, not to future time. Cf. Bergson, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*. Alcan, Paris 1888; P.U.F., Paris 1961, p. 78, 138.

³ Cf. Klaus Held, “Wie entstand die Wissenschaft?”, in: Klaus Held, *Die Geburt der Philosophie: Zwei Vorträge in Griechenland*, Tadashi Ogawa (ed), Dogakusha, Tokyo 1987, p. 38—40. It is pointed out in this lecture that the Life-World Philosophy of Husserl and its precursor the presocratic origin of thinking have relevance and importance to ecological problems.

Is the “danger” to our survival brought about by something immanent in technology itself? Or, does the root of evil lie rather in the human being who uses and handles it? It is not difficult to answer the first question: no one cannot simply affirm the idea that technology contains evil in itself, considering how much benefit it has brought to human beings. Actually, technology has no doubt contributed to the increase of industrial productivity. As a result, contemporary Japan, for example, can afford to support almost three times the population compared with that of the Edo-period (1600—1868).

It is not easy, however, to answer the second question, which is much more complicated. It is likely that technology invites crisis. However, by bringing the essence of being to light, it may also serve to modify and improve this being for the benefit of the human race. Hence the source of every problem centers on the relation between technology and human beings. There are two modes of relation in question: direct and indirect relations. Today all of us are at least indirectly related to technology. But it is only those who are called scientists or engineers who are directly related to technology. First of all, our consideration should start with the direct relation because the development of science and technology directly owes to research and experiments achieved by scientists and engineers. A way to illuminate the threat of technology to mankind can be found in how these scientists live and how they cope with life. The alienation of technology from mankind mostly concerns this problem.

Scientists are inclined to do research without considering the intrinsic value or ethics or politics of the matter. In fact it was not until they consciously narrowed and restricted their own field of interest that the newer discoveries and inventions could be achieved. For this very reason, the danger of technology to human beings will increase in the future. Among other threats, nuclear weapons, the development of atomic energy and “Strategic Defense Initiative” possess unimaginably serious significance for the survival of the human race. As everyone knows today, the whole of mankind would expire in several weeks if an unlimited world war should break out. Even if some should survive, they would be directly exposed to fatal radioactivity under the radioactive clouds and rains; thus in due course of time, the whole human race would be totally destroyed.

In this greatest crisis that mankind has ever experienced, what could we, what should we philosophers do?

2. ETIOLOGY

The attitude of just waiting for the advent of the “Savior” (Heidegger) in order to prevent the extinction of the whole human race is ineffectually passive and unforgivable. It is absolutely important for us to see through to the origin from which this threatening crisis derives. Since modern science and technology have originated from Europe, it is necessary to confirm the kind of ideas and interpretations of the world on which European technology is based. For, although there was a germination of mathematics and technology both in China and Japan much earlier than in Europe,⁴ that modern science and technology were established only in Europe very likely owes itself to European metaphysics. In this respect, Cartesian philosophy definitely played an important role because Descartes pointed out that the meaning of the observations of Galileo Galilei lacked a metaphysical viewpoint. Thus the former made it his theme to consolidate the foundations of the latter.⁵ As a result, Descartes has given the distinctively metaphysical foundations to modern science which was begun by Galileo. Proceeding from this founding project Europeans have acquired a privileged axis for interpreting the world, and this axis has proven indispensable for the further development of science.

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Now, let us consider more deeply in what sense Cartesian philosophy has given the metaphysical framework to modern technology. We must admit at least two achievements Descartes has fulfilled:

(1) That he opened up the way to objectify the world including one’s own body by the ego=cogito which he had obtained via his method of doubt.

⁴ In China and Korea the three greatest inventions were achieved: paper, gunpowder and the technique of printing, which the Occident learned later from China. In both China and Japan the tradition of mathematics flourished. Cf. Tetsuo Tsuji, *Scientific Ideas in Japan*, Chouokoronsha, Tokyo 1974.

⁵ Descartes states in his letter to Mersenne (Oct. 11, 1638) as follows: “Je commencerai cette lettre par mes observations sur les livres de Galilée. Je trouve en général qu’ il philosophe beaucoup mieux que le vulgaire, en ce qu’ il quitte le plus qu’ il peut les erreurs de l’ École, et tâche à examiner les matiere physique par des raisons mathématique. /.../ Mais il me semble qu’ il manque beaucoup en ce qu’ il fait continuellement des digressions et ne s’arrete point a expliquer tout a fait une matiere; ce qui montre qu’ il ne les a point examinés par ordre, et que, sans avoir considéré le premieres causes de la nature, il a seulement cherché les raison de quelque effets particuliers, et ainsi qu’ il a bati sans fondement.” Rénatus Cartésius, *Correspondance*, Ch. Adam, G. Milhaud (ed.), tome. B/III., P.U.F., Paris 1941, p. 77.

(2) That he approved of man's domination over the world and nature by using one's own body as a tool.

In these two points, we can declare that the Cartesian philosophy anticipated the modern age. Cogito, however, is wont to be confined to the cave of the inner world, which is not found in the outer world. In this way the Cartesian philosophy indicates the inner world as being in a different dimension from the outer world. Thus Descartes divided the world into these two different dimensions. He created the inner world as a cave or a retreat, in which the ego can be safely protected from any danger or menace of the outer world without being exposed to it. This is what I call the "subject-object division," which anticipates the ontological trend of modern European philosophy.

The problem lies, however, not only in the metaphysical cognition of Descartes but also in the provisional morality that backed up his theoretical position. He attempted drastically to re-construct the universal system of science, morality and medicine, but in the meanwhile he could not help but go on living. This is why he created a provisional morality for his own life, by which he tried to steer through the impending necessities of his life. This morality is not theoretically developed enough to have decisive truth but it at least serves as one principle of life. It is, to put it in Platonic terms: doxa supporting episteme from behind. This principle of life consists of three maxims: (1) to abide by the customs and laws of one's own country, (2) to decide on the basis of one's own judgement without hesitation and (3) to try to overcome oneself rather than fate, to change one's own desire rather than the world's order. These maxims respectively indicate (1) an apolitical stance, (2) situational decisionism, and (3) the dualism of the ego-world distinction.

The apolitical stance results in the Epicurian attitude of de-politicization (*Entpolitisierung*).⁶ The second maxim of decisionism must be a matter of question even today because it functions in the political situation itself, regardless of the truth. Here, danger lies in the possibility of making whatever decision one likes provided one bears the responsibility for the deed. The third maxim, originating from the Stoa and Epictetus, results in the distinction between something within and something without the sphere wherein one's will dominates. The first and second maxims are related to one another, which indicates the

⁶ This is the expression of Klaus Held in his lectures at Wuppertal, Winter-Semester 1982—83.

justification of the possibility to live apolitically. It is the third maxim that realizes the subject-object division, freedom-necessity division and the inner-outer world distinction.⁷

Descartes affirmed “life in retreat,” and in this point he followed Epicurus.⁸ He regarded outer nature as being lifeless and worthless in the sense that he considered the world built distinctly outside the ego as fate or necessity. What the ego can control by its own will are just the modes of ego-consciousness. Epictetus in this respect had distinguished “the field at my own will” from “the field against my own will” and paralleled “free will” to “unfree will;” he had already anticipated the Cartesian distinction of inner-outer world.⁹ The Stoa, too, recognized the outer world as being indifferent (*adiaphoron*) to good or to bad, as the orthless field of existence.

It is upon his voluntarism that the Cartesian apolitical stance, the situational decisionism and the ontological dualism (subject-object division) ultimately converge.

10 Cartesian voluntarism is found in that the ego strengthens its own inner world by self-concentration, while the ego sets itself as a basis for the ego to objectify materialistic nature. It is not until the ego makes its own will as such the ultimate instance of decision in its situation where it finds itself that it can decide itself. Hence it is necessary to distinguish the inner from the outer world, to situate the former in a different dimension from the latter. Namely the ego controls only itself by will and it gives up being continuously related to the

⁷ Hermann Schmitz formulates this as the introjection theory of feelings and thoughts, and he regards this as the greatest fallacy philosophy has ever committed. Cf. Tadashi Ogawa (ed.), *Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit und der Gefühle von Hermann Schmitz*, Sangyo-tosho, Tokyo 1986, p. 41—42.

⁸ Descartes took the following quotation from Ovid as his favorite motto: *bene vixit, bene qui latuit*. (The one who hides lives well.) Cf. Matao Noda, *Descartes Studies, Collected Works of Matao Noda*, vol. 1, Hakusuisha, Tokyo 1981, p. 399—400. Epicurus had a similar idea although we cannot confirm his relation with Ovid philologically; he tried to find the peaceful state of the soul in living in retreat from the political world. It is generally believed that it was Epicurus who first uttered, “Live in retreat!” (*lathe biosas*). Cf. Epikur, Reclam, Stuttgart 1980, p. 70, 92. While Aristotle positively sought pleasure in intellectual activities, Epicurus, the hedonist, sought it solely negatively in the self-satisfaction (*autarcheia*).

⁹ Henrich Dieter, *Selbstverhältnisse*, Reclam, Stuttgart 1982, p. 112—114. Cf. Oldfather (ed.) Epictetus, Loeb Classical Library II., p. 482).

outer, political world. It goes without saying that this Cartesian standpoint underlies the research attitudes or ethos of today's scientists and engineers.

Today our scientists are inclined to dedicate themselves to seeking after truth within an ever narrower view according to the progressive specialization of science. For example, there can be no communication established between geologists of hard rocks and those of soft rocks because of the utter difference in their approaches and ideas.¹⁰ Moreover, as far as we understand it, this specialization is a condition absolutely necessary for science: specialization is the inevitable fate, for science always means "specialized science" (Fachwissenschaft). Therefore, as science is more and more specialized these days, the systematic knowledge and integration of philosophy must play the role of science-critique.¹¹

3. THERAPEUTICS

The focal point of our problem lies in the philosophical trend which started with Epicurus and the Stoa and was completed by Descartes. In order to break through the difficulties in which all human beings have been thrown, it would be very useful to consider what kind of philosophy had prevailed even prior to these Hellenistic-Roman philosophers.

No doubt the ancient Attic philosophers regarded politics as the most important thing for human existence, which is shown in Plato's ideality of the "philosopher as king" as well as in the Aristotelian definition: "the human being is a political animal".¹²

Aristotle, for example, pursued the modes of human being in the polis (Nation in relation to happiness. As is well-known, his ethics was a part of and an introduction to political science.

That Aristotle regarded the polis in which man aims to "live well" in a cooperative way as being exclusively self-sufficient and complete, is evidence that he

¹⁰ E. Laszlo, *The systems View of the world*, Oxford 1972, p. 3.

¹¹ A. N. Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, New York 1938, 1968, p. 3.

¹² Aristotle, *Politica*, 13 a, p. 3—4; Platon, *Respublica* 501 d—e.

considered all political problems merely in terms of domestic politics (oikia). This is obviously the limitation of Aristotle, because our contemporary politics must be considered within international relations in most cases; it is exactly international politics that will most likely induce the important events that will decide the destiny of the whole of mankind.

Aristotle, on the other hand, assumed the holistic attitude that the nation precedes both the family and the individual, since “the whole must necessarily be prior to the part”.¹³ This is his fundamental theory argued, for instance, in the *Metaphysics*: parts found the whole and the whole is contracted into parts. In this proposition of “whole and part,” a part is always “a part of the whole and one part together with the rest of parts complementarily found the whole.” In the first place “a finger”, for example, means “a finger of a human body” and this finger (a part), is equipped with the whole of the human body. According to Aristotle, “the semicircle is defined by means of the circle. And the finger is defined by means of the whole body; for a finger is a particular kind of part of a man”.¹⁴ It is utterly impossible that a hand or a foot can exist as living flesh after the whole body is destroyed, unless the whole body is made of stone. Every part is defined from the viewpoint of how it functions (to ergo) within the whole and of what kind of ability (te dynamei) it possesses. Therefore if a hand or a foot loses the ability or the function either as a hand or a foot, every part is no longer the same thing and only the name remains the same.¹⁵ “It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature¹⁶ to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole ...”¹⁷

Today it may be impossible to avoid a coming third world war, and it may be difficult for the human beings to maintain peace and prosperity, unless we consider the control of the development and production of the nuclear weapons from an international perspective. For this problem, it would be very useful to expand Aristotelian thought and to interpret it more deeply. What we must do

¹³ Aristotle, op.cit., 1253 a, p. 20—21. The quotation is taken from *Loeb Classical Library*, Rackham (ed.), p. 10.

¹⁴ Arist. *Metaphysica*, Z. 1035 b, p. 9—10.

¹⁵ Arist. *Politica*, 1253 a, p. 21 onward.

¹⁶ Arist. op.cit. 1253 a, p. 26. Here I follow Rackham in omitting kai after fusei; otherwise we are forced to read “the state abides by nature”.

¹⁷ Arist. op.cit. 1253 a, p. 25—28.

is to stop regarding the state as being self-sufficient and autonomous even on the international horizon. What the individual is to the state, the state is to international world: every state must contribute a certain function and ability to the wholeness of world politics. As Aristotle asserted, the “part-whole relation” can be relocated to political dimensions.

Now that we see science and technology, and especially nuclear weapons, threatening our future survival, the pursuit of individual happiness must benefit all human beings for the sake of their survival and prosperity. Aristotle thought of the whole at one time in the dimension of one body (living flesh) and at another time in the dimension of one state. Pursuing the Aristotelian holistic thought, however, we must grasp human existence in situational wholeness and consider each individual happiness in relation to the general wholeness of the world situation.

Therefore both the Stoic and the Epicurian philosophy, as well as the Cartesian individual morality and situational decisionism, are insufficient because they eventually concern personal matters which make them retreat from the world political situation. Although we must seriously and urgently think of the global survival of the human race, neither situational decisionism nor personal morality can raise the question of the possibility of human survival. Even though Cartesians intend to bear the responsibility for the result of a decision, it will be nothing but a personal decision. On the contrary, as far as I understand it, only politics can save the human race on the threshold of destruction.

Well then, how could we realize the wholeness of the attribution of an individual to the world in an enhanced way? The answer will concern the therapeutic prescription I am about to present now. What we must do now is to probe some way or other to overcome the philosophy and ethics of voluntarism and private individualism developed from the Stoa to Descartes. This is the only way to pass through our present crisis, at least in principle.

As we have already discovered, philosophy and morality, especially those of Descartes, have invited our present crisis in terms of (1) the apolitical, (2) the dualistic ontology of ego-world, and (3) situational decisionism, all of which are ultimately controlled by Cartesian voluntarism. This voluntarism threatens the fate of mankind in the present age, firstly because it tries to control nature by objectifying nature, secondly because it adheres to an apolitical and pri-

vately narrowed view. Such a tendency corresponds with the attitude of scientists who pursue specialized research today.

Then, how could we ever cope with this voluntarism? In order to answer this question, we must beforehand make sure of the essence of the “will” which is the foundation of this voluntarism. What is the essence of the will? The will sets up an aim and achieves it. The aim of the will lies furthest from the correlation of the object that the will works upon. The working will tries to achieve its ultimate aim through the object it directly works upon., even through this correlation. In this essence the function of the will is none other than the setting-up and the fulfilling of an aim. Hence we must ask what does the “setting up” mean? To set up means to stand something as something in front of one’s eyes, distinguishing it from other things. To stand generally means to put something in front of one’s eyes through the following two processes:

(1) First of all, something put in front of one’s eyes is different from the function of standing. “This desk” I am setting up in front of my eyes, for example, apparently appears by dint of the function of my setting it up, but it is not the function itself.

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(2) Something set up in front of one’s eyes differs from other things, which are not yet explicitly set up. That this desk appears to me indicates that a window or a curtain behind me does not appear as something set up. (Needless to say, these things are set up implicitly.)

In the dimension of sight which leads the other four senses, the will no doubt functions: one opens one’s eyelids trying to see something, turns one’s eyes upon a certain direction and adjusts the lens to the most appropriate focal distance. What Husserl called kinaesthetic consciousness is founded on the will as far as it is intentional. Sight is volitional setting-up. The world, the whole of being, nature, political objectives, planned projects, the supposition of enemies — ask if these are set up and are enabled by the setting-up of the will. A set-up objective must be fulfilled and penetrated. It is the will that fulfills and penetrates. The will contains in itself self-affirmation and self-setting-up. The will can set up the other simply because it concerns itself affirmation and positing. This will can be interpreted in terms of the substantialistic, self-causal aseity. The substance exists as *causa-sui*.

To continue our argument above, does it logically follow that each national will and each individual will are thoroughly set up self-affirmatively? In order to answer this question, we must first consider each individual's will in the dimension of politics. Each individual possesses what are called "human rights" so that he should not be violated either by the state or by any other person without any legitimate reason. This human right is nothing other than the unifying, free will that we are going to call the "original-right" (Urrecht). Like each individual person, each individual state in the present international world possesses the sovereignty and the unifying free will, which should not be violated by any other country. Namely, the free will of a state possesses autonomous independence, the free will and the ability to make decisions. However, is it permitted for each national will to decide whatever it pleases freely and self-affirmatively? The answer to this question is, of course, "no." For in the world, every matter is correlated to each other, and so if one country develops new weapons, it inevitably affects other countries. If one country changes its economic policy, other countries are subject to the influence. Therefore it is apparent that each national will should not, cannot behave freely and ego-centrally. If the free will of each individual person is unconditionally permitted, what Hobbes called "the war of all against all"¹⁸ is bound to arise. Likewise, unless each nation controls its behavior, "the war of every state against every state" is sure to break out.

This demand that the third world war should not break out, the demand that the whole of mankind should make human survival our common human condition in order to guarantee each individual's happiness—these are the absolute demands for peace that we must fulfill today. To consider these matters seriously, each national will must be necessarily controlled by and adjusted to each other exactly in the situational, holistic coherence of the world. On each individual person's level, likewise, the individual free will and "original right" must be controlled and adjusted to each other so that the order of the whole state might be maintained. Each person is requested to voluntarily restrict his or her original right or to give up a part of his or her right. Although the national will is supposed to be self-affirmatively free and autonomous, the nation must restrict this original right on the basis of its free will. Freedom can be protected only by freedom. As long as each state tries to advance only its own agenda, world peace and order will be so fragile that it is likely to be destroyed. This loss

¹⁸ T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, C. B. Macpherson (ed.), Penguin Classics, p. 185—186.

would also be the loss of the foundation of the being of the provocative state. Namely, the self-will of a state is doomed to the destruction not only of the whole of mankind but of each individual person.

As we have discussed, it is the partial limitation of the original right of a state that conditions the reciprocal restriction and the reciprocal approval among countries. Only under these conditions, will coexistence and co-prosperity be possible. What kind of theory, then, can prove the relative independence of the will by the reciprocal approval among countries? We must now find reasonable grounds for this situation.

As far as I believe, what theorizes this relative independence of the national will concerns the structural philosophy of politics. We can find some preceding forms of the structural theory already in Heraclitus, Parmenides of Elea (especially in the treatment of doxa), Schelling, and Hegel. More directly, however, this theory originates from Husserl's profound, third logical investigation, "On the Theory of Wholes and Parts," in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*.¹⁹

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The celebrated structural linguist Roman Jakobson not only used to read this investigation of Husserl with much pleasure all his life, but he even used some quotations from this dissertation in one of his most important works.²⁰

Next, let us see what intention and theme the structural-ontological theory possesses. It starts with the negation of the affirmative setting-up of self based on an item having independent substantiality. Each item can exist only in relation to other items. For this, it is necessary to negate each item's substantiality, self-dependence, self-setting-up and self-affirmation. This is the main feature of the structural theory. Coseriu, for instance, thinks that the opposition between two items is neutralized and converted into an inter-complementary motive so that it is unified as an inevitable moment in wholeness: the principle of this neutralization is said to be characteristic of European Structuralism.²¹ Jakobson had linguistically elucidated this neutralization in the reciprocal relation of

¹⁹ E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II/1, Niemeier, Tübingen 1968.

²⁰ R. Jakobson, *Kindersprache, Aphasie und allgemeine Lautgesetze*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1972.

²¹ Eugenio Coseriu, *Lezione di Linguistica Generale*, Tadao Shimomiya (ed.), Sanshusha, Tokyo 1978, p. 132—133.

each item embedded in the system. The oppositions of distinctive features are simultaneously neutralized. I strongly believe we can convert the principal theme of this structuralist theory into an elucidation of political dynamics. This is exactly the intentional subject for the structural philosophy of politics. Now let us consider this political philosophy in pursuit of international peace and analyze various conditions of its possibility.

First of all we must clarify some principles of the structuralist theory as ontological premises. What we must do is extract the ontological meaning of “structure,” for although each structural theory implicitly postulates “structure” and the concept of “structure” is used as a matter of fact, no one has yet explicitly brought structure as such to light. The structural theory approves of the following four principles as axes: (1) system, (2) function, (3) opposition, and (4) neutralization. First, system is not a potpourri of items and partial moments; it is wholeness itself in which each item is arranged in a certain order. The wholeness possesses significance that surpasses a mere sum of partial moments. This significance enables the wholeness of the relation insofar as one item indicates another item, which in turn indicates still another item. Second, function means the contribution of a certain result to the significance of the wholeness by each item within the system, playing a certain role in relation to others.

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Function indicates that each country as each item embedded in the system is concerned in the total situation of the world in some way or other. Third, opposition is seen in that while individual states are relatively opposed to each other, they occupy their own positional value (*Stellenwert*) not only in the natural condition of each state’s spatial difference but in the opposed relation of the national will and economic interests. The opposition between countries is exclusive to each other.

Opposition is “neutralized” in the system, which means that oppositions are modified to be “restricted oppositions” in the whole system. In this “conditioned opposition” each item becomes an inevitable aspect of the wholeness. Thus, the neutralized and inter-complementary opposition can be converted to interdependence. *Mutatis mutandis*, these fundamental themes may be helpful to grasp the political situations of today’s world. Wholeness means the oneness of the world situation, which, however, is being exposed to the global crisis. Opposition means the reciprocally-exclusive relation between two items; one item is utterly opposed to another so that they are non-exchangeable.

“Neutralization” complements “Opposition”: owing to the former principle, the power of each country is converted into an intercomplementary opposition, namely inter-dependence without destroying the whole order. As what we have seen clearly shows, the principle of the neutralization is the most important in the sense that it leads to the neutralization of oppositions and their conversion into inter-complementary inter-dependence. What is even more momentous is that when this principle of neutralization functions in the dimension of world politics, the very crisis that mankind now faces in the integration of the political situation functions paradoxically affirmatively. Human beings are now marginally surviving under various nuclear umbrellas. Therefore, in order to be able to maintain world peace for our further survival we must grasp international politics according to structuralism. It is not our task here to systematize and fulfill concrete studies of politics. What we are about to do is to give grounds for the various theories of politics which can be realized only by actual experiences. Our approach is to pursue fundamental possibilities of international politics in a structural-ontological way.

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Let us summarize our argument. The sovereignty of each state is set up and approved as independent, free will. Each state, however, must control its original right to some extent in order to unify political situations and to maintain world peace. This voluntary self-control means to give up a part of its original right for the maintenance of world order. Nobody can deny the fact that “the best state (*politeia ariste*) is the order (*taxis*) in which anybody whosoever could act in his best condition and live in felicity.”²² Then, where is this “partial will” or “the power controlled and resigned” which has been brought by the restriction of each original right bound for? Is the United Nations a means to concentrate powers turned over from each country under its organization? Or should we approve what is called a world-government, which may signify a new global government of concentrated powers and put it above all the nations? The setting-up of this world-government would newly bring a paradox of powers even though each state had approved it. The accumulation of powers turned over little by little from each state would produce a new intensively-concentrated power. The world-government would heap up granted rights and wills so as to grow into a huge body of powers, which might incur the danger of robbing each state of its independence and freedom. Schelling once discerned that

²² Aristotle, *Politica*, 1324 a, p. 23—24. Here Rackham’s translation (Loeb) is inappropriate in our context, and so I have re-translated this passage by directly consulting the original Greek text.

the relation between that which depends and that from which it depends would be extinguished if one of them were to be absorbed into the other; it is not until we give that which depends a root of freedom and independence that true dependence is established. Therefore, if the world-government should violate the independence of each state, the danger that Schelling deeply surmised would arise in the political dimension. Namely, this paradox of political powers is exactly what Schelling called “dependence without the depending” (*Abhängigkeit ohne Abhängiges*).²³ Hence, if a superpowerful world-government robs each state of its independence, each state would lose its root of selfness and freedom, only to be a dead substance without freedom. Then, how can we discover a way out of this dilemma? That we approve of national sovereignty and the unified will, while we disapprove of such a concentrated organ as a world government — is this a declaration of a kind of anarchism in the dimension of world politics? Obviously there is nothing worse than anarchism, for it would confound all order. A system without order would destroy not only peace but also the happiness of each person, of each state. However, it would be possible for each of us to trust a “functional dependency” between countries by making the menace of a world war and the crisis of human demise an unalterable nucleus. What enables this functional dependency is the restriction and when occasion demands, even the negation of substantiality and self-dependency of each national sovereignty. As long as the whole world is grounded upon the structural relation of functional dependency between countries, it could wisely continue to survive. The above-mentioned theory results from structural truth. We must sever ourselves from the tradition of the decisionism of Hobbes, Descartes, Kant and Lübke, in the sense that truth should be pursued and realized in the political dimension as well. What Lübke means by “decisionism” is that truth should be excluded from the political dimension but that appropriateness instead should be approved in the political dimension.²⁴ Hobbes liberated people from the duty that they must fall into line with what is generally regarded as truth; he indicated freedom and decision-possibility of privacy.

Descartes liberated people from the political upheaval and the menace of a possible revolution by his famous dualism, theory-practice; he insisted that we

²³ F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Sämtliche Werke*, I—7, Cotta, Stuttgart 1861, p. 346.

²⁴ Hermann Lübke, “Dezisionismus”, in: *Praxis der Philosophie, Praktische Philosophie, Geschichtstheorie*, Reclam, Stuttgart 1978, p. 61—77.

20 need not be so radical in practice as in theory, which attitude is plainly found in his morality. Kant liberated us from the duty that we must find objectively theoretical assurance in our acts, because the will should be free and autonomous. These three philosophers have the same premise in common: "ego as an inner asylum." You might remember in the second part of this article I was utterly opposed to the idea of a separate inner world. Hermann Lübbe, however, cannot help but accept decisionism as long as the principle of the majority functions in the political dimension. For one thing, decision by the majority is not always based on phenomenological truth, as many people have already pointed out. Besides, decision by the majority not only demands responsibility from decision-makers but finds them long afterward. Lübbe approves of decisionism because he thinks that we should pursue neither absoluteness nor truth in the political dimension but that we should be content with the relativity that it is appropriate to decide on such and such in a certain situation. Lübbe's way of thinking originates from the bitter experiences of religious wars that have broken out over and over again in Europe concerning the problem of religious truth. The most typical religious war was, needless to say, the Thirty Years War (1618—1648) between Catholics and Protestants. The main cause of these religious wars was their will to solve various problems of religious truth politically. This political solution tends to result in war.

Lübbe thinks that pursuing the truth of salvation in the politics does not lead to creating peace. The important element for peace is rather the theory of tolerance and the basic insight of decisionism can be seen in this theory. It is nothing other than the function of appropriateness in the situations. That something is appropriate in a certain situation does not always mean that it is the structural-phenomenological truth.

Lübbe's decisionism insists that confessions and decisions in situations do not need rational arguments. Thus, the consciousness of responsibility resulting from decisionism replaces the reasonable argument. The significance of decisionism for us today might be that the political predominance of world peace is superior to any other universal consensus concerning truth. What drove Lübbe to decisionism was the pursuit of peace and tolerance; he insisted on the separation of the truth of religious salvation from the political dimension. Namely, the motive was a dualistic separation of the secular right from the sacred right:

“Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s. Render unto God the things that are God’s.” According to Lübbe, this can be summarized as the separation of truth from appropriateness.

Here I do suspect Lübbe’s motive for decisionism would be admitted only within the Christian tradition, for Buddhism, for example, has hardly experienced religious wars in the Christian sense. From the beginning Buddhism was tolerant to other religious and Buddhist sects.²⁵ Therefore, if we take Buddhism as a criterion of consideration, Lübbe’s motive for decisionism would lose its ground. I must confess I am openly opposed to Lübbe. Buddhist truth should be pursued in the political dimension, and if people really want world peace, they are unconsciously practicing tolerance. Today the whole world might learn much from Buddhism. Now, let me present the principal two theorems of Buddhism: Engi and Ho. As far as I understand, these theorems will give us the theoretically positive support to maintain world peace. Moreover, these Buddhist ideas are indeed quite close to the structural-phenomenological philosophy of politics. Last but not least, let me expound the background of my structural-phenomenological theory by delving into the traditional truth and ideas of the Orient. Buddhism is a religion both speculative and philosophical. Its spirit is so tolerant and comprehensive that its practitioners have never suffered martyrdom protesting against political opposition.²⁶ As I have mentioned above, the important ontological principles are Engi and Ho.²⁷ En means “being dependent on” and Gi means “to happen”. Therefore Engi means that anything happens dependent on something else, which signifies, in my understanding of the term that we see each being from the viewpoint of functionalism. In other words, each being exists, neither independently nor self-dependently nor substantially; everything is in dependent-relativity with each other. Ho (Dharma) is a word derived from the verb “to preserve”; it means both “the preserving law” and “each preserved being”. The meaning of Dharma can be grasped by the notion of functionalism. For example, the ego does not exist substantially but what really exists is rather the functioning Ho. As we have seen, since Ho possesses two meanings, the whole of being and the preserving law, any existing being in the totality of the world, everything from a stone, a beast, a tree, a mountain and a river to the human being, supports each other

²⁵ Gajin-Masato Nagao, *Daijyo Butten (Mahayana Sutra)*, Chuokoronsha, Sekaino Meicho 2, Tokyo, p. 7—8.

²⁶ Op. cit.

²⁷ Op. cit., p. 25—27.

inter-dependently. The same thing is also true of the practical, political dimension; every country, every group, every individual can actually function only in the totality of the world. They manage to co-exist dependent on each other.

Thus it is evident that these two Buddhist theorems assert the fundamental relationalism and functionalism, namely the structuralism, of all beings. In a Buddhist sutra called Kongo-hannya-kyo (Diamond-sutra) the major proposition is: "S is not S; therefore S is S." The actual citation is as follows: "Because /.../ the idea of truth is namely not the true idea, therefore Nyorai (mediator of truth) says that it is the true idea."²⁸ What does this contradictory proposition really mean? The negation of the substantiality of something means that the selfness of something exists only in relation to the otherness. Borrowing Keiji Nishitani's remark,²⁹ fire does not burn itself but other things except itself such as trees, houses and furniture; therefore fire can be fire. Likewise, eyes do not see themselves but other things; therefore eyes can be eyes. Namely, in the very center of the functioning fire or the functioning eyes there lies self-negation, which ultimately leads to fruition in self-realization in relation to otherness. There are two modes of the will: self-will and will-unto-tolerance-and-peace. The self-will strives toward war and sets up enemies, which is always bound to the one-sidedness of the whole situation in the world. This will is blind to the other side of the wholeness in which the human being is thrown. The will-to-tolerance is intended to be the realization exactly of peace, that is, the will to see the structuralized wholeness of the crucial world situation. This seeing is the praxis to peace.

²⁸ Op. cit., p. 78.

²⁹ Keiji Nishitani, *What is Religion?*, Sobunsha Tokyo 1961, p. 131—132.