

# Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

ISSN 2463-9575  
September 2021 – 23/št. 3



REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA  
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO  
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

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## PRIHODNOST SKUPNE VARNOSTNE IN OBRAMBNE POLITIKE EU

*»Da bi dosegli svoje politične cilje, moramo uporabiti vse svoje zmogljivosti, izkoristiti evropsko trgovinsko in naložbeno politiko, finančno moč, diplomatsko prisotnost, zmogljivosti za določanje pravil in razvijajoče se varnostne in obrambne instrumente.«*

*Josep Borrell, intervju, EJIL: Talk, 29. oktober 2020*

## THE FUTURE OF THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

*»To reach our political goals, we must use the full range of our capacities, to capitalize on Europe's trade and investment policy, financial power, diplomatic presence, rule-making capacities, and growing security and defense instruments.«*

*Josep Borrell, interview, EJIL: Talk, 29 October, 2020*



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## UVODNIK

### PRIHODNOST SKUPNE VARNOSTNE IN OBRAMBNE POLITIKE EU

Maja letos se je začela Konferenca o prihodnosti Evrope oziroma posvet, na katerem lahko sodelujemo državljanke in državljani Evropske unije ter predstavimo svoje predloge in mnenja. Sodelujemo lahko individualno ali skupinsko, s strokovnim, znanstvenim ali povsem osebnim prispevkom se lahko vključimo v razprave, dogodke oziroma organiziramo dogodek v svoji skupnosti o eni izmed prednostnih tem – vse je predstavljeno na posebnih skupnih spletnih straneh EU in držav članic.

Hkrati na institucionalni ravni Evropske unije nastaja Strateški kompas, dokument, ki naj bi združil, uskladil in poenotil vse predloge, razprave in izhodišča o prihodnosti Unije tako, da jih bo mogoče tudi čim bolj uresničiti.

Tokratna tematska številka Sodobnih vojaških izzivov se v okviru razprave o prihodnosti Evropske unije posebej osredotoča na področje skupne varnostne in obrambne politike. Nastala je v sodelovanju z Novo univerzo v okviru projekta Integralna teorija o prihodnosti Evropske unije (J5-1791), ki ga vodi Matej Avbelj in financira Agencija Republike Slovenije za raziskovalno dejavnost.

O evropski varnostni in obrambni politiki je bilo že veliko napisanega. Že leta 1998 sta se v Saint-Malu sestala takratni francoski predsednik in angleški ministrski predsednik ter podpisala izjavo o oblikovanju evropske varnostne in obrambne politike, vključno z evropsko avtonomno vojaško silo, ki bo sposobna delovati v primerih, ko se Nato ne bi odločil za vojaško sodelovanje. Leto pozneje je bil kot neposredna posledica vrha v Saint-Malu v Helsinkih oblikovan glavni cilj, v okviru katerega je bilo leto 2003 določeno kot ciljni datum za ustanovitev evropskih oboroženih sil z do 60.000 vojaki. Evropska unija cilja še vedno ni uresničila, ponovno pa ga je obudila Globalna strategija Unije iz leta 2016 z nekaterimi novimi pristopi k starim izzivom. Tako so nastali med bolj znanimi dejavnostmi Evropski obrambni sklad, Stalno strukturno sodelovanje, Usklajeni letni pregled obrambe in drugi.

V ospredju razprave o prihodnosti skupne varnostne in obrambne politike Unije so spremembe v mednarodnem varnostnem okolju, ki vplivajo na Evropsko unijo in dogajanje v njej ter v njenem sosedstvu. Analiza varnostnih groženj in z njimi povezana tveganja predstavljajo prvi korak pri nastajanju prihodnjega strateškega okvirja, ki ga bodo dorekli razpravljavci na nacionalnih ravneh in ga uskladili na evropski ravni. Med najpomembnejše dosežke bomo šteli usklajene dogovore na področju doseganja glavnega cilja iz leta 2003, in sicer Evropsko unijo kot samostojnega akterja na področju varnosti in obrambe. Ta naj bi imel več geopolitične moči, ki bo, kot se je leta 2019 izrazil Josep Borrel, visoki predstavnik EU za zunanje zadeve in varnostno politiko, »znan uporabljati tudi jezik moči«. Pot do tega cilja ne bo lahka. Medsebojno usklajevanje sedemindvajsetih članic na varnostnem in obrambnem področju je zahteven proces, ki ga je treba tudi ustrezno umestiti v odnosu do strateškega varnostnega partnerja Nata. Najzahtevnejša in pomembna pa bo njegova umestitev v obrambno načrtovanje držav članic.

Republika Slovenija prav v času nastajanja pomembnih sprememb za Unijo, ki so lahko odločilne v prihodnosti, predseduje Svetu Evropske unije. S to tematsko številko Sodobnih vojaških izzivov želimo sodelovati pri slovenskem prispevku v tem dogajanju.

O pomenu odpornosti Evropske unije v kognitivnem smislu piše **Igor Senčar**, ki v prispevku *Kognitivni vidiki evropskih varnostnih in obrambnih izzivov* na primeru ruskega zavzetja Krima razloži, kako je prišlo do nekega pojava, kako smo ga kolektivno zaznali, razumeli in kaj smo se iz njega naučili. Sodobna evropska družba ima s svojo blaginjo in visokimi demokratičnimi standardi tudi pomanjkljivosti, ki jih je treba ozavestiti, da bi dosegli večjo odpornost družbe v prihodnje.

Eden izmed načinov, kako bi lahko dosegli večjo moč Unije, je tudi večja vloga njene skupnosti oziroma njenih ustanov, kar **Katarina Vatovec** predlaga v prispevku *Komunitarizacija obrambne politike Evropske unije*. Spremembe so nujne tudi pri načinu sprejemanja odločitev, v kar spada način glasovanja, ki bi moral biti večinski, da bi lahko dosegli večjo učinkovitost te politike.

V prispevku *Evropska varnost in obramba: preboj ali nadaljnje životarjenje* **Dick Zandee** ugotavlja, da mora v Uniji na področju varnostni in obrambe priti do sprememb. Dolgoletno dogovarjanje in usklajevanje na tem področju, ki se kaže predvsem v njenih dokumentih in ne v dejanjih, se mora končati. Avtor predlaga konkretne spremembe, ki so potrebne za doseg tega cilja.

Dvajset let delovanja Evropske unije na področju mednarodnih operacij in misij dokazuje, da je ta pomemben mednarodni akter. Podrobnosti o njenem delovanju predstavlja **Aleksandra Koziol** v prispevku *Misije in operacije kot orodje za oblikovanje delovanja EU na globalni ravni*. Ugotavlja, da je epidemija virusa covid-19 povzročila preusmeritev pozornosti Unije z globalnih na notranje zadeve, zaradi česar je potreben premislek o prihodnosti tudi na tem področju.

V okviru slovenskega predsedovanja Svetu Evropske unije **Jelena Juvan** v prispevku *Prihodnost skupne varnostne in obrambne politike in majhne države članice* razpravlja o tem, kaj majhna država lahko doseže ob dejstvu, da Uniji ni uspelo uresničiti svojih odločitev iz preteklosti. Pomembno pa je, ali je področje skupne varnostne in obrambne politike zasnovano tako, da bi lahko predstavljalo odgovor na sodobne varnostne grožnje.



## EDITORIAL

### THE FUTURE OF THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

In May this year, a process called the Conference on the Future of Europe was launched, which serves as a platform in which the citizens of the European Union can take part. In this context, we all have the possibility to make suggestions and give opinions. We can participate as individuals or in groups; with a professional, scientific or purely personal contribution we have the possibility to participate in discussions and events or organize an event in our community on one of the priority topics. All this takes place on special common websites of the EU and the Member States.

At the same time the Strategic Compass is being developed at the institutional level of the European Union. It is a document that is designed to unite, harmonize and unify all proposals, discussions and starting points on the future of the Union so that they can be implemented to the greatest extent possible.

The above-mentioned facts served as the starting point for this thematic issue of Contemporary Military Challenges, which, in the context of the debate on the future of the European Union, specifically focuses on the area of Common Security and Defence Policy. It was designed in cooperation with the Nova univerza-New University as part of the project entitled an Integral Theory of the Future of the European Union (J5-1791), led by Matej Avbelj and financed by the Slovenian Research Agency.

Much has been written on European security and defence policy. What can be summed up on this occasion is the fact that as early as 1998, the then French President and the British Prime Minister met in Saint-Malo and signed a statement on the creation of a European security and defence policy, including a European autonomous military force capable of operating in cases where NATO would not opt for military participation. A year later, as a direct result of the Saint-Mal summit in Helsinki, the »main goal« was set, setting the year of 2003 as the target date for the establishment of the European armed forces with up to 60,000 troops. However, the European

Union has still not reached this main goal. It was again revived by the EU Global Strategy in 2016 with some new approaches to old challenges. Consequently, some of the better known activities that were formed as its result include the European Defence Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and others.

The debate on the future of the Union's common security and defence policy is mostly determined by the changes in the international security environment that affect the European Union and the events in and around it. The analysis of security threats and the risks associated with them represent the first step in creating a future strategic framework, to be defined by the debaters at national levels and coordinated at the European level. The key achievements will include coordinated agreements in the field of achieving the »main goal« of 2003, namely the European Union as an independent actor in the field of security and defence. It is expected to have more geopolitical power, which, as Josep Borrel, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, put it in 2019, will »also know how to use the language of power«. The path to this goal will by no means be easy. Coordination between the 27 members in the field of security and defence is a demanding process. In addition, it needs to be properly positioned in relation to NATO's strategic security partner. However, its placement in the defence planning process of the Member States will be the most demanding and important.

The Republic of Slovenia is chairing the Council of the European Union at a time of important changes for the Union, which may be decisive in the future. With this thematic issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, we want to add to Slovenia's contribution in this process.

**Igor Senčar** writes about the importance of the European Union's resilience in a cognitive sense. In the article *The cognitive aspects of Europe's security and defence challenges* he uses the case of Russia's annexation of Crimea to describe the development of a phenomenon that was collectively perceived, understood and learnt from. Modern European society, with its prosperity and high democratic standards, also has shortcomings that need to be acknowledged in order to increase societal resilience in the future.

One of the ways in which we could achieve greater power of the Union is the greater role of its community or its institutions. This is proposed by **Katarina Vatovec** in the article *The communitarization of the European Union's defence policy*. Changes have to be applied also in the way the decisions are made, including the voting method, which should be a majority one in order to increase the effectiveness of this policy.

In the article *European security and defence: a breakthrough or simply muddling through*, **Dick Zandee** notes that changes should be made in the EU security and defence. The long-standing agreement and coordination in this area, which is

reflected primarily in its documents and not in its actions, must end. To this end, the author proposes the concrete changes needed to achieve this goal.

Twenty years of the European Union's activities in the field of international missions and operations is a proof that the EU is an important international player. The details of its activities are presented by **Aleksandra Koziol** in her article *Missions and operations as a tool for shaping EU's global engagement*. She notes that the Covid 19 epidemic has shifted the Union's focus from the global to more internal affairs of the Union itself, which calls to a reflection on the future in this area as well.

As part of Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, **Jelena Juvan** discusses *The future of the common security and defence policy and small member states*. She writes about what a small country can achieve in this process given the fact that the Union as a whole has failed to implement its decisions from the past. However, it is crucial whether the area of the common security and defence policy is designed in such a way that it could represent a response to modern security threats.



## KOGNITIVNI VIDIKI EVROPSKIH VARNOSTNIH IN OBRAMBNIH IZZIVOV

## THE COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF EUROPE'S SECURITY AND DEFENCE CHALLENGES

**Povzetek** Evropski posthladnovojni red je temeljil na panevropskem konsenzu, da je demokracija edini vir legitimnosti, dokler se niso udeleževali vizije celovite in svobodne Evrope, ki je v miru sama s seboj, uprle kremejske oblasti. Prišlo je do spremembe paradigme – sistemsko tekmovanje namesto sodelovanja. Ruski revizionizem pomeni največjo varnostno grožnjo za Evropo. Narava grožnje ni bila pravočasno zaznana. Pri napadu na posthladnovojni red ni šlo le za klasično vojno, ki temelji na trdi moči, saj vojna poteka tudi v kognitivni sferi, kar za odprte, demokratične družbe pomeni poseben izziv. To je bil tudi normativni napad. Za učinkovit odgovor sta nujna mentalni premik in krepitev kognitivne odpornosti ter tudi solidarnosti kot eni najpomembnejših temeljev varnosti.

**Ključne besede** *Kognitivna odpornost, Evropska unija, informacijska vojna, normativni konflikt, revizionistična sila.*

**Abstract** The European post-Cold War order was based on a pan-European consensus that democracy was the only source of legitimacy – until the Kremlin opposed the realization of a Europe whole, free and at peace with itself. There has been a paradigm change from cooperation to systemic competition. Russian revisionism poses the greatest security threat to Europe. The nature of the threat was realized rather late. The assault on the post-Cold War order was not just a classic war, which relies on hard power; instead, the war also took place in the cognitive sphere, which represents a particular challenge for open, democratic societies. Furthermore, it was also a normative assault. An effective response requires a mental shift and the strengthening of cognitive resilience as well as solidarity as the key foundations of security.

**Key words** *Cognitive resilience, European Union, information warfare, normative conflict, revisionist power.*

## Introduction

The Conference on the Future of Europe was launched on 9 May 2021. The Joint Declaration on the Conference on the Future of Europe defines its aim as to »open a new space for debate with citizens to address Europe’s challenges and priorities« (Sassoli et al., 2021, p 1). The Conference should reach its conclusions by Spring 2022, building on citizens’ concerns and ambitions, as well as on lessons learned from the multiple crises the EU has experienced in the past decade, including the financial crisis which morphed into a crisis of the euro area, the crisis of the post-Cold War order in Europe, the migrant crisis, and Brexit. These conclusions should provide guidance on the course that the European Union should take to tackle common challenges effectively.

Geopolitical challenges and security also figure among the issues mentioned in the Joint Declaration. The Conference offers an opportunity for reflecting on the geopolitical and security challenges as well as on the appropriate orientations and ambitions of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

This article discusses the nature of the present geopolitical and security challenges in view of the fact that Europe’s security landscape has changed to such a degree that the assessment given by the European External Action Service in its EU Global Strategy states that »peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given« (2016, p 33). At the outset, the article analyzes the basic structural elements of the European post-Cold War order, which, theoretically speaking, correspond to the Kantian tradition of thought. They also serve as an analytical framework for further discussion, which stems from realizing the limitations and weaknesses of the concept of liberal cooperative interdependence and the post-Cold War European order in the face of the present geopolitical and security challenges.

There are several diverse sources of these challenges and threats. The southern and south-eastern flanks of the EU are facing a variety of threats and challenges – be they terrorist threats, irregular migration flows, or the consequences of possible state collapses. The northern and eastern flanks face a different challenge: the European security order has been severely violated and remains under pressure from a revisionist power. In addition, the EU is faced with a rapidly rising China, which the EU categorizes simultaneously as a cooperation partner, a negotiating partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival (European Commission, 2019, p 1). Since the end of World War II, Europe’s defence has been based on the principle that the US is Europe’s pivotal power and has underwritten Europe’s security and defence. Due to the effects of a rapidly rising China, which has become the main strategic challenger of the US, and assuming its security and defence commitments in Europe, the US is faced with »the American security dilemma: the rise of China’s military capability and European military weakness« (Allen et al., 2021, p 148). This will have profound implications for the strategic assumptions upon which European defence stands.

Reflecting on the events that have taken place on the eastern European flank since 2008 and especially in 2014, the article identifies the immediate and basic source of security and defence challenges that Europe is facing in Russia as a revisionist power. This is also the subject of discussion in this article. In doing so, the discussion draws on the way that awareness of the nature of this challenge has developed. Only gradually has a different awareness of Russia – distinct from the one based on the West's hopes and expectations – come into existence. Its development resulted from the confrontation between the expectations and the reality of the post-Cold War order. Theoretically speaking, the key assumptions of the structural elements of the post-Cold War order have been confronted by a paradigm that in important ways corresponds to the Hobbesian tradition of thought – but due to its focus on a normative aspect, surpasses it. When considering an appropriate credible and effective response, this discussion focuses on the primacy of the cognitive domain of the challenge. Its objective should be to facilitate a corresponding mental shift as the necessary basis for strengthening the resilience of States and societies, as well as European solidarity. This will help it to »promote peace and guarantee the security of its Member states and citizens«, as stated by the Council of the European Union (2016, p 2). This should be a basis for informed decisions about the realistic trajectory of the development of the CSDP.

## 1 THE EUROPEAN POST-COLD WAR MINDSET

If peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given, the initial question needs to be about the kind of security challenge Europe is confronting. The answer to this question, which is also the premise of our discussion, is that the challenge it is facing is a crisis that concerns the European post-Cold War order.

The fall of communism in Europe in 1989 made it possible to establish free, democratic societies based on respect for human dignity and the rule of law. In this spirit, all European countries, including the Soviet Union, together with the United States and Canada, have formulated the values and principles of the European post-Cold War order and committed themselves to respecting them. This resulted in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which represents a consensus between former Cold War adversaries. On these foundations the historical tasks of *Europe whole and free*, as well as *a Europe that is free and at peace with itself* (Bush, 1989) would actually be feasible. The fundamental notions of the Charter are democracy, peace, unity, cooperation, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Important common objectives are defined as »steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries« (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1990, p 3). The expectations of a new perception of security in Europe were thought possible on the basis of the unprecedented reduction in armed forces and new approaches to security and cooperation. These would enable a transformation of relations between European states as a foundation of »a just and lasting order of peace for a united, democratic Europe« (Ibid., p 6). The basic structural principles

of the European post-Cold War order that represented a consensus agenda include the following: 1) democracy as the only legitimate system of government based on respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law; 2) equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, respect for territorial integrity, political independence and freedom of choice of any participating State; and 3) friendly relations between participating states and equal security for them. These basic structural principles comprise the foundations of the post-Cold War order. Its basic code of behaviour is defined by respect, cooperation, and solidarity. Cooperation and solidarity thus unite nations in a common destiny, in a *community of fate* (Senčar, 2020). These structural principles form the consensus agenda and the type of order that corresponds to the Kantian or universalist tradition of thought (Bull, pp 23-26). They also serve as an analytical framework for further discussion.

The only source of legitimacy in the post-Cold War European order is democracy. »We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations« (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1990, p 3). On this basis, the vision of Europe as a community of democracies became possible. The Charter points out the adherence of all parties to shared values and common heritage. Having also in mind the consensus on the structural principles of the European post-Cold War order, it can be argued that what emerged in Europe was a *society* of states, i.e. an international – or more concretely – European society as defined by Bull (2002, pp 13-16). Democracies, however, are peaceful in their relations with each other and will in themselves be guarantors of peace.<sup>1</sup> A basic assumption of the European post-Cold War order is that European security and peace are therefore based on the victory of democratic values across Europe. »Friendly relations among us will benefit from the consolidation of democracy and improved security« (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1990, p 3). European security order would therefore not be based on the principle of balance of power, but on the common norms and values of a free democratic society. It would be based on universal rules, and not on blocs with their exclusive areas of influence. What is allowed and what is forbidden does not depend on the power of the state, but is defined by international law. On these foundations of universal normative ambition, the Council of the European Union in 2003 conceived the first European Security Strategy (ESS): »The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order« (2009, p 37). At that time, the EU approved the draft Constitutional Treaty (defeated in the referendums held in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005), the big bang enlargement of 2004 was rapidly approaching, and parallel to it the neighbourhood policy concept was to be launched the following year.

<sup>1</sup> *The concept of the theory of democratic peace was conceived by Immanuel Kant (Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch; Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective). A similar thesis in terms of the theory of democratic peace was also put forward by Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy In America).*

Robert Cooper characterized this order as postmodern, inclusive, and based on a voluntary association of states that share common values and their openness – thus a sort of voluntary cooperative empire: »The postmodern, European answer to threats is to extend the system of co-operative empire ever wider« (2003, p 78). The basic building block of a postmodern order, according to Cooper, is a postmodern state, which »is one that above all values the individual, which explains its unwarlike character« (2003, p 78). This vision could have been developed on the assumption of a pan-European consensus: that the only source of legitimacy in the post-Cold War European order is democracy based on human rights and free elections. In this context, the EU has come to understand itself as a soft power that acts as a transformational and normative power (Manners, 2008). There is no room for traditional geopolitics within this vision. »The very language of geopolitics was an anachronism« (Colby and Mitchell, 2020) not only in Europe, but also in the US.

In accordance with the assumptions of the post-Cold War European order, the ESS identified key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (European External Action Service, 2009). The corresponding policy implications for the CSDP have been to develop a full spectrum of instruments for out-of-area crisis management and conflict prevention, both military and civilian. Since 2003, the EU has launched 36 operations and missions on three continents (as of now, 11 civilian and 6 military are on-going). The emphasis has been on a widened security agenda, mainly of a civilian nature (mediation, security sector reform, the rule of law, police missions). Military operations carried out within this agenda have been characterized by a relatively non-coercive approach.

## 2 THE COLLAPSE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN POST-COLD WAR ORDER

The expectations stemming from the fundamental principles and values of the European post-Cold War order – the exercise of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, democratic self-determination, the »freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements« (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1990, p 6), the option of eventual association with the EU – led Ukrainian citizens, in autumn 2013, to express their determination to *return to Europe* through widespread anti-government protests. Their determination, which was fully in line with the expectations legitimized by the European post-Cold War order, and the subsequent collapse of the government that had acted differently, resulted in the Russian annexation of Crimea and the encouragement of separatist uprisings in eastern Ukraine, ultimately with the aid of its military forces.

This development took everyone completely by surprise. The ESS had not mentioned any traditional threats or geopolitical challenges to Europe or its security order. However, frozen conflicts already existed in the post-Soviet area at the time (Moldova: Transnistria, Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia). EU support for

the de-escalation and resolution of these disputes was rather modest. The EU and its Member States took care to maintain equidistance, and did not question the controversial role of Russia as a neutral mediator, which, however, always supported the separatist parties against the legitimate authorities in order to maintain leverage and dominance. Frozen, freshly staged, and still hot conflicts in the post-Soviet space act as a force preventing an escape to the opposite, European pole of attraction. These countries are thus prevented from developing their own, autonomous, independent choice and closer relations with the EU and NATO (Snyder, 2018, p 173). Lo argues that in this way »today's 'arc of instability' around Russia's borders would evolve gradually into a zone of Russian-led stability. And outside actors would engage with the region only in conjunction with Russia or in ways that did not threaten its interests« (2015, p 105).

Five years later, the Report on the Implementation of the ESS also noted some causes for concern. Frozen conflicts in Georgia led to the military invasion of Georgia by Russia in August 2008. The EU led the international response through mediation between the two parties, and EU relations with Russia deteriorated accordingly. And yet, in the EU – and in the West as a whole – there was clearly no realization at the time that Russian military intervention was in stark contrast to post-Cold War arrangements: »The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives« (Council of the European Union, 2009, p 23). The Report reflects the EU's normative approach without realizing its limitations and without assessing its real transformative power in the face of Russia's increasingly active role in blocking democratic reforms in the post-Soviet space. Assuming a pan-European consensus for a post-Cold War agenda was no longer valid. However, the EU had not yet fully grasped this fact and its fundamental consequences. The Report added only cyber security, energy security and climate change to the list of key threats identified in the ESS. Youngs therefore claims that at that stage »the EU did not see any major danger coming from Russia's territorial and civilizational understanding of security« (2017, p 62). In the very same year, 2009, the EU included the Russian Federation in the list of 10 Strategic Partners.

### **3 THE NATURE OF THE VIOLATION OF THE EUROPEAN POST-COLD WAR ORDER**

After Russia's military invasion and occupation of Crimea, and its subsequent illegal annexation, as well as its full spectrum activities to destabilize Ukraine, it became very clear that peace and stability in Europe were no longer a given, which the EU Global Strategy also stated.

There were several signals indicating a fundamental change in the Kremlin's view of the European post-Cold War order and its interests from the period of the first years

after the fall of communism. There were growing signs of the authoritarian instincts of the ruling structures, and the desire for domination over countries that once were part of the former Soviet Union. This development was no longer in line with the principles of the Paris Charter for a New Europe. Several prominent experts, as well as numerous politicians from the European countries that were most exposed to Russian influence, began to publicly express their worries. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1994) warned against idealistic optimism based on the amnesia of history, and wrote the following axiomatic statement: »Russia can be either an empire or a democracy, but it cannot be both«. In addition there were also two signals from President Putin announcing new times. In 2005, he stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the great geopolitical catastrophe of the century (2005). This was President Putin's view of the consequences of the events that made the vision of a *Europe whole and free and at peace with itself* a reality. Furthermore, Putin very clearly rejected the post-Cold War security order in Europe in a February 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference (2007). However, Russian revisionism was not a reaction to some concrete actions of the West, although the later rhetoric of the Russian side increasingly emphasized various reasons for resentment. Instead, Russian revisionism was a response to the perceived threat that Western identity, principles and values represented to Russia's political system (Snyder, 2018, p 91; Krastev and Leonard, 2014, p 4). The fundamental vulnerability of Russian political identity, however, is not a lack of power but of legitimacy, as Sherr (2013, p 98) also claims: »Moscow's cardinal anxiety is not that its political order is vulnerable, but that it is illegitimate. To preserve its legitimacy, it must ensure that no alternative take root on its doorstep. It must be proactive in its defence«. The reaction of the Russian authorities was thus not merely military and geopolitical; it was also a normative assault on the European post-Cold War order (Liik, 2018, pp 2-5).

#### 4 THE REALIZATION OF A CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: COGNITIVE ASPECTS

The realization that Russia had turned out to be a revisionist power came quite late in Europe and in the West in general. In November 2014, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, became one of the first leaders to articulate the difficult predicament the EU had found itself in (Foy, 2014): »For Putin, and Russia today, the EU is a problem. And we have to understand, and I think we are close to this moment, that Russia is not our strategic partner. Russia is our strategic problem«. The EU's Global Strategy, which was adopted two years later, reflects the realization of the changed security environment in exactly the same way: »Managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge« (European External Action Service, 2016, p 33). A country that so far had been categorized as a strategic partner had become a strategic challenge. Three years later, there were no grounds for a different assessment (European External Action Service, 2019, p 19).

The realization of the fundamentally changed security environment came only after the understanding of how the occupation and annexation of Crimea and the staging

of separatism in eastern Ukraine took place. A whole range of means and approaches short of war were used (an information campaign, psychological warfare, economic measures, intelligence activity, special forces actions, subversive activity, infiltration, use of criminal activities, corruption, etc.), from unconventional, asymmetric warfare all the way to overt, classical military intervention in the later stages. The novelty of this particular approach lay in the flexible integration of military tools with other, non-military tools and means of pressure; escalation control; the skilful orchestration and management of a soft, seamless transition from peace to conflict; and the exploitation of an ambiguous intermediate state between what was no longer normal peace, but was not yet clear military conflict according to formal, conventional criteria. Thus, such hostile and offensive activities were hidden behind the veil offered by the possibility of formal, credible denial. Deception was an extremely important element in the execution of these operations. An analysis of the means used by the aggressor in this war reveals that this was not only a classic war in which the key category was *hard power*<sup>2</sup>, it was also a war that took place in the cognitive sphere in the form of *information warfare*<sup>3</sup>, the central driver of which was the need to legitimize the regime. What went on, therefore, was also a *normative conflict*. The contemporary Russian strategic approach is based on the fact that modern wars are fought primarily on the information battlefield, and that the main battlefield is the cognitive sphere.<sup>4</sup> With regard to the term »war« or »warfare« in the Russian cognitive context, the following explanation is important: »/.../ the use of military strategy does not imply an actual war or conflict and has significantly influenced the Kremlin's foreign policy. Warfare in Russian understanding is more of an art of deception rather than a military act and can be used on multiple levels of policy or adjusted to any particular situation. Moreover, Russian military science itself is being transformed to better suit peacetime conditions and has shifted towards asymmetrical measures« (Morozova, 2017, p 27).

Russia's strategic approach was based on an excellent understanding of the cognitive filter and the weak points of the West, which were confirmed by every encouragement of de-escalation as well as by statements that it did not intend to resort to the use of military force. Thus, fixing the West on the issue of war and skilfully promoting the threat of escalation created room for an ambiguous situation between a clearly identifiable conventional war and its absence, which was exploited to achieve strategic objectives and establish an irreversible reality. Crimea was seized and occupied without a single shot being fired. Because soldiers without insignia (dubbed the »little green men« by journalists) did this, it was not formally possible to talk about occupation, although that was exactly what took place. The West was confused, and before it had realized and acknowledged what was going on, Russia

<sup>2</sup> Sherr (2013, p 12) defines the Russian concept of hard power as »the ability to compel others to comply with our wishes by means of force or other direct forms of coercion«.

<sup>3</sup> Bērziņš, 2014; Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2013; Giles, 2015, pp 46-48; Liik, 2018; Morozova, 2017; Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014; Sherr, 2015, pp 23-32.

<sup>4</sup> Bērziņš (2014, p 5), where the author states: »/.../ the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battle-space is the mind«. A similar claim is also made by Giles (2015, p 45).

had achieved its strategic objectives without facing any sharp reaction, and the new situation was already irreversible. In addition, when armed conflict broke out in eastern Ukraine, the European Council once again stressed its support for a peaceful settlement (European Council, 2014, p 2).

It is necessary to point out the cognitive challenge posed by Russian revisionism. There was no uniform or perfectly clear awareness in the EU of the seriousness of the threat to the European order, not even during the aggression against Ukraine. In May 2018, the European Council on Foreign Relations conducted an analysis of Member States in which eight of them, including Slovenia, fell into the category of those who believe that there is a lot of hype around Russian interference but are not certain that there is any substance to the allegations (Liik, 2018, p 4).<sup>5</sup>

## Conclusion

The assault on the EU's eastern flank suggests that an analytical framework for understanding actual security threats and challenges should also be informed by the Hobbesian<sup>6</sup> or realist vision of the world, rather than being based solely on Kantian aspirations. At the heart of this vision is the anarchic character of the international system, characterized by fundamental antagonism between states: competition, conflict and war, instead of cooperation; the context of a zero-sum game instead of mutual benefit (Bull, pp 23–26). The foundation of the post-Cold War order in Europe is *legitimacy* based on respect for the equal dignity of people, nations and states, freedom, rule of law, and democracy that enables self-government and thus the sovereignty of the people. Yet the central category of this alternative, challenging vision is *power* which strives for domination.<sup>7</sup> The specificities of the assault on the EU's eastern flank also suggest that it was not only about geopolitics and the question of influence and dominance in a territorial sense. This was also a *normative conflict*, the central driver of which was the need to legitimize and ensure the survival of the regime. However, this crucial fact cannot be captured by an approach based on classic realist categories – power, balance of power, spheres of influence. Instead, a focus on warfare in the cognitive domain is required.

<sup>5</sup> The same analysis also finds the following (p 6): »In some states – including Slovenia, and parts of Bulgaria and France – Russia is seen as a counterweight to other powers, usually the US.« Nevertheless, there is also a noticeable increase in awareness of the strategic challenge among such members (p 9): »Moscow's ambition to have a sphere of influence no longer disturbs only – or even primarily – eastern EU Member States. Croatia and Slovenia, for example, are both concerned about Moscow's attempts to create obstacles to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans.«

<sup>6</sup> Hobbes defined the state of nature as a state of war in the sense of *bellum omnium contra omnes*. In such a state there are no objective, absolute norms of good and bad, there is no justice, only the law of the stronger. In fact, this state of affairs applies especially to interstate relations: »/.../ so in states and Commonwealths not dependent on one another, every Commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that man or assembly that representeth it shall judge, most conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round about« (Hobbes, 2008 [1651], pp 142-143).

<sup>7</sup> The concept of power in this case is defined, as suggested by James Sherr (2013, p 12), in relational terms as »the utilization of resources and capacities to achieve one's ends with respect to others.« In the specific case of the assault on the eastern flank, it is particularly important that it is not only about the possession of resources and capacities, but especially about the use of these resources and facilities, about the willingness to actually use them.

In order to be able to effectively and efficiently protect and defend their freedom, democracies must firstly realize that the assumption of a pan-European consensus for a post-Cold War agenda is no longer valid. There has been a paradigm change from cooperation to systemic competition. Secondly, this is a state of affairs that democracies will need to be able to coexist with and manage. Thirdly, democracies must face the realities of great-power competition, conflict, and war – and take them into account when shaping their strategy and deciding on priorities. Or, according to Hobbes's dictum, »covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all« (Hobbes, 2008 [1651], p 111).

Allen et al. defined future war as warfare across the 5D spectrum of deception, disinformation, destabilization, disruption, and destruction (2021, pp 27–30). 5D warfare will be made possible by revolutions in many areas of civilian technology that will find their application on the battlefield.<sup>8</sup> The year 2014 was marked by a foretaste of this: it ranged from complex intimidation and coercion from the low end of the warfare spectrum (deception, disinformation, and destabilization), through disruption to the high end of the warfare spectrum with destruction. This type of warfare represents a challenge from both the security and the defence aspects.

On the lower level of the warfare spectrum, there is *information war* (Sherr, 2015) with the objective of wakening the adversary from within. It could be argued that the liberal order itself has proven to be a source of vulnerability. Within the context of a liberal order, openness and interdependence are supposed to strengthen cooperation and weave stronger bonds with new partners, even a strategic partnership. Yet when confronted with a power that opposes an existing order and is willing to use force, openness and interdependence suddenly turn into vulnerabilities, since they can be exploited as levers for pressure and extortion (*weaponization of interdependence*). Confronting revisionist power reveals the limits of the concept of liberal cooperative interdependence, as well as the cognitive problem of recognizing that a partner has become a rival and even an adversary.

The focus of this reflection is on the activities of the lower level of the warfare spectrum, which easily exploit the values and principles of an open, liberal order. These forms of warfare can cohabit with open, democratic societies and weaken them from within, with the aim of turning a state of society at peace with itself into a Hobbesian *war of all against all*<sup>9</sup>. Societies with multiple communities and multiple identities are particularly vulnerable to this type of assault, particularly the exploitation of existing societal conflicts and grievances. Information warfare is the first phase of an attack, and because of its non-kinetic nature, open societies can be

<sup>8</sup> *Radical and disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, computer vision, quantum-computing, nano technologies, big data analytics, hypersonic weaponry etc.*

<sup>9</sup> »Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as if of every man, against every man. For WAR, consisteth not in battle only /.../ so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary« (Hobbes, 2008 [1651], p 84).

constantly exposed to this type of warfare without themselves realizing that they are actually already in a new generation warfare context. The goal of the information war and its instruments (disinformation, propaganda) is to weaken loyalty to the values of democratic societies where they are established, as well as their attractiveness in societies where they have not yet (fully) established themselves (Liik, 2018, pp 2-5). The vulnerability of open, free, democratic societies to such attacks depends on a sense of belonging, the strength of loyalty, members' identification with the values, principles and goals that enable fundamental mutual solidarity in a society, and the ability to recognize such attacks. In this sense, the initial, key resistance to the nature of future war is cognitive resilience. One of the key enablers to stimulate, develop and strengthen cognitive resilience is the strengthening of the potential for critical thinking through enhancing the societal situational and threat awareness. Since ensuring safety and security are the basic responsibilities of political authorities, it is necessary that electorates within democracies are informed about and involved in discussions about these questions and the shaping of the answers. Thus, they could more firmly identify themselves with the strategies developed on the basis of democratic deliberations. The embeddedness of issues of security within democracy could also enhance domestic resilience (Strachan, 2020, p 76). In this way, societal solidarity is also strengthened. Given the assumptions on which European self-perception was based, the European post-Cold War order, challenged by a revisionist power, clearly could not provide »equal security« (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1990, p 3) for all European countries. In these conditions, a pan-European solidarity as articulated in the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* can only be a desirable but distant goal. Instead, it is now urgent to put European geopolitical solidarity into practice. A very important step in this direction is the initiative labelled the »Strategic Compass«. This initiative is a 2-year process that should refine the EU Global Strategy, with Member States' initially discussing how they perceive the threats they face and analyzing the types of vulnerabilities that may arise related to the identified threats. This should hopefully lead to a common threat perception. What is most important in this exercise from the context of this article is that the process of deliberation be truly inclusive; further, it must emphasize the importance of the cognitive aspect. New types of threats that are not of a kinetic nature pose a great challenge also from the perspective of solidarity, i.e. how to understand and determine the threshold of threat or aggression on a Member State, albeit non-military, which would require the EU and its Member States to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity?

Russian non-kinetic and kinetic assaults on Ukraine – and especially the annexation of seizure of Crimea – are case studies and harbingers of the future face of war. The lessons learned from the crisis on Europe's eastern flank need to inform necessary reflections on security and defence challenges when thinking about the course the EU should take and how to best to promote its interests in the face of existing and future challenges.

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## KOMUNITARIZACIJA OBRAMBNE POLITIKE EVROPSKE UNIJE

## THE COMMUNITARIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEFENCE POLICY

**Povzetek** V prispevku se zagovarja teza, da postopni koraki, začeti z institucionalnim okvirom, ki ga je postavila Lizbonska pogodba leta 2009, prek sprejetja Globalne strategije Evropske unije leta 2016 do nedavnih političnih pobud in vpeljanih mehanizmov ter njihove implementacije na področju obrambne politike, omogočajo komunitarizacijo te politike. Prek izkušenj, številnih političnih pobud in njihove uspešne implementacije ter zavedanja o sodobnih geopolitičnih spremembah s tradicionalnimi in novimi varnostnimi grožnjami se lahko počasi ustvarja politična volja držav članic. Ta je potrebna za proces komunitarizacije, ki dolgoročno lahko vodi k oblikovanju Evropske obrambne unije.

**Ključne besede** *Obramba politika, Evropska unija, komunitarizacija.*

**Abstract** This paper argues that incremental steps, beginning with the institutional set-up framed by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, through the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, to recent policy initiatives, endorsed mechanisms and their implementation in the field of defence, are paving the way towards its communitarization. The political will of Member States could be gradually generated through experience, through a number of policy initiatives and their successful implementation, and through the awareness of the contemporary geopolitical changes with traditional and new security threats. The process of communitarization is dependent on the Member States' political will, and could eventually lead towards building a European Defence Union.

**Key words** *Defence policy, European Union, communitarization.*

## Introduction

The terrible experiences and memories of the two World Wars have long been a sufficient reason for the European communities to maintain the character of a »civilian power« (Duchêne, 1973),<sup>1</sup> focused on multilateral and economic co-operation. Europe has rested on the traditional principle of »Westphalian sovereignty« over the most sensitive and vital areas of its Member States, which included defence policy.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the European States were not interested in having a strong common defence policy. In fact, there was an early attempt to establish the European Defence Community in the early 1950s, in order to create a lasting peace through military integration, but the treaty establishing the European Defence Community never entered into force. Nevertheless, the idea of a common defence policy remained dormant but not forgotten. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),<sup>2</sup> the acronym used in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) once the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, has been slowly and gradually built. Over time the European Union (EU) has increased its cooperation in the field of defence policy. Indeed, it can be argued that this policy has come a long way since its inception.

In recent years, an enormous emphasis has been put on the EU's defence policy. The numerous weaknesses that hamper its improvement and stand as obstacles in the way of a European Defence Union have often been stressed: for example, insufficient operational or military commitment, few collaborative procurement projects, the reluctance of Member States to pool sovereignty in defence, divergent perceptions of the security threat and national preferences, and perhaps the (ab)use of the consensus or unanimity principle (e.g. Engberg, 2021, p 1; Zandee et al., 2020, p 12). Nevertheless, political events and worrisome developments in the EU's neighbourhood and in the world have yet again served as an impetus to enhance its defence dimension and its credibility in the international community.

There is an abundance of doctrinal research in this field. Whereas in the last decade some scholars researched the influence of Member States or their political will in the area of defence (e.g. Hoeffler, 2012; Weiss, 2020; Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier, 2021), others focused on the institutional aspects and the role of different EU institutions

<sup>1</sup> The term »civilian power« was originally coined by Duchêne (1973). A civilian power could be depicted as a state that pursues its foreign and national objectives primarily through political and economic means. It is committed to multilateral co-operation and international law. For more on the (contested) image of the EU as a civilian power, see, for example, Lodge, 1996; Smith, 2000, pp 11-14. See also Maull's redefined concept of a civilian power which encompasses the possibility of a resort to military force, but only if necessary and if all peaceful means have been exhausted (Maull, 2000).

<sup>2</sup> For clarification purposes, the concept of security combines a »soft« power policy, focusing on the promotion of peace and security by non-military tools, and a »hard« security policy focusing on conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace monitoring, where military force may be used if necessary (Nugent, 2003, p 420). The notion of defence, on the other hand, is narrower and focuses on military activities and the deployment of military force (Feld, 1993, p 4). Hill pointed out the difference: »The purpose of the [Foreign and Security Policy] is a longer-term conflict prevention, whereas the [Security and Defence Policy] serves for a possible intervention when prevention fails« (Hill, 2001, p 322). This paper focuses mainly on the notion of defence and »hard« security policy.

in this process (e.g. Nissen, 2015; Reykers, 2019; Chappell, Exadaktylos, Petrov, 2020; Engberg, 2021; Håkansson, 2021). Some scholars observed that the role of the European Commission in EU defence policy has increased (Peterson, 2017; Nugent and Rhinard, 2019; Håkansson, 2021). This paper argues that incremental steps, beginning with the institutional set-up framed by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, through the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, to recent policy initiatives and endorsed mechanisms in the field of defence, have paved the way towards the communitarization of this policy. This could, consequently, lead to a true European Defence Union should there be enough (internal and external) incentives and challenges, but also, and most importantly, the political will of the EU Member States.

From the conceptual point of view, communitarization signifies a process where the »Community Method« (Dehousse, 2011) prevails. The supranational institutions (in particular the European Commission and the European Parliament) are thus more involved in the decision-making and their influence is enhanced. Moreover, the decisions are adopted by a (qualified) majority so that a closer relationship between the EU's institutions is required, and the dominance of one or a few Member States can be avoided (see also Nusdorfer and Vatovec, 2003, pp 44-46). Such a process, as argued elsewhere (Nusdorfer and Vatovec, 2003, p 45), results in a coherent, transparent, democratically legitimate and efficient functioning of a policy.

The paper is structured in five parts. First, several characteristics of the EU's defence policy are listed. The second part presents a brief overview of the development of this policy, and to a greater extent deals with the institutional framework adopted by the Lisbon Treaty in this field. The next part underlines some major developments from 2016 onwards, to show the preparedness for the creation of the European Defence Union. It thus focuses on crucial steps that have been taken in recent years in order to enhance this policy field. The fourth part sheds light on some proposals concerning the future enhancement of the EU's defence policy. In the conclusion the paper tries to anticipate what the future will bring in this policy field by stressing the importance of the existent »triangle« (institutional framework, shared or at least »harmonized« vision and preferences, political initiatives) and elements of communitarization in order to move towards a true European defence union.

This paper does not attempt to be comprehensive in addressing the evolution, strengths and shortcomings of EU defence policy, or the possibilities of its future development. Its aim is to contribute to the ongoing debate about the future of this policy and to the vast endeavour of creating a European Defence Union.

## 1 SOME PECULIARITIES OF EU DEFENCE POLICY

The EU's defence policy is a reflection of a never-ending »capability-expectations gap« (Hill, 1993; Hill, 1998) between the proud rhetoric with which the EU launched the defence policy, and its lamentable performance in terms of the lack of military

and technological capabilities and modest defence expenditure. There is probably no other EU policy that is subject to such dichotomy between theory and practice, »between ambition and paralysis« (Kintis, 1999), between aspirations on the one hand and the reality of differing national preferences, different priorities and individual interests on the other (see e.g. Menon, 2011, p 136).

The defence policy is perhaps a rare EU policy where (internal and external) crises function as an impetus to strengthen the defence dimension, but national preferences are often too strong and allow only incremental steps to be taken. At one end of the spectrum, mainly larger Member States focus on intergovernmental co-operation in the field of security and defence. They are reluctant to lose sovereignty over these highly sensitive and vital areas. At the other end, mostly smaller Member States maintain their wishes and (nationally backed) interests in a supranational role of defence. Permanent clashing between these two main stances either makes the EU incapable of taking decisive common action, or slows its progress and prolongs decision-making. Divergences stemming from different cultural backgrounds, traditions, and historical experiences are preventing the development of a »common security culture«, defined by Gnesotto (2000, p 1) as »the aim and the means to incite common thinking, compatible reactions, coherent analysis – a short, a strategic culture that is increasingly European, one that transcends the different national security cultures and interests«. Or as other commentators observe: »On paper, all actors involved have agreed on the need to promote a comprehensive approach in crisis management – meaning a joint and global analysis of the crises, a common assessment of the situation, a more collective effort on the ground, as well as improved situational awareness and assessment of results« (Angelet and Vrailas, 2008, p 6). However, it is practice (with either institutional rivalry or differences in interests, priorities or military means of Member States) that is lacking (e.g. Menon, 2011, pp 141-142).

This initial outlook is certainly not in line with popular demand. For years, strengthening the EU's defence dimension has commanded strong support in public opinion. The latest Eurobarometer survey, conducted in summer 2020, indicated that 77% of Europeans support the efforts to develop a CSDP policy in the EU (Standard Eurobarometer 93, 2020, p 113). In fact »since 2004, when this indicator was introduced, proportions are relatively stable with variations fluctuating between 71% and 78%« (Standard Eurobarometer 93, 2020, p 117). Even the coronavirus pandemic has not changed the very high support for this policy. The expectations, and indeed the demand, of EU citizens can hardly be ignored. They must be considered as a reference point for the EU institutions and national politicians to do their best to deliver on such expectations.

## 2 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU'S DEFENCE POLICY

It became obvious that the EU's defence policy needed to develop after the inadequate performance of the EU (then the European Community) in dealing

with the devastating war in Yugoslavia. It was then that the EU's civilian character began to be seriously contested. Two subsequent European Council summits in 1999 reached landmark decisions: at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 the European Council decided to give the EU »the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence«, so that the EU could acquire »the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces« (European Council, Cologne, 1999, Annex III, p 33, para 1). However, as Bono (2002, p 34) observed, the Summit failed to define the political and military doctrine to guide those forces. Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council, the Helsinki European Council created a Rapid Reaction Force of up to 50,000-60,000 personnel able to be deployed at 60 days' notice (European Council, Helsinki, 1999, para 28). The EU Member States were to generate military forces capable of carrying out the Petersberg tasks (European Council, Helsinki, 1999, para 28). The EU's objective was to have »an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises« (European Council, Helsinki, 1999, para 27).

The Cologne and Helsinki Summits gave a profound emphasis to building a credible EU military capability (Yesson, 2001, p 205). Notwithstanding the Member States' divergent views on how military means should be developed, and what the relationship between military and political tools should be, a crucial step was taken towards the future development of a credible security policy backed up by an efficient military dimension.

The process of creating the EU's defence policy became irreversible. Although scholars interpreted the outcome of the Nice European Council Summit differently (see Duke, 2001, and the opposing view Bono, 2003), it can be argued that yet another step forward was taken. The French Presidency Report in 2000 determinedly stressed the need »to give the EU the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field« (European Council, Nice, 2000, Annex VI). The military and political structures in the EU were created, namely the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, and the Political and Security Committee (Council Decisions, 2001).

After that the debate on the EU's defence policy progressed, and was given much attention during the negotiations that led to the Lisbon Treaty. This Treaty brought some important institutional innovations worth reiterating because of their impact on the defence policy. For example, the common foreign and security policy (as well as the defence policy) has been empowered by the establishment of the European External Action Service (Article 27(3) TEU). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and at the same time occupies the post of Vice-President of the European Commission

(in particular Articles 18 and 27(1) TEU). The mutual assistance clause, which is determined in Article 42(7) TEU, obliges Member States to aid and assist a victim Member State in the case of armed aggression. The introduction of a solidarity clause enables Member States to prevent terrorist threats or respond to terrorist threats or natural or manmade disasters within the EU by mobilizing all the necessary military and civil instruments (Article 222 TFEU).

An important instrument to overcome possible blockages in the field of military capabilities is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and that have more binding commitments to one another in this area can intensively cooperate within the EU's framework by establishing PESCO (Article 42(6) TEU). As Angelet and Vrailas (2008, p 33) observe, PESCO is »more flexible than enhanced cooperation«, because there is no minimum quorum of participants required, no threshold fixed for entrants and no exclusions, as any Member State can participate even at a later stage. Its participation is voluntary.

Commentators have differed in their findings as to how these Lisbon Treaty innovations changed the defence policy. Their analyses ranged, as Menon (2011, p 134) put it, »from the clinically depressed to the massively optimistic«. According to Menon (2011, p 134), the Lisbon Treaty failed to address »the fundamental challenge confronting CSDP: the reluctance of Member States to take their responsibilities seriously«. This was an argumentative stance taken in 2011, when several of these Treaty provisions were in practice used either rarely or never. But recent years have shown that the challenges are many and varied, the threats have increased, perceptions have differed less, and the preferences have been harmonized to such an extent that the strengthening of the EU's defence policy has been possible.

### 3 »HARMONIZED« VISION AND DEFENCE POLICY INITIATIVES

What constitutes threats and dangers, both within Europe and outside of it, has for a long period had no unanimous answer. Menon (2002, p 2) rightly pointed to the fact that in such a sensitive area as defence »a clear definition of ends is crucial in order to create appropriate policy instruments«. A clear and common understanding of the security threats is thus important (de Vasconcelos, 2009, p 18). The document that tried to unify Member States' security concepts was the European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in December 2003. Its »father«, Javier Solana, occupying the post of the High Representative, commented that this document would provide »a road map for the EU to play a role of a strategic partner in the world« (Beatty, 2003). For the first time, a comprehensive strategy was adopted, with global challenges, key threats and strategic objectives for advancing the EU's interests. Terrorism, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, the weakening of the state system, and organized crime were considered as key threats (European Security Strategy, 2003, pp 5-7). Its initial paragraph stated:

»Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history« (European Security Strategy, 2003, p 3).

Thirteen years later, in 2016, which was depicted by Lazarou (2019, p 28) as »a landmark year for the EU's approach to peace and security«, the EU laid out the EU Global Strategy. Compared to the European Security Strategy, the opening sentences of the EU Global Strategy showed a more complex situation, recognized the intensity of the threats, and offered a shared vision of the EU:

»We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity [...] Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world« (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p 13).

As Engberg (2021, p 5) illustrated, there are »harsh realities« that separate these two strategies. The EU's geopolitical context has changed in the last decade. Unstable neighbouring regions; multiple traditional security threats in a challenging environment; emerging new threats such as cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and hybrid attacks; persistent or even aggravated conflicts; and disruption caused by climate change and energy insecurity are several challenges that the EU faces (Bassot, 2020, p 105; Engberg, 2021, pp 8-9; EU Global Strategy, 2016; Regulation (EU) 2021/697, first recital). Moreover, the coronavirus pandemic has shown, as analysts argue, that the EU defence policy is needed because »investment in military preparedness, equipment and training can pay off when a crisis hits, as capabilities to protect citizens can be deployed in multiple scenarios, from CSDP missions to repatriation and to building hospitals« (Lađići, 2020, p 8).

In response to this challenging security environment since the adoption of the EU Global Strategy, »significant progress« (Mills, 2019, p 5) has been made in the field of the defence policy. The EU has adopted or pursued a number of new and noticeable policy initiatives by using the potential of the institutional framework adopted by the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier, 2021), although, as noted by the study of the European Research Service, there are still some »unused or under-used legal bases« of the TEU in this policy (Bassot, 2020, pp 8-9, 24-25).

Subsequently, in December 2016, the European Council discussed a defence package and urged all relevant actors to speedily and actively pursue the work on enhancing

the defence policy (European Council, 2016, paras 10-15). The adopted initiatives were the following: the Council established the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) with the aim of serving as a command and control structure for the EU's non-executive military missions (Council Decision (EU) 2017/971); the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) was approved by the Council in order to foster capability development and provide for a greater coherence of defence spending plans; and PESCO has been activated (Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315) and has proved its inclusive and modular nature by welcoming 25 participating Member States that want to take part in individual defence projects (Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, Articles 2, 5, Annex I, II). These projects are listed on the PESCO website and include, *inter alia*, a European Medical Command; the creation of the European Logistic Hubs; the upgrade of the Maritime Surveillance System; and the establishment of an information-sharing platform with the aim of strengthening nations' cyber-defence capabilities.

The Council and the European Parliament established the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) with the aims of fostering collaborative defence capability development and reinforcing the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the Union's defence industry (Regulation (EU) 2018/1092). The European Peace Facility was set up in order to finance the EU's actions to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security through EU Member States' contributions (Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509). The EU is also increasing its engagement with industrial innovation by establishing the European Defence Fund »to foster the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity« of the EU's defence industry (Regulation (EU) 2021/697, Article 3(1); see also Oliveira Martins and Mawdsley, 2021, p 11).

In June 2020, the Council decided to work on the Strategic Compass, which »will enhance and guide the implementation of the Level of Ambition agreed in November 2016 in the context of the EU Global Strategy« (Council of the European Union, 2020, para 4). The work began in the autumn of 2020 by the German Presidency and should be finished during the French Presidency in 2022. As analysts noted, the preparation of the Strategic Compass and its timeframe »might point to a Paris-Berlin 'deal' to take an important next step in defining the future course of EU security and defence« (Zandee et al., 2020, p 24). What the outcome will be is still too soon to predict. Due to possible »disunity within the EU on the military level of ambition« (Ibid., p 24), it might be doubtful whether the Strategic Compass will provide a common understanding of threats, objectives and concrete goals (Engberg, 2021, p 13). The Strategic Compass should probably avoid either extensively encompassing all possible security and defence threats, challenges and goals (thus being too broad to be useful) or just mentioning those that are shared by all Member States (in which case it would be nothing more than the lowest common denominator).

## 4 SOME PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

The policy initiatives mentioned in the previous part are recent progressive steps that the EU has taken towards building a common defence policy.

In June 2017, the European Commission began a public debate on the future of the CSDP by publishing a reflection paper and setting out scenarios on how to address the threats facing the EU (European Commission, 2017). It offered three visions of the EU's defence policy from the largely *status quo* security and defence cooperation, to upgraded shared security and defence (where Member States pool certain financial and operational assets in defence), to the most ambitious level of common defence and security, where the EU develops its capacity to run military operations, has a common strategic culture, and paves the way to the European Defence Union (European Commission, 2017, pp 12-15).

Should there be a shared political will, visible by unanimity in the European Council, the European Defence Union could be created within the established legal framework (Article 42(2) TEU). At the current state of affairs, such political will of Member States has not yet been attained, but the incremental steps that have already been taken, discussed above, and the implementation of the aforementioned policy initiatives and the results they obtain could help generating that political will.

There are, however, several proposals and possibilities to further enhance this policy field. These proposals stem out of discussions on the future of the defence policy.

One symbolic, but also practical, proposal, which could improve the efficiency, coherence and coordination of decisions implementing the CSDP, affects the functioning of the Foreign Affairs Council under which the Defence Ministers currently operate. The idea to set up a permanent Council of Defence Ministers chaired by the High Representative should get proper attention, and has been reiterated in debates (European Parliament Resolution, 2017, para 22; European Parliament Resolution, 2019, para 42; Angelet and Vrailas, 2008, p 5; Engberg, 2021, p 40). By establishing a separate Council of Defence Ministers the Council could follow the European Commission's creation of a new Directorate-General for the Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) which emerged under the Commissioner for the Internal Market.

The EU's defence policy has had questionable democratic scrutiny, although, as has been observed, it is a popular demand to have more of a common defence policy. The parliamentary dimension should be enhanced when discussing or adopting decisions in this policy field, evaluating this policy or controlling its implementation (see European Parliament Resolution, 2017, paras 35, 37; European Parliament Resolution, 2019, para 42).

The next proposal concerns the voting mechanism. Although the Lisbon Treaty removed the pillar structures and qualified majority voting in the Council became the rule rather than the exception, the common foreign and security policy (with the defence policy as its integral part) is still »subject to specific rules and procedures« (Article 24(1) TEU; see also Article 42(1) TEU). Decisions in the CSDP are currently taken on the basis of unanimity, which is often an insurmountable obstacle towards a common defence policy, as it signifies that each Member State has a veto power. An important move away from intergovernmental decision-making would thus be to take decisions by qualified majority. The European Commission has already suggested the enhancement of the use of qualified majority voting in the area of external relations (European Commission, 2018a, p 10; European Commission 2018b, p 11). However, the specific exclusion of qualified majority voting for decisions having military and defence implications in Article 31(4) TEU means that a treaty change would be required for the realization of this proposal (Zandee et al., 2020, p 13).

These proposals have not yet been properly addressed, but their implementation could help in communitarizing the EU defence policy.

**Conclusion** Since its inception, the EU defence policy has been characterized by intergovernmentalism, where supranational EU institutions have a limited role and decisions are taken by unanimity. The communitarization of an EU policy, on the other hand, implies greater involvement by supranational institutions, mainly the European Commission, but also the European Parliament, representing EU citizens; the scrutiny of the European Court of Justice; a common budget; and the vast majority of decisions taken by qualified majority. Defence is a very delicate field, sustained in the hands of sovereign EU Member States. Their political will is required for further progress in this policy field.

However, we argue that a workable legal and institutional framework and functional operational and financial system could stimulate and gradually generate such political will. As have been pointed out, in recent years the EU has pursued many policy initiatives and intensified the functioning of its defence policy. The European Commission has not only repeatedly urged for a strong EU defence, pursued many defence policy initiatives and created a new Directorate-General, it is also in charge of implementing these initiatives (e.g. Action Plan on Military Mobility, the European Defence Fund). We can agree that the involvement of the European Commission in the defence policy, which is close to national sovereignty, blurs the traditional boundaries between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making (Håkansson, 2021, p 15; see also e.g. Nissen, 2015; Chappell et al., 2020).

The future of the European Defence Union remains in the hands of Member States and intergovernmental decision-making. Nevertheless, the existence of a workable institutional framework, many implemented policy initiatives, and striving for a harmonized vision by strategic documents speak in favour of the strengthened EU's defence policy. Incremental changes pave the way towards its communitarization by

gradually generating the political will of Member States through experience, through a number of policy initiatives and their successful implementation, and through the awareness of the contemporary geopolitical changes with traditional and new security threats.

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## EVROPSKA VARNOST IN OBRAMBA: PREBOJ ALI NADALJNJE ŽIVOTARJENJE

### EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE: A BREAKTHROUGH OR SIMPLY MUDDLING THROUGH

**Povzetek** V članku je predstavljen razkorak med tem, o čemer smo se na področju Skupne varnostne in obrambne politike Evropske unije že dogovorili in kar smo načrtovali, pa tega še vedno nismo dosegli. Osredotočamo se na njeno strateško avtonomijo in kredibilnost evropskih vojaških sil. Postopek nastajanja Strateškega kompasa je priložnost za ponoven premislek o evropski varnostni prihodnosti in poenotenju stališč držav članic ter za več realizma pri zmanjševanju razkoraka med retoriko in dejanji. Za njeno večjo strateško avtonomijo in kredibilnost vojaških sil predlagamo izboljšave na osmih področjih.

**Ključne besede** *Skupna varnostna in obrambna politika Evropske unije, Strateški kompas, strateška avtonomija Evropske unije, evropske vojaške sile.*

**Abstract** This article presents the gap between what has already been agreed and planned in the field of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy in the past, and what we have actually achieved. We focus on the EU's strategic autonomy and the credibility of European military forces. The process of creating the Strategic Compass is an opportunity to rethink Europe's security future, to unify the positions of the Member States, and to increase realism in bridging the gap between rhetoric and action. For greater strategic autonomy and the credibility of the military, we propose improvements in eight actions.

**Key words** *EU Common Security and Defence Policy, Strategic Compass, European military forces.*

**Introduction**

»(...) *the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions undertaken by NATO.*«

The quote above could be attributed to the proponents of European strategic autonomy in the field of security and defence – a topic that has raised debate and generated criticism in recent years. Yet, the statement is part of the conclusions of the German EU Presidency issued at the Cologne European Council in June 1999 (Cologne European Council). Almost the same sentence was included in the Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998 by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, which paved the way for the EU to create a security and defence policy (Joint Declaration on European Defence Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, Council of the European Union, 2021). In other words, more than 22 years ago the Heads of State and the Government of the European Union had already declared that the EU should be able to act autonomously, including with military means if required, and in cases where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would not undertake any action.

More than two decades later, the EU is still struggling to realize this objective while, in the meantime, the United Kingdom has left the EU. Despite improvements in capability development, ‘credible military forces’ are lacking and, above all, the ‘readiness’ to act has proven to be slow in most cases and with limited results. Over the past twenty-plus years, the EU has launched a considerable number of civilian missions and military operations, but the latter have been mainly at the low end of the spectrum, small in size and mostly to assist and train local or regional security providers. In ‘hot’ crises (such as Libya in 2011, Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014, and Mali in 2015) it has rather been ‘coalitions of the willing’ under the leadership of France, the United Kingdom and the United States that have intervened. Perhaps the most successful EU military operation has been *Atalanta*, the anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia which is still ongoing.

The turbulence in the Middle East and Africa (in the slipstream of the emergence of ISIS), the Russian annexation of the Crimea, and Moscow’s interference in eastern Ukraine, as well as the rise of China, have woken Europe up from its strategic slumber. Instead of a world that is evolving according to Western norms and values – democracy, the rule of law, human rights, multilateralism, international regimes to control the most dangerous weapon systems – the dominating ‘world affairs’ are now global competition, power projection, confrontation and the undermining of international cooperation. Today and in the future, Washington’s biggest challenge is China, which – contrary to Russia – poses an economic challenge of the first order, providing a new opponent for the US with a much stronger base for global power competition. As a result, Europe is no longer dominating on the American radar screen, and the US will continue to press its European partners to take more responsibility for their own security. Under President Trump the tone was harsh, if not aggressive. Under President Biden transatlantic relations have become much

smoother, but although the tone is friendly, the song is the same: ‘Europe, do more for your own security and defence’. On top of this, the US expects its European partners to join Washington in opposing China – a topic that will be prominent on the agenda in the upcoming discussions on the new NATO Strategic Concept.

This article analyzes the EU’s current efforts – the development of the Strategic Compass – to close the gap between the rhetoric statements on strategic autonomy and the practical goals that need to be achieved. The author proposes steps to be taken in the short term, taking into account what is realistically possible, and even more ambitious steps for the longer term. Eight action points are listed to achieve this objective, after which the author concludes the article by proposing the way ahead.

## 1 THE STRATEGIC COMPASS SO FAR

The changing international environment, with its complex set of challenges and threats – of both a military and non-military nature – is the driving factor for developing the EU Strategic Compass. The Compass should provide direction for the EU’s role in security and defence, and it should be »ambitious and actionable«. The Compass »will define policy orientations, concrete goals and objectives for the next 5 to 10 years, in areas such as crisis management, resilience, capability development and partnerships« (Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, Council of the European Union, 2021). These four areas constitute the ‘baskets’ of the Compass and they are interlinked. Further definition of the EU’s tasks in crisis management cannot be seen in isolation from the other three areas. A higher military level of ambition for the EU will have consequences for capability development. Another example of this interlinkage is resilience: countering hybrid threats (cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and other ways of interfering in and undermining Western societies) is a matter in which the EU and NATO must act together as partners.

The process of developing the Compass consists of three phases. The first phase was concluded at the end of 2020 with the presentation of the first ever ‘threat analysis’ by the EU, based on the input of the civil and military intelligence services of the Member States (Towards a Strategic Compass, 2021). This threat analysis is classified, but one may assume that it depicts a wide array of security challenges, both military and non-military, stemming from regional contexts (Russia, the Middle East, Africa) or from further afield (China in particular). In the second phase, encompassing the first semester of 2021 (plus a bit of extra time), a ‘strategic dialogue’ (Ibid.) took place with the purpose of exploring the ground for the content of the Strategic Compass itself. This dialogue involved not only the EU bodies but also think tanks, academia and others convening a huge number of webinars and other events. In the debates the first differences of opinion between the Member States could be noted. Opposite a large group of more ambitious Member States in Western and Southern Europe, several Eastern European countries argued for a cautious approach that should mainly focus on optimizing the EU’s current level of ambition in crisis management, instead of expanding the Union’s role in security and

defence. Some Eastern European capitals fear that the latter could be detrimental to NATO and the American security commitments to Europe.

The third phase has begun (Ibid.) and will lead to the presentation of the first draft of the Strategic Compass, written by the European External Action Service (EEAS), to the Foreign Affairs Council, including Ministers of Defence, in November 2021 during the Slovenian EU Presidency. The coming months are crucial in the development of the Compass, but the same applies to the period after the November ministerial meetings when the Member States will provide their reactions to the draft. This phase will be concluded by the adoption of the final version of the Strategic Compass in March 2022 at the European Council during the French EU Presidency.

## 2 WHAT SHOULD THE EU BE ABLE TO DO?

The differences of opinion between the EU Member States will have to be bridged. There is no other option. Another element to take into account is realism. The EU has a track record of bold declarations and strong verbal statements on international crises without delivering action or results. One of the reasons for this is that political-diplomatic initiatives cannot be backed up fully by military force, as the available means are too limited and too scarce. The European Security and Defence Policy – now the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – was launched in 1999, not only to make the EU an actor with civilian and military means in crisis management, but also to end European shortfalls and improve the military capabilities of the Member States. More than two decades later and despite the activities of the European Defence Agency (EDA), the conclusion is that results are limited and that many of the shortfalls still exist, in particular in the areas of intelligence and strategic reconnaissance (ISR) and precision munitions. In addition, capabilities in the cyber realm and in space have become critical – for both civilian and military purposes (Zandee, 2019). In short, the demand (requirements) has increased but the supply side (available military means) has improved at too slow a pace and not across all domains at the same time. The limited capabilities of the EU Member States cannot be denied. Therefore, the Strategic Compass' ambition must be squared with realism; one way to do this is to make a distinction between the short and the long term (Zandee, Stoetman, Deen, 2021)<sup>1</sup>.

### 2.1 Short term

In the short term, the EU must focus on closing the gap between rhetoric and action based on the broad range of crisis management operations defined in the Implementation Plan for Security and Defence from 2016, which followed after the EU Global Strategy was published. The tasks related to CSDP crisis management are

<sup>1</sup> *The EU's Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – Squaring Ambition with Realism, Clingendael Report, May 2021. The following sections are based on this report.*

defined in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)<sup>2</sup>. They encompass all types of operations, from the low end to the high end of the spectrum. The proposal by a large number of EU Member States for an initial-entry capability of around 5,000 military with all necessary enablers could be one of the force packages that need to be developed. As NATO will be primarily concerned about the military threat from ‘the East’, the EU, with its wider toolbox of civilian and military means, is more suited for crisis management operations in ‘the South’ (the integrated approach). In the short term, taking into account the restrictions on available forces, the geographical priority area for the EU would be the southern neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean<sup>3</sup>.

Furthermore, the EU could strengthen resilience for ensuring stable access to the ‘global commons’, which may include the protection and defence of sea lines of communication, by extending the ‘maritime presences concept’, for example. This concept is already applied in the Gulf of Guinea in response to the increasing risks of piracy (The EU launches its Coordinated Maritime Presences concept in the Gulf of Guinea, 2021)<sup>4</sup>. Military support to internal security actors is another sector that needs to be explored. If required, the military can provide important capabilities under the leadership of civil security and safety actors in civil protection and disaster response, cyber security, countering terrorism and other areas. This brings Article 42.7 (the mutual defence clause) of the TEU and Article 222 (the solidarity clause) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) into the debate. What scenarios and which situations could trigger the use of these articles? What role could the EU have if the Member States were to invoke Article 42.7, which has happened once – at the request of France after the terrorist attacks on the Bataclan theatre in 2015 – but without any follow-up in terms of developing concepts and policies for future application?

## 2.2 Long term

The military level of ambition should be considerably raised in the long term, that is by 2030 and beyond<sup>5</sup>. In essence, the EU should be able to conduct all sorts of crisis management operations across the full spectrum and in all domains (air, sea, land,

<sup>2</sup> Article 43 of the TEU outlines the following CSDP tasks: »joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.«

<sup>3</sup> Author’s opinion.

<sup>4</sup> The maritime presences concept deviates from an EU military operation as it is based on coordination between the assets (ships, aircraft) of the Member States in the deployment area without a full command and control chain connecting the political and military-strategic level in Brussels with the forces in theatre. As it is not a formal EU CSDP operation, it even allows for Danish participation as it is not contradictory to Denmark’s opt-out on the military aspects of CSDP. Denmark will contribute a naval vessel to the Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea in the second half of 2021.

<sup>5</sup> The Strategic Compass looks ahead 5-10 years, but for capability development this time frame is too short. Particularly in capability areas with investment in new technologies, development and production cycles often take more than ten years.

cyber, space) autonomously in support of its own role as a global actor. This should imply the following:

*Air domain:* the ability to conduct all air operations up to the highest level of the spectrum including the full package of air tasks (air-to-air refuelling, reconnaissance, suppression of air defence, interdiction, close air support, etc.).

*Land domain:* the ability to conduct military crisis operations up to corps level or comparable levels (task forces), from the low end of the spectrum to the highest level of interventions with all necessary capabilities (combat power, long-range artillery, engineering, drone defence, etc.).

*Sea domain:* the ability to conduct naval operations across the full spectrum up to the level of a carrier-centred strike force or comparable naval task forces.

*Cyber domain:* the ability to protect and defend EU forces and military infrastructure against cyber-attacks and to conduct offensive cyber operations against identified opponents; military cyber commands and cyber assets should also be available to assist EU-coordinated cybersecurity activities (including under Article 42.7 TEU).

*Space domain:* the full use of the Galileo global positioning system and the Copernicus observation capacities in support of military operations; the availability of an EU capacity in space for secure governmental satellite communications (Gov/SatCom).

This EU level of ambition is not meant to create competition with NATO. On the contrary, if realized in the long term, the European capabilities would also result in much better burden-sharing between the US and the European Allies, most of whom (21 in total) are also members of the EU. For crisis management operations, the EU should extend the geographical scope worldwide, in particular to protect and defend its interests in the global commons (such as sea lanes of communication).

### 3 WHAT IS NEEDED TO GET THERE?

For a long time, the response to the question of what the EU needs most in order to be an effective actor in security and defence consisted of three words: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities. There is no doubt that the EU is facing a major problem which could already be partly solved if all Member States were to make their full military capabilities available to the EU; currently several Member States make only a part of their military forces available. But even if the EU could call on all the military capabilities of the Member States, serious shortfalls remain. However, capability development is not the only area of concern. The EU must improve its efforts by taking the following eight actions:

- **Speed up decision-making** In the EU, decision-making is very slow and not suited to quick action in crisis circumstances. Within the boundaries of the existing

Treaty – which does not allow the application of qualified majority voting for decisions on CSDP operations and missions – two tools could be used. Constructive abstentionism (not agreeing, but not blocking a decision either) could provide a way out for Member States that object to EU action but can accept that a decision is nevertheless taken. Furthermore, Article 44 TEU offers the option of entrusting the implementation of an EU operation to a smaller group of Member States. The potential of these two options should be explored as a means to speed up decision-making. It should be noted that Member States always have the option of operating as a ‘coalition of the willing’ in the event that the EU (or NATO for that matter) is unable to act. In fact, almost all interventions high in the spectrum have been coalitions of the willing under a lead nation. Several operations in the Sahel, under French leadership, may serve as examples. It is important to keep the option of such coalitions available in order to have maximum flexibility in crisis circumstances.

- **Better preparedness** The EU could reduce the time needed for preparing operations by introducing contingency planning, advance planning and exercises. Various types of operations could be elaborated in Strategic Operational Cases. As far as possible, the EU should make use of contingency plans already developed by NATO. They should be adapted to changing circumstances and take the integrated EU approach into consideration. Live exercises must be organized for all kinds of operations to train in multinational formations and to solve problems that may come to the fore during those exercises, in order to prevent delays that could occur during real operations.
- **Enlarge the MPCC** The EU’s command and control system at the military-strategic level must be stepped up from the current small-scale Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to an enlarged version capable of planning and conducting all EU military operations. In the long term an EU Civil-Military Headquarters is required, with two co-located but separate civilian and military command and control components. There is an urgent need to install secure communications between all relevant EU actors in Brussels and with the force level command elements in theatre.
- **Streamline capability development** No new instruments need to be created for capability development, but the existing tools must be streamlined and used to their full extent by the Member States. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) could be optimized as the indicator of the results of capability improvement and driving collaborative project selection by the Member States. The commitments of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) could be raised and peer pressure should be increased on Member States not fulfilling their commitments. The effectiveness of the European Defence Fund<sup>6</sup> could be enhanced by creating an EU Government-to-Industries Forum in order to bring demand and industrial supply together in multinational cooperation formats as early as possible.

<sup>6</sup> *The European Defence Fund (EDF) provides financial support to consortia involving at least three EU Member States and three entities in different EU Member States for technology research and the development of military capacities.*

- **Integration into national defence planning** The EU instruments must be brought into national defence planning processes to end the habit in many Member States of considering collaborative projects as ‘something additional’. It must be turned around: collaborative solutions first, national projects second, and they should only be the preferred option when a multinational programme is absent while capability is an absolute requirement. ‘Europe Days’ could be organized regularly to increase awareness of EU defence cooperation within Ministries of Defence.
- **Connect civilian and military capability development** Civil and military capability development should be aligned to the maximum extent, particularly in the space and cyber sectors, but also generally with regard to emerging and disruptive technologies with dual-use applications. European capabilities originally developed for civilian users – such as the EU’s global positioning satellite system, Galileo, and the Copernicus earth observation programme – can be used by the military as well. The next step in the European Commission’s Action Plan to seek synergies between the civil, defence and space sectors is the development of a Technology Roadmap, to be ready in October 2021. It should help to steer investment in all three sectors in a coordinated way.
- **Step up defence industrial cooperation** Increasing collaborative programmes by Member States must go hand in hand with more cross-border defence industrial cooperation. Major European companies have embarked on such cooperation, but further steps must be taken in order to integrate and specialize defence industries and create a true European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Special attention must be given to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the defence sector which are facing the most serious problems in joining procurement programmes which are carried out by the ‘integrators’ (major companies) in the larger EU Member States.
- **European specialized capability groups** A neglected but important area that should be looked at is the already ongoing process of drawing up the national capability profiles of the Member States. Germany and the Eastern European countries have ongoing programmes to increase the heavy land forces that are most suited to collective defence. Countries with overseas commitments or whose security interests are primarily determined by the instability and conflicts in areas to the South put more emphasis on naval capabilities and on more mobile, lighter forces. These national capability profiles could be the basis for discussing certain forms of specialization coordinated by groups of European countries.

Ultimately, better decision-making processes, operational planning, capability development tools and other ways of improving European defence cooperation are dependent on **political will at the highest level**. The European Council should be regularly involved in assessing results based on milestones and targets – agreed by EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence – in order to ensure sustained political pressure and financial investment by the EU and at the national level, which will be a key precondition for success.

## The way ahead

The Strategic Compass exercise is entering its final and crucial phase. The European External Action Service has the important task of providing a draft text to the Foreign Affairs Council with the participation of Defence Ministers on 15-16 November this year. It is expected that the EEAS will provide an ambitious proposal in line with various Council Conclusions. Following the release of the draft text, the last and most difficult steps will have to be taken with the aim of reaching consensus among all EU Member States by March 2022. Most likely, the European countries favouring a less ambitious Strategic Compass will try to water down the draft text during this period. In any case, this will be a challenging process, of course for the EEAS as the penholder, but also for the Slovenian and French EU Presidencies.

The solution to bridge the gap between ‘the East’ and ‘the rest’ in the EU may lie in the linkage with NATO. In a parallel process (to be concluded later in 2022) the Alliance is developing a new Strategic Concept, taking into consideration the changed security environment of the 2020s and beyond. With a pro-EU Biden Administration in Washington, there is now a window of opportunity to strike a new transatlantic bargain. This bargain can no longer be solely concluded within the Alliance. It must involve the EU as a strategic partner, because the EU will continue to enhance its role in security and defence in order to take more responsibility for European security. Furthermore, the broader agenda of the EU – from trade to finances and from development aid to security and defence – provides added value to the narrower but important responsibilities of NATO as an organization with a political-military focus on collective defence.

The EU should now rise to the occasion. If its ambition level in security and defence is not raised considerably, the EU will never become a global actor. Continuing business as usual is not an option. The EU must step up its efforts: it is about breaking through or simply muddling through, and with regard to a better burden-sharing with the US. At the start of the European Security and Defence Policy process, around the turn of the century, its purpose was mainly defined as ‘to act autonomously, also with military means if needed, and in cases where NATO would not undertake action’. More than 20 years later, this must be extended – due to the changed security environment and the US focus on the Indo-Pacific – to ‘the ability to act autonomously to protect and defend European interests, and to develop the required military capabilities, while strengthening NATO at the same time’. It is essential that the Strategic Compass states very clearly not only what the EU should be able to do and what is needed to realize that level of ambition, but also that the military capabilities required for this purpose will automatically lead to better burden-sharing in NATO.

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# MISIJE IN OPERACIJE KOT ORODJE ZA OBLIKOVANJE DELOVANJA EU NA GLOBALNI RAVNI

## MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS AS A TOOL FOR SHAPING THE EU'S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

**Povzetek** Evropska unija je mednarodni akter, ki prispeva k povečanju stopnje varnosti v svetu. Trenutno izvaja 11 civilnih in šest vojaških operacij ter misij s približno 5000 napotenimi pripadniki. Čeprav je z leti svoje mehanizme in instrumente, ki temeljijo na učenju na podlagi izkušenj, prilagodila, se je v zadnjem času, ki ga poglobljeno zaznamuje pandemična kriza, pozornost držav članic obrnila navznoter. Evropska unija se zato zdaj spoprijema z velikim izzivom glede opredelitve svoje varnostne vloge.

**Ključne besede** *Evropska unija, krizno upravljanje, misije, operacije, varnost, mir.*

**Abstract** The European Union is an international actor which makes a contribution to increasing the level of security in the world. It is currently carrying out 11 civilian and 6 military missions and operations, deploying approximately 5,000 personnel. Although over the years it has adapted its mechanisms and instruments based on learning by doing, in recent times, deepened by the pandemic crisis, the attention of the Member States has shifted inwards. As a result, the European Union now faces a major challenge to define its security role.

**Key words** *European Union, crisis management, missions, operations, security, peace.*

## Introduction

Although the idea of defence cooperation between European states dates to the end of the Second World War and the signing of the Treaty of Brussels, in fact, until the 1990s, it was NATO that was perceived as the primary security provider, and the only organization capable of rapid deployment of forces. The end of the Cold War, as well as conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, brought a change in the perception of security issues by European leaders, and revealed the need to conduct crisis management operations autonomously. Among other things, this led to the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992, and to the transfer of a European Security and Defence Policy to the EU in 1999 (the EU also took over the »Petersberg Tasks« – a list of potential crisis management operation types – agreed in 1992 as part of the Western European Union). Nevertheless, NATO's role in Europe has not since been diminished; its importance was emphasized by the possibility of cooperation between the two organizations in the Berlin Plus format in 1999 (Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy, 2016).

The major change in the EU's global engagement brought the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009. It created a European External Action Service (EEAS) and enhanced the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), aimed at running the CFSP. The Treaty also set up the current Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as part of the CFSP, with operational capacity in both civilian and military dimensions (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

The EU therefore received a current legal basis to use the assets provided by the Member States to run missions and operations outside its territory for peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter (Treaty on European Union, Article 42). More specifically, these include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization (Treaty on European Union, Article 43.1). The objectives and scope of these tasks, as well as conditions for their implementation, are established by Council decisions, and the HR/VP is responsible for coordination between the civilian and military dimensions of the tasks (Treaty on European Union, Article 43.2). EU missions and operations thus serve as a tool for response to the challenges posed outside the EU, but do not address the common defence issues that most Member States are consistently developing within NATO. However, discussions about the division of responsibilities are ongoing, and both organizations are ready to carry out missions and operations in parallel.

Along with expanding technical cooperation between the Member States, it was also necessary to develop strategic guidelines that would help understand contemporary global challenges and define the role that the EU should play. Such a comprehensive document was first formulated in 2003 as a European Security Strategy, and replaced

in 2016 by a new document – a Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS). Five priorities identified in the latter include: 1) Security of the Union; 2) Resilience of the neighbourhood in the East and South; 3) Integrated crisis management; 4) Regional orders; and 5) Global governance. The approach to crises is therefore one of the essential elements of the CFSP. The strategy identifies the need for the EU to act at all stages of the conflict cycle (prevention, resolution, and stabilization), as well as at different levels (local, regional, and global). At the same time, deep alliances and cooperation in a spirit of multilateralism were named as supportive to the EU's crisis response capacity to ensure global stability and long-lasting peace (Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, 2016).

The nature of EU-led missions and operations – their number, type, and size – was first analyzed below, and the directions of EU involvement was also specified. Following these data, the main challenges for the CSDP were presented, as well as the EU's adaptive response to them. The analysis was based on the system method, supported by quantitative methods, which allowed the determination of the weaknesses of the existing instruments and the prospects for further enhancing the EU's global engagement.

## 1 PRESENT ENGAGEMENT

Delegated competences in the field of the CSDP allowed the EU to become one of the global security actors. Since 2003, the EU has run 36 missions and operations on three continents. Currently, around 5,000 personnel are deployed to 11 civilian<sup>1</sup> and 6 military missions and operations (see Table 1), which demonstrates the scale of the EU's engagement and the reliance of its partners. As for international law, a mission or operation can only be launched if the state requests assistance or if the United Nations Security Council issues a corresponding resolution. CSDP missions and operations are also open to the contributions of third states, and 20 Framework Participation Agreements have been signed so far (EU Missions and Operations, 2020).

The EU carries out a wide range of civilian activities, engaging in strengthening the internal security sectors of its partners, cooperating with police and border guards, supporting rule-of-law reforms, and carrying out observation activities at the borders of conflict zones. Missions are located both in the EU neighbourhood and in Africa and Asia, covering regions with the greatest destabilizing potential for Europe. Similar localization logic applies to military activities, although their tasks include not only training but also executive operational activities at sea and on land (see Table 1).

<sup>1</sup> The EUBAM mission in Moldavia and Ukraine is included in those numbers due to its objectives, although it is not managed within CSDP structures.

**Table 1:**  
Ongoing EU  
missions and  
operations  
(Source: Own  
elaboration  
based on EEAS  
data (EU CSDP  
Missions &  
Operations for  
Human Security,  
2019))


Type	Assignment	Territory	Year of launch	Personnel <sup>2</sup>
Civilian	Police (EUPOL)	Palestine	2006	110
	Border-control support (EUBAM)	Rafah (Palestine)	2005	16
		Libya	2013	65
	Observatory (EUMM)	Georgia	2008	411
	Security-sector reform (EUAM, EUCAP)	Niger	2012	210
		Somalia	2012	170
		Mali	2015	194
		Ukraine	2015	357
		Iraq	2017	98
Central African Republic	2019	170		
Rule-of-law reform (EULEX)	Kosovo	2008	503	
Military	Naval force (EUNAVFOR)	Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, part of the Indian Ocean, Somali coastal territory	2008	398
		Central Mediterranean Sea	2020	n/a <sup>3</sup>
	Land force (EUFOR)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2004	553
	Military training (EUTM)	Central African Republic	2016	205
		Mali	2013	697
		Somalia	2010	137

Given the slight changes in the number of missions and operations by continent, the EU has maintained its basic direction of global engagement over the past 18 years (see Figure 1, Figure 2). The overall number of activities has decreased only slightly, and the lead of civilian over military missions has remained quite stable. However, data on the number of personnel deployed show that in Europe, where the number of missions and operations is much smaller, staffing remains almost as high (though the lack of data for the operation in the Mediterranean Sea should be noted) as in Africa (see Figure 3, Figure 4). It therefore seems that while the greater number of missions and operations in Africa is due to the large number of trouble spots, missions and operations in Europe remain in the vital interest of the EU.


<sup>2</sup> Data for 2019.

<sup>3</sup> Data for EUNAVFOR Med Irini not available; however it succeeds Operation Sophia, which in 2019 had 352 personnel.


**Figure 1:**  
Ongoing missions and operations by continent  
(Source: Own elaboration based on EEAS data (EU CSDP Missions & Operations for Human Security, 2019))




**Figure 2:**  
Completed missions and operations by continent  
(Source: Own elaboration based on EEAS data (EU CSDP Missions & Operations for Human Security, 2019))



**Figure 3:**  
Change in number of civilian and military activities  
(Source: Own elaboration based on EEAS data (EU CSDP Missions & Operations for Human Security, 2019))



**Figure 4:**  
Number of personnel deployed to ongoing missions and operations  
(Source: Own elaboration based on EEAS data (EU CSDP Missions & Operations for Human Security, 2019))



It should be remembered that while it is the EU that carries out civilian and military activities, the decisive voice on the assets provision depends on the Member States. Launching a new mission or operation requires consent expressed by a unanimous vote in the Council. This, despite possible problems due to divergent interests and the strategic culture of individual states, ensures the coherence of the external action. Eventually, however, only a limited number of Member States become involved in an individual mission or operation.

The level of funding also depends on the common interest of the Member States. Military activities must be covered by extra-budgetary sources, which constitute the European Peace Facility (EPF) and individual contributions, while civilian tasks are financed through the CFSP part of the EU budget. For the years 2021-2027 the EPF budget will amount to €5 billion (about €500 million to €1 billion annually), which is an increase over the previous financial framework (Special Meeting of the European Council, 2020, p 56). Civilian activities, meanwhile, have a budget of about €281 million annually (Working to Improve Human Security: Civilian CSDP, 2019). The disproportion in finance is significant given the larger number of civilian missions, but it is also important to consider the higher personnel numbers and intensity of on-site activities in the case of military assignments.

## 2 MAJOR CHALLENGES

The changing international environment is having a significant, if sometimes underestimated, impact on the EU's global engagement (Lindstrom, 2020, p 88). Recently the most frequently mentioned, although not traditionally related to security issues, is climate change (Fetzek and Schaik, 2018; Towards a climate-proof security and defence policy, 2020). Its effects are among the most important factors today that can cause or intensify other trends directly translating into the global order. Dwindling natural resources, such as water and food, and increased risk of natural disasters, e.g. floods and fires, can force many people to fight for goods that are difficult to access or to migrate. These effects will be unevenly distributed, and one of the region's most at risk is Africa (Brown et al., 2007), where the EU is already involved in the greatest number of missions and operations. Due to climate change, but also exacerbated by the economic crisis after the pandemic, there will also be a growing number of weakened or failed states. This, related to rising social inequalities, can create unrest or support for terrorist activity, in the EU's neighbourhood as well as in other places.

The demand for missions and operations is therefore likely to increase in the near future<sup>4</sup>. It will be indicated by the destabilization of the situation in the East (escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, renewed clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh), and the potentially growing instability in the South (including the Balkans, Libya, and the Sahel) and the Middle East (the 10-year war in Syria). Russia and China's aspiration to curb the multilateral world order will also be a phenomenon of increasing importance.

Furthermore, the conditions for conducting missions and operations will change, mainly due to shifts in the nature of conflicts (Terlikowski, 2020). On the one hand, they are taking on a more fluid character, which is expressed, for example, by the growing ability of terrorist organizations to easily transfer their activities or by increasing the possibility of global impact as information technologies develop (see

<sup>4</sup> On 12 July 2021 Council adopted a decision setting up an EU military training mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique).

the case of ISIS foreign fighters in Syria). On the other hand, the use of modern technologies is creating completely new battlefields. This is mainly related to rising digital threats such as disinformation and cyber-attacks; building resistance to these is currently one of the key tasks in the field of security (Poushter and Huang, 2019).

All these issues have so far been insufficiently considered in shaping the CSDP missions and operations. The evolution of the EU's approach to addressing them will be of key importance for the effective achievement of its goals and ensuring a corresponding security level in general. Consideration should be given not only to geographical distribution but also to the profile and assets necessary for carrying out external activities (Lindstrom, 2020, p 88).

One of the fundamental issues is the approach that Member States have towards launching new missions and operations. Currently, a trend of protracted decision-making is becoming apparent. Member States tend to react only when large-scale crises break out, and as a result, effective crisis management is more difficult compared to a situation where the reaction takes place at an earlier stage of the conflict cycle, i.e. in the prevention phase. At the same time the EU is rather selective when it comes to launching new missions and operations, and prefers to avoid taking action in areas of high military intensity (Palm and Crum, 2019)<sup>5</sup>. An additional reason is the relatively low percentage of military actions financed by the extra EU budget so far. The remainder of the costs must be borne by the individual Member States, which means that only those with strong national or strategic interests tend to become involved. In this context, flexibility in setting missions and operations objectives and mandates is also a matter to discussion.

Secondly, considering rapidly changing operating conditions requires proper forecasting, adaptation of staff training, and selection of appropriate equipment. In the digital age, it is also necessary to ensure adequate access to data, including satellite navigation and imagery, as well as secure communication channels (such as the currently in development GOVSATCOM) in any deployment location.

Finally, the added value of missions and operations, both from the EU and the local perspective, should be considered. Although external activities are usually very complex in nature, their sometimes-unclear goals make it difficult to evaluate and compare their effectiveness. Considering this as a matter of not only enhancing credibility but also the power of its own actions, the EU should do more to better define them and to introduce a clear, accessible evaluation methodology. Improving the availability of certain mission and operation data (e.g. allocations and delegated personnel) would also be advisable.

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<sup>5</sup> To use recent examples, reference can be made to Libya 2011 and the use of chemical weapons in 2013 during the Syrian civil war.

### 3 EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSE

In recent years the EU has taken several steps to improve its crisis response by launching an evaluation and revision process. In 2018 the Council adopted »Conclusions on the Implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact«, defining 22 political obligations that are meant to enhance the EU's capacity to conduct civilian missions (Conclusions of the Council, 2018). The main premise is improvement in the responsiveness and flexibility of missions, to make them more capable and effective in fulfilling their adopted mandates (Civilian CSDP Compact, 2019). Although its implementation is anticipated by mid-2023, the process has been rather slow, and the current pandemic works as an additional distraction. Thus far one of the biggest achievements has been the opening of the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management in Berlin in 2020 (Kozioł, 2020a). While it has only been a few months since the CoE became fully operational in January 2021, it is already evident that this new initiative is enjoying limited interest. Of the 18 states that decided to cooperate in this format, only four have so far seconded their national experts (European Centre of Excellence, n.d.). In this way the main assumption, of raising the level of analysis to standardize tasks and procedures related to civilian missions, will be rather difficult to implement in the near future. The slow development of the CoE reflects also the overall trend in civilian actions to reduce the proportion of staff and shift from delegated to contracted positions in employment.

The issue of the EU's military involvement has been the subject of much debate in recent years. As a result, significant changes have been made to the EU's foreign military activities with the launch of the European Peace Facility in 2021 (Kozioł, 2020b; EU sets up the European Peace Facility, 2021). External actions that have military or defence implications are now covered under the CFSP by replacing previous instruments, such as the Athena and the African Peace Facility. The EPF is designed to standardize the financing and management mechanisms, as well as to facilitate the EU's military engagement and move it to the global level. The main incentive for Member States to take joint action is of financial character: the overall budget increased (from €250-500 million to €500 million - €1 billion annually) and the ceiling for common costs has been raised to 35-45% (from 5-15%). On the other hand, the EPF introduces the possibility of purchasing military equipment for partner countries, which is meant to increase the effectiveness of actions taken, although it raises legitimate concerns about possible misuse. This new instrument has only just been introduced, which makes it difficult to judge the real response to the number of challenges set. Certainly, however, the smaller-than-assumed budget (€5 billion instead of the initial €10.5 billion) confirms a shift in the EU's priorities in the short term towards economic recovery following the pandemic, rather than increasing the Union's security potential (New European Peace Facility, 2018).

Despite the launch of the EPF and several ongoing, albeit technical, changes to the EU's missions and operations, key questions remain unanswered. Above all, the level of ambition of the EU's crisis response management has not yet been defined.

Such issues as: 1) geographical priorities; 2) modalities of response; and 3) types of missions and operations to engage, are to be discussed and included in the work on the new Strategic Compass (Towards a Strategic Compass, 2021). At the same time, Member States should set ambitious but realistic tasks, trying to deviate from the current course of growing disenchantment with the CSDP (Pietz, 2021). It is also important to consider NATO's strategic planning to avoid duplication, while ensuring an increase in the EU's potential and further successful cooperation between the two organizations (Fifth Progress Report, 2020). Focusing on possible other bi- or multi-lateral partnerships, e.g. with the post-Brexit United Kingdom, could also elevate the EU's crisis response potential. In this context, however, Member States' reluctant attitude towards common security commitments seems disturbing. The position of the French in favour of organizing coalitions of the willing is particularly clear in this respect (e.g. the case of the Strait of Hormuz) (Brzozowski, 2020; European Maritime Awareness in the SoH, 2020). Such a way of responding to international crises is perceived as more effective, ensuring greater flexibility and speed of reaction, allowing the avoidance of the protracted consent process and the negotiation of the mandate by Member States. Nonetheless, it does not provide legitimacy for action at the EU level. The French position may be counterbalanced by Germany if it decides to take an active part in the debate on the future shape of the EU's crisis response. Due to a reluctance for ad-hoc responses, Germany proposed giving EU action more flexibility while retaining full legitimacy by the implementation of Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union. In the German concept, this would allow, on the one hand, the maintenance of the required unanimity in taking external actions, while only delegating tasks to willing Member States. Although this proposal does not dispel all doubts, it certainly does open the door to further debate on the future conduct of EU missions and operations (Puglierin, 2021).

**Conclusion** When Ursula von der Leyen announced in 2019 that she would chair the »geopolitical Commission« (Szymańska et al., 2019), the international situation was radically different. The pandemic, which has caused a global health crisis combined with an economic downturn, forced the EU to pay more attention to internal problems than to building its global importance. It does not change, however, the demand for the EU as a global actor (CSDP missions and coronavirus, 2020). For this reason, seeking a consensus between Member States on a common approach to building international security should be considered as one of the important elements defining ongoing reflection on the Strategic Compass. Crisis management missions and operations could play an important role in this process and be treated as a measurable tool for the EU's global engagement. Moreover, an increase in efforts to promote the external actions should be considered at this point, as information on the EU's global role as a peace-making actor is still limited.

The EU has continually been trying to improve crisis management capabilities by adapting its structures and mechanisms. Nevertheless, recently proposed initiatives, such as the CoE or the EPF, are rather limited tools for the improvement of the EU's external actions. A similar reference should be made to the Battle Groups

concept, which was initiated in 2007, three years after the initial commitment; however, no Battle Groups have yet been deployed. As Europeans face more serious challenges related to the changing nature of threats and the declining level of both local and global security, the need to build a common strategic view within the EU takes on importance. Nevertheless, while differences in perceptions of threats do not necessarily have to be eliminated, reducing the reluctance of Member States to engage in new missions and operations is a vital factor, not only for effective action but also to maintain credibility in their global commitments. Several actions at the EU level would have an indirect but positive impact on this.

Most importantly, the role of external actions should be redefined. While purely military tasks could be used for rapid interventions, civilian missions should be a more long-term response. In addition, it would also be necessary to ensure better cooperation between civilian and military tasks, or even to combine mandates. This would help to achieve the best possible results on the ground. Cooperation with NATO, especially in the case of military tasks, would also help to increase the effectiveness of such actions. Next, threat detection, advanced planning and building probable action scenarios should be improved. It would be easier to prevent escalation if a developed forecasting system were introduced. Therefore, the EU should act according to the concepts of early warnings, early action, and rapid responses. Then, steps in civilian dimension could be taken, such as under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. Its rapid response component, dedicated to financing a fast response capacity for crisis management, conflict prevention and peace building, could become one of these useful tools (Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, 2020).

The last thing to note is the multilateral effort to ensure security. For example, for countries like Poland, the Baltic States or Romania, the EU's crisis management capabilities should not be developed at the expense of activities undertaken within NATO. Still, there are possibilities of tightening cooperation between the two organizations, which could maximize the effect of the EU's global engagement, as in the case of the Somali coast (Del Principe, 2020). Likewise, cooperation between the EU and local societies or the United Nations can be mentioned, with an agreement signed in September 2020 to facilitate alignment and enhance complementarity in the field, including areas of logistics, medical, and security support (UN and EU sign agreement, 2020). It seems that currently only the efforts of various actors, undertaken on many levels, can bring about a tangible effect.

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## PRIHODNOST SKUPNE VARNOSTNE IN OBRAMBNE POLITIKE IN MAJHNE DRŽAVE ČLANICE

## THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AND SMALL MEMBER STATES

**Povzetek** Dvaindvajset let po srečanju na vrhu v Kölnu, ki velja za zgodovinsko za Skupno varnostno in obrambno politiko (SVOP), danes še vedno ne moremo govoriti o popolnoma funkcionalni in operativni SVOP. Prispevek analizira PESCO, CARD, CDP in EDF ter nekatere najpomembnejše težave evropskega obrambnega prizorišča, ki mu primanjkuje skladnosti in ostaja razdrobljeno v številnih vidikih. Države članice še vedno namenjajo veliko več finančnih sredstev za druge varnostne okvire, ki niso del EU, kot je na primer Nato. Prav tako države članice ohranjajo nacionalno osredotočenost na področju obrambnega načrtovanja in v resnici zelo slabo izpolnjujejo dane obljube. Vprašanje je, kaj in koliko v trenutni evropski arhitekturi majhna država članica sploh lahko doseže. Prispevek osvetli vlogo majhnih držav skozi institucijo predsedovanja Evropskemu svetu.

**Ključne besede** *SVOP, Slovenija, PESCO, CARD, EDF*

**Abstract** Twenty-two years after the EC meeting in Cologne where the CSDP came to life, we still cannot talk about a fully functional and operational CSDP. This article reflects on PESCO, CARD, the CDP and the EDF, and on some of the main issues in the European defence landscape today, which continues to be fragmented and lacks coherence in several aspects. Member States are still investing more in non-EU frameworks such as NATO, and still retain a national focus in their defence planning, showing very little discipline in meeting the commitments that they have undertaken. The question arises of what a small state can achieve in the current European architecture, if anything. The role of the small state is reflected through the Presidency of the European Council.

**Key words** *CSDP, Slovenia, PESCO, CARD, EDF*

## Introduction

Over six-plus decades<sup>1</sup>, the trend of improving cooperation between European countries in the field of defence has been slow but mostly positive. There have been several moments in the »life« of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which can be identified as crucial, and which have accelerated European states' desire and need for stronger defence and military cooperation. Serrano (2020, p 16) mentions two main development stages in the life of the CSDP: »the birth and initial steps of the ESDP, as it was called prior to the Lisbon Treaty from 1999 to 2003; and its adolescence and adulthood, as the CSDP from 2016 to date. The 2003 European Security Strategy crowns the first phase, and the 2016 Global Strategy marks the beginning of the second phase«. As also noted by Culetto and Himelrajh (2018, p 15) the 15 years after 1991 showed very slow progress in the area of common defence. »Perhaps the most important event was the Saint-Malo summit between Tony Blair<sup>2</sup> and Jacques Chirac<sup>3</sup> in December 1998« (Ibid.), which paved the way for the creation of the CSDP at the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999. However, for many years to follow, the CDSP remained very far from being functional and operational. Moving on 22 years from the Cologne meeting, we are still asking ourselves whether the CSDP can be considered functional and operational, especially considering the new threats to European security which have emerged during the last decade(s) and how (if at all) a CSDP framework could effectively offer answers and solutions to them. »*When the CSDP is weighed against the Trump presidency, the rise of China and a crumbling multilateral order, it cannot help but disappoint*« (Fiott, 2020c, p 10).

The main issue of the European defence landscape today is that it still continues to be fragmented and lacks coherence in several aspects. »Existing capabilities are characterised by a very high diversity of types in major equipment and different levels of modernisation and of interoperability, including logistic systems and supply chains« (CARD Report, 2020). As noted by Fiott (2020b), over the past 20 years European governments have collectively invested more in non-EU frameworks such as NATO or in bilateral and mini-lateral endeavours, rather than engage in defence cooperation with other EU Member States through the CSDP. »Conversely, the CSDP may have been overtaken by the geopolitical realities that have developed over the past two decades« (Fiott, 2020b, p 4). The EU, its Member States and its institutions have been trying to make European defence more unified, with several initiatives which have followed the Lisbon Treaty. This article reflects and analyzes the new initiatives taken on since 2016, when the new EU Global Strategy was adopted. In the second part the article analyzes the role of small Member States, especially through the institute of the Presidency of the Council of the EU, with Slovenia starting its Presidency on July 1st 2021.

<sup>1</sup> The historical development of the different initiatives in the period following WWII which led to the CSDP as it exists today is not the subject of this paper. The paper focuses on the CSDP in the time period after the Lisbon Treaty.

<sup>2</sup> The UK Prime Minister.

<sup>3</sup> The French President.

## 1 THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER 2016

Since 2016, the EU has developed several new initiatives on security and defence. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the latest Strategic Compass are frameworks and incentives that were designed to progressively overcome the failures of the past. Although not new, the Capability Development Plan (CDP) must also be mentioned. All these initiatives are strongly interlinked: the CDP identifies the capability priorities Member States should focus their common efforts on; CARD provides an overview of existing capabilities in Europe and identifies opportunities for cooperation; PESCO offers options on how to develop prioritized capabilities in a collaborative manner; and the EDF provides EU funding to support the implementation of cooperative defence projects, with a bonus for the PESCO project (EDA, 2018).

Previous initiatives have certainly led to greater interaction between Member States with regard to cooperation; however, the main issues of de-fragmentation and operational commitment still remain (see also CARD Report, 2020). National defence interests and related approaches continue to prevail, and financial and other allocations made by Member States to their already launched national programmes do not leave much room for manoeuvre for collaborative defence spending in the near future.

### 1.1 Capability Development Process (CDP)

Although the CDP is not a novel process, it deserves to be mentioned as one of the crucial ones. The CDP was jointly developed by the European Defence Agency and the EU Military Staff in 2008 and updated in 2010, with revisions occurring in 2014 and 2018. »The CDP is both a document and a process that clarifies existing capability shortfalls, plans for future technology trends, explores avenues for European cooperation and details lessons learned from the EU's military missions and operations« (Fiott, 2018, p 2). According to Fiott (Ibid.), the CDP might be seen as the glue that could enhance the coherence between the CARD, the EDF and PESCO. »The CDP is more than just a document because it sits at the intersection of the fundamental challenge of defence capability development« (Ibid.).

The most tangible output of the 2018 CDP revision was the eleven<sup>4</sup> new EU Capability Development Priorities, developed together with the Member States. The CDP should be seen as a vital element of the EU's broader defence policies because of the important role it plays in arbitrating between short-term capability requirements and longer-term capability and technology needs. »The challenge facing the EU today is one that involves having to fill a multitude of capability shortfalls in the short term,

<sup>4</sup> »Out of the 11 priorities, three are related to the Command, Control and Information/Cyber domain, two to land capabilities and logistics, two to the maritime domain, and three are dedicated to the air domain. One priority deals with cross-domain capabilities contributing to achieve the EU Level of Ambition. There is no ranking between the priorities« (EDA 2018, p 4).

while also thinking about what future capabilities and technologies the EU Member States should invest in« (Fiott, 2018, p 8).

## 1.2 CARD

The main aim of CARD is to provide a picture of the existing defence capability landscape in Europe, and to identify potential areas of cooperation. CARD was eventually approved by the EU Council in May 2017. The first full CARD cycle was launched in autumn 2019 and completed in November 2020, and has identified a total of 55 collaborative opportunities throughout the whole capability spectrum, considered to be the most promising, the most needed or the most pressing, including in terms of operational value<sup>5</sup> (CARD Report, 2020). In order to overcome the current issues of the de-fragmentation of the European defence landscape, the conclusions of the first full CARD cycle suggest more coordinated and continuous efforts by the participating Member States over a long period of time in three major areas which are interlinked: defence spending, defence planning, and defence cooperation (CARD Report, 2020).

The first full cycle of CARD should help to identify capability development opportunities that could be initiated through either PESCO, the EDF or both mechanisms. »Time will tell whether there is a greater appetite for European defence collaboration, however« (Fiott et al., 2020, p 242).

## 1.3 PESCO

Almost four years<sup>6</sup> have passed since the establishment of PESCO, and as stated by Biscop (2020, p 4), PESCO is a capability development process, which is necessarily a slow process. We cannot, therefore, expect any revolutionary breakthroughs after only four years, but »one can assess whether decisions have been made and steps taken that will produce major effect in due time« (Ibid.). In order to evaluate progress, the first PESCO Strategic Review was carried out in 2020<sup>7</sup>. Forty-seven collaborative projects have been launched, with twelve of them already delivering concrete results or reaching their initial operational capability (Council of European Union 2020, p 3).

The coherence between PESCO, CARD and the EDF promotes a better use of scarce resources by increasing the joint development of the capabilities required for Europe's security. With the first strategic review PESCO's participating Member States have agreed that the binding commitments they mutually agreed upon »have

<sup>5</sup> *The Member States are recommended to concentrate their efforts on the following six specific 'focus areas': Main Battle Tanks (MBT); Soldier Systems; Patrol Class Surface Ships; Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (Counter-UAS); Defence applications in Space and Military Mobility (CARD, Report 2020).*

<sup>6</sup> *PESCO was established in December 2017.*

<sup>7</sup> *On 20th November 2020, the European Council approved the first PESCO Strategic Review (PSR), an assessment of the first initial phase (2018-2020) of PESCO, and guidelines for its second initial phase, commencing in 2021 and lasting until 2025.*

proven to present a solid guideline in ensuring consistent implementation of PESCO and must therefore not be changed in the context of the current PESCO Strategic Review« (Council of the European Union, 2020a, p 4). Although it may seem that only four years after its launch PESCO is a successful story, a more critical view is required. The annual report also noted that participating Member States still need to do much more on strengthening collaborative defence capability development and ensuring the availability and deployability of forces for CSDP missions and operations (Fiott et al., 2020).

Biscop (2020) has identified three major reasons why PESCO does not work as planned and will probably not give the results that were expected at the launch of this initiative in 2017. Firstly, one of the main issues with PESCO is that participating Member States have given PESCO a very broad scope. »It addresses the whole of the participating Member States' armed forces, rather than just the elements that they have declared theoretically available for the CSDP«. We can also note a more pragmatic approach, with many participating Member States seeing PESCO as an instrument to achieve both EU and NATO capability targets. As Biscop (2020) states, some of the PESCO projects would have happened anyway, but by putting it under the PESCO framework participating Member States can count on co-funding from the Commission's EDF. What is more worrying and may self-destruct the whole initiative is the fact that »this list of projects does not effectively address the priority capability shortfalls that the participating Member States have commonly identified« (Biscop, 2020, p 5).

Secondly, PESCO needs clearly defined goals and desired capabilities. Formally, the Headline Goal<sup>8</sup> remains the basis for much of the EU's capability development efforts. However, there are two problems with the Headline Goal: it is no longer sufficient, and Member States simply ignore it (Biscop, 2020, p 6).

The third cause as named by Biscop (Ibid) is »a culture of non-compliance«. Member States overwhelmingly retain a national focus in their defence planning, and show very little discipline in meeting the commitments that they have undertaken. The question of how many Member States really intended to meet the commitments when they signed up for PESCO must be asked. In some countries, the defence establishment surely saw in PESCO a useful tool to impress the importance of a serious defence effort upon their national political authorities. Instead of using PESCO as an instrument to reach a common EU goal, Member States have instrumentalized it to further their own projects. »But many governments probably joined more out of fear of being left out than from a sincere desire to join in« (Biscop, 2020, p 7).

<sup>8</sup> *The 1999 Headline Goal set the quantitative level of ambition for the CSDP as a whole for the first time in the EU's history.*

## 1.4 A Strategic Compass for the Common Security and Defence Policy

In late 2019 a new and, according to Biscop (2020), potentially promising debate began by a German proposal to provide the CSDP with political guidance. The Strategic Compass can be understood as an initiative stemming from shortcomings in the EU Global Strategy. The EU Strategic Compass will set out what the EU should be able to do and achieve in the area of crisis management and resilience in the next 5-10 years, and which capacities and partnerships (including EU-NATO) it will need. »There are questions about the EU's military level of ambition, especially in terms of what type of missions and operations the Union should be able to carry out« (EUISS, 2021a). Any operational commitments that may derive from the EU Strategic Compass will have implications for resources, command and control, and capabilities. The challenge for the Strategic Compass is also a need to assess what type of military contribution can be made to enhancing resilience and countering hybrid threats (Ibid.).

A lack of political visibility represents an additional challenge. EU security and defence initiatives can only be credibly implemented if they are reflected in national defence planning. »Without national buy-in, it will be difficult to stimulate a culture of cooperation and common strategic perceptions in the EU. This is a major task for the Strategic Compass, as defence planning rests with the Member States (EUISS, 2021b).

For now the focus of the Strategic Compass remains unclear. Through informal discussions, Member States have come to a consensus that the Compass should not affect the Global Strategy or lower the agreed level of ambition. During the German Presidency in the second half of 2020, Member States launched an assessment of the threats and challenges facing the EU. According to Fiott (2020a, p 1) the Strategic Compass could potentially provide long overdue politico-strategic guidance for EU security and defence, especially in an era when EU security is being eroded. What is crucial to emphasize is that the Compass will not fill capability shortfalls or enhance the EU's technological and operational readiness itself, but it could help to align the overall strategic guidance and capabilities. However, it is still too early to evaluate, and only time will tell whether the Strategic Compass has fulfilled its expectations.

## 1.5 THE EDF

The EDF is designed to support EU collaboration in defence research and capability development by offering financial incentives for cooperation. The final decision on the setting up of the EDF was taken by the Council and the European Parliament in 2019/2020. The Fund began to function on 1 January 2021, with a total agreed budget of €7.953 billion for the 2021-2027 period. »Roughly one third will finance competitive and collaborative defence research projects, in particular through grants, and two-thirds will complement Member States' investment by co-financing the costs for defence capabilities development following the research stage« (European Defence Fund).

## 2 THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AND SMALL MEMBER STATES<sup>9</sup>

The role and possible influence of small states<sup>10</sup> in international politics and international relations have been frequent subjects of analysis in studies on international relations<sup>11</sup>. Small states' powers are limited and their economy and military capability do not match those of their larger neighbours, but small states enjoy certain advantages that increase their ability to influence international politics. »Small states can become much more than negligible actors if they actively pursue their agenda and consolidate all elements of their national power to achieve their desired objectives« (Urbelis, 2015, p 61). When you are a small state, it does not necessarily mean that you have no voice, or that you must remain passive in all matters of international relations.

Being a part of a larger alliance or a supranational institution is of great importance for small states. »Supranational institutions are considered a natural ally of small states both for ensuring their representation and for championing a common interest that often reflects the small states' priorities better than a compromise just among the major powers« (Weiss, 2020, p 2). According to Weiss (Ibid.) the literature has long recognized that international institutions in general, and supranational institutions in particular, allow small states to have a bigger impact on policy results, and has studied the means and channels they use. »More intergovernmental forms of cooperation, such as the CSDP, provide the small states with shelter as well, although the influence of the big states is much stronger« (Weiss, 2020, p 11).

According to Urbelis (2015, p 62), »Small states pursue active policies on internal NATO and EU matters«. An extremely successful example of small state policies is the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission in the Baltic States. From the beginning of the NATO air policing mission in 2004, the mission was considered to be of a temporary nature. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were not satisfied with this arrangement and they sought a permanent solution. »The Baltic states, with the assistance of the US and Denmark, persuaded other allies that NATO must agree to make temporary NATO air policing arrangement a more permanent one« (Urbelis, 2015, p 70). Actively pursuing their priorities is one of the most important rules for the success of small states. »Clearly defined and persistently sought priorities can lead to amazing results unless these priorities collide with a strong opposition by larger Allies« (Ibid.). However, prioritization remains crucial; small states, because of their limited resources, cannot fight for their interests on multiple fronts. Small states must choose wisely which battle to fight. If prioritization is the first rule of

<sup>9</sup> Urbelis (2015) uses the term »small states« for all nations that spend less than 10 billion USD on defence.

<sup>10</sup> De Wijk (in Urbelis 2015, p 62) emphasized that the main features of small states are easily recognized by their inability to maintain a full spectrum of military capabilities, and their limited abilities to project military power in distant regions of the world. Small states are dependent upon larger countries' military capabilities, as only they can provide the framework that small states can plug into with their available assets.

<sup>11</sup> Reiter et al. (in Urbelis 2015, p 61) and others have created a theoretical framework for the analysis of small states' behaviour and motivations within larger international formations.

success, then specialization is the second. »Specialization allows small countries to accumulate expertise in one or another particular area, thus achieving respect and importance while discussing those issues in NATO and the EU« (Urbelis, 2015, p 70).

An excellent opportunity for a small state to shape and influence EU (and CSDP) decisions is the Presidency of the Council of the EU. However, it is important to note that since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty the role of the Presidency in the area of the CSDP has decreased. Urbelis (2015) analyzed Lithuania's Presidency in the second part of 2013. Based on several examples of Lithuania's influence during the Presidency (the EU's Eastern Partnerships<sup>12</sup>, Energy Security<sup>13</sup>, EU Battle Groups (EUBG))<sup>14</sup>, Urbelis concluded »that small states can have a role by taking the Presidency of the EU Council, but its possibilities to influence decision making are limited« (2015, p 77). Small states can quite easily introduce a topic onto the agenda, but when national interests come into play the role of the Presidency disappears. One very good example of Member States' national interests prevailing is the issue of the EUBG. The EU countries could not agree on the deployment option, and when actual crises hit there was no political will to use the EUBG. The discussion clearly showed that neither the Lithuanian Presidency nor the EEAS had the power to impose any decision upon the use of force to any EU Member State. When the time for real decisions came, sovereign nations followed their own national interests with little regard to the Presidency or the CSDP (Urbelis, 2015). The Presidency's powers are also limited in terms of influence on wider political debates such as the NATO-EU dialogue (Urbelis, 2015, p 77).

On 1 July 2021 Slovenia took over the Presidency, as the last country in the Germany-Portugal-Slovenia trio. The period of the trio's Presidency has been guided by an 18-month Programme of the Council (Council of the European Union, 2020b). Although 2020 and 2021 so far were strongly marked by the worldwide pandemic of Covid-19, this is not the subject of our analysis. However, it must be mentioned that the trio's Presidency programme strongly focuses on plans for recovery after the pandemic, making this also the priority for the period of Slovenia's Presidency. This chapter focuses on those goals of the Presidency directly dealing with strengthening the resilience of societies and the issues of the CSDP. »The Three Presidencies are determined to take full account of the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic for

<sup>12</sup> Eastern partnerships were one of the main priorities of the Lithuanian Presidency, including in the area of the CSDP. The Eastern partnership policy serves as a perfect example of how a small but active country can use existing circumstances, i.e. the Presidency of the Council, to push forward its agenda. Lithuania's partial success was supported by the fact that no major European power had big issues with moving forward with this agenda (Urbelis, 2015).

<sup>13</sup> Energy security was another priority of great importance to the Lithuanian Presidency, as a result of which energy security became a part of the CSDP routine, with most of the work done at the EDA, which received a wider role in looking at the defence aspect of the energy security debate (Urbelis, 2015).

<sup>14</sup> The future and relevance of the EUBG was discussed long before the Lithuanian Presidency. At political and expert levels the main issue with the EUBG was well known – the EUBGs had existed already for ten years; however, they had never been used (Urbelis, 2015).

the EU, also in the framework of European Civil protection./.../ the Presidencies will aim to further enhance the EU crisis response and strengthen the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, including further development of RescEU and other capacities.../« (Council of the European Union, 2020b, p 10). The trio also promised to take all possible steps to increase the EU's capacity to act decisively and in unity to effectively promote Europe's interests and values and to defend and shape a rules-based international order. The trio also promised to enhance the EU's capabilities for emergency response, making it more effective in complex emergencies. The Covid-19 pandemic and other threats (cyber attacks; natural disasters, etc.) have unveiled several gaps in the EU's crisis and emergency response, while still having enough space for improvement.

With regard to the CSDP it is very promising that the trio are »strongly committed to enhance all aspects of the CSDP...« (Council of the European Union, 2020b, p 29). Special mention is given to the Strategic Compass and the importance of »shared threat analysis providing a basis for this strategic dialogue« (Council of the European Union, 2020b, p 30). The trio also emphasizes the importance of several new defence initiatives, including PESCO, CARD and the EDF. However, what the programme lacks is a clearer and stronger statement on enhancing the CSDP towards a more coherent and stronger European defence. In fact, the programme does not bring any groundbreaking CSDP issue to the European table, but only emphasizes and acknowledges the importance of the existing status.

With its slogan »Together. Resilient. Europe.«, Slovenia has decided to focus on four priorities during its Presidency: »to facilitate the EU's recovery and reinforce its resilience, to reflect on the future of Europe, to strengthen the rule of law and European values, and to increase security and stability in the European neighbourhood« (Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2021a). Slovenia will focus on strengthening capacities to successfully deal with pandemics and different forms of modern and complex security risks and threats, such as large-scale cyberattacks, and will also work to further strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the EU's response to large-scale natural and other disasters. Slovenia's programme evolves from the Trio Presidency programme as it gives support to the further development of the European Civil Protection Pool and rescEU capacities, as well as increasing the efficiency of operations, including transport and logistics capacities. Unfortunately, not much attention is given to the issues of defence and the CSDP. Not only that, but surprisingly there is no mention of PESCO, CARD or the EDF anywhere in the document. One would expect at least confirmation of Slovenia's position on following and fulfilling commitments given within PESCO. As Culetto and Himelrajh (2018, p 28) noted three years ago: »...the Slovenian Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2021 will be a great opportunity to advance PESCO«. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case so far, at least based on the political goals and statements written in the programme.

**Conclusion** The CSDP still has many issues to be solved in order to become more coherent and effective. One of the main issues is certainly the prevailing national interests and the fact that Member States are still not willing to put the EU's interests before their own national interests. Until this obstacle is overcome, we cannot talk about a fully operational and effective CSDP. However, we must ask ourselves if this is possible at all. Maybe issues of security and defence are too strongly perceived as strictly national, and the whole idea of having a stronger, coherent and homogenous European defence is actually based on the wrong assumptions.

Another important issue is the new and emerging threats which the EU cannot offer an appropriate response to through the CSDP framework, simply because the scope of the CSDP is limited due to its nature and it was not, in the first place, intended to offer an effective response to some types of new threats (e.g. cyber threats). The CSDP was not set up to deal with global geopolitical competition; however, we may all expect to see the EU securing its values and interests in a world where old partners and new powers cannot be trusted, and where life-long alliances are being broken. It is definitely a new global landscape in which the EU must reposition itself while considering the interests of all 27 Member States.

The financial and other allocations made by Member States to their national programmes do not leave much space for manoeuvre in collaborative defence spending in the near future. This is especially the case with small(er) states with limited financial and military resources. Their first priorities are national interests, and when it comes to the EU's interests and capabilities, they simply cannot afford them. In this EU playing field, small states must position themselves, enforce their own interests, and find ways to effectively overcome their (small) size.

Even in the case of small states, a desire to influence international relations and be an active (and not a passive) player is present. But a small state must know how »to pick their own battles« and not try to solve some over-ambitious issues, such as EU-Russia relations or the question of a European Army. Maybe this is the main reason that the programme for the Slovenian Presidency does not include any mention of the CSDP initiatives. Other, more achievable, goals have prevailed, offering at least a small possibility for success. The time for a more coherent and stable EU defence is yet to come.

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## RECENZIJ

### PRIHODNOST SKUPNE VARNOSTNE IN OBRAMBNE POLITIKE EVROPSKE UNIJE IN USTAVNO VPRAŠANJE

Trditev, da je Evropska unija (EU) na razpotju, je prepogost, pravzaprav kar zastarel kliše. Danes pogosteje najdemo mogoče celo natančnejšo trditev, da se EU spoprijema z eksistencialno krizo. To ni le mnenje akademikov, temveč retorika, ki je vse bolj prisotna v političnih, usmeritvenih in strateških dokumentih EU. Zaradi spreminjajočega se in vedno slabšega regionalnega in globalnega varnostnega okolja, ki je odkrito ogrozilo obstoj EU, so se povečale zahteve po resnični in stabilni skupni varnostni in obrambni politiki EU (SVOP), ki pa ni nič novega. Ima namreč dolgo zgodovino s številnimi vzponi in padci, podobno kot proces evropskega povezovanja. Pri slednjem se skrbi za nacionalno suverenost in s tem povezane nacionalne, čeprav prepogosto preozko umerjene prednostne naloge poskušajo usklajevati z normativnimi ambicijami in slovesnimi izjavami, pripravljenimi kot odgovor na resnično naraščajočo skrb za varnost. Kako so v težkih časih SVOP EU in njene države članice krmarile med Scilo nacionalnih suverenih obrambnih prednostnih nalog in Karibdo objektivnih potreb nadnacionalnega sodelovanja? Kateri so trenutno najaktualnejši varnostni izzivi? Kaj bi lahko ali morali storiti za izboljšanje SVOP in ali glede na njen prihodnji razvoj obstajajo razlogi za pesimizem ali optimizem?

To so vprašanja, ki jih tematska številka *Sodobni vojaški izzivi*, posvečena SVOP, obravnava v petih člankih, ki so jih napisali akademiki s področja prava, mednarodnih, družboslovnih in varnostnih ved ter strokovnjaki za varnost in obrambo. Slika, ki je nastala iz člankov v tej izdaji, je pestra. Skromni optimizem v smislu napredka mehanizmov SVOP je pomešan z obžalovanjem zaradi zamujenih priložnosti, prepogosto zaradi kulture neusklajenosti, in s pomisleki v zvezi s spremembami v celotnem globalnem modelu upravljanja. Slednje je predvsem tema Senčarjevega članka, ki prepričljivo pokaže, kako sta v zadnjih 20 letih evropski konsenz in miselnost obdobja po hladni vojni, vpeta v kantovske ideale liberalne demokracije, pravne države, zaščite človekovih pravic in solidarnosti v državah in med njimi, postopoma, a skoraj neopazno, prepustila prostor hobbesovskemu strateškemu

in konkurenčnemu svetovnemu redu, ki so ga spodbudili interesi po nacionalni suverenosti. Kljub temu zaradi tehnološkega napredka razpad konsenza po hladni vojni in posledična sprememba paradigme prinašata nove, še neraziskane varnostne grožnje, ki ne vplivajo na nič drugega kot na naše razmišljanje. Kot Senčar tudi jasno pokaže, bosta sodobno in še posebej prihodnje vojskovanje usmerjena proti našim glavam, s ključnim poudarkom na kognitivni dimenziji, zato morajo EU in njene države članice, še posebej glede na vodilno revizionistično silo Rusijo, vlagati v kognitivne vidike SVOP.

Toda EU mora za to imeti potrebne in ustrezne pristojnosti, podprte z zadostno nacionalno politično voljo. Preostali štirje članki so namenjeni prav preučevanju tega vprašanja. Članek Katarine Vatovec se zdi najbolj optimističen. Avtorica govori o procesu tako imenovane komunitarizacije obrambnih politik EU in opredeljuje potrebne družbeno-politične razloge za krepitev tega procesa v prihodnosti. Po njenem mnenju je s pomočjo zadostne politične volje, ki izhaja iz dejanskih izkušenj, mogoče postopoma uvesti komunitarizacijo, ki je tradicionalno pomenila, da se neko področje politike iz medvladnega prenese v nadnacionalni steber, za katerega velja redni zakonodajni postopek. Ta temelji na glasovanju s kvalificirano večino, katerega izplen je odvisen od uspešno izvedenih političnih pobud in vse večje ozaveščenosti o naraščajočih varnostnih grožnjah. Medtem ko po mnenju avtorice prihodnost evropske obrambne unije ostaja v rokah držav članic in medvladnega sodelovanja, so po pomembnem preboju z Lizbonsko pogodbo številni institucionalni, pravni, politični, mehki pravni in finančni ukrepi okrepili delovanje obrambne politike EU in jo hkrati vodili v smeri nadaljnje komunitarizacije.

Članek Dicka Zandeeja govori o podobni normativni premisi. Avtor je namreč prepričan, da se skupna varnostna in obrambna politika spoprijema z dilemo, ali naj naredi preboj ali še naprej životari. Zanj je odgovor nedvoumen. Potreben je preboj, ki bi zapolnil vrzel med retoričnimi zavezami in dejanji. Priložnost za to ponuja Strateški kompas. Zamišljen je kot konkretno, ambiciozno in uporabno orodje, ki naj bi z oprijemljivimi smernicami oblikovalo varnostno-obrambno vlogo EU v naslednjih petih ali desetih letih. Po Zandeejevem mnenju za doseg tega cilja ni potrebno nič drugega kot realno razmišljanje. Članek se tako konča z opredelitvijo osmih konkretnih in realnih ukrepov, s katerimi bi se EU lahko prebila iz trenutnega statusa quo v SVOP, da bi lahko resnično postala globalna sila, preden bo prepozno.

Prispevek Aleksandre Koziol povsem primerno dopolnjuje Zandeejevega, ko normativno podlago podkrepi z nekaj empirične vsebine. Opisuje aktualno varnostno-obrambno udejstvovanje EU v Evropi in tujini, velike izzive, ki jih to predstavlja, in dejansko zmožnost EU, da se z njimi spopade. Ta zmogljivost ostaja razmeroma šibka in včasih vprašljiva zaradi različnih političnih, organizacijskih, finančnih in včasih tudi ad hoc razlogov. Slednji se trenutno najbolj kažejo v obliki epidemije covida-19, ki je, kot dokazuje avtorica, pomembno oslabilo ambicijo Evropske komisije, da prevzame vlogo geopolitične komisije. Po avtoričinem mnenju je za prihodnji razvoj SVOP odločilno, da EU hkrati gradi na civilni in vojaški strani

SVOP ter razvija svoje zmogljivosti za zgodnje opozarjanje, zgodnje ukrepanje in hitro odzivanje.

Članek Jelene Juvan kot zadnji, potem ko opiše zgodovinski razvoj SVOP v kontekstu evropskega povezovanja, zre v njeno prihodnost. Pri tem posebno pozornost namenja vlogi majhnih držav članic, kot je Slovenija. Avtorica ugotavlja, da velikost je pomembna in da bi lahko razvoj nadnacionalnih varnostnih in obrambnih struktur še posebej koristil majhnim državam članicam. Njihova sposobnost oblikovanja razvoja SVOP je namreč najbolj omejena, razen če vlagajo v specializacijo in sodelovanje ter preudarno izkoristijo priložnost, ko predsedujejo Svetu EU, v svoji vlogi posredovanja in nekoliko tudi določanja programa. Čeprav bo čas pokazal, kako bo Slovenija izkoristila svojo priložnost kot predsedujoča Svetu EU, avtorica članka vztraja, da je predvsem pri majhnih državah članicah z omejenimi človeškimi in finančnimi viri določanje prednostnih nalog SVOP najpomembnejše. Ko so te določene in sporazumi sklenjeni, jih je treba tudi izpolniti. V nasprotnem primeru začne prevladovati kultura neupoštevanja predpisov, zaradi česar ostane SVOP le na pol zgrajena hiša.

Pet člankov iz te številke, ki sem jih recenziral, še enkrat potrjuje Kintisov vtis, da je področje SVOP bolj kot katero koli drugo področje politike EU razpeto med ambicijami in paraliziranostjo. To je predvsem posledica neskladja med stalno spreminjajočimi se varnostnimi in obrambnimi izzivi, ki jih povzročata vse bolj dinamično globalno okolje, in resnično zmožnostjo EU, da jih rešuje. Ta je odvisna od nacionalne politične volje. Članki v tej številki odražajo zaskrbljenost zaradi počasnega napredka skupne varnostne in obrambne politike, vendar jo poskušajo premagati tudi tako, da predstavijo nekaj novih predlogov, ali vsaj z odpiranjem pravih vprašanj. Na koncu bo skupna varnostna in obrambna politika lahko resnično, kakovostno in zahtevam ustrezno napredovala šele, ko se bo oblikovalo soglasje o pravni in politični naravi EU. Dokler bo slednja ostala v sedanji hibridni obliki *suigeneris*, bo tudi SVOP obtičala med ambicijami in paraliziranostjo. Operacionalizacija SVOP in njen resnično funkcionalni značaj zato zahtevata, da se najprej obravnava ustavno vprašanje narave, predmeta in namena Evropske unije.



## REVIEW

### THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AND A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

It has become an overused, indeed dated, cliché to claim that the European Union (EU) is at a crossroads. Today it is more common, and perhaps also more accurate, to argue that the EU faces an existential crisis. This is not just an academic opinion, but the language that is increasingly present in the EU's political, policy and strategic documents. The changing, indeed deteriorating, domestic, regional and global security environment, which has openly put the very existence of the EU at risk, has consequently increased demands for a genuine and robust EU common security and defence policy (CSDP). The latter is not a recent invention. It has a long history, with many ups and downs, not unlike the process of European integration, in which concerns about national sovereignty and related national comprehensive, if too often parochial, priorities have been struggling to match normative ambitions, and solemn declarations that have been developed in response to the actual growing security concerns. How have the EU and its Member States coped with the Scylla of national sovereigntist defence priorities and the Charybdis of the objective needs of supranational cooperation in the dire straits of the CSDP? What are the current most acute security challenges? What can or should be done to improve the CSDP and are there grounds for pessimism or optimism with a view to its future development?

These are the questions that this special issue of Contemporary Military Challenges, dedicated to the CSDP, explores across five articles written by legal, international, social and security science academics, as well as security and defence experts. The picture these articles have painted is a mixed one. Modest optimism in terms of the progress of the CSDP mechanisms is combined with chagrin related to missed opportunities, too often due to the culture of non-compliance, and concerns related to the changes taking place in the overall global model of governance. The latter are particularly addressed in the article penned by Senčar. He persuasively demonstrates how, in the course of the last 20 years, the European post-Cold War consensus and mindset, embedded in the Kantian ideals of liberal democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights and solidarity in and between the states has gradually, but almost

without notice, given way to a Hobbesian, strategic and competitive world order, primed by national sovereigntist interests. However, due to technological progress, the collapse of the post-Cold War consensus and the resulting change in paradigm possesses new, as yet still unexplored security threats, which will affect nothing as much as our minds. As Senčar powerfully demonstrates, contemporary and, in particular, future warfare will be directed against our heads, featuring a paramount cognitive dimension. It is for this reason that the EU and its Member States must invest in the cognitive aspects of the CSDP, in particular with an eye on the leading revisionist power, Russia.

However, to do so the EU must be in possession of the necessary and appropriate competencies, backed by a sufficient national political will. The remaining four articles are thus dedicated to the examination of this issue. The article by Katarina Vatovec comes across as the most optimistic. She traces the process of the ‘communitarization’ of the EU’s defence policies and identifies the required socio-political grounds for strengthening this process in the future. In her view, communitarization, which has traditionally stood for bringing a particular policy field from an intergovernmental to a supranational pillar, subject to an ordinary legislative procedure based on qualified majority voting, can be gradually introduced through the presence of a sufficient political will resulting from actual experience, successfully implemented policy initiatives, and growing awareness of the increasing security threats. While according to this author the future of the European Defence Union remains in the hands of the Member States and intergovernmental cooperation, following the important breakthrough with the Treaty of Lisbon, a number of institutional, legal, policy, soft-law and financial measures have intensified the functioning of EU defence policy and, simultaneously, driven it in the direction of further communitarization.

The article by Dick Zandee partakes of a similar normative premise. He believes that the CSDP is faced with the dilemma of making a breakthrough or simply continuing to muddle through. For him the answer is unequivocal. What is needed is a breakthrough, which would contribute to closing the gap between rhetorical commitments and action. A concrete opportunity for that is presented by the Strategic Compass. This is envisaged as a concrete, ambitious and actionable tool that should provide tangible direction for the EU’s role in security and defence over the next five or ten years. To meet this goal, according to Zandee, nothing is required more than realism. The article thus concludes by laying down eight concrete and realistic actions by which the EU could break out of its current status quo in the CSDP and turn itself into a truly global power before it is too late.

Aleksandra Koziol’s contribution, quite fittingly, complements Zandee’s contribution by putting some empirical flesh on the normative agenda. She describes the EU’s current security and defence engagement in Europe and abroad, the major challenges that it poses, and the actual capacity of the EU to address them. This remains relatively weak and sometimes questionable for a variety of political, organizational, financial and sometimes also ad hoc reasons. The latter are currently the most

explicit in form of the Covid-9 pandemic, which has importantly hampered, as the author demonstrates, the European Commission's ambition of assuming the role of a geopolitical commission. In the author's opinion it is decisive for the future development of the CSDP that the EU simultaneously builds on the civilian and the military side of the CSDP and develops its capacities for early warnings, early actions and a rapid response.

Finally, the article by Jelena Juvan, after describing the historical evolution of the CSDP in the context of European integration, looks into the future of CSDP, paying special attention to the role of small Member States, such as Slovenia, in it. The author notes that size matters, and that the development of supranational security and defence structures could especially work to the advantage of the small Member States. Their capacity to shape the development of the CSDP is, however, limited, unless they invest in specialization and cooperation, and also prudently seize the opportunity when presiding over the Council of the EU in their mediating and to an extent also agenda-setting role. While time will tell how Slovenia is going to use its opportunity as the head of the Council of the EU, the article insists that, especially for small Member States with limited human and financial resources, setting the CSDP priorities matter most. When these are set and the agreements entered into, they must also be delivered upon. In the opposite case a culture of non-compliance prevails, which effectively leaves the CSDP as only a half-built house.

In conclusion, the five reviewed articles contained in this volume yet again confirm Kintis' impression that the field of the CSDP, more than any other EU policy field, is torn between ambition and paralysis. This results, in particular, from the discrepancy between the ever-changing security and defence challenges brought about by an increasingly dynamic global environment, and the actual EU capacity to address them that is, in turn, dependent on the national political will. The articles contained in this volume express their concerns with the slow progress of the CSDP, but they also try to overcome it by putting forward some new proposals or, at least, by raising the right questions. Eventually, however, the CSDP can only make a real, qualitative and required step forward when a consensus on the legal and political nature of the EU is formed. As long as the latter stays in its current, sui-generis, hybrid form, the CSDP will remain stuck between 'ambition and paralysis'. The operationalization of the CSDP and its actual functional character thus first requires the addressing of the constitutional question of the nature, object and purpose of the European Union itself.



Avtorji

Authors



Igor Senčar

**Doc. dr. Igor Senčar** je docent za področje mednarodnih političnih, ekonomskih in poslovnih odnosov na Fakulteti za mednarodne in evropske študije na Novi univerzi v Sloveniji. Zaposlen je kot državni sekretar za usklajevanje mednarodnih in zadev EU v Uradu predsednika Vlade Republike Slovenije. Bil je veleposlanik in stalni predstavnik Slovenije pri EU v letih 2005–2010. Njegovo raziskovalno in akademsko delo se osredotoča na evropsko povezovanje, solidarnost in mednarodni red.

**Assist. Prof. Igor Senčar, PhD,** is a professor of International Political, Economic and Business Relations at the Faculty of Government and European Studies, New University, Slovenia. Currently, he is employed as State Secretary for Coordination of International and EU Affairs in the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia. He was Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the EU from 2005-2010. His research and academic work focuses on European integration, solidarity, and international order.



Katarina Vatovec

**Doc. dr. Katarina Vatovec** je docentka na Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije ter na Evropski pravni fakulteti Nove univerze. Diplomirala je na Pravni fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani. Magistrirala je iz mednarodnega prava na LSE Univerze v Londonu. Doktorirala je iz mednarodnih odnosov na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. V svojem raziskovalnem delu se posveča zlasti pravu EU, pravu in politiki mednarodnih organizacij, mednarodnim sankcijam ter varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin.

**Assist. Prof. Katarina Vatovec, PhD,** is a professor at the Faculty of Government and European Studies and the European Faculty of Law (New University). She studied law at the Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, and obtained her LL.M. in Public International Law at the LSE, University of London. She completed her PhD in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Her research focuses on the EU law, politics and law of international organizations, international sanctions, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.



Dick Zandee

**Dick Zandee** je magistriral iz sodobne zgodovine na univerzi Leiden. Je predstojnik enote za varnost in višji raziskovalec na raziskovalnem oddelku nizozemskega inštituta za mednarodne odnose Clingendael. Raziskuje varnostne in obrambne teme, vključno s čezatlantskimi odnosi, strategijami, politikami, razvojem zmogljivosti, raziskavami in tehnologijo, sodelovanjem pri oboroževanju in z industrijskimi vidiki. Svojo kariero je začel v štabu kraljeve nizozemske kopenske vojske, pozneje pa je delal na nizozemskem obrambnem ministrstvu v mednarodnem štabu Nata in Evropski obrambni agenciji.

**Dick Zandee** holds a Master's degree in modern history from Leiden University. He is Head of the Security Unit and a Senior Research Fellow at the Research Department of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. His research focuses on security and defence issues, including transatlantic relations, strategies, policies, capability development, research and technology, armaments cooperation and industrial aspects. He began his career in the Royal Netherlands Army Staff, and later worked in the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, at the NATO International Staff and in the European Defence Agency.



Aleksandra Koziol

**Aleksandra Koziol, mag.,** je analitičarka za evropsko varnost v programu Evropske unije na Poljskem inštitutu za mednarodne zadeve. Ukvarja se z obrambo, zunanjo politiko in sistemom upravljanja meja Evropske unije. Njeno raziskovanje se osredotoča na razmere na postsovjetskem območju s posebnim poudarkom na politiki Ruske federacije. Je magistrica mednarodnih odnosov in ruske filologije ter doktorska študentka političnih ved na Jagelonski univerzi. Tekoče govori angleško in rusko, dobro zna tudi nemško in belorusko.

**Aleksandra Koziol, MA,** is a European security analyst in the European Union Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. She deals with defence, foreign policy and border management system of the European Union. Her research interests focus on the situation in the post-Soviet area with particular emphasis on the policy of the Russian Federation. She holds MA in international relations and Russian philology and is a PhD student in political science at the Jagiellonian University. She has a good command of English and Russian, and a fair command of German and Belarusian.



Jelena Juvan

**Doc. dr. Jelena Juvan**, je visokošolska učiteljica in predavateljica na Katedri za obramboslovje Fakultete za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani in raziskovalka na Obramboslovnem raziskovalnem centru Fakultete za družbene vede. Na Fakulteti za družbene vede je zaposlena od leta 2003. Je nosilka predmetov varnostna in obrambna politika EU in strokovna praksa na 2. stopnji magistrskega študija obramboslovja. Je tudi soizvajalka pri predmetih varnost v informacijski družbi, obrambni in varnostni sistem na 1. stopnji ter kibernetška varnost na 2. stopnji.

**Assist. Prof. Jelena Juvan, PhD**, is a higher education teacher and lecturer at the Department of Defence Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana and a senior research assistant at the Defence Research Centre of the same faculty. She has been employed at the Faculty of Social Sciences since 2003. In the pedagogical process, she holds the courses in EU Security and Defence Policy and Professional Practice at the 2nd level of the Master's Degree in Defence Studies. She is also a co-lecturer in the courses of Security in the Information Society, Defence and Security System at the 1st level and Cyber Security at the 2nd level of studies.

Navodila za avtorje

Instructions to authors

## NAVODILA ZA AVTORJE

### Vsebinska navodila

- Splošno** **Sodobni vojaški izzivi** je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja ter recenzije znanstvenih in strokovnih monografij (prikaz knjige).
- Vojaškošolski zbornik** je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.
- Vsebina** Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.
- Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporoči uredniku in pridobi soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navede razloge za ponovno objavo.
- Tehnična navodila**
- Dolžina prispevka** Praviloma naj bo obseg prispevka 16 strani ali 30.000 znakov s presledki (ena avtorska pola). Najmanjši dovoljeni obseg je 8 strani ali 15.000 znakov s presledki, največji pa 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.
- Recenzija znanstvene in strokovne monografije (prikaz knjige) naj obsega največ 3000 znakov s presledki.
- Recenzije** Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, nato pa, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.
- Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.
- Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.
- Lektoriranje** Lektoriranje besedil je zagotovljeno v okviru publikacije. Lektorirana besedila se vrnejo avtorjem v avtorizacijo.

<b>Navajanje avtorjev prispevka</b>	Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano. <i>Primer:</i> Ime 1 Priimek 1, Ime 2 Priimek 2
<b>Naslov prispevka</b>	Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.
<b>Povzetek</b>	Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 800 znakov (10 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
<b>Povzetek v angleščini</b>	Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 800 znakov (10 vrstic). Izjemoma se prevajanje povzetka in ključnih besed zagotovi v okviru publikacije.
<b>Ključne besede</b>	Ključne besede (3–5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
<b>Oblikovanje besedila</b>	Avtorji besedilo oblikujejo s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik, pisava Arial. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
<b>Predstavitev avtorjev</b>	Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov s presledki (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka, po navedeni literaturi.
<b>Strukturiranje besedila</b>	Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni). <i>Primer:</i> 1 Uvod 2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven) 2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven) 2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven) 2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)
<b>Oblikovanje seznama literature</b>	V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s <b>harvardskim načinom navajanja</b> . Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu. <i>Primeri:</i> <i>a) knjiga:</i> Priimek, ime (začetnica imena), letnica. Naslov dela. Kraj: Založba. Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. <i>Critical Heuristics of Social Planning</i> . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

*b) zbornik:*

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. S. Stone, ur. Humanities information research. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

*c) članek v reviji*

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. Acta geographica Slovenica. 46-2, str. 143–167.

### Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.

*Primer:*

Ulrich, W., 1983. Critical Heuristics of Social Planning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008. Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

### Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite priimek avtorja, letnico izdaje in stran. *Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997, str. 12) ...

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite tudi stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

*Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...

Če je avtor omenjen v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo le letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).


### Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Diagrami se štejejo kot slike.

Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...

Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele



- Opombe pod črto** Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.
- Kratice** Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvornik in morebitno angleško kratico.
- Format zapisa prispevka** Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word.
- Kontaktne podatke avtorja** Prispevkom naj bo dodan avtorjev elektronski naslov.
- Kako poslati prispevek** Avtor pošlje prispevek na elektronski naslov odgovorne urednice.
- Potrjevanje prejetja prispevka** Odgovorna urednica avtorju potrdi prejetje prispevka.
- Korekture** Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.
- Naslov uredniškega odbora** Ministrstvo za obrambo  
Generalštab Slovenske vojske  
Sodobni vojaški izzivi  
Uredniški odbor  
Vojkova cesta 55  
1000 Ljubljana  
Slovenija  
Elektronski naslov  
Odgovorna urednica:  
liliana.brozic@mors.si

**Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.**

## INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS

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**General** **Contemporary Military Challenges** is an interdisciplinary scientific and professional publication publishing articles on topical subjects, research, scientific and professional discourse, technical or social-science analyses in the field of security, defence and military, as well as reviews of scientific and professional monographs.

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*Example:*  
Name 1 Surname 1,  
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- Abstract** The paper should include an abstract of a maximum of 800 characters (10 lines). The abstract should provide a concise presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not constitute a part of the abstract, but are rather included in the introduction.
- Key words** Key words (3-5) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
- Text formatting** The article should be formatted with 1.5 line spacing, font Arial, size 12. The text should have justified alignment, without indents.
- About the author(s)** The author(s) should prepare a short text about their professional or scientific work. The text should not exceed 600 characters with spaces (10 lines, 80 words) and should be placed at the end of the paper, after the bibliography.
- Text structuring** Individual chapters should be separated by independent subtitles and numbered accordingly.  
*Example:*  
 1 Introduction  
 2 Title of the chapter (1<sup>st</sup> level)  
 2.1 Subtitle (2<sup>nd</sup> level)  
 2.1.1 Subtitle (3<sup>rd</sup> level)  
 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4<sup>th</sup> level)
- Bibliography** Bibliography should include an alphabetical list of authors referred to in the article. Each reference has to comply with the **Harvard referencing style**.  
*Examples:*  
 a) *book*  
 Surname, name (initial), year. Title. Place. Publishing House.  
 E.g. Ulrich, W., 1983. Critical Heuristics of Social Planning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 b) *journal*  
 E.g. Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. S. Stone, ed. Humanities information research. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, pp 44–68. For individual articles in a journal, the pages where the article is located are also to be indicated at the end of each source, e.g.  
 c) *article in a journal*  
 Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. Acta geographica Slovenica. 46-2, pp 143–167.

**Referencing from the internet**

Internet sources are referenced the same as with printed ones, but are followed by the information about where on the Internet and when the document was obtained. The information when a document was obtained is important because of the frequent changes to the www environment.

*Example:*

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp 45-100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting URLs in the text (not citing a particular document), only URL (e.g. <http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>) can be indicated and a separate reference at the end of the text is not necessary.

**Citation**

When citing sources in the text, indicate the author’s surname, the year of publication and page. *Example:* ..... (Smith, 1997, p 12) ...

When quoting a part of the text, put the text in the quotation marks, and indicate in the parentheses the author and year followed by the page of the quoted text.

*Example:* ...(Smith, 1997, p 15) ...

**Figures, diagrams, tables**

Figures, diagrams and tables to be included in the article should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The location in the text where the image is to be inserted should be clearly indicated. The total length of the article may not exceed the given limit.

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.....

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



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Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



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

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