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© Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative 
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  Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 2024 – 26/št. 3
 Contemporary Military Challenges, 2024 – 26/No. 3
IZOGIBANJE »DIGITALNEMU 7. OKTOBRU«: 
ŠTUDIJA O KIBERNETSKEM VOJSKOVANJU 
PROTI IZRAELU MED VOJNO OKTOBRA 2023
Tal Pavel
AVOIDING A ‘DIGITAL 7 OCTOBER’: A STUDY 
ON CYBERWARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL 
DURING THE OCTOBER 2023 WAR
DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0022
Povzetek
Ključne	
besede
Abstract
Key	words
Palestinska militantna skupina Hamas je 7. oktobra 2023 začela obsežno skupno 
ofenzivo proti Izraelu. Hkrati s kinetičnimi napadi so različni povzročitelji kibernetskih 
groženj, ki jih pripisujejo Hamasu, Hezbolahu, Iranu in Rusiji, sprožili kibernetske 
napade na izraelske informacijske sisteme v komercialnem, industrijskem in vladnem 
sektorju. Ta prispevek analizira te kibernetske napade in izraelske protiukrepe na 
področju kibernetske varnosti. Čeprav je Izrael sicer vzdržal napad kibernetskega 
napadalca »digitalni 7. oktober«, ključne ugotovitve kažejo na to, da lahko tovrstni 
napadi znatno vplivajo na različne institucije in jim povzročijo škodo ter da je treba 
tako v Izraelu kot po svetu temeljito spremeniti opredelitev kibernetske obrambe in 
odpornosti, zlasti kar zadeva civilno družbo in infrastrukturo.
Izrael, Hamas, kibernetsko vojskovanje, kibernetska varnost, hibridno vojskovanje.
On 7 October, 2023, the Palestinian militant group Hamas launched a massive 
combined offensive against Israel. Concurrent with the kinetic attacks, various cyber 
threat actors attributed to Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia initiated cyberattacks 
targeting Israeli information systems across commercial, industrial, and governmental 
sectors. This paper analyses these cyberattacks, as well as Israel's cybersecurity 
countermeasures. Key findings indicate that while Israel was able to withstand the 
»Digital 7 October« onslaught from cyber attacker, the attacks demonstrated the 
potential to significantly impact and damage different institutions; the need for a 
fundamental shift in defining cyber defence and resilience, especially regarding the 
civil society and infrastructure, in Israel and worldwide.
Israel, Hamas, cyber warfare, cyber security, hybrid warfare.
96 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
„The potential for the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyber-attack“.
(Leon Panetta, CIA Director, 11 February 2011) (ABC News, 2011)
On 7 October 2023, at 06:30 local time, Hamas launched a comprehensive attack, 
simultaneously firing thousands of rockets toward populated villages deep within 
Israel and launching waves of massive invasion and raids on the towns and villages 
near the Gaza border, resulting in a massacre in which 1,200 civilians and soldiers 
were killed and 250 living and dead hostages were abducted to Gaza. The massacre 
led to an ongoing Israel Defense Forces (IDF) war in Gaza, named „Operation Iron 
Swords“.
Just minutes after the Hamas raid, a massive and ongoing cyberattack targeted the 
computer systems and websites of Israeli commercial and industrial companies, 
governmental agencies and institutions (Kahan, 2023c). These cyberattacks 
continued with diverse intensity, scope, duration, complexity and success rates, 
carried out by around a hundred different cyber actors, mainly Iranian-backed cyber 
actors („Agrius“, „CyberAv3ngers“, „Adl Ali“) with Hamas („Gaza Cybergang“) 
and Hezbollah („Lebanese Cedar“) collaboration, and Russian-affiliated groups 
(„Killnet“ and „Anonymous Sudan“). In addition to these were „Team_Insane_
Pakistan“ and „The Mysterious“ groups, „Black Cyber Army“ and „Anon Ghost“, 
among others, most of them anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian groups (Check Point 
Research, 2023; CYFIRMA, 2023; Kahan, 2023f; Meyran, 2023; Milenkoski, 
2023; Mimran, 2023; Recorded Future, 2023; Wullman, 2023; Andriani, 2024). The 
cyber-attacks had two goals: to steal sensitive information, including personally 
identifiable information and intellectual property, and to cause significant damage 
and destruction by deleting data and harming critical operational systems.
This research aims to analyse both the cyberattacks targeted at Israel from 7 
October 2023 onwards and the countermeasures put in place, by examining various 
publications in Hebrew and English published by local and foreign media outlets 
and governmental agencies, including the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD). 
Even though the Directorate’s website has versions in English, Arabic, Russian, 
French, Spanish, and Hebrew, only some publications are available in English. For 
example, the Israel Internet Association‘s survey of March 2023 revealed that just 
1% of the INCD web pages were available in Arabic (14 pages translated into Arabic, 
of 1,572 in Hebrew), and only 5% in the survey of January 2024 (The Israel Internet 
Association (ISOC-IL), 2023b, 2024). For this reason, the Hebrew version of the 
relevant publications was used in those cases.
The research goals are as follows: (1) to analyse the cyberattacks imposed on Israel 
from 7 October 2023, their types and perpetrators, and the damage and implications; 
(2) to analyse the official Israeli countermeasures and recommendations, mainly
from the INCD; and (3) to analyse the lessons that should be learned in Israel and
worldwide.
Introduction
Tal Pavel
 97 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
The research employs a qualitative research method, based on public analyses and 
reports by various international and local cyber security research corporations and 
Israeli governmental institutions and NGOs, to analyse the cyber threats and attacks 
on Israel during the conflict from October 2023 onwards. 
The limitations of this research are (1) reliance on public analyses and reports due 
to the lack of access to classified information – this means that the study‘s scope 
is limited to publicly known incidents and may not cover covert operations or 
unreported attacks; (2) challenges in attributing cyber-attacks and separating fact 
from potential disinformation campaigns; (3) the study‘s scope is limited to the time 
after October 2023, so the availability of data is limited to a specific short timeframe 
– future studies will have a broader time perspective; (4) geopolitical factors and 
state involvement can lead to biases or blind spots in reporting/analysis.
	 1		 CYBER	THREATS
	 1.1		 Cyberwarfare
During the war, cyber-attacks and operations were aimed at two main targets: 
machines (computerized systems) and human beings (media consumers). The cyber-
attacks may target either information technology to leak and destroy data and for 
website defacement, or operation technology to damage and destroy operating 
systems of infrastructure, companies and organizations, in addition to different 
online influences and psychological operations against Israeli citizens and internet 
users to generate and disseminate Fake News and even attempts to engage them in 
online spying against their own country.
The INCD stated in a report, published at the end of December 2023, that the offensive 
cyber activity against Israel during the fighting in Gaza gradually intensified (Israel 
National Cyber Directorate, 2023j). The attacks evolved from simple ones, such as the 
defacement of websites and theft of information, to more sophisticated and targeted 
ones aimed at harming organizations which were primarily critical infrastructures. 
These attacks were intended to disrupt and damage activity and create a wide-
ranging effect by attacking companies which act as a supply chain for numerous 
organizations. The cyber-attacks included DDoS attacks1 (including against Israel‘s 
government website system at gov.il, a day after the Hamas raid). In most cases, 
the disturbances had only minor effects, if any, in addition to website defacement2, 
1 “A denial of service technique that uses numerous hosts to perform the attack.” (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), no date a)
2 “Defacement (also website or web defacement) is an attack on a website that alters its visual appearance or 
informational content. Often, cybercriminals add messages of a social, religious or political nature, or swear 
words and other text that is unrelated to the subject of the site. Defacement can be described as graffiti in 
electronic form. People who deface websites are called defacers.” (Kaspersky IT Encyclopedia, no date)
AVOIDING A ‘DIGITAL 7 OCTOBER’: A STUDY ON CYBERWARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL DURING THE 
OCTOBER 2023 WAR
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phishing attacks3, leaks and deletion of information, and even use of malware by 
Hamas (BiBi-Linux wiper) against Israel with „capabilities that resemble that of an 
advanced cyber weapon“ (Bestuzhev, 2023; Check Point Research, 2023; Kahan, 
2023d, 2023a, 2023e; Yoachimik and Pacheco, 2023). 
Gil Shwed, founder and CEO of Check Point, has asserted an 18% increase in cyber-
attacks on Israel since the beginning of the war, with most of the attacks aimed at 
government agencies, marking a jump of 52% in attacks on government websites. 
Most of these were „not very sophisticated“. He reported that the number of 
ransomware attacks were double that of the previous year, which included „slightly 
more sophisticated“ attacks perpetrated by „close to a hundred Iranian, Russian and 
other groups which attack at the same time“ (Shulman, 2023). 
On 16 November 2023, „Cyber Toufan Al-Aqsa“ claimed responsibility for one 
of the most prominent attacks during the war on Gaza, one which had sustained 
implications, targeting Signature-IT, an Israeli website hosting and online shopping 
solutions company. In their written statement, the attackers claimed to have been able 
to steal data files totalling approximately 16 GB, and to have wiped and destroyed over 
one thousand servers and critical databases belonging to over 150 victims, among 
them leading commercial and industrial companies and governmental institutions 
and ministries, while disrupting their online activity (Security Joes, 2023; Pines, 
2024). Among a dozen others, the Israel State Archives was targeted with devastating 
and evident implications. Since the attack, the following message has been displayed 
on both versions, English and Hebrew, of the website: „The company that hosts the 
website of the Israel State Archives has undergone a cyber-attack. Unfortunately, 
the attack has disrupted the services enabling you to search the site and to view 
archival material“ (Israel State Archives, no date). Indeed, for at least three months, 
any search on the web for any document has led the user to the same error page.
On 1 December 2023, the US and Israel‘s security and cyber authorities announced 
that the Iranian Government Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) affiliated 
cyber actors, CyberAv3ngers, had published „both legitimate and false claims“ of 
attacks against Israeli systems in the water, energy, shipping, and distribution sectors 
between 18 September and 30 October 2023. A claim of responsibility from 18 
October argued that over 50 servers, security cameras, and smart city management 
systems in Israel had been compromised, but the „majority of these claims were proven 
false“. Another wave of attacks began on 22 November 2023, with compromising 
default credentials in the Israeli company Unitronics’ devices used in control and 
automation systems, indicating that these attacks had already affected several states 
across the US (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), 2023; Israel 
National Cyber Directorate, 2023b).
3 “A technique for attempting to acquire sensitive data, such as bank account numbers, through a fraudulent 
solicitation in email or on a web site, in which the perpetrator masquerades as a legitimate business or 
reputable person.” (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), no date b)
Tal Pavel
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On 18 December 2023, the INCD reported on a combined attempt by Iran and 
Hezbollah to disrupt Ziv hospital‘s operations. The directorate‘s statement declared 
that the orchestrated attack „ultimately failed“, but at the end of the third (of five) 
paragraph, the statement admits: „However, the attackers managed to extract private 
data stored in the hospital‘s systems“ (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023i). 
Indeed, local media outlets reported the hacker‘s claim of possessing „over 500 
gigabytes of information, including 700,000 medical documents, among which 
100,000 pertain to the IDF“, and shared screenshots of medical documents dating 
back to 2022 (Ben Shushan, 2023). 
The waves of cyber-attacks on Israel harmed a wide range of targets from various 
sectors. Local media outlets indicated that the computer systems of the municipality 
of Elad had been hacked: „the attackers succeeded in disrupting the communication 
systems but not extracting information“ (Kolodetsky, 2024). The websites of two 
relief groups providing aid to Israel and Gaza were also under cyber-attack (Siddiqui, 
2023). Ono Academic College was attacked by a hacker group named „Malek Team“, 
where „approximately 250,000 records, including sensitive student information, 
were targeted in the attack, „putting the privacy and security of its students at risk 
(Israeli Financial Insider, 2023; Mann, 2023b). The Israeli daily The Jerusalem Post 
was targeted by multiple cyberattacks the day after the Hamas onslaught (Hindustan 
Times, 2023).
	 1.2		 Cyber	Espionage
During the Gaza war, several reports indicated various online attempts by Iran and 
its affiliates to gather information and intelligence on relevant local assets.
Between November 2023 and January 2024, the Israel Security Agency (ISA) 
and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) uncovered and thwarted Hamas and Iranian 
attempts to recruit Israelis and extract sensitive information from IDF soldiers over 
various social media platforms, including Telegram and Instagram, and to carry 
out spying missions in favour of Iran, including assassination, in exchange for 
money, while also exacerbating social divisions in Israel. The agency indicated that 
since the beginning of the war, it had identified that „the activity efforts of Iranian 
security forces have greatly intensified, while using digital space for the purposes of 
intimidation, conveying messages or advancing terror activity“ (Ben Kimon, 2023; 
CTech, 2023; Fabian, 2024; Zitun, 2024). 
In December 2023 the INCD reported on cyber-attacks against web and security 
cameras (CCTV), aimed at damaging the ability to use this equipment to maintain 
the required security of physical space, and as attempts to gather intelligence from 
the areas observed by these cameras (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023d).
AVOIDING A ‘DIGITAL 7 OCTOBER’: A STUDY ON CYBERWARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL DURING THE 
OCTOBER 2023 WAR
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1.3		 Influence	Operations
Alongside the offensive cyber-attacks, there has been evidence of numerous online 
attempts at information warfare, mainly by Hamas, using old and new media to 
generate fake news. Some has been disguised as coming from local, right-wing, 
politically-motivated Israeli actors, but also some of the fake news and conspiratory 
theories have really been circulated by local, right-wing, politically-motivated Israeli 
actors, with and without sophisticated technology (IDF, no date; Ring, 2023).  
AI – The Israel Internet Association has indicated that most distributed fake news 
has included images and content already published and reused during the war, in 
some cases images allegedly of Palestinians, mainly children wounded or in poverty, 
and fake social network profiles and pages generated by Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) as part of pro-Palestinian information warfare. In this regard, Israeli research 
from February 2024 revealed pro-Palestinian usage of AI to produce fake Hebrew 
messages using Chat GPT, to be disseminated in Hebrew channels on social media 
(Mann, 2023a; The Israel Internet Association (ISOC-IL), 2023a; Abu Ali Express, 
2024a; Shwartz Altshuler and Yasur, 2024). 
Fake News – Israeli research has unveiled fake reports of conspiracy theories of „the 
Enemy Within“, allegedly an internal betrayal of the Israeli political and military 
establishment which supposedly cooperated with Hamas to enable the unbearable 
catastrophe aimed at undermining and overthrowing the Israeli prime minister and 
its right-wing government. These conspiracies were produced by both external 
and internal actors, disseminated from marginal Telegram channels into the Israeli 
mainstream, and echoed by local right-wing politicians (BZ, 2023; Czerny, 2024b). 
A fake report published on 11 January 2024, in Hebrew, allegedly about three 8200 
unit officers being killed in Iran‘s missile attack on Erbil in Iraq, was posted on 
a probably fabricated website under the name of the „Jerusalem Times“ (Abu Ali 
Express, 2024b). In addition, during the war pro-Palestinian hackers released a 
leaked file on 6.5 million Israelis, which had already been stolen and published in 
2021 (Kahan, 2023g). 
Harassment – Online activities involving harassment and intimidation have served 
as a primary method of influence to instil fear, uncertainty and doubt (Irwin, 1998) 
among Israelis during the war. A week after Hamas‘ raid and the beginning of the 
war, pro-Palestinian hackers disseminated an impersonated rocket alert application 
(RedAlert) on the Google Play Store. The same was reported in August 2018 when 
Hamas tried to take control of cellular devices and enable tracking and outgoing calls 
(Melman, 2018). Others exploited a vulnerability in another application (Red Alert: 
Israel) and sent fake alerts to some app users, including a message that a „nuclear 
bomb is coming“ (Cluley, 2023; Darché et al., 2023).
As part of the cyber-attack on the Israeli company Signature-IT, the attackers managed 
to gain access to mailing lists „stored on the company‘s servers, through which they 
Tal Pavel
 101 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
distributed SMS messages and emails with hateful messages to thousands of Israelis“ 
by spoofing the email address so it looked as if it had been sent from signature-it.
com (Kabir, 2023; see also Pines, 2024). Another online psychological influence 
operation was reported at the end of October 2023, while many Israelis reported 
„disturbing video and audio calls on WhatsApp“ from unknown numbers, which 
immediately disconnected. Fake messages and links were sent to the smartphones, 
emails and digital platforms of Israeli users, officials and government ministers, with 
the justice minister claiming to have received over 40,000 such messages (Eichner, 
2023b, 2023a; Ifargan, 2023; Kahan, 2023b). The INCD believed that the calls 
and messages originated from Hamas supporters, and did not cause any damage to 
phones nor gain unauthorized access (Walla!, 2023).
Another method of influence was to display harassing messages publicly. In 
one case, a hacked billboard displayed the Palestinian flag, and in another, pro-
Palestinian Turkish hackers targeted Israeli cinema advertising screens, projecting 
threatening messages in Hebrew and offensive 7 October massacre images (Check 
Point Research, 2023; I24NEWS, 2023; Kutub, 2024).
Anti-Israel Content – Various social media and platforms, such as Telegram and 
TikTok, were flooded with anti-Israeli content by Hamas supporters, while TikTok 
denied pushing pro-Palestinian content and allegedly failed to remove thousands of 
videos supporting terrorism (Eichner, 2023c; Reuters, 2023; Zohar, 2023), Telegram 
partially blocked Hamas channels, some of which posed as pro-Israel channels scams 
for donations (Kahan, 2023h; Mann, 2023c).
Domestic Influence – Several local researchers unveiled a „poison machine“, an 
online, local, right-wing, politically-motivated campaign aimed at influencing the 
regional general public in favour of the current government; creating constant 
incitement against political opponents and gatekeepers, such as the media and the 
judiciary law enforcement, the public service and the security establishment; inciting 
parts of Israeli society against each other, including by opposing and undermining 
the protests against the government, among them the families of those kidnapped 
and taken to Gaza; and demanding the Israeli government act for their immediate 
release, including by releasing Hamas prisoners (BZ, 2023; Shem Ur, 2023; Agari, 
2024a, 2024b; Czerny, 2024b; Fake Reporter, 2024).   
A unique phenomenon was revealed and reported in January 2024, in which Israelis 
tried persistently to modify the Hebrew version of Wikipedia‘s articles about events 
and local military officers, political figures and groups regarded as affiliated to the 
left wing of Israeli politics, in order to put the blame and responsibility for the 
Hamas attack on them, alongside modification attempts of Wikipedia‘s article about 
right-wing ministers and political figures to minimize their blame and responsibility 
for the catastrophe under the pretext of „removing marginal information“, with an 
attempt to emphasize their alleged contribution to preventing and minimizing it 
(Czerny, 2024a). 
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102 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Another domestic influence operation against Israelis was reported on 12 December 
2023, claiming the IDF Operations Directorate‘s Influencing Department, which 
is responsible for psychological warfare operations against the enemy and foreign 
audiences, operated a Telegram channel called ‚72 Virgins – Uncensored‘ which 
targeted Israeli audiences with „exclusive content from the Gaza strip“ including 
„the bodies of Hamas terrorists“. A military official denied the reports, admitting 
on 4 February 2024 that „its staff was behind the graphic Gaza Telegram channel“ 
(Kubovich, 2023, 2024).
1.4		 Cryptocurrencies	and	Online	Crowdfunding
Terrorist organizations, Hamas among them, use the internet and social media as a 
platform to raise funds for their terrorist operations, including through cryptocurrencies 
(Monroe, 2023). The US Deputy Treasury Secretary, Wally Adeyemo, stated that 
„cryptocurrencies are still used by terrorist groups like Hamas, but their use is limited 
compared to more traditional alternatives“ (Binance News, 2023).
Over the years, the National Bureau for Counter-Terror Financing of Israel 
(NBCTF) has seized millions of ILS (the new Israeli shekel) worth hundreds of 
cryptocurrency digital wallets linked to Hamas (National Bureau for Counter Terror 
Financing of Israel, 2021, 2022b, 2022a, 2023a), the Quds force, a branch of Iran’s 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah (National Bureau for Counter 
Terror Financing of Israel, 2023b). During the war in Gaza, reports have indicated 
that Hamas allegedly used cryptocurrencies to receive financial support from Iran 
while evading detection (Berwick and Talley, 2023). The NBCTF published a list 
of „ongoing crowd-funding campaigns run by Hamas and other terrorist designated 
entities“, indicating that „ since the outbreak of the „Swords of Iron“ war, there has 
been a significant increase in the scope of online crowdfunding campaigns „ (National 
Bureau for Counter Terror Financing of Israel, no date).
Over 100 Hamas-linked cryptocurrency accounts on Binance, the world‘s largest 
cryptocurrency exchange, accounting for about half of all crypto activity, have been 
closed since 7 October 2023, which has led to the largest settlements in history, 
with a leadership change and fine of over 4.3 Billion USD on Binance for not 
guarding against money laundering. It „failed to implement safety programs aimed 
at preventing suspicious transactions“ to Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al 
Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Binance Blog, 2023; Bushard, 
2023; Harty and Sutton, 2023; United States Department of Justice, 2023; US 
Department of the Treasury, 2023; Versprille, 2023). 
However, there are claims that Israel failed to halt Hamas‘ cryptocurrency fundraising 
which meant that „in certain instances, action was taken only after 7 October, by 
which point the majority of the funds had already been withdrawn“ (Czerny, 2023).
Conclusion
Tal Pavel
 103 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
	 2		 ISRAEL‘S	COUNTERMEASURES
To confront these cyberattacks, the INCD issued several general recommendations 
for the public (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023o) and small and medium 
businesses on how to mitigate malicious online activities (Israel National Cyber 
Directorate, 2023p), alongside specific recommendations, mainly in Hebrew. The 
directorate launched a campaign to „empower citizens in discerning fake news and 
enhancing online security amid the rising prevalence of digital disinformation“ 
(Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023e), alongside a similar campaign by the 
Israel Internet Association (The Israel Internet Association (ISOC-IL), no date); 
guidelines about warning signs for hacked social media accounts (Israel National 
Cyber Directorate, 2023f); how to recognize and avoid phishing (Israel National 
Cyber Directorate, 2023g, 2023h); a recommendation to replace webcam passwords 
immediately (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023m);, and how to protect 
children from improper online material (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023r), 
including during online distance learning (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023k). 
In addition, the INCD issued several cyber warnings about Iranian cyber-attacks 
(Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023t, 2023c), a planned phishing attack (Israel 
National Cyber Directorate, 2023q) and reports summarizing the cyber-attacks 
during the war (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023d). 
The INCD has launched several initiatives to improve local and national cyber 
resilience, such as the TITAN project (Team for Information Threat Analysis and 
Neutralization) „to generate the sharing of technical information in a rapid and 
reciprocal manner between all parties involved in order to maximise the realisation 
of the collective ability of the community to identify and prevent cyber-attacks as 
early as possible“ (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2024); a marketplace of cyber 
defence solutions by local vendors, free of charge for a limited time (Israel National 
Cyber Directorate, 2023l, 2023n); a working group to confront fake news (Israel 
National Cyber Directorate, 2023s), and a forum for the cyber events Incidents 
Response service local providers (Israel National Cyber Directorate, 2023a).
On 26 December 2023, the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) approved a temporary 
provision for a seven-month „Bill authorising Cyber Directorate, Israeli Security 
Agency and Director of Security of the Defense Establishment to instruct digital or 
storage service supplier to take measures to detect, prevent, or contain cyber-attack“, 
aiming to „provide an effective response for coping with the challenges the State of 
Israel faces in the cyber field“. It authorized the INCD, when faced with a cyber-
attack, „to instruct the attacked [digital or storage service supplier] to take measures 
to detect, prevent, or contain the attack“ (The Knesset, 2023).
The ground invasions of Israeli villages by Hamas terrorists on 7 October 2023 were 
accompanied by days and weeks of cyber-attacks on Israeli digital assets, which 
caused some damage, mainly to information technology, at least in terms of stolen 
information, alongside various information operations. 
Conclusion
AVOIDING A ‘DIGITAL 7 OCTOBER’: A STUDY ON CYBERWARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL DURING THE 
OCTOBER 2023 WAR
 104 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
The first days and weeks of the war marked an intensification of the quantity and 
quality of cyber offensive activities across Israel and demonstrated the blending of 
kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfare into a ‚hybrid warfare‘, with various and 
contradictory motivations, and actors aiming to leverage cyberspace as an added 
battlefield to harm Israel‘s critical information and operation systems and create 
chaos, and to tear Israeli society apart by spreading fake news and conspiracy 
theories by external and even internal political actors, including nation state-based 
cyber-actors and more than a hundred pro-Palestinian cyber groups, hacktivists, 
cybercriminals and cyber-terrorists, and even Israeli politically-motivated fake news 
and conspiracy theory originators and distributors.
Similar to the physical military dimension, Israel is seen as a regional and even a 
global cyber power, mainly in the light of its capabilities in technology development, 
intelligence and offensive uses of cyber tools. However, Israel must conduct a 
reassessment and a strategic conceptual change relating to the cyber protection of 
its digital and physical assets. Although this round of cyber-attacks and operations 
did not have as much critical damage and impact as the physical attacks, the cyber-
attacks and online influence operations demonstrated the need to redefine concepts 
such as „cyber power“ and „cyber resilience“ of states and organizations.
A future ‚Digital 7 October‘ could include cyber onslaughts by various cyber 
actors, with diverse motivations and levels of sophistication, carrying out ‚hybrid 
warfare‘, which could affect information systems by leaking sensitive information 
or destroying the system itself and other vital infrastructure, alongside influence 
operations to manipulate the general population according to the attackers‘ agenda, 
and even cyber espionage operations. An alarming conclusion is the involvement 
of local politically motivated actors in generating and disseminating fake news and 
conspiracy theories which can find their way from the margins to mainstream media 
outlets, alongside attempts to rewrite history by the manipulation of Wikipedia 
articles. 
We must avoid a ‚Digital 7 October‘ in Israel and worldwide, as it could have 
consequences many times more severe, since cyber-attacks on vital infrastructure 
and information systems can yield tangible, kinetic outcomes that disrupt local 
operations and can lead to extensive chaos and collateral damage in a modern state. 
Preparedness should include not only technological means and capabilities, but also a 
comprehensive perspective of cyber capabilities and the resilience of the private and 
government sectors. Bruce Schneier stated in April 2000 that „security is a process, 
not a product.  Products provide some protection, but the only way to effectively do 
business in an insecure world is to put processes in place that recognise the inherent 
insecurity in the products. The trick is to reduce your risk of exposure regardless of 
the products or patches“ (Schneier, 2000). 
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Tal Pavel
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 112 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
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email: tal@cybureau.org
ORCID: 0000-0002-4046-0867
Tal Pavel