

Reference and the true value of clauses NPr be NPp

*The creation of non-linguistic entity
as a consequence of a linguistic one*

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1. Purpose, problem, and hypotheses

My attention has been drawn by the question of how to explain the illocutionary force of ordinary speech which makes it possible, primarily in ideological discourse, to completely govern the beliefs and actions of individuals, sometimes against the evident facts or in contradiction to them. This issue of modern linguistics was asked very persuasively by Chomsky: »Plato's problem is to explain why we know so much although existing evidence is so scarce. However, it is Orwell's problem to explain why we know and understand so little although the evidence at our disposal is so rich. Orwell was, like many other intellectuals of the 20th century, very impressed by the ability of totalitarian regimes to implant beliefs that are firmly valid and widely accepted although completely unfounded and often even in disagreement with the facts about the world which surrounds us« (Chomsky, 1989: 6).

I agree with Chomsky who states that the reasons must be sought in institutionalized and other factors which in the decisive spheres of our lives block insight and understanding. My hypothesis, however, is that the sources of the convincing force of ordinary speech must likewise be sought in its inner structure, in its possibility to present entities as equal although they in fact belong to different worlds, thus creating possibilities for their exchange. I will try to demonstrate this hypothesis through the semantic, pragmatic, and grammatical structure of the clause NPr be NPp where index r stands for reference and p for predication. The clause has an underlying proposition $P: r$ equals p . The use of these clause structures will be illustrated by examples taken from both fundamental functional discourses, namely the ideological and the scientific. They are characteristic of both discourses and frequently used in both of them. We are going to investigate their semantic-cognitive and illocutionary function. We will point out that the true value of a clause does not depend on its semantic-logical structure but rather on the functional discourse in which the clause is used as well as on the communicative principles that particular discourses abide by. This means that classification of the communicative space in functional discourses (discourse of art, science, ordinary speech) and the communicative principles governing them must necessarily be taken into account as a significant pragmatic factor that influences the interpretation of these clauses. Linguistic studies that do not

take this into account inevitably lead to overgeneralizations. This is undoubtedly true of many conclusions of speech act theory.

An *NPr be NPp* clause is simultaneously a means of expression which makes possible the understanding of procedures of equating the so-called »real world« with the world of intentional mental states of the speaker (mind world), equating and transposing entities that belong to different worlds. I will call this phenomenon »communicative blindness«. Clauses with the same surface structure whose deep structures expresses a relation between value and role (value be role) will be excluded from this study. Example: *M. K. is the president of the Republic of Slovenia*. As Fauconnier (1985) states, these clauses express a relation between value and role, between entities that belong to the same mental space.

NPr be NPp clauses will be considered in the pragmatic context of their utterance. The paradigmatic space builder of the pragmatic space is the explicit performative verb *to say*: *S says that P*. This fact makes the issue of the true value of a clause even more complicated, as from the point of the true value, identifying relation between P and S *says that P* is problematic.

2. *NPr be NPp* in the context of speech act theory

We will investigate the structure of the propositional act and the relationship between propositional and illocutionary acts. We will try to answer the question which illocutionary act is performed by uttering the *NPr be NPp* clause with the underlying proposition *P: r equals p*. To be able to answer the question whether this is an illocutionary act with constative illocutionary force (assertion) or an illocutionary act with performative illocutionary force, the true value of the assertion has to be determined. According to Searle, assertions bind the speaker towards the true value of the expressed proposition: »The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker... to the truth of the expressed proposition. All of the members of the assertive class are assessable on the dimension of assessment which includes true or false« (Searle, 1979: 12). It must be added that the true value is a necessary but not sufficient condition in determining the type of illocutionary act, as in indirect speech seeming assertions are not selected with the intention to describe an actual state of affairs or fact, but rather with the intention of performing some other illocutionary act by means of description, e.g., a request, promise, or threat. The intention of the utterance is not a true proposition; the latter is chosen as a means of performing the illocutionary act with performative illocutionary force. This means that besides the true value, intention has to be taken into account in determining assertions: assertions are illocutionary acts whose intention is a truthful description of the actual state of affairs or facts. In order to make the intention recognizable, reasons to believe P to be true or false must be ensured. Let us try to investigate whether

utterances with the *NPr be NPp* clause structure are determinable as to their true value. A clause has the apparent structure of an assertion, it appears to be a description of a state of affairs; we are going to demonstrate – which has already been done by Fauconnier (1985) – that this clause is a typical space builder, i.e. an utterance that does not represent reality but rather creates new mental spaces composed of ungrounded beliefs. True value conditions of this clause and reasons to believe it really being true or false can be ensured only in scientific discourse.

According to Searle, the expression of a proposition is a propositional act composed of reference and predication: »The utterance of a referring expression characteristically serves to pick out or identify a particular object from other objects« (Searle, 1969: 28). In the clause *Sam is drunk*, the proper name *Sam* is the referring expression and *is drunk* is the predication. Searle defines »referring expression« as follows: »An expression which serves to identify any thing, process, event, action, or any other kind of 'individual' or 'particular' I shall call a referring expression. Referring expressions point to particular things...« (Searle, 1969: 26-27).

Having been asked what the reference of the expression *is drunk* in the clause *Sam is drunk* is, Frege answered »the concept of drunkenness.« »He appears to think that the use of a predicate expression commits one to the existence of a property.« Searle, however, does not agree with Frege: »From the fact that a statement I utter commits me to the existence of a property it does not follow that in that statement I referred to a property« (Searle, 1969: 98-99). Asked about the function that a grammatical predicate can have, Searle answered with two statements taken from Frege: »a grammatical predicate refers to a concept and a grammatical predicate ascribes a property« from which follows »a reference to a concept simply is the ascription of a property« (1969: 100). Searle rightfully called attention to the inconsistency of this usage and solves the contradiction by insisting on the difference between reference and predication »and the correct description is to say that the predicate expression is used to ascribe a property« (1969: 100), adding: »Remember that 'ascribe' here is meant to carry no assertive force.« Searle does not believe that the referring expression and the predicate expression refer to identical entities: »... I believe that the notion that some entity stands to a predicate as an object stands to a singular referring expression should be abandoned« (1969: 103). (...) »It is easy to see in what sense the term identified by the subject expression, 'the rose', is non-linguistic, it is material object, its existence is a contingent fact. (...) But is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? And can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of linguistic entity? (...). Universals are not entities in the world, but in our mode of representing the world; they are, therefore, identified not by appealing to facts in the world, but in the utterance of expressions having the relevant meanings« (1969: 114-116).

Searle maintains that »Strawson avoids saying that predicates refer by adopting the (apparently) neutral term 'identify'« (1969: 113) and stresses that the expression »identify« has two completely different meanings: »... the means of identifying universals are quite different from the means of identifying particulars, and that this is a consequence of the fact that universals are parts of our mode of describing the world, not parts of the world« (1969: 117).

The ideas developed above seem important for the pragmatic interpretation of *NPr be NPr* clauses in ordinary everyday speech as well as for Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces. Complications as to the true value of this type of clause and their apparent constative function are the reason for a scientific discourse to develop which fulfills Frege's hypothesis that the reference of a predicate expression is a concept and at the same time creates conditions for determining the true values of these clauses. Therefore it is vital in the interpretation of *NPr be NPr* clauses to take into account principles, strategies, and intentions of functional discourses which determine interpretation of the illocutionary acts performed by uttering these clauses. In ordinary speech the true value of these clauses cannot be determined, and they cannot be considered assertions, but rather utterances with performative illocutionary force or, as Fauconnier says, as space builders. They obtain the constative illocutionary force of assertions by scientific discourse. Not taking into account this context leads to overgeneralizations in linguistic science. The usage of these clauses in ordinary speech, however, has a blinding effect, i.e. the phenomenon in which performative illocutionary force and its perlocutionary influence are exchanged for the constative illocutionary force, beliefs for these clauses to be descriptions of actual state of affairs and facts. In other words: intentional mental states which are expressed through our choice of predicate expression are understood as a part of the actual state of affairs and which we equate with facts, expressed with subject expression.

It is time to undertake the analysis. Examples will be chosen in which referential properties are not ascribed by adjectives but with nouns, i.e. in the metonymic mode: the whole denominated by a noun in the function of a predicative ascribes the reference, expressed by NP in the role of subject, typical properties contained in the predicate meaning. These properties are evaluated as acceptable or unacceptable, desirable or undesirable, permissive or unpermissive within the given context. A change of context may change the evaluation.

3. *NPr be NPr* clauses in ideological discourse

A detailed definition of ideological discourse would reach beyond the scope of this paper. Simply, we can say that this is a discourse which is primarily directed toward having a perlocutionary effect and forming beliefs,

irrespective of the true value of the assertions and occurs in ordinary speech. In order to answer the question what illocutionary act is performed by uttering *NPr be NPp* clauses, the true values of these clauses must be determined and the intention of their utterance in pragmatic contexts which are paradigmatically expressed by the performative *to say*. This verb allows the following questions to be asked: who has uttered the clause, to whom, when, from what reason, with what intention. A pragmatic analysis therefore presupposes that a clause is placed in a context of utterance and based on the relation between literal meaning and the actual state of affairs or facts to make conclusions about the true value; whereas by taking into account the context, intended meaning can be concluded from literal meaning and the question may be answered as to what the intention of the uttered clause was, in other words, what illocutionary act was performed by the speaker through the utterance act.

In 1990, an article appeared in the main Slovene daily entitled *B.Š. – The Last Bolshevik*. *B.Š.* is a proper name that enables us to identify a very concrete person who functioned as a university vice chancellor. The copula *to be* is left out of the title; in full the predicate expression would run *is the last bolshevik*. The person who can be identified with the referring expression *B.Š.* in the role of subject (*NPr*) is ascribed properties of meaning expressed by *bolshevik*. The copula *to be* expresses equality in the value of the referring subject expression and the predicate expression. Can the clause be considered an assertion, i.e. the true description of the actual state of affairs or of the reference? To answer this question, the following must be verified: (1) does the reference have truly ascribed properties? and (2) does the copula *to be* have the value of a logical equivalent? The analysis of (1) will be performed by investigating the relations between the signifying expressions and corresponding two entities. The analysis of (2) will be performed through an investigation of the grammatical relations in the surface structure. There is no problem identifying entities denoted by the referring expression *NPr B.Š.* But how to verify whether the person possesses the properties ascribed by the predicate expression? What does this word mean? The definition of the word *bolshevik* as taken from the Dictionary of Standard Slovene: *1. at the beginning of the 20th century, an adherent of the left wing of the Russian social-democratic workers' party or a member of the Russian social-democratic workers' party (of the Bolsheviks): Lenin's followers began to be called Bolsheviks, his opponents Mensheviks / expr. for communist in general. 2. expr. for the opponents of communism, atheist, rebel: let them alone, they are only bolsheviks.*

Besides the denotative meaning, this word also has an expressive connotative meaning depending on the attitude towards its denotation, i.e. it depends on whether the speaker is an adherent or opponent of communism. Referent *B.Š.* cannot be ascribed the properties of the denotative meaning but can be ascribed the value connotation. The referent is negatively evaluated through

the utterance. Properties ascribed to the referent by the predicate expression have been completely revalued by the changed ideological context: the formerly positive connotation adopted a negative connotation during the period of anti-communism. Bolshevism is an undesirable and unacceptable property. From the point of view of true value, we are found in a contradictory situation: the same referent has conflicting properties in different ideological contexts: in context A these properties are evaluated as positive, in context B as negative. Obviously we are not dealing with an illocutionary act of assertion but with an evaluating judgement with a performative illocutionary potential which influences our attitude toward the reference. This can be further confirmed by the fact that different speakers ascribe the referent different, conflicting properties although in the same context. While speaker A says that B.Š. is the last of the bolsheviks, speaker B says that it means the same as if said that B.Š. is the last of the Mohicans. The connotation is no longer a negative one. Speaker C may define the referent to be a democrat, another a Stalinist. It is obvious that the choice of the predicate expression does not depend on the referent, but on the intentional mental state of the speaker, his positive or negative attitude towards the reality that he is describing. If we wanted to ascribe true value to *NPr be NPp* clauses, we would have to remove differences in beliefs, desires, and intentions from the ideological context and proclaim only individual convictions or convictions of single homogeneous communities of interest as acceptable; these in turn could then proclaim their »assertions« expressed by *NPr be NPp* clauses as true. That this hypothesis is true can be demonstrated by the actual experience of totalitarian regimes. Sometimes uttering of this type of clause was sufficient reason for the persecution of individuals who were negatively evaluated by them.

On the other hand, the dependence of these utterances on the intentional mental states of the speakers and their vague true value is summed up in the folk wisdom that there are many truths. This saying also confirms man's right to take a different attitude toward reality.

NPr be NPp clauses set up a seemingly equal relation between two expressions, *NPr* and *NPp*, which express differing entities belonging to different worlds. *NPr* represents a reference in the »real world« of actual state of affairs or facts, whereas *NPp* represents the speaker's intentional mental state, his beliefs and attitudes towards reality. Although the discourse values expressed by *NPr* and *NPp* appear identical, the *NPp* expression actually represents the speaker in the clause. The *NPp* expression is bi-relational: (1) it appears as a reference property via the equality relation with *NPr*, and (2) is optional and the option depends on the speaker and is the expression of his convictions, desires, and intentions.

Thus a speaker does not express his intentional propositional attitude towards reality and toward the listener explicitly, by denominating intentional mental

states but rather indirectly by his choice of the predicate expression *NPp* that contains either positive or negative connotations. With the seemingly equal relation between *NPr* and *NPp*, personal attitudes and evaluations are presented as part of the actual state of affairs. Clauses with the underlying proposition *P: r equals p* and with the expressive realization *NPr be NPp* are in ordinary speech the basic means of so-called communicative blindness, as it permits a seeming equalization of the real world with the world of the intentional mental state (mind world). They appear as descriptions of actual states of affairs and facts, as assertions, when in fact they express the speaker's beliefs, desires, and intentions, and by way of connotative meaning exercise influence on the listener's evaluation of reality and his actions resulting from it. Their performative illocutionary force stems from the connotative meaning of the predicate expression *NPp*.

It is therefore not surprising that this is the form in which slogans are written on the front of the Ministry of Truth: *War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is power.* (Orwell, 1983: 7,15). They transform reality and its usual understanding into its opposite. Searle's question of whether the existence of a non-linguistic entity follows from the existence of a linguistic entity can be answered positively.

4. *NPr be NPp* clauses in the theory of mental space

In accordance with the hypothesis of the performative illocutionary force of clauses under analysis and in accordance with the indefinability of their true value, we can agree with Fauconnier's claim that »Relative simple grammatical structures give instructions for space construction in context. (...) Language, then, is not merely interpreted with respect to worlds, models, contexts, situations, and so forth. (...) It builds up mental spaces, relations between them, and relations between elements within them« (1985: 2). (...) »The space elements are not referred to by expressions of language: they are set up, identified, etc., and may then be used for purposes of reference (or possible purported reference). Mental space construction is an important part of natural semantics and pragmatics« (1985: 158).

Fauconnier already classed *NPr be NPp* clauses among space builders, i.e. linguistic expressions that establish new mental space: a »construct distinct from linguistic structures but built up in any discourse according to guidelines provided by the linguistic expressions« (1985: 16). He also established that *be* links elements that are counterparts in different spaces: »In other words, even though a simple clause usually expresses relations within a space, those of the form *NP be NP* may establish a counterpart relation between elements of different spaces. As opposed to many other verbs, *be* may express transpatial links: this is a consequence of its general metonymic function and of the metonymic nature of pragmatic connectors in general, and of interspatial

ones in particular» (1985: 145). Thus, the copula *be* is not a logical conjunction but a pragmatic connector that »can stand for metonymic relations in general and in particular for the relation between a role and its value« (1985: 137).

Its function in *NPr be NPp* clauses is worth special attention as it links two entities that belong to different worlds and corresponding mental spaces into a seemingly equal relation. *NPr* represents the actual state of affairs or facts of the »real« world, while *NPp* the entities that belong to the world of intentional mental states (mind world). The speaker does not express his beliefs, intentions, and desires through propositional attitudes but through the predicate expression *NPp* containing the performative illocutionary potential contained in the connotation. Thus the intentional worlds appear as real worlds. The function of the connector *to be* that connects entities belonging to different mental spaces into a seeming equal relation is similar to the function of pronouns »because the connectors that link elements in different spaces are open, ... a pronoun with an antecedent in one space freely identify its counterpart in another, connected space:

(1) Vivien saw herself in *Gone with the Wind*.«

The pronoun *herself* identifies the true person with her role in the film. This would come as no surprise if one viewed all the counterparts being in some sense 'the same' elements« (1985: 35). This blinding illusion which makes possible the equalization of entities that belong to different worlds or mental spaces was convincingly dashed by Cary Grant who said, »Everyone would like to to be Cary Grant, even me!« This type of mechanism built into the structure and interpretation of *NPr be NPp* clauses and other means of expression that set up equal relations between entities in different spaces makes possible the creation of a non-linguistic entity as a consequence of a linguistic one. This enables the full swing of symbolic imagination, but also a schizophrenia of mind, the substitution of a linguistic creation of an entity for a non-linguistic one.

5. Grammatical structure of *NPr be NPp* clauses

What is the grammatical and logical structure of *NPr be NPp* clauses like? Is the relation between *NPr* (trigger) and *NPp* (target) symmetrical and reversible or asymmetrical and irreversible? Jackendoff maintains that »the trigger will always be real referents, while the targets may be concrete or mental representation of them. However, this asymmetrical view is not reflected by the linguistic data: the triggers may be in the pictures, beliefs, etc., and the target in the so-called real 'world'« (Fauconnier, 1985: 14). Let us see what opinion is valid for *NPr be NPp* clauses.

NPr is the trigger and has the function of a subject in the surface structure, while *NPp* is the target and has the function of the predicative in the surface structure. The predicate consists of the copula *to be* and *NPp*. In the Slovene

language, subject and predicate are unambiguously definable. Slovene does not have the definite article to identify the referring expression and to separate it from the predicate phrase, but recognition of these syntactic functions is made possible by the rule of agreement: NPR in the function of a subject agrees in gender and number with the form of the copula. This, in fact, does not show in the present and the future tenses of the auxiliary *to be*, but it can be noted if the verb is put in the past tense: *Peter je bil*; *Marica je bila*; *dekleta so bila*; *dečki so bili* (Peter was; Marica was; the girls were; the boys were). On the other hand, NPp functioning as a predicative is a syntactic free form, a simple adjunct to the verb. As both NP are in the nominative and if also of the same gender and number, difficulties arise in defining them. Some examples:

- (1i) *Avtobusna postaja je največji problem Ljubljane.*
(The bus station is the biggest problem in Ljubljana.)
- (1ii) *Največji problem Ljubljane je avtobusna postaja.*
(The biggest problem in Ljubljana is the bus station.)
- (2i) *Ta hiša je opera.*
(This building is the opera.)
- (2ii) *Opera je ta hiša.*
(The opera is this building.)

Which nominal phrase in these clauses has the function of subject (trigger) and which the function of predicate (target)? An empirical experiment was carried out. The test population were students of Slovene language and students of the fourth class of a natural sciences secondary school, i.e. linguistically highly educated individuals with a developed linguistic sense. Everybody ($n = 45$) chose the nominal phrase *avtobusna postaja* as the subject in the clause (1i). In clause (1ii) 43 out of 50 test individuals attributed the function of subject to the nominal phrase *največji problem Ljubljane*. This means that test individuals in accordance with the rule of the functional perspective chose the first nominal phrase in the clause to be the subject. The experiment, however, also confirmed the working of semantic intuition which tends to ascribe the function of subject (trigger) to a nominal phrase with a »concrete« semantic feature and the function of predicative (target) to the nominal phrase with an »abstract« semantic feature. This tendency is even more obvious in clause (2ii). All tested individuals ascribed the function of subject to *ta hiša* in clause (2i), whereas in clause (2ii) the same function was ascribed to the nominal phrase *opera* by only 32 out of 45 individuals. It must be mentioned that in this clause there is a relation between value and role. It can be concluded that semantic intuition speaks in favour of the asymmetric relation between the two nominal phrases, namely the relation between trigger and target. There is a clearly expressed tendency that the role of trigger is ascribed to a nominal phrase with a »concrete« semantic feature.

Because in the present tense, agreement between subject and predicate, i.e. the copula form, is not expressed in the surface structure, difficulties in defining the subject and the predicate in the clause arise, along with grammatical mistakes. Due to the complicated relations between meaning and expression, grammatical rules are not absolutely defined and speakers must depend on semantic intuition. This may be illustrated by the following example:

(3)* *Moja največja ljubezen je bila organizacijske vede.*

(My greatest love was management sciences.)

(4i)* *Predmet razprave je bil družbena razmerja.*

(The topic of the discussion was social relations.)

The speaker chose the nominal phrase as the trigger, i.e. the subject in the clause *moja največja ljubezen* (my greatest love) and *predmet razprave* (the topic of the discussion). This can clearly be seen in the surface structure from the agreement between the nominal phrase and the copula. The form of the copula *je* agrees in gender and number with the subject. However, all the test individuals expressed the opinion that both clauses are grammatically incorrect, and that they should run:

(3i) *Moja največja ljubezen so bile organizacijske vede.*

(My greatest love were management sciences.)

(3ii) *Organizacijske vede so bile moja največja ljubezen.*

(Management sciences were my greatest love.)

and

(4i) *Predmet razprave so bila družbena razmerja.*

(The topic of the discussion were social relations.)

(4ii) *Družbena razmerja so bila predmet razprave.*

(Social relations were the topic of the discussion.)

As already mentioned, this phenomenon is not unambiguously described in the grammar of Standard Slovene, so the question should be posed where the source of this semantic and expressive intuition is. The role of trigger or subject of the clause must be taken on by an NPr that at the same time represents entities outside the speaker, whereas the role of the target or predicate the NPp which is the expression of the speaker's attitude towards the external entity. In clause (3) the management sciences are those that the speaker loved, in clause (4) it is social relations that were chosen as the topic of discussion. Although a semantic rule referring to the precise structure of clauses NPr be NPp is not described and normed in the Slovene language, one can obviously rely on intuition. It could be said that from the grammatical viewpoint, the relation between NPr and NPp is asymmetrical, as the relation between NPr and copula is formally defined, while the relation between copula and NPp is free in accordance with the optional understanding. This can be further confirmed by the following examples:

- (5) Matematika *je bila* moj največji problem.
(Maths was my greatest problem.)

and not

- (5i)* Moj največji problem *je bil* matematika.
(My greatest problem was maths.)

- (6) Peter *je bil* moja velika ljubezen.
(Peter was my greatest love.)

and not

- (6i)* Moja največja ljubezen *je bila* Peter.
(My greatest love was Peter.)

The following clauses are also correct:

- (5ii) Moj največji problem *je bila* matematika.
(My greatest problem was maths.)

- (6ii) Moja največja ljubezen *je bil* Peter.
(My greatest love was Peter.)

The difference between the *NPr* in the role of subject and the *NPp* in the role of predicative can be expressed on the level of expression only in the past tense, but not in the present or in the future; it also remains concealed if *NPr* and *NPp* are of the same gender and number. Therefore, we should not be surprised that this clause has escaped exact grammatical description, which strengthens the feeling of the equivalent relation between *NPr* and *NPp* to the extent that we can say that the grammatical structure of these clauses is favourable for the blinding effect, i.e. the exchange of the external world with the world of the speaker's beliefs, desires, and intentions, especially in the present and future tenses.

On the basis of the analysis performed, it can be stated with certainty that the relation between *NPr* and *NPp* in an *NPr be NPp* clause is neither symmetrical nor reversible, although it appears to be such in cases when *NPr* and *NPp* are of the same gender and number as well as in the present and the future tenses. Semantic intuition comes into play in these cases and ascribes the role of trigger, i.e. subject, to the *NPr* which represents entities outside the speaker and the role of the target, i.e. the predicative, to the *NPp* expressing the speaker's attitude and relation towards external entities. The analysis shows that in the Slovene language, the definite and indefinite articles which help identify the *NPr*, i.e. the trigger, and the *NPp*, i.e. the target, are replaced by the rule of agreement of subject and predicate. *NPp* has two features: (a) it takes a space in the clause structure as an adjunct, and (b) is an optional value in the paradigmatic system. Language rules on one hand permit the differentiation between *NPr* and *NPp*, especially in the past tense, while on the other hand, they permit the necessary exchange and equalizing which permits communicative blindness.

6. *NPr be NPr* in scientific discourse

NPr be NPr clauses are not only frequent in ideological discourse, but also in scientific discourse. These are clauses that categorize remarks belonging to the actual state of affairs into conceptual categories belonging to the system of scientific concepts. E.g.:

- (1) *Beseda* Peter je samostalnik.

(The word »Peter« is a noun.)

If in ordinary speech the true value of such clauses is non-definable and the relation between *NPr* and *NPr* is only seemingly equivalent, it is not valid for scientific discourse. The true value of clause (1) can be determined within the frame of grammatical theory and its conceptual system by means of syllogistic inference:

Definition: nouns are words that denote beings, things, or concepts, and whose gender, case, and number can be determined.

Recognition of the defined properties under consideration: the word »Peter« denotes a being, it is masculine, nominative, singular.

Conclusion: the word »Peter« is a noun.

Let us consider how scientific discourse can ensure conditions for defining the true value of clauses as opposed to everyday human speech. It ensures those conditions that are not ensured in everyday human speech: (1) the choice in denomination is replaced by the use of non-selective denominations, i.e. terms; (2) the meanings of terms are precisely defined without connotative value surplus; (3) this makes possible by means of syllogistic inference to verify if a clause of perception has the properties contained in the concept and thus determine the true value of a clause. Ensuring these conditions is therefore a constituent component of the communicative laws of scientific discourse. In this way it is scientific discourse that ensures the truth of Frege's hypothesis that the reference of a predicate expression *NPr* is a concept. It could be said that both Frege and Searle were correct to a certain extent; Searle's conclusions are valid for the ordinary speech that was the dominant topic of his research; Frege's conclusions are valid for the logical metalanguage of science. Their conclusions are wrong in as much as they do not take into account the functional segmentation of communicative space in functional discourses. Not taking this very obvious fact into account presents the danger of overgeneralizations.

The fact that *NPr be NPr* clauses are impossible as assertions in ordinary speech can be best confirmed by examples with logical tautologies:

- (2) *Življenje je življenje.*

(Life is life.)

Logical equivalence of *NPr* and *NPr* in such clauses is achieved, but the price for it is their sameness. The copula certainly has the value of logical

equivalence, but the clause demonstrates the impossibility of understanding and the necessity of agreeing with reality as it is. These are clauses that meet the need for true definability, but at the price of coinciding of two entities, the intentional and the real. Language structure makes it possible for us to escape from the state of unperceptiveness and passivity. In everyday human speech, *NPr be NPr* clauses enable the performative illocutionary force which performs beliefs, attitudes, and acting, i.e. transformation of a linguistic entity into a non-linguistic one. Clauses with the same structure in scientific discourse, on the other hand, allow us to perceive a non-linguistic entity with linguistic means. Thus the linguistic structure of *NPr be NPr* clauses meets both fundamental human intentions, the intention to change the world according to one's desire and the intention to perceive the world.

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