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Revija za teorijo in raziskave vzgoje in izobraževanja

# Šolsko polje

Radicalization, Violent Extremism  
and Conflicting Diversity

Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan (eds.)

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*Šolsko polje* je mednarodna revija za teorijo ter raziskave vzgoje in izobraževanja z mednarodnim uredniškim odborom. Objavlja znanstvene in strokovne članke s širšega področja vzgoje in izobraževanja ter edukacijskih raziskav (filozofija vzgoje, sociologija izobraževanja, uporabna epistemologija, razvojna psihologija, pedagogika, andragogika, pedagoška metodologija itd.), pregledne članke z omenjenih področij ter recenzije tako domačih kot tujih monografij s področja vzgoje in izobraževanja. Revija izhaja trikrat letno. Izdaja jo *Slovensko društvo raziskovalcev šolskega polja*. Poglavitni namen revije je prispevati k razvoju edukacijskih ved in interdisciplinarnemu pristopu k teoretičnim in praktičnim vprašanjem vzgoje in izobraževanja. V tem okviru revija posebno pozornost namenja razvijanju slovenske znanstvene in strokovne terminologije ter konceptov na področju vzgoje in izobraževanja ter raziskovalnim paradigmam s področja edukacijskih raziskav v okviru družboslovno-humanističnih ved.

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# Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity

Mitja Sardoč  
Tomaž Deželan

The problem of radicalization and violent extremism is one of the most important challenges facing modern plural societies. The brutality of terrorist attacks and their frequency together with some of the ‘collateral’ problems associated with radicalisation and violent extremism, e.g. Islamophobia (Esposito & Iner, 2019), ‘moral panic’ (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2018), right-wing populism [and terrorism] together with other forms of political extremism have brought to the forefront problems previously either compartmentalized in specialized courses on intelligence and security studies or at the very fringes of scholarly interest. Despite the consensus that radicalization and violent extremism represent a major threat to political, economic and social security of contemporary democratic societies, with terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 figuring as some sort of ‘Year One’<sup>1</sup> on the calendar of the ‘war on terror’, the discussion about what precisely is radicalization, as the authors of the book *Counter-Radicalization: Critical Perspectives* have emphasized, ‘has been marked by a significant degree of conceptual confusion’ (2014: 5). Interestingly enough, the process of radicalization and the adjacent issue of violent extremism has opened up a number of different issues, which the theories, policies and practices of counter-radicalization, deradicalization and anti-polarization do not offer a unanimous answer to. Other important questions arise here as well, e.g. what criteria apply in order to distinguish between non-violent and violent radicalization (Bartlett & Miller, 2012)? What is the relationship between the cognitive

1 The analogy of ‘Year One’ is based on the French Republican Calendar created in 1792 during the French Revolution after the abolition of the monarchy in France.

and the behavioral dimension of radicalization? Is radicalization problematic only when it turns to violent extremism or is radicalization wrong in itself? Is the process of radicalization problematic irrespective of the method being used or is its negative valence associated exclusively with the use of indoctrination?

These and other questions are a clear sign that existing research and its focus on the etiology of radicalization [looking primarily for a causal explanation of the process of radicalization or the turn to violent extremism] leaves several definitional and conceptual issues either neglected or outrightly ignored. Radicalization, as Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, have emphasized ‘is a research topic plagued by assumption and intuition, unhappily dominated by “conventional wisdom” rather than systematic scientific and empirically based research’ (2010: 889). At the same time, radicalization and violent extremism are only one part of the puzzle associated with the polarization of contemporary societies as hate speech and fake news [as well as other dystopian narratives (e.g. sensationalism)] combined with prejudices and stereotypes are an important factor contributing to social fragmentation and the phenomenon of conflicting diversity. Most importantly perhaps, these [and other] problems also challenge some of the foundational principles of contemporary democratic societies. For example, how to strike a balance between the respect of privacy and the requirements of security? What are the limits of the freedom of expression etc.?

In his well-known essay on punishment and accountability [‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment’], H.L.A. Hart, one of the most important scholars working in jurisprudence, made an insightful comment on punishment, one of the most controversial and pressing public issues back in the 1950s [at least in the UK]. As he eloquently emphasized, ‘[g]eneral interest in the topic of punishment has never been greater than it is at present and I doubt if the public discussion of it has ever been more confused’ (Hart, 2008: 1). This observation applies well also to the many issues addressed in this journal special issue of *Šolsko polje* entitled ‘Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity’. Its overall aim is to move beyond the ‘conventional wisdom’ over radicalization (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010: 889) best represented by many well-known slogans [e.g. ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’], metaphors [e.g. ‘hearts & minds’]<sup>2</sup> as well as various thought-terminating clichés [e.g. ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’]. It brings together

2 The metaphor of the ‘hearts and minds’ figures prominently in both radicalization and violent extremism literature including other adjacent areas of scholarly research, e.g. counter-insurgency operations (Egnell, 2010), ‘war on terror’ (Mockaitis, 2003) etc. as well as in



a set of articles discussing some of the most important empirical, methodological (Knudsen, 2018) and conceptual (Kundnani, 2012, Neumann, 2013) questions associated with this area of scholarly research. Without sounding as a truism, the unifying assumption of the articles published in this journal special issue is the complex nature of radicalization, violent extremism and conflicting diversity [as well as their interwoven relationship]. While radicalization has become one of the ‘great buzzwords of our time’ (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013: 360) and ‘perhaps the most pervasive framework for understanding micro-level transitions towards violence’ (Silva, 2018: 34), pleas for its very abandonment as a useful analytical category due to some of its ‘conceptual fault-lines’ (Neumann, 2013) have started to emerge as well.

In order to tackle a sort of conceptual carelessness stemming from much of the literature on radicalization and violent extremism, Julian Richards takes a closer look at the concept of radicalization itself and discusses the main trends, problems and challenges associated with it. Interestingly enough, some of the recent publications have moved toward the examination of the concept of radicalization itself (Knudsen, 2018; Silva, 2018). Kundnani (2012). Next, Dianne Gereluk and Carol-Ann Titus look at the role of schools in addressing youth radicalization as well as in making sense of the alleged paradox between the overall disengagement of youth in contemporary democratic societies on the one hand and the radicalization of youth [the single most vulnerable group being exposed to radicalization and violent extremism] on the other. As they write, ‘[w]hile schools must not be burdened solely to address those youth who may become radicalized, schools have a significant role to help support those youth who feel that radicalization is the only way forward for them’. Furthermore, their emphasis on the role of slogans [and other buzzwords] on the way we make sense of such complex phenomena is an illuminating example for future research. The interview with Michel Wieviorka discusses some of the most pressing issues associated with radicalization and violent extremism. The initial section of the interview is devoted to the discussion of the main differences between violent extremism fueled by radicalisation and other forms of terrorism that existed in different European countries back in the 1960s and 1970s. In the central part of the interview, Prof. Wieviorka reflects on some of the conceptual problems associated with the ‘standard’ interpretation of radicalization and violent extremism. The concluding part of the interview takes a closer look

political rhetoric as both the former US president Barack Obama and the Canadian PM Justin Trudeau made considerable use of it.

at the role education should play in the tackling of radicalization and violent extremism. Based on the analysis of the key distinctions associated with radicalization and violent extremism, Kosta Bovan, Marko Kovačić and Milica Vučković present the findings of their research on ‘how the terms “radical” and “mainstream” are understood by Croatian youth’ as well as how young people in Croatia conceptualise radicalism as a relative, neutral, and context-dependent term. The article by Iztok Prezelj, Klemen Kocjančič and Urša Marinšek discusses the process of Islamist radicalisation at the conceptual level as well as ‘the fight for the hearts and minds of the population’ strategy that has gained considerable leverage in discussions over radicalization. Ultimately, as the authors emphasize, their article also ‘proposes some ideas of how to fight Islamist radicalisation in public schools’. In his article ‘Factors of Radicalization’, Srečo Dragoš addresses the various uses of the term radicalization through the concept of a “cage” made of four dimensions. As he emphasizes, ‘[r]adicalisation is defined by the coincidence of unfavourable combinations of these dimensions, which is why it is difficult to understand it, if it is reduced only to one level and qualified more as a reason than as an effect’. The second part of his paper ‘gives some examples on the influence of the social context on the phenomenon of radicalism, with a special emphasis on the Slovenian example’. The final article to this special issue ‘Radical Hate Speech and Islamophobia: The Fascination with Hitler and Fascism on the Slovenian Webosphere’ by Boris Vezjak examines cases of radical hate speech posted on Slovenian social networks during the development of the refugee crisis in Europe and Slovenia beginning in 2015.

Alongside the focus on problems and challenges associated with the ‘standard’ interpretation [the ‘security paradigm’], this journal special issue aims to address also other contextual, definitional and conceptual issues as the relationship between radicalisation, violent extremism and conflicting diversity is anything but unambiguous or unproblematic.

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# A Conceptual Exploration of Radicalisation

Julian Richards

## Introduction

The concept of radicalism in society has a long history, with many suggesting a close affiliation to the developments of eighteenth-century Enlightenment Europe (Bötticher, 2017: p. 76). It appears to be the case that the active process of “radicalisation”, however, has taken on a new lease of life in the twenty-first century. A rough starting-point for such a development can be identified as the 9/11 attacks in the US, which not only triggered a global shift in security policy and irrevocably reoriented the post-Cold War security landscape; but which also emphasised the human element of identity in the postmodern, internet-age terrorist movements with whom we found ourselves at odds.

Two key factors are inherent in these more recent developments. Firstly, the importance of bureaucratic drivers to the debates, formulations and reformulations of radicalisation theory cannot be overestimated. It appears to be the case that studies supporting governments and state agencies in the early years after 9/11 increasingly identified and scoped a “process” connected with radicalisation, which could be modelled and turned into clearly-defined counter-radicalisation policy and strategy. This work, in turn, catalysed an interest in academic circles in the notions of extremism, radicalism and radicalisation.

Second, a line was drawn in the chronology of counter-terrorism strategies in many states, such that policy after 9/11 took on a greater pre-occupation with the human element than was the case before. This became an accelerating process in the aftermath of the major terrorist

attacks that followed 9/11 in the US, such as those in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004) and London (2005), to name but a few. Here – somewhat unlike the situation in 9/11 – the attackers were not radicals from overseas who had breached the borders and brought in a foreign radicalism; but citizens of the very states themselves under attack in which the perpetrators had been born and brought up.

A number of paradoxes unfolded. In the London attacks, for example, the leader of the bombing cell, Muhammad Siddique Khan, had not only been born and brought-up in the UK, but had been relatively successful in the sense that he had achieved a university degree and landed a solid job. His occupation, furthermore, had been in the healthcare profession. How, asked the state and its citizenry, could an individual move from caring for his fellow citizens to murdering and maiming them in the most dramatic fashion? A depressingly substantial number of other cases have subsequently followed in many nations.

Insofar as answers could be established (and it is worth noting that we are still some way from doing so at the time of writing), the obvious explanation seemed to be that something had happened to these individuals whereby their conceptualisation of their own identity and role in society had undergone some sort of transformative process, taking them away from a “normal” member of society to one with the most violent intent. Furthermore, in the normative sociological language of rational-choice which has largely held sway since the latter part of the twentieth century, such individuals were not mentally disturbed, but had each made some sort of rational calculation about the best way forward for themselves and others in society.

The advent of such developments led to a growing bureaucratic interest not only in the fire-fighting of terrorist attacks on the streets (which involves such actions as police and military action, and gathering intelligence on those involved) but also in the “fire prevention” activities, whereby the circumstances in which individuals find themselves being drawn towards violently extreme actions are examined at a deeper and longer-term level of societal development and intervention. A whole range of policies and strategies have subsequently been instituted, known as “CVE”, or Countering Violent Extremism strategies. Here, the key word – extremism – suggests something ideological and societal, rather than the black-and-white legalistic notion of a violent criminal act.

It should be noted that, while 9/11 set in motion the bureaucratic and academic thinking in these directions, an awareness has grown that the “extreme” ideology in question may not be confined to the violent jihadist ideologies of the likes of Al Qaeda and *Daesh*, but could equally

involve radical-right ideologies, as Anders Breivik starkly underlined in 2011 when he killed 77 and maimed many more in a terrorist attack in Oslo, inspired by what Khosrokhavar describes as a “frenzied utopianism” defined by extreme Islamophobia and ultra-nationalism (Khosrokhavar, 2015: p. 119).

As a result, the concept of radicalisation could be said to have been approached from two major directions, with intersections between them. These can be differentiated as macro-, and micro-level approaches; or the question of extreme *ideology* set against extremist *individuals*. The macro-level approach mirrors much analysis in the realms of Politics and International Relations, whereby the behaviours of individuals are considered within the wider context of societal structures and developments. Here, questions of power-relations in society are significant, and have driven such thinking that socio-economic marginalisation underpins the emergence of violent and revolutionary movements. Such an approach also allows for a notion that discrimination and Islamophobia, which may be as stressful for conceptions of personal identity as for actual daily physical experience, may lead whole sections of society to feel dangerously embittered and to turn to violent thoughts as a way of redemption.

Rather like the calculation concerning gun control, however, the author has noted elsewhere that ideologies are important, but it is the individual who becomes violently extreme (Richards, 2017: p. 220). The micro-level approach is initiated in part by the challenge that bedevils much political and sociological analysis, namely that: if some people respond to societal pressures in violent ways, why do so many others – all of whom are living in exactly the same environment – not do so? There must therefore be some level of context-specificity that needs to be considered in the process of radicalisation.

This has driven much psychological and anthropological work on radicalisation, which looks not at ideologies per se but at the cognitive and human processes that may cause one individual to become violently extreme when another will not. It is intriguing, for example, that the vast majority of individuals who have carried out violent “jihadist” attacks in Western countries under the *Daesh* banner, for example, could not be described as religious ideologues in their formative years, but quite the opposite (Sexton, 2017). Indeed, most of them have had histories of criminality and problems with the vices of secular, Western society. In most cases, their understanding of Islam could be described as shallow at best. This must surely mean that the influence of extreme, religiously-inspired ideology is rather more complicated than initially presumed.

Such factors have led to a certain degree of introspection in the academic community in more recent years about the radicalisation process models that characterised much of the early, post-9/11 debate, and which were driven to a significant degree by bureaucratic impetuses in the counter-terrorism realm. Indeed, some of the protagonists of the “step” models of radicalisation in this period, such as Horgan and Sageman, are starting to question their own earlier thinking to such an extent that one could ponder whether the established notion of radicalisation is reaching its end (Schmid, 2013). For somewhat different reasons, there are also critics who suggest that the bureaucratic drivers of the radicalisation debate actually had covert, sinister motives in othering certain communities and practising a form of institutional Islamophobia (Kundnani, 2009: p. 24).

In this paper, the argument is presented that radicalisation is *not* becoming a completely moot concept, and that some of the original thinking still has a great deal of utility. More specifically, theories that emphasise the dual and synergistic processes of top-down (macro-level) and bottom-up (micro-level) drivers which may (or may not) cause a particular individual to become involved in a violent and extreme act, remain important and useful in our analysis. Any theories that over-emphasise the importance of ideology over individual identity factors, or vice versa, are likely to have far less utility.

The various theories and debates across the spectrum of discussion concerning radicalisation are reviewed in this paper. These will consider each of the macro- and micro-level positions, before moving on to an analysis of the synergistic, over-arching theories that, it is argued, sensibly take the discussion forward. Some of the implications of the debate for policy-makers will also be briefly considered in conclusion.

### The Macro-level Approach

One of the areas of socio-political research that has also enjoyed a resurgence in recent years alongside the question of radicalisation is that examining populist politics; boosted in part by the rise of new, Far Right movements in Western politics, and by the elevation to power of the protagonists of identity-politics such as President Trump in the US.

Much of the analysis in this area takes a structuralist stance, in the sense of structuralism as a Neo-Marxist critique of global politics and economy. This leads to an analysis of postmodern and post-industrial society, in which political constituencies are increasingly thinking not only about the traditional deleterious effects of inequitable distribution in capitalist society, but also, in a somewhat postmodern way, about “governance structures of social organization and cultural life styles” (Kitschelt,



2004: p. 1). In the Kitscheltian argument, populist, identity-based politics may capitalise on the “times of uncertainty” to offer an intersubjective identity politics to those looking for answers (Monroe et al., 2000: p. 438).

In some cases, new political movements are emerging to compete in the traditional political sphere and are gaining traction, notably in southern Europe where the likes of *Syriza* in Greece and *Movimento Cinque Stelle* (M5S) in Italy are starting to gain power. In other cases, “freedom parties” on the far right-wing of politics, such as Geert Wilders’ PVV in the Netherlands or *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany, are also shaking the traditional political establishment. Many of these parties and their sister movements and groups on the fringes of politics would be considered radical at best and extreme at worst by many in the political mainstream.

In this context, several constituencies who may be drawn towards this more disruptive politics are significant. First are what some have described as the “left behinds” of postindustrial society (Speed and Mannian, 2017: p. 249), namely those with low levels of skills and education, who find themselves poorly equipped to find jobs in the new information economy, or indeed competing for manual jobs with incoming migrants or with overseas producers operating at lower costs. This constituency feels the cold winds of globalisation more than most, against which populist politicians may offer a redemptive narrative, such as a promise to “Make America Great Again” that rings in the ears of embittered Rust Belt workers. Similarly, such processes may be reminiscent of political developments in earlier periods of history, and notably the rise of Fascist, national-socialist movements in Europe during the severe economic depression of the 1930s.

A related key constituency is the so-called “precariat” of workers in the new “gig economy” (Standing, 2014), whose sharply reduced job and income security compared to some of their forebears can lead to feelings of anxiety and a desire to change the fundamental economic structure. For such members of society, technological advances such as the increasing penetration of the economy by automation and artificial intelligence (AI) offer a growing anxiety about the future as much as of the present.

Political analysis looks closely at such structural shifts in the economy and society and considers how they feed into shifts in voting towards more “extreme” parties away from the traditional mainstream. While a shift towards an unorthodox political party is not necessarily cause for major alarm, recruitment into more extreme and violent groups by ideologues protesting a more revolutionary and anti-democratic narrative most certainly is. Thus, in December 2016, the UK government placed on

the proscribed list a Far Right organisation called National Action: the first such group to be placed on the banned list in British political history. The trigger was the murder a few months before of a sitting member of parliament, Jo Cox, by an extremist proclaiming the nationalist slogan of “Britain First!” and subsequently being found to have sympathies for National Action.

Interestingly, the author of Jo Cox’s murder, Tony Mair, turned out to be a troubled and embittered member of the majority white community, who had lived for many years in exactly the same district as Muhammad Siddique Khan, the leader of the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London (Rayner et al., 2016). Here, we may be seeing a connection between the dangerous embitterment of the “left-behinds”, and certain structural factors affecting minority communities living within Western society. For these minority communities, structural discrimination and socio-economic marginalisation may increase the lure of revolutionary ideologies in slightly different ways.

Here, there is a particularly pertinent reference to Muslim society. A nostalgic “golden age” thesis whereby Islamic society may be perceived to have been progressively subjugated and undermined by Western imperialism over the centuries from the heady days of the *Umayyud* and *Abbasid* caliphates, can – in the hands of skilful ideologues – feed upon a grim economic reality in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in Europe, whereby a youth-bulge of relatively well-educated and skilled citizens find themselves faced with extremely poor economic prospects. In Europe, the frustration this engenders is coupled with real or perceived discrimination and marginalisation.

Khosrokhavar (2015: p. 22) characterises the dual and relentless effect of “humiliation and despair” in such minority communities as the most common trigger for radicalisation towards a “theology of wild hope”, in which the perceived injustices are turned upon their perpetrators and the wrongs are scheduled to be righted at some indeterminate time in the future. Such a thesis may partly explain the “Arab Spring” uprisings against entrenched authoritarian regimes in the Middle East from 2011 onwards, but may also offer some explanation for how some troubled Muslims living in Western societies may be drawn towards violent jihadist movements in their quest for self-meaning or redemption.

At the macro-level of analysis, therefore, structural factors in society such as shifts in relative economic and political power relations across different groups, feed into environmental factors that may cause the dangerous radicalisation of certain individuals. The manifestation of that radicalisation may emerge in several different places, such as on the

extreme-right of politics in an expression of violent nationalism and xenophobia; or in the radicalisation of minority groups towards revolutionary, sectarian and anti-democratic movements such as *Daesh*. When looking at the problem through the macro end of the telescope therefore, radicalisation must be conceptualised as the result of structural shifts in society.

### The Micro-level Approach

However, it is pertinent at this stage to return to the troubling question of why responses to structural factors that affect broad swathes of society are so variable, not only between regions but right down to the individual level. Why did structural transformations in society cause Thomas Mair and Muhammad Siddique Khan to decide that murder was an appropriate way forward, when the vast majority of their immediate neighbours and associates have decided otherwise? This must mean that generalisations must be taken carefully, and that context-specificity may often be crucially important.

What this also means is that much of the analysis of the concept of radicalisation has connected with micro-level analysis in the realms of anthropology, sociology and psychology, taking as a frame the closely-related questions of how and why individuals can turn to violence.

Jeff Victoroff undertook a useful survey of theorising around extremism and radicalisation in the run-up to, and immediately post-9/11, which identified a significant range of macro-level and micro-level theories (Victoroff, 2005). Echoing Crenshaw's triumvirate of perspectives based on person, group and society (Crenshaw, 1981), theories have been active in the political, sociological and psychological realms. At the macro-level, "relative deprivation and oppression theories" appear to be dominant (Victoroff, 2005: p. 11), but at the psycho-social levels, theories have abounded to include rational choice theory, identity theory, theories focusing on narcissism and paranoia, cognitive, and group process theories. Indeed, particularly after the spur of 9/11 and notwithstanding the difficulties in defining "terrorism", a veritable "potpourri of psychological theories" have emerged about extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism (Victoroff, 2005: p. 31). Virtually all of these are somewhat flawed in their methodological approaches and none can be taken as safe generalisations.

With that said, one of the key intersections between the macro and micro-levels of analysis can be seen in identity theory, and specifically in Sheldon Stryker's development of "structural symbolic interactionism" (SSI). As Stryker suggests, the starting point for identity theory is that "society impacts self impacts social behavior" (Stryker, 2008: p. 20). It

could be argued that all of us live within particular inescapable societal contexts which have a major bearing on our sense of ourselves and our interactions with others around us. But the sense of “interactionism” suggests that the relationship between societal structures and any one individual’s behaviour is a complex and variable one.

Closely related to SSI is “identity control theory” (ICT), which, in the words of Stryker, is:

concerned with the internal dynamic of selves viewed as cybernetic systems seeking to restore equilibriums when identities are threatened by external events (Stryker, 2008: p. 21).

The notion here is that individuals are constituted by a complex system of identity drivers and values, arranged in a delicate and finely-balanced “hierarchy of salience” to the individual. The individual’s behaviour will be determined by a constant rebalancing and adjustment in response to external events and stimuli, depending on how far a particular element of identity may be challenged and how salient that particular identity factor is to the overall identity of the individual. Perceived challenges to the more important elements of identity in the hierarchy of an individual may be followed by particularly robust responses as a way of attempted rebalancing. Such a theory applies not only to how and why individuals may turn to violence, but much more widely to interactions in the workplace, management psychology and so on.

On the question of violence, one of the most infamous experiments is that conducted by Stanley Milgram in the early 1960s. The Milgram Experiment, as it came to be known, explored the relationship between power and hierarchy by establishing in fairly chilling terms that ordinary individuals will be prepared to inflict suffering on others if told to do so by those in positions of power over them (De Vos, 2009: p. 223). The experiment helped to shed some light on the gruesome bureaucratisation of daily violence during the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, in which the human desire for conformity trumped adherence to fundamental values of humanity.

In terms of security, ICT can help to conceptualise how and why individuals choose to undertake a violent act, with some analysts building on the essentials of rational choice theory by using linear “decision-tree” approaches (see for example Dornschneider (2016)). There has also been much connection in these approaches with cognitive psychology, notably in terrorism studies. Maikovich, for example, presents an interesting “cognitive dissonance” model for understanding terrorists. Here, the radicalisation process (although Maikovich does not describe it as such) aims

to gradually reduce an individual's cognitive dissonance between feeling embittered about an issue and considering extreme violence against other human beings as an appropriate response (Maikovich, 2005). In this way, radical ideologues will use "dissonance-reducing mechanisms" to enable individuals to make the journey into violence, by offering social support (making people feel part of a wider collective); suppressing unhelpfully contradictory information; and developing a "just world bias" in the worldview of the individual. Such information strategies will be broadened and deepened by opportunities offered through new media. At a level of broad conceptualisation, this is little different from how a state may recruit an individual into an army and train them to feel comfortable with using violence.

In social group theory, some of the analysis of how and why individuals become drawn into radical movements suggests a more problematic lack of generalities. In a very interesting empirical study of how women became drawn into radical-right organisations in the US, for example, Kathleen Blee observed that a move into violent extremism can often be down to circumstantial and social developments in an individual's life (such as meeting a new person or group of people socially) which can offer the promise of a new narrative that helps to "make sense" of an otherwise seemingly disconnected and happenstance life (Blee, 2002: p. 45). This suggests the nexus of two important processes: vulnerability and stress in a person's life (a need to make sense) and socialisation (meeting new people who invite one into a particular group). This might mean that individuals could be just as likely to be drawn into a church group, or hobby circle, as into an extremist organisation, given a different set of circumstances.

Blee's analysis also supports an apparent geographical clustering of recruitment into extremist organisations, which may suggest that social connections may be as important as any other structural or personal factors. In a study of the social media traffic of 99 individuals who had left Germany to fight for violent jihadist organisations in Syria, Reynolds and Hafez (2017) found that the "integration deficit" hypothesis appeared to be a weak factor in this particular dataset. Meanwhile, the study accorded with some of the findings of a similar study in Belgium and the Netherlands by Bakker and de Bont (2016), noting that face-to-face peer-group socialisation was potentially as important as any other factor, including social media (Reynolds and Hafez, 2017: p. 24). Indeed, three cities in the North Rhine-Westphalia region (Bonn, Solingen and Dinslaken) appeared to have contributed more than half of all identified German "jihadist foreign fighters" in the recent conflict in the Middle East. This may explain why certain very specific districts, such as the Molenbeek region

of Brussels; or parts of the Hague in the case of the “Hofstad Group” of terrorists in the Netherlands, appear to have been so significant in the stories of recent terrorist attacks in Europe.

## Radicalisation Models

There are undoubtedly problems with conducting empirical work in the fields of terrorism and extremism, since the subjects of interest are either difficult or dangerous to reach; incarcerated in prison which poses a particular set of ethical issues on interviewing; or are deceased. There are also methodological problems in asking someone, where they are available, why they became a radical or a terrorist, as Horgan observes, since there may be a natural tendency for the response to focus lazily on an ideological narrative about “the cause” rather than revealing anything personal (Horgan, 2008: p. 87).

This does not, however, mean there is a dearth of empirical study in the area of radicalisation, as some have suggested (Githens-Mazer, 2012: p. 558). In fact, many have undertaken surveys of a range of people of interest about notions of radicalisation and extremism, delivering an interesting body of primary material. The problem is not so much about the many valiant efforts to gather such data, but about the ability to derive generalisations from them.

One of the more interesting recent studies was that of McGilloway, Ghosh and Bhui, who undertook an extensive survey of academic outputs on the radicalization of Muslims in the West up to 2012 (McGilloway et al., 2015). This project identified 17 relevant major studies based on original primary research. The conclusions of this survey were broadly that there was:

no single cause or route responsible for engaging in violent extremism. Radicalization was seen as a process of change, but that some may be more predisposed to being vulnerable if catalytic events/precipitating factors are present (McGilloway et al., 2015: p. 49).

There was general consensus across the studies reviewed that there is a significant connection between personal “vulnerabilities” and the risk of exposure to “violent radicalization”; namely the synthesis of macro- and micro-level processes and influences, to which we will return. All of the studies involving empirical survey work with young Muslims seemed to suggest that the difficulties in “finding a sense of identity and belonging” were highly significant sources of vulnerability for many, with a number of studies identifying this factor among young British Muslims in particular (McGilloway et al., 2015: p. 49).

Despite these identified difficulties in establishing generalities about the radicalisation “process”, however, the bureaucratic drivers described above in the post-9/11 period have been key factors in the development of a range of radicalisation process models. These can be collectively conceptualised as “step” or “pathway” models (following Moghaddam’s influential “staircase” model (Moghaddam, 2005)), in that they generally describe a phased transitional process whereby an individual moves from being a law-abiding and peaceful member of society to a dangerous radical with violent intent. (In Moghaddam’s analysis, the process is likened to ascending an ever-narrowing staircase in which distracting influences and opportunities are increasingly expunged.)

King and Taylor looked at five of the more quoted and discussed models of radicalization that emerged in this period (King and Taylor, 2011). These are: Randy Borum’s four-stage progressive model of psychological development towards extremism (Borum, 2003); Wiktorowicz’s four-stage model of joining extremist organizations, with the now-proscribed British group *Al-Muhajiroun* (the Emigrants) as the case study (Wiktorowicz, 2004); Moghaddam’s aforementioned six-stage staircase model of radicalization into terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005); Silber and Bhatt’s four-stage radicalization model, developed in conjunction with the New York Police Department (Silber and Bhatt, 2007); and Marc Sageman’s “four-prong” heuristic, published in 2008. In all cases apart from Sageman, these are linear models, whereby the individual under analysis moves progressively along a pathway towards problematic extremism. In Sageman’s model, the four prongs are not linear, in that they can be present and affect an individual in simultaneous ways and in different combinations (King and Taylor, 2011).

One of the defining characteristics of these models was the cleanly identified linear sequence of processes through which target individuals may progress (with the exception of Sageman’s study in which several identifiers could appear simultaneously). There was clear utility in these linear models for counter-terrorism bureaucracies, in that these models could be used institutionally to train analysts and security practitioners to “watch for the signs” and tick off the identifiers of radicalisation as they were observed. Much of Randy Borum’s work has been conducted in conjunction with the FBI, and Silber and Bhatt’s model was produced in conjunction with the NYPD. Others in this field, such as Elaine Pressman, have also developed multiple indicator models (Pressman 2006). Pressman’s ten-indicator model, for example, identifies a set of personal indicators, weighted according to their importance, which combine to describe an eventual pathway towards dangerous radicalisation. There are clear connections

here to work in identity theory, and notably the “hierarchy of salience” conceptualisation at the heart of ICT, whereby an individual’s struggle with factors important to their self-identity can lead to a problematic anxiety and schism.

Other important studies in this period also described alleged indicators of radicalisation without necessarily building these into a “pathway” as such. Notable examples were Taylor and Horgan’s 2006 conceptual framework (Taylor and Horgan, 2006); and Kruglanski and Fishman’s 2009 study of psychological factors in terrorism (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009), to name but two.

The key conclusions emerging from an over-arching analysis of these studies and models are twofold. Firstly, there is an “assumption that radicalization is a transformation based on social-psychological processes” (King and Taylor, 2011: p. 609). This reflects a primarily micro-level focus on the identity formulation and development of the individual. Secondly, there was also something of a consensus about the central importance of “relative deprivation” as a driver (King and Taylor, 2011: p. 609), which brings us back to the broader structural considerations. Here we can recall Stryker’s observation that self, society and social behaviour are inextricably interwoven (Stryker, 2008: p. 20).

“Relative” is an important word here in a social constructivist sense. One might imagine that many young men joining militant groups in economically very deprived areas of the world, whether it be the Taliban, Lord’s Resistance Army or any number of other groups, may be motivated in part by simple factors of daily income and protection, and not necessarily because of a strong ideological affiliation. In a major study looking at Somalia, Colombia and Afghanistan, the NGO MercyCorps attempted to understand why young men were joining insurgent and terrorist groups in such areas. The report somewhat debunked – or at least finessed – what they called the “economics of terrorism narrative”, noting that:

In some cases, economic inducements may compel someone to join an armed group, but upon further analysis, this appears to be rare. While unemployment is often emblematic of systemic sources of frustration and marginalization, *employment status alone does not appear to determine whether a young person is likely to join an insurgency*. Violence makes people poor, but poverty doesn’t appear to make them violent (Mercy Corps, 2015: p. 17; emphasis in original).

The report concluded that “young people take up the gun not because they are poor, but because they are angry” (Mercy Corps 2015: 3). In part, this is a comment on the corrupt and venal nature of the states in



which such young people live, which echoes the “humiliation and despair” narrative noted above in the context of the Middle East (Khosrokhavar, 2015: p. 22). It is also a specific comment on the importance of making sure aid and development programmes do not make problems worse in such environments.

But what of radicals living in Western contexts, who, by comparison, are much better-off than their counterparts in war-torn and deprived parts of the world? This is where the “relative” nature of deprivation may be important. Muslim radicals in European contexts, claims Khosrokhavar (2015: p. 39–40) tend to be of a “lower social strata”, and hailing from “tough neighbourhoods”. This may explain the preponderance of cases of criminality amongst the recent cohort of Western terrorists, since this characterises the environments in which many of the subjects have lived. It may also increase the importance of fundamental socio-economic struggle to the radicalisation story. Again, the notion of a generation of *indignados* driving political radicalism in different ways gains further weight.

Similarly, a factor concerning modern, information-age society is probably of critical importance in this respect, and this concerns the ease with which the disaffected of Western society can access and consume narratives from other parts of the world and identify with the plight of others. The aforementioned Muhammad Siddique Khan, who led the July 2005 terrorist cell that struck London, noted in his posthumously-aired suicide video that he identified with a wider *ummah* of believers and saw them as “my people”, for whom revenge and justice were a collective duty (Horgan, 2008: p. 85). Similarly, the perpetrators of a brutal terrorist attack in a French church in July 2016 explained to one of their hostages that “peace” was what they wanted, and that “as long as there are bombs on Syria, we will continue our attacks. And they will happen every day. When you stop, we will stop” (Sky News, 2016).

From a psycho-social theory perspective, such factors may accord with the results of Tajfel’s “minimal group paradigm” experiments of the late 1960s, which confirmed in-group and out-group dynamics, even when the groups were artificially designed in a laboratory setting and there were no real-world consequences for affiliation with any particular group (Tajfel, 1970). Wider group identification may allow for a disaffected Muslim in the West to feel a sense of shared anger and humiliation at the suffering of co-religionists in Palestine, Kashmir or Syria. In this sense, deprivation or injustice may not need to be experienced directly to form a component of radicalisation, providing the narrative is developed and promulgated skilfully. It might also explain how groups can be mobilised

in a collective way to establish a “dehumanized other”, or a “life unworthy of life” as was the case with Nazi Germany (Glass, 1999). Similarly extreme cases of the bestial denigration and rejection of outgroup others were seen in Rwanda, or Gaddafi’s Libya, in which outgroups and political opponents were described as “cockroaches”, from whom the country had to be “cleansed” (Higiro, 2007: p. 85; BBC, 2011). There are almost certainly parallels between such genocidal mass movements, and the narratives of radicalisation.

### Synthesised Perspectives

The over-arching message of this analysis and modelling could be said to be a growing acceptance that the early aspirations for “profiling” or modelling the sorts of people who will be dangerously radicalised, and the processes by which this will happen, are probably a fruitless pursuit. As Horgan noted, the “moment of epiphany” concept of an embittered individual suddenly crossing an identified line and deciding they will become violent, is naïve at best (Horgan, 2008: p. 92). Instead, we seem to be faced with a framework of situations and environments which could lead to violent radicalisation, but whether and how these take effect on any one individual is very much a case-by-case analysis.

In a detailed study of the circumstances in which a group of individuals came to be recruited by Palestinian militant organisations as suicide bombers during the Second Intifada, Assef Moghaddam developed a useful synthesised top-down and bottom-up schema, which has a great deal of utility in considering the wider question of radicalisation (Moghaddam, 2003). In his “two-phase model”, Moghaddam suggested that the factors that lead to an individual being successfully recruited as a violent militant are when a set of *personal* motivations intersect to a sufficient degree with the *organisational* motivations of a particular group (Moghaddam, 2003: p. 68).

At the individual level, a set of ideas, frustrations, and direct or indirect experience of oppression or violence may lead to an individual feeling so embittered that they might be willing to die to achieve some sort of justice or redemption. But only when these feelings neatly align with the organisational objectives of a particular group do the two come together at the “recruitment” stage. Thereafter, the group will have to further radicalise and train the individual to carry out an attack before the second and final phase of the process is completed. (Indeed, some individuals will never proceed from recruitment to actual attack.)

Here, we see the complex interplay between bottom-up personal circumstances, and the top-down objectives of a militant organisation or

movement. The situation is almost infinitely variable, and it will be very difficult to predict when any one individual will pass successfully through the recruitment and deployment phases. This also helps to explain why most individuals who experience exactly the same things and consume the same narratives will *not* become violent militants.

In a wider-ranging sense, Horgan used the language of “push and pull” factors which describe a similar situation (Horgan, 2008: p. 87). Militant organisations and movements will be constantly trying to pull recruits into their ranks, but they will only be successful where a set of individual factors push a particular person sufficiently far into the arms of that organisation or movement. More significantly, from a policy point of view, Horgan notes:

Despite the increased discussions of root causes of terrorism, we can do little in a practical sense to change the “push” factors (i.e., the broad sociopolitical conditions) that give rise to the increased likelihood of the emergence of terrorism. In contrast, counterterrorism programs may be more effective in concentrating on the “pull” factors (or “lures”), since they tend to be narrower, more easily identifiable, and specific to particular groups and contexts (Horgan, 2008: p. 90).

Thus, macro-level factors are not ignored, but policy may be better aimed at a bottom-up perspective than an exclusively top-down one.

In some ways, we can see these ideas reflected in more contemporary Western counter-terrorism policy. In the post-2010 refreshed version of the UK government’s “Prevent” Strategy document, for example, the word “radicalisation” and its derivatives are mentioned 185 times. The strategy notes that:

All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are prepared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is significantly greater amongst young people. We now have more information about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and then to engage in terrorist-related activity. It is important to understand these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks it poses to our national security. We judge that radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling. There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrat-

ed, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values. Terrorist groups can take up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popularised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country. This has significant implications for the scope of our Prevent strategy. Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist organisations (HM Government, 2011: p. 13).

The statement here is extremely interesting and indicative of more recent thinking about the process, although it is also – as you might expect from an official pronouncement – somewhat political in nature.

From a definition point of view, the above statement reflects an understanding of the interwoven relationship between micro-level factors (“personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors”); and macro-level factors, in terms of the top-down effect of propagandists, recruiters and “extremist organisations”. Thus, some people will fall prey to such actors (those who are vulnerable to their narrative) while the majority of others will not.

The political elements are the sense that the core problem is a rejection of the political system the government is charged with upholding. Any government is primarily interested in winning votes and consolidating power, and a successful and proportionate discharging of security policy will help to do so. Within this process sits the sanctity of a secular and democratic order, placing those interested in a more extreme millennial, *caliphatic* vision on the wrong side of history and decency.

From a policy point of view, the thinking about radicalisation reflected above has helped to shape the detail of the Prevent policy: itself an arch example of a European CVE policy. Specifically, the thinking drives intensive work in institutions and environments where “vulnerable people” are expected to be located, and notably prisons, or the education and health sectors.

The potential problem with such official approaches, as McCauley and Moskalenko (2017: p. 211) note, is that they tend to concentrate overly on the importance of political ideology and thus find themselves sucked into a “war on ideas”. This can be dangerous and problematic, since ideas as to how a perfect system should be, are many and varied, and none more so than in a supposedly free-thinking democracy.

This, in a sense, strikes at the heart of some of the conceptual problems around a notion of radicalisation. There are those who suggest that

the inherent relativity of terms such as “radical” is dangerous, in the Orwellian sense of a state outlawing any thoughts or ideas it considers non-mainstream; and unhelpful, as there have been good and bad radicals in history and radicalism itself is not necessarily a bad thing per se (Githens-Mazer, 2012; Sedgwick 2010). Latterly, like the word “terrorist”, it could be argued that radicalisation has “become part of the rhetorical structure of the waging of the ‘War on Terror’” as an inherently dangerous and negative concept (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2009: p. 82).

A suitable response to such thinking does not necessarily mean ditching the term “radicalisation” altogether, since it would probably only result in another term being inserted in its place with similar problems of definition (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017: p. 211). Clearly something is happening repeatedly whereby individuals move from being law-abiding members of society to violent and dangerous individuals, and we should not bury our heads in the sand in response.

McCauley and Moskalenko’s prescription has been to develop a “two pyramid” model, whereby “radical thought” is separated from “radical action”, with the former being not necessarily problematic (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017: p. 211). To be fair to governments, this has been recognised variously across the Western world as a suitable approach, not least since becoming embroiled in ideological and counter-extremism battles and debates is an extraordinarily resource-hungry and controversial business. Indeed, the “VE” element of Countering *Violent* Extremism reflects such thinking in essence.

Peter Neumann outlines some of the issues in his appropriately-named paper, “The trouble with radicalization” (Neumann, 2013). He outlines two important positions taken on the concept of radicalization, which he characterises as the Anglo-Saxon, and European approaches. The former tends to be fairly reductionist, focusing almost entirely on the rule of law and not generally on the wider hinterland of radical views or beliefs. (With this said, the official statement by the British government above shows there has been some degree of ambiguity about whether and how ideology should be part of the picture.) By contrast, the European model is defined by a clear connectivity between terrorist operations and the ideological activities of those who might be on the track of violent extremism, or who might be facilitating others on that pathway. In this way, holding views defined as radical can be a cause of state attention. It is thus no surprise that countries such as France and Denmark have generated controversy over their approach towards such issues as Islamic dress in public spaces, when “banning the burqa” would be much more complex in an Anglo-Saxon country. Conversely, recent thinking by the British

government has suggested some degree of convergence with policy against radicalisers and recruiters as well as actual terrorists.

## Conclusions

Martha Crenshaw showed remarkable foresight by writing some years before 9/11 that an analysis of who becomes a terrorist and why, should sensibly focus on the three interlocking dimensions of person, group and society (Crenshaw, 1981). This was all the more noteworthy when much of the post-war analysis of radical movements in Europe, such as the Red Brigades or *Baader-Meinhof* gang, had been imbued with a “pathology aura” in seeking to suggest that terrorist behaviour must surely reflect mental instability (Silke, 1998: p. 67).

After 9/11, Sageman further undermined the pathology thesis in his study of 172 militants associated with Al Qaeda, which, he found, showed unusually high indicators of income, education and mental health when compared to the population at large (Sageman, 2004). While this study was admittedly based on a relatively small number of individuals associated with one particular movement, it did suggest a more general finding that radicalisation is not necessarily as simple as it first seems.

Sageman was writing in a period when studies of terrorism and radicalisation were flowering at a remarkable rate following the shock of the 9/11 attacks. The results generated a great deal of heat but not necessarily light, in the sense that a considerable range of top-down and bottom-up theories delivered a panoply of possible explanations, united only in the fact that none of them worked against statistically significant samples of subjects; and none offered strong replication across environments and circumstances.

As with most areas of social science, the most important conclusion is that much further research will be needed before the science can be substantially moved forward. In the meantime, notions of radicalisation seem to be settling on the understanding that a combination of top-down and bottom-up drivers will cause any one individual to move into violent extremism, but when and whether this happens will be almost entirely case-specific. It does seem to be the case that frustration and despair (both immediate in a personal sense and concerning wider developments in society) can act as some of the most important drivers, as can personal struggles over identity, but when these will cause one person to become violently extreme and his or her neighbour not to do so, are matters of continual debate and examination.

In some ways therefore, the challenge *is* akin to that of mental health in society, in that the drivers that push any one person into difficulties are

extremely numerous and varied, and the best that can be done is to bolster community networks, support and information. In other ways, of course, radicalisation is significantly different in that there are anti-state groups and organisations working to “pull” recruits into their fold and offer an outlet for violent intentions. States inevitably have to work against these organisations in gathering intelligence and understanding, and disrupting networks. Back at the individual level, both state and society have a strong interest in continuing to try to understand how and why individuals become violently extreme, and who most sensibly conforms to the notion of a “vulnerable individual”. Unfortunately, the most effective sample-set to help with so doing tends to be the biographies of individuals who have already carried out violent actions.

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# How Schools Can Reduce Youth Radicalization

Dianne Gereluk and Carol-Ann Titus

## Introduction

Arguably, youth radicalization, extremism and terrorism are among the most divisive issues in the public discourse internationally. We do not wish to create an apocalyptic panic about the rise of such activities. Extremism and terrorism have been a part of history since the test of time. Yet the very public nature of such events that are proliferated on social and news media makes it accentuated in our public lives, making it seemingly more present and unnerving. This said, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and subsequent attacks that have ranged in scope since then, created an unprecedented rise in the issue on interrelated aspects of terrorism and extremism. The increasing fear and anxiety about terrorism filters commonly into other issues and influences debates such as immigration and refugee policies, the rise of fundamentalist ideologies, typologies of those individuals who may be predisposed to carry out terrorist attacks, and the polarization among diverse populations who may undermine and threaten the stability of democratic societies. The educational response is not unlike these broader political debates and the range of responses to these issues appear to be both sporadic and limited in scope about how to best respond to these complex issues (Gereluk, 2012).

There has been a subtle but perceptible shift in discourse from the actual terrorist acts in terms of the response from societies to looking at the preconditions of what makes individuals become radicalized in the first place. The nature of many of the terrorist attacks over the last decade suggests that the characteristics of individuals are not homogenous, and

commonly are perplexing to individuals. There is no single terrorist profile and looking at age, gender or socio-economic backgrounds will not detect the next terrorist. The stereotypes of immigrants or refugees who move to a new country in order to carry out terrorist activities is actually few and far between. For instance, in many cases the public finds out with the aftermath of a terrorist attack that the individual was not an immigrant or refugee, but rather a person born in the country in which the attack occurred. For example, the attack by Alexandre Bissonette related to the slayings that occurred in a Quebec City mosque in 2016 noted that the student was a French Canadian citizen (Perreux and Andrew-Gee, 2017). Aaron Driver, an Ontario student in Canada, was killed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) during an altercation prior to an imminent terrorist attack in Toronto. Damian Clairmont, who converted to Islam shortly before he travelled to Syria to join a terrorist group in 2012, was born in Nova Scotia into an Acadian family. He was killed in 2014 during fighting between the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) militias. André Poulin, from Timmins, Ontario, loved hockey and was by all accounts an average Canadian until his conversion to Islam and subsequent departure to Syria. In all of these instances, the parents were utterly shocked and traumatized that their children were terrorists, coming from long-standing Canadian families. They did not fit the profile of having recently moved or been indoctrinated by fundamentalist parents. While we are clear that the prototypes of terrorists are as vast and unique as the nature and context of each of the attacks, what we wish to highlight in the previous cases is that they did not fit the common stereotype that is perceived by the general public, these boys were: white Caucasian; raised by Canadian parents<sup>1</sup>, and; were not raised by fundamentalist parents. The perplexing question that arises is how did these boys become radicalized in the first place that leads to terrorist actions?

We do not suggest that schools must take the full burden of addressing this broader complex issue about youth radicalization. This said, Trees Pels and Doret de Ruyter (2012) suggest that education has largely been conspicuously absent from the discussions on youth radicalization where schools might offer some attempts to be better responsive and attentive to youth radicalization. While we do not offer the solution, this article wishes to create an educative space to consider what role schools, and specifically teachers, might be able to do to mitigate the rise of youth

1 Given that Canada is an immigrant population other than the Indigenous peoples, everyone is arguably an immigrant. For the purposes of making a distinction, however, I wish to suggest that in these cases the parents were not first or second generation immigrant parents.

radicalization. In the first section, we define and distinguish between the notions of youth radicalization, extremism and terrorism, and focus our attention on the principles of youth radicalization. In the second section, we examine what role educators may play to create a learning environment to reduce polarization, isolation, and marginalization. In so doing, we contend that schools can play a partial role in how the formal curriculum may better inform students about the broader political and social determinants that lead to terrorism and extremism and reduce more fundamentalist and ideological stances.

### Indicators of Youth Radicalization

Youth radicalization is an increasingly common rhetorical device that is used in public media portrayals. Yet, little articulation is provided as to what that means or how youth become radicalized in the first place. More commonly, it is a term that is used in a reactive sense, when a public act of violence or atrocity has been committed, to describe a youth as ‘other’ in light of what is perceived as within mainstream society. To start, I draw upon David Mendel’s (2010) definition of youth radicalization as the “increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the thinking sentiments, and/or behavior of individuals and/or groups of individuals” (p. 111). In this way, it is distinguished from extremism, which focuses primarily on the nature of the principles, values, and beliefs that are limited and constrained in options and choices, commonly fixated on a particular ideology or absolute truth. Youth radicalization emphasizes the process by which an individual or group becomes more extremist in nature, while extremism is on the current state of beliefs by an individual or group “who has a particular perspective to the exclusion of other perspectives or that it strays from the accepted norms and behaviors of mainstream society” (Gereluk, 2012: p. 7). In both cases, neither refers to the act of committing an act of violence, nor does it refer to any particular political, social or religious movement. When such acts of violence are committed to destabilize the citizens of society and to create fear, it is terrorism. In this case, terrorism is the actual act against civilians to cause general instability, often to disrupt the political, religious or social discourses that terrorists are trying to upend (Bonar, 2002). Radicalized youth and extremists may or may not commit an act.

There is a futility in declaring definitive principles of what makes youth become radicalized. Trying to pinpoint the motivational bases for reasons why youth become radicalized is as frustrating as trying to decipher why a person commits gun violence in schools. The reasons for why individuals become radicalized are as vast and varied. As noted in the

introduction, they may or may not be educated, single or married, have jobs, be men or women, and come from high or low socio-economic status. Despite those individuals who inevitably commit terrorist attacks, media portrayals inevitably default to highlighting the characteristics that may be deemed as abnormal, half crazed, or come from indoctrinatory families of communities (Vertigans, 2011). It is a caricature that helps to assuage the anxieties that the individual could lurk anywhere, and instead creates an individual who is unlike the rest of us. Yet, this problematizes and obscures the way in which our societies could better support individuals who become radicalized in our own societies.

As such, we draw upon some of the research that examines possible indicators of radicalizing youth, understanding full well that there is a complexity and uniqueness in the formation of youth who become increasingly extremist in nature. Knowing that this is a flawed approach, akin to trying to hit a fly with a baseball bat, we argue that there is some relevance for considering more broadly several factors that may move youth in this direction. Despite the relative amorphous tendencies, we contend that there are some general factors that are worthy of consideration from an educational standpoint.

It would be remiss to suggest that history is not a critical factor in setting the preconditions for the way in which stories are told, positioned, and applied. Historical narratives shape particular norms and values, often feelings of superiority or conversely insecurity that do not promote mutual interdependence. Drawing upon particular events as a catalyst to strengthen the narrative, stories, songs, and folklore position a particular story for targeted purposes; in the case of radicalizing individuals, historical narratives may mobilize support for a particular cause or movement. The historical past helps to create a collective memory positioned in a particular way to either exploit past wrongs and injustices, glorious heroes, or of a particular time and place that was once held in great esteem of a golden age now lost. There is a narrowing of citizenship that prioritizes and highlights particular narrow versions of patriotism, commonly noting the heroes of their cause, solidarity and unity of the collective movement, which affirms their particular ideology to the exclusion of others (Ben-Porath, 2006).

Drawing upon the past, contemporary rhetoric builds momentum to valorize or condemn the past. "Across discursive and nationalist terror groups there is therefore a tendency both to integrate ideas and behavior from the past into contemporary rhetoric and strategies" (Vertigans, 2001: p. 31). Individuals who move toward radicalized positions may take two different views of considering the past. In one way, there may

be a view to position the past of what once was – a nostalgic depiction of what the group once had. Arguably, the rise of the far Right in the United States calls forth a call back to a “Golden Age”, where the superiority of the white Anglo-Saxon settler, and colonizer, had positional authority and racial supremacy over others (Johnson & Frombgen, 2009). The Far Right Christian movements harken back to this racial supremacy and Christian assimilation is commonly used to spur increasing polarization and radical extremism for the shifting political and religious diversity across America. The desperation to return to such a past may help validate the nature of individuals to take more radicalized stances.

Conversely, radicalized groups may draw upon the injustices of the past to justify the means for more extremist positions. Calling upon inappropriate use of military or state force against a particular group may become a catalyst for the injustices of the past. Bloody Sunday, a peaceful protest on January 22, 1905 at the Tsar’s winter palace regarding the plight of the common Russian people, is often attributed to the catalyst and eventual fall of the Romanov Dynasty and the subsequent Bolshevik Revolution. The massacre of approximately 500 individuals who peacefully demanded reforms from the increasing corrupt nature of the dynasty was met with the Imperial forces drawing fire on the demonstrators. In this case, the inappropriate act of violence became a catalyst for strikes and riots across the country, and for growing sympathy and support for the socialist revolutionary Bolsheviks. In this way, such an event adds legitimacy and urgency to the collective memory and agency of a radicalized group that feels historically persecuted. Without the mechanism to redress such injustices in the current day, in the recognition and formal apologies of such atrocities, with substantive attempts to create any form of reconciliation and understanding between groups, then there is more inclination for radicalized groups to create momentum that something drastic ought to occur if the balance of power is to be shifted.

Social media has shifted the lens for recruiting and attracting radicalized youth towards extremist views. Vertigans (2011) starts from the premise that social media in and of itself does not create a radicalized person; rather, individuals who already hold dispositions toward more radicalized ideas may search out events, behaviors, to help validate their particular dispositions. However, the way in which the media is used to describe a particular terrorist event has unintentionally helped to radicalize individuals and groups. The process of describing the event, how it was done, and the fear and anxiety amongst the citizenry helps to further legitimize the nature of those events for groups who wish to commit violent acts. In this way there is some parallel to the use of historical events.

Similar to the historical events which give legitimacy, it also raises the reputational status of the extremist groups in that the values and behaviors have been propagated broadly in popular media and that the act of violence created the intended result. Ironically, the news-worthiness of combatting terrorism, further legitimizes those groups that turn to terrorist actions given the viral nature of terrorist activities and events. For the individual who may yearn of having a place or an identity, there is the potential to create a romanticized excitement at the prospect of gaining notoriety, particularly if that individual has felt isolated, marginalized, or on the peripheries of communities.

At an individual level, the potential to create a convert requires to some extent a particular narrowing of one's affiliations and identity to the one group to the exclusion of others. It creates a sense of affiliation of belonging, a purpose, particularly if those individuals have been isolated or pushed to the peripheries of society. It creates a form of legitimacy for their frustrations or worldviews that are exclusive to the group. Capitalizing on an individual's disenfranchisement is critical to becoming radicalized. One's own dissatisfaction, frustration, isolation, inequalities, discrimination or racism, and relative deprivation, is commonly a catalyst for individual who become more radicalized (Toolis, 1995, Richardson, 2007; Sageman, 2008). Youths who are the most susceptible to radical messaging are those who perceive themselves to be politically, economically or socially marginalized, resulting in a pervasive sense of purposelessness and lack of hope for the future. It is not solely poor socio-economic status that results in susceptibility, but rather a sense of relative deprivation, coupled with feelings of political and/or social exclusion that makes youth susceptible to the radicalization process. This process entails drawing upon the affective emotions and for the group to create a more compelling affiliation to them than to any alternative affiliations that may include family, friends, schools, communities and other forms of affiliation or belonging. As such, one's existing social relations, bonds, and ties, are all but substantively severed in favor of this one particular group to the exclusion of any others. This process creates a new form of socialization where secrecy and trust creates a heightened sense of self, of being an insider, and concomitantly attempts to sever any alternative groups that may provide an alternative worldview. The attempt then is to instill increased apathy and disillusionment with the outside world, with an unbreakable pact with those within the extremist group. In so doing, it lessens one's own individual identity to a more collective solidarity and unity, which in some cases can sacrifice the self to a greater cause espoused by the group. "Secrecy and trust, the intersection between group charisma and stigmatization and



minorities of the best and worst are integral to group cohesion, recruitment and retention processes” (Vertigans, 2011: p. 110). Finally, as part of their greater affiliation to one extremist view propagated by a group, there is often a corollary weakening of moral obligations that reduce the inhibitions of an individual to think about, and potentially carry out, acts of violence. Ensuring that the valor of the collective memory and agency takes precedence over the individual wellbeing of citizens is paramount to the extremist position that is inculcated by the group on the particular individual.

Radicalization and mobilization to violence are distinct but often intertwined processes. Mobilization is the process by which a radicalized individual moves from extremist intent, to preparing for an act of terror, travel to join a terrorist entity and/or facilitating the terrorist activity of someone else (CSIS, 2018). While terrorist attacks may be difficult to anticipate, indicators are often present. Analysis conducted by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) found that the speed of mobilization to violence takes an average of twelve (12) months, but that youth mobilize to violence more quickly than adults and that they tend to mobilize in groups. Young adults and minors generally have fewer obstacles to overcome in their process of mobilization and by mobilizing in groups. They can overcome any existing obstacles quickly by pooling resources and expertise allowing them to engage in terrorist activities. For example, “a person may give money to another member of the group and share items such as luggage or cell phones” (CSIS, 2018). Of note, however, are the findings that many extremist mobilizers demonstrate behaviours that they are mobilizing to those around them. In other words, youth mobilizers will demonstrate observable ‘leakage’, which puts bystanders (friends, family, educators) in a position to identify their impending mobilization to violence (CSIS, 2018). According to the research conducted by CSIS, however, it is often more difficult to spot indicators of mobilization to violence in groups than by individuals alone.

The nature of radicalizing youth, and subsequent possible mobilization, is thus a progression of increasing extremist views that narrows one’s own outlook on the world that is aligned with the extremist views, and gives legitimacy and potentially valour to the individual who may yearn for creating such an identity and persona. There is a valorization of playing a role in the greater cause, built upon the historical legacy, rhetoric, and broader public discourse on extremism and terrorism that may fuel greater polarization toward a view of one absolute truth to the neglect of any others. Self-radicalization does not exist. While radicalization is an individualized process, it is influenced both by factors (such as peer pressure,

grievances, international events) and through association with people supporting and/or promoting a violent extremist ideology. These associations or relationships can occur in person (face to face) but they often take place online. The consumption of extremist media and/or messaging promotes violent ideological norms through which a person becomes convinced that violence is a legitimate means to advance their ideological causes or beliefs.

In reviewing these imprecise indicators, what is most prevalent is the relative normalcy that leads an individual to become radicalized. There is a particular historical perspective that is positioned in a particular way to promote the particular norms and values that are to be perpetuated and amplified. The individual identifies with the group and with the values that resonate with the individual, whether it be disillusionment, frustration, disenfranchisement, or isolation at the one end of the spectrum to that of heroism, valorization, heightened recognition, or martyrdom on the other. The move toward extremist views and acts of terror may remove the suffering of the one event and highlight the suffering and plight of the people for whom have historically or presently commonly feel atrocities over a longer period. In this way those who move to more radicalized groups may see that their views are not to their own benefit but serving the greater need of those who have suffered, and thus create a moral distinction between that of a criminal to one who is sacrificing oneself to the benefit of others (Richardson, 2007). The nature of youth who becomes radicalized is not half crazed, or a villain, or evil. The weight of their values and arguments have been shaped and constructed within the broader historical, political and social discourses. For instance, Jihadi groups utilize these discourses effectively to put forward narratives that are enticing to youth who may not be well educated in the nuance of Islamic history, other religious history, or theology writ large. These discourses feed their disillusionment and fuel their desires to belong to a group and participate in what they see as a noble cause.

If the nature of the individual who becomes more radicalized is not simply a case of someone with severe mental health issues or evil as is often caricaturized by popular media, and is relatively mundane and normal indicators that may move a person to become more extreme, then there may be a corollary educative response to consider the ways that may reduce those initial inclinations to become radicalized in the first place. Let us turn to the corollary educational response to youth radicalization.

## An Educational Response to Youth Radicalization

Similar to the previous section, we want to be explicit that we do not think that schools have the sole responsibility to address this complex issue. Further, it might seem imprudent to address youth radicalization at all given the very few youth who may become increasingly extremism and radicalized, which begs the question of whether this is an educational question at all. We start from the premise that the pedagogical task is beneficial not only to those who may be susceptible to radicalization, but would bolster general polarization that is prevalent. A purposeful educational task to create more opportunities for more robust historical and political analysis, political deliberation, and political tolerance seems more than warranted for all students. Thus, the intended aim is to build capacity for students to better negotiate the rhetoric and public discourse that narrows and polarizes particular ideologies.

If the aim of radicalized groups is to create an absolute truth among its members – a historical and contemporary narrative that rises to their cause, to the exclusion of all other possible alternative ways forward – then arguably the primary task is to interrupt one particular ideology and worldview. Yet historically, educational institutions and historical curricula have been quite poor at this (Loewen, 2010). It requires thus a move away from a particular dominant ideology, which often positions the wars and events as winners and losers, providing a simply descriptive narrative of key dates, leaders, and heroes. In many cases, the work of developing a democratic conception, and an historical understanding of one's society, may skew and obfuscate the complexities, nuances, and tensions among individuals and groups. For instance, an approach that suggests that the “mark of true citizens: courage, loyalty, responsibility, gratitude to forebears, and a self-sacrificing devotion to the common good” (Kersten, 2011: para 2), may move us toward belligerent forms of citizenship, and only heighten the polarization and isolation felt by some (Ben-Porath, 2006). In creating a narrow, commonly simplified historical narrative, it potentially causes problems for multiple students. For those disenfranchised, the historical narrative may further silence or oppress their perspective. And similarly, it may create a lack of awareness or understanding from those who do not see a particular historical time period as problematic. For instance, the portrayal of Afghanistan under current regimes may highlight the current oppressions of women and children, with increasing religious indoctrinations. However, without a better understanding of the historical epochs, which has been a strategic place for its location to South Asia, one may have a one dimension and misconstrued

understanding of the rise of radicalized groups in Afghanistan. For instance, the tribes and sub-tribes fought for territory in the early eighteenth century. The colonization of Europe in the 1800s had yet another element of territorial strife, with Britain increasing its world dominance and forcible entry into Afghanistan creating an artificial and unnatural boundary line – the Durand line – dividing the people of Afghanistan until 1919. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia also affected the nature of the reforms and Afghan people, which raised hopes of removing the British imperialism that it felt. The ideals of the socialist attempt at world revolution would affect the Afghan tribes and their way of life. Lands were confiscated, and legal courts were replaced with their Indigenous customs and laws, and changes to the familial unit with women entering education. The growing radical movements bolstered by the Stalinist and socialist movement thereafter forced further drastic reforms on the nation. The American government visibly nervous of this shift in power by the Russians, created a deliberately armed, financed coalition against the Afghan Soar Revolution in 1978. Billions of dollars were spent by the American government so that they could defeat the positionality of Russia in Afghanistan. The fall of Kabul, however, represented a victory to Islamic fundamentalism, who had yearned for the nostalgic past and had felt oppressed by the increased reforms, shifts in land and customs. The very nature of the rise of the Taliban, funded and supported historically by the American government, is now mostly lost in the contemporary political discourse surrounding the terrorist activities of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Yet, the understanding of the historical turmoil of this nation highlights the strife and trauma of the people, commonly invaded, conquered and oppressed from multiple regimes and multiple points of history. This (briefly and crudely portrayed) example is just a glimpse of what is lacking when students are asked to learn about history. Rather than simply having an understanding that the Taliban are 'bad' people, a more robust understanding of the history may account for the move toward more extremist stances given the historical legacy that has been largely unresolved, contested, and volatile.

If our contemporary understanding of a particular country such as Afghanistan is devoid of the broader historical, political and religious context that gives rise to extremist fundamentalism, then this creates a caricature of the complexity and spectrum of injustice that has occurred to redress the issue. Such a lack of understanding of how the Afghan people and its tribes and sub-tribes have battled and struggled, been manipulated and exploited, for the bigger positional global power by major countries, exacerbates the historical narrative held by extremist groups to propagate

their views. Rapoport (1989) notes that “for most commentators terrorism has no history, or at least they would have us believe that the ‘terrorist problem’ had no significance until the 1960s, when the full impact of modern technology was felt, endowing most individuals as individuals or as members of small groups, with capacities they never had before” (xii). In this sense, the deep history of societies is critical to better understanding the impetus for, and long-standing desperation of, particular individuals and groups to become radicalized. If we turn to the United States, a robust history of the country would include the precursors of the nation built upon colonialism, genocide, revolution, racism, oppression, overlaid upon the broader espoused civic dispositions of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness from their Declaration of Independence. In this way, Aislinn O’Donnell warns that “both schools and society more broadly offer cultural scripts that privilege certain kinds of responses to violence, which depend on the perceived identity of the perpetrator” (p. 480). In disrupting the cultural scripts that represent a more accurate portrayal of strife, the aim is to create an opening for more honest deliberation about how to “imagine and practice another future, one that will move beyond the current cycle of revenge” (Butler, 2004: p. 20).

In such instances when there has been such entangled injustices that remain unresolved, there is a second educational response worth considering: that of restorative justice. For understanding the past atrocities gives individuals better clarity of what is at stake when individuals become more radical, yet it does little to create another space where individuals can see beyond the one absolute truth told by radicalized groups. In this case, restorative justice calls upon individuals, institutions and societies to formally recognize and acknowledge past atrocities, and call for mechanisms for increased dialogue and reforms, to promote reconciliation and mitigate conflict over the past. O’Donnell contends that part of uncovering the historical genealogies help to make visible those who have been silenced. She states, “Renewed honest conversations and reimagined curricula would ask how we can respond to, and talk about, violence in the broader lived context of students. These conversations and curricula would find ways of including the voices of those who are pushed outside and beyond political consideration” (2015: p. 477). Without naming the historical legacy that informs and fuels contemporary radical movements, the potential for groups to capitalize and draw upon an historical narrative as evidence that they have been silenced, humiliated and shamed throughout history is compelling for a radicalized group to recruit and mobilize.

Inevitably such an approach might elicit concerns about further polarization of ideological differences. It is at this point that the pedagogical task of opening a deliberative space for critical reflection, and critical analysis of rhetoric comes into play. As part of the task of making explicit the conflicts in history, and in contemporary times, the task is then to develop students' capacities to examine, critique, and offer their voices to understanding these worldviews with the hope of developing more capacity to consider alternative perspectives and ways forward. If radicalized groups primary purpose is to espouse one view and one way forward, the educational response is to complicate and encourage a deliberative space where students can begin to unpack such rhetoric. There is no simple, definitive response to radicalization and/or the mobilization to a violent terror attack; however, combatting the rhetoric and providing alternative messaging may provide an opportunity for educators to help susceptible youth recognize the dangers of radicalization, challenge and debunk the false allure of violent extremism, and offer them another more productive pathway. To illustrate this point, a common educational practice is to look at the rhetoric and slogans used in commercials for children to understand how the slogans target particular individuals, create an association or identity with the product, and persuade them to ultimately buy and have an affinity with that product. Of the large brand names, we can point to Coca Cola's historical legacy of slogans that aligned their product with the good life (e.g. 1923, Enjoy life, 1964 Things go better with Coke, 1985 America's real choice, etc.<sup>2</sup>) The list is endless and targeted to particular political and social periods, different countries, and different emotions, dispositions and experiences. A teacher may draw upon this timeline to unpack the slogans and the targeted messaging that notes the ways in which the company tries to evoke more than buying the drink, but rather to create a positive experience in so doing.

This common activity is useful for students to understand rhetoric in a non-threatening manner in how rhetoric, and specifically slogans, inform our perceptions of a particular phenomenon. Yet, there is a missed opportunity to then look at political slogans that do the same with particular movements. For instance, the Irish Republican Army commonly would use the slogan, "Tiocfaidh ár lá" (our day will come) to incite solidarity and as a reminder to the historical injustices felt by the movement. Popularized by Booy Sands, an IRA prisoner who wrote prolifically from his cell, the latter used the Irish language to both revitalize the language

2 For a full list, see Wikipedia "coca cola slogans" Wikipedia (2018) List of coca-cola slogans. Retrieved on July 30, 2018 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_Coca-Cola\\_slogans](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Coca-Cola_slogans)

as part of the broader movement to preserve their culture, but also to keep secrets from the prison wardens and smuggle out radicalized ideas to other republicans. The phrase was a rally cry and would be drawn in the songs of the IRA, written in the speeches and used in the protest marches.

Like the rhetoric used by the IRA, terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al Qaeda (AQ) use the word ‘jihad’ to describe a declaration of war or a ‘holy war’ against their enemies. They have hijacked the concept of ‘jihad’ to justify various forms of violence. However, jihad, as described by the *Quran*, has many meanings. It can refer to internal as well as external efforts to be a good Muslim or believer; jihad means the striving or struggle to be good. When returning from a military campaign, the Prophet Mohammed told his followers that “the jihad of the battlefield is a lesser form of the concept when compared to the greatest jihad – jihad ul-nafs – the inner struggle to lead an ethical and pious life” (Awad, 2015). Other verses in the *Quran* have also been used by terrorist groups to convince suicide bombers that they will inherit paradise:

Those who believe and who have forsaken the domain of evil and have striven [jihad] hard in God’s cause with their possessions and their lives have the highest rank in the sight of God; and it is they, they who shall triumph in the end! Their Sustainer gives them glad tidings of the grace that flows from Him, and of His goodly acceptance, and of the gardens which await them, full of lasting bliss, therein to abide beyond the count of time. Verily, with God is a mighty reward! (Rogers-Melnick, 2001: para 7)

These verses have been taken out of context by terrorist groups and have been promoted to those who do not understand their true meaning. The violent rhetoric espoused by terrorist groups contradict and violate the fundamental tenets of Islam and they “do not give blanket permission to condemn or kill those who hold political or religious views other than your own” (Rogers-Melnick, 2001: para 8).

The explicit unpacking of slogans and rhetoric for radicalized groups thus shows the power of permeating and disseminating its message. For students to unpack political and social slogans and rhetoric with an ability for critical analysis and critique, may both offer acknowledgement to the rise of those movements, but also create a disruption to how they may narrow one’s own scope.

The recent slogan, ‘Make America Great Again’, similarly harkens back to a perceived golden age when the United States was considered a dominant global power (Edwards, 2018). Yet, it also lingers of times when

held power over blacks, and when there was an explicit isolationist stance by the country. It further underpins more Christian fundamentalist perspectives, commonly interwoven with Far Right policies, that commonly advocate for social conservative policies on aspects of reproductive rights and women's rights. Conversely, if we look to the key phrases espoused by Malcolm X, you can note the rise of African American rights, but different from Martin Luther King Junior. In this way, the phrases provided a call to action, and sometimes justified use of force. One such slogan by Malcom X: "I don't even call it violence when it's in self-defense; I call it intelligence", provides the justification of violence and one's credibility. On this view, to not defend oneself suggests a weakness, and a lack of judgment or discretion to not take action. Violence is justified under the guise of self-defense, and is linked to the greater cause of the rights of African Americans.

By unpacking the language that is commonly seen on t-shirts, protest marches, speeches, songs, and so forth, the intent is to build the capacity of students to engage in civil discourse. Paula McAvoy and Diana Hess (2013) note how one teacher captures this sentiment aptly, by stating:

I think students should be able to carry out an intelligent conversation using civil discourse to express themselves and not to be simply a political pundit... and express themselves in an appropriate manner and have honest, genuine discussions with one another about these issues. I think what they see a lot of times, in the media today, it is not really modelling civil discourse. (p. 15).

The aim is that by deliberating through these issues, such as rhetoric and slogan, it can create more political engagement. Furthermore, Diana Mutz (2006) contends that not only does talking across political spectrums build civic discourse – a term she coins 'cross-cutting political talk' – the process itself creates more political tolerance among those from diverse perspectives. When a classroom creates such a learning environment that invites respectful dialogue and deliberation, students may better be equipped to develop dispositions that weigh the evidence, understand the diversity of values and beliefs at play, and be more apt to listen and consider alternative perspectives. And while they may not shift their view or change their perspective, they may have a bit more empathy, understanding or tolerance to the different perspective. It opens up the ability to think beyond the limited narrow view of oneself and their own perspective, and rather consider that all views do not hold an 'absolute truth', but are located in a particular time and place, and highly contextual. This disruption and interruption of an absolute, narrow perspective compromises



the radicalized group's mandate. Giving voice to students – simply, letting students talk about such issues – arguably is a strong determinant of creating more openness for political engagement and deliberation (McAvoy and Hess, 2013).

This leads to the final point. That when students can see themselves as part of the conversation, not silenced, marginalized or oppressed, there is a greater chance that those students will not feel hopeless, destitute, and desperate. For those students who do not have a sense of hope or optimism, where they do not see themselves as part of broader society, there is greater chance that radicalized groups can seduce and recruit based on their vulnerabilities and emotional burden that they carry. A call for empathy and inclusion, while reconciling very different worldviews, may provide an opening to create some cautious optimism whereby the individual can see themselves as living out a flourishing life rather than a life of desperation and despondency. In this regard, schools have a great role to play in ensuring that students see their rightful place among their peers in this community. For example, programs that physically remove individuals into targeted programs (for instance, English Language Learners for refugee students) on the one hand may provide targeted support for language skills; unintentionally, however, the language program may physically remove students who do not have the opportunities to meet other students in the school, and to have such opportunities for deliberation, belonging, or a sense of community. It is a missed opportunity for both the refugee students who do not become enculturated with other students from diverse backgrounds; it is also a missed opportunity for those students who may have stereotypes of refugee students, or worse, do not see them at all and are metaphorically 'invisible' to the school population. The mechanisms to create substantive opportunities for support and belonging to a range of communities in and beyond the school are critical to ensure that individuals who may feel on the periphery feel otherwise. When individuals see opportunities that they can lead fulfilling lives beyond the walls of the school, then there is more optimism that the future is worth pursuing for oneself. When little future opportunity exists, and students remain isolated from their peers and their communities, radicalized groups see the opportunity to create a collective identity that is currently lacking in that individual.

## Conclusion

We began this article with some indicators of why youth may turn to radicalized groups. And while these indicators are not definitive or set, they suggest that the indicators are fairly mundane and normal, and do

not necessarily require a strong indoctrinatory upbringing or extremist community for it to rise. Further, the indicators suggest that there are far more youth who may be radicalized than is perceived by the greater public. Given that the youth need not commit an act of violence, but rather have a narrowing of extremist views, it suggests that the numbers are beyond the rare individual, and there may be more youth who are increasingly becoming radicalized. This is troubling given that there is some evidence to suggest that youth are more susceptible to radicalization than adults. The nature of recruiting youth makes it easier to conform and create allegiances among youth who are negotiating their own cognitive and emotional development as adolescents. It thus begs the question of whether schools are able to attend to this concern.

In this way, we argue that schools ought to provide more robust political deliberation in classrooms. The ability for students to better negotiate the complex historical, political, social and religious discourses builds capacity to trouble single narratives and rhetoric that perpetuates a superficial account of the 'Other'. Giving voice to students may help unpack the issues, rhetoric and power, and in so doing, help develop the dispositions that create more political engagement and tolerance. And while we do not suggest that students may drastically shift their ideological stances, it may better create a possibility that the other perspective may hold some weight. In an effort to disrupt polarized radical views, educators can build students' capacity to create a complexity to such long contested and complex issues, as part of the effort to prevent socialization into violent extremist movements.

Finally, in so doing, we do not suggest that this is yet another additive burden that teachers must do to solve society's ills. Nor do we think that schools shoulder the burden for redressing the radicalization of youth. Yet, these recommendations call for a shift in pedagogy to what is currently done, that creates a deliberative space for students to feel included and empowered. In this way, the suggestions offered above support good pedagogical practices that are helpful to all students – not simply the ones who may be more susceptible and at-risk for radicalization. The ability to negotiate and wrestle with the historical and contemporary political discourses in a controlled learning environment, may better allow individuals to negotiate a more nuanced perspective more generally that does not revert back to 'absolute truths' and 'rhetorical slogans'.

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# Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity

An Interview with Michel Wieviorka

Mitja Sardoč

Prof. Michel Wieviorka is currently president, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, and professor at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, France. He served as president of the International Sociological Association (ISA 2006-2010), and is a member of the scientific Council of the European Research Council (ERC). He is the author of *The Arena of Racism* (Sage), *The Making of Terrorism* (University of Chicago Press), *The Lure of Anti-Semitism* (Brill), *Violence: A New Approach* (Sage), *Evil* (Polity Press).

*What are the most important differences between violent extremism fueled by radicalisation and other forms of terrorism that existed in different European countries back in the 1960s and 1970s, e.g. Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK (those you have examined in your book The Making of Terrorism [Sociétés et terrorisme])?*

We have to distinguish, between what I will call classical terrorism, and global terrorism. Classical terrorism began, at least seen from Europe, in the sixties, and was at its highest level in the seventies and early eighties. It could be domestic, then with three main possibilities: extreme-left, extreme-right, and independentist (for instance, Basque, or Irish). Sometimes, a same country, or a same movement could combine two aspects. Italy faced in the seventies both extreme-left and extreme right terrorisms, the Basque and the Irish movements had sometimes extreme-left components. And classical terrorism could also be international, which was mainly the case with those groups that acted in name of the

Palestinian cause, but also, less important, with the Asala, the Armenian movement. Classical terrorism was highly political, not religious.

Global terrorism began to appear, from my point of view, in the early or mid eighties, with some attacks in Lebanon, and, later, in France – but not only. In the nineties, it began to be much more active, and there was a summit in 2001, in the United States, with Bin Laden and 9/11. Global terrorism is religious, and either meta-political or infrapolitical. The actors want to die, as “martyrs”. In some cases, the actors are at the crossroads of two logics, a domestic one – they are for instance migrants in a country where they feel badly treated – and a geopolitical one – they are part of a world fight, like in the Huntington theory of “Clash of Civilizations”. In some cases, they have no territorial basis, and act as a network, which has been the case with Al Qaeda, but they may also try to have their own State, the Califate for Daech. Global terrorism can become individual, i.e. actors act as “lone wolves”, without strong ties with any network. It is in fact not so frequent with Daech; I would say that the more a country experiences only these kind of terrorist actors, the more it means that there are no strong centers abroad, no real capacity to organize important attacks from abroad, like in Paris in January and November 2015.

My book (in English: *The Making of Terrorism* [University of Chicago Press]) results from some eight or nine years of research, including fieldwork, at a time when classical terrorism was at stake, and it mainly deals with it. But I also made my research at a time when the new, Global Terrorism was appearing – which was very difficult to understand and, much more, to conceptualize.

*Should we only use one term for this process or do we need to employ the term radicalisation(s) instead?*

Radicalisation is not a concept, nor a theoretical category, but one of these words that is used in ordinary life, or by experts, technocrats, journalists, etc. when they want to speak of those people that are ready to commit terrorist acts. Or who commits them. When social scientists use it, they very quickly understand that it is not easy to pass from an ordinary vocabulary to a scientific one. In history, so many actors have been involved in commitments that today we could call “radical”! The French or Soviet Revolutionaries were radicalized! Those that were acting in order to decolonize their people were radicalized! Leftism, and extreme-right ideologies are radical! It is much more useful to introduce other concepts such as subjectivation and desubjectivation, and to analyze processes where they are at stake.

*Despite the fact that in the EU's Internal Security Strategy and Action, radicalisation is defined as 'a complex phenomenon in which individuals adopt a radical ideology that can lead to committing terrorist acts', the relationship between radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism is anything but unambiguous or unproblematic. Is there any distinction between these terms that is in need of further clarification?*

If social scientists expect to have their conceptual categories provided by the US or EU bureaucrats or politicians, then we can consider that social science does not exist! How do some individuals enter in a specific way of thinking, this is a first question. And here, it is clear that there is not only one worse way, but several, and that in order to understand this phenomenon, we need in-depth interviews or any other solid materials. In my own research for instance, I have been frequently surprised by the narrative which were provided to me by former terrorists accepting to tell me their life-story: the moment when they passed to some ideological "radicalisation" was not at all what you could have expected. It may have been purely accidental, or connected with very ordinary events, or interactions. Then, there is a second question due to the fact that many people can share radical ideas or ideology, but very few act as terrorists. Why and how do some people only pass from ideas to action? As far as Islamic terrorism is at stake, I consider that religion is absolutely decisive, even if the terrorist actor doesn't know a lot about Islam, or if he discovered Islam only a few months before he committed an attack. Without religion, there wouldn't be this impetus that makes possible the decision to die: dying, here, due to religion, means passing to another world, where you will have a wonderful life. So, let us forget this confusing word, "radicalisation", and let us analyse terrorism with other categories!

*The 'causal' interpretation of the process of radicalisation as a 'path' or 'staircase' to terrorism advanced by some scholars has been very influential in this area of scholarly research. Is the process of radicalisation deterministic [that any individual who is radicalised is already a potential terrorist (the equivalence premise)]?*

We had some years ago an interesting debate in France on this issue. Gilles Kepel, a good specialist, explained that religion is the key element in order to analyse passing to terrorism, in opposition to another good specialist, Olivier Roy, who gave more importance to social radicalisation, i.e. the social trajectory that leads to terrorism, for instance, in France: young migrants, living in poor neighbourhoods, victims of discrimination, and

racism, becoming small criminals, going into jail, meeting some Islamist preacher there ... So, Kepel spoke of radicalisation of Islam when Roy spoke of islamisation of radicality ... But a third excellent specialist, Farhad Khosrokhavar, published recently a great book in which he demonstrates that there is not only one single model, but many different paths, some of them including long training in religion, and others a short one, or almost none. And we should avoid two risks. One can be called "sociologism": explaining terrorism only by social determinations, which is risky since many people share the same experience, but only a few may become terrorists; the second risk can be called "psychologism": explaining terrorism by the personality, without taking into account the social background of actors. Many people are "radicalised" and will never commit any terrorist attack, and many people have an authoritarian and destructive personality but will not act like this too.

*Some scholars argue that radicalisation is exclusively a reaction to the status quo [causal interpretation]? Do you find this interpretation 'reductionist' or otherwise problematic?*

This is a very old way of thinking, explaining the action without analysing the actor, nor any kind of interaction, but observing the system and its modifications that make people react. Terrorism, like any other action, has its meaning, even if we should consider much more its loss of meaning. Actors do not become actors only because they react, for instance to some change in the status quo. They become actors in order to fulfil some goals, and because they want, as subjects, to transform the situation, and not only react.

*Existing research on violent extremism focuses prevalently on its etiology looking for a causal explanation of the process of radicalisation leaving several conceptual issues either neglected or even ignored. What are the most important shortcomings of existing discussions on radicalisation(s) and violent extremism?*

Let me say again that any causal explanation is generally too simplistic. And let me add a methodological remark: we need, when discussing this kind of affirmation, some proof, some test, some demonstration. In my case, the demonstrations were the result of fieldwork with former (or not so former) terrorist actors: when it has been possible for me to present to these people my analysis of their action as terrorists, the test was in what they did with my analysis. When they accepted it, and when they said something like: this analysis helps me to understand better what happened with such event, or what I did in such context, when they did



something with my analysis, I could consider that there was some element of demonstration. So, to these people that propose a causal explanation: what is the proof, the demonstration, the test?

*Can the process of radicalisation be considered as 'the last of the remaining options' (when the 'loss of meaning' is taken into account)?*

I wouldn't give a general answer, I would take this as a hypothesis, and I would test it with concrete actors. Did they have the feeling of having no other option? How do they react when I introduce this idea? My first reaction to this question is that I would be surprised to see terrorist actors accepting this kind of proposal, and say: yes, it is or it was the last option. I imagine much more them saying: it was the best option, far from any other one.

*The brutality of terrorist attacks and their ever-increasing frequency also open the space for 'moral panic', Islamophobia, right-wing populism and political extremism that contribute considerably to the polarization of societies. How to deal with these so-called 'collateral' problems associated with radicalisation and violent extremism?*

When terrorist attacks are striking a society, there is a lot of fear and irrationality that develops. Democracy then is in danger, the executive power will consider it necessary not to let the judicial and the legislative powers work as usual, and will diminish their capacity of action. Rumours, looking for scapegoats, prejudice will develop. Some very small issues will become big affairs; people will sometimes say they want a very strong, non-democratic authoritarian regime. I don't have any recipe in order to face such challenges, I can only say that social scientists have here an important responsibility, we must explain, provide serious analysis, contribute in the public debate on the basis of our researches.

*Furthermore, how can radicalisation be understood within the framework of discussions about diversity? Perhaps as 'conflicting diversity'?*

What you still want me to call "radicalisation" is one aspect of thinking and eventually acting when the processes of subjectivation, desubjectivation and resubjectivation appear in social life. If such processes exist, it is because social life is made of divisions, and they appear and develop when a non-radical action is not possible, when it is not possible for some individuals to transform through debates and non-violent conflicts

their subjectivity into action. Non-violent conflictuality including democratic negotiations and dialogues is the best answer to violence and “radicalisation”.

*Are the phenomena of radicalisation, right-wing populism and political extremism poised to ultimately dominate our future? Is there a way of ‘exiting violence’ (to borrow the term from the ‘Violence and Exiting Violence Platform’ that you chair)?*

You could add international criminality, school shooting, extreme nationalisms, etc.! One should not be too optimistic! Sometimes, one form of violence disappears, but another appears. For instance in Mexico, there is almost no more political violence, but there is a lot of criminal violence! There are no total solutions, but real possibilities to always try and implement preventing, reducing and eventually exiting violence. This means for instance being able to help traumatised people to recover, justice and peace to be articulated and not opposed, law, democracy and the state to replace chaos and civil war, etc. We are living in very dangerous times, and it is difficult not to be pessimistic.

*Several scholars argue that one of the main limitations of existing approaches to the problem of radicalisation lies in its reliance on the ‘security’ paradigm, which leaves unanswered several key issues associated with the tackling of radicalisation and violent extremism. What would be the most pressing challenges to the ‘security paradigm’?*

Radicalisation is a process, and in order to understand this process, we must first of all take into account the great diversities, on the one hand of those that are “radicalised” and on the other hand, of not only the national, but also international and local situations in which radicalisation has been possible. The “security” paradigm intervenes mainly at the national level, and deals with limited dimensions, most of them in the very short term. It doesn’t take into consideration the long-term issues, for instance education, and it has nothing to do with the economic, political, cultural and social sources of radicalisation, such as racism, social inequalities. It may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and exert devastating perverse effects, for instance by stigmatizing some people that have at the beginning nothing to do with terrorism and violence. Security is necessary, but should appear as just one aspect of public policies. And security measures shouldn’t be voted in order to face terrorism, and be used for other goals.

*What are the most important motivational factors that ‘trigger’ the process of radicalisation and what groups or individuals do you think are most at risk?*

Radicalisation is such a diverse phenomenon; one cannot say that there are some “most important factors” that would “trigger” it. More generally, social science shouldn’t try to propose one or several “factors” of “causes to explain human behaviours, since these behaviours are not determined by them, they develop within the framework of relations between human beings, and usually these relations are not explained just by some “factors”. We shouldn’t think in terms of social or political determinism.

In some cases, radicalized individuals or groups select one kind of targets – journalists, Jews, catholic priests for instance. In other cases, the action is blind and there is no specific target, they just kill those that are there when they act, in the street for instance, like in Nice on July 14th, 2016. Today, there is such an importance of geopolitical and religious dimensions as far as radical violence is at stake that those individuals and groups that are concerned with these dimensions are most at risks – visibly Jews first.

*What role should education play in the tackling of radicalisation and violent extremism and what educational programs and strategies do you find most appropriate? Which educational environments are most appropriate for programs and other activities associated with deradicalisation, counter-radicalisation, anti-polarisation (e.g. schools, peer groups, civil society organizations)? Why?*

Education will not solve all issues, but no education will contribute to a more radical and violent society. The more important, from my point of view, is to consider that educational systems should create such conditions for more capacity, for each individual to become a Subject, i.e. a person able to master his or her own life while considering that all human beings should also be able to be more and more able subjects. This means: more capacity to analyze problems and situations, and one’s own participation or role in some problems and situations. When some individuals are radicalized, or in a process of radicalisation, there is always also a tendency towards sectarianism, incapacity to discuss out of one’s own group, feeling that “society” cannot understand, and then, I consider that facing this means creating new opportunities for these individuals to be re-integrated in debates and even tense discussions. Let me give you an example. In the early 70s in France, there was a revolutionary leftist “maoïste” group

who was radicalized, and not far from passing to terrorism. Their chance was that some very important intellectuals, including Jean-Paul Sartre or Michel Foucault were interested and concerned with talking to them, the leaders of this group had a relationship with external people that talked with them, and it has been one element that made them decide to finish with these tendencies of clandestine and violent action.

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# Being Mainstream, Being Radical: How do Young People Understand Radicalism in Croatia

Kosta Bovan, Marko Kovačić and Milica Vučković

## Introduction

To understand new modes of terrorist attacks that were happening in USA and Europe at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, policy-makers and researchers in terrorist studies employed the concept of radicalisation. Since then, however, several authors have questioned the analytical use of radicalisation in explaining terrorist actions (e.g. Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Kühle & Lindekilde, 2010; Kundnani, 2012), as well as the lack of sound empirical support for radicalisation models and theories (Borum, 2011b; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Geeraerts, 2012). Some authors have been explicit about the uselessness of the concept. For example, John Horgan (2013) stated in an interview with Rolling Stone magazine that “the idea that radicalisation causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism research”, and Marc Sageman (2013) told in an interview for Huffington Post that “the notion that there is any serious process called ‘radicalisation’, or indoctrination, is really a mistake”. Regardless of the negative tone of these quotes, it is clear that the concept of radicalisation is present in the (USA) mainstream media. Keeping the above-mentioned caveats in mind, this article has two goals. First, we offer an elaboration of the way researchers have used radicalisation in the past, point to several issues, and offer a relativistic and contextual approach to it (following authors like Sedgwick (2010), Onnerfos & Steiner (2018), and Neumann (2013)). With this approach radicalisation can be studied in a broader context (non-Western, as well as non-democratic states), and not necessarily limited to political

violence and terrorism. The second part of the article discusses a qualitative empirical study that was done using focus groups with youth in Croatia. The goal of the study was to grasp how young people in Croatia understand the concepts of mainstream and radical individuals.

### **Radicalisation – Short History and Major Issues**

When one is confronted with the vast literature and definitions of radicalisation, one finds that the only thing common among them is that they portray radicalisation as a process, i.e. a change, a shift from being a non-radical to becoming a radical. All other aspects are debated and contested – what does it mean to be a radical; are there multiple ways of becoming one; what is the relationship of radicalisation with violence and terrorism; is it a change in attitudes and/or behaviour, etc.

It is perhaps best to start with the meta-approaches to radicalisation. Neumann (2013) makes a distinction between the Anglo-Saxon and the European approach to radicalisation, the former focusing on the behavioural aspects of radicalisation (such as terrorism and violence), while the latter shifts the focus a bit more towards radical ideas<sup>1</sup>. The Anglo-Saxon approach to radicalisation was the one that came first in the post-9/11 era, solidifying with the so-called NYPD model (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Within this model, radicalisation is the change that happens within individuals before they plan and execute a terrorist attack. Radicalisation includes four distinct phases – pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, and Jihadisation. The model is reminiscent of the staircase model to terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005) according to which individuals, who perceive a certain unfairness or relative deprivation, go up five “floors” after which their inhibition of killing is removed and they perform terrorist acts. Both models were important for dismissing the ideas that all terrorists are people with psychological problems or are motivated primarily by their low economic status. Instead, they point to psychological factors as being key for terrorist actions, such as the processes of identification, anger, moral reasoning, cognitive process of categorisation, feelings of helplessness, etc. At the same time, these authors are aware, and are explicit about, the fact that not all individuals that start on the radicalisation pathway end up as terrorists.

On the other side of the Atlantic, especially following the London and Madrid attacks, policy makers and academics have also adopted the

<sup>1</sup> Neumann (2013) points out that this distinction is probably due to the emphasis that American society has on free speech. Thus, the act of violence is problematic, not radical ideas, since ideas are not illegal and going down the path of intervening into that sphere is seen as going against freedom of speech.

radicalisation discourse and framework for understanding terrorist acts (e.g. Khalil, 2014; Lindekilde, 2012b; Slooman & Tillie, 2006). In line with the Anglo-Saxon approach the outcome of the radicalisation process concerns violent acts. However, the difference is in the explicit separation between cognitive radicalisation (thoughts, ideas, or attitudes), and behavioural radicalisation. In both instances violence is present, i.e. in “increasing motivation to use violent means” (Doosje et al., 2016: p. 79), “change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence” (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008: p. 416), “active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: p. 4), or “a movement in the direction of *supporting* or *enacting* radical behaviour” (Kruglanski et al., 2014: p. 70). Borum (2011a: p. 9) differentiates between “...developing extremist ideologies and beliefs...” and “engaging in terrorism or violent extremist actions”, while Busher and Macklin (2015) use the terms extreme narratives and extreme forms of action. Perhaps the best known model of this approach to radicalisation is McCauley and Moskaleiko’s (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008; 2014; 2017) two pyramid model. They argue that “it is necessary to separately theorise radicalisation of opinion and radicalisation of action” (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2017: p. 213) precisely because they are psychologically different phenomena. According to the model, a person goes up or down the opinion or action pyramid. On the former, one can be neutral, believe in a cause but not justify violence, believe in a cause and justify violence, or feel a moral obligation to act violently to promote the cause; on the latter, one can do nothing for a cause, engage legally, engage illegally, or engage illegally toward civilians. Given the point that these are two distinct pathways of radicalisation, they argue that security counter-measures must use different policies and actions to prevent ideas and actions.

Regardless of the differences between these two approaches, both come from a securitisation frame, i.e. they are focused on “how one becomes a radical”. Since the consequences of the radicalisation process are clearly negative and can hurt the fabric of a society, understanding how that process occurs has major security implications. But even more, the securitisation frame creates “an atmosphere of a ‘state of emergency’ which calls for extraordinary policy measures” (Lindekilde, 2012a: p. 339). Onnerfors and Steiner (2018) juxtapose this with the socio-cultural frame, within which the question is why certain individuals or groups radicalise. The answers usually come from contexts, discourses, anthropological factors, narratives, etc. For example, Hafez and Mullins (2015) argue that the answer to the “radicalisation puzzle” must include micro,

meso, and macro levels of understanding, which in turn include grievances, existing networks, ideologies, support structures, foreign policies, etc. Hörnqvist and Flyghed (2012) argue that radicalisation can be understood as a consequence of the clash of civilisations, lack of integration, dissolution of civil society, and even as the result of the counter-terrorist measures that were intended to prevent it (Lindekilde, 2012). On the other hand, Costanza (2015: p. 14) points out that a “theoretically-grounded discursive approach that seeks to understand individuals within their sociocultural environment seems better suited to capture the changing nature of behaviour within context”. This includes studying cultural narratives of different social structures that include family, school, peer groups, and local community. If we think about the Anglo-Saxon and European approach as bringing the psychological process into the field of political violence and terrorism, the socio-cultural frame offers a “step back” outside of an individual’s thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. However, it is important to keep in mind that the socio-cultural frame is not incompatible with the securitisation frame; it could be viewed as the causal background of the radicalisation phases through which an individual goes. For example, the concept of radicalisation that the authors want to understand still includes an extremist worldview and legitimising violence (e.g. Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012).

There are three broad issues that are present within the above-mentioned approaches. First, the definition of radicalisation, and its relation to close concepts is inconclusive/ambiguous. For example, is the end point of radicalisation extremism (e.g. McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Mandel, 2009), terrorism (e.g. Al-Badayne, Alhasan, & Almawajdeh, 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2014), or is attaining extremist beliefs a step in the radicalisation process that ends in terrorist acts (e.g. Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013)? Furthermore, if we accept any of these end results of radicalisation, we are left with the question – what characteristics constitute a radical person? This issue is even more troubling when authors study radicalisation without defining it (e.g. Grattan, 2008; Quayle & Taylor, 2011; Rousseau, Hassan, & Oulhote, 2018). One can only agree with Neumann’s (2008: p. 4) widely cited statement that “experts and officials started referring to the idea of ‘radicalisation’ whenever they wanted to talk about ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’.” Still, it seems that the key outcome, or rather ingredient, of the radicalisation process is violence; increasing the justification of violence of relevant groups and/or increasing the probability of performing violent acts (e.g. Della Porta & LaFree, 2012; Doosje et al., 2016; Jaskoski, Wilson, & Lazareno, 2017; Khalil, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Yet,



researchers have pointed out that radicalisation can be non-violent (e.g. Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013), and some use the term “radicalisation to violent extremism” to distinguish between these two types (Borum, 2014). Thus, we are left with a theoretically extremely contested term, and without any agreement even on its basic definition. Due to its versatility and usage in various disciplines, radicalisation is in fact something scholars in the field of humanities call – travelling concepts. This basically means “they travel – between disciplines, between individual scholars, between historical periods, and between geographically dispersed academic communities” (Bal, 2002: p. 2).

Unfortunately, when we move to the empirical findings the situation is even worse. First of all, there is a general paucity of empirical studies on the topic of radicalisation (see Borum, 2011b; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Second, studies that use empirical data usually do not study the processes of radicalisation, even though the transformation to extremism or radicalism is the key aspect of the concept. Instead, for example, they study the characteristics of individuals already identified as radicals (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Jaskoski et al., 2017), use a questionnaire to determine the level of radicalisation within individuals (Al-Badayneh et al., 2016; Chebotareva, 2014), identify determinants of radical beliefs (Doosje et al., 2013; Doosje, van den Bos, Loseman, Feddes, & Mann, 2012), etc. This by itself would not be a problem if not for the lack of studies dealing with the processes of radicalisation, not just with the characteristics and determinants of radicals<sup>2</sup>. Finally, the studies on radicalisation are geographically and sample-wise narrow – they almost exclusively deal with Western democracies and Muslims<sup>3</sup> (see Della Porta & LaFree, 2012). Kundnani (2012: p. 5) captures these issues stating that research on radicalisation is “in practice, limited to a much narrower question: why do some individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam that leads to violence?”

Finally, several authors have been critical of what could be dubbed “the sociological background” of radicalisation studies. Since the beginning of the surge in radicalisation studies, academia has been closely connected with security and public policy experts. From one point of view this is expected – the former can gain data, the latter insights that can be used for de-radicalisation policies. On the other hand, Kundnani (2012:

2 Studies dealing with the processes use post-hoc accounts of radicals (mostly terrorists) or close acquaintances which is of course subject to major rationalisation processes (see Pissou, 2013).

3 This is clear in the “symbolic purging of the NYPD radicalisation report” (Jenkins & Daddario, 2016).

p. 4) argues that “the radicalisation discourse was, from the beginning, circumscribed by the demands of counter-terrorist policy-makers rather than an attempt to objectively study how terrorism comes into being”. The de-radicalisation efforts have been portrayed as “industries” (Kühle & Lindekilde, 2010), while Githens-Mazer & Lambert (2010: p. 901) argue that academics, politicians, and the media use conventional wisdom on radicalisation to ensure that the public feels safe – “Deviation from conventional wisdom requires one group of participants to break this cycle—at the tangible risk, variously, of livelihood, of not being re-elected, of losing sales, and of losing research funding”.

After this brief overview of radicalisation studies, we can conclude that most of them use non-empirical methodology and are based on contested models of radicalisation to violent extremism of Muslim youth in Western democracies. Furthermore, they are mostly embedded within the securitisation frame, and as such have been under the influence of public policy agendas and needs. At the same time, there are several voices that argue that a different approach to radicalisation is not only possible, but theoretically clearer and analytically more useful.

### Radicalisation – An Alternative Approach

It should be clear that radicalisation is a term that has “terminological ‘baggage’” (Khalil, 2014: p. 199). It has a negative connotation, usually connected with extremist positions and political violence. At the same time, several authors have pointed out that the radicalisation process is highly context dependent (e.g. Lub, 2013; Mandel, 2009; Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018). Neumann (2013) points out that the term “radical” has no meaning on its own, and what gives it meaning is its position to the mainstream, to the status quo. Bartlett and Miller (2012: p. 2) also state clearly that “to be a radical is to reject the status quo”. This means that there is no single ideology or position that is universally radical, and one can be a radical democrat in an authoritarian regime or a radical anti-democrat in a democratic regime; an extremist, a terrorist, or a defender of human rights (Schmid, 2013). In this sense, mainstream and radical positions are mutually co-determined and can shift, which means that today’s “radicals” can be tomorrow’s “regulars” (Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018). It’s important to note that based on this approach extremism is only a specific type of radicalism – it includes anti-democratic tendencies and values within a democratic setting (mainstream).

But it is not only the relative (o)position to the mainstream that defines radicals, it is also the desire for a fundamental and immediate change of society’s dominant values and/or political regime (McLaughlin, 2012).

This desire can, but does not necessarily encompass, violent behaviour or support for violent actions. Following this approach, radicalisation can be defined as a shift toward adopting more radical values and positions. This approach is relatively new, and there are a lot of open issues – such as what are the differences in radicalisation in different settings, are there any universal phases or steps in the process, under what conditions is violence present or supported, what is the relationship between radical values and radical behaviour, etc. However, these issues are open within the studies of Islamist radicalisation to violent extremism, which means that we are not “losing” any insights by adopting an alternative approach to radicalisation. On the other hand, this allows us to broaden our scope of research, both in different socio-political settings as well as within groups and individuals with different ideological positions. Furthermore, this approach points out potential fallacies in simply assuming what the normative/mainstream position is, and who the radicals are, as was done in the majority of studies so far (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Sedgwick, 2010).

## Radicalisation and Youth

The field of radicalisation studies is young, and once we adopt an alternative approach to radicalism it becomes even younger. Thus, the goal of this study is to take a few steps back toward the basics of radicalisation and study the relationship between the mainstream and radical positions and put it in the context of young people. One way to do this is to see how citizens/young people themselves see these terms and what they think are the defining characteristics of radicals.

Growing literature in the area of security studies points out youth as a group particularly prone to radicalisation. Young people are thus seen as a “growing concern for counter-terrorism policy” (Bizina, Grey, 2014: p. 72), relatively easy to recruit for violent radical acts and extremism (Özerdem, Podder 2011; Costanza, 2015), or even as an emerging issue for national security in various national contexts (Yom, Sammour, 2017; Doosje et al., 2017; Bezunartea et al. , 2009). Even though relevant sociological research also pinpoints young people as being more predisposed to extremist values than adults (Ilisin, 1999), this notion should not be taken for granted without taking into account other variables that influence youth behaviour, such as political culture of a specific state, economic situation, the quality of governance and democracy as such, social values constellation and so on. That being so, there is a tacit consensus among youth researchers that young people should be involved not only in policy-making but also in research when investigating their universes. In other words, it is advisable to give voice to young people when studying

phenomena related to them in order to assure greater accuracy and ample analytical value. Considering the fact that the aforementioned research papers stem from security studies rather than youth studies, they fail to assure youth voices when constructing arguments on youth radicalisation. As a result, this paper seeks to deconstruct the meaning behind radicalism and put this originally Western European concept emerged within the security studies paradigm (Borum, 2012), in the context of Croatia and youth studies. More concretely, the goal of this paper is to analyse how radicalism is understood by Croatian youth. We believe that by focusing on youth radicalisation from the perspective of youth studies we could get clearer and more substantial understanding of radicalism which can result in more effective policies in that area.

### Youth in Croatia

The situation regarding young people in Croatia is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the recent empirical studies on young people in Croatia (Ilisin & Spajic-Vrkas, 2017; Kovacic & Horvat, 2016; Ilisin et al, 2013) describe this generation of young people as “disillusioned”. Hence, they show “overall deterioration of the social standing of young people compared to that of young generations 10–15 years ago” (Ilisin & Spajic-Vrkas, 2017: p. 422), further weakening of youth’s trust in the social perspective, retraction into a private sphere, and distancing themselves from social and political matters (ibid), as well as a growing process of retraditionalisation (Kovacic & Gvozdanovic, forthcoming). On the other hand, there is a trend of diminishing gender differences, better understanding of the importance of political participation, and growing personal optimism (Kovacic & Horvat, 2016). When describing youth mainstream in Croatia, authors claim that “young people are actually still predominantly oriented on pragmatic adaptation to requirements of the environment for the purpose of personal prosperity, by relying on individual and family resources, without worrying too much about large topics and problems of society” (Ilisin et al, 2013: p. 145). Still, in order to understand these findings, they should be analysed within Croatian social and political reality.

Paradoxically, in the years after joining the European Union in 2013, Croatia entered a politically and socially turbulent period. In less than a year, the government changed three times, numerous independent political and public institutions were censured or pacified, public discourse shifted towards neoconservative values, the sphere for progressive civil society organisations shrunk, and several normative acts changed in order to

limit different minorities' rights<sup>4</sup>. As demonstrated, young people on average are not as interested in greater societal and political occurrences and their actors which cannot be said vice versa. In other words, even though young people do not find radical societal actors important, young people are important to them because they wish to influence them. In Croatia, topics of young people and education are of great interest for various societal actors due to their importance for shaping (future) society. Both progressive and (neo)conservative social and political actors seek to influence curricula and young people in order to perpetuate and strengthen their values and points of views on society. Kovacic & Horvat (2016) in their book analyse civic competences of young people in Croatia and point out the progressive actors' agenda to empower young people, teach them to think critically, and engage them in society and politics via quality implementation of civic education in schools. Complementary, Petricusic et al. (2017: p. 69–70) point out that “the religious-political movement objects to the introduction of health and civic education programs in school curricula on the grounds that learning about sexuality in elementary and high schools is contrary to parental rights and interests of educating their children in accordance with their own value systems”. Latter actors are particularly important in the context of radicalisation due to their wish for fundamental and immediate change of society's dominant values and/or political regime which is how McLaughlin (2012) defines radicalism. Furthermore, both conservative and progressive actors consider the other one radical. Thus, one of the incentives for this research was to see what do young people understand as being radical and what is mainstream from their perspective.

## Methodological Framework

For that purpose, six focus groups, each consisting of nine questions, were conducted encompassing a total of 33 young people between the ages of 15 to 30, from five Croatian cities and towns (Zagreb, Split, Šibenik, Sinj, Dalj), throughout May and June 2018. All focus groups were transcribed and analysed by using Nvivo software. Focus groups were used because this qualitative research method technique allows researchers to explore participants' knowledge and experience in order to examine how they

4 Petricusic et al. (2017: p. 69) in their text on the rise of the neoconservative movement in Croatia describe the hallmark of this movement, namely the “initiative ‘In the Name of the Family’ that managed to include the definition of marriage into the text of the Croatian constitution as a union between a man and a woman. In this way they were able to create a constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage and the impossibility of marriage equality for LGBT individuals”

think, construct reality, and why they think in that way (Kitzinger 1995). Considering the fact the main research question of this empirical study is to comprehend where the line between “radical” and “mainstream” is for young people and what does radicalism means for them, it was important to assure the platform for participants’ interaction. This aim is particularly relevant because it will assure researchers in the field of radicalism use it in a way that is in line with youth’s understanding of it. Therefore, the methodological design built upon focus groups has been chosen. Furthermore, relying on previous studies which define radicalisation as context dependent (e.g. Lub, 2013; Mandel, 2009; Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018), and bearing in mind that the studies on radicalisation almost exclusively deal with Western democracies and Muslims (see Della Porta & LaFree, 2012), we decided to conduct research in Croatia, a country that has a different context from previously studied country cases.

Since the starting point of the research was to study how young people conceptualise the radical and the mainstream, both constructs were operationalised into the focus groups’ questions, which can be seen in Table 1. Participants were asked to assess general characteristics of Croatian society and specifically the situation regarding themselves - young people. Additionally, they were asked to offer their conceptualisation of radicalism, both in the general public and youth specifically.

Table 1. Operationalisation of the relevant constructs.

Mainstream	Radical
How would you describe a good citizen? What characteristics does a typical/ordinary citizen have?	How would you describe a radical citizen? What characteristics should a radical citizen have?
Who is a typical/ordinary citizen in Croatian context? Describe one’s characteristics	Who is a radical citizen in Croatian context? Describe one’s characteristics
What does it mean to be a typical young person today?	What does it mean to be a radical young person today?

## Results and Discussion

Being “between the hammer and the anvil” or struggling to exercise their autonomy and innovation by expressing their creativity in a setting where society has expectations from them to perpetuate existing value patterns and societal norms, young people of today mature in a perplexed, confused, and hectic environment reinforced by uncertainty, prolonged economic dependence on their families, insufficient inclusion in decision-making, and growing disparities among the rich and the poor. Thus, the youth perception of the society they live in is an important insight for

sociologists and political scientists. Hence, by understanding their perception one can analyse the position of young people in society, current developments and projections for future development of society, and the structure and constellation of societal values due to youth’s characteristic of being “one of the most sensitive seismographs of social change” (Ilisin et al, 2013: p. 9).

Results of the data obtained from the focus groups conducted with young people, point to some rather compelling findings (Table 2). Generally, young people are rather pessimistic when characterising society as well as themselves. Despite nominally claiming radicalism to be a neutral concept, they in fact perceive it negatively, particularly when describing a radical young person. In continuation we analyse each set of characteristics and discuss wider consequences of these findings for society.

Table 2. Youth perception of mainstream and radical individuals in Croatian society.

	Mainstream	Radical
Citizens	apathetic; incompetent and non-informed; dissatisfied and lazy; prone to media manipulation; single issue activism; (non)solidarity; dependent on the context	shift from mainstream; (in)competence; set of values; neutral concept; reductionism; reaction on society
Young people	similar to typical citizens; confused, anxious, impatient; disinterested and non-informed; pliable; dependent on the system; identity issues; prospective	enthralled; exclusive; the importance of public expression; the importance of set of values; machiavellianism; solidarity;

Corrosive Apathy

It is no surprise young people believe Croatian *citizens* are relatively passive and apathetic. In public discourse there is an ongoing perception that the average Croatian citizen is disinterested, dissatisfied, or even lazy when it comes to standing up for society or themselves (Gvozdanovic & Bagic, 2015). Interestingly, young people very distinctively address prevailing problems of Croatian society, namely corruption, nepotism, lack of responsiveness between the government and society, weak economy, low salaries, etc. Young people claim the average citizen is aware of these problems but not ready to actively engage in changing their reality. When asked whom to blame for this, the unfavourable situation Croatian

society is in, they point to both passive and lazy citizens as well as the incompetent government.

One of the key elements of this apathy is certainly the lack of competences that could motivate citizens to rebel in case they are not satisfied. One of the participants addressed it as follows:

I would like to emphasise one other thing; we love to talk a lot but we don't have tools and means to act. We can sit and discuss for hours while having coffee but we don't know how to act. (Zagreb)

Similarly, a participant from Dalj believes that there are mechanisms to raise one's voice, but they are not used by Croatian people.

We don't do anything! Whatever will be, will be! They complain a lot about their bad situation but when there are protests organised about it, half of them don't attend them, they are too lazy to appear, they just sit at home.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim citizens in Croatia do not fight for their rights. However, young people believe these are relatively isolated acts and when they exist they are connected with so-called single-issue activism. Citizens in Croatia rebel when their (way of) life or the life of people close to them is being jeopardised.

I would like to point out that here we are discussing the average citizen of the Republic of Croatia, and I don't think they are not as active. In order to activate this trigger [for activism] the life of this individual or one's children has to be in danger. Furthermore, the percentage of people that have this trigger is small... (Zagreb)

All aforementioned circumstances make citizens prone to media manipulation. Media, according to young people, has an important role to educate citizens and yet it is providing useless information which pacifies citizens who stop following the news and retract into their private sphere. Our participants feel that this *modus operandi* is intentional, since political elites prefer disengaged citizens who are not vigilant nor adequately informed about the way the polity works.

### **“Youth in the Chains of Society”**

Another dimension studied in this research was self-perception. Young people were asked to describe themselves – *young people in Croatia*. The analysis of their responses confirms sociological insights that young people are the mirror of society. Most of the attributed characteristics for citizens can be applied to young people too. Young people describe their



generation as confused, anxious, impatient, disinterested, and uninformed. On top of that, young people are pliable and rarely engage in the deconstruction of certain processes and constructs but rather “go with the flow”.

A young person does not take any responsibility, we have one of the lowest election turnout rates. (Sinj)

Generally, to be popular is the main goal right now, but there are exceptions; however, for most young people this is an imperative, to have as many followers as possible on Instagram.... As many “likes” as possible.... And if someone goes out on the weekends and does something like getting drunk then everyone else feels they need to do the same. (Dalj)

The most convincing explanation for this situation is a system which is not responsive, nor recognising of the needs and potentials of young people. Due to their limited access to power, young people are much more dependent on the system than adult citizens, thus they feel the flaws of the system much more. For instance, a participant from Dalj summarised this problem very well by claiming that the scarcity of investment in young people makes young people disappear.

I think there are two things... there are... how to say two things.... There are no young people because there is no money and there is no money because the country is deteriorating.

Contrary to citizens, young people are characterised as being full of potential. Despite this rather negative view of young people, participants believe young people in Croatia have certain potentials that could be used for the benefit of themselves and society. Participants once again pointed out that the state does not allow young people to express themselves and use the potentials they have. They offer some examples of young people who left Croatia and succeeded in their intentions due to a better system.

But then what I see is that they have certain knowledge which is boring for them, which was not accessible before the internet. They have more opportunities and they are aware of them but I think they lack self-confidence to use them. I dunno how to describe that... (Zagreb)

I believe that plenty of young people that go abroad to make some money for their future life if they're gonna get married or something, they see that abroad is better because people are more fair and more kind and that the mentality is different than in Croatia. Perhaps they like that more, they decide to stay, find a job and have a good salary. (Dalj)

To sum up, just as regular citizens, Croatian youth is facing the ills of contemporary Croatia. They react by retracting from the public sphere and ignoring potential means for active involvement in society and politics. This relatively gloomy picture of Croatian youth is to some extent mitigated by the perception of young people being full of potential; however, they need to be given a change to exercise it adequately. After getting the picture of an average (young) person in Croatia, our second goal was to see what it means to be a radical in Croatia and how this perception relates to the mainstream.

### “Radical vs. Mainstream”

The analysis of responses from participants shows that young people were able to do two things when conceptualising *radicalism*. First, they offered their view on radicalism by contrasting it with the mainstream, which is in agreement with our theoretical concept. Second, and rather impressive, young people managed to identify the roots of radicalism.

When asked to explain the term radical, participants understood it as a great change or a shift from the average. Thus, any oscillation from something that is widely accepted and widespread in society is, from the point of view of young people, radical.

*The radical act is one that makes a great change, a turn from something that is the norm, a norm that one society decides to set. We can suppose that the norm in society in Croatia is centre-right, I don't have any empirical evidence, but let's just assume it is – society does not have any far-right attitudes but is more prone to accept them than the values from the left. However, there are some elements from the left that society embraces, for instance public services. Radicalisation is oscillation from that norm, that's how I see a radical citizen. (Zagreb)*

*Firstly, I'd set a hypothesis that a radical citizen is a person that diverges from the mainstream, for example that you are not in some liberal mainstream and have some conservative opinion – that you are a fascist, a Nazi. A radical citizen is someone like Željka Markić, who is Opus Dei. (Split)*

*Another example of a radical citizen is one on the other side of the ideological spectrum who does not care about anything apart from progressive values, such as LGBT rights, gender rights.... I think this is a bit premature for our country. (Split)*

For radicals, it is important to have a certain set of values which creates solidarity within the group.

*Having a set of values clearly organised is important. In other words, the system of values in which one believes in. Furthermore, the set of values as such has to have a hierarchical setup. (Zagreb)*

Another interesting finding is that, nominally, young people characterise radicalism as a neutral concept which can be filled with meaning depending on the context, just as this participant from Zagreb claims:

*For me, for this is important to define what it means to be radical because, for me, this concept is not necessarily negative, it is neutral and being filled by negative and positive connotations. A certain type of radicalisation can be very useful if directed adequately, it can be productive for societal change and in some cases it is even necessary. On the other hand, it can be very problematic when it is directed towards those at the bottom. If radicalisation is directed towards the top, towards the power structures then it is acceptable, but if it is directed towards the bottom, towards those who are weak then it is very problematic.*

However, when we analysed later responses (even from participants who described radicalism neutrally), it is evident that our participants view radicalism as in fact a negative occurrence. Attributed with reductionism, exclusion, lack of tolerance for others, and belief of superiority of one's set of values, for young people radicalism is unwanted. This claim is supported by their diagnosis of how radicalism is being created. According to participants the combination of reductionism and reaction to societal problems creates a radical response. Young people therefore see radicalism as a product of narrow-mindedness and a tainted system which is clearly a negative attribution of a concept.

*A radical citizen is someone who looks only in one direction and sees nothing left or right and does not agree with other attitudes. He does not accept other opinions/attitudes and stubbornly pushes his head against the wall. It doesn't matter in which direction this radical is looking, right or left, but he does not accept anything except his framework which is there since his childhood. (Split)*

*Radicalism is a consequence of not seeing the whole picture, not looking at the wider context, but only how your family has educated you. (Zagreb)*

This discrepancy between the text and subtext is of a particular value because it shows that young people in fact reluctantly accept everything that diverges from the average or common. This clearly demonstrates that young people have “fallen into society's trap”; they predominantly want to replicate existing social patterns and values and want less to enforce innovation and creativity. The perception of young people is that everything

that challenges the status quo, no matter in which direction, is seen as radical.

Lastly, young people were asked to define *a radical young person*. Here, again the negativity of the concept comes to play. Young people described a radical young person as being enthralled, exclusive, and focused on goals rather than the means.

*That's the group of people that talks only among themselves. They have relatively similar opinions and every time this opinion reflects to themselves back and forward. And if somehow another opinion shows up, the opposite from theirs then they will attack that person and just say: 'you're a fool, what you think is idiotism' and keep thinking what they were thinking before. (Split)*

*Some characteristics of a young radical is not allowing the intervention in their opinions or any shift from that. They might think it is, I dunno, OK to hit a woman. (Zagreb)*

*I'd say one is perhaps a bit ignorant because he/she accepts only one form of opinion and one type of information. (Sibenik)*

For young radicals it is important publicly to express their attitudes and opinions. They are not quiet and wish to impose their point of view as dominant.

*They are very loud and like to draw attention to themselves. They try to be a loud minority because they believe that what they believe should be so. (Split)*

As seen, young radical people are negatively characterised which is a rather peculiar situation. From the description of the mainstream young people believe the status quo is negative and thus it is plausible to expect that a radical young person in Croatia will be positively described, especially because youth is earlier described as being full of potential. However, this does not happen. Surprisingly, both mainstream and radical young people are viewed equally negative. One of the potential explanations for this is the worrisome epidemic of apathy and hopelessness among Croatian citizens and youth. This explanation is supported by the huge emigration rates of Croatian youth due to economic instability, ideological divisions, and ineffective government (Adamovic & Potocnik, 2018), coupled with the relatively low 88<sup>th</sup> position on the World Happiness Report for 2018 (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2018).

## Discussion and Conclusion

Many authors have tried to define the phenomena of radicalisation and radicalism and their complexity resulted in many different concepts and

definitions. Most of these definitions have been conceptualised in the context of terrorist attacks in Western Europe and the US, while the intention of this study was to investigate different forms of radicalism in a country without terrorist attacks, with the focus on young people.

Encouraged with the unclear and confusing use of the term radicalisation, the general lack of empirical studies on the topic of radicalisation (see Borum, 2011b; Dalggaard-Nielsen, 2010), and relying on the existing literature which suggests that young people have been particularly prone to radicalisation (Özerdem & Podder, 2011; Costanza, 2015), we conducted empirical research to reveal what young people in Croatia understand under the term “radical” and what they perceive as elementary characteristics of radical individuals. To get these answers we conducted six focus groups among young people in Croatia.

This rather new approach to studying radicalism resulted in several interesting observations. Firstly, our research confirmed that the radicalisation process is highly context dependent (Lub, 2013; Mandel, 2009; Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018). When giving some examples of radicals from their point of view, our participants recall politicians and different “advocacy” groups on the extreme right or extreme left political spectrum in Croatia. Although terrorist group ISIS has been recognised as an example of radicals, our research revealed that terrorists in the Croatian context, which luckily never suffered terrorist attacks, are not among the first associations with the term radical. Furthermore, when emphasising the importance of the context for explaining what is radical, authors underline the mainstream, i.e. the status quo, defining radical as a shift from that status quo (Neumann, 2013; Bartlett and Miller, 2012). Findings from our research immensely support this definition that sees radical as a shift from the mainstream. Following, from the point of view of young people in Croatia, any oscillation from something that is widely accepted and widespread in society is, radical. As mainstream, or as a “norm” in society, they posit centre-right political beliefs and related sets of values. Consequently, as radical citizens they identify for instance politicians who do not fit into the “norm”, like Ivan Pernar, one of the leaders of leftist populist party *Živi zid*, or former politician and leader of green liberal party *Orah*, Mirela Holy.

Further, young people in Croatia describe as radical Željka Markić, the leader of the Croatian neoconservative movement “In the Name of the Family”, that among other things fights against marriage equality for LGBT individuals. Interestingly, while on the one hand they see Markić as radical, they also see as radical all those people who fight for LGBT rights! Protesting for LGBT rights or showing an LGBT flag as an act of

support, they also see as radical, because, as one respondent said, “that is a little bit too premature for our state”. Not only should the importance of context be emphasised here, but also what Schmid (2013) argues that no single ideology or position is universally radical, and that one can be a radical democrat in an authoritarian regime or a radical anti-democrat in a democratic regime; an extremist, a terrorist, or a defender of human rights (2013). Moreover, Onnerfors & Steiner (2018) find that mainstream and radical positions are mutually co-determined and can shift, which means that today’s “radicals” can be tomorrow’s “regulars”. In line with this notion our respondents provided an example of women rights activists who were identified as radicals at the time, while today young people in Croatia see as radicals those who offend women’s rights.

Secondly, our findings revealed the presence of a corrosive apathy among Croatian youth. Young people described a typical young person in Croatia using negative terms, captured in the negativity and problems of the entirety of society. While one could expect that this could be fertile ground for radicals to bring change or a “shift from the status quo”, this does not happen. Surprisingly, both mainstream and radical young people are described as equally negative. Although young participants in our research claimed that radicalism is not necessarily a negative term and that it depends on the context and content, obviously the “terminological ‘baggage’” (Khalil, 2014: p. 199) was heavier and the negative connotation of the term prevailed.

Feeling helpless in the chains of numerous problems in the state, young people in Croatia have fallen into corrosive apathy. Only single-issue problems and personal involvement in a particular thing can motivate them to stand up and try to change what bothers them. But, most of the time, they feel deprived and abandoned by society, and yet, they are not ready to do anything to change that. It seems they just want to fit into existing norms and structures, and be part of the “status quo”. However, that would be perfectly understandable if they did not describe that same status quo as corrupted, lazy, missing cultural norms, poor, etc. Their apathy is obviously strongly correlated with state affairs, because, on the one hand they are ready to leave the country and change their lives from the roots, whereas on the other hand, while in Croatia, they are not even ready to vote in elections.

Thirdly, describing a radical young person as enthralled, exclusive, as a public attention seeker, as someone who has a specific set of values, someone who is in solidarity with one’s group, and who favours Machiavellianism, and giving examples of radicals who do not use violence to achieve their goals, young people in Croatia confirmed that

radicalisation has many different faces and that it can be non-violent, as some scholars already stated (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013). Our participants perceive radicalism as something that is omnipresent in different political spectrums in Croatia. Furthermore, many questions arise from our research: what are the causes and origins of radicalism in Croatia, how does the process of radicalisation start, where is the line between radical ideas and radical actions? Existing literature dedicated to radicalisation, published dominantly in the area of security studies, does not provide sufficient answers to our questions. Therefore, we believe that further research that will study radicalisation interdisciplinary in different research areas, in youth studies, cultural studies, media and communication studies, is not only necessary, but obligatory. Also, most scholars agree that radicalisation is always context related, hence, we believe more research should be conducted in different contexts and from different points of view. For example, a major issue in research on radicalisation is the relationship between radical ideas and radical action. One way to think about this is to use the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 2002), according to which behaviour is in part a result of an individual's perception of social norms. Thus, the key aspect by which individuals turn their radical ideas into radical behaviour could be their perception of societal rules, dominant norms, and, of course, who occupies the mainstream and radical positions in society.

Even though this research demonstrated several important insights about young people in Croatia and their relation to radicalism, there are still several caveats to it. Firstly, our sample consisted of 33 young people from Croatia, so our generalisation scope is limited. However, as our main goal was to investigate the concepts of mainstream and radical in more depth, this methodological design was chosen deliberately. Furthermore, the results of this research are in line with studies conducted on larger samples using quantitative approach. Even though this paper focused exclusively on Croatia, being a single-case study, it is advisable to replicate this type of research in different contexts, as well as using a broader sample within Croatia. Secondly, the focus of this paper was not to study individuals that would be identified as radicals from the point of view of society, or from dominant approaches to radicalisation. Thus, we could not study the radicalisation processes or characteristics of such individuals. However, the idea of this paper was to grasp the conceptualisation, perception, and notions about radicalism of young people in Croatia, which is in line with the relativistic and context-dependent approach to radicalism.

Finally, even though this paper did not provide a straightforward way of identifying radical individuals, its innovation lies in the fact that for the first time young people's perceptions about radicalism were studied. Therefore, this paper should serve as a starting point for researchers particularly interested in non-violent radicalisation in non-Western contexts.

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# Islamist Radicalisation Towards Extreme Violence and Terrorism<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

Violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism have become an increasing problem and threat in contemporary Europe. European countries and all relevant international organisations (UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO) identified terrorism and related radicalisation as a threat to national and international security. Presently, these countries are shaping or reshaping their policies and programs for monitoring radicalisation, de-radicalisation, and countering terrorism. This has also necessitated an increased scientific attention expressed in an increasing number of studies, books, and articles published in this field.

There is no universal definition of 'radicalisation' in the literature and in practice. In this paper, we define it as *a complex process of adopting radical views by individuals and social groups about political or social problems, which can eventually lead to the use of extreme violence in the form of terrorism*. This process is more or less hidden from the general public, but not in its end phase. Radicalisation is a problem predominantly because it may, at its evolutionary end point, lead to terrorism. In contrast, not all radicalisation processes lead to the use of violence for the purpose of achieving specific goals. As pointed out by Veldhuis and Staun (2009), some radicalisations can be linked with non-violent changes of the existing system. This means that we are actually worried more about those kinds of radicalisation where individuals, social groups, or entire societies

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move from the peaceful solving of pressing conflicts to the use of illegal and extreme violence.

Terrorism as the end point of the radicalisation process refers to the use of extreme violence for the purpose of achieving political goals. Key characteristics of terrorist violence are human casualties, destruction, and fear. Most of the time terrorists cannot achieve their extreme goals, so spreading fear is also good enough for their purposes. A key form of terrorism is the terrorist attack, and we can observe several forms of it, such as political murders or assassinations, kidnapping, hijacking of airplanes, ships, buses, etc., arson, bomb attacks (including the use of letter bombs, car bombs, or suicide bomb attacks), attacks on embassies and diplomats, shootings in public places, etc. Radicalisation may also end up in the use of the so-called special or nonconventional terrorism, such as chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological terrorism. The motivation of terrorist actors in the direction of non-conventional terrorism is increasing due to their wish to perform more visible and influential events. Trends on the use of terrorist violence show increasing brutality, the primacy of innocent civilian targets and victims, connections with military presence in crisis areas, connections with migrations and inter-cultural and inter-religious relations, and a broadening of the spectrum of methods (such as the use of suicide terrorists in Europe, simultaneous attacks, use of vans, attacks on concerts, restaurants, media houses, etc.). The radicalisation end point, however, does not relate only to the execution of terrorist attacks. As Prezelj (2007: p. 81) argued, terrorism includes, besides carrying out attacks, also planning, organizing, and supporting terrorist activities. Additionally, terrorism refers to threats with terrorism as well. This all means that terrorism is actually a very complex security and social problem.

After this explanation of the evolutionary end point of radicalisation, we should also define more precisely the relationship between terrorism and extremism. Terrorism is always an expression of extremism. The latter refers to an ideology of maximising own goals without considering the majority view. It also refers to activities that are far away from the normal persuasions, values, opinions, activities, strategies, etc. All examples of terrorism are a form of political extremism, though not all forms of political extremism are terrorism. Many extremists and even political extremists live in our world, but they are not considered as terrorists because they do not (or intend to) use violence to achieve their political goals. This means that terrorists are to be found among political extremists, but not all such extremists are terrorists. Additionally, several sources point to subjectivity or political nature of the labelling act of someone as extremist (see Bartoli and Coleman, 2003, etc.).



A study of radicalisation is necessary for preventing individuals and groups from pursuing the path towards using violence in solving their (perceived) problems. This paper aims to explain the process of Islamist radicalisation at the conceptual level, present the idea of Jihad, the related misuse of Islamic religious principles, and empirically explore the related propaganda process (especially the use of social media to attract and mobilise potential terrorists). We argue in this paper that the basic element in the radicalisation story is a fight for the hearts and minds of the population. The basic rule of the game is that the actor who attracts more popular support will prevail, and actually be able to define what is normal and what is radical.

This paper is structured in the following way. Firstly, we define the process of Islamist radicalisation, its aims and define one of its key purposes: winning the hearts and minds of the general population to increase support for own goals. Secondly, we present and analyse the misuse of Islamic religious principles in the radicalisation process. In the last part of the paper, we explain the role of communication tools and propaganda in the radicalisation process. In this respect, the paper identifies typical elements of Islamist propaganda (especially used by al-Qaeda and ISIS), the role of social media, and the role of the online magazine *Inspire*. In conclusion, we collect and verify evidence for our argument on winning hearts and minds.

## Islamist Radicalisation towards Terrorism and the Struggle for Winning the Hearts and Minds of the Population

The existing literature defines several types of terrorism and related motivations. This implicitly means that we have also several types of radicalisation. These types are different in terms of their goals and end points, but also share some similarities. In this respect, we distinguish among:

- Islamist radicalisation towards the use of violence for the establishment of an Islamic religious state (caliphate),
- Right-wing radicalisation towards the use of violence for establishing a mono-ethnic and mono-religious state (e.g. Blood and Honour, Forza Nuova, Sturm 34, Soldiers of Odin),
- Left-wing or anarchistic radicalisation with the use of violence against the existing capitalist systems and its symbols (e.g. Secours Rouge),
- Secessionist or ethno-nationalistic radicalisation towards the use of violence to secede or to increase autonomy (e.g. IRA, ETA), and

- Single-issue radicalisation linked to solving specific problems through the use of violence (e.g. Animal Liberation Front, etc.).

Accordingly, Islamist radicalisation is a religion-related process of radicalisation towards the use of violence for achieving religious or pseudo-religious goals, such as the establishment of an Islamic religious state with the supremacy of Sharia law. Islamist radicalisation and the related terrorism have become the most pressing type of terrorism in Europe since 9/11. As Laquer found out (2004: p. 29), such religious motivation has become prevalent over the previously strongest ideological motivation. After a brief look at the history of radicalisation, we can see that Al-Qaeda has become a supreme organisational and motivational actor with global influence on the Islamist radicalisation process, and that ISIS successfully continued this work on the global level. *The main aim of Islamist radicalisation process has been to increase the number of supporters and members of terrorist or radical groups.* This process has been based on recruiting volunteers for Jihad in present conflict areas (Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Lebanon, etc.), enabling these volunteers to get into conflict areas and return from there (foreign fighters and returnees), sending them to training camps in various countries (where they learn to shoot, assemble bombs, collect intelligence), etc. The radicalisation process, however, does not lead only to the recruitment of fighters, it also focuses on the recruitment of people for several support roles.

*The whole radicalisation process is strongly based on the use of communication tools and propaganda to increase membership, increase broader support, and explain or excuse their violence.* Accordingly, the radicals and terrorists increasingly use the internet, publish speeches of imams and other relevant persons, carry out and publish interviews, publish magazines, produce movies and other multimedia materials, promise paradise for jihadists, etc. With ISIS, the radicalisation time has decreased, participation in foreign conflict areas by the so-called foreign fighters has increased and more elaborated communication strategies targeted to various publics have been used.

We need to understand that Islamist radicalisation is a process composed of several phases. It starts with pre-radicalisation or moral outrage, interpretation and self-identification, internalisation or indoctrination, and mobilization by terrorist network or jihadisation (see Sageman, 2008: pp. 71–89). *Islamist terrorist and radical actors need to capture the mind of individuals in this process or, in other words, need to win their hearts and minds.* The more people captured this way, the more support and legitimisation for their actions will exist. The same is true for fight against

terrorism and anti-radicalisation measures (normally carried out by governments). If the government, with its own interpretation of affairs, does not win the hearts and minds of the population, it can never win over terrorists and radicals. This is one of the key elements of the so-called 'smart counter-terrorism' (see Prezelj, 2013). The question is why terrorism still exists despite successful counterterrorist operations. Why have dead or captured leaders been replaced by new leaders and new hubs?

Part of the answer lies in the network structure of radical and terrorist groups, which is quite adaptable and resistant to traditional forms of combat and law enforcement. The other part of the answer relates to the support of the people. At this cognitive level (in the world of meaning and feeling), radical terrorist and counter-terrorist narratives and ideologies are competing to win the hearts and minds of the population. These facts have been confirmed by the counter-insurgency literature. For example, Nagl (2005) clearly explained that there are two basic approaches in counter-insurgency: directly annihilating the insurgents (extremists, radicals, and terrorists in our discussion), or indirectly turning the loyalty of the people. The indirect approach (in Mao Tse-Tung's terms "to separate the fish from the water") recognizes that while continuing to attack the armed elements of the insurgency, it is also essential to attack the support of the people for the insurgents. Such an indirect approach is rather different from the direct approach, and in the long term is usually more effective. O'Neill (2002) also stressed that several aspects of popular support need to be considered, such as active and passive support, the role of intellectuals and the masses, and various techniques to gain support. Such a fight for the loyalty of the population is essentially political in nature, but is also inseparable from law enforcement and military activities.

This leads us to the need to understand how Islamist radicals try to win the hearts and minds of the population, as well as to increase their membership. We will first look at how they handle religious principles, and then how they use propaganda.

### **Misuse of Islamic Religious Principles in the Radicalisation Process**

Islamist radicalisation and terrorism does not exist without a religious basis. The basis comes from religious texts, and more precisely from specific interpretations of religious texts (see Capan, 2006; Esposito, 2003; Hartevelt Kobrin, 2010). The purpose of this chapter is to explain how individuals move from Islam to jihadi extremism and terrorism, and how they misuse related religious principles and texts.

The story of Islam starts with its founder, Muhammad, who was born around the year 570 into the Quraysh tribe, which controlled the west Arabian town of Mecca. The tribe was known predominantly for trading, mainly because in Mecca there was a sacred stone (displayed in Kaaba), which was a pilgrimage destination (Donner, 2006: pp. 23–24). Around the year 610, Muhammad had his first revelation that he was a new, and the final, prophet of God. This was the start of Islam. Initially, his new beliefs weren't accepted in the tribe, so he migrated to Medina in 622, where he started to acquire followers and became a leader of "an autonomous political community" (Donner, 2006: pp. 24–26). With his new base in Medina, he started to expand his power with a variety of methods (from negotiations, purchase, marriage, to raids and battles). This culminated in 630 when he managed to conquer Mecca, and with this he became the unchallenged political leader of Western Arabia and played the role of a monotheist prophet (Donner, 2006: pp. 27–29).

When Muhammad died in 632, the Muslim community (*Ummah*) was left without a leader (both as political and religious group). They started to collect his teachings and revelations, which resulted in the formation of *Quran* (Gilliot, 2006: pp. 44–45). Additionally, they also preserved the memories of the first-generation Muslims of Muhammad's teachings, deeds, and life; this collection is known as *Hadith*. Based on the *Quran* and *Hadith*, Muslims created their law (*Sharia*) (Gabriel, 2002: pp. 25–26).

One of more important concepts that was formed already in his lifetime is also that of *jihad*:

Jihad as struggle pertains to the difficulty and complexity of living a good life: struggling against the evil in oneself in order to be virtuous and moral, making a serious effort to do good works and to help to reform society. Depending on the circumstances in which one lives, it can also mean fighting injustice and oppression, spreading and defending Islam, and creating a just society through preaching, teaching, and, if necessary, armed struggle or holy war. (Esposito 2003: p. 28)

Knapp defines jihad as a "struggle or striving (in the way of God) or to work for a noble cause with determination; it does not mean holy war" (war in Arabic is *harb* and holy *muqadassa*). Hadith explains jihad as an "armed action," while classical period theologians and jurists saw it as an obligation in a military sense (Knapp, 2003: pp. 82–83).

*Later, Islamic scholars defined four different ways how a Muslim is to perform Jihad: by his heart (to combat the Devil inside), his tongue and hands (both through supporting the right cause and correction of wrong),*

*and by war.* Muhammad considered the first way as “the most important type of jihad” (Schwartz-Barcott, 2004: p. 271).

Already during Muhammad’s lifetime the expansion of Islamic rule was becoming more and more aggressive. Gabriel (2002: 31) wrote that “the Quranic revelations in Mecca talk about peace and cooperation with others. But in Medina, Muhammad became a military leader and invader, so the revelations in Medina talk about military power and invasion in the name of Islam (jihad).” This resulted in the belief that Islam has to be spread with military action and not (only) through a just society: “The religious justification made for a jihad to propagate the word of God and the just reign of God’s will for all humanity” (Esposito, 2003: pp. 32–33).

To participate in the jihad, you must be selected by the Imam (or his delegate) and also meet some requirements. The obligation to participate in jihad is defined by Knapp as follows:

Jihad was not generally understood as an obligation of each individual Muslim (known as *fard’ayn*), but as a general requirement of the Muslim community (*fard kifaya*). Only in emergencies, when the Dar al-Islam<sup>2</sup> comes under unexpected attack, do all Muslims have to participate in jihad. Under normal circumstances, therefore, an individual Muslim need not take part so long as other Muslims carry the burden for all the defending of the realm.” (2003: pp. 83–84)

Furthermore, such military jihad must be waged for “justifiable reasons,” and can also be “invoked in order to justify offensive operations in distant lands, to suppress and punish dissent, secession, and rebellion” (Schwartz-Barcott, 2004: pp. 272–273).

Knapp (2003: p. 83) also specifies that jihad (in general) has a political aim, which is the drive to establish a single, unified Muslim realm, and which justified Islam’s suppression of other faiths and allowed for the creation of a just political and social order.

At the latter time, with the creation of modern states and the inability to perform the military jihad, the goals of a just and fair society (according to the Muslim interpretation) were tried by people to accomplish their goals through political process. This political movement is known as Islamism, which is focused on finding “empowerment and justice” for Muslims. But the political and economic decline led to the formation of several extremist and radical responses from different political

2 Sharia divides world in two hemispheres: *dar al-Islam(m)* (land of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (land of war). The first is territory under Muslim control and rule, while the second consists of all the states and communities outside the world of Islam; inhabitants of this world are known as infidels or unbelievers (Schwartz-Barcott, 2004: p. 270).

and ideological camps. Combined with contemporary nationalist, socialist, and secular causes, this radical Islamism led to modern Islamist terrorism. It strives to achieve a just (Muslim) society across the globe by using violent means (Azzam 2006: p. 1121). This is where the misuse of Islam starts in order to excuse the use of illegal violence.

Islamist jihadi terrorism can achieve its goals by basing its ideology and motivation on Islamic religious teachings, or more correctly, on their interpretation of the Quran and Hadith (Capan, 2006; Esposito, 2003; Hartevelt Kobrin, 2010; Taheri 1987; Kocjančič and Prezelj, 2015). According to Brachmann (2009), this is accomplished through three basic treatises of the global jihadist doctrine: 1) Muslims need to fulfill their religious commitment, 2) they should refrain from the modern interpretation of Sharia and return to the original interpretation, and 3) Muslims need to love everything that leads to Allah and combat everything that hinders that.

Several different studies (Halverson, Furlow and Corman 2012; Singh and Perry 2010) clearly showed that *leading jihadists use quotes from the Quran and/or Hadith to justify their terrorist activities*. This is done through manipulation and/or selective usage of Quranic verses.

Halverson, Furlow, and Corman (2012) examined more than 2,000 extremist texts, which were created between 1998 and 2011, and discovered there is a disproportionate use of surahs (chapters) from the later Medinan over the earlier Meccan period. This is mostly because Medinan surahs represent “the onset and completion of military conflict between earliest Muslims and the ‘pagan’ clans of Mecca and their allies.” They were also surprised that Islamist extremist don’t use the most violent or militant verses, but are focused on themes of victimisation, dishonor, and retribution, which show close integration with the rhetorical vision of Islamist extremists.

One notable example of militant verse is the so-called “Sword Verse” (9:5), which states:

And when the forbidden months have passed, kill the idolaters wherever you find them and take them prisoners, and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe Prayer and pay the Zakat, then leave their way free. Surely, Allah is Most Forgiving, Merciful.

The Islamist terrorists will predominantly use only the first part of the verse, which calls to the killing and enslavement of unbelievers, while they will omit the second part, which mandates peaceful coexistence (under some terms). Furthermore, jihadist ideologists like to use Quranic

verses that speaks about salvation, the defense of Islam, and striving towards a worldwide Islamist society. This political-religious goal is based on the radicalisation of masses that want to subdue other countries with the ultimate goal of creating the Islamic caliphate. *To accomplish this goal, they deliberately misuse Quranic texts and Sharia law and propagate their vision of "true" Quranic understanding through their propaganda system.* Their propaganda is based on the belief that the Muslim community as a whole is under (constant) attack from non-believers, and the only way to solve this, is to wage war (e. g. terrorism) against Western countries (see Kocjančič and Prezelj, 2015: pp. 311–313).

### Role of Islamist Propaganda in the Radicalisation Process

Radicalisation process contains elements of propaganda, but in somewhat specific circumstances. *Winning the hearts and minds of new supporters and even the general population can also be a result of typical propagandistic approaches.* Daugherty and Janowitz (in Malešič et al., 1997: p. 32) described propaganda as “a planned dissemination of news, information, special arguments, and appeals designed to influence the beliefs, thoughts, and actions of a specific group.” Propaganda is actually a multi-layered and complex phenomena, and in this paper we can examine only one of its models. According to Malešič (see Malešič et al., 1997: pp. 39–47), the study model of propaganda consists of elements that are directly connected to propaganda message (such as ideology expressed as nationalism, religion or (re)interpretation of history, routine lies, collective and selective memory loss, classic or hard propaganda, and anti-propaganda), indirectly connected with a propaganda message (such as the use of language, source criticism, iconography, compatibility of visual and textual information, (de)construction of the national memory, and specifying who is “the Other”), while there is also an environmental aspect of the message. The latter consists of the context of propaganda, the public for propaganda, the propagandist, and the structure of the propaganda organisation.

Lakomy (2017: pp. 39–40) perceives Islamist propaganda as sophisticated, well-thought-out threats to stability, and the safety of states. It is a part of psychological warfare aimed towards the Western world, which simultaneously also has to gain support from Islamist groups from this Western world.

The foundations for modern Islamist propaganda were laid by al-Qaeda and ISIS. Islamic propaganda is labelled as modern, where modernity refers to the fact of being predominantly disseminated through the social networks on the Web 2.0. Suitable, recruitable demographic groups

now exist only few clicks away from the propaganda source. This improves the chances for recruitment of new members of terrorist groups in ways previously seen only in case of propaganda by some nation states. ISIS's use of the internet for propaganda purposes reflects a very professional approach, resulting in an increase in the reach of messages, and consequently in the recruitment of new members (worldwide and not only in the Middle East). Dissemination of propagandistic messages through social networks is additionally appealing because of the use of online media and the simplicity of access (Taylor, 2017).

The propaganda strategies of al-Qaeda and ISIS have actually been intertwined. They have many common characteristics. Allison Smith and her colleagues (in Cohen, Kruglanski, Gelfand, Webber and Gunaratna, 2016: p. 144) studied the content of propagandistic material of several violent Islamist extremist groups. They discovered that the main points of propaganda material are based on the *emphasis of in-group righteousness, morality, and civility*. *Al-Qaeda liked to use positive emotion words* in its messages and in the speeches of its leaders (Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri), such as "happy," "joy," "love," etc. Positive emotion words were actually used more frequently than negative emotion words, such as e.g. "awful," "cry," "hate," and anger words (e.g. "kill," etc.) (Pennebaker and Chung, 2007: p. 5). An important element of Al-Qaeda's propaganda material is also violence. Through *violent content*, the group gains access to even wider audiences and realises the group's main objective – gaining new activists, winning hearts and minds among the Muslim population, awakening sympathy in parts of the audience, and terrorizing the enemies – who have to begin to seek surrender. The ideology in propaganda by al-Qaeda is strictly religious, since the group wanted to be a sole representative of global Jihad (Jordan, Torres and Jeep, 2005).

The *religious ideology* of al-Qaeda has performed like a glue, which held together the entire terrorist group, not only on a local scale, but on a global one as well. A strong ideology, which translates through the propaganda of the group, is also needed because of the apparent out-numbering by the majority population. The ideology also serves as a motivational factor, and strict interpretations of Quran are helpful. In the case of al-Qaeda, the ideology has been always internationally oriented and filled with the attempts of contextualising local conflict as parts of global struggles. But this is not enough for speeding up the whole radicalisation process. *Dehumanisation of the enemy* is often portrayed in propagandistic messages, and it became one of the key factors of rapid radicalisation towards violence. This way, the ideology can have a deeper impact, since the enemy



and the victims become symbols, and not humans made out of flesh and blood.

The al-Qaeda propaganda began to flourish when the above identified propagandistic elements were spread to a broad spectrum of internet users all around the globe. The group actually started using the internet for propagandistic dissemination in a similar way as modern states do or could do. Dissemination of messages was quick and global. Literacy barriers, created by the Arab illiteracy, were transcended by the mixture of audio-visual messages (Rabasa et al., 2006: p. 16).

By the year 2006, Al-Qaeda operated more than 4,000 websites used for different purposes, such as attracting new members (beginning of the radicalisation process), communication among the core of the group and its periphery, fundraising, and planning of new and improved attacks, etc. (Rabasa et al., 2006: p. 18). Terrorist groups also used websites for publicly claiming their responsibility for the past attacks. One such website was *revolutionmuslim.com*. This website acted like a hub with links to other social platforms where individuals could start or proceed their online radicalisation. The hub included links to YouTube (links to at least six channels), Facebook, Scribd, PalTalk, Slideshare, and BlipTV. *One of the greatest achievements of this hub, if we can say so, was introduction of “e-zine” or online magazine named Inspire*. To this day, there have been 17 recorded issues of this magazine. The man behind the dissemination of *Inspire*, in its early issues, was Anwar al-Awlaki, sometimes dubbed as: “the bin Laden of the internet.” He was also well known for online sharing of his audio tapes and literature. He was also seeking connections with potential new terrorist members and sympathisers through the comments sections on his blog posts (Klausen, 2016: pp. 31–34).

On the other hand, propaganda by ISIS became much more complex and multi-faceted than the one by al-Qaeda. ISIS also used violence as a theme of its propaganda messages. ISIS actually turned out to be a much more brutal terrorist organisation than al-Qaeda, resulting in even more brutal messages (e.g. more video materials showing decapitations of hostages, shooting of prisoners in front of their freshly dug graves, disfigured bodies of enemies, etc.). *Flames of War*, an ISIS movie from 2014, is a good example of incorporation of all above mentioned factors. The movie shows a symbolic image of the ISIS fighter on the one hand and also a very brutal message to their enemies on the other hand. ISIS fighters are shown as good, moral, and cheerful human beings, who defeat the opposing side in a battle. The lives of these fighters have meaning in an attractive way. These “good” and “moral” men as fighters show no mercy when it comes down to captured prisoners. The movie uses an example of such prisoners

who were punished for their disgraceful acts (i.e. fighting against ISIS). They had to dig their own graves and the movie ends with the prisoners' mass murder, with their bodies falling into shallow graves. Such propaganda tools can have a very strong pull and push effect for potential candidates for radicalisation and Jihadisation, and also strong deterrent effects on all people who disagree with ISIS.

Gartenstein-Ross, Barr and Moreng (2016: p. 15) found three core messages in ISIS propaganda:

- Successful restoration of the caliphate by ISIS, making it the only authentic Islamic state on the globe;
- A message that ISIS is the only legitimate Islamic organisation in the world, from theological, legal, and political points of view, therefore it nullifies existing governments, rival Jihadi organisations, and also political Islamic groups;
- A message that ISIS is more capable and unified than al-Qaeda ever was.

These messages show that a terrorist group leads its propaganda efforts not only against its direct enemies, but also against its Islamic rivals as well. The propaganda is made in a way to attract potential followers and recruits, and to radicalize them further towards the use of violence.

The question in the present information age is also *what role modern social information media plays in the radicalisation process*. Modern social information networks are based on websites and applications that enable users to create and share content or to participate in social networking (*Oxford Dictionary*, 2018). Social media represent a group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of the Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of any user-generated content. Forms of social media are scattered across not only Facebook and Twitter, but across internet forums, message boards, product-review websites, blogs, open editable contents and websites that share picture and video material. Such examples include Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, YouTube, Wikipedia, Second Life, etc. (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010: p. 61).

*All these social media platforms can be used and misused by the terrorist and radical groups, as propagandistic messages can easily be spread to great numbers of recipients.* Additionally, as stated by Taylor (2017), propaganda dissemination through the internet, offers anonymity on high levels, as well quick site relocation, which lowers risks of apprehension by law enforcement. Hegghammer (2016: p. 163) identified several potential benefits of internet (mis)usage by Jihadi terrorist groups: speed, cheapness,

globalist character, and the fact it is more expansive than analogue alternatives. Therefore, the internet is a more affordable platform for propaganda distribution, recruitment, fundraising, reconnaissance, and operational coordination than any other existing means. Khosrokhavar (2017: p. 57) added that the internet actually represents “an instrument that amplifies the capacity for violence in radical people or groups by allowing types of communication that forgo rigid structures and face-to-face meetings.” It can even be said that in the today’s society terrorist groups would not exist (at least not on a scale they do) without the use and presence of social media.




Figure 1: Radicalisation process and propaganda

### Example of the Magazine *Inspire*

In this sub-chapter, we present and briefly analyze an example of radicalisation and propaganda tools, called *Inspire*. *Inspire* has been one of the main magazines published by Islamist radicals spread over the internet to large masses in different continents, including to Western Europe. *Inspire* is an English-language magazine published by al-Qaeda of Arab Peninsula (AQAP). ISIS has been publishing a similar online magazine

called *Dabiq*. We also have other magazines published in the past, such as *Jihad Recollections* with a few issues in 2009.

*Inspire* is an online magazine that is published irregularly. The latest issues are Summer 2017 (17), Autumn 2016 (16), Spring 2016 (15), Autumn 2015 (14), Winter 2014 (13), etc. This means we cannot predict publishing date of new issues of the magazine. But, all new issues will be available on the internet for all interested radicals.

Propagandistic radicalisation moves can be found in all 17 issues of *Inspire* magazine. In the last issue from 2017 (pages 14–16), author Hamza Usama bin Laden gives advice to anyone who intends to carry out a “martyrdom operation.” Below, we added our comments in parentheses to explain broader characteristics of the radicalisation move. In the beginning of the article, the author asks Allah for mercy upon all the great martyrs, who already committed attacks for Ummah (move of glorification of the extreme act, legitimisation by referring to Allah). The article is written in story-like style, full of words like: noble knight, the greatest of virtues, glory, worship, blessed operation, etc. (this creates an attractiveness and desire to be a part of this process). Allah is also dubbed as the greatest of protectors<sup>3</sup> for whom, the martyr has to do the best deeds. Only in this way Allah will have a good opinion of the future terrorist (this creates an illusion that there is only one way and nothing else). The future terrorist has to prioritise his targets and the article identifies the following prioritised targets: people who violate “pure” religion of jihadists and/or the prophet, Jews, American crusaders, if unable to find Americans, NATO member states crusaders, and Russians for their interference in matters of Islam (this represents an operationalisation of effort and an attempt to direct the radicalised person). The author stressed that when attacking these targets the terrorist has to convey the message of the “blessed operation” through the media. The intent of the attack must be well known to the masses (this serves to spread the message on its purpose, and also to spread the fear to the broader audience). If a radicalised person follows this advice, the propaganda circle is completed. A person was attracted, motivated and persuaded, directed and his/her act was transmitted to many different publics by various media (multiplication of the impact). Additionally, a successful attack by such a person will likely be documented and consequently serve to create new propagandistic material for new recruits. This is why *Inspire* also reports in detail about some

3 Followed by the lines from Quran: “If Allah is your helper, none can overcome you. And if He forsakes you, who is there after Him who can help you?” [3: 160]

past successful terrorist attacks. These reports include explanation on the why and how these attacks were carried out.

A person that calls himself Sheikh Hamd bin Hamoud Al-Tameemy sums up the target selection in one of the magazines published in 2017. He published it in a part of the magazine called “Ruling of the Lone Jihad” (this part reflects the wish to influence lone wolves, that is people who radicalise by themselves using such literature). He claims, that it is way easier to target the “so-called male civilians” in comparison to military targets. The latter expect own casualties while the former (civilians) do not. He also points out that attacks on civilians will ignite more fear, and that fear will spread among the entire population and not only within the military personnel. The same person described categories of the target civilian population in an issue of *Inspire* from 2016. He divided civilian non-Muslim population in four different categories (the first three categories are protected by Sharia law):

- non-believers who have peace agreements of ceasing fight with Muslims,
- non-Muslims who live under the rule and protection of Islam,
- protected non-Muslims, and
- ‘combatant non-believers’ also dubbed as infidels.

Every Muslim has the “right” to fight these non-believers (the last category above) at any given time and at any given place, claims the author. This was followed by the lines from Quran:

And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them, and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful. And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively.

And additional lines were also included:

And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you.

Content of *Inspire* magazine can be distributed in two different pillars. The first pillar consists of articles that sum up the main events since the last issue (official statements and *Inspire* reactions), personal information about terrorists who committed attacks (sometimes dubbed as ‘martyrs’), interviews with influential people in al-Qaeda, guidance about target selection and lifestyle, and specific instructions for homemade IEDs

(improvised explosive devices) and other devices with which one can harm civilians. The second pillar consists of themes that are part of the everyday lives of perpetrators. These are mainly recommendations for future perpetrators (sometimes dubbed as ‘martyrdom seekers’), on how to overcome the fear in Jihad, including the quotes by influential al-Qaeda members to be followed (entitled “Words of Wisdom”), etc.

Specifically, the entire *Inspire* content is divided into several sections.

- Editor’s letter. In the beginning of every issue, the editor, called by the name Yahya Ibrahim, shortly sums up the entire issue. The summary is full of advertising of Jihadi ideas. The language is strongly anti-American<sup>4</sup>, and it advises potential recruits and radicals to carry out attacks in the future;
- The second rubric consists of statements about the US military raids and own operations by the Mujahedeen martyrs. In cases of military operations done by the United States, *Inspire* offers condolences to Muslim brothers and glorifies lost martyrs. Executed terrorist attacks against civilians are praised under the term “blessed operations.” Statements are full of praise, congratulations, and Quran verses, and Arabic poetry. Perpetrators are elevated into heroes, who fulfilled their promises (“*when the heroes were assigned, they acceded to,*” “*they promised and fulfilled,*” “*congratulations to you,*” “*o Ummah of Islam, for this vengeance that has soothed our chests*”).
- The rubric called “*Words of Wisdom.*” In some 100 words, influential al-Qaeda members (dead or alive) are quoted. Usama bin Laden has been quoted in the 17th issue of the magazine, even though he had been killed in a military operation led by the United States in year 2011. Therefore, the cult of personality outlives these main figures of terrorist organisations. His quote addresses future perpetrators and radicals: “*. . . in front of you is a great opportunity to resist this oppression and tyranny that has for decades been upon you. . .*” In some cases quotes from influential people in terrorist world are backed up by lines from Quran as described already above.
- The rubric called “Open Source Jihad.” This part of the magazine gives specific instructions how to build weapons at home, such as IEDs. It also describes how to create damage (mainly to economy)

4 In his letter in the beginning of the issue 15 (spring 2016), the editor has stressed the disruption United States created in the Middle East. He stated that the United States are “exhausting and weakening the Sunni population, so it can not enjoy living a free life under Sharia.” He also claimed that politics of United States is cowardly and “dirty,” because it is unable to confront Muslims directly on the ground. He also claimed that Democrats *are smilingly stabbing Muslims in the back, while the Republicans openly kill them.*

and cause victims (mainly civilians). In the issue number 17, there is a 20-page long instruction on how to assemble a homemade train derailment tool (the entire issue is about public transport, specifically about public railway systems). In their words, this form of weapon distinguishes itself from others because it is:

easy to design; operation is not martyrdom operation, thus it can be repeated; easy to hide your tracks from forensics /.../, causes great impact on the economy; the enemy is confused /.../ new kind of attack; security agencies will be puzzled and confused to find a solution.

Some other issues offer instructions how to build pressure cooker bombs, explosives for home assassinations (parcel bombs, door trap bombs, and magnetic car bombs), timed hand grenades, hidden bombs made with simple kitchen materials, etc.

- As we can see, the radicalisation process stimulated by Inspire magazine is multi-layered. Not only it describes the “How to?” it also describes the “Why?” and “Who?”. Every gruesome act that a future terrorist should commit is supported by verses from the Quran, which in the view of authors and editor adds to the credibility of the article and the whole terrorist action.

## Conclusion

This paper argued that the basic point of Islamist radicalisation process is to win the hearts and minds of people. We can confirm this argument and give the following explanation how this is done in the Islamist radicalisation process. We found out that radicalisation is a vital process for a radical or terrorist social group because it enables them to obtain future members, fighters, and supporters. Youngsters are more vulnerable to such a process than older people. Especially critical is the misuse of Islamic religious texts as an excuse or legitimisation to use violence for achieving very narrow political aims. The next stage is the extensive use of propaganda, especially through the internet and social media. The cases of al-Qaeda and ISIS show that the hearts and minds of the population can be won by indiscriminately using attractiveness (carrots) and threats (sticks) in the propaganda process. The main factors of propaganda by terrorist groups that affect radicalisation are selective memory, amplification of certain messages, creation of an illusion of supreme Islamic truth and supreme reality, claiming responsibility for attacks, misuse of religion and specific religious texts, the mobilisation into an attractive and important endeavor, extortion, the dehumanisation of enemies, threats, etc.

Based on this, we can describe Islamist propaganda as the premediated spread of messages to potential targets, sympathisers, members of terrorist organizations, and their enemies through online social platforms and traditional media with the intention of winning the hearts and minds or deterring the enemy. The latter is easily done by showing merciless violence (e.g. beheadings, shooting people in front of cameras, etc.). Additional lessons from the magazine *Inspire* confirm that messages of attraction and messages of violence are simultaneously combined in an Islamic propaganda approach. Each number of this magazine includes messages of glorification of the brave acts, legitimisation using religious quotes, a desire to be a part of a violent Islamist Jihad, the operationalisation of desire to help by identification of potential targets, etc. Messages that there is no other alternative are also involved. The radicalisation approach also takes care about publicizing preparation and execution of attacks, and uses such messages for spreading fear, getting support, and teaching new radicals how to attack. Additionally, Islamist propaganda involves specific instructions how to build explosive devices and other weapons at home. All this is done in combination with Arabic poetry, Quran verses, and instructions how to overcome fear, descriptions of heroic brothers who killed many people, etc.

The question is how to fight such the multi-layered process of radicalisation, especially at the point of our highest vulnerability: youngsters. Schools, families, and social networks play a crucial role here. Families provide children their primary socialisation, where children are taught to distinguish right from wrong. The socialisation of children in schools should also focus on talking about the presently taboo theme – the radicalisation of youngsters. Children should be educated about radicalisation, especially about online radicalisation, and extreme violence, and the same goes for teachers and social workers. The educational system should perceive radicalisation process as a reality. From this standpoint, many workshops and lectures should be held for youngsters, where the consequences of radicalisation process would be shown. More studies with the best and worst practices should be conducted and publicly presented, teachers should be more careful about deviations from normal behavior in classrooms and in public, and the presence of the above analyzed propaganda. We also need more comparative studies on radicalisation and de-radicalisation. The de-radicalisation process should also aim to win the hearts and minds of population, and therefore use all possible media and educational tools to present alternative narratives. Schools should be able to identify early indicators of Islamist or any other radicalisation with groups of kids



or, even more importantly, lonely individuals. This is a difficult task that will require further research in this field.

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# Factors of Radicalization

Srečo Dragoš

## Introduction

When addressing radicalism a problem occurs at the very beginning – in terms of the unclear definition of the subject under examination. Usually, the problem begins with vague definitions that are too broad or inadequate in other ways. As pointed out by Đorić (2016), expert elaborations tend to contain three kinds of errors in this respect: the use of synonyms, voluntarist qualifications and disregard of the difference between the general and specific. A superficial use of synonyms often leads to the equalisation of terms, such as populism, right-wing radicalism, extremism, neo-fascism, ultra-radicalism, terrorism, and so on.

Most often the voluntarist approach uses radicalism as a stigma in political discourse, and this occurs in two ways: for disqualification, where the designation of radicalism is used as a label of inferiority to demarcate competitive ideas or groups; or the same designation can serve as an “orientation” criterion of the analysis in which the term radicalism serves to qualify the extreme poles of the relationship between the left and the right wings, in order to more easily discern the nuances between different competitive actors in the political space. This is not always wrong, because such an “orientation” use is not necessarily without an analytical value, but it can only be realised under three conditions: if the concept of radicalism is clearly defined, if it is consistently applied, and at the same time empirically supported. If this is not the case, and only one of these conditions is absent, we have slipped into voluntarism. There is a

current example: in Slovenia, as elsewhere in Europe, this “orientation” confusion typically presents us with the problem that I am going to describe in the rest of this paragraph, and that was most clearly visible after the parliamentary election, in Slovenia in 2018, when the governing coalition was composed of numerous heterogeneous and small political parties. Despite the explicit, substantive as well as declarative competitiveness of all political parties that managed to enter Parliament, their only common characteristic was in the unified qualification of the one newly-formed party (established in June 2017) called the Left (*Levica*). Only because no other party (in Slovenia) was located even farther left from it, this political party has been considered the “extreme left” by all political actors and most of the media, although neither in its programme nor its actions has there been anything that would distinguish the Left from the classical social-democratic parties that existed for most of the 20th century.<sup>1</sup> The third case of erroneous designation occurs through blurring the difference between the general and the specific; this shift often leads to the hasty equalisation of radicalism with terrorism, merely due to the assumption that any terrorism is at the same time also radicalism (which it is) – but the reverse is not always true. Not every form of radicalism advocates the use of terrorism, as the first is a general concept, while the second is a specific one (by analogy with fruit/apple, building/house, justice/equality, etc.). This supports the point that one of the biggest problems in examining radicalism and extremism “lies in the fact that these social phenomena are dynamic and, in order to be analysed in a scientifically objective manner, they must be examined in the specific temporal, spatial and socio-political context” (Đorić, 2016: p. 215).

## Modernisation and Pluralism

In addressing the subject in the title, I will consider this general warning expressed in three more concrete points:

- 1 It is true, however, that the *Left* party is more to the left than its most proximate competitor, that is, the *Social Democrats* party [*Socialni demokrati*], after the latter's once social-democratic profile was diluted by the party's declared, decisive and actual move to the political centre, where now (in Slovenia) most parliamentary parties try to hold their positions. There are two reasons for the *Social Democrats'* turn to the right in the past quarter of the century. Firstly, due to their susceptibility to neoliberalism, and secondly their premeditated attempt to destigmatise themselves from the socialist system in which this party was constituted (under the then name *The League of Communists of Slovenia - Zveza komunistov Slovenije*). This is not to be considered mimicry, but the transition philosophy of the “Visegrad Group” of former socialist countries: *Social Democrats* – to survive in such nations – saved themselves from the stigma of impersonating the former one-party regime by proving that they were the trustworthy followers of the neoliberalism that replaced the collapsed system of the Eastern bloc.

1. radicalism (as a general qualification) should be distinguished from the concrete *factors* of this social phenomenon;
2. the factors of radicalisation are not typical of any single social sphere, system or organisation; on the contrary, as a rule they can occur in all dimensions of human (social and psychical) action;
3. radicalism is defined (in this article) as a combination of four factors: cognitive, political, existential and temporal.

The first point involves the understanding of the factors of radicalism in terms of its *conditions*, or, as it were, in terms of its *constituents* (in such cases when this phenomenon actually occurs in reality); which means that no individual factor can be considered as the cause of radicalism.<sup>2</sup> If, independently of the context, religion or socialisation, the media or authoritarian leaders, deprivation or inequality, culture or values... are declared the cause of radicalism, this is similar to saying that the cause of radicalism is like water which is consumed, in one way or another, by all radicalised people. A typical example of such erroneous reduction to a single factor of the causal effect is the polemics about the causes of fascism in American sociology (Bannister, 1992: pp. 174–176). A specific variation of such overrating of an individual factor is its selective valuation, in which only the obvious, expected or desired effects of a factor are considered, and its opposite effects are ignored. An example of this variation is the qualification of the theology of Martin Luther, the founder of the Protestant Reformation, in which the emancipatory effect of his radicalism on the relation between the believer and God is often one-sidedly emphasised, and this same radicalism's effect on secular authorities is ignored, although it was quite opposed to the first effect, because it strengthened the legitimacy of absolutism (Spruk, 2018).

The second point calls attention to the false assumption which in the West has (again)<sup>3</sup> escalated in the Islamophobic responses to the terrorism

2 An analogy with precipitation: water, condensation, droplet growth, temperature, pressure, air flow etc., are the factors without which precipitation could not occur, although none of them is the cause that in itself would explain this result.

3 Also in Slovenia, the same pattern of wrong responses has been traditionally present since the late 19th century and is known as the “cultural fight”. This syntagm mistakenly qualifies the history of radical social movements in the territory of Slovenia, the essence of which is allegedly “culturally” conditioned due to the antagonism between the Catholic and Communist social movements, which empirically cannot be sustained. The result of this approach is – on one side – ignoring the historically important and very strong Christian-socialist current that opposed the clericalists of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia (and that during World War II recruited most of the partisans in the fight against fascism), and at the same time – on the other side – this same approach blurred the difference between the actors on the political left, where the dominant social-democratic current was equated with the representatives of the Stalinist version of Marxism, although even in the early 1930 the

of Islamic extremists. Namely, that radicalism is immanent to a certain religion as opposed to other religions and spheres of action, which is a mistaken belief. Radicalism is not an inherent characteristic of any social sphere, and at the same time no sphere is immune to this phenomenon or holds monopoly over it. This applies to politics as well as religion, economics, the arts, dietary practices,<sup>4</sup> physical needs, gardening<sup>5</sup> and other fields. Forget this and radicalism can easily be attributed only to the religious<sup>6</sup> or political spheres (as seen in the example of the religious functionaries of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia, who still blame the political authorities from the former socialist system for all the current problems of their organisation; Štuhec, 2000: p. 21). Simplified qualifications of radicalism – particularly in the case of terrorism – are the principal origin of such wrong reactions (Lerner 2006: pp. 167–171). It is the problem of the origin of radicalism that is one of the questions to which there is no essential difference between the religious and political fields. This can be seen both from the empirical evidence<sup>7</sup> as well as the definition of these general fields, such as in the following examples:

A religion is a complex mixture of beliefs, values, symbols and rituals. Most mayor religions /.../ contain beliefs and values about this world, whatever they may say about another, super-empirical one /.../ Religion can be seen as a part of the ideological sphere of a society when it operates in a way which helps to maintain the political, cultural and economic arrangements of that society over time. (Bocock, 1985: p. 207)

“Religion refers to the systems of general compensators”<sup>8</sup> (Stark, & Bainbridge, 2007: p. 47), with characteristically both politics and religion

latter were still a very marginal political force (Dolenc, 1996; Dragoš, 1998, 2011, 2015; Pelikan, 1997, 2002; Prunk, 1977; Repe, 2015).

4 For example, veganism, particularly in cases, when it is practiced from birth.

5 In Great Britain as many as 17 % of the owners of gardens were victims of thefts, most often of garden gnomes – which were most frequently the target of the organisations fighting for the liberation of garden gnomes and for their return to the forest. The most well-known phenomenon of this kind was noticed in France, where the Front for the Liberation of Garden Gnomes took several thousand gnomes from the gardens” (Thieves [Tatovi], 2018).

6 See the list of examples in Lerner, 2006: pp. 41–43.

7 “Sacrifice and self-sacrifice, particularly from young people, is known in numerous national and liberation movements; we know this also from Slovenian history. Because Islam is very heterogenous, and can be understood in different ways, it can act as the grounds for encouraging people to sacrifice and self-sacrifice for religious-political goals /.../ There is nothing exceptional in this. The Crusaders also left for war, obtaining concessions for their sins in advance, in case they would die, while fighting with infidels.” (Kerševan, 2015).

8 Compensators are unattainable, unverifiable or non-existent rewards for which there is demand (e.g. an afterlife). Definition: “Compensators are expectations of a reward correspond-



maintaining their respective monopolies in terms of the “protection of compensators against their rebut. (ibid.: p. 300)

What was said about religion, applies, *mutatis mutandis*, also for other forms of superior order of meaning. Modernisation has, if not completely abolished, at least made more difficult the maintenance of the monopoly of locally constrained socially integrated systems of meaning and values. (Berger & Luckmann, 1999: p. 32)

The boundaries of politics are always and necessarily highly contested of the range of issues that can potentially be considered as political – from the economy to the environment, and from morality to sex /.../ These debates and challenges underscore the fact that an element of force is always necessarily involved in politics. From this perspective, politics can be conceived in the terms of Harold Lasswell’s book *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (1936). (Turner, 2006: pp. 446–447)

Not accidentally, the fields of religion and politics, as described in the above quotes, are so similar that we probably would not even notice if somebody would mixed up the words and replaced “religion” with politics”, and vice versa – the definitions would still remain equally meaningful. The historical differentiation of religion and politics towards specific and autonomous<sup>9</sup> systems, that we started to face half of millennium ago in the West, does not mean in itself that these two fields of social regulation have remained without a common core. Instead, both systems – politics and religion – are oriented to that which they have never surrendered: they are specialised to operate with all three kinds of transcendences, i.e., with the small and medium, as well as large-scale.<sup>10</sup> In relation to transcendence, the differences between both fields in terms of the division of labour only refer to the amount of the attention they attract:<sup>11</sup> religion mainly puts forward large transcendences, while politics focuses on the

ing to the explanations that are not easily susceptible to unambiguous valuation /.../ People consider compensators in terms of rewards” (Stark & Bainbridge, 2007: p. 44).

9 Autonomy is the systems’ reaction towards the reduction of risk, as well as contingency and complexity of the outer environment in which they operate. At the same time this is how they create their own, new problems, for which only they can find appropriate solutions (Luhmann, 1995: pp. 186, 204). One of these solutions is the interpenetration of systems (ibid.: pp. 212–218) – however, it is in the case of the interpenetration of political and religious systems that this strategy is the most theoretically vague, politically risky and legally constrained.

10 Transcendences are the basic building-blocks of meaning (as defined by Thomas Luckmann, 1997: pp. 109–112).

11 The degree of attention is institutionally regulated with positive and negative sanctions, or with benefits and costs (as Stark & Bainbridge, 2007, would say).

medium ones. But, as noted above, neither is without them. With, in this sense, both politics as well as religion being typically omnipresent or hypercomplex<sup>12</sup> systems, it makes sense to consider the following two theses in relation to radicalisation. For lack of space I will not go into detail, but will only give a short formulation of both:

- the more the systems of institutionalised meanings (in our case, politics and religion)<sup>13</sup> are hypercomplex, the greater the possibility for the radicalisation of dissatisfied minorities among the members of the system;
- although, in the long term, modernisation and pluralisation of social systems are narrowing the space for radical choices, this can only be said for top to bottom radicalisation, and not in the opposite direction.

The more optimistically we understand modernisation the more these two theses will sound pessimistic, as a “tax” on Enlightenment illusions. This “tax” is justified for two reasons; the first is linked to the expected scope of modernisation processes, and the second to their depth. The estimations of both were exaggerated, beginning with the father of sociological science, Émile Durkheim (for more on this see Berger & Luckmann, 1999: pp. 33–34). Sociologically, there is no controversy, and thus it is believed that – more than ever before in the history of human societies – such strong factors as modernisation and modern<sup>14</sup> pluralism lead to relativisation due to demonopolisation. Values, the persuasiveness of their explanations and the power of institutional mechanisms that support them, are becoming weaker due to the competition that erodes them. This results in the “decanonisation” of truths as well as “dis-orientation

12 It is hypercomplex in terms as understood by systems theory (for a definition, see Niklas Luhmann, 1995: 471), and the fundamental problem of these systems is autoperalysis. Willke describes this problem as the paradox of the “relationship between complexity and contingency: paradoxality of the principled possibility of creating diverse realities by choosing certain options of the complex whole on one hand, and the autoperalysis of the complex system for the very abundance of options” on the other (emphasis in Willke, 1993: p. 87). Willke wrote this diagnosis, that gives a good explanation of today’s crisis of the system of parliamentary democracy, in 1989, that is, in different times that were extremely optimistic for the development of democracy.

13 Because the art system also belongs among hypercomplex systems (specific theories or aesthetics + “language” + rules + institutions + production processes + definitions of system boundaries of inside/outside), this system is also considered overburdened and consequently equally susceptible to radicalisation. However, it is not dangerous, because – as opposed to politics and religion – it is based on essentially different relationship between coercive and persuasive forms of power.

14 As a consequence of modernisation processes, modern pluralism differs from previous pluralisms in pre-modern societies (Berger & Luckmann, 1999: pp. 28–29).

of the individual and entire groups” (ibid.: pp. 33–38). Although modern pluralism is useful, because it promotes the peaceful coexistence of different lifestyles, it cannot be considered a “direct inhibitor of the process of expansion of crises of meaning”, as Berger and Luckmann have put it. The authors show that the problem lies in the narrow scope of pluralisation processes. Namely, pluralisation only suggests to the individual how they should behave towards others, but that is all. Pluralisation is neither a map nor an algorithm for action. Now individuals have to find their own way of how to “very concretely lead one’s life,” as they find themselves in a situation when “the unquestioned *validity* of the *traditional order* is shaken” (ibid.: pp. 29–30), faster and faster and more and more dramatically.

Moreover systems theory – about which Berger and Luckmann give an account with regard to the individual as a psychic system (confrontation with meaning) – points to the same problem with regard to interactive, social and societal systems.<sup>15</sup> The processes of modernisation and pluralisation have come to present a growing challenge for the systemic regulation of their boundaries with the environment due to the growing contingency; that is, the possibility that “something can be like this or like something else” (Luhmann, 1995: pp. 25, 56–57). The growing contingency is related to the growing complexity and the need for its selection, which, as I have said, applies to all human systems. The more complex the circumstances the more difficult is the regulation of the difference between a system and its environment (both external and internal). With regard to the strategies of radicalisation, contingency is important, because it increases the degree of vagueness, insecurity, distress and risk, and in turn radicalism can (under certain circumstances) become a possible exit from the resulting dilemma.

## The Cage of Radicalisation

Radicalism means – as I defined it at the beginning of this paper – a combination of four factors (as illustrated in Figure 1):<sup>16</sup>

- Cognitive factor: this involves the *attitude* to reality. Its perception is possible on the dimension between two extreme poles, between complete relativism and the opposite extreme, a fundamentalist attitude to the world or to certain truths in individual fields. With regard with this dimension Krüger’s definition of fundamentalism seems appropriate: “‘Fundamentalism’, thus understood, implies not only a set of substantive ideas, but also a particular cognitive style

15 For a general theory of systems and their classification see Luhmann, 1995: pp. 1–11.

16 Figure 1 present factors as dimensions in space.

and stance, as well as a style of social positioning” (Krüger, 2006: p. 888).

- Political factor: this means the choice of the *mode* of action in all those cases and circumstances that involve making the decision that something needs to be changed. Of course, the answers to the question of how this should be done can be different, although not entirely arbitrary. They are possible on the dimension between two extreme poles, where one pole presents the minimum correction in terms of reformism, and the opposing pole presents the maximum, that is, radical change (with taking into account that being radical within this dimension is not the same as radicalism in a wider sense).<sup>17</sup>
- Existential factor: this defines the *direction* of action, including two opposing directions that are usually combined, and sometimes can be one-sidedly intensified. One possibility is to direct the action inwards, involving only a change in the psychological world of the individual or social networks within a community. The opposite is the outward action, where changing the world is the condition for change at the micro level. The most evident consequences of both choices are segregation in the case of acting inwards, and proselytism in the case of acting outwards.
- Temporal factor: this involves the perception of time in the *acausal* sense, where “time is not a line, but a network of intentionalities” (Merleau-Ponty 2006: p. 423). We usually imagine time superficially as a chronological sequence of “presents”, classified in three more general categories, the past, present and future. More adequate is the intentional qualification of temporality, where this phenomenon both in terms of contents and attitude to them depends on the position of the observer. Intentionality opens up many different and

17 This radicalness in the *mode* of action needs to be separated from the wider phenomenon of radicalisation, presented in Figure 1, for the following reasons: the first case involves radicalness in the *narrow* sense of a conscious choice of action (within the dimension), while the second involves radicalisation in the *wider* sense of the effect of all four dimensions (Figure 1) that coincide in the extremes. The difference is important, because radicalism in the narrow sense is easier to change, as it still involves a conscious decision, where – in Weber’s terminology – the actor carries out either purposive-rational or value-rational action (Brunkhorst, 1998: pp. 2–3), while it is no longer possible to easily exit radicalism in its wider sense: it already acts as a “cage”, because action is no longer only dependent on the actor, but mainly on the context in which it takes place.

For the needs of this article let it be enough to define radicalism in the *narrow* sense as the action of those individuals, groups or organisation that carry out “positive or negative influence on more mainstream movement organizations by pushing for more action than on-radical actors are willing to commit” (Cross & Snow, 2011: p. 117).




Figure 1: Four dimensions (of the cage) of radicalisation:

subjectively possible combinations, because – “I do not pass through a series of instances of now, the images of which I preserve and which, placed end to end, make a line. With the arrival of every moment, its predecessor undergoes a change /.../ beginning to outline itself against, or project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment ago it *was* my present. When a third moment arrives, the second undergoes a new modification;” and so on (ibid.).<sup>18</sup>

This approach to understanding time is three times more adequate than the conventional one. First, it deters us from reducing time, as we

<sup>18</sup> This is why Merleau-Ponty points out that instead of reducing temporality (to a mere sequence of factual events  $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ ) we always have to deal with the “network of intentionalities” that is not composed only of A, B and C, but also of A', B', A'', B'', etc. For a schematic illustration of this network, taken from Husserl, see Merleau-Ponty, 2006: p. 423; for an explanation see ibid.: pp. 416-439. The aforementioned events, marked by the capital letters and one or two apostrophes, also include memory which cannot be reduced only to present or to past. Memory is the intersection of both, which means that the same object of memory can involve several different intersections, depending on the viewpoint. In this regard, Davie’s revealing classification of memory related to the reproduction of religious tradition in Europe lists eight different types of memory (Davie, 2003: p. 273).

usually do, to a series of superficial events, by introducing an additional logic of connections that are not only causal; second, it considers these connections – or better associations – of objective events as depending on the observer. And third, the intentional concept avoids the reduction of temporality on factuality that can be objectively measured, such as with a clock, since time is a relational phenomenon (“network”) to which we only have access through conscious understanding. This means that one and the same object of temporal events (A, B, C) triggers different phenomena. Because these are defined by the position of the actor that subjectivates objectivity (in A', A''...), the phenomenological approach to temporality is particularly important in confronting radicalism. It calls attention, for example, to the fact that a literal reading of holy books or historical chronologies is as equally possible as any other, and that it is impossible to ignore this (typically fundamentalist) feature by assuming a binary logic (actual / fictional, permitted / prohibited, adequate / inadequate), where only one possibility would be the right one and the other stigmatised as unreal.

The arrow in Figure 1 illustrates the radicalisation of an individual actor. Only when the fundamentalist attitude to reality is combined (from the temporal perspective) with the radical mode of outward action do we have radicalisation as a social phenomenon. If all four dimensions do not appear simultaneously, then radicalness is not dangerous, because it remains within the individual dimensions. The same can be said for institutions as the tools of power, as was pointed out over half a century ago by Robert K. Merton, the critic of classical functionalism, in the debate on simultaneous functionality and disfunctionality of an actor (Merton, 1979).<sup>19</sup> The same applies to radicalism – which at times can even be considered beneficial.

## Examples

A typical example of one of the benefits of radicalism is the demand for the separation of church and state from the religious sphere. This modernist solution – which Slovenia has even written into its Constitution (Article 7) – started with the demand for the establishment of a “wall of separation” between the church and the state. This innovative and radical

19 “In every concrete example a certain phenomenon can have functional as well as dysfunctional consequences”, says Merton (1979; p. 115). From this he derives two conclusions in regard with social analysis: “To the extent that functional analysis focuses wholly on functional consequences, it leans toward an ultraconservative ideology; to the extent that it focuses wholly on dysfunctional consequences, it leans toward an ultra-radical utopia” (ibid., p. 103). *Social Theory and Social Structure*, The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 94.

idea was first set out by Roger Williams (1603–1683), an English theologian and reformed Baptist, who aimed, in his words, to safeguard the religious gardens against the secular desert, and protect the church against the harmful influence of the secular authorities. Williams' solution was adopted a hundred years later by the third president of the USA, Thomas Jefferson, although this time with the opposite aim: to keep conflictual religious tendencies away from the federal authorities, and to protect the secular government against any religious influence (Weber, 1998; Dragoš, 2001). Although in Williams' case we speak about religious fundamentalism and radical political demands, we cannot consider this radicalisation (as a "cage"),<sup>20</sup> as Williams' endeavours were not directed outward, but rather inward (isolation against a secular exterior, rather than diffusion of religion outwards). Numerous other cases of radicalism can be seen as neutral; that is, neither detrimental nor beneficial to society. For example, a vegan lifestyle or the separation of dental floss in plastic waste – lying within the fields of dietary practices and environmental concerns, respectively – could both be considered radical, maybe even fundamental, actions (if they involve the belief that they help change the world). But as long as such gestures are directed only to the actor that performs them, they do not have any detrimental effects in terms of Figure 1.

A different case is the recent European trend of promulgate sanctions on wearing headgear in public that partly or entirely cover the face (as in France, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, and, to some extent, the Netherlands). In terms of the mode of action this is a radical measure, because it violates both religious and human rights. At the same time it is directed outwards, as it implies the formal imposition of new habits that are to be observed by all members of society, while in practice this can actually be seen as a measure against Muslim women that wear a niqab or burqa. In terms of the third dimension (Figure 1) involving the attitude to reality, these measures could be strongly suspected as indicating a shift towards fundamentalism, which, in this case, is even supported by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. How could we understand in any other way the explanation that this prohibition is "necessary in a democratic society", as the judges' explanation reads, because it aims to "ensure the conditions for a common life as an element for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" (Prepoved, 2017)? How can 200 women from the social margins, who cover their mouths and noses in Denmark population of 5.7 million, shake democracy along with the conditions for a common life, and endanger the freedom of others? It is those

20 See footnote 17.

who truly believe this that have a fundamentalist attitude to reality. Only the fourth dimension in Figure 1 (temporality) shows the social function of such sanctioning of clothes. Even if we are not phenomenologists, it is not difficult to predict different temporal “networks of intentionality” in the perception of this measure. Obviously, some will believe that this is only a safety measure against the erosion of tolerance in society, while others will see the same measure as a symptom or even a trigger of intolerance.

One of perhaps the most bizarre examples of radicalism, which is unimaginable outside the social context, is the recent movement known as “QAnon”<sup>21</sup> in the USA. It consists of a vast collection of pro-Trump claims and predictions that foretell, like one of Nostradamus’ prophecies, the fight against a “deep state”, including ideas such as 1) the “Russian investigation” is a distraction to hide something else, namely Donald Trump’s endeavours to uncover a network of paedophiles, naturally including Barak Obama and Bill and Hillary Clinton, and after these figures are arrested they will be imprisoned in Guantanamo, Cuba; 2) the Republicans lost the Senate elections in Alabama on purpose, because this is a long-term plan to fight against those who are tampering with voting machines, with the final goal of this strategy being to bring down George Soros; or 3) President Kennedy’s assassination only happened because he wanted to disclose the existence of the “deep state” and its secret government, while according to some versions of this story Kennedy is still alive, and the assassination was faked by this same “deep state” in order to kidnap Kennedy and then use him, in some way, to gain power in the next elections, etc. QAnon is not interesting because of the bizarre and obviously false stories that it proposes, but because it has been able to attract mass attention and help start a kind of social movement (called by some the “Trumpenproletariat”). An application for mobile phones related to these conspiracy theories has become one of the top sellers on Apple’s online store, while a video with the same kind of contents has already reached over 200,000 views on YouTube; a man “took over” the Hoover Dam bridge in Arizona, blocked the road and demanded the publication of some classified documents, the existence of which he was informed of by QAnon; and at a Donald Trump’s rally in Florida his supporters wore T-shirts with capital letter Q and posters saying “We are Q” (Kopušar, 2018). If we classify these developments in Figure 1, we can see that they are oriented towards extremes on all four dimensions (radicalism in the mode of action, outward orientation, the change of the entire

21 Q is a code for an anonymous person who is supposedly a high official with access to classified information, and Anon is an abbreviation of the word anonymous.



society, a fundamentalist attitude to reality, and an “alternative” reading of events). How much impact this radicalism will have depends on both the social circumstances and the most powerful man in the country who is creating them.

The reason why Figure 1 is marked as a “cage” is because it illustrates the *social* context that moves various combinations of dimensions towards one or the other direction. When negative extremes of the four dimensions coincide, everything goes wrong, because they encourage closed, self-referential logic. One of the important constituents of the context that strengthens the development of individual dimensions is social power: that is why it does matter who combines the extremes in the abovementioned dimensions (Figure 1) – whether the actors are people in power or from the social margins. In this context, Koopmans (1993) and others<sup>22</sup> point out that the qualification of radicalism primarily depends on the state and its reaction to certain events. Since in Europe Muslims (beside the Roma) are now the most stigmatised part of the population, some educational experts warn that Muslim schools – despite their practicing religious indoctrination – pose less threat for the radicalisation of their students than mixed schools that are also attended by Muslim children, because in mixed schools children are exposed to more pressure coming from the environment due to their specific religious or ethnic differences (Merry, 2018). While I am certainly not trying here to advocate educational indoctrination, what I am suggesting is a choice of lesser risk. Although studies with the opposing findings also seem convincing (e.g. Hewstone et al., 2018), it is very likely that the reduction of discrimination and stigmatisation that can occur in the learning process does not depend on the (non-)existence of religious schools, but on the social context in which they operate.

Apart from social power and status, the context of radicalisation also depends on material inequality and the related expectations. According to Gallup and Castelli (1989: p. 122) – “American blacks are, by some measures, the most religious people in the world.” They see the reason for this in the context in which such people live, as individual religiosity is most influenced by ethnicity or colour of skin, social-economic status, degree of education, size of the city in which a person lives, and the religiosity of one’s parents (Batson et al., 1993: pp. 38–43). If the changes in economic or social conditions that are occurring in the richest societies of the world prevent the majority of people from expecting that their material

22 “The tolerance of different regimes for certain types of behavior can cause dramatic shifts in what constitutes radicalism over very short periods of time” (Cross & Snow, 2011: p. 117).

conditions will ever improve, and in fact they fear they will become ever worse off, then this is a favourable condition for radical thinking. While in the past half century the characteristics of the USA and UK which gave rise to Trump and Brexit have been amply and empirically documented and commented on, they still deserve to be repeated:

In the UK, the average income of the richest 10% is almost 10 times as large as for the poorest 10%. The OECD average is 9.5, in France and Germany it is around 7 and in the US 16. OECD (2015)

In this context, Slovenia stands out as one of the most developed countries among the smallest in the world (with only two million inhabitants). However, it is in relation to social inequality that public opinion is also becoming radicalised in Slovenia, although, as opposed to the US and UK, it has a much better situation in this regard. Slovenia was always (and remains) a state with one of the smallest degrees of income inequality in Europe, and therefore is among the world's most egalitarian countries according to this criterion. This is why Slovenia still (for now) also boasts a below the European average degree of poverty among its population, is high in the world in terms of the degree of general safety and has a low per capita number of criminal acts and prisoners, a rapid reduction in the traffic mortality rate, high gender equality rate, low neonatal mortality rate, and is further distinguished by a series of other key indicators that show the good quality of life (Messner, 2014; Flere & Lavrič, 2005: p. 741; UNICEF, 2009; Porter et al., 2014). In short, if a alien from the space would shipwreck on the planet Earth and chose to live in the Slovenian oasis, they would come off rather well.<sup>23</sup> However, even in Slovenia public opinion has become radicalised, and the most so in terms of inequality. What has been going on to cause this?

The right side of *Table 2* shows that Slovenia remains (in almost all years of the measured period) a very, and even exceptionally low, degree of inequality with respect to the whole EU. Even the Nordic states do not come close to it, and although they are among the best in the world they still lag behind Slovenia according to this criterion, because they have a higher average Gini coefficient (GC). In 2016, only Iceland and Slovakia had an even lower GC than Slovenia (Eurostat, 2018). For Slovenia, a former socialist country, this is an excellent result, because most of the former socialist countries show a much higher degree of inequality, which exceeds the European average.

23 But only under the condition that they do not tell they are alien (Dragoš, 2016; Lukšič-Hacin, 2017; Kramberger et al., 2004).

Table 2: Inequality (Gini coefficient) and the attitude towards it, as measured by the share of those who strongly agree with the statement that the government “*should adopt measures to reduce differences in peoples’ incomes*” (measured on a five-degree scale: 1 = strongly agree ... 5 = not agree at all; summarised from Toš, 2017: pp. 354-355)

STATE	YEAR	ATTITUDE TO INEQUALITY				INEQUALITY		
		STRONGLY AGREE		AVERAGE (1-5)		Gini coefficient		CHANGE '09 - '16 (%)
		%	CHANGE '02 - '14 (%)	%	CHANGE '02 - '14 (%)	2009	2016	
Slovenia	2002	34.4	+ 25.6	1.89	- 3.7	22.7	24.4	+ 7.5
	2014	43.2		1.82				
Ex-socialism <sup>1</sup>	2002	29.7	+ 31.6	1.64	+ 18.3	32.2	31.7	- 1.6
	2014	39.1		1.94				
Nordic countries <sup>3</sup>	2002	18.7	+ 7.0	2.46	- 0.4	26.6	26.0	- 2.3
	2014	20.0		2.45				
EU <sup>4</sup>	2002	25.5	+ 24.7	2.21	- 4.1	30.6	30.8	+ 0.7
	2014	31.8		2.12				

1 The higher the value of the coefficient, the larger the inequality.

2 Ex-socialist states (without Slovenia): the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland. The Gini coeff. (on the right side of the table) here refers to the average of 11 countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Croatia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, Macedonia and Serbia (in the last two countries the data for 2013 and 2013 is used instead of the data for 2009).

3 Nordic states: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden. The Gini coeff. (on the right side of the Table) applies to the average of all five Nordic states, including Iceland.

4 Given is the average of the EU 24 countries (including Israel and Switzerland). The Gini coeff. (on the right side of the Table) applies to the EU 27.

However, the last column of *Table 2* shows that in the years during and after the most recent economic crisis inequality has increased in Slovenia, with the GC having risen by 7.5 percent in seven years. During the same period of time it has only increased by 0.7 per cent on average in Europe, and notably reduced in the former socialist countries and Nordic

nations. If we compare this significant shift towards a greater inequality in Slovenia with the left side of the table, which shows the public attitude toward the issue of wealth redistributions, it becomes clear where the dissatisfaction comes from. The figures show that the percentage of Slovenians who strongly agree that inequality should be reduced and that it is the responsibility of the government to achieve this is above the European average, as well as that seen in the Nordic and former socialist countries. Similarly, in Slovenia the growth in this percentage between the years 2002 and 2014 – while also increasing in the rest of Europe – is above the European average.

The next factor that makes Slovenia consistently stand out from the rest of Europe is the political one (= dimension: “mode of action” in *Figure 1*). Typically, it shows the simultaneous presence of a markedly leftist orientation of public opinion and the continued rule of neoliberal governments (cohibentency). Slovenia has one of the “leanest” states, and is rather stingy towards its citizens considering the size of its GDP. Slovenian expenditure on social protection (as a percentage of GDP) is well under the European average, and has been decreasing over the past decade, while in other EU countries this figure has been increasing. The same applies to expenditure on pensions (as a percentage of GDP), while the Slovenian health sector is on the verge of collapse, due to both a lack of finances and staff. According to this criterion it is completely uncomparable with the European average. There are similar stories in the public resources available for science, as well as for the housing sector that is one of the most privatised in Slovenia and among the worst in Europe. There is also a very high level of precarious employment, a high level of dissatisfaction regarding trust in company managers and directors, and Slovenia also has one of the highest levels of state involvement in the economy<sup>24</sup> (Eurostat, 2017; OECD, 2017; Dragoš & Leskošek, 2016). As shown in Table 2, public opinion is very critical of the Slovenian state, while the political consequences of this can be seen in Table 3.

In its political preferences, it is Slovenian society that is most oriented to the left in Europe. In Slovenia in all the years examined the average value on the ten-degree (self-evaluated) scale is well under 5, while the European average is above this mean value, which also applies to the former socialist countries that are most comparable with Slovenia, and even more for the Nordic group. For reasons of comparison Table 3 also includes two more countries (participating in the ESS 2002–2016 survey)

<sup>24</sup> This indicator of central government spending by function is measured as a percentage of total expenditures: the OECD average is 12 %, and data for Slovenia show 17 %; the opposite is shown for social protection: Slovenia 25.4 %, OECD average 26.4 % (OECD, 2017).

Table 3: The leftist orientation of Slovenian public opinion (between 2002 and 2014, based on self-evaluation in the question): *“Politics sometimes speaks about the left and the right. Where would you classify yourself on the scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10 means right?”* (Toš, 2017: pp. 352–353)

STATE	YEAR	AVERAGE VALUE	DIFFERENCE 2002 – 2014	
			%	Direction of shift
Slovenia	2002	4.70	- 6.2	Very much to the left
	2014	4.41		
Spain	2002	4.41	+ 0.2	Slightly to the right
	2014	4.42		
Israel	2002	5.68	+ 2.5	To the right
	2014	5.82		
Ex-socialist <sup>1</sup>	2002	5.17	+ 1.4	To the right
	2014	5.24		
Nordic states <sup>2</sup>	2002	5.34	+ 0.4	Slightly to the right
	2014	5.36		
EU (24) <sup>3</sup>	2002	5.11	- 0.2	Slightly to the left
	2014	5.10		

1 Ex-socialist states (without Slovenia): the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland.

2 Nordic states: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden.

3 The stated average of the EU countries (including Israel and Switzerland).

that stand out with regard to this factor, i.e. Spain and the “European” complement, Israel; the first is at the extreme, because it has the same value as Slovenia, while the second is the most right wing. As is evident from the last two columns of the table, in economically the most critical years – that is, between 2002 and 2014<sup>25</sup> – public opinion in Slovenia moved more to the left than anywhere else in Europe. Moreover, Slovenia is also the country in Europe with the highest percentage of respondents who (according to various criteria) are very critical of capitalism and consider socialism to be better (Toš & Vovk, 2014). In short, a basic characteristic of Slovenia is that, right from the very foundation of this young country, in 1991, the general public has been moving notably to the left, while the

25 Economically the mentioned period is the most critical for three reasons: because it indicates the peak of the most recent recession, which marked the triumph of neoliberalism and the collapse of various stock market bubbles that had inflated due to a belief in infinite economic growth; because this collapse was followed by a very severe economic crisis, comparable with that in the 1930s; because even after leaving this crisis nothing indicates that we have had learned anything from it.

Table 4: “How satisfied are you in general with the functioning of democracy in Slovenia?” - comparison of Slovenia with the EU average and with the Czech Republic and Norway (between 2002 and 2014; summarised after Toš, 2017: p. 347)

COUNTRY (all in %)	YEAR of measurement	SCALE from 0 to 10: 0 = very unsatisfied ... 10 = very satisfied										AVERAGE VALUE		
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		10	
Slovenia	2002	6,7	5,0	10,0	14,5	12,3	20,9	10,4	11,0	7,1	1,4	0,9	4,39	
	2014	18,1	11,8	16,2	18,6	10,4	12,8	5,4	3,6	2,1	0,3	0,7	2,90	
		64,7										6,7	Fall for	
	2002→2014	Growth for +78,7 %										Fall for -67,2 %	-33,9 %	
Czech Rep.	2002	3,8	5,4	7,6	13,1	11,1	20,5	11,4	12,9	8,7	4,7	0,9	4,85	
	2014	5,2	2,7	5,6	10,7	10,2	20,5	12,3	15,6	9,7	4,1	3,4	5,20	
		24,2										43,0	32,8	Growth for
	2002→2014	Fall for -19,1 %										No change	Growth for +20,6 %	+7,2
Norway	2002	1,0	0,9	2,5	5,4	8,4	18,4	15,1	20,6	17,9	7,7	1,8	6,14	
	2014	0,7	0,2	0,8	2,3	4,1	10,1	10,1	19,0	26,6	15,6	8,5	7,23	
		4,0										24,3	69,7	Growth for
	2002→2014	Fall for -59,2 %										Fall for -42,0 %	Growth for +45,2 %	+17,8
EU <sup>1</sup>	2002	3,8	2,6	5,2	8,7	9,9	18,5	12,8	16,0	14,2	5,2	3,0	5,51	
	2014	5,5	3,6	6,6	9,6	10,0	16,4	11,8	14,9	13,3	5,3	3,2	5,27	
		25,3										38,2	36,7	Fall for
	2002→2014	Growth for +24,6 %										Fall for -7,3 %	Fall for -4,4 %	-4,4 %

1 Given is the average of the EU countries (including Israel and Switzerland).




Table 5: Attitude to social change in Slovenian public opinion (Toš, 2014: p. 106)

Slovenian elites have been moving to the right. The results of these trends are shown in *Tables 4* and *5*.

Slovenian dissatisfaction with democracy is at a critically high level. *Table 4* shows that in 2014 the share of people who declared themselves unsatisfied with democracy in Slovenia amounted to over 64 %, well above the European average of 25.3 %. For reasons of comparison this table also includes the Czech Republic as the country that is most similar to Slovenia due to its experience of socialism, although the percentage of its citizens who are unsatisfied with democracy is substantially lower (24.2 %), and Norway, where the dissatisfaction is the lowest seen in Europe. The same trends can be seen in the right column of the same table: in 12 years the average self-assessed level of satisfaction, as measured on a scale from 0 to 10, fell 33.9 % in Slovenia, while during the same time the average fall for the whole EU was only 4.4 %. One consequence of these trends is an extraordinary radicalisation of public opinion in Slovenia over the past decade. As seen from *Table 5*, the percentage of self-defined conservatives who reject any changes to the current system has been approaching zero; the percentage of reformists that wish for gradual changes, which in the previous quarter century represented the majority of the public, has fallen dramatically; while those who think that “the entire way of functioning of our society needs to be radically changed with a determined action” have become the majority.

In short, the case of Slovenia is an educative illustration of the influence that social context has on radicalisation, even when seemingly nothing is wrong. Despite one of the lowest levels of inequality, and many other very favourable factors, public opinion in Slovenia has become radicalised, because of the growing distance between ordinary citizens and the political elites that run the country following a neoliberal plan. According to the results of the survey outlined above, an aversion to democracy has deepened with the majority of the population, who favour the option of having a “strong leader that would fix things” instead of more democracy. In 2015 – that is, several years after the end of the most recent economic crisis – this attitude was expressed by as much as 62.4 % of the Slovenian public, the highest level in Europe, while only 13 years ago this opinion was held by much less than half the population (Dragoš, 2016: p. 45).<sup>26</sup> Among those who would prefer to have an authoritarian leader over greater democracy, most are voters with low education, the unemployed, the religious, those over the age of 60, and those who live in poverty or close to it (Toš & Vovk, 2014). In short, despite the relatively low degree of inequality in Slovenian society, social factors are among the main ones linked to the mainstream distrust of democracy. With regard to other contextual reasons related to radicalisation, two other factors need to be noted, namely social capital along with unfavourable psychological shifts related to what is usually uncritically idealised as the Slovenian “national character”. While the indicator of the quality of social ties in Slovenia remains below the European average<sup>27</sup>, it is with regard to “national character” that Slovenians are markedly above the European average, and here they value the most negative personal characteristics, which are related to the concept of authoritarian personality. These characteristics are: submissiveness, modestolatry,<sup>28</sup> conformism and traditionalism. Despite the already high measured values for these characteristics at the start of the

26 In these terms the statement of the current president of Slovenia, Borut Pahor, seems typical: “With regard to running the governments, a certain world trend also needs to be considered. We are witnessing the growing phenomenon of strong political leaders, also in countries with long democratic traditions. For many people it is attractive to have a leader that can compensate for the deficiencies of democracy. If democracy does not work, they say to themselves, at least it is better to have a strong leader. Contrary to those that typically jump to conclude that this leads to authoritarianism, I am not so sure that the two are interconnected. People look for strong leaders for whom they believe would be able to fix things /.../ I am reserved towards predictions of apocalypse in cases when a strong political personality takes over leadership of the government” (Korljan, 2018).

27 Although slightly above the average of the former socialist countries.

28 It shows agreement with the statement: “It is important to be humble and modest, not to draw attention.”



period examined in this survey, these value orientations only grew stronger over the following 14 years (Toš, 2017: pp. 376 ss).

## Conclusion

The potential for radicalisation is not the characteristic of a single social sphere, system or organisation; quite the contrary, it can emerge in all dimensions of human (social and psychological) action. With the concept of radicalisation, as illustrated with the “cage” of four dimensions, we can thus avoid the most common mistakes that can occur when addressing the problem indicated in the title of this paper, namely the unreflected use of synonyms, voluntarist qualifications and ignoring the difference between the general and specific. The dimensions included in the concept are political (involving the mode of action), cognitive (attitude to reality), existential (direction of action) and temporal in the acausal sense (which Merleau-Ponty names the “network of intentionalities”). Radicalism arises because of an unfavourable combination of these dimensions, when moves along them coincide in the direction of extremes. Social context is an important amplifier of such shifts, and within this the primary factors are the power relations among the actors, inequality in the distribution of goods and opportunities, and the related expectations people have with regard to their lives. The example of Slovenia is particularly interesting to illustrate such effects, because this country does not have a very problematic degree of inequality among its citizens. Nonetheless, public opinion in Slovenia has become radicalised to a greater extent than in other European countries (although it remains within the political dimension of the “mode of action”, as shown in Figure 1). The main characteristics of the social context that explains this state of affairs are the prolonged and openly expressed division between – on one hand – people’s expectations, which are socially rather egalitarian and politically oriented to the left (socialist), and – on the other hand – the actions of the political elites who have applied neoliberal strategies of development. The future direction of Slovenian society, in terms of the strengthening of these individual and contradictory characteristics, depends on the social context. The least favourable direction would be the one leading towards the cage of radicalisation (Figure 1), where the extremes coincide. Slovenia is currently at a crossroads where everything still remains open, including a destructive version of the future that could resemble the 1930’s. This is because the country has many of the factors needed to realise this outcome, as laid out in the following equation: an aversion to parliamentary democracy and capitalism + favourable views of socialism and a strong leader +

the predominance of the authoritarian personality type + nationalism = national socialism.

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# Radical Hate Speech: The Fascination with Hitler and Fascism on the Slovenian Webosphere

Boris Vezjak

## Introduction

In January 2015, Lutz Bachmann, the leader of the German anti-Muslim Pegida movement, posted a photo of himself on his Facebook profile posing as Adolf Hitler and captioned by hate speech, referring to the migrants as “vermin”. This triggered an avalanche of media backlash and public distancing, also within the right movement’s membership itself. It seemed that a direct fascination with the Führer was going to be too difficult to justify even in the framework of political convictions of the likeminded and the wider public, which has come to expect nothing other than this sort of islamophobia and hatred towards migrants from Pegida and its leader. Kirn (2015: p. 51) notices that Bachmann’s positions were considered absolutely fine until the publication of the leader’s portrait. But having thus penetrated the media agenda, the leader’s public flaunting of his Hitlerian visage, which veritably reflects the truth about Pegida, miscarried and resulted in his, at least temporary, resignation from Pegida’s leadership.

Bachmann later tried to apologise by claiming that the photograph, featuring him wearing the typical Hitlerian parting with the addition of the recognizable moustache, was only an attempt at satire after a visit to the hairdresser for his sound book titled *He is back*. He added that that satire was a normal human reaction, which needs to be applied from time to time to allow for self-mockery (Connolly, 2015). This paper specifically examines the issue of the intolerability of the fascination with Hitler in Facebook users from Slovenia and, in turn, runs aground a similar

dilemma: how very seriously should online flirting with fascism be taken and considered to represent radical hate speech, while avoiding hasty generalizations? The textual evidence is unequivocal: social networks in Slovenia were flooded by markedly homogenous hate speech of intolerance, hatred, xenophobia and islamophobia after the outbreak of the refugee crisis, in particular after August 2015, which was continuously made legitimate by Slovenian politicians and their parties. At the same time, a large part of the mass media leaning towards or even financed by those same political parties saw a new political and marketing niche for self-promotion in the dissemination of fear, racism, intolerance and a negative attitude towards the refugees. In its most extreme form, the discourse occasionally resorted to direct approval of the worst crimes against humanity that were committed by fascist forces during WWII, including a fascination with Hitler, the Third Reich, and concentration camps as a freshly-discovered historical “solution” to the refugee problem. There can be no other explanation for the numerous calls for the Furner’s intervention, and the seeming disposition towards concentration camps and the use of gas chambers.

Is the fascination with Hitler on social networks, then, a *de facto* manifestation of oncoming fascism in Europe; and how to epistemologically explain it without arriving at (erroneous) conclusions? Can the enthusiasm over former fascist leaders alone constitute fascism; or, are references to Hitler to be taken at some other plane? Stanley (2018: pp. 9–10) lists common traits shared by fascist politicians as follows: a) emphasis on a common sense of history through the creation of a mythic past; b) rewriting the people’s understanding of reality through the establishment of the language of ideals, achieved in turn through propaganda and promoting anti-intellectualism; c) attacking universities and educational systems, when these challenge their ideas; d) creating a state of »unreality« through conspiracy theories and fake news replacing reasoned debate; e) the introduction of dangerous and false beliefs replacing the established understanding of reality; f) the naturalization of group differences, established through a seemingly natural and scientifically supported hierarchy of values; g) the solidification of social differences by using fear; h) a feeling of victimhood, developed in the dominant population every time progress of a minority group is detected; i) the appeal of the law and order policy, casting »us« as law-abiding citizens and »them« as criminals representing an existential threat to the nation; j) sexual anxiety that threatens the patriarchal hierarchy by growing gender equality.

It is impossible to deny that the evocations of Hitler and the Third Reich represent a form of promotion of fascism. Three public discourses on



Hitler may be distinguished, though they may not necessarily be »fascist discourse«. Below, these are treated summarily. The first includes modern attempts at reinterpreting fascism as an expletive; the assumption underpinning this thesis is that either the examined social phenomenon does not constitute fascism since it serves to obfuscate real social antagonisms, or that the marker “fascism” is only used to disqualify a political or any other opponent. Such a potentially dangerous “reductive” thesis is promulgated, among others, by Žižek (2018: p. 39):

Their function is to obfuscate actual social antagonisms – people are magically united against some demonized ‘fascist’ threat... The demonized image of a fascist threat clearly serves as a new political fetish, in the simple Freudian sense of a fascinating image whose function is to obfuscate the true antagonism. Fascism itself is inherently fetishist, it needs a figure like that of a Jew, condemned as the external cause of our troubles – such a figure enables us to obfuscate the immanent antagonisms that cut across our society. My claim is that exactly the same holds for the notion of ‘fascist’ in today’s liberal imagination: it enables us to obfuscate immanent deadlocks which lie at the root of our crisis.

In an interview, Žižek (Forstnerič Hajnšek, 2016) pointed out: “It is fashionable to speak about Europe becoming fascist. When I hear the word, I clench. Fascism usually replaces thinking. Instead of analysing an adverse situation, slap the fascism sticker on it, and it all gets clear.” It seems that to Žižek the search for the fascist as an enemy functions to obfuscate real social antagonisms. The more we look for the fascist, the blinder we are to real social problems. Therefore, the fascist threat is an unnecessary demonization practice: a fascist is demonised so as not to have to face real issues. The image of the fascist threat serves as a new political fetish, in the simple Freudian sense of a fascinating image whose purpose is to obfuscate true antagonisms; while fascisms is inherently fetish – hence the need for the figure of the Jew as the external root cause of our plight; however, such a character obfuscates the immanent antagonisms that govern our society. In the theory of fallacies, the *ad Hitlerum* line of argumentation comes with the same caveat: drawing analogies with Hitler will usually result in ensnaring the counterpart in a fatal analogy. A similar conclusion has been drawn by Mike Godwin, the author of the commonly referred to Godwin’s law: as a discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1. Since the Nazi leader has become a traditional metaphor to epitomise evil on online fora, any comparison drawn with Hitler is always simple, yet highly efficient, as noted by Erk (2012: p. 97). On the other hand, what is always

lurking is the danger that the real relevance and the historical gravity of the Nazi atrocities would pale into insignificance as a result of the hypertrophy of analogies with Hitler. However, Godwin's discovery does little to explain people's desire and need to sympathise with the Nazi regime. In fact, the fascination with Hitler is diametrically opposite to Godwin's law and may be paraphrased in the following rule: as the discussion on the refugees grows, why the parallel rise in probability that a person would mention Hitler as a potential solution?

If the first type of discourse on fascism can be labelled reductive, since it minimizes the significance of fascism and attributes the relevant discussion with a certain self-blinding tendency, or even draws parallels between the purposes of anti-fascism and fascism: that is a fetishist exclusion of the Other, then the next type is imitational. Meaning that fascism, including the fascination with Hitler, can only be virtual, satirical, »unreal«, perhaps pedagogical, and containing elements of parody. In this type, imitations of the Führer function most often to amuse, or provide a current social critique at best, but never serve to approve or foster fascist belief. Contrary to Žižek's reading, under which the marker is too hastily employed, this reading reduces the marker to a mere tool for consideration: a good example of such imitational discourse is the 2015 David Wnendt film titled *Er is wieder da*, a satirical parable on the return of Hitler in the twenty-first century, his resurfacing among the Germans, who convivially embrace him, and who, in return, delivers a number of grievous remarks about the society. Wnendt, perhaps in order to promote the film, even decided to engage in a small-scale psychological experiment and sent the male lead, Oliver Masucci, out on the streets of Berlin (Drury, 2015) with a surprising result: people pulled him over to take selfies and begged him to re-introduce concentration camps – 2015 marked one of the high tides of the refugee crisis in Germany – and support right wing movements in Germany.

In this second type of discourse on fascism, Hitler is still perceived as a pop icon, rendering the fascination with his personae not entirely attributable to the existence of fascist beliefs. Sometimes, Hitler is the source of material for comedy, featuring online in the form of various memes, with the emphasis on the interplay of incongruity and the search for amusement. The World Wide Web has made possible numerous visual, graphical and textual depictions; one noteworthy example is a scene from the 2004 German film *Der Untergang*, featuring a dramatic performance by Bruno Hanz as Hitler, which has been imitated profusely. Published on Youtube, the videos invariably alter the scene's context by subtitles playing out different variations of social events so as to further the agenda of

the authors of the subtitles, which is to ridicule. In the cases of Facebook users listed below; however, people do not embrace fascist nostalgia for name-calling, nor do they wish just to play make-believe fascism; rather, they are actually enthusiastic about it, at least from the perspective of the “useful solutions” that the holocaust offered.



### Textual evidence: Hitler’s awakening by Facebook users from Slovenia

“Nothing ever dies on the Internet,” says Rosenfeld, the author of *Hi Hitler! – How the Nazi Past Is Being Normalized in Contemporary Culture* (2015: 9). Facebook profiles, blogs, his websites and his digital presence are going to survive, making sure that Hitler’s presence in humanity is a constant. And while social networks today are one of the drivers of free speech online, providing an open platform for the expression of political and social beliefs in a significantly more open manner than in the past, there is a certain element of danger contained of trends of the line between freedom of speech and hate speech becoming increasingly blurred. People create posts, upload images or videos and make comments without being fully aware of the extent to which this may degrade and insult other groups, or individuals (Dawn, 2012).

If users are anonymous, the situation only worsens. The statements cited below were made from August 2015 to December 2015 on Facebook. They refer to the transit of refugees across Slovenia during one of the peaks of the refugee crisis and represent just a small proportion of all recorded opinions of Slovenian users. Importantly, it must be noted that the authors are not anonymous and have not concealed their identity. The sample – since only a small selection is cited – is intended for illustration purposes only. We emphasise that the statements were not sampled from Facebook profiles given over to the expression of radical positions and the dissemination of xenophobia, or locations frequented by aspiring radical right-wingers or neo-Nazi followers. The personal profiles of the authors reveal that the sample is a valid representation of a system of belief of common people, who had not been subjected to any prior ideological indoctrination. Below follows a list of thirty documented statements that show readily identifiable basic elements of fascination with Hitler discussed above:

1. “Off to Auschwitz with them! They don’t belong anywhere else.”
2. “Too late for borders – they are here already – Hitler must be brought back from the dead. He’d sort this out fast.”
3. “Mauthausen, followed by a group shower.”

4. "Dachau, Auschwitz, etc. still in condition for repopulation. Folks, I know, it's ugly to hear it from me, but if we want what's best for our kids, European countries will have to, absolutely, really, have to do something to protect our people. I'm not a racist, but this can't be happening in Europe. A million people, are you nuts? Where to put them? Who to feed them? Should it come to war, I hope the EU wins, even though a lot of people think Europe is led by Jews."
5. "Lock 'em all up in concentration camps, the trash of a nation have no business in the EU."
6. "Oh, no. C'mon people, these are poor ol' refugees. Mercy, Adolf, please reincarnate."
7. "Sometimes, when you see this real images and the statements by the police, you wish that Hitler woke up and put an iron curtain on our border with Croatia."
8. "Hitler was a cruel leader, but he put all who disrespected him in their place. He also taught his people to respect their nation and their land. Despite his cruel behaviour, he was a respected and successful leader."
9. "Auschwitz's been deserted for too many years, and the stacks are in need of cleaning."
10. "Take them to Auschwitz, the vermin."
11. "Gas it up."
12. "Stinkin' vermin. I'd make gas chambers instead of these centres and ship 'em off there. Goddam."
13. "Gas chambers still open?"
14. "Europe will come to miss 'mein Führer' Adolf Hitler. Fuck it, this IS hate speech."«
15. "Hitler, where are you? Shoot 'em all up."
16. "Lock all 5,000, or how many there may be in Slovenia, in a gas chamber."
17. "Put 'em on trains. On cattle cars, then 'destination' Dachau."
18. "Gas chambers are the solution."
19. "Here is our Lebensraum. They should adapt to us, not the other way 'round. What is being done is just the opposite; they have almost more rights than we do, and people are just idle. We will be exterminated, that's their goal. Where is Hitler, when you need on? He'd sort it out."
20. "I think the entire Middle East is going to migrate. This means the soon downfall of Europe. Regrettably, we're missing the kind of ruler that the Germans had in 45."
21. "Gas chambers, then run all the bloody vermin directly in there."
22. "Put 'em all in camps with gas chambers."



23. "The refugees just need to be fed rat poison or locked up in a gas chamber. Death to the refugees, long live Slovenians."
24. "The furnaces in the concentration camps need to be stoked so that this lot can burn and migrate through the chimney stacks."
25. "All we need is a Hitler too quickly put them all away. I'd chip in for the ammo from my own salary."
26. "Release the gas, otherwise we'll be slowly beaten and stabbed, since there's more and more of them by the hour, what about our poor kids?"
27. "Sorry, but just wake up Dolfi, if we can't hack it."
28. "Where's Hitler now?"
29. "Open up Auschwitz, and then welcome them home. I want to work there and we'll shower them, the bunch of Muslims."



30. “Hitler’s spirit has risen in Europe, which will unify the people this time over and wash the immigrants back to where they came from. People in Europe are not as naive as the politicians in Brussels imagine. You can lie some time to ten people, but you can’t lie all the time to all the people.”

The anti-refugee xenophobia exhibits certain common characteristics both in the cited statements and otherwise. Firstly, a large part of the statements directly calls for Adolf Hitler to be reawaken (statements 2, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, 20, 25, 27, 28, 30). What is typical is that Hitler is imagine as if in a form of hibernation, or as somebody who needs to wake up himself (7, 27), or somebody who needs to be resuscitated (2), since we all “miss” or need him to intervene against the refugees (14, 15, 19, 25), because of which

he needs to reincarnate (6). The author of (8) paints, with great sympathy, an image of Hitler's historical success, as a foundation for the need for his reappearance, while the author of (30) recognises that the spirit of the Nazi leader is already present, that he is arisen and will "wash away the migrants." All of the above ideas associate directly with the icon of the leader of the Third Reich and indisputably emanate a fascination with him, as well as a type of open idolatry, while perceiving Hitler as the only truly successful person that will handle the problem of the inflow of refugees in Europe in the same manner as with the Jews. In other words: his crimes against humanity and the holocaust are regarded with admiration and pride; there are moments when he is intimately and amiably addressed as Adolf (6) and "Dolfi" (27).

A second characteristic is the reference to Nazi concentration camps, offered as a solution to the refugee crisis and the "annulment" of the refugees, who are frequently termed "trash" (5) or "vermin" (10, 12, 21). Accompanying are references to three widely known camps, well-established in Slovenian historical memory (Auschwitz, Dachau, Mauthausen). That the refugees ought to be deported and locked up in concentration camps is asserted by a particularly high number of users (statements 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 17, 22, 24, 29). Some of them also directly indicate the suggested method of execution, while others do not. The former mostly connect concentration camps with gas chambers. In this sense, gas as the suggested method of execution is mentioned by authors of 3, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 21, 23, 24, 26 and 29, who sometimes refer also to chimney stacks, which need to be "cleaned" (9), or cleverly suggesting that the refugees migration route is now going to lead through the stacks (24). Other Facebook users, a significantly lower number, proposed shooting (15, 25), or using rat poison (23). Generally, most often the evocation of Hitler as the image of the saviour is accompanied by a reference to the concentration camps and gas chambers, while the anticipation of his arrival is pervaded by the feeling that he will "sort it out" (19) and handle what we "can't hack" (27).

### **What is fascism and what isn't? Casual epistemic fascism**

What to think of the beliefs of such Facebook users and where to place them? To what extent and observing which criteria may they justifiably by attributed fascist beliefs? In a highly-publicized article, Fuchs (2017: pp. 228–263) analyses user-generated fascism, which he calls "Fascism 2.0", a more appropriate term than "participatory fascism". Based on Hitler's 127th birthday (20 April 2016) and the fascination of Twitter users, he develops a thesis on the four elements of such fascism: online authoritarianism, online nationalism, online friend-foe scheme, and online patriarchy

and naturalism. Fuchs attributes the fascination with Hitler and the growth of “Fascism 2.0” to the social crisis, which generates fascism.

According to Griffin (1991: p. 201), the “fascist minimum” is represented by three mythic components: the myth of the rebirth, populist ultra-nationalism and the myth of decadence. Today, many radical right wing and extremist movements contain elements of the above and it represents the ideological core of the movements or the parties similar to them. Their desire for ethnic purity and a sort of fundamental order places them alongside of fascism. The fascism of social network users interprets the myth of the rebirth literally, as far as the Führer is concerned: it is Hitler, who needs to be reborn, his time is allegedly coming again. The fascist myth of the rebirth, taken as a palingenetic myth, can be associated with the feeling of a fresh start or regeneration, following a stage of crisis or downturn (Griffin, 1991: pp. 33–35). However, the convictions of Facebook users are not entirely associated with the coming of a new era and a sense of belonging; the evocation of Hitler is rather a practical recipe for what to do with the refugees, so belonging to the established fascist idea is hardly an appropriate designation.

Are there any social and historical idiosyncrasies, typical only in social network users from Slovenia? Even though individual thought patterns cannot be the result of abstract thinking alone, removed from social certainties, historical reminiscence and the political atmosphere, whose composition is heavily influenced by intensive journalistic and media propaganda, the affinity to fascism cannot be directly tied to the Home Guard tradition entirely. Šumi (2015: pp. 28–44) finds that the propaganda drive against Jews by the Home Guard was central to the argumentation of their political programme. General Leon Rupnik certainly could not go without it in all of his published speeches. It also constituted the entire purpose of the political and military alliance with Germany and the Third Reich. Concurrently, allied policies, positions and military actions were, as a rule, subject to sarcasm and ridicule, in particular as these were believed to be the result of falling for the Zionist plot, the disclosure of which and, in turn, destruction was the holy objective of the struggle by the Third Reich and its allies. Similarly, Slovenian partisans were consistently portrayed as a tragically misguided, laughable vigilante movement by a handful of traitors to the Slovenian nation and the Catholic religion, who have voluntarily fallen for the Jewish propaganda and global conspiracy, which blinded them with their fairy-tale of communism. The Home Guard fought with conviction on the side of Germany for the victory of the healthy Aryan race against the Jewish-borne destruction of Europe and all things Slovenian. The Home Guard quisling authorities and its



mouthpieces thought of themselves as privileged participants in an epochal, decisive war against Jews, the Zionists and their global conspiracy, while Hitler and the Third Reich were perceived as the only, last historical opportunity for Europe, Aryans, including Slovenians, civilization and the pure Catholic faith to ward off the cataclysm of the Jewish hell-bent plan.

Similarly, the above mentioned Facebook users cannot be necessarily accused of negationism, i.e. the denial of historical facts against humanity, describing a movement that denies the Nazi genocide over Jews in 1941–1945 (Finkelkraut et al., 1998). In fact, we know nothing about their anti-Semitism, since they only state a fascination over Hitler's "efficiency". Pavlič's research (2015: pp. 245–257) has found that the degree of anti-Semitism and negationism in secondary school students in Slovenia is not negligible. However, methodological prudence dictates that users are not attributed with beliefs that cannot be evidenced. In addition, there is no evidence of their membership in groups or movements that are otherwise considered racist, homophobic, zealot, anti-Semitic, aggressively nationalist or similar, or that they abide by National Socialism in any other form, or employ neo-Nazi iconography. Moreover, we do not know if they have adopted Nazi modes and patterns of operation, such as glorifying one race's supremacy over others, promulgation of the mythical explanation of the nation's history, verbal and physical altercations with others, or if they are perhaps organising military training.

Once the above mentioned users are shed of the listed circumstances, their mental allegiance might be termed casual epistemic fascism: the proponents' system of beliefs still follows the fascist tradition, but only to the extent that they harbour convictions of the success, historical role, and efficiency of fascism, Nazism or national socialism, perceiving the foregoing with casual nostalgia and expectation. Casual epistemic fascism does not represent a political ideal, its followers lack the drive for active engagement, and, in all likelihood, not everyone fosters ambitions and expectations for the coming of a fascist social and political order, since there are not any indications that the Facebook users quoted above might be credited with such inclinations, completely equating them with existing neo-Nazi and other radical ideas on the political right. It seems more likely that they have turned to Hitler with a certain resentment, casually and exclusively out of a need driven by their xenophobic and Islamophobic beliefs. Even though each fascism is based on a system of beliefs and opinions, epistemic fascism may be distinguished from the full-fledged fascism in this respect, as these are not users that are likely to practice the use of fascist symbols in their daily life, or pursue a political agenda. At the same

time, their fascism had been used opportunistically for the purpose of dissemination of own Islamophobic, xenophobic and intolerant attitudes towards the refugees.

In the users' statements, the refugees are not necessarily identified as a threat on a nationalist level through a kind of a patriotic discourse, but have become that Other in a manner, similar to the erased in the past. The difference being that the mythologization of being European is now replaced by its defence: European, that is Judeo-Christian, roots must be defended from the incursion of the alien Islam. The problem is not that we are witnessing a "new racism" in hiding, spoken about by Van Dijk (2000: p. 33), but that we are faced with a direct apology of old racism and fascism.

**Hate Speech, Fascism and the Refugee as the New-age Jew**  
Racism in Slovenia traditionally targets "non-Slovenians", which is a term usually used for the ethnic origin of people coming from the territories of former Yugoslavia, with the standard addition of the Roma people and immigrants (Trplan 2005: p. 226). Jalušič (2015: p. 40), has found that the dominant understanding of racism today is that it represents an ideology, or racist ideology, manifested through speech and the symbols of hatred as one of the key reasons for the focus on hate crimes. A similar conclusion can be drawn about fascism: its historical backdrop is the interpretation of the Nazi totalitarianism and the holocaust as phenomena, whose origin can be traced directly to Nazi ideology (anti-Semitism and racism and Hitler as the extreme irrational zealot), and not some separate new structure of authority that took root in the twentieth century Europe, but it also follows from the thesis of "victory" over fascism in WWII.

Anti-Semitism was replaced by anti-Islamism during the refugee crisis, and the hatred towards Jews by the hatred towards Muslim refugees. The latter have become the new-age Jew. Refugees do not exist, they are outside the realms of social and political subjectivity. Any emotion of empathy is redundant in relationships with them, they do not require help; on the contrary, they must be eliminated: gassed, shot, and murdered. Presented as a homogenous ethnic, national and religious group, their origin, political, or religious beliefs are irrelevant; their homogeneity is constructed and warranted by the simple fact that we need to get rid of them and that Hitler will see to it. The casual epistemic fascism does not generate a discourse of exclusion; instead, it demands a clean, ultimate exclusion in the form of extermination. The refugees as the Other, as opposed to "us", are no different from us, but represent an ultimate threat. Peaceful co-existence and the intermingling of different racial and ethnic groups

are not issues relatable to refugees, but only a radical rejection of every possibility of the former. Being dehumanised, the abstract perception of refugees is that of a threat that needs to be eliminated.

With the outbreak of the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 and 2016 and the appearance of distinct hate speech in Slovenia in the public discussions on the attitude towards the refugees, two camps were again formed in the heated discussions: numerous figures from the fields of sociology and other humanities, as well as the lay and critical public detected unfathomable cases of, expecting law enforcement authorities to sanction it. Conversely, there were opposing opinions by mostly political and ideological reactions, which had difficulties concealing their mere tolerance of the phenomenon of hatred and hate speech in the spirit of more or less latent xenophobia, mostly under the pretext of safeguarding the freedom of speech, as the result of their ideological or political agenda, or simply out of some economic or other justification of the fear of refugees. In this stalemate, it was the law enforcement institutions that were called upon to be the arbiter, even with regard to sociologically charged interpretations and public diagnosis of the society; for example, the state prosecutors were expected to take action. Public discussions did not bring any significant progress, mostly because of the law enforcement institutions' lack of involvement in the discussions. The first more intensively examined case of a highly publicised tweet of Sebastjan Erlah, a publicist, was reported to the state prosecutor's, but the charges were dismissed. Similar charges were later brought to bear on account of different posts on social networks; however, the results of those proceedings are not in the public domain. When Erlah, acting as a publicist, posted a tweet on his Twitter account, saying that Middle Eastern refugees must be ambushed at the border and shot ("I have a more radical idea: allow them up to 500m of the border. Anything closer than that and shot them all, God will know his own."), this was followed by numerous other examples, and keeping up with the tone (Vezjak, 2017).

The Slovenian public was also able to follow a website called Zlovenia for a few months, whose anonymous author was attempting to identify the authors of similar hate posts. Below is a small sample of the statements by social network users, mainly Facebook, posted at the site: "Shoot, and once ten are down, they are guaranteed not dragging themselves to Europe anymore," "Good enough for killing only," "If I see one nigger in Prevalje, I'll slaughter him," "It's 'bout time that the people get a licence to kill economic migrants," "Let's slaughter us some ragheads," "Any Muslim is a terrorist by default," "Shoot every one in three as a warning," "Put all the migrants under a sort of dome, then just gas 'em, or let loose a hail of bullets,"

and similar. The number of very specific and identified cases is staggering; actually, these were not cases of particular hate speech, but its mass outburst (Vezjak, 2017). It stood to reasons that the state prosecutor's office would provide a sensible explanation as to why they had not taken action, even though criminal charges were raised.

In their analysis of the language of the "anti-Semitic mind" in present-day modern Germany, Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz (2017: p. xiv) find that the World Wide Web has become the largest and most influential propagator of anti-Jewish statements, in particular in social media:

"You ugly little Jews, mankind's rats, one should gas all genetically declared Jewish criminals." Or, "The Jews are to be blamed for everything. Therefore we should eliminate the Jews, in whatever way we can." These are two examples among thousands in online comments, in chat forums, on Twitter accounts, on Facebook, and so on.

They also list some cases that bear a strong resemblance with the quoted users from Slovenia – insofar as these refer to Jews: "Its time again for proper Aryans to turn on the gas! [. . .] HEIL HITLER!" (Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, 2017: p. 131), "I'm going to give you a grand gassing in Auschwitz!" (Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, 2017: p. 251), or "It's getting to be time again for proper Aryans to turn on the gas!" (Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, 2017: p. 268). Sometimes, the use of gas is aimed at Israelis, too: "The Israelis are the rats of the world and should one and all be poisoned with Zyclon gas, the way you do with rats" (Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, 2016: p. 268). Such anti-Semitic discourse has largely doubled up on anti-Muslim today. In his analysis of islamophobia, Lean (2017: p. 66) highlights the significant surge of anti-Islamism and the role of social networks in this regard:

Conversations about the anti-Muslim blogosphere cannot overlook the role of social media. Indeed, without it, write-ups about Muslim-led violence and the threatening cloud of 'Islamic extremism' that are so dominant on the Internet today would not enjoy the traction and success that they do. Social media replaces traditional advertising. While Facebook has been influential in the past, it is Twitter that, more recently, stands out as the platform that is so crucial to getting Islamophobic messages out to the masses.

Kompatsiaris and Mylonas (2015) detect a significant linguistic similarity between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hatred in the membership of the Greek extremist party called Golden Dawn, that some consider fascist: the vocabulary, as in the case of Hitler's Germany, is aimed at migrants, Jews and Bolsheviks, who contain an element of "impurity" and

threaten to destroy the nation. Undeniably, the fires of the anti-refugee political propaganda are in a large part stoked by politicians; Stanley (2018: p. 92) makes a detailed report on Trump's completely fabricated accusation of Mexican refugees being rapists. Casual epistemic fascism and racism is indisputably the result of international migrations, creating an increasingly nationally and ethnically heterogeneous society. Intolerance, the creation of stereotypes, the division to "us" and "them", discrimination and new racism, which is adopting the ideas of the Third Reich and the fascination with Hitler are based on national, religious and ethnic identities. Bučar Ručman (2014) finds that the ideological machinery of a state is a key player in the (re)production and dissemination of (neo)racism, the discourse of Otherness, stereotypes and prejudice, operating behind the curtain of such a discourse upon which discriminatory and racist social practices are founded. At the same time, the recourse to hatred and the division between "us" and "them" follows from the feeling of being endangered, direct assault, rape, terrorist attack, the expected loss of jobs and abuse of subsidies in the destination country.

Casual epistemic fascism as a form of hate speech is certainly based on social stereotypes on refugees; the formation of a feeling of threat from a Muslim invasion took place through the processes of attribution of characteristics based on group membership and not individual traits. The paranoia, so typical of islamophobia, is propped up by the dichotomy between the external Other, perceived as an enemy, and an internal saviour. The framework of such a dichotomous division is also the birthing plane of a homogenous demand for a super "us" that would face off with the imagined enemy. The evocation of Hitler by means of a wide-spread political and media propaganda is the logical, though radical, offspring of the psychopolitics of hatred, permanently fostered by certain political parties in Slovenia and their media.

## Conclusion

On 27 January 1945, the Red Army liberated one of the worst Nazi concentration camps – Auschwitz in Poland. At least 1.6 million Jews, Roma, Slavs and other "lesser" peoples died there. Auschwitz is also the final resting place of 1,351 Slovenians. At its session on 1 November 2005, the General Assembly of the United Nations designated Auschwitz liberation day as the Annual International Day of Commemoration to Honour Holocaust Victims. The Slovenian government designated in 2008 27 January as the National Holocaust Remembrance Day. Slovenians, too, remember the holocaust as a terrible experience of the unhuman, the beastly, the experience of ethnic cleansing and a history of extermination. According to Alič

(2018), almost 13,000 Slovenians died in Italian, German, Croatian and Hungarian concentration camps, of which the majority in Riseria di San Sabba in Trieste, a sub-camp of Auschwitz, – over four thousand. During WWII, almost 59,000 Slovenians were interred in concentration camps, of which 36,000 in the Italian camps of Rab, Gonars, Renicci and Visco.

What is the horizon of beliefs and judgements of this world, adopted by those who in 2015 and even today want a repeat of the experience, calling for new extermination in the case of the refugees and offering “migration through the stacks?” Copsey (2018) finds that, in political science today, the line separating the radical right and fascist is hard to define. He believes that the (neo)fascism of the past is the best way to understand the modern radical right, but this chain of reasoning is missing a link. One part of this link is the casual epistemic fascism, wearing the disguise of many forms of adoration of the Third Reich, and expressed in the belief that the time is coming for Hitler to walk among us. The distinction between the causal epistemic and the full-fledged fascism may explain the magnitude of the phenomenon: the rise of radical movements, right wing popularise, nationalism across Europe and the world cannot be explained by counting actions and memberships alone. It also allows for a more serious consideration of fascism even when fascism appears at the level of individuals’ convictions, and even when it is remedied, though treated it with insufficient gravity and due analysis, upon detection on social networks.

In 1995 Umberto Eco wrote:

Ur-fascism is still present, sometimes, even surprisingly in the open. It would be a lot easier for us, if someone appeared and said: ‘I want to reopen Auschwitz, I want the Black Shirts to parade the squares of Italy again.’ Life is not that simple. Ur-fascism may return in the meekest of disguises. It is our duty to expose it and point a finger at any of its new versions – each and every day and in every corner of the world.

Eco’s choice, the one he considered easier, is before us: this paper lists sufficient evidence of the existence of not just ur-fascism as a structural reality, but even in the form of a desire to reawaken and reopen concentration camps; and we should not be lulled by the fact that it is present amongst Facebook users alone. Erlah’s example explains why, for reasons that are incomprehensible, we cannot prosecute and limit fascism in accordance with our criminal legislation. In this regard, it is imperative that we be guided by methodological inhibitions. It is not just that there are not any substantial reasons to believe that the philosophy of life of the mentioned Facebook users harbours “full-fledged” convictions on the imperative of fascist transformation of Europe and the arrival of a saviour in the guise

of Hitler; no, in all likelihood, the users carry no such convictions. On the other hand, the declaration of their position on the level of utterances cannot be neglected: the enthusiasm over the Führer, gas chambers and concentrations camps, which are to be reused. These remain their core message; one whose significance must not and cannot be simply waved off as empty talk, nor can it be examined separated from the social and media practices in which flirting with fascist leaders and the subscription to their ideas seems to be becoming the norm. Or, as Timothy Snyder (2018) ominously wrote: "Some Americans ask: What is wrong with the Internet? Others ask: Can fascism return? These questions are the same question."

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## Povzetki/Abstracts

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### BEING MAINSTREAM, BEING RADICAL: HOW DO YOUNG PEOPLE UNDERSTAND RADICALISM IN CROATIA

Motivated by the lack of theoretical concepts to grasp the shock of 9/11, social scientists put forward the concept of radicalisation. Since then, it has become one of the buzz concepts in social sciences, particularly in security and terrorist studies. However, recent critiques point out the need to reconceptualise radicalisation so that it can be used outside its dominant, Western home-grown violent terrorism context. Following those critiques, we adopt a relative approach to radicalisation and use it empirically in the context of South-Eastern Europe and youth studies. More concretely, the goal of this paper is to analyse how the terms “radical” and “mainstream” are understood by Croatian youth. To do this, we employed qualitative methodology, namely focus groups conducted in urban and rural settings on a sample of young people. We wanted to uncover where the line between the “radical” and “mainstream” is for young people. By answering these questions, we sought to confirm the assumption that in Croatia, although the term “radical” cannot be understood in the context of violence, it may have dangerous repercussions for social and individual development of young people and society as a whole. Our results show that young people in Croatia conceptualise radicalism as a relative, neutral, and context dependent term. At the same time, they describe both the mainstream and radical individuals in negative connotations.

*Keyword:* Croatia, mainstream, terrorism, radicalism, mainstream, youth

## BITI MAINSTREAM, BITI RADIKALEN: KAKO MLADI NA HRVAŠKEM RAZUMEJO RADIKALIZEM

Zaradi pomanjkanja teoretičnih konceptov, ki bi lahko zaobjeli šok 11. septembra, so družboslovci predstavili koncept radikalizacije. Od takrat je postal eden od najbolj aktualnih konceptov v družbenih vedah, zlasti v varnostnih vedah in terorističnih študijah. Vendar pa nedavne kritike opozarjajo na potrebo po ponovni rekonceptualizaciji radikalizacije, da bi jo lahko uporabili zunaj svojega prevladujočega konteksta zahodnega 'domačega' nasilnega terorizma. Po teh kritikah sprejemamo relativni pristop k radikalizaciji, ki ga empirično uporabimo v okviru jugovzhodne Evrope in študij mladih. Konkretnije, cilj tega prispevka je analizirati, kako hrvaška mladina razume izraza 'radikalen' in 'mainstream'. V ta namen smo uporabili kvalitativno metodologijo, in sicer fokusne skupine, ki so potekale na vzorcu mladih v urbanih in podeželskih okoljih. Želeli smo odkriti, kje je za mlade meja med 'radikalnim' in 'mainstreamom'. Z odgovorom na ta vprašanja smo skušali potrditi predpostavko, da ima na Hrvaškem, čeprav izraza 'radikalen' ni mogoče razumeti v kontekstu nasilja, lahko nevarne posledice za družbeni in individualni razvoj mladih kot tudi družbe kot celote. Naši rezultati kažejo, da mladi na Hrvaškem pojmujejo radikalizem kot relativen, nevtralen in od kontekstna odvisen pojem. Hkrati tudi opisujejo tako 'mainstream' in radikalne posameznike z negativnimi konotacijami.

*Ključne besede:* Hrvaška, mainstream, terorizem, radikalizem, mainstream, mladina

*Srečo Dragoš*

## FACTORS OF RADICALIZATION

The subject in the title is addressed through a concept appropriate both for religious as well as political ideology. It is the concept of a "cage" made of four dimensions: the first is the cognitive relationship to reality (this dimension involves two extremes: relativism / fundamentalism), the second involves the mode of impacting the environment (reformism / radicalism), the third dimension is presented by the direction of action (outward / inward) and the fourth is the temporal dimension. Radicalisation is defined by the coincidence of unfavourable combinations of these dimensions, which is why it is difficult to understand it, if it is reduced only to one level, and qualified more as a reason than as an effect. This approach also provides the easiest way to avoid three very common mistakes when considering radicalisation: unreflected use of synonyms, voluntarist qualifications, and disregard of the difference between the general

and the specific. The second part of the paper gives some examples on the influence of the social context on the phenomenon of radicalism, with a special emphasis on the Slovenian example. Despite having one of the lowest degrees of social inequality and other very positive indicators, Slovenia is a good illustration of the emergence of radicalisation when apparently nothing is wrong.

*Keywords:* radicalisation, social power, social inequality, social systems, democracy, ideology

#### DEJAVNIKI RADIKALIZACIJE

Naslovna tema je obravnavana skozi koncept, primeren tako za religijsko kot za politično ideologijo. Gre za koncept »kletke«, sestavljene iz štirih dimenzij. Prva je kognitivno razmerje do resničnosti (dimenzija z dvema ekstremoma: relativizem / fundamentalizem), druga je v načinu delovanja na okolje (reformizem / radikalizem), tretjo dimenzijo predstavlja smer delovanja (navzven / navznoter) in četrto časovna razsežnost. Radikalizacija pomeni sovpadanje neugodnih kombinacij na omenjenih dimenzijah, zato jo težko razumemo, če jo reduciramo zgolj na eno raven in jo kvalificiramo bolj za vzrok kot pa učinek. S tem pristopom se tudi najlažje izognemo trem najpogostejšim napakam pri obravnavi radikalizacije: nereflimirani uporabi sinonimov, voluntarističnim kvalifikacijam in pa ignoriranju razlike med splošnim in posebnim. V drugem delu prispevka je navedenih nekaj primerov o vplivu družbenega konteksta na pojav radikalizma, s posebnim poudarkom na slovenskem primeru. Kljub eni najnižjih stopenj družbene neenakosti in kljub drugim zelo ugodnim rezultatom je Slovenija dobra ilustracija nastanka radikalizacije v razmerah, ko na videz ni nič narobe.

*Ključne besede:* radikalizacija, družbena moč, družbena neenakost, družbeni sistemi, demokracija, ideologija

*Dianne Gereluk and Carol-Ann Titus*

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#### HOW SCHOOLS CAN REDUCE YOUTH RADICALIZATION

An increased public discourse about the radicalization of youth is notable since 9/11. There is heightened anxiety about how: youth may turn to extremist groups; become radicalized, and; act on these feelings to undertake extremist activities. Schools are increasingly called upon to look out for youth who turn to radicalized groups, but lack the awareness or training to thoughtfully address ways in which to create conditions for youth to not turn to these radicalized groups. In this paper, we argue that in order for educators to support youth in their schools so that they are not

drawn to radicalized groups, we suggest three directives. First, educators must understand the indicators that are a precondition for youth radicalization. Second, educators must understand how their learning environment may play a role in whether youth feel isolated or marginalized from the general community, which may lead to radicalization. Third, an explicit formal curriculum must embed a broader political deliberation to understand the broader political and social determinants that lead to terrorism and extremism. While schools must not be burdened solely to address those youth who may become radicalized, schools have a significant role to help support those youth who feel that radicalization is the only way forward for them.

*Keywords:* youth, radicalization, schools, curriculum, extremism

### KAKO LAHKO ŠOLE ZMANJŠAJO RADIKALIZACIJO MLADIH

Vse od 11. septembra 2001 je opazno povečano javno razpravljanje o radikalizaciji mladih. Obstaja namreč večja zaskrbljenost glede tega, kako se mladi lahko pridružijo ekstremističnim skupinam; postanejo radikalizirani in delujejo na podlagi teh občutkov, da bi izvedli ekstremistične dejavnosti. Šole so vedno pogostejše pozvane, da poiščejo mlade, ki se obračajo k radikaliziranim skupinam, vendar jim primanjkuje ozaveščenosti ali usposabljanja za premišljeno obravnavanje načinov, kako ustvariti pogoje za mlade, da se na te radikalizirane skupine ne obrnejo. V tem članku predlagava tri direktive, da učitelji v svojih šolah lahko podprejo mlade, da jih ne bi pritegnile radikalizirane skupine. Prvič: učitelji morajo razumeti kazalnike, ki so predpogoj za radikalizacijo mladih. Drugič: učitelji morajo razumeti, kako lahko njihovo učno okolje igra vlogo pri tem ali se mladi počutijo izolirane ali marginalizirane od širše skupnosti, kar lahko privede do radikalizacije. Tretjič, jasen formalni učni načrt mora vključevati širšo politično razpravo, da bi razumeli širše politične in družbene determinante, ki vodijo v terorizem in ekstremizem. Medtem ko šole ne smejo biti obremenjene le z obravnavanjem tistih mladih, ki se lahko radikalizirajo, imajo prav šole pomembno vlogo pri podpori tistim mladim, ki menijo, da je radikalizacija zanje edina pot.

*Gljučne besede:* mladina, radikalizacija, šole, kurikulum, ekstremizem

Iztok Prezelj, Klemen Kocjančič and Urša Marinšek

### ISLAMIST RADICALISATION TOWARDS EXTREME VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

Islamist terrorism and the related Islamist radicalisation have become very serious national and international security threats in Europe and around the world. Islamist radicalisation towards extreme violence and

terrorism takes place locally in many conflict areas of the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and in European ethnically and religiously mixed cities. This process is led and stimulated by the global Jihadi idea of establishing an Islamic religious state or caliphate. This paper aims to explain the process of Islamist radicalisation at the conceptual level, presents the idea of Jihad, the related misuse of Islamic religious principles, and empirically explores the related propaganda process, especially the use of social media and the magazine *Inspire* to attract and mobilise potential terrorists. The paper argues that the basic fight in the radicalisation story is the fight for the hearts and minds of the population. Finally, the paper proposes some ideas of how to fight Islamist radicalisation in public schools. *Key words:* Islamism, radicalisation, extreme violence, terrorism, propaganda, winning hearts and minds, social media, Al Qaeda, ISIS

#### ISLAMISTIČNA RADIKALIZACIJA V SMER SKRAJNEGA NASILJA IN TERORIZMA

Islamistični terorizem in islamistična radikalizacija sta postala zelo resni nacionalni in mednarodni varnostni grožnji v Evropi in tudi širše. Islamistična radikalizacija v smeri izvajanja ekstremnega nasilja in terorizma je prisotna na številnih konfliktnih področjih in v evropskih etnično ter versko mešanih mestih. Ta proces je voden in stimuliran s strani ideje globalnega džihada, ki ima cilj vzpostavitev islamske verske države oz. kalifata. Članek predstavlja proces islamistične radikalizacije, idejo džihada in s tem povezane zlorabe islamskih verskih principov. Poleg tega se besedilo osredotoča na uporabo socialnih omrežij in revije *Inspire* v propagandne in mobilizacijske namene. Članek utemeljuje, da je osnovno orožje v boju proti radikalizaciji v bistvu boj za "srca in misli" prebivalstva. Članek v zaključnem delu izpostavlja ideje, kako se boriti proti islamistični radikalizaciji v javnih šolah.

*Ključne besede:* islamizem, radikalizacija, ekstremno nasilje, terorizem, propaganda, pridobivanje podpore, družbeni mediji, Al Kaida, ISIS

*Julian Richards*

#### A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION OF RADICALISATION

Interest in radicalism has a long history, dating back at least to the stirrings of Enlightenment Europe. Scrutiny of processes of *radicalisation*, however, have a much more recent history, with an upsurge in interest following the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001. Two key drivers have shaped the renewed interest. First, bureaucratic pressures in governments charged with dealing with the problem of terrorism have led to a number of attempts to profile terrorists and shape process models that can "explain"

radicalisation. Second, a growing realisation that attacks after 9/11 – especially in Europe – were committed not by foreign radicals but by “home-grown” citizens, has led to an increase in policy circles in the human factors concerning how individuals become drawn into violent movements, from a societal and sociological perspective. In terms of research and modelling, there is growing recognition of two poles in the landscape: macro-level, or top-down models focus on the ideologies and ideologues who are pulling individuals into the radical movement. Micro-level, or bottom-up models, conversely, look at the individuals becoming radicalised and their personal life-stories and experiences. More recently, research into radicalisation has settled into a new narrative that offers a synthesised perspective on macro- and micro-level factors. This more enlightened approach stresses the context-specificity of radicalisation, in that, while environmental factors causing despair and humiliation may be broad and widely present, the circumstances in which any one individual will be drawn into a violent course of action will be highly variable. This, in turn, stresses the importance of continual and repeated empirical research into individual tipping-points leading to violent radicalisation.

*Key words:* radicalism, radicalisation, extremism, terrorism, modelling, empiricism

#### KONCEPTUALNO RAZISKOVANJE RADIKALIZACIJE

Zanimanje za radikalizem ima dolgo zgodovino, ki sega vsaj do začetkov razsvetljenske Evrope. Preučevanje procesov *radikalizacije* pa ima veliko novejšo zgodovino, s povečanjem zanimanja po napadih 11. septembra 2001 v ZDA. Ta obnovljeni interes sta oblikovala dva ključna dejavnika. Prvič: birokratski pritiski v vladah, ki so zadolžene za reševanje problema terorizma, so privedli do številnih poskusov, da bi opredelili teroriste ter oblikovali procesne modele, ki radikalizacijo lahko ,razložijo‘. Drugič: naraščajoče spoznanje, da napadov po 11. septembru – zlasti v Evropi – niso izvedli tuji radikalizirani posamezniki, temveč ,domači‘ državljani, so privedli do povečane pozornosti političnih krogov za človeške dejavnike v zvezi s tem, kako se posamezniki pritegne v nasilna gibanja, iz družbenega in sociološkega vidika. V smislu raziskav in modeliranja vedno bolj prihajata v ospredje dva pola: makro raven ali ,top-down‘ modeli, ki se osredotočajo na ideologije in ideologe, ki posameznike pritegnejo v radikalno gibanje. Prav nasprotno pa modeli na mikro ravni ali ,bottom-up‘ modeli gledajo na posameznike, ki postajajo radikalizirani, ter na njihove osebne življenjske zgodbe in izkušnje. Nedavno so se raziskave o radikalizaciji ustalile okoli nove naracije, ki ponuja sintetizirano perspektivo dejavnikov na makro in mikro ravni. Ta bolj razsvetljen pristop poudarja kontekstualno specifičnost radikalizacije,



saj so lahko okoljski dejavniki, ki povzročajo obup in ponižanje, široki in vseprisotni, okoliščine, v katerih bo vsak posameznik vpleten v nasilni potek dejanj, bodo zelo spremenljive. To pa hkrati poudarja pomembnost rednih in ponavljajočih se empiričnih raziskav posameznih prelomnih točk, ki vodijo v nasilno radikalizacijo.

**Ključne besede:** radikalizem, radikalizacija, ekstremizem, terorizem, modeliranje, empirizem

*Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan*

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#### RADICALIZATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND CONFLICTING DIVERSITY

Despite the consensus that radicalization and violent extremism represent a major threat to political, economic and social security of contemporary democratic societies, the discussion about what precisely is radicalisation is far from being over. In fact, the problem of radicalization and violent extremism have brought to the forefront problems previously either compartmentalized in specialized courses on intelligence and security studies or at the very fringes of scholarly interest. This introductory article to 'Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity' journal special issue identifies some of the most pressing of problems and challenges associated with radicalization and violent extremism as their relationship is anything but unambiguous or unproblematic. It also introduces the articles and the interview that are part of this journal special issue.

**Keywords:** radicalization, violent extremism, conflicting diversity, education

#### RADIKALIZACIJA, NASILNI EKSTREMIZEM IN KONFLIKTNA RAZLIČNOST

Kljub soglasju, da radikalizacija in nasilni ekstremizem predstavljata pomembno grožnjo za politično, gospodarsko in socialno varnost sodobnih demokratičnih družb, je razprava o tem, kaj je radikalizacija, vse prej kot zaključena. Pravzaprav je problematika radikalizacije in nasilnega ekstremizma postavila v ospredje probleme, ki so bili prej del specializiranih tečajev o obveščevalnih in varnostnih študijah ali celo na samem obrobju znanstvenega interesa. Uvodni članek z naslovom 'Radikalizacija, nasilni ekstremizem in konfliktna raznolikost' identificira nekatere izmed najbolj perečih problemov in izzivov, ki so povezani z radikalizacijo in nasilnim ekstremizmom, saj je njun odnos vse prej kot nedvoumen ali neproblematičen. Hkrati predstavi tudi ostale članke ter intervju, ki so del te tematske številke.

**Ključne besede:** radikalizacija, nasilni ekstremizem, konfliktna različnost, vzgoja in izobraževanje

*Mitja Sardoč*

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# RADICALIZATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND CONFLICTING DIVERSITY: AN INTERVIEW WITH MICHEL WIEVIORKA

This interview with Prof. Michel Wieviorka discusses some of the most pressing issues associated with radicalization and violent extremism. The initial section of the interview is devoted to the discussion of the main differences between violent extremism fueled by radicalisation and other forms of terrorism that existed in different European countries back in the 1960s and 1970s. In the central part of the interview, Prof. Wieviorka reflects on some of the conceptual problems associated with the 'standard' interpretation of radicalization and violent extremism. The concluding part of the interview takes a closer look at the role education should play in the tackling of radicalization and violent extremism.

*Keywords:* radicalization, violent extremism, terrorism, conflicting diversity, violence

# RADIKALIZACIJA, NASILNI EKSTREMIZEM IN KONFLIKTNA RAZLIČNOST: INTERVJU Z MICHELOM WIEVIORKO

V tem intervjuju prof. Michel Wieviorka obravnava nekatera od najbolj perečih vprašanj, ki povezana z radikalizacijo in nasilnim ekstremizmom. Uvodni del intervjuja je namenjen razpravi o glavnih razlikah med nasilnim ekstremizmom, ki ga spodbuja radikalizacija in druge oblike terorizma, ki so obstajale v različnih evropskih državah že v šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih. V osrednjem delu intervjuja prof. Wieviorka razmišlja o nekaterih konceptualnih problemih, povezanih s "standardno" interpretacijo radikalizacije in nasilnega ekstremizma. Zaključni del intervjuja podrobneje obravnava vlogo, ki naj bi jo imela vzgoja in izobraževanje pri spoprijemanju z radikalizacijo in nasilnim ekstremizmom.

*Ključne besede:* radikalizacija, nasilni ekstremizem, terorizem, konfliktna različnost, nasilje

*Boris Vezjak*

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# RADICAL HATE SPEECH AND ISLAMOPHOBIA: THE FASCINATION WITH HITLER AND FASCISM ON THE SLOVENIAN WEBOSPHERE

This paper examines cases of radical hate speech posted on Slovenian social networks during the development of the refugee crisis in Europe and Slovenia beginning in 2015. The onset of this radical behaviour is subject to particular scrutiny – the manner and the causes underpinning the transition of a discourse of hatred, racism, xenophobia and intolerance to one of open approval of Hitler, fascism, Nazism, the Third Reich;

and the fascination with the horrendous events of the holocaust, genocide, extermination, systematic starvation, torture, mass killing or gasification as methods that should be used against the refugees, in a manner not unlike that against the European Jews, arguing that Hitler reawaken might solve the problem of the refugees coming to Europe and Slovenia in the first place. Strangely, this discourse is not championed by extreme, far right groups, such as neo-Nazis, skinheads, or nationalists. On the contrary, it is the ordinary social networks users that have, in their fascination with the Nazi leader and the final solution method (*die Endlösung*), replaced the stereotype of the Jew with the Refugee. The rise of hate speech in a part of the population is evidence of the fact that fear, the feeling of threat and the encouragement of hatred have, at least in social networks, occasionally morphed to the norm; in Facebook users this is termed casual epistemic fascism, representing a system of beliefs that undoubtedly indirectly sympathises with the holocaust, genocide and the mass killings – in the present case based on anti-Muslim prejudice against the refugees.

*Keywords:* fascism, islamophobia, xenophobia, hate speech, social media, Facebook, Adolf Hitler, Slovenia

#### RADIKALNI SOVRAŽNI GOVOR IN ISLAMOFBIJA: FASCINACIJA NAD HITLERJEM IN FAŠIZMOM NA SLOVENSKEM SPLETU

Članek obravnava primere radikalnega sovražnega govora na slovenskih socialnih omrežjih ob razvoju begunske krize v Evropi in Sloveniji z začetkom v letu 2015. Posebno pozornost posveča vprašanju vznika te radikalnosti – v čem in zakaj se je diskurz sovražstva, rasizma, ksenofobije in nestrpnosti spremenil v odkrito odobravanje Hitlerja, fašizma, nacizma, tretjega rajha in fascinacijo nad grozljivimi dejanji holokavsta, genocida, iztrebljanja, sistematičnega stradanja, mučenja, pobijanja ali zaplinjanja kot metod, ki bi jih, tako kot na primeru evropskih Judov, morali uporabiti na primeru beguncev in na ta način, s pomočjo na novo prebujenega Hitlerja, rešiti problem njihovega prihoda v Evropo in Slovenijo. Nosilci takšnega diskurza niso ekstremne, desno usmerjene ekstremistične skupine, neonacisti, skinheadi, nacionalisti, temveč preprosto uporabniki socialnih omrežij, ki so v fascinaciji nad nacističnim vodjem in metodo dokončne rešitve (*die Endlösung*) zamenjali figuro Juda in jo nadomestili s figuro begunca. Vzpon sovražnega govora v delu prebivalstva dokazuje, da so strah, občutki ogroženosti in spodbude sovražstvu najmanj na socialnih omrežjih občasno prešli v normalizirane oblike, pri uporabniki Facebooka pa to označujem z izrazom priložnosti epistemski fašizem in ga razumem kot sistem prepričanj, ki nedvoumno posredno

goji simpatije do holokavsta, genocida in ubijanja – v tem primeru na podlagi antiislamističnih predsodkov do beguncev.

*Ključne besede:* fašizem, islamofobija, ksenofobija, sovražni govor, družbena omrežja, Facebook, Adolf Hitler, Slovenija

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## Avtorji/Authors

### Kosta Bovan

Kosta Bovan is an assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. He holds an MA in psychology, and a PhD in political science. His main research topics are political behavior, evolutionary political psychology and cultural trauma. He published several articles on these topics, as well as edited a book. He participated in international research groups, projects and COST actions.

Kosta Bovan je docent na Fakulteti za politične vede Univerze v Zagrebu. Ima magisterij iz psihologije in doktorat iz političnih znanosti. Njegove glavne raziskovalne teme so politično vedenje, evolucijska politična psihologija in kulturna travma. O teh temah je uredil monografijo in objavil več člankov. Sodeloval je v mednarodnih raziskovalnih skupinah, projektih in akcijah COST.

### Tomaž Deželan

Tomaž Deželan (PhD) is associate professor of Political Science, research fellow at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana and assistant secretary-general of the University of Ljubljana. After completion of his PhD studies he pursued a research career and subsequently coordinated more than 15 basic and applicative national and international research projects. He holds a prestigious title of Jean Monnet Chair for citizenship education awarded by the European Commission. He currently coordinates more than 10 research projects, among them most notably the project on teaching and learning in higher education (INOVUP) with a budget of more than three million EUR. Prof. Deželan also performs

the role of the principal researcher for the Youth Progress Index and is the principal evaluator of the programme of the Republic of Slovenia for youth, national evaluator of the E+ Youth in action programme, principal research partner of the National E+ Youth in Action Agency, principal reviewer of the European Commission's Youth Wiki project, member of the Council of Europe and European Commission's European Pool of Youth Researchers, policy advisor of the OSCE for the field of political participation of youth, policy advisor of the International IDEA for the field of intergenerational dialogue and policy consultant of the European Youth Forum for the field of political participation and representation of youth. He authored or co-authored more than 30 peer reviewed scientific journal articles, 25 chapters in edited volumes, 10 scientific monographs and edited several edited volumes and journal special issues (ISI ranked) as well as several policy papers for international governmental organizations (OSCE, International IDEA).

Tomaž Deželan je izredni profesor s področja politologije na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani ter pomočnik glavnega tajnika univerze. Po končanem doktoratu je nadaljeval akademsko pot kot raziskovalec na Inštitutu za družbene vede ter posledično vodil več kot 15 raziskovalnih mednarodnih in domačih znanstvenih projektov. Profesor Deželan je prejemnik prestižne titule Jean Monnet Chair za področje državlanske vzgoje, ki ga podeljuje Evropska komisija, prav tako so njegovi projekti prejeli prestižno oznako »zgodba o uspehu« (ACES), prav tako s strani Evropske komisije. Trenutno vodi več kot 10 raziskovalnih projektov, med njimi velja še posebej omeniti projekt s področja učenja in poučevanja v visokem šolstvu, ki je prejel več kot tri milijone evrov evropskih sredstev (INOUP). Profesor Deželan je tudi vodilni raziskovalec globalne iniciative Youth Progress Index in vodilni evalvator nacionalnega programa za mladino, programa Erasmus + za področje mladine, raziskovalni partner slovenske E+ nacionalne agencije za področje mladine, ekspert Evropske komisije za področje mladine, še posebej za orodje YouthWiki, član bazena raziskovalcev mladine pod okriljem Partnerstva med Svetom Evrope in Evropsko Komisijo, svetovalec Organizacije za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi, svetovalec International IDEA ter svetovalec Evropskega mladinskega foruma. Je avtor ali soavtor več kot 30 izvirnih znanstvenih člankov, 25 poglavij v znanstvenih zbornikih, 10 znanstvenih monografij in več uredniških del, bodisi zbornikov bodisi znanstvenih revij, ter avtor več *policy paper-jev* za mednarodne vladne organizacije.

### Srečo Dragoš

Srečo Dragoš, PhD in sociology, is a social worker and a professor of sociology at the Faculty for Social Work (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia). His main areas of interest are the general sociology, sociology of religion, social politics and social work. In the recent published work he has written about social inequality and social capital (in Slovenia), multiculturalism and social policy.

Dr. Srečo Dragoš, sociolog in socialni delavec, je predavatelj Fakultete za socialno delo na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Raziskovalno se ukvarja predvsem s področji splošne sociologije, sociologije religije, s socialno politiko in s socialnim delom. V zadnjem času se ukvarja predvsem z družbenimi neenakostmi, socialnim kapitalom (v Sloveniji), multikulturalizmom in socialno politiko.

### Dianne Gereluk

Dianne Gereluk is professor in Educational Leadership, Policy and Governance at the Werklund School of Education, University of Calgary. Her research examines normative aspects of educational policy and practice specifically related to politically contested and controversial issues in education. An overarching philosophical focus examines how educators can create the conditions for more robust political deliberation in an increasingly polarized civil society. She is author of *Education and Community* (Continuum, 2006), *Symbolic Clothing in Schools* (Bloomsbury, 2008), *Education, Extremism and Terrorism* (Bloomsbury, 2012), *Questioning the Classroom: Perspectives on Canadian Education* (Oxford University Press, 2016 co-authored with Christopher Martin, Bruce Maxwell, and Trevor Norris), and *Understanding School Choice in Canada* (University of Toronto Press, 2016, co-authored with Lynn Bosetti). Her edited book with Michael Corbett, *Rural teacher education in Canada: connecting land and people* (Springer) will be published in 2019.

Dianne Gereluk je profesorica na področju vodenja v vzgoji in izobraževanju, izobraževalnih politik in upravljanja na Werklund School of Education Univerze v Calgaryju. Njeno raziskovalno delo obravnava normativne vidike izobraževalne politike in prakse, posebej povezane s politično spornimi in protislovnimi vprašanji v izobraževanju. Krovna filozofska usmeritev proučuje, kako lahko pedagoški delavci ustvarijo pogoje za močnejšo politično razpravo v vse bolj polarizirani civilni družbi. Je avtorica knjig *Education and Community* (Continuum, 2006), *Symbolic Clothing in Schools* (Bloomsbury, 2008), *Education, Extremism and Terrorism* (Bloomsbury, 2012), *Questioning the Classroom: Perspectives on Canadian Education* (Oxford University Press, 2016 [soavtorji Christopher Martin,

Bruce Maxwell in Trevor Norris), ter *Understanding School Choice in Canada* (University of Toronto Press, 2016 [soavtorica Lynn Bosetti]). Leta 2019 bo objavila zbornik *Rural teacher education in Canada: connecting land and people* (Springer), ki ga soureja z Michaelom Corbettom.

#### Klemen Kocjančič

Klemen Kocjančič holds a university graduate degree in theology, a M.A. in Defence Studies and a Ph.D. in History. His research focus is on military history (Second World War in Slovenia), foreign personnel in armed forces, intertwinement of religion and military, and also religious terrorism.

Klemen Kocjančič je univerzitetni diplomirani teolog, magister obramboslovja in doktor znanosti s področja zgodovine. Raziskovalno se ukvarja z vojaško zgodovino (druga svetovna vojna na Slovenskem), vprašanjem tujih pripadnikov v oboroženih silah, prepletom religije in vojaštva, ter verskim terorizmom.

#### Marko Kovačič

Marko Kovačič is a researcher at the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb where he is affiliated to the Center for Youth and Gender Studies. He specializes in youth political sociology and youth policy (particularly youth participation, youth work and civic education). He is a national correspondent on youth policy for the Youth Partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Commission, a Youth Wiki national correspondent, as well as the expert on youth policy for the European Commission. In addition, he is a founder and a lecturer at the first academic studies on youth at the University of Rijeka. So far he has published 20 peer-review research articles, co-authored three books, and managed approximately 20 (international research) projects, all in the field of youth studies.

Marko Kovačič je raziskovalec na Inštitutu za družbene raziskave v Zagrebu, kjer je član Centra za mladinske in študije spolov. Je specializiran za politično sociologijo mladih in mladinsko politiko (predvsem participacijo mladih, delo mladih in državljansko vzgojo). Je nacionalni dopisnik za mladinsko politiko za Partnerstvo mladih med Svetom Evrope in Evropsko komisijo, nacionalni Youth Wiki dopisnik ter strokovnjak za mladinsko politiko pri Evropski komisiji. Poleg tega je ustanovitelj in predavatelj na prvih akademskih študijah o mladini na Univerzi na Reki. Objavil je 20 raziskovalnih člankov, je soavtor treh knjig in je vodil približno 20 (mednarodnih raziskovalnih) projektov, vse na področju študije mladih.



### Urša Marinšek

Urša Marinšek holds a Bachelor degree in Defence Studies and is a student of postgraduate Defence Studies. Her research focus is on radicalization and Islamic propaganda.

Urša Marinšek je diplomirana obramboslovka in študentka podiplomskega študija obramboslovja. Raziskovalno se ukvarja z radikalizacijo in islamistično propagando.

### Iztok Prezelj

Iztok Prezelj is an Associate Professor and Vice-Dean for Scientific Research at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. In this capacity, he is directing the Institute of Social Sciences with 20 research centres. He was a Head of Defence Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences in the period from 2015-2017. His teaching and research activities cover counter-terrorism, national security, threat and risk assessment, intelligence studies, crisis management and critical infrastructure. He published widely in the mentioned fields and also coordinated many influential research projects in the mentioned fields.

Iztok Prezelj je izredni profesor in prodekan za raziskovalno dejavnost na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. V slednji funkciji vodi Inštitut za Družbene vede, v katerem deluje 20 raziskovalnih centrov. V obdobju od 2015 do 2017 je bil predstojnik Katedre za obramboslovje. Področja njegovega raziskovalnega in pedagoškega delovanja so: protiterorizem, nacionalna varnost, ocenjevanje groženj in tveganj, obveščevalne študije, krizni menedžment in kritična infrastruktura. Na omenjenih področjih je objavil veliko število kakovostnih znanstvenih del, prav tako pa je tudi vodil številne projekte s tovrstno vsebino.

### Julian Richards

Julian Richards successfully completed a doctorate in political violence in Pakistan, at Cambridge University, in 1993. He then spent nearly 20 years working in intelligence and security for the British government. In 2008, he co-founded the postgraduate Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS) at the University of Buckingham, in the UK. Among various affiliations, he is on the editorial board of the academic journals, *Intelligence and National Security*; and the *International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs*. He has published four books on various aspects of intelligence analysis and national security, with the latest (*Extremism, Radicalization and Security: An Identity Theory Approach*) delivering a detailed critique of research on extremism and radicalization, and the implications for policy. He is a regular media

commentator at national and international levels on security and intelligence issues, and has been to give evidence before the Joint Parliamentary Committee at the Houses of Parliament on the draft Communications Data Bill. His current research interests include attitudes towards surveillance in contemporary society, the rise of cyber-threats and cyber-security, security issues in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and violent extremism in Europe.

Julian Richards je leta 1993 uspešno zaključil doktorat iz političnega nasilja v Pakistanu na univerzi v Cambridgeu. Nato je skoraj 20 let delal na področju obveščevalnih podatkov in varnosti za britansko vlado. Leta 2008 je soustanovil podiplomski center za varnostne in obveščevalne študije (BUCSIS) na Univerzi v Buckinghamu v Veliki Britaniji. Je član uredniškega odbora akademskih revij *Intelligence and National Security* ter *International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs*. Objavil je štiri knjige o različnih vidikih analize obveščevalnih podatkov in nacionalne varnosti, vključno z najnovejšo (*Extremism, Radicalization and Security: An Identity Theory Approach*), ki podaja podrobno kritiko raziskav ekstremizma in radikalizacije ter posledic za politike. Je redni medijski komentator o varnostnih in obveščevalnih vprašanjih na nacionalni in mednarodni ravni. Je tudi pričal pred skupnim parlamentarnim odborom na parlamentarnih zasedanjih o osnutku Zakona o komunikacijskih podatkih. Njegovi trenutni raziskovalni interesi vključujejo odnos do nadzora v sodobni družbi, porast kibernetских groženj in kibernetško varnost, varnostna vprašanja v Pakistanu in Afganistanu ter nasilni ekstremizem v Evropi.

#### Mitja Sardoč

Mitja Sardoč (PhD) is a senior research associate at the Educational Research Institute in Ljubljana (Slovenia) where he is member of the 'Social Contract in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century' research programme. He is author of scholarly articles and editor of a number of journal special issues on citizenship education, multiculturalism, toleration, equality of opportunity and patriotism. He is Managing Editor of *Theory and Research in Education* [<http://tre.sagepub.com/>] and member of the editorial board of *Educational Philosophy and Theory* and the *Open Review of Educational Research*. He edited two books published by Wiley (*Citizenship, Inclusion and Democracy* and *Toleration, Respect and Recognition in Education*). He is also a contributing author to the *SAGE Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy*. He is editor-in-chief of *The Handbook of Patriotism* [<http://refworks.springer.com/> Patriotism] that is to be published by Springer in 2019.

Mitja Sardoč (PhD) je zaposlen kot raziskovalec na Pedagoškem inštitutu v Ljubljani, kjer je član programske skupine 'Družbena pogodba v 21. stoletju'. Je avtor znanstvenih in strokovnih člankov s širšega področja vzgoje in izobraževanja ter urednik vrste tematskih števil domačih in tujih znanstvenih revij s področja državlanske vzgoje, multikulturalizma, enakih možnosti itn. Je glavni urednik revije *Theory and Research in Education*, odgovorni urednik revije *Šolsko polje* ter član uredniškega odbora revij *Educational Philosophy and Theory* ter *Open Review of Educational Research*. Je tudi urednik dveh zbornikov, ki sta izšli pri založbi Blackwell (*Citizenship, Inclusion and Democracy* ter *Toleration, Respect and Recognition in Education*), avtor monografije *Multikulturalizem: pro et contra* ter soavtor monografije *Enake možnosti in družbena (ne)enakost v družbi znanja*. Je urednik publikacije *Handbook of Patriotism*, ki bo leta 2019 izšla pri založbi Springer.

#### Carol-Ann Titus

Carol-Ann Titus is a PhD Candidate at the Centre of Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. Over the last twenty years, Carol-Ann has worked in the field of intelligence and national security in Canada. She is an expert on Canadian security policy, risk perception, terrorism and counterterrorism, and intelligence studies.

Carol-Ann Titus je doktorska kandidatka na Centru za vojaške, varnostne in strateške študije na Univerzi v Calgaryju. V zadnjih dvajsetih letih je Carol-Ann delala na področju obveščevalnih podatkov in nacionalne varnosti v Kanadi. Je strokovnjakinja za kanadsko varnostno politiko, zaznavanje tveganja, terorizem in protiterorizem ter obveščevalne študije.

#### Boris Vezjak

Boris Vezjak (PhD) is associate professor of philosophy at the department of philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Faculty of Education in Maribor, Slovenia. His field of interest covers various topics, such as history of philosophy, theory of discourse, media analysis and theory of argumentation. He is the author of several books, commentaries and translations, such as *Plato: Charmides* (1994), *Plato: Philebus* (2000), *Plato: Parmenides* (2001), *The relaxed ideology of Slovenes: on political implications of the philosopheme relaxedness* (2007), *Mistakes and fallacies in argumentation: a guide to bad argumentation in quotidian life* (2007, together with Janez Bregant), *The Twilight of media autonomy* (2009), *Paranoia, manipulation and rationality: on psychopolitics of conspiracy, hatred and humiliation of reason* (2010), *Introduction to Socrates for young people* (2011) and *Ad populum: analyses of social discourse* (2012).

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*Clanki*: Kerr, D. (1999b) Changing the political culture: the advisory group on education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools. *Oxford Review of Education* 25 (4), str. 25–35.

*Poglavja v knjigi*: Walzer, M. (1992) The Civil Society Argument. V MOUFFE, Ch. (ur.). *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship and Community*. London: Routledge.

*Spletne strani*: [http://www.cahiers-pedagogiques.com/article.php3?id\\_article=881](http://www.cahiers-pedagogiques.com/article.php3?id_article=881) (pridobljeno 5. 5. 2008).

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- 5 keywords in both Slovene and English;
- a short presentation of the author in both Slovene and English (each of up to 100 words) including his/her institutional affiliation.

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The spacing of the article should be double spaced, the font Times New Roman (size 12 in the main text and size 10 in the footnotes). Paragraphs should be indicated using an empty row. There are three types of hierarchical subheadings, which should be numbered as follows:

I.

I.1

I.1.1

For emphasis, use italics only. Words in a foreign language should also be italicized. Use self-numbered footnotes.

Double quotations marks should be used for quotes in the text and single quotation marks for quotes within quotes. Longer quotations (more than 5 lines) should be extracted in separate paragraphs and separated from the rest of the text by omitting the rows and by having an indentation to the right. The source of the quotation should be in round brackets at the end of the quotation, e.g. (Benjamin, 1974, pp. 42–44).

Please mark in the text the place where a graphic product (tables, diagrams, charts, etc.) should be included, e.g. [Table 1 about here]. These products should be attached in a separate file (in 'eps', 'ai', 'tif' or 'jpg' format [300 dpi resolution]). The table title should be above the relevant table or the graph.

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For the works of an author that were published in the same year, distinguish between them by adding small letters (a, b, c, etc.), e.g. (Bourdieu, 1996a). Repeatedly cited works should use the following: (ibid.). Please, use the following style for each of publication:

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Kerr, D. (1999b) Changing the political culture: the advisory group on education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools. *Oxford Review of Education*. 25 (1–2), pp. 25–35.

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Walzer, M. (1992) The Civil Society Argument. In: Mouffe, Ch. (ed.). *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship and Community*. London: Routledge.

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