

Marian Kempny

## KULTURNI SISTEMI V VZHODNI EVROPI V ČASU TRANZICIJE

(OPOMBE K ISKANJU GLOBALNE LOGIKE V FRAGMENTIRANEM SVETU)<sup>1</sup>

Pričujoče opombe je treba razumeti kot izraz nezadovoljstva - nezadovoljstva, ki izvira iz sedanjega stanja razprav o načinih raziskovanja in analiziranja postkomunistične realnosti, s katero se srečujemo danes. Vendar je treba lokalne izzive, kot so tisti, ki so jih povzročile sedanje preobrazbe družbenega reda v srednje- in vzhodnoevropskih državah, neizogibno motriti z vidika globalnih fenomenov. Ti so predmet obravnave v družbeni teoriji v zvezi z refleksijo o tako imenovanem postmodernem preboju - ki velja za večdimenzionalni globalni fenomen. Zato se zastavljajo vprašanja, kot so: Kakšne so postkomunistične kulture? Kaj lahko imajo skupnega kulture (družbe), ki so bolj predmoderne kot moderne, daleč od fenomenov, s katerimi se srečujejo postmoderne (beri: najbolj razvite, postindustrijske)? In, spet, kaj imajo lahko skupnega s tako imenovanimi primitivnimi kulturami, ki naj bi bile prav tako pod pritiskom iste logike postmodernizacije?

Vendar, kakor sam razumem vse to, moramo, da bi odgovorili na ta in podobna vprašanja, nujno analizirati preslišane domneve, ki so v podlagi sodobne teoretske prakse v družboslovju. Še več, moja temeljna trditev je, da je dejansko treba ponovno premisliti sredstva za dojemanje spreminjajoče se resničnosti, ki so na razpolago družboslovju, saj jih je treba videti kot neko vrsto stranskega produkta bolj fundamentalnih vzorcev, ki oblikujejo kulturno identiteto obravnavanih družb. Z drugimi besedami, zdi se, da ima diskurz o realnosti iste zunanje oblike kot znanstveni metadiskurz, ki se danes pojavlja iz "nezaupljivosti do metanaracij" (kot se je izrazil F. Lyotard). Posledica je neprijetna strateška dilema, v katero smo ujeti.

Po eni strani se nauk iz postmodernizma za mnoge zvoja v prepričanje, da morajo družboslovci prevzeti fragmentirano perspektivo, posebej kar zadeva tako imenovane kulturne resnice. Po drugi strani pa kaže, da priznanje, da vsi živimo v postmodernem, fragmentiranem svetu, implicira, da je naša lastna perspektiva neizogibno omejena, kar izključuje vsakršno možnost obravnavanja drugih realnosti, kot da so "monade brez oken". Vprašanje, ki se zarisuje v ozadju, se z drugimi besedami glasi: Kako "globalna" je lahko družboslovna teorija, ki je "neobčutljiva" za lokalne naracije in pomembnosti? V praktičnem jeziku se, kot kaže, to strne v vprašanje, kako uskladiti težnjo po odkrivanju globalne kulturne logike z odpravo avtoritete "velikih teorij" v prid mikroskopskih analiz procesa spreminjanja.

Kot sta se izrazila Marcus in Fischer, "je potreben juvelirjev pogled na svet" (1986: 25), kar pomeni, da naj bi si antropologi bolj prizadevali najti razlago pričakovanj in indeterminant kot pa regularnosti in globalnih posledic opazovanih pojavov. Kar nameravam dokazovati sam, gre v isto smer. Menim, da mora tisti, ki hoče konceptualizirati dinamiko družbe (njeno logiko), najprej premisliti teoretsko logiko družboslovnega raziskovanja. Po mojem mnenju je zlahka mogoče opaziti močno težnjo, ki se vrti okoli kulturizacije družboslovne teorije in spremembe statusa ter značaja analiz široko pojmovanih kulturnih vidikov družbenega življenja. Ta težnja je usmerjena v prepoznavanje njihove določujoče vloge tako na teoretski kot na metateoretski ravni.

Potemtakem mora prizadevanje po konceptualiziranju "kulturnih sistemov" Vzhodne Evrope spodbujati poskuse po karakterizaciji sprememb, do katerih prihaja v tem delu sveta v smislu preobrazb simboličnih/kulturnih praks, in jih povezati z refleksijo o kulturnih temeljih družbenega življenja ter tudi s skrbnim premislekom o kulturnih dejavnikih, ki determinirajo svojsko simbolično prakso - sodobno družboslovje.

V mislih imam predvsem vprašanje, do kolikšne mere imamo lahko transformacije, ki smo jim priča in ki so pogosto zelo spektakularne, za kulturne spremembe? Ali lahko, na primer, govorimo o regularnosti ali sočasnosti političnih in gospodarskih transformacij na eni strani in kulturnih sprememb na drugi? Do kolikšne mere so vzhodnoevropske revolucije produkt kulturne spremembe in do kolikšne mere so njen vzrok? Do kolikšne mere so kulturne spremembe vzrok, gonilna sila transformacij, in do kolikšne mere so njihov korelat? Itd. Seveda, v sami koncepciji revolucije kot radikalne spremembe, ki zadeva vse vidike družbenega življenja, mora biti zajet tudi kulturni dejavnik. Zastavlja pa se vprašanje, kakšna je njegova vloga in kako se manifestira njegova funkcija. Če je socialni in politični kaos značilni element revolucije (kot so nekateri raziskovalci eksplicitno izpostavili), mar moremo potem govoriti tudi o kulturnem kaosu? Če revolucijo spremljajo velika pričakovanja (kot se običajno poudarja), visoke ambicije in erupcija družbene energije, ali vse to učinkuje tudi na kulturo? Kako se to kaže na področju simbolne prakse?

Dovolj paradoksalno je, da so bila takšna vprašanja zastavljena v jeziku, ki je bil bolj abstrakten, tj. v jeziku teorije posredovanja (M. Archer, A. Giddens, A. Touraine) ali v historični sociologiji - med njenimi prominentnimi predhodniki so bili N. Elias, P. Abrams, C. Tilly in še posebej T. Skocpol (prim. njeno delo *States and Social Revolutions*).

S sklicevanjem na razvoj antropološke teorije homo dobili dragocen namig, kako implementirati takšno usmeritev.

<sup>1</sup> Prvotna inačica tega članka je bila predstavljena na 13. kongresu antropoloških in etnoloških znanosti, ki je potekal v Ciudad de Mexico od 29. julija do 2. avgusta 1993.



Navsezadnje se v antropologiji kaže, da kategorija kulture generira pojmovanje, ki nam dopušča obravnavati jo kot "metakategorijo", ki deluje kot posrednik med makroprocesi družbenega nastajanja ali njegove preobrazbe in človekovo aktivnostjo (vključno s simbolnimi praksami). Do tega pride, ker za sodobno antropologijo kultura ni več mehanizem, ki zagotavlja stabilnost socialnega sistema, ampak je postala dejavnik, ki generira spremembo s pomočjo svoje zmožnosti, da pod določenimi pogoji artikulira kompetitivne vizije kulturnih svetov (glej npr. Ortner 1984).

V tem kontekstu je poučno preučiti preobrazbo, skozi katero je šla sama koncepcija "kulturnega sistema". Postopni vse večji poudarek na kulturni diskontinuiteti in odprtosti kulturnih sistemov je najboljšje izrazil Geertz v svoji teoriji kulture. Tako pravi: "Analiza kulture se torej ne spusti v heroičen 'holistični' naskok na 'temeljne konfiguracije kulture', vseobsežen 'red vseh redov' /.../, temveč v temeljito preučevanje značilnih simbolov /.../ - materialnih posrednikov percepcije, emocij in razumevanja" (1973: 408). Kljub vsemu pa metafora za kulturne sisteme, na katero se končno sklicuje Geertz, ni ne pajkova mreža niti grad iz peska, temveč hobotnica. Še bolj pomembno pa je, da je ta metafora izhajala iz njegove diagnoze o stanju sodobne humanistike.

Kot je opisal C. Geertz (1980) v svojem članku *Blurred Genres* (Nejasne zvrsti), so bila sedemdeseta leta 20. stoletja tako neverjetna mešanica žanrov, da imamo sedaj v humanistiki opraviti s povsem novimi konfiguracijami človeške misli. Še več, spremenjena usmeritev, s katero so začeli mnogi družboslovci na podlagi odmika od družbenih analogij, izvedenih iz fizikalnih procesov, k analogijam s področja analiz simbolnih form (tj. k metaforam "igre", "drame", "teksta", sestavljenih iz različnih vrst vedenja), prinaša določen destabilizirajoči učinek ne le na metode, uporabljane v teh znanostih, temveč tudi na njihove cilje. Geertz verjame, da naraščajoče zanimanje za analize simboličnih sistemov sili znanstvenike zastavljati nova vprašanja o razmerjih med preučevalci teh sistemov in tako imenovanim realnim svetom. Skratka, kultura postaja manj transparenten medij, skozi katerega raziskovalec "lahko preučuje" družbo, ki postaja nekaj, česar si, recimo tako, mi ne izmislimo, temveč nekaj, v čemer živimo.

To je del težnje sodobnega družboslovja (ali, v širšem smislu, humanistike) po problematiziranju objektivne realnosti. J. Habermas, na primer, ki nadaljuje tradicijo frankfurtske šole, poudarja potrebo po iskanju prehoda od znanja, ki izraža tako imenovano "indirektno zavest" o preverjeni objektivni realnosti, h "kritičnemu" znanju. "Kritično" znanje, ki je rezultat "kritiziranega" znanja, je po svojem značaju metalingvistično in konstituira svojsko zavest o "indirektni zavesti" ter o njenih socio-kulturnih pogojih. Povedano drugače: ta vrsta znanja raziskovalcu ne dopušča identificirati svetovnega nazora, ki mu je dan bolj posredno, z objektivno realnostjo. Ta vidik interpretira kot miselno realnost, kot koncept, katerega pojav napoti raziskovalca k iskanju temeljnih določujočih dejavnikov "kritiziranega" znanja, ki je ponovitev vednosti zdravega razuma.

Po drugi strani velja v različnih filozofskih usmeritvah od Husserla do postmodernizma za lažno že sama ideja zoperstavljanja spoznavajočega subjekta in spoznavnega objekta, saj te usmeritve ne obravnavajo niti subjekta niti objekta kot trajnih konstitutivnih virov našega mišljenja ali delovanja. Še več, mnoge oblike postmoderne preobrata v humanistiki (že samo njihovo število kaže, kako daleč od homogenosti je ta težnja), v katero sodijo, med drugim, francoski poststrukturalizem, ameriški neopragmatizem, koncepcije, ki izvirajo

iz heideggerjanske tradicije ali iz Wittgensteinove filozofije - pomenijo opustitev ohranjanja upravičevanja veljavnosti znanstvenega diskurza, tj. opustitev prepričanja, da je ta ali oni način mišljenja ali oblikovanja sodb (uporabe "idiomov" mišljenja) mogoče uporabiti samo, če je potrjen. Ne zahteva več vsaka "pripoved" prikaza potrjevalne ali upravičevalne "meta-pripovedi".

Zato bi si težko predstavljali koncept kulture, ki ne bi upošteval naslednjih dveh vidikov. Prvič, temeljne kategorije antropološke analize, kot sta "kultura" ali "družba", je mogoče misliti samo znotraj svojiskih miselnih konstrukcij, ki odsevajo miselno realnost nekoga drugega. Drugič, sama konceptualizacija kulturne realnosti pomeni, da mora vključiti teoretsko vprašljivo opozicijo - spoznavajočega subjekta - zavedajoč se, seveda, da kulturna analiza ni sekundarna glede na "neposredno zavest" o kulturni realnosti, ki obstaja za nekoga nekje v "zunanj" realnosti, temveč da se svet kulture ustvarja ali rekonstruira tudi znotraj znanstvenega diskurza. Še več, tak diskurz konstituira del kulture v smislu vsote znanja in pravil argumentiranja, s katerimi razpolagajo posamezniki samo zato, ker pripadajo skupnosti. Tako recipročno prepletенost znanstvenega diskurza in kulturne realnosti bi ob uporabi Habermasove terminologije lahko definirali kot svojsko kolonizacijo znanosti, ki jo izvede življenjski svet, medtem ko se raziskovalci v vlogi ekspertov za kulturo sklicujejo na kategorije, prenešene v teoretski diskurz iz praktičnih diskurzov o standardih in vrednotah, ki uporabljajo koncepte, ki so v dani družbi očitni. Na tem mestu se ne sklicujem po naključju na jezik Habermasovega dela *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, da bi opozoril na pomen analize vloge znanosti (znanstvene prakse) kot foruma za razpravljanje o zadevah v teoretskem diskurzu, s katerimi naj bi racionalizirali in modernizirali življenjski svet. To, z drugimi besedami, ne pomeni samo, da se n-tič sklicujem na Habermasovo razpravo o razmerju med teorijo in prakso, ampak nam to sklicevanje omogoča na jasn način ponazoriti pomembno tezo, da je med znanstvenim diskurzom in zdravo pametjo le fiktivna distanca ali fiktivno razločevanje in da ni resnične avtonomije jezika znanosti.

Tako je tudi kulturna analiza, osredotočena na simbolne/kulturne prakse, sredstvo ali simbolno orodje za potrditev vizije družbenega življenja, ki vsili določeno zaznavo mehanizmov družbenega življenja ali temeljnih družbenih procesov. Sklicujoč se na Habermasovo zasnovo, je "kultura" kot ena od treh komponent, ki sestavljajo življenjski svet, področje kristalizacije simbolnih praks (znanost je lahko ena od njih) in je tako podvržena kolonizaciji z logiko, ki vodi podsistema sistema - politiko in gospodarstvo. Ta dualistična družbena teorija, ki razločuje in združuje dve enako pomembni kategoriji - "življenjski svet" in "sistem" (glej Habermas 1981: 171-229) - ter obsega sistematično analizo diferenciacije med tema dvema kategorijama, se nanaša tudi na splošno videnje kulturnega procesa. V tem kontekstu je ključnega pomena Habermasova teza o potencialni racionalizaciji (modernizaciji) bistvenih komponent življenjskega sveta kot procesa, ki odseva in tudi implicira določene spremembe v sistemu. Izkaže se, da v skladu s to usmeritvijo pride z modernizacijo ne le do pojava dveh podsistemov, omenjenih zgoraj, temveč tudi do sprememb na kulturni in družbeni ravni življenjskega sveta s procesoma, ki pogojujeta drug drugega.

Potemtakem ima Habermas dobro podlago za mnenje, da kulturna modernizacija, torej diferenciacija kulturne sfere v skupine institucij, zbranih okrog treh aksioloških sfer (Habermas navaja, po Webbru, kognitivno-instrumentalne vrednote),



omogoča razvoj institucij civilne družbe - post-tradicionalnih, post-konvencionalnih, komunikativno koordiniranih in fleksivnih oblik združevanja, izražanja javnega mnenja, vzpostavljanja solidarnostnih vezi in načinov oblikovanja identitete. Na podlagi Habermasove usmeritve J. L. Cohen in A. Arato (1992: 421 ff.) obravnavata rekonstrukcijo teorije civilne družbe bolj izčrpno. Še več, potencialna vez med kulturno racionalizacijo in družbeno racionalizacijo po Habermasu ni utopični horizont kulturnega modernizma; deloma je bila že udeležena kot rezultat razvoja tržnega gospodarstva in sodobne države (glej Habermas 1992: 471 ff.).

Vendar pa ob tem Habermas ponovno ugotavlja, da kulturni modernizem nikjer ni bil v celoti uresničen, in poudarja, da je bila modernizacija zahodnih družb izvedena na tak način, da sta kulturno osiromašenje in kolonizacija (reifikacija) življenjskega sveta spodkopala potencialno posodobljeni življenjski svet. Na ta način Habermasova teorija potrjuje tezo o nastajanju vrzeli med kulturami ekspertov in kulturo občestva. Ta vrzel v splošnem vodi v obubožanje kulturne razsežnosti življenjskega sveta, s čimer zaradi omejenega števila verovanj, na katere se sklicujejo udeleženci interakcij v želji, da bi uskladili svoje interpretacije realnosti, zavira gladko implementacijo komunikacijskih praks. Hkrati pa teorija kaže privlačno moč praktičnih diskurzov (splošne komunikacijske prakse, kot se izraža Habermas), kadar pride do oblikovanja kulturne ravni življenjskega sveta tako v kontekstu družbene integracije, predajanju novim generacijam in obnavljanju kulturnega znanja kot v kontekstu oblikovanja posameznih identitet (glej Habermas 1986).

S to teorijo, navedeno za primer, lahko dešifriramo dve temeljni značilnosti, ki se kažeta kot neločljiva dela vsakega teoretskega poskusa po izčrpnem dojetju družbene resničnosti in njene dinamike. Na eni strani torej takšno početje vsakič temelji na predpostavkah, ki se nanašajo na mehanizme in smeri zgodovinskega kulturnega (civilizacijskega) procesa, predpostavkah, ki se lahko utrdijo samo kot del kulture ekspertov. Zato je treba objektivno znanje ves čas verificirati glede na predpostavke spoznavajočega subjekta, ki se nanašajo na dani objekt. Na drugi strani pa je razlikovanje, podobno razlikovanju med kulturo (življenjskim svetom, če se zavedamo Habermasovih pridrzkov do kulturalističnega ožanja življenjskega sveta) in sistemom kot dvema vidikoma družbe, neodtujljivi atribut tiste usmeritve, ki noče skriti svojega področja obravnave le na miselno resničnost ali na reprezentacije družbenih akterjev.

\*\*\*

Namen zgoraj navedenih razmišljanj je bil prikazati vlogo kulturne kategorije (kulturnega procesa) pri razvijanju družboslovne teorije, ki naj bi pojasnila realnost, v kateri pod množico nepovezanih dejstev deluje notranja logika procesov modernizacije. Tako rekoč v drugo skrajnost pa lahko umestimo drugo usmeritev, v kateri "kulturo" obravnavajo kot poseben kontekst, ki omogoča v resničnosti živečemu posamezniku dojeti tok takšnih nepovezanih dogodkov kot kulturnih reprezentacij teh dejstev.

Spet se izkaže, da je Geertzova koncepcija dobra ilustracija za tovrstno usmeritev, ker združuje prepričanje, da kultura ni nič drugega, kot so mreže pomenov (semantične strukture), ki jih ustvarja posameznik in v katere je zapleten (prim. Geertz 1973: 5), in interpretacijo kulture kot "fikcije" (v izvornem pomenu latinske besede *fictio*), kot nečesa, kar so ustvarili raziskovalci. Z drugimi besedami, svet, do katerega so prišli

raziskovalci, se ne nanaša neposredno na neko zunanjo realnost. Mreža simbolov sestavlja avtonomno sfero, na katero ne-kulturni dejavniki nimajo vpliva. Za razliko od zgoraj omenjenega Habermasovega koncepta, po katerem postavljane kulturne ravni življenjskega sveta nasproti sistemu vodi v prepričanje, da obstajajo procesi kolonizacije in dekolonizacije življenjskega sveta, ki jih generira skupna logika, pa so koncepti, kakršnega je na primer podal Geertz, zaradi načela integracije enotni v izločanju "kulture" od "socialnega sistema". Razločevalna poteza kulture je v tem primeru "logično-pomenska" integracija elementov, ta pa je v nasprotju s "kavzalno-funkcionalnim" načelom integracije družbenega sistema.

Podobno sled razmišljanja lahko najdemo v Archerini sociološki teoriji (1988). Archerjeva v bistvu pove naslednje: problem s konceptualizacijo kulturnih kategorij leži v "mitu o kulturni integraciji", ki smo ga podedovali od klasične kulturne antropologije (prim. Archer 1988: 4). Logična kohezivnost in konsistentnost kavzalnih razmerij sta za "častilce" tega mita nerazločljivi komponenti, sestavljeni iz dveh analitično ločenih razsežnosti kulturne realnosti - sveta idej (po Archerjevi je to kulturni sistem v ožjem pomenu besede) in razmerij med skupino in posameznikom (socio-kulturna raven).

Tako pojmovano vprašanje kulturne analize presega enostavno zoperstavljanje kulture in družbene strukture bodisi z obravnavanjem prve kot pojavne oblike slednje (ali narobe) bodisi s priznavanjem njune absolutne avtonomije zato, da bi označili prav odvisnost, ki obstaja na vsaki od posameznih ravni in med njima (podrobneje glej Archer 1988: I. del). Vendar pa se zdijo posledice sprejetja tega vidika analitičnega dualizma, če uporabim Archerin izraz, nekoliko nenavadne (*peculiar*). V prvi vrsti je za Archerjevo kulturni sistem po definiciji sistem kulturne inteligibilnosti (nekaj podobnega je Popperjev *Tretji svet objektivnega znanja*; prim. Archer 1988: 104 ff.), ki mora biti izražena v skupnem jeziku. Nadalje mora imeti ta sistem zanj značilne poteze (logična razmerja), ki se ne zrealijo verno v prepričanih posameznikov. Skratka, "svet miselnih produktov" se kaže kot nekaj popolnoma različnega od sveta človeških pomenov.

Zato da bi artikulirali kulturni sistem, moramo po Archerjevi predpostaviti, da njegova notranja logična razmerja niso odvisna od konteksta vzročnih odvisnosti, do katerih prihaja med posamezniki, niti od pomenov, ki jim jih pripisujejo. Še več, sodbe, nastale v zvezi s kulturnim sistemom, naj bi bile predvidoma brez vsakršne ambivalence. Prav tukaj pa se srečamo s klasičnima in nerešljivima antropološkima vprašanjema - z relativnostjo in interpretacijo. Celo Archerjeva pravi (glej 1988: 278), da tako razumljenega kulturnega sistema ni mogoče v celoti opisati, medtem ko teoretsko refleksijo, ki prevladuje v družboslovju, povezuje z izidom dosti bolj negativni sklep. Če naj bi za družboslovno teorijo postmodernizem pomenil destrukcijo ključne ali celo, kot bi se morda zdelo, konstitutivne kategorije družboslovja, to se pravi kategorije "družbe" (Z. Bauman je prepričan, da je predstavo o reificirani kategoriji družbe nadomestil koncept družbenosti, ki se sklicuje na epizodni značaj družbene realnosti), potem tudi "kultura" dobi novo obliko, kar izhaja iz takšnega drugačnega pojmovanja družbene realnosti.

Ta novi način interpretiranja kulture je že po sami svoji naravi v nasprotju s konceptom "objektivne" kulture kot nečesa, kar ima skupnega določena skupnost ljudi (to je z družbo, razumljeno na tradicionalen način) in katere pripadniki so podobno kulturno usposobljeni. Na splošno povedano je tovrstna usmeritev izražena v postmodernistični kritiki pojmovanja kulture kot "razdeljenega znanja", kot



"norm" ali kot "javnega vedenja". Kot alternativo "kulturnemu ali retoričnemu holizmu" (glej Thornton 1988) ta kritika ponuja vizijo notranje heterogenih ali celo kompetitivnih oblik (kulturnih praks in spretnosti). V tej situaciji koncepti, kot so "hibridizacija", "decentralizacija", "dekonstrukcija" ali "lokalnost" kulturnega znanja, postajajo glavne kategorije, ki označujejo "kulturo". Če jo opazujemo s tega vidika, je kultura zmeraj videti kot hibrid, ki se sam ločuje od kulturne tradicije.

\*\*\*

Zdi se, da vse, kar je bilo povedano do sedaj, razkriva nujno potrebo po ponovnem premisleku ključnega vprašanja teh razmišljanj - do kolikšne mere lahko kulturne analize pomagajo pri našem objektivnem poznavanju realnosti v postkomunističnih svetovih in na kakšnih premisah (predpostavkah) mora biti utemeljeno? Že sama dezintegracija komunističnega sistema in kopica različnih interpretacij tega fenomena je do določene mere razkrila, kako vzorci mišljenja, s katerimi imamo opraviti, determinirajo načine, s pomočjo katerih predstavljajo "logiko" kulturne spremembe.

Raznolikost interpretacij je rezultat razhajanj v predpostavkah - ne le v socioloških, temveč tudi v filozofskih, političnih ali etičnih - na katerih temeljijo. Z. Krasnodębski, na primer, dokazuje (1991), da mnoge interpretacije ne zmorejo doumeti pravega pomena tega pojava, čeprav so lahko korektne v detajlih. Do tega pride zaradi neustreznosti takšnih izhodišč, ki jih dejansko pogosto privzamejo povsem neosmišljeno. Če se strinjamo s tem, da razumemo dezintegracijo realnega socializma kot krizo sedanjega časa - tako kot postmodernizem naj bi bil tudi komunizem 'post-', bil naj bi post-kapitalizem in naj bi sklenil vso zgodovino do trenutka, ko se je pojavil; tako so se izrazili Krasnodębski (1991: 284) in drugi - potem ni mogoče videti komunizma (oziroma, natančneje, tistega, kar je ostalo od njega) bodisi ekskluzivno v čisti sociološki perspektivi bodisi zgolj v jeziku dezintegracije političnih in gospodarskih institucij realnega socializma ter v jeziku propada moralnega reda (ob razumevanju komunizma kot etičnega nihilizma).

Samo z upoštevanjem kulturne razsežnosti in širokega zgodovinskega ozadja tega kompleksnega in večplastnega fenomena - ali zgolj s privzemom idej in vrednot, ki so konstitutivne za sisteme razmišljanja o analizirani realnosti - lahko vidimo v pojavih, ki smo jih že izkusili, in v teli, ki jih še doživljamo, nekaj več kot ponovno rojstvo barbarstva, ki je izvorno prišlo z vzhoda. Na ta način bomo tudi opazili vzajemne odvisnosti med bližajočim se padcem komunistične utopije na Vzhodu in spremembami v zahodnih družbah, ki začenjajo s postindustrijsko fazo ali z obdobjem postmoderne.

Vendar teza, da je postmodernizem, pojmovan kot ideja o postmodernosti, deloma tudi reakcija na eksperiment z "realnim socializmom" in na njegove učinke (glej Krasnodębski 1991: 284 ff.), ne ponuja zadovoljivega pojasnila o mehanizmih kulturne spremembe, ki je bistvo transformacije in po mnenju mnogih avtorjev omogoča pojav nove kvalitete v družbene realnosti - postmoderno družbo. Potemtakem splošno vprašanje ostane: je globalno-lokalna polarnost pojasnjevalna ali, bolj preprosto, diagnostična?

Po mojem mnenju želja po rekonstruiranju realnosti v objektivnem jeziku determinira rabo določenega metajezika, ki je, v tem primeru, metakulturna deskripcija. Spet se torej zastavlja vprašanje o karakteristiki takega "diskurza o diskurzu" in o njegovi avtonomiji itd. Skratka, da bi prišli do objektivnega poznavanja procesov, do katerih prihaja v postkomunistični resničnosti, potrebujemo kritiko posebne "neposredne zavesti",

ki omogoča refleksijo vprašanj, kot so "vrnitev v Evropo", "povaj civilne družbe" itd., kot znanstveno deskripcijo teh procesov. To je v veliki meri iskanje kulturnih predpostavk (idej, vrednot), ki segajo - pogosto se tega raziskovalci ne zavedajo - v njihovo "neposredno zavest", ki je blizu prevladujoči zdravi pameti. Ko gremo po tej poti, iščemo tudi argumente na filozofsko-etični ravni med predpostavkami, ki določajo temeljne predpostavke predmeta ali raziskave.

V njih se kaže prevladujoča tendenca intelektualnih procesov, ki so značilni za sodobno družboslovje, to je, da se zapletajo v moralne trditve. Kot se je izrazil Geertz (1980: 35): "Strokovnjak brez duha, ki trosi zdravilne zvarke usmeritev, se obnese, toda tudi modri predavateljevi zapiski, ki delijo potrjene sodbe, prav tako delujejo." Medtem pa je antropologu ostala vloga participacije ob uživanju-enakih-pravic v procesih interpretacije in reinterpetacije družbenega sveta, participacije v etičnem diskurzu, ki skupaj z drugimi avtonomnimi subjekti določa alternativne, fragmentirane kulturne realnosti. Ta misel naj bi bila nekaj več kot zgolj stilistični leitmotiv - pokazala naj bi smer raziskav, ki jih je šele treba izvesti. Kot sam razumem, to pomeni hrepenenje po "lokalnem" in vodi v opuščanje ambicij po globaliziranju antropološkega znanja. Zato moramo, potrjujoč Geertzovo videnje kulture kot 'oktopoidnega sistema', upoštevati "lokalnost" antropološkega znanja, zato da to ne bi preprečilo temeljitega raziskovanja in analize kulturnih reprezentacij procesov, ki so v osnovi postkomunistične realnosti. Zatorej se danes ne zdi plodno iskati globalnih civilizacijskih trendov v Vzhodni in Zahodni Evropi, temveč obravnavati partikularne impulze, ki bi lahko očrtali "množično skupno delovanje /kulturne/ celote" skozi razdruževanje gibanja njenih delov.

(Iz angleščine prevedel Božidar Jezernik.)

## LITERATURA

- ARCHER, M. 1988: Culture and Agency. Cambridge.
- BATESON, G. 1936: Naven. Stratford.
- COHEN, J. L., and A. ARATO: Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, Mass.
- GEERTZ, C. 1973: The Interpretation of Cultures. New York.
- GEERTZ, C. 1983: Blurred Genres. V: Local Knowledge. New York. Pp. 19-35.
- HABERMAS, J. 1981: Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Vol. 1. Frankfurt/M.
- HABERMAS, J. 1986: Pojęcie działania komunikacyjnego (uwagi wyjaśniające). V: Kultura i Społeczeństwo 3, pp. 21-44.
- MARCUS, G. E., and M. M. J. FISCHER 1986: Anthropology as Cultural Critique. Chicago.
- KRASNODĘBSKI, Z. 1991: Waiting for Supermarkets or: Downfall of Communism Seen in Postmodern Perspective. V: Polish Sociological Bulletin 4, pp. 281-87.
- LASH, S. 1990: The Sociology of Postmodernism. London.
- ORTNER, S. B. 1984: Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties. V: Comparative Studies in Society and History 26/1, pp. 126-166.
- THORNTON, R. J. 1988: The Rhetoric of Ethnographic Holism. V: Cultural Anthropology 3, pp. 285-303.



Marian Kempny

## CULTURAL SYSTEMS OF EASTERN EUROPE IN TRANSITION

### NOTES ON THE SEARCH FOR GLOBAL LOGIC IN FRAGMENTED WORLD<sup>1</sup>

These notes should be treated as an expression of a dissatisfaction - a dissatisfaction rooted in the present state of debates about the ways of inquiring and analysing the postcommunist reality that we face nowadays. However, local challenges, such as those caused by the present transformations of the social order in Central and East European countries, should inevitably be observed from the point of view of global phenomena which, in social theory, are debated in connection with reflection upon the so-called postmodernist breakthrough - regarded as a multidimensional global phenomenon.

That is why questions arise such as: What are postcommunist cultures like? What can be common to the cultures (societies) which are rather premodern than modern, far from phenomena with which those postmodern (read: most advanced, postindustrial) are faced? In turn, what can they have in common with the so-called primitive cultures which allegedly are also under pressure of the same logic of postmodernisation?

As I see it, however, it is indispensable to analyse tacit assumptions underlying contemporary theoretical practice in the social sciences in order to answer these and similar questions. Furthermore, my basic claim is that the means of grasping the changing realities, which are at the disposal of social science, need in fact to be reconsidered, as they should be seen as a kind of by-product of more fundamental patterns shaping the cultural identity of the societies in question. In other words, the discourse about the reality appears to have the same features as the scientific metadiscourse emerging today from "incredulity towards metanarratives" (as F. Lyotard put it).

Consequently, we are caught in an embarrassing strategic dilemma. On the one hand, for many people a lesson of postmodernism boils down to a belief that the social scientist must take a fragmented perspective, especially as so-called cultural truths are concerned. On the other hand, however, to avow that we all live in a postmodern, fragmented world seems to imply that our own perspective is inevitably limited which precludes any possibility to deal with other realities as if they were like 'windowless monads'.

In other words, the problem that looms behind is, how 'global' can social theory be while 'insensitive' to local narratives and concerns. In practical terms this seems to boil down to the question how to reconcile the pursuit of global cultural logic with suspension of the authority of 'grand theory' in favour of microscopic analyses of the process of change. As Marcus and Fischer put it, "a jeweller's-eye view of the world is needed" (1986: 25), what means that anthropologists should seek for explanation of expectations and indeterminants rather than regularities and global consequences of phenomena observed.

What I am going to argue goes in the same direction. I assume that in order to conceptualise the dynamics of society (its logic) one must previously rethink the theoretical logic of social inquiry. To my mind, a strong tendency revolving around the culturisation of social theory and around the change of the status and character of the analyses of the broadly understood cultural aspects of social life can be easily noticed. The direction of the tendency is to recognise their determining role both on the theoretical and metatheoretical level. This is why, then, an endeavour to conceptualise 'cultural systems' of Eastern Europe has to incite the attempts to characterise the changes which are occurring in this part of the world in terms of the transformations of symbolic/cultural practices and to link them with the reflection over the cultural foundations of social life, and also with careful consideration of the cultural factors which determine the peculiar symbolic practice - modern social sciences. What I especially have in mind is the question to what extent the transformations, often very spectacular, that we witness, can be regarded as cultural changes? For instance, can we talk of the regularity or parallelness of political and economic transformations on the one hand, and of cultural changes, on the other? To what extent are East European revolutions a product of the cultural change, and to what extent are they its cause? To what extent are cultural changes the cause, the driving force of the transformations, and to what extent are they their correlate?, etc. Of course, in the very concept of revolution as a sweeping change which includes all aspects of social life there has to be a cultural factor. The question arises, however, what its role is and how its function manifests itself? If social and political chaos is a characteristic element of a revolution (as some researchers have explicitly put it), can we then also talk of a cultural chaos? If a revolution is accompanied (as commonly pointed out) by great expectations, high ambitions and an eruption of social energy, does all this also effect culture?

<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this draft was presented as an introduction to the session on *Cultural Systems of Eastern Europe in Transition: In Pursuit of Global Cultural Logic?* held during the 13th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (Mexico City, July 29 - August 2 1993).



How is this expressed in the area of symbolic practice? Paradoxically enough, such questions have been asked in a language which was even more abstract, i.e., in the language of the theory of agency (M. Archer, A. Giddens, A. Touraine), or in historical sociology (among its prominent forerunners were N. Elias, P. Abrams, C. Tilly, and especially T. Skocpol (cf. her *States and Social Revolutions*), particularly in the past ten years.

If we refer to the development of anthropological theory, we will get a valuable hint how such an approach is to be implemented. It is in anthropology after all that the category of culture appears to be generating an understanding which allows us to treat it as a "metacategory" that acts as a mediator between the macroprocesses of social becoming, or of its transformation, and human activity (including symbolic practices). It happens so because for modern anthropology culture has ceased to be a mechanism that secures stability of a social system, but has instead become a factor that generates change by means of its ability to articulate, on certain conditions, competitive visions of cultural worlds (see, e.g., Ortner 1984). In this context it is instructive to examine the transformation which the very concept of 'cultural system' has undergone. A gradually growing stress on cultural discontinuity, openness of cultural systems has found the best expression in Geertzian theory of culture. In his view "the analysis of culture comes down therefore not to an heroic 'holistic' assault upon 'the basic configurations of the culture', an overarching 'order of orders' /.../, but to a searching out of significant symbols /.../ - the material vehicles of perception, emotion, and understanding" (1973: 408). Nevertheless, it is neither the spider web nor the pile of sand, but the octopus as a metaphor standing for cultural systems that Geertz finally refers to. What is even more important is that it resulted from his diagnosis of the condition of contemporary human sciences.

As described by C. Geertz (1983) in his article *Blurred Genres*, the 70's have seen such an incredible mixture of genres that what we are now dealing with in the humanities are new configurations of human thought. Moreover, the change of approach that many social scientists have made by moving from social analogies, derived from physical processes, to analogies from the area of symbolic form analyses (i.e. metaphors of "play", of "drama", of "text" made up of various kinds of behaviour) has a certain destabilising effect not only on the methods used in these sciences but also on their aims. Geertz believes that a growing interest in the analyses of symbolic systems in turn forces scientists to ask anew questions about the relationships between the researcher of these systems and the so-called real world. In short, culture is becoming a less transparent medium, thanks to which the researcher "can examine" society, becoming something which, say, we do not invent but which we live in.

This is a part of a tendency in modern social sciences (or, in broader terms, in the humanities) to question objective reality. For instance, J. Habermas, who continues the Frankfurt school tradition, stresses the necessity to find a passage from the knowledge which expresses the so called "indirect awareness" of the ascertained objective reality to the "critical" knowledge. The "critical" knowledge, which is the result of "criticised" knowledge, is metalinguistic in character and constitutes a peculiar awareness of the "indirect awareness" and of its socio-cultural conditions. In other words, this kind of knowledge does not allow the researcher to identify the world-view, which he is given rather indirectly, with the ob-

jective reality; it interprets this view as the thought reality, as a concept whose emergence tells the researcher to look for the fundamental determining factors of the "criticised" knowledge which is a repetition of common sense knowledge.

On the other hand, in various philosophical approaches, from Husserl to postmodernism, the very idea of contrasting the knowing subject with the known object is considered a false one because these approaches do not treat either the subject or the object as permanent constitutive sources of our thinking or activities. Moreover, the many versions of the postmodern turn in the humanities - their number alone shows how far from homogeneous this tendency is, the tendency that includes, among other things, French poststructuralism, American neopragmatism, conceptions which stem from the Heidegger tradition or from Wittgenstein's philosophy - mean the abandonment of the preservative to legitimate the validity of scientific discourse, i.e. giving up the belief that this or that way of thinking or of formulating judgments (of using thought "idioms") can be used only if it is validated. Each "narration" no longer demands the presentation of a validating and justifying "metanarration".

Consequently, it would be hard to imagine a concept of culture without considering these two aspects. Firstly, the fundamental categories of anthropological analysis, such as "culture" or "society", are possible to think of only in terms of peculiar thought constructions which reflect someone else's thought reality. Secondly, the conceptualisation of the cultural reality alone means having to employ the theoretically questioned opposition - the knowing subject - being aware, however, that cultural analysis is not secondary as regards the "direct awareness" of a cultural reality that exists for someone somewhere in the "external" reality, but that the world of culture is created or reconstructed also within scientific discourse. Moreover, such a discourse constitutes a part of culture in terms of the amount of knowledge and rules of arguing available to individuals only because they belong to a community. Such a reciprocal entanglement of scientific discourse and cultural reality which, using Habermas's terminology, could be defined as a peculiar colonisation of science by the life world, at the time when researchers, acting as culture experts, refer to the categories transferred to the theoretical discourse from the practical discourses about standards and values which use concepts that are obvious in a given community. It is no coincidence that I refer here to the language of Habermas's *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* in order to emphasise the importance of the analyses of the role of science (scientific practice) as a forum for discussing, within the theoretical discourse, matters which are to rationalise and modernise the life world. In other words, the reference to Habermas is not meant just to refer for the n-th time to the discussion on theory - practice relationships; it allows us to exemplify, in a clear way, a significant thesis that there is in fact only a fictitious distance or a fictitious separation of scientific discourse and common sense, and that there is no real autonomy of the language of science. Thus, cultural analysis, focussed on symbolic/cultural practices, is also a means or a symbolic tool for sanctioning a vision of social life which imposes a certain perception of the mechanisms of social life or of fundamental social processes. Referring to the Habermas' framework, "culture", as one of the three components that make up the life world, is an area of the crystallisation of symbolic practices (science could be one of them), and thus it is subject to colonisation by logic which governs the subsystems of the system - politics and economy. At the same



time, this dualistic social theory which singles out and combines two equally important categories - "the life world" and "the system" (see J. Habermas 1981: 171-229), which contains a systematic analysis of the differentiation between these two categories, refers to a general vision of the cultural process. In this context, of vital importance is Habermas' thesis of potential rationalisation (modernisation) of the essential components of the life world as of a process that not only reflects but also implicates certain changes in the system.

It turns out that, according to this approach, modernisation brings about not only the emergence of the two subsystems, mentioned earlier in this work, but also changes on the cultural and social levels of the life world, with the two processes conditioning each other.

Habermas has therefore a good reason to suggest that it is cultural modernisation, the differentiation of the cultural sphere into groups of institutions gathered around three axiological spheres (Habermas quotes, after Weber, the cognitive-instrumental values), that enables the development of the institutions of the civil society - the post-traditional, post-conventional, communicatively coordinated and reflexive forms of associating, of voicing public opinion, of solidarity bonds and of shaping identity. On the basis of Habermas' approach J. L. Cohen and A. Arato (1992: esp. 421 ff) deal with the reconstruction of the civil society theory more exhaustively. Furthermore, the potential link between cultural rationalisation and social rationalisation is not, according to Habermas, the utopian horizon of cultural modernism; it has already been partly implemented as a result of the development of the free-market economy and modern state (see Habermas 1981: 471 ff).

At the same time, however, Habermas repeatedly stated that cultural modernism had never been fully realised anywhere and stressed that the modernisation of Western societies had been carried out in such a way that the potential of the modernised life world was undermined by a cultural impoverishment and colonisation (reification) of the life world. In this way Habermas' theory itself becomes a confirmation of the thesis of the emerging gap between the experts' cultures and that of the public in general resulting in the cultural pauperisation of the cultural dimension of the life world, thus not permitting a smooth implementation of communication practices because of the limited set of beliefs to which the interaction participants refer in their desire to agree on their interpretations of reality. At the same time, the theory shows the captivating power of practical discourses (of the common communication practice, as Habermas puts it) when it comes to the shaping of the cultural level of the life world both in the context of social integration and handing down and renewing the cultural knowledge and in the context of shaping individual identities (see Habermas 1986).

Quoted as an example, the theory allows us to spell out two fundamental characteristics which seem to be inseparable parts of every theoretical attempt to grasp comprehensively the social reality and its dynamism. Thus on the one hand, an undertaking like this is, each time, based on the assumptions relating to the mechanisms and directions of the historic cultural (civilisational) process, assumptions which are consolidated only by being part of the experts' culture. In consequence, the objective knowledge is constantly verified against presuppositions which relate to the given object and which are made by the knowing subject. On the other hand, a differentiation similar to that between culture (the life world) if we keep in mind Habermas' reservations as to the cultural-

istic narrowing down of the life world) and the system as two aspects of society, is an inalienable attribute of the approach which refuses to narrow its area of deliberation down to the thought reality or to the representations of social actors.

\*\*\*

The above-mentioned deliberations have been aimed at bringing out the role of the cultural category (the cultural process) in an effort to develop a social theory that would explain the reality in which, beneath a magnitude of unconnected facts, there is the internal logic of modernisation processes. At the other extreme, so to say, we could place another approach, according to which "culture" would be treated as a peculiar context which allows an individual who lives in a reality to perceive the stream of such unconnected events as the cultural representations of those facts.

It is again that Geertz's concept is a good illustration of this kind of approach, as he combines the belief that culture is nothing but webs of significance (semantic structures) which the individual creates and in which he is entangled (cf. Geertz 1973: 5) with the interpretation of culture as of "fiction" (in the original sense of the Latin term *factio*), as of something which has been created by the researcher. In other words, the world which the researcher has reached does not directly refer to some external reality. The network of symbols makes up an autonomous sphere which is not influenced by non-cultural determining factors. Unlike Habermas' concept mentioned above in which juxtaposing the cultural level of the life world versus the system induces a belief that there are processes of colonisation - decolonisation of the life world which are generated by common logic, concepts like the one Geertz came up with are unanimous in isolating "culture" from "the social system"; the reason for this is the principle of integration. The distinguishing feature of culture is here the "logico-meaningful" integration of elements which is in contrast with the "causal-functional" principle of social system integration.

A similar line of thinking can be found in A. Archer's sociological theory (1988). What Archer says comes down to this: the problem with the conceptualisation of the cultural category lies in "the myth of cultural integration" that we have inherited from classical cultural anthropology (cf. Archer 1988: 4). The components which the "worshippers" of this myth find undistinguishable are the logical cohesion and consistency of the causative relations which consist of two analytical separate dimensions of the cultural reality - the world of ideas (according to Archer, the cultural system in the strict sense of the term) and the relationships between groups and individuals (the socio-cultural level).

So understood, the problem of cultural analysis lies in going beyond the simple contrasting of culture with the social structure either by treating the former as the latter's epiphenomenon (or vice versa) or by recognising their absolute autonomy in order to define precisely the dependence that exists at each of the isolated levels and between them (see in detail Archer 1988, part I). The consequences, however, of adopting this perspective of the analytical dualism, to quote Archer's term, appear to be somewhat peculiar.

First of all, by definition the cultural system is for Archer a system of cultural *intelligibilia* (something like Popper's Third World of objective knowledge; cf. Archer 1988: 104 ff) which have to be expressed in a shared language. In addition, however, this system has to have features (logical relationships) which are typical of it and which are not faithfully re-



flected in the beliefs of individuals. In short, "the world of thought products" appears to be something totally different from the world of human meanings.

According to Archer, in order to articulate the cultural system we have to assume that the logical relationships existing within it do not depend on the context of the causative dependencies which occur between individuals, nor on the meanings attributed to them. Moreover, the assumption is that statements made in connection with the cultural system are free of any ambivalence. That is exactly where we face the classical and unsolvable anthropological problems - relativity and translation. Even Archer says (see Archer 1988: 278) that, so understood, the cultural system cannot be fully described, whereas the theoretical reflection which is prevailing in the social sciences is bound to result in a much more negative conclusion.

If, for social theory, postmodernism is supposed to mean the destruction of the key, or even, as it might seem, constitute for this discipline, category of "society" (Z. Bauman believes that the notion of the reified category of society has been replaced by the concept of sociality which refers to the episodic character of the social reality), then "culture" itself is given a new form as a result of such different thinking about the social reality.

This new way of interpreting culture is by its very nature contrary to the concept of "objective" culture as of something that is shared by a community of people (that is by the traditionally understood society), whose members have similar cultural equipment. Broadly speaking, this kind of approach is expressed by the criticism, formulated by the followers of postmodernism, of perceiving culture as "divided knowledge", as "norms" or as "public behaviours". As the alternative to "cultural (or rhetoric) holism" (see Thornton 1988) this criticism proposes the vision of an internally heterogeneous or even competitive forms (cultural practices and resources). In this situation the concepts, such as "hybridisation", "decentralisation", "deconstruction", or "localness" of the cultural knowledge become the main categories denoting "culture". Perceived in this perspective, culture always seem to be a hybrid that shuts itself off from the cultural tradition.

\*\*\*

It seems that everything that has been said so far reveals the urgent need to rethink the problem which is the key one in these deliberations: To what extent can cultural analysis contribute to our object knowledge of the reality in the postcommunist worlds and on what premises (presuppositions) must it be based? The disintegration of the communist system alone and the bulk of different interpretations of this phenomenon have revealed to some extent how patterns of thought at work determine the ways by means of which the 'logic' of cultural change is represented.

The variety of interpretations is a result of the divergence of assumptions - not only sociological but also philosophical, political or ethical - on which they are based. For instance, Z. Krasnodębski argues (1991) that many interpretations do not grasp the true meaning of this phenomenon, though they can be correct as to details, which is due to the inadequacies of such premises, which in fact are frequently adopted quite unwittingly. If we agree to perceive the disintegration of real socialism as a crisis of the present time - just like postmodernism, communism was to be 'post-', it was to be postcapitalism and, at the same time, it was to close all history up to

the moment of its emergence, as Krasnodębski (1991: 284) and others have put it, then it is impossible to view communism (or rather what is left of it) either exclusively in a purely sociological perspective or only in terms of the disintegration of the political and economic institutions of real socialism or in terms of the decay of a moral order (while perceiving communism as ethical nihilism).

It is only by taking into consideration cultural dimensions and the broad historical background of this complex and multi-aspect phenomenon - or just by adopting the ideas and values which are constitutive for the systems of thinking about the analysed reality - that we can see in the phenomena that we have experienced and in those which we are still experiencing something more than the rebirth of barbarism that originally came from the East. This will also allow us to see the mutual dependencies that exist between the forthcoming fall of the communist utopia in the East and the changes in Western societies which are opening the postindustrial phase or the postmodern epoch.

However, the thesis that postmodernism, understood as the idea of postmodernity, is partly a reaction to the "real socialism" experiment and to the effects it has produced (see Krasnodębski 1991: 284 ff.) does not offer a sufficient explanation of the mechanisms of the cultural change, which is the essence of the transformation that, according to many authors, enables the emergence of a new quality of the social reality - the postmodern society. Therefore the general question remains: Is the global/local polarity explanatory or rather simply diagnostic?

To my mind, the desire to reconstruct reality in the object language determines the use of a certain metalanguage which, in this case, is a metacultural description. The question thus arises again about the characteristics of such a "discourse about discourse" and about its autonomy, etc. In short, what we need in order to gain object knowledge about the processes that happen in the postcommunist reality is a criticism of a peculiar "direct awareness" which enables reflection, such as "the return to Europe", "the emergence of civil society", etc., as a scientific description of these processes. This is largely a search for cultural presuppositions (ideas, values) which interfere, often without the researchers realising it, in their "direct awareness" which is close to the overwhelming common sense. Following this path, we are also looking for arguments that exist on the philosophical-ethical plane among assumptions which determine assumptions underlying the object or research.

They reflect a prevailing tendency of intellectual processes typical of modern social sciences to be enmeshed in moral claims. As Geertz put it (1983: 35), "the specialist without spirit dispensing policy nostrums goes, but the lectern sage dispensing approved judgments does as well", whereas the role that has been left to the anthropologist is that of an enjoying-equal-rights participant in the processes of the interpretation and reinterpretation of the social world, a participant in an ethical discourse who, together with other autonomous subjects, determines alternative, fragmented cultural realities. This thought should be something more than merely a stylistic leitmotif - it should show the direction of research yet to be conducted. As I see it, it means longing for 'local' and leads to suspending of ambitions to globalize anthropological knowledge. Consequently, endorsing Geertzian view on culture as an 'octopoid system', one should keep in mind such 'localness' of anthropological knowledge, in order not to obstruct a thorough study and analysis of cultural repre-



sentations of processes underlying the post-communist reality. Hence, rather than to look today for global civilizational trends in Eastern and Western Europe it seems more fruitful to deal with particular impulses which could foreshadow 'a massive coaction of the /cultural/ whole' by disjointment movements of its parts.

## REFERENCES

- ARCHER, M. 1988: *Culture and Agency*. Cambridge.
- BATESON, G. 1936: *Naven*. Stratford.
- COHEN, J. L., and A. ARATO: *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, Mass.
- GEERTZ, C. 1973: *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York.
- GEERTZ, C. 1983: *Blurred Genres*. In: *Local Knowledge*. New York. Pp. 19-35.

- HABERMAS, J. 1981: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. Vol. 1. Frankfurt/M.
- HABERMAS, J. 1986: *Pojęcie działania komunikacyjnego (uwagi wyjaśniające)*. V: *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 3, pp. 21-44.
- MARCUS, G. E., and M. M. J. FISCHER 1986: *Anthropology as Cultural Critique*. Chicago.
- KRASNODĘBSKI, Z. 1991: *Waiting for Supermarkets or: Downfall of Communism Seen in Postmodern Perspective*. V: *Polish Sociological Bulletin* 4, pp. 281-87.
- LASH, S. 1990: *The Sociology of Postmodernism*. London.
- ORTNER, S. B. 1984: *Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties*. In: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26/1, pp. 126-166.
- THORNTON, R. J. 1988: *The Rhetoric of Ethnographic Holism*. In: *Cultural Anthropology* 3, pp. 285-303.