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
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Janez Evangelist Krek – sto let pozneje (1917–2017)

Kaj ima Krek povedati danes, svojim rojakom, ki so z dosego lastne države vzeli usodo povsem v svoje roke in si lahko danes in svoj jutri oblikujejo sami, čeprav v povezanosti z drugimi evropskimi narodi, pa vendarle brez potrebe, da bi odgovorne za neuspehe iskali drugod? Odgovore na tako zastavljena vprašanja je skušala najti skupna dobrih poznavalcev Krekove misli in njegovega življenja, časa, v katerem je Krek deloval, in družbe, ki jo je sooblikoval, a tudi oblikovalcev sedanjega trenutka slovenske zgodovine.

Uvod

Tematski blok predstavlja izbor prispevkov z mednarodne konference z naslovom Religija v filozofiji: Izzivi sodobnosti (Philosophy's Religions. Challenging Continental Philosophy of Religion), ki je potekala na Teološki fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani septembra 2018. Konferenca je bila organizirana kot sklepni dogodek triletnega slovensko-avstrijskega raziskovalnega projekta z naslovom »Vračanje religioznega v postmoderni misli«[1] in je poleg vabljenih predavateljev vključevala širok krog referentov iz mednarodnega okolja. Ker so bila vsa predavanja v angleščini, – razen glavnega predavatelja Jeana-Luca Mariona, ki je govoril v francoščini s slovenskim prevodom – smo sprejeli uredniško odločitev, da razen Marionovega članka, ki je objavljen v slovenskem prevodu, ostale prispevke objavimo v angleškem jeziku. Z njimi se tako Bogoslovni vestnik kot raziskovalno delo na Teološki fakulteti predstavljata mednarodni znanstveni skupnosti in krepita svoj ugled. Da pa bi izkazali spoštovanje tudi do slovenskega jezika in njegove rabe na raziskovalnem področju, je v okviru raziskovalnega projekta izšla znanstvena monografija v slovenščini s prispevki tujih in domačih avtorjev, ki se ukvarjajo s podobnimi raziskovalnimi vprašanji kot pričujoč tematski blok.[2]

Vodilna nit člankov je vprašanje novega odnosa med filozofijo in religijo (ter teologijo), ki ga lahko zasledujemo v zadnjih desetletjih znotraj tistih tokov filozofije religije, ki se naslanjajo na fenomenološko in hermenevtično filozofsko tradicijo. V anglosaškem prostoru se je za te tokove ustalila oznaka »kontinentalna filozofija religije«. Med njene najodličnejše predstavnike spada že omenjeni filozof Jean-Luc Marion, ki v svojem prispevku odpre temeljno vprašanje, ki v prvi vrsti zadeva teologijo, obenem pa ni tuje niti filozofiji – vprašanje razodetja. Krščanska vera in posledično njena teologija temeljita na razodetju Boga. Obenem pa tradicionalno prav (nadnaravno) razodetje ločuje teologijo od filozofije, saj slednja priznava zgolj (naravni) razum. Marion pokaže na povsem nov pristop do razodetja, ki posledično omogoči nov odnos med filozofijo in teologijo. Razodetje je po njegovem namreč prisotno že znotraj občečloveškega izkustva, ko se srečujemo s t. i. presežnimi ali nasičenimi fenomeni. Posluh za nasičene fenomene zahteva razširitev pojma razuma in pojma resnice. Takšna razširitev filozofijo odpre za možnost religijskega razodetja, obenem pa pomaga teologiji, da o razodetju razmišlja onkraj tradicionalnih metafizičnih kategorij.

Naslednja dva članka sta posvečena dvema eksistencialnima temama, ki povezujeta tako filozofijo kot teologijo in ki sta tudi med seboj neločljivo prepleteni:

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ljubezen in trpljenje. Emmanuel Falque, ki je eden od vodilnih mislecev srednje generacije kontinentalne filozofije religije, v svojem prispevku opusti znanstveni aparat, obenem pa postreže s svežo in izvirno mislijo. Ljubezen si napačno predstavljamo kot harmonično pomirjenost, ki ne trpi pomanjkljivosti ali poškodb, in ne moremo sprejeti, da bi k njej spadala »travmatičnost«, ki je ne bi bilo mogoče ustrezno (os)misliti. S slikovito prispodobo Adamovega rebra, iz katerega je Bog ustvaril Evo (in Adamu napravil rano), Falque zagovarja izvorno ranjenost (»travmo«), ki predstavlja pogoj za vzpostavitev odnosa in ljubezni. Vztrajanje na predpostavkah napačne celovitosti in neranljivosti se mora umakniti sprejemanju izvorne ranjenosti kot daru ter razumevanju ljubezni kot ljubečemu boju, ki sprejema svoje padce in stalno nepopolnost. Članek izpod peresa Jamesa Menscha, odličnega poznavalca fenomenologije, se nehote dopolnjuje s svojim predhodnikom, pri čemer težišče prenese na vprašanje koristnosti trpljenja. Izhodišče mu nudi Levinas, ki v svojem razmišljanju o holokavstu napiše članek »Nekoristno trpljenje«. Toda Mensch opozori, da koristnost in smiselnost prepogosto razumemo na menjalno ekonomski način, pozabimo pa, da se trpljenje dogaja v edinstvenosti in nezamenljivosti naše telesnosti, ki prekine z vsako logiko ekonomije. Božje »utelešenje« (inkarnacija) pokaže na presežni smisel trpljenja onkraj menjalne logike in odpira pot odpuščanju.

Vsak izmed treh člankov, ki sledijo, se naslanja na enega od klasikov fenomenološke filozofije: Levinasa, Merleau-Pontyja in Derridaja. Profesor teologije iz Regensburga Erwin Dirscherl oriše Levinasovo misel in s tem pokaže na teme, pri katerih se katoliška teologija navdihuje ob tem judovskem mislecu. Katoliška misel zagovarja pot analogije, toda ob tem pogosto pozablja na presežno drugačnost (Boga), ki jo Levinas tako vehementno zagovarja. Ta drugačnost postaja konkretna v etičnem odnosu do sočloveka in etika, kot jo zagovarja Levinas, je bližje teološkemu govoru kot ontologija klasične metafizike, ki ne trpi resnične drugosti. Zato po mnenju Dirscherla s pomočjo Levinasove misli lahko poglobimo razumevanje krščanske teološke antropologije. Reinhold Esterbauer, profesor za krščansko filozofijo v Gradcu, se v svojem članku posveti Merleau-Pontyju, ki velja za osrednjo avtoriteto fenomenologije telesnosti. Ključno vlogo igra pravilno razumevanje telesa: kot »od znotraj« živeta telesnost (fr. chair, ang. flesh) in ne kot objektivirano telo v zunanjem svetu. Ta živeta telesnost se nahaja pred ločitvijo med subjektom in objektom, pred dualizmom med zavestjo in svetom. Zato je vloga telesnosti po Merleau-Pontyju na poseben način »ustvarjalna« in lahko pomaga pri razumevanje stvarjenja kot osrednjega pojma krščanske teologije. Naslednji sodobni »klasik« je Derrida, ki predstavlja miselno ozadje in poglavitno referenco v članku Luke Trebežnika. Mesijansko razumevanje časa je ena od temeljnih razsežnosti religij. Derrida pa mesijanski značaj časa vnese v občečloveško izkustvo odnosa do prihodnosti, kajti pristna prihodnost se izmika vsakemu predvidevanju in prijemu iz sedanjosti. Še več, za odnos do takšne prihodnosti, ki ni zgolj podaljšek ali projekcija sedanjosti, se je potrebno poslužiti jezika, ki razodeva sorodnost z religiozni besednjakom. Ob tem pa se nakazujejo možnosti za dialog med filozofijo in teologijo.

Skupna točka naslednjih treh prispevkov je izziv, ki ga pred filozofijo in teologijo postavlja misel Jeana-Luca Mariona. Christian Rößner predstavi Marionovo argumentacijo, ki kritizira klasično metafiziko kot poskus, da bi Boga mislila znotraj svojega ontološkega okvira in iz njega napravila pojmovnega malika. Resnični Bog mora biti za naše omejeno mišljenje »nemogoč« in svojo skrivnost (mysterion) – ki je etimološko povezana z mistiko – lahko razodene zgolj po lastni iniciativi in skozi lastno logiko. Podobno pa velja tudi za celotno fenomenologijo oziroma filozofijo, ki se mora odpreti fenomenom, kakor se ti dajejo sami od sebe, preden jih poskuša subjekt podrediti svojim pogojem spoznanja. Toda ta metodološki obrat, ki ga v fenomenologijo uvede Marion, odpira mnoga vprašanja, ki jih v svojem članku obravnava Branko Klun. V ospredju je vloga subjekta, ki ni zgolj pasivni naslovnik razodevanja fenomenov, temveč jim mora najprej priznati presežno danost. To priznanje ni na isti ravni kot spoznanje, je pa nujno za odnos do presežnosti. Kljub kritičnim opazkam Klun v Marionovi filozofski misli, ki lahko služi kot alternativa klasični metafiziki, prepozna izjemen potencial za dialog s krščansko teologijo. Bolj kritičen do Mariona je Lenart Škof, vendar tokrat s stališča drugačne teološke paradigme, ki jo sam razvija v smeri prenovljenega teološkega pomena materialnosti (elementov) in telesnosti. Namesto distance in transcendence, ki vodi Marionovo misel, se Škof ob dialogu z mormonsko teologijo usmeri v imanenco elementarnih danosti, ki pa v sebi nosi potencial človekovega pobožanstvenja.

Blok zaključujeta članka, ki obravnavata vprašanje religiozne izkušnje in religioznosti v družbenem kontekstu. Jason W. Alvis se ustavi pri pojmu dogodka, ki povezuje teološko (dogodek razodetja) in sodobno filozofsko misel (dogodek kot nasprotje metafiziki substance). Toda če želimo opisati religiozno izkušnjo s tem pojmom, se pojavlja nevarnost, da bi religiozni dogodek dobil prizvok in pomen spektakla. Zato se Alvis zavzema za nespektakularnost in s tem za neopaznost oziroma nevpadljivost religiozne izkušnje. Vprašanje religioznosti in status religije v sodobnem (post)sekularnem času je tudi v ospredju analiz Charlesa Taylorja, ki se jim v svojem članku posveti Bojan Žalec. Po predstavitvi Taylorjevih temeljnih pojmov in genealoške razlage sekularne dobe Žalec pokaže kritične ugovore, s katerimi se je moral soočiti Taylor. Avtorjeva zaključna ocena Taylorjevega projekta je v celoti pozitivna in v njem prepoznava velik potencial za ustrezno razumevanje religije in religioznosti v sodobnem družbenem kontekstu.

Branko Klun in Luka Trebežnik,
urednika tematskega bloka

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ločenost ❦ izdajstvo ❦ prevara ❦ abstinenčna kriza
❦ praznina ❦ žalovanje ❦ otrok in ločitev ❦

Bolečina
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bF

Christian Gostečnik

Bolečina ločenosti

Ko razpade odnos, ko odide dekle, ko se fant ne javi več, lahko vse to grozovito boli. Še bolj pa boli izdajstvo, prevara, ko partner odide drugam. Ni ga hujšega čustvenega razcepa in žrela, ki srka nedolžne žrtve, otroška srca, kakor je razpad družine. Tedaj ni več varnosti, je samo še krik bolečine, ki se razlega po opustoše-nih poljanah družinskih sag. Otrok že po naravi hrepeni po pripadnosti in spreje-tosti, zdaj pa se mu to hrepenenje izjalovi. A tudi tu je in mora biti pot naprej, pot, ki jo omogoča milostni poseg od Zgoraj.

Jean-Luc Marion
Razodetje kot fenomen in njegovo odprtje
The Phenomenological Openness of Revelation

Povzetek: Kako se Razodetje manifestira na način nujnega nasprotovanja apriornim pogojem izkustva? Skozi kakšne paradokse se izvrši ta proti-izkušnja? S temi teološkimi vprašanji se ni moč soočiti, če ne obvladamo možnosti fenomenalnosti, ki je lastna nasičenim fenomenom. In ne smemo se pretvarjati, da jih lahko hitro rešimo na način, ko pod krinko teoloških kategorij uporabljamo pojme in formule, ki izhajajo iz filozofije v njenem metafizičnem stanju. Zato moramo poskusiti opisati proti-izkušnjo Razodetja kot paradigmatičnega nasičenega fenomena.

Ključne besede: razodetje, fenomenologija, teologija, nasičeni fenomen, proti-izkušnja, paradoks

Abstract: How does Revelation make itself manifest by contradicting, as it must, the a priori conditions of experience? By what paradoxes is this counter-experience accomplished? These theological questions cannot be confronted without mastering the possibility of a phenomenality of saturated phenomena. And we must not claim to resolve them too quickly, by mobilizing, under the cover of theological categories, concepts and formulas that are derived directly from philosophy in its metaphysical state. Therefore we must try to describe the counter-experience of Revelation as a paradigmatic saturated phenomenon.

Key words: revelelation, phenomenology, theology, saturated phenomenon, counter-experience, paradox

Ločitev med vprašanjema razodetja in vere, ki je v novoveški teologiji sprejeta kot razlikovanje med traktatoma *de revelatione* in *de fide*, je teologiji (ali bolje, teološki fakulteti, kot bi lucidno popravil Kant) zagotavljala določeno prednost: omogočala ji je oblikovanje racionalnih tez, razumljivih samih po sebi, in s tem uveljavitev kot znanost, celo status ene izmed »višjih fakultet« (če spet povzamemo Kanta), povsem v duhu Aristotelove razvrstitve in podreditve znanosti, ki trdi, da nad vsemi vlada teologija. Toda ta prednost je imela ceno, ki jo je bilo treba na koncu plačati. Zatrjevana znanstvenost teologije je ostala nenatančna in nezadostna, kajti v tem življenju nimamo dostopa do *scientia Dei et beatorum* (ki bi edi-

na lahko bila temelj teologiji), zato je moralo razodetje svoje domnevno »zadostne« trditve podrediti interpretaciji edinega razuma, ki je bil na razpolago – to je razum »naravne luči«, kakor ga je uporabljal sistem metafizike. Ta proti-interpretacija je zaposlovala celotno razsvetljensko gibanje, najprej angleško razsvetljenstvo (vse od H. Cherburyskega začenši s 1624, pa do Humea in njegovih *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* [*Dialogi o naravni religiji*] iz leta 1679 ter Lockea s *The reasonablesness of Christianity* [*Razumnost krščanstva*] iz leta 1695, da ne omenjamo del J. Tolanda, *Christianity not mysterious* [*Krščanstvo brez skrivnosti*] iz leta 1696, in M. Tindala, *Christianity as old as the creation of the World or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature* [*Krščanstvo staro kot stvarjenje sveta ali Evangelij kot ponatis religije narave*], 1730), nato francosko razsvetljenstvo (zlasti z *Izpovedjo vere savojskega vikarja* iz četrtega poglavja Rousseaujeve knjige *Emil ali o vzgoji*, 1762), in potem še nemško razsvetljenstvo, ki zaključuje razpravo na način, da jo povzdigne na raven pojma (pri J. G. Fichteju, *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung* [*Poskus kritike vsakega razodetja*] iz leta 1793, ki anticipira sklepe, ki jih Kant leto kasneje izpelje iz lastne kritike čistega uma, *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* [*Religija v mejah golega uma*]). Zdi se, da je ta proti-interpretacija postala zmagovita, saj so se celo najbolj konservativni zagovorniki »razodetja« sklicevali na razum, ki naj bi veljal za »naravno razodetje«. Toda zmaga je bila zgolj navidezna, ker je zmagovalec v trenutku zmagoslavja na različne načine razkril nenatančnost pojma »razuma«, s katerim je utemeljeval svojo pravico kritike razodetja (kot znanosti).

Ta nenatančnost je postala očitna na več načinov – ali vsaj na dva, ki sta razvidna zlasti skozi izraza »kritika« in »pojem« [concept]. »Kritika« si postavi zahtevo, da začrta meje »uma«, bodisi da svetopisemske (ali domnevno svetopisemske) trditve zavrača kot nerazumne (Spinoza jih je imenoval domišljijske misli, Hume pa gola verjetja), bodisi da jih preoblikuje v skladu z razumskimi normami (včasih celo namerno dela silo besedilom, za kar je Kant trdil, da ima pravico[3]). Toda s sklicevanjem na razum se obenem postavlja vprašanje glede statusa in legitimnosti samih meja, ki jih »razum« vsiljuje »religiji« (ki se razume kot »razodeta«), ne da bi to polemično nasprotje privedlo do določitve obeh pojmov. Seveda so s kantovskega zornega kota meje, ki jih »goli um« postavlja bibličnim besedilom, utemeljene v tistih mejah, ki jih je čisti um postavil sebi znotraj svojega teoretskega ukvarjanja: da namreč ni moč ničesar spoznati s pojmi (a priori), kar se ne daje in ni utemeljeno v čutnem zrenju ali intuiciji (v formah prostora in časa). Um postavlja glede epistemoloških zahtev razodetja iste meje, ki si jih postavlja v svojem epistemološkem delovanju. Toda takšen argument kaj hitro udari nazaj. S kakšno pravico um, ki vse legitimira na podlagi svoje bistvene končnosti in ki na podlagi te končnosti sebe omeji zgolj na spoznanje *predmetov*, zdaj zahteva postavitev istih meja, torej meja lastne končnosti, tudi na to, kar se v načelu daje [propose]

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3   Kant zapiše: »Diese Auslegung mag uns selbst in Ansehung des Texts (der Offenbarung) oft gezwungen scheinen, oft es auch wirklich sein, und doch muß sie, wenn es nur möglich ist, daß dieser sie annimmt, einer solchen buchstäblichen vorgezogen werden, die entweder schlechterdings nichts für die Moralität in sich enthält, oder dieser ihren Triebfedern wohl gar entgegen wirkt.« (1968b, 110)

kot prekoračitev končnosti na način posega neskončnosti? Ni se treba vračati k Heglu, da bi nasproti »kritiki« postavili vprašanje neskončnega in absolutnega, dovolj bo, če prisluhnemo Schleiermacherju: »Vse, kar je, je zanjo [tj. za religijo] nujno, in vse, kar more biti, je zanjo resnična in neizbežna podoba neskončnosti« (1799, 65). Ali filozofija, ki se v imenu *svojega* »razuma« omeji na moralno razlago »razodetja«, še vedno spoštuje svoje meje? Kaj ne prekorači meja že s tem, ko končni morali podeli vzvišeni naziv »moralnega boga« in končnost okrona skozi »priznanje Boga kot moralnega zakonodajalca« (Fichte 1845, 53)? Skratka, ali lahko razum, ki ga na koncu vzpostavi sistem metafizike in ki ostaja končni in »goli um«, še naprej vsiljuje, ali zahteva vsiljevanje brez kakšne druge utemeljitve, lastne meje tistemu, kar se formalno definira preko odsotnosti meja ali indiferentnosti do njih? Ali je to, kar se za *»um«* oziroma *za nas*, smrtnike, kaže kot nemogoče, nemogoče tudi za bogove – ali za tiste, ki jih nadomeščajo –, za katere se vsi strinjajo, da če obstajajo, za njih ni nič nemogoče?[4] Zatorej »razum«, ko širi jurisdikcije lastne končnosti nad to, kar zatrjuje, da je izven nje, nad neskončno, priča le o nedoločnosti svojega lastnega pojma.

Toda tudi pojem, do katerega prihajamo, ko se sprašujemo glede pojma »razuma«, namreč sam pojem »pojma«, nosi enako nedoločenost. Hegel je videl to kantovsko zagato in jo želel preseči še bolj odkrito kot Fichte in Schelling: končni razum lahko postavlja zakone le na področju, ki ga zmore poznati – na področju končnih predmetov ter svojih čutnih zorov, svojih pojmov in svoje apercepcije. Da bi resnično postal univerzalen, bi moral zaobjeti – in to *skozi pojem* – tudi neskončno samo: neskončno kot realno in kot dejansko dojeto v absolutni vednosti. Le pod tem pogojem lahko um prevzame domeno nad neskončnim, ki se med drugim odvija v »religiji« in ki se bo potem upravičeno lahko imenovala »razodeta«. Še enkrat, takšno razodetje, kot je predlagano tu, ne razodeva ničesar, česar razum ne bi že vedel, toda tokrat je to upravičeno, saj bi takšen »razum« predstavljal kar absolutno vednost. Vendar pa ostane vprašanje, kako upravičiti razširitev pojma končnosti na neskončnost. Ta ključna težava opredeljuje vrhovno ambicijo in temeljno dvoumnost, ki spremljata pozitivno uresničenje metafizičnega sistema pri Heglu, preden se ta pod svojo težo zruši v negativno uresničenje (kar sproži Feuerbach, dovrši pa Nietzsche). V odnosu do »razodetja« vsaka »filozofija religije« (Hegel), ki je razumljena kot nadgradnja pojma »filozofije razodetja« (Schelling), dopušča dvoumnost v istem pojmu dveh *skoraj* enakovrednih izrazov: *razodeta* (*geoffenbarte*) vednost in *razkrita* (*offenbare*) vednost, razvidna in gotova, jasna in razločna, kot bi dejal Descartes.[5] Toda ali je razkritje [découvrement], odstrtje [dévoilement] in obelodanjenje, ki so na delu pri razodetju, še vedno moč spraviti v isti okvir – četudi kot njegovo krono in najvišjo varianto –, znotraj katere metafizični »um« (tudi če nastopa v spekula-

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4 O statusu tega, kar je nemogoče *za nas*, a je istočasno mogoče *za bogove in Boga*, glej mojo analizo v *Certitudes négatives* (2010a, 86–137).

5 Ta enakovrednost, ki ni nikoli pojasnjena, preveva Heglovo analizo: »In dieser Religion ist deswegen das göttliche Wesen *geoffenbart*. Sein Offenbarsein besteht offenbar darin, daß gewußt wird, was es ist. Es wird aber gewußt, eben indem es als Geist gewußt wird, als Wesen, das wesentlich selbst *Selbstbewußtsein* ist /.../ Dies – seinem *Begriffe* nach das Offenbare zu sein – ist also die wahre Gestalt des Geistes.« (Hegel 1980, 405)

tivni dialektiki) vse privede do razvidnosti, h gotovemu posedovanju izjave, ki se brez preostanka razstre absolutnemu duhu kot resnica, ki je dokončno zagotovljena? Se to, kar raz-kriva [découvre] razodetje (karkoli to že je), more in *mora* še naprej vpisovati v polje, ki ga razum raz-vija, raz-laga in raz-kazuje kot resnico? Ali torej razum, ko *od-grinja in raz-kaže* [dé-cèle] resnico (*alêtheia*), deluje po istih postopkih kot razodetje (*apokalypsis*), ko *raz-kriva to*, kar nam daje spoznati?

Ta vprašanja so bila do sedaj odstotna, ker se je zdela epistemološka razlaga razodetja povsem očitna. Ta očitnost je do sedaj prekrivala izvirnost in težavnost pojma (če je to sploh še primeren izraz) *razodetja*, ker se je njegovo *raz-krivanje* brez vsake kritične previdnosti podredilo načinu delovanja resnice v smislu raz--lage in raz-kaza. Doslej se je zaradi epistemološke interpretacije razodetja in njenih posledic (*propositio sufficiens*) spregledal pravi značaj razodetja kot *apokalypsis* in je ostal skrit pod masko samoumevnosti resnice kot *alêthéia*. Tu je treba napraviti pojasnilo in izbiro. Nasprotje, pri začetnem raziskovanju, ne more in ne sme biti postavljeno med grško določitvijo *alêthéia*, ki jo je na edinstven ali skoraj edinstven način predstavil Heidegger v oziru na Aristotela, Platona in druge, in med judovskim ter krščanskim pojmovanjem *apokalypsis*. Tu se s tem vprašanjem ne bomo ukvarjali, ne le ker presega, kar tu lahko le orišemo, temveč ker za to dejansko ni potrebe. Kot smo že videli, splošni (in nedoločen) pojem razodetja ostaja novoveško modern in je rezultat takratnih polemik med teologi in metafiziki. Iz tega sledi, da tisto, proti čemur se je »razodetje« zoperstavilo in tisto, kar je obenem zakrilo – ker je samoumevnost njegovega antagonizma z »razumom« zaprla dostop do lastne določitve oziroma je v najboljšem primeru razodetje ostalo nedoločeno –, ne najdemo v *aletheia* v njenem izvornem pomenu, temveč v figuri, ki se je vzpostavila skozi debato med »razumom« in »razodetjem«.

To pomeni, da prikritje razodetja kot *apokalypsis* izvira iz interpretacije *alêthéia* kot resnice, v smislu postaviti nekaj v razvidnost z gotovostjo jasne in razločne predstave. Ta trenutek (tj. novoveška filozofija, začenši s poslednjimi sholastiki in filozofijo kartezijanskega obdobja) lahko poenačimo z vznikom prizadevanj po vzpostavitvi metafizičnega sistema. Resnico definira skozi pogoje možnosti za dosego gotove razvidnosti; gre za dve načeli, ki ju je Leibniz utrdil v paradigmatska obrazca: načelo protislovnosti in načelo zadostnega razloga (Leibniz 1991, 113 in 116). Ti dve načeli kot bronasta vrata uokvirjata dostop do resničnih izjav, ki se jih zdaj razume kot posedovanje, vsaj v možnosti, gotove razvidnosti. Izjava [proposition], ki jo ugotovimo po takšni metafizični definiciji resnice, lahko doživi odobritev, postane na razumu utemeljeno prepričanje, skratka prejme pritrditev volje, kakor pravi znamenita Descartesova formulacija: »Iz velike luči razuma je sledil velik nagib volje« [*Ex magna luce in intellectu magna consequuta est propensio in voluntate*] (Descartes 1996, 59). Če ta epistemološki model razširimo na »razodetje«, na primer pri izvajanjih Suareza, pridemo do »propositio sufficiens«, ki »razodeto resnico« v vsej razvidnosti ponudi volji, katera jo – pod pogojem, da ostaja v dobri veri, torej v veri – mora odobriti, jo mora imeti za resnično in jo, po možnosti, ljubiti.

Toda obstaja še neka druga miselna določitev razodetja kot *apokalypsis*, ki se

ne razlikuje le od resnice, razumljene v skladu s sistemom metafizike, ampak spre-vrne postavke slednjega. Čeprav se zdi njeno pojavljanje v tekstih dokaj obrobno, pa je njeno izročilo vedno in povsem koherentno. Pri Viljemu Teoderiškem na primer lahko zasledimo dva kartezijanska izraza, ki pa sta strogo zaobrnjena: »[Z]di se, da ni razum ta, ki privlači voljo [sc. k razvidnosti], temveč da volja privlači razum k veri [*non tam ratio voluntatem, quam voluntas trahere videtur rationem ad fidem*]« (Viljem 1959a, 46).[6] Ta zaobrnitev je bila tematizirana še z večjo jasnostjo pri Pascalu, ki je bil povsem nedvoumen glede svojega nasprotovanja Descartesu: »Namesto da bi o človeških stvareh rekli, da jih je treba poznati, preden jih lahko ljubimo, kar je danes že prešlo v pregovor, svetniki povsem nasprotno govorijo o božanskih stvareh, ki jih je treba ljubiti, da bi jih poznali, in da v resnico lahko vstopimo le skozi ljubezen, kar je postal eden izmed njihovih najbolj uporabnih stavkov«.[7] Dejansko sta ta dva avtorja komentirala izjemen obrazec sv. Avguština, ki ga je treba prebrati v celotnem kontekstu:

> »Probamus etiam ipsum [sc. Spiritum Sanctum] inducere in omnem veritatem, quia non intratur in veritatem, nisi per charitatem: ›Charitas autem Dei diffusa est‹, ait apostolus, ›in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis.‹« (Rim 5,5).[8]

Z drugimi besedami, kakor se razodeta resnica ne odkriva niti *de facto* niti ne *de iure*, razen ko nas Sveti Duh sam, izlit v naša srca (po sv. Pavlu), vodi k njej (*inducere* odmeva v Pascalovem *entrer* kot tudi *trahere* pri Viljemu Teoderiškemu), tako pogoj možnosti njenega odkrivanja ni več zagotovljen skozi pogoje možnosti izkustva *končnih* predmetov (namreč »kritike«, načel metafizike, jasne in razločne ideje, gotove razvidnosti), temveč skozi ljubezen, ki od zdaj prevzame vlogo pogoja spoznanja za tisto, kar se končnemu razumu zdi še naprej nedostopno in nemogoče, ali bolje: nemisljivo, še zlasti če tega ne prizna *kot nemogoče*.

Treba bo izmeriti skrajni in čudni domet tega pojmovnega preobrata, pri katerem

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[6] Gregorij Veliki to opisuje precej natančno: »Sed inter haec sciendum est quia saepe et pigras mentes *amor ad opus excitat*, et inquietas in contemplatione timor refrenat. /.../ Unde necesse est ut quisquis ad contemplationis studia properat, semetipsum prius subtiliter interroget, *quantum amat. Machina quippe mentis est vis amoris*, quae hanc dum a mundo extrahit, in alta sustollit. *Prius ergo discutiat, si summa inquirens diligit*, si diligens timit, si novit incognita aut *amando comprehendere*, aut non comprehensa timendo venerari. In contemplatione etenim mentem si amor non excitat, teporis sui torpor obscurat; si timor non aggravat, sensus hanc perinania ad nebulam erroris levat.« (1849, stolpca 762, 763, poudarki so dodani)

[7] »Et de là vient qu'au lieu qu'en parlant des choses humaines, on dit qu'il faut les connaître avant que de les aimer, ce qui a passé en proverbe, les saints au contraire disent en parlant des choses divines qu'il faut les aimer pour les connaître et qu'on n'entre dans la vérité que par la charité, dont ils ont fait une de leurs plus utiles sentences.« (Pascal 1963a, 355) (To stališče sem komentiral v *Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes* (1986, 360 sl) ter v *Au lieu de soi: L'approche de saint Augustin* (2008, 190 sl.), kjer se nanašam na vso avguštinsko obzorje tega preobrata.). Heidegger (2006, 139) se nanaša na to temeljno besedilo, navedimo le sledečo pripombo: »Scheler je v eseju ›Liebe und Erkenntnis‹ prvi jasno izrazil, da so intencionalna razmerja precej raznolika ter da celo, na primer, ljubezen in sovraštvo utemeljujeta vednost. Tu Scheler črpa iz Pascala in Avguština.« (Heidegger 1978, 169)

[8] »On [Sveti Duh] vodi k vsej resnici, kajti edina pot k resnici je preko ljubezni, in ›ljubezen Boga‹, kot pravi apostol, je bila izlita v naša srca po Svetem Duhu, ki nam je bil dan.« (Avguštin 1841a, 507; deloma prirejen prevod)

volja od zdaj ukazuje razumevanju. Ne gre več za preprosto rabo razuma v praksi, ko nihče (še zlasti ne Kant)[9] ne izpodbija predhodnosti volje pred razumevanjem: jaz sprejmem odločitev glede na to, kar hočem, nato pa uporabim svojo razumnost glede izbire sredstev za dosego tega cilja. Gre za rabo razuma v teoriji, pri čemer predpostavljamo, da ostaja teorija še vedno misljiva, tudi ko pride pod nadzor volje. Treba bo šele dognati, če se ta preobrat jasno in izrecno nanaša na koncept razodetja, še zlasti pri Sv. Avguštinu, ki, kot je bilo pogosto opaženo[10], o njem govori precej malo. Začetek odgovora na ti dve vprašanji bi lahko našli v natančnem branju ene izmed redkih avguštinskih formulacij razodetja, ki pa zato ni nič manj presenetljiva: »*Ista attractio, ipsa est revelatio*« (Avguštin 1977, 496). To formulacijo je treba razumeti kot rezultat precej poglobljenega komentarja k Jan 6,44: »Nihče ne more priti k meni, če ga ne pritegne Oče, ki me je poslal« (*eklusê auton, traxerit eum*). Ob tem se vsiljuje naslednji ugovor: ali niso »lačni in žejni pravičnosti« tisti, ki bodo glede na blagre tudi »nasičeni« (Mt 5,6)? Treba je torej imeti željo, kar pomeni voljo, da jo Bog izpolni. Kako pa naj v tem primeru verujemo na pasiven način, na način pritegnjenosti in privlačnosti (»*Nemo venit nisi tractatur*«), ko pa vsi izkušamo, da verjamemo le, če hočemo (»*credere non potest nisi volens*«; Avguštin 1977, 486), kajti ko nočemo več, tudi dejansko ne verujemo in, obratno, »izpovedovati pomeni izreči, kar imamo v srcu« (*Hoc est enim confiteri dicere quod habes in corde*; Avguštin 1977, 486). In temu navkljub lahko izjava iz Jn 6,44 potrdi izkušnjo, da »dušo pritegne tudi ljubezen« (»*Trahitur animus et amore*«; 490). Toda ta aporija ponuja tudi pot za svoje preseganje: kajti v resnici me zelo malo vleče po moji volji, veliko in predvsem pa po moji želji za užitkom (»*Parum est voluntate, etiam voluptate traheris*«; 490). Tega ne potrjuje le izkušnja (»*Da amantem, et sentit quod dico* – Dajte mi človeka, ki ljubi, in razumel bo vse, kar pravim«) ali Vergilova avtoriteta (»*Trahit sua quemque voluptas* – Vsakogar privlači njegov lastni užitek«), pač pa celo Psalmi: »Razveseljuj se v Gospodu (*delectare in Domine*), pa ti bo dal, kar želi tvoje srce« (Ps 36,4) ali pa: »opajajo se z obiljem tvoje hiše, v reki svojih radosti jih napajaš. Zakaj v tebi je izvir življenja, v tvoji luči vidimo luč« (Ps 35,8–10). Ne samo, da nam je dovoljeno (*licet*), temveč smo dolžni (*debemus*) priznati, da smo »pritegnjeni«, gnani z željo po ugodju, ko ljubimo (Avguštin 1977, 490 in 492). V izkušnji te pritegnjenosti naletimo na nič manj kot na logiko ljubezni: »*Amando trahitur* – Ko ljubimo, smo pritegnjeni« (496). In vendar ta atrakcija ostaja svobodna, kajti brez svobode nikakor ne bi mogli ljubiti. Še več, izlitje te privlač-

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[9] »Reine Vernunft ist für sich allein praktisch, und gibt (dem Menschen) ein allgemeines Gesetz, welches wir das Sittengesetz nennen /.../ einen Willen, d.h. ein Vermögen haben ihre [sc. die Menschen] Kausalität duch die Vorstellung von Regeln zu bestimmen« (Kant 1968a, 31–2). Ali pa: »Mit dem praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft verhält es sich schon anders. In diesem beschäftigt sich die Vernunft mit Bestimmungsgründungen des Willens, welche rein Vermögen ist, den Vorstellungen entsprechende Gegenstände entweder hervorzubringen, oder doch sich selbst zur Bewirkung derselben /.../ d.h. seine Kausalität zu bestimmen.« (15)

[10] »Nič kaj bolj kot drugi Očetje se Sveti Avguštin ni *ex professo* ukvarjal z idejo razodetja«, ugotavlja René Latourelle (1963, 151). Toda kako naj potem razumemo, da je »tema razodetja nesporno v ospredju krščanske zavesti v prvih treh stoletjih« (1963, 152)? Je morda *ideja* umanjkala prav zato, ker je bila v *zavesti* »nesporno«? Če ne gre ravno za to, da je to, kar retrospektivno imenujemo (moderna) ideja razodetja, nekaj, kar ima malo opraviti s tem, o čemer so imeli Očetje »nesporno« jasno zavest: primerno bi bilo, da na podlagi te zavesti prenovimo tudi naše razumevanje razodetja.

nosti v srca (po Sv. Duhu) je treba razumeti kot to, kar je lastno Bogu kot tistemu, ki ljubi in povzroča ljubezen, kajti Kristus ne bi privlačil, če ne bi v sebi manifestiral Očeta, se pravi, če ne bi razodel Očeta »*trahit revelatus Christus a Patre* – Kristus, razodet po Očetu, privlači po Očetu« (ablativ tu zadeva dva glagola: *revelari/revelatus* in *trahere*). Še enkrat: »*Trahit Pater ad Filium eos qui propterea credunt in Filium, qui eum cogitant Patrem habere Filium* – Oče privlači k Sinu tiste, ki verujejo v Sina, ki ga dojemajo kot Sina takšnega Očeta / kot Očeta, ki ima takšnega Sina« (kajti dva tožilnika lahko vsak po svoje določata glagol) (496 in 494).

Od tod sledita dve posledici, dve bistveni značilnosti za teološko umevanje razodetja. (a) Razodetje je prav v privlačnosti Očeta, ki jo usmerja k Sinu, da bi v njem videli Očeta, »*Ista revelatio, ipsa est attractio*« (Avguštin 1977, 496).[11] Dejstvo, ali je ta atrakcija nežna ali nasilna,[12] ne spremeni ničesar: razodetje izvaja ta dva učinka, ker se preprosto izvaja. V Boga verujemo le, ko to hočemo, to je očitno; toda hočemo le, kadar ljubimo to, kar želimo; v primeru Boga pa to željo [željo po ugodju] prejmemo od Boga samega: »Tisti je pritegnjen h Kristusu, ki mu je dano v Kristusa verjeti. /.../ Ta zmožnost, če nam ni dana od Boga, ne more priti iz svobodne izbire, kajti te [svobodne izbire] ne osvobodi osvoboditelj, ni svobodna za to, kar je dobro.«[13] Razodetje nastopa kot zanimiv zaplet: privlačnost najprej deluje na voljo, ki odloči, da razum vidi to, česar drugače ne bi hotel videti. Videnje izhaja iz odločitve za videnje, ta odločitev pa, čeprav jo sprejmem jaz, k meni prihaja od drugod. Moram se odločiti, da se bom odločil, moram hoteti, da bom hotel, da bi tako prispel do videnja. Razodetje k meni prihaja *od drugod*. (b) Privlačnost velja kot razodetje le zato, ker dopušča, da vidimo Jezusa kot Kristusa, se pravi kot Sina od Očeta, kot vidnost nevidnega. Ničesar ni za dodati: »*Nisi ergo revelet ille qui intus est, quid dico aut quid loquor?* – Če se ne razkrije ta, ki je znotraj, kaj naj rečem, o čem naj govorim?« (Avguštin 1977, 500) Zdaj lahko bolje razumemo, zakaj je videnje (razkritje) odvisna od volje (odločitve): ne vidimo Očeta, če ne interpretiramo (po »Svetem Duhu izlitem v naša srca«) Jezusa kot Očetovega Sina – tj. če ga *hočemo* interpretirati tako. Tu ni sprejemljiva nikakršna *propositio sufficiens objecti revelati*, ki jo spoznamo tudi brez vere (*sive credatur ..., sive non* – Suarez, *De Trinitate*), kajti brez hermenevtične odločitve ni ničesar za videti, ničesar za verjeti in ni ničesar razodetega. Kdor želi pri razodetju videti, ne da bi veroval, ne vidi ničesar. Klement Aleksandrijski je opredelil pravo *gnosis* (spoznanje) na naslednji način: »Ni vednosti brez vere, niti vere brez vednosti, prav tako kot ni Očeta brez Sina [*oute g' gnôsis aneu pisteôs, outh' hê pistis aneu gnôseôs ou* mên *oude ho patêr aveu uiou*]« (Klement 1981, 25). Razodetje prihaja do nas skozi hermenevtiko, kar pomeni, skozi *spreobrnjenje* ene intencionalnosti v drugo.[14]

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[11] Glej tudi: »Revelare se voluit quid esset.« (Avguštin 1977, 504)

[12] Glej »potestatem adducendi et trahendi – moč voditi in privlačiti« (1841b, stolpec 793).

[13] »Ille quippe trahitur ad Christum, cui datur ut credat in Christum. /.../ Quae potestas nisi detur a Deo, nulla esse potest ex libero arbitrio: quia nec liberum in bono erit, quod liberator non liberavit.« (1841c, stolpec 553) Glej še: »Nemo igitur potest habere voluntatem justam, nisi nullis praecedentibus meritis acceperit veram, hoc est, gratuitam desuper gratiam.« (stolpec 554)

[14] To posredno potrjuje raba besede *revelare* v razpravi o zmoti Sv. Ciprijana v zvezi z možnostjo ponovnega krsta krivovercev: manko razodetja jim daje možnost za poniznost in spreobrnjenje (Avguštin 1841d,

Neposredni dedič svetega Avguština Viljem Teoderiški prispeva k okrepitvi teološkega razumevanja razodetja. – (a) Ko prevzame avguštinski rek, ki ga (svobodno) vzame iz Izaija 7,9: »Če ne boste najprej verovali, ne boste razumeli«, v skoraj paskalovskem izrazju izpodbija prepričanje, da je možno spoznati »božje reči« brez predhodnega verovanja: »*In eis vero quae sunt ad Deum, sensus mentis est amor* – Če se hoče duh dvigniti k rečem, ki se tičejo Boga, je čut (sensus), ki ga pri tem vodi, ljubezen« (Viljem 1959a, 76).[15] Dejansko »ta znanost ni nič drugega kot način ali dispozicija duha, da bi prejel [in prevzel] tisto, kar pravilno izhaja iz vere«[16]; posledično je treba najprej verovati, kar pomeni, da je prva tudi ljubezen, saj gre za dve dejanji iste operacije (*idipsum*): »Kdo pozna, ne da bi ljubil? Pravzaprav gre za Boga in to je ista stvar (*idipsum*), kajti misliti in ljubiti je ista reč (*idipsum*). Pravim misliti in ne misliti *nanj*. Kajti mnogi mislijo [le] *nanj*, ker ga ne ljubijo. Nihče pa *ga* ne misli, ne da bi ga ljubil.«[17] Zatorej je pretvarjanje, da poznamo *propositio sufficiens,* ne da bi verovali, kot če bi se strinjali z zdravljenjem, brez da bi imeli zaupanje ali ljubezen do svojega zdravnika (Viljem 1959a, 26).[18] Od tod izhaja prvi sklep: *nihče ne more videti, kar se razkriva (apokalypsis), ne da bi veroval*. – (b) Viljem Teoderiški nadalje privzame avguštinski komentar k Jan 6,44, o razodetju kot privlačnosti (»*nisi Pater traxerit eum*«) ter ponovi njegovo logiko: »Seveda, če nočeš verovati, ne veruješ; veruješ torej, če to hočeš; toda hočeš samo takrat, kadar te je že prehitela milost; kajti ›nihče ne more priti k Sinu, če ga ne pritegne Oče‹ /.../ Ne moreš hoteti (verovati), razen če te je pritegnil Oče in zatorej vsakič, ko hočeš, te je Oče že pritegnil.«[19] Iz tega paradoksa sledi pomembna posledica: hoteti se na koncu zvede na ljubiti in na nič drugega. Volja hoče samo, če najde in izkusi privlačnost, ki voljo razgiba; ta privlačnost, ki vedno pride od *drugod* (na splošno od hotene stvari), v primeru Boga prihaja od tistega, ki se še bolj daje v ljubezni, ki sam ljubi in ne sestoji iz ničesar drugega kot iz ljubezni. Od tod ne moremo hoteti, ne da bi ljubili, kot univerzalno pravilo, toda še bolj zato, ker je tu tisto, kar je ljubljeno, poistoveteno z ljubeznijo: »*Voluntas enim haec aliquatenus jam amor Christi est* – Ta volja je v neki meri že ljubezen do Kristusa«

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stolpca 129–30). Argument je še toliko pomembnejši, ker ga sam Sv. Ciprijan uporabi, da utemelji, zakaj je Pavlovo stališče v razpravi s Petrom o krstu poganov pravilno (Ciprijan 1844, stolpca 410–11).

[15] »[F]ides voluntarius est assensus mentis, in eis quae fidei sunt; credere vero cum assensu de eis cogitare.« (Viljem 1959a, 44)

[16] »Scientia vero haec modus quidam est vel habitus mentis, ad suscipienda ea, quae proprie fidei sunt.« (Viljem 1959a, 66)

[17] »Quis cogitat, et non amat? Nimirum Deus est idipsum est, quod cogitare et amare idipsum est. *Ipsum* dico, non *de ipso*. De ipso enim multi cogitant, qui non amant, ipsum autem nemo cogitat, et non amat.« (Viljem 1959a, 84, poudarki dodani) To načelo je za Viljema tako pomembno, da popravi tudi vrstico iz Janezovega evangelija (2,23) »quia credebant in eum quem non diligebant« (gre za neosnovan spoj dveh vrstic iz Vulgate: v. 23, »multi crediderunt« in v. 24, »Ipse autem Iesus non credebat semetipsum eis«, kjer niso poslušalci ti, ki verujejo, ne da bi ljubili, temveč Jezus, ki ne želi zaupati tistim, ki pravijo, da verjamejo in nič drugega). Viljem komentira: »Abusive quippe dictum de illis est, quia credebant in eum, quem non diligebant. Credere enim in eum, amando in eum ire est.« (1959a, 60)

[18] Z drugimi besedami: »Non credis, qui non diligis et non diligis, quia non credis.« (1959a, 36)

[19] »Equidem si non vis credere, non credis; credis autem, si vis; sed non vis, nisi a gratia preveniaris; quia ›nemo venit ad Filium, nisi Pater traxerit eum‹. /.../Sed si vis credis, sed non vis nisi a Patre traheris; et si utique vis, quia Pater traxeris.« (Viljem 1959a, 34)

(Viljem 1959a, 36). Stavek, ki ga ne bi smeli razumeti kot srednjeveško predhodni-co implicitne vere »anonimnega krščanstva«, kot da je vsaka volja nezavedno obr-njena h Kristusu, marveč gre povsem nasprotno za priznanje dejstva, da nobena volja ne bo uspela hoteti, razen v obsegu, v katerem je pritegnjena, in to s strani tistega, kar ljubi. Tedaj razumemo, da volja hoče toliko bolj, kolikor bolj ljubi Kri-stusa, ki je Bog, ki sebe razodeva kot ljubeč. V tem smislu lahko Viljem Teoderiški povzame in celo poglobi avguštinsko definicijo ljubezni: »*Voluntas enim initium amoris est. Amor siquidem vehemens voluntas est* – Volja je začetek ljubezni. Lju-bezen pa je vehementna volja« (Viljem 1959a, 36).[20] Ali drugje: »*Nihil aliud est amor, quam vehemens et bene ordinata voluntas /.../ bonae voluntatis vehemen-tia amor in nobis dicitur* – Ljubezen ni nič drugega kot vehementna in dobro ure-jena volja, /.../ ljubezen imenujemo vehementnost dobre volje« (1954, 52 in 54).[21] Od tod sledi drugi sklep: nihče ne more videti, kar se razodene (*apokalypsis*), če ne veruje; toda nihče ne more verovati, če noče in *nihče ne more hoteti, če ne ljubi, kar veruje in kar hoče hoteti.*

To vodi do tretjega in odločilnega zaključka. Če dejansko nihče ne more videti, kar se raz-kriva (*apokalypsis*), razen če veruje, in če nihče ne more verovati, razen če hoče, in če nihče ne more hoteti, razen če ljubi, potem nihče ne more videti, če ne ljubi. In torej, končno, *v situaciji razodetja* (*apokalypsis*, *raz-kritje*) *je pozna-ti enakovredno ljubiti*, to je povsem obratno od situacije resnice (*alêtheia*, neskri-tost), kjer poznati označuje videti in neposredno vedeti. »*Ratio docet amorem, et amor illuminat rationem* – Razum uči ljubezen, ljubezen pa razsvetli razum« (Viljem 1879, 102).[22] Ali drugače: »*amor ex fide spe mediante per cognitionem oriatur; et fides itidem in amore per cognitionem solidetur* – ljubezen vznikne iz vere skozi vednost, po posredništvu upanja« (1959a, 54). Ljubezen spoznava in se daje spo-znati, toda pod *enim* pogojem – da je zagotovljena svoboda, da sama določi po-goje *svojega* spoznanja, se pravi, da začne z voljo, saj se ta prva spreobrne in nato spreobrne um. Ta pogoj opredeljuje, kar bomo odslej imenovali raz-kritje oz. *apo-kalypsis.* V tem razkritju ljubezni iz nje same se uresničuje znano pravilo očetov: »učiti se vednosti *o* Bogu začenši *od* Boga – *para theou peri theou /.../ mathein.*« In rečeno drugače: »*Edocuit autem Dominus quoniam Deum nemo potest scire nisi Deo docente, hoc est sine Deo non cognosci Deum* – Gospod nas je naučil, da nihče ne more spoznati Boga, če ni učitelj Bog sam. To pomeni: Brez Boga Bog ne more biti spoznan«.[23]

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[20] Sveti Avguštin je dejal: »voluntatem nostram, vel amorem seu dilectionem, quae valentior est voluntas.« (1995, 532) Glej še: »si tam violentia est [sc. voluntas], ut possit vocari amor, aut cupiditas, aut libido /.../« (172) Dopolnilno gradivo k tem nauku je moč najti v *Au lieu de soi* (2008, 250–1). V tem smislu bi lahko upravičeno dejali »Amore quippe illuminatus, caritas est« (Viljem 1953, stolpec 387).

[21] Glej tudi »vehementer velle, quod est amare« (Viljem 1959b, 56).

[22] Glej tudi: »Voluntas crescit in amorem, amor in caritatem, caritas in sapientia.« (Viljem 1879, 74)

[23] V tem oziru opozarjam tudi na misli Atenagore Atenskega (1972, 14) in Ireneja Lyonskega (1965, 446). Tudi Klement Aleksandrijski pravi: »Le po božji milosti in skozi sam Logos, ki je z Njim, lahko spoznamo neznano [monô tô par'autou logô to agnôston noein].« (1981, 160). Gregorij Veliki: »Ko ljubimo nad-nebeške reči, *o katerih smo slišali*, te ljubljene reči že poznamo, kajti ljubezen sama je spoznanje [Dum enim audita supercoelestia amamus, amata jam novimus, quia amor ipse notitia est]« (1857, stolpec

Tu se poraja pomislek, ki je toliko močnejši, ker ne zavrača logike raz-kritja (*apokalypsis*), temveč se zdi, da iz nje preprosto potegne sklep. Za kar tu gre, je logika vere, ki kot nespornega predpostavlja diskurz, ki jo potrjuje in to po svoji definiciji. Ta diskurz in ta logika sama na sebi ostajata legitimna, ne moreta pa se artikulirati s koncepti ali z razumom, ki mora v skladu z logiko neskritosti (*alêtheia*) neposredno videti, da bi razumel, in vedeti, da bi hotel. Ta ločitev, pa naj se zdi še tako tradicionalna, ni niti samoumevna, niti je s stališča vere ni moč sprejeti brez dodatnih pojasnil. Čeprav gre namreč za dve logiki, se obe sklicujeta na en logos; *logos tou staurou* (1 Kor 1,18) še naprej ostaja *logos*, vse do točke, ko se Bog sam razkrije z imenom *Logos* (Jan 1,1). Zatorej »modrost sveta« ne more biti v protislovju z »božjo modrostjo« (1 Kor 1,20–21), niti ena ne more druge sprevrniti v »norost« (1 Kor 1,18; 20; 24), če se poprej ne soočita pod eno skupno logiko. Pravzaprav se »norost« pojavlja prav zato, ker se logiki ne uspe poenotiti. Ne uspe pa ji zato, ker se mi, kot »svet«, kot Grki, ki jim ponosno sledimo v *našem* razumevanju logike in »iščemo modrost« (1 Kor 1,24), kot jo je iskal že Aristotel, nikoli ne vprašamo, zakaj »vedno iskana vednost« ostaja aporetična (*aei zetoumenon kai aei aporoumenon*; Aristotel 1968, 312). Ker namreč nikoli ne postavimo pod vprašaj razvidnosti našega pojmovanja tako modrosti kot logike. Kot smo videli se apokalipsa raz-kritja ne pojavlja brez logike, toda nasproti neskritosti (*alêtheia*) postavlja drugačno logiko, za katero trdi, da je močnejša, a še vedno in vseskozi logična. Vprašanje odnosa med raz-kritjem in neskritostjo, med *apokalypsis* in *alêtheia*, se ne odvija izven, temveč znotraj logike. Še natančneje: postavlja se vprašanje, če *naše* razumevanje logike lahko vlada vsem drugim logosom, tudi logosu *Logosa*, ali pa se more in mora pustiti reformirati skozi logiko *Logosa*.

Teža tako preoblikovanega vprašanja zadeva predvsem filozofijo ter meje njene logike. Gre za vprašanje, kako mora filozofska logika reformirati svoja filozofska načela, da ne bi vpričo *Logosa* postala norost. Kajti *Logos* se, vsaj kot trdi biblični dogodek, razkrije in fenomenalizira. Toda kar filozofija oziroma logika, ki jo je razvil sistem metafizike, razume pod fenomenom, nam ne dopušča pojmovanja, kako se *Logos* more fenomenalizirati. Kje se nahaja težava? V dejstvu, da se Logos, predvsem in še zlasti ko se manifestira (»prevzel podobo služabnika in postal podoben ljudem, *skêmati euretheis hôs anthrôpos*«, Flp 2,7), manifestira *kot* človek in ne kot objekt. Metafizika pa o vsakem pojavu sprva razmišlja kot o objektu, ki se pojavi v skladu s pogoji izkustva: »*A priori* pogoji možnega izkustva na sploh so istočasno (*zugleich*) pogoji možnosti predmetov izkustva« (Kant 1968c, 111).[24] Da se ta fenomen ne zvede na objekt pomeni, da ni nujno, da se pojavi v skladu s pogledom, ki ga predvideva (v čisti obliki svojega zora), ga vnaprej pojmovno zasnuje (v skladu z *a priori* pojmi razuma) in ga sintetizira (po svoji aktivni apercepciji), temveč da se fenomen pojavi ali se *more* pojaviti izhajajoč iz sebe samega.

1207, poudarek dodan) in Janez Damaščan (1633, 483) »Nihče ne more poznati Boga, če ga sam Bog ne poduči, to pomeni, da Boga ni moč spoznati brez Boga [aneu theou mē gineēskesthai ton theon]« in Karl Holl (1899, 61). Omenimo še Pascala, ki pravi »Bog lahko dobro govori o Bogu« (1963b, tč. 303).

[24] Glede interpretacij (med drugim tudi Kantove) fenomena kot objekta napotujem na peto poglavje mojega dela *Certitudes négatives* (2010a, 253 sl.).

Tako se fenomen ali vsaj določeni fenomeni ne bi pojavili znotraj odprtega polja vidnega, temveč bi se pojavili začenši iz sebe in na način, ki bi ga sami narekovali. Dejansko je najvišja ambicija filozofije, v obliki fenomenologije, prav v tem, da bi dopustila fenomenom, da se razvijejo izhajajoč iz sebe in se pokažejo, kakor so sami na sebi (*das Sich-an-ihm-selbst Zeigende*; Heidegger 2006, 28). Toda da se fenomen pojavi na sebi in od sebe, – kar v principu pomeni odpraviti Kantovo prepoved, ki je *nasebnost* pridržala prav stvarem, ki se *ne pojavijo* – je potrebno, da takšno pojavljanje ne dolguje ničesar pogojem možnosti nekega tujega izkustva (to je transcendentalnega *ega*), temveč črpa iz sebe samega in po sebi. Potrebno je, da prihaja začenši iz sebe; skratka, da se daje. Ali spet povedano drugače: fenomen se ponudi (*sich darbietet*) v čutnem zoru in v mejah tega zora, ter upravičeno zahteva, da je sprejet in priznan (*annehmen*) tak, kot se daje (*wie est sich gibt*) (Husserl 1950, 52). Fenomen *se kaže* sam po sebi in od sebe, ker in v koliko *se daje* osebno, od sebe. Iz sintetiziranega ali konstituiranega predmeta se fenomen *preoblikuje* v dogodek, ki ne vznikne iz ničesar drugega kot iz svoje lastne prepustitve [abandon]. Takšna preobrazba, takšen prehod iz ene oblike v drugo se lahko zgodi na strogem filozofskem polju in fenomenologija si ne prizadeva za nič drugega kot za splošen opis teh fenomenov, ki se spreminjajo iz objektov v dogodke. Označujemo jih z nazivom nasičeni fenomeni. Tudi pri Kristusu, ki je prevzel človeško podobo (Flp 2,7), vidimo, da se kaže tako, da se daje. Kajti Kristus, vstali, se manifestira v vsej fenomenalnosti (*ephanerôthê*) (Mr 16,12 in 14; Jn 14, 21 in 22; 21,1 in 14; 1 Jn 1,1) »med« (Jn 20,19) ljudmi. Eksegeza je upravičeno pripomnila, da se kaže sam od sebe, da se pojavlja na vidnem po lastni iniciativi, kot nakazuje pasivni aorist (*ôphthê*): *naredil se je vidnega, dal se je videti* (Mt 17,3; Mr 9,4; Lk 9,30 in 24,34; 1 Kor 15,6–8). Toda ta vidnost prihaja iz onkraj smrti, saj je svoje življenje svobodno *dal in ga prejel* na absolutni način: »Zato me Oče ljubi, ker dam (*tithêmi*) svoje življenje, da ga spet prejmem. Nihče mi ga ne jemlje, ampak ga dajem (*tithêmi*) sam od sebe. Oblast imam, da ga dam (*theinai*), in oblast imam, da ga spet prejmem« (Jn 10,17–18).[25] Kristus kot vstali in torej kot fenomen *par excellence* onkraj vsake običajnosti, se tudi kaže na izjemen način, ker in v kolikor se na izjemen način daje [daruje]. Tako v osrednjem fenomenu bibličnega raz-kritja najdemo obe značilnosti fenomena, ki sta lastni njegovi definiciji v fenomenologiji (ne pa v metafiziki), da je namreč dogodek in ne več objekt.

Ostane nam torej, da natančno opišemo vstalega kot nasičen fenomen. Omejili se bomo na tri določitve. Glede na prvo se *nasičeni fenomen*[26] definira skozi presežek čutnega zrenja (intuicije) nad pojmom ali pomenom. To je nasprotno kot pri občem fenomenu (in še bolj pri siromašnem fenomena), ki sledeč metafizični fenomenalnosti prizna le dve drugi razmerji med čutnim zrenjem (intuicija) in pomenom (pojmom): bodisi primanjkljaj čutnega zrenja glede na pomen, ki slednje-

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[25] Glej tudi Jn 5,26. Znotraj tega okvirja moramo slišati »kdor izgubi svoje življenje [svojo dušo, *psykēn*] zaradi mene, ga bo našel« (Mt 10,39; Mr 8,35; Lk 9,24). Ter znova Jn 12,25: »Kdor ima rad svoje življenje, ga bo izgubil; kdor pa sovraži svoje življenje na tem svetu, ga bo ohranil za večno življenje.«

[26] Bralca napotujem na podrobnejšo analizo v *Etant donné: Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation* (1997, 329 sl.).

ga le delno izpolni (vendar dovolj za uporabo ali celo za spoznanje tehničnega objekta), bodisi enakost med njima (v primeru razvidnosti čutno zrenje resničnega zapolnjuje ves pomen). Obratno pa ko čutno zrenje, ki ga ni moč izčrpati v pojmu, preplavi pomen, ki to zrenje formalizira – kot v primerih dogodka, malika (ali maksimuma vidnosti za dani pogled), moje telesnosti (mesa) in ikone (obličja drugega) –, mora tisti, ki ta fenomen vidi, sprejeti, da ga vidi, ne da bi ga mogel predvideti (glede na že znani pojem), da ga ne more razložiti (glede na odnos, vzročni ali drugačni), niti ga ponoviti (na način proizvajanja). Z neoporečno empirično razvidnostjo mora vzeti na znanje, kar se samo narekuje [s'impose], ne da bi se pustilo razumeti. Tako nas dogodek pusti neme in brez izhoda, ker nam manjka kakršen koli pomen, ki bi ta dogodek lahko napravil pojmljiv, kar pomeni (v metafizičnem smislu) možen. Vsiljuje nam dejanskost, ki nikoli ni bila možna ali zamisljiva vnaprej, in si zato zasluži naziv nemogoče. »To je nemogoče!« Takšen vzklik vpričo tega, kar se nam vsiljuje [s'impose] kot dejstvo, pravzaprav označuje nasičeni fenomen. Pušča nas dobesedno brez glasu, brez besed, brez pojmov za razumevanje. Zagotovo bomo o njem še več govorili, toda vedno naknadno, da bi zanj našli ali, bolje, zanj *spet* našli hipotetično razlago, vzroke, ki si jih osporavamo in ki jih naknadno izpeljujemo iz učinkov, kateri pa so nesporni. Skratka, govorili bomo o hermenevtiki brez konca, ki se vedno popravlja in dopolnjuje, ne da bi rekli ničesar – ali natančneje, brez pomenov, ki bi ustrezali presežku danega nad tem, kar zmoremo razumeti, ali presežku danega nad tem, kar bi lahko uredili v okvir vidnega, ki se kaže. Ta situacija presežka danega *na sebi* nad pokazljivim kot tistim, kar je vidno *za nas*, ki jo doživljamo že v vsakodnevnem izkustvu, se potrjuje povsem in v najvišji meri spričo fenomena Kristusove manifestacije.

Tako ob *Spremenjenju* učenci, ki jim je bilo dovoljeno vnaprejšnje videnje slave vstajenja, ne le, da ne dvomijo, da se je »videz njegovega obličja spremenil« (Lk 9,29) »kot sonce« (Mt 17,2), da so njegova oblačila »postala bela kot luč« (Mt 17,3), »nadvse (*lian*) bela, da jih tako ne more pobeliti noben belivec na svetu« (Mr 9,3). Ne le, da je manjkalo čutnega zrenja, temveč je bila težava v tem, da ga je bilo preveč, da je šlo za njegov presežek: učenci so padli na obraz, niso prenesli intenzivnosti videnja in so »se zelo (*sphodra*) prestrašili« (Mt, 17,6).[27] Zato je resnična težava pri tem nasičenem fenomenu »pomanjkanje božanskih imen« (Hölderlin) ali vsaj besed, primernih za to razkrivanje božanstva. Ko Peter skuša nekaj povedati (o treh šotorih, ki bi jih bilo »dobro« postaviti za Kristusa in za ostali dve osebi, ki naj bi bila Mojzes in Elija), se zateče k tradicionalnemu pojmu, ki ga ima na razpolago: k Abrahamovemu gostoljubju (*philoxenia* iz 1 Mz 18,1–15), ki pa je seveda povsem neustrezen. In besedilo takoj pojasni, da »[N]i namreč vedel, kaj bi rekel, *mê eidôs ho legei*« (Mr 9,6 in Lk 9,33). Ustrezni pomen torej ne prihaja s strani tistih, ki so videli ta fenomen, temveč končno iz fenomena samega. Kajti »iz oblaka se je zaslišal glas« (Mt 17,5; Mr 9,7; Lk 9,35), ki je priskrbel ustrezen pomen za presežek zrenja, se pravi presežen, dobesedno nedojemljiv pomen: »Ta je moj ljubljeni Sin, njega poslušajte!« Pomen, ki je bil podan že pri Krstu (Mt 3,17; Mr

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[27] Glej tudi Mr 7,7 in podobno situacijo, ki jo zasledimo pri ženah po Vstajenju (Mr 16,8).

1,11; Lk 3,22), pa ga poslušalci niso zares razumeli. Pomen, ki se ponovi po zadnjem javnem nastopu v templju in pred pasijonom (Jn 12, 27–28), pa ga prav tako slabo razumejo ali preprosto zavrnejo. Skoraj-nemožnost [quasi-impossibilité], da se poimenuje Jezusa, da se mu da ime, Njegovo ime, je, vsaj s stališča fenomenološke analize, posledica pomanjkanja pojma v trenutku presežka zrenja. Tako se Herod, potem ko »je slišal, kaj vse se je zgodilo«, sprašuje: »kdo pa je ta« (Lk 9,7–9). Tako se ob siloamskem vodnjaku ozdravljeni slepi mož čudi nevednosti duhovnikov v templju, ki jih je v skladu s postavo obvestil o ozdravitvi in ki ga zdaj obtožujejo, da ne uspejo prepoznati njegovega zdravilca: »To je res čudno, da ne veste, od kod je, *ouk oidate pothen estin*« (Jn 9,30). Po Vstajenju učencema na poti v Emavs ne manjka čutnega zora (»se jima je približal sam Jezus in hodil z njima«),[28] ker pa jima manjkajo ustrezni pomeni (tisti, ki jih poda Jezus, ko razlaga Pisma in jih povezuje s seboj ter dogodki v Jeruzalemu), ne razumeta nič (*anoetoi*) in torej *ne vidita ničesar* (»*bradeis* tê *kardia tou pisteuein*«, Lk 24,25). Šele ob zadnjem pomenu, ob znamenju evharističnega kruha, bosta razumela: raz-kritje se zgodi šele, ko pomen, ki pride *od drugod*, omogoči, da se zrenje tistega, ki je sebe že dal iz sebe, pokaže v celovitosti fenomena. Pravzaprav je tako tudi pri Mariji Magdaleni, ki zagotovo »vidi« (*theorei*) Jezusa, ne da bi ga prepoznala, vsaj ne do trenutka, ko do nje pride ustrezen pomen, namreč Jezusov glas, ki jo pokliče po imenu: »Marija!« (Jn 20, 14–16) in se s tem da prepoznati. In podobno velja tudi za učence, ki so znova postali ribiči rib in ko so ga videli na obali Tiberijskega jezera, »niso vedeli, da je Jezus« (Jn 21,4), dokler jim ni s pečenimi ribami dal znamenja za manjkajoči pomen. Kot nasičen fenomen in v najvišji meri [par excellence] takšen, ker na radikalen način vznika od drugod, Kristusovo razkritje prinaša presežek zrenja, ki povzroči pomanjkanje pomena, ki je v njem: njegovo ime postane bodisi pokazatelj za absurdnost fenomena, bodisi pomen sam, ki prihaja od *drugod*, ki pa ni doumljiv, čeprav je slišan (»Ta je moj ljubljeni Sin, njega poslušajte!«, »Ta je moj ljubljeni Sin, nad katerim imam veselje; njega poslušajte!«). To ime se torej lahko sliši le kot nedoumljiva absurdnost ali pa kot Ime sàmo. Posledično je ta pomen dobesedno opredeljen kot znamenje, ki nasprotuje temu, kar imamo *mi* za *našo logiko*, »znamenje, ki se mu nasprotuje, *sêmeion antilegomenon*« (Lk 2,34–35), *logos*, ki gre v imenu *Logosa* nasproti *logosu*.

Sedaj lahko razumemo drugo določitev Kristusove manifestacije kot nasičenega fenomena: *jaz* glede njega zavzame status *priče*.[29] Na področju *alêtheia* ali neskritosti *jaz* vedno določa fenomene po anticipaciji, bodisi po anticipaciji svoje apercepcije, bodisi po anticipaciji svoje intencionalnosti. Fenomen bo po definiciji znan jazu, saj bo *jaz* organiziral njegovo celotno možno zrenje v skladu s pojmom ali pomenom, ki ju bo fenomenu dodelil *vnaprej*. Jaz ve, o čem govori, kajti v skrajnem smislu govori o tem, kar je sam napravil vidno (če tega ni celo ustvaril v vidnosti) v skladu s svojim ciljem. Pojem ali intencionalni pomen se ne bi mogla

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[28] Glede tega prizora sem podal bolj podroben komentar v Ils le reconnurent et lui-même leur devint invisible (2010b, 195–205).

[29] O statusu priče podrobneje razmišljam v *Etant donné: Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation* (1997, 302–5).

občasno izkazati za prazna, če se ne bi že vnaprej razširila na fenomen, ki se potem lahko daje videti (skozi zadostno zrenje) ali ne. Glede svojega intencionalnega objekta *jaz* vedno ve več kot vidi, saj v resnici ni treba videti (v polnem zoru), da bi poznal vsaj pomen objekta (ali njegov pojem). *Jaz* pozna (ali zmore poznati) svoj fenomen, ne da bi se ta v polnosti ali kot tak pojavil. Toda pred nasičenim fenomenom takšna drža postane za *jaz* nevzdržna: presežek zora nad pomenom oz. nad pomeni (ali pojmi), ki jih ima na voljo, prepoveduje ne le spoznanje, ki ne bi moralo videti (vsega), temveč zlasti spoznanje, ki bi bilo ustrezno, prav zato, ker jaz še predobro predvideva. Priča vidi, vidi neizpodbitno, vendar ne uspe vpisati presežka zora v sintezo (skozi prepoznanje) pojma ali v (noematsko) konstitucijo pomena. Priča zagotovo in zelo zanesljivo ve, kaj govori, saj govori o tem, kar je prejela s čutnim zorom (vid, sluh itd.); vendar *ne razume*, kaj pravi, saj tega ne more združiti v celovit pojem, niti prepoznati zadostnega pomena (*propositio sufficiens*). Poleg tega, ko je priča (v policijskem in pravnem smislu) zaslišana, jo zasliševalec, ki zahteva poročilo (nekaj, kar priča pozna, a ne razume), uporabi, da bi razumel nekaj *drugega*, kar on, v nasprotju s pričo, predvideva, ugiba in zatorej išče: pojem, pomen, končno rešitev primera (zločin, krivca itd.). Zasliševalec želi preoblikovati nasičen fenomen, ki je *jaz* zvedel na raven priče, in ga pretvoriti v objektiviran fenomen, v običajen pojav, pri katerem bo pojem napravil celoten dogodek razumljiv.[30] Priča pa se prav nasprotno, vzemimo primer slepega moža iz Siloe, seznani in seznani druge naokrog z uzrtim dejstvom svojega ozdravljenja (ko od rojstva slepi spregleda), vendar ne pozna ne izvora, ne pomena, niti v nobenem trenutku ne trdi, da bi to poznala: »Rekli so mu: ›Kje je tisti?‹ Dejal jim je: ›Ne vem‹ (*ouk oida*)« (Jn 9,12). Prav tako vsi sogovorniki te prve priče, ozdravelega slepca, ponavljajo, da vedo še manj (*ouk oidamen*, Jn 9,21; 22; 30). To je običajna in neizogibna fenomenološka drža, ki jo mora vsak *jaz* zavzeti pred nasičenim fenomenom, zlasti pred nasičenim fenomenom, ki ga uvrščamo pod tip dogodka, morda pa celo pred dogoditvijo [événementialité] kateregakoli nasičenega fenomena. Drža priče se izkaže za tako bistveno pri raz-kritju, da zaznamuje razliko med hudičem, ki je bil »od začetka morilec« in »ni obstal v resnici, ker v njem ni resnice« (Jn 8,44), in Kristusom, ki ne govori od sebe (»Besed, ki vam jih govorim, ne govorim sam od sebe«, Jn 14,10). In tako lahko *tudi* priča na koncu poda resnični pomen, toda ta tedaj ne izhaja iz nje, temveč napravi, da se nasičeni fenomen pokaže izhajajoč iz sebe samega in ne iz intencionalnega *jaza*. Karl Barth je to zelo dobro izpostavil: »Zakaj in kako ima biblična priča avtoriteto? V tem in natančno v tem, da zase ne zahteva nikakršne avtoritete ter da je njeno pričanje namenjeno zgolj temu, da dopušča drugemu, da uvaja svojo lastno avtoriteto« (Barth 1935, 115). In tako slepec iz Siloe zaključi z besedami »Verujem, Gospod«,

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[30] Ponovna pretvorba nasičenega fenomena v splošen fenomen je metoda vsakega detektiva, pomislimo le na Sherlocka Holmesa: »Ta proces«, pravi, »se pričenja s predpostavko, da potem, *ko smo izločili vse, kar je nemogoče*, mora, karkoli ostane, kakorkoli *neverjetno* že je, biti *resnica.* Prav lahko se zgodi, da ostane več razlag, v tem primeru je treba preizkusiti eno za drugo, dokler ena izmed njih nima *prepričljive* podpore.« (Conan Doyle 2003, 556, poudarki dodani) Očitno je, da Sherlock Holmes naleti na iste težave kot Hume: kako razlikovati med nemogočim [impossible] in malo verjetnim [improbable], kako oceniti prepričanje in kako definirati nemogoče? Dober *krščanski* ekseget mora v tem oziru biti antiHolmes, nekdo, ki ve, kako prepoznati nemogoče v malo verjetnem, ko *vidi* pomen tega nemogočega.

kajti Kristus mu na vprašanje »Kdo je to, Gospod, da bi veroval vanj?« odgovori v prvi osebi: »Jezus mu je rekel: ›Videl si ga; ta, ki govori s teboj, ta je‹« (Jn 9,36–37). Zato tudi stotnik ob vznožju na koncu prizna: »Zares, ta človek je bil pravičen« (Lk 23,47), in celo: »Resnično, ta je bil Božji Sin!« (Mt 27,54, Mr 15,40), kajti »vidi«[31] »znamenja in dogodke, ki so se zgodili (*ton seismon kai ta genomena*)« (Mt 27,54, *ta genomena*, Lk 23,48), so bili videni izhajajoč iz njih samih, kot dogodek, ki vznikne iz sebe in v sebi. In očitno ni naključje, da ob Kristusovi smrti kot nasičenem fenomenu, ki je viden le pričam, ki ga prejmejo, ne da bi si domišljale, da ga razumejo, evangelist Luka edinkrat v celotni Novi zavezi uporabi izraz *theôria*: »In vse množice, ki so se zbrale, da bi gledale (*theôrian*), in so videle (*theôrêsantes*), kar se je zgodilo (*genomena*), so se nazaj grede tolkle po prsih« (Lk 23,48).

Od tod sledi tretja določitev Kristusove manifestacije kot nasičenega fenomena: gre za *paradoks*, ki vodi k proti-izkušnji. Paradoks ni isto kot logično protislovje v izjavi (ali ne-smisel), ni (empirična) nemožnost spoznanja, ni zatemnitev (zmeda) v fenomenalnosti, ki bi jo lahko s pomočjo pojasnitev, redukcij in popravkov privedli nazaj v objektivno in ontično polje (v metafizičnem smislu) manifestacije.[32] Med fenomeni, ki jih nesporno izkušamo, paradoks definira tiste, ki se prigodijo (kot dogodki) le kot *kontra*-dikcija pogojem mojega izkustva, ki se vsiljujejo [s'imposent] le tako, da mi vsilijo [m'impose] *proti*-izkušnjo. Tu se lahko spet obrnemo na Kierkegaarda, ki v *Filozofskih drobtinicah* pravi: »To se zdi paradoks. Vendar nikar ne mislimo slabo o paradoksu; kajti paradoks je strast misli in mislec, ki je brez paradoksa, je kot ljubimec brez strasti: povprečen patron. /…/ Takšen je tedaj najvišji paradoks mišljenja, hotenje odkriti nekaj, česar sam ne more misliti« (1987, 42). Če to svarilo prenesemo v izrazje fenomenalnosti, nam paradoks ponuja logično kategorijo, ki omogoča formulacijo nasičenih fenomenov, katere noben pomen ali pojem ne more vzpostaviti kot objekte. Kot pravilno ugotavlja H. de Lubac, je treba razlikovati »paradokse v izrazu: nekdo pretirava, da bi ›naprvil učinek‹« in »stvarne paradokse«, ki v sebi nosijo uporno antinomijo. Potemtakem paradoks ni rezultat logičnih težav pri opisovanju fenomenov, temveč samo on lahko logično opiše svojevrstnost določenih fenomenov. »Paradoks: beseda, ki označuje predvsem stvari same in ne načina njihovega izražanja.« (de Lubac 1999, 13; 72)[33] Če ponovimo: paradoks ponuja korektno logično obliko za opis (nasičenih) fenomenov, ki se pojavljajo v izkustvu na način, da nasprotujejo – kot *kontra*--dikcija – (končnim) pogojem možnosti izkustva. Paradoks ne izniči izkušnje, temveč jo naredi znosno in opisljivo, tudi če izkazana in izkušena fenomenalnost zavrača status predmeta ali občega fenomena (kjer se zrenje lahko razume v pojmu in pomenu). Paradoks torej razširi izkustvo – daleč od tega, da bi izkustvo izključil

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[31] Mt 27,54: *idontes*; Mr 15,40 in Lk 23,48: *idōn*.

[32] V mislih imam pristop Bertranda Russella v *On Denoting* (1956) ali pa W. V. O. Quinea v *The Ways of Paradox* (1966): v obeh primerih se paradoks obravnava z logično distinkcijo (npr. razredi), da bi bil znova pripeljan v občo racionalnost. V nasprotju s tem je treba paradoks v močnem smislu obvarovati in okrepiti, da bi nas uvedel v neobčo logiko.

[33] »Od tod nujnost paradoksa; ali bolje, trajni okus po paradoksu, ki ga ima resnica v svoji novosti za tistega, ki se zaveže resnici, ki se spreminja v laž.« (Lubac 1999, 153) Glej tudi Simone Weil: »Protislovja, s katerimi trči um, [so] edina resničnost, merilo resničnosti.« (1948, 103)

ali se sam iz njega izključil – in razširi ga tako, da dovoli opis izkušnje, ki je ni moč objektivirati, a je zato še bolj manifestna, kajti prihaja od fenomenov, ki se manifestirajo v njih samih, ker se dajejo iz sebe samih. Takšno izkušnjo lahko imenujemo proti-izkušnja.

Pri tej logični figuri fenomenalnosti in izkušnje, ki gre v nasprotje [contredit] s pogoji izkustva, ne moremo, da ne bi pomislili na radikalni opis Razodetja, ki ga je predstavil teolog Barth: samorazodetje Boga iz sebe samega poseže v izkušnjo ljudi kot kamen, ki pade nenadoma in vse zdrobi pod svojo težo.[34] Ta upravičena brutalnost pa ne pove preveč, temveč še vedno premalo. Iz dveh razlogov. – Prvič, ker se razume samo po sebi, Razodetje, v smislu vdora Boga v to, kar je končno, omejeno in brez svetosti, po definiciji tam ne more napraviti sebe prejeto, doumeto ali videno. V svetu brez svetosti [immonde, grdobije] ne more in *nikoli ne sme* najti svojega bivališča, odprtega prostora ali templja, ki bi ustrezal njegovi svetosti. Težko bi našli zmotnejšo interpretacijo Razodetja od Heideggerjeve, ki nadaljuje paradigmo *Aufklärunga* in je bolj hegeljanski, kot se zdi na prvi pogled, ko je hotel Razodetje Boga podvreči manifestaciji bogov, to manifestacijo podvreči prihodu božanskega, božansko odprtosti svetega in slednjo podvreči čistemu odprtju Biti.[35] Razodetja ni, *ker* so se steze zravnale, doline napolnile, gore znižale in ker se je zravnalo, kar je bilo krivo (Lk 3, 4–5 navaja Iz 40, 3–5), kakor da bi morali biti izpolnjeni številni predpogoji, preden se Bog *lahko* razkrije. Ne, razodetje je, četudi steze ostajajo neporavnane – ali pa celo, *da* pokaže, kakšne so. Če se Bog manifestira kot Bog, kdo more to zdržati, kdo ga more videti, ne da bi umrl, kdo ga more slišati? In če bi ga kdo lahko slišal in bi ga videl, ne da bi umrl, in bi stal pred njim, bi šlo potem sploh še za Boga ali samo še za malikovanje? Ne le da pogoji možnosti Razodetja niso in nikoli ne bodo zbrani skupaj, temveč jih nikoli tudi ne sme biti, če naj si razodetje zasluži naziv Razodetje Boga: »Ne nahaja se pod nobenim pogojem (to lahko rečemo samo glede našega spoznanja razodetja), temveč je sàmo pogoj.« Dejansko »ne obstaja nobeno drugo ali večje dejanje, iz katerega bi ga lahko utemeljili ali izpeljali /.../ Je v resnici pogoj, ki pogojuje vse, ne da bi ga karkoli pogojevalo, in prav to izrekamo, ko ga označujemo za Razodetje« (Barth 1935, 121–122).[36] V teologiji ne gre za vprašanje, *ali* Razodetje nasprotuje pogojem končnega izkustva – takšno nasprotovanje ali kontradikcija mora Razodetje določati analitično, po definiciji in a priori –, temveč za razumevanje, *kako* Razodetje vrši to nasprotovanje in *kako* kljub temu prispe do svoje popolne in dokončne manifestacije. Možno je, da tako imenovana dialektična teologija v

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[34] Pomislimo lahko na Rudolfa Bultmanna in njegovo označbo Razodetja kot »daß« pošiljanja Besede v dejstvu Kristusa (1965, 1–34). Glej moj oris v *Remarques sur le concept de Révélation chez Rudolf Bultmann* (1968).

[35] Med drugimi teksti napotujem na *Brief über den »Humanismus«* (Heidegger 1976, 338–9 in 351). Zanimive so vzporednice z mojo diagnozo v *Dieu sans l'être* (1982, 2. pogl). Barthova (glej Gogarten 1929) zavrnitev zahtev o pripravi za vednost o Bogu skozi »eine existentialphilosophische Begründung der Theologie« (1935, 124) prav gotovo velja tudi za Heideggra.

[36] Glej tudi: »Offenbarung wird von keinem Anderen her wirklich und wahr, weder in sich noch für uns. Sie ist es in sich und für uns durch sie selbst« (Barth 1935, 322) ali pa »Gott offenbart sich. Er offenbart sich durch sich selbst. Er offenbart sich selbst« (312).

svojih raznolikih oblikah tega vprašanja sploh ni videla ali zaslutila. – Od tod sledi drugi razlog. To novo in nadvse pronicljivo vprašanje ostaja nerazumljeno iz dokaj jasnega razloga. Najprej je potrebno preučevanje fenomenov nasploh in šele skozi fenomenološki pristop do razodetja se postavi vprašanje glede razodetja kot fenomena – kot izjemnega fenomena, ki pa formalno ostaja primer nasičenega fenomena, ali natančneje fenomena razodetja, ki v sebi združuje štiri zvrsti fenomenološke nasičenosti (dogodek, malik, telesnost in ikono)[37]. Kako se Razodetje manifestira na način nujnega nasprotovanja apriornim pogojem izkustva? Skozi kakšne paradokse se izvrši ta proti-izkušnja? S temi teološkimi vprašanji se ni moč soočiti, če ne obvladamo možnosti fenomenalnosti, ki je lastna nasičenim fenomenom. In ne smemo se pretvarjati, da jih lahko hitro rešimo na način, ko pod krinko teoloških kategorij uporabljamo pojme in formule, ki izhajajo iz filozofije v njenem metafizičnem stanju.[38]

Zato moramo poskusiti opisati proti-izkušnjo Razodetja kot paradigmatičnega nasičenega fenomena. Pri tem poskusu bomo spoštovali dve že usvojeni gotovosti. – Prvič, nikdar ne zapustiti položaja in statusa, ki ga jazu naloži nasičen fenomen: namreč biti priča. To pomeni, vedno imeti v mislih Kristusovo opozorilo: »Še veliko vam imam povedati, a zdaj ne morete nositi (*ou dynasthe bastazein*)« (Jn 16,12). Ne samo veliko drugih stvari (Jn 20,30 in 21,25), ki niso zapisane v bibličnih besedilih, temveč tudi tiste stvari, o katerih je pisano, pa nam naše pomanjkanje pojmov in naše nepoznavanje pomenov Boga (*anoetoi*, Lk 24,25) ne dovoljuje, da bi lahko nosili presežek njihove razvidnosti. Zato je nujno potreben »Duh resnice«, da nam odpre pot do resnice v celoti (*hodogêsei hymas eis tên alêtheian pasan*) (Jn 16,13). Kazati pot pa pomeni *metodo*: Sveti Duh določi metodo interpretacije pri nasičenosti fenomena Razodetja. – Iz tega sledi druga gotovost: vedno je treba upoštevati, da se v nasičenem fenomenu Razodetja, kot njegova *alfa* in *omega*, razodeva en sam in edini presežek: presežek ljubezni. Gre le za to, da »/.../ z vsemi svetniki dojamemo, kolikšna je širina, dolžina, višina in globina, [drugače rečeno] da spoznamo hiperbolično Kristusovo ljubezen, ki presega spoznanje (*gnônai te tên hyperballuosan tês gnôseôs*), da smo napolnjeni z Bogom do popolne nasičenosti (*plêrôthête eis pan to plêrôma tou theou*)«. Da pa bi to dosegli, da bi *prenesli* to nasičenost in to hiperbolo, moramo najprej pustiti, da smo »ukoreninjeni in utemeljeni v ljubezni« (Ef 3,17–19). Kristus torej določi element, v katerem se fenomen Razodetja nahaja kot nasičen in kot nasičevalec, to je ljubezen.

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[37] Za podrobnejšo distinkcijo med fenomenom razodetja in Razodetjem kot fenomenom glej *Etant donné* (Marion 1997, 383).

[38] Obrobna in pogosto kritizirana misel Louisa Charlierja, da bi Razodetje pojmoval v okvirih »danega« (»Razodetje je predvsem dana resničnost [une réalité donnée].« (Charlier 1938, 50)), bi predstavljala pristen napredek le, če bi to »dano« bilo preprašano in definirano, ne pa zvedeno na golo faktualnost danega problema ali dane zavesti, ali celo občutja. Ker pa danost ni resno vzeta kot taka, hitro pademo v lažno alternativo »dane-razodete-vednosti« in »dane-razodete-resničnosti«, kjer vsakega od pojmov napaja najbolj splošna, najbolj ustaljena in najbolj krhka metafizika. Kaj pa pomeni »resničnost«? Kaj označuje »vednost«? In v kakšnem odnosu sta z »razodetim«, ki ostaja povsem nedoločeno, razen z epistemološkimi interpretacijami in svojim sodobnim filozofskim izvorom?

Pod pogojem spoštovanja teh dveh gotovosti metode postane možna ne le osvoboditev koncepta teologije izpod vsakršnega vpliva metafizike in vsake epistemološke interpretacije, temveč tudi, da ju z uporabo virov teologije občasno popravimo in občudujoče motrimo [contempler] Razodetje kot fenomen vse do najmanjših podrobnosti bibličnih besedil.

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Christian Gostečnik

Psihoanaliza in sakralno izkustvo

Psihoanalitična relacijska paradigma predpostavlja, da imata tako religiozni kot nereligiozni človek svoje psihične razloge za vero oziroma nevero. Zato je pomembno ugotoviti v kakšnega Boga verujoči veruje oziroma v kakšnega Boga neverujoči ne veruje. Tudi religiozna oseba namreč ne veruje v Boga v katerega nereligiozna oseba ne veruje ali ne more verjeti.

Emmanuel Falque
The Original Injury or the Trauma of Love

Izvorna ranjenost in travma ljubezni

Abstract: The »trauma of love« is often thought of as a lack, a privation, or as a weakness. This consideration leads to a kind of irenicism where life is considered without wounds and love is thought of as merely being a fusion, or an integrity lacking any exemplar. And sometimes in accepting the harsh reality within the act of love we can give it so much meaning that its impossibility fails to hurt us or even shock us. Everything happens as if in phenomenology, of course, but so also in hermeneutics, and even in psychoanalysis everything must be »signified« so that nothing remains outside of the meaning that we've attributed to it. Not converting too quickly the »trauma of love« into the »love of trauma« amounts to accepting there to be an original injury that makes no sense, so then allowing for love to return and remain in a new way.

Key words: trauma, love, phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, sin, injury.

Povzetek: Pri »travmi ljubezni« pogosto pomislimo na neko umanjkanje ali na šibkost. Takšen pogled vodi v irenizem, ki življenje vidi brez bolečin in ljubezen enači z zlitjem ali s celostjo, ne da bi bil takšen vzor kadarkoli dosežen. In če kdaj sprejmemo trdo resničnost dejanja ljubezni, temu pripisujemo tako velik pomen in smisel, da nas njegova nezmožnost ne more več raniti ali šokirati. Zdi se, da mora tako v fenomenologiji kot v hermenevtiki in tudi v psihoanalizi vse »pomeniti« do te mere, da nič ne ostane zunaj pomena in smisla, ki ga želimo pripisati. Ne da bi prehitro obrnili »travmo ljubezni« v »ljubezen do travme« tu zagovarjamo sprejetje izvorne ranjenosti, ki nima pomena in smisla, toda v katero se ljubezen naseli in v njej biva na drugačen način.

Ključne besede: travma, ljubezen, fenomenologija, hermenevtika, psihoanaliza, greh, rana.

1.   Love's irenicism

We believe that it is easy to love, yet difficult to be loveable. We indeed think first about loving than about being loved since that at least depends on us. Admittedly,

we could repeat endlessly that we need to be loved and that this is the condition being ourselves able to love. And therefore we believe that love precedes us and that in reality we never »make« love but rather that we are »made« by it. And this irenicism is sometimes such that if we do not love, or if we love badly, we ascribe it to our »love deficits«, believing thus that the »trauma of the act of loving« is but the neglect of what we should have obtained or the deprivation of what we should have been given. In this way we go back to our past as if to heal from it or at least to recognize that such a gulf was opened inside us and that, if we cannot get through it, we should at least not flee it.

The fact remains that the simplicity of such an understanding of the »trauma« that is the act of loving cannot divert us of its harsh and necessary reality at this point. Because, by criticizing it as a deficiency or a weakness, we fail to see why or how it should still constitute us, unless we establish it as rooted in our infantile life as if to justify it. In other words, if the »trauma of love« is only the accidental injury of childhood, we cannot be sure, on the one hand, that it is sufficient to look at it in order to get past it and, on the other hand, that conjuring it up does not presuppose a golden age that could have made it not exist. That the »trauma of love« *not be* or that it be *able not to be,* such is the irenic understanding of love of which we should definitively rid ourselves. Because we would probably »sink very low« by wanting to »rise too high«.

Thus, *originally*, there is no life without »trauma« – in the etymological sense of »injury« or »wound« (*trauma*) inflicted on the body by an exterior act: cut, burn, fracture etc. We could certainly believe, and even dream, of a life made of integrity in which the body never was or never had to be injured. But besides illness, against which one cannot always defend oneself, at least insofar it also represents a law pertaining to the degeneration of the living, the mere fact of exteriority prevents one from avoiding being injured, or at least hurt, by what in this context we have to call »figures of alterity«: accidents and illnesses of course, but also the death of a friend, or simply the ageing process of a life coming to its end. So-called »natural« death, as the law of the living, always remains »violent« for those who experience or approach sit.

The ideal of a life »without shock« or the angelic aspiration to health without »injury« is thus not really of this world. By falsely giving the illusion that it would be better if it were different this ideal negates the presence of the other in me and makes me believe in a perfection to which I am not entitled. Man is perfectible but not perfect. *Becoming better* is better for him than being the best. The reality of sin is not that of a »decline« from an idyllic state from which man has fallen. Adam and Eve were »expelled« from paradise rather than that they fell from it – because there is neither top nor bottom in the Adamic world (Gn 3:23). Man, who can become better, can also become worse. And in this lies our greatest freedom.

Should we then give up and simply miss those past days where this might have been different (infantile or heavenly life), or even hope for future days when – as

we sometimes believe – things will no longer be this way (total recovery or the ideal of a subsequent life)? In other words, how can we stop accusing the injury of constituting us and stop rejecting the trauma like a flaw that had to be overcome at all costs? If always and forever we are »traumatic beings«, should we regret this or necessarily want to dispense with it? Would accusing our being injured in the name of some past integrity not be taking the easy way out? And, conversely and maybe even more so, are we not sometimes tempted to too easily welcome or falsely desire the injury, as if living it were to convert it in a form of vulnerability that should be sought imperatively? Do we not often see injuries being »spiritualized« to the point that any scarring would become the lucky stigma of a supposedly improved life? In short, whether one rejects or claims it, is the »trauma« of love not deduced from a nature that we are no longer (integrity) or pulled toward a form that we are not yet (vulnerability) to the point that we do not see, or do not wish to see, that it directly constitutes us and makes up the brunt of our existing?

2. The dangers of the signified

Let there be no mistake about it: Invoking the »injury« or even »fragility« or »vulnerability« time and time again today frequently serves as a defence, or a leitmotif, for the body or the psyche at which one does no longer dare to look. There is quite simply a danger in wanting too quickly to *interpret* everything or in demanding too much of the act of *signifying.* By overusing hermeneutics (the art of interpreting through textuality), phenomenology (the way of signifying through intentionality) or even psychoanalysis (the hypertrophy of the signifier up to the Freudian slip), one omits the »thickness« of the body as well as the »impenetrability« of thought. From an emaciated being to an open wound, from neurosis to psychosis, trauma becomes »traumatism« not only in the way it is felt but also in the horror of that objectivity of the injured body and soul. That one still have eyes to see or ears to hear and not only interpretative patterns or meanings allowing one to make sense of things, that is the challenge at stake here regarding trauma – simultaneously through its hyper-presence and sometimes also through its function as a deterrent. »Traumatic existence« is a mode of being not to be deplored or envied, nor even to be overcome or healed, because the »there« of its being simply cannot fail to constitute me.

We should thus not transform the »trauma of love« into the »love of trauma« too quickly. Because one does not seek the injury, one lives it, simply because it is there and always remains present – and one would be lying to oneself if one believed it to be absent, be it just for one moment. The fact remains that, by imagining that it better disappear or not be there, one no longer sees how much it constitutes us, even if we live it differently or transform it. One does not heal from the injury, at most one closes it or tries to make sense of it. But the *fact that it is* always resists and can never be forgotten. Be it the memory of the body or the spirit, by way of a precipice the gulf remains forever open, ready to emerge or

reemerge. One event (illness, accident, the death of a loved one) can suffice to make us sense it again and then the worries of the past as well as the anxieties regarding the future do not stop haunting us. *Dasein* alone, or »being-there«, always subsists but this time not as an opening to the world giving it meaning (Heidegger) but as the mere fact of its »being faced with«, which is all the more insupportable in that the sole idea of carrying its burden becomes in itself unbearable. The actual trauma is not only the fact of something »hurting«, as if it were sufficient to localize the injury. The »trauma« becomes »traumatization« when it invades the entire being and thus transforms man himself into a giant wound which he will never be able to heal.

3. The original trauma

Hence *from the beginning*, and including in the Hebrew tradition, trauma or injury has been constitutive of creation: »And the Lord took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof« in order to transform it into Eve, his wife (2:22). Thus is it not that *at the beginning* (*en archê*) the trauma is there in the difference between man and woman? In reality, does Adam's »missing rib« not always remain *symbolically there* so that the wound of the torn torso will never be able to fully close? The same is at stake in the act of creating (in theology) as in that of being born (in psychoanalysis). If we stop believing wrongfully that on the day of our birth we came to the world *peacefully*, we will conversely realize and admit that any form of procreation demands an act of separation and thus the *traumatism* of lost unity, which really has no other objective than to let another or something other exist. If »giving birth« is usually a testimony to the act of loving, it will nevertheless remain burdened by a flaw or an initial injury which is not to be repaired or overcome but rather to be inhabited differently. The »gulf« or »mouth of shade« (»bouche d'ombre«, cf. Victor Hugo) through which we also have been begotten, or created, always remains, and it is by denying it that we live in the illusion of a love whose essence does not also consist in accepting to live as admittedly joint but never eradicated »solitudes«.

4. Who wants most wants least

So we are often wrong – as has already been said but should be insisted upon – by believing that we need to be loved before we can love ourselves. But maybe we fool ourselves by believing that we love or are capable of loving. Because love is neither solely received nor solely given according to a tune nonetheless constantly repeated. One can certainly open up inorder to welcome it or make an effort to dispense it but neither its force nor its virtue will ever be satisfied with the exchange of »me« for »you«. Nor could love entirely abstract from this exchange, as if it were enough to engage in it in order to spread and propagate it to all

those willing (or not) to be loved. Staying within the terms of reciprocity or, conversely, calling upon the ideal of pure gratuitousness does not say anything or enough of what the act of loving is. Or rather forgetting the »trauma« or the »initial wound« is then such that the double ideal of either »giving back« or »not giving back« wrongfully remains at the horizon of what loving should mean. Far from the utopias of love we will thus stick to the *limit* of what we are, not beings made of integrity but also people constitutively »traumatized« or »wounded«, at least in the sense of the fracture of the other through whom we are engendered. One often wants the most but it is appropriate to sometimes be content with less. Surprisingly, minimalism in matters of love has a maximal effect – or better, it is by not doing too much that one does the most and even the best.

Of course, it is no way a matter of renouncing that »more« nor of showing a whiff of pessimism which would make us believe that »loving and being loved« is not worth the effort of sharing one's life. But man and woman or, in other words, the couple is first constructed on that flaw into which it descends rather than elevating itself to the top. Trying to go up (climbing) is totally justified. But one should not forget to go down (speleology) since water sources always fall towards the bottom and it is »down below« or »at the bottom« that we find the greatest waters. Following the river thus sometimes means accepting to dive into the sea and to join the »abysses« where »groundlessness« (*abussos*) can be, if not explored, at least recognized as being there, always present and resisting, in spite of our futile attempts to forget or eliminate it. In love, just as in speleology or scuba diving, cavity expresses fullness and contains the greatest riches for those who know how to find them or at least suspect their existence. The »trauma« or wound hence becomes – and that *from the very beginning* – constitutive of love in that alone that this false ideal of integrity, which should originally have innervated our past life, will have been renounced for the time being.

5.   The act of self-differentiation

Being, as we said, neither mere vulnerability nor pure fragility, the act of loving is thus a »flaw« rather than an »opening«, a trauma (an injury as well as a wound) rather than the revelation of our own being-there (injury as gift). Sometimes in love our naïve optimism is such that we still wish to transform weakness into strength or fragility into an offering. But the experience resists such an alchemy or, at least, one does not transform asthenia into joy or powerlessness into merit that easily. There is certainly and first of all a »paralogism of force« (Nietzsche), which means that we often take as a virtue what is really only impotence or incapacity in us. By claiming weakness or praising passivity, we could be led to forget that what is at stake here is force and the necessity to fight. But conversely we would not pursue just any ideal of »great health« (again Nietzsche) either. Because, if love is not first, or at least not exclusively, vulnerability, it is not an act of »distancing oneself« and of claiming the act of existing »as such« either.

Then we could certainly also want to look for the »in-between« to satisfy us. Is the »trauma of love« not ultimately the happy medium between the claim of the powerlessness of the act of loving on the one hand (vulnerability) and the ideal of its exemption from the other (generosity)? But, as we said, by considering love as a whole one forgets and always subtracts its inner defect without every letting the latter exist »as such«. Fusion is what hides the fission inside us, whilst the dream of unity hides the urgency of difference. One does not like the other in that he is supposed to represent »my other half«, as depicted in Aristophanes' false conception in the *Symposium* (Platon), but rather in that together we are »acts of differentiating ourselves« (Hegel). Wanting to constitute a unity in order to no longer differentiate oneself is not an unrealizable dream but rather an unthinkable one. Forming »one flesh« (2:24) does not prevent us from being »two bodies«, quite the contrary.

6.   The amorous struggle

In love we will thus always be »two« and never form »one«, if in this context we understand unity as the act of merging and not that of »resisting« insofar as »being against«, or rather »being all against«, is precisely what makes one exist. The same applies to man and woman as to the struggle of Jacob with the angel: »I will not let thee go, except thou bless me.« (32:26) Pressed on the other, the sciatic nerve dismissed »at the socket of the hip«, Jacob has no other choice than to brace himself on the other. Buttress or counterforce, the other in love allows me to not fall on myself (due to lack of resistance) and prohibits me from crushing him (due to an excess of power). Not falling by remaining pressed on him and not destroying him because I do not seek to annihilate him, that is the truth of *injured life* in the traumatic sense of rupture – in this context the sciatic nerve – through which I exist only by leaning on the other according to a resistance which allows me, if not to exist, then at least to get back up thanks to him. We are never two differentiated being made to encounter one another, on the contrary, it is by meeting that we differentiate. Alterity arises neither from a separated unity nor from poles that remained alien to each other. It comes from the »struggle« or the »battle«, in the positive sense of the term, through which the trial will make both of us win.

One indeed and most often forgets the constitutive value of the »trauma of love« either because we associate the act of loving to an ideal of unity, as was already said, or because we aim for a false state of peace without seeing that »struggle« (*agon*) and not »war« (*polemos*) is that from which we are made and which makes us progress. The same that holds true for lovers also applies to sportspeople or wrestlers: They test themselves and lean on each other in order to underline their difference or to thus discover what their own existence is about. So no concurrence between the masculine and the feminine but rather the intimate conviction that one will never reach the other in the way he experiences the

world, not because of the defect that this lost unity supposedly is but in virtue of this »initial injury« or »trauma« which comes to positively constitute us. At the beginning, Eve is taken from Adam's rib (original differentiation), and at the beginning Jacob is fighting with the angel (original struggle).

7. Going through the flaw

There is, or there is thus supposed to be, a »blissful failure« of love. Not that we should praise the »misfires« or not despair of the reversal of love into hate as it often occurs when lovers separate, but the »flaw« reveals the breach through which we are to move forward. *I love you because you differ from me*. Or better, *loving is the act of differing*. In this »faith« – not solely in the love of difference but more precisely in the act of differentiating oneself by loving – there is the constitutive value of the »trauma«. Bodies never unite without injury because they will never make up a total unity which would imply the risk of no longer differentiating themselves. And they will never actually stop their struggle either, be it in order not to believe in an unduly pacified and too easily obtained togetherness.

One would have to never have experienced eros in order to believe that the union of the fleshes is simply the act of »penetrating« and not that of »resisting«. The »resistance of the flesh« of the other is what causes pleasure, which situates it far from the ideal of some form of fusion which would falsely justify it. There is indeed *tenderness* and it seeks to fully encounter the other while knowing that it will never totally succeed at it. Emmanuel Lévinas teaches us that the caress »does not know what it is looking for«, and losing oneself in this unknown is before all giving up on controlling everything. But there is also the *eros* through which bodies go »into battle«, not exclusively to unite but also to measure, or even try themselves. The *difference* that makes the »I« never a »you« – the act of differing and thus also of battling – does not equal fighting in the sense of crushing the other but of recognizing that through the other and the injury he produces in me I get to exist.

The »blissful failure« of love (the impossibility of encountering the other there and where he experiences himself) is coupled with »blissful obscurity« (the renunciation of wanting to attain the other fully in what he is, because in his difference he takes me back to what I am). The thickness of the bodies concurs with the impenetrability of the psyche. We will not experience the other in his own body any more than we will penetrate entirely the depths of his thoughts. One and the other – body and spirit – live and suffer from the very same inaccessibility, and it is by recognizing this that the trauma will cease to belong to the order of the accidental and transform into a veritable factor of our common identity. The same is at stake as with the »flaw« – for the mountaineer, of course. The cavity of the rock expresses the entire wall and that through which paradoxically it is still possible to have a grip and to go on up. The smooth spots do not allow for

a roped party and only the »rugged« makes the act of climbing still possible. The shield of habit (Péguy) or the illusion of a flawless love is the biggest danger in the act of loving. We can only climb where there are asperities and it is by recognizing them that together it is possible to rise. The »injury« in this sense is not desirable but still to be recognized as being constitutive of the act of loving. At this price, and at this price only, we might not only praise vulnerability but above all consecrate the »body-to-body« (*corps-à-corps*) and the »heart-to-heart« as the ideal places where the gulf still leaves us »gaping« insofar as it opens us to an alterity which indeed comes to »injure« us.

Translated by Natalie Eder

James Mensch

Non-Useless Suffering

Je trpljenje res nekoristno?

Abstract: What does it mean to suffer? How are we to understand the sufferings we undergo? Etymologically, to suffer signifies to undergo and endure. Is there a sense, a purpose to our sufferings or does the very passivity, which they etymologically imply, robs them of all inherent meaning? In this paper, I shall argue against this Levinasian interpretation. My claim will be that suffering, exhibits a meaning beyond meaning, one embodied in the unique singularity of our flesh. This uniqueness is, in fact, an interruption. It signifies the suspension of all systems of exchange, all attempts to render good for good and evil for evil. It is in terms of such suspension that suffering – particularly as found in selfless sacrifice – finds its »use«. This »use« involves the possibility of forgiveness.

Key words: suffering, passivity, Levinas, meaning, flesh, sacrifice, forgiveness

Povzetek: Kakšen pomen ima trpljenje? Kako naj razumemo trpljenje, ki ga prestajamo? Etimološko beseda trpljenje pomeni prestajanje in prenašanje. Ima trpljenje smisel in smoter ali pa je že trpnost (pasivnost), ki jo trpljenje etimološko vključuje, nekaj kar ga oropa vsakega inherentnega pomena? V tem članku bom ugovarjal tovrstni Levinasovi interpretaciji. Zagovarjam tezo, da trpljenje nosi pomen onkraj pomena – namreč tisti pomen, ki je utelešen v edinstveni singularnosti našega telesa. Ta edinstvenost dejansko predstavlja neko prekinitev. Označuje suspenz vseh menjalnih sistemov, vseh poskusov vračati dobro za dobro in zlo za zlo. V okvirih takšnega suspenza trpljenje, še zlasti v nesebičnem žrtvovanju, dobi »koristnost«. Takšna »koristnost« prinaša možnost odpuščanja.

Ključne besede: trpljenje, pasivnost, Levinas, pomen, telo, žrtev, odpuščanje

What does it mean to suffer? How are we to understand the sufferings we undergo? Is there a sense, a purpose to them or is the very passivity implied in the word to »suffer«, which etymologically signifies to »undergo« and »endure«, something that robs suffering of all inherent meaning? Levinas, in his article, »Useless Suffering«, argues that »intrinsically«, suffering »is useless: ›for nothing‹.« It exhibits »a depth of meaninglessness« that repeals any sense that we could attach

to it (Levinas 1998, 93). He remarks, further, that while »suffering is /.../ a datum in consciousness«, it is, nonetheless, »unassumable«. We cannot synthesize such data into a one-in-many – i.e., a common sense that would apply to them. Suffering is not simply »a symptom of the rejection« of »the synthesis of the Kantian ›I think‹«, it is »this rejection itself«. As such, it is »[t]he denial, the refusal of meaning, thrusting itself forward as a sensible quality« (91). What we experience in suffering is a pure »passivity«, one that »is not the other side of any activity«. Thus, normally, the receptivity (or passivity) of our senses »is already active reception«. The data that we receive are synthesized and are part of the active perceptual process (92). Here, however, what we experience is »the concreteness of the not /.../ a negativity extending as far as to the realm of un-meaning« (92). It is the »un-meaning«, »absurdity« of suffering that makes it intrinsically useless. (93).[1] In this paper, I shall argue against this interpretation. My claim will be that suffering, in its suspension of synthesis, exhibits a meaning beyond meaning, one embodied in the unique singularity of our flesh. This uniqueness is, in fact, an interruption. It signifies the suspension of all systems of exchange, all attempts to render good for good and evil for evil. It is in terms of such suspension that suffering – particularly as found in selfless sacrifice – finds its »use«.

1.   Suffering and Theodicy

Historically, the question of suffering is tied to theodicy. In the monotheistic religions, which see God not only as the creator, but also as the ruler of the world, the question becomes that of his tolerance of evil. Hume, in his *Dialogues*, put this in terms of a series of alternatives: »Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?« (Hume 1966, 66) Something, here, has to give. To explain evil, we seem to have to abandon God's power or his goodness or his intelligibility. The last alternative is included since, as Hans Jonas writes, »Only a completely unintelligible God can be said to be absolutely good and absolutely powerful, yet tolerate the world as it is« – the world that is marked by the frequency of suffering (Jonas 1996, 139).

The classic answer to this impasse is to understand suffering in terms of an economy or a system of exchange. Individuals within society live by exchanging goods and services. Legal systems defend the social order by imposing fines and other penalties on those who violate its rules. Here, the exchange is one of penalties for misdeeds. Given the pervasiveness of the economy in our lives, it seems natural to apply this to our relation to God. This thought, in fact, is not limited to the monotheistic creeds. Plato brings it up in a dialogue where Socrates asks a priest about the nature of piety. The priest describes it as a »care of the gods« (Euthyhro 12e). Prayer and sacrifice is what we offer to the gods; in return they

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[1]   The stress, here, is on its being intrinsically useless. Suffering does have for Levinas a non-intrinsic use in the ethical response it calls forth from others (Levinas 1998, 94).

provide us with their benefits. As Socrates sums up this position, »piety would then be a sort of trading skill between gods and men« – one involving a mutual exchange of benefits (14e). To explain suffering in such a context, one need only extend this exchange to include penalties. God not only returns good for good, but also evil for evil.

As Levinas remarks, such a view »is as old as a certain reading of the Bible. It dominated the consciousness of believers who explained their misfortunes by reference to Sin, or at least to their sins« (1998, 96). This, for example, is the view of Job's »comforters«. Job, they claim, »cheated orphaned children of their rights«. He was »led astray by riches or corrupted by fat bribes« (Jb 36,17-18).[2] This is why he suffers. God, in fact, saves the wretched »by their very wretchedness, and uses distress to open their eyes« (36,15). Job, however, insists on his innocence. God »knows that I am innocent; if he sifts me«, he asserts, »I will shine like gold« (23,10).[3] Since we do see the innocent suffer and the wicked flourish, prosperity and power cannot, he argues, be the sign of goodness (12,6; 21,7-13; 34,1-12). Neither can suffering be a penalty for evil doing. At the end of The Book of Job, God affirms that Job, unlike the comforters, has spoken »truthfully about me« (42,7). But if this is so, what sense can be made of innocent suffering? How can we understand it in terms of an economy?

One way to do so is to acknowledge that debts need not be paid by those who incurred them. A friend can pay off a friend's debt; a father can pay for his son's traffic fine. If we apply this to our commerce with God, we can see suffering as a recompense, a »payment«, by the innocent for the guilty. This seems to be the conception behind Isaiah's depiction of the »suffering servant«, who was »reckoned among transgressors« because of what he endured (Is 53,12). In fact, however, »he was pierced through for our transgressions, tortured for our iniquities«. It is, according to Isaiah, »by his scourging we are healed« (53,5). He pays our debt. In this exchange, »himself bearing the penalty of their guilt«, the servant »bore the sins of many« (53,12-13). Paul, in his Epistles, imports this view to describe the Passion. According to Paul, »God designed [Christ] to be the means of expiating sin by his sacrificial death« (Rom 4,25). Insofar as »Christ died for our sins« (1 Cor 15,3), he pays the penalty that God imposed on us. The sentiment here is the same as that of the prophets who saw the misfortunes of Israel as punishments for its sins. What Paul does is combine this view with Isaiah's conception of the suffering servant. Christ, like the servant, pays the debt. He squares our accounts with God, our creditor.

To an impartial observer, this economic view of suffering suffers from two overriding difficulties. The first is that it reifies the relation between God and mankind, making it one of debt and credit.[4] In this exchange, suffering takes on the rule of

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2 These translations from Job are taken from The Jerusalem Bible, while all the other Bible citations, if not stated otherwise, come from The New English Bible.

3 The Book of Job 1992, 59. The New English Bible translates this: »when he tests me, I prove to be gold«.

4 See, for example, Num 28,22.

a currency. Money is indifferent to those who employ it: I can pay for my meal, but you can also pay for it. It makes no difference so long as the bill is paid. Suffering, however, is the opposite of this indifference. It is always personal. At the extreme, it nails one to one's flesh, the very flesh that makes a person himself and not someone else. It is as little transferable as one's organic body. Given this, it is inherently incapable of serving as a neutral currency. The second difficulty is that it makes God, the Father, a moral monster. No moral being would treat his son that way. If I am angry at someone for something that he has done, how would it make sense to take my anger out on my son?

2.   Flesh

For Levinas and Jonas, the events of the Holocaust spell the end of this economic view of suffering. In Levinas' words, »It renders impossible and odious every proposal and every thought that would explain it by the sins of those who have suffered or are dead« (Levinas 1998, 98; see also Jonas 1996, 133). No sins could justify the atrocities the Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis. The problem, in fact, is not the imbalance. It is the very attempt to understand suffering in terms of an economy. For Derrida, in fact, the whole economic interpretation of God's relation to believers witnesses »the irreducible experience of belief, between credit and faith, the *believing* suspended between the credit [*créance*] of the creditor ([*créancier*] Gläubiger) and the credence ([croyance] Glauben) of the believer [croyant].« He asks, »How can one *believe* this history of credence or credit?« (Derrida 1995, 115)[5] If this account is unbelievable, what is the alternative? Is there sense to expiatory suffering that avoids the conception of an exchange? Is there a way to understand Christ as exemplifying the »suffering servant« without turning his Father into a moral monster?

   As Levinas correctly observes, suffering is characterized by passivity, exposure, and openness. It exhibits flesh before the syntheses of the ego, before, in fact, any expression of the self's autonomy. How can we understand the flesh that is thus regarded? One answer comes from the fact that flesh is at the basis of one's being oneself rather than another. It expresses what cannot be transferred to the Other. Such non-transferability shows itself in our organic functioning. Heidegger remarked that each of us must die our own death.[6] No one can do this for another. Death, of course, is the cessation of the functioning of our flesh. Such functioning is inherently non-substitutable. Thus, no one can eat for you, sleep for you, breathe for you, or perform for you any of your bodily functions. Now, as non-transferrable, the functioning that makes us unique is *inherently incapable of participating in an economy*. So is the suffering of the flesh that functions. This, as I indicated, is why suffering cannot act as a currency.

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5   For him, it is, in fact, part of »a history of cruelty and sacrifice« (Derrida 1995, 112).

6   »Keiner kann dem Anderen sein Sterben abnehmen.« (Heidegger 1986, 240)

The reason why we hardly ever grasp this non-transferability is that the flesh that is uniquely our own escapes all conceptualization. As unique, its ontological status is not that of being one among many possible instances, each of which is essentially substitutable for another – like, for example, apples in the store. Having many instances of this fruit, we can draw from them a number of common features and express them with common meanings. The flesh that incarnates us, however, is exhibited only in one example. It exists, not as one among many, i.e., as a countable singular, but rather as uniquely one. So regarded, it cannot be defined in Aristotle's sense. We cannot understand it in terms of species and genus. We can only directly sense it.[7] It is, in fact, inexpressible in the common meanings of our language, which, by definition, apply to more than one object. What, then, is the flesh that suffering exposes, the flesh that incarnates each of us? To borrow a term from Nietzsche, we confront here *universalia ante rem* (universals before the thing). Concepts are *universalia post rem* (universals after the thing); they are universals that we draw *after* we regard similar individuals. The flesh that each of us directly encounters is, however, *before* such individuals.[8]

3. Flesh and Forgiveness

Does this mean that we must embrace Levinas' position that suffering is intrinsically useless? Does suffering's reduction of a person to his flesh, his flesh taken as *before* the syntheses of the ego, leave us with the absurdity, the lack of sense of suffering? Is suffering, so regarded »useless – ›for nothing‹«? If we mean by »for nothing« its »economic« value, the answer is certainly affirmative. As we have seen, the senselessness of flesh is rooted in its uniqueness. It is a function of its non-substitutability, its inability to enter into any system of exchange. In fact, flesh *qua* flesh is the interruption of all systems of exchange – be they the return of goods for goods or the rendering of suffering for misdeeds.[9]

This inability to participate in an economy does not, however, imply that suffering is »useless«. *Its use is, in fact, in its interruption of the economy*. This can be put in terms of the Passion of Christ. His suffering and death on the Cross is senseless when regarded in terms of the economy. This is not simply because it has no »use« within it. It is because it exists as a denial of this economy. In fact, to claim to see God on the Cross – God in the form of suffering flesh – is to claim to regard him as outside of this economy. It is to assert that he is present as the in-

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[7]   »But when we come to the concrete thing, e.g. /.../ one of the individual circles /.../ of these there is no definition, but they are known by the aid of intuitive thinking or of perception; and when they pass out of this complete realization [of being perceived] it is not clear whether they exist or not.« (*Metaphysics* 1036a; 1941, 799)

[8]   See Nietzsche 1967, 102–3. For Nietzsche, such *universalia ante rem* are expressed »by music as the immediate language of the will« (103). For us, what they point to is the flesh that makes every living being unique.

[9]   Shakespeare indicates this inability of flesh to figure in legal exchanges through the remarks of Portia to Shylock in the *Merchant of Venice*. See Act IV, scene 1, lines 290–31.

terruption of this economy – the interruption of the very system of exchange by which Paul attempts to interpret Christ's sacrifice. The concrete expression of such an interruption is the forgiveness that Christ expresses. Regarding his crucifiers, he says, »Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing« (Lk 23,34). Forgiveness is an abandonment of the economy that exchanges evil for evil. It is outside of the system of credit and creditor that is associated with belief. A similar abandonment occurs at the end of Job, when God, having affirmed Job's words, has Job pray that his friends be forgiven for not speaking truthfully about God (Jb 42,7-9). Their error was to think of God in terms of the economy – the very economy that Job denied.

Where do we get the basis for such forgiveness? How is it possible for humans, who are enmeshed in and live from a system of exchanges with one another, to transcend the economy? An answer can be found in Abraham's pleading for the people of Sodom and Gomorrah. Again and again, he intercedes for them. He gets God to »pardon the place« if there are, first, »fifty good men in the city«, then, »forty-five«, then, »forty«, then, »thirty«, then, »twenty«, and, finally, if »ten can be found there« (Gn 18,23-33). What is striking in this pleading is Abraham's remark, »May I presume to speak to the Lord, dust and ashes that I am« (18,27-28). How is this a basis for his pleading for the city's pardon? According to Genesis, the city's sins merited its destruction. The economy of misdeed and penalty was clear. Such an economy, however, is interrupted by flesh – the very flesh that Abraham references in speaking of himself as »dust and ashes«.

This indicates that the basis for forgiveness is our flesh – the very flesh that God assumes in the Incarnation. Anselm of Canterbury, in his book, *Why God Became Man*, writes that »it is not right to cancel sin without compensation or punishment« (Bk I, ch. 12). God, having assumed flesh, takes this on for us. His suffering is sufficient to compensate for our sins.[10] The alternate view, which I am suggesting, is that God becomes man in order to interrupt this economy. His purpose is to present ourselves to ourselves apart from it.

4. Creation and Forgiveness

This presentation of ourselves as distinct from the world's economy is implicit in the creation story of Genesis. In this account, God creates the world not from some pre-existing matter, but rather *ab novo*. If we accept this, then neither God nor his action are bound by the world – since both are prior to it. Insofar Genesis asserts three times that we are created in the image of God, this, in some measure, also holds for us (Gn 1,26-27). The question this raises has long vexed theology. How are we to understand the transcendence implicit our being created in »the image and likeness« of God? Does it imply that we, like God, are somehow

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[10] This, for Anselm, does not mean that he suffers enough but only that he does enough to pay our debt. The alternative would have Christ going through unimaginable horrors during his passion.

immaterial – that we display an immunity to being determined by the world? The facts of mortality – and, more generally, of embodiment – argue against this. We share with other living creatures the pleasures and vicissitudes of flesh. Like them, we are enmeshed in the economy of the world. The very notion of metabolism (in German, *Stoffwechsel* – or exchange of material) implies such an economy. We breathe and exchange carbon dioxide for oxygen. Like the other animals, we live from the world, both conditioning and being conditioned by it. What, then, is our claim to be the image of God? In what sense do we share God's priority to the world and its economy?

An answer can be found in returning to the story of Job. At the beginning of this book, God makes a wager with Satan (the »adversary« or »accusing« angel). God praises Job as »a man of blameless and upright life« (Jb 1,8). Satan, in reply, asserts that Job's goodness is motivated by the benefits he receives in turn. He says, »Has not Job good reason to be God-fearing? Have you not hedged him round on every side with your protection, him and his family and all his possessions. Whatever he does you have blessed, and his herds have increased beyond measure.« If, however, God withdraws such benefits, »then he will curse you to your face« (1,9-11). The wager, then, is that Job's goodness is simply a function of the economy. His goodness is dependent on the benefits he receives. Insofar as his relation to God is a relation to such benefits, it is simply transactional. God accepts this wager and tells Satan, »All that he has is in your hands« (1,12). Satan, accordingly, destroys Job's wealth and family, leaving only his wife alive. Job, however, does not curse God. Rather, he proclaims, »The Lord gives and the Lord takes away; blessed be the Name of the Lord« (1,21). Satan next induces God to let him ruin Job's health. He says to God, »But stretch out your hand and touch his bone and his flesh, and see if he will not curse you to your face« (2,5). Still, however, Job retains his integrity. He does not curse God, he does not return evil for evil. Reduced to his suffering flesh, he is placed outside of the economy. The flesh that incarnates him can offer nothing to the economy. It is »useless – for nothing.« Job, however, claims, »if He sifts me, I will shine«. What shines through is the very basis for his forgiveness. The interruption of the economy, exhibited by his flesh, is also a manifestation of his transcendence as God's image.

Such transcendence does not deny, but rather is based upon the embodiment that enmeshes us in the world. The economy that reaches to the physicality of our flesh – our need for food, clothing and shelter – exceeds the sense that structures the economy's exchange. It exhibits that which transcends it. This transcendence appears in Mathew's account of those who will be admitted into Christ's kingdom when he comes in his »glory«. They are those who fed him when he was hungry, who gave him drink when he was thirsty, who clothed him when he was naked, who made him welcome when he was a stranger and visited him when he was in prison. When asked by the elect, »When did we do this?« Christ replies that it was when they did it »to one of the very least« – that is, to the hungry, the naked, the rejected of society (Mt 25,33-40, in my translation). The objects of their attentions were precisely those who had nothing to offer the exchange eco-

nomy – those who were »useless – for nothing«. Christ's presence as such is his presence as prior to the world. He exhibits his identity with God the creator in his giving himself as not being able to be given in terms of this economy – i.e., in identifying himself with the powerless, the helpless and the vulnerable.

If we accept this, then the Incarnation appears as a *kenosis*, an emptying out. In Paul's words, God, in incarnating himself, »made himself nothing, assuming the nature of a slave« (Phil 2,7). The completion of this self-emptying is Christ's appearance on the Cross. At the end of his earthly life, he appears as the wretched creature who cries out, »My God, my God, why has Thou forsaken me?« (Mt 27,46). In Christ's very nakedness and exposure, in his having absolutely nothing to offer the earthly economy, Christians are supposed to see God.[11] What they view, in fact, is his reduction to suffering flesh. This is the flesh that is uniquely singular – the flesh that is not one-among-many, but uniquely one. Christ here exhibits the singularity that all monotheistic religions claim for God. This is the singularity that we all share as God's likeness. It is the singularity that, in its interruption of every economy, opens the way for forgiveness.

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[11] To take the assertion of desertion literally, they are supposed to see God in Christ's being abandoned by God. The vision, in other words, is that of God's self-abandonment; it is one of his complete self-emptying or *kenosis*.

Erwin Dirscherl

The Ethical Significance of the Infinity and Otherness of God and the Understanding of Man as »Inspired Subject«: Emmanuel Levinas as a Challenge for Christian Theology

Etični pomen neskončnosti in drugosti Boga ter razumevanje človeka kot »navdihnjenega subjekta«: Emmanuel Levinas kot izziv za krščansko teologijo

Abstract: The thinking of E. Levinas deeply influences the actual debates in Christian systematic theology. In catholic thinking, we know the norm of the Lateran Council in 1215: You cannot discern a similarity between God and man without discerning a greater dissimilarity between them. Do we take this norm seriously in our metaphysical ontology and theology? The otherness and goodness of God is the main problem in Levinas' philosophy and with regard to the catastrophes of the two world wars and the Shoa in the twentieth century he asks, what the significance of the talking about God in present times could be. Ethics has to become the »prima philosophia« because all our thinking and acting has an ethical significance and thus we may not forget this. Therefore, infinity and otherness receive an ethical meaning and constitute our responsibility as »inspired subjects« for the whole world. In the tradition of Jewish thinking, Levinas combines the unicity of each man and the universality of human responsibility for all people. In the face of the other, who is suffering, we are confronted with the face of God himself. What can we learn from Levinas today?

Key words: Infinity of God, Otherness, Levinas, Talking about God, Ethics, Anthropology

Povzetek: Misel E. Levinasa v veliki meri zaznamuje sodobne razprave s področja krščanske dogmatične teologije. V katoliški misli poznamo določbo Lateranskega koncila (iz leta 1215), da ne moremo izraziti nobene podobnosti med Bogom in človekom, ne da bi morali ob tem priznati še večjo nepodobnost med njima. Ali to določilo v naši metafizični ontologiji in teologiji jemljemo resno? Drugost in dobrost Boga predstavlja glavni problem v Levinasovi filozofiji in z ozirom na katastrofe obeh svetovnih vojen ter holokavsta v dvajsetem stoletju se Levinas

sprašuje, kakšen pomen ima lahko govor o Bogu v sodobnem času. Etika mora postati »prva filozofija«, saj ima vse naše mišljenje in delovanje etični pomen, na katerega ne smemo pozabiti. Tako neskončnost kot drugost dobita etični pomen in vzpostavljata našo odgovornost, ki jo kot »navdihnjeni subjekti« nosimo za ves svet. Opirajoč se na tradicijo judovske misli Levinas spaja edinstvenost slehernega človeka in univerzalnost njegove odgovornosti za vse ljudi. Pred obličjem drugega, ki trpi, se nahajamo pred obličjem samega Boga. Česa se lahko naučimo od Levinasa danes?

Ključne besede: Božja neskončnost, drugačnost, Levinas, govor o Bogu, etika, antropologija

The rule of analogous talking about God, which was verbalised in the fourth Lateran Council in 1215, still has an impact on Roman Catholic theology today. »We cannot express a similarity between God and creature without mentioning an even bigger dissimilarity« (DH 806).[1] That is why in my opinion Levinas is a great thinker, who can teach us Christian theologians to take the rule above more seriously and to incorporate it to a greater extent into our day-to-day business than we sometimes manage in our field of study. How do we cope with the remaining incomprehensibility of the talking about God without jeopardising the significance of biblical speech?

1. Levinas and the question of the meaning of life: Critical thinking and responsibility in light of the problems of our time

Emmanuel Levinas' (1906–1995) thinking was strongly influenced by both world wars, Nazi-oppression, and the Shoah?, during which nearly his whole family was extinguished. Biography and thinking belong together. Due to the incomprehensible pain and the mass-murderous extermination of human life, he struggles with the questions of God, man, and the good. This illustrates that the question of theodicy is as dramatically touched as the doctrine of God, anthropology, and ethical philosophy, from a systematic theological point of view.

In the context of a post-Auschwitz theology, which cannot simply go back to day-to-day business after the catastrophe of the Shoah?, Levinas becomes a valuable and essential interlocutor. Not only was he globally received as a philosopher, but as an important advocate of Judeo-Christian dialogue. He was repeatedly invited to Rome by Pope John Paul II and Pope Francis knows about Levinas theories also through the reception of liberation theology.

Levinas was inspired by the Bible of Israel and Hebrew thought. Hebrew thought differs from Greek philosophy and its idea of an immortal soul. It deals with

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[1] »Quia inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda.« (DH 806)

temporality and physical condition of mortal human beings in an alternative approach. Levinas liked to compare both theories to Abraham and Ulysses. Abraham leaves his secure home and travels to an unknown remoteness without speculating about a return. Likewise, Ulysses leaves his home and experiences many adventures, but other than Abraham, he comes back home after every adventure. He represents the human, who is received as a self-reflective subject, which in a state of self-reflection and self-confidence manages to revert to the Self and to bundle outer influences within. Whereas, in Levinas opinion, Abraham represents the biblical anthropology, in which mankind lives through time and according to God's promise and awaits an open future, as it is promised in the book of Exodus. Levinas sees the passing away of the Self as the incarnate motion of transcendence and as a step to exceed the Self towards God and the neighbour. Mankind is »incarnate consciousness«. The body is the organ of transcendence because the flesh becomes the word whenever we share a conversation with others. Through speech we develop a true proximity between each other. I give myself to the other, I ex-pose myself to a full extent, up to a vulnerability and maybe even up to the gift of my life. The relationship to the Other gets deeply under the skin, into the heart and the conscience.

Levinas adopted the phenomenology, which he had learned from M. Heidegger and E. Husserl in Freiburg during his academic studies. His starting point were the dramatic experiences of his times and his questioning their meaning for humanity. Levinas also adopts the question of the meaning of existence by Heidegger. There are countless methods to interpret what happens between two people, but how do we determine the initial meaning? Is the meaning that we are looking for given, or does it only come about through our contemplation? The question of the origin of meaning is what connects Levinas and Husserl. Husserl used the method of reduction to answer the question of the essence of things. He also reached a conclusion about »original impression« (Ur-impression), which is present at the beginning of our experiences and which emphasises the meaning of sensuousness. Levinas talks about a fundamental passivity of mankind, which preceeds the contrast of active and passive, and he connects these thoughts with the question about the creation by God (Dirscherl 2017, 246–252).

2. The idea of the infinite ethically turned over: universal responsibility

To Levinas the idea of the infinite in metaphysics is most clearly depicted by the well-known philosopher Descartes. Descartes managed to depict the relationship between the Self and the infinite as a separation (Levinas 1987, 196). Levinas wants to attribute theoretical thinking about existence and the idea of the infinite to a significance which is not based on the light of reason, but still is not irrational and thus is ethically important, by using the phenomenological method. The idea of infinity means the separation of the Self and the Other. This separation

opens the space »between us« and symbolises a relationship of proximity in independence (1969, 103). Furthermore, it constructs the thinking and inwardness of the subject. Accordingly, this relation is characterised by asymmetry. The subject sees itself confronted with an infinity that is not only based on inner thought, but rather refers to an incarnate consciousness, which directly encounters the Other (27–28).

According to Levinas, experience only deserves its name if it exceeds our nature (1987, 185). Experience inevitably needs to lead to the Other, to transcendence (1986, 346). To encounter otherness excludes any reduction of the Other towards the Self. The idea of the infinite is the only idea which teaches us something that we do not already know.

> »The infinite *is* within us. It is not a memory. We have an experience in the only radical meaning of the word: a relationship with the outer, the Other, without being able to integrate it within the Self. The thinker, who carries the thought of the infinite, is more than just himself, and this inflation and addition does not come from within.« (1987, 197)

Levinas, nevertheless, manages to talk about experience, an experience of the Other in a sense of fundamental passivity. He talks about an experience that cannot acquire the Other and does not manage to integrate it into the horizon of consciousness. The consciousness thinks more than it can (185).

»Experience and the idea of infinite proves itself within a frame of a relationship to the Other. The idea of the infinite is a social relationship« (198). This relation means the approximation to an outer-being. Being on the outside manifests itself in a complete resistance, which the Other, in its epiphany, sets against any capability of the Self. This resistance does not take place in an abstract thinking which achieves to conquer any resistance. The epiphany of the ultimate Other is not a vision of a sensuous or intelligible form in the light of reason, but rather the »no« which is hurled at the capability of the subject.

»Its *logos* is: ›You shalt not kill!‹« (198) Levinas adopts the Decalogue, the Ten Commandments, and puts the prohibition of killing in focus. This is the ethical resistance between the Self and the Other: You will not have me at your disposal! Levinas also connects this thought with aniconism: You shall not make for yourself an idol of God and of the Other! I cannot imagine an idol of the Other because he is characterised by an incomprehensibility, which exceeds any imagination. To force the Other into an image, which I have visualised of him, forces a violence on him that robs him of his transcendence. The condition of mankind, which represents a transition from the order of being into an order beyond being is sensibility and bodiliness. It is through these that the subject can manage to be »out of itself«. Through these the subject can directly encounter the neighbour as another, from which it receives sense and meaning.

»This, which immediately makes sense, even before it is given to it, that is thy neighbor.« (281) This is where the meaning of sensuousness lies: an immediate

sense can be received through it, which cannot be constructed or deduced from a consciousness of the Self. Significance is received by the Other. The Other does not gain its meaning by the Self, but through himself, which means that he gains an underivable meaning and dignity. This is the exact meaning of the face of the Other. This face is not a phenomenon, but rather »self-importance par excellence« (282). It does neither receive its meaning through the Self, nor by a totality of sense or a system. Levinas follows the thought of unicity (unicité) radically. Every human being is unique, incomparable, individual, and indefensible. Unicity describes an inaccessible and immediate meaning of every person, which is not due to human ascription. No one can deny another's meaning and dignity, like it is the case in totalitarian systems or ideologies, which even want to decide when a human is a human and when humanness is denied. This means killing someone else. According to Levinas the importance of mankind is out of the question. The face of the Self is the source of sense. Its significance is absolute; it is detached from any attribution of meaning by the subject or a system. This cannot be without consequence for the Self and reasoning.

Ethical resistance opens the dimension of infinity, which sets bounds to the compelling imperialism of the Self, which wants to control and design everything. Ethical resistance symbolises the presence of the infinite (199). To the Self it signifies the injustice of its imperialistic thoughts towards the Other.

> »That is why the Other is not just another freedom. To know about the injustice means to have a view out of the dimension of the ideal. The Other has to be closer to God than the Self. This is by no means an invention of philosophy, but rather a given fact of moral consciousness, which could be determined as the consciousness of the priority of the Other over the Self. Well perceived justice starts with the Other.« (200)

Levinas once summarised his philosophy very simply: after you, my lady, sir. Aprés vous! The ethical relationship with the Other is the basis and not a superstructure of awareness. The Other precedes me, he is already there when I am born, and I follow him. Others have decided that I should come into existence. Even before I can reflect up it, I am confronted with the Other. That is why the idea of the infinite, in which the conscious thinks more than it actually can, cannot be understood as a matter of contemplation.

Beyond desires (besoin) like hunger and thirst, which can be met, to Levinas there also exists a desire (désir) for the absolute Other, which cannot be met. This desire is unappeasable and thus is witness to the otherness of the Other. The desired cannot be reached. The yearning is about the Other that cannot be coopt. It moves otherness into a sphere of the sublime (201). That is how free will is empowered to benevolence.

> »The structure of free-will, which transforms into *benevolence*, is no longer like the conceited and modest spontaneity of the Self and of luck, which are perceived as outer movements of existence. In relation to this a

volition which transformed into benevolence is so to speak an inversion. The life of freedom, which in itself discovered to be unjustified, the life of a freedom of heteronomy, only exists within a never-ending movement that constantly doubts itself. That is how the depth of inwardness reveals itself. The growth of high standards that I set for myself accentuates the verdict that I have to endure. This results in responsibility. The intensification of responsibility increases insistence. Within this construct, freedom does not have the last word. I never rediscover myself in loneliness, or, to put it differently, the moral consciousness is unmet, there is always a certain desire.« (205)

The subject constantly compares itself to the idea of the infinite, which doubts the self-assertion of the Self, and, thus, always feels a certain feeling of injustice and imperfection. There is a certain feeling of shame, which freedom perceives itself to be because it acts like a usurper. The substitution of freedom represents a moral life, which is bound by diachronic heteronomy. Ethical consciousness precedes freedom. Levinas interprets the dissatisfaction of moral consciousness as a contraction, as a retraction of consciousness in itself, and as a systole of the same. This insinuates the biological and biblical perception of the heart. Levinas conceives creation as a means of giving the Other space and withdrawing oneself. The movement of the idea of the infinite means contraction and this contraction is even more fundamental than the freedom, which opens the environment for it (205). God commands people by putting us in contact with people who require our action (207). This is the only fashion in which Levinas even dares to speak of mediation. Mediation implies that a free person is dedicated to their neighbour and that no one can save themselves without the help of another (2003, 66). This is precisely where Levinas draws from the biblical legacy and Jewish tradition.

3. The trace of the infinite and the human being as an image of God

The trace of God, who did not expand himself in creation but rather retreated in order to give the world its needed space, disrupts the order of the world. The mystery of transcendence and mankind evolves from this trace. This mystery is the way the ab-solute performs. The traces of God disrupt synchronisation. Also, the traces cave in the idea of the infinite as a symbol of immemorial past. Still existing questionability and mysteriousness shape the existence of humankind, which cannot explain everything in the world, but nevertheless has to act and make decisions.

To leave traces means to pass by, to decamp, to self-absolve, and to let go (1986, 357). Levinas interprets transcendence as a passing (passer), as the passing (se passer) of transcendence in an immemorial past (passé). Saying this, Levinas has the passing of God like in Pesach in mind, which the Bible talks about in Exo-

dus 33. The transcendence of God left its traces. These traces are a bond of the ab-solute Other. They imply the merging of time and space, the point where the world yields to past and future (358). Transcendence happens outside the diffe-rentiation of to be and being, as »Ille« and the third person. »Only a being that transcends the world can leave a trace.« (358)

The trace symbolises the presence of him who was not there, of something that has always past. It does not lead to the past, but it is the changing into a past, that is more distant than all the past and all the future which still belong to the presence of the Self, a changing into the past of the Other, in which eternity be-comes apparent, the absolute past, that unites all times (358). The movement of the transcendence happens in the face of the neighbour. It is through itself tran-scendence and affliction, because it is within the trace of the *illeity*. The *illeity* is the »origin« of the otherness.

The Self gets closer to the infinite by approaching a »you« that is his contem-porary. In the trace of the *illeity*, however, the you walks up to me from the depths of an uncatchable past. The Self gets closer to the infinite to the same degree as it forgets itself for the neighbour.

> »I only forget myself by breaking through the unalterable simultaneity of perception (imagination) by existing beyond my own death. I get closer to infinity by sacrificing myself. The sacrifice is the degree and the norm of the approximation. And the truth of transcendence lies in the fact that speech and action should be reconciled« (1987, 258).

The sacrifice symbolises the possibility of self-sacrifice for the Other that can lead up to giving one's own life for the others that happens between ourselves and gives us something to think about. Accordingly, Levinas can understand people's God-likeness.

> »The God who passes is not the model of which the face would be an image. To be in the image of God does not mean to be an icon of God, but to find oneself in his trace. The revealed God of our Judeo-Christian personal order itself. He shows himself only by this trace, as is said Exodus 33. To go toward Him is not to follow this trace which is not a sign; it is to go toward the others who stand in the trace of illeity.« (1986, 359)

The unevenness of the trace lies in the fact that it commends the Self in his longing for the good, for God, to the Other and thus infers a longing onto the ne-ighbour.

In the relationship to the Other, he is not established as an object, his meaning is not set up. It is a matter of the immediate contact/touch to a unicity that attains its distinction not through a system, a universality or a totality, but is attributed me-aning of its own accord. The immediacy of the contact does not imply a spatial bor-dering of one another that would be apparent to a third person, but it is the proxi-mity itself that attributes meaning of its own accord (1987, 274). Due to the proxi-

mity, the intentional turns into ethics. The ethical signifies a turn of subjectivity. The subjectivity that is open for the entities for the purpose of perception, turns back into a subjectivity that comes into contact with an ab-solute and unconceivable singularity which excludes every thematization, imagination or comparison.

»Here we have the original language, the foundation of the other languages. Where this transition of the intentional into the ethical takes place and does not cease to take place, where the approaching *breaks through* consciousness – where that happens, right there is skin and human face. The touch means tenderness and responsibility.« (275) Levinas thinks of language as a contact of incarnate subjects, in which the touch breaks through consciousness in its intentionality. Solely because of that it can be spoken of immediate proximity, that it not mediated through consciousness or its imagination or first and foremost could be set up by it. It is not surprising that Levinas refers to the immediacy of the sensual and brings it to mind as an incident of proximity. The immediacy of the sensual consists of the fact that the sensual touch in the proximity cannot be attributed to an experience of proximity. The example of the caress, becoming apparent with physical touch, without changing its meaning into an experience of caress, thus illustrates the immediacy of the proximity without intention.

»This relationship of proximity, this contact that cannot be converted into noetic-noematic structures and that already is the wherein for all transmissions of messages /… /, is the original language, language without words or sentences, pure communication.« (280) In a language understood just like that, the other immediately holds meaning, before it is given to him. The immediacy arises from the proximity that the Self is exposed to. The proximity between the separated skips consciousness – not due to a lack but due to a surplus of proximity. The surplus of proximity means that it always has an anachronistic presence in relation to consciousness. Only in hindsight we can catch the meaning of the presence that has passed just now and that we can only interpret later. Consciousness is always late when having a rendezvous with the neighbour, it chases after an absolutely elusive meaning that it has not constituted itself. The neighbour is not made to measure consciousness (282). With reference to consciousness as a passive work of time, as passivity that is more passive than all passivity – like the passivity of the creature during the Creation – Levinas ascertains that such consciousness cannot be characterised with categories of intentionality (271). It rather means that human speech occurs as proximity and touch. In the speech, the Other is not made the subject of discussion but he is approached (1981b, 61–85).

> »The speech and its logical workings were thus not rooted in the Other›s understanding but remained in his proximity. Not being able to elaborate on any subject, not splitting itself up into images, not being able to appear – the invisibility, is it due to the meaninglessness of existence or due to the surplus meaning that exceeds the meaning that obtains its light from the existence of the being?« (1987, 274)

The proximity of the other means a break in the presence, absence in the presence, a presence that cannot be envisioned as proximity of the Other who is the ab-solute, the ab-sent whom consciousness cannot envision. Here the biblical tension of God's immanence and transcendence appears. The Self cannot make up the surplus meaning of the Other, in which infinity announces itself. A relationship without simultaneity, dia-chrony (1998b, 107–108). The presence of the other receives its order from the non-place, from the absence in which the infinite advances. Its order is based on the trace of its own progress and is organised according to my love and my responsibility.

Speech stands for a sign that is given to the Other nearby. The Self itself turns into a sign (signi-fiance) for the Other. Language as fraternity means responsibility for the other and hence responsibility for what I have not committed, also for the pain and the mistakes of the others. The subject is responsible for everyone. Levinas develops a messianic conception of responsibility (1998a, 60). What someone does can be meaningful for everyone and change the world. The messianism starts with myself (Esterbauer 1996, 70–73), with me as a vulnerable human being, capable of suffering (Levinas 1992, 93). The proximity of the infinite symbolises responsibility. It symbolises endless passivity and the inability to withdraw oneself from one's responsibility and desertedness, in which infinity symbolises absence. I am subjected to the Other, an ex-posed existence. This is my election (Dausner 2016, 119–138; Dirscherl 1996, 462–480).

4.   The incarnated and inspired subject

According to Levinas the body and not consciousness turns into an organ of transcendence, the sensuousness turns into a place where meaning is received. Transcendence can only occur in the physical act and not in mere imagination. Through the body, the Self is responsible for the world, the passivity of being incarnated implies a responsibility that I am appointed to before every relationship that I can choose freely. The freedom arises from a responsibility and a choice that in a diachronic sense precedes the freedom. I cannot escape this responsibility, I cannot make excuses if the Other is commended to me and needs my help. The responsibility signifies freedom.

> »Here what is due goes beyond having but makes giving possible. This recurrence is incarnation. In it the body which makes giving possibly makes one *other* without alienating. For this other is the heart, and the goodness, of the same, the inspiration or the very psyche in the soul.« (Levinas 1981a, 109)

The words »inspiration« and »psychism« are chosen deliberately. The phenomena of air and breathing are of outstanding importance for Levinas. Phenomenologically, this, for one thing, is once again illustrated through speech. For when what is said is traced back (re-duced) to speech, what is said is thus traced back to breathing (181). The breath of speech opens me up to the Other. Speech sym-

bolises the only way in which the incarnated Self and the Other can immediately come close to each other without using violence. In Hebrew, the word »Ruah« that is often translated with »mind« actually means breath, air, or wind. Levinas adopts this biblical context. The openness of the Self for the Other signifies a relationship that does not imply to arrange oneself, but to breath. The first human being in the book of Genesis is given respiration by God, he is inspired, and transcendence takes place as de-termination (181–182). It means »To open oneself as space, to free oneself by breathing from closure in oneself« (180).

Levinas speaks of the »psychism of the soul« that is understood as the phase shifting of human identity, as the Other within me. The time in which I meet the other is expanded between the I and the Self. Time and otherness happen within me, in my dynamic identity. The »incarnated ability to benevolence« derives from the Other and »is extended to become physically tangible benevolence« (Sirovátka 2006, 197). Without this heteronomy, Levinas cannot envision freedom as responsibility. The subject is not identical to himself. The discrepancy within himself symbolises the temporal relationship to the Other that is lived in the flesh and was opened by the Other and by the infinite in an immemorial past: creation. This is how incarnate transcendence can happen for the Other in existence which implies a nuclear fusion of the Self. This, however, requires a world beyond, my inspiration through the Other. Closeness of the Other means inspiration to the end, to breathing one's last breath if death is coming. This takes a long breath, it takes great persistence. Mind signifies having the longest breath possible (Levinas 1981a, 181–182).

Within himself, deep-down, the Self is physically and placelessly exposed to this Other. According to Levinas, this exposedness at the same time signifies being appointed as a subject in freedom and responsibility. The Self's path to the Self leads through a time in which I encounter the other as someone who is destitute and challenging, whether I like it or not. The Self's immediate meaning is owed to something that is »beyond existence«, the infinity. »The glory of Infinite is the anarchic identity of the subject flushed out without being able to slip away. It is the ego led to sincerity, making signs to the other, for whom and before whom I am responsible, of this very giving of signs, that is, of this responsibility: ›here I am‹.« (144–145)

The Self's identity signifies bearing physically witness of the glory of the infinite: in-fini in the double meaning of »in the finite« and »infinite«. According to Levinas, God's revelation occurs through the person that receives it, through the inspired subject. Levinas once referred to the Gospel according to Matthew (Mt 25) to emphasise his case in the Judeo-Christian context:

> »I would say, yes, insofar as I say that the relation to the other is the beginning of the intelligible. I cannot describe the relation to God without speaking of my concern for the the other. When I speak to a Christian, I always quote Matthew 25; the relation to God is presented there as a relation to another person. It is not a metaphor: in the other, there is a real presence of God. In my relation to the other, I hear the Word of God. It is

not a metaphor; it is not only extremely important, it is literally true. I'm not saying that the other is God, but that in his or her Face I hear the Word of God.« (1998a, 109–110)

And that signifies according to Levinas' ethics: the immediate vision of the Other's epiphany, without mediation (1990, 47–48).

The dialogue with E. Levinas' thought can help theology to take the analogous talking of God, that I mentioned at the beginning of my paper, more seriously, to respect its all the more greater dissimilarity and incomprehensibility, and understand analogy as correspondence (Casper 1989, 219–223); to fulfil the word of God in the light of the Other by taking over our prophetic and messianic responsibility for the purpose of charity: Here look at me, you have got me here!

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
Luka Trebežnik

Med nihilizmom in mesijanizmom: Derridajeva filozofija religije

Derridaju nikakor ne gre za zavračanje obstoja resnice, temveč gre le za sporočilo, da ta nastopa preko razlike. Dekonstrukcija trdi, da ne obstaja zunaj teksta, kar pomeni, da ne obstaja večna resnica. Temu je tako, ker je sleherna resnica inkarnirana v jezik in pripoved. Ta Derridajeva stališča pa so v veliki meri nasprotna tradiciji, ki veruje, da se za tekstom nahaja trden in nesporen smisel. Izmed vsega slovstva je to najočitneje izraženo pri religijah, ki sprejemajo nadnaravni izvor svojih tekstov. Od to sledi, da sta dekonstrukcija in teologija izvorno nerazdružljivi.

Reinhold Esterbauer
The Flesh of Creation:
Notes on Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Telesnost stvarjenja:
Zapiski o Mauriceu Merleau-Pontyju

Abstract: Unlike Emmanuel Levinas, who rewrites the concept of creation in general and – in his sense – transfers it from ontology to ethics, Maurice Merleau-Ponty does not deal with this central Christian concept in detail. But it seems to be possible to gain important impulses for the further development of the theological idea of creation from his philosophy as well. If one conceives his concept of the *flesh* – which he develops in late philosophy – as the concept of an ontology that goes beyond traditional metaphysics, conclusions – which redefine the Christian concept of creation – can be drawn from his book »The Visible and the Invisible« as well as from his lectures on natural philosophy.

Key words: Merleau-Ponty, nature, creation, flesh, ontology.

Povzetek: Za razliko od Emmanuela Levinasa, ki na novo in celovito opredeli pojem stvarjenja ter ga v skladu s svojim pristopom prenese iz ontologije v etiko, se Maurice Merleau-Ponty s tem osrednjim krščanskim pojmom ne ukvarja podrobneje. Toda zdi se, da lahko v njegovi filozofiji najdemo pomembne spodbude za nadaljnji razvoj teološke ideje stvarjenja. Če koncept *telesa/mesa*, ki ga razvije v svojem poznem filozofskem delu (še zlasti v delu »Vidno in nevidno« ter v predavanjih o filozofiji narave), dojemamo znotraj takšne ontologije, ki gre onkraj tradicionalne metafizike, lahko potegnemo sklepe, ki na novo opredeljujejo krščansko pojmovanje stvarjenja.

Ključne besede: Merleau-Ponty, narava, stvarjenje, telesnost, ontologija.

The term of Creation is a central theological concept for the three Abrahamic religions, that is for Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Of course, »creation« has been conceived differently in the respective religions and over time. In general, on the Christian side, the *creatio ex nihilo* is distinguished from the *creatio continua*. *Creatio ex nihilo* means that God's act of creation constitutes the turn from nothing to something, although the idea of the Zimzum in Jewish thinking also addresses the problem of how something can exist except from or »within« God, provided

that He is the only and sole reality to be imagined. Despite these and other difficulties, it seems to be evident in which perspective the act of creation of God is conceived; namely as an occurrence of being. The concepts »nothing« and »something« or »being« derive from an ontological terminology. This fact is made even more explicit by the second creation concept, the *creatio continua*, essential to the Christian conception expressing God's ongoing activity, which is that God does not allow the world to revert to nothingness, but keeps it being and thereby makes sure that the world will last through time. This is again an ontological statement about God and his relation to the world. For the ontological interpretation of the concept of creation, the long tradition of philosophical theology is characteristic, as well – for example that Thomas Aquinas philosophically comprehends God as the *ipsum esse subsistens*, which is the ground of the world's existence[1], and that the question of God within philosophy is assigned to ontology.

In recent francophone phenomenology, the effort to think God »otherwise than being«[2] was made by Emmanuel Levinas who reflected creation no longer ontologically but ethically, that is, in the context of the Other and the I (Klun 2018). The connection of creator and creature as relation, due to which something is given existence, is no longer the center of attention (Levinas 1972, 120–121/74).[3] Rather, it is the person, who is under an ethical claim that emanates from the face of the *other* person and makes me permanently responsible for the other. Levinas thinks that we passively find ourselves in existence, without having caused our own existence (in an ontological sense). According to him, each person discovers furthermore an unprethinkable beginning in the face of every other human being, which cannot be grasped ontologically but has already made »me« responsible for him or her. God is not presented as the one who brings beings into existence, but as a trace in the face of the other person, which you can never capture. This situation radically transcends both phenomenology and ontology.[4]

Even if Maurice Merleau-Ponty takes an intellectual path different from Levinas', I think that a theology of creation can receive important impulses from his philosophy. That is why, in the following, I will try to take up a central idea of his late philosophy and to examine how his concept of a radicalized body-phenomenology, characterized by his concept of the *flesh*, could acquire meaning in terms of theology of creation. The frame of reference in this case remains an ontological one and is not abandoned in favor of an ethical one. However, Merleau-Ponty's

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[1] Confer STh I, 11, 4 corpus, where Thomas reflects on the unity of God and states that God is in the highest degree both being, undivided and one. He is not determined by anything outside of himself: »Est enim maxime ens, in quantum est non habens aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam, cui adveniat; sed est ipsum esse subsistens omnibus modis indeterminatum.«

[2] This is the title of Levinas' (1974) second main work: *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence*.

[3] In the following quotations the first page number is that of the English translation, the second one is that of the source text. The books of Merleau-Ponty are cited according to the abbreviation list at the end of the text.

[4] Confer Levinas (1984, 269): »La théologie traite imprudemment en termes d'ontologie l'idée du rapport entre Dieu et la créature. /.../ La notion de transcendant nous place au-delà des catégories de l'être, si les notions de totalité et d'être se recouvrent.«

conception of flesh, if one reads it ontologically, contains a break with traditional ontology insofar as reality is not seen through materiality but through corporeality. Merleau-Ponty does not put the concept of life at the center of his reflections, as Michel Henry does when he speaks of »incarnation« (Henry 2000) and he especially has an interest to re-interpret Christology. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty starts from the concept of the body, which in his late philosophy he extends to reality as a whole, by developing it to the concept of the flesh that grounds reality as a whole.

Before applying Merleau-Ponty's ontology, based on his concept of the flesh, to the Christian idea of creation and deriving implications for theology, it is essential to analyze relevant passages of »The Visible and the Invisible« and some of the lectures at the Collège de France on »The Nature«.

1. Nature and Creation

In his dispute with René Descartes, Merleau-Ponty states that the recourse to the Christian idea of the infinite, which was applied to God, has fundamentally changed the understanding of the relationship between God and nature, and thus also between God and creation. Namely, nature is split into a *natura naturans* and a *natura naturata*, so that the world (*natura naturata*) has lost the moment of the creative, which is reserved for God alone (*natura naturans*). Thus, the earth was not only godless, but also degraded to a mere product, while God was no longer found in the world, but was elevated to the sole creator (N, 10/28). As Christopher Ben Simpson rightly points out with reference to Merleau-Ponty's collection of essays with the title »Signes«, Merleau-Ponty sees the deficiency of such an idea of creation as »acosmism« (Simpson 2014, 101; 108). If creation is reduced to mere material, according to Merleau-Ponty, not only is God›s immanence in the world lacking, but also the creative power of nature. Nature is only a *natura naturata*, but not a *natura naturans* anymore.

The endeavor of Merleau-Ponty is opposed to this conception of nature, which in his opinion has been induced by the Christian idea of creation, – a philosophy of nature emanating from liveliness and »wildness«. In addition, with his concept of flesh, he highlights an ontology that recalls human corporeality and generalizes it to the flesh of reality. In this way the ontological part of the conceptual relation between nature and creation is addressed. I believe that the concept of the flesh, if it is taken ontologically, sheds new light on the question of creation. With this thesis, I follow Andreas Nordlander, who maintained »that this ›flesh‹ may be addressed as ›creation‹« (Nordlander 2011, 355), and I will try first to highlight some moments of the term *flesh* of the late philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, important for an ontology of creation.

2. Flesh as an Ontological Factor

According to Merleau-Ponty's further development of Husserl's phenomenological approach and his emphasis on corporeality the question arises if he has only exchanged the concept of consciousness with that of corporeality. But such an insinuation does wrong to Merleau-Ponty, not only because it restricts his position, but also because already in his book »Phenomenology of Perception«, he wants to parallelize the constitutional consciousness and the subject to the body and the world and not to replace it. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the reciprocity of the subject and the world by asserting:

> »The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects. / Le monde est inséparable du sujet, mais d'un sujet qui n'est rien que projet du monde, et le sujet est inséparable du monde, mais d'un monde qu'il projette lui-même.« (PP, 499–500/491)

He adds at this point that the subject, with its tendency to transcend towards the world, prefigures its form. (PP, 500/491–492)

In this period of his philosophy, Merleau-Ponty, although he imagines a unity between the I and the world, writes that the relationship is an inclined plane, since the world receives its final destination from the subject. Although he conceives the subject as bodily, Merleau-Ponty thinks that it constitutes the opposite in order to gain a relationship to it. Thus, constitution is indeed separated from the mere consciousness, because it is unthinkable without the body, but the so-conceived subject determines the world to a greater extent than it itself is determined by the world.

In his book »The Visible and the Invisible«, and in the accompanying work notes, Merleau-Ponty seeks to overcome this asymmetry. He first points out that the visible body loses its own visibility just as little as the world being seen. This may seem strange, because Merleau-Ponty assumes that the ability of seeing is part of the world non-alive, too. To illustrate this, he refers to the experience of painters. These feel, as he believes, »looked at by the things / regardé[es] par les choses«, so that »the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen / voyant et visible se réciproquent et qu'on ne sait plus qui voit et qui est vu«. (VI, 139/183)

What connects the two areas is the fact that they are both flesh. Merleau-Ponty asks rhetorically: »Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh? / Où mettre la limite du corps et du monde, puisque le monde est chair?« (VI, 138/182). This phrase means that there is an *intertwining/ entrelacs* (VI, 138/182) between the world and the subject conceived as a body. However, the boundary between them does not blur because both were composed of the same matter, which would miss not only the concept of the body but

also the concept of the world. Nor is the world simply the body of the subject. If so, corporeality would be thoroughly misunderstood. Rather, Merleau-Ponty thinks of flesh as the principle of unity not only of the consciousness and the body – so to say, not only within the ego –, but also between the subject as a body and the world. He calls this connection *chiasm*, which is characterized by the fact that the relation »to see – to be seen« is reversible (*reversibility/réversibilité*).[5]

But how is flesh, which forms the reason for the mentioned chiasm, to be recognized more exactly? Merleau-Ponty does not think of a matter-mind-dualism and, moreover, wants to overcome a substance ontology. Subjectivity and objectivity can no longer be clear because of the facts of chiasm and reversibility. They apply both to the person *and* to the world. Flesh »is not matter, is not mind, is not substance / n'est pas matière, n'est pas esprit, n'est pas substance« (VI, 139/184) – as Merleau-Ponty declares. Rather, he compares it with the concept of the *element/l'élément* of early Greek philosophy and wishes flesh to be comprehended »in the sense of a general thing / au sens d'une chose générale« (VI, 139/184), in which the perception and the perceived cannot be distinguished yet. So, flesh is not material that can be grasped empirically, but an ontological principle that logically precedes the subject-object-division. Merleau-Ponty tries to define it as »a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an ›element‹ of being. / principe incarné qui imports un style d'être partout où il s'en trouve une parcelle. La chair est en ce sens un ›élément‹ de l'Être.« (VI, 139/184)

Flesh is understood here as a principle of being that is incarnated in everything and from which the difference between perception or knowledge on the one side and reality or world on the other side exclusively arises. But as a principle it is not without purpose but indicates the way in which a difference can arise from the flesh. For being is not equal to being, but each shape of »to be« has its own *style*, which is shown and realized in the concrete differentiation of the subject-object--split. As the example of vision, which gave the title to the last book of Merleau--Ponty, shows, the visible and the invisible come together in the flesh. However, their dissociation never takes place in the same way, but always happens newly and differently, and dictates how the appearance of the visible occurs. The visible is never completely visible but remains invisible at the same time. The same thing takes place vice versa for the invisible: the visible and the invisible interpenetrate differently at any point and their relationship is never determined in the same way.

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[5] See e.g. his working notes from November 1960, where he writes: »The chiasm, reversibility: /.../ one no longer knows who speaks and who listens. Speaking-listening, seeing-being seen, perceiving-being perceived circularity (it is because of it that it seems to us that perception forms itself *in the things themselves*) – *Activity = passivity*. / Le chiasme, la réversibilité: /.../ on ne sait plus qui parle et qui écoute. Circularité parler-écouter, voir-être vu, percevoir-être perçu (c'est elle qui fait qu'il nous semble que la perception se fait *dans les choses mêmes*) – *Activité = passivité.*« (VI, 264–265/318) Similar in his notice on the 16th of November 1960: »chiasm my body – the things, realized by the doubling up of my body into inside and outside – and the doubling up of the things (their inside and their outside) / chiasme mon corps-les choses, réalisé par le dédoublement de mon corps en dedans et dehors, – et le dédoublement des choses (leur dedans et leur dehors).« (VI, 264/317)

In his late philosophy, Merleau-Ponty does not only think of perception in the context of the flesh. Flesh is not only an element of cognition but, as mentioned above, also »an ›element‹ of being / un ›élément‹ de l'être« (VI, 139/184). That means that different dualisms in the flesh find a unity principle that already contains the two sides in the form of intertwining and therefore is able to let them separate each other. This ontological principle of unity, however, is not an erratic block, but is determined by *chiasm*, *intertwining*, *being subsequent*, *duplication* and *reversibility*, that is, it is able to let differences emerge in different ways. The mode of such differentiation results in the different *style* to be, which is generated again and again.

3. Merleau-Ponty's View of Creation

Before attempting to draw some conclusions from this ontology of the flesh for a Christian understanding of creation, I would like to outline Merleau-Ponty's general criticism of the concept of creation. This will demonstrate why Merleau--Ponty rejects the ontology that, in his opinion, determines the theological concept of creation. His criticism targets primarily two points, which, he believes, are wrong. On the one hand, he dislikes the already mentioned separation between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, which René Descartes carried out and which led to the elimination of the creative element in all the created. In his lectures at the Collège de France, he speaks of the fact that nature no longer possesses any interior, but only represents the external realization of the rationality of God (N, 10/27). For Merleau-Ponty, this means that the concept of creation allows nature to be recognized as a lawful system that enables the natural sciences to be based on a deterministic conception of nature. »Nature as a system of laws renders the presence of forces interior to it superfluous; the interiority is wholly within God. / La Nature comme système de lois rend la présence de forces qui lui soient intérieures superflue; l'intériorité est toute en Dieu« (N, 10/28). That is why, according to Merleau-Ponty, the Christian conception of creation and the scientific determinism go hand in hand. According to both complementary views, nature has no creative power in it, because all of it is reserved for God. In other words: Creator is only God, not the world; and God is not in the world, but strictly separated from it. As historical evidence that this interpretation of creation met resistance even within Christianity, Merleau-Ponty refers to the French worker priests who, in his judgment, wanted to show that God cannot be positioned exclusively outside the world (N, 138/184–185).

On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty starts with his criticism of the term *contingency*. He conceives this one – as Andreas Nordlander (Nordlander 2011, 230–233) worked out – in a double sense. On the one hand, it is the *relative* contingency of the world, through which the world is open to new sense and to the appearance of hitherto unknown meaning. This *semantic* contingency is contrasted with *absolute* contingency, which the world regards as being unnecessary in its existence

and which must be understood ontologically. Merleau-Ponty correlates both forms of contingency in such a way that »an affirmation of divine creation as a response to the enigma of ontological contingency implies a denial of intra-mundane relative contingency« (231). This is because a created world for Merleau-Ponty is a determinate world in which the prevailing natural laws make it impossible to freely shape reality. Convinced, however, of the possibility of semantic creativity within the world, Merleau-Ponty, by implication, rejects the creation of the world by God. For the sake of semantic openness and freedom in the world, which cannot be described scientifically, he denies the creation of the world by God – according to Descartes' opinion, which was criticized by him.

In his inaugural lecture »Éloge de la philosophie« at the Collège de France (15th of January 1953), in which he deals with Henri de Lubac and Jacques Maritain and their Christian understanding of contingency, Merleau-Ponty introduces philosophy as a mode of thinking which must take a definite position against the theology of creation, because there, giving sense is reserved exclusively for God. The contingency of the world, and astonishment that there is anything at all, have no other importance than to deduce an eternal being from it:

> »For theology recognizes the contingence of human existence only to derive it from a necessary being, that is, to remove it. Theology makes use of philosophical wonder only for the purpose of motivating an affirmation which ends it. / Car la théologie ne constate la contingence de l'être humain que pour la dériver d'un Être nécessaire, c'est-à-dire pour s'en défaire, elle n'use de l'étonnement philosophique que pour motiver une affirmation qui le termine.« (EP, 44/53)

This strict rejection of the concept of creation stems, in particular, from the fact that Merleau-Ponty again grasps the implicit contingency as the world's determination and sees a creator God as a distraction from the creativity of the world. He contrasts the theological idea of creation with the philosophical esteem of a world that freely develops. Because of the creative dimension of reality, the contingency of the world must be recognized without misusing it for the derivation of a God of creation.

However, this view of contingency seems to have changed in »The Visible and the Invisible« and with the concept of the flesh presented there. Although Merleau-Ponty assigns the possibilities of creativity to the flesh, he also conceives it as an ontological approach. Now, *semantic* contingency no longer excludes *ontological* contingency: »In a word, what was previously absolutely contingent is now seen to be rooted in being« (Nordlander 2011, 236). As the contingency of giving sense is no longer arbitrary or totally free but is connected back to the ontological structure of the flesh, it is no longer absolutely optional or chaotic. Merleau-Ponty himself maintains in »The Visible and the Invisible« that the »The flesh (of the world or my own) is not contingency, chaos, but a texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself. / La chair (celle du monde ou la mienne) n'est pas contin-

gence, chaos, mais texture qui revient en soi et convient à soi-même.« (VI, 146/192)

Moreover, according to a note from the 17th of January 1959, he does not want to think of the infinite as an idealized infinity beyond the world, but as an openness and as the infinite of the »Lebenswelt«. The infinite is now – as he says – »meaning or reason which *are* contingency / sens ou raison qui *sont* contingence« (VI, 169/223). Contingency is no longer structurally or chaotically uncertain. Rather, it is now thought of as an ontological imprint and even identified with reason. The flesh itself has a structure that, although not determinate, provides a framework for meaning as a style and as a changing mode of being. Merleau-Ponty locates the flesh as an initial ontological determination, so to speak, between determinism and chaos, conceding the freedom of giving sense, but without allowing it to slip off into arbitrariness.

4.   Consequences for the Theology of Creation

Initially Merleau-Ponty defended contingency against the theological conception, which he thought would misunderstand the world as determinism, as completely indeterminate. Now he develops this concept in the way that the flesh and the accompanying style of being have a basal structure. On the one hand, this opens a gap recognizing that the contingent world can also be thought of as created. For the world is no longer self-determined but has ontological conditions that predetermine its evolution. On the other hand, however, the Cartesian conception of creation, according to which every creativity is to be found in God alone, is further rejected. For the world, insofar as it is grounded in the flesh, is itself, according to Merleau-Ponty, creative. By following these considerations, the following formula is no longer out of range: the »flesh as *creation* and the flesh as *creative*« (Nordlander 2011, 355) are the same.

If one admits that Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy opens the door to creation, one must concede while the concept of creation that becomes relevant now must be different from the one he criticized. Because this one separated God from the world so that the world was not given its own creative power. Finally, I would like to take up a few moments of the ideas shaped by Merleau-Ponty and to phrase some consequences for the Christian concept of creation. In doing so I am not occupied by apologetic attempts[6], but want to emphasize the innovative force of his reflections.

First of all, it has to be noticed that the concept of creation according to Merleau-Ponty would have to receive an incarnational moment.[7] This does not mean that God is separate from the world since creation is incarnated in Jesus Christ,

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[6]   This impression is made when reading Simpson (2014) and sometimes when reading Nordlander (2011). For a different criticism of Simpson see Vogelsang (2016, 162f.).

[7]   For Merleau-Ponty and the concept of incarnation in general, see Vogelsang (2016, 160–163).

and in this way He overcomes the hiatus between transcendence and immanence – even though the Second Divine Person was involved in creating the world. Rather, the incarnational element is already to be asserted *for the creation itself*. Beyond salvation history, the style of being in the world is always incarnational, that is, it is bodily. What Merleau-Ponty pointed out most prominently for human corporeality and asserted beyond Husserl's constitutional activity of consciousness, is that the concept of the flesh becomes a universally ontological determination that is a fundamental feature of every reality and *always has been*.

The flesh of the world is indeed a principle of ontological unity which already contains the difference in itself. Because the opposites in it are not »sublated« in the Hegelian sense, but intertwined and mutually interpenetrated, differences can arise which are ever new, and which allow being to be carried out differently. Being proves to be creative, because it never resembles in the repetition of its existence, but always performs differently and therefore is always new. Sense not yet known is generated again and again. The contingency of the created world does not only mean that it is possible not to be, but always to be both different and new. In this sense, according to Merleau-Ponty, creation must be reflected as incarnational.

Secondly, the time of creation is to be reconsidered – it cannot be asked further when the date of the creative act should be exactly estimated. But creation in the view of Merleau-Ponty must be thought of as *eternal*. Eternity does not mean that something lasts infinitely long, but that the world ever emerges anew from the same origin, which is not a past origin that could be historically distanced. In this sense, time is a »Stiftung«, as Merleau-Ponty maintains using a German term, which he assumes from Husserl (VI, 267–268/321). In a work note from November 1960, he explains this idea in such a way that he – like the flesh – also perceives time as a chiasm and, consequently, states: »Then past and present are *Ineinander* [sic!], each enveloping-enveloped – and that itself is the flesh. / Alors passé et présent sont *Ineinander* [sic!], chacun eveloppé-enveloppant, – et cela même est la chair.« (VI, 268/321)

With this specification of time, the everyday distinction between past and present and their outcome from the inner time consciousness is exceeded. Time is not constituted, but takes place carnally out of itself and is, so to speak, the genesis of the becoming explicit of the differences within the chiasm. The time conceived in this way prescribes a direction, which is not the time arrow, but the style of the being's self-realization. Merleau-Ponty calls this time »[e]xistential eternity / [é]ternité existentielle« (VI, 267/321). Consequently, the time of creation is existential eternity and not the time of consciousness.

Thirdly, the idea of *creatio continua* also changes with this concept of time. It no longer primarily describes that the created is kept in existence and does not fall back into nothingness. Such a view of creation would once again ascribe all activity to God, while the world remains passive. In contrast, *creatio continua* must be interpreted as the continuation of the creative action of God by the world it-

self. The created is so not only open to new meanings attributed to it from outside, but in itself there can be found a moment of freedom that generates sense and gives rise to it. The idea of *creatio continua* is no longer a matter of describing that to be is to endure within time, but that the process of creation itself determines time permanently.

That is why the adjective »creative« attains a transcendental meaning, admittedly not in the sense of Kant as a condition of the possibility of knowledge, but – in the sense of classical ontology – as a universal ontological quality which belongs to all beings. This provision does not only express that created nature does not cease to be *natura naturans*, but also asserts that reality as a whole remains creative at any time. For example, not only the emergence of new life, but also any work of art (Delcò 2013) are founded ontologically and enabled by the flesh of the world.

Finally, it should be noted that Merleau-Ponty's approach opens a third way beyond the conventional concept of creation and the theory of evolution. Merleau-Ponty criticizes not only the Christian idea of creation, but also the Theory of Evolution. He argues that Darwin eliminates the creative force of the world like a concept of creation that sees nature primarily subjected to its own laws. In his lectures on »Nature«, Merleau-Ponty refers to Darwin's findings as »[r]eturned finalism / [f]inalisme retourné«, in which the »determinations/déterminations« are »as rigorously prescribed as by finalism / aussi rigoureusement prescrites que par le finalisme« (N, 244/309). In the theory of evolution – in his opinion – there is only a »causal explanation or no explanation / explication causale *ou* pas d'explication« (N, 245/310).

Merleau-Ponty is, as he says in a work note of 1960, »not a finalist / pas finaliste« (VI, 265/318; 265/319), but he is no Darwinist either. In my opinion, he tries to understand creativity as a trans-causal event that cannot be recorded by laws – whether they are finalistic or evolutionary. The ongoing development of the world is rooted in a different ground of being, which he calls flesh. It helps that being achieves its own style, which contains a moment of freedom that neither the classical logic of creation nor Darwin's evolutionary logic can account for. The dispute between conventional creation theology and evolutionary biology is therefore idle and for nothing. What it is all about can only be rethought with the help of the ontology of the flesh.

To me, these four impulses from the late philosophy of Merleau-Ponty seem to be essential for the ongoing theory formation concerning a Christian theology of creation: (1) Creation has to be recognized as incarnational, right from the start; (2) its time property has to be conceptualized as existential eternity; (3) creativity has to be reformulated as a transcendental – in the classical sense of this term – principle of the world; (4) and, finally, the contrast between theology of creation and evolutionary biology seems to become obsolete on the basis of a new ontology of the flesh.

Perhaps Merleau-Ponty's considerations can be made useful for a new theology of creation, not for an ethical, but for an ontological one.

Abbreviations

EP – Merleau-Ponty 1953 [Éloge de la philosophie].
 N – Merleau-Ponty 1995 [*La Nature*].
PP – Merleau-Ponty 1945 [*Phenomenology de la Perception*].
VI – Merleau-Ponty 1964 [*Le Visible et l'Invisible*].

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Branko Klun, Luka Trebežnik (ur.)

Vračanje religije v postmodernem kontekstu

Zbornik želi pokazati, da religija ni izginila iz filozofije, kot so napovedovali neka-
teri razsvetljenski misleci, temveč se vanjo vrača in jo na novo vznemirja. Sicer je
to vračanje raznoliko in pogosto nekonvencionalno, vendar pa to ne zmanjšuje
njegovega pomena in s tem potrebe po dialogu med postmoderno filozofijo in
teologijo.

Luka Trebežnik
Being on the Brink of the Future: Jacques Derrida and Poetics of Waiting

Na pragu prihodnosti: Jacques Derrida in poetika čakanja

Abstract: Religious anticipations are generally manifested in the form of a messianic promise or an apocalyptic warning in a vision of impending judgment. The majority of the so-called secular philosophies mirror this kind of religious prognosis as well, sometimes resulting in a utopic or dystopic vision of the future and other times in a purely formal scheme that remains endlessly open towards the other, but practically does not offer any content at all. The future is often regarded (quasi)religiously since it cannot appear as such and become present. That is why Jacques Derrida methodically distinguishes between two modes of the future – for him, the established future (*le future*), the future of the timetables that could be represented and anticipated, belongs to the present, while the »real« future (*l'avenir*) always remains and must remain in deferral. That is the reason that he almost exclusively describes the relation of expectation towards the absent future in religious terms: promise, call, covenant, and prayer. This paper contrasts his use of a messianic vocabulary with some influential contemporary philosophers, and takes into account a linguistic background of messianic thinking.

Key words: future, anticipation, deferral, Derrida, messianism, parabolic speech

Povzetek: Religijska pričakovanja so običajno izražena v obliki mesijanskih obljub ali pa preko apokaliptičnih svaril pred bližajočo se sodbo. Tudi večina tako imenovanih sekularnih filozofij odseva tovrstna religiozna predvidevanja, včasih kot utopične ali distopične vizije sveta, drugič pa nastopajo le kot gola formalna shema, ki ostaja neskončno odprta za drugost, a ob tem ostaja praktično nedoločljiva in brez slehere vsebine. Prihodnost pogosto motrimo (kvazi)religiozno, saj ne more nastopiti kot taka in tako postati prisotna. Zato Jacques Derrida metodično razlikuje med dvema modusoma prihodnosti – zanj ustaljena prihodnost (*le future*), prihodnost urnikov, ki jo moremo reprezentirati in pričakovati, spada k sedanjosti, medtem ko »pristna« prihodnost (*l'avenir*) vselej ostaja in mora ostati v odlogu. Zato Derrida odnos pričakovanja z odsotno prihodnostjo skoraj izključno opisuje z religijskimi koncepti: obljuba, klic, zaveza

in molitev. Pričujoči članek zoperstavlja njegov mesijanski besednjak nekaterim vplivnim sodobnim filozofom in premišljuje lingvistično ozadje mesijanskega mišljenja.

Ključne besede: prihodnost, pričakovanje, odlog, Derrida, mesijanizem, parabolični govor

The striking trait of our time is a widespread conscience that the future is achieved, realized, completed and abolished. There seems to be no future (needed) anymore: all that is left is an endless present full of presence. This belief seems to be a direct negation of traditional religions, since they are formed as concrete arrangements of futural time. Nearly all religions, in essence, function as a developed relation towards what is not here (yet), what we cannot see (clearly), the unforeseen. The Jewish version of relating to the future stands out and should be recognized as a significant source of western understanding of temporality. While the influence of Jewish messianism on Marxist futurology has been well researched, we will be interested in some of the other expressions of this worldview; we'll look at the relationship with the futural in some of the other aspects of contemporary philosophy. In this regard, we'll attempt to answer the seemingly simple questions: is the future over or it has it even begun yet? And how does our common language influence those perceptions of time and veracity of the future?

1. The End of the Future?

Alain Badiou identified the previous century as the century of waiting and, in that regard, the posture of being on the lookout as its most typical artistic figure; waiting thus becomes a cardinal virtue, because it is the only existing form of intense indifference (Badiou 2007, 20–24). The previous century fetishized the idea of waiting and indecisive expectations. However, is this sentiment still relevant today, when

> »we are practically bereft of any thinking of time. For just about everyone, the day after tomorrow is abstract and the day before yesterday incomprehensible. We have entered a period of a-temporality and instantaneity; this shows the extent to which, far from being a shared individual experience, time is a construction, and even, we might argue, a political construction« (105).

The century should, therefore, be praised »for having borne the epic proposal of an integral construction of time« (106), says Badiou, talking about five-year plans that shaped the temporal vision of the Soviet regime, and regrets that this epoch of (political) time arraignments has come to an end.

Does the question of what the future holds remain a relevant philosophical topic today? In the age in which remarkable proclamations of »death of the future« have been made, the future seems to be more distant than ever. While those pro-

clamations rightly oppose the messianic character of philosophy, they too hastily discard the virtue of hope as an affirmation of what is still to come. Jacques Derrida tackled some of those afutural proclamations, notably the ones that were pronouncing the end of history, made by thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama (1992). In this context at the end of the previous century, Derrida formed the concepts of »waiting without waiting«, »messianism without religion«, and »messianic without messianism«. His insistence on the virtue of waiting (hope) and assertions that the future is always worth more were made despite the nondeterministic nature of his prognosis. He was well aware that the future could even be the worse, *arrivant*[1] could well arrive as a pure evil, but this (possibility) doesn't change the reality of hope, the future is always worth more, even though it is uncertain or better precisely because it is uncertain. The certain future is no future at all.

2.   Deferral after Deferral: Derrida's Philosophy of Time

While the future is not here, it effects as a cause of uncertainty. Derrida expresses this with one of his most beloved examples, the incessant paradoxical forming of a context:

> »A simple phrase takes its meaning from a given context, and already makes its appeal to another one in which it will be understood; but, of course, to be understood it has to transform the context in which it is inscribed. As a result, this appeal, this promise of the future, will necessarily open up the production of a new context, wherever it may happen [*arrive*]. The future *is not present*, but *there is* an opening onto it; and because *there is* a future [*il y a de l'avenir*], a context is always open. What we call opening of the context is another name for what is still to come.« (2001, 19–20)

»Still to come« is a crucial expression that translates Derrida's emphasis on the chain of the Latin word *venire*. His whole outlook on the future depends on the distinction between two modes of the future. The first one is the future (*le futur*) that will (surely) be; this future is predictable, foreseeable, this is a future of timetables. This future can be handled, controlled and programmed. But the second future (*l'avenir*), the future to come, is totally unexpectable and unpredictable. It signals the otherness of the future and the otherness of the coming *arrivant*. *L'avenir* is the future that signals the coming of the other.

From his early works onwards, Derrida's attention was devoted to the question

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[1]   »I was recently taken by this word, *arrivant,* as if its uncanniness had just arrived to me in a language in which it has nonetheless sounded very familiar to me for a long time«, writes Derrida (1993, 33). The word signifies the neutrality of the future, we do not and we cannot know any specificity about the arriving. However, we must wait nonetheless or in spite of the situation. For the unknown we must wait wholeheartedly, otherwise nothing occurs. The arrivant does not carry any identity, it is completely undetermined, its time is future. In this abstracted figure of the coming the Levinasian influences can be found. For Levinas the other comes from the sphere of absolute secrecy and therefore overwhelm us with arrival (Klun 2013, 503–504).

of the future. In his »grammatological« phase, he deconstructed the image of language as a magical device that delivers the truth. He replaced the predominant logocentric scheme with an endless movement of *différance*, a play of traces that prevents everything from being in itself. There is always a work of spatio-temporality that disables every forming of being in itself. His critique of a firmly established hierarchical relation between writing and speech results in a reversal of a saussurian theme: the signifiers never arrive at a conclusion and reconciliation in a (transcendental) signified; all they do is distinguish between themselves, endlessly differentiating, thus forming an endless chain. In this regard, he always emphasized that to deconstruct does not simply mean to destroy a certain conception but to loosen the stiff and rigid structures that bind them, to deconstruct means to give concepts a future.

Therefore, all of Derrida's main concepts figure somewhere in the future; they are never a present given, since they belong to the experience of expectation. We are dealing with the questions of limits and overcoming, the questions of temporality and extra-temporality. The impossible approach towards otherness prevents everything from being in itself, »impossible therefore calls upon a figure that resembles a structure of temporality, an instantaneous dissociation from the present, a *différance* in being with-itself of the present« (1993, 17). Nothing can be in itself, since the flow of time prevents every firm identity.

This kind of deconstructive affirmation of the future is also the central part of recent work by John Caputo. He often repeats Derrida's insistence on future as *l'avenir*, on something that has yet to come and (spectrally) appears only as an absolute heterogeneity to the present. However, for neither of them does this situation simply imply that we are powerless and incapable; the aporia is not the end of the path but the beginning. While we certainly cannot willingly realize an event or make it true, we can make ourselves available for the event; we can be true to events and for them. The event is »what is simmering in the present, but still to come«, it is a promise and a threat at the same time. Moreover, what is true must be in the future; it must have a future, and that's why we must affirm it. »To say that something is true is to say that it has a future, and for us to be in the truth is to be exposed to that future« (Caputo 2013, 75–77). The future is, therefore, precious and always worth more; it carries the truth and salvation. »We stand in the truth to the extent that we stand exposed to the event, open to what we cannot see coming, putting ourselves in question and making ready for something for which we cannot be ready« (93).

Therefore, we experience time and the future as an aporia, and Derrida even describes deconstruction as a certain aporetic experience of the impossible. The most basic question that he poses repeatedly can be expressed as: Can we experience aporia as such? Who arrives and what arrives, is it possible? The arrivant is always in arrival, therefore, never here, never present and always absent, but not quite:

> »This absolute *arrivant* as such is /.../ disarmed as a newly born child, it
> no more commands than is commanded by the memory of some origina-

ry event where the archaic is bound with the *final* extremity, with the finality par excellence of the *telos* or of the *eskhaton.* It even exceeds the order of any *determinable* promise« (Derrida 1993, 34).

The promise acts as the privileged modus for the appearance of the future, but not the determinable promise or hope, but the indeterminate one. The future as *l'avenir* is entirely outside of the imaginable horizon, cannot be expected, and must remain unexpected. No proof about the future can be attained; the undecidability is the constant mark of the unforeseen future. The future, in this sense, holds no truth; when we talk about the future, we talk on the limits of the truth and fiction, outside of truth that is (practically) embodied in the present. But faith can transgress this obstacle, because faith the truth isn't time-dependent; it isn't relative but an absolute. Faith works with »not yet« of the future and crosses it. Even though nothing is really present in fullness:

> »The to-come precedes the present, the self-presentation of the present; it is, therefore, more ›ancient‹ than the present. It thus chains itself to itself while unchaining itself at the same time; it disjoins itself, and disjoins the self that would yet join itself in this disjunction.« (2005, 37–38)

3.   Weak Messianic Power

Many commentators (Jameson, Caputo et al.) have compared and associated Derrida's concepts of waiting in the form of »messianicity without messianissm« with Walter Benjamin's messianic view of history. But this associating seems to be partially misguided, since their respective foci concern almost opposite aspects of time. While they both use the religiously connotated vocabulary, mainly the tropes belonging to the Jewish thought of the futural, they differ in their focus. Derrida, on the one hand, uses the concept of messianism for the basic rapport with the unforeseeable nature of the future, and the affirmation of what is always to come. For Derrida this appears as a necessary stance towards the otherness of time[2], which is always heterogeneous; that is why not only the future never becomes present, but the present itself remains always deferred.

Benjamin, on the other hand, forms a concept of »weak messianism«, some sort of reversed messianic power, a hope that is aimed at the past, a view of history that is completely antiteleological. This was aimed towards historicism of his time, mainly fascism, but also to some extent socialism (with its vision of hi-

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[2]   But not just the future; the present is also never here, and it always needs a supplementary time to form itself. A French linguist, Guistave Guillame called this »the operative time«, this is the time needed to form a time in our consciousness, a perception of time, that is always unperceived (as time), this time remains outside, but is at the same time necessary for the present time to exist as such. Giorgio Agamben used this notion to form a reading of Paul's messianic thought as a »time that remains« (2005). Inside the present there is always a little remainder of time, the »operative time«, time needed for forming of time. This is the impossibility of the present expressed in a psycholinguistic terms.

story as progress). His weak messianism is not concerned with future salvations but with redeeming the past.

> »The past carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to redemption. There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a *weak* Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim.« (Benjamin 2007, 254)

We are the promised ones for which our ancestors prayed, he says. He portrays this with Paul Klee's monoprint *Angelus novus,* a picture of an angel of history that is looking back at a pile of catastrophes.[3] The concept of the messianic, therefore, doesn't involve faith in future salvation, since primarily it doesn't even concern the future. This is, therefore, the opposite of Derrida's notion of the messianic without messianism, who even to an even greater extent than Benjamin refuses to give a detailed and certain content to the messianic promise, for him such content would dismantle the promise of the future itself. The messianism for Derrida, therefore, isn't a matter of the future or the past, since »The time is out of joint«, as we can hear Hamlet say. »To affirm the coming of the event, its future-to-come /.../ all of this can be thought /.../ only in a dislocated time of the present, at the joining of the radically disjointed time, without certain conjunction« (Derrida 1994, 17–18). The event is what we justifiably call »the impossible«; it cannot occur, because the conditions of possibility coincide with the conditions of impossibility; thus, it is paradoxical and self-preventing.

4. Endless (Jewish) Waiting

This passion for the secret and the future seems to be an echo of a Jewish messianism. In this regard, Derrida, just like Benjamin, surely fits in the family of Jewish intellectuals, so-called »cultural Jews«. Robert Gibbs writes about this topic and lists five specifics of Jewish philosophy. They are certainly interesting and although we could easily find exceptions for all lists of this kind, it holds a few interesting accents. For all »Jewish« philosophers:

> »(1.) Truth is in the (messianic) future. (2.) The present is not true nor just. (3.) The past was not true, not the way it had to be nor the way it should have been. (4.) Messianic hope makes us criticize the present and the past.

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[3] »A Klee painting named ›Angelus Novus‹ shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.« (Benjamin 2007, 257–258)

(5.) The study of the past, therefore, exposes the falsity of the present, and in particular, the false sense of limitations for change, for the chance of justice«. (Gibbs 2001, 120)

The listed facets are in line with the thinking of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Professor of Jewish history, who distinguishes Judaism (*judaïsme*) and Jewishness (*judéité*). This is the difference between culture, religion, and nationality on the one hand (*judaïsme*) and the Jewish essence, which is independent of Judaism and can exist independently of it, on the other (*judéité*). Judaism is timely; Jewishness is timeless. According to Yerushalmi's book on Judaism and Freud (1993), Jewishness does not even depend on the belief in God. What is essential is the experience of the future, opening up a relationship with the future. The Jew not only has the hope of the future but also the expectation of a forthcoming hope for the future. Freud's suppression of this is, therefore, says Yerushalmi, more anti-Jewish than his non-belief in God. Anti-Jewishness is nothing else than not believing in the future. The experience of the future-related promise and the obligation of memory linked to the past are not separated in Judaism; one is justified by another.

There is a deep underlying awareness of the fact that the messianicity always remains merely a promise that cannot be fulfilled running through the whole Jewish tradition. The realization of endless deferral of Parousia seems to be the main feature of Jewish version of secularization. Derrida uses those frameworks to describe the concept of chosenness; for him, it simply represents the future or more precisely a reminder of the future. The Jewishness is marked by:

> »the absolute privilege, the absolute uniqueness in the experience of the promise (the future) and the injunction of memory (the past) /.../ the law has already presented and *inscribed* itself in the historical memory as an injunction of memory, with or without substrate, that the two absolute privileges are bound the one to the other. As if God only inscribed one thing in the memory of a *single people* and *entire people*: in the future, remember to remember the future.« (Derrida 1998, 76)

Remembering the future is an enormous task: the task of forming a language capable of futural expressions, the task of opening a poetical sphere of existence.[4]

5.　Parables of the Future

Nietzsche famously declared that we would not get rid of God as long as we have a belief in grammar (2005, 170). It is not difficult to notice the theological foun-

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[4]　We should mention the privileged place that modus of waiting holds in some of Heidegger's writings. He, for example, closely links waiting and *Gelassenheit*. But contrary to Derrida, who tries to present waiting as a joyful task, Heidegger describes the pure experience of time as fundamental boredom; he compares it with waiting for a train at the small deserted train station; he pictures an emptied scene of being forced to wait and do nothing else. (Heidegger 1995, 93–115)

dations of our verbal relating towards the elusive reality, of our symbolization of an eluding event. There is a glimpse of hope incarnated in the way we form our sentences; they are oriented towards the future. Nevertheless, the question remains: what is the most appropriate form to express a forthcoming event; how can we talk about the future? How should our language express our status of the ones who are awaiting; what is the proper literary form?

The New Testament is a union of Greek rhetoric and Jewish temporal thought. As such, it gives rise for a plethora of great new rhetorical devices. The closest to the discourse we seek seems to be a parabolic way of presenting the unpresentable. To illustrate it better we will conceptually simplify it and oppose it to the kerygmatic teachings about the future. Parabolic allusions (as can also be found in Hebrew genre Mashal, an allegory) are the tremendous futural proclamations and the primary way of presenting the mystery of the Kingdom of God in the gospels. The time of the kerygmatic way of describing an event (for example, theological teachings of St. Paul) is now (present), while parables (for example the one by Jesus) describe infinitely later (future). This is because theological kerygmatic language always appears after the event, *post festum*, and parabolic language appears before, *ante festum*. Kerygma is a talk that deals with teachings, the parables with paradoxes, the eschatology is the mode of the former, while the latter performs a form of messianicity; the first one uses relatively clear, syllogistic propositions and logical language, while the second uses wild metaphoric expressions.

A parable, Ricoeur (2003) tells us, is a metaphorical process worked into a narrative form. As such, it offers new possibilities for a post-metaphysical expression of transcendence (Vodičar 2017). A parabolic metaphor, in the strangeness of its plot, institutes a shock that re-describes reality and opens for us a new way of seeing and being. The Kingdom of God is not »what happens« in the story but how we do not understand it: a misunderstanding that the parables provoke despite the completely coherent narrative. What happens, despite its everyday setting and circumstances, is not understandable; despite the perfect intelligibility, the parable brings only confusion. Even more, it is »extravagant«. This form of metaphorical process opens an otherwise matter-of-fact situation to an open range of interpretations and to the possibility of new commitments.

However, parables do not exist solely as a biblical genre; modern literature is obsessed with them, as we saw from diagnosis set by Badiou, the previous century was a century of the poetics of waiting, and the poetics of threshold. The completely new theatrical genre – a theater of waiting – did emerge; the threshold was the locus of the song, and the poetics were aimed at the ever-distant future. Why does this phenomenon called »poetics of waiting«, a renewed Jewish forming of future as an endless play of differences, appeal to modern man? The answer must be the parabolic logic inherent to the language. Derrida famously said about Kafka that his writings evoke more of the coming and futural [*fait surgir plus d'avenir*] (Derrida 2007, 34) than any other. This is the form of a parable, which perfectly reflects the parabolic nature of language. It hides more than it reveals; it brings

questions and confusion. Kafka's[5] *Parabeln und Paradoxe* are opening the doors of the future in such a way that we have to constantly ask ourselves if we heard correctly, since the parabolic language functions as hinting, and not claiming,

> »it is not even excluded that no one, no One, nobody, ever called any One, any unique one, anybody. The possibility of an originary misunderstanding in destination is not an evil, it is the structure, perhaps the very vocation of any call worthy of that name, of all nomination, of all response and responsibility.« (34)

This is worth emphasizing again: the unpredictability of the future for Derrida doesn't cause the paralysis of praxis; it even acts as a source of ethical demand.

All that remains is, therefore, a bare hope, stripped of every knowledge. This is the demarcation line between messianic and apocalyptic speech, while the latter knows much, in some cases even the date, it works as an unveiling, removing of the veil (Derrida 1984; Cixous & Derrida 2002), the former stays completely in the dark. Derrida is, therefore, quite compatible with Jewish revelation, although his expectation remains even more emptied of almost any determination. Jews regard themselves as the ones whose job is to prepare the path. The history of Jewish messianic hopes is a history that is full of confusion and disappointments. That is why they often regard their vocation as a tragic awareness that nothing is going to come. Derrida does not form a messianism, but only a messainicity without messianism. The messianic is anterior to each and every concrete messianism; as such it is even beyond deconstruction. The messianicity is an experience of the future, as such. This stance consists of affirming the promise without the content (the promised), the promise that is structurally inherent in language. For Derrida, the forthcoming justice remains impossible; the promise is the true sign of heterogeneity of the present that cannot be presented. This is clearly not in line with the orthodox Jewish stance on revelation, but he is near proximity to Maurice's Blanchot's *Writing of disaster,* one of the truly futural expressions of the previous century, in it we can find an amazing interpretation of the messianic essence as a nonoccurrence. The future is here but cannot be accepted as such; the same can be said for the present. When the Messiah arrives at the gates of Rome among the beggars and lepers, he is recognized (despite being incognito) and asked »›When will you come?‹ His being there is, then, not the coming« (Blanchot 1995, 141–142). The Messiah guarantees nothing with his presence; the fact that he came and will come guarantees no presence whatsoever; it brings only the future. And the Messiah's answer backed up with an authority of a presence, »Look at me, I did come today«, cannot negate the obligation to wait and await. According to Blanchot, awaiting

> »is not related to the future any more than it is related to an inaccessible past — is also the awaiting of awaiting, which does not situate us in a pre-

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[5]　Regarding the short story *Before the Law* Derrida remarks,that with its possibility that there will always be other doorkeepers represents a perfect literary metaphor for the infinity of *différance* (1992, 211).

sent, for ›I‹ have always already awaited what I will always wait for: the immemorable, the unknown which has no present, and which I can no more remember than I can know whether I am not forgetting the future — the future being, my relation with what, in what is coming, does not come and thus does not present, or re-present itself.« (117)

To exist is to await (for the conclusion of existence, if nothing else), and that is why to exist poetically means to refer to the existence in the futural form: the impossible task to project ourselves therefore always remains ahead of us.

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Christian Rößner

Mysticism instead of Metaphysics: Marion's Phenomenology of Revelation

Mistika namesto metafizike: Marionova fenomenologija razodetja

Abstract: In a dense and important text that has recently been published in the Vienna Yearbook for Philosophy, Jean-Luc Marion treats the topic of the complex relationship between phenomenology and theology by inquiring into the philosophical status of mysticism. Whereas the concept and meaning of the mystical commonly have become problematic and suspicious, Christian faith remains based on the »revelation of the mustêrion« (Rom 16, 25). If, in this sense, theology is always already a mystical one, it has to take into account the specific phenomenality of such a manifestation of the mystery the Bible is testifying. By learning from phenomenology to better see what there is being given, theology can help phenomenology to become clear-eyed and to be no longer blinkered by transcendental restrictions of classical apriori-metaphysics.

Key words: mysticism, metaphysics, phenomenology, revelation, God

Povzetek: V zgoščenem in pomembnem članku, ki je nedavno izšel v *Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie*, Jean-Luc Marion obravnava področje kompleksnega odnosa med fenomenologijo in teologijo skozi raziskovanje filozofskega statusa mistike. Medtem ko sta v splošnem pojem in pomen mističnega postala problematična in sumljiva, pa krščanska vera ostaja utemeljena v »razodetju skrivnosti (mysterion)« (Rim 16,25). Če je v tem smislu teologija že vedno mistična, mora upoštevati specifično pojavnost (fenomenalnost) takšnega razodevanja skrivnosti, o kateri priča Sveto Pismo. Teologija se od fenomenologije uči bolje videti to, kar se daje, s svoje strani pa fenomenologiji pomaga, da ta razširi svoj pogled in se ne pusti utesnjevati skozi transcendentalne omejitve klasične apriorne metafizike.

Ključne besede: mistika, metafizika, fenomenologija, razodetje, Bog

The classical form of philosophical thinking about God is called metaphysics, so that the concept of metaphysics seems to be coextensive with the concept of philosophical theology. The question is if this classical form is the only one, the

only possible and hence necessary form of thinking of and about God or the Divine: Do we have to do metaphysics when we think of and about God?[1] Or can the *Λόγος*, that for Christian thinking is God himself, be rationally expressed not in the logic of metaphysical theo*logy* but in a kind of post- or nonmetaphysical *theo*-logy which would be no longer dependent upon metaphysics and its philosophical presumptions and pretentions.[2]

To answer that question a precise definition of metaphysics is needed. Understood in the broadest sense of the word, metaphysics is concerned with everything that cannot be taken up in physics. Metaphysics in this widest and vaguest, *post*- or even *trans*physical sense means precisely the supernatural, what is above, beyond or behind physical nature, τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (Heidegger 1983, 36–87; Tengelyi 2014, 29–45). In this supersensory sense every philosophy that is not identic with natural science and therefore transcending strictly empirical knowledge is metaphysical by itself, by its transnatural nature. And insofar as God is not part of that nature to which we have an experimental access, every thinking of and about the Divine is metaphysical by being an intellectual access to the transcendent.

But beside this generic definition, that is far too unspecified, there is another definition of metaphysics that is much stricter and much more helpful to better understand and interpret the tradition and history of philosophical thinking (Marion 1983; 2001, 217). Already in Aristotle the πρώτη φιλοσοφία that became used to be called metaphysics later, is concerned not only with everything that there is and insofar as it is – τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν – but as well with its principles and the highest causes of being. By inquiring into the most universal aspects and structures of being as such and in general, metaphysics is also thinking an eminent and specified being that is, but *par excellence*. This indissoluble entanglement of the most universal – *metaphysica generalis* or ontology – and its highest unity – *metaphysica specialis* or philosophical theology – can be summed up with Rémi Brague and Jean-François Courtine who have established the notion of a *katholou-protologic structure* of Aristotelian metaphysics (Brague 1988; 110; 194; 271; 391; 513–515; Courtine 2003, 192–194; see also Tengelyi 2014, 46–83). As a typological feature this interdependency of ontology and theology has been continued by medieval scholasticism and modern rationalism, despite the crisis of metaphysics that is marked by Kantian criticism, calling into question precisely the possibility of metaphysics as rational science. From Kant to Levinas the word, term and notion of metaphysics kept a certain ambiguity (Levinas 1972, 76; 1984, 18–19; Rößner 2018a, 95–97; 130–131), where a kind of pre-critic or old-fashioned metaphysics is criticised by a new form of critical or ethical metaphysics still to come. But it was Heidegger in *Identity and Difference* who made the attempt to under-

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[1] For the question: »Does Christianity Need Metaphysics?« see the instructive symposium with Rémi Brague & Jean-Luc Marion, held November 6, 2014, at the Lumen Christi Institute, University of Chicago (accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xlan-yjUcxA).

[2] Marion 1982, 197: »La théologie ne peut accéder à son statut authentiquement *théo*logique, que si elle ne cesse de se défaire de toute théo*logie*.«

stand the intrinsic affiliation of ontology and theology or »theio-logy«[3] in classical metaphysics, where being always already appears as a cause or ground:

> »Because Being appears as ground, beings are what is grounded; the highest being, however, is what accounts in the sense of giving the first cause. When metaphysics thinks of beings with respect to the ground that is common to all beings as such, then it is logic as onto-logic. When metaphysics thinks of beings as such as a whole, that is, with respect to the highest being which accounts for everything, then it is logic as theo-logic.« (Heidegger 2002, 70–71)[4]

It is not the least merit of Jean-Luc Marion to have taken up this famous Heideggerian thesis of *the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics* as a historian of early-modern philosophy: As a hermeneutical principle Marion made Heidegger's insight into the onto-theological character of occidental thought fruitful for a differentiated re-reading of canonical texts and authors as Descartes first of all in whose work Marion analysed *the metaphysical prism* (Marion 1986a). But insofar as Marion is not only an eminent historian of Cartesian thought, but himself a thinker who is theologically ambitious and inspired by phenomenology, there is still another question that is posed in this connexion by Heidegger: »Someone who has experienced theology in his own roots, both the theology of the Christian faith and that of philosophy, would today rather remain silent about God when he is speaking in the realm of thinking.« (Heidegger 2002, 54–55)[5]

The onto-theo-logical character of metaphysics has become highly questionable, for Heidegger as well as for Marion. Whereas the former accuses metaphysics of a misjudgement of the ontological difference, Marion is a disciple of Levinas in accusing onto-theology of another misjudgement: the metaphysical concept of God as *causa sui* implies a kind of ontological contamination of God.[6] The problem of onto-theological metaphysics is not to think unreasonably about being, but to think unreasonably, that is: all too reasonably about God. Metaphysics is very well able to establish a supreme principle, a first cause, a last *telos*, that at the end of the *quinque viae* of Saint Thomas Aquinas everybody was used to call God. But that by the means of metaphysics we can identify the highest point in which all lines of our thinking consequently converge, does not mean by itself, that this po-

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[3]   Heidegger 1977b, 195: »Theologie«.

[4]   Heidegger 2006, 76: »Weil Sein als Grund erscheint, ist das Seiende das Gegründete, das höchste Seiende aber das Begründende im Sinne der ersten Ursache. Denkt die Metaphysik das Seiende im Hinblick auf seinen jedem Seienden als solchem gemeinsamen Grund, dann ist sie Logik als Onto-Logik. Denkt die Metaphysik das Seiende als solches im Ganzen, d. h. im Hinblick auf das höchste, alles begründende Seiende, dann ist sie Logik als Theo-Logik«; see also Gondek and Tengelyi 2011, 353–357.

[5]   Heidegger 2006, 63: »Wer die Theologie, sowohl diejenige des christlichen Glaubens als auch diejenige der Philosophie, aus gewachsener Herkunft erfahren hat, zieht es heute vor, im Bereich des Denkens von Gott zu schweigen.«

[6]   Levinas 1974, x: »Mais *entendre un Dieu non contaminé par l'être*, est une possibilité humaine non moins importante et non moins précaire que de *tirer l'être de l'oubli* où il serait tombé dans la métaphysique et dans l›ontothéologie.« see also Rößner 2018b.

int that is necessary for our finite reason and made possible by this very reason, is identic with the point where God the Infinite comes to our finite minds. It is the job of metaphysics and onto-theology to identify among all the beings one being that perfectly fits the requirements of a supreme principle or transcendental ideal and therefore could be called God. But that so-called God is logically a God of our own graces! When God is thought by the ways and means of onto-theology, then we think the highest possible vertex that crowns, and by crowning supports, the round arch of reasoning. The Quasi-God of metaphysics is and cannot be unconditioned, because he is subject to the conditions of possibility our reason is stipulating for its highest, highest possible principle. So, if God as God is what is absolutely unconditioned, He cannot be transcendentally conditioned by conditions of possibility. We have to decide: when we want to save the absoluteness of God who is sovereign and does not accept any conditions a conditioned and finite reason is dictating, then God is no more possible. No more possible in the strict sense and definition of metaphysical possibility: A self-revealing God, who comes to mind, but from the outside of the mind, who gives himself, but by himself, is not and cannot be the proven or postulated God of metaphysics. If God is really God and not an idea, ideal or idol of thought, He will always and exactly be the one who, in this well-understood sense, is impossible, that means: impossible for us, for our capacities of thought (Marion 2004; 2006; 2010a; 2010b). *Si comprehendis*, said Saint Augustine (*Sermon* 117), whatever you comprehend within the reach of reason, *non est Deus* (Marion 2008, 392; Grondin 2017, 2). It is not God, because only God Himself can decide and say if His modesty is katabatically or kenotically humble enough to take the seat and place metaphysics has reserved for Him. Metaphysics is the way to think God as possible. But no being here on earth is qualified to define what is possible for God and what it is not. You would have to be God to be able to say that something is impossible for Him. God does not have to respect the conditions of possibility all our possible thinking about God naturally has to respect. God is not necessarily what appears to us to be that what could be called God. So, God is impossible for us because, par definition, nothing is impossible for Him (Lk 1, 37; see Marion 1989 and Marion 2018a, 91). God is greater than the heart (1 Jn 3, 20), greater than the mind, greater than the largest concept, even that of being (Marion 2018a, 83). That is not to say that God is not, but that when we think about God we strictly think about the Unthinkable.

The necessary failure of the possibilities of onto-theological metaphysics in the face of the auto-manifestation of a self-revealing God marks the starting point where Marion's philosophy of religion commences, beginning with *Idol and Distance* and *God without Being*. In the frame of this paper Marion's rich and original thought cannot be expounded, so that it is advisable to give a short presentation of a text that has recently been published in the *Vienna Yearbook of Philosophy* (Marion 2018a). In this dense and important essay Marion presents mysticism as an alternative to metaphysics.[7]

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[7] The presentation of this paper paraphrases Marion's argumentation.

Whereas the concept and meaning of the mystical commonly are considered problematic and suspicious, Christian faith remains based on the »revelation of the *mustêrion*« (Rom 16, 25). To Christian faith and to Christian theology »it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven« (Mt 13, 11). But if, in this sense, theology must become the mystical one it always already is, theology has to take into account the specific phenomenality of such a manifestation of the mystery the Bible is testifying (Marion 2018a, 73–74).

For a first determination of the mystical a famous sentence of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (6.522) is to be remembered: »There is indeed the inexpressible. It manifests itself. It is the mystical«[8]. Whereas common sense insists that the inexpressible that cannot be put into words cannot become visible either, Wittgenstein points out that there are things that cannot be said, but shown, insofar as they show themselves by, in and from themselves. The problem of the mystical is not that in mystical language we speak without saying anything, but on the contrary that we are not capable to adequately say, express and put into words what nevertheless does not stop to show and manifest itself by, in and from itself. Mystical experience makes no illusions, it has no voice to adequately articulate what it sees show itself. If theology as well has to speak and think about things that are actually unspeakable and unthinkable, because they can be seen for now only darkly as reflections in a mirror (1 Cor 13, 12), theology is inevitable on the border to the mystical and must meditate the phenomenal setting of what manifests itself without being expressible and what appears without being illusion or a mere apparition (Marion 2018a, 74–75).

Now there is a philosophical enterprise whose concern is precisely to reveal the invisible and that is phenomenology. To quote the famous paragraph 7 of *Being and Time*:

> »What is it that phenomenology is to ›let us see‹? What is it that must be called a ›phenomenon‹ in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence is *necessarily* the theme whenever we exhibit something *explicitly*? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does *not* show itself at all: it is something that lies *hidden*, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground.« (Heidegger 1962, 59)[9]

Even if Heidegger probably does not have in mind the problem of the mystical,

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[8]   Wittgenstein 1984, 85: »Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies *zeigt* sich, es ist das Mystische«.

[9]   Heidegger 1977a, 35: »Was ist das, was die Phänomenologie ›sehen lassen‹ soll? Was ist es, was in einem ausgezeichneten Sinne ›Phänomen‹ genannt werden muss? Was ist seinem Wesen nach *notwendig* Thema einer *ausdrücklichen* Aufweisung? Offenbar solches, was sich zunächst und zumeist gerade *nicht* zeigt, was gegenüber dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, *verborgen* ist, aber zugleich etwas ist, was wesenhaft zu dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, gehört, so zwar, dass es seinen Sinn und Grund ausmacht.«

his classic definition of phenomenality shares its paradox: to think what shows itself requires also thinking what does not show itself but is constitutive for everything that shows itself. To gain the visible, phenomenology has to get involved in that invisible which constitutes all visibility. That is why the unspeakable we cannot talk about requires much more than our silence (Marion 2018a, 76).

The consequence of this is not that theology has just to adopt the methods of phenomenological philosophy. On the contrary, Marion quotes Heidegger, for whom »the concept of a Catholic phenomenology is even more absurd than the concept of a Protestant mathematics« (Heidegger 1982, 20; see also Marion 2018a, 76)[10]. When they get into touch with theology, philosophy and phenomenology must stay true to their own rules of which methodological atheism is the most important. For Husserl the transcendental reduction that is practised by phenomenology implies the suspension of all transcendence, of the »horizontal transcendence« of the mundane object as well as of the »vertical transcendence« of a God who is cause and ground of the world and all its objects. God is not part and no possible theme of phenomenology, because God does not appear in the immanence of phenomenal consciousness (Marion 2018a, 78–79).

To skip other difficulties that deal with the deeply problematic character of our access both to the objective world and to the non-representational Other, it seems to have to be stated that we face a multiple blockade that stems from the transcendental character of egoity and does not allow any access precisely to the three main domains theology is concerned with: God as self-revealing Creator, the created world as »book of nature« written by God, and the social world of creatures living a non-solipsistic life (79–80).

Marion's phenomenology does not give up the Husserlian principle of methodological atheism. But there is a change or shift in phenomenology itself that does not result from any »theological turn« (Janicaud 1991) of phenomenology. It is not a kind of ideological takeover of phenomenology by theology, but rather a nearly involuntary and spontaneous self-development of phenomenology which begins to extend over areas of thought that traditionally refer to theology. These advances and attempts of a revised and renewed phenomenology can be summarized with Marion formulating as new principle that there is the more givenness the more there is reduction (Marion 2018a, 82). If we want to take serious the Heideggerian definition of the phenomenon as that which shows itself in, by and from itself, and if we accept that doing phenomenology means ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα: »to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself« (Heidegger 1962, 58; also Marion 2018a, 81)[11], then we have to further investigate in this self of the phenomenon. The self of the phenomenon manifests itself from itself: καθ᾽ αὐτό. But what manifests itself shows itself from

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[10] Heidegger 1975, 28: »Der Begriff einer katholischen Phänomenologie ist jedoch noch widersinniger als der Begriff einer protestantischen Mathematik«.

[11] Heidegger 1977a, 34: »Das, was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen«.

itself only in the exact measure as it gives itself. That something shows itself is only possible if it first gives itself. »Everything that shows itself gives itself, even though not everything that gives itself shows itself« (Marion 2018a, 82).

This Marionian development of phenomenology that prioritizes the donation of givenness implies an understanding of reduction that does no more block methodologically all access to transcendence. When transcendence comes to mind by giving itself, phenomenology has to open or widen the eyes without contradicting the methodological atheism which attached the legitimacy of appearance to the degree of phenomenal givenness.

This first and basic development is accompanied by at least two corollaries (82–83): first, when phenomenological reduction is carried out in accordance to the criteria of givenness, then there is no need to directly link the phenomenological enterprise with ontical or ontological questions (82). Insofar as phenomenology enters the heritage of metaphysics, (the question of) God is cleared and liberated from any onto-theological constrictions. The second consequence consists in the refusal of every identification of phenomenality and objectity. A phenomenon that shows itself only insofar as it gives itself appears much more as an incidental occurrence that is just happening and as a brute fact than as a permanently subsistent object. Instead of the Kantian differentiation of all objects into *phaenomena* and *noumena* we have to differentiate between those (poor) phenomena that appear as mere objects, and those (rich or saturated) phenomena that manifest themselves as true and unpredictable events. Such an *evenemential* transformation of phenomenology entails a new understanding of possibility: the possible is no more that which does not contradict its transcendental conditions and can therefore be anticipated by the constituting synthesis of the subject to which it remains subjected, but rather the opposite, that is: what remains impossible for us insofar as it is an event that is not impossible in itself, but precisely in its evenemential character something absolutely unexpected and surprising (Serban 2016) that can neither be anticipated nor represented in the presence of our mind and consciousness (Marion 2018a, 83).

From these deep Marionian modifications of the original notions of phenomenology two figures emerge: the saturated phenomenon and the successor of the former transcendental subject that Marion calls the *adonné* and who is both: gifted and giving himself. Without explaining in the frame of this paper these rich and complex figures in further detail (84–88), the point of convergence shall finally be sketched where a phenomenology that is reformed in the sense of the primacy of the given over objects being given, may meet mystical theology.

Theology has always been based on the terms and current concepts of each epoch, but with the aim of better responding and corresponding to what theology is all about. Among these terms and concepts, special consideration traditionally has been given to the term and concept of being in the sense of metaphysics. But if and because Christian theology is and remains centered around the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ, it must be taken into account that this reve-

lation is treated in the Bible as an affair of divine self-manifestation, that is: as donation and givenness. In this sense, the biblical character of revelation is radically phenomenal. The terms and concepts theology may use to speak about a revelation that is the event of all events, do not have primarily to respond and correspond to mere objects, but to that over-saturated phenomenon, to that paradox of paradoxes that is absolutely impossible for us (88).

If this phenomenologically evenemential character of the Christ and the modi of his manifestation as the Son of God make necessary such a phenomenological consideration of revelation (92–93), theology could learn from phenomenology to become mystical and close the eyes to see better what there is – not an object but being given. And in return: such a mystical theology could help phenomenology to become clear-eyed and to be no longer blinkered by transcendental restrictions of classical apriori-metaphysics (94).

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Tanja Pate

Kronična bolezen v družini

Kronična bolezen pomembno poseže v vsakodnevno življenje posameznika in njegove družine. Bolezen se nepovabljeno vrine pred osnovno nalogo staršev, partnerjev, sorojencev. Celotna družina se mora soočiti z izgubo možnosti, ki bi jih življenje predpostavljalo, spremeniti že vzpostavljene čustvene, miselne in vedenjske vzorce ter razviti nove, ki bodo omogočali prilagoditev na novo situacijo, nadaljnji razvoj in funkcionalnost.

Branko Klun

Transcendence and Acknowledgment: Questioning Marion's Reversal in Phenomenology

Transcendenca in priznanje: Vprašanja glede Marionovega obrata v fenomenologiji

Abstract: Marion gives a new interpretation to the phenomenological notion of givenness (of a phenomenon) by attributing to this phenomenon a »self« which is, in a certain sense, independent from and prior to its reception by the subject (as »the gifted one«, *adonné*). In this way, Marion pleads for a phenomenological turn which can also be described in terms of counter-intentionality and counter-method. However, this turn is not a logical necessity, but a (rationally grounded) decision which the subject, or *adonné* has to make. In this paper I would like to interrelate this decision to the notion of acknowledgement. The *adonné*, by acknowledging the priority of givenness over its own receiving capacities, adopts the attitude of humility in every relation to reality (not understood ontologically, but in its »saturated« phenomenality). This attitude is of fundamental importance with regard to (the possibility of) the phenomenon of revelation.

Key words: Phenomenology of Religion, Marion, Levinas, Transcendence, Givenness, Counter-Intentionality

Povzetek: Marion poda novo razlago fenomenološkega pojma danosti (nekega fenomena), ko fenomenu pripiše nasebnost, ki je neodvisna in predhodna sprejetju s strani subjekta (kot »obdarjenega«). Na tej osnovi zagovarja fenomenološki obrat, ki ga opiše tudi s pojmi proti-intencionalnosti in proti-metode. Toda ta obrat ni logična nujnost, temveč (razumsko utemeljena) odločitev, ki jo mora napraviti subjekt (oziroma obdarjeni). V tem prispevku želim povezati to odločitev s pojmom priznanja. Ko obdarjeni prizna prioriteto danosti pred sposobnostjo lastnega sprejetja, zavzame držo ponižnosti v odnosu do resničnosti (pri čemer slednje ne gre razumeti ontološko, temveč v njeni »nasičeni« fenomenalnosti). Takšna drža je temeljnega pomena za odnos do (možnosti) fenomena razodetja.

Ključne besede: fenomenologija religije, Marion, Levinas, transcendenca, danost, proti-intencionalnost

There is a legitimate question as to whether the »turn« of French phenomenology toward »excessive« phenomena – with its subsequent abandonment of intentional correlation as one of the pillars of classical phenomenology – is not the result of a hidden theological agenda which has invaded phenomenology, a rigorous and universal science. Are we dealing with a theological turn, coming from outside of phenomenology, as suggested in the famous critique of Janicaud (2000)? Or is this turn the result of a development within phenomenology itself, which found itself having to respond to the paradoxical givenness of various excessive or »transcendent« phenomena, and having to abandon its classical methodological presuppositions in order to be faithful to its original vocation: to allow us to see phenomena as they show themselves, in and from themselves? In the second case the proximity between phenomenology and theology would be incidental, referring mainly to the structural similarities between a passive subject and the superabundant givenness of paradoxical phenomena.

In this paper[1] I argue for this latter position. From Husserl's very conception of phenomenology there has been a fundamental ambiguity concerning the phenomenological reduction. It pursues two distinct, but interrelated objectives: on one hand, it is oriented towards the »things themselves« (or to the »phenomena themselves« in Heidegger's version), where »themselves« stands precisely for the priority of phenomena over the subject which seeks to »subject« or subordinate the phenomena to its own will and domination. On the other hand, adequate phenomenological knowledge, as the final goal of the phenomenological reduction, is an act of the subject, of the consciousness, which breaks with the naïve realism that overlooks the exemption of the subject (or of the consciousness) from the world of objects. The phenomenological reduction reduces such presumed objects to their givenness to consciousness, but this process of »bringing back« to the subject nevertheless seeks to safeguard the original truth (more »objective« than the truth within a supposed objective world) of these phenomena.

There is, however, a constant tension between the two objectives. If we ascribe a horizontal structure to knowledge or to the understanding performed by consciousness (or to *Dasein*), then this (intentional) horizon takes on a transcendental role. It becomes the condition of possibility for any knowledge or understanding of phenomena. But how are we to come to the phenomena themselves if they can only appear within the horizon opened by the knowing subject? The need to overcome the transcendental role of the subject can be observed in the phenomenological development of Husserl (by recognizing various forms of passivity in the process of phenomenological constitution) and even more radically in the »turn« (*Kehre*) of Heidegger. Heidegger deposes *Dasein* from its central position in *Being and Time* and attributes to Being the priority and initiative of disclosing and giving itself. However, Being – as Levinas and Marion rightly observe – still functions as a (transcendental) horizon for the understanding (or consti-

tution) of beings (entities). The deposition of the subject in a post-foundational phenomenology does not necessarily lead to the renouncement of the transcendental approach as such.

Here precisely lies the problem for Levinas, who tries to introduce a reversal or a turn within phenomenology itself. Even if he offers several studies on passive elements in Husserl's phenomenology (ranging from sensibility and embodiment to the paradoxical nature of time consciousness), his central argument remains tied to the paradoxical phenomenon of the face, in front of which the transcendental approach experiences its most evident failure. It is true that there are other motives in Levinas' engagement with phenomenology and that his quest of transcendence has indubitable religious implications – something which may be suspicious for Janicaud. Still, Levinas seeks to remain within the methodological boundaries of phenomenology, and to challenge these implications from within.

In this paper, I will start with Levinas' »turn« within phenomenology, which he describes as an inversion of intentionality, and then proceed with Marion's turn, which introduces a methodological reversal in the very idea of the phenomenological reduction. It is evident that such a reversal, which grants the priority of otherness or givenness over that of the receiving subject, offers new possibilities of dialogue with the phenomenon of religion, which is structured in a similar way: as a priority of transcendence over the subjectivity of the self. But how can such a turn within phenomenology be justified? On which presuppositions is it based? How can an active and knowing subject end up with the conclusion that it is the passive receiver of a prior and transcendent givenness? For this purpose, I would like to introduce the component of acknowledgement. If knowledge – as a fundamental notion and the goal of any philosophical enterprise – tends to capture the object of its knowing and to reinstate the knowing subject in its transcendental role, there is also a moment of acknowledgement which is different than the act of knowing itself. The acknowledgment of a transcendent otherness, or a paradoxical givenness, comes close to the notion of decision, but it is the decision of someone who has been passively confronted with a claim from outside of the self, and who has to respond to this claim. The methodological turn which follows such an acknowledgment is not a rational necessity, as it includes the freedom of response. But let us develop the argument in close connection with Levinas und Marion.

1.   Levinas and the inversion of intentionality

For Levinas, the face of the other (person) represents an exception among the phenomena which constitute the world, and it is even characterized as a »pure hole in the world« (Levinas 1994, 198). There is no intentionality that could adequately correlate with the face of the other, not even the intentionality of sensibility (and enjoyment) which, in Levinas' early works, is considered as prior to the theoretical intentionality of Husserl's phenomenology. However, the face

does not remain a pure negation, or a mere deficit, because it is able to affect the subject, to ethically »manifest« it. »The face speaks«, writes Levinas (1969, 198). When confronted with the ethical call of the other – prior to any word being spoken – the subject finds itself in the passive position of being called to responsibility prior to its own initiative and activity. It is deposed from its central and transcendental position. The primacy of the other leads to a methodological reversal which can be observed in the transition from Levinas's first major work *Totality and Infinity* to his second major work *Autrement qu'être*. The notion of the exteriority of the other is replaced and radicalized by the specific interiority (and temporal priority) of the other within the (ethical) subject itself: it is always already penetrated by the other; there is a fission within the subject (the-Other-in-the--Same). The broken ontological identity is replaced by an ethical subjectivity qua responsibility. This responsibility, writes Levinas, is »irreducible to consciousness of ..., and describable, if possible, as an inversion of intentionality« (1991, 47).

With the notion of »inversion« or »bouleversement« (1994, 196) of intentionality, Levinas tries to express the paradox of being in relation to something that (infinitely) transcends the (finite) understanding of the subject. Levinas wants to see this inversion as a methodological program: instead of starting with my consciousness and its understanding (as the obvious point of departure), I have to start from the Other, from beyond my Self. In my responsibility (in my interiority) I discover the call that preceded me in the same way that I discover (in my exteriority) that the face of the Other possesses a specific transcendence which cannot be reduced to an intentional meaning within my consciousness.

But is such an inversion or reversal of intentionality really possible? One could argue from the standpoint of classical phenomenology that intentionality refers to the very fact of understanding, and that an inversion can only be a metaphorical way of saying that my consciousness understands that it is being regarded or called by the other. There can be no »inversion of intentionality«, but only the »intentionality of inversion« (Welten 2004, 89–90). I can objectify my neighbor through the meaning-bestowal of my consciousness, or I can understand him as transcendent, as truly other and irreducible to any meaning that I may impose on him. Even in this second case we still have an understanding – it is the understanding of what we do not, or cannot, understand.

This is precisely the objection which comes to Levinas from hermeneutics. In contrast to Levinas' thesis about the violence of every understanding (to understand something implies reducing its otherness to the categories of one's own understanding), hermeneutics regards understanding as a fundamentally positive act. According to hermeneutics the only problem is that of an inadequate understanding or knowledge. The fundamental task consists in the quest for an adequate understanding – which is a way of searching for the truth. The subject always presupposes and disposes of some understanding, which creates the horizon of its openness to the world. It is within this horizon that it encounters phenomena, but it does not want to subjugate phenomena to this horizon. In the dialogical version of hermeneutics, understanding possesses a dynamic dimension, since

the horizon of understanding is constantly modified by the interaction with phe-
nomena, and is in a never-ending quest for more adequate knowledge (and for
the truth).

Levinas, in contrast, dismisses any possibility of a hermeneutical approach to
the otherness (alterity) of the other. Translated into phenomenological terms,
such an approach would imply the possibility of a constant improvement of the
intentional approach. It would represent the search for an adequate intentiona-
lity, which would be able to respond to the other (Klun 2012). But Levinas deman-
ds more. There can be no adequate intentionality, but only its subversive reversal.
Yet how can this reversal come about? Where is the point at which the subject
»acknowledges« the absolute priority of the other – or where it acknowledges an
alterity beyond any knowledge?

I think this reversal is not possible without a certain *decision* on the part of the
subject, even if Levinas strongly opposes any active element (which a decision
undoubtedly entails), since he feels this would endanger the original passive sta-
tus of the subject (»more passive than all passivity«, Levinas 1991, 14). And yet,
I have to decide how to respond. Confronted by the call of the other – either in
the physical exteriority of his face or in the interiority of my ethical subjectivity
(which amounts to the same) – I find myself compelled to respond, but an essen-
tial element of my response consists in »acknowledging« the priority of the call
or, according to Mensch, in »the internalization of an alternate perspective, one
that can call our own into question« (Mensch 2017, 484). It is not a contradiction
to think that there is no such call. A similar situation can be described in front of
the face of the other. What happens when I »see« in this face – which is also a
physical phenomenon – an infinite (ethical) transcendence? This is not an obvio-
us experience, and it is not irrational to deny it. The acknowledgment of this infi-
nite transcendence (Esterbauer 2013) is therefore not a rational necessity, but
neither is it a blind decision, or a pure leap of faith. It is motivated and justified
by reason. It is reasonable to assume the paradoxical view that I can never form
an adequate understanding of the other and that his infinite, ethical call can never
be met adequately by my finite response.

The inversion of intentionality therefore consists in an act of acknowledgement,
which never achieves the status of knowledge. To know (in the sense of intentio-
nality) would re-establish mastery and domination over what is known (intended).
To acknowledge, in contrast, has the character of a response: the acknowledge-
ment re-acts to a prior claim or call. There is, however, no correlation between
the call and the response: the acknowledgement is asymmetrical and no respon-
se (as an active decision) can offset the initial passivity of the subject. It is similar
to Levinas' distinction between the »saying« and the »said« (Levinas 1991, 37).
No(thing) »said« can exhaust the infinite ethical vocation implied in the act of
»saying«. There is no new intentionality which could grasp what is meant with
the inversion of intentionality.

2. Marion: givenness and counter-intentionality

Marion shares Levinas' critique of Husserl and Heidegger with regard to their transcendental approach and their inability to be open to genuine transcendence. But he does not follow Levinas in his assumption of the privileged role of the other (person) and of ethics (the relation to the other) as the original place for the manifestation of transcendence. Marion does not regard the face as a hole in the world, as a lack or deficit, but rather as an excess or surplus of phenomenality. This is a very important methodological move, which allows Marion to open phenomenology to the variety of ways in which phenomena can give themselves. And, his abandonment of the phenomenological demand of correlation is equally important. For Marion, the principle of correlation is a consequence of the transcendental approach, which poses limits on how phenomena can manifest themselves. That principle attests to the priority of the intention(ality) over intuition. For Husserl, authentic and adequate knowledge (in contrast to inadequate knowledge) can only be achieved when an intention is adequately fulfilled in intuition (*Anschauung*), but it would make no sense for him to speak about the excess of intuition over intention. Marion disputes the priority of intention over intuition and concedes the possibility of such phenomena which »overflow« or »saturate« intention by an excess of intuition. He refers to those phenomena – the face being one of them – as »saturated« phenomena.

This leads not only to phenomenology's extension to new types of phenomenality, but also to a radical transformation of phenomenology as such. The acknowledgement of saturated phenomena is an indicator that phenomenology can free itself from the prison of transcendentality, and that phenomena can give themselves »in themselves« beyond the conditions of possibility posed to them by the intentional subject. This requires a new understanding of the phenomenological reduction. In the version of Husserl or Heidegger the purpose of the reduction is to overcome naïve realism and bring phenomena back to the constitution of their givenness within intentional consciousness (or the constitution of beings, *Seiende*, within the prior understanding of Being, *Sein*). For Marion, the reduction is not about coming back to the subject pole, but the inverse: it leads to the original and undistorted givenness of phenomena, as and inasmuch as they give themselves in and from themselves (we cannot say the »object pole«, because the notion of »objectness« is already a problematic consequence of Husserl's transcendental reduction).

By changing the presuppositions of Husserl's phenomenology, Marion has to introduce a distinction between the phenomenon as (transcendentally) constituted by intentional acts (on the part of the subject) and the phenomenon in itself. He must grant the phenomenon its own »self« (Marion 2002a, 248), which is prior to its phenomenalization, or the appearing of the phenomenon with the aid of the subject. Here we are not dealing with the Kantian distinction between the phenomenon and the thing in itself, because there is no ontological reality outside the phenomenon. Nevertheless, without admitting this »self« to the pheno-

menon, the notion of the self-givenness of phenomena would no longer have any meaning at all. If we take for example the phenomenon of the face, which belongs to the icon-type of saturated phenomena, the intentional subject has to acknowledge a specific »self« to the face, which is the initiator of givenness and which transcends any attempt to contain (to grasp) it within the limits of the subject's intentionality. The phenomenological reduction, as Marion interprets it, does not lead to the constitution of the meaning of the face by the intentional subject, but to the self-givenness of the face beyond the boundaries of intentionality.

This reversal of the phenomenological reduction has far-reaching methodological consequences. It could be regarded as a methodological turn within phenomenology itself. Marion (7) uses expressions like »counter-method«, »counter--intentionality«, or even »counter-experience« (2008, 138). Levinas' unique experience in front of the face now becomes a universal paradigm for the relation of the subject toward phenomenal reality. This then inevitably leads to a new status of the subject or »what comes after the subject« (2002a, 249). The subject is the addressee of phenomena which give themselves according to their own initiative. There are some similarities between Levinas' subject »in accusative« and Marion's subject »in dative« (*l'adonné*, the gifted, the devoted). However, whereas Levinas insists on the radical passivity of the subject, Marion retains some active aspects of the *adonné* »who is himself received from what gives itself« (282). It is true that the *adonné* does not exist prior to the reception of givenness – in that sense he is always posterior to givenness – but, unlike the absolutely passive subject by Levinas, he must receive or assume himself. Marion rejects the criticism that he tolerates a phenomenological »experience without a subject« (2008, 123), as his overall objective is to think of subjectivity in a non-ontological and non-transcendental manner. Everything that the *adonné* »is« has been given to him, but this also includes what we can call his »active powers«. The *adonné*'s original status of passivity does not negate his ability to respond to the givenness in an active way (143). It does not preclude or diminish his freedom: his ability to will and to decide (2012, 141).

But, is Marion's position really tenable? Is it possible to substitute the phenomenological method with a counter-method, and then to transform its exceptional status (as does Levinas) into a new norm and a new normality? Could not have Marion merely fallen prey to a new form of naiveté? From which position does he speak when he assumes the self of phenomena, and describes their self-giving before and beyond the subject? How can we talk about intuitions overflowing intentions if we cannot but think intentionally (or conceptually), even when experiencing an intuition? How then is it possible to speak about the deposition of the transcendental subject if it seems to accompany and to make every kind of speaking and thinking possible? In my opinion, there is no logical necessity to perform Marion's phenomenological turn and accept the inversion of intentionality (the counter-method). But it is a possibility, and no less rationally justified than the classical phenomenology of Husserl or Heidegger. Marion's inversion implies some kind of »conversion«: there must be a »decision to see« (Carlson 2007) differen-

tly, to transcend not only the natural, but even the phenomenological attitude of Husserl. This »post-transcendental« attitude includes a specific acknowledgment: the priority of otherness or givenness over the transcendental I (ego) – even if this acknowledgement has to be performed by the I itself.

3. Decision and acknowledgement

In his lectures titled *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1907), Husserl writes that the phenomenological reduction »excludes everything that is posited as transcendent« (Husserl 1999, 63). In this immanence of intentional consciousness, however, he introduces the notion of »reelle Immanenz« which is not to be equated with the (empirical) real presence, but also is not something purely ideal. What is immanent in this way »counts as indubitable precisely because it presents nothing else, it refers to nothing ›beyond‹ itself, because here what is meant is also adequately self-given, full and complete« (63). This absolute givenness as a complete intuitive fulfilment of intention must, however, be acknowledged as such. One might say that this is a trivial claim, because what motivates Husserl is the possibility of the (objective) knowledge of reality, which according to the most basic experience is something other than me (the I) and my consciousness. Nevertheless, if the perfect phenomenological situation is one of immanence (excluding all transcendence), one could ask the question – as Levinas later does – of whether a phenomenon in its self-givenness is really something *other* than consciousness.[2] It is not contradictory (at least in theoretical terms) to adopt a solipsist position (mentioned by (17), or to say along with Fichte that it is the I who posits the non-I. The consciousness has to acknowledge the intuitive givenness of phenomena as their *self*-givenness. If I see the color red (my intention or concept of »red« is fulfilled by a concrete and full intuition), I acknowledge it as a phenomenon in its own right, in its own sovereignty.

It is already at this level that the subject is called to decide and to acknowledge the otherness within the immanence of the phenomenological reduction, and, precisely since there is a situation of immanence, this decision to acknowledge could also be different. After these lectures, Husserl decided to embrace the transcendental approach which he fully developed in his *Ideen*, whereas Marion – who commented on these lectures of Husserl in depth (Marion 2011, 28) – insists on the inverse way of moving from the transcendental role of consciousness towards the self-givenness of phenomena. But, the ambiguity of the original phenomenological situation remains: it is the decision of the subject whether or not to admit and acknowledge otherness (and transcendence), or to remain closed within its own immanence.

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[2] Husserl (1999, 41) distinguishes *within this immanence* between what is »reell« and what is (purely) intentional: »And here we will not only be concerned with what is really [reell] immanent, but also with what is immanent in the intentional sense. It belongs to the essence of cognitive experiences to have an intentio: they refer to something; they relate themselves in one way or another to an objectivity.«

Even if Marion wants to present a compelling description of what he calls saturated phenomena – and he does this in a remarkable manner – there is still a need for the voluntary decision to acknowledge them as such. Marion's understanding of phenomenology demands far more than an abstract theoretical stance: it is ultimately about the acknowledgement, about my acknowledgment that everything that »is« is given; that what we call reality is in fact a saturated phenomenality that cannot be subdued to our limitations, and that I myself am a saturated phenomenon (which is another way of expressing the traditional idea of creation, or perhaps better, createdness), because I acknowledge and recognize myself as being given to myself.[3] There could also be a different, i.e. a transcendental way, which would conclude (or deduce) the necessity of the transcendental I beneath the empirical I. Kant argues that the subject must recognize the transcendental role of »I think«,[4] which accompanies every representation, or every content of thinking. But this deduction which posits the necessity of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness is a pure act of thinking without any intuitive givenness. What is more convincing: to believe in the (necessity of the) transcendental I, or to believe that the »I« is always late with regard to it and thus given to it (even when it performs the transcendental deduction)?

The decision cannot be a blind choice. It must be a rational deliberation. It is important to emphasize the rationality of the counter-method. The paradox, which accompanies it, should not be excluded from rationality, but rather included in it. Levinas criticizes the domination of the traditional (onto)logical meaning and rationality (taken for granted), and pleads for an entirely different »structure« of meaning (the-One-for-the-Other); for an ethical rationality. With Marion (2008, 148) we could argue for a »higher reason« which is able to admit and attest to the priority of transcendence over correlative and adequate thinking. With higher reason it is possible to acknowledge a saturated phenomenon. At the same time, this acknowledgment also represents the primordial act of the self-transcendence of the *adonné*. Not that the *adonné* goes beyond himself by his own initiative. This is just a re-sponse which re-cognizes (acknowledges) the priority of the givenness which has always already (*passé absolu*) been given to the *adonné*.

Saturated phenomena are not rare occurrences within phenomenal reality. In

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3   Could the term »acknowledgement« be substituted with the term »recognition«? Marion writes about this kind of recognition, or what I call acknowledgement, at the end of *Reduction and Givenness*, where he uses the term »interloqué« to characterize the subject: »I recognize myself as *interloqué* well before having consciousness or knowledge not only of my eventual subjectivity, but especially of what leaves me *interloqué*. /.../ This a priori [of a claim, BK] exerts itself all the more insofar as it is not identified, since it consists only in its pure recognition by the *interloqué*. The claim itself is attested in the recognition by the *interloqué* that it incurs a claim.« (Marion 1998, 202) However, the problem with the term recognition is that it may be burdened with an extensive philosophical history, ranging from Hegel to contemporary thinkers like Honneth or Ricœur. The notion of recognition is normally associated with (dialectical) reciprocity, symmetry, and mutuality, but this is precisely what is not meant with our interpretation of acknowledgement as an asymmetrical and non-reciprocal relationship.

4   *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 131-132: »The I think must be able to accompany all the representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.« (Kant 1998, 246)

the development of his thought, Marion extended the notion of saturated phenomena to almost all phenomenality, and he even speaks about their banality: »The banality of the saturated phenomenon suggests *that the majority of phenomena, if not all* can undergo saturation by the excess of intuition over the concept or signification in them« (126). This acknowledgement, therefore, does not only relate to some exceptional phenomena (Alvis 2018, 45), but to the whole of reality. Everything that »is« (being, existence) has to acknowledge its origin in givenness. In this way a new kind of »ontology« becomes possible; an ontology posterior to givenness. To understand beings (*Seiende*) in their Being (*Sein*), as Heidegger would require it, presupposes an acknowledgement of givenness: it is given to the *adonné* in order for him to understand what gives itself (a phenomenon) as *being*, as *existing*. Ontology is related and, in this sense, relative to the recipient, to the *adonné* (whom Heidegger calls *Dasein*). Givenness, in contrast, is not relative, because it is prior and unconditional. For Marion, it becomes the first principle and it grants phenomenology the status of »first philosophy«.[5] It also leads to the reversal of ontology: our understanding of being (ontology) is a response which includes the acknowledgement of an all-encompassing »giving« prior to and beyond ontology.

To acknowledge the priority of givenness leads to a kind of a Copernican reversal. Before the reversal the (transcendental) subject forms the center of reality: everything besides the subject, all of reality surrounding it, appears to be secondary and posterior. After the reversal there is the priority of »reality« – understood as everything that gives itself – over the subject. When the subject becomes conscious of itself (when it comes into »being«), it has to admit (to acknowledge) its secondary role: to be the recipient of the givenness, which is primary, and which always transcends its receptive capacities. The transcendence of givenness is prior to the immanence of the subject.

4. The Copernican reversal and its consequences for theology

It is clear that Marion's new phenomenological setting offers a favorable ground for a dialogue with theology, which is based on the phenomenon of revelation. Additionally, Marion seems to offer to Christian theology a new philosophical interpretation of reality which can be a substitute for traditional metaphysics, now widely discredited. This may even be the main objective of Marion's philosophical work, but this fact cannot be an argument to accuse him of having a hidden theological agenda.

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[5] »I thus conclude that no appearing is excepted from the fold of givenness, even if it does not always accomplish the phenomenal unfolding in it entirely. Givenness is never suspended, even if and precisely because it admits an indefiniteness of degrees. Yet again, there can be indefinite degrees of givenness but no exception from it. Givenness is thus set up, by its certitude and its automatic universality, in principle unconditioned. There could, therefore, be a ›first philosophy‹ according to phenomenology.« (Marion 2002b, 23)

Marion's Copernican reversal completely refigures the question about transcendence, which is usually associated with God, and is of central importance to every religion. We no longer have the problem of *how* – or *if* at all – we can reach transcendence, because the saturated phenomenal reality that surrounds us is »counter-experienced« as a constant givenness of transcendence. The question is rather whether such givenness which can be deemed divine revelation can actually occur. Such a revelation would still need to phenomenalize itself, to become a phenomenon, but it is not something that philosophy or phenomenology could anticipate or determine in advance. Philosophy cannot preclude revelation. To put it positively: it must allow for revelation as a possibility – not in the sense of »potency«, which is set out to materialize itself in an »actus«, but as a preclusion of impossibility, or in Marion's terms: the impossibility of impossibility (Marion 2015, 69). Theology, in contrast, regards revelation as historically actualized, as an actuality which is accepted or »acknowledged« in the attitude of faith. Herein lies the main methodological difference between philosophy and theology.

Theology always presupposes some (philosophical) understanding of reality, irrespective of whether these ontological presuppositions are hidden and not reflected, or if they are thought of and thematized. In the Catholic tradition there has always been a need to combine (supernatural) revelation with a philosophical (or natural) understanding of reality. This is in contrast to the Protestant position, which is distrustful of any natural reason (which has been corrupted by original sin) prior to or independent of revelation (it is not until we embrace faith that reason can be liberated from its fallenness and function properly). According to Karl Barth there can be no natural knowledge of God (i.e. natural or philosophical theology) prior to His revelation: in the revelation God »gives« Himself from Himself and according to Himself – without any prior (transcendental) conditions and irrespective of any »natural« reason. Marion has occasionally been reproached for appropriating the Barthian paradigm (Marion 2016, 57), which led to the criticism both from philosophy (for secretly transposing theology into phenomenology) and from Catholic theology (for his refusal of the classical metaphysics of being). But Marion offers a differentiated position which escapes both criticisms. His phenomenological analyses are based on rational argumentation. However, in the philosophical search for truth there are moments of decision regarding what is acknowledged as prior and principal. This may point to an inevitable element of faith (in a general sense) within philosophical reasoning, which is related to human freedom. But any such decision or acknowledgment seeks to find a rational justification (sometimes expanding on the notion of rationality), and it is able to enter into a rational discussion with competing positions.

The second criticism concerning Marion's refusal of the metaphysics of being, which is still an important philosophical reference for Catholic thinking, can be dismissed in a similar way. Despite its apparent resemblance to the Barthian position, Marion develops a philosophically autonomous – we could even say a *natural* – account of reality. He could accept the scholastic distinction between natural reason and supernatural revelation, where supernatural grace does not »de-

stroy nature, but fulfils it«. However, he rejects the position that natural reason has to be identified with the (onto)logical thinking of classical metaphysics (no longer regarded as *philosophia perennis*, but as a historically contingent vein of thought). Marion shares Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics, which has been accused of a specific attitude towards reality: an attitude of power and domination. It is the same attitude that we find in the transcendental approach, which Marion tries to overcome with his phenomenology of givenness, and which also implies a reversal in attitude: the approach of domination is replaced with one of humility when faced with saturated phenomenality.

Although Marion's phenomenology of givenness dismisses the priority of ontology – either in the form of classical metaphysics or in the form of Heidegger's thinking of *Being* – he does not reject the question of »being« altogether. But this question becomes of secondary importance, as it always presupposes the primacy and anteriority of givenness. It is the *adonné* who brings being to language (who announces what »is«), but this articulation is a never-ending response (a hermeneutic »without end«, Marion 2002b, 33) to what gives itself prior to and beyond being. There is no possibility for the *adonné* to go beyond givenness – to pose and propose some ontological giver behind the givenness, which would repeat the ontotheological gesture of proving God's existence. Marion also refuses the method of analogy, not only in the ontological sense (*analogia entis*), but in general. To think of transcendence »according to the same logos« (*ana ton auton logon*, i.e. analogically), which we encounter within our immanence, is always susceptible to idolatry. The only way to know something about transcendence is through its own givenness, through its own revelation. However, as already mentioned, this does not diminish the role of philosophy for theology. The acknowledgment of saturated phenomenality is a »natural« experience of transcendence. The grace of God's revelation builds upon and perfects this natural experience (*gratia praesupponit et perficit naturam*).

There is a remarkable statement made by Marion in his conversation with Dan Arbib, which can help us understand his view of both phenomenology and theology. It shows how the Copernican reversal lies at the very center of his thinking and how it is related to a fundamental »acknowledgement«:

> »Then came the day when I finally discovered that the crucial problem lies not in knowing or not knowing the existence of God, but in figuring out whether I myself am sure about my own existence. For let's be serious: existence is the least thing we could dispute of God. The question would rather be whether anything that is not God could ever hope to be? /.../ There is nothing exterior, absolutely nothing that is not found already and above all given a norm by God, including the questions of his being and his potential existence. /.../ The idea that there is anything outside of God has no meaning at all. That was for me truly a Copernican reversal, one about which I have never had the slightest doubt.« (2017, 28)

This passage may be perceived as an argument for those who reproach Marion for pursuing a theological agenda in his philosophical thinking. I would rather interpret it as an impulse regarding Marion's new phenomenological approach to reality and his search for a phenomenological Copernican turn: a turn away from the self-centeredness of the subject toward the radical priority of transcendent givenness. It is a turn which again seeks to reverse Kant's famous Copernican turn without falling back to the old metaphysics. But, it is as paradoxical as the possibility of experiencing saturated phenomena; that is, if we acknowledge them at all in the first place.

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
Maksimilijan Matjaž

Klic v novo življenje - Prevod in komentar Pavlovega prvega pisma Korinčanom

S Prvim pismom Korinčanom si je apostol Pavel zadal težko nalogo, kako sporočiti skrivnost Božje modrosti in človekovega odrešenja, razodetega po Jezusovem križu, v okolje cvetoče blaginje, ki se je zavedalo svoje moči in modrosti ter je prisegalo na svobodomiselnost in pluralizem. Zato sodi pismo danes med najbolj preučevane in aktualne tekste Nove zaveze. Odpira namreč vprašanja, ki jih soočenje Kristusovega evangelija in sodobnega sveta vedno prebuja. Zdi se, kot da krščanski oznanjevalci izgubljajo boj s konkurenčnimi kulturami, religijami, ideologijami ter z vplivi raznih centrov politične in gospodarske moči. Stanje duha tako danes ni bistveno drugačno, kakor je bilo v Korintu pred skoraj dva tisoč leti, ko je tam Pavel tisto peščico poslušalcev, ki ga je hotela poslušati, učil o nekem drugačnem, alternativnem načinu življenja. Te alternativnosti pa ni prikazoval kot nekaj, kar bi bilo mogoče živeti samo tako, da bi izstopili iz kulture, v kateri so živeli, ampak kot novost, ki jo je mogoče živeti v vsaki kulturi – na vsakem kraju (1,2)..

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Lenart Škof

On two Unpleasant Gestures: Rethinking Marion's Critique of Nietzsche and Heidegger in *The Idol and Distance*

Dve neprijazni gesti: premislek ob Marionovi kritiki Nietzscheja ter Heideggra v Maliku in razdalji

Abstract: This paper deals with an analysis of Jean Luc Marion's *The Idole and Distance* in light of his criticism of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Two unpleasant remarks of [should this be »by« or »about«] Marion are critically confronted and discussed from the point of view of his idea of the distance and idolatry. We argue for a different genealogy of the fatherly distance, one that is more attuned to the original Nietzschean thought and sensitive to the idea of the child. On the other hand, from Marion's criticism of »elemental« ontology of Being in Heidegger we try to argue for another possibility of onto(theo)logy in light of the proximity of the elements and God-Being within the Heideggerian ontological field of Fourfold and *Ereignis*. In our elaborations, we also invoke contemporary Mormon philosophical theology as an example of a post-Christian thought, being able to address some of the key questions that were haunting Marion in his criticism of both philosophers. From the Fatherly distance in Marion and his charges of idolatry towards various thinkers we thus aim to arrive to the newly coneptualized material and elemental onto(theo)logy of *God-Being*.

Key words: J.-L. Marion, F. Nietzsche, M. Heidegger, R. Rorty, idol, distance, revelation, Mormonism, materialism.

Povzetek: Članek se ukvarja z analizo Marionovega dela *Malik in razdalja* v luči njegove kritike Nietzscheja in Heideggra. V njem se kritično odzovemo na dve neprijazni pripombi ter o njima razpravljamo na podlagi Marionove misli o razdalji in malikovalstvu. Prizadevamo si za drugačno genealogijo od tiste, ki vodi v Očetovsko razdaljo, genealogijo, ki je bolj primerna za tematizacijo izvirne Nietzschejeve misli o ideji otroka. Po drugi strani na podlagi Marionove kritike elementarne ontologije pri Heideggru razmišljamo o drugačni možnosti onto(teo)logije – takšni, ki lahko vztraja v luči bližine elementov ter Boga-Biti znotraj heideggerjanskega ontološkega polja četverja ter dogodja. V razpravo kritično vpeljemo sodobno mormonistično filozofsko teologijo, ki kot vzorčni

primer postkrščanske misli lahko pomaga razrešiti nekatere ključne dileme Marionove misli, ki preganjajo tega filozofa. Iz Očetovske razdalje in iz Marionovih znanih obtožb na temo idolatrije se tako v sklepu premaknemo k na novo utemeljeni materialni in elementarni onto(teo)logiji *Boga-Biti*.

Ključne besede: J.-L. Marion, F. Nietzsche, M. Heidegger, R. Rorty, malik, razdalja, razodetje, mormonizem, materializem.

This essay[1] is about some philosophico-theological possibilities, emerging from the unusual but interesting relation between Marion's project in philosophical theology on one hand, and recent liberal philosophico-theological elaborations within Mormonism on the other hand. Many and varied scholars (Davies 2003; Miller 2008; Webb 2013; Givens 2015), have written monographs on Mormonism and its theology. These have received timely critical attention within academic circles, that we argue is deservedly so, and as a consequence they have been firmly placed within the contemporary (post-)Christian thoughts-world. One of the most provocative and original Latter-day Saints theologians, Adam S. Miller, has already put this focus in close conversation with Badiou, Marion and Mormonism (Miller 2008). According to Simon Critchley, as an example of a *post*-Christian tradition, Mormonism pluralizes divinity and »makes god radically immanent« which enables us to rethink some of the key features of any theology (Critchley 2012). Moreover, with its idiosyncratic theory of matter and related accounts on ontology, cosmology, revelation and eschatology, the Latter-day Saints theology has, in my opinion, become one of the most important and vibrant theological narratives that we have for the 21st century. In this essay we will critically look at two arguments or in my view two disturbing gestures of Marion that I find as perhaps even being key markers of his philosophical intervention into the very core of both phenomenology and theology; on this basis I will critically read Marion's philosophical theology as contrasted to some more recent views on Mormonism. Further, I will also attempt to present (hopefully in a sufficiently humble manner) my own thesis on religion and some of its tasks in today's world.

1.   Marion's Two Unpleasant Gestures

In his *L'Idol et la distance* Marion makes two intriguing comments – one on Nietzsche and another on Heidegger – which I wish to take as a starting point of my essay on the relation of theology to ontology, materiality, and salvation. In his analysis of Nietzsche and his »Christology«, Marion makes an observation that interests me as an example of an ungentle philosophico-theological reading. In the §6 he starts with the following sentence:

> »The darkness of the final delirium (*Wahnsinn*) concludes the destruction of idolatrous ilussions (*Wahn*) by exposing, once the veil is torn, an individual, Friedrich Nietzsche, to the unbearable trial of the divine that is immediately (corporeally) confronted.« (Marion 2001, 55)

This observation is followed by another thought in the same section on Nietzsche's Christ, namely, that it was precisely Nietzsche's idolatric confrontation with the divine (in this case only with the »semigod«, *demi-dieu*) that has caused the Nietzsche's final and longlasting fall into the mental illness:

> »hence the final failure – *to which the darkness testified for ten years. /.../* I am saying that the coherence of the Nietzschean text, including the plunge into darkness, becomes visible in this way, in this way more than otherwise, and perhaps that Christ haunts Nietzschean thought more profoundly than as an adversary or a reference – he remains the typical and ultimate place where that thought lives, whether consciously or unconsciously. An empty figure of Christ.« (60f., *my emphasis*)

Apart from a more ethical point of view of such an etiquette which one could address (for example, why there is a need at all in someone to exert such pressure or an insistence on this issue *ad personam*), I still wish to reflect on some even more serious philosophical and theological consequences of a such a thought. Clearly, for Marion the Christological gesture of Nietzsche only leads to the semi--death (*demi-mort*), of Nietzsche's soul/spirit (*esprit*), but not of his body (*corps*), which thus tragically or comically (as you wish) survives the necessary breakdown of an allegedly heroic soul of the individual man called Friedrich Nietzsche, and causes his fall into the absyss of unthought. According to Marion, already for Feuerbach it became impossible to evade the idolatrous nature of making his »God« devoid of any remaining feature of negative theology and its inherent distance. Feuerbach and Nietzsche cannot step into the distance and are therefore idolatrous towards their divinities. If Feuerbach was still able to remain at this side of this ontological gap (*Kluft*),[2] it was Niezsche who has made one more step and has therefore collapsed into the final transgression, and into the sad and final, but rightly deserved (as it seems if we take Marion seriously enough) *entenébrèment* of his soul (1977, 104).

Is there perhaps another way to think through this aspect of Nietzsche? I wish to argue in favor of Nietzsche by making an unusual step first – namely by invoking the idea of a child as we can find it in his thought. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche famously introduces three metamorphoses *of the spirit* – namely first the spirit becomes a camel, then the camel becomes a lion, and finally, the lion becomes a child (»On the Three Metamorphoses«, Nietzsche 2006, 16). It is decisive, for us, to know that for the play of creation, for Nietzsche, a very special relation to the sacredness is required. The idea of a child is described as follows:

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[2] See on Feuerbach's philosophy of religion in my *Breath of Proximity: Intersubjectivity, Ethics, and Peace* (Škof 2015, ch. 5).

»The child is innocence and forgetting, a newbeginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying. Yes, for the game of creation my brothers a sacred yes-saying is required. The spirit wants *its* will, the one lost to the world now wins *its own* world. Three metamorphoses of the spirit I named for you: how the spirit became a camel, and the camel a lion, and finally the lion a child. –« (17)

In »The Soothsayer«, there is another modality, or even acceleration of this thought, when »like thousandfold children's laughter Zarathustra comes into all burial chambers, laughing at these night watchmen and grave guardians, and whoever else rattles about with dingy keys« (108). Here, the idea of a child is even radicalized as representing the only possible way of thinking about the future, since, clearly, *the child is the category of the future*. But why is the idea of the child so important? Apart from the fact that we do not have any single modern philosopher – with the exception of Nietzsche or Irigaray – that would dedicate an important portion of his or her work to the idea of the child, the most important reason is also that, for Marion, the distance with which we could escape idolatry, can solely be understood and nurtured from the idea of the vertically understood relationality within the very concept of the parenthood: because, as we know from Marion, taken radically, »Paternal distance offers the sole place for a filiation.« (Marion 2001, 139)

In *To Be Born* Luce Irigaray raises the question of the origin as follows: »Unveiling the mystery of our origin is probably the thing that most motivates our quests and plans.« (Irigaray 2017, v) The question of origin can refer to two possible paths: firstly, to the ontological thesis about the origin of our Being, and secondly, but by no means less important, to the question that is most closely connected with the idea of the child. Irigaray introduces her explication of the idea of the child in *To Bo Born* in an idiosyncratic and, at first, recondite manner: she argues that whatever the factors of our conception or creation as individuals coming to this world, *we have wanted to be born – our will to live* is manifesting itself already at the moment of our birth. (1) In this gesture she allies herself to this aspect of Nietzschean thinking, and this, naturally, leads to a break with the established perception of the child as the third one in relation to its parents, or, as is the case with Marion, as the second to his father (*filiation*) – as the one who *is born* and thus does not *give birth* to oneself, and, consequently, does not have his own self-affection (including the debates around *filioque*). But if the original idea of the child is related to its explicit singularity (which assures the child its autonomy) another ontology of the child is needed. Based on this, I wish to argue that between parents and children, even when being fully devoted to their child (or to each other), this relationship essentially and ontologically is *not* hierarchical, as their complete and unconditional love is fed precisely by what they themselves and each on their own *had never possessed or been* and by what they in equal perfection receive from their child, or from their parent; this is what vertical *transcendence* of the relationship and exchange of love consists in – it is a

process of reciprocal giving and thus of the *gift of mutual love among them all* (this love being the third thing now). Now, to bring these thoughts back to my previous Nietzsche-Marion dispute: if filiation is only possible through the onto--theological gap (distance), then the very idea of a child, as described above, and ontologically, evaporates into nothingness and indeed becomes *an empty figure*, if we may use Marion's own terms here. One more time, according to Marion, now with the passage in its entirety:

> »Paternal distance offers the sole place for a filiation. Since in the intimacy of the divine strictly coincides with withdrawal, the paradox can lead to confusion: distance must, in order that we might inhabit it, be idenfitied. We will be able to speak of it only if we come from it and remain in it. To speak of distance: concerning it, and also starting from it. But which language can be suitable to distance?« (Marion 2001, 139)

We have now come full circle: but a further step needs to be taken – from distance to proximity, and from ontological gap to material closeness of a processual divine-human relationship, which will be a topic of the next part of this paper.

Let me now focus on the second ungenerous comment by Marion from *The Idole and Distance*, this time on Heidegger's ontology. Towards the end of *The Idole and Distance*, Marion critically elaborates on the possibility of Christians positioning themselves within the *Ereignis*. For Marion, after dealing with Derrida's *différance* and *trace* there is a nihilism at work, when there is nothing that could be invoked, called – all there is, is the »platitute of *différance*, since the trace removes any name for it, disqualifies any identification of it, and finally fills any of its depth« (225). Derrida, in this »abyssal thought« (225), is in fact not far away from Nietzsche, for Marion. All is indifferent, there is no transcendence, and beyond ontotheology (including the ontological difference itself) the Being of being is indifferently differentiated into the nothingness. The distance of the Father, clearly, cannot be present or encapsulated in this process. Marion knows that in order

> »To eliminate any paternal site, it is necessary to reject the ontological difference. /.../ The refusal of ontological difference in the one case, and its assertion in the other, aim at the same goal: to reduce to the Neuter, to neutralize the distant irruption of the Father.« (231)

In this sense there is another, this time final possibility that now has to be taken into consideration: it is Heidegger's *Ereignis* and the posibillity of an ontological difference/distance. The entire §19 (titled »The Fourth Dimension«) of *The Idole and Distance* deals with that possibility. Heidegger's lecture »Time and Being« is now crucial for Marion since it introduces the notion of *giving*. For Heidegger, Being as giving is presented as follows:

> »What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together, we shall call: *Ereignis,* the event of Appropriation. *Erei-*

gnis will be translated as Appropriation or event of Appropriation. One should bear in mind, however, that ›event‹ is not simply an occurrence, but that which makes any occurrence possible. /.../ However: Appropriation neither *is,* nor *is* Appropriation *there.«* (Heidegger 1972, 6; 8; 19)

But, from these still more abstract thoughts on Being as *Ereignis,* we can say that Heidegger's event of appropriation is also necessarily related to the gentle constellation of the »elements« of being, and thus related to the discrete or hidden, but still discernable »material« ontology of Being. Heidegger's proximity to the elemental world is, for example, visible in the Introduction to his essay »What is Metaphysics?«, when the earth/soil is presented as a root of the nourishing sources and strenghts or the tree (2007, 277). But it is in *Building Dwelling Thinking* that he elaborates on the elements in the following way:

> »Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal. When we say earth, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four. /.../ The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year's seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether.« (1971, 147–148)

We have earth/rock, plants and animals, water, the atmosphere (with winds, air or ether), and sun/light/fire in Heidegger. All these archaic elements in their mysterious but visible materiality in the midst of the Fourfold are the source or our All-life and our being/Being. But in an even more elemental sense, and in a complete syncronicity with the inner dynamics of the Fourfold, for Heidegger there is one of the elements that still is privileged, and this is precisely the wind/air/ether – or, with the words of Heidegger: »Beyng is the ether, which man breathes« (2014, 231). Appropriation appropriates, but the distance within the ontological difference can neither be called »idolatrous« nor can it be dispossesed of its ontological meaning here. It is rather »spiritual« – but in a subtle material way. Now, to return back to Marion – based on these thoughts, in his critical exposition of Heidegger, our philosopher is able to guide us towards the conclusion, namely, that in the context of »Time and Being«, neither time nor Being exist. The *Il y a* of a Being (*Es Gibt:* as an impersonal *Es* which *gives* itself) is *Ereignis* (the event of Appropriation). *Ereignis* and distance are now incomensurable, since it is *Ereignis* itself which posits into the distance from the distance itself, for Marion (Marion 2001, 239ff.). Now, another dimension – the so called the fourth dimension – reveals from this constellation when we talk about the difference between God and Being, and this is the *Distance* itself:

> »The fourth difference, between God and Being, puts the other differences in place, because to begin with it gives rise to the (unextended, nonspatial) space where these differences, including the ontological difference,

become imaginable. The fourth dimension, the last, is always the first. It is a question in fact of distance itself, such as it passes beyond every possible idol, and exercises itself as the distance of Goodness.« (246)

Ereignis could under certain conditions even support this fourth dimension, but we are now coming to the very core of Marion's criticism of Heidegger: the play of *Ereignis* cannot, and this is now clear and undisputable, satisfy Christians in their radical ontological standing towards Being: not only being as such, but Being »itself« is now logically put into radical suspension, evaporation, the fall into nihilism. Here we are now at our second ungentle remark, or gesture of Marion, that I wanted to analyse. On the basis of previous criticism of *Ereignis*, Marion writes again a very unpleasant or disturbing observation, which is now also very straightforwardly elucidated with the following words:

> »From the point of the view of charity, everything enters into another light: Beings and Being itself appear, certainly not annihilated of without value (for *nihil* and *value* come to us from metaphysics), but nil in charity, inept because inapt for distance, in a word, vain. *Vain*, in the sense that ›vanity of vanities, all is vanity‹ must be understood more or less as: ›wind, nothing that holds, nothing but wind‹. That which reveals itself at this point to be vain (*vergeblich*) – namely, Being as well as beings – departs like wind. But the ›wind‹ indicates also the spirit, which ›breathes‹. Can the inanity of *Dasein*, like ›wind‹, offer a name to the Spirit, offer its inanity (*Vergeblichkeit*) and give it (*geben*) to another authority? /.../ The ontico--ontological inanity uncovers such a poverty to charity (distance), that charity cannot but remit it to it /.../ [B]ut only a forgiveness can grant it that one not impute that absence to it as a fault. /.../ Only forgiveness will allow us to receive it [namely, Being, L.Š.] as a gift without abandoning ourselves to its serene inanity. /.../ For what places Being in distance as an icon of distance remains first the humble and unthinkable authority of the Father.« (252; 253)

Here Marion uses the play of words, in which »wind« is particularly exposed as a symbol of ontological nihilism. We know that wind (and breath as its microcosmic twin) has had an imporatant role in the cosmologico-ontological constellation of Being since the Presocratics, although it has later been supressed or forgotten (see for example Irigaray's *The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger*[3]). Secondly, Marion thinks about the possibility of Dasein (cynically, though) as an existence to interfere with the plane of grace, but even if so, without any trace of joy. Here we come close to Nietzsche: for Nietzsche, we have seen, it is in the child and its *laughter* (and joy) that a new beginning is possible – thinking beyond nihilism, beyond metaphysics, beyond idolatry. It seems that Marion would like to warn us against making this essentially dangerous step into laughter and joy of

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[3]   More on this in my *Breath of Proximity* (Škof 2015) which is entirely dedicated to this forgotten but sacred element.

life: with his first remark on Nietzsche, the idea of a child has evaporated into nothingness and became an emtpy figure. With the second gesture which Marion makes against Heidegger, Being or Event of Appropriation (*Ereignis*) is cut off from any remains of even the most discrete presence of material signifiers. But this only means that, based on the thought of Being as an icon of distance, Marion itself establishes and insists on the idolatrous distance of the Father *of* Being which, in my opinion, needs to be deconstructed in favor of a more gentle, intimate, and elemental gesture of divinity, or *God-Being*, that both has a body and indwells in an ontological proximity which still needs to be philosophically explained and theologically revealed.

2. Against idol and distance – on the plan of salvation in Mormonism and its philosophical theology of matter

Let me first briefly present some basics of Mormon Christianity. For the Later Day Saints, the idea of God cannot be related to the metapyhsical triade of *incorporeus, impartibilis* and *impassibilis*. For Joseph Smith, not only Jesus, but also God the Father is passible, and weeps with us. The portrayal of a weeping God is directly opposed to ideas of the early Greek fathers which persisted through the history of Christianity until the modern era – namely that God (the Father) cannot be changed or affected by emotions (Givens 2015, 85ff.). Distant God without the body or (bodily) parts, and God that is unchangeable, *cannot really* be vulnerable to external events and thus also cannot be affected by any possible external perturbations. But if we allow ourselves to think of God as vulnerable and thus changeable, this diminishes the *distance* between God and us and opens immense possibilities for a theological revitalization of the divine-human relationality, with all ethico-eschatological consequences of such a turn. If God weeps, and if weeping means that God's (not »only« Jesus') *tears* are then »real« and necessary, God must also have had a material substance that we cannot yet comprehend. Spirit and element – i.e., God and his/her tears are not separated any more, in the words from *Doctrine and Covenants* – »spirit and element, inseparably connected, receive a fullness of joy; And when separated, man cannot receive a fullness of joy (D&C 93: 33–34).[4] On this basis we must contend that within Mormon cosmology (and theology), there is a radical counter-movement as regards the realms of spirit and matter. According to one of the most prolific Mormon thinkers

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[4] The Mormon scriptures (four primary texts, also called Standard Works), consist of: The Bible (KJV), *Book of Mormon* (1830)*, Doctrine and Covenants* (1835; D&C)*,* and *Pearl of the Great Price* (1851). If not otherwise indicated, the citations from the scriptures are from the official LDS Church website at https://history.lds.org/article/web-resources?lang=eng. This citation from D&C goes as follows:
32 And every man whose spirit receiveth not the light is under condemnation.
33 For man is spirit. The elements are eternal, and spirit and element, inseparably connected, receive a fulness of joy;
34 And when separated, man cannot receive a fulness of joy.
35 The elements are the tabernacle of God; yea, man is the tabernacle of God, even temples; and whatsoever temple is defiled, God shall destroy that temple.

John Durham Peters, Mormon cosmology »is the story of humankind's increasing immersion in matter for the sake of progress and growth« (Durham Peters 1993, 47). This means that in the process of our spiritual growth, both realms – of spirit and matter – commingle and in this sense also Heavens are only the exaltation of *this* world, for Mormons (this is also one of the features that Rorty praised most in Mormonism which obviously was close to his romantic »faith« in the human progression). In the *Doctrine and Covenants* we also read that »God the Father and his Son have tangible bodies of flesh and bone« (Durham Peters 1993, 47; see D&C 130, 22[5]), and for the leading early Mormon theologian Orson Pratt, any theology that was not willing to deal with this kind of theological materialism seriously enough, was no less than absurd.

Now, for the sake of a better understanding of this context, a short review of Mormon theology is needed. Mormon theology distinguishes radically from other Christian trinitarian doctrines in its teaching that there are God, the Eternal Father (and, sometimes, also Mother), His Son, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Ghost, but with an important difference, namely, that Jesus is identified with Jehovah (according to the teachings of Joseph Smith, Jesus Christ only *became* divine at some point »in the distant pre-earth past«; Givens 2015, 122). God the Father (and, sometimes Mother) is now identified with *Elohim* in its original plural meaning, and thus representing the »Gods« in their plurality rather than being one and only God (Davies 2003, 68). If both God the Father and Son have tangible bodies, finally, the Holy Ghost is more purely spiritual although still enigmatically subtely material in its ontological character. Although some Mormons think that it also must possess a certain kind of a spiritual bodily substance, it usually will be recognized in the form of an unembodied cosmic ether, being able to »dwell in us« (D&C, 130, 22). This is interesting since it relates to the remark of Marion on the vanity of wind as related to the onto-theological concepts of Being and God. Furthermore, for Mormonism, God is supreme intelligence, but »he is not the source of all being, or even the creator of that which constitutes the human soul. Men and women have existed from eternity as uncreated intelligence.« (Givens 2015, 45). How could this be understood? For Mormonism, *creatio ex nihilo* is therefore not an option and this clearly paves the way towards another theory of an independent and eternalist matter and element within the theology. In this light, embodiment, which usually was understood theologically as a degradation of the pure spiritual existence into the material form, is now rather a step upward. Since God (which comprises both heavenly Father and Mother[6]) is itself embodied, this is the reason that men and women themselves can *expand* toward divinity to par-

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[5] Full citation from D&C 130, 22: »The Father has a body of flesh and bones as tangible as man's; the Son also; but the Holy Ghost has not a body of flesh and bones, but is a personage of Spirit. Were it not so, the Holy Ghost could not dwell in us.«

[6] See on this teachings about Mother in Heaven by various Mormon theologians and thinkers. Since 1854 revelation of Sister Eliza R. Snow about Mother in Heaven in »O My Father« hymn, this topic developed into an (un)official doctrine of the LDS. On this, and related dogmatic controversies over the decades see Paulsen and Pulido (2011) and Taylor G. Petrey's »Rethinking Mormonism's Heavenly Mother« (2016).

ticipate more and more in an ongoing process of salvation in which God desires to save the entire humankind. *As man is, God once was, as God is, man may become*. In this view cosmos is essentially ontologically continuous, and the *fatherly distance* evaporates into the teaching on God's progression and passibility:

> »Mormon rejection of creation *ex nihilo* in favor of creation *ex materia*, out of preexisting intelligence and element, together with the corollary that matter is uncreated and coeternal with God, affirm that the primordial origin of being is plural, not singular. Irreducible plurality is the fundamental character of being. The Mormon teaching that the spirit world is coextensive with the physical world suggests the immanence of the divine and orients the theological imagination toward the here and now rather than toward the transcendent.« (Welch 2017, 69)

I now wish to address the second topic of my investigation – namely to elaborate on this basis on Marion's second remark on the vanity of wind and related question of Being. In perhaps the most important of the sermons of Joseph Smith now known as *The King Follet Discourse* (from 1844) – we find the clearest distillation of Mormonism's more radical views, but before that what strikes us is a remark that he makes in the very beginning of this sermon.[7] The subject of the sermon is the death of King Follett, a fellow Mormon who died in March 1844, only few months before the prophet itself has died. Joseph Smith starts his speech with a prayer – namely by seeking the inspiration (here in the most literary sense – as being filled with *pneuma*) in the Holy Spirit and by wishing »that the Lord may strenghten my lungs and stay the winds« (Smith 1844; »lungs« are here being used as a bodily-spiritual organ[8]). In this sermon, Smith first contends that God himself »is a man like one of you«, which dwellt on the earth as Jesus did.[9] Now, according to Smith, also a God had to become God, actually, all Gods have done this before (remember the plurality of Gods as a principle in Mormonism). Now, a crucial argument appears: since *creatio ex nihilo* is not possible, God had before him materials. i.e., the elements, from which he organized (and hence *not* created) the world. These elements had their existence from the time they had – they are coeternal with God, and even more: »The pure principles of element are principles that can never be destroyed; they may be organized and reorganized but not destroyed.« (Smith 1844) And in *Doctrine and Covenants* we also read:

> »There is no such thing as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter, but it is

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[7] *The King Follet Discourse* is regarded by many as Joseph Smith's greatest sermon. It was delivered in front of a large audience (estimated at 8.000) on April 7, 1844 (few month before his death). On that day, Smith spoke for more than 2 hours and three men made official notes, and by adding the fourth source, and with comparing of various versions, the sermon was completed and composed in the current version. On this and more details on the historical setting of the sermon see Cannon (1978).

[8] See on the ethical relevance of »lungs« in Levinas's thought in my *Breath of Proximity* (Škof 2015, 137).

[9] All citations from *The King Follet Discourse*, if not otherwise indicated, are from the official online version, available at: http://mldb.byu.edu/follett.htm (Smith 1844). For more on these radical aspects of thinking about the progression of God(s) and divinizing of the humanity see Critchley 2012.

more fine and pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it; but when our bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter.« (D&C 131,7–8)

Mormons therefore establish the realm of the elements (or matter) as a primordial ontological plane from which all beings have once emerged.[10] But why is the role of the air or wind as an element so special in this constellation? And why did Marion choose precisely wind and rather not some other element – for arguing against Heidegger's Being?

We have already seen that for Heidegger, wind had rather a key role within the ontology of Being/Beyng (if we remember his remark on Beyng as ether): now, in his reading of Hölderlin's *Hyperion*, Heidegger even thinks about the air that is breathed by all living beings, as: »›This air‹ hallows the holy air, sister of the spirit, mighty master of the fire which reigns and lives within us« (Heidegger 2000, 109[11]). This is a proof that, even for Heidegger, spirit was elementarily linked to its archaic and subtle material core. These observations do not correspond to Marion's remark and show that he is among those philosophers that unfortunately are not sensible to the respiratory aspects of our being.[12] Now, also for Smith the *inspiration* of the Holy Spirit is crucial and among the sins committed, according to *The King Follett Discourse*, there is only one that cannot be forgiven – and it is the sin against the Holy Ghost.[13] The respiratory thinker Petri Berndtson has already shown the importance of the relation between God and spirit/breath/air/wind (as *pneuma*) – as in John 4:24, where Jesus answers to Nicodemus' question about the new birth with the following words:

> »Very truly, I tell you, no one can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and Spirit [*ex hydatos kai pneumatos*] /.../ The wind blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes to.« (Jn 3:5,8)

Based on these thoughts, interpreted in a horizontal and elemental »respiratory« (*pneuma*) and not vertical and metaphysical »spiritual« (*spiritus*) manner, Berndtson (2013) argues that *The Bible* should be reread and reintepreted in an elemental sense – as a text being much more closely connected to the original or archaic elemental constellation. But we must return to Marion now for one more time: for him, there is a double movement in wind – firstly, it shows itself in its sheer vanity or nothingness, it evaporates before Being is reached, or, Being itself evaporates with(in) it. Secondly, and despite that, wind could perhaps still lead us towards the spiritual and thus it could »offer a name to the Spirit« (Marion 2001,

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[10] See here excellent interpretation of Mormon theology and materialism in ch. »What's Up with Mormons and Matter« (Webb (2013).

[11] The part of the sentence that is from Hölderlin, is from Hyperion, Part 1, Book 2, II, 147.

[12] For more on problems related to respiratory thinking see *Atmospheres of Breathing*, ed. by L. Škof and P. Berndtson (2018).

[13] Mormons usually refer to Holy Ghost rather then to Holy Spirit although both designations are used.

252) – but this could only happen in a way of giving up its »material« essence to the elevated and distanced authority of the Father and this is yet another dead--end for the element of the wind.

In his more recent thought on saturated phenomena (see *Giveness and Revelation* – i.e. his 2014 Gifford lectures), Marion represents the unity and continuity of his thinking over the decades by adding important new elements – which are known as saturated phenomena. Revelation now »encompasses the four types of saturated phenomena (the event, the idol, the flesh, and the icon; Marion 2016, viii), and Jesus Chirst itself is a saturated phenomenon and »the Icon of the invisible God« (ix). We must ask ourselves whether this new constellation could perhaps offer us an alternative way of thinking with or through the elemental plane. The Holy Spirit, as the third person of the Trinity, is now revealed to us as the giveness of the gift, *donum Dei*. His (sic![14]) role is that »the Holy Spirit enables the paternal depth of the filial icon to be seen, which no one can see without him and outside of him« (114). Finally, no revelation is possible without the inherent paradox that must be accepted as such: No one has ever seen God, because he remains »the only God, invisible« dwelling »in unapproachable light, and whom one among men can ever see« (*hon oudeis anthrōpōn oude idein dynatai*) (1 Tm 6.16), and of whom »the only Son, who is turned toward the Father's bosom, has made the exegesis (*eikenos ezēgēsato*)« (Jn 1:18), under the pre-eminently paradoxical title of »icon of the invisible God (*eikōn tou theou tou aoratou*) (Col. 1:15; see 2 Cor 4:4).

It seems, then, that even in his most recent thinking, Marion is still not willing to let distance of the Father to give its way to a more elemental ontological understanding. Or, in Marion's own words: »No misinterpretation of Revelation could surpass that of Heidegger /.../ who wanted to submit the Revelation of God to the manifestation of the gods, that manifestation to the dwelling of the divine, that dwelling to the opening of the sacred, and that opening to the intact open region of Being.« (Marion 2016, 57)

The icon of distance that has never allowed us to *breathe* the air of proximity.

3.   Conclusion

I have already argued that, in my opinion, Marion insists on the idolatrous distance of the Father *of* Being which rather needs to be deconstructed in favor of a more gentle and intimate gesture of divinity, a *God-Being*, as it were, that both indwells in a bodily and spiritual manner as well as in an ontological proximity to

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[14]   One cannot stop wondering about this *insensitivity* for sexual difference in Marion, and similarly, in the major philosophical traditions of Western thinkers (with some rare exceptions, such as Feuerbach in the 19th century, and among more contemporary philosophers Derrida and Badiou, and, of course, Beauvoir and Irigaray. See also Hawke (2018) who, taking her lead from Irigaray, does consider this insensitivity in the way cosmic worlds have been written up without acknowledgement of the »theological exile« (42) of female deities, sexual difference and an »ontology of maternal asylum« (44).

all of »us« (the elements, plants, nonhuman animals, human beings, divine beings) which still needs to be philosophically explained and theologically revealed in future post-Christian theology. In one of the most generous and thorough accounts on Mormonism and interfaith dialogue, *Mormon Christianity,* Stephen Webb presents us with a beautiful and theologically sensitive correction of any claim that God even could not have a being. (Webb 2013, 29) According to the Mormon belief, God is not »radically different from everything else that exists« (33) but this does not imply any simplistic or materialistic theory, underpinning such a statement. Finally – and thus to wind up this essay – thinking beyond any materialism-immaterialism divide, »God is mysterious but not indescribable, glorious but not unknowable, perfect but not infinite and unlimited« (37).

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Jason W. Alvis
Anti-Event: A Case for Inconspicuousness in Religious Experience

Proti-dogodek: zagovor neopaznega pri religiozni izkušnji

Abstract: It generally goes assumed that philosophical movements provide the fundamental inspiration and content for new theological reflection. Yet it also is the case that some philosophical concepts are secularized Christian theological concepts. Contemporary »postmodern« philosophy, for example, holds to the idea of »the event« as essential to its parting ways with the Modern philosophical tradition; an idea that is strikingly similar to how individual experiences of »revelation« have been understood in the Christian tradition, both as a personal and political phenomenon/phenomenality. Further, remaining unreflectively and theoretically beholden to the idea of the event may actually entail falling into its more negative form, the »spectacle«. By calling into question some of the negative potentials that clinging to such a notion could pose, this paper proposes a developed notion of »inconspicuous« as a means of countering such negative potentials. It engages the work of Heidegger, Debord, Janicaud and others in order to provide another angle by which it is possible to interpret the by now well-known »Theological Turn in French Phenomenology«. If over-reliance upon the concept of »the event« may fall prey to overemphasizing the outsourcing of imagination to a third party so that an agent might benefit from the novelty of surprise, difference, and newness, then both theological and philosophical engagements with »the event« run the risk also of becoming a »spectacle«.

Keywords: inconspicuous, spectacle, religion, event, phenomenology

Povzetek: Običajno se predpostavlja, da filozofska gibanja prinašajo temeljni navdih in vsebino novim teološkim razmišljanjem. Toda istočasno drži, da so premnoga filozofska pojmovanja le sekularizirana različica krščanskih teoloških pojmov. Sodobna »postmoderna« filozofija, na primer, kot točko razhajanja z novoveško moderno filozofskim izročilom izpostavlja idejo »dogodka«, ki močno spominja na način, kako so bile posamezne izkušnje »razodetja« razumljene v krščanskem izročilu tako na ravni osebnega kot tudi političnega fenomena/fenomenalnosti. Poleg tega pa lahko nereflektirana teoretična privrženost ide-

ji dogodka vodi k njegovi negativni različici – dogodku kot »spektaklu«. Z izpostavitvijo nekaterih negativnih potencialov, ki jih nosi nekritično oklepanje pojma dogodka, ta članek ponuja koncept »neopaznosti« kot možnost zoperstavitve tovrstnim negativnim potencialom. Članek premišljuje dela Heideggerja, Deborda, Janicauda in drugih ter ponuja nov zorni kot za soočenje z dobro znanim »teološkim obratom v francoski fenomenologiji«. Pretirano poudarjanje pojma »dogodka« lahko vodi v prekomerno pomembnost domišljijskih podob, ki si jih želijo tretje osebe, da dogodek zaradi novosti, presenečenja in drugačnosti pridobi na privlačnosti. Toda s tem tako teološko kot filozofsko ukvarjanje z »dogodkom« tvega, da se pretvori v »spektakel«.

Ključne besede: neopazno, spektakel, religija, dogodek, fenomenologija

It often is understood that contemporary Philosophy – known for its means of developing logical distinctions and arguments in a *clear* way and without recourse to contradictions – often runs counter to practical religious experiences and revelation – which attest to the enchanting, unpredictable, shocking, and »eventful« nature of life beyond epistemological conditions. Yet in many ways, these two tendencies or aspects of understanding the human condition share more similarities than we imagine, as both focus upon, and seek to unfurl in their own ways, what *shines* with apparent brilliance and what *shocks* with an eventful spectacularity. From Tillich's *Unbedingtheitserlebnis* (1940) to Badiou's ontology of *l'événement* (2013), the idea of »the event« has become a central means of describing the most fundamental ways the human condition (on both autonomous and societal levels) receives its continued shaping and meaning of influence. That is, »the event« is a primary *Stichwort* of postmodern philosophical discourse in general, as well as in contemporary postmodern theology and theory.

How is the idea of the event presented in such discourses and theories? It was Heidegger whose thought in the mid-30's (surely influenced by historical »events« such as the world wars) was transformed by this key term, *das Ereignis,* or »the event of appropriation«. The »overcoming« (*Überwindung*) of the blindness expressed in the metaphysics that dominates our Western age is an expression of the Event, and the Event is a showing (Er-eigen) or bringing under our eyes' visibility (Er-äugen) that which is lit up in clarity in order that we can take responsibility for something as our own (*eigen);* to accept that our empirical reality is an expression of our metaphysical committments. It was precisely this ontological aim that Badiou has integrated within his politically-oriented concern with *how* the »Event« *is* defined as that which is new and disrupts the present political »situation« as »Trans*-being« or how something can be *recognized* to bear such newness and disruption. Or for Deleuze, »in all my books, I have tried to discover the nature of the event«, (Deleuze 1995, 141) and »I spent a lot of time writing about this notion of the event« (160). The event follows his symbol of the unpredictable rhizome, which expresses an ontological priority of immanent »Events« over »substances« *(*Bowden 2011; Zourabichvili, 2012).

This is just to scratch the surface of 20th century postmodern theorists who rely heavily upon the idea – and explication – of cognates of the event within their work, as it is a topic that continues to exert a heavy influence still today by signaling towards political disruption and the upheaval of traditional subjectivity. Further, being passively affected by the shock of the *unpredictable* is essential to notions such as Derrida's »differánce«, »messianism«, and event-mentality, or Arendt's optimistic »newness« of natality. Although for Marion »the event« is limited to being one of the 4 (or 5) types of saturated phenomena, held »in the restricted sense, according to quantity« (Marion 2015, 362), it may be that, according to his more recent *Negative Certainties*, it is no longer simply that saturation determines the event, but that the event determines saturation. For »a phenomenon shows *itself* to be all the more saturated when it gives itself with a greater eventness« (362).[1] Most recently, Claude Romano has built an entire phenomenological approach to the event, which »upsets the hierarchy of the agent's objectives, the configuration of his possibilities, the way in which he understands them, and himself in light of them, that is, his world as such« (2015, 15). For him events are fundamentally impersonal, and mark the overall »transformation of the world« (XVI).

I realize the main title of this paper, »Anti-Event«, is rather bold, and I certainly do not dismiss wholesale the value the idea of the event may hold in many instances of thought. Yet one caution needs to be posed to the wholesale reliance upon the idea of the event. My criticism of the contemporary uses of the event hinges upon a) how I perceive a strange deviation from Heidegger's original intent with *Ereignis,* as the *idea* of event today often is automatically praised and broadly applied to all circumstances related to the positive benefit of the contemporary human condition; and b) the negative dark side of being utterly and passively beholden to the novelty that events are supposed to furnish us, thus (and here paradoxically) reinforcing the importance of nature (what gives itself, the world, the conditions that exert their power over us) over freedom (the voluntary, the risk, the agency of action). Indeed, the aforementioned understandings of the event as seemingly coming from nowhere and enrapturing us have a striking parallel to what Guy Debord referred to as a more negative notion of »spectacle«, with which, as he critiqued, western societies are obsessed.[2] The spectacle, whi-

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[1]   It is an open question for me if for Marion the greater the degree of unpredictability or »eventness« of a phenomenon signals to the greater the degree of its »saturation« and potency. Since most references to the event are situated according to being *but one* kind of saturated phenomena, it is not entirely clear what weight Marion wishes to give »the event« in his phenomenological approach, for Marion also critiques the very idea of passivity of intuition without passion, which also points to a responsibility to act. What he will refer to as elsewhere as »poor« or »common law« phenomena are poor or common because they are predictable; not to mention the fact that Marion's dictum still stands: »so much reduction, so much givenness« (Marion 1998, 203). Regarding the event as a saturated phenomena, »in happening /.../ attests to an unforeseeable origin, rising up from causes often unknown, even absent, at least not assignable, that one would not therefore any longer reproduce, because its constitution would not have meaning« (2002, 31).

[2]   The spectacle says »imagine for me in my place so I do not have to«, and this is not unlike what Robert Pfaler will refer to as »inter-passivity« (Pfaler 2017) like the »canned laughter« on sitcoms.

ch also expresses itself with a phenomenality or »spectacularity«, is the uncritical privelieging of whatever automatically grabs attention with the highest degree of bedazzelment, and in a way that presents a certain *Bildung* of reinforcing an ove-remphasis upon shocking *appearance*.[3] The moral consequences of a society of the spectacle operates implicitly by a maxim that auto-ascribes spectacularity with a certain Divine quality: »what appears is good; what is good appears«. Although contemporary post-structuralist theory is quick to judge the »spectacle«, and the proletariat we claim are unreflectively beholden to an undisciplined clicking on flashy political fake news and prescient internet fads, »the event« somehow is given a futural *carte blanche* with unlimited discretionary force as a purely neutral and laudable »idea«.

One also cannot overlook the fact that the event/spectacle is a typology that follows from the secularization of theological concepts, namely in this case, of certain aspects of revelation. Although some Christian denominations would find reference to contemporary revelation as concerning, I take it that revelation is a phenomenon that always necessitates first an individual, phenomenological encounter, as an experience of consciousness. It is in this sense that one can give description of revelation through various ways, for example, as an event. As Fr. Giussani put it in 1968, Christianity arose »as an event. Christianness is a social and historical furrow, but Christiaity is an event«. As expressed recently by Caputo – following Deleuze and Derrida, building his own theology around the event –, overall »religion has the structure of the event, and that theology takes the form of the analysis of that event«.[4] The event for him is a pre-personal and »anonymous transcendental field« that gets actualized in the world yet gains its power from calling the individual back and forth: back to its own original creative ability to change, and forth towards becomming and a messianic outside in the play of differences. Although religion has this evental structure, providing the underlying intelligibility of a particular »happening«, the event does not, for Caputo, have a religious structure. They belong to two »different orders«.[5]

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[3]   Debord here reflects a certain reliance upon Günther Anders here in the sense that he is charting a Western cultural shift. We »Westerners« are no longer obsessed with »being« or »having« but rather »appearing«. (Debord 2005, 10).

[4]   For Caputo, »My notion of the event is inspired by the work of Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, which gives it a double valence. On the one hand, events are a kind of pre-personal and anonymous transcendental field, a scene of virtualities or creative potencies that are expressed in names and actualized by things. Events make up a groundless ground, a ground that is not a foundation, a non--originary origin or quasi-arche, a becoming, which recalls the creature to its creative sources and resources. Events represent a kind of ›inside‹ of things and that inside is the more Bergsonian and Deleuzian side of events. On the other hand, the event is the scene of a promise, of a solicitation, which calls the present beyond itself, so that whatever is present is not the event but something that has been and is continually solicited by the event, constituting not the inner vein of becoming, the inside, but the structure of the to-come, the outside. That outside is its more messianic and Derridean side of events. The world is an open-ended non-totalizable totality, an open quasi-system, a linking, a chain of differences, of différance, of effects in space and time, history and nature, nature and culture, a complex of natura naturans and natura naturata. A theology of the event takes heed of both sides.« (Caputo 2010, 38, n 5)

[5]   Caputo: »To say that religion has the structure of the event is to say that religion gives allegorical expression to the event, so that the parables we find in religion are parables of the event. The event

This striking claim of Caputo's that religion has the structure of the event also could be reversed, especially if we consider that the idea of the event has appeared in a Western philosophy that is undoubtedly enervated by Christianity; that is, *the event also has the structure of this Christianity*. This, especially if one *either* holds to theology as the queen of the sciences, or religion to be an irreducible drive within the *conditio humana.* From a more Catholic perspective, the event is writ large within the language of recent Popes within the 20th century to describe Christianity (Lewis 2019): Francis emphasizes »the amazement of the encounter«, John Paul II the energizing of a »new impetus« and Benedict XVI the decidedly new »horizon« and »direction« events of given-grace bring about in disrupting our rationalisms and discursive formulae.[6]

With its persistent futurity, its overall insistence upon shattering the presently given with something new, the event in contemporary discourse could be interpreted as a secularized expression of some aspects of how *revelation* generally gets understood as a life-course-altering in-breaking into the finite landscape with a super-immance that transcends the everyday and given. Taking this latter point as a presumption (and here not disagreeing per se with Caputo's insight), the remainder of this paper aims to locate and describe particular aspects of the emphases upon the more negative version of the event within the spectacle, or a spectacular phenomenality, then develops a »phenomenology of the inconspicuous« in response to it. It in fact is possible to define the word »inconspicuous« (or that which is non-apparent, *Unscheinbar*), according to its etymological basis as »counter-spectacular« (*spek*)*.* After (1) locating a particularly paradigmatic debate that reflects these tensions within the pejoratively named »Theological turn in French Phenomenology« and the work of Dominique Janicaud), I then (2) introduce Heidegger's notion of a »phenomenology of the inconspicuous« in order to demonstrate three reasons why »inconspicuousness« may be used to give us some hesitation over any wholesale acceptance of the »event«. After demonstrating how this secularized theological notion of the spectacle is an outgrowth of modern philosophical thought with its emphasis upon clarity/appearance, I then demonstrate three ways such a notion of »inconspicuousness« may be used for more theological reflection.

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does not ›compete‹ with religion, the way Platonism competes with Aristotelianism, because religion and the event belong to different orders. Religion is something that happens, while the event is not what happens but what is going on in what happens. The event belongs to the order of a virtual or potential complex of operations or openings, while religion belongs to a different order, the order of what is concretely deployed, of what has been opened. The event belongs to the order of conditions, while religion is something unconditioned.« (Caputo 2010, 30)

6   Here I am reliant upon Stephen Lewis' reading, and his recognition of their uses of the language of the event. Lewis emphasizes especially that Francis frequently speaks of Christianity as an event (Lewis 2019, 3).

1. From Modern Clarity to Ontotheology

After Heidegger's early theological treatments of St Paul, Augustine, and Luther, and his 1927 diminishment of theology as »ontic« and under the oversight of philosophy, three years later in his 1930/31 Hegel Seminars he calls upon metaphysics to avoid ontotheology, later qualified in the early 50's as a means whereby philosophy »requires how the deity enters into it«, and refuses to acknowledge the limitations of knowledge. Ever since ontotheology has been that which philosophers within the continental tradition have sought to »overcome« (a very effort that still may be ontotheological), as it points also to how there are implicit theologies hiding within everyone's metaphysics, one task becomes the peeling apart of ontology from theology. Derrida once referred to implicit theologies as »unavowed theologeme[s]«, (2003, 155), which are at work within the social imaginaries of contemporary »secular« life. In a similar vein, in his recent and cleverly titled *The Insistence of God,* John Caputo proposes a synthesis of Hegel's »Protestant Principle« and Tillich's »ultimate concern« in order to conceive of a counter-relativistic »radical« theology in efforts to further continue separating the ontological from the theological.[7] As he put it 10 years earlier, however, and reflecting his Derridean and Heideggerian influences, »secularism is the continuation of theology by another means«[8] with its ethically entangled »unconditionals« like legal justice, human rights, or public rationality.[9]

What this approach iniated by Heidegger never seemed to account for are the ways in which the critique of modern philosophical metaphysics could ingrow within contemporary postmodern theory. The former emphasizes appearance and clarity, and the latter (especially as it has become socially embedded) is motivated by the spectacle/event. The former, concerned with appearance and theoretical focus, the latter, insistent upon the unforseeable, spontaneous, passive, and »evental« dimension of life. In a nutshell, the modern insistence on clarity is sutured to contemporary, »postmodern« insistence on the event.

There are two senses at work here in the association between modern philosophy and clarity. First, when we hear the phrase »clear and distinct«, we of course are reminded of Descartes, for whom those ideas or propositions are indubitably clear and capable of acting as a fundament upon which warrant for an argument can be built. »Triangles have three sides« is a clear and distinct proposition beca-

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[7] For Caputo, Continental Philosophy of Religion is a direct product of the tensions produced in precisely the earlier movement of »Phenomenology and the theological turn«: »The expression ›theological turn‹, coined by Janicaud, was intended as a complaint that philosophy was again becoming a handmaiden of a theological agenda. But it also described a genuine renewal of what had been traditionally called the ›philosophy of religion‹, resulting in a new subdiscipline, a specifically ›Continental philosophy of religion‹, offering an alternative to the reigning neo-Scholastic and analytic approaches, conceived in the spirit of Heidegger's critique of ›onto-theo-logic‹ and his meditations on ›non-objectifying thinking‹. God is not an object for a subject, not the referent of a propositional assertion, not the subject matter of a demonstration, all staples of ›modernity‹.« (Caputo 2012)

[8] For Caputo »secularization always presupposes a theology to secularize, so that, for better or for worse, secularism is the continuation of theology by another means« (Caputo 2006, 139).

[9] As Caputo continues, sovereignty is the »heritage of a barely secuarlized theology« (Caputo 2006, 140).

use it is relatively self-evident, as the conclusion already is contained within the proposition. As Descartes understood, this is *how* consciousness *grasps* information: constantly sorting out the clear from the unclear, which also entails distinguishing the valuable from the insignificant. Such propositions lead to metaphysical certainty, *Adequatio*— a truth of »correctness« armed with unquestionably that sutures Clarity and truth. Second, this clarity involves implicitly a religious dimension. Without going into too much detail regarding his ontological argument, it is the clear and distinct idea of God that reasserts Descartes' own existence and indubitability. This three-fold argument follows the following structure: 1. that which I clearly and distincly percieve to be contained in the idea of something is true of that particular thing. 2. I clearly and distinctly percieve that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God. And 3. we therefore might conclude God exists. Clarity of this perception (or at least the intuition of what is obvious) becomes immediately associated with divinity *and* to some degree*, vice versa*.

The twin impulses of philosophical clarity and the unpredictability of eventhood can lead us to some extent in the direction of phenomenology, a self-proclaimed inheritor of Cartesian self-consciousness that seeks truth through *focused description* of things as they present and illuminate themselves in differing modes. It is of no coincidence that the word phenomenology, rooted in *Phainesthai*, relates to the Greek *phōs*, which concerns what »burns« and thus shines its revelatory light upon something to make it obvious. The tendency has been to reproach phenomenologists as claiming full right to allow them control over the things of this world, as their illuminators. Yet it is actually in this total committment to the clear, obvious, and illuminated that – like Plato's cave dwellers stuck in passive stupor – phenomenology's practitioners run the risk of abstract *prehension* and detailed attention, that loses the textures of the lived involvement with that which is – or in their temporal element, have been – perceived. In other terms, when a phenomenological study of experience is limited to clear »presentation« of the given, its results may yield little value because illumination always, by its very nature, is limited with its scope-like focusing. Without refracting this illumination back into the everyday, what is acheived through this focus borders on abstration and reification. While one might laud phenomenology for its ability to create distance from the thing perceived in order to get a better grip on it, there also comes a sense of urgency upon us for experiences do not allow us to presume we are inactive. As we might learn from the lives of religious mystics, »we are either moving in the direct of verticality or in the direction of idolatry« (Steinbock 2009, 6; 10).

2.   Janicaud and the Theological Turn in French Phenomenology

Stunningly paradigmatic of making phenomenology a question unto itself, and of inquiring into it as an approach that can/cannot be used to study religious experience (as well as to its relation with »clarity« and illumination) are the debates

that began in the 60's regarding the work of Levinas, Ricœur, Derrida, Henry, Chrétien, and Marion. These debates reached a climax in 1991, with Dominique Janicaud pejoratively dubbing this work to mark *Le tournant théologique de la phénomenénologie française* (The theological turn in french phenomenology).[10] For him, these thinker's works made them religious wolves in phenomenological sheeps clothing. They were accused of misusing phenomenological language to address theological interests, and this was deemed inconsistent with Husserl's »methodological atheism« (in §58 of *Ideen*), the aim of which is to study the activities within pure consciousness with a presuppositionlessness in our descriptive enterprises *that does hinder an accurate description of whatever appears*. Claiming they presumed an idealist *metaphysica specialis* to describe an *invisible* hinterland that does *not* appear *clearly* and *obviously* to the senses, Janicaud was motivated by seeking to protect the method from any delusional transcendence seeking to infiltrate immanent life. It is perfectly fine if an individual wishes to believe in the transcendence of God and any invisible hinter-world, nevertheless it »must remain excluded /.../ insofar as this field must be a field of pure consciousness.« (Janicaud 2000) Phenomenology, after all, describes things as they are constituted *prior to any evidential character* of epistemological justification, and religion seems to be a laminiate that gets placed onto the experiences of the everyday lifeworld.

At various points during the last 30 years, the very same critique has been turned back on Janicaud's insistence upon methodological atheism, which could just as easily entail a different kind of a priori requirement by claiming that theological concepts putatively *cannot* appear for investigation, and that religion is not phenomenologically describable, thereby limiting phenomenology's wide-open, »unsuspecting« horizon. Yet Janicaud raises some reasonable caution that needs to be considered carefully: if any claims or »prejudgments« are to be taken seriously as having social-explanatory power, then taken to its extreme the method can be commandeered easily to proclaim as *true* whatever *can be imagined*. For Husserl, although immanent reality is essenceless without a transcendental and intersubjective connection to the outside world, we are to take his »golden rule« of phenomenology very seriously: to not to claim anything that we »*cannot make essentially transparent to ourselves by reference to consciousness* and on purely immanental lines.« Especially in an age that once held religion antithetical to the secular hypothesis, Janicaud thus brings to a climax a central double-bind of any phenomenology of religion: phenomenological description must be presuppositionless and not import what cannot be valid as undisguised and obvious (*selbstverständlich*) upon its horizon. Yet, any methodological »mustness« also can just as well limit what phenomenology is capable of achieving for thought to think. »Method« may leave phenonenology under threat of the de facto abandonment of the primacy of description and thus dissolution into epistemology; yet an unruly

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[10] This of course was not the first iteration of phenomenology of religion, which has a rich–although at times scattered–heritage, from Geradus van der Leeuw's 1925 contribution to more recent attempts of James Cox, to use the approach as a method for emperical sociology.

openendedness to a description of religious phenomena easily waters-down the approach, leaving the findings threatened by being trapped in abstraction as *solus ipse,* and lacking social power.

Within Janicaud's critique of these young French thinkers, something goes generally overlooked, yet it is what he calls the core, »sick root« of their work: they relied on Heidegger's »phenomenology of the inconspicuous«. Under this notion, which concerns claims to the viability of »the nonvisible«, Janicaud claims even »the most audacious soundings stand permitted«. That is, anyone can claim anything as true so long as they can reference its status as »inapparent«. (Janicaud 2000, 30–31; 28–29) Janicaud brifely returns to this notion over a decade later, insisting that »the inconspicuous« is »not reducible to a mere appendix to the thought of the later Heidegger«, and indeed presents »a new meditative form of thought« (2005, 75). At the very least, it certainly is not a banal or marginal concept, for it is »an oxymoron, a supreme paradox, or a disconcerting impossibility« (1998, 106). This somewhat ambiguous idea of inconspicuousness did not appear formally until Heidegger's 1973 *Zähringen Seminar*, in which he claimed: »Phenomenology is a path that leads away to come before /.../ and it lets that before which it is led show itself. This phenomenology is a *Phänomenologie des Unscheinbaren* [inconspicuous] /.../ Indeed, in conceiving [*Be-greifen*], there is the gesture of taking possession.« Yet »that which sight takes into view, it does not conceive.«[11]

What might this »approach« or typology of phenomenology concern beyond this ambiguity? What of the phenomena it describes? Would they be phenomena that 1) have-not-yet-appeared, 2) have-appeared-yet-are-obscured, 3) never-are--to-appear, or 4) always-already-remain-in-the-blind-spots-of-appearance?

3.   Phenomenology of the Inconspicuous

I have tried to fill in some of the gaps where Heidegger – likely intentionally – remained opaque (or as he might say »fortuitously ambiguous«) by developing this notion further, then applying it to Religious Experience. It is clear that for Heidegger »The inconspicuous is by no means to be confused with ›the invisible‹« and that we are always to begin with our immanent place and moment in the world. As addressed throughout his works, the mundane things of the world – carpentry shoes, workers' hammers – paradoxically have the greatest potential to impact us in the world. This, it seems, is one of the motivations that have driven interest in the inconspicuous.

Building upon, yet also departing from Heidegger's work, here is my running definition of inconspicuousness/*Unscheinbarkeit*: it characterizes an experience of phenomena whose aspects of intelligibility oscillate between presence and

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[11]   Heidegger, 2003, 80. Or, in German: »So verstanden ist die Phänomenologie ein Weg, der hinführt vor /.../ und sich das zeigen läßt, wovor er geführt wird. Diese Phänomenologie ist eine Phänomenologie des Unscheinbaren.« (Heidegger 1986, 397)

withdrawal, specifically *in a way that disturbs (with a very unique* »ability«) the presumptions of both the *spectacular* (what snatches our attention) and any vacuous, empty, or banal ideal of »unthinkability« (what leads attention to indifference).[12] Inconspicuousness thus is paradoxical, running contrary to expectation, and resisting extraction from that within which it mundanely is integrated in the *Lebenswelt,* like a wallflower. It may refer to something with which we are in relation, yet as unobtrusive (*Unaufällig),* and as without *signifying* itself by being bright (*leuchtend*), manifested (*offenbar*), or clear (*klar*). Since it is not awareness-grabbing (*Aufmerksamkeit erregen*), it thus is transfixed with a phenomenality that is apresentative and inconceivable.[13]

Some phenomenal experiences indeed actively evade any attempt to be grasped directly, and they require a broadened vision to be experienced because they are so deeply imbedded and integrated within the lifeworld. The visual example of the Mona Lisa smile depicts this quite nicely: It enigmatically only can be seen through a peripheral glance that eludes the conceptual grasp of directedness, thus *requiring some creative imagination.* That is, the Mona Lisa smile is not given without co-creation. This inconspicuousness is *essential to the experience* of her smile.[14] Such experiences help us deprivelege, even if but momentarily, our prevailing presumptions regarding presentation, and our own relational opening to the world as co-constituted.

This leads us also back to the overall interests of phenomenology. One of the most relied upon half-truths of phenomenology is that it provides only pedantic and painstakingly detailed descriptions of phenomena. Yet more fundamentally, it concerns »the how« of appearance (Husserl's »*Gegenstände im wie*«)*,* the suspension (*epoché*) also of all presumptions regarding *appearing*.[15] Any detailed or »ontological« description cannot be untethered therefore from its turn *to recontextualize* the experience back in its holistic context. Otherwise, we end up with a hyperfocus that births, somewhat ironically, a certain deficit of attention to no longer see the thing in its lifeworld or environment, thus ultimately *losing a grip on the thing itself as it was given*. Husserl's categorial/sensical intuition distinction inspires towards an example: When I write with my pen, I am not engaged in a judgement but a state of affair: the *hyle* of that pen (blue, ink, cyllindrical, etc) in fact (and thankfully!) withdraws in favor of the pen-in-use. And thus the most *objecti-*

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[12] I rely here upon the German ending *–barkeit,* which points to a thing as dynamic and active.

[13] Françoise Dastur interprets, Heidegger's »inapparent« is »the nonappearance that resides in all appearing, the event itself of apparition and the giving of being« (Dastur 2002 146). Jacques Taminiaux, who played a decisive role in the early reception of the Zähringen seminar, concludes that the com-ing-into--appearance of things is inconspicuous insofar as it always is transfixed with an inaccessible »excessiveness at the very heart of seeing« (Taminiaux 1977, 79).

[14] As the neuro physicist Eric Kandel recently discovered, our peripheral »cone« vision allows us to experience things that otherwise are impossible to experience in central »foveal« vision because despite not being able to »perceive details well, [it] employs a holistic analysis that enables us to see.« Indeed »We can perceive things in peripheral vision – like Mona Lisa' smile – that we miss in central vision« and in this case »peripheral vision may often be better than foveal vision« (Kandel 2012, 246).

[15] Phenomenology's aim is to descibe this »how« structure or phenomenality. See Husserl 1991, 121.

vely or materially present becomes inconspicuous. If this were not the case, then I would be stuck as a kind of *Grübelsucht* of appearances, compulsively obsessed and fixated upon only a few material aspects, never even using the pen.

4. Inconspicuousness as Useful for Describing Religious Experiences

Among the many possible tasks for a phenomenology of religious experience, there are three that stand out to benefit from the concept of »inconspicuousness«: 1. to develop concepts that do justice to religious experience and revelation *as lived;* 2. to probe the *socially* influenced notions of God's phenomenality; and 3: to describe the types of evidence appropriate to religion's modes of givenness. I will sketch here a few ways the notion of inconspicousness has been employed to take up these three tasks, keeping in mind the aforementioned matrix of clarity/spectacle and event as a backdrop.

1. Religious Experience can be understood as an inconspicuous and paradoxical kind of »unveiling«. It typically gets conceived that only *exceptional* or superlative experiences of everyday life are religious, and thus our philosophical devices are employed to study it from a particular *arch* that conceives religion as ever in reference to a superlative, namely, from *abstracted distanciation*. Religion, for example, has been theorized as the experience of »invisible things« (Jevons) that overwhelm us with »the greatest« holiness (Otto), as distanciated from us a pure and untouchable (Eliade), our most laudible or »ultimate concern« (Tillich) or a kind of system of life-ordering *penultimate* symbols (Geertz).[16] Although these theories may be an historically accurate means to discuss normatively some aspects of religious traditions, overemphasizing the »awe« and distance of revelation may come at the expense of forgetting the re-jointing (re-*ligare)* of the sacred *within* the profane and in a way that a spectacular clarity is given even more credence.

Inconspicuousness might help draw our attention to the exceptional from within the insignificant; the holistic imbeddedness of revelations and their unique kinds of unveiling from-within a certain atmosphere essential to their expression. If an experience of revelation is meant to be shocking and inherently *paradoxical,* then the content of this shocking should come *precisely* from out of *unexpected* and non-spectacular things, places, and people. Following Heidegger, there is a *saving* power of the ordinary, especially that which resists passive assimilation into technological efficiency and enframing machination. And indeed those of us not fortunate enough to have had spectacular supernatural experiences must find

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[16] As Geertz claims »[A] religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts (2) to establish powerful, pervasive, long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence« (Geertz 1966, 4). Or as Tillich puts it »Religion as ultimate concern is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion expresses itself« (Tillich 1964, 42).

revelation among St Teresa's pots and pans or what the lowly kitchen assistant, Brother Lawrence (who some thought had a mental disability) commonly referred to as »Common Business«.

2. Next, inconspicousness can a means of describing the kind of social-explanatory power or paradoxical *evidence* unique to such religious experience. Usually evidence is achieved by isolating information relevant to an experience or phenomenon, then applying it back to the whole context to learn something new about it (this is what happens in a court of law for example). Yet in the case of religious experiences, which inherently are paradoxical, it seems the means to attaining the »evidences« of their phenomenality concerns locating what *cannot* be isolated or extracted from the whole. Experience, the means of grasping from within the steady stream of consciousness, takes on a different sense when it becomes »religious« insofar as it ascribes intelligibility and meaningfulness without total comprehension. To attest to an inconspicuous religious experience, then, is to bear witness and give testimony to that which strangely is qualifiable neither as visible nor invisible.

Coincidentally, the root of the German *Unscheinbar* is *schein,* a ticket, warrant (such as *Der Fahrschein*, or travel ticket) or *evidence*. It conerns licenses and tickets that present their reasons easily and clearly upon command. Thus, what is Un--schein-bar furnishes an index of questionability both to whatever presents itself as obvious and neutral, *and* any »direct« and univocal manifestation of its evidence. It is not *contrary,* however, to evidence. It seems an »inconspicuous evidence« used to characterizes Religious experience would shroud its warrant in a unique way *necessarily* because the vast intelligibility of the *content* is so overwhelmingly significant that it cannot be extracted from the *form* of presentation. Such evidence would not attain any such level of provability, for this would entail that the person or figure of religious experience (often, although not always associated with gods or the Absolute) can be *conjured* upon our command.

Yet on the other hand, inconspicuousness is not the same as invisibility, and what is given also would not simply slip into inconceivability. Such an evidence would thus *give itself* as *non-isolatable in a way that its* non-isolation becomes, itself, a phenomenon of experience. It attests to how »evidence« is not univocal, but indeed needs to be understood in proportion to that which it hopes to represent. Indeed, not all evidences are the same: being qualified to drive a car is not the same as the evidence of »qualification« or »defense« of one's religious experience. And since evidence also is meant to have socially explanatory power beyond *solus ipse,* the experiencer also would *express* that evidence and *enact* it in the world in a way that she emulates the phenomenality of that which she experienced as inconspicuous. That is, the individual herself would present evidence through acting in the world, and give witness inconspicuously as culturally imbedded and integrated.

3. And thirdly, inconspicuousness could be a characteristic of God. One of the most often relied upon character traits of God is invisibility or hiddenness, often

leading to God's unthinkability. Schellenberg's popular »Hiddenness of God« argument for example hingest upon precisely this to prove God's non-existence (Schellenberg 2015). The argument builds from the premise that people fail to believe in God by no fault of their own, and concludes therefore that this »hiddenness« of God contradicts that God is all loving. The salience of the argument pivots around a rather univocal dichotomy between the invisible and the visible, between the hidden and the revealed. Yet in thinking with Levinas in his *Of God who Comes to Mind,* is not hiddenness itself a phenomenon, and more than a total privation? The task then becomes deciphering *what kind* of hiddenness is experienced. Or as Tomás Halík has put it, in some way chanelling boht Levinas and Schellenberg: »If there is something that might be described as the religious experience of modern man, then it is the experience of God's hiddenness.« (2016, 36)

A phenomenology of the inconspicuous helps us work out in greater detail (yet again, without »conceiving« fully) the various *kinds* of hiddenness that could characterize God and God's phenomenality. The false dichotomy between unconcealedness and concealment (*Unverborgenheit),* should instead be thought according to distinct modes (*Weisen*) and kinds (*Arten*), for example, such as those of *displacement* (such as setting aside, making absent, destroying, or withdrawing) and those *of sheltering* (like preserving, safeguarding, rarifying, or treasuring). The claim that inconspicuousness is one means of characterizing God could be interpreted in many different ways, but here I rely here upon Levinas, whose »Other« is marked by a riddle and paradox: the Other becomes a phenomenologically inflected inconspicuous divinity. Here divine omnipotence is not just »all powerful«, but »all potential« (as Catherine Keller insists). It would mark precisely the cunning of God to integrate within the marginal and insignificant. This is not a defect. Not unlike what political theorists call the *détournement* of capitalistic producton, a subversion of the spectacular *from within* the mundane, is a core paradox of God's phenomenality.

5.   Conclusion

Concluding, over-emphasizing the shockingly spectacular eventhood, unpredictability, or enchanting newness of religious experience may leave its subjects in a strangely *passive* state; yet a surgeon-like precision that demands that all experiences fit into the model of direct appearance and clarity often lack attention to the ethical context, texture, or lifeworld of presentation. Our contemporary society obsessed with spectacles, and its entanglement in implicit theological imaginaries, is not simply antithetical to philosophical clarity, *but also its product*. One reason: the modern search for clarity that has insisted upon a solipsistic and individual way of establishing experience of the world has been inherited by the postmodern, which expresses this search in its even greater emphasis upon appearing, as our present, media-frenzied society of the spectacle demonstrates. The search for »clarity« has shifted from ideas to images.

This is not to discount either the modern or postmodern projects, however, yet to demonstrate the productivity of their internal contradictions and challenges. As we learn from Freud's *Civilization and its discontents,* praiseworthy and necessary social imperatives entail the provocation of the very negative effects that seek to erode those imperatives. Likewise, the hopes for philosophical clarity and distinction inadvertently have played a role in birthing what intuitively seems to be their opposite, yet in fact are their stunning discontent – our contemporary society of the spectacle, obsessed with images and illusions. Today we live with the fundamental anxiety that we are just one click away from missing the essential; with the information not being in the form of words, but rather of images and hype. The unconditioned call to *comprehensivity, i.e. to see and experience it all with a still focused and abstracted perception,* innervates our social relations and quietly motivates our thinking.

Given this context, should the idea of »the event«, which fundamentally refers to the experience of being enraptured with something, be a primary and fundamental *telic end* for philosophical thinking? Similarly, can there be any salvation from the aforementioned and related idea of the spectacle? And thinking theologically, could it be that theologies that overemphasize revelation as all shock, awe, and hype – think here of St Paul's being knocked down from his horse and blinded as *the* paradigm of revelation – in part be to blame for insisting that we await whatever spectacle God is going to bring us? I have sought here to point out simply that there are phenomenal experiences that do not fit into either category of »shining with brilliance« or »not shining«, and rather present their phenomenality through »counter shining«. Returning once again to the etymological basis of *inconspicuous:* at the root of *conspicere* is *specere* or »spec«, the basis of *spectacle.* It thus is necessary to not overlook how »inconspicuous« *is* precisely »the-counter spectacular« – it acts not as a simple, passive privation, but rather with a force and dynamic *ability*. This counter spectacularity could mark the subversion of the holy, the *detournement* of God, neither through the provision of an image, nor through the removal of one. We scholars of religion who are interested in the idea of »the event« (perhaps even Christianity is, par excellence, *the* religion of the event!) would do well to mind the difference between looking-at and looking-longingly-at in order to prevent a total beholdenness to a passive *awaiting itself*. Abraham looks at (שקף *šāqap*) Sodom, while Lot's wife looks longingly back (טבת *tāḇeṭ*) at it (Genesis 19). The former experiences the event by actively taking account of the breadth of the present context; the latter surrenders to the event as a spectacle of the desired, ultimately turning into a pilar of salt.

Acknowledgements

ous Violence« [P 29599], and concluded within the project »Revenge of the Sacred: Phenomenology and the Ends of Christianity in Europe« [P 31919].

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Bojan Žalec

Between Secularity and Post-Secularity: Critical Appraisal of Charles Taylor's Account[1]

Med sekularnostjo in postsekularnostjo: kritična ocena pojasnitve Charlesa Taylorja

Abstract: The article deals with Charles Taylor's account of the secular age. In the first part, the main constituents of Taylor's narrative account are presented: the central concepts, distinctions, definition of the subject, the aims etc. The author pays special attention to the notions of secularity, secular age, religion, and transcendence. In the second part, Taylor's genealogy of the secular age is outlined and comparatively placed in the context of other main relative forms of genealogical account. Because our age is an age of authenticity, a special section is devoted to it. The final section presents some reproaches to Taylor and evaluates their strength and the value of Taylor's contribution. Besides, some speculative »forecasts« about secularity and post-secularity in Europe, the USA, and at the global scale are presented (by reference to Taylor's account). The author concludes that despite some (serious and cogent) reproaches and second thoughts about Taylor's account, it is doubtless one of the major achievements in the area that manifests features of a paradigmatic work. It helps us a lot to understand the condition of religion not only in the past and today, but also gives us directions and guidelines, conceptual and methodological tools, and ideas to more clearly discern the forms and condition of religion in the future.

Key words: Charles Taylor, secularization, secular age, religion, transcendence, genealogy, authenticity, post-secularity.

Povzetek: Članek se ukvarja s pojasnitvijo sekularne dobe, ki jo zasledimo v delu Charlesa Taylorja. V prvem delu so predstavljeni glavni elementi Taylorjeve narativne pojasnitve: središčni pojmi, razlikovanja, opredelitev predmeta, nameni itd. Avtor posveti posebno pozornost pojmom sekularnosti, sekularne dobe,

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religije in presežnosti. V drugem delu oriše Taylorjevo genealogijo sekularne dobe, ki jo primerjalno umesti v kontekst drugih glavnih relevantnih oblik genealoške pojasnitve. Ker je naša doba doba pristnosti, ji avtor posveti poseben razdelek. Zadnji razdelek predstavi nekatere kritike Taylorja, ovrednoti njihovo težo, pa tudi vrednost Taylorjevega prispevka. Poleg tega so podane – v nanašanju na Taylorjevo pojasnitev – spekulativne »napovedi« o sekularnosti in post- -sekularnosti v Evropi, ZDA in na globalni ravni. Avtor zaključi, da je Taylorjeva pojasnitev, kljub nekaterim (resnim in tehtnim) očitkom ter pomislekom, nedvomno izjemen dosežek. Izkazuje značilnosti paradigmatičnega dela. Ne samo da nam zelo pomaga razumeti položaj religije v preteklosti in danes, ampak nam daje tudi usmeritve in smernice, pojmovna in metodološka orodja ter ideje za jasnejše razbiranje oblik in položaja religije v prihodnosti.

Ključne besede: Charles Taylor, sekularizacija, sekularna doba, religija, presežnost, genealogija, pristnost, postsekularnost

In this paper, I will present[2] Charles Taylor's understanding of (our) secular age and its genesis. Taylor's aim is an analysis and understanding of the conditions, characteristics and potentials of religious belief today. His starting premise is that the conditions of belief determine the nature of belief: if the relevant conditions of two beliefs are different then also these beliefs are different. So, for instance many people nowadays say: »Today people don't believe but in the past, they believed«. However, this comparison is only conditional because the conditions of belief changed (Hoffmann 2017, 272). Taylor stresses that his narrative covers only West,[3] i.e. North Western Europe, the USA and Canada. Despite these constraints, I think that it is enlightening and useful also for understanding in a broader frame.

1. Secularisation and a Secular Age

Taylor discerns three meanings of »secularization«: In the first sense (S1), secularization is understood in terms of public space – which concerns common institutions and practices. Societal subsystems (economy, politics, religion, legal sphere, education, science ...) have become differentiated, separated and autonomous. But Taylor points out that the fact that religion is not present any more in the autonomous public areas doesn't mean that people don't believe any more. Maybe the example is even Poland under communism, but certainly the USA. The USA is

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[2]   Beside Taylor 2007, his most important works relevant for our paper are Taylor 1989 and 1991. From the secondary sources, we should mention the condensed presentations and valuable reflections on Taylor's (relevant) views and approaches in Abbey 2000 and 2017, Smith 2014, and Hoffmann 2017.

[3]   Taylor speaks about »our (North Atlantic, or ›Western‹) civilization« (Taylor 2007, 15) or about »changes which have arisen in one particular civilization, that of the modern West – or in an earlier incarnation, Latin Christendom«.

one of the first secularised countries in this first sense. But statistically (religious belief and praxis), it is one of the most religious. For this reason, Taylor alleges the second meaning of secularization (S2), which consists in people not visiting church any more. In this sense, the majority of Western countries have become secular. But Taylor notes: »Deconfessionalization is a major phenomenon, but it by no means betokens simply unbelief. Religion does not decline because churches do« (Taylor 1990, 105). So, both two meanings of »secularization« mentioned above are insufficient for a complete and adequate description of our condition today (Abbey 2000, 196). Moreover, they don't encompass the most important characteristic of present condition, which is the key to its true understanding. Therefore, Taylor introduces the third meaning of secularity (S3) which focuses on the background of belief. The shift in secularity consists in that that in the secular societies a belief in God has been set under the question and challenged. In this sense the main environments in the USA are secularized and probably the USA in general. The opposite examples are the majority of Muslim countries and the environments where the majority of people in India live (Taylor 2007, 1–3).

Secularity in this third sense is the true subject of Taylor's interest; and it is the age which is secular in this third sense that is the subject of his seminal work from 2007. S3 is a matter of the integral context of understanding in which our modern, spiritual and religious experience takes place. With this »context« Taylor means not only the things to which almost everybody would explicitly point – as for instance a plurality of options – but also the elements which are a part of the implicit, »hidden« part of this context. This is the background of our experience and (spiritual) searching to which mostly we don't pay attention. Taylor speaks – in a Heideggerian manner – about the »pre-ontology« of this searching (3). Whether a society is secular or not in the third sense (S3) depends on the conditions under which their members' experience and (spiritual) searching take place.

According to Taylor, the difference between secular and religious view consists in where they put the origin of fullness of human life (10–11). The same point he expresses also by saying that today we can live a spiritual life in different ways, that the strength and fullness of life can take different forms, and the »exiles« as well (11). Because of the changed condition of belief, »belief in God isn't quite the same thing in 1500 and 2000« (13). These conditions philosophers – influenced by Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Polany – call »background«.[4] People cultivate all their beliefs inside the frame which usually remains tacitly assumed, but the subject or the agent of belief may not acknowledge it because this frame is never explicitly formulated. Thus, what Taylor has here in mind are not some changes of belief at the propositional or discursive level (»decline« of hell, new understanding of atonement etc.), therefore the changes through which even orthodox Christianity has gone. No, even in the case of the identical propositions of belief, a belief now (in the secular age) and before are – because of the changed background – different. Taylor speaks about the disruption of the earlier background.

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[4]   For the importance of backgrounds, see Žalec 2016.

These changes become most visible if we focus on some distinctions – for instance between immanent and transcendent, natural and super-natural etc. – which today practically everybody understands, regardless if they accept them or refuse the second term of the pairs (13–14). Therefore, S3 refers to the change or shift in the background of belief: »It is this shift in background, in the whole context in which we experience and search of fullness, that I am calling the coming of secular age, in my third sense« (14). And he immediately adds:

> »How did we move from a condition where, in Christendom, people lived naïvely within theistic construal, to one in which we all shunt between two stances, in which everyone›s construal shows up as such: and in which moreover, unbelief has become for many the major default option? This is the transformation that I want to describe, and perhaps (alas very partially) explain in the following chapters« (14).[5]

This task is in no way an easy one, but only through identifying changes as changes of lived experience, we can start rising the right questions properly, and we avoid naïve views and accounts on all sides as are the following: non-belief is only a fall away of every sense of fullness or it's betrayal (what theists sometimes are tempted to think about the atheists); a belief is only a set of theories which try to make sense of experiences which we all have and which nature can be understood totally immanently (what atheists are sometimes tempted to think about theists). But in fact, we must, as Taylor stresses, understand the differences between these options not only in terms of creeds, but also in terms of differences in experiences and sensibility. What happened is a massive change in the whole background of belief and unbelief, which consists in disappearance of the »naïve« frame and establishing of the »reflective one«. We must bear in mind that after this change, both believers and non-believers experience their worlds very differently (14).

The characteristic of the secular age is that it happened first time in human history that self-sufficient humanism became a viable option. Self-sufficient humanism – or exclusive humanism, these are synonyms for Taylor – is a standpoint which doesn't accept any final ends beyond human flourishing and no commitment to anything beyond this flourishing. This is not true about any previous societies (18). Taylor notes that humanism has appeared already before, but it was not self-sufficient or exclusive.[6] Further, he accepts that there were also exclusive humanisms before the secular age, for instance Epicureanism in Antiquity. But only in the secular age exclusive humanism became widely spread and accessible option. In the past this was true only about some small elite which itself was a minority (19). It is important that we bear in mind that modern secularity (S3) is neither identical nor equivalent with exclusive humanism. S3 (hereafter simply secularity) is a condition in which experience and searching for fullness of both

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5   We may maybe say that our faith before was naïve realism, now it can be at most critical realism.

6   About the temporal frame of the development of exclusive humanism, see also Abbey 2000, 200.

believers and non-believers take place. Further, exclusive humanism is not the only alternative to religion. In our age there are intellectual currents which we can call non-religious anti-humanism which according to Taylor today appear under several names as for instance »deconstruction« and »post-structuralism« and which are rooted in some very influential texts of 19th Century, especially in Nietzsche. Taylor mentions here also deep ecology, which tries to find non-exclusive humanism on a non-religious basis. This deep ecology takes different forms.

We can summarise what we said above as follows: the secular age finished the period of naïve religious belief. Its deciding characteristic is coming of exclusive humanism on a sociologically relevant scale. For the first time in history »the eclipse of all goals beyond human flourishing becomes conceivable; or better, it falls within the range of an imaginable life for masses of people« (20).

2.   Religion and Dimensions of Transcendence

Taylor defines religion by the concept of transcendence: religion offers a transformation which goes beyond human perfection. He discerns three dimensions of transcendence, and religion combines all three.[7] We can explain these three dimensions by the example of Christianity. In it, we can find: 1. Good (of man) which transcends mere human prosperity. This is *agape*, love, that God has for us and in which we can partake through his love. Thus, it is offered to us a possibility of transformation which leads beyond merely human perfection. We can become super-natural, more as merely human(s); 2. A higher, transcendent power (God) which reaches beyond human perfection and is understandable to us – makes sense – only in the context of belief in a higher, transcendent God of faith, who appears in the majorities of the definitions of belief; 3. Posthumous life, a life beyond this life. Our story about the potential transformation through *agape* demands that we see our lives as extending beyond their »natural« scope between birth and death, in other words, beyond »this life«. In short, according to Taylor (Christian) transcendence and religion have three dimensions: a good which surpasses the mere human perfection, the power which makes possible human reaching of this perfection, and the belief that our life extends beyond this life (beyond our birth and death). In order to understand the struggle, rivalry, or debate between religion and unbelief in our culture, we must, Taylor says, understand religion as combining all these three dimensions of transcendence. In our culture, there are many options which are somewhere between the option which affirms these three dimensions, and their total denial, thus a total denial of religion. But the debate in our society, which otherwise includes different standpoints, is primarily shaped by two »extremes«: transcendent religion on one hand, and its frontal denial on the other. Taylor claims that this is a fact about the modern cul-

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7   On the phenomenological understanding (Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Marion) of transcendence, self-transcendence, and temporality see Klun 2017. On the Biblical monotheism and its comprehension of transcendent God see Petkovšek 2017, 625.

ture. But in general, the naïvety is not possible (any more) for nobody in the secular age. This situation includes different environments in which there may be different default options than in others although those who inhabit those environments are well aware of the default options preferred by others and they can't any more dismiss them as an unexplainable exotic error (21). In this sense Taylor speaks about the »mutual fragilization« of beliefs or »world views« in the secular age (303). Thus, S3 is not a term opposite to the term »religious« but it rather denotes the entire frame in which today all worldviews are situated. It is the result of the transformation of society from one in which not believing in God is impossible, into society in which belief in God is just one among other »worldviews« or beliefs. The secular age is according to Taylor irreversible (Taylor 1989, 401; Abbey 2000, 199): no return to pre-secular condition is possible. Earlier, the natural order, the societal order, the family, and the lives of individuals were explained with a reference to God. Belief in God has been a self-evident frame. In the secular age, after the change, nature, society, and lives of individuals, they are all explained without reference to God. One can still do it, but they don't have to because they can explain and interpret the world entirely from the immanent world itself. But in general, a belief, and other beliefs or non-beliefs are just one interpretation among others.

3.   Genealogy

Taylor uses frequently some concepts, distinctions, periodisations, classifications etc., among them division of religions on pre-axial, axial and post-axial (Christianity and Islam), and his threefold periodisation of the Modern Age: the age of *Ancien Regime*, the age of mobilization (1800–1950), and the age of authenticity, from the 1960s onwards. Taylor's genealogy of the secular age is very complex and involves many factors. But among the drivers of secularization, Taylor stresses especially two that are mutually connected. The first is the Reform, the second is the development of science. But the most important is the first, the Reform. The Reform started in the 16th century in North Western Europe. It originates in the coincidence of military, economic and religious interests. It includes the process of civilizing and disciplining of the European citizens, demythologization and disenchantment of the world (Taylor 2007, 61–88; 116–117; 216–217; 464–466; 496–499; 503–504; 613–615). The results were fundamental and crucial changes of the Western thought, culture and society, in the European theological, metaphysical, economical, moral, social and political segments. Among them, Taylor stresses as the most basic and important especially the following four: 1. new understanding of a self as a buffered, nonporous entity (Abbey 2000, 203ff); 2. disenchantment of the world (203ff); 3. naturalization of time (204ff); 4. new, modern societal imaginary (205ff): the idea of modern moral order and its penetration in the societal imaginary which it has transformed in a new one. The project of the Reform contributed to disembedding, i.e. it increased the distancing

and even hostility toward older forms of belonging and rituals. This disembedding – which is a matter of both, of identity (the contextual limits of the image of self), and of the social imagination (about the whole society) – was characteristic for elites (156).

The main features of the (idea of) modern moral order can be summarized in four characteristics (Taylor 2007, 170–171): 1. The original idea of mutual benefits has passed over into the theory of rights and legitimate rule; 2. Political society makes possible, as an instrument, for individuals to serve each other both in providing of security and in strengthening of exchange and prosperity as well; 3. The starting point are individuals whom society must serve; 4. These rights, liberty, and mutual benefit must be provided and secured equally for all citizens. What exactly is meant with »equality« changes, but the demand for enacting of some equality is evident already from the refusal of a hierarchical order. According to Taylor, these are the crucial characteristics and constants appearing in the modern idea of moral order, through all its changing »redactions« (171).

According to Casanova (2010, 267), there are four basic forms of genealogical account of modernity and secularism. The first is triumphant secularism. At this point we should mention a special stadial historical consciousness, a special secularist stadial conception of history. This secularist stadial consciousness is the outlook that sees exclusive humanism as the final and highest stadium in the progress of science and rationality (see also Strahovnik 2017, 270; 276 for the idea of secular fundamentalism that takes this form even further). According to Taylor, this stadial historical consciousness is a crucial part and pillar of the triumphalist secularist view. Besides, the stadial consciousness functions as a ratchet which makes the leaving behind of secularism impossible (Taylor 2007, 289). It would be a deep intellectual regression. But for the stadial consciousness such »[i]ntellectual regression would be unthinkable; it would involve pretending that we could go back« (289). We should add that also for Taylor the return from the secular age to the pre-secular is not possible. But of course, he thinks and hopes that the post-secular age is coming.

The second genealogical account is traditionalist – mostly Catholic – criticism of secularity as a deviation in intellectual and normative sense. The third is protestant account that sees secularity as internal to realization of true Christianity (at the institutional level). The fourth is a rejection of exclusive humanism in a Nietzschean way. Taylor accepts some particular insights of all four accounts, but he is far from really and integrally accepting any of them. He criticizes all of them for the unidirectional teleology and for one-sidedness. His own account is characterized by zig zag thinking and unintended shifts in understanding and accounting.

Taylor's main reproach to the first account is that it is blind for the role of Christianity as a root of secularity. Secularist triumphalism is blind for the particular contingent fact that Western secularism – its benevolence and universalism – is possible only as the (re)configuration of Christian *agape*. Taylor's reasons for refusing the second approach are on one side familiar moral reasons which are to-

day well known and widely spread. These reasons are visible also from Taylor's approval and positive inclination to Kearney's anatheism (Kearney and Taylor 2016, 77; 84; 87; 90). But besides these reasons, he refuses the traditionalist approach also because of its incapability to see the internal connection between Christianity, and secularism and the secular age. The »traditionalist« Christianity would be today possible only as a (partial) »(self)mutilation« of Christianity.

The third account is problematic for Taylor because its representatives don't see the great losses we suffer with the establishing of the immanent frame. One of the main aims of the book *A Secular Age* is pointing out these loses. And lastly, Taylor can certainly partly sympathise and empathise with the Nietzschean criticism of exclusive humanism, for instance with its criticism of the rationalism of exclusive humanism. But he can sympathise also with exclusive humanism because exclusive humanism has taken many values from Christianity, but it pulled them out from the Christian religious and metaphysical context and put them in the immanentist horizon. On the other hand, he cannot fully support Nietzschean immanent anti-humanism because of its criticism of any metaphysical grounding of transcendence. In such a way immanent anti-humanism reinforces the very component of exclusive humanism that Taylor wants to destabilize.

In general, Taylor doesn't want to take part or side in the discussion between traditionalists and secularists which is in general interpreted as the debate and even struggle between belief and unbelief. Taylor wants – by means of his »generous« hermeneutics (Bellah 2007) – to overcome the closed and unfruitful circle of this debate. He wants to show that there is a (dialectical) connection between the so-called belief and unbelief, and that they are not clearly separated poles.

4. Authenticity[8]

The age of authenticity is our age which is why it is the most important age for us. Authenticity is »a child« of Romanticism (Taylor 1992, 25) but it became our mass culture ideal in the 60s of 20th Century. The most important are not authority or tradition but rather my own spiritual way. What is crucial is a personal resonance, what a particular belief means to me (Hofmann 2017, 277). Is this a wellness-religion? Not necessarily, because we can distinguish between trivial and non-trivial forms of authenticity. These latter imply contexts that transcend an individual, called horizons by Taylor, which only make a non-trivial (definition of) identity possible.[9]

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[8] Taylor 1991; 1992; 2007, 473ff; Abbey 2000, 86ff; Hoffmann 2017, 276ff. Taylor 1991 appeared originally in Canada as *The Malaise of Modernity* and was later reprinted in the USA as *The Ethics of Authenticity* (1992).

[9] A crucial and foundational thinker of authenticity is Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard believed that the transcendent dimension of love is a condition of its authenticity (see Máhrik et al. 2018, 51). Moreover, an authentic existence in general – in all its dimensions – is possible only on the basis of the self's relation to Transcendence. This relation is constitutive for all relationships which form an authentic life. (Králik and Torok 2016, 73; Valčová et al. 2016, 102; Králik 2017, 32)

What implications, trends, forecasts and »morals« can we draw from the fact that our culture is a culture of authenticity? Authentic religion demands much more of personal praxis, personal reflexion, personal experience; it demands greater capacity for argumentation, greater depth of thinking and sensibility on both sides (»providers« and »consumers« of religion). Without achieving of personal resonance, no effort is fruitful. Personal resonance doesn't exclude a support or accompanying and a wish for them. That the journey is personal doesn't imply that one must travel alone. Churches, religious institutions and communities should adapt to this situation if they want to be influential, important, and foremost in a genuine dialogue with the people of the modern world. According to Taylor, the searching for fullness of life is a basic human impulse. With »fullness« he means experiencing of the whole and the meaning which gives life a centre and direction. Also, belief or religion can be understood here as such searching (280). The fact is that we all search for meaning and direction, both believers and non-believers, and a big number of those who feel around somewhere between. Furthermore, all, different believers and (various) unbelievers on the West share the same past, the same genesis of Western society. They were shaped by the same process. As Taylor says, we are »brothers under the skin« (Taylor 2007, 675; Abbey 2017, 228).[10] All these commonalities can and should help us in our efforts to cultivate mutual respect, understanding, solidarity and dialogue (Abbey 2017, 230).

5. Reproaches and »Forecasts«

Taylor's account has been subjected to several criticisms and reproaches. Some of them are not so serious, but others are more fatal. Let us present and evaluate some of them. The first reproach is that Taylor's account of the Middle Ages is too monolithic, it doesn't pay enough attention to the presence of unbelief in the Middle Ages which is relevant also at the sociological scale (Schantz 2009, 34–35). This critique is important, but I don't think it is fatal. Of course, the elaboration of this aspect of Taylor's narrative could bring important new insights and reconfigure to some degree our view about the role of the Middle Ages in the genesis of the secular age. The second critique claims that Taylor reaffirms the religious views, but he doesn't discern the bad from the good among them (35). But clearly some religious views are more anti-intellectual than others, and some are justifiably criticized by an immanentist like Richard Dawkins. I think that this criticism is unfounded. It is evident from Taylor's works what kind of religion he accepts and prefers and what forms of religion he rejects. If we read the passages about traditionalist or anti-modern Catholic views, about anatheism, and ne-

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[10] We are also susceptible and subjected to similar deviations: »But it's not an accident that ›Christians‹ fall into similar deviations to those of ›secular humanists‹. As I have tried to show throughout this book, we both emerge from the same long process of Reform in Latin Christendom. We are brothers under the skin.« (Taylor 2007, 675)

vertheless his defence of the ideal of authenticity against the hard-conservative criticism (Taylor 1991; 1992), we can discern Taylor's relevant criteria.

The third criticism concerns the thesis that the enchanted world is lost for Westerners/Europeans forever (Schantz 2009, 35–36). The counterexample is Iceland where most people still believe in supernatural creatures, encounters of dead persons etc. The next example in this complex is the New Age movement. Taylor interprets it as a reflexion of the culture of authenticity. But isn't it more right to construe it as people's desire for enchanted world? It is not possible to fully answer to these reproaches without some adequate sociological data. But we can nevertheless estimate the power of these claims in case they are true. Regarding Iceland, we can say that it is a similar type of counter-example like the USA: Iceland as such is just not – or wouldn't just be – a part of the European exception. Regarding the New Age movement, it is well known that there are some pretty much consumerist forms of it. In these forms, the New Age is used just as an instrument for relaxation. There is a parallel to some similar non-religious instrumentalist consumerist approaches to yoga, and the classes of the consumers of yoga and the New Age overlap.

But there are maybe more important second thoughts about Taylor's account. One concerns the European exceptionalism (Casanova 2010, 273) and the difference between the USA and Europe (277–280) and thus the justifiability of speaking about the USA and Europe as one civilization. Can this endanger Taylor's main thesis that both Americans and Europeans live today in a secular age?

There are two relevant differences between Europe and the USA. The first concerns the extension of exclusive humanism as an accepted (default) view. There is a salient difference between the USA and Europe in this regard. According to the sociological surveys (271; 280), the overwhelming majority of Americans actually don't take exclusive humanism as their option. Most Americans see themselves as religious, not secular humanists (271). A situation is very different in Europe. I don't think that this fact presents a problem for Taylor's thesis that both, Europe and the USA, are secular societies. The reason is that the defining characteristic of secularity in Taylor's sense is not exclusive humanism, but rather the immanent frame. We should not identify the two, they are different concepts. Exclusive humanism is a view that doesn't recognise any transcendence, it practically excludes it. On the other hand, the immanent frame, or the immanent order, allows exclusive humanism as a real option, it allows, permits closure, but it doesn't demand it (Taylor 2007, 543–544). Theoretically it is possible that all members of society A are exclusive humanists, and all members of society B are for instance Christians (or Muslims, or Jews etc.) but still they all live in the immanent frame, i.e. in a secular society/age if in both societies exclusive humanism is understood as a real possible option. The difference shows that the American secularity/secular age is different from the European, that there are two different »subjects« of the secular age in the USA and Europe, maybe even that we are not the same civilization ... But still all that doesn't mean that we – both Americans and Europeans – don't live in secular societies. Moreover, as Casanova points out (2010, 273–274), we can also

speak about Japanese and even Chinese secularities, which differ not only from the European, but also from the American secularity. Even if secularity became global there would be many secularities because every secularity is a refashioning, reshaping or reconfiguring of a previous (presecular or (possibly) already secular) society. The specific of Europe is not (any more) secularity as such, but if I may put it so, a specific secularity or particularities of its secularity. One of them is the stadial historical consciousness which is not importantly extended nowhere else except in Europe. This is a result of the European unique history. On these special features of secularities, a specific impact of a secularity depends – or will depend. These findings may cause that some will find Taylor's thesis less attractive because of its lesser explanatory power, yet all this, I repeat, does not falsify it.

But there is also another aspect. It concerns the phenomenon that Taylor calls a nova effect (Taylor 2007, 299–313; Smith 2014, 142). According to Taylor, views and opinions in the secular age take place in the space of strong cross pressures. The result is fragilization of all opinions, beliefs and unbeliefs, and proliferation of many different forms and ways of belief and spirituality. The claim about the nova effect is certainly true for the USA, but hardly for Europe if we consider the empirical sociological surveys (Casanova 2010, 280). What we are witnessing in Europe is only a steady decline of the membership in churches and participation in church life. But there is no corresponding proliferation of alternative religious or spiritual transcendent forms (280). In accordance with this fact is the fact that, as Casanova put it, there is no religion that has not taken roots in the USA (280). In Europe, the situation is quite different, now and in the historical perspective. The newcomers are much more pressed to adapt and assimilate. Recent witness to that is the European hostility to Islam (281).

Non-applicability to Europe demands that nova effect is not essential for the secular age. But if we delete nova effect from the list of essential or central characteristics of secularity this means not only that Taylor's view about nova effect as characteristic of the secular age is not exactly true, but it also represents a further impoverishment of Taylor's notion of secularity and weakening of his (hypo)thesis.

At the end let us present some speculations about the secularity and post-secularity in the future. The first relevant factor in this regard is migrations and the influence of non-Christian religions. Considering the above outlined religious openness and pluralism of the USA we should not expect there some drastic change from the aspect of secularity. On the other hand, we have different history and experience in Europe. If the USA is a melting pot of nations, Europe is a melting pot of immigrant religions. However, such a view is set under the question because of Islam. But for believing Muslims, the immanent frame is surely not a default option. On the other hand, we shouldn't expect that Islam will produce a nova effect in Europe.

Considering the global dimension, we should take into account the appearance of non-Western modernities, besides long-time single case of Japan, for instan-

ce Chinese and Indian (281). China and India are growing global political, economic, technological, and socio-cultural super-powers. Their modernisation can give rise to post-secular Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, or Confucianism. Their combining with the phenomenon that Casanova calls global denominationalism (deteritorialisation of religious denominations) (281) could generate something we might call global post-secularity. What is important is that the stadial consciousness is specific and unique for the European modernity and secularism. The appearance of non-Western modernizations which wouldn't include the stadial consciousness would – according to Casanova – cause that for the first time in the history Europeans would be aware of the Christian roots of their secularity and of the post--Christian nature of their secularism (281). This would cause, again according to Casanova, a reshaping and re-evaluation of Christianity in Europe and thus a post--secular age in Europe. Nevertheless, despite his speculations, Casanova warns us that it is still premature to forecast the appearance of post-secularity in Europe. But we may agree with Casanova about the possible double merits of Taylor's account: if the post-secular age really comes (in Europe), it would be fair to say not only that Taylor is one of the most important interprets and explainers of the secular age, but also a herald of the post-secular age (270; 281). By pointing to the cracks in the immanentist view, he destabilised it and heralded the coming of a new age. But not only the merits, also the approach and Taylor's mind are twofold (270). The first part is his lucid analysis, hermeneutics and genealogy. By it, he has destabilized the foundations and »certainty« of the immanent view. Thus, he has provided the grounding for the second part, his Romantic side, for his will to believe and »utopian« visions of possible future. In any case his work manifests some features that are characteristic for what Hubert Dreyfus has called a paradigm (Dreyfus 2005, 409–418): it is something around what scholars and wider circles of people gather and about what they discuss. Such works, concepts, questions and complex narratives they contain, provide the ground and material, stuff for debate and arguing. Such widely discussed works are drivers and generators of human intellectual and cultural evolution, and of progress. Despite the alleged (and maybe sometimes justified) criticisms, Taylor is surely one of the most important trail-blazers in the area of thought about religion. His work helps us a lot to understand the condition of religion not only in the past and today, but also gives us directions and guidelines, methodological tools, and ideas to more clearly discern its future perspective.

Taylor's understanding of secularity and the secular age helps us also to understand better the phenomenon of the return of religion. The secular age is an age in which no »views« are firm, neither of believers nor of unbelievers, theists or atheists. They all must live with consciousness that they can be wrong and that their belief or unbelief can be false. Upon such intellectual and experiential background, the questions about belief and religion become very relevant. This is one of the reasons for the return of religion not only to the public and political sphere but also to the theoretical area in the sense of the increasing attention and research of religion and religiously relevant phenomena in humanities and social science.

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
Mari Jože Osredkar

Teologija odnosa
In beseda je človek postala

Odnos je nekaj duhovnega, nekaj, kar se ne vidi, nekaj česar človeški čuti ne zaznajo neposredno. Pa vendar je odnos za posameznikovo življenje nekaj eksistencialno pomembnega. Je pravzaprav naš življenjski prostor: »v njem živimo, se gibljemo in smo«. Še več, odnos je ključ za razumevanja vere in Boga.

Mateja Centa
Umetnost življenja in kognitivno-izkustveni model čustev in čustvenosti

The Art of Life and Cognitive-Experiential Model of Emotions and Emotionality

Povzetek: V prispevku izpostavimo, kašno vlogo imajo doživljanje, izražanje, razumevanje in oblikovanje čustev pri vzpostavljanju dobrega življenja. Ob tem kot privzet pristop k čustvom in čustvenosti uporabimo kognitivno teorijo čustev, hkrati pa tudi splošni, antropološki pogled na človeka kot odnosno in dialoško bitje. Doživljanje in razumevanje čustev se pokaže kot ključni gradnik za vzpostavitev umetnosti življenja, pri tem pa opozorimo, da do sedaj oblikovane teorije umetnosti življenja ta vidik čustev in čustvenosti postavljajo bolj ob stran, posebno v zvezi z vprašanjem neposrednega kultiviranja čustev oziroma celostnosti in pravilnosti čustvenega doživljanja. Kot model, ki ustreza temu izzivu, predlagamo sintezo kognitivne teorije čustev in geštalt pedagogike; imenujemo ga kognitivno-izkustveni model čustev in čustvenosti. Na njegov pomen opozorimo tako, da ob koncu zarišemo ključne gradnike umetnosti življenja in v njihovem okviru nakažemo vlogo kognitivno-izkustvenega modela čustev in čustvenosti za oblikovanje celostnosti in pravilnosti čustvenega doživljanja.

Ključne besede: umetnost življenja, dobro življenje, čustva, geštalt pristop, kognitivna teorija čustev, kognitivno-izkustveni model čustev osebnostna rast, identiteta

Abstract: In the paper we emphasize the role played by experiencing, expressing, understanding and shaping emotions in establishing a good life. As a default approach to emotions and emotions we pressupose the cognitive theory of emotions, as well as the general, anthropological view of man as a relational and dialogic being. Experience and understanding of emotions is posed a key building block for the creation of the art of life. However, we also draw attention to the fact that the so theories of the art of life put this aspect of emotions and emotions more on the side, especially when it comes to questions of direct cultivation of emotions, and unity and correctness of emotional experience. As a model that answers this challenge, we propose the synthesis of the cognitive

theory of emotions and gestalt pedagogy, which we call a cognitive-experiential model of emotions and emotionality. We demonstrate its significance by ending up with the foundational elements of the art of life and and we point out the role of the cognitive-experiential model of emotions and emotionality to create the unity and correctness of emotional experience.

Key words: art of life, good life, emotions, gestalt approach, cognitive theory of emotions, cognitive-experiential model of emotions, personal growth, identity

1. Uvod

Ustrezno gojenje oziroma kultiviranje čustev in čustvenosti, ki vključuje prepoznavanje in medsebojno razlikovanje različnih čustev v različnih položajih in okoliščinah, razločevanje čustev od razpoloženj ali telesnih občutij, prepoznavanje in ločevanje svojih lastnih čustev in prevzetih čustev drugih, oblikovanje, doživljanje in izražanje čustev in čustvenih naravnanosti glede na vrednotenje sveta okoli nas itd., je eden ključnih gradnikov umetnosti življenja. Umetnost življenja kot eden od pristopov k etičnosti poudarja predvsem pomen vprašanja o dobrem ali srečnem življenju. Umetnost življenja se vse bolj uveljavlja kot del praktične filozofije. »Umetnost življenja je v ustvarjanju dobrega življenja zase. Gre za umetnost, ker od posameznika terja dolgotrajno (vseživljenjsko) prizadevanje, ki ga noben ne more opraviti namesto njega in za katerega ni posebnih podrobnih načrtov. Dobro življenje mora biti sestavljeno iz posameznikovega značaja, okoliščin, izkušenj in idealov, ki se s posamezniki, družbami, obdobji in prostori razlikujejo.« (Kekes 2002, 1)

V prispevku bomo izpostavili, kakšno vlogo imajo pri tem oblikovanje, razumevanje, doživljanje in izražanje čustev. Kot pristop k čustvom in čustvenosti uporabimo kognitivno teorijo čustev (Nussbaum 2001; Centa 2018a), hkrati pa tudi splošni, antropološki pogled na človeka kot odnosno in dialoško bite (Juhant 2006; 2014) in celostni pristop k njegovi rasti (Gerjolj 2009). To je tudi eden od izvirnih prispevkov članka, saj bomo teorije umetnosti življenja, ki se posvečajo vprašanju srečnega posameznika in dobrega življenja v sodobnem svetu, dopolnili z vidikom pomena čustvene razsežnosti pri posamezniku. Večina teorij namreč ta vidik bodisi zanemari ali pa obravnava zgolj površinsko, medtem ko bolj poudarjajo pomen moralnosti, posebno z vidika kreposti in osebnostnih odlik (Kekes 2002; Bauman 2008). Drugi izvirni prispevek pa je model, ki spaja umetnost življenja, razumevanje čustev kot vrednostnih sodb in geštalt pristop k rasti posameznika, označimo ga lahko kot celostnega in izkustvenega. Ta pristop razume čustva in čustvenost kot tesno povezana s preostalimi vidiki človekovega življenja, z vzpostavljanjem njegove identitete v celotnem okviru življenja.

Čustva so eno od jeder posameznikovega dojemanja sveta okoli njega – posebej glede razsežnosti vrednotenja tega sveta –, čustva so odsev narave njegovih potreb in vzpostavljanja odzivov na položaje, v katere je postavljen. Na podlagi tega

določamo glavno izhodišče za naš prispevek: čustva kot vrednostne sodbe imajo miselno podlago in z njimi vzpostavljamo svoj vrednostni svet, njihova ustreznost je torej odločilni pogoj za moralno življenje posameznika (Nussbaum 2001). V okviru takšne kognitivne teorije čustev lahko ustrezno razumemo odnos soodvisnosti med (moralnimi) čustvi, povezanimi z našim celostnim moralnim življenjem, na eni strani in simbolnostjo, dialoškostjo in odnosnostjo človeškega bitja na drugi strani. Razumevanje tega odnosa pa omogoča oblikovanje nadgraditev in poglobitev pristopov umetnosti življenja. Pristno doživljanje in razumevanje čustev se pokažeta kot ključna gradnika za vzpostavitev umetnosti življenja.

2. Etika in umetnost življenja

Umetnost življenja je pristop v praktični filozofiji, ki usmerja posameznika pri tem, kako naj oblikuje in usmerja svoje življenje, da bo dosegel dobro in srečno življenje. V okviru gledišča umetnosti življenja ne najdemo povsem poenotenega pristopa. Etika je tradicionalno resda usmerjena na posamezne vidike človekovega ravnanja ali življenja. Trije najbolj uveljavljeni pristopi so *deontološka* etika, *teleološka* etika (širše tudi vrednostna etika) in *etika kreposti*. Prva se osredotoča na vrste dejanj (dolžnosti) in na splošna moralna načela, druga na vredne (koristne, dobre) posledice dejanj, zadnja pa na značajske značilnosti, ki jih mora posameznik oblikovati, da bo lahko deloval moralno pravilno (Juhant 2009). Vsak pristop k etiki resda obravnava teme dolžnosti, vrednot in kreposti, vendar pa navadno enega (ali več) od teh vidikov razumemo kot normativno primarnega.

Vsaka etika obsega neke določene vrednote in tudi dolžnosti, ki te vrednote varujejo, saj brez izpolnjevanja in spoštovanja dolžnosti ne moremo vrednot ohranjati (Juhant 2009, 85–86), tudi če smo jih ustrezno prepoznali in postavili ter verjamemo vanje. Vodili sta antropološki oziroma sta utemeljeni v človeku, v katerem vsako vodilo odpira neki določen vidik etičnega v posamezniku. Prvo vodilo odpira človekov čut dolžnosti, saj ima posameznik (v sebi) izkušnjo, da mora spoštovati pravila, ki drugače nujno neposredno ne zadevajo njegovega življenja, vsekakor pa se ga dotikajo posredno. Drugo vodilo odpira njegove vrednostne opredelitve, v katerih posameznik na podlagi vrednotenja sveta okoli sebe sledi tudi neki določeni lestvici vrednot. Umanjkanje ene ali druge plasti lahko vodi v različne skrajnosti, ki vodijo proč od osnovnega cilja, to je: proč od dôbrosti in srečnosti (življenja) posameznika in družbe. Etika vrednot razume človeka kot čustveno bitje: za svoje delovanje potrebuje ustrezno motivacijo, ki ga bo spodbudila k moralnemu delovanju. To motivacijo sproža privrženost vrednostnemu svetu (Juhant 2009, 90).

Pristop umetnosti življenja poskuša kar najširše zajeti zgoraj opredeljene razsežnosti moralnosti, osredotoča pa se na posameznikovo doseganje dobrega življenja. Juhant (2009) trdi, da imata (zgoraj omenjeni) etika vrednot in normativna etika skupno podlago – in to je umetnost življenja. Meni, da družbenega življenja ni mogoče uspešno urediti, če člani družbe ne priznavajo nečesa bolj notranjega, se pra-

vi: etičnih drž oziroma splošno priznanih etičnih vrednot. Bistvo in namen tega, da ima družba to etično notranjost, je: na podlagi te notranjosti lahko človek – kot posameznik ali pa tudi kot del skupnosti – uresničuje svoje (dobro) življenje (2009, 375). Za uspešno delovanje družbe, v kateri je človek kot oseba (polna različnosti), kot svobodno bitje in kot skrivnost, ki je nikoli ne moremo dojeti (lahko jo le sprejmemo), pa je nujen (pristen) dialog z drugim oziroma drugačnim. Umetnost življenja pomeni (aktivno in zavzeto) živeti življenje in ga ne preganjati oziroma zasledovati zunaj sebe. Umetnost življenja poudarja življenje, povezano z občutki polnosti in uresničitve svojega lastnega življenja, ki ga prevevata globlja pobuda in notranji občutek izpolnjenosti. Ker pa je življenje vsakega posameznika povezano tudi z drugim/družbo (drugače ne preživi), ta dolžnost, ki jo čuti, ostaja zunanja (377). Ključna je torej človekova notranja naravnanost do življenja oziroma notranji odnos do sveta, na podlagi katerega človek vodi in načrtuje svoje življenje. V nadaljevanju nas bo ob dveh takšnih teorijah zanimalo, kako lahko razumemo čustva in čustvenost kot (nujni) gradnik umetnosti življenja.

3. Analiza teorij umetnosti življenja z vidika čustev in čustvenosti

V tem razdelku ob zgledih analiziramo dve teoriji umetnosti življenja: opiramo se na pristopa Johna Kekesa in Zygmunda Baumana. Kekes ubere (metodološki) pristop premisleka in analize konkretnih posameznih življenj (stvarnih ali fiktivnih), ki jih lahko razumemo kot dobra, in izpostavlja posamezne *središčne gradnike* oziroma osebnostne odlike teh življenj (Michel de Montaigne in Thomas More (*avtonomija in samousmerjanje*), modrec (*moralna avtoriteta*), Newland Archer in grofica Olenska (*spodobnost)*, Ojdip (*globinskost*), Lamoignon Malesherbes (čast)). V vseh teh primerih potem utemeljuje, da osebnostne odlike kot vodilne moralne ideje oblikujejo dobro življenje, da pa so to hkrati zgolj primeri doseganja dobrega življenja in ne edini načini, ki bi jih bilo moč posplošiti (2002, 123–125). Kljub temu pa nam lahko razkrijejo pomembne gradnike dobrih življenj. Obenem poudari pomen dveh nujnih (a ne zadostnih) pogojev za dobro življenje. To sta moralna sprejemljivost in osebno zadovoljstvo. Dobro življenje mora biti moralno življenje, posameznik mora slediti občim družbenim zahtevam moralnosti. Vsi ljudje namreč kot bitja delimo enake fiziološke, psihološke in skupnostne potrebe, ki morajo biti izpolnjene, da dosežemo dobro življenje. Moralnost ima vlogo ustvarjanja teh pogojev in zahtev, ki jih moramo v zvezi z njimi izpolnjevati, tako za blagostanje drugih kakor tudi za naše lastno blagostanje (Kekes 2002, 147). Umetnost življenja tako poteka le znotraj okvira moralnosti. Če bi se med moralnostjo in našim zasledovanjem dobrega življenja zgodil konflikt, nimamo posebnih vodil, kako se odločati. Posamezna odločitev je odvisna od okoliščin in od tako imenovanih zasebnih razlogov. Drugič, dobro življenje je osebno zadovoljujoče, to pa pomeni, da posameznik živi v skladu s postavljenimi razumnimi ideali in je vključen v projekte, ki mu prinašajo osebno zadovoljstvo.

Glede na ta pristop je ključ v oblikovanju osebnostnih odlik, ki so tvorni gradniki našega značaja in povezani z našo identiteto in samo-podobo in samo-vrednotenjem. Hkrati je to postavljanje idealov, ki si jih posameznik lahko pridobi in oblikuje v okviru svoje skupnosti, z vzgojo in v soočenju z zgledi odlikovanih življenj (zgodovina, literatura, religija, filozofija, umetnost), vse skupaj pa moramo povezovati s praktično modrostjo, ki prilagodi te modele in ideale za naše konkretno življenje in njegove okoliščine. Da bi se udejanjilo takšno življenje, moramo oblikovati tudi ustrezne naravnanosti do teh modelov in idealov; to vključuje miselne, čustvene in motivacijske vidike naše osebnosti, ki morajo biti medsebojno usklajeni, drugače se lahko zgodijo – prek prevelike poudarjenosti kakega od teh vidikov – zablode oziroma zmote (moralizem, sentimentalizem ali romanticizem). To je tudi ena od vstopnih točk, s katero bomo v nadaljevanju s sintezo povezali čustva in čustvenost.

Umetnost življenja je tako način ustvarjanja oziroma vzpostavljanja dobrega življenja. Kekes (2002) pravi, da je to *umetnost* življenja tudi zato, ker od posameznika zahteva vseživljenjski ustvarjalni trud. Takšno življenje je sestavljeno iz značaja, okoliščin, izkušenj in iz idealov osebnih odlik, ki so značilne za posameznika, družbo, neki določen kraj in tudi za čas. Ključni element takšne umetnosti vključuje odsev posameznikovega življenja in njegovih prilagoditev, njegovih idealov in odlik.[1]

Za dobro življenje pa je poleg osebnega zadovoljstva oziroma srečnosti pomemben tudi gradnik moralne sprejemljivosti. Oba gradnika (osebno zadovoljstvo in moralna sprejemljivost) sta nujna in nobeden sam zase ni zadosten za dobro življenje, saj je lahko osebno zadovoljujoče življenje hkrati tudi moralno nedopustno in moralno sprejemljivo življenje je lahko polno težkih osebnih razočaranj in nesrečno (2002, 3). Osebno zadovoljstvo ima tako dva vira. Prvi meri na razumni ideal odličnosti, ki si ga je posameznik (razumno) zaslužil, drugi vir pa so njegovi osebni projekti. A hkrati je nujno, da dobro življenje zadosti tudi zahtevam moralnosti, ki so vezane na posameznika, na družbo in na skupnost. Tem zahtevam se mora posameznik prilagoditi, ne glede na značaj, okoliščine, ideale osebnih odlik in projektov (5). Morala zato narekuje in meri na oblikovanje in sledenje pravilom, da bi te temeljne potrebe lahko zadovoljili (Kekes 2002; Nussbaum 2001). Kekes trdi, da je dobro življenje vezano tudi na zaščito teh univerzalnih

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[1] Žalec si zastavi splošnejše vprašanje, kaj umetnost pomeni človeku. Prvič, če želimo človeka zares razumeti, potem je treba upoštevati dejstvo, da je človek telesno bitje. Človek se izraža skozi telo in prav tako je v umetnosti življenja: človek je telesno bitje in ustvarja svoje življenja prek vseh zaznav, ki jih prejema iz/od telesa in ki z njimi tudi deluje v svetu. Drugi vidik je, da je človek bitje, ki ima potrebo po izražanju (Žalec 2010, 273). Glede vidika izražanja najdemo v okviru umetnosti življenja iskanje in izboljševanje osebnih odlik, prek njih se izražamo in delujemo; po tem izražanju ima posameznik potrebo, saj teži (v svoji naravi) po (bolj ali manj) dobrem življenju. Tretji vidik je, da je človek bitje, ki ga ni mogoče izčrpati, totalizirati in reducirati. V okviru umetnosti življenja je vsak človek poseben in edinstven in prav tako je edinstveno njegovo življenje, ki ga oblikuje po zanj značilnih sposobnostih (osebne odlike, vrednote itd.). Četrti vidik je, da je človek bitje, ki ima v sebi gon po smislu (273). V okviru umetnosti življenja je ta gon razumljen kot »gon« po dobrem in srečnem življenju. Posameznik torej vidi smisel v dobrem zase in v tem, da svoje življenje oblikuje (etično-dialoško) v skupnosti z drugimi. Gradivo (vsebino) posameznikove umetnosti je njegovo življenje, zato rezultat takšnega uspešnega življenja prinaša osebno zadovoljstvo. (Kekes 2002)

pravil. Seveda imajo ta pravila tudi različno obliko in vsebino, saj so kulturno določena tako, da družbena pravila pomenijo »umeščene« načine sledenja univerzalnim zahtevam moralnosti (Kekes 2002, 5). Univerzalna in družbena pravila ščitijo pogoje za dobro življenje, toda na koncu je odvisno od posameznika, kaj naredi s svojim življenjem, ko so te zahteve izpolnjene. Če kratko povzamemo, je dobro življenje sestav osebne zadovoljenosti, izvirajoče iz vključenosti v projekte, ki odsevajo posameznikove osebne odličnosti, in moralne sprejemljivosti, ki je odvisna od usklajenosti z univerzalnimi, družbenimi in posameznikovimi moralnimi zahtevami (5).

Ko ljudje skladno zasledujejo ideal odlik, so v to dejavnost vključena njihova čustva. Njihova pozitivna čustva izhajajo iz pomembnosti njihovih idealov oziroma osebnih odlik, ki jo imajo ti ideali in odlike v njihovem življenju. Takšni ideali dajejo pomen in smisel njihovemu življenju na dva načina. Prvič, oblikujejo osrednje dele psihološke identitete, in drugič, vodijo njihove pomembne odločitve. Razumemo, zakaj ljudje ta čustva tako močno občutijo in da bi bilo celo nenaravno, ne imeti takšnih čustev ob pomembnih vidikih njihovega življenja (237). Posamezniki lahko občutijo tudi negativna čustva, posebno tedaj, kadar jim je preprečeno delovati tako, kakor mislijo, da bi morali. Lahko občutijo sram in krivdo, kadar si za neko določeno stvar ali ideal prizadevajo in jim po njihovi krivdi ne uspe. Ali pa občutijo obup, ko spoznajo, da ne bodo mogli doseči želenega ideala. Kekes trdi, da je v danih primerih predanost idealom osebnih odlik tista, ki določa, kakšna je ali bo (moralna in čustvena) občutljivost posameznika. Zavzetost oziroma predanost »omogoča posameznikom, da ti svet vidijo na določen način, ker jih usmerja in osredotoča na osrednje dele vrednostne razsežnosti njihovega življenja. Njihovo občutljivost določa prevladujoča naravnanost v njihovem življenju, prav tako pa tudi njihova dejanja, saj se le-ta razširja onkraj meja neposrednega odločanja o tem, kaj storiti. Te naravnanosti določajo to, kako se vedejo do drugih, imajo vzgojen vpliv na to, kaj vidijo kot dane ali sprejemljive možnosti odzivanja ter osvetljujejo njihove presoje o tem, kaj je pomembno in kaj ne, kaj jih navdihuje in kaj mori, kaj je zanimivo in kaj dolgočasno, kaj je zaslužno in kaj vredno zaničevanja.« (238)

Prevladujoče naravnanosti (angl. *dominant attitudes*) nekega določenega posameznika so večplastna zmes kognitivnih, čustvenih in motivacijskih delov. Ljudje imajo namreč prepričanje, kako bi morali živeti in delovati, kako živijo in delujejo in kako blizu je drugo prvemu. To prepričanje vzbudi – glede na posameznikovo življenje (ali oceno življenja) – pozitivna ali negativna čustva. Kot posledica tega ta prepričanja in čustva, povezana z njimi, spodbujajo oziroma motivirajo posameznika, da še dalje živi takšno življenje ali pa ga spremeni (Kekes 2002, 238). Kar posameznikovo naravnanost naredi za prevladujočo, »je to, da je ona smer, v katero teži to, kako njen subjekt misli, čuti, čustvuje in ravna, in ne, kaj v posebnem so predmeti prevladujočih prepričanj, čustev in motivov«. (Žalec 2005, 78; prim. Kekes 2002, 196)

Kadar posameznik zavzame omenjeno naravnanost, to pomeni, da je tej osebi za nekaj mar, da mu neka določena stvar nekaj pomeni. Naravnanosti so torej v

bistvu vrednotenjske oziroma ocenjevalne. To vrednotenje ali ocenjevanje je lahko moralno, ekonomsko, znanstveno, zasebno ali javno, pomembno ali nepomembno, razumno ali nerazumno, izraženo ali neizraženo, pravilno ali nepravilno itd., vedno je v domeni posameznika in sestavljeno iz posameznikove reakcije (všečne, nevšečne ali mešanice obeh), ki jo ima na naperjeni predmet (Kekes 2002, 180). Umetnost primernega in polnega življenja (kakor jo razume Kekes) vključuje dejavnost ustreznega oziroma pravilnega čustvovanja, pa tudi dejavnost (umetnost) ustreznega oziroma moralno pravilnega delovanja. Ampak zgolj zavedanje o tem, da bi bilo ustrezno oblikovati neko določeno čustveno naravnanost, te naravnanosti še ne bo sprožilo ali privedlo do tega čustvovanja (184). A tudi če čustvenih naravnanosti ni mogoče neposredno nadzorovati (spodbuditi, odstraniti), jih je mogoče oblikovati posredno, in to tako, da krepimo razumna čustva in šibimo nerazumna. Takšni popravki so mogoči z uporabo povezanih oziroma bližnjih prepričanj, ki so v podlagi teh čustev (184).

Bauman (2008) analizo umetnosti življenja začne z analizo sodobnosti in pojma srečnosti kot cilja dobrega življenja in umetnosti življenja. Najprej prizna, da srečnost ni posebej povezana z ekonomsko razvitostjo ali ravnijo. Kljub temu sodobna potrošniška družba povezuje zasledovanje sreče prav s pridobitvijo in prilastitvijo dobrin v upanju, da nas bo to osrečilo. V okviru potrošniške družbe zasledujemo ta cilj, ki pa ga nikoli ni moč doseči. »Varno stanje srečnosti ni dosegljivo; ves poudarek je na lovu za to izmuzljivo tarčo, ki nas zasledovalce ohranja vsaj zmerno srečne.« (Bauman 2008, 9) To zasledovanje v okviru potrošniške družbe postane celo neke vrste zapoved, obveza in cilj življenja (prim. Bruckner 2004, ki govori o prisilni sreči). Srečni smo, dokler imamo upanje, da postajamo srečni. Potrošniška družba ves čas ustvarja tudi nove predmete želja, ki ponujajo nekaj novega, edinstvenega, boljšega, kar obljublja srečnost. Bauman celo pravi, da najstrašnejši ukaz naše družbe ni »to moraš«, ampak »to si želiš, to si zaslužiš ...«, ki se ga ne moremo zlahka osvoboditi (78).

Sodobna družba v nas zbuja občutke nenehnega spreminjanja in negotovosti, posebno mlajše generacije naj bi doživljale življenje kot niz nepovezanih trenutkov, v katerem je vsak odsek, v katerem ne uživamo, izguba časa. Svet se predstavlja kot fragmentiran in nepovezan, preteklost ne določa več sedanjosti in prihodnost je vir tesnobe in strahu, mi pa občutimo, da nimamo orodij, kako se s tem spoprijeti. Eden od znakov tega stanja je tudi upad ravni trajnih in tesnih intimnih odnosov, ki jih bodisi vidimo kot omejitev naše svobode ali pa kot del negotove usode. Ključni del umetnosti življenja je namreč prav vzpostavljanje takšnih intimnih odnosov. Vse prej omenjeno ima posledice tudi za našo identiteto, za njeno vzpostavljanje in vzdrževanje. Zdi se, da se nenehno na novo izumljamo in postajamo nekdo, ki do sedaj še nismo bili (73). Stabilna in trdna identiteta pa je za umetnost življenja ključna, »izdelek« te umetnosti naj bi bila prav takšna identiteta umetnika, ki pa ni zlahka dosegljiva. Bauman odgovore na te izzive optimistično išče v pojmih izbire, volje in odgovornosti. Najprej moramo priznati, da je življenje umetniški izdelek in da ne more biti drugo kakor prav to. Nadalje, vsak posameznik je umetnik tega življenja, ne po svoji lastni izbiri, ampak po usodi. V

takšnem položaju je identiteta posameznika predmet nenehne manipulacije, zato posameznik v tej tekoči moderni, ki je polna izzivov, prenavljanj in reciklaže identitete, potrebuje spretnosti nekakšnega žonglerja v smislu umetelnosti in domiselnosti rokohitrca (2008, 13). Erika Prijatelj (2010) trdi, da »vzpostavljanje identitete (pri posamezniku) poteka vse življenje in sicer z upravljanjem osnovnih življenjskih spretnosti, kot so na primer prejemanje, dajanje (podarjanje), zavarovanje samega sebe, zadržanje in osvobajanje samega sebe, delo in sodelovanje, sprejemanje sebe in odpiranje drugemu. /…/ Učenje spretnosti prejemanja in dajanja v medosebnih odnosih pretvori prvotno nezaupanje (v drugega) v zaupanje. Izmojstritev spretnosti zavarovanja v samega sebe pretvori prvotno negotovost in odvisnost v avtonomijo in neodvisnost. /…/ Utrditev svoje identitete se v odraslem življenju kaže na tri načine: v skladnosti med znanjem in odločitvami, ki jih sprejema posameznik; med začasno trdnostjo in pozitivno obarvanimi čustvi, ko se življenje posameznika preoblikuje tako, da bo omogočalo osebno rast identitete v vseh njenih razsežnostih; in v harmoniji z najdenim smislom posameznikovega življenja.« (315)

Če povzamemo, bi lahko trdili, da je ena od lastnosti identitete gibljivost oziroma prožnost, saj – kakor trdi Prijateljeva – jo lahko posameznik oblikuje vse življenje. Vendar lahko zdrsi v šibkost identitete, o kateri govori Bauman: posameznikova identiteta je lahko predmet številnih manipulacij pod pritiski (tekoča moderna, medijska družba, potrošništvo, kultura strahu ipd.). Da bi preprečili ali omilili takšne položaje, v katerih posameznik izgublja, prodaja, menja, zavrže svojo identiteto, je ključno vzpostavljanje pristnih odnosov, katerim je temelj pristni dialog in vzpostavitev (osnovnih) življenjskih vrednot že v zgodnjem otroštvu.

Pristopa Baumana in Kekesa k umetnosti življenja sta resda raznolika in deloma odgovarjata tudi na različna vprašanja, vendar lahko izluščimo neko problemsko jedro, ki bo pomenilo tudi podlago za našo sintezo v nadaljevanju. Oba pristopa poudarjata pomen značaja in identitete, predvsem za oblikovanje naših izbir in za delovanje (Strahovnik 2010). Oba vsaj nakazujeta tudi mesto čustev in čustvenosti v teh procesih, čeprav ne vedno na izrecen način in brez pravih vzvodov za ustrezno razumevanje in oblikovanje čustev. Posebno v okviru Kekesove analize, ki izpostavlja osebnostne odlike kot dolgotrajne miselne, čustvene in delovanjske težnje, se odpira pomemben prostor za preučevanje teh čustvenih mehanizmov in prepletenost s preostalima dvema vidikoma.

4. Čustva in izkustvenega pristop v okviru umetnosti življenja

V tem razdelku bomo sintetično predstavili shemo vidikov oziroma razsežnosti umetnosti življenja, v katerih bomo nakazali pomen in vlogo čustev in čustvenosti. Shemo tvorijo naslednji vidiki: (a) dialoška odprtost; (b) vstopanje v stabilne, dolgotrajne, varne in ljubeče odnose in oblikovanje teh odnosov; (c) stabilnost oziroma trdnost posameznikove identitete; (d) odkrivanje in razvijanje osebnih odlik; (e) razvijanje in

zasledovanje osebnih projektov; (f) zavezanost moralnosti in moralno sprejemljivo delovanje; (g) prizadevanje za celostno miselno in čustveno doživljajsko pravilnost.

Za njeno razumevanje, posebno pa za vlogo čustev in čustvenosti v njej je ključnega pomena okvir kognitivne teorije čustev (Centa 2018a, 59–63) in geštalt pristopa k osebnemu razvoju in odnosom (2018b, 429–442); ta pristop smo ga že predstavili. Oboje omenjeno – kot celoto to poimenujemo kognitivno-izkustveni model čustev in čustvenosti (v nadaljevanju KI model) – nam pomaga pri razvijanju umetnosti življenja, pri doseganju dobrega življenja in pri razumevanju pogojev za umetnost življenja. Bistvo tega modela je, da pri čustvih hkrati poudarja njihovo kognitivno stran, to je: treba jih je razumeti kot vrednostne sodbe, hkrati pa je zelo pomemben tudi izkustveni vidik čustev, ki nam prav tako pogosto (glede na načela geštalt pedagogike) omogoča ustrezno prepoznavanje in preoblikovanje čustev in čustvenih odzivov glede na naš dejanski položaj.

Dialoška odprtost

Dialoška odprtost je drža oziroma naravnanost, ki jo posameznik zavzame v komunikaciji s seboj, z drugim in s presežnim. Drža je pristna, kadar je posameznik v odnosu iskren in sprejema (v vsej različnosti) tako sebe kakor tudi (D)drugega. Odprta drža je za posameznika pomembna, da na podlagi izmenjave z drugimi ne tvori zmotnih prepričanj, sodb in iluzij o sebi ali svetu, ki bi utegnile ovirati njegovo (zdravo) osebnostno napredovanje oziroma blaginjo. V tem oziru je zato v odnosu pomembno obravnavati tudi čustva, ki bistveno sooblikujejo posameznikov vrednostni svet. Pristna dialoška odprtost odnosa je torej hkrati tudi čustveni dialog, v tem smislu, da so navzoča čustva in čutenje, ki jih posameznik (zavestno ali podzavestno) doživlja v odnosu. Dialog torej ni le v domeni (po)govora, ampak je tudi v domeni čutenja (zajema tudi čustveno razsežnost posameznika). Kjer imamo torej med posameznikoma vrednostno komunikacijo, posameznika ne vstopata samo v miselni svet drugega, ampak se vključujeta tudi v čustveno življenje (čustvovanje) in hotenje drugega (Mindus 2009, 99). Držo dialoške odprtosti v odnosu vidimo kot nujno za oblikovanje dobrega in srečnega življenja, tako z miselnega kakor tudi s čustvenega vidika. V dialogu pa seveda lahko nastopi tudi čustvena napetost, ki dialoško odprtost ovira, posebno ob sporih ali napačnih ravnanjih. V nekih določenih trenutkih namreč posameznik spoznava, da je nemočen in ranljiv ob zunanjih dogodkih, nad katerimi nima nadzora. Pri tem in podobnih izzivih, ko nastopijo neprijetna čustva, si lahko pomagamo s KI modelom, ki lahko prispeva k razvijanju umetnosti življenja in dobrega življenja. Navzočnost kot odločitev, da smo, kar smo, da smo v dialoškem odnosu iskreni, in vključenost predstavljata temelj za sprejemajočo, strpno, pozitivno in zaupljivo držo, ki v odnosu do (D)drugega pomeni tudi to, da smo pripravljeni postaviti svoje lastne cilje in načrte ob stran, če ne vodijo do želene spremembe. Zavzetost oziroma predanost pa je naravnanost, ki vključuje iskrenost in zaupanje, temelja odločnosti, da smo dialogu ves čas predani. Te drže pomagajo, da lahko neovirano (tudi v konfliktnih ali napetih položajih) poiščemo skupne korenine in da razlike omejimo na globinsko raven vrednostnih sodb.

Vstopanje v stabilne, dolgotrajne, varne in ljubeče odnose in oblikovanje teh odnosov

Za dobro in srečno življenje je vsekakor pomembno vstopanje v stabilne, dolgo-trajne, varne in ljubeče odnose in oblikovanje teh odnosov, in to z več vidikov. Prvič, takšni odnosi so izpolnjujoči in osrečujoči v tem smislu, da ima posameznik občutek sprejetosti in priložnost za zdrave in pristne pohvale (in kritike) ter spod-bude. V okviru takšnih odnosov posameznik tudi nima stalnega, neizpolnjenega občutka hrepenenja po nečem ali nekom in ne občuti praznosti (v sebi oziroma v svojem življenju) – kakor je težnja v tekoči moderni, o kateri je govoril Bauman – marveč nasprotno, v takšnih odnosih se počuti izpolnjenega in motiviranega za uresničevanje svojih ciljev itd. Drugič, posameznik se v ljubečem odnosu (laže) sooča s svojo lastno preteklostjo, saj se v takšnem odnosu počuti varnega, ljublje-nega in sprejetega, ne glede na njegovo ozadje. Zato preteklosti ne odriva ali za-nika, marveč jo sprejema, to pa je ključnega pomena, da na njej gradi svojo po-sebno identiteto (Bauman 2008; Gerjolj 2009; 2015). Tretjič, posameznik iz sta-bilnih odnosov deluje iz danega trenutka, iz »tukaj in zdaj« (geštalt načelo), ker je manj obremenjen s preteklostjo, ki bi ga v mislih in občutjih »vlekla nazaj« in ga morda onesrečevala, niti se ne ukvarja preveč z raznimi (nerealnimi) željami za prihodnost, ki bi ga morda »povlekle« v neizpolnljivo hrepenenje in sanjarjenje, marveč se ukvarja s konkretnimi dogajanji, ki oblikujejo njegovo dobro življenje in srečnost. Z oblikovanjem takšnih odnosov se posameznik uči zaupanja (sebi in drugim), sprejemanja odgovornosti in odločitev, s katerimi gradi svoje (dobro in srečno) življenje.

Ključno za vzpostavitev varnih, stabilnih, dolgotrajnih, ljubečih in osrečujočih odnosov je poleg pristnega dialoga tudi upoštevanje (razumevanje) čustev. Upo-števanje in razumevanje čustev je pravzaprav pogoj že za samo vzpostavitev kate-regakoli (intimnega) pristnega odnosa. Kadar posameznik na kakršenkoli način potiska ob stran svoja čutenja, s tem potiska ob stran tudi del svoje izkušnje, del samega sebe, to pa povzroči, da posameznik zaostaja v razvoju, tako osebnem kakor tudi čustvenem, in predvsem, tako njega kakor druge udeležene v odnosu onesreču. Zato so za posameznika dolgotrajni, stabilni in ljubeči (intimni) odno-si bistveni za njegovo rast, ker ima v takšnih odnosih čas in prostor, ko se lahko opogumi in spregovori (na primer tudi o svojih neprijetnih čustvih). V sprejema-joče odnose si posameznik želi vstopati in se jih ne brani, saj se iz njih uči o sebi (in o drugih) in si tako z razumnim in odgovornim upravljanjem svojega čustvova-nja oblikuje srečno življenje. KI model pri vstopanju in oblikovanju odnosov po-maga tako, da posameznika usmerja k ozaveščanju njegovih lastnih predsodkov, zablod in samoprevar; z začetkom pri tem, da posameznik pritrdi spoznanju, da je nesamozadosten in da je njegova temeljna potreba (kakor potreba vseh preo-stalih ljudi) navezanost na drugega (Bowlby 1969; MacIntyre 2006). V okviru od-nosov je pomembno, da posameznik razume: nihče in nobena stvar nista samo-umevna, da bi mu pripadala – tudi če je zanju zavzeto garal in jima je predano zavezan – marveč njegova čustva razkrivajo, da je ob stvareh, ki pomembno se-stavljajo njegovo evdajmonijo, ranljiv in nad njimi nima nadzora. Ob teh občutjih

nemoči in ranljivosti nam lahko KI model pomaga – prek analize vpogleda v vrednostni svet ciljev, želja in projektov posameznika – razumeti, kako se neki določen predmet tam kaže, kakšna prepričanja ima posameznik v zvezi s tem predmetom, kakšna je pomembnost tega predmeta in kako ga vidi v primerjavi (v odnosu) z drugimi.

Stabilnost posameznikove identitete

Posameznikova identiteta se oblikuje vse življenje in glede na naravo človeka prehaja skozi različne razvojne stopnje (Juhant 2006, 168–181; Prijatelj 2010, 303–319). V vsaki razvojni stopnji so izzivi, s katerimi se posameznik sooča, različni in morajo bili preseženi, da lahko govorimo o dobrem življenju. Zato je pomembno, da je njegova identiteta ves čas navezana na neko določeno trdno jedro, po drugi strani pa, da je hkrati prožna za soočanje, z vsemi temi izzivi, in za njihovo razreševanje. Posameznik se v sodobnem času pogosto sprašuje o svoji identiteti (kdo je, kaj je smisel njegovega življenja, kaj naj stori itd.), pri tem pa odgovore navadno išče zunaj sebe, ker se mu morda ne zdi vredno, ukvarjati se s seboj, ali pa ne ve, kaj bi pravzaprav lahko sploh našel pri sebi, ali ker je odgovore poiskati »zunaj« pogosto tudi najhitreje in najlaže. Zato pogosto ostaja v tavanju, hrepenenju in iskanju, celo razdiranju in sestavljanju več novih identitet (Bauman 2008; Žalec 2015). Odgovori »od zunaj« niso pristni, saj v njih ni pristnega, dialoškega odnosa. Zato zagovarjamo prepričanje, da so za trdno identiteto ključni odnosi, ki smo jih omenili zgoraj. Pomen takšnih odnosov se razkrije, ko se posameznik po porazih, ki jih doživi v »svetu«, lahko vrača v te odnose z zaupanjem, da bo vedno sprejet in bo tako laže sprejel sebe, podobno kakor nam to razkriva prilika o izgubljenem sinu (Lk 15,11–15). Jedro identitete v okviru umetnosti življenja poleg odnosov tvorijo posameznikove prevladujoče naravnanosti (Kekes 2002), saj te naravnanosti »[u]telešajo hierarhijo vrednot subjektov in tvorijo korenine njihove motivacije. Živeti v skladu z njimi je vir samospoštovanja.« (Žalec 2005, 79) Vlogo čustev in čustvenosti pri oblikovanju identitete posameznika razumemo kot pomembno vodilo k ustreznemu oziroma boljšemu razumevanju samega sebe. Čustva vedno nastopajo v povezavi z neko določeno pomembno stvarjo, ki bistveno nagovarja posameznikov svet. Glede na KI model si lahko posameznik pomaga pri vzpostavitvi in ohranjanju stabilnosti svoje identitete prek razumevanja čustev, natančneje, vrednostnih sodb, ki odsevajo njegove vrednote in ideale, spoznava, kaj mu je pravzaprav pomembno. Še posebno kadar govorimo o grajenju stabilne identitete, je ključno poznavanje osebnih vrednot in vrednostnih stališč, hkrati pa njihovega čustvenega izraza v posameznih položajih.

Odkrivanje in razvijanje osebnih odlik

Posameznik mora v zasledovanje svoje srečnosti, v doseganje določenih ciljev ali v udejanjanje projektov vlagati trud. Kekes izpostavlja, da je pomembno del tega truda vložiti v odkrivanje in razvijanje osebnih odlik, to pa zahteva aktivnega in motiviranega posameznika. Njihovo razvijanje in odkrivanje je nujno zato, ker so

to pomembne značajske lastnosti, ki so bistvene za oblikovanje identitete in samo-podobe posameznika, hkrati pa pomembni gradniki dobrega življenja. Posameznik res lahko živi dobro življenje tudi brez teh osebnih odlik, toda življenje, v katerem se posameznik posveti osebnim odličnostim, je boljše, ker to pomeni močno zave-zanost njegovemu temeljnemu življenjskemu idealu (Kekes 2002, 164; 176). Zglede pomembnosti zasledovanja, odkrivanja in razvijanja osebnih odlik lahko najdemo v svetopisemskih osebnostih, na primer pri Abrahamu in Mojzesu, kakor ju pred-stavi Gerjolj (2009). Vse te osebe potrebujejo čas za učenje, vztrajnost, ponižnost in vero, da prepoznajo in sprejmejo svoje prave odlike, ki se pozneje kažejo v nji-hovih izboljšanih samopodobah. Te odlike so v skladu tudi z njihovimi osebnimi projekti. Gerjolj pravi, da »pravzaprav celotno Abrahamovo popotovanje lahko ra-zumemo kot napotitev v lastno notranjost, kot iskanje in hkrati oblikovanje same-ga sebe in lastne osebnosti, kot svojevrstno realizacijo sebe« (2009, 39). Pri Abra-hamu ne govorimo samo o iskanju in oblikovanju identitete, ampak tudi o iskanju posebne narave, skupaj z odličnostmi, za katere tudi sprejme odgovornost, jih raz-vija, se o njih uči. Njegov lik pomeni (med drugim) osebne odlike ljubezni, (za)upa-nja in vere, ki jih dosega prek vloge starševstva in prek ponižnosti pred Bogom. V okviru njegove življenjske zgodbe lahko razberemo, da se je začel globlje poučeva-ti o svojih odličnostih. Njegove odličnosti (ljubezen, vera in zaupanje), ki jih spo-znava prek vloge starševstva, ga zelo osrečujejo, toda hkrati od njega zahtevajo celo nepredstavljive stvari, smrt njegovega sina. »Bog je preizkušal Abrahama. Rekel mu je: ›Abraham!‹ Rekel je: ›Tukaj sem.‹ Pa je rekel: ›Vzemi svojega sina, svojega edin-ca, ki ga ljubiš, Izaka, in pojdi v deželo Moríja! Tam ga daruj v žgalno daritev na gori, ki ti jo bom pokazal!‹.« (1 Mz 22,1–19) Ker je kljub dvomom sledil svoji odličnosti (neomajni ljubezni, veri in zaupanju), je tako poskrbel, da je njegov sin preživel. Koraki so bili težki, ker je moral preiti strah in dvom, a je prišel tudi do globljega spoznanja o samem sebi in o življenju in je lahko napredoval v svojih odlikah, do naložene vloge očeta narodov. »Ne boš se več imenoval Abram, temveč Abraham ti bo ime, kajti postavljam te za očeta množici narodov.« (1 Mz 17,5) Mojzes je na drugi strani zgled, da moramo kljub dvomom in preizkušnjam vztrajati pri svoji veri v odlike, čeprav za to potrebujemo potrditev vere (ukaz Boga); Mojzes tako doseže celo »čudež« (prehod čez morje). V okviru krščanskega pogleda lahko tako razu-memo skladnost širšega božjega načrta s konkretnimi življenji posameznika. Na eni strani imamo božji klic in na drugi strani človekov odziv na ta klic (Petkovšek 2015, 677): nekatere osebe s temi odlikami se v njem prepoznajo in so v tej poklicanosti lahko uspešne in srečne. Čustva in čustvenost imajo pri odkrivanju in sledenju oseb-nostnim odlikam pomembno vlogo. Kadar ljudje skladno zasledujejo ideal osebne odličnosti zaradi pravega motiva, so v to dejavnost kot vodila ali motivacija vklju-čena njihova čustva (na pozitiven in negativen način) in bilo bi celo nenaravno, ne jih imeti (Kekes 2002, 237).

Razvijanje in zasledovanje osebnih projektov

Udejanjenje umetnosti življenja je odvisno od ciljno naravnanih dejavnosti. Način, kako posameznik razvija osebne odlike, torej ni takšen, da bi neposredno meril

nanje, ampak pride do njih prek osebnih projektov (164). »Vsako življenje vključuje brezštevilne različne aktivnosti. /.../ Nekatere od zadnjih terjajo in postanejo osrednje preokupacije v teku življenja. To so projekti osebe. Ti imajo cilje in vključujejo aktivnosti, katerih namen je doseganje teh ciljev. Pri dobro izbranih projektih zadovoljstvo osebe izvira iz obojega: iz doseženih ciljev in iz opravljanja dejavnosti. Življenje je lahko osebno zadovoljujoče, četudi njegov cilj ni dosežen. Živeti dobro življenje je odvisno od angažiranosti v osebno zadovoljujoče projekte na način, ki primerja ideal osebne odličnosti osebe. /.../ Umetnost življenja je ustvarjalna, domiselna in individualna.« (Žalec 2005, 75) To pomeni, prostor, ki je odprt za ljudi z različnimi značaji in okoliščinami. Pomeni tudi prostor učenja in izboljševanja. Pri doseganju dobrega življenja je torej pomembno udejanjati oba vira osebnega zadovoljstva, vir osebnih projektov in vir osebne odličnosti. Znotraj teh dveh virov pa je pomembno zasledovati tudi ustrezno čustveno naravnanost. Za to je potrebna aktivna zavzetost in ne zgolj zavedanje o tem, da bi bilo ustrezno oblikovati odločno čustveno naravnanost, ker samo zavedanje spremembe ne bo sprožilo. Čustva nam pomagajo razkrivati dejansko pomembne in osrednje vidike dobrega življenja. V okviru KI modela lahko posamezniku pomagamo prepoznavati osebne potrebe, želje in cilje, torej tudi vprašanje, kateri projekti so resnično pomembni in ključni za njegovo evdajmonijo, ob tem pa je ključno spoznanje, da imajo prav čustva, ki nastopajo v zvezi s temi projekti, motivacijski naboj in moč, saj se poleg najbolj pomembnih ciljev in projektov dotikajo tudi najbistvenejših oziroma najpomembnejših odnosov. Ta motivacijski naboj in pomembnost imata za posledico, da sprožita misli oziroma sodbe o morebitni ogroženosti ali krepitvi (našega) dobrega oziroma blaginje, zato posameznika motivirata, da se zanje resnično (predano) zavzame.

Zavezanost moralnosti in moralno sprejemljivo delovanje

Če bi umetnost življenja vključevala le razumni ideal odličnosti in osebnega projekta, bi bilo takšno življenje lahko nemoralno (Kekes 2002). Za dobro življenje je torej poleg osebnega zadovoljstva pomemben tudi element moralne sprejemljivosti. Zato je nujno, da dobro življenje zadosti zahtevam moralnosti, ki so vezane na posameznika, na družbo in na skupnost. Tem zahtevam se mora posameznik prilagoditi ne glede na značaj, okoliščine, ideale osebnih odličnosti in projektov. Dobro življenje mora biti moralno življenje, v katerem posameznik sledi spoštovanju človeškosti (Juhant 2009, 88). Vsi ljudje kot bitja delimo enake fiziološke, psihološke in skupnostne potrebe, ki morajo biti izpolnjene, da dosežemo dobro življenje. Moralnost pa ima vlogo zaščite teh pogojev in zahtev, ki jih moramo v zvezi z njimi izpolnjevati, tako za blagor drugih kakor tudi za našo lastno blaginjo (Kekes 2002, 147). Umetnost življenja tako poteka le znotraj okvira moralnosti. Če bi med moralnostjo in našim zasledovanjem dobrega življenja nastal konflikt, je posamezna odločitev odvisna od okoliščin in od tako imenovanih zasebnih razlogov (Kekes 2002). Glede odnosa med moralnostjo in čustvenostjo se lahko vzpostavi dvom, povezan s tem, da čustva ne morejo zajeti nepristranskega gledišča, saj izražajo posameznikov osebni pogled na svet (na cilje in na ideale). Vendar

lahko ta dvom zavrnemo. V okviru moralnega delovanja razumemo vlogo čustev kot nekaj, kar razširja meje posameznikovega jaza. Čustva povezujejo tisto, kar je posamezniku pomembno oziroma vrednoti posameznik kot bistveno, kar sestavlja njegovo blaginjo, njegove cilje in želje, pri tem vseskozi ostaja v odnosu z drugimi ter preverja in usklajuje izbire. Poudariti moramo, da je »moralno življenje nekaj, kar poteka nenehno, ne pa nekaj, kar se izključi med pojavi eksplicitno moralnih odločitev« (Murdoch 2006, 48). To pomeni, da umetnost življenja ne more biti omejena le na deontološke ali neposredno dejavnostne vidike etike, ampak med drugim vključuje tudi način moralnega videnja in moralne naravnanosti (Strahovnik 2016a; 2018, 309). Pri tem nam KI model pomaga pri spodbujanju in razvijanju tenkočutnosti, sočutja in empatičnega vstopanja v odnose.

Prizadevanje za celostno pravilnost mišljenja in čustvovanja

Umetnost primernega in polnega življenja vključuje poleg dejavnosti (umetnosti) ustreznega oziroma moralno pravilnega delovanja tudi dejavnost ustreznega oziroma pravilnega mišljenja in čustvovanja (Kekes 2002). Vidik dialoške odprtosti v odnosih nujno zajema čustveno odprtost. Pri vstopanju in oblikovanju stabilnih, dolgotrajnih, varnih in ljubečih odnosov sta oblikovanje in upoštevanje čustev ključni. V povezavi z identiteto in njeno trdnostjo čustva posamezniku pomenijo vrednostna vodila in vodila za boljše samorazumevanje. V povezavi z odkrivanjem, razvijanjem in udejanjanjem osebnih odlik čustva in čustvenost po eni strani razumemo predvsem kot motivacijsko podlago, po drugi strani pa (npr. sočutnost) tudi kot del teh odlik samih. Pri razvijanju in zasledovanju osebnih projektov čustva (kot vrednostne sodbe) bistveno prispevajo k razjasnjevanju in usmerjanju, kaj je posamezniku v življenju resnično pomembno in kaj ne; delujejo lahko tudi iz ozadja. V okviru vidika zavezanosti moralnosti in moralno sprejemljivemu delovanju pa čustva in čustvenost razumemo kot tiste, ki širijo meje jaza, nam omogočajo ustrezno moralno videnje in moralne naravnanosti, hkrati pa tudi odzive na ravnanja drugih in nas samih (npr. jeza, občutek krivde, moralni sram ipd.; Strahovnik 2016b) in stvarni pogled na nas same (473). Ker čustva razumemo kot vrednostne sodbe, naša čustva pravzaprav določajo, kako vidimo svet okoli nas, ne govorimo torej le o nerazumskih poznejših odzivih na svet. Tako vplivajo tudi na druga prepričanja, ki jih oblikujemo. (Po drugi strani pa tudi preostala, nevrednostna prepričanja pomembno vplivajo na čustva in na čustvenost, na primer glede na naše zmotno prepričanje, da nam je nekdo nekaj slabega storil, naš odziv jeze ali zavračanja ni nič manj stvaren ali iskren; ne temelji na napačni splošni vrednostni sodbi, ampak na zmotnem prepričanju o položaju.) Prav to celostnost (miselnega in čustvenega) doživljanja izpostavlja KI model, v delu, ki vključuje geštalt pristop, in nam jo omogoča (v procesu terapije ali osebnega razvoja) skladno razvijati.

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
Mari Jože Osredkar in Marjana Harcet

Pojem odrešenja in nauki o odrešenju v svetovnih religijah

Monografija obravnava religiološki pojem odrešenja in predstavlja nauk o odrešenju v najpomembnejših verstvih: v judovstvu, krščanstvu, islamu, hinduizmu in budizmu. Delo najprej predstavlja koncept odrešenja, nato je obdelan nauk o odrešenju v judovsko krščanski tradiciji, v tretjem poglavju spoznamo nauk o odrešenju v islamu in v zadnjem poglavju knjiga primerja pojmovanje odrešenja v religijah indijske podceline. Delo predstavlja prvo tovrstno predstavitev v slovenskem jeziku. Posebna pomembnost za slovenski prostor je v tem, da predstavi odrešenje kot eno najpomembnejših poglavij pri obravnavi sleherne religije. Avtorja v monografiji obravnavata uporabnost religije v tuzemskem življenju in eshatologijo omenjenih verstev.

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Matjaž Celarc

Christ as the Goal of the Law (Rom 10,4): Christ as the Converging Point in the History of Salvation.

Kristus – namen postave (Rim 10,4): Kristus kot združevalna točka zgodovine odrešenja.

Abstract: The article attempts to present Paul's argument in the Letter to the Romans that Christ is the goal of the Law and the culmination of all Israel's expectations, as suggested by the *propositio* Rom 10,4. The article highlights Paul's thought that Judaism and Christianity are not at odds but are part of God's plan that leads to Christ from the Law. The author uses the approaches of rhetorical analysis and intertextual reading. An analysis of structure, vocabulary and subject matter shows how all Paul's thought supports the idea of the continuity of the salvation history of Christ. Not less crucial is the intertextual approach, which shows how Paul bases his thought on the Old Testament parallels tied to the theme of the covenant that characterizes deuteronomistic and prophetic thought. The article points to an additional historical literary parallel to Luke, who presents Christ in the Apostolic Works as the fulfilment of Messianic expectations. The article shows how Paul invites his contemporaries and today's readers to discover in Christ the key to the history of salvation.

Keywords: Letter to the Romans, Law, Christ, relations with Judaism

Povzetek: Članek poskuša predstaviti Pavlovo argumentacijo v Pismu Rimljanom, da je Kristus cilj postave in vrhunec vseh pričakovanj Izraela, kakor nakazuje *propositio* v Rim 10,4. Članek izpostavi Pavlovo misel, da si judovstvo in krščanstvo nista v nasprotju, temveč sta del božjega načrta, ki od postave vodi h Kristusu. Avtor članka pri tem uporabi pristope retorične analize in intertekstualnega branja. Analiza strukture, besedišča in tematike pokaže, kako celotna Pavlova misel podpira idejo kontinuitete zgodovine odrešenja, ki teži h Kristusu. Pri tem je ključen tudi intertekstualni pristop, ki pokaže, kako Pavel svojo misel utemeljuje s starozaveznimi vzporednicami, vezanimi na tematiko zaveze, ki zaznamuje devteronomistično in preroško misel. Članek pokaže na dodatno zgodovinsko literarno vzporednico z Lukom, ki v Apostolskih delih Kristusa predstavi kot izpolnitev mesijanskih pričakovanj. Članek pove tudi,

kako Pavel svoje sodobnike in sedanje bralce vabi, da bi v Kristusu odkrili ključ zgodovine odrešenja.

Ključne besede: Pismo Rimljanom, postava, Kristus, odnos z judovstvom

"For years I have looked for the right key to the mystery of life, seeking God and righteousness by close observance of the Law but now, I have finally found it in Christ whom I had persecuted." These words could be ascribed to Saint Paul, an observant Jew and Pharisee, who struggled to achieve God's righteousness through the observance of the Law. For this reason, he ferociously persecuted Jesus's movement, called "the Way," as well as simple Christians who seemed to overturn the existing socio-religious style of life. However, Paul followed strict prescriptions and prohibitions defined as the Law in its entirety, at least until his personal encounter with Jesus the Risen Christ. This event represents a turning point in Paul's life. Paul realizes that Jesus, whom he was fighting against, represents the realization of all the promises, i.e. the renewal of the covenant by bestowing God's righteousness on all who believe. Paul's struggle to fulfil the Law receives an answer. The meaning, the goal (τέλος) of the Law is given in Jesus, the Risen Christ. However, if Paul has accepted the message of Christ due to his personal encounter with the Risen Lord, many Jews did not have such a privilege and thus preferred to cling to the social-religious establishments of the Law. Paul tackles this problem by discussing the problematic issue of the relationship between the Torah and Christ, between Israel and the Gentiles, very thoughtfully in his *Letter to the Romans*, especially in chapters Rom 9–11, and this is also a pivotal point for this paper.

Following Paul's argument, the article tries to reconsider the relationship *Christ – Law* in terms of the continuity of the history of salvation. For this purpose, the teleological meaning of the notion τέλος in Rom 10,4 is defended by considering: (1) the rhetorical structure of Rom 9–11; (2) the lexical analysis of the notions τέλος and νόμος; (3) the context and Paul's use of the Scriptures; and, finally (4), the context of Acts as contemporary and in thematically similar writing. These steps should shed some light upon how the nascent Christian community constructed its self-identity by referring to Israel's inheritance.

1.   Structure and interpretation

Paul confronts the question of salvation of both Israel and the Gentiles in the central part of Rom 9–11 (Aletti 2010, 126–127).[2] This part is interpreted as: (1) post-

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2   Various sections complement one another. Thus, the faith is not essential only for justification (Rom 4) but also for salvation which is given in Christ (Rom 10).

-Exilic supplication (2012, 140),[3] (2) lamentation Psalm (Hays 1989, 64),[4] and (3) intertextual correspondence to Is 51,1-18 (Belli 2010, 169–170). However, the argumentative proposal has precedence over the stylistic one (Belli 2010, 136–147; Gadenz 2009, 139–141) In any case, the well-organised composition of the main *propositiones* and Rom 9–11, as presented below, underlines the Christological interpretation of the entire letter (compare also Rom 10,4).

Exordium: 9,1-5

Probatio: 9,6–11,32

A:	9,6-29	(9,6a: propositio A)
B:	9,30–10,21	(10,4: propositio B)
A':	11,1-32	(11,1a: propositio A')

Peroratio: 11,33-36

Subdivision of B: 9,30–10,21

Exordium:	9,30–10,3	presentation of the question	A: 9,30–10,3
Propositio:	10,4	proposed thesis	B: 10,4-17
Probatio:	10,5-17	demonstration of the thesis	
Peroratio:	10,18-21	conclusion	A': 10,18-21

Moreover, the consideration of the main *propositiones* as the structural markers of the letter, shows how the argumentation guides towards the *propositio* in Rom 10,4. (Aletti 1990, 9–14)

Propositiones:

1,16-17: the gospel is righteousness/power of God for salvation of the believer

A: 9,6a: God is faithful (God's word has not failed)

B: 10,4: Christ is the centre (goal/end/culmination) of Torah

A': 11,1: God has not abandoned his people

The Christological statement, by reintroducing the main *propositio* (Rom 1,16), represents the clue to the understanding of Rom 9–11. Thus, salvation can be at-

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3 The closest correspondence could be seen with Deut 32.

God is just	Deut 32,3-4.8.14	Rom 9,14-23
The Israelites have sinned	Deut 32,5-13.15-18	Rom 10,21; 11,12
God will/has punished them	Deut 32,19-26	Rom 11,15.19
He will save his people	Deut 32,36	Rom 11,25-32

4 Thus, the disposition follows the pattern:

9,1-5:	lament over Israel
9,6-29:	defence of God's elective purpose
9,30– 10,21:	paradox: Israel failed to grasp the word of faith attested by God in the Scriptures
11,1-32:	God has not abandoned his people – Israel will be saved
11,33-36:	doxological conclusion.

tained by everyone who believes, first the Jew and then the Greek (10,4-13). As the statement in 10,4 represents a watershed-line within Paul's argumentation (i.e., *exordium*: 9,30–10,3; and *probatio*: 10,5-17), the interpretation of the term τέλος also depends on the manner of connection either to the previous (causal γάρ) or the following section (connective γάρ).

2.   The lexical analysis

2.1   The meaning of τέλος

Concerning the meaning of the concept τέλος there are different proposals (Howard 1969, 332; Schreiner 1993, 113–117; Fitzmyer 1993, 584); however, for the purpose of this paper, I will limit myself to briefly considering three basic meanings of the term τέλος as

(1)   temporal: end, termination, cessation;
(2)   teleological: goal, fulfillment; and as
(3)   the junction of both dimensions: climax, outcome and result.

(1) Τέλος as "end," thus by giving the term a temporal connotation. The event of Christ terminates the period of the Mosaic Law (i.e. human strivings to achieve righteousness). Thus, Christ forms a complete discontinuity between the Law and the period of the gospel. The τέλος is consequently linked to the following 10,5 that speaks about the Law of Moses (presented by the citation of Lev 18,5). The adversative particle δέ and Midrashic citation of Deut 30,11-14 in Rom 10,6 introduces the theme of the Law of faith fulfilled in Christ. (Aletti 2010, 144–145) With the coming of the Christ the authority of the Law is ended (Badenas 1985, 28), meaning that the new era of the relationship with God begins.

As the Jews and the Gentiles lived together, it is difficult to sustain a mere historical interpretation. However, the theological claim, i.e. that the Law ends where there is faith, is valid if it is understood correctly. (Munck and Stendahl 1967, 84; Luz 1968, 143–158; Légasse 2004, 500–502) Thus, τέλος as "end" means the cessation of the misunderstanding of the Law in terms of achieving righteousness through works. The believer in Christ ceases using the law as a means of establishing his own righteousness (10,3-4). The search for righteousness is achieved neither by works nor by nation, but by submission to God. Reading with the following vv. 10,5-8 indicates that life according to the Law is impossible, unless by trusting Christ. Thus, Christ presents the end of the Law, since it is in Christ that Israel ceases to exclude others. (Dunn 1988, 596–597; Räisänen 1992, 30–45; Schreiner 1993, 121–124)

(2) Τέλος as "goal." On the other hand, some scholars try to overcome the traditional understanding, as presented above, by defending the teleological meaning of the term (Howard 1969, 336; Gaston 1987, 122–130; Bechtler 1994, 291–302; Johnson 1997, 159). Christ is represented as the goal of and as the continuation

between the Mosaic Law and the gospel. According to Mary Getty, the Pauline studies have often been seen as polemicizing with Judaism, but this perspective should be modified, as Paul's mission aims only to include the Gentiles rather than to exclude the Jews (1988, 466–468). For Getty, to present Christ in 10,4 as a definite end of the Law, would mean to "jeopardize the entire endeavour of Romans" (466). The term τέλος should be understood as a "fulfillment," based on the embracing *propositiones* (9,6; 11,1), as well as on the following chain of biblical proofs. Robert Badenas analyses the lexeme τέλος both within the Hellenistic and the biblical context (1985, 38–115). While the term certainly possesses a teleological meaning in the first context, in Pauline corpus it is used differently. Since Paul addresses Romans to Hellenistic recipients, the teleological meaning of the term is probably supposed. Badenas also supports his position by pointing out God's impartiality and the possibility of salvation for all people (1,16). In fact, by faith in Christ (10,4) Israel returns to the winning-post of righteousness, on the one hand, and the Gentiles join God's people, on the other.

(3) Τέλος as a converging "climax." Some prefer to leave the term τέλος as *finis*, which means both "termination" as well as "fulfilment" (Dunn 1988, 589). Perceiving Christ as the climax, i.e. the point of convergence of the Law, means also the cessation of the Law; albeit in relative terms because Paul still quotes the Law as the norm also for the Christians (13,8-10) and Christ represents the finishing line in the race for righteousness (Moo 2000, 328–331; Sanders 1975, 379–383; Walters 1993, 73–75; Neusner 2009, 15–20). Some scholars such as Andrew Wakefield translate the term as "culmination," as the history of salvation has arrived at its fulfilment by the arrival of Christ and the cessation of sin (2003, 77).

In brief, each of two basic interpretations of τέλος has important socio-religious consequences. Thus, neither of these positions should be carried to extremes, as it could overemphasize either (1) the discontinuity and lead to the *theology of substitution*, or (2) the continuity that could lead to misunderstanding the salvation of Israel as Israel's *Sonderweg* (Rom 11). In my opinion, the reader of Romans should take seriously Paul's endeavour to vindicate God's salvific purpose that includes both Israel and the Gentiles at the main *propositio* (1,16). Paul must combine both Christ's newness as well as the continuity of Israel's history by pointing to: (1) God's faithfulness (9,6a), despite Israel's rejection of his gospel (9,3) (Donaldson 1997, 243–248); and (2) the inclusion of the Gentiles that lies at the heart of the Law. For this reason, Christ represents the very goal of the Law (10,4). (Wright 2010, 42–53; Jewett 1985, 354)

In the following argumentation, Paul by using Scriptures defends the events as a prophetical call to conversion and renewal of the covenant between God and his people. However, before considering the context, the polysemantic nature of the correspondent notion νόμος must be exposed.

2.2 The meaning of νόμος

The notion of νόμος, equivalent to the Jewish law, Torah (תּוֹרָה), is very important for Paul, not only because of the number of occurrences (50 times in Ro-

mans),[5] but moreover, because of its polysemantic value. Paul, in fact, does not make any explicit distinctions in semantic usage of the notion, but rather plays with its different meanings: (1) moral norm/measure of righteousness or God's will; (2) moral-ritual value of these norms confronted with faith; (3) Torah/Pentateuch.

(1) The Law refers to the Mosaic legislation, intended as a moral norm, that expresses God's will and represents the embodiment of knowledge and truth for the Jews (2,12-20). Although the Gentiles do not possess the law, they do what is required by the law. Thus, the law defines a moral imperative, on the one hand, and sin, on the other (5,13.20). If Paul seems to ignore the ritual value and to reduce the law to the commandment to love (13,8-10), it is to impress his Christian readers so that they do not nullify the law (3,31), but rather that they fulfil the most important parts of the law. (Räisänen 1983, 26–28)

(2) The Law is good and thus cannot be abolished as it indicates what is good or bad. Thus, the Law is not sin (7,7), but rather, it defines what sin is, therefore the Law is holy and spiritual (7,12-16); albeit, by setting the norm of good works, it calls down God's wrath on the wrongdoer (4,15). In Romans, the law is in force and it is only the misunderstanding and misinterpretation that has to be put away. (Räisänen 1983, 42) Even though it appears that "works of law" or "works" have negative connotations (4,2; 9,32; 11,6), this does not refer to the works as such, but rather to sin (7,9-11). God, in fact, reveals his will by means of the law, thus, the problem is not the law itself, but the law-dependent attitude, as a man believes he can attain salvation solely by doing the works of the law.

God's law, previously identified by the Law, has been reinforced as the "law of faith" (3,27) and as the "law of Spirit" (8,2). If within our hearts there is a constant battle between the law of sin and the law of God (7,23), as Paul asserts, the law of God goes hand in hand with the Law of the Spirit (8,2). Therefore, what counts is not ethnic or ritual membership, but membership through faith. Although Israel pursued the law of righteousness, it did not receive it because it was struggling according to its own works and not in faith (9,31-32). Christian freedom from the "law's condemnation" through being "under grace" (6,14) refers not to the moral measure of the law, but it includes the freedom of its misuse and misunderstanding as in some dietary prescriptions (14,14.20). (Räisänen 1983, 46–48)

The Law may be intended both as a part of the Old Testament (i.e. as it is either distinguished from the prophets in 3,21 or connected with Moses in 5,13-14) as well as the entire Old Testament tradition in 3,10-18 (Martin 1989, 22). If the combination of the notions τέλος and νόμος hints at the goal of the Law, intended either as a moral norm or as the entire Old Testament tradition, this is further supported by Paul's use of the Scriptures of Israel's tradition in terms of both the continuity and the newness of the Christian community.

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[5]   Writing the occurrences by extent, Paul gives a certain picture: Rom 2,12-15.17.18.20.23.25-27; 3,19-21.27.28.31; 4,13-16; 5,13.20; 6,14.15; 7,1-9.12.14.16.21-23.25; 8,2-4.7; 9,31; 10,4-5; 13,9-10.

In brief, the Law is not presented in direct opposition to Christ. It defines the borders of sin, it indicates the way to God, which, however, can be walked only through faith in God and his Christ. Nevertheless, the Law does not possess the power to bring man righteousness; only Christ, who has been indicated all along, brings the goal of the Law: the righteousness of man before God through the faith.

3.   The context and Paul's use of the Scriptures

By observing Paul's intertextual reading of the Old Testament, i.e. his redactional use of the biblical citation as a proof of authority, the reader better understands how Paul constantly underlines the continuity and fulfilment of Israel's history in Christ. For the scope of this article, I will consider only some "quotation verses" in three main parts: (1) *exordium* (9,33), (2) *probatio* (10,5.6-8), (3) *peroratio* (10,19-21).

(1) In *exordium* (9,30–10,3), Paul reflects both on Israel's failure (i.e. stumbling due to disbelief) as well as its salvation. His reflection is anchored in Isaiah's promise of "saved remnant" (κατάλειμμα [ὑπόλειμμα] σωθήσεται: Isa 10,22; Rom 9,27) and "left seed" (κύριος ἐγκατέλιπεν σπέρμα: Isa 1,9; Rom 9,29). Moreover, the lexical correspondences allude to Isa 51,1-8, where a hope for Israel is indicated. (Belli 2010, 205) Paul using the rabbinical *gezerah shawah* (Basta 2006, 24–29), concludes the first part of exordium (Rom 9,33) with a conflation of the two texts Isa 26,16 and 8,14.

Rom 9,33		Is 28,16	
	ἰδοὺ τίθημι ἐν Σιὼν		ἐμβαλῶ εἰς τὰ θεμέλια Σιων λίθον πολυτελῆ ἐκλεκτὸν ἀκρογωνιαῖον ἔντιμον εἰς τὰ θεμέλια αὐτῆς
	λίθον προσκόμματος καὶ πέτραν σκανδάλου,	Is 8,14	καὶ ἐὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ πεποιθὼς ᾖς καὶ οὐχ ὡς λίθου προσκόμματι συναντήσεσθε αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ὡς πέτρας πτώματι
	καὶ ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ οὐ καταισχυνθήσεται.		καὶ ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ

Table 1:   *Comparison between the texts of Isaiah and Romans.*

The first and last part of the *exordium* is taken from Is 28,16, where God replies to the leaders of Jerusalem. Thus, by setting a precious stone as a foundation in Zion, the salvation is announced to whoever believes, i.e. sets his hopes upon this chosen foundation. However, the quotation from Is 28,16 is modified by the redactional insertion from Is 8,14, which portrays the division between two groups of people: those who fear the imminent danger of the Samaria-Damascus invasion and those who fear the Lord. (Childs 2001, 74–75) The link between two Isaianic quotations is lexically (stone: λίθος) and thematically (faith/trust: πιστεύω/πεποιθώς) based. The conflation of the two texts underlines the importance of

faith as a prerequisite for salvation. Only through faith and trust in God may salvation be attained. If trust in God should be associated with the Law, the context of Is 28–29 explains why people are unable to grasp the Law. The reason is the rigidity of the religious and political leaders who rather than listening to the Lord would seal the Law of God so no one can attain it. (Wagner 2002, 136–152) However, Paul will address the question of the formal cause of faith, i.e. hearing and obeying the Lord, only later in his letter (Rom 10,17; Deut 28,2). Therefore, Israel's pursuit of the Law through works instead through faith, causes it to stumble, whereas the Gentiles have achieved the righteousness of the Law due to their faith (9,31-33) (Barrett 1982, 140–141). The second part of *exordium* (10,1-3), by using the same terminology (righteousness, Law-works, faith) underlines the argument. Israel, although having the zeal for God, lacks knowledge of God. Consequently, Israel, instead of submitting itself to the righteousness of God, seeks to establish its own. The righteousness of faith as the goal of the Law is established through Christ (10,4; 10,11).[6]

In brief, Israel seeks its own righteousness through works. However, the righteousness of God comes from faith and not from works.

(2) In the initial part of *probatio* (10,5-8) Paul uses different scriptural allusions (Belli 2010, 248).

Rom 10,5	Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ [τοῦ] νόμου ὅτι ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.	~~καὶ φυλάξεσθε πάντα τὰ προστάγματά μου καὶ πάντα τὰ κρίματά μου~~ ~~καὶ ποιήσετε αὐτά ἃ~~ ποιήσας ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς	Introduction Quotation Lev 18,5
Rom 10,6	ἡ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη οὕτως λέγει· μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου· τίς ἀναβήσεται εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; τοῦτ' ἔστιν Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν·	μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου […] τίς ἀναβήσεται ~~ἡμῖν~~ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ~~καὶ λήμψεται αὐτὴν ἡμῖν~~ ~~καὶ ἀκούσαντες αὐτὴν ποιήσομεν~~	Introduction Quotation Deut 9,4.(8,17) Allusion Deut 30,12 Comment
Rom 10,7	τίς καταβήσεται εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον; τοῦτ' ἔστιν Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν.	τίς διαπεράσει ~~ἡμῖν~~ εἰς τὸ πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης ~~καὶ λήμψεται ἡμῖν αὐτήν καὶ ἀκουστὴν ἡμῖν ποιήσει αὐτήν καὶ ποιήσομεν~~	Allusion Deut 30,13 Comment

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[6] Christological references start with *propositio*: 10,4.6.7.9.12.13. The last two references indicate Christ in a theological sense as the Lord who saves.

Rom 10,8	ἀλλὰ τί λέγει; ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσομεν.	ἔστιν σου ἐγγὺς τὸ ῥῆμα σφόδρα ἐν τῷ στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ~~ἐν ταῖς χερσίν σου αὐτὸ ποιεῖν~~	Introduction Quotation Deut 30,14 Comment

Table 2: *Comparison between Old Testament texts and the text of Romans.*

In 10,5 Paul refers to the text of Lev 18,5. The citation is taken from the *Holiness Code* (Lev 17–26) that regulates the covenant between God and his people. By extracting the verse, "the man doing the precepts will live by them," Paul interprets "doing" as the basic rule that determines the Mosaic Law. Following this logic, the Law instead of providing life, seems to lead the people to death (Rom 7,10). Therefore, Paul adds another twist to the matter. By personifying the righteousness of faith (10,6), he questions the possibility of achieving this righteousness. Paul, while quoting the rhetorical questions of Deut 9,4 and Deut 30,11-14, omits the reference to "doing" and instead introduces the comment from a Christological perspective (i.e. to bring Christ down from heaven or to bring him up from the dead). The fulfilment of the Law is not too hard since through Christ it comes closer to man. Thus, the Law can be accomplished through faith in Christ who descended from heaven and ascended from the dead. (Penna 2010, 708–710)

Not all scholars share this interpretation of Paul's argumentation. The *crux interpretum* represents the particle δέ in 10,6 (BDR 1979 §447.1), as it can either separate or link two manners of righteousness: the righteousness of the Law and the righteousness of faith. Some scholars, by interpreting δέ as a strong opposition particle, distinguish between the two manners of righteousness. Thus, Paul demonstrates that the regime of the Law is ended and, moreover, that by faith in Christ, righteousness becomes possible. (Légasse 2004, 508–509; Penna 2010, 710–713) Others, by interpreting it simply as a linking particle, take the two verses as being interrelated and interpreting each another. Thus, the Law becomes possible by faith in Christ. Based on Christological insistence in 10,4.6.7.9, stylistic criteria and because the adversative particle ἀλλά appears only in 10,8 (BDB §§ 448.3; 452.1.3), I follow this second interpretation. Thus, the text shows the shift concerning fulfilling the Law, i.e. from the impossibility of fulfilling the Law to the possibility of fulfilling it through faith. The content of the faith that Paul announces is expressed in 10,9, "Jesus is Lord." Thus, a man attains salvation by believing and confessing Jesus' lordship.

In brief, as in the past, the people of Israel were granted deliverance by God's faithfulness (Deut 9,4), thus again, now, believing what God has done in Christ leads to life (Howard 1969, 334–335; Wagner 2002, 160–167; Hays 1989, 76–77).

(3) The part of conclusion, *peroratio* 10,18-21, includes different quotations: Ps 18,5 (LXX), Deut 32,21 and Is 65,1-2. For the purpose of this article, I comment only on the last two Old Testament references.

Rom 10,19	ἐγὼ παραζηλώσω ὑμᾶς ἐπ᾽ οὐκ ἔθνει, ἐπ᾽ ἔθνει ἀσυνέτῳ παροργιῶ ὑμᾶς.	Deut 32,21	αὐτοὶ παρεζήλωσάν με ἐπ᾽ οὐ θεῷ παρώργισάν με ἐν τοῖς εἰδώλοις αὐτῶν κἀγὼ παραζηλώσω αὐτοὺς ἐπ᾽ οὐκ ἔθνει ἐπ᾽ ἔθνει ἀσυνέτῳ παροργιῶ αὐτούς
Rom 10,20	[Ἠσαΐας λέγει] εὑρέθην [ἐν] τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ζητοῦσιν, ἐμφανὴς ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπερωτῶσιν.	Is 65,1	ἐμφανὴς ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ζητοῦσιν εὑρέθην τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπερωτῶσιν εἶπα ἰδού εἰμι τῷ ἔθνει οἳ οὐκ ἐκάλεσάν μου τὸ ὄνομα
Rom 10,21	[πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ] ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐξεπέτασα τὰς χεῖράς μου πρὸς λαὸν ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα.	Is 65,2	ἐξεπέτασα τὰς χεῖράς μου ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν πρὸς λαὸν ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα οἳ οὐκ ἐπορεύθησαν ὁδῷ ἀληθινῇ ἀλλ᾽ ὀπίσω τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν

Table 3:   *Comparison between the texts of Deuteronomy, Isaiah and Romans.*

Paul changes the personal pronoun αὐτούς of Deut 32,21 to ὑμᾶς in Rom 10,19, so that God now speaks directly to the people. As once Moses witnessed that God is calling Gentiles to be a part of his people in order to make Israel jealous, now God addresses his people to explain this plan. Thus, Moses' song describing the history of Israel (Deut 31,1– 32,47) underlines how God makes the people jealous to bring them to final salvation. (Wagner 2002, 190–196) Thus, while real, genuine zeal means faith as the sole way to approach God (Belli 1994, 103–104), Israel's arrogance causes it to stumble – on the one hand, and the Gentiles to be included, on the other. However, the prophetic indictment in Rom 10 should lead Israel to repentance (Getty 1988, 458–459).

The redaction of Is 65,1 in Rom 10,20 tries to set the evoked text in a more logical sequence: seeking-finding, asking-manifesting. However, despite the people's complaint about God's silence (64,11), the problem is not God's absence, but the people's resistance. God, in fact, calls: "Here I am" (65,1) and extends his hands to the people as if he were a petitioner (65,2). (Childs 2001, 535) If the addressee of God's speech in Isaiah is the people of Israel (65,1-2), Paul disunites the verses in order (1) to proclaim the inclusion for Gentiles (65,1) in Rom 10,20 and (2) to decry Israel's constant rebellion (65,2) in Rom 10,21 (Wagner 2002, 211–215).

In brief, in the *peroratio* Paul makes rhetorical use of the Old Testament to point out both the widespread message of Christ as well as Israel's rebellion to provoke its conversion.

3.1   Reading the context of the Romans

The notions of τέλος and νόμος converge as the notion of "righteousness" (10,4: εἰς δικαιοσύνην). This latter term expresses both the condition as well as the con-

sequence of salvation and it is important both for the immediate context (as its numerous occurrences form a thematic cluster) as well as for the entire letter (as it constitutes the connective thread of Romans).

In fact, as expressed in *propositio* (1,16-17.18), God's righteousness means both salvation for the believer in Christ as well as judgment against all ungodliness. Paul compares God's righteousness and faith, on the one hand, to the Law and circumcision, on the other, in order to show how righteousness and salvation can be reached only through faith in Christ, as Christ represents the verge of God's righteousness on man's behalf.

The law and the prophets witness to God's righteousness; however, God's righteousness supersedes the Law. Even though all have sinned, the righteousness of God is bestowed to all who believe in Christ (3,21-25). Therefore, even Abraham's circumcision is a seal of the righteousness of the faith, as righteousness precedes the circumcision (4,11). Paul shows how Jesus Christ's grace provides righteousness leading to eternal life (5,21). It is because of Jesus that the believer may begin a new life of faith (8,3-4), thus walking the way of Jesus to gain eternal life (8,10). Thus, righteousness is not due to the merit of works, but rather through faith in Christ (9,30).

With the aim to preserve the primacy and hope of salvation for Israel (11,26), Paul adopts different perspectives and points at:

(1) God's faithfulness (9,6; 11,1);

(2) the theology of Israel's faithful remnant (9,27; 11,5) and

(3) God's plan of salvation for the Gentiles by means of Israel's hardening and stumbling (9,16.32; 11,11.17-24).

As God is both impartial (2,11) and faithful (9,6), he entrusts the entire humanity with righteousness through faith in Christ, through life in Christ and the life by the Law of Spirit (8,1-2). Thus, the believers have already been saved in hope (8,24), knowing that all things work for the good of those who love God (8,28). (Wright 2010, 50)

In brief, God demonstrates his righteousness for the salvation of man in Christ. If the Law had a preparatory function, Christ by showing God's love fulfilled the righteousness of the Law and the path to righteousness through faith and love. Christ is thus a goal of the Law, as through faith in him righteousness can be achieved that prior to him was impossible solely through works of the Law.

4.   Comparison with Acts

Paul is not alone in his endeavour to interpret Christ as the goal of the Law. This can be supported by some thematic correspondences in the *Acts of the Apostles*, perceiving Christ as the core of the *kerygma*: thus as (1) the leader to life and (2) a stumbling stone to the ignorant and hardened people. On the other hand, Acts constantly underline God's faithfulness and impartiality.

Stone of stumbling	Rom 9,32-33: They have stumbled over the stumbling stone (λίθος προσκόμματος), as it is written, "See, I am laying in Zion a stone that will make people stumble (λίθος προσκόμματος), /…/ and whoever believes in him will not be put to shame."	Ac 4,11: This [Jesus] is 'the stone' (λίθος) that was rejected by you, the builders; it has become the cornerstone.
Ignorance	Rom 10,2-4: They have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. For, being ignorant of the righteousness that comes from God /…/ Christ is the goal of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes.	Ac 3,17-20: I know that you acted in ignorance, as did also your rulers. [… Repent] that he may send the Christ appointed for you, Jesus.
Salvation in Christ	Rom 10,9: If you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.	Ac 2,36; 4,12: God has made him both Lord and Messiah, /…/ there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved.
Inclusion Impartiality	Rom 10,12: For there is no distinction (διαστολή; 2,11: προσωπολήμπτης) between Jew and Greek; the same Lord is Lord of all, bestowing his riches on all who call on him.	Ac 10,34-35: I truly understand that God shows no partiality (προσωπολήμπτης), but in every nation anyone who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him.
Hardness of the people	Rom 10,21: Isaiah says [Isa 65,2] "All day long I have held out my hands to a disobedient and contrary people."	Ac 7,51: [Isa 63,10] You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Spirit.

Table 4:   *Thematic comparison between the texts of Romans and Acts.*

4.1   Peter's second kerygmatic speech (3,11-26)

While there is a vast array of thematic correspondences, here only some themes developed in Peter's second speech will be exposited. In fact, both faith in Jesus and his resurrection, on the one hand, as well as the hope of the universal blessing due to God's impartiality, on the other, indicate an intertextual meeting point.

After the healing of the lame man in the temple, Peter addresses the astonished crowd (3,11). Peter designates Jesus as (1) God's servant, (2) holy, (3) righteous and (4) leader to life. All these titles evoke the figure of Isaianic Servant. While the people handed him over, denied and killed him out of ignorance, God has glorified him and raised him from the dead in order to fulfil his plan, as announced by his prophets (3,13-18). Jesus as the leader to life and salvation represents the common theme and the junction of the texts in terms of faith and hope in resurrection (Ac 5,31; Rom 4,24; Is 53,12).

Ac 3,13 God has glorified his servant (ἐδόξασεν παῖδα) Jesus	Is 52,13 (παῖς δοξασθήσεται)
Ac 3,14 you have denied the Holy and Righteous One (ἅγιον, δίκαιον)	Is 49,7 (ἅγιος); Isa 53,11 (δίκαιος)
Ac 3,15 [you have] killed the leader to life [ἀρχηγὸν τῆς ζωῆς]	Is 53,8 ἤχθη εἰς θάνατον
Ac 3,15 God has raised him from the dead	Is 53,8 αἴρεται ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς

Table 5:   *Comparison between the texts of Acts and Isaiah.*

The people obtaining new awareness of God's plan are invited to conversion, as a prerequisite for the arrival of the times of refreshment and of the appointed Messiah (Ac 3,19-20) (Tyson 1992, 103–111). The need for new awareness is further supported by biblical proof, i.e. Moses' announcement of the arrival of the Messiah (3,22-23). In Ac 3,23, the reader perceives how Peter adopts some redactional retouches. Firstly, by conflating two texts, Deut 18,15.19 and Lev 23,29, he hints at the need to listen in order not to be cast off from God's people. Secondly, by introducing "every soul-whoever" (πᾶσα ψυχή), he extends his audience to all men. Moreover, the impartiality of God's plan is underlined in Ac 3,25 by introducing God's promise to Abraham in Gen 22,18 (Gen 12,3; 18,18; 26,14; 28,14). The people of Israel, as the bearer of the promises, is the bearer of the blessing to all the families of the earth.

Gen 22,18: ἐνευλογηθήσονται	Ac 3,25: ἐν τῷ σπέρματί σου
ἐν τῷ σπέρματί σου	[ἐν]ευλογηθήσονται
πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τῆς γῆς	πᾶσαι αἱ πατριαὶ τῆς γῆς.

Table 6:   *Comparison between the texts of Genesis and Acts.*

The final verse sums up Peter's entire speech. Jesus as the servant (παῖς) is the focus of Peter's speech, as shown through the inclusion of the term at the beginning and at the end of the speech (Ac 3,13.26). God's action in raising his servant expresses God's faithfulness. This means a blessing attained through conversion first to the people of Israel and then to the Gentiles (3,26). The people of the covenant are the first to attain the blessing, as is indicated by the adverb of time and quality (πρῶτον). However, Israel is the forerunner of the blessing (3,25) that should spread over the entire world, as the people gathered in Jerusalem for the Pentecost represent the worldwide diaspora (2,5-9).

Ac 3,26: **ὑμῖν** *πρῶτον* ἀναστήσας ὁ θεὸς τὸν παῖδα αὐτοῦ

ἀπέστειλεν αὐτὸν εὐλογοῦντα **ὑμᾶς**

ἐν τῷ ἀποστρέφειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῶν πονηριῶν **ὑμῶν**.

A brief overview of Peter's second speech in Acts shows some resemblances with the content of Rom 10. Although the comparison cannot completely fulfil

Hays' criteria of availability and historical plausibility, in order to speak of direct dependence (1989, 29–31); however, it underlines the impression that the first believing community is not separated from, but rather rooted in Jewish tradition. Thus, the goal of the Jewish Law-covenant represents righteousness and blessing. As this goal is achieved through Christ's exaltation, the continuity of the promise of the righteousness and blessing is confirmed, whereas the termination and the abolishment refers to the dimension of sin.

5. Conclusion

The article, using *prosopopoeia* in Paul's observation "The mystery of life finds its goal and final resolution in Jesus," brings to the fore the turning point in Paul's life, namely the encounter with Jesus. Only a fervent Pharisee could rightly balance the Hebrew attitude to the Torah with the newness of Jesus Christ. Paul has understood that Christ represents the goal and purpose of the Torah. However, he must explain this fact both to the Jews as well as his communities.

The *propositio* "Christ the goal of the Law" (10,4) in the central part of the letter to the Romans (9,30–10,21) not only represents a part of the string of the main *propositiones* (1,16-17; 9,6a; 10,4; 11,1), but rather, it shows how God's salvific plan arrives at its purpose in the gospel of Christ (1,16), both for Jews as well as for the Gentiles.

The analysis of the terms τέλος and νόμος shows their ambiguity and polysemantic valence. Following scholars such as Mary Getty and others, the article interprets τέλος in terms of continuity, teleological meaning and covenantal theology.

Both reading of the close context as well as a brief thematic overview of Romans (i.e. pursuing the terms Law and righteousness) lead to similar conclusions that τέλος elicits teleological and covenantal interpretation. Such interpretation opens the doors of the believing community universally. Moreover, this reading finds some resonance also in the Acts both with regard to the form, by the redactional use of Scripture (Deut, Is), and the message by portraying the expansion of the gospel beyond the limits of Israel (Ac 1,8).

Thus, Christ is not abolition, but the goal of the Law, in which God's righteousness is given to all who believe in him. Thus, the community of believers, regardless of the limits of space and time, perceive Christ as both the realization of the aspiration for righteousness as well as the model to follow; moreover, the community perceives itself as a continuation of the covenant with Israel, in terms of bringing God's righteousness and blessing to the entire world. The Law, formerly indicating the way to follow, finds its goal not in itself, but in Christ. The Law prepares and points to Christ, given that not works, but rather only faith in Jesus leads to life and salvation.

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Irena Avsenik Nabergoj

Narodi, religije in misijon v dokumentih drugega vatikanskega koncila

Nations, Religions and Mission in Documents of the Second Vatican Council

Povzetek: Z izbruhom prve in druge svetovne vojne in z nastopom globalizacije, ki je zajela ves svet, je vodstvo Cerkve moralo odgovoriti na izziv gospodarskega, političnega, vzgojnega in kulturnega sodelovanja med vsemi narodi. Ta izziv je koncilske očete drugega vatikanskega zbora tako pritegnil, da so v primarnih virih Svetega pisma in cerkvenih očetov poiskali besedila, ki najbolj jasno in enoumno govorijo o misijonski naravi Cerkve kot vesoljnega občestva ljudi, podobno ali enako hrepenečih po sreči in ljubezni, pa tudi enako ali podobno trpečih zaradi zemeljske omejenosti človekovega življenja. Vračanje v duhovne vire Svetega pisma, ki vrh svojega sporočila doseže v zapovedi ljubezni do Boga in do sočloveka, omogoča nenehno prečiščevanje hermenevtike misijona, tako na strokovni ravni kakor tudi na ravni živete resnice po vzoru božje ljubezni do vseh ljudi na svetu. Članek po kronološkem redu obravnava koncilske dokumente, ki izražajo nove poglede koncilskih očetov na vlogo narodov, religij in misijona v perspektivi svetopisemskega razodetja: Konstitucijo o svetem bogoslužju; Izjavo o razmerju Cerkve do nekrščanskih verstev; Dogmatično konstitucijo o Cerkvi; Odlok o misijonski dejavnosti Cerkve in Pastoralno konstitucijo o Cerkvi v sedanjem svetu.

Ključne besede: misijonsko poslanstvo Cerkve, mejniki misijona skozi zgodovino, prenova v razmerju do tradicije, skupno jedro vseh religij, dialog

Abstract: With the outbreak of the First and Second World War and with the onset of globalization that engulfed the whole world, the leadership of the Church had to respond to the challenges of economic, political, educational and cultural cooperation among all nations. These challenges attracted the fathers of the Second Vatican Council so much, that in the primary sources of the Holy Scriptures and the Church fathers they found texts that speak most clearly and unambiguously about the missionary nature of the Church as the universal communion of people who in the similar or same way yearn for happiness and love, but also in the similar or same way suffer from the earthly limitations of the human life. The return to the spiritual sources of the Bible, which reaches

the summit of its message in the commandment of love for God and the fellow men, enables the constant purification of the hermeneutics of the mission, both on the professional level and on the level of living the truth according to the pattern of God's love for all people in the world. The article deals with the chronological order of the conciliar documents reflecting the new views of the Council fathers on the role of nations, religions and mission in the perspective of biblical revelation: Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy; Declaration on the Relation of the Church to non-Christian Religions; Dogmatic Constitution on the Church; Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity; Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.

Key words: The Missionary Mandate of the Church, Milestones of the Missions throughout History, Renewal in the Relation to Tradition, Common core of all Religions, Dialogue

1. Uvod

V svojem članku Od poetizacije poslanstva v Stari zavezi do polnosti misijona v Novi zavezi (2018) sem bila pozorna predvsem na najpomembnejša besedila Stare in Nove zaveze, ki govorijo o odnosu Boga do narodov in narodov do Boga ter o poklicanosti nekaterih svetopisemskih oseb Stare in Nove zaveze za misijonsko dejavnost. Posebej sem izpostavila vlogo apostola Pavla, ki velja za največjega misijonarja prve krščanske dobe. V pismih utemeljuje misijonsko naravo Cerkve, pri tem izhaja iz Svetega pisma. V tem prispevku, ki je nadaljevanje prejšnjega, pa me predvsem zanimajo svetopisemske in teološke utemeljitve samega misijona ter odnos katoliške Cerkve do nekrščanskih verstev v dokumentih drugega vatikanskega koncila, predvsem v Izjavi o razmerju Cerkve do nekrščanskih verstev (*Nostra aetate*, kot koncilska izjava sprejeta leta 1965).[1]

Svetopisemska besedila Stare in Nove zaveze kažejo kontrastno razmerje med široko in poglobljeno vizijo prerokov, ki so božje razodetje dojemali in oznanjali z odprtostjo do narodov, in zagovorniki ozkega, zgolj v Izrael usmerjenega pojmovanja postavke o izvolitvi Izraela kot posebnega ljudstva med vsemi narodi. V Novi zavezi se je to nasprotje tako izostrilo, da je nastopil prelom med judovstvom in krščanstvom. Ta prelom je na podlagi Jezusovega nauka in njegovega zgleda vodil do spoznanja, da je razodetje božjega kraljestva namenjeno vsem narodom. V Novi zavezi je misijonsko poslanstvo utemeljeno z vero v Boga, ki prek svojega sina Jezusa deluje v svetu in posreduje božjo ljubezen med ljudmi. Podobno naj misijonarji in misijonarke posredujejo božjo ljubezen in vero v dobrohotnost Boga ljudem vsega človeštva, ki si ne glede na različnost religiozne in kulturne pripadnosti vsi postavljajo enaka ali podobna temeljna vprašanja o izvoru, smislu in

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[1] Za več o poteku in pomenu drugega vatikanskega cerkvenega zbora gl. Flannery 1992; *Koncilski odloki* 1980, Lamb in Levering 2008; Marchetto 2010; Faggioli 2012 idr. V slovenščini je najbolj vsestranska predstavitev drugega vatikanskega koncila v *Koncilski odloki* 1980.

cilju človekovega življenja.

Zakoreninjenost misijonske dejavnosti v Svetem pismu med drugim poudarja Brian Hearne v svojem članku New Models of Mission (1993). Meni, da celostno dojemanje in uresničevanje misijona temelji na zgledu misijonskega poslanstva Jezusa, ki je ljubil ljudi vseh kultur in religij, in ugotavlja: »Veliko pogledov na misijon in razvoj, tako v religioznih kot tudi v svetnih, tako v katoliških kot tudi v protestantskih skupinah, zanemarja to zakoreninjenost, ki ji sledi spoštovanje drugih kultur – današnjih, ne preteklih, kajti kultura je dinamična in spremenljiva stvar, ne mrtev fosil.« (Hearne 1993, 94) William R. Burrows pa v svojem članku Christian Mission and Interreligious Dialogue: Mutually Exclusive or Complementary?, *Buddhist-Christian Studies* (1997) v misijonski dejavnosti poudarja predvsem pomen dialoga. Prav dialog je zanj bistvena razsežnost krščanskega misijona, ne pa morda spreobračanje ljudi drugih religij. Spreobrnjenje se resda lahko zgodi, a v prvi vrsti prav prek dialoga, kakor pravi: »Krščanski misijon v kontekstu recipročnega dialoga ni v prvi vrsti predmet spreobračanja ljudi iz drugih tradicij, da bi pripadali krščanskim ustanovam, temveč utelešenje Jezusovega duha. Spreobrnitve se *lahko* razvijejo (verjetno se *bodo*) v procesu dialoga.« (Burrows 1997, 127–128)

2.   Okoliščine, ki so bile razlog za sklic drugega vatikanskega koncila

Po drugi svetovni vojni je bilo veliko razlogov za to, da je vodstvo katoliške Cerkve, ki živi in deluje po vsem svetu, premislilo, kako odgovoriti na izzive nove delitve sveta ter novih družbenih, verskih in političnih gibanj po svetu. Leta 1946 je bila ustanovljena Organizacija združenih narodov, leta 1947 je Indija dosegla samostojnost, leta 1949 je bila ustanovljena komunistična Ljudska republika Kitajska. V Južni Ameriki se je začelo močno gibanje »teologije osvoboditve«. Te okoliščine razložijo, zakaj je papež Janez XXIII. dne 11. oktobra 1962 sklical drugi vatikanski koncil, ki ga je dokončal njegov naslednik papež Pavel VI. (1963–1978). Velik poudarek drugega vatikanskega koncila na odnosu Cerkve do drugih verstev in spodbujanje dialoga vključujeta tudi večjo odprtost za idejo inkulturacije v smislu prilagajanja kulturam misijonskih dežel, predvsem pa za uresničevanje svetopisemske zahteve po osvobajanju ubogih, zatiranih in trpečih.

Na drugem vatikanskem koncilu so škofje vse Cerkve razpravljali o zadevah Cerkve v celoti, o njenem nauku ali doktrini, o njeni bogoslužni praksi in o temeljnih verskih resnicah.[2] Razlaga misijonske narave Cerkve na drugem vatikanskem zboru temelji v Svetem pismu, pa tudi v zgodovini Cerkve: »Iz te zgodovine se učimo,

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2   Zborovanje naj bi zaobseglo celotni naseljeni svet, to nakazuje že sama beseda »ekumenski«; oikouméne v grščini pomeni »naseljeni svet«. V prvih stoletjih krščanstva je ekumenski koncil pomenil zborovanje škofov vsega krščanstva, po razkolu med Vzhodom in Zahodom leta 1054 pa so se mnenja o tem, katere Cerkve morajo biti vključene, da se koncil še lahko pojmuje kot ekumenski, spremenila. Danes katoličani in pravoslavni kristjani, pa tudi nekateri protestanti priznavajo avtoriteto prvih sedmih ekumenskih koncilov, pri nadaljnjih koncilih pa so glede tega razlike. Za kronološki kratek pregled koncilov glej *Koncilski odloki* 1980, 18–20; Flinn 2007, 193–197.

kako Cerkev razume svoje misijonsko poslanstvo; to je zgodba s številnimi stopnjami ter kaže evolucijo misli in prakse misijona v svetu in svetu samemu.« (George 2008, 287) Po presoji Karla Rahnerja naj bi bil drugi vatikanski koncil v nekem smislu celo najpomembnejši koncil po prvem jeruzalemskem koncilu: »Kakor je tedaj Cerkev potrdila premik iz judovskega v evropsko krščanstvo, se zdaj rojeva razširitev iz evropskega v svetovno krščanstvo in v svetovno Cerkev, ki je po naravi suprakulturna.« Po svoji bistveni naravi je Cerkev tako azijska in afriška kakor evropska, zato »mora postati dom za vsak način življenja in vsako mentaliteto« (Luzbetak 1993, 109; navaja Bahovec 2009, 323).

V času drugega vatikanskega ekumenskega koncila je bila sestava škofovskega zbora resda precej drugačna od današnjih razmer, predvsem glede tako imenovanih »misijonskih teritorijev«. Iz ameriške celine in Evrope je na koncil prišlo 2090 škofov, iz Azije jih je bilo le 408, iz Afrike 351, iz Oceanije pa 74. Večina škofov, ki so prišli z misijonskih območij, je bilo Evropejcev in so pripadali misijonskim ustanovam. Zlasti škofje z misijonskih območij so s seboj prinesli misijonsko problematiko in izkušnje, ki kličejo po vračanju k svetopisemskim virom. Drugi vatikanski cerkveni zbor je prinesel največ novosti v poudarkih, da se je treba vrniti k virom, in v odpiranju možnosti za boljši medverski dialog.

3. Konstitucija o svetem bogoslužju, Sacrosanctum concilium (1963)

Koncilski očetje (škofje) drugega vatikanskega ekumenskega koncila so v iskanju ustreznega razmerja katoliške Cerkve do nekrščanskih verstev in kultur svoj odnos najprej opisali v koncilskem dokumentu Konstitucija o svetem bogoslužju (Sacrosanctum concilium). Ta konstitucija, sprejeta 4. decembra 1963 z 2147 glasovi proti 4, je bila prvi dokument, ki so ga sprejeli koncilski očetje. Namen konstitucije, ki obsega sto trideset členov, razdeljenih na sedem poglavij, je bil, da bi pomen bogoslužja v katoliški Cerkvi utemeljili s trdnimi teološkimi osnovami (Jackson 2008, 1001).[3] O tem govori že njen uvodni, prvi člen, ki se glasi:

> Sveti cerkveni zbor si postavlja za nalogo: poskrbeti, da bodo verniki vedno bolj krščansko živeli; bolje prilagoditi potrebam našega časa ustanove, ki so spremenljive; pospeševati, kar bi moglo prispevati k edinosti vseh, ki verujejo v Kristusa; in okrepiti, kar bi pomagalo vse ljudi poklicati v naročje Cerkve. Zato sodi, da je njegova prav posebna naloga poskrbeti za obnovo in gojitev bogoslužja. (B 1)

Novost drugega vatikanskega koncila je, da v svoji razlagi narave in namena liturgije ne nagovarja le krščanskih vernikov, temveč vse človeštvo. Konstitucija na koncu drugega člena na podlagi svetopisemskih virov izpostavi nalogo katoliške Cerkve, naj Kristusa oznanja tudi tistim, ki so zunaj Cerkve. Cerkev naj bo »zna-

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[3] Citati v slovenski različici so iz *Koncilski odloki* 1980. Angleški prevod Flannery 1992, 1–40.

menje, dvignjeno med narodi« (Iz 11,12), »pod katerim se zbirajo razkropljeni božji otroci« (Jn 11,52), »da bo ena čreda in en pastir« (10,16). Prvo poglavje konstitucije, člen 5, govori o Pavlovem oznanjanju volje Boga, »da bi se vsi ljudje zveličali in prišli k spoznanju resnice« (1 Tim 2,4). V členu 9 konstitucija izpostavlja misijonsko nalogo Cerkve, da ljudi vseh narodov pripravi na obhajanje bogoslužja, in navaja Pavlovo dilemo: »Toda kako naj ga kličejo, če niso verovali vanj? In kako naj verujejo, če niso slišali o njem? In kako naj slišijo o njem, če ni oznanjevalca? In kako naj oznanjajo, če niso bili poslani?« (Rim 10,14–15) V drugem odstavku člena 9 sledi odgovor: »Zato Cerkev nevernim razglaša oznanilo odrešenja, da bi vsi ljudje spoznali edinega pravega Boga in katerega je poslal, Jezusa Kristusa, ter da bi se spreobrnili s svojih potov in se spokorili.« (prim. Jn 17,3; Lk 2,47; Apd 2,38)

Na začetku četrtega poglavja (člen 83) konstitucija označuje namen in pomen molitve vernih. Verni naj nadaljujejo poslanstvo Jezusa Kristusa, ki duhovniško službo nadaljuje po svoji Cerkvi, »ki nenehno hvali Gospoda in prosi za zveličanje vsega sveta ne le z obhajanjem evharistije, ampak tudi na druge načine, zlasti z molitvijo duhovnih dnevnic tj. molitvenim bogoslužjem« (Koncilski odloki 1980, 83). Gerald O'Collins posebno pozornost posveča tistim prvinam konstitucije, ki govorijo o oznanjevanju evangelija vsemu človeštvu, in ugotavlja: »Vse od prvega pomembnega besedila, ki ga je razglasil koncil, lahko vidimo, kako visoko mesto je imelo odrešenje vsega človeštva v duhovni domišljiji in v delu škofov ter njihovih svetovalcev na II. vatikanskem koncilu.« (2013, 68) Poudarek na odrešenju vsega človeštva pa ne pomeni preloma s prejšnjo zgodovino Cerkve, temveč nasprotno. Koncilski očetje so v konstituciji pokazali, »da je koncil treba razlagati v nepretrganosti z veliko tradicijo Cerkve, vključno z nauki prejšnjih koncilov« (Cessario 2008, 130).

4.   Dogmatična konstitucija o Cerkvi, Lumen gentium (1964)

Dne 21. novembra 1964 so koncilski očetje na drugem vatikanskem ekumenskem koncilu sprejeli in potrdili dogmatično konstitucijo o Cerkvi z naslovom Lumen gentium. Pri osnutku te konstitucije, ki je obsegala devetinšestdeset členov v osmih poglavjih, sta pomembno sodelovala Marie-Rosaire Gagnebet in Sebastian Tromp pod pokroviteljstvom kardinala Alfreda Ottavianija. Ker je bilo njuno težišče na predstavitvi Cerkve kot hierarhične ustanove, ne pa na skrivnosti in univerzalnosti Cerkve, škofje ob pregledu orisa dne 23. novembra 1962 z njim niso bili zadovoljni. Na podlagi revizije, ki jo je opravil Gérard Philips, sta končno različico pripravila Karl Rahner in Yves Congar. Congar je odločilno prispeval člene, v katerih je označen odnos katoliške Cerkve do ljudi, ki niso člani krščanskih skupnosti (O'Collins 2013, 68–69).

Nekateri ocenjevalci vsebin te konstitucije so konstitucijo označili kot »revolucionarno« glede predstavitve narave, poslanstva in strukture Cerkve. Toda globlji pogled k virom razkriva, da novosti v resnici izhajajo iz globljega in širšega razu-

mevanja primarnih virov krščanstva, kakor ugotavlja Dulles: »Vsako posodabljanje, ki ga je koncil dosegel, je bilo notranje povezano z načelom vračanja k virom.« (Dulles 2008, 26) Konstitucija v uvodnem členu Cerkev označuje na podlagi svetopisemskih in patrističnih izjav. Zanjo je Cerkev skupnost, na katere obrazu odseva svetloba Kristusa, ki je »luč narodov« (C 1), ko oznanja evangelij »vsemu stvarstvu« (prim. Mr 16,15). V uvodu je rečeno, da je Cerkev v Kristusu »nekak zakrament, to je znamenje in orodje za notranjo zvezo z Bogom in za edinost vsega človeškega rodu« (člen 1). Takšna predstava Cerkve spominja na univerzalistična besedila Izaijeve knjige (Drugi Izaija, pogl. 40–55; Tretji Izaija, pogl. 56–66). Na Sveto pismo pa se opira tudi sam naslov konstitucije Luč narodov, ki se navezuje na Iz 49,6 in Lk 2,30–32. Univerzalistični svetopisemski opisi vloge izraelskega ljudstva, ki velja za ljudstvo zaveze, presegajo zgolj hierarhično ureditev Cerkve in usmerjajo pogled v njeno univerzalnost.

Za razumevanje nove opredelitve odnosa Cerkve do nekrščanskih verstev sta ključna člena 16 in 17 ob koncu drugega poglavja. V členu 16 konstitucija označuje mesto Judov, muslimanov in drugih, ki verujejo v Boga. Kakor zapiše, so Judje »tisto ljudstvo, kateremu so bile dane zaveze in obljube in iz katerega je po telesu izšel Kristus (prim. Rim 9,4–5), po izvolitvi zaradi očetov nad vse ljubljeno ljudstvo; kajti Bog se ne kesa svojih darov in svoje izvolitve« (prim. Rim 11,28–29). Pri muslimanih konstitucija poudarja, da imajo posebno mesto med nekrščanskimi verstvi, kakor beremo: »Med temi so na prvem mestu muslimani, ki se imajo za izpovedovalce Abrahamove vere in ki z nami častijo edinega, usmiljenega Boga, ki bo sodil ljudi poslednji dan.« (C 16) V nadaljevanju beremo: »Bog sam ni daleč niti od tistih, ki iščejo neznanega Boga v sencah in podobah, ker daje vsem življenje in dihanje in vse« (prim. Apd 17,25–28) in ker kot Odrešenik želi, da bi se vsi ljudje zveličali.« (prim. 1 Tim 2,4) Konstitucija dalje priznava možnost odrešitve za tiste, »ki brez lastne krivde še niso prišli do izrečnega spoznanja o Bogu, a si prizadevajo, ne sicer brez pomoči božje milosti, da bi prav živeli« (C 16). Člen 16 sklene poudarek na misijonski nalogi Cerkve, ki je skladen z Jezusovo zapovedjo apostolom: »Oznanjujte evangelij vsemu stvarstvu.« (Mk 16,16)

Člen 17 začenjata izjava v Janezovem evangeliju, da je Jezus poslal apostole, kakor je Oče poslal Sina (prim. Jn 20,21), in Jezusovo pooblastilo apostolom, naj vsemu stvarstvu oznanjajo evangelij (Mt 28,18–20). Ta zapoved naj bi Cerkvi nalagala dolžnost, da pošilja oznanjevalce, dokler se mlade Cerkve tudi same ne usposobijo za nadaljevanje oznanjevanja evangelija. Pomembna novost konstitucije pa je tudi opredelitev odnosa misijonarjev in misijonark Katoliške Cerkve do članov nekrščanskih religij. Cerkev naj v obredih in kulturah različnih nekrščanskih narodov sprejema vse, kar je dobrega v srcu in duhu ljudi. Z vizijo preroka Malahija o širjenju Božjega imena »med narodi« (1,11) pa naj si Cerkev obenem prizadeva, da bi ves svet častil Stvarnika in Očeta vesoljstva. Poglobljeni opisi osnov krščanskega verovanja ter življenja in delovanja Cerkve v odnosu do drugih verstev, ki jih vsebuje konstitucija Lumen gentium, temeljijo na svetopisemski veri v Boga, ki že s svojim stvarjenjskim delom poživlja, razsvetljuje in posvečuje vse stvari in vse ljudi.

Konstitucija izhaja iz pomembne teološke premise, da je Bog Stvarnik vsem lju-

dem podaril glas vesti in hrepenenje po dobrem, zato človeku na njegovi življenjski poti na različne načine prihaja naproti. Kristusova božanska navzočnost in milost naj bi vse ljudi navdihovali z željo po edinosti. V konstituciji sta tesno povezana teološka pojma stvarjenja in odrešenja – to pomeni, da je skupnost Cerkve sad Božje milosti z nalogo, da tudi deluje kot sredstvo Božje milosti: »V skrivnosti odrešenja nas *resničnost* milosti doseže s *sredstvom* milosti in združitev teh dveh je taka, da sestavljata eno resničnost, eno Cerkev. Ta je hkrati znamenje – orodje odrešenja *in* odrešenje samo, v katerem so vidne in nevidne, človeške in božje, časne in večne, transcendentne in imanentne resničnosti, združene v skrivnosti utelešene Besede, ki ji je Cerkev čista in zvesta Nevesta.« (La Soujeole 2008, 52)

5.   Izjava o razmerju Cerkve do nekrščanskih verstev, Nostra aetate (1965)

Dne 28. oktobra 1965 so koncilski očetje sprejeli in potrdili izjavo o razmerju Cerkve do nekrščanskih verstev Nostra aetate. Ta dokument je postavil temelje za iskanje skupnega jedra vrednot in resnic vseh religij in za razvoj medverskega dialoga, ki tudi danes uživa vsestransko odobravanje. To je krajši dokument, obsega pet členov, naslov je vzet z začetka uvodnega člena. Tu navajamo samo prvi odstavek prvega člena:

> V našem času, ko se človeštvo vedno tesneje zedinja in ko se množijo odnosi med različnimi narodi, Cerkev pazljiveje razmišlja, kakšno je njeno razmerje do nekrščanskih religij. V skladu s svojo nalogo prizadevati si za edinost in ljubezen med ljudmi in s tem tudi med narodi, obrača tukaj pozornost predvsem na to, kar je ljudem skupnega in jih vodi k medsebojnemu sožitju. (N 1)

Izjava Nostra aetate je doživela več redakcij, da bi dosegla čim večjo popolnost v priznavanju edinosti vseh ljudi vseh narodov. Človeštvo razume kot eno samo skupnost, ki ima isti izvor in tudi smoter pri Bogu. Besedilo izjave spominja na Mdr 8,1; Apd 14,16–17; 17,26; Rim 2,5–11; 1 Tim 2,4; Raz 21,23–24 (prim. drugi odstavek prvega člena), to pa pomeni, da se vrača k svetopisemskim osnovam. V tretjem odstavku zasledimo ugotovitev, da enotnost vsega človeštva določajo najbolj prvobitna vprašanja, ki so v vseh časih, pri vseh posameznikih in vseh narodih ista. Govorimo o vprašanjih o smislu in namenu človeškega življenja, o skrivnosti trpljenja ipd.

V luči teh in drugih temeljnih vprašanj, ki si jih postavljajo ljudje vsega sveta, izjava v drugem členu pozitivno ocenjuje naravnanost hinduizma in budizma. O hinduizmu zapiše: »Tako v hinduizmu ljudje razglabljajo o božji skrivnosti in jo izražajo z neizčrpnim bogastvom mitov in z globokoumnimi filozofskimi poskusi; in iščejo osvoboditve iz tesnob našega bivanja ali v oblikah asketičnega življenja ali v globokem premišljevanju ali v tem, da se z ljubeznijo in zaupanjem zatekajo k Bogu.« (N 2) Izjava pozitivno ocenjuje tudi budizem, kakor beremo: »V različnih

oblikah budizma priznavajo do poslednjih korenin segajočo nezadostnost tega spremenljivega sveta in učijo pot, po kateri morejo ljudje s pobožnim in zauupljivim srcem ali doseči stanje popolne osvoboditve ali dospeti – bodisi z lastnimi priza-devanji bodisi oprti na višjo pomoč – do najvišjega razsvetljenja.« (N 2) Pozitivno sprejemanje nekrščanskih verstev narekuje načelno izjavo v drugem odstavku dru-gega člena: »Katoliška Cerkev ne zameta ničesar od tistega, kar je v teh verstvih resničnega in svetega.« (N 2)

Izjava Nostra aetate v svojem poudarjanju nujnosti bratstva med vsemi ljudmi (člen 5) večjo pozornost kakor hindujcem in budistom posveča muslimanom (člen 3) in še posebno Judom (člen 4). Kakor ugotavlja, je krščanstvo najtesneje pove-zano z judovstvom. Edinstvena vloga Judov kot ljudstva je v tem, da ga je Bog izbral za posebno zavezo z njim. Ker je bil Izrael izvoljen zato, da razodetje »Izraelovega Boga« posreduje drugim narodom, je s tem odprta »pot za razumevanje drugih religij v njihovih poročilih o transcendentnem večnem bitju in o različnih vizijah človekovega osvobajanja iz trpljenja in zla« (Kennedy 2008, 405).

6. Odlok o misijonski dejavnosti Cerkve, Ad gentes (1965)

Dne 7. decembra 1965 so koncilski očetje sprejeli in potrdili odlok o misijonski dejavnosti Cerkve z naslovom Ad gentes, ki obsega dvainštirideset členov v šestih poglavjih. Uvodni člen začenja izjava, kako je Bog k narodom poslal Cerkev, da bi bila vesoljni zakrament odrešenja. Kakor poudarja besedilo, koncil želi začrtati načela misijonske dejavnosti, namenjene širjenju Kristusovega kraljestva. Odlok najprej opisuje trinitarične podlage misijona. Iz tega osnovnega načela izhaja vse-bina prvega poglavja, ki vsebuje več vidikov. Ti vidiki označujejo poslanstvo bož-jega Sina (člen 3), poslanstvo Svetega Duha (člen 4), poslanstvo Cerkve po Jezu-sovem pooblastilu (člen 5), univerzalno naravo misijonske dejavnosti tudi v po-sebnih razmerah (člen 6), božjo voljo kot razlog misijonske dejavnosti (člen 7), misijonsko dejavnost v tesni povezanosti s samo človekovo naravo in njenimi te-žnjami po bratstvu, edinosti in miru (člen 9) in njeno eshatološko naravo.

Utemeljitev temeljnega trinitaričnega načela misijona se opira na klasična sve-topisemska besedila, ki govorijo o božjem načrtu odrešenja, za vse ljudi: Jn 11,52; Apd 4,12; 2 Kor 5,19; 1 Tim 2,4. Kakor je izpostavljeno, Jezusovo poslanstvo po-meni klic k misijonski dejavnosti Cerkve. V tretjem odstavku člena 3 prvega po-glavja beremo: »Kar pa je Gospod enkrat za vselej oznanil ali kar se je v njem zgo-dilo v odrešenje človeškega rodu, to je treba razglašati in razširjati do konca sveta, začenši v Jeruzalemu. Tako naj bi tisto, kar je bilo enkrat storjeno v odrešenje za vse, v potekanju časov doseglo svoj učinek v vseh.« (M 3)

Drugo poglavje odloka izpostavlja glavno nalogo v izvajanju misijonskega po-slanstva, to je, pričevanje z življenjem, spreobrnjenje. Svetopisemska podlaga ra-zumevanja spreobrnjenja ne postavlja v ospredje prestopanja ljudi iz ene religije

v drugo, temveč spreobrnjenje srca c skladu z božjo postavo, ki je po prepričanju prerokov univerzalna in torej posredno ali neposredno zajema vse ljudi sveta. Najbolj jasno je to preroško načelo razvidno iz Jonove knjige, ki opisuje vzgojni pristop Boga v razmerju do Jona: pošilja ga oznanjat pokoro v pogansko mesto Ninive brez slehernega namiga, da bi se Ninivljani morali spreobrniti v judovsko vero. Prerok mora Ninivljane pozvati k moralnemu spreobrnjenju, »kajti njihova hudobija se je vzdignila do mojega obličja« (Jon 1,2). Prvi odstavek člena 13 koncilskega dokumenta odreja:

> Kjerkoli Bog odpre vrata nauku za oznanjevanje Kristusove skrivnosti, je treba vsem ljudem z zaupanjem in vztrajnostjo oznanjati živega Boga in Jezusa Kristusa, katerega je poslal v odrešenje vseh, da bi nekristjani, ko jim Sveti Duh odpre srce, verovali, se svobodno spreobrnili h Gospodu in se ga iskreno oklenili, saj kot »pot, resnica in življenje« izpolnjuje vsa njihova duhovna pričakovanja in jih celo neskončno preseg. (M 13)

Opravljanje poslanstva misijona posveča skrb oblikovanju krščanskega občestva (člen 15), vzgoji domačih duhovnikov (člen 16), vzgoji katehetov (člen 17) in skrbi za redovno življenje (člen 18). Tretje poglavje je posvečeno misijonski dejavnosti regionalnih cerkva, četrto poglavje vzgoji misijonarjev, peto poglavje ureditvi misijonske dejavnosti, šesto poglavje pa dolžnosti sodelovanja celotne katoliške Cerkve v izvajanju misijonov.

Namen drugega vatikanskega koncila ni bil, postaviti neke nove podlage misijona, temveč poglobiti razumevanje misijona. Pri tem je vesoljni cerkveni zbor izhajal iz prepričanja o enkratnosti in univerzalnosti Jezusa Kristusa, ki prinaša polnost odrešenja vsem ljudem.

7. Pastoralna konstitucija o Cerkvi v sedanjem svetu, Gaudium et spes (1965)

Dne 7. decembra 1965 so koncilski očetje sprejeli in potrdili pastoralno konstitucijo o Cerkvi v sedanjem svetu z izvirnim naslovom Gaudium et spes. To je najobsežnejši dokument drugega vatikanskega cerkvenega zbora, saj obsega kar triindevetdeset členov. Istega dne so sprejeli tudi Odlok o misijonski dejavnosti Cerkve (Ad gentes). Čeprav se konstitucija osredotoča predvsem na svetopisemske podlage razumevanja edinosti celotnega človeštva in na človekovo dostojanstvo, pa citatov iz Svetega pisma ni veliko. Temeljna vsebina dokumenta je jasno izražena že v uvodnem odstavku predgovora:

> Veselje in upanje, žalost in tesnoba ljudi današnjih ljudi, posebno ubogih in vseh kakorkoli trpečih, je hkrati tudi veselje in upanje, žalost in tesnoba Kristusovih učencev. In ničesar resnično človeškega ni, kar bi ne našlo odmeva v njihovih srcih. Tudi njihovo občestvo je sestavljeno iz ljudi, ki jih, zedinjene v Kristusu, vodi Sveti Duh na njihovem romanju Očetovemu kra-

ljestvu naproti in ki so prejeli nalogo, da vsem prinašajo oznanilo odreše-
nja. Zato se Cerkev čuti resnično in na notranji način povezano z vsem
človeškim rodom in njegovo zgodovino. (CS 1)

Izhajajoč iz sklepa prvega svetopisemskega poročila o stvarjenju (1 Mz 1,26;
prim. Mdr 2,23; Sir 17,3–10), konstitucija povzdigne svetopisemski nauk o člove-
kovi bogopodobnosti in o njegovi sposobnosti, spoznati in ljubiti svojega Stvarni-
ka (3. odstavek člena 12). Na podlagi slovite Pavlove razlage vesti kot postave, ki
je zapisana v človekovem srcu, v Rim 2,14–16, člen 16 razglaša dostojanstvo člo-
vekove vesti. Kakor govori člen 16, vest govori za človekovo osebno dostojanstvo
in za možnost osebnega stika z Bogom. Človekova bogopodobnost naj bi se kaza-
la v dejstvu, da si vsa človeška bitja postavljajo ista temeljna vprašanja o izvoru,
smislu in cilju življenja (členi 3, 4, 10, 21). Po Svetem Duhu vsa prejemajo tudi dar
vere (člen 15). V členu 38 dokument sporoča: »S svojim vstajenjem je bil Kristus
postavljen za Gospoda, kateremu je dana vsa oblast v nebesih in na zemlji, in z
močjo svojega Duha že deluje v srcih ljudi.« (CS 38, 1)

Kristus razglaša človekovo svobodo, odklanja sovraštvo in vzpostavlja postavo
ljubezni (člen 41). Konstitucija od začetka do konca odobrava in spodbuja dialog
in sodelovanje z ljudmi vseh narodov, religij in kultur. Še posebno poudarja medre-
ligijski dialog v prizadevanju za pravičnost in mir (členi 3, 4, 11, 28, 40, 44, 84, 92)
in s tem do konca utemelji katoliško razumevanje misijonske narave Cerkve. V
prvem odstavku člena 28, na primer, beremo: »Spoštovanje in ljubezen se mora-
ta raztezati tudi na tiste, ki v družbenih, političnih ali tudi v verskih stvareh druga-
če mislijo in ravnajo kakor mi. Čim globlje namreč jih bomo človekoljubno in do-
brohotno razumevali v njihovem mišljenju, tem laže bomo prišli z njimi v pogovor.«
(CS 28)

Religiozni temelj poslanstva Cerkve pomeni, da Cerkev ni vezana na kak eko-
nomski, družbeni ali politični sistem. Kljub temu se mora zavzemati za spoštovanje
prava, osebnih pravic in verske svobode. Evangelizacija lahko doseže svoj cilj samo
takrat, ko se člani drugih ver in prepričanj povsem svobodno odločijo za sprejetje
evangelija na temelju spoznanja njegove univerzalne vrednosti. Konstitucija izpo-
stavlja pet področij, ki zahtevajo služenje v ljubezni: poroko in družino, kulturni,
ekonomski in politični razvoj ter prizadevanje za mir v svetu. Za življenje in delo-
vanje na vseh teh področjih je po izjavah konstitucije potrebno iskanje resnice v
luči Kristusove ljubezni (Levering 2008, 163–183).

8. Odzivi teologov na usmeritve drugega vatikanskega koncila

Inkulturacija je manifestacija novih spoznanj in praks glede poslanstva Cerkve. To
poslanstvo ima korenine v Kristusovem poslanstvu in vključuje nadaljevanje skriv-
nosti utelešenja v vsem človeškem, natančneje: v vsaki kulturi. Izraz inkulturacija
je na področje misiologije uvedel Peter Charles SJ, véliki belgijski misiolog, vendar

mu je dal enak antropološki pomen kakor enkulturaciji, ki pomeni proces, s katerim človek asimilira svojo kulturo. Joseph Masson SJ (1883–1954) pa je izumil izraz »inkulturirano katolištvo«. Toda šele po približno petnajstih letih se je izraz inkulturacija začel uporabljati v današnjem teološkem pomenu. Papež Janez Pavel II. je izraz uradno sprejel v svojem apostolskem pismu Catechesi Tradendae iz leta 1979 in mu s tem dal univerzalno vrednost.[4] V krščanstvu je inkulturacija prilagoditev načina, kako so cerkveni nauki predstavljeni drugim, večinoma nekrščanskim kulturam, in kot posledica tega vpliv teh kultur na razvoj cerkvenih naukov.

V obdobju po drugem vatikanskem cerkvenem zboru večina razprav o dokumentih tega cerkvenega zbora pozornost posveča zlasti vprašanju, ali dokumenti pomenijo obnovo Cerkve v njeni nepretrgani kontinuiteti znotraj dvatisočletnega izročila ali pa, nasprotno, prinašajo prelom z izročilom. V središče pozornosti sta stopila predvsem termina »inkulturacija« in »evangelizacija« v njuni vzajemnosti. Zanima nas, kako na to vprašanje odgovarjajo novejše študije o misijonu. Ugotovimo lahko, da najpomembnejše novejše študije izhajajo iz svetopisemskih virov in patrističnih razlag, upoštevajo pa tudi novejša iskanja antropološke argumentacije misijonske narave Cerkve. Vse poglobljene avtorje vseh krščanskih veroizpovedi zanima predvsem primarni, se pravi: svetopisemski vir razumevanja misijona.[5] Na tem mestu velja izpostaviti zorenje pojmovanja pojma »inkulturacije« do uradne opredelitve tega pojma v dokumentu mednarodne teološke komisije z naslovom Vera in inkulturacija (Faith and Inculturation) iz leta 1988.

Profesor na papeški univerzi Gregoriana v Rimu, Michael Paul Gallagher, v svojem članku Inculturation: Some Theological Perspectives (2018) ugotavlja, da je »inkulturacija razmeroma nov termin za nekaj, kar ima dolge korenine v krščanski zgodovini – čeprav to 'nekaj' živi z drugačno nujnostjo in z bolj kompleksnim zavedanjem v našem času« (Gallagher 2018, 173).

Gallagher meni, da teološko razumevanje inkulturacije vključuje predvsem novo zavedanje o dostojanstvu in različnosti kultur, bolj razvito teologijo o navzočnosti Duha v vseh kulturah in prepoznavanje, da je evangelizacija dvosmerni proces dvojne konverzije, ker se v evangelizaciji v dialogu z različnostjo kulture spreminja tudi obzorje oznanjevalca evangelija. Ta smer dojemanja procesa inkulturacije odseva željo po spreobrnitvi na podlagi navdiha, ki išče dialog na duhovni ravni, kajti samo duhovna razsežnost človeškega bitja lahko preseže kulturne razlike kot relativni okvir življenja, ki v svojem duhovnem jedru v vseh kulturah izraža hrepenenje po dobrem. Ključ za uspeh dialoga, ki omogoča organski proces inkulturacije, so manifestacije človekove duše, kakor ugotavlja Pavel v Pismu Filipljanom: »Bratje, vse, kar je resnično, kar je vzvišeno, kar je pravično, kar je čisto, kar je ljubeznivo, kar je častno, kar je količkaj krepostno in hvalevredno, vse to imejte v

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[4]   Https://www.omiworld.org/lemma/inculturation/ (pridobljeno 17. 3. 2019).

[5]   Walter C. Kaiser Jr. v knjigi *Mission in the Old Testament: Israel as a Light to the Nations* (2000) na podlagi primerjalne analize besedil Stare in Nove zaveze, ki izražajo razumevanje odnosa Boga do Izraela in do drugih narodov, sklepa, da v Stari zavezi nimamo le besedil, ki poudarjajo odrešenjski božji načrt samo za Izraelce, temveč tudi pesniške opise božje darežljivosti do vseh narodov. Prim. tudi Ocvirk 2006.

mislih. Kar ste se od mene naučili, prejeli, slišali in videli, to delajte. In Bog miru bo z vami.« (4,8–9)

Chibueze Udeani se v svoji knjigi *Inculturation as Dialogue: Igbo Culture and the Message of Christ* (2007) sprašuje, »zakaj krščanska vera ni pognala korenin v Afriki« (Udeani 2007, v). Zelo velika ovira za inkulturacijo krščanstva v Afriki naj bi bila boleča kolonialna preteklost z brutalnim obdobjem suženjstva ter drugih oblik poniževanja in zatiranja. Paul M. Collins v svoji knjigi *Christian Inculturation in India* (2007) poudarja škodljive posledice kolonialne ekspanzije v Indiji in izpostavlja pomen liturgije v prizadevanju za proces inkulturacije. Collins meni: »Nobenega jamstva ni, da se vse kulturne oblike ustrezno ujemajo z evangeljskimi imperativi. Evangelij je relevanten v vsakem kontekstu le, če je hkrati kritičen in prilagodljiv.« (Collins 2007, xvi)

Na bistvene poudarke koncilskih dokumentov glede odnosa Cerkve do drugih religij spominja študija *Christianity in India: From Beginnings to the Present* (2008), ki jo je napisal misiolog in zgodovinar Robert Eric Frykenberg. Po njegovi razlagi svetopisemsko pojmovanje namena misijona izraža najčistejše vidike »prvobitne« religije, ki je tako »univerzalna«, da ni omejena na »nobeno ljudstvo, kulturo ali religijo«. Takšna »prvobitna« religija zanj pomeni »iskro večnosti«. Tako kakor za koncilske očete sta tudi za Frykenberga za svetopisemsko utemeljitev misijona najpomembnejša Jezusov nauk in zgled, da ni prišel za bogate, temveč za uboge, ki so odprti za spoznanje duhovnih resničnosti.[6] Danes se vse več misijonarjev odloča, da med ljudmi drugih verstev živijo in delujejo brez namena, da bi jih spreobrnili v krščansko skupnost.

Tudi protestantski biblični eksegrt David Bosch v svoji vplivni knjigi *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Mission Theology* (Bosch 1991, 2011) svoje poglede na misijon gradi na svetopisemskih temeljih, predvsem na evangeliju po Luku, na Apostolskih delih in na Pavlovih pismih. Kakor meni, izzivi časa zahtevajo bolj poglobljen teološki pristop, ki naj temelji na biblični hermenevtiki. Kakor trdi, se je »prva in kardinalna sprememba paradigme zgodila s prihodom Jezusa iz Nazareta in s tistim, kar je temu sledilo.« (2011, 15)

Brian Hearne v članku New Models of Mission (1993) sklene svoje zavzemanje za celosten življenjski in dialoški pristop v misijonu z ugotavljanjem, da v sodobnem globaliziranem svetu človek najbolj pogreša dialog o temeljnih življenjskih vprašanjih. Po njegovem mnenju bo v tretjem tisočletju na tej podlagi potekal dialog z ljudmi različnih kultur, religij in prepričanj: »Kar potrebujemo, je komuni-

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[6] Craig Ott, Stephen J. Strauss in Timothy C. Tennent v knjigi *Encountering Theology of Mission: Biblical Foundations, Historical Developments, and Contemporary Issues* (2010) predstavljajo zgodovinske preglede razvoja različnih pogledov in sodobni teološki diskurz o globalnem misijonu s stališča protestantske (evangeljske) perspektive. Osrednji vidiki, ki jih avtorji obravnavajo, so misijonski poklic, odnos Cerkve do misijona, teologija religij in sodobni kontekst misijonskega dela. V uvodu knjige beremo stališče avtorjev: »Teologija misijona ima nalogo, da drži vztrajno in biblično podprto vizijo božjih načrtov za svet pred očmi pastorjev, akademskih ustanov in skupnosti, krščanskih voditeljev in krščanskih spreobrnjencev. Tako je treba ustvarjanje teologije poslanstva obravnavati kot osrednjo zadevo v razumevanju biblичnega razumevanja Boga in njegovih načrtov za Cerkev danes.« (Ott, Strauss inTennent 2010, xiv)

kacija med ljudmi o vrednotah, težavah, radostih in žalostih, upanjih in strahovih njihovih življenj. /…/ Bi lahko rekli, da gre v misijonu za preproste stvari, kot sta naklonjenost in prijateljstvo, toda razširjena prek meja človekove lastne dežele, jezika, kulture in religije?« (Hearne 1993, 97) V tej smeri razmišljajo tudi nekateri drugi avtorji znanstvenih prispevkov o misijonu.[7] V izjavi Nostra aetate tretji člen izpostavlja »preproste stvari«, ko glede odnosa do muslimanov pravi: »Če so torej v poteku stoletij med kristjani in muslimani neredko nastale razprtije in sovražnosti, spodbuja cerkveni zbor vse, naj pozabijo na to, kar je bilo, naj se odkritosrčno trudijo za medsebojno razumevanje in naj skupno nastopajo v obrambo in pospeševanje socialne pravičnosti, moralnih vrednot ter miru in svobode za vse ljudi.« (N 3)

9. Sklep

V Svetem pismu Nove zaveze se je izoblikovala podoba Cerkve, ki je po sami naravi misijonska. Misijon je torej po svoji naravi zadeva celotne skupnosti, ne pa zadeva želja in interesov posameznikov. Misijonar je obenem lahko samo tisti, ki ga za misijonarja pooblasti Cerkev. Spoznanje o misijonski naravi Cerkve je v celotni zgodovini Cerkve navdihovalo misijonsko dejavnost, širjenje misijona pa je ustvarjalo nove napetosti med poglobljenim duhovnim razumevanjem misijonskega poslanstva in različnimi oblikami interesnih politik, ki so imele v načrtu ekonomski in kulturni kolonializem. Zaradi te temeljne napetosti je vesoljno vodstvo Cerkve moralo budno bedeti nad potekom misijonov. Najpomembnejša naloga ekumenskih koncilov od antike do danes je bilo samorazumevanje narave Cerkve, to pa hkrati pomeni samorazumevanje Cerkve glede njenega misijonskega poslanstva.

Z izbruhom prve in druge svetovne vojne in z nastopom globalizacije, ki je zajela ves svet, je vodstvo Cerkve moralo odgovoriti na izziv gospodarskega, političnega, vzgojnega in kulturnega sodelovanja med vsemi narodi. Ta izziv je koncilske očete drugega vatikanskega zbora tako pritegnil, da so v primarnih virih Svetega pisma in cerkvenih očetov poiskali besedila, ki najbolj jasno in enoumno govorijo o misijonski naravi Cerkve kot vesoljnega občestva ljudi, podobno ali enako hrepenečih po sreči in ljubezni, pa tudi enako ali podobno trpečih zaradi omejenosti človekovega življenja. Vračanje v duhovne vire Svetega pisma, ki vrh svojega sporočila doseže v zapovedi ljubezni do Boga in sočloveka, omogoča nenehno prečiščevanje hermenevtike misijona, tako na strokovni ravni kakor tudi na ravni živete resnice po vzoru božje ljubezni do vseh ljudi na svetu. Igor Bahovec je v svojem razmišljanju o prispevku sv. Pavla pri inkulturaciji krščanstva v helenistično kulturo (2009) pozoren na bistvene značilnosti načina, s katerim je sv. Pavlu uspelo prinesti evangelij narodom takratne družbe in tako postati nosilec prve inkulturacije. Pavel je »pokazal, da krščanstvo lahko živi v različnih kulturah, ne da bi izgu-

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[7]   Wonderly in Nida 1963; Burrows 1997; Ott 2001; Ma 2007; Ma 2009.

bilo svoje bistvo: nasprotno – iz tega srečanja je veliko pridobilo tudi krščanstvo« (321). V opažanju, da sta prevladujoča evropska in slovenska kultura vse bolj oddaljeni od krščanskih virov, v zgledu sv. Pavla vidi oporo za poti nove evangelizacije v srečevanju med evangelijem in postmoderno kulturo v sodobnem času, za pristno inkulturacijo v sodobnem času pa sta pomembni duhovno razločevanje med nespremenljivimi vsebinami vere in raznolikostjo kulturnih izražanj vere in pa razvijanje pristnega dialoga med vero in kulturami.

Temeljno načelo usmeritve drugega vatikanskega cerkvenega zbora, vračanje k virom, v teologiji pomeni vračanje k biblični hermenevtiki, ki je celostna in temelji na postavki o enem Bogu kot začetku in koncu celotne človeške zgodovine. Po svetopisemski misli Bog kliče »narode« k spoznanju univerzalnega načrta odrešenja, Izrael pa je izvoljen za posredniško misijonsko vlogo v odnosu do »narodov«. Nova zaveza odpiranje narodom postavi v samo središče razumevanja Boga, ki vse narode kliče k odrešenju. Nova zaveza posebej izpostavlja univerzalnost naravnega zakona (vest) in Jezusov nauk o vzajemnosti med zapovedjo ljubezni do Boga in ljubezni do sočloveka. Če je dejavna ljubezen do sočloveka merilo izpolnitve zapovedi ljubezni do Boga, je jasno, da je ta vzajemnost temeljno vodilo odnosa Cerkve do ljudi, ki niso člani krščanskih skupnosti, ker Sveto pismo priznava duhovno veličino vsem ljudem na zemlji. Preroki Stare zaveze, Jezus in Pavel, ki velja za prvega misijonarja narodov, so v središče vsega oznanjevanja postavili spreobrnjenje. Zavedali so se, da božji klic po spreobrnjenju velja v prvi vrsti njim. To pomeni, da velja kot temeljno vodilo misijonarjev v vseh časih. Spreobrnjenje pa po svoji naravi pomeni uresničevanje dialoga z vsemi ljudmi vseh narodov, kultur in verskih prepričanj oziroma navad.

Kratice

B – *Koncilski odloki* 2004 [konstitucija O svetem bogoslužju].
C – *Koncilski odloki* 1980 [dogmatična konstitucija O Cerkvi].
CS – *Koncilski odloki* 1980 [pastoralna konstitucija O Cerkvi v sedanjem svetu].
M – *Koncilski odloki* 1980 [odlok O misijonski dejavnosti Cerkve].
N – *Koncilski odloki* 1980 [izjava O razmerju Cerkve do nekrščanskih verstev].

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Mari Jože Osredkar

Božje razodetje v Bibliji in Koranu

Judovstvo, krščanstvo in islam so tri monoteistične religije, ki so imele in še imajo pomembno vlogo v zgodovini človeštva. Vse tri temeljijo na razodetju enega Boga. Prva izmed treh monoteističnih religij prepoznava dokončno Božje razodetje v Tanahu, druga v Svetem pismu, tretja v Koranu. To so svete knjige treh monoteističnih religij, ki se prepletajo v mnogih skupnih vsebinah. Naš cilj je predstaviti, kako se prepletajo najpomembnejša besedila Svetega pisma in Korana.

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Vloga teološkega študija v Ljubljani pred in po ustanovitvi Univerze v Ljubljani

The Role of Theological Studies in Ljubljana Before and After the Foundation of the University of Ljubljana

Povzetek: Prispevek prinaša pregled razvoja teološkega študija v Ljubljani od njegovih začetkov v Jezuitskem kolegiju (1619) in v okviru Univerze v Ljubljani (1919), katere soustanoviteljica je bila tudi Teološka fakulteta. Študij teologije je bil prvi organiziran visokošolski študij v Ljubljani, ki je ustvaril okvir za poznejši nastanek in razvoj drugih znanstvenih disciplin. Posebno pomembno vlogo so imeli profesorji teologije pri ustanovitvi in predvojnem razvoju Univerze v Ljubljani. Po vojni je bila Teološka fakulteta štirideset let izključena iz Univerze in iz javnega prostora. V Univerzo je bila ponovno vključena leta 1992. Teološki študij, ki je znanstveno preučevanje vere, je bil vedno odprt tudi v vsakokratno kulturno, družbeno in politično okolje, ki ga je kritično sooblikoval in izboljševal. S svojim specifičnim epistemičnim statusom ima teologija tudi danes nenadomestljivo funkcijo na družbeno-kulturni, na cerkvenostno-duhovni in na etično-politični ravni.

Ključne besede: Teološka fakulteta v Ljubljani, Univerza v Ljubljani, Jezuitski kolegij v Ljubljani, teologija, študij teologije

Abstract: The article brings an overview of the development of theological studies in Ljubljana from its beginnings in the Jesuit College (1619) and then within the University of Ljubljana, co-founded by the Faculty of Theology (1919). First studies organized as higher education studies in Ljubljana were in theology. These initial theological studies created a framework for the subsequent establishment and development of other scientific disciplines in the next centuries. In 1919, professors of theology played a significant role in the founding and the pre-war development of the University. After the war, the Faculty of Theology was excluded from the University and the public space for forty years. It again became a member of the University in 1992. Theology, defined as a scientific approach to faith, has always been open to the particular cultural, social and political environment, which it has critically co-created and improved. With its specific epistemic status, theology today has an irreplaceable function in the socio-cultural, church-spiritual and ethical-political contexts.

Key words: Faculty of Theology in Ljubljana, University of Ljubljana, Jesuit College in Ljubljana, Theology, Theological Studies

1. Teološki študij na Slovenskem pred ustanovitvijo Teološke fakultete

Teološka fakulteta v letu 2019 skupaj s svojo Almo mater Univerzo v Ljubljani obhaja stoletnico ustanovitve. Študij na novoustanovljeni Univerzi v Ljubljani se je začel s prvim predavanjem, ki ga je imel 3. decembra 1919 ob 9. uri dopoldne v nekdanji deželni zbornici prof. dr. Fran Ramovš o historični gramatiki slovenskega jezika. Zametki visokošolskega študija pa segajo nazaj k začetkom organiziranega teološkega študija na koncu 16. in v začetku 17. stoletja. Ljubljanski škof Janez Tavčar je v svojem poročilu Apostolskemu sedežu z dne 27. oktobra 1589 zapisal, da je v skladu s sklepom tridentinskega koncila o ustanavljanju semenišč, sprejetem 15. julija 1563, v Gornjem Gradu ustanovil semenišče, v katerem šest duhovnikov vzgaja šestnajst semeniščnikov. S tem se je na slovenskih tleh začel organiziran teološki študij na škofijski ravni. (Benedik 2009, 43; Dolinar 1979, 204)

Poleg škofijskih semenišč pa so v času katoliške obnove bili pomembni jezuitski kolegiji. Kmalu po tem, ko je Ignacij Lojolski leta 1551 ustanovil Rimski kolegij z gimnazijo ter filozofsko in teološko fakulteto, ki je bil leta 1584 po svojem dobrotniku preimenovan v Univerzo Gregoriano, so začeli jezuitske kolegije ustanavljati tudi po avstrijskih deželah: na Dunaju (1551), v Pragi, v Ingolstadtu, v Innsbrucku in drugje. Za slovenske študente je bil pomemben kolegij v Gradcu, ustanovljen leta 1573 in leta 1585 povzdignjen v univerzo s privilegijem nadvojvoda Karla, ki sta ga naslednje leto potrdila tudi papež in cesar. S tem je kolegij v Gradcu pridobil univerzitetne akademske pravice, kakor jih je pred tem pridobil kolegij v Olomoucu, ustanovljen 1566 in v univerzo povzdignjen leta 1573. Drugače od drugih univerz so univerze, ki so se razvile iz jezuitskih kolegijev, gojile teologijo in filozofijo, ne pa prava in medicine. Jezuiti so v mestih, kjer univerz še ni bilo, prevzeli vodstvo novoustanovljenih; kjer pa so univerze že obstajale in so imele tudi študij prava in medicine, so prevzeli le vodstvo teološko-filozofskih študijev. Po inštrukciji papeža Klemena VIII. z dne 13. aprila 1592, v kateri je naročil obnovo katoliške vere na Štajerskem, Koroškem in Kranjskem, so jezuiti kolegije ustanovili tudi v Ljubljani,[8] v Celovcu (1604), v Gorici (1619) in v Trstu (1620). Vloga jezuitskih kolegijev v tem času je bila pomembna, saj so bili kolegiji od ukinitve protestantskih šol v letu 1589 oziroma 1600 do ukinitve jezuitskega reda 1773 skoraj edine gimnazije na slovenskem ozemlju. (Zwitter 1969, 19–20) Kolegiji pa, kakor smo videli, niso gojili samo predmetov, ki jih danes poučujejo na gimnazijski ravni, ampak tudi filozofske in teološke študije, ki so po vsebini ustrezali študijem na tedanjih filozofskih in teoloških fakultetah. S tega vidika je bil na naših tleh pomemben mejnik akademsko leto 1619/20, ko so v ljubljanskem jezuitskem kolegiju vpeljali visokošolski seminar iz moralne teologije. S to uvedbo se je začel visokošolski študij teologije, ki se je v naslednjih desetletjih postopoma širil, leta 1704 pa so v ljubljanskem jezuitskem kolegiju uvedli tudi visokošolski študij filozofije. Ta se je

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[8] Kot zanimivost omenimo, da spletna enciklopedija Britannica ustanovitev Univerze v Ljubljani – sicer brez pojasnila – postavlja v ta čas, natančneje v leto 1595 (Https://www.britannica.com/place/Slovenia/Government-and-society#ref477061 (pridobljeno 1.1.2019)).

s predavanji iz logike stodvainštiridesetim slušateljem začel leta 1705, v naslednjih dveh letih pa so sledila tudi predavanja iz fizike in metafizike. S tem je bil izpolnjen program filozofskega, artističnega študija, za katerega je Vasilij Melik (1989) zapisal: »S filozofskim študijem, uvedenim na jezuitskem kolegiju v Ljubljani leta 1704, lahko začnemo predzgodovino današnje Filozofske fakultete.« Leta 1705 so na kolegiju začeli tudi s predavanji iz cerkvenega prava (Kovačič 2013, 291). Po Zwitterju ne moremo dvomiti v to, da je Ljubljana vse od začetka 17. stoletja imela visokošolski študij – ne moremo pa tega študija opredeliti kot univerzitetnega. »Tako nam ostane samo sklep, da so pri nas sicer bile višje študije, da se pa na njih niso podeljevale akademske stopnje, ker se je upoštevalo načelo, da je za to potreben poseben privilegij, ki je ... ostra meja med temi študijami in pravimi univerzami.« (Zwitter 1969, 28)

Kot zanimivost, kako se je širil akademski prostor, ki ga je leta 1619 odprl teološki študij, omenimo jezuita Gabrijela Gruberja. Njegov prihod v Ljubljano 4. junija 1768 je pomenil pomembno prelomnico v visokošolskem študiju. Že od konca 17. stoletja je jezuitsko šolstvo naletelo na odpor, ki se je kazal v ustanavljanju »viteških akademij«, katerih namen je bil razširiti vzgojo in pouk še na druga področja, kakor so študiji prava, medicine in umetnosti, ter upoštevanje modernih jezikov, naravoslovja in aktualne politike. Tudi avstrijska državna oblast je želela v študij vključiti te nove smeri, zlasti spoznanja s področja eksperimentalnih metod. Gruberjev prihod je Ljubljani prinesel ustanovitev nove stolice za mehaniko, na kateri je poleg mehanike in hidravlike poučeval tudi nizke gradnje in mapiranje.

V zadnji četrtini 18. stoletja in v 19. stoletju je visoko šolstvo v Ljubljani doživljalo različne pretrese in spremembe. Jožef II. je za krajši čas v Ljubljani ukinil teološki (1783–1791) in filozofski študij (1785–1788); prvega je prenesel v Gradec, drugega v Innsbruck. V dobi Napoleonovih Ilirskih provinc so v Ljubljani delovale »centralne šole« (1810–1813) s študijskimi smermi za zdravnike, kirurge, inženirje-arhitekte, pravnike in teologe; te so imele pravico podeljevanja akademskih naslovov in jim zato lahko pripišemo status univerze. Po koncu Ilirskih provinc so se v okviru liceja nadaljevali filozofski, teološki in medicinsko-kirurški študiji vse do ukinitve liceja leta 1849. Revolucionarno leto 1848 je okrepilo zahteve po ustanovitvi slovenske univerze, posledica teh zahtev pa je bila ukinitev liceja in s tem vseh študijev na liceju. Ostal je le študij teologije. Tega je leta 1852 prevzela ljubljanska škofija kot »škofijsko bogoslovno učilišče« (*Institutum dioecesanum Studiorum theologicorum*), ki je z ustanovitvijo Univerze 1919 dobilo status Teološke fakultete in je tako prešlo pod vodstvo Univerze.

2. Ustanavljanje Univerze v Ljubljani in Teološke fakultete

Prizadevanja za ustanovitev slovenske univerze so svoj sad obrodila leta 1919. A tudi tedaj ob koncu 1. svetovne vojne ustanovitev slovenske univerze ni bila samoumevna (Mikuž 1969, 54–59). Ustanovitelji iz akademskih in političnih krogov so

se razhajali že glede kraja: ali naj bo to Ljubljana ali Trst? Večini pa se je zdelo samoumevno, da bi z ustanovitvijo morali počakati še nekaj let, v tem času pa bi na univerzah v Zagrebu in Beogradu na filozofski in pravni fakulteti ustanovili katedre v »slovenskem narečju«, na katerih bi se pripravili in habilitirali profesorji za slovensko univerzo. To je še pred ustanovitvijo Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev 1. decembra 1918 predlagal Kulturni odsek Narodnega sveta 21. novembra v Ljubljani, nalogo pa naj bi izpeljala Vseučiliška komisija, ustanovljena 23. novembra 1918, katere predsednik je postal dr. Danilo Majaron. Komisija, ki se je konstituirala 5. decembra, je že na prvi seji razpravljala o tem, da bi zagrebška univerza postala matica ljubljanske. Le tri dni pozneje, 8. decembra, so profesorji ljubljanskega bogoslovja komisiji poslali spomenico z zahtevo po ustanovitvi teološke fakultete v Ljubljani.[9] A še dva meseca kasneje ideja o tem, da bi univerza morala začeti delovati v Ljubljani, ni bila povsem sprejeta. 6. februarja 1919 je dr. Karel Verstovšek, poverjenik za uk in bogočastje v narodni vladi za Slovenijo, prvič poročal beograjski centralni vladi o potrebah visokega šolstva v Ljubljani: predlagal je ustanovitev univerze s štirimi fakultetami, še prej pa začasno gostovanje na zagrebški univerzi, kjer bi se za pripravo novih kadrov za nekaj let ustanovile katedre s slovenskim predavateljskim jezikom. Kakor se je pokazalo že na 1., konstitutivni seji in na sejah Vseučiliške komisije v naslednjih tednih in mesecih, je večinsko mnenje zagovarjalo postopno ustanavljanje univerze. Mnenje je bilo: »Boljše je namreč, da z začetkom odložimo za več let, nego s prenagljenjem oviramo pot boljšemu.« In: »Takoj naj začno z jedrom v Zagrebu, ›ako pa je vse vkup komedija, naj se vse to pove, da gremo narazen, ker čemu bi za komedijo tratili čas‹.« Tako je razmišljal Josip Plemelj. Podobno je razmišljal profesor v Zagrebu Boris Zarnik, ki je zagovarjal mnenje, naj se univerza v Ljubljani odpre šele, ko »bomo imeli za vse stroke dobro izobražene in izvežbane učne moči«. Profesor Josip Plemelj je bil tudi proti predlogu, ki je hotel »našemu vseučilišču dati poseben značaj v Jugoslaviji s tem, da bi se obvezalo predavatelje posluževati se pri svojih predavanjih slovenskega jezika«; poudarjal je, da je pridevnik »slovenski« le teritorialna, narečna oznaka, ki se ji je treba odreči v prid centralizacije visokih šol v Jugoslaviji in se s tem odreči »separatističnim stališčem« (Mikuž 1969, 56). Tudi France Kidrič, slavist, je menil, da sta slovenščina in srbohrvaščina le dve narečji. Mnenje večine je torej v začetku nasprotovalo hitremu ustanavljanju univerze in uporabi slovenskega jezika v letih, ko bi se na univerzah v Zagrebu in Beogradu pripravljali kadri za novo slovensko univerzo.

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[9] »Že 8. decembra 1918 so poslali profesorji ljubljanskega bogoslovnega učilišča Vseučiliški komisiji spomenico o ustanovitvi teološke fakultete v Ljubljani, ki navaja naslednje utemeljitvene razloge: a) Slovenski profesorji teologije bi lahko znanstveno tekmovali z znanstveniki drugih narodov in verstev; to pa je mogoče samo z znanstvenim osebjem, ki ga nudijo univerze. b) Teološka fakulteta v Ljubljani je potrebna zato, ker ima teološka znanost veliko nalogo pri zbliževanju vzhoda z zahodom, ki jo morejo rešiti predvsem Jugoslovani. Zato je v najvišjem kulturnem interesu, da nastane med Jugoslovani resna bogoslovna znanost, ki naj bi jo omogočila slovenska bogoslovna fakulteta, ki sicer že obstaja v Zagrebu, toda tudi na tem področju je potrebna določena tekmovalnost. c) Slovenski duhovniki, ki se hočejo nadalje izobraževati, potrebujejo nadomestilo za teološke fakultete na Dunaju, v Gradcu in Innsbrucku, kjer so lahko doslej študirali, ne bodo se mogli več odslej. V drugem delu govori spomenica, kako naj bi se ustanovitev fakultete praktično izvršila. Opozarja, da bi bile težave mnogo manjše kakor pri drugih fakultetah, ker je potrebno že obstoječe bogoslovno učilišče v Ljubljani le primerno razširiti, izpopolniti in mu dati značaj univerzitetne fakultete.« (Polec 1929, 151–152; Ciperle 2009, 29)

Takoj, le tri dni po konstitutivni seji Vseučiliške komisije, so ljubljanski teološki profesorji odločno pokazali pot v drugo smer, ki je bila po mnenju Metoda Mikuža (59) smerokaz – »edina prava pot« – nadaljnjim pripravam: »Zanimivo je torej, da so bili prav teologi tisti, ki so pokazali vseučiliški komisiji edino pravo pot, da je treba ... iskati rešitev vprašanja ljubljanske univerze le na domačih tleh.« Ko so mnogi zagovarjali mnenje, da ustanovitev univerze v Ljubljani ni samo vprašanje Slovencev, ampak je vprašanje »visokega šolstva celega slovanskega juga« (J. Plemelj), in da naj bi pri študiju uporabljali jugoslovansko terminologijo, kakor je to v začetku zahtevalo društvo inženirjev, so bogoslovni profesorji vztrajali pri takojšnjem ustanavljanju fakultet na slovenskih tleh (59). Vseučiliška komisija je zato že 14. januarja 1919 Narodni vladi poslala predlog, naj »ljubljanskemu škofijskemu bogoslovnemu učilišču«, ustanovljenemu 1852, podeli status fakultete. (*Zgodovina slovenske univerze* 1929, 152) Dr. Aleš Ušeničnik, dr. Franc Ušeničnik in dr. Janez Zore, dotedanji profesorji na ljubljanskem bogoslovju, pa so 21. marca 1919 od zagrebške teološke fakultete dobili odgovor, da imajo »naučnu spremu«, to je, da jih je ta habilitirala za univerzitetne profesorje (Mikuž 1969, 60).

O ustanovitvi Univerze v Ljubljani so se prek svojih časopisov izrekale tudi politične stranke. *Slovenec* je 13. februarja 1919 v uvodniku poudarjal nujnost ustanovitve slovenske univerze, liberalni *Slovenski narod* pa je 15. februarja 1919 temu nasprotoval, češ da je s koncem vojne »odpadlo nemško potujčevanje«, s tem pa tudi »vzrok za ustanovitev ljubljanske univerze« (59). Liberalci so tudi nasprotovali temu, da bi bila univerza slovenska – nasprotno, biti bi morala »orodje centralizma in unitarizma«. Predvsem pa so bili proti ustanavljanju teološke in medicinske fakultete. (59)

Odločilno vlogo pri ustanavljanju univerze sta imela dr. Danilo Majaron, pravnik in nekdanji gojenec Alojzijevišča, in dr. Anton Korošec, podpredsednik prve vlade Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev. Majaron je že leta 1898 v slovenskem in nemškem jeziku sestavil spomenico z naslovom Za vseučilišče v Ljubljani, ki je bila izročena vladi na Dunaju in Državnemu zboru. Kot predsednik Vseučiliške komisije pa se je v začetku leta 1919 po skoraj trimesečnih nasprotnih razpravah napotil v Beograd po dovoljenje za ustanovitev univerze, kjer je o tem v osebnem razgovoru prepričal ministra prosvete Ljuba Davidovića. 6. marca je prišlo iz Beograda sporočilo, da je vlada naklonjena predlogu, da se v jeseni 1919 v Ljubljani začne univerzitetni študij. A že 1. aprila je Davidović sporočil, da predloga ne bo mogoče uresničiti. Zato je Majaron 5. aprila interveniral pri podpredsedniku vlade Korošcu in 2. julija (Mikuž 1969, 62)[10] so na seji ministrskega sveta pod vodstvom podpredsednika Antona Korošca (slovenskega liberalnega ministra dr. Alberta Kramerja, Davidovićevega strankarskega kolega, na seji ni bilo) sprejeli zakonski predlog, ki ga je Davidović pripravil. Zakon o Vseučilišču kraljestva Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev v Ljubljani, ki ga je nato na 56. redni seji 17. julija 1919 sprejelo Začasno narodno predstavništvo, je podpisal prestolonaslednik Aleksander 23. julija, v Uradnem listu pa je bil razglašen 1. septembra 1919. Zakon je določal:

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[10] V katalogu Častni doktorji Univerze v Ljubljani (2011, 12) najdemo podatek, da je bila seja ministrskega sveta 30. junija 1919.

»Čl. 1: V Ljubljani se ustanavlja vseučilišče kraljestva Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev, ki ima pet fakultet: teološko, pravoslovno, filozofsko, tehnično in medicinsko. Medicinska fakulteta bo imela samo dva pripravljalna letnika.

Čl. 2: Vse fakultete se otvorijo začetkom šolskega leta 1919/20, in sicer teološka, filozofska in pravoslovna v popolnem obsegu, tehnična s prvim in drugim letnikom, medicinska s prvim letnikom.

Čl. 3: Dokler se ne izdelajo specialni zakon in uredbe, se bo vseučilišče v Ljubljani povsem upravljalo po zakonu in uredbah o vseučilišču kraljestva Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev v Beogradu.

Čl. 4: Ta zakon stopi v veljavo, ko ga kralj podpiše, obvezno moč pa dobi, ko se razglasi.«

Videli smo, da so imeli profesorji ljubljanskega bogoslovja pri ustanavljanju univerze pomembno in po Mikužu celo odločilno vlogo, saj so pokazali »pravo pot«. Vendar pa so včlenitvi teološke fakultete v univerzo nekateri nasprotovali, med drugimi dr. Dragotin Lončar, član Začasnega narodnega predstavništva in član Jugoslovanske socialdemokratske stranke. Zagovarjal je mnenje, »da teološke fakultete niso v pravi zvezi z moderno univerzo, ki nima konfesionalnega značaja. Niso v pravi zvezi ne zato, da ne bi tudi te imele znanstvenih disciplin in priznanih znanstvenikov, temveč zato, ker vse te discipline spadajo na filozofsko fakulteto, ves ostali bogoslovni pouk pa v učilišča in vzgojevališča vsake verske skupnosti same.« (Mikuž 1929, 64) V nasprotju s tem mnenjem se je prav dr. Majaron posebej zavzel za vključitev teološke fakultete v univerzo.

Glede na razklanost, ki je pri ustanavljanju univerze delila slovensko akademsko in politično javnost, se zdi, da je bila prav osebnost dr. Danila Majarona tista, ki ji Univerza dolguje svojo ustanovitev v letu 1919. Akademik Janko Polec (2013) je o njem zapisal:

»Podprt od najboljših slovenskih mož vseh strank, zlasti od poverjenika za uk dr. K. Verstovška, je Majaron z veliko modrostjo in previdnostjo v malo mesecih do podrobnosti izvršil priprave za ustanovitev univerze s petimi fakultetami. Prebrodil je še zadnje težave tik pred uresničenjem stare narodove terjatve. Prepričal je v osebnem razgovoru ministra Davidovića o pravičnosti zahteve in reelnosti priprav, zlasti tudi o potrebi ustanovitve bogoslovne fakultete. Juristični fakulteti je izoblikoval s sestavo učnega načrta in prvega profesorskega kolegija njen prvi zunanji obraz. Po pravici velja za očeta slovenske univerze in s tem za enega prvih naših prosvetiteljev... Pri tem vsestranskem, vztrajnem in premišljenem delovanju v raznih panogah narodnega življenja so Majarona vedno vodili idealni nagibi, njegova velika ljubezen do naroda in zlasti do slovenskega jezika. S svojim delom, ki so ga pospeševale ugodne razmere, je doživel uspehe, ki so ma-

lokomu dani. V jeseni svojega življenja je videl uresničen svoj ideal, sloven-sko univerzo; slovenski jezik, za katerega se je boril desetletja, je zavladal v vseh uradih, izoblikovan za to rabo predvsem po njegovi zaslugi. Čeprav je bil umstveno in družabno visoko naobražen in odličen govornik, se kot političen strankar in voditelj ni mogel uveljaviti, ker je bil kulturno preširoko orientiran in je imel pred seboj vedno občenarodne interese. Majarona prištevamo po pravici najzaslužnejšim slovenskim možem novejše dobe; po svojem plemenitem človečanstvu, resnični kulturi in uglajenem nastopu pa je bil tudi ena najbolj simpatičnih in uglednih osebnosti slovenske javnosti.«

Oba, dr. Majaron in dr. Korošec, sta zaradi svojih zaslug pri ustanovitvi univerze postala njena častna doktorja, dr. Majaron prvi leta 1929, dr. Korošec pa tretji leta 1939 (drugi častni doktorat je leta 1930 prejel dr. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, prvi predsednik Republike Češkoslovaške (1918–1935)).

Kako pomembna je bila ustanovitev univerze v Ljubljani leta 1919 in enotnost, ki jo je dosegel dr. Majaron, se je pokazalo komaj dve leti po njeni ustanovitvi. Že v oktobru leta 1921 je »prišla iz Beograda novica o nameravani ukinitvi medicinske in tehnične fakultete v Ljubljani, čeprav sta obe že pokazali lepe uspehe in sta brez vsake državne podpore postavili sicer skromne, a prav lepe inštitute« (Mikuž 1969, 69). Od tedaj so podobni signali iz Beograda prihajali redno. V akademskem letu 1923/24 je Univerzitetni svet ob vladni nameri, da ukine medicinsko fakulteto v Ljubljani, protestiral in poudaril, da je univerza v Ljubljani »največega kulturnega pomena za celo državo in neobhodni pogoj vsake nacionalne odpornosti našega naroda izven mej Kraljevine SHS«. Ugotavljal je tudi, da »splošen vtis o ljubljanski univerzi v Beogradu ni bil ugoden« (Mikuž 1969, 71). Vlada v Beogradu je svoje namene po skrčenju programov, zmanjšanju profesorjev ali celo po ukinitvi fakultet zaradi finančnih stroškov utemeljevala z majhnim številom študentov, z neza-posljivostjo absolventov in s tem, da bi v Kraljevini morali imeti eno samo univer-zo s fakultetami po različnih mestih. Proti temu se je Univerzitetni svet skliceval na avtonomijo univerze, v dogajanje pa se je vključila tudi širša javnost in politika. O tem je Metod Mikuž (1969, 73) zapisal naslednje: »Posebno glasna je bila SLS, saj je imel takrat dr. Korošec v žepu dragoceni ljubljanski mandat. *Slovenec* je 6. decembra 1925 zaklical Roke proč od naše univerze! Ljubljanska univerza je viden znak ›najsrčnejše vzajemnosti s Hrvati in Srbi, ki jo bomo branili v vsakem slučaju z vsemi silami in z vsemi sredstvi‹. Vsak poskus vzeti jo ›bomo smatrali kot vojno napoved na življenje in smrt‹.« Javno mnenje je postajalo vedno bolj nasprotno vladni politiki in je poudarjajo, kakor je to izjavil ljubljanski škof dr. Anton Bona-ventura Jeglič, da nam je »naša univerza potrebna, pa tudi zasluži, da ostane ne-okrnjena in da dobi sredstev, da se lahko nemoteno razvija«. (Mikuž 1969, 75) Na Univerzitetnem svetu 25. novembra 1927 je rektor Rajko Nahtigal predložil načrt za resolucijo z zahtevo po »neokrnjeni univerzi«. Na pritiske iz Beograda je Uni-verza odgovarjala z manifesti in resolucijami. V manifestu oziroma v apelu narodu, ki ni bil objavljen, je univerzitetna uprava že izražala strah, da Univerza ne bi pro-

padla: »Sto let smo čakali nanjo, z ujedinjenjem so jo učakali. Ali še prezgodaj, še premalo pripravljeni? Morda, – a to je gotovo, če sedaj propade, da nam ne vstane nikoli več! In bojimo se, da ne bi propadla.« (v: *Zgodovina slovenske univerze* 1929, 250) Manifest, ki ga je podpisal rektor Leonid Pitamic 11. decembra 1925, pa poroča o »vesteh, da se namerava ukiniti ljubljanska univerza ali vsaj nekatere njene fakultete« (255). Na seji Univerzitetnega sveta 25. novembra 1927 je Leonid Pitamic prebral resolucijo o pomenu ljubljanske univerze: »Ljubljanska univerza je za Slovence veličasten simbol osvoboditve, priznanje njihove enakopravnosti ter narodne in kulturne individualnosti in zato mogočno poroštvo iskrene vzajemnosti Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev. Kakršna koli okrnitev bi slovenski narod žalila, našim sosedom pa je univerza živ opomin neuničljivosti slovenstva.« (*Slovenec,* 26. 11. 1927, v: Mikuž 1969, 76) Tiskana spomenica o pomenu univerze v Ljubljani za Slovence in državo SHS pa je izšla konec leta 1927. Podpisalo jo je osemintrideset slovenskih društev, ustanov in organizacij obeh političnih taborov. Spomenica govori o zgodovini visokošolskega študija na Slovenskem, o dosežkih novoustanovljene univerze in o njenem pomenu za slovenski narod. V skupno spomenico so vključeni tudi manifesti vseh petih fakultet: filozofske, pravne, medicinske, tehnične in teološke fakultete. (v: *Zgodovina slovenske univerze* 1929, 263–271) O vlogi Teološke fakultete v Univerzi spomenica pravi:

> »Slovenska duhovščina je bistveno sodelovala pri pozitivni zgradbi slovenske prosvete; vrhu tega je imela odlično in velevažno vlogo pri obrambi slovenstva proti premoči Italijanov, Nemcev in Madžarov. Zaradi tega bi ukinitev bogoslovne fakultete smatral narod za udarec proti vitalnim narodnim koristim. V današnjih razmerah bi posebno bolestno občutili ta udarec primorski in koroški Slovenci, katerim je duhovščina prepotrebna narodna opora.

> Bogoslovna fakulteta je važna nacionalna institucija, ker goji znanost s posebnim ozirom na domače razmere in na slovanske vzhodne cerkve. V slogi z drugimi fakultetami sodeluje pri znanstvenem raziskovanju domače zgodovine, pri proučavanju staroslovenske cerkvene književnosti in poznejše slovenske literature.

> Tekom osmih let so izdali profesorji 17 znanstvenih knjig, 120 razprav in osem letnikov znanstvenega *Bogoslovnega vestnika.*

> Število rednih slušateljev je bilo dosedaj redno okoli 100 na leto, kar je za bogoslovno fakulteto razmeroma visoko število.

> Budžetnih razlogov za ukinjenje bogoslovne fakultete ni, ker bi bil finančni efekt ukinitve minimalen; saj bi morala država vzdrževati namesto fakultete bogoslovno učilišče v Ljubljani.

> Na vprašanje, zakaj samo ena pravoslavna fakulteta in dve katoliški bogoslovni fakulteti, odgovarjamo: ker tri bogoslovne fakultete popolnoma odgovarjajo kulturni strukturi kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev. Sloven-

ska duhovščina se mora usposobiti za svoje vzvišeno kulturno poslanstvo med slovenskim ljudstvom na slovenskem zavodu.

Odkar obstoji v Ljubljani visokošolski študij, je bila z njim zvezana vedno bogoslovna fakulteta.« (269)

Po večletnih poskusih beograjske vlade, da bi univerzo v Ljubljani okrnila ali jo celo ukinila, je rektorju Milanu Vidmarju prišlo na misel, da je po posvetu z Univerzitetnim svetom in upravo na avdienci 18. aprila 1929 zaprosil kralja Aleksandra za protektorat nad univerzo. O tem je Vidmar zapisal: »Na mojo prošnjo, da se imenuje naša univerza Univerza kralja Aleksandra I. (*Alma Mater Alexandrina*), je Njegovo Veličanstvo kralj to dovolil s toliko ljubeznivostjo, da sem srečen odšel iz avdience.« (v: Mikuž 1969, 78) O tem, zakaj in kako je zaprosil za avdienco pri kralju, Vidmar govori v svojih *Spominih* v poglavju z naslovom Boj za obstanek slovenske univerze. Po sprejemu rektorata jeseni 1928 je kmalu izvedel, da ima »minister prosvete« v načrtu »ukinitev medicinske fakultete in cele teološke (katoliške) fakultete v Ljubljani«. Minister je v aprilu 1929, ob desetletnici ustanovitve Univerze v Ljubljani, že imel pripravljene »dekrete o ukinitvi ... obeh fakultet za podpis vladarja, kralja Aleksandra«. Vidmar, ki je zaobšel ministra, je kralja v avdienci najprej zaprosil, da bi univerza smela privzeti ime njegovega veličanstva, nato pa je izrazil željo, da se medicinska in teološka fakulteta ne ukineta. Pogovor s kraljem o teološki fakulteti opiše Vidmar takole:

> »›Vi želite, da ostane nedotaknjena teološka fakulteta!‹ ›Da,‹, sem odgovoril s poudarkom. ›Če pa je tako, mi morate povedati, zakaj to želite,‹ je malce nemirno rekel kralj. ›Glejte, veličastvo,‹ sem odvrnil, ›v slovenskem narodu ima duhovščina močan vpliv, pa ne samo duhoven, temveč tudi materialen. Važno se mi zato zdi, da vzgajamo slovenske duhovne javno, tako rekoč pod nadzorstvom, na univerzi in ne v zatohlih semeniščih.‹ Novo pečeni protektor slovenske univerze se pa ni takoj vdal. Očitno mu je bila katoliška miselnost zoprna. Po kratkem premisleku je menil: ›V Zagrebu sta katoliška in pravoslavna teološka fakulteta. Ali vam to ne zadostuje?‹ Nasmehnil sem se: ›Hrvatje ne znajo vzgajati niti svojih popov, kako naj bi bili kos vzgoji naših?‹ To je zaleglo. Kralj si je zakril z desno roko oči in se podnjo diskretno zasmejal. Potem pa se je sprostil: ›Dobro, dobro, obdržite svojo teološko fakulteto.‹ ... Po vrnitvi v Ljubljano se mi je zdelo, da moji profesorji – kolegi niso zelo navdušeni za poklon, izražen v novem imenu univerze. Morda so premalo poznali nevarnost, ki je bila ogrožala univerzo. Morda niso razumeli, da bi ukinitev teološke fakultete, ki seveda že dolgo nima več legitimacije, da se uvršča med resnično potrebne in zelo žive fakultete, nedvomno pomenila začetek podiranja vseučilišča.« (Vidmar 2018, 74–75; 78)

Proti naklepom ministra prosvete je imel Vidmar podporo v tedanjem ministrskem predsedniku dr. Antonu Korošcu, ki »seveda ni želel okrnjevanja univerze« (80). Pod kraljevim protektoratom je univerza v Ljubljani – od takrat naprej *Uni-*

versitas Alexandrina – zaplula v mirnejše vode. Navedeni zapisi pa kažejo, da je bila Teološka fakulteta vse od ustanovitve dalje jeziček na tehtnici v merjenju političnih interesov, kakor je to še danes, žal nemalokrat tudi predmet ideoloških razprtij. V *Spominih* pravi Vidmar zase, da je »svojo rdečo obleko« (126) začel javnosti kazati že leta 1937; ni bil torej samo pomemben znanstvenik in šahovski velemojster, ampak je bil tudi politično opredeljen, vseeno pa je skrb za skupno dobro znal v ključnih vprašanjih postaviti pred osebna prepričanja. V *Spominih* se sicer čudi naklonjenosti, ki mu jo je izkazoval škof dr. Gregorij Rožman – kakor da katoliški škof ne bi mogel biti naklonjen drugače mislečim! –, ni pa mogel skriti odklonilnega stališča do profesorja dr. Lamberta Ehrlicha in njegovih somišljenikov, ki da so za »svoje sramotno počenjanje kmalu plačali z glavo« (168; 126–127). Odločilno vlogo, ki jo je teološki študij odigral na področju kulturnega in intelektualnega razvoja na Slovenskem, so mnogi kakor Majaron priznavali, drugi kakor Vidmar so teologiji odrekali »legitimacijo« univerzitetnega študija, a so v prid skupnega dobrega do nje izražali strpnost. Tu ne bomo dokazovali znanstvenega značaja teologije, ki jo uvršča v krog univerzitetnih znanj vse od začetkov univerzitetnega študija, poudariti pa želimo, da bi Slovenci brez teoloških profesorjev verjetno še dolgo ostali brez univerze, morda celo brez lastne države, če nova slovenska univerza ne bi zajezila razraščajočega se jugoslovanstva, ki so mu bili naklonjeni mnogi vodilni znanstveni duhovi. Zato je bila tu nadvse pomembna vloga bogoslovnih profesorjev. Ti so takoj po konstitutivni seji Vseučiliške komisije 5. decembra, ko so drugi še nekaj mesecev razmišljali o tem, da bi z večletno pripravo na ustanovitev ljubljanske univerze začeli zunaj slovenskega ozemlja pod okriljem zagrebške in beograjske univerze in niti ne nujno v slovenskem učnem jeziku, 8. decembra v soglasju z vizijo dr. Majarona v spomenici zahtevali ustanovitev teološke fakultete na slovenskih tleh in v slovenskem jeziku – za to so bili tudi usposobljeni in pripravljeni. Prepoznali in izkoristili so edinstveni trenutek, ki se ne bi ponovil – ta trezna in odločna vizija je omogočila ustanovitev univerze. Tako so prehiteli vlado v Beogradu, ki se v poznejših mesecih ne bi več pustila presenetiti in zahtevi iz Slovenije gotovo ne bi več ustregla, saj je nenehno nameravala ukiniti celo že obstoječo univerzo oziroma fakultete, ki so že odlično delovale.

3. Teološka fakulteta in študij teologije po 2. svetovni vojni

Po 2. svetovni vojni komunistična oblast svojih odločitev ni več tehtala in usklajevala z različnimi interesi. Tako je bila Teološka fakulteta leta 1950 izločena iz Univerze in je eno leto delovala kot samostojna državna fakulteta, 4. marca 1952 pa je Svet za prosveto in kulturo pri vladi Ljudske republike Slovenije dekanatu Teološke fakultete sporočil: »Z ozirom na ustavne določbe o ločitvi cerkve in države Vam sporočamo, da z 31. junijem t.l. fakulteta preneha biti državna ustanova in da s tem prenehajo vse proračunske in druge obveznosti našega Sveta do Vaše fakultete.« (ATF) Univerzitetni svet Univerze v Ljubljani je Teološko fakulteto po-

novno vključil v Univerzo na svoji 8. seji 18. novembra 1992 s sklepom, da se »Teološka fakulteta kot akademska inštitucija ponovno vključi v Univerzo v Ljubljani kot ena fakultet«. Sklep tudi določa, da »posebna komisija, sestavljena iz predstavnikov Teološke fakultete in Univerze v Ljubljani, oblikuje pravila, ki omogočajo delovanje Teološke fakultete znotraj Univerze v Ljubljani /…/ Teološka fakulteta pa jih lahko nadgradi s svojimi internimi pravili«. (ATF)

Po letu 1952 se je tudi teologija na slovenskih tleh odprla procesom modernizacije katoliške teologije, zlasti teološkim iskanjem po 2. vatikanskem koncilu. Kako je Fakulteta v tem času dojemala svoje poslanstvo, vidimo iz predavanja, ki ga je ob koncu tega obdobja ob praznovanju sedemdesetletnice Fakultete imel na Tomaževi proslavi 7. marca 1989 slavnostni govornik beograjski nadškof dr. Francè Perko, dolgoletni profesor Teološke fakultete (Perko 1990). Predavanje je naslovil Teološka fakulteta v službi naroda in Cerkve. Leto 1990 je bilo enako prelomno, kakor je to bilo leto 1919. Perko poudarja, da je v tem času slovenski narod skupaj z drugimi jugoslovanskimi narodi prehodil »dolgo in težavno pot« in šel skozi mnoge preizkušnje. Tu je tudi teologija, »znanost o Bogu na podlagi krščanskega razodetja in človeškega iskanja«, odigrala pomembno vlogo s svojim pogledom v skrivnost človeka, njegove biti, njegovega smisla, medčloveških odnosov in njegove prihodnosti. Sklicuje se na Emmanuela Mounierja, po katerem »krščanstvo angažira in aktivira človeka pred izzivi zgodovinskih dogajanj, in na Zoltana Alszeghya, ki teologijo opredeljuje kot »aktivnost vere, kot znanost vere v službi Cerkve in človeštva« (5). Perko je poudaril globoko zakoreninjenost teologije v slovenskem narodu, ki sega vse do Brižinskih spomenikov, katerih avtorja označi za »prvega slovenskega teologa, ki so ga napajala vzhodna in zahodna razmišljanja o ničnosti in veličini človeka v Kristusu« (6). Temu so v srednjem veku sledile samostanske šole in šole v župnijskih središčih, ki so pripravljale kandidate za duhovniško delovanje med slovenskim ljudstvom, v novem veku pa razvoj teološkega študija, ki smo ga že prikazali. Ob tem Perko poudarja, da je bila Teološka fakulteta vedno v službi slovenskega naroda in kulture. Kultura slovenskega naroda je od 8. stoletja dalje vezana na krščansko duhovno izročilo, ki je ustvarilo »dušo slovenskega naroda« (7). Zato brez poznavanja krščanstva ni mogoče razumeti slovenske kulture. Fakulteta pa je tudi bogatila slovenski jezik s teološko terminologijo, prispevala je k spoznavanju naše krščanske preteklosti in dajala slovenskemu človeku »plemenito krščansko razsežnost«. K temu so veliko prispevali duhovniki, ki jih je izobrazila Fakulteta. »Vnašanje prvin žlahtne kulture v posameznika in v narodno skupnost je bilo in je še danes veliko poslanstvo Teološke fakultete. S tem se krepi hrbtenica slovenskega naroda, da se mora upirati različnim prisilam in težavam, ki jih prinašajo viharji zgodovine.« In tu se Perko zopet sklicuje na Mounierja, ki je zapisal: »Vloga krščanskega duha je, da počasi, od znotraj zmanjšuje zasužnjenost prisili, ko vnaša pravičnost in končno neizmernost in preobilje ljubezni do bližnjega. Kajti prave revolucije, ki potiska svet naprej, ne povzroča nasilje, ampak luč duha in moč ljubezni.« (7)

Vseeno pa fakulteta – tako kakor tudi Cerkev – svojega prednostnega poslanstva ni videla v »žlahtnjenju in oblikovanju kulture«, v obravnavi socialnih vprašanj,

ampak v »uresničevanju odrešenja v teku zgodovine narodov in vsega človeštva«, ki je »božji poziv k popolni osvoboditvi v brezmejnosti božjega bitja« in ga »uresničuje Bog po Kristusu v moči Svetega Duha v Cerkvi« (7).

Tej vzgojni, kulturni in cerkveni razsežnosti teološkega študija je treba dodati tudi znanstveno razsežnost. Fakulteta raziskuje versko in cerkveno preteklost na Slovenskem, to pa pomaga »poznati sebe, se identificirati« (8). Kot rezultanto vseh teh silnic pa Perko vidi nalogo, da v »simfoniji z vesoljnim božjim ljudstvom Kristusove Cerkve« teologija na Slovenskem izdela »slovensko teologijo«, katere naloga je utelesiti Božjo besedo znotraj posebnosti slovenske kulture in izročila.

Kot posebnost ljubljanske Teološke fakultete Perko omenja njeno dialoško poslanstvo, ki ga ta ima glede na dejstvo, da stoji na kulturnem, verskem in jezikovnem križišču različnih svetov: na meji pravoslavnega, protestantskega in katoliškega sveta; na meji med krščanstvom in islamom, med vzhodno in zahodno Evropo ter tudi na meji komunistično ateističnega in za vero odprtega zahodnega sveta. Dobra tri leta po praznovanju sedemdesetletnice je bila Fakulteta ponovno sprejeta v krog fakultet Univerze v Ljubljani; s tem se je zanjo začelo novo obdobje.

4. Teološka fakulteta in študij teologije po letu 1992

Po letu 1992 sta se Univerza in Teološka fakulteta znašli v novih okoliščinah: Republika Slovenija je postala samostojna, demokratična država, pristopila je k bolonjski prenovi, Fakulteta pa je bila vnovič vključena v Univerzo (Petkovšek 2009). Mnogi so se nadejali, da bo v novih, demokratičnih razmerah po zgledu večine evropskih držav tudi v slovenskem šolskem sistemu pouk o verski dediščini in svetovnih religijah našel pravo mesto in odprl učiteljska mesta. Zato je bilo zanimanje za študij teologije veliko. V ta namen je Fakulteta v sodelovanju z univerzama v Ljubljani in v Mariboru pripravila dvopredmetne pedagoške programe. Zlasti z Univerzo v Ljubljani je Teološka fakulteta na področju humanističnega študija sodelovala že pred ponovno vključitvijo; tako je bil v navzočnosti rektorja in vélikega kanclerja 19. junija 1989 podpisan protokol o sodelovanju med Teološko in Filozofsko fakulteto. Vendar se pričakovanja o uvedbi pouka o verski in religijski dediščini v šolski sistem niso uresničila in zanimanje za študij teologije je med laiki zaradi nezaposljivosti diplomantov teologije v šolstvu upadlo. Zato se je Fakulteta v okviru svoje temeljne teološke poklicanosti odprla drugim študijskim področjem, ki jih je narekoval čas. To so religiologija, etika ter zakonski in družinski študiji. Poleg študija na teh področjih, ki ga izvaja na vseh treh stopnjah (= stopenjski študijski programi, namenjeni pridobitvi izobrazbe), Fakulteta danes izvaja tudi študij v izpopolnjevalnih programih v obliki vseživljenjskega izobraževanja, katerih cilj je izpopolnjevanje, dopolnjevanje, poglabljanje in posodabljanje znanja. Ti programi so: zakonska in družinska terapija, pastoralno izpopolnjevanje, duhovno izpopolnjevanje, geštalt pedagogika in karitativno delo.

Teološka fakulteta deluje v okviru Zakona o visokem šolstvu, ki univerzi zagotavlja avtonomijo,[11] in v skladu s Statutom Univerze v Ljubljani (Ur. l. RS, št. 4/2017), na podlagi katerega so narejena Pravila Teološke fakultete, ki jih lahko po sklepu Univerzitetnega senata (18. 11. 1992) nadgradi »s svojimi internimi pravili«. Fakulteta je v skladu z zakonom študij preoblikovala po smernicah Bolonjske deklaracije, katere cilj je uvajanje primerljivih diplomskih stopenj in razporeditev diplomskega in podiplomskega študija v tri stopnje, poenotenje kreditnega sistema, pospeševanje mobilnosti študentov in učiteljev, dvig kakovosti znanja in študija, odprtost študija evropskim razsežnostim in sprejemanje konkurenčnih izzivov, ki bi Evropo bolj vodili v Evropo znanja.

Sveti sedež je k bolonjski reformi pristopil 19. septembra 2003 v Berlinu, svoje stališče do reforme pa je zavzel v dokumentu z naslovom Observations of the Holy See on becoming a signatory member of the »Declaration of Bologna« (31. maja 2003). Sveti sedež, ki se sklicuje na apostolsko konstitucijo Sapientia christiana (Janez Pavel II. 1979) in govori o značilnostih cerkvenih univerz in fakultet, v svojih opazkah ob pristopu k Bolonjski deklaraciji izpostavi specifične značilnosti visokošolskega sistema, za katerega je odgovoren, nato kanonski (cerkveni) in civilno pravni položaj cerkvenih in drugih katoliških visokošolskih ustanov v različnih evropskih državah, v tretjem delu pa predstavi svoje stališče do bolonjske prenove. (Sveti sedež 2003; Petkovšek 2009) Primerjava načrtovanega bolonjskega študija z že izvajanim teološkim študijem na cerkvenih fakultetah pokaže, da je študij na cerkvenih teoloških fakultetah že pred bolonjsko reformo vseboval značilnosti, ki jih je reforma šele uvajala, med temi na primer mednarodna primerljivost študija katoliške teologije, ki je svoj prvi temelj dobila že leta 1599 v dokumentu Ratio studiorum, mobilnost učiteljev in študentov, primerljivo kreditno ovrednotenje in drugo. Predvsem pa Sveti sedež v dokumentu poudari posebnosti glede učiteljev: da bi učitelji prispevali k uresničevanju ciljev cerkvenih fakultet, se morajo odlikovati po zglednem življenju, po integralnem nauku in po predanosti dolžnosti. Prav tako mora biti učitelj vsebin v zadevah vere in morale v polnem občestvu z učiteljstvom Cerkve in s papežem. Ta posebnost teološkega študija, ki zadeva živo občestvo in njegovo vero, ni nerazumljiva, čeprav v njej mnogi – ideološko in zgrešeno! – vidijo ideološko pristranskost. Pred ideologijo varuje učitelja teologije zahteva po njegovi znanstveni usposobljenosti in doslednosti, ki se kaže v zahtevanem akademskem nazivu, v bogastvu znanja, v čutu za odgovornost, v pričeva-

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[11] Zakon o visokem šolstvu (ZVis), čl. 6: »Univerze in samostojni visokošolski zavodi, ki jih ustanovi Republika Slovenija, delujejo po načelih avtonomije, ki jim zagotavlja predvsem: - svobodo raziskovanja, umetniškega ustvarjanja in posredovanja znanja; - samostojno urejanje notranje organizacije in delovanja s statutom v skladu z zakonom; - sprejemanje meril za izvolitev v naziv visokošolskih učiteljev, znanstvenih delavcev in visokošolskih sodelavcev; - volitve v nazive visokošolskih učiteljev, znanstvenih delavcev in visokošolskih sodelavcev; - izbiro visokošolskih učiteljev, znanstvenih delavcev in visokošolskih sodelavcev za zasedbo delovnih mest; - izdelavo in sprejem študijskih in znanstveno-raziskovalnih programov, določanje študijskega režima ter določanje oblik in obdobij preverjanja znanj študentov; - podeljevanje strokovnih in znanstvenih naslovov v skladu z zakonom ter podeljevanje častnega doktorata in naziva zaslužni profesor; - volitve, imenovanja in odpoklic organov v skladu s statuti in drugimi akti; - odločanje o oblikah sodelovanja z drugimi organizacijami; - upravljanje s premoženjem v skladu z namenom, za katerega je bilo pridobljeno.«

nju za življenje, v izkazani raziskovalni sposobnosti in podobnem. (Sapientia christiana, tč. 26; 27)

V akademskem letu 2009/10 je Teološka fakulteta začela izvajati programe, ki jih je preoblikovala po smernicah bolonjske reforme. Pri pripravi programov je izhajala iz dokumenta Ratio fundamentalis institutionis sacerdotalis (6. 1. 1970), ki ga je glede norm o duhovniški vzgoji izdala Kongregacija za katoliško vzgojo, in iz apostolske konstitucije Sapientia christiana (15. 4. 1979) Janeza Pavla II. o cerkvenih univerzah in fakultetah.

Kateri so razlogi, ki danes utemeljujejo univerzitetni študij teologije v Republiki Sloveniji? Poleg sklicevanja na njegovo večstoletno rodovitno navzočnost na naših tleh lahko navedemo univerzitetno-epistemične, družbeno-kulturne, duhovno-cerkvenostne in etično-politične razloge.

Teologija sodi v univerzitetni krog védenj najprej zaradi svoje nenadomestljive *epistemične vloge* (Habermas 2004). O presežnem, o veri in o religijah razmišlja v hermenevtični, humanistični perspektivi, to je na način, ki ni lasten družboslovnim znanstvenim pristopom, kakor sta sociološki ali psihološki na primer. Metodologija, lastna teologiji, omogoča, da se na pristen način izrazijo modrosti in spoznanja, ki so si jih o življenju, človeku in Bogu pridobila verska izročila skozi tisočletja. Na življenjske, etične in duhovne dileme, ki jih sodobne tehno-znanosti in sekularizirana kultura največkrat niti ne zaznajo, lahko tudi danes človek ustrezno odgovarja le v luči teh modrosti. Post-sekularistična kultura, v katero vstopamo, se zaveda vrednosti teh izročil in poskuša presegati ideološki razkol med sekularističnim razumom in religiozno izkušnjo. Razum in vero vedno bolj razume kot dva dopolnjujoča se, komplementarna vira spoznanja, ki sta drug drugemu v oporo in se morata medsebojno učiti drug od drugega. Razum, ki ni odprt za tisočletne kulturne in religijske modrosti, ter vera, ki je zaprta za kritični razum, omogočata patologije, ki ogrožajo človeštvo. Patologije prinaša znanost, ki je ravnodušna do etičnih in presežnih temeljev družbe, na drugi strani pa verski fundamentalizem, ki ne sprejema razvojnih izzivov. V moči te epistemične avtonomije, ki ji jo dajejo verska in religijska izročila, teologija v sodobni pluralistični in demokratični kulturi vstopa v procese medsebojnega učenja, med katerimi je temeljni dialog med izročilom in sodobnimi liberalnimi izzivi. Tu teologija razmišlja univerzalno, izpostavlja se metodični refleksiji, intersubjektivni preverljivosti svojih tez, obenem pa v luči kulturnega spomina opozarja znanosti na nevarnost ideologij in jih spodbuja k odgovornosti do skupnega dobrega, ki se kaže zlasti v prizadevanjih za mir in pravičnost v svetu in tudi v skrbi za skupni dom Zemljo ter za življenje. (Habermas 2004)

Razlogi za univerzitetni študij teologije so tudi *družbeni in kulturni*. Po 2. vatikanskem vesoljnem cerkvenem zboru teologija ni več namenjena zgolj izobraževanju duhovniških in redovniških kandidatov, ampak odgovarja na širše duhovne, verske, kulturne in družbene potrebe. V skladu s smernicami istega koncila si sodobna teologija prizadeva za vrednote, kakor so na primer dialog s kulturnim in družbenim okoljem, globalna solidarnost, obramba verske pluralnosti ali varstvo

okolja. V času globalnih sprememb prispeva h kritičnemu, pozitivnemu preoblikovanju identitete posameznika, kulture in naroda. Na slovenskih tleh ima že dolgo tudi sredniško vlogo na tromeji med katoliško, evangeličansko in pravoslavno veroizpovedjo, pa tudi na področju krščanske in bližnje islamskega kulture. Po osamosvojitvi Slovenije se je dejavno vključevala v oblikovanje demokratičnih norm ob prehodu v demokratično družbeno ureditev. Tako teologija na slovenskih tleh uresničuje poslanstvo, ki ga je imela od svojih začetkov, ko je v dialogu z antičnimi kulturami in verstvi ter s kulturami in religijami sveta opredeljevala vrednote, ki omogočajo človekov osebni in družbeni razvoj. Po Habermasu (2004) so temeljne vrednote sodobnega sveta rezultat teološke refleksije. Te so: odgovornost, avtonomija, opravičenje, emancipacija, individualnost, občestvo itd. K temu dodajmo idejo osebe, ki ima svoje korenine v kristoloških in trinitaričnih razpravah cerkvenih očetov, idejo osebnega dostojanstva in nedotakljivosti, ki ima svoje korenine v Svetem pismu, izostrili pa so jo sv. Bonaventura, Tomaž Akvinski in španska sholastika v srečanju evropske kulture z indijanskimi kulturami, ali pa idejo splošne enakosti, ki je vzklila v srednjeveškem samostanskem življenju. Te ideje, ki izražajo temeljno kulturno in družbeno vlogo teologije, se v pedagoških, raziskovalnih in publicističnih prizadevanjih fakultete kažejo v sodelovanju z drugimi krščanskimi veroizpovedmi (ekumenizem), v dialogu z nekrščanskimi verstvi – predvsem z judovstvom in islamom –, s sodobnimi kulturnimi in miselnimi tokovi, zlasti pa v njenem delu na področju socialne etike in bioetike, kjer se v zadnjem času srečuje z vprašanji sodobnih tehnoloških izzivov digitalne dobe, ki jih nekateri povzemajo pod izraz »transhumanizem«.

Cerkvenostni in duhovni razlogi so naslednji temeljni sklop razlogov, ki utemeljujejo teološki študij v Republiki Sloveniji. Večinski delež državljanov pripada trem krščanskim skupnostim – katoliška je med njimi največja. Teologija pa je znanstvena obravnava vere in verskega izročila. 2. vatikanski koncil v dokumentu Gaudium et spes (tč. 45) opredeljuje Cerkev kot »›zakrament odrešenja‹, ki razodeva in hkrati uresničuje skrivnost božje ljubezni do človeka«. Teologija pomaga kristjanom bolje razumeti njihove korenine in njihovo poslanstvo, ki je v uresničevanju evangeljske zapovedi ljubezni – s tem utrjuje temeljne človeške vrednote. To je eden temeljnih namenov preučevanja svetopisemskega izročila, iz katerega teologija črpa odrešenjsko sporočilo za sodobnega človeka in preroško besedo za prihodnost. Študij svetopisemskega razodetja in cerkvenega izročila, ki je hrbtenica teologije, artikulira norme krščanske eksistence. Teologija, ki se nenehno preverja ob evangeliju, utemeljuje opcijo za uboge kot temeljno biblično usmeritev. S tem prevzema vlogo socialno-etičnega korektiva, ki zaznamuje vsa področja teološkega študija, od študija zgodovine krščanstva in sistematične teologije pa vse do praktično usmerjenih disciplin, kakor so moralna teologija, kanonsko pravo, pastoralna teologija, katehetika in liturgika. V tej smeri in na teh področjih je fakulteta v zadnjem času izvajala raziskave z obravnavo temeljnih vidikov judovskega in krščanskega oznanila, kakor so na primer pravičnost, krivda, strah, sprava, kazen, odpuščanje, molitev, daritev, razmerje med troedinim Bogom in družbo in podobno. Pomemben rezultat dela na tem področju je prikaz teološkega nauka v

obliki priročnika sistematične teologije. V drugem nizu raziskav so raziskovalci obravnavali cerkveno-zgodovinska vprašanja, kakor so zgodovina prve Cerkve, ali pa pomembne osebe iz zgodovine Cerkve na Slovenskem, pa tudi vprašanje prenosa verskega izročila, kakor je razvoj obrednikov ali vprašanja iz homiletike. V velikem porastu so raziskave na področju duhovnega in terapevtskega svetovanja.

Ne nazadnje so razlogi za študij teologije tudi *etično-politične narave*. V sodobni družbi je politika avtonomna in zavezana demokratičnim idealom – ti pa se ne morejo vzdrževati sami od sebe. Demokracija predpostavlja politične kreposti, kakor sta solidarnost ali žrtvovanje za skupno dobro. Te kreposti imajo svoj izvir v kulturnem in religioznem življenju. Kakor sta poudarila Böckenförde (1992, 212) in Habermas (2004) niti popolna demokracija ni zmožna izključiti morebitnega nasilja večine nad manjšino. To se je zgodilo v primeru nacizma, ki je bil demokratično, legitimno izvoljen politični sistem z nečloveškimi posledicami. Po svojem temeljnem poslanstvu je teologija vse od svojih začetkov v hebrejski kulturi imela funkcijo kritike totalitarnih družbenih oblik; svojo kritiko je utemeljevala z metafizičnimi argumenti, nepogojeno od konkretnih kulturnih ali religijskih okoliščin. Svoja etična spoznanja je tako prenašala tudi na področja političnega, družbenega in ne nazadnje gospodarskega življenja.

8. decembra 2017 je papež Frančišek podpisal nove smernice za študij katoliške teologije, ki so nadomestile predhodne, ki jih je določal dokument Sapientia christiana papeža Janeza Pavla II., razglašene 15. aprila 1979. V novih smernicah papež Frančišek poudarja, da mora biti sodobna teologija misijonska in kerigmatična. Tem smernicam študij teologije na Teološki fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani tudi sledi. (Palmisano 2018; Petkovšek 2018; Osredkar 2018; Saje 2019; Tommasi 2018)

5. Sklep

V prispevku smo poskušali izluščiti vlogo, ki jo je igral študij teologije v našem prostoru v času od prvih oblik visokošolskega študija v letu 1619, zlasti pa v obdobju, ko je študij dobil svoje mesto na Teološki fakulteti. Teološka fakulteta je imela leta 1919 pomembno vlogo pri soustanavljanju Univerze v Ljubljani, ko je bila z Univerzo ustanovljena tudi sama. Pred 2. svetovno vojno je imela pomembno vlogo pri razvoju Univerze, po vojni pa je bila izključena iz Univerze in nato iz javnega prostora ter je štirideset let delovala kot zasebna cerkvena fakulteta. V Univerzo je bila ponovno vključena leta 1992. V štiristoletnem izročilu teološkega študija in v stoletni zgodovini Teološke fakultete niti študij niti Fakulteta nista bila nikoli povsem samoumevna. V teh, k racionalnosti in funkcionalnosti usmerjenih modernih časih sta morali svojo družbeno koristnost nenehno dokazovati. Teološki študij, ki se je v Ljubljani začel 1619, je postavil okvire razvoja drugih visokošolskih disciplin, najprej filozofije, ta pa je omogočila celo nastanek naravoslovnih in tehničnih disciplin. Najpomembnejša vloga študija teologije pa je bila ta, da je v svojem tristoletnem razvoju na domačih tleh ustvarila zametke univerzitetne kulture, ki je pripomogla k hitri in zanesljivi ustanovitvi univerze v Ljubljani. Podobno vlogo je

imela v Mariboru Visoka bogoslovna šola, ustanovljena leta 1859 na pobudo tedanjega lavantinskega in prvega mariborskega škofa Antona Martina Slomška. Ta je v tem delu Slovenije oblikovala univerzitetnega duha, ki je služil kot temelj ustanovitvi Univerze v Mariboru leta 1975. Profesorji Teološke fakultete so v času pred 2. svetovno vojno sloveli kot vidni znanstveniki in družbeno-kulturni delavci; med njimi so bili trije rektorji Aleš Ušeničnik, Franc Ksaver Lukman in Matija Slavič. Zlasti Matija Slavič je pomembno prispeval k razvoju in obrambi Univerze in je njen edini dvakratni rektor. Na izrazit način se je poslanstvo teološkega študija pokazalo v času izključenosti Fakultete iz Univerze in iz javnega prostora. To njeno vlogo je v slovesnem predavanju ob sedemdesetletnici izrazil nadškof Perko, ki je poudaril, da je teologija kot znanost o Bogu – njen cilj je uresničevanje odrešenja v teku zgodovine narodov in popolna osvoboditev v brezmejnosti božjega bitja po Kristusu v moči Svetega Duha v Cerkvi – usmerjena tudi v svet, da v luči duha in v moči ljubezni gradi svet pravičnosti. V svojem predavanju si ne pomišlja poudariti, da teologija preučuje krščansko duhovno izročilo, ki je ustvarilo »dušo slovenskega naroda« in da brez poznavanja tega duhovnega izročila ni mogoče razumeti slovenske kulture. Po ponovni vključitvi v Univerzo leta 1992 Fakulteta svoje delovanje usklaja z drugimi članicami Univerze v okviru univerzitetnih Statutov, ki v skladu z zakonsko ureditvijo zagotavljajo avtonomijo univerze. Avtonomija tudi fakulteto varuje pred političnimi vplivi, ki jim je teološki študij vseskozi izpostavljen. Svoje prvo poslanstvo tudi danes vidi v artikuliranju krščanskega duhovnega izročila, obenem pa išče vedno nove načine, kako bi s svojimi spoznanji služila človeku na različnih ravneh njegovega bivanja, kakor so družbeno-kulturna, cerkvenostno-duhovna in etično-politična raven. Pri tem izhaja iz teološke metode, ki ji daje specifični epistemični status ter posledično specifična spoznanja in videnja. V tem je teologija nenadomestljiva ne glede na to, ali ji je določeno kulturno, družbeno in politično okolje naklonjeno ali ne.

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Irena Marković

Pomen Baragovega misijonskega delovanja pri uresničevanju Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev iz leta 1830

The Significance of Baraga's Missionary Work in the Implementation of the Indian Removal Act of 1830

Povzetek: Prispevek obravnava izselitveno politiko ZDA do indijanskih plemen vzhodno od reke Misisipi, ki je bila utemeljena z nakupom Louisiane leta 1803 in z izvajanjem »civilizacijskega načrta«. S tem načrtom so bili postavljeni temelji za politiko zvezne vlade do Indijancev in za njihovo izselitev zahodno od reke Misisipi. S sprejetjem Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev leta 1830 se je začelo obdobje sistematičnega nasilnega izseljevanja Indijancev zahodno od reke Misisipi, ki so bili deležni etnocidnih pritiskov takratne uradne ameriške politike. Leta izvajanja tega zakona se časovno prekrivajo z začetki delovanja slovenskega misijonarja in škofa Ireneja Friderika Baraga (1797–1868) med Indijanci. Uspeh njegovega delovanja in njegovih naslednikov se ne kaže le v širjenju krščanskega nauka in pismenosti med Otavci in Očipvejci, ampak tudi v njihovem prilaganju belskemu načinu življenja; prav zato vlada ZDA pretežnega dela teh dveh indijanskih plemen ni izselila zahodno od reke Misisipi na podlagi Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev leta 1830.

Ključne besede: ZDA, misijonar in škof Irenej Friderik Baraga, Otavci in Očipvejci, »civilizacijski načrt«, Zakon o izselitvi Indijancev iz leta 1830

Abstract: This article discusses the US relocation policy towards the Native American tribes living east of the Mississippi River, based on the purchase of Louisiana in 1803 and the implementation of the "civilization program." This program laid the basis for the federal government's policy towards the Indians and for their removal west of the Mississippi River. Indian removal Act of 1830 thus represents the beginning of a removal period – a systematic and violent deportation of Indian people from east of the Mississippi River to the lands west (Indian Territory) as a part of the official US policy. The years of implementation of this law overlap with the beginnings of the activities of the Slovene missionary and Bishop Irenaeus Frederic Baraga (1797–1868) among the Indian peoples. The success of his work and that of his successors does not appear only in the spread of Christianity and literacy between the Native American tribes Ottawa and Ojibwe, but also in their adaptation to the lifestyle of the white

settlers. This resulted in the decision of the US government not to follow the Removal Act regarding these two tribes and, therefore, not removing them west of the Mississippi River.

Key words: USA, missionary and Bishop Irenaeus Frederic Baraga, Native American tribes Ottawa and Ojibwe, "civilization program", Indian Removal Act of 1830

1. Uvod

Vse 19. stoletje trajajoči proces širitve ZDA na zahod Severne Amerike in integracija državnega ozemlja sta imela negativne posledice za severnoameriške Indijance. Širjenje ZDA na zahod severnoameriške celine je bilo povezano s preseljevanjem indijanskih plemen v skladu z Zakonom o izselitvi Indijancev (Indian Removal Act), ki ga je sprejel ameriški kongres leta 1830. Indijanci so bili žrtve namernega iztrebljanja, saj je bilo širjenje na zahod v interesu ameriške zvezne vlade, ki je s politiko sklepanja pogodb o nakupu zemljišč indijanska plemena izseljevala z njihovih tradicionalnih zemljišč v gorata območja zahodno od reke Misisipi. Proti etnocidni politiki zvezne vlade so bili voditelji indijanskih plemen brez moči, prav tako so bili nemočni proti izkoriščanju evropskih trgovcev s krznom. (Debo 1983, 101–117)

V prvi polovici 19. stoletja je imela trgovina s krznom pomemben vpliv na gospodarsko in politično dogajanje v ZDA ter na odnose med zvezno vlado in indijanskimi plemeni. V tem času so trgovino s krznom obvladovale pomembne trgovske družbe: Hudson Bay Company, North West Company in American Fur Company, ki so imele prvenstveno pravico za kupovanje kož pobitih divjih živali od Indijancev v zameno za industrijsko blago. Ta oblika trgovanja je bila njihov osnovni vir dohodka, ni pa ogrožala tradicionalnega načina življenja Indijancev, temveč jih je celo podpirala pri ohranjanju lova in ribolova. Hkrati je ekonomski koncept agrarne ekonomije v ZDA, ki ga je podpiral predsednik Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) in so ga širile množice priseljencev iz Evrope, uničeval naravne razmere za preživljanje indijanskih nomadskih lovcev. Politiko naseljevanja evropskega prebivalstva na indijanskih območjih je zvezna vlada podpirala tudi z ugodnimi pogoji za nakup zemljišč na zahodu Severne Amerike. (Taylor 2006, 380–382; Land Act of 1820, 566–569)

Leta izvajanja Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev – to je pomenilo nasilni izgon ameriških Indijancev zahodno od reke Misisipi – se časovno prekrivajo z začetki Baragovega misijonskega delovanja med Otavci in Očipvejci na območju Great Lakes. Z vidika posledic tega zakona je prav delovanje slovenskega misijonarja in škofa Ireneja Friderika Baraga (1797–1868) med leti 1831–1868 prispevalo k dalj časa trajajoči fizični ohranitvi Otavcev in Očipvejcev na območju današnjih zveznih držav Michigan, Minnesota in Wisconsin. Baraga je s širjenjem krščanstva in pismenosti prispeval h kulturnemu in gospodarskemu razvoju Otavcev in Očipvejcev, zato vlada ZDA pretežnega dela teh dveh indijanskih plemen ni izselila zahodno

Zemljevid 1: *Območje Louisiane leta 1803 (avtorja: Irena Marković in Zmago Drole, Maribor, 2014).*

od reke Misisipi. Po letu 1851 je zvezna vlada v Baragovih misijonskih postajah začela ustanavljati indijanske rezervate in podprla prizadevanja katoliške Cerkve, da bi civilizirala in evangelizirala Indijance. (O'Connell 2009, 89–90; DA/ALSt, 1840, XIII, 39–42)

2.   Zakon o izselitvi Indijancev zahodno od reke Misisipi

Idejne podlage izselitvene politike zvezne vlade do indijanskih plemen so bile utemeljene z nakupom Louisiane leta 1803 in z izvajanjem »civilizacijskega načrta«, ki je postal podlaga pri vzpostavljanju odnosov med zvezno vlado in indijanskimi plemeni. S tem načrtom je predsednik ZDA Thomas Jefferson (1801–1809) postavil temelje etničnega čiščenja Indijancev vzhodno od reke Misisipi, ki je bilo neposredno povezano s politiko zvezne vlade in z njenimi ukrepi zaradi belih priseljencev. Z nakupom Louisiane so ZDA pridobile skoraj celotno porečje reke Misisipi, vključno s pristaniščem New Orleans. Ameriški kongres je razglasil vse ozemlje zahodno od reke Misisipi, vključno z delom Skalnega gorovja, za državno posest. Intenzivno naseljevanje tega ozemlja je vlada ZDA podpirala z ugodnimi pogoji za nakup zemlje, tako da je uresničevala določila zakona iz leta 1820, ki je zniževal

ceno zemljišč. S tem ukrepom je zvezna vlada povečala nakup zemljišč in privabljala priseljence na zahodna območja ZDA. (NARA, Louisiana Purchase Treaty, 1803; Klemenčič 2011, 37)

Jefferson je za pridobitev indijanskega ozemlja in za naselitev belih naseljencev na ozemlju kupljene Louisiane julija 1803 predlagal »civilizacijski načrt«, ki je postal podlaga pri vzpostavljanju odnosov med zvezno vlado in indijanskimi plemeni. »Civilizacijski načrt« je vseboval naslednja določila:

> – V stiku z Indijanci je treba ohraniti mir. Omejiti je treba uporabo vojaških utrdb, s tem pa bi preprečili zlonamerne posege belih naseljencev in druge zlorabe Indijancev, ki bi lahko izzvale vojne med njimi. S tem bi zatrli tudi nastajajoče vstaje med indijanskimi plemeni.

> – Spodbuditi je treba prosto prodajo viskija, ki jo javno podpirajo trgovine s krznom, da bi tako preprečili vpliv tujih (predvsem britanskih) trgovcev. Prodajo alkoholnih pijač bi zaupali predvsem poglavarjem plemen, ki bi bili tako pripravljeni prodati zemljišča za plačilo svojih obveznosti.

> – Zaposliti je treba indijanske nadzornike in agente pod vodstvom oddelka za vojno (War Department), prek katerih bi ohranili povezavo z indijanskimi plemeni in jih prepričali glede prodaje zemljišč.

> – Ozemlje vzhodno od Misisipija bi pridobili s kupovanjem indijanskega ozemlja, s tem bi zmanjševali obseg njihovega ozemlja na območju med Misisipijem in Apalači.

> – Indijanskim plemenom bi v zameno za zemljo vzhodno od območja reke Misisipi ponudili investicijsko blago; za preživetje bi jih izobrazili v evropskem načinu kmetovanja in jim dodelili državljanstvo ZDA.

> – Tista indijanska plemena, ki bi zavrnila »civilizacijski načrt« kot edino alternativo za svoje preživetje, lahko zapustijo kupljeno ozemlje Louisiane in se odselijo na območje, kjer bodo lahko kot avtohtoni prebivalci svobodno živeli kot lovci na krzno, dokler njihovo ozemlje ne bo potrebno za naselitev belega prebivalstva.

> – Ko se težave stopnjujejo do točke ogrožanja ali vojne, dobijo Indijanci zemljišča kot ceno za mir. (Horsman 1992, 105–113)

S tem načrtom so bili postavljeni temelji za politiko zvezne vlade do Indijancev in za njihovo izselitev zahodno od reke Misisipi. Cilj pogajanj z indijanskimi plemeni je bil, pridobiti ozemlja, pospešiti trgovsko izmenjavo in – kar je bilo najpomembnejše – zadržati zavezništvo z indijanskimi plemeni, da ga ne bi sklenila z Britanci. Načrt za pridobitev indijanskega ozemlja vzhodno od Misisipija je predvideval tudi proces akulturacije indijanskih plemen, v katerem bi Indijanci opustili svojo kulturo, vero in način življenja s sprejemanjem zahodnoevropske kulture, krščanske vere in poljedelskega načina življenja. Jefferson je bil prepričan, da je poljedelstvo – in ne lov – resnična podlaga za razvoj civilizacije. Za Indijance ni

videl druge rešitve, kakor da postanejo podobni belim naseljencem. Poslal je številna pisma poglavarjem indijanskih plemen, v katerih jih je spodbujal, da bi se odpovedali nomadskemu načinu življenja in postali kmetovalci. S tem je uveljavljal stališče, da je treba indijanska plemena, ki se upirajo akulturaciji, prisilno odstraniti z njihovih tradicionalnih zemljišč in jih izseliti zahodno od reke Misisipi. (NARA, President Thomas Jefferson's confidential message to Congress concerning relations with the Indians, January, 18, 1803; Wallace 1999, 225–240)

Za uresničevanje »civilizacijskega načrta« je kongres leta 1819 sprejel Zakon o Indijanskem civilizacijskem skladu (The Indian Civilization Fund Act), ki je dovoljeval, da zvezna vlada financira program akulturacije med indijanskimi plemeni. Zakon je bil sprejet 3. marca 1819. Na podlagi tega zakona je kongres prvič odobril 10 000 dolarjev za uresničitev »civilizacijskega načrta« za Indijance, katerega cilje je zvezni vladi predstavil že Thomas Jefferson leta 1803. Predsednik ZDA James Monroe (1817–1825) se je odločil, da se iz Indijanskega civilizacijskega sklada financirajo misijonske družbe, ki so se že ukvarjale s kulturnim prilagajanjem Indijancev. Tako so protestantski misijonarji prejeli večino finančnih sredstev iz Indijanskega civilizacijskega sklada, saj je bilo takrat med indijanskimi plemeni najbolj razširjeno protestantsko misijonsko delovanje. S to novo obliko financiranja se je okrepilo misijonsko delovanje med Indijanci. Z ustanavljanjem novih šol in z organizacijo cerkvenega življenja so širili pismenost med Indijanci in jih posredno spodbujali v procesu zaščite njihovih ozemeljskih pravic proti vladi ZDA. (NARA, Indian Civilization Act of 1819, 516–517; Marković 2016, 663–674)

Za uveljavitev politike zvezne vlade do Indijancev je bil leta 1824 v okviru zveznega ministrstva za vojno ustanovljen Urad za indijanske zadeve (Bureau of Indian Affairs). Predstavniki tega urada kot zastopniki zvezne vlade so podpirali »civilizacijski načrt« in izselitev indijanskih plemen na območje zahodno od Misisipija. V kongresu so podpirali širitev misijonskega delovanja med indijanskimi plemeni in se zavzemali, da se zagotovijo finančna sredstva za ustanavljanje šol za Indijance, v katerih bi se osredotočili predvsem na poučevanje kmetijstva, gospodinjstva in krščanstva. Predstavniki Urada za indijanske zadeve so s sklepanjem pogodb z indijanskimi plemeni uresničevali izselitveno politiko vlade ZDA do Indijancev. Prek vladnih agentov je Urad za indijanske zadeve upravljal kmetijska zemljišča indijanskih plemen in imel nadzor nad izvajanjem trgovinskih odnosov in pogodb med zvezno vlado in indijanskimi plemeni. (Fixico 2012, 14–17)

V obdobju dveh predsedniških mandatov Andrewa Jacksona (1829–1837) se je s sprejetjem Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev leta 1830 začelo obdobje sistematičnega nasilnega izseljevanja indijanskih plemen zahodno od reke Misisipi, na območje današnje zvezne države Oklahome. Njegova administracija se je zavzemala za usklajeno sprejemanje predloga tega zakona, saj so imeli takrat demokrati večino v kongresu, zagovarjali pa so izselitev Indijancev zahodno od reke Misisipi. Tako je bil osnutek tega zakona, ki so ga predložili demokrati, glavna tema v senatu od 6. aprila 1830 do zadnjega glasovanja v kongresu, 28. maja 1830. Tako je v obeh domovih kongresa potekala razprava, na kateri so tehtali ustavne in moralne dileme Jacksonovega predloga. (Naylor 2008, 59)

Nasprotniki osnutka zakona so opozarjali, da je resnični problem zakona v razveljavitvi in prikrojitvi državnih pogodb s pogodbami Indijancev. Odločno so nastopali proti sprejetju tega zakona s podpisovanjem peticij in s pisanjem člankov v časopisih, v katerih so obsodili dejanja tistih, ki so želeli, da se kršijo pravice Indijancev v imenu ozemeljske širitve ZDA in suženjstva. Vztrajali so, da so Indijanci suverena etnična skupina, ki ima zakonsko pravico do svojega ozemlja, pridobljenega s številnimi pogodbami. Zagovarjali so stališče, da je izvajanje politike zvezne vlade glede izseljevanja indijanskih plemen škodljivo za proces akulturacije Indijancev, saj naj bi z izselitvijo ostali zunaj dosega vpliva evropske civilizacije. Poudarjali so, da zaradi nenehnih posegov belih naseljencev po indijanskih ozemljih sprejetje tega zakona ogroža obstoj indijanskih plemen. Opozarjali so, da je zvezna vlada dolžna priznati suverenost indijanskih plemen in njihovo pravico do ohranitve zemljišč v njihovi lasti. Vložili so amandmaje k temu zakonu, da bi zaščitili indijanska plemena vzhodno od reke Misisipi, če bi bil ta zakon sprejet. Hoteli so doseči, da bi vlada spoznala svoje obveznosti glede uresničevanja podpisanih pogodb z vsemi indijanskimi plemeni, ki bi se uprla izseljevanju, in bi zagotovila preseljenim plemenom njihovo stalno pravico do kateregakoli ozemlja na območju zahodno od reke Misisipi, ki jim je dano v zameno za njihove posesti vzhodno od Misisipija. Doseči so želeli tudi, da se vlada odreče vsem dejanjem preselitve, dokler kongres ne bo imel možnosti presoditi, ali so predlagana nova območja zahodno od Misisipija ustrezna za njihov način življenja. Toda te amandmaje so Jacksonovi podporniki zavrnili v obeh domovih. V senatu je za Zakon o izselitvi Indijancev leta 1830 glasovalo 28 senatorjev, proti pa jih je bilo 19. (Satz 2002, 295–298; Marković 2017, 77)

Kongres je 28. maja 1830 sprejel Zakon o izselitvi Indijancev. Zakon je uzakonil proces, v katerem je lahko predsednik indijanskim plemenom podelil zemljišča zahodno od reke Misisipi, potem ko so plemena potrdila, da bodo zapustila svoja ozemlja na območju vzhodno od reke Misisipi. S tem se je začel pritisk na indijanske voditelje, da so podpisovali pogodbe za izselitev. Za premestitev Indijancev in njihovo naselitev na novih ozemljih je zakon predvideval finančno pomoč in sredstva za življenje Indijancev v prvem letu njihove nastanitve. Določila zakona so dovoljevala predsedniku, da je zaščitil indijanska plemena na območju nastanitve pred motnjami drugih indijanskih plemen in belih naseljencev. Predsednik je nadziral, upravljal in skrbel za indijanska plemena v zvezni državi, v katero so se preselila. Sam zakon ni vseboval načrta za doseganje ciljev izseljevanja, je pa Jackson predložil smernice za izseljevanje indijanskih plemen, ki jih je uresničeval sam in tudi njegovi nasledniki. Jackson je želel doseči izselitev poceni, poudarek je bil na hitrosti in ekonomiji, kajti na humanost izselitve Indijancev se ni preveč oziral. S tem je omogočil tudi vojaško ukrepanje ZDA pri izselitvi Indijancev na območje današnje zvezne države Oklahome. (The Indian Removal Act of 1830, 411–418)

Skoraj vse izselitve so bile izvedene prisilno z vojaškim spremstvom in s kršitvijo dogovorjenih pogodb ter s prevarami zemljiških agentov. Jackson je v sedmih od svojih osmih letnih poročil kongresu namenil največjo pozornost politiki izseljevanja indijanskih plemen, ne da bi pri tem omenil Zakon o izselitvi Indijancev iz

Zemljevid 2: *Območje izselitve Indijancev zahodno od reke Misisipi (avtorja: Irena Marković in Zmago Drole, Maribor, 2014).*

leta 1830. Jacksonova politika izseljevanja indijanskih plemen je bila med belimi naseljenci promovirana tako, da javnost v njej ni prepoznala nemoralnih dejanj zvezne vlade v odnosu do Indijancev. (Stewart 2007, 48–58)

3. Vpliv Baragovega misijonskega delovanja med Otavci in Očipvejci pri uresničevanju zakona o izselitvi Indijancev iz leta 1830

V 19. stoletju je katoliška Cerkev v ZDA doživljala razcvet tako po obsegu kakor pri širjenju oblik pastoralnega dela in pri vzpostavljanju odnosov z javno oblastjo. Izoblikovala je nekatere izvirne načine delovanja in sodelovanja laikov, čeprav je družba kot celota, predvsem na kulturnem področju, skozi 19. stoletje ohranila prevladujočo protestantsko podobo. Posamezni škofje so samoiniciativno pripravljali programe in vanje vključevali nekatere duhovnike, ki so odhajali kot misijonarji med Indijance. Ko je Baraga leta 1831 začel misijonsko delovati med Otavci v naselju Arbre Croche (današnje mesto Harbor Springs), je bil v ameriški katoliški Cerkvi čas vzpostavljanja in hitrega razmaha razgibane organizacijske strukture. Cerkev je potrebovala ljudi, ki bi bili velikopotezni v svojih načrtih, a se niso dali

zapeljati zunanjim dejavnostim, temveč so znali usklajevati vse razsežnosti cerkvenega življenja. Vendar pa so bili voditelji cerkvenih skupnosti pri realizaciji projektov odvisni od finančne pomoči misijonskih družb iz Evrope. Pri tem jih je podpirala tudi Leopoldinina ustanova, ki je nastala leta 1829 na Dunaju in je delovala do leta 1914. Ta ustanova je podpirala dejavnost katoliških misijonov v ZDA in delovanje slovenskih misijonarjev. V njej je Baraga našel močno oporo, saj je zanj zbirala denarno pomoč, organizirala dopisovanje in finančno podpirala tiskanje njegovih knjig. Pri tem se je cincinnatijska škofija zavedala svoje odgovornosti do staroselcev, saj so med njimi začenjale širiti pastoralno delo tudi druge krščanske denominacije. (Kolar 1998, 90–91; Klemenčič 2017, 687–701)

Baraga se je ob prihodu v ZDA vključil v škofijo Cincinnati, ki je bila ustanovljena leta 1821 in je obsegala celotno ozemlje zvezne države Ohio. Škofijo je do leta 1832 vodil škof Edward Dominic Fenwick (1768–1832), njegov generalni vikar pa je bil Friderick Résé (1791–1871), ki je za seznanjanje Evrope z verskimi in gospodarskimi razmerami v škofiji Cincinnati pripravil več knjig in jih pošiljal Leopoldinini ustanovi. Leta 1850 je škofija Cincinnati postala nadškofija, naslednje leto je dobila visoko teološko šolo, ki je postala znana tudi zaradi prvega katoliškega časopisa v ZDA, z naslovom Der Wahrheitsfreund, izhajati pa je začel v nemščini leta 1837. Kot tednik je izhajal v Cincinnatiju med letoma 1837 in 1908 (Kolar 1999, 41–53). Baragovo vključitev v škofijo Cincinnati je prvi katoliški časopis v ZDA opisal z naslednjimi besedami:

> »Friderik Baraga je stopil na ameriška tla v trenutku verske ekspanzije; v trenutku, ko bi skrb za zunanje strukture lahko zasenčila ali celo zadušila globoke duhovne probleme naraščajočega organizma, to se pravi probleme, ki često uidejo površnemu opazovalcu, a večkrat pogojujejo njegovo eksistenco.« (Baraga 1990, 41)

Leta izvajanja Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev (1830–1838) se časovno prekrivajo z začetki Baragovega misijonskega delovanja v današnjih zveznih državah Michigan, Minnesota in Wisconsin. Baraga je z akulturacijo in s širjenjem krščanskega nauka spreminjal njihove navade, vsakodnevno življenje ter njihove norme in vrednote. Ob tem so se Otavci in Očipvejci umikali iz izoliranih skupnosti, opuščali so nekatere prvine svoje izvorne kulture in v procesu kulturnega prilagajanja sprejemali nekatere prvine evropske kulture. Na podlagi spremenjenih življenjskih razmer so se iz razpršenih naselij ob rekah preselili v stalna in strnjena naselja na misijonskih postajah na območju jezer Great Lakes. (Marković 2015, 127–148)

V procesu akulturacije so spreminjali tudi verske običaje, vedenja in navade, da so laže preživeli ob stiku z belimi naseljenci. Postali so trezni, delavni poljedelci in obrtniki, ki so skrbeli za svoje lastno preživetje in prodajali agrarne presežke belim priseljencem. O tem priča naslednji zapis:

> »Način življenja spreobrnjenih divjakov te misijonske postaje in posebej v župnijski vasi sami (Arbre Croche) je zdaj zelo podoben načinu življenja belcev. V župnijski vasi je zdaj že 36 dograjenih hiš, ki so sicer samo iz lesa,

ampak zato trdne in v njih se da dobro stanovati. Gradnja številnih drugih hiš je že na poti, tako da bo župnijska vas že kmalu imela 50 hiš. Tudi v podružničnih vaseh začenjajo spreobrnjeni divjaki (Otavci) graditi uporabne hiše namesto svojih revnih koč, in tako bo tudi kmalu vsakdanji blagor, ki ga prinaša krščanstvo ljudem, vedno bolj viden. Divjaki naselja Arbre Croche se zdaj vsi ukvarjajo s poljedelstvom. /.../ Prst te pokrajine vendar ni posebej rodovitna, ker je preveč peščena, zato sejejo le koruzo, stročnice in krompir kot tudi buče, ki so zelo okusne. Koruzo morajo ob pomanjkanju mlinov sami zdrobiti, kar potem skuhajo v kašo. V vseh vaseh imajo svinje in perutnino in v nekaterih najdemo tudi krave in konje. Slednje pa uporabljajo samo za potovanja. Poti so še preslabe, da bi jih uporabljali z vozovi, in njihova polja ležijo na jasah, kjer so posekali drevesa, ter so še premalo očiščena štorov, da bi jih lahko obdelali s plugom. Toda tudi to bo kmalu možno. Najprej je treba narediti tisto, kar je nujno, in to je treba dobro premisliti in udejaniti. Ker v celotnem misijonskem prostoru ne živi noben mojster, tudi tu ni obrtnikov. Svoja oblačila in čevlje sami izdelujejo; indijanske ženske so zelo spretne v tem. Slednje tudi strojijo kožuhe srn in jelenov, ki jih usmrtijo njihovi možje na lovu, in iz tega naredijo čevlje. /.../ Ribolov je tudi eden virov njihove prehrane. Območje Lake Michigan je zelo bogato z ribami, zato živijo vsi divjaki tega misijonskega območja ob jezeru in vzdolž rek. Nihče ne živi v notranjosti dežele. Donosen vir pridelovanja je sladkor, ki je pridobljen iz soka sladkornih dreves, sicer ni bel, vendar je skoraj tako okusen kot beli.« (DA/ALSt., 1834, VII, 17–22)

V skladu z določili Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev iz leta 1830 je bila leta 1836 v Washingtonu sklenjena pogodba med vlado ZDA in predstavniki Otavcev in Očipvejcev. S to pogodbo so odstopili ZDA ozemlje, ki danes obsega 37 % ozemlja današnje zvezne države Michigan. Hkrati pa so Indijanci na tem območju obdržali pravico do ribolova in jo razširili na območje jezer Great Lakes. Podjetje American Fur Company je preselilo sedež podjetja v La Pointe in na območju jezera Lake Superior reorganiziralo ribolovno dejavnost. Z reorganizacijo ribolova so bile ustanovljene nove podružnice podjetja American Fur Company za zbiranje rib v sodih, ki so jih odkupovali od Očipvejcev. Novoustanovljene podružnice ob jezeru Lake Superior so bile: La Pointe, Grand Portage, Fond du Lac in Isle Royale. V skladu s to pogodbo je vlada ZDA vsem tistim Otavcem in Očipvejcem, ki so v procesu Baragovega misijonskega delovanja spremenili način življenja – to pomeni, da so od lova prešli k poljedelstvu, postali poljedelci in obrtniki ter skrbeli za svoje lastno preživetje –, dala državljanske pravice in enakopravnost z belimi naseljenci. S to pogodbo je zvezna vlada tudi opredelila način kulturnega prilagajanja Otavcev in Očipvejcev in odprla dve kovaški trgovini, eno na misijonski postaji ob reki Grand River, drugo pa v Sault Ste. Marie. Na obeh misijonskih postajah so bili na voljo sodni tolmač ter kmetje in njihovi pomočniki, ki so v procesu akulturacije spreminjali način življenja Indijancev. (Treaty With The Ottawa, Etc. 1836, 451–456; Treaty With The Chippewa 1836, 461–462)

Zemljevid 3: *Ozemlja, ki so ga ZDA pridobile s pogodbami z Indijanci (avtorja: Irena Marković in Zmago Drole, Maribor, 2014).*

Z določili Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev iz leta 1830 je bila na območju današnjega mesta Mendota v današnji zvezni državi Minnesota leta 1837 podpisana pogodba med vlado ZDA in Očipvejci. V skladu z določili te pogodbe so Očipvejci odstopili tretjino ozemlja na severu v današnji zvezni državi Wisconsin in več kot tri milijone hektarjev zemljišč med rekama St. Croix in Misisipi ter ozemlje južno od jezera Mille Lacs Lake, ki danes sodi k zvezni državi Minnesoti. Z odstopom teh zemljišč je zvezna vlada pridobila pravice do izkoriščanja borovih gozdov na območju Wisconsina, ki jih je potrebovala pri gradnji stanovanj za naraščajoče prebivalstvo v današnjih mestih St. Louis v današnji zvezni državi Missouri in Cleveland v današnji zvezni državi Ohio. (Treaty With The Chippewa, 1837, 501–502; Kolar 2015, 105–126)

Leta 1842 je bila v La Pointu v današnji zvezni državi Wisconsin sklenjena pogodba med vlado ZDA in predstavniki Očipvejcev, ki so živeli na območju jezera Lake Superior in reke Misisipi. S to pogodbo so ZDA pridobile lastništvo nad ozemljem severnega dela današnje zvezne države Wisconsin in zahodnega dela Upper Peninsula v Michiganu. Indijancem plemena Očipva, ki so živeli v Baragovih misijonskih postajah (1835–1843) in napredovali v smislu akulturacije, je vlada ZDA dala enakopravnost z belimi priseljenci, vendar pa si je pridržala vsestranski nadzor nad njimi. Na območju La Pointa je Agencije za indijanske zadeve leta 1843 izdala prvi natančni popis števila Očipvejcev, ki so živeli južno in zahodno od jeze-

Zemljevid 4: *Geografska razprostranjenost Očipvejcev na območju jezera Lake Superior (avtorja: Irena Marković in Zmago Drole, Maribor, 2014).*

ra Lake Superior, in to na podlagi podatkov o izplačanih rentah o odstopu zemljišč iz leta 1837 in iz leta 1842. Glede na te podatke je leta 1843 živelo na območju južno in zahodno od jezera Lake Superior 5285 Očipvejcev. Najštevilnejši so bili Očipvejci z območja La Pointa in iz naselij Fond du Lac in Crow Wing v današnji zvezni državi Minnesoti. V vseh treh naseljih je bilo veliko potomcev iz mešanih zakonov z belimi priseljenci, ko so se naselili na območju severnega Wisconsina in Minnesote. Tam so bila bogata nahajališča železove rude v tako imenovanem »železnem okrožju« (Iron Range). (Treaty With The Chippewa 1842, 542–545; Klemenčič 2013, 621–637; Danzinger 1979, 78–79)

Območje celotne obale jezera Lake Superior, severovzhodno območje jezera Lake Michigan in del območja jezera Lake Huron, kjer so takrat živela indijanska plemena, so bili izrazito misijonski. Po letu 1851, ko je kongres sprejel Zakon o prisvojitvi indijanskih ozemelj (Indian Appropriations Act), s katerim je zvezna vlada pravno pri-

znala ustanavljanje indijanskih rezervatov na območju ZDA in podpirala prizadevanja katoliške Cerkve, da bi Indijance »civilizirala«, pa misijonsko delovanje med Indijanci ni bilo več usmerjeno samo v širjenje krščanskega nauka. Širjenje pismenosti med Otavci in Očipvejci, ki so živeli v rezervatih na območju današnjih zveznih držav Michigan, Wisconsin in Minnesota, je bilo treba nadaljevati, da bi jih v kulturnem in gospodarskem življenju približali ravni belih priseljencev. Leta 1854 je vlada ZDA v La Pointu sklenila pogodbe z Očipvejci, ki so živeli na območju jezera Lake Superior in reke Misisipi. Po ratifikaciji pogodbe leta 1855 je zvezna vlada začela na Baragovih misijonskih postajah ustanavljati manjše rezervate za Očipvejce, ki so bili razpršeno naseljeni v severovzhodni Minnesoti, na severu zvezne države Wisconsin in na polotoku Upper Peninsula Michigan. V rezervatih je zvezna vlada nadaljevala proces akulturacije njihovega načina življenja, zato je po letu 1855 ustanavljala rezervate na območjih njihovih tradicionalnih bivališč in jih izobraževala v poljedelstvu in obrti. (Treaty With The Chippewa, 1854, 648–651; DA/ALSt., 1852, XXIV, 93–95)

4.   Sklep

Thomas Jefferson je s »civilizacijskim načrtom« postavil temelje etničnega čiščenja Indijancev vzhodno od reke Misisipi, ki pa je bilo neposredno povezano s politiko zvezne vlade in z njenimi ukrepi zaradi belih priseljencev. Zato so bili Jeffersonovi cilji v odnosu do Indijancev enaki politiki poznejšega predsednika ZDA Andrewa Jacksona, to je, politiki izseljevanja indijanskih plemen zahodno od reke Misisipi, ki jo je uresničila zvezna vlada leta 1830 s sprejetjem Zakona o izselitvi Indijancev.

Ob 150-letnici Baragove smrti lahko poudarimo, da je z organizacijo cerkvenega življenja, s pripravo in tiskanjem knjig v njihovem jeziku med Otavci in Očipvejci širil pismenost in jih spodbujal k čim večji neodvisnosti, s katero bi bili učinkovitejši pri zaščiti ozemeljskih pravic proti vladi ZDA. Baraga je s svojim delovanjem posredno nastopal proti zvezni vladi, zato tudi vlada ZDA pretežnega dela Otavcev in Očipvejcev ni izselila zahodno od reke Misisipi, kakor je predvideval Zakon o izselitvi Indijancev iz leta 1830.

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Matjaž Klemenčič, David Hazemali in Matevž Hrženjak
Slovenska župnija presvetega Srca Jezusovega v Barbertonu, Ohio, skozi zgodovino[1]

The History of the Slovene Parish of the Sacred Heart of Jesus in Barberton, Ohio

Povzetek: V prispevku je obravnavana zgodovina slovenske etnične župnije presvetega Srca Jezusovega v Barbertonu, Ohio, ki so jo ustanovili tam živeči člani slovenske priseljenske skupnosti. Prispevek temelji na izčrpnem arhivskem gradivu clevelandske škofije in na znanstveni literaturi. Slovenska priseljenska skupnost v mestu Barberton, Ohio, je postala konec drugega desetletja 20. stoletja številčno in finančno dovolj močna, da je lahko podprla ustanovitev etnične župnije. V 85-letni zgodovini te barbertonske župnije je tamkajšnjim faranom uspelo zgraditi tri cerkve in župnijsko šolo, v župniji pa se je izmenjalo dvanajst duhovnikov; od tega jih je imelo enajst slovenske korenine. Župnija je bila skupaj s tamkajšnjim slovenskim narodnim domom središče slovenske narodnostne in kulturne dejavnosti v mestu. Z njeno pomočjo se je slovensko-ameriška skupnost v mestu obdržala do današnjih dni. Zaradi spremenjenih razmer – amerikanizacija potomcev tretje in četrte generacije – je župnija presvetega Srca Jezusovega začela izgubljati etnično naravo, v začetku 21. stoletja pa je ob združitvi s tamkajšnjo poljsko etnično župnijo prenehala obstajati. Takšno usodo posameznih etničnih župnij lahko zasledimo tudi v nekaterih drugih do sedaj raziskanih slovenskih naselbinah v ZDA.

Ključne besede: Barberton, presveto Srce Jezusovo, etnična župnija, clevelandska škofija, farni odbor, barbertonski Slovenci, Združene države Amerike

Abstract: This article deals with the history of the Slovene ethnic parish of the Sacred Heart of Jesus in Barberton, Ohio, founded by the members of the Slovene immigrant community of Barberton. It is based on exhaustive archival sources of the Cleveland Diocese and the newest scholarly literature. The Slovene immigrant community in Barberton, Ohio, became numerous and financially strong enough at the end of the second decade of the 20th century to support the establishment of an ethnic parish. In the 85-year history of the

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Slovene ethnic parish in Barberton, the local parishioners managed to build three churches and a parish school, with 12 priests in succession, 11 of which were of Slovene descent. The parish, along with the Slovene national home in Barberton, was the center of Slovene ethnic and cultural activities in the city. The parish, together with other ethnic institutions, enabled for the preservation of the Slovene-American community in the city to the present day. Due to altered circumstances – the Americanization of the 3rd and 4th generation of Slovene immigrants – the parish of the Sacred Heart of Jesus began to lose its ethnic character, and at the beginning of the 21st century it merged with the Polish ethnic parish, thus ceasing to exist. Such fate of individual ethnic parishes is also that of some other researched Slovene settlements in the United States.

Keywords: Barberton, Sacred Heart of Jesus, ethnic parish, Cleveland Diocese, parish pastoral council, Slovenes of Barberton, United States of America

1.   Uvod

Tridentinski koncil (1545–1563) je spodbudil prenovo katoliške pastoralne dejavnosti in za nekaj stoletij zakoličil stališča katoliške Cerkve do sveta, do družbe in do drugih krščanskih veroizpovedi. Na tem koncilu je bilo sprejeto tudi stališče, naj vsak katoličan pripada neki določeni teritorialni župniji. To stališče je bilo za ZDA, ki so sprejele več milijonov evropskih katoličanov, tudi Slovencev, težko uresničljivo. Potreba po duhovni oskrbi je bila velika, enako so bile tudi široko odprte možnosti za delovanje katoliške Cerkve, to pa je bilo v tedanji Evropi prej izjema kakor pravilo (Kolar 2015, 105). Razlike med priseljenimi pripadniki različnih evropskih narodov so bile pogosto nepremostljive, zato so z ustanovitvijo filadelfijske župnije Svete Trojice leta 1788 v ZDA začele nastajati etnične župnije (Matovina 1999, 46).

Na katoliškem kongresu družb sv. Rafaela v Luzernu so leta 1890 razpravljali o razlogih za izgubljanje katoliške vere med priseljenci v Severni Ameriki. Rezultat je bil Luzernski memorandum, ki ga je predstavnik nemške Rafaelove družbe Peter Paul Cahensly dne 16. aprila 1891 predal papežu Leonu XIII (1810–1903). Memorandum je med drugim zahteval ustanavljanje posebnih etničnih far; nastavitev župnikov iste narodnosti, kakor so ji pripadali farani; ustanovitev posebnih etničnih šol, tudi tam, kjer število faranov ni zadoščalo za ustanovitev ločenih far; enakopravnost za duhovnike vseh narodnosti; ustanavljanje katoliških bratskih podpornih organizacij; papeževo podporo vzgoji misijonarskih duhovnikov za delovanje v ZDA in ustanavljanje družb sv. Rafaela v evropskih državah (Meng 1946, 403–407). Memorandum je povzročil nemir v hierarhiji katoliške Cerkve v ZDA, saj so iskali odgovor na vprašanje, zakaj se katoliški priseljenci niso najprej obrnili nanje in ne neposredno na papeža. V tem času je bilo za ameriške Slovence, ki so bili praktično vsi verni (pomembnejša sekularizacija nastopi v slovenskem etničnem prostoru šele med obema vojnama (Lavrič in Friš 2018, 43)), pomembno

delovanje škofa Johna Irelanda (1838–1918) iz St. Paula, ki je podpiral amerikanizacijo katoliške Cerkve v ZDA. Tako je v Minnesoti na nemške župnije pogosto nastavljal slovenske duhovnike, ki so znali nemški jezik (O'Connell, 1988).

Etnične župnije so bile sprva zatočišča za priseljence. V 20. stoletju so postale središča za integracijo v novonastajajočo ameriško družbo. Obrnjeni proces je ameriške katoličane, med njimi več stotisočev ameriških Slovencev, katerih priseljevanje je doseglo višek v začetku 20. stoletja (Friš 2005, 458), zajel v drugi polovici 20. stoletja. Tedaj so se morale etnične župnije v luči večanja prevlade ameriške identitete vernikov združevati med seboj, s tem pa se jim je povrnila njihova teritorialna narava. Združevanju posameznih etničnih župnij lahko sledimo v slovenskih naselbinah od Leadvilla in Rock Springsa do San Francisca (Klemenčič, 1999). V tej študiji opisujemo nastanek in razvoj slovenske župnije presvetega Srca Jezusovega v Barbertonu, v ameriški zvezni državi Ohio, ter njeno vlogo in pomen za ameriške Slovence, živeče v Barbertonu in okoliških krajih. Študija temelji na izčrpnem arhivskem gradivu in na znanstveni literaturi.

2. Slovenska skupnost v Barbertonu in ustanovitev svoje lastne etnične župnije

Nastanek slovenskih naselbin se je dogajal hkrati s sklepnim obdobjem delovanja slovenskih misijonarjev v Severni Ameriki med indijanskimi plemeni (Marković 2015; Klemenčič 2015). Mnogi slovenski duhovniki so se odzvali želji slovenskih Američanov, da bi med njimi delovali duhovniki slovenskega izvora. Posebno obliko organiziranosti tako slovenske kakor tudi drugih izseljenskih skupnosti v ZDA pomenijo etnične župnije, katerih nastanek je, kakor smo nakazali, konec 19. stoletja podpirala tudi katoliška Cerkev (Klemenčič 2017, Klemenčič 2013; Kolar 1998, 56). V Barbertonu, ki leži 58 kilometrov južno od Clevelanda, je v drugem desetletju 20. stoletja začela slovenska skupnost izražati želje in zahteve po ustanovitvi svoje lastne etnične župnije, v kateri bi deloval slovenski duhovnik.

Vincent Lauter, eden od aktivnih članov slovenske skupnosti v Barbertonu, v svojih neobjavljenih spominih piše, da je bil prvi Slovenec v Barbertonu Anton Štrukel (Lauter 1994, 4), ki pa naj bi prispel v mesto že kmalu po njegovi ustanovitvi, leta 1891. Med prvimi slovenskimi priseljenci v Barbertonu so omenjeni še: Alex in Uršula Dormiš, Martin Možek, Martin Žagar, Jernej, Franka in Anton Gerbec, Frank Tonja, Joseph Hiti, Joseph Podpečnik, Matija Kramar in Tom Pavlič. Prvi Slovenci so se naselili v soseski Snydertown, pozneje pa je središče slovenske naselitve postal zahodni del mesta, imenovan Wolf Creek (Slovenci v Barbertonu si ustanove lastno župnijo 1940, 110). Ko je slovenska skupnost postala številčnejša, so začeli barbertonski Slovenci ustanavljati prva društva slovenskih bratskih podpornih organizacij. Tu so delovale podružnice skoraj vseh slovenskih bratskih podpornih organizacij. V naselbini je obstajala tudi podružnica Jugoslovanske socialistične zveze (Richardson 1989, 7; Gabrosek 2004, 1–5). Posebej aktivna je bila Slovenska moška zveza, ki je bila ustanovljena leta 1938. O tem priča naslednji zapis:

»Nedavno v Barbertonu ustanovljena Slovenska moška zveza je začela dobivati veje in ustanavljajo se podružnice. V Chicagu je bila ustanovljena prva podružnica, ki je dobila št. 2. Originalna postavka v Barbertonu ima številko 1. V sredo 13. julija pa se vrši v Slovenskem domu na Holmes Ave, ustanovna seja za podružnico št. 3. Priglasilo se je že 18 mož in fantov. Kdor hoče biti med ustanovnimi člani, naj pride v sredo večer na sejo v Slovenski dom ob osmih zvečer.« (Slovenska moška zveza 1940, 1)

Po letu 1910 so pripadniki slovenske skupnosti v Barbertonu začutili potrebo po ustanovitvi svoje lastne župnije. Za slovenske vernike je bila ustanovitev nove župnije in zgraditev cerkve zahteven projekt, saj je sama gradnja pomenila velik strošek, poleg tega pa so morali za ustanovitev župnije dobiti tudi dovoljenje clevelandskega škofa Johna Patricka Farrellyja (1856–1921), ki je njihove prošnje sprva zavračal. Pri tem se je skliceval na pomanjkanje slovenskih duhovnikov v clevelandski škofiji (ACD, fond: Parishes Outside of Cleveland, Barberton, Sacred Heart 1917–1920, Farrelly, Slovenci škofu, september 1916; oktober 1916; januar 1917; september 1916; januar 1918). Barbertonski Slovenci so na prvem sestanku leta 1916 izvolili člane cerkvenega odbora, ki naj bi vodili postopek za ustanovitev župnije in zgraditev cerkve. Izvoljeni so bili John Ujčič, Joseph Lekšan in Anton Okoliš, ki so bili delavci v tovarni Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company. Predtem so verniki na škofa Farrellyja naslovili prošnjo za ustanovitev župnije, ki jo je škof zavrnil z obrazložitvijo, da v naselbini že deluje slovenski duhovnik Vitus Hribar. Pastoralno je deloval v irski župniji sv. Avguština in uporabljal angleški jezik. V pismu škofu Farrellyju so barbertonski Slovenci zapisali, da so farani pri sv. Avguštinu sovražno razpoloženi proti Slovencem in zato oni ne želijo obiskovati te cerkve. Tam je prav tako primanjkovalo mest za obiskovanje verouka. Po ocenah avtorjev pisma je bilo v tem času v Barbertonu okoli 400 slovenskih otrok, od katerih je večina ostajala brez verske izobrazbe (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, Slovenci škofu, september 1916).

Vsi pripadniki slovenske skupnosti drugače res niso podpirali ustanovitve nove župnije. Predvsem so nasprotovali temu, da bi jo morali sami financirati. Zato so nekateri tiskali letake in plakate, s katerimi so pozivali sonarodnjake, naj za ustanovitev župnije ne prispevajo niti centa (ACD, BF, nedatirani zapis Antona Okoliša; Okoliš, 1927, 2). To je bila med drugim posledica dejstva, da jim v domovini ni bilo treba financirati Cerkve na takšen način (Klemenčič 1995, 144–145).

Zagovorniki nove župnije so v tem času pisali še drugim slovenskim duhovnikom, med njimi tudi Johnu Novaku v Sheboygan. Odgovoril je, da jih clevelandski škof verjetno zgolj »vleče za nos«, saj po njegovih izkušnjah škofov ne zanimajo »nepomembne« slovenske naselbine. Svetoval jim je, naj se obrnejo na apostolskega delegata; to so pozneje tudi storili (ACD, BF, Novak Okolishu, julij 1916). Farani so avgusta 1916 kupili zemljišče v vrednosti 1200 $, na katerem so nameravali postaviti cerkev (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, Berk škofu, april 1917). Škofov odgovor na novo prošnjo je bil iz istih razlogov znova negativen, menil je, da bi gradnja cerkve pomenila prevelik finančni zalogaj za slovensko skupnost, ki bi

jo še dolga leta bremenil dolg (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, odgovor škofije, september 1916). Pripadniki slovenske skupnosti se niso pustili prepričati, zato so prošnjo za ustanovitev župnije poslali apostolskemu delegatu v Washingtonu. Ta poteza se je obrestovala, saj je škof Farrelly 7. januarja 1917 izdal dovoljenje za ustanovitev župnije (ACD, BF, Sacred Heart Church, 2002).

Po šestindvajsetih letih je slovenska skupnost v Barbertonu torej postala dovolj močna in številčna, da ji je uspelo doseči ustanovitev svoje lastne etnične župnije. Župnija je bila tedaj ustanovljena zgolj na papirju, saj je bila še vedno brez duhovnika in brez svoje lastne cerkve. V januarju 1917 je škofu pisal duhovnik Hribar, svojemu pismu pa je priložil še pismo duhovnika Jakoba Černeta, ki je tedaj služboval v Sheboyganu, in je izrazil pripravljenost, da pride v Barberton. Oba škofa pozivala, naj Slovencem odobri še gradnjo farne cerkve, saj bi drugače že zbrani denar in kupljeno zemljišče namenili za gradnjo narodnega doma. Slovenski narodni domovi v ZDA so po Černetovem mnenju ljudi odtujevali od Cerkve, saj naj bi bili to »domovi za socializem« (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, Hribar škofu, januar 1917). Černetov poziv tedaj ni bil nič posebnega, saj so takšna opozorila odmevala tudi po drugih slovenskih naselbinah v ZDA. Škof je Hribarju odgovoril, da bo odobril gradnjo cerkve in zanjo poiskal slovenskega duhovnika takrat, ko se mu bo to zdelo primerno (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof Hribarju, januar 1917).

Marca 1917 je v naselbino končno prispel duhovnik Anton Berk, ki je prvo mašo v novi župniji opravil 24. marca, v cerkvi slovaške župnije sv. Cirila in Metoda. Istega dne je potekala tudi seja, na kateri so farani izbrali ime nove župnije: presveto Srce Jezusovo v Barbertonu, Ohio (Podpečnik, 1917, 121). V manj kakor enem mesecu je uspelo Berku zbrati še dodatnih 800 $, ki so jih darovali farani za zgraditev cerkve, nekaj denarja pa so potrebovali tudi za plačevanje najemnine za opravljanje obredov v slovaški cerkvi. Otroci barbertonskih Slovencev so začeli obiskovati verouk – sobotne in nedeljske šole se je udeleževalo več kakor 100 učencev, junija 1917 je 56 otrok pristopilo k prvemu obhajilu (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, Berk škofu, april in junij 1917). Slovenci v Barbertonu so bili zadovoljni, da so dobili svojega duhovnika, in so še dalje nabirali denar za gradnjo. V ta namen so organizirali med drugim koncert slovenskega pevskega društva Lira, ki je nastopilo v barbertonski operi (Okoliš 1917, 3; Barberton, O. 1917, 2). Berk je bil že konec leta 1917 premeščen v slovensko župnijo sv. Cirila in Metoda v Lorainu, Ohio. Škof Farrelly je zaradi pomanjkanja duhovnikov – to je bilo tudi posledica vojne (mnogi duhovniki so bili vpoklicani za vojaške kurate) – prerazporedil duhovnike v škofiji in pisal Slovencem v Barberton, naj bodo potrpežljivi. Obljubil jim je, da bodo zanje začasno opravljali obrede frančiškanski duhovniki iz samostana v West Parku, Ohio. (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof faranom, februar 1918)

Škof se je nato po pomoč znova obrnil k duhovniku Hribarju (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof Hribarju, februar 1918). Farani so temu poskusu rešitve nasprotovali, saj je bil Hribar izjemno nepriljubljen. V enem od pisem škofu so se pritožili, da je obiskal nekaj slovenskih družin in od njih zahteval, naj prispevajo denar za cerkev sv. Avguština, čeprav je vedel, da Slovenci varčujejo za gradnjo svoje lastne cerkve. Slovenski farani so to dejanje dojemali kot poskus uničevanja slovenske

fare (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, farani škofu, februar, marec 1918). Ker niso dobili od Farrellyja nobenega konkretnega odgovora, so se odločili, da začnejo graditi cerkev, saj so imeli občutek, da s čakanjem zgolj zapravljajo čas. Pridobili so informacijo, da naj bi gradnja stala med 9 in 10 tisoč dolarji (današnja vrednost okoli 180 000 $), njim samim pa je do tedaj uspelo zbrati nekaj več kakor 4000 $. Prepričani so bili, da bodo v kratkem času lahko nabrali manjkajoči znesek (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, Okolish škofu, marec 1918). Škof jih je še naprej prosil, naj bodo potrpežljivi (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof faranom, april 1918).

Škof je želel v Barberton namestiti duhovnika Antona Prinčiča (Dve novi Maši, 1918, 245), ki naj bi v naselbino prispel v poletju 1918, vendar se načrt zaradi njegove bolezni ni uresničil (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof faranom, junij 1918). Barbertonski slovenski farani so škofu predlagali, da pridobi duhovnika iz kake druge škofije, če jih v clevelandski primanjkuje, a je škof tudi to možnost zavrnil (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, pisma faranov škofu, februar–junij 1918). Novembra 1918 je v Barberton prispel duhovnik Alojzij Mlinar (Rev. K. Zakrajšek, O.F.M. 1919, 2; Barbertonski Slovenci 1918, 454; ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof Mlinarju, december 1918). Mlinar je po dvomesečnem bivanju v Barbertonu pripravil poročilo o razmerah v župniji. V njem je izrazil ostro nasprotovanje etničnim župnijam, saj naj bi zgolj ovirale cerkveni razvoj in enotnost, škofom in duhovnikom pa povzročale številne težave. Poleg tega naj bi ljudi preveč usmerile v jezikovne in etnične delitve. Njegovo stališče do etničnih župnij preseneča, glede na to, da je bil doma z avstrijske Koroške, kamor se je pozneje tudi vrnil (Klemenčič 1999, 287). V začetku leta 1919 je po Mlinarjevih ocenah v Barbertonu živelo okoli 175 slovenskih družin (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, Mlinar škofu, januar 1919). Mlinar je farane opozarjal, da gradnja cerkve pomeni prevelik strošek, vendar se niso dali prepričati. Duhovnik je imel težave pri zbiranju denarja za svojo plačo, saj mu župljani zaradi njegovega nasprotovanja etničnim župnijam niso prispevali dovolj sredstev zanjo. Mlinar je bil mnenja, da župnija nima prihodnosti, če ne bo hkrati s cerkvijo zgrajena župnijska šola, to pa bi pomenilo še dodaten strošek. Že po nekaj tednih pastoralnega delovanja v Barbertonu je prosil škofa Farrellyja za nekajmesečni oddih, saj je menil, da bodo farani v času njegove odsotnosti »prišli k pameti« (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, Mlinar škofu, februar 1919). Škof je Mlinarju dovolil, da je odšel za nekaj tednov v youngstownsko župnijo sv. Kolumba, kjer bi nadomeščal obolelega župnika Mearsa (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof Mlinarju, marec 1919). Farani so aprila 1919 kupili novo zemljišče za gradnjo cerkve, staro pa so nameravali prodati (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, farani škofu, april 1919). Škof jim ni mogel dati zagotovila, kdaj bo v naselbino ponovno prišel slovenski duhovnik. Prav tako jim je prepovedal prodajo zemljišča (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof faranom, april, maj 1919). Novi kandidat za duhovnika je v tem času postal duhovnik P. Rebar, a iz vsega tega ni bilo nič (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, farani škofiji, maj in junij 1919; pismo škofa Rebarju, junij 1919; škof faranom, junij 1919).

V poletju 1919 je škof prosil duhovnika Jerneja Ponikvarja iz Clevelanda, naj v Barbertonu razišče položaj v zvezi s slovensko župnijo (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, škof Ponikvarju, avgust 1919). Farani so škofu jezno odgovorili, da je Ponikvar

zagotovo lahko ugotovil: na stotine slovenskih otrok se ne more učiti božje bese-
de in na stotine ljudi ostaja brez duhovne oskrbe, zato počasi »odpadajo« od ka-
toliške Cerkve. Škofu so postavili zahtevo, naj jim pošlje slovenskega duhovnika,
ali pa bodo razpustili faro (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, farani škofijski pisarni,
september 1919). Dobili so odgovor, da je Ponikvar pooblaščen za iskanje primer-
nega duhovnika (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Farrelly, odgovor faranom, oktober 1919).
Slovenski farani so leta 1921 stopili v stik tudi z duhovnikom Johnom Miklavčičem,
ki je bil kaplan župnije sv. Vida v Clevelandu in je bil pripravljen sprejeti pastoralno
delo v Barbertonu. Škof Joseph Schrembs (1866–1945) je bil obveščen, da se je
Miklavčič pripravljen preseliti v Barberton. (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, fara-
ni škofu, december 1921).

V faro si je v začetku leta 1922 položaj prišel ogledat duhovnik John Štefanič.
Ugotovil je, da je bila ocena faranov o 250 slovenskih družinah v Barbertonu pre-
tirana, saj se je na svoje lastne oči prepričal, da tam živi največ 145 slovenskih
družin, od katerih jih je bilo pripravljenih finančno podpirati župnijo le 60. Ocenil
je, da bi bila zato gradnja cerkve zahteven podvig, prihodnost celotne župnije pa
negotova. Tako je škofa prosil, naj ga ne pošlje v Barberton, saj bi bila vzpostavitev
dobro delujoče župnije nemogoč podvig (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Štefanič
škofu, januar 1922). Škof je kljub tem opozorilom Štefaniča vendarle imenoval za
župnika barbertonske slovenske župnije. V časniku Edinost je bilo zapisano:

> »Naši dobri Barbertončanje so dosegli, kar so toliko želeli in kar se jim je do-
> sedaj odrekalo, dobili so lastnega slovenskega duhovnika. V Clevelandskem
> uradnem škofijskem listu smo čitali, da je bil imenovan za Barbertonsko žu-
> pnijo presvetega Srca. Rev. John Štefanič, dosedaj župnik na angleški župni-
> ji v Avonu blizu Clevelanda. Bila je v resnici vnebovpijoča krivica, katera se
> je zgodila Barbertončanom, ko so jim najprej ustanovili župnijo, potem pa
> jo pustili brez duhovnika.« (Barberton dobi slov. duhovnika 1922, 1.)

Kljub veselju so verniki izrazili zaskrbljenost, češ da Štefanič zelo slabo govori
slovensko. Prvo mašo v župniji presvetega Srca Jezusovega je opravil 22. januarja
1922. (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, farani škofu, januar 1922).

Štefanič je na škofa kmalu naslovil prošnjo za odobritev prodaje enega od starih
farnih zemljišč, poleg tega pa je prosil za dovoljenje za najem posojila za gradnjo
cerkve. Gradnja nove cerkve naj bi po ocenah stala 13 000 $ (današnja vrednost
približno 196 000 $). Farani so bili zmožni zbrati okoli 3000 $, za 10 000 $ pa bi
najeli posojilo (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Štefanič škofu, marec 1922). Škof
posojila ni želel takoj odobriti, zato je povabil Štefaniča na sestanek (ACD, fond:
POCB, SH, Schrembs, škof Štefaniču, april 1922). Štefanič se je sestankov, ki sta
potekala 21. in 24. aprila 1922 v škofovi rezidenci, udeležil skupaj s farnimi odbor-
niki. Podrobneje so govorili o številu slovenskih družin v fari, ki naj bi jih bilo oko-
li 150, od teh naj bi jih bilo okoli 90 pripravljenih finančno podpirati župnijo in
duhovnika (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, zapisnik 21. in 24. aprila). Temeljni
kamen za cerkev je bil položen oktobra 1922, blagosloviti pa ga je prišel sam škof

Schrembs, ki ga je v Barbertonu pozdravilo več tisoč ljudi (Fr. Beg, Barberton, O.1922, 2). Prva maša v novi cerkvi je potekala na sveti večer 1922. A cerkev je bila manjša od prvotno načrtovane in lesena, zato je postala tarča zlonamernega zbadanja nasprotnikov gradnje, češ da so namesto »lepe in zidane cerkve« postavili »ubogo leseno kolibo« (Železnikar 1922, 2).

3. Župnija presvetega Srca Jezusovega do zgraditve nove cerkve

Duhovnik Štefanič je bil nezadovoljen z razmerami, ki so vladale v župniji Barberton. Poročal je: farani za cerkev prispevajo tako malo denarja, da je komaj dovolj za najemnino za njegovo stanovanje, nič pa mu ne ostane kot plača. Prav tako so ga farani, zaradi slabega znanja slovenščine, obravnavali kot tujca in med njimi ni čutil prave podpore (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Štefanič škofu, oktober 1922). Farani so se leta 1923 pritožili nad Štefaničevo odločitvijo, da bo k birmi spustil zgolj otroke, ki so že prejeli prvo obhajilo. Ker v župniji več let ni bilo duhovnika, mnogi otroci, nekateri med njimi stari tudi več kakor 16 let, pogoja niso mogli izpolniti, to pa je pomenilo, da niso mogli niti k birmi. Farani so Štefaniča prosili, naj spremeni odločitev ali vsaj najprej podeli prvo obhajilo tistim otrokom, ki ga še niso prejeli. Vendar župnik tega ni želel storiti. Škofa so prosili, naj posreduje pri Štefaniču, in škof ga je pozval, naj stanje uredi tako, da bodo otroci najprej opravili prvo obhajilo, nato pa v istem tednu še birmo (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, škof Štefaniču, april 1923). Člani farnega odbora so v začetku leta 1924 ponovno pisali škofu, naj jim v župnijo pošlje drugega slovenskega duhovnika (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, farni odbor škofu, februar 1924). Škof se je tokrat odzval izjemno hitro, saj je Štefaniča že naslednji mesec premestil v župnijo sv. Pavla v Cantonu, Ohio (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, škof Štefaniču, marec 1924).

Marca 1924 je začasno prišel v faro duhovnik Ludvik Virant (Barberton, O.1924, 2; ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Virant škofiji, april 1924), že julija 1924 pa ga je škof poslal v Cleveland kot pomočnika v župnijo sv. Vida (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, škof Virantu, julij 1924). Avgusta 1924 je bil za župnika v Barbertonu imenovan Anton Bombach (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Bombach škofiji, avgust 1924). Z Bombachem je župnija vendarle dobila duhovnika, ki je na svojem položaju ostal dlje kakor le nekaj mesecev.

Leta 1924 so v Barbertonu organizirali tudi slovenski katoliški shod. Na njem so sodelovali duhovnik John Oman, Joseph Zalar (glavni tajnik KSKJ), Ivan Zupan (urednik Glasila KSKJ), John Zulic (odbornik KSKJ), Alojz Žužek (odvetnik KSKJ) in Anton Grdina (glavni predsednik KSKJ) (Slovenski kat. shod v Barbertonu 1924, 1; Pripravljalni odbor kat. Društev 1924, 2). Leta 1925 je v župniji potekal še misijon, ki ga je vodil pater Kazimir Zakrajšek (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Bombach škofu, avgust 1925; Barberton, O.1925, 2).

Leta 1925 je Bombach škofijo ponovno prosil za dovoljenje za prodajo dveh starih župnijskih zemljišč (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Bombach škofu, julij 1925),

Slika 1: *Zračni posnetek Barbertona, 1941 (Akron Beacon Journal, 5. julij 1941).*

ki jo je škof odobril (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, škofija Bombachu, julij 1925). Zemljišči so dokončno prodali leta 1927, in to za 2300 $ (današnja vrednost okoli 33 000 $). Župnija je višjo vsoto iztržila zato, ker je prišlo več kupcev (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Bombach škofiji, april 1927), kupila pa ga je faranka župnije Jennie Troha (ACD, fond: POCB, Schrembs, škofija Bombachu, april 1927). Leta 1926 je župnija kupila tudi novo zemljišče, zaradi morebitne širitve v prihodnosti (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Bombach škofiji, julij 1926). Leta 1928 je Bombach v pismu škofijskemu kanclerju izrazil željo, da bi zapustil barbertonsko župnijo in od-šel v župnijo sv. Kristine v Euclid, ki je bila župnija slovenskih faranov druge gene-racije. Iz škofije je prispel odgovor, da je mesto pri sv. Kristini že zasedeno (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, škofijska pisarna Bombachu, junij 1928). Bombach je bil prvi duhovnik župnije, ki je pripravil natančno finančno poročilo. V letu 1928 je imela župnija za 10 154 $ prihodkov (današnja vrednost okoli 150 000 $) in za oko-li 11 275 $ stroškov (današnja vrednost okoli 166 000 $), od tega so najvišjo postav-ko pomenili obroki za plačevanje posojila in obresti. Največ so nabrali s prispevki faranov (nekaj manj kakor 5000 $) in s prirejanjem koncertov in gledaliških predstav (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, finančno poročilo župnije za leto 1928).

Škof je Bombachevi želji po odhodu v Euclid ugodil leta 1931 (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Bombach škofu, januar 1931), nadomestil pa ga je Joseph Medin, ki je bil resda hrvaškega rodu, vendar naj bi dobro obvladal tudi slovenski jezik. V Barberton je prispel že v januarju 1931 (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs škof Medinu, januar 1931). Medin je pomožnemu škofu McFaddnu pisal, da je župnija zelo urejena in da vse poteka gladko. Farani so za Medina ob njegovem prihodu v Barberton priredili slavnostni sprejem, ki se ga je udeležilo okoli 240 ljudi (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Medin McFaddnu, februar 1931).

Leta 1933 so se župnik in farani odločili, da obnovijo in razširijo župnišče, ki je bilo edini prostor, v katerem so se lahko sestajali farni odbor in cerkvena društva. Prostor so želeli dograditi, da bil bolj prostoren, s tem pa bi tudi ponovno ustrezal potrebam župnije (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Medin McFaddnu, brez datacije 1933). Leta 1935 je Medin začel razmišljati o gradnji nove cerkve, saj je bila obstoječa premajhna in neprimerna za tedanje potrebe občestva (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Medin škofu, 1935). Škof se je strinjal z ugotovitvijo, da je obstoječa cerkev premajhna, vendar je dvomil, da bi lahko novo zgradili za 25 000 $ (današnja vrednost okoli 460 000 $). Poudaril je, da župnija nima dovolj sredstev za postavitev nove cerkve, je pa povabil Medina na sestanek, na katerem bi se podrobneje pogovorila o načrtu gradnje nove cerkve (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, škof Medinu, april 1935).

Na informacije o tem so se odzvali tudi farani, ki se zaradi pomanjkanja denarja niso strinjali s to idejo. Po njihovih besedah naj bi o gradnji nove cerkve razmišljala zgolj Medin in farni odbornik Joseph Lekšan, pri tem pa nista želela upoštevati mnenja preostalih župljanov. V več pismih, ki so jih poslali škofu, so navedli še mnoge druge obtožbe zoper Medina. Škofa so pozvali, naj jim pošlje slovenskega duhovnika, ki jim ga je obljubljal (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, farani škofu, julij 1935, julij 1937, maj 1938). Medin je vse obtožbe zavračal. Slišal pa je tudi govorice, naj bi nezadovoljstvo med barbertonskimi Slovenci pomagal sejati duhovnik Matija Jager, ki naj bi si želel njegovega položaja. Poudaril je še, da je med svojim službovanjem v Barbertonu nazaj v cerkev pridobil okoli 40 družin, ki so se od nje oddaljile, krstil je tudi 56 skoraj odraslih otrok teh družin (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Medin škofu, februar 1936). Prav tako je razložil, da so nekateri farani zahtevali, naj začnejo v fari graditi večjo cerkev, zato ni razumel, zakaj ga zdaj zaradi načrtovanja gradnje isti farani kritizirajo (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Medin škofu, marec 1936, maj 1938). Pomožni škof je Medina pomiril, da govorice o Jagru niso resnične (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs Medinu, februar 1936). Hkrati je leta 1938 naročil akronskemu duhovniku O'Keefu, naj gre preverit, kaj se dogaja v Barbertonu. Prosil ga je, naj se udeleži nedeljske maše in preveri, kakšen je obisk in koliko je mladih (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs O'Keefu, junij 1938). Medin je bil po spominih ljudi borec za delavske pravice. Ob stavkah je redno obiskoval stavkajoče, pogosto je tudi javno nastopal in izražal svojo podporo delavcem (Ožbolt 1936, 6). Nekateri vidni predstavniki slovenske skupnosti naj bi bili zato, ker so kritizirali Medinovo početje in nasprotovali stavkam, začasno celo izobčeni iz skupnosti, saj je večina barbertonskih Slovencev

aktivno podpirala delavsko gibanje (Borsos 1996, 246–252). Mogoče je sklepati, da je to povzročilo obtožbe na Medinov račun.

Leta 1940 se je Medin upokojil. Ob prihodu v Barberton je bil star 60 let. Ves čas službovanja se je spopadal z zdravstvenimi težavami. Nadomestil ga je duhovnik Matija Jager (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs Jagru, julij 1940; Jožef Medin v privatnem življenju 1940, 4). Ukvarjal se je s kulturnimi dejavnostmi, predvsem z gledališčem. V Clevelandu in v Barbertonu je na oder postavil več različnih dramskih iger. Med Slovenci v ZDA je bil zelo priljubljen (Ohajčani zmagali v kampanji Novega sveta 1940, 3). Takoj ob Jagrovem prihodu v faro so se začele akcije zbiranja denarja za gradnjo nove cerkve, saj je bila stara lesena tedaj že občutno premajhna in prestara za nadaljnjo rabo. Jagra je skrbelo predvsem slovensko neodvisno društvo Domovina, ki so ga obvladovali Cerkvi manj naklonjeni ljudje. Društvo je bilo zelo priljubljeno, zgradilo pa je tudi slovenski narodni dom z veliko dvorano, ki so jo nameravali še razširiti. Jager je bil prepričan, da bo v tem primeru še več ljudi nehalo obiskovati mašo, saj bodo raje hodili v narodni dom. Prav tako je želel, da se v fari začne čimprej zbirati denar za gradnjo cerkve, drugače bodo ljudje svoj denar prispevali za gradnjo prizidka stavbe društva Domovina (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Jager McFaddnu, januar 1941). Na njegovo pobudo je leta 1941 v fari začelo izhajati farno glasilo Naša fara (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, Jager škofu, avgust 1941). V prvi številki je Jager pozival ljudi, naj darujejo denar za novo cerkev, in jim poočital, da so do tedaj darovali premalo. Ostro je kritiziral tiste farane, ki niso želeli prispevati za novo cerkev. Poudarjal je, da se morajo vsi zavedati svojih dolžnosti. Mnogi Slovenci naj bi se premalo zavedali pomena katoliške vere v svojem življenju (Jager 1941, 3).

Nova cerkev je bila zgrajena v enem letu, blagoslovil jo je pomožni clevelandski škof James A. McFadden (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, McFadden dekoratorju, avgust 1942). Stroški gradnje cerkve so znašali 89 000 $ (današnja vrednost okoli 1 360 000 $), od tega je imela župnija okrog 46 000 $ gotovine (današnja vrednost okoli 700 000 $), za preostali znesek so najeli posojilo (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Schrembs, finančno poročilo).

Finančno stanje župnije je bilo tudi po gradnji cerkve stabilno. Leta 1948 je imela za 21 953 $ prihodkov (današnja vrednost okoli 226 000 $) in za 21 515 $ odhodkov. V tem letu je župnija odplačala še 2100 $ posojila, leta 1949 pa še dodatnih 5600 $ dolga (ACD, BF, finančno poročilo župnije za leti 1948 in 1949). Preostanek je župnija uspešno odplačala v letu 1950 (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, Jager škofu, avgust 1950).

4.   Obdobje po drugi svetovni vojni

Leta 1947 je v Barberton kot begunec prišel slovenski duhovnik Anton Merkun, stric Matija Jagra. Med vojno je ostro pisal proti komunizmu in narodnoosvobodilnemu boju. Zato je po vojni postal begunec in leta 1947 odšel k svojemu neča-

Slika 2: *Nova cerkev župnije presvetega Srca Jezusovega v Barbertonu leta 1942 (ACD, BF).*

ku v ZDA. Leta 1950 je dal pobudo za ustanovitev novega časopisa Slovenska pravica, ki se je kmalu preimenoval v Slovenska država. Prva številka časopisa je izšla v Barbertonu. V odmevnem listu so se avtorji zavzemali za samostojno in neodvisno Slovenijo. Časopis je nato začel pod imenom Slovenska država izhajati v Chicagu, od leta 1954 dalje pa je izhajal v Torontu. Merkun je leta 1961 umrl v Clevelandu, njegove ideje pa med slovensko emigracijo niso imele večjega odmeva. (Duhovni svetnik – Anton Merkun, 1950, 3; Bisernomašniku Antonu Merkunu v slovo 1961, 2; Klemenčič, 1996, 399)

Matija Jager je bil v maju 1952 prestavljen v Collinwood k župniji Marije Vnebovzete, v Barberton pa je prispel Joseph Celesnik (ACD, BF, osmrtnica ob smrti Josepha F. Celesnika, 1989; ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, škof Jagru, maj 1952). Leta 1953 je škof Hoban v Barbertonu opravil kanonično vizitacijo (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, škof Celesniku, januar 1954). Iz zapisnika je razvidno, da je v tem času v Barbertonu živelo 254 slovenskih družin ter okoli 50 neporočenih posameznikov in posameznic. Katoliške obrede v cerkvi je v celoti obiskovalo 1000 ljudi. Župnija je imela nekaj več kakor 15 000 $ (današnja vrednost okoli 143 000 $) dolga, zaradi nakupa zemljišča (še v Jagrovem času), na katerem so želeli zgraditi farno šolo, ki bi jo lahko obiskovali otroci slovenskih družin (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, vizitacijski zapisnik 1954). Pomen farne šole za župnijo je pred odhodom poudaril že Jager, saj je bil mnenja, da bo župnija začela stagnirati, če bo še dalje ostala brez svoje lastne šole (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, Jager škofu, avgust 1950). Do začetka gradnje šole je minilo še nekaj let, saj so temeljni kamen položili šele 1959 (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, škofija vikarju Conryju, maj 1959), gradnja pa je bila končana aprila 1960. Novo šolsko poslopje je prišel blagoslovit

novi clevelandski pomožni škof John Joseph Krol (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, Krolovo potrdilo o blagoslovu šole, april 1960). Dolg za gradnjo šole je bil v celoti odplačan leta 1963 (ACD, BF, bilten ob 85. obletnici barbertonske slovenske župnije, 2002). Celesnik je leta 1960 pisal šolskim sestram sv. Frančiška Kristusa Kralja v samostan Mount Assisi v Lemontu; sestre so bile slovenskega ali hrvaškega rodu. Zanimalo ga je, ali bi bile pripravljene poučevati na šoli župnije presvetega Srca Jezusovega. Načeloma so se strinjale s predlogom, a so imele nekaj zadržkov. Moteče je bilo dejstvo, da bi bile učiteljice nastanjene v stavbi, ki bi bila od šole oddaljena kar sedem minut, uporaba javnega prevoza pa ni bila zaželena. Toda na koncu jim je uspelo premostiti vse pomisleke (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, New School Building, sestra Zorko Celesniku; december 1959, januar 1960). Šolske sestre so na šoli poučevale do leta 1971, ko je bila zaprta (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, šolske sestre, School Sisters of St. Francis 1989; ACD, BF, Sacred Heart Church, 2002). Zaprtju šole je botrovalo vse manjše število učencev, ki so jo obiskovali (ACD, BF, Ozimek komisiji za katoliško izobrazbo clevelandske škofije, februar 1971). Podobna usoda je doletela tudi druge tovrstne šole (Klemenčič 2011, 253) Šolsko stavbo so pozneje v obeh naselbinah uporabljali za kulturne namene.

Jeseni 1962 je škof izvedel novo spremembo v župniji. Celesnika je premestil v župnijo sv. Kristine v Euclid (tam je do smrti tega leta služboval nekdanji barbertonski slovenski duhovnik Bombach), v Barberton pa je poslal duhovnika Rudolpha Praznika. Praznik je bil predtem duhovnik v župniji sv. Viljema v Euclidu (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, škof Celesniku in Prazniku, september 1962). Leta 1967 je župnija praznovala 50. obletnico obstoja. Ob tej priložnosti so farani izdali poseben bilten, v katerem so navedeni tudi nekateri statistični podatki. V petdesetih letih obstoja župnije je bilo v njej krščenih 1195 in pokopanih 415 ljudi. Slavnostno mašo je 30. aprila 1967 vodil clevelandski škof Clarence G. Issenmann (ACD, BF, bilten ob 50. obletnici župnije, 1967). Praznik je v Barbertonu ostal do leta 1969, ko je postal župnik v župniji sv. Vida v Clevelandu (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Issenmann, škof Prazniku, avgust 1969).

Iz župnije sv. Frančiška Saleškega v Parmi, Ohio, je v Barberton prišel Joseph J. Ozimek, ki je v Barbertonu ostal do smrti leta 1996 (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Issenmann, škof Ozimku, avgust 1969). Ozimek je nadaljeval projekt gradnje novega župnišča, ki ga je začel Praznik. Ker je Prazniku pri faranih že uspelo zbrati denar, nekaj pa ga je župnija tudi imela, je škof odobril izvedbo projekta (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Hoban, pomožni škof Ozimku, april 1970). Prav tako so farani skupaj s Praznikom razmišljali o gradnji nove cerkve na novi lokaciji – na isti, kjer sta bila na novo zgrajena šola in župnišče. Ideja se je vendarle začela uresničevati sredi sedemdesetih let. Zemljišče, na katerem je stala dotedanja cerkev, so skupaj s cerkvijo prodali. Celotna vrednost zemljišča in stavb na njem je bila ocenjena na okoli 75 000 $ (današnja vrednost okoli 340 000 $), v posebnem skladu za gradnjo nove cerkve pa je župnija že imela privarčevanih okoli 125 000 $. Gradnja nove cerkvene stavbe naj bi stala okoli 335 000 $ (današnja vrednost okoli 1 500 000 $) (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, Chancer, New Corp., New Church, Ozimek škofiji, januar 1975). Škof je še isti mesec odobril začetek gradnje nove cerkve (ACD, fond: POCB, SH, JAH, škof

Ozimku, januar 1975). Temeljni kamen zanjo je bil položen avgusta 1975, cerkev pa je bila decembra že dokončana. Prva maša v njej je potekala na sveti večer, natanko na 53. obletnico prve maše, ki je bila darovana v prvi cerkvi župnije. Cerkev je spomladi 1976 posvetil clevelandski škof James A. Hickey (ACD, BF, Sacred Heart Church, 1976).

Joseph Ozimek se je leta 1991 upokojil, zamenjal ga je Albert Kunkel (ACD, BF, osmrtnica ob smrti Josepha Ozimka, 1996; škof Ozimku, avgust 1991; škof Kunklu, avgust, 1991). Kunkel je v župniji deloval do leta 2001, ko je odšel v pokoj (ACD, BF, Sacred Heart Church, 2002).

5.   Združitev župnije presvetega Srca Jezusovega z drugimi etničnimi župnijami v Barbertonu

Leta 1999 je clevelandski škof Anthony M. Pilla pisal Kunklu, naj se s farani pogovori o morebitni združitvi s poljsko župnijo v Barbertonu (ACD, BF, škof Kunklu, maj 1999). Po Kunklovi upokojitvi je upravitelj župnije postal Richard Arko, ki je bil tudi upravitelj poljske barbertonske župnije sv. Marije. V tem času je slovensko cerkev obiskovalo okoli 200 družin, poljsko pa okoli 180 (ACD, BF, škof faranom obeh župnij, april 2001). Arko je dobil nalogo, naj obe župniji združi, saj je v tem času postalo zelo nepraktično, da sta bili ločeni. Prav tako sta v preteklosti že dokazali zmožnost uspešnega medsebojnega sodelovanja (ACD, BF, škof Arku, april 2001).

Farna odbora sta se aprila 2002 dogovorila o novem imenu župnije, ki je dobila ime Prince of Peace Parish – župnija Kneza miru (ACD, BF, farna odbora škofu, april 2002). Proces združevanja obeh župnij je bil dokončan poleti 2002, ko je škof uradno objavil odlok o prenehanju obstoja župnije presvetega Srca Jezusovega v Barbertonu. S tem je po 85 letih delovanja v Barbertonu prenehala obstajati slovenska etnična župnija (ACD, BF, dekret o ukinitvi župnije, junij 2002). Načrtovano je bilo, da bo Richard Arko postal župnik v novonastali župniji, a je te načrte prekrižala njegova aretacija, ki se je zgodila leta 2004, saj je v župnišču gojil konopljo. Farani so župniku resda stopili v bran, ker so bili z njegovim delom izjemno zadovoljni, a to ni obrodilo sadu (Sadowski 2004).

6.   Sklep

V Barberton, Ohio, ki je nastal kot industrijsko mesto, zgrajeno po viziji mogotca O. C. Barberja, so že takoj ob nastanku leta 1891 prispeli prvi Slovenci. Glavni vzrok za prihod ljudi v mesto je bil finančne narave. Barbertonske tovarne so namreč delavcem plačevale nekoliko višje mezde od tovarn v sosednjih mestih. Slovenska skupnost je v drugem desetletju 20. stoletja postala dovolj številčno in finančno močna, da je začela razmišljati o gradnji svoje lastne cerkve.

Slovenska župnija presvetega Srca Jezusovega je bila ena od šestih slovenskih etničnih župnij v zvezni državi Ohio. Slovenski skupnosti v Barbertonu je ob narodnem domu pomenila središče kulturnih aktivnosti, ki so, kakor vemo, stebri družbenega in posameznikovega razvoja (Kirbiš 2018, 24). Slovenski verniki so se v začetkih župnije spopadali s številnimi ovirami: najprej škof ni odobril ustanovitve slovenske župnije, ko pa ga je barbertonskim Slovencem vendarle uspelo prepričati, je župnija dolga leta ostajala brez svojega lastnega duhovnika in cerkve. V 85 letih obstoja župnije je faranom uspelo zgraditi tri cerkve in farno šolo, ki je delovala nekaj več kakor deset let. Obstoj slovenske etnične župnije je imel odločilen vpliv na ohranjanje spomina na slovenske korenine med slovenskimi priseljenci in njihovimi potomci v Barbertonu. Slovenska župnija presvetega Srca Jezusovega v Barbertonu je bila leta 2002 združena s tremi drugimi etničnimi župnijami: s poljsko, s slovaško in z madžarsko. Nova župnija se od tedaj imenuje Prince of Peace.

Kratice

ACD – Archives of the Cleveland Diocese.
BF – Brez fonda (gradivo).
JAH – James A. Hickey, škof Clevelanda.
KSKJ – Kranjsko slovenska katoliška jednota.
POCB – Parishes Outside of Cleveland, Barberton.
SH – Sacred Heart.

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The Relationship between the State and the Catholic Church in Postcolonial Vietnam: The Case of Christian Village of Phung Khoang

Odnos med državo in katoliško Cerkvijo v postkolonialnem Vietnamu: krščanska vas Phung Khoang

Abstract: Christian missionaries found Vietnam a spiritual country, and many Vietnamese converted to Christianity. On the other hand, during history, the Christian religious identity has brought various tensions due to the issues of colonialism, nationalism, and communism. Most Vietnamese Christians lived in pure Christian villages (*lang cong giao toan tong*) or mixed villages with Christians accounting for about a half of the population (*lang cong giao xoi do*). They have played an important role in the social, economic and cultural life of these villages. This article presents the historical background of a mixed village called Phung Khoang, contrasting the Christian vs. non-Christian cultural-religious views, and then discussing both the collaboration and tension played out over various historical periods.

Key words: Phung Khoang, Christianity, Vietnamese Catholic Christians, Christian missionaries

Povzetek: Krščanski misijonarji so Vietnam doživljali kot duhovno dovzetno deželo in veliko Vietnamcev se je spreobrnilo v krščanstvo. Po drugi strani je krščanska verska istovetnost – zaradi kolonializma, nacionalizma in komunizma – skozi zgodovino povzročala različne napetosti. Večina vietnamskih kristjanov je živelo v povsem krščanskih vaseh (*lang cong giao toan tong*) ali mešanih vaseh, v katerih so kristjani sestavljali približno polovico prebivalcev (*lang cong giao xoi do*). Kristjani so igrali pomembno vlogo v družbenem, v gospodarskem in v kulturnem življenju teh vasi. Članek prikazuje zgodovinsko ozadje mešane vasi Phung Khoang, pri tem se posveča primerjavi med krščanskimi in nekrščanskimi kulturno-verskimi nazori, nato pa razpravlja tako o sodelovanju kakor tudi o napetostih, ki so se dogajale v različnih zgodovinskih obdobjih.

Ključne besede: Phung Khoang, krščanstvo, vietnamski katoliški kristjani, krščanski misijonarji

1. Introduction: historical background of Phung Khoang

Phung Khoang, formerly known as Khoang Village or Phung Quang, is an old Christian village founded in the 16/17th century during the Le dynasty (Ngo 1975, 71). In the 19th century, the village was renamed Phung Khoang and belonged to Dai Mo, Quoc Oai Prefecture, Son Tay Province. At the beginning of the 20th century, it became part of Ha Dong Province. Today Phung Khoang is one of two villages of the Trung Van co-operative commune, in the Tu Liem District. It is less than ten miles south of the center of Hanoi and just two miles from Ha Dong City. Its territory is about 120 hectares (almost 300 acres) with a population of about 2.100, including 1.064 Christians in 2005.[1] These Christians make up two-thirds of the Phung Khoang Parish, which has a total of 1.850 Christians in 1995.

Traditionally Phung Khoang was an agricultural village, as people said, "*Tien lang Moc, thoc lang Khoang*" (Moc Village was known for having money and Phung Khoang Village for rice). Only since the 1990's there have been radical changes in village life. On the one hand, there are social-economical transformations. Two-thirds of the living earning of native villagers are from occupations other than agriculture, such as handicraft industries and services. The living standard has improved. Per capita personal income is now 700 USD.[2] Phung Khoang is not poor and its cultural standard (*dan tri*) is relatively high. Some families have three or four children studying in a university or an institute,[3] and most families have telephones, TV, mopeds, and other modern means.

Phung Khoang is also being urbanized and may no longer remain a village in two decades.[4] It is overpopulated and polluted. About 4.000 students of the universities of architecture, Post and Telegraph, and Vietnam National University live in Phung Khoang now. About 90 % of families have rooms for rent. This unplanned "student village" brings many social evils such as prostitution, gambling, and drug (mostly spread by non-native residents).

Phung Khoang is culturally and spiritually rich. The village's communal house (*dinh*) was built in the 17th century. People revere the village's tutelary genie (*thanh hoang lang*) Doan Thuong, an army general in the 13th century.[5] There are six stone steles (*van bia*) in the village's communal house, of which the oldest was built in 1698. Vestiges of the Le dynasty can be seen in the village's communal house. There were eight honors (*sac phong*) of kings of the Le and the Nguyen dynasties for the village's tutelary genie.[6] Old parallel sentences (*cau doi*) about Doan Thuong in his struggle to save the Ly dynasty in its declined period are still hanging in the communal house.

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[1] The Christian population included 517 men and 547 women, all Catholics.

[2] In comparison, the US per capita personal income in 2007 is 38.611, or more than 50 times, according to the US Department of Commerce: http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/drill.cfm (2008).

[3] Sixty-nine people finished their studies at a university or institute in 1995–2005.

[4] The same situation is in other villages in suburbs Hanoi, such as Co Nhue.

[5] Doan Thuong had built his troops against the Tran family. He was killed by Tran Thu Do's troops in a battle in Hai Duong. He is reportedly venerated in 72 villages.

[6] The first honor was by king Canh Hung in 1783, the second, Minh Mang in 1821, the third, Thieu Tri in

The present pagoda in Phung Khoang, Thanh Xuan Tu, was re-built in 1877. Formerly it was a temple for a Trinh family in the 17th century.[7] A stone stele in this temple dated back to 1692. In the following century, it was transformed into a pagoda. Both the village's communal house and the pagoda were repaired and recognized by the Culture Department of Hanoi in 1991 as historical vestiges (*di tich lich su*). The village festival is carried out yearly on January 8th of the lunar calendar, recently restored in the last two decades. Every five years people celebrate a festival of the Moc Village, which was founded in the 11th century, the predecessor of Phung Khoang and its four neighboring villages. The historical context shows the dichotomies between Christians and non-Christians, between native villagers and non-native residents. Next, we will contrast the Christian and non-Christian views.[8]

2. Christian and non-Christian cultural-religious views

The first groups of Christian missionaries, headed by Alexandre de Rhodes, might have reached Phung Khoang because of its proximity to the Thang Long capital. There were sixteen churches in the capital and its suburbs before the arrival of the *Missions Etrangères de Paris* (MEP) in the second half of the 17th century (Nguyen 1959, 226). Then Phung Khoang Christians suffered persecution under the emperors Minh Mang and Tu Duc.[9] Therefore, the Christian parish of Phung Khoang was not founded until the end of the 19th century. The present parish church was built in 1910.[10] The Phung Khoang parish flourished in the colonial period and had 1.689 Christians by 1939 (Truong 1996, 153).

From a cultural-religious point of view, Christians and non-Christians here remained relatively independent from each other, as displayed in the following table:

Traditional non-Christians	Christians
Under the influences of the traditional East Asian Confucian culture.	Under the influences of the Christian-European culture.
Loyal to the emperor (*trung quan*) above all.	Loyal to the emperor, but Christ comes first.
Patriarchy: the male conducted ancestor veneration and inherited property.	Gender equality: women are emancipated; monogamy.

1844, the fourth, Tu Duc in 1850, the fifth, Tu Duc in 1881, the sixth, Dong Khanh in 1887, the seventh, Duy Tan, and the eight, Khai Dinh in 1924.

[7] In this temple a discussion of the Trinh family in 1623 was held about the succession of the throne of Trinh Tung in the context of the conflict between his first son and second son. Trinh Trang was allowed to succeed the throne.

[8] The authors of this article built on the results of an extensive field research, the partial findings of which were published in: Nguyen 2008a, 13–25.

[9] Tonkin under the governor Nguyen Dang Giai (in the middle of the 19th century) usually did not obey the anti-Christian edicts of Emperor Tu Duc. For example, the harsh anti-Christian edict in 1851 was not carried out by both governors Nguyen Dang Giai in Tonkin and Nguyen Tri Phuong in Cochinchina.

[10] The first church in Phung Khoang was built under Tu Duc, but it was small and destroyed.

Parents–children: piety with ancestor veneration.	Parents–children: piety, but without ancestor veneration[11]
Cultural-religious life: polytheism, not devout to any religion.	Cultural-religious life: monotheism, devout.
Religiously inclusive and tolerant.	Religiously exclusive.
Religious activities: private, without ecclesiastical organization.	Religious activities: collective, with ecclesiastical organization.
Relationship with God: a relative distance.	Relationship with God: an absolute distance.
Hierarchy: by age and social position.	Hierarchy: by ecclesiastical position.

There have been changes in both the Christian and non-Christian communities in the last few decades. The Second Vatican Council opened the Catholic Church up to other religions and cultures. Vietnamese Catholics can venerate ancestors. Nowadays the Catholic Church in Vietnam is very active in supporting a cultural integration. On the non-Christian side, in the context of the Renovation (*Doi Moi*) and the collapse of the Communist bloc in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Vietnam carried out a more open policy regarding religion with the Resolution Nr. 24 of CPV in November 1990. However, significant differences between Christians and non-Christians still exist. We will briefly examine the ritual differences.

The "ritual question" (*van de nghi le*) has not been systematically analyzed. It appeared in Vietnam since the beginning of the Christian mission. In the 19th century, the issue became more serious because the Nguyen dynasty considered Confucianism the "state religion." In a Confucian state, the emperor has absolute power, which is not acceptable to Christians. If Vietnam became more Christian, the legitimacy of the emperor and his dynasty would be challenged – thus, the question about the ritual was also a political one.

Before this question was intensified, Christians and non-Christians in Phung Khoang coexisted peacefully and even collaborated well through several centuries. Non-Christians helped Christians build the parish church. On the three steles by the church, there are national writings (*Quoc ngu*), *Nom* and Chinese.[12] Some Christians had non-Christian relatives, and they celebrated together on numerous occasions, such as death anniversaries and New Year (*gio*, *Tet*). Marriages between Christians and non-Christians were common.

There were differences even during those "good days." Before the Second Vatican Council, Catholics were not allowed to venerate their ancestors. Even now some Christians in Phung Khoang do not have an ancestor altar. They had another concept of piety (*hieu thao*) than Confucians. Non-Christians valued sons more than daughters, which was not true for Christians. Except for New Year (*Tet*) and Mid-Autumn Festival (*Trung Thu*), Christians did not participate in the village's traditional festivals such as the *Nguyen Tieu* on 15th January, the *Thanh Minh* on

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[11] The Vietnamese Catholics were allowed to carry out their ancestor veneration only after the Second Vatican Council.

[12] The oldest of those steles was built in 1893, the other was in 1913, and the last in 1927.

3rd March, the *Doan Ngo* on 5th May and the *Vu Lan* on 15th July of the lunar ca-
lendar (Nguyen 2006, 22–23).[13] The lunar calendar was not important for them.
Instead, they celebrated Christian festivals such as Christmas and Easter. On Sun-
days, they went to church and did not work. Christian family parties were usually
frugal.

Since the end of the 19th century, with the formation of the Christian parish,
Christians and non-Christians in Phung Khoang have lived in two separate quarters
(*xom*, *giap*). Christians conduct weddings and funerals differently. Except for the
first death anniversary (*gio dau*), Christians in Phung Khoang do not carry out
other customary rituals, such as on the 49th and 100th day after the death. Unlike
their non-Christian relatives, they do not exhume and move the remains of the
deceased. They have a planned cemetery called the "Holy Garden" (*Vuon thanh*).
Nearby is a cemetery for non-Christians. A Christian is responsible for the Holy
Garden and a non-Christian cares for the other one. The Holy Garden has strict
regulations and preferences so that not all Christian villagers are equal after they
die.[14]

The long-time cultural-religious differences between Christians and non-Chri-
stians did not decline after 1945. Viet Minh's Marxist doctrine had a philosophical,
cultural and religious outlook contrary to that of Christianity, somewhat similar
to the situation under the Nguyen dynasty. The two words, "Christian" and "ordi-
nary civilian" (*luong dan*), continued to be used in official statements, just like
under the Nguyen dynasty.

The "ritual question" is understandable because of unavoidable differences
between Christianity and the Vietnamese traditional religions and beliefs. It is an
excuse to divide Christians and non-Christians, but alone it could not account for
eventual hostilities between the two groups. There were collaborative periods
which will be reviewed next.

3. Collaborative periods before 1954

In the colonial period young men in Phung Khoang were recruited to the French
army, among them were many Christians. Some of them were sent to Europe du-
ring the First and Second World Wars. Those men received privileges. According
to the village convention of *Dai Mo*, each man in Phung Khoang serving in the
French army was allowed to own a *mau* and 5 *sao* of land.[15] Many villagers were
recruited to perform heavy handiwork for colonial authorities. They did not have
to pay the land rent (*Lich su cach mang xa Trung Van* 2005, 17). In 1924, the pa-
rish church opened a primary school. Christian and non-Christian children could

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[13] The same findings were confirmed by a series of interviews conducted in 2008 (Nguyen 2008b).

[14] This is discrimination among the Catholics in "Saint Garden," especially against the un-devout or pre-
-Communist Catholics.

[15] A *sao* is 360 m^2, a *mau* is 3600 m^2.

go to this school. The tuition was free. There were Christian and non-Christian teachers. People had freedom of religion. In general, there was no hostility between Christians and non-Christians during this colonial period, except for a dispute in 1934 concerning a religious shrine.[16] The village communal house was a common cultural center for all. Village leaders and notables were both Christians and non-Christians. A Communist cell could not be established there until 1945 (34).

By the end of the colonial period, Phung Khoang was warm to welcome the Ho Chi Minh's government.[17] A meeting in the village's communal house was held in 1945 (August 23rd) to welcome national independence. That year Phung Khoang suffered hunger, which killed 40 people, mostly non-Christians, including several complete families, but Phung Khoang collected fifteen tons of rice in a "gold week" for the Viet Minh (37). Communist cells and the *Saving the Fatherland Groups* (*cuu quoc*) were founded, with the participation of the Buddhist monks (38). Some young men who worked in a printing factory in Hanoi played a role in spreading the Communist propaganda. All villagers took part in the election of the First National Assembly of DRV on January 6th, 1946. The Viet Minh founded the Administrative Resistance Committee of the Trung Van Commune (*Uy ban Hanh chinh Khang chien xa Trung Van*). In March 1946, Viet Minh clashed with the Chinese National troops in Phung Khoang after a Chinese soldier was killed there (42). Hundreds of men were mobilized into the patriotic movements against the French. Six young men joined a voluntary suicide squad.[18] At the beginning of 1947, Phung Khoang was under French occupation, and the local colonial authorities were restored as it was before 1945. At the beginning of the First Indochina War, part of the Buddhist pagoda was burned by a resistance fighter according to the scorched earth policy of Viet Minh (*tieu tho khang chien*).[19]

Deep in their hearts, Christians were nationalists. To cooperate with the French was not their motivation. J. Buttinger was right when he wrote: "To defeat the French and achieve national independence was an aim on which, with very few exceptions, all Vietnamese agreed; even those who hated the Viet Minh could not but sympathize with this cause." (1958, 11) Some Christians in Phung Khoang worked together with the resistance fighters against the French. There were Christians among the seventeen men who sacrificed their lives for the country (*liet si*) during the First Indochina War.[20]

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[16] Village's communal house in Phung Khoang is near to the church. In 1934, the parish priest in Phung Khoang planned to build a shrine to the Blessed Virgin Mary. Non-Catholics protested strongly against this plan because it faced the village's communal house. The dispute ended after the parish dropped the plan.

[17] Before 1945 Phung Khoang had belong to Ha Dong province.

[18] Four of them were sacrificed in First Indochina War.

[19] Local Viet Minh had a plan to destroy the Church in Phung Khoang, but this plan was not carried out.

[20] The mother of these Catholics who died for the country was recognized later as a hero because she had only one son left.

4. Conflicts after 1954

4.1 Exodus to South Vietnam

Meanwhile, Christians feared the Communist Viet Minh. During the First Indochina War, most village officials and militia members were Christians. The parish priests in Phung Khoang actively co-operated with the French. More than thirty men (among them Christians and non-Christians) were recruited into postcolonial troops of Bao Dai's regime. A bunker was built there. Some native Communist guerrilla were disclosed and killed by their villagers. Many villagers who worked for Viet Minh were arrested and tortured in the First Indochina War. Although Bishop Joseph Maria Trinh Nhu Khue decided to remain in Hanoi with his believers, a priest, and more than three hundred Christians, about 40 % of Christian population in the village of Phung Khoang at that time, left their homes for South Vietnam after the Geneva Agreement in 1954 (*Lich su cach mang xa Trung Van* 2005, 57, 60–61).[21] In comparison, only 9 % of the Christian population in Hanoi diocese left home.

4.2 Land Reform

After 1954, Phung Khoang was a "problematic Christian village" in the eyes of the Communist cadres from the security point of view. It had to come through difficult years of land reform.

> "The DRV had an official policy of freedom of worship. However, even when local officials obeyed this policy (which they often did not), there was conflict. Catholicism was not simply a religious institution; it was a system of political, economic, and paramilitary power. The Communists were not willing to let the Catholic Church retain large amounts of land or any strong influence over local administrations, much fewer local militias." (Moise 1983, 193)

Before the land reform, Phung Khoang had a relatively good land situation in comparison to other neighbor villages in the suburbs of Hanoi. It had 585 *mau* for only 1.123 men (1926), and each young man (*xuat dinh*) was allotted a *sao*. There were not many changes until 1954. By the beginning of the land reform, all worship places (church, pagoda) in Phung Khoang owned 28 *mau*. They rented land and received land rent, so they were pretty well to do.[22]

Two teams implemented land reform in Trung Van in January 1956. Overall, it was a repression. By the middle of 1956, all land of the landlords was confiscated and distributed to the poor peasants. All church and pagoda properties were liquidated. Two persons in Phung Khoang were classified as landlords. They owned 50

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[21] However, some villagers say that the number of Catholics who had gone to South Vietnam was higher.

[22] The church in Phung Khoang owned 18 *mau*, while the church in the neighboring village Trung Van owned only 6 *mau*. The pagoda in Phung Khoang owned 10 *mau*, while the pagoda in Trung Van owned only 2 *mau* and 6 *sao*.

mau, including 33 *mau* of ponds and lakes, which was less than 10 % of the total land area in Phung Khoang at that time. They inherited their estate from their fathers and received land rent. These two landlords, both Christians, were executed (*Lich su cach mang xa Trung Van* 2005, 13).[23]

Without land, the church and pagoda could not support their religious activities. Among people, who were classified to the "extortion class" (*giai cap boc lot*), were also Communists who had fought the French. Some soldiers of VNA and guerrilla could not be freed from sentences. Many Communists or core cadres had to denounce their parents or relatives publicly. Without detail investigation, people accused some Communists of belonging to oppositional Vietnam's Nationalist Party (*Viet Nam Quoc dan dang*). Two hundred men in the Trung Van commune were considered working for the colonial authorities. Hundreds of people were in prison because they or their relatives had connections to the "exploiting class." All the property of two landlords was confiscated so that their relatives had a lot of difficulties to live. Many people who were chosen as core cadres (*cot can*) were illiterate.

After these serious errors, a "correction" (*sua sai*) was implemented. Many people were released from the prison and reinstated, among them some Christians.[24] In many cases, their properties were returned. The parish church was allowed to own two *mau*, including ponds. The Buddhist pagoda was allowed to own 5.880 m2. Although land reform was denounced by the middle of 1957, until now Christians (as well as non-Christians) here cannot forget the land reform days.[25] Some considered the land reform in North Vietnam a blood bath (Hoang 1964). That might be an exaggeration, but the brutal conflict was a reality.

4.3 Coop Farming

Since October 1959, Christian and non-Christian peasants in Phung Khoang were mobilized to establish a co-operative farm. The following year, 90 % of the villagers had to join a lower-level coop farm (*hop tac xa cap thap*). Most Christian peasants had to take part in coop farm "voluntarily," although they did not want it.[26] Only eight families did not join the coop farm, among them some Christians. In 1964, Phung Khoang became an upper-level co-operative farm. The agricultural production in the 1960s was poor. In 1964 Phung Khoang had a crop failure and had to call the help from capital authorities – 50 % of the peasants wanted to leave the coop farm. It is ironic that the Communist cell in Phung Khoang was so proud that it admitted twenty new members in 1965 and lobbied the upper Com-

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[23] Many villagers reported that one of these landlords was Mr. Chanh Than. He was a speaker of the rural assembly, herbal doctor, who did not do anything bad, and received sympathy from his villagers.

[24] Among those people who were sentenced by the land reform was also a Communist. He was mistakenly classified as a resistance of a landlord rank. After the land reform he became the Vice Chairman of district Hoai Duc.

[25] Many Catholics had lost all hope on the policy of DRV toward religion and in that time (after the Geneva Agreement) they had felt that it was better for them to go to the South Vietnam.

[26] The Catholic Church considers privately owned property as an inalienable human right that is contrary to the Marxist concepts.

munist organization to award it "the Communist cell of four virtues" (*Lich su cach mang xa Trung Van* 2005, 73). In 1966–1967, Phung Khoang was under American bombardment. The Commune Administrative Committee was built by the church to avoid the bombs. In that time the coop Trung Van Commune donated 152 kg rice, 100 kg pork, and 178 VND to the army. Only one out of 74 members of the Communist cell in Phung Khoang was expelled, and six others were reprimanded. This might have been the biggest achievement of the co-operative movement in Phung Khoang before Vietnam's unification. (81–88)

Both the communal house and one part of the parish church were used for public works. The church was used as a school. The communal house was used for storage and a preschool with kindergarten. A total of 174 young men (7,36 % the population; 40 in 1968 alone) joined the Vietnamese People's Army. Some families had three or four men in VPA. Forty-one persons received different honors of VPA. The agricultural production after 1975 was not better. The rice output of the Trung Van coop was at its best in 1985, but only achieved 469 tons or 4,5 tons per hectare. In short, the social-economic situation, as well as the cultural--spiritual life, in Phung Khoang until the end of the 1980s was catastrophic.

5. State and Church as conflicting institutions at the village level

Until now, most scholars have examined the relationship between the state and the Christian Church from the social-political and cultural-religious points of view. We will examine them as two different organizations at the village level.

Clearly, the Communist Party and the Christian Church are two disciplined and basically closed organizations (*hoi kin*) with different histories, philosophical outlooks, and ideologies. The state considers materialistic Marxist ideology as a "state doctrine." The Christian Church could not accept the Marxist conception of religion as an "opium for people." The Communist Party wants to build a paradise in this world and socialism is considered as its first phase, without a role for religion. Thus, the Christian peasants are caught between the authorities of the state and the Christian Church.

During the period between 1945–1986, the Christian peasants in Phung Khoang were in a very difficult situation between the two institutions. Bishop Francois Chaize (*Thinh* in Vietnamese) did not cooperate with the Viet Minh during the First Indochina War. Since 1950, the town was under the See of Bishop Joseph Maria Trinh Nhu Khue, who had no contact with the Hanoi regime after land reform.[27] The relation between the DRV and the Christian Church in North Vietnam worsened after 1945. During the Vietnam War, there was no contact between the Christian Church in North Vietnam and the outside world, even with the Holy See.

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[27] Bishop Joseph Maria Trinh Nhu Khue refused to take part at the meeting in 1958 on the initiative of the Premier Pham Van Dong to look for a co-operation between the state and Catholic Church.

The relation between the state and the Church at the village level was a gulf, similar to the postcolonial period.[28] There was no contact between the Viet Minh guerilla and Phung Khoang parish during the First Indochina War. After 1954, all kinds of religious worships were officially not prevented, but they were restricted, and local authorities discriminated against Christians in Phung Khoang, as in the postcolonial period.[29] Every religious activity, even a procession for the Blessed Virgin or for Christ (*ruoc kieu*), could only be on the parish ground and under the strict control of the capital authorities.

Vietnamese traditional religions and beliefs were in the same situation. The last village's festival was carried out in 1939, and they were restored only in the last two decades. The relation between the local authorities and the parish in the first years after the Geneva Agreement was worse, because of the power struggle between the state and the Church at the village level during the exodus and land reform. Land reform team denounced the priest in Phung Khoang parish Paul Tran Dinh Thuy publicly (*dau to*) by a core Christian woman (*cot can*), but she did not classify him to the landlord rank.[30] He was isolated from Christian peasants and was in hunger. By mistake, the correction officer treated him lighter. He died in 1957 at the age of seventy. In the eyes of many Christians, his death was considered as an indirect consequence of the land reform.

After the land reform, the tense relationship between the local authorities and the parish did not improve. Christians lacked pastors after the exodus and many seminaries were closed, including the Saint Joseph Seminary in Hanoi.[31] One priest said mass at various parishes and his travels were restricted, though not prevented. Sometimes there was no mass on feast days, even Christmas.[32] The appointment of every priest and catechist had to be approved by the state. A catechist in Phung Khoang, Peter Nguyen Van Nghi (born in 1942), was ordained to the priesthood without permission because his *curriculum vitae* was "problematic" (*co van de ly lich*). As a result, he was under house arrest for nine years. Only at the beginning of 1990 he was sent to study at the Saint Joseph Seminary and was appointed officially in 1994.

Some points should be emphasized in the analysis of the relation between the local authorities and the parish. Firstly, it was very difficult for a Christian to become a member of the CPV. Although there was officially no religious discrimination by CPV, a Christian Communist, in fact, received no support, either from the

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[28] Catholics co-operating with Viet Minh during First Indochina war had to leave the Church.

[29] The first discrimination between Catholics and non-Catholics was taking place under the Nguyen dynasty. Non-Catholics were classified as ordinary citizen (*luong dan*), while Catholics were called people of the "wrong religion" (*ta dao*). Those words in official state documents and individual *curriculum vitae* were common until 1986.

[30] Some villagers reported that she later became insane (maybe because of remorse).

[31] The lack of priests is improved in the last decades. Saint Joseph Seminary in Hanoi is allowed to accept students every year.

[32] Although the situation has somewhat improved after the Saint Joseph Seminary in Hanoi re-opened in 1982, there were only 33 priests in the Hanoi Diocese by 1995. See: Truong 1996, 151–152.

Christian Church or the Communist organizations. Most Christians had no motivation to join the CPV. Between 1954–1975 four Christians joined the Communist cell in Phung Khoang. They were not practicing and received no support from the parish.[33] After 1986, the situation improved slightly, but there are still few Christian Communists. Among fifty-six Communists in Phung Khoang in 2006, only four were Christian. Among seventeen secretaries of the Communist cell in Trung Van during 1945–1995, there was not a single Christian.[34]

Secondly, there were few Christians who had a good position in the local government. The appointment of local cadres is supposed to follow the policy structure (*co cau*) that mobilizes both Christians and non-Christians. However, there were few Christians in a leadership position in the local institutions such as the Commune Administrative Committee (*Uy ban hanh chinh xa*), the Ho Chi Minh's Working Youth Union (today the Ho Chi Minh's Communist Youth Union), etc. Among nineteen chairmen of the Commune Administrative Committee (*Uy ban Hanh chinh xa*) in Trung Van before 1986, there were no Christians, though Christians made up two-fifths of the total population of Trung Van. Among eight heads of the co-operative farm (*Chu nhiem Hop tac xa*) only two were Christians.[35] Sometimes Christians serve as second in command (*cap pho*). The situation after the Renovation improved, but not radically better. Christians take part in the Church youth organizations and have no time for other organizations. Some Christians take part in the local social works and are appointed to the Fatherland Front (*Mat tran To quoc*), People's Committee (*Hoi dong Nhan dan*), People's Inspection Committee (*Ban thanh tra Nhan dan*), etc.[36]

Thirdly, before 1990 there was no contact between the local authorities and the parish to decide local common issues (for example, against social ills or building of new life). The activities of the parish committee (*Ban hanh giao*) in Phung Khoang were not prohibited, but limited and under control and investigations. Although the situation now is improved, there is no co-operation between them to decide common local issues. The relationship is diplomatic and symbolic. The representatives of the local authorities and the parish have to visit each other on some occasions (New Year, Christmas). The parish priest in Phung Khoang is not interested in a pro-governmental Catholic Solidarity Committee (*Uy ban Doan ket Cong giao*). He was sometimes invited by the local authorities to take part in a meeting of the Fatherland Front (*Mat tran To quoc*) or at similar events, but he only sends his representatives.

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[33] One Catholic wanted to join the Communist cell. He was a Deputy head of a co-operative farm. He had to deny that he was a Catholic, but he still could not join because his true *curriculum vitae* was discovered. Another Catholic name, Joseph Tran Quoc Cuong, is now the head of a co-operative farm Thong Nhat (Phung Khoang), but he has no motivation to join the Communist cell. Among a hundred of Communists in the Trung Van cell there are only seven Catholics. Those Catholics are often not practicing.

[34] The situation in the village of Co Nhue (Tu Liem, Ha Noi) is the same. Among 780 Communists there, only two are Catholic (0.3 %), though Catholics are about 20 % of its total population.

[35] The situation has slightly improved since 1990. The first Catholic chairman of the Commune Committee was a woman in 1989. However, due to some mistakes (not concerned with religious factors) she and some other colleagues were sentenced to imprisonment for two years. She was not a devout Catholic.

[36] The present situation in another Catholic village, Co Nhue, is the same.

The role of Christians in Phung Khoang in the resistance struggle of Viet Minh against the French colonialists was almost not recognized.[37] Today some villagers still consider their Christian neighbors as collaborators of colonial authorities, although in a hushed voice. Christians are still caught in a power struggle between the state and the Church at the village level. In many cases, the Christian peasants obey the parish priest more than the secretary of the Communist cell, and the local authorities are not pleased.

6. Conclusion

The postcolonial period was not an easy period for the Phung Khoang Christian village. The social-political factors from both the state and the Christian Church increase the gulf, on the one hand, between Christians and non-Christians, and between the parish and the local authorities, on the other. The gulf during the postcolonial period appeared to be wider than during the colonial. "If it is true that religion with its doctrines and rituals belongs to the most potent cultural forces – for better or worse – influencing people's values and subsequently their attitudes, convictions, and interactions" (Do and Valco 2018, 621), more political and academic attention should certainly be paid to this social and cultural phenomenon. (Bąk et al. 2019)

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
René Girard

GREŠNI KOZEL

René Girard (* 1923) v duhu knjige O stvareh, skritih od začetka sveta nadaljuje razmišljanje o »mehanizmu žrtvovanja«. So preganjanja in zlo usojeni? So človeške družbe nujno nasilne? Tankočuten komentar zgodovine in evangelijev ponuja prvine odgovora.

Barbara Simonič, Elżbieta Osewska in Tanja Pate
Partnersko nasilje v krščanskih družinah in vloga vere[1]

Partner Violence in Christian Families and Role of Faith

Povzetek: Nasilje v partnerskih odnosih je oblika družinskega nasilja, ko v intimnem odnosu fizična ali psihična nasilna dejanja izvaja partner ali zakonec nad drugim partnerjem ali zakoncem, žrtve pa so lahko tudi preostali družinski člani. Njegova razširjenost je zaskrbljujoča in ni omejena le na specifične okoliščine. Najde se tudi v krščanskih družinah, to pa je pravzaprav zaskrbljujoče, saj bi pričakovali, da verno okolje spodbuja in omogoča varne in ljubeče odnose. V prispevku, v katerem smo z metodo sistematičnega pregleda literature analizirali 28 različnih raziskav o partnerskem nasilju v krščanskih družinah, predstavljamo ugotovitve, ki nakazujejo, kako napačno razumljena in zlorabljena uporaba krščanskega izročila in prakse – v povezavi z drugimi dejavniki – lahko pospešuje oziroma ohranja nasilje v zakonskem in partnerskem odnosu in kako ustrezno živeta in razumljena krščanska vera in duhovnost zagotavljata zaščito in podporo pri preprečevanju nasilja.

Ključne besede: družinsko nasilje, partnersko nasilje krščanska vera, zloraba vere, duhovnost, religiozno soočanje

Abstract: Intimate partner violence is a form of domestic violence where, in an intimate relationship, physical or psychological acts of violence are perpetrated by a partner or spouse over another partner or spouse; victims may be other family members too. Its prevalence is worrying and is not limited to specific circumstances. It also occurs in Christian families, which is actually a concern, as one would expect a religious environment to encourage and provide safe and loving relationships. In this article, where 28 different studies on partner violence in Christian families using the method of systematic literature review were analyzed, we present findings that show which aspects of the Christian tradition and practices, in correlation with other factors, promote or perpetuate partner violence within marriage and partnership. On the other hand, we emphasize those aspects which represent protection and support in the prevention of violence.

Key words: family violence, partner violence, Christianity, abuse of religion, spirituality, religious coping

Religioznost ima – ne glede na orientacijo – ponavadi pozitivno vlogo pri oceni kvalitete družinskega življenja in zakonskega odnosa. Glede na številne raziskave so različni vidiki vernosti, kakor so, na primer, visoka verska aktivnost, poglobljena osebna vera, vključenost v različne verske in zakonske skupine, skupna molitev, pozitivno povezani s kvaliteto in zadovoljstvom v zakonskih (in tudi zunajzakonskih) odnosih (Homaei et al. 2016, 57–58; Logar 2018, 246–247M; Sullivan 2001, 610; Wilcox in Wolfin 2008, 828), s stabilnostjo odnosa (Lambert in Dollahite 2008, 592) in s pozitivnimi vidiki starševstva (Mahoney in Cano 2014, 583) ter negativno povezani z intenzivnostjo konfliktov in z nasiljem v družinskem krogu (Butler, Stout in Gardner 2002, 19; Fincham et al. 2008, 381–385). Mnoge verske skupnosti na podlagi verskega sporočila, ki spodbuja k miru, k ljubezni do sočloveka in k oblikovanju dobrih medsebojnih odnosov, obsojajo izvajanje vsakršne oblike nasilja ter zavzemajo pomembno aktivno in pozitivno vlogo pri preprečevanju zlorab otrok in partnerjev (Ellison, Bartkowski in Anderson 1999, 90–91). Zaradi vsega tega je težko verjeti, da je tudi v krščanskih družinah pogosto navzoče družinsko nasilje in da lahko nekateri vidiki religioznosti celo ohranjajo ali spodbujajo dinamiko nasilja.

1. Partnersko nasilje v krščanskih družinah

Nasilje v odnosih ima mnogo oblik in ga lahko spremljamo skozi celotno človeško zgodovino. Verjetno pa ima nasilje v domačem družinskem okolju najtežje posledice, saj naj bi bili dom in družinski odnosi prostor, ki bi zagotavljal največ fizične in psihične varnosti in s tem zanesljivo okolje za rast in razvoj vseh posameznikov. Družinsko nasilje naj bi tako pomenilo enega od najbolj življenjsko ogrožajočih in travmatičnih dogodkov za posameznika (Roberts 2007, 29). Žrtve so lahko vsi družinski člani, prav tako so lahko izvajalci nasilja vsi družinski člani. V prispevku se osredotočamo na nasilje med partnerjema v intimnem odnosu.

Nasilje v intimnih odnosih je pogosta izkušnja številnih parov, še posebno pa žensk, ki naj bi bile med žrtvami družinskega nasilja v 80 % (Svetovna zdravstvena organizacija 2010; U.S. Department of Justice 2012). Številne raziskave, ki temeljijo na reprezentativnih vzorcih udeležencev držav po vsem svetu, ugotavljajo, da je 10–50 % žensk enkrat v svojem življenju doživelo fizično zlorabo intimnih partnerjev (Ellsberg in Gottemoeller 1999). Večinoma se torej nasilni odnos manifestira kot nasilje moškega nad žensko, vendar so nasilne lahko tudi ženske, žrtve pa moški, prav tako je partnersko nasilje lahko navzoče v istospolnih zvezah. Svetovna zdravstvena organizacija (2010) opredeljuje partnersko nasilje kot vsako vedenje v intimnem razmerju (fizična agresija, spolna prisila, psihična zloraba in nadzorovanje vedenja), ki povzroča fizično, psihološko ali spolno škodo tistim, ki so v razmerju. Intimno partnersko nasilje je torej nasilje enega partnerja nad sedanjim ali nekdanjim zakoncem ali partnerjem v intimnem razmerju. V nasprotju

z zlorabo otrok je tukaj žrtev eden od partnerjev, čeprav so otroci pogosto vpleteni kot priče in so tako žrtve zlorabe. Pri partnerskem nasilju torej govorimo o vzorcih različnih oblik nasilnega vedenja v kontekstu intimnega partnerskega odnosa. Navadno imamo vzorec, v katerem nasilnež ohranja moč in nadzor s fizično zlorabo, s psihično zlorabo, s spolno agresijo, s socialno izolacijo, z grožnjami in z drugimi taktikami. (McColgan idr. 2010, 1)

Pri tem se postavlja vprašanje, ali je v takšni obliki partnersko nasilje enako navzoče tudi v krščanskih družinah. Ali ima (krščanska) vera vlogo pri preprečevanju ali vzdrževanju partnerskega nasilja in kakšna je ta vloga?

O partnerskem nasilju v krščanskih družinah obstajajo podatki, ki kažejo, da se v krščanskih družinah dogaja nasilje enako kakor v splošni populaciji (Todhunter in Deaton 2010, 745). Verska pripadnost sama po sebi ne ščiti pred tem, da posameznik ne bi bil žrtev družinskega nasilja ali da ne bi izvajal nasilja (Annis in Rice 2001, 38). Dejavniki, ki vplivajo na nastop nasilja in na vztrajanje v nasilnem odnosu, so namreč številni in kompleksni. Nasilje nad partnerjem je navadno produkt socialnih, kulturnih, psiholoških, religijsko-teoloških in situacijskih konstruktov (Ellison in Anderson 2001, 269–270). Socialni dejavniki ponavadi temeljijo na dojemanju dominantnosti moške vloge v družini in družbi. Patriarhalni pogled je eden od glavnih vzrokov zlorabe nad ženskami, saj postavlja moškega na pozicijo »močnejšega« spola, ki ima kot takšen pravico (in dolžnost) voditi, odločati, skrbeti in urejati stvari po svoje, ženske pa so tu v podrejenem položaju. (Tracy 2007, 576) Kadar je ta dominantna pozicija moškega ogrožena, ima moški pravico uporabiti tudi silo, da ohrani ženo v popolni podrejenosti in jo postavi na mesto, ki ji pripada. Ta podrejeni položaj ženske v večini svetovnih družb pa, ob preostalih dejavnikih, naredi ženske za lahke žrtve nasilja (Almosaed 2004, 71). Poleg socialnih dejavnikov imajo lahko pomembno vlogo pri nasilju nad ženskami tudi nekatere kulturne norme, ki velikokrat nasilje vidijo kot sprejemljiv del zakonske zveze, v kateri se ne cedita samo »med in mleko«, ampak so tudi viharji in preizkušnje, vendar je treba zdržati (Oyedokun 2008, 306). Psihološki dejavniki, ki so lahko razlog za nasilje nad ženskami v partnerskem odnosu, so na primer patološke osebnostne strukture nasilnežev, recimo psihopatija (Tracy 2007, 508), ali nesposobnost primerne regulacije afektivnih stanj, ki so se v preteklosti že v primarnih družinah nasilnežev ali žrtev regulirale z nasiljem, in postane metoda za regulacijo frustracije, agresije in nemoči tudi pozneje v življenju ob konfliktih (Gostečnik et. al 2019, 123–124). Tudi nekateri situacijski dejavniki, kakor je, na primer, nizek socioekonomski status, lahko spodbudijo družinsko nasilje. Nizka izobrazba, nizki prihodki in brezposelnost se povezujejo z višjo stopnjo nasilja, saj je to situacija, zaradi katere je oseba lahko bolj frustrirana, ima nižjo samopodobo, je pod stresom, čuti nemoč, medtem ko v nasilnem izbruhu čuti, da je močnejša in ima kontrolo. (Ellison in Anderson 2001, 269) Tudi alkoholizem se povezuje z nasiljem v partnerskem odnosu (Katerndahl in Obregon 2007, 124). Alkohol sam po sebi ni razlog za nasilje, je pa lahko gorivo, ki pomaga zanetiti eksplozijo nerazrešene jeze, poslabša presojo, zmanjša zavore in vpliva na sposobnost upoštevanja družbenih norm (Jewkes 2002, 1423).

Vsem tem dejavnikom se lahko pridružijo tudi religiozne vrednote in pogledi, ki morda prispevajo k temu, da nasilnež opravičuje svoje nasilje ali da žrtev ostaja in vztraja v tem odnosu. Nekateri avtorji poročajo, da je eden od dejavnikov okolja, ki lahko prispevajo k nasilju nad ženskami v partnerskem odnosu, institucionalni vidik religioznosti (Westenberg 2017, 2). V religioznosti (v praksi, jeziku in strukturi moči oziroma hierarhiji) so velikokrat vsebovane socialne norme in kulturno razumevanje (npr. patriarhalni pogled) (Pearles in Bouma 2019, 338), ki lahko prispevajo k temu, da nasilni posameznik najde »izgovor« za nasilje, žrtev pa velikokrat zaradi istih norm raje molči in tiho trpi (Wuthnow 2004, 18).

Nasilje v partnerskem odnosu ne pozna meja razredov, barve kože, narodnosti ali religiozne orientacije, zato ne moremo trditi, da je zaradi kakih okoliščin nasilja več ali manj; zagotovo pa lahko rečemo, da nekateri vidiki oziroma njihova kombinacija lahko prispevajo k temu, da se nasilje ohranja ali pa se ne preprečuje oziroma se primerno ne razrešuje. Nasilje je navzoče tudi v krščanskih družinah, njegova pogostost v vernih družinah v zahodni kulturi pa je podobna stopnji nasilja v splošni populaciji (Todhunter in Deaton 2010, 745; Westenberg 2017, 2). Nasilja v krščanskih družinah torej ni več kakor drugod, je pa žalostno in sramotno, da ga ni manj; to nakazuje, kako smiselno je razmišljati o tem, da bi v religioznih prepričanjih in okolju iskali faktorje, ki lahko prispevajo k nastopu nasilja v partnerskem odnosu in ga ohranjajo. Razmisliti moramo, kateri vidiki in kako bi ti vidiki mogli prispevati k temu, da bi se nasilje ne dogajalo oziroma bi se primerno ustavilo. Vprašanje ni torej, ali je religioznost vzrok za nasilje, ampak kako to, da ne prispeva k zniževanju nasilja. Po ugotovitvah Birkenhoffa, Grandina in Luprija (1992, 15) religija sama po sebi ni povezana z nasiljem nad partnerjem (da bi bilo torej v vernih družinah več ali manj nasilja nad partnerjem), je pa lahko religioznost v povezavi z drugimi medosebnimi dejavniki tista, ki prispeva k ranljivosti žrtve ali moči nasilneža (Nason-Clark 2004, 303).

Namen tega prispevka je ‚predstaviti sistematični pregled najnovejših znanstvenih člankov in študij, ki so preučevale partnersko nasilje v povezavi z religioznostjo oziroma vero (krščanske družine), in prikazati dejavnike, ki znotraj krščanskega nauka in izročila lahko ob nerazumevanju naukov in izročila pomenijo tveganje za izvajanje in ohranjanje nasilja v družini (tako z vidika žrtve kakor z vidika storilca), in dejavnike, ki pomenijo zaščito in podporo pri preprečevanju nasilja v krščanskih družinah.

2. Metoda: sistematični pregled literature

Za metodo raziskovanja smo uporabili sistematični pregled literature, ki je metoda, podobna metaanalizi. Omogoča objektiven, sistematičen in pregleden kvalitativni opis področja in daje dober vpogled v posamezno znanstveno polje, s tem ko identificira, kritično vrednoti in integrira ugotovitve pomembnih kakovostnih znanstvenih študij, ki obravnavajo specifično raziskovalno vprašanje. (Cooper 2003, 5) Vključuje lahko tudi ugotovitve metaanaliz. Za metodo je potrebno, da temelji

Slika 1:   *Proces pridobivanja in izbora študij.*

na pripravi natančnega protokola analize in da pri iskanju literature išče ustrezne študije, ki so v skladu z vnaprej opredeljenimi kriteriji vključitve in izključitve iz analize (Ressing, Blettner in Klug 2009, 457). Rezultat je celosten in sistematičen pregled rezultatov večjega števila že objavljenih kvantitativnih in kvalitativnih raziskav na nekem določenem področju, s tem pa pridobimo uvid v obstoječe znanje in prakse na raziskovalnem področju v času, ko se pregled izvaja (Cooper, Hedges in Valentine 2008, 4–6).

V naši raziskavi je iskanje kvalitativnih in kvantitativnih znanstvenih člankov potekalo v treh glavnih spletnih zbirkah podatkov: Scopus, Web of Science in Sage. Za zajem člankov smo izbrali časovno obdobje od januarja 2000 do julija 2019. V bazah smo iskali zadetke pod iskalnimi pojmi »partnersko nasilje« (ang. partner violence) in »religija« (ang. religion), ki so se našli v naslovu ali povzetku ali ključnih besedah. Pri identificiranju ustreznih študij so bila upoštevana naslednja merila:

– Celotni članek je predstavil izvirno študijo (kvantitativno ali kvalitativno) v angleškem jeziku in je bil objavljen v recenzirani reviji med januarjem 2000 in julijem 2019.
– Vsebina članka je zadevala tudi krščanske vidike duhovnosti in religioznosti v povezavi z nastopom intimnega partnerskega nasilja.
– Članek se je osredotočal na nasilje nad ženskami, ki ga je povzročil sedanji ali nekdanji intimni partner.
– Raziskovalni vzorec so sestavljali partnerji (potencialne žrtve ali storilci), čeprav so bili lahko vključeni tudi drugi udeleženci.

Članki so bili najprej ocenjeni na podlagi naslova in povzetka. Nato smo pri člankih, ki niso bili izločeni, pogledali celotno besedilo, ki se je zdelo relevantno. V skladu s postavljenimi merili smo oblikovali končni izbor člankov, ki smo jih po-

drobno vsebinsko analizirali v skladu z namenom naše raziskave. Celotni postopek iskanja in izbora člankov je prikazan na sliki 1.

Začetno iskanje v izbranih bazah podatkov z istimi ključnimi besedami je izpostavilo 333 člankov, ki so bili pregledani na podlagi ustreznosti naslova in povzetka glede na zgoraj omenjene kriterije. 195 člankov je bilo neustreznih, zato smo jih izločili iz nadaljnje analize, 138 pa smo jih vključili v podrobnejši pregled celotnega besedila. Glede na merila smo izločili še 110 člankov, 28 pa smo jih vključili v predstavitev, ki je rezultat tega prispevka.

3. Rezultati

V tabeli 1 so predstavljene glavne značilnosti vključenih študij. Od vključenih 28 študij jih je bilo 11 kvantitativne narave, 16 kvalitativne narave, 1 študija pa je kombinirala kvalitativni in kvantitativni raziskovalni pristop.

Raziskava (avtorji, letnica) in tip raziskave	Vzorec	Raziskovalni pristop in način zbiranja podatkov
Ake in Horne (2003) Kvantitativna raziskava	Ženske (kristjanke) s sedanjo ali preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 157)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)
Anderson, Renner in Danis (2012) Kvantitativna in kvalitativna raziskava	Ženske s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 37)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki) in metoda postavljene teorije (polstrukturirani poglobljeni intervju)
Asay (2011) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Odrasli pripadniki evangeličanske Cerkve – Romunija, Moldavija (N = 146; moški N = 61, ženske N = 85)*	Fokusne skupine (skupinski intervju)
Bent-Goodley in Fowler (2006) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Pripadniki (Afroameričani) verske skupnosti (N = 6) in verski voditelji (N = 13)	Fokusne skupine in metoda postavljene teorije (poglobljeni polstrukturirani skupinski intervju)
Cunradi, Caetano in Schafer (2002) *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Pari z opredeljeno versko pripadnostjo (N = 1440; moški N = 824, ženske N = 616)	Statistična analiza (intervju s standardiziranimi vprašalniki)
Drumm idr. (2014) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Odrasle pripadnice adventistične Cerkve z izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 42)	Metoda postavljene teorije (poglobljeni intervju)
Gezinski, Gonzalez-Pons in Rogers (2019) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Ženske z izkušnjo partnerskega nasilja (N = 43) in strokovnjaki, ki delajo z žrtvami nasilja (N = 59)**	Fokusne skupine (poglobljeni polstrukturirani skupinski intervju)
Ellison in Anderson (2001) *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Odrasli pari (N = 13017)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)
Fowler in Rountree (2010) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Ženske s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 22)	Fenomenološka metoda (skupinski intervju)
Horne in Levitt (2003) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Ženske (kristjanke) s sedanjo ali preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 167); verski voditelji (N = 22)**	Primerjava in sinteza treh prejšnjih študij z različnimi pristopi

Jung in Olson (2017) *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Posamezniki nad 18 let iz 49 različnih držav (N = 55523)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)
Knickmeyer idr. (2003) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Ženske (kristjanke) s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 10)	Metoda postavljene teorije (pol-strukturirani poglobljeni intervju)
Knickmeyer, Levitt in Horne (2010) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Ženske (kristjanke) s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 10)	Metoda postavljene teorije (pol-strukturirani poglobljeni intervju)
Koch in Ramirez (2010) *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Posamezniki – študentje (N = 626)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)
Levitt, Todd Swanger in Butler (2008) *Kvalitativna raziskava.*	Moški z nižjim ekonomskim statusom, ki so v preteklosti izvajali nasilje nad partnerko (N = 12)	Metoda postavljene teorije (pol-strukturirani poglobljeni intervju)
Lilly, Howell in Graham-Bermann (2015) *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Ženske s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskih odnosih (N = 91)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)
Neergaard idr. (2007) *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Ženske z izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskih odnosih (N = 476)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)
Potter (2008) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Afroameričanke z izkušnjo pretekle fizične ali druge zlorabe v intimnih partnerskih zvezah (N = 40)	(poglobljeni polstrukturirani intervjuji)
Pyles (2007) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Ženske s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 12) in strokovnjaki, ki delajo z žrtvami nasilja (N = 63)**	Fokusne skupine (poglobljeni polstrukturirani skupinski intervju)
Renzetti idr. (2017) *Kvantitativna raziskava.*	Odrasli moški (N = 269)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki).
Senter in Caldwell (2002) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Verne ženske s preteklo izkušnjo partnerskega nasilja (N = 9)	Fenomenološka metoda (pol-strukturirani poglobljeni intervju)
Sharp (2014) *Kvalitativna raziskava.*	Ženske s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 62)	Metoda postavljene teorije (pol-strukturirani poglobljeni intervju)
St. Vil idr. (2017) *Kvalitativna raziskava*	Afroameričanke z nizkimi dohodki z izkušnjo fizične ali spolne zlorabe intimnega partnerja (N = 29)	Analiza vsebine (poglobljeni polstrukturirani intervjuji)
Tarrezz Nash in Hesterberg (2009) *Kvalitativna raziskava.*	Ženske (kristjanke) s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja partnerja (N = 3)	Narativna analiza (poglobljeni polstrukturirani intervjuji)
Ting in Panchanadeswaran (2016) *Kvalitativna raziskava.*	Ženske (afriške imigrantke v Ameriko) s preteklo izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (N = 15)	Fenomenološka metoda (pol-strukturirani poglobljeni intervju)
Todhunter in Deaton (2010). *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Mladi moški med 18 in 26 leti (N = 1507)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)
Wang idr. (2009) *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Verne kristjanke (N = 1476)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)
Watlington in Murphy (2006) *Kvantitativna raziskava*	Afroameričanke z izkušnjo nasilja v partnerskih odnosih v zadnjih 12 mesecih (N = 65)	Statistična analiza (vprašalniki)

Tabela 1: *Vključene študije in njihove značilnosti.*
* Analizirali smo samo del raziskave, v kateri so bili udeleženi pari.
**Analizirali smo samo del raziskave, v kateri so bile udeleženke žrtve.

Študije so se osredotočale na različne vidike duhovnosti in religioznosti v povezavi z nasiljem v partnerskem odnosu. Pri tem je treba poudariti, da govorimo pri

razumevanju duhovnosti in religioznosti o dveh različnih konceptih, ki pa sta med seboj povezana. Duhovnost je v študijah razumljena kot osebni in ponotranjeni občutek za sveto, kot vera v višjo silo, kot poglobljeni in osebni odnos s presežnim, medtem ko velja religioznost bolj za zunanji izraz vernosti, institucionalnosti in pripadnosti (Bent-Goodley in Fowler 2006, 283). Komponento duhovnosti/religioznosti so tako posamezne študije vključevale na različne načine, bodisi so se obračale na globoke in intimne vidike duhovnosti ali pa na bolj površinske in zunanje izraze religioznosti. Študije so večinoma bile opravljene v okviru različnih krščanskih skupnosti in izročil, čeprav so nekatere vključevale tudi druge religiozne perspektive (npr. kvantitativne študije), vendar ne v tolikšni meri, da rezultati ne bi bili interpretirani v skladu s krščansko paradigmo. Med udeleženci posameznih raziskav so bile večinoma ženske žrtve nasilja v partnerskem odnosu, nasilni moški (1 študija), pripadniki verskih skupnosti, pari oziroma splošni vzorec moških ali žensk iz populacije, strokovnjaki za obravnavo žrtev partnerskega nasilja in verski voditelji. V raziskavah, v katerih je bilo vključenih več različnih udeležencev, smo se osredotočili samo na ugotovitve, ki so prikazovale perspektivo žrtev oziroma nasilnežev.

Podrobno smo analizirali ugotovitve posameznih študij in na podlagi tega oblikovali sintezo ugotovitev o vidikih duhovnosti ali religioznosti, kadar so lahko prepoznani kot dejavniki tveganja ali dejavniki zaščite pri soočanju z nasiljem v krščanskih družinah.

3.1 Dejavniki zaščite

V splošnem raziskave potrjujejo, da so duhovni in religiozni vidiki pri vernih osebah v večji ali manjši meri pomembni pri soočanju z nasiljem v partnerskem odnosu na vseh ravneh (preživljanje nasilja, proces zapuščanja partnerja oziroma prekinitve nasilnega odnosa ali v procesu okrevanja). Navadno je duhovnost v teh procesih pomemben vir moči za soočanje s preizkušnjami (Drumm idr. 2014). Nasilje je namreč travmatična izkušnja, ki spremeni pogled na svet pri žrtvah. Hujše ko je bilo nasilje, bolj negativen pogled na svet imajo žrtve, ta pogled pa je povezan z višjo stopnjo simptomov posttravmatske stresne motnje. Simptomov posttravmatske stresne motnje je manj pri višji stopnji religioznosti (ali duhovnosti?). Žrtve, ki vključujejo v soočanje z nasiljem religiozne in duhovne vidike (ali katerekoli, religiozne ali duhovne, ali je tudi glede notranje in zunanje drže kaka razlika?), v večji meri po travmi ohranijo občutek smisla in pomena in doživljajo nižjo stopnjo stresa. (Lilly, Howell in Graham-Bermann 2015) V študijah je mogoče identificirati pozitivne vidike religioznosti in duhovnosti, ki preprečujejo nasilje v partnerskem odnosu oziroma pomagajo, da se žrtev reši iz tega odnosa in okreva po njem.

3.1.1 Moč religiozne prakse

Različne študije poročajo o povezavah zunanjih vidikov religioznosti (obisk cerkve in obredov, molitev, branje Svetega pisma) z nižjo stopnjo dogajanja in odobravanja nasilja v partnerskih odnosih (Drumm idr. 2014; Jung in Olson 2017). Za ženske in njihove partnerje, ki bolj redno obiskujejo cerkev in obrede, je manj možno, da

bi se zapletali v nasilje v partnerskem odnosu (Wang idr. 2009), verjetno zaradi indirektnih povezav: obiskovanje verskih obredov spodbuja stopnjo socialne integracije in podpore, ki je negativno povezana z nastopom nasilja, znižuje tveganje uživanja drog in alkohola – to je pozitivno povezano z nastankom nasilja – in znižuje verjetnost psihičnih problemov, kakor sta depresivnost in nizko samospoštovanje (Cunradi, Caetano in Schafer 2002; Ellison in Anderson 2001; Watlington in Murphy 2006). Verska aktivnost je žrtvam v pomoč tudi v trenutkih preživljanja nasilja, saj pomaga ohranjati živ odnos z Bogom (Drumm idr. 2014; St. Vil idr. 2017).

3.1.2 Poglobljena vera in osebni odnos z Bogom

Ponotranjena religioznost je negativno povezana s psihičnim stresom pri žrtvah partnerskega nasilja (Ake in Horne 2003; Watlington in Murphy 2006). Številne žrtve poročajo, da jim globok in oseben odnos z Bogom pomeni prostor, v katerem dobijo moč in potrditev za svoje razmišljanje in ukrepanje, obenem pa tudi pomoč pri okrevanju po nasilju. Več kakor 70 % kristjank, ki so odšle iz nasilnega odnosa, poroča, kako jim je vera dala moč, da so lahko odšle (Wang idr. 2009). Pri tem izpostavljajo pomen duhovnosti v nasprotju z religioznostjo (večji pomen ima notranja povezanost s presežnim kakor pa religiozne tradicije, institucije, ljudje, ki so povezani z njimi), torej pomen resničnega in pristnega odnosa z Bogom (Drumm idr. 2014). Ponotranjena duhovnost, v kateri osebe pri soočanju s stresnim dogodkom izhajajo iz osebnega, močnega, pozitivnega in pristnega globokega odnosa z Bogom, vodi v večjo učinkovitost pri soočanju z nasiljem in pri njegovem nadaljnjem preprečevanju (Horne in Levitt 2003; Senter in Caldwell 2002). V globokem odnosu in dialogu z Bogom čutijo, da je Bog vir moči, zaščite, ljubezni in upanja, da daje moč za ukrepanje in zanje skrbi (Anderson, Renner in Danis 2012; Drumm idr. 2014). To jim pomaga pri odhodu iz nasilnega odnosa, saj v tem odnosu prevrednotijo svojo lastno dojemanje in na prvo mesto postavijo svojo varnost in blaginjo ter proaktivno ukrepajo (Knickmeyer idr. 2003; Tarrezz Nash in Hesterberg 2009), obenem pa zaradi zaledja tako močnega zaveznika niso tako izolirane (Drumm idr. 2014; Senter in Caldwell 2002) in se laže tudi zatečejo po pomoč drugam (družina, zavetišča, pravosodni sistem) (Potter 2008) oziroma kljubujejo nasilju tudi v okoljih, v katerih je nasilje bolj sprejemljivo zaradi šibkejše pravne ureditve in nižjih etičnih standardov (Jung in Olson 2017).

Duhovnost spodbuja odpornost in podporo pri nadaljnjem življenju po nasilnem odnosu. Žrtve jo prepoznavajo kot notranjo moč, ki jim pomaga pri predelovanju na videz nepremagljive travme, kakršna je nasilje v partnerskem odnosu, in pri regulaciji vedenjskih odzivov na pozitiven način (Fowler in Rountree 2010). V odnosu z Bogom žrtve doživijo osebno transformacijo, ko lahko pogledajo na travmatično izkušnjo in smisel življenja v drugačni luči. Namesto razmišljanja in obžalovanja, da so bile zlorabljene, lahko začnejo ceniti, da so se skozi to preizkušnjo veliko naučile (večja moč, modrost, sočutje). Povezanost z Bogom jim vliva občutek pomena, namena in vrednosti življenja, to pa so področja, ki so pri žrtvah nasilja še posebno na preizkušnji. (Anderson, Renner in Danis 2012) Skozi pristen in varen odnos z Bogom, v katerem se dogaja tudi predelovanje negativnih občutkov

(npr. jeze do Boga), žrtve osebno in duhovno rastejo, ko odkrivajo temelje svojega lastnega dostojanstva, vrednosti in veljave (Drumm idr. 2014; Senter in Caldwell 2002).

3.1.3 Pomen pozitivnih vsebin verskega nauka

Žrtvam je v pomoč, da se v vsebinah verskega nauka oprejo na dele, ki poudarjajo pomen medsebojnega spoštovanja, resnične ljubezni in skrbi zase. Ti vidiki žrtvam dajo moči in vodijo v proaktivno delovanje v smeri skrbi zase in svoje lastne zaščite. Spoznanje, da Bog ne želi zlorab, pomaga pri pridobivanju dostojanstva in svoje lastne vrednosti, da v tej moči naredijo vse potrebne korake iz nasilnih odnosov. (Knickmeyer idr. 2003) Številne verske teme, molitev in arhetipi (biblič-ne zgodbe, zmaga dobrega nad zlim, pomen trpljenja) lahko pomagajo ustaviti zlorabljajoči odnos, razumeti izkušnjo in jo umestiti v življenjski kontekst (Tarrezz Nash in Hesterberg 2009). Pomemben del teh vsebin je tudi upanje, ki ga žrtve vnesejo v življenje, da se lahko borijo z zlorabo. Tudi poudarek procesa (zdravega) odpuščanja vodi žrtve v rast in utrjuje upanje v boljšo prihodnost (Watlington in Murphy 2006).

3.1.4 Verska skupnost in povezanost z drugimi kot vir pomoči

Številne (verne) žrtve se pri soočanju z nasiljem v partnerskem odnosu obrnejo tudi na sovernike in versko skupnost, saj pričakujejo, da bodo tu dobile podporo. Kadar jo dobijo, je to lahko ključnega pomena pri urejanju nasilja. Žrtve poudarjajo, da jim pomaga, če jim skupnost prisluhne, verjame in daje podporo pri ukrepanju (Pyles 2007; St. Vil idr. 2017). Ob tem čutijo veliko čustvene pomoči, občutka pri-padnosti, varnosti (Anderson, Renner in Danis 2012); to je še posebej pomembno, saj zloraba v partnerskem odnosu žrtev izolira oziroma jo poskuša izolirati (Wa-tlington in Murphy 2006). Podporna mreža žrtvam nasilja, kjer obstaja v cerkveni skupnosti, je žrtvam v veliko pomoč. Proaktivno sodelovanje med verskimi insti-tucijami in drugimi službami je dobra praksa, verska skupnost pa je velikokrat spregledana moč pri delovanju proti nasilju v družini (Pyles 2007).

3.1.5 Podporni odziv verskih voditeljev/duhovnikov

Poleg iskanja podpore v verski skupnosti iščejo številne žrtve podporo tudi pri du-hovnikih, saj jim zaupajo (Neergaard idr. 2007). Žrtvam pomaga, če pri njih dobijo sočutno podporo, nasvet, praktično pomoč, tolažbo in občutek pripadnosti (An-derson, Renner in Danis 2012; Gezinski,Gonzalez-Pons in Rogers 2019; St. Vil idr. 2017). Ključnega pomena za žrtve je, da duhovniki prisluhnejo, kako nasilje vpliva na njihovo življenje, in jih usmerjajo v njihovih (verskih) dvomih glede ukrepanja proti nasilju (Horne in Levitt 2003). Vloga duhovnika je pomembna tudi pri sode-lovanju z zunanjimi institucijami, ki obravnavajo nasilje (Pyles 2007).

3.2 Dejavniki tveganja

Odnos med soočanjem z nasiljem in zatekanjem k verskim prepričanjem je zelo kompleksen in velikokrat paradoksen (Knickmeyer idr. 2003). Napačno razumljena in izkrivljeno uporabljana duhovnost in religioznost, lahko v povezavi z drugimi dejavniki nasilje opravičujeta in ohranjata. Glede na študije poznamo različne napačne oblike duhovne oziroma religiozne prakse.

3.2.1 Pozunanjena in tradicionalistična religioznost

Vernost, ki je pozunanjena in temelji bolj na slepem upoštevanju verskih načel kakor pa na črpanju iz osebnega in poglobljenega odnosa z Bogom, pomeni večje tveganje, da žrtve iščejo podporo pri soočanju z nasiljem zunaj sebe, pri tem pa so bolj ranljive za zmotna prepričanja in pritiske, zaradi katerih ostajajo v nasilnem odnosu. Pri teh osebah je manj notranje moči in duhovnega kapitala, na katerega bi se oprle in bile tako bolj proaktivne v soočanju z nasiljem (Ake in Horne 2003). Tudi moški z bolj pozunanjeno vero so bolj verjetno nasilni od tistih s ponotranjeno vero, ki jim drugače pomaga pri samoregulaciji stresa in s tem tudi znižuje verjetnost za izvajanje nasilja nad partnerko. Pri religioznih moških je večja verjetnost, da bodo nasilni nad partnerko takrat, ko je njihova religioznost manj funkcionalna (introjicirana, ozek pogled, fundamentalizem, tradicionalizem). (Renzetti idr. 2017) Tudi krščanski fundamentalizem je pozitivno povezan z odobravanjem nasilja in z izvajanjem nasilja nad partnerjem (Koch in Ramirez 2010). Brez globoke duhovnosti je različnost verske pripadnosti v zakonskem odnosu napovednik nasilja v partnerskem odnosu (Cunradi, Caetano in Schafer 2002). Prav tako tudi samo zunanji izrazi vere (obiskovanje obredov, molitev), ki so brez trdne duhovnosti (npr. molitev ni dovolj, da se nasilje konča, tudi če žrtev čuti takojšnje pomirjenje ob molitvi), ohranjajo nasilje s promoviranjem pasivne drže nemoči ali vdanosti v usodo (Horne in Levitt 2003).

3.2.2 Napačna interpretacija verskega nauka

Kar nekaj vidikov krščanskega nauka ali svetopisemskih besedil je takšnih, da jih je z napačno interpretacijo ali izvzetjem iz konteksta mogoče uporabiti za upravičevanje in utemeljevanje nasilja. Tako je možno manipulirati z žrtvino nemočjo in pritiskati nanjo na način, ki vzbuja krivdo, sram, strah in zmedo (Bent-Goodley in Fowler 2006). Predvsem želja, zadostiti kriterijem »dobrega kristjana« (to je tisti, ki odpušča, zaupa, marsikaj prenese in pretrpi in sledi krščanskim idealom družine in svetosti zakona za vsako ceno), zadržuje žrtve v rigidni poziciji in v nasilnem odnosu, saj raje ohranjajo fasado, kakor se soočijo z osramočenostjo. Zato žrtve velikokrat molčijo in ne iščejo pomoči, navzven pa kažejo podobo popolnega krščanskega para in družine. (Knickmeyer idr. 2003; Knickmeyer, Levitt in Horne 2010) Ločitev je zanje grešno dejanje, zato je pri ženskah, ki ne podpirajo ločitve zaradi nasilja v partnerskem odnosu, bolj verjetno, da bodo ostale žrtve nasilja (Wang idr. 2009). Strah jih je, da bodo naredile greh, če ne bodo odpustile nasilnežu (še posebno takrat, ko se partner navzven kaže kot dober kristjan) in če jim

ne bo uspelo živeti krščanskih vrednot (Anderson, Renner in Danis 2012; Horne in Levitt 2003; Knickmeyer, Levitt in Horne 2010; Tarrezz Nash in Hesterberg 2009).

Posebno moč pri ohranjanju in upravičevanju nasilja nad partnerjem ima patriarhalni pogled na odnos, ko nasilneži (moški) z napačno interpretacijo svetopisemskih besedil, v katerih se moškemu pripisuje vloga voditelja oziroma glave družine, naloga ženske pa je, da se mu podredi, utemeljujejo svojo dominantnost in poudarjajo ideal poslušnosti žene (Asay 2011; Knickmeyer, Levitt in Horne 2010). Patriarhalna religiozna prepričanja so še zlasti močna v povezavi z drugimi dejavniki (revščina, sram), saj lahko nasilnežem pomagajo dvigniti občutek moškosti, kadar je ta občutek šibek (Levitt, Todd Swanger in Butler 2008). Ker je za žrtve doktrina pomemben del njihove vere, velikokrat sprejmejo nasilneževo interpretacijo (Sharp 2014), ki ima še več moči, če patriarhalni pogled zagovarjajo tudi verski voditelji in člani verske skupnosti (koliko krivde pripišejo žrtvi, kakšni so njihovi pogledi na vloge med spoloma v odnosu, kako vidijo razmerje moči in kontrole v odnosu) (Ake in Horne 2003). To se posebno pogosto dogaja, ko žrtve nimajo intimnega in ponotranjenega odnosa z Bogom in dovolj religioznega kapitala (poznavanje doktrine in nauka, poglobljena vera), da bi se lahko zanesle na svoje lastno doživljanje: nasilje je, ne glede na vse, nesprejemljivo (Sharp 2014). Doživljanje eksplicitnih in implicitnih pritiskov, da mora ženska biti v vlogi dobre žene in se držati krščanskega učenja o zakonu, je tako pomemben mehanizem, prek katerega religija lahko deluje tako, da ohranja zlorabo (Bent-Goodley in Fowler 2006; Knickmeyer, Levitt in Horne 2010).

3.2.3 Neprimeren odziv verske skupnosti

Žrtve se po pomoč zatekajo k verski skupnosti in voditeljem, pri katerih velikokrat doživijo tudi odtujenost, zavrnitev ali nasvet, ki jih naredi še bolj ranljive za zlorabo (Knickmeyer idr. 2003). Velikokrat je vloga cerkvene skupnosti pri soočanju z nasiljem v družini nejasna. Cerkev nima možnosti ali ne prevzame odgovornosti pri pomoči družini, ki se sooča z nasiljem (Asay 2011), saj mnoge verske skupnosti ne prepoznajo teže nasilja (tudi neprimerne uporabe religioznosti pri tem), ker ga ne razumejo. Zato številne žrtve partnerskega nasilja molčijo, saj ne dobijo podpore tam, kjer bi jo pričakovale, to pa še dodatno potrdi njihovo zmedo in neodločnost (Bent-Goodley in Fowler 2006). V teh primerih verska skupnost ni varen in podporen prostor, ki bi pomagal pri razreševanju partnerskega nasilja. Z neprimernim reagiranjem lahko še prispeva k nadaljnji izolaciji in pošilja prikrita sporočila ženskam, da je prav, če ostanejo v zlorabljajočem odnosu; to se še posebno pogosto zgodi v rigidnih, ekstremističnih in fundamentalističnih skupnostih (Pyles 2007).

3.2.4 Nerazumevanje in neprimerni odzivi duhovnikov in verskih voditeljev

Verne žrtve v soočanju z nasiljem iščejo pomoč pri verskih voditeljih, a pri njih ne dobijo vedno ustrezne podpore in pomoči, predvsem takrat ne, kadar se ti voditelji v svojih odzivih ne znajo in ne zmorejo približati izkušnji žrtve, to pa žrtve naredi še bolj ranljive za zlorabo (Knickmeyer idr. 2003). Žrtve poročajo, da duhovniki večkrat (predvsem zaradi pomanjkanja znanja) ignorirajo ali pa ne prepo-

znajo njihove potrebe po psihološki, čustveni in fizični varnosti. Velikokrat so njihovi nasveti splošni in površinski, naj na primer molijo in obiskujejo cerkev z upanjem in prošnjo razrešitve. Včasih se postavijo tudi na stran storilca in mu želijo pomagati, pri tem pa je varnost žrtve še dodatno ogrožena, saj je večkrat žrtev ocenjena kot tista, ki je kriva za nastalo situacijo; zlasti pogosto se to dogaja v manjših skupnostih. Teža nasilja se ignorira tudi zaradi dajanja prednosti ohranjanju zakona za vsako ceno, čeprav to ustvarja za žrtev dodatni pritisk, da ostaja v nasilnem odnosu. (Gezinski,Gonzalez-Pons in Rogers 2019; Horne in Levitt 2003; Potter 2008) Duhovniki večinoma (zaradi pomanjkanja znanja in nelagodja ob tej temi) raje ne govorijo o nasilju v partnerskem odnosu v svojem oznanjevanju, tako žrtev čuti še večjo potrebo po tišini in dobi občutek, da se nasilje drugače v njihovi skupnosti ne dogaja. Zato raje molči, ker se boji, da bi bila čudna. Žrtve ob stiku z voditelji, ki ne znajo pomagati, doživijo še globlji občutek osamljenosti, sramu in zadrege, zmede, strahu pred izgubo statusa, še bolj se zaprejo in manj aktivno iščejo pomoč (Ting in Panchanadeswaran 2016). S tem je večkrat zapravljena dragocena priložnost, ki jo ima Cerkev kot institucija, saj bi lahko pripomogla k preprečevanju in ustavljanju partnerskega nasilja. Tudi seksistična prepričanja ali prepričanja o tradicionalnih spolnih vlogah pri duhovnikih spodbujajo nasilje v družini (Bent-Goodley in Fowler 2006).

Nasilneži čutijo, da jim duhovniki ne pomagajo tako, kakor bi pričakovali, zato ponavadi pri njih ne iščejo pomoči. Na splošno jim ne zaupajo in mislijo, da ne bodo razumeli izzivov, s katerimi se soočajo, ali se zanimali zanje. Prav tako se v pridigah navadno ne dotikajo zakonskih konfliktov, ko pa se jih, storilce razumejo kot zločince in s tem povečujejo njihov občutek krivde, ali pa ne pokažejo jasnih strategij, ki bi bile v pomoč. Od njih storilci pričakujejo predvsem instrumentalno pomoč – nasvet, kako si kljub nasilju zagotoviti božjo naklonjenost. (Levitt, Todd Swanger in Butler 2008)

4.   Razprava

Ugotovitve sistematičnega pregleda literature kažejo, da niti krščanska religioznost niti duhovnost sama po sebi ni vzrok za nasilje v partnerskem odnosu, izjemnega pomena pa je razumeti, kako je možno religioznost in duhovnost zlorabiti za upravičevanje in ohranjanje nasilja v partnerskih odnosih. Z analizo ugotovitev posameznih študij smo doumeli, da je duhovnost oziroma religioznost v okviru krščanskega izročila z odkritimi ali prikritimi mehanizmi mnogokrat pomemben korelacijski dejavnik pri razreševanju ali ohranjanju partnerskega nasilja. Molitev, religiozna praksa, zakramenti za nekoga, ki je doživel nasilje v partnerskem odnosu ali ga še vedno doživlja, lahko pomembno prispevajo k umirjanju in učinkovitemu soočanju z nasiljem in k zaščiti pred nasilnim odnosom. Po drugi strani pa lahko izkrivljeno in zlorabljajoče razumevanje religioznosti upravičuje oziroma pospešuje nasilje. Pri tem je treba poudariti, da se pri iskanju vzrokov za izvajanje nasilja nad partnerjem oziroma pri nezmožnosti primerne zaščite žrtve ne moremo in ne

smemo osredotočati le na zunanje dejavnike. V ozadju nasilnih odnosov je tako pri nasilnežu kakor pri žrtvi globlja čustvena dinamika, ki izvira iz preteklih (travmatičnih) izkušenj in iz težkih afektivnih stanj, neprimerno reguliranih prav prek dinamiko v nasilnem odnosu (Schore 2003, 110).

Med prepoznane dejavnike, ki prispevajo k nasilju nad partnerjem, lahko štejemo pozunanjeno religioznost brez trdne osebne in globoke vernosti oziroma odnosa z Bogom, zvestobo verskemu nauku, ki je dojet zgolj kot zbirka togih pravil brez vsebine, napačne interpretacije in neprimerne odzive verske skupnosti in duhovnikov. Vse to dela žrtve še bolj ranljive, nasilju pa ne postavlja jasnega »NE«. Navadno so vsi ti dejavniki med seboj povezani, moč pa imajo zato, ker uporabljajo manipulativne strategije, ki so čustveno zlorabljajoče (Simonič, Rahne Mandelj in Novšak 2014, 120). Žrtev je ranljiva že zaradi samega dejstva, da je žrtev nasilja svojega partnerja, v odnosu, v katerem naj bi bil drugače prostor največje varnosti. K njeni ranljivosti prispeva še pomanjkanje globokega in trdnega odnosa z Bogom, ki za verne posameznike ni abstraktno ali oddaljeno bitje, ampak pomembna oseba, ki ima pomembno mesto v njihovem intimnem svetu. Tudi v trenutkih stresa in ranljivosti je ta odnos tisti, ki pomirja in daje trdnost in moč (Hill in Pargament 2003, 64–65). Kadar te povezave ni, se oseba oklepa zunanjih kriterijev, namesto da bi zaupala sebi, svojemu doživljanju in se oprla na svoj lastni notranji duhovni kapital. Posamezniki, ki to zmorejo, so sposobni bolje prenesti negotove in izzivalne izkušnje, pri tem pa se tudi laže oprejo na Boga, saj se ne zanašajo pasivno nanj ali ga celo zavrnejo, tako pa tudi bolj učinkovito rešujejo posledice stresorjev (Frederick et al. 2016, 560–561).

Žrtve so tudi bolj ranljive za pritiske nasilnežev, duhovnikov in verske skupnosti. Duhovniki in verska skupnost navadno zaradi neznanja in nelagodja ob soočanju z nasiljem žrtvam ne pomagajo, če se slepo oklepajo doktrine in poudarjajo le ideale krščanskega zakona, pri tem pa ne vključijo temeljnih dimenzij sočutja in razumevanja in nasilja ne vzamejo resno. Zavedati se je treba, da govorimo pri vernih žrtvah partnerskega nasilja o unikatni ranljivosti, saj se ne srečujejo le s praktičnimi in čustvenimi zapleti, ampak so prizadete tudi njihove duhovne potrebe. Žrtve se morda sprašujejo, ali je primerno za predanega kristjana, da zapusti partnerja in išče zatočišče drugje. Lahko se ukvarjajo s tem, ali Bog želi, da odpustijo partnerju »do sedemdesetkrat sedemkrat« (Mt 18,22), kakor pravi Sveto pismo o odpuščanju. Žrtve velikokrat čutijo razpetost med tem, kar uči verski nauk o pomenu krščanskega zakona in o ločitvi, in tem, kar doživljajo. Po drugi strani pa travmirani posameznik lahko tudi čuti, da ga je Bog zapustil, prevaral in se bo tako odvrnil od vere in od religiozne prakse. Za mnoge žrtve je v tej razdvojenosti laže prenašati nasilje in ohraniti vsaj iluzijo celovitosti in svetosti družine, kakor pa občutiti krivdo in se bati, da so grešne (Nason-Clark 2004, 304). Žrtev čuti, da je njena dolžnost, ljubiti in spoštovati moža do smrti in rešiti zakon ne glede na ceno. Zelo pogosto misli: če se bo trudila odpuščati, če bo molila in še bolj ljubila, se bo partner spremenil (McMullin idr. 2015, 117).

Turbulence na duhovnem področju in manipulacija z vero so velikokrat pomemben dejavnik, zaradi katerega je nasilje v krščanskem zakonu teže preprečiti ozi-

roma ustaviti. Zlasti nekatere teme in koncepti so se izkazali kot tisti, ki so v kr-
ščanski govorici in pojmovanju večkrat posebej namerno zlorabljeni (niso zlora-
bljajoči, zlorabijo pa jih lahko ljudje, če jih vzamejo iz konteksta in uporabijo za
manipulacijo) ali uporabljeni in v žrtvi povzročajo zmedo, krivdo in dvom. Večkrat
se napačno poudarja vidik ženske podreditve moškemu, češ da je to značilnost
dobre žene. Ta vidik se poudarja ločeno od poudarka enakega dostojanstva mo-
škega in ženske. (Rakoczy 2004, 31) Posebna vrednota je tudi svetost zakona, ki je
sveta in neločljiva vez, zato ga je treba ohraniti za vsako ceno (Westenberg 2017,
4). Poudarja se tudi pomen trpljenja (žrtev se zmotno vidi kot nedolžno jagnje
Kristus) ali prepričanje, da Bog nalaga trpljenje kot kazen za pretekle grehe; trplje-
nje žrtev lahko vidi kot božjo voljo in način, da jo Bog nečesa nauči; prav tako lah-
ko doživlja, da je Bog navzoč v njenem trpljenju, tudi če je nepravično, saj je to
njegova obljuba (Starkey 2015, 185–186). Poudarek je tudi na odpuščanju, ki je
resda zdravilno, vendar ne, če žrtev samo odpušča, nasilnež pa se ne spremeni.
Odpuščanje je ključno v procesu zdravljenja in je celosten proces, prezgodnje od-
puščanje pa lahko ta proces zdravljenja in rasti poškoduje. Odpustiti namreč ni
enako kakor pozabiti. (Erzar 2019, 13–14; Nason Clark 2004, 304)

5.   Sklep

Čeprav smo s pregledom literature izpostavili nekaj točk, ki so ali zaščita pred
nasiljem ali pa nasilje pospešujejo in upravičujejo, lahko rečemo, da je moč
posameznih dejavnikov najmočnejša v kombinaciji s še drugimi dejavniki.
Razmišljati tako velja o študijah, ki bi celostno obravnavale preplet posameznih
dejavnikov in integrirale v teoretične modele tudi druge spremenljivke
(sociokulturni vidiki, psihična zrelost, osebnostna struktura, čustvena dinamika in
regulacija afekta v nasilnem partnerskem odnosu). Še zdaleč ne moremo trditi,
da lahko neki izkrivljen vidik verskega nauka ali religiozne prakse povzroči nasilje,
zagotovo pa smemo reči, da v kombinaciji z drugimi dejavniki lahko prispeva k
njegovemu ohranjanju. Kakor smo videli, religioznost in vera sama po sebi nista
zlorabljajoči in tudi nista vzrok za nasilje. Ju je pa je mogoče zlorabiti kot izgovor
za ohranjanje dinamike nasilnega odnosa, v ozadju katerega je tako imenovana
travmatična vez, to je, čustvena odvisnost med dvema osebama v razmerju, za
katero so značilna obdobja zlorabe in nasilja in neravnovesje moči. Narava te vezi
je zaznamovana z občutki intenzivne navezanosti, s kognitivnim popačenjem in
vedenjskimi strategijami obeh posameznikov, ki paradoksno krepijo in vzdržujejo
vez, to pa odseva v začaranem krogu nasilja (Dutton in Painter 1993, 105). V tej
dinamiki so tudi verski vidiki popačeni in zlorabljeni in jih je težko uporabiti kot
pomoč in podporo za prekinitev nasilja.

Za nasilje ni opravičila in kot takšno mora biti obravnavano resno, brez izjeme,
vedno je treba zavzeti držo ničelne tolerance. V nasilju je zmeraj nekdo žrtev, ki
po krivici trpi in si v nobenem primeru tega ne zasluži (za konflikt vedno obstaja
rešitev brez nasilja). Veliko pa lahko pri tem naredimo z razumevanjem okoliščin,

ki prispevajo k nasilju. Tudi religiozni vidiki pri tem niso izključeni, čeprav jih ne moremo jemati kot glavne vzroke za ohranjanje ali prekinitev nasilja, lahko pa imajo posebno mesto v teh dinamikah. Strokovnjaki, ki delajo z žrtvami nasilja, so pred posebnim izzivom, kadar obravnavajo verne žrtve nasilja, če ob nasilju doživljajo tudi duhovne pretrese in zato tudi ne poskrbijo za svojo lastno zaščito. Prav tako tudi verska skupnost in duhovniki lahko s poznavanjem problematike partnerskega nasilja zavzamejo primerno držo ob soočanju z žrtvami in storilci in s celostno duhovno oskrbo veliko pripomorejo k preprečevanju in prekinitvi partnerskega nasilja. V globini in širini krščanske tradicije je dovolj virov, ki to omogočajo.

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Bojana Filej in Boris Miha Kaučič

Vpliv duhovnosti na kakovost življenja starejših v domačem in v institucionalnem okolju

The Influence of Spirituality on the Quality of Life of the Elderly in the Domestic and Institutional Environment

Povzetek: Duhovnost je večdimenzionalni koncept, ki usmerja človekovo življenje, se s starostjo krepi in vpliva na kakovost življenja. Z raziskavo smo želeli ugotoviti, kakšen je vpliv duhovnosti na kakovost življenja in ali molitev vpliva na preprečevanje osamljenosti starih ljudi v domačem in v institucionalnem okolju. Raziskava temelji na kvantitativni metodi, v raziskavo smo zajeli 656 starih ljudi v domačem in v institucionalnem okolju. Za pridobivanje podatkov o kakovosti življenja smo uporabili standardizirani vprašalnik Svetovne zdravstvene organizacije WHOQOL-BREF, za pridobivanje podatkov o osamljenosti pa Oldwellactive (A self-rated welness profile for the assessment of wellbeing and wellness activity in older people). Ugotovili smo, da se stari ljudje ne počutijo osamljeno in da so nekoliko bolj osamljeni v institucionalnem okolju (PV=3,71) kakor v domačem okolju (PV=3,90). Molijo tisti, ki so pogosteje osamljeni in ki niže ocenjujejo kakovost življenja. Molitev ne vpliva na preprečevanje osamljenosti. D*uhovni dejavnik je za stare ljudi najpomembnejši dejavnik, ki vpliva na njihovo kakovost življenja.*

Ključne besede: stari ljudje, duhovnost, molitev, kakovost življenja

Abstract: Spirituality is a multi-dimensional concept that directs human life, increases with age and affects the quality of life. With this research, we wanted to find out the impact of spirituality on the quality of life and whether prayer can have an influence on the prevention of loneliness of elderly people in the domestic and institutional environment. The research is based on a quantitative method. The survey involved 656 elderly people in the domestic and institutional environment. To obtain data on the quality of life, we used the standardized WHOQOL-BREF questionnaire of the World Health Organization, while for obtaining data on loneliness the Oldwellactive questionnaire was used (A self-rated wellness profile for the assessment of wellbeing and wellness activity in older people). We found out that elderly people do not feel lonely and that they somewhat feel lonelier in the institutional environment (AV = 3.71) than in the home environment (AV = 3.90). We have also found out that people who pray are mostly those who feel lonely more often and who have

an esteemed lower quality of life. Prayer does not affect the prevention of loneliness. The spiritual factor is the most important factor that affects the quality of life for the elderly people.

Key words: elderly people, spirituality, prayer, quality of life

1. Uvod

Prebivalstvo držav članic EU-27 se bo po predvidevanjih močno postaralo, delež oseb v starosti 65+ med skupnim prebivalstvom naj bi se v EU-27 povečal s 17,1 % na 30,0 % (Statistični urad Republike Slovenije 2009, 27). Dejstvo je, da so generacije, ki so sedaj zakoračile v tretje življenjsko obdobje, bolj zdrave, kakor so bile ob tej starosti prejšnje generacije. Zato in tudi zaradi zmanjšanja umrljivosti dojenčkov lahko pričakujemo podaljšanje pričakovanega trajanje življenja (Kožuh - Novak 2006, 12–13). V Sloveniji lahko ženske, rojene leta 2011, pričakujejo 53,8 in moški 54 zdravih let. Glede pričakovanih zdravih let življenja je Slovenija na samem repu med državami EU, za njo je le Slovaška (Eurostat 2013).

Jakoš (2009) navaja, da je sedanja demografska slika Slovenije posledica več kakor stoletnega demografskega razvoja treh demografskih dejavnikov: smrtnosti, rodnosti in selitev. Med dejavniki, ki vplivajo na prihodnji demografski razvoj, je praviloma najstabilnejša smrtnost, pri kateri lahko pričakujemo, da se bo s sedanjih 18 000–19 000 umrlih število povečalo na 30 000. Drugi pomembni dejavnik, ki vpliva na prihodnji demografski razvoj, je rodnost. Rodnost v Sloveniji pada, saj je iz projekcije do leta 2027 razvidno, da se bo zniževalo število žensk v najbolj rodni dobi, to pa je logična posledica vse nižjega števila rojstev po letu 1980.

Temeljna značilnost demografske prihodnosti evropske družbe je torej staranje. Vsak človek doživlja staranje in starost drugače. Vsak ima svoje značilnosti, ki jih je treba spoštovati, vsak ima tudi posebne potrebe, ki morajo biti zadovoljene, če želimo govoriti o kakovosti življenja v starosti.

Svetovna zdravstvena organizacija je kakovost življenja opredelila kot posameznikovo dojemanje življenja v kontekstu njegovih vrednot in v povezavi z njegovimi cilji, standardi, pričakovanji in interesi (WHO 1997). Danes navadno govorimo o konceptu kakovosti življenja, pri katerem je pomemben subjektivni večaspektni konstrukt, ki ga opredeljujemo in ocenjujemo na več načinov (Filej, Kröpfl in Kaučič 2015). Glavni elementi, ki po mnenju starejših vplivajo na kakovost njihovega življenja v starosti, so medosebni odnosi, dom in soseščina, dobro psihično počutje in videz, aktivnosti in konjički, s katerimi se sami ukvarjajo, dobro zdravje in funkcionalna sposobnost, socialne vloge, ustrezen dohodek, neodvisnost in nadzor nad življenjem (Bowling et al. 2003).

Na kakovost življenja starega človeka vpliva holistični pristop obravnave, obsegati mora fizični, psihični, socialni in duhovni vidik, ki pa je pogosto spregledan (Kaučič 2017).

2.   Duhovnost in kakovost življenja

Duhovnost pomeni prebujenost. Mnogi, tudi če se tega ne zavedajo, spijo. Rodijo se speči, živijo speči, speči se poročijo, speči vzgajajo otroke, tudi umro speči, ne da bi se sploh kdaj prebudili. Nikoli ne razumejo lepote tega, kar imenujemo »človeško življenje« (De Mello 1991). Duhovnost je večdimenzionalni pojem, ki ga oblikujejo družina, družba, ekonomski status, pripadnost neki določeni etnični skupini, kulturološki in mnogi drugi dejavniki. Duhovnost lahko vpliva tudi na oblikovanje pozitivizma, na vestnost in odgovornost ter na sovražnost (Matulić 2012). Pojem duhovno je zelo nejasen in mnogopomenski. Duhovnost je človekova temeljna usmeritev na življenjski poti, je povezovalec vsega v smiselno celoto (Ramovš J. in Ramovš M. 2013). Platovnjak (2012) meni, da je duhovnost nujno potrebna, še zlasti v tem razdvojenem času, in da se v tej besedi skriva nepregledna množica pojmov, ki so si največkrat protislovni in nimajo nič skupnega s krščansko duhovnostjo. Navaja tudi, da pomeni duhovnost način življenja ali življenjski slog.

Vsak posameznik je edinstven znotraj petih dimenzij holistične filozofije: telesne, emocionalne, intelektualne, socialne in duhovne. Navedene dimenzije so v nenehni interakciji. Duhovna dimenzija raziskuje človekovo iskanje življenjskega smisla, to mu je v pomoč pri premagovanju različnih življenjskih težav (Skoberne 2002). Duhovnost in vera nista sinonima, saj je duhovnost treba razumeti širše od vere (Mukherjee 2016). Skoberne (2002) povzema različne avtorje in sklene, da ima duhovnost dve dimenziji: horizontalno in vertikalno. Horizontalna dimenzija zadeva odnos s samim seboj in z drugimi ljudmi ter z okoljem. Ta dimenzija duhovnosti pomeni nereligiozno občutenje smisla življenja. Vertikalna dimenzija zadeva Boga, ki ga nekdo priznava, zadeva vesolje ali nekaj, kar je nad njim. Obe dimenziji človeku pomagata, da prepozna svoje lastne osebne vrednote in integracijo telesa, razuma in duha.

Duhovnost ni nasprotje telesnega in materialnega, temveč pomeni najvišjo kakovost popolnega človeka, prek katere je možno uresničevanje osebnosti. Ljudje so duhovna bitja, saj se nenehno sprašujejo: kdo sem, kaj je smisel mojega življenja, kaj smisel trpljenja, od kod sem, kam grem (Stojanović 2015).

Ramovš J. in Ramovš M. (2013, 447) navajata, da je duhovnost za kakovostno staranje obetavna človekova zmožnost, ki se s staranjem krepi, medtem ko telesne in duševne zmožnosti upadajo.

Ena od kategorij duhovnosti je molitev, ki za vernike pomeni vzpostavljanje stika in osebnega odnosa z Bogom. Z njo se želi molivec Bogu za kaj zahvaliti, ga za kaj prositi ali mu le posredovati svoja razmišljanja in čustva. Za molivca je molitev miselna, duševna, telesna in duhovna dejavnost, lahko je prosilna, zahvalna ali slavilna (Molitev 2018). Nastran (2015) poudarja, da je molitev za verujoče najbolj tipični odsev njegovega odnosa do Boga. Kaučič (2017) v svoji raziskavi ugotavlja, da slaba četrtina starih ljudi, vključenih v raziskavo, moli in da molijo tisti, ki so niže ocenili svojo kakovost življenja in so pogosteje bolj osamljeni. Vendar molitev ne vpliva na preprečevanje osamljenosti starih ljudi. Banthia et al. (2007) ugotavljajo, da obstaja povezava med ljudmi z nižjo izobrazbo in nižjim dohodkom ter

molitvijo in religioznostjo. Molitev je tudi povezana z manjšimi zdravstvenimi simptomi in boljšo kakovostjo življenja.

Višja je stopnja vernosti in duhovnosti, boljša je kakovost življenja (Rusa et al. 2014). Tudi Gallardo-Peralta (2017) ugotavlja specifično povezanost duhovnosti s kakovostjo življenja.

3. Vpliv osamljenosti na kakovost življenja

Človek je lahko osamljen v vseh življenjskih obdobjih. Štandeker (2016) meni, da je osamljenost kot duševno stanje resen problem današnje družbe. Osamljenost ni splošna značilnost starejše populacije, ali drugače povedano, stari ljudje niso nujno osamljeni. Če star človek nima zadovoljene potrebe po temeljnem ali osebnem medčloveškem odnosu z nekom, je po navajanju Rantove (2013) osamljen, pa naj je okrog njega še toliko ljudi. Potreba po osebnem medčloveškem odnosu je pri današnjih starih ljudeh med najmanj zadovoljenimi, zato je osamljenost ena od njihovih pogostejših in hujših stisk. Osamljenost je doživljanje človeka, ki nima zadovoljene temeljne človeške potrebe po osebnem odnosu z ljudmi. Graham (2012) navaja raziskavo, ki so jo opravili geriatri z univerze v Kaliforniji. Pravi, da so osamljenost definirali kot občutek pomanjkanja za človeka pomembnih stikov z drugimi ljudmi, spremljata ga žalost in duševna bolečina. Osamljenost je odvisna od subjektivnega doživljanja odnosov z drugimi ljudmi (od kakovosti in ne od kvantitete odnosov). Pečjak (2007) osamljenost v starosti razlaga z dvema teorijama. Po prvi teoriji stare ljudi izolira, diskriminira in izključuje družba, po drugi pa se sami umikajo iz družbenega življenja.

Ko umre partner, vrstniki, sorodniki, ostajajo stari ljudje vedno bolj sami, vendar je Kogoj (2011) prepričan: ni nujno, da so osamljeni vsi, ki živijo sami ali imajo malo stikov. Pri staranju, kakor navaja Grün (2012), se moramo najprej soočiti s svojo osamljenostjo in jo pozitivno sprejeti. Kdor je lahko sam s seboj, je sposoben tudi sklepati odnose in graditi prijateljstva. Ločiti je treba med samskostjo in osamljenostjo. Osamljenost je subjektivni občutek, da smo sami. Lahko nas spremlja občutek, da smo od drugih oseb zavrženi, zapuščeni, čeprav v resnici ni tako. Nekateri se počutijo osamljene, čeprav so v skupini z drugimi in čeprav imajo veliko število socialnih kontaktov.

Pogosto se dogaja, da se osebe počutijo bolj osamljene v srednji življenjski dobi. V tem obdobju so ljudje bolj usmerjeni v karierno in poklicno napredovanje in manj v medosebne odnose. S starostjo se zmanjšuje število prijateljskih odnosov in v tem obdobju je izbira prijateljev selektivna (Kristančič 2005). Littva in Králová (2016) menita, da imajo ljudje v srednji življenjski dobi in v starosti manj priložnosti za razpravo o svojih problemih z drugimi. Pogosto se počutijo zanemarjene in osamljene. Osamljenost je po njunem mnenju splošni problem sodobne družbe, v kateri si ljudje ne vzamejo dovolj časa za svoje sorodnike, pa tudi ne zase.

Na osamljenost vplivajo osebni dejavniki: zmanjšanje zmožnosti oblikovanja dobrih odnosov, pomanjkanje veščin za začetni kontakt, nezmožnost za intimnejši odnos z drugimi, sramežljivost, strah pred zavrženostjo, konflikt znotraj sebe glede spreminjajočih se čustev v odnosu, nezaupanje vase, nejasni občutki krivde, bojazni pred ljudmi nasploh, čustvena »revščina«, dosedanje neprijetne, travmatične izkušnje v odnosih do drugih. Z uporabo telefonov in računalnikov zmanjšujemo možnosti komunikacije »iz oči v oči«. Posledica tega je zmanjševanje števila medosebnih odnosov (Kristančič 2005).

Maček, Skela Savič in Zurc (2011) ugotavljajo, da občutek osamljenosti narašča s starostjo, z upadom zmožnosti za samostojno gibanje, s poslabšanjem odnosov v družini in s poslabšanjem sosedskih odnosov. Večja osamljenost je statistično pomembno navzoča pri starih ljudeh, ki so samski, ločeni in ovdoveli, v primerjavi s starimi ljudmi, ki so vezani.

Osamljenost je pri starih ljudeh pogosto povezana s kronično boleznijo (Alpass in Neville 2003), ženske jo bolj občutijo kakor moški (Neuberg in Canjuga 2015). Osamljenost je identificirana kot dejavnik tveganja, ki lahko vodi do resnih zdravstvenih problemov (Josić et al. 2014). Tudi Znika et al. (2016) v raziskavi ugotavljajo, da se stari ljudje s slabim zdravjem pogosto počutijo socialno izolirane, osamljene in živijo v strahu glede prihodnosti. Eshbaugh (2008) ugotavlja, da je pri nekaterih starejših ženskah, ki živijo same, navzoča osamljenost, vendar pa tega ne moremo posploševati na celotno populacijo. Rezultati so pokazali, da 13 % starih žensk negativno doživlja samskost, 37,7 % pa jo doživlja pozitivno. V samskem življenju najbolj uživajo zato, ker so same sebi gospodar, ker so neodvisne od drugih in ker lahko imajo svoj urnik aktivnosti. Kot pozitivno izpostavljajo tudi, da lahko jedo tisto, kar imajo rade, da imajo kontrolo nad televizorjem, da imajo miren dom in da jim ni treba skrbeti za nikogar.

Raziskava, ki so jo Leskovic, Leskovar in Miglič (2012) opravili med zaposlenimi v desetih socialnih zavodih v Sloveniji, je pokazala, da večina zaposlenih meni: starost je osamljena, umirjena, utrujena in težka. Slabi tretjini respondentov se starost kot življenjsko obdobje zdi lepa, preostali respondenti pa menijo, da starost ni lepa.

Večje število družinskih članov navadno pomeni manjšo možnost za osamljenost. Družine na podeželju imajo tradicionalno več otrok kakor družine v mestih. Vendar pa so na podeželju pogoste dnevne migracije v bližnja mesta, ki ponujajo več možnosti za zaposlitev. V nekaterih podeželskih okoljih se zelo hitro zmanjšuje število prebivalcev, zlasti mlajših, ki se zaradi zaposlitve trajno odselijo. Starejši ostajajo pogosto osamljeni tako v mestih kakor tudi na podeželju, vendar se število samskih gospodinjstev hitreje povečuje na podeželju. Malo verjetno je tudi, da bi ljudje, ki so vse življenje živeli sami, v starosti želeli spremeniti način življenja. Tudi če se preselijo v socialnovarstveni zavod (dom), raje živijo v sobi, v kateri so sami. V domovih je za tiste, ki si želijo družabnih aktivnosti, dobro poskrbljeno. V urbanih okoljih se dogaja, da je posameznik (star človek) kljub množici sosedov socialno neviden (Kogoj 2011). Josić et al. (2014) ugotavljajo, da je zaznavanje

osamljenosti večje pri starih ljudeh, ki živijo v domačem okolju, kakor pri tistih, ki živijo v domovih za starejše. To si lahko razlagamo z dejstvom, da v socialnovarstvenih zavodih pretežno živijo stari ljudje, ki se med seboj pogovarjajo, se med seboj razumejo in se obračajo drug na drugega.

Z raziskavo smo želeli ugotoviti, kakšen je vpliv duhovnosti na kakovost življenja in ali molitev vpliva na preprečevanje osamljenosti starih ljudi v domačem in v institucionalnem okolju.

4. Metoda

V raziskavi smo uporabili kvantitativni raziskovalni pristop, metodo deskripcije, kompilacije in kavzalno neeksperimentalno metodo.

4.1 Opis instrumenta

Za pridobivanje podatkov o kakovosti življenja smo uporabili standardizirani vprašalnik Svetovne zdravstvene organizacije WHOQOL-BREF (Skevington et al., 2004) in za pridobivanje podatkov o osamljenosti vprašalnik Oldwellactive (A self-rated welness profile for the assessment of wellbeing and wellness activity in older people) avtorjev Koistinena et al. (2013). Za uporabo obeh vprašalnikov smo pridobili dovoljenje avtorjev. K obema vprašalnikoma smo dodali še vprašanja o demografskih podatkih. Vprašalnik o kakovosti življenja je obsegal 25 vprašanj, ki so zadevala življenje starega človeka. Na vprašanja je bilo možno odgovoriti na več načinov: zelo slabo, slabo, niti slabo niti dobro, dobro, zelo dobro; zelo nezadovoljen, nezadovoljen, niti nezadovoljen niti zadovoljen, zadovoljen, zelo zadovoljen; nič, malo, zmerno, veliko, zelo veliko; nič, malo,d zmerno, v glavnem, popolnoma; nikoli, redko, pogosto, zelo pogosto, vedno. Strinjanje na trditve so respondenti ocenjevali po 5-stopenjski Likertovi lestvici (1 – sploh se ne strinjam, 2 – ne strinjam se, 3 – ne morem se opredeliti, 4 – se strinjam, 5 – popolnoma se strinjam). Vprašalnik o osamljenosti je obsegal 9 vprašanj in 9 trditev. V vprašanjih je bilo ponujenih več možnih odgovorov, stopnjo strinjanja z navedenimi trditvami pa so prav tako ocenjevali z uporabo 5-stopenjske Likertove lestvice.

4.2 Opis vzorca

V raziskavi smo uporabili preprosti naključnostni vzorec in se odločili za stratificirano vzorčenje po regijah. Glede na velikost populacije 65 let in več smo po statističnih regijah izbrali proporcialno stratifikacijo (velikosti vzorca v stratumih so sorazmerne velikosti stratuma). Za izračun vzorca smo uporabili Creative Research Systems, Sample Size Calculator (2012).

V raziskavo smo vključili 1064 starih ljudi, pri tem smo upoštevali naslednja vključitvena merila: starost 65+, moški in ženski spol, regija bivanja, lokacija bivanja (domače okolje, socialnovarstveni zavod), brez demence in drugih duševnih motenj, zmožnost sporazumevanja in bralna pismenost.

V raziskavi je sodelovalo 656 anketirancev, povprečno starih 78,2 leti, večinoma ovdovelih, in 33,9 % jih je imelo srednješolsko izobrazbo (tabela 1).

Demografski dejavnik		n = 656	%
Spol	Moški	186	28,4
	Ženski	470	71,6
Zakonski stan	Poročen	246	37,5
	Samski	48	7,3
	Ovdovel	302	46,0
	Ločen, odtujen	43	6,6
	Zunajzakonska skupnost	17	2,6
Izobrazba	Osnovnošolska	132	20,1
	Poklicna	146	22,3
	Srednješolska	229	33,9
	Višja, visokošolska	97	14,8
	Univerzitetna in več	52	7,9
		PV ± SO	Razpon
Starost (v letih)		78,2 ± 8,0	65–98

Tabela 1: *Demografske značilnosti anketiranih po spolu, zakonskem stanu, izobrazbi in po starosti.*

4.3   Opis poteka raziskave in obdelave podatkov

Raziskava je potekala v 21 socialnovarstvenih zavodih, v desetih statističnih regijah in v domačem okolju. Anketirani so bili naključno izbrani in so izpolnjevali vključitvene kriterije. V vsako okolje smo razdelili 532 anketnih vprašalnikov, skupaj torej 1064. Pravilno izpolnjenih vprašalnikov je bilo 656, se pravi, da je bila realizacija vzorca 61,6 %, v domačem okolju 57,9 %, to pa kaže na boljše zdravstveno stanje starih ljudi.

Pri zbiranju podatkov je sodelovalo 43 anketarjev. Za izpolnitev vprašalnika v domačem okolju so anketirani potrebovali od 45 do 69 minut, v socialnovarstvenih zavodih do 120 minut. Ustrezno izpolnjene vprašalnike smo šifrirali (določili ID) in podatke vnesli v matriko za vnos podatkov (Excel).

Podatke smo analizirali z metodami opisne in inferenčne statistike. Najprej smo spremenljivkam izračunali srednje vrednosti (aritmetična sredina) in mere variabilnosti (standardni odklon). Sklope posameznih spremenljivk smo združili v nove spremenljivke. Pri sklepanju z vzorca na populacijo (inferenca) smo izvajali statistične teste, kakor so t-test (za primerjavo povprečij dveh neodvisnih skupin), test ANOVA (za primerjavo povprečij več skupin), hi-kvadrat test (za testiranje neodvisnosti nominalnih spremenljivk). Povezanost ordinalnih spremenljivk smo preverjali s Spearmanovim rangom korelacij. Analiza je bila izvedena s programom SPSS 22.0.

5. Rezultati

Prikazani rezultati so del širše raziskave, v kateri smo merili kakovost življenja, zadovoljstvo z življenjem in samospoštovanje starega človeka. V nadaljevanju bomo prikazali rezultate vpliva duhovnosti na kakovost življenja starih ljudi, ki živijo v socialnovarstvenih zavodih in v domačem okolju, in vpliv molitve kot kategorije duhovnosti na osamljenost.

	Institucionalno okolje n = 276		Domače okolje n = 380		T	p
	PV	SO	PV	SO		
Kako pogosto se počutite osamljene?	3,71	1,27	3,90	1,19	-1,861	0,063
Kako pogosto se vam zdi, da nimate nikogar, s komer bi se lahko pogovorili o osebnih zadevah?	3,86	1,19	3,89	1,15	–0,276	0,783

Tabela 2: *Navzočnost osamljenosti pri starih ljudeh.*
PV – povprečna vrednost, SO –standardni odklon, DSO – institucionalno varstvo;
t-t test za neodvisne vzorce, p – statistična verjetnost, 1 – dnevno, 2 – tedensko, 3 – mesečno, 4 – redko, 5 – nikoli.

Iz tabele 2 je razvidno, da se stari ljudje ne počutijo osamljeno (PV med 4 – redko in 5 – nikoli). Glede na okolje bivanja pa ni večjih razlik v pogostosti občutka osamljenosti.

Skupinska statistika				
	Lokacija bivanja	N	PV	SO
Osamljenost	Domače okolje	372	3,90	1,186
	Institucionalno okolje	269	3,71	1,271

Tabela 3: *Osamljenost starih ljudi glede na lokacijo bivanja.*
N – število; PV – povprečna vrednost; SO – standardni odklon, 1 – dnevno,
2 – tedensko, 3 – mesečno, 4 – redko, 5 – nikoli.

Iz tabele 3 je razvidno, da se stari ljudje v institucionalnem okolju počutijo nekoliko bolj osamljeno (PV = 3,71) kakor stari ljudje v domačem okolju (PV = 3,90).

		Levenov test za enakost varianc		t-test za enakost povprečne vrednosti				95 % interval zaupanja za razliko	
		F	p	t	df	p	Razlike v PV	Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
Osamlje-nost	Predpostavljeni enaki varianci	6,839	,009	**–1,881**	639	**,060**	–,184	–,376	,008
	Predpostavljeni različni varianci			–1,861	553,368	,063	–,184	–,378	,010

Tabela 4: *Test neodvisnih vzorcev glede vpliva lokacije bivanja na preprečevanje občutka osamljenosti.*
F – statistika; p – statistična pomembnost; t – statistika; df – stopinje prostosti; PV – povprečna vrednost.

Iz tabele 4 je razvidno, da ni statistično pomembnih razlik med tistimi, ki bivajo doma, in tistimi, ki bivajo v institucionalnem okolju. Lokacija bivanja ne vpliva na pogostost osamljenosti v starosti (p = 0,060).

Skupinska statistika				
	Molitev	N	PV	SO
Osamljenost (v87)	Da	144	3,68	1,266
	Ne	497	3,86	1,211

Tabela 5: *Opravljanje molitve za preprečevanje osamljenosti v starosti.*
N – število; PV – povprečna vrednost; SO – standardni odklon.

Stari ljudje navajajo, da se kdaj pa kdaj vsak mesec ali redko počutijo osamljene. Iz tabele 5 je razvidno, da so tisti, ki opravljajo molitev (PV = 3,68), pogosteje osamljeni kakor tisti, ki molitve ne opravljajo (PV = 3,86). Vprašalnik Oldwellactive vrednoti vrednost 3 kot mesečno osamljenost in 4 – kot redko osamljenost človeka. Obe povprečni vrednosti se bližata vrednosti 4.

Test neodvisnih vzorcev								
		Levenov test za enakost varianc		t-test za enakost povprečne vrednosti				
							95 % interval zaupanja za razliko	
		F	p	t	df	p	Razlike v PV	Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
Osamljenost	Predpostavljeni enaki varianci	3,885	,049	**−1,560**	639	**,119**	−,181	−,408	,047
	Predpostavljeni različni varianci			−1,522	224,288	,129	−,181	−,414	,053

Tabela 6: *Test neodvisnih vzorcev glede vpliva molitve na preprečevanje osamljenosti.*
F – statistika; p – statistična pomembnost; t-statistika; df – stopinje prostosti; PV – povprečna vrednost.

Iz tabele 6 je razvidno, da ni statistično pomembnih razlik med tistimi, ki molijo, in tistimi, ki ne molijo. Molitev ne vpliva na preprečevanje osamljenosti med starimi ljudmi.

Skupinska statistika				
	Molitev	N	PV	SO
Kakovost življenja	Da	145	3,41	,894
	Ne	498	3,63	,762

Tabela 7: *Vpliv opravljanja molitve na kakovost življenja.*
N-število; PV-povprečna vrednost; SO-standardni odklon

Iz tabele 7 je razvidno, da molitev opravlja 145 (22,24 %) starih ljudi; 498 (77,76 %) jih je odgovorilo, da ne molijo. Tisti, ki opravljajo molitev, so niže ocenili kakovost življenja (PV = 3,41) kakor tisti, ki molitve ne opravljajo (PV = 3,63), vendar je med njimi zelo majhna razlika.

6. Razprava

Z raziskavo smo ugotovili, da se stari ljudje ne počutijo osamljeno, nekoliko bolj so osamljeni v institucionalnem varstvu, lokacija bivanja pa ne vpliva na pogostost občutka osamljenosti. Molijo tisti, ki so pogosteje osamljeni, vendar molitev ne vpliva na preprečevanje osamljenosti. Tudi kakovost življenja so ocenili nižje kakor tisti, ki ne molijo.

Naimi et al. (2018) so ugotovili, da molitev vpliva na kakovost življenja in da se kakovost življenja poveča z uvajanjem verskih intervencij s poudarkom na molitvi. Navedene rezultate so ugotovili pri pacientih s stalnim srčnim vzpodbujevalnikom. Podobno je ugotovil Robinson-Smith (2002): da se pri pacientih po kapi z molitvijo poveča kakovost življenja, da je molitev ena od pomembnih strategij soočanja z boleznijo, da je zaznati duhovno rast pri pacientih in da se spremenijo duhovni pogledi na življenje. Ross et al. (2008) so na vzorcu 2262 moških in žensk z rakom preučevali molitev za zdravje v povezavi z dobrim oziroma boljšim zdravstvenim stanjem. Ugotovili so, da obstaja povezava med kakovostjo življenja in duhovnostjo in da odrasli Američani, vključeni v raziskavo, pogosto molijo za zdravje. Podobno so ugotovili tudi Walton in Sullivan (2004) ter Krupski, Kwan in Fink (2006): da obstaja pozitivna povezanost med duhovnostjo in kakovostjo življenja ali zadovoljstvom med moškimi z rakom na prostati.

Na kakovost življenja vplivajo tudi kronične bolezni: to so v raziskavi, izvedeni med 100 anketiranci, starejšimi od 65 let, ugotovili Filej, Kröpfl in Kaučič (2015). Z večanjem števila kroničnih bolezni se namreč zmanjšuje kakovost življenja. Banthia et al. (2007) so v raziskavi med 155 anketiranimi ugotovili, da je molitev povezana s stopnjo zdravja in z boljšo kakovostjo življenja in da obstaja korelacija med vero in molitvijo ter nižjo izobrazbo in nižjimi dohodki anketiranih.

Povezanost duhovnosti in zadovoljstva z življenjem med starimi v domačem in v institucionalnem okolju je preučeval Mukherjee (2016, 336). Rezultati so pokazali, da duhovnost vključuje sistem prepričanj, ki obsegajo ljubezen, sočutje in spoštovanje življenja. Govorimo o odnosih s samim seboj, z drugimi in z načinom življenja. Avtor je ugotovil, da ima duhovnost večinoma pozitivne učinke na počutje in na zadovoljstvo z življenjem v poznem starostnem obdobju. Stari ljudje, ki so bili vključeni v raziskavo, so sprejeli duhovnost kot pomembno v njihovem življenju. Zavedajo se, da jim duhovnost pomaga v starosti, tako se laže soočajo s starostjo in s procesi, značilnimi za to obdobje. Zaradi duhovnosti se laže soočajo z izgubami bližnjih in z drugimi težavami v starosti.

Rahimi et al. (2013, 163) so med zdravimi starimi ljudmi opravili polstrukturirane intervjuje in ugotovili, da je duhovnost pomembna za vsakega posameznika in da vpliva na njihovo zdravje. Duhovnost je osnovni element, ki jim pomaga pri prilagajanju na vsakodnevne življenjske situacije. Tudi Elo (2016) pravi, da je zaznavanje duhovnosti ključni faktor, ki prispeva k dobremu počutju med starejšimi.

Močno povezanost med duhovnostjo in duševnim zdravjem med starimi, ki so živeli v lokalni skupnosti, sta v svoji raziskavi ugotovila Meisenhelder in Chandler

(2002). Ugotovila sta tudi, da kategorije duhovnosti (molitev, vera, religija) močneje vplivajo na mentalno zdravje kakor pa kategorije fizičnega zdravja.

Soriano et al. (2016) so izvedli napovedno korelacijsko raziskavo (raziskava povezav z namenom napovedovanja) med 200 naključno izbranimi starimi ljudmi v stanovanjski skupnosti in v domovih za starejše (institucionalno okolje) in ugotovili, da institucionalizacija v domu za starejše pozitivno vpliva na njihovo duhovnost in kakovost življenja in da ima duhovnost neposredne pozitivne učinke na dimenzije kakovosti življenja. Mok, F. Wong in D. Wong (2010) so izvedli fenomenološke intervjuje med petnajstimi terminalno bolnimi pacienti in ugotovili, da je duhovnost integrirana s telesom in umom. Navajajo, da je duhovnost multidimenzionalni koncept.

Duhovnost, dobro počutje in upanje imajo pomembno vlogo pri občutku zadovoljstva z življenjem za paciente z rakom (Jafari et al. 2010). Velasco-Gonzales in Rioux (2014) sta želela identificirati napovednike za duhovno dobro počutje starih ljudi. Raziskava je bila izvedena med ljudmi v starosti 60–95 let. Ugotovila sta, da niti zdravstveno stanje niti starost nista statistično pomembna napovednika za duhovno dobro počutje. Opravljena študija omogoča boljše razumevanje koncepta duhovnega blagostanja. Podobno so ugotovili tudi Tomás et al. (2016) med 224 stanovalci stanovanjske skupnosti v Španiji, saj so dognali, da je duhovnost ključni element uspešnega staranja.

Robinson-Smith (2002) je ugotovil, da ljudje, ki so doživeli težko življenjsko izkušnjo, ponovno preučijo duhovni vidik svojega življenja in da ta vpliva na njihovo duhovno rast in razvoj. Tudi Gallardo-Peralta Lorena (2017) je na podlagi raziskave med 777 starimi ljudmi z regresijsko analizo ugotovila specifično povezanost med duhovnostjo in kakovostjo življenja.

7. Omejitev raziskave

Omejitev raziskave vidimo v izbrani samo kvantitativni raziskovalni metodi, saj bi bili nekateri podatki, pridobljeni s kvalitativno metodo, drugačni, ker bi nas tedaj zanimal posameznik in ne celotna preučevana populacija. Drugo omejitev vidimo v načinu pridobivanja podatkov, saj anketiranim ni bila zagotovljena popolna anonimnost. Pri izpolnjevanju vprašalnika so jim namreč pomagali anketarji.

Tudi vprašalnik je bil razmeroma zelo zahteven in obsežen. Na vprašanja in trditve je bilo možno odgovarjati z različnimi merskimi lestvicami; nekatera vprašanja so bila teže razumljiva in jih je bilo treba dodatno pojasniti, saj jih anketirani niso v polnosti razumeli; stari ljudje v institucionalnem okolju so bili na splošno v slabšem psihofizičnem stanju in so tudi teže izpolnjevali vprašalnik; izobrazbena struktura vseh vključenih v raziskavo je bila sorazmerno nizka.

Izvedba raziskave je bila glede na obseg časovno zamudna in logistično zahtevna, saj je potekala v vseh statističnih regijah v Republiki Sloveniji, vendar smo v raziskavo zajeli le 21 (22,3 %) od 94 socialno varstvenih zavodov.

Tudi vzorec (n = 656) anketirancev je bil glede na celotno populacijo starih ljudi v Sloveniji sorazmerno majhen, vendar ne glede na to, da vzorec ni reprezentativen, lahko na podlagi analize rezultatov širše raziskave te rezultate posplošimo na populacijo starih ljudi. Pridobljeni rezultati so namreč plod analize, ki je bila narejena na uravnoteženem študijskem načrtu in na uravnoteženih podatkih.

Glavna ugotovitev naše raziskave je torej, da je duhovni dejavnik za stare ljudi najpomembnejši dejavnik, ki vpliva na njihovo kakovost življenja. Ker pa je duhovni dejavnik najmanj raziskan dejavnik, je naša raziskava dobro izhodišče za nadaljnje raziskovanje.

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Mednarodno združenje za moralno teologijo in socialno etiko:
39. strokovni kongres Krščanska etika živali
Briksen, 8.–11. 9. 2019

Okrog osemdeset moralnih teologov in socialnih etikov pretežno iz nemško govorečega področja se je od 8. do 11. septembra 2019 zbralo na 39. strokovnem kongresu v Briksnu, ki je bil posvečen živalski etiki s krščanskega zornega kota. Predsedujoči združenju, južnotirolski moralni teolog Martin Lintner, je vodil srečanje z veliko zavzetostjo in osebno angažiranostjo za okrepitev etične zavesti med kristjani glede njihovega odnosa do živali. V preteklem letu je izdal obširno monografijo o tej temi, ki bo v kratkem izšla tudi v slovenskem prevodu. Etika živali v zgodovini krščanske teologije ni igrala pomembne vloge. Na porast splošnega zanimanja v družbi za odnos do živali se teologija danes odziva na dva načina: del teologov in teologinj kritično gleda na dosedanjo zgodovino in vidi v živalih od Boga ustvarjena bitja, ki imajo svojo lastno vrednost in dostojanstvo, zato mora človek spremeniti svoj odnos do živali, drugi pa so kritični nasproti sodobni pozornosti do živali, saj naj bi ogrožala biblični pogled na posebno mesto človeka v stvarstvu. S prevelikim poudarjanje pravic živali naj bi namreč izgubili samo jedro teologije, ki poudarja, da je samo človek ustvarjen po božji podobi. Vsi predavatelji in velika večina udeležencev na kongresu v Briksnu so bili bliže prvi skupini, ki se zaveda, da je nujno treba na novo premisliti odnos med človekom in živalmi, človekovo spoštovanje živali in njihovega dobrega in človekovo odgovornost za živali, ki jo ima pred Stvarnikom.

V uvodnem predavanju je biolog Kurt Kotrschal predstavil najnovejša dognanja glede vedênja živali, ki v marsičem znižujejo predstave o posebnosti človeka. Za veliko reči, ki smo jih pripisovali izključno človeku, danes vemo, da so v neki določeni meri navzoče tudi v živalih. To velja tudi za področje mentalnih sposobnosti. Kotrschal je bil kritičen do Descartesa in novoveške filozofije, ki je zaradi mehaničnega pogleda na resničnost ugotovila, da živali nimajo duše in da so zato podobne strojem. Na podlagi opazovanja živalskega vedenja lahko sklepamo, da imajo tudi živali neko določeno mero zavesti, sposobne so učenja, povezovanja v skupine … Više razvite živali imajo možnost nadzora svojega vedenja, sposobne so mentalnih predstav in kognitivnih procesov, imajo možnost spominjanja in čustvovanja. Na podlagi opazovanja vedenja živali lahko jasno sklenemo, da obstaja kontinuiteta med živalmi in človekom na različnih ravneh.

Filozof Markus Wild je v svojem predavanju skušal odgovoriti na temeljno vprašanje, ali ljudje sploh lahko karkoli vemo o notranjem življenju živali. Argumentirano je pokazal, da lahko tudi živalim pripišemo neko določeno obliko kognitivnih

stanj in stanja zavesti. Hkrati pa je opozoril na pretiravanja pri nekritičnem postavljanju vzporednic med človekom in živalmi. Dejansko ne moremo vedeti, kaj je vsebina intencionalnosti neke določene živali, vendar lahko v neki določeni meri v smislu analogije predvidevamo, kaj žival misli in doživlja.

Herwig Grimm, ki je avtor več del s področja živalske etike, je predstavil različne konceptualne pristope k temu področju (konsekvencialistični, deontološki, kontraktualistični …). Različnim pristopom je skupen moralni individualizem, po katerem tudi na področju živalske etike velja načelo, da se je treba do vsake živali vesti v skladu z njenimi posebnimi značilnostmi. Čim večja je podobnost s človekom, tem večje naj bi bilo tudi spoštovanje, čim manj je podobnosti, tem manjše je tudi moralno spoštovanje. Grimm je bil kritičen do takšnih pogledov, saj lahko omogočajo človeku alibi za opravičevanje moralnega zla, ki ga povzročamo živalim.

Po bolj filozofsko obarvanem uvodnem delu so sledila predavanja s področja biblične teologije. Ute Neumann - Gorsolke je pregledno povzela pojmovanje živali v starozaveznih knjigah. Še posebno domače rejne živali imajo svojo domovinsko pravico v družinah. Pravičnost človeka se kaže v tem, da skrbi za življenje (*nefeš*) živali. Neumann - Gorsolkejeva je poudarila, da obstaja v Svetem pismu ista beseda za življenjski dih pri človeku in pri živalih: *nefeš,* to pa pomeni, da imajo tudi živali svojo lastno vrednost, ki jim je dana od Boga. Prav tako imajo živali pravico do sobotnega počitka. Svetopisemski pogled pa vsekakor človeka postavlja nad živali, saj lahko človek razpolaga z živalmi za hrano in za pomoč pri delu.

Fundamentalna teologinja Julia Enxing je pozvala k kritičnemu premisleku o antropocentrični paradigmi znotraj krščanske teologije in spodbudila k dekonstrukciji človeka kot tistega, ki se postavlja nad stvarstvo. Po njenem prepričanju je človek del skupnega stvarjenjskega procesa in zgolj ena od entitet znotraj sveta, ne pa višek stvarstva. Enxingova je poudarila, da je za stvarjenjsko teologijo višek stvarstva sobota, ne pa človek. Resno je vzela tudi svarilo nekaterih filozofov, ki krščanstvu očitajo specizem (diskriminacija na podlagi pripadnosti neki določeni vrsti), in se zavzela za planetarno solidarnost do živali kot soustvarjenih bitij.

Po prepričanju teologinje Brigit Hegewald, ki se ukvarja z odgovornostjo do živali, je prav koncept »soustvarjenosti« temeljni svetopisemski koncept, ki poudarja sorodnost med človekom in preostalimi ustvarjenimi bitji. Vsa ustvarjena bitja imajo vrednost v sebi in s tem tudi neke določene pravice, človek, ki je ustvarjen po božji podobi, pa ima poleg pravic tudi dolžnosti in odgovornosti. Hegewaldova je poudarila pomen okrožnice *Laudato Si´* za oblikovanje krščanske etike odgovornosti do drugih živih bitij.

Moralni teolog Marcus Vogt se je zelo sistematično lotil dveh konkretnih vprašanj z etičnega vidika: pogojev za rejo živali in izumrtja nekaterih živalskih vrst. Vogt je kritično ugotovil, da je kljub velikanski vsoti, ki jo EU namenja kmetijstvu, veliko kmetov propadlo v zadnjih dvajsetih letih, to pa ima negativne posledice za način kmetovanja, ki bi omogočal trajnostni razvoj. Za etična merila Vogt predlaga »dobro živali« (*Tierwohl*) in ne zgolj zaščite živalske vrste. Živali imajo nekatere svoboščine in morajo biti rešene lakote in žeje, strahu in stresa, poškodovanja,

bolečine in bolezni. Pri zagotavljanje teh pravic ima teologija pomembno vlogo: lahko je partner v javnem diskurzu, lahko sistematično poglablja svojo refleksijo, lahko nadaljuje svojo tradicionalno povezanost z ljudmi v kmečkem okolju in je lahko zaradi razpredenosti po vsem svetu pomemben globalni igralec.

Živinozdravnica Anita Idel je opozorila na škodljive posledice človekove želje po maksimiranju naših posegov v naravno okolje. Pokazala je na temeljne naravne procese, ki omogočajo skupno življenje vseh živih bitij, in na uničevalne učinke, ki jih za naravo prinašata intenzivno kmetijstvo in množična reja živali.

Etik Kurt Remele je s kritičnim tonom predstavil živalske produkte, ki jih ljudje uporabljamo poleg prehranjevanja. Zaradi potrošniške logike pogosto povsem nepremišljeno posegamo po usnju, volni, svili, perju in po kožuhu. Nazorno in šo-kantno je prikazal nekatere postopke pridobivanja teh stvari, ki so prevečkrat po-vezane z nepotrebno bolečino živali.

Moralni teolog Michael Rosenberger se je kritično izrazil do prevelike potrošnje mesa pri prehranjevanju. Ne nasprotuje živinoreji na splošno, ampak se zavzema za živinorejo, ki omogoča živalim prosto gibanje in na koncu tudi neboleço smrt. Pri takšnem načinu živinoreje je končna cena mesa dvakrat dražja od sedanje, vendar bi si ob hkratni omejitvi mesa na naših jedilnikih lahko to tudi privoščili.

Glavni organizator kongresa Martin Lintner se je v svojem sklepnem referatu dotaknil vprašanja, v kakšni meri so živali navzoče v krščanskem bogoslužju. Pri analizi liturgičnih besedil je ugotovil, da živali zelo redko pridejo do izraza. Veliko-krat se njihove podobe uporabljajo za upodabljanje zlih duhov. Celotno stvarstvo je pozitivno ovrednoteno v četrti evharistični molitvi, vendar tudi tukaj živali niso posebno izpostavljene. Lintner je navedel nekaj temeljnih elementov, ki bi jih lah-ko uporabili za umestev živali v liturgično govorico: živali so izraz božje nežnosti (Ps 104), obstaja skupna končna usoda živali in človeka (Prd, 1 Mz 1-2), živali trpi-jo zaradi nas ljudi, živali so partnerice zaveze med Bogom in človekom. Lintner zagovarja stališče, da potrebujemo liturgična besedila, ki bodo vključevala skrb za živali (npr. blagoslov živali).

Sklepno predavanje je imela filozofinja Claudia Paganini. Izpostavila je etične izzive na področju poskusov z živalmi, ki jih potrebujemo za razvoj na področju medicine. Prepričana je, da se lahko bistveno omeji število poskusov in s tem zmanjša število poskusnih živali. Prav tako bi morali tem živalim zagotoviti ustre-zen življenjski prostor, saj imajo pogosto premalo gibalnega prostora in so ome-jeni v socialnih stikih. Pogledati bi bilo treba, kakšne so alternative, in ustrezno poskrbeti za živali tudi po samih poskusih.

Poleg vabljenih referentov na plenarnih predavanjih so bili na kongresu še šte-vilni krajši referati in možnost ogleda plakatov, na katerih so raziskovalci predsta-vljali svoje aktualne projekte. Teme so bile zelo raznovrstne: od temeljnih vprašanj vesti, dostojanstva, svetosti osebe, prednostne izbire za uboge pa do popolnoma konkretnih vprašanj odnosa do domačih živali, živali v poizkusih in živalskih robo-tov z umetno inteligenco. Kongres se je končal s podijsko razpravo, na kateri so sodelovali lokalna političarka, predsednik evropskega združenja znanosti o živalih,

profesor krščanskega družbenega nauka in novinar RAI. Razprava je pokazala, da se je v zadnjem obdobju občutljivost za varovanje okolja in za odgovoren odnos do živali resda povečala na vseh ravneh, vendar je treba vložiti še več znanja in moči, da bi dosegli korenit obrat v globalni družbi.

Kongres je bil odlično organiziran. Predavatelji so osvetlili problematiko člove-kovega odnosa do živali z različnih zornih kotov: z naravoslovnega, družbenega, filozofskega, teološkega, medijskega in s političnega. Etika živali je tako končno dobila svojo domovinsko pravico tudi v katoliški Cerkvi in v teologiji. Živali so bož-je stvaritve in delijo mnoge lastnosti s človekom, zato jim moramo priznati njiho-vo lastno vrednost in z njimi ne moremo poljubno razpolagati. Nazorni zgledi ne-primernih življenjskih razmer pri množični živinoreji in nepotrebnega trpljenja, ki ga živalim povzroča človeka – izpostavili so jih predavatelji –, udeležencev niso pustili neprizadetih. Kongres je izzvenel kot klic k angažiranju znotraj sodobne družbe, predvsem pa znotraj Cerkve, za širitev zavesti, da so živali naše partnerice v ekološkem sobivanju in da imamo do njih etične dolžnosti in odgovornosti.

<div align="right">Roman Globokar</div>

Patristični študiji:
18. mednarodna konferenca

Oxford, 19.–24. avgust 2019

Letošnje poletje je v Oxfordu potekala že 18. mednarodna konferenca patrističnih študij (XVIII. International Conference in Patristic Studies), ki je – kakor ji pravijo – »mati vseh patrističnih simpozijev«. Že vse od leta 1951 dalje poteka v tem starodavnem angleškem mestecu, poznanem po svetovljanskem in intelektualnem renomeju. Sprva je bila oxfordska konferenca zamišljena kot ekumensko srečanje neke določene skupine, pretežno kleriških strokovnjakov za področje zgodnjekrščanskih študij, z leti pa je prerasla številne okvire in postala najprestižnejše srečanje učenjakov tega področja z vseh celin. Znanstveno konferenco organizira Teološka fakulteta oxfordske univerze prek sveta profesorjev različnih britanskih univerz v sodelovanju z dvema največjima svetovnima patrološkima organizacijama, Association Internationale des Études Patristiques (AIEP/IAPS) in North American Patristics Society (NAPS).

Osemnajsta izvedba je postregla z nadaljevanjem trenda rasti, saj je na konferenci sodelovalo kar okrog tisoč strokovnjakov z različnih področij preučevanja zgodnjega krščanstva. Poleg številnih izjemno zanimivih plenarnih predavanj, ki so jih imeli nekateri najbolj ugledni znanstveniki (npr. John Behr, Lorenzo Perrone, Wendy Mayer, Antony Dupont, Robin Jensen), so udeleženci nastopili bodisi s kratkimi referati bodisi so sodelovati v tako imenovanih delavnicah (workshops), na katerih so predstavili svoje vidike o posamezni skupni temi.

Konferenca je potekala v oxfordskih Examination Schools, ki zagotavljajo dovolj prostora, saj je sočasno potekalo tudi do petnajst različnih sekcij. Obsežno število strokovnjakov namreč omogoča podrobno tematsko razporejenost referatov in tako so vse velike osebnosti krščanske antike dobile svojo lastno sekcijo, nekatere celo po več. Poleg prozopografske razdelitve so bile sekcije in delavnice posvečene tudi posameznih žanrom zgodnjekrščanske antike (npr. poezija), temam (npr. filozofija) ali posameznih orientalnim jezikom (npr. sirščina). Nasploh konferenca zaobjame izredno širok razpon, tako časovno (od Nove zaveze do konca srednjega veka) kakor tudi tematsko (od klasičnih bibličnih, patroloških, zgodovinskih in literarnozgodovinskih panog do sodobnejših spraševanj in metodologij).

Spremljevalni program konference je obsegal predstavitev vseh večjih svetovnih založb, ki se ukvarjajo s publiciranjem kritičnih izdaj, sekundarne znanstvene literature ali pa znanstvenih revij za področje patristike in širše. Posebna priložnost, ki jo med konferenco številni udeleženci izkoristijo, je uporaba bogatih oxfordskih knjižnic (npr. rokopisni oddelek v Bodleian Library). Poleg vsebinskega dela je največja dodana vrednost tradicionalnega oxfordskega srečanja v tem, da se za teden

dni na enem mestu zbere večina najboljših strokovnjakov za sorodne tematike, to pa omogoča bogate priložnosti za navezavo številnih stikov, za vzdrževanje poznanstev ali pa za načrtovanje novih skupnih projektov.

Organizatorji konference vse bolj poudarjajo vključenost mlajših raziskovalcev; to je – poleg ene od dvajsetih štipendij NAPS – omogočilo tudi udeležbo podpisanega. Kot edini sodelujoči iz Slovenije sem v okviru sekcije o zgodnjebizantinski literaturi predstavil referat z naslovom Metamorphosis and Theosis: Oratio in Transfigurationem Domini nostri by Andrew of Crete, ki sodi med pionirske študije homiletične opusa tega, žal, pogosto spregledanega avtorja z začetka 8. stoletja. Tudi diskusija, ki je sledila predstavitvi, je bila izjemno koristna, saj je bilo navzočih nekaj največjih strokovnjakov tako za tematiko teoze (Normal Russell, Paul Blowers) kakor tudi za samega Andreja Kretskega (Mary B. Cunningham, Damaskinos Olkinuora).

Referati s konference bodo, po opravljeni recenziji, v nekaj letih izšli v okrog dvajsetih zvezkih *Studia patristica* pri belgijski založbi Peeters Publishers. Obširen nabor prispevkov vsakokrat znova prikazuje najnovejša dognanja na področju patrističnih študij, pa tudi znanstvenega udejstvovanja na različnih sorodnih področjih nasploh. In prav ta raznovrstnost in zbranost avtorjev – ki jih skozi leto srečuješ zgolj prek njihovih knjig ali člankov – na enem mestu dajeta oxfordski konferenci poseben pečat duhovnega doživetja. Če parafraziramo pregovor Judov iz diaspore: »L'Shana Haba'ah«, skupaj z arabskim vzklikom: Inshallah – čez štiri leta v Oxfordu!

Jan Dominik Bogataj

Navodila sodelavcem

Rokopis znanstvenega ali strokovnega članka, ki ga avtor/ica pošlje na naslov *Bogoslovnega vestnika,* je besedilo, ki še ni bilo objavljeno drugod niti ni drugod v recenzijskem postopku. Rokopis je treba poslati v pisni in v elektronski obliki. Elektronska oblika naj obsega le osnovne programske definicije (urejevalnik besedila Word s standardno obliko pisave brez dodatnih slogovnih določil). Pisna oblika rokopisa naj ima velikost črk 12 pt (Times), razmik med vrsticami 1,5, opombe 10 pt.

Zaradi **anonimnega recenzijskega postopka** mora imeti vsak rokopis prijavo oziroma spremni list, na katerem avtor/ica navede svoje ime in priimek, naslov članka, svoje ključne biografske podatke (akademski naziv, področje dela, poslovni naslov in/oziroma naslov, na katerem prejema pošto, elektronski naslov itd.) in izjavo, da besedilo še ni bilo objavljeno in da še ni v recenzijskem postopku. Obrazec prijave je na spletni strani revije (*http://www.teof.uni-lj.si/bv.html*). Na drugi strani, ki je prva stran besedila, pa naj navede samo naslov članka brez imena avtorja.

Rokopis znanstvenega članka ima **povzetek** in **ključne besede**, in sicer na posebni strani (listu). Povzetek naj obsega do 160 besed oziroma do 800 znakov. Povzetek obsega natančno opredelitev teme članka, metodologijo in zaključke.

Obseg rokopisa izvirnega znanstvenega članka naj praviloma ne presega dolžine ene avtorske pole (30.000 znakov); pregledni članki in predhodne objave naj ne obsegajo več kot 20.000 znakov, poročila ne več kot 10.000 znakov, ocene knjig ne več kot 8.000 znakov. Za obsežnejša besedila naj se avtor dogovori z urednikom. Besedila daljša od 8.000 znakov morajo vsebovati podnaslove. Tabele in slike morajo biti izpisane na posebnem listu papirja, v besedilu članka mora biti označeno mesto, kam sodijo.

Naslov članka mora biti jasen, poveden in ne daljši od 100 znakov.

Na koncu članka pripravimo **seznam referenc oz. literature**. Knjižna dela navajamo v obliki: Priimek, Ime. Letnica. Naslov. Kraj: Založba. Npr.: Janžekovič, Janez. 1976. *Krščanstvo in marksizem: od polemike do razgovora.* Celje: Mohorjeva družba. Članke iz revij navajamo v obliki: Priimek, Ime. Letnica. Naslov članka. Ime publikacije letnik:prva-zadnja stran. Npr.: Krašovec, Jože. 1991. Filozofsko-teološki razlogi za odpuščanje. *Bogoslovni vestnik* 51:270-285. Pri referencah z interneta navedemo spletni naslov z datumom pridobitve dokumenta. Če je bil dokument objavljen v periodični publikaciji, to označimo za naslovom dokumenta. Priimek, Ime. Letnica. Naslov. Ime publikacije, dan. mesec. URL (pridobljeno datum. mesec leto). Npr.: Rebula, Alojz. 2006. Rekatolizacija ali recivilizacija? *Družina, 7.* aprila. *Http://www.druzina.si/ICD/spletnastran.nsf/* (pridobljeno 16. oktobra 2006).

V besedilu navajamo citate po sistemu avtor-letnica. Priimek avtorja, letnico izida citiranega dela in stran zapišemo za citatom v obliki (priimek letnica, stran).

Npr. (Janžekovič 1976, 12). Na isti način navajamo tudi citate iz periodičnih publikacij in s spletnih strani. Če sta avtorja dva, navedek zapišemo v obliki (Priimek in Priimek letnica, stran). Npr. (Rode in Stres 1977, 33). Pri več kot treh avtorjih uporabimo obliko (Priimek idr. letnica, stran) ali (Priimek et al. letnica, stran). Npr. (Lenzenweger et al. 1999, 51). Če avtor dela ni naveden, namesto priimka uporabimo naslov, lahko tudi skrajšanega, npr. (*Devetdnevnica k časti milostne Matere Božje 1916, 5*). Če priimek navedemo že v citatu, ga v navedku izpustimo in navedemo samo letnico in stran.

Npr.: »Kakor je zapisal Anton Strle (1988, 67) [...]. Če v istem oklepaju navajamo več del, ločujemo eno od drugega s podpičji. Npr. (Pascal 1986, 16; Frankl 1993, 73). Če citiramo v istem odstavku isto delo, navedemo referenco v celoti samo prvič, v nadaljevanju v oklepajih navedemo samo številko strani. Okrajšave »Prim.« ne uporabljamo. Po ustaljeni navadi v besedilu navajamo Sveto pismo, antične in srednjeveške avtorje, koncilske in druge cerkvene dokumente, Zakonik cerkvenega prava (ZCP), Katekizem katoliške Cerkve (KKC) in druge dokumente, ki jih obravnavamo kot vire. Natančnejša navodila za citiranje so na spletnem naslovu *http://www.teof.uni-lj.si/obrazci/citiranje.doc.*

Uporaba kratic znanih časopisov, periodičnih publikacij, najbolj citiranih del, leksikonov in zbirk mora ustrezati mednarodnemu seznamu (splošni seznam: List of serial title word abbreviations, COBISS.SI-ID: 61626368, dostopen v NUK-u; za teologijo: *Internationales Abkürzungsverzeichnis für Theologie und Grenzgebiete,* W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1992); kratice domačih del, zbirk in leksikonov se uporabljajo, če so splošno znane in priznane, na primer »*BV*« za *Bogoslovni vestnik.* Kratice revij/časopisov so v ležeči pisavi (kurzivi), kratice zbornikov, leksikonov ali monografij so v pokončni pisavi. Pravila glede prečrkovanja (transliteracije) iz grščine in hebrejščine so dostopna v uredništvu.

Objave v Bogoslovnem vestniku se ne honorirajo. Uredništvo zavrnjenih rokopisov ne vrača.

MAGNA CHARTA
FACULTATIS THEOLOGICAE LABACENSIS

Teološka fakulteta, ki ima korenine v srednjeveških samostanskih in katedralnih sholah in najodličnejše mesto na prvih univerzah, je tudi ena od petih ustanovnih fakultet Univerze v Ljubljani. Njeni predhodniki so bili jezuitski kolegij, ki je deloval v Ljubljani v letih od 1601 do 1773, vrsta drugih redovnih visokih šol in škofijske teološke šole. Kakor ob svojih začetkih želi Teološka fakulteta tudi na pragu 3. tisočletja ob nenehni skrbi za prvovrstno kvaliteto pedagoškega in raziskovalnega dela razvijati svoj govor o Bogu in o človeku, o božjem učlovečenju in o človekovem pobožanstvenju, o stvarstvu in o človekovem poseganju vanj, o začetkih vsega in o končnem smislu, o Cerkvi in o življenju v njej.

Opirajoč se na Sveto pismo in na izročilo in ob upoštevanju dometa človekove misli, usposablja svoje študente za jasen premislek o témah presežnosti in tukajšnjosti, vere in razodetja, kanonskega prava, morale in vzgoje. Kot katoliška fakulteta v zvestobi kulturnemu krogu, iz katerega je izšla, sledi avtoriteti cerkvenega učiteljstva in skrbi za intelektualno pripravo kandidatov na duhovništvo in za duhovno rast laiških sodelavcev v Cerkvi in v širši družbi.