61 Sodobni vojaški izzivi, september 2017 – 19/št. 3
Contemporary Military Challenges, September 2017 – 19/No. 3
OCENJEVANJE	NAČRTOVANJA	IN	IZVAJANJA
MISIJ	IN	OPERACIJ	EU:	ŠTUDIJA	PRIMERA	EUFOR
ALTHEA	V	BOSNI	IN	HERCEGOVINI
Ivana Boštjančič Pulko
Johanna Suhonen
Kari Sainio
ASSESSING	THE	PLANNING	AND
IMPLEMENTATION	OF	THE	EU	MISSIONS
AND	OPERATIONS:	CASE	STUDY	OF	EUFOR
ALTHEA	IN	BOSNIA	AND	HERZEGOVINA
Evropska unija je vzpostavila tesne povezave z državami Zahodnega Balkana v 
zadnjih tridesetih letih, predvsem zato, da bi zagotovila stabilno, uspešno in dobro 
delujočo demokratično družbo pri vključitvi v Evropsko unijo. Tudi takratna Evropska 
varnostna in obrambna politika (EVOP), pozneje preimenovana v Skupno varnostno 
in obrambno politiko (SVOP), je bila umeščena visoko v političnem programu 
agende Evropske unije. Nato je predal operacijo Sfor v Bosni in Hercegovini, 
katere naloga je ohranjanje varnosti v regiji, in Evropska unija je 2. decembra 2004, 
devet let po koncu vojne, začela operacijo Althea. Eufor Althea je najdaljša vojaška 
operacija Skupne varnostne in obrambne politike v zgodovini do zdaj. V prispevku 
so opisani pridobljene izkušnje in vidiki ter posledice zmogljivosti načrtovanja 
operacije. Temelji na intervjujih, izvedenih v BiH, pri čemer se upoštevata tako 
Evropska unija kot zunanji vidik glede tematike. Na začetku naj bi bil okvir SVOP 
predviden kot kratkoročni instrument. Avtorica sklene, da mora Evropska unija, če 
želi učinkovito načrtovati in izvajati zapletene dolgoročne civilne in vojaške misije 
ter operacije, ustrezno prilagoditi mandate in svoj splošni pristop. Eufor Althea naj 
bi kljub dolgotrajni prisotnosti na terenu in brez znakov umika v bližnji prihodnosti 
dosegla uspeh, in sicer predvsem pri ohranjanju varnega okolja, spodbujanju 
človekovih pravic in enakosti spolov ter krepitvi zmogljivosti oboroženih sil Bosne 
in Hercegovine, prav tako naj bi k omenjenim dosežkom prispevala tudi zmogljivost 
načrtovanja.
Evropska unija, Bosna in Hercegovina, SVOP, Eufor Althea, načrtovanje, 
učinkovitost.
The European Union has established close links with the countries of the Western 
Balkans over the past thirty years, primarily with the aim of ensuring a stable, 
successful and well-functioning democratic society when joining the EU. The 
Povzetek
Ključne 
besede
Abstract
DOI:10.33179/BSV.99.SVI.11.CMC.19.3.4
 62 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Johanna Suhonen, Kari Sainio
former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), later renamed the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), was placed high on the political agenda of 
the EU. NATO handed over the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose 
task was maintaining security in the region, and on 2 December 2004, nine years 
after the end of the war, the EU began its Operation Althea. EUFOR Althea is now 
the longest CSDP military operation in history. The article describes the acquired 
experience and the aspects and implications of the operation’s planning capacity. 
It is derived from interviews conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and takes into 
account both the EU and external aspects of the topic. At the outset, the CSDP 
framework was envisaged as a short-term instrument. The article concludes that, 
in order to effectively plan and implement complex long-term civilian and military 
missions and operations, the EU must adapt its mandates and general approach. The 
article claims that EUFOR Althea, despite its long-term presence on the ground and 
without any signs of withdrawal in the near future, has achieved a certain success, 
especially in maintaining a secure environment, promoting human rights and gender 
equality, and strengthening the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Moreover, it claims that it was the planning capacity that contributed 
to these achievements.
European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, CSDP, EUFOR Althea, planning, 
efficiency.
 
One of the six constituent republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), entered a period of war 
in March 1992 which lasted until December 1995. The violence led to the deaths of 
100,000-200,000 people and left almost half the population displaced (New World 
Encyclopaedia, 2016). The war ended in 1995 with the assistance of the international 
community under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
after negotiations in Dayton between leaders from Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb, 
and with the official signing of the Dayton Accords1 in Paris on 14 December 1995. 
This commenced a long and turbulent path towards restoring peace and security. 
NATO’s first operation, Implementation Force (IFOR), with over 60,000 troops, 
became operational in December 1995. A year later, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) 
took over IFOR’s mandate. NATO’s presence in BiH for almost nine years ensured the 
successful implementation of the Dayton Accords in all entities of BiH, encompassing 
the de-escalation of the conflict and the disarmament and demilitarization of the 
armed forces and the civilian population, as well as the repatriation of displaced 
people. NATO expressed its intention to retreat its forces at the Istanbul Summit in 
June 2004 (Knezović, 2005).
1 United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council S/1995/999 General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina.
Key words
Introduction
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ASSESSING THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS:  
CASE STUDY OF EUFOR ALTHEA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The European Union (EU) intended to take over the operation from NATO. The 
EU’s approach to the Western Balkans was based on strategic objectives aiming 
at the eventual accession of these countries to the EU, and guaranteed European 
commitment in BiH (Council of the EU, 2004 b). On 9 July 2004, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) welcomed the intention of the EU to provide for the new 
operation in BiH with UNSC Resolution 15512, and authorized the EU operation to 
proceed in November 2004 with UNSC Resolution 15753.
 1 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
This article4 introduces the findings of the research conducted in the framework of 
the project Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention 
(IECEU).5 A large portion of the IECEU research was dedicated to examining the 
effectiveness of ten Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions based 
on case study research of six key capabilities – planning capacity, operational 
capacity, interoperability, competencies, comprehensiveness and technologies. This 
paper seeks a deeper understanding of the first – planning capacity – and argues that 
EUFOR Althea has achieved a satisfactory level in this, despite the fact that room 
for improvement still remains. Each of the capabilities can be analysed from an EU 
and a non-EU perspective. The two perspectives overlap and thus provide a good 
overview of different opinions and viewpoints (Mekri, 2015, p. 25).
The applied research method was a qualitative analysis of interviews and focus group 
discussions. The interviews were conducted in the period between November 2015 
and March 2016. Due to the sensitivities of the issues discussed, the names of the 
interviewees are not disclosed.6 All preliminary research findings were afterwards 
‘tested’ at a round table in Slovenia.7 Analysis of primary and secondary sources 
served as a supportive research method. 
2 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1551 (2004), adopted 9 July 2004.
3 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1575 (2004), adopted 22 November 2004.
4 This article is based on deliverable D2.3 of the IECEU Project (http://www.ieceu-project.com/), which received 
funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement 
No. 653371. The responsibility for the content of the article lies solely with the authors and the opinions 
expressed therein do not reflect the official position of the European Union. The deliverable is based on data 
collection and interviews conducted by J. Suhonen, K. Sainio, E. Norvanto, J. Salonen, I. Boštjančič Pulko, M. 
Muherina and B. Udovič, as well as on Deliverable 2.3 of the IECEU project.
5 This project received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 
2020. For more info check: http://www.ieceu-project.com/ (08 June 2017). 
6 The interview data and details are in the possession of the authors; the interviews were conducted with former 
and current personnel of EUFOR Althea, local and international regional experts, representatives of the 
governmental actors of various EU member states, European External Action Service (EEAS) representatives 
as well as other EU, non-EU and civil society representatives, NATO, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and others.
7 Video from the round table with statements of the representatives taking part is available here: http://www.
ieceu-project.com/?p=536.
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Planning capacity is assessed from the perspective of EUFOR Althea’s initial 
mandate, namely the operational planning and capacity-building and training (CBT) 
of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) and support to the BiH 
authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment (SASE)8. Additionally, 
EUFOR Althea’s engagement in Security Sector Reform (SSR) and defence reform 
is covered, due to its linkage with CBT. Research on EUFOR Althea’s planning 
capacity strived to encompass strategic and operational planning and its implications 
for the management and implementation of the operation, the lessons learned and the 
operation’s situational awareness (Mekri 2015, pp. 102-104).
 2 PLANNING OF EUFOR ALTHEA
EUFOR Althea was established in December 2004 by the decision of the Council 
of the European Union9. It is the longest-running military intervention launched in 
the framework of the CSDP as one of the EU’s crisis management instruments. It 
was deployed under the Berlin Plus Agreement10, enabling the EU to utilize NATO’s 
assets and capabilities in the operation (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015).
The history leading up to the launching of the operation began with the Maastricht 
Treaty, which was the first to identify the EU’s objectives regarding external and 
foreign relations, as the EU realized it had no power over conflict in its immediate 
neighbourhood.11 This fact had a direct impact on the EU’s borders, as the member 
states began developing the two key levels of common crisis management capabilities: 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), focusing on strategic foreign 
policy objectives, and, a couple of years later, the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), which aimed at operational execution of crisis management. 
The St. Malo declaration12 and the Treaty of Amsterdam13 expressed the need for 
operational capabilities, the latter integrating crisis management into the CFSP. 
In 1999, the European Council approved the Action Plan for Non-Military Crisis 
Management and the development of institutional structures for its implementation 
(Gourlay and others, 2006). The ESDP, established at the 1999 European Council 
8 As stressed at the general presentation at HQ EUFOR Althea, 2 March 2015: the CBT of the AFBiH and 
support to the BiH authorities in maintaining a SASE represent COM EUFOR’s Main Effort within Op 
ALTHEA.
9 Council of the European Union Decision 2004/803/CFSP of 25 November 2004 on the launching of the 
European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10 The Berlin Plus agreement is a comprehensive package of arrangements finalized in 2003 between the EU and 
NATO, which enables the EU to make use of NATO’s assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management 
operations (European External Action Service, 2016a).
11 European Union, Treaty on European Union, Treaty of Maastricht, signed 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, in 
force from 1 November 1993.
12 Saint-Malo Declaration, signed on 4 December 1998 in Saint-Malo. 
13 European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities, and certain related acts, as signed on 2 October 1997 in Amsterdam, in force from 1 
May 1999.
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meeting in Cologne (renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
after the Lisbon Treaty14) became operational in 2003, with the launch of the first 
CSDP missions.
EUFOR Althea was launched in a context where the future of BiH mattered not 
only for maintaining peace and security in the EU’s neighbourhood but also for the 
EU’s self-perception as a foreign policy and security actor. BiH has been referred 
to as a ‘testing ground’ for the CSDP many times (Council of the EU, 2004 b). It 
contributed to the EU’s development from a civilian power to a more multifaceted 
one, resorting to military instruments with an aim of promoting its own values and 
goals. EUFOR Althea has allowed the EU to experiment with its military capabilities 
in a relatively safe multi-actor environment, and the operation has been explicitly 
framed as an element of a broader and comprehensive EU policy towards the region 
(Juncos, 2015). 
EUFOR Althea’s launch aimed at ensuring the continued implementation of 
and compliance with the Dayton Agreement, to contribute to a safe and secure 
environment and to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of BiH.15 The EU initially 
deployed 7,000 troops (Kim, 2006). The mandate has evolved and been reconfigured 
four times, most recently in September 2012. The operation continues to function in 
line with its peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The 
most recent mandate of the operation encompasses three main objectives: providing 
CBT for the AF BiH, which is the non-executive part of the operation; supporting the 
BiH authorities in maintaining SASE16 in BiH; and providing support to the overall 
EU comprehensive strategy for BiH. The non-executive part aims at BiH becoming 
a security provider rather than a security consumer in the long term (Council of EU 
Secretariat, 2015). 
With the reconfiguration in 2012, EUFOR Althea’s troop level dropped to 
approximately 600, which remains its current strength. The reconstruction of the 
operation was driven primarily by lack of political will and by withdrawals of the 
participating nations (Interview no. 21).
14 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01
15 EUFOR Althea’s current mandate is twofold: its mission is based on the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) joint 
action, which has an executive component derived from the UNSC resolution (to support the BiH authorities in 
maintaining a SASE) and a non-executive component (to provide capacity-building and training for the AFBiH) 
(Interview no. 39).
16 SASE consists of the following tasks: countermines activities, military and civilian movement control of 
weapons, ammunition and explosive substances, and management of weapons and ammunition storage sites 
(Council of EU Secretariat, 2015). 
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CASE STUDY OF EUFOR ALTHEA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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 3 PLANNING CAPACITY OF EUFOR ALTHEA
Resolution UNSCR 1575 mandated EUFOR to exclusively inherit the role of SFOR. 
A robust force of 7,000 troops from 22 EU member states and 11 other countries was 
deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ensure continued implementation 
of and compliance with Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton Agreement, and to 
contribute to a SASE. Large number of SFOR troops remained in BiH and were 
only transferred under the command of EUFOR Althea, which was assessed as 
operationally smooth and relatively simple, particularly because of the use of ‘Berlin 
Plus’ arrangements and the existing SFOR operation plans which formed the basis of 
EUFOR Althea’s strategic and operational planning (Interviews no. 21, no. 23, no. 
32, no. 33 and no. 44).17 The NATO common assets and capabilities as defined in 
the Specific Agreement for EUFOR Althea comprise mainly Command and Control 
(C2) items such as Operation Headquarters (OHQ) at Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the EU Command Element (EUCE) at Joint Forces 
Command (JFC) Naples, and Communication and Information Systems (CIS) 
and access to NATO’s classified networks, specifically intelligence systems and 
intelligence databases, as well as infrastructure (Interviews no. 21, no. 23, no. 32, 
no. 33 and no. 44).
EUFOR Althea is conducted under the authority of the European Council. Its political 
control and strategic direction is exercised by the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC).The EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitors the appropriateness of its 
execution, and the EUMC’s chairman acts as the primary point of contact for the 
operation commander (OpCdr), who is also a Deputy Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (DSACEUR) in the NATO structure. In his role as OpCdr, the DSACEUR 
is supported by the EU OHQ, which is the whole of SHAPE amplified by the 
European Union Staff Group (EUSG) as the core of EU expertise. To ensure synergy 
and prevent unnecessary duplication, the EUSG is closely interconnected with the 
SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis and Operation Management Centre (CCOMC), 
which facilitates access to all SHAPE Directorate entities. The OpCdr reports to 
the PSC through the chairman of the EUMC on all issues of strategic value for the 
operation. He also attends EUMC and PSC meetings and briefs them on the EUFOR 
Althea EUCE (Interviews no. 21 and no. 65 and EUSG, 2016).
17 ‘About CSDP – the Berlin Plus agreement’, from the EEAS, accessed on 26 May 2016, at http://eeas.europa.
eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm. This agreement involves a comprehensive package of arrangements 
finalized in early 2003 between the EU and NATO that allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and 
capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.
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 4 STRATEGIC LEVEL PLANNING
Strategic-level planning is conducted within the EUSG at OHQ.19 EUSG also 
deals with force generation, manpower and organization review, the EUFOR 
Althea reporting system and financial issues, and provides updated information 
from the operation itself. The EUSG maintains situational awareness within BiH. 
Theoretically, a clear military command structure, a solid reporting system, and 
the availability of NATO assets provide a very good basis for real-time situational 
awareness. However, the reduced number of troops and, especially, the current low 
number of liaison and observation teams (LOTs)20 in the field compromise the ability 
to react and respond in a timely manner to a potential deterioration of the SASE 
(Interviews no. 34, no. 24 and no. 40).
OHQ will update the operational plans as required in coordination with the NATO 
Strategic Operational Planning Group. In addition to co-ordinating all operational 
matters, monitoring current operations, and advising on all operational issues, 
18  Interview no. 47; EUSG basic brief of 7 January 2016.
19 ‘European Union Staff Group: Operation ALTHEA OHQ in Shape’, accessed on 23 May 2016, at http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100608%20Shape%20-%20EUFOR%20
Althea%20OHQ%20-%20how%20it%20works.pdf. The European Union Staff Group at EU Operation 
Headquarters at SHAPE. It supports the DSACEUR in his role as Operation Commander, the individual who 
plans and directs the operation at the military strategic level of command.
20 ‘Liaison and observation teams in EUFOR’, accessed on 22 May 2016, at http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.
php/eufor-elements/liaison-and-observation-teams.
Figure	1:	
Command 
and control 
structure and 
responsibilities18
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CASE STUDY OF EUFOR ALTHEA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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OHQ participates in operational planning and the process of development for 
current operations. OHQ is responsible for the reserves concept; co-operating with 
troop-contributing nations (TCNs) and the EUCE with respect to intelligence and 
reconnaissance assets; and collaborating with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in 
connection with possible EU Battlegroups intervention. In addition, it liaises with 
NATO on the Balkans Operational Reserve Forces and Strategic Reserve Forces. The 
role of the OpCdr as the NATO-EU strategic co-ordinator, and his well-functioning 
interaction with the EUFOR commander (COM EUFOR), was seen as a critical 
factor for operational success (Interviews no. 34, no. 24 and no. 40 and EUSG 2016). 
From a military point of view, the C2 structure of EUFOR Althea is quite complicated 
due to the several ‘layers’ of political and military actors. The political-strategic 
level sometimes provides no coordination or planning guidance directed to the 
operational level. The EU as a whole should have a common understanding on the 
preferred strategic development of the country, since political realities limit strategic/
operational planning (Interviews no. 25 and no. 34). The operation clearly suffers 
from lack of a clear end state (Interviews no. 21, no. 28, no. 40, no. 39 and no. 36). 
The mission staff often lack understanding of what is going on at the HQ level in 
Brussels, but the same is also true vice versa (Interview no. 21).
Member states’ approvals of the mission’s extension or its adjustment are crucial 
and sometimes a show stopper to the planning process and execution. Changes or 
adjustments of the OHQ-level operation plan (OPLAN) have to be approved by the 
member nations (Interviews no. 29 and no. 47). EUFOR Althea is quite low on the 
agenda of the member states, and nations do not usually send their best staff to the 
operation, since they perceive it as a training opportunity for individuals (Interview 
no. 28). NATO is the main counterpart for EUFOR in the planning process and is 
considered to be much better at planning and resource allocation. One EU official 
stressed that the operation is actually much more NATO-conducted than EU-
conducted with a mandate being framed in member states’ discussions, but the reality 
is given by DSACEUR, and sometimes NATO’s input is significantly greater. This 
fact gives more freedom, more input and outcome, but in the end it shows that the 
EU is not able to provide more than basic instructions (Interviews no. 21 and no. 24).
Notwithstanding the multi-level and complex C2 structure, political realities, 
and sometimes lack of coordination between the political-strategic level and the 
operational-tactical level, the interviewees perceived the current planning system 
based on NATO assets as functional, and considered the planning process to take all 
the necessary factors into account. The EUSG at OHQ is seen as ‘the core’, liaising 
with all the SHAPE Directorate’s branches, particularly through the Strategic 
Operations Centre, thereby enabling a complete interface in all areas. The EUSG 
maintains a close relationship with the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
and EUMS through recourse to SHAPE’s assets at OHQ when needed, in accordance 
with the CSDP (Interviews no. 24 and no. 47). Strategic planning is perceived to be 
problematic, since at the outset of the operation there was a clear lack of discussion 
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regarding the end state, which should define what milestones should be reached for 
the operation to end and leave the country (Interview no. 67, 68). The so-called end 
state is listed very vaguely as “(…) to be based on progress in building efficient state 
level structures, in particular in the area of security and defence. This objective is 
primarily the responsibility of the BiH government assisted by EU civilian actors. 
Moreover, it will be important to avoid the creation of a culture of dependence 
upon EUFOR” (Council of EU 2004, 4). Some of the respondents perceive that the 
continuation of the operation mainly serves the EU’s political purposes (IECEU, 
Round table discussion of experts, 2016).
 5 OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION
When EUFOR Althea was deployed there were already OPLANs in place, prepared 
by SFOR HQs and troops, and work continued largely in line with the existing plans. 
SFOR OPLANs formed the basis for EUFOR Althea’s strategic/operational planning 
(Interviews no. 21, no. 23, no, 32, no. 33 and no. 44).
EUFOR Althea uses a ‘standard military’ operations planning process (OPP) and 
follows NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). OHQ at 
SHAPE will update or develop the operational plans as required in coordination 
with the NATO Strategic Operational Planning Group. The key element at OHQ is 
the EUSG, which supports the DSACEUR in his role as OpCdr and is responsible 
to him for the day-to-day running of the operation and operational planning. 
OHQ co-ordinates all operational matters, and advises on operational issues and 
participates in operational planning and the development process for current 
operations (Interviews no. 21, no. 23, no, 32, no. 33). 
Planning is usually carried out in parallel with the EUCE at JFC in Naples and HQ 
EUFOR Althea in Sarajevo. Parallel planning entails the various individual levels 
sharing information and products with subordinate units as soon as these are ready to 
be used in the subordinate units’ planning. Subordinate units keep the higher levels 
informed of their planning through back-briefing. This enables dialogue between 
the various levels from early in the planning phase, and the OPLANs at OHQ and 
EUFOR Althea level are co-ordinated. Finally, COM EUFOR is able to act, put the 
plan into action, and distribute the necessary orders/directives/guidance within the 
OPLAN framework.
The OpCdr pays regular visits to EUFOR Althea, enabling face-to-face contact 
between the commanders, supporting COM EUFOR Althea’s leadership, and giving 
him direct strategic/operational level guidance (Interview no. 34). The OPLANs at 
both the strategic-operational level (OHQ) and operation level (Area of Operation 
in BiH) are reviewed in light of the security situation and the development of the 
operational environment in BiH. Since the beginning of the operation, the OpCdr’s 
OHQ OPLAN has been revised four times, and COM EUFOR’s OPLAN five times 
(Interviews no. 40, no. 41, no. 46 and no. 47).
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CASE STUDY OF EUFOR ALTHEA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
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The current planning process produces detailed and co-ordinated plans, and 
the decision-making process is functional and takes into account all the factors 
that need to be considered. However, the political guidance or member states’ 
‘approval’, linked to national interests/agendas related to extending or adjusting the 
mission, nominating reserves, or amending the operational plan, must be taken into 
consideration. The role of the EU member states/TCNs is crucial and sometimes 
slows down the planning process and execution (Interviews no. 29, no. 34, no. 35 
and no. 47).21
 6 TECHNOLOGIES AS PART OF PLANNING CAPABILITIES 
The J6 (Communications) element of the EUSG at OHQ/SHAPE provides military 
strategic expertise to ensure the delivery of NATO information systems and 
communica tion support for EUFOR Althea. The EUSG/J6 maintains secure CIS 
systems across two environments (EU and NATO) which are technically different, 
and also operates secure communication links from EU OHQ at SHAPE through 
EUCE (Naples) to HQ EUFOR (in Sarajevo) (Interviews no. 46 and no. 47). The 
use of NATO CIS, NATO secure networks and intelligence systems, and the NATO 
intelligence database has provided an efficient and cost-effective mechanism for 
EUFOR Althea since the beginning of the operation. Similarly, one of the EUMC’s 
major lessons, already identified in 2007, was that ‘the use of NATO CIS assets 
was a pragmatic and cost-effective solution for the beginning of the EU operation 
and provided EUFOR with appropriate CIS support’ (Council Document 2013). 
Although the communications established under the Berlin Plus agreement worked 
well, means of mobile communication were scarce and often unreliable, because of 
the use of often incompatible national systems in the Multinational Task Forces. This 
has also been a challenge in operations established since EUFOR Althea. Currently, 
NATO HQ Sarajevo supports the static CIS infrastructure at Camp Butmir (HQ 
EUFOR Althea) and deploy able secure CIS systems are supported by EUFOR Althea 
personnel (EUSG 2016). In December 2010, a civilian contractor22 was selected to 
provide full operation and maintenance support for the CIS on behalf of NATO HQ 
Sarajevo and HQ EUFOR Althea. 
 7 IMPLICATIONS OF PLANNING CAPACITY ON SECURITY SECTOR 
REFORM AND DEFENCE REFORM
Originally, EUFOR Althea’s engagement in Security Sector Reform (SSR) was 
connected to the European Union Police Mission’s (EUPM) inefficiency in filling 
21 Any major changes or adjustments to the OHQ level OPLAN must be approved by the member nations. National 
caveats and national agendas were not seen as obstructing interoperability per se but were considered to be 
a phenomenon that presents challenges to operational planning. The issue of the strong national agendas of 
certain individual nations (e.g. Turkey and Austria) is not seen as significantly hampering interoperability in 
practice.
22 ‘ATCO awarded NATO contract in Sarajevo’, ATCO Structures & Logistics material, accessed on 31 May 2016, 
at http://www.atcosl.com/en-ca/Media-Room/News-2010/081210-NATO-Contract-Sarajevo.
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the law-enforcement void. Consequently, EUFOR became heavily involved in 
the fight against organized crime. The EUFOR involvement in fighting crime ran 
counter to accepted SSR norms and highlighted the continued weakness of Bosnian 
law enforcement. By the end of 2005 EUFOR had scaled down its contribution in 
this area, allowing the EUPM to become the primary international law enforcement 
agency in BiH (ISSAT, 2016).
EUPM’s closure in 2012 marked an important transition for BiH’s authorities, 
forcing them to take ownership of SSR. Today the EU still remains committed 
to strengthening the rule of law in BiH through other instruments, including the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) and the reinforced office of the EU 
Special Representative (EUSR). Military reform in BiH has been progressive while 
police reform has been slower. The police force continues to be ethnically divided 
despite the creation of state-level agencies. A general lack of coordination and 
cooperation between law-enforcement agencies hampers the ability of the police to 
deliver a full range of services (European Commission, 2015).
NATO still owns the strategic dimension of the reform process, working closely with 
BiH’s Ministry of Defence (MOD). EUFOR, on the other hand, has an important 
role in the implementa tion of the technical and tactical aspects of the reform, and the 
organizations try to complement one another’s efforts as much as possible. Currently, 
NATO and EUFOR seek to co-ordinate their efforts to foster defence reform, with 
NATO’s objective being to support the development of the capacity of the defence 
sector in pursuit of NATO standards, thereby preparing BiH for possible future 
NATO membership. The EU aims to strengthen the country’s security sector in 
order to ensure its consistent stability in connection with the EU integration process 
(Interview no. 39)23.
Lack of a nationally owned strategy covering the defence sector has been a major 
barrier to a consistent reform process in BiH. The political framework in BiH makes 
the reform process challenging; a collective presidency directs the BiH Ministry of 
Defence and the country’s armed forces, but BiH’s three main ethnic groups differ 
in their views and vision for the development of the defence sector. In consequence, 
the government has so far been unable to produce a defence strategy (Interview no. 
56). BiH’s defence budget (€ 250,000,000) is very limited. To establish some sort 
of common baseline for the capacity-building and equipping process, EUFOR and 
NATO are jointly conducting an assessment with the aim of identifying the armed 
forces’ current capabilities. They see this joint effort as potentially enabling them 
to focus their efforts on building appropriate defence capabilities and helping them 
co-ordinate and regulate third-country support. In addition, it should help to ensure 
23 As EU and NATO requirements are in line with one another, the joint reform efforts can help both organizations 
reach their long-term goals for the country. One interviewee described the cooperation between the two 
organizations, stating that no decision is taken on any aspect of SSR without the EUFOR and the NATO 
commanders first discussing it, before approaching any local authorities.
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that EUFOR Althea concentrates its capacity-building efforts on the right elements 
(Interviews no. 21, no. 34, no. 53 and no. 56).
 8 IMPLICATIONS OF PLANNING CAPACITY ON INTEROPERABILITY 
Civil-military synergies in BiH were unfortunately destined to be lost from the 
beginning. The two CSDP missions, EUPM and EUFOR Althea, were planned 
separately and there was no joint strategic planning or set of connecting structures 
(Interviews no. 22, no. 23, no. 31). 
Moreover, the interviewees stated that cooperation with another EU actor, the 
European Union Monitoring Mission (until August 2007), was poor or non-existent. 
The presence of and cooperation with the UN during the initial stage was described 
as ‘shallow’. Despite Berlin Plus, cooperation with NATO at the field-operations 
level was also considered poor; NATO directed its attention and activities toward 
the AF BiH, and CBT was not within Althea’s mandate at that time. On account 
of the predominance of the OHR, the OSCE played only a minor role in terms of 
cooperation. The presence of NGOs in BiH was strong, and in fact, EUFOR Althea 
cooperated with them and aimed at information sharing, although this group of actors 
was described as the ‘most difficult’, both because of their unwillingness to share 
information and differences in working logic that sometimes even posed security 
risks for their personnel (Interviews no. 22, no. 23, no. 31, no. 32, no. 33, and no. 
54).
 9 IMPLICATIONS OF PLANNING CAPACITY ON CAPACITY-BUILDING 
AND TRAINING 
Developing the CBT of the AF BiH in close coordination with NATO is currently 
one of the key tasks of EUFOR, but the comprehensive nature of BiH’s defence 
reform only allows EUFOR’s role to be minor when compared to that of other actors’ 
(Interviews no. 28 and no. 34).24 The aim is to support BiH’s efforts to develop into 
a ‘security provider’ rather than being a ‘security consumer’, that is, to enhance 
local ownership by the BiH authorities and their autonomy. The current stage of 
the operation may lead to a major restructuring or might even be the first step 
towards the conclusion of the operation. The situation has stalled due to the political 
circumstances in BiH, which are currently not favourable. In general, the political 
design of BiH is not conducive to completing all tasks (Interviews no. 28 and no. 52). 
24 ‘About EUFOR’, accessed on 23 May 2016, at http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor/
background. In 2012, the operation reconfigured and moved its focus to CBT for the AFBiH. It nevertheless 
retained its obligations to support the BiH authorities in maintaining a SASE; Council of the European Union 
press release ‘2992nd Council meeting – foreign affairs’, Council document 5686/10 (Presse 10), Brussels, 25 
January 2010.
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Interviewees stressed that the shift from the initial implementation of compliance 
with the Dayton Agreement and contributing to a SASE to providing CBT stems 
from the fact that the original mandate no longer matched the needs on the ground. 
EUFOR Althea’s current focus on CBT actually derives from the member states’ 
inability to decide ‘where to go’ and their unwillingness to contribute troops and 
resources to the operation. 
EUFOR Althea is currently implementing a highly integrated and jointly co-ordinated 
training plan with the AFBiH, together with NATO and several bilateral partners. 
Within this joint framework, delivering effective CBT requires careful coordination of 
all the efforts by international actors. This is critical, as sometimes nations have been 
willing to provide training or donate equipment outside the agreed training plan. In 
consequence, the capacity and resources of EUFOR Althea and NATO HQ Sarajevo 
have become tied up for a long time in training the AFBiH in the use of particular 
equipment. Donations are sometimes politically linked to national interests. All this 
is reflected as a lack of sustainability of the capacity-building efforts (Interviews no. 
36, no. 34, no. 39, and no. 24).
Several interviewees confirmed the existence of one major obstacle to effective 
CBT for the AF BiH; although the training is organized and planned very well and 
is currently also co-ordinated between EUFOR Althea, NATO and the AF BiH, 
financial support is a considerable challenge. EUFOR Althea conducts training 
mainly with its own equipment. When the training is completed, the trained AF BiH 
units should possess the skills and knowledge needed, but do not have the equipment 
and assets to execute what they are trained for. Certain budget allocations should 
therefore be made for purchasing equipment and basic assets for the AF BiH, since 
they have very limited resources to invest or procure practically any equipment. 
Currently, the Athena mechanism cannot be used to fund equipment or material for 
the AF BiH. One solution might be an ‘Equip and Train’ programme which is based 
on an assessment of the AF BiH’s long-term needs. There has already been some 
progress in this regard, as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) 
is working on the issue (Interviews no. 36, no. 34). 
 10 LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS
Several papers and reports addressing lessons identified within the operation have 
been issued by the EU institutions since 2004.25 Sometimes these lessons have been 
implemented, while on other occasions old problems either re-emerged or were not 
sufficiently dealt with. Examples of these are the need for better coordination of 
EU instruments and for more efficient procurement procedures, which have been 
25 See, for example, the Council of the European Union and European External Action Service’s ‘Annual 2014 
CSDP Lessons Report’ (partially accessible to the public as of 26 May 2015, Annex C: EUMS contribution still 
limited), 6777/15, of 3 March 2015, and the Council of the European Union’s ‘Op Althea – Consolidated Report 
on “Historical Lessons Identified” from the execution of Operation Althea’, Council document 14181/07, 
Brussels, of 11 March 2013. 
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recognised as continuous problems by the Council (Interviews no. 28 and no. 30). 
The most significant progress has been made with a comprehensive approach, 
namely coordination and coherence between the individual actors in BiH. Further 
lessons have been learned about the Berlin Plus agreement, cost-sharing agreements, 
sharing of intelligence, and having clear delineation of tasks whenever NATO and 
EU military operations are in the same theatre (Emerson, Gross 2007; Leakey 2007). 
The current lessons learned (LL) process in EUFOR Althea is based on a standard 
operating procedure (SOP) (HQ EUFOR 2011). Under this SOP, EUFOR Althea’s 
J3 (Operations) branch is responsible for managing, directing, and staffing the LL 
process within EUFOR. Also, SOP states that each branch at HQ and at the unit HQs 
conducts its own process and designates LL analysts/points of contact tasked with 
dealing with J3. However, because of a range of factors, e.g. the temporary nature of 
HQ EUFOR, the frequent rotation of personnel or lack of trained personnel, this is 
not always achieved (Interviews no. 46 and no. 40, EUMS 2012).
Official public documents make no specific reference to a pre-planned and formal 
lessons learned process or products of best practices in EUFOR Althea (Directorate-
General for External Policies of the Union, 2012).26 According to the EUFOR 
OHQ operational documents, LL capability should prioritize EUFOR Althea’s 
observations on the implementation of its key tasks, including elements such as 
capability requirements, concept development, and structures, along with the 
consequent reconfiguration of the operation. Also, the procedures for LL reporting 
should be integrated into the six-monthly review (SMR) process (Interview no. 46). 
EUFOR Althea SMRs do not directly include observations, lessons identified or best 
practices. Most of the reviews nevertheless feature recommendations, which can be 
understood as observations/lessons identified or even best practices. (Interview no. 
34). Most of the recommendations or best practices are related to national caveats 
and the restrictions to operational effectiveness; the importance of Psychological 
Operations (PSYOPS) assets and Information Operation campaigns; the coordination 
between EUFOR and other EU/international actors (a very good ‘best practice’ has 
been the joint EUFOR Althea and NATO HQ Sarajevo coordination of the CBT 
for the AF BiH); the importance of a comprehensive approach at all levels; the 
inadequate training level and skills of staff officers; and the short tours (tour lengths 
should be 12 months for key posts and not less than six months for other posts at 
HQ) (Interview no. 46). The LL process has been implemented in all staff exercises 
and field-training exercises. The results and action bodies have been specified in 
final exercise reports, and these findings were presented in the OHQ LL report to 
the EUMS. The EUFOR Althea LO’s report from 2015 dealt with AFBiH’s lack 
of capabilities, along with procedures that have an impact on CBT planning and 
conducting of CBT activities, the reserve forces concept and reserves’ activation 
process, CBT planning, assessment, and CBT cooperation with NATO HQ Sarajevo, 
26 There were approximately 30 lesson observations for EUFOR Althea in the ELMA database in February 2012.
Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Johanna Suhonen, Kari Sainio
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as well as military-camp management in the light of in-sourcing vs. outsourcing 
camp management (Interviews no. 28, no. 30 and no. 47).
It seems that in very rare cases, the ‘field-level’ observations go through the EU 
Military LL Process (ELPRO) and that these observations eventually become official 
best practices. The key lessons and best practices listed in the EEAS Annual Reports 
are very general in nature and seem to be of little importance at the field level. It 
may take a very long time for an observation to be approved for learning and finally 
propagated as a best practice (Interview no. 28). Widespread use of informal best 
practices and mechanisms, such as information-sharing within personal networks, 
for learning and improving various phases is present in EUFOR. However, the 
informal mechanisms are highly dependent on personal relationships, leaving doubts 
about reliability and reach (Interviews no. 28, no. 30, no. 41, no. 34, no. 39, no. 37, 
no. 35 and no. 36). 
The CSDP missions and operations have been envisaged as a rather short-term 
response to a crisis. The current trends, however, indicate that they are used 
as relatively long-term post-conflict institution-building instruments. This fact 
highlights the importance of planning capacity, which has significant influence 
on the implementation of a given mission. The stabilization and reconstruction of 
a multicultural and multi-ethnic community in BiH became a litmus test for the 
Union’s commitment to becoming a political and security actor that projects peace 
and stability across the entire continent. BiH’s future therefore mattered not only to 
the citizens of the country, but also to the EU’s perception of itself as a foreign-policy 
and security actor. In this sense, EUFOR Althea’s deployment meant projecting its 
aspirations for the region in a relatively safe, risk-free environment, with low costs.
The timeframe of planning the mission in BiH was not a critical question in the case 
of BiH, since the military problem had largely ceased to exist by the time EUFOR 
Althea took over its tasks from SFOR. Notwithstanding the political divisions related 
to the CFSP, and in the face of institutional opposition from some quarters (ini tially 
the Council and the Commission) (Flessenkemper, Helly 2013, p. 9), EUFOR Althea 
was launched at a time of momentum for the ESDP. Following the events of the 
1990s, particularly in BiH and Rwanda, several Member states developed a common 
understanding of the need to develop the EU’s crisis management capabilities. No 
rapid deployment was deemed necessary and force generation did not present a 
challenge for the Union. Furthermore, the operation was not very demanding in terms 
of planning, since it was carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities 
under the Berlin Plus arrangements.
Access to NATO planning assets, structures and capabilities under the “Berlin 
Plus” arrangements, which contributed to a smooth and relatively simple transition 
from SFOR to EUFOR Althea, is clearly extremely beneficial and important for the 
functioning of the operation. The present planning system based on NATO assets takes 
all the necessary factors into account. The operation has a clear military command 
Conclusion
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structure and reporting system, and the availability of NATO assets provides a good 
basis for real-time situational awareness. There is also a well-integrated and jointly 
coordinated training plan with AF BiH together with NATO and several bilateral 
partners.
Despite the fact that deployment and initial planning were successful, the EU has 
failed to define and agree on an end state. The evaluation criteria for the operational 
tasks have been discussed and drafted at the OHQ level since 2005, but the CSDP 
operation still lacks official time-limited benchmarks. Lack of coordination or 
planning guidance exercised from the strategic/political level towards the operational 
level is a clear inadequacy. As for the CBT work, EUFOR Althea has only recently 
come to an understanding with NATO and the AF BiH on the coordination of efforts 
and resources aimed at building a specific set of capabilities of the AF BiH. A fully 
funded plan for the procurement of key assets and equipment and an agreement on 
the goals against which the development of the AF BiH could later be evaluated are 
still required. 
Efficiency associated with the capabilities and their implementation is more difficult 
to assess. EUFOR Althea had good initial planning capacity, but certain gaps and 
weaknesses which manifest themselves in operational capacity were identified in the 
course of the research process. Lack of human intelligence (HUMINT) capability is a 
gap that hinders efficient and effective intelligence-gathering. It is also questionable to 
what extent the 17 LOTs can maintain and produce situational awareness, especially 
in the current context. Other problems with the LOTs lie in the personnel breakdown, 
especially in the low proportion of female officers and older personnel, as well as in 
the short rotation cycles, which hinder the develop ment of relationships of trust with 
locals and follow-up on the implemented policies. Apart from these, the LOTs that 
are living among the local population across BiH seem to have been an excellent tool 
for gathering information, bringing visibility to the operation, and engaging with a 
wider audience. Another force element that the interviewees mentioned as having 
been an excellent asset in the first years of the operation was the IPUs.
There are still some challenges to be addressed. The operation suffers from a lack of 
a clearly defined end-state. The ‘political realities’ and the member states’ role are 
crucial and often do not add positively to the planning process and execution of the 
operation. The reduced number of troops, and especially the current low number of 
LOTs, compromise the ability to react and respond in a timely manner to a potential 
worsening of the SASE in BiH. In EUFOR Althea’s case national caveats have 
certainly been a challenge to operational planning. 
The conflict in BiH ended 20 years ago and it is questionable whether the EU’s ‘hard 
power’ is still required at this stage. Consequently, the question arises of whether BiH 
would be able to ensure a SASE at this stage. However, this question lies beyond the 
scope of the present article and the IECEU research project.
Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Johanna Suhonen, Kari Sainio
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