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ZUR VORGESCHICHTE DER UNTERSCHEIDUNG VON NATUR UND KULTUR[1]

Soll im Zeitalter der Globalisierung eine nicht bloß oberflächliche interkulturelle Verständigung möglich sein, bedarf es der Besinnung auf die tief verwurzelten, in althergebrachten Gewohnheiten spürbaren Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten der großen Traditionskulturen. In solcher Besinnung liegt eine der Hauptaufgaben für das philosophische Denken am Beginn des zweiten Jahrtausends unserer Zeitrechnung. Für die Globalisierung ist die alles beherrschende Technisierung unserer Lebensverhältnisse konstitutiv, die sich heute durch die um sich greifende Digitalisierung ins Äußerste steigert. Durch diese Entwicklung befreien wir uns mehr und mehr von den Vorgegebenheiten der Natur; sie werden fortschreitend vom Menschenwerk der Kultur ersetzt oder zumindest überlagert.

In dieser Situation muss das Verhältnis von Natur und Kultur zu einem zentralen Thema der interkulturellen philosophischen Besinnung werden. Traditionell erscheint dieses Verhältnis primär als ein Gegensatz. Die Annahme eines solchen Gegensatzes geht auf die Gegenüberstellung von *phýsis* und *téchne* im Altgriechischen zurück. Diese Gegenüberstellung hat aber erst Aristoteles gut zwei Jahrhunderte nach dem frühgriechischen Beginn von Philosophie und Wissenschaft bei den sogenannten „Vorsokratikern" vorgenom-

men. Bemerkenswerterweise fehlte dieser Gegensatz ursprünglich auch im ostasiatischen Denken der Natur als *shizen*. Demnach gibt es in Ostasien und im Westen eine alte Übereinstimmung in der Welterfahrung, auf die sich Philosophen aus Ost und West im interkulturellen Gespräch gemeinsam besinnen können. Dieser Übereinstimmung soll im Folgenden genauer nachgegangen werden.

Die gängige Opposition von Natur und Kultur hat einen einfachen Sinn: Man versteht dabei unter Kultur den Gesamtzusammenhang alles vom Menschen Hervorgebrachten und hebt es ab von der Natur als dem Gesamtbereich dessen, was „von selbst", d.h. nicht durch uns, entstanden ist und entsteht. Wenn eine Sache durch uns entsteht, sind wir die Ursache ihrer Entstehung – „Ursache" im weiten Sinne des griechischen Wortes *aítion* oder *aitía* verstanden als das, was an einer Sache schuld ist. Die durch uns Menschen verursachte Entstehung von etwas hieß auf Altgriechisch *poíesis*, zu deutsch „Machen". Das durch ein Machen Zustandegekommene bezeichneten die Griechen als *érgon*, „Werk". Für ein Machen brauchen wir ein Wissen; wir müssen uns in der Hervorbringung eines geplanten *érgon* auskennen. Dieses Sich-Auskennen – die „Kunst" im weiten alten Sinne dieses Wortes – hieß im Griechischen *téchne*. Weil das Machen nur durch die so verstandene Kunst möglich wird, ist die *téchne* die eigentliche Ursache bei der menschlichen Hervorbringung eines Werks.

Diese Ursache steckt nicht im entstehenden Werk, sondern ist als menschliches Wissen außerhalb davon angesiedelt. Wenn wir von dem, was von Natur existiert, sagen, es entstehe „von selbst", meinen wir damit, dass es für sein Zustandekommen nicht der Anleitung durch ein außerhalb seiner befindliches Wissen als Ursache bedarf, sondern seine Ursache in sich selbst hat. In diesem Sinne kann Aristoteles der Natur, *phýsis*, die ihre Ursache in sich selbst hat, die *téchne* gegenüberstellen. So steht hinter dem Gegensatz von Natur und Kultur der Gegensatz zwischen zwei Ursachen: *phýsis* und *téchne*.

Nur weil *phýsis* und *téchne* gemeinsam haben, dass sie beide Ursachen sind, können sie miteinander verglichen werden. Aristoteles bedient sich dieses Vergleichs, um uns auf solche Weise die Natur philosophisch verständlich zu machen. Für die aristotelische Analyse des Ursacheseins der *téchne* ist eine Unterscheidung grundlegend: Wir Menschen brauchen für die Herstellung

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eines Werks ein vor- und bereitliegendes geeignetes Material, das wir bearbeiten, griechisch: die *hýle*, den Stoff, beim Bau eines Hauses beispielsweise die Steine, die Balken usw. Den Plan für das Ziel des Machens und für die einzelnen Schritte der Anfertigung des Werks liefert die *téchne*. Demnach müssen wir bei der Weise, wie die *téchne* Ursache ist, zwei Seiten unterscheiden: Auf der einen Seite haben wir die *hýle* als das, worauf die *téchne* für das Zustandebringen des *érgon* angewiesen ist. Weil die *hýle* hierfür gebraucht wird, ist sie mit schuld am Werk und gehört in diesem Sinne mit zu den Ursachen des *érgon*. Auf der anderen Seite stehen die Faktoren, die dank der *téchne* ebenfalls das Zustandekommen eines Werks verschulden: die Zielsetzung der Herstellung, der Plan für das fertige Werk und der Anstoß dafür, dass der Herstellungsprozess überhaupt auf den Weg kommt. Die genauere Beschreibung dieser drei Elemente des Ursacheseins – in der scholastischen Rezeption des Aristoteles als Wesensursache, Finalursache und Bewegungsursache bezeichnet – kann für die weiteren Überlegungen übergangen werden; es genügt die Feststellung, dass diese drei Weisen von Ursächlichkeit zusammengehören, weil sie auf der Seite der *téchne* ihren Ort haben, dem auf der Gegenseite die *hýle* – scholastisch gesprochen: die Materialursache – gegenüberliegt.

In welchem Verhältnis stehen diese beiden Seiten der Ursächlichkeit zueinander? Das Material, die *hýle*, liegt bereit dafür, gemäß den drei auf der anderen Seite angesiedelten immateriellen Ursachen umgestaltet oder bearbeitet zu werden; es unterliegt in diesem Sinne einer mit Einsetzen der *poíesis* über sie ergehenden Bestimmung; sie ist das dieser Bestimmung ausgesetzte Bestimmbare, ihr Bereitliegen ist ein der Bestimmung Unterliegen, griechisch ausgedrückt: ein *hypokeîsthai*. Die *hýle* kann deshalb mit dem Partizip Präsens dieses Verbs als das *hypokeímenon*, das „Unterliegende", „Zugrundeliegende" der *poíesis* bezeichnet werden. Dass die von der *téchne* gesteuerte Bestimmung „über" die darunter liegende *hýle* ergeht – dieses Verhältnis des „von oben herab über" drückt im Griechischen die Präposition *katá* aus. Ganz formal lassen sich sowohl das Bestimmbare, die *hýle* als *hypokeímenon*, als auch die Elemente der darüber ergehenden Bestimmung als ein „etwas", griechisch *ti* – mit dem Genitiv *tinós* – bezeichnen. Bei der Hervorbringung eines Werks ereignet sich demgemäß ein Geschehen mit dem Charakter „*ti katá tinós*", „etwas über etwas" – oder mit einer deutschen Formel „Bestimmung des Bestimmbaren".

Der Heideggerschüler und spätere Sprachanalytiker Ernst Tugendhat hat die Struktur *ti katá tinós* in seinem so betitelten hervorragenden Aristotelesbuch überall im Denken des Aristoteles aufgespürt. Vor allem bestimmt diese Struktur auch die aristotelische Interpretation der Sprache, die sich primär an den Aussagesätzen orientiert. Ein einfacher beliebiger Aussagesatz sei als Beispiel gewählt, etwa „die Tanne ist groß". Wir finden darin ein zugrundeliegendes Bestimmbares, ein *hypokeímenon*, worüber die Aussage ergeht, nämlich die Tanne. Und wir haben eine Bestimmung, der dieses Bestimmbare unterliegt, nämlich das „ist groß". Über das Vorliegende „die Tanne" ergeht die Bestimmung des Großseins.

Die Frage liegt nahe, ob diese *ti katá tinós*-Struktur im Aussagesatz vielleicht das Muster abgegeben hat für die Aufdeckung der gleichen Struktur im Werk als einem Erzeugnis der *poíesis* oder ob möglicherweise umgekehrt die Struktur der Bestimmung des Bestimmbaren bei der Interpretation des Aussagesatzes an der Struktur der Herstellung des Werks abgelesen war. Für die weiteren Überlegungen dürfen wir diese schwierige Problematik überspringen, weil es im Folgenden nur um die Frage gehen soll, welche Bedeutung die gleichermaßen in der Herstellung von etwas und in der Sprache auffindbare Struktur *ti katá tinós*, Bestimmung des Bestimmbaren, für das philosophische Verständnis der Natur hat.

Aristoteles bezieht seine oben erwähnte Unterscheidung von vier Ursacheweisen nicht nur auf das Werk, das durch menschliche *poíesis* hervorgebracht wird, sondern auch auf die Dinge der Natur, die „von selbst" entstehen. Auch im Von-selbst-Entstehen lassen sich die vier Ursacheweisen unterscheiden. Die Tanne etwa hat einen Bauplan, die Gestalt des Tanneseins, als ihre Wesensursache, das Reifen der Tannenzapfen ist ihre Finalursache, und die Auslösung ihres Wachstums durch die Einnistung von Tannensamen in einem günstigen Fleck Erdreich bildet ihre Bewegungsursache. Diesem Ursachebündel gegenüber liegt das Holz als die *hýle*, der Stoff, das Material, woraus die Tanne besteht.

Betrachten wir kritisch die drei immateriellen Ursacheweisen der Tanne, die wir mit Aristoteles in Entsprechung zur *téchne* auf der Gegenseite des Materials „Holz" unterscheiden, so zeigt sich sogleich, dass diese Unterscheidung im wörtlichen Sinne etwas „Künstliches" hat; sie ist eben an der menschlichen

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„Kunst", nämlich der *téchne*, abgelesen; wir haben bei der Herstellung eines Werks ein Bewusstsein vom Ziel und Plan unseres Herstellungsprozesses und davon, dass wir mit unserem Tun das Geschehen dieses Prozesses auslösen. Aber das Wachstum der Tanne bietet uns von sich her keinen Anhalt für die Unterscheidung dieser drei immateriellen Ursacheweisen. Wenn wir mit einer gewissen Hilflosigkeit formulieren, die Naturdinge entstünden „von selbst", so sprechen wir damit im Grunde nur das Verbot aus, bei ihnen die drei immateriellen Ursacheweisen zu unterscheiden. Das hat schon Aristoteles beobachtet; deshalb sagt er, dass diese drei Ursacheweisen beim Naturding eigentlich zusammenfallen.

Doch diese Beobachtung hindert ihn nicht, wenigstens an der Grundunterscheidung zwischen dem Material auf der einen Seite und der immateriellen Ursächlichkeit auf der anderen Seite festzuhalten, was ein Beleg dafür ist, dass Tugendhat mit seiner Grundthese recht hat: Im aristotelischen Denken herrscht durchgängig die Struktur *ti katá tinós*. Die Fundamentalunterscheidung zwischen Bestimmung und Bestimmbarem, die Differenz von *ti* und *tinós* in der Formel *ti katá tinós* soll auch für die Natur gelten. Weil es sowohl beim menschlichen Machen als auch beim Von-selbst-Entstehen in der Natur eine gemäß dieser Formel strukturierte Ursächlichkeit gibt, kann Aristoteles beides vergleichen und auf der Basis dieses Vergleichs unterscheiden. Dass wir bis heute den Unterschied zwischen Natur und Kunst bzw. Kultur machen, geht letztlich auf diese schicksalhafte Denkentscheidung des Aristoteles zurück.

Durch diese Denkentscheidung ist es uns zur Selbstverständlichkeit geworden, die Unterscheidung von Material und Bestimmung des Materials von der menschlichen *poíesis* auf das Entstehen und Wachsen in der Natur zu übertragen. Warum erscheint es uns eigentlich gerechtfertigt, auch in den Naturdingen das Material und die immaterielle Ursächlichkeit zu unterscheiden? Wir finden es, ohne dass wir darüber nachdenken, deshalb fraglos selbstverständlich, weil wir in unseren Aussagesätzen über die Dinge – auch über die Naturdinge – schon durch die Struktur solcher Sätze zwischen dem *hypokeímenon*, dem Zugrundeliegenden, und der darüber ergehenden Bestimmung unterscheiden.

In einem Aussagesatz kann vieles als das Zugrundeliegende, das unten Liegende fungieren, worüber – *katá* – eine Bestimmung ausgesprochen wird. Gram-

matisch gesprochen kann vieles das „Subjekt", das *subiectum* sein, das unter die Bestimmung „Geworfene", das „Unterworfene", also das ins Lateinische über-setzte *hypokeímenon*. Aber wir können mit Aristoteles danach fragen, welches das am tiefsten unten Liegende ist, also dasjenige *subiectum*, *hypokeímenon*, das als Basis bei allen höherstufigen Aussagen vorausgesetzt ist. Dieses *hypokeí-menon* ist ein einzelnes deiktisch gegebenes Ding, also etwa diese Tanne hier, auf die wir bei einem Waldspaziergang zeigen können und über die wir dann beispielsweise die Aussage machen können „diese Tanne ist groß". Solche deik-tisch gegebenen Einzeldinge bezeichnet Aristoteles als erstrangige *ousía*, d.h. als etwas, das es in erster Linie verdient, mit dem Wörtchen „ist" im Aussagesatz als etwas Seiendes angesprochen zu werden. Die so verstandene *ousía* ist die grundlegende Seins- und Aussageweise, die erste Kategorie, die Kategorie der Substanz, wie dann die Scholastik übersetzt; auch *substantia*, das „Darunterste-hen", das „unten Stehende", ist eine lateinische Spiegelung von *hypokeímenon*. Eine *ousía*, etwa diese Tanne hier, unterliegt einer Reihe von hinzutretenden kategorialen Bestimmungen; sie ist Träger solcher Bestimmungen, der Akziden-tien, wie dann die scholastische Tradition sagt, hier etwa des Akzidens aus der Kategorie der Quantität: des Großseins als Bestimmung der *ousía* „Tanne".

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Ein Aussagesatz wie „diese Tanne ist groß" ist so gebaut, dass es Aristoteles als zwingend erscheinen konnte, ihn hinsichtlich seiner Struktur so wie gerade skizziert zu verstehen. Aber ist es wirklich zwingend? Ein Indiz dafür, dass man daran zweifeln kann, ist schon die Tatsache, dass Platon, der Lehrer des Aristoteles, zumindest in seiner mittleren Periode einen solchen Satz anders gelesen hat. Ein deiktisch gegebenes Ding wie diese Tanne hier ist nicht etwa als Substanz Träger von Eigenschaften wie Großsein, sondern sie nimmt daran teil. Was in erster Linie verdient, „seiend" genannt zu werden, ist nicht das aufgezeigte einzelne Ding, sondern eine von Platon als *idéa* oder *eîdos* bezeich-nete Bestimmtheit wie etwa das Großsein. Das einzelne Ding verdankt sein Sein dem Umstand, dass es zu solchen Ideen-Bestimmtheiten im Verhältnis der Teilhabe, der *méthexis*, steht.

Mit diesem Gedanken bewegt sich Platon noch in der Nachfolge der früh-griechischen Philosophen. Die Berichte über die Lehren von Denkern wie Anaximander oder Heraklit und die von ihren Schriften erhaltenen Frag-mente lassen erkennen, dass die Welt für sie keine Ansammlung von Dingen

als Substanzen mit akzidentellen Bestimmungen war, sondern ein Ganzes von Bestimmtheiten wie Wärme oder Helligkeit, zu deren Erscheinen es gehört, mit der Zeit in ihr Gegenteil überzugehen.[2] In der so verstandenen Welt ist das einzelne Ding jeweils ein Ort, an dem sich eine Reihe von solchen zuständlichen Bestimmtheiten versammelt.[3] Noch für Platons sogenannte Ideenlehre bildet diese Weltauffassung den Hintergrund, und erst Aristoteles vollzieht den radikalen Bruch mit dieser Tradition. Die sogenannten Vorsokratiker sind bei Licht betrachtet Voraristoteliker.

Man könnte einwenden, dass Aristoteles mit der Ding-Auffassung seiner Vorgänger brach, weil diese Auffassung sich sachlich nicht halten ließ. Ist es ernsthaft denkbar, dass die Dinge uns Menschen nicht als substantielle Akzidenzenträger, sondern vielmehr als Orte erscheinen, an denen sich zuständliche Bestimmtheiten versammeln? Es ist in der Tat denkbar, weil die *ti katá tinós*-Struktur, die sich am Aussagesatz beobachten lässt, zwar diese Art von Sätzen in indoeuropäischen Sprachen wie dem Altgriechischen des Aristoteles charakterisiert, aber nicht in allen Sprachen für die Aussagesätze gelten muss. Ein kurzer Blick in die japanische Sprache liefert uns dafür einen Beleg, dem nach dem Eindruck des Verfassers philosophisch bisher noch zu wenig Beachtung geschenkt wurde.

Stellen wir uns die markante Darstellung eines Himmels mit einer weißen Wolke auf einem klassischen japanischen Holzschnitt vor und formulieren eine einfache Aussage über das, was wir da sehen: „die Wolke am Himmel ist weiß". Auf Japanisch würde dieser Satz lauten: *Sora no kumo wa shiroi desu* oder auch *nur sora no kumo wa shiroi.* „Sora no kumo" ist „die Wolke am Himmel", wörtlich: „vom Himmel, *sora*, die Wolke, *kumo*". „*Shiroi*" bedeutet „weiß", und das „*desu*" am Ende des Satzes entspricht unserem „ist"; es hat aber eigentlich eine andere, schwächere Funktion als unsere indoeuropäische Copula „ist" und kann deshalb auch wegfallen. In der Zusammenstellung zu einem Satz klingt die Wörterreihe „*sora no kumo wa shiroi desu*" bei ober-

2 Näheres hierzu beim Vf.: *Phänomenologie der natürlichen Lebenswelt*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M./Berlin/Bern 2012 („New Studies in Phenomenology – Neue Studien zur Phänomenologie" Bd. 9).

3 Vgl. v. Vf. „Vom Ansichsein der Dinge", in: *Kraft der Dinge: Phänomenologische Skizzen*, hg. v. I. Därmann, Wilhelm Fink, München 2014.

flächlichem Hinhören so, als sei der japanische Satz so gebaut wie unser der indoeuropäischen Sprachfamilie angehöriger deutscher Satz „die Wolke am Himmel ist weiß". Aber schon der westliche Anfänger im Japanischkurs lernt, dass das nur so scheint; denn auf die Wortgruppe „*sora no kumo*", „Wolke am Himmel", folgt die Silbe „*wa*", die soviel bedeutet wie „betreffend".

Die Wolke am Himmel ist ein Betreff, englisch ausgedrückt: ein *concern* der Aussage, und das heißt: das Wort „die Wolke" fungiert nicht als *hypokeímenon*, lateinisch: *substratum* oder *subiectum* des Satzes. Was der Aussagesatz sagt, wird nicht adäquat wiedergegeben, wenn wir ihn gemäß der Substanz-Akzidens-Struktur mit „die Wolke am Himmel ist weiß" übersetzen. Mit dieser Übersetzung tun wir so, als drücke der japanische Satz aus, dass die Wolke als Subjekt, als *hypokeímenon* der Bestimmung des Weißseins unterliegt. Doch bei genauer Wiedergabe ist das, was hier auf Japanisch gesagt wird, etwas anderes, das wir so umschreiben können: „die Wolke am Himmel betreffend findet Weiß statt". Das Tragende in diesem Satz ist nicht die Wolke am Himmel als substantielles *tinós* in der indoeuropäischen Aussagestruktur „*ti katá tinós*", sondern das Stattfinden einer zuständlichen Bestimmtheit, in diesem Falle der Farbe Weiß.

Demgemäß ist die Wolke kein substantieller Träger von zuständlichen Bestimmtheiten, sondern ein Ort für ihr Erscheinen. Wir stoßen hier augenscheinlich auf eine Parallele zum voraristotelischen griechischen Denken. Aber man könnte das Bedenken haben, dass wir mit diesem Brückenschlag zwischen frühgriechischer und japanischer Weltauffassung die Bedeutung der harmlosen kleinen Silbe *wa* im japanischen Aussagesatz überschätzen. Dem Verfasser sind durchaus japanische Kollegen begegnet, die es für erlaubt oder sogar geboten hielten, eine solche japanische Aussage trotz des *wa* nach dem Muster der indoeuropäischen Sprachstruktur „*ti katá tinós*" zu lesen. Dazu neigten vor allem diejenigen, die an der programmatischen Vorstellung der Aufklärung festhielten, dass alle Sprachen dieser Welt eine universelle Grammatik gemeinsam haben, die es aufzudecken gelte. Aber eigentlich sollte uns schon ein unbefangener Umgang mit der Rolle der Silbe *wa*, zu der es im Japanischen sogar noch Varianten gibt, veranlassen, diese Leitvorstellung aufzugeben. Es sei aber ein weiterer Beleg angeführt, der uns mit Blick auf die japanische Lebenswelt abermals zeigen kann, dass eine Auffassung der Dinge möglich

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ist, die sich nicht an der Struktur *ti katá tinós* orientiert und uns dadurch ermöglicht, in ein Naturverständnis zurückzufragen, das noch nicht durch die Unterscheidung von Natur und Kultur oder Kunst bestimmt ist.

Wie oben gesagt,, gehört zur Interpretation der Dinge gemäß der *ti katá tinós*-Struktur die Unterscheidung von zwei Seiten des menschlichen Hervorbringens von etwas: auf der einen Seite das Material, die *hýle* als das Bestimmbare, das den Bestimmungen unterliegt, auf der anderen Seite, der Seite der *téchne*, die Bestimmungen, die über das Bestimmbare ergehen. Die letzten Überlegungen sollten der Beantwortung der Frage dienen, ob wir dem Naturding gerecht werden, wenn wir auf sein Sein die am Herstellen eines Werks abgelesene *ti katá tinós*-Struktur übertragen; es zeigte sich, dass wir damit die Geltung der Struktur des indoeuropäischen Aussagesatzes, an der sich Aristoteles in seiner Kategorienschrift orientiert hatte, zu Unrecht universalisieren. Wir können aber eine noch radikalere Frage stellen, die sich rein auf das Herstellen eines Werks bezieht. Bisher wurde davon ausgegangen, dass dieses menschliche Tun die Struktur der Bestimmung des Bestimmbaren haben muss. Aber ist das eigentlich so sonnenklar?

Um in dieser Frage weiterzukommen, können wir davon ausgehen, dass es sich bei der Herstellung von etwas um eine Art von Arbeit handelt. Wenn wir Dinge zu Herstellungszwecken „bearbeiten", wie wir charakteristischerweise sagen, erscheint uns das als ein Tun, mit dem wir genau die kategoriale Struktur „Bestimmung des Bestimmbaren" in die Praxis des Alltags umsetzen; denn etwas bearbeiten heißt: dieses Etwas als vor- und bereitliegendes Bestimmbares unserem Bestimmen unterziehen. Wir stellen etwas mit Hilfe unserer *téchne* her, indem wir von uns aus an den Eigenschaften von Dingen eine qualitative Veränderung herbeiführen, griechisch gesprochen: eine *metabolé*, einen Eigenschaftswechsel, d.h. eine Veränderung der Dinge im Bereich der Akzidenskategorie der Qualität, der Beschaffenheit. Eine solche Veränderung eines Dings ist deshalb möglich, weil dabei etwas Beharrendes als das Tragende der wechselnden Eigenschaften bestehen bleibt, nämlich die *ousía*, die Substanz als *hypokeímenon*, als das bleibend Zugrundeliegende der akzidentellen Eigenschaften.

Auf diese Weise verstehen wir die Arbeit der *poíesis* als ein Tun, das der Struktur „Bestimmung des Bestimmbaren" entspricht. Das herstellende Bear-

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beiten bezieht sich auf eine *ousía* als das Bestimmbare, an dessen zeitweiligen eigenschaftlichen Bestimmungen wir uns zu schaffen machen, indem wir bereits vorliegendes Seiendes als Material benutzen. Dieses Verständnis der Arbeit gemäß der Struktur „Bestimmung des Bestimmbaren" hat nun aber eine für die europäische Tradition gravierende Folge. Die Arbeit muss dann mit begrifflichen Mitteln beschrieben werden, die sich aus den von Aristoteles ans Licht gehobenen kategorialen Unterscheidungen ergeben, und eine dieser Grundunterscheidungen ist die von Tun und Leiden. Das ist die Unterscheidung, die wir aus der Grammatik unserer indoeuropäischen Sprachen als den Unterschied von Aktiv und Passiv beim Verb kennen. Das Passiv ist die Leideform, d.h. die Form, die zeigt, dass dasjenige, worüber die Aussage gemacht wird, etwas erleidet. Leiden ist hier also im Sinne solchen Erleidens zu verstehen, d.h. des Überkommenwerdens von etwas, was dem Gegenstand der Aussage, dem Satzsubjekt widerfährt. Der grammatische Unterschied von Aktiv und Passiv konnte nur entdeckt werden, weil Aristoteles Tun und Leiden schon als zwei Kategorien des Akzidens eingeführt hatte. Er musste sie – im Unterschied zur späteren Auffassung von Kant – zu den Kategorien zählen, weil sie zu den Grundweisen des Seins gehören, die im indoeuropäischen Aussagesatz, an dem sich Aristoteles orientiert, zur Sprache gebracht werden.

Die Kategorie des Leidens kann man nur im Zusammenhang mit der des Tuns verstehen; Tun und Leiden sind so komplementär wie Berg und Tal. Entsprechend dieser Komplementarität gibt es bei der Art von Geschehen, die Aristoteles als *metabolé*, als Eigenschaftsveränderung, bezeichnet, jedesmal ein Tuendes und ein Leidendes. Wenn ein Stein sich erwärmt, also an ihm die *metabolé* von Kälte in Wärme stattfindet, muss es ein Tuendes geben, beispielsweise die Sonne, die den Stein erwärmt. Welches von den beiden beteiligten Seienden – in diesem Beispiel Stein und Sonne – das Leidende ist, kann man daran erkennen, dass es dasjenige ist, was sich durch die *metabolé* verändert. Am Tuenden, sofern es Tuendes ist, kann man die Veränderung nicht bemerken. Bei unserem Beispiel findet die Erwärmung, um die es geht, nicht an der Sonne, sondern am Stein statt. Er ist also das Erleidende.

Das Erleiden muss nicht bedeuten, dass das Erleidende leidet, d.h. Schmerz oder Not erfährt. Der Stein ist nicht lebendig und leidet nicht, wenn ihm das Warmwerden widerfährt. Sobald aber dasjenige Seiende, das von einem

Widerfahrnis betroffen ist, ein Lebewesen ist, kann sich das ändern. Deshalb ist es kein Zufall, dass im Deutschen ebenso wie in anderen indoeuropäischen Sprachen, etwa dem Altgriechischen, das Wort „erleiden", mit dem zunächst nur das Passivische des Widerfahrnisses gemeint ist, auch das als notvoll und schmerzhaft erfahrene „Leiden" bezeichnen kann. Dies wiederum ist von Bedeutung für die Arbeit des Bearbeitens von etwas.

Bearbeiten heißt: etwas tun, nämlich am Gegenstand der Bearbeitung eine *metabolé* herbeiführen. Das, was durch die Bearbeitung verändert wird, das Ding, unterliegt als Träger der Eigenschaften, die sich durch die Bearbeitung ändern, der Bearbeitung und ist so von Hause aus das Erleidende; das Tuende ist der Mensch. Nun muss der Mensch bei der Bearbeitung aber Mühe aufwenden, und diese Mühe entsteht dadurch, dass sein Tun durch Widerstände in dem, was er bearbeitet, behindert wird. Durch die Mühe, die für die Überwindung der Widerstände aufgewendet werden muss, kehrt sich das Verhältnis zwischen Tun und Leiden beim Bearbeitungsprozess um. Die Behinderung geht vom Bearbeiteten aus, und das bedeutet: sie ist ein Tun vonseiten des Bearbeiteten, des Dings. Da zum Tun ein korrespondierendes Erleiden gehört, wird durch die Behinderung derjenige, dem sie widerfährt, zum Erleidenden, also der arbeitende Mensch. Als Lebewesen spürt der Mensch, dass ihm durch den Widerstand der Dinge ein Erleiden widerfährt. So wird das passivische Erleiden für ihn zum schmerzhaft empfundenen Leiden, und die kategorial interpretierte Arbeit erscheint als Leiden.

Dass das Mühevolle der Arbeit im Horizont der Struktur *ti katá tinós* als Leiden aufgefasst wird, hat sich auch im europäischen Vokabular niedergeschlagen. Das deutsche Wort Arbeit bedeutet von seiner sprachlichen Herkunft her soviel wie Not und Beschwernis. Das gleiche gilt für die Entsprechungen in anderen europäischen Sprachen, etwa das lateinische *labor*, worauf das englische *labour* zurückgeht, oder das französische Wort *travail*, das ursprünglich mit der spätlateinischen Bezeichnung für ein Folterinstrument zusammenhängt. Charakteristischerweise gehört im biblischen Mythos zur Vertreibung von Adam und Eva aus dem Paradies die Bestrafung mit der Arbeit. Das schöne und gute Leben bestand für das alte Europa im Freisein von Arbeit, im „süßen Nichtstun", *dolce farniente*, – in Süditalien, woher dieser Ausdruck stammt, bis ins vergangene Jahrhundert, vielleicht sogar bis in unsere Zeit hinein. Man

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darf sagen: Die Mühe der Arbeit wird in der vorherrschenden Tradition unserer Kultur fast ausschließlich mit Schmerz und Leid verbunden. Es wäre ein eigene Aufgabe, zu klären, wie es vor dem geschichtlichen Hintergrund dieser negativen Bewertung möglich wurde, dass in unserer modernen Gesellschaft der Kampf für die Verwirklichung des Rechts auf Arbeit eine geradezu beherrschende Rolle spielt.

Die notvolle Mühe der Arbeit begegnete dem europäischen Menschen in der alltäglichen lebensweltlichen Erfahrung in zwei Grundsituationen. Die erste Situation ergibt sich daraus, dass wir durch die Notwendigkeit, unser Leben zu erhalten, vor bestimmte regelmäßig wiederkehrende Aufgaben gestellt werden. Wir müssen beispielsweise jeden Tag für unsere Nahrung sorgen. Das bedingt, dass wir bestimmte periodisch sich wiederholende Tätigkeiten verrichten müssen, etwa das Bestellen und Abernten der Felder, auf denen unsere Grundnahrungsmittel oder die Rohstoffe dafür wachsen. Das Urbeispiel für den hier erforderlichen Typ von Arbeit ist die Tätigkeit des Bauern.

Der andere Typ von Arbeit ergibt sich aus einer zweiten Grundsituation. Das ist die Notwendigkeit, vorgegebenes Seiende zu Dingen umzugestalten, die uns auf irgendeine Weise für die Lebenserhaltung dienlich sind, Kleider, Behausungen, Essgefäße, Werkzeuge usw. Menschheitsgeschichtliche Urbeispiele hierfür sind die Tätigkeiten des Webers, des Maurers, des Schmieds, des Töpfers usw., also die handwerklichen Tätigkeiten, bei denen ein *érgon*, ein Werk hergestellt wird. Der Typ von Arbeit, um den es hier geht, ist die Mühe des Bearbeitens, die erforderlich ist, wenn eine *poíesis*, die Herstellung eines *érgon*, stattfinden soll.

Der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Typen von Arbeit[4] besteht darin, dass man bei dem zweiten Typ ein Ende der Mühe absehen kann. Nach der Vollendung des Werks hört der Bearbeitungsprozess auf. Beim ersten Typ von Arbeit hat die Mühe prinzipiell niemals ein Ende. Man kann zwar auch den bestellten Acker als ein Werk bezeichnen. Aber sein Untergang ist gleichsam schon in der Bearbeitung programmiert. Der Acker wird dafür bestellt, dass er Frucht

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4 Den Horizont für solche Unterscheidungen hat Hannah Arendt mit ihrer bahnbrechenden Untersuchung *Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben*, Piper, München, Zürich 2002 (englisch: *The human condition*, Chicago 1998) eröffnet.

tragen kann. Aber eben dieses Fruchttragen bedingt, dass der Acker im nächsten Jahr neu bestellt werden muss. Die Arbeit ist bei diesen, dem Grundtyp nach bäuerlichen Verrichtungen in einen Kreislauf immer wiederkehrender Notwendigkeiten eingespannt. Diese periodisch sich wiederholende Arbeit ist der Typ von Tätigkeit, den die alten Griechen als die eigentlich sklavische angesehen haben, weil das Leiden an ihrer Unbeendbarkeit eigentlich nur den Sklaven zugemutet werden kann. Die handwerkliche Arbeit, die das Herstellen eines Werks begleitet, kann in die Freude am fertigen Werk einmünden. Deshalb haben die Griechen diese Arbeit ein wenig höher eingeschätzt, aber auch der Handwerker ist doch dem „Tagewerk" ausgeliefert, das sich immer und immer wiederholt. Das eigentlich Qualvolle an aller Arbeit ist für die Europäer der Tradition die Fesselung an die Notwendigkeit dessen, was immer wiederkehrt. Diese Notwendigkeit verhindert oder behindert die Freiheit, in der der Mensch seine Würde erblicken kann. Von daher hatte für die Griechen alle Arbeit etwas Verächtliches, dem der freie Mann so weit wie möglich zu entgehen suchte.

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Die große Ausnahme in der Einschätzung der Arbeit bei den griechischen Klassikern war Hesiod, neben Homer der Urdichter Europas, mit seinem Lehrgedicht „Werke und Tage", *Érga kai hemérai*. Hesiod befasst sich hier in einer für die griechische Kultur ungewöhnlichen Ausführlichkeit mit der Landarbeit, also gerade der Art von Arbeit, die am stärksten durch die Notwendigkeit ihrer unaufhörlichen Wiederholung gekennzeichnet ist, und mahnt die Menschen, den Verpflichtungen dieser Arbeit mit Regelmäßigkeit und Treue nachzukommen. Die Perspektive, dass die Freiheit darin bestehen könnte, sich von solcher Arbeit zu befreien, liegt Hesiod noch fern. Etwas von seiner Einschätzung der Arbeit ist ein halbes Jahrtausend später noch einmal lebendig geworden im Gedicht des römischen Dichters Vergil über den Landbau, den *Georgica*.

Hesiod hat sein Lehrgedicht vermutlich an der Wende vom 7. zum 6. vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts verfasst, also etwa ein Jahrhundert, bevor mit Thales und Anaximander in Milet das frühgriechische Denken begann. Wie war es möglich, dass Hesiod so anders als die spätere Zeit über die Arbeit denken konnte? Wir dürfen vielleicht vermuten: Er konnte es, weil sich zu seiner Zeit schon der Geist der erwachenden frühgriechischen Philosophie vorbere-

itete, in deren voraristotelischer Dingauffassung die Gegenüberstellung von *phýsis* und *téchne* noch fehlt. In der Tat ist die *phýsis* das beherrschende Thema der sogenannten „Vorsokratiker", weshalb Aristoteles sie als *physikoí* oder *physiológoi*, als Physisdenker, bezeichnet; aber nirgendwo findet sich in den Fragmenten ihrer Schriften eine Konfrontation der *phýsis* mit der *téchne*.[5] Das deutet darauf hin, dass der Sinn des menschlichen Lebens möglicherweise gerade darin erblickt wird, sich mit allen Tätigkeiten – auch mit der „sklavischen" Arbeit – in das Grundgeschehen der *phýsis* einzufügen, nämlich das Erscheinen von zuständlichen Bestimmtheiten im Ding als seinem Ort.

Hesiod und die frühgriechischen Denker eröffnen uns den Ausblick in eine denkbare Deutung des Bearbeitens von etwas, in der die Mühe der Arbeit und sogar der sogenannten sklavischen Arbeit nicht als ein Leiden erfahren wird. Wenn die Dinge Orte für das Erscheinen zuständlicher Bestimmtheiten sind, dann lässt sich das Bearbeiten der Dinge als ein Geschehen verstehen, wodurch der Mensch das Geschehen dieses Erscheinens mitvollzieht. Und wenn die Bearbeitung der Dinge sich in diesem Sinne versteht, dann ist sie nicht von dem Bewusstsein begleitet, das Ursachesein des Menschen bei der Herstellung von etwas sei eine andere Art von Ursachesein neben der Selbstursächlichkeit der Natur. Das bearbeitende Tun des Menschen behält gleichsam etwas Selbstloses. Die *poíesis* stellt sich nicht dem natürlichen Entstehen von etwas gegenüber, sie macht dem Von-Selbst-Entstehen keine Konkurrenz, wie es unvermeidlich ist, wenn die *téchne* als eine andere Art von Ursächlichkeit von der Selbstursächlichkeit der *phýsis* unterschieden wird. Und die Kategorien Tun und Leiden passen nicht mehr, weil das Bearbeiten nicht als eine Bestimmung von Bestimmbarem aufgefasst wird. Dafür, dass es eine solche Auffassung von der Arbeit auch heute noch geben kann, kann nun wiederum Japan einen Beleg liefern.

Nach dem Eindruck des Verfassers deutet alles, was man in zuverlässigen Quellen über das Verhältnis zur Arbeit bei den Menschen in Ostasien oder jedenfalls in Japan lesen kann, darauf hin, dass die Arbeit dort zumindest ur-

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5 Für die hier vorausgesetzte Interpretation des frühgriechischen Denkens vgl. v. Vf.: *Heraklit, Parmenides und der Anfang von Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Eine phänomenologische Besinnung*, De Gruyter, Berlin 1980.

sprünglich anders erfahren und aufgefasst wurde und vielleicht noch wird. Der im Westen übliche Hinweis auf die sogenannte andere „Arbeitsmoral" in Ostasien liefert dafür aber nur eine nichtssagende Erklärung. Einen wirklich aufschlussreichen Hintergrund bildet vielmehr abermals die japanische Sprache. Weil ihre Aussagesätze nicht nach der *ti-katá-tinós*-Struktur gebaut sind, gibt es auch den Unterschied von Aktiv und Passiv nicht. Die Sprache macht den Menschen in dem von ihr geprägten Kulturraum von vornherein nicht das Angebot einer Interpretationsmöglichkeit, dergemäß das Mühevolle der Bearbeitung gemäß dem kategorialen Wechselspiel von Tun und Leiden als Leiden erscheint. Natürlich kann das nicht bedeuten, dass die Arbeit nicht auch in Ostasien mühevoll wäre; etwas zu bearbeiten ist auf der ganzen Welt mühsam. Entscheidend ist, wie diese Mühsal aufgefasst wird, d.h. welches der Sinnhorizont ist, in den sie alltäglich, vor aller philosophischen Reflexion hineingestellt wird.

Den Eindruck eines anderen Grundverhältnisses zur Arbeit des Bearbeitens hat der Verfasser bei seinen Japan-Aufenthalten vor allem in den berühmten Gärten des Landes gewonnen. Um diese oft bezaubernd schönen Anlagen zu verstehen, muss man sich als erstes vor Augen halten, dass das in den Sommermonaten sehr intensiv feucht-heiße Monsun- bzw. Taifunklima in Süd- und Ostasien das Wachstum der Pflanzen in diesen Gegenden unvergleichlich stärker fördert als in unserem Klima. Beim Besuch in einem japanischen Garten kann man fast immer Menschen beobachten, die mit seiner hingebungsvoll genauen Pflege beschäftigt sind. Jedes Detail, vom kleinsten Fleck Moos angefangen, ist in einem extremen Maße das Resultat eines ewigen Kampfes gegen das im Taifunklima unablässig im Garten wiederkehrende Unkraut.[6] Das bedeutet, dass dieser Kampf eine unendlich sich wiederholende Mühe ist, also unzweifelhaft gerade dem Typ von Arbeit angehört, welcher der europäischen Tradition als extrem leidvoll und damit sklavisch erschien. So steckt in der außerordentlichen Gepflegtheit dieser Gärten eine Arbeit, die aus europäischer Sicht in besonderem Maße als ein Leiden erscheinen muss.

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6 Dass diese Beobachtung philosophische Bedeutung hat, wurde entdeckt von Tetsurō Watsuji: *Fūdo – Wind und Erde. Der Zusammenhang zwischen Klima und Kultur*, übers. v. D. Fischer-Barnicol u. O. Ryogi, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1992.

Umso erstaunlicher ist es für den westlichen Besucher, dass im Erscheinungsbild dieser Gärten nichts von der darin investierten menschlichen Mühsal spürbar wird. Im Gegenteil: die Gärten sehen so aus, als verdankte sich ihre ganze Gestalt dem mühelosen Von-selbst-Erscheinen – japanisch *shizen* – der Natur. Genau auf diesen Eindruck wird in den Gärten mit nie erlahmender Sorgfalt hingearbeitet, und das zeigt, dass die Mühe der Arbeit nicht in Erscheinung treten soll, weil sie sich gerade in ihrer endlosen Wiederholung einfügt in das Erscheinen von zuständlichen Bestimmtheiten in den Dingen – hier den Pflanzen- und Stein-Arrangements – als ihren Orten.

Weil die Arrangements in diesem Horizont als Zeichen der Mühelosigkeit der Natur erfahren werden, kann jede gelungene Komposition von Pflanzen und Steinen in den Gärten das Entzücken der japanischen Besucher hervorrufen. Aber das Entzücken beruht nicht auf der imaginären Vorstellung, die menschliche *téchne* und *poíesis* hätte an der Gestaltwerdung der Arrangements keinen Anteil; das wäre eine europäische, aus dem Geiste des aristotelischen Naturbegriffs, d.h. der Gegenüberstellung zur Kunst gedachte Gedankenkonstruktion. Die extreme Künstlichkeit der japanischen Gärten ist kein Gegensatz zu ihrer Natürlichkeit, weil die Mühe der Bearbeitung nicht im Horizont der Struktur *ti katá tinós* erfahren wird, die den kategorialen Unterschied von Tun und Leiden impliziert.

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Liankang NI

THE MIND'S EYE

K. Gödels mathematische Intuition und E. Husserls Wesensschau

I. Einleitende Bemerkung zu Husserls Ideation

Husserls Göttinger Schüler, der Kanadier Winthrop Pickard Bell schreibt in dem Brief vom 19. Februar 1922 an Husserl (Hua Brief, III, 37):

Die Idee einer "Wesenserkenntnis", welche nicht bloß unkontrollierbare Dicta eines an eine mysteriöse "Intuition" appellierenden Temperaments sind, ist in England neu. Das heißt, logische Intuition hat durch Russell Anerkennung gewonnen. Aber als Prinzip in der Philosophie im allgemeinen sieht man dabei keine Haltepunkte. Bergson appelliert an die Intuition für die abstrusesten Resultate. Ja! Läßt man einmal intellektuelle Intuition in "sachhaltigen" Fragen gelten, weshalb darf nicht jeder Spiritist und Schwärmer die Evidenz einer "Intuition" beliebig zitieren?

Also die Stelle, die Rolle, die Grenzen der Evidenz von wirklichen und wirklich brauchbaren Wesenserkenntnissen: das wäre ein Thema, welches Beachtung finden würde.

In den Briefen von Husserl an Bell zu dieser Zeit befindet sich keine Reaktion Husserls darauf. Der Grund dafür mag darin liegen, daß er eine Antwort darauf für nicht nötig hält, weil er seit der Zeit seiner Habilitation (1887) schon damit beschäftig ist, dieses Thema zu erwägen und zu erläutern. Noch einen anderen Grund für Husserls Schweigen gegenüber Bells Frage, den Kurt

Gödel einmal erwähnt hat, brauchen wir wohl nicht ernsthaft in Erwägung zu ziehen, nämlich: "Husserl had to conceal his great discovery. Philosophy is a persecuted science. Without concealment, the structure of the world might have killed him."[1] Wir halten es für einen Scherz von Gödel. Aber er hat in der Spätzeit wirklich ernsthafte Untersuchungen und Ausführungen zur Problematik der Husserlschen "Wesenserkenntnis" unternommen, und seine Überlegungen sind uns heute für das Verständnis von Wesensschau bzw. Ideation bei Husserl nicht ohne Erleuchtungen.

II. Einleitende Bemerkung zu Gödels Husserl-Forschung

Kurt Gödel begann 1959 oder etwas später, die Werke von Husserl, seinem Landsmann, in Mähren, zu studieren.[2] Wang Hao berichtet in seinen *Reflections on Kurt Gödel* (1987): Gödel "was only interested in Husserl's later work (after 1907)."[3] Das hier verstandene "Husserl's later work" entspricht zwar nicht der geläufigen Vorstellung der späten Werke Husserls, schadet aber im wesentlichen nichts. Und in der Tat können wir schon in Wang Haos späterem Fortsetzungsbuch *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy* (1996), das Wang verfaßte, nachdem er teilweise die Nachlaßschriften Gödels nachgeprüft hat, etwas korrektere Beschreibungen finden: "His library includes all of Husserl's major writings, many marked with underlinings and marginal comments, and accompanied by inserted pages written mostly in Gabelsberger shorthand. These comments are now being tran-

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1 Vgl. Wang Hao, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London 1996, S. 166.
2 Sowohl nach der von Wang notierten Selbstdarstellung Gödels unter dem Titel "Some Facts about Kurt Gödel", als auch nach den mehrmaligen Berichten und Ausführungen in den Werken von Wang, soll die geistige Verknüpfung zwischen Gödel und Husserl ab 1959 beginnen. Aber in Gödels *Collected Works,* Volume III meint der Herausgeber Føllesdal, daß Gödels Husserls Studien nicht in diesem Jahr beginnen sollen, sondern etwas später, er hat aber dafür keinen konkreten Belege gegeben. (Vgl. Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Introductory note to *1961/?", in Gödel, *Collected Works, Volume III, Unpublished Essays and Lectures*, New York/Oxford, Oxford Oniversity Press, 1995, S. 367.
3 Wang Hao, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1987, S. 156. – Føllesdal listet in seinem "Introductory note to *1961/?" zu Gödels *Collected Works* III alle von Gödel angeeigneten Werke von Husserl mit Angaben der Auflagen auf. Vgl. Gödel, *Collected Works* III, a.a.aO., S. 367, Anm. b.

scribed, and a selection of them will be published in a future volume of Gödel's *Collected Works*."[4] Und Wang berichtet hier auch in ausführlicherer Weise: "Gödel told me that the most important of Husserl's published works are *Ideas* and *Cartesian Meditations* (the Paris lectures) lectures): 'The latter is closest to real phenomenology – investigating how we arrive at the idea of self.'"[5]

Über den Grund, warum Gödel sich zu dieser Zeit plötzlich mit Husserl zu beschäftigen begann, vermutete Wang in *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*: "In 1959 he began to study Husserl, probably to look for a deeper foundation of human knowledge in everyday life."[6] Diese Vermutung ist zu einfach und unklar. Später in *A Logical Journey* macht Wang dazu ebenfalls eine Korrektur: er meint, der Anlaß für Gödels Husserl-Studium ist eine Entscheidung im Zusammenhang mit Rudolf Carnap: Gödel ist nicht zufrieden mit der allgemeinen philosophischen Ansicht von Carnap, aber während der Verfassung seines Carnap-Artikels "Is mathematics syntax of language?" seine Manuskripte sechsmal geändert, und nach der Abgabe der letzten Fassung beim Editor im Februar 1959 wieder zurückziehen und sich entscheiden, den Artikel nicht mehr zu veröffentlichen. Wang erinnert sich: "He [Gödel] had, he told me once, proved conclusively in this essay that mathematics *is not* syntax of language but said little about what mathematics *is*."[7] Das bedeutet, obwohl Gödel von sich aus den negativen Beweis zu Carnaps Auffassung der Mathematik liefern konnte, wollte er doch hoffen, mit Hilfe Husserls eine positive Begründung des mathematischen Realismus zu vollziehen, oder noch konkreter gesagt, "the objective reality of concepts and their relations"[8] zu begründen. Diese Erklärung zu dem Motiv der Gödels Husserl-Forschung ist überzeugend.

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4 Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., S. 156. – Das Mißleitedes des Satzes liegt vor allem darin, daß das sogenannte "later work" von allgemeinen Lesern als Husserl "last work" (*Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*). Und wie oben schon erwähnt, gilt hier eher der Gegenteil: von Wangs Bericht in *A Logical Journey* her gesehen, schätzt Gödel unter den Spätwerken Husserls nur *Cartesianische Meditationen* (1929). Außerdem hat er sich ernsthaft mit den Frühwerken Husserls beschäftigt, wie *Logischen Untersuchungen* (1900/01) und *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* I (1913).
5 Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 164.
6 Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., S. 12.
7 Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 163.
8 Das ist von Wang notierte Aussage von Gödel selbst, vgl. Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 7.

Die Begründung, welche Gödel versucht, steht mit den methodologischen Gedanken Husserls, die er in verschiedenen Perioden unter den Namen "allgemeiner Vorstellung", "kategorialer Anschauung", "Ideation", "formaler Anschauung", "Wesensschau" usw. äußert, im immanenten Zusammenhang. Die von Carnap in seiner Dissertation Der Raum (1920) mehrmals erwähnte "Wesenserschauung", ist nur der andere Ausdruck Husserls für seine Methode der Wesenserkenntnis. Husserl bezeichnet seinen Idealismus als "phänomenologischen", im Unterschied zu dem platonischen "naiven Realismus", und zwar einerseits aus dem Grund, daß er glaubt: "Das Problem der echten historischen Erklärung fällt bei den Wissenschaften mit der 'erkenntnistheoretischen' Begründung oder Aufklärung zusammen."[9] Dies ist eine Erklärung zu einem genetischen und geschichtlichen Idealismus. Aber sie ist nicht Husserls Patent, sondern vielmehr eine Position, die er seit 1905 von W. Dilthey übernimmt und in seinem letzten Werk Krisis durchführt, eben eine Position, von welcher Gödel nicht viel hält, ein genetischer Idealismus.[10] Andererseits, unterscheidet sich der phänomenologische Idealismus vom platonischen "naiven Idealismus" noch in dem Hauptzug, daß der Erstere, wie es sich in seinem Name schon zeigt, hervorhebt: die Ideen können uns erscheinen, sie sind phänomenal, erschaubar, ersichtlich, und nicht metaphysisch, daher ist der phänomenologische Idealismus ein anschaulicher Idealismus.[11] Der Charakterzug dieser Art vom Idealismus ist es, was Gödel am liebsten durchblicken möchte.

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9 Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, HuaVI, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1976, S. 381.

10 Vgl. Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., S. 277: "G[ödel] does not seem to sympathize with Husserl's 'Last Work' (*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology Phenomenology*), which is generally taken as adding a historical dimension".

11 Die Eigenschaften des Husserlschen Idealismus hat der Verfasser vor allem in den folgenden Aufsätzen ausfürhlicher dargestellt: "What's Essence and How intuitive? – A Rethinking of the Phenomenological Idealism", in *Academic Montly*, 2012, No. 9, S. 50–55; "Husserl und Platon – Entstehung und Begründung des phänomenologischen Idealismus", bald in *World Philosophy*. Der erstere behandelt das Problematik der Idee, Ideation sowie ihr Verhältnis zu Sprache und Ausdruck vor allem aus dem Perspektiv der Sprachanalyse, der letztere dann vorwiegend die Problematik der Wesenserschauung aus dem Perspektiv der Bewußtseinsanalyse.

Es ist zu bemerken, daß die Frage der Grundlegung der Mathematik in den fünfziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, mit welcher sich Gödel beschäftigt, im Grund genommen die gleiche Frage der Grundlegung der Arithmetik in der achtziger Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts ist, welche Husserl gegenüberstand: sie bearbeiten beider die Fragen: "Was ist Mathematik?" und "Was ist Zahl?", und die Antwort auf die erstere wird schließlich auf die Antwort auf die letztere zurückgehen. Bei der Veröffentlichung seiner *Philosophie der Arithmetik* 1889 ist Husserl das Problematische der psychologistischen Erklärung bewußt, und er hat in der Diskussion mit G. Frege in den Jahren 1891–1894 seine idealistische Position wieder feststellt.[12] Daher kann er in dem nach zehn Jahr veröffentlichten ersten Teil der *Logischen Untersuchungen*, in *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, mit dem weitverbreiteten, einschließlich seinem eigenen früheren Psychologismus sowie dessen relativistischen und anthropologischen Konsequenzen abrechnen. Dies wird wohl bei Gödel kein großes Interesse erwecken, sondern nur stilschweigend von ihm anerkannt. Es ist hier jedoch hinzuweisen, daß Husserls Kritik an Psychologismus in *Prolegomena* letzten Endes mit Gödels Kritik an Carnaps Auffassung der Mathematik in seinem Aufsatz "Is mathematics syntax of language?" übereinstimmt, wenn auch auf verschiedenen Wegen. Denn eine nominalistische und konventionalistische Erklärung zur Grundlage der Mathematik zum Relativismus und Anthropologismus **führen** muß.

Nach Wangs Bericht soll Gödel in der darauf folgenden Husserl-Forschung viel geerntet haben. "In the 1960s he recommended to some logicians that they should study the sixth investigation in *Logical Investigations* for its treatment of *categorial intuition*."[13] Und in der Kommunikation mit Wang spricht Gödel Anfang siebziger Jahre zum ersten Mal mit ihm über Husserl und Phänomenologie, und äußert ausdrücklich seine Überzeugungen wie gefolgt: "He urges that our intuition goes beyond Kantian (or, according to him, concrete) in-

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12 In Gödels Bibliothek befindet sich kein Exemplar von Husserls *Philosophie der Arithmetik* I (vgl. Gödel, *Collected Works* III, S. 367, footnote b). Es könnte sein, daß das Buch nach der Erscheinung keinen Neudruck hat und deshalb in USA damals nicht zugänglich ist. Die Husserliana-Ausgabe von *Philosophie der Arithmetik* erscheint erst 1970, und Gödel scheint Husserliana-Bände nicht mehr erworben zu haben, die nach 1968 erschienen sind.
13 Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 164.

tuition and that, indeed, we can also *perceive* concepts. Kant's *Anschauung* is restricted to space-time (or sensory) intuition."[14]

III. Erfassung der geschichtlichen Entwicklungslinie der Gedanken von der Ideation

Diese Ansicht Gödels Ansicht ist die wichtigste Ernte, die er in den fünfziger Jahren durch Erforschung der Phänomenologie erzielt hat. Und von den anderen möglichen Einflüssen, die Husserl auf Gödel ausübt, wie etwa hinsichtlich Realismus,[15] Monadologie, Psychologismus-Kritik, Transzendentalismus, Zeitproblem, Absolutismus, Mathematischer Logik usw., kann man im Grund genommen absehen.

Ohne Zweifel hat Gödel, von dem Gespräch zwischen Wang und Gödel her betrachtet, wirklich detaillierte Erforschungen und systematische Überlegungen zu Husserls Gedanken von Wesenserschauung durchgeführt. Dies erweist sich vor allem in zweierlei: einerseits Gödel ist mit Husserls Begriffen und Ausdrücken bezüglich Ideenschau in verschiedenen Perioden sehr vertraut, wie etwa "categorial intuition" in *Logischen Untersuchungen*, dem Unterschied zwischen "streng" und "exakt" im Logos-Aufsatz, "Reduktion" und "epoché" in *Ideen* I, den Unterschied von "objektive Logik" und "subjektive Logik" in *Formaler und transzendentaler Logik*, "die Idee von Ich" in *Cartesianischen Meditationen*, usw.[16]

Andererseits besitzt Gödel gute geschichtliche Kenntnisse über die Tradition der deutschen Philosophie, wo sich Husserl befindet. Er, so nach Wang, "was not satisfied with Kant's dualism or with his restriction of intuition to sense intuition, which ruled out the possibility of intellectual or categorial intuition." Aber "Leibniz believed in the ideal of seeing the primitive concepts

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14 Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 12.
15 Føllesdal ist der Ansicht, daß in der geistigen Beziehung zwischen Gödel und Husserl die wichtigsten Elemente "Realismus" und "intuition" sind (Vgl. Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Introductory note to *1961/?", in Gödel, *Collected.Works* III, a.a.O., S. 368). Aber Gödel findet in der Hinsicht auf Realismus in Husserl nur einen Wegbegleiter, keinen Lehrer, in Hinsicht auf Anschauung aber zugleich beider.
16 Vgl. Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 164, S. 166 f.

clearly and distinctly. When Husserl affirmed our ability to 'intuit essences,' he had in mind something like what Leibniz believed. Even Schelling adhered to this ideal, but Hegel moved away from this."[17] Offenbar stellt Gödel bereits im Gebiet der intellektuellen Anschauung bzw. der begrifflichen Intuition eine Entwicklungslinie von Leibniz zu Husserl heraus. Das ist ein Weg, der den Platonismus und die mathematische Intuition verbindet. Daraus ist auch zu folgern, warum Platon, Leibniz und Husserl für Gödel "the three philosophers he found most congenial" sind.[18]

Wir können Gödels Auffassung de begrifflichen Anschauung bzw. der mathematischen Intuition sowie die möglichen Einflüsse von Seite Husserls Gedanken der Ideation auf sie unter folgenden drei Aspekten (IV–VI) bis betrachten.

IV. "Die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffes" und "die vereinigende der synthetischen Apperzeption"

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Im allgemeinen werden Frege und Husserl für Begriffsrealist oder mathematischen Platonist oder Idealist gehalten. Und der Unterschied zwischen beiden liegt darin, daß Frege nicht, aber Husserl schon die Methode der Erfassung des "dritten Reichs" bzw. des "idealen Seins" besitzt. In diesem Sinne stellt Husserl einen Platonist dar, weicher aber nicht naiver oder metaphysischer, sondern phänomenologischer oder intuitiver Idealist ist.

Wenngleich der Platonismus in der Mathematik vor Gödel schon durch Frege kräftig vertreten wurde, und auch unmittelbare wie mittelbare Einflüsse auf Gödels Denken ausübte,[19] stellte sich Frege jedoch nicht andächtig die Fra-

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17 Vgl. Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 206, S. 210. – Das ist ungefähr die Problematik, welche der Verfasser in den folgen drei Aufsätzen behandelt hat: "The fundamental significations of Kant's concept of 'Intellektual Intuition'", in *Philosophische Forschung*, 2001, No. 10, pp. 49–65; "The different fates of 'Intelligible Intuition' in the Eastern and Western Thoughts" (1–2), in *Social Science Front*, 2002, No. 1, pp. 42-49; No. 2, pp. 46–54. Der Verfasser hat in diesen Aufsätzen nur nicht den Glauben von begrifflichen Anschauungen sowie ihre immanente Beziehung zur Monadologie bei Leibniz behandelt, dafür aber mehr ausführlicher die Entwicklung des Kantischen Gedanken von "Intellektueller Anschauung" bei Kitaro Nishida und Mu Zongsan.
18 Vgl. Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., p.74.
19 Über die Entwicklung des methematischen Realismus von Frege zu Gödel vgl. Ga-

ge gegenüber, wie "Gedanke" oder "Begriffsrealität" als "dritter Reich" mit dem "Denken" oder "Geist" der Mathematiker in Verbindung treten und von ihnen erfaßt werden kann? In *A Logical Journey* liefert Wang eine rückfolgernde Erklärung zu Frege: "Presumably Frege believes that, since we do 'grasp' or 'perceive' thoughts (nonsensibly), there must be an objective realm of thoughts."[20]

Jedenfalls teilt Gödel zwar von Anfang an mit Frege den Standpunkt in Ontologie, und ist überzeugt von der Begriffsrealität, aber eine ausdrückliche methodische Unterstützung kann er von Frege nicht bekommen. Eben darum appelliert sich Gödel in seiner Spätzeit mehr an einen anderen Verbündeten, nämlich Husserl, der ebenfalls auf dem platonischen Standpunkt steht, ebenfalls das "ideale Sein" hervorhebt, aber überdies noch den konkreten methodischen Anhalt als phänomenologische "Ideation" anbietet. In der Verbundenheit zwischen Frege, Husserl und Gödel vertritt zuerst nur Husserl ausdrücklich den "intuitiven Idealismus". Das ist eben der realistische Standpunkt, den Gödel unter "conceptual intuition" "intuition of concepts" versteht.

Streng genommen, gibt es bei Frege bereits ansetzende Überlegungen von der Beziehung zwischen "Begriffsrealität" und der geistiger Tätigkeit der Mathematiker. Wenn wir hier Husserls Begriffspaar "Noesis-Noema" einführen, gehört im Verfahren der Wesensschau oder Ideenschau das Wesen bzw. die Idee zu ihrem noematischen Teil, und die Intuition bzw. Anschauung zu ihrem noetischen Teil. Frege betont mehr die Funktion des Begriffs, also der noematischen Seite, und im allgemeinen Sinne können wir auch sagen, mehr die Seite der Objektivität bei der Entstehung des Gedankens. Daher wird Husserl, als er in *Philosophie der Arithmetik* die Bildung der Zahl auf unsere kollektive Verbindung oder unsere eigentliche Vorstellung (Anschauung) sowie die Reflexion darauf zurückführt, von Frege kritisiert, daß Husserl die psychologische Vorstellung mit dem logischen Begriff, und dem subjektiven Akt des

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briella Crocco, "Gödel, Carnap and the Fregean Heritage", in *Synthese*, Vol. 137, No. 1/2, "History of Logic", 2003, S. 21–41, sowie Jean van Heijenoort (ed.), *From Frege to Gödel – A Source Book in Mathematical Logic*, 1879–1931, Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1967. – Überdies sind wir der Ansicht, daß Gödels "concept" oder "conceptual" in "conceptual intuition" den "Begriff" im Sinn von Frege oder zumindest einen von Frege beeinflußten "Begriff" darstellt.

20 Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 291 f. usw.

Denkens mit dem objektiven Gedanken vermengt. Auf diese Differenz zwischen dem damaligen Husserl und Frege hat Robert Sokolowski hingewiesen, indem er sagt: "Frege saw things differently. For him, the number four does not arise through our collecting; the collecting is done by concepts. In his *Foundations of Arithmetic* (1884) Frege speaks of *die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffs* (§ 48)".[21] So gesehen ist diese Kraft für Frege eine solche, die zwar mit unserer subjektiven Tätigkeit des Denkens im Zusammenhang steht, die aber abhängig von dieser Tätigkeit ist, ja sie sogar bestimmt. Sie ist die Kraft des objektiven Gedankens. Daher betont Frege hier gleich: "Die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffes übertrifft weit die vereinigende der synthetischen Apperzeption."[22] Die letztere Kraft führt Frege zwar auf Husserls Göttinger Kollegen Johann Julius Baumann zurück,[23] sie stimmt aber wesentlich mit der Kraft "unserer kollektiven Verbindung" oder "unseres Zählens" überein, worauf der damalige Psychologist Husserl stand, und schließlich auch mit der "Denkkraft", von welcher Frege selber in seiner Schrift "Der Gedanke" (1918) spricht: "Dem Fassen der Gedanken muß ein besonders geistiges Vermögen, die Denkkraft entsprechen."[24]

Aus Freges Aussage kann man deutlich ersehen, daß die Streitfrage hier nicht eine Auswahlfrage von Entweder/Oder ist: ob die Bildung des Begriffs durch "die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffes" oder durch "die vereinigende Kraft der synthetischen Apperzeption" zustande kommt, sondern eher eine **Ge**wichtungsfrage: welche Kraft spielt im Verfahren der Erfassung des Gedankens bzw. der Anschauung der Idee die Hauptrolle: die Kraft der Erscheinung des

21 Robert Sokolowski, "Husserl and Frege", in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 84, No. 10, S. 522.

22 Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl*, Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg 1986, S. 62. – Das Beispiel aber, das Frege hier angibt, klingt nicht sehr überzeugend: "Durch diese [vereinigende der synthetischen Apperception] wäre es nicht möglich, die Angehörigen des deutschen Reiches zu einem Ganzen zu verbinden; wohl aber kann man sie unter dem Begriff 'Angehöriger des deutschen Reiches' bringen und zählen."

23 Vgl. Johann Julius Baumann, *Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik in der neueren Philosophie nach ihrem ganzen Einfluss dargestellt und beurtheilt*, Berlin 1868, 1. Band, S. 169.

24 Vgl. G. Frege, "Der Gedanke – Eine logische Untersuchung", in: ders. *Logische Untersuchungen*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttigen 1993, S. 49 f.

Gedankens selbst, also die Kraft des Gedankens, oder unsere Fähigkeit zur Entdeckung und Erfassung des Gedankens in einer Weise der Synthesis und Abstraktion: Denkkraft.

Bei Husserl bedeutet diese Frage nach seiner phänomenologischen Wendung, die er in *Logischen Untersuchungen* vollzieht, bereits eine Frage, wie "Noesis" (d.h. "die vereinigende Kraft der synthetischen Apperzeption", "Denkkraft" im Sinne Freges) und "Noema" (d.h. "die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffes", "Kraft des Gedankens" im Sinne Freges) im Fall der Ideation gegenseitig wechselwirken. Für Husserl bedeutet diese Frage auch eine solche, wie "ein Übergang von den psychologischen Zusammenhängen des Denkens zur logischen Einheit des Denkinhaltes (der Einheit der Theorie) vollzogen wurde".[25] Wenn wir das Erstere als "Denkkraft" oder "Kraft der Noesis" verstehen, und das Letztere als "Kraft des Gedankens" oder "Kraft des Noema", dann bilden sie jeweils Forschungsthemen der Noetik (Lehre vom Denken) und Noematik (Lehre vom Gedanken) im Sinne von Husserl.

In *Logischen Untersuchungen* weist Husserl auf die "wunderbare Affinität" zwischen dem Wesen des Denkens und dem Wesen des Gedachten hin, und hebt den "Unterschied und Parallelismus von 'Noetischem' und 'Noematischem'" hervor.[26] Und der noetische und der noematische Bedeutungsbegriff, wovon Husserl im Vorwort der zweiten Auflage der logischen Untersuchungen spricht, können als einen anderen Ausdruck für "die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffes" und "die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffes" betrachtet werden. Husserl gesteht hier in der ersten Auflag: "Einseitig wird der noetische Bedeutungsbegriff betont, während doch in manchen wichtigen Stellen der noematische vorzüglich in Betracht käme."[27] In der Tat weisen "die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffes" und "die vereinigende Kraft der synthetischen Apperzeption" bei Frege darauf hin, was bei Husserl durch "den noematischen" und "noetischen Bedeutungsbegriff" ausgedrückt wird. Diese Wesensstruktur des intentionalen Bewußtseins gilt ebenfalls für den Bewußtseinsakt der "Ideation", welche Husserl in *Logischen Untersuchungen* hinstellt und durchführt. Diesen Be-

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25 Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Band I, A VII f./B VII f.
26 Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Band I, A 254/B 254, B XIV.
27 Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Band I, B XIV f.

wußtseinsakt oder Bewußtseinsfähigkeit benutzt Husserl auch, um die Methode unserer unmittelbaren Erfassung der Ideen bzw. Wesen zu erklären. Kurz gesagt, erscheinen uns einerseits Ideen oder Begriffe oder Gedanken mit ihren eigenen Kräften in evidenter Weise, andererseits aber zeigt sich unser Bewußtsein auch als eine Art aktiver Tätigkeit zu ihrer Konstitution.

Gödel versteht unter dieser "conceptual intuition" oder "mathematischen intuition" im phänomenologischen Sinne "ein Verfahren oder Technik, welches in uns einen neuen Bewußtseinszustand hervorbringen soll, in dem wir die von uns verwendeten Grundbegriffe unseres Denkens detaillieren oder andere bisher uns unbekannte Grundbegriffe erfassen."[28] Dieses Verständnis ist offenbar sehr zutreffend. Und Wang spricht in der Chronik Gödels davon, daß Gödel im Jahre 1958 sowohl die konstruktive Beweisführung als auch die klassische benutzt, um das erweiterte Programm Hilberts zu begründen und dabei die sehr komplizierte Beziehung zwischen "constructivity and evidence"[29] berührt. Wenn wir die "constructivity" hier als noetische Bewußtseinsfähigkeit der Apperzeption oder Konstitution des idealen Gegenstands versteht, und die "evidence" als die Kraft des idealen Gegenstands selbst, welche in der Bewußtseinsaktivität selbst erscheint, dann soll diese Beziehung zwischen "constructivity and evidence" im wesentlichen der Beziehung zwischen "der sammelnden Kraft des Begriffes" und "der vereinigenden der synthetischen Apperzeption" bei Frege, und ebenfalls der Beziehung zwischen dem "noetischen und noematischen Bedeutungsbegriff bei Husserl entsprechen.[30] In all drei Fällen handelt es sich von Überlegungen der modernen Idealisten über die wesentliche Beziehung zwischen der Idealität und dem ihr entsprechenden Bewußtsein.

28 Gödel, *Collected.Works* III, a.a.O., S. 382, die englische Übersetzung dafür wird auch zitiert in Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 158.
29 Vgl. Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., S. 121.
30 Es ist schließlich auch Wangs Ansicht: "In my opinion this experience illustrates the sort of grounds for needing to relax absolutist appeals to intuition (and introspection), associated with Husserl's program." (Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., S. 121)

V. "Data of the first kind" und "data of the second kind"

Bezüglich der Frage der Ideation wird ein anderes wichtiges Verständnis von Gödel in seinem Gespräch mit Wang ausgesprochen. Nach Wangs Bericht, "Gödel asks us to acknowledge two kinds of datum: (a) sensations, the primary data for our ideas referring to physical objects; and (b) data of the second kind, which include (b1) those immediately given data, other than the sensations, on the basis of which we *form* our physical ideas (what Gödel calls 'the abstract elements contained in our empirical ideas'), and (b2) 'the 'given' underlying mathematics.' Gödel observes that (b2) 'is closely related to' (b1). The data of the second kind in both cases enable us, as explicated in the footnote cited in 7.2.14, to form concepts whose function is *synthesis*."[31] Es scheint, daß Gödel selber die zweite Art von Daten keine unmittelbare Charakterisierung angegeben hat. Wang neigt dazu, daß die zweite Art von Daten in der mathematischen Intuition als "mathematical data" zu bezeichnen, und in Folge darauf, daß die zweite Art von Daten in der physischen Ideation ist auch als "physical data" zu benennen. Er ist der Meinung, "the data of the second kind are the basis on which we *form* both Kant's categories of pure understanding and mathematical concepts such as those of set and number".[32]

Die Interpretation Wangs zu Gödels Aussage könnte Mißverständnisse bewirken, z.B., man könnte meinen, hier würden jeweils zwei Anschauungen vollzogen: einerseits die sinnliche Anschauung der Sinnesdaten A, andererseits die mathematische und konzeptuelle Anschauung der Daten B bzw. die ideale Anschauung der physischen Ideen. In Wirklichkeit ist aber die Ideation, zumindest im Sinne Husserls, ein Anschauungsakt, der in sich prinzipiell zwei Daten A und B enthält. Wir können gegebenfalls A als anschauliche Daten und B als ideale Daten bezeichnen; ohne eins davon ist Ideation nicht möglich.

Wir können hier zuerst mit Hilfe von Husserls Kinästhese-Analyse die mit der Zwei-Daten-Lehre von Gödel parallelen Fälle der Bewußtseinstätigkeit beschreiben. Bei der Kinästhese hier sind auch zwei Arten von "Bewußtseinsstoff" oder "Empfindung" vorhanden: fürs Erste diejenigen Empfindungen

31 Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 228.
32 Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 229.

im engen Sinne, welche Farb-, Ton-, Tastinhalte usw. liefern (Datenempfindung); fürs Zweite diejenigen Empfindungen, in denen die Bewegung selbst empfindungsmäßig gegeben ist (kinästhetische Empfindungen).[33] In Gödels Redeweise können wir nun sagen, daß unsere Kinästhese aus Daten A (Datenempfindung) und Daten B (Bewegungsempfindung) besteht.

Wir brauchen wohl nicht nachzuprüfen, ob Gödel Husserls Kinästhese-Analyse studiert hat und eben unter diesem Einfluß die von Wang notierten Ausdrücke geformt hat, weil der ähnliche Zustand mit zwei Arten Daten nicht nur in Husserls Analyse des kinästhetischen Bewußtseins, sondern fast in Bewußtseinsanalyse zu allen unter dem Titel "Anschauung" im weiteren Sinne fallenden Bewußtseinsakten auftritt. Husserl benennt diese zweiten Arten nur nicht mit dem formativen Zeichen "A und B" wie bei Gödel, sondern mit dem deskriptiven Ausdruck "Präsentation und Appräsentation".[34]

Diese zwei Bewußtseinsarten und -weisen (nämlich Gödels zwei Arten Daten) werden anfänglich von Husserl in der phänomenologischen Analyse zum bewußtseinsalt der Einfühlung bzw. zur Fremderfahrung: Der fremde Leib ist präsentiert, die fremde Seele appräsentiert; mit Gödels Ausdrucksweise kann man sagen, der andere ist uns in einer Weise von "A + B" gegeben. Später weist Husserl noch darauf hin, daß im Fall der Wahrnehmung der äußerlichen Dinge ebenfalls solche synthetische Gegebenheitsweise "Präsentation + Appräsentation" mehrfach zu finden sind, wie z.B. wenn wir ein Haus sehen, erscheinen uns seine Vorderseite und Nebenseiten präsentativ, und seine anderen nicht unmittelbar erscheinenden Seiten, wie etwa die Innenseite und Rückseite, sind uns appräsentativ mitbewußt. Dazu kommt noch, daß im Fall der Selbsterfahrung die gegenwärtige Phase des Ich in der Weise der Reflexion präsentiert, also gegenwärtigt, und alle vergangenen und zukünftigen Phasen des Ich in appräsentativer Weise gegeben, also vergegenwärtigt. Auf

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33 Vgl. Husserl, *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* III, Hua V, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1971, S. 118 f., und vgl. auch: Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* II, Hua IV, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1952, S. 57.

34 Dieses Themabehandelt der Verfasser in seinem noch nicht veröffentlichten Aufsatz "'Appräsentation' – Ein Versuch mit Husserl". Überdies werden als Synonymen von "Präsentation" und "Appräsentation" bei Husserl noch das Brieffspaar " Gegenwärtigung" und " Mitgegenwärtigung/Mitvergegenwärtigung" verwendet.

solche Erscheinungsweisen "Präsentation + Appräsentation" hat Husserl mehr oder weniger hingewiesen.

Außerdem können wir, wenn auch nicht von Husserl erwähnt, ebenfalls im Fall des Bildbewußtsein, Zeichenbewußtsein und Ideation eine durch diese Bewußtseinsarten hindurchgehende Gemeinsamkeit, nämlich eine "Präsentation + Appräsentation" ähnliche, aber doch unterschiedliche Intentionalitätsweise. In diesen Bewußtseinsakten kann man zwei die Struktur A + B finden, aber hier kann man sagen, präsentiert ist etwas Geistiges, etwas Seelisches, wie etwa das geistige Bild im Bildbewußtsein, Bedeutung in Zeichenbewußtsein, Idee Rot in der Ideation, während die Empfindungen (bzw. Phantasmen), welche die Grundlagen dieser besonderen Bewußtseinsarten ausmachen, wie etwa das physische Bild im Bildbewußtsein, Töne oder Streiche im Zeichenbewußtsein, sinnliche Daten in der Ideation (ein rotes Papier, ein roter Tuch, fünf Enten, fünf Finger usw.), appräsentiert sind.

34 Husserl unterscheidet "ideale Appräsentation" und "reale Appräsentation".[35] Hier, in Hinsicht auf den Fall der Ideation, wir können sagen, ihre Eigenschaft liegt in der synthetischen Erfassung der "idealen Präsentation (des idealen Selbstseins)" und der "realen Appräsentation (realen Mitseins)". Und mit der formalen Ausdrucksweise Gödels gesagt, hat das Modell A + B weiterhin seine Gültigkeit: A stellt weiterhin die Sinnesdaten dar, und B die idealen Daten, die in sich mathematische wie physische Daten enthält. Freilich ist B nun der aufzumerkende Fokus der gesamten Ideation, oder anders gesagt, die Richtung, worauf sich der im vorigen Paragraphen genannte "die vereinigende Kraft der synthetischen Apperzeption" richtet, und auch die Richtung, woraus "die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffes" herstammt. B wird also in präsentativer Weise durch Mind's Eye erfaßt, währen A in diesem Verfahren als unentbehrliche Sinnesdaten appräsentiert wird.

Überdies ist es hierbei nicht schwer zu ersehen, daß dem Modell der Appräsentation im Bildbewußtsein und Zeichenbewußtsein entsprechend, im Fall der "ideierenden Appräsentation" auch die Möglichkeit der Einander-Einschneiden und Einander-Umwandeln von beiden Schichten der empirischen und idealen Daten. Mit anderen Worten, kann das Appräsentierte jeweils mit

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35 Vgl. Husserl, *Ideen* IV, a.a.O., S. 341.

dem Wechsel der Aufmerksamkeit der ideale bzw. ideelle Stoff sein, wobei das Präsentierte dann den empirischen bzw. reellen Stoff darstellt. Somit berühren wir die Funktionen der Abstraktion und Aufmerksamkeit im Bewußtseinsakt, die das Thema des nächsten Paragraphen bilden.

VI. Die Frage der ideierenden Abstraktion und Aufmerksamkeit

Wir haben vorher bereits den Inhalt eines Vortragsmanuskripts von Gödel zitiert. Er hat sich zwar für diesen Vortrag vorbereitet, hat aber ihn niemals gehalten. Er hat in diesem Vortragsmanuskript vor allem die folgenden Arbeiten geleistet: 1. Er liefert sein Verständnis über die Krise der Grundlage der Mathematik; 2. Er hat seine Überlegung für die Lösung der Krise geäußert; 3. Er weist auf die mögliche Funktion der Phänomenologie in der Verwirklichung dieser Möglichkeit; 4. Er mach eine allgemeine Charakterisierung der phänomenologischen Ideation.

In den folgenden Sätzen werden diese Punkte konzentriert dargestellt:

"Das heißt offenbar die Sicherheit der Mathematik nicht dadurch sicherzustellen, daß man gewisse Eigenschaften in Projektion auf materielle Systeme, nämlich das Umgehen mit physischen Symbolen, beweist, ist, sondern dadurch, daß man die Erkenntnis der abstrakten Begriffe selbst, welche zur Aufstellung jener mechanischen Systeme führt, kultiviert (vertieft) und daß man ferner nach dem gleichen Verfahren Einsichten über die Lösbarkeit und über tatsächliche Methoden zur Lösung aller sinnvollen mathematischen Probleme zu gewinnen sucht.

Auf welche Weise aber ist es möglich, die Kenntnis jener abstrakten Begriffe zu erweitern, d. h., also diese Begriffe selbst zu präzisieren und umfassende und sichere Einsicht über die für sie bestehenden Grundrelationen, d. h., die für sie geltenden Axiome, zu gewinnen? Offenbar nicht dadurch oder jedenfalls nicht ausschließlich dadurch, daß man versucht, explizite Definitionen für Begriffe und Beweise für Axiome zu geben. Denn dann braucht man ja dafür offenbar andere undefinierbare abstrakte Begriffe und für sie geltende Axiome. Sonst hätte man ja nichts, woraus man definieren oder beweisen könnte. Das Verfahren muß also wenigstens zum großen Teil in einer Sinnklärung bestehen, die nicht in Definieren besteht.

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Nun gibt es ja heute den Beginn einer Wissenschaft, welche behauptet, eine systematische Methode für eine solche Sinnklärung zu haben, und das ist die von Husserl begründete Phänomenologie. Die Sinnklärung besteht hier darin, daß man die betreffenden Begriffe schärfer ins Auge faßt, indem man die Aufmerksamkeit in einer bestimmten Weise dirigiert, nämlich auf unsere eigenen Akte bei der Verwendung dieser Begriffe, auf unsere Mächte bei der Vollführung unserer Akte, etc."[36]

Gödel hat hier einen methodologischen Gedankengang: der abstrakte Begriff ist nicht durch Definition zu gewinnen, sondern durch eine Kultivierung der Erkenntnis zu erfassen, zu erweitern und zu vertiefen; diese Art vom Erkennen des abstrakten Begriffs besteht vor allem in der phänomenologischen Sinnklärung: in dem reflektierenden Aufmerken unserer die abstrakten Begriffe verwendenden Bewußtseinsakte sowie unserer diese Akte vollführenden Mächte, um die abstrakten Begriffe deutlicher zu sehen.

Hier spielt die auf abstrakte Begriffe richtende Aufmerksamkeit eine sehr wichtige Rolle. Dies stimmt mit Husserls Charakterisierung der Ideation überein. In der ersten Auflage der *Logischen Untersuchungen* (1901) betont Husserl, daß die Ideation zwar von einer individuellen Anschauung ausgeht, aber "nicht mehr ist das individuell Angeschaute schlechthin gemeint , so wie es da erscheint; sondern bald ist die Spezies in ihrer idealen Einheit gemeint (z. B. *die Tonstufe c, die Zahl 3),* bald die Klasse als Allheit der am Allgemeinen teilhabenden Einzelheiten *(alle Töne dieser Tonstufe;* formal: *alle A),* bald ein unibestimmt Einzelnes dieser Art *(ein A)* oder aus dieser Klasse *(irgendeines unter den A),* bald dieses angeschaute Einzelne, aber als Träger des Attributs gedacht *(dieses A hier)*," usw.[37] In *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* I (1913) schreibt er: "Gewiß liegt es in der Eigenart der Wesensanschauung, daß ein Hauptstück individueller Anschauung, nämlich ein Erscheinen, ein Sichtigsein von Individuellem ihr zugrunde liegt, obschon freilich keine

36 Gödel, *Collected.Works* III, a.a.O., S. 382. Wang zitiert in seinem *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy* die englische Übersetzung des letzten Satzes hier (S. 198).
37 Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* II/1, A 170/B$_1$ 172.

Erfassung desselben und keinerlei Setzung als Wirklichkeit; gewiß ist, daß infolge davon keine Wesensanschauung möglich ist ohne die freie Möglichkeit der Blickwendung auf ein 'entsprechendes' Individuelle und der Bildung eines exemplarischen".[38] Mit den hier genannten zwei "Meinungen" und "Anschauungen" ist eigentlich eine Umwandlung des Blicks gemeint: der empirische Blick auf die individuellen Sinnesdaten wandelt sich in den geistigen Blick auf die Art und Gattung, ähnlich wie bei Gödel, der Blick richtet sich von der ersten Art Daten A zur zweiten Art Daten B. Diese Blickwendung bedeutet nicht von einem sinnlichen Anschauungsakt zu einem anderen idealen Anschauungsakt zu folgern, auch nicht in einem Anschauungsakt von A zu b zu folgern, sondern, Beim Anschauen den Blick der Aufmerksamkeit von A zu B zu wenden, und davon das Mathematische oder das Physische oder Ideales anderer Art zu abstrahieren. Das Verfahren hier sieht der Methode annähernd aus, welche Gödel wie gefolgt nennt: "viewing them [abstract impressions] in comparison with or on the occasion of sense impressions".[39] Und eben in diesem Sinne sagt auch Husserl: "Die intuitive Erfassung des Gesetzes mag psychologisch zwei Schritte verlangen: den Hinblick auf die Einzelheiten der Anschauung und die darauf bezogene gesetzliche Einsicht. Aber logisch ist nur eines da. Der Inhalt der Einsicht ist nicht Folgerung aus der Einzelheit."[40]

Freilich genügt es mit der Blickwendung von Daten A zu Daten B und somit der Umwandlung des sinnlichen Auge zum Mind's Eye anscheinend noch nicht; wie brauchen in der geistigen Blickrichtung eine eigentliche Abstraktion, eine idealisierende Tätigkeit vollziehen, die sich sowohl von der psychologischen Abstraktion als auch von logischen Erfindung der Begriffe und Symbole unterscheidet. Im Brief an Anton Marty von 7. Juli 1901 schreibt Husserl, "das Allgemeine ist etwa das Identische im

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38 Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* I, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1977, Hua III/1, S. 15.
39 Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., S. 190. – Aber wie schon erwähnt, daß Gödel dieses Vermögen zur Erfassung der abstrakten Impression auf ein "physical organ" zurückführt, entspricht offenbar nicht Husserls Gedankengang, und widerspricht zumindest seinem antinaturalistischen Standpunkt.
40 Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* I, A 76/B 76.

wiederholten Vollzug der Abstraktion. Dieses Identische ist weder das moment<an>e Rote noch das Abstrahieren des allgemeinen Rot. Denn das sind zufällige Einzelheiten", "das Rot in sp<ecie>"ist "vielmehr eine ideale intentionale Einheit…, die 'selbst' gegeben ist, oder angeschaut ist im Vollzug der 'eigentlichen' Abstraktion, der Ideation, wie ich, um den gewöhnlichen Abstraktionsbegriff auszuscheiden, auch sage, mit einem Wort, der im erweiterten Sinne verstandenen 'Wahrnehmung' des Allgemeinen."[41] In der zweiten Auflage der *Logischen Untersuchungen* (1913) wird dieses Verfahren in sachkundiger Weise charaktrisiert, "daß die phänomenologische Wesenserschauung sich als immanente Ideation auf dem Grunde der inneren Anschauungen derart vollzieht, daß sie den ideierenden Blick ausschließlich nach dem eigenen reellen oder intentionalen Bestand der geschauten Erlebnisse orientiert und die spezifischen Erlebniswesen, die sich in diesen singulären Erlebnissen vereinzeln, sowie die ihnen zugehörigen (also 'apriorischen', 'idealen') Wesensverhalte zu adäquater Erschauung bringt."[42] Später in *Phänomenologischer Psychologie* (1925) benutzt Husserl zur Beschreibung noch andere Begriffe. Er spricht dort z.B. von der "geistigen Überschiebung" und "Kongruenz" in Ideation, "in der das Gemeinsame, das Rot, die Figur 'selbst' hervortritt, selbst zur Erfassung, zur Erschauung kommt", usw.[43]

VII. Zusammenfassung der drei phänomenologischen Aspekte

Die drei Paragraphen oben haben den Akt der von Gödel genannten mathematischen Intuition und der von Husserl genannten Ideation beschrieben und charaktrisiert, und zwar jeweils von den folgenden drei Perspektiven: 1. Von der Perspektive der Beziehung zwischen Noesis und Noema; 2. Von der Perspektive der Beziehung zwischen den beiden Auffasssungsmaterialien (Daten); 3. Von der Perspektive der besonderen Auffassungsform. Wenn wir es durch das folgende Schema darstellen, dann

41 Vgl. Husserl, *Briefwechsel* I, Kluwer Academic Publishers: The Hague 1994, S. 82 f.
42 Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* II/1, B$_1$ 440.
43 Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, Hua IX, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, Netherlands 1968, S. 85 f.

beziehen sich die erste Reihe auf die erste Perspektive, der erste Teil der zweiten Reihe auf die zweite Perspektive, der zweite Teil der zweiten Reihe auf die dritte Perspektive, und der dritte Teil der zweiten Reihe schließlich auf das gesamte Ergebnis der Ideation.

Noesis (Auffassung)		Noema
Zwei Arten von nicht-intentionalen Auffassungsmaterialien $A + B_1, B_2, B_3 \dots B_n$	Formen der Intentionen (Auffassungsformen), abstrakte, aufmerksame Ideation	Idee (idealer Gegenstand)

Von diesen Perspektiven aus kann man die wichtigen Elemente und Eigenschaften der Gedanken der Methode der Ideation bei Husserl sehen, wie es der Verfasser versteht. Und im Verständnis Gödels zu Ideation bzw. zu mathematischer Intuition, werden diese Elemente und Eigenschaften von ihm, wie der Verfasser glaubt, mehr oder weniger betroffen. Das einzige von ihm Ausgelassene kann das Aufmerken und Erwägen Husserls in Hinsicht auf das Problem der Seinssetzung in der Ideation sein: in der Ideation wird das individuelle, sinnliche, sichtbare Sein nicht gesetzt, also nicht für seiend gehalten, sondern beiseite gelegt; und sobald die Idee wirklich von Mind's Eye geshen, wird sein für Mind's Eye sichtbares, ideales Sein gesetzt, für seiend gehalten. Aber dieses in der Ideation gesetztes Sein ist So-Sein, also das ideale Sein, anders als das in der sinnlichen Anschauung real gesetztes Da-Sein, also das empirische Sein.[44] Welche Wesensunterschiede bestehen zwischen diesen beiden Seinsglauben und Seinssetzungen, ist eine Frage, die weitere Überlegungen und Erforschungen verdient.[45]

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44 Vgl. Wang, *A Logical Journey – From Gödel to Philosophy*, a.a.O., S. 209.
45 Wenn Gödel sich im folgenden über die unterschiedlichen Arten von "confidence" zu empirischer Wahrnehmung und mathematischer Intuition diskutiert, bezieht er sich wohl bereits auf diese zwei Arten von Seinsglauben oder Seinssetzung: "But despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don›t see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e. in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception". (Re-

Im allgemeinen läßt sich Gödels Gedanken über das Problem der Ideation wie gefolgt zusammenfassen: Wenn er mit seinem Unvollständigkeitssatz bereits gelang zu zeigen, daß der formale Beweis für die Lösung des Problems der Grundlage der Mathematik nicht imstande ist, oder dafür nicht das fundamentaliste Problem lösen kann, soll man jetzt mit einer von formalisierender Beweisführung unterschiedlichen Methode versuchen, um der Wahrheit näherzukommen und sie zu erfassen, wie etwa mit der Methode der Ideation. In diesen Umständen wäre es konsequenterweise eine unrechtmäßige Aufforderung, wenn der Zeitgeist noch von Gödel verlangt, seine mathematische Intuition oder Husserls Ideation zu beweisen. Gödel glaubt offenbar, daß er von solcher ungehörigen Aufforderung, deshalb läßt er seine Überlegungen lieber unveröffentlicht liegen, und verzichtet auf jederlei Publikation, weder als Vortrag, noch als Aufsatz. Wang vermutet, "G[ödel] would probably have published more in philosophy if he had found himself living in a more sympathetic philosophical community."[46] Aber Gödel hält die Zeit, wo er sich befindet, für eine seiner Ansicht nach Zeit mit "rabiater Entwicklung" und "nihilistischen Folgerungen", und fühlt sich deshalb unzeitgemäß. Wenn er auch hartnäckig aufruf: "Jedenfalls ist kein Grund, dem Zeitgeist blindlings zu vertrauen",[47] und das ist fast eine Erwiderung auf das, was Husserl vor fünfzig Jahren gesagt hat: "Um der Zeit willen dürfen wir die Ewigkeit nicht preisgeben",[48] doch im Vergleich zu der großen Stattlichkeit, in welcher Husserl in "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" seine phänomenologische Manifestation macht, findet Gödel es sogar nutzlos und überflüssig, solche Apelle wieder an die Welt zu richten, und will lieber die Rolle nehmen als "an intellectual exile", oder die Rolle als "out-Wittgensteined these Wittgensteinians", also "kept silent".[49] – Der Grund dafür liegt wohl darin, daß seine Gedanken nicht mit der zeitlich geläufigen Sprache auszudrücken ist.

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becca Goldstein, *Incompleteness. The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel*, W. W. Norton & Company: New York/London, 2005, S. 216)

46 Wang, *Reflections on Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., S. 29.

47 Vgl. Gödel, *Collected Works* III, a.a.O., S, 374, S. 376, S. 380.

48 Vgl. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge*. 1911–1921, Hua XXV, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 1986, S. 57.

49 Zu beider Aussagen vgl. Goldstein, *Incompleteness. The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel*, a.a.O., S. 215 f., S. 76.

Christophe Perrin

HEIDEGGER, PHILOSOPHE DE LA LIBERTÉ ?

Si chacun sait qu'en écrivant que « Heidegger ne sait pas ce qu'est la liberté »[1], c'est certainement Karl Jaspers qui ne savait pas qu'il le savait, combien savent qu'en décrivant sa pensée comme étant restée « jusqu'à la fin une pensée de la liberté »[2], c'est curieusement Günter Figal qui ne savait pas trancher « la question de savoir si l'on a raison de dire que la pensée heideggérienne est une pensée de la liberté »[3] ? Car on l'a dit et bien dit : « la discussion peut être résumée comme suit. Il s'agit d'abord de se demander, d'un point de vue que l'on pourrait qualifier d'interne, ce que Heidegger cherche *explicitement*, c'est-à-dire s'il s'adresse véritablement à une philosophie de la liberté lorsqu'il évoque littéralement ce concept et ses implications propres » ; ceci acquis, reste ensuite à « savoir, d'un point de vue cette fois externe, dans quelle mesure l'œuvre de Heidegger peut être considérée comme une philosophie de la liberté »[4]. Or, « c'est sans nul doute la deuxième question » que, traditionnellement, les commentateurs « développe[nt] dans [leurs] étude[s] et à laquelle il[s] répond[ent] de façon magistrale. Mais on ne peut cependant omettre le fait que [leur] réponse à la seconde question s'opère aux dépens de la première, pourtant cru-

1 Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Heidegger*, Munich/Zürich, Piper, 1978, p. 77.
2 Günter Figal, *Martin Heidegger. Phänomenologie der Freiheit*, Francfort-sur-le-Main, Athenäum, 1988, p. 275.
3 Hans Ruin, « Le sort de la liberté chez Heidegger », *Klēsis*, 2008, n° 7, p. 60.
4 *Ibid.*, p. 61.

ciale elle aussi »[5] et, *a fortiori*, primordiale. Pascal l'a montré en effet : à tort ou à raison, c'est la « substance » que nous croyons aimer, non ses « qualités »[6], et c'est à celle-là que nous prêtons celles-ci, non l'inverse. Aussi n'est-ce pas à nos yeux parce qu'elle est une pensée de la méthode que la pensée de Descartes est la pensée de Descartes, mais parce qu'elle est la pensée de Descartes que la pensée de Descartes est une pensée de la méthode. Dès lors, l'essentiel n'est-il pas de savoir qui est Heidegger pour savoir quelle est sa pensée ? Autrement dit, ne faut-il pas, pour décider de tous les aspects que sa pensée revêt, deviner ce que rêvait de penser Heidegger ?

Sans doute s'en soucierait-on si l'on avait l'impression de l'ignorer. Or, n'a-t-on pas entendu plus d'une fois Heidegger affirmer lui-même que la *Seinsfrage* s'est posée à lui dès 1907 et qu'elle a depuis « déterminé [son] chemin de pensée »[7] ? Reste que si, de l'évidence qu'il était pour nous, l'être est bien devenu une question avec lui, la question de savoir si la question de l'être fut *la* question pour lui n'a rien d'une évidence pour nous. Et pour cause : la question de l'être n'est ni sa question à lui, ni la question de sa vie. *Ni sa question à lui* puisque, dans *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger reconnaît d'emblée qu'« en tant que *question thématique d'une enquête effective* », l'être a « tenu en haleine la recherche de Platon et d'Aristote »[8] bien avant la sienne. *Ni la question de sa vie* puisque, dans « *Zeit und Sein* », Heidegger admet volontiers que « si nous pensons proprement après l'être, alors la question elle-même nous mène d'une certaine manière loin de l'être », tant « le propre de l'être n'est rien du genre de l'être »[9]. Qu'on se le dise : non seulement

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5 Nous mettons ici au pluriel ce qu'écrit Hans Ruin au singulier, puisque ce qu'il affirme de Günter Figal vaut pour lui aussi, qui n'entend pas faire autre chose qu'« apporter un complément à l'analyse » de celui-ci « en orientant l'attention plus spécifiquement vers la double question du quand et du comment le concept spécifique et le problème de la liberté émergent comme un souci explicite au sein de l'œuvre de Heidegger » – *ibid.* Et cela de valoir pour d'autres, ainsi Jean-Édouard André dans son triptyque *Heidegger et la liberté. Le Projet politique de « Sein und Zeit »*, *Heidegger et la liberté. Le Dasein face à la technique* et *Heidegger et la politique. L'épreuve de la liberté*, Paris, L'Harmattan, coll. «La philosophie en commun», respectivement 2001, 2005 et 2006.
6 *Cf.* Pascal, *Pensées*, V, fragment 323, édition Brunschvicg.
7 *Ein Vorwort. Brief an Pater William J. Richardson*, dans *GA* 11, 145 (trad. mod.). *Cf. Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*, dans *GA* 14, 93.
8 *SZ*, § 1, 2 (trad. mod.).
9 « *Zeit und Sein* », in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, *GA* 14, 14.

Heidegger n'est pas le premier à penser l'être et sa question, mais l'être n'est pas le dernier mot de sa pensée, le penser sous ses différentes graphies pour en mieux saisir l'idée – l'être orthographié comme on le fait aujourd'hui (*Sein*) ou le faisait jadis (*Seyn*), barré ou non d'une croix décussée (*Sein ou Seyn*), voire écrit avec une majuscule et en français (Être)[10] – et en discerner l'homonymie – « l'être lui-même (*das Sein selbst*) », « l'être comme tel (*das Sein als solches*) » et « l'être de l'étant (*Sein des Seienden*) », « l'étantité (*Seiendheit*) »[11] – faisant entrer dans une contrée où « il n'est plus de place pour le nom être »[12] parce qu'il n'en est pas encore question. C'est que, si Heidegger n'en finit plus de penser l'être après avoir réveillé la question de son sens, l'être lui-même n'en relance pas moins sa question dans l'horizon de sa vérité, en sorte que la pensée de notre penseur reste ce qu'elle est : une pensée *de* l'être, à ceci près qu'elle n'a plus l'être pour *objet* mais pour *origine*.

D'où la question que nous posions ailleurs[13] et que d'aucuns nous ont repris depuis[14], celle de savoir de quoi il est au fond question avec Heidegger. Or, une fois admis que cette question se pose bien, donc que la réponse qu'on lui offre d'ordinaire ne tient pas, n'avons-nous pas l'embarras du choix et, par là même, aucune option de prédilection ? Car si ce n'est l'être, ne serait-ce point le « temps (*Zeit*) » ? Non, puisque avec Heidegger « nous ne disons pas *l'être est*

10 *Brief über den „Humanismus"*, dans *GA 9*, 313 et 314.
11 Aussi Heidegger peut-il, sans se contredire, à la fois unir « l'estre et l'être » – *Zum Ereignis-Denken*, *GA 73.1*, 686 – et les séparer, écrire que « l'être est l'estre » – *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, dans *Gedachtes*, *GA 81*, 76 – et opposer « l'être » à « l'estre » comme « le plus ordinaire » au « plus étrange », « le plus courant » au « plus rare », « le plus général » au « plus unique », comme ce qui est « plat et long » à ce qui est « abrupte et court » – *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, dans *Leitgedanken zur Entstehung der Metaphysik, der neuzeitlichen Wissenschat und der modernen Technik*, *GA 76*, 59.
12 *Seminar in Le Thor 1969*, dans *Seminare*, *GA 15*, 365 (trad. mod.).
13 « De quoi Heidegger est-il le penseur ? », voilà l'interrogation par laquelle, le 17 octobre 2012, nous lancions notre deuxième séminaire sur Heidegger à Paris, au Collège international de philosophie. *Cf.* « De quoi Heidegger est-il le penseur ? », *in* Christophe Perrin (éd.), *Qu'appelle-t-on la pensée ? Le philosopher heideggérien*, Bucarest, Zeta Books, 2014, pp. 17-52.
14 Ainsi Thomas Sheehan, « *What, After All, Was Heidegger About?* », *Continental Philosophy Review*, 2014, vol. 47, n° 3-4, pp. 249-274*, et Making Sense of Heidegger. A Paradigm Shift*, Londres/New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, pp. 3-28.

ou *le temps est*, mais *cela donne être* et *cela donne temps* »[15]. Si ce n'est le temps, ne serait-ce point le « cela donne (*Es gibt*) » ? Non, puisque avec Heidegger « nous essayons de prendre en vue le cela et son donner et d'écrire le «Cela» en majuscule »[16]. Si ce n'est le cela donne, ne serait-ce point le « Cela (*Es*) » qui donne ? Non, puisque avec Heidegger « nous nommons ce qui détermine ensemble le temps et l'être dans leur propre, c'est-à-dire dans leur coappartenance : *l'appropriement (Ereignis)* »[17]. Si ce n'est le Cela qui donne, ne serait-ce point l'appropriement ? Non, puisque avec Heidegger « la tâche de la pensée » semble finalement avoir « pour titre «éclaircie et présence» au lieu d'«être et temps» »[18]. Si ce n'est l'appropriement, seraient-ce l'éclaircie et la présence (*Lichtung und Anwesenheit*) ? Non, puisqu'il nous faut nous demander « d'où et comment cela donne l'éclaircie », soit, ultimement, « ce qui parle dans le Cela donne »[19], à moins bien sûr qu'il ne s'agisse de cela même que donne « l'éclaircie qui rend libre (*freigebende Lichtung*) »[20], soit la liberté elle-même. Mais qu'est-ce qu'une pensée *de* l'être, au sens d'une pensée qui trouve ses racines en lui ? De la philosophie. En effet, « la philosophie est de l'estre, elle lui *appartient* »[21], vu qu'elle vient de lui qui vient à elle et auquel elle revient pour autant qu'elle en vienne à lui. Est-ce à dire qu'il ne retourne, chez Heidegger, que de cette seule question qu'est *la question même de la philosophie* ? Nous l'affirmons ici et le confirmerons cette fois avec un seul de ses textes, plutôt qu'avec plusieurs.

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Qu'il ne retourne, chez Heidegger, que de cette seule question qu'est la question même de la philosophie s'impose d'abord à la lecture d'un seul de ses enseignements, celui qu'il dispense, à raison de quatre heures par semaines,

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15 « *Zeit und Sein* », dans *GA* 14, 9 (trad. mod.).

16 *Ibid.* (trad. mod.).

17 *Ibid.*, 24 (trad. mod.). Inutile de rappeler qu'*appropriement* constitue la proposition de Heidegger en personne pour rendre *Ereignis*, cet intraduisible, en français – *cf. Seminar in Le Thor 1969*, dans *GA* 15, 365.

18 *Ibid.*, 90 (trad. mod.).

19 *Ibid.*

20 « *Das Wesen der Sprache* », dans *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, *GA* 12, 186.

21 *Besinnung*, *GA* 66, 53.

durant le semestre d'été 1930 à Fribourg sous l'intitulé suivant : *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, et même à la lecture de sa seule première leçon, tenue le 29 avril et dévolue tout entière à une « considération préliminaire »[22]. C'est que, si « [c]e cours a un titre », « il a aussi un sous-titre », si bien que « celui qui s'essaie justement à [le] lire ne se contentera point de déchiffrer l'un et l'autre sur la couverture d'un livre, mais s'interrogera sans cesse sur leur sens respectif, leur commune nécessité, leur lien vivant »[23], en étroite collaboration d'ailleurs avec Heidegger lui-même, dont la réflexion débute précisément par la justification d'une telle appellation. Et à raison, car n'y a-t-il pas dès le départ « contradiction apparente (*scheinbarer Widerspruch*) entre la question «particulière» (*„besondere" Frage*) de l'essence de la liberté humaine et la tâche «générale» (*„allgemeine" Aufgabe*) d'une introduction à la philosophie »[24] ? Certes, l'apparence n'étant pas la réalité, la première épithète dans ce libellé du premier paragraphe vend aussitôt la mèche. La faute à l'éditeur du cours. Mais cette contradiction sans doute illusoire, dont la dissipation surviendra tôt ou tard, n'en rendra pas moins malaisé pour l'heure de désamorcer la situation rendue explosive par les deux suivantes, la particularité étant redoublée et la généralité décuplée. Traiter de l'essence de la liberté humaine en effet, c'est traiter d'« une *question particulière* (la liberté) » sur « un *étant particulier* (l'homme) » ; introduire à la philosophie en revanche, c'est non seulement offrir « un aperçu » du « tout de son questionnement », sinon « une vue d'ensemble » de son « champ entier », mais encore fournir « une orientation sur le plus général (das Allgemeinste) en elle »[25], sur l'universel.

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22 *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, GA 31, 1-15.
23 C'est par là qu'Emmanuel Martineau achève l'« Avertissement du traducteur » qui est le sien dans la version française de ce cours – *De l'essence de la liberté humaine. Introduction à la philosophie*, Paris, Gallimard, coll. «Bibliothèque de Philosophie», 1987, p. 10.
24 *GA* 31, 1.
25 *Ibid.*, 2 (trad. mod.). Nous ne corrigeons la traduction d'Emmanuel Martineau, qui rend le superlatif allemand par «universel» en français, que pour mieux lui donner raison. Si *allgemein* peut se traduire aussi bien par «général» que par «universel», l'universel, qui désigne tous les particuliers sans exception, n'est pas le général qui, de manière plus globale, renvoie à un ensemble de cas auxquels quelques-uns pourront toujours manquer. Porté au maximum néanmoins, le général n'est rien moins que l'universel.

Que le problème qui se devine en soit un faux n'empêchera donc pas que les termes qui le dessinent soient de vraies sources d'interrogation, solidement unis et soigneusement choisis qu'ils sont par Heidegger. *Solidement unis* – en dépit d'un cours dont les deux parties eussent pu se prêter au partage des tâches, l'intention du professeur n'est surtout pas double, elle qui consiste en ce travail unique : « entreprendre une introduction à la philosophie en prenant la voie du traitement de la question de l'essence de la liberté humaine »[26]. Aussi n'aurons-nous pas affaire à une question *puis* à une introduction, mais à une introduction *par* une question, Heidegger ne s'interdisant rien en voulant penser les deux à deux, même si tout le lui interdit, à commencer par l'affaire en question (*Sache selbst*) qui, pour sûr ici, n'est pas la liberté. Quoique, dans le nom de ce cours, la forme précède le fond, dans le cours de ce cours, le *quid* du sous-titre prime le *quomodo* du titre, dans la mesure où c'est la matière à traiter qui décide de la manière à adopter pour le faire. S'ensuit la mise en abyme en laquelle consiste cette entrée en matière *in medias res*. De fait, dans ce qui sert d'introduction à ce cours d'introduction à la philosophie, Heidegger ne fait rien d'autre qu'introduire à introduire *à la philosophie*. Car n'est pas introduit ici à l'introduction, sous la forme d'une théorie qui se demanderait ce qu'introduire veut dire[27], mais à la philosophie, sous la forme de cette pratique qui consiste à (s')introduire (par) une aporie[28] : s'« il peut bien y avoir, au sein même de la philosophie, des questions spéciales *(Sonderfragen)*, une introduction à la philosophie se doit toutefois à chaque fois, pour commencer, de tenter de nous rapprocher du tout universel en tant que tel » ; or, « chercher une compréhension de l'*universel de la philosophie* mais, pour cela, glisser pour commencer vers une *question spéciale* : voilà, à l'évidence, un projet impossible (*unmögliches Vorhaben*). Car le but poursuivi et le chemin choisi pour

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26 *Ibid.*, 2.

27 Ce que Heidegger fait en 1928/1929 et fera en 1944/1945, dans ses deux autres *Introductions à la philosophie* précisément – *cf. Einleitung in die Philosophie, GA* 27, § 2 : « *Einleiten besagt: in Gang bringen des Philosophierens* », 4-6 et *Einleitung in die Philosophie – Denken und Dichten, GA* 50, § 1 : « *Die Unmöglichkeit einer Ein-leitung in die Philosophie »*, 90-91.

28 Par l'étonnement aussi certes, mais par l'aporie étonnante plus que par l'étonnement aporétique, ainsi que le suggère Aristote : « apercevoir une aporie et s'étonner » – *Métaphysique*, A, 2, 982 b 17.

l'atteindre se contredisent »[29].

Telle est l'impasse, non pas strictement le cul-de-sac ici, la voie sans issue, mais l'obstacle qui se dresse sur la route et déroute qui la suit, au point de lui faire manquer le point qu'il souhaitait rallier pour peu qu'il ne veuille s'arrêter. Aussi paradoxal qu'il puisse sembler, face à une difficulté, stopper fait progresser car l'affronter, quand avancer fait digresser car la contourner. Ainsi, loin de renoncer ou à la philosophie, ou à la liberté, Heidegger entend montrer que celle-ci est le « moyen adéquat (*angemessener Weg*) » de parvenir à la « juste fin (*rechtes Ziel*) »[30] qu'est celle-là. *Soigneusement choisis* – en dépit de son déterminant, article défini qui la présente comme connue, *la* philosophie reste d'emblée indéterminée, cependant que la liberté, elle, est spécifiée, puisque circonscrite à l'homme auquel elle est spécifique, de sorte que la particularité de l'un n'est pas sans lien avec la particularité de l'autre : l'homme a beau être « *un étant parmi le reste de l'étant* » et la liberté « une propriété »[31] parmi d'autres propriétés, ni l'homme ni la liberté ne sont n'importe quels étant et propriété. La liberté étant l'apanage « non pas de l'animal, non pas de la plante, non pas des corps matériels, non pas des produits de l'artisanat et de la technique, non pas des œuvres d'art »[32], mais de l'homme, le propre de cet étant est cette propriété que, pourtant, il « ne «possède» pas […] comme une propriété », tant « c'est l'inverse qui est vrai : la liberté, le *Da-sein* ek-sistant et désabritant, possède l'homme, et ce si originellement que c'est seulement elle qui accorde à une humanité un rapport à l'étant en tant que tel et entier »[33]. Si ces lignes de 1926 font voir que Heidegger n'a pas tardé à concevoir la liberté comme éclaircie[34], et ainsi comme ce qui éclaircit – au double sens de rendre moins sombre, donc

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29 *GA* 31, 2-3 (trad. mod.).
30 *Ibid.*, 17 (trad. mod.).
31 *Ibid.*, respectivement 1 et 5.
32 *Ibid.*, 1.
33 « *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* », dans *Wegmarken*, *GA* 9, 190 (trad. mod.).
34 Ce sur quoi il reviendra en toutes lettres durant l'hiver 1966/1967 : « Dans la conférence « *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* », là où je parle de «liberté», j'avais en vue l'éclaircie » – *Heraklit*, dans *GA* 15, 262 (trad. mod.). D'où l'expression « le libre de l'éclaircie (*Freie der Lichtung*) » en 1942/1943 – *Parmenides*, *GA* 54, 195, 225 et 226 –, 1959 – « *Der Weg zur Sprache* », dans *GA* 12, 246 et 247 – et 1964 – « *Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens* », dans *Zur Sache des Denkens*, *GA* 14, 82.

plus franc, et moins épais, donc plus léger – et ce qui « régit […] l'éclairci (*Ge-lichtete*), c'est-à-dire ce qui est désabrité (*Entborgene*) »[35], que l'homme n'*ait* pas la liberté n'empêche pas qu'elle *soit* le *Dasein* en lui[36].

Qu'à cela ne tienne : c'est bien « le traitement de ce thème » qui « doit devenir une *introduction à la philosophie* »[37]. Le défi se mesure au risque encouru : « se perdre à l'excès » dans une partie, voire dans le détail, et « obstruer la vue »[38] sur le tout, donc sur le principal. Mais Heidegger d'assumer sa témérité en cherchant à la justifier. D'où son raisonnement : « le particulier est quelque chose d'autre que l'universel » – idée générale illustrée ici par plusieurs exemples singuliers, celui de « la théorie des équations différentielles » qui « n'est pas *la* mathématique » et celui de « l'interprétation de l'*Antigone* de Sophocle » qui « n'est pas *la* philologie classique » parmi d'autres – ; or, « nous commençons par le particulier, par le concret », non « pour nous y arrêter […], mais pour nous confronter bientôt à l'essentiel et à l'universel » – constat établi dans les domaines où il vient d'être emprunté, puisque « le calcul différentiel » mène à « la théorie des équations différentielles » en mathématiques, comme « la lecture et l'interprétation d'œuvres » à « la question du chef-d'œuvre » en philologie – ; donc « gagner l'universel de la connaissance philosophique à travers le traitement de cette question spéciale – la liberté humaine –, voilà qui n'est pas une gageure impossible (*unmögliches Unterfangen*), mais l'unique chemin fécond et, de plus, scientifique d'une introduction à la philosophie »[39]. Cette conclusion aura de quoi conforter Heidegger et réconforter ses auditeurs, vu que deux cautions valent mieux qu'une : d'un côté celle de la philosophie dans sa dialectique de l'universel et du particulier[40] – « le particulier est toujours le

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35 « *Die Frage nach der Technik* », *dans Vorträge und Aufsätze, GA 7, 26.*
36 Ainsi, c'est la liberté qui libère ce qui est pour laisser être le libre qui relève de l'être, non l'inverse. Ou littéralement : « la liberté n'est pas l'«essence» de l'estre pour ainsi dire, comme si l'estre pouvait être rangé dans et subordonné à la liberté, mais c'est dans l'estre et en tant qu'estre que s'essencifie la «liberté», pensée ici plus originellement que la liberté métaphysique et, bien plus encore, que la liberté morale » – *GA* 66, 101.
37 *GA* 31, 2 (trad. mod.).
38 *Ibid*. (trad. mod.).
39 *Ibid*., 3-4 (trad. mod.).
40 En pensant l'Histoire comme déploiement de l'Esprit dans la succession des peuples, Hegel y avait insisté, pour qui l'universel n'existe que dans le particulier, faute de quoi il n'est qu'un universel abstrait et vide. Or, inutile de rappeler combien la ré-

particulier d'un universel, mieux, de l'universel inclus en lui », et l'universel « l'universel du particulier déterminé à partir de lui » –, de l'autre celle de la science dans sa pratique du particulier en vue de l'universel – saisir celui-là comme « l'occasion vraie et véritable (echte und rechte Gelegenheit) »[41] de trouver celui-ci, « c'est le chemin que toute science suit naturellement »[42].

C'est pourtant là que le bât blesse. « Il en va » ou en ira « ainsi, si l'on pré-suppose que la philosophie est *aussi* une science et, par là même, qu'elle reste liée aux principes qui régissent la procédure des sciences »[43] – ce qui ne se peut car ne se doit. Si Heidegger n'entend pas faire la démonstration du caractère « erroné » et « illégitime »[44] de cette option sur laquelle, avec ce manifeste de Husserl qu'est, en 1911, l'article « *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* », s'ouvre, plus que la phénoménologie, toute la philosophie du XXe siècle, c'est qu'après avoir hésité dix ans durant – de 1919 à 1929 exactement – entre une conception de la philosophie qui fait d'elle une science incomparable et une conception de la philosophie qui la rend incomparable aux sciences[45], à présent il a tranché. Pour lui, si la philosophie n'est plus une « science originaire (*Urwissenschaft*) », c'est-à-dire une « science pré-théorique (*vor-theoretische Wissenschaft*) »[46], si elle n'est plus non plus une « science *critique (kritische Wissenschaft)* », autre-ment dit une « science différenciante (*unterscheidende Wissenschaft* »[47], c'est qu'elle n'est *pas* une science *du tout* ou alors qu'elle est une *science du tout*. Ceci revient à cela et cela tient à ceci que, parce que « l'étant – le tout du monde et de Dieu – est divisé par la science en différents domaines » et que « ces domaines ainsi divisés sont répartis entre les sciences », chacune ayant choisi le sien his-

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férence à l'auteur des *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* est importante pour celui, le 22 mars 1930, de cette conférence donnée à Amsterdam sous le titre « *Hegel und das Problem der Metaphysik* ».
41 *GA* 31, 3-4 (trad. mod.).
42 *Ibid.*
43 *Ibid.*, 4 (trad. mod.).
44 *Ibid.*
45 *Cf.* le titre du premier paragraphe de *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – End-lichkeit – Einsamkeit*, *GA* 29/30, 1 : « L'incomparabilité de la philosophie ».
46 *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem*, dans *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, *GA* 56/57, 4 et 95.
47 *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*, *GA* 22, 6 et 7.

toriquement pour, en se spécialisant, s'émanciper de la philosophie[48], « il ne reste plus aucun domaine de la multiplicité de l'étant » pour celle-ci, qui « ne peut plus s'occuper que de tout l'étant (*all dem Seienden*) – justement en son tout (*im Ganzen*) »[49]. Du coup, « toute science ne se détermine essentiellement qu'à la mesure d'un domaine » et puisqu'aucun ne lui revient, la philosophie ne peut pas être une science, et il ne subsiste aucune raison de la nommer ainsi »[50]. Heidegger a beau dire par deux fois dans ce cours qu'il n'en dira pas plus sur le sujet[51], n'en a-t-il déjà pas dit assez ?

Certes, un point est acquis désormais : « il n'est pas si sûr qu'il y paraît que nous ayons le droit, en philosophie, de prendre pour modèle la manière de procéder en science »[52]. Mais le problème de savoir si nous pouvons « partir d'une question spéciale pour trouver à travers elle l'universel d'une orientation d'ensemble sur la philosophie auquel aspire notre «introduction» »[53] reste entier, à ceci près que l'aborder ne semble plus exiger que du courage. La contradiction entre la fin visée et le moyen de la gagner peut être levée en effet à remarquer que, de même que tenir la méthode scientifique pour « salutaire et nécessaire (*zuträglich und gefordert*) »[54] au développement philosophique, tenir la question de l'essence de la liberté humaine pour séparée et isolée n'est qu'un présupposé... infondé. Après avoir indiqué le piège – la déduction ma-

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48 Ainsi, au IIIe siècle av. J.-C., l'astronomie avec les travaux d'Eudoxe de Cnide ou d'Aristarque de Samos, les mathématiques avec la géométrie d'Euclide et la mécanique avec l'invention de l'hydrostatique par Archimède, puis, aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, la physique avec Galilée et Newton, avant que ce ne soit le tour de la chimie au XVIIIe siècle avec Lavoisier, de la biologie au XIXe siècle avec Lamarck et Bernard et des sciences humaines au tournant et dans la première moitié du XXe siècle – la psychologie avec Ribot et Binet, la sociologie avec Durkheim, la linguistique avec Saussure.
49 *GA* 31, 4 (trad. mod.).
50 *Ibid.*
51 « Dans quelle mesure la présupposition du caractère scientifique de la philosophie est illégitime, cela n'a pas à être élucidé pour le moment », « cette réflexion ne prétend pas trancher la question de savoir si la philosophie est ou peut être absolument science, mais seulement rendre clair le fait que demeure la possibilité fondée de mettre à tout le moins en question et de contester ce caractère scientifique de la philosophie tel qu'on l'admet sans autre forme de procès » – *ibid.*, 4-5 (trad. mod.).
52 *Ibid.*, 5 (trad. mod.).
53 *Ibid.* (trad. mod.).
54 *Ibid.*

chinale de la totale particularité de son statut à partir de la double particularité de son objet –, Heidegger s'attache à le déjouer. Comment ? En montrant « en quoi le *problème de la liberté* n'est pas une *question spéciale* »[55]. Comment ? En montrant pourquoi il est « manifestement une question universelle »[56]. Or, sa démonstration est limpide : partant de ce que l'on entend couramment par liberté, à savoir le fait d'« être libre de… (*Freisein von*) », l'« indépendance (*Unabhängigkeit*) » ou la « non-dépendance (*Nicht-Abhängigkeit*) » par lesquels le « concept négatif de la liberté » se laisse déterminer, le maître fait observer que cette « liberté négative » se conçoit doublement, d'abord « vis-à-vis de la nature », c'est-à-dire « vis-à-vis du «monde» », puis « vis-à-vis de Dieu », si bien qu'en son sens plein, la liberté désigne le fait de n'avoir partie liée à aucun des deux, donc de n'avoir partie liée à rien, « monde et Dieu form[a]nt en leur unité le tout (*das All*) »[57]. Et de conclure, puisque la liberté, qui permet à l'homme de faire sans le monde et sans Dieu, ne peut être pensée sans eux, que la questionner revient à questionner « *nécessairement dans la direction de la totalité* (*das Ganze*) »[58].

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Aussi Heidegger va-t-il pouvoir défendre l'« extrême importance (*ausnehmende Wichtigkeit*) »[59] de la question de l'essence de la liberté humaine. Extrême car, « non seulement [elle] ne borne (*schränkt…ein*) pas la considération à un domaine particulier », au sens où elle ne la restreint à rien de précis et donc ne la ferme pas, « mais c'est l'inverse qui est vrai : […] elle lui fixe des bornes (*entschränkt*) »[60], au sens où elle l'ouvre à tout ce qui est et donc la déploie. Une telle interrogation n'est alors « *ni question d'un particulier* (*Besondere*)*, ni question d'un universel* (*Allgemeine*) » mais, en tant qu'elle « renvoie dès le départ à la totalité de l'étant », « question spécifiquement *philosophique* »[61]. Une telle affirmation précise dès lors un peu l'essence de la philosophie et beaucoup l'impuissance de la science. Au minimum, la philosophie est une activité où sont

55 *Ibid.*
56 *Ibid.*, 7.
57 *Ibid.*, 6-7.
58 *Ibid.*, 7 (trad. mod.).
59 *Ibid.*, 10.
60 *Ibid.*, 7.
61 *Ibid.*, 8.

posées des questions non régionales – oserait-on dire non catégoriales qu'il faudra réduire la philosophie à la philosophie première et en déduire que la philosophie est essentiellement ontologie, ce que fait Heidegger lui-même sans ambages[62]. À son maximum quant à elle, la science n'a pas encore les moyens de traiter de la liberté, non parce que le déterminisme que suppose le principe de causalité sur lequel elle repose pourrait ne pas faire bon ménage avec la liberté, mais parce qu'aucune « n'a comme telle, non pas seulement quantitativement mais qualitativement, essentiellement, la portée et l'ampleur d'horizon suffisantes pour embrasser dans son questionnement la totalité unitaire qui est visée d'emblée, bien qu'encore de manière indéterminée et non clarifiée, dans le questionnement qui s'enquiert de la liberté »[63]. Dit positivement, avec la liberté, « nous nous trouvons dès le départ et de fond en comble (*von vornherein und von Grund aus*) ailleurs, dans un lieu qu'aucune science, ni aujourd'hui, ni demain, ni jamais, n'est en mesure d'occuper »[64]. Bref, la liberté est, de la philosophie, la chasse gardée.

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Mais pour finir d'abolir notre contradiction liminaire, encore faudrait-il pouvoir ajouter, à l'idée selon laquelle la question de la liberté n'est pas une question particulière *en général*, cette autre selon laquelle la question de la liberté n'est pas davantage une question particulière *en particulier* – *i.e.* en philosophie. Or, s'il prévient l'objection voulant que la philosophie « ne s'épuise tout de même pas à traiter cet *unique* problème », force est à Heidegger de

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62 Ce qu'a fait Heidegger en 1927 : « la philosophie n'est pas *science* de l'étant, mais de l'être, ou encore, pour parler grec, elle est *ontologie* » – *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, *GA* 24, 15. Même à aussitôt prévenir qu'il entend « cette expression dans sa plus grande extension possible, et non pas au sens limité qu'elle a reçu dans la scolastiques, ou même dans la philosophie moderne », la formule n'en est pas moins malheureuse, car l'affirmation de la scientificité de la philosophie et, corrélative, la distinction de « la philosophie scientifique (*wissenschaftliche Philosophie*) » avec les « sciences non philosophiques (*nichtphilosophische Wissenschaften*) » ne sont alors faites que pour contester que la philosophie soit une vision du monde. Or, des trois possibilités qu'il interroge en 1928/1929 : la philosophie ou est « *ou* science, *ou* vision du monde », ou est « *aussi bien* science *que* vision du monde », ou n'est « *ni* science, *ni* vision du monde » – *GA* 27, 9 –, c'est la troisième qu'il retiendra avec les années 1930 pour ne plus jamais y revenir.
63 *GA* 31, 8 (trad. mod.).
64 *Ibid.*

reconnaître que les questions s'y diversifient et, partant, se particularisent – ainsi « la question de l'essence de la vérité », qui n'est pas celle « de l'essence de la connaissance humaine », qui n'est pas celle « de l'essence de la nature », qui n'est pas celle « de l'histoire », qui n'est pas celle « de l'art », en sorte que, comme chacune d'elles, la question de la liberté n'est qu'*une* question, autant dire pas grand-chose « en comparaison de la question plus universelle et même universellissime (*allgemeinere und allgemeinste Frage*) de l'essence de l'étant comme tel et en général »[65]. Mais plus que de défendre l'égalité de cette question avec telle ou telle autre, vu que « l'une comme l'autre questionnent dans et sur la totalité »[66] ni plus ni moins, défendre sa dignité n'exigeait-il pas moins de défendre bien plus sa dignité de question (*Fragwürdigkeit*) ? Heidegger l'eût pu mais n'en fait rien ici. Question parmi d'autres en philosophie, la liberté n'est pourtant pas une question comme une autre. En effet, la liberté interroge la philosophie dans et sur sa possibilité – dans sa possibilité à elle, la philosophie, étant donné que la liberté de penser du philosophe bute sur le fait que nul n'a la liberté de ne pas la penser, comme sur sa possibilité à elle, la liberté, étant donné que la liberté est « la vraie pierre d'achoppement de la philosophie »[67]. Par conséquent, ce n'est pas seulement parce qu'il échappe à la science, mais encore parce que la philosophie n'y échappe pas que le « problème de la liberté (*Freiheitsproblem*) »[68] peut constituer une introduction à la philosophie.

Qu'étrangement, Heidegger ne le dise pas en dit long cependant sur l'idée qu'il se fait d'une introduction à la philosophie, sinon sur l'idéal qui est le sien en la matière. On l'aura compris : quoiqu'elle soit un problème en philosophie, la liberté n'est pas tout le problème de la philosophie, et on le comprendra : « s'il en est ainsi, c'est qu'il y a dans le problème de la liberté (*Problem der Freiheit*), en dépit du bornage de son champ (*sachliche Entschränkung*), un abornement

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65 *Ibid*., 9.
66 *Ibid*. (trad. mod.).
67 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, AK 3, 310 (A 448/B 476). Kant radicalise ici l'affirmation de Leonard Euler : « L'Article sur la liberté est une pierre d'achoppement en Philosophie » – *Lettres à une princesse d'Allemagne sur divers sujets de physique et de philosophie*, lettre du 13 décembre 1760, dans *Leonhardi Euleri Opera Omnia*, Leipzig/Berolini, Typis et in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1960, t. 1, p. 191.
68 *GA* 31, 5, 7, 8, 10, 14, 21, 26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 40, 54, 112, 117, 132, 134, 136, 137, 161, 191, 198, 199, 200, 202, 209, 226, 227, 238, 239, 244, 247 et 299.

de son thème (*thematische Beschränkung*) »[69]. Impossible de faire autrement. Certes, traiter de la liberté, c'est aussi bien traiter de l'étant que nous sommes que traiter du tout de l'étant dont nous nous affranchissons, le tout par nécessité, non « par hasard (*zufällig*) et par surcroît (*dazu*) »[70]. Mais dans la mesure où jamais ce tout n'est pris pour « thème en tant que tel », toujours il « reste une question spéciale à l'intérieur de la philosophie », de sorte que l'« introduction projetée doit emprunter une direction partielle » la condamnant à demeurer, « en tant qu'introduction », « incomplète »[71]. En résulte, *stricto sensu*, une « situation scandaleuse (*Mißstand*) »[72] aux yeux d'un professeur désolé, s'excusant de ne pouvoir faire mieux en invoquant la disproportion entre la « connaissance de la totalité » qu'est la philosophie et ce « faire humain justement fragmentaire, fini et borné »[73] qu'est le philosopher. Or, qu'est-ce qu'un scandale sinon la contradiction du droit par le fait ? Est-ce à dire qu'une introduction, une bonne, une vraie, requiert l'exhaustivité, quitte à ce qu'elle serve, en tant que plein et entier développement d'un sujet, à une conclusion sur lui ? En somme, *introduire à* la philosophie signifierait-il tenter d'*en finir avec* elle ? On le croira volontiers à songer aussi bien à ce titre d'une conférence de Heidegger : « « *Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgable des Denkens* », qu'à cette expression de ses petits papiers : « *nous nous devons de tirer la philosophie hors de la «philosophie» (aus der «Philosophie» herausphilosophieren)* »[74].

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69 *Ibid.*, 9 (trad. mod.). C'est la distinction architectonique établie par Kant entre les limites (*Grenze*) et les bornes (*Schränke*) dans sa première Critique – *Kritik der reinen Vernunft AK* 3, 300 (A 433/B 461) – qui nous a fait opter pour le champ lexical de la borne pour rendre en français les dérivés de *Schranke*. Or, pour dire l'action de borner, le français a deux mots : *bornage* et *abornement*. Le premier désigne la fixation de la limite, le second sa démarcation. Ainsi, le premier ouvre l'horizon, le second le ferme à l'aide de ces repères matériels que sont, précisément, les bornes.

70 *Ibid.*, 7 (trad. mod.).

71 *Ibid.*, 7 et 10 (trad. mod.).

72 Soulignons le fait que *das Mißstand*, en allemand, ne désigne pas seulement l'inconvénient, mais la situation déplorable causée par une défaillance, un manquement, une anomalie.

73 *GA* 31, 10 (trad. mod.).

74 *Überlegungen II-IV („Schwarze Hefte" 1931-1938), GA* 94, 20. C'est là une correction de la phrase d'Ernst Mach, « il ne faut pas tirer la philosophie de nous-mêmes (*nicht aus uns herausphilosophieren*) mais de l'expérience » – *Die Mechanik in ihrer*

Expression moins paradoxale qu'il n'y paraît mais abyssale à souhait, tant se voit replié en elle le cheminement de toute une pensée, à laquelle et de laquelle, en la ressaisissant à travers quelques grands mots clés, nous n'entendrons ni faire injure, ni faire la caricature. Son point de départ n'est donc pas tant la philosophie que le philosopher car, avec Heidegger, « «étudier la philosophie» doit être un authentique «philosopher» »[75]. « Il ne s'agit pas en effet d'apprendre de la philosophie, mais de pouvoir philosopher »[76]. Or, « philosopher signifie initialement (*anfänglich*) penser »[77]. La réciproque est vraie : « philosopher, c'est penser, et penser, c'est chaque fois déjà en quelque manière (*irgendwie*) philosopher »[78] – ce qui, dans les deux cas, donne à penser à la fois que philosopher pourrait un jour ne plus l'être, penser, et que penser suppose toujours plus que philosopher. Philosopher pourrait un jour ne plus l'être, penser, car si « «la pensée», tout simplement comprise, est la philosophie, φιλοσοφία » et si cette pensée est celle de « ceux que l'on nomme «les penseurs» », dont l'« ancien nom est φιλόσοφοι, les philosophes », ceux-ci « accomplissent (*vollbringen*) »[79] celle-là. S'ensuit que cette « pensée des penseurs » qu'est la philosophie consiste à achever, donc à parachever, à finir de finir ce qu'ils pensent, soit « ce qui est, l'être, en ce qu'il détermine l'étant »[80]. De ce point de vue, « cette pensée pense en entretenant elle-même un rapport à l'histoire »[81] et la pratiquer, «faire de la philosophie» comme on dit, c'est tenter d'y mettre un terme, tenter de la faire aboutir pour en sortir et entrer de plein pied dans une autre pensée où

Entwicklung. Historisch-kritisch dargestellt (1883) –, que commente Lénine dans *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus. Kritische Bemerkungen über eine reaktionäre Philosophie* (1908) – *Sämtliche Werke*, Vienne, Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1927, t. 13, p. 140/*Œuvres complètes*, Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1928, t. 13, p. 122 – en citant la troisième édition du livre – Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1897, coll. «Internationale wissenschaftliche Bibliothek», p. 14.

75 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 61, 51.

76 *GA* 24, 1.

77 *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, dans *Leitgedanken zur Entstehung der Metaphysik, der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und der modernen Technik*, GA 76, 54.

78 GA 50, 92.

79 *Ibid.*, 136 (trad. mod.).

80 *Ibid.*, 147.

81 *Ibid.*, 149 (trad. mod.).

penser suppose plus que philosopher. D'où l'importance d'une introduction méticuleuse à la philosophie : « l'introduction (*Einleitung*) à la philosophie est l'invitation (*Anleitung*) de la pensée de prime abord maladroite (*unbeholfenes Denken*) à devenir une pensée précautionneuse (*behutsames Denken*) de ce qui est »[82].

Ainsi, méticuleuse, l'introduction à laquelle aspire ici Heidegger le sera si elle est généreuse et donc si elle sait être générale, globale, totale. Mais comment « *décider*, par rapport au problème de la liberté, s'il n'est qu'une question spéciale de la philosophie parmi d'autres questions ou si, finalement, le tout de la philosophie est quand même compris en lui »[83] ? Il faudrait pour cela avoir pleinement circonscrit la liberté. Et Heidegger de s'exécuter : si la liberté est négation d'une dépendance, la liberté n'en est pas moins affirmation d'une relation. Dans ces conditions, la penser elle revient à penser ses membres comme tels. En clair, penser la liberté comme relation, c'est aussi bien penser la liberté que penser le libre et penser vis-à-vis de quoi le libre est libre, bref, s'enquérir de « l'essence de l'indépendance de l'homme […] aussi bien que de l'essence du monde et de Dieu »[84]. Vertigineuse est l'ampleur de la tâche, qui est celle de « toute question philosophique », la totalité de ces questions questionnant « dans la totalité »[85]. Voilà désormais Heidegger rassuré, puisque nous tenons là la raison pour laquelle, « au fil directeur de la question de l'essence de la liberté humaine, nous avons le droit et même *le devoir* de risquer une réelle introduction à la philosophie comme totalité »[86]. Mais comment ne pas s'inquiéter encore du défaut qui subsiste dans la procédure ? « Bien que le problème de la liberté nous mette sous les yeux la totalité de la philosophie, cela ne se produit que dans une perspective particulière, celle de la liberté justement, et non pas celle de la vérité par exemple »[87] – autre perspective découlant de cet autre problème, la vérité, abordé dans cet autre cours, celui du semestre d'hiver 1928/1929. « La réelle totalité de la philosophie ne serait donc saisie que si

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82 *Ibid*. (trad. mod.).
83 *GA* 31, 10.
84 *Ibid*., 13.
85 *Ibid*., 14 (trad. mod.).
86 *Ibid*. (trad. mod.).
87 *Ibid*., 14. (trad. mod.).

nous traitions et pouvions traiter la totalité possible de toutes les questions possibles et de leurs perspectives »[88]. Or, n'est-ce point là précisément ce que Heidegger a tenté – du moins l'impression qu'il ne cesse de donner ?

C'est que nécessité fait loi. « Quel que soit le sens dans lequel nous tournons la chose, nous ne pouvons pas ne pas tomber sur celui où l'introduction à la philosophie au fil directeur du problème de la liberté prend une orientation particulière et isolée (*besondere und vereinzelte Orientierung*) »[89]. C'est pourquoi Heidegger remet à chaque fois sur le métier la tâche qui est la sienne, variant certes toujours les questions, les textes ou les auteurs dont il entend traiter, mais ne variant jamais quant à sa finalité. Aussi peut-il faire ici contre mauvaise fortune bon cœur et renier le défaut de la philosophie qu'il avait commencé par pointer. C'est toute « la force et la vigueur (*Stärke und Schlagkraft*) du philosopher » en vérité de reposer sur le fait qu'« il ne rende manifeste la totalité qu'au sein du problème singulier réellement saisi »[90]. Pour Heidegger en ce sens, le philosophe n'est pas le « spécialiste des généralités »[91] – le serait-il qu'il prendrait les traits de son ennemi juré depuis l'Antiquité, attendu que « le procédé qui consiste à plier à n'importe quel cadre tout ce qui existe en matière de questions philosophiques et à parler à partir de là de tout et de n'importe quoi sans *questionner* réellement est le contraire d'une introduction à la philosophie, autrement dit une apparence de philosophie, une *sophistique* »[92]. Le philosophe serait plutôt le penseur de « l'universel singulier »[93] – serait-il le penseur du contraire qu'il aurait le visage de celui dont il a fini de se distinguer

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88 *Ibid.* (trad. mod.).

89 *Ibid.* (trad. mod.).

90 *Ibid.*, 14-15 (trad. mod.).

91 Nous empruntons le mot non pas directement à Comte, mais à ses commentateurs lorsqu'ils présentent l'idée qui est la sienne en matière de « perfectionnement de la division du travail intellectuel », à savoir « faire de l'étude des généralités scientifiques une grande spécialité de plus » – *Cours de philosophie positive*, Paris, Bachelier, 1830, t. 1, p. 30.

92 *GA* 31, 15-16. Et Heidegger de renvoyer lui-même en note à Aristote, *Métaphysique*, Γ, 2, 1004 b 17 *sq.* et 26.

93 Nous reprenons à Sartre le nom de sa conférence de 1964 lors du colloque *Kierkegaard vivant à Paris. Sur les tenants et les aboutissants de l'expression, cf.* Jean-François Louette, *Silences de Sartre*, Toulouse, Presses universitaires du Mirail, coll. «Cribles», 1995, pp. 239-292.

avec la modernité, attendu qu'« il n'en va pas ici comme dans les sciences : la philosophie vise dès le départ la totalité, quoique dans une perspective déterminée »[94]. Il faut y insister. Si Heidegger s'évertue ici à « *comprendre la philosophie positivement à partir d'elle-même*, non point au travers d'une discussion creuse sur la philosophie en général, mais *à partir du contenu du problème choisi* »[95] qu'est la liberté, c'est que la penser autrement serait forcément la penser d'une manière indigne d'elle, car d'une manière non philosophique.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

Si Heidegger s'est plu à retracer « le mouvement fondamental de l'histoire de la question de la liberté dans la philosophie moderne, de Descartes jusqu'à l'idéalisme allemand »[96], il découvre que « l'homme moderne est non seulement «libre» », mais que « son être-libre consiste à faire droit (*Anspruch*) à la liberté et à connaître ce droit comme la sentence (*Ausspruch*) de sa propre essence »[97]. La liberté d'être libre du sujet fait donc de la liberté son destin. À nous interroger sur Heidegger et la liberté, nous aurions pu aisément retracer cette histoire avec lui, dont l'oracle ne fait pas qu'annoncer le destin de (la) liberté, puisqu'il le décrit. Mais nous n'en avons rien fait, ayant préféré analyser comment cette « question «particulière» » de la philosophie qu'est la liberté peut servir la « tâche «générale» »[98] d'une introduction à la philosophie par le maître en 1930. Par où se voit confirmé que « la pensée de Heidegger peut être appelée à juste titre une philosophie de la liberté », mais « non pas dans le sens d'un génitif subjectif, comme une philosophie portant sur la liberté ; mais plutôt dans un sens objectif, comme une philosophie issue de la liberté, en tant que tentative de répondre à son difficile et évanescent appel »[99]… mais non pas tant l'appel de la liberté, qui appelle l'homme à penser, que l'appel de la philosophie elle-même, qui appelle l'homme et à en faire, et à s'en faire une idée. En

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94 *GA* 31, 17 (trad. mod.).
95 *Ibid.*, 19 (trad. mod.).
96 *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809)*, *GA* 42, 103.
97 *Aufzeichnungen zu Ernst Jünger*, dans *Zu Ernst Jünger*, *GA* 90, 153.
98 *GA* 31, 1.
99 Hans Ruin, « Le sort de la liberté chez Heidegger », art. cit., p. 79.

faire, de la philosophie, et s'en faire une idée, en faire pour s'en faire une idée et s'en faire une idée pour la parfaire jusqu'à ne plus en faire – « *tirer la philosophie hors de la «philosophie»* » –, nous l'affirmons : c'est l'objet même de la pensée heideggérienne. On l'a vu : au moment même où Heidegger semble accorder à la question de la liberté la primauté, c'est pour mieux donner la priorité à la question de la philosophie puisque traiter de celle-là revient à introduire à celle-ci. En ce sens, Heidegger est sans doute moins un *philosophe de la liberté* qu'un *philosophe en liberté*, autrement dit un philosophe dont la philosophie même constitue le philosophème.

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Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen

EXPERIENCE, POETRY AND TRUTH: ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ERNST JÜNGER'S THE ADVENTUROUS HEART

This essay is dedicated to Dr. Chiara De Franco in appreciation of her love and support.

Ernst Jünger (1895–1998) was a German writer, entomologist and soldier mostly known for his literary masterpiece *Storm of Steel* (1920); an autobiographical account on his experiences in the trenches during the First World War. Several commentators have emphasized the philosophical qualities of Jünger's works. Most notably, Martin Heidegger engaged with Jünger's writings and corresponded with him personally on topics including nihilism, modernity and technology.[1] Nevertheless, Jünger's works yet have to be fully recognized by international phenomenologists.[2] This essay is an attempt to, uncover some of the phenomenological themes present in Jünger's *The Adventurous Heart* (1938), a work of poetry that offers sophisticated insights hidden under a colorful and imaginative prose.

The Adventurous Heart is thematically dense and bears resemblance to a maze in that it lacks an apparent logical structure. It is polycentric and fragmented with numerous entry points, meaning that it is open to different – and

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1 Vincent Blok, »An indication of being – Reflections on Heidegger›s Engagement with Ernst Jünger«, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 42 (2011), p. 194–208.
2 For some of the exceptions, see: Günter Figal, *For a Philosophy of Freedom and Strife*, trans. Wayne Klein, SUNY Press: Albany 1998; Thomas Sheehan, »Nihilism: Heidegger/Jünger/Aristotle«, in: Burt Hopkins (ed.), *Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrect 1998, p. 273–316.

possibly even conflicting – interpretations. I have not written this essay under the illusion of offering an exhaustive investigation of every phenomenological theme of this particular work. Rather, the purpose of my analysis is to show that *The Adventurous Heart*, despite its poetic and esoteric character, ought to be regarded as a work of phenomenology. Seeking to substantiate this claim, I consider Jünger's views on truth, subjective experience and poetry. In fact, Jünger not only uses poetry to convey his philosophical ideas, but also to show how we as human beings come to a deeper understanding of the world. Jünger holds poetic language in high regard, calling it "true language."[3] Poetry is special, he argues, because it synthesizes two of our cognitive faculties, namely embodied perception and disembodied understanding.

I

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Before taking a closer look at Jünger's view on poetry, however, we must first clarify his notion of truth in relation to other phenomenological contributions. For Jünger, truth is irreducible to the factual truth of the natural scientist and the realist philosopher. Rather, truth is more profound in that it does not merely concern empirical facts. Truth is synonymous with extra-sensuous facts that are hidden from – but nevertheless connected with – our everyday experiences. He writes that the world's "secrets lie exposed on the surface" and that "only a minimal adjustment of the eye is required to view its wealth of treasures and wonders," thus acknowledging that subjective experience is linked to truth.[4]

Jünger tacitly counters traditional metaphysics and the idea that the phenomenal world exists independently of our experiences. On his view, the subject and the world are mutually constitutive, meaning that the individual has decisive influence on things perceived. He underlines this in the following lengthy quote as he recounts his experiences of a city during a sunset:

3 Ernst Jünger, *The Adventurous Heart – Figures and Capriccios*, Telos Press Publishing, Candor 2012, p. 17.
4 Ibid., p. 73.

Shortly before sunset, a startling game of colors transfigured the city. All things red and yellow began to stir and awaken; they took on the hues characteristic of nasturtium flowers. The old tiled roofs in particular resembled bolsters of red chalk–overflowing reservoirs radiating their surplus light energy […] Incidentally, this lighting seemed so extraordinary to me that in observing the faces of people on the streets, I was surprised to see that they were not alarmed by it.[5]

Evidently, knowledge influences our perceptual experiences, thus rendering neutral observations impossible. This is evident from the associations to 'nasturtium flowers' and 'red chalk-overflowing reservoirs' which are deeply subjective and, in the case of the former, reflects Jünger's personal interest in botany. Also, they underline the subject-relative dimension of perceptual experiences which, consequently, are affected by the perceiver's personal history. Other people will inevitable have different associations, and due to this a "particular fright lies in the awareness that one is alone in being affected by a significant spectacle."[6] Individuals have different experiences of what, objectively speaking, is the same phenomenon. This is in line with Merleau-Ponty's view of perception. He argues that the act of perception and the thing perceived are mutually constitutive, and that sensuous impressions convey a meaning irreducible to a thing perceived or a given stimulus.[7]

Truth, Jünger holds, is concealed in the outset, but it may nevertheless be revealed by the subject. For instance, he writes about penetrating into "disguised chambers that are less subject to gravity and the assaults of time." He elaborates that thinking "is lighter here–in an incomprehensible instant, the mind harvests fruits it would not otherwise gather in years of work. The difference between present, past, and future also falls away."[8] So although we experience the world in authentically in our everydayness, we have the latent possibility of experiencing truth by venturing into the world's extra-sensuous realm.

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5 Ibid., p. 24.
6 Ibid.
7 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Routledge, London and New York 2002, p. 86.
8 Jünger, op. cit., p. 19.

At this point it makes sense to draw a parallel to Heidegger and his assumption that inauthenticity "has possible authenticity as its basis."[9] Thus, although the subject has fallen prey to the practical concerns of the world, she has a transcendental relation to it. For Heidegger, this relation enables her to fall prey in the first place. But, he argues, one may come to experience authenticity by superseding one's practical engagements with the world. Consequently, the "self is brought to itself."[10] As a matter of fact, Jünger also holds that authentic self-assessment demands an "extraordinary level of enlightenment."[11] However, he explicitly relates this to realizing truth since reality's extra-sensuous domain allows man to find "the right measure by which to assess himself when he stands at the crossroads."[12]

He introduces an experiential stance called *stereoscopic sensibility* which, according to him, enables the subject to realize truth. Below, I consider this stance in further detail. But before doing so, it is important to stress how Jünger's phenomenology differs from that of Husserl although he also assumes that truth can be realized on the basis of a special experiential capacity. For Husserl, we experience truth by means of a disembodied intellect (i.e. a *pure ego*) that "occupies a completely isolated position as opposed to all that is real" and requires a degree of reflection.[13] Conversely, stereoscopic sensibility implies that at least some aspects of truth realization are embodied and pre-reflective. For instance, the feeling of *dizziness* is a way for us to know that we are in authentic contact with a given phenomenon. In principle, this feeling can be experienced by anyone, meaning that one does not need to take a reflective or intellectual stance towards the world. The commonality of this kind of sensibility is underlined by the fact that "everyone has at least once felt how people and things have been illuminated in certain significant moments, perhaps to such a degree that dizziness or even a shudder overcame them. This is true in

9 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, SUNY Press, Albany 2010, p. 249.
10 Ibid.
11 Jünger, op. cit.,
12 Ibid., p. 19.
13 Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989, p. 107.

the presence of death, but all significant powers, beauty for instance, elicit this effect–and we can ascribe it to truth in particular."[14] Jünger considers the realization of truth as something that pertains to our existence as human beings.

The purpose of these brief considerations has been to clarify some of the basic similarities and discrepancies between Jünger and key figures in the phenomenological tradition as to how they consider experience and truth. The overall aim has been to validate the claim that *The Adventurous Heart* is a work of phenomenology. I continue this thread by clarifying how Jünger considers the subject's relation to truth. In the following, I show that we may come to realize truth in a number of ways that differ in terms of how they lend themselves to our everyday activities. Here, the stereoscopy mentioned above is of significant importance.

II

Stereoscopic sensibility is a kind of experience that limits to cases involving perception with more than one sensory modality. Jünger provides several examples of this including the following: "In the aquarium, at the coral fish. One of these creatures was superlatively colored, a deep dark-red, striped with velvety-black bands, of a hue only possible on this planet at those places where the flesh is produced in islands. Its creamy body seemed so thoroughly tender, so thoroughly color, that I felt I could push through it with a very gentle poke of my finger."[15] The stereoscopy differs from our perceptions in general since it allows us to extract two different sensuous qualities with the same sense organ.[16] For instance, one might come to sense a color as also having a tactile

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14 Ibid., p. 4.
15 Ibid., p. 15.
16 Ibid., p. 16. By introducing this kind of sensibility, Jünger implicitly contrasts his phenomenology with the standard view on perception in philosophy. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger posits that the philosophical tradition has been obsessed with giving unjustified priority to visual perception. As a consequence, other sensory modalities and cognitive functions have been neglected (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 164–166). Contrary to what the aquarium-example suggests, Jünger does not prioritize vision. In fact, he explicitly states that all of our senses are ultimately grounded in tactility: "Generally speaking, the sense of touch, from which all other senses derive, seems to play a special

value. Jünger's example with the aquarium suggests that truth can be realized in relation to what some might call 'mundane' everyday activities like seeing a beautiful fish or an outstanding piece of art.[17] So although stereoscopic experience comprises a special kind of perception, it occurs in our everyday life.

Specifically, this kind of experience constitutes the point of contact between, on the one hand, our embodied cognitive comportment towards the world and, on the other hand, the world's extra-sensuous structures. For Jünger, it is by means of stereoscopic sensibility that we acquire a deep and nuanced impression of a given phenomenon. Epistemologically, however, the relation between stereoscopic experiences and the realization of truth is far from clear: In fact, it is a paradox that stereoscopy not only reveals the world's extra-sensuous dimension, but also conceals it. This is evident from the following observations:

Stereoscopic sensibility is a mediate – rather than an immediate – experience. Jünger underlines this by stating that the stereoscopy makes us feel the play of our senses moving as "a mysterious veil, like a curtain on the marvelous."[18] The veil metaphor shows that stereoscopic sensibility conceals parts of reality. One reason for this may be the fluctuating nature of our sensuous experience; a fluctuation that Hegel explores in the first part of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* where he considers sense-certainty and perception.[19] Jünger posits that it is difficult for us to retain our authentic perceptual engagement with things. For instance, he states that: "Alongside the shaping and cultivating done by institutions, there exists a direct relationship to the world, from which primal power accrues to us. Our eyes must retain the power, if only for a moment, to see the works of this earth as if on their first day, that is, in their divine magnificence."[20] However, our experience remains to be affected by the world because our perception continuously changes due to novel sensuous impressions and because the stereoscopy occurs only in a particular instant.

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role in perception" (Jünger, op. cit., p. 17).
17 Ibid., p. 40.
18 Ibid., p. 18.
19 G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1977, p. 58–79.
20 Jünger, op. cit., p. 59.

Also, Jünger introduces a more fundamental notion of truth by arguing that we must steer clear of empirical facts in order to gain access to "spiritual centers" that are "unapproachable by ordinary senses and more unknown than the dark side of the moon."[21] As the stereoscopic sensibility is enabled by our senses it is evident that these 'spiritual centers' are closed off from this experiential stance and, thus, cannot be disclosed by means of it.

For these reasons, the stereoscopic sensibility is dialectical and furthermore, it fails to reveal truth once and for all. Rather, it oscillates between revealing and concealing truth, meaning that the emergent glimpses of truth are insufficient for bringing about a stable truth realization. On my reading, stereoscopic sensibility involves a continuous experiential flow that gives us a brief but far from exhaustive sense of the world's extra-sensuous dimension. The dialectical nature of this kind of sensibility suggests that we have to progress beyond our sensuous experience in order have the necessary stability.

Jünger argues that there is a way to secure permanent access to the extra-sensuous. In order to do so, he holds, we must abandon our sensuous perception and experience the world by means of a particular cognitive faculty that is different from our senses, namely *spirit* [Geist]. Our spiritual capacity allows us to bridge the apparent divide between, on the one hand, the domain of the sensible, and, on the other hand, the extra-sensuous domain. In this connection, Jünger introduces *the elusion* as a mysterious and vaguely defined meta-logical figure that reveals truth. When using this figure the individual abstracts from sensuous givens. In contrast to stereoscopic sensibility which is commonly occurring, this figure is only available to a small group of individuals. Jünger underlines this as he refers to the teachings of the imaginary philosopher Nigromontanus:

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> Nigromontanus could tell us of solitary spirits, whose dwellings, though they seemed to be in our midst, were in an absolutely inaccessible world. Accustomed to the purest, highest grade of fire, they came forth only when the proximity of the highest danger made the transition

21 Ibid., p. 19.

tolerable for them. But he also felt that anyone who moves actively in an inverted orientation to the world and is capable of the elusion for just a moment should already be considered fortunate.[22]

This possibility of dwelling suggests that the elusion may bring about a more stable and long-lasting experiential relation with the the world's extra-sensuous realm than what can be achieved by means of the stereoscopy. Particularly skilled individuals (i.e. the few of the few) are thus faced with a choice when stereoscopic sensibility occurs and they begin to feel dizzy:

> They may choose to stick to their perceptual attitude. Consequently, they would then live through their senses, and experience truth in glimpses due to the presence of the so-called veil, or;

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> They may decide to engage more deeply with truth by using the elusion. Thus they would come to explore the world on the basis of their spiritual faculty while neglecting their perception.

Stereoscopic sensibility relates to something more profound than our everyday experiences, but it is nevertheless enabled by such experiences. As we shall see next, the stereoscopy reveals truth to both layman and poet thus comprising a source for valuable insights and inspiration.

I have argued that, for Jünger, truth may be realized in at least two ways, namely, either by means of stereoscopic sensibility or the elusion. Now, I consider a third option that is available to the skillful poet and relies on poetic articulation. In this connection, Jünger also nuances the phenomenon of spirit as he explicitly links truth realization to the faculty of understanding. This third way of realizing truth does not imply that one has to abandon one's sensuous engagement with the world, meaning that Jünger grants us the possibility of realizing truth without, at the same time, losing sight of the sensuous richness of our experiences.

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22 Ibid.

III

The faculty of understanding is crucial to Jünger's view on poetic articulation in that it enables the author to experientially engage with the world. In fact, the poet is not only able to realize the extra-sensuous aspects of a particular phenomenon, but also to communicate these insights to her readers.

Jünger assumes that the poet is informed by means of her stereoscopic sensibility. Experientially, to gain access to a phenomenon implies *grasping* it. Jünger indicates this by stating that the poet uses her so-called 'inner pliers'[23] in order to 'grasp' and 'hold on to' the truth.[24] In doing so, he presents grasping as an extra-sensuous activity, as he explicitly links it to the individual's ability to uncover truth. Our understanding enables us to transcend the dialectical movement of " 'revealing-concealing' " caused by the stereoscopy, thus allowing us to experience a phenomenon's extra-sensuous aspects. So instead of being tied to our sensuous experience which is immediate and relative, our ability to grasp is enabled from within. It thus comprises a cognitive activity that relies on a spiritual capacity.

I will now take a closer look at what grasping truth implies. According to Jünger, it is by means of grasping that we come to understand a particular phenomenon while we gain insight into "the secret harmony of things."[25] In other words, we come to have a rich intuitive understanding of the interrelatedness of certain phenomena. Jünger's tacit notion of 'the grasped' thus differs from Plato's notion of εἶδος. Plato considers εἶδος to be synonymous with the universality of a concept in the sense that a given concept refers to an atemporal essence; an *Idea*.[26] Conversely, Jünger does not see truth as being traceable to concepts which represent static ideal types existing in an extra-sensuous domain. Instead, he emphasizes the dualistic nature of the content that emerges from a grasping: "Every meaningful phenomenon resembles a circle, whose

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23 Thomas Friese translates the German word "Zange" to "claws." However, I find the English term "pliers" to be more accurate.
24 Ibid., p. 17.
25 Ibid.
26 Plato, *The Republic*, Penguin Books, London 2007, p. 337–338.

periphery can be traced by day in fullest clarity. At night, however, the periphery disappears and the phosphorescent midpoint shines forth […] In the light, the form appears, in the darkness, the procreative power. Our understanding is such that it is able to engage from the circumference as well as at the midpoint."[27] This distinction between a phenomenon's surface and depth – or its form and procreative power – emphasizes that our experiences are fallible. Each of its dimensions hides the others, meaning that our engagement with a given thing at hand necessarily involves focusing on either its surface or its depth. Also, Jünger states that what is grasped essentially relates to the stereoscopic experience and the subject's dizziness or fear.[28] In other words, it is tied to a particular situated and embodied encounter.

I have clarified how grasping, considered as a spiritual ability grounded in the faculty of understanding, allows us to realize truth without requiring us to abstract away from our situated, embodied encounter with the world. I will now turn to the role that linguistic concepts play with regards to overcoming the apparent duality of the grasping.

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<center>**IV**</center>

Jünger sees poetic articulation as being different from both stereoscopic sensibility and the elusion. Considered in isolation, however, linguistic concepts have no truth value. Nevertheless, he argues, language has the general capacity to dissolve the apparent conflict between life's surface, on the one hand, and its depth, on the other.[29] In other words, it is by means of poetry that we are able to supersede the dialectical movement of the stereoscopy sensibility.

27 Jünger, op. cit., p. 12.
28 Ibid., p. 17.
29 Ibid., p. 3.

According to Jünger, the creative process of writing is necessary for realizing truth. For instance, he refers to the imaginary philosopher Nigromontanus who has "said at one point that the world had been given to us in its elements like the twenty-six letters of the alphabet – and that the elaboration of its image depended on the texts we wrote. Naturally, one had to be a genuine author and not merely a scribe."[30] Articulation is positive and creative. Nevertheless, Jünger emphasizes, the poet looks back upon the completed work with the feeling of being a *forger*. He elaborates on this by stating that "precisely this reconsideration of already concluded works has special value" since they offer "a rare opportunity to grasp its language as a whole, to some extent with a sculptor's eye, and to work on it as a single corpus."[31] The literary work emerges as the author engages and re-engages with her past experiences. Metaphorically, the literary work is a 'sculpture' that is situated in a process of more or less constant becoming. Jünger recognizes that articulation skills improve with time, meaning that one may come to acquire "a sure hand."[32]

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Realizing truth by means of poetic articulation is possible because the poet does not only rely on the skill of grasping, but also uses her understanding in a *combinatorial* way. Grasping and combining, Jünger holds, are vital to the creative process of writing. The skill of combining is important since it allows one to obtain a higher insight which "does not live in the separate compartments but in the structure of the world." He continues, stating that this insight "corresponds to a mode of thinking that does not move around in isolated and parceled-off truths but rather in meaningful connections, whose power to order lies in its combinatorial faculty."[33] As the quotes suggest, this faculty is primarily used by the poet as she seeks to uncover the extra-sensuous realm. But it is also used by the so-called *eminent specialist* who knows about the genealogy of things and is able to distinguish the profound similarities between the world's phenomena.[34] The faculty of combining also enables the poet to manipulate meanings and articulate extra-sensuous insights."

30 Ibid., p. 74.
31 Ibid., p. 2.
32 Ibid., p. 3.
33 Ibid., p. 13.
34 Ibid., p. 14.

Combining implies a kind of ordering. It entails that the poet orders, or better, arranges concepts with the purpose of manipulating their meanings. The poet is a kind of skilled technician. Here, we may draw a parallel to Heidegger who states that craftsmanship relies on a particular kind of knowledge which the ancient Greeks called τέχνη. Heidegger writes that for "Greek thought the nature of knowing consists in ἀλήθεια, that is, in the uncovering of beings. *Τέχνη, understood as knowledge* experienced in the Greek manner, is a bringing forth of beings in that it *brings forth* present beings as such beings *out of* concealedness and specifically *into* the unconcealedness of their appearance…"[35] The fact that Jünger sees works of poetry as open to revisions also underlines that poetic articulation is not a matter of mere presenting insights from past experiences. Rather, Jünger's tacit commitment to anti-intellectualism extends beyond the basic cognitive aspects of human living as it relates to how we express ourselves by means of language and, specifically, how we articulate our understanding of past and present experiences. To express truth, he holds, the poet must creatively engage with language in the process of articulation. This gives evidence to the importance of creativity and skills when combining words. For as Jünger writes, every "significant individual work has at least a drop of the combinatorial faculty mixed into it–and how inspired we feel when we stumble already in the introduction across those simultaneously powerful and playful sentences by which sovereignty shows its presence."[36]

Importantly, the poet combines words, phrases, tropes etcetera which are available to everyone belonging to a particular speech community. As such, language is accessible to us as a repertoire and words may have both tacit and overt meanings. For Jünger, however, it is by combining words that insights emerge in the difference between different meaningful words: "We have countless expressions at our disposal in which a plain meaning coexists with a deeply concealed one, and what is transparency to the eye is here secret consonance."[37] It is on the basis of a skillful combination of linguistic units that past insights are articulated. Consequently, a transparent structure emerges.

35 Martin Heidegger, »The Origin of The Work of Art«, in Albert Hofstadter (trans.) *Poetry, Language, Thought*, HarperCollins Publishers, New York 1975, p. 57.
36 Jünger, op. cit., p. 14.
37 Ibid., p. 4.

Jünger sees language as synonymous with "waters that at once stir and are *transparent*" in the sense that language *moves* and *discloses*.[38] Language is transparent, meaning that it transcends the meanings of individual words and the literary work, thus enabling the reader to realize truth. This is possible because secret teachings "are concealed in every language of merit."[39] In fact, articulation does not reveal isolated meanings but *chains of meanings* that emerge as a set of intersecting differences. Truth is uncovered as the author poetically combines words in novel ways. And it is on the basis of these combinations that she reveals truth to her readers.

Language speaks to us, but it also speaks through us as we poetically articulate our experiences. And it does so in a spiritual manner due to the fact that it is capable of *convincing* our readers. In fact, Jünger sees conviction as "a spiritual act" that should not be confused with simple factual knowing and understanding.[40] Rather, poetic language communicates directly to the reader's intuitive understanding. Also, the "spirit of language does not lie in the words and images; it is embedded in the atoms, which an unknown current animates and compels into magnetic figures. Only thus is the spirit of language able to grasp the unity of the world, beyond day and night, beyond dream and reality, time and place, friend and foe–under all conditions of spirit and matter."[41] Thus Jünger ascribes a special status to language in that poetic articulation makes it possible for the poet to transcend the apparent dichotomy between, on the one hand, a phenomenon's form and, on the other hand, its procreative power. Jünger sees poetic articulation as a more viable epistemic alternative to perception and pure spirituality because it implies a synthesis that abolishes the distinction between perception and understanding. For this reason, poetry allows us to experience truth in ways that neither stereoscopic sensibility nor the elusion is able to bring about.

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38 Ibid., p. 3.
39 Ibid., p. 12.
40 Ibid., p. 11.
41 Ibid., p. 105.

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Xia Hong

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES OF LIFE-WORLD

Life-world is one of the key words in Husserl's last work, Herbert Spiegelberg has pointed out that, "the most influential and suggestive idea that has come out of the study and edition of Husserl's unpublished manuscripts thus far is that of the Lebenswelt or world of lived experience". [1] Since then, the contents of this concept has been developed continuously. The German sociologist N. Luhmann has also pointed out that life-world is the most fruitful made word in the last century. [2] Heidegger, Schutz, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Lenivas, Habermas, and Derrida have done much research on this concept and enriched its connotation or meaning. During the course of its development, there are two mainly basic but slightly different conceptual perspective understandings of life-world. One is the phenomenological perspective; the other is the sociological one. In the context of phenomenology, the core connotation of life-world is embodied in the prefix of this word, which is 'life'. This connotation can be seen from the analysis to this concept from two important phenomenologists, Husserl and Heidegger. But in the context of sociology, the core connotation of life-world is embodied in the suffix of this word, which is

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1 Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction,* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p. 159.
2 Niklas Luhmann, »Die Lebenswelt---nach Rücksprache mit Phänomenologen«, A*rchiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie,* LXXII (1986), S. 176–194.

'world'. This connotation can be seen from the analysis to this concept from Schutz and Habermas, two important sociologists. Although they are different from each other, there is a family resemblance between these two mainly conception: Life-world is the trinity of subjective, objective and social worlds.

1. The Concept of Life-world in the Tradition of Phenomenology

First, let us focus on how Husserl illustrates this basic concept. According to Husserl, life-world is a totality which comes to the fore when we are in the state of perceiving the objects in a "natural attitude", or in other words, life-world is a "pre-scientific", and therefore "a realm of original self-evidences",[3] to which any test validity on mathematics and other natural sciences should finally appeal. It is the life-world that provides a starting point and founding basis for "all our acts, whether of experiencing, of knowing, or of outward action".[4]

This understanding of life-world aims at the positive science. During the 19th century, the influence of positive scientific worldview has dominated these people who inquiry the meaning or value of human activities, the introduction of the concept of life-world blazes a new way for considering these problems. It is well known that people are deceived by the "prosperity" caused by scientific achievement in the second half of 19th century. As a result, the basic explanations to the objective world from the perspective of positive natural sciences have replaced the traditional worldview on the world with a complete new one. In fact, the old worldview is a hybrid which contains the religious, theological, artistic, cultural, theoretical and practical understandings of the world in which human beings live. It is these hybrid understandings that human beings have lived in the pre-scientific world, and constituted their own beliefs or convictions to the world. However, with the advent of the appearance of "scientific world", which is mainly the mental product of scientists, the world that human beings live in seems to be real and reliable by way of positive scientific explanations, and the other understandings to the world from the perspectives

3 Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 127.
4 Ibid., p. 144.

of religions, mythologies, theologies and so on are unreliable, and should be put into question, even be refused radically. If the world in which people live from the natural attitude, that is the life-world, is replaced by the world that is regarded as the scientific object by scientists, a serious result will happen: the crisis of European sciences, or the crisis of European humanity. As he points out in his *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*: "the spiritual need of our time has, in fact, become unbearable… far more than this, it is the most radical vital need that afflicts us, a need that leaves no point of our lives untouched."[5] So, according Husserl, if we use scientific world which seems objective in the terms of positive science, traditional norms will be doubted or mistreated irrationally and the cultural model or values will be relativized, for the positive sciences will exclude in principle "the questions which man, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence".[6]

Husserl strictly discusses the problem of what "life" is. According to him, any life is "taking a position".[7] This behavior of taking a position is, to a certain degree, a *Noesis* that is relative to the *Noema*. A person without his consciousness or in a vegetative state cannot take a position or live a real life. Husserl's understanding to life is analogous to Marx's. Marx points out that the difference between human life and animal life activity lies in that: "The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. … Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity."[8]

By identifying human life with position-taking, Husserl shows the essential difference between the human life and animal activity. This identification is

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5 Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (Q. Lauer Trans.), New York: Harper & Row, 1965, p. 144.
6 Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 6.
7 Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (Q. Lauer Trans.), New York: Harper & Row, 1965, p. 144.
8 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto* (M. Milligan Trans.), New York: Prometheus Books, 1988, p. 165.

more important in that it shows that human life itself is not a subjective causal thing: human life must obey a certain Sollen (must), that is, norms with absolute validity. In Husserl's words, 'So long as these norms were not attacked, were not threatened and ridiculed by no skepticism, there was only one vital question: how best to satisfy these norms in practice.' Here Husserl only to illustrate that the crisis is not because of the lack of norms, but "any and every norm is controverted or empirically falsified and robbed of its ideal validity".[9]

So, according to Husserl, the reason of ineffectiveness of life-norms lies in the science itself, the problem can be solved only through science. The solving path is: scientific criticism and a radical, rigorous science with reliable foundation, which is the philosophical science.[10] Husserl has insisted on this conviction without any interruption: it is only through science that this crisis can be solved. Getting rid of rationalism and the ideal of science is no use for overcoming this crisis. Contrarily, only rationalism is radicalized, the ideal of science is only reduced to its most original and grand sense, that is to say, to the lifeworld, can this crisis be overcome. Husserl suggests that people should abide by Descartes' method and use it to find out the absolute clear and grounded basis on the one hand, and should improve this method for the sake of unilateralism on the other hand. "Die Rationalität, die Descartes von der Philosophie fordert, als die er vor sich und jedermann vertreten könne, ist nichts anderes als der äußerste Radikalismus der philosophischen Selbstverantwortung."[11] The treatment method must appeal to life itself, for "what is actually first is the 'merely subjective-relative' intuition of pre-scientific world-life".[12] The problem of rationalism is this fact: concrete sciences are always replacing the relative truth with the universal and general truth, to overcome the subjectivities so as to attain the 'being' itself. While doing so, they forget the life-world. The fact is that the life-world is a realm of original self-evidence which provides

9 Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (Q. Lauer Trans.), New York: Harper & Row, 1965, p. 144.
10 Ibid., p. 144.
11 Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, S. 427.
12 Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 125.

the foundation of ultimate confirmation, so it is also the basis which objective truths are founded.

From the perspective of Husserl's understanding to the life, we can infer that life-world is an all-inclusive and universal realm which cannot be thematized and questioned. As he points out: "the life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the 'ground' of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical... To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world."[13] The meaning or value of 'scientific world' provides from the perspective of positive science ultimately should return to "life-world", this is the world which human beings live in and endow it with the meaning and value. It is also the world that connects human daily consciousness, so it is not an abstract one, but be given "pre-scientifically" "in a subjectively relative way".[14] Only in the course of human life, can people find that the so-called "objectivity" is just the endowment of their subjectivity, the objective world is forever the *Noema* of human consciousness, and only in human actual life, can people find the crisis coming from positive science.

Heidegger also emphasizes the importance of life meaning in the concept of "life-world", which can be read in his distinguished book "*Being and Time*". He claims that philosophy and science since ancient Greece had reduced things to their presence and regarded their presence as "Being", this kind of philosophy is doomed to be rootless one. According to Heidegger, the root of philosophy is the "*Dasein*"(being-there) which is always "to be"(Zu-sein). *Dasein* is always a being engaged in the world: neither a subject, nor the objective world alone, but the coherence of Being-in-the-world. Only "*Dasein*" and its state are explained, can the entrance to the Being be found. Then, how about is the state of "*Dasein*"? It is "being in the world" among the secular things. Dasein is revealed by projection into, and engagement with, a personal world.[15] For Heidegger, "*Dasein*" denotes a structured awareness or an institutional way of life. But at the same time, Being-in-the-world is the spanning site of human *Dasein*. The spanning means is the projection (Entwurf), that is to say, it is by way of

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13 Ibid., p. 142.
14 Ibid., p. 23.
15 Herman Philipse, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 120.

projection that something turns to be something or not to be something. The object in the world can be meaningful or valuable only through the activities of *Entwurf* (projection), *Anwendung* (utilization), *Zuhandene*, ready-to-hand, of *Dasein*. "*Sorge*" (or Care), which includes *Besorge* (care for something) and *Fürsorge*(care for somebody) is the basic structure of *Dasein*. However, projection, utilization, ready-to-hand and care are life itself. Although Heidegeer seldom uses the word "life-world", "… yet the whole of *Sein und Zeit* springs from an indication given by Husserl and amounts to no more than an explicit account of the '*natürlicher Weltbegriff*' or the '*Lebenswelt*' which Husserl, towards the end of his life, identified as the central theme of phenomenology,… "[16]Heidegeer use the word "*in-der-Welt-sein*" (Being-in-the-world) to illustrate the state of human being, this word has the same meaning as the word of "life-world", which is also pre-given and must be accepted as a proposition.

2. The Concept of Life-world in the Tradition of Sociology

Alfred Schutz has thought highly of Husserl's understanding to the life-world, and emphasizes that precise analysis to this concept will be beneficial to the philosophical anthropology. According to Schutz, life-world is actually a realm which consists of the partners, these partners are the same as I, and they can communicate and understand each other.

Husserl emphasizes the transcendentality of life-world. However, Schutz highlights its secularity for two reasons. First, the realms that sociology and philosophy deal mainly with are not the same. Philosophy should focus on the transcendental life-world, but it is not necessary for sociology. Secondly, the purpose of transcendental phenomenology is neither to deny the real existence of actual life-world, nor to prove it as the deluded vision influenced by the pure natural or positive science, but only to explain how the present life-world is possible. According to Schutz, life-world is a pre-given framework that we take for granted without any doubts. "'unquestionably'in the sense that it is un-questioned until further notice but may be called into question at any time".[17] If

16 Maurice Marleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (C. Smith Trans.), London and New York: Routledge, 1962, p. viii.
17 Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality* (M. Natanson Ed.),

we explain the life-world like this, the world itself is an everyday world that we live there and then or " a commensense world" or "a cultural world", it is also an intersubjective world of culture, because "we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being an object of understanding for others",[18] and it is this world that provides a pregiven framework for us to theoretical and practical activities. This kind of explained life-world is actually the "repository" with which we can change our lives or give a novelty interpretation.

This "commensense world" can also be called "social world", for commensense or culture is social in the sense of being enjoyed or recognized by society. First, its constructure is socilized, the reason is that, if I adopt way of the "pairing" with my partner in Husserl's sense, I would experience the same part of the world with the same perspective as his. Schutz calls this "idealization of the reciprocity of perspectives". Secondly, it is socialized from the perspective of genesis. The reason lies in that most of our knowledge, whether in its contents or in its form, is obtained in the course of communication with others, and should be socially recognized by others. Thirdly, it is socilized in the sense of distribution. The reason lies in that: any individual recognizes only a small part or special part of the whole world, and maybe attains to its clarity or definity in certain community. However, the meaning or the value of this kind of clarity or definity is different from each other.

Habermas has accepted Schutz's intersubjective understanding to life-world and his emphasis on the significance of communication in catching up with life-world. However, he does not think that Schutz actually interprets the life-world from the linguistically intersubjective structure. So he emphasizes the role of language in understanding the meaning of life-world. And he insists that "the *logos* of language embodies the power of the intersubjective which precedes and grounds the subjectivity of speakers".[19] A speech act refers to the objective world, subjective world and social world. If a man wants to arrive at agreement with others by way of language, he will raise three valid claims, that

The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, p. 145.
18 Ibid., p. 133.
19 Jürgen Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p. 11.

is, *normative rightness*, *theoretical truth* and *expressive or subjective truthfulness*. However, these three worlds are latent as a communicative background in daily speech acts and related to thematization of any world while communication or speech act refer to. These three worlds as a background form an organic unit. This unit, according to Habermas, is the life-world. The life-world is brought out by way of communicative action and speech act. It is important to point out that the social world is only one part of the outside world, which can be divided into two parts, which is "objective world and social world", [20] the particularity of the social world lies in that: "as the totality of legitimately ordered interpersonal relations, it has a different ontological constitution from the objective world".[21]

Influenced by Marx's thought that social existence can be distinguished into economic base and superstructure, Habermas thinks that social existence can be distinguished into system and life-world, the former is the realm of material reproduction, and the later is the realm of reproduction of communicative action and its meaning. The later exerts influence on the former.[22] According to him, traditional subjective philosophy interprets the society as a unit which comprises of the political citizens or free united producers who belong to their countries. This interpretation is based on the basic principle of positive sociology, and cannot fully clarify the course of social development. Habermas discards the thinking model of subjective philosophy, and interprets the society as "life-world constructed by symbols".[23] According to the relationship between two systems (that is, economy and administration) and life-world, he divides the course of social development into four stages, and explains how the subsystems of economy and administration has detached from the life-world, and resulted in "colonization of life-world" which is just the plight of western modernization.

20 Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action,* Vol. 1 (T. McCarthy, Trans.), Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984, p. 278.
21 Jürgen Habermas, *Justification and Application* (C. Cronin, Trans.),Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, p. 39.
22 Pip Jones, *Introducing Social Theory,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p. 169.
23 Jürgen Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken,* Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988, S. 95.

According to Habermas, the system and life-world forms a unit at the first stage of the archaic society, and they have advanced synchronically in the small tribes. In the later period, the exchanges of goods between different tribes are more frequent than ever. However, the frequent exchanges do not result the professional labor divisions in the modern sense, for the categories and realms of exchange are limited. As a result, the social reproduction is coordinated and cooperated in terms of conventional norms, and daily exchange activities and execution of tribal power are confined in the sphere of life-world. In hierarchized tribal societies, the rigorous rituals and conventional customs which are original from traditional cultural life have changed into obligatory legal rules. These rituals and customs function in the integration of whole society to certain degree. The result is that the executor of legal rules are gradually changing into the dominators or holders of the governing power, and this power for which life-world provides legitimacy is gradually highlighted, and has become a self-regulating and autonomous force, and finally separated from the life-world. However, because of the special sense of mystery, the handling of power has not moved beyond of circumstance of the life-world, state and society is incorporate wholly. In the period of politically stratified class societies, the complexity of social things has increased so quickly that a new medium, which is the money, has gradually become an important means and obtained its self-consistency in regulating the relationship between different levels of society. The medium of money is "specifically tailored to the economic function of society as a whole, a function relinquished by the state; it is the foundation of a subsystem that grows away from normative contexts."[24] The subsystem of economy, by way of the medium of money, is also highlighted from the life-world which provides for the meanings basis, and gradually gets rid of and finally is independent of life-world. The result is the separation of civil society and the state. The governor of a state can attain to its collective goal by way of its subsystem of power, such as administrational management, military and legal institutions on one hand, and coordinate the relationship among different social levels and groups by way of money on the other hand.

24 Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. 2 (T. McCarthy, Trans.), Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987, p. 171.

Habermas has analyzed the relationship between life-world and systems, and concluded that political and economical subsystems have basically run within the circumstance of life-world. Only until the period of later capitalism, the balance between these two subsystems and life-world was broken, and they are independent of each other. This independence leads to the expansion of two subsystems, respectively by media of money and power. During the course of independence, the social expansion and enlargement of social communities, accompanying the collapse of traditional worldviews and religious worldviews, these subsystems function thoroughly in the realms of administration and economy and finally in turn dominate the life-world from which these subsystems obtain legitimacy. Habermas calls this phenomenon "the colonization of life-world", which is the cause of problems in the modern society.

Life-world is an original and self-understanding realm which supports people in the world the meaning and value of life, and all kinds of human actions can be explained from it. Superficially, the appearance of these two subsystems has made the human contact much easier and organized the human labor activities more efficiently than ever, but it does not mean that the running rules defined by them should not be used also as rules of the life-world. Life-world should not be controlled by the media of money and power; on the contrary, it should be integrated through the medium of language. The life-world is the realm of activities of reproduction which cannot be integrated by the media of money and power, such as the education of private sphere, the development of personality, and the universal beneficial of public sphere activities. These realms should be handled by communicative actions.

We can see that the life-world itself is another expression of society, it is not the assemble of the human beings or objects, but the background of communicative action which is reproduced by the medium of language. It is in this realm that human beings learn and understand the meaning or value of their life.

3.The Family Resemblance of Two Conceptual Model of Life-world

The interpretation of life-world from the life perspective pays much attention to the blending relationship between life and world. The world in which human being lives is of its meaning for the sake of human life. The interpretation of life-world from the world perspective emphasizes the importance of self-evident background of human actions; it is this realm that we obtain the meaning and value of our activities, especially our daily ones. These two interpretations to life-world emphasize the different aspects of this word, but the difference of these two understanding models is not thoroughly clear defined. Both of them influence each other, and continually enrich the contents of the concept of life-world. For instance, Habermas has agreed Husserl's basic understanding of life-world which is the spatial-temporal structure. This structure is a framework for better understanding of the relationship among the objective, subjective and social worlds and human lives. It is this understanding that overcomes the limitations which exist in Kant's philosophy of subject.[25] Generally, there is "family resemblance" between these two understanding models of life-world: life-world is not an objective or concrete existence, but a trinity of subjective, objective and social worlds, an unity of nature and human beings(*tian ren he yi* in Chinese).

Husserl declares that "the formal and most general structures of the life-world: things and world on the one side, things-consciousness on the other".[26] That is to say, the life-world is formally the union of the consciousness and its objects. If we express this union in traditional philosophy, life-world is the organic union of objective worlds (including social worlds) and subjective world. In fact, Husserl occasionally talks of the society. However, he uses such terms to express the life-world: "surrounding world", "the world valid as existing for us", "world for all", "world for all actual and possible", "community of peoples",

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25 Jürgen Habermas, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction* (B. Fultner Trans.), Mass. : MIT Press, 2001, pp. 23–26.
26 Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p.142.

"our common world".[27] From these worlds we can infer that life-world also does not exclude the society itself. In order to highlight the social element of life-world, Husserl sometimes uses the whole of subjective realm to stand for life-world. As he points out: "... it is only by being in possession of the totality of the subjective sphere, in which man, the communities of men intentionally and internally bound together, and the world in which they live, are themselves included as intentional objects..."[28] If we identify human life with conscious activity, this activity must be actually an intentional one combining the subject or subjective world on one hand, and object or objective world on the other hand. The emphasis of organic union of subject and object, subjective world and external world is analogous to pragmatism advised by William James, which pays much attention to life, practice and efficiency. For example, William James has pointed out, human life experience itself is a stream of consciousness which dynamically connects with the objects; and for this reason, he calls this stream "immediate stream of life". [29] Superficially, objective life materials such as air, water, land are essential to our human life, and traditional philosophy has regarded these materials as objective reality out of human control, however, only when they should be or would be understood or recognized by human being, can they be meaningful or valuable to human being. As Marx has pointed out in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844:* "But *nature* too, taken abstractly, for itself – nature fixed in isolation from man – is *nothing* for man."[30] There is no abstract nature without human beings and no outer objective world without human activity. For the need of interpretation of the world, philosophers have used the concepts such as "subjective world", "objective world" and "social world", however, these concepts can be understood only in the course of life or human practices. It is in this sense that we can affirm that life-world is the trinity of subjective, objective and social worlds.

27 Ibid., p. 104, 109, 256, 259, 336.
28 Ibid., p. 263.
29 William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, New York: Longman Green and Co., 1912, p.74.
30 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto* (M. Milligan Trans.), New York: Prometheus Books, 1988, p. 165.

Husserl's grounding analysis to the concept of life-world has also influenced his followers. Schutz, the sociologist, interprets the life-world as a meaningful framework which is produced by human life and activities. Human activities are subjective, but, they cannot separate from objective world. "Objective world exists for me" by way of pure conscious life,[31] human subjective world is not independent of objective world, but they melts into a union. The activities of combining subjective world and objective world are not sole individual life, but intersubjective life. The world that the life concerns is a world that is shared by me and my partners and experienced and interpreted by us. The life in the world can be actually called social life, and all the phenomena of social life… belong to this life-world.[32] Every individual is always in a historically given world of nature, society and culture.[33] Here Schutz's emphasis on the subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity of life shows that he has regarded life-world as the trinity of subjective, objective and social worlds.

The uniformity of life-world is embodied in its inner structure, that is to say, the life-world is a union of culture, society and personality in the form of symbols, for example, the culture is embodied as the "cultural reservation" of objective world: the society is embodied as "interpersonal order" that should be abided by during the communicative courses; The formation of personality cannot be possible without the cultural influence and socialization of individuals. There is no sense talking of the personality of an insular person. Grounding life-world on such interpretations, Habermas emphasizes that communicative action oriented toward understanding by medium of language integrates the subjective, objective and social worlds into an interpretive framework, contrary to the communicative action, the cognitive-instrumental action, the normatively regulated action and expressive self-presentation concern respectively with only one or two of these worlds. This trinity framework of life-world provides a convictional stock for communicative action oriented toward understanding. In this way, to understand others is to understand other human life-world. From the context of their pre-interpreted life-world, speakers and

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31 Alfres Schutz, *Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality* (M. Natanson Ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, p.123.
32 Ibid., p. 121.
33 Ibid., p. 312.

hearers "refer simultaneously to things in the objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common definitions of the situation".[34] Habermas also has emphasized that "communicative actors are always moving within the horizon of their life-world; they cannot step outside of it".[35]

In traditional philosophy, every individual has his own will and his personality; he is his own subjective world. However, he cannot separate himself from objective world in the sense of traditional philosophy. It is because of his subjectivity that he is different from the animals and plants in the nature. At the same time he is a social being, so he cannot separate himself from the community or social world which consists of persons. There is no "Robinson Crusoe" in real life, even if he really lives in an isolated island, he should have an accompany named "Friday". It is impossible for someone to draw his hair to leave the earth, so is it for anyone to understand life-world without referring life itself. As pointed out by Husserl, modern metaphysics which originates from Descartes has defined the separation of subjective and objective worlds from the epistemological standpoint; this separation hastened the development of science and also led its crisis. The reason is that, natural scientists interpret the objective world by their own ideas. The objective world concerning human being or in another word, life-world is covered by "garb of ideas" in Husserl's words[36], and replaced by scientific world. By doing so, natural science has forgotten its meaning-fundament which should be understood from human life-world.

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36 Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 51.

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Salvatore Italia

DELETING INDIVIDUALITIES: HABERMAS' WORRY ABOUT AUTONOMY

1. Communicative Turn in Critical Theory

Jürgen Habermas' philosophy expresses well the relationships between culture and personal identity, which, by preserving the notion of free will, allow him to preserve a key notion for his philosophy — the notion of critique (social and political), which comes from autonomy. Habermas' first and main interest is in critical theory, and in particular in developing an approach to critical theory that aims at avoiding the narrowness of the past theories. Since Marx, and continuing through Adorno, critical theories expose social constructions with an emancipatory aim: what sometimes seems to be inevitable can be unmasked as depending on contingent and hidden interests. Criticism also makes possible the modification of those realities that turn out to be mere constructions with manipulatory purposes.

The main problem from Marx to Adorno, Habermas thinks, consists of considering subjects as separate from the intersubjective relationships in which they live. In this view, they are subjects *before* entering social relationship and cultures, so that they can criticise ideology, but only from the outside: they are not deeply related to the social and political system they live in. We can define ideologies as spread illusions of legitimacy that, to maintain power, hide a particular interest whose appearance would crumble the legitimacy that

people wrongly attribute to a particular situation.[1] Critical theories aim at dissolving illusions (ideologies) that, in turn, aim at controlling communication. An example of how ideology works can be found in George Orwell's *1984*, where Big Brother adjusts the telling of history to communicate the legitimacy of his power. This is why ideologies are authoritarian: an authority is authoritarian if it restricts free discussions, excluding a dogmatic (and legitimating) core from the realm of discussion.[2]

Critical theory is "critical" not only in a negative sense: after discovering and dissipating an ideology, it also aims at imposing a new and legitimate social order. Here arises the problem of creating social order (a legitimate one, not imposed through violence but by acceptance of the social order as valid) from individuals who share nothing but their own desire to see their interests safeguarded. This circumstance puts social order in a critical position of instability because if it is true that interests unite individuals, it is a temporary rapprochement, since interest is the least steady basis of society.[3] Interest is a bonding force that is *external* to individuals the subject relates to: Habermas searches, instead, for a more stable bonding force. He finds it in the force of good reasons, which bond people by *convincing* them. This agreement, reached through discourse (argumentation) animated by the normative idea of an ideal speech situation (aiming for maximum inclusiveness of people and themes, and equal respect for varying opinions), is at the core of Habermas' communicative critical theory: argumentation is the means of criticizing illegitimate powers and, simultaneously, the way to set up legitimate ones.

1 J. Habermas, *Theorie und Praxis. Sozialphilosophische Studien* (Luchterland: Neuwied-Berlin, 1963/78), pp. 307–335, here p. 311.
2 M. Cooke, "Avoiding Authoritarianism: On the Problem of Justification in Contemporary Critical Social Theory", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 13 (3), 2005, pp. 379–404, here pp. 382–383.
3 J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Surhkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 1981), II, pp. 176–177.

2. Social Order between Individuals and Society

Formulating the possibility of social criticism *from within* presupposes a conception of society as neither (1) the mysterious output of isolated subjects nor a (2) steel cage imposed from above on individuals. In the first case, the difficulty is in explaining how social integration would be possible—that is, how interactions based on mere reciprocal influence can consolidate (*verstetigen*) into laws.[4] In the second case, the difficulty is preserving an individual's autonomy (the ability to determine their own rules—that is, self-determination, the only source of legitimacy), while acknowledging that society, woven together by "networks of linguistically mediated interactions", is not encountered as an "external nature", accessible only to an observer, and so unchangeable.[5] In fact, individuals can also access social phenomena "from within"; this hermeneutic perspective is complementary to the external-observative one that is typical of social scientists who approach social interactions as *systems.*[6] The hermeneutic perspective is rather related to the *validity* of social relations, which in turn has to do with their origin as related to the "shared meaning" that participants in social interactions must share to reach mutual understanding (*Verständigung*) first, before looking for an agreement (*Einverständnis*).

Mead and Wittgenstein provide Habermas with the basis for the development of a "communicative theory of society".[7] In fact, the identity of meaning is the basis for social coordination and thus for social order: an hermeneutic perspective can encompass the prior phenomenon (accepting and stipulating same meanings) that creates what an observer can then perceive as system.

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4 J. Habermas. *Nachmetaphysisches Denken. Philosophische Aufsätze* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 1988), pp. 63–104, here p. 82.
5 Ibid, p. 84, See also Id., *Vorstudien und Ergänzugen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 1984), pp. 11–126. Maeve Cooke, "Habermas, Autonomy and the Identity of the Self", *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 18 (3–4), 1992, pp. 269–291, in the case of Habermas speaks of an identity of meaning between autonomy, self-determination, self-realisation and individuation, p. 272.
6 J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken*, cit., p. 84
7 Id., *Vorstudien und Ergänzugen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, cit., pp. 26–27 and 58. Using the same meaning is neither a coincidence nor a miracle. Id., *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, cit., II, p. 34–39 to see how Habermas integrates Mead and Wittgenstein.

The identity of meanings comes from the union of expectations that subjects have about a phenomenon. In this way, the shared meaning arises when *intersubjectivity* takes place. Meanings are neither outside nor inside the mind (prior to intersubjectivity); individuals find and create them by drawing close to each other. This notion protects the autonomy of individuals with their possibility to influence the process of meaning creation; at the same time, it put constraints on individuals because they do not have infinite ways to come to understanding, yet they have to consider the possible understanding of the partner of the interaction.[8]

If social order must be conceived as emerging from processes of consensus about the interpretation of reality (phenomena and needs), the problem arises regarding where can men find the resources for coming to the same interpretation of reality (understanding) as a basis for developing a consensus. This consensus is possible because the individuals who are engaged in an interactive search for it share the same "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*), a reserve of meanings on which they have a "previous agreement" made of "unquestioned certainties" that provide a "backing" that, being constantly nourished by shared experiences and feeding back on previous interpretations, absorbs the risk of a strong and insurmontable incommunicability, and subsequent disagreement.[9] In Habermas' view, social actors are part of a "circular process" in which the actor does not appear as the initiator, but as the product of (1) traditions, of (2) groups to which he belongs and of (3) processes of socialisation and learning.[10] In fact, Habermas identifies three components of a lifeworld: that is,

(1) cultural models;
(2) legitimate systems of norms;
(3) structures of personality.

8 J. Habermas, N. Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. Was leistet die Systemforschung?* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 1971).
9 J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken*, cit., pp. 85–86.
10 Ibid, p. 95.

They are all defined as "condensations and sedimentations" of communicative processes of agreement, action coordination and socialisation.[11] In particular:

- culture is defined as a reserve of knowledge for interpretations of situations;
- society as legitimate systems of norms that rule memberships;
- and structures of personalities as reasoning and abilities that are provided to the subjects with their own identity.[12]

The concept of society and social interaction, as conceived by Habermas, seems to strike the right balance between the priority of individual or of society, allowing social scientists to describe society from two perspectives, i.e., respectively the observative and the hermeneutic. In the hermeneutic approach, the social scientist is still an observer, but a "participant-observer" who, by participating in the same lifeworld, can understand reasons and meanings that are otherwise incomprehensible through mere observation.[13] This is because humans are both natural beings (characterised by physical behaviours that can be described as causal events) and cultural beings (acting based on reasons that originate from their culture). These reasons of action are linguistically shaped, according to Habermas, since humans think linguistically and language is a pragmatic and adaptative tool, adequate to its use-context. This fact, in turn, makes meanings (which, pragmatically, are also reasons for actions) contextual and explains why, to understand them, a social scientist has to participate in the same context (lifeworld) that he has to explain hermeneutically.[14]

To balance Habermas' notion of identity, on the one hand, and society and

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11 Ibid, p. 96.
12 Ibid, pp. 96–97.
13 Id., Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, cit., I, p. 168.
14 Here the distinction arises between explaining/describing and understanding as two mutually exclusive and complementary approaches. Habermas has developed a pragmatic theory of meaning, through the notion of speech act, that represents the double dimension of the human being (natural and cultural) through the compresence of illocutive and perlocutive sides in every speech act. If the illocutory effect is the agreement reached understanding the act — that is, understanding the sense we give

culture, on the other hand, the key is to find the *boundary* between a social determinism on the individual and a determinism of the individual on society: the first would lead again to ideology (imposing an order and restricting or manipulating individual autonomy), while the second would lead to the problem of explaining social order. The balance of these two types of determinism depends on the development of a complete concept of critical theory — that is, completed by both *pars destruens* and *pars construens*. If individual determinism is stronger than the social one, so the deconstruction of ideology can not be followed by the reconstruction of a legitimate society: how can subjects come to share identical meanings and so coming to an agreement? If social determinism is stronger, what ensures us that the new order is not a new ideology, as the individual has no freedom to check and influence it?

Individuals and society are not two systems that are external to each other: "communicatively socialised subjects" would not be subjects without the structure of social institutions and cultural traditions. Persons are symbolic structures, while their "natural substrate", "completely" symbolically structured, is experienced as their "own body".[15] By means of "interpretative performances", individuals preserve and innovate culture, while the latter can serve as a resource for people's identity construction: they build themselves by renewing and stabilising society.

The problem is the *completely symbolical character of identity*, which makes it dependent on culture and society. It is true that self-formation is a process of socialisation: I recognise the other as having the possibility of taking my place, but I recognise him as someone different from me. If identity is intersubjectively shaped, emancipation can not be an emancipation *from* society, but an emancipation *in* society, a redemption from a certain kind of isolation where ideological societies drive individuals. Only through a *pure* sociality individuals can develop identity and freedom.[16]

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to it by communicating a locutive content (illocutory effect/success 1) and accepting it (illocutory effect/success 2) — then perlocutory effects are *physical* effects, acting as contingent consequences of illocutory ones.

15 J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken*, cit., pp. 100–101.

16 By interpretating communication (and language) as made of speech acts, Habermas can link linguistic meaning to action meaning, and so he can link together communi-

In this way, the goal is the "rational foundation" of cultural prescriptions and social norms, where the validity of a norm is made conditional on a consensus reached through a "communication free from domain".[17] Habermas considers self-formation as a process of socialisation: I recognise the other with his possibility to take my place, but I recognise him as someone different from me. This process of "individualisation through socialisation" is available only in a community: infants do not develop into persons until they do not come to intersubjectively shared meanings.[18] In this vein, he thinks that identity can arise only at the intersubjective level — but self-identity then becomes a questionable "criterion of demarcation" (*Abgrenzungkriterium*).[19]

The way out from this empasse consists of aknowledging another type of constraint, different from the cultural one – the natural ones – as Habermas does in 2002. Here he reinforces the idea that nature is the substrate for the development of personal history that makes a person unique.[20] If a person was only the product of a socialization process which he/she undergoes, he/she would lose any reference to his/her *self*. Each one is determined also by abilities, qualities and predispositions that come from genetics.[21] In this way, Habermas seems to revise his original conception of the *completely* symbolic character of identity, which makes it dependent on culture and society (social world). This is Habermas late idea. Into the subject, manipulation of communication and genetic engineering attempt at controlling respectively the cultural and natural non-epistemic dimensions of his/her identity, that is the socialized and the natural aspect of it, whose *personality* make the subject original and autonomous (aknowledging his intentions as its own intentions).

cation and building society. See J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken*, cit., p. 64. I speak of pure society in the sense of a society that does not impose a model and let free the dialectic between social refusal and acceptance (of ideas and persons).

17 Id., *Erkenntnis und Interesse* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 1968), p. 344.

18 Id., *Nachmetaphysisches Denken*, cit., pp. 187–241.

19 J. Habermas, and N. Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie,* cit., pp. 216–217.

20 J. Habermas, *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion. Philosophische Aufsätze* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 2005) , pp. 187–215, p. 194.

21 J. Habermas, *Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik?* Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M., 2001/2002, pp. 80-114, here p. 105.

3. Saving Individuals: Free Will between Cultural and Natural Determinism

I have argued that to make criticism possible it takes a certain degree of autonomy, to allow people the possibility to become aware of ideological pressures and manipulations. Autonomy is linked to free will, so critical theory too is linked to it. This connection motivates Habermas' attempt to save free will from *determinist* attacks. Habermas refers to the Kantian concept of freedom as the possibility of self-determination, strictly related to autonomy. To be clear, free will is necessary for critical theory, but also for a concept of learning that is consistent with the interpretation of humans as free to learn and to make mistakes (fallibilism). As learning is necessary for critical theory (at least in its *pars destruens*), it is important to save this phenomenon. A reductionist view, like strong naturalism, is not able to explain what learning is because learning is a normative activity, one that can succeed or not; for this reason, a strong naturalist perspective is insufficient, even if it can show the biological basis of learning and how learning operates in its biological substrate. As Habermas observes, on neurological self-description, individuals become unintelligible as learners:

> "According to the neurological self-description of a 'dialogue of brains,' the researchers would no longer be able to understand what it means to correct theoretical hypotheses in light of better reasons, and would thus be unable to improve the state of their knowledge or even to seek out new knowledge. For knowledge and the growth of knowledge are irredeemably normative concepts that resist all attempts at empiricist redescription".[22]

22 J. Habermas, "The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will. How can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?", *Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action*, 10 (1), 2007, pp. 13–50, here p. 25. If knowledge and science aim at enlightment and emancipation, strong naturalism is an extreme perspective that loses the original and emancipatory possibilities of science, ibid., p. 42.

Free will is the most general kind of freedom because it involves the same possibility of conceiving of all other kinds of freedom.[23] Free will is the basis for responsibility, a feeling through which we take ownership for all our actions and decisions that we conceive of as free.[24] A sense of responsibility can be lost in both determinist and indeterminist conceptions. At the same time, *determinism* is a category that collects all those positions arguing for responsibility and free will's inexistence, since in this view everything is determined. *Indeterminism*, by contrast, suggests that events are not necessarily determined but only probable. The problem arises due to the casuality associated with actions, which runs against self-determination associated with free will and with the possibility of conceiving of reasons as having the same force of causes (normativity).

If under determinism we can not act differently (it can be causal, teleological or fatalistic determinism, but here I will refer to the first type), under indeterminism we do not control our choices and actions, which are completely random. Two paths are available here: *incompatibilism*, according to which free will and determinism are not compatible, forcing us to choose between them; and *compatibilism*, according to which a way for reconcilation is available.

This last is Habermas' route. The question is: how can we conceive of an action as both free (determined by only will) and determined by social or biological factors? Habermas thinks it is possible by way of a Kantian pragmatism that sees freedom and determinism as two complementary and inevitable *lexicons*, both useful to describe human life, and both of which we impose (*auferlegen*) on reality, globally considered. This is connected to the double character of human knowledge of human phenomena (accessible by both observation and understanding), as depending on the double character of humans as both cultural and natural beings. If determinists are right in saying that mental events are always associated with physiological events, the first can not be reduced to the latter, since the lexicon of free will makes us able to understand many so-

23 People can be free *of* or free *from* something; still, there is political, religious, economical freedom.
24 *Epiphenomenalism,* too, can take into consideration responsibility and will, but only as mere manifestation of the *real* reality — that is, made of nervous reactions to stimuli.

cial and human phenomena (associated with the normative dimension), such as the attribution of responsibility and social coordination by means of a system of faults and awards.

The possibility of a complementarity of two different and opposed perspectives is the result of the degree of development of our lifeworld, which allows people to take different approaches to the same phenomenon and, for example, to unite both a scientific and a daily-common-sense perspective on phenomena like decision, responsibility and free will. This fact answers the human need for a perspective able to maintain both the common-sense idea of the self and a coherent image of the universe that also includes man as natural being, subject to natural laws (causes).[25] Habermas' "weak naturalism" is presented as an attempt to integrate "free will into the whole of nature".[26] He looks for an answer to the ontological problem of naturalism—how to reconcile the *contingency* of our natural and historical evolution with the normativity we feel as members of a culture.[27] Habermas' answer is a "weak" naturalism (*schwache Naturalismus*), where compatibilism makes it possible to avoid a reductionist view like Quine's (defined as "strong" naturalism) that loses the meaning of actions as distinguished from behaviours and events:

> "The difficulty consists in the fact that the language games, terminologies, and explanatory models that we have to employ in such cases cannot be reduced to one another. Descriptions of persons and their thoughts or practices cannot be translated into behaviorist or physicalist terms without losing or changing their meaning. Every attempt at conceptual reduction fails in the face of the intersubjective constitution of a mind that is intentionally oriented towards the world, communicates

25 J. Habermas, *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., pp. 155–186, here p. 156.
26 Id., "The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will. How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?", cit., p. 17. Subjects who act freely, on the basis of reasons cannot "escape" from natural events, *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., p. 188.
27 Id., *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Philosophische Aufsätze*, (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 1999), p. 8.

via propositional contents, and is responsive to rules and standards of validity".[28]

This is the difference between behaviour and action; the first is described from an observer-perspective, while to understand actions we need to participate at the same cultural horizon of the agent under analysis. Actions, as normatives, can go wrong while behaviours simpy take place. In Habermas' perspective, causes and reasons are no longer conceived as two sides of the same coin (ontological dualism), but as two approaches that subjects (through their evolution) have developed to operate *on* subjects in the first case and *with* subjects in the second. The only way to preserve this useful dualism — which allows for operating on the same object (the other subject) both instrumentally and communicatively — is to consider it as the product of our view of reality, rather than as something existing independently from our ability to conceive it (non-epistemic). This is a kind of Kantian pragmatism (*Kantische Pragmatismus*), where our categories to approach, know, and see reality are subjected to a cultural and natural evolution.[29]

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Habermas' perspective seems to be that the distinction between mind and brain originates from the evolutionary history of human being — not from the *objective* side (as a mutation of human natural body), but from the *subjective* side (as a mutation that we, through our culture, can *create*). Evolution did not distinguish between brain and mind, but led humans to develop this distinction as two different approaches. The ineluctability of these two lexicons is not necessary but simply factual: evolution might have proceeded differently,

28 Id., "The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will. How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?", cit., p. 25. Against reductionism, Habermas thinks we have developed two "irreconciliable ontologies", Id., *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., p. 172.
29 The two lexicons (transcendental conditions) are now inserted in an evolutionary conception (in a way the Kantian one was not). Even if usually we see examples of instrumental action in daily contexts (strategic actions), according to Habermas this is possible only on the basis of a communicative framework that, e.g., makes lying possible. Attempts to reduce mental life to natural impulses that are instrumentally manipulatable (in their predictability) hides the dream of manipulating human life, Id., *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., p. 173.

leading maybe to three or more (or less) different possible approaches.[30] What makes Habermas' naturalism 'weak' is that in this approach he avoids the risk of assuming that the contingencies of what is necessary for us are the same as what is absolutely necessary — that is, the risk of identifying what we know here and now with how things really are (God's Eye Point of View).[31] This is why Habermas opts for a methodological dualism, rather than an ontological one.

How can this help with our question? How can we conceive of an action as both *free* (determined by only will) and *determined* (conceiving of will as caused by social or biological factors)? Habermas conceives of free will as endowed with its own causality, but free will is in the grip of both natural and social causes. This is why he distinguishes between the "absence of freedom" (*Un-freiheit*) as contraints from the outside and "freedom under condition" (*Freiheit unter Bedingungen*), where one can be free to choose among different ways to act but the choices are predetermined by the natural and bodily substrate of personality and by the lifeworld.[32] If it is easy to figure out how the natural body puts contraints on free will (genetic predispositions), the lifeworld restricts free will in a similar way: the reasons that are available to subjects in their particular culture to justify/motivate their choices and actions are not infinite and thus: "freedom [...] appears only in the deflationary form of a conditioned freedom, embedded in the context of reasons as they arise within the lifeworld".[33] This is because "in taking on the role of motives that are sufficient to explain an action, reasons acquire a causal effectiveness that they initially, as semantic content, lack".[34] If the actor had chosen a different model-reason-desire (available among those provided by his own culture), he would have wanted and acted differently.

30 Id., *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., p. 170.
31 Id., *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung*, cit., p. 34. Habermas post-metaphysical thinking is aimed at showing the post-modern awareness of finitude (fallibilism and contextualism) as opposed to metaphysical faith in the accessibility of a God's-Eye Point of View.
32 Id., *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., p. 161.
33 Id., "The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will. How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?", cit., p. 19.
34 Ibid., p. 16. "Only retrospective demands for reasons tend to reveal the unclear feelings, dispositions, preferences, and values that direct action pre-reflectively. These motives can be traced to moods, preferences, inclinations, and character traits that often merely express traditions, customs, and social norms", ibid., p. 18.

Whoever acts can conceive as a constraint the reasons coming from his character and history only if he steps out of himself and looks at his personal history as a natural event.[35] The constraints of reasons are therefore different from the constraints of natural causes, which can't be chosen or changed in the same way but only accepted/recognized. To be clear, there are pragmatic, ethical and moral reasons:

"Pragmatic reasons, based on current desires or given preferences, can become relativised by ethical reasons, which bring into play long-term interests. These can be trumped, in turn, by moral reasons. Ethical reasons have a broader temporal scope than pragmatic reasons but, like them, remain bound to the agent-relative perspective of what is good 'for me' or 'for us'. Moral and rights-based reasons are the only reasons that are directed at a decentered perspective of what is equally good (or just) "for all"".[36]

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Cultural influence on individuals takes the form of these constraints on the available reasons. It is not a tight influence, allowing people to choose among different (but not infinite) model of actions. What emerges from this perspective is that natural causes are somehow conceptually (but not existentially) submitted to cultural ones, to the extent that Habermas conceives of the first as "enabling conditions" (*ermöglichende Bedingungen*), waiting to be exploited by reasons.[37] In fact, Habermas thinks that humans think and feel only through the language they use to interact and, consequently, to create their own identities. This is because awareness of freedom is the awareness of participation in a space of reasons that others can understand and among which the subject can choose.

35 Id., *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., p. 161 and 196–197. M. Cooke, 'Habermas, Autonomy and the Identity of the Self', cit., p. 274, stresses that Habermas's concept of "recognition" here does not imply "agreement" but only understanding. In fact, "what is recognised is not the rightness of what the autonomous self does or says but its willingness to accept responsibility for what it does or says", ibid., p. 286.
36 Id., "The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will. How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?", cit., 18.
37 Id., *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., p. 164. Social relationships are like a *second* nature, ibid., p. 189.

Can this double form of constraints be associated with freedom? According to Habermas, it depends on the existence of something like consciousness, a coordinating centre of human personal identity and history; however, it has to be conceived as *osmotic* (that is, socially built), whose boundaries are redesigned with the individual social living. In particular, according to Habermas, if we can aknwoledge the power of society on the brain, we also have another step to make: acknowledging the feedback of the subject on society and so ensuring his freedom, which can be exploited to change his own identity-possibilities, or the cultural models among which he can choose his reasons, will, and identity. This can be done only indirectly, i.e., by operating on society and hoping to change it as a means to change culture and therefore the influences on the individual's own identity. This is exactly what critical theory wants to preserve — the possibility for subjects and societies to change cultural pressure that otherwise would be conceived of as ideological (dogmatic and immutable).

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Free will is a presupposition of our social life, but one that has to be conquered every day so that we can participate in social life with a personal contribution and not feel the burden of being ineluctably socially built. In particular, people born assuming the available models but growing up as subjects can reflexively feed back on their culture, exerting a critical pressure on it.

It is only in the public sphere that a subject can *show* his freedom, where he is accountable for the reasons of his actions;[38] it is only in the public sphere that a subject can *be* free, where there is a dynamic of negotiation of (at least social) constraints. However, Habermas also fears for the future of human *nature*, that is its disappearance from influencing the public realm. In fact, if a person was only the product of an educational socialization his self would get out of hand, disappearing into the vortex of influences and relationships;[39] there is a natural body too, that is supposed to work as both a constraint and a source of renewal for the cultural and symbolic formation of personality. Its disappearance would also lead to the disappearance of the individual self. It is

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38 Free actions have to be explained by referring to an intention based on reasons. This can show the subject's responsible authorship of the choice, *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., pp. 191–192.
39 J. Habermas, *Die Zukunft der Menshlichen Natur*, cit., p. 103.

from the body that the subject can take the innovative resources to innovate and influence society.

The game of these two sources of influence on free will makes the individual autonomous because they make him free: through socialization he can choose among the natural pressures he feels as coming from its bodily side; through his bodily side he can choose which social influences are apt (or are not) to its own particular personality. Still, through his socialization side of influence on his personal growth, he can feed back on its own natural desires (by restricting those judged as unacceptable) and through his bodily side he can push new ideas into the social realm. From these new ideas the social sphere can be innovated so to fit better the needs of the individuals. Without one of the two poles, the internal dialectic between social and natural influence would crumble, leading it to the distruction of the individual autonomy as a centre of mediation (by making the subject completely subjected to either society or nature). So, without a dialectic of internal/external (necessary for an autonomous Self) also the dialectic between individuals and society would be compromised.

4. Culture and Individuals, Culture and Nature: Couples of Mutual Influence

Thus far, I have shown how culture relates to identity construction, but also how the latter is not completely constructed, depending on natural influences too (natural causes) that are complementary to social ones. Finally, I have mentioned how identity relates to culture in a positive (and not just parasitic) way: entering into public space individuals innovate it by bringing new desires into the public sphere, where they can be seen and publicly discussed.[40] This innovation is particularly evident in modern societies, characterised by "deliberative democracy" (mirroring their evolutionary degree of emancipation from traditions and religious pressures).[41]

40 New desires and ideas can come from imagination or from intercultural exchanges.
41 Habermas sketches the history of the evolution of political forms mostly in *Struk-*

What is at stake now is the possibility for culture to feed back on nature. In fact, Habermas here acknowledges that the mind is part of a natural history where the "universe […] includes humankind as part of nature".[42] In fact, "Even if the complementarity interlocking of epistemic perspectives is part of the constitution of socio-cultural forms of life, everything speaks for the assumption that our forms of life, like other animal forms of life, are the result of natural evolution'".[43] However, "Since we can not escape *the epistemic primacy* of the linguistically articulated horizon of the lifeworld, *the ontological priorit*y of language-independent reality can make itself heard in our learning processes only by imposing *constraints* on our practices and by indirectly steering us via the interplay of construction and experience".[44] We can conceive the lifeworld as our specific orientation modality into the natural world.

Culture can feed back on nature, in particular on environment. This has to be conceived as part of the *nature-universe*, which in turn may be conceived of as the indefinite sum of all environments that are external to our own perspectival environment (including our own). An environment can be defined as the realm of potential actions for each living species.[45] It depends, on the one hand, on constraints posed by other environments (natural selection) and is in that sense independent from us. On the other hand, environment also depends on our cultural or ecological intervention (niche construction). These two sides are related because "products, resources, and habitats that [...] organisms construct [...] constitute fundamental components of their

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turwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Ge-sellschaft* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 1962). An analysis of the characters of delibe-rative democracy is provided in *Faktiztät und Geltung. Beiträge zu Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., 1992).

42 Id., "The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will. How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?", cit., p. 37. "The epistemic subject does not simply encounter the world but also knows itself to be one entity among others in the world", ibid, p. 23.

43 Ivi.

44 Ibid, p. 39.

45 J. T. Sanders, "An Ontology of Affordances", *Ecological Psychology*, 9 (1), 1997, pp. 97–112, here p. 108.

world and those of *other* species".[46] In other words, a species's niche construction processes constitute natural selection forces for other species.

To be clear, I use "natural selection" in a "non-selectionist" way, rejecting "environmental determinism", the idea that the environment as an independent variable supplies a set of possibilities (or ecological niche) to which we must conform in an adaptive way[47]. This traditional selectionist view, "best captured in the metaphor of adaptation", forgets that animals' "utilisation, destruction and creation [of elements of their respective environments] are central elements in evolutionary dynamics", so that "animals do not evolve so as to fit in a pre-existing environment".[48] If an environment does not preexist the animals to which it is linked through the notion of *affordances* (defined as relations between the abilities of organisms and features of the environment), it remains the case that other environments do (*nature-universe*).

The notion of affordance was first coined by J. J. Gibson, to describe what the environment offers the animal as a possibility, either good or bad. If a species disappears, the affordances linked to it (whose sum constitute its environment) also vanish; the same is not true for *other* environments or for "geological and hydrological processes [that] can also alter the affordances in an animal habitat".[49] Affordances owe their existence to the existence of a species able to perceive and exploit them, while their exploitability depends on the appearance of an intention.[50] The gap between intentions and affordances (what is available for intentions accomplishment) can be bridged by human niche construction: animals can alter the environment "in order to change what it

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46 R. L. Day, K. N. Laland and J. Odling-Smee, "Rethinking Adaptation: The Niche--Construction Perspective", *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, 46 (1), 2003, pp. 80–95, here p. 87, italics mine. It is important to stress that niche construction also holds for plants.
47 A. Costall, "Darwin, Ecological Psychology, and the Principle of Animal Environment Mutuality", *Psyke & Logos*, 22 (2), 2001, pp. 473–484, here p. 478.
48 R. Withagen and M. V. Wermeskerken, "The Role of Affordances in the Evolutionary Process Reconsidered: A Niche Construction Perspective", *Theory Psychology*, 20 (4), 2010, pp. 489–510, here pp. 489–490.
49 Ibid, p. 503. See J. J. Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1979).
50 T. A. Stoffregen, "Affordances as Properties of the Animal-Environment System", *Ecological Psychology* 15 (2), 2003, pp. 115–134, here pp. 125–126.

affords them".[51] In the case of humans, this niche construction process happens mostly through the use of language as a powerful instrument of intentions formation, communication and realisation. Language is the cultural instrument humans use to change their own environment. When affordances do not allow us to realise an intention, we begin to think about different solutions in order to realise our goals. Our thoughts are linguistically and culturally shaped, so that is language that allows us to feed back on culture and then on nature. In a few words, we can say that human niche construction operates mostly through *culture*—that is, through sociality and linguistic communication (following Habermas' idea that primarily language is there for communication).[52]

In light of this, affordances are the connectors between cultural and linguistic human activity and external reality, always linguistically and culturally perceived. External reality reveals its unavailability when it does not allow change to happen (at least at the present time), showing a resistance from a dimension that does not depend on us. For example we can not force water to be XZY rather than H2O. This circumstance depends on something that is external and independenf from us, not in our power, – what I have called *nature-universe* — and exists prior to an environment. It is worth to remind that culture too can avoid some change to happen (from the individual's perspective), providing a different kind of resistance. Cutures and societies (respectively through traditions and institutions) save "good" reasons that can change when circumstances change but that we also face when we try to establish new standards of evaluation or to change social order.[53]

When there is a cultural change it is *learning* that takes place. It can happen both for internal and external effects. In the first case "the change [...] is a direct result of the act of articulating certain points of view", while in the other, "the change [...] comes about as a result of things that happen independently of that situation".[54] In fact, such a change can be brought about "argumentatively, as

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51 T. Kono, "Social Affordances and the Possibility of Ecological Linguistics", *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 43 (4), 2009, pp. 356–373, here p. 366.
52 J. Habermas, *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, cit., pp. 15–16, here p. 19.
53 J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisces Denken II. Aufsätze und Repliken*, (Suhrkamp:, Frankfurt am Main, 2012), p. 73.
54 M. Cooke, "Violating Neutrality? Religious Validity Claims and Democratic Legiti-

when we are swayed by the arguments of others", or through "non-argumentative experiences, which make us receptive to these arguments".[55] But what does learning means here?

I am referring to "socio-cultural learning". According to Maeve Cooke, learning is a phenomenon that can take place on three levels. There is a technical learning, which refers to "gains in knowledge for a pre-defined purpose"; a personal learning, when "it refers to beneficial changes in the self-understandings of the participants, and in their assignments of meaning and value"; and finally, there is a socio-cultural learning, which "refers to beneficial changes in the prevailing standards of what constitutes beneficial change on the second level – in other words, to a beneficial transformation of the very standards according to which changes in individual participants' perceptions, interpretations and evaluations are deemed changes for the better".[56]

In this way, it is possible conceiving learning as the linguistic-connecting activity among the individual, the cultural and the external-natural dimension, as a chain of dialectic interactions between culture (providing all the intentions the self finds as socially accepted), nature (the self's natural predispositions) and the individual, which is both the object and the subject of all these processes of mutual influences.

5. Conclusion

I have shown how critical theory is better conceived under communicative dresses (1); I have also highlighted that critical theory's concern is to legitimate social order. To make it possible, we need to conceive humans as free (3). However, a coherent image of freedom can not be without aknowledging both

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macy", in C. Calhoun, E. Mendieta, J. Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Habermas and Religion*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 249–274, p. 259.

55 M. Cooke, "The Limits of Learning: Habermas' Social Theory and Religion", *European Journal of Philosophy*, (2014) (Early View, Online Version of Record published before inclusion in an issue) pp. 1–18, p. 8. She says that "the internal/external distinction is analytic. Since the causes of perceptual shifts are multiple and complex, such a distinction is rarely possible in practice" (ibid.)

56 M. Cooke, "Argumentation and Transformation", *Argumentation*, 16 (1) (2002), pp. 79–108, p. 83.

social and natural determinism (4), so the point for critical theory is to play a role into the dialectic dynamic between freedom and determinism, choice and acceptance, identity and socialization.

If it is true that culture emerges along the course of natural evolution, culture can also feed back on nature. Environment and identity, as *partially* cultural dependent, are Janus-faced (cultural and natural at the same time). These two poles have a shape that is prior of culture but that is heavily influenced by culture. Culture can feed back on nature, but nature—both mental and environmental—is not completely constructed and determinable by culture. If inside men there is biological and chemical resistance, outside there are constraints that other environments provide our own with, together with the resistence of the physical structure of reality.[57] This is how nature can negatively feed back on culture and on individuals, by putting constraints that we can not help but taking into consideration in the development of our self.

110   As individual identity is also culturally and socially shaped, and as free will can assert itself only in the public sphere, so democracy is the only way to raise and preserve differences and to allow them to have a role in decision-making (by means of argumentation). Democracy is thus the only way to influence natural constraints in a non-ideological. Only democratic processes can drive cultural feedbacks on nature in a way that retain both the individual experience of free will and the responsibility towards our destiny as social and natural beings. Democracy, by allowing criticism, responsibility, and an autonomous contruction of the self (which also entails recognition of what is unchangeable about us), seems to play a central role in this dynamic of natural and cultural feedbacks.

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57 E.g., we cannot modify the boiling point of water.

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Boško Pešić - Martina Ivanko

PARRHESIA AS ALETHURGIC PRACTICE

1. Introduction

Few words depend on the time of utterance as much as the concept of *parrhesia*.[1] Because of that dependence, and especially on the time of the now, parrhesia is a particular way of speaking. It is insofar an undelayable speech in which the one who speaks, tells the truth, but that truth is at the same time necessarily an expression of his opinion or attitude. The concept of parrhesia is semantically related to the ancient Greek verb παρρησιάζομαι, as well as the noun παρρησίαστής. In the beginning, when it appeared in the Greek thinkers' works, it was related to democracy, and only later to the action within the autocratic form of government.

Although it is possible to speak about parrhesia after the period of ancient Greece, it is in its true sense a substantially Greek concept, which refers to the action in the *polis*, the political action. Michel Foucault defines it as "the courage of the truth in the person who speaks and who, regardless of everything, takes the risk of telling the whole truth that he thinks, but it is also the interlocutor's courage in agreeing to accept the hurtful truth that he hears".[2]

1 The word *parrhesia* is of Greek origin and literally translated means "to say everything" (παρρησία; from παν, everything and ρημα, that which is said). It is translated also as free speech or open speech, and it appears for the first time in Euripides' plays *The Phoenician Women*, *Hippolytus*, *The Bacchae*, *Electra*, *Ion*, and *Orestes*. Cf. more on that in: Michel Foucault, *Fearless speech*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles 2001, p. 12.
2 Michel Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2011, p. 13.

2.

In *Fearless Speech* Foucault states that the first characteristic of parrhesia, i.e. the parrhesiast, is frankness. The parrhesiast is the one "who says everything he has in mind."[3] A definition of this kind is doubtful because Foucault also distinguishes two kinds of parrhesia. There is parrhesia in the negative sense, which is affirmed as early as in Plato's *The Republic* and *Phaedrus*. Parrhesia understood in the negative or pejorative sense is not at all different from "chattering", saying everything one has in mind, and it characterizes the bad form of democracy, in which everyone thinks they have the right to say anything at all to their fellow citizens, regardless of its importance, harmfulness to the city-state[4] and, lastly, even truthfulness. The second kind of parrhesia, the one Foucault talks about, is a sort of open and risky speech, which is at the same time a criticism of the real state of affairs, most often presented in the way it is not. The fundamental characteristic of parrhesia in the antiquity is the correspondence of truth uttered by the parrhesiast and that what he truly thinks. When it is said that the parrhesiast is telling the truth, it means that he "says what is true because he *knows* that it *is* true; and he *knows* that it is true because it is really true."[5] Therefore, parrhesia can also be defined as true discourse, but truth is not an epistemological problem for Foucault. His concept of *episteme*, which will be discussed, has little to do with comprehending what cognition is in the history of philosophy. The object of Foucault's interest is not the problem of truth itself, but the problem of truth-telling as a kind of activity and the problem of the one telling the truth. Thus, Foucault distinguishes two questions and two methodologies which link the Greek and the modern age Western thinking. The first question is about the certainty of the process of considering truthfulness, and it is at the same time the basis of the thinking of Western civilization, which Foucault calls the "analytics of truth".[6] The second question is about who tells the truth, which entails other questions: the one about the importance of the individual who utters that truth for the

3 M. Foucault, *Fearless speech*, p. 12.
4 Ibid., p. 13.
5 Ibid., p. 14.
6 Michel Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, Antibarbarus, Zagreb 2010, p. 28.

society, and the one about the importance of telling the truth which Foucault, unlike the "analytics of truth," classifies into the so-called "critical" tradition, which raises the question of present reality.[7] Foucault founds his thinking in the "critical" tradition and attempts to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude of Western philosophy.

In accordance with the said, Foucault distinguishes between the epistemological analysis of the truth structure and the alethurgic form.[8] The emphasis is on the subject's constitution of the self as the subject in front of others, but even more importantly, in front of himself.[9] That is the reason why Foucault in *The Government of Self and Others* highlights that parrhesia should be looked for in "the effect that its specific truth-telling may have on the speaker, in the possible backlash on the speaker from the effect it has on the interlocutor".[10] The basis of this problem presents the relation of the subject and truth through which its discursive forms, i.e. the total practice of the happening of truth and the truth of the subject as such, are brought into the domain of the reviewable. The alethurgic practice of this kind actually rests on the importance of the principle of truthful speaking about the self as the assumption of thorough care for singularity.

Characteristics of parrhesiasts can inasmuch correspond to the characteristics of different persons telling the truth, although these persons still cannot be called parrhesiasts. In parrhesia, namely, there is often a relation of the superordinate and the subordinate. The parrhesiast addresses a sovereign, e.g. a tyrant, and tells him the truth about his terror. In doing so, the parrhesiast risks his life because often the tyrant cannot stand listening to an unpleasant truth about his form of government. It is not necessary that the parrhesiast's

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7 Ibid.

8 *Alethurgia* (αλετηουργια) is Foucault's neologism, which marks "the production of truth" or "the act through which truth manifests," the manifestation of truth. In other words, alethurgia is the analysis of the conditions of that kind of act through which the subject manifests itself by telling the truth, presenting it to himself, while others acknowledge his truthfulness. Cf. more on that in: M. Foucault, *Hrabrost istine*, Sandorf & Mizantrop, Zagreb 2015, p. 13.

9 Ibid.

10 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2011, p. 56.

interlocutor be a sovereign. It could also be his friend, completely equal to the parrhesiast, but once again the emphasis is on danger because the parrhesiast could make his friend angry, and in that way put their friendship at risk.[11] Thus, parrhesia is related to courage. Telling the truth demands courage of the one doing so. That is why Foucault emphasizes that sovereigns or gods cannot be parrhesiasts because they do not risk anything.[12] In the relation between the parrhesiast and his interlocutor a certain kind of game is established, which Foucault calls the game of parrhesia. Besides playing that game, the game of life and death, with himself, the parrhesiast is also playing it with his interlocutor, e.g. a tyrant. The game of parrhesia is a kind of pact between the parrhesiast, i.e. the one who takes the risk of telling the truth, and the one who agrees to listen to it.[13] Foucault also uses the term the parrhesiastic pact and says that "if he wishes to govern properly, the one with power must accept that those who are weaker tell him the truth, even the unpleasant truth."[14] Therefore, a twofold relation is established in the game of parrhesia. The parrhesiast takes the risk of angering another person by telling the truth, and it requires communication or a relation. But the parrhesiast values telling the truth more than a safe and peaceful life without the spoken truth. Thus, the parrhesiast values the relationship with himself more than with others, because he prefers himself as the one telling the truth, rather than the one not being true to himself, and so to others as well.[15] Since the parrhesiast directs his objection at the tyrant, parrhesia can also be defined as a distinctive criticism. But that does not mean that every criticism is parrhesia.

The goal of parrhesia is not to provoke the interlocutor, but simply to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, so that it corresponds to all attitudes of the one telling it, because otherwise there could be no parrhesia. Parrhesia always concerns duty as well. The speaker who tells the truth to those who cannot accept it is still not a parrhesiast because he has a choice to keep it for himself.[16]

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11 M. Foucault, *Fearless speech*, p. 16.
12 Ibid.
13 M. Foucault, *Hrabrost istine*, p. 22.
14 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 163.
15 M. Foucault, *Fearless speech*, p. 17.
16 Ibid., p. 19.

The parrhesiast's criticism of a friend is a duty of helping the friend become better, and his criticism of a sovereign is a duty to his own *polis*. According to all of the said, "*parrhesia* is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty."[17] Foucault goes on to say that the parrhesiast uses his freedom and chooses frankness, not persuasion. He chooses "truth instead of falsehood or silence" and the risk of death rather than life and security. He chooses criticism "instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy," which is, unlike its negative meaning, parrhesia in the true sense of the word.[18]

3.

It was already said that parrhesia presents a relation between the subject and the truth he tells, which is at the same time his truth, his opinion, and his attitude, so in that way the parrhesiast also establishes a relationship with himself. That relationship could be called the care of the self. Foucault gives an example of the Delphic oracle, at the entrance of which it says γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, and highlights that the inscription is misinterpreted, as many ancient Greek texts and fragments are. When one says "know yourself," the relation between the subject and truth is emphasized,[19] and that could be an epistemological approach, which does not interest Foucault. But it can also be an instruction for man's relationship with god, as a distinctive principle by which man always has to be conscious of his mortality and that he has to act accordingly to the kind of being he is, not allowed to defy gods nor ask too much of them when he comes in the Delphic oracle.[20] Foucault relates the phrase γνῶθι σεαυτὸν rather to Socrates. There is something in its very base, and that is ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ, the already mentioned care of the self. Ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ has an atti-

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17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 20.
19 Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of Subject*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005, p. 3.
20 Ibid., p. 4.

tude "towards the self, others and the world," but in a way that it is also a form of attention directed at its own thinking, and it is closely related with exercise, practice or meditation (μελέτη).[21] Ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ is the basis of what γνῶθι σεαυτὸν really means and is inseparable from it, because to know oneself defines and is defined by the attention we direct at the care of the self and with the care of the self.[22]

In Plato's *The Apology of Socrates*, for example, Socrates defends himself in court against the charge of corrupting the youth of Athens, saying he would change nothing and would always encourage others to take care of themselves and practice philosophy.[23] Socrates takes the role of the parrhesiast who helps others in becoming better in the care of the self. It is a command[24] he received from the gods to help people pay attention to themselves. Elsewhere Foucault gives a second definition of parrhesia as "a virtue, duty, and technique which should be found in the person who spiritually directs others and helps them to constitute their relationship to self."[25] Therefore, the parrhesiast does not only have the established relationship with himself, even though that is primary. The parrhesiast is most often "the other" who speaks truthfully. In the care of the self, in establishing the relation to oneself, therefore, a different judgment is needed which could prove helpful. Foucault highlights that in such a case a respectable and mature person to whom parrhesia gives a sound personal integrity[26] should be discussed and that "truth-telling by the other, as an essential

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21 Ibid., p. 10–11.
22 M. Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, p. 45.
23 Plat. *Apol.* 29d2–29e1, as quoted in: Platon, *Obrana Sokratova*, Demetra, Zagreb 2000, p. 91.
24 A question is raised here on how is it possible to speak of Socrates as the parrhesiast telling the truth and helping others, because he was ordered to do so by the gods. But that is still possible because one of the basic characteristics of parrhesia is duty. Duty in a way that Socrates would do the same, no matter if it came from the gods or from him. Although it seems that such an argument would go in favor of the person who is not a parrhesiast, but is trying to present himself as such, by following orders of a man superior to him, it is still necessary to notice that in this case it is certainly not about parrhesia. The alleged truth, namely, which a man who is ordered to utter, and who would utter it, would not be his personal attitude, his personal truth, which is at the same time also truth in general.
25 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 43.
26 M. Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, p. 46.

component of how he governs us, is one of the essential conditions for us to be able to form the right kind of relationship to ourselves that will give us virtue and happiness".[27] According to all of the said, Socrates is a parrhesiast because he speaks truthfully and believes what he is telling to be true because it is indeed true. Thus he has the relationship established with himself and encourages others to take care of themselves by realizing a relationship with themselves. Plato compares Socrates to a gadfly, an insect that aggravates animals, because by encouraging and almost compelling man to take care of himself, he presents the care which is, as the care of the self, a special kind of discomfort in man, in his existence, which compels him forth[28] and that is what Foucault calls the continuous concern or constant care.

4.

Parrhesia was primarily related to politics, and in accordance with that, there are two forms of political parrhesia. The first is the political parrhesia as a political act in Athenian democracy, as witnessed as early as in Euripides' plays, and the play *Ion* is completely dedicated to the question of the relationship among parrhesia, individual, and democracy. The second form of political parrhesia occurs when democracy weakens and monarchies become stronger during the Hellenistic period. Parrhesia is no longer practiced in the agora, but in the royal court, and such parrhesia is at the root of the relationship between the sovereign and his advisor.[29]

Athenian democracy is the government of *demos* (δῆμος), people or free citizens. In a broad sense it is a defined arrangement or constitution (πολιτεία) in which free people practice *isonomia* (ἰσονομία, equality of all citizens in participation in governance), *isegoria* (ἰσηγορία, equality of right to speak, right to take the floor) and parrhesia, which is what Polybius, a Greek historian of the Hellenistic period, mentiones in *The Histories*, where he defines the Achaean system of government as exemplary and states that isegory and parrhesia are

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27 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 45.
28 Plat. *Apol.* 30e1–6.
29 M. Foucault, *Fearless speech*, p. 22.

the basic elements of Achaean democracy, while isonomy is included in the general concept of democracy.[30] But what is the difference between parrhesia and isegory? Isegory is, namely, a statutorily determined right to speak, that is to say, in the function of city-state organization (*politeia* as a framework which defines citizens' status and their rights)[31] everyone has the right to speak their mind. Parrhesia is a way of speaking, but it is not statutorily determined, so not everyone can be a parrhesiast. Because of isegory in a *politeia*, either good or bad parrhesia is possible. The bad parrhesia is the above-mentioned negative parrhesia and, because everyone has the right to speak their mind, it can be realized by every citizen. The good parrhesia, the first and true kind of the so-called political parrhesia, is harder to realize because it is "what ensures the appropriate game of politics"[32] and "a hinge between *politeia* and *dunasteia*, between the problem of the law and the constitution on the one hand, and the problem of the political game on the other."[33] Thus, isegory is only an institutional framework which enables parrhesia to be a free activity of remarkable individuals, who take the floor and strive to direct others, all for the benefit of the city-state.[34] Therefore, the goal of political parrhesia is to arrange the balance between *dunasteia* (δυναστεία, governance, power, governing) and *politeia*. Problems related to political parrhesia arise here. These are problems of *politeia* as an arrangement and problems of *dunasteia* as the game of politics.[35] Politics is understood as a certain practice "having to obey certain rules, indexed to truth in a particular way, and which involves a particular form of relationship to oneself and to others on the part of those who play this game".[36] In order to explain this problem more clearly, Foucault provides an example of the rectangle of parrhesia. Democracy, which gives all citizens equality and freedom of speech, is at the first corner of the rectangle.[37] It is clear from the above-mentioned that the concept of democracy also includes concepts

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30 Polybius, *The Histories*, Oxford University Press, New York 2010, p. 106.
31 M. Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, p. 145.
32 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 159.
33 Ibid.
34 M. Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, p. 145.
35 Ibid., p. 146.
36 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 158.
37 M. Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, p. 157.

of isonomy and isegory. Democracy is at the same time a formal condition needed to realize parrhesia. "The game of ascendancy and superiority" is at the second corner.[38] As a factual condition, it enables those taking the floor and speaking to be listened to and to persuade others, in that way managing them and increasing the prosperity of the *politeia*. The third corner is defined as truth-telling, the already mentioned characteristic of parrhesia, the same as the fourth corner, which is courage. The final two corners make for the truthful condition, i.e. the truth condition and the moral condition.[39] This symbolic rectangle of parrhesia makes it clear that democracy in ancient Greece was a condition of parrhesia, or at least the above-mentioned political parrhesia. Parrhesia did not make sense without democracy, and vice versa. Parrhesia was at the root of the democratic government. If there were no truthful speech, democracy would not be possible as well. Therefore, the said circularity is necessary, so Foucault defines political parrhesia as "an element which, within this necessary framework of the democratic *politeia* giving everyone the right to speak, allows a certain ascendancy of some over others".[40] Political parrhesia allows individuals to speak their minds, but only to say what they really think is true, so with such a speech and advice they could persuade the people and govern the city-state more easily.

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The weakening of democracy in ancient Greece brought about the rise of the autocratic form of government. Parrhesia and the game of parrhesia no longer took place in the agora among citizens. The monarch's court became the place of parrhesia. The game of parrhesia took place between the monarch and his advisor or teacher, and it is very important to emphasize that the advisor had to be a philosopher. Philosophy did not play a key role in democracy because truthful speaking, even as the relationship toward the self and others, always had the political, governing the *polis* as the goal. It is no longer about a morality exercise or the influence of some over others in order to realize a true government, but about philosophy.[41] As an example of parrhesia in the

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 157.
41 Nancy Luxon, *Crisis of Authority. Politics, Trust, and Truth-Telling in Freud and Foucault*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2013, p. 147.

autocratic governance Foucault uses Plato's *The Seventh Letter*, in which Plato describes his three visits to the court of Syracuse and the tyrant Dionysius.

In Plato's most important political works,[42] when he is dealing with who and how should govern, philosophy always takes center stage. Philosophy and upbringing make for the foundation of every city-state. Philosophers or those who know and practice philosophy are the ones who should intervene when it is about the city-state governance. The said is affirmed as early as at the beginning of *The Seventh Letter*, in which Plato expresses his discontent due to the bad governance in all city-states at the time: "And so, when praising true philosophy, I was forced to claim that it enables the knowledge of all that is just in public and private life. Thus, mankind will not free itself of trouble until either true and right representatives come to state power or those in power by some divine providence become true philosophers."[43] Plato goes on in *The Seventh Letter* to describe his three visits to Syracuse, to the tyrant Dionysius' court. The second visit is particularly important because Dion, Dionysius' relative, who was hated among the blinded Dionysius' subjects, what Plutarch also testifies to,[44] invited him to teach the tyrant philosophy, in order to improve the state governance. The said teaching is not only a lecture on a specific subject of knowledge. In Plato's case it is about *psychagogy* (ψυχαγωγία). The goal of the philosopher-advisor, who is at the same time the parrhesiast because he is taking a risk by speaking the truth that the sovereign may not like, is to advise the sovereign-student and teach him philosophy because, according to Plato, that is the only way for him to become a true sovereign. The advisor's goal is not to advise on how to govern. In his lectures on parrhesia in the autocratic governance, Foucault highlights that philosophy is not politics. Philosophy and politics are in a necessary relationship, but it is impossible to consider them identical.[45] "Philosophical discourse in its truth, in the game it necessarily plays with politics in order to find its truth, does not have to plan what political action should be. It does not tell the truth of political action, it does not

42 *The Republic*, *The Statesman*, *The Seventh Letter*, and *The Laws*.
43 Plat. *Epist. VII*, 326a.
44 Plutarch, *Plutarch's Lives VI; Dion and Brutus, Timoleon and Aemilius Paulus*, William Heinemann LTD, London 1954, p. 17.
45 M. Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, p. 257.

tell the truth for political action, it tells the truth in relation to political action, in relation to the practice of politics, in relation to the political personage."[46] Therefore, the advisor would always help the sovereign by pointing out things the sovereign could not see, in that way acting as his signpost and enabling him to realize the relationship with himself and others. Plato always thinks truth-telling as philosophical truth-telling.[47] Similar to Socrates' action and the Cynics' life, Plato thinks philosophy and parrhesia find their reality in practice, so Foucault highlights: "Philosophical truth-telling is not political rationality, but it is essential for a political rationality to be in a certain relationship, which remains to be determined, with philosophical truth-telling, just as it is important for a philosophical truth-telling to test its reality in relation to a political practice."[48] The above-mentioned clearly constitutes the relation of parrhesia, philosophy and politics. That relation is necessary, but it is not the same as in the democracy of ancient Greece, where parrhesia conditioned democracy and vice versa. The one in power has to practice philosophy, but it does not mean that philosophy determines the way of governance. Philosophy is a factor perfecting the individual, enabling him a stable relationship with himself and others in order to improve the political action. It is about an overlap of subjects, and not of politics and philosophy.[49] The subject is the same, the one in power and the one practicing philosophy, which helps him improve his governance. Therefore, the essence of Plato's psychagogy is to shape the sovereign's soul to make him better in his political action, but also in life generally. That is why the game of parrhesia in the autocratic governance takes place in the sovereign's soul, and not his court or agora. In that way the whole state regime is the subject of the philosopher's intervention. In what way does the philosopher-advisor-parrhesiast shape the sovereign's soul? "Philosophy can only address itself to those who want to listen."[50] So, the first circle is the circle of listening. The second is the circle of learning, and the third is the circle of practice. The sovereign or the one yet to govern has to practice philosophy in

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46 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 288.
47 N. Luxon, *Crisis of Authority*, p. 147.
48 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 288.
49 M. Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, p. 266.
50 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 235.

his reality. Foucault highlights three necessary abilities of the learner. The first is εὐμαθής, i.e. the ability to learn easily. The second is μνημων or the ability of good memory and permanently retaining everything learned, and the third is λογίζεσθαι δύνατος, the ability to reason and apply everything learned.[51] Therefore, it is important that both sides are willing to cooperate, because that is the only way to achieve the goal.

5.

Parrhesia in a relationship with philosophy[52] is called moral or ethical parrhesia. Although political parrhesia demands certain practice, ethical parrhesia is completely dedicated to it, or in other words, ethical parrhesia is practice. There is no place for ascendancy and competition with others in ethical parrhesia. It is about the relationship with the self and one's own life, about the concept of ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ, with an emphasis on the relationship with the self through one's own living, i.e. life (βίος). What makes the man practicing ethical parrhesia the parrhesiast "is not to be found in his birth" nor his citizenship nor his intellectual competence, but "in the harmony which exists between his *logos* and his *bios*."[53] Furthermore, the target audience is not made of masses which need to be directed to state prosperity. The parrhesiast-philosopher addresses the one who needs to take care of himself, but others as well. The parrhesiast strives to change someone's life.[54] When it was about taking care of the self in the previous chapters, it turned out that the parrhesiast is always "the other", who needs to be addressed by the person seeking help in order to realize the relationship with himself, truth, and others. The parrhesiast will not lead the listener to clear-cut solutions, but will be his support and act as his signpost, directing him toward the goal. One of the best examples of the said parrhesiast is certainly Socrates, who had practiced parrhesia throughout his life and had taken care of himself, but also the youth in the state, which

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51 M. Foucault, *Vladanje sobom i drugima*, p. 217.
52 Namely, it is about a different kind of parrhesia, which in this case has nothing to do with improving the state governance.
53 M. Foucault, *Fearless speech*, p. 106.
54 Ibid.

is why he was eventually sentenced to death. Another good example, besides Socrates, are the Cynic philosophers. Their way of life entailed everyday and complete practice of parrhesia, which is indeed practice, ἄσκησις. Parrhesia is no longer explicitly related to the agora or the king's court. Parrhesia began to be practiced in different places and throughout life. So parrhesia becomes one of the foundations of philosophy, but also vice versa, and Foucault even gives it a status of the reality of philosophy: "Philosophy finds its reality in the practice of philosophy understood as the set of practices through which the subject has a relationship to itself, elaborates itself, and works on itself. The reality of philosophy is this work of self on self."[55]

Many of Plato's dialogues inform us of the protagonist Socrates and his life, but Socrates the parrhesiast is best witnessed in Plato's *The Apology of Socrates*. The sentence Socrates utters as early as in the prologue is a proof that he was a parrhesiast and that he considered himself as such: "Not, however, men of Athens, [will you hear from me] speeches finely tricked out with words and phrases, as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything else."[56] Foucault calls this Socratic parrhesia the positive game of parrhesia or "the propitious form of *parrhēsia*,"[57] which is a complete practice, a way of living. Socrates always seeks the consent of his interlocutors, who reward his courage and virtue with the courage of their own, and Socrates will not let go until his interlocutor has been led to the point where he can give an account of himself (διδόναι περὶ αὑτοῦ λόγον, explain himself).[58] Thus, Socrates tempts his interlocutors by establishing a relationship with them, leading them to a lifelong self-examination. The concept of the care of the self or ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ was analyzed in the first chapters of the paper. It will not be elaborated here again, but it completely applies to Socrates, i.e. Socrates is a true example of the parrhesiast acting as it has already been described. Socrates is "the other" taking care of man, acting as his signpost thanks to parrhesia. Foucault describes Socratic discourse as the one which can

55 M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 242.
56 Plat. *Apol.*, 17c.
57 M. Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, p. 143.
58 M. Foucault, *Hrabrost istine*, p. 128.

"deal with men's care for themselves inasmuch as Socratic *parrhēsia* is precisely a discourse joined to and ordered by the principle 'attend to yourself'".[59] Socratic parrhesia can also be called ethical parrhesia because "telling the truth in the realm of the care of men is to question their mode of life".[60] The place of such parrhesia is never determined. The Socratic game of parrhesia takes place anywhere, but throughout the whole life, the same as with the Cynics.[61] Socratic parrhesia also includes all features of parrhesia described in the first chapters: frankness, courage, risk, and duty.

6.

Foucault's philosophy as a whole is composed of three parts – the archaeology of knowledge, the genealogy of power, and the hermeneutics of the self – where each part includes a fundamental concept (knowledge, power, subject), and it is in fact a criticism Foucault directs at Western society, i.e. the modern age society. The primary goal of the criticism lies at the center of the so-called third part, the hermeneutics of the self. Foucault's intention primarily was not to describe the ways in which knowledge and truth had been produced and the procedures and apparatuses (*Le dispositif*) on which they had been based, but the foundation of the subject over whom the mentioned power is exercised. In Foucault's philosophy parrhesia is not mentioned explicitly, except in his lectures at the Collège de France. If it really is about such a task with the goal of founding the subject in the modern age, then the concept of parrhesia has to be inserted in it. Before discussing that, however, some of the basic terms of Foucault's philosophy, like power, discourse, sexuality, and apparatus, need to be elaborated.

59 M. Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, pp. 148–149.
60 Ibid., p. 149.
61 Cf. Diogen Laertije, *Knjiga VI: Diogen*, in: Diogen Laertije, *Životi i mišljenja istaknutih filozofa.*

The Order of Things, subtitled *An archaeology of the human sciences*, is a peculiar methodology and a kind of anti-historical work, in which Foucault analyzes the concept of language and discourse. Foucault starts from the fact that in every period of human history there were certain limitations of the ways in which people could think, giving an example of a Chinese encyclopedia and an animal taxonomy strange to Western thinking.[62] Foucault's idea was to show that each way of thinking includes the rules which limit the range of thinking and, if we uncover these rules, we will be able to see how seemingly arbitrary limitations completely fit into the framework defined by those rules.[63] Besides, his goal is also to show the way in which discursive practices create subjectivity and truth, i.e. to show the way in which that which is epistemological, the knowledge we have of society, reflected on that which is ontological, the individual body that became the place of the exercise of power. The history Foucault describes has no hermeneutical character. It does not want to interpret given texts by seeking their profound meaning. It deals with texts, but reads them as an archaeologist would, treating them as monuments.[64] In other words, archaeologists of knowledge will take a text, e.g. Leibniz's text, yet they will not be interested in the meaning of the concrete text, but will find in it the main structure of the system in which Leibniz lived and worked. It is clear that the emphasis was never on the individual, what Foucault at the same time criticizes. Although such a subject does exist, he is submissive to the way of thinking characteristic of the period in which he lives. That brings us to the concept of *episteme*, completely different from its traditional sense. Foucault's epistemology has little to do with former attitudes on cognition in the history of philosophy, which is proven also by his reckoning with Kant and the theory of conditions of the possibility of all cognition in *The Critique of Pure Reason*.[65] *Episteme* Foucault writes about in *The Order of Things* marks a set of relations or a defined space of the order which unites different discursive practices that

62 Michel Foucault, *Riječi i stvari. Arheologija humanističkih znanosti*, Golden marketing, Zagreb 2002, p. 9.
63 Gary Gutting, *Foucault. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 2005, p. 33.
64 Ibid., p. 34.
65 Cf. M. Foucault, *Riječi i stvari*, pp. 239–273.

define knowledge of some period. That concept is extremely broad and it is impossible to define in a sentence, so it needs to be examined in a broader sense. Foucault differentiates three types of episteme: the Renaissance *episteme*, the Enlightenment *episteme*, and the modern age *episteme*.

Up to the end of the 16th century, the resemblance had a fundamental role in the knowledge of virtually all of Western culture.[66] Going back to the ancient culture, art, and philosophy, the Renaissance practiced this method in all areas; even painting "imitated the universe".[67] At the beginning of the 18th century, during the Baroque, the similar weakened, then ceased to be the fundamental characteristic of the period and gave way to another peculiarity and *episteme*, which as the fundamental category of knowledge, both the form and the content of cognition, establishes the concepts of identity and difference, in that way establishing the new meaning of *episteme*.[68] The said Classical *episteme* is first and foremost enabled by the relation to order. Hence Foucault highlights as crucial the concepts of *mathesis* and *taxonomy*, but especially that of order: "For the fundamental element of the Classical *episteme* is neither the success or failure of mechanism, (…), but rather a link with the mathesis which, until the end of the eighteenth century, remains constant and unaltered. This link has two essential characteristics. The first is that relations between beings are indeed to be conceived in the form of order and measurement, but with this fundamental imbalance, that it is always possible to reduce problems of measurement to problems of order."[69] Therefore, one resorts to the *mathesis* when simple natures need to be ordered because its universal method is algebra. When dealing with complex natures (Foucault mentions representations in general, as they are given in experience),[70] it is necessary to constitute a system of signs, and then a *taxonomy*.

Archaeology is the one to show the way in which configurations characteristic of each science were modified, the one to analyze changes of empirical givens in sciences, study mutual relations of individual sciences and, lastly, at

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66 M. Foucault, *Riječi i stvari*, p. 35.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., p. 72.
69 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, Routledge, London and New York 2005, p. 63.
70 M. Foucault, *Riječi i stvari*, p. 91.

the very end of the Enlightenment, show that the general area of knowledge is no longer that of identities and differences, *mathesis* and *taxonomy*, but an area in which *Analogy* and *Succession* appear as the organizing principles.[71] They are organic structures, i.e. internal relations "whose totality performs a function".[72] Foucault highlights that history since the 19th century, after the Enlightenment, is the birthplace of the empirical.[73]

By the concept of discourse Foucault means representation "unfolding in the verbal signs that manifest it".[74] Discourse is used to form an image of the world, and it can at the same time be material, as a realization of an apparatus, and immaterial, as speech. Discourse is always about "the relationship of language and speech in the historical pre-reflexive way of thinking".[75] Each discourse is a historically determined language as speech, but in the structurally set area of time and the world.[76] It could be said that discourse itself is power because it establishes truth. It is a power that needs to be acquired. Power itself, namely, does not have an active operating force, so it needs knowledge, i.e. institutionalization, to directly influence society. Every *episteme* has its own discourse which defines it, so the main task of Classical discourse was "*to ascribe a name to things, and in that name to name their being*".[77]

The relation of knowledge, power and the subject needs to be clarified by concepts of the genealogy of power and sexuality. In the interview "Microphysics of Power" Foucault defines genealogy as "the form of history which takes into account the constitution of knowledge, discourse, fields of subjects etc., with no need to address a subject that would be transcendent with regard to the field of happening which he covers in his empty identity throughout history."[78] Genealogy has to rid itself of the subject as such and arrive at the historical analysis "which could be held accountable for the constitution of

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71 Ibid., p. 240.
72 M. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, p. 63.
73 M. Foucault, *Riječi i stvari*, p. 241.
74 M. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, p. 88.
75 Žarko Paić, „Parresia vs. Phronesis: Foucault i političko danas", *Croatica* 38 (58/2014), p. 296.
76 Ibid.
77 M. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, p. 132.
78 Michel Foucault, *Znanje i moć*, Globus, Zagreb 1994, p. 149.

the subject in the historical weft".[79] The genealogy of power at the same time problematizes the modern age *episteme* and the subject's subjectness. Foucault thinks the subject as "the game of the transcendental and empirical double, and the task of the modern episteme amounts to the construction of the subject".[80] Therefore, the subject is a product of the historical formation of the subjectivation process. The first part of *The History of Sexuality*, *The Will to Knowledge*, is a distinctive question about technologies which serve to establish relations of power and domination over culture and nature. In it Foucault examines two hypotheses: the repressive hypothesis and the biopower hypothesis. After the 17th century, an age of repression and censorship of discourse on sex, sex had been introduced more and more into discourse, and eventually it was institutionalized.[81] It is important to highlight that, according to Foucault, power is not possessed – it is exercised. Neither the very discourse on sex nor its suppression is the main goal of the technologies of power. They are just a part of the means power uses in order to shape discourse. Technologies of power serve as a manipulation which produces more power, but knowledge as well. The introduction of sex into discourse had brought about a multiplicity of discourses, until a whole network of discourses was created, which goes as far as to force speaking about sex.[82] The multiplicity of discourses on sex brought about a great sexual diversity. That act could also be called a distinctive defense mechanism because the multiplication blurs the real truth of sex, a new truth is produced, and it is about sexual perversions.[83] In that way discourse serves power, instead of truth. Truth is related to the systems of power which produce it and the effects of power which it induces and which reproduce it. Foucault calls it the "regime of truth".[84]

With the concept of apparatus Foucault wanted to define "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural

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79 Ibid.
80 Žarko Paić, „Tehno-scientia sexualis: Što nakon *Povijesti seksualnosti*?", *Holon* 4 (2/2014), p. 222.
81 Michel Foucault, *Znanje i moć*, Globus, Zagreb 1994, pp. 15–16.
82 Ibid., p. 27.
83 Ibid., p. 39.
84 M. Foucault, *Znanje i moć*, p. 160.

forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short the said as much as the unsaid."[85] The apparatus is a system of relations which can be established among these elements. These are the elements of the apparatus, and the apparatus itself is a system of relations which can be established among the said elements.[86] The apparatus, therefore, links discourse as knowledge and power as government, but also sexuality and power. The apparatus is a kind of a *mechanism*, which can be anything, from an institution to a book, even to language itself. It serves the creation of the societies of control and discipline, and Foucault is interested in the way power manifests in such societies, i.e. how the subject is submitted to that power.

7. Conclusion

The individual not aware of his complete submission affirms Foucault's attitude about the missing subject in the modern age, in which power appears in the form of the scientific discourses of discipline and control of the body as an object of its own thirst for freedom, where the individual realizes himself as a set of practices of thirst, the unconscious, and language, while his limits are given in the relation of truth, power and ethics.[87] Parrhesia assumes freedom of speech and vice versa, considering it was inseparable from democracy in the very beginning, and later on it existed in the autocratic forms of government. An excessive control and monitoring brings into question democracy and freedom of speech, which is also a possibility of freedom as a kind of practice that needs to be provided for everyone.[88] If there is no practice of free speech, there can also be no equality and justice in democracy and vice versa, as it is said in the previous chapters on the relation of parrhesia and democracy. When democracy is threatened by a possibility of falling into a tyrannical or

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85 Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, Pantheon, New York 1980, p. 194.
86 Michel Foucault, *Istorija seksualnosti I. Volja za znanjem*, Karpos, Beograd 2006, pp. 182–183.
87 Ž. Paić, »Parresia vs. phronesis«, pp. 308, 316.
88 Ibid., p. 322.

an oligarchic form of government, it tries to defend itself through the principles of freedom of speech, justice and equality.[89] Parrhesia is Foucault's answer to the social situation of the modern age Western civilization. It is the active truthful living and working in the present for the purpose of a better future, its own and that of society. Foucault wants to replace what is considered to be true in the modern age by producing truth, and not by disclosure, with a new relation to truth. With parrhesia as the question of human existence, a different model of existence begins. Foucault calls it the *aesthetics of existence*, and it has "an ethical meaning of the dignity of truth in the political area of democracy".[90] So parrhesia needs to emerge as the answer to the procedures and mechanisms of power and to its relation to truth, knowledge and the apparatus, i.e. power. After reckoning with Kant and his subject based on the moral imperative and the mind, in his lectures on parrhesia and the essence of government Foucault gave directions for the reconstruction of the subject. Life itself resists subordination and reducing to the relation of power and knowledge of an apparatus, which emerged as the system of effects of the dictatorship policy over human freedom, and only the practice of parrhesia would better that resistance.[91]

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89 Ibid., p. 323.
90 Ibid., p. 324.
91 N. Luxon, *Crisis of Authority*, p. 199.

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Harris B. Bechtol

ABRAHAMIC FIGURATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY: RELIGION WITHOUT RELIGION IN JACQUES DERRIDA AND JEAN-LUC MARION

While continental philosophy of religion has, in large part, become a response to and continuation of the death of God movement,[1] this is only part, or perhaps half, of its development. In the history of the death of God, the death of God is said in many ways. Nevertheless, in the new dawn after the death of God in continental philosophy of religion, we find a striking similarity amongst different philosophers. For example, though Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Luc Marion may disagree over the meaning of the death of God, they all agree as to its significance: we are the one's responsible for making the world a better place. For the logic of the thinkers in continental philosophy of religion moves from the death of God, in some sense, to the birth of

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1 This movement of the death of God really begins with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* where God becomes nothing more than an idea of reason that we have a tendency to posit when examining the world in terms of cause and effect. Of course, this movement of the death of God has become more popular in light of the announcement of Nietzsche's madman in the *Gay Science* along with the death of God theology of T.J.J. Altizer and William Hamilton in the 1960's. Since then, the death of God has made a resurgence not only among the new materialist critiques of religion in Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou but also among the even more orthodox religious thinkers, such as Jean-Luc Marion.

human responsibility. For each figure, the survival or living on (*sur-vivre*) after the death of God entails an increase in responsibility for those who survive this eventful death of the other. By examining two figurations of responsibility engendered by the scene in Genesis 22, the binding of Isaac, I argue that we come to learn about not only this logic at play in what has been called continental philosophy of religion but also the status of responsibility in the wake of the binding of Isaac. Though Derrida and Marion engage this narrative of the binding of Isaac from different philosophical perspectives, both of their engagements highlight the ethical impetus that the structure of sacrifice brings to bear on our ethical life. Through both of their readings, we learn that the ethical impetus of such a structure includes but extends beyond the face of the other or the various modalities of alterity — be it divine, human, or animal — because this impetus includes a comportment to phenomenality itself. And, in this, we find that our ethical life can never be whole or complete but abides always as finite: our responsibility always harbors irresponsibility.

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RELIGION WITHOUT RELIGION

In order to understand the significance of the approaches to responsibility from both Derrida and Marion, we must first understand the way that they engage religion philosophically. We must begin with what Derrida calls religion without religion in order to establish how both he and Marion similarly approach religion. This statement may sound shocking considering Marion's proximity to Catholicism and Derrida's more distant relation to Judaism. So before getting to each figure's reading of Genesis 22, I want to show that both of their readings are aimed at developing a similar approach to religion.

Derrida's approach to religion in *The Gift of Death*, where he offers his reading of Genesis 22, revolves around three major thematics. He develops, what he calls, an account of "sacrificial responsibility" (GD 68)[2] in the shared narrative of the binding of Isaac as found in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic sacred texts. With this, his account of responsibility turns on a largely neglected

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2 Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death* Second Edition, trans. David Wills, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2008. Citations appear parenthetically as GD followed by the page number.

view of death in the history of philosophy, namely the death of the other. Here he is taking his lead from Levinas's critique of Heidegger's *Sein zum Tode*. For both Levinas and Derrida, in contrast to Heidegger, the originary experience of death is not my own death or personal death but the "the possibility of dying *of* the other or *for* the other" (GD 48 emphasis his). This possibility of the death of the other—even, for Derrida, the actual death of the other—"institutes responsibility as giving oneself death, putting oneself to death, or offering one's death, that is to say one's life, in the ethical dimension of sacrifice" (GD 48). So his account of sacrificial responsibility turns on the death of the other where all of the senses of *donner la mort* are at play: to give a gift of death to one other, even oneself as other, for another other. Such a polysemy of giving death will become the site for Derrida's description of *the fix*—the difficult, complex, and messy situation—we are in with regard to responsibility.[3]

And all of this is developed in an effort to develop a "religion without religion" (GD 50). The logic of the *sans* is of utmost import here, not only for Derrida but also, we shall soon see, for Marion. Derrida explains that his approach to religion is *without* religion because he is concerned only with the *possibility* of what gets itself actualized in a particular religion. As he says, this religion without religion "has no need of the event of a revelation or the revelation of an event" (GD 50). The actuality or historicity of the revelations in a religion are less important to him than are the various conditions that possibilize such actualities. As he even says of Genesis 22, "Whether or not one believes the biblical story, whatever credence or credit one gives to it, … it could still be said that there is a moral to this story, even if we take it to be a fable" (GD 67). This means that while he is interested in religious themes and texts, such as love, sacrifice, salvation, God, etc., his relation to these religious themes is "without reference to religion as institutional dogma" (GD 50). Religion without religion repeats these religious themes but without the belief or credence (*croyance*) given to them in a particular religion. In other words, religion without religion occupies the slash between a/theism, which means that

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3 This focus on the fix of ethical life follows John D. Caputo's notion of radical hermeneutics understood as "an attempt to stick with this original difficulty of life, and not to betray it with metaphysics" (*Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1987, p. 1).

it will constantly be negotiating the space between atheism and theism at times sounding like a particular religion while at times sounding like sheer atheism.[4] Consequently, religion without religion is a "nondogmatic doublet of dogma" (GD 50) that describes the ways in which existence, particularly ethical life, is rife with religious undertones.[5]

Though Marion's approach to religion is markedly different than Derrida's on account of Marion's strictly phenomenological approach to the givenness or phenomenality of phenomena, his concern with religion remains similar to Derrida. And Derrida himself even admits that Marion belongs "to this tradition that consists in proposing a nondogmatic doublet of dogma" (GD 50). Marion most clearly develops this nondogmatic doublet in his essay "Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology." For in this essay, Marion is, in part, providing an apology for *why* phenomenology should engage the question of God through givenness and *how* this use of phenomenology is not a hidden theology or a colonization of phenomenology for merely theological purposes.

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4 On account of the way that religion without religion occupies this space between theism and atheism, how to characterize it has become contested territory particularly with the recent text from Martin Hägglund, *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life*. John D. Caputo and Richard Kearney both offer their responses to Hägglund in *The Trace of God: Derrida and Religion*. Caputo insists in this volume, as he has elsewhere, that that religion without religion is interested in a deeper faith (*foi*) as a quasi-transcendental for theism and atheism, both of which are dogmatic beliefs (*croyances*). Kearney develops, in a vein critical of Derrida, what he calls Derrida's "messianic atheism," which is another way of talking about the negotiation between theism and atheism at play in religion without religion. Caputo's interpretation of Derrida follows closely Derrida's notion of messianicity without any messianism, thereby admitting that the religious hope for the messiah is structurally always to come. Kearney's criticism of this structural to-come in both Derrida and Caputo concerns, what Kearney calls, the lack of particularity and carnality of this approach. Kearney writes, "[T]he messianic universality so dear to deconstruction is only guaranteed, it seems, at the cost of particularity; it forfeits the incarnate singularity of everyday epiphanies" (Edward Baring and Peter E. Gordon (Eds.), *Trace of God: Derrida and Religion*, New York: Fordham University Press, 2015, p. 205).
5 All of which sounds close to what Dietrich Bonhoeffer calls "religionless Christianity" in his *Letters and Papers From Prison* as well as to what Paul Tillich means by a theology of culture.

According to Marion's overall phenomenological project, phenomenology has been concerned since its beginnings in Husserl and Heidegger with the givenness of phenomena. Yet, Marion maintains that while both Husserl and Heidegger have been concerned with givenness, they both fail in their phenomenological approaches to make givenness their centerpiece.[6] In Marion's view, the proper phenomenon that should concern phenomenology is the very givenness or phenomenality of phenomena, that is, the ways in which phenomena give themselves. To return to the things themselves means to return to givenness. Thus, the question for Marion's phenomenology concerns the being-given (*etant-donné*) where the being of a thing is in transit, underway, and on its way in the thing as given. In other words, the being of the given is its very givenness or the way in which it is being given. For Marion, then, wherever we may find givenness, this givenness is the concern of the phenomenologist.

And Marion maintains that this principle holds for religious phenomena, especially God. In this, he distinguishes his phenomenological approach to religion from theology. For he says, "[T]he figure of 'God' in phenomenology … still concerns the 'God of the philosophers and the scholars,' and in no way the 'God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob'" (VR 64).[7] The "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" is the concern of "revealed theology," that is, the theology that *needs* the event of a revelation or the revelation of an event in order to exist. Revealed theology needs the "historicity" (VR 64) of that with which it is concerned; it needs the historicity of God's revelation. However, for Marion, phenomenology needs no such historicity but can identify the givenness of religious phenomena "only as a possibility: not only a possibility as opposed to actuality

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6 See Jean-Luc Marion, *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998 for Marion's critiques of both Husserl and Heidegger. In short, while Marion thinks that Husserl is correct to broach the topic of givenness for phenomenology, he thinks Husserl fails by focusing phenomenology of the structures on consciousness in experience. Moreover, while Marion thinks that Heidegger thinks givenness in more detail than Husserl, Marion ultimately thinks that Heidegger's insistence on the *Seinsfrage* prevents him from probing the depths givenness.

7 Jean-Luc Marion, *The Visible and the Revealed*, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner, et. al, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008. Citations appear parenthetically as VR followed by the page number.

but, above all, as a possibility of givenness itself" (VR 64). Thus, Marion claims that if we start with givenness in our approach to any phenomenon, then phenomenology can describe the *possible* phenomenality or givenness of religious phenomena, even the *possible* givenness of God. Consequently, Marion characterizes God's possible givenness, not in onto-theological terms as a *cause sui* being who transcends the material world, but in phenomenological terms as "the being-given par excellence" (VR 62). Marion turns to this phrase for the givenness of God in order to avoid characterizing God as The Giver because this characterization would be a move back into onto-theology, a move about which Marion from the beginning of his corpus has warned. He develops the significance of this givenness of God by saying that if all phenomena are determined by their givenness or their being-given, then God "is given and allows to be given more than any other being-given" (VR 62). In fact, and this is the weakening of God in Marion's phenomenology, God's givenness is so excessive that nothing seems to be there at all when God gives Godself. God "shines by absence" to such a degree that God's "status as phenomenon might never be acknowledged. The phenomenon par excellence on account of that very excellence lays itself open to not appearing—to remaining in a state of abandon" (BG 63).[8] Far from the omni-being of metaphysics and medieval theology rests the God of Marion's phenomenology who can be ignored to the point of abandon.

This account of the possible givenness of God is non-dogmatic because this account is not an account of the God of the religions of the book around which dogmas have been and are being written. Even the apophatic theologians are unwilling to admit that the purpose of mystical union with God is to abandon God.[9] The God who comes to mind for Marion is a non-dogmatic repetition that concerns itself with describing only the possibility of the givenness of God around which the religions of the book have based their dogmas. The God of

8 Jean-Luc Marion, *Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness*, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002. Citations appear parenthetically as BG followed by the page number.
9 Meister Eckhart's famous prayer, "God, rid me of God," is not saying that he wants to abandon God. Rather, the purpose of the prayer is precisely mystical union with God so that between he and God there would be no distinction.

phenomenology as the being-given par excellence would then be a God without any religious dogma attached. Therefore, Marion's own phenomenological approach to religion provides us with a religion *without* religion.

And yet we must not forget that both Derrida's and Marion's religions without religion have different birth certificates. While both are a kind of religion *without* religion, they both draw predominantly from one religion more than any other. Derrida's religion religion without religion is markedly Jewish or Hebraic, but Marion's religion without religion is markedly Christian and Catholic. Derrida has even told us, in what he calls a kind of "post-script" to *The Gift of Death*, that his concern with possibilization, a concern that has been the concern of his deconstruction from the beignning, has been influenced by his being born a Jew in El Biar and the anti-Semitism that he experienced in the educational system on account of this cultural identity.[10] And Marion's approach to phenomenology through his third reduction to the givenness of phenomena has been influenced by medieval, Christian mystical theology and especially the notion of the effulgence of the divine in worldly things.[11] Considering these different birth certificates of their respective religions without religion, we will not be surprised to find differences amidst their similar accounts of the responsibility that the figure of Abraham engenders.

DERRIDA'S ABRAHAM

Derrida's non-dogmatic doublet of religion in *The Gift of Death* revolves around his reading of Genesis 22 in response to both Søren Kierkegaard's reading of this narrative and Emmanuel Levinas's philosophy in general. With this, he allows these other two figures to help guide his own reading of the narrative. I claim that he shows in his reading how Abraham's relation to God in this narrative is *structurally* the same as our relation to any other. Thus, Derrida exposes the religious structure of our ethical life based on the kind of responsibility that Abraham

10 Jacques Derrida, "Abraham, The Other," in: Betinna Bergo and Michael D. Smith (Trans.), *Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida*, New York: Fordham University Press, 2005, p. 2.
11 See Tasmin Jones, *A Genealogy of Marion's Philosophy of Religion: Apparent Darkness*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011.

exemplifies toward his God. Yet Derrida does not require belief (*croyance*) in the historicity of Genesis 22 in offering this reading. Hence, this religious structure of ethical life belongs to a religion *without* religion as delineated above.

Derrida describes this structure of our ethical life by highlighting how, at least, four different aspects of Abraham's relation with God provide the structure of our relation to any other. Through these four aspects, Derrida develops his description of the Abrahamic, sacrificial responsibility that makes all of ethical life difficult, complex, and vertiginous.

First, just as Abraham's relation to God is a relation with the wholly other, so too is our relational with any other a relation with the wholly other. When Derrida turns to Genesis 22 in light of Kierkegaard-Silentio's reading of this narrative in *Fear and Trembling*, Derrida offers a characterization of the transcendence of God based on God's silence in this narrative. Drawing on one of the sources for the title of Kierkegaard's text, Derrida comments that God instills fear and trembling because "God is himself absent, hidden and silent, separate, secret, at the moment he has to be obeyed. God doesn't give his reasons … Otherwise, he wouldn't be God, we wouldn't be dealing with the Other as God or with God as wholly other [*tout autre*]" (GD 58). God's transcendence for Derrida is based not only on the singularity of God but also on the fact that God is *abscondus*, hidden, or secret at the moment when God demands obedience. God does not say *why* Abraham must do this. God commands it, as if requesting in a prayer Derrida notes (GD 72), without saying why. And Abraham obeys this singular request without asking for a why. God knows in the text that this is a test, but this reason remains secret from Abraham. Abraham only learns that this is a test *after* he is willing to show absolute responsibility to God in sacrificing Isaac. So the wholly other is wholly other or transcendent precisely because from out of his or her singularity, his or her reasons remain absent, hidden, or secret at the moment when we must respond, that is, be responsible, to this wholly other.

Derrida plays on these two aspects of transcendence—singularity and secrecy—when he deconstructs Kierkegaard's text with the seemingly tautological phrase: *tout autre est tout autre*. If "every other is wholly other," this means that the singularity and absence of reasons that defines God's alterity in Genesis 22 are the same structural features that define the alterity of any other.

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Drawing on Edmund Husserl's "Fifth Meditation" in his *Cartesian Meditations*, Derrida says, "[S]ince each of us, every one else, each other is infinitely other in its absolute singularity, inaccessible, solitary, transcendent, nonmanifest, originarily nonpresent to my *ego* …, then what can be said about Abraham's relation to God can be said about my relation … to *every other as wholly other*" (GD 78 translation modified). Every other, be it God, humans, non-human animals, places, or languages, says Derrida (see GD 69–71), is wholly other or transcendent like God in Genesis 22 because every other is a unique singular who calls to us for obedience without granting us access to the why of his or her demand. For this reason, the name "God" for Derrida no longer signifies a "someone, over there, way up there, transcendent." In other words, "God" is not the God of onto-theology. Rather, "God" now signifies a "structure of conscience" marked by "the possibility I have of keeping a secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior" (GD 108). Therefore, our everyday ethical life consists of relations with multiple wholly others, that is to say, Gods.

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Second, just as Abraham is absolutely singular in his responsibility to God, so too is each of us absolutely singular in our responsibility to any other. To be responsible from out of his absolute singularity means, says Derrida, that Abraham "assumes the responsibility that consists in always being alone, re-trenched in one's own singularity at the moment of decision. Just as no one can die in my place, no one can make a decision … in my place" (GD 60). Abraham is absolutely singular in his responsibility to God because only Abraham is tested. So only he can respond to God. Abraham is unsubstitutable in responding to the command or prayer of God. Isaac, Sarah, and the ethical community cannot help him by responding for him.

Derrida draws the structural similarity to our relation with any other when he says that our responsibility to the other "binds me in my absolute singularity to the other as other. God is the name of the absolute other as other and as unique … As soon as I enter into a relation with the absolute other, my singularity enters into relation with his on the level of obligation and duty" (GD 68). So I too am unsubstitutable in my relation to any other, that is to any wholly other. Therefore, our everyday ethical life consists of multiple relations with the wholly other in which each of us is unsubstitutable in our responsibility to this wholly other.

Third, just as Abraham's decision to sacrifice Isaac to God entails silence and secrecy, so too are our decisions to sacrifice one other to another other marked with silence and secrecy. In the final chapter of Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*, Kierkegaard-Silentio repeatedly insists that Abraham cannot speak or tell others what he is doing because he has no universal reason or no universal, ethical standard to give for what he is doing. And considering that such reasons or standards are the currency of the ethical community in *Fear and Trembling*, without these, Abraham's actions would not be understandable were he to try to explain it to the ethical community. Kierkegaard-Silentio insists that the one thing that he could say that would make the whole *ordeal* understandable would be: *this is a test*. However, Abraham does not know this is a test until much later in the narrative after he has passed the test, so to speak. Only God, and we the reader, know from the beginning that this is just a test. Abraham responds to God not out of knowing what will happen but out of faith, which means, for Derrida, deciding without knowledge. Thus, Derrida highlights that Abraham must keep this secret that it is a test "because at bottom he can only keep it: he does not know it, he is unaware of its ultimate rhyme and reason. He is sworn to secrecy because he is in secret" (GD 60). Thus, Abraham's decision to respond to God's call or prayer is a decision made without knowledge or without calculative rationality (see GD 78). This lack of knowledge means, for Derrida, that Abraham is about to give a gift. He is about to make the impossible possible. Abraham (the giver) is going to give a gift (of death) to Isaac (the givee) and to God (the givee) without this economy being ruled by knowledge, calculation, or expectation of a reward. Abraham responds "absolutely … without hoping for a reward, without knowing why yet keeping it secret" (GD 73). The economy of Abraham's sacrificial responsibility is an an-economy, an economy without circular exchange or reciprocity.

And Derrida draws a structural parallel to our decisions to choose to help some others while also choosing not to help other others in our ethical life. He maintains that all of our decisions in our ethical life are like Abraham's decision to follow God's command out of faith, that is without knowing why or deciding without calculative rationality. My decision to help one particular other, which is a sacrificing of myself or a giving of a gift of death to myself, and not to help other others, which is a gift of death to these others, is a deci-

sion that I cannot justify with universal reasons or universal, ethical standards. He writes, "I can respond to the one …, that is to say to the other, only by sacrificing to that one the other … And I can never justify this sacrifice, I must always hold my peace about it … I will always be in secret, held to secrecy in respect of this, for nothing can be said about it" (GD 71). For if every other is wholly other, I am bound by absolute responsibility in my absolute singularity to every other. So I cannot justify why I choose to help one while choosing not to help another. My decision is "always secret" and, thereby, an exercise of faith. All decisions in our ethical life are structured by faith insofar as we, like Abraham, know not to know why we choose to be responsible to the wholly other. Therefore, our everyday ethical life consists of multiple relations with the wholly other in which each of us is unsubstitutable in our responsibility to this wholly other, and our decision to respond to one other over other others is a leap of faith to give a gift outside of the economy of calculative rationality and circles of exchange.

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Fourth, just as Abraham's responsibility toward God harbors an irresponsible core toward Isaac and his family, so too does our responsibility harbor an irresponsible core. Abraham's silence in *Fear and Trembling* marks, in part, what Kierkegaard-Silentio calls the teleological suspension of the ethical by religion. Abraham suspends his ethical responsibility to Isaac in order to respond to his absolute, religious responsibility to God. Derrida draws on this to show that responsibility, then, is double-headed. General responsibility and ethics, the ethics of the community, demands an accounting of my actions, namely that my decision have known and universal reasons and principles that are substitutable among different subjects. Yet absolute responsibility, the responsibility that Abraham has toward God, demands "uniqueness, absolute singularity, hence nonsubstitution, nonrepetition, silence, and secrecy" (GD 61). Moreover, to act responsibly to one requires acting irresponsibly toward the other. This is the aporia of ethics for Derrida, or what he calls "ethics as 'irresponsibilization'" (GD 62). For Abraham to respond to his absolute responsibility toward God requires that he act irresponsibly toward Isaac and the ethical community. This is to act just like a hateful murder in the eyes of the ethical

community—a point that Kierkegaard-Silentio is unafraid to highlight.[12] Likewise, if Abraham were to act responsibly toward Isaac, then he would act irresponsibly toward God. Responsibility, then, harbors an irresponsible core.

This tension within responsibility itself continues, says Derrida, in our ethical life. If every other is wholly other, is just as much God as any other, then we are *absolutely* responsible to every other. This means that we can never have a clean conscience because responsibility always harbors irresponsibility at every instant when we make a decision to give a gift of life to one other and, concomitantly, a gift of death to every other other. Derrida writes, "I am responsible to any one (that is to say to the other) only by failing in my responsibilities to all the others, to the ethical or political generality" (GD 71). Therefore, such is the fix that we are in with responsibility in our everyday ethical life where we are bound by absolute responsibility to every wholly other. The choice to respond, that is, responsibility, does not lead to nice, neat, and always good outcomes because responding to the other entails, as we can see, complexity, messiness, and aporia.

Through these four structural parallels, Derrida offers his *de*-scription, not *pre*-scription, of our ethical life. This is a description of ethical life that embraces the finitude of our responsibility, namely, the reality that being responsible and doing the right thing cannot be appropriated to and programed as an ethical system. The responsibility of our ethical life requires making unjustifiable decisions in responding responsibly to some while irresponsibly to others. In this, the demands of ethical life and responsibility in relation to any other are demands that structurally mirror Abraham's religious duty to his God—a duty, Kierkegaard-Silentio argues, that resides outside the ehtical. In this, Derrida is problematizing the distinction between the ethical and the religious that *Fear and Trembling* wishes to uphold with strict boundaries and gate keepers. In the end, Derrida wants to extend the Levinasian face of the other beyond just

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12 Kierkegaard writes with regard to Abraham's relation to the ethics of the community, "[T]he reality of his act is that by which he belongs to the universal, and there he is and remains a murderer" (Søren Kierkegaard, trans. and eds. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, *Fear and Trembling* and *Repetition*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 74).

the human other. He wants more than the human other to take on a face.[13] He wants even animals, places, and language to take on a face or to have the face of God. As we turn now to Marion's reading of Genesis 22, he too is concerned to let other things take on a face. In fact, he wants all phenomenality to take on a face.

MARION'S ABRAHAM

In Marion's reading of Genesis 22, Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac is emblematic of a phenomenologically radical account of responsibility. For Abraham's willingness to sacrifice is a willingness to render "givenness visible by re-giving the gift" (RoG 84). In this sense of a phenomenological account of responsibility, *all* phenomena, not just the other, call out to us to respond to them or call out to us to responsibly receive them. The result of this for Marion is that our responsibility goes all the way to *how* we make the givenness of phenomena visible. In order to understand Abraham's exemplification of this responsibility in Marion's reading of Genesis 22, we first need to understand who "the subject" is for Marion in his phenomenology of givenness.

As we have seen, Marion determines phenomenality or the givenness of a phenomenon to be the proper focus of phenomenology. For him, he agrees with Heidegger's definition of a phenomenon as "what shows itself from itself."[14] But Marion maintains that before a phenomenon can show itself, it must first give itself. This difference between givenness and manifestation or givenness and showing is crucial for Marion. Phenomena give themselves without reserve and of their own accord, but they do not manifest this givenness or manifest themselves of their own accord. Only when "the subject," which Marion names *l'adonné*, receives the givenness of a phenomenon is

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13 In 1951, in Levinas's first *explicit* critique of Heidegger's philosophy after returning from the POW camp, Levinas asks a question to which Derrida and Marion are responding, "Can things take on a face" (Emmanuel Levinas, "Is Ontology Fundamental?" in: Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Eds.), *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996, p. 10)?

14 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh and Dennis J. Schmidt, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2010, p. 21.

this givenness brought to visibility or manifestation. In a sense very close to Heidegger's *Da-sein*, *l'adonné* remains the *there* where givenness can show itself. We have givenness without *l'adonné*. But without *l'adonné*, we have no *manifestation* of this givenness. Moreover, Marion maintains that the givenness of each phenomenon *should* be received in the way that it gives itself. This indicates that *l'adonné* is the subject without subjectivity for Marion because *l'adonné* is meant to be freed from any constitution of, which is to say, constraining of, the givenness of phenomena. Thus, *l'adonné* is placed "between the given and phenomenality" or "between the given—which never ceases to be imposed on it and to impose itself on it—and phenomenalization."[15] *L'adonné* is placed between the given and its givenness in order to receive this givenness and make it manifest. *L'adonné* receives the givenness of the phenomenon and lets this givenness show itself by submitting to it "without interfering or causing a disturbance" (BG 264).[16]

Therefore, the responsibility of *l'adonné* includes, while extending beyond, the face of the other or ethical responsibility. *L'adonné* must be responsible in how he or she receives the givenness of *any* phenomenon.[17] He writes, "Responsibility belongs officially to all phenomenality that is deployed according to givenness: what is given (the call) succeeds in showing itself as a phenomenon only on the screen and according to the prism that *l'adonné* … alone offers it" (BG 293-294 translation modifed). The responsibility of *l'adonné* is grounded not merely on responding to the call of the face of the other but also, more generally, on "having to respond in the face of the phenomenon as such, that is to say, such as it gives itself" (BG 294). This is Marion's phenomenologically radical account of responsibility in which *l'adonné* remains responsible to the very givenness of phenomena in being the site where this givenness can come to manifestation.

15 Jean-Luc Marion, *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena*, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud, New York: Fordham University Press, 2002, p. 49.
16 Marion does think that this reception of givenness is inherently hermeneutical. But his understanding of the hermeneutic process here is riddled with problems and unanswered questions.
17 In *Being Given*, Marion extends this responsibility primarily to the saturated phenomena. However, in light of his essay "The Banality of Saturation," we can see how Marion thinks that this responsibility extends to all phenomena because all phenomena can potentially be received as saturated phenomena.

So when Marion turns to Genesis 22 to establish a phenomenological concept of sacrifice, he has working in the background of his reading this notion of phenomenological responsibility. With this, Marion offers his concept of sacrifice by examining this phenomenon, like Derrida does, in terms of the an-economy of the gift. His aim is to reduce, in the phenomenological sense of lead-back, the gift of sacrifice to givenness. He admits that in sacrifice a giver (the one who sacrifices) gives a gift (the something or someone sacrificed) to a givee (the one for whom the sacrifice is made). What is most important for Marion in this an-economy is not the destruction of what or whom is sacrificed nor the reception by the givee of the sacrifice but the reduction of the gift that is sacrificed to its givenness. This reduction of sacrifice enables Marion to provide an account of the an-economy of sacrifice because the reduction to givenness avoids the circle of exchange or reciprocity. When the content of the gift is bracketed, as it is in Marion's understanding of sacrifice, then the gift itself is no longer of concern but its givenness becomes the focus. The gift's givenness understood both as the originary gesture of a *giver* and as receivable by a recipient becomes the focus, not the economy of exchange, when the gift is reduced to its givenness. In this an-economy of sacrifice, the responsibility rests on the giver to reduce the gift to givenness so that the sacrifice is not ruined by reciprocity. For Marion, the issue at stake in sacrifice is "the suspending of the gift given so that it would allow the process of its givenness … to appear in its own mode, instead of crushing it in the fall from the given into a pure and simple found object" (RoG 82).[18] The one who sacrifices, the giver, then, has the responsibility in sacrifice of not merely destroying the gift but of "making this gift transparent anew in its own process of givenness" (RoG 82), that is, in letting the gift's givenness manifest itself. This account of sacrifice presupposes, then, that the gift given in the sacrifice has already been a gift given to the one doing the sacrifice. Sacrifice "presupposes a gift already given" (RoG 83). And the responsibility of the giver is to let this givenness of the already given gift manifest itself in the giver's own re-giving of the gift through sacrifice. Thus,

18 Jean-Luc Marion, *The Reason of the Gift*, trans. Stephen E. Lewis, Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2011. Citations appear parenthetically as RoG followed by the page number.

Marion writes, "Sacrifice gives the gift back to the givenness from which it proceeds, by returning it to the very return that originally constitutes it" (RoG 83).

Marion finds all of this confirmed in his reading of Genesis 22. To begin with, Isaac, the gift to be given in sacrifice, has already been a gift given by God to Abraham and Sarah who were both too advanced in their years for child bearing (Genesis 18:11). In the first of a series of passages that begin to identify God as The Giver, a point, recall, that Marion wants and *needs* to avoid in order not to slip back into an onto-theological determination of God, Marion comments that Isaac belongs "from the beginning and as a miracle to God alone" (RoG 86). Marion further maintains, in his interpretation of Genesis 21:3 and 21:7, that Abraham and Sarah both forget this givenness of Isaac after his birth when they claim or appropriate Isaac to be *their* son. Isaac had become Abraham and Sarah's possession rather than the gift given them by God. Consequently, the binding of Isaac occurs according to Marion so that Abraham can re-give Isaac back to God thereby manifesting Isaac's originary givenness as a gift from God. Marion writes, now identifying God as the originary, masculine giver, "The demand for a sacrifice opposes to this illegitimate appropriation, which cancels the gift given in a possession, the most original right of the giver to have *his* gift acknowledged as a gift given, which is to say, simply acknowledged as an always provisional, transferable, and alienable usufruct" (RoG 87 emphasis mine). And Abraham himself, "who already reasons according to the phenomenological concept of sacrifice," accomplishes this reduction of Isaac to his originary givenness (RoG 87). The climax of this reduction occurs when Isaac recognizes that Abraham has no lamb for the sacrifice and Abraham tells him, "God will provide himself the lamb" (Genesis 22:8 in RoG 87). For Marion, this statement means "that every gift made to God comes first from God as gift given to us" (RoG 87). Far from the Kierkegaardian-Derridian Abraham who fears and trembles with a secret that he knows not, Marion's Abraham is one who seems to know or recognize, like any good phenomenologist of givenness, that the point is not to destroy Isaac but to receive Isaac, "for the first time" (RoG 89), according to his own givenness as a gift from God, the originary giver. According to Marion, Abraham seems to realize early in the narrative that this really is just a test. Abraham recognizes that it is no longer important that [he] kill, eliminate, and exchange his son for God's benefit in

order to accomplish the sacrifice demanded …; rather, it matters exclusively (according to the phenomenological concept of the gift) that he acknowledge his son as a gift, that he accomplish this recognition of the gift by giving it back to its *giver*, and, thus, that he let God appear [as giver] through his gift (RoG 88, emphasis mine).

Thus, Abraham exemplifies the phenomenological responsibility that *l'adonné* has in receiving the gift according to its givenness and manifesting this givenness visibly. Thus, following Marion's account of phenomenological responsibility, Abraham's responsibility in Genesis 22 provides the structure for our own responsibility in our ethical life.

What is explicitly lacking from Marion's reading of Abraham is the finitude of responsibility. Yet this may not be surprising, to draw on *Fear and Trembling* and the book of *Hebrews* from the Christian New Testament, if we recall that Abraham has been called the father of faith or the figure who exemplifies what obedience to God means. This understanding of Abraham would explain why Abraham gets it just right for Marion while the best any one else can do is come close to Abraham. After all, Marion does describe the finitude of the responsibility of *l'adonné* in receiving the givenness of phenomena. A phenomenon may give itself without reserve, but *l'adonné* is itself determined by finitude. This finitude of *l'adonné* prevents him/her from adequately receiving "the given such as it gives itself — namely, without limit or reserve" (BG 309). Thus, despite our responsibility, on Marion's accounting, to receive a phenomenon in the way that it gives itself and to let this givenness manifest itself, this reception and manifestation remains always limited and inadequate to the givenness of the given. Consequently, as with Derrida, but for deeply different reasons, as we have seen, the fix that we are in with our ethical life is that even when we act responsibly toward phenomena, our responsibility harbors irresponsibility because our finitude prevents us from receiving the phenomena perfectly according to the degree of their givenness.

CONCLUSION

We have seen, then, how the structure of sacrifice found in Genesis 22 has spurred both Derrida and Marion to emphasize the ethical impetus that this narrative places on our life. In this, they both emphasize how responsibility or ethical life itself is rife with religious undertones. For the religious figure of Abraham is emblematic of our responsibility for ethical life, despite how frightening that may be at times. Both, then, are calling us to be Abrahamic in their two versions of religion without religion but not without warning. Derrida and Marion, but Derrida more explicitly and abrasively so, warns us that while being more like Abraham may be a call to responsibility, it also inherently entails irresponsibility. Such is the messiness of our ethical life. Such is the fix we are in with the flux of life. Our responsibility interminably remains finite harboring within itself irresponsibility.

152   Despite Marion's extension of Derrida's account of responsibility to include not just iterations of alterity but also the givenness of all phenomena themselves, Marion does misstep in this development. He has claimed that the God of phenomenology is not the God of onto-theology, which he says his account avoids by not calling God the giver of all gifts but, rather, calling God the being-given par excellence. With this, Marion belongs as part of the tradition of religion *without* religion. Nevertheless, as we have seen, when Marion provides his phenomenological account of sacrifice, he explicitly identifies God as the originary giver. Thus, though he may extend Derrida's notion of Abrahamic responsibility, he does so by stepping-into the God of onto-theology. A step that does not seem necessary. A step that Marion has warned against from the beginning. A step that moves outside of the logic of a weakening of God in order to heighten our responsibility. Even though Marion may do the latter, he ends right back at the position that continental philosophers of religion have been trying to avoid all along: the strong God of metaphysics. For this reason, continental philosophers of religion can only go so far with Marion *if* they want to continue doing something philosophically different with religion.

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Andrej Božič

THE OTHER IN DIALOGUE. BETWEEN HERMENEUTIC EXPERIENCE AND RESPONSIVE RATIONALITY[1]

Dialogicality is – and, indeed, is (being) as such also discussed by numerous, almost innumerable authors – one of the fundamental phenomena of human co-existence in the world: throughout, from birth to death, before and after, beyond them both, insofar as each and every person as a single, as a singular individual, traversing (through) presence, transfers onwards the potentiality of (still – not yet or not anymore –) absent fragments – the ancient remnants and the novel seeds, the memory and the expectation – of conversations past and future, the movement – the event(uation) – of dialogue – because of its endless finitness, brittle in-(de)terminability continuously threatened by the precarious prospect of radical discontinuation in the rupture of deafening noise or of dumbfounding muteness – not only occasionally accompanies our lives, but – first and foremost –, as a kind of atmosphere that surrounds us, occasions,

co-constitutes the manner, in which we encounter all there is: lifeless as well as living beings, material things as well as spiritual concerns, plants, animals, fellow human beings as well as ourselves, and – perhaps (who knows?) likewise – the (wholly, absolutely, divinely) transcendent: – in a word: – the other. As beings of sociality, reaching towards the other, reached by the other, handling the matters, debating them and doing them, dealing with them, we are already always a part of a dialogue: dialogue dis-closes – at once reveals and conceals – the horizon(s) of the world, the time(s) and the space(s), within which what is appears: be-speaking we dwell in the world. Through the inter-play of questions and answers, through the inter-mediality of language, (a/the) dialogue opens (us) up (for) the different dimensions of the "inter-esse" – the "in-between(ness)" – of our being-in-the-world: it is a medium of the encounter with the other.

With regard to the problem of the other as it gives itself to be encountered in the dialogical movement the present paper would like to take into account – and recount – the principal points of contention between two conflicting, but nonetheless complementing philosophical stances: the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) and the phenomenology of Bernhard Waldenfels (1934). The intention of subsequent consideration of the confrontation between Gadamer's compelling advocacy of the primacy of question in his conceptualization of hermeneutic experience and Waldenfels' critical reassessment of the phenomenon of answer in his theory of responsive rationality, between opposing positions that, thus juxtaposed, by themselves circumscribe the basic elements of dialogue, is not – and cannot be – to overplay or to underplay the significance of either of them by comparing its pertinence to the counterpart, nor to establish an unsurmountable, a moated frontline by declaring complete self-sufficiency of one – or contestable (e)quality of the illegitimacy of both – of the rivals in a wager of war "for truth" between them, but by re-tracing the converging and diverging traits at the crossroads of their paths attempt to re-approach exactly and expressly the openness of the "in-between(ness)" of (our) being and thus – maybe – show anew – nuanced from (within) the viewpoints of both authors – the way the other comes into play (to be encountered) with-in (the medium of) dialogue.

From the beginnings of the "art" – practice and skill – of understanding in Ancient Greece, through its modern blossoming into a general theory and

doctrine, to the attempts of a methodological founding of human(ist[ic]) sciences upon its basis in the 19th century, the historical development of hermeneutics has been – and still is – intrinsically incited – at first implicitly and unthematized, later on explicitly and emphatically – by the problem of understanding – and interpretation – of sense, of the meaning – for example – of (an utterance in) a conversation or of (a passage in) a text, the problem of an understanding mediation in the relation between the interpreted and the interpreter: the ever profounder, in effect never-ending (self-)reflection upon/of the procedures of understanding, of/upon the circumstances of interpretation, denotes (also) the gradual passage from classical hermeneutics, through hermeneutic philosophy, to philosophical hermeneutics as instigated and instituted by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his seminal, epochal book *Truth and Method* (*Wahrheit und Methode*; 1960), as well as – before publication – recurrently re-announced and – afterward – exhaustively re-elaborated in his other writings regarding a diverse range of topics.

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The origin of Gadamer's outline of philosophical hermeneutics is the situation of crisis within the humanities – *Geisteswissenschaften* – of the 19th and the 20th centuries stemming from predominantly accepted persuasion that solely "exact" and "objective" – that is to say: natural – science with its ideal of inductive method can warrant the attainment of truth. Although Gadamer from the onset on recognizes the fundamentally non-methodical nature of humanist knowledge, his hermeneutics is not aimed at an attempt neither to forge a new – better – method nor to renew old – inadequate – ones, and it does not represent yet another, a(n) re-iterated effort to reconcile the humanities with natural sciences. On the contrary: as such it seeks – by re-examining and re-evaluating the re-sources of hermeneutical tradition – to offer an answer to the critical question(s) of the "sciences" of human in their unique placement between scientific technique and openness of sense, between method and truth, whilst it asks how is understanding – if at all – possible, whilst it investigates what conditions and defines it.

Gadamer therefore rethinks the concept of the circle of understanding, which classical hermeneutics had adopted from ancient rhetoric, and distinguished it as the key principle for interpretation, which signifies a special relationship of mutual co-determination between the parts and the whole of a text to

be understood, in accordance with the impulses received from his philosophical teacher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), whose groundbreaking work *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*; 1927) – the "project" of hermeneutic phenomenology it entails – gave (back) – in Gadamer's opinion – to (the structure of) understanding its ontologically positive sense, insofar as it comprehended understanding as the original, the originary form of the realization of (human) existence in the world, the *Dasein*. As (a/the) being – not by its own choice – thrown into the world to be – one day – re-called (off) – of it – existence always (already) possesses a(n) un-certain understanding of the surrounding world: the self-understanding of existence incorporates the co-understanding of the world. And vice versa: the understanding of the world, of things and of people with-in it, already (always) includes the self-understanding of existence. The circularity of understanding – the hermeneutic circle – is grounded in existence itself.

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From this circumstance, from this presupposition far-reaching consequences for the problem of understanding and interpretation of a text or of a person, of the sense of what is being said and conveyed to us through language, ensue: on the one hand no interpretation starts from zero, it is an explication, an unfolding of understanding pre-determined by the latent and anticipatory movement of fore-understanding; on the other hand the elaboration of fore-understanding concerning the content into explicit, evident understanding cannot remain arbitrary, but needs to seek (initial) guidance and (ultimate) confirmation in "the things themselves" (Heidegger 1996: 153).[2]

In the entire progression of understanding of a (written or oral) "statement", which can be – according to Gadamer – construed as a process of constant re-projection(s) – re-(en)visioning(s) –, of verification and/or of transformation of the expectation(s) (of the unity) of sense, in the movement of interpretation, the attention to the subject matter is of vital, inevitable importance: the goal of understanding is to come to an agreement concerning the content of what addresses us, what is at stake and as such, by itself, "desires" to be – by us – understood: "For what leads to understanding must be something that has already asserted itself in its own separate validity. Understanding begins /…/ when something addresses us. This is the first condition of hermeneutics." (Gadamer 2004: 298)

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2 Cf. also Gadamer 2004: 269.

Interpreter's fore-understanding – his/her fore-meaning, her/his fore-judgements – of the content at hand consists of prejudices that – at the same time – command the endeavor of understanding – and can thus lead it astray – as well as – paradoxically – enable it: they demarcate, mark its limits and condition its very possibility. Prejudices defining all attempts at understanding everything and anything are, re-present the actuality of the historicity of being, the sign and the signature of human finiteness. The hallmark of our – of beings' and of being's – "belonging" to (the/a) tradition.[3]

One of the cardinal – and distinctive – characteristics – in-valuable merits – of Gadamer's hermeneutics is precisely the re-acknowledgment of the historicity of understanding through the concept, the principle of history of effect – *Wirkungsgeschichte* – that indicates, specifies the movement of tradition enveloping interpretation, and therefore complements the thought about the hermeneutic circle. The emphasis upon the mutual inter-connectedness, intertwining and interweaving of history and understanding in their historically effec(tua)ted relationship does not only intend to describe the influence a text has had and continues to have on tradition, that its meaning has been and can be understood otherwise in different times, but – above all – that all our understanding is always already influenced – inter-mediated – by the history of its effects, by the effectuation of history itself. The awareness of the co-conditioning of understanding through tradition, the historically effected consciousness – as Gadamer calls it –, is the awareness of the effect history exerts on, with-in understanding: the conscious re-cognition of hermeneutic situation, which essentially determines, in-activates the horizon, the capacity of our understanding of the world we inhabit, and which of itself, by delineating its borders brings about the acceptance of the finiteness of human existence. Hermeneutic, historically effected consciousness is the awareness of finitude – the latter is the former's fundamental constituent –: as such it possesses the openness of the structure of experience.

Hermeneutic experience is concerned and deals with tradition. Insofar as tradition, what it brings and carries, the meaning it transfers onto us, is not something we can simply learn and easily master, but effectuates our under-

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3 Cf. Gadamer 1998: 64.

standing while it relates to us, hermeneutic experience – Gadamer claims – can be – and it is at this crucial, accentuated point that for him the problem of (the otherness) of the other arises – viewed as being analogous to the (I's) experience of the Thou. Gadamer distinguishes three possibilities of an approach towards the other and – in a transposition onto the problematic of hermeneutics – towards tradition: – on the one hand – the behavior of the other can be typified, methodologically studied and debated as an object of scientific prediction robbed of personality – in the humanities with such a position the naïve, blind and outdated "scientism" can be compared that perceives itself detached from the (subjective) effect(s) of tradition –, and – on the other hand – the other can remain, despite being acknowledged as a person, under siege of the self-relatedness of the I, which does not alter the reflective nature of the relation, but unleashes the struggle for mutual recognition – historical consciousness offers an appurtenant parallel within hermeneutical sphere to such a stance, since it denies its own historical conditionedness –; yet, neither of these possibilities breaks with the preponderance, the predominance of the I, on the contrary: the Thou in its otherness thus never really reaches the fortifications of the I. Only the third, the highest option of the I-Thou relationship is correspondingly a true analogue of hermeneutic experience that is of prominence for the historically effected consciousness: it allows a person to make their claim to validity – even if it is being made against us – and lets the Thou say something to the I: it listens to the other – to the meaning, the sense it is trying to communicate – in the openness of understanding. In the essay entitled "Hermeneutics and the Ontological Difference" ("Hermeneutik und ontologische Differenz"; 1989) Gadamer succinctly wrote: "For precisely when we seek to understand the other person, we have the hermeneutical experience that we must break down resistance in ourselves if we wish to hear the other as other. This is really a basic determinant of all human existence, and also still governs the success of our 'self-understanding.'" (Gadamer 2007: 371)

The effectuation of hermeneutic experience comes about, according to Gadamer, as *Horizontverschmelzung*, as the fusion of the horizons of understanding: the understanding of anything and everything transferred and conferred onto us through tradition occurs as the flowing together of the horizon divulged by what is (being) said, what addresses us as a meaningful message

to be understood, and the horizon of the interpreter: hence it must always include the application – *Anwendung* – onto one's own hermeneutic situation. Application is not only an integral, but also the integrative part of understanding, the source of the productivity of interpretation.

The openness of historically effected consciousness for the address of tradition – the truth claim (encountered) with-in it – possesses the logical structure of question. The essence of the question is "to open up possibilities and keep them open," (Gadamer 2004: 298) to open (up) the *pro et contra*, the in-between of "thus and otherwise" in their counter-balance. Within this space of possibilities, however, all cannot be possible: a question is meaningful only if its pre-suppositions are fixed and its horizon clearly outlined. It needs a sense of direction, of directedness towards the openness of the (still) questionable from wherein an answer may eventually emerge. The decision regarding a question, the passage through the field, the uncertainty of questionability, the weighing(-out-and-in) of options is the way towards knowledge and comprehension: to experience something we must learn the subtle art of questioning. Questioning is the mindful with-holding with-in the realm of the possible, it is an attentive attitude practiced with self-restraint and carefully contemplated judgment. Whilst questioning opens the possibilities of sense, of understanding it (also) holds our prejudices *in suspenso*: as the openness for truth it is a kind of hermeneutical *epoché*, which Dean Komel had in his book *Outlines. On philosophical and cultural hermeneutics* (*Osnutja. K filozofski in kulturni hermenevtiki*; 2001) described with the following words: "/…/ to withhold oneself from any judgment regarding tradition, before by itself it addresses us and becomes for us [note]worthy. There is no understanding of tradition without hearkening to its voice; what distinguishes hermeneutic experience is therefore not the ability to form a unifying uncomplicatedness of interpretation, but the possibility of truly listening to the other that can be fulfilled in the sincerity of a simple conversation." (Komel 2001: 12)

Defending the priority of the question before the answer Gadamer defines the task of hermeneutics as "entering into a dialogue" with tradition accomplished as a dialectic of question and answer. To understand a traditionary text means to understand it as an answer to a question, that is to say, to attain the hermeneutic horizon of the question defining the sense of the text. "Thus a

person who wants to understand must question what lies behind what is said. He must understand it as an answer to a question. If we go back *behind* what is said, then we inevitably ask questions *beyond* what is said. We understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the horizon of the question – a horizon that, as such, necessarily includes other possible answers. Thus the meaning of a sentence is relative to the question to which it is a reply, but that implies that its meaning necessarily exceeds what is said in it." (Gadamer 2004: 363) However, insofar as the text asks us a question, questions us, while it puts our fore-understanding into question, and requires a reply, we ourselves must start questioning. For a sense of a question can really be understood only if we pose and raise it also (for) ourselves: the (self)questioning is the realization, the actualization of a question as such. The understanding thus, in effect, in truth, entails a doubly dialectic inter-play of questions and answers: a text questions us, asks us a question and demands a reply from us; we are asking, questioning the text, and demanding its reply. Whenever we attempt to endeavor behind and beyond what is said, whenever we are trying to gain the horizon of the question, to reconstruct the question being asked and replied to, our questioning itself determined by the (limited) horizon of our own historical, our own contemporary understanding, is, and needs to be involved, if we are to understand at all. The reconstruction of a question passes through and surpasses the historical horizon of tradition in a fusion of past and present horizons. And vice versa: the fusion of horizons as the understanding of the questionability of something surpasses and passes through the reconstruction.

The dialectic of question and answer that determines the structure of hermeneutic experience describes understanding as a mutual relation(ship) between the interpreted and the interpreter: as a process of a dialogue. The understanding of tradition opens up the seemingly closed hermeneutic circle into – and for – a liberated, a liberating – free(d) – dialogue as the inter-play of questions and answers, addresses and replies, assertions and objections: the – communicatively, communally articulated – play with/of words, of/with language itself.

For Gadamer language re-presents, is the universal medium, the speculative, the mediating middle of all (mutual) understanding, it determines both, the hermeneutic object as well as the hermeneutic act. It is, at once, in one,

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the interpreter and the interpreted.[4] As the "universal aspect of hermeneutics" language enables the effectuation of the synthesis between the horizon of the past and the horizon of the present, between the horizon of the text and the horizon of the reader: the fusion of the horizons is "*the achievement of language.*" (Gadamer 2004: 370) Guided by language Gadamer therefore – in (the third, the concluding part of) *Truth and Method* – considers and attempts to accomplish an "ontological shift of hermeneutics". A shift from the general theory of understanding towards hermeneutic ontology: a shift that is no subversive action and no revolution, but the awareness of linguistic mediation of all experience: the linguality of all understanding, according to which our relationship with all there is, with beings and with being (as such), can be defined as interpretation. A re-summarizing sentence – at first glance only an unassumming "statement" – concisely recapitulates Gadamer's "stance": "*Being that can be understood is language.*" (Gadamer 2004: 470)

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Understanding of tradition, of all there is and thus lends itself to understanding, is fulfilled in the linguistically mediated process of interpretation, as experience it is an event and partakes in the immediacy of the eventuation of truth: it is an encounter with what claims its validity as a binding truth, what forces us to pose questions and to seek answers. An encounter with-in – the openness of – language.

An understanding encounter can never be grasped as a mere methodological procedure, obtainable through learning. As the dialectic of question and answer it is – rather – a dialogue that entices both parties, all the counter-parts in their inter-play. Historically effected, it never begins "from scratch", and it never ends in ultimate, final totality, with "the full sum" of a whole elucidation of sense. The acknowledgment of the intrinsic, innermost in-complete, un-concluding endlessness of the finite, forever im-perfective, ever im-perfectible possibility of dialogical movement is the truth of historically effected consciousness, the truth of its openness for the experience of tradition. The openness for its future.

Insofar as, however, hermeneutic(al) consciousness is compelled to examine and to verify, to question its presumptions, its prejudices, to critically re-

4 Cf. Komel 2002: 16 ff.

asses and re-appropriate them in the event of encounter itself, if it wants to ex-perience the unalienable truth of tradition, to view the own as well as the other in proper proportions of their relation(ship), insofar as the understanding of tradition does not denote the naïve and passive submission, self-surrender and self-submersion regarding the overwhelming superiority of tradition, insofar as the interpreted is not irrevocably bound by the self-evident life of tradition, insofar as the appropriation of tradition stemming from what addresses us as a task of understanding pre-supposes the re-cognition of the distance between the interpreted and the interpreter and therefore an openness for its otherness, the true position of hermeneutics lies in the in-between of – the opposition(s) of – familiarity and strangeness, with-in the un-known: "Hermeneutic work is based on a polarity of familiarity and strangeness; but this polarity is not to be regarded psychologically /…/, but truly hermeneutically – i.e., in regard to what has been said: the language in which the text addresses us, the story that it tells us. Here too there is a tension. It is in the play between the traditionary text's strangeness and familiarity to us, between being a historically intended, distanced object and belonging to a tradition. *The true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between.*" (Gadamer 2004: 295)

The juxta-pos(ition)ing polarity between the proximity and the distance of what is to be understood, between the past and the present, between the text and the reader, motivates the dialogical movement of understanding. The true, the f-actual beginning of – the process of – understanding, the impulse that brings it about, is a misunderstanding, the initial discord that incites us towards searching and finding accord, the dissension, which provokes the her-meneutical attitude as the (im)mediation of sense: "Challenged by something not understood or not understandable, hermeneutics is brought onto the path of questioning and is required to understand. In this process one never has some advance lordship over all meaningfulness. Instead, one is answering an always self-renewing challenge to take something not understood, something surprisingly other, strange, dark – and perhaps deep – that we need to under-stand." (Gadamer 2007: 363)

But: are sense and understanding, is questioning, is the truth of historically effected, hermeneutic(al) consciousness all (there is)? Does understandabil-ity – the availability of everything for understanding and the readiness for it

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– have the final word? Does there (not) exist another, different (and differentiated) kind of otherness, a foreignness (as such)? The alien by itself, the radically alien? A more radical form of incomprehensibility? An unintelligibility, which is not only contrary to understanding, which does not represent neither its lower degree nor its earlier phase, which is not a mere misunderstanding? An unintelligibility that does not mean neither what is not yet comprehensible nor what is not comprehensible anymore? The unintelligibility that cannot be sur-passed (through) by understanding, that eludes the sphere – and the economy – of sense, that trespasses (against) them, lies beyond sense and understanding, cannot be integrated or assimilated, opposes all appropriation, and thwarts all attempts at/of hermeneutical mediation, that comes from elsewhere and undermines the safety of established orders? An untamable, irrepressible, unsurmountable alienness? Alienness as the unintelligibility with-in the understandable, as the unannullable border-line, the limit of understandability? As the a(nti)-hermeneutic counter-force with-in hermeneutics itself, which questions all of its efforts and all of its endeavors, puts the hermeneutics itself, its possibility in-to the question? Alienness as a radical surplus?

Bernhard Waldenfels – following especially the stimulations he had received from the phenomenological theories of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), as well as from the works of Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) and Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) – thoroughly scrutinizes, from the viewpoint of the problem(s) of the experience of the alienness (of the other), from within the horizon of responsivity, on the way towards responsive rationality, which stands at the center of his studies from the treatise *Order in the Twilight* (*Ordnung im Zwielicht*; 1987) onwards, rationality that does not allow any kind of fixation or hypostatizing,[5] that in an expressly formulated antagonism with Gadamer's advocacy for the methodological primacy of question, emphasizes – as its name suggests – the dimension of answer, of response and, therefore, also of responsibility towards the situative, singular

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5 Waldenfels wrote in his diary published in book form under the title *A Philosophical Diary. From the Workshop of Thinking 1980–2005* (*Philosophisches Tagebuch. Aus der Werkstatt des Denkens 1980–2005*; 2008) already in 1980: "Direction of thought: *floating rationality*, confronted by such differences as subject and object, world and man, no fixation and no hypostatization into a higher reality". (Waldenfels 2008: 25)

address – the demands and the claims –[6] of the other as the alien, that with the underlying ethical impulse combines and binds together the ontological as well as the epistemological problematic, (also) Gadamer's hermeneutics and accentuates its limits, its internal, intrinsic limitation, stemming from its ex-clusive focus on understanding and interpretation, the mediation of sense, the a-biding by the search for a consensus in a mutually reciprocal understand-ing, by the wholeness of the common, communally shared sense, the truth. Whilst Waldenfels in (the 13th chapter of the first part of) the central, seminal work *The Registers of Answer* (*Antwortregister*; 1994) discusses Gadamer's her-meneutical philosophy in the context of the relation between question and answer, in the essay "Beyond Sense and Understanding" ("Jenseits von Sinn und Verstehen"), published in the 4th volume of his *Studies on the Phenom-enology of the Alien* (*Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden*) entitled *The Polyphony of Speech* (*Vielstimmigkeit der Rede*; 1999), he turns his attention to hermeneutics precisely from the stance of the questions posed and accord-ingly summarized above, from the stance he first elaborated and exhaustively expounded upon – under the guidance of the problems of order, its foundation and its arbitrariness, its genealogy and the subject within it – in the work *Order in the Twilight*.[7]

The idea of order in the twilight means that the movement, the occurrence of (any kind of) order is fundamentally determined by an essential ambiguity, double-sidedness, which clearly comes to the fore against the background of the dissolution, the disintegration of "the grand narratives", the dis-closure of the deficiency of all-encompassing cultural-social and experience orders in the post-modern age, orders such as the total, purposeful and teleological order of cosmos of Ancient Greece, based on the coordination of parts into a whole, or as the grounding formal order of modernity, constructed upon normativity,

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6 I predominantly translate the German word "Anspruch", which represents one of the key concepts of Waldenfels' thought, with "address", because of its original reference to language and dialogue; it could, however, also be rendered as "claim", "appeal", "de-mand", "aspiration" or "tendency", meanings that simultaneously re-sound, and need to be heard in the word itself.

7 Reflecting upon hermeneutics and the conference organized in 2000 in honor of Gadamer's 100th anniversary Waldenfels in his diary describes himself – half seriou-sly, half jokingly – as a half-hermeneutical heathen. Cf. Waldenfels 2008: 235.

the universality of legislative directive or interdiction, upon the subordination under a rule. An order enables and disables at once, it dis-(en)ables, at once it forms and transforms, it trans-forms, whilst it embraces certain possibilities of experience, of thought and of practice, it also rejects other and dismisses them, an order renders im-possible: in the friction amongst diverse orders the movement of a specific order is comprised of a process of inclusion, selection and exclusion, of mutual effectuation, of re-productivity. An order marks, de-marcates its own limits, it de-limits: it has a limited reach and remains contingent. The order, wherein we find and move ourselves, is an order in the form of potentiality, only one of the possible orders, an order amongst other orders.[8]

The order as "*according to rules (i.e., non-arbitrary) ordered complex of this and that*" (Waldenfels 1987: 17), as the equa(liza)tion of the unequal, the disparate, originates on the threshold of disorder by the organization of the dis-organized, what needs to be ordered and comes into order, to it, it emerges as a response to its address, its appeal, through the open confrontation from the intermediary event of address and response, from the sphere of the in-between of their inter-play: "As *an intermediary event* [*Zwischenereignis*] I understand something that, whilst it occurs, refers to something else by responding to its incentive and address. Insofar as this corresponds with every utterance and every action, they can be viewed as being interlocutory or interactive events. I denote the order that arises from this complex and in an organizing way intervenes in it as *responsive rationality* [*responsive Rationalität*]. It incorporates an open organization, because what is being organized does not itself stem from the order. It organizes the means and the manner someone confronts and accepts the alien." (Waldenfels 1987: 47)

On the threshold, on the border(s) of dis-order, on the edge(s) of order, in the tears and the gaps between orders, in their selectivity, inclusive exclusivity and exclusive inclusivity, what is not ordered, the disordered, re-appears at once as preceding and as surpassing order, as a transgression, as the surplus of the address: as the excess originating from the exorbitant over-determination of all phenomena, from their hyper-/super-abundancy, transcending the limit(ation)s of order without abolishing (or replacing) them: as the extraor-

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8 Cf. Waldenfels 1998: 15 ff.

dinary which remains – at once – inside and outside of order, challenging it and provoking it, enticing it and threatening it, but never disappears, never dissipates, which can never be completely and fully integrated with-in (the/an) order itself. All that emerges within order is simultaneously present and absent in it, it is itself and also something else, other, here and there, more and less, determined by a series of breaks and leaps, passages and pauses, the abysses of our experience.

The shadows of the alien as the extraordinary with-in order itself accompany and disquiet the relative peacefulness, the serenity of order, as the element of uncertainty in the certain, of the unusual in the usual, they motivate its movement, they impart upon it the seal of the ambiguous "*es gibt* [*there is*]".[9]

The radical alienness that defies appropriation, evades it and cannot be entirely caught even by the nets of the hermeneutical mind, that finds no fixed, no fixated settlement, is the "outer", the "dark" side of order, the extraordinary with-in it itself. The alien resists all order(ing), all coordination and all subordination into (an/the) order, although it does not – as excluded – exist without it: there is no order without disorder and there is no disorder without order, nothing alien without the own and nothing own without the alien. The sting of the alien lurks in the heart – of hearts – of order, it puts it into question.

Responsive rationality is decisively denoted by the constitutive asymmetry, the hiatus between the addressing appeal of the alien and the subsequent, the for-ever belated response to it, the discrepancy, which is of consequence for the movement of dialogue, which withdraws support from the orders of speech and action, of sense and understanding.[10]

The possibility of responsive rationality, originating from the recognition of the contingent, limited nature of order(s), from the acknowledgment that "the response to an address is what primary demands questioning" (Komel 2001: 22) – and not vice versa –, designates a change, a regrouping and a redistribution of weight(s), a shift: the passage from the posing, the bringing about of question(s) towards the 'being-brought-into-question' [In-Frage-gestellt-

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9 Cf. Waldenfels 1998: 79, as well as Waldenfels 2013: 5 ff.
10 Cf. Komel 1998: 246.

sein],[11] from the question towards answer, to its different dimensions, its registers, towards the acceptance of the address and the response to it, towards the inevitability, the necessity of responding, towards the 'not-being-able-not-to-respond', towards 'the-im-possibility-of-non-response', towards *Nichtnichtantwortenkönnen*.[12]

Whereas Waldenfels in the first part of *The Registers of Answer* deliberates – comprehensively considering, besides Gadamer's hermeneutics, also Husserl's theory of intentionality, the concepts of speech acts as presented by John L. Austin (1911–1960) and John R. Searle (1932), as well as Jürgen Habermas' (1929) communicative agency and Michel Foucault's (1926–1984) discursivity – upon the movement of dialogue, upon the problem of the relation between question and answer, the second and the third part of his book are dedicated to the detailed and consequent explication of responsive rationality, to the exposition of responsivity as the fundamental characteristic of all our experience, of speech and of action, and as the principal incentive for a phenomenology of the alien.

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Every and each question, whether we understand it traditionally, as an objective question that arises from the lack of knowledge and that seeks to fulfill its goal within the total order, or as a questioning of someone which originates in the need for help and which finds completion in the following of rules within the grounding order of directives and interdictions, or, finally, as a question under the sign of possibility, as the opening of possibilities and as keeping them open that stems from their surplus and that as an event of dis-closure turns to answering as the solving of problems – question as it is also understood by Gadamer –, moves and remains within the boundaries of the existing, pre-established order, order "incapable of motivating, regulating and enabling itself" (Komel 1998: 249), laying thus bare its blind spot inaccessible to any kind of ordering attempts. The same – namely, that it, although one can recognize also different motives, remains within an accepted, preconceived order (the tradition) – is true, insofar as it a-bides by the continuum of sense and by the reciprocal relation between the own and the alien, insofar

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11 Cf. Waldenfels 2007: 153.
12 Cf. Waldenfels 2008: 165.

as it is denoted by a certain yearning for knowledge, by the *Wissenwollen*, of Gadamer's exposition of the priority, the primacy of question as the methodological "parenthesis", of questioning as a hermeneutical *epoché*, and is true of the mutual play, the inter- and the counter-play of question and answer, for the constant oscillation between them, their inter-weaving within the circle of understanding, in the dialogue of interpreter with tradition and with its texts, in which the questioning of someone and the objective question fall into one and almost unnoticeably, without leap transverse into a questioning answering and a listening questioning, into a questioning thinking.

Yet, thinking originating in the priority of questioning, which must in the end, if it wants to be really radical, put itself into question, according to Waldenfels, finally finds itself caught in the circle of circles, confronted by the alternative: if nothing else suffocates questioning, then questioning must suffocate itself: "Either questioning is incorporated into an unquestionable order, therefore resigning its genuine character of question, or it retains its genuinely questioning character, thus retiring backwards into the nirvana of its own unquestionability." (Waldenfels 2007: 186) The change of approach, a turning of perspective can perhaps offer a way out of the dilemma of question: perhaps a question can be what it is only when we attempt to rethink it from something other than itself, from the answer, if we think it as an address which brings us into question, and to which we have to respond.

The new, the renewed beginning with the answer that does not mean a mere shift of priority, that – on the contrary – evades all primacy with-in the en-closed en-circling of question and answer as such, because it itself eludes us, Waldenfels re-traces following the guiding line of a simple, at first glance almost a naïve question: "What do we respond to when we experience, say or do something?" (Waldenfels: 2007: 188) To respond – to offer an answer – to something means to reply and react to a challenge, to the appeal, the address posed from something or someone other, to take advantage of given possibilities. To answer – to offer a response – means to begin from elsewhere, from the exposition to the other. Responsivity kept in motion by intermediary events, by the surplus of the address, is the confrontation with, the acceptance of the alien.

In this context it is necessary to emphasize an important and meaningful – also a linguistic – duplication: the difference between answer and answering, between the answer to a question and the answering to a questioning, between the given answer and the giving of the answer, between answer and response – the latter being the event(uation) of responding and responsiveness – which (can) never coincide in fullness. Traditional interpretations of the answer as (a kind of) a filler filling the void, the lack of knowledge, as a fulfillment of striving, according to a goal or a rule, are insufficient if we attempt to approach them from the appeal, the address we receive and perceive in speech, because the giving of the answer, responding, is more than merely transmittance of preconceived knowledge. We can, after all, respond not only with a counter-question or a(n) re-action, but also with a denial of answer, by looking away or through silence.

The duality, non-coincidence of answer and response indicates the (self-)differentiation and the (self-)duplication with-in the event of utterance itself: the ch(i)asm between the saying (or: the – act of – uttering) [das Sagen] and the said (or: the uttered) [das Gesagte], which comes into language, which is expressed in words, whilst it suppresses, presses all other "things" into silence. Waldenfels names – in *The Registers of Answer* implicitly, but explicitly in the book *The Estrangement of Modernity* (*Verfremdung der Moderne*; 2001) that represents a kind of a succinct summary of his own philosophical path – the turning of attention away from the said, the return back to the saying, to its address, the reduction of the said to the event of saying allowing the saying itself to re-sound, to be heard as an excess, a responsive *epoché*.[13] The reduction of the responsive *epoché* is an ex-propriation, a dispossession of events; it is an *Entordnung*, a dis-ordering, a nomadization, de-subjectification and de-personalization, de-finalization and de-causalization, de-totalization and de-structuralization, a dis-organization of speech and action; it is the re-acknowledgment, the recognition of the event character of activity and speaking, the noncoincidence with-in the coincidence of saying and the said. Whereas a question and a given answer remain within an order, the event of saying and, therefore, the event

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13 Cf. Waldenfels 2007: 195, as well as: Waldenfels 2001: 96.

of response, the giving of the answer, can never be subjugated to a(n) pre-established order: "The event of saying avoids being said, because it is not the said, *whilst it is more than the said*; it is a sur-plus, an ex-cès, something extra-ordinary that disquiets different orders of the said." (Waldenfels 2007: 199). The event of saying differentiates, differs by/from itself, reflects and inflects, folds and unfolds itself. "If there exists a certain point of indifference, a kind of a primary differential, it is the dead point of differentiation itself, the locus of a *diastasis*, which always lies in a grey area, the place, of which we cannot speak without speaking from [with-in] it." (Waldenfels 2007: 200)

The intermediary event of the alien address and the response to it – the event of their dual rhythmization – is marked by the diastasis, by the *Ausein-andertreten*, the simultaneous reaching towards each other and rending again asunder, between them lies a gap, a hiatus of an abyss: there is no comparison between what I respond to and what I offer as an answer, they do not move on an equal level, with-in the same order.[14] The difference between the "what-to [Worauf]?" and the "what [Was]?" of responding, whereat the "what-to?" cannot be subsumed and incorporated fully in the "what?" of the given an-swer, whereat the "what" cannot completely grasp the elusive "what-to?" of a response, Waldenfels calls – in contrast to both the intentional or the significa-tive difference (*something being thought/given as something*: as sense) and the regulative difference (*something according to something*: according to a rule) – *the responsive difference*: we always respond *something to something*.[15] The ad-dress as the singular event of a break into the order, of a breach with-in it, can neither be coordinated into a whole nor subordinated under a rule, it is neither an example of a law nor has it sense by itself:[16] it precedes the response and the answer: no presence can ever catch up with the precedence of the address. Absent in its presence, present in its absence: the address interrupts and dis-

14 Similarly, in the work *The Phenomenology of Attention* (*Phänomenologie der Auf-merksamkeit*; 2004) Waldenfels also recognizes an intermediary event in the phenom-enon of attention and explains it as a double movement of *Auffallen* ["attracting atten-tion"] and *Aufmerken* ["becoming attentive"]: the latter is a form of responding. Cf. Waldenfels 2004: 271, as well as: Waldenfels 2006: 92 ff.
15 Cf. Waldenfels 2007: 242, as well as: Waldenfels 2001: 78.
16 Cf. Waldenfels 1999: 46.

rupts all mediations, its immediacy is the im-mediate(d)ness of a breakthrough through the net of inter-mediation. The response follows subsequently, it always comes (too) late, is always belated. The precedence of the address and the subsequence of the response form a manifold movement, the rhythm of which cannot be unified or harmonized. On the contrary: an ineffaceable arrhythmia traverses it. The event(uation) of the addressing question and the giving of the answer is in itself punctured and ruptured, it passes through a pause, the calm of a break, it is a leap over an abyss, de-fined by the temporal-spatial delay, the postponement, the diachrony and the diatopy, the nonreciprocity: between the address and the response there is no pre-supposed, pre-approved concordance, no community, no inter-link(age), no synthesis.

We invent, find (out) answers in response to the inevitable addresses of the alien, to the inevitability of the – at once enticing and threatening – alien address, engaging (with) it, confronting (with) it, which to a certain extent entails not only arbitrariness, but also – at the other extreme – violence. The alien touches us in separating from us, in separation, in withdrawal: it gives itself onto us, it provokes our response, whilst it withdraws itself from (within) the distance of *with*drawing and from (within) the proximity of with*drawing*, in their intertwining: as the distance in proximity and as the proximity in the distance. "Responding moves beyond sense and rule; whilst it supersedes them, it of course also presupposes them. Responsive rationality which grows from responding itself, can neither replace nor leap over the intentional, the hermeneutic and the communicative mind, but it does surpass these forms of rationality." (Waldenfels 2001: 78)

Responsive rationality as the logic of answer and response grows from responding to the alien claim, the address of alienness, from the dimension of responsivity that Waldenfels regards as the fundamental trait of all our bodily behavior, of all our corporeal conduct, rooted in our living, lived body [der Leib], and that he comprehends as contrasting not only intentionality and communicativity, but also the hermeneutic(al) mind. Responsive rationality sur-passes the borders of established orders without replacing them with other, with different orders: its locus is the in-between of the ordinary and the extraordinary: as such – in the sign of responsive(ness) – it touches (upon) – the limits of – the impossible with-in the possible: the im-possible.

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The experience of the alien causes the alienation, the estrangement of experience itself, the pathways of which Waldenfels discusses in the figures of deviation, surplus and transformation.[17] Insofar as in all our action and in all our speech, in everything we experience we always respond, have already responded to the address of the alien, the alienness – besides influencing the processes of orders and amongst them, besides influencing the interpersonal relationships between human beings – reaches into and coconstitutes – "infects" – the sphere of the own.[18] All relating to one's self, all self-relation, is denoted by alienness, it is a relation towards one's own self as the alien. The alien and the own, the own and the alien are crosswise chiasmatically inter-connected over the chasm between them. The alienness can be – and is – encountered in our own home(s), it undermines the possibility of total and complete self-control, the disposal over one's (own) self. The radically alien is what – with its address that demands a response, with

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its call –, in truth, in effect, "calls us into our own" (Waldenfels 1999: 53).

The ch(i)asm of the own and the alien imparts upon every utterance, upon all speech the seal of polyphony,[19] which prevents the "logos" in dialogue to pre-dominate over the "dia-", over the sphere of the in-between, and which transforms the dialogical movement into a polylogue without the first and the last word, into the re-sounding of the own and the alien voices of all words, with-in them themselves. After all: in the listening to the sound of my own voice the own returns as (being) different, and allows me to hear the alien with-in it. "The polyphony begins by the duplication and the multiplication of the voice itself, by the circumstance that speech deviates from itself, supersedes and overtakes itself, that it is never completely by itself, but always already outside." (Waldenfels 1999: 12)

Responsive hearkening to the address of the alien in its interweaving with the own thus means the acknowledgment of the polyphony of word, of the constant self-differentiation of saying. In the essay entitled "Hybrid

17 Cf. Waldenfels 2001: 70 ff.
18 In *The Estrangement of Modernity* Waldenfels distinguishes between the ecstatic alienness within ourselves, the diastatic alienness as the alienness of other human beings and the extraordinary alienness of the other order. Cf. Waldenfels 2001: 55 ff.
19 Cf. Waldenfels 2007: 435 ff.

Forms of Speech" ("Hybride Formen der Rede") Waldenfels – in reference to Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) – writes: "In each speech something is being brought into language, whilst something other is left out. This concurrent bringing-into-language [Zur-Sprache-bringen] and putting-to-silence [Zum-Schweigen-bringen] accentuates selective orders of speech, specific thematic fields and discourses, yet does not succumb to the binary orders of the true and the false, the regular and the irregular." (Waldenfels 1999: 160) What is brought into language is not situated within language, as the alien, which the speech responds to, it is the extra-ordinary. As responding speech remains, un-resting, dis-quieting, on the border-line of the extra-ordinary, between the possible and the impossible: on the threshold between the own and the alien. It originates from the other, comes from elsewhere, and in saying refers to the unsaid, perhaps the unspeakably unsayable.

Waldenfels attempts to comprehend the responding attitude towards the address of the alien, the inventive confrontation with it, the incessant intervention, the ceaseless returning from the said to the event(uation) of saying, the effect(uation) of the responsive *epoché*, with the possibility of an indirect way of thinking and speaking.[20] In *The Estrangement of Modernity* he determines the necessity of an indirect mode and manner of approach towards the alien with following words: "If the alien is something that shows itself, *whilst* it withdraws itself, if the alien affects us, *before* we even see and understand it as something, if we respond to the claims, *before* we even speak about them, then this means that we do not take reference to the alien directly, but in a sidelong, crosswise or lateral way of seeing and speaking, which sees something, *whilst* it sees something other, which speaks and does something, *whilst* it does something other." (Waldenfels 2001: 92) Moreover: speech, language itself functions indirectly, since from onset onwards it already always says and speaks more – and differently – than it speaks and says. To speak about and of something indirectly does not mean to adopt a position of a "meta-language", but to speak from elsewhere, from the alien, to begin with the other. Indirect speech brings the alien to language without including it in the pre-established order of lan-

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20 Cf. Waldenfels 1987: 200 ff.

guage and of understanding. To speak indirectly means to respond to the surplus of the alien address.

Responsive rationality springs forth from the alien as the extraordinary that eludes all order, that defies its reach and its nets, that precedes and su-persedes it, sur-passes (through) it, that always occurs as the singularly plu-ral and as the plurally singular, the alien, to which we have to, we are obliged to respond, because it demands us as being responsive, as responsible beings, demands us as (a) response (to it), rationality stemming from responsivity is attentive rationality mindfully over-looking (over) the alien.

With regard to the road taken along the crossways of the confrontation of Gadamer's hermeneutics and Waldenfels' phenomenology in conclusion re-turning to the departure point of deliberation, to the question of the other (as encountered) in dialogue, it can – or: could – be – in summary somewhat schematically and therefore with a tendency for oversimplifying – ascertained that Gadamer's notion of hermeneutic experience, although admitting the otherness of the other, nonetheless finds its fulfillment in the movement of the appropriation, whereas Waldenfels' theory of responsive rationality re-presents the counter-movement of the estrangement of expe-rience in-directly engaging with the alien (of the other-ness) as the extra-ordinary.

Waldenfels' critique – as he himself emphasizes – does not – nor does it want to – render (Gadamer's) hermeneutics obsolete or redundant, but allows – whilst it accentuates the (inward) limitations and the (outward) boundaries – its very possibility – and therefore also its necessity and its richness – by itself stand out and come clearly to the fore upon the back-ground of what if does (not) address. However: if sense and understanding are not everything and cannot be everything, if they (had) come from else-where, if the connection with and belonging to tradition is hindered by the gap of an interruption, the breach of a break between the interpreter and the interpreted, if continuity is perforated, trans-pierced by discontinuity, by the abyss, which at once enables and disables, dis-(en)ables all hermeneutic endeavor(s), the other – (also) in dialogue – denoted by radical alienness that exceeds and transcends the orders of (mutual) understanding, sense and tradition, that exhorts us to respond to its address, demands – from us –

a change of and with-in the hermeneutic(al) itself – yet not against it –, a change dis-closing – "guarding" – the secret of the (dialogical) encounter with the other.

The acknowledgment of the ambiguous im-possibility of dialogical under-standing, the recognition of the a(nti)-dialogical trait with-in the movement of dialogue itself, of the impenetrable, all-penetrating alterity with-in it, prevents the omnipresent, the endlessly ad nauseam repeated, the fashionable talk of "dialogical openness" to become either an "idealist" moralization or a "realis-tic" amorality. To re-think, to re-consider – to respond to – the other in dia-logue means to make sure the fragility of the human(e) in-between(ness) does not fall prey neither to the exuberance of unfounded "optimism" nor to the desperation of fathomless "pessimism", to ensure that (a/the) dialogue – (with-in) which we are – can take place, that it can – perchance without quotation marks – *be*.

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Ilya Inishev

DIE BEDEUTENDEN FLÄCHEN: DIE FEHLENDE MATERIALITÄTS-ANALYSE IN HERMENEUTISCHER BILDTHEORIE

„Bilder sind bedeutende Flächen" (Vilém Flusser)[1]

1. Hermeneutische Bildtheorie: Exposé

Bekanntlich spielt die Problematik des Bildes im ganzen hermeneutischen Projekt Gadamers eine wichtige, sogar paradigmatische Rolle. Aber die Motive dieses paradigmatischen Status des Bildes bleiben bis heute nicht ausreichend klar. Es ist auf den ersten Blick recht merkwürdig, dass sein programmatisches Werk "Wahrheit und Methode", das die „Grundzüge" der allgemeinen philosophischen Theorie der Interpretation zu seinem Thema macht, die ihrerseits in erster Linie mit sprachlichen Phänomenen zu tun hat, initiiert sich mit einer Kunstanalyse, die sich fast ausschließlich auf die visuellen Kunstformen fokussiert. Dabei tritt die Bildwahrnehmung als das Paradebeispiel der Kunsterfahrung auf. Die Sache aber wird noch komplizierter aussehen, wenn wir darauf aufmerksam werden, dass der ganze dritte und entscheidende Teil des Buches die universale Dimension der Sprache thematisiert. Es fragt sich, warum Gadamer all diesen Umweg gegangen war, um letzten Endes zum Schluss zu kommen, dass die Sprachlichkeit grundsätzlichen Vorrang hat? Kurze Antwort darauf kann wie folgt klingen: Gadamer geht seinen Weg zur Universalität der sprachlichen Dimension der menschlichen Erfahrung über die Bild-Analyse,

1 Vilém Flusser, *Für eine Philosophie der Fotografie*. Berlin: Edition Flusser, 2006, S. 8.

um die Trivialität der überlieferten Sprachauffassung zu vermeiden, d.h. sie nicht auf die expliziten Sprachformen (mündliche und schriftliche Rede, die zudem ausschließlich in syntaktisch-semantischer Hinsicht thematisiert sind) zu beschränken. Darum spricht Gadamer nicht nur über die Sprache, sondern auch über die Sprachlichkeit. Die Sprachlichkeit, obwohl sie in Schrift und Rede ihre vollgültige Manifestation findet, zeigt ihre wichtigen strukturellen Charakteristiken und wesentlichen – zwar im Rahmen des „Linguozentrismus" nicht sichtbaren – kommunikativen Potenziale gerade in anderen Media wie Malerei, Musik, Theater, Dekor und vor allem Architektur.

Was diese verschiedenen Medien auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner bringt, ist das Geschehen der Darstellung, die laut Gadamer nicht nur den *Effekt*, sondern auch die eigentliche *Seinsweise* der Kunstwerke ausmacht. Diese darstellende – ins Da bringende – Seinsweise zeichnet sich durch Performativität und Transformativität aus, die Gadamer als „Verwandlung ins Gebilde" bezeichnet. Diese Verwandlung ins eigenständige sinnhafte Ganze ist bekanntlich total, oder allumfassend. Daraus folgt unter anderem, dass auch die Materialität der Kunstwerke – welcher Art auch immer – ihre ursprüngliche Bestimmung aus der Darstellung gewinnen muss. Und wenn wir in Betracht ziehen, dass ein integraler Aspekt der Darstellung nach Gadamer die Verwandlung der Wirklichkeit „ins Wahre" ist, dann müssen wir zum Schluss kommen, dass auch die Materialität der äußeren Welt in den modifizierenden Sog der darstellenden Seinsweise gerät.

Gerade im Kontext dieser hermeneutischen Ontologie, die intersubjektiven Sinn, individuelles Selbstverständnis und materielle Textur in strukturellen Zusammenhang zu bringen sucht, spielt die Problematik des Bildes eine paradigmatische Rolle.

In seiner Bildanalyse strebt Gadamer seine These über den medialen Charakter der Kunsterfahrung, die an den transitorischen Künsten wie Musik und Theater ausgewiesen wurde, auf die statuarischen Künste auszudehnen. Die Medialität der (hermeneutischen) Erfahrung, die nicht ausschließlich der Kunstwahrnehmung inhärent ist, aber an ihr sich am leichtesten explizieren lässt, ist gerade die Schlüsselidee der oben erwähnten hermeneutischen Ontologie, die die hermeneutische Plastizität der Welt, ihre Geschichtlichkeit, Performativität, ihre Erfahrungs- und Situationsabhängigkeit systematisch

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betont. Die Medialität der hermeneutischen Erfahrung, die sich zuerst in totaler Vermittlung von künstlerischem Artefakt und seiner Darstellung („ästhetische Nichtunterscheidung") zeigt, wird letzten Endes als die Kernstruktur des wirkungsgeschichtlichen Bewusstseins (Horizontverschmelzung) ausgewiesen. Dabei macht die Darstellung-Ontologie und ihr Paradebeispiel, die Bildwahrnehmung, den Hintergrund auch der Gadamerschen Reflexionen über Geschichte und Sprache aus.

Bei all ihrer Innovativität enthält Gadamers und vielleicht jede andere phänomenologisch-hermeneutische Bildkonzeption auch einige, nicht unerhebliche Nachteile. (1) Vor allen Dingen möchte ich den Dualismus von Bild und Abbild erwähnen, der den Bezugsrahmen für die ganze Gadamersche Besprechung der ontologischen und epistemischen Eigenart des Bildlichen angibt. Dieser Dualismus führt aber zur ungenügenden Differenziertheit der Analyse, die als Ergebnis zahlreiche Zwischen- und Hybridformen des Bildlichen aus dem Blickfeld verliert. (2) Der andere Nachteil ist mit der vorherrschenden thematischen Ausrichtung der Überlegungen Gadamers verbunden, die in der Akzentuierung des räumlichen Aspekts der hermeneutisch-performativen Medialität zum Ausdruck kommt. Merkwürdigerweise – wenn Gadamer „der Bezug des Bildes zu seiner Welt"[2] diskutiert – nimmt er als das Modell des Bildlichen den Dekor und die Architektur, was den Gebilde-Charakter (eigentümliche Räumlichkeit) und Diesseitigkeit der Bilderfahrung herausstellt. Im Vordergrund seines thematischen Interesses steht der Interpretationsbeitrag, den die Wahrnehmung des Dekors und der Architektur *explizit* leistet. Das, wofür sich Gadamer in seinen Bild-Analysen vorwiegend interessiert, sind die Erfahrungsstrukturen, aber nicht die Materialität des Bildes, die auch, wie gesagt, ins künstlerische Verwandlungsgeschehen produktiv involviert ist. (3) Diese Indifferenz gegenüber den Fragen der materialen Konstitution schränkt drastisch die Tragweite der Gadamerschen Bild-Analysen ein und ist offensichtlich ein der wesentlichen Merkmale der phänomenologischen Tradition im Ganzen. Das findet seinen Ausdruck in der augenfälligen Diskrepanz

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2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, in: Gadamer H.-G. *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 1, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1999, S. 142.

zwischen den ausführlichen Erfahrungsanalysen und den seltenen und wenig informativen Aussagen über die Gegenstandsseite. Das gilt auch von seinen späteren Texten zum Bild und zur Literatur, wo er den sinnlichen Aspekt der interpretierenden Erfahrung in den Vordergrund seines Interesses rückt. Dabei wird die „semantische" Funktion der Materialität – der Stimme in der Literatur, der Farben und Linien in der Malerei und der leiblich wahrnehmbaren Räume in der Architektur – meistens nur angegeben, aber kaum untersucht. Und in der Tat, wenn wir mit Gadamer davon reden, dass das Bild „mehr an Bedeutung" darbringt,[3] dann müssen wir uns nicht mit der emphatischen These vom Bild als das Wahrheitsgeschehen begnügen. Vielmehr wäre es fruchtbar, sogar notwendig, diese These in die analytischere Besprechung der semantischen Fragen überzuführen. Das setzt unter anderem voraus, dass die Analyse des semantischen Potenzials der Materialität des Bildes den geeigneten und relevanten phänomenalen Boden und Ausgangspunkt ausfinden kann.

182   Als solchen Boden und Ausgangspunkt werde ich im Folgenden die materielle darstellende Fläche betrachten. Der methodische Vorrang der Bildfläche für unsere Fragestellung hat hauptsächlich drei Gründe. Erstens, bei aller Vielfalt der historischen und gegenwärtigen Formen der Bildhaftigkeit – von Kleinplastik bis IMAX-Kinos – kann gerade bildhafte Fläche als Konvergenzpunkt dienen, der den thematischen Schwerpunkt nicht aus dem Blickfeld verlieren lässt. Dabei entspricht die Plastizität der Idee der bildhaften Fläche in vollem Maße der Vielfalt der sie verkörpernden Bildtypen. Zweitens, jede bildhafte Fläche, welcher konkreter Form der Bildlichkeit auch immer, stellt unbedingt eine phänomenale Konkretion dar, deren jeweilige Kondition mit entsprechendem Typus der Bildlichkeit korreliert. Dies erlaubt einen geeigneten Forschungsfokus auszubilden, der den Forschern der Bildproblematik helfen kann, die unmerkbaren Auswechslungen des Forschungsgegenstands zu vermeiden, weil nicht alles, was in der Umgangssprache ein Bild genannt wird, das Bild in der Tat ist. Drittens, das Modell der bildhaften Fläche steht im Einklang mit der allgemeinen Tendenz der gegenwärtigen Bildtheorie zur „Horizontalisierung" der semantischen Frage nach der spezifisch ikonischen Bedeutung. Dies ist unter anderem das, was den Dialog mit Bildtheorien aus

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3 Ebd., S. 159.

der analytischer Tradition, der bis heute noch nicht begonnen hat, möglich macht. Man kann sogar behaupten, dass all das, was phänomenologisch-hermeneutische und analytische Bildtheorien, die nicht selten als divergierende betrachtet werden, miteinander gemein haben, ist die folgerichtige – und gegenüber der traditionellen Bildtheorie ganz innovative – Überführung der Bildproblematik von der vertikalen in die horizontale Dimension. Diese Überführung besagt, dass von nun an nicht die „vertikale" Beziehung des Bild-Zeichens zum abgebildeten, d.h. außerbildlichen Objekt im Vordergrund des bildtheoretischen Interesses steht, sondern die „horizontalen" Beziehungen von innerbildlichen, d.h. ikonischen Elementen, die von sich aus die spezifisch ikonischen Bedeutungen erzeugen *können*. Mit anderen Worten wird nun das Spektrum der Repräsentationsfähigkeit der Bilder in engem Zusammenhang mit dem Spektrum der Modi ihrer Selbstpräsentation betrachtet. *Die bildhaften Bedeutungen und bildhafte Erscheinungen sind eng miteinander verwoben.* Auf jeden Fall gibt es zwischen ihnen eine Korrelation, die die prinzipielle Grundlage der möglichen Klassifizierung der bildhaften Repräsentationstypen darstellt.

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2. Bildzeichen und Bild. Normativität des Bildbegriffs

Ich möchte im Folgenden eine Position vertreten, dergemäß die Darstellungsfunktion von mindestens einigen Bilder nicht nur von unserem Interpretations- und Wahrnehmungsvermögen, sondern auch von ihrer materiellen Verfassung abhängt. Das scheint aber nicht nur für Bilder, sondern auch für alle Zeichen gültig zu sein. Die Materialität von jedem Zeichen, jedem bedeutenden Objekt partizipiert an seiner Fähigkeit, Bedeutungen zu vermitteln, d.h. an der Semiose.

Wohlbekannt ist, dass ein Objekt – um als ein Zeichen fungieren zu können – erst ein Zeichen *werden* muss. Nicht nur in dem Sinn, dass es als ein Zeichen konventionell gestiftet und verwendet wird, sondern auch, dass seine materielle Verfassung auf die Zeichen-Funktion zugeschnitten wird. Dieser Sachverhalt deutet unter anderem darauf an, dass der vom Zeichen vermittelte Sinn meistens dem Zeichen selbst vorausgeht.

Das betrifft nicht nur die Sprachzeichen. Es gibt genug auch bildhafte Darstellungen (sogenannte ikonische Zeichen), deren Struktur auf solche Weise beschrieben werden kann: z.B. Passfoto, Verkehrszeichen, Logotypen, Piktogramme usf. Hier ist das Bild-Zeichen in seiner materiellen Verfassung ganz und gar der Repräsentationsaufgabe unterworfen. Das Bild selbst tritt dabei in gewissem Maße zurück. Es muss in gewissem Sinn halbdurchsichtig bleiben: d.h. unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf sich ziehen und sofort zum gemeinten Objekt weiterleiten. Also bleibt hier das bildliche Zeigen dem sprachförmigen Meinen untergeordnet.

Aber es gibt auch die Bilder, die auf ganz andere Weise funktionieren. Sie haben im Vergleich zu linguistischen und ikonischen Zeichen mehr Autonomie, was nicht zuletzt mit Besonderheit ihrer materiellen Verfassung verbunden ist. Diese Bilder stellen nicht ein Element des semiotischen Verhältnisses dar, sondern machen den Raum der Semiose aus, d.h. schließen solche Verhältnisse in sich ein.

Also gibt es im Hinblick auf den Prozess der Bedeutungsbildung, d.h. auf den der Semiose einen deutlichen Unterschied zwischen ikonischen Zeichen und Bildern. Während die Materialität der sprachlichen und ikonischen Zeichen in die Semiose (d.h. in unsere Interpretationstätigkeit) einbezogen wird, bezieht uns (d.h. unsere Verstehens- und Interpretationstätigkeit) die Materialität der Bilder in die Semiose ein.

Jetzt möchte ich den Begriff des Bildes jenseits der Vorstellung vom Bild als ikonischem Zeichen präzisieren. Damit soll der Bildbegriff als ein geschichtlicher und normativer eingeführt und begründet werden.

Bekanntlich gehört der Begriff des Bildes zu geschichtlichen Begriffen, deren Bedeutung sich im Lauf der Zeit ändert. Insbesondere heute – in der Zeit der unwiderstehlichen Differenzierung und Pluralisierung der Welt – fallen unter den Begriff Bild sehr verschiedene Dinge: Kunstwerke, imaginäre Inhalte, fiktionale Objekte, Diagramme, Zeichnungen, Piktogramme und so fort. Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach müssen wir mit Wittgenstein auch im Hinblick auf verschiedene Bild-Phänomene über die „Familienähnlichkeit" sprechen. Es gibt keinen identifizierbaren „inneren Kern", ein Verzeichnis „wesentlicher" Merkmalen, die dem „Bild " inhärent wären, und die es uns erlaubt hätten, irgendein Objekt aufgrund der formalen Anzeichen als ein Bild zu qualifizieren.

Diese Variabilität des Bildbegriffs wird nicht selten nur in geschichtlicher Perspektive sichtbar. Die Formen der Bilder und Bilderfahrungen kommen und gehen, und nur das Wort „Bild" nach wie vor bleibt im Gebrauch.

Das „Bild" ist – so eine der meinen Thesen – nicht ein deskriptiver, sondern eher ein normativer Begriff. Dieser Begriff nicht einfach beschreibt etwas, das an sich ein Bild-Objekt *ist* und entsprechende „bildhafte" Eigenschaften *hat*, sondern einen offenen Horizont vorgibt, innerhalb dessen etwas als ein Bild erfahren werden *kann*. Dies findet seinen Ausdruck unter anderem darin, dass Bildbegriff – ebenso wie Kunstbegriff – ein Streitbegriff ist. Ob ein Objekt in der Tat ein Bild ist, darüber kann man streiten. Und diese Streitigkeit ist in den Bildbegriff selbst eingebettet. Nicht zuletzt ist es damit verbunden, dass das Bild (mindestens sogenanntes eminentes oder starkes Bild) nicht auf eine Sinngebung von außen warten muss, sondern es selbst eine Quelle der Sinngebung sein *kann*. Der Sinn wird dem Bild nicht durch eine Leistung des wahrnehmenden Subjektes gebracht. Das gilt nur den bestimmten Klassen der bildhaften Darstellungen, deren materielle Verfassung im Großen und Ganzen arbiträr ist. Dazu gehören z.B. verschiedene Karte, Diagramme, Piktogramme, Schemata und so fort. Was die Bilder im engeren und sogar eminenten Sinn (z.B. Photographie, Film und Malerei) anbetrifft, können sie meistens nicht von ihrer situativen materielleren Verfassung separiert werden, die zu ihrem „Sinngehalt" einen essentiellen Beitrag leistet. Daraus folgt unter anderem, dass die Bilder von solcher Art gewisse Autonomie den subjektiven Sinngebungen gegenüber beibehalten.

Ich plädiere also für einen sozusagen dynamischen und graduellen Bildbegriff.

Vielleicht ist es recht plausibel, die traditionelle philosophische (Wesens)-Frage auch im Feld der Bild-Forschung umzuformulieren: statt „Was ist das Bild?", müssen wir – in Anlehnung an Nelson Goodman – „Wann ist das Bild?" fragen.[4]

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4 Oliver R. Scholz, „When is a picture?", in: *Synthese* 95, den Haag: Springer, 1993, pp. 95–106.

Das Bild ist nicht so viel ein Zeichen oder ein Artefakt als eine Konstellation, die dennoch die Prämisse des Vorhandenseins des auf bestimmte Weise geformten Objekts nicht ausschließt. Aber solch ein Objekt stellt eine der notwendigen Komponenten der genannten Konstellation dar, die obwohl auf diese Komponente angewiesen ist, geht dennoch in ihrer inneren Tendenz über sie (ihr bloßes Vorhandensein) hinaus. Das „Bild als solches" ist eher als eine Möglichkeit zu verstehen, die in zahlreichen „faktischen Bildern" verschiedene approximative Verkörperungen findet. Daraus folgt, dass der Bildbegriff einen normativen Charakter nicht nur in dem Sinn hat, dass er ein „konstitutiver", „horizonterschließender" Begriff ist, sondern auch angesichts seiner „Gradualität". Viele bildhafte Darstellungen sind fähig, nur einen Teil der Potenzen in Gang zu bringen, die das Bild überhaupt zeigen könnte. Darum schlage ich vor, die „Bildhaftigkeit" nicht als topologische (in der Imagination lokalisierte *Inhalte*) oder gegenständliche (auf bestimmte Weise gestaltete *Objekte*), sondern als eine strukturelle Charakteristik (eine bestimmte *Konstellation*) zu verstehen. Mit anderen Worten, was ein Bild zum Bild macht, ist die besondere Erfahrungsstruktur, der die besondere Struktur sowie besonderer Status der Materialität des wahrgenommenen „Objekts" entspricht. Dabei sind diese Strukturbildungen in Hinsicht auf ihre Vollkommenheit, oder Dichtheit sehr variabel, und die Entsprechung von Erfahrungs- und Gegenstandsstrukturen wird jeweils in verschiedenem Grade realisiert.

Um diese Konstellation zu erläutern, werden wir einen raschen Blick in die Grundstruktur des Bildes bzw. Bildwahrnehmung tun.

3. Die Grundstruktur des Bildes

Wenn es sich um das graduelle und – das heißt – dynamische Verständnis des Bildes handelt, dann müssen die Extremfälle und entsprechende paradigmatische Beispiele angegeben werden, die das Bildhaftigkeitsspektrum (Spektrum der Gradualität der Bildhaftigkeit) vorgeben.

In Anlehnung an Gottfried Boehm, der bei der „ikonischen Wende" Pate gestanden hat, unterscheiden wir zwei idealtypische Extremfälle der „Bildhaftigkeit": schwache und starke Bilder, die in semantischer wie ontologischer

Hinsicht ganz verschieden sind.[5] Diese zwei Extremfälle, die unserer Distinktion von ikonischen Zeichen und Bildern entsprechen, deuten auch auf den kategorialen Unterschied an, der zwischen dem Hinweisen (auf) und Zeigen (von) als zwei Grundformen der bildbezogenen Repräsentation besteht. Die diesen Grundformen entsprechenden sinnstiftenden oder sinnvermittelnden Potenzen beruhen, wie gesagt, auf der jeweiligen Rolle der Materialität innerhalb der bildlichen Darstellung. Was ein Bild vom ikonischen Zeichen (z.B. Piktogramm) unterscheidet ist die *Tendenz* zu – sogar Drang nach – der Herausbildung des unauflösbaren Zusammenhangs von sinnhaften und materiellen Elementen der bildlichen Darstellung, d.h. des Zusammenhangs von der Repräsentation des im Bilde Dargestellten und der Präsentation des Bildes selbst.

Um diese Behauptung zu erläutern, besprechen wir kurz die Grundstruktur des visuellen „starken" Bildes, d.h. die Grundstruktur der entsprechenden Bildkonstellation. Als Paradebeispiel des Bildes dieser Art nehmen wir zweidimensionales materielles Bild (Gemälde, Photographie, Darstellung auf dem Bildschirm und so fort). Diese Wahl hat mindestens zwei Gründe. Erstens gelten heute die Bilder dieser Art als die bekanntest und verbreitest. Meistens denkt man eben an solche Bilder, wenn man irgendwie Bezug auf die Bilder – egal, von welcher Art – nimmt. Darum dürfen wir gerade solche Phänomene als Ursprungs-oder Basisformen der gegenwärtigen Vorstellungen vom Bild und Bildlichen betrachten. Zweitens hat dieses Beispiel einen wichtigen methodischen Vorrang der Externalität, was unter anderem uns erlaubt, die mentalistischen Fehldeutungen der Bilderfrage zu vermeiden und unsere Ausrichtung auf die strukturellen Charakteristika nochmals zu unterstreichen.

In Anlehnung an die Husserls dreifache Struktur des Gegenstands der Bildwahrnehmung[6] unterscheide ich drei Grundkomponente, drei Grundschichten der Bildkonstellation:

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5 Gottfried Boehm, „Die Wiederkehr der Bilder", in: G. Boehm (Hg.) „Was ist ein Bild?", München: Fink, 1994, S. 11–38.
6 Edmund Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen* (Husserliana XXIII). Den Haag/Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1980. S. 19.

Die erste Grundschicht möchte ich *tabula* nennen. Darunter verstehe ich eine „physische" Grundlage der bildlichen Darstellung: Leinen, Fotopapier, Bildschirm, Farbe, Pigment etc. Diese Schicht kann man auch Bild-Objekt oder Bildträger nennen. Obwohl tabula eine nicht unerhebliche Rolle im „Sein" des Bildes spielt, macht sie kaum einen eigentlichen Gegenstand der Bildwahrnehmung aus. Anders gesagt zeichnet sie sich nicht durch Bildhaftigkeit aus. Dieses Element der Bilderfahrung hat vielmehr einen *außerbildlichen* Charakter. Daraus folgt unter anderem, dass nicht jede Bild*erfahrung* in die Bild*wahrnehmung* mündet. Es gibt verschiedene Umgangsweisen mit Bildern (im Sinne der Bild-Dingen), die sich auf ein Bild so beziehen, dass seine spezifisch bildhaften Züge nicht ins Spiel (und d.h. nicht zum Vorschein) kommen. Auf jeden Fall nicht direkt. Indirekt lenken diese *im gegebenen Moment nicht erscheinenden* Züge unsere mannigfaltigen „nichtikonischen" Umgangsweisen mit Bildern. Z.B. hängen wir ein Gemälde an die Wand nicht ganz ebenso wie ein Bücherregal. Aber vor allen Dingen wirkt sich diese – „physische" – Schicht auf die Verbreitungs- bzw. Präsentationsmöglichkeiten der bildlichen Inhalte aus. Die fast grenzenlose Mobilität der photographischen Darstellungen (insbesondere der digitalen), die sie ihrer „physischen" Grundschicht verdanken, hat zweifelsohne sehr starken Einfluss auf die spezifisch bildhaften Effekte der Photographie. Obwohl diese „physische" Schicht des Bildes nur in der sogenannten „normalen" (pragmatisch orientierten) Wahrnehmungsweisen zugänglich ist, befinden sich diese letzteren ihrerseits im Gravitationsfeld der möglichen Bildwahrnehmung, in die sie gegebenenfalls verwandelt werden *können*. In dieser Hinsicht macht die Erfahrung von tabula eine Art Vorspiel und Vorfeld von jeder eigentlichen Bildwahrnehmung aus. Damit aber diese eigentliche Wahrnehmung stattfinden kann, muss die zweite Grundschicht – pictura – vorliegen.

Pictura ist eigentlich „Bildnis". Sie ist die „bedeutende" Fläche, die durch eine bestimmte Anordnung der materiellen ikonischen (innerbildlichen) Elemente (Farbgrund, Pigmente, Farblinien, Farbpunkte und so fort) in Erscheinung tritt. Pictura ist gerade das, worauf das Subjekt der Bildwahrnehmung *blickt*, aber nicht ganz und nicht immer das, was er in der Tat *sieht*. Aber diese zweifache Blickrichtung (Blicken und Sehen) stellt eine Ermöglichungsbedingung der Wahrnehmung der dritten Schichte – imago – dar. Dabei ist zu be-

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merken, dass pictura als solche nur für das analytisch eingestellte Bewusstsein zugänglich ist, das ein Ding als bedeutende Fläche (derer Elemente zueinander in einem nicht-metrischen Verhältnis stehen) zu identifizieren vermag.

Was ich *imago* nenne, ist das Bild im engeren und eigentlichen Sinn. Imago ist gerade das, was in und durch „pictura" gesehen wird, die bildhafte Darstellung, die nicht das Transzendieren (gedankliches Überschreiten), sondern die (innerhalb der Bildwahrnehmung zu vollziehende) Transformation der materiellen Bildfläche (pictura) ist. In diesem Sinn wäre es eine Missdeutung, die Materialität der bildhaften Darstellung zu verleugnen. Aber diese Materialität ist von besonderer Natur. Sie wird nicht einfach als eine passive Masse wahrgenommen, sondern sie *leistet* einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur unseren Fähigkeit, die Bilder (in allen drei Aspekten) wahrzunehmen.

Jetzt werfen wir einen kurzen Blick auf die Typen der für die Bildwahrnehmung konstitutiven Materialität, um dann ihre Rolle in der bildhaften Sinnerzeugung zu erörtern.

Zuerst ist zu bemerken, dass die oben aufgezählten Grundschichten des Bildes relativ selbständig sind. Unter ihnen nur imago schließt in sich zwei andere ein, während tabula und sogar pictura ohne imago durchaus wahrnehmbar sind. Dies kommt zum Ausdruck in den verschiedenen Erfahrungen, die wir mit den Bildern machen können. Wir können mit Bildern umgehen, ohne sie aktuell als bildhafte Darstellung wahrzunehmen: zum Beispiel im Fall der pragmatisch oder reflexiv-analytisch motivierten Zugänge zu Bildern.

Diesen drei Grundschichten entsprechen drei Typen der Materialität, die ihrerseits verschiedene Beträge zur Bilderfahrung leisten, d.h. verschiedenen ontologischen und semantischen Status innerhalb der Bilderfahrung haben.

Im Aspekt „tabula" stellt das Bild ein materielles Objekt dar, das auf dieselbe Weise wahrnehmbar ist wie die anderen – nichtikonischen – Dinge. Diese Art von Materialität hat *außersemantischen* Charakter, was sich in der Notwendigkeit ihrer verbalen Artikulation zeigt, die erst es erlaubt, diesen Aspekt zu identifizieren und konkretisieren. Materialität des Bild-Objektes können wir als *abgrenzend* kennzeichnen. Sie bietet uns die Möglichkeit, das Bild-Objekt im Raum zu lokalisieren und mit ihm auf passende Weise praktisch umzugehen.

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Im Aspekt „pictura" ist das Bild ein ikonisches Zeichen: ein relativ dichter syntaktischer Zusammenhang der ikonischen Elemente. Diesem Aspekt wie jedem Zeichen entspricht *präsemantische* Materialität. Im Unterschied zur Materialität des „physischen" Objekts fordert sie nicht eine „Sinngebung" von außen. Sie muss jeweils in den Prozess der „Sinnbildung", d.h. in die Semiose einbezogen sein. Also können wir die Materialität des Bild-Zeichens als *unterstützend* charakterisieren. Sie hat eine fördernde Funktion, indem sie zur Semiose einen Beitrag leistet. Diese Materialität hat einen relationalen Charakter, weil sie sich nur innerhalb der Semiose zeigt (sonst wäre sie ein Teil des Bild-Objektes und hätte darum einen außersemantischen Status). In ontologischer Hinsicht ist solche Materialität nicht etwas Gegebenes (eine Eigenschaft, die ein Bild-Ding *hat*), sondern etwas Erscheinendes, das sich nur als integrale Komponente der bedeutenden Fläche offenbart. Daraus folgt auch die relative Selbständigkeit der Materialität dieser Art.

190   Die Materialität des „imago" hat den *semantischen* Charakter. Sie integriert sich ins Geschehen des Sich-Zeigens des Bildes, das zugleich ein Geschehen der bildhaften Darstellung ist. Die Sichtbarkeit und Verstehbarkeit des starken Bildes sind miteinander verwoben. Das Sehen und Verstehen – Sehen-in und Sehen-als (Boehm) – machen eine dynamische und dennoch unhintergehbare Einheit aus.[7] Die Materialität des starken oder eminenten Bildes können wir die ekstatische oder *mediale* Materialität nennen. Sie stellt eine integrale Komponente der eigentümlichen Präsenz des Bildes dar. Strenggenomen fällt sie mit dieser Präsenz zusammen. In gewissem Sinn geht sie der „zu erzeugenden Bedeutung" voraus, weil diese Bedeutung letztlich jeweils aus ihr hervorgeht und nicht von ihr separiert werden kann. Damit ist auch eine gewisse Intransparenz oder Unhintergehbarkeit der bildhaften Materialität, eine gewisse *Diffusion von Materiellem und Sinnhaftem* verbunden.

Zusammenfassend können wir diese drei Materialitätsformen auch auf folgende Weise charakterisieren: wenn die erste eine wahrnehmbare Eigenschaft des Bilddinges ist, stellt die zweite ein Element innerhalb der Semiose

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7 Gottfried Boehm, *Wie die Bilder Sinn erzeugen. Die Macht des Zeigens*, Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2007, S. 39.

dar, während die dritte als eine Art Erscheinungsmilieu fungiert, d.h. nicht so sehr als ein Wahrnehmungs*gegenstand* oder *Voraussetzung*, sondern als ein Wahrnehmungs*raum*.

Dieser dreifachen Materialität entsprechen verschiedene Bilderfahrungen: das *Manipulieren* mit Bilddingen, das *Identifizieren* des Bildinhalts und das *Verweilen* bei der Bild-Konstellation.

Um die materielle Eigenart der Bilder etwas klarer zu machen, möchte ich einen weiteren Unterschied vorschlagen: zwischen physischer Oberfläche und ikonischer Fläche.

Dieser Unterschied hat *normativen* Charakter. Er kann als Bezugsrahmen für das Bestimmen des Spezifikums der ikonischen Materialität dienen. Aber er ist auch phänomenologisch ausweisbar.

Physische Oberfläche zeichnet sich durch prinzipielle Pluralität aus. Jede Oberfläche wird durch die anderen Oberflächen begrenzt. Damit wir einzelne Oberfläche wahrnehmen können, müssen wir auch angrenzende Flächen in Betracht ziehen (mitwahrnehmen), die dabei als konstitutives Wahrnehmungselement dienen (als notwendiges und phänomenales Limit). Die Erfahrung der physischen Oberflächen ist diskret, was andererseits eine grundsätzliche Voraussetzung der Kontinuität der Dingwahrnehmung ausmacht.

Ikonische Fläche ist umgekehrt grundsätzlich singulär. Sie kennt keine sichtbaren Grenzen (wenn man sie nicht mit physischer Oberfläche verwechselt, die ein Korrelat der pragmatisch motivierten Perzeption ist.). Im Unterschied zur physischen *Ober*fläche hat ikonische Fläche keine sie *transzendierende* Tiefe. Sie ist nicht auf einen entsprechenden Träger angewiesen (auf jeden Fall nicht bei ihrer Wahrnehmung), während im Fall der physischen Oberfläche wir in der Regel anzudeuten vermögen, was ihr Träger ist, – etwas, das sie *hat*.

Um diesen Unterschied noch schärfer zu profilieren, machen wir uns auf solchen konstitutiven Aspekt der Wahrnehmung der ikonischen Fläche wie Simultaneität aufmerksam.

4. Simultaneität: nicht-transitorischer Charakter der Bildwahrnehmung

Die Wahrnehmung der Bildfläche unterliegt den besonderen Bedingungen: Alle Elemente der ikonischen Fläche – in Unterschied zu physischer Oberfläche – müssen simultan wahrgenommen werden. Strenggenommen lässt nur diese Simultaneität die eine der Oberflächen eines physischen Bildobjekts zur ikonischen Fläche werden. D.h. nur durch sie kann die Bildfläche bzw. ihre eigentümliche Materialität zur Erscheinung gebracht werden.

Hier schließe ich an Martin Seels These über den konstitutiven Charakter der Simultaneität für ästhetisches Erscheinen an, das dabei als eine bestimmte Konstellation der „äußeren" Welt verstanden wird.[8] Gerade der folgerichtige Externalismus ist ein der Vorteile des Seels Position in diesem Punkt.

Aber ich möchte vorschlagen, den Unterschied zwischen dem ästhetischen (pictura) und *ikonischen* (imago) Erscheinen zu machen. Obwohl das letztere auf dem ersteren beruht, entspricht jedem von ihnen seine eigene Art der Simultaneität. Die *ikonische Simultaneität* zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass sie die metrischen (messbaren) Verhältnisse der Elemente von pictura in die grammatischen (syntaktischen) von imago verwandelt. Die syntaktischen (oder sinnhaften) Zusammenhänge – im Unterschied zu metrischen – nicht so sehr anordnen die gegebenen ikonischen Elemente als machen sie erst sichtbar (ein Farbfleck kann zum ikonischen Element, d.h. zum Element des Bildes nur als ein integraler Teil der ikonischen Fläche *werden*). Bei dieser Verwandlung bleiben wir nicht nur an die Materialität der Bildfläche angewiesen, sondern gewinnen sogar näheren Kontakt mit ihr, tauchen in sie tiefer ein. Dieses Eintauchen ist nicht so sehr von sensitiver als kognitiver Natur, weil materielle Komponenten hier einen dichten syntaktischen Zusammenhang bilden und sich nur im und als diesen Zusammengang zeigen. Je mehr wir uns auf den „Inhalt" des Bildes konzentrieren, desto nachdrücklicher die ikonische Materialität ins Spiel kommt. Der (materielle) Grund des Bildes wird dabei gerade nicht zurückgedrängt (zugunsten des freien Spiels der Phantasie des wahrnehmenden Subjekts), sondern ganz umge-

8 Martin Seel, Ästhetik des Erscheinens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003.

kehrt taucht er innerhalb der Bildwahrnehmung hartnäckig empor.[9]

Die Bildwahrnehmung (in erster Linie gilt das für imago) ist nicht so sehr der Akt der identifizierenden (erkennenden) Auffassung als der eigentümliche Zeit-Raum des „scannenden" *Verweilens* (Vilém Flusser).[10]

Die Bildwahrnehmung (im Sinne von imago) hat eine eigene Zeitlichkeit und Präsenzweise und stellt eine Aufgabe dar, an der wir auch scheitern können. Offensichtlich ist ein solches Scheitern im Fall der sowohl Ding- als auch Zeichenerfahrung viel seltener, weil in diesen Fällen die Wahrnehmungsgegenstände unsere begriffsgeleiteten Antizipationen meistens bestätigen (während bei den vielen Bildwahrnehmungen diese Antizipationen weit überstiegen werden). Die Bildwahrnehmung (imago) kann nicht in den Zusammenhang von weiteren Wahrnehmungen eingebaut werden, egal, ob es hier um Bild- oder Dingwahrnehmungen geht. In diesem Sinn ist sie absolut, d.h. *nicht-transitorisch*.

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5. Die bildhafte Präsenz/Die Präsenz des Bildes

Zum Schluss sagen wir ein paar Worten über die Hauptprobleme des Aufsatzes: über das Problem der Bild-Semantik und das der Bild-Ontologie in ihrem Zusammenhang und ihrem Bezug auf die Gadamersche Bildtheorie.

Natürlich kann das Bild als ikonisches Zeichen fungieren, aber nur wenn eine bestimmte Bildkonstellation (bestimmte Anordnung der konstitutiven Bildelemente) vorhanden ist: nämlich, wenn eine bildhafte Darstellung sich strukturell auf zwei Elemente (tabula und pictura) beschränkt. Ein gutes Beispiel dafür ist Piktogramm.

Wenn es aber um die „starken" Bilder (imago, Bildfläche) geht, bleibt es zu wenig Gründe, das Wort „Zeichen" in Bezug darauf zu verwenden. Die Antwort auf die Frage „Was stellt ein Bild dar?" wird in diesem Fall auf folgende Weise klingen: „sich selbst".

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9 Jean-Luc Nancy, *Am Grund der Bilder*, Berlin: Diaphanes, 2006, 10.
10 Vilém Flusser, *Für eine Philosophie der Photographie*, Berlin: European Photography, 2006, S. 8–9.

Aber „das Bild selbst" (im Sinn des imago, des eminenten Bildes) ist kein Zeichen, das über sich hinaus auf etwas hinweist, sondern eine Art Konstellation, eine besondere Art von Präsenz, die sich auf die Selbsterfahrung des wahrnehmenden Subjekts auswirkt. Solch ein Bild – als eine eigentümliche Interdependenz von Sinnhaftem und Materiellem – ist nicht so sehr ein Gegenstand (egal von welcher Art), der in der „äußeren" Welt seinen Platz findet, als eine Verdichtung der Weltverhältnisse, die *im* starken Bild und *als* starkes Bild *sichtbar* werden. In diesem Fall kann das Sehen nicht umhin, *gleichzeitig* das (sinnliche) Verstehen zu sein. Während ein *Ding* auf das Sinnverleihen wartet und ein *Symbol* auf seine Verkörperung, stellt das starke *Bild*, das sich durch *volle Bildstruktur* auszeichnet, ein Paradebeispiel des („immer schon") *verkörperten Sinns* dar.

In Korrelation mit semantischen Fragen stehen die ontologischen. Den Modi und Funktionen der bildhaften Repräsentation entsprechen die bildhaften Präsenzweisen, die ihrerseits in entsprechendem Status und entsprechenden Funktionen der Bildmaterie ihren Ausdruck finden. Tabula, pictura und imago können sowohl die verschiedenen Manifestationen der Bildhaftigkeit (verschiede Bildarten) als auch die nur relativ zu verselbständigenden Schichten der komplexen Bildkonstellation sein. Die Bilder im Ganzen und starke Bilder im Einzelnen sind nicht schlechthin vorhanden. Sie führen eher eine Art schillernde Existenz, die nicht zuletzt von vorhandenem Register der Materialitätsregimes abhängig ist.

Wahrscheinlich, gerade dieser Zusammenhang von Geschehenscharakter des Bildes und seinen Materialitätsstrukturen rückt den Gadamerschen Entwurf der großangelegten Bildtheorie zum ersten Mal ins rechte Licht. Weil wenn das Bildhafte als ein universelles dynamisches Prinzip nicht nur der menschlichen Welt, sondern der ganzen Natur postuliert wird, soll in den transformativen Sog dieser vielstufigen und vielschichtigen Dynamik der "Verwandlung ins Gebilde" auch die performativ formbare Materialität einbezogen sein. Nur in diesem Fall können wir über den allumfassenden Charakter solcher Transformation reden und die hermeneutischen analytischen Prozeduren, die sich im Kontext der grobmaschigen Analysen der allgemeinen ontologischen Erfahrungsstruktur als sehr fruchtbar ausgewiesen haben, auch auf die feinkörnigen Betrachtungen der sich ständig ändernden materiellen kommunikativen Milieus ausdehnen.

Krešimir Purgar

MODALITIES OF PICTORIAL APPEARING: FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

Introduction: theoretical framing of *appearing*

Although still used as signifiers in the uninterrupted chain of semiosis, images today mean increasingly little and even less seldom do they represent. The availability of digital coding led to the manner of their appearing – that is, the ontological level of pictorial cognition – being in terms of information and communication more important than the iconological and semiotic level of pictorial cognition. Following this rather technical insight, it is necessary to think anew the relationship between aesthetics and *aiesthesis*. The German philosopher Martin Seel has included art, image and sensousness into a new kind of phenomenologically based understanding of art objects that he calls the *aesthetics of appearing* [Ästhetik des Erscheinens].[1] Seel's concept is designed, above all, for the sake of an aesthetic analysis of systematically new phenomena of beauty that in the age of the technosphere are realised no more as signifiers of the classic European metaphysical tradition but as visual phenomena that are realised aesthetically and artistically through their own mechanisms of sensoriness. However, what seems the most important contribution of the aesthetics of appearing is precisely the omission of criteria based on historical and theoretical canons of beauty, as well as the relativisation of

1 Martin Seel, *Aesthetics of Appearing* [Åsthetik *des Erscheinens*, München und Wien: Carl Hansen Verlag, 2000]; translated by John Farrell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

art historical topoi. This does not mean that classical artworks have ceased to be peaks of the humanist tradition; it does mean that their appearing, like the appearing of any other object, has to be comprehended in the light of the new paradigms of *becoming*, *emergence* and *event*. Whether the object in its appearing will be constituted as aesthetic object or common-or-garden thing depends on the observer's capacities of intuition and imagination. Although Seel does not limit his research to pictorial media, the aesthetics of appearing is based on the modalities of *pictorial* appearing, but not viceversa: the modalities of pictorial appearing are not necessarily involved in any kind of aesthetic experience. Having in mind that the *aesthetical* does not have to be *pictorial*, in this article we will give the *pictorial appearing* its theoretical independence. Starting from the difference that exists between aesthetic object and any other kind of object, we will try to open the discussion about what defines the aspects of "pure" visibility on the one hand and visibility of the image on the other.

196   The difference between visuality and pictoriality is comparable to the difference between simple sensuousness and aesthetic perception. Seel says of this:

"In principle, anything that can be perceived sensuously can also be perceived aesthetically. Among possible aesthetic objects, there are not only perceivable things and their constellations, but also events and their sequences – in short, all states or occurrences of which we can say that we saw, heard, felt or otherwise sensed them. Nevertheless, the concept of aesthetic object does not coincide with the general concept of an object of perception, because what is sensuously perceivable and can therefore be the occasion of aesthetic perception is not for that reason already an aesthetic object. All aesthetic objects are objects of intuition, but not all objects of intuition are aesthetic objects."[2]

Since this kind of stance clearly indicates Seel's polemical attitude towards the inheritance of metaphysical aesthetics, at the beginning of his analysis he also distances himself from the tradition of the analytical philosophy of art following on from Arthur Danto: although he is in agreement with the American philosopher than any object can have aesthetic qualities (that is, "it can be aesthetically perceived"), Seel thinks that this fact is due to the manner of the appearing of the concrete object in the visible world, and not to the features

2 Martin Seel, *Aesthetics of Appearing*, pp. 21–22.

that have been ascribed to this object in some institutional or social context. Seel's theory is essentially phenomenologically determined for it is sceptical in equal measures about the philosophical and speculative source of aesthetic experience and about its conceptualisation. Accordingly, he sends aesthetic experience back from the domain of intellectual perception to the domain of sensoriness, from the activity of critical reflection to the event and phenomenality of appearing.[3] This is in a sense a return to the original Kantian teaching of "disinterested pleasure": it does not mean that the aesthetic object must not have any purpose other than being the object of pure aesthetic pleasure, rather that the human mind is capable of seeing or experiencing some object – outside or beyond its practical function – as an aesthetic object as well. Duchamp did not draw attention to the neglected beauty of the urinal nor did he reveal its aesthetic dimension that had been suppressed for years, just as Cézanne's painting is not interesting because of the artist's experience of nature. We appreciate both, like most of the great artists of modernity, because of the change of paradigm of the creation of the artwork, from the individual artistic genius to public critical judgement, i.e. from work-as-object in the direction of observer-as-subject.

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But, how the things stand with images in general? Does (non-art) pictorial appearing have any other similarities with the much more exclusive Seel concept of aesthetic appearing, apart from the fact that in both cases we are more interested in visual and sensory phenomena than sign and textual narration? Can pictorial experience in the time and space of the technosphere still be articulated as iconic difference? The main thesis of this article is that today it is precisely the perception of difference, or the ability to differentiate a real from a virtual experience of the image the place in which the drama of the real, to put it in Baudrillard's terms, is played out. It seems to us that in the age when traditional images are increasingly less differentiated from immersive synaesthetic experiences (which are also partly visual phenomena, but are not images alone), there is a need for an equal perceptual concentration for us to recognise either an original art object or some simple pictorial object.[4]

3 Op. cit., p. 23.
4 See my article "What is not an Image (Anymore)? Iconic Difference, Immersion and

Another German author important for our discussion, Dieter Mersch, explains that the "logic of iconic structures" is also in essence the logic of the perception of the difference between picture and frame, i.e., image and non-image, the iconic thus necessarily being something like phenomenon or occurrence, rather than text or sign.[5] He claims that the "pictorially visible" is a differently visible than the "nonpictorial visual", because the picture possesses a distinctive material status through which a difference is produced between on the one hand something that is visible precisely as image and, on the other hand, something that is also visible, but is a mere visual phenomenon that is not an image. Mersch says that even the totally immersive experience of IMAX cinema can be considered an image for there is still a border that frames the in-the-image from the surrounding visual.[6] Although in this book, and in other places, I also urge that in the case of immersion there is a marginal experience of the image and although I agree with Mersch it is still a matter of a pictorial phenomenon, the question remains whether that is really because, as he says, in the cinema we see the frame of the screen and the seat in front of us and we feel the specific cinema arrangement, or whether it is actually because we know that cinematographic apparatus is involved, together with the traditional institution of the cinema, which has not changed its illusionist character since the beginning of the era of moving images? True, much more important for us than this epistemological speculation is the phenomenological insight of Mersch according to which it is the immersive experience of the image that wipes out the basis of pictorial ontology: "All technical illusionism, what can be called pictorial immersiveness, finds in it its dynamics and its futility". What the image attempts is equivalent to a paradox: "the effacement of that which constitutes the viewing of an image, and thus the erasure of pictoriality as a medium. The logic of technological progress exists due to this telos: a medium that negates its own mediality".[7]

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Iconic Simultaneity"; Phainomena, no. 92/93, vol. XXIV, 2015. pp. 92–93, 2015.
5 Dieter Mersch "Pictorial Thinking: On the 'Logic' of Iconic Structures"; in: Žarko Paić and Krešimir Purgar (eds.) *Theorizing Images*; Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcaste, 2016.
6 Dieter Mersch, op. cit. pp. 163–166.
7 Op. cit., p. 166.

From this it follows that the observation of the modality of pictorial appearing is the fundamental precondition for both the possibility of aesthetic perception and also of the perception of the image in general as phenomena that have an interior logic different from that of reality (or continuum of reality) in which they are located as objects of perception. These modalities have to be precisely defined, for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, because they can throw a new light on the still unresolved aporias of the pictorial turn, primarily that part of it that dealt with the issue of the domination of the visual by the textual and vice versa; and secondly, because the technosphere faces pictorial mediality with completely new challenges: the question arises, that is, how to preserve a person's capacity for the artistic transcending of reality when the experiences of pictorial representation – traditional painting and cinematography in the "old fashioned" 2D technique, for example – vanish in the digital worlds of virtuality, in which transcendence is actually no longer possible? If art in the pre-digital era was the only means through which it was possible to transgress the borders of cognition/perception and comprehend reality outside the framework of mere necessity, then the virtual space of some immersive reality makes art today equally impossible and unnecessary. As Martin Seel and Dieter Mersch suggest, a new strategy of art accordingly must be identical to the new strategy of the image: the *iconic* that in his text of 1978 Gottfried Boehm could still call *image-as-difference*, in the epochal turn of the technical-scientific age has to be turned into the *image-as-appearing*.

In order to set up a plausible model of universal pictorial appearing taking into account equally changes in the mediality of images as well as Mersch's contrast of the pictorial and the visual (one of the basic features of the technosphere), it is necessary to liberate images of the surplus of content inscribed, that is, approach them as abstract entities; I do not necessarily think here of pictures of abstract art, but as pictures as objects set free of culturally inherited aesthetic content.[8] Martin Seel in *The Aesthetics of Appearing* sets himself a

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8 In the second part of *Aesthetics of Appearing* is an essay entitled "Thirteen Statements on the the picture" in which the German author expressly states that the problem of the ontology of the picture is opened up more clearly if we start off from abstract images, sinve they do not bear the burden of representation: "Every theory of the image has on the one hand to explain how the pictured object is linked with the pictured

harder task for not only does he attempt to split off the factual kind of appearing (constitutive for any object at all) from the concrete phenomenal appearing (which is a precondition for aesthetic differentiation), but also endeavours within the desired aesthetic norm to set up criteria for noticing those phenomena that take part *only* in the aesthetics of appearing. Unlike the approach to the aesthetic object in traditional hermeneutic disciplines, like art history for example, in which some object – painting or three-dimensional object – is ascribed artistic properties in the process of interpretation, Seel's method assumes a process of subtraction or abstraction of a multitude of the phenomenal features of some object and drawing attention to only those phenomena that are aesthetically relevant. He calls this process of aesthetic reduction of all those unlimited and never ultimately comprehensive phenomena that make up the universal facticity of some object "the simultaneous and momentary appearing of appearances".[9] In other words, something can occur or appear in a specific way, in some context and in a specific manner of looking, irrespective of all those universal and permanent features of that object according to which it would not actually be particularly aesthetically interesting. The *appearance* of an object is its universal factuality according to which we recognise the object within one class of visually and haptically perceptible objects. On the other hand, *appearing* is an aesthetic operation of visual focusing and sensory comprehension of the object in a new status: at once liberated of the multiplicity of its everyday appearance and also enriched with a unique "simultaneous and momentary" appearing.

In this German author, as we can see, we are faced above all with a model of understanding artistic objects, while our analysis refers primarily to the much more general concept of *iconic* difference. To this extent the modalities of pictorial appearing that I shall propose here are not entirely comparable

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depiction,, and on the other how the pictured depiction is connected with representation". In other words, the concept of representation in any event complicates what the picture itself is, for it is clear that representation is above all the relation between the presence of what is depicted in the picture and its absent referent. For this reason, when we have to do with non-figurative pictures, Seel concludes that the so-called abstract picture "is proved to be the most concrete and hence the paradigmatic picture" (see: M. Seel, *Aesthetics of Appearing*, pp. 161–163.)
9 Seel, op. cit., pp. 46–62.

with appearing as aesthetic category described in Martin Seel, but they are also not general categories of appearance – the merely visual or visible. I shall use *Erscheinen* only partially in the Seel sense, primarily thinking here of the abstraction of the symbolic-narrative content of the image through a kind of phenomenological turn from the textual to the iconic substance of the artistic (in this case pictorial) object. I shall attempt, thus, to come closer to phenomenological models that invoke Seel's "event and moment of appearing", then Boehm's "iconic difference" as well as Mersch's "pictorially visible", and apply them taking into consideration above all the consequences of Paič's interpretation of the technosphere, an interpretation that dramatically draws attention to the completely new meaning of concepts like the real, the simulated and the virtual.[10] In addition, or primarily perhaps, my intention in the sequel is to describe four basic modalities of pictorial appearing, in order in the second part of the book to consider with respect to concrete examples the possibilities of a new theory of the image outside the essentialist-subjectivist aporias.

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1. Temporality: representational, simultaneous and reciprocal images

The most important change that digital technology has brought to the whole of visual culture is the totally new effect of *time* in the production and perception of images. The basic characteristic of representation, i.e. of the reproduced image, whether painting on canvas, photography or film – is that it is always a visual phenomenon that has come into being only *after* the represented event took place. The purpose of representation and the visual arts that have been based on it during the several-millennia-long history of images was

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10 Among the Croatian authors, Žarko Paić has most systematically argued on the account of *technosphere* as a term that defines consequences of the technological turn in the contemporary universe of humanist thought. According to Paić, technosphere is a new time and space of the image in which new digital construction of reality does not aim at creating a sort of new utopia, or new model od representing the world, rather technosphere is now *itself* this new world. For more about this see in: Žarko Paić, *Treća zemlja. Tehnosfera i umjetnost*; Litteris, Zagreb, 2015. On the contextualisation of Paić's concept of technosphere in connection to *Bildwissenschaft* and also on his general thoughts about this specific term see in: Krešimir Purgar, "Zero Degree of Representation. Art, Technique and *Pictorial Appearing*"; *Ars Adriatica*, no. 6/2016.

precisely in enabling the division between the unfolding of the experience of life as temporal continuum from the experience of art as cut inside the continuum. Until the appearance of direct televisual transmissions with the help of video-links or somewhat later with the aid of satellites, every image could be *only* representation, that is, the image always followed the principle of temporal otherness or discontinuity with respect to the relentless course of time. The image halted time, although it was not its main ontological property, for the problem of pictorial anachronism has always been a priori experienced as innate to what the image is – that is, halted time that has always already occurred. Since not a single picture that was created before the twentieth century could have been simultaneous with the event it depicted, the problem of temporality is seen in relation to the characteristics of the intra-pictorial depiction and not with respect to the source reality. Irrespective of how long a period of time represented in the image was concerned, every representation was ontologically congruent with any other.

Let us take as an example a depiction of movement in four totally distinct categories of representation that all present some kind or phase of movement but differ in terms of their media basis: Caravaggio's *Entombment* of 1603; a series of photographs of a horse galloping by Edward Muybridge of 1878 and his proto-cinematographic device called the zoopraxiscope; then the painting of Marcel Duchamp, *Nude Descending a Staircase* of 1912, the Umberto Boccioni sculpture *Continuity of Space* of 1913 and finally the oil on canvas of Gerhard Richter *Woman Descending a Staircase* of 1965. In order to depict movement, each of these artists had to find a manner of how to condense the time necessary for movement to be distinguished from the depiction of some static scene. Photography, oil on canvas and sculpture require intervention in the content and the stylistic complex in order for the depiction to be interpreted temporally, while for the film, the media ground alone is enough: even a very static film depiction will always reveal the presence of time via hardly perceptible shifts.[11] A static represented picture does not possess any time proper to itself,

11 The introductory scene from Haneke's film *Caché* is a good example of the treacherous and manipulative character of filmic time. The very static first shot in Haneke's film has a double role: structural and narrative. At the structural level the static shot taken with a fixed camera announces the director's manipulation of film temporality,

but is dependent on the temporality that it shows: a classic *tableau* could capture only that very moment that we do indeed see in the picture. Since in Caravaggio's *Entombment* we do not see what immediately preceded the moment represented, or what comes just after it, the condensation of time is rendered by the dramatic gesturality of the figures that is able merely to *foreshadow* the continuity of the act of the entombment.

In Boccioni and Richter temporality is shown with the same ontological restriction of the medium (one pictorial composition and one sculptural volume) but in the stylistic innovations of these two authors it is suggested, much more directly, that the invisible time (time left out of the picture, not represented) before and after the moment represented nevertheless did exist. Richter shows this time representing the long exposure of the camera, while Boccioni achieved the same effect by combining an imagined series of temporal moments into a single united volume. Thus both of them, and Caravaggio and Duchamp as well, had to sacrifice the verisimilitude of the depiction to be able to present time within the static media. On the other hand, Muybridge, with the help of experiments with a galloping horse, showed that the new medium of moving images would not know such a restriction: film shows time by its mere nature as medium, it does not exist without the time necessary for a rapid interchange of a multitude of static images or frames.

The 1964 Andy Warhol film *Empire* shows in a drastic manner what cinematographic representation would be like without the specifically filmic condensation of film time through editing: a single continued frame that can theoretically last as long as a reel. Accordingly, cinematic time came close to or was totally identified with real time but – what is particularly important for this discussion – never ceased to be representation. What happens in the Warhol film is that, although almost identical to the real pictorial-temporal situation before the camera, it is necessarily a depiction of a time that has gone irretrievably. In the film, it is true, moments of cutting can be seen when Warhol and his cinematographer Jonas Mekas change reels. The result of this manipulation

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a fundamental constructive determinant of the film. At the level of content, the static frame that extends into time adumbrates the thematic linchpin, i.e., the psychological effect of observing and being observed (Michael Haneke, *Caché*, 2005, starring Daniel Auteuil and Juliette Binoche).

of real and film time is that this temporal continuity and total identification of the two realities is disturbed only because of the technological constraints of the film medium.[12] Or, in other words, the technological constraint of the medium drew attention to its fundamentally manipulative (and accordingly, potentially artistic) character.

The most important question is still to come: what happens with pictorial representation when the technological restrictions of the classical analogue film or painting medium give way to the iconic simultaneity of the digital age? Hidden in the answer to this question is the reason why addressing the issue of temporality – and not representation – is the primary task of image theory today. My thesis runs as follows: before the appearance of direct television transmissions and before the satellite coverage of the whole planet we could reasonably consider representation as the ontological specificity of *every* pictorial depiction. In spite of its lasting validity as philosophical and phenomenological concept, Gottfried Boehm did not think he needed to append any kind of technical or scientific legitimation to his concept of iconic difference, legitimation that today might crucially determine the difference between image and non-image, as Boehm proposes to us in his key text *Die Wiederkehr der Bilder* of 1994. The turn to the image – that is, the iconic turn – he then recognised in the turn to the pictorial particularly in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the spirit, and not in a turnabout from traditional representation toward other, new technologies of visualisation. We can find the same problem in Mitchell's *pictorial turn* of the same year, in which the turn to the image is interpreted from the position of the ideological criticism of existing visual regimes, and not from the spirit of a

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12 I do not think my argument is even slightly vulnerable to Warhol's *Empire* being shown slowed down vis-à-vis the speed of the camera used during shooting. Cinematographer Jonas Mekas shot the iconic New York skyscraper with a classic film speed of 24 frames per second, and yet Warhol decided to show it at 16. The interventions included a minimum amount of editing (although editing out of sheer necessity only), since there is no film reel big enough to shoot visual material for an uninterrupted period of six and a half hours, which is how long the material shot lasts. My argument is based above all on Warhol's idea of showing real physical time as totally inappropriate to the manipulative character of film as art from. This idea, that is, could have been conveyed in an uninterrupted film of two hours, which is that a single reel permits.

technique that has irrevocably and radically changed the methods of pictorial cognition; this also explains to us why Mitchell interprets Crary's book *Techniques of the Observer* as, primarily, a collection of the technological symptoms of modern visual culture.[13] Although in his celebrated text Mitchell does not identify technology as the main driver of the turn to the image and does not think that it can radically separate the observer from his "human nature", he does nevertheless give Crary that contemporary techniques of visualisation, like CAD, synthetic holography, flight simulators, computer animation, control of movement or multispectral sensors can contribute to the moral and political fear of the "loss of the human".[14]

In this place we should not go too far and talk about the loss of the human, and yet I do think it is justified to speak about the new ontology of the image. If we look at visual phenomena in the framework of the technosphere, from the position of the technological possibilities of visualisation, then we shall observe that classical representation is today just one of three equal forms of representation: the other two are *simultaneous* and *reciprocal* images, and all three categories constitute the new *temporal* dimension of the image. Why is it needful to discuss a temporal dimension, and in what way does time affect the nature of pictorial experience? It is essential to understand that here it is not a matter of the kind of time that is necessary for a specific temporal medium, like the digital or analogue film, or the still earlier zoopraxiscope or kinetoscope, to be able to produce movement, but of real time which is actually now going on within the image. When we look at any film representation, irrespective of the edited sequences characteristic of the narrative film, or of a continuous, extremely long take characteristic of experimental films (like Warhol's *Empire*), we are dealing then with a precisely determined time that has always already happened. The very idea of both filmed fiction and documentary faction counts on images of a time that has passed. On the other hand, there are increasingly more cases of the media exploitation of pictorial time that is actually going on, which is simultaneous to all three: 1) the person looking, 2)

13 For more on this, see: W.J.T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, Chicago University Press, 1994, pp. 23–25.
14 Ibid.

to what is looked at, and 3) that through which it is looked at. The observer, the observed and the medium of observing share the same temporal continuum. This form of visualisation is not new and it is a bit paradoxical that at the dawn of the television age, in the1920s, it was the live broadcast that was cheaper and easier to produce than the recording of a TV show on a some kind of recording media.[15] Such live images are formed as visual facts at the moment they are broadcast and without this moment they cannot actually exist.

Such simultaneous images take on a very different character in our time when they are no longer used only by the entertainment industry and public information departments to involve us in some sporting event or convey to us the drama of natural disasters; rather iconic simultaneity is used to take the place of something much more material – physical presence. The use of drones in missile attacks from the air, the ability to surveil in real time every little piece of the planet, CCTV cameras in public spaces – all these are examples of simultaneous images. These images do not *re-present*, they *present*; they are the incarnation of time and the presentness of the event – what is *there* and what is *here* are together made present in the continuum of time and, unlike representations, without that continuum, they do not exist. A subspecies of simultaneous images consists of *reciprocal* images, which also possess all the features of simultaneity, with the important difference that the effect of being present is enabled for both observer and the observed. The availability of digital services like Skype and virtual technology like Oculus Rift will lead to reciprocal images in the near future providing totally immersive experience. In a traditional classification in which images were always representation, such visual experiences could no longer be considered images: in the new classification that I propose here, they are new, specific "space/event" phenomena in the sphere of the visible.[16]

15 For more on this, see Stefan Münker "Eyes in the Window: Intermedial Reconfiguration of TV in the Context of Digital Public Spheres", published in: Žarko Paić and Krešimir Purgar (eds.) *Theorizing Images*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, 2016.
16 I have written more extensively on visual experience that cannot be considered an image in "What is not an image (anymore)? Iconic difference, immersion and iconic

The criterion of temporality is a direct consequence of the new technologies of the presentation and transmission of visual information and does not depend on the techniques of representation or reproduction and cannot be correlated with individual skills of picture production in the widest sense (painting, drawing, cinematographic technique). And now we come to a paradox. Although information technology has enabled immense possibilities of the creation and communication with the use of simultaneous and reciprocal images, representational images are still the main medium of art, while the new technology of visual simultaneity is used principally in the production of *non*-fictional contents. Does this mean that time that has "always already passed" sill enables a more creative manipulation of fictional (artistic) contents or does it mean that the artistic imagination has not yet caught up with the cutting edge techniques of simultaneous and reciprocal visualisation? Or is it perhaps about iconic simultaneity still be experienced simply as reality, and not as art? It seems that the magical effect of the artistic contingency of the image has not faded in the slightest in the face of the omnipresent simultaneity of live streaming or the immanence of the image that is proper to simultaneity.

2. Transparency: non-transparent, transparent and immersive images

A division according to transparency tells about the semiotic and phenomenological *agency* of the pictorial surface: in other words, it tells about the kind of visual information we recognise on a piece of paper, on a canvas, a film or television screen. As we shall see a bit later, transparency is directly connected with referentiality, but in the case of transparency it is crucial *how* we see, while with referentiality, *what* we see. In principle we can say that in the traditional concept of representation, "intelligibility" is much more pronounced in the image than transparency. This axiom derives from the concept of the Renaissance picture as window onto the world and from Western culture having taken over this principle of representation as a natural form in which to convey three-dimensional reality into different media of two-dimensional representations. Since the whole of the classical tradition was founded on nature

simultaneity in the age of screens"; op. cit.

as model of beauty and on Aristotle's principle of the imitation of nature as the objective of the poet's art, what is transparent on the painting, i.e. what we see through it, is actually the natural world and human interventions in the natural world (architecture, clothing, technical aids and so on). The more elements from nature we are able to "recognise" in some painting, the more will we say this image is real and realistic; it accordingly becomes more transparent, for "through it" we recognise what the image depicts.

The first paradox of the principle of transparency, which does not in fact at all diminish the credibility of this principle, is contained in the realistic nature of the painting necessarily leading to the domination of pictorial content over pictorial phenomenon. In other words, the more the attention of the viewer is directed to what the painting represents, the slighter the awareness of the actual phenomenon of representation will be. We might take, for example, the digital medium of moving images that can be maximally transparent or extremely non-transparent. We will experience a highly realistic depiction of a terrorist attack shot with a high resolution smart phone camera by a participant on the spot like a high technology snapshot, almost like a contemporary version of the Italian Baroque tableau, but, which is particularly important, will not recognise any artistic pretension in it. If the shot is fuzzy, dark or low-resolution, because it was shot from a distance with a CCTV, the observer's attention will be the more focused on the formal and technical failings of the image and accordingly on its phenomenological properties. The questions that the observer will then ask will impinge more on the area of pictorial experience ("am I sure of what I see?") than on the domain of pictorial content ("did things really happen that way?"). Non-transparency and partial transparency draw attention to the medium itself, because in conditions of reduced realism in the depiction the metaphorical window will have come between observer and world, hazy if a shot is unclear, and in the picture of abstract art, totally non-transparent. Following up Martin Seel and his "Thirteen statements on the picture" we can confirm that the paradox, then, consists of the pictorial experience being the more pronounced if the transparency is the smaller or, put still more simply, we shall be the more aware of the image itself and its media ground if we *do not* ask the question of what the image is presenting.

The second paradox of the principle of transparency – which, as I shall endeavour to show, perhaps more than the previous one confirms the theoretical relevance of the problem of pictorial transparency – consists in any possible attainment of the ideal of total transparency and full immersion eliminating the very possibility of pictorial experience. Since, as we mentioned a little earlier, transparency can be considered a person's naturalised system of recognition of the content of a picture, it follows that transparency will be present to the extent to which in a natural manner we manage to recognise the realistic nature of pictorial content, or as Kendall Walton would say, to the extent to which in the picture we manage to "see the world". This author thinks that between highly transparent media, like photographs, and those a little less transparent, like hyper-realistic paintings on canvas, there is nevertheless an essential difference. According to Walton, photographs possess "a bit more" of those features of transparency that other kinds of image lack: however, the differences in the degree of transparency are not enough, he thinks, for us to make an essential cut among the different kinds of images.[17] This analytically oriented American philosopher invokes phenomenological insights into the nature of pictorial experience and concepts like *difference* and *cut* that can be said to be equally popular in the new image science of the European tradition, thinking here primarily of the theoretical work of Gottfried Boehm and Jean-Luc Nancy.

Kendall Walton is of the opinion that the transparency of photography does not of itself contribute to its realism, for photography in a phenomenological sense is always split off from the continuum of the surface on which it lies and this separation is enough for each picture surface to have ontological otherness, irrespective of the degree of transparency: the flatness of a photograph, its frame, the wall on which it is hung, all these are elements that contribute to its flagrancy: "photographs look like what they are: photographs".[18] This claim, of course, does not tend to support my argument, that is, the second paradox of the principle of transparency; however, Walton ascribes to the transparen-

17 Kendall Walton, "Transparent Pictures. On the Nature of Photographic Realism"; in: K. Walton, *Marvelous Images. On Values and the Arts*. Oxford University Press, 2008.
18 Op. cit., p. 83.

cy of the photograph some features that cannot possibly be ascribed to other kinds of visual representations. In his earlier and better known work *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, Walton avers that the realism of mimetic representation is produced by a series of conventions, the primary being that certain depictions in some situations are considered truthful, irrespective of them being inherently fictional.[19] From this it derives that recognition of reality in the image is not rationally founded, but is the product of "make-believe", which always unfolds according to set rules. According to this theory, the transparency or mimetic nature of realistic images from art history is not the fruit of searching for the perfect representation of reality, but is to do with a series of historically changeable rules of make-believe. Although, for example, every realistically done portrait is always and only a fictional substitute for the real presence of the painted person, in the fictional world of mimetic make-believe that person is really present in the image. Walton says of this: "Fictionality has turned out to be analogous to truth in some ways; the relation between fictionality and imagining parallels that between truth and belief. Imagining aims at the fictional as belief aims at the true. What is true is to be believed, what is fictional is to be imagined".[20]

Accordingly, no matter how transparent it might be, realistic painting belongs among the categories of imaginary world because it came into being within it, just like painterly representation. For our argument, indeed, it is more important what Kendall Walton says in his later text, which is that the transparency of the photography definitely does not belong to that category of visual experience to which some other kinds of mimetic representation belong (like painting, sculpture and so forth). Walton thinks that the degree of realism in some depiction does not depend on the degree of its mimesis, but whether the given depiction belongs to the category of imagination or the category of truth. In photography the rules of make-believe cannot be applied simply because different rules of perception prevail: in the photograph we do not imagine we see something, rather we believe that we do.[21] Although the

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19 Kendall Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts*; Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 38.
20 Op. cit., p. 41.
21 Walton, "Transparent Pictures", pp. 85–87.

basic difference between photography and painting is that the former always shows something that does indeed exist, while painting does not necessarily have to present really existing objects, much more important is that the photograph has brought us a totally new way of looking at mimetic scenes; that kind of looking that no longer has any connection with the post-Renaissance endeavour for realism in painting or with the usual theories of realistic art. For Walton the photograph is something like a "supertransparent" medium through which we really do see *that which* the photograph shows.[22]

This insight is important to us because in it Walton definitely sets the problem of transparency aside from the area of representation theory and shows that these are two very different categories of visual experience, categories that depend on two incompatible theoretical premises: the phenomenology of looking in the case of transparency and the semiotics of the pictorial sign in the matter of representation. Accordingly, from Walton's insights we might draw the conclusion that maximum transparency in the painting can lead to immersive visual experience, on condition that the technique of visualisation by which this is achieved enables pictorial truth in which it is possible to believe (and not be imagined, as in painting). The transparency of photography is just one, in truth very small, but historically verified, step in the direction of media strategies of transparency that today can be seen in the ever greater dimensions of TV screens, the huge cinema screens of IMAX, the 3D technologies, VR spectacles and so on. In the book *Virtual Art. From Illusion to Immersion,* Oliver Grau showed that a kind of "poetics of transparency" has always been present in the pictorial representations of Western art and has depended on both the scopic regimes current in individual periods and on the technologies of visualisation available.

We might therefore look today at the modernist revolution of the second half of the 19th century and the abstract art that stemmed from it more as a conflict with the poetics of transparency than as a conflict with the tradition of realism. I derive this conclusion from the conviction that pictorial immersion, i.e., the merging of pictorial experience with reality is part of the historical process of the teleology of representation – the human need to produce im-

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22 Ibid.

ages that will describe, replace or amend reality. The second paradox of the transparency principle, then, consists in those depictions that have managed the most to get away from the "image of reality" having in an ontological sense come closest to the "true image" – naturally, this is a matter of radically *non*-transparent paintings of abstract art.

The division of images according to transparency is aimed at the introduction of a multidisciplinary criterion capable of approaching images from the position of their attitudes to the reality of the technosphere, and not, as was the case in traditional visual disciplines, from the position of attitude to the concept or idea of reality. This is a crucial turn that above all takes into consideration that there is no longer one reality, which is capable of being perfectly simulated using some exceptional painting skill or highly precise technologies of reproduction. It is about the classical Renaissance ideal of painterly transparency not only getting into the area of technical reproducibility, as Walter Benjamin already observed in his celebrated essay, but above all today about the technological *generativity* of the digital code, i.e., of becoming picture as immaterial visual phenomenon. Abstract art, as we saw in the case of Martin Seel, looks after the material experience and opacity of the painting as iconic difference, while digital technology plunges us into areas of simulation that undoubtedly provide some kind of synaesthetic total experience of visuality – but of visuality that is *no longer* an image.

3. Mediality: material, imaginary and virtual images

When we speak of the division of the image from a medial ground one should remark right at the beginning that this is not a division according to the traditional kinds of media carriers, like graphic prints, photographic negatives and positives, newsprint, screenings and so on; rather, it is about tangibility as categories of material and non-material appearing. Primarily I am referring here to the classical Mitchell division: into the concept of *picture* that unites material, solid or three dimensional objects in which one of the surfaces serves as vehicles of the visual information; then to the concept of *image*, which relates to non-material, purely optical visual sensations present in the human mind in the neuro-cognitive form of mental awareness or non-material picto-

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rial experience; finally, I am thinking that one should add to Mitchell's division a third medial ground that is neither generated by indexation (leaving a trace) on some material support nor is a purely mental picture, but depends above all on electronic impulses – the kind of picture that Friedrich Kittler calls the "calculated image", that is, the *digital* file of virtual image.[23]

Why would I think that the theory of pictorial appearing has to be aware of this radically simplified division of the medial grounds of the image? Put in other ways, why would I think that it is more important for contemporary interdisciplinary picture theory, for example, to notice the difference in medial ground between the mechanical and the digital picture, or the mental and the hologram image on the one hand, than between the graphic print and the oil painting on the other? The first part of the answer to this question is simple: above all because the theory of pictorial appearing as conceived here deals with the ontological issues of images and not with their artistic value or social function. The mediality of the image is connected with its origin as visual phenomenon, and not with its value as signifier or with theories of identity, like semiotics, at history or gender studies. The second half of the answer is less connected with the academic disciplines mentioned and their criteria and so is more theoretically specific. In the theory of pictorial appearing, that is, as well as the other criteria that I list (temporality, transparency and referentiality), it is necessary to define more precisely the manner in which images arrive in the world, how they appear to us and what makes them possible. As we saw earlier, Martin Seel is fully aware that it is necessary to look at the problems of meaning, value and identity, however important in and of themselves they were in Western art history, not as values in relation to some aesthetic *ideal*, as is the case in traditional disciplines, rather that aesthetic value always needs reconstituting in the space that is opened up *between* appearance and appearing. Let us recall: in Seel appearance is the universal factuality of some object, while appearing is an aesthetic operation that depends on the specific momentary relation of one and the other.

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23 For the calculated image see the text in Croatian of Friedrich Kittler "Pismo i broj. Povijest izračunate slike", Europski glasnik no. 10/2005. Translated from German by Martina Horvat, pp. 471–484.

Pictorial appearing itself is freed of this relationship simply because we are here – as already stated – not interested in the aesthetic and value components of the image, rather the way we see it, or the way it appears to us. This problem can be more successfully analysed with the use of one more exclusive theory, that which deliberately leaves out the aesthetic component of the image – meaning the "logic of iconic structures" of Dieter Mersch. Very clearly in the footsteps of the iconic difference concept, Mersch goes much deeper than Boehm himself even into the problem area of pictorial experience and creates out of the concept of iconic difference a much more useful theoretical tool. Mersch, that is, presents iconic difference as a kind of "medial philosophy of the picture" and says that mediality of the picture cannot be derived from its structures of representation or from a symbolic or hermeneutic reading of it. Each of these dominant models obscures its specific pictorial ontology. It is necessary, above all, to devise and create awareness of models that distinguish the pictorial from the non-pictorial, and not one meaning from another meaning. Most images will create a specific problem here, for by what they show they will draw us into them and in this way divert our attention from their pure media ground. Mersch thinks that the solution of this problem is not in the image but in the gaze: only the specific logic of the gaze can make a difference between picture as *picture* and picture as *thing*: "a gaping difference exists between pictoriality and the creation of visibility, which nonetheless remains invisible".[24] In other words, the image can be constituted in a kind of "cut" or "border"; this border, indeed, is not made visible by itself, but only by the gaze of the beholder, since iconic difference cannot become visible *on* or *inside* the picture. If the iconic difference, as fundamental phenomenological property of the image, is not visible then it means that the image is not visible *per se* but only as a multiple relationship of the possibility of the gaze, the temporality, transparency, mediality and referentiality of pictorial surfaces.

For the theory of pictorial appearing, and particularly for the category of mediality, this is particularly important and so we shall attend to it a little more. Mersch correctly states that the special mediality of the image cannot

24 Dieter Mersch, "Pictorial Thinking: On the 'Logic' of Iconic Structures", pp. 163–166.

be reduced to a grammatical or rhetorical mode and so semiotics, hermeneutics and iconology both essentially and disciplinarily miss what should be addressed as the medial in the image. One of the most egregious examples of this is, according to Mersch, the figure of ekphrasis, which only emphasises the incommensurability of image and text, and in this way or a priori guarantees failure in the linguistic presentation of the visual or through a discursive analysis of the image turns visual mediality into the incommensurable experience of text.[25] However, after we have rejected ekphrasis, hermeneutics or traditional iconology, we have still not answered the question of what actually defines the mediality of the image. In my opinion it is possible to answer this question only if we understand mediality as just one of four categories that in their specific interrelationship create the whole ontology of the image or picture. As Mersch very reasonably observes, we cannot discuss mediality in the context of meaning and that is why every theory of the image should in its classification system draw attention to this. Bearing this out is the earlier mentioned claim of Martin Seel that abstract paintings are *paradigmatic* pictures because they do not represent anything. However, when this – actually otherwise acceptable – statement is made in this way, it turns out that one is the condition of the other, or, that some picture is paradigmatic precisely because it is abstract. In this place I would propose a different causality: the abstract picture is the paradigmatic picture because in the abstract picture there is the greatest cut between its medial ground on the one hand and referentiality on the other. Or as Dieter Mensch would say, because in the case of such a kind of picture the most visible is "a series of fissures" between image and gaze: in other words, in the perception of the abstract picture a whole series of "differences, aporias and chiasms which evoke varied series of 'perforations' occurs, and the task of the philosophy of the pictorial that is based on the gaze has to be committed to reconstructing the mediality of the image and the specific scopophilia it evokes from this inherent system of differences".[26]

A special task of the theory of pictorial appearing is to differentiate the categories of appearing in a satisfactory manner, for as we have seen it is not

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25 Ibid, p. 167.
26 Ibid.

enough just to distinguish the medial and the semiotic/iconological, but they have to be put into a sustainable relationship. The "pure iconic" will never exist independently of other kinds of appearing and so the theory of the image has above all to take into account the modalities of separation and the potential linking of apparently incompatible ontological categories. This separation is suggested to us primarily by phenomenology and Husserl's concept of intentionality, but also by Mitchell's division into visible and invisible pictures/images, to which we must certainly add a whole string of theoreticians of the technosphere, including Benjamin, Kittler, Bolter, Grusin, Manovich, Massumi and Paić. The digital or the virtual image is the third media ground that in a theoretical sense is still largely a tabula rasa in image theory.

4. Referentiality: non-referential/self-referential, referential, inter-referential, multi-referential and meta-referential images

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The fourth basic term in pictorial appearing is *referentiality*. This concept is similar to the terminological set used by traditional visual history and visual theory disciplines such as art history, iconography, hermeneutics and semiotics. In addition, referentiality is still people's most direct way of being in contact with picture, or at least a way that in everyday communication each one of us is most aware. While temporality, transparency and mediality are primarily concepts useful for aims of the reflexive activity of theory, i.e., while the role of these concepts can in its entirety be understood as a kind of splitting of theory off from the content of the image, the concept of *referentiality* in this division lets us encompass the image as *instrumental* medium with pronounced functions of communication, discourse and narrative. The reasons for the theoretical consideration of the diverse functions of images in this context need explaining at once. Of all the arguments given to date it should become clear that inside the theory of pictorial appearing, the instrumentality of the image is not foregrounded, before the problem of function would necessarily take us back again to the essentialist and subjectivist features of images (that is, to "great humanist theories" and politics of identity respectively). However, the instrumentality of images cannot be dismissed in an ontological analysis like ours because the ultimate object of this theory is to show that the instru-

mentality of images, or their "lives" as objects of communication, is actually the consequence of three modalities of appearing that precede the referential functions of pictorial communication, i.e., which essentially determine how images will be looked at and understood.

It is possible to set up various categories of referentiality only if we also have in mind the classical Aristotelian tradition of imitation of nature as source of sensory pleasure as well as (the now equally classical) semiotic tradition. This latter covers, among other things, de Saussure's concept of sign and referent, Barthes' interpretation of denotation, connotation and mythologisation, then the semiosphere of Yuri Lotman and the concepts that have been derived from it like Eco's interpretation of semiosis that later developed into Eco's particular criticism of semiotic inscription of meaning into the work – overinterpretation [sovrainterpretazione]. However, the great semiotic tradition is not there for us to set up within what is primarily a phenomenological theory of pictorial appearing some counter-method of sign and meaning, rather it is necessary to us simply because signifying (or the deliberate absence of it) is the everyday practice of visual communications. Both these arguments are a reason why our ontology of pictorial appearing cannot deal with the issues of *what* is represented, or *why*, but of *how* this is done and what the effects of referentiality are for the concept of pictorial appearing itself are. The semiotic construction of the sign and the enchaining of meanings (which we can call semiosis or mythologisation, depending on the source) is a suitable model for the understanding of referential appearing because it shares with it the idea according to which one visual utterance is always related to a second utterance, that is the next utterance is created as a function of the predecessor or in reference to its predecessor. If we set off from referentiality as the degree zero of pictorial meaning, then each subsequent category of referentiality is established in some relation to this degree zero, which we can call the *original meaning*. Every other, every derived image that refers to the original image in some way contains its predecessor, i.e., refers to it. The only exception to this rule lies in non-referential or self-referential images, but this will be discussed below.

If we get away from de Saussure's concept of the signifier, signified and sign and think of the sign not as an arbitrary but as a *motivated* point of referentiality (as proposed by Barthes' mythology and Eco's semiosis), then the iconic

sign can be anything that in a sufficient measure recalls or refers to some extra-pictorial reality: photographs, printed matter, pictures on the screen, in a word, pictures of very diverse genres and media grounds. In the modality of pictorial referentiality the smallest unit of meaning is that within which we recognise some completed relation or reference to reality, and this relation in practice is most often set up with individual (artistic) images, film sequences or a photographic snapshot. These are referential images, and from them the chain of semiosis (or the mythologisation of meaning) starts off; these images then get into more complex relations, commenting on and invoking the initial pictorial reference. We can best understood this if we make use of the example of some actual pictures and compare and contrast them to other pictures that might stem from or be derived from them. A photograph of Joe Rosenthal shot in 1945 on Iwo Jima became an iconic sign of the victory of the American army in the war in the Pacific. During the years it became much more than its instrumental function tells us, i.e., it became much more than a pictorial reference to the event it shows – the placing of the American flag. However, the original or "zero" meaning in the semiotic chain has to be reduced to mere referentiality, for no other meaning could have arisen if this first photographic snapshot, which meant at the moment it was taken only what it shows, had not been recorded.

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On the other hand, an advertising photograph created in 1990 for HIS Jeans does not just show a boy and a girl lifting the American flag, but very obviously gets into a dialogue with the mythic meaning of Rosenthal's photograph taken a few decades earlier. The ad photograph is, undoubtedly, referential, but it is also, and much more so, *inter-referential*, for it takes much more of its meaning from the mythic position of Rosenthal's photograph than from its own referentiality, which is based on a mimetic depiction of four youngsters raising the American flag. Its own referentiality, then, is there only for it to take up the thread from some other, previous meaning. At this moment, the motif of raising the American flag, has already got into a *multi-referential* field in which the original (Rosenthal) sign of heroism and the ironical advertisement heroism open up a space in which each subsequent reference to the original or the ironical picture are interwoven and get "out of control". An example of the multi-referential image is the photograph of Thomas Franklin taken on

September 11, 2001, on the ruins of the New York Twins, showing three firemen putting up the American flag in the manner of the American soldiers on Iwo Jima, but also in the manner of the carefree youngsters in the jeans ad. To which of these two photographs does Franklin's snapshot of the firemen refer? The original sign of heroism or the ironical persiflage intending to call into question the myth of American invincibility? Although Franklin's was probably triggered by inter-reference to Rosenthal's iconic work, a photograph in the open sphere of culture necessarily refers to both predecessors, for its meaning cannot avoid semiotic chaining in any direction whatsoever. And so this is a multi-referential picture. Multi-referentiality is a much more complex form of pictorial interrelations for it not only includes invocation of a vast mass of iconographic sources, but also because in this process it is not possible to exclude the action of quite often opposed ideological discourses, which also make up part of the referential scope of the image.

Meta-referential images are what W.J.T. Mitchell calls metapictures: pictures that refer to themselves, that is, to several levels of their own ontological position: 1) they reveal the way in which they are made or to the mechanism of the production of pictorial meaning in general; 2) they depict a kind of "theory of images" without getting outside their own pictorial medium, i.e., raise the question of whether it is possible to speak about images without ekphrasis, without language as verbal substitute; 3) they reveal the essential pictorial nature: the image, that is, to be able to function at all as medium of communication, cannot be equated with reality, but not with itself either.[27] Mitchell's concept of metapicture (or pictorial meta-referentiality in our case) raises in principle the question of whether images can discuss themselves, instead of the traditional disciplines of iconology and semiotics doing it for them. When pictures are directed toward themselves and when they reveal the models of production of all other images, they become subversive mechanisms that uncover institutions and the discursive production of power. One of the best known examples of such a kind of painting is Diego Velázquez's *Las Meninas*, which, with a complex system of inter-, multi- and meta-referentiality tests out

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27 For more detail about this see Mitchell's text "Metapictures" published in W.J.T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, University of Chicago Press, 1994.

the status of the iconic in general as mechanism of the political production of power.

It is interesting that Mitchell should say that metapictures are at the same time radically self-directed, i.e. they create their own inter-pictorial theory of the image, but they are also intertextual, that is, they create meaning by being enchained with other pictorial utterances that co-exist in parallel within the visual culture of some community or historical period. If we take into consideration Mitchell's reasoning and his concept of referentiality that I am endeavouring to defend here, it follows that metapictures, or meta-referential pictures, go back to the very beginning of pictorial referentiality, i.e. to *self-referentiality*, or radical orientation of the images to itself. Paradoxically, images that are most oriented to themselves, as we saw above in the case of Martin Seel, are those that refer to nothing except themselves, that is, pictures of abstract art. I think that we might approach this paradox in the following way: non-referential, or self-referential images on the one hand and metareferential on the other only confirm in different ways the same basic pictorial ontology that Boehm calls iconic difference. Both kinds of images ultimately reveal their position of otherness as compared to extra-pictorial reality: the first does this by emphasising the differences between image and world, and the other by radical deconstruction of the way in which it is culturally produced.

Every picture that appears in some referential modality – irrespective of whether it relates to something outside itself (referentiality) or is related only to itself (non-referentiality and self-referentiality) can in principle possess only the two earlier mentioned temporal modalities – representationality and simultaneity. In a pictorial-ontological sense it is irrelevant whether we look at a direct transmission (iconic simultaneity) of a picture that represents something or reminds us of something (referential, then) or whether we look at non-referential, i.e. abstract, images (for example, when in a live broadcast of the opening of an exhibition we look close up at some abstract picture). This latter picture would be simultaneous and non-referential. However, we cannot term pictorial experience the rather improbable, if possible, situation in which in front of two computer screens with web cameras turned on there are two non-referential pictures "looking" at each other. This hypothetical situation confirms that the effect of referentiality is independent of the effect of temporality, but

only if the condition that Husserl calls "pictorial consciousness" is satisfied. In other words, an image, in order to appear at all, irrespective of the degree of its own referentiality, has to be "produced" by the gaze. The need for pictorial consciousness to exist tells us that this fundamental phenomenological insight sets up a border behind which perception of the image is no longer possible.

On the other hand, although we have seen that an image does not exist without the intentional consciousness (of the observer) that produces it, Sartre says that these two – perception and the image – are not one and the same. From this it derives that what makes the *act* of perception inseparable from the *object* of perception is just the product of consciousness that agrees to the cognitive convention that Sartre calls "the illusion of immanence".[27] The illusion of immanence is necessary in a communication system in which consciousness operates at a level different from that of physical objects, even when these objects are in a certain way incorporated into consciousness and constitute a continuum with it. The illusion of immanence enables the continuum not to be revealed, enables the images to be received *as if* they were what they show, although they are not what they show, but are simply images.[28] The modalities of pictorial appearing open up the possibility of a kind of "transitional" theory of images for contemporary times that are not (only) analog any more while not being (only) digital either. This theory takes into account the vast space that still exists between objects and perception, that is, between *eikon* and pure sensousness.

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28 See Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Imaginary. A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination*, Routledge, London 2004. [1940], p. 12; then John Lechte, "Some Fallacies and Truths Concerning the Image in Old and New Media", *Journal of Visual Culture*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2011, pp. 357–358; and in Krešimir Purgar, "What is not an image (anymore)?", op. cit., pp. 166–167.
29 Jean-Paul Sartre, op. cit., p. 6.

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Veronica Neri

THE AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IMAGE IN CYBERSPACE

The autonomy and responsibilities of the image in cyberspace

Premise

The birth of the internet has given rise to the diffusion of images on a previously unimaginable scale. Furthermore, in this digital era the status of the image has changed, taking on new distinctive features. In parallel, we are witnessing in the academic world, at international level, a renewed centrality of the *visual*, as theorized in the field of *visual culture studies*.[1] In particular, in the Anglo-American world, Mitchell has introduced the concept of the »pictorial turn«, while, in the German-speaking world, Boehm has coined the expression »Ikonische Wende«.[2]

With this new approach to the visual, the aim is to overturn the Rortyan

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1 The origins of this subject can be traced back to the studies of the 1920s, which describe the transformation produced by photography and cinema. Béla Balàzs wrote of »visuelle Kultur« in Béla Balàzs, *Der Sichtbare Mensch oder die kultur des Film*, Deutsch-Österreichischer Verlag, Wien 1924; while Moholy-Nagy used the expression »Schaukultur« ("culture of vision") in László Moholy-Nagy, *Pittura Fotografia Film* (1925, 1927), Antonio Somaini (ed.), Einaudi, Torino 2010, p. 31. Cfr. Nicholas Mirzoeff, *An Introduction to Visual Culture*, Routledge, London 1999; Antonio Pinotti, Antonio Somaini, *Cultura visuale. Immagini, sguardi, media, dispositivi*, Einaudi, Torino 2016.

2 Cfr. in particular: William J. T. Mitchell, "The Pictorial Turn", in: *Artforum*, 30, 7, 1992, p. 89–94; Gottfried Boehm, "Die Wiederkehr der Bilder", in: G. Boehm (ed.),

paradigm based on the supremacy of language as the main vehicle of knowledge.[3] This shift has also necessarily involved the internet, a space within which our– choices and our actions are also, to a large extent, related to images.[4] In the »videosphere«[5] images seem to have become entities with their own *agency*. They generate actions and reactions in observers in their online as well as their off-line world.[6] They appear in all their communicative and interpretative power and ambiguity. But above all, we are dealing with autonomous images with their own ontological status, that are easily manipulated using everyday software and highly performative. Consequently, in relation particularly to these three characteristics of the visual in cyberspace, changes seem to have occurred: changes regarding the responsibility of the individual towards the image as well as that of the image towards the individual. As regards the responsibility on the part of the image, it is necessary to consider the preliminary specification below. Particular reference is made to Mitchell and his reflections on the new status of the image, in his essay »What do Pictures Want?«.

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He states that, »Images are like living organisms; living organisms are best described as things that have desires […]; therefore, the question of what pictures want is inevitable«. In particular, Mitchell refers to »What pictures want from us, what we have failed to give them, is an idea of visuality adequate to

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Was ist ein. Bild, Wilhelm Fink, Munich, 1994, p. 11–38; John Elkins, *Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction,* Routledge New York 2003; Antonio Pinotti, Antonio Somaini A. (eds.), *Teorie dell'immagine. Il dibattito contemporaneo*, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano 2009; Olaf Breidback, Federico Vercellone, *Pensare per immagini. Tra arte e scienza*, Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2010; Federico Vercellone, *Il futuro dell'immagine*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2017; Krešimir Purgar, *J.T. Mitchell's Image Theory: Living Pictures*, Routledge, New York 2017. Cfr. Veronica Neri, *Immagine nel Web. Etica e ontologia*, Carocci, Roma 2013, to which this essay is intended as a continuation, in light of the new horizons opened up by new technologies and by continuing academic debate.

3 Richard Rorty (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1967.

4 Krešimir Purgar, *"What is not an Image (Anymore)? Iconic Difference, Immersion and Iconic Simultaneity in the Age of Screens"*, in: *Phainomena*, XXIV/92-93, June 2015, p. 155–170; Žarco Paič, Krešimir Purgar (eds.), *Theorizing images*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle 2016.

5 Term coined by Régis Debray in relation to the mediasphere theory: cfr. *Vie et mort de l'image*, Éditions Gallimard, Paris 1992, cap. VIII.

6 Antonio Pinotti, Antonio Somaini, op. cit., p. XXI.

their ontology«.[7] The image can only be thought of as being "responsible" if we engage in an imaginative game in which we choose to consider it a "living thing", something with desires and which participates in the construction of reality.[8] In this sense, the image takes on responsibilities beyond those evoked by the etymological meaning of the Latin verb *respondeo*.[9] In the digital world, the concept of responding to something, in terms of adhering to a referent, assumes a lesser importance than in the past. Without radicalizing this theory, it is, however, necessary to hypothesize a new interpretative paradigm for the visual on the web. One which cannot be reduced to language systems, nor to the exclusive iconic system of the off-line world.[10]Such a paradigm necessarily overturns the traditional relationship between the image and the observer.

Certain ethical issues emerge in relation to this. Of particular importance are those relating to the acceptance of the responsibilities outlined above, regarding the autonomy, mutability and power of the image to "make us do things" on-line and off-line. The purpose of this essay is to try to understand how best to exploit these particular features of the visual in order to promote conscious and respectful behaviour, both in the online community as well as in society in general. Another aim is to understand how, or even *if*, it might be possible to limit these images when they become the vehicle for messages that are ambiguous, or even potentially dangerous for the community. Such limits might be put in place by the individual, or even on the part of the image itself. One possible solution could be a more critical interpretation of the image, in order that the image reveal itself, one might say an "ethics", which would operate above and beyond the boundaries of the law and deontology.

Such interpretation would need to be sure to identify all those elements

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7 William J. T. Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2005, p. 11; William J. T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory: Essay on Verbal and Visual Representation*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1994.
8 William J.T. Mitchell, *Cloning Terror: the war of images, 9/11 to the present*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London 2011, p. XVIII–XIX.
9 Adriano Fabris, *Etica della comunicazione*, Roma, Carocci 2014, p. 47–51.
10 Alberto Martinengo, "La fine dell'arte e il ritorno dell'immagine*"*, in: Francesca Iannelli *et al.* (ed.), *Fine o nuovo inizio dell'arte. Estetiche della crisi da Hegel al pictorial turn*, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2016, p. 381–383.

that make up the image and to contextualize them. To properly understand the meaning, beyond mere face value. Moreover, it would require an understanding of the consequences related to the presence of the image and of its viewing, a viewing which might be either attentive or distracted. It is an interpretation which seeks to understand "what pictures want", to refer back to Mitchell. Distorted interpretations convey distorted values and concepts. On the web, such messages are spread to a potentially infinite audience. Consequently, interpretation occurs on various levels, from the most basic analysis of the signs, to a level of analysis that leads to inferences as well as links to concepts that are unrelated to the images.[11] Indeed, it is only through such interpretation of images, that one fully grasps their performative character, and, therefore, the potential consequences for individuals. What's more, it is only after this attempt at interpretation (which by the way is also typical of communication processes based on dialogue and understanding), that one can choose whether or not to accept the values and imaginary conveyed by the image. This is the case of the »unspeakable and the unimaginable« images, to borrow an expression used first by Mitchell, and later expressed in similar terms by Didi-Huberman, relating to images of terror.[12] We must, therefore, attempt to find our way through this iconic overdose, which could lead to a new age of iconoclasm. Here, iconoclasm is to be understood, above all, as the will to destroy the meanings of certain images, even through the actual destruction of the (electronic) image itself, to avoid becoming prisoners of its fascination. Nevertheless, the permanent removal of certain images from the network is not an easy task.

2. Features of the digital image

To understand the ethical issues related to the visual sphere on the web, a brief reference to the peculiarities of the digital image is necessary. Its numerical nature is certainly its most fundamental feature. This aspect has made

11 *Ibid*; Federico Vercellone, op. cit.
12 William J. Thomas Mitchell, ''The Unspeakable and the Unimaginable: Word and Image in a Time of Terror'', in: *ELH*, 72, 2, 2005, p. 291–308; William J. Thomas Mitchell, *Cloning Terror*, op. cit; George Didi-Huberman, *Images malgré tout*, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 2003.

it possible to go beyond the imitative and referential dimension of reality. In fact, as pointed out by Lévy, it »opens itself to immersion«. This process is increasingly the aim of web communication, »[r]epresentation makes room for interactive visualization of a model; simulation replaces resemblance«.[13] And, as Boehm also states, digital images »are able to simulate the mode of representation or even the very referents of the representation«.[14] What comes into play, therefore, is the self-referentiality of the image.

This numerical nature opens up numerous other possibilities for the image. It enables, for example, an infinite duplication.[15] On this point Mitchell, with his term »biopicture«, uses the metaphor of the biological cloning process to emphasize the ability of the image to multiply on the web.[16] This numerical nature allows for a high degree of manipulability, for adaptation to various media and the highest levels of definition and "readability". This is fundamental, for example, in scientific research. And, as Montani writes, it represents »a cognitive mode that allows us, through the images (*eikones*) that it produces, to see something more than the phenomenal reality that underlies it«.[17] As regards manipulability, there are two options that invite ethical reflection. The first is the option of respecting the original sense of the image. Therefore, acting responsibly, improving the quality and readability of the image, without modifying the actual meaning or the salient visual characteristics; the identifying elements of people or places may be cancelled for reasons of privacy or security; deontological and regulatory constraints, when present, are respected. Therefore, the individual participates in the im-

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13 Pierre Levy, *Cyberculture* (1997), Engl. trans. by R. Bononno, University Of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2001, p. 130.
14 Gottfried Boehm, "Vom Medium zum Bild", in: Yvonne Spelman, Gundolf Winter (eds.), *Bild-Medium-Kunst*, Wilhelm Fink, Munich, 1999, p. 177–178. Regarding the loss of the representational element in the relationship between the virtual image and the real object, cfr. Oscar Meo, "Ontologia ed estetica del cyberspazio", in: *Anthropos & Iatria*, 3, 2006, p. 56–61.
15 Gottfried Boehm, "Vom Medium zum Bild", cit.
16 William J. Thomas Mitchell, *The Unspeakable and the Unimaginable*, cit; William J. Thomas Mitchell, *Pictorial turn. Saggi di cultura visuale*, Michele Cometa (ed.), Duepunti Edizioni, Palermo 2008, p. 15–17.
17 Pietro Montani, *Arte e verità dall'antichità alla filosofia contemporanea. Un'introduzione all'estetica*, Laterza Roma-Bari 2002, p. 93.

age, transforms it, and becomes, in a certain sense, co-author.[18] However, this characteristic can also lead to a second option, that of performing unethical actions.

Huge transformations alter the original meaning of the image, turning it into something other than was originally intended.

Yet, only certain image manipulation processes can be legally and deontologically sanctioned, that is if they affect the privacy or the dignity of the person, or if they breach copyright, etc. There is, for example, no legislation that permits the blocking of images published by ordinary users on the social media.[19] Rules, charters and codes of conduct for the web, though much needed, cannot take the place of a sense of responsibility, both on the part of the individual and of the web community. Particularly in an era where *post-truth* seems to have taken on an important role.

What emerges, therefore, is another characteristic of the image in cyberspace and, indeed, among the most important from an ethical point of view: the autonomy of the image in relation to the individual's actions.[20] Once an image enters into the web circuit, its path is not always predictable, and neither are the consequences that can result from its viewing. The individual aims to control the movements of the image, as well as the consequence of these movements, in relation to pre-defined procedures. These procedures may, however, escape the control of the individual and the images may end up circulating around autonomously in cyberspace. The case of Abu Graib is emblematic, in which the intentions of the photographers were not properly accomplished.[21]

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18 Pierre Levy, op. cit., p. 130.

19 See Adriano Fabris, "Etica e internet", in: Adriano Fabris (ed.), *Guida alle etiche*, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2011, p. 98–99; Paolo Passaglia, "*Privacy* e nuove tecnologie, un rapporto difficile. Il caso emblematico dei *social media,* tra regole generali e ricerca di specificità", in: *Consulta* Online, 3, 2016, p. 332–348.

20 Regarding the autonomy of the image, cfr. also, Horst Bredekamp, *Theorie des Bildakts*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin 2010, it. trans. by Simone Buttazzi, with introduction by Federico Vercellone, *Immagini che ci guardano. Teoria dell'atto iconico*, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano 2015. Regarding the autonomy of the Internet in general: Luciano Floridi, *The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, p. 101 ff.; Adriano Fabris, *Etica delle nuove tecnologie*, La Scuola, Brescia 2012, p. 55.

21 William J. Thomas Mitchell, "Realismo e immagine digitale", in: Roberta Cogli-

This type of de-contextualization of the image leads to a misunderstanding of its original meaning. The observer sometimes finds himself having to re-contextualize and interpret the image based on his own imaginary and time and, as such, risks changing the meaning and function.

Its uniqueness also lies in the fact that it can be viewed in real time, i.e. immediately after being uploaded onto the web. Furthermore, the present has become "eternally present". However, what also emerges is the difficulty in erasing traces of certain "presences" that we may, in time, come to regret. What we have is a (potentially) eternal preservation of images in ever accessible electronic archives. These are archives in which the images do not undergo deterioration, but if anything, are subject to interpretative distortions due to changes in the time and context of the viewing. With regard to the spatial dimension, however, apart from the physical space between the spectator and the image, there is also an imaginary space, within the image on the web.[22] It is a "social space", subjective, a place of interaction, with the observer at its centre. This same space, however, in the case of the social media, can also create, paradoxically, a communicative isolation from the off-line world.

The online image can thus be seen as an "event" and extremely peculiar in that it can be repeated indefinitely, or be ever present. The (virtual) image »happens«, as Belting would say. There is no pre-defined viewing time on the *web*. It is the viewer who decides when to view the images, the order in which to view them and, indeed, whether or not to repeat the experience.[23]

In this context, anyone can publish and manipulate an image and use it on the web; they can also make it interactive, encouraging involvement on the part of all web users. Therefore, even the role of the author of the image has changed, intersecting with the viewer in a constant exchange of roles. Thanks also to immersive technologies, such as virtual reality or augmented reality, the possibility of perceiving images *in presentia* is even greater, creating a genuine

tore (ed.), *Cultura digitale. Paradigmi a confronto*, Duepunti edizioni, Palermo 2008, p. 81–99: 89.

22 Jean Aumont, *L'immagine*, it. trans. by Valentina Pasquali, Lindau, Torino 2007, p. 138–141.

23 Hans Belting, "Immagine, medium, corpo. Un nuovo approccio all'iconologia", in: Antonio Pinotti, Antonio Somaini (eds.), op. cit., p. 75, 165–172.

dialogue between the subject and the image.[24] A context of hyper-reality is created, which renders the image "realer than reality". However, this technological development, though opening up a space for possibilities, also creates barriers: if one does not keep up with technological innovations, certain applications cannot be used.

In light of the above, compared to the images of the off-line world, those on the web appear much more ambiguous. Their potentially unlimited and autonomous circulation can lead to interpretations that are (in)voluntarily partial, undefined, or even false.

This manipulability would imply that a web image is to be considered "good" if it reveals itself, its technical characteristics and, therefore, any measures to which it has been "subjected" in order to appear the way it does.[25] But is this always the case? Or is it perhaps that, rather than the actual manipulation of the image, we ought to worry more about the lack of hermeneutical skills on the part of individuals who view it? Every image should be subject to an ethics of interpretative doubts. We should ask ourselves whether we have adopted an attentive reading, taking into account our own subjectivity. Only such a critical and responsible reading can penetrate the veil of spectacularization, on the part of contemporary society, within which images often find themselves trapped.

And it is only through such an ethical interpretation, which takes into consideration all the figurative elements and the communicative and meta-communicative levels of reference,[26] that one can appreciate the "responsibility" of the image. Images are responsible, therefore, due to their autonomy to move on the web without control; in relation to "what they want", *à la* Mitchell, and thus to their own performativity, making people act; but they are responsible,

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24 Giovanni Avveduto *et al.*, "A Scalable Cluster-Rendering Architecture for Immersive Virtual Environments", in: *Augmented Reality, Virtual Reality, and Computer Graphics*, International Conference on Augmented Reality, Virtual Reality and Computer Graphics, AVR 2016, p. 102–119; Federico Vercellone, op. cit., p. 117–118.
25 Cfr. Adriano Fabris, "Die Selbständigkeit der Bilder", in: Adriano Fabris, Annamaria Lossi, Ugo Perone, *Bild als Prozess. Neue Perspektiven einer Phänomenologiedes Sehens*, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2011, p. 207–222.
26 Ruggero Eugeni, *Analisi semiotica dell'immagine. Pittura, illustrazione, fotografia*, I.S.U. Università Cattolica, Milano 2004, p. 20–21.

in a certain sense, for the values and imaginaries they convey. It is, nevertheless, a partial responsibility, on the part of those who create the images, those who publish or use them, and those who simply observe them. Let us then try to understand which choices open up to the individual in relation to the images on the web. And let us try to understand what consequences may derive from such choices. However, it is also important to understand in what way these images may act upon us, in light of the autonomy, manipulability and performativity mentioned above, which are greatly amplified on the web.

3. Responsibilities and limits of the individual towards the image

More specifically, in relation to the autonomy, manipulability and pervasiveness of the image, a further two issues emerge. The first concerns the responsibility of the individual towards the image; the second concerns the limits that can be set by the individual or other "subjects" such as, for example, corporations, regarding the characteristics of the visual.

With regard to the first aspect, the responsibility of the individual would appear to be threefold. Firstly, in either responding or not responding to the principles that inspire the creation and conveyance of the image. This is where the use of image manipulation tools comes into play. For example, one chooses whether to opt for the principles of verisimilitude and truth regarding the image of the event to be represented, or not. An emblematic case of this is the photographic image published after the bombings at the Bataclan in Paris, in 2015. This image is meant to represent a deserted Paris immediately after the attack. In this case, however, the picture was published as true, despite being false.[27] It is in fact an overlaying of various images, most likely taken at different times. The other choice is to upload arbitrary images onto the web, obvious fruits of fantasy, which may either represent a mere *divertissement* or convey meanings.

Secondly, it is important to clarify what actions we wish to accomplish, or have others accomplish, via these images: whether to inform, entertain, instigate action, shock, etc. We are, therefore, responsible for what we publish.

27 Giovanni Scarafile, "Etica delle immagini, spectatorship e la questione ingenua dell'oggettività della rappresentazione", in: *Teoria*, 2016/2, p. 137–148.

Finally, we must reflect on the responsibility we bear for technological images, in light of the autonomy mentioned above. It is a concept of responsibility closely linked to that of the control, both of the individual and the community, over various technologies.[28] It is a responsibility that concerns the present, but also the future, the duration of a message and the (un)predictable consequences which may ensue. An image may arrive directly before the eyes of individuals who either cannot understand it due to lack of critical tools, could be indifferent to it or may be upset by it. The individual can, in spite of himself, become both an acting entity (conveying the image) and indeed a performative entity. What's more, he can also be subject, at the same time, to the conditioning power of the image.

As regards the limits that may be placed on the image by the individual, we can certainly identify those deriving from technological knowledge. This know-how allows us to bypass at least some unwanted images. Consider, for example, those for commercial purposes. However, we ought to focus, above all, on the significant role played by corporations, such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo, etc. Such companies have played an increasingly significant role in the dissemination of images, directing them on the basis of specific research conducted on the web by the individual user. This *ad personam* procedure, which acts on the basis of specific algorithms, can reach the wrong user, who, in turn, (un)consciously becomes a conveyor of the image and its (dis)values, to other users or virtual communities. This opens a potentially endless circuit. In a certain sense, the corporations seek to "exploit" the autonomy of the image to their advantage, "limiting it", i.e. shaping it according to a certain procedure. In this way, its autonomy is further accentuated. The images are inserted into a new communication circuit, thanks to which they can act freely.

4. Responsibilities and limits of the image towards the individual

As we have seen, the image on the web is an entity in its own right. Let us therefore now try to look at it from the opposite perspective: what responsibilities can the image, as conceived by Mitchell, assume towards individual? And what limits can this image impose on individual?

28 Adriano Fabris, *Etica delle nuove tecnologie*, cit., p. 41–43.

As for the responsibilities, those images which may be considered true iconic acts, *à la* Bredekamp, and therefore modify the observer's intentions are, as such, responsible for their ability to guide the choices, behaviour and sensibilities of the viewer. This aspect is true, not only regarding what the images communicate, but, above all regarding the cloning process that characterizes them on the web. This ability to generate other images can cause confusion, misunderstanding or even indifference, to the point of generating a new iconoclasm. Their strength lies in their ability to jump from a state of latency to one of agency, through visualizations.[29] So once again, it is this autonomy and adaptability to different spaces on web that make the image responsible for its own movements in cyberspace and for its effect on the observer.[30]

As for the limits imposed on the individual by the image, these would seem again to depend on the autonomy of the image. This factor can certainly limit the actions of the individual and their options, for which it is responsible. It is an autonomy that reinforces the pervasive power of the visual. Consider the advertising image, for example. Or the scientific image, which shows what we would not otherwise be able to see with the naked eye. By means of a particular symbolic system, it provides an analysis of phenomena that can affect the lifestyle choices of an individual. Such limitations on the individual's freedom of choice "work" especially well in the case of a distracted viewing of the image. However, its pervasiveness may even trigger the opposite effect: the refusal on the part of the individual towards an image whose content, appearance, or goals he does not share.

Another limit for which the image is responsible and which, in a sense, it imposes upon the individual, is the possibility of taking a glimpse into new worlds. This is a process which, from another point of view, could also represent an opening, a stimulus for dialogue and comparison. In this way, the image conveys social imaginaries, acting not only on the individual but on virtual communities in general. By social imaginary we do not mean something that relates exclusively to the imagination. We mean, to quote Taylor, those shared

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29 Horst Bredekamp, *Theorie des Bildakts,* op. cit., p. 36.
30 Regarding the autonomy of new technology and the image, see: Adriano Fabris, *Die Selbständigkeit der Bilder*, cit.

values at the heart of an understanding of reality and our actions within it, values also at the heart of our relationship with ourselves and with others. They are ways of understanding the social, which themselves then become social entities, mediators of collective life. They exist by virtue of implicit representations, but also represent the means through which people understand their own identity and their place in the world.[31]

This communication process also affects two further aspects, sometimes implicitly, at other times explicitly: on some websites, certain imaginaries are reinforced, whereas others are criticized on different sites. Such inputs can then spread to vast segments of the population. What we have, therefore, is a multitude of imaginaries "brought before our eyes", each potentially different from the others. These strongly direct our individual and collective choices, to the point of becoming mirrors in which to observe ourselves.

The behavior of the individual can therefore be limited on the basis of the imaginary conveyed; but, at the same time, the individual interprets both the proposed image and the imaginary on the basis of his own imaginary of reference. In this process the interpretation of the image appears to be extremely relative. Nevertheless, in the present-day era of the image, the western imaginary still appears to dominate. Furthermore, it is strongly permeated by the logic of the corporations, by frequent migration, by globalization and by mass communication (including the web itself). These aspects are making it more hybrid, "weakening" its uniqueness, and further complicating the hermeneutic aspect of the image. Consider, for example, the images of terror increasingly circulated on the web; they serve to raise awareness for the war on terror in the case of many individuals, but as incitement to terror for others.

This iconic typology opens up new possibilities, for both acquiring knowledge and for acting, on the web. Therefore it opens up new responsibilities on the parts of both the image and the individual. Care must be taken not to become either indifferent to or addicted to the proliferation of such images. Rather, we must act co-responsibly, reporting not only the possible non-objec-

31 Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries,* Durham, London 2004, p. 23; Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, "Toward New imaginaries. An Introduction", in: *Public Culture*, 14, 1 (Winter 2002), p. 1–4.

tivity or untruthfulness of the image, but also any misleading or inappropriate contextualization. Otherwise, these spaces may give way to a vicious circle in which the images of terror are spread, inciting dysfunctional behavior, rather than discouraging it. This is the »cloning terror« mentioned by Mitchell. In this way, all its ethical unacceptability is revealed. "Information at any cost" can become a double-edged sword in these situations. A disturbing objectivity which can also be interpreted amorally by those, for example, who believe in the imaginary of terror.[32]

These are representations that pave the way for a media war, fought with visual "weapons" that cause emotional shock. This war between images and imaginaries, in parallel with the real one being perpetrated in objective reality, can have important consequences for the imaginary of both the individual and the community, and, as a result, in their off-line world. As Paul Virilio affirms, the most modern means of mass communication have turned into weapons of mass destruction.[33]

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The web has thus become a »synchronic warehouse of cultural scenarios«. It is no coincidence that Appadurai uses the metaphor of »modernity at large« in which, in his opinion, globalization does not so much homogenize differences, rather it locates them and further radicalizes them.[34] Therefore, what is significant is not simply the imaginary of the individual or of the community, rather how this aligns and fits in with that of other individuals or communities with which it interacts and shares different imaginaries.[35] Moreover, it seems important to maintain this pluralism, otherwise we risk radically closing ourselves within the imaginary of the environment in which we act.

32 William J. Thomas Mitchell, *Cloning Terror,* cit.; Gigi Didi-Huberman, op. cit.; Nicholas Mirzoeff, *Watching Babylon: the War in Iraq and Gobal Visual Culture*, Routledge, London-New York 2005; Pierandrea Amato, *In posa. Abu Graib 10 anni dopo*, Cronopio, Napoli 2014.
33 Paul Virilio, *Città panico. L'altrove comincia qui*, it. trans. by Laura Odello, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano 2004.
34 Arjun Appadurai (1996), *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2003, p. 30 and ss.
35 Dilip Gaonkar *et al.*, "Modern Social Imaginaries. A Conversation", in: *Social Imaginaries*, 1, 1, 2015, p. 201–205.

5. Conclusions. Towards an interpretative ethics of the image.

The image on the web thus represents a window, opening up new worlds and imaginaries, unveiling multiple horizons of meaning. It is the tool through which we become conscious of our view, both of the world and of ourselves. Indeed, this has always been the role of media, starting right from the first medium used by the individual, his own body. This use of the body has made it possible to take possession of ourselves in the image.[36] The image, this window onto the web, for the first time offers us an indefinite number of possibilities, continually presenting the individual with choices. Whether to continue with the process suggested somehow by the links and by the images encountered from time to time whilst browsing, or whether to stop viewing and switch off the computer.

Yet, at the same time, the image can consolidate already existing worlds and imaginaries, limiting our critical thinking skills and imagination. The image can transform, from being a window to becoming a screen. As happens with social media, for example: places where individuals often risk closing themselves within a micro-world, as if it were the only one available. This may even develop into dysfunctional behaviour in some cases.

How then can the autonomy and performative power of images on the web be limited, in order that they do not completely escape the control of the individual? And how can the individual be limited with regards to the image? Finally, and most importantly, is it possible to find the "right" way in both these cases?

We have looked at the individual's responsibility towards the image on the web, and, vice versa, that of the image towards the individual. Limits to these responsibilities have emerged, often irrespective of the will of the individual and of the image itself. The "limits" imposed by the corporations, for example. This is actually a strategy, and not strictly ethical, for exploiting the autonomy of the image in their favour, and to strengthen what has become a true publicity "machine". We have also seen the limits (openings?) imposed by imaginar-

36 Hans Belting, "Per una iconologia dello sguardo", in: Roberta Coglitore (ed.), op. cit., p. 6–7.

ies that guide our interpretation of the image. But this, again, is a limit of a cultural nature, which can lead to a partial reading of the images.

In light of the peculiarities of images, as discussed above, it is clear that new interpretive *standards* are needed to understand the power of the image and, if necessary, to control it. Moreover, to understand the journey that images may take on the *web,* compared to other communication media.

National and transnational regulations, as well as the deontological rules of the web's leader companies, are often difficult to apply, therefore, they do not always serve as a deterrent against the publication of certain images. So it would appear necessary to appeal, firstly to the responsibility of those who convey the images, as well as to the co-responsibility of all persons using the web, to monitor and to request the removal or modification of the images displayed. This self-management, however, does not yet seem to suffice.[37]

There is also the need to make images more accountable for what they 'do'. They are *imagines agentes*, which impose on the observer a redefinition of their approach to the visual.[38] That is, a redefinition of our concept of viewing. The pictures on the web interact directly with the observer's gaze. They find themselves face to face only with the observer via his technological equipment. The observer is an individual who interprets, therefore, an understanding of how to observe, how to ask an image what it wants, as well as to act on the image before the image acts peremptorily on the observer, has become important in the field of research for "viewing ethics". This represents a necessary interpretative process, one which must take into account not only the observer and the image, but also the social context of reference. What emerges then is the importance of an ethics *of* the image and *in* the image, when trying to understand how to observe, and on the basis of which principles, to observe the image. An ethics *of* the image that defines and promotes adherence to its principles of behaviour, based on certain moral notions, which operate in communicative interaction.[39] An ethics *in* the image that should be inspired by the principles of understanding and interpretative co-participation, but also by the principles

37 Adriano Fabris, "Philosophy, Image and the Mirror of Machines", in: Žarco Paić, Krešimir Purgar (eds.), op. cit., p. 119.
38 Horst Bredekamp, op. cit., p. 11.
39 Adriano Fabris, *Etica della comunicazione*, cit., p. 34.

of truth and verisimilitude, when simulating facts or events that have actually taken place. This in order to appreciate not only what is present in the image, but also what the image would like to mean and, indeed, what it desires: its purpose and its sense. Some images, however, may not want anything.[40] An ethics, therefore, which investigates the persuasive power of the image, not only for ourselves, but, since the web is worldwide, from a potentially global perspective. So, an appeal for recognition of the importance, not only of an intuitive and subjective reading, but also of an inter-subjective and critical reading of the image.

As Mitchell writes on this point: »Images [...] want to be taken as complex individuals which adopt a variety of subjective positions and identities«:[41] from a »representative« to a »subjective« status.[42] A subjectivity, fundamental to the reading of an artistic image, which it is now necessary to encourage in the reading of non-artistic images. Such subjectivity must be supplemented by an inter-subjective analysis, belonging to the social medium through which it is published. But, above all, what cannot be overlooked is the importance of a semiotic-communicative analysis. It is not enough merely to react emotionally to the image circulating on-line, it should be analyzed at various levels. The first, and certainly the most basic, allows the detection of signs (shapes, colours, figures and spaces, the author, etc.). The second, based on what is revealed by the first, aims for a more global understanding of the message. It identifies the relationship between signs in order to arrive at the narrative expressed in the image. Finally, a level that, to use Eugeni's words, we might define as »meta-communicative«. It is a fundamental level that enables one to reflect on the possible hidden meanings behind the message. This approach is essential for the identification of other interpretive perspectives, particularly in light of the image's own "will".

Therefore, in addition to a viewing ethics, we must take an interpretative ethical approach, based on the search for the deeper and more articulated meaning behind the image (what it wants, what it might mean for the ob-

40 Cfr. Margaret Dikovitskaya *The Study of the Visual after the Cultural Turn*, Mit Press, Cambridge Mass. 2005, p. 238 ss.
41 William J. Thomas Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want*, cit., p. 47–48.
42 Olaf Breidbach, Federico Vercellone, op. cit., p. 68.

server). The aim is to arrive at as complete an interpretation as possible. This is to ensure that the image does not act autonomously on the individual, without control. In order that the individual acts as responsibly as possible following the viewing, using his critical skills. But, above all, to create a virtuous circle of reciprocal exchange, within a dialogical paradigm, in which the image is one of the interlocutors.

However, the question of whether the autonomy of the electronic image may be limited can only be partially answered. It is not always possible to understand the genesis of an image, contextualize it properly, decipher its original meaning, the imaginary which it conveys, or indeed to which it is subjected. Moreover, an image can take us by surprise and remain in our memory. In this way, it acts upon our emotions, not giving the viewer time to understand its deeper meanings.

In conclusion, we can argue that the images on the web cannot act independently in the internet arena without provoking a reaction on the part of the individual. (Co-)responsibility is required in the publication and removal of images, and furthermore, (co-)responsibility is required for their interpretation and for the control of their movements in cyberspace. Otherwise, the web risks being perceived as a modern-day digital and interactive version of the Platonic cave, in the sense that, the images would appear merely to be shadows of the iconic off-line reality. These are shadows to which we might give little weight, as they could be perceived as misleading. Instead these images exert strong power over the viewer, and this is further amplified by the potential of the web and by the intrinsic characteristics of the digital image.

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Chung-Chi YU

GAME OBJECTS AS INTENTIONAL OBJECTS

Introduction

Nowadays our daily lifeworld is drenched with simulated objects that digital technology brings up. Experiences such as watching the seamless insertion of computer animations, special effects in contemporary movies and television commercials are all too familiar to us. Computer games, constructed through digital technology, enable us to immerse in a virtual world that is completely different from our daily lifeworld. In the computer-game world, objects are encountered as if they were real. (Heim 1993, 1995, 1998; Martin 2009; Sagen 2012) These objects are rendered real by players during the game-playing. The aim of my present paper is to inquire into the ontological status of these game objects. My research will be based on the phenomenology of Husserl, in the framework of which I will examine the following question: to what extent the phenomenological thinking can cope with the issue of virtual objects, so long as we are aware of the fact that phenomenology was developed long before the development of cyberculture, the type of culture that apparently characterizes our daily lifeworld.

1. The Reality of Computer Games

Looking at the reality of a computer game from the angle of phenomenology, one tends to evoke the concept of image-consciousness. The reason

is quite simple. The reality of a game object is first of all the image that displays through the computer screen. The screen as interface is comparable to the canvas for a traditional painting or the film for a camera. So long as the game object belongs to the category of image, it is no more than a variation of images, just like the painting drawn by hand, the photos taken by camera, the film taken by video recorder. All of them belong to the category of image. In the terminology of Husserlian phenomenology, they share the common ground of image-consciousness. Certainly one should not ignore the fact that virtual reality is a result of digitalization. When the camera was invented, it was a major innovation that resulted in a discrepancy between the traditional way of expressing and the modern way of producing images. Digitalization is another technological advancement that has produced commensurate changes in regard to images. In the framework of phenomenology, we would like to raise the following question: How can Husserl help us assess the significance of digitalization? To be more precise, is the image-consciousness still available for the analysis of a game object?

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In Husserl, the image-consciousness is based on imagination. As representation, the imagination is in contrast to perception that incorporates the vivid presentation of real objects. In perception, the object is given genuinely in original experience. Together with the potential givens in horizon, the object of perception is apprehended as a transcendent object. Moreover, a belief in objective existence is posited. (Hua XVI: 141) In contrast, the object is not originally experienced in imagination; it appears instead only as image. That is, the object is not present, rather, it is represent. In case the image is solely mental, it is pure imagination, whereas in case it is displayed through material basis, it turns into externalized image, a painting, for example. Besides perception and imagination, both of which Husserl determines as intuition, there is conceptual apprehension that proceeds with abstract concepts as well as linguistic or scientific signs.

Things that are imagined are not taken to exist objectively. Image-consciousness appears when people, for example, watch a film, in which they actually perceive the moving image on the screen. The things represented there, be they people, automobiles, or anything else, are not actually present. Husserl holds that in image-consciousness of physical image there are three objects:

the image or "image object," the physical substrate, be it canvas, pigment, film stock, which supports the image; and the subject that is depicted in a portrait or perhaps some fictional creation, a centaur, for "example".

The inconsistency between the image, its physical support, and its subject makes us experience the image both as an image and as an actual thing. The painting as a physical thing hung on the wall in a room is in the real world, but the image-scene appearing in the painting is not. It may represent, for example, a unicorn, but the unicorn conflicts with its real surroundings – the room where the painting is hung. There can be no further experience of the depicted scene beyond the picture's frame. The differentiation between image object and image subject is essential to the concept of image. The former is though analogically similar to the latter, yet it can never replace the latter. Husserl insists on the distinction between the two. A picture or a photo is always imitating something beyond itself. However, is such a distinction sustainable for the digitalized virtual object, in particular a game object?

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An object in the game world is based on computer hardware as well as software. The image of game object is the graphical result of complex programming. It depends upon the material conditions to a large extent. The game object presents itself on the screen and the object refers to something else – plants, animals, streets, human beings or monsters. Seen as such, the phenomenological concept of image-consciousness seems to fit the game object very well.

Yet, in dealing with the distinction between traditional media and digital media, the Danish theorist Espen Aarseth asks the question: is "fictional" (imaginary, as Husserl would put it) a good way to depict a computer game? Is it appropriate to characterize the game world, including the game object, the Avatar and the whole narrative structure of game world as fictional? Aarseth questions such a viewpoint so long as we compare, for example, the figure of a dragon in a movie with that in a computer game. (Aarsth 2007: 36) Although the audience of a movie can be affected by such a figure, no interaction can happen between them. The audience has no chance to act on figures in a movie to make them different. In contrast, the interaction between figures and players is fundamental to computer game. The ending of the game remains open, a fact that makes a computer game tremendously different from movie.

Aarseth grants that there can also be fictional elements in a game world. There are things that present themselves on the screen but that have no reactions at all to the inquiry or action of a player. Such things can be seen to be purely fictional. A door that cannot be opened is fictional, the player cannot make another adventure behind that door. That a door can be opened signifies that more can be experienced after the door is opened. Using the terminology of Husserl, the openable door is perceptual, whereas the fictional door is purely imaginary. The latter is like a picture hung on the wall, purely decorative. Because the game object is more than imaginary, Husserl's conception of image-consciousness does not seem to fit in the framework of game objects very well.

II. Game object as intentional object, and as interplay of perception and imagination

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The computer game creates its own reality, with its own environment replete with, for example, tunnels, city streets, human figures, monsters and vehicles, which are based on the algorithms of the computer simulation. That means, such a reality is mathematically structured and determined. Each game is a "dynamic simulated world with its own spatial and temporal dimensions and dynamic relationships of virtual forces and effects." (Aarseth 2001: 299) The game world lets the participant play an active role, where he or she can test the system and discover the rules and structural qualities in the process. It is also a dynamic real-time experience of intervening with sets of algorithms that model any environment or process.

An analysis of game objects aims at what is disclosed in the experience of game playing, that is, what appears to consciousness. It does not inquire into the question as regards what lies behind the gameplay, even though what appears on the screen depends to a large extent on computer hardware as well as software. While they are the pre-condition for computer games, these things do not constitute the essence of a game. A game is a game because a player is involved, the game is something meaningful to the player during game-playing. Not only the game as a whole is meaningful, but also the content or objects that are involved in the game. In order to illustrate this point more closely I would like to refer to an example given by Aarseth. (Aarseth 2011: 11)

It involves two games. Form the viewpoint of computer mechanism or algorithm, no difference can be found between them. However, whereas the first one (Vote Dean for Iowa) may amuse players in general, the second one ('Kaboom' – the suicide bomber game) might disgust players. The significance of a game can be very well illuminated by such an example.

The distinction between mechanism and gameplay is decisive when we stick to the intentional analysis of game object. We do not go behind what is disclosed to consciousness. Instead, we focus on the analysis of what is going on with the consciousness of the player, of what he experiences. The intentional analysis aims at the analysis of the co-relation of consciousness and its object. The co-relation between consciousness and object does not simply mean that a connection is built between two separate realms: consciousness and the physical world. Denouncing such a presupposition Husserl focuses on phenomenon which is characterized through intentionality.

The thesis of Husserl is: intentionality means consciousness is consciousness of something. "Something" denotes that it is loaded with some meaning. Wherefrom comes such a meaning? How is it given? In Husserl's view, the act of consciousness has its contents: seeing entails some visions, hearing some voices, eating some flavors, and in hoping some wishes. These contents are depicted by Husserl as hyletic, or reell elements. They are diversely complex; some of them are even often out of our notice. What do we know about them? Once we pay attention to them, they begin to organize themselves to become something. They become the focus of our consciousness. This is what happens when some meaning emerges in our consciousness. Regarding this stage, one should not overemphasize the act of attention, because even when we do not actively pay attention to our consciousness-life, we passively do focus on something. Our consciousness in daily life alternate between different focuses. Some meaning is often replaced by another, and such alteration goes on and on and on. Now the question arises as regards the emergence of meaning. What happens when something becomes something for consciousness? In daily life, we usually experience something without question. Yet a further reflection reveals that when we think we experience something as a whole, we experience actually only a tiny part of it or we never experience anything without starting from a certain perspective. While we experience just a tiny part of something, we experience that "something" as a unity. Why is that?

Every experience happens only once, it comes up and fades immediately along with the contents contained in such acts. Once this is true, does that mean that nothing permanent can be experienced unless we keep it continuously present? The early Husserl struggles with such a question. He observes

that even though we count 2x2 on different occasions, that is, in various consciousness-acts, we nevertheless recognize every time the same validity that 2x2=4. There is something that lies beyond the act of consciousness. There is something that remains the same even when every status of consciousness is very different. Husserl concludes that what consciousness can do is far beyond its immediate contents. It points beyond itself. In an analogical way, we might answer the question raised above: why can the experience of a tiny part of something lead us to point to the unity of such a thing? In Husserl's view, this is attributed to the intentionality of consciousness. Consciousness is not confined to its present domain, it points to something far beyond itself. It can happen in ideal objects in logic or mathematics, it can be also revealed in perception of physical objects.

Consciousness does not only have hyletic, reell contents, but also transcendent objects as its correlates, which are intentional. Each intentional object is subjectively intended as a unitary object. An intentional object is intended mostly by way of a significant sign, picture or image, or even just vague thought. So long as it remains an object as such, it is merely intended, not fulfilled. Fulfillment is mainly conditioned by intuition. The intentional object will win a new status through fulfillment, and we are assured of our knowledge of it. (Hua XI, 10) I may claim that a dinosaur tramping alone a main street of Kaohsiung, but I can hardly make my claim true so long as the chance for fulfillment of such an intentional object through intuition is rather low, it lacks what Husserl coins as evidence. But what about the game object in the game world, which is rendered virtual? In what sense could we say that it is intentional? How is the game object to be determined phenomenologically?

In order to answer this question, a more detailed explication about horizon is necessary in such a context. The inner horizon implies the possibility of how the object may display itself and the ways it has been in the past. The adumbrations in the future are potential compared to the present adumbration. The object seen as such is always related to the infinitely open, possible adumbrations. Some of the open possible adumbrations remain dead potentialities, (Hua XI, 13) whereas the others turn into expected adumbrations, according as how the process of perception runs. (Hua XI, 12) All these expected adumbrations will show up according to the kinesthetic structure of the perceiver. In this regard,

Husserl stresses that though the way the object shows itself is indeterminate, it is yet in principle determinable. On every present perception there is the potentiality that other adumbrations will come up. There is always the plus ultra for the object, for this reason there is never an ending of the appearance. (Hua XI, 11) The other adumbrations transcend the present adumbration and it is impossible for the process to come to an end.

Now back to the question regarding the object in computer game. In order to determine to what extent it is an intentional object, let us first of all distinguish two levels of objects in a computer game. One of them refers to the whole scene on the screen in computer game. The other refers to the objects and landscape except Avatar — the replacement of the player in the computer game. The former signifies that even the avatar is objectified as an intentional object. The ego of the player is so to speak objectified. He is distinguished from the player outside the game, who dictates the ego on the screen, that is, in the game, to carry out the assignments that are demanded. The second case signifies that the whole screen disclosed to the player is no other than the environment or objects that are experienced by the player. This used to be called "first person perspective".

As indicated above, the thesis of Husserl regarding intentionality is: consciousness is consciousness of something. Now, what is this something in a computer game? What does the game object mean to the player? In the computer game, in particular in the 3-D games of today, the object stays constantly fluid, according as the player turns his angles or positions. This results in the change of size or shape of the object that appears. How then can we say that these game objects remain the same, or they are what they are with identity? This is very much comparable to a normal perception or an object in the lifeworld. So long as the object in perception can be seen to remain identical due to intentionality of consciousness, i.e. apprehension, so can the game object remain the same in spite of constant changes. This is based on the intentionality of the consciousness of player. The game object is undoubtedly an intentional object. The intentional object goes beyond the various consciousness-acts, it can be recognized as the same object in different modes of perception. The intentional object is the correlate object. It is no longer the reell content of a consciousness-act, but goes beyond. Now the question arises as regards what

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this consciousness belongs to? Whose consciousness is it after all? Is it the consciousness of the player or the consciousness of Avatar, the replacement of player in a computer game? Can the latter case be reasonable? How can Avatar, a simulated character, be viewed as having consciousness? My contention is that, making Avatar a conscious being is the necessary condition of game-playing.

So long as Avatar replaces the player during the game-playing, it also experiences the game-world on behalf of player. During the game-playing, the game object is more significant to the Avatar than to the player himself. (Klevjer 2012: 21) That is to say, there is correlation between the consciousness of Avatar and the game object. Only on a second level can we say that there is the correlation between the player and the game object. On such a level the Avatar is counted as one of the objects, he is so to speak the objectified subject in a game.

Besides inner horizon, the object has also outer horizon. The object itself is located among other objects, appear against backgrounds. The horizon of game world should extend infinitely much the same as that in real world. Yet basically such a world is constructed by designer, analogical to a fiction or movie. As long as no fictional reality can extend infinitely, so should no horizon of game world extend infinitely. Such a fact can be easily understood so long as the player steps out of the game world, i.e., when he no longer plays the role of Avatar. (Klevjer 2011) In terms of phenomenology, this is similar to making a transcendental turn, i.e., no longer so immersed in the "reality" that he used to assume but brackets it. It is in this moment that he gains a new perspective about himself, about what he or she has been doing. In terms of game-playing, when the player steps out of the simulated character of Avatar, he or she assumes a position about what Avatar has been doing, and how the game world has been disclosed to Avatar till then. Right at this moment, the player realizes that he or she, incorporated in Avatar, has experienced the game world as a reality, but after withdrawing from the game, the player views the game-world as no more than virtual.

The game object is real to Avatar, so is it real to the player during the time when he plays the game? The game object fulfills the intention of the player, that is, he can experience the game object in as many aspects as he desires in different

occasions with the kinetic function of Avatar. A game, however, has a narrative structure. Due to such a structure the outer horizon cannot extend infinitely. It is instead limited, and such a restriction reveals the demarcation of its reality. It counts on a certain narrative structure in order to seem real, but for the same reason it cannot be definitely real. While being intentional, it is also virtual. Game object can thus be regarded as mixture of reality and unreality.

We saw from the beginning that game object is basically image on the screen. Yet it is not only image because it is rendered as reality during the game-playing. During the game-playing, so long as the simulated image is perceived by the Avatar that is animated and controlled by the player, it is closer to perception. When the player leaves the game, the image on the screen loses the validity as a perceptual object. It recedes to the status of pure image. Such a situation is comparable to the puppet of a puppet-theatre. It is activated during the performance, but it is no longer alive after the theatre performance comes to an end. Viewed as such, the sharp distinction between image-object and image-subject seems to become vague, whereas an interplay of perception and imagination becomes more and more clear.

But no matter whether a game object is closer to perception or imagination, it is intentional object. An intentional analysis focuses mainly on how the game object is revealed to consciousness and we conclude that so long as a game object is neither solely pure perception nor solely pure imagination, it can be rendered as interplay between perception and imagination.

Conclusion

A game object is complex. It is far beyond Husserl's framework; yet, I hold that, no matter how complex it may be, it is intentional. It fits the framework of intentional analysis. As long as intentional analysis has priority to physical analysis, it does not focus on how the game is based on physical or digital requirement. It focuses on the interactive sphere between subject and object, on the in-between of player and game object, on how the player experiences the game world. To sum up, the intentional analysis helps reveal the core of the computer game experience. It also helps disclose the intentional character of the game object.

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Im Memoriam

LESTER E. EMBREE (1938–2017)

After months of struggle with a spinal injury and complications, Lester Embree, Ph.D., passed away on January 19, 2017. He was Professor of Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University and received his Ph.D. from the New School for Social Research in 1972. He did his doctoral work with Aron Gurwitsch and had taken classes with Dorion Cairns. He was instrumental in setting up the archives for the papers and files of, among others, Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, and Dorion Cairns. He was a prolific scholar, having published 5 book-length investigations, 94 book chapters, 89 interpretive essays, 46 edited books, and 31 edited works of other authors. Many of his works have been published in several languages. He also gave 200 presentations in various conferences and academic settings. He served on the boards of 35 phenomenological societies and belonged to 20 philosophical societies. One of his great services was to foster the growth of phenomenological organizations worldwide, and he was frequently involved in the beginnings of such organizations, such as the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations, the Husserl Circle, the Círculo LatinoAmericano de Fenomenología, the Central and European Conference in Phenomenology, the Nordic Society for Phenomenology, Phenomenology for the East Asia Circle, Réseau Euro-Méditerranéen de phénoménologie pour le dialogue interculturel, the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, and the

International Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science. He was instrumental in establishing two book series, *Contributions to Phenomenology* (Springer Press) and the *Series in Continental Thought* (Ohio State University Press).

He was a great entrepreneur for phenomenology, always imagining and realizing new phenomenological projects and setting up new organizations. His service to phenomenology included encouraging the practice of phenomenological method, fostering multidisciplinary engagement, mentoring a generation of younger phenomenology scholars, and helping the tradition of phenomenology to flourish across cultures. In the many scholarly conferences he attended, he could be counted on to provide regular illuminating comments based on the views of authoritative phenomenologists, particularly those of the New School; to offer encouraging compliments and insightful criticisms; and to occasionally indulge in instances of corny humor. With Lester's death, phenomenology has lost one of its great animating spirits.

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Michael Barber

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Advancing Phenomenology as a Practical Endeavor (http://www.icnap.org/embrees-contributions-4.pdf) by Thomas Nenon

Abstracts

Klaus Held

On the Prehistory of the Differentiation between Nature and Culture

Because of the technization of all relationships within life our culture is globally becoming more and more emancipated from nature. Therefore, it might within an intercultural philosophical conversation seem reasonable to attempt to juxtapose the traditional understandings of nature in East Asia and the Western world. The opposition between nature and culture stems from Aristotle's differentiation of *phýsis* and *téchne*. The article firstly analyzes, what does the circumstance that Aristotle's thought sought its linguistic-philosophical and ontological orientation in the structure of *ti katá tinós* mean for the Western relation towards nature. Thereupon, considering the Japanese sentence and the manner of work in the care for a traditional Japanese garden, the article shows that the life-world of Japan has preserved the ancient East Asian understanding of nature as *shizen*, wherein there exists – like in the early Greek thought before Aristotle – no contrariety between *phýsis* and *téchne*.

Key words: culture, nature, Japanese garden, *Lebenswelt*, Aristotle.

Klaus Held

K predzgodovini razlikovanja med naravo in kulturo

Zaradi tehnizacije vseh življenjskih razmerij se naša kultura globalno vse bolj emancipira od narave. Zato je nemara smiselno, da v medkulturnem filozofskem pogovoru poskušamo vzpostaviti mostove med tradicionalnim razumevanjem narave v Vzhodni Aziji in na Zahodu. Nasprotje med naravo in kulturo izhaja iz razlikovanja med *phýsis* in *téchne* pri Aristotelu. Najprej analiziramo, kaj za zahodnjaški odnos do narave pomeni, da je Aristotelovo mišljenje jezikovno-filozofsko in ontološko skozinskoz vodila struktura *ti katá*

tinós. Nato ob primeru japonske povedi in načina dela pri negi tradicionalnega japonskega vrta pokažemo, da se je v življenjskem svetu Japonske ohranilo staro vzhodnoazijsko razumevanje narave kot *shizen*, znotraj katerega – tako kot pri zgodnjih grških mislecih pred Aristotelom – protislovje med *phýsis* in *téchne* ne obstoji.

Ključne besede: kultura, narava, japonski vrt, *Lebenswelt*, Aristotel.

Liangkang Ni
"The Spiritual Eye"

K. Gödel started his overall studies of E. Husserl at the end of the fifties of the last century. He mainly focused on Husserl's method of ideal intuition and reached therefrom a positive conclusion: concept is perceivable. In principle, the ideal intuition upheld by Husserl may be investigated from at least three phenomenological perspectives: 1. noesis-noema; 2. the apprehension-materials (*Auffassungsmaterie*) in noesis; 3. the apprehension-form (*Auffassungsform*) in noema. In Gödel's relevant studies, these three perspectives are more or less touched by him, and are described in his own way. Gödel all the time remained silent regarding these study results. In terms of this, he of course had his own reasons.

Key words: Gödel, Husserl, noema, noesis.

Liangkang Ni
»Duhovno oko«

K. Gödel se je z mislijo E. Husserla začel ukvarjati ob koncu petdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Predvsem se je osredotočal na Husserlovo metodo ideacije in na njeni podlagi prišel do pozitivnega sklepa: pojem je mogoče zaznati. Načeloma je ideacijo, kakor jo je zasnoval Husserl, mogoče raziskati s treh fenomenoloških perspektiv: 1. noesis-noema; 2. materija umevanja (*Auffas-*

sungsmaterie) znotraj noesis; 3. forma umevanja (*Auffassungsform*) znotraj noeme. V svojih razpravah se Gödel dotakne skorajda vseh treh perspektiv in jih opiše na svoj način. Kljub temu je ves čas molčal glede rezultatov svojih študij. Za to je, kajpada, imel svoje razloge.

Ključne besede: Gödel, Husserl, noema, noesis.

Christophe Perrin
Heidegger, Philosopher of Freedom?

In his lecture *course* from the *Summer* Semester 1930, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Heidegger, who seems to grant to the question of freedom the superiority, gives nevertheless the priority to the question of philosophy, because dealing with the former question returns for him, introduced anew, in the latter one. How do we consider the judgment, according to which his thought is a "philosophy of freedom"? We think this is true, but the real object of this thought is the question of philosophy itself, since to philosophize consists, as Heidegger writes in his *Schwarze Hefte*, of "getting out of the 'philosophy'".

Key words: Heidegger, philosophy, freedom, question, introduction.

Christophe Perrin
Heidegger, filozof svobode?

V predavanjih poletnega semestra leta 1930, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Heidegger, za katerega se zdi, da prvenstvo podarja vprašanju svobode, vendarle podeli prednost vprašanju filozofije, kajti zanj se prvo vprašanje povrne, nanovo vpeljano, v slednjem. Kako naj obravnavamo sodbo, v skladu s katero je njegova misel »filozofija svobode«? To je morebiti res, toda resnični predmet njegove misli je vprašanje filozofije same, kajti filozofirati pomeni, kakor Heidegger zapiše v *Schwarze Hefte*, »izstopiti iz 'filozofije'«.

Ključne besede: Heidegger, filozofija, svoboda, vprašanje, uvod.

Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen

Experience, Poetry and Truth: On the Phenomenology of Ernst Jünger's *The Adventurous Heart*

Ernst Jünger is known for his war writings, but is largely ignored by contemporary phenomenologists. In this essay, I explore his *The Adventurous Heart* which has recently been made available in English. This work consists of a set of fragments which, when related, disclose a coherent flow of philosophical thinking. Specifically, I show that, beneath a highly poetic and obscure prose, Jünger posits how subjective experience and poetry allow individuals to realize truth. I relate parts of Jünger's insights to contributions by Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, arguing that Jünger offers a unique and valuable contribution to the phenomenological discipline.

Key words: Jünger, experience, poetry, truth, phenomenology.

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Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen

Izkustvo, poezija in resnica: O fenomenologiji v *Pustolovskem srcu* Ernsta Jüngerja

Ernst Jünger je znan po svojih vojnih spisih, vendar ga sodobni fenomenologi skorajda ne upoštevajo. V članku obravnavam njegovo delo *Pustolovsko srce*, ki je pred kratkim izšlo v angleškem prevodu. Knjigo sestavlja niz fragmentov, ki razkrivajo, če jih medsebojno povežemo, strnjen tok filozofskega razmišljanja. Poskušam predvsem pokazati, kako Jünger s skrajno poetično in zastrto prozo razgrne, da subjektivno izkustvo in poezija posamezniku omogočata spoznanje resnice. Dele Jüngerjevih uvidov povežem s teorijami Husserla, Heideggra in Merleau-Pontyja, pri čemer zagovarjam, da Jünger ponuja edinstven in upoštevanja vreden prispevek k fenomenološki disciplini.

Ključne besede: Jünger, izkustvo, poezija, resnica, fenomenologija.

Xia HONG
Relationship between two conceptual Perspectives of Life-world

This essay attempts to analyze phenomenological and sociological perspectives of life-world. These two perspectives differ in their respective emphasis of different dimension of life-world, but this difference is trivial in that there is a family resemblance in the sense of Wittgenstein's philosophy: life-world is the trinity of subjective, objective and social worlds.

Key words: life-world, world, life, phenomenology, Wittgenstein.

Xia HONG
Odnos med dvema pojmovnima perspektivama glede življenjskega sveta

Članek poskuša analizirati fenomenološko in sociološko perspektivo glede življenjskega sveta. Pogleda se razlikujeta glede na drugačne poudarke, ki jih podeljujeta različnim razsežnostim življenjskega sveta. Toda razlika je trivialna, saj med njima obstoji družinska podobnost v smislu Wittgensteinove filozofije: življenjski svet je trojnost subjektivnega, objektivnega in družbenega sveta.

Ključne besede: življenjski svet, svet, življenje, fenomenologija, Wittgenstein.

Salvatore Italia
Deleting Individualities: Habermas' Worry About Autonomy

After discussing the mutual relations between culture, personal identity and nature in Habermas' philosophy, I shed light on the narrow path of free

will between social and natural determinism, the first being a "softer" form of determinism than the second. Then I show how humans can feed-back on society and modify their own culture to in turn feed-back on nature too. Finally, I conclude highlighting the interplay between identity, autonomy, free will and democracy.

Key words: Habermas, autonomy, free will, culture, nature.

Salvatore Italia
Izbrisovanje individualnosti: Habermasova skrb glede avtonomije

Po obravnavi medsebojnih razmerij med kulturo, osebno identiteto in naravo znotraj Habermasove filozofije osvetlim ozko pot svobodne volje med družbenim in naravnim determinizmom, pri čemer je prvi »mehkejša« oblika determinizma kakor slednji. Nato pokažem, kako ljudje lahko vplivajo na družbo in spreminjajo svojo lastno kulturo, ki obenem vpliva tudi na naravo. V sklepu, slednjič, poudarim medsebojno igro identitete, avtonomije, svobodne volje in demokracije.

Ključne besede: Habermas, avtonomija, svobodna volja, kultura, narava.

Boško Pešić – Martina Ivanko
Parrhesia as Alethurgic Practice

Parrhesia, the concept on which Foucault gave lectures at the Collège de France, is essentially a Greek concept and literally means to say everything. With parrhesia, the relation between the individual who practices parrhesia and the truth is the most important, whereat he at the same time realizes the relation with himself, and then also with other people. In ancient Greece, parrhesia was mainly realized either in the democratic or the autocratic form of government, as witnessed in some of Euripides' tragedies like *Ion*, or Plato's *The Seventh Letter*. Parrhesia in ancient Greece also appears as a kind of care of the self (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ), and Foucault considers that very important. In

the first two cases parrhesia was related to philosophy only indirectly – the emphasis in the mentioned cases was always on the political, on the very political action. Parrhesia as the care of the self is undoubtedly directly related to philosophy and one may say that in some way it is realized as philosophy itself. In this sense, parrhesia can be considered as alethurgic practice – as an act of producing truth, truth as the happening of the subject itself. This alethurgic practice rests on the importance of the principle of truth-telling about oneself as the assumption of the care for singularity. Aside from his lectures, parrhesia as an explicit concept absents from Foucault's other works, but this is exactly the way in which it is present in them. As a new care of the self, it is just one possible answer to the procedures of power that occur through apparatus in the modern age.

Key words: Foucault, parrhesia, alethurgia, truth, democracy, politics, philosophy, power.

Boško Pešić – Martina Ivanko
Parezija kot aleturgična praksa

Parezija, pojem, o katerem je Foucault predaval na Collège de France, je v svojem bistvu grški koncept in dobesedno pomeni upovedati vse. Pri pareziji je najpomembnejši odnos med posameznikom, ki udejanja parezijo, in resnico, pri čemer on sam ta odnos uresničuje najprej v sebi, nato z drugimi ljudmi. Stara Grčija je parezijo uresničevala predvsem v demokratski ali avtokratski obliki vladanja, kakor izpričujejo nekatere Evripidove tragedije, kakršna je *Ion*, ali Platonovo »Sedmo pismo«. V stari Grčiji se parezija pojavlja tudi kot neke vrste skrb za sebstvo (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ), kar se Foucaultu zdi zelo pomembno. V prvih dveh primerih se parezija na filozofijo nanaša samo posredno – poudarek pri obeh omenjenih primerih leži na političnem, na samem političnem delovanju. Parezija kot skrb za sebstvo je nedvomno neposredno povezana s filozofijo in reči je mogoče, da se nekako uresničuje kot filozofija sama. V tem smislu je parezijo mogoče dojeti kot aleturgično prakso – kot dejanje proizvajanja resnice, resnice kot dogajanja subjekta samega. Takšna

aleturgična praksa temelji na pomembnosti načela izrekanja resnice o sebi kot predpostavki skrbi za singularnost. Razen v predavanjih parezije kot izrecnega pojma ni mogoče najti v drugih Foucaultovih delih, toda to je pravzaprav natanko način, na katerega je v njih prisotna. Kot nova skrb za sebstvo je samo eden izmed možnih odgovorov na oblastne procese, kakor se dogajajo znotraj ustroja moderne dobe.

Ključne besede: M. Foucault, parezija, aleturgija, resnica, demokracija, politika, filozofija, oblast.

Harris B. Bechtol
Abrahamic Figurations of Responsibility: Religion Without Religion in Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion

Abraham has played a prominent role in recent developments in phenomenology and, in particular, continental philosophy of religion. This paper examines the importance that the scene of Genesis 22 plays in both Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion's contributions to continental philosophy of religion. Specifically, I argue that Derrida and Marion turn to this scene of the binding of Isaac in order to describe the way in which our ethical life is structured religiously around the theme of sacrifice. In this, sacrifice brings an impetus to ethical life that includes a comportment to the other but also extends beyond the other to include the givenness of phenomena themselves.

Key words: Abraham, Derrida, Marion, religion, responsibility.

Harris B. Bechtol
Abrahamske oblike odgovornosti: Religija brez religije pri Jacquesu Derridaju in Jeanu-Lucu Marionu

Abraham igra odlikovano vlogo v sodobnem razvoju fenomenologije in, še posebej, kontinentalne filozofije religije. Članek preučuje pomembnost, ki jo prizor iz Geneze 22 zavzema tako pri Jacquesu Derridaju kakor pri Jeanu-

Lucu Marionu znotraj njunega prispevka h kontinentalni filozofiji religije. Zagovarjam misel, da se Derrida in Marion na prizor vezanja Izaka nanašata zato, da bi lahko opisala način, na katerega se naše etično življenje religiozno strukturira ob témi žrtvovanja. S tem žrtvovanje prinaša spodbudo za etično življenje, ki obsega odnošaj do drugega, a se obenem razteza onkraj drugega in vključuje danost fenomenov samih.

Ključne besede: Abraham, Derrida, Marion, religija, odgovornost.

Andrej Božič
The Other in Dialogue.
Between Hermeneutic Experience and Responsive Rationality

With regard to the problem of the other as it gives itself to be encountered in the dialogical movement the paper discusses the principal points of contention between two conflicting, but nonetheless complementing philosophical stances: the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the phenomenology of Bernhard Waldenfels. The intention of the consideration of the confrontation between Gadamer's compelling advocacy of the primacy of question in his conceptualization of hermeneutic experience and Waldenfels' critical reassessment of the phenomenon of answer in his theory of responsive rationality, between opposing positions that, thus juxtaposed, by themselves circumscribe the basic elements of dialogue, is not – and cannot be – to overplay or to underplay the significance of either of them by comparing its pertinence to the counterpart, nor to establish an unsurmountable frontline between them, but by re-tracing the converging and diverging traits at the crossroads of their paths attempt to re-approach exactly and expressly the openness of the "in-between(ness)" of (our) being and thus show (anew) – nuanced from (within) the viewpoints of both authors – the way the other comes into play (to be encountered) with-in (the medium of) dialogue.

Key words: Gadamer, Waldenfels, the other, dialogue, question, answer.

Andrej Božič
Drugo v dialogu.
Med hermenevtičnim izkustvom in responzivno racionalnostjo

Z vidika problema drugega, kakor ga srečujemo znotraj dialoškega dogajanja, članek obravnava poglavitne točke spora med dvema nasprotnima, a komplementarnima filozofskima stališčema: hermenevtiko Hansa-Georga Gadamerja in fenomenologijo Bernharda Waldenfelsa. Namen premisleka soočenja med Gadamerjevim prepričljivim zagovorom prednosti vprašanja znotraj njegove konceptualizacije hermenevtičnega izkustva in Waldenfelsovim kritičnim ovrednotenjem fenomena odgovora znotraj njegove teorije responzivne racionalnosti, med dvema miselnima držama, ki sami na sebi – takó sopostavljeni – naznačujeta nekatere temeljne elemente dialoga, ni – in ne more biti – niti izigranje pomembnosti ene izmed njiju v primerjavi z drugo niti vzpostavitev nepremostljive črte ločitve med njima, temveč z zasledovanjem konvergentnih in divergentnih potez na njunem križpotju zarisati odprtost »vmesnosti« (našega) prebivanja in se, zatorej, (nanovo – z osvetlitvijo gledišč obeh avtorjev –) približati načinu, na katerega se (nam) drugo daje, daruje (v/za) so-igro, znotraj (medija) dialoga.

Ključne besede: Gadamer, Waldenfels, drugo, dialog, vprašanje, odgovor.

Ilya Inishev
The Meaning Surfaces: The Missing Materiality Analysis in Hermeneutical Image Theory

The main goal of the article is to outline the notion of the materiality analysis, missing in hermeneutical image theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The necessity of such an analysis springs from Gadamer's thesis that image is not just an artifact representing reality but a most authentic mode of appearance of reality itself allowing us to experience it as a meaningful whole. As a result, such a transformative power of the image raises a question about status and functions of materiality within pictorial experience. The article outlines and

defends the notion of iconic materiality, i.e., of dynamics and manifold functions of material structures in the perception of pictures and images.

Key words: hermeneutics, image theory, iconic materiality.

Ilya Inishev
Površine pomena: Manko materialne analize v hermenevtični teoriji podobe

Poglavitni cilj članka je oris ideje materialne analize, ki je umanjkala v hermenevtični teoriji podobe pri Hansu-Georgu Gadamerju. Nujnost tovrstne analize izhaja iz Gadamerjeve teze, da slika ni samo artefakt, ki reprezentira resničnost, temveč avtentični način predstavljanja resničnosti same, ki nam omogoči, da jo izkusimo kot pomenljivo celoto. Takšna transformativna moč podobe posledično sproža vprašanje o statusu in funkcijah materialnosti znotraj pikturalnega izkustva. Članek oriše in zagovarja idejo ikonične materialnosti, tj. dinamike in mnogoterih funkcij materialnih struktur pri zaznavanju slik in podob.

Ključne besede: hermenevtika, teorija podobe, ikonična materialnost.

Krešimir Purgar
Modalities of Pictorial Appearing: Basic Concepts

The proliferation of digital technology requires from us to think about images in a new way. We should no longer refer to them only as Greek *eikon*, that is, reflection or representation, but as experiences, events and special kind of appearing. In contemporary digital culture pictorial appearing is the symptom of the most recent turn towards images, the one that is happening after the "original" pictorial turn that was described by W. J. T. Mitchell and Gottfried Boehm almost three decades ago as the epoch-making new kind of relationship between images and language. Today we witness a different kind of urgency: the one that will exemplify the relationship between analogue images and

digital images, representations and post-representations, reality and virtuality, semiotics and phenomenology. In this article I will propose a "transitional" theory of the image that takes into account the wide gap between objects and perceptions, that is, between *eikon* and pure sensuousness. To this end, I will introduce the four basic modalities of pictorial appearing: temporality, transparency, mediality and referentiality.

Key words: image ontology, pictorial appearing, Martin Seel, Dieter Mersch, temporality, transparency, mediality, referentiality.

Krešimir Purgar
Modalnosti pikturalnega prikazovanja: Temeljni pojmi

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Razmah digitalne tehnologije od nas zahteva, da podobe premislimo na nov način. Podobe ne smemo več obravnavati samo kot grške *eikon*, se pravi, kot odsev ali kot reprezentacijo, temveč kot izkustvo, dogodek in posebno vrsto prikazovanja. V sodobni digitalni kulturi je pikturalno prikazovanje simptom nedavnega obrata k podobam, tistega obrata, ki se dogaja po »originalnem« pikturalnem obratu, kakor sta ga pred skorajda tremi desetletji opisala W. J. T. Mitchell in Gottfried Boehm kot epohalno novo vrsto razmerja med podobami in jezikom. Danes smo priče drugačni nujnosti, ki naj bi pojasnila odnos med analognimi in digitalnimi podobami, med reprezentacijami in post-reprezentacijami, med realnostjo in virtualnostjo, med semiotiko in fenomenologijo. V članku predlagam »tranzicijsko« teorijo podobe, ki upošteva širok razkorak med objekti in zaznavami, se pravi, med *eikon* in čisto čutnostjo. Zato vpeljujem štiri temeljne modalnosti pikturalnega prikazovanja: temporalnost, transparentnost, medialnost in referencialnost.

Ključne besede: ontologija podobe, pikturalno prikazovanje, Martin Seel, Dieter Mersch, temporalnost, transparentnost, medialnost, referencialnost.

Veronica Neri
The Autonomy and Responsibilities of the Image in Cyberspace

In my paper, I wish to discuss the problem of responsibility and autonomy of the image in the web. In particular, I will examine, *in primis*, the characteristics of the digital image. Then I will analyze the responsibility and limits of the individual towards web images, and, similarly, the responsibilities and limits of web images towards the individual. An understanding of these relationships is necessary in order to develop an ethics of the image in cyberspace.

Key words: autonomy, ethics, image, responsibility, web.

Veronica Neri
Avtonomija in odgovornosti podobe v kiberprostoru

V članku želim obravnavati problem odgovornosti in avtonomije podobe na spletu. Zlasti bom, *in primis*, raziskala značilnosti digitalne podobe. Potem bom analizirala odgovornost in meje posameznika v njegovem odnosu do spletnih podob in, na soroden način, odgovornosti in meje spletnih podob v njihovem odnosu do posameznika. Razumevanje teh razmerij je nujnega pomena, če želimo razviti etiko podobe v kiberprostoru.

Ključne besede: avtonomija, etika, podoba, odgovornost, splet.

Chung-Chi Yu
Game Objects as Intentional Objects

What are game objects in the game world? How is the game object to be determined phenomenologically? A game object is complex. It is far beyond Husserl's framework; yet, I hold that no matter how complex it may be, it is intentional. It fits the framework of intentional analysis. As long as intentional analysis has priority to physical analysis, it does not focus on how the game is based on physical or digital requirements. It focuses on the interactive sphere

between subject and object, on the in-between of player and game object, on how the player experiences the game world. There is original experience of game playing, and it constitutes the essential part of computer game. I tend to hold that the intentional analysis helps reveal what is the core of the computer game, even though the computer game constitutes a challenge to Husserl's phenomenology.

Key words: computer games, Husserl, phenomenology, intentionality.

Chung-Chi Yu
Igralni objekti kot intencionalni objekti

Kaj so igralni objekti znotraj sveta igre? Kako naj fenomenološko opredelimo igralni objekt? Igralni objekt je kompleksen. Je daleč onkraj Husserlovega okvira; vendar trdim, da je, ne glede na vso njegovo domnevno kompleksnost, intencionalen. Ustreza okviru intencionalne analize. Kolikor ima intencionalna analiza prednost pred fizično analizo, se ne osredotoča na fizične ali digitalne temeljne predpogoje za igro. Osredotoča se na interaktivno sfero med subjektom in objektom, na vmesnost med igralcem in igralnim objektom, na to, kako igralec izkuša svet igre. Obstaja izvirno izkustvo igranja igre, ki konstituira bistveni del računalniške igre. Zagovarjam, da intencionalna analiza lahko pripomore k razkritju jedra računalniške igre, čeprav računalniška igra predstavlja izziv za Husserlovo fenomenologijo.

Ključne besede: računalniška igra, Husserl, fenomenologija, intencionalnost.

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Rainer Wiehl, »Gadamers philosophische Hermeneutik und die begriffsgeschichtliche Methode«, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 45 (2003), S. 10--20.

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Held, Klaus (1989): »Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit«, in: *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*, Otto Pöggeler (Hrsg.), (S.) 13–39. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag.

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Wiehl, Rainer (2003): »Gadamers philosophische Hermeneutik und die begriffsgeschichtliche Methode«, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 45, (S.) 10–20.

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