https://doi.or g/10.31449/inf.v47i1.4463 Informatica 47 (2023) 1–10 1
Enhancement of NTSA Secur e Communication with One-T ime Pad (OTP) in
IoT
Ali Hasan Aidaros Alattas
1
, Mahmood A. Al-Shareeda
1
, Selvakumar Manickam
1, ∗ and Murtaja Ali Saare
2
1
National Advanced IPv6 Centre, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1 1800, Penang, Malaysia
2
Department of Computer T echnology Engineering, Shatt Al-Arab University College, Basrah, Iraq
E-mail: alshareeda022@usm.my , selva@usm.my , murtaja.a.sari@sa-uc.edu.iq
∗ Corresponding author
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), NTSA, One-T ime Pad (OTP), lightweight cryptographic algorithms
Received: October 24, 2022
Internet of Things (IoT) systems use inter connected devices with limited pr ocessing, memory , storage, and
power availability . Designing the IoT system r equir es car eful consideration of data security . IoT networks
ar e used to collect, pr ocess, and transport data; as a r esult, it needs to be encrypted and secur ed. T o
ensur e that the data of IoT systems ar e pr otected, a variety of lightweight encryption techniques have been
developed. These algorithms ar e unable to carry out complicated or extensive computations. The curr ent
challenge facing lightweight cryptographic algorithms, such as NTSA, is how to combine the highest level of
security with the least amount of negative influence on runtime speed and space. By applying the One-T ime
Pad (OTP) technique, the pr oposed mechanism can raise the security level and effectiveness of NTSA. The
pr oposed mechanism must be put into practise and put to the test in or der to demonstrate its effectiveness
and capacity to satisfy the needs of the r esour ce-constrained devices. Due to the benefits of the OTP , this
suggested method would be beneficial for devices with minimal r esour ces. The pr oposed technique offers
a gr eater security level, 2134, than NTSA, 2128, after examining and evaluating the experimental data
noticed thr oughout the tests. NTSA is slower than the suggested appr oach by 70% in terms of runtime
speed. While NTSA uses 16% of SRAM, the pr oposed algorithm only uses 12%. NTSA uses 70% mor e
ener gy than the suggested algorithm, with higher ener gy consumption r esults of 0.000388 Joules for the
pr oposed algorithm and 0.001295 Joules for NTSA.
Povzetek: Pr edstavljena je nova metoda za šifriranje in varnostna vprašanja IoT omr ežij, ki dosega boljše
r ezultate kot NTSA.
1 Intr oduction
The Internet is a system architecture that has allowed com-
munications to advance to connect devices via dif ferent
networks all over the world. Any individual object that
connects to one of its networks can access the Internet
for nearly any purpose that requires information ( 1 ; 2 ).
It enables access to digital information through human or
machine-to-machine (M2M) communications ( 3 ). Each
connected object in the Internet of Things has a unique iden-
tity and can connect to other connected objects ( 4 ). Medi-
cal equipment, monitoring equipment, machinery , automo-
biles, and buildings will all be upgraded to become intelli-
gent objects that can interact with people or other IoT de-
vices ( 5 ; 6 ). The digital transformation of many industries
is what fuels the IoT’ s growth. IoT connections will in-
crease from fifteen billion in 2015 to seventy-five billion
by 2025, as stated in ( 7 ), see Figure 1 .
The security issue is an afterthought because the
resource-constrained networked device is meant to con-
sume a little power to give all essential capabilities ( 8 ; 9 ).
There are problems with IoT hardware, including the possi-
bility of an attack on the device’ s encrypted data since some
Figure 1: IoT connected devices in number .
IoT devices are too small to support asymmetric cryptogra-
phy algorithms. A gadget transmits or receives data that
needs to be encrypted ( 10 ; 1 1 ). However , using crypto-
graphic methods on devices with limited resources is dif-
ficult. The device itself, such as an 8-bit microcontroller
with a 2KB RAM limit, performs the encryption operation
( 12 ; 13 ).

2 Informatica 47 (2023) 1–10 A.H.A. Alattas et al.
T raditional cryptography techniques cannot be imple-
mented on such devices since they are expensive and inef-
ficient. In order to address the security concerns on nodes
with limited resources, lightweight ciphers have been de-
veloped. They are made to achieve cryptographic computa-
tional operation while adhering to the restrictions of micro-
controllers, small-size RAM, and low power consumption
( 14 ; 15 ; 16 ).
By exploiting the benefits of the OTP technique, the sug-
gested mechanism introduces a solution for both high secu-
rity and higher performance. This paper focuses on sym-
metric encryption ciphers and the OTP approach as a foun-
dation for lightweight cryptography . The advantages of
block ciphers, which are simple to implement, the OTP
technique, high security , and high performance can result
in a dependable and robust system. The following are some
of the research’ s contributions:
– This study will make it easier to deploy OTP in all ar -
eas of life and execute its secrecy into sensitive appli-
cations that require a high level of security with high
performance because the OTP approach has shortcom-
ings that have limited its adoption.
– One of OTP’ s flaws is the key exchange procedure.
Therefore, this study will address this problem by cre-
ating a simple protocol for parties to exchange keys.
The rest of this paper is or ganized as follows. Section
2 reviews some related work. Section 3 introduces the
background of this paper . Section 4 describes the general
proposed mechanism’ s architecture. Section 5 and Section
6 provide a security analysis and results for the proposed
mechanism, respectively . Lastly , Section 7 shows the con-
clusion and future work in this work.
2 Related work
Advance Encryption Standard (AES) was proven to be the
best trusted and researched block cipher and still has to be
subjected to more study to make it acceptable for resource-
constrained devices, as indicated in ( 17 ; 18 ). While some
lightweight cryptographic algorithms, like G-TBSA, are
adequate for some factors like processing power and en-
er gy , they are not resistant to all types of attacks. Like G-
TBSA, a number of lightweight cryptographic algorithms
are adequate in some respects, such as computational power
and ener gy , but are not resistant to other assaults.
None of the prominent modern lightweight block and
stream ciphers is typical in of fering the security , af fordabil-
ity , and performance for IoT devices with limited resources
( 19 ). It has been noted that the advancement of lightweight
cryptography is still ongoing ( 20 ; 21 ).
However , developing an algorithm that satisfies the
needs of lightweight cryptography for IoT devices is a
considerable task. T o accommodate various IoT device
memory limits, the author has devised a simple encryption
method that employs variable-sized keys and data blocks.
This idea makes use of DNA sequences to produce random
keys.
Many current L WC algorithms, according to ( 22 ), con-
centrate on lowering the cost of memory , computational
power , physical area, and ener gy consumption and enhanc-
ing throughput and latency without paying attention to se-
curity vulnerabilities. In addition, the author claims that
a successful encryption algorithm must strike a balance
between three L WC design objectives (Security , Perfor -
mance, Cost).
Banani et al. ( 23 ) employed the standard performance
measures (memory occupied, execution time, and power
consumption) to trade of f among the various algorithms,
including TEA. They did this by referring to the security
and performance evaluation criteria. The avalanche ef fect
attribute was utilised by the author to illustrate the security
metrics in ( 24 ).
In order to summary the limitations of existing works, we
list algorithms and attacks occurred as presented in T able 1 .
According to this leak, we enhance NTSA secure commu-
nication with OTP in IoT in order to raise the security level
and ef fectiveness of NTSA. The proposed mechanism must
be put into practise and put to the test in order to demon-
strate its ef fectiveness and capacity to satisfy the needs of
the resource-constrained devices ( 13 ).
3 Backgr ound
3.1 One-T ime Pad technique
Similar to a stream cipher but not one that uses a random
key generator is a One-T ime Pad (OTP). It is a safe method
for encrypting a message so that a cryptanalyst cannot deci-
pher the message from the information ( 25 ). When encrypt-
ing and decrypting data, a random key must have a length
equal to or greater than the message length produced by a
genuine random generator . Then, it will be deleted so that a
fresh new random key is used for the subsequent encryption
and decryption procedures ( 26 ; 27 ).
OTP typically employs the XOR operation to encrypt
plaintext by fusing the message and key bits, which is quick
and appropriate for IoT devices. This increases security
and makes OTP uncrackable under the following circum-
stances: (I) The key’ s unpredictability; (II) The length of
the key must be at least as long as the plaintext; (IV) The
key can be used just once; and (IV) The key has a very high
level of confidentiality ( 28 ; 29 ; 30 ).
3.2 Lightweight Cryptographic Algorithm
(L WC)
Designed for devices with limited resources, Lightweight
Cryptographic Algorithm (L WC) is a branch of cryptogra-
phy that seeks to of fer solutions ( 31 ). The NIST started
a lightweight cryptography project in 2013 to investigate
how well the NIST -approved cryptographic standards func-
tion on restricted devices and to determine the demand for

Enhancement of NTSA Secure Communication… Informatica 47 (2023) 1–10 3
T able 1: Dif ferent Attacks on Some Lightweight Cryptosystems in Related W ork
Algorithm Attack Cipher Key Size Structure
TEA Related-key attack Block 128 bits Feistel
XTEA Related-key attack Block 128 bits Feistel
HB-2 Related-key attack Hybrid 128 bits Hybrid
PRINT cipher Related-key attack Block 80, 160 bits SPN
PRESENT Related-key attack Block 80, 128 bits SPN
XXTEA Chosen-Plaintext attack Block 128 bits Feistel
AES Biclique cryptanalysis Block 128, 192, 256 bits SPN
LED Biclique cryptanalysis Block 64, 80, 96, 128 bits SPN
PRESENT Biclique cryptanalysis Block 80, 128 bits SPN
Grain Key recovery attack Stream 80 bit Stream
MICKEY Dif ferential fault attack Stream 80 bits Stream
SIMON Dif ferential fault attack Block 64,72, 96,128, 144, 192,
256 bits
Feistel
SPECK Dif ferential fault attack Block 64,72, 96,128, 144, 192,
256 bits
ARX
PRESENT Dif ferential fault attack Block 80, 128 bits SPN
PRESENT T runcated dif ferential attack Block 80, 128 bits SPN
ChaCha T runcated dif ferential attack Stream 256 bits ARX
specific lightweight cryptography standards. The litera-
ture will go into detail about how lightweight encryption
algorithms have been designed to meet the capabilities of
resource-constrained devices to provide both a high level of
security and high performance in terms of minimizing the
runtime and space complexities as much as feasible ( 32 ).
3.3 TEA and NTSA algorithms
TEA uses 64 rounds spread over 32 cycles. Starting with
dividing a 128-bit key into four 32-bit subkeys (k0, k1, k2,
and k3), a 128-bit plaintext block is split into two blocks
of 32 bits. Each set of four operations uses ADD, XOR,
and left and right shift operations. In order to increase con-
fusion during all rounds of encrypting a 64-bit plaintext
block, NTSA, which is an upgrade to TEA, tries to generate
dynamically changing subkeys derived from a 128-bit key
( 33 ; 34 ).
4 General pr oposed mechanism’ s
ar chitectur e
The TEA algorithm performs well in L WC and is simple
to implement in both hardware and software. It also uses
less memory . However , it is susceptible to related-key as-
saults and has a flaw in the round function mixing. Based on
the findings of the comparison analysis between TEA and
NTSA, NTSA resolved the primary scheduling issue ( 35 ).
It turns out that developing a system based on the NTSA
and OTP will of fer a reliable and lightweight cryptosystem
for IoT devices with limited resources. As shown in Figure
2 , the system uses block ciphers and OTP techniques along
with two dif ferent forms of symmetric-key primitives ( 36 ).
Figure 2: The proposed scheme’ s mechanism.
4.1 Random keys generation
Both in hardware and software, the TEA algorithm works
well in L WC and is straightforward to implement. It con-
sumes less memory as well. However , it has a vulner -
ability in the round function mixing and is vulnerable to
related-key attacks. The fundamental scheduling issue was
resolved by NTSA based on the results of the comparative
analysis between TEA and NTSA ( 12 ).
T o prevent noise bias between the axes, the V on Neu-
mann extractor method extracts two bits from each axis.
Then the desired value is generated by applying Equation
( 1 ) to a random byte.
RandByte = (x≤ 6)⊕ (z≤ 4)⊕ (y≤ 2)⊕ x⊕ (z≤ 2)
(1)

4 Informatica 47 (2023) 1–10 A.H.A. Alattas et al.
Additionally , XORing independent binary variables al-
ways minimizes bias, as the piling-up lemma in ( 37 ) shows.
Let the random byte be made up of the values x, y , and z
that are retrieved from the x, y , and z axes, respectively .
The flowchart for the procedure that will produce a random
byte is shown in Figure 3 .
Figure 3: RNG flowchart.
4.2 Pr oposed mechanism
W e examine three dif ferent instances of data transmission
via the Internet of Things devices:
– Periodically , devices will send data; the transmission
interval is determined by the application domain.
– The transmission interval is fixed, and devices will pe-
riodically deliver data.
– Data will be sent by devices when it is modified.
This approach is intended to be used in the third scenario,
which involves passing information from the temperature
sensor to an air conditioner . A key must be used once in
the OTP approach before being discarded in order to gen-
erate a new key for use in the following encryption pro-
cedure. Therefore, sending data on a regular basis is not
recommended, especially if the interval is small, like every
second or even every hour ( 16 ).
4.2.1 Encryption algorithm
Regarding the first research issue, Figure 4 provides an il-
lustration of the suggested algorithm. The Feistel struc-
ture, which uses the around function, is used by the pro-
posed method since it employs the same round function that
NTSA and TEA do. Data block P and subkey ki are two in-
puts that a round function accepts and returns one result.
The following conditions can be met by watching the en-
cryption process’ s algorithm:
Figure 4: Encryption flowchart.
– single-use key .
– The key’ s confidentiality .
– T rue random secret keys for each encryption proce-
dure and the high level of security provided by random
keys contribute to increasing security .
4.2.2 Decryption algorithm
Figure 5 shows depicts the entire decryption process.
Figure 5: The entire decryption process.
4.3 Key padding pr otocol
When a new key is generated and utilised in each encryption
procedure, the problem of key exchange between a sender
and recipient arises. The s ender and the recipient need to
exchange this key . The problem must be taken into account
to minimise the need for computationally intensive opera-
tions, as is the case with traditional cryptography like RSA.
The complexity of key exchange problems grows as a result
of the connectivity between IoT devices and machine-to-
machine communication. The approach suggests padding
the key for message encryption and decryption into the ci-
phertext after it has been encrypted using the previous key
and the XOR operation, as shown in Figure 6 .

Enhancement of NTSA Secure Communication… Informatica 47 (2023) 1–10 5
Figure 6: Process of encrypted key padding.
4.4 Key extraction pr otocol
Using (16), the intermediate ciphertext’ s bytes are first ex-
tracted from the final ciphertext C during the decryption
process, D(cn, kn-1). Next, the bytes of the encrypted key
ke is collected from the f inal ciphertext, as shown in Figure
7 . Then kn is obtained by performing an XOR operation
between kn-1 and ke in order to decrypt the message and
the following newKey ke.
Figure 7: Final ciphertext bits.
4.5 Discussion
OTP is the suggested remedy , as discussed in the sections
that came before it, to simplify the design complexity of
lightweight encryption methods. If all of its requirements
are met, it operates at a high-performance level with strong
security . NTSA was chosen for this thesis because it fixed a
flaw in the TEA algorithm, the most desirable lightweight
encryption technique. However , NTSA continues to em-
ploy the same key , which is vulnerable to attack, across
all encryption processes. IoT systems’ limited-resource de-
vices can use the proposed technique. The simplest and
fastest computational processes, XOR, left and right shift,
and modular addition arithmetic, which rely on bitwise op-
eration, have been suggested as an ef fective mechanisms
for implementing key exchange procedures.
5 Security analysis
Shift registers, Feistel structures, and substitution-
permutation networks are a few examples of specific
structures on which certain ciphers are based. The most
frequent threats to Feistel-structure block ciphers, upon
which this paper depends, will be covered.
5.0.1 Cipher -text only attack
In this type of attack, the attacker can capture ciphertext
and attempt to decrypt it in order to learn more about the
plaintext and, if possible, the key . T o examine and decrypt
ciphertexts, an attacker needs n of them. These attacks have
not been successful against current ciphers.
5.0.2 Known-plaintext attack
Some ciphertext’ s plaintext can be deciphered by an at-
tacker . The goal of this assault is to reveal and decrypt the
remaining ciphertext blocks using already-known informa-
tion, which may reveal the key .
5.0.3 Chosen-plaintext attack
Despite being the least factual, this form of attack is potent.
W ith this technique, the key used to encrypt data is deter -
mined by measuring a change in the ciphertext.
5.0.4 Chosen-ciphertext attack
The chosen-Ciphertext attack also includes a chosen-
plaintext assault, which decrypts ciphertexts with a partic-
ular key . If this type of attack is combined with a chosen-
plaintext attack, it is not very practical.
5.0.5 Differ ential cryptanalysis
The typical technique for attacking cryptographic algo-
rithms is this one. Since linear cryptanalysis uses a known-
plaintext attack instead of the usual dif ferential cryptanal-
ysis method’ s chosen-plaintext attack, it is thought to be
more practical in everyday life. Particularly , it examines
ciphertext pairs. Pairs of ciphertexts with distinct plain-
text dif ferences and examine how these dif ferences change
as the plaintexts move through the encryption algorithm’ s
rounds when they are encrypted with the same key . As long
as the two plaintexts satisfy specific dif ferences, they can
be selected at random (with a fixed dif ference). Then, as-
sign various probabilities to various keys based on the vari-
ations in the generated ciphertexts. One key will become
more and more obvious as the most likely correct key as
more and more ciphertexts are studied.
5.0.6 Related-Key attack
Comparable to dif ferential cryptanalysis, but focused on
key dif ferences. W ithout knowing the actual keys, this ap-
proach focuses on the relationship between a pair of keys.
It uses plaintext encryption using both the real key K and
some derived keys, as well as a straightforward link be-
tween subkeys in neighboring rounds. The method for

6 Informatica 47 (2023) 1–10 A.H.A. Alattas et al.
changing the keys must be specified; it may involve flip-
ping key bits while concealing the true key .
The TEA ’ s issue, which is brought on by weak key
scheduling and a weak mixing component of the round
function, is resolved by the NTSA. The TEA technique can
be broken by a r elated-key attack using 223 selected plain-
texts, especially if the key is weak ( 38 ). The NTSA ’ s de-
fence against the related-key attack will then be clear see
how it was created.
5.0.7 Keys equivalence
If two keys, k1, and k2, produce the same ciphertext after
encrypting the same plaintext, then they are equal. Ek1(P) =
Ek2(P), where E is the encryption function, P is the plain-
text, and k1 and k2 are separate keys K and K is the key
space, illustrating this relationship. The connection be-
tween the classes that make up K is such that k1 and k2 are
members of the same class. T o make this ar gument more
understandable, use mathematical equations and demon-
strate the TEA ’ s susceptibility as shown in ( 39 ).
5.0.8 Resistance of NTSA against r elated-key attack
The NTSA uses the same round function as the TEA algo-
rithm, with one modification to improve the key schedule
procedure. In the NTSA, the extract() function is called af-
ter each round, and it dynamically returns a value from an
array . Thirty-three separate 32-bit values that are obtained
from the 128-bit key fill up this array
5.0.9 The pr oposed mechanism security analysis
against r elated-key attack
Great security level and high performance in terms of space
and time complexity are coupled in the suggested method
by incorporating the OTP technique. As long as its require-
ments are met, the OTP , a conventional but nonetheless
powerful cipher , can withstand quantum computers ( 40 ).
Despite using the same round function as the TEA, the sug-
gested approach is more secure than NTSA.
6 Results
6.1 Execution time
This analysis will show the encryption and decryption pro-
cess execution times for both algorithms, measured in mil-
liseconds based on the number of cycles. The number of
bits encrypted and decrypted using the 128-bit key serves
as a measure of the data size, which is determined by each
cycle’ s two rounds. T ables and bar charts are going to be
used to show the results. W ith data blocks of 64, 128, 192,
and 256 bits, encryption and decryption functions will be
conducted throughout the number of cycles 8, 16, and 32
to reach the execution time tests. These several categories
serve as illustrations of how the suggested mechanism and
the performance of NTSA are af fected by the number of
rounds and size of the data block.
6.1.1 Execution time of encryption pr ocess
The encryption function in the suggested technique requires
three inputs: a 64-bit block of data, a previous key with a
128-bit size, and a 128-bit fresh key that is generated before
each new encryption function begins. It has two parameters
in NTSA: plaintext block with a 128-bit key and 64 bits.
The execution time of NTSA increases by roughly 0.828 ms
in Figure 8 and T able 2 for the same number of rounds, 16
rounds, and various block sizes. The suggested algorithm,
however , is implemented more quickly than NTSA, and its
runtime increases by about 0.544 ms for every increase in
block size. In other words, the suggested algorithm outper -
forms the NTSA by 50%.
Figure 8: Encryption time for 8 cycles in ms.
T able 2: 8-cycle encryption process results in milliseconds
Algorithm 64 Bits 128
Bits
192
Bits
256
Bits
NTSA 0.802 1.640 2.462 3.285
Proposed 0.530 1.081 1.617 2.161
6.2 Execution time of decryption pr ocess
While the proposed algorithm’ s ciphertext contains both
the encrypted data and the new key , the NTSA ’ s decryp-
tion function requires 64-bit ciphertext and 128-bit key pa-
rameters. The execution time increment rate for both algo-
rithms to complete the decryption function in 8 cycles, or
16 rounds, is shown in Figure 9 and T able 3 . The proposed
technique and the NTSA have slightly dif ferent runtimes
for the encryption and decryption operations under a class
of eight cycles.
6.3 Memory occupation
Memory occupation in Bytes: In this paper , memory usage
is calculated using SRAM memory for execution time and

Enhancement of NTSA Secure Communication… Informatica 47 (2023) 1–10 7
Figure 9: Decryption time for 8 cycles in ms.
T able 3: 8-cycle decryption process results in milliseconds
Algorithm 64 Bits 128
Bits
192
Bits
256
Bits
NTSA 0.805 1.634 2.445 3.261
Proposed 0.558 1.024 1.533 2.045
flash memory for storing code. T o measure the amount of
ener gy used by both algorithms, the Arduino Uno board is
powered by a 9-volt battery in this experiment. The reading
of the current passing through the Arduino Uno board was
taken using the multimeter . There is a 5V voltage and a
20mA current (0.02A).
Figures 10 and 1 1 show that the NTSA uses 7% of flash
memory to store the algorithm, which is 2546B, and 16%,
or 340 bytes of 2KB, to store the global variables in SRAM
for encrypting and decrypting 64-bit plaintext with a 128-
bit key . Because the NTSA ’ s code file has two routines—
encryption and decryption—as well as one function to re-
trieve the array’ s contents, it uses less flash memory than
the suggested approach. In contrast, the code file for the
proposed approach contains the encryption and decryption
procedures as well as the key generation function. In com-
parison, the NTSA employs an array to hold 33 32-bit sub-
keys during runtime, which requires more SRAM capacity .
The suggested approach, in contrast, employs an array that
holds six 32-bit values that constitute the final ciphertext.
Figure 10: Memory occupations.
Figure 1 1: Global variable memory occupation.
6.4 Energy consumption
Ener gy consumption: a device with limited resources and
low ener gy usage lasts longer on its battery . As shown in
Figure 12 , the following equipment should be available to
conduct this experiment and assess the power consumption:
an 8-bit microcontroller Arduino Uno board (MCU), the
proposed algorithm, and its equivalent NTSA. (1) Multi-
meter to measure the voltage and the current; (2) Jumper
wires; (3) Banana Plug to Crocodile Clip; (4) DC Barrel
Jack Adapter – Female to screw terminals; and (5) Power
Source whether 9V Battery with 9V Battery Connector to
DC Jack Arduino or W all Power Supply (5V - 2Am).
Figure 12: T ools used.
The procedures that follow explain how to set up the nec-
essary equipment to begin this experiment’ s mechanism:
– Prepare the multimeter by inserting the red probe of
the banana-crocodile cable into the mA V port to mea-
sure the voltage and the black probe of the cable into
the COM port to measure the current.
– The multimeter ’ s dial should be set to A for current
and V for voltage.
– Connect the red probe from the multimeter to the (+)
end of the power supply and the black probe to the
V in port on the Arduino Uno board using a DC Barrell
Jack Adapter . Lastly , attach the (-) end of the power

8 Informatica 47 (2023) 1–10 A.H.A. Alattas et al.
supply to the GND port on the Arduino Uno board.
This circuit has a series connection.
In this experiment, the Arduino Uno board is powered by
a 9-volt battery to measure the ener gy required by both al-
gorithms. Using the multimeter , the reading of the current
flowing through the Arduino Uno board was captured. The
voltage is 5V , and the current is equal to 20mA (0.02A).
T able 4 shows the ener gy usage for the encryption proce-
dure for various categories of data sizes with fewer than
64 rounds. The results in T able 4 demonstrate that the
suggested method provides great optimization in terms of
power usage compared to the NTSA.
T able 4: The ener gy consumption for encryption process
Algorithm 64 Bits 128 Bits 192 Bits 256 Bits
NTSA 0.0003192 0.00065 0.000972 0.001295
Proposed 0.000096 0.000193 0.00029 0.000388
7 Conclusion and futur e work
T raditional cryptographic algorithms are not suitable for
IoT devices due to their inherent limitations in terms of
processing power , memory , storage, and ener gy . How-
ever , the ongoing development of lightweight cryptogra-
phy will continue to produce suitable lightweight crypto-
graphic mechanisms to meet these requirements. Conse-
quently , this research suggests a mechanism to incorporate
the OTP technique into the NTSA in order to take advan-
tage of the high-security level with the high performance
of fered by the OTP and easy implementation of fered by
block cipher and combine them into one mechanism to pro-
vide a lightweight cryptographic algorithm that can be im-
plemented on IoT devices easily and ef fectively .
The first research goal was accomplished by integrating
the OTP technique into NTSA in order to increase security .
The data was encrypted using various new random keys
generated by the MPU6050 sensor , and the final cipher -
text was created by padding the bits in order to share the
newly generated key . The experiments covered in Chap-
ter 4 demonstrate that the suggested mechanism of fers a
greater security level and higher performance in terms of
the complexity of speed, reduced memory utilization, and
lower ener gy consumption. This is relevant to the second
study objective. The encryption and decryption runtimes
show that NTSA is 7 0% slower than the suggested tech-
nique. NTSA uses 16% of SRAM, compared to 12% for the
suggested method. In terms of security , the proposed tech-
nique of fers 2134 security complexity compared to 2128
security complexity of fered by NTSA. The proposed al-
gorithm uses 0.000388 Joules of ener gy , but NTSA uses
0.0013 Joules, meaning that NTSA uses 70% more ener gy
than the proposed approach.
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