

‘room for faith’ onto which feminism can project its horizon. For this, it reconstructs a hypothetical dialogue between Jacques Lacan and Mary Jane Sherfey, an American psychiatrist who, in 1966, presented the theory that civilization was founded on the suppression of women’s insatiable sexual drive. Comparing this insatiability to reason’s natural tendency towards the absolute, I propose a reading of the relationship between Kant’s antinomy of pure reason and Lacan’s formulas of sexuation that revises Joan Copjec’s reading. If *Encore* invites a passage from a masculine to a feminine position within discourse, this involves moving from the mathematical to the dynamic class of conflicts in the antinomy, from the point of view of the theoretical or speculative to that of practical reason.

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Etika psihoanalize *Encore*, onstran meja spekulativnega uma

Ključne besede: ženski užitek, antinomija čistega uma, formule seksuacije, etika, Immanuel Kant, Jacques Lacan, Mary Jane Sherfey, Joan Copjec

Prispevek ponuja branje Seminarja XX, *Encore* (Še) Jacquesa Lacana kot transcendentne refleksije o ženski seksualnosti, ki sooči skepticizem biologije spola z dogmatizmom idealizirane ženskosti, pre čemer odpira področje »onstran izkustva« kantovskega *noumenon* oziroma »onstran falosa« lacanovskega ženskega užitka kot etični »prostor za vero«, na katerega se lahko projicira horizont feminizma. To podjetje zahteva rekonstrukcijo hipotetičnega dialoga med Jacquesom Lacanom in Mary Jane Sherfey, ameriške psihiatrinje, ki je leta 1966 razvila teorijo, po kateri je civilizacija utemeljena na zatrtju ženskega nenasitnega spolnega gona. Primerjajoč to nenasitnost z naravno težnjo uma k absolutu, avtorica ponuja novo branje razmerja med Kantovo antinomijo čistega uma in Lacanovimi formulami seksuacije, ki pomenijo popravek branja Joan Copjec o isti temi. Če *Encore* napotuje na prehod od moške k ženski poziciji v diskurzu, ta prehod obenem zahteva premestitev od matematičnega k dinamičnemu konfliktu v antinomiji, od teoretičnega oziroma spekulativnega gledišča k gledišču praktičnega uma.

Christian Fierens

Logic of Truth and Logic of Erring in Kant and Lacan

Key words: the antinomies of pure reason, the big Other, Cogito, Freud, the ideal of pure reason, impossible, Kant, knowledge, Lacan, nothing, noumenon, object a, paralogisms of pure reason, phallus, phenomenon, drive, the real, reason, repetition, transference, truth, unconscious, erring

Four fundamental concepts (the *Freudian* concepts of repetition, unconscious, drive, and transference) articulate not just psychoanalytical theory, but also its practice. They relate directly to the *phenomena* that are present in the treatment; in this sense, they come

under the first part of the Kantian transcendental logic, i.e. the logic of truth or the transcendental analytic of pure reason. Psychoanalysis cannot be satisfied by exploring the field of *possibilities* given in and by the phenomenology of these fundamental concepts without being confronted with the *impossible*; it must take into account that it bumps against something impossible for each of these Freudian concepts (the invention of the “object a” and its four forms by Lacan and Kant’s table or nothing) and this opens the infinite field of suppositions that go far beyond the phenomenological field; nevertheless these suppositions are very effective. The logic of *noumenon*, the logic that guides us, or the logic of these pure suppositions does not respond only to the research of truth, but to an approach of the Real and it corresponds to the logic of an erring or to Kant’s transcendental dialectic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The latter entails another three Lacanian concepts (besides the “object a”): the subject and its questioning (corresponding to the paralogisms of the psychological idea of Kant), the phallus and its functioning (corresponding to the cosmological ideas of Kant), and finally the big Other and its ex-sistence outside every existence (corresponding to the theological idea of Kant).

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Logika resnice in logika blodnje pri Kantu in Lacanu

Ključne besede: antinomije čistega uma, veliki Drugi, cogito, Freud, ideal čistega uma, nemožno, Kant, Lacan, nič, noumenon, objekt a, paralogizmi čistega uma, falos, pojav, gon, realno, um, ponavljanje, transfer, resnica, nezavedno, blodnja

Štirje temeljni freudovski pojmi (ponavljanje, nezavedno, gon in transfer) omogočajo ne le artikulacije psihoanalitične teorije, marveč tudi psihoanalitične prakse. Neposredno se nanašajo na pojave, s katerimi imamo opravka v zdravljenju. V tem oziru bi jih lahko uvrstili v prvi del Kantove transcendentalne logike, tj. logike resnice ali transcendentalne analitike čistega uma. Psihoanaliza se ne more zadovoljiti s tem, da preiskuje polje *možnosti*, kot se ji le-to daje s fenomenologijo teh temeljnih pojmov, ne da bi bila hkrati že soočena z *nemožnostjo*. Psihoanaliza mora namreč računati s tem, da v vsakem od teh freudovskih pojmov trči na nemožno (Lacanova izum »objekta a« in njegovih štirih upodob in Kantova tabela nič), s čimer pa se šele odpre neskončno polje supozicij, ki daleč presegajo fenomenološko polje, a so vseeno zelo učinkovite. Noumenalna logika (« noumène »), logika, »ki nas vodi« (« qui nous mène ») ali logika teh golih supozicij ne ustreza zbolj iskanju resnice, temveč dostopu do realnega in s tem logiki blodenja (« errance ») ali pa Kantovi transcendentalni dialektiki iz *Kritike čistega uma*. Slednja zahteva druge tri Lacanove pojme (poleg »objekta a«): subjekta in njegovega spraševanja (kar ustreza paralogizmom Kantove psihološke ideje), falosu in njegovemu funkcioniranju (kar ustreza Kantovim kozmološkim idejam) in končno velikemu Drugemu kot tistemu, kar ek-sistira zunaj vsake eksistence (kar ustreza Kantovi teološki ideji).