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GOSSIPING GOING SOUTH: ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSIGHTS INTO GOSSIP ON A DALMATIAN ISLAND

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to identify different scripts of gossip among the inhabitants of the municipality of Bol on the island of Brač. The method of participant observation is used in combination with interviews, deep hanging out method and thick description. The results are introduced, embedded and reflected in the relevant social theory. Different gossip solidarity groups are distinguished and the reference to the truth of the gossip material is analysed to distinguish between modern and postmodern gossip, the latter being referred to as bullshitting.

Keywords: gossip, Brač, local taxonomies, social stratification, Generation Z, tourism

IL PETTEGOLEZZO CHE VA A SUD: APPROFONDIMENTI ANTROPOLOGICI SUL GOSSIP IN UN'ISOLA DALMATA

SINTESI

L'obiettivo di questo articolo è di analizzare le diverse tipologie di gossip raccontati dagli abitanti del comune di Bol, località dell'isola di Brač. Al metodo dell'osservazione partecipante si affiancano quello delle interviste, dell'immersione totale tra i soggetti e della descrizione densa. I risultati vengono presentati rispetto alla relativa realtà sociale degli individui. Gli stessi gossip sono suddivisi in due categorie (in base alla veridicità del materiale raccolto), al fine di distinguere tra gossip moderno e postmoderno (ove quest'ultimo viene etichettato con l'appellativo di 'cazzate').

Parole chiave: gossip, Brač, tassonomie locali, stratificazione sociale, Generazione Z, turismo

INTRODUCTION

*The sole method of studying mankind
is to sit on a Melanesian island
for a couple of years and
listen to the gossip of the villagers.*
(Grafton Elliott Smith)

Egyptologist Grafton Elliott Smith's acid remark was a not-so-incorrect summary of the main method of social and cultural anthropology, participant observation, invented 100 years ago by Bronislaw Malinowski (Šterk, 2020). His first publication on the islanders of the Trobriand Islands in *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (Malinowski, 1922) is still considered the birth certificate of the modern anthropological method. Since then, gossip has been the primary vehicle of participant observation and became an exemplary focus of anthropological observation some 60 years ago, deserving to be considered a total social fact comparable to kinship, marriage, language, status differentiation, division of labour or gift-giving. For a phenomenon to be a total social fact, it must be:

*at the same time juridical, economic, religious,
and even aesthetic and morphological, etc.
They are juridical because they concern
private and public law, and a morality that is
organized and diffused throughout society;
they are strictly obligatory or merely an occa-
sion for praise or blame; they are political and
domestic at the same time, relating to social
classes as well as clans and families. They
are economic. The idea of value, utility, self-
interest, luxury, wealth, the acquisition, and
accumulation of goods—all these on the one
hand—and on the other, that of consumption,
even that of deliberate spending for its own
sake. (Mauss, 2010, 101)*

Gossip fulfils too many social functions to be left to the gossipers. It tackles a variety of topics, contributes strongly to group identity, establishes hierarchies and solidarities, and conveys myriad cultural messages, to say the least. And in the field of gossip research, "methods more sophisticated than eavesdropping and more convenient than ethnography need yet to be developed and applied" (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012, 2665). Until then, there is an anthropological report.

AIMS AND METHODS

The aim of this study is to elucidate varieties of gossiped material, different gossiped and gossipers solidarity groups, and single out different scripts and tenets of hearsay and gossip of the inhabitants

of municipality of Bol and Murvica, located on the south side of the island Brač in central Dalmatia region of Croatia. According to the 2021 census, the town Bol has 1,656 inhabitants with spread over 23.3 km² and village Murvica, situated 6 km west of Bol has 22 inhabitants over 0.3 km² (Državni zavod za statistiku RH, 2021).

The core method of this study is the principal ethnographic method of participant observation (Okely, 2012) lasting for over two decades. After gaining insight into patterns and curiosities of social conduct, several distinguishable characteristics of gossip groups and scripts are established. Subsequently informal conversation on the subject included a total of 73 participants, followed by semi-structured interviews with 36 participants, of whom 16 were younger than 35 (born after 1990) and 8 were older than 70 (born before 1950). As to accomplish the state-of-the-art protocol, the interviews were upgraded to so-called deep hanging out method, which allows for the observer to gain an insider perspective and mitigate the power imbalances of the fieldwork (Snodgrass et al., 2024). The interviewed sample was composed of 14 females and 22 males. The information gathered is contextualized with relevant fragments of general social theory and applicable interpretational scopes of social and cultural anthropology. The method of thick description (Geertz, 1973) is used to further elucidate, illustrate, and exemplify the material.

GENERAL THEORY

*Hear no evil, speak no evil,
and you will never be invited to parties.*
(Oscar Wilde)

The most recent and comprehensive empirical meta-analysis of gossip as behaviour shows that the average person participates in gossip for 52 minutes per day (Robbins & Karan, 2019). Gossip is likely to "comprise between 65% and 90% of people's everyday conversations" (Harris, 2021, 7650). Gossip is not only a quotidian and time-consuming practice, but also a passionate one: There is evidence that "people gossip with an appetite that rivals their interest in food and sex" (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012, 2641).

If the empirical studies support the methodological and epistemological value of gossip for an anthropologist, one is inclined to regard it as nothing less than a total social fact, a term applied most proficiently in anthropology by Marcel Mauss, having previously been introduced into sociology by his famous maternal uncle, Emile Durkheim (1982). Mauss is adamant: "In our opinion, nothing is more urgent or more fruitful than this study of total social facts" (Mauss, 2010, 102).

Another sociological concept that can be useful in contemplating gossip is the idea of social capital (Wittek et al., 2000). Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes between economic and social capital and defines the latter as “accumulated actual or virtual resources acquired by individuals or groups through the possession of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, 119).

Social capital is thus anchored in the individual and linked to social connections that a person can use for one’s advancement. Gossip is a mixture of both, financial and social capital. In postmodern ‘celebrity culture’ (Feeley, 2012), it is institutionalized as an asset and drives substantial media production that can be aptly described as the gossip industry.

Gossip arises from rumours and vice versa; rumours are “unverified and instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation that arise in contexts of ambiguity and that function primarily to help people make sense and manage threat” (Difonzo & Bordia, 2005, 273). Gossip is evaluative idle talk about individuals – usually not present – often shared for amusement, to convey social mores, and to exclude someone from a social group. Gossip is spread with the aim of establishing, changing, or maintaining social structures such as norms, hierarchy, and group identification (Gluckman, 1963).

Gossip was traditionally regarded as an efficient means of transmitting information about rules, norms, and guidelines for life in a community. It served to create and maintain a consensus on the need for conformity to crucial cultural values and as such functioned as an efficient means of informal social control. It contributed to egalitarianism and a clear distinction between insiders and outsiders (Gluckman, 1963). Ruminating on the old days, one of the important social norms of conversation was also to pass on accurate information. Belief in a rumour and gossip was associated with their transmission; spreading false rumours and betraying confidentiality could damage credibility and social capital. In terms of social power and status, “high frequency gossipers were perceived as less powerful than low frequency gossipers” (Farley, 2011, 578).

Although gossip is a *non plus ultra* anthropological phenomenon, once a prominent object of empirical observation and theoretical contemplation of a community, it has been in past decades adorned with more personalized and individualistic notes and as such overtaken by the discipline of social psychology. The established taxonomy of social psychology and sociology divides gossip into positive, negative, and neutral. This assessment is too value-ridden for an anthropologist, too moralistic, too context-dependent, and frankly outdated in

times of postmodernity and post-truth (Rommetveit, 2022), where all opinions count, facts have become alternative and fame and infamy collapse into a single signifier of celebrity. Even my interviewers themselves, especially the younger ones, too often hesitated to attribute a gossip with such value characterization. This may be due to the self-denial of the prevalence of malice in the gossiped content, which is also measured in theory (Robbins & Karan, 2019), albeit the most sinister and fervently taken-for-granted aspect of gossip, “gossip aimed at influencing or manipulating others, was rated as the least important motive” (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012, 2667). The clash of traditional taxonomic orientations may also be reflective of the postmodern interchangeability of moral prerogatives, expressed in popular culture in the maxim ‘there is no such thing as bad publicity’. As expected, when they were the targets of ‘positive’ gossip, all respondents experienced pleasurable self-conscious emotions, culminating in satisfaction, joy, and pride of the old and vanity, self-righteousness, and smugness of the young. In contrast to recent findings in social psychology (Martinescu et al., 2019), the targets of ‘negative’ gossip in my study experienced virtually no negative self-conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment, shame, or guilt). The older generation reacted with contemptuous mockery, the younger generation with disparaging laughter. Given the prevailing *zeitgeist* of cultural decadence, debatable facts, and the moral obscurity of the (gossiped about) state of affairs, one cannot expect the reactions to be anything but ambiguous. The principle of confidentiality is also considered obsolete, evermore so by the younger participants in the study. If the gossip was introduced with the proverbial ‘I need to tell you something, but you must not tell anyone else...’ curiosity often gave way to reluctance to participate further in the conversation for fear of not being able to keep it a secret. As if there is some anxious compulsion to gossip that cannot be tolerated but must maintain its necessary circulation.

The most definite gossip, for example, that refers to the inhabitants of the island of Brač and is epitomized in countless jokes about the islanders, is that they are stingy. This reputation is a good example of how it is impossible to label gossip morally, as positive, or negative, and even of how once compatible notions of (good) reputation and honour diverge. For outsiders, stinginess is considered a bad thing, while the islanders are proud of it because in their minds it is equated with conscientiousness and proves them to be financially savvy, responsible, and penny-wise. One person’s gossip is another person’s social capital; one person’s stinginess is another person’s competence.



Figure 1: Peeling the beans: traditional occasion for spilling the beans (personal archive).

Contributing to gossip's bad reputation is the fact that monotheistic moral codes across all times and cultures condemn all forms of gossip (Cohen & Soukup, 2023), for in Christianity it is culpable of bearing false witness, separating intimate friends and damaging reputations; in Islam, it assassinates characters and creates unnecessary doubt; in Judaism, *lashon hara* or the 'evil tongue' functions as a curse or witchcraft and can have immediate lethal effects on anyone involved in spreading the rumours, even if they are true.

It was only anthropological cross-cultural evidence that first drew attention to 'good' gossip, and provided reflections on cultural mores regarding gossip and the positive functions it fulfils in a society (Gluckman, 1963; Meyer Spacks, 1982; Rosnow & Fine, 1976; Goodman & Ben-Ze'ev, 1994; Feinberg et al., 2012; Ferrari, 2015; Giardini & Wittek, 2019). Social and cultural anthropology views hearsay, rumour, and gossip in terms of their usefulness and empowering potential as tools for challenging established social hierarchies and resisting social domination. These weapons are seen as symbolic: They enable the vulnerable to express their opposition to social domination and exploitation, while providing

them with the anonymity and security necessary to do so. Since gossip is treated as an anonymous form of political discourse, it allows vulnerable political actors to participate in the contestation of a political order without having to jeopardize their personal standing. As an invisible, intangible source of empowerment of the subordinate social groups and communities, gossip provides for counter- and anti-hegemonic opinions and attitudes (White, 2000), which helps us to understand why gossip is adorned with negativity and/or feminine attitudes in the dominant discourse of the West.

One study, which briefly summarizes the social construction and etymological span of the word, claims that "gossip started out as a gender-neutral term and only gained a bad reputation when it began to denote specifically feminine behaviour in the 19th century" (Leaper & Holiday, 1995, 176). Thus, while men engage in a non-nonsense talk about non-intimate subjects, exchange ideas about politics and sport celebrities, debate and argument serious broad issues, women merely chitchat, tittle-tattle, and gossip. This is a traditional patriarchal and paternalistic strategy to dismiss relevance to women's talk and take away its empowerment potentials, social role, and solidarity effect.

Recent studies, however, confirm moral neutrality of gossip since the findings suggest that the affirming the negative reputation through gossip is much less important than adjusting the image of other people to be more attuned with oneself (Hartung et al., 2019). Negative influence motive is consistently self-reported as the least important reason to gossip (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012).

Empirical studies also agree with my observation that gossip is gender-neutral (Levin & Arluke, 1987; Eckhaus & Ben-Hador, 2019) and generation-specific (Eder & Enke, 1991). It is a truism that different generations gossip about different things; in the life cycle, at first, we are preoccupied by the number of toys and parents' professional statuses, then come identity issues, body image and sexual exploits, later we focus on our professional achievements, parenting techniques and consummation of experiences, and still later come eschatological issues. What is less known and unexplored in the literature is the parallel divergence of ontological and epistemological frameworks, which was established in my field research results. Only the older generation still holds to a certain reference of truth and some gossipers are therefore seen as trust worthier than others. For them, gossip is not only relevant to the social condition, a serious endeavour that one must not go trivially about, but also a form of art (Gluckman, 1963). With regard to the notion of truth, my study showed a clear distinction between the old-fashioned 'modern' gossip and the 'postmodern' gossip of the young.

COMING ON STAGE IN BRAČ

In 2000, I bought a dilapidated stone house in the small village of Murvica on the south side of the island of Brač. As a foreigner of Slovenian nationality, 30 years young and female, I immediately became embroiled in all sorts of innuendos, insinuations and gossip typical of a small patriarchal environment when confronted with a newcomer, a single blond female nonetheless: where is her husband, where did she get the money, how many apartments will she build on the property, what is with this German shepherd dog of hers? It is common knowledge to expect “rural inhabitants as inclined to respond with suspicion when diversity is introduced into the community” (Haugen & Villa, 2006, 213), but I did not expect the prejudices embedded in gossip and hearsay to persist for so long. To tell the truth, the natives still think there’s something shady about me. When visiting, the first question after the formal greeting and casual offer of a drink is always ‘what’s new in the village’. This vaguely refers to one’s own circumstances, but is more focused on who is coming to the village, when, and if there is any news from the descendants of the village who only come in the summer. The old people are mainly inquiring about the health of their generation, the younger ones are curious about new romantic relationships and when everyone is coming for their summer vacation. Owing to living next to one of the most beautiful beaches in the Mediterranean, the Golden cape (*Zlatni rat*), the everyday life of the islanders is sharply divided into the tourist season and the rest of the year. Tourism has grown exponentially since the Croatian War of Independence in 1991–1995. Brač counted 154,746 overnight stays in 1995 and 590,105 in 1997 (Kuveždić, 1999), 1,212,00 in 2012 and 1,505,000 in 2022 (Ministarstvo turizma RH, 2023). In 2000, the municipality of Bol contributed with 342,877 overnight stays (Splitsko-Dalmatinska Županija, 2023) and in 2011 with 442,655 (Državni zavod za statistiku RH, 2012) and in 2022 with 499,480 overnight stays (Splitsko-Dalmatinska Županija, 2023).

During the height of the tourist season, it is all hands on deck. Children of primary school age are mostly left to their own devices, those in secondary school help in the tourist industry, if there is one, they are expected to contribute to the family business. The work of the family offspring is largely underpaid, as it is seen as a contribution to their own inheritance or is done for the sake of good family relations. In the off-season, the younger generation does not participate in any of the social or entrepreneurial events; the traditional weakly bowling (*balote*), wine and oil harvesting are considered activities of the older men, the carnival and Christmas fair should only involve women and children of school age. The unemployed youth, and local high school students, either hang around idly gossiping, or they are endlessly glued to one popular streaming network or another. Either way, they take delight in being deviant.

It has taken me over 20 years to become privy to the islanders’ most sensitive issues: wealth, well-being, work habits, love life and pedigree. It is not automatically acquired by buying a plot of land or a house in a village, by participating in the grape or olive harvest, or by registering your residence, nor does or marrying a local help. Idle life in the village, permeated with casual nagging about the weather in times off tourist season and especially in times of crisis, does. In my case, the village fire contributed a little, in 2020–2021 my stay the whole coronavirus episode did the rest. Only then could I hear a gossip being introduced with “I can tell you; you are one of us”. Dwelling upon who is ‘us’ in that statement for quite some time, I realized that I was let in a glimpse into the most exclusive, elite, precious and valuable identity of the locals, the identity that trumps all other social networks, economic standing and political influence, the identity of ‘born here’. Even the natives may frown upon this blood-and-soil mentality, but the principle of birth they claim either tacitly or openly, gives one the right to stand above conventions and rules, moral or otherwise. Written and unwritten laws of the community no longer apply: if the catch is good, the fishermen offer it to you before they take it to market, you are given access to home-grown food that is only bartered and never sold, you are allowed to visit unannounced, you may pick wild asparagus and capers in the scrubby no-man’s land, a store or petrol pump can be opened for you outside working hours, you even have the right to disobey traffic signs, to no longer be judged for having an unconventional romantic engagement, or a dog. To have equal or at least comparable standing in a ‘born here’ gossip group, one must have extensive genealogical knowledge of the prerequisite of that group, its ancestors. Never gossiped about in any other social settings or belittled to other solidarity groups, the tales about ancestors, whether dead or alive, are told to legitimize, verify, and underscore the current state of affairs. Like everyone else, ancestors cannot escape bad reputation. Most of the gossip revolves around them being attributed undeserved bulk of land in the post-World War II agrarian reform, or that they let the land become overgrown with brushwood so that it is no longer of any use, that they favoured one child at the expense of another, that they gained or lost their wealth through shady sexual escapades, or that they simply drank themselves to death.

Be that as it may, the law of gossip formulated by anthropologists a long time ago still applies: “The more exclusive the social group is, the more will its members indulge in gossip and scandal about one another. And the more persistently will they repeat the same gossip again and again and again without getting bored” (Gluckman, 1963, 315).

Since the vineyards are the most prized and distinguishable assets, the first interaction a greenhorn into a village life gets with members of the elite group of ‘born here’ locals, is the annual grape harvest. This

occasion also provides an insight into the attitudes of the participants, their mindsets, evaluation of social groups and an initial distinction between different gossip solidarity groups.

The 12 km of coastline from Bol to Farska Bay (Murvica being in the middle) is considered the best location for *Plavac Mali*, a very traditional, highly prized and extravagantly high-priced sort of wine. There is an unconfirmed legend circulating far and wide that the Austro-Hungarian rule (1867–1918) forbade this strip of land to be planted with anything other than vineyards due to the perfect soil and abundant sunshine. Truth be told, the olive groves in the south of the island were only planted after the Second World War and are located on rocky plateaus away from the sea.

The traditional grapes hand-harvesting brings together family and relatives, neighbours and/or other acquaintances, for whom reciprocity is obligatory and who are rewarded daily pay (*žurnata*, Ital. *giornata*) in wine or *prošek*, most famous Croatian dessert wine. In the last two decades, they have been joined by an increasing number of hired workers who are paid in cash. The vineyard owners start preparing for the harvest at least a month in advance, bringing baskets, scissors, knives, and sacks. During their almost daily visits to the vineyard, they nervously measure the sugar content of the grapes and feverishly lament about the possibility of rain, which would postpone the harvest and ruin all logistical efforts. On the day the harvest begins, the owners arrive first with their immediate male family and relatives, bringing the alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. Then the majority is assigned to picking and some of the most physically fit men are given the task of carrying the sacks once they are filled with the grapes. The chatter begins by shamelessly mocking those who are absent but should have been helping for one reason or another. Older men who were ‘born here’, are either experienced pickers or own their own vineyards, are highly revered and most welcome, even if they are very opinionated on all issues: they habitually complain that the harvest started too early in a year and too late in a day; the grapes, they say, have not yet reached their full potential and the work did not start at dawn as it should have. In their opinion, work should start punctually at dawn and not an hour later, as it is normally the case. After that, their discussions focus on the stupidity of other vineyard owners who have already harvested earlier in the harvest season. Those old men do most of the gossip and things get particularly intense when it comes to the sugar content of the various vineyards. The higher the sugar content, the higher the value and price, but the owners of such a successful harvest are never praised for the success. A good vintage is attributed to the position of the vineyard and the age of the plants – the closer to the sea and the older, the better. Experienced older men do not trust the refractometer

for sugar content, they are convinced that they can better predict the sugar content in the grapes based on the presence of wasps (high sugar content) or the presence of worms (low sugar content). This ability is supposedly only granted to the ‘born here’ owners of local vineyards, although anyone can see if there are wasps or worms, and if the scissors are getting sticky because of the high sugar content, but no one dares to intervene. There are many more things that bother the grape pickers. They complain most about the weeds that overgrow the vineyard and about vines that are uneven or not tied up. Leaving the newcomer none the wiser, as all of the above is also typical for old, most cherished vineyards. The biggest shame that can befall the owner during harvest is when there are not enough baskets or when the sacks pile up before they are loaded into the truck that takes them to the owner’s winery or to the one winery that buys from the local grape growers in Bol. A certain amount of respect is only paid to the owner if one managed to successfully complete the harvest without having to pay in cash for hired labour, if there were enough sacks and baskets, and if there was enough food for everyone to even take some home and enough drinks for everyone to get drunk. Traditionally, women did not take part, only when labour became scarce in the last two decades, were they allowed to join in. This does not apply to the women from the owner’s immediate family. They are still at home preparing lunch for the midday break, but their absence is nonetheless frowned upon by the other female participants in the harvest. Lunch is taken in the shade in the vineyards; it is a scandal if it reaches the grape pickers cold. As a rule, the owners do not take part in either the harvesting or lunch because they are too busy emphasizing their crucial role, organizing, and looking worried and burdensome. The owners thus engage in what is called “impression management” (Barth, 1966, 3), a selective communication in which what is considered relevant is over-communicated. Vineyard owners try hard to generate the so-called skipper effect (Pálsson & Durrenberger, 1990), but to no avail. The successful harvest and the subsequent high sugar content of the grapes are attributed to the ancestors who left them a good vineyard, the position of the vineyard and the amount of rainfall in the previous months. In a way, this is comparable to the local valuation of good olive oil, the production of which has been growing steadily on the south side of the island since the Second World War. It is believed that the laziest owners of the olive groves produce the best oil, as their disinterest in the olive groves is the best guarantee that the fruit has not been treated with chemicals.

Another law proposed by anthropologists, which is typically Mediterranean, was blatantly obvious: the more honourable the social group, the more shameless (Busatta, 2006).




Figure 2: Genealogical tree of the oldest family from Murvica (personal archive).

HONOR AND REPUTATION OF SOLIDARITY
GROUPS OF GOSSIPED AND GOSSIPERS

Most prestige is attributed to the above-mentioned group of the 'born here', where 'here' refers to the whole island of Brač. All others are assigned to one or another derogatory category. When people are being assigned to diverse categories, there is a general, cross-culturally established classification according to the principle of gender, generation, and affiliation to moral philosophy.

In terms of gender differences, most of the literature suggests that gossip as a function of social control "puts pressure on women to act in certain ways and not challenge the traditional gender roles" (Haugen & Villa, 2006, 214). The exact opposite is true for the younger population in my study sample. The younger the respondents are, the more they emphasize that male norms are more burdensome, strict, and non-negotiable. This might have to do with the confusing gender anticipations of the new masculinities of the 21st century (Bridges & Pascoe, 2014) invading an otherwise very patriarchal community, or it could be an extension of the same paternalistic attitude that women can do no wrong simply because nothing good is expected of them.

While they are gossiped about, the young people of Bol and Murvica are attributed the same traits that characterize Gen Z (born in the mid-1990s) throughout the Western world. Many synonyms are used in the literature to describe this generation, and they are fairly accurate in describing some of its characteristics: Facebook generation, C generation (C stands for either connected, clicking or computerized), and iGeneration to name but few (Dolot, 2018). Its social participation is seen to be limited to online social media and Internet forums. Gen Z members consider themselves proactive and engaged, while others see them as a bunch of aloof and opinionated couch activists who cannot really critically evaluate the social and environmental issues on which they so freely express their opinions. In the public opinion, they are sharply divided into the insecure ones, who are reluctant to leave home, to get a steady job; and standoffish ones, who have left the island to study and pursue careers abroad. The division, fitting the criterion of mobility, roughly corresponds to the gender split: young men stay at home, which is justified by the fact that they are supposed to inherit the family's land, young women are accused of being ambitious, which is supposedly due to the prevailing cultural discourse of exaggerated feminism. Due to the prevalence of multitasking, i.e., being present in the real (public) and virtual (private) worlds at the same time, they are judged for having a short attention span and an addiction to instant and constant access to mobile devices. Attributed to the values of child-centred society, they

are blamed of having inflated narcissistic tendencies, a grandiose sense of self, materialistic preferences, a malignant ego, and a general lack of empathy (Lasch, 1978). All in all, rumour has it, their purpose in life is to have fun, and that they despise jobs they find 'unattractive', which refers to any manual or low-paying work.

According to moral philosophy, the locals are divided by religious denominations, only one of which is commendable: Roman Catholicism. There are 'the churchgoers', who are in the majority; they deem themselves to be permeated with decent traditional family values. On the other side, there are 'the communists', whose reputation strongly corresponds to the popular label of cultural Marxism (Bolton, 2017): they are class-conscious, liberal, atheist, anti-capitalist and fierce advocates of public sector accessibility.

And then there is a locally specific taxonomy of social groups with its own nomenclature: *furešti*, *vlaži*, *uhljebi*, *filipinci* and of course there are *turisti*. Ever so many of them.

First of all, there are the *furešti* (from the Italian *forestiere*, foreigners). They are locals but were not born on the island. They are developers either from Croatia or abroad, who have acquired some property, either an old house or a plot of land in the immediate vicinity of the locality. They are most despised when they come from the Croatian capital Zagreb. They are accused of exploiting the beauty and tranquillity of the small town by the crystal-clear sea at the expense of the local community and are seen as the main cause of overcrowding, overpopulation, pollution and the corruption of both, the traditional way of life and the local political structures in the pursuit of their economic interests. Official reports from the municipality of Bol municipality reflect the local attitude:

The investors based outside the municipality of Bol (and most often the island of Brač), build apartments for temporary residence, in which no one lives for most of the year. Therefore, jobs are not created, space is usurped, natural potentials and resources are harmed, there are no additional supporting facilities, the vision of a small Dalmatian town is changing with none or minimal benefits for the local community, which is most often reflected in one-time charge for the acquisition of land. (Turistička zajednica Općine Bol, 2022)

Another category with a bad reputation and frequent unified (and unifying) gossip are parvenus, the newcomers either from the Dalmatian mainland (Zagora) or from regions of the former common Yugoslav state. Derogatively called *vlaži*, they are emigrants to the island who usually came for seasonal work in the tourist industry and stayed on the island

for marriage arrangements or the quick acquisition of new wealth, or both. They are considered primitive, ignorant, pretentious, and boorish as they do not have the proper native pedigree but act as if they are entitled to the same privileges as the native population with an island ancestry. For example, the parvenus are considered self-righteous because they effectively privatize public access to the sea, which is prohibited by law but done by the 'born here' locals. The few who have not enriched themselves by building tourist facilities, such as plumbers, electricians, or cashiers, are spared the harshest judgement.

The most recent social group that functions as a well cohesive cluster are the migrant workers from Asia, named *filipinci* (Filipinos), whether they come from the Philippines or elsewhere. In the first two decades of this century, seasonal workers continued to come from inland Croatia, mainly from the Dalmatian Highlands, Zagora, and the eastern region of Slavonia, or from other former republics of the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia and Serbia. Since Croatia's accession to the EU in 2013, the traditional work force poll got steadily depleted and seasonal recruitment has become increasingly difficult. Due to immigration to the wealthiest European countries, Croatia has lost an estimated 350,000 jobs and one million inhabitants, or almost 20%, since before its independence war began in 1991, 396,360 of them in the last ten years. This led to national legislative changes and the abolition of work quotas and temporary residence permits for non-EU citizens in 2021. The formerly non-existent Asian community, employed mainly in low-paid physical work, is held in high regard. They are considered modest, hardworking, humble, and docile. Truth be told, when talking about them to their peers, locals usually start with 'everyone says they are no good and cause troubles, but they are really okay, they are good and polite'. Such unwarranted introductory remarks inevitably resonate with what is known as Freudian negation (Freud, 1925), in which the speaker's actual but unwelcomed attitudes are shielded by an unprovoked negation, revealing racist attitudes. This group, which engages in manual labour and takes odd jobs with low incomes, is seemingly comparable to a segment of *vlaji* emigrants. The difference, however, is that the *filipinci* are not considered a marriage material, which, again, is a clear expression of racism.

And then, of course, there are the tourists, who come in large numbers and whose numbers are steadily increasing. The tourism sector's share of GDP in Croatia was estimated at 19.5% in 2019, 8.9% in the corona year 2020, 19.9% in 2021 and 19.5% in 2022 (Ministarstvo turizma i sporta RH, 2023). It is forecasted to rise continuously by a total of 1.5 percentage points per year between 2023 and 2028. The share of GDP is estimated to be at least 26% in 2028 (Statista, 2023).

According to the local tourist board, Bol with its 1656 inhabitants had 8192 registered tourist accommodations in 2022 and has been visited by over 100,000 tourists annually in the last ten years, with the exception of the corona year 2020 (Turistička zajednica Općine Bol, 2022).

The village of Murvica does not have its own official statistics, but until 2000 there was not a single registered accommodation facility. By connecting the village to the municipality's drinking water network in 2010, the village transformed into having over 40 rental apartments with around 180 beds to date. The sanitation supply chain is currently still under construction and is being financed by the EU Cohesion Fund. The locals 'born here' regard the latest developments as progressive, while everyone else blames them of irrevocably erasing any semblance of village life.

Tourists seasonally and temporarily level existing hierarchical differences or local social groups by uniting them in their attitudes towards and gossip about them. They are considered too frivolous in their use of apartments' furnishings, too ostentatious and stay too short to make their stay optimally profitable. Everyone is very nostalgic about the good old days when Bol used to attract family tourism, while lately predominate single guests or groups of young people staying only a few days; the situation worsening with onset of online platforms (e.g., Airbnb, Vrbo, Booking.com) and the fashionable so-called island hopping. Compared to 1997, when the average tourist spent 7.2 days in Bol (Kuveždić, 1999), according to the latest available statistics in 2021 it was 5.2 days (Turistička zajednica Općine Bol, 2022).

Be that as it may, tourists are considered fair game. If you talk to restaurant owners and various suppliers of local products (wine, cheese, fish, oil), about 30 years ago there was an unspoken fixed arrangement for the income of the restaurants: one third of the earnings went to the supplies, one third to the salaries of the employees, one third was the profit of the owners. In the 2023 tourist season, according to one informant, the target ratio of supply costs to owners' profit was 1:7, price of the local products increased exponentially, by several hundred percent even, while employees' salaries barely increased by about 30%, with owners chipping them off by using family labour from far and wide and Asian workers, who are still satisfied with being paid less. So-called freeriding on the tourism wave is not seen as shameful or norm-violating behaviour (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012); rather, islanders consider it a privilege that belongs to those who were 'born here' and for which parvenus have sacrificed themselves. There-is-a-sucker-born-every-minute mentality prevails in the local community. Only a few old-fashioned entrepreneurs with decades of tradition and native

pedigree are exempt from this general attitude. On the other hand, everyone, tourists, residents of the Croatian hinterland and the mass media, loathes united members of the entrepreneurial hospitality industry. Here is a typical excerpt from news website from 22. 2. 2024, in which a restaurant owner from the coastal region of Croatia laments about the difficulties of hiring seasonal workers: “I cannot give a waiter a 3000 euro salary” (Index.hr, 2024). The reactions are strong and representative:

have you been puffing yourself up and bragging over the past few years? Have you paid the minimum wage? Have you been aloof to workers and told them there are many at the unemployment office if they don't want to work? Did you buy a BMW and go skiing? Did you demand knowledge, experience and a command of three languages? Was it important to you that the worker had a stable income all year round? Either you pay or you shut up... who cares... Import a Bushman from Africa to be your waiter. (Index.hr, 2024)

And another one:

I've been a seasonal worker for many years! Nobody steals more than restaurants and cafés; I'd rather not tell you about the selection of ideas for issuing non-fiscalized invoices, which still have JIR [jedinstveni identifikator računa – the unique identifier of the invoice op. K.Š.]. There is no facility in which 50, 60, 70% was not cashed illegally earned and the rest with proper fiscalization. Last year, due to circumstances, I had to work in the hospitality industry in a hotel for a while, I have university diploma, but I could not find work in my profession. My salary was 1000 euros of which 300 euros was black money, without tips because it was not a La Cart, 7 days a week without a day off.... Never again! A person literally feels like a slave. I have a lot of experience with the tourist seasons, I have had better and worse salaries, but this last year the restaurant industry completely disgusted me and let me tell you, no one was stingier with the salaries than the restaurateurs and they stole MILLIONS for all to see. I have no sympathy for them at all, thieves, honour to the exceptions if they exist. (Index.hr, 2024)

Another distinctive category of gossiped are those who have managed to get a job in the public sector; in Bol, employees of primary and secondary school and kindergarten are exempt. This category is called *uhljebi*, an untranslatable word that refers to a particularly foul kind of social parasite, a shameless

person without any merit, unqualified and unable to do the work for which they are paid, and who only got employed because of political or family connections.

In Bol, as the gossip goes, *uhljebi* are employed in an office of the municipality, and the public Communal services *Grabov rat*. Since 60% of employees in the municipality of Bol are temporary or seasonal workers (Ministarstvo turizma i sporta RH, 2023), jobs in public offices are highly sought after because they offer a rare opportunity for stable employment. It does not matter how competent you really are to get a job in the public sector, the rumour is always the same – you are well connected and supposedly deserve to be fiercely gossiped about, ridiculed and belittled. This is a very Croatian rumour, not specific to Bol or even the island, albeit on the northern side, in the capital Supetar with 4,325 inhabitants, the moral discretization of officials is not so taken-for-granted.

The unifying principle of all solidarity groups, which is also another well-known anthropological law, is that everyone lies (Metcalf, 2002) but there is another commonality in the conversations of the islanders that is not so cross-culturally universal – in Brač everyone complains about everything all the time: the annoying weather, the poor quality of tourists, the large quantity of tourists, the high prices, the local government, the lonely winters, the summer crowds, unpleasant neighbours, uncooperative relatives, the tasteless nightlife, the flamboyant gender-benders, the tacky outfits, the inconvenient opening hours of offices, corrupt dignitaries, the standoffish hospitality industry, the nonchalant youth, the niggling old folks, the fuzzy catamaran timetable, the lack of parking spaces, the reckless drivers, the incompetent national soccer team, the ungrateful children, the spoiled teenagers, the greedy employers, the lazy employees, dog shits, feral cats. Everything bothers the locals, and they freely admit it would be best if vacationers just sent them the money but stayed at home. And they are not joking.

GOSSIP AS A GIFT-GIVING

In general, the literature on gossiping as a form of gift-giving is sparse and outdated. Besnier very briefly mentions Maussian gift-giving as a possible analytical paradigm of gossiping, and Bailey was the first to point out the relationship between the micropolitics of reputation and gift-giving practices (Besnier, 2009, 118–119; Bailey, 1971).

Is there a similarity between the exchange of material gifts (commodities) and the exchange of ideas (symbolic goods)? Can one of the most famous and accomplished analysis of a total social fact in anthropology, the Maussian gift-giving, be compared to gossiping? Or, to put it differently: what are the conditions under which ideas may circulate like gifts? This,



Figure 3: Gossip setting waiting for full shade (personal archive).

at least, is the logic implicit in Mauss' two introductory questions: what law of legality and self-interest compels the gift received to be inevitably returned? What power lies in the gifted object that causes the recipient to pay it back? (Mauss, 2010).

The main part of Mauss' theory of the gift is his analysis of the concept of *Hau*, the spiritual force, the main essence, and value of a gift (Mauss, 2010). *Hau* is responsible for the fundamental characteristics associated with gift-giving: the necessity to return a gift received, the obligation to give and the obligation to receive gifts. The character of gift-giving is only seemingly free and unconditional, but at its core it is obligatory and driven by interest. Giving encourages giving. What is the rule that determines the exchange and reciprocation of gifts in societies? According to Mauss, every gift carries a *Hau*. The gifted thing is not dead, "in the gift, the living forest of the giver, his land" (Mauss, 2010, 14) resides. To receive a gift means "to receive part of his essence, his soul" (Mauss, 2010, 31). On the other hand, *Hau* brings with it the absolute obligation to return the gifts, under the threat of losing social standing, reputation, and the source of wealth.

Lévi-Strauss in his Introduction to the work of Marcel Mauss, elaborates further: *Hau* "is not the root cause of exchanges; it is the conscious form of the concept, which expresses an unconscious necessity" (Levi-Strauss, 1982, 44).

Reading this, the gossip practices inevitably come to mind: it is suggested in the literature and confirmed by my interviewers, that the social group is willing to punish, ostracize or be offended by an individual who did not share the gossip (Wilson et al., 2000). The exchange of gossip seems to function as the *Hau* of communication, an empty speech, which denotative value is completely suspended and irrelevant. The surplus value created by the symbolic gifting of gossip is the survival of the gifting community itself. Gossip, the giving, receiving, and returning of gossip are necessary to maintain at least the fiction of at least a 'liquid' (Giddens, 1990) community.

AN ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS: GOSSIP AS BULLSHIT

*One of the most salient features of our culture
is that there is so much bullshit.*
(Harry Frankfurt)

Developed from the linguistic theory of speech acts and analytical philosophy, "bullshit is a statement made without regard to whether the hearer comes to believe it, or without regard to whether it is actually true or false" (Easwaran, 2023, 8). The term gained popularity when anthropologist David Graeber published the book *Bullshit jobs: A theory* based on his 2013 essay *On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs* in 2018, which immediately caused a sensation.

A bullshit job is a "form of paid employment that is so completely pointless, unnecessary, or pernicious that even the employee cannot justify its existence even though, as part of the conditions of employment, the employee feels obliged to pretend that this is not the case" (Graeber, 2018, 9–10). Bullshit job does not equal a shitty job, as the latter has a positive impact on society, while bullshit jobs, by employees' own admission (Graeber, 2018, 14), have no positive social value, moreover, their disappearance would most probably make the world a better place. Graeber provides an impressive qualitative research scheme and compelling statistics: he claims that more than half of working time in American offices is spent on bullshitting, while 37% of British citizens and 40% of Dutch workers said they believe their jobs have no reason to exist (Graeber, 2018, 24).

The percentages skyrocket when gossipers are asked to evaluate in this respect their own gossip and gossip in general. The consensus is unanimous; the world would be a much better place without gossip, albeit a bit boring. Hardly anyone would contest that gossip is pointless and unjustified. Old-fashioned, 'modern' gossip, on the other hand, was "a discourse predicated on trust, anonymity, and the effective existence of a community among which informal discourse may circulate safely" (Monot, 2020, 18), postmodern gossip has none of these prerogatives. Furthermore, there used to be unwritten rules: firstly, that you don't 'kiss and tell', secondly, that the people you gossip with are not to be gossiped about in other social contexts, and thirdly, that the content of gossip was confined to clearly distinguishable circles of either family members, close friends or acquaintances, and those boundaries should not be transgressed. There was also a clear rivalry between recognized solidarity groups of gossipers (Mayer, 1966), and the information motive was the most prevalent reason for instigating gossip (Beersma & van Kleef, 2012).

Although gossip, viewed through an anthropological lens, still fulfils many of the familiar purposes and functions, in its postmodern version it is neither positive nor negative, it is neither confidential nor informative, nor does it contain any important moral lesson, and it is definitely devoid of any reference whatsoever to truth. As such, it is mainly bullshit. Bullshit is a speech act (Frankfurt, 1986; Easwaran, 2023) in which the speaker holds neither sincere nor insincere attitudes. An honest speaker means what is said, and also believes it. A liar means it but does not believe it. A bullshitter does neither.

When bullshitting, we are only acting out, playing the role in our own scenario of ourselves, managing the impression we have of ourselves for ourselves. Information gathering and validation,

credibility of material, honesty, reputation of all involved, etc. become secondary to social entertainment, narcissistic pleasure, and the enjoyment of acting out. What you do tell is irrelevant as long as you are telling it. Truth gave way to opinions, argument-based debate succumbed to user experience, facts and fakes are becoming indistinguishable. And nobody cares.

CONCLUSION

All the local solidarity groups mentioned above, whose participants are connected by gossip, have lost their integrative potential in recent decades due to the loosening of the prerogatives of good, old-fashioned gossip. They all view themselves “as disembedded from local culture, tradition and place” (Giddens, 1990). The literature (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) also points to institutionalized individualism in post-industrial society as the main culprit for the de-traditionalization of collective group identities, whereby “authorities such as kin, family, religion, class, and gender systems have been weakened” (Haugen & Villa, 2006, 211). The truth is that gossip has always been treated with caution, but in the post-truth times we live in, combined with the emergence of new technologies,

new identities, and new realities, it can be expected to transform further in its social functions, cultural value, and critical scientific evaluation.

The limitations of the present study are manifold. As the study was conducted in a specific setting of a post-socialist society in transition in terms of values, identity politics and technological progress in combination with an increasingly industrialized touristic region, the results would benefit from a comparative insight into an milieu not affected by this gigantic leap in social change, as well as an economy more representative of the social organization of a (post)industrial (post)modern megapolis. Quantitative methods, questionnaire surveys and statistical data on the characteristics of generational samples could also be informative to confirm or refute the findings of the present study. Given the IT revolution of the last two decades, it would be instructive to comparatively assess online gossiping and the diversification of gossip groups, especially for distinct and cyber-savvy Generation Z, born between the mid-1990s and mid-2010s.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to my fellow gossipers and apologetic for spilling the beans.

SENČNA STRAN GOVORIC: ANTROPOLOŠKA PERSPEKTIVA OPRAVLJANJA
NA DALMATINSKEM OTOKU

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POVZETEK

Namen te študije je raziskati o čem teče beseda, ko ogovarjamo, in razmejiti solidarnostne skupine tistih, ki so akterji ali tarče ogovarjanja med prebivalci občine Bol na južni strani otoka Brača v srednji Dalmaciji na Hrvaškem. Uporabljena metoda je osrednja etnografska metoda opazovanja z udeležbo. Po začetnem vpogledu v vzorce in specifične družbenega vedenja je opaziti več značilnosti, skupin in scenarijev ogovarjanja. V nadaljevanju je bilo izvedenih 73 neformalnih pogovorov, ki so jim sledili polstrukturirani intervjuji in globoko druženje s 36 udeleženci, od katerih jih je bilo 16 mlajših od 35 let in 8 starejših od 70 let. Vzorec je obsegal 14 žensk in 22 moških. Zbrano gradivo je nadalje kontekstualizirano z relevantnimi fragmenti splošne družbene teorije in uporabnimi interpretativnimi posegi socialne in kulturne antropologije. Metoda gostobesednega opisa je uporabljena za dodatno ponazoritev gradiva. Članek predstavi lokalno specifično taksonomijo družbenih skupin s svojo nomenklaturo: »tu rojeni«, furešči, vlaji, uhljebi, Filipinci in turisti. V kontekstu ogovarjanja so predstavljene značilnosti spola, moralne filozofije ter generacijske značilnosti. Ugotovljeno je, da se ogovarjanje mladih epistemološko razlikuje od staromodnega ogovarjanja, ker v to vnaša postmoderne značilnosti bulšit dejavnosti par excellence.

Ključne besede: opravljanje, Brač, lokalne taksonomije, družbena stratifikacija, generacija Z, turizem

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EXPLORING THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF CONSPIRATORIAL BELIEFS ABOUT COVID-19 IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION: A CASE APPROACH

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ABSTRACT

This study examines conspiratorial beliefs associated with the coronavirus pandemic in the United States, the European Union, and Slovenia. Drawing on a case-based approach, this research seeks to understand the underlying factors that have led to the emergence of conspiratorial beliefs regarding the coronavirus and the COVID-19 disease. We analysed surveys from the US and the EU to investigate the support of the general population towards the selected statements and beliefs closely connected to prevailing conspiracy theories. We seek the answer to the question of which demographic and societal factors contribute the most towards people's beliefs about the origins of coronavirus.

Keywords: Covid-19, conspiracy theories, beliefs, United States, European Union, Slovenia

ESPLORARE I DATI DEMOGRAFICI DELLE CREDENZE COSPIRATORIE SUL COVID-19 NEGLI STATI UNITI E NELL'UNIONE EUROPEA: UN APPROCCIO A CASI SPECIFICI

SINTESI

Questo studio esamina le basi e l'impatto delle teorie del complotto sul coronavirus negli Stati Uniti, nell'Unione Europea e in Slovenia. Basandosi su un approccio basato sui casi, questa ricerca cerca di comprendere i fattori sottostanti che hanno portato all'emergere di convinzioni cospiratorie riguardo al coronavirus e alla malattia Covid-19. Stiamo analizzando sondaggi provenienti da Stati Uniti e UE per analizzare il sostegno della popolazione generale verso le affermazioni e le credenze selezionate strettamente legate alle teorie del complotto prevalenti. Stiamo cercando la risposta alla domanda su quali fattori demografici e sociali contribuiscono maggiormente alle convinzioni delle persone sull'origine del coronavirus.

Parole chiave: Covid-19, teorie cospiratorie, credenze, Stati Uniti, Unione Europea, Slovenia

INTRODUCTION¹

Conspiracy theories are attempts to explain events as the secret acts of powerful, malevolent forces (Swami & Coles, 2010, 560). For example, popular conspiracy theories allege that the US government orchestrated the 9/11 attacks and that the NASA moon landings were actually recorded in a Hollywood studio. Conspiracy theories often lack evidence and may be based on speculation or hearsay. Belief in conspiracy theories is widespread, with polls consistently indicating that more than 70% of Americans believe some form of conspiracy was responsible for President John F. Kennedy's death (Wood, Douglas & Sutton, 2012). Conspiracy theories may also result from *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, Latin for 'after this, therefore because of this'. It is a logical fallacy in which two events occur sequentially or simultaneously, leading to the misattribution to one event appearing to be the cause of the following event. Further, polls demonstrate that more than 20% of respondents endorse the idea that there is a link between childhood vaccines and autism (Public Policy Polling, 2013). Many other anti-vaccine conspiracy theories have emerged in recent years, with the COVID-19 pandemic giving them a major boost (Birchall & Knight, 2023). At the heart of the anti-vaccine conspiracy movement lays the argument that large pharmaceutical companies and governments are covering up information about vaccines to meet their own sinister objectives. According to the most popular theories, pharmaceutical companies stand to make such healthy profits from vaccines that they bribe researchers to fake their data, cover up evidence of the harmful side effects of vaccines, and inflate statistics on vaccine efficacy. Therefore, anti-vaccine conspiracy theories reflect suspicion and mistrust of scientific research examining vaccine efficacy and safety. Conspiracist ideation, in general, tends to be associated with a mistrust of science, such as the link between smoking and lung cancer.

Several conspiracy theories surrounding the novel coronavirus, commonly called COVID-19, stem from numerous sources and logical fallacies. The spread of the coronavirus has been accompanied by a massive spread of conspiracy theories (Bierwiazek, 2022, 1). One of the most pervasive conspiracy theories about the spread of COVID-19 is that it was deliberately released into the population by some nefarious group or organisation, most often the government of China. This theory is based on the idea that the virus was created in a lab, possibly as a bioweapon, and then accidentally or deliberately released into the public to cause mass chaos and destruction. The fact that the virus originated in the

Wuhan region of China has been used to attribute the discovery of the virus to nefarious actors in China, regardless of the severe lack of evidence. Bierwiazek, Gunderson, and Kunst's (2022, 3) study on the impact of conspiratorial claims regarding COVID-19 has had a significant and detrimental effect on public health simply due to the scale of the worldwide pandemic. Another common conspiracy theory is that the COVID-19 virus was deliberately spread by 5G networks. This theory claims that 5G radiation is powerful enough to weaken the immune system, allowing the virus to spread more quickly. While no scientific evidence supports this claim, the theory continues to circulate. Another popular conspiracy theory is that the virus was created as a way to control the population by imposing restrictions on travel and public gatherings. This theory suggests that the virus was created as a social engineering tool to keep people in their homes and limit their ability to interact with one another. However, a motive for such social engineering never materialises in this discourse. Finally, there is the theory that the virus is part of a vast conspiracy to increase the power and wealth of a select group of people. This theory gained significant popularity during the COVID-19 pandemic; it suggests that the virus was released to cause mass economic disruption, giving those in power an opportunity to amass even more wealth and power. How this global phenomenon leads to creating more wealth during global lockdowns seems to contradict this claim but does not halt its spread.

PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES

In the modern communication age, filtering through misinformation to arrive at a semblance of truth is a daunting task that requires us all to attempt to make it beyond the wall of conspiracy theories. If a phenomenon has made it to the nightly news, it is highly likely that there is a corresponding conspiracy theory. People seek causal explanations of events to construct a clear sense of their world (Douglas et al., 2017, 538). They have an intrinsic need to make sense of the world because it helps them better understand their environment, make decisions, and form opinions. It is also essential for social interaction and relationships. People need to understand the world around them to interact with it, and constructing their worldview through these interactions gives them a framework for doing so. Douglas, Sutton and Cichocka (2017, 539) point out that explanations for events are important and help people feel safe and secure in their environment, providing a sense of control over that environment and themselves.

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Conspiracy theories provide a sense of control and autonomy because they provide an explanation for events that can otherwise appear chaotic and unpredictable. When people believe in a conspiracy theory, it gives them a sense of control over their lives because they can understand the world and why certain events occur (Wardawy-Dudziak, 2024, 53). This feeling of control and autonomy can be comforting for people who feel powerless in the face of events that are out of their control. Conspiracy theories may also help people feel like they are special because they provide a unique perspective and understanding of events that seem hidden from most people. Believing in a conspiracy theory can make people feel like they have access to knowledge and information that others do not, making them feel 'in the know'. According to van Prooijen and van Vugt (2018, 771), conspiracy theories have five critical ingredients: a) conspiracy theories assume events are causally linked; b) conspiracy theories ascribe intentionality; c) conspiracy theories always involve a group of actors working together; d) conspiracy theories always contain a threat of harm to achieve their goal; e) conspiracy theories always rely on secrecy to make them difficult to detect. Douglas and Sutton (2018) found that people who believe in one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe another (265). In their study of conspiratorial belief, Douglas and Sutton found that belief in conspiracy theories about the JFK assassination made someone more likely to believe conspiracies about Princess Dianna's death and the origins of the AIDS virus (Douglas & Sutton, 2018, 265).

This feeling of exclusivity can be empowering, as it provides a sense of importance and purpose. Some people adopt a belief in a particular conspiracy because it allows them to preserve their pre-existing beliefs in the face of uncertainty and contradiction (Douglas *et al.*, 2019, 7). Douglas and colleagues (2019, 6) have pointed out that a growing body of psychological research focuses on psychological factors that increase the likelihood that someone will believe a conspiracy theory. The data in these studies indicate that some people believe multiple conspiracy theories, while others believe none (Douglas *et al.*, 2019, 7). These conspiratorial beliefs help satisfy several psychological factors, for example:

1. Need for control: Individuals who believe in conspiracy theories may need control, believing that they are the only ones who have the knowledge to understand the hidden mechanisms of power in the world.
2. Cognitive biases: Confirmation bias, the tendency to interpret information so that it confirms one's own beliefs, can lead individuals to interpret certain facts as evidence of a conspiracy.

3. Social cues: People tend to take cues from their peers and the media regarding which conspiracies might be plausible.
4. Fear of the unknown: Uncertainty can lead individuals to latch onto conspiracy theories to make sense of the world.
5. Sense of powerlessness: People who feel powerless may be more likely to look for hidden forces to explain the events that shape their lives.

Conspiracy theories may be considered a form of political propaganda constructed around a particular policy belief (Cassam, 2023, 1). When a conspiracy grows to a certain size, it can gain salience with communities and specific political belief systems. The salience of conspiracy theories refers to the extent to which they capture people's attention and interest. Conspiracy theories are often used to explain events or situations that are claimed to be due to the involvement of secretive and malevolent groups or individuals working behind the scenes to achieve their goals in opposition to the interests of the wider public. According to Cassam (2023, 6), conspiracy theories typically involve some aspect of cognitive bias, though cognitive bias itself does not create a belief in conspiracy theories. As part of political belief systems, denial occurs on an ideological basis, according to Cassam (2023, 9), which may lend credibility to the assertion that conspiracy theories are a kind of propaganda. Conspiracists often make illogical leaps in logic as a means of suggesting one thing is evidence of another. The explanation of a conspiracy itself is generally self-sealing to insulate it from evidence (Cassam, 2023). Conspiracists often cherry-pick their sources for the evidence that supports their assertions and dismiss experts or contradictory evidence out of hand. Evidence to the contrary may also be utilised as a new aspect of the conspiracy, as the 'experts' who do not support the conspiracy theory and their evidence are all faked to perpetuate their malevolent agenda. Overall, conspiracy theories can be difficult to refute because they often rely on circular reasoning, selective evidence, and a rejection of established sources of information. It is important to engage with conspiracy theorists in a respectful and evidence-based way, but it is also important to recognise that some conspiracy theories may be impervious to evidence-based arguments since they may have been constructed to trigger an emotional, rather than a rational, response.

DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS

Research Design

To evaluate the types of demographic factors that are most likely to be connected to beliefs of conspiracy theories related to the origins of the coronavirus,




Chart 1: Crosstabulation of respondent beliefs regarding coronavirus creation vs. US political parties.

we are comparing both sides of the Atlantic, as we utilise the American Trends Panel (ATP) conducted by the Pew Research Center in the United States and the combination of European Social Survey (2023) and Special Eurobarometer 516 survey (European Commission, 2021) in the European Union. In the United States, we use Waves 63.5 and 68, asking respondents their opinion on the origins of coronavirus. In Wave 63.5, conducted from 10 to 16 March 2020, 8,914 respondents completed interviews. For Wave 68, 9,644 interviews were completed between 4 to 10 June. In the European Union, the European Social Survey, from June to August 2021, included 1,252 respondents from Slovenia who completed interviews on several statements, including three that are closely connected with conspiracy theories and the origin of the coronavirus. We also used Special Eurobarometer 516, conducted in September 2021, among 25,289 respondents from EU-27 countries who completed interviews on statements (among others) related to the origin of coronavirus. We are seeking the answer to the main research question on the demographic and societal factors that contribute the most towards people's beliefs of the origins of coronavirus, such as the potential production of the viruses in government-controlled laboratories. This study is limited to macro analysis of this phenomenon by use of national surveys, rather than a focused micro analysis of individual causes of conspiratorial beliefs.

United States Covid-19 conspiracy theory survey

The Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel dataset was used to examine the influence of demographic factors on believing conspiracy theories regarding Covid-19 in the United States. The ATP dataset consists of a nationwide survey on Covid conspiracy theories and was conducted during the pandemic, which makes the ATP ideal for the purposes of our project. The first dependent variable measures respondents' attitudes regarding beliefs about the origins of coronavirus, as reported in wave 63.5. The respondents were asked, 'From what you've seen or heard, do you think it is most likely the current strain of the coronavirus... 1. Was developed intentionally in a lab, 2. Was made accidentally in a lab, 3. Came about naturally, 4. Doesn't really exist' (Pew Research Center, 2020a). The largest category is 'Came about naturally', with 69.4% of respondents choosing this answer, followed by 23.4% answering 'Was developed intentionally in a lab', then 6.4% of respondents saying, 'Was made accidentally in a lab', and finally 0.8% indicating 'Doesn't really exist'.

The primary independent variable of interest for the analysis of the United States is party identification, namely whether the respondents considered themselves Republican or Democrat. The variable is coded as '0' for Democrat and '1' for Republican. Chart 1 below shows a crosstabulation between the first dependent




Chart 2: Crosstabulation of respondent beliefs regarding coronavirus being planned by powerful people vs. US political parties.

variable and the main independent variable, indicating that both parties had the highest frequency of answers in the ‘Came about naturally’ category. However, Republicans had higher numbers than Democrats in the ‘Was developed intentionally in a lab’ and ‘Was made accidentally in a lab’ categories, while Democrats had a higher frequency than Republicans in the ‘Doesn’t really exist’ category. Due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable, a multinomial logistic regression is used to test the hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the views of Republicans and Democrats regarding the origins of the coronavirus.

Other variables of interest include sex, education level, marital status, race, whether or not the respondent is Evangelical or ‘born again’, age category, and family income. The control variable of sex is coded as ‘0’ for male and ‘1’ for female. Education level is divided into three categories, with ‘0’ indicating high school education or less, ‘1’ for some college, and ‘2’ for college graduate or higher. Marital status is divided into not married, indicated by ‘0’, and ‘1’ for married. The race category is represented by a ‘1’ if the respondent was not white, while a ‘0’ indicates the respondent is white. If the respondent identified as an Evangelical or being ‘born again’, they are coded as ‘1’, while ‘0’ signifies that the respondent does not identify as an Evangelical. The age category variable is divided into six classifications: 1=18–24 years old, 2=25–34 years old, 3=35–44 years old, 4=45–54 years old, 5=55–64 years old, and

6=65+ years old. Finally, the family income variable is an ordinal variable with nine categories, ranging from less than \$10,000 to \$150,000 or more.

The second dependent variable comes from the 68th wave of the American Trends Panel, which asks, ‘From what you have seen or heard, do you think the theory that powerful people intentionally planned the coronavirus outbreak is... 1. Definitely NOT true, 2. Probably NOT true, 3. Probably true, 4. Definitely true’ (Pew Research Center, 2020b). The greatest share of respondents answered ‘Definitely NOT true’, at 36.7%, followed by ‘Probably NOT true’, with 32.1%, indicating the majority of respondents (68.8%) believe it was unlikely coronavirus was intentionally created by powerful people. The third largest category of respondents answered ‘Probably true’, at 25.5%, and finally, 5.6% of respondents answered ‘Definitely true.’ Although the second dependent variable is coded as an ordinal variable, the variable failed the test of parallel lines, and thus, a multinomial logistic regression is used when testing the hypothesis that US political party identity is a predictor of the likelihood that a respondent believes coronavirus was planned by powerful people.

As with the first dependent variable, the main independent variable of interest for the second model is US party identification, where ‘0’ indicates the respondent is a Democrat and ‘1’ is Republican. As Chart 2 demonstrates, Democrats had a higher share in the ‘Definitely NOT true’ and ‘Probably NOT true’

Table 1: Demographic factors and beliefs of coronavirus origins.

	Developed Intentionally in a Lab			Made Accidentally in a Lab			Doesn't Really Exist		
	Coef.	S.E.	Odds Ratio	Coef.	S.E.	Odds Ratio	Coef.	S.E.	Odds Ratio
Party	1.199***	0.115	3.317	1.007***	0.186	2.738	-0.594	0.530	0.552
Sex	0.087	0.100	1.091	-0.206	0.162	0.814	0.648	0.521	1.911
High School or Less	0.630***	0.146	1.878	0.312	0.235	1.366	0.643	0.603	1.902
Some College	0.546***	0.110	1.726	0.304	0.181	1.355	0.359	0.520	1.432
Marital Status	-0.024	0.113	0.976	-0.020	0.183	0.980	0.261	0.486	1.299
Race	0.790***	0.138	2.204	0.739***	0.216	2.094	0.294	0.503	1.342
Evangelical	0.364***	0.099	1.438	0.108	0.164	1.114	0.492	0.447	1.636
Age	-0.083	0.052	0.920	0.004	0.012	1.004	-0.487*	0.227	0.615
Income	-0.132***	0.026	0.876	-0.218***	0.041	0.804	-0.275*	0.109	0.760
Constant	-1.053***	0.256	-	-1.592***	0.313	-	-2.252*	0.998	-

n 2526

Pearson's χ^2 7369.102***

Nagelkerke's Pseudo .167

 R^2 * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The reference category is: Came About Naturally.

categories, while Republicans had more answers in the 'Probably true' and 'Definitely true' categories. The control variables in the second model are the same as used in the first model and follow the same coding schemes with one exception: the race variable is coded as '0' if the respondent identified as not white, while a '1' indicates the respondent identified as white. When testing for multicollinearity between variables in both models, all variance inflation factors ranged between 1 and 1.5, suggesting low correlation.

For the first dependent variable, in which respondents indicate their beliefs regarding whether coronavirus was developed intentionally in a lab, made accidentally in a lab, came about naturally or does not really exist, we find significant differences between the beliefs of Republicans and Democrats, holding all else equal. As Table 1 demonstrates, the Republicans, compared to Democrats, have higher odds (3.317 times) of believing the coronavirus was developed intentionally in a lab compared to the reference category that coronavirus came about naturally. In other words, the odds increase that the respondent is a Republican by 231.7% as compared to a Democrat. Similarly, the odds are higher that a Republican will believe the coronavirus was made accidentally in a lab as compared to coming about naturally by 2.738 times higher as compared to a Democrat, or an increase of 173.8%. No significant

relationship was found between the respondents who do not think coronavirus really exists and the reference category that coronavirus came about naturally when comparing the party identity of Republicans and Democrats. However, as indicated in Figure 1, the sample size was quite low, with only 24 Democrats and 6 Republicans answering that they did not believe coronavirus really existed.

For the control variables in Table 1, lower levels of education were significantly related to whether the respondent believed the coronavirus was intentionally developed in a lab compared to coming about naturally. Likewise, lower income levels were also more likely than higher income levels to believe coronavirus was developed intentionally in a lab rather than coming about naturally. Finally, respondents who identified themselves as not white and as Evangelicals or 'born again' had a higher probability of believing coronavirus was developed intentionally in a lab instead of coming about naturally than their white and non-Evangelical counterparts. No significant result was found for the control variables of sex, marital status, and age.

Comparing the control variables for those who answered that coronavirus was made accidentally in a lab to the reference category that coronavirus came about naturally, race, and income were found to have statistically significant relationships, in which those

Table 2: Demographic factors and belief that powerful people created coronavirus.

	Probably NOT True			Probably True			Definitely True		
	Coef.	S.E.	Odds Ratio	Coef.	S.E.	Odds Ratio	Coef.	S.E.	Odds Ratio
Party	1.789***	0.137	5.981	2.376***	0.115	10.757	2.870***	0.264	17.630
Sex	0.270*	0.126	1.310	0.564***	0.138	1.757	0.437*	0.208	1.548
High School or Less	0.817***	0.232	2.264	1.481***	0.236	4.396	1.657***	0.312	5.243
Some College	0.351*	0.142	1.421	0.963***	0.150	2.619	0.859***	0.233	2.361
Marital Status	0.116	0.142	1.123	0.104	0.153	1.110	0.360	0.237	1.434
Race	-0.764***	0.175	0.466	-1.399***	0.183	0.247	-1.018***	0.306	0.361
Evangelical	0.117	0.134	1.124	0.294*	0.141	1.342	0.661**	0.207	1.936
Age	-0.171*	0.067	0.843	-0.307***	0.073	0.735	-0.204	0.112	0.815
Income	-0.132***	0.035	0.873	-0.272***	0.036	0.762	-0.311***	0.054	0.733
Constant	0.825*	0.391	-	1.184**	0.412	-	-1.247*	0.633	-

n 2202

Pearson's χ^2 3540.893***

Nagelkerke's .300

Pseudo R^2 * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The reference category is: Definitely NOT True.

who responded they were not white or of a lower income level were more likely to think the coronavirus had been made accidentally in a lab. The results for the control variables sex, education, marital status, being Evangelical, and age were all found to be inconclusive. Finally, for the comparison of respondents who believe coronavirus does not really exist with those who think coronavirus came about naturally, age and income were the only statistically significant control variables, with those in younger age categories and of lower income status being more likely to believe that coronavirus does not really exist.

The second dependent variable tested for the US case is an ordinal variable that denotes if the respondent thinks coronavirus was created by powerful people, ranging from definitely not true to definitely true. As with the first dependent variable, the main explanatory variable of party identification is found to have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable across all categories. In this case, all else being equal, Republicans are significantly more likely than Democrats to believe that coronavirus was created by powerful people. In Table 2, respondents who are more likely to believe that powerful people created coronavirus have higher odds of being Republicans than Democrats compared to the reference category

that powerful people definitely did NOT create coronavirus. Notably, when comparing those who believe it is definitely true that powerful people created coronavirus to those who think it is definitely NOT true, the odds that the respondent is a Republican, compared to a Democrat, multiply by 17.630, or 1,663.0%.

Across categories of the dependent variable, those who identify as non-white and female are more likely to think powerful people created coronavirus than those who identify as white or male, as well as those of lower education and income levels. When a significant relationship is found with the Evangelical and age control variables, Evangelicals were more likely than non-Evangelicals, and those in younger age categories were more likely than older age categories to believe coronavirus was created by powerful people. The control variable for marital status had results that were inconclusive with the dependent variable.

European Covid-19 Conspiracy Theory Surveys

As Birchall and Knight (2023) note in their work dedicated exclusively to coronavirus conspiracy theories, immediately after the first news about the emergence of a new infectious virus in China, various speculations about the actual origin of the virus emerged on various

Table 3: Belief that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control people's freedom (in %) (Source: Special Eurobarometer 516 (European Commission, 2021)).

COUNTRY	TRUE	FALSE	DON'T KNOW
Austria	23	64	12
Belgium	10	74	16
Bulgaria	52	19	29
Croatia	50	28	22
Cyprus	52	26	22
Czech Republic	14	66	20
Denmark	6	83	11
Estonia	21	52	27
Finland	10	69	21
France	30	54	16
Germany	14	70	16
Greece	44	31	25
Hungary	43	43	14
Ireland	10	73	17
Italy	34	52	14
Latvia	28	41	31
Lithuania	31	40	29
Luxemburg	13	66	21
Malta	36	35	29
Nederland	7	84	9
Poland	40	41	19
Portugal	19	50	31
Romania	53	31	16
Slovakia	37	44	19
Slovenia	47	36	17
Spain	36	42	22
Sweden	7	75	18
EU-27	28	55	17
Monte Negro	71	22	7
North Macedonia	60	24	16
Albania	53	24	23
Kosovo	53	18	29
Bosnia Herzegovina	52	30	18
Serbia	51	31	18
Turkey	51	22	27
United Kingdom	12	69	19
Iceland	11	66	23
Switzerland	9	74	17
Norway	8	75	17

social networks. Given previous findings on the patterns of virus emergence and the situational factors that lead people to look for alternative explanations, the emergence of conspiracy theories in similar situations is by no means a new phenomenon (Douglas, 2021).

Table 3 refers to the Special Eurobarometer 516 (European Commission, 2021) survey that was conducted in September 2021, including more than 25,000 respondents in all European Union member states and ten other non-EU member countries. Question 20.11 is particularly interesting for our research, as it asked the respondents whether it was true or false that viruses had been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom. There are six EU Member States where at least seven in ten respondents correctly say that it is false that viruses are produced in government laboratories to control people's freedom: the Netherlands (84%), Denmark (83%), Sweden (75%), Belgium (74%), Ireland (73%) and Germany (70%). By contrast, less than three in ten respondents in Bulgaria (19%), Cyprus (26%), and Croatia (28%) correctly say this statement is false. This compares with the EU average of 55%. The countries with the highest proportions of respondents unable to answer are Latvia and Portugal (both 31%), Bulgaria, Malta and Lithuania (29% in each), and Estonia (27%), compared with the EU average of 17%. Among the non-EU countries surveyed, at least seven in ten respondents correctly said that it is false that viruses were produced in government laboratories to control people's freedom in Norway (75%) and Switzerland (74%). By contrast, less than three in ten respondents correctly say that this is false in Kosovo (18%), Turkey and Montenegro (both 22%) and North Macedonia and Albania (both 24%). Again, Kosovo has a high proportion of respondents (29%) who are unable to answer. We can clearly observe the divide between the western and northern European countries (e.g., Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark), where shares of false votes are consistently near or above 70 per cent and southern, central and eastern European countries (e.g., Slovenia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Croatia), where shares of false votes are consistently (well) below 40 per cent. There are also notable exceptions to this rule, for instance, the Czech Republic or Estonia, which are much closer to the former group than the latter.

Unukič, Turjak, and Rašič (2023, 58) also analysed Special Eurobarometer 516 (European Commission, 2021), specifically question 20.11. Their analysis confirmed that EU citizens differ in the opinion that viruses were made in government laboratories to maintain our freedom. At the significance level of 5%, they rejected the hypothesis that EU citizens have an equal opinion that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom. The next step in our research is to identify the demographic and societal factors influencing the respondents' conspirative

Table 4: General population opinions on selected conspiracy theories in Slovenia (Source: European Social Survey, 2023).

STATEMENTS	Definitely not true (1)	Probably not true (2)	Not sure; cannot decide (3)	Probably true (4)	Definitely true (5)	Mean value (1-5)
1) Coronavirus is the result of the deliberate and covert action of one of the governments or organisations	128 (11.0%)	278 (23.9%)	353 (30.3%)	279 (23.9%)	127 (10.9%)	3.00
2) A small hidden group of people is responsible for making all the major decisions in world politics.	59 (4.9%)	260 (21.8%)	281 (23.6%)	431 (36.2%)	161 (13.5%)	3.31
3) Groups of scientists manipulate, falsify, or conceal data to mislead the public	89 (7.5%)	305 (25.6%)	336 (28.2%)	377 (31.6%)	86 (7.2%)	3.14

n= 1252.

beliefs in the above-mentioned survey. We have used Pearson correlation analysis and tested age, gender, religion, education, marital status and left-right political placement as possible factors influencing conspirative beliefs in survey respondents. We used aggregated data for all 27 EU member states. There is not enough evidence that gender, marital status, and age influence the respondent's beliefs that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom. Further, we found evidence that religion, education, and left-right political placement have a very mild influence on the respondent's beliefs that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom. In left-right political placement,² the largest group to believe that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom are respondents refusing to place themselves on the left-right political scale (39.8%), followed by centre-oriented (30%), right-wing oriented (27.8%) and left-wing oriented (24.2%) respondents. We can see differences, especially among respondents who declared their political orientation, are mild at best. The biggest (but still only moderate) differences were spotted using religion as the factor that should best explain differences in conspirative beliefs in survey respondents; we can conclude that respondents following certain religions are more likely to believe that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom compared to atheists and non-believers (32.9% compared to 17.4%). Interestingly, there are quite important differences among different religions in the EU in terms of their support of the claim that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to

control their freedom; the smallest support comes from protestants (12.7%), and the largest support comes from orthodox Christians (48.2%).

Slovenian Covid-19 Conspiracy Theory Surveys

Table 4 refers to the European Social Survey data collected in 2020 and 2021 and includes three interesting questions closely related to the typical conspiracy theory claims. We analysed data for Slovenia on a sample of 1252 completed in-person interviews that evaluated their opinions towards three statements on the scale from one (definitely not true) to five (definitely true). This survey complements Special Eurobarometer 516 findings that we analysed above, as the first statement ('Coronavirus is the result of the deliberate and covert action of one of the governments or organisations') splits the general population into two opposing camps; namely, almost exactly equal shares of population believe (34.8%) or do not believe (34.9%) that coronavirus is the result of the deliberate and covert action of one of the government or organisations. The second statement refers to one of the most recognised and popular conspiracy theories, which claims that a small covert group of people is responsible for making all the major decisions in global politics. The levels of support (49.7%) towards this conspirative statement are much stronger than the opposition (26.7%). The last statement indirectly connects to the anti-vax movement and conspiracy theories, as it claims that scientists manipulate, falsify, or conceal data to mislead the public; we can again ascertain that support (38.8%) towards this statement is stronger than the opposition (33.1%).

² Respondents were asked to place themselves on the left-right political scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right). We grouped all respondents which assigned themselves values from 1 to 4 as left-wing oriented, respondents with assigned values from 5 to 6 as centre-oriented and respondents with assigned values from 7 to 10 as right-wing oriented.

We have also tested demographic and societal factors that are (possibly) influencing conspirative beliefs in respondents to the Special Eurobarometer 516 (European Commission, 2021) survey, using data only from 1,023 respondents from Slovenia. We have tested a number of the independent variables, such as age, gender, religion, education, marital status, and left-right political placement, as possible factors influencing conspirative beliefs in survey respondents. There is not enough evidence that gender, marital status, and age influence the respondent's beliefs that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom. Further, we can confirm that religion, education, and left-right political placement have a (moderate) influence on the respondent's beliefs that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom. When analysing religion, we can conclude that respondents following certain religions are more likely to believe that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom compared to atheists and non-believers (52.4% compared to 33.7%). Analysing education, we found evidence that respondents who have obtained higher levels of education (university degree and more; 35.7%) are less likely to believe that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom compared to persons with lower obtained levels of education (less than university degree; 53.1%). In left-right political placement, the largest group to believe that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom are respondents refusing to place themselves on the left-right political scale (59.5%), followed by centre-oriented (49.4%), right-wing oriented (45.2%) and left-wing oriented (35.4%) respondents.

CONCLUSIONS

It is not surprising that the coronavirus pandemic has given rise to numerous conspiracy theories in the age of the internet and the widespread use of social media, as well as the simultaneous presence of populist politics and public mistrust towards major political institutions. Conspiracy theories have become an important part of public discourse worldwide, including in the United States and the European Union. Furthermore, the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has led to increased scientific interest in conspiracy theories (Šteger, 2024, 83).

The main aim of this article was to provide an overview of demographic and societal factors that are contributing towards people's beliefs of the coronavirus origins; for this purpose, we have analysed and compared three big data surveys, namely American Trends Panel (ATP) conducted by the Pew Research Center in the United States, and European Social Survey and Special Eurobarometer 516 surveys from European Union.

The analysis of the ATP survey from the United States found that lower levels of education were significantly related to whether the respondent believed coronavirus was intentionally developed in a lab compared to coming about naturally. Likewise, lower income levels were more likely than higher income levels to believe coronavirus was developed intentionally in a lab rather than naturally occurring. Finally, respondents who identified themselves as not white and as Evangelicals or 'born again' had a higher probability of believing coronavirus was developed intentionally in a lab. We could also confirm that Republicans are significantly more likely than Democrats to believe that coronavirus was created by powerful people. Also, females in younger age categories are more likely to think powerful people created coronavirus than males and those in older age categories.

In the European Union, citizens do not have an equal opinion that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their own freedom, as there are major differences between EU member states with a stark divide between the western and northern European countries on anti-conspiracy side and southern, central and eastern European countries on a side more inclined towards conspiracy theories. We could also confirm that religion, education, and left-right political placement have a (very) mild influence on the respondents' inclination towards conspiracy theories. To gain additional insight into the EU findings, we also analysed both EU surveys including only respondents from Slovenia, and found out that religion, education, and left-right political placement have a moderate influence on the respondent's beliefs that viruses have been produced in government laboratories to control their freedom, but it is clear that Slovenian general population is (much) more inclined towards supporting conspiracy beliefs compared to EU averages.

RAZISKOVANJE DEMOGRAFIJE ZAROTNIŠKIH PREPRIČANJ O COVID-19 V ZDRUŽENIH DRŽAVAH AMERIKE IN EVROPSKI UNIJI: ŠTUDIJA PRIMEROV

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POVZETEK

Članek analizira vpliv teorij zarot o koronavirusu v Združenih državah Amerike, Evropski uniji in v Sloveniji. Na podlagi pristopa, ki temelji na študijah primerov, si raziskava prizadeva razumeti osnovne dejavnike, ki so privedli do nastanka zarotniških prepričanj glede koronavirusa in posledične bolezni Covid-19. V članku analiziramo raziskavo *American Trends Panel*, ki so jo izvedli *Pew Research Center* (Združene države Amerike), *European Social Survey* (Evropska unija) in *Special Eurobarometer 516* (Evropska unija), da bi analizirali podporo prebivalstva izbranim izjavam in prepričanjem, tesno povezanim s prevladujočimi teorijami zarote. Pri tem odgovor na raziskovalno vprašanje, kateri demografski in družbeni dejavniki prispevajo k prepričanju ljudi o izvoru koronavirusa, kot je morebitna proizvodnja virusa v laboratorijih pod nadzorom oblasti. Ugotavljamo, da obstajajo določeni demografski in družbeni dejavniki, ki vsekakor prispevajo k prepričanju ljudi o izvoru koronavirusa, predvsem so to versko prepričanje, stopnja izobrazbe in levo-desna politična umestitev, vendar je njihov vpliv močnejši v Združenih državah ter nekaterih južnih, vzhodnih in osrednjih evropskih državah (npr. v Sloveniji) v primerjavi z zahodno in severno Evropo. Slovenski anketiranci kažejo zmeren vpliv teh dejavnikov in so opazno bolj nagnjeni k zarotniškemu prepričanju kot povprečje EU. Članek zaključimo z ugotovitvami o desničarskih političnih ideologijah, ki prispevajo k verovanju v teorije zarot o pandemiji, in uporabi družbenih medijev kot mehanizma za širjenje teorij zarot o koronavirusu.

Ključne besede: Covid-19, teorije zarote, prepričanja, ZDA, Evropska unija, Slovenija

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ZA TRANS OTROKE GRE: INTEGRATIVNI PREGLED LITERATURE O IZKUŠNJAH TRANS MLADIH Z VZGOJNO-IZOBRAŽEVALNIM SISTEMOM

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IZVLEČEK

Namen prispevka je s pregledom literature predstaviti posebnosti vzgojno-izobraževalnih izkušenj transspolnih učenčev in s tem opozoriti na tematike, ki so bile v preteklosti spregledane. Opravljen je bil sistematičen integrativni pregled literature. V končno analizo je bilo vključenih 29 znanstvenih besedil, ki so bila analizirana s kvalitativno tematsko analizo. Prepoznane so bile štiri kategorije, in sicer so to (i) nepravilnosti in sovražnosti, (ii) cishnormativnost šolskega sistema, (iii) posledice transfobije in strategije za navigiranje skozi cishnormativen šolski prostor ter (iv) varovalni dejavniki in vizija za prihodnost. V izsledkih so izpostavljeni pozitivni in negativni vidiki izkušenj transspolnih oseb v vzgojno-izobraževalnem sistemu ter posledice teh izkušenj.

Ključne besede: transspolnost, otroci, mladostniki, izobraževanje, integrativni pregled literature

ALUNNI E ALUNNE TRANSGENDER: REVISIONE INTEGRATIVA DELLA LETTERATURA SULLE ESPERIENZE DEI GIOVANI TRANSGENDER NEL SISTEMA EDUCATIVO

SINTESI

L'obiettivo dell'articolo è presentare le specificità delle esperienze educative degli alunni e delle alunne transgender attraverso una revisione della letteratura, grazie alla quale possono essere individuate alcune questioni che in passato sono state trascurate. In un primo momento abbiamo effettuato una revisione sistematica integrativa della letteratura, mentre per l'analisi finale ci siamo concentrati su 29 testi che abbiamo valutato utilizzando un'analisi tematica qualitativa. In seguito abbiamo identificato quattro categorie principali che contengono i punti essenziali delle esperienze delle persone transgender nel sistema educativo, ovvero (i) disuguaglianze e ostilità, (ii) cishnormatività del sistema scolastico, (iii) conseguenze della transfobia e strategie di gestione dello spazio scolastico, e (iv) fattori protettivi e visione per il futuro. I risultati evidenziano gli aspetti positivi e quelli negativi delle esperienze delle persone transgender nel sistema educativo e le conseguenze di tali esperienze.

Parole chiave: transgender, bambini, adolescenti, educazione, revisione integrativa della letteratura

UVOD¹

Transspolne osebe sodijo med zgodovinsko marginalizirane družbene skupine, ki jih tudi v trenutni družbeni klimi umeščamo med skupine z ranljivimi življenjskimi konteksti (Carlozzi & Choate, 2019). Še vedno so namreč zaznavni nasprotujoči si trendi, kjer pogosto uspešne pobude za legalizacijo trans pravic (Taylor et al., 2018), spremlja izrazito nasprotovanje tem spremembam (Mezey, 2019). V preteklosti so bili pojavi transspolnosti dolgo obravnavani kot kriminalna in »nenaravna« dejanja (Stryker & Whittle, 2006), kasneje pa patologizirani kot duševne motnje (Langer & Martin, 2004). Šele nedavno je mogoče zaslediti preobrat, v katerem medicina transspolnost vedno manj pogosto obravnava kot duševno motnjo (medicinski model), temveč kot legitimno spolno identiteto (model človekovih pravic). Posebno pomemben mejnik predstavljajo spremembe v Mednarodni klasifikaciji bolezni 11, ki jih je uvedla Svetovna zdravstvena organizacija leta 2019 (Suess Schwend, 2020). V posodobljeni verziji klasifikacije so bile diagnostične kode vezane na transspolnost prestavljene iz poglavja o duševnih in vedenjskih motnjah v poglavje o spolni nekongruentnosti. To je sicer pomemben korak v smeri depatologizacije (Koletnik, 2022; Suess Schwend, 2020), ki pa se v praksi ponekod, vključno s Slovenijo, še ne udejanja (Koletnik, 2022). Sodobne mednarodne raziskave, ki jih je v tujini kar nekaj, kažejo, da se transspolne osebe soočajo s številnimi ovirami, kot so na primer nasilje in diskriminacija (Grant et al., 2011), brezdomstvo (Ritosa et al., 2021) in povišano tveganje za težave z duševnim (Mezzalana et al., 2022) ter telesnim zdravjem (Diamond et al., 2021; Diamond & Alley, 2022). Omenjene_i avtorice_ji možne vzroke vidijo predvsem v družbi, ki je za transspolne osebe pogosto ne-varna, jih ne vključuje, zavrača, disciplinira ali sili k življenju v skladu s pripisanim spolom. V Sloveniji raziskovanje transspolnosti nima dolge tradicije, po naših informacijah in pregledu literature, obstaja le malo raziskav, ki bi se ukvarjale specifično s populacijo transspolnih oseb. To področje je v okviru nebinarnosti raziskovala Perger (2020; 2023a; 2023b). Širše, v okviru transspolnosti pa Koletnik (2019), ki je raziskoval vsakdanje življenje transspolnih oseb. Ugotovitve iz slednje študije kažejo, da se transspolne osebe v različnih kontekstih ne počutijo dovolj varne za razkritje. Med okolščine z visoko stopnjo nerazkritosti denimo sodijo javni prostori in odnosi z učiteljicami. Ob razkritju svoje spolne identitete

nekatero osebo poročajo o negativnih posledicah, kot so npr. izguba prijateljstva in finančne podpore staršev ter zavrnitve s strani staršev. Poleg tega velik delež oseb (41 %) poroča, da je že doživelo nasilje, diskriminacijo oz. neenako obravnavo na podlagi spolne identitete oz. izraza (Koletnik, 2019). V pričujočem besedilu nas zanimajo izkušnje transspolnih oseb, vezane na vzgojno-izobraževalni sistem. Kot kažejo rezultati našega pregleda literature, je bilo področje izobraževanja v navezavi na izkušnje transspolnih oseb v tujini že razmeroma dobro raziskano. V Sloveniji pa so bile vzgojno-izobraževalne izkušnje trans oseb izven študij o vsakdanjem življenju raziskane le v sklopu LGBT+ tematik (Sešek & Margon, 2021; Ferbežar et al., 2021; Ferbežar & Gavriloski, 2023; Ferbežar & Gavriloski Tretjak, 2023a; 2023b). Namen tega prispevka je s pregledom literature predstaviti posebnosti vzgojno-izobraževalnih izkušenj transspolnih učenk_cev in s tem opozoriti na tematike, ki so bile v preteklosti spregledane. V besedilu odgovarjamo na naslednja raziskovalna vprašanja: R1: Kateri so negativni vidiki vzgojno-izobraževalnih izkušenj transspolnih oseb glede na obstoječe raziskave? R2: Kateri so pozitivni vidiki vzgojno-izobraževalnih izkušenj transspolnih oseb glede na obstoječe raziskave? R3: Katere posledice vzgojno-izobraževalnih izkušenj transspolnih oseb beležijo obstoječe raziskave?

V Tabeli 1 predstavljamo razlage osnovnih pojmov, ki predstavljajo sintezo različnih virov (Brill & Pepper, 2022; Carlozzi & Choate, 2019; Grm & Mrakovčić, 2019; Janssen & Leibowitz, 2018; Mallon, 2018; McNabb, 2020; Shelton & Mallon, 2022; Sullivan & Urraro, 2019).

METODA

Opravile_i smo sistematiziran integrativni pregled literature. Metoda integrativnega pregleda literature je bila izbrana, saj vključuje različne vrste literature (teoretični prispevki in gradiva, ki temeljijo na kvalitativni ali kvantitativni metodologiji) in s tem omogoča celostni pregled določene tematike (Torraco, 2016). Sistematizirale_i smo po načelih The PRISMA 2020 statement (Page et al., 2021).

V obdobju od februarja do aprila 2023 so bile pregledane naslednje podatkovne baze: Web of Science, Scopus in COBISS+. Z iskalno strategijo smo po nastavitvi filtrov v skladu z našimi kriteriji za vključitev oz. izključitev identificirale_i 225 kosov literature. Po izločitvi podvojenih rezultatov (69) smo 156 kosov literature pregledale_i s tristo-penjsko presojo (Ferbežar & Štemberger, 2023).

¹ Članek je nastal v okviru programa »Vseživljenjsko učenje za trajnostno družbo prihodnosti« (ARIS P5-0444), ki ga finančno podpira Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

Tabela 1: Razlage osnovnih pojmov.

Izraz	Razlaga
Transspolna (trans) identiteta	Spol, kot ga doživlja oseba sama, ni v skladu s spolom, ki ji je bil pripisan ob rojstvu.
Cisspolna (cis) identiteta	Spol, kot ga doživlja oseba sama, je v skladu s spolom, ki ji je bil pripisan ob rojstvu.
Cisnormativnost	Družbena predpostavka, ki na osnovi predvidevanja, da so vse osebe cisspolne in prepričanja o naravnosti oz. večvrednosti cisspolnih oseb, privilegira cis-osebe.
Trans ženska	Oseba, ki ji je bil ob rojstvu pripisan moški spol, vendar se sama identificira kot ženska.
Trans moški	Oseba, ki ji je bil ob rojstvu pripisan ženski spol, vendar se sama identificira kot moški.
Nebinarna oseba	Oseba, ki svoj spol doživlja izven binarnih pozicij ženska-moški.
Transfobija	Sovražna, nestrpna ali nasilna vedenja oz. stališča do transspolnih oseb.
Spolni izraz	Način vidnega izražanja spola osebe (npr. način hoje, obarvanost nohtov, oblačila itn.).
Spolna disforija	Občutek nelagodja, ki se pri osebi razvije kot posledica neskladja med notranjim doživljanjem spola in zunanjimi pričakovanji okolice glede spola, spolnih vlog, spolnega izraza, vedenja itn.
Tranzicija ali potrditev spola	Proces spreminjanja telesnih, socialnih in pravnih karakteristik v smeri osebi lastnega spola. Tranzicija je lahko medicinska (npr. hormonska terapija, kirurški posegi) ali družbena (lahko npr. menjava osebnih zaimkov in imena, sprememba oblek, dokumentov).


Tabela 2: Iskalne strategije v podatkovnih bazah Scopus, Web of Science in COBISS+.

Web of Science	Scopus	COBISS+
Topic: Education OR school? AND Title: transgender or non-binary or genderfluid or "trans child*" or "trans youth*" or "gender minority" or "gender diverse" or "gender queer" or "trans girl?" or "trans women" or "trans boy?" or "trans men"	Article title: Education OR school? AND Article title: transgender or non-binary or genderfluid or "trans child*" or "trans youth*" or "gender minority" or "gender diverse" or "gender queer" or "trans girl?" or "trans women" or "trans boy?" or "trans men"	Ključne besede: izobraževanje, edukacija, šola, vzgojno-izobraževalni sistem Ključne besede: transspolnost, nebinarnost, "trans otroci", "trans mladi", "spolne manjšine", "trans* dekleta", "trans* punce", "trans* fantje", "trans* dečki", "trans* moški", "trans ženske"

Literatura je bila vključena v pregled, če je ustrezala naslednjim kriterijem: 1) Udeleženke_ci raziskave so transspolne osebe ali osebe, ki z njimi živijo oz. delajo (starši, šolske_i psihologinje_i, učitelji_ce, ipd.). 2) Obravnavana tematika se navezuje neposredno na izkušnje transspolnih oseb v vzgojno-izobraževalnem prostoru, in sicer v institucijah, ki so primerljive s slovensko osnovnošolsko ali srednje-šolsko stopnjo (npr. middle school, secondary school, K12). 3) Jezik literature je angleščina ali slovenščina. Literatura je bila izključena iz izbora za pregled, ko: 1) je šlo za višje in visoko izobraževanje (npr. undergraduate education, higher education, college),

2) je šlo za preglede literature, uvodnike, poglavja v knjigah, povzetke strokovnih_znanstvenih srečanj, pisma, recenzije knjig, prispevke v monografijah ali zaključna dela in 3) je bil glaven tematski poudarek vsebinsko vezan na drugo področje (npr. zdravstvo, management) ali manj bistven za naš prostor (npr. razisem, nošenje orožja, vezanost na specifično tujo zakonodajo).

Najprej je ena raziskovalka opravila primarni pregled, v okviru katerega smo preletele_i naslove gradiv in odstranile_i očitno ne ustrezno literaturo (izločenih 42 kosov). Nato sta obe avtorici neodvisno naredile_i sekundarni pregled in končni



Slika 1: Proces identifikacije literature prek podatkovnih baz Web of Science, Scopus in COBISS+.

pregled. V okviru drugega pregleda je bila izločena neustrezna literatura glede na branje naslovov in povzetkov. Nesoglasja so bila razrešena z razpravo (izločenih 60 kosov). Na zadnje smo opravile_i še končni pregled 54 kosov literature in besedila prebrale_i v celoti (izločenih 25). Literaturu smo izključile_i zaradi tematske neustreznosti (npr. zdravstvena obravnava transspolnih oseb), neustrezne starostne strukture (npr. odrasle transspolne osebe), kulturne oddaljenosti (npr. analiza dokumentov vezana na ZDA) in neustrezne vrste gradiva (npr. uvodnik). V končno analizo je bilo vključenih

29 izvirnih znanstvenih besedil, ki so prikazana v preglednici 3. Sam proces identifikacije literature prek podatkovnih baz Web of Science, Scopus in COBISS+ pa je prikazan v Sliki 1.

Vseh 29 kosov literature, ki je prestalo izbor, je bilo analiziranih s kvalitativno tematsko analizo (Braun & Clarke, 2006; 2012; 2013). Pri tem smo oblikovale_i štiri glavne kategorije: nepravilnosti in sovražnosti, cisnormativnost šolskega sistema, posledice transfobije in strategije za navigiranje skozi cisnormativen šolski prostor, varovalni dejavniki in vizija za prihodnost.

Table 3: Pregled vključenih raziskav.

Avtorica	Naslov	Letnica	Država/mesto	Vključeni	Paradigma
Bower-Brown et al.	Binary-trans, non-binary and gender-questioning adolescents' experiences in UK schools	2023	Velika Britanija	N = 74 trans mladostnic_kov (13–17 let)	Komb. ²
Bradford et al.	Sex education and transgender youth: 'Trust Means Material By and For Queer and Trans People'	2019	ZDA	N = 12 trans mladostnic_kov (14–18 let)	Kval.
Cederved et al.	A Clash of Sexual Gender Norms and Understandings: A Qualitative Study of Homosexual, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Adolescents' Experiences in Junior High Schools	2021	Švedska	N = 10 LGBTQ mladostnic_kov (16–19 let)	Kval.
Clonan-Roy et al.	Sexual and gender diverse youth's marginalization in school based sex education and development of adaptive competencies	2023	Ohio	N = 17 LGBT+ mladih (14–18 let)	Kval.
Craig et al.	Empowering lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth: Lessons learned from a safe schools summit	2008	ZDA	N= udeležence_ci dogodka "The safe school summit" (15-18 let)	Komb.
Day et al.	Safe Schools? Transgender Youth's School Experiences and Perceptions of School Climate	2018	Kalifornija	N = 838,814 mladih oseb, od tega N = 9,281 transspolnih mladih oseb	Kvant.
De Pedro et al.	Substance Use Among Transgender Students in California Public Middle and High Schools	2017	Kalifornija	N = 4778 trans otrok in mladostnic_kov, N = 630,200 cispolnih otrok in mladostnic_kov (od 5. do 11. razreda; stari približno od 10 do 17 let)	Kvant.
De Pedro et al.	Exploring Physical, Nonphysical, and Discrimination-Based Victimization among Transgender Youth in California Public Schools	2019	Kalifornija	N = 423,168 učenk_cev (stari približno 12–17 let) od tega N = 3810 trans učenk_cev	Kvant.
Ferfolja et al.	Inclusive pedagogies for transgender and gender diverse children: parents' perspectives on the limits of discourses of bullying and risk in schools	2021	Avstralija	N = 10 staršev trans otrok in mladostnic_kov	Kval.
Gowen et al.	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Questioning Youths' Perspectives of Inclusive School-Based Sexuality Education	2014	Oregon	N = 30 LGBTQ mladostnic_kov (16–20 let)	Kval.
Green et al.	Factors Impacting Implementation of Evidence-Based Strategies to Create Safe and Supportive Schools for Sexual and Gender Minority Students	2018	New Mexico	N = 41 (podravnateljic_ce), N = 55 (šolsko medicinsko osebje, socialne_i delavke_ci, šolske_i svetovalne_i delavke_ci)	Kval.
Hobaica et al.	Here's Your Anatomy ... Good Luck: Transgender Individuals in Cisnormative Sex Education	2019	ZDA	N = 11 trans oseb (19–31 let)	Kval.
Horton	Gender minority stress in education: Protecting trans children's mental health in UK schools	2022	Anglija, Škotska, Wales	N = 30, starši otrok, ki so vstopili v socialno tranzicijo trans otrok, OŠ, SŠ N = 10, trans otroci v socialni tranziciji (9–16 let)	Kval.
Horton	Institutional cisnormativity and educational injustice: Trans children's experiences in primary and early secondary education in the UK	2023	Anglija, Škotska, Wales	N = 30, starši otrok, ki so vstopili v socialno tranzicijo trans otrok, OŠ, SŠ N = 10, trans otroci v socialni tranziciji (9–16 let)	Kval.
Horton et al.	We Just Think of Her as One of the Girls: Applying a Trans Inclusion Staged Model to the Experiences of Trans Children and Youth in UK Primary and Secondary Schools	2022	Velika Britanija, Avstralija, Švica, Kanada, ZDA	N1 = 12 staršev trans otrok, N1 = 13 (5–20 let), N2 = 30 (staršev trans otrok), N2 = 10 (6–16 let)	Kval.
Johns et al.	Minority Stress, Coping, and Transgender Youth in Schools-Results from the Resilience and Transgender Youth Study	2021	ZDA	N = 41 trans mladih (16–25 let)	Kval.
Kuhlemeier et al.	Production and Maintenance of the Institutional In/Visibility of Sexual and Gender Minority Students in Schools	2021	New Mexico	N = 96 šolskih strokovnih delavk_cev	Kval.
Kwok & Kwok	Navigating transprejudice: Chinese transgender students' experiences of sexuality education in Hong Kong	2021	Hong Kong	N = 8 trans mladostnic_kov (16–20 let)	Kval.
Mangin	Transgender Students in Elementary Schools: How Supportive Principals Lead	2020	ZDA	N = 20 ravnateljic_ev, ki so jih za intervju priporočili starši trans otrok	Kval.
Martino et al.	We Have No 'Visibly' Trans Students in Our School: Educators' Perspectives on Transgender-Affirmative Policies in Schools	2022	Ontario	N = 463 šolskih strokovnih delavk_cev	Kval.
Meyer et al.	Transgender and Gender-Creative Students in PK-12 Schools: What We Can Learn From Their Teachers	2016	Kanada	N = 26 šolskih delavk_cev z izkušnjami z delom s trans učenkami_ci	Kval.
Neary	Trans children and the necessity to complicate gender in primary schools	2021	Irska	N = 18, starši trans otrok, osnovnošolski pedagoški delavci	Kval.
Paechter et al.	Non-binary young people and schools: pedagogical insights from a small-scale interview study	2021	Velika Britanija	N = 8 nebinarnih mladih (13-18 let)	Kval.
Proulx et al.	Associations of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Questioning-Inclusive Sex Education With Mental Health Outcomes and School-Based Victimization in US High School Students	2019	ZDA	N = 47,730 mladih oseb (od 9. do 12. razreda; stari približno od 12 do 18 let)	Kvant.
Riggs & Bartholomaeus	Transgender young people's narratives of intimacy and sexual health: implications for sexuality education	2018	Velika Britanija, ZDA, Kanada, Nova Zelandija	N = 7 YouTube posnetkov trans vplivnic_ežev (18–25 let)	Kval.
Skelton	Schools Often Fail to Expect Trans and Nonbinary Elementary Children: What Gender Independent, Nonbinary, and Trans Children Desire	2022	Kanada	N = 17 2SLGBT otrok (4–12 let), N = 12 2SLBTQ staršev/skrbnikov	Kval.
Sørli	Transgender Children's Right to Non-discrimination in Schools: The Case of Changing-room Facilities	2020	Norveška	starši transspolnih otrok, N = 4 šolske_i strokovne_i delavke_ci	Kval.
Tordoff et al.	"Talk about Bodies": Recommendations for Using Transgender-Inclusive Language in Sex Education Curricula	2021	ZDA	N = 5 zaposlenih na "Children's Gender Clinic", N=5 staršev trans mladih, N = 11 mladih trans oseb (18–26 let)	Kval.
Warwick et al.	Transgender Youths' Sexual Health and Education: A Qualitative Analysis	2022	ZDA	N = 30 trans mladostnic_kov (15–20 let)	Kval.

2 Komb. (kombinirana), kval. (kvalitativna), kvant. (kvantitativna).

IZSLEDKI

Nepravičnosti in sovražnosti

Pomanjkanje varnosti v vzgojno-izobraževalnih ustanovah je v pregledanih raziskavah zelo pogosto izpostavljen problem. Marsikatera trans učenka³ se v šoli nikoli ne počuti varno (Horton, 2022; 2023), tam namreč (kontinuirano) doživljajo različne oblike medvrstniškega nasilja, nadlegovanje, verbalne in telesne zlorabe, grožnje in mikroagresije (Bower-Brown et al., 2023; Craig et al., 2008; Day et al., 2018; De Pedro et al., 2019; Ferfolja & Ullman, 2021; Horton, 2022; 2023; Meyer et al., 2016; Paechter et al., 2021). Raziskava De Pedro et al. (2019) je na primer pokazala, da trans učenke⁴ dvakrat pogostejše, kot njihovi cis vrstnice⁵, poročajo doživljanje telesnih in netelesnih viktimizacij. Šolsko osebje se na transfobne dogodke pogosto ne odziva, se jim v nekaterih primerih celo smeji ali v njih aktivno sodeluje (Bower-Brown et al., 2023). Trans osebe poročajo o izkušnjah, ko so nasilje na šoli prijavile, vendar se osebje ni odzvalo. Neodzivnost so razumele kot jasen znak, da jih šola tudi v prihodnjih primerih nasilja ne bo zaščitila. Poleg tega je opisano pomanjkanje intervencij še dodatno prispevalo k občutkom ogroženosti tudi za trans osebe, ki so nasilje zgolj opazovale. Če tudi nasilja same (še) niso doživele⁶, so namreč živele⁷ v neprestanem strahu pred tovrstnimi izkušnjami (Paechter et al., 2021). O neuspehu šol, da bi zavarovale trans otroke, poročajo tudi starši. Ti opisujejo kontinuirano dopuščanje zlorab in pogosto nekompetentnost osebja za naslavljanje nasilja. Želele⁸ bi si, da bi bili njihovi otroci zaščiteni od prvega trenutka dalje. Čakanje na to, da se učiteljice⁹ izobražujejo, medtem ko njihovi otroci odraščajo v nespodbudnih in nevarnih okoljih, se jim zdi neustrezno. Zaradi neodzivnosti šol so se bili nekateri primorani obrniti tudi na policijo. Starši so problematizirali še ozko razumevanje medvrstniškega nasilja in izpostavili izrazito nekompetentnost osebja za naslavljanje transfobije na splošno, še posebej pa za bolj prikrite oblike. Primernejše intervencije opisujejo zgolj v situacijah povsem odkritega transfobnega nasilja, ki ga je izvajala le ena oseba (Horton, 2023).

Posebna oblika nasilja, ki so ga izpostavljale trans osebe, je tudi neustrezna jezikovna raba spola (angl. *misgendering*), kot je npr. uporabljanje napačnih zamkov in mrtvega imena¹⁰ (Bower-Brown et al., 2023;

Horton, 2022; 2023; Paechter et al., 2021). Napačno jezikovno rabo spola trans osebe kot nasilno doživljajo predvsem v primerih, ko jih ljudje na tak način naslavlja namerno. V primerih, ko prihaja do napak po nesreči, izkazujejo razumevanje. Zavedajo se, da ljudje potrebujejo nekaj časa za prilagoditev spremembi. V takih situacijah so osebo največkrat le popravile¹¹. Ko so presodile¹², da se napačna raba spola dogaja iz škodoželjnih razlogov, se nekatere osebe raje niso odzvale in so upale, da bodo to storile¹³ zaposlene¹⁴ (Paechter et al., 2021). Napačna jezikovna raba spola in naslavljanje z mrtvim imenom prihajata tako s strani vrstnic¹⁵ kot tudi zaposlenih. Trans oseba iz raziskave Bower-Brown et al. (2023) recimo poroča, da se je zaradi nespoštljivega naslavljanja ene¹⁶ ga izmed učiteljic¹⁷ ev obrnila na drugo¹⁸ ga zaposleno¹⁹ ga, a se je ta odzvala v slogu, da ima vsaka oseba pravico do lastnega mnenja. Za mlade je v situacijah, ko so odrasli na šoli tisti, ki ne spoštujejo njihovega spola, na to še težje opozoriti, saj je v nekaterih primernih od teh oseb odvisen njihov šolski uspeh (Horton, 2022). V jezikovnem kontekstu izpostavljajo tudi verbalno nasilje/mikroagresije v obliki žaljivk, kot so npr. tranny, faggot, dyke²⁰, naslavljanje kot »it«²¹ in sodbe o tem, da niso »prave²²«²³ predstavnice²⁴ ki svojega spola (Horton, 2022; Johns et al., 2021; Paechter et al., 2021). Nespoštljiva raba jezika je pri trans mladih sprožila občutke sramu, izločenosti, anksioznosti, spolne disforije, stresa, jeze in občutkov, kot da je nekaj narobe s tem, da so trans (Tordoff et al., 2021).

Pogost pojav je tudi socialna izključenost, ki se kaže kot izključenost iz igre, socialnih skupin, pomanjkanje prijateljstev in občasno tudi s strani učiteljic²⁵, pri katerih trans mladi zaznavajo odpor (Horton, 2022; 2023). Ob tem čutijo osamljenost in izoliranost (Bower-Brown et al., 2023). Starši opisujejo bolečino ob zavrnitvah njihovih otrok s strani vrstnic²⁶ v kontekstih, kot so npr. rojstnodnevne zabave, kjer se skupine otrok običajno razdelijo v družbo deklic in družbo dečkov. Trans in nebinarni otroci so pogosto izključeni iz obeh (Neary, 2021). V okviru šolskega sistema imajo nekateri starši občutek, da šole ne posvečajo dovolj pozornosti transfobiji kot vzroku za socialno izolacijo njihovih otrok in prevelik del krivde prelagajo na trans učenke²⁷ ce same (Horton, 2022).

Zadnja oblika zaznih nepravičnosti je prisilno prevzemanje odgovornosti za lastno viktimizacijo, ki jo raziskave opisujejo predvsem v povezavi z

3 V besedilu kot sopomenke za poimenovanje trans učenk²⁸ cev v vzgojno-izobraževalnem sistemu, uporabljamo tudi nekatere druge izraze. »Trans mladi«²⁹ in »trans osebe«³⁰ uporabljamo z namenom se izogniti prevelikemu številu podčrtajev. Izraz »(trans) otroci«³¹ pa uporabljamo kadar gre za stališča staršev transspolnih otrok. Ker so vse raziskave vezane na vzgojno-izobraževalni prostor, gre v vseh primerih pravzaprav za trans učenke³² ce.

4 Izraz »mrtvo ime«³³ uporabljamo za opisovanje imena, ki so ga trans osebi dali starši, vendar ga oseba zaradi napačno pripisanega spola ob rojstvu ne uporablja več. Trans osebe si namreč pogosto izberejo imena, ki bolj ustrezajo njihovi spolni identiteti.

5 Gre za žaljivo naslavljanje transspolnih oseb, gejev in lezbijk.

nekompetentnostjo šolskega osebja za naslavljanje transfobije in tematik transspolnosti na splošno (Horton, 2023; Meyer et al., 2016). Pogosto je na šoli razkrita samo ena trans oseba, ki jo osebje na neki način prisili oz. spodbudi k temu, da ozavešča šolsko okolje o trans tematikah in poskuša zmanjševati pojave transfobnega zatiranja (Meyer et al., 2016). Nekatere trans osebe so vsaj v začetni fazi to možnost sprejele z navdušenjem, vendar starši opozarjajo, da je sam proces za nekatere kmalu postal zelo naporen. Za druge je bila naloga ozaveščanja stresna že od samega začetka, še posebej, ko je šlo za izobraževanje starejših učenk_cev (Horton, 2023). Možnost (samo)zagovornosti sicer lahko deluje varovalno, vendar oseba ob enem izgubi pravico do zasebnosti in na neki način prevzema odgovornost za transfobijo okolice, katere tarča je sama. Osebo se na tak način postavi v vlogo izobraževalke_ca in strokovnjakinje_a, ki pravzaprav brezplačno opravlja delo nepripravljenega šolskega osebja, kar Meyer et al. (2016) označujejo kot problematično.

Cisnormativnost šolskega sistema

Horton (2022; 2023) ugotavlja, da so v Veliki Britaniji kurikulumi cisnormativni, kar se kaže predvsem v splošnem pomanjkanju tem o transspolnosti in pri temah, kot so izobraževanje o telesih, adolescenci in v okviru športov, ki se binarno delijo na spol (Horton, 2022; 2023). Nekatere trans osebe iz raziskave, ki je bila prav tako izvedena v Veliki Britaniji, moti, da se teme sicer omenjajo, ampak predvsem v povezavi s spolnostjo, čeprav ti dve področji nista dovolj povezani, da bi bilo po njihovem mnenju to smotno. Marsikatera oseba poroča o dodatni nevidnosti nebinnarnih transspolnih identitet, ki praktično nikoli niso naslovljene. Če že, se v tem kontekstu omenja binarna transspolnost. Neizobraženost/tišina učiteljic_ev o transspolnih temah je zanje znak, da razkritje najverjetneje ni varno. Dodatno na podlagi tega ne pričakujejo razumevanja zaposlenih, prepoznavanja transfobije ali ustreznih intervencij v primeru pojavov nasilja (Paechter et al., 2021). Starši opozarjajo, da je transfoben ali cisnormativen način naslavljanja tematik spodbujal, legitimiral oz. ojačeval dvome o spolnih identitetah trans mladih. Nekatere šole so ob zavedanju, da je njihov kurikulum za trans osebe škodljiv, omogočale, da so trans učence_ci pri teh urah manjkale, hkrati pa so učitelji_ce ob njihovi odstotnosti stigmatizirajoče vsebine nemoteno poučevale_i druge učence_ce (Horton, 2023). Pri potencialnem spreminjanju kurikuluma v trans varnega bi nekatere mlade osebe želele biti vključene (Paechter et al., 2021).

Šolska politika, ki jo razumemo kot skupek sistemskih ukrepov, strategij, dokumentov in odločitev, pomembno vpliva na potek izobraževanja trans

učenk_cev. V raziskavi Horton (2022; 2023) recimo opozarjajo, da so politike pogosto cisnormativne in ne upoštevajo obstoja trans učenk_cev. Odsotnost trans varovalnih šolskih politik negativno vpliva na procese razkrivanje in tranzicijo. Osebe se namreč ne počutijo dovolj varno za razkritje, poleg tega pa na ravni ustanove ne obstaja ustaljen sistem za primere, ko se trans osebe odločijo za tranzicijo (npr. stališča šol, v katerih primerih oseba lahko zamenja spolne identifikatorje na šolski dokumentaciji in na katere načine). Okoli tega trans osebe poročajo o velikih zmedah in pogostih nejasnostih, kar podaljšuje in otežuje proces tranzicije (Paechter et al., 2021). Podobno sistemsko cisnormativnost, ki se kaže kot neusklajenost administrativnih zadev (npr. v različnih dokumentih, različna imena trans učenk_cev), problematizira tudi Horton (2023), saj te neusklajenosti omogočajo neželena razkritja učenk_cev. Po mnenju staršev šole tovrstne napake neustrezno rešujejo in se ne zavedajo resnih posledic za otrokovo zdravje in varnost. V raziskavi Paechter s sodelavkami_ci (2021) udeleženi opozarjajo, da so šolske politike, ki bi specifično naslavliale nebinnarne transspolnosti, še redkejšje kot take, ki vključujejo binarne transspolnosti. Nekatere_i izobraževalke_ci iz kanadske raziskave izhajajo iz perspektive, da so trans varovalne šolske politike, ki ščitijo trans učence_ce in zagotavljajo spoštljivo vzgojno-izobraževalno izkušnjo potrebne le, ko so na šoli razkrite trans osebe, za katere vedo. Pri tem ne razmišljajo o možnosti, da se ravno zaradi pomanjkanja trans varovalnih politik učence_ci ne počutijo dovolj varne_i za razkritje (Martino et al., 2022).

Posebna problematika, ki je vezana na izobraževanje transspolnih učenk_cev, je tudi diskriminativnost šolskih prostorov (Bower-Brown et al., 2023; Ferfolja & Ullman, 2021; Horton, 2022; 2023; Johns et al., 2021; Paechter et al., 2021; Skelton, 2022; Sørli, 2020). Trans učence_ci poročajo o doživljanju neprijetnosti v straniščih in slačilnicah, saj ne morejo uporabljati prostorov, ki bi bili v skladu z njihovo spolno identiteto, oz. prostorov, ki bi jim bi jih bilo udobno uporabljati. Marsikatera oseba se zato straniščem izogiba, zadržuje urin in tvega negativne vplive na telesno zdravje (Horton, 2023). Kot rešitev so nekatere šole uvedle možnost, da trans učence_ci uporabljajo spolno nevtralna stranišča zaposlenih, kar problematizirajo nekatere trans osebe (Bower-Brown et al., 2023), nelagodje pa izražajo tudi zaposlene_i (Kuhlemeier et al., 2021). Druge šole so kot rešitev uvedle uporabo stranišča za osebe s telesnimi oviranostmi. Vrtnice_ki so namreč v enem izmed primerov plezale_i čez vrata stranišča, saj trans punca ni želela urinirati v pisoarju. Posledice teh posegov v zasebnosti so bile čakanje, da pride do doma, izostajanje od pouka zaradi nezmožnosti zadrževanja urina do konca pouka in zdravstvene

težave zaradi predolgega zadrževanja urina. Šele po interveniranju matere je šola ponudila možnost uporabe stranišča za osebe s telesnimi oviranostmi, kar pa je dodatno pripomoglo k stigmatiziranosti in čustveni viktimizaciji (Ferfolja & Ullman, 2021). Problemi nastajajo tudi pri drugih prostorih, ločenih na ženski in moški spol. Starši poročajo, da se njihovi otroci izogibajo slačilnicam npr. s tem, da pridejo v šolo v športnih oblekah, se po telovadbi ne oprhajo v šoli ali sploh ne gredo na telovadbo. Trans mladi in njihovi starši komentirajo tudi različne rešitve za vključujoče prostore. Nekaterim staršem se ne zdi prav, da šole otroka pošljejo preoblačiti se v ločen prostor, saj so tako izolirani od vrstnic_kov in vseh socialnih interakcij, ki tam potekajo. Ločeni prostori za nekatere trans mlade predstavljajo vir stigme in konstanten opomnik, da so drugačne_i. Na drugi strani nekateri trans mladi niso naklonjeni uporabi skupnih prostorov, saj se zavedajo, da njihovo telo izgleda drugače kot telesa njihovih vrstnic_kov. Starše pri tem skrbi, da bi se že tako pogoste transfobne opazke še okrepile (Sørlie, 2020).

Trans osebe poročajo tudi o cis-heteronormativni, površni in seksistični spolni vzgoji, ki je po njihovem mnenju nekoristna in krepi občutke sramu in tabuje, vezane na spolnost (Bradford et al., 2019; Clonan-Roy et al., 2023; Gowen & Wings-Yanez, 2014; Hobaica et al., 2019; Kwok & Kwok, 2021; Proulx et al., 2019; Riggs & Bartholomaeus, 2018; Warwick et al., 2022). Transspolna ženska je poročala o tem, da je dobila samo informacije, vezane na telesne značilnosti, ki jih v cisnormativni družbi označujemo kot moške. Kasneje bi po operacijah za potrditev spola potrebovala informacije, ki so jih v času njenega izobraževanja dobile samo vrstnice s pripisanim ženskim spolom, kar je označila za problematično (Hobaica et al., 2019). Osebe so izrazile potrebo po tem, da je zdravstveno osebje, ki izvaja spolno vzgojo, poučeno o tematikah, vezanih na zdravje transspolnih oseb. Dodatno bi si želele spolno vzgojo, ki bi zajela vse spolne usmerjenosti in spole, informacije o možnostih tranzicije, nebinaren pogled na spol, vključevanje interspolnih tematik, o možnostih raznovrstne zaščite itn. Večina je informacije, ki jih pomanjkljiva spolna vzgoja ni predstavila, iskala prek interneta, medijev LGBT+ nevladnih organizacij, redkeje pri starših ali vrstnicah_kih (Bradford et al., 2019; Hobaica et al., 2019). Nekateri mladi so opisovali negativne izkušnje, ko so imeli občutek, da je njihova edina možnost učenje o spolnosti preko pornografije, saj so te vsebine bistveno bolj dostopne kot uporabni medicinski viri. Na tak način pridobljene informacije so bile po njihovem mnenju pogosto transfobne in so podajale škodljive predstave o tem, kako naj bi bila spolnost videti (Bradford et al., 2019). Tudi informacije, ki so jih pridobile_i na druge načine,

so bile občasno napačne, pomanjkljive in vezane na stereotipe (Hobaica et al., 2019). Različne raziskave poleg splošnega primanjkljaja informacij navajajo še druge posledice ne vključujoče spolne vzgoje, kot so občutki izločenosti, patologizacije, utišanosti, zavrnitve, nespoštovanja (Kwok & Kwok, 2021) in nepripravljenost na transfobijo v okviru zmenkarij in spolnih odnosov (Riggs & Bartholomaeus, 2018).

Posledice transfobije in strategije za navigiranje cisnormativnega šolskega prostora

Kot posledice transfobije smo v pregledanih gradivih zasledile_i izobraževalne neenakosti, ki se kažejo kot izostajanje od pouka, menjavanje šol, nižje ocene in predčasna zapustitev vzgojno-izobraževalnega sistema zaradi telesne in duševne ogroženosti (Day et al., 2018; Horton, 2022; 2023). Ugotovitve Day et al. (2018) kažejo, da obstaja večja verjetnost, da bodo trans mladi v primerjavi z njihovimi cisspolnimi vrstnicami_ki izostajali od pouka (npr. zaradi pomanjkanja občutka varnosti), izkusili splošno in LGBT+ specifično nasilje, imeli nižje ocene in dojemali šolsko klimo kot manj pozitivno.

Poleg izpostavljenih izobraževalnih neenakosti, trans mladi zaradi številnih negativnih izkušenj, ki so jih doživeli, pogosto pričakujejo nasilje in živijo v konstantnem strahu pred transfobijo. Zaznamuje jih zavedanje o tem, koliko nasilja so deležne trans osebe v družbi, pa tudi osebne zgodbe o prijateljih_cah in znankah_cih, ki imajo izkušnje s transfobijo. Za marsikatero osebo to pomeni, da so v socialnih interakcijah izredno previdne in se zaradi samozaščite pogosto raje socialno izolirajo. Nekateri osebe so se denimo zaradi strahu pred medvrstniškim nasiljem med kosilom raje družile z učiteljci_cami (Johns et al., 2021). Pogosto torej izkazujejo nezaupanje do odraslih in vrstnic_kov, z izjemo situacij, ko osebe zelo eksplicitno in jasno izražajo podporo trans skupnosti (Horton, 2022).

Zaradi strahu pred negativnimi dogodki nekatere trans učenke_ci opisujejo proces stalnega upravljanja z vidnostjo transspolne identitete, ki je pogosto izrazito utrujajoč (Bower-Brown et al., 2023; Horton, 2022; Johns et al., 2021; Paechter et al., 2021). Razkrivanje oz. nerazkrivanje je kontinuiran proces in predstavlja eno izmed ključnih strategij navigiranja cisnormativnega šolskega okolja. Veliko časa in energije namenijo odločanju, kako se razkriti, komu in kdaj. V določenih situacijah želijo ostati skrite_i, saj presodijo, da bi bilo sicer lahko ogroženo njihovo zdravje (Bower-Brown et al., 2023). Upravljanja z vidnostjo transspolne identitete se poslužujejo tudi zato, ker želijo pridobiti več

nadzora nad tem, kako se okolje vede do njih (Johns et al., 2021). Marsikatera oseba je ob pričakovanju nasilja posebej izpostavila strah pred potencialnim neželenim razkritjem. Nekatere osebe so druge_i proti njihovi volji dejansko razkrile_i, kar opisujejo kot negativno izkušnjo, ki ji je zares sledilo nasilje vrstnic_kov. Morebitne pozitivne plati razkritja pogosto zasenčijo varnostna tveganja, splošno pomanjkanje podpore, nizka informiranost o trans temah na šoli in pomanjkanje podpore v duševnem zdravju (Bower-Brown et al., 2023). Nezmožnost razkritja označujejo kot izrazito stresno in kot oviro za avtentično življenje (Bower-Brown et al., 2023; Johns et al., 2021). Lažje se razkrivajo prijatelji_cam_em kot družini ali širši šolski skupnosti. Nekatere šole so bile pri razkritju kljub temu v pomoč, saj so mladim pomagale pri razkritju pred starši in s soglasjem⁶ osebo razkrile drugim učiteljicam_em in učenkam_cem ter s tem delno razbremenile trans učenko_ca (Paechter et al., 2021).

Številne raziskave kažejo, da se trans osebe soočajo s številnimi težavami v duševnem zdravju (Hobaica et al., 2019; Horton, 2022; 2023; Riggs & Bartholomaeus, 2018; Paechter et al., 2021; Tordoff et al., 2021). Izpostavljena je bila denimo spolna disforija, ki jo krepijo pritiski k prilagajanju spolnim normam (trans ženske morajo biti videti feminilno, trans moški maskulino, nebinarne osebe androgino). Če ne izgledajo tako, kot od njih pričakuje cisnormativna družba, nekatere osebe poročajo o močnih družbenih pritiskih, ki povzročajo stres in ojačujejo spolno disforijo (Paechter et al., 2021). Spolno disforija omenjajo tudi nekatere druge raziskave (Hobaica et al., 2019; Riggs & Bartholomaeus, 2018). Hobaica et al. (2019) poročajo o različnih težavah z duševnim zdravjem, ki so po njihovem mnenju še posebej vezane na spolno disforijo, to so depresija, anksioznost in motnje prehranjevanja. Osebe se npr. stradajo, da bi se počutile manj feminilno (manjše prsi in prekinitev menstruacije). Konstantni občutek stresa in nevarnosti dodatno vplivata na raznolike težave v duševnem zdravju, kot so: anksioznost, travmatiziranost in samomorilnost (Horton, 2023). Hobaica et al. (2019) omenjajo še nekatere druge težave, kot so depresija, generalizirana in splošna anksioznost, samomorilno vedenje, samopoškodovalno vedenje in motnje (pre)hranjevanja (prenajedanje/stradanje). Depresijo v tem kontekstu povezujejo predvsem z začetkom pubertete, nemožnostjo razkritja in negativnimi občutki o lastni identiteti (vezani na transspolnost oz. istospolno usmerjenost). Anksioznost pa omenjajo predvsem v kontekstu

procesov razkrivanja. Poleg tega je raziskava De Pedro et al. (2017) je pokazala povišano tveganje za uporabo psihoaktivnih substanc med transspolnimi mladimi. Avorji_ce kot možnost za povečano tveganje navajajo doživljanje različnih distalnih (npr. medvrstniško nasilje) in proksimalnih stresorjev (npr. ponotranjena transfobija).

Varovalni dejavniki in vizija za prihodnost

Kot pomembne varovalne dejavnike raziskave omenjajo prijateljstva, aktivizem, opolnomočene starše in LGBT+ nevladne organizacije. Iskanje drugih LGBT+ oseb ali LGBT+ zaveznic_kov, ustvarjanje skupnosti, aktivizem (za zaščito sebe in drugih oseb) so v raziskavi Bower-Brown et al. (2023) izpostavljeni kot pozitivni dejavniki. Posebej poudarjajo pomen prijateljstev, ki imajo ključno varovalno funkcijo, opisujejo jih kot drugo družino, ki pomaga pri soočanju z negativnimi izkušnjami. Tudi aktivizem izpostavljajo kot pozitiven, vendar opozarjajo, da je za marsikoga zelo obremenjujoč. Trans osebe v raziskavi Johns et al. (2021) ravno tako pozitivno opisujejo možnosti ozaveščanja okolice in spreminjanja škodljivih šolskih praks. Pri soočanju z negativnimi dogodki v okviru šole jim pomaga humor, pozitiven pogled v prihodnost in optimizem glede zmožnosti ljudi, da se naučijo trans spoštljivih praks. Horton (2022) izpostavlja ključno vlogo zagovorniških staršev, ki pomagajo premeščati diskriminatorne šolske prakse. Pri tem je pomemben socialni status staršev. Boljše pozicionirani starši poročajo, da uspešneje premeščajo diskriminacijo. Poleg staršev so za preseganje diskriminatornih šolskih politik pomembne tudi zunanje LGBT+ organizacije (Horton, 2022; Meyer et al., 2016).

Na izkušnje trans učenk_cev v vzgoji in izobraževanju vplivajo tudi različne perspektive vzgojno-izobraževalnih institucij in kompetence zaposlenih. Eden izmed strokovnih delavk_cev v raziskavi Kuhlemeier et al. (2021) pripoveduje o izkušnji, ko se je šola prvič srečala s transspolno_im učenko_cem. Navaja občutke strahu med zaposlenimi, ki niso vedele_i, kako delati z osebo. Težave z neustrezno usposobljenim osebjem za delo s transspolnimi mladimi omenja več raziskav (Bower-Brown et al., 2023; Cederved et al., 2021; Ferfolja & Ullman, 2021; Green et al., 2018; Horton, 2022; 2023; Kuhlemeier et al., 2021; Meyer et al., 2016; Paechter et al., 2021). Tudi ravnatelj_i_ce v raziskavi Mangin (2020) izpostavljajo pomen trans relevantnega znanja med zaposlenimi. Nekateri

6 Obstaja namreč nenapisano pravilo, da transspolne osebe (in druge osebe, ki jih zajema termin LGBT+) nikoli ne razkrijemo brez njihovega eksplicitnega dovoljenja. Poleg spoštovanja pravice do zasebnosti, biti LGBT+ še vedno prinaša različna tveganja, zato je pomembno, da je oseba na razkritje psihično pripravljena.

izmed intervjuvanih ravnateljic_ev se trudijo trans učenkam_cem čim bolj olajšati izobraževalni proces, saj izhajajo iz razumevanja, da imajo in bodo imele_i trans osebe v življenju že tako bistveno več ovir, in želijo, da šola ni ena izmed njih. Kot oviro za vzpostavljanje varnega izobraževanja med drugim navajajo transfobne in homofobne starše. V raziskavi Green et al. (2018), izvedeni v Novi Mehiki, vodstvo šol dodatno izraža skrb zaradi zaostrene nacionalne politične klime glede pravic LGBT+ oseb in izpostavlja potrebo po sistemsko urejenem varovanju pravic LGBT+ oseb. Polega tega omenjajo strah pred konservativnim lokalnim okoljem in starši oz. skrbnicami_ki, ki ne sprejemajo dobro LGBT+ varovalnih mehanizmov. Horton in Carlile (2022) predstavita Trans inkluzivni model: od trans zatiranja do trans emancipacije, ki navaja stopnje inkluzije transspolnih mladih na vzgojno-izobraževalni instituciji. Na tem mestu ga zaradi prostorske omejitve ne opisujemo.

Na zadnje povzemamo še želje transspolnih učenk_cev o spremembah znotraj vzgojno-izobraževalnega sistema. Želijo si varna stranišča, možnosti za raziskovanje svoje spolne identitete, konec pritiskov v smeri stereotipnih, binarnih spolnih vzorcev, zaposlene, ki poznajo osnove spola in omogočajo varno okolje za samoidentificiranje (Skelton, 2022), vključujočo spolno vzgojo (Warwick et al., 2022) in LGBT+ vzornike_ce (Hobaica et al., 2019).

RAZPRAVA

Vzgojno-izobraževalni sistem predstavlja pomembno okolje, ki po eni strani predstavlja ne-varen in sovražen prostor za transspolne mlade, v katerem doživljajo različne oblike nasilja, diskriminacije in izključevanja, po drugi strani pa se kažejo izhodišča in možnosti, v okviru katerih bi lahko krepile_i varovalne dejavnike za optimalen razvoj in rezilientnost mladih transspolnih oseb.

Naše ugotovitve o pomanjkanju varnosti v vzgojno-izobraževalnem okolju, cismativnosti šolskega okolja in nevidnosti transspolnih ter ne-binarnih oseb so skladne z ugotovitvami preteklih pregledov literature (Martin Castillo et al., 2020; McBride, 2021). Ena od možnih razlag dobljenih rezultatov bi lahko bila heteronormativnost in cismativnost našega družbenega sistema, del katerega je tudi vzgojno-izobraževalni sistem. Heteronormativnost in cismativnost predstavljata socialni strukturi, ki legitimizirata homofobijo, bifobijo in transfobijo ter delegitimiziranje in marginaliziranje vseh nenormativnih spolnih identitet, spolnih usmerjenosti in spolnih izrazov (Perger, 2018). Heteronormativni in cismativni diskurzi se uporabljajo za ohranjanje obstoječih razmerij moči, udejanjajo pa se na različne načine, ki

segajo od nasilja do molka (DePalma & Jennett, 2010). Ferbežar in Gavriloski (2023) izpostavljata, da nenaslavljanje LGBTQ+ tematik v šolskem prostoru dopušča in reproducira pojave nasilja nad mladimi LGBTQ+ osebami v vzgojno-izobraževalnem prostoru. Podobno tudi Perger et al. (2018) ugotavljajo, da je nasilje nad LGBTQ+ osebami normalizirano, ker ga učitelji_ce dopuščajo s svojo pasivnostjo in neaktivnostjo.

Negativne izkušnje v vzgojno-izobraževalnem prostoru lahko prispevajo k manjšinskemu stresu, ki ga doživljajo transspolne osebe (Meyer, 2015). Manjšinski stres je povezan s težavami v duševnem zdravju (Poteat & Espelage, 2007) in pogostejšim izostajanjem od pouka ter slabšimi učnimi rezultati (Swearer et al., 2008). V raziskavah, ki smo jih vključile_i v naš pregled literature, smo opazile_i številne negativne posledice, povezane z uspešnostjo transspolnih oseb v šoli. V Sloveniji sta bila sicer objavljena dva mednarodna pregleda literature, ki naslavljata manjšinski stres med LGBT+ osebami (Ferbežar & Gavriloski, 2023; Ferbežar & Gavriloski Tretjak, 2023a), vendar empiričnih raziskav na to temo še nismo zasledili. Glede na številne negativne posledice manjšinskega stresa je to področje vsekakor vredno dodatne pozornosti tudi v našem vzgojno-izobraževalnem prostoru.

V raziskavah je izpostavljenih zelo malo pozitivnih vidikov izkušenj transspolnih oseb v vzgojno-izobraževalnem okolju, kar je bilo značilno tudi za že obstoječe preglede literature. Ti kažejo, da sprejemanje in potrditev identitete transspolnih mladih na medosebni ravni ter aktivno vključevanje in podpora na institucionalni ravni oblikujejo pozitivne izobraževalne izkušnje (McBride, 2021). Za uspešen psihološki razvoj v mladostništvu je pomembna pozitivna šolska klima, ki mladim transspolnim osebam zagotavlja občutek varnosti in vključenosti (Wilson & Cariola, 2020). Ključni viri, ki prispevajo k pozitivnim izobraževalnim izkušnjam transspolnih mladih in v Sloveniji glede na obstoječe podatke še niso implementirani, so trans-specifične politike, podporno osebje, vključujoči kurikulumi in vrstniške podporne skupine (McBride, 2021). Pozitivne vidike izkušenj transspolnih oseb v šolskem okolju lahko razumemo tudi kot dejavnike psihološke odpornosti oziroma rezilientnosti, ki omogoča posameznici_ku, da se uspešno sooča z manjšinskim stresom (Meyer, 2015).

Omejitve in predlogi za nadaljnje raziskovanje

Izkušnje transspolnih mladih v vzgojno-izobraževalnem sistemu so kompleksne in raznolike. Pregled literature je pokazal številne negativne izkušnje, ki jih imajo transspolne osebe v vzgojno-izobraževalnih ustanovah in posledično

prepoznava veliko negativnih posledic, ki jih te izkušnje puščajo pri njih. Manj pozornosti pa je v obstoječih raziskavah namenjene pozitivnim in varovalnim vidikom. Za ustrezno oblikovanje podpornih okolij ni dovolj zgolj zmanjševati in preprečevati okoliščine, ki povzročajo negativne posledice, ampak tudi načrtno vpeljevati ukrepe, za katere je dokazano, da spodbujajo pozitivne vidike ter krepijo varovalne dejavnike, zato menimo, da bi bilo v prihodnosti dobro bolj raziskati tudi varovalne dejavnike in pozitivne vidike izkušenj.

V pregledanih raziskavah, v katerih so bili vključeni starši transspolnih oseb, so sodelovali samo starši, ki so bili podporni in sprejemajoči, vendar veliko transspolnih mladih živi v nepodpornem družinskem okolju (Russell & Fish, 2016), ki dodatno vpliva na njihove izkušnje v vzgojno-izobraževalnem sistemu. Prav tako nismo zasledile nobene raziskave, ki bi se osredotočala na pomen socialno ekonomskega statusa družine ali zdravstvenega stanja transspolnih mladih za njihove izkušnje v vzgojno-izobraževalnem sistemu. Zato bi bilo v prihodnosti smiselno raziskave oblikovati intersekcionalno, tako da bi se upoštevalo več različnih osebnih okoliščin.

V primerjavi z izkušnjami mladih v splošni populaciji je raziskav o izkušnjah transspolnih mladih bistveno manj, še manj pa je raziskav, ki proučujejo izkušnje nebinarnih oseb. Tudi v splošnem je raziskovanje transspolnosti večinoma omejeno na binarno razumevanje spola. V prihodnosti bi bilo dobro razširiti fokus tudi na nebinarne spolne identitete.

Umestitev v slovenski prostor

Rezultati pregleda literature so pomembni tudi za slovenski vzgojno-izobraževalni prostor. Pri iskanju gradiva nismo našle nobene empirične raziskave v slovenskem jeziku, ki bi se specifično osredotočala le na izkušnje transspolnih mladih v vzgojno-izobraževalnem okolju. Obstajajo pa študije, ki so v okviru vzgojno-izobraževalnega sistema raziskovale izkušnje LGBT+ skupnosti na splošno (npr. Ferbežar et al., 2021; Ferbežar & Gavriloski Tretjak, 2023b; Perger et al., 2018; Sešek & Margon, 2021). Ugotovitev izvedenega pregleda literature ne moremo preprosto prenesti v slovenski prostor, zato so empirične študije, v katerih se bo raziskovalo izkušnje transspolnih oseb v okviru vzgojno-izobraževalnega sistema v Sloveniji, še kako potrebne. Z ozirom na to, da obstoječe slovenske raziskave, ki naslavlja izkušnje LGBTQ+ oseb v vzgoji in izobraževanju na splošno, kažejo podobne rezultate kot tovrstne študije v tujini, pa pregled literature izpostavlja nekatera področja, v katera bi bilo smotno usmeriti pozornost tudi v slovenskem prostoru.

Raziskava o vsakdanjem življenju LGBT oseb (Perger et al., 2018) je pokazala, da šolsko okolje v kontekstu razkrivanja ne predstavlja varnega okolja, večina oseb tako šolskemu osebju ni razkrita. V šolskih prostorih se pogosto niso čutile varne, predvsem na hodnikih ali med odmori. Šola je bila tudi prostor, kjer mlade LGBT+ osebe doživljajo največ nasilja in/ali diskriminacije (Perger et al., 2018). Perger et al. (2018) so poročale tudi, da so mladi podali predloge za spremembe na različnih področjih. Za področje šolstva so predlagali obvezna dodatna usposabljanja za zaposlene na šolah in povezovanje šol z LGBT+ nevladnimi organizacijami. LGBT+ mladi so izpostavili potrebo po vključevanju LGBT+ vsebin v učbenike, didaktične pripomočke, šolske pravilnike ter specifične in splošne šolske predmete.

Posredno se tematike transspolnih oseb v vzgojno-izobraževalnem sistemu dotika tudi raziskava izkušenj LGBT mladih v šolah, ki sta jo izvedli a Sešek in Margon (2021). Avtorici ja ugotavljata, da šola LGBT osebam predstavlja ne-varen prostor, zaradi česar se lahko začnejo izogibati določenim šolskim dejavnostim, kjer se ne počutijo varno, ali celo šolanju na splošno. Najpogosteje se izogibajo uri telovadbe. Dijaki nje so poročale, da so v šoli slišale homofobne opazke in negativne opazke glede spolnega izraza, tako od vrstnic kot tudi s strani šolskega osebja. Šolsko osebje v večini primerov ni ukrepalo, če je bilo priča homofobnim opazkam. LGBT dijaki nje so poročale o verbalnem nadlegovanju, fizični napadi pa so bili manj pogosti. Dijaki nje, ki so v šoli doživljale nadlegovanje ali napade, so se temu skušale izogniti z izostajanjem iz šole in občutile nižjo stopnjo pripadnosti šoli, bolj pogosto so se počutile depresivno, imele nižjo stopnjo samozvesti. Glede dostopnosti virov in podpore znotraj šole je raziskava pokazala, da je podporno šolsko osebje pomemben vir moči in da je na šoli vsaj ena šolska uslužbenec, za katero so menile, da podpira LGBT dijake inje. Več kot polovica sodelujočih v raziskavi je poročala, da se o LGBT tematikah v šolah sploh niso učile, približno četrtnina je poročala, da so tematike naslavljaile samo v pozitivnem smislu, približno petina pa samo v negativnem smislu. Šolskih pravilnikov o medvrstniškem nasilju, nadlegovanju in napadih v slovenskih šolah po poročanju dijakinj ov večinoma ni. Na podlagi rezultatov raziskave sta avtorici ja predlagali a sledeče rešitve za slovenski prostor: (i) sistematizacija izobraževanja o LGBT tematikah in preprečevanju in naslavljanju homofobnega, bifobnega in transfobnega medvrstniškega nasilja; (ii) vključevanje LGBT tematik v učne kurikule v osnovnih in srednjih šolah ter (iii) sodelovanje s strokovnjaki njami in organizacijami LGBT za celovitejšo izobraževanje učenk cev, dijakinj ov in šolskega osebja.

ZAKLJUČEK

S prispevkom smo želele_i opozoriti na posebnosti vzgojno-izobraževalnih izkušenj transspolnih učen_cev, saj tovrstne tematike v našem prostoru pogosto ostajajo spregledane. Izkazalo se je, da so izkušnje transspolnih mladih večinoma negativne, saj v vzgojno-izobraževalnem okolju doživljajo različne oblike nasilja, nadlegovanje, grožnje, mikroagresije, socialno izključenost, namerno uporabo napačnih zaimkov in naslavljanje z mrtvim imenom. Vzgojno-izobraževalni sistem je izrazito cisnormativen in ne

vključuje tematik transspolnosti v šolske politike, prav tako pa transspolnim osebam pogosto ne omogočajo uporabe prostorov, v katerih bi se počutile udobno. Posledice teh izkušenj so vidne na področju učnega uspeha, v socialnih odnosih, v slabšem duševnem zdravju transspolnih oseb in v zlorabi psihoaktivnih substanc.

V slovenskem prostoru predstavlja prispevek prvi pregled literature s področja izkušenj transspolnih oseb v vzgojno-izobraževalnem kontekstu. Ker je področje še neraziskano, obstaja veliko priložnosti za nadaljnje raziskovanje izkušenj transspolnih mladih v tem okolju.

TRANSGENDER STUDENTS: AN INTEGRATIVE REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON TRANS YOUTH'S EXPERIENCES WITH THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

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SUMMARY

This article addresses the experiences of transgender students in the educational system. In accordance with PRISMA methodological principles, a systematic, integrative review of the literature was conducted. The final analysis included 29 peer-reviewed scientific texts from the Scopus and Web of Science databases, which were evaluated using qualitative thematic analysis. Four main categories describing transgender people's experiences in the educational system were identified, namely (i) inequities and hostility, (ii) cisnormativity of the school system, (iii) consequences of transphobia and strategies for navigating the school space, and (iv) protective factors and visions for the future. The results of the literature review indicate that the educational space is often unsafe for transgender youth, where they experience various forms of hostility and injustice, while transgender issues go unaddressed. Research indicates that minority stress, mental health issues, and barriers to academic success are all consequences of an unsafe school environment. Despite the fact that the negative aspects of transgender individuals' experiences dominate the research, the findings demonstrate the many ways that the education system can create a safe and stimulating school environment for transgender students. The review of the literature is important for the Slovenian context because there are no empirical studies that examine transgender students' experiences in the education system. Research that has examined the everyday lives of LGBT+ individuals generally shows that there are also challenges in the Slovenian education system that are related to those highlighted in the current literature review. In addition, the research included offers ways to create a safe school environment that have not yet been developed in our area. In this way, it represents a potential guide for educational practice and opens opportunities for empirical research in the Slovenian context.

Keywords: transgender, children, adolescents, education, integrative literature review

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AGEISM IN SLOVENIA: ASSESSING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 2008 AND 2022

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ABSTRACT

Ageism is one of the most widespread forms of discrimination in Europe and one of the mechanisms for generating social inequalities, which is why it is essential to monitor its prevalence. This paper compared the prevalence of ageism in Slovenia in 2008 and in 2022 based on data from round four of the European Social Survey (ESS 2008) and the ESS web panel survey Cronos-2 (2022). The comparison showed that attitudes towards older people remained relatively positive, that there was an increase in the proportion of people who reported perceiving ageism and that there was a slight increase in awareness of the magnitude of the problem. At the three focus points we observed, gender emerged as a key demographic variable with a statistically significant impact.

Keywords: ageism, European Social Survey (ESS), Cronos-2 cross-national web panel study, public opinion, comparative analysis

L'AGEISMO IN SLOVENIA: VALUTAZIONE DELLE DIFFERENZE TRA IL 2008 E IL 2022

SINTESI

L'ageismo è una delle forme di discriminazione più diffuse in Europa e uno dei meccanismi di creazione delle disuguaglianze sociali, per questo è importante monitorarne la diffusione. Il presente documento confronta la diffusione dell'ageismo in Slovenia nel 2008 e nel 2022, sulla base dei dati dell'Indagine sociale europea - Onda 4 nel 2008 e del panel online dell'ESS – Cronos-2 nel 2022. Il confronto mostra che gli atteggiamenti nei confronti degli anziani sono ancora relativamente positivi, che c'è stato un aumento della percentuale di persone che percepiscono l'ageismo e che c'è stato un leggero aumento della consapevolezza dell'entità del problema. Sui tre punti sostanziali che abbiamo esaminato, il genere è emerso come una variabile demografica chiave con un impatto statisticamente significativo.

Parole chiave: ageismo, Indagine sociale europea (European Social Survey – ESS), panel online Cronos-2, opinione pubblica, analisi comparativa

INTRODUCTION

Robert N. Butler defined ageism as “a process of systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they are old” (Butler, 2002, 12). Ageism is based on stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination (Tornstam, 2006). Stereotypes are “relatively fixed fragments in cognitive structuring of external reality, operating within the constraints of a certain culture” (Mrkaić, 2020, 66), that enable the categorisation of people into age groups. The negative effects of stereotypes appear when people use them to make implicit inferences about people’s abilities, competences and skills (Vauclair et al., 2014), leading to prejudices and discriminatory behaviour (cf. Cuddy & Fiske, 2002).

Ageism occurs at both the individual level (Lev et al., 2018) and at the societal or structural level (Ayalon & Tesch-Römer, 2018b). It manifests in social interactions (Butler, 2006), influences the beliefs and expectations of older people through the mechanism of internalisation (Levy, 2009) and is embedded in the functioning of various sectors and institutions such as legal (Doron et al., 2018), care (World Health Organization, 2021), media (Gerdina, 2022; Loos & Ivan, 2018), workplace (Jyrkinen & McKie, 2012), and health institutions (Wyman et al., 2018).

A recent report by the World Health Organization recognised ageism as a global problem (World Health Organization, 2021) responsible for the widening of social inequalities (Ayalon & Tesch-Römer, 2018a). It has detrimental effects on older people’s well-being, since it conveys to them that they are not valued members of the community (Stokes, 2019), and may lead to social isolation, since individuals who experience discriminatory behaviours are prone to restricting social interactions to avoid being discriminated against (Chen & Yang, 2014). Ageism is not only a problem affecting individual well-being but also a serious public health risk (World Health Organization, 2021). Several studies have shown that internalised negative beliefs about ageing and old age lead to a more pronounced risk of cardiovascular disease (Levy et al., 2002), increase the likelihood of the development of dementia (Levy et al., 2016) and reduce will to live (Levy et al., 2000).

One of the hallmarks of ageism is the tendency to perceive older people as a homogeneous group (Gerdina, 2022). However, substantial differences exist within this demographic, ranging from diverse life experiences (Ferraro, 2018) to sociodemographic variability in terms of gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and more (Thompson, 2017). Given the multitude of categories within the older population, it is reasonable to anticipate variations

in experiences of and vulnerability to ageism. However, these variations are not universal, as a recent systematic review of the determinants of ageism against older people revealed. The study found mixed evidence regarding the effects of age, sex, education, cultural background, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religiosity, urban versus rural living and marital status on experiences of ageism (Marquez et al., 2020). These variations underscore the importance of considering the cultural, socioeconomic and political context when examining experiences of ageism. They also emphasise the need for further exploration of the correlates of ageism within specific social environments.

Social environments that are characterised by rapid population ageing, such as is the case in Europe, are especially important areas of observation. There is strong evidence that ageism is directed mainly towards older adults (Ayalon, 2014), meaning that an ageing population places more people at risk of ageism. Despite this, contemporary studies on the prevalence of ageism among the general population in Europe are rare, the last internationally comparable data on such prevalence in Europe being from the fourth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2008. According to the ESS, the highest levels of perceived ageism were found in East European countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine), while the lowest were in a mixture of countries (e.g. Portugal, Cyprus, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland) (Seddig et al., 2020). However, this might have changed in recent years, since according to some estimates, an increase in the proportion of older people in the population (especially when available economic resources do not increase to the same extent) portends negative attitudes towards the older people in that country (North & Fiske, 2015). The lack of more recent data is especially concerning in countries with the highest percentage of older people, many of which are located in Southern Europe—that is, according to the United Nations (2022), in each of Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Serbia, Spain and Slovenia, over 21% of the population is older than 65 years.

This article presents data on the prevalence of ageism in one of these countries, Slovenia. The case of Slovenia is especially interesting because among the 11 European countries that participated in the World Values Survey (WVS), it had the second highest proportion of respondents (74.8%) who agreed that older people were not treated with respect in 2011 (Inglehart et al., 2014). This figure was only surpassed by Romania (85.3%), while countries such as Germany, Estonia and the Netherlands reported around 50% agreement (Inglehart et al., 2014).

Given that the proportion of people aged 65 and over increased by almost a quarter between 2011 and 2022 (from 16.6% to 21.3%; Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2023), it is necessary to reassess the prevalence of ageism in Slovenia and measure the general population's attitudes towards older people and age discrimination. This was carried out in 2022 by OPRO, the Institute for Applied Studies, in cooperation with the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, through the ESS web panel study, Cronos2.

The aim of this paper is to present data on attitudes towards older people and ageism in Slovenia in 2022 and to compare the figures with data from 2008. The comparison is based on the remarkable opportunity offered by the replication of some of the questions from the European Social Survey. In addition to a comparison of summary data, the paper also expands the literature on ageism by presenting some structural differences at the level of specific subpopulations, particularly at measurement point 2 (in 2022), which represents the current situation.

METHOD

The baseline measurement was the 2008 ESS, which included a comprehensive set of questions entitled 'Expressions of ageism' as a separate module and was carried out in 30 European countries, including Slovenia¹ (n = 1286) (Kurdija et al., 2010). The survey included 55 questions on experiences and perceptions of age discrimination and attitudes towards intergenerational solidarity.

The European Social Survey (ESS ERIC) is a renowned cross-national social science survey emphasising empirical observations of social phenomena through systematic data collection and analysis. It aims to record attitudes, values and life practices among European societies, and its deductive approach involves formulating hypotheses based on existing theories and testing them using a quantitative data approach via questionnaires and specific thematic blocks selected by open European tenders. The final questionnaires were designed by eminent scientists from different disciplines (depending on the topics covered), the Core Scientific Team and the well-supported feedback from the national coordinators.

The ESS's research design relies on cross-sectional survey data collection from a representative sample of individuals across multiple European countries. This allows researchers to capture a snapshot of social attitudes, behaviours and values at

a specific point in time. The cross-national scope of the ESS enables the comparison of social trends and structures across different cultural and political contexts.

The ESS sampling strategy was designed and is implemented to procure comparable sampling procedures in all participating countries. It follows the following fundamental principles: 1. samples should be representative of individuals aged 15 years and older (without an upper age limit) residing in private households in the country, regardless of their ethnicity and citizenship; 2. the selection of individuals should adhere to strict principles of randomness and equal probability at each stage; 3. the sampling frame in each country should be derived from the best possible statistical sources, which consist of a list of individuals from the Central Register of Population (or households or addresses); and 4. all countries are expected to strive for the highest possible response rate. The use of quota sampling or the inclusion of reserves or replacements for selected individuals at any stage is strictly prohibited.

To address potential imbalances in the sample, post-stratification weighting is applied. This corrective measure adjusts the data to align with known population characteristics, thereby enhancing the generalisability of the findings to the entire population.

Standardised questionnaires are a key tool of the ESS data collection process. Questionnaires cover a wide range of topics, including social attitudes, political beliefs and demographic information. The survey employs face-to-face interviews and self-completion methods, adapting to cultural and linguistic differences across participating countries. Prior to data collection, every national team should provide extensive interviewer training. The ESS places a strong emphasis on ethical considerations. Informed consent is obtained from all participants, ensuring they are fully aware of the survey's purpose and how their data will be used. Anonymity and confidentiality are prioritised to protect the privacy of respondents. The survey complies with ethical standards and data protection regulations across European countries.

In summary, ESS is one of the most valid and reliable instruments for systematically monitoring attitudes and subjective perceptions in European countries. Its methodology has reached the highest level of standardisation in comparative social science research (Malnar & Kurdija, 2010), and the survey has been awarded the Descartes Prize, the

1 Since its launch in 2002, the ESS has also been implemented in Slovenia. The Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana is a partner in the project (members of the core scientific team: Dr. Brina Malnar and May Doušak) and the national coordinating team and the provider of the fieldwork (national coordinator: Dr. Slavko Kurdija).

highest European award in scientific research, for its achievements in ensuring consistency and the equivalence of methods cross-nationally.

The second measurement was the Cronos-2 survey, which was conducted via online self-completion by respondents who initially participated in the ESS round 10 survey in 2020. Cronos-2 is the first cross-national online panel based on probability sampling and following the sophisticated methodological principles of the ESS survey. Twelve countries, including Slovenia, participated in this centrally coordinated online survey. The content modules for the six waves of the Cronos-2 survey were selected through a public call for tenders, two of which – Wave 3 and Wave 6 – were nationally specific. This means that national teams could include content of their own choice. Thus, Wave 3 of the Slovenian version of the Cronos-2 online panel ($n = 564$) included a broader set of questions on perceptions of ageism in Slovenia, among which a typical part of the questions was replicated specifically from the ageism module in round 4 of the ESS in 2008.

There are three aspects of ageism, which we look at in more detail in this article. The first concerns attitudes towards older people and is based on question (A): “Using the scale below, please tell us how negative or positive are your personal feelings towards people over 70 in general. Please rate on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is extremely negative and 10 is extremely positive”. The second concerns self-perceived discrimination and is derived from question (B): “Tell me how often in the last year it has happened to you that someone has been prejudiced against you or treated you in an unequal way because of your age” (0 = never, 4 = very often). The third aspect of ageism concerns the general perception of ageism as a pressing problem in Slovenia in the form of question (C): “How pressing, if at all, would you say discrimination against people over 70 is in Slovenia?” (1 = very pressing, 2 = quite pressing, 3 = not very pressing, 4 = not at all pressing). We began by analysing the three content items from a cross-temporal perspective and then examined how the structural characteristics of the population affected the expression of attitudes. For the structural variables, we used basic demographic variables: gender (two categories), age (four categories: up to 30, 31–45, 46–60 and 61 years and over), education (three categories: lower, middle and high, recoded from the seven values of the ISCED classification) and income (three categories, recoded from deciles of household income; 1–3 = low, 4–7 = middle and 8–10 = high) and two attitudinal control variables. The was subjective assessment of the material situation (two categories; based on question: ‘Feeling

about household’s income nowadays’, where the first answer (living comfortably on present income) represented the category ‘comfortably’ and the other answers (coping, difficult and very difficult) represented the category ‘non-comfortably’. The second control variable was subjective assessment of own age (five categories; based on question ‘Tell us which age group you belong to the most’, if you see yourself as very young, choose number 1, if you see yourself as very old, choose the last number 9, if you see yourself somewhere in between, choose one of the numbers in between. The five categories were derived from the following scale recoding: 1–3 = 1, 4 = 2, 5 = 3, 6 = 4, 7–9=5).

RESULTS

In the analysis, we wanted to explore respondents’ views on three issues: attitudes towards older people (A); perceptions of personal discrimination (B); and general perceptions of ageism (C). Since the three questions were measured with slightly different scales, we decided to standardise the results by showing the percentile values of the averages.

Focusing on question A, the 2008 ESS showed an average percentile of 79.3%, while the Cronos-2 study gave a slightly lower average, of 78.0%. These average values were derived from an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (extremely negative attitudes) to 10 (extremely positive attitudes). This meant that respondents generally showed positive attitudes towards older people. The difference between the two measures was insignificant, amounting to only 1.3%. This shows that attitudes towards older people remained relatively stable over 15 years, and only minimal changes were observed.

Comparing the results measured at both time points for question B, we could see that a relatively low value was measured at both time points. However, the perceptions of personal discrimination increased from 16% in 2008 to 28.7% in 2022. In this case, the range of the percentile value was taken to mean that at 0%, the respondent had never been discriminated against based on age, and at 100%, they had been discriminated against very often. Because of the slightly less sensitive scale, we also presented this question (B2) as a bi-nominal type variable (0 = never experienced such discrimination and 1 = all other responses) and compared only the proportions of responses with a value of 0. We could see that the proportion of respondents who had never experienced ageism was 64.2% in 2008 and decreased to 40.7% in 2022. This negative difference of 23.5% showed a noticeable decrease in the proportion of individuals who had not experienced any form of ageism.

Table 1: Comparison of selected variables in a cross-temporal perspective (Source: the authors).

Question	ESS 2008	C2 2022	The Difference
	100 th		
(A) Attitudes towards older people	79.3	78.0	-1.3
(B1) Perception of personal discrimination	16.3	28.7	+12.5
	% of respondents: <i>never</i> (%)		
(B2) Perception of personal discrimination	64.2	40.7	-23.5
	Sum of answers: <i>pressing</i> + <i>very pressing</i> (%)		
(C) General perception of ageism	38.8	42.7	+3.9

For question C, we presented the data at the level of the sum of the responses ‘pressing’ and ‘very pressing’. It should be noted, however, that the two questions were slightly different. The 2008 question included discrimination against people under 20 years of age², while the 2022 question explicitly asked about discrimination against older people. We could see that the 2008 figure was 38.8% and the 2022 figure was 42.7%. Although not directly comparable, these significantly different figures indicated a tendency towards increased sensitivity to discrimination based on age.

We were also interested in differences in attitudes according to the typical subpopulations in the 2022 study. In question (A) attitudes towards the older people we could see significant differences. First, in terms of gender, women were more likely than men to express positive attitudes towards older people. The difference in means was 7.51 for men and 8.09 for women (overall mean: 7.80; sig.: .000). Second, age also had a significant impact on these attitudes. A comparison of the averages showed a linear increase in the averages according to age group (up to 30 years = 7.14, 31–45 years = 7.70, 46–60 years = 8.15, 61 and over = 8.23; overall average 7.80; sig.: .000), meaning that positive attitudes towards older people increased with age. Similarly significant gender and age differences were also found in the 2008 ESS data. In the case of education, the differences were also significant, but slightly less so than for gender and age (sig.: .020). In particular, the category of less educated stood

out with a significantly lower average (i.e. a less pronounced positive attitude towards older people). At the same time, income and household material status did not show statistically significant differences. In combination with the selected explanatory variables, the strength of gender and age as stronger predictors of attitudes toward older people was also clearly confirmed by a simple regression analysis⁴ model.

For question (B1) perception of personal discrimination, the picture of the structural analysis was very similar to question A, with the difference being that there was a slightly more significant difference in age than in gender. Women perceived personal discrimination to a greater extent than men at the average level (women 1.26, men 1.04; overall average 1.15; sig.: .000). The averages on a scale from 0 (never) to 4 (very often) for the age categories were 1.74, 1.06, 1.00 and 0.85 for up to 30 years, 31–45 years, 46–60 years and 61 years and over, respectively (overall average 1.15; sig.: .000). What is interesting here is that more self-reported age discrimination was found in the category of up to 30 years. The same pattern was also found in the 2008 ESS data. For question B1, education also showed a certain degree of significant differentiation (lower = 1.29, middle = 1.24, high = 0.98; overall average 1.14; sig.: .020), where we could see in particular that a higher proportion of discrimination was experienced by those with lower and middle education. The regression model confirmed the same; for question B1, the most significant differences were

2 The question from the ESS 2008 reads: “What would you say is the extent to which discrimination against people on the grounds of their age – whether they are old or young – is a pressing problem in Slovenia, if at all?”

3 To analyse statistical differences in means between groups, an ANOVA test in the ‘Compare Means’ analysis was employed using SPSS. This also applies to the analyses below.

4 The regression analysis was carried out using SPSS. A tabular output of the regression coefficients is included in the Appendix. This also applies to the analyses below.

generated by age, followed by education and, to a lesser extent (but still significant), gender. Income and household material status again dropped out of the model as variables with no significant explanatory power⁵.

Unlike the previous two questions, third question (C, assessment of the general perception of ageism as a pressing social problem), significantly differentiated only in terms of gender and, interestingly, household material status. The regression model also confirmed both these variables as significant. A comparison of averages by subpopulation showed that women perceived ageism as a pressing problem significantly more. On a scale of 1 (very pressing) to 4 (not at all pressing), the averages were 2.71 for men and 2.48 for women, with an overall average of 2.60 (sig.: .000). In the subjective assessment of the household's material situation, measured in two categories (getting by without problems and getting by with difficulty), we could see that ageism was perceived as a pressing problem to a significantly greater extent by those who were getting by with difficulty (mean: 2.37) than by those who were getting by without problems (mean: 2.72; overall mean: 2.59; sig.: .000).

DISCUSSION

Data from the Cronos-2 ESS web panel showed that public opinion was still relatively favourable towards older people in 2022, despite a sharp increase in the proportion of older people in the population, contrary to the assumption that a higher proportion of older people in the population predicts negative attitudes towards older people (North & Fiske, 2015). One possible interpretation of the (almost) unchanged attitudes towards older people is that when the proportion of older people increases, more negative attitudes towards older people only occur when social resources are (perceived to be) scarce, which is in line with the classical realist theory of intergroup conflict (Sherif, 1966), according to which competition for scarce resources can be the cause of the emergence of negative intergroup attitudes. The Cronos-2 web panel was implemented during post-Covid-19 pandemic mitigation measures, when EU member states, including Slovenia, were encouraged to provide subsidies and public investment and able to obtain additional funding (e.g. from 28/7/2021 onwards, under the Recovery and Resilience Plan), which put large amounts of money into circulation and reduced the sense

of scarcity of societal resources. The coronavirus pandemic could also have had a qualitative impact on attitudes towards old age. Coronavirus has had a disproportionate impact on the health and well-being of older people (Oostlander et al., 2022). Early epidemiological data showed that the virus poses a major threat, especially to older people (Bergström & Edström, 2022). In the absence of public opinion data on attitudes towards old age during the pandemic, media coverage can be used as an indicator of public opinion. Representations of old age in the media are important because they indicate what the dominant social representations of old age are in a given period (Gerdina, 2022). Since media coverage of tragic events, of which the coronavirus pandemic was undoubtedly one, usually includes judgements about the social value of the victims of tragedies (in this case, mostly older people) and influences perceptions of social distance and social differences, it is possible that the coronavirus pandemic (at least temporarily) reinforced positive attitudes towards older people. Indeed, research on traditional media coverage as well as representations of old age on social networking sites during the pandemic has shown that older people were represented in the media as a social group deserving community support (Morgan et al., 2021) and as a vulnerable and socially disadvantaged group in need of state support and protection (Døssing & Craciun, 2022).

In relation to perceptions of personal discrimination, we found that in 2022, more than half of respondents (58.5%) had experienced prejudice or discrimination on the grounds of age at least once in the previous year, which is in line with the finding that ageism is the most prevalent form of discrimination in Europe (Abrams et al., 2009; Abrams et al., 2011; Swift et al., 2018) and emphasises that researchers should devote more research attention to it (Ayalon, 2014). The proportion of respondents perceiving age discrimination in Slovenia increased significantly compared to 2008, which may have been due to the increased sensitivity to discrimination experienced by different age groups as a result of age-based measures to prevent the spread of coronavirus⁶. However, it should be noted that an increase in actual discrimination cannot be completely ruled out. The increased sensitivity to all forms of discrimination in 2022 compared to 2008 could also have been influenced by 'woke' movements such as #MeToo or the establishment of the Advocate of the Principle of Equality in Slovenia, which has

5 As well as subjective age, which does not emerge as a significant predictor in any of the analyses. In all cases, it is better replaced by age categories of actual age.

6 For example, in Slovenia, the initial distribution of vaccines was limited to certain age and occupational groups, and older people faced restrictions on shopping at certain times.

since 2016 been raising public awareness about different forms of discrimination based on personal circumstances, including age (Advocate of the Principle of Equality, 2016). Regardless of the reasons for the increase in the perception and reporting of personal age discrimination, the fact that in 2022, more than half of respondents had experienced prejudice or discrimination based on age at least once in the previous year is a testimony to the urgency of taking measures to reduce age discrimination in Slovenia. Ageism has a negative impact on quality of life and has been correlated with lower levels of happiness (Jung & Kim, 2023), a reduced will to live (Levy et al., 2000) and a range of detrimental effects on the health of older people (Levy et al., 2020).

Our results regarding perceived ageism highlight that policies, programmes and strategies are needed to reduce ageism. For example, to reduce ageism among older people, Nelson (2016) suggested that old age and ageing should be transformed into a time of positive activity, growth and optimism for the future; that positive intergenerational contact within families should be strengthened by promoting stable and positive family relationships; and that psychologists and health professionals should be educated about ageism so that ageist stereotypes and prejudices do not take root among those who work directly with older people. In 2022, about two out of five respondents identified ageism as a pressing social problem, indicating a relatively broad awareness of the issue and suggesting that the abovementioned strategies to reduce ageism in Slovenia would enjoy relatively broad public support.

Interestingly, the proportion of respondents who considered ageism to be a pressing social problem in 2022 was comparable to that found in 2008. It should be noted, however, that the 2008 question covered attitudes towards ageism across the age spectrum, including discrimination against people under 20, whereas the 2022 question specifically focused on discrimination against those aged 70 years or older. Given the narrower focus of the 2022 question compared to the 2008 question, it can be assumed that if both questions were worded similarly, the proportion of respondents considering ageism to be a pressing social problem in Slovenia would show a stronger increase.

Regarding structural differences at the level of specific subpopulations, we found gender to be the only demographic variable with a statistically significant impact across all three variables. This clearly shows that society has an influence on the formation of gender roles and expectations, which may be reflected in different attitudes towards old age. Even though Slovenia has been characterised

by there being a high proportion of women in full-time employment since the 1960s (Jogan, 2004) and highly educated women since at least the 1980s (Renner & Kralj, 2015), neither the full-time employment of both genders nor the relatively small gender wage gap at the population level have significantly changed the position of women in the private sphere, since the ideology that polarises social ideals of masculinity and femininity has proven to be very persistent (Renner et al., 2008). Men fulfil (their own and society's) expectations 'outside the home', where there are also benchmarks of success and social recognition, while women fulfil their expectations 'inside the home' by performing duties related to household care, motherhood and family life (Oakley, 2000). The latter could lead women to be more concerned about older people. On the other hand, men are more often associated with the role of protector or as individuals who are less involved in providing care to others, which could lead to them having less empathy towards older people. In Slovenia, women are the primary caregivers for older family members (Hrženjak, 2010) and are more active in maintaining intergenerational kinship ties (Stratton & Moore, 2007), making them more likely than men to have frequent contact with older people. This frequent interaction could contribute to a better understanding of older people's experiences, and consequently, to greater concern about ageism. Indeed, several authors have found that a higher number of positive interactions with older people has a positive effect on attitudes towards older people (Peacock & Talley, 1982; Nelson, 2019), which may also explain why older respondents had more positive attitudes towards older people than did younger respondents – that is, social attitudes are characterised by relatively strong and stable levels of age homophily (Smith et al., 2014). The fact that older respondents had more positive attitudes towards older people is also in line with the social identity theory, which posits that people are inclined to value their in-group and derogate out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Regarding age differences in perceptions of personal discrimination, the Cronos-2 survey confirmed that young people perceived the highest levels of age discrimination (Kessler et al., 1999). This shows that young people are often overlooked victims of ageism (Ayalon, 2013), which is reflected among the scientific community itself, which has mainly focused on ageism among older people (Chasteen et al., 2021) and assumes that age becomes a more powerful factor in shaping social judgements after middle age, when there is also a greater likelihood of being exposed to ageism (North & Fiske, 2012). The increased research and policy attention to ageism among older people

is to some extent understandable when the consequences of ageism for older and young people are considered. As Garstka et al. (2004) noted, young people's perceptions of ageism do not have a negative impact on quality of life. For example, if young people are ridiculed because of their age when they form a political party or run for a high-status position, this is less likely to have a long-lasting negative impact on their well-being, since they are aware that their situation is temporary because they will eventually leave their group and enter middle age, which represents the most advantageous position on the age continuum (Jowell, 2009; Swift et al., 2018). Conversely, older people cannot leave their age category, so ageism has a potentially more negative impact on their quality of life (Garstka et al., 2004). The latter mirrors findings from other studies using the fourth wave ESS data that show that experiencing ageism has a negative effect on physical and mental well-being in old age (Kim & Jung, 2021).

However, the data on perceptions of personal discrimination can also be read in another way. It may be that older people experience the same, if not higher, levels of age discrimination as young people but do not perceive them as such, at least not to the same extent as young people. Social norms and values change over time and generations (Leijen et al., 2022), and it seems that negative attitudes towards discrimination in general, and consequently, higher sensibility towards perceiving any type of discrimination, are more characteristic of the younger generation. Using the fourth wave of ESS data, Ayalon (2014), for example, found that younger respondents perceived not only more age discrimination but also more discrimination based on sex and ethnicity. It may be that younger generations have easier access to information on discrimination and have experienced a greater emphasis on social justice in the education system. For instance, in Slovenia, an ethics and society class that tackles the issue of discrimination was introduced in primary education in 1999 (Šimenc et al., 2012).

Another explanation is that young and older people experience different forms of ageism (Iversen et al., 2009). In line with the content model of stereotypes, social groups are assessed on the dimensions of warmth and competence (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002), where competence refers to independence, skill, self-confidence and ability and warmth refers to good nature, trustworthiness, honesty and kindness. The stereotype content model suggests that a social group is likely to be stereotyped as cold if it is perceived to be a rival and as warm if it is perceived to be an ally (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002). Phalet and Poppe (1997), in a study of European national stereotypes, found that older people were judged to be

intellectually incompetent, less ambitious and less responsible than young people but, in contrast, also perceived to be friendlier and warmer. The biases revealed in the study by Fiske et al. (1999) further show that older people receive patronising attitudes characterised by pity and sympathy, which may be difficult to perceive as a form of discrimination.

The lower perception of personal discrimination among older people may also be a consequence of the normalisation of age discrimination. Due to the pervasiveness of ageism and the fact that older people have been exposed to it for the longest time, it is possible that older people are more likely to accept unequal treatment in old age as unproblematic. Jung and Kim (2023), for example, argued that victims of age discrimination may find a degree of comfort in the fact that they are not the only ones experiencing discrimination or that they assess their own situation in comparison to that of others and normalise it. Future research will need to explore the differences in awareness of age discrimination between young and old people and to look more closely at the forms of ageism experienced by young and old people.

The survey also showed some statistically significant differences in attitudes towards older people and perceptions of personal discrimination depending on the respondent's education. In contrast to studies that examined the relationship between education and perceived ethnic discrimination, which have shown that being racially conscious is associated with higher levels of perceived discrimination (Gary, 1995), in our study, the less and middle educated perceived more age discrimination, suggesting that education may act as a buffer against the experience of ageism. Inglehart and Baker (2000) found that improvements in education reinforce social norms that oppose general discrimination. The least educated also have slightly less positive attitudes towards older people, raising the possibility that education may act not only as a protective but also as a deterrent to age discrimination.

The assessment of household material status in relation to attitudes towards the older people and perceptions of personal discrimination was not statistically significant in our study, and therefore contradicts theories of social stratification according to which members of social groups with low social status are more likely to experience discrimination (Fiske, 2010). The absence of an association between low social status and personal perceptions of discrimination could be explained by potential strategies used by members of stigmatised groups to minimise the extent to which they personally feel discriminated against, as Crocker and Major (1989) pointed out. However, we cannot confirm

this with the available data. Other differences in attitudes with respect to typical subpopulations were not large and suggest that there were no significant differences in attitudes between subpopulations. This could indicate that there is a broadly accepted consensus on attitudes towards ageism.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to know the extent to which the rise in the reporting of ageism is a consequence of the greater prevalence of ageism or awareness of ageism as a social problem that has increased in recent years. With the data we have from 2008 and 2022, it is not possible to predict how perceptions of age discrimination have been affected by events that occurred in Slovenia during the period under review, such as the global financial crisis of 2008, the creation of the Advocate of the Principle of Equality in 2016, different social movements and the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Regardless, the data from 2022 clearly show that ageism is widespread in Slovenia, leading to a range of probable negative impacts on people's quality of life, well-being and health. Legislative changes adopted in recent years to protect against age discrimination, such as the Act of 21 April 2016 on protection against discrimination (The Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 2016), have clearly not been sufficiently effective in preventing age discrimination. More efforts are needed in policies and programmes to reduce ageism, such as initiatives aimed at more positive media coverage of older and younger generations; educational programmes on old-age and ageing specifically targeted at the least educated; interventions to promote stable and positive family relationships and social support, especially among men; and interventions to train and educate about age prejudice and discrimination on both sides of the age spectrum. Such policies and programmes need to be informed by high-quality and nationally representative data on ageism, while more detailed comparative research is needed to assess the level of age discrimination

and more accurately understand social changes in this domain. In addition, we should aim to repeat the entire ageism module from the ESS 2008 every few years, with a few additional content upgrades and, of course, within the same level of methodological accuracy as the ESS survey. As Applewhite (2017) said, ageing is inevitable, but living in an ageist society is not.

METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

Regarding limitations, it is worth mentioning that the two measurements were carried out using different data collection methods and that the sample size and completeness were, of course, not identical. The first measurement, in 2008, was conducted using a face-to-face survey method, with a sample response rate of approximately 60% among 1286 respondents. The second one, which was conducted by online self-completion and included individuals who agreed to being a panel of respondents for a year and a half (six survey waves), had (in wave 3, where ageism questions were included) 564 respondents and a response rate of around 30% – regarding the ESS 2020 mother survey gross sample. The expected higher dropout in the second measurement and possible discrepancies in the sample structure of the web panel were mitigated using combined weights. These were designed for the Cronos-2 project for all countries at a high level of complexity because they included various (demographic and attitudinal) dimensions to correct possible discrepancies in the sample structure either because of the data collection approach or the lower response rate of the web panel measurement. Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that we have data of sufficient quality and reliability to allow for both situational analysis and cross-temporal comparisons, especially since a broader methodological and cross-national analysis of the sample, both in the mother survey (ESS round 4) and in the web panel (Cronos-2), shows that Slovenia is one of the most prosperous among ESS participating countries.

Appendix – A Tabular Output of the Regression Coefficients**A (w3siq41)**

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstd. Coeff.		Std. Coeff.	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	6,2659	0,5579		11,2303	0,0000		
	Gender	0,5212	0,1598	0,1422	3,2626	0,0012	0,9571	1,0448
	Age (4)	0,4140	0,0948	0,2259	4,3685	0,0000	0,6794	1,4720
	S. Age (5)	-0,0997	0,0811	-0,0639	-1,2295	0,2195	0,6727	1,4866
	Education (3)	0,1866	0,1122	0,0757	1,6631	0,0969	0,8759	1,1417
	Income (3)	-0,1395	0,1279	-0,0533	-1,0902	0,2761	0,7601	1,3156
	S. Material Status (2)	-0,0586	0,1827	-0,0154	-0,3207	0,7486	0,7897	1,2662

- a Dependent Variable: (A) Using the scale below, please tell us how negative or positive are your personal feelings towards people over 70 in general.

B1 (w3siq42)

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstd. Coeff.		Std. Coeff.	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1,3212	0,3516		3,7576	0,0002		
	Gender	0,2136	0,1007	0,0921	2,1217	0,0343	0,9571	1,0448
	Age (4)	-0,3228	0,0597	-0,2784	-5,4051	0,0000	0,6794	1,4720
	S. Age (5)	0,1039	0,0511	0,1053	2,0340	0,0425	0,6727	1,4866
	Education (3)	-0,1791	0,0707	-0,1149	-2,5337	0,0116	0,8759	1,1417
	Income (3)	0,0885	0,0806	0,0534	1,0975	0,2729	0,7601	1,3156
	S. Material Status (2)	0,1650	0,1151	0,0684	1,4330	0,1525	0,7897	1,2662

- a Dependent Variable: (B) Tell me how often in the last year it has happened to you that someone has been prejudiced against you or treated you in an unequal way because of your age.

C (w3siq43)

Coefficients(a)

Model		Unstd. Coeff.		Std. Coeff.	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	3,3269	0,2235		14,8852	0,0000		
	Gender	-0,2228	0,0639	-0,1522	-3,4872	0,0005	0,9581	1,0437
	Age (4)	0,0324	0,0378	0,0445	0,8591	0,3907	0,6802	1,4703
	S. Age (5)	-0,0097	0,0325	-0,0156	-0,2998	0,7644	0,6735	1,4847
	Education (3)	0,0388	0,0448	0,0394	0,8653	0,3873	0,8790	1,1376
	Income (3)	-0,0219	0,0510	-0,0210	-0,4288	0,6683	0,7603	1,3153
	S. Material Status (2)	-0,3516	0,0731	-0,2311	-4,8086	0,0000	0,7903	1,2654

- a Dependent Variable: (C) How pressing, if at all, would you say discrimination against people over 70 is in Slovenia?

STARIZEM V SLOVENIJI: OCENJEVANJE RAZLIK MED LETOMA 2008 IN 2022

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POVZETEK

Starizem je ena najbolj razširjenih oblik diskriminacije v Evropi in pomeni enega od mehanizmov za ustvarjanje družbenih neenakosti, zato je pomembno spremljati njegovo razširjenost. V prispevku primerjamo razširjenost starizma v Sloveniji leta 2008 in leta 2022 na podlagi podatkov Evropske družboslovne raziskave (2008) in spletnega panela ESS – Cronos-2 (2022). Podatki, pridobljeni s spletnim panelom Cronos-2, so pokazali, da je bilo javno mnenje starih ljudi leta 2022 še vedno razmeroma naklonjeno, kar je v nasprotju s predpostavko, da večji delež starih ljudi napoveduje negativen odnos do starih ljudi. Delež respondentov, ki zaznavajo starizem, se je v primerjavi z letom 2008 povečal, kar je lahko posledica večje občutljivosti za diskriminacijo v zadnjih petnajstih letih. Glede strukturnih razlik na ravni specifičnih podpopulacij smo ugotovili, da je spol edina demografska spremenljivka, ki ima statistično značilen vpliv na treh opazovanih vsebinskih točkah (odnos do starih ljudi, zaznavanje osebne diskriminacije zaradi starosti, splošno dožemanje starizma). To kaže, da ima družba vpliv na oblikovanje spolnih vlog in pričakovanj, kar se lahko odraža v različnem odnosu do starosti. V obeh letih so največ starizma zaznavali mladi, kar kaže, da so mladi pogosto spregledana žrtev tovrstne diskriminacije. Manj in srednje izobraženi so zaznavali več starizma, kar nakazuje na varovalno funkcijo izobrazbe. Ocena materialnega stanja gospodinjstva pri odnosu do starih ljudi in zaznavi starizma v naši raziskavi ni bila statistično značilna in je torej v nasprotju s teorijami socialne stratifikacije, ki pravijo, da bodo družbene skupine z nižjim socialnim statusom verjetneje izkusile diskriminacijo. Stopnja strinjanja, da je starizem v Sloveniji pereč problem, je visoka, kar nakazuje, da bi strategije in ukrepi za zmanjšanje starizma uživali razmeroma široko javnomnenjsko podporo.

Ključne besede: starizem, Evropska družboslovna raziskava (European Social Survey – ESS), spletni panel Cronos-2, javno mnenje, primerjalna analiza

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RETHINKING DEBT-TRAP DIPLOMACY: A CASE STUDY OF MONTENEGRO'S DEBT TO CHINA

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the claim that Montenegro is a country towards which China is practising debt diplomacy. The study aims to assess whether Montenegro's borrowing from Chinese banks can be taken as an example of deliberate Chinese lending intended to subjugate Montenegro both economically and politically. The case study method is used to draw conclusions regarding the validity of accusations about the harmfulness of the debt to Montenegro, or lack thereof. In addition, the paper examines the economic parameters of the relationship between China and Montenegro, as well as the political reactions to the indebtedness within Montenegro. It also considers the reactions of the European Union and the USA, within the context of China's geopolitical role in Europe. Based on the findings, it appears unlikely that China is engaged in ongoing debt diplomacy with Montenegro. The criticisms of China's involvement in the Montenegro case seem politically motivated and unwarranted.

Keywords: China, Montenegro, debt-trap diplomacy, soft power

RIPENSARE LA DIPLOMAZIA DELLA TRAPPOLA DEL DEBITO: UNO STUDIO DI CASO SUL DEBITO DEL MONTENEGRO NEI CONFRONTI DELLA CINA

SINTESI

Il presente articolo analizza l'affermazione secondo cui il Montenegro è un paese verso il quale la Cina sta praticando la diplomazia del debito. L'obiettivo della nostra analisi è determinare se i prestiti concessi dal sistema bancario cinese al Montenegro possano essere considerati come un esempio di una deliberata azione di indebitamento finalizzata a sottomettere il paese, sia dal punto di vista economico che politico. Al fine di valutare l'accusa della dannosità del debito nei confronti del Montenegro, è stato adottato il metodo dello studio di caso. Inoltre, l'articolo analizza i parametri economici del rapporto tra Cina e Montenegro, nonché le reazioni politiche all'indebitamento del Montenegro e le reazioni dell'Unione Europea e degli Stati Uniti, nel contesto del ruolo geopolitico della Cina in Europa. Sulla base dei risultati, sembra probabile che la Cina non sia impegnata nella continuazione della diplomazia del debito nei confronti del Montenegro e che le critiche al coinvolgimento della Cina nel caso del Montenegro siano politicamente motivate e ingiustificate.

Parole chiave: Cina, Montenegro, diplomazia del debito, soft power

INTRODUCTION AND THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

This article aims to analyse the claims concerning Chinese debt diplomacy,¹ focusing on the case of Montenegro. In other words, it seeks to assess the relevance of the “China-seizing-assets story” (Deron et al., 2021) in relation to Montenegro. Problematising the indebtedness of Montenegro to China resulting from infrastructure activities initiated by Montenegrin authorities in 2014 introduces a novel aspect to the political landscape. Only in recent years has Montenegro started to be portrayed as yet another example of Chinese debt diplomacy, which allegedly financially enslaves smaller nations along the so-called New Silk Road.

There are several reasons why the case of Montenegro, in particular, needs to be considered from the point of view of problematising debt diplomacy. First of all, it is a very small country, the smallest among those whose borrowing from China is considered problematic.² Soyaltin-Colella (2023) considered the indebtedness of the Montenegrin authorities to Chinese banks as an additional incentive to perpetuate corruption in Montenegro. Bakalov categorically labelled Montenegrin indebtedness as an example of China's debt-trap diplomacy. He even went a step further, suggesting that there is a real danger in the medium and long term that Beijing will have enough economic influence to undermine NATO's capabilities, if not directly, then certainly diplomatically through its economic levers via Montenegro as a member of NATO (Bakalov, 2021, 42). However, Montenegro's geopolitical importance³ far outweighs its size, as it has a deepwater port, which is still majority state-owned and is close to being directly connected to Central Europe via Belgrade and Budapest. In addition, Montenegro is integrated into the Western European and Atlantic security architecture, having been a member of NATO since 2017 and a candidate for EU membership since 2010. Therefore, it is also important to examine how Montenegro's Western partners reacted to the debt issue that arose following extensive borrowing from China.

Debt-trap diplomacy represents a novel phenomenon in political science and diplomatic theory and practice. Unlike classical phenomena in diplomacy,

which, in various forms, have shown continuity over several centuries and even millennia, debt-trap diplomacy is a distinctly modern phenomenon closely related to the diplomacy and economies of the 20th and 21st centuries. For example, commercial diplomacy after the First World War manifested itself through the credit diplomacy of Western creditors and assistance in the post-war reconstruction of Europe (Udovič, 2022). Furthermore, dollar diplomacy has, up to the present day, manifested itself partly through debt diplomacy, especially during the period of the presidencies of William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt. The Monroe Doctrine, which guided US foreign policy during the interwar period, argued for the use of economic means in foreign policy, specifically the granting of loans to the countries of the American continent so that other, non-American countries would not do the same.⁴ Issues of debt diplomacy also arose during World War II, so a broader interpretation of the concept of debt diplomacy could equally be transferred to the American-Soviet Lend and Lease agreement. Finally, debt diplomacy is evident in the case of socialist and federal Yugoslavia, of which Montenegro was a constituent republic from 1945 until 1991; here, the policy of choosing creditors for its dysfunctional economy resulted in the understanding that there was no free lunch when those loans came due (Dyker, 2011).

The authors who have addressed the concept of debt diplomacy agree that the term first appeared in 2017. Since then, the use of the term has spread globally, often accompanied by negative connotations, apparently because of its frequent association with the word “trap”. The influential Indian geostrategist, economist and professor Brahma Chellaney introduced the term “debt diplomacy” in his influential article titled “China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy” (Chellaney, 2017) published in Project Syndicate. In this article, Chellaney uses the term “debt diplomacy” to describe China's low-interest loans to countries around the world as predatory. He contends that China's original intention was to make these loans *de facto* unpayable, thereby gaining influence and power over the indebted countries and forcing them to cede valuable infrastructure to China. According

1 More on Chinese commercial diplomacy cf. Fister & Brglez (2021).

2 Some authors unequivocally consider Montenegro a target of Chinese debt diplomacy (cf. Soyaltin-Colella, 2023; Bakalov, 2021). However, this topic has always been dealt with in a much louder fashion by the media – cf. Schmitz (2021) interviewing, among others, Milica Kovačević, the director of the influential Montenegrin NGO Center for Democratic Transition. Kovačević (2021) is the most comprehensive study on the Chinese loan to date.

3 The Port of Bar is financially and geopolitically the most valuable asset of Montenegro. The port is still majority-owned by the state capital. In 2022, the port's annual transshipment exceeded two million tons, and the total revenue for the same year was over 20 million euros (for more detailed business information cf. the Company Wall electronic register entry at: <https://www.companywall.me/firma/luka-bar/MMTpu2C>). Former Montenegrin President Filip Vujanović emphasized the importance of the port at the Cooperation Forum between China and Central and Southeastern Europe in Ningbo in 2019. He suggested that the Port of Bar could serve as China's port corridor on the Adriatic. The Digital Forensic Center, a prominent NGO from Montenegro, produced a special report in 2023 on the strategic importance of the Port of Bar. This report, titled “Port of Bar - strategic or commercial interest?” discusses why it would be in China's interest to own the port to enhance its maritime influence in the Balkans).

4 For further reading on dollar diplomacy cf. Veaser (2002); Carroll & Herring (1995); Rosenberg (2003).

to Chellaney, China pursued geostrategic dominance by offering loans to other countries for infrastructure development, aiming to “facilitate (Chinese) access to natural resources or to open the market for low-cost and shoddy Chinese goods” (Chellaney, 2017). Chellaney sees the realisation of China’s, a priori negative, intentions through its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative which, at the time of the article, was worth over one trillion US dollars (Chellaney, 2017).

The goal of China’s global expansion through the New Silk Road is to foster deeper ties between Europe and Asia (Urban, 2016). The OBOR initiative connects China and Europe through both the sea route and the overland Silk Road. It is envisaged that the direct land route to Western Europe will traverse Eastern Europe, while the sea route to EU countries will pass through the Adriatic Sea (Gruebler, 2021). In order to achieve political and economic connection with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the “16+1” initiative was launched in 2012. The cooperation programme for Central and Eastern Europe is comprised of various European Union (EU) Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, including all the countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later (excluding Cyprus and Malta), as well as five Western Balkan countries, including Montenegro, located on the shores of the Adriatic Sea; the “+1” refers to China (Gruebler, 2021). Greece joined in 2019, while Lithuania left the group in 2021 (Lau, 2021) and Estonia and Latvia followed suit the following year (BNS, 2022). Montenegro remains a participant in this initiative, which can be analysed as a quasi-institutional framework for China’s relations with Central and Eastern Europe.

After 2017, a series of analyses, articles, policy papers, and other works dealing with the topic of debt-trap diplomacy appeared within academic and other communities. Following this surge, two researchers from the Harvard Kennedy School published a student paper in 2018 on the new Chinese economic strategy and the challenges it posed for the policy of the United States, using the term “debtbook diplomacy” to describe the same phenomenon that Chellaney had called debt-trap diplomacy (Parker & Chefitz, 2018). The claim that China is deliberately trying to “trap” the countries on its New Silk Road (OBOR) in debt, to increase its geostrategic influence either through the settlement of outstanding debt through the acquisition of valuable ports, transport infrastructure, or mineral resources, or else to achieve political control over these countries, has caused considerable worry at the highest echelons of the political authorities in both the USA and Western Europe. A prominent researcher in Chinese diplomacy, Deborah Brautigam, described the speed and ease with which the new idea-image of Chinese debt diplomacy spread in the US and Western Europe as “The rise of a

meme” in her influential article on debt-trap diplomacy (Brautigam, 2020). Moreover, Google Trends statistics indicate a growing interest in the term debt-trap diplomacy, peaking at a value of 100 in May 2022. However, Chinese politicians, most notably Xi Jinping, contend that no real geopolitical significance is attached to the OBOR initiative (Saich, 2017).

The construction of the narrative about predatory borrowing practised by China was significantly bolstered by the public letter sent in 2018 by Edwin M. Truman, a former Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury at the International Monetary Fund, together with 15 senators, to the US Secretary of State for the Treasury. In this letter, we find a description of how “Beijing’s attempt to weaponize its capital is not just limited to Asia and Africa but extends to Europe” (Truman, 2018). Here, “[t]he term ‘weaponize’ clearly situated China’s lending as an insidious tool, and the letter possessed a series of striking questions about China’s intentions” (Lai et al., 2020, 111).

In 2021, Chellaney once again highlighted China’s debt diplomacy, describing the entire process. First of all, he argues that China does not assess the financial viability of the debtor; instead, it is happy to lend regardless. He then asserts that: “[t]he heavier the debt burden on the borrower, the greater China’s leverage becomes” (Chellaney, 2021). Referring to AidData’s dataset analysis of 100 cases of Chinese loans (Gelpert et al. 2021), Chellaney also notes that:

*these agreements arm China with considerable leverage by incorporating provisions that go beyond standard international lending contracts. Such is the lopsided nature of the Chinese-dictated contracts that, while curtailing the options of the borrowing nations, they give China’s state-owned banks untrammelled discretion over any borrower, including the power to scrap loans or even demand full repayment ahead of schedule.*⁵ (Chellaney, 2021)

It is extremely important, according to Chellaney, that China obliges the creditor country to maintain confidentiality regarding all the lending conditions. Referring to the aforementioned study (Gelpert et al., 2021), he also says that:

contracts [...] obligate the borrower to exclude the Chinese debt from any multilateral restructuring process [...] This is aimed at ensuring that the borrowing country remains dependent on Beijing, including for any debt relief in the event of financial distress [...]. [...] Infrastructure financing

⁵ This primarily refers to the fact that over 90 per cent of the Chinese contracts they analysed, encompassing all Certificates of Bank Deposit (CDB) contracts, contain provisions that grant the creditor the authority to terminate the contract and request immediate repayment in the event of substantial alterations in the laws or policies of either the debtor or creditor nation.

comes mainly in the form of market-rate loans like those from private capital markets. The more dire the borrower's financial situation, the higher the interest rate China is likely to charge for lending money. (Chellaney, 2021)

What the study does not show is how, in cases of loan default, China charges the indebted countries by taking their infrastructure. Chellaney provides several examples of this form of settlement in his work, including loans to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan. However, these examples have been analysed in detail elsewhere and dismissed as not being true examples of debt diplomacy (Hwang et al., 2016; Brautigam, 2020; Carmody, 2020; Singh, 2020).⁶ However, once the narrative of the debt-trap diplomacy had been built, it could only spread to other geographical areas where China appeared as a creditor. Although Africa and Asia are not the only continents where China's controversial debt diplomacy has expanded, it is interesting to note that much less attention has been paid in the academic debate to European countries that have accepted loans from Chinese banks.

In this paper, our focus is on Montenegro, a small Mediterranean country which has been in the spotlight of both research and policy communities for several years as another example of China's debt diplomacy. It was only after 2020 that researchers began to discuss several cases of indebtedness among European countries, prominently featuring instances such as the Greek and Croatian ports as well as the indebtedness of Montenegro for the construction of a highway. This highway aims to connect the Montenegrin port on the Adriatic Sea, the Port of Bar, with Central Europe, via Serbia and other countries where road infrastructure is already under extensive construction with financing from Chinese loans. Montenegro borrowed from China in 2014 to undertake the construction of the first highway in its history, with the loan taken from Chinese banks amounting to just over \$900 million. Montenegro's debt to its Chinese creditors, due to the highway, accounts for a quarter of the country's GDP, posing a threat to the stability of public finances if it continues to grow (Grgić, 2017). The construction of the Montenegro highway, funded by Chinese loans, is part of the EU-China Connectivity Platform scheme in Europe (2016–19) (Gruebler, 2021). The list of the projects supported indicates the intention to connect the EU and China infrastructurally to a degree that aligns with the conceptualisation of a New Silk Road.

If we reconsider that the new maritime Silk Road passes through the Adriatic Sea, it becomes evident why, at least hypothetically, Chinese loans, the New Silk Road, and a heavily indebted Montenegro, which is part

of the initiative "16+1", can be brought together into one single geopolitical problem. Therefore, the main research question of our work is set as follows: Is there any justification for the apprehension about Chinese debt diplomacy towards Montenegro?

The analysis of China's alleged debt diplomacy towards Montenegro will be carried out by addressing two further research questions:

1. How does the criticism of borrowing relate to the broader issues of debt sustainability, financial stability, and sovereignty of Montenegro?
2. To what extent does the borrowing affect relations between the European Union and Montenegro, bearing in mind the latter's integration process into the EU?

In this paper, we use the case study method to address the research questions by analysing primary and secondary sources and synthesising the empirical data obtained. The primary sources include statements from political officials, as well as statistical data on Montenegrin-Chinese economic ties obtained from the Chamber of Commerce of Montenegro, the Central Bank of Montenegro, and the Ministry of Finance of Montenegro. The secondary sources are derived from existing analyses of Montenegrin-Chinese economic ties and, specifically, the indebtedness of Montenegro to Chinese banks. These analyses were conducted by both academic and non-governmental organisations.

The paper consists of four sections. The first chapter provides an overview followed by an analysis of the economic and trade relations between Montenegro and China, with a specific focus on Chinese investments in Montenegro. This section aims to present the significance of China's investments for Montenegro and vice versa. In the second section, the paper examines the economic and political aspects central to its theme – Montenegro's indebtedness to Chinese banks for the construction of its first highway. In addition to the analysis of the loan agreement, an overview of the importance of the planned highway in the context of the New Silk Road initiative is also offered. The third section is dedicated to the presentation and analysis of the political reactions of the relevant political actors in Montenegro to the debt, including officials of the Montenegrin government in power until 2020 and those in power after 2020, when the first democratic change of government in this country took place. Additionally, the reactions of the European Union and the United States of America to Montenegrin indebtedness are also analysed, especially in relation to the hedging arrangement that Montenegro pursued with the help of American and French banks after the European Union's refusal to help Montenegro. The final

⁶ Regarding Africa, Deborah Brautigam refers to the largest database of loans that China has given to African countries (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies), which includes over 1000 such cases. She states that in Africa, there are no instances where it could be said that the Chinese deliberately ensnared another country in debt and then used that debt to extract unfair or strategic advantages, including 'asset seizures' (Brautigam, 2020, 6).




Figure 1: New Silk Road Map with the Balkans (Grgić, 2017, 5).

part of the paper synthesises conclusions drawn from preceding sections in order to answer the research questions.

THE RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND MONTENEGRO

China's increasing influence in the Western Balkans has been observed since the introduction of the New Silk Road initiated by Xi Jinping in 2013. Two important corridors, namely the Economic Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road, have been designed to reach the heartland of Europe through Greece via the Balkan Peninsula by connecting land and sea. This form of cooperation at the political level aims to speed up the economic rapprochement between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (hereinafter CEE) (Zuokui, 2014). Figure 1 shows the countries that are directly or indirectly included in the New Silk Road, formulated through the OBOR initiative. It is observed that of the Western Balkans countries, only Serbia is on the trajectory of the Economic Silk Road, while Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia are on the route of the Maritime Silk Road.

Since 2012, through the OBOR initiative, China has established an institutional framework for future infrastructure projects with significant financing from the state-owned EXIM Bank. Western analysts perceive a geostrategic approach which involves gaining entry to the EU through unconventional means. For China, this presents yet another business prospect, particularly in the energy and infrastructure industries, where its state-owned enterprises have discovered profitable opportunities. Countries that are still outside the EU may provide government assurances for large-scale infrastructure projects, but EU regulations are stringent and impose comparatively rigorous restrictions on non-EU financial inflow. However, on the "European periphery" foreign banks and firms have greater confidence in investing in projects backed by robust state guarantees, which helps mitigate risk (Grgić, 2017, 5).




Chart 1: Montenegro imports by country, 2021 (in %)
(Source: Central Bank of Montenegro, 2021a).

In the context of the "European periphery", Montenegro found itself in a political and economic vacuum regarding the construction and financing of the "project of the century" – part of the Bar-Boljare highway. On the other hand, officials in Montenegro did not speak publicly about Montenegro's place in the OBOR initiative, nor did they associate the construction of the highway with this initiative. Such connections were mostly found in the media and partly in the work of some analysts. The Montenegrin authorities overwhelmingly talked about this project as a domestic issue of strategic significance.

There are three important aspects to the economic ties between Montenegro and China over the past 15 years. The first aspect is trade, where Montenegro has been in deficit since 2006. This is understandable, considering its population of only around 620,000 and an economy based on the service sector, particularly tourism. The second aspect involves Montenegro's borrowing of funds from Chinese creditors. The third aspect of these economic relations is foreign direct investment from China into Montenegro.

An essential economic indicator is the direct connection between the two countries through the relationship between exports and imports. Montenegro's main foreign trade partners in 2021 were the countries of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), where 43.21% of goods were exported, the largest proportion of which was electricity. This was followed by EU countries with a share of 31.14%, where the main exports were aluminium and electricity, and the member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with 11.6%. On the other hand, the largest proportion of goods were imported from the EU (45.68%), CEFTA and EFTA countries (28.48% and 2.34%), while 23.5% were imported from other countries (Central Bank of Montenegro, 2021a, 117–118). Individually, the largest export partners were Serbia, Switzerland, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chart 1 presents the most important

Table 1: Comparison of selected variables in a cross-temporal perspective (Source: the authors).

Structure of Montenegro's external debt as of September 30, 2022		
Creditor	Debt balance (in millions of euros)	Share of external debt (%)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	186.94	5.16
Member countries of the Paris Club of Creditors	57.25	1.58
International Development Association (IDA)	14.77	0.41
European Investment Bank (EIB) 1.68 2.40	95.90	2.65
EBRD	58.95	1.63
Council of Europe Development Bank	76.40	2.11
European Commission	60.00	1.66
Credit Bank for Reconstruction - Germany (KfW)	343.54	1.20
Hungarian credit	0.30	0.01
Polish credit	3.10	0.09
French credit - Natixis	0.85	0.02
China EXIM Bank	710.27	19.60
Spanish loan for landfill construction	1.36	0.04
EUROBOND	1,750.00	48.28
IFAD	2.99	0.08
Export Development Canada (EDC)	7.42	0.20
Syndicated loan - PBG	225.71	6.23
Syndicated loan – PBG 2	234.54	6.47
HAPOALIM - Armoured vehicles	14.78	0.41
Rapid Financing Instrument - IMF	79.43	2.19

import partners of Montenegro. In terms of imports, Serbia again holds the first position, followed by China and Germany. China as an export partner does not appear individually in the calculations of the Central Bank of Montenegro due to its insignificant share. On the other hand, China is the second most important partner for Montenegro when it comes to imports. This speaks of the significant dependence of Montenegro on the import of Chinese goods, with China's share at almost 10% (245 million US dollars) of Montenegro's total imports, while the share of China's exports to Montenegro in the total exports of China is negligible (245 million against 3.3 trillion US dollars) (Workman, 2021).

Public debt is a crucial factor in analysing the economic relationship between China and Montenegro. As a country in transition, Montenegro struggles with its level of public debt. The EXIM Bank loan had a significant impact on the growth of public debt, which reached 103% of GDP in 2020. Table 1 presents the latest available data on Montenegro's public debt by lender and the share of individual debt in total public debt. Notably, the debt to the EXIM Bank

constitutes a substantial 19.6% of the total public debt. However, the table also shows that the rest of Montenegro's public debt is owed to banks and international organisations from Western countries. Thus, almost half of Montenegro's public debt arises from the placement of bonds (EUROBOND), while the debt to international financial institutions and banks stands at 32%. As the data show, China is the largest single lender; however, Montenegro exhibits a stronger orientation towards the Western financial market in terms of its sources of financing.

An overview of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Montenegro indicates its relatively modest volume in the period since the restoration of Montenegrin independence in 2006. Table 2 shows that the amount of FDI in the period up to 2019 was only around 10 million euros. Also, the share of FDI from China in the total FDI averaged 0.129%, or concerning GDP, only 0.027% on average until 2020. The situation changed drastically in 2020, when FDI amounted to 71.2 million euros, making China the largest investor in that year and

Table 2: FDI from China 2006–2020.

Amount of Chinese FDI from 2006 to 2020 expressed in euros		Share of the Chinese FDI in total FDI %	Share of the Chinese FDI in GDP %
Year	Amount of FDI		
2006	219,900		0.01
2007	377,050	0.042	0.013
2008	696,660	0.084	0.023
2009	2,470,800	0.256	0.083
2010	1,694,370	0.305	0.057
2011	840,470	0.185	0.026
2012	440,000	0.084	0.014
2013	141,000	0.035	0.004
2014	1,017,590	0.028	0.029
2015	1,376,240	0.205	0.038
2016	441,000	0.069	0.011
2017	676,730	0.126	0.016
2020	71,234,140	13.9	1.702
2021	6,438,390	0.843	0.13
2022	882,160	0.084	0.015
Total	88,946,500		

the second largest investor in Montenegro in the period from 2006 to 2020, just behind Russia.

In the analysis of FDI in Montenegro from 2006 to 2015, China did not rank among the top 16 countries with the largest share (Chamber of Commerce of Montenegro, 2016). This can be interpreted in two ways. First, it may suggest that Montenegro was not perceived as an important geostrategic or economic partner during that period. Second, it is true that the aforementioned initiatives only materialised in institutional, diplomatic, and political forms in the second half of the 2010s. This assertion is supported by the economic data for the period 2016–2020, which places China in first place in terms of FDI inflow in Montenegro, with an average share of 9.6% of total FDI (Cental Bank of Montenegro, 2021a).

The lack of reliable data on Chinese investment in the Western Balkans has left room for different interpretations. The communication gap among Western Balkan countries regarding the surge in Chinese investment has further exacerbated this situation. All of this has led to increased concern on the part of the EU and the US. A prevailing narrative has been that such actions by the governments of these countries undermine Europe's political cohesion and open up space for "malign" Chinese influence. To gain a more nuanced understanding of this influence, it is crucial to emphasise that loans from Chinese banks do not equate to FDI from China into the Western Balkans. China predominantly focuses on infrastructure projects, not FDI per se. When these data are compared, the scope




Chart 2: Comparison of China's infrastructure projects, FDI and the actual flow of capital in CEE countries (Source: Matura, 2021, 9).

of China's influence becomes somewhat clearer. In a comprehensive study, Matura compared the data on the number of infrastructure projects, FDI, and actual inflow of Chinese capital; upon analysing the chart below, it can be concluded that China's presence in this region is relatively limited (Matura, 2021).

The research considered here, spanning sixteen countries, concludes that investment from China actually plays a more important role in Western European countries than in any of the EU 17+1 members. On the other hand, Chinese investment is limited in this region, especially in countries that are already members of the EU. "Traditional European partners like Germany, other East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea and to a lesser extent the United States are still the most important investors" (Matura, 2021, 11). The only exception in the group of non-EU countries mentioned in the research is Serbia, which, in addition to infrastructure, has a substantial share of direct investments.

A HIGHWAY TO A DEBT TRAP?

In the economic sense, as Morrison states, Montenegro was the smallest and least developed republic of the former Yugoslavia (1945–1992). Its development relied to a large extent on the Yugoslav federal economic structures and federal subsidy programmes (Morrison, 2009, 76). The breakup of Yugoslavia also meant economic collapse and the disintegration of the single Yugoslav market, on which the economy of Montenegro depended significantly. Montenegro, as part of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, was economically weaker, with a pronounced decline in employment levels

and an increasing number of workers financed from public revenues (Djuric, 2003, 144–146). Upon regaining its independence, Montenegro entered the process of transition and privatisation with a significantly weakened industry, relying to a large extent on tourism and services to prop up the economy.

In Montenegro, even before 2006 and the restoration of independence, questions were raised about the construction of the first kilometres of the highway. As early as 1969, there were plans to build a highway in Montenegro connecting Bar, a town and seaport in the south, to the north of the country, more precisely to Boljare, a village in Serbia and a state border crossing. During the communist period, Montenegro's infrastructural development was also emphasised. It was believed that better infrastructure in this small, hilly and then underdeveloped country would help break Montenegro's tribal particularism. Grgić (2017) explains that the reason for the construction of the highway was the desire of the political authorities in Montenegro to strengthen the sense of belonging to the state and the nation by connecting the north of the country with the south. A similar logic of thinking is presented by Dalakoglou in the case of socialist Albania, which also strengthened national unity through infrastructural development (Dalakoglou, 2010).

In more contemporary times, international Western creditors considered the construction of a highway in Montenegro unprofitable (Vukićević, 2021), even though the highway would connect with Corridor 11 and then to Corridor 10 (cf. Figure 2), highways built or planned in Serbia that would link Montenegro, especially the Port of Bar, with Serbia, then extending to Budapest and Zagreb, and



Figure 2: Corridors 10 and 11 (Source: Grgić, 2017, 7).

ultimately to Western Europe. By 2013, Montenegro had failed to find creditors willing to finance the construction of the highway. In 2009 and 2010, the Montenegrin government held unsuccessful negotiations with the Croatian company Konstruktor, which failed to secure the funds in time. Additionally, discussions with the Greek-Israeli consortium Aktor/HCH also proved fruitless, as the consortium failed to provide the necessary financial guarantees within the specified period (Kovačević, 2021). The only remaining option for the Montenegrin government was to turn to China, a recognised global leader in funding infrastructure projects, as the primary source of financial support.

The total length of the planned highway was 169.2 kilometres. Montenegro secured a loan from the Chinese EXIM Bank, valued at approximately 868 million US dollars, for the construction of the initial 41-kilometre-long Smokovac–Uvac–Matešev section (GEODATA, 2021). In the meantime, the funds necessary for the construction of this first section rose to 1.3 billion euros. This segment of the highway connects Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro, where one-third of the country's total population resides, with Kolašin, a town in the north of the country. This section is also the most costly due to the configuration of the terrain. The premise is that the highway as a whole would cost Montenegro around 1.7 billion euros (Arbutina, 2020). For comparison, Montenegro's budget for 2020 amounted to 4.779 billion dollars, and the debt associated with the highway, coupled with the pre-existing public debt, resulted in Montenegro having a 74.91% share of public debt in GDP in 2019 (Trading Economics, 2022). Montenegro's debt to Chinese creditors, stemming from the highway project, accounted for almost a quarter of Montenegro's GDP and threat-

ened the stability of public finances if it continued to grow.

Two independent financial sustainability assessments, one undertaken by the French company Louis Berger in 2009 and the other by the American company URS, indicated potential risks to the functioning of public finances and the sustainability of the project (Barkin & Vasovic, 2018). A third study was conducted in support of the project, but its findings were not published. The Law on the Highway, adopted in 2014, provided for significant concessions from Montenegro for the project, such as tax exemptions for construction works, labour, and imports associated with the highway construction (Preferential Buyer Credit Loan Agreement, 2014). Montenegro also assumed a considerable exchange rate risk by agreeing to accept the project financing in US dollars (Navarro et al., 2022). The contract with EXIM Bank stipulated an exemption from income tax for Chinese workers and Montenegrin companies involved as subcontractors. All these points are the matrix of the behaviour of a country in transition, actively seeking to attract investors by issuing state guarantees. This approach to financial dealings has been severely criticised in several European Commission reports on Montenegro's integration process (European Commission, 2018), and also by domestic institutions such as the State Audit Institution (Dabović & Pešić, 2013).

One of the most cited analyses, titled "How China Lends?" (Gelpert et al., 2021), also includes the example of Montenegro in order to prove the geopolitical character of Chinese financial affairs in different parts of the world. Although the case of Montenegro was not specifically addressed, the authors concluded that they "find widespread use of 'No Paris Club' and 'no comparability of treat-

ment' clauses – that expressly prohibit the borrower country from restructuring their outstanding debts to China in coordination with Paris Club creditors and/or on comparable terms with them" (Gelpern et al., 2021, 45).

The part that is particularly worrying and is at the core of the debt trap narrative is a clause (Article 5) within the contract. According to this clause, in case of non-payment of the debt, Montenegro waives its immunity based on sovereignty, except for military assets and property related to diplomatic-consular missions, within any possible arbitration procedure. In essence, that means that if Montenegro were to default on its debt, any and all state property or infrastructure, with limited exceptions, could potentially be seized by China, as the creditor, to satisfy the terms of the outstanding debt (Preferential Buyer Credit Loan Agreement, 2014). Precisely because of this vulnerability, Montenegro was listed as one of the eight highly endangered countries in a separate report by the Center for Global Development (Hurley et al., 2018).

REACTIONS TO MONTENEGRO'S CREDIT DEBT

The case of Montenegro has attracted the attention of Western institutions and researchers in particular. Most studies characterise the issue as a typical example of debt diplomacy. However, we believe that the case of Montenegro is rather an example of how a country in transition functions in the international financial and business environment. Borrowing from Chinese creditors was simply the most affordable option for Montenegro after years of searching for creditors. At the same time, narratives around China's desire to make Montenegro politically dependent can be dismissed immediately; this contention is further strengthened by Montenegro's NATO membership. The project, alongside the search for investors and creditors, was motivated by a clear multi-year political agenda in the country.

The fact that the highway was at the top of the political and electoral agenda of the then government in Montenegro is evident in the narrative that has been present in the Montenegrin public since 2014, referred to as "the project of the century" or "the national project that was only more important than the restoration of the independence of Montenegro" (Vijesti, 2017). At the time, President Milo Đukanović placed the responsibility for the highway and its geopolitical implications in the context of the EU's relationship with the Western Balkans region, stressing that Chinese capital was doing what the EU should be doing (B92, 2018). On the other hand, the intense response from the political opposition, segments of the professional

community, and the civil sector raised concerns about possible corruption, a debt crisis, and the catastrophic reflection of the debt on the sustainability of public finances. Consequently, the Movement for Change, then an opposition party, launched a petition calling for a referendum on the construction of the highway (Boričić, 2014). Furthermore, the NGO MANS filed a criminal complaint against the Ministers of Transport and Finance, alleging harmful behaviour during the conclusion of the contract for the highway construction project (Mina, 2014). After the change of government in 2020, ending the thirty-year rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists, the new government and the parties of the parliamentary majority viewed the completion of the construction of the highway as a significant success. The focus then shifted to publicising all contracts and assessing the potential environmental impact of the highway. Representatives of the new government made extensive use of media appearances to highlight the importance of the highway, again to strengthen their political agenda, particularly given that the highway became operational during their mandate. This is another indication that the various ruling structures viewed the highway as a compelling argument for their political relevance.

In mid-March 2021, the then Deputy Prime Minister of Montenegro, Dritan Abazović, asked the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs to help repay the loan. "Please help us to repay that money, to exchange that loan for a loan with a European bank, to conclude cooperation with a European financial institution, and to end Chinese influence", Abazović said at the time (Al Jazeera, 2021). Afterwards, Montenegro sent an official letter to the European Commission requesting the above-mentioned assistance (Tuhina, 2021). In response, the EU clarified that it could not aid Montenegro repay debts acquired from third parties (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2021). Within the EU itself, Montenegro's debt issue triggered a debate about the bloc's strategic positioning in the Western Balkans. High Representative Josep Borrell emphasised the strategic importance of the Montenegro – China relationship, stating, "Montenegro is in the EU's backyard: it would be, finally, a concrete way to show that the EU is indeed a player, a true geostrategic actor, [and not] just the playground" (Ivković, 2021). After the EU's initial negative response in 2021, the Montenegrin government eventually made a hedging arrangement in cooperation with two American banks and one French bank. This arrangement reduced the interest rate on the debt owed to the Chinese Exim Bank from 2% to 0.8%, resulting in annual savings of eight million euros (Nyabiage, 2021). The issue of

Montenegro's debt resurfaced in July 2021 during discussions on Sino-US relations. The then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of the United States of America, Matthew Palmer, assessed that the hedging arrangement protected Montenegro from the currency risk of the Bar-Boljare highway loan and that the reduced interest rate limited China's influence (RTCG, 2021). By contrast, in the domestic public debate, this financial arrangement faced criticism. Members of the Parliament demanded that the documents be made public, while analysts pointed out that after two years, depending on global financial trends, such an arrangement could mean either a profit or a loss for Montenegro's budget (DAN, 2021).

It is interesting that the actions of the EU, i.e. the expressed pragmatism towards Montenegrin debt, did not affect citizens' confidence in the EU. Support for membership remains extremely high, as does the assessment that Montenegro should rely on the EU to the greatest extent in its foreign policy (CEDEM, 2022). On the other hand, if we exclude the period of negative narratives about China during the COVID-19 pandemic, the percentage of those who evaluate China's role positively is stable at about 40%, placing China in second place just behind the EU and well ahead of individual Western countries (Kovačević, 2021, 7). In addition to the fact that issues related to China's debt diplomacy have been lost in the public debate, these data also indicate that citizens do not perceive the relationship between Montenegro and China as a factor that would disturb their attitudes towards the EU. However, we believe that the EU missed a significant moment to position itself as an important geopolitical actor, to indicate its sphere of influence, and to strengthen its soft power in Montenegro and the region by taking an active role in solving this problem. By contrast, the position of China in Montenegro is the result of a developed network of soft power instruments. As Tonchev argues, "the safest way to assess the effectiveness of China's soft-power strategy in WB countries would be a review of China's reputation, as reflected in opinion polls" and adds that according to some surveys "it is clear China is markedly more popular in the region [of South-east Europe] than in other parts of EU" (Tonchev, 2020, 19). There is almost no perception of the ideological framework in which China operates within Montenegrin public opinion, while public debates on China's domestic policy and respect for human rights are very rare. Political, cultural and economic cooperation, as part of a wider range of soft power, has only gained importance. Research from 2017 indicates that 56% of respondents believe that Montenegro would best achieve its

interests by strengthening ties with China (International Republican Institute, 2017). According to the same survey, China ranked third in the most desirable countries for investing in Montenegro, while 16% of respondents had the perception that China is the largest investor in Montenegro, just behind the EU in the first place. The previously mentioned evidence proves that in the years after the re-independence of Montenegro, China managed to build a favourable position in the public opinion and perception of Montenegrin citizens, indicating the influence and scope of its soft power in Montenegro. The enormous apparatus of China's soft power is based on building the image of a friendly state and a desirable economic partner that strives to achieve a win-win situation in every type of relationship without a "specific soft power strategy for this region" (Tonchev, 2020, 5). Based on the data shown, in the case of Montenegro, it can be concluded that this tactic has succeeded. The impact is based mainly on strengthening bilateral relations. Unlike developed democracies, such as North America, Germany, and Japan, where there is a very negative perception of Chinese influence (Nye, 2015), in Montenegro, a developing democracy, this is not the case. Due to the pronounced economic side of bilateral relations over the previous 15 years, we believe that this is another aspect due to which the Montenegrin authorities perceived China as a desirable highway creditor. That is why China's soft power strategy in Montenegro can be measured much more as a complement to its' economic presence than as a separate strategy per se. We understand this as a modified soft power concept in which economic power has taken on the aspects of soft power and is defined as commercial diplomacy in the context of soft influence.

CONCLUSION

In this scientific article, we investigated whether Montenegro is a target of Chinese debt diplomacy. We presented the economic relationship between Montenegro and China, and vice versa, along with the presentation of the most important parameters such as the volume of foreign trade and direct foreign investments. The primary focus of the work was on the financial debt arrangement that Montenegro agreed with the Chinese EXIM Bank in 2014, with the aim of building its first highway. The main conclusion of the research is that China did not conduct debt diplomacy towards Montenegro and that the request for indebtedness came from the Montenegrin side; thus, it was not in any way encouraged by China. In addition, we rejected claims suggesting that the Montenegrin Port of Bar would be a potential prey for China if Montenegro could not repay its debt.

When it comes to answering the first research question i.e. *How do the critics of borrowing relate to the wider issues of debt sustainability, financial stability and sovereignty of Montenegro?*, we believe that the answer lies not only in the Montenegrin debt to China but that it should be derived from wider scientific discussions. As explained in this paper, China has emerged as a major global lender, a policy initiated in the 1980s but only actualised in the first and second decades of the 21st century due to accusations of debt diplomacy and questionable intentions. As previously highlighted, related studies encompassing numerous examples of countries in Africa and Asia borrowing from China indicate that China behaves benignly and without ulterior motives. Therefore, from the perspective of Chinese lending practices, it would be unprecedented to attempt to seize part of Montenegro's national assets, in the hypothetical situation that Montenegro could not repay the loan. In the regional context, it would be short-sighted of China to risk compromising its international reputation by trying to annex part of the territory of Montenegro. We might also add to that the fact that the potential of China's soft power would be greatly harmed and that the gain would be disproportionately small compared to the reputation damage to China.

Montenegro, as a candidate for EU membership and a member of NATO, has successfully managed both to become part of the Western security architecture and to satisfy its need for Chinese financing. This experience could in the future serve as a model for cooperation between other small countries and China, particularly when these nations become integrated into security architectures distinct from China's.

As regards the second research question, i.e. *To what extent does borrowing affect relations between the European Union and Montenegro, bearing in mind the latter's integration process in the EU?*, Montenegro's debt to Chinese lenders has received a lot of attention within the EU. The EU was in a delicate position when Montenegro formally sought assistance, due to China's debt diplomacy. The EU could not help Montenegro directly, as this would have violated longstanding regulations governing how countries deal with loans from third parties. However, with the assistance of European and American banks, Montenegro was able to enter into a hedging arrangement that greatly helped it financially. Through this indirect aid, Montenegro continued to enjoy a form of EU protection. Apart from this episode, the transport infrastructure that China is developing in the Balkans and throughout Europe is supported by the EU. This is demonstrated by various joint transport improvement programmes, from which both Brussels and Beijing clearly benefit. Considering that Montenegro's highway project constitutes only a small segment of a broader road network, we conclude that the whole initiative is about the complementarity of EU and Chinese policies, with a reminder that Montenegro's stance towards the EU remains unchanged, despite the EU not directly intervening in the settlement of the loan issue.

The article analysed the economic relationship between Montenegro and China, in the light of the Montenegrin loan for the construction of its first highway. This loan served as a basis for claims that China is using debt diplomacy with Montenegro. This investigation paves the way for future research into the political relations between these two countries, the attitudes of Montenegrin citizens towards China through public opinion surveys, and the content of the narratives about China in the Montenegrin media.

PONOVNI RAZMISLEK DIPLOMACIJE DOLŽNIŠKE PASTI: ŠTUDIJA PRIMERA DOLGA ČRNE GORE DO KITAJSKÉ

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POVZETEK

V zadnjih letih je dolžniška diplomacija močno vstopila v politologijo in diplomacijo. Ker se zavedamo razširjenosti enostranskih pogledov na ta pojav, smo v prispevku želeli na novo osvetliti gospodarsko aktivnost Kitajske v Evropi z analizo odnosa s Črno goro na primeru izgradnje prve avtoceste v Črni gori. Pregled literature je s pomočjo znanstvene in javnopolitične analize omogočil celovit vpogled v izvor in razvoj tega pojava. Z obdelavo razpoložljivih primarnih podatkov smo opozorili na pomen raziskovanja gospodarskih odnosov med Kitajsko in Črno goro z vidika ekonomskih dejavnikov, kot so neposredne tuje investicije, zadolženost in javni dolg. Pokazali smo, da je Kitajska za Črno goro relevanten gospodarski partner in da poleg tega, da je največja posamična upnica, v Črni gori nima izrazitega gospodarskega položaja, ki bi ji dajal pomembno geostrateško lego. Z združevanjem ekonomskih in pravnih vidikov zadolževanja smo pokazali, da je ta poslovni odnos del notranjepolitičnega pomena in da so ga dominantno oblikovale politične elite v Črni gori. Z analizo smo izpostavili mednarodni pomen tega primera s poudarkom na odzivu EU in njihovi (ne)komplementarnosti s pobudami EU na Zahodnem Balkanu. Rezultati raziskave so pokazali znanstveno nevzdržnost kitajske dolžniške diplomacije na primeru Črne gore.

Ključne besede: Kitajska, Črna gora, diplomacija dolžniške pasti, mehka moč

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VKLJUČEVANJE SLOVENIJE V ZVEZO NATO: PRISPEVEK OBRAMBNEGA IN ZUNANJEGA MINISTRSTVA

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IZVLEČEK

Članek predstavi proces vključevanja Slovenije v zvezo Nato v obdobju 1999–2004 ter pregled dejavnosti in korakov ministrstva za obrambo in ministrstva za zunanje zadeve, ki so Sloveniji omogočili dosego cilja – vključitev v zvezo Nato. V tem obdobju je Slovenija intenzivno mednarodno sodelovala na obrambnem in zunanjepolitičnem področju, hkrati pa aktivno preoblikovala nacionalni varnostni sistem po letnih nacionalnih programih za članstvo in akcijskih načrtih za včlanitev v zvezo. Pozitiven izid referenduma o članstvu v zavezništvu je kljub nasprotovanju določenega dela politike, civilne družbe in akademskega sveta zagotovil legitimno podporo javnosti.

Ključne besede: zveza Nato, Slovenska vojska, ministrstvo za obrambo, ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve, letni nacionalni program za članstvo, akcijski načrt za članstvo v Natu

ADESIONE DELLA SLOVENIA ALLA NATO: CONTRIBUTO DEL MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA E DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

SINTESI

L'articolo presenta il processo di adesione della Slovenia alla NATO nel periodo 1999–2004, nonché una panoramica delle attività e dei passi compiuti dal Ministero della Difesa e dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri, che hanno consentito alla Slovenia di raggiungere l'obiettivo di aderire alla NATO. Durante questo periodo, la Slovenia ha collaborato intensamente a livello internazionale nel campo della difesa e della politica estera, trasformando allo stesso tempo attivamente il sistema di sicurezza nazionale secondo i programmi nazionali annuali per l'adesione e i piani d'azione per l'adesione alla federazione. L'esito positivo del referendum sull'adesione all'alleanza, nonostante l'opposizione di una certa parte della politica, della società civile e del mondo accademico, ha assicurato il legittimo sostegno pubblico.

Parole chiave: NATO, Forze armate slovene, Ministero della Difesa, Ministero degli Affari esteri, Programma nazionale annuale di adesione, Piano d'azione per l'adesione alla NATO

UVOD

Namen članka je prikazati in komentirati proces vključevanja Slovenije v zvezo Nato. Proces se je stopnjeval v obdobju od leta 1999 do leta 2004, zaznamovanega z dejansko vključitvijo v zavezništvo. Pogojevanje je bilo sprejemom ustrezne zakonodaje, prilagoditvijo obrambno-varnostnega sistema standardom zveze Nato, uresničevanjem letnih akcijskih načrtov za članstvo v zvezi Nato in demokratičnim procesom odločanja o včlanitvi.

Zveza Nato je v obdobju po vključitvi Slovenije v letu 2004 v svoje vrste sprejela še več držav, danes šteje 32 članic. Širitve na vzhod in želje Ukrajine po članstvu v zvezi pa Ruska federacija ni sprejela z naklonjenostjo. Spor o namerah Ukrajine glede članstva v zavezništvo in njenih notranjih regijah je 24. februarja 2022 pripeljal do ruske agresije na Ukraino, ki je prerasla v vojno, v kateri sta na ukrajinski strani z vojaško pomočjo posredno angažirani zveza Nato in Slovenija. Zveza Nato je prav zaradi tega spopada ponovno dobila težo, saj sta državi, kot sta Švedska in Finska, v letu 2022 izrazili željo po priključitvi zavezništvo. Finska in švedska priključitev sta bili že realizirani.

Zveza Nato je politično-obrambna meddržavna organizacija in kot taka proizvod hladne vojne, ki želi k svojim osnovnim nalogam, ohranjanju ozemelske celovitosti, neodvisnosti in kolektivne obrambe, dodati nove. Te so povezane z radikalnimi geostrateškimi, geopolitičnimi in geoekonomske spremembami v mednarodni skupnosti po koncu hladne vojne (1990), z razpadom bipolarnega mednarodnega sistema, razpadom nekaterih večnacionalnih držav (Jugoslavije, Sovjetske zveze, Češkoslovaške), razširitvijo tržnega gospodarstva na svetovni ravni, in v smislu širitve zavezništva na nove članice predstavljajo izziv za vse, obstoječe članice zavezništva in države, ki sprejmejo katero od mogočih oblik sodelovanja preko programa Partnerstvo za mir (PzM) pa vse do polnopravnega članstva v Natu.

V tako nepredvidljivem mednarodnem varnostnem okolju si je morala novonastala slovenska država pridobiti mednarodnopravno subjektiviteto in si zagotoviti obrambni vidik svoje suverenosti. Odločitev slovenskega političnega razreda za vključitev države v evroatlantske integracijske procese je dobila podporo državljanov na izvedenih referendumih 23. marca 2003. Čeprav je v Evropsko unijo (EU) in zvezo Nato vstopala Republika Slovenija z vsemi svojimi institucijami, pa sta imeli v tem procesu na izvršilni ravni glavno vlogo zlasti dve ministrstvi – ministrstvo za obrambo in ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve.

V članku želim ugotoviti, ali je bila ta vloga res tako pomembna, zato bom skušal odgovoriti na naslednji raziskovalni vprašanje: Kakšno vlogo je v procesu vključevanja Slovenije v zvezo Nato odigralo Ministrstvo za obrambo RS in kakšno Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve RS?

Pri preučevanju procesa vključevanja Slovenije v zvezo Nato sem uporabil naslednje znanstvene metode: deskripcijo, analizo, sintezo in kompilacijo.

Članek je strukturno razdeljen na uvod, dve poglavji s pregledom aktivnosti obrambnega in zunanjega ministrstva pri vključevanju v zvezo Nato, poglavje, ki preučuje odnos družbe in politike do tega vprašanja, ter zaključek.

AKTIVNOSTI OBRAMBNEGA MINISTRSTVA PRI VKLJUČEVANJU SLOVENIJE V ZVEZO NATO OD LETA 1999 DO LETA 2004

Usmeritve, ki zadevajo nacionalno varnost Republike Slovenije, so bile zapisane v Resoluciji o strategiji nacionalne varnosti RS, sprejete v državnem zboru decembra 1993 (Resolucija o izhodiščih zasnove nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije, 1993), in v dopolnitvah resolucije leta 1994 z jasno izraženim ciljem vključitve v zvezo Nato in Zahodnoevropsko unijo (Resolucija o izhodiščih zasnove nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije, 1994). Temu cilju približevanja zavezništvo je obrambno-varnostni sistem Slovenije sledil do prve širitve zveze Nato v letu 1999, v kateri so bile povabljenе Poljska, Češka in Madžarska. V prvem krogu širitve Slovenija ni bila povabljenā v zavezništvo, zato pa se je s še večjo intenzivnostjo prilagajanja obrambnega sistema in zakonodaje trudila za sprejetje v drugem krogu. Ta se je z normativnega vidika skliceval na 10. člen Severnoatlantske pogodbe (Priročnik o zvezi Nato, 2001, 539), najpomembnejšo vlogo pa so igrali politični dejavniki. Kot del razvoja zveze Nato na področju še tesnejšega sodelovanja z državami nečlanicami zavezništva na vojaškem področju se je na vrhu zveze Nato v Bruslju januarja 1994 odprla pot programu Partnerstvo za mir. Sprejet je bil skupaj z bruseljsko deklaracijo, ki je omogočila širitev zveze z novimi državami iz vzhodne Evrope (Grizold, 1999, 79; 2022). Vanj so bile povabljenе vse partnerske države Severnoatlantskega sveta za sodelovanje in države članice Konference o varnosti in sodelovanju v Evropi. Objavljen je bil tudi okvirni dokument Partnerstva za mir (Priročnik o zvezi Nato, 2001, 474).

Po podpisu okvirnega dokumenta med Slovenijo in zvezo Nato so se začela pogajanja o področjih in oblikah obrambnega sodelovanja, ki so bila podlaga za individualni program Partnerstva za mir. Dokument je na sedežu zavezništva v Bruslju podpisal takratni predsednik Vlade RS dr. Janez Drnovšek.

Formalno je proces nadzoroval Severnoatlantski svet za sodelovanje, v dejanskem operativnem smislu pa je nad procesom bdela politično-vojaški nadzorni odbor pod predsedovanjem namestnika generalnega sekretarja zveze Nato. Organ je skupaj s predstavniki partnerske države oblikoval letni delovni program in individualni program Partnerstva za mir ter spremljal njuno uresničitev. Praktično izvajanje programov in vojaških vaj

je bilo v pristojnosti koordinacijske celice s sedežem v Monsu. V okviru Partnerstva za mir je bil januarja 1995 vzpostavljen proces načrtovanja in ocenjevanja. Program je zvezi Nato omogočil svojevrstno preobrazbo iz zaprte vojaške zveze zahodnih držav v odprt proces zbliževanja z novimi državami, potencialnimi članicami zavezništva. Vanj so bile vključene države, ki so bile še do pred nekaj leti več desetletij onkraj »železne zaveze«, pa tudi države, ki niso bile blokovsko opredeljene. Črtal je delitve, vzpostavljene med hladno vojno (Grizold, 1999, 81; 2022). Maja 1997 je bil na zasedanju Severnoatlantskega sveta v Sintri na Portugalskem ustanovljen Evroatlantski partnerski svet, ki je nasledil Severnoatlantski svet za sodelovanje, z namenom doseganja boljšega sodelovanja v okviru Partnerstva za mir zveze Nato (Priročnik o zvezi Nato, 2001, 495). Leta 1997 je Državni zbor Republike Slovenije sprejel Deklaracijo o vključevanju v zvezo Nato.

Po kakšni poti bo šla Slovenija kot novonastala država na obrambno-varnostnem področju, je bilo eno od pomembnejših političnih vprašanj. Sistem kolektivne obrambe (Grizold, 1998, 11; 2022) je bil ena od možnosti, za katero se je v nadaljnjem razvoju odločila slovenska obrambna politika. Na voljo so bile tudi druge opcije, denimo popolna naslonitev na lastne oborožene sile s članstvom v Organizaciji združenih narodov, pridobitev statusa oborožene nevtralnosti, dvostranski varnostni sporazum z močnejšo državo, vključitev v evroatlantske varnostne strukture Zahodno-evropske unije, Evropska unija, Nato in kombinacija več zadev (Grizold, 2022). Leta 1994 se je s pristopom k programu Partnerstva za mir začela pot pridruževanja Natu, ki se je končala 29. marca 2004, ko je Slovenija postala petindvajseta polnopravna članica zveze Nato (Šteiner, 2015, 46). Po sprejetju Deklaracije o vključevanju v Nato v državnem zboru leta 1997 je predsednik države Milan Kučan podpisal ukaz o ustanovitvi misije Republike Slovenije pri Natu, vendar Slovenija še ni bila povabljen k pristopnim pogovorom za članstvo (Sotlar et al., 2020, 15).

Za to obdobje je značilno intenzivno mednarodno sodelovanje, katerega težišče je bilo približevanje zvezi Nato, Evropski uniji, sodelovanje s sosednjimi državami na področju obrambe in sodelovanje v mednarodnih mirovnih operacijah. Že v letu 1999 so bili podpisani splošni sporazumi o sodelovanju na področju obrambe med Slovenijo in naslednjimi državami: Portugalsko, Madžarsko, Nizozemsko, Estonijo in Grčijo. Opravljenih je bilo 21 obiskov obrambnih ministrov, Slovenijo pa so obiskali obrambni ministri Kanade, Portugalske, Poljske, Nizozemske, Slovaške, Češke in Italije (Poročilo o delu MO RS, 1999, 2). V procesu načrtovanja in ocenjevanja so 27 ciljev poveztivosti razširili za dva, sprejetih je bilo osem začetnih partnerskih ciljev. Pripadniki Slovenske vojske so februarja 1999 začeli sodelovati v operaciji »Joint Forge« v Bosni in Hercegovini z vodom vojaške policije. Maja 1999 je v operaciji mednarodnih

sil v Albaniji Slovenska vojska sodelovala z bataljonsko sanitetno postajo. 15. brigada vojaškega letalstva je nadaljevala sodelovanje v operaciji stabilizacijskih sil v Bosni in Hercegovini in v mirovni operaciji Organizacije združenih narodov na Cipru – z do 30 vojakov v skupini (Poročilo o delu MO RS, 1999, 4). Okrepljeno je bilo vojaško predstavništvo stalne misije Republike Slovenije pri zvezi Nato. Zlasti je bilo razvidno sodelovanje z Združenimi državami Amerike v okviru programa vojska vojski, bilateralnega sodelovanja in Partnerstva za mir. Pod okriljem individualnega partnerskega programa je bilo v obravnavanem obdobju izvedenih 132 različnih aktivnosti. Aktiven je bil verifikacijski center Slovenske vojske, ki je organiziral predstavitev vojaških objektov in novouvedene oborožitve (tanka T 55 S1 in havbic H 155-mm) za opazovalce iz 21 držav Organizacije za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi. Izvedena je bila evalvacija pri oboroženih silah Hrvaške in Italije. Slovenija je leta 1999 sprejela evalvacijo od Slovaške. V skladu z zaključki vrha zveze Nato v Washingtonu je bil v pripravi akcijski načrt za vključevanje v zvezo (Poročilo o delu MO RS, 1999, 5).

Na vrhovnem zasedanju Nata v Washingtonu je bil leta 1999 sprejet akcijski načrt, v katerem je bila vključena tudi Slovenija. S tem mejnikom se je končalo prvo obdobje na slovenski poti v Nato. Programi Partnerstva za mir in zlasti proces načrtovanja in ocenjevanja so v šestih letih zaznamovali tranzicijski proces in prispevali k spoznanju, da bo treba v nadaljevanju izvesti še več temeljitejših sprememb. Skladno z akcijskim načrtom, ki je predstavljal program, s katerim je Nato opredelil predvideno stanje prihodnje članice, je Slovenija od leta 1999 pripravljala letne nacionalne programe za članstvo. Nacionalni programi so obsegali pet področij: (1) političnoekonomske zadeve, (2) obrambno-vojaške zadeve, (3) varnostne zadeve, (4) pravne zadeve in (5) finančne zadeve (Šteiner, 2015, 83).

Letni nacionalni programi so nastajali v posebnem postopku dialoga z Natom, na podlagi katerega si je država za omenjena področja določila cilje, izvedbene naloge in roke zanje ter se tako približala predvidenemu stanju in znotraj tega postavljenim standardom. Program aktivnosti po področjih in ocenjevanje napredka pri doseganju ciljev in uresničevanju nalog je oblikovala država sama, zveza Nato pa je skrbela za oblikovanje ocene napredka in njeno potrditev pri pristojnem delovnem telesu ter na politični ravni. Posebno delovno telo je bil odbor za pregled obrambe, politični organ pa je bil Evroatlantski partnerski svet.

Če proces načrtovanja in ocenjevanja primerjamo s procesom sprejemanja ter ocenjevanja akcijskih načrtov, lahko pri zadnjem opazimo višjo stopnjo zahtevnosti in tudi odgovornosti, čeprav je bilo v izvedbenem delu veliko podobnosti (Šteiner, 2015, 84).

V letu 2000 si je ministstvo za obrambo pod vodstvom ministra dr. Antona Grizolda, ki je v tem letu nastopil mandat, kot prioritetni cilj zastavilo doseči vse

standarde zveze Nato na področju organizacije obrambnega sistema, zakonodaje in začetka demokratičnega procesa za vstop v zavezništvo (Grizold, 2023). Za doseganje tega cilja so bili pripravljani planski dokumenti za leta 2001, 2002 in 2003. Naj poudarim nekaj strateških ciljev ministrstva za obrambo: izboljšanje in popolnitev kadrovske strukture Slovenske vojske, povečanje pripravljenosti Slovenije na obrambno-vojaškem področju za vključitev v Nato in na sodelovanje v skupni evropski varnostni in obrambni politiki (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2001, 3).

V državnem zboru je bil leta 2001 sprejet temeljni konstitutivni in razvojni dokument Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti, ki ga je skupaj z drugimi resorji pripravilo ministrstvo za obrambo. V resoluciji so bili opredeljeni temeljni in strateški cilji države, ocenjene so bile spremembe v varnostnem okolju in določene usmeritve politik, ki sestavljajo politiko nacionalne varnosti. Razčlenjene so bile struktura sistema nacionalne varnosti in temeljne usmeritve za razvoj ključnih treh pod-sistemov (obrambnega, varnostnega ter sistema varstva pred naravnimi in drugimi nesrečami). Na tej podlagi je bil sprejet nov Splošni dolgoročni program razvoja in opremljanja Slovenske vojske, ki je nadomestil program iz začetka leta 2000. Določal je temeljne usmeritve in rešitve za nadaljevanje preoblikovanja Slovenske vojske in konec tega procesa v obdobju do leta 2007, nekatere usmeritve so bile določene do leta 2010.

Vlada Republike Slovenije je konec leta 2001 sprejela Obrambno strategijo Republike Slovenije in na tej podlagi pripravila spremembe drugih dokumentov in normativnih rešitev (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2001, 11; 2002, 9).

Ministrstvo za obrambo je tudi leta 2002, ki se je končalo z vrhunskim zasedanjem zveze Nato v Pragi, nadaljevalo neposredne priprave za vključitev v Nato, skladno z opredelitvami v Resoluciji o strategiji nacionalne varnosti. Ta je jasno opredeljevala strateško usmeritev Slovenije, da postane članica Nata in EU, zato je tudi nacionalna varnostna politika bila oblikovana na domnevi o prihodnjem članstvu v zvezi, k čemur je bilo usmerjeno preoblikovanje nacionalnega varnostnega sistema. Dejavnosti za vključevanje v Nato in skupno evropsko varnostno in obrambno politiko so potekale na dvostranskih in večstranskih področjih (Organizacija združenih narodov, Organizacija za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi, Pobuda za sodelovanje srednjeevropskih držav v podporo miru, Pobuda za sodelovanje obrambnih ministrstev Jugovzhodne Evrope, Pakt stabilnosti za Jugovzhodno Evropo in drugih). Posebna pozornost se je posvečala seznanjanju slovenske javnosti z namenom pridobivanja podpore za članstvo Slovenije v Natu (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2001, 24–25).

Na obrambnem področju so se leta 2002 začeli procesi, ki so povzročili korenite spremembe v obrambnem sistemu. Odvijalo se je delo pri projektu Strateški pregled obrambe, katerega temeljni namen je bil pregled

stanja obrambe na področjih reorganizacije Slovenske vojske in ministrstva za obrambo, profesionalizacije vojske, graditve soglasja na obrambnem področju ter zagotovitve obsežne skupne vizije prihodnjih obrambnih potreb Republike Slovenije in nalog obrambnih sil. Rezultat projekta je omogočil podlago za pripravo akcijskega načrta obrambnih reform do leta 2010, splošnega dolgoročnega programa Slovenske vojske do leta 2015 in srednjeročnega obrambnega programa za obdobje 2004–2009 ter sintezo dejavnosti vključevanja v zvezo Nato (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2002, 12).


V skladu s smernicami za delo ministrstva za obrambo do leta 2004 in prednostnimi nalogami za leto 2002 so bile sprejete spremembe in dopolnitve za delo ministrstva za obrambo, Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o obrambi (Ur. l. RS, št. 47/02) ter Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o vojaški dolžnosti (Ur. l. RS, št. 86/02). Predstavljale so normativne podlage za preoblikovanje Slovenske vojske, spremembo sistema njenega popolnjenja in prilagoditev državne zakonodaje za prevzemanje obveznosti pri izvajanju skupne obrambe z zavezniškimi državami. V spremenjen Zakon o obrambi so bile vključene številne novosti. Zakon določa, da Slovensko vojsko sestavljajo sile za posredovanje in glavne ter dopolnilne sile, poleg tega določa tudi njihovo namembnost (Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o obrambi, št. 47/02, 40. člen). Spremembe so omogočile pravno podlago za uvedbo prostovoljne službe v rezervni sestavi, kar je bil pomemben del sprememb v sistemu popolnjenja ob prehodu na poklicno vojsko. Na novo je bilo urejeno opravljanje vojaške službe zunaj države v miru, ki jo opravljajo poklicni pripadniki – vojaške in civilne osebe, zaposlene v Slovenski vojski ali na ministrstvu za določen ali nedoločen čas ali le za posamezno misijo (Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o obrambi, št. 47/02, 47., 48. b in 48. c člen). Zakon je na novo uredil vojaško obrambo zunaj države. Ob povečani nevarnosti napada na državo ali neposredni vojni nevarnosti lahko v skladu z odločitvami državnega zbora in sklenjenimi mednarodnimi pogodbami vojaško službo pri vojaški obrambi zunaj države poleg pripadnikov poklicne sestave opravljajo tudi pripadniki vojne sestave. Te določbe so postale uresničljive z vključitvijo v zvezo Nato. Vojaška obramba ni opredeljevala sodelovanja v operacijah v podporo miru, v katerih je Slovenija sodelovala že kot članica Organizacije združenih narodov, Partnerstva za mir ali je nameravala v prihodnje sodelovati kot članica zveze Nato (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2002, 15).

Strukturne spremembe v Slovenski vojski

Na ministrstvu za obrambo so proti koncu leta 2003 zaradi številnih sprememb, ki so se zgodile na obrambnem področju, pripravili Strateški pregled obrambe. V dokumentu so opisali pregled stanja na področju obrambnih reform, ocenili varnostno okolje,

Tabela 1: Zaposlitve na Ministrstvu za obrambo RS in v Slovenski vojski (Vir: Ministrstvo za obrambo RS, dopis/informacija MO z dne 28. 9. 2023).

MORS	31.12.1999	31.12.2000	31.12.2001	31.12.2002	31.12.2003	31.12.2004
1911-NOE MORS	1560	1454	1428	1425	1163	1155
1912-URSZR	69	86	87	84	324	338
1913-IRSVNDN	62	64	63	61	67	67
1915-IRSO					20	18
SKUPAJ	1691	1604	1578	1570	1574	1578
1914-GŠSV	4393	4873	5043	5583	6376	6944
SKUPAJ MORS	6084	6477	6621	7153	7950	8522

**Graf 1: Zaposlitve na Ministrstvu za obrambo RS in v Slovenski vojski (Vir: Ministrstvo za obrambo RS, dopis/informacija MO z dne 28. 9. 2023).**


razvoj varnostnega sistema in opisali cilje nacionalne varnostne politike. Predstavljala je temelj splošnega dolgoročnega razvoja in opremljanja Slovenske vojske do leta 2015 ter srednjeročnega programa za obdobje 2005–2010. Strateški pregled obrambe je bil tudi osnova za spremembe Zakona o obrambi in številne reorganizacije in racionalizacije na ministrstvu za obrambo. V letu 2003 je prišlo do sprememb in dopolnitev podzakonskih predpisov, potrebnih za izvajanje Zakona o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o obrambi (Ur. l. RS, št. 47/02) in Zakona o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o vojaški dolžnosti (Ur. l. RS, št. 86/02), sprejetih leta 2002. Z uvajanjem sprememb, izhajajočih iz noveliranega zakona, je bila v sestavo Slovenske vojske uvedena kategorija vojaških uslužbencev, posebna skupina vojaških oseb za opravljanje pravnih, kadrovskih, finančnih, tehničnih in nekaterih drugih del, potrebnih za dejavnost Slovenske vojske. Njihove naloge ter zahtevano izobrazbo in stopnje je uredila

Uredba o vojaških uslužbencih (Ur. l. RS, št. 54/03). Z Uredbo o prostovoljnem služenju vojaškega roka so bili opredeljeni splošni pogoji služenja vojaškega roka in vse podrobnosti, ki zadevajo prostovoljce na služenju v Slovenski vojski. Z dopolnitvijo Pravil službe Slovenske vojske so se uredila statusna in delovnopravna vprašanja vojaške službe ter prehoda na poklicno vojsko s pogodbeno rezervo. Z Zakonom o obrambi je bila povezana tudi izdaja Uredbe o dovoljenjih in soglasjih za promet in proizvodnjo vojaškega orožja in opreme. Zaradi razvoja in reform obrambnega sistema je bila sprejeta Uredba o organizaciji in delovanju upravnih zvez (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2004, 11).

Skladno z zahtevami predlagane nove strukture Slovenske vojske je bilo načrtovano bistveno povečanje poklicne sestave. S 4134 pripadnikov stalne sestave ob koncu leta 2000 naj bi se ta povečala na približno 5300 pripadnikov leta 2004 ter končno število 7100 leta 2010. Od leta 2002 do leta 2010 naj bi načrtovana končna

Tabela 2: Delež obrambnih izdatkov v obdobju od leta 1999 do 2004 (Vir: Ministrstvo za obrambo RS, dokument 090-25/2023-3 z dne 5. 5. 2023).

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Sprejeti FN v EUR	237631544	255541453	284527106	292432799	329592358	364715675
Realizacija FN v EUR	237392877	237903390	286119963	291250512	321075010	357884342
Obrambni izdatki v EUR	258012473	247382807	303438845	347230063	369466567	396188010
Delež obrambnih izdatkov (OI) v % BDP	1,21	1,12	1,3	1,39	1,41	1,43

**Graf 2: Delež obrambnih izdatkov v odstotkih BDP v obdobju od leta 1999 do 2004 (Vir: Ministrstvo za obrambo RS, dokument 090-25/2023-3 z dne 5. 5. 2023).**

struktura stalne sestave obsegala 1350 častnikov, 1850 podčastnikov in 3850 vojakov. Pričakovalo se je tudi zmanjšanje števila civilnega osebja s 735 na 610 uslužbencev. Formacija Slovenske vojske se je od leta 2002 do leta 2004 zmanjšala s 47.000 na največ 26.000 pripadnikov. Vojska se je prestrukturirala v enote poklicne sestave (A-ešalon), enote rezervne sestave z mirnodobnim jedrom (B-ešalon) in enote rezervne sestave (R-ešalon). Poudarek je bil na povečanju poklicne sestave oziroma izgradnji sil za posredovanje (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2002, 22).

Iz grafa in tabele je razvidno, da se je profesionalna sestava Slovenske vojske v obdobju 1999–2004 s 4393 (1999) pripadnikov povečala na 6944 pripadnikov (2004) oziroma za 2551 pripadnikov.

S tem povečanjem so bili izpolnjeni kadrovske načrti popolnjevanja Slovenske vojske.

Delež obrambnih izdatkov se je tudi v naslednjih letih gibal med 1,3 in 1,4 odstotka, kar je krepko manj od cilja, ki je pri 2 odstotkih. Slovenija se tako že vse od vključitve v zaveznitvo sooča s potrebo po zagotavljanju svoje verodostojnosti pri izpeljavi zavez, danih zvezi Nato.

Na osnovi Zakona o spremembah in dopolnitvah zakona o vojaški dolžnosti (Uradni list RS, št. 86/02, 37. in 62. a člen) je prišlo do pomembne zgodovinske spremembe.

Zakon v VII. a poglavju govori o opustitvi izvajanja določenih sestavin vojaške dolžnosti v miru ter njihovi ponovni uvedbi (v primeru neposredne ogroženosti države). Sprejet je bil leta 2002 kot posledica odločitve Vlade RS pod predsedstvom mag. Antona Ropa o ukinitvi obveznega služenja vojske. Tako se v oktobru 2003 ni izvršil vpoklic nove generacije vojakov na služenje vojaškega roka. S tem se je končalo obdobje naborniške vojske, omogočilo pa se je prostovoljno vojaško usposabljanje.

Mednarodno sodelovanje Slovenske vojske

Posebej pomembno je bilo v letu 2003 mednarodno sodelovanje Slovenije, saj je ta iz kandidatke za članstvo v zvezi Nato postala država, ki vstopa v zvezo Nato. Ta sprememba se je začela odvijati spomladi 2003, v praksi pa je pomenila pregled in uresničitev petega, torej zadnjega cikla akcijskega načrta za članstvo v zvezi Nato. K temu se je Slovenija v političnem smislu zavezala že v pristopnem procesu, zaveze pa je uresničevala po časovnici reform. Skladno z načrti Slovenske vojske je v letu 2003 povečala sodelovanje v mirovnih operacijah

stabilizacijskih sil v Bosni in Hercegovini, sil zavezništva Nato na Kosovu, v mirovni misiji EU v Republiki Severni Makedoniji »Concordia« in drugih ter izrazila pripravljenost, da sprejema del bremen pri zagotavljanju miru v regiji. Vse to je potrdila z vključitvijo v operacijo mednarodnih varnostnih podpornih sil v Afganistanu. S tem je pokazala, da je sposobna prevzemati obveznosti, ki jih prinaša članstvo v zvezi Nato. Potrditev prave poti in uresničevanja nalog iz časovnice se je pokazala na zasedanju Višjega razširjenega političnega odbora zveze Nato 21. oktobra 2003 v Bruslju. Tema zasedanja so bili pregled izvedbe nalog in napredka pri uresničevanju akcijskega načrta za članstvo v zvezi Nato, pregled časovnice za izvedbo reform in obravna akcijskega načrta 2003–2004. Slovenija je bila na vseh področjih, zahtevanih v okviru akcijskega načrta, pozitivno ocenjena.

V letu 2003 se je vključila v delo odborov, pododborov in delovnih skupin zveze Nato (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2004, 42). Vključevanje v Evropsko unijo je v letu 2003 za ministrstvo za obrambo pomenilo vključevanje v evropsko varnostno in obrambno politiko. Pri tem je izhajalo s stališča, da sta obe organizaciji med seboj povezani in se vsebinsko dopolnjujeta kot pomembna člena pri zagotavljanju evropske varnosti. Slovenija je imela do polnopravnega članstva v Evropski uniji status aktivne opazovalke v njenih telesih, prisotna je bila na zasedanjih večine delovnih skupin. Vse to so bili koraki, ki jih je v letu 2003 naredila proti Evropski uniji. Vse od podpisa pristopne pogodbe 16. aprila 2003 v Atenah se je predstavljala kot dejaven člen pri oblikovanju evropske varnostne in obrambne politike. Med drugim je sodelovala pri vsebinskem oblikovanju evropske varnostne strategije (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2004, 43).

AKTIVNOSTI ZUNANJEGA MINISTRSTVA PRI VKLJUČEVANJU SLOVENIJE V ZVEZO NATO OD LETA 1999 DO LETA 2004

Leto 1999 je za ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve zaradi vključevanja Slovenije v Evropsko unijo in zvezo Nato pomenilo okrepljeno multilateralno mednarodno sodelovanje. Zvezo Nato so v letu 1999 zaznamovali trije pomembni dogodki. Prvi je bil vrh zveze ob njeni petdeseti obletnici, ki je potekal od 22. do 25. aprila 1999 v Washingtonu; drugi je bila prva oborožena akcija zveze Nato v njeni zgodovini – proti ciljem v Zvezni republiki Jugoslaviji; tretji pa formiranje evropske obrambne identitete in njena institucionalizacija. Zveza Nato je v svoje vrste sprejela tri nove članice – Češko, Madžarsko in Poljsko. Tako se je število članic povzpelo na devetnajst. Novi generalni sekretar je postal dotedanji britanski obrambni minister

lord George Robertson. Na vrhu zveze Nato v Washingtonu sta bila sprejeta nov strateški koncept in Pobuda o obrambnih zmogljivostih. Na teh temeljih naj bi se zveza pripravljala na nove varnostne izzive v prihajajočem tisočletju. Po ocenah Slovenije rezultati vrha, še posebej širitve zavezništva, niso bili presenečenje. Vrh se ni ukvarjal z novimi vabili, čeprav je Slovenija naredila vse, da se je pred vrhom pri vseh zaveznicah izkazala kot verodostojna kandidatka za članstvo. Prav s tem namenom je bil izveden poseben vladni program neposrednih priprav za članstvo. Vanj so bili vključeni predsednik vlade, minister za zunanje zadeve in oba državna sekretarja ministrstva za zunanje zadeve (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2000, 63).

Razlogi, da Slovenija ni bila sprejeta v prvem krogu širitve, so bili geopolitični, geoekonomske in geostrateški. Teža Slovenije v mednarodnem prostoru ni bila enaka naši percepciji oziroma je bila veliko manjša od treh večjih in vplivnejših držav (Poljske, Madžarske in Češke). Takšna ocena je prevladala tudi za geopolitično, geostrateško in geoekonomske oceno Slovenije. Glavno besedo pri obeh strateških ocenah so imele ZDA (Grizold, 2023). Prevladala je presoja, da je sprejetje Poljske, Češke in Madžarske v okviru prvega kroga širitve dodana vrednost za članstvo, sprejetje manjše države, kot je Slovenija, pa bi za zvezo Nato predstavljalo breme (Rupel, 2019, 13).

Politika odprtih vrat zveze Nato

Pomembno je bilo, da je vrh zveze Nato v Washingtonu v svojih sklepnih dokumentih potrdil politiko odprtih vrat za nove članice, kar je opredelil v 7. točki washingtonske deklaracije. Zagotovil je nadaljevanje politike, opredeljene v 8. točki madridske deklaracije. Sprejetje treh novih članic ni bilo zadnje dejanje širitvenega procesa. Vrh je potrdil odprtost za nove članice, ki po svojih močeh prispevajo k varnosti in stabilnosti evroatlantskega prostora. V izjavi je bilo opredeljenih devet kandidat, v prvi skupini sta bili Romunija in Slovenija. Baltske države so bile v drugi skupini, posebej pa so bile imenovane Bolgarija, Slovaška, Makedonija in Albanija. Vrh zveze je za kandidatke pripravil akcijski načrt za članstvo, ki je omogočil postopno pripravo na članstvo, zveza pa se je s tem zavezala, da bo spremljala proces priprav. Načrt je predvidel, da bo vprašanje širitve ponovno na dnevnem redu najkasneje leta 2002. Med vojaško akcijo zveze Nato proti Zvezni republiki Jugoslaviji je Slovenija dala na razpolago svoj zračni prostor za prelete zavezniških letal. Tako kot drugih devetnajst članic zavezništva je bila obveščena o izvajanju vojaških akcij, ravno tako kot sosednje države – Albanija, Bolgarija, Bosna in Hercegovina, Makedonija in Romunija (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2000, 64).

Čeprav Slovenija leta 1999 ni bila sprejeta v zvezo Nato, je bila med prvimi kandidatkami za naslednji krog širitve. Sprejela je nacionalni program vključevanja v zvezo, s katerim je utrdila prednosti in odpravila pomanjkljivosti na obrambno-vojaškem področju. S predložitvijo letnega nacionalnega programa je opredelila stanje in načrte za delo na petih področjih akcijskega načrta. Zveza Nato je na podlagi letnega nacionalnega programa za izvajanje akcijskega načrta 1999–2000 (7. oktober 1999) in njegove dopolnitve (18. november 1999) ocenila, da je Slovenija kakovostno vstopila v proces izpolnjevanja. Ocena je bila podana na zasedanju slovenskih izvedencev s posebno izvedensko skupino zveze Nato (25. oktobra 1999) in na zasedanju Okrepljenega političnega odbora zveze Nato v sestavi 19 + Slovenija 26. novembra 1999. Mnenje zveze je bilo, da Slovenija izvaja akcijski načrt in si s tem zagotavlja vodilni položaj za članstvo (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2000, 66).

Na slovensko pobudo so se v maju leta 2000 v Vilni sestali zunanji ministri držav kandidatke za članstvo v zvezi in podpisali izjavo za skupno delovanje v okviru »vilenske skupine«. Na humanitarnem področju sta se povečevali vloga in dejavnost Mednarodnega sklada za razminiranje in pomoč žrtvam min (ITF), ki ga je ustanovila slovenska vlada. Sklad je dosegel pomembne rezultate pri čiščenju min v Bosni in Hercegovini, Hrvaški in Albaniji. V program rehabilitacije je bilo vključenih več kot 300 oseb. Za svoje delovanje je skladu uspelo pridobiti donacije iz 23 držav. Slovenija je bila na zunanjepolitičnem področju zelo dejavna tudi v okviru Srednjeevropske pobude, kvadrilaterale in pri novi regionalni povezavi mediteranskih držav – Jadransko-jonski pobudi. V letu 2000 si je prizadevala za ureditev razmer v regiji. Prav s tem namenom je bila aktivna v Paktu stabilnosti, v okviru tega in Sveta Evrope je organizirala mednarodno konferenco o medetničnih odnosih in narodnih manjšinah v Jugovzhodni Evropi. Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve je nadaljevalo pogajanja za nasledstvo Socialistične federativne republike Jugoslavije. Zvezna republika Jugoslavija pa je bila novembra 2000 sprejeta v Organizacijo združenih narodov, tako kot preostale naslednice Socialistične federativne republike Jugoslavije (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2001, 8–11).

Zunanja politika intenzivnega mednarodnega sodelovanja v cilju vstopa v zvezo Nato

V letu 2000 je med Slovenijo in zvezo Nato potekalo intenzivno sodelovanje. Okvir sodelovanja je predstavljal letni nacionalni program za izvajanje akcijskega načrta 1999–2000. Izvajali so se priprave in usklajevanja ter akcijski načrt 2000–2001.

Spomladi leta 2000 je v Slovenijo pripotovala izvedenska skupina zveze Nato, ki je pozitivno ocenila izvajanje prvega akcijskega načrta. Predstavniki ministrstev za zunanje zadeve in obrambo so v Bruslju na sedežu zveze Nato predstavili dopolnjen letni nacionalni program za izvajanje akcijskega načrta za obdobji 1999–2000 in 2000–2001 (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2001, 109–110).

Leto 2001 sta zaznamovala teroristični napad na ZDA 11. septembra 2001 in nato začeta »vojna proti terorizmu«. Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve je v tem letu nadaljevalo uresničevanje zunanjepolitičnih prioritet. Dejavnost diplomacije se je zaradi pospešenega približevanja EU in zvezi Nato okrepila na področju bilateralnega in multilateralnega sodelovanja. Slovenija je do konca leta »zaprla« 26 poglavij pogojev za vključitev v Evropsko unijo in se s tem uvrstila na prvo mesto med kandidatkami za vstop. Po načrtu naj bi se pogajanja o vključitvi končala v letu 2002, sprejem v polnopravno članstvo pa je bil predviden v letu 2004. Tudi na področju vključevanja v zvezo Nato je bila Slovenija na vodilnem položaju med kandidatkami za članstvo v organizaciji. Visoko sta bili ocenjeni izvedba akcijskega načrta v preteklem letu in priprava novega načrta. Slovenija je veliko prispevala k vzpostavitvi varnosti v regiji z vključevanjem svojih sil v operacije sil zavezništva Nato in začasne upravne misije Združenih narodov na Kosovu. Uspešno je izvajala naloge Partnerstva za mir in bila dejavna v okviru »vilenske skupine«. V letu 2001 je bila gostiteljica ameriško-ruskega vrha, srečanja ameriškega predsednika Georgea Busha in predsednika Ruske federacije Vladimirja Putina (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2002, 5–8).

Slovenija, in s tem njen zunanjepolitični aparat, si je zadala za cilj zagotoviti članstvo države v zvezi Nato in ga zasledovala tudi v letu 2001. Po takratni oceni ministrstva za zunanje zadeve je bilo pričakovati, da bo v naslednji krog širitve povabljen že na prihodnjem vrhu zveze Nato v Pragi – novembra 2002. Pričakovanja so temeljila na delujoči demokraciji, tržnem gospodarstvu, demokratičnem nadzoru nad oboroženimi silami, spoštovanju človekovih pravic in urejenih odnosih s sosednjimi državami. Določeno težo sta predstavljala tudi geografska lega med dvema članicama zveze Nato, Italijo in Madžarsko, in pomen komunikacij z Jugovzhodno Evropo. Slovenija je bila zelo dejavna v operacijah v podporo miru pod vodstvom zveze Nato v Bosni in Hercegovini in na Kosovu. V letu 2001 je izpolnila vse cilje in naloge s področja vključevanja v zavezništvo ter uspešno zaključila akcijski načrt 2000–2001. Pripravljen je bil tudi letni nacionalni program za akcijski načrt 2001–2002, ki ga je državni sekretar ministrstva za zunanje zadeve Ignac Golob po vladni potrditvi

predstavil na zasedanju Višjega razširjenega političnega odbora Nata na sedežu zavezništva v Bruslju (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2002, 66).

Prejem povabila za vstop v zvezo Nato

Slovenija je 21. novembra 2002 na vrhunskem zasedanju zveze Nato v Pragi prejela povabilo za vstop v zavezništvo. Zasedanja se je udeležila delegacija Slovenije pod vodstvom predsednika države Milana Kučana. V delegaciji so bili predsednik vlade dr. Janez Drnovšek, zunanji minister dr. Dimitrij Rupel, obrambni minister dr. Anton Grizold in načelnik Generalštaba Slovenske vojske brigadir Ladislav Lipič. Povabilo je bilo dokaz, da je Slovenija izpolnila ključne naloge, ki si jih je zadala skupaj z zavezništvom, in vzpostavila dobre odnose z zvezo Nato in zavezniškimi državami. Končal se je letni nacionalni program akcijskega načrta 2001–2002 in pripravil program za leto 2002–2003. Dokument je vlada sprejela 25. julija 2002, zvezi Nato pa je bil predan 18. septembra istega leta. Pri doseganju povabila sta pomembno vlogo odigrali veleposlaništvi ZDA in Nemčije kot kontaktni veleposlaništvi za zadeve zveze Nato v Sloveniji. Slovenija je pred pričakovanim prejetjem povabila opravila dvostranska politična posvetovanja z Grčijo, Italijo, Madžarsko, Poljsko, Portugalsko, Španijo, Nemčijo in Veliko Britanijo (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2003, 282–285).

Veleposlaniki držav članic zveze Nato so 26. marca 2003 v Bruslju podpisali protokole o vstopu sedmih novih držav. Nekaj dni zatem, 16. aprila 2003, so predstavniki desetih kandidat v Atenah podpisali Pristopno pogodbo k EU. Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve je v letu 2003 poleg prioritete vključitve Slovenije v EU in Nato delovalo tudi pri izpeljavi tradicionalnih političnih ciljev, denimo dobrih odnosov s sosednjimi državami, delovanja v regionalnih pobudah in širšega mednarodnega sodelovanja (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2004, 3–4).

Zadnji akcijski načrt pred vključitvijo v zvezo Nato in sprejem zakonodaje, neposredno povezane z vstopom v zvezo Nato

Junija 2003 je Slovenija začela pripravljati letni nacionalni program za izvedbo akcijskega načrta za članstvo v Nato 2003–2004. Vsebinsko je bil povezan s časovnico reform, imel je pet poglavij: političnoekonomske zadeve, obrambno-vojaške zadeve, področje virov, varnostne zadeve in pravne zadeve. Dokument je vlada sprejela 31. julija 2003, zvezi Nato pa je bil izročen 6. oktobra 2003. V oktobru je potekalo tudi zasedanje Višjega razširjenega političnega odbora s Slovenijo. Glavni temi sestanka sta bili pregled napredka in izpolnjevanja

nalog iz prejšnjih ciklusov letnih nacionalnih programov, upoštevajoč časovnico za izvedbo reform, in pregled oziroma obravnava novega letnega nacionalnega programa 2003–2004 (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2004, 450–451).


Državni zbor je 24. februarja 2004 sprejel Zakon o ratifikaciji Severnoatlantske pogodbe. Po deponiranju listine o pristopu 29. marca 2004 pri depozitarju (ZDA) je Slovenija dejansko postala članica zavezništva. Državni zbor je na seji 15. julija sprejel Zakon o ratifikaciji Sporazuma med pogodbenicami Severnoatlantske pogodbe o statusu njihovih sil. S tem zakonom se je uredil status sil države pošiljateljice v državi gostiteljici, se pravi v Sloveniji. Ravno tako 15. julija je državni zbor sprejel Zakon o ratifikaciji Protokola o statusu mednarodnega vojaškega poveljstva, ustanovljenega v skladu s Severnoatlantsko pogodbo. S tem zakonom je bilo omogočeno, da se pod določenimi pogoji vzpostavi mednarodno vojaško poveljstvo v državi gostiteljici, v tem primeru v Sloveniji. Istega dne je državni zbor sprejel še Zakon o ratifikaciji Sporazuma o statusu organizacije Severnoatlantske pogodbe, nacionalnih predstavnikov in mednarodnega osebja, ki ureja upravni, administrativni in finančni del organizacije zveze Nato, ki se lahko odvija tudi na ozemlju države gostiteljice, se pravi Slovenije.

DRUŽBENO IN POLITIČNO DOGAJANJE MED VSTOPNIM PROCESOM V ZVEZO NATO

Niti politične sile niti širša javnost se za vključitev v Nato niso zavemale enoglasno. Med letoma 1999 in 2003 se je med nasprotnike tedanje nacionalne varnostne politike, ki so jo z različnimi utemeljitvami zagovarjale domala vsa politične sile, razen Slovenske nacionalne stranke z Zmagom Jelinčičem na čelu, vključil Mirovni inštitut. V ta namen je izdal dve publikaciji: *Ne NATO – mir nam dajte* (Gorjanc et al., 2002) in *Nato – za in proti*; državljanski priročnik (Fabjančič et al., 2002). V publikaciji *Ne NATO – mir nam dajte* (Gorjanc et al., 2002) so članke objavili naslednji avtorji: Milan Gorjanc, Tone Peršak, Janko Messner, Rastko Močnik, Jože Mencinger, Darij Zadnikar, Zoran Kanduč, Zoran Radej, Peter Kovačič-Peršin, Marta Gregorič, Gorazd Kovačič in Tonči Kuzmanič. Avtorji so v člankih opisali svoja negativna stališča do članstva Slovenije v zvezi Nato.

V publikaciji *Nato – ZA in PROTI*; državljanski priročnik (Fabjančič et al., 2002) so svoja stališča predstavili Nina Fabjančič, Marta Gregorič in Gorazd Kovačič. V nadaljevanju navajam nekaj poudarkov iz publikacije o negativnih straneh zveze Nato:

- globalne varnosti ni mogoče doseči z vojaškimi sredstvi, pač pa z mehanizmi preprečevanja konfliktov in razvojnimi priložnostmi;




Graf 3: Strinjanje s prizadevanji, da Slovenija postane članica Nata (Politbarometer december 1998–november 2000)
(Vir: Letni nacionalni program RS za izvajanje Akcijskega načrta za članstvo v Natu 2001–2002, 2001, 22–23).

- poleg zveze Nato obstajajo tudi druge varnostne strukture, ki Sloveniji zagotavljajo stabilnost in razvoj;
- Nato je preostanek hladne vojne, ki je s padcem Berlinskega zidu izgubil smisel;
- 11. september je dokaz, da Nato ne zna definirati svojih ciljev delovanja;
- Nato postaja vedno bolj politična integracija, vendar so razmerja moči znotraj nje asimetrična, zato so male in vojaško šibkejšje države v podrejenem položaju;
- prihodnost Nata je negotova, ker se ameriško-evropski blok cepi na dva dela;
- Nato ni bil ustanovljen za obrambo demokracije, pač pa za obrambo kapitalizma;
- Nato je nenačelna organizacija in praviloma ne posreduje tam, kjer se dogajajo množične kršitve človekovih pravic in genocidi;
- Nato se ne zavzema in ni usposobljen za vodenje mirovnih procesov;
- Nato ni bil dovolj uspešen pri doseganju trdne politične rešitve in stabilnosti na Balkanu;
- Nato je asimetrična organizacija, v kateri so glavni igranci ZDA zaradi svoje vojaške premoči;
- ZDA kot velesila ne potrebujejo evropskega partnerstva, razen za opravičevanje nekaterih svojih interesov regiji;
- Nato je edina mednarodna sila, ki ni pod demokratičnim in pravnim nadzorom;
- ZDA se kot dominantna članica Nata nagiba k militarizmu.

V publikaciji so avtorji analizirali prednosti in slabosti članstva v zavezništvu – v večji meri so poudarjali slabosti. Besedilo je napisano tako, da se neka domnevna prednost članstva v zvezi Nato v naslednjemu stavku zanika. Vidni predstavniki Mirovnega inštituta so objavili tudi več člankov z namenom nasprotovanja vključitvi Slovenije v zvezo Nato: Nato kot leninistični projekt (Jalušič, 2003); Zavzemajo se za suverenost in nevtralnost: klečepljenje bodisi za Evropo bodisi za zvezo Nato lahko pripelje v slepo ulico (Kuzmanič, 1999); Protest: protestno pismo Mirovnega inštituta zoper enostransko predstavitev tematike vključevanja Slovenije v zvezo Nato v oddaji Aktualno na TV Slovenija dne 16. aprila 2002 (Jalušič, 2002).

Podobno so v časopisu Mladina nekateri znani predstavniki politike, Jaša L. Zlobec, Anton Anderlič in Majda Širca, ter predstavnik akademškega sveta, dr. Darko Štrajn in dr. Bogomir Kovač, izrazili svoje kritične pomisleke in nestrinjanje z aktualno politiko, ki je promovirala vključitev Slovenije v zvezo Nato. V članku navajajo svoja stališča, ki jih lahko povzamemo kot nasprotovanje imperialistični politiki, povečanju obrambnih stroškov, izgubi suverenosti in pomanjkanju dialoga o tem vprašanju (Ozmeč & Trampuš, 2002, 28–30).

Na notranjepolitičnem področju so se v takratni vladni koaliciji, posebej pri Združeni listi oziroma njenem Mladem forumu, začeli pojavljati vse večji pomisleki o smiselnosti vstopa Slovenije v Nato. V Cankarjevem domu so v maju 2002 pripravili konferenco o argumentih proti vstopu, glavni govorniki



Graf 4: Strinjanje s prizadevanji, da Slovenija postane članica Nata (Politbarometer januar–junij 2001) (Vir: Letni nacionalni program RS za izvajanje Akcijskega načrta za članstvo v Natu 2001–2002, 2001, 22).

proti vključitvi pa so bili Luka Juri, Jože Mencinger in Franco Juri (Mednarodna konferenca Mladega foruma Združene liste proti Natu, 2002).

Z vprašanji, povezanimi z vključitvijo v zvezo Nato, so se poleg državnih institucij ukvarjali tudi raziskovalci Obramboslovnega raziskovalnega centra, ki so že v začetku devetdesetih izdelali več študij o obrambnem sistemu, vojski in njeni organizaciji, popolnjenanju, vojaškem šolstvu in usposabljanju (Guštin, 2016, 71–85).

Ob vključevanju Slovenije v Nato so izdali zbornik, ki je med drugim obravnaval uvajanje poklicne vojske (Malešič et al., 2001). Diskusije o članstvu v zvezi Nato so bile tudi pozneje opazne v časopisju in na različnih javnih prireditvah.


Javno mnenje in referendumsko odločanje ter politične ocene referendumске odločitve za vključitev v zvezo Nato

Za vstop v Evropsko unijo in vstop v zvezo Nato sta bila razpisana referendum. Vlada je zastavila obširno kampanjo, pri kateri je manjši del javnosti preko civilnodružbenih in mirovnih organizacij oporekal včlanitvi v zavezništvo. Naslanjal se je na politiko demilitarizacije, mirovništva in pacifizma. Nekatere od idej, ki so jih zastopala ta gibanja, so v širši javnosti pustile pečat, ki se je pozneje odrazil tudi na referendumskih rezultatih.


Vlada RS se je zavedala pomena javne podpore pri vključevanju Slovenije v zvezo Nato, zato je izoblikovala strategijo informiranja javnosti in v njenem okviru izvajala vrsto dejavnosti. Slovensko javno mnenje je bilo delno naklonjeno vključitvi v zavezništvo. Raziskave je izvajal Center za raziskave javnega mnenja pri Fakulteti za družbene vede v Ljubljani v okviru mesečne raziskave Politbarometer.

Od leta 1998 (december) do leta 2001 (julij) se je na vprašanje »Ali se strinjate, da Slovenija postane članica Nata?« delež vprašanih, ki so izrazili strinjanje, gibal med 49 in 58 odstotki. Popolnoma odklonilen odnos je izražalo med 15 in 32 odstotkov vprašanih, podoben delež so zavzemali neopredeljeni.


Ker sta bila referendum za vstop v zvezo Nato in referendum za vstop v Evropsko unijo načrtovana istočasno, sta se pri merjenju javnega mnenja zastavljali obe vprašanji. V obdobju med junijem in septembrom 2002 se je za vstop v EU odločilo okoli 55 odstotkov, proti in neopredeljenih pa je bilo med 18 in 28 odstotkov vprašanih. Delež tistih, ki so bili za vstop v zvezo Nato, se je v istem obdobju gibal med 48 in 49 odstotki. Skoraj enak delež, kot je bil za, je bil tudi proti včlanitvi. Pri merjenjih javnega mnenja je vstop v Evropsko unijo imel veliko prednost pred vstopom v zvezo Nato.




Graf 5: Na morebitnem referendumu za vstop v Evropsko unijo bi glasoval (v %, 2002) (Vir: Repovž, 2002a, 3).




Graf 6: Na morebitnem referendumu za vstop v Nato bi glasoval (v %, 2002) (Vir: Repovž, 2002a, 3).



Graf 7: Kako bi glasovali, če bi bil jutri referendum o vstopu Slovenije v Nato? (Vir: T., J., 2002, 3).



Graf 8: Na referendumu o vstopu v Nato bi glasoval (v %, 2002) (Vir: Repovž, 2002b, 3).




Graf 9: Na referendumu o vstopu v Evropsko unijo bi glasoval (v %, 2002) (Vir: Repovž, 2002b, 3).

Časopis Delo je v novembru 2002 izvedel lastno telefonsko raziskavo (n = 1693), ki je pokazala majhno prednost tistih, ki bi glasovali za vstop v zvezo Nato (51,30 odstotka), pred tistimi, ki bi bili proti vstopu (48,70 odstotka).


Raziskava Centra za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij za obdobje september, oktober in november 2002 je bila zelo vzpodbudna, kazala je na pozitiven rezultat referenduma za vstop v Evropsko unijo (za bi glasovalo več kot 60 odstotkov), veliko manj vzpodbudna pa je bila za vstop v zvezo Nato, saj delež tistih, ki bi glasovali za, ni presegal 50 odstotkov, res pa je, da se ni povečal odstotek tistih, ki bi obkrožili »NE«. V nadaljevanju so predstavljeni dejanski rezultati obeh referendumov.

Seveda je na mestu tudi vprašanje, kakšen je odnos javnosti do članstva v zvezi Nato danes, v luči dogajanja, ki se odvija v neposredni sosesčini. V časopisu Delo je izšel članek z naslovom V času Golobove vlade več natoskeptikov (Esih, 2023), ki obravnava odnos javnosti do zveze Nato in do vojne v Ukrajini. Članek je podkrepljen z več grafi in s primerjavo, kakšno je stanje v drugih državah članicah zveze Nato. Okoli 55 odstotkov vprašanih v Sloveniji se strinja, da Slovenija ostane članica zavezništva. Ta delež je v preostalih članicah zavezništva mnogo večji in se giblje okoli 70 odstotkov.

Prav tako se slovensko mnenje o tem, ali ruska invazija vpliva na varnost države, razlikuje od mnenja v drugih državah članicah zavezništva, kjer



Graf 10: Raziskava javnega mnenja 2023 – Če bi lahko glasovali za ali proti članstvu vaše države v zvezi Nato, kako bi se odločili? (Vir: Esih, 2023).



Graf 11: Je po vašem mnenju ruska invazija na Ukrajino vplivala na varnost države? (Vir: Esih, 2023).


je odstotek tistih, ki Rusko federacijo dojemajo kot grožnjo za svojo državo, nekoliko večji kot v Sloveniji.

V preostalih članicah zaveznitva se veliko bolj kot v Sloveniji strinjajo, da članstvo v zvezi Nato zmanjšuje verjetnost napada na državo.

Če primerjamo javno mnenje iz obdobja 2000–2002 in javno mnenje o odnosu do zveze Nato iz leta 2023, vidimo, da se kljub vojni na tleh Evrope ta odnos v Sloveniji ni spremenil na bolje. Na osnovi zgornje raziskave je Slovenija s približno 55 odstotki podpore članstvu v zaveznitvu med

državami pri koncu lestvice podpore. Rezultat je v primerjavi s podporo na referendumu leta 2003 za kar 11 odstotkov nižji. Rezultati javnega mnenja gredo vse bolj v smer, ki jo v svojih stališčih do Nata zagovarja najmanjša koalicijska stranka (Esih, 2023).

V okviru vladne medresorske delovne skupine za sodelovanje z zvezo Nato je bila s ciljem povečanja podpore članstvu v Natu leta 2000 formirana informacijsko-komunikacijska podskupina. Sestavljena je bila iz predstavnikov vladnega urada za informiranje, ministrstva za obrambo in ministrstva



Graf 12: Ali članstvo v zvezi Nato zmanjšuje verjetnost napada na državo? (Vir: Esih, 2023).

za zunanje zadeve. Njeni člani so se marca 2001 udeležili komunikacijske delavnice na sedežu zveze Nato v Bruslju. Naslednje srečanje oziroma delavnica je bila predvidena v oktobru 2001 v Sloveniji z delovnim nazivom »Izvajanje informacijske strategije«. Informacijsko-komunikacijska podskupina je aprila 2001 medresorski delovni skupini za sodelovanje z Natom predstavila komunikacijsko strategijo za vključevanje Slovenije v Nato. V pripravo dokumenta so bili v prvi vrsti vključeni predstavniki Slovenske vojske, predstavnika iz urada predsednika vlade in države ter predstavniki državnoborskega odbora za obrambo, potrdila pa ga je tudi vlada. Za izvajanje vsebinskega dela strategije je bila zadolžena medresorska delovna skupina za sodelovanje z Natom (Letni nacionalni program RS za izvajanje Akcijskega načrta za članstvo v Natu 2001–2002, 2001, 23).

Cilji komunikacijske strategije so bili domačo javnost celovito, razumno, verodostojno in sproti informirati o pomenu vključevanja Slovenije v zvezo Nato in pri vseh ministrstvih in službah zagotoviti poenoten pristop pri podajanju vsebin, nanašajočih se na vključevanje Slovenije v zavezništvo. Eden od ciljev se je nanašal tudi na tujo javnost, z nalogo doseganja večje prepoznavnosti Slovenije kot države in njene dosedanje vloge v operaciji za podporo miru v okviru Partnerstva za mir zveze Nato. Informacijsko-komunikacijska podskupina je marca 2001 v Ljubljani pripravila javni posvet o vključevanju RS v zvezo Nato, na katerem so sodelovali minister za obrambo dr. Anton Grizold, minister za zunanje zadeve dr. Dimitrij Rupel in predsednik Atlantskega sveta

Slovenije dr. Anton Bebler. V pripravi je bilo tudi 47. zasedanje letne skupščine Združenja atlantskih svetov v oktobru 2001 na Bledu. Ob tej priložnosti je bila predvidena udeležba generalnega sekretarja zveze Nato lorda Georgea Robertsona, britanskega politika, ki je bil 10. generalni sekretar zveze Nato od leta 1999 do leta 2003, in vrhovnega poveljnika Nata za Evropo generala Josepha W. Ralstona. Načrtovani so bili izdaja publikacij o zavezništvu v slovenskem jeziku in obiski ciljnih skupin na sedežu zveze v Bruslju. V nadaljevanju izvajanja komunikacijske strategije so računali tudi na podporo urada za informiranje zveze Nato (Priročnik o zvezi Nato, 2001, 29, 30).

Odprta razprava o članstvu v zvezi Nato

Januarja 2002 je bila v državnem zboru javna predstavitev mnenj z naslovom Slovenija pred vrhunskim zasedanjem zveze Nato v Pragi. Na dogodku so svoja stališča predstavili predsednik države, predsednik državnega zbora, predsednik vlade, poslanci, ministra za zunanje zadeve in obrambo ter načelnik GŠSV. Njihova mnenja so podprla vključitev, v nasprotju z mnenji in pomisleki nekaterih drugih udeležencev razprave. V državnem zboru je 22. in 23. maja 2002 potekala poslanska razprava o vključevanju v zvezo Nato. Po razpravi je sledilo glasovanje za razpis posvetovalnega referenduma za vstop v zavezništvo (16. redna seja DZ RS, 23. maj 2002).

Poslanec Janez Janša je v svoji razpravi podprl članstvo v zavezništvu s tem, da je bolj kot spremembe v Natu poudaril spremembe, ki so se

ali pa bi se morale zgoditi v Sloveniji. Odpori so po njegovem mnenju prihajali iz smeri, ki je bila proti izgradnji slovenskih oboroženih sil, tako v času osamosvajanja kot po njem. Po njegovih besedah se za Nato ni moglo agitirati pod praporom z rdečo zvezdo in tudi ni mogel agitirati nekdo, ki je proti denacionalizaciji oziroma je ne podpira. Izrazil je podporo referendumu, na katerem so se Slovenci vedno znali pravilno odločiti, kot je bilo v primeru odločitve za osamosvojitve (Janša, 2002, 43–47).

Poslanec Aurelio Juri se je v razpravi vprašal, kako je mogoče, da je med devetdesetimi poslanci kar osemdeset takih, ki so za članstvo, medtem ko je javnost, ki je večinoma za vstop v Evropsko unijo, do vstopa v zvezo Nato veliko bolj zadržana. Svoje pomisleke glede vstopa v zvezo Nato je podkrepil z nestrinjanjem s spremembo Pomorskega zakonika, ki bi omogočal vplutje ladij na jedrski pogon v slovenske teritorialne vode. Po njegovem mnenju je bila Slovenija za povabilo v zvezo Nato pripravljena plačati previsoko ceno, dvomil pa je, da bo javnost to sprejela. Odprl je več vprašanj, povezanih s protiteroristično koalicijo in 11. septembrom, Afganistanom, palestinskim vprašanjem, izraelskim ravnanjem ipd., ter sklenil s podnebnimi spremembami in odgovornostjo ZDA. Na koncu je postavil vprašanje, ali včlanitev v Evropsko unijo ni dovolj in ali so države, kot so Avstrija, Finska, Švedska, zgrešeni ali vsaj nedokončani projekti. Že vnaprej se je zahvalil za pojasnila (Juri, 2002, 97–99).

Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti, poslanec državnega zbora in vodja poslanske skupine Slovenske nacionalne stranke, je v uvodu omenil, da je zveza Nato organizacija, v kateri imajo vodilno vlogo ZDA, česar v svojih dokumentih ne skrivajo, še več, to celo poudarjajo. ZDA želijo delovati v okviru kolektivne akcije, če pa te ni mogoče zagotoviti, se zanjo odločijo same in delujejo neodvisno, zato pri zvezi Nato ne gre za nič drugega kot dominacijo ZDA in njihovega gospodarstva v Evropi in svetu. Kot primer je navedel nakup popolnoma neustreznih vozil humvee. Skrbeli so ga pomanjkanje podatkov in dodatni stroški vključitve v zvezo Nato, saj je vlada te podatke skrivala pred javnostjo. Po njegovem mnenju nevarnosti napada na Slovenijo ni bilo, ampak je šlo zgolj za realizacijo ideje in cilja, ki si ga je zastavil predsednik vlade dr. Drnovšek. Poudaril je, da Slovenija ni vojaško ogrožena, je pa gospodarsko, in prav zveza Nato je tista, ki jo ogroža. Še natančneje je povedal, da bo morala Slovenija zamenjati vse orožje in kupiti orožje od ZDA. V zaključku je izrazil negativno stališče Slovenske nacionalne stranke do vstopa Slovenije v zvezo Nato in zahtevo po razpisu referenduma (Jelinčič, 2002, 80–82).

ZAKLJUČEK

Po podatkih Republiške volilne komisije je imelo na referendumu 23. marca 2003 možnost glasovati 1.613.305 volivcev, glasovalo pa jih je 974.988, kar je 60,43 odstotka. Za Evropsko unijo je glasovalo skoraj 90 odstotkov volivcev, za vstop v zvezo Nato pa dobrih 66 odstotkov (Poročilo o referendumu EU, 2003, 19; Poročilo o referendumu NATO, 2003, 19). Navesti je treba, da je kljub referenduskemu rezultatu koncept oborožene nevtralnosti med prebivalstvom imel še dolgo veliko podporo (Guštin, 2016, 77). Velika razlika na referendumih med podporo včlanitve v Evropsko unijo in podporo vključitve v zvezo Nato izhaja iz več razlogov:

- delu volivcev je vojska predstavljala samo dodaten strošek v proračunu, ki bi ga vključitev v zvezo Nato samo povečal;
- zveza Nato je za nekatere poosebljala kapitalistični imperializem, drugi pa so temelje države videli v civilni družbi, ne v vojski;
- civilna družbena gibanja so se izrekla proti vstopu v zvezo Nato, kar je imelo velik odmev v javnosti.

Slovenija je 29. marca 2004 po številnih prizadevanjih, ki so se začela deset let pred tem z vključitvijo v program Partnerstvo za mir, postala članica zveze Nato. Zavezništvo se je takrat priključilo še šest držav: Bolgarija, Estonija, Litva, Latvija, Romunija in Slovaška. S 1. majem 2004 je Slovenija postala še članica Evropske unije. Članstvo v obeh organizacijah je predstavljalo večletni strateški nacionalni cilj, zastavljen v dopolnjeni Resoluciji o strategiji nacionalne varnosti, sprejeti v državnem zboru januarja 1994, ki je bil dosežen po trinajstih letih samostojnosti (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2005, 6). Slovenija je bila že med kandidaturjo za članstvo v zavezništvo dejavna v operacijah kriznega odzivanja, ki so vključevale operacije v podporo miru in humanitarne operacije. Vlada Republike Slovenije je leta 2004 sprejela načrt za povečanje udeležbe v mednarodnih misijah v letu 2005. Ministrstvo za obrambo je z zvezo Nato uskladilo kadrovske načrte, na osnovi katerega je bila načrtovana napotitev 20 pripadnikov v različna poveljstva in strukture zveze Nato. S članstvom v zvezi je začela Slovenija sodelovati v 114 delovnih telesih zavezništva, težišče mednarodnega delovanja pa je bilo usmerjeno na področje Jugovzhodne Evrope (Letno poročilo MO RS, 2005, 46).

Slovenija je že junija 2003 vzpostavila stalno misijo pri zvezi Nato v Bruslju, ki je sodelovala na zasедanjih Severnoatlantskega sveta in drugih odborov ter delovnih teles zveze Nato. Imela je dva oddelka, političnega in vojaškega (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2004, 455–456). Kot tretji del Stalne misije

Republike Slovenije pri zvezi Nato je začelo delovati vojaško predstavništvo Slovenske vojske (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2004, 458).

Zunanjo politiko Slovenije sta v letu 2004 zaznamovali polnopravni članstvi v EU in zvezi Nato. S tem sta bila dosežena dva pomembna zunanjepolitična cilja po vzpostavitvi neodvisnosti. S priključitvijo k razvitim državam se je končal proces gospodarskega in političnega prehoda. Nove okoliščine so zahtevale prilagoditev ministrstva za zunanje zadeve za delo v novih razmerah v koordinaciji z Evropsko unijo, še posebej na področju II. stebra evropske politike, t. i. skupne zunanje in varnostne politike. V prvi polovici leta 2004 je Evropski uniji predsedovala Irska. Zaključila so se pogajanja o Pogodbi o ustavi za Evropo, ki je bila sprejeta na vrhu medvladne konference junija 2004, podpisana pa oktobra 2004 v Rimu. Med drugim je predvidevala uvedbo skupne diplomatske službe – Evropske službe za zunanjepolitično delovanje (Letno poročilo MZZ, 2005, 5).

Z deponiranjem listine o pristopu k Severnoatlantski pogodbi 29. marca 2004 v Washingtonu je Slovenija dejansko postala članica zveze Nato in tako dosegla enega od dveh najpomembnejših zunanjepolitičnih ciljev. Kot novonastala država je morala, da bi se lahko enakopravno vključila v mednarodno skupnost, svojo suverenost potrditi in zagotoviti tudi z obrambnega vidika. Slovenska politika se je v dinamičnem mednarodnem varnostnem okolju po koncu hladne vojne (1990) odločila, da ta strateški cilj uresniči z vstopom države v sistem kolektivne obrambe zveze Nato, seveda s hkratno naslonitvijo na lastne sile (Grizold, 2022). Proces vključevanja Slovenije v Nato v obdobju 1999–2004 je v znanstvenem članku predstavljen na podlagi dejavnosti dveh ministrstev, obrambnega in zunanjega, ter dinamičnega družbenopolitičnega dogajanja, ki vključuje tudi odnos civilne družbe do

ttega vprašanja. Proces se je zaključil s pridobitvijo polnopravnega članstva v Severnoatlantski zvezi.

Pregled vseh aktivnosti v okviru priprav na vključitev v zvezo Nato je dal tudi odgovor na raziskovalni vprašanje, zastavljeni na začetku: Kakšno vlogo je v procesu vključevanja Slovenije v zvezo Nato odigralo Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije in kakšno Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve Republike Slovenije?

Obe ministrstvi sta v raziskovanem obdobju 1999–2004 odigrali ključno vlogo pri pripravi zakonodaje, operativnih in organizacijskih rešitev, transformaciji Slovenske vojske v profesionalno vojsko, implementaciji letnih akcijskih načrtov za članstvo v zvezi Nato, sprejemanju standardov zveze Nato in bili nosilca vseh priprav na referendum o članstvu v zvezi Nato.

Z vstopom v Nato 29. marca 2004 je bila Sloveniji dana možnost sooblikovanja varnosti in stabilnosti v evroatlantskem prostoru skupaj z drugimi članicami zavezništva. Ob vstopu Slovenije se je predvidevalo, da bo članstvo omogočalo učinkovito soočanje s sodobnimi varnostnimi izzivi in vsemi oblikami groženj. Vstop v zavezništvo pa ni zmanjšal odgovornosti Slovenije za krepitev in ohranjanje lastnih obrambno-varnostnih potencialov in s tem tudi moči zavezništva. K temu je v letih priprave na članstvo prispevalo tudi izvajanje letnih nacionalnih programov – akcijskih načrtov za članstvo v Nato. Ti dokumenti so nedvomno pomagali k jasnim opredelitvam obrambno-varnostnih prioritet pri zagotavljanju lastne obrambe in varnosti ter varnosti v evroatlantskem prostoru. Z realizacijo akcijskih načrtov je Slovenija dokazala, da je dozorela v kredibilno članico, zavezano vsem načelom, na katerih temelji washingtonska pogodba, demokratičnemu postopku vstopa pa je z vidika legitimnosti veliko težo dal pozitivni izid referendumu za članstvo v zavezništvo.

SLOVENIA JOINING NATO: CONTRIBUTION OF THE MINISTRY OF
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SUMMARY

The purpose of the article is to present and critically evaluate the process of Slovenia's integration into NATO between 1999 and 2004 through description, analysis, synthesis, and compilation, and to provide an overview of the activities and steps taken by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that enabled it to achieve your goal. Already in the Resolution on the National Security Strategy in 1993, with an amendment in 1994, Slovenia clearly expressed the goal of joining NATO, the same year that the alliance opened the way for membership expansion with the help of the Partnership for Peace program. The program enabled NATO to transform from a closed military alliance of Western countries into an open process of rapprochement with potential alliance members. Slovenia joined the program and began to implement activities within the framework of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its path of integration ended on March 29, 2004, when it became the twenty-fifth member of NATO. Especially in the period in question, Slovenia has intensively cooperated internationally with neighboring countries and in international peace operations. It signed several agreements on cooperation in the field of defense, and at the same time actively worked towards the transformation of the national security system. In doing so, it followed the annual national programs for membership and action plans for membership in the NATO alliance and successfully completed all five cycles. The article ends with Slovenia joining NATO. This gave Slovenia, together with other members of the alliance, the opportunity to create security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Keywords: NATO, Slovenian Army, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, annual national program for membership, action plan for membership in NATO

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UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF TRADITIONAL FAIRY TALES IN CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT – TEACHING FOR CRITICAL THINKING

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to develop a model for critical reading of traditional fairy tales, which will enable the understanding of their meanings in contemporary educational context from a gender perspective. We have posed the following research questions: Why is the fairy tale so important in education and how does it influence the reader? What kind of ideology do fairy tales present? Which fairy tales (traditional or non-traditional) should one read during education, and how should their critical reading be arranged? We have used the method of theoretical analysis, followed by the historical method, and finally, the morphological analysis of the selected fairy tale. The model of critical reading has been developed using the fairy tale titled Baš-čelik, published in Vuk Karadžić's collection in 1870, as a case study. It has been shown that texts tend to hyperbolically affirm the cult of heroism. Research indicates that such stories could be read in schools with the aim of understanding their semantic structure from a feminist perspective, while accentuating the construction of characters reduced to very few qualities that ideally conform to the heterosexual pattern. The model for critical reading of such stories, based on reader-response theory, has been developed in this paper.

Keywords: non-traditional fairy tale, critical reading, understanding the meaning, research-based reading, traditional fairy tale

COMPRENDERE IL SIGNIFICATO DELLE FIABE TRADIZIONALI NEL CONTESTO EDUCATIVO CONTEMPORANEO – INSEGNAMENTO PER IL PENSIERO CRITICO

SINTESI

Lo scopo di questo articolo è quello di sviluppare un modello per la lettura critica delle fiabe tradizionali, che consentirà la comprensione dei loro significati nel contesto educativo contemporaneo da una prospettiva di genere. Abbiamo posto le seguenti domande di ricerca: Perché la fiaba è così importante nell'educazione e come influenza il lettore? Che tipo di ideologia fanno fiabe presenti? Quali fiabe (tradizionali o non tradizionali) si dovrebbero leggere durante l'istruzione e come dovrebbero essere organizzate le loro letture critiche? Abbiamo utilizzato il metodo dell'analisi teorica, seguito dal metodo storico, e infine l'analisi morfologica della fiaba selezionata. Il modello della lettura critica è stato sviluppato utilizzando la fiaba intitolata Baš-čelik, pubblicata nella collezione di Vuk Karadžić nel 1870, come caso di studio. È stato dimostrato che i testi tendono ad affermare iperbolicamente il culto dell'eroismo. La ricerca indica che tali storie potrebbero essere lette nelle scuole con l'obiettivo di comprendere la loro struttura semantica da una prospettiva femminista, accentuando la costruzione di personaggi ridotti a pochissime qualità che idealmente si conformano al modello eterosessuale. Il modello per la lettura critica di tali storie, basato sulla teoria lettore-risposta, è stato sviluppato in questo articolo.

Parole chiave: fiaba non tradizionale, lettura critica, comprensione del significato, lettura basata sulla ricerca, fiaba tradizionale

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of this paper, it is necessary to describe what we mean by the term fairy tale. As Jack Zipes emphasizes, “the literary fairy tale developed as an appropriation of a particular oral storytelling tradition that gave birth to the wonder tale, often called the *Zaubermärchen* (magic tale) or the *conte merveilleux* (marvelous tale)” (Zipes, 2000, 44–45). The term ‘marvelous tale’ best corresponds to our understanding of this story, as it is compatible with the characterization of the ‘strange’ event depicted in the fairy tale (the marvelous), as defined by Tzvetan Todorov (1973, 41) with a clear distinction from related concepts such as ‘the fantastic’ and ‘the uncanny’. The marvelous is “also a feature of the myth. A fairy tale differs from the myth by the fact that marvelous in it is deritualized and desacralized” (Vučković, 2018, 313). Nevertheless, since the term ‘marvelous tale’ is not common in literature, especially considering that in collections,¹ reading textbooks, or picture books containing marvelous content, the term fairy tale (*bajka*) is predominantly used today, we have opted for this general name (fairy tale), comprising all stories that contain the phenomenon of the marvelous, regardless of whether they are authored or folk tales.² If we were to use only the term folk tale (*narodna priča*), we would risk imprecision – at least genre-wise – because in this group, alongside fairy tales, there are other forms such as fables, legends, humorous stories, etc. Therefore, the term fairy tale in this paper encompasses both oral wonder tales³ and literary fairy tales,⁴ as we primarily consider it genre-wise, indicating the character of the depicted event. In support of such a definition, we can refer to Graham Anderson’s study *Fairy Tale in the Ancient World* (2000), in which the author uses the same term to encompass stories of the *marvelous* nature dating back to the period before the Common Era. Furthermore, in most South Slavic languages, the term fairy tale is used as a common name for both folk and authored texts that tell of marvelous events (Vuković, 1996, 162–188). The stories we analyse in this paper mostly correspond to the category of ‘tales of magic’ (300–749) from the ATU index (Aarne-Thompson-Uther is an international motif-based classification of folk tales). Considering that the ATU index contains about 2400 types of folk tales, grouped into seven categories, it is clear that the term folk tale encompasses all of them, which is

another reason to distinguish the group of stories that involve a marvelous event under the term fairy tale.

Fairy tales tackle both personal and social phenomena, and relationships between males and females; in other words, fairy tales are often focused on the relations which develop between princes and princesses. In the abundant corpus of fairy tales from around the world, both by known authors and from the oral tradition, there are stories with traditional, patriarchal features, as well as texts with emancipatory traits (Zipes, 1986). The first group of stories should be read with the task of understanding their deeper meaning from different perspectives. Their particular value lies in the fact that they show to young readers the ideology of their time, and describe the relations which existed in those times. The second group of fairy tales is often called disruptive stories, which refers to stories “that challenge and go beyond conventional and limiting traditional storylines about race, gender and class through presenting unexpected characterisations, plots, outcomes or details – for example, feminist fairy tales, or stories where the protagonists belong to visible minorities” (Yeoman, 1999, 427). They should be read during upbringing with the purpose of enabling the mindset to grow.

The aim of this paper is to elaborate on the importance of reading the traditional fairy tale in the process of education, which is founded on the possibilities of a critical approach to the interpretation of the story. Our research perspective is derived from literature teaching methodology, or literary pedagogy. We used morphological analysis in the case of a typical traditional folk story – *Baščelik* (*The Head of Steel*) – to depict the manner in which the patriarchal values creating and maintaining the myth of heroism function in the story. We started with a number of research questions: Why is the fairy tale so important in education and how does it influence the reader? What kind of ideology do fairy tales present? Which fairy tales (traditional or non-traditional) should one read during education, and how should their critical reading be arranged?

The paper first defines the literary nature of the fairy tale and briefly outlines its historical development. Relevant critique of the didactic value of the fairy tale and the way in which children receive this story are also described. After that, the work places emphasis on male and female protagonists, who are often described in the tale by means of a series of fascinatingly similar attributes. These are considered

1 For example, although the collection *The Collected Sicilian Folk and Fairy Tales of Giuseppe Pitre* (Zipes & Russo, 2009), contains exclusively stories collected from the people (folk tales), the title itself creates a distinction between fairy tales and others.

2 The title of Propp’s book *Morphology of the Folktale* (2009), translated from Russian to Serbo-Croatian by Petar Vujičić for the first edition 1982 (Propp, 2012) is *Morfologija bajke*.

3 The term ‘wonder tale’ is not genre-sensitive enough for the purposes of this paper, as in fantasy for the children – to which fairy tales belong (Vuković, 1996, 162–188) – various wonders happen. For more details, please refer to the subchapter *Fairy tales in literary theory and history* in this paper or cf. Vuković (1996). For the etymological origin and the discursive meaning of related notions cf. Trautnik (2020, 958–960).

4 In both groups, there are stories with traditional and non-traditional characteristics.

by Propp (2009) under the scope of (a) hero-seeker and (b) princess (a sought-for person) and her father. Thus, certain characters express gender relations in a fairy tale and represent guidelines which can model critical reading. The hero-seeker is predominantly a male character of the heroic type, whose task it is to conquer, enslave, kill a monster, etc.,⁵ while the princess is a helpless female, often an underdeveloped literary character, simply featuring the values of emphasized femininity (Connell, 1987, 183–190). The method we apply to the chosen fairy tale – *The Head of Steel* – is explained in the rest of the article and is based on Propp's (2009) morphological approach. It corresponds to a feminist perspective and offers possibilities for teaching interpretation. Implications for teaching and conclusions follow.

FAIRY TALES IN LITERARY THEORY AND HISTORY

The fairy tale is an old and remarkably fruitful story. Over the centuries, stories with strikingly different ideological patterns were created (Zipes, 2000). In the rich corpus of fairy tales, one may find both those with an emancipatory role, even among those crafted a long time ago (oral wonder tales), as well as those whose themes could be interpreted as conservative in contemporary terms (Bacchilega, 1997, 9). Moreover, retellings or adaptations of fairy tales would often shift the stories' ideologies, moving from emancipatory themes towards more conservative perspectives. For example, the Disney Princess edition, consisting of ten stories (*Snow White* (1937), *Cinderella* (1950), *Sleeping Beauty* (1959), *The Little Mermaid* (1989), *Beauty and the Beast* (1991), *Aladdin* (1992), *Pocahontas* (1995), *Mulan* (1998), *The Princess and the Frog* (2009), and *Tangled* (2010)), is essentially based on "consistently problematic representations of gender, class, and race" (Wohlwend, 2012, 594). One example of this is Andersen's tale *The Little Mermaid*. In his version, the heroine displays genuine emancipatory tendencies, expressing a yearning to transcend the confines of the familiar. This impulse is driven by two great motivations: spiritual (to obtain the immortal human soul) and romantic (to win a prince's love). By contrast, Disney's adaptation reduces her motivation to a romantic need, which undoubtedly constitutes a moral simplification, as shown by Walter Hastings (1993, 90).

Having emerged a long time ago, through the deritualization and desacralization of the myth, the fairy tale appears to be a result of oral tradition belonging to fantasy literature for children (Vuković, 1996, 162–167). Novo Vuković (1996, 161–188) examines oral and authored fairy tales within the framework of the chapter 'Fantastic Prose', and he precisely makes a distinction between fantastic prose genres – after

pointing out the diversity in terminology and the frequent imprecisions it causes – according to the genre principle with explicit reference to Tzvetan Todorov's study (Vuković, 1996, 164). In the realm of fantasy literature, various kinds of miracles occur – boundless travels through time and space, transformations, battles against supernatural beings, and many other events defying the laws of reality. However, a miracle taking place in a fairy tale has a specific character – it does not seek a realistic transformation, i.e. the reader accepts it without attempting to explain its nature. Tzvetan Todorov (1973, 41, 87) labelled such a miracle, typical of the fairy tale, with the term *the marvelous* (*les merveilleux*). While other types of fantasy might be explained by some kind of logic (dream, delirium, frenzy, hallucinations, and other altered states of consciousness), *the marvelous* occurring in the fairy tale is utterly inexplicable and accepted by the reader as such. The reader does not think about the way in which Snow White's step-mother's mirror 'sees' who the most beautiful person in the world is – it merely happens, and is accepted as magic. Magical occurrences take place in numerous variations: metamorphosis, metempsychosis, resurrection, exorcism (Vuković, 1996, 165). The realm of *the marvelous* is identified by the reader as a parallel universe in relation to the real world (Todorov, 1973, 87). There is no misunderstanding or interference between the two worlds (the reader's world and the fairy tale world). In the process of reception, the fairy tale easily attains "the impossible unity, suggesting to the reader to believe without truly believing" (Todorov, 1973, 87). Therefore, if we start from Todorov's theory where *differentia specifica* of this story is recognized, we may consider the fairy tale to be a story about marvelous events.

Fairy tales are most commonly classified into folk or oral and authorial or literary tales, although many have traits of both those types (Vuković, 1996, 163, 176). For example, the majority of fairy tales in the Grimm Brothers' collection originate in folklore, whereby the Grimms did shape and write down the theretofore oral tales (Antonijević, 2023, 109–111; Vuković, 1996, 180–181). It is also important to note that not all folk tales are fairy tales (Samardžija, 1997), which is also evident from the Aarne-Thompson-Uther (ATU) index. Only such folk tales as can be described with the term *les merveilleux*, according to Todorov (1973), are treated as fairy tales in this paper.

There are several inconsistent theories about the origin of fairy tales (Vuković, 1996, 165–167). Knowledge about fairy tales created before the invention of printing is based on mere assumptions and has no reliable sources (Zipes, 2000, 46). Conversely, knowledge on printed or literary fairy tales is far more reliable.

5 For the discussion about the dragon slayer fairytale matrix cf. Darovec (2021) and Tratnik (2022a).

Thus, Giovanni Francesco Straparola, who published his collection, *Le piacevoli notti* (*The Pleasant Nights*, 1550–1553), is mentioned as the first fairy tale writer in Europe (Zipes, 2006, 59). Another important fairy tale writer from Italy was Giambattista Basile, who published *Lo cunto de li cunti* (*The Tale of Tales*, 1634–1636).

The fairy tale earned its place among the literary genres in France in the late 17th and 18th centuries. Zipes (2006, 67–68) points out that there is strong evidence that Straparola's and Basile's collections were known to French fairy tale writers from the 17th and 18th centuries. At that time, many female authors wrote fairy tales, such as Madame d'Aulnoy, Henriette-Julie de Murat, Gabrielle-Suzanne Barbot de Villeneuve, and Jeanne-Marie Leprince de Beaumont. The fairy tales they told in French salons were intended for the aristocratic class, as is the case with the fairy tales of Charles Perrault, published in 1697 in the collection entitled *Histoires ou contes du temps passé* (*Stories or Tales of Times Past*) (Zipes, 2006, 72–73). Perrault's tales taught lessons in morality. The potential for fairy tales to convey moral lessons did not go unnoticed by the above French female authors, who in most cases worked as governesses and teachers, and perceived the fairy tale as a powerful didactic tool (Zipes, 2006, 77; Tratnik, 2022b).

After France, the fairy tale expanded its influence to Germany. The Grimm Brothers' collection *Children's and Household Tales* (*Kinder- und Hausmärchen*) was published in two volumes in 1812 and 1815 (Vuković, 1996, 180–181). Taking into consideration that the Grimm Brothers mentioned children as their audience in the very title, numerous terrifying scenes in the tales soon received severe criticism. As a result, by 1819 the authors had already published the second edition, toning down such scenes and leaving out whole stories that were impossible to adapt for younger audiences (Vučković, 2018, 323). Shortly after the Grimm Brothers' fairy tales, the first texts of Hans Christian Andersen started emerging, starting in 1835. Though carrying some notable authorial interventions by the collectors, the Grimm Brothers' fairy tales still originated from folk sources (Antonijević, 2023, 109–111). By contrast, the majority of Andersen's fairy tales attained an authentic authorial mode, and many of them omit patriarchal gender patterns (Vučković, 2018, 317).

Apart from the above authors, many collectors throughout Europe, driven by Romanticism and its predilection to folk literary heritage, recorded various forms of folk literature in the 19th century (Vuković, 1996, 179–180). In today's Italy, this task was carried out by Thomas Frederick Crane (1844–1927), Laura Gonzenbach (1842–1878), and Giuseppe Pitre (1841–1916), among others; in the areas inhabited by

South Slavs – Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787–1864); in today's Russia – Alexander Afanasyev (1826–1871), etc. (Vuković, 1996; Zipes, 2000). Rich collections of folk art were published through their work. Along other genres, these collections include numerous wonder tales. Research shows that the motivational structures of folk tales are strikingly similar, which can be at least partially explained by the so-called principle of transferability, which was introduced by Vladimir Propp (2009). Furthermore, Propp (2009) started his important research after noticing the fascinating wealth of motifs among folk tales, which essentially covers the incredible internal, i.e. morphological similarity and repeatability.

The authorial interventions by collectors are a regular feature of the collections of folk tradition from the 19th century (Zipes & Russo, 2009, 14), raising the question: is there any clear demarcation line between the oral (folk) and authorial (literary) fairy tale? Jack Zipes (2006, 42–48) asserts that there are no final boundaries between the folk (oral) and literary fairy tale, as there are intersections from the very beginning. In the stage of oral tradition, stories were spread by retelling and were transformed during communication – they tended to acquire something new and lose something old in the process. At the moment of their being written down by collectors, their relative longevity was established.⁶ However, the main period when oral stories were collected and written down (mostly in 19th century) was not marked by today's codes on the conservation of the original and on avoiding the adaptation for the purpose of maintaining authenticity (Vuković, 1996, 180). Instead, the collectors freely added and omitted content in fairy tales whenever they deemed it necessary (Antonijević, 2023, 109–111). For example, Vuk Karadžić had the primary objective of reforming the language and its standard use, while the collection of folk literary works served to support that project. Thus, his opinion that “when writing short stories, one should think and adjust the words (again, not according to one's own taste, but according to the characteristics of the Serbian language)” (Karadžić Stefanović, 1987, 47–48) is completely understandable in order to avoid excesses, and to allow both the learned to read and the laymen to listen.

To further pinpoint the definition of the fairy tale, which this paper considers a text with *les merveilleux* elements, we will also mention Karadžić's classification of stories into *male* and *female*. According to the author, “female stories are those where all sorts of wonders are described, things that cannot be (and in all likelihood, only they can be called a *gatka* [...]); whereas male stories are without wonders, and one could say that things described in them could truly

6 Tratnik showed how fairy tale versions change depending on the cultural context of production and reception (cf. Tratnik, 2023a).

happen” (Karadžić Stefanović, 1987, 48). Therefore, fairy tales would be female stories.

Classical popular fairy tales have practically hundreds of versions (Zipes, 2000; 2006, 1–41). What we know today about any popular fairy tale, such as *Cinderella*, *Red Riding Hood*, *Snow White*, is a result of the interference of many stories with the same or similar titles. However, though all these fairy tales have many versions, their widely known plots are mostly a combination derived from the stories by Perrault, brothers Grimm, and the Disney production which provided a new, film-like form for the fairy tale in the 20th century (Zipes, 2006, 140–141).

This paper underscores the difference between two groups of traditional fairy tales:

1. The modern literary fairy tale canon is predominantly formed by the fairy tales of Charles Perrault, the Grimms, Disney and Andersen, at least in the western world. Though authorized, all fairy tales by the mentioned writers – with the exception of Andersen’s fairy tales – originate from folk sources (Vuković, 1996, 178, 180, 184–188). Fairy tales by Perrault, the Grimms and Disney have mostly been considered as stories which norm the patriarchy and do not have an emancipatory role (Parsons, 2004, 137–138).
2. Folk tales (which contain the ‘marvelous’ category), which have an important role in children’s education. These stories are included in collections edited during the period of Romanticism, and they often, though not always, display traditional patterns. This paper focuses on the latter group.

It is important to pinpoint that the fairy tale is not a sexist narrative in and of itself. In the rich tradition from across the world, there are many stories of this genre with an emancipatory role, even in the collections of folk tales (Zipes & Russo, 2009, 26). However, there are fairy tales with different substance; it is important to read them in class with the tasks of achieving an aesthetic experience and of reaching a critical understanding of past and (future) society as well.

THE TRADITIONAL WORLD OF FAIRY TALES – THE IDEOLOGY OF HETERONORMATIVITY AND THE HEROIC MYTH

The traditional, patriarchal social order in which men dominate the family and society (Sultana, 2012, 3) is founded on a heterosexual matrix as a model that is the result of a binary gender pattern (Butler, 1990). Gender has a performative character, as pointed out by Butler (1990), which means that an individual performs certain types of behaviour before the eyes of society. Those types of behaviour that are normed are affirmed and repeated, while other types of behaviour are suspended. The resulting heterosexual matrix is simply obtained by combining hegemonic masculinity and

emphasized femininity as conspicuous binary gender characteristics (Connell, 1987, 183–190). Many heroes in fairy tales, especially folk tales, embody the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity – they fight monsters and dragons, surmount vast expanses and subjugate everything in their way. Their princesses have traits of emphasized femininity – they are beautiful, quiet, vulnerable, require protection, etc.

Based on the concept of ecofeminism, Margery Hourihan’s (1997) study *Deconstructing the Hero* identifies the layer of connotations underlying many popular stories, where a white European male is glorified as a hero. The hero’s task is to master women, other beings and nature, as Hourihan (1997, 57–95) states. The heroic myth associates the man-hero with civilization and common sense, while it places the woman into the context of emotions and uncultivated conduct (Hourihan, 1997, 51, 175), which suits patriarchal ideology. The research conclusions indicate that literature targeted at young readers, spanning from myths and fairy tales to adventure narratives, often promotes a world steeped in patriarchal traditional values. It is a world where stark gender, racial, class and other differences appear, in which everything is subjugated to the white masculine domination of the Westerners (Hourihan, 1997, 57–95).

Though she embarks from a completely different theoretical position – ecofeminism, Hourihan (1997) effectively follows a similar trajectory to that on which Joseph Campbell (2004) created his monomyth theory. This theory describes the hero’s journey of a civilized white man who, driven by an adventurous spirit, sets off to distant and unknown regions. While travelling, he goes through an initiation, receives help from higher powers, succeeds in all his ideas and endeavours, and his return to his homeland is touted as the hero’s return (Campbell, 2004). The fairy tale is genealogically related to the myth and hence it fits into Campbell’s theory.

It is possible to further affirm the close connection between the fairy tale and the heroic myth, with another significant study on the construction or morphology of the folk tale, which was described by Vladimir Propp (2009) from a formalist-structuralist position. While examining folk tales from Afanasyev’s collection, Propp (2009, 25–65) detected 31 functions (function is the action which generates the plot) that make it possible to define the structure of any folk tale. In Propp’s theory, characters do not have a particularly important role, because they represent a variable category and are interchangeable, but the functions they carry are invariable. Propp (2009) labels characters as *dramatis personae* functioning within the seven scopes of action. In Propp’s theory, the scope of action of a hero is certainly important, if not the most important. The hero may either be a hero-seeker or a hero-victim. No fairy tale has both types of the hero. Male *dramatis personae*

are much more frequently heroes in fairy tales (Propp, 2009), while female characters are either victims, or what Hourihan calls 'trophy-brides' (Hourihan, 1997, 51), the term referring to an undeveloped female character exclusively placed in the position of a trophy to be awarded to the brave male hero.

RECOGNIZING AND DENYING THE FAIRY TALE AS A DIDACTIC TOOL

Fairy tales started to be recognised as a powerful didactic tool at the time of their popularity in the French court and the aristocracy in general, and become more prevalent as such in the 19th century, when the Brothers Grimm explicitly identified children as the target audience (Vučković, 2018, 322–323).

Vuković (1996, 171–176) stated that in different periods there were doubts about the didactic value of fairy tales, a position shared by Maria Nikolajeva, who points out that "fairy tales, with their seemingly explicit morals, are highly problematic" (2014, 183). Nikolajeva (2014) cites examples in which the heroes of fairy tales break basic rules, steal, cheat, lie and kill without much consideration, while the main thread of the story justifies such actions if they are committed by a seemingly positive character. Critics have drawn attention to the difficulties regarding children's reactions to violent scenes in fairy tales, and have also pointed out that these stories can potentially detach children from reality (Vuković, 1996, 171–176).

Probably the strongest trend in fairy tale criticism, crucial for this paper, originates from feminist-oriented researchers, and may be initially introduced by Zipes' opinion that the fairy tale is maintained and replicated "by a cultural industry that favours patriarchal and reactionary notions of gender, ethnicity, behaviour, and social class" (Zipes, 2006, 2). Zipes (2006, 103, 204, 229–233) considers the fairy tale from a sociological point of view as a powerful means which supports and sustains the patriarchal ideology.

Criticism aimed at the patriarchal ideology of the fairy tale commenced with the first wave of feminism. Feminism being a virtually spectral phenomenon today, here it is important to define the type of feminist position that we are taking in this paper. Feminism is "the system of ideas and political practices based on the principle that women are human beings equal to men" (Lengermann & Niebrugge, 2011, 223). It is a layered phenomenon that had developed for a long period of time towards the end of the 20th century, when it also adopted the concept of intersectionality. It means that, along with the issue of gender, it includes other identity features as well, and supports equality among all, regardless of any personal characteristics (Lengermann & Niebrugge, 2011, 223).

Feminist-oriented researchers were not against reading fairy tales; they perceived it as a powerful

means of education, but also re-education. In this sense, they thought it necessary to retell classic fairy tales, along with a change in characterization of female and male characters; furthermore, they also thought it desirable to write completely new fairy tales. One of the examples of retelling classical texts is the collection entitled *Don't Bet on the Prince* (Zipes, 1986) containing feminist versions of many well-known fairy tales. Feminist ideas provided for the emergence of the so-called disruptive fairy tales, some of which are a type of retelling, and some are original.

Of course, it is important to recall the existence of numerous perspectives for interpreting fairy tales in science and education, "that are Jungian, Marxist, sociopolitical, dialectical, historical, text-historical, feminist, gender-related, mythological, and economic, with both affirmative and critical assessments" (Murphy, 2000, 7). The approach employed by this paper is but one possible way, not disputing the validity of other, different interpretations.

THE ROLE OF THE FAIRY TALE IN EDUCATION AND THE MANNER IN WHICH CHILDREN RECEIVE IT

Considerable research has been carried out on the role of literature in the social, emotional and conative development of personality since the beginning of this century, particularly from the perspective of cognitive criticism. It has been confirmed "that literature affects our beliefs and opinions" (Nikolajeva, 2014, 5), which is largely the result of the function of mirror neurons, because "cognitive criticism, supported by neuroscience, has shown that the brain, through recently discovered mirror neurons, reacts to fictional worlds (descriptions, events, characters) as if they were real" (Nikolajeva, 2014, 8). Stories have a strong educational effect and therefore directly influence the formation of a person's character, owing to the fact that they are interesting, understandable, easy to remember, and most of them provide some kind of optimism (Nodelman, 2008, 81). Moreover, the child-reader embarks on the adventure of reading rather sympathetically, in that they need to identify with literary characters that they experience in a powerful and realistic manner (Nodelman, 2008, 36). Taking that into account, reading fiction may help us understand the real world better, but such understanding will indeed depend on the reading material that we choose, as well as on the reader's skill to consider the text inquisitively, critically and problematically. Namely, cultural codes and patterns, social values and prejudices, negative opinions and stereotypes are transmitted to young generations through stories and become an integral part of their personalities.

Children's literature has a special role in the preservation and transmission of culture and tradition, as well as in the formation and maintenance

of social norms (Hourihan, 1997, 235–238; Zipes, 2006, 28, 148, 166; Vučković, 2018, 316–317).⁷ The most prominent role of fairy tales is their impact on socialization, as they are commonly listened to and read during early childhood. The meanings embedded in these tales are absorbed by children, subsequently evolving into their steadfast and nearly immutable points of view, as supported by research (Davies, 1989; Westland, 1993; Yeoman, 1999; Parsons, 2004; Kostas, 2018; Adriany, 2019). The aforementioned research shows that children early adopt the gender discourse and other norms in traditional stories, and that their devotion to that discourse grows with age, which is particularly true for boys (Davies, 1989; Kostas, 2018). Furthermore, the mentioned research was performed in various parts of the world – Australia, European and American states, Indonesia – and its results are worryingly similar. Through stories, and fairy tales in particular, children partly confirm existing experiences, and partly acquire new experiences with a frame of reference that was named by Judith Butler (1990) as the *heterosexual matrix*, whose binary oppositions of masculinity and femininity are clearly defined with the terms of *hegemonic masculinity* and *emphasized femininity* by Raewyn Connell (1987, 183–190). This frame represents a basic construction as a foundation for the patriarchy as a social ideology responsible for traditionalism, i.e. for maintaining the position of a white man as master over other beings and entire nature (Hourihan, 1997, 38–44).

Stories affect the way in which children perceive themselves and other people and understand the concepts of goodness, justice, truth, beauty, etc. Pre-school girls from Vina Adriany's (2019, 735–736) study described female beauty according to the appearance of Disney's princesses, which is an edition of fairy tales popular worldwide. The fact that Disney's princesses do not resemble adult women from their surroundings did not affect the girls in the mentioned research (Adriany, 2019, 736).

METHOD

The aim of this paper is to elaborate on the importance of reading traditional fairy tales during education, which is founded on the potential for critically approaching the interpretation of the story. Bearing in mind that this is not an absolutely novel objective, we underline that in the numerous works we consulted, which were cited in this paper, we have encountered a wide variety of types of critical reading. Yet, we have not come across an approach grounded in reader-response theory, particularly with reference to the specific program derived from that theory (Reading and Writing for Critical Thinking),

complemented by our incorporation of research-based reading. This, however modest, constitutes the original contribution of the paper.

In order to achieve this goal, we started with two tasks:

1. Establishing the traditional features of the selected fairy tale;
2. Creating a model of its critical reading.

We opted for Propp's structuralist method as a way to establish traditional features of the fairy tale, and the critical reading of the story relies on reader-response criticism (Iser, 1978; Jauss, 1982) and follows after *Discussion*.

Vladimir Propp (2009) developed the model of a meta-tale, which is an abstract structure capable of interpolating any existing story of such kind. The meta-tale develops as a story with 31 functions, where a function represents "an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action" (Propp, 2009, 21). Characters or *dramatis personae* are a variable category; they alternate and perform their functions according to the established schedule.

Propp (2009) described functions and their sub-groups; each function has a marker and an abbreviated name, all of which is accompanied by examples from Afanasyev's tales. Thus the construction of the meta-tale is formed by the following functions: absention (β), interdiction (γ), violation (δ), reconnaissance (ε), delivery (ζ), trickery (η), complicity (θ), villainy (A) or lack (a), mediation (B), beginning counteraction (C), departure (†), first function of the donor (D), the hero's reaction (E), provision of a magical agent (F), guidance (G), struggle (H), branding (I), victory (J), liquidation of lack (K), return (↓), pursuit (Pr), rescue (Rs), unrecognized arrival (o), unfounded claims (L), difficult task (M), solution (N), recognition (Q), exposure (Ex), transfiguration (T), punishment (U), wedding (W) (Propp, 2009, 25–65).

The plot commences from the eighth function, so that the function of villainy or lack generates the storyline. Propp's definition of the folk tale relates to that function: "Morphologically, a tale (*skázka*) may be termed any development proceeding from villainy (A) or a lack (a), through intermediary functions to marriage (W*), or to other functions employed as a denouement" (Propp, 2009, 92). Propp (2009) noticed that a single story may contain several instances of villainy or lack, so that each part of the story from the occurrence of villainy to its compensation is called a move. The moves within the same story may be combined in various ways. They might flow successively or simultaneously, or a single move might be interpolated within a wider one, etc.

⁷ Fairy tales and folktales are also important tools to build communities (cf. Tratnik, 2023b). Folktales in particular transmit cognitive matrices from one generation to the next (cf. Horvat, 2022).

Real stories regularly differ from theoretical models, i.e. fairy tales did not emerge from ideal structural features posed by Propp for the meta-tale. Not all tales have all functions; on the contrary, there are series of functions absent from specific examples. In addition, there is frequent trebling, i.e. the same procedure repeats three times in variants: (a) every time successfully, (b) twice with a negative outcome, the third time with a positive one, (c) in accordance with the grading sequence (Propp, 2009). Some functions might be assimilated (included in other actions) or they might be recognized with a double morphological meaning (Propp, 2009, 66, 69). Functions frequently have a negative outcome; for instance, if the hero does not respond positively to the donor's temptation, he does not acquire a magical means. Therefore, the morphological analysis of folk tales is substantially complicated given the abundance of singularities contained in these stories. What helps to define the function more precisely is its consequences and it is the fundamental criterion that is necessary to follow in the morphological analysis.

Characters in tales function within seven ranges of action according to Propp's (2009) theory: villain, donor, helper, princess (a sought-for person) and her father, hero and false hero. The main character is a hero-seeker or a hero-victim. The wonder or fairy tale always follows the path of a single hero. Male characters dominate among hero-seekers, while female characters are dominantly defined as trophy-brides or victims (Propp, 2009). In that sense, Propp's approach may be used to depict a heroic venture of a hero-seeker.

METHOD LIMITATIONS

According to some researchers (Hammond, 2011, 47–52), Propp did not describe the morphological analysis in detail; as a result, his descriptions of functions might be unclear to those who are not quite familiar with Afanasyev's tales, which were the corpus for Propp's analysis. In the article *Structural and Historical Study of the Fairy Tale*, published as an addendum to some editions of the book *Morphology of the Folktale*, Propp provided an explanation for inaccuracies in the English translation of the book, which were a cause for some of the complaints it received (Propp, 2012). This obstacle was overcome by the fact that the authors of this paper are well-acquainted with the corpus of the fairy tales analysed by Propp. In addition, MIT's instructions (Finlayson, 2012, 18–25) were very helpful in the analysis.

The most important objection to Propp's morphology is that it is of a significantly formalist nature and that it does not deal with the semantics of the stories enough, and especially that it does not provide the interpretation of the tale in the social and cultural contexts (Zipes, 2000, 16). This particular problem is

addressed in *Discussion* in that the results have been considered within the context of the previous theoretical hypotheses.

Propp's theory is not new. On the contrary, it dates back to the first half of the previous century. However, newer research by Mikita Suprunčuk (2022) and Žarko Trebješanin (2022) is also based on Propp's approach, which was also deemed valid by Antonijević (2023, 126–128). Suprunčuk believes that Propp's morphology is "incredible in terms of its beauty, and unusually valuable for its universality of generalisations" (Suprunčuk, 2022, 14). Trebješanin (2022) wrote about the morphological functions and *dramatis personae*, addressing the psychological questions with which the fairy tale assists children during the process of socialisation. This aspect of communication between a child and the fairy tale is indeed the closest, albeit not identical, to our perspective. Uther (2009, 25) is another who claims that Propp's influence lives on, a viewpoint confirmed by studies focused on the development of software for creating stories based on Propp's theory (Hammond, 2011, 81–117; Finlayson, 2012, 19–25). These trends are hugely important for education science, particularly for literature teaching methodology at the present moment when artificial intelligence is becoming an unknown that needs to be thoroughly understood and utilised promptly. Propp's morphology has not been adequately employed in studies on education, to the authors' best knowledge.

MATERIAL

Vuk Stefanović Karadžić compiled two rich collections of folk tales, the first of which was published in 1853, and the second in 1870. The second collection contains 19 long-form folk tales. Among other stories, this category includes well-known fairy tales, such as *Biberče (Peppercorn)* and *Baš-čelik (The Head of Steel)*. The stories, like those from the first collection, were collected from different regions inhabited by South Slavic peoples, so some of them were also recorded in the territory of today's Montenegro. We chose the fairy tale *Baš-čelik*, or *The Head of Steel* (Turkish word *baş* for "head" and *čelik* for "steel"), from that collection for our analysis. Regarding this story, Kilibarda (2012, 199) points out that it belongs to the fairy tales collected in the territory of Montenegro. In terms of his characteristics, *Baš-čelik* himself resembles *Košćej the Immortal*, the evil sorcerer from East Slavic folk tales.

RESULTS

The initial situation is depicted at the beginning of the story, where the reader discovers that the emperor has three sons and three daughters. This instantly signifies the prominence of number three. Its symbolism is made obvious through several times in the text.

Move I: On his deathbed, the emperor makes an interdiction (γ) to his sons, ordering them to marry off their sisters to the first suitors who come forward. He then dies, which represents the function of the so-called intensified absention (β). One night, some kind of force appears and demands the eldest sister to be his wife. Two older brothers violate their father's interdiction (violation – δ), which places their conduct into the classical morphological structure of the fairy tale (interdiction and its violation). However, the youngest brother does not violate his father's interdiction and gives his sister to the unknown groom. The appearance of the unknown groom and the reaction of the youngest prince are later recognized as the donor function (*first function of the donor* where the hero is being questioned, interrogated, assaulted, etc. and is therefore being prepared to obtain a magical medium or a sidekick – D, *the hero's reaction*, where the hero reacts to the deeds of the future donor – E), because the young man has gained a magical ally (provision of a magical agent – F). The acts triple and we have identical reactions of the three brothers repeated three times. When the three sisters have been married, the brothers feel that they miss them (a), which is the point where the plot proper starts. They decide to set off on a quest, which they do together, so we have a series of functions of the plot – mediation (B), beginning counteraction (C), departure ($\uparrow$).

While travelling, the brothers spend a night beside a lake where dragons live. They spend three nights by the lake, so every night one of the brothers, the one who keeps watch, struggles (H) with a dragon and achieves victory (J). The dragons grow increasingly terrifying, and the youngest brother naturally proves to be the bravest, because he wins over the most terrifying dragon. During his struggle, the fire next to his brothers is extinguished, which is a new lack (a) providing a series of events for the young man to embark on. They have already started another move (Move II) before the problem of lack from the first move has been resolved (the sisters have not been found yet), which means that the first move does not end here.

Move II: Unrelated to the events previously described, there is a city rampaged by giants-cannibals who kidnap local people every day, take them to a cave and eat them, which is the function of villainy (A). While solving the lack of fire (a), the youngest prince comes across the giants' cave and stays with them. He is informed about their misdeeds and decides to confront them (mediation – B, beginning counteraction – C). During the giants' assault on the town, the young man succeeds in achieving a victory (J) through his cleverness in direct struggle (H) one-on-one.

After that, the young man visits an almost deserted town, where he encounters a sleeping princess with a snake slyly approaching her. The prince kills the snake with his tiny knife, pinning it against the wall, which

finally liquidates the troubles from Move II (K), and swears on his knife, proclaiming that it should only be taken out from the wall by his hand, which represents branding (I). In a series of events through which the characters go, the emperor of the town finds out who saved his town and his daughter, and the ultimate proof is the sworn knife which serves as a means of recognition (Q) of the real hero. The saviour is given the emperor's daughter to be his wife and remains in town as the emperor's equal (the hero gets married and ascends the imperial throne – W).

Move III: The emperor goes for a short journey (absention β) and he gives the keys to many premises to his son-in-law, but forbids (γ) him to enter one of them, which the young man does not obey (violation – δ). In that room he encounters Baš-čelik, a paladin in immense shackles; near him there is water, but he cannot drink. Baš-čelik asks the young man for water, the young man gives it to him, which is repeated three times (the functions of trickery – η and complicity – θ). However, they are at the same time three donor functions (DEF), because every time Baš-čelik gives a new life to the young man. When Baš-čelik has drunk water for the third time, he breaks the shackles, spreads his wings, grabs the prince's wife and takes her away, constituting villainy (A). The young man reports to the emperor and leaves with a firm decision to confront the villain (mediation – B, beginning counteraction – C and departure $\uparrow$).

Travelling the world, the young man finds his sisters, through which he liquidates the lack that had taken him on the journey in the first move. At the same time, it represents the end of the first move, because the basic element of the plot has been solved (the first move ending). In addition, he finally meets his brothers-in-law (the emperors of dragons, hawks and eagles), each of whom presents him with a feather that he can use to call them when in trouble (here we are informed on the third donor function from the first move).

Continuing his journey, the prince finds his wife and attempts to flee (Pr) with her three times, but the function of rescue is not materialized, i.e. rescue – Rs has a negative index. Baš-čelik catches them every time and every time the young man loses one of the lives gifted to him by the villain, until his own life is finally taken by Baš-čelik. His brothers-in-law, the magical agents, rescue him with life-giving water. The final struggle (H) is, however, in cleverness: the prince tells his wife to ask Baš-čelik where his power lies. She succeeds in her intention and finds out that Baš-čelik's power lies high in a mountain, where there is a fox; in the fox is a heart, in the heart is a bird, and the bird holds his power. With the help of his brothers-in-law, the prince manages to reach his opponent's power, which brings him victory (J). He takes his wife back, liquidating the lack (K), and regains his marriage and the crown (W).

DISCUSSION

The fairy tale *The Head of Steel* has a strikingly complicated structure, which is to a certain extent clearer with a morphological approach. The story seems to have a number of digressions and/or episodes, if analysed without Propp's terminology. Using Propp's morphological approach, we see that the story has three moves, or that its dramatic composition contains three plots. The story tracks a hero-seeker, who searches for several 'objects' – in the first move he searches for his sisters, in the second move for the villains who rampaged the town of another emperor, and in the third move for his wife who has been kidnapped. Only in the third move does he resolve the search from the first move by finding his sisters.

The first move of the story, especially its beginning, depicts a typical patriarchal family in which the head of the house (the emperor) pronounces his last will on his deathbed. He exclusively entrusts to his sons the directive on how their sisters should be married (the event takes place without the daughters' presence). The youngest prince, predestined to be a hero, is the only one to fully respect his father's will. Despite the fact that some horrendous force claims his sisters, he irrevocably fulfils his duty imposed by the head of the family on his deathbed. Thus, in the beginning, he is presented as loyal to the values of the patriarchy and worthy of assuming the role of the future master of the family.

Specific morphological circumstances occur in the very first move – the same doings could be interpreted in numerous ways; some functions have double morphological meanings. The prince's reaction to the appearance of the future brothers-in-law is an obvious example. On the one hand, it is a non-violation of the prohibition in the classical sequence of the fairy tale, i.e. a negative realization of one of the introductory functions. On the other, these are typical donor functions because after the trial (evidenced in the testing of his loyalty to his father's testament) the young man proves himself worthy of obtaining magical agents. In addition, in this move, we encounter the initial instance of trebling as the three brothers-in-law arrive. The trebling recurs in other moves as well (the confrontation with three dragons, three water-givings to Baš-čelik, and the loss of three lives), presenting symbolism that could be linked to the Christian significance of the number three.

In the first move, the brothers struggle with the lake dragons, which is seemingly irrelevant for the development of central events. However, that struggle is essentially quite important in the function of characterization – the older brothers are brave as well, and skilled in fighting dragons, but the youngest

is the most skilful and bravest, because the dragon he fights is the most horrendous. Moreover, the youngest prince appears to be caring when guarding his brothers' sleep, for he sets off to look for fire that was extinguished by water while he was struggling with the dragon.

The second move starts even before the prince enters the central part of the storyline. Giants-cannibals kidnapped the local people from another emperor's town. The prince discovers this by accident, when he comes across the cave where they live. Without any external plea or request, he decides to rescue the unknown locals and manages to kill the giants. In addition, the young man kills the snake threatening the princess's life. Thus the prince defeats other uncivilized, inhuman beings after the struggle with the dragon, and fulfils all conditions to marry the princess given to him as an award, and to attain the position equal to that of an emperor. However, his quests are not yet over; he still has to find his sisters and get into yet another fight – the struggle with the sorcerer whose power is hidden outside himself. That struggle develops in the third move.

No matter how loyal he is to the values of patriarchy and obedient to the head of the family, which he proves at the very beginning of the story, the prince is still young, inexperienced and curious. He violates his father-in-law's prohibition to enter the room where the sorcerer Baš-čelik is shackled. When communicating with Baš-čelik and responding to his plea for water, the young man is deceived on the one hand (he provides his opponent with strength), but at the same time he is merciful (he gives water to the thirsty one). In that complex reaction there is another double morphological meaning. In the continuation of the storyline, the young man finally finds his sisters and brothers-in-law while searching for his kidnapped wife, and acquires the magical agents that he earned in the first move. In the merciless fight against Baš-čelik, the prince loses the lives he was given and is finally killed. His brothers-in-law revive him with miraculous water, after which he finally acquires the true heroic status as described by Joseph Campbell (2004) relating to the hero's journey that includes dwelling in the world of the dead. After that stage of the hero's journey, the prince becomes much cleverer – he realizes that he has to fight Baš-čelik by outwitting him. When his wife finds out the location of the power of Baš-čelik, he strikes at that power, defeats it, regains his wife and the imperial throne. Therefore, the whole story is a great hero's journey in which a young member of a patriarchal society undergoes initiation (Campbell, 2004). He fights various monsters, defeats all of them successfully and, having matured, becomes worthy of being the guardian of the patriarchal order – he marries and ascends the throne. To make his heroism even

more conspicuous, his brothers resemble him – they are also heroes without traits of dishonesty or deceit. However, from the very beginning they lack one characteristic essential in the patriarchal order – they are not ready to respect their father's last will. Thus, our protagonist is the typical image of the hero that Hourihan (1997) writes about.

We observe the characteristics of the main character's features of hegemonic masculinity. There are practically no female characters, all the girls are in the function of a bride-symbol. If *Cinderella* is, as boys often say, a *female* text, then *The Head of Steel* is a pure *male* text. The analysis of the fairy tale has shown its concordance with the theses of Hourihan (1997) and the monomyth (Campbell, 2004), while the morphological approach (Propp, 2009) has made it possible to observe the journey and struggle of the hero-seeker, which is the basis for the educational interpretation of this traditional fairy tale.

Given the mentioned limitations of this method, in particular the fact that stories are not 'ideal' forms – like some natural phenomena – in order to establish their morphology, we are cognizant of the fact that the presented morphological structure may be discussed further. In fact, Propp himself (2009, 69) discussed the transfer of functions or double morphological meaning. In spite of this, the above analysis may be used as the foundation for research-based reading of the fairy tale in teaching. While interpreting any story, including fairy tales, during teaching, the elaborated positions and opinions of readers (students) are respected, and the diversity of those positions and opinions founded in parts of the text is completely valid in the context of the reception theory (Jauss, 1982), and reader-response theory (Iser, 1978).

All ideas contained in this chapter need to be activated in the educational interpretation of the fairy tale, to the extent allowed by the age and prior knowledge of the students who read the fairy tale. It is our estimation that a story with this structure can be understood by students aged twelve or more. During analysis in class, Propp's cards can be used (Hammond, 2011, 121).

THE CRITICAL READING OF THE FAIRY TALE IN THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION

Researchers have confirmed that it is equally important to read completely new, disruptive fairy tales in the process of education (Davies, 1989), but it is also important to endeavour to understand the meaning of traditional fairy tales (Walderkine, 1984, 182–184). From the methodical point of view, reading with the task of critically understanding the textual reality is particularly important in education, as described in the programme Reading and Writing for Critical Thinking – RWCT (Crawford et al., 2005). By reading traditional texts that contain the ideology of the patriarchy, and

given the task to problematically discover individual and social roles and relations and their (dis)agreement with the modern perspective, students develop critical thinking skills. It goes without saying that it is not desirable to impose opinions unacceptable for students, aiming to uphold the pluralism of ideas and thoughts.

In contemporary literature teaching, the interpretation of the text is founded on the active participation of the reader in decoding the meaning of the text, which is explained by the reception theory (Jauss, 1982) or reader-response criticism (Iser, 1978). This theory postulates two important concepts that are being introduced in all activities in the process of education. These concepts are *the horizon of expectation*, formed on the basis of students' previous knowledge and experiences; *aesthetic distance*, as a new value or a new insight provided to the reader by the work. The theoretical concept essentially implies that, before reading a story with children, we should talk to them about their experiences and their previous knowledge, i.e. to primarily evoke the horizon of their expectations (the phase of *evocation*), and then read the story with research tasks which enable students to understand meanings (the phase of *understanding the meaning*), and finally to critically estimate the aesthetic distance and identify conceptual and other values of the text (the phase of *reflection*). The sequence of phases – evocation, understanding the meaning, reflection, or the ERR system – has been derived on the basis of reader-response criticism. Special techniques and strategies have been created (Crawford et al., 2005) to ensure the reader's active role.

The RWCT programme involves a series of techniques and strategies ensuring an active role of the reader, such as: know – want to know – learn (KWL chart), brainstorming, reading in sequences, Venn's diagram, paired reading, question-board, think-pair-share, semantic map, character map, directed reading activity, read with text coding, jigsaw (cooperative learning technique), etc. (Crawford et al., 2005). For example, reading in sequences utilises the technique of 'cuts' in the same way that Scheherazade tells stories in *One Thousand and One Nights*.

As for the fairy tale used as our example, it is necessary to activate students' previous knowledge in the phase of evocation, which is possible with the technique of associations or by making some kind of graphic knowledge organizer, such as a semantic map (e.g. mind map). During the first stage, students discuss familiar characteristics of fairy tales, either in pairs or in small groups, remember the heroes, and provide hypotheses about the content of the text based on its title. Since a fairy tale with a complex structure such as *The Head of Steel* should, in our opinion, be introduced to students only when they reach the stage of formal logical thinking (around the age of twelve), by that point students are already familiar with many

fairy tales. During the creation of a semantic map of fairy tales, they will, with the help of the teacher, note down the main characteristics of those tales, such as: time and place, relations between good and evil, typical beginnings and so-called happy endings, main and secondary characters, the dramatic structure of events, etc. In fact, the identification of the dramatic structure of events in a fairy tale could be used as an introduction to Propp's cards (cards with illustrations of heroes in various functions), which will help students understand certain events in terms of their significance for the continuation of the plot (understanding functions and their consequences). When the students create the semantic maps, a discussion on them will follow, and assumptions will be made about the fairy tale *The Head of Steel*, which they will read later on. The students' assumptions, i.e. their predictions, are used exclusively to spark the readers' interest.

What follows is the stage of reading the fairy tale with a deeper understanding, which requires corresponding research questions to be prepared in advance. Research-based reading is founded on such questions and tasks, which are given to students before reading to direct their attention to the key elements of the text (Nikolić, 2006, 272–283). These questions should draw readers' particular attention to the parts of the text that could be the starting points for understanding the meaning of the traditional ideological layer, in the case of the approach used in this work. If we want to attain students' critical thinking, then the questions should by no means be suggestive and superficial. Instead, each question must encourage learning by comprehension (Vilotijević, 2000). Some readers will be faster in discerning and understanding connotations, while others will remain loyal to the traditional discourse. Generally speaking, students are likely to react in various ways, and in the subsequent stage, it is necessary to structure the discussion so that it allows for peer learning and possesses the fundamental qualities of the social and constructivist paradigm of learning (Vilotijević, 2000). Research questions may be as follows:

1. The youngest prince is the only one who obeys his father without any dispute, while his brothers are more inclined to act against their father's will. Whose act do you like better? State the arguments to support the act you chose.
2. Consider the role of the sisters in the story. To what extent and in what manner do they participate in the events?
3. The brothers go off in search of their sisters. During the journey, they have an adventure with dragons. Based on what previous events do you expect the youngest prince to defeat the most dangerous dragon?

4. While looking for fire, the emperor's youngest son comes across a cave of cannibals and joins them with the intention of killing them. Think about how he felt among them – did he feel fear for his life? What parts of the text support your opinion?
5. After he has killed the cannibals, saved the princess and performed other heroic deeds, the youngest prince marries the princess. Do you think the princess wanted to marry him? Did he want that marriage? Elaborate on your opinion.
6. The emperor gave his son-in-law the keys to many rooms, but he warned him not to enter one of them. The prince did not obey. Would you expect that?
7. The prince gives water to Baš-čelik and the latter regains his strength to finally break the shackles, grab the prince's wife, and kidnap her. How does the prince feel at that moment? Does he regret his actions or not?
8. While searching for his wife, the prince finds his sisters and brothers-in-law, and realizes that he has acquired magical and very powerful allies. On what basis could we have previously known that the sisters were married to powerful persons? Give at least two arguments.
9. While struggling with Baš-čelik, the prince first loses the three lives gifted to him, and then his own. His brothers-in-law revive him with miraculous water, which is not surprising in this and similar stories. Explain why we are not surprised that the prince came back to life.
10. In the end, the prince defeats Baš-čelik and solves all the problems. Describe in detail all the qualities that he showed in different situations.
11. Compare the prince to his brothers. What characteristics do they have in common, and how do they differ from one another?
12. What female characters are mentioned in the story? Describe their role in the events and identify their characteristics.
13. This story contains many messages/ideas. What messages do you perceive? What could these messages mean in everyday life?
14. What messages do you agree with? What messages do you disagree with? Elaborate on what ideas of the story you would apply in everyday life.

The above questions are in the function of deep inspection of the gender perspective in the fairy tale, which we discussed in the theoretical section of this paper. Depending on teaching objectives and the defined outcomes of learning, other elements and layers of the fairy tale can and should be identified.

Apart from the above questions, students may also be given Propp's cards (with the explanation of their meaning), with the task to compare them to important events and determine which card corresponds to which

event. After reading, a discussion takes place about those series of cards, any potential individual mistakes are corrected, and the order of the cards, i.e. functions, is synchronized.

After the students read the story for themselves and respond to the given questions and tasks, this is followed by a discussion of the text where students provide their insights, thoughts and ideas. It is necessary to check whether everybody has understood the content of the text, then listen to their initial responses to the research questions, and finally, organize a pros and cons discussion related to several topics (it is advisable to divide the class into smaller groups):

- a. State the arguments for and against the youngest prince's behaviour.
- b. State the arguments for and against the female characters' roles in this text.
- c. State the arguments for and against the overall characterization of male and female characters in the text *The Head of Steel*.

After the discussion in small groups, once the arguments have been provided, an additional discussion on a third topic could be developed at class level, which might represent the final stage of reflection.

Since reception theory implies that the finale of every reading process should be directed towards a new creation, it is possible to give students the following tasks in that particular creative stage:

1. Retell the story from the perspective of the sisters.
2. Retell the story by exchanging the roles of male and female characters.
3. Write the continuation of the story in which the sisters and the prince's wife embark on adventures.

Students are expected to write tasks that are widely different in all, including ideological, terms. Their reading, analysis and discussion on them may contribute to the development of critical thinking through the understanding and acknowledgment of perspectives of the tasks' authors.

CONCLUSION

Besides the indisputable need to read disruptive or non-traditional fairy tales in the process of education, it is also important to read texts which contain fully traditional and patriarchal patterns. The task of understanding the meaning of the text in the corresponding social, cultural and historical context represents a

problem-solving and research demand. By fulfilling it, students develop critical thinking skills. The fairy tale has an undeniable didactic value, but the manner in which it is read in education must be approached in a critical tone. Omitting traditional stories from the reading material may be construed as concealing the conditions of reality and circumstances inherited by patriarchal ideology. If they were interpreted in an uncritical fashion, without understanding of meanings and discerning social, gender, class and other stereotypes and prejudices, it could be detrimental, because it would lead to the uncritical adoption of the superficial message of the fairy tale, which mostly comes down to *They married and lived happily ever after*. Therefore, fairy tales such as *Cinderella* and *Snow White* "may have acted to confirm the wisdom of a safely unquestioning passivity for their underclass audience that helped preserve the social structures that kept the underclass in its place and under the control of its wealthier and more powerful masters" (Nodelman, 2008, 48). In conclusion, the uncritical absorption of the meaning of such stories has the potential to affect children and educate them in the spirit of subjugation, or in the spirit advocating the hegemonic masculinity of white man. Stories become integral to children's lives, shaping their worldview and influencing the way they perceive reality. This, in turn, extends their impact on society.

Reader-response criticism is a theoretical framework that enables the reception of the story in education to be carried out in three stages: evocation, understanding the meaning, and reflection. It is necessary to activate students in these stages to read carefully, provide arguments and discern denotative and connotative meanings. Such an approach particularly accentuates the exchange of ideas and thoughts with other readers through discussions about what has been read. In addition, the active role of the reader implies associating the literary with everyday life experience, especially in the phase of reflection. In that phase, students are encouraged to express their own insights into reality through their literary experience.

We have explained the concept of reading traditional fairy tales in education, which has been demonstrated on the selected textual example, and corresponds with the case study. The entire procedure can be extrapolated, without many restrictions, to other fairy tales within the corpus of folk or literary stories, after it has been confirmed that these stories contain traditional aspects.

RAZUMETI POMEN LJUDSKIH PRAVLJIC V KONTEKSTU SODOBNEGA UČENJA – UČITI ZA KRITIČNO RAZMIŠLJANJE

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POVZETEK

Namen tega prispevka je razviti model kritičnega branja ljudskih pravljic kar bi omogočalo razumevanje le-teh v sodobnem učnem kontekstu, posebej v luči koncepta razumevanja spolov. Postavili smo si naslednje raziskovalno vprašanje: Zakaj so pravljice tako pomembne pri poučevanju in kako vplivajo na bralca? Kakšno ideologijo nosijo pravljice? Katere pravljice (ljudske ali sodobne) naj posameznik bere v času učenja in kako naj bo kritično mišljenje zastavljeno? Uporabili smo metodo teoretične analize, katero smo dopolnili s historično metodo in na koncu smo opravili še celostno analizo izbrane pravljice. Izbrana pravljica je pripoved z naslovom Baš-čelik, ki jo je objavil v svoji zbirki leta 1870 Vuk Karadžić. Pokazalo se je, da tekst utrjuje pojem heroizma. Raziskava je pokazala, da so tovrstne zgodbe lahko v šolah brane kot primeri semantične forme feminističnega perspektive, medtem ko izpostavljajo karakterje zreducirane na le nekaj klasičnih heteroseksualnih vzorcev. Model kritičnega raziskovanja tovrstnih besedil je bil razdelan v pričujočem članku in temelji na vzpostavljenem odnosu branje-odgovor. Teoretični pristop k kritičnemu branju izhaja iz teorije literarne recepcije in zasnovan po tridelni strukturi programa Reading and Writing for Critical Thinking: evocation-understanding the meaning – reflection. Ker je poudarek prispevka na razumevanju spolnih vzorcev tradicionalnega besedila, je v bralnem modelu predlagan sistem raziskovalnih vprašanj in nalog, ki bralce usmerjajo na tiste dele besedila, ki vsebujejo konotativne, predvsem pa denotativne pomene, ki so pomembni za učno interpretacijo.

Ključne besede: ljudske pravljice, netradicionalne pravljice, kritično branje, razumevanje pomena

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HOTELSKO-TURISTIČKA ARHITEKTURA ALEKSANDRA DRAGOMANOVIĆA NA JADRANU I REFLEKSIJE NIZOZEMSKJE PROJEKTANTSKE ŠKOLE U HRVATSKOJ

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SINTESI

L'architetto Aleksandar Dragomanović – uno dei principali luminari del modernismo croato del dopoguerra – annovera nel suo opus creativo oltre un centinaio di opere, tra le quali le meno conosciute e finora inedite sono i suoi progetti per alberghi, villaggi turistici, ristoranti e porti turistici sull'Adriatico. Si tratta di una dozzina di complessi architettonici progettati per Abbazia, Laurana, Medea, Draga di Moschiena, Zara, Spalato e Gelsa (Lesina). Concepiti principalmente come progetti di gara (1949-1961), poi premiati e molto apprezzati, a causa della loro carica d'avanguardia, la loro natura e le esigenze che ponevano non furono mai realizzati. La loro innovazione tipologica e tecnologica dell'inizio del 'periodo d'oro' dell'edilizia alberghiera sull'Adriatico, così come il livello altamente estetizzato dell'espressione artistica e compositiva, sono parte imprescindibile del patrimonio modernista ex Jugoslavo con chiari riflessi del contesto europeo di quel tempo, in particolare sulla scuola olandese di architettura.

Parole chiave: Aleksandar Dragomanović, tardo moderno, architettura turistica, edifici alberghieri

THE HOTEL AND TOURISM ARCHITECTURE OF ALEKSANDAR DRAGOMANOVIĆ ON THE ADRIATIC AND REFLECTIONS OF THE DUTCH SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE IN CROATIA

SUMMARY

The architect Aleksandar Dragomanović, one of the key luminaries of Croatian post-war Modernism, left a creative oeuvre of over a hundred works, among which the most poorly known, and so far unpublicised, are designs for hotels, holiday complexes, restaurants and marinas along the Adriatic. At issue are some dozen architectural complexes devised for Opatija, Lovran, Medveja, Mošćenička Draga, Zadar, Split and Jelsa, which were mainly created as competition entries (1949-1961), then awarded and highly valued, but due to their avant-garde nature and demands, they were never realized. Its typological and technological innovativeness at the beginning of the 'golden age' of hotel development on the Adriatic, as well as the highly aestheticised level of artistic and compositional expression, are an unavoidable part of the ex-Yugoslavian modernist heritage, with clear reflections on the European context of the time, particularly of the Dutch architectural school.

Keywords: Aleksandar Dragomanović, late Modernism, tourist architecture, hotel buildings

UVOD

Na hrvatskoj arhitektonskoj sceni neposredno nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata afirmirala se nova, progresivna generacija projektanata koja je svoj likovni prosede gradila na beskompromisnom kontinuitetu međuratne moderne internacionalnog stila i na tradiciji *zagrebačke škole arhitekture*.¹ Među ključnim mladim predvodnicima struke koji počinju djelovati oko 1950. kao važna autorska osobnost izdvaja se arhitekt Aleksandar Dragomanović (Banja Luka, 1921.–1996., Zagreb) čiji je opus donekad bio slabo istražen, a doprinos hrvatskoj modernoj arhitekturi nedovoljno valoriziran (Žunić, 2016),² unatoč činjenici da je cijeli radni vijek djelovao kao profesor Arhitektonskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (Slika 1).

Autor je više od 100 radova – od natječaja i neizvedenih projekata te studija, do kapitalnih realizacija (ukupno 24), među kojima su i neke nesumnjivo antologijske vrijednosti, poput zagrebačkih zgrada: 'Modne kuće' u Praškoj ulici (na prvotnoj lokaciji na 'Velesajmu' bila je postavljena 1958.), paradigmatičke robne kuća 'NaMa' u novozagrebačkom naselju Trnsko koja je njegovo najvažnije djelo (1966.),³ sveučilišnog sklopa SRCE (1974.), Dječje ustanove u naselju Sopot (1977.) i palače SDK (1981.). Sve su te zgrade projektirane izrazito racionalno, s dosljednim diskurzivnim postupkom (Žunić, 2017c; Žunić, 2017d), a odlikuju ih besprijeorna funkcionalna čistoća, inženjerski promišljena konstruktivna rješenja i profinjeno minimalističko oblikovanje s atributima najboljih apstraktnih kompozicija moderne – sve to uvijek u neodvojivoj korelaciji (Karač, 1996). Dragomanovićev seriozni pristup arhitekturi i izrazito estetizirani likovni rukopis prepoznati su na strukovnim natjecajima gdje je osvojio brojne nagrade i priznanja, a u konačnici je bio i laureat najuglednijih nacionalnih nagrada za životno djelo – 'Viktor Kovačić' (1986.) i 'Vladimir Nazor' (1988.) (Jurić, 1988). Uz projektantski rad nezaobilazan je i njegov pedagoški utjecaj na više od 40 generacija studenata zagrebačkoga Arhitektonskog

fakulteta gdje kao nastavnik, u različitim statusima,⁴ djeluje 1947.–1991. (Obad Šćitaroci, 2000, 183).

Cjelokupni Dragomanovićev doticaj s arhitekturom, odnosno karijerni put, točno se poklopio s razdobljem postojanja socijalističke Jugoslavije – od efektivnog početka njegova studija (1945.), zaposlenja na Fakultetu kod prof. Alfreda Albinija (demonstratura od 1947.) i potom cjeloživotnoga nastavnikoga i projektantskog djelovanja do umirovljenja (1991.) – pri čemu je specifičan politički, društveni i kulturni okvir onodobne države refleksno utjecao i na karakter njegovih djela. Osobit Dragomanovićev doprinos hrvatskoj arhitekturi vidljiv je ponajviše u razvoju tipologije suvremenih robnih kuća, poslovno-uredskih zgrada i obrazovnih objekata, koji su već u vrijeme nastanka imali veliki utjecaj u struci (Žunić, 2018b).

S obzirom da sam tijekom višegodišnjega sinteznog istraživanja u nekoliko objava koncipiranih po tipološkome kriteriju funkcija objekata bio u prilici obraditi upravo te najdominantnije vrste Dragomanovićevih zgrada (Žunić, 2017a; 2020; Žunić & Karač, 2015), u ovom se članku po prvi puta analizira ostala komplementarna, do sada gotovo nepoznata skupina autorovih projekata. Naime, pomalo u sjeni spomenutih paradigmatičkih realizacija ostala je neafirmirana njegova ostavština inovativnih hotelskih i turističko-ugostiteljskih projekata, jer niti jedno od tih ranih djela nastalih uglavnom u prvoj fazi Dragomanovićeva djelovanja stjecajem okolnosti nije realizirano ni izlagano, a tek rijetka su fragmentarno publicirana u starijoj literaturi, no bez detaljnije obrade⁵ i s tek ponekim usputnim podatkom u tekstovima drugih istraživača koji su imali diferentan fokus i nisu se bavili Dragomanovićem.⁶

Stoga je istraživački odabir upravo ovog segmenta Dragomanovićeva opusa s nizom nepoznanica i još neriješenih pitanja (u nekim slučajevima čak i posve netočnim podacima u ranijim radovima nekritičkih autora) – od atribucije, autorstva i datacije pojedinih projekata, do valorizacijskih odrednica – znanstveno

1 Pojam se ne odnosi na visokoškolsku ustanovu, već na specifičan 'zajednički nazivnik' avangardne arhitektonske produkcije, poglavito u međuratnom Zagrebu, nastale na dodiru i ispreplitanju edukacijskih modela tzv. 'Iblerove škole' na Likovnoj akademiji (djeluje 1926.–1942.) i paralelne inženjerske škole arhitekture na onodobnome Tehničkom fakultetu (djeluje od 1919.), što će se kao prepoznatljivi likovni kôd održati sve do danas (Obad Šćitaroci, 2000, 17–24).

2 Prva cjelovita obrada i komparativno vrednovanje Dragomanovićeva opusa pripremljena je u sklopu doktorske disertacije *Diskurzivna metoda projektiranja u opusu arhitekta Aleksandra Dragomanovića* (Žunić, 2016) izrađene i obranjene 26. 10. 2016. na Arhitektonskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu u okviru znanstvenog projekta *Heritage Urbanism* [HRZZ-2032] glavnog istraživača akademika Mladena Obada Šćitarocija, a pod mentorstvom prof. dr. sc. Zlatka Karača.

3 Robna kuća 'NaMa' Trnsko jedno je od rijetkih djela moderne arhitekture u Zagrebu i Hrvatskoj koje već uživa spomeničku zaštitu kao registrirano kulturno dobro (Žunić, 2017b).

4 Djelovanje na Fakultetu započinje kao demonstrator na Katedri arhitektonskih kompozicija kod prof. Alfreda Albinija (1947.), zatim je zaposlen kao njegov laborant (1949.), kasnije asistent (1951.), viši predavač (1971.), izvanredni (1972.) te redoviti profesor (1988.) (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29).

5 Jedini projekt koji je u ranijoj literaturi spominjan, no bez objave nacrtne dokumentacije, je onaj za Hotel u Mošćeničkoj Dragi, a izvan naslovnog fokusa ovoga članka ponegdje su još navedeni smještajni objekti u fiskulturnom parku u Karlovcu te u Jugoslavenskom studentskom paviljonu u Parizu.

6 Prva i to posthumna izložba Dragomanovićevih odabranih djela održana je tek povodom 100 godišnjice njegova rođenja u Hrvatskome muzeju arhitekture HAZU u Zagrebu tijekom 2022., no u zbog epidemioloških ograničenja i potresnih oštećenja zgrade održana je virtualno (Žunić, 2022).

relevantan jer otvara i temeljito elaborira za struku važne nove spoznaje o hrvatskoj hotelsko-turističkoj arhitekturi iz vremena kasne moderne. Svrha je provedenog istraživanja dobiti nove podatke i zaključke koji će biti uklopivi u šire arhitektonske sinteze promatranog razdoblja, stila i tipologije, pri čemu bi trebali doprinijeti i izradi opusne monografije samog autora, a kao važan izvorni doprinos ovog članka valja istaknuti ovdje po prvi puta publiciranu primarnu arhivsku građu iz do sada neobrađene ostavštine Dragomanovićevih projekata. U mojim prethodnim radovima, uzimajući u obzir tipološki diskurs obrade, hotelsko-turistička arhitektura nije mogla biti dotaknuta, no kao komplementarno važan dio Dragomanovićeva opusa po prvi se puta analizira ovom prigodom.⁷

Hipoteza koju je bilo moguće postaviti i koja se ovim člankom nastoji potvrditi jest – da su Dragomanovićevi projekti hotelsko-turističke arhitekture vrlo vrijedan i u svoje vrijeme utjecajan fundus inovativnih, internacionalno kontekstualiziranih rješenja unutar promatrane tipološke skupine, a uz to su i važna 'karika koja nedostaje' u cjelovitoj interpretaciji njegova stvaralačkog opusa.

METODOLOŠKI OKVIR

Nakon inicijalnih doktorskih istraživanja cjeline opusa arhitekta Aleksandra Dragomanovića⁸ temeljenih na arhivskoj građi sačuvanoj u muzejskim fondovima (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/; Bobovec, 2022, 128, ad 14), fakultetskoj arhivi (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29) i mikroteci Ministarstva kulture i medija RH (MKM-MKT AD, br. 422–455; MKM-MKT RN, br. 362–387), gradivo disertacije i dosadašnjih autorovih objava je u međuvremenu prošireno obradom novootkrivenih, ranije nedostupne dokumentacije iz obiteljske ostavštine autora (fondovi AMD, AAŽ), osobito u domeni Dragomanovićeve hotelsko-turističke arhitekture koja nije bila publicirana i koja je upravo u fokusu ovog članka, s odabranim izvornim projektima naglašeno artistskih odlika.

Istraživačka procedura odvijala se u nekoliko operativnih etapa (preliminarna bibliografska obrada → arhivsko-dokumentacijski fondovi → terenski rad na lokalitetima *in situ* → kritička elaboracija), pri čemu su kao ključni israživački uzorci izlučeni samo jadranski primjeri (ukupno 8), dok su autori tipološki srodni projekti na drugim područjima promatrani sažeto, kao komplementarno gradivo.

Tijekom istraživanja korišteno je više metodoloških postupaka, među kojima se, ovisno o pojedinoj dionici obrade, ističu slijedeći: *metoda inventarizacije*



Slika 1: Arhitekt Aleksandar Dragomanović, oko 1960. (AMD).

Figure 1: Architect Aleksandar Dragomanović, c. 1960 (AMD).

(ujednačeni popisni postupak uz formiranje ključnih meta-podataka o raspoloživim izvorima i faktografiji za svaki projekt), a s tim u vezi su primijenjivane i *metode sistematizacije te klasifikacije* (primjerice, prema tipološkim, peridizacijskim i dr. osobitostima projekata). U opisu i interpretaciji rezultata istraživanja u svakoj je 'kataloškoj jedinici' primijenjena *metoda deskriptivne analize*. U raspravi pak dominira *induktivna metoda* gdje se iz korpusa pojedinačnih projekata izlučuju opće i zajedničke odrednice Dragomanovićeve hotelsko-turističke arhitekture. Napokon, *metoda komparacije* je primijenjena u valorizacijskom postupku gdje se važnost pojedinih projekata propituje usporedbom s ostalim djelima unutar autorova opusa, također i u komparaciji s drugim autorskim doprinosima u sličnim domenama te u komparativnoj analizi srodnih inozemnih primjera (osobito nizozemskih) koji su Dragomanoviću prilikom projektiranja bili mogući uzori.

Konačna elaboracija istraživanja i struktura ovog članka provedena je prema uzusima *IMRaD* sustava.

⁷ Stoga su citatne reference unutar teksta, ako je riječ o radovima drugih autora, uglavnom uputnice na kontekstualne i komparativne studije, a ako su u pitanju radovi autora ovog članka, onda su to poveznice na ranije publicirane članke o komplementarnim dijelovima opusa Aleksandra Dragomanovića, dok o njegovoj hotelsko-turističkoj arhitekturi ranijih objava nema pa je bilo nužno osloniti se gotovo isključivo na interpretaciju originalne i nepublicirane arhivske dokumentacije.

⁸ Dovođena su u listopadu 2016. (cf. bilj. 2).

REZULTATI

Uzimajući u obzir postavljeno istraživačko pitanje fokusirano na doprinos i važnost Aleksandra Dragomanovića u razvoju hrvatske hotelsko-turističke i ugostiteljske arhitekture, te valorizaciju njegovih slabo poznatih projekata i natječajnih rješenja, kao ključne nove i dosada nepublicirane rezultate provedenog istraživanja valja istaknuti:

- identifikaciju i inventarizaciju svih, uglavnom nepoznatih, radova ove tipološke skupine u Dragomanovićevu opusu;
- cjelovito kolacioniranje i obradu pripadajućih sačuvanih arhivskih, dokumentacijskih i bibliografskih izvora;
- utvrđivanje (ko)autorskih relacija, točnih datacije i okolnosti nastanka pojedinih projekata što je rezultiralo novom i do sada neobjavljenom faktografijom;
- postavljene valorizacijske i kontekstualne odrednice istraživanih projekata u odnosu na autorov ukupni opus te spram tipologije hotelsko-turističkih zgrada u hrvatskoj arhitekturi tijekom 1950-ih i ranih 1960-ih godina.

Navedeni rezultati su u obliku interpretativnih 'kataloških jedinica' sa svim bitnim podacima sistematizirani za krucijalna djela projektirana za jadranske lokalitete, uz još nekoliko komplementarnih primjera ove tipološke skupine rađenih za Zagreb i druge lokacije u Hrvatskoj i inozemstvu.

Analiza ključnih primjera Dragomanovićeve hotelsko-turističke arhitekture na Jadranu

Zanimljivo je da je istraživana tipološka skupina zapravo najranija kojom se je autor bavio, već tijekom studija. Naime, na samom početku karijere Dragomanović je o turističkoj i hotelskoj arhitekturi, koja je u poslijeratnoj Jugoslaviji bila tek u povojima i na fakultetima se nije predavala, imao prilike učiti u neposrednoj suradnji sa svojim profesorima.

Tako već u studentskim danima (vjerojatno tijekom 1950.) s prof. arh. Zdenkom Strižićem sudjeluje na istraživanju lokaliteta za hotelsku izgradnju na Plitvičkim jezerima (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi).⁹ Potom u statusu asistenta s prof. arh. Alfredom Albinijem koautorski radi natječajni projekt hotela, upravo na Plitvičkim jezerima (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/6/1-8; MKM-MKT AD, 431) (Slika 2).

Ondje osvajaju 5. plasman i nagradu od 40.000 dinara (1953.).¹⁰ O samom projektu Zdenko Strižić u osvrtu na natječajna rješenja (Strižić, 1953, 7) navodi da je „...Albinijev (i Dragomanovićev, op. a.) prijedlog zanimljiv, ali za ljetni hotel u blažoj klimi“. (Jurić, 1988, 7; Uchytel, 1990, 7; Uchytel & Štulhofer, 2007a, 100, 107; Ivanuš, 2021, 119, 121, 173, 204)

• **Split: Hotel brodogradilišta.** – Prvi autorski projekt ove vrste Dragomanović, još kao student, radi u suradnji s generacijskim kolegom Srđom Čulićem, a riječ je o idejnom rješenju sklopa neobične hibridne tipologije – *Domu kulture i novogradnji hotela brodogradilišta 'Vicko Krstulović'* u Splitu (1949.). Nažalost, nacrti i opisi tog projekta nisu sačuvani, no moguće je pretpostaviti da je to bio samački hotel za uposlenike Brodogradilišta. Vjerojatno je projekt rezultat nekoga lokalnog natječaja na kojem su Dragomanović i Čulić slobodno sudjelovali jer neobično bi bilo da je za takav posao velika tvrtka angažirala dvojicu još nesvršenih studenata (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29).

• **Zadar: Marina s hotelom.** – Do prvoga samostalnoga Dragomanovićevog projekta ove tipološke skupine proteklo je desetak godina, kada radi natječaj za *Marinu s hotelom* u Zadru (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/36/1-3; MKM-MKT AD, 455), s osvojenim otkupom (oko 1958.).¹¹ (Slika 3).


Cijeli sklop planiran je na zadarskoj Voštarnici, nasuprot povijesne jezgre grada, kao longitudinalna zgrada pravokutnog tlocrta položena uz samu liniju obale koja je tada trebala biti i dodatno nasuta.¹² Na zapadnom dijelu kompleksa bio je predviđen hotel s recepcijom

9 Dragomanović u popisu svojih radova tijekom studija (dakle, prije 1951. kada je diplomirao) navodi nedatiranu „suradnju s prof. Strižićem na istraživanju lokaliteta za hotelsku izgradnju na Plitvičkim jezerima...“ (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi), no s obzirom da je Strižić 1950. u časopisu *Arhitektura* objavio članak o toj tematici (Strižić, 1950) vjerojatno se i Dragomanovićev angažman može smjestiti u tu godinu ili nešto ranije.

10 Uz Albiniju i Dragomanovića u natječajnom su timu još bili aps. arh. Krešimir Forgarić i aps. arh. Julije De Luca, pri čemu su svi potpisani kao ravnopravni autori (Anonim., 1953a). Sam Dragomanović svoje sudjelovanje na tom natječaju u nizu dokumenata skromno atribuirao kao *suradnju* (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi), s iznimkom asistenskog reizbora 1960. kada ovaj projekt u priloženom popisu bilježi kao *autorski rad* (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29). Indikativno je što se i originalni nacrti ovoga natječajnog rada čuvaju u ostavštini A. Dragomanovića, a ne A. Albinija, što znači da je njegovo sudjelovanje na ovom projektu nesumnjivo imalo veću važnost od puke suradnje. Inače, među nagrađenim radovima, koji su u srpnju 1953. bili i javno izloženi, vidljivo je da su na natječaju participirali brojni korifeji tadašnje hrvatske arhitekture pa se kao voditelji timova pojavljuju: Josip Uhlik, Radovan Nikšić, Bernardo Bernardi, Rikard Marasović, Marijan Haberle, Dragica Crnković, Miro Marasović, Lavoslav Horvat, Ivo Vitić, spomenuti Alfred Albini i dr. (Anonim., 1953a; Strižić, 1953). Zanimljivo da ni tadašnji student Julije De Luca rad na ovome natječaju ne atribuirao kao autorski, već neodređeno piše *sudjelovao*, pri čemu u svojim autobiografskim zapisima navodi netočnu dataciju 1957. (Mutnjaković et al., 2013, 11).

11 Godina projekta nije posve točno utvrđena; u literaturi se navodi 1958. (Jurić, 1988), no sam autor u popisu svojih radova navodi tek okvirnu dataciju „oko 1958.“ (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi).

12 Nasipavanje obale na dijelu gdje je trebao biti smješten ovaj sklop nije nikada izvedeno (kao ni izgradnja planiranih objekata), a prema projektu mikrolokacija hotela i marine protezala bi se uz današnju Obalu kneza Branimira na potezu od kbr. 12 do 47.



Slika 2: Plitvička jezera, hotel, natječajni projekt (1953.): a) perspektiva, b) tlocrt prizemlja (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/6).


Figure 2: Plitvička jezera, hotel, competition entry (1953): a) perspective drawing, b) ground floor plan (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/6).

i lokalima u prizemlju te smještajnim kapacitetima na katu, a na istočnom je potezu pozicioniran restoran organiziran na dvije etaže, s kolnim i pješačkim pristupima sa sjeverne prometnice. Nad cijelim se sklopom proteže krovna terasa panoramskih vizura prema moru i starom gradu. Uz južni prospekt planirana je marina koja formira novu liniju obale s manjim 'džepovima' za brodice. Ekspozirana mikrolokacija i urbanistička situacija cijelog sklopa rezultirala je zahtjevnim kompozicijskim studijama dvaju jednakovrijednih pročelja – prema novom dijelu grada – promeni u zaleđu, i prema moru. Tijekom 1950-ih, pa tako i u ovom projektu, autor je pod izrazitim utjecajem Le Corbusierove likovne geste (vidljive već u njegovome diplomskom radu iz 1951.) za koju arhitekt Zlatko Jurić piše kako

rana etapa Dragomanovićeva opusa „...ima sve odlike suvremene arhitekture internacionalnog stila, koja se može odrediti kao funkcionalizam s poetskim akcentom“ (Jurić, 1988).

• **Lovran: Hotel.** – Nakon zadarskog projekta uslijedio je u vrlo kratkom razdoblju niz radova hotelsko-turističke i ugostiteljske tipologije na istočnoj obali Istre, kada je Dragomanović u samo dvije godine (1960./61.) izradio pet natječajnih projekata te vrste za lokacije na Opatijskoj rivijeri.

S Radovanom Nikšićem 1960. u Lovranu projektira inovativno koncipirani atrijski hotel (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/9/1-8; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/28/1-3; MKM-MKT RN, 375; MKM-MKT AD, 427) za što su na natječaju osvojili otkup (Slika 4).



Slika 3: Zadar, marina s hotelom, natječajni projekt (1958.): a) tlocrt prizemlja b) pogled s mora, c) aksonometrija sklopa (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/36).

Figure 3: Zadar, marina with a hotel, competition entry (1958): a) ground floor plan, b) perspective view from the sea, c) axonometric drawing of the complex (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/36).

Hotelski je sklop trebao biti smješten u sjevernom dijelu Lovrana posve blizu morskoj obali, između tadašnje vile Izvršnog vijeća NR Slovenije i odmarališta 'Romanija'. Opskrbni je pristup planiran s glavne ceste Rijeka-Pula (Šetalište maršala Tita), dok je ulaz za goste s parkiralištem predviđen na sjeveru, iz Ulice Viktora Cara Emina.¹³ Urbanistički, hotelski je kompleks smješten na kosom terenu, položen kaskadno i komponiran od dva jednokatna i glavnoga trokatnog volumena koji se međusobno isprepliću u maniri kvadratnih *mondrianovskih* formi s decentnim refleksijama na holandski strukturalizam (Ivanković, 2008); na istoku bliže moru kao spojnica triju volumena je projektirana otvorena terasa s restoranom. Prema riječima Radovana Nikšića kod ovog je hotela ideja bila anticipirati temu motela (!) s neposrednim pristupom osobnim vozilima koja u to vrijeme postaju ključni prometni medij individualnih turista iz inozemstva. Iz toga je proizašao kvadratni oblik glavne smještajne zgrade s unutarnjim internim vrtom, parafrazom zelenoga mediteranskoga klaustara (*hortus conclusus*), no i kao nastavkom vanjskih parkovnih površina. Atrijski tip hotela ovim je projektom na Jadranu inauguriran po prvi put, dok izvedeni primjeri te morfologije nastaju tek kasnije, uglavnom od sredine 1960-ih.¹⁴ Glavna zgrada je dimenzija 46 x 46 m, sa sobama po vanjskom obodu i komunikacijskim galerijama oko ozelenjenog atrija, čime je izbjegnuta klasična organizacija hotelskog tlocrta s mračnim unutarnjim hodnikom. U jednome konstruktivnom rasteru (49 m²) smještene su po dvije sobe, s ekstenzijom konzolno prepuštenih lođa dubine 2 m. Na svakoj etaži su na uglovima hotelskog volumena po dva veća apartmana s panoramskim pogledom prema moru, a na krovu je solarij s velikom terasom za sunčanje. Vertikalna komunikacija je ostvarena s tri stubišta (zbog novih protupožarnih propisa) pri čemu glavno, reprezentativno, vodi iz ulaznog hala s recepcijom do restorana, kupališta itd. Konstruktivni sistem je armiranobetonski skelet na pravilnom rasteru (7 x 7 m) s montažnim stropovima i prepoznatljivim odlikama Dragomanovićeva projektantskog prosedea obilježenog racionalnošću i modulacijom konstrukcije. Oblikovanje eksterijera komponiranog s niskim

i širokim volumenima naglašeno je horizontalnim 'trakama' parapeta lođa u alternaciji sa staklenim trakastim cezurama otvora provučenima po cijelom obodu hotela (Kisić, 2005, 16, 66, 106, 126).

Zanimljivo je da su na ovaj natječaj bila pozvana tri tima u kojima Dragomanovića isprva nije bilo: Radovan Nikšić s Bernardom Bernardijem, Zdenko Sila s V. Karlavarisom i Zdravko Bregovac s M. Pletencem. Ukupni fond obeštećenja iznosio je 271.000 dinara, a 1. nagrada koju je vjerojatno osvojio Z. Sila iznosila je 136.000 dinara.¹⁵ Na natječaju Bernardi ipak nije sudjelovao, već je na njegovo mjesto uključen Dragomanović koji je u konačnici na ovome projektu ostavio nezaobilazan kreativni trag. U žiriju su od poznatijih imena bili prof. Drago Ibler i prof. Vladimir Turina (HAZU-HMA Ibler, DI/Raspisi; AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29; GF-APD Nikšić, doss.; AINO; HKA, Galerija).

• **Mošćenička Draga: Hotel.** – Iste te godine (1960.) uslijedio je interni natječaj za još jedan veliki hotel u obližnjoj Mošćeničkoj Dragi¹⁶ (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/10/1-8; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/27/1-2; MKM-MKT RN, 372; MKM-MKT AD, 425; AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; AINO), koji Dragomanović također radi u koautorstvu s Nikšićem (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29; GF-APD Nikšić, doss.) (Slika 5).

Kompleks hotela smješten je u zaljevu, u samom središtu mjesta između povijesne jezgre i poteza novije izgradnje uz plažu, na parceli gdje je kasnije podignut 'Hotel Marina'.¹⁷ Čine ga tri kompaktna volumena mirnije kompozicije od one lovranskoga hotela. Promet je riješen na cirkularan način s parkiralištem i kolnim prilazima na zapadu (odvojak s ceste Pula-Rijeka). Na istoku obuhvata između hotela i mora je uređen park, a tenis igrališta su na jugu parcele, što je u ocjeni žirija istaknuto kao problematično zbog buke od prometnice i estetske neusklađenosti zaštitnih mreža igrališta sa slikom arhitekture i pejzaža (HAZU-HMA Bregovac, ZB/5/38/1-1). Hotel je u elevacijama složen od podruma, prizemnog dijela s recepcijom, ulaznim halom i gospodarskim prostorijama te tri kata sa sobama.


13 Parcela na kojoj je hotel planiran i danas je neizgrađena, a nalazi se na K.O. Oprić, K.Č. 109/1; na sjevernom rubu obuhvata nalazi se crkvice sv. Nikole koju je i Dragomanović namjeravao zadržati.

14 Tako koncipiranome modelu pripadaju neki važniji jadranski hoteli (kojima Dragomanovićev projekt prethodi!), a među njima se ističu: kao prvi realizirani takav primjer, antologijski vojni hotel 'Pelegrin' u Kuparima D. Fincija iz 1963. (Benić & Žunić, 2019), potom 'Bellevue' na Čikatu u Malom Lošnju Z. Bregovca iz 1966., 'Solaris' kod Šibenika B. Magaša iz 1968., 'Marina' u Mošćeničkoj Dragi Z. Bregovca iz 1970., 'Novi Park' u Boriku kod Zadra također Z. Bregovca iz 1970., 'Haludovo' u Malinskoj B. Magaša iz 1972. (Žunić, 2018a) i niz drugih primjera koji variraju temu otvorenoga ili zatvorenoga atrija (Zhi Fang, 1983).

15 O prvoj nagradi Z. Sile zaključujemo posredno, budući da se ni u monografiji Z. Bregovca (Nikšić Olujić, 2015), niti u monografiji R. Nikšića (Kisić, 2005) ili pak dokumentaciji A. Dragomanovića (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi) nigdje ne navodi da su osvojili neki plasman.


16 U retrospektivnom popisu svojih radova Dragomanović ovaj natječaj netočno datira u 1962. pa je ta godina ušla i u njegovu službenu biografiju u monografiji Arhitektonskog fakulteta (Obad Šćitaroci, 2000, 183).

17 Mimo rezultata ovog natječaja na kojem je tim Dragomanović-Nikšić osvojio 1. nagradu s očekivanom realizacijom (koja je tada izostala) deset je godina kasnije, 1970., po projektu Zdravka Bregovca na tome mjestu na današnjoj adresi Aleja slatina 2 izveden Hotel 'Marina' (Nikšić Olujić, 2015).



Slika 4: Lovran, hotel, natječajni projekt (1960.): a) situacija, b) pročelje prema moru, c) perspektiva sklopa, d) perspektiva interijera (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/9; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/28).

Figure 4: Lovran, hotel, competition entry (1960): a) site plan, b) hotel facade facing the sea, c) perspective drawing of the complex, d) perspective drawing of the interior (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/9; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/28).



Slika 5: Mošćenička Draga, hotel, natječajni projekt (1960.): a) situacija, b) pročelje prema moru, c) perspektiva sklopa, d) perspektiva interijera (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/10; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/27).
Figure 5: Mošćenička Draga, hotel, competition entry (1960): a) site plan, b) hotel facade facing the sea, c) perspective drawing of the complex, d) perspective drawing of the interior (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/10; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/27).

Glavna smještajna zgrada projektirana je u obliku izrazito elegantno proporcionirane izdužene lamele iako je u propozicijama natječaja tražena razvedena paviljonska morfologija. Izgrađena površina sklopa razvijena je na 10.472 m² s kapacitetom od 120 soba i 124 ležaja, a više od polovice površine hotela otpada na smještajni dio. Sobe su organizirane gotovo identično kao kod hotela u Lovranu, smještene po dvije unutar konstruktivnog rastera s konzolno nadodanim lođama dubine 2 m. Smještajne etaže organizirane su konvencionalno, sa središnjim podužnim hodnikom i obostranim potezima soba, no uvučeni treći kat na krovnoj terasi doima se kao slikoviti *penthouse* s puno rahlijim rasporedom apartmanskih jedinica različitih tipova i dimenzija te s dodatnim društvenim sadržajima oko velike terase. Ispred istočne fasade hotela okrenute k moru projektirane su dva niska istaknuta aneksa – jedan restoranski s atrijem, a drugi s bazenom i pratećim prostorijama u podrumskoj etaži povezan s glavnim korpusom hotela. I ovdje se pojavljuje skeletna nosiva konstrukcija od armiranobetonskih stupova na ortogonalnom rasteru (7 x 7 m) s križno-armiranim *hennébique* stropovima. Pregradne stijene su predviđene kao montažni *monier* paneli zvučno izolirani plutenim pločama. Pročelja su komponirana od brojnih pravokutnih i kvadratnih elemenata u dinamičnome geometrijskom pomaku i raznolikim tonovima, što je svojevrsni *hommage* likovnosti *De Stijla* koji je posredovanjem nizozemskih primjera toga vremena uvelike utjecao i na Nikšića, i na Dragomanovića. Iako je riječ o impozantnoj fronti zgrade, takvim likovnim tretmanom izbjegnuta je monotonija i dojam predimenzioniranosti volumena, što potvrđuje i ocjena žirija koji navodi da: „...objekt daje utisak lakoće i prozračnosti usprkos velike izduženosti (preko 100 m)“ (HAZU-HMA Bregovac, ZB/5/38/1-1).

I hotel u Mošćeničkoj Dragi dio je serije pozivnih natječaja provedenih gotovo istovremeno za Lovran, Opatiju i Medveju, tako da su i ovdje u Mošćeničkoj Dragi žiri vodili prof. Vladimir Turina i prof. Drago Ibler (koji nije prisustvovao zbog bolesti). Sudjelovala su tri već uhodana projektna tima s lovranskog natječaja, s ponešto permutiranim koautorskim relacijama, uz isti fond obeštećenja od 271.000 din.: Zdravko Bregovac s Ninoslavom Kučanom, M. Pletenac s Vojom Karlavarišom i Radovan Nikšić s Aleksandrom Dragomanovićem, pri čemu je potonjima za prvonagrađeni rad pripalo i dodatnih 136.000 din. (HAZU-HMA Ibler, DI/Raspisi). Iako su na natječaju osvojili 1. nagradu ni ovaj iznimni projekt nije nikada realiziran, ali je u struci u novije doba visoko valoriziran i tek recentno djelomično publiciran (Odak, 1986, 60; Premerl, 1987; Redakcija, 1987; 1995; Jurić, 1988; Premerl, 1993; Redakcija, 1995; Obad Šćitaroci, 2000, 183; Kisić, 2005, 16, 65, 106, 126; Nikšić Olujić, 2015, 121; Čavlović & Uchytel, 2022, 604).

• Mošćenička Draga i Medveja: Turistička naselja.


– Osim pojedinačnih hotela u istom ciklusu natječaja s početka 60-ih godina Dragomanović se pokazao i kao vješti urbanist-pejsažni planer kada na zahtjevnim lokacijama u prirodnom okružju uz samu morsku obalu, i to na vrlo teškome kosom terenu, projektira cijele turističke zone složenog programa.

Tako s Radovanom Nikšićem i Borisom Krstulovićem sudjeluje na internom natječaju za turistička naselja u Mošćeničkoj Dragi i obližnjoj Medveji (1960./61.) gdje osvajaju 2. plasman (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/11/1-12; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/31/1-1; MKM-MKT RN, 374; MKM-MKT AD, 426; AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29; GF-APD Krstulović, doss.; GF-APD Nikšić, doss.; AAŽ Krstulović, Monografija; AINO). Iako je natječaj proveden kao jedinstveni zadatak s gotovo istim funkcionalnim elementima za dvije različite lokacije u susjednim mjestima (međusobno su udaljene 4 km), zbog karaktera prostora Dragomanović je osmislio posve drugačije kompozicijske i morfološke koncepte ovih dvaju *resorta*. U Mošćeničkoj Dragi naselje je pozicionirano na južnom dijelu mjesta u dubokoj strmoj uvali ponad plaže Sv. Ivana (Slika 6).

U Medveji turističko je naselje smješteno na uskoj izduženoj padini također južno od mjesta i proteže se u dužini od oko 500 m ispod glavne ceste Rijeka-Pula, do plaže Cesara.

Do oba se turistička naselja, prema rješenju, pristupa neposredno odvojcima s glavne ceste, pri čemu je na ulazima u zone postavljena servisna pumpa sa zajedničkim parkiralištem unutar svakog sklopa, recepcija, objekt za smještaj osoblja i glavna zgrada s društvenim sadržajima. Najveći dio obuhvata naselja namijenjen je za smještajne turističke objekte koji se u kasnijem slogu prilagođenom slojnicama terena razvijaju niz padinu do morske obale i uređene plaže (u oba naselja opremljene snack-barom, kabinama i servisnim prostorima). Komunikacije u naselju su isključivo pješačke, s mrežom staza, rampi i stubišta.

Najzanimljiviji dio rješenja su vrlo inovativno osmišljene smještajne jedinice – svojevrsni bungalovi – složene u slikovitim nizovima posmaknutih pročelja, zatim u disperziranim manjim 'klasterima' ili u pojedinačnim točkastim objektima u prirodnom zelenilu. Smještajne jedinice su zapravo unificirani 'boxovi' jednostavne arhitekture (poput današnjih kontejnera) koji se mogu slobodno slagati u različite strukturne grupe jer otvore imaju samo na jednom užem pročelju. Ti smještajni moduli tehnološki su prilagođeni jednostavnoj i jeftinoj prefabriciranoj izvedbi od drvenoga skeleta obloženog drvenim panelima te se gotovi i opremljeni dopremaju na lokaciju i *in situ* se samo polažu na teren. Osim racionalnosti i brzine realizacije ovakav koncept omogućuje potpunu reverzibilnost izgradnje, po potrebi drugačiji razmještaj ili pak uklanjanje cijelog naselja bez tragova u prirodnom habitusu! Sve su smještajne jedinice riješene



Slika 6: Mošćenička Draga, turističko naselje, natječajni projekt (1960./61.): a) situacija, b) pročelje društvene građevine, c) perspektiva središnje zone (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/11; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/31).
Figure 6: Mošćenička Draga, tourist resort, competition entry (1960/61): a) site plan, b) facades of the social building, c) perspective drawing of the central area (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/11; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/31).



Slika 7: Medveja, turističko naselje, natječajni projekt (1960./61.): a) situacija, b) perspektivna skica smještanih jedinica (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/11; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/31).

Figure 7: Medveja, tourist resort, competition entry (1960./61.): a) site plan, b) perspective sketch of the accommodation units (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/11; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/31).


tipski, modularno na mreži od 80 cm, sa širinom od 270 cm. Međutim, različitih su dubina (4 do 8 m), ovisno o broju ležajeva i veličini sanitarnog prostora, pri čemu je u oba naselja najveći udio dvokrevetnih jedinica, dok je jednokrevetnih i trokrevetnih znatno manje. Nažalost, niti jedno od ovih turističkih naselja nije izvedeno, a projektirane lokacije i danas su prazne, u međuvremenu dosta gusto pošumljene (Slika 7).

Na spomenuti interni natječaj za ova naselja bili su pozvani arhitekti Zdravko Bregovac, Radovan Nikšić, Aleksandar Dragomanović, Zdenko Sila, Josip Uhlik, Žarko Vincek i Andrija Čičin-Šain. U žiriju su od značajnijih arhitekata, kao i za hotele iz prethodnoga godišta, bili sveučilišni profesori Drago Ibler, Vladimir Turina i od urbanista Dragan Boltar, a odlučili su ne dodijeliti prvu nagradu, već su napravili poredak plasmana 'prema zbiru najprihvatljivijih ocjena' te su novčani fond raspodijelili na prva tri najbolja rada (HAZU-HMA Ibler, DI/Raspisi). Prvi plasman (250.000 din.) s izradom predprojekta dodijeljen je Bregovcu, a Nikšić i Dragomanović su zauzeli drugi otkup (150.000 din.). Inače, u retrospektivnom popisu svojih radova

Dragomanović ovaj projekt netočno datira u 1963. (Obad Šćitaroci, 2000, 183), no u monografijama ostalih sudionika natječaja – Bregovca (Nikšić Olujić, 2015, 14, 121), Krstulovića (AAŽ Krstulović, Monografija, 18) i Nikšića (Kisić, 2005, 16, 107, 126) – godina je točno navedena (1960./61.).

• **Opatija: Hotel 'Ambasador'.** – Nakon aktivne 1960. Dragomanović sljedeće godine u koautorstvu s Ninoslavom Kučanom (Dubrović, 2006, 94, 162) radi natječajno rješenje za Hotel 'Ambasador' u Opatiji (1961.) na lokaciji uz samu morsku obalu i šetalište Lungomare. Ondje je upravo prema rješenju s ovog natječaja kasnije izgrađen prvonagrađeni rad Zdravka Bregovca¹⁸ (1966.) (HAZU-HMA Bregovac, ZB/5/41/1-140), u to doba prvi moderni hotel 'A/lux' kategorije na području Istre i Kvarnera, ali i cijele onodobne Jugoslavije! (Nikšić Olujić, 2015, 14, 25, 121–122, 133). Nacrti ni detaljniji opisi Dragomanovićevoga natječajnog projekta nisu sačuvani, no iz njegovog popisa radova poznato je da je rad osvojio 2. nagradu (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29; AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; Jurić, 1988; Obad Šćitaroci, 2000, 183).

¹⁸ To je parcela na adresi Feliksa Perišića 5, Opatija, K.O. Volosko, K.Č. 945/1.



Slika 8: Jelsa, restoran, projekt (o. 1960.): perspektivna skica (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/35/1-1).
Figure 8: Jelsa, restaurant, project (c. 1960): perspective sketch (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/35/1-1).

• **Jelsa: Restoran.** – Osim hotelskih sklopova impozantnog mjerila Dragomanović je projektirao i manje objekte ugostiteljske namjene poput restorana u Jelsi na Hvaru (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/35/1-1; MKM-MKT AD, 440) za koji nije poznata ni točna datacija (oko 1960.), niti lokacija u samome mjestu. Riječ je o atrijskome ugostiteljskom objektu ambijentalne arhitektonike, prizemnih elevacija s blagim jednostrešnim krovovima, pri čemu dvorišni patio s velikim stablom okružuju natkriveni trijemovi s drvenim stupovima. Glavni ulaz za goste predviđen je iz južne ulice, također i kroz vrt sa zapadne strane parcele, dok je gospodarski pristup s istoka. Objekt je izvana obložen velikoformatnim kamenom s osjećajem za lokalnu tradiciju, iako će takav pristup arhitekturi Dragomanović razvijati tek od 1970-ih kada u svoje projekte naglašenije uključuje regionalne materijale i domicilne elemente arhitekture. Od jelšanskog restorana sačuvan je samo jedan nacrt sa situacijom i perspektivnim prikazom pa se o ovome projektu više ne može zaključiti.


Djelo nije publicirano, niti se u literaturi navodi (Slika 8). Moguće je da je riječ o idejnoj varijanti na zajedničkom projektu s Berislavom Radimirom koji je, prema popisu njegovih radova, doista realizirao jedan restoran u Jelsi (oko 1960.).¹⁹

Komplementarni ekskursi na drugim prostorima

• **Zagrebački primjeri.** – Iako je dio Dragomanovićeva turističko-ugostiteljskog opusa lociran izvan zemljopisnog okvira ovog članka, zbog cjelovitog uvida u ovu tipološku skupinu njegovih zgrada valja sažeto spomenuti i autorove nešto kasnije zagrebačke projekte nastale tijekom 1960-ih.

Prvi takav primjer je *Restoran društvene prehrane* u sklopu programa *Opskrbnog centra u Folnegovićevom naselju* (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/16/1-5; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/40/1-5; MKM-MKT RN, 376; MKM-MKT AD, 443), pozicioniran u središtu kompleksa uz atrijski trg (tema foruma). Projekt je nastao u koautorstvu s Radovanom Nikšićem i Edom

¹⁹ Prof. Berislav Radimir, česti suradnik Aleksandra Dragomanovića, u popisu svojih radova navodi restoran u Jelsi kao izvedeni projekt (AF-APD Radimir, doss. 110), no prema arhitekturi izgleda da se radi o potpuno drugoj građevini pa nije jasno jesu li ova dva projekta na neki način povezana.



Slika 9: Karlovac, fiskulturni park s turističko-sportskim hotelom, natječajni projekt (1953.): perspektiva, pogled s rijeke (HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/13; HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/1).

Figure 9: Karlovac, gymnasium park with tourist and sports hotel, competition entry (1953): perspective drawing, hotel as seen from the river (HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/13; HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/1).

Šmidihenom (1963.),²⁰ no Centar u konačnici nije realiziran (Kisić, 2005, 110, 127; Žunić & Karač, 2015, 284, 289).

Kao dio širega urbanističko-arhitektonskog programa *Opskrbnog centra u stambenom naselju Trnskom* u Novom Zagrebu Dragomanović, također s Nikšićem i Šmidihenom, projektira *Restoran Trnsko* (1966./67.) koji je trebao biti smješten istočno od znamenite robne kuće 'NaMa' (Žunić, 2012) uz pasaž, ali nije nikada izveden²¹ (HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/44/1-21; MKM-MKT RN, 387; AF-AKAK Šmidihen; GF-APD Nikšić; AOŠ; AINO). Osmišljen je u dvije varijante različitih veličina i restoranskih programa (površine oko 1200 m²) u poluetažnim nivelacijama, s čeličnom skeletnom konstrukcijom (na rasteru 6 x 6 m). Oblikovan je kao jednostavan čisti volumen u skladu s cijelim sklopom *Centra* kojim dominira bijela 'lebdeća' arhitektura minimalističke likovnosti. Objekt restorana predstavlja vrlo uspješno rješenje s tehnološki besprijekornim tlocrtima i zanimljivo artikuliranim presjecima, a u kontekstu teme ovoga članka valja istaknuti izraziti nizozemski utjecaj trgovačkog centra *Lijnbaan* u Rotterdamu koji je autorima i poslužio kao neposredni model za cijeli sklop u Trnskom (Sekulić-Gvozdanović, 1992, 73–74, 77–78; Kisić, 2005, 111, 127; Strukić, 2010, 45; Žunić, 2012, 126).

Valja spomenuti i dvojbeni projekt *Hotela 'Sljeme'* u Zagrebu (1966.) od kojega u Dragomanovićevoj ostavštini nacrti ni opisi nisu sačuvani, iako ga autor navodi u svom popisu radova te ističe da je nastao u suradnji s Borisom Krstulovićem (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29; AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi).²² S druge strane, Krstulović kao svoj jedini sljemenski projekt bilježi hotel-planinarski dom (!) na Kulmerovoj livadi (uz dataciju 1963.), pri čemu Dragomanovića ne spominje (AAŽ Krstulović, Monografija) pa nije jasno je li riječ o istom projektu neusklađenih datacija i autorskih relacija ili o posve drugom djelu.

• **Variis.** – Valja još spomenuti i nekoliko također nerealiziranih Dragomanovićevih projekata koji u svom programu imaju neke elemente specifičnih funkcija 'hotela' iako to iz njihova naziva nije razvidno.

Najraniji takav projekt je natječajno rješenje za *Studentski dom (oporavilište) na Mežakli* u Sloveniji, nedaleko Bleda (1948.), od kojega nacrti nisu sačuvani. Riječ je o autorovu studentskom sudjelovanju, a iz raspisa je vidljivo da je to bio objekt sažetog programa s desetak smještajnih jedinica²³ (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29).


Zanimljivo je da se u natječajnom projektu za *Fiskulturni park u Karlovcu* (1953.) unutar pejzažnoga

²⁰ Datacija na nacrtima nije navedena, donekle je nesigurna jer u različitim dokumentima Dragomanović kao godinu navodi 1963., ali i 1965. (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi), Šmidihen navodi 1964. i 1965. (AF-APD Šmidihen, doss.), no kao *terminus ante quem* ipak valja uzeti 1963., budući da te godine u dokumentaciji asistentskog reizbora Dragomanović ovaj projekt već navodi među svojim radovima (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29). Moguće je da je naknadno slijedila daljnja razrada projekta pa bi i kasnije navedene godine imale smisla, no o tome nema podataka.

²¹ U svome životnom intervjuu Edo Šmidihen navodi da je realizacija tog objekta izostala: „...jer za restoran nije bilo uopće interesa“ (Margaretić Urlić, 2010, 74).

²² U Dragomanovićevoj dokumentaciji za asistentski reizbor iz lipnja 1966. taj se projekt još ne spominje (što je, dakle, *terminus post quem*!), već se navodi tek znatno kasnije u njegovoj aplikaciji za višeg predavača 1971. (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29).

²³ Natječaj je organizirao Savez studenata, na njega je pristiglo 26 radova, a zanimljivo je da su svim studentima ti projekti (iako su rađeni izvan nastave) priznati kao semestralni programi na katedri Arhitektonskog projektiranja kod prof. Zdenka Strižića. Dragomanovićev plan sman na tom natječaju nije poznat, a realiziran je prvonagrađeni projekt zagrebačke studentice Ade Feliče (Anonim., 1948; Feliče, 1948).



Slika 10: Pariz, Jugoslavenski studentski paviljon u Sveučilišnom gradu, natječajni projekt (1956./57.): a) aksonometrija sklopa, b) poprečni presjek (AMD).

Figure 10: Paris, Yugoslavian student pavilion in Cité Universitaire, competition entry (1956/57): a) axonometric drawing of the complex, b) cross section (AMD).

kompleksa kao zasebni objekt javlja i *Turističko-sportski hotel* (HAZU-HMA Dragomanović, AD/9/1/1-9; HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/13/1-7; MKM-MKT RN, 362; MKM-MKT AD, 422) kapaciteta 100 kreveta smješten uz rijeku, koji je kao troetažni volumen bio najviša zgrada u obuhvatu. Ovo rješenje Dragomanović radi s Radovanom Nikšićem i Zdravkom Bregovcem, za što osvajaju 2. nagradu u iznosu od 180.000 dinara (Anonim., 1953b; Anonim., 1954; Fulla, 1954; Hitl, 1954; Stošić, 1954; Jurić, 1988; Sekulić-Gvozdanović, 1992, 95; Obad Šćitaroci, 2000, 183; Kisić, 2005, 57, 102, 124; Nikšić Olujić, 2015, 1) (Slika 9).

Internacionalni autorov iskorak obilježio je natječajni projekt za *Jugoslavenski studentski paviljon u Sveučilišnom gradu u Parizu* (1956./57.) (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29; AMD) koji je po konceptu blizak hotelu *broad-foot* morfologije s visokim smještajnim blokom kapaciteta 96 soba te kuhinjom, blagovaonicom i nizom drugih sadržaja u nižem horizontalnom dijelu. Zanimljivo je da je konceptijski i kompozicijski vrlo sličan rad na ovome natječaju predao i Neven Šegvić, Dragomanoviću pretpostavljeni nastavnik na Arhitektonskom fakultetu, što otvara pitanja mogućih koautorskih relacija, barem u prvoj

fazi razrade (Uchytíl & Štulhofer, 2007b, 136–137). Među 73 pristigla rada Dragomanović je osvojio 3. plasman²⁴ (Paladino, 2015, 263) te, unatoč izostanku realizacije, zapaženo mjesto u kasnijoj stručnoj literaturi (Odak, 1986, 55; 2006, 129, 229; Jurić, 1988; Juras, 1996; Uchytíl et al., 2009, 79–80; Čavlović & Uchytíl, 2022, 598) (Slika 10).

Vrlo sličan program Aleksandar Dragomanović u koautorstvu s Berislavom Radimirom razvija i u projektu *Internata Industrijske škole u Zenici* (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; AMD) gdje uz preklapanje s odgojno-obrazovnom funkcijom zgrade ipak dominira smještajni i restoranski dio sklopa (1957.).²⁵ Projekt nije publiciran, zabilježen je u biografskoj dokumentaciji oba autora (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29; AF-APD Radimir, doss. 110), a u literaturi je naveden kratko tek kao faktografska bilješka (Anonim., 1968; Pavlović, 1968).

I u nizu drugih sklopova različitih tipologija Dragomanović je predvidio specifične ugostiteljske sadržaje (menze, slastičarnice, caffè barove, restorane), poput uslužnog bloka u studiji *Veslačkog kluba u Zagrebu* (1952.) (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi; Jurić, 1988), brojnih poslovno-uredskih zgrada kao što su palača SDK u Zagrebu, 'Banatska

²⁴ Kao republički predstavnici u jugoslavenskom su žiriju sudjelovali: prof. Oliver Minić (Srbija), prof. Vladimir Turina (Hrvatska) i arh. N. Bežak (Slovenija). Prvu nagradu je osvojio Ivan Vitić, a pod nomenklaturom 3. plasmana žiri je umjesto nagrade odlučio dodijeliti 6 jednakovrijednih otkupa, među kojima je bio i Dragomanovićev rad (Anonim., 1957).

²⁵ Sačuvane su dvije varijante rješenja: jedna s razvedenim niskim paviljonima oko dvorišta i sportskih terena i druga kompaktna s dominantnom visokom lamelom etažnosti P+4.

banka' u Zrenjaninu, 'Riječka banka' u Rijeci, neboder 'Vagonogradnje' u Beogradu (Žunić, 2017a), Paviljon za usluge na Glavnom kolodvoru u Zagrebu (Žunić, 2021), zatim atraktivnih restorana u robnim kućama poput onoga panoramskog na krovnoj terasi varaždinske 'VaMe', vinkovačke 'NaMe' i dr. (Žunić & Karač, 2015) te internih menzi u gotovo svim odgojno-obrazovnim ustanovama – dječjim vrtićima, školama i fakultetima – koje je tijekom karijere projektirao (Žunić, 2020). Ta skupina projekata hibridnih tipologija zahtijevati će, međutim, posebno istraživanje jer unatoč funkcionalnoj srodnosti u dijelu programa sve te primjere ovom prigodom nije moguće razmatrati u Dragomanovićevu 'jadranskom opusu' hotelske arhitekture.

RASPRAVA

Promatrajaći izložene rezultate istraživanja u širem kontekstu povijesne pripadnosti i vremena nastanka pojedinih projekata, njihova položaja u okvirima ukupnoga Dragomanovićevoga autorskog opusa, zatim važnosti i utjecaja tih djela na razvoj tipologije hotelsko-turističkih zgrada u Hrvatskoj, te osobito na refleksije internacionalne scene prepoznate u likovnosti analiziranih djela, moguće je izlučiti ključne arhitektonske odlike i zajedničke poveznice koje ovu skupinu projekata čine jedinstvenom unutar autorova kreativnog djelovanja.

Kontekst vremena: društvene i strukovne mijene 1960-ih

Opus Aleksandra Dragomanovića na prijelazu desetljeća (1950./1960.), u razdoblju kada najviše projektira i kada se okreće novim turističkim tipologijama valja promotriti u širem kontekstu koji je nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata poprimio drugačije političko-kulturne okvire u novoj, federativnoj tvorevini. Prijelazom u 1960-e Jugoslavija s političkim sustavom 'između Zapada i Istoka' (koji će 1961. rezultirati utemeljiteljskom ulogom u Pokretu nesvrstanih) naizgled ostavlja dojam uspješne i važne države. Ambicioznom privrednom reformom 1964./65. i zaokretom prema tržišnoj ekonomiji napušta se klasična socijalistička planska privreda, što je donijelo više slobode u cijelom društvu i prilično pozitivne ekonomske rezultate.²⁶

U velikome gospodarskom zamahu od početka '60-ih ključno uporište modernizacije u Hrvatskoj je postao turizam (za razliku od drugih republika onodobne Jugoslavije koje su se oslanjale na industrijalizaciju). Ta je gospodarska grana donijela infrastrukturu u priobalju – Jadransku magistralu, nove luke i

aerodrome, lokalne komunalne sustave – i kapital je u kratkom periodu preobrazio cijeli potez gradova uz jadransku obalu. Kroz četiri i pol desetljeća, osobito intenzivno od 1960., sve do raspada Jugoslavije 1991., na hrvatskoj je obali izgrađeno gotovo tisuću hotelskih objekata, kao posljedica specifičnoga 'državnog kapitalizma' koji postaje ključni izvor nasušno potrebnoga deviznog priljeva (Zhi Fang, 1983; Mutnjaković, 2014). U takvom okružju traže se novi i atraktivni sadržaji za inozemne goste pa su arhitekti dobili neočekivano veliku kreativnu slobodu i poticaj za eksperimentalno 's autorskim potpisom' (Žunić & Vukić, 2015). Upravo šezdesete godine su fokus arhitektonskog djelovanja, uz Zagreb, premjestile i na Jadran pa se vrijedne i istaknute realizacije (ne nužno samo turističke) podižu i u drugim dijelovima zemlje (Štraus, 1991; Kulić et al., 2012).

U tom valu intenzivne izgradnje za potrebe turizma i ugostiteljstva kvalitetom i brojnošću dominiraju hotelske zgrade kao ekonomski zamašnjaci razvoja obalnih gradova, ali i kao novi vrijedan korpus hrvatske moderne arhitekture koji danas doživljava svoju pozitivnu, čak internacionalno priznatu valorizaciju (Stierli & Kulić, 2018). Tijekom 1960-ih kada se hotelskom arhitekturom intenzivno bavi i Aleksandar Dragomanović, na hrvatskom dijelu Jadrana posebno su se istaknuli projektanti prve generacije modernih hotela, poput Zdravka Bregovca, Nevena Šegvića, Ive Vitića, Bernarda Bernardija, Miroslava Begovića, Ive Bartolića, Andrije Čičin-Šaina, Branka Žnidareca, Julija De Luce, Igora Emilija, Lovre Perkovića, Ante Rožića, Matije Salaja, Žarka Vinceka, Borisa Magaša, Petra Kušana..., a od početka 1970-ih u domeni hotelske arhitekture djeluje i niz mlađih arhitekata, međutim oni više ne pripadaju kontekstu vremena u kojemu se Dragomanović bavio ovom tematikom.

Kontekst autorskog opusa: Dragomanovićeva arhitektura početkom 1960-ih

Aleksandar Dragomanović se tijekom karijere, uz već spomenute vrste zgrada koje su dominante u njegovu opusu, okušao kao kreativni projektant u gotovo svim arhitektonskim tipologijama, pri čemu se nekim funkcionalnim temama bavio tek u kraćim omeđenim periodima. Tako su hotelski i općenito turističko-ugostiteljski objekti pozicionirani samo u prvoj etapi njegova djelovanja, u studentskim godinama i u prvom desetljeću profesionalne prakse (glavnina u razdoblju 1948.-1961.) kada, uz ostalo, nastaju i svi 'jadranski projekti' koji su predmet elaboracije u ovom članku, dok je nakon toga do sredine '60-ih imao još samo nekoliko zagrebačkih ekskursa ove vrste.

26 Podlogu za takvu promjenu ekonomskih paradigmi osigurala je uspješno provedena poslijeratna obnova koja se, međutim, kao direktivni gospodarski model našla u krizi i više se u postojećem obliku nije mogla održati. O dosegnutoj razini razvoja na pragu 1960-ih zorno govori sljedeći podatak: „Indeks rasta za FNRJ između 1947. i 1959. godine bio je 221%, a za Hrvatsku 206%. Činilo se da zemlja napreduje...” (Jakovina, 2012, 11).

U različitim je statusima – kao student, suradnik svojim profesorima te kao autor i koautor – radio na 17 projekata turističke tematike, od kojih 8 pripada 'jadranskoj skupini' što nam je ovom prigodom fokusna tema. U ukupnom broju dominiraju hoteli (9), zatim objekti hibridnih programa koji imaju i dio hotelsko-ugostiteljskih funkcija (3), restorani (3) i turistička naselja urbanističkog mjerila (2). Gotovo sve su to projekti naglašene kompetitivnosti pa ih je čak 12 nastalo u okviru natječaja, gdje su uglavnom nagrađeni ili otkupljeni. Dragomanović je osobito aktivan tijekom 1960./61. kada u nepune dvije godine radi čak pet pozivnih natječajnih projekata za opatijsku rivijeru i na svima osvaja neku od nagrada ili otkupa!²⁷ Nažalost niti jedan od tih projekata nije došao do stupnja realizacije.

Promatrajući ovu tipološku skupinu u cjelini, valja primijetiti da je dio projekata Dragomanović radio samostalno, no najviše ih je nastalo u koautorskoj suradnji s Radovanom Nikšićem, čak šest projekata (Sekulić-Gvozdanović, 1992), s Borisom Krstulovićem i Edom Šmidihenom radi na po dva projekta, a po jedan supotpisuje sa Srđom Čulićem, Zdravkom Bregovcem, Ninoslavom Kučanom i Berislavom Radimirom; u suradničkom statusu po jednom je sudjelovao na hotelskim projektima prof. Zdenka Strižića i prof. Alfreda Albinija (AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi). S iznimkom Šmidihena i Bregovca svi navedeni koautori prisutni su i na užoj skupini njegovih 'jadranskih projekata' hotelsko-turističke arhitekture koju ćemo u nastavku detaljno razmatrati.

Dragomanovićevi projekti ove tipologije rađeni su uglavnom za jadransku zonu i to ponajviše u gradovima 'Liburnijske Istre' (Opatija, Lovran, Medveja te Mošćenička Draga u dva navrata) i Dalmacije (Zadar, Split, Jelsa na Hvaru); u Zagrebu su locirana tek tri kasnija projekta (Folnegovićevo, Trnsko, Sljeme), a još šest projekata se veže uz kontinentalne i inozemne lokalitete (Mežaklja u Sloveniji, Plitvička jezera u dva navrata, Karlovac, Zenica, Pariz).

Zanimljivo je da tijekom 1960./61. kada Dragomanović sudjeluje na čak 5 sukcesivno provedenih natječaja na opatijskoj rivijeri, istovremeno radi još 6 zahtjevnih natječaja drugih tipologija (u dvije godine čak 11 kompeticija!), među kojima su i neki od njegovih najvažnijih nerealiziranih projekata paradigmatičke važnosti prepoznati kao istaknuti reperi autorova najintenzivnijega stvaralačkog razdoblja. Tako je tada osmislio Kemijski institut Prirodoslovno-matematskog fakulteta u Skopju (1960.). U koautorstvu s Ninoslavom

Kučanom, nastavlja *miesovska* istraživanja na natječaju za Paviljon usluga na Glavnom kolodvoru u Zagrebu (također 1960.), a s istim arhitektom te godine (1960.) sudjeluje i na tri natječaja stambene namjene – za stambeni toranj u Rijeci, tipske objekte četverokatne stambene izgradnje i tipske stambene tornjeve.²⁸

U kontekstu autorova opusa važno je i Dragomanovićevo sudjelovanje na dva u Hrvatskoj toga vremena najznačajnija arhitektonska natječaja državne važnosti. Prvi je bio za zgradu CK Saveza komunista Hrvatske na zagrebačkom Prisavlju koju Dragomanović projektira s Radovanom Nikšićem i Edom Šmidihenom, gdje osvajaju 3. nagradu (1961.).²⁹ Također, na lokaciji u neposrednoj blizini Dragomanović s istim arhitektima radi veliki natječaj za Dom Radio-televizije Zagreb (1962.) koji u njegovu opusu zauzima posebno mjesto zbog činjenice da je s timom na natječaju osvojio 1. plasman i potencijalnu daljnju izvedbu (Kolacio, 1962), pri čemu se razrada projektnih inačica protegnula na narednih osam godina i unatoč svim naporima da se projekt prilagodi novoj tehnologiji i željama investitora, realizacija mu nije povjerena, već je kasnije izveden importirani generički projekt.

Tako se prijelaz iz 1950-ih u 1960-e, kada Dragomanović intenzivno radi na nizu projekata hotelsko-turističke arhitekture, pokazuje kao najplodnije i možda najzanimljivije razdoblje u njegovu cjelokupnom opusu.

Kontekst tipologije: odlike Dragomanovićeve hotelsko-turističke arhitekture

Sagledaju li se Dragomanovićevi turističko-ugostiteljski projekti sintezno, mogu se iščitati prepoznatljivi uzorci i zajednički nazivnici na nekoliko arhitektonskih razina.

Prema urbanističkom položaju svi su prethodno opisani objekti samostojeći i uglavnom su zasebne građevine ili sklopovi, osim restorana 'Trnsko' i 'Folnegovićevo' koji su uklopljeni u opskrbe centre te turističkih naselja u Mošćeničkoj Dragi i Medveji što su pak veće urbanističke zone s paviljonima i klasterima izgradnje povezanim u cjelinu.

Tlocrtno-morfološki Dragomanovićevi turističko-ugostiteljski objekti su geometričnog, uglavnom kvadratnog ili 'lamelnog' tlocrta. Takvoj dispoziciji imanentan je i modularni konstruktivni sistem koji je kod ove grupe projekata redovito armiranbetonski skelet na rasteru 6 x 6 m (Trnsko) i 7 x 7 m (Lovran i

27 Tada osvaja jednu 1. nagradu (Mošćenička Draga), jednu 2. nagradu (Opatija) i tri otkupa (Lovran, Mošćenička Draga i Medveja).

28 Suradnju s arh. Ninoslavom Kučanom Dragomanović je započeo 1958. na projektu paviljona 'Porodica i domaćinstvo' za zagrebački Velesajam (kasnije premještenom u Prašku ul.), zatim suradnju intenzivno razvijaju tijekom 1960. na navedena četiri natječaja, i zaključuju 1961. na natječaju za opatijski Hotel 'Ambasador' (Dubrović, 2006).

29 Temeljem toga natječaja realiziran je prvoplasirani projekt Ivana Vitića – zgrada koja je danas poznata kao 'Kockica' – no natječaj je polučio i niz inovativnih, estetiziranih rješenja brojnih drugih autora pa je nagrada Dragomanovićevu timu u tako velikoj konkurenciji važno kompetitivno postignuće (Marić-Vitić, 1961).

Mošćenička Draga), što je kod hotelskih soba rezultiralo maksimalnom iskoristivošću i uklapanjem u propisane norme. Turistička naselja blizu Opatije imaju pak vlastiti sistem prefabriciranih tipskih smještajnih jedinica od drvenih panela što omogućava njihove različite dimenzije unutar iste modulacijske mreže.

Projekti ove tipološke skupine se oblikovno-kompozicijski prepoznaju kao autorovi radovi s naglašenim nizozemskim utjecajem, posebno kod istarskih hotela i restorana 'Trnsko', što je vidljivo ne samo u likovnosti pročelja, već i u tlocrtnoj kompoziciji. Tek restoran u Jelsi prati lokalni tip izgradnje i sadrži regionalne motive podržane odabirom tradicijskih materijala i oblika.

Kontekst međunarodnih utjecaja: refleksije nizozemske arhitektonske škole

Unatoč tome što je zagrebački studij arhitekture međuratnoga razdoblja bio pod snažnim konstitutivnim utjecajem bečke Politehnike i Akademije te švicarske škole ETH na postulatima kojih je u Zagrebu i ustrojen prvi edukacijski program (Obad Šćitaroci, 2000, 21–22), poslijeratno doba tijekom kojeg Aleksandar Dragomanović počinje nastavnički djelovati na Fakultetu pokazuje novo preusmjerenje škole prema naglašenome nizozemskom likovnom izričaju već od sredine 1950-ih, i osobito tijekom 1960-ih godina. To će se snažno manifestirati i u Dragomanovićevu stvaralačkom prosedeu, po prvi puta upravo na skupini turističko-ugostiteljskih projekata.

Njegova dva najčešća koautora u timu – Radovan Nikšić i Edo Šmidih – specijalizanti su s vrsnim edukacijama i praksom stečenom upravo u Nizozemskoj, a slične je poveznice gradio i sam Dragomanović povremenim studijskim boravcima u Nizozemskoj 1959. i 1961. (AF-APD Dragomanović, doss. 29; AAŽ Dragomanović, Radovi) te putovanjima s apsolvencijama u Rotterdam i drugdje u Holandiji (Dragomanović et al., 1964). Prvi doticaj s Nizozemskom od članova je Dragomanovićeva tima ostvario Radovan Nikšić tijekom šestomjesečnoga usavršavanja u birou Johanna Hendrika Van den Broeka i Jacoba Berenda Bakeme u Rotterdamu (1956.), gdje je upoznao Ouda, Rietvelda i druga ključna imena nizozemskoga arhitektonskog miljea. Usto, sudjelovao je na posljednjem kongresu CIAM-a u Otterlou (1959.), gdje je izlagao o vlastitom projektu zagrebačkoga Radničkoga narodnog sveučilišta koje je tada bilo još u izgradnji, a smatra se ključnim primjerom holandskoga utjecaja u našoj modernoj arhitekturi (Kisić, 2005, 14). Ondje uz Bakemu susreće i Alda van Eyecka, jednog od članova grupe *Team X* i ključnog protagonista nizozemskog strukturalizma³⁰ koji je i organizirao skup. Važno

je ukazati na koncepcijski utjecaj rotterdamskoga trgovačkog centra – pješačke ulice *Lijnbaan* projektanata Van der Broeka & Bakeme, iz 1953. na sličnu realizaciju tima Dragomanović-Nikšić-Šmidih u zagrebačkom naselju Trnsko. Valja spomenuti i činjenicu da je u osobnoj arhivi R. Nikšića sačuvana opsežna prijepiska s Bakemom (HAZU-HMA Nikšić, RN/3/79/varia), gdje su međusobno tijekom niza godina izmjenjivali ideje, što je Nikšiću (a posljedično i Dragomanoviću) osiguralo kontinuitet doticaja s nizozemskom arhitektonskom scenom u 'realnom vremenu' kada informacije iz inozemstva nisu lako dopirale do hrvatskih arhitekata.

Da nije sve ostalo samo na korespondencijskom posredovanju, dokazuje i spomenuto apsolventsko putovanje u Nizozemsku 1964., koje je Dragomanović organizirao upravo s Nikšićem i Radimirom, pri čemu su sa studentima obišli najvažnije rotterdamske suvremene zgrade, s naglaskom na Bakemine radove. U uvodnome tekstu publikacije izdane nakon putovanja Dragomanović piše: „Arhitektonski biro prof. Van den Broeka i Bakeme proveo nas je kronološki po rotterdamskim realizacijama svog biro-a počevši od objekata izgrađenih 1919. godine do najrecentnijih“ (Dragomanović et al., 1964).

O holandskim uplivima u jednom od svojih kasnih intervjuja eksplicitno govori i Edo Šmidih, treći član autorskoga tima:

Svi naši učitelji bili su korbizjeovci, tako da je njegov utjecaj bio znatan u našem obrazovanju. Gropius nešto manje, ali obožavali smo Miesa i Aalta. Međutim, teško se može o uzoru govoriti kao konstanti. Konkretno naša trojka – Dragomanović, Nikšić i ja – jedno vrijeme smo bili pod utjecajem nizozemske arhitekture, od Rietvelda do Bakeme. Nikšić i ja bili smo stipendisti u Nizozemskoj, tako da smo dobro upoznali radove arhitekata njihove predratne i poratne arhitekture. (Margaretić Urlić, 2010, 74)

Možda je najbolji zaključak o utjecaju Bakeme i Nizozemaca dao Ivan Juras u vrlo osobnom prisjećanju, u nekrologu Aleksandru Dragomanoviću:

Uzora je bilo puno, ali to primarno nije bio Mies van der Rohe, kako se mislilo. U kabinetu, preko puta radnog stola, na zidu iznad niza niskih ormara još stoje, već pomalo izbljedile, kaširane fotografije kuća holandskih arhitekata: Bakeme, Van der Broeka i Brinckmana... Zašto upravo ta arhitektura? Holandanci su dali doprinos novom urbanizmu kroz socijalnu kategoriju. Istraživali

30 Kako arhitekt Vedran Ivanković piše u svojoj disertaciji: „...potvrda uspjeha i generacijska bliskost s nizozemskim članovima novoosnovane grupe *Team X*, Nikšiću je otvorila vrata novoga stvaralačkog prosedeu, koji je govorio o promjenama ustoličenog moderniteta, o novome vidu habitata, o Geddes's Valley Section, Lijnbaanu, Charged voidu, Lost identity... i o nepripadanju egzemplarnoj arhitekturi pravilnih kubusa kao herojskih oblika prve polovice pedesetih godina“ (Ivanković, 2008, 169).

su strukturu organizma ovih trgovačkih centara, pješačkih zona i ljepotu industrijskih zgrada. Njihovu su arhitekturu proučavali i snimali naši arhitekti na putovanjima po Holandiji. Inventari oblika njihove arhitekture bili su reflektivni elementi nove, a ne infrastrukturne naslage, Dragomanovićeve personalne slojevitosti. Ne vrijede opisni i brbljivi citati, već jasnoća i konzistentnost. (Juras, 1996, 60)

Unatoč uobičajenom mišljenju kako je holandski utjecaj u hrvatskoj arhitekturi dopro samo do Zagreba, iz Dragomanovićevih je projekata razvidno da se ta likovna gesta oko 1960. javlja i na jadranskoj obali u nizu izrazito modernistički oblikovanih hotela – od strukturalističkih kompozicija adirajućih volumena u Lovranu, do *mondrianovskoga* grafizma pročelja u Mošćeničkoj Dragi. Indirektno će njegova ‘holandska introdukcija’ poslužiti kao inspiracija za neke od najvažnijih kasnijih realizacija naše turističke arhitekture pa, primjerice, sam Boris Magaš ističe da se pri projektiranju hotelskoga kompleksa ‘Solaris’ kod Šibenika kompozicijski referirao na *mondrianovske* forme kvadrata u tlocrtima, što podržavaju i bijele lebdeće volumene *De Stijl* provenijencije (Žunić, 2015, 18).

ZAKLJUČAK

Iako je Aleksandar Dragomanović u struci bio primarno prepoznat kao utjecajni i višestruko nagrađivani projektant robnih kuća, poslovnih zgrada, škola i dječjih vrtića, u ovom se istraživanju po prvi puta elaborira i niz do sada nepoznatih njegovih projekata hotelske i ugostiteljsko-turističke namjene koji u

svoje vrijeme nisu bili ni izlagani, niti publicirani. Kroz kritičku valorizaciju u članku je istaknuta vrijednost tih djela u kontekstu vremena kada nastaju kao inovativna rješenja novih arhitektonskih tipologija. Kod svih se primjera razmatraju osobitosti Dragomanovićeva urbanističkog pristupa, oblikovno-kompozicijske odlike analiziranih zgrada, tlocrtno-funkcionalne sheme i napredni konstruktivno-tehnološki aspekti građevina.

Tako je uz brojne, u literaturi dobro poznate projektante hotelskih sklopova na hrvatskoj obali, sada i Aleksandar Dragomanović prepoznat kao relevantni autor s vrijednim doprinosom razvoju naše turističko-ugostiteljsko arhitekture – posebno novih tipova hotela, poput atrijskog modela koji je prvi inaugurirao u našoj struci – a njegova su rješenja gotovo redovito prethodila kasnijim zapaženim realizacijama drugih autora, ponekad izvedenim upravo na istim lokacijama. Inženjerski racionalna i tehnološki kreativna razina Dragomanovićevih projekata iz 1960-ih na početku ‘zlatnog razdoblja’ hotelske izgradnje na Jadranu te izrazito estetizirana razina likovno-kompozicijskog izričaja vrednovani su kao važan dio ex-jugoslavenskoga modernističkog naslijeđa, unatoč činjenici što niti jedan njegov projekt iz ove funkcionalne skupine zgrada nije realiziran.

Uz to, Dragomanovićevi projekti turističkih sklopova, kako je izloženo, izraziti su primjeri utjecaja *nizozemske škole* na hrvatsku arhitekturu 1960-ih, koja stavlja naglasak na mjerilo čovjeka, kompozicijske kanone u minimalističkom oblikovanju pročelja i na odmjerenu dispoziciju arhitektonskih volumena s naznakama strukturalizma – specifičnog prosedea do tada gotovo nepoznatog u još zatvorenom kontekstu onodobne Jugoslavije, gdje se i sam maršal Tito izrije- kom odredio protiv apstraktne likovnosti.

HOTELSKA IN TURISTIČNA ARHITEKTURA ALEKSANDRA DRAGOMANOVIĆA NA JADRANU IN REFLEKSIJE NIZOZEMSKJE OBLIKOVNE ŠOLE NA HRVAŠKEM

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POVZETEK

Eden ključnih korifejev hrvaške povojne moderne – arhitekt Aleksandar Dragomanović – je v svojem ustvarjalnem opusu pustil več kot sto del, med katerimi so najmanj znani in doslej neobjavljeni projekti hotelov, turističnih naselij, restavracije in marine na Jadranu, v obdobju 1949–1961, z več kasnejšimi tovrstnimi zagrebškimi izleti. Članek s kritično valorizacijo izpostavi njihovo vrednost na urbanistični, oblikovalsko-kompozicijski, tlorisno-morfološki in konstruktivni ravni. Gre za okoli deset arhitekturnih kompleksov, zasnovanih za Opatijo, Lovran, Medvejo, Mošćeničko Drago, Zadar, Split in Jelso, ki so večinoma nastali kot razpisni projekti, nato nagrajeni in visoko ovrednoteni, a zaradi svoje avantgardnosti in zahtevnosti niso bili nikoli uresničeni. Tako se poleg številnih znanih arhitektov, ki so zapustili kapitalne primere turistične arhitekture na hrvaški obali, Aleksandar Dragomanović ponovno potrjuje kot avtor z neizogibnim prispevkom k razvoju hotelsko-turistične in gostinske arhitekture. Njena tipološka in tehnološka inovativnost na začetku 'zlatega obdobja' hotelirstva na Jadranu (prevladuje okrog leta 1960) ter visoko estetizirana raven likovnega in kompozicijskega izraza so neizogiben del nekdanje jugoslovanske modernistične dediščine z jasnimi refleksijami na evropski kontekst tistega časa, predvsem na nizozemsko arhitekturno šolo. Kljub splošnemu mnenju, da je nizozemski vpliv prisoten le v arhitekturi Zagreba, je iz Dragomanovićevih projektov opaziti, da se je v realnem času prenašal tudi na hrvaški Jadran.

Ključne besede: Aleksandar Dragomanović, pozna moderna, turistična arhitektura, hotelske stavbe

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KAZALO K SLIKAM NA OVITKU

SLIKA NA NASLOVNICI: *Prostor za ogovarjanje čaka na senco* (Karmen Šterk, osebni arhiv).

INDEX TO IMAGES ON THE COVER

FRONT COVER: *Gossip setting waiting for full shade* (Karmen Šterk, personal archive).

