Arto Haapala 
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place 
I 
There are many reasons for distinguishing aesthetics and ethics from 
each other, but the most obvious ones are probably historical. The tradition 
stemming f rom Baumgarten and Kant largely understood aesthetics in the 
original Greek sense of the word: aisthanomai, to perceive or sense. Aesthetics 
is primarily a matter of the senses, especially the 'higher senses', seeing and 
hearing. Ethics is concerned with principles distinguishing morally acceptable 
actions from immoral ones, or setting standards for a good life. Aesthetics 
deals with matters that are somehow more vague and indefinite than ethical 
problems, and aesthetics is, indeed, based on something less reliable and 
permanent - the senses - compared to ethics where reason and rational 
justifications seem to have a greater role. This has contributed, no doubt, 
to the evaluation and ranking of them in philosophy: aesthetics has been 
seen as the least important field, coming well behind the more sophisticated 
and well-grounded fields of epistemology and ethics. These distinctions and 
their validity have been quest ioned,1 and there have been numerous 
arguments and attempts to establish, for example, the cognitive function of 
art, Hans-Georg Gadamer's being one of the most well-known.2 However, 
the ways we think about aesthetics and ethics are still strongly marked by 
this tradition. 
I do not want to question the rationale of these divisions; I do think 
that we need a distinction between aesthetic and ethical issues to make more 
sense of ou r world. In this paper I consider an area crucial to our 
unde r s t and ing of ourselves and our position in the world where the 
distinction becomes not only problematic but disappears altogether. In our 
everyday dealings with the surroundings we have made our own we are 
within a sphere that exemplifies how both aesthetic and ethical issues overlap 
1 See Wolfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics (London: Sage Publications, 1997), translated 
by Andrew Inkpin, 60-102. 
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method ( London: Sheed & Ward, 1989), second, 
revised edition, translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 81-
100. 
Filozofski vestnik, XX (2/1999 - XIVICA), pp. 253-264. 253 
Arto Haapala 
to a significant degree. All this comes together in the concept of place. Place 
understood in the sense of a person's meaningful and significant location 
brings together aesthetics and ethics. When living in a place - or more 
existentially, when living a place - we are rooted to our surroundings in 
such a way that both our aesthetic and moral judgements are determined 
by the deep ties that we have developed. It is because of this existential 
foundation that the distinction between aesthetic and ethical aspects of life 
tends to disappear. In certain areas of life, but not in all, beauty and goodness 
come together. 
I shall first delineate a short existential account of the concepts of 'place' 
and 'world' or 'life world'. I call my account 'existential ' because I am 
interested in the structures of the life world, and the life world is determined 
by human existence and its structures. The 'existentials'3 of human existence 
are also the structures of our life world. The hermeneutic circle of human 
and world, or human and history, means that we as human beings are also 
determined by the world.4 The interweaving of human and world is one of 
my starting points, and it creates the ontological f o u n d a t i o n for my 
understanding of aesthetics, ethics and their role in human existence. 
My emphasis will be in environmental issues in a broad sense. I am 
interested in the human environment, including art, the built environment, 
and to some ex ten t the na tura l e n v i r o n m e n t . I shall discuss some 
consequences of my account for ou r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the h u m a n 
environment, but I shall not go into issues such as ecology, conservation and 
restoration. 
II 
Let me begin with the concepts of 'culture' and 'tradition'. These are 
crucial terms in understanding what is meant by world or by life world. 
Historicity and tradition are grounding ideas in hermeneutics and figure 
prominently in Gadamer's thinking. For Heidegger, the hermeneutic circle 
was existential in nature in the sense that the human way of being, existence, 
was characterised by a 'fore-understanding' of Being in general.5 To grasp 
3 Mart in He idegge r in t roduces the no t ion of the ' ex is ten t ia l ' , 'ein Existenzial' to 
distinguish his ideas f rom Kantian categories. Macquarrie and Robinson translate the 
term as 'existentiale' (pi. 'existentialia'), Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 70 
and 79, but this is somewhat clumsy. See Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1979), 44 and 54. 
4 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 424-449; Gadamer , op. cit., 254-264. 
5 See Heidegger, op. dt., 358-364; Gadamer, op. cit., 265-271. 
254 
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place. 
Being in general we must study human existence, and this is what Heidegger 
does in Being and Time. For Gadamer, the question is more 'mundane' : the 
role of historicity in understanding in the humanities, and the importance 
of tradit ion in h u m a n life. Gadamer criticizes the Enl ightenment for 
neglecting the role of history and for operating with the concept of pure, 
non-historical reason, and he goes so far as to make morals also relative to 
a tradition: 
T h a t w h i c h h a s b e e n s a n c t i o n e d by t r a d i t i o n a n d c u s t o m h a s a n 
au thor i ty tha t is nameless , a n d our finite historical b e i n g is ma rked by 
the f ac t t ha t t he au thor i ty of what has been h a n d e d down to us - a n d 
n o t j u s t wha t is clearly g r o u n d e d - always has power over ou r a t t i tudes 
a n d b e h a v i o u r . ... T h e rea l fo rce of morals , fo r example , is based o n 
t rad i t ion . T h e y are f ree ly taken over b u t by n o means c rea ted by a f r e e 
ins ight o r g r o u n d e d on reasons. This is precisely what we call t radi t ion: 
t he g r o u n d of the i r validity. And in fact it is to romant ic i sm that we owe 
this co r r ec t ion of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t : tha t t radi t ion has a jus t i f icat ion 
tha t lies b e y o n d ra t iona l g r o u n d i n g a n d in large m e a s u r e d e t e r m i n e s 
o u r ins t i tu t ions a n d att i tudes.1 ' 
I shall not take a stance on the question of whether all moral principles 
are based only on tradition or whether they have a more fundamental 
justification, be it rational or otherwise. But when we come to aesthetic 
problems, then, I think, we are firmly on a historical foundat ion. Our 
aesthetic cul ture - our practices within the arts as well as judgements 
concerning the aesthetic value of our environment — has gained its present 
form during the course of history. There would not be any aesthetic culture 
without its tradition, and if its tradition had been different, our aesthetic 
culture would also be different. Our aesthetic culture is structured in certain 
ways and quite complex, with a number of contrasting tendencies. 
It is also time that makes a cultural practice possible and guarantees its 
existence. The longer a tradition is, the stronger it is. A tradition always has 
the tendency to multiply itself by producing objects and events of the same 
kind and creating new practices around itself. This means that the structures 
are further strengthened and their existence is taken more and more for 
granted. Here, ' the test of time' means that time justifies the existence of 
certain practices as well as objects and events that go with it; there are no 
dmeless criteria which would constitute the test and through which different 
objects and events would have to pass. There is no logic beyond time that 
would provide an explanation and a rationale for the present state of affairs. 
Once there is a tradition its structures are always the basis for new things 
to come. But in the development of the Western art world, there can occur 
6 Gadamer , ibid., 280-281. 
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Arto Haapala 
strands at certain times in history which go very much against of the tradition. 
This is what many avant-garde movements have done. A general theory 
cannot explain why these sorts of developments take place, or why many 
other different kinds of developments take place. We have to refer to 
particular circumstances - economic, religious, social - and to particular 
individuals living and making decisions in these circumstances. 
The Heideggerian ideas of the relatedness of Being in general and 
human existence could be applied to clarify the relationship between cultural 
structures and an individual living within them. The Sein, being, in our Dasein, 
there-being, is formed by the different cultural structures into which we are 
born. One of the 'sites' (das Da) which we inhabit is the aesthetic culture. 
The way we exist in our aesthetic culture, that is, what we as human beings 
in the existential sense are as far as aesthetic matters are concerned, is set 
by constituents of that culture. We have an 'aesthetic nature ' of a certain 
kind because we were 'thrown into'7 an aesthetic culture of a certain kind. 
One of the existentials of our existence is the 'aesthetic existential'. In a 
Heideggerian manner we could also investigate the nature of our aesthetic 
culture through a study of our 'aesthetic existential ' ; and vice versa by 
exploring the aesthetic culture we throw light on ourselves as entities existing 
in this culture.8 
I have been talking about 'aesthetic culture'. I understand the word 
'culture' as synonymous with the word 'world', so, we can use the expression, 
'aesthetic world'. This raises further Heideggerian points. Heidegger writes 
about the world and its relation to entities within it as follows: 
T h e w o r l d i tself is n o t an en t i t y w i t h i n - t h e - w o r l d ; a n d ye t i t is so 
de te rmina t ive fo r such enti t ies t ha t only in so f a r as ' t h e r e is' a wor ld 
can t h e y be e n c o u n t e r e d a n d s h o w t h e m s e l v e s , in t h e i r B e i n g , as 
enti t ies which have b e e n discovered. But in wha t way 'is t h e r e ' a wor ld? 
If D a s e i n is on t ica l ly c o n s t i t u t e d by B e i n g - i n - t h e - W o r l d , a n d if an 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Being of its Self be longs j u s t as essentially to its 
Being ... then does n o t Dasein have a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e wor ld -
a pre-ontological unde r s t and ing , which i n d e e d can a n d does ge t a l o n g 
w i t h o u t expl ic i t on to log i ca l ins ights? Wi th t h o s e e n t i t i e s w h i c h a r e 
7 In Being and Time Heidegger defines 'thrownness': »This characteristic of Dasein's Being 
- this ' that it is' - is veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither ' , yet disclosed in itself all the 
more unveiledly; we call it the 'thrownness' of this entity into its ' there ' ; indeed , it is 
thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ' there ' .« (174) 
8 This reciproci ty has i m p o r t a n t consequences for many t rad i t iona l p r o b l e m s in 
aesthetics, fo r example interpretation; see Arto Haapala, »Interpreta t ion, Context , 
and the Ethics of Interpretat ion - An Essay in Existential Aesthetics«, in Interpretation 
and Its Boundaries (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1999), edited by Arto Haapala 
and Ossi Naukkarinen, 162-176. 
256 
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place. 
e n c o u n t e r e d wi th in- the-wor ld - tha t is to say, with t he i r c h a r a c t e r as 
wi th in - the-wor ld - d o e s n o t s o m e t h i n g like t h e wor ld show itself f o r 
t h e c o n c e r n f u l Being-in-the-world?' J 
Humans as entities existing in the world are constituted by being-in-
the-aesthetic-world. And in so far as we have been acquainted with the 
aesthetic world, we have also developed a pre-ontological understanding of 
its structures. As we are dealing with or taking care of the entities existing in 
the aesthetic world - works of art, buildings, design objects, natural objects 
and landscapes - we are at the same time necessarily taking care of the 
aesthetic world, although the world itself is not an object or event in the 
same sense as entities within-the-world. The aesthetic world is indeed the 
precondition of any aesthetic object and event, but at the same time the world 
would not exist without its objects. The world makes individual things 
possible, and it can exist and manifest itself only through these entities. This 
is also true for the strand of human existence I have called the 'aesthetic 
existential': there is a mutual dependence between this aspect of human 
being and the aesthetic world. 
I have so far deliberately avoided the expression 'art world', and used 
instead the broader expression 'aesthedc world'. Worlds of a r t - music, visual 
arts, literature, him, theatre, etc. - are paradigmatic examples of the aesthedc 
world. Many of our aesthetic practises have been established in one art form 
or another, and the practices vary depending on the era and the art form. 
Visual arts in the Middle Ages were very different compared to now. The 
observations I have made of the aesthetic world apply to the art world as 
well. But I would like to broaden the scope because my concerns in this essay 
are mainly about non-artistic objects. However, I do not deny the significance 
and influence of art on our aesthetic culture as a whole. 
Ill 
I have now established the foundation of our aesthetic culture, and 
shown some of the complicated relations there are between the aesthetic 
world, aesthetic objects and human existence. Let me now turn to die concept 
of place. The concept has become common and popular in recent analysis 
of the human environment. It is worth noting that Heidegger's writings on 
'dwelling' have inspired numerous writers.10 Rather than going into a 
9 Heidegger, op. cit., 102. 
10See Edward Relph, Place andPlacelessness (London: Pion Limited, 1976), 17-18, 37-41; 
Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place - Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-
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Arto Haapala 
discussion of the concept of place, let me simply stipulate a meaning for the 
term. This will allow me to clarify its relationship to the aesthetic world and 
our experience of aesthetic objects. This will in turn provide a path to 
considering how aesthetic and ethics coincide in this context. 
When writing this essay at my office I have a place. I occupy a place in 
the straight forward physical sense: I am sitting in my chair, which is in my 
office, which is in a building, etc. But I am not interested in the Cartesian 
sense - as Heidegger calls it - of an object and its place in the world. " I do 
not want to define place in terms of a fixed space so that a certain space or 
spaces would be necessary for my place. I have a place in the m o r e 
sophisticated sense of the word. I have a place in the sense that I have a 
relationship to humans, to different things and events around me. My place 
is meaningful and significant for me because I have construed different kinds 
of relations to entities surrounding me. I have familiarised myself with the 
immediate surroundings of my office. Most of the things inside the office 
are 'ready-to-hand' - they are there for me so that I can use them. The 
computer, telephone and all the books and papers are familiar to me, within 
my reach, and I see them as entities which exist for my purposes.12 But also 
the view from the window, the corridor behind my office door, the different 
routes I take to the office, the lecture halls in which I teach, these also 
constitute my place. I create a place for myself within the structures of a 
cultural world by connecting different sorts of ties to different sorts of entities. 
My place has more or less permanent features to which I return almost every 
day, like my home and my office. 
In the existential sense that I want to define it, place is, thus, the for-
me-significant-and-meaningful-collection-of-entities. I am using the word 
'entity' broadly to cover not only physical things, but also all kinds of cultural 
objects and events, such as different organisations and institutions, cultural 
practices and conventions, but also other human beings who are defined by 
their relations to entities which are significant and meaningful to them. World 
is the historically structured foundation that gives us entities with meaning 
and value; place is a selection of different culturally meaningful entities that 
are significant for particular individuals because of their actions, interests, 
or anything that has an influence on their evaluations and decisions. 
World (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Ind iana University Press, 1993), 109-145. I have 
analysed the concept of place in more detail in my 'On the Aesthetics of the Everyday 
- Familiarity, Strangeness and the Meaning of Place", fo r thcoming in Philosophy and 
Geography, Vol. IV: Aesthetics of Everyday Life, 1999. 
258 
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place. 
IV 
Now we have a view to the basic ontological structure of the world and 
humans within it in terms of aesthetic world and place. Where does the 
relationship between aesthetics and ethics come in? The idea of aesthetic 
culture already raises the basic issues in aesthetics, such as aesthetic value. 
Let me look at the status of aesthetic values within the aesthetic world and 
proceed in this way to the more general problems of values and evaluation. 
Our aesthetic culture is deeply marked by values; the structures defining 
our aesthetic existential and from which all aesthetic objects are born are 
value-laden. The role of values is manifested very clearly in pieces that are 
regarded as classics - a classic is by definition valuable in some respect. In 
the arts in particular, classics are defined within a period or style. J.S. Bach's 
pieces are classics within the corpus of baroque music; Tolstoy's novels are 
classics within the canon of Russian literature. The criteria of goodness in 
Bach's music and in Tolstoy's novels differ understandably to a great extent 
already because music and literature appeal to different aspects of our 
existence, music more often to our emotions, literature to our cognitive 
faculties. To be a real classic, the piece must go beyond its original context; 
Bach is clearly not limited to the Baroque, but to the whole tradition of 
Western music. As Gadamer puts it: 
. . . w h e n we ca l l s o m e t h i n g c lass ica l , t h e r e is a c o n s c i o u s n e s s of 
s o m e t h i n g e n d u r i n g , of s ign i f icance tha t c a n n o t b e lost a n d tha t is 
i n d e p e n d e n t of all c i rcumstances of t ime - a kind of t imeless p resen t 
t h a t is c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s with every o t h e r p resen t . ' 3 
I shall, however, concentrate here on the more personal side of our 
aesthetic evaluations. Joseph Margolis has made a distinction between 
'appreciative judgments ' and 'findings'. When talking about 'findings' there 
is a widely accepted set of norms to which one refers in justifying a claim, 
whereas in appreciativejudgments personal preferences, or 'taste' as he calls 
it, have a role to play. He writes: 
. . . f i nd ings ob ta in w h e r e some set of the actual p rope r t i e s of an object 
a re , on a theory , t aken to b e suff ic ient f o r the ascr ipt ion of a cer ta in 
value; t he in formal i ty with which such proper t i es may b e specif ied does 
n o t a f f ec t t h e logica l s ta tus of f i nd ings . But a p p r e c i a t i v e j u d g m e n t s 
o b t a i n w h e r e , p r e c i s e l y , t h e a c t u a l ( t h e m i n i m a l l y d e s c r i b a b l e ) 
p r o p e r t i e s of an ob jec t a r e ' f i l t e red ' t h r o u g h the pe r sona l tastes a n d 
11 Heidegger, ibid., 122-134. 
1 2This is Heidegger ' s ' Umsicht', Sein und Zeit, 69; in English translation, 'circumspection', 
Being and Time, 98. 
13 Gadamer , op. cit., 288. 
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Arto Haapala 
s e n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e a g e n t of j u d g i n g ; t h e r e , n o s e t o f t h e a c t u a l 
p r o p e r t i e s of an ob jec t a r e su f f i c i en t to j u s t i f y t h e a s c r i p t i o n of t h e 
re levant value. H e n c e , on an a p p r o p r i a t e theory , we say tha t an ob jec t 
has a certain value (f indings) or o n e is jus t i f i ed only in ascribing a cer ta in 
value to t ha t ob jec t (appreciat ive j u d g m e n t s ) . 1 4 
I am interested in appreciative judgments rather than findings. A finding 
is a judgment about a constitutive feature within the aesthetic world - like 
»Bach's 'Matthew Passion' has great artistic (or aesthetic) merit« - an 
appreciative judgment says more about the speaker — »Finnish landscapes 
in the winter are very calming and beautiful«. But both f indings and 
appreciat ive j udgmen t s play a role in aesthet ics; in Margolis 's view 
»appreciative matters dominate ... in the aesthetic domain«.15 
What is it that makes some aesthetic objects more significant for us than 
others? Why is it that certain works speak to us more than others? There 
are cases in which we acknowledge the value of a piece, it may even be a 
classic, and still we cannot enjoy it. This does not have to be a case of 'aesthetic 
acrasia', i.e. that we cannot enjoy the aesthetic value of a piece because of 
some kind of personal defect in us. I want to look at cases where we are able 
to create a particularly deep relation to an aesthetic object. These kinds of 
bonds are, I think, often based in particular characteristics of our place. 
I can develop a taste for certain kinds of art by systematically studying 
a particular style and getting more and more familiar with the features that 
constitute it. Or I may develop a taste unknowingly, for example when living 
in a part icular environment , be it rural or u rban , and I may start to 
appreciate that particular environment or that kind of milieu more generally. 
I might begin to feel attached to particular kinds of aesthetic objects. Because 
of my place and the 'horizon' that is created by it, I have an affinity with 
certain kinds of aesthetic objects. Some of these affinities are based on very 
fundamental human existentials: to be a man or to be a woman clearly shapes 
different kinds of affinities. These primary divisions are, however, made more 
complicated by numerous other factors that define human existence - all 
the cultural aspects that are essential for the human way of being, as well as 
the personal aspects of individuals living and acting in a culture. 
Place is, indeed, the horizon that determines our perceptions and 
preferences. Gadamer defines 'horizon' in this way: 
Every f i n i t e p r e s e n t ha s its l i m i t a t i o n s . W e d e f i n e t h e c o n c e p t o f 
' s i t u a t i o n ' by saying t h a t it r e p r e s e n t s a s t a n d p o i n t t h a t l imi t s t h e 
possibi l i ty of vis ion. H e n c e the essen t ia l c o n c e p t of s i t u a t i o n is t h e 
"Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanit ies Press, 1989), 
223-224. 
15 Margolis, ibid., 224. 
260 
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place. 
c o n c e p t of 'horizon'. T h e ho r i zon is t he r a n g e of vision tha t inc ludes 
every th ing tha t can b e seen f r o m a par t icular vantage poin t . Applying 
this to t h e t h i n k i n g m i n d , we speak of t h e nar rowness of hor izon , of 
t h e poss ib le e x p a n s i o n of h o r i z o n , of t h e o p e n i n g of new hor i zons , 
a n d so fo r th . " ' 
Our places and horizons are by no means fixed, on the contrary, the 
existential and historicist conception of human existence I have developed 
is very explicit about the possibility of change. But it is also an existential 
fact that the range of choices diminishes in the course of dme - my existence 
is by now much more determined than twenty years ago. It is this construal 
of one's existence that limits our choices and decides our preferences. 
The connect ion between a place and aesthetics is, however, more 
complicated than that. There is a tendency to feel affinity to something 
familiar that is part of one's own existence, but one of the striving forces 
behind different developments in Western art is the search for something 
new. In the visual arts this tendency has been very clear, and it reveals the 
other side to aesthetics - the values innovativeness and strangeness. In the 
contemporary arts, the uncanny and the shocking have played a significant 
role. By contrast, in everyday surroundings strangeness has had a significantly 
minor role, not only in the aesthetics of natural environments but also in 
urban settings. Although one can point out singular examples of striking 
buildings and built areas, as well as spectacular natural scenes, it is still true 
to say, that generally speaking strangeness does not have such importance 
in environmental aesthetics. 
In the 'aesthetics of place' I am putting emphasis on those aspects of 
aesthetics where familiarity rather than strangeness dominate. My place is 
dear to me because it is part of my existence. All features of one's place do 
not have to be beautiful in any strong or definite sense of the word, but there 
is a tendency to value them positively. The relation between a person and 
entities constituting his or her place is an affectionate one; when we are in 
constant contact with our surroundings and have created our very own 
personal ties to it, it becomes something to which we cannot have an 
indifferent attitude. Our place is too close to us for us to have any distance 
from it. 
As I have tried to show above, this closeness is ontological in nature: is 
no t something independen t from us but precisely the personal in our 
existence. This means that there can be tensions and contradictions between 
a person's aesthetic preferences and more generally accepted aesthetic 
standards. A suburban area can be very dear to somebody who has lived 
" 'Gadamer , op. cit., 302. 
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Arto Haapala 
there during his or her childhood even though an outsider would estimate 
its aesthetic value to be very low. We gain satisfaction through a kind of 
comforting security: the aesthetic pleasure of place is based on the fact that 
we know it so well; it is something we can trust; it is not threatening; it does 
question our preferences, values or indeed, existence. 
Even the ugly aspects of one's place - ugly again by some culturally 
defined standards - gain some aesthetic value. They may contribute to the 
stability and comfort that is essential in place. An old pair of shoes may be 
repulsive to someone who does not know their history and has not used them. 
For the owner, they are both familiar and comfortable, and it is in this that 
their aesthetic value lies. This does not mean, however, that we prefer no 
changes to our surroundings. We may well be willing to allow even major 
modifications if the surroundings are aesthetically, socially, or in some other 
respects defective. The point I am making is that being part of a place imbues 
every entity with value for a person. 
This value can be understood also in ethical terms: my place defines 
my way of existing and any change in the place has some consequences for 
my existence. Let me take an extreme example to illustrate these moral 
implications. It is morally wrong to move people from an area without a 
compelling reason. A compelling reason could be, for example, that there 
is something poisonous in the area that constitutes a health hazard to people 
living there. There could be other compelling reasons, but for my argument 
it is not necessary to define as what constitutes a compelling reason. 
It is clear that there are reasons which are not compelling from the 
point of view of those living there. To force people to move because of their 
race or age, is, generally speaking, morally wrong, although there might be 
singular cases and contexts in which even such actions could be justified. 
With recent shocking cases of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, it becomes 
obvious that the arguments used by all parties of the conflict are of the form 
that a particular area is an essential part of a nation's identity. The reference 
is to larger cultural structures that then serve as a ground for the constitution 
of individual places, and in this way are also parts of places. So there is a 
very deep existential and moral dimension in the concept of place. 
V 
The existential, the moral, and the aesthetic aspects are intertwined 
together in complicated ways. My j u d g m e n t s abou t my place are not 
objective, but necessarily 'biased'. My place has aesthetic value simply 
262 
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place. 
because I am existentially tied to it, and through this existential connection 
I am attached to it emotionally too. It has ethical value because it is at the 
heart of my existence and a changing of it would affect my existence. Entities 
in my place are, in a way, part of me, and so I tend see them as beautiful 
and worth preserving. Once again I have to stress that this is a tendency, not 
a general rule. We can each point out things constituting our place that we 
would rather replace with something else. It might be a building style we do 
not like, or it might be something more abstract, like an institution or a 
custom that goes against our nature. 
Let me finally draw some conclusions regarding judgments about the 
environment. If my existential analysis is on the right track, there seem to 
be two very different sorts of value judgments. When I am talking about my 
closest env i ronment , about something that constitutes my place, my 
judgmen t s are derived f rom my very own existential constituents, and 
accordingly they are very much about myself. They do not say much about 
the environment as such, but rather about a possible way of life. For a New 
Yorker the city of New York is the familiar surrounding which exemplifies 
numerous positive qualities: it is rich and exciting, maybe sometimes even 
cosy and homely. For an outsider New York may appear as threatening and 
hostile. These judgments stem from very different grounds, different ways 
of life constituting different horizons. They are both genuine and in their 
own contexts acceptable verdicts. But because of their incompatible points 
of departure, they cannot be placed on same scale. They address different 
places. This is Margolis's appreciative judgment : taking pleasure f rom 
matching one's way of life with the surroundings or displeasure from the 
lack of such matching. 
But our value judgments about the environment are not always subjective 
in this sense. There are culturally accepted values the validity of which is 
not dependent on any individual preferences. Classics are paradigmatic 
examples of this, and there are classics in all fields of culture. Also, many 
natural scenes have gained the status of a classic, for example Niagara Falls 
or the Rocky Mountains. Classics exemplify certain values and they maintain 
these values. Value judgments in this sense are in a cultural sphere. Cultural 
entities exist within a culture, and this goes for cultural values too. Someone 
may not like Bach's music, but this does not deny its cultural value. To do 
the latter would only show ignorance of our music culture. 
Both cultural values and our personal preferences, both world and 
place, are rooted in our existence. They determine what we are and how 
we view things around. This also means that goodness and beauty go hand 
in hand: the way I am in the world is both an ethical and aesthetic issue. 
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Arto Haapala 
The determining grounds and character of my place are of utmost importance 
for me in every sense of the word because these are matters that constitute 
what, as a human being, I finally am. Place is not an imperative, it is rather 
an exemplification of certain choices and decisions that a particular human 
being has made, and that further constitute this particular individual as a 
human being. These are the origins of human existence as a cultural entity 
and as an individual with distinctive features distinguishing him or her from 
other humans. 
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