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# TEMATSKI SKLOP

Migrations and Citizenship

Migracije in državljanstvo

THEMATIC SECTION



# MIGRATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP: “NEW” CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES

Cirila TOPLAK<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

### **Migrations and Citizenship: “New” Concepts and Practices**

This paper explores interconnections of concepts of migration and citizenship by first presenting a case study of an internal migration of Bolivian indigenous communities which have been using temporary internal migrations as a form of political mobilization. An interpretation of such civic practices follows, on the one hand in the context of Bolivian politics, and on the other hand within concepts of “deep” (“ecological”) citizenship. To conclude, the author examines additional motives for migrations as a result of interactions of global mobility and new (Western) considerations of citizenship.

KEY WORDS: migration, citizenship, environment, ethics

## IZVLEČEK

### **Državljanstvo in migracije: »Novi« koncepti in prakse**

Znanstveni prispevek povezuje državljanstvo in migracije tako, da najprej predstavi primer interne migracije bolivijskih staroselcev, ki začasno notranjo migracijo uporabljajo kot obliko politične mobilizacije, nato pa umesti tovrstno obliko migracij znotraj bolivijskega političnega dogajanja ter konceptov »globokega« (»ekološkega«) državljanstva. Avtorica v sklepu predstavi dodatne motive za migracije kot posledico interakcije med globalno mobilnostjo in novimi (zahodnimi) koncepti državljanstva.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: migracije, državljanstvo, okolje, etika

## INTRODUCTION

I propose to jointly discuss two concepts here that, according to Bauböck (2006), research has only fairly recently interconnected: “Citizenship has emerged as an important topic of research on migration and migrant integration since the 1980s. Before this there was little connection between migration research and the legal literature on nationality law or political theories and sociological analyses of citizenship in a broader sense” (Bauböck 2006: 9).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> According to Bauböck, concepts of citizenship and migrations were not studied jointly because citizenship was considered rather self-evidently as the final stage of assimilation processes concerning emigrants in Western Europe. On the other hand, guest workers' category was excluded from this possibility from the start. Although

The precondition for the interconnection of citizenship and migrations was “a more inclusive conception of citizenship” (*Ibid*). However, Bauböck conceives of citizenship rather narrowly as of an “individual’s belonging, rights and participation in political community ... [while] ... migrations highlight the political core and limits of citizenship. (Bauböck 2006: 15). My intention here is to reverse the perspective and take a look at the migrant not as an individual with an eventual citizen status, but at migrations as civic practices that can be encompassed in inclusive and interpretative conceptions of citizenship made possible by globalization processes. Migrations thus acquire additional agendas as I propose to demonstrate later on, while the scope of consideration of both concepts expands from areas of sociology and law into areas of ethics and anthropology.

Owing to diverse national policies on migration, there is no global consensus on the definition of migrant or migrations; the closest to one may be definitions proposed by international organizations active in this area. The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants identifies migrants as “all cases where the decision to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of ‘personal convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling factor” (UNESCO). Migrant status therefore cannot be associated with refugees, displaced persons and other individuals forced to leave their homes. Following the obvious legal gap in protection of forced migrants, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro proposed that the definition of a migrant would include all

persons who are outside the territory of the State of which they are nationals or citizens, are not subject to its legal protection and are in the territory of another State; persons who do not enjoy the general legal recognition of rights which is inherent in the granting by the host State of the status of refugee, naturalised person or of similar status; persons who do not enjoy either general legal protection of their fundamental rights by virtue of diplomatic agreements, visas or other agreements (*Ibid*).

Since the definition of migrations has no legal and statutory consequences, it is more generous. According to UNESCO, a migration is “the crossing of the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period of time. It includes the movement of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people as well as economic migrants” (UNESCO). The UNESCO definition further differentiates between internal migrations in the sense of movements between two administrative units (provinces, districts or municipalities) within a state, and international migrations between states. However, it excludes from this definition any movement

which does not lead to any change in ties of social membership and therefore remains largely inconsequential both for the individual and for the society at the points of origin and destination, such as tourism [...] as well as “a relocation in which the individuals or the groups concerned are purely passive objects rather than active agents of the movement, such as organised transfer of refugees from states of origins to a safe haven (UNESCO).

According to the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM), migrations are defined as

the movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification (IOM).

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Bauböck’s study is entitled *Citizenship and Migrations*, it is primarily focused on citizenship and migrations in Europe (Bauböck 2006: 9).

This definition does not limit migrations to an arbitrary "minimum" time period and allows for any reason for movement of individuals over all forms of borders. Subsequently, it also allows for future developments, i.e. new forms of migrations and reasons to migrate that I shall discuss later on.

## CASE STUDY OF BOLIVIAN INDIGENOUS MIGRATION

On 15 August 2011 about one thousand members of indigenous communities inhabiting the protected area of Isiboro-Secure in the Bolivian Amazon lowlands started marching from the settlement of Trinidad in the Beni district towards the Bolivian capital La Paz. They marched to oppose highway construction across their territory that had already begun with the financial assistance of Brazil in need of fast transport connections between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The government launched the construction to boost the local economy by providing better access to markets and to improve public services in isolated areas. According to the indigenous peoples' representatives, the construction would cause catastrophic damage to the Amazonian rainforest, the habitat of the Guarani-Izoceños, Chiquitanos, Ayoreos and Guarayos communities, and encourage illegal settlement and deforestation by landless farmers, loggers and mineral explorers. They decided therefore to walk the 605 km distance to La Paz to stop the project.

Global media transmitted images of the march that impressed viewers as different from the usual display of irrational collective violence of the (Islamic) "Third World": along a steep winding road (La Paz is located on the *altiplano* at 3650 m above sea level) men, women, some with babies, elderly and children were slowly advancing in a stretched line, their tired expressions evoking sadness, calm, and dignity. Their media statements sounded articulate and coherent: they started this slow march on foot, a symbolic protest against a fast moving highway, not for themselves, but for their children and future generations to come, for whom they felt obliged to conserve the culture and nature that they themselves lived in at present; they mobilised themselves out of concern for others, even other species, the rainforest and its inhabitants that they considered inseparable from the indigenous communities living in it as well as from humanity as a whole; they migrated in protest to take care of those who will inhabit the rainforest when the protesters are long gone (CIDOB). Bolivian President Evo Morales' first reaction was to call the marchers "enemies of the nation" and "tourists". He expressed suspicions that they had been brainwashed by NGOs and that the march was yet another manifestation of the American imperialist agenda (Picq 2011). The President then attempted to stop the protest march by a forceful police intervention that turned bloody. On 25 September police tear-gassed marchers and forced some of them onto buses to return them home. Four protesters were killed and 74 injured. The police violence spurred adverse public opinion and (student) protests in the national capital La Paz, in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Yucomo, Rurrenabaque, Trinidad, San Antonio, El Alto and Beni, while members of the Aymara and Quechua indigenous peoples from the highlands began a solidarity hunger strike. National outcry led Interior Minister Sacha Llorenti to resign, while Defence Minister María Chacón Rendón quit in solidarity with the protestors (MercoPress 2011). Morales then changed his position, apologised in public for the police violence and issued a presidential decree followed by a law to suspend the highway construction (Friedman-Rudovsky 2011). He also agreed to an international investigation into the police crackdown and arrests of hundreds of activists who had then been marching for a month. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) announced plans to form a commission to investigate the abuses.

On 19 October 2011 the marchers reached the capital city of La Paz where they were warmly welcomed by the locals and the authorities. Reportedly, school children, office workers, university students and even soccer clubs greeted the marchers dressed in their traditional garments and carrying bows and arrows. Many of the marchers were donated socks and warm clothes to protect themselves from high-altitude cold to which they were unaccustomed. Several of their children were admitted to La Paz hospitals with pneumonia (Shahriari 2011).

The Great March of 2011 was not the first indigenous internal migration done out of protest. The Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), uniting 34 indigenous communities from the Amazonian lowlands and Andean highlands, organized the first protest march in 1990. Marchers walked the same 605 km distance from Trinidad to La Paz to win recognition of four indigenous territories and the ratification by Bolivia of the 1957 International Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention. They resumed marching in 1996, following a land reform that threatened the territorial integrity of indigenous territories. Although the march culminated in mass demonstrations in La Paz, gathering 40 000 people, they were not successful. Further marches in 2000, 2002, 2006 and 2007 had similar aims: protection of indigenous territories, administrative autonomy of indigenous communities, recognition of indigenous languages and rights. In 2010 the Seventh Great March for territory, autonomy and indigenous rights clearly articulated the indigenous agenda: recognition and respect for indigenous local communities, land ownership, ban on mining and logging that threaten indigenous territories, territorial integrity, government-financed autonomy, the right to participate in decision-making processes on development projects and economic resources, participation of indigenous representatives in the parliament and the government (CIDOB).

In order to interpret the conception of citizenship at work in indigenous communities and the logic of the forms of their political mobilization such as protest migrations, the specific political and ethnic situation of Bolivia first needs to be considered.

## BOLIVIAN POLITICS BETWEEN SOCIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS

The majority of the Bolivian population (64 %) claim indigenous origins. While the Andean Aymara and Quechua peoples account for the majority of the indigenous population, the Amazonian indigenous communities are more diverse. The remainder of the Bolivian population is a heterogeneous emigrant mixture resulting from (de)colonisation processes and adding to the complexity of cohesion issues in a culturally diverse and economically unequal society.

Although indigeness is “a discursive construction, there can be no doubt that it is a central category around which a large sector of Bolivians have organized and made political and cultural claims in recent decades” (Postero 2010: 19). In Bolivia’s historically agricultural and mining economy (nowadays also significantly based on natural gas exports), the primary form of political involvement was the miners’ union. “The union model fused citizenship and labour rights through a unifying discourse focusing on the historical and national value of labour” (Linera *et al* 2004: 44). The unions’ representation reached beyond miners by fighting for democracy and human rights in addition to labour rights, and eventually opposed the elite-controlled political parties. Also important were farm labour unions of *campesinos* where the overlapping of social class and indigeness was even stronger than with miners. Intellectual movements such as the Katarista in the 1960s were predominantly based on indigeness, motivated by rediscovery of indigenous history that fought the double exploitation of indigenous people on social as well as ethnic grounds. The Katarista radicalised the *campesinos* to the point for the latter to split into a conformist political movement working within the party system and the Aymara guerrillas. Neoliberal economic pressure from the second half of the 1980s on pushed a significant number of migrant miners and farm workers to return to their countryside homes. As a result, those who started to grow coca, the *cocaleros*, became part of the international anti-globalization movement and used traditional union approaches to fight the authorities and to attract global attention.

Parallel to this, another indigenous political mobilisation rose that did not claim any connection to social class or anti-capitalist struggle. It consisted of indigenous communities from Bolivian eastern lowlands whose habitats were threatened by pressure from loggers, ranchers and gas extractors. By early

1990s they were organized in the CIDOB platform mentioned above. They relied on identity politics, based on culture and ethnicity, and were therefore quite compatible with the multiculturalist agenda of Bolivia's governments, which during the 1990s actually complied with some of indigenous demands for redistribution of land. However,

Bolivia's neoliberal multiculturalism was more effective as a politics of recognition than as a politics of redistribution. It did not substantially alter the structural inequalities facing indigenous people. Rather, it was a top-down effort by the neoliberal state to incorporate indigenous peoples into the national project as responsible and docile neoliberal subjects (Postero 2010: 22).

The long ignored *campesinos*, the unionized workers, and the indigenous movements eventually cut through into the elite-controlled party system by creating in 1995 an ideologically flexible political party called MAS that was only to be a temporary instrument in the hands of its heterogeneous supporters to reach their political goals. This new Bolivian "multitude", "in contrast to traditional forms of association, which control and mobilize their members, [...] maintain their power through moral authority, relying on participants' commitment to the cause" (Postero 2010: 23). MAS was to represent "a symbolic structure" based on black-and-white oppositions to define and maintain itself (*Ibid*: 29). The enemies in question have been identified as the United States, the oligarchy, the political parties, Western culture and neoliberalism. The friends were the people and the indigenous peoples in particular.

From 2002 on, MAS was becoming increasingly conformist, having seemingly given up its initial revolutionary agenda, and in 2005 Evo Morales won the presidential elections as the first indigenous Head of State in Bolivia. Symbolically, he was inaugurated twice: as President at the presidential palace but also as the highest authority of the Andean peoples at the sacred Inca site of Tiahuanacu (Postero 2010: 18).<sup>2</sup> His electoral promises focused on a counter-neoliberal economic agenda and control of natural resources, political empowerment of the indigenous population and an anti-American imperialist stand that all together amounted to what began to be identified as "indigenous nationalism". Morales linked his party and new government to struggles for indigenous cultural and political rights, national and territorial sovereignty, human rights, workers' rights, anti-neoliberalism, and socialism. Yet, the core of the Morales revolution remained indigenous empowerment: his principal aim was to "refound the nation" (*Ibid*: 19).

When Bolivia's predominantly white eastern provinces attempted to secede in 2008, local indigenous populations and their highlands allies were instrumental in keeping Morales' government in power. Subsequently, the constitution of 2009 established the "plurinational state of Bolivia", explicitly protecting the communal rights of the indigenous communities over their traditional lands, which they insist on identifying as "territories" because the term includes physical land and their cultures and traditions (Gonzales 2011).

This Constitution was also the first in the world to explicitly protect the rights of "Mother Earth", an ancient indigenous concept encompassing the living world. It redefined Bolivia's natural resources as "blessings" and established 11 new rights for nature, including: the right to life and to exist; the right to continue vital cycles and processes free from human alteration; the right to pure water and clean air; the right to balance; the right not to be polluted; the right to not have cellular structure modified or genetically altered as well as the right of nature "to not be affected by mega-infrastructure and development projects that affect the balance of ecosystems and the local inhabitant communities" (Vidal 2011). Ecuador with a similar demographic composition followed Bolivia's example by giving nature constitutional rights to existence and maintenance.

<sup>2</sup> The inauguration was also attended by then Slovenian President Janez Drnovšek, stirring astonishment and criticism among the Slovenian political elite and public.

Despite such political innovations, the Morales government's attempts to conciliate the seemingly incompatible *Indigenista*, socialist and populist agendas have been criticised from all sides; the support by indigenous majority however, remained stable and even increased as the respective election results have demonstrated. After all, Evo Morales' political ascent started when as a union leader he co-organized the indigenous March for Territory and Dignity in 1990, which helped create the autonomous indigenous territories. Morales' primary support had come, however, from the Aymara and Quechua communities in the highlands. Despite joint political mobilization with the Amazonian communities, the highlanders have also come to be resented in the lowlands as "colonists" for having migrated to the Amazonian region following the scarcity of agricultural land in the highlands. After the 2011 march, some media reported that there appeared to have been a "change of mind" among the protesters and they no longer opposed the construction. According to other sources, the opposition was halted by a compromise on the highway now bypassing the indigenous territories; also, the highlanders started to favour the construction despite the lowlanders' opposition (BBC News).<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, political theorists and social scientists in the West have been introducing alternative concepts of citizenship that correspond quite closely to the citizenship practices described above in several respects. The concepts I have in mind are part of the interpretative scholarship in post-post-modern citizenship theory that attempts to transgress the conventional territorial, national, statutory, public and rights-based understanding of citizenship. A brief summary of evolution of these academic positions on citizenship is given below.

## "NEW" CITIZENSHIP CONCEPTS

The conception of citizenship as a statutory relationship of rights and duties, i.e. a contractual bond between the citizen and the state, had been rather self-evident from the early era of political societies on – the citizen ensured his rights by paying taxes and therefore working, while the state guaranteed his rights in exchange for taxes (see Ellis et al 2006). The modern welfare state emphasized rights considerably more than duties, which was also one of the key arguments of its opponents (Dobson 1998: 6). Contemporary civic education theory tends to balance this relationship with a greater emphasis on civic duties and responsibilities. Some states went ahead and legally transformed the right to vote into a civic obligation (Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia, but also Australia and Belgium and Switzerland, and until recently, Austria).

The scope of duties in the context of this reciprocity has also broadened, at least in theory, by not only "emphasizing social duties as against rights [but] extending social duties into previously relatively uncolonised non-state "civil society" spheres, particularly the family ... but also society's ecosphere ... and into society's historicity (intergenerationality, heritage etc.)" (Roche 1992: 5). By introducing the postnational concept of citizenship, Soysal pointed at another evolution of the binarity of rights and duties: "What were previously defined as national rights become entitlements legitimised on the basis of personhood. Postnational citizenship confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in the authority structure and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community" (Soysal 1994: 3).<sup>4</sup> According to transnational concept of citizenship (Bauböck 2003), rights

3 The tension between the highlands and the lowlands indigenous communities also appears to involve a pre-supposed and cultivated cultural hierarchy. "National education authorities have done nothing to include information about [the Earth Movers, highly developed and architecturally skilled Moxos people from the Amazonian lowlands] in history books or education curricula; therefore few Bolivians and even fewer foreigners are aware that Eastern Bolivia rivalled Western Bolivia in cultural development" (Ethnoarcheological Museum).

4 The European Union has made possible a postnational citizenship that is not only a practice, but also a status (see Eder in Giesen 2001).

and duties of this individual are distributed between two or more states, reaching beyond territoriality of conventional national citizenship and creating hereby new meanings of "belonging".

Some interpretative concepts of citizenship no longer even consider the rights-and-duties principle but altogether exclude the contractual relation as anachronistic precisely in the context of radically expanded meanings of belonging. If the entire living world comes to be considered as a polity where all living beings are interconnected and interdependent, the individual citizen can no longer be extracted as a separate entity standing in opposition to another entity with which a contract can be agreed upon. Introduced by Dobson (1998) as "ecological" citizenship, such a conception undermines the reciprocity of civic rights and duties, since

the source of the ecological citizen's obligations does not lie in reciprocity or mutual advantage, but in a non-reciprocal sense of justice, or of compassion. The obligations that the ecological citizen has to future generations and to other species [...] cannot be based on reciprocity, by definition. Ecological citizens can expect nothing in return from future generations and other species for discharging their obligations towards them. ... The workfare view [of citizenship] is founded on the link between rights and obligations: the right to social security entails the duty to work or to look for work. Ecological citizenship involves a different type of obligation: one owed to strangers who may be distant in time as well as space (Dobson 1998: 6).

However, the breakup or absence of contractual relationship in ecological citizenship does not appear complete. Indeed, ecological citizens, when sufficiently numerous, could not expect reciprocity with future generations, yet they could rely on indirect reciprocity with antecedent generations and with other contemporaries worldwide. Each of them while acting for common good simultaneously acts for their own good. In such a conception of citizenship the contract on rights and duties exists *bona fide*, as an inter-generational agreement on the one hand, and on the other hand, as a global agreement with all "strangers" that are willing to act as responsible citizens, since the impact of such an attitude benefits everyone, even those who are not willing to act that way (at least compared to the situation when no one would be willing to act responsibly). In a way, such a citizen also enters into a contractual bond with herself, since her responsible enactment of civic duties has a global impact that eventually results in a better quality of life of the citizen in question as well as of all those that she cares about and who improve the quality of her life by their very existence. The impact is considerably more delayed and indirect than the impact of the conventional exchange of taxes for rights, but it is conceivable. Moreover, such a conception of citizenship does away with any form of conscious redistribution of resources and welfare (conventionally performed by the state): all individual actions have inevitable redistributive consequences, be they positive or negative, on general quality of life and ultimately the existence of life itself. The impact is relative to the number of citizens willing to take on such a contract with strangers and themselves, yet it suffices for one to embrace such a conception of polity and her position in it to call it into existence.

In his concept of "deep citizenship", Clarke (1995) similarly conceives of a citizen moved by an ethics of care for himself, for others and the world as a whole without being limited to the human world, since people too embedded in the ecosystem to care only about human "others". Subsequently, the responsible and politically sensibilised deep citizen uses all possibilities for political engagement in his community and transcends state borders as a member of a transnational political/ethical polity (Clarke 1995: 116). Clarke's deep citizenship is "participatory, contextual and works to recenter the politics of belonging" (Driver 2008: 280), politics thereby becoming an act of communal participation rather than a function dominated by the state. For Joseph, too, citizens themselves call their citizenship into being through their own involvement (Joseph in Driver 2008: 281). The "deep" citizen is therefore determined to be a citizen and act as one accordingly, not only allowed to be one under such and such conditions (determined by the state).

Clarke also argues for a reduction of the divide between the conventionally civic public sphere and the private sphere and, unlike Roche, for the citizen herself to select the domains of her political involvement: "The fundamental change in the way in which the particular and the universal are related to the public and the private is to admit civic virtues to wide areas of life: most generally wherever one can act towards the universal, therein lies the civic virtues and therein lies the deep citizenship" (Clarke 1996: 118). In line with Dobson's ecological citizen, what makes the deep citizen's action one of civic virtue is "the degree to which, while being possibly private in origin and particular in concern, it nevertheless sets selfishness, sectarianism and sectionalism aside in favour of acting into the universal ... While the actor is individual, the place and focus of the activity is less concerned with the individual than with the shared dimension of the activity" (Clarke 1996: 117).

As with the civic rights and duties "package" discussed earlier, we are not on completely new grounds here either. When Clarke identifies an entirely private behaviour as a "deep" civic attitude, he recalls the classic feminist position on privacy. Feminist theory equates personal with political since every private act is a sort of a fractal of the totality of the gender-determined world and its power relations. The private sphere then cannot be less important than the public one; on the contrary, the private ground can be a crucial ground to implement civic practices. In the context of "ecological" citizenship, this is no longer mere theory, as Kymlicka and Norman point out: "Consider the many ways that public policy relies on responsible personal lifestyle decisions; the state cannot protect the environment, if the citizens are unwilling to reduce, reuse, and recycle in their own homes" (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 360).<sup>5</sup>

Although some authors continue to see the differentiation between public and private as a tension and even an agenda for citizenship conceptualists (Dean 2001: 22), with "ecological" and "deep" citizenship it could also be perceived as a reversed logic: *Only* by consistently acting privately does one join in a political action with universal public impact. By accurately interpreting the global context, one can resign oneself to "modest" local action, knowing that the world will improve as a result, even if infinitesimally. The result ceases to be infinitesimal when the necessary critical mass of individuals is willing to interpret their behaviour through this perspective, and there may lie the actual tension between the private/local and public/global, i.e. in how to mobilize a sufficient multitude of individuals so that their internalized private behaviour and local action may produce lasting universal impact beyond successful "civic campaigns" here and there.<sup>6</sup> This tension includes an additional dilemma, whether by her always limited personal and local impact on the global context an individual citizen can optimize that impact when persisting in minority attitudes (such as vegetarianism), which put her in a position of exclusion and "social martyrdom" in closed and intolerant societies prone to the cultural defence reflexes, or perhaps new civic practices would render more and faster global impact if individuals were concentrated territorially into a dense multitude whose voice would thus be better heard. There are societies that clearly distinguish themselves by their collective attitude toward the environment and the living world, such as the Netherlands, Austria, Costa Rica and for that matter, Bolivia. These societies then impact whole other societies via international organisations and agreements. Migrations of "ecological" citizens to societies where such conceptions of citizenship have already become internalized collective practices would then appear almost a civic duty, while also facilitating the individual destinies of those struggling to act like "ecological" citizens in societies where mindless anthropocentrism is predominant.

5 The interdependency of public policies and civic practices is but one way of solving environmental issues. State administrations should focus on large corporate and industrial polluters instead, since citizens are a minor actor in global pollution trends that will not be reversed by putting the blame on individuals alone.

6 Such as "Clean Up Slovenia!" that mobilized an unexpected number of citizens in 2011, following the Estonian example. "Clean Up the World!" is to follow in 2012.

Dean and Hartley (2001) cite Falk's suggestion (1994) that

the 'ecological imperative' is just one of several grounds upon which it is possible to conceive or advocate forms of global citizenship. The other grounds relate to longstanding aspirational demands for global peace and justice; the consequences of economic globalization; and emergent modes of transnational political mobilization arising both from regional movements and new social movements. These grounds are intimately interconnected, yet at least as pressing as any of them is the argument that "for the sake of human survival ... some forms of effective global citizenship are required to redesign political choices on the basis of an ecological sense of natural viabilities and thereby to transform the established forms of political behaviour (Falk 1994: 32 in Dean and Hartley 2011: 4).

Because of this sense of irrefutable urgency, "the normative nature of ecological citizenship is in tension with liberal democratic governments' ostensible commitment to neutrality as far as 'good life' is concerned, and in this wider sense the increasingly popular notion of 'environmental education' stands in a tense relationship with the liberal project" (Dobson 1998: 3).

Some form of tyranny of ecology is also feared by Ferry (1998) when he discusses the converse correlation between the love for nature and hatred of people, and cites the example of the ecologically progressive legislation of Nazi Germany. Ferry believes freedom to be threatened in some future "ecological new order" because ecologism does not bow to the overall postmodern questioning and relativizing tendency. This tendency has had many a positive impact on dogmatism; however, it ended up questioning even the unquestionable for the stability of the individual psyche and the society as a whole: if *nothing* can be identified as right or wrong any longer, how are we to determine our values and subsequently, the course of our actions?<sup>7</sup>

By arguing for only one urgent ethical choice, "deep" or "ecological" citizenship can represent a source of security, far from limiting the citizen's freedom to choose in what ways she is going to demonstrate her belonging to the polity of the living world. After all, citizenship as practice can only be defined in a particular context, dependent upon the power structures at play; its definition is constantly reinterpreted and reshaped as it is expressed by the members of the polity. In Joseph's words, "citizen and its vehicle citizenship are unstable sites that mutually interact to forge local, often changing (even transitory) notions of who the citizen is and the kinds of citizenship possible at a given historical-political moment" (Joseph in Driver 2008: 281).

There is, contrary to Ferry's thesis, freedom in the way "new" citizenship concepts and practices break with the identification processes that require "others" to differentiate "us"; since in belonging to the ecosystem, the very possibility of the "other" is gone. Also, the "ecological" or "deep" citizen becomes omniterritorial and completely connected in the borderless ecosystem. Her mobility is theoretically absolute, even between life and death, yet she is home wherever she is, safely home within one living world.

## CONCLUSION: "CONCERNED" MIGRATIONS

The 2011 Bolivian protest march lasted from mid-August until October 21 and ended with a prolonged stay of the marchers in the capital before they returned to their homes. According to both defi-

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7 One cannot be obliged to active, responsible and ethical citizenship, and obligation itself may be perceived as a (self-induced) constraint, while compassion often masks a down-looking sense of superiority – we help the helpless other because we are strong and therefore better. The ecological citizen's *concern* however is rooted in her inescapable connectedness with all life – as she is inextricable part of this life, the concern for everything alive here and tomorrow is as much a concern for herself. The responsibility for everything comes from the realisation that one is part of everything and whatever she does to everything affects everything else.

nitions of migrations stated in the introduction, this was an internal migration. The UNESCO definition does exclude movement *"which does not lead to any change in ties of social membership and therefore remains largely inconsequential both for the individual and for the society at the points of origin and destination"*; however, the protesters could hardly be identified as tourists, and their march had an impact on the individuals involved as well as the society as a whole; although their social membership was not immediately altered, the long-term consequences of the principal cause of the march were to do just that, at least for those the protesters were marching for.

The indigenous conception of citizenship as manifested in their political mobilisation and civic practices corresponds quite precisely to the definitions of "new" civic practices described in the context of "new" concepts of postnational, transnational, active, internalized, rights-and-duties transcending citizenship in which private and public, personal and universal merge into an active expression of concern for the polity of boundaries so broad that the very concept of boundary is made redundant: the living world. I am putting the "newness" of these conceptions in quotes as similarly grounded civic practices are evidently hardly new in parts of the world that tend to be considered (politically) less developed by the West. Indigenous civic mobilization in Bolivia has actually been motivated by the failure of ideologies and political concepts exported from the "developed" world and the inability of governments to navigate a viable consensus between local tradition and globalization pressure. As Yashar says, "Latin America's indigenous movements reflect the weak process of democratization and state building in the countryside and the deleterious effects that the current transition has had on indigenous communities." (Yashar 1998: 39)

The Bolivian protest marches are also quite an illustrative example of the hybrid results of globalization. Civic mobilization for political rights has a considerable tradition; the 20<sup>th</sup> century brought about a world-altering progress in this area. Moreover, indigenous Bolivians mobilized themselves so impressively not to claim their minority rights in some exotic voice dissociated from reality, but to protect the already formally adopted constitutional rights of universal "Mother Earth", which could not speak for itself. What has also been "new" or less familiar from a West-centred perspective in indigenous mobilization in Bolivia was the use of migration as a form of political protest, which in itself required a very active and personalised civic attitude. The protesters after all subordinated several months of their existence to their political action. The effort and powerful symbolism involved in the migration gained them global attention and an eventual compromise with the authorities. Constitutions are designed to protect the rights of those who can claim their rights; perhaps states like Bolivia or Ecuador that seek to reconcile Western political instruments with non-Western collective worldviews may need to formalize new political practices to accommodate the latter. Clearly,

rather than delineate a single relationship between the state and its citizens, indigenous organizations demand multiple types of citizenship with boundaries that guarantee equal rights and representation at the national level and recognize corporate indigenous authority structures in the indigenous territory. They challenge policymakers and states to recognize both individual and communal rights in an ideologically meaningful, practically feasible, enduring way (Yashar 1998: 39).

The political mobilization of Bolivian lowlanders had an entirely local context, yet the global reaction was substantial. Notwithstanding the media coverage, similar protest migrations were organized elsewhere. On 26 September 2011 eleven Buddhist monks ended a three-week protest march, while on hunger strike, from Pune to Dharamsala in India (a distance of 1912 km) in order to draw attention to the oppression of Tibet by Chinese authorities. The "Occupy Wall Street" movement organized a 531-km "Occupy the Highway" march from New York to Washington in November 2011; about 20 protesters reached Washington after two weeks. In March 2012, protesters in Ecuador began a cross-country march against President Rafael Correa's policies on mining in the Amazon.

As Vodovnik concludes (2011), "the new citizenship does not equal a legal status, but rather a performative status constituted beyond nation-state, sometimes in opposition to it, but always transcend-

ing parochial forms of polity that don't allow for global connection" (Vodovnik 2011: 17). Instead of forcefully (and so far unsuccessfully) searching for solutions to the current ails of Western democracy, we should first without cultural prejudice consider already existing political inventions.

Besides protest migration as an instrument in political struggle, "ecological" and "deep" concepts of citizenship allow us to at least speculate on other motives and agendas that migrations might have for a concerned, active and mobile citizen. Although not yet registered and systematically observed, such "concerned" migrations are certainly conceivable and possible. Over 200,000 humanitarian workers abroad worldwide represent typical "concerned" migrants (ALNAP 2010: 18). Were a migration decided upon for conventional economic, political, personal and other reasons, such a citizen would still conduct it in accordance with her civic ethics, and in the course of migration her internalized concern for herself, others and the living world could not be suspended, but expressed in environmentally responsible means of travel, sustainable transport, concern for co-travellers etc. In addition to internal migration out of political protest, an internal "concerned" migration might be to a rural environment to escape urban pollution or inversely, to an urban environment to pool resources. More importantly, the "ecological" citizen would also remain consistent in the selection of her destination, no longer considering primarily economic opportunities or the hospitality of the relevant emigrant community in the host country, but rather its tolerance for concerned ways of life. If faster and greater global impact on current predominant conceptions of polity and citizenship is indeed to be expected from a geographical concentration of ecological citizens, ecological international migrations to this end may take place in the future. Rather reversing the conventional migration flows, an international ecological migration might target a country where climate conditions allow for rationalisation of energy consumption and where anthropocentric consumerism does not prevail, although life may be less comfortable than in technologically more developed societies.

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## POVZETEK

### DRŽAVLJANSTVO IN MIGRACIJE: »NOVI« KONCEPTI IN PRAKSE

Cirila TOPLAK

Članek obravnava dva koncepta, ki ju je teorija začela povezovati šele pred relativno kratkim časom, ko se je uveljavila »bolj inkluzivna koncepcija državljanstva« (Bauböck 2006: 9). Fokus razmisleka ni na migrantu kot posamezniku s statusom, ki mu ga podeli država, ampak na migracijah kot praksi znotraj post-postmodernih interpretativnih koncepcij državljanstva.

Zaradi razlik med migracijskimi politikami držav ni konsenza o definiciji migranta oziroma migracij. Po Mednarodni organizaciji za migracije so migracije »gibanje posameznika ali skupine ljudi čez državno mejo ali znotraj države, [...] ne glede na trajanje migracije, sestavo migrantov in razloge za migracije; vključuje migracije beguncev, razseljenih oseb, ekonomskih migrantov in ljudi, ki se selijo iz drugih razlogov, vključno s ponovnim združevanjem družin.« Ta definicija je prav tako inkluzivna, saj migracij časovno ne zamejuje za abstraktno »minimalno« obdobje in priznava vse razloge za gibanje ljudi čez takšne ali drugačne meje. Zato pušča odprta vrata tudi za nove oblike migracij, ki so v članku obravnavane po predstavitvi primera.

15. avgusta 2011 je okrog 1.000 članov staroselskih skupnosti, živečih na območju nacionalnega parka Isiboro-Secure v bolivijski Amazoniji, začelo večmesečni pohod do 605 km oddaljene bolivijske prestolnice La Paz. Pohod je bil izraz protesta staroselcev proti gradnji avtoceste, ki se je že začela z brazilskim financiranjem in ki naj bi povzročila katastrofalen poseg v deževni gozd, primarni življenjski prostor staroselcev. Podali so se na *pešpot* za protest proti *avtocesti*, ne zase, ampak za svoje otroke in prihodnje rodove, ki jim želijo ohraniti vsaj takšne možnosti za preživetje in ohranjanje njihove kulture, kot jo imajo sami. Na pot jih je pognala skrb za druge vrste, za deževni pragozd in njegove prebivalce, neločljive od njih samih in od ljudi nasploh. Bolivijski predsednik Evo Morales je najprej poskusil zadržati mirni protest s krvavim policijskim nasiljem, ki je proti njemu obrnilo bolivijsko in globalno javno mnenje. Morales je navsezadnje prvi predsednik Bolivije, ki sam izhaja iz skupnosti staroselcev in se od leta 2005 na oblasti ohranja predvsem z njihovo podporo. Po odstopu dveh njegovih ministrov je Morales z zakonom ustavil gradnjo sporne avtoceste. Konfederacija 34 skupnosti bolivijskih staroselcev (CIDOB) je od leta 1990 organizirala deset podobnih protestnih migracij za prepoznanje in spoštovanje lokalnih skupnosti staroselcev ter njihovo participacijo v procesih odločanja.

Protestne interne migracije so v 20. stoletju del politične mobilizacije bolivijskih staroselcev na ozadju zgodovine boja za politično in etnično emancipacijo. Ta boj so narekovali predvsem delavski in kmečki sindikati, ki so boj za socialne pravice navezovali na (post)kolonialno zatiranje staroselskih skupnosti. S podporo večinskega staroselskega prebivalstva Bolivije so v etabrirano politično sfero bele oligarhije navsezadnje prodrli s političnim gibanjem MAS, katerega voditelj Evo Morales je pred sedmimi leti prevzel oblast v Boliviji. Moralesovo predsedovanje je potekalo v znamenju skoraj nemogočega konsenza med nasprotovanjem neoliberalnim ekonomskim pritiskom, socializmom, populizmom in preobrazbo bolivijske nacije z ideologijo t. i. »staroselskega nacionalizma«. Politična trenja zaostrujejo tudi napetosti med andskimi in amazonskimi staroselskimi skupnostmi. Pa vendar je bila Bolivija prva država na svetu, ki je v leta 2009 sprejeto ustavo zapisala zaščito pravic »Matere Zemlje« in s tem kot družba prepoznala svojo vitalno odvisnost od naravnega okolja. Bolivijski staroselci se torej konstituirajo ne le kot zagovorniki zaščite narave, ampak branijo njene ustavne pravice v njenem imenu. Njihove

državlanske prakse se precej natanko umeščajo v post-postmoderno koncepcijo državljanstva, kot so jo zasnovali zahodni teoretiki državljanstva od devetdesetih let 20. stoletja.

Sodobni interpretativni diskurzi o državljanstvu prevprašujejo teritorialnost državljanstva (post-nacionalnost po Soysalu, 1995; transnacionalnost po Bauböcku, 2003) in ločnici med javno in zasebno ter aktivno in pasivno državljansko držo. Konvencionalno pogodbo o pravicah in dolžnostih med državljanom in državo še posebej izzivata koncepta »ekološkega« (Dobson 1998) in »globokega« (Clarke 1995) državljanstva. Pri teh konceptih je državljanska skupnost ves živi svet, kjer je vse prepleteno med seboj, posameznika državljana pa ni mogoče izdvojiti kot ločeno entiteto, ki stoji nasproti druge in med katerima je mogoče skleniti pogodbo; prav tako znotraj tega enega sveta ni več fiksnih meja in statusov kot tudi ne identifikacije preko razlikovanja »nas« od »drugih«, kajti v pripadnosti ekosistemu možnosti »drugega« ni več. Tako koncipiran državljan je omniteritorialen in svoje državljanstvo živi kot ponotranjeno prakso, zato ni več ločnice med njegovo javno in zasebno državljansko držo. V pogodben odnos sicer vstopa, a ne z državo, pač pa z drugimi državljani in s samim seboj, saj se mu etično ozaveščena skrb za druge, čeprav neznane in še nerrojene, in za svet kot celoto vrača v obliki boljše kakovosti njegovega življenja, čeprav le sčasoma in z zamikom. Vendar pa »ekološko« ali »globoko« državljanstvo kljub urgenci globalnega obvladovanja groženj našemu življenjskemu okolju in s tem nam samim, ne vsebuje nekakšne etične tiranije. Državljanstvo se zmeraj kontekstualizira in reinterpretira v odvisnosti od vpletenih struktur moči, zato je od vsakega posameznika odvisno, na kakšne načine bo uveljavljal in uresničeval svoje državljanske pravice in dolžnosti in ga k temu ni mogoče prisiliti.

Čeprav etična normativna komponenta »ekološkega« državljanstva nasprotuje zavezi liberalnih vlad k nevtralni definiciji dobrega življenja, je tiranija ekologije zamisljiva samo znotraj postmodernega hiperrelativizma. Ta je sicer prinesel osvobajanje od številnih dogem in veliko dragocenih novih interpretacij, a tudi vrednostni vakuum, v katerem je res mogoče in tolerirano vse, tudi najslabše. Če ničesar ni več mogoče dovolj prepričljivo definirati kot slabo ali dobro, kako lahko posameznik še sprejema konsistentne odločitve?

Tako zamišljeno in živeto državljanstvo lahko sproži in zajame dodatne migracijske motive in agende. Dvesto tisoč humanitarnih delavcev po svetu bi že lahko uvrstili med »etične« migrante. Če bi bila migracija nuja iz konvencionalnih razlogov, skrb ozaveščenega aktivnega državljana zase, za druge in za svet med migracijo ne bi bila odložena. Tovrstna interna migracija bi lahko bila selitev v ruralno okolje za boljšo povezanost z živim ali pa selitev v urbano okolje za bolj skupnostno izrabo virov. Pri mednarodni migraciji bi »ekološki« državljan ostal zvest samemu sebi v izboru države gostiteljice, pri katerem ne bi več prevladovala kriterij obstoja gostoljubne priseljenjske skupnosti in obseg ekonomskih priložnosti, ampak toleranca družbe gostiteljice do opisanih državljanskih praks. Če drži predpostavka, da je mogoče učinkoviteje spreminjati svet s koncentriranjem somišljenikov in z njihovim posledičnim globalnim vplivom, bomo morda v prihodnosti priča »ozaveščenim« migracijam, ko se bodo »ekološki« državljani selili v okolja, kjer bodo lažje uresničevali svojo skrb za vse živo in navsezadnje zase. Mednarodna »ozaveščena« migracija proti konvencionalnim migracijskim tokovom bi lahko bila v državo, kjer podnebne razmere omogočajo energetsko varčnejše življenje ali tja, kjer je manjši pritisk antropocentričnega potrošništva, pa čeprav je življenje manj udobno kot v tehnološko razvitejšem okolju.

# GLOBALISING CITIZENSHIP: THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL MIGRATIONS ON CONCEPT FORMATION

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## ABSTRACT

### **Globalising Citizenship: The Impact of Global Migrations on Concept Formation**

Answers to the question of what it means to be a citizen are as old as political theory itself. These answers have changed throughout history because citizenship is an open and unstable concept, which is provided its contents and meanings based on diverse political relations and contexts, in interaction with which it is formed and changed. For centuries the concept of citizenship has been associated with the nation-state and nationality. Today, this modern notion of citizenship has been challenged by globalisation and global migrations. Contemporary global transformations give rise to a new form of citizenship that is not constituted exclusively around the ideas of territoriality and belonging. The main thesis of this article is that a theory of citizenship for a multicultural and global society must be based on the separation between citizenship and nationality. Global citizenship should be understood as an inclusive political community without any claim to common identity and belonging. We identify some major theoretical implications of global migration through which we can understand the need for contemporary conceptual changes that marks a rupture with the ways in which we have previously considered citizenship. By exploring the intersections of citizenship, community, and migration, we aim to deconstruct the contradictions of national citizenship and their simplistic transference to the global level in order to find ways of achieving new concept of imagining and practising political citizenship without belonging.

KEYWORDS: citizenship, globalisation, global migrations, political concepts, political community

## IZVLEČEK

### **Globalizacija državljanstva: Vpliv globalnih migracij na formacijo koncepta**

Odgovori na vprašanje, kaj pomeni biti državljan, so stari toliko kot sama politična teorija. Ti odgovori so se spreminjali skozi zgodovino, kajti državljanstvo je odprt in nestabilen koncept, ki svojo vsebino in pomene dobiva na podlagi različnih političnih odnosov in kontekstov, v interakciji s katerimi nastaja in se spreminja. Koncept državljanstva je bil stoletja povezan z nacionalno državo in nacionalnostjo. Tovrstno moderno predstavo državljanstva danes spreminjajo globalizacija in globalne migracije. Sodobne globalne spremembe ustvarjajo novo obliko državljanstva, ki se ne konstituira izključno preko idej teritorialnosti in pripadnosti. Temeljna teza članka je, da teorija državljanstva za multikulturno

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in globalno družbo mora temeljiti na ločitvi med državljanstvom in nacionalnostjo. Globalno državljanstvo je treba razumeti kot inkluzivno politično skupnost brez sklicevanj na skupno identiteto in pripadnost. V članku identificiramo nekaj temeljnih teoretskih implikacij globalnih migracij, s katerimi razlagamo potrebo po sodobnih konceptualnih spremembah, ki pomenijo prelom z načini, na katere smo do sedaj premišljali državljanstvo. Z raziskovanjem povezave med državljanstvom, skupnostjo in migracijami dekonstruiramo kontradikcije nacionalnega državljanstva in njegove preproste preslikave na globalno raven, da bi našli načine, s katerimi je mogoče misliti in izvajati politično državljanstvo brez pripadnosti.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: državljanstvo, globalizacija, globalne migracije, politični koncepti, politična skupnost

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Citizenship is one of the most significant concepts in political science through which the fundamental categories of life in the political community are defined and practiced. This means that citizenship affects the other concepts and the political reality in a given political context (cf. Bartelson 1995). Political concepts are always in relationship with other concepts and the broader social, economic, and political context, in interaction with which they are created and changed (cf. Skinner 1969; Koselleck 1999; Foucault 2001; Lukšič and Pikalo 2007). Because citizenship is a dynamic, relational, rhizomatic, and open concept, in this article the possibilities of a post-modern concept of citizenship arising from the current globalisation processes are discussed. Such an interpretative methodological approach shows that citizenship cannot always have the same conceptual content because it changes according to the different usages depending on the different discursive and material conditions of the formation and circulation of discourse (Skinner 1969, Koselleck 1999; Foucault 2001; Bevir 2002). Thus, the concept of citizenship is always a set of political relations in a given context.

The history of the concept of citizenship is as old as politics itself, although its content is constantly changing. So the modern conception of citizenship, which is linked exclusively to the modern state and political participation in common or public affairs (Balibar 1988: 723), while still prevalent, is only one form of citizenship. Contemporary changes in the political context, which is becoming increasingly global, have a significant impact on the transformations of the concept of citizenship and on the way in which we perceive it. In recent decades several countries have revised their laws and practices concerning the rights and obligations of citizens; others have changed their rules for access to citizenship for immigrants, their children, and other minorities (Castles and Davidson 2000: 2). There have always been some fundamental ambiguities in the concept of citizenship, but this did not seem to matter much as long as the political context of the nation-state appeared stable (Castles and Davidson 2000: 2). Today, the global context reveals these contradictions and opens the theoretical field for reflections on new forms of citizenship that correspond to the world in which we already live. Thus, globalisation has become the contemporary context for the theory and practice of citizenship.

Since every concept is a composite whole (Deleuze and Guattari 1999), in this article we present a several elements arising from the processes of globalisation and changing the modern theoretical foundation of thinking about citizenship. Paying particular attention to the formation of global or transnational citizenship, we show that the very practices of current global migrations generate qualitative conceptual changes of citizenship because they bring new definitions of political belonging, political community and the relationship between people, territory and state.

## 2 THE PROCESS OF FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

In recent years, the concept of citizenship has become the focus of political discourse and political science considerations mainly because of its relationship to the closed conceptual scheme of the nation-state. Since political concepts are products of the specific time, space, and language which express the dominant political relations, it would not only be unusual but also inappropriate to understand citizenship today in the same way as we did in the 18th and 19th centuries. The problem lies in the fact that the concepts do not merely describe the world, but also actively co-create it (cf. Skinner 1969; Koselleck 1999; Bartelson 1995; Bevir 2002). This social cycle or double hermeneutic shows that once concepts are formed, they filter back into the everyday world and change the way people think (Giddens 1987: 20). Therefore, it is important that we understand concepts over their historical span (cf. Balibar 1978; Braudel 1980). Moreover, if political concepts are seen as a multilayered semantic sediment from an accumulation of discourses, then a genealogical approach (cf. Foucault 1977) also comes to appear to be a crucial step (Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 11) on our way to understanding the concepts of citizenship. Only then can we make assumptions about current uses and conceptual changes, because concepts, meanings and changes are not generated according to any internal, independent dynamic of their own but through the accumulation of discursive practices.

Discourse is not only a logically-structured semantic system but it is primarily a social practice that produces a discursive whole in the form of concepts, terminology and coherent sets of meanings, which are institutionalised in a particular context (cf. Foucault 1977; 2001). So, discourses and concepts do not have a 'true', original, or single meaning. They obtain their meanings by being used, that is by the circulation of discourse. Thus, "one cannot speak of anything at any time" (Foucault 2001: 49). This means that today the formation of the concept of global citizenship is generated by the new discourse, i.e. a set of theoretical articulations, practices and institutions which define a new way of speaking about citizenship. This kind of discursive and conceptual shift is related to the transition from the national to the global perspective. In contemporary literature several different terms are used to indicate this shift, e.g. global, transnational (cf. Balibar 2004b), postnational (cf. Sassen 2002), multinational (cf. Harty and Murphy 2005), multicultural (cf. Kymlicka 2010), transpolitical (cf. Stoker et al. 2011) and cosmopolitan (cf. Osler and Starkey 2005) citizenship. This also implies that the new discourse, which found its conditions of existence in the current processes of globalisation, is semantically and conceptually heterogeneous.

The formation of concepts, their uses and meanings, is always the result of the political struggle for the future social articulation or *Gliederung* (Foucault 1977; Koselleck 1999; Bahtin 2005). Because the concepts are not merely derived from political reality but also respond to a constantly changing political context and political relations, the dominant way of thinking about citizenship depends on the dominant political power relations. Therefore, citizenship has been a focal point of political struggles and ideological conflicts throughout the history of political thought. This also means that today the persistence of the modern or national concept of citizenship is no less a political gesture than the demand for its global redefinition.

When we refer to such a globalisation of citizenship, we speak about the conceptual change rather than the global extension of national citizenship. It is becoming evident today that citizenship has multiple conceptualisations, and only some of them are linked to the nation-state. So, the conceptual separation of citizenship from nationality, i.e. the denationalisation of citizenship, allows citizenship to escape from the territorial trap in which the national concept of citizenship was caught.<sup>1</sup> The current

<sup>1</sup> The genealogy of the modern or national concept of citizenship developed in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries was linked to the formation of the modern nation-state and the ideology of nationalism. Citizenship was thus defined as a mutual legal relationship between the individual and state. This kind of nationalization of citizenship

need for the transformation of the modern concept of citizenship is not based solely on the new global political constitution, which makes it impossible to concentrate political power in one place. It is also related to the processes of immanent transformations of the modern state, national belonging and identity (Castles and Davidson 2000; Sassen 2002; Balibar 2004b). One of the elements that contribute significantly to these transformations are global migrations, which make current political communities increasingly multicultural and less exclusivist in the sense of national belonging and identity.

With regard to the process of formation of the political concepts, we can say that there are constantly in motion. This movement of concepts is generated by their relationship with the various theoretical and non-theoretical elements from which they are composed (Deleuze and Guattari 1999; Patton 2000, Foucault 2001). That is, the concepts are open multiplicities composed of various singularities, i.e. the elements and the relations between them. Each concept is the sum of these elements, their point of coincidence, condensation and accumulation. There is no concept with only one element, although the removal or adding of one component may change the concept (Deleuze and Guattari 1999: 25–7; Patton 2000: 12). The way in which these various elements are related to one other depends on the political choices that generate different concepts of citizenship.

One such element, which provided the contents of the modern concept of citizenship, was the specific modern relationship between the people, territory and state. This relationship was essential for the equation of citizenship and nationality (Balibar 2004b). Even today, its longevity is semantically expressed and institutionalised in the Slovenian language. Furthermore, its continuity is ensured primarily by the juridical understanding of citizenship as a legal relationship between the individual and the state.<sup>2</sup> However, the current practices of multiculturalism and global migration flows indicate that such an understanding of citizenship is conservative and reactive because it does not take into account the dynamic of the concept of citizenship discussed above. Therefore, if we look at citizenship using post-modern conceptual methodology, we can understand it as a process which is co-created by these practices. From this perspective, it is also important that the legal understanding of citizenship opens itself to a view that considers the theoretical structure, process of formation, and contemporary elements which constitute the concepts and their meanings.

### 3 TOWARDS A GLOBALISED AND DENATIONALISED CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP

Because the concept of citizenship is open to change, we argue that current globalisation processes have challenged the concept of modern citizenship, and introduced a new theoretical basis to discuss the possibilities of an alternative concept of citizenship, which is not rooted in the territorial closure of the modern state. In the last three decades, a weakening of the ties between citizenship and state has become evident. Globalisation as a set of multiple processes resulting in increasing political, economic,

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made citizenship synonymous with nationality. Pursuant to this particular historical feature of the concept of national citizenship, the term citizenship still refers to the membership in the nation-state or the national political community, despite the fact that such a conception of citizenship is no longer adequate to understanding the dynamics of membership and belonging in a globalised world (Sassen 2002; Balibar 2004b).

2 In contemporary societies, the legal understanding of citizenship is dominant. It is characterized by a strictly technical recognition of the legal status of individuals, who are recognized as citizens and members of the political community only because of this specific status. Since this status is the basis for the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the state has the duty to create the laws to determine who are citizens and non-citizens (Sassen 2002; Smith 2002; Hoffman 2004; Kymlicka 2010). This kind of juridical logic is both inclusive and exclusive (Wallerstein 2003) because it represents the legal basis for the production of aliens, their political marginalization, detention, and economic exploitation.

and cultural interconnectedness among societies has encouraged the establishment of new global political actors. Additionally, the concept and institutions of the modern state, which remains the principal actor in the globalised world, have been transformed by these processes (cf. Pikalo 2003; Skinner 2010).<sup>3</sup>

However, the practices of alternative notions of political community and membership beyond the nation-state may not necessarily be new, because in some cases they can be found since the beginning of the formation of citizenship as a national institution (Sassen 2002: 277). Currently, these practices are only more evident and prevalent due to the emergence of cross-border or global (real and virtual) networks unwilling to automatically identify with a nation as represented by the state (Sassen 2002: 277). This kind of relaxation of nationally-based and culturally-exclusive membership in the community is also demonstrated by global migration flows. Consequently, modern patterns of political belonging, mobilisation and participation have been significantly changed (Harty and Murphy 2005). Moreover, the processes of globalisation and transnationalisation of politics, including the European Union, have expanded political participation at the supranational level. This in turn means that the national concept of citizenship is no longer consistent with the contemporary political reality to which political science must turn when designing its concepts (cf. Hegel 1821/1989). That is, the elements that constitute the concept of citizenship in a multicultural and global world transcend state borders since the nation-state is no longer the only 'architect' of the concepts of citizenship.

The political consequence of such a thesis is that national citizenship is in double crisis because it cannot adequately respond to the current challenges of citizenship on both the national and transnational level. More than one component that was constitutive for the national concept of citizenship has changed. One of them is the territoriality principle, the nexus between political power and place that was broken by globalisation (Castles and Davidson 2000: 6). In national citizenship, the nation-state was conceptualised as the spatial ground of citizenship. And citizenship was defined as the privileged collection of rights and duties which are tied to membership in a national community. The genealogy of the idea of the territorial limited political community reveals its roots at the very beginning of modern politics and modern political thought, when especially the natural law and social contract theorists (cf. Hobbes 1641/1998; Locke 1690/2010; Rousseau 1762/2001) sought to explain the political constitution of the state and citizens (the people). On this theoretical basis, citizenship has become tied to the nation-state and in fact, a product of the nation-state. As a consequence, the nation is not only an imagined community, as Anderson (1989) says; it has become the only way to imagine political communities (Negri and Hardt 2003: 96).

If the connection between citizenship and nation-state results from the specific modern political gesture, then it cannot be generalized to every concept of citizenship. This applies particularly to con-

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<sup>3</sup> The genealogy of the state shows that there has never been any agreed concept to which the word state has referred (Skinner 2010, 26). Specifically, the concept of state is not always the same, but changes compositionally according to the different elements which give it its content and form. The state is not a fixed entity, but a multiplicity of institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calculations, and tactics that constitute and stabilize it (Foucault 2007: 108). So "the state is far from being a kind of natural-historical given which develops through its own dynamism like a 'cold monster' /.../. The state is not a cold monster; it is the correlative of a particular way of governing" (Foucault 2008: 6). This methodological decentring and decomposition of the state into processes helps us to see that the state is practice, which is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually became an ever-changing formation or effect (Foucault 2007: 277; Saar 2011: 39–40). "The state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual statification (etatation) or statifications /.../. In short, the state has no heart, as we well know; but not just in the sense that it has no feelings, either good or bad, but it has no heart in the sense that it has no interior. The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities" (Foucault 2008: 77). Accordingly, we can claim that theses about the erosion of the nation-state by globalisation processes are sometimes overstated. States still exercise control over their territory and take responsibility for most aspects of their economy, including taxation, foreign policy, repressive and ideological apparatus.

temporary multicultural and globalised societies where people's identities and belongings are multiple and no longer necessarily tied to a single nation (Hoffman 2004; Osler and Starkey 2005). On the other hand, the decline of the exclusive connection between citizenship and nationality can also be interpreted from the viewpoint of the state. In fact, current state transformations lead to the destruction of practices which in the last century represented the main political link between the state and its citizens. We talk about the political mechanisms that institutionalised the Marshall (1950/1992) concept of social citizenship in a strong welfare state and in the idea of democratic correspondence between constituted and constitutive political power. These mechanisms were based on a claim that citizens' privileges, such as rights to employment, health, and education, can be available only to national citizens. The significance of those practices is reduced by the current trend that the welfare state is increasingly inaccessible for citizens and not solely for migrants. This kind of thinning if not decline of Marshall's concept of evolving citizenship towards social rights raises the possibility of a corresponding dilution of loyalty to the state (Sassen 2002: 280). But, in turn, citizens' loyalty may be less important to the state today than it was at a time of modern politics and its need for loyal citizen-soldiers (Sassen 2002: 280).<sup>4</sup>

Although citizenship cannot be equated with identity, the understanding of citizenship as a collective identification with the state often serves as some kind of supplement to the juridical or static conception of citizenship. Within this conception, citizenship is an internally inclusive and externally exclusive status and a key mechanism for the current restrictive immigration policies in a globalised world. It is ironic that global migration, which creates greater cultural diversity in the nation-states, and tends to promote social activity across borders and to challenge exclusive identification of a nation with the legal and political structure of the state, in this juridical logic is therefore restricted, criminalised and presented as the most negative aspect of globalisation (Carter 2001: 100). However, the idea of a citizen who spends most of his life in one country and shared a common national identity is losing ground because there are increasing numbers of *citizens who do not belong* (Castles and Davidson 2000: viii). Accordingly, open, multiple and flexible identities and affiliations undermine the notion of cultural belonging as an essential or even necessary element of political citizenship (Soysal 1994: 165–6; Castles and Davidson 2000: viii). In this way, global migrations redefine the modern patterns of balancing the contradictions of citizenship, namely the contradiction between inclusion and exclusion, between rights and responsibilities, and most importantly, between political belonging as a citizen and cultural belonging as a national (Castles and Davidson 2000: ix). Consequently, the practices of global migrations indicate that the new forms of belonging, which may be a constitutive element of citizenship in a global world, can only be political. In other words, the key question of the formation of global citizenship is a political constitution of a denationalised and globalised political community beyond national borders.

## 4 HOW GLOBAL MIGRATIONS TRANSFORM THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP

As was discussed above, the current practices of global migrations have an important theoretical and practical impact on transformations and redefinition of the elements which are constitutive for the na-

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4 Currently, the state is less and less defined by the distinction between inside and outside, which at the beginning of modern politics was identified by the Machiavellian (1513/1966) thesis that the modern state depends both on good laws (internal order) and a national army (defence and external expansion). Since today the functioning of the state is still dependent on the civic virtue of citizens, which can be cultivated only through their participation in public affairs, military virtue is no longer a condition for external liberty and outward expansion. Therefore, the ideal citizen is no longer the armed citizen, and the ideal warrior is no longer the citizen who identifies himself primarily by his loyalty to the state and its structure of civic values, as was the case in modern politics (cf. Bartelson 1995: 119).

tional concept of citizenship. We shall now analyze how these conceptual changes affect the formation of new or alternative concepts of citizenship. From this perspective, we explain the theoretical implications and political consequences of the form of citizenship that we get when we combine the elements derived from global migration practices. We will focus primarily on three elements: the redefinition of borders, political community and belonging.

#### 4.1 The multiplication of borders

The first and perhaps most important constitutive element of national citizenship is the concept of the border, which has changed significantly in the last few decades through globalisation processes, including migrations. Similarly to other concepts and institutions, borders are not stable, univocal and natural, but multiple in their meanings and functions, and instituted through political practices. It follows from this that they obtain their meanings, functions and also sense through their constant redefining.

Today, borders are no longer a place when one political power ends and the other begins (Balibar 2004a: 411). "The borders of new sociopolitical entities /.../ are no longer entirely situated at the outer limit of territories; they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled" (Balibar 2004b: 1). This kind of movement of borders from the edge to the centre of the political space (Balibar 2004b: 109) does not mean that borders are disappearing. Rather, they are being multiplied in their functions and locations, and become so diffuse that they have transformed whole states into borderlands (Balibar 2004a). In particular, the context of global migrations indicates that these borders are everywhere, even beyond the traditional state borders, at airports, in shops, in detention centres, in streets, and so on. And even more, they show that the new borders, such as the external borders of the European Union, are stretched far beyond the official (e.g. Schengen) borders; they are located in the candidate countries, in northern Africa and everywhere where the European migration and other policies are implemented.

All this also proves that the notions of interiority and exteriority, which form the basis of the modern concepts of border, citizenship and political community, are undergoing a veritable redefinition (Balibar 2004b: 5). We may regard it not as the territorial separation between two national states or political identities but rather as the internal dividing line within the states, within the transnational communities like the European Union, within the multicultural and globalised world. The most obvious political consequence of the transformations we have tried to sketch is that today the modern concept of the border cannot be a constitutive element of current citizenship in both its national and transnational forms. Contemporary borders are porous (Castles and Davidson 2000: 24), so they no longer function as walls but rather as membranes and filtration systems (Balibar 2004b: 111). And, as the practices of global migrations show, they operate as a political mechanism of control, regulation and restriction of the free movement of people. In fact, far from the myth of a borderless world, during the current global processes the world has become more open to flows of capital and commodities but more closed to the circulation of human bodies (Mazzadra and Neilson 2008). In this case, the practices of migrants and asylum-seekers, which is, of course, a global issue, dramatically reveals the outdated juridical conception of citizenship enshrined in the legislation of most states (Osler and Starkey 2005: 24). This juridical choice seems to have a direct political relevance: the focus on the modern territorial borders may in fact reduce the visibility of the production of postmodern borders, their effects, and outcomes.

It is possible to argue that the modern concept of the border as a dividing line *between* the territories of two states was replaced with a complex mechanism of a dispersed and fragmented border network everywhere *within* the territory. In other words, borders are being deterritorialised and reterritorialised through different mechanisms and institutions such as detention centres, migration controls, asylum systems, labour legislation etc. So we cannot say that border policies are simply oriented towards the prevention of migration. Rather, they are the main mechanism of social divisions within

societies, which can only operate effectively in conditions where the borders are not completely closed off. Consequently, the role of borders in shaping labour markets is particularly pronounced because the processes of filtering and differentiation that occur at the borders clearly shape labour forces and establish the particular kinds of labour regimes in and across different global and local places (Mazzadra and Neilson 2008).

The new concept of borders and their functions suggests that a form of citizenship which could have the potential to resolve these postmodern divisions can only be conceptualised as an inclusive political practice that is not created on the basis of modern identification techniques, but on the recognition of political rights to all people who live and work in a particular territory.

## 4.2 From national to global political community

The idea of the nation as a cultural community based on common identity, descent, language and historical experiences was a vital element in defining membership of the political community in the concept of national citizenship (Castles and Davidson 2000: 81). The invention of the nation was the result of the French Revolution and the transfer of sovereignty from the monarch to the people. Earlier, when politics had not yet been understood through the liberal ideology of the separation of social spheres, the citizens were incorporated with the monarch (cf. Lefort 1986; Foucault 2003). In principle, citizenship rights and responsibilities were applied to anyone within the territory, so that cultural belonging was irrelevant (Castles and Davidson 2000: 81).

The formation of modern politics and the nation-state has produced a new relationship between individuals and the state, and a new way of defining who belongs to the state. The nation has thus become the only people in the state, an active and constituent core of the state (Foucault 2003: 222–4). And thanks to this process, the political community and citizenship have become nationalised. In this model, the exclusion and production of the Otherness are always a precondition for the inclusion because the definition of political community as a single and unified national community inevitable led to nationalism as a mode of dealing with the relations to non-citizens (Anderson 1989; Balibar 1994; Castles and Davidson 2000). There is also a need to recognize that the nation or the nation-form is not itself a community but the concept of a structure capable of producing determinate community effects, which is obviously something quite different, and we have every reason to think that no structure has ever stopped transforming itself and differentiating itself from what it was at the moment it began to produce its effects (Balibar 2004b: 20–1). Because very few states are one-national, they have produced various nation-building policies to achieve greater national homogeneity and effective integration and assimilation of national minority groups (Kymlicka 2010: 7). The implementation of these policies has varied between soft approaches of promoting national identity and violent approaches which seek to pressure national minorities into assimilating into the majority's national culture. In both cases, the national identity operates as a mechanism of defining who belongs to the national community and who does not.

Today, globalisation processes such as the possibility of increased mobility of people make myths of homogeneity unsustainable because many people who actually have the formal status of citizenship are excluded from full political participation through unemployment, poverty, sexism, racism, or any other exclusionary factors (Castles and Davidson 2000: 127). The mechanism of exclusion changes according to different criteria of belonging. The decisive question then is how to conceptualise citizenship in circumstances in which the practices of exclusion are no longer linked to external state borders. In other words, contemporary societies are facing new challenges to define forms of political community which would allow greater political involvement and participation of all citizens regardless of their cultural specificities or nationality (Soysal 1994; Hoffman 2004).

The first step towards a post-national citizenship detached from its purely national definition and disengaged from all myths of identity is the conceptual opening of the borders of political citizenship.

To put it another way, the practices of belonging must be based on the development of citizenship and not vice versa (Balibar 2004b). This kind of radical redefinition of political belonging has already been implemented in practice. Migrant workers without formal citizenship status are incorporated into various aspects of the social and institutional order. They participate in the educational system, welfare schemes, and the labour market (Soysal 1994: 2). Similarly, we can argue that the political participation is not limited to the members of the national community. When the people constitute themselves politically through protesting against war or through any other political issue, there are not only the nationals but also migrants and other people who live in the same territory. This results in a fact that multicultural and globalised societies must recognize that the Other is a necessary component of their identity and their political community, and thus an essential element of their future conceptualisations of citizenship (Balibar 2004b: 223). Therefore, we face the necessity of collectively inventing a new image of the people, a new image of the relation between membership in the community and the continued creation of citizenship through collective action and the acquisition of fundamental rights to existence, work, and political participation (Balibar 2004b: 9). To a certain extent, this kind of change within the concept of citizenship, which would involve *all* global peoples, is comparable to the historical changes that led to the political rights for women and black people. Since globalisation and global migration have produced transnational communities (Osler and Starkey 2005: 21), such a change could affect their democratization and the reduction of the democratic deficit which is characteristic of these communities, including the EU (Stoker et al 2011).

### 4.3 Citizenship without belonging

As we have seen, recent migration practices indicate that involvement in a political community does not inevitably require incorporation into the national collectivity (Soysal 1994: 3). On the other hand, we have shown that in transnational political communities the concept of citizenship must be based on a universal mode of membership and political belonging. The globalisation processes and the new global migration patterns have developed concepts of citizenship that are at least as novel as national citizenship was at the beginning of modern politics (Castles and Davidson 2000: 156). Although these concepts have not yet been recognized in legal documents, they exist in practice. The global movement of people has resulted in multicultural and globalised societies where the context for citizenship based on belonging to a single nation is being eroded. It is the rapidity and variety of the migration flows that are forcing the formation of a new layer of citizenship above that of the nation – the citizen who does not belong (Castles and Davidson 2000: 156).

The question we are dealing with is not only that of which community the citizenship should be instituted in but that of knowing what the concept of community means and how we should understand it today (Balibar 2004b: 65). As we have seen, nowadays the opposition between an inside and an outside does not define the civic community. An illustrative example is the migrant “workers who ‘reproduce’ their lives on one side of the border and ‘produce’ on the other side, and thus more precisely are neither insiders nor outsiders, or (for many of us) are insiders officially considered outsiders” (Balibar 2004b: 123). This is why the recognition and institution of citizens’ rights have to be organized beyond the exclusive membership to one community and located on the borders, where so many of our contemporaries actually live (Balibar 2004b: 132). From this point of view, which focuses on participation rather than on status (Isin 2009), the important question is permanent access to rather than simply entitlement to citizenship, because this kind of citizenship ‘in the making’ is only possible as an active and collective civil process rather than a simple legal status (Balibar 2004b: 132).

Therefore, the elements that are revealed from the practices of global migrations show that conceptualisations of citizenship within a post-national context have to consider the dissociation of citizenship from the state and identity (Soysal 1994: 165). There are no significant or even sentimental or pa-

triotic relationships to the community because post-modern citizenship is a political process where the citizens are all people who participate in the political community and who simultaneously also constitute this community (Nyers 2008; Stephens 2010). This kind of citizenship does not consist of the passive enjoyment of formal rights conferred upon the citizens because of their membership in the community but rather in the fact that they themselves produce the conditions of a nonexclusive belonging in a new sense of the word (Balibar 2004b: 162). Seen in this perspective, the inclusion of migrants in political citizenship is not a question about who can exercise the right to vote; it is a question of giving the opportunity to people so that they could make decisions concerning their lives (Osler and Starkey 2005: 5).

Through this new mode of belonging, or better, non-belonging, we can reflect on the effects of the insistence on the national citizenship concept and its transfer to the transnational level without having to consider the new elements discussed above. This kind of an attempt was institutionalized within the European Union with the Maastricht Treaty, which prescribes European citizenship as a simple addition to the national citizenship of the member countries of the union. This nation-based 'transnational' citizenship is precisely why this political choice has already shown its conservative and reactionary nature. That is, the EU has produced the contradictory practice where foreigners have become second-class citizens because they are included in the economy and excluded from citizenship (Balibar 2004b: 171). Therefore, the institution of citizenship has become a key mechanism which allows and even encourages the systemic exploitation, marginalization, and inequality of migrant workers. The argument that post-national citizenship must confer the right and responsibility of political participation to every person regardless of his or her cultural and historical ties to the political community (Soysal 1994: 3) has, therefore, a strong material basis.

## 5 CONCLUSION

As discussed in this article, the multiple processes of globalisation in general and global migrations in particular have eroded the national concept of citizenship and opened up a theoretical field for discussing conceptual transformations of citizenship towards transnational or global forms. It was also emphasized that the most salient conceptual transformation, which enabled the formation of modern or national citizenship, has been the rise of the modern nation-state. In this political context, citizenship was perceived as a mutual relationship or political link between the state and individuals. It becomes apparent that current globalisation processes and especially global migrations have transformed the ethno-cultural composition of societies. Within this multicultural and global context, the political community can no longer be perceived only through the institution of the nation and its ideological outcomes in the forms of identities, belonging, nationalism etc.

The practices of global migrations have revealed that national citizenship functions as a mechanism of closure that sharply demarcates states and distributes people. From this point of view, global migrations throw a new light on the contradictions carried by the national concept of citizenship as a legal status and identity that excludes instead of includes people. We have sought to describe some elements that illustrate the way in which the global migrations have transformed the conception of citizenship. Because the content of citizenship is not stable, it might be assumed that the general trend in contemporary societies today is towards denationalised and globalised citizenship practices, which significantly reverses a two-hundred-year-old citizenship tradition. Unfortunately, the practice of European citizenship, which is undoubtedly the first formal attempt to upgrade national citizenship to the transnational level, could not be described as a transnational or alternative political project. European citizenship does not bring a new qualitative conceptual change. Rather, it is a complementary institution to national citizenship and thus an institution which reproduces the exclusionary tendencies of national citizenship.

As we have seen, the practices of global migrations pluralize and displace the political and ideo-

logical link between citizenship and national belonging. Therefore, what we have made the subject of research, the migrants take as a starting point: political citizenship does not require any ideological affiliation to the political community, since these communities must be constituted politically. In this regard, Rousseau's (1762/2001) theory of the political constitution of people appears to have new relevance today when read according to the contemporary globalised context we live in. And, in addition, as Soysal (1994) concludes, the guestworkers in post-war Europe demonstrate that they are heralds of a new form of post-national membership in the community, based not on particular national belonging but on the discourse of universal human rights. No matter of what form of universality we defend, the political struggle for a redefinition of the concept of citizenship is therefore linked not only to the status or the rights of migrants. This struggle is important because it is a political struggle for the concepts that will define our future common life, and consequently the concepts of political participation and democracy, and the concept of politics itself.

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## POVZETEK

### **GLOBALIZACIJA DRŽAVLJANSTVA: VPLIV GLOBALNIH MIGRACIJ NA FORMACIJO KONCEPTA**

Simona BEZJAK

Članek analizira vpliv sodobnih globalizacijskih procesov in še zlasti globalnih migracij na oblikovanje novih konceptov državljanstva. Pri tem izhaja iz metodoloških pristopov, s katerimi je mogoče na koncept državljanstva gledati kot na skupek političnih odnosov, ki se spreminjajo glede na različne kontekste. S tega vidika je državljanstvo predstavljeno kot dinamičen, relacijski in odprt koncept, ki svojo vsebino in pomene dobiva v interakciji z različnimi elementi, ki ga sestavljajo.

Ker je vsak politični koncept sestavljena celota, se postavlja vprašanje o novih elementih, ki jih prinaša novi globalni in multikulturni kontekst. Sodobni procesi globalizacije, med katere sodijo tudi globalne migracije, so danes spremenili nekaj temeljnih teoretskih izhodišč, ki so bila v zadnjih dveh stoletjih značilna za t. i. moderni ali nacionalni koncept državljanstva. Članek je osredotočen predvsem na tri tovrstne elemente, ki prinašajo novo opredelitev politične pripadnosti, politične skupnosti in odnosa med državo in državljani. Za vse tri elemente je značilno, da so bili konstitutivne sestavine nacionalnega koncepta državljanstva, torej specifičnega koncepta državljanstva, ki je spremljal nastanek in delovanje moderne nacionalne države. Sodobni globalni in multikulturni kontekst tako prinaša konceptualno spremembo državljanstva v smeri njegove denacionalizacije in globalizacije. Pri tem pa jasno razkriva, da so danes nacionalne prakse identifikacije in pripadnosti nevzdržne z vidika, da bi preko njih definirali politično državljanstvo v multikulturnih in globaliziranih družbah.

S tega vidika predvsem globalne migracije postavljajo sodobne družbe pred nov izziv, in sicer da spoznajo, da članstvo v politični skupnosti in torej državljanstvo ni vezano na nacionalnost ljudi, ampak na njihovo participacijo pri političnih, to je skupnih ali javnih zadevah. Državljanstvo Evropske unije, ki je prvi poskus institucionalizacije nadnacionalnega ali transnacionalnega državljanstva, se je s tega vidika že izkazalo za konservativno in celo reaktivno politično izbiro, kajti gre zgolj za eno od oblik nacionalnega državljanstva, ki je raztegnjeno čez nacionalne meje brez vsakršnega upoštevanja konceptualnih sprememb znotraj koncepta državljanstva. Tovrstne politične odločitve ne ohranjajo le modernih izključevalnih praks nacionalnega državljanstva, ampak državljanstvo vzpostavljajo kot institucijo in mehanizem, ki omogoča in spodbuja nove delitve znotraj družbe, kjer je ljudem, ki so vključeni v gospodarstvo in druge družbene procese in aktivnosti, sistemsko onemogočena politična participacija pri zadevah, povezanih z njihovimi življenji. Boj za politično vključenost migrantov in ljudi brez statusa zato ni le boj za njihov status in pravice, ampak je predvsem politični boj za novo opredelitev konceptov, ki bodo definirali naše skupno življenje v sodobnih družbah, in to so koncepti državljanstva, politične participacije, demokracije in tudi sam koncept politike.



# EUROPEAN IDENTITY THROUGH PRACTICES OF ENUMERATION: THE FORMATION OF EU CITIZENSHIP AND EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY

Marinko BANJAC<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

### **European Identity through Practices of Enumeration: The Formation of EU Citizenship and European Migration Policy**

The paper analyzes the function and the role of enumerative practices within European migration policy and practices of managing and regulating borders and (illegal) immigration. By employing enumerative practices, illegal immigrants are constructed and represented as a threat to the European Union and as such empower and legitimize European authorities and contentious mechanisms of controlling and regulating migrations. The paper also shows that enumerative practices are paramount in the process of creating a common European identity because of their role in the formation and articulation of the idea of EU citizenship as a particular value of belonging to the European community.

KEYWORDS: Enumerative practices, EU citizenship, (Im)migration, European migration policy

## IZVLEČEK

### **Evropska identiteta skozi prakse številčenja: Oblikovanje EU-državljanstva in evropske migracijske politike**

Prispevek analizira vlogo in namen praks številčenja v evropskih migracijskih politikah in praksah nadzora ter regulacij meja in (nelegalnih) migracij. S številčenjem so nelegalni migranti konstruirani in predstavljeni kot nevarnost in grožnja Evropski uniji in kot taki omogočajo ter legitimirajo evropske mehanizme nadzora in regulacij migracij. Prispevek pokaže, da so prakse številčenja pomembne v procesih nastajanja skupne evropske identitete, saj imajo pomembno vlogo pri oblikovanju in artikulaciji ideje EU-državljanstva kot specifične vrednote pripadanja evropski skupnosti.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: številčenje, EU-državljanstvo, (i)migracije, evropske migracijske politike

## INTRODUCTION

EU citizenship is one of the most propagated and fostered ideas in the European Union. Since the 1970s<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The initial steps towards the formation of European citizenship were taken at the Copenhagen foreign ministers' meeting in 1973. In the Declaration on European Identity the concept of European citizenship is not explicitly referred to, but it is possible to identify terminology on which subsequent articulations of European citizenship were made. For example, the Declaration urged for the need to nurture the shared "heritage" of the Community, its countries and the potential new members (CEC 1973).

it has been promoted through greatly diverse campaigns, strategies and policies in various policy areas, ranging from culture to education and migration (Banjac 2011; Mitchell 2006; Fernández 2005; Delgado Moreira 2000). In fact, it is possible to identify certain phrases through which EU citizenship is advanced and nurtured. The 'People's Europe', 'Unity through Diversity' and 'Cultural Mosaic' have all become catch-phrases within the official European narratives striving to develop "a stronger sense of European identity and citizenship above the level of the nation-state while simultaneously contributing to the 'flowering' of local, regional and national cultures and identities below it" (Shore 2004: 28).

Although EU citizenship has been institutionalized through various legal acts and is an important instrument or discourse in the official European parlance and in diverse European policies and practices, its evolution has hardly been a straightforward process. As Olsen (2007: 41) concisely states, it is a phenomenon which is not conjured up *ex nihilo*, but one which emerges, evolves and changes within concrete practices. Indeed, a number of scholars have shown that EU citizenship is not only a body of rights and duties ascribed to the citizens of the EU Member States and is not only used and perpetuated to create a distinct European identity, but is also inherently connected with the processes of creating boundaries and the marking of the European space (Geddes 2005; Walters 2002; Paasi 1996).

Moreover, in creating a common European space and space(s) of EU citizenship, the issue of immigration from non-European countries is particularly important. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (1999) states that immigration has an immense impact on EU citizenship, both in terms of its effect on the legal formulation of European citizenship and in terms of content. While de Wenden identifies an exclusive logic inscribed in the idea of EU citizenship, Henk Van Houtum and Roos Pijpers (2007) as well as Anssi Paasi (1996) argue that European collective identity is constructed through European migration policy, deterring illegal or undocumented<sup>2</sup> migrations and border controlling.

Building on these valuable insights on the intricate relationship between migration and the idea of EU citizenship, the paper analyzes enumeration and other calculative practices within the European governmental mechanisms of regulating migration flows. While a significant amount of research (Dover 2008; Huysmans 2006; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Bigo 1998) has been conducted regarding the diverse, often violent, exclusive and racially-based regulatory policies, mechanisms and practices of (illegal/undocumented) migration and their function in constructing a common European space and identity, there is little (practically none) on the role and function of enumeration and calculative practices within migration policies. As this paper will show, calculative practices and enumeration understood as the specific formulation, instrumentalization and implementation of programs, mechanisms and policies (Inda 2006; Rose 1991, 1999) are intrinsic to modern governmental technologies<sup>3</sup> and are, as such, integral to monitoring and managing migration flows. Mitchell Dean (1999) argues that new governmental approaches, including enumeration practices and other statistical technologies (Rose 1996) used by the state and other governing actors or bodies target individuals as members of a population. Gathering knowledge about the individuals and populations so that they could be fostered and optimized has become one of the primary objectives of governing authorities.

Following the main arguments discussed above, the paper is structured as follows: the first part provides a brief theoretical reflection on the role of numbers and statistical data in constructing the European space/territory<sup>4</sup> and its (external) borders, while the second part considers how the two are re-

2 For a clear explanation of the difference between illegal and undocumented migration see Jørgen Carling (2007).

3 For a historical analysis of the rise of modern governmental mechanisms and diverse modes of political decision-making connected with the rise of heterogeneous strategies, programmes and political practices rooted in numbers and calculative practices see Cole (2000), Rose (1999, 1996), Urla (1993), Hacking (1991), Alonso and Starr (1987), and Porter (1986).

4 The concept of territory rarely receives critical treatment, which means that it is not seen and perceived as unproblematic even within academic discussions. For more on territory, its modern specifics and political usages see Elden (2005; also Elden 2010).

lated and conceptualized within the continuously evolving European migration policy. With the analysis of the historical development of European migration policy, we aim to show how exclusionary governmental technologies in the field of migration are employed in diverse historical contexts. Furthermore, we also consider how these practices are fundamental for the process of community-building and shaping of the European identity in the European Union.

In the third part, the paper proceeds to argue that enumeration is a specific governmental technology through which illegal or undocumented immigrants are constituted and imagined as a threat. The rationale for governing through numbers is, as we will show, at least twofold. On the one hand, immigrants, in particular illegal or undocumented, are constructed as a threat to the security and quality of life within the European Union and are, as such, represented as anti-citizens (Inda 2000), while European citizens, on the other hand, are seen as responsible, economically (self-)sufficient and 'normal' (Van Houtum and Pijpers 200: 295). Through this specific technology, the image of a common and safe ordered European space based on the prevalence of order is constructed, and at the same time the idea of EU citizenship as a particular value of belonging to the European community is fostered and advanced. Furthermore, we examine the case of EU's agency Frontex, a specialized body tasked to coordinate the activities of Member States in the field of (external) border security. We show that Frontex as a calculative authority (see Inda 2006) utilizes statistical data to construct illegal immigrants as a threat and justifies its activities formally aimed at securing EU citizens and the common European space.

## **CREATING BORDERS AND THE EUROPEAN SPACE/ TERRITORY: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF NUMBERS**

Borders are commonly and predominantly perceived as something physical, demarcating specific geographic spaces which encompass different communities living within these bounded territories. Within this perception borders are something which hardly – if ever – change and are, as such, universal and constitutive for each and every population, regardless of their historical and socio-political context (Elden 2005; Agnew 1994). At the same time, borders are paradoxically perceived as relatively fluid in a sense that they are subjected to changes in different historical moments and are the object of political disputes (Duchacek 1986).

Borders do not only exist in the material sense but are also constructed through symbols. At the same time they are geographically based and bearers of historical memories, representations, images etc. As James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd (1999: 595) argue, borders are often seen as encapsulating a history of struggle against 'outside' forces and as marking the limits of the community or society. They appear inherently contradictory and multifaceted because they are at once gateways and barriers to the 'outside' world, inclusionary and exclusionary, zones of cooperation and conflict, and spaces where identities are constructed and differences are asserted. In the latter sense, borders are inherently violent because they function as a (biopolitical) process of normalization. They constitute norms through which specific individuals and communities are recognized as normal and healthy, while other individuals and populations are constructed as abnormal, septic and potentially dangerous (see Foucault 2003). As Foucault argues, the process of normalization, also within (spatial) b/ordering practices (see Van Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhofer 2005), produces "a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogenous social body but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization, and a distribution of rank" (Foucault 1995: 184). The expansion of this normalizing power also proceeds through statistics, which enables knowledge of individuals and communities under a type and becomes, as such, knowledge about how to manage diverse economic and social issues and affairs (2007; 1991). And, as Julian Neylan (2008: 14) also clearly states, "statistics made it possible [to] quantify these specific characteris-

tics so that information about the population could be maintained, thereby enabling the populace to be managed and controlled”.

The violent nature of borders and their exclusivity are present within the process of European integration and formation of a common European space (Paasi 2001). As Pissareva (2010) states, “the extensive spread of bureaucracy coupled with statistics, surveys, social sciences and other calculative practices, has helped the European Union to acquire the needed infrastructural power”. At the European level subjects and diverse collectivities are thus classified and quantified in order to construct them as populations and administrable categories such as ‘unemployed’ or ‘immigrant’, and thereby to rationalize European integration as a manageable process. Although the integration process is predominantly seen as an act of dissolving of (national) borders, leading to more efficient communication and cooperation between different actors at local, national, regional and global levels, they remain an important political mechanism; a specific governmental technology, through which specific (parts of) populations are excluded and migratory flows are controlled, regulated and managed. Specific images of European external borders and their management are crucial for regulating migrations of different populations and communities. Regulatory machinery for controlling immigration is commonly based on statistics (see Rose 1999: 220–221). The statistical data are collected and employed at national and European level while at the same time statistical monitoring is interpreted through (population) maps, so that boundaries are depicted and, through this, the existence of bounded territorial spaces is effectively reified (Paasi 2005).

Furthermore, as Van Houtum and Pijpers (2007: 294) note, issues of immigration and minority integration have topped the political agenda in all of the Member States. Therefore, at the European level, border management and political practices related to the regulation of migratory flows are tightly connected with the rise and development of a common European migration policy (Pikalo, Ilc, and Banjac 2011). Additionally, it must be stressed that this bordering process through which the European space and identities are created is not straightforward in terms of a conventional inside/outside model, and therefore the categories of internal/external are also increasingly seen as problematic. Nevertheless, through European migration policies and concrete practices, strategies and technologies, the European Union excludes subjects whose entry to the EU area is deemed to be illegal (Vaughan-Williams 2008).

## **EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY: HISTORICAL CONTEXTS OF THE EXPANSION OF EXCLUSIONARY MECHANISMS AND PRACTICES**

As an evolving field, the European migration policy is extremely important because it concerns the integration of different national migration policies and their discretion over the entry and residence of non-citizens in their territory. Andreas Ette and Thomas Faist (2007: 4) argue that harmonization of immigration policy defines the finality of Europe, its outer borders and how they are controlled. Although there is a prevailing discourse on the need to harmonize different national Member States’ migration policies at the European level, this tendency is far from uncontested. The European migration policies are, as Christina Boswell (2003) argues, in flux, because harmonization of these policies has faced political blockages despite, as noted above, being seen as necessary (Givens and Luedtke 2004).<sup>5</sup> Growing<sup>6</sup>

5 For a more in-depth analysis of the reasons behind the blockages and stalemates of the common EU migration policy see Givens and Luedtke (2004) and Boswell (2003).

6 This growing tendency needs to be addressed critically because, as De Haas (2008) reminds us, the image of a “tidal wave of desperate people [...] trying to enter the European El Dorado” is often based on fundamentally flawed assumptions about the magnitude, historicity, nature and causes of this migration.

levels of illegal migration and migrant-trafficking have also triggered doubts whether states are “capable of protecting *their citizens from outsiders*” (Boswell 2003: 1, emphasis added). For this reason, immigration policies have for the most part remained under national control (Ette and Faist 2007), while the main dilemma of to what extent European Member States should abdicate decision-making interests to forge a common immigration policy at the European level remains a crucial one.

Despite this ambivalence between the tendency of harmonization and keeping migration policy within national jurisdiction, it is possible, following Andrew Geddes (2003), to identify four distinct phases of integration of the European migration policy. The first period, from 1957 to 1986, is characterized by the fact that immigration policies remained firmly within the national prerogative, which means that European involvement in this field was quite clearly minimal. Geddes (2003: 131) identifies initiatives by the European Commission towards a more intense EU cooperation in the field of migration which were regularly rebuffed. Despite the negative trend during this period, a number of cooperation initiatives were undertaken; however, they were not formally part of the EU institutional framework. The so-called Schengen Agreement of 1985, which laid the foundation for the abolishment of internal border controls and harmonization of internal security measures, is one important example. The Agreement was signed between five members of the European Economic Community. The rules adopted under the Agreement were separate from the EU *acquis* until 1997, when the Amsterdam Treaty was adopted and the Agreement was incorporated into European Union law.

These forms of cooperation were shaped and intensified during the second period, from 1986 to 1993. This period was marked by closer cooperation among the representatives of Member States’ administrations. The result of this informal intergovernmental collaboration was a set of concrete mechanisms for cooperation in the field of migration.<sup>7</sup>

The third period begins with the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993 and lasted until 1999. If the second period was characterized by informal cooperation among the European countries, in the third period the cooperation became increasingly more formal. The Treaty offered a framework within which the Member States could define (im)migration as a field of common interest and, on this basis, deepen their cooperation. The field of migration was integrated under the third pillar of the European Union, which meant that, because of the decision-making structure, the cooperation remained intergovernmental (Ette and Faist 2007).

Finally, the fourth period begins with the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, amending the Treaty on European Union. Among the substantial changes implemented were increased powers for the European Parliament, development of a common foreign and security policy, formation of the Community area of freedom, greater emphasis on citizenship and the rights of individuals, and, in the context of migration policy, the possibility of the European Union to legislate on immigration and incorporation of the previously mentioned Schengen Agreement in the *acquis communautaire*. The incorporation of the Agreement should be understood, as William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr (2005: 94) argue, not only as another step in the formalization of security measures but also as the generalization of security and mobility practices “across the geographical and institutional space of the European Union and beyond”. The construction of a borderless Europe has become transfixed by the specific mobilities of undocumented and illegal migrants, refugees and people traffickers which need to be controlled. (External) borders need to be regulated and, through the implementation of Schengen, these precise borders are manifested as vulnerable coastlines, permeable land borders and always-insufficiently managed airports. What is produced is a space where (European) citizenship is constructed as a right to protection from alien threats (Walters and Haahr 2005: 111).

In 1999, the European Council summit in Tampere, Finland, made crucial steps towards a common European asylum and immigration policy. The objective defined in the Conclusions of the Tampere European Council is that there should be a harmonized policy for immigrants and asylum seekers to

7 For more see Mathew J. Gibney and Randall Hansen (2005).

seek and obtain entry to all EU Member States. The Council defined four separate elements of a common European immigration policy: partnership with countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment of third-country nationals, and management of migration flows (Caviedes 2004: 294). A need for a concrete move towards a common European immigration policy, outlined in the Tampere Conclusions, was emphasized in the Hague Programme, prepared by the European Commission in 2005. As Van Munster and Sterkx (2006) show, these novel recent attempts to develop a common European immigration policy are based on increased emphasis on security and control and driven by the distribution of danger and the political principle of fear. Furthermore, through this, EU seeks to mould the conduct of freedom between itself and the external environment and manage of the “improper and dangerous” exercise of freedom.

The European integration of migration policy is not, as we argue, important only in terms of the institutional development of the migration policy field at the European level, but also in terms of how dilemmas or issues concerning immigration to the European Union and responses to it are integral to advancing the ideas of a common European civilization and identity. It is possible to identify specific political practices, mechanisms, strategies and regulations of migratory flows, through which migrants are portrayed as (biopolitical) (Sparke 2006; Fassin 2001) targets, and notions of common European space and identity are imagined, created, fostered, urged and advanced.

## **PRACTICES OF ENUMERATION, (IM)MIGRATIONS AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY/CITIZENSHIP**

Institutional arrangements, ideas about borders, (im)migrants and specific political practices within the evolving field of European migration policy are in numerous ways connected with statistics and other calculative practices. The enumerative basis of the European migration policy and practical responses to immigration issues are explicitly brought up in the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community Statistics on migration and international protection, adopted in 2007. The regulation states that “harmonized and comparable Community statistics on migration and asylum are essential for the development and monitoring of Community legislation and policies relating to immigration and asylum, and to the free movement of persons” (EU 2007). The European Union clearly emphasizes the significance of numerical data for the development of migration policy and its implementation, while further stressing that statistical data should be categorized, accessible, comparable and mutually compatible across the European Union.

As noted above, the development of the European migration policy is particularly affected by the dilemma of whether, if at all, Member States should transfer powers to the European level with the aim of forging a common migration policy. The European Union strives to solve this through a calculative logic, which is also declared in a statement of the Council of the European Union expressed in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum:

The European Council considers that legal immigration should be the result of a desire on the part of both the migrant and the host country to their mutual benefit. It recalls that it is for each Member State to decide on the conditions of admission of legal migrants to its territory and, where necessary, to *set their number* (Council of the European Union cited in Duca 2011: 159, emphasis added).

By introducing statistical estimates, the European Union therefore endeavours to establish control over the circulation of individuals and immigrating populations, allowed or permitted to stay only if it is beneficial for the Member States. On the other hand, it is equally if not more important to calculate the number of illegal or undocumented immigrants. In order to obtain this data, the European Parliament and the

Council adopted a decision which calls on the Member States to provide the Commission with statistics, among others, on the numbers “of third-country nationals refused entry to the Member State’s territory at the external border [and] third-country nationals found to be illegally present in the Member State’s territory under national laws relating to immigration” (EU 2007). It may seem that statistics are merely an objective tool for measuring the phenomenon of illegal immigration, but in the political discourse, immigrants, particularly illegal and undocumented, are constituted through enumerative practices as a problem which needs to be addressed and resolved at the national as well as the European level.

By labelling the immigrants in terms of statistical observations and estimates and by presenting them through quantitative data, specific characteristics are assigned to them. In this light, immigrants are perceived and imagined as a specific population which exploits social benefits and are, as such, perceived as a burden to European society. Through numbers, immigrants are portrayed as a threat to existing order and a threat which could potentially undermine the stability of the European socio-political environment (Huysmans 2006: 47–51). This specific governmental technique of producing a threat of overpopulation is not a modern invention but historically originates from the end of eighteenth century, when ideas that overpopulation of a specific territory can be detrimental for the social cohesion and welfare of a specific society or community emerged. Following this line of reasoning, statistical knowledge needs to be obtained and accumulated in order to prevent the detrimental effect to the welfare of the population. Thus, using enumerative practices, which serve as a justification and rationalization for collecting statistical data, immigrants are constructed as a threat in order to maintain and regulate the (European) population. It is in this context that immigration flows are continually portrayed as a security problem (Bigo 1998), while the European Union – with its formative steps towards the common European migration policy – establishes itself as a force capable of delivering security for all and of creating a common European space; a space of free and secure Citizens: “The ‘security-oriented’ vision of the area of freedom, security and justice inevitably feeds the profound disquiet on civil liberties grounds [...]” (Shaw 2000: 308).

Another political function of enumerative practices not to be overlooked is the simplification of the socio-political complexity (Latour 1987; Pikalo and Trdina 2009), which has important consequences for regulative practices of various forms of migrations. Statistical data serve as a mechanism of assessing which immigrants are desirable and beneficial to the European community, while, on the other hand, the illegality of specific migrants is materialized, providing legitimacy to the European Union’s preventive and regulative measures which hinder such migrations. Reduction of the socio-political complexity not only allows but enables the creation of arbitrary categories through which different types of immigration are classified, arranged and sorted. And this, in turn, enables the authorities to more efficiently and effectively manage and administer the immigration processes and the immigrating individuals and populations.<sup>8</sup> Rens Van Munster (2005) scrupulously shows how intensively heterogeneous are the political practices and administrative measures aimed at preventing illegal immigration. These practices and measures, formulated, authorized and legitimized through statistics and other quantitative data, are – precisely because the effect of enumerative practices is, presumably, objectivity – seen as unproblematic, legitimate and appropriate. They are perceived as effective and appropriate because it is through these measures and practices that safety, freedom and the good life (of European citizens) are guaranteed, ensured and protected (Van Houtum 2002; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002).

This idea of a European space as an “area of freedom, security and justice” is one of the EU’s more explicit objectives, formally deriving from Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.<sup>9</sup>

8 As stressed earlier, the statistics were incorporated in the apparatus of government and, as such, developed as a specific knowledge on how to govern various socio-political affairs. In this context the European level is no exception, as management and regulation of migration through quantitative data and statistical reasoning are co-constitutive not only of authorities but also specific governmental practices. On different modes of governing Europe see Walters and Haahr (2005).

9 The challenge of creating the area of freedom, security and justice is already set out in the Amsterdam Treaty and is also based on the Tampere, Hague and Stockholm programmes.

One of the fundamental rights in this area is the free movement of people, realized through abolishment of all internal borders and, according to the EU, securing and guaranteeing this right to citizens of the European Union requires a strengthened management of the Union's external borders. This, in turn, calls for the management and regulation of entry and residence of non-EU nationals and includes a common asylum and immigration policy. Furthermore, the creation of the area is not intended to "re-invent democracy but to allow *citizens* to enjoy their long-standing democracies in *common*" (European Commission 1998, emphasis added) and thereby bring the European Union "closer to the *people*" (CEU 1999). Therefore, it is clear that the management and regulation of immigration at external borders is a crucial task for the formation of the common European area and also for nurturing, supporting, sustaining and reinforcing the idea of a common European citizenship.

One of the important institutional arrangements at the EU level, created specifically to manage and control (illegal) immigration is the Frontex agency (from French: *frontières extérieures*) set up in 2004. It is a specialized body established by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 and tasked to coordinate the activities of the national border guards in the field of border security (see Carrera 2007). It is intelligence-driven and can be seen, using Jonathan Xavier Inda's (2006) phrase, as a specific calculating authority. As a calculating authority Frontex is not only involved in activities in the field, but also formulates and designs these activities through systematic studies and research. The agency gathers information from partner countries within and beyond the EU's borders, as well as from other research and academic publications and the media in order to estimate and assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats at the external borders. This enables Frontex to balance resources and risks (Frontex 2011a). Its research activities and assessments are based mainly (although not exclusively) on statistics and other quantitative data. A clear example is Frontex's evaluation of the situation on external borders in 2010 (Frontex 2011b). The situation is presented through quantitative estimates of illegal migrations. The statistical data is not used solely to present objective facts, but is used as a specific governmental technique which exposes, exhibits and displays the threat of illegal immigrants in order to secure a common European space (Neal 2009). The important effect of this is the strengthening of the authority not only of the agency but of the European Union as a whole. As Mladen Dolar (2004) argues, the threat of 'external' forces is one of the sources of power of the authority. The authority must always rely on the anticipation of a threat that can be realized anyplace and anytime. "The power of the Authority becomes organized as a defence against the invisible threat which is posed by a ubiquitous foe. The Authority presents itself as a victim of the invisible threat" (Dolar 2004: 124). Frontex must constantly produce new estimates and new statistical data on possible danger from illegal immigrants as the bearers of this threat. In this context, Frontex emphasizes the rapidly changing reality on the ground as a rationale for its existence and for the European Union to support an institutionalized body which is able to react swiftly to new dangers that can present an imminent threat to its external borders (Leonard 2010): "Frontex strengthens the *freedom and the security of the citizens of the EU* by complementing the national border management systems of the Member States" (Frontex, emphasis added). Therefore, Frontex is a specialized body for managing and controlling illegal immigration and, through enumerative practices and activities, advancing the idea of a safe common European space where its citizens must be protected.

## CONCLUSION

The paper has sought to analyze the function and the role of calculative practices understood as specific governmental technologies within the European migration policy, European monitoring and managing strategies as well as practices of regulation of borders, migration and illegal immigrants.

As means of the specific formulation, instrumentalization and implementation of programmes, mechanisms and policies, calculative practices are intrinsic to modern governmental technologies and

are furthermore firmly incorporated in controlling and managing migration flows. Enumerative practices are intimately incorporated and utilized within the evolving field of the Common European migration policy and practices of regulating immigrations at the European level. By employing governance through numbers, immigrants, particularly illegal or undocumented, are constructed, imagined and represented as a threat to the security and quality of life within the European Union. While we show that this represents a reduction of the socio-political complexity of immigration processes and migration phenomena in general, it is precisely through this simplification that European authorities and specific governmental agencies such as Frontex are legitimized. The idea that illegal immigrants are a threat to the existing order and an economically efficient European environment authorizes and empowers European political bodies in their quest to decide and determine which immigrations are (economically) acceptable and which are detrimental to the European Union. Furthermore, the construction of immigrants as a threat represents a political strategy which seeks to justify diverse, contentious, even violent and exclusive, mechanisms and techniques of controlling and regulating migrations.

Enumerative practices as a governmental technology within migration policies and practices are paramount also in the process of creating a common European identity. If illegal immigrants are portrayed as a population invading the European Union and, as such, a threat to the existing order, the statistical data exhibits and displays its actions as rational, pragmatic, efficient and operative measures to secure a common European space in which European citizens are seen as responsible, economically (self-)sufficient and 'normal'. Therefore, the enumerative practices are a key and fundamental element in the formation and articulation of the idea of EU citizenship as a particular value of belonging to the European community.

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## POVZETEK

### EVROPSKA IDENTITETA SKOZI PRAKSE ŠTEVILČENJA: OBLIKOVANJE EU-DRŽAVLJANSTVA IN EVROPSKE MIGRACIJSKE POLITIKE

Marinko BANJAC

Prispevek analizira vlogo in namen praks številčenja v evropskih migracijskih politikah in praksah nadzora ter regulacijah meja in (nelegalnih) migracij v kontekstu procesov nastajanja skupne evropske identitete skozi oblikovanje in artikulacije EU-državljanstva kot specifične vrednote pripadanja evropski skupnosti. Kot način specifičnih formulacij, instrumentalizacij in implementacij programov, mehanizmov in politik so kalkulativne prakse intrinzične oblastnim tehnologijam ter vpete v nadzor ter upravljanje migracijskih tokov. V prispevku pokažemo, da so prakse številčenja pomemben del nastajajoče skupne evropske migracijske politike ter s tem reguliranja mobilnosti populacij na evropski ravni. Z uporabo

statističnih podatkov ter drugih praks številčenja so imigranti, še zlasti tisti, ki so označeni kot nezakoniti in/ali nedokumentirani, konstruirani in reprezentirani kot grožnja varnosti in kvaliteti življenja v Evropski uniji. S prikazovanjem in z opisovanjem imigrantov s številkami se vzpostavlja ideja o neobvladljivem številu novoprihajajoče populacije, ki načenja red in gospodarsko učinkovitost evropskega okolja. Prakse številčenja delujejo kot nevtrarno in objektivno popisovanje, ocenjevanje, kalkuliranje in evalviranje imigracijskih populacij, vendar so ravno te prakse inherentno politične, saj med drugim reducirajo družbenopolitično kompleksnost, in, kot že rečeno, vzpostavljajo podoba imigrantov kot prihajajoče grožnje. Redukcija kompleksnosti in podoba grožnje sta način zagotavljanja legitimnosti evropskim oblastnim praksam specifičnih institucij in hkrati strategija, s katero politične institucije upravičujejo različne, pogosto nasilne in izključevalne mehanizme in tehnike nadzora ter regulacij migracij. Na ta način je določeno, kateri tip imigracij je dovoljen, dopusten in toleriran, ter na drugi strani, katere migrirajoče populacije so grožnja in so kot take nedopustne in hkrati evropskemu gospodarskemu okolju nekoristne. Določanje, ki poteka prek praks številčenj o zakonitih / nezakonitih, dobrodošlih / nekoristnih ipd. imigracijah je izjemno pomembno tudi v kontekstu vzpostavljanja idej o tem, kaj je evropski prostor in kaj evropska identiteta, saj se z negativnim portretiranjem nelegalnih / nedokumentiranih imigrantov hkrati ustvarja podoba o evropskem okolju (učinkovitem, urejenem ipd.) in EU-državljanih (racionalnih, odgovornih, itd.). V tem smislu sta v nekakšnem dialektičnem procesu upravljanje in regulacija migracij prek praks številčenja ne le teren izključevanja specifičnih migrirajočih populacij in ustvarjanje grožnje na zunanjih mejah Evropske unije, temveč tudi polje formacij in artikulacij ideje EU-državljanstva kot specifične vrednote pripadanja evropski skupnosti.



# BEYOND A CONSTRUCTION SITE, BEYOND NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: THE INFRAPOLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP

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## ABSTRACT

### **Beyond a Construction Site, Beyond National Citizenship: The Infrapolitics of Translocal Citizenship**

Since the nation-state ceases to exist as the only centre of sovereignty and arena where key political decisions are made, efforts to envisage new forms of citizenship are separating political membership from the nation and constitute it according to entirely new criteria. The article examines the new concept of translocal citizenship that moves away from the nation-state as its territorial reference point, and simultaneously rejects its continuation within some new supranational entity. In the second part, the article reflects on the *Beyond a Construction Site* project, initiated by the Obrat Culture and Art Association (KUD Obrat), where an unused construction site has been employed as a community garden. The project illustrates translocal citizenship in practice, since the garden is fostering new forms of collective action and new forms of political membership which are better suited to intercultural dialogue and inclusion of migrant communities than are nation-states.

KEY WORDS: citizenship, migration, democracy, urbanism, community gardens

## IZVLEČEK

### **Onkraj gradbišča, onkraj nacionalnega državljanstva: Infrapolitika državljanstva**

Danes, ko nacionalna država ni več edini center suverenosti in prostor sprejemanja ključnih odločitev, poskusi zamišljanja novih oblik državljanstva politično članstvo čedalje bolj ločujejo od države in ga konstituirajo po novih kriterijih. Članek obravnava koncept translokalnega državljanstva, ki se oddaljuje od nacionalne države kot glavne referenčne točke, in ki hkrati zavrača njegovo oblikovanje v okviru novih nadnacionalnih entitet. V drugem delu članek reflektira projekt Onkraj gradbišča, s katerim je KUD Obrat opuščeno gradbišče spremenil v skupnostni vrt. Projekt prikazuje translokalno državljanstvo v praksi, saj je vrt rezultiral v novih oblikah kolektivne akcije in novih oblikah političnega članstva, ki so bolj primerne za medkulturni dialog in vključevanje migrantskih skupnosti kot pa nacionalne države.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: državljanstvo, migracije, demokracija, urbanizem, skupnostni rtovi

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## INTRODUCTION

“Private faces in public places  
 Are wiser and nicer  
 Than public faces in private places.”  
 – W. H. Auden, *Marginalia*

In recent years there has been a growing interest in new conceptions and practices of citizenship that transcend the nation-state. Attempts to imagine a new citizenship in the 21<sup>st</sup> century soon revealed that this is not only a political question but rather an epistemological one, since exclusion, oppression and discrimination have not only economic, social and political dimensions but also cultural and epistemological ones (cf. Vodovnik 2011; Santos, Nunes and Meneses 2008: xix). As opposed to past practices, political control and domination are today not grounded solely on economic and political power, but foremost on knowledge or the hierarchization of knowledge. When imagining a new citizenship, conceptual clarity and theoretical thoroughness are thus insufficient since this task demands a wider epistemological or cognitive transformation.

Such transformation is especially necessary in societies where the leveling of political membership to national or even ethnical identity results from a linguistic or semantic similarity between both concepts. We often forget that at the very beginning, citizenship was not related to the state but solely meant a specific “urban relationship” between rights and duties in the city (Delanty 2006: 12).<sup>1</sup> *Citizenship* therefore meant political membership in a *city* and existed independently of the state. It is thus erroneous to talk only about a “citizen of the state” since we can also identify other types of citizenship that are built on different – e.g. territorial or functional – criteria.

In the article we start from the position that a new citizenship is already put in practice on the margins of the political map, where various “subterranean” collectives and movements are developing a genuinely new political alternative, and with it also a new understanding of political membership that is worked out on a more manageable scale, *ergo* within local communities. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007: xv) argues that we can find many important innovations – on both the political and theoretical level – within a network of local initiatives (urban or rural) that have gradually developed ties of mutual recognition and interaction. For Santos, this network represents the beginning of a translocal yet truly global network of direct democracy that, in its fight against social exclusion and the “trivialization of citizenship”, recuperated an idea of alter-globalization, direct democracy and subaltern cosmopolitanism. A new citizenship, we shall call it translocal citizenship, is thus constituted beyond the nation-state, sometimes in opposition to it, but always transcends the parochial forms of political community that make global connectedness impossible.

In this article we will argue that it is necessary to rescue citizenship from the narrow statist confines that reduce citizenship to a legal status. Intrinsic to this aim will be an attempt to briefly reflect on the main contours of translocal citizenship. We will not offer a modest modification of the traditional conception of citizenship as a special relationship between the state and citizen whose contents are certain rights and duties, but will instead offer a new understanding of citizenship within translocal polities, where the mechanical link between rights and duties is finally loosened, as is the relationship between equality and difference.

Next, we will show how translocal citizenship is not a political membership in the narrow meaning of the word, but is rather offering us a broader and deeper understanding of democracy. Translocal citizenship, however, does not represent the depoliticization of political membership but rather a substantive understanding of the concept that in past decades has been reduced to a legal status without

<sup>1</sup> The etymological origin of the word citizenship – from *civitas*, *civitatus*, to the modern *citoyen* – always linked political membership to smaller and more fluid polities.

substance (Pikalo and Trdina 2009). Translocal citizenship, in this respect, closely resembles the idea of “infrapolitics”, that according to James C. Scott (1990: 184) “provides much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible political action on which our attention has generally been focused”. The infrapolitics of the seemingly non-political is as much a product of political necessity as of political choice and we should therefore understand infrapolitics not only as a form of political resistance in circumstances of tyranny, but also as “the silent partner of a loud form of public resistance” within modern democracies.

In the last part, the article will offer a case study of a project initiated by the Obrat Culture and Art Association (KUD Obrat), *Beyond a Construction Site*, that illustrates translocal citizenship in practice. The project reclaimed an unused, rubble-strewn construction site in the middle of residential neighbourhood in the centre of Ljubljana and transformed it into a community space intended for a community garden. The goal of the collective was not only the transformation of a degraded urban area into a garden, but rather a different kind of socializing, building a real community with a vibrant democracy from below. We should therefore understand the *Beyond a Construction Site* project as a political laboratory “not only about urban gardening and ecology, but also about sharing the management of a space and its processual and participatory organization” (KUD Obrat 2011). A “people’s garden” represents a microcosm of a different polity, where new citizen(ship) successfully challenges, *inter alia*, private property and atomization of domestic arrangements.

The case study will highlight the performative power of translocal citizenship with a new constellation of its basic tenets, whereby an explication of the original intent and meaning of citizenship represents one of its major characteristics. In times of intensified migration flows, migration and unprecedented mobility of the *demos*, this idea and practice of translocalism can indeed be understood as a much needed *panacea* for the shortcomings of national citizenship. The project shows how a migration on a local scale offers an exodus to a new polity and also to a new political membership. On the other hand, the project shows how a local project on a micro level can indeed be understood as a much better form for inclusion and empowerment of migrant communities than nation-states (cf. Toplak et al. 2010).

## TRANSLOCAL CITIZENSHIP?

Gerard Delanty (2007: 25) maintains that in a global age political, social and economic transformations “have brought in their wake responsibilities that go far beyond duties to the state”. Ksenija Vidmar Horvat (2010: 205), on the other hand, ascertains that national citizenship no longer represents the only form of political membership, because with accelerating trend of multiculturalization and denationalization of society it is obvious that national citizenship can’t accommodate demands for proper civic participation and democratic control. For Vidmar Horvat (2011: 10), the tension between a “territorially defined nation-state on the one hand and deterritorialized rights on the other” is only an additional reason for imagining a new model of political membership that exists independently of the nation-state.

We should emphasize, however, that a “new” citizenship beyond the nation-state should not be understood as a total break from all previous conceptions of citizenship, but rather as an explication of its original intent and meaning. Political membership beyond the state is, according to James C. Scott (2009: 3–4), rather the regularity of history, despite the inscription of the nation-state on the political map and consequently the sedentarization or administrative, economic and cultural standardization of fluid political entities. In addition, Harold Barclay (1996: 12) argues that political membership beyond the state is by no means unusual, since the non-statist polity “is a perfectly common form of polity or political organization. Not only is it common, but it is probably the oldest type (...) and one which has characterized most of human history.”

Nowadays, the nation-state is ceasing to exist as the only centre of sovereignty and arena where key political decisions are made. At the same time, the altered local – regional – global nexus makes it

possible to finally separate political membership from the nation and its constitution according to entirely new criteria. It should not surprise us that the new concept of translocal citizenship moves away from the nation-state as its territorial reference point, and simultaneously rejects its continuation within some new supranational entities. We could argue that it rejects the very notion of permanence and continuity and therefore builds on municipalized political praxes.

The concept of translocal citizenship represents a significant departure from classical theories of citizenship because it builds on *inclusion* and *participation* rather than on *identity* and, instead of *equality*, it accentuates *differences*, or “equal differences”. Yet translocal citizenship should also not be understood as another postmodern conception of political membership characterized by relativism and particularism that, according to Rizman (2008: 37), only detects diversity, difference, fragmentation, conflict and opposition, but not also commonality, equality, integration, consensus and integration. Referring to Darren O’Byrne (2003: 227), it “embraces plurality without being relativistic, universality without being deterministic, and identity without being unduly subjectivistic”. Translocal citizenship thus represents a critique of the universalistic assumptions within the liberal tradition, or their upgrade with differentiated universalism that draws close to Habermas’ idea of “constitutional patriotism”.<sup>2</sup> It does not equate democracy with a particular constitutional system only, nor with a particular constellation of centres of power within a society, but instead understands democracy in Westian terms – as a verb, and never as a noun (cf. West 2005: 68).

Translocal citizenship can also be understood as a performative citizenship that goes beyond citizenship as a normative disposition, since it is grounded in an actual political practice (cf. Slaughter and Hudson 2007: 9). We can agree with Ruth Lister (1998a) when she writes that to avoid a partial integration of a new political subject into the polity – and therefore rising numbers of *denizens* or *margizens* – we should once again understand citizenship not only as a legal status (citizenship-as-status) but also as a practice (citizenship-as-activity).

## THE CONTOURS OF TRANSLOCAL CITIZENSHIP

According to Gerard Delanty (2000: xiii), a reconfiguration of the relationship between equality and difference will be one of the most important aspects of a new citizenship. Citizenship is nowadays perhaps the most important point of contestation about the identity and recognition of (group) differences that cannot be resolved by the current model of multiculturalism, or can rather only be resolved in times of economic growth. On the other hand, the paradigm of universalism only results in the homogenization and uniformity of polities, but not also in social justice and the inclusion of their members. If the affirmation of equality and universalism does not mean necessarily emancipation, since it can result in a loss of identity, and affirmation of differences and relativism can, conversely, result in another anomaly, in the justification of discrimination and subjugation, the question that we should be asking is: Is there any solution to the so-called “politics of difference”?

In overcoming the errors and limitations of universalism along with relativism, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2008: 28) identifies the meta-right of *equal difference*. The equal difference upgrades the idea of *differentiated citizenship* (Young 1989) and *differentiated universalism* (Lister 1998b), since it is based on two axioms that transcend the old relationship of equality *versus* difference in a genuinely new relationship of equality *et* difference: first, it stresses difference when equality would threaten our identity and, second, it stresses equality whenever diversity would result in inferiority and discrimination. The

2 Considering that translocal citizenship offers a different understanding of political community and stresses its constant reinvention, we should instead conclude that translocal citizenship represents a form of “unconstitutional patriotism” that in its replacement of *ethnos* with *demos* follows a significantly more radical definition of democracy than Habermas.

differences that would remain when inequalities and hierarchy vanish thus become a powerful denunciation of the differences that the status quo reclaims in order not to disappear.

Yet the reconfiguration of equality and difference is not the only key characteristic of translocal citizenship. Another important novelty is a loosening of the mechanical link between rights and duties or, rather, the constitution of citizenship beyond this link. Within different theories of citizenship we find various understandings of the link between rights and duties – e.g. the preponderance of duties within the republican tradition and the preponderance of rights within the liberal one – but it is always established and perceived entirely mechanically. Citizenship as a special status is thus impossible without a burden of corresponding duties. Although such a definition of citizenship may seem logical and reasonable, it is highly problematic in many aspects. Since citizenship and citizenship rights are allocated only to subjects able to accept corresponding duties, a national citizenship is not open to subjects who are unable to be bearers of duties. This logic of reciprocity ensures, *inter alia*, that children, future generations, or nature cannot become full members of a community. Identifying an individual as a subject with rights and duties furthermore prevents the identification of group rights and group identity, and results in the exclusion of all indigenous communities that do not want to enter into a polity without their particular group identities.

We can agree with Ruth Lister (1998a) when she writes that to avoid a partial integration of a new political subject into the polity – and therefore rising numbers of *denizens* or *margizens* – we should once again understand citizenship not only as a legal status but also as a practice. We should add that it is not enough to understand new, performative citizenship as a practice *per se*, but as a *praxis* or a philosophical category of practice. Praxis differs considerably from the epistemological category of practice, which can, however, mean an activity that remains entirely alienated. Although the word *praxis* is commonly used in everyday language and appears relatively clear and understandable, since it is primarily used as a synonym for activity, creation, work, habit, experience, training etc., its meaning within philosophy, especially praxis-philosophy, is considerably more profound and specific. *Praxis* is equated only with free, universal and creative activity through which man creates and transforms his world and consequently himself. The key characteristic of *praxis* as a normative concept therefore lies in the fact that this activity represents a goal and purpose in itself. *Per analogiam* with Gajo Petrović's definition of praxis (1978: 64), performative citizenship or citizenship understood as praxis "is the most developed form of creativity and the most authentic form of freedom, a field of open possibilities and the realm of the truly new. It is the very 'essence' of Being, the Being in its essence".

## THE INFRAPOLITICS OF (TRANSLOCAL) CITIZENSHIP

Translocal citizenship closely resembles the idea of "infrapolitics" which, according to James C. Scott (1990: 184), "provides much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible political action on which our attention has generally been focused". Translocal citizenship is not constituted in relation to the nation-state and is not practiced through the institutionalized channels of political action, but it rather extends the sphere of political action to include health, ecology, urbanism, food production, culture, sustainable development, sports, architecture etc. When Howard Zinn (2002: 25) explains that democracy is "not just a counting up of votes; it is counting up of actions", he argues that we should imagine democracy and new citizenship in much broader terms whereby the performative dimension proves to be crucial, especially if we understand democracy outside of the political sphere (an achievement of the 18<sup>th</sup> century) so that it also includes a social and economic dimension.

According to Scott, the infrapolitics of the seemingly non-political on the micro level is thus recognized as the crucial precondition of democracy on the social level. Infrapolitics is as much a product of political necessity as of political choice, and we should therefore understand infrapolitics not only as a form of political resistance in circumstances of tyranny, but also as "the silent partner of a loud form of public

resistance" within modern democracies. True, the infrapolitics of the seemingly non-political is not part of the mainstream, and many times it is hard to detect this "immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt", but it is still real politics and "in many respects conducted in more earnest, for higher stakes, and against greater odds than political life in liberal democracies" (ibid., 200). The political struggles of the *Sans-Papiers* in France, the Erased in Slovenia, the "illegal" immigrants in the United States, the participants in the *Beyond a Construction Site* (as we will see below) etc. further demonstrate this.

These forms of struggle are, nevertheless, still marginalized and trivialized – from the political Right and Left advocating *real* political action meaning action *via* political parties – as: (a) unorganized, unsystematic, and individual; (b) opportunistic and self-indulgent; (c) with no revolutionary potential/consequences; and/or (d) implying accommodation with the system of domination (Scott 1985: 292). It is true that in case of "the unwritten history of resistance", the prosaic but constant or even Brechtian forms of struggle often merely result in marginal gains that ease the forms of their exploitation. It is also true that instead of targeting the main source of exploitation or the immediate source of exploitation, everyday forms of resistance, as Scott also chooses to call them, rather follow the line of least resistance.

Although we should never overly romanticize the "weapons of the weak", conversely, these forms of infrapolitical actions – e.g., passive noncompliance, evasion, desertion, deception, foot-dragging, pilfering – are also not trivial. Needless to say, the advantage of such resistance is that it results in concrete and immediate advantages. As Scott observes, even failed petty acts of resistance may achieve some gains: "/A/ few concessions from the state or landlords, a brief respite from new and painful relations of production and, not least, a memory of resistance and courage that may lie in wait for the future" (ibid., 29). Moreover, when multiplied by thousands and millions of people, such individual acts of quiet resistance "may in the end make an utter shambles of policies dreamed up by their would-be superiors" (ibid., 36).

It is ironic that in times of "fluid modernity" (Bauman), infrapolitical action that in the past characterized peasant resistance in settings where open political activity was restricted is once again becoming the most convenient form of struggle for "social movements with no formal organization, no formal leaders, no manifestoes, no dues, no name, and no banner" (ibid., 35). This is exactly what KUD Obrat attempts to do with the *Beyond the Construction Site* project, where an unused, rubble-strewn construction site has been employed as a "temporary experimental community".

## BEYOND A CONSTRUCTION SITE

Translocal citizenship closely resonates Hakim Bey's popular conceptualization of the spontaneous and subversive tactics of Temporary Autonomous Zones (TAZ), that is, according to Bey, "an uprising which does not engage directly with the State, a guerrilla operation which liberates a part (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, *before* the State can crush it" (Bey 2003: 99). The greatest strength of the TAZ is "its invisibility – the State cannot recognize it because History has no definition of it. As soon as the TAZ is named (represented, mediated), it must vanish, it will vanish, leaving behind it an empty husk, only to spring up again somewhere else, once again invisible because undefinable in terms of the Spectacle". (ibid.)

In times when the political map has been completely inscribed with the nation-state – Bey talks about the "closure of the map" – the TAZ is offering new perception and conception of political change. The TAZ is a subversive tactic corresponding to "an era in which the State is omnipresent and all-powerful and yet simultaneously riddled with cracks and vacancies":

Ours is the first century without *terra incognita*, without a frontier. Nationality is the highest principle of world governance – not one speck of rock in the South Seas can be left open, not one remote valley, not even the Moon and planets. (...) Not one square inch of Earth goes unpoliced or untaxed in theory. (ibid.)

According to Jeffs' (1997: 368–369) elaboration of Bey's theory of TAZ, the political change should be "deterritorialized, decentralized, and delinearized on all political, economic, social, libidinal, and, last but not least, narrative levels, and small and nomadic forms of resistance introduced, also because there is not a single place in the world which has not been delineated by the nation state. /.../ [the TAZ] is invisible to the state and flexible enough to vanish, when determined, defined, and fixated." Such emancipation does not have to postpone its mission for fulfilment of the necessary precondition – the maturity of objective historic circumstances, or the formation of some coherent subject or class – since it builds on the supposition that every individual is capable of co-creating the world with their, even if very small, gestures (cf. Jeffs 1998: 22–23). This premise was also the basis on which a community-based garden intervention was started in a degraded urban space in Ljubljana by KUD Obrat, where unused land covered with waste and rubbish has been transformed into a community garden.

In collaboration with the neighbourhood community, KUD Obrat revived a long-fenced-off plot of land near Resljeva Street in Ljubljana and transformed it into a community space intended for a community garden. Although the original goal of the project was "to examine and show the potential of degraded urban areas and the possibility of their receiving new value through temporary use and community-based interventions" (KUD Obrat 2011), the project soon revealed new dimensions – reclaiming the commons and inventing new modes of political membership.

According to the members of KUD Obrat, the project started "i/n August 2010 (...) as part of a programme by the Bunker organization, *Garden By the Way*. The programme presented a series of events within the Tabor neighbourhood with the intention of making people more aware of the green parts of the city, encouraging urban gardening, and providing support for social urban spaces" (ibid.). Even more, the rehabilitation of a construction site in the middle of a residential neighbourhood – "a symptom of real estate speculations and capitalist production of space, which follows the maxim of growth and profit" – was an ideal place for a project that puts in the forefront "a need for a different revitalization of cities and where a space is a constitutive dimension of social action" (ibid.). The goal of the collective was not a modest transformation of a degraded urban area into a community garden, not only an independent production of healthy food and increasing food self-sufficiency, but rather a different kind of socializing, building a real community with a vibrant democracy from below: "J/ust as gardening is an activity, community is also an activity – a process and an effort to establish relationships and linkages – not only among the participants in *Beyond a Construction Site*, but also *beyond* that the project" (ibid.).<sup>3</sup>

After opening the site in the second half of August 2010 the group faced the question of whether or not a plan for organizing the space was needed. Although the collective experimented with a détournement of traditional spatial planning (e.g. Polonca Lovšin's action *A Day with a Goat*), they still decided to have a planning process based solely on active engagement of the public.<sup>4</sup> At the beginning the project attracted only a few people taking part in the clean-up and organization of the site, but the invitation to "Make Your Own Garden" drew a wide array of participants "enthusiastically setting up their vegetable beds", further confirming the rich local tradition of small-plot gardening. Although the project was organized on the principles of horizontalism and direct democracy, the KUD Obrat collective, as the initiator of the project, defined at the very beginning three basic rules for the use and management of the site:

3 Beyond a Construction Site has a daily "office-hours", where the participants introduce and explain the project to visitors or passers-by and a "need for green space, for gardens, and for a place to socialize".

4 In a reflection of the project, KUD Obrat writes that "Polonca Lovšin's art action *A Day with a Goat* put a symbolic question mark over traditional spatial planning. She spent a day on the abandoned construction site with Hana the goat and charted her movements around the overgrown terrain. On the basis of her notes about the goat's movements, she drew up a plan for organizing the plot. In contrast to the rationalistic approach of the rectangular grid, Lovšin's plan was guided by Hana's search for food and her investigation of her surroundings. We never, in fact, applied this plan to the space." See KUD Obrat (2011).

- everyone should construct her/his own allotment and, if they were unable to do this, would receive help from other participants;
- the use of garden chemicals is forbidden;
- everyone should manage her/his own allotment, and take part in the care for the commons.

What is of utmost importance for our imagining of a new citizen(ship) is a different understanding of community that developed throughout the project – community should not be based on the vague notion of identity (no matter how inclusive), but rather on a concrete relationship and common action. KUD Obrat explains that their goal was not some new homogenous collective, but a heterogeneous community that will connect equality with difference and *vice versa*:

A unified community erases the differences and contradictions, as well as the productive conflicts and negotiations that are necessarily connected with the aim of sharing (space, tools, water, etc.). This aspect of conflict and negotiation is crucial, for it has to do with managing the relationships among differences rather than affirming commonalities based on similarities. In contrast to an idea of community based on a notion of identity and belonging (“being in”), which is, in this sense, always exclusionary for “others”, we are striving for a community that produces more open and fluid relationships in order to foster a sense of “being with”. (ibid.)

When the collective offered first theoretical reflection of the project they reiterated that the empowerment of the public and inclusion of the public in decision-making process was most important aspects of the project. The collective still warned that we should not overly romanticize participation *per se*. Instead of reiterating participation, we should, as already noted above, rather aim towards *praxis* or a philosophical category of practice. The same holds also for art, architecture and urban planning, where participation and practice is becoming increasingly more instrumentalized. The performative dimension of the *Beyond the Construction Site* project should rather be understood as an objection to the republican interpretation of citizenship as a universal office, conscripting rather than mobilizing the *demos* to participate in the *res publica*, and epitomized in the *levée en masse* (1793) and *La Marseillaise* (“Aux armes, citoyens!”) (cf. Walzer 1995: 211–12). The collective thus warns that participation cannot and should not become a standardized norm or technique, for this presupposes a standardized participant. Just as there is no abstract community of participants, there is also no single common general participation method. Instead of searching for general instruments and tools that would introduce a sort of a dialogue into architectural and urban planning, we should strive to formulate a participative practice as an *altering practice* (a term coined by Doina Petrescu) – a critical spatial practice that is aware of power relations, asks ethical questions, takes social responsibility, and reinvents itself with every new project in a different context. (KUD Obrat 2011)

Chris Carlsson (2008: 82) argues that in a communal garden “time opens up for conversation, debate, and a wider view than that provided by the univocal, self-referential spectacle promoted by the mass media”. *Beyond a Construction Site* soon became the source of power, identity, occupation, and, needless to say, food. It became a place of experimentation, innovation and prefiguration. The garden was not only giving everyone access to fulfilling occupations and food self-sufficiency, but it also enabled immigrants – e.g., a family from Russia was amongst the active participants of the project before moving back, now a whole family from Japan is part of the project along other *denizens* and *margizens* – to make first connections with neighbourhood population, and hence get a sense of community and empowerment. The project thus confirms Gerard Delanty (2007: 24) when he argues that citizenship also “takes place in communicative situations arising out of quite ordinary life experiences”. For Delanty, citizenship in a global age is no longer national citizenship only, “realized (...) as a condition secured by the state but is also pertinent to subnational levels, such as local and regional levels. In this regard, what is particularly important is the level of the city as a basis of citizenship” (ibid., 26). Even more, for Manuel Castells (1994), the cities are replacing the nation states, witnessing a slow erosion of their power, as “a driving force” in current and future political developments.

We can find similar results highlighting the *potentia* of the city in similar projects elsewhere, where the plots “become catalysts of community development, as the networks and other social capital formed over gardens are deployed to (...) serving other community needs” (McKay 2011: 182). For instance, in the case of the *Loisaida* – a migrant pronunciation of Lower East Side – community gardens in New York City, the project triggered interaction and cooperation amongst various migrant communities whilst preserving their migrant culture. For the Latino communities, small garden houses, *casitas*, are a symbol of their culture and lifestyle. In the interplay between various communities, the *casitas* received new features and design, and very often the *casita* was built or maintained by groups from different cultural backgrounds that have kept up the original spirit of the *casita*. Ashram Acres in Birmingham (UK), a community garden started in the early 1980s, is also appraised as an example of intercultural dialogue and inclusion of migrant communities that successfully surpasses the limitations of narrow multiculturalism, because it does not place civic practice within the framework of the nation-state, it does not aim towards the *integration* of “others” that can, at the same time, lead to their *exclusion* or *subjugation*, it is not apolitical, thus ignoring the problem of power relations, inequality and exclusion. The garden, which was initiated by a local community activist working with a local migrant population, empowered groups otherwise marginalized by the mainstream society and allowed them to “reconnect to their own cultural identity through the crops they grow, and they work across cultures by co-operating with people from different parts of the world growing different things. Nobody gets any ‘wealthier’ – but everybody is enriched” (ibid.: 181–82).

## CONCLUSIONS

With the current processes of economic globalization, the nation-state is being forced to redefine its position and purpose, thereby also significantly transforming the arena of political participation. What is left from Marshall’s triad of citizenship rights is largely only political rights, and we can therefore understand objections that citizenship is nowadays merely a legal status without a performative dimension.

Since the contemporary world has rendered customary methods of civic action obsolete, Howard Zinn (2009: 608) maintains that political change should “/m/ore likely be a process, with periods of tumult and of quiet, in which we will, here and there, by ones and twos and tens, create pockets of concern inside old institutions, transforming them from within. (...) We must begin *now* to liberate those patches of ground on which we stand – to ‘vote’ for a new world (as Thoreau suggested) with our whole selves all the time, rather than in moments carefully selected by others.”

The solution is therefore prefigurative politics as an attempt to create the future in the present through political and economic organizing alone, or at least to foresee social changes to which we aspire. It is indeed an attempt to overcome current limitations with a construction of alternatives from the bottom-up since it foresees a renewal of the political power of local communities, and their federation into a global network. Exactly this idea is embodied in that the community garden of the *Beyond the Construction Site* project, fomenting new forms of collective action and new forms of political membership better suited to intercultural dialogue and inclusion of migrant communities than are nation-states.

To begin our analysis, we introduced a new concept of citizenship that goes beyond citizenship as a normative disposition (citizenship-as-status), since it is grounded in an actual political practice (citizenship-as-activity). We argued that it is necessary to rescue citizenship from the narrow statist confines that reduce citizenship to a legal status. A new citizenship, we called it translocal citizenship, is thus constituted beyond the nation-state, sometimes in opposition to it, but always transcending the parochial forms of political community that make global connectedness impossible. We also showed how translocal citizenship does not represent the depoliticization of political membership but rather a substantive understanding of the concept that in past decades has been reduced to a legal status without substance.

In the second part, we focused on the *Beyond a Construction Site* project initiated by KUD Obrat, which was used as a case study of new translocal citizenship in practice. The project evokes Haig Patapan's (2007) conceptualization of "friendship as citizenship", that "can flourish and reveal its considerable strengths and advantages" only in the local. The détourned construction site – community garden in this way represents a part of truly global network of direct democracy that, in its fight against social exclusion and the "trivialization of citizenship", restores the idea of direct democracy and citizenship in its original meaning and purpose. The new citizenship "growing" on the project site does not offer a modest modification of the traditional conception of citizenship as a special relationship between the state and citizen whose contents are certain rights and duties, but instead offers a new understanding of political membership within translocal polities, where the mechanical link between rights and duties is finally loosened, as is the relationship between equality and difference. The project revealed that the garden should not be only a place of "power and pain", but also a place of "harmonious enlightenment, equality and pleasure" (Burrell and Dale 2002: 107; cf. Munro 2002), as it is a place not only for *Homo Faber* (the "working man"), but also *Homo Ludens* (the "playing man").

We are left hoping that the article and, above all, the *Beyond a Construction Site* project have succeeded in demonstrating that translocal citizenship cannot be understood as a naïve, utopian fantasy but rather as a lucid critique of the existing social, economic and political *status quo* as well as a strategy for achieving a different world, a world where many worlds fit. Here, the innovation on the micro-level should be guided by Colin Ward (2011: 30) who warns that "the choice between libertarian and authoritarian solutions occurs every day and in every way, and the extent to which we choose, or accept, or are fobbed off with, or lack the imagination and inventiveness to discover alternatives to, the authoritarian solutions to small problems is the extent to which we are their powerless victims in big affairs."

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## POVZETEK

### ONKRAJ GRADBIŠČA, ONKRAJ NACIONALNEGA DRŽAVLJANSTVA: INFRAPOLITIKA DRŽAVLJANSTVA

Žiga VODOVNIK

Danes, ko nacionalna država ni več edini center suverenosti in prostor sprejemanja ključnih političnih odločitev, poskusi zamišljanja novih oblik državljanstva politično članstvo čedalje bolj ločujejo od države in ga konstituirajo po novih kriterijih. Članek posega v te razprave s konceptom translokalnega državljanstva, ki se oddaljuje od nacionalne države kot glavne referenčne točke, in ki hkrati zavrača njegovo oblikovanje v okviru novih nadnacionalnih entitet. Avtor v refleksiji translokalnega državljanstva izpostavlja pomen novih oblik kolektivne akcije in nove oblike političnega članstva, ki ga omogoča državljanstvo na lokalnem nivoju.

Na primeru študije projekta *Onkraj gradbišča*, s katerim je KUD Obrat opuščeno gradbišče spremenil v skupnostni vrt, avtor konstatira, da so lahko projekti na mikro ravni bolj primerna osnova za medkulturni dialog in vključevanje migrantskih skupnosti kot pa nacionalna država. Kot poudarja avtor, je ta ugotovitev še toliko pomembnejša, če pri tem upoštevamo, da smo v zadnjih desetletjih z naraščajočimi stopnjami mobilnosti globalnega demosa priča le delnemu vključevanju političnih subjektov v politične skupnosti. To posledično vodi v hierarhizacijo članov politične skupnosti oz. naraščajoče število nepopolnopravnih članov skupnosti (*denizens* ali *margizens*). Razkrivanje omejitev statusnega državljanstva, pri tem pa kritika statusnega determinizma, ki je v sami genezi nacionalnega državljanstva, seveda ne sme pomeniti razumevanja translokalnega državljanstva kot brezstatusne kategorije, saj gre zgolj za poskus municipalizacije demokracije in političnega članstva. Cilj prispevka tako ni naivna negacija kategorije državljanstva, ampak prispevek k afirmaciji drugačnega razumevanja in prakticiranja državljanstva v

globaliziranem svetu, pri čemer municipalizacija političnega članstva ne pomeni vračanje v parohialne oblike političnega članstva, ki onemogočajo globalno delovanje ali povezovanje.

Po avtorjevi oceni je potreba po takšni redefiniciji državljanstva večja v okoljih, kjer so težave pri razumevanju odnosa med konceptom državljanstva in države tudi na jezikovni ravni pogojene z nive-liranjem političnega članstva na narodno ali celo etnično pripadnost, čeprav je etimološki izvor besede – od koncepta *civitas*, *civitatus*, pa vse do modernega *citoyen* – politično članstvo vezal vedno na manjše in bolj fluidne politične skupnosti. Državljanstvo je tako dobilo izključevalni aspekt prav preko utrjevanja fizičnih in kulturnih meja posameznih držav, s čimer je državljanstvo postalo instrument izključevanja oz. vključevanja v politično skupnost. V izhodišču se državljanstvo nikoli ni vezalo na državo ali narod, ampak je pomenilo izključno specifični »urbani odnos« med pravicami in dolžnostmi v mestu. Zato lahko po avtorju idejo državljanstva (*citizenship*), ki je pomenila članstvo v mestu (*city*), razumemo tudi kot zgodovinski argument po ponovni municipalizaciji politike.

Avtor v študiji projekta *Onkraj gradbišča* ugotavlja, da translokalnega državljanstva ne gre enačiti s političnim članstvom v ožjem pomenu besede, saj translokarno državljanstvo nudi povsem drugačno – širše in globlje – razumevanje demokracije. Tako je tudi zmotno govoriti samo o »državljanu države«, pač pa je treba rekonstruirati tudi druge oblike »državljanstva«, ki se konstituirajo po drugih kriterijih. Kljub temu translokalnega državljanstva spet ne gre razumeti kot depolitizacijo političnega članstva, saj gre zgolj za ekspliciranje performativne dimenzije novega državljanstva. Pri tem avtor izhaja iz koncepta infrapolitike, ki politično delovanje širi onkraj institucionalizirane politike. Infrapolitika namreč ni zgolj rezultat politične nuje v primeru nedemokratskih političnih sistemov, pač pa je čedalje bolj tudi »tihan partner« javnega delovanja v modernih demokracijah. Teza, ki iz tega sledi je, da se državljanstvo realizira ravno preko navidezno »nepomembnih« in »nepolitičnih« dejanj, ki jih aktualne razprave o demokraciji in državljanstvu žal nikoli ne detektirajo.



# “IF THEY DID NOT EXIST THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE INVENTED” – THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR REGULATION IN THE AMERICAN SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

Blaž ILC<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

### “If They Did Not Exist They Would Have To Be Invented” – The Role of Immigrants and Their Regulation in the American Socio-Political Context

The article explores the multidimensional, heterogeneous and complex role that immigrants and their regulation played and play in the American socio-political context. It argues that immigrants have played and play a crucial role in the establishment and development of the American republic. They were and are crucial for the continuous re-inscriptions of symbolic and material boundaries of the American nation and citizenship and in the development of the capacities and legitimacy of state apparatuses to regulate the US population. They are also indispensable for the functioning of the American economy. KEY WORDS: immigrants, immigration, American nation, American citizenship, racism

## IZVLEČEK

### »Če ne bi obstajali, bi si jih morali izmisliti.« Vloga priseljencev in njihovo reguliranje v ameriškem družbeno-političnem kontekstu

Članek obravnava večdimenzionalno, heterogeno in kompleksno vlogo, ki so jo v ameriškem družbeno-političnem kontekstu igrali in jo še vedno igrajo priseljenci ter zakonodaja o njih. Utemeljuje stališče, da so priseljenci v formiranju in razvoju ameriške republike igrali in še vedno igrajo ključno vlogo. Bili so in so še vedno ključnega pomena za trajno ponovno potrjevanje simboličnih in fizičnih meja ameriške države in državljanstva ter pomembno vplivajo na razvoj zmogljivosti in pravnih podlag državnega aparata za zakonsko urejanje ameriškega prebivalstva.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: priseljenci, priseljevanje, ameriška nacija, ameriško državljanstvo, rasizem

## INTRODUCTION

When following the mainstream political and public debates, the mainstream news reporting on immigrants and immigration and observing the ever more repressive regulation of immigrants and immigration at the federal (e.g. border wall) and state level (e.g. Arizona “anti-immigration” laws) one can come to the conclusion that immigrants in the contemporary American socio-political context play a simple role of a burden (welfare-dependent) and a threat (job-stealing, terrorist, biological) to the American way of life and the wellbeing of the American nation. Although the importance of this role should not

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be underestimated, especially regarding the conditions for the possibility of such a conception of immigrants, the role of immigrants and their regulation has been and is, as we intend to demonstrate in the following article, much more complex, multidimensional and crucial for the American socio-political context.

In order to comprehensively address the roles of immigrants and their regulation in the American context we will by employing a broad Foucauldian approach firstly critically analyse the central characteristics of the modern Western socio-political arrangements that are pertinent for understanding the complex role of immigrants and their regulation in these arrangements. The analysis will form the conceptual basis upon which the specificity of the American context will be critically examined in regard to immigration, its central norms, socio-political hierarchies and the boundaries of the American nation and citizenship. This will provide an analytical framework needed to explore the roles of immigrants in their multidimensionality and complexity that will conclude our critical reflection. In this context we will focus upon the historical role of immigrants and their regulation in the constitution and development of the American republic, the bordering of the American nation and citizenship, the functioning of the economy and their role in the development and legitimization of the expansion of the state apparatuses and the technologies of regulation, control and surveillance.

## THE CENTRAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN WESTERN SOCIO-POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS

All modern Western socio-political arrangements share a specific dual nature. On the one hand they are characterised by respect for liberty and human rights, popular sovereignty, the rule of law, separation of powers, the protection of private property, the notion of productive enterprise and policies for providing security and welfare to their populations. Their constitutions formally provide all citizens with equal civic and political rights and all other inhabitants with universal human rights. They are self-represented as providing equal opportunities and being based upon non-discrimination and inclusion. But on the other hand they are characterised by persistent structures, practices and discourses of discrimination, exclusion, exploitation and division. What is crucial regarding this dual nature is that the exclusion, discrimination, exploitation and de-privileging of certain populations are not anomalies of the modern Western liberal-democratic socio-political system but its constitutive elements (Bracken 1978: 241–60; Foucault 2003b; Foucault 2009; Goldberg 2002; Hindess 2001: 93; Losurdo 2011; McWhorter 2009; Stoler 2002).

Formal democratic political participation was implemented simultaneously with the genesis of the global capitalist and imperialist system (subjugation and exploitation of non-western populations). These processes were intertwined with the establishment of new forms of socio-political organisation (liberal nation-state and capitalist mode of production) based upon new disciplinary and biopolitical technologies and techniques of power and correlative knowledges<sup>1</sup> (Foucault 2003a; Foucault 2003b; Hindess 2001: 93; Mudimbe 1988). These technologies and techniques enabled an unprecedented decentralisation, dispersion and penetration of power. Power functioned not only as a repressive force and in a top down, hierarchical way, but predominantly as a productive force (creating specific bodies) and in a capillary way by reaching into individuals and functioning through them by conducting their conduct (Foucault 1978; Foucault 2009; Nadesan 2008). This was essential for the establishment of the (industrial) capitalist mode of production, which requires disciplined (docile, effective, useful) bodies and self-interested subjects competing on the open market. Furthermore, it was essential in the context

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<sup>1</sup> Modern power is founded upon and in turn produces knowledge. Through knowledge, objects, subjects, issues and relations become visible to technologies and techniques of power (Foucault 1978).

of re-establishing the social order and securing internal pacification of a society that was radically destabilised through violent socio-political revolutions (Foucault 1978).

What should be stressed is that the subject of democratic political participation – the citizen – was itself the product of specific practices and discourses and limited to a specific socio-political group (Banjac 2010: 669–88; Burchell 1995: 540; Foucault 1977; Foucault 2009). The only group of individuals that was from the outset established as fully capable of democratic participation was the group of white, affluent, sane, bourgeois, heterosexual, non-disabled men. The ascribed and identified characteristics of these individuals were established and perpetuated as the central norm of modern socio-political arrangements (Stoler 2002). Hence in the context of the genesis of the modern liberal-democratic arrangement only a small minority of individuals acquired full political subjectivity and full citizenship (Glenn 2002; Hindess 2001: 93).

This process was intertwined with the constitution of the modern liberal nation-state and the nation. The nation was simultaneously constituted as a central modern collective identity (as an anchor of the individual's identity) and as an object of modern power's intervention. That is, the nation was constituted as a population, a biological phenomenon that requires continuous biopolitical regulation and resides in a specific territory (Foucault 2003b; McWhorter 2009; Mendieta 2007: 138–52; Nadesan 2008; Stoler 2002).

In this simultaneous establishment of the liberal subject and the nation we can discern that one of the crucial characteristics of modern power is its simultaneous individualisation and totalisation (Foucault 2001). Both of these processes serve a specific central objective of modern power, i.e. the welfare, development and security of the nation/population. At the level of the individual this objective is to be achieved through the disciplining and managing of the individual bodies and by establishing conditions for the free activity of citizens. At the collective level this is to be achieved through biopolitical regulation of general processes that affect the population such as rate of reproduction, longevity, mortality, economic production/circulation/accumulation and illness (Foucault 2003b; Inder 2005). In this context the idea of regulation of illness was intertwined with notions of purity, authenticity and nativist notions that are present in nationalist myths as well as the notions of heredity and degeneracy that were materialised in various medical and social public policies (Foucault 2003b; Nadesan 2008). But the starting point of all these notions was the notion of normality(norm)/abnormality that formed the basis for the biopolitical regulation of population(s) and individuals (Foucault 2003a; McWhorter 2009). Who or what populations were and are established as normal in the context of a specific territory was and is the outcome of the continuous operation of various modern racist and other discriminatory practices and discourses tied to specific normalising technologies and techniques of power and their correlative knowledge(s), and pertinent to modern liberal nation-states that (re)inscribe boundaries/borders between specific individuals and populations and situate them on the hierarchically structured normality (superiority) / abnormality (inferiority) continuum (Dillon and Neal 2008; Hindess 2001: 93; Reid 2006: 127–52). In the context of the modern biopolitical rationality the severe regulation of abnormal individuals and populations is established as an inevitability not only for the normal population's (nation's) survival but also for its health, progress and welfare due to the perception that these populations and individuals could and would if not regulated contaminate and endanger the normal population and its future that is being secured by the liberal nation-state (Foucault 2003b; Weitz 2003).

The crucial problem that biopolitical regulation faces is the paradoxical, dialectical, fluid nature of boundaries and borders between the normal and various abnormal populations and individuals. These boundaries and borders, although presented and perceived as clear and unproblematic as well as unchangeable, had to be historically inscribed. But even after they are inscribed they have to be continuously policed and re-inscribed due to the processes of constant negotiation of these boundaries and due to the resistance and socio-political struggles of those that were constituted as more or less deviating from the norm and normality. Although resistance is always possible and is continuously enacted, that does not mean that resistance in regard to normalisation practices and practices of exclu-

sion is always progressive and destabilizing for existing hierarchical social relations and discriminatory practices (Foucault 1978).

## THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN LIBERAL NATION-STATE

Although migrations played a crucial role in the establishment, development and transformation of the modern Western liberal nation-state and the global capitalist system (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Games 2009), the role of immigration and immigrants in the process of the constitution and development of the American liberal nation-state is even more central.

Firstly, the American liberal nation-state was established by British colonial settlers who together with other European settlers won the war of independence against the British and managed to become the first independent modern European colony and one of the first states with democratic political institutions based upon individual freedoms, civic and political rights, sovereignty of the people and representative government (Losurdo 2011).

Secondly, a substantial part of the population, i.e. the black slaves, who provided the crucial labour force that enabled not only political but economic independence of the new state by providing conditions of possibility for the development of fundamental industries, were also immigrants, but in contrast with the European immigrants whose migration was predominantly voluntary their migration was involuntary. The un-free labour of black slaves was foundational for the US capitalist economy (Fields 1990: 95–118; Glenn 2002).

Thirdly, the major expansion of the territory of the US was enabled by the forced migration (in certain cases elimination) of the native population of the territory of the US, the Native Americans (Calavita 2007: 1–20; Horsman 1981). Fourthly, the territorial expansion of the US was enacted also through wars against Mexico that resulted in forced and voluntary migration to Mexico from the occupied territory (Texas, California) and in 'non-physical' migration of a substantial population from the sovereignty of Mexico to the sovereignty of the US. Fifthly, for its development into an economic and geopolitical super power the US needed a constant flow of immigrants from all parts of the globe to populate its vast and empty territories and to ensure the labour force needed by the burgeoning American economy. Immigrant labour was instrumental in the transformation of the US from a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrial superpower. In this context immigrants represented a reserve of cheap labour that was fundamental for this transformation. The US is the only developed country that has substantially relied for its economic development on the labour of immigrants from Africa, Latin America, and Asia (Glenn 2002).

Finally, the voluntary migration of English and other European immigrants represents a constitutive part of the historical and contemporary processes and practices of the establishment, articulation, proliferation and popularization of the origin myth of the American nation and the American national identity. As David Gerber (2011: 1) observes, one of the crucial elements of this myth is the notion that Americans did not become a nation by accident. Depending on the intellectual frames that are co-constitutive of this myth (liberal, Christian-providential and racial), America became a nation by the free choice of those who choose to live in a democratic republic to which they swear allegiance and/or by the hand of providence that guided the chosen people to the promised land, the new Canaan and/or the unstoppable historical movement of civilization that travelled from Asia and the 'Asian' race to Europe and the 'white' race, and finally reached its apex in North America and the 'Anglo-Saxon' branch of the 'white' race, which was historically and/or naturally predisposed to rule the American continent and subsequently lead the world into a new era of progress and/or establish global dominance (Feagin 2001; Feagin 2010; Gerber 2011; Horsman 1981; Lipsitz 1995; McWhorter 2009). We can discern that the involuntary migrations of black slaves and migrations of people from non-European parts of the

world that substantially affected the present composition of the population of the US is predominantly silenced and de-legitimated as a central process that formed the population of the US in the context of the articulation of the American national identity. The actual heterogeneity of the population of the US and the multiple historical forms of the migrations that constituted it is absent from the predominant use of the word "Americans", which is routinely, if predominantly unconsciously used to mean "white Americans of European descent" (Feagin 2010). This demonstrates that only a specific part of the US population, a part conceived as descending from European immigrants and more specifically from immigrants from Northern Europe (especially England) was established and is conceived, perceived and presented as having an undisputed, objective, unproblematic right to represent the American nation, as having the sole right to reside on and as being naturally connected with the American territory, and as the only descendants of immigrants to become proper, normal Americans. In other words, this part of the population represents the collective norm (normality) of the entire American socio-political arrangement. It represents the central American biopolitical category and the population whose fostering, development and protecting is the central objective of the American liberal nation-state (McWhorter 2009).

But as we have already pointed out, no nation, population, or biopolitical category has natural, fixed and ahistorical boundaries. The boundaries of the 'proper' American (white, Anglo-Saxon, protestant) population/nation are the result of heterogeneous, dynamic and multidimensional historical processes and their continuous (re)inscription, (re)articulation, re-establishment, normalisation and policing in various sites and spaces and through multiple technologies and techniques of power and their correlative knowledge(s) as well as technologies of the self, organised in the context of specific *dispositifs* of power-knowledge of the American liberal nation-state. A *dispositif* is a specific dynamic system of relations among specific institutions, regulations, discourses, knowledge(s), technologies of power, spaces, architectural forms and technologies of the self, which are organised and in a specific historical and geopolitical context stabilised in regard to specific strategic functions. They are constantly evolving and incorporating new elements (Foucault 1980). Among various *dispositifs* present in the context of the American liberal nation-state we can identify the nationalist and racist *dispositifs* as crucial for the (re)establishment of the American nation and citizen. Their primary strategic functions can be identified as homogenising and normalising the population(s) according to a specific norm, establishing borders among specific biopolitical categories of the American liberal nation-state and thereby establishing these categories, establishing and securing the social order and cohesion and fostering loyalty to the American nation and the State, establishing, perpetuating and legitimating specific relations of inequality, exploitation, exclusion or hierarchical inclusion, and discrimination of certain socio-political groups and normalising the privileges of other groups.

In order to understand the role that immigrants and their regulation played and plays in the American socio-political and economic context, we have to address the specific characteristic of the American racist and nationalist *dispositif*.

## THE AMERICAN RACIST *DISPOSITIF*

From the outset the US was a *racist state* (Goldberg 2002) that was organised in the context of a specific continuum of superiority-inferiority, where two central extremes, two central biopolitical categories, a norm/normality and an anti-norm/abnormality were established and inscribed into the American society in order to enable and legitimize the exclusion, exploitation and discrimination of certain groups and establish and secure the dominance and privileged position of others. This was crucial in the context of the establishment of a democratic American republic that legitimated its revolution and its independence on the grounds of securing individual freedoms, ensuring the respect of civil and political rights, political representation, separation and limitation of powers, and equality with regard to the rights of

all American citizens (Feagin 2001). The American socio-political arrangement whose fundamental basis was a democratic political system that rejected every hereditary claim of individuals had to, in order to secure and legitimise the oppression, exploitation and discrimination of certain groups, establish a hereditary superiority of races and consequently naturalise these biopolitical categories.

As various authors argue (e.g. Calavita 2007: 1–20; Feagin 2001; Feagin 2010; Glenn 2002; Losurdo 2011; McWhorter 2009), the US was from its establishment until the mid-1960s a formal master-race democracy with massive legal discrimination that ranged from chattel slavery to legal segregation. For instance, the first citizenship law of the young American republic explicitly established that only white people could become naturalized citizens (Feagin 2010; Gerber 2011).

In fact, citizenship laws and policies played and play a crucial role in establishing boundaries among specific socio-political groups of the US population and in establishing biopolitical categories and the asymmetrical relationships of power among them. Together with other racist technologies and techniques of power and correlative knowledge(s) they established and inscribed the norm of the American socio-political arrangement. The central norm that was established and inscribed was the norm of the *white*, affluent, independent man, who is superior to other races and to women, who is rational, hard-working and active, who is the proper and unquestioned *master of the national space*, an enactor of law, a governor of the nation and responsible for its progress. He is an individual that carries the American creed of liberty, individuality and independence (Feagin 2010; Glenn 2002; Hage 2000). As Ruth Frankenberg (1996: 62–77) stresses, *Whiteness* and *Americanness* have been established as inextricably linked normative and exclusive categories, in relation to which all other socio-political groups are identified, marginalized and discriminated. But whiteness was not established in isolation. The establishment of this norm was inextricably linked to the establishment, perpetuation and inscription of the anti-norm into the discriminated, exploited, marginalised socio-political groups, namely the anti-norm of *Blackness*, the biopolitical category of blacks. The anti-norm of blackness was discursively established through specific ascribed traits. Blacks were perceived as anatomically different/inferior, as bestial, smelly, apelike and childlike. Additionally, they were conceived as unintelligent, uncivilized, immoral, criminal, dangerous, lazy, oversexed, ungrateful and rebellious, living in abnormal families (multi-generational/single-parent). They were perceived as unsuitable for democratic citizenship as well as alien and a potential biological, economic, social, cultural and political danger and disease (Cohen 1980; Curtin 1964; Feagin 2001; McWhorter 2009; Nadesan 2008). Together these representations (statements, images etc.) that established, proliferated and perpetuated the norm of *Whiteness* and the anti-norm of *Blackness* form a specific discursive field and a historical archive of representations that represents the conditions of possibility for contemporary conceptions and perceptions of the majority and specific minorities and immigrants. They constitute a crucial part of the American racist *dispositif*, namely its discursive field: a *white racial frame* (Feagin 2010) through which every socio-political group in the US population is conceived and situated. Whiteness and blackness represent the extremes of the hierarchical continuum of the American socio-political arrangement. The central importance of this normative dichotomy for the establishment, proliferation and persistence of other American biopolitical categories, its status as a template for other relations among American biopolitical categories and the specific position of blacks as the prototype of otherness against which other minorities and immigrants are compared and juxtaposed has been demonstrated by numerous authors (e.g. Calavita 2007: 1–20; De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003: 18–57; Kim 1999: 105–38; Ong 1996: 737–62; 2003). This white-black dichotomy can be attributed to specific and diametrically opposed socio-political and economic positions of English settlers and black slaves that were gradually established in the colonial context and strengthened after the constitution of the American republic. While the English settlers dominated socio-political and economic institutions of the colonies and of the independent republic, the black migrants were from the start the most subjugated socio-political group. They were the only socio-political group that migrated involuntary and they were dominated and exploited in larger numbers than other immigrants (Feagin 2001; Lipsitz 1995).

But in this context we must be careful not to ascribe naturalness and objectivity to specific biopolitical categories. Although the biopolitical category of white (American) and black (later African-American) seem from the point of view of ascribing membership in a specific category to certain individuals unproblematic and objective, the historical and contemporary socio-political realities of categorisation reveal the elusiveness and instability of markers of differentiation. In light of the propensity of populations to mix, blend and blur visual markers as well as individual and collective struggles and resistance against specific categorisations that had and have implications for the life-chances and opportunities of individuals and socio-political groups, these categorisations reveal themselves as fields of continuous socio-political struggle.

In other words, the central norm and anti-norm and the biopolitical categories have to be historically established and continuously (re)established, reinscribed, perpetuated and policed through the workings of the racist *dispositif* and its heterogeneous elements, ranging from legal, political, public and scientific discourses (on racial categories and their implications), specific disciplinary and regulatory spaces (families, schools, public spaces, factories etc.), to mass media and technologies and techniques of power (e.g. citizenship laws, censuses, documentation, segregation, ghettoization, social transfers), from structural macro differentiation to micro practices of privileging and discrimination present in the everyday actions of socio-political groups and individuals (Lipsitz 1995; McWhorter 2009; Nadesan 2008)

The multiple elements of the racist *dispositif* continuously racialize/categorise individuals and socio-political groups, thereby shaping everyday relationships, life-chances and opportunities of these individuals and groups by simultaneously giving and legitimizing unequal access to resources (material and symbolic) of specific biopolitical categories (races). The heterogeneous nature and the multidimensionality of the racist *dispositif* had and has crucial implications for understanding the historical persistence of the white-black dichotomy, its continuous transformation and adaptability to various resistances and struggles of specific socio-political groups and individuals against their discrimination, deprivilegation and marginalisation that they experienced as a consequence of being categorised into intellectually, socially and culturally biopolitical categories perceived as inferior.

Firstly, the heterogeneous and multidimensional nature of the racist *dispositif* was and is instrumental in the continuous re-establishment and re-inscription of the white norm in the face of the removal or limitation of certain formal racist technologies and techniques such as the restriction of full legal citizenship to white persons, which was achieved through historical struggles of discriminated socio-political groups. Secondly, these resistances and struggles (e.g. the white workers' struggle for political rights and the struggle of non-Northern European immigrants), although redrawing the boundaries of specific biopolitical categories, specific races and transforming the racist *dispositif*, predominantly neither subverted nor destabilized the central white-black dichotomy, nor (due to the adaptability of the racist *dispositif* and the American liberal nation-state and their technologies and techniques of power) were they radically destabilising and threatening to the asymmetrical power relations, asymmetrical distribution of wealth, relations of exploitation and discrimination and the overall socio-political order and cohesion of the US (Feagin 2010; Glenn 2002; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 1999). The majority of the excluded socio-political groups in fact struggled for inclusion by establishing themselves as different from blacks. They employed a marginally altered *white racial frame* through which they represented themselves as independent, free, hard-working (the perceived and perpetuated characteristics of the white elite) by simultaneously distancing themselves from the coloured population (slaves and free blacks), whom they conceived as dependent, lazy (criminal) and non-white (Feagin 2010; Roediger 1999).

## THE AMERICAN NATIONALIST *DISPOSITIF*, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN NATION

Although many of its heterogeneous elements are intertwined with the racist *dispositif* and it shares with it many discursive practices, statements, technologies and techniques of power and correlative knowledge(s), in contrast with the racist *dispositif*, the nationalist *dispositif* is characterized by an inner tension regarding the imagining of the American nation and American citizenship. Even though formal citizenship was and is considered and perceived as necessary condition for inclusion in the American nation and represents a crucial technique of division and discrimination, the possibility of its attainment and its actual power to secure full membership of the individual in the American nation has been and is made problematic by the two diametrically opposed conceptualisations of American citizenship and the American nation. On the one hand there were and are the consensual and egalitarian conceptualisations based upon ideas of democracy, liberty, equality of opportunities and individual achievement that determine membership in the American nation. Consequently, the American nation was and is conceptualised as an inclusive democratic community of free and independent individuals (Citrin, Reingold and Green 1990: 1124–54; Smith 1988). These conceptualisations to a certain extent provided one of the conditions for the possibility of the struggle of discriminated and excluded socio-political groups for inclusion and the conditions for the possibility of the transformation of certain formal regulations. They also provided and provide hope for immigrants that they will be accepted, included and offered opportunities to succeed.

On the other hand and in view of the historically predominant conceptualisations and practices of citizenship, the bordering of the American nation and American citizenship, there were and are conceptualisations that posit an ascriptive Americanism. These conceptualisations emphasize the notion of Americans as special people endowed with superior intellectual and moral traits associated with certain ascriptive traits such as religion, gender and race (Smith 1988). In this context it is crucial to point out that these conceptualisations predominantly conceive the racial character of the American nation as a specific branch of the white/Caucasian race, namely Anglo-Saxon. To be a full member of the American nation, to have full citizenship one had and has to be of the Anglo-Saxon race. As the central racial referent of the American nation, the Anglo-Saxon race is in this conceptualisation established as inherently superior to other races and as the sole reason for the superiority of American political institutions, its economic progress and the manifest destiny to conquer and/or dominate the entire globe. Democratic political institutions and individual freedoms are conceived as being inscribed in the blood, and therefore only Anglo-Saxons possessed the moral and intellectual qualities required for democratic citizenship (Citrin, Reingold and Green 1990: 1124–54; Horsman 1981).

What needs to be pointed out is that although racial exclusion and hierarchical stratification was central to the history of American citizenship and the American nation, the American nation is predominantly perceived as having been and being determined by universal inclusion and egalitarianism and not in any way tied to specific race or gender (Glenn 2002). This specific mythological interpretation of history is one of the central elements of the American national mythology through which the American nation is imagined and perceived nationally and globally.

Consequently, it is one of the crucial elements of the nationalist *dispositif* through which the American nation was and is continuously (re)established and through which clear boundaries between the membership and non-membership of certain socio-political groups in the American nation are established, inscribed and proliferated.

It is perpetuated in political and public discourses (mass media), entertainment (films, literature) and through the academic writings of crucial American social scientists (Lipsitz 1995). It is materialised

in central national symbols such as the Statue of Liberty and in certain daily practices such as the *Pledge of Allegiance*.

Two things are crucial regarding the nationalist *dispositif* and specifically the aforementioned selective/mythologizing historical memory. Firstly, the nationalist *dispositif* enacts continuous processes of the whitening of American history in the sense of making American history an essentially white history and in the sense of cleaning history of the rivers of blood that were the result of oppression (slavery, land grabbing), killings and genocide that accompanied the modernisation of the US. This has the function of silencing certain historical conflicts and antagonisms by (re)inscribing the boundaries of the American nation through homogenising the experience of socio-political groups perceived and conceived as white. Regardless of their actual inequalities, the perceived and acknowledged members of the American nation can conceive of themselves and be conceived of as sharing a destiny, a common interest, beliefs, culture and blood (Poole 1999). On the other hand it excludes the experiences of other socio-political groups and intensifies conflicts and transfers these antagonisms onto the territorial and biopolitical borders between white/Americans and non-white/not-quite or non-Americans. In this context it articulates and establishes the idea of the dangerousness of certain socio-political groups whose regulation and/or removal is crucial to the prosperity and future of the American nation. Modern power cannot operate without establishing boundaries between the population that has to be fostered and the populations that represent a threat and danger to this population which is perceived as homogenous (Anderson 1991; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Greenfeld 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Marx 2003).

Secondly, although it is a constitutive part of the American liberal nation-state, the nationalist *dispositif* together with the American racist *dispositif* operates on the global level (e.g. through Hollywood films, consumer goods) hence proliferating and popularising the whitened, liberal, freedom-loving, land of opportunity self-perception of the US among global populations whose immigration to the US is crucial for the functioning of its capitalist economy (Glenn 2002). It also establishes a specific referential frame for potential immigrants of what to expect, how to position themselves, which category is superior, the norm, the part of the population which must be emulated and the part(s) and socio-political groups established as problematic and therefore dangerous (Gregory and Sanjek 1996; Merry 2003).

## **THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL, HETEROGENEOUS AND COMPLEX ROLE(S) OF IMMIGRATION REGULATION AND IMMIGRANTS IN THE AMERICAN SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT**

Building upon the analyses of the complexity of the modern socio-political arrangement and the American liberal nation-state, this final part of our analysis will explore the multidimensional, heterogeneous and complex roles of immigrants and immigration regulation. These can become visible and understandable precisely through a broader examination of the general characteristics of the Western socio-political arrangement and the specific characteristics of the American liberal nation-state.

In this final section we will focus upon the role of immigrants, more specifically on groups and individuals who through the formalised regulation of their entry into the US since the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century have been established, categorised, classified, documented, regulated, conceived and perceived as immigrants.

There has been limited regulation of immigration since the establishment of the American republic. But not until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century was the regulation of immigration established as a legitimate and central concern and a field of substantial intervention of the federal government. Before that immigration was regulated by local authorities at crucial entry points into the US, especially ports (Brickner

and Hanson 2003: 203–37; Dow 2004). The beginning of the federal regulation of immigration can be located in the 1870s when the economic boom in California that attracted a large number of Chinese workers ended. The Californian economy was confronted with a severe economic depression and the white (Anglo-Saxon) workers perceived that their living standards were threatened by the low wages acceptable to many Chinese workers. Consequently, white workers began protesting against the presence of Chinese workers and further Chinese immigration. But their protests were not effective until certain processes and elements converged in the 1880s and 1890s. In this period, workers' protests were beginning to take effect due to the political opportunism of certain political elites who depended on the workers' votes, a certain fear among American elites of potential disorder, violent upheavals and the destabilisation of existing hierarchical social order based upon worker exploitation, the appearance of new scientific theories of racial differences that intertwined with a new understanding of diseases, heredity and degeneration and the rise of ideas of biopolitical regulation of the population that were proliferated by the increasing popularity and importance of the eugenics movement (Higham 2002; Lee 2003; McWhorter 2009; Ong 1996: 737–62; Salyer 1995). As Lucy Salyer (1995) observes, (pseudo) scientific findings that depicted the Chinese as biologically incapable of democratic citizenship and a "yellow peril" to America's bloodstream gained general acceptance among the American elites and the general population.

In subsequent years other immigrants were established in (pseudo)scientific theories that informed the political and public debates and policies as naturally lacking the capabilities needed for acquiring legal citizenship and as a danger to the healthy, superior American population (Higham 2002; Lee 2003; Nadesan 2008).

The issue of biopolitical regulation of immigration became not only a legitimate political issue but a central one. It became and remains a central political issue because simultaneously with the establishment of Chinese and later other immigrants, depending on their perceived position in the American racial hierarchy as a biopolitical threat or capable of hierarchical integration, the boundaries of American citizenship and nation were and are drawn, their perceived characteristics (cosmopolitan, exclusive-ascriptive-unchanged racial/cultural core), core values (individualism, independence, homogeneity, nativism) and visual/biological markers (whiteness, masculinity) and consequently the norm was (re) articulated and defined. In this context the experience of acknowledged members of the biopolitical category of whites was homogenised, the frustration of the white workers was redirected and their resistance was de-radicalised, which not only limited the threat to the existing American socio-political and economic hierarchy and order but strengthened and reinforced the racist nature of this hierarchical order. That the regulation of immigration and immigrants still plays a central role in American political debates can clearly be observed in various contexts from presidential elections to state and local elections, from the federal level to the local and community levels, from formal politics to political movements (e.g. the Tea Party). The issue of immigration and the status (rights) and membership of immigrants remain crucial contexts where the boundaries of the American nation and citizenship are drawn, where a socio-political battle rages between two central conceptions of the American nation and citizenship. In other words, it is one of the crucial issues where continuous (re)definition is performed regarding the boundaries and characteristics of Americans (Brickner and Hanson 2003: 203–37; Carter, Green and Halpern 1996: 135–57). That this issue is crucial for America's self-definition can also be observed in scholarly works, which due to their perceived objectivity and neutrality have substantially influenced public and political debates and play an important role in the nationalist and racist *dispositif* in re-establishing and perpetuating the biopolitical boundaries. In this context one of the crucial works is Samuel Huntington's *Who Are We?*, not only due to its being widely cited and discussed, but even more so due to its arguments regarding the boundaries of the American nation and American citizenship and the dangers that they are facing. Huntington rearticulates the norm of the American nation and American citizenship that we identified and explored in the previous sections, namely the norm of the white Anglo-Saxon male. However, due to the de-legitimisation of explicit racial hierarchies since

the 1960s (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Barker 1982), he replaces the concept of race with the concept of culture that functions similarly as race. Culture becomes nature in his arguments, where he posits that there is a centuries-old unchangeable core of American culture that is and must remain Anglo-American (Anglo-Saxon). In this context he establishes the non-assimilation of Mexican immigrants as the crucial danger for the future prosperity of the US (Huntington 2004) and consequently establishes them as a biopolitical threat to the proper American population whose members are proper American citizens subscribing to the American creed of liberty and independence. Simultaneously, he implicitly positions himself, a white, affluent Anglo-Saxon male, as being a universal representative of the American nation.

By drawing upon a discursive archive of statements and the universal norm of the American liberal nation-state established historically and in the context of the nationalist and racist *dispositif*, he articulates a clear and unproblematic dichotomy between proper Americans (who are established as white, independent, moral, intelligent, rational, hardworking, democratic, live in normal nuclear families, name their children Michael, eat ketchup etc.) and Mexican immigrants (who are established as dark-skinned, irrational, lazy, live in multigenerational or single parent families, name their children Jose, eat salsa etc.) that parallels the white-black dichotomy (see Huntington 2004). In this context, Mexican immigrants are established as non-citizens and as non-members of the American nation, as a danger to it and as simultaneously and in a certain sense perversely responsible for their own exclusion from the American nation that is despite its exclusionary and discriminatory history in Huntington's argument imagined as based upon inclusion and equal opportunities for all and therefore on the homogeneity of experiences (Johnson and Hing 2005: 1347–90).

What is crucial is that the (re)articulation and the (re)establishment of boundaries between the proper American nation and citizens and specific biopolitical categories such as Chinese, Mexican and other immigrants did not destabilise the central coordinates of the American liberal nation-state, namely the white Anglo-Saxon norm and the white-black dichotomy which evolved and were reinforced. The white-black dichotomy was made more complex (various categories of non-whites and whites) and became even more embedded through the development of specific technologies and techniques of power and correlative knowledge(s) in the contexts of the implementation of the regulation of immigration and immigrants. As various authors (Calavita 2007: 1–20; De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003: 18–57; Feagin 2001; Glenn 2002; McWhorter 2009; Ong 2003; Santa Ana 2002) demonstrate, immigrant racialization and African-American racialization have been integrally connected. For instance, the congressional debates over Chinese exclusion in the 1880s were replete with references to African-Americans as incapable of democratic citizenship, not being proper members of the American nation and being a burden and a threat (Calavita 2007: 1–20).

The federal regulation of immigration began with the adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which suspended Chinese immigration to the US. The act constituted a crucial precedent by institutionalising biopolitical rationality as central to immigration lawmaking and the regulation (restriction, prevention) of immigration in the sense of establishing racial categories and racist hierarchies in order to foster the superior American population and limit contagion, dangers and threats (Lee 2003; Salyer 1995). By being enshrined in law and implemented in practice, the biopolitical rationality and racial categories and hierarchies were in a dialectical way legitimated in the eyes of the general American population (Glenn 2002).

But the central turning point in the regulation of immigration in the US was the Immigration Act of 1891. This was the first comprehensive immigration law and it established a centralized institution, the Bureau of Immigration, which was given the right and responsibility to enforce immigration laws (Brickner and Hanson 2003: 203–37).

The Act was an unambiguous statement of the centralized authority of the federal government (Gerber 2011). It formally assigned responsibility for the biopolitical assessment of individuals seeking entrance to the national government, which was consequently established as the guardian of the American nation and the American territory. The establishment of federal immigration regulation was

central to the maturing of the American liberal nation-state. It legitimated the centralization of authority in the eyes of the American public through the codification of biopolitical concerns and it resulted in the gradual development of a massive bureaucratic machine that was needed to enforce federal immigration laws (Lee 2003; Nadesan 2008). The federal regulation of immigration was simultaneously an exercise of sovereignty at the territorial borders of the US and an exercise of biopower in the sense of establishing and inscribing, perpetuating and policing the boundaries between the American nation and American citizens and different categories of immigrants established as more or less biopolitically beneficial or threatening to the prosperity of the American nation and its members.

What has to be stressed is the central role that the regulation of immigrants and immigration played in the process of establishing the American nation as a biopolitically imagined community and establishing the legitimacy, the central authority and the capacity of the American liberal nation-state to biopolitically regulate the American population (McWhorter 2009; Nadesan 2008). The immigrants were one of the first parts of the US population to be exposed to the massive bureaucratic procedures of the state apparatuses. They served as “experimental” subjects to multiple, multidimensional and novel technologies and techniques of power and knowledge production. For instance, the Chinese immigrants were the first part of the US population that was disciplined through documentation. They were the first group that had to obtain a “certificate” that identified them (Brickner and Hanson 2003: 203–37). Immigrants were also the first to be subjected to IQ tests that were later applied to the entire American population. The implementation and the functioning of the IQ test was and is a specific template for the wider implementation and functioning of other technologies of power due to their dual role as a technique for the production of knowledge on immigrants and identification/bordering of dangerous populations and the calculation of the dangers they pose to the normal and healthy American population, and a technique of power that disciplines immigrants and whose published results manufacture fear of degeneracy among the American population (Dowbiggin 1997).

The context of the regulation of immigrants and immigration was one of the crucial contexts of the gradual development of technologies and techniques of power and correlative knowledge(s) that were later implemented and employed for regulating, controlling, disciplining and surveillance of the entire American population and its homogenisation and normalisation, whereby the boundaries between the proper American population/nation and the not-quite normal and/or abnormal parts of the population and populations was continuously re-established and inscribed into the bodies of individuals (McWhorter 2009).

Whereas certain techniques of power and knowledge production were later applied to the entire American population, others such as immigration quotas, visas, asylum, retroactive enforcement of laws, naturalisation procedures, continuous detention and deportation were primarily or exclusively used upon immigrants. But these techniques had and have wider implications for the continuous processes of drawing boundaries between the American nation and American citizens and individuals or groups established and perceived as not-quite or non-members and non-citizens; they perform continuous biopolitical regulation by classifying, categorising, identifying, calculating the risks/dangers, regulating/preventing/removing potential dangerous for the health of the American nation, its social order and cohesion, its political and social institutions and consequently securing them. They continuously establish and promote a sense of security among the general American public and the complementary sense of insecurity that has to be addressed through the regulation of immigration and immigrants. By establishing/representing/regulating immigrants variously as a biopolitical peril, communists/anarchists (since the October Revolution and during the Cold War), criminals (since the Reagan administration) and terrorists (especially since 9/11), they visualise/materialise tangible threats to the American nation and establish and reinforce the perception of the American state apparatuses as being able to secure the American territory and the American nation and its socio-political institutions. This became even more crucial in the context of globalisation processes and neoliberal socio-political transformations of the American society that represented the state not as a solution for socio-political issues but as

a problem. Furthermore, these technologies and techniques have racialized (until 1952 and the removal of racial barriers for immigration) and criminalized immigrants and securitized and depoliticized the issue of immigration (Diken 2004: 83–106; Pikalo and Trdina 2009: 41–62) in the sense that immigrants are predominantly established as a calculable potential threat that needs to be more or less severely regulated depending on threat level calculations. Hence it is paradoxically a central political issue that is thoroughly depoliticized through specific threat calculations and statistics perceived as objective.

Due to certain historical processes, events and struggles (e.g. WWII, the de-legitimisation of explicit racist theories and hierarchies, the civil rights movement) and the specific historical political context, some technologies and techniques have been removed (e.g. race-based quotas, retroactive enforcement of naturalization laws) while others have evolved (e.g. quotas, visas, deportation). In this context the persistent central importance of formal American citizenship as a technology for bordering the American nation has to be emphasised. Although the status of formal American citizen if it is acquired by immigrants disables some technologies for regulating immigrants (e.g. it removes the possibility of deportation) (Dow 2004), this did and does not mean that individuals who were established and perceived as non-members of the American nation through other technologies and techniques enjoy the same protection of rights as a citizens conceived and perceived as full members of the American nation. For instance, the historical example of the incarceration in concentration camps of Japanese-Americans and the recent example of continuous surveillance and formalised discrimination of Arab-Americans despite their formal citizenship status (Engle 2004: 59–114).

In addressing the role of the regulation of immigrants and immigration and the roles played by immigrants, we must not forget the very important role that they play in the context of the American economy. The technologies and techniques of biopolitical regulation and capitalist accumulation were and are inextricably linked and not only operate simultaneously but certain technologies and techniques also perform both functions (e.g. restrictive immigration quotas) in the sense of establishing biopolitical categories, thereby establishing and inscribing boundaries between the full members of the American nation and the not-quite or non-members, as well as calculating their potential threat and on the other hand providing the American economy with the needed cheap racialized labour of immigrants. These technologies and techniques co-produce a specific category of discriminated workers. Certain industries such as agribusiness, the sweat trades and the service sector rely substantially on not only legal but illegal immigrant labour (Alexseev 2006; Cohen 2006; Dow 2004; Simon 1999). Agribusiness could not be profitable without employing a large immigrant labour force that is expendable, cheap and non-organised, and which is in certain areas predominantly illegal and therefore lives in constant fear of detention and consequent deportation, and which can be easily employed as an instrument to put pressure on American workers (Dow 2004). Technologies and techniques for regulating immigrants and immigration not only provide indirect profits for private businesses, but also direct profits due to the privatization of immigrant detention centres and the increasingly restrictive immigration policies and practices that have produced a large population of illegal immigrants and ensure a growing number of inmates and consequently a continuously increasing flow of profits (Diken 2004: 83–106; Dow 2004). Illegal immigrants also play an important biopolitical role as a materialised threat, an object to redirect the anxieties and dissatisfaction and anger of (white) workers and American citizens and as object through which the boundaries of the American nation are drawn (Kerber 2007: 1–34; McWhorter 2009).

Immigrants also play a crucial role as active subjects and relays of power in the context of regulation of immigrants and immigration as well as in the functioning of the American liberal nation-state. On the one hand they are crucial as economic subjects not only as workers but also as consumers, taxpayers and savers (Simon 1999). On the other hand they are crucial relays of power in re-establishing, re-articulating the biopolitical categorisations, the white (Anglo-Saxon) male norm, the white-black dichotomy, the socio-political hierarchies and the consequent functioning of the racist and nationalist *dispositifs*. In their striving to be integrated into the American society, to become hierarchically included into it and in their resistance to their negative representations in the general public, immigrants em-

ploy the white racial frame and reinforce the white-black dichotomy by proclaiming their distance from African-Americans. They struggle for recognition and acceptance and integration through denigrating African-Americans by employing similar negative representations for blacks (lazy, welfare dependent, privileged) and self-representations (hard-working, tax-paying, independent and self-reliant) as the white majority or 'proper Americans', thereby despite resistance reinforcing the dominant socio-political order, exclusion, exploitation and hierarchical inclusion (Calavita 2007: 1–20; De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003: 18–57; Ong 1996: 737–62; Salyer 1995).

## CONCLUSION

By firstly analysing the general characteristics of the modern Western socio-political arrangements and the specific characteristics of the American liberal nation-state, the article established a complex analytical frame that enabled the identification and analysis of the multiple, heterogeneous and complex roles that immigrants and immigration and their regulation played in the historical and contemporary American socio-political context. This analytical frame enabled us to analyse the specific roles that certain historically established categories of immigrants played and play in the American context, why they play these roles and what the central implications of their roles are. We argued that immigrants and immigration were crucial to the establishment of the American republic, that specific immigration and immigrants (white, English) were established as the core and the norm of the American nation and its mythology while others were established as the anti-norm (black), and that immigrants played and play a crucial function of establishing the boundaries of the American nation. Furthermore, we argued that immigration and immigrants played a central role in the economic development of the US and that the regulation of immigrants and immigration was crucial for the development of the American state apparatuses, for legitimating biopolitical regulation of the American society and for developing capabilities for the regulation, disciplining, controlling and surveillance of the entire US population as well as establishing capabilities for the continuous re-inscription of borders between the proper American nation and citizens and the non-members. Finally, we argued that immigrants play an indispensable economic and political role in the contemporary American context by providing a source of profit, by being an object of fear and foreignness on which basis the boundaries of the American nation are drawn as well as playing the role of active subjects in reinforcing the central coordinates of the American socio-political hierarchies.

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## SUMMARY

### »Če ne bi obstajali, bi si jih morali izmisliti.« Vloga priseljencev in njihovo reguliranje v ameriškem družbeno-političnem kontekstu

Blaž ILC

Članek analizira in kritično premišlja multidimenzionalno, heterogeno in kompleksno vlogo, ki so jo imigranti in njihova regulacija igrali v kontekstu vzpostavljanja, transformacije, perpetuiranja in legitimiranja družbenopolitične ureditve ZDA. Pri tem delno naslovi še vedno osrednjo vlogo, ki jo igrajo imigranti, regulacija imigracije in imigrantov v politični, družbeni, kulturni in gospodarski sferi sodobnih ZDA. V tem okviru članek zagovarja tezo, da so imigranti igrali in igrajo ključno vlogo pri vzpostavljanju, utrjevanju, razvoju in transformacijah Ameriške republike, pri čemer naslovi predvsem specifičnost vzpostavljanja ameriške družbenopolitične ureditve napram drugim Zahodnim družbenopolitičnim ureditvam, ki so bila ravno tako vzpostavljena preko multiplih in heterogenih migracijskih procesov. V tem okviru kritično premišlja osrednjo vlogo imigrantov v simbolnem in materialnem procesu vzpostavljanja, utrjevanja in perpetuiranja kolektivne ameriške nacionalne identitete, ameriške nacije in ameriškega državljan(stv)a kot tudi njihovem zamejevanju na specifične dele ameriške populacije preko dveh osrednjih prepletajočih se oblastno-vednostnih dispozitivov (zbirov heterogenih elementov, in sicer oblastnih praks, urbanistično-arhitekturnih form, diskurzov, vednosti in subjektivnih pozicij organiziranih in temporalno stabiliziranih okrog specifičnih strateških funkcij) družbenopolitične ureditve ZDA, in sicer rasističnega in nacionalističnega dispozitiva. Preko analize slednjih dispozitivov sta identificirani in reflektirani tako norma (beli protestantski Anglo-Ameriški moški) kot anti-norma (črni Afro-Američani) ameriške družbeno-politične ureditve, ki sta utemeljeni na dveh družbenopolitičnih skupinah z diametralno nasprotno historično migracijsko izkušnjo (svobodno na eni in prisilno/suženjsko na drugi strani). V kontekstu refleksije norme in anti-norme je kot ključen razlog za njuno kontinuirano historično reartikuliranje in perpetuiranje identificirana njihova osrednja funkcija, ki jo igra za zagotavljanja legitimnosti in ohranjanje kohezivnosti ameriške družbenopolitične ureditve v smislu zamejevanja »pravih« Američanov in lociranja »nepravih« ameriških formalnih državljanov ter »nevarnih, temnopoltih« imigrantov, ki jih je potrebno regulirati, disciplinirati, hierarhično umestiti v ameriško družbeno-politično ureditev ali fizično in simbolno izključiti iz nje zaradi percipirane nevarnosti, ki jo tako osmišljane družbenopolitične skupine utelešajo. Hkrati z analizo vloge imigrantov, ki so jo in jo igrajo v simbolno-materialnem

vzpostavljanju ameriške nacionalne identitete, nacije in državljan(stv)a, članek kritično analizira vlogo, ki jo je igralo vzpostavljanje vedno bolj institucionalizirane in strukturirane regulacije imigracijskih procesov v okviru vzpostavljanja in legitimiranja moderne birokratsko-centralizirane ameriške države, ki je ravno preko institucij za regulacijo migracijskih procesov vzpostavila sposobnost in legitimnost za interveniranje v ameriško populacijo. Članek delno analizira tudi ključno vlogo imigrantov pri vzpostavitvi in razvoju ZDA v gospodarsko velesilo ter ohranjanju in utrjevanju njene osrednje globalne gospodarske pozicije preko vedno novih valov imigrantov. Pri tem naslovi tako vlogo, ki jo imigranti igrajo kot delovna sila v delovno intenzivnih panogah ameriškega gospodarstva v smislu kontinuiranega vira dobička v smislu neposrednega izkoriščanja imigrantov kot tudi v smislu inštrumentov za omejevanje pravic ameriških delavcev.

# CITIZENSHIP AS METAPHOR

Jernej PIKALO<sup>1</sup>

COBISS: 1.01

## ABSTRACT

### **Citizenship as Metaphor**

The aim of the paper is to analyse metaphors used in imagining forms of citizenship. It moves away from the conventional formula of researching citizens as metaphors in various contexts and introduces a new research perspective: relations between citizens as metaphors. It begins by outlining five major theoretical and methodological considerations relevant to a study of metaphors. The second part of the paper deals with complexities of change in citizenship concepts through metaphors from organic to body politic, mechanistic and multidivisional (regional, global, social, sexual, etc) in the era of globalisation. KEY WORDS: citizenship, metaphors, changes in citizenship, era of globalisation.

## IZVLEČEK

### **Državljanstvo kot metafora**

Članek analizira uporabo metafor pri zamišljanju različnih oblik državljanstva. Konvencionalni način preučevanja metafor državljana in državljanstva v različnih kontekstih zamenja z novim raziskovalnim pogledom: odnosi državljana kot metafore. V prvem delu članek očrta pet teoretskih in metodoloških za študij metafor relevantnih opažanj. V drugem delu pa prikazuje kompleksnost sprememb v metaforičnih konceptualizacijah državljanstva v dobi globalizacije, od organskih do telesnih, mehanicističnih, večnivojskih (regionalnih, globalnih, družbenih, seksualnih itn.).

KLJUČNE BESEDE: državljanstvo, metafore, spremembe pri državljanstvu, doba globalizacije

## INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, metaphors have played an important role in the political imagination. They have been used in various contexts to generate perceptions and images of politics that have necessarily changed as conceptions in other domains (science, nature, medicine, mechanics, etc.) have changed. Politics has usually been viewed as being on the receiving end of the relationship, borrowing imagery and vocabulary from other domains.

This paper has the particular task of looking into the specific role of citizenship metaphors and their trajectories of change. It begins by outlining five major theoretical considerations relevant to the study

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of metaphors. It shows that in the last two decades the study of political metaphors has moved from analysis of the ornamental functions of metaphors to a constructivist view of metaphors as ontologically creative. The second part of the paper deals with complexities of change in citizenship concepts through metaphors from organic to body politic, mechanistic and multidivisional (regional, global, social, sexual, etc) in the era of globalisation.

The paper shows the trajectories of the development of citizenship through the perspective of metaphor. This may be a rather unconventional way of approaching the topic, but we believe that in this way we can add a new perspective. We would like to change the conventional formula of researching citizenship metaphors and move away from researching citizens as metaphors in various contexts, and introduce a new perspective: relations between citizens as metaphors. It is the relations the citizens are subjected to or relations that they (re)produce that define the role of the citizen. Various metaphors have been used throughout history to describe/create the relations that form the concept of citizen and citizenship. In this paper we therefore present a historical analysis of citizen relations as they have emerged in ontologically creative metaphors over time.

## CITIZENSHIP METAPHORS: FIVE ISSUES

### One: Is metaphor just a literary device?

Metaphors have a long history in politics. One of the most persistent questions about the nature and role of political metaphors has been the distinction between the metaphorical and literal meanings of political concepts. The 1771 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* states:

Metaphor, in rhetoric, a trope, by which we put a strange word for a proper word, by reason of its resemblance to it; a simile or comparison intended to enforce or illustrate the thing we speak of, without the signs or forms of comparison (quoted in Miller 2003: 3).

A metaphor can be a number of things. It can be just a rhetorical device, a figure of speech, a tool in language, a device of poetic imagination, a deviant linguistic expression, a matter of words rather than thought or action, the primary role for which the depiction of social reality with a word is different from the one usually understood to be literal. Or, as we have come to know it since the linguistic turn in social sciences and its accompanying linguistic-based methodologies, as something 'more' than just ornament of language.

The Greek roots of the word 'metaphor' have very little to do with metaphor as a corrupting device in language. Metaphor, literally meaning 'to carry over', is in the Aristotelian tradition characteristically defined in terms of movement, change with respect to location, mainly movement 'from ... to' (Ricoeur 1981: 17; see also the chapters by Fridolfsson, Honohan, Mottier and Howarth and Griggs in Carver & Pikalo 2008). Aristotle applies the word 'metaphor' to every transposition in terms. Metaphor functions as a kind of borrowing; the borrowed meaning is opposed to the 'proper' meaning, one resorts to metaphors to fill a semantic void, and a borrowed word takes the place of an absent proper word where such a place exists (Ricoeur 1981: 17–18).

In the Aristotelian tradition metaphors do not have an ontologically creative function. They may, however, disturb an already established logical order of language where transposition operates. They may bring upon an already established order a new one, since the transposition operates within this established order. Aristotle's process of *epiphora* (movement from ... to) rests on a perception of resemblance, established ontologically prior to metaphor itself. Metaphors just add meanings, fill semantic voids, and substitute where necessary, but they do not have a creative (constructive) function. Aristo-

tle's ontological assumption is that language is transparent to reality and that metaphors are operating within this already established order.

The classical perception of metaphor as having merely a substitutive function was challenged by Max Black in his seminal study *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (1962). According to Black, metaphor does more than just substitute for a literal term (see Zashin and Chapman 1974: 296–7; Ricoeur 1981: 83–90; Maasen 1995: 14–15), when a speaker chooses to replace it with another expression different from a supposed 'normal', 'proper' meaning. Mere substitution introduces no new information and has therefore no cognitive function. Black's 'interaction view' of metaphor, on the other hand, goes beyond a merely decorative function for metaphor. It emphasises cognitive function by stressing the re-organisation and transformation of the original term. Metaphor operates by describing one phenomenon in terms of the other. By this it evokes re-organisation of meanings in both domains and reciprocity of impact.

Metaphor can also have a function of rendering certain views as prominent – by emphasising some details and de-emphasising others. In this it functions almost like a pair of tinted glasses through which a re-organisation of the view of the observed object is viewed. A successful metaphor establishes a privileged perspective on the object and thus becomes normalised – in this, it disappears as metaphor (Maasen 1995: 14–15).

With regard to citizenship metaphors it is important to note that different metaphors used in the conceptual history of citizenship are not just ornaments of language, rhetorical devices or, said very plainly, nicer words replacing others, but that they serve ontologically creative purposes. They construct our understanding of citizenship, they are tools for discursive constructions and consequently our understanding of political reality, political relations and processes. They are vehicles for the production of subjects and objects that participate in what are generally regarded as (global) political processes. As discursive constructions change, so do conceptualisations of citizenship. Trajectories of metaphorical change are therefore good indicators of the changes in understanding and constructing of citizenship.

## Two: The ontologically creative function of metaphors

Metaphors can therefore perform functions other than just corrupting language. They are also creative of the world and reality. This does not, however, mean that there must be an unequivocal/linear/singular relation between the language and the world. Social theory and twentieth-century social science methodologies have offered numerous insights and solutions to this question; most post-positivist theories reject the notion that writing and thinking are transparent activities performed by historically and socially 'cleansed' or 'disembedded' subjects. Non-empirical and non-positivist political studies rely heavily on the narrative form of explanation, thereby rejecting the view of language as literal, static and intersubjectively and transhistorically uniform. They argue instead for a multifaceted view of language that includes paradoxes and antitheses as *constructive* elements of the world-creating process (see Zashin and Chapman 1974: 294).

The way we organise our perceptions of the world (and the world itself) is very much dependent upon the ways through which we form knowledge about the world. These may be called traditions, cultures, discourses, epistemic realities governing the production of knowledge, and conceptualisations through power relations, the bottom line being that knowledge is dependent upon the structures governing its production. Metaphors are therefore dependent upon the same structures, functioning in this respect as myths, rendering the unintelligible intelligible and the non-empirical empirical. It is through metaphor that the abstract field of 'the political' *becomes* empirical as a matter of reality, and thus a world that political science can purport to explain.

Thought processes that create the world are irreducibly metaphorical in their structure; the world is rendered intelligible through metaphor (cf. Lakoff 1980/2003). Citizenship metaphors, *inter alia*, are

manifestations of these thought processes through which the political world and its processes become intelligible. In this way, metaphors inscribe meanings and produce political realities that stretch the limits of our imaginations.

This poetic function of metaphor presents a potential for construction and creativity in politics. It is closely connected with the transference of meanings from one domain to the other. As such it is a challenge and a potential for the transformation of meanings across any number of domains. One result of these processes may be that grids of intelligibility themselves become unstable, requiring a re-articulation of knowledge and identity not just epistemically but also ontologically.

### Three: Contextualisation of metaphors

Isolated statements or utterances are the usual units of metaphorical analysis for cognitive linguists. This is also the path that most analysts of political metaphors have taken. That approach is somewhat problematic for citizenship metaphors, because it fails to take into account the wider contexts of statements and discourses and the circumstances of their production (see the chapter by Mottier in Carver & Pikalo 2008). Social and political contexts play a major role in how citizenship metaphors are defined, how they function and what their meanings are. The contingency of historical contexts should be taken into account in order to situate metaphors within political, social, and scientific relations of power and resistance against those relations of power. Metaphors develop their meanings in this interplay of texts and contexts, albeit not in a linear causality between the two.

The principal weakness of analyzing metaphors in a text-context hermeneutical fashion is in the neglecting of power relations and the institutions that structure that context. The aim of the research of citizenship metaphors (and in social sciences in general) should be to locate metaphors in wider contexts, beyond mere statements and their meanings. We should be interested in discursive power relations/epistemic realities that permit/forbid the emergence of citizenship metaphors. The analysis should question the *mode* of existence of citizenship metaphors – what it means for them to have appeared when, where and by whom they did – and why they and not others.

The research endeavour should be to find out what were/are the ways and efforts to stabilize, fix and possibly to materialize the dominant meaning of citizenship through metaphors. To see how knowledge of citizenship (concepts, theories, etc.) were structured and changed via metaphor. How knowledge was ordered and othered through metaphors. Grids of intelligibility in a discourse (e.g. political discourse) are inherently unstable, requiring constant and repeated re-articulation of knowledge and identity. Intelligibility through a 'regime of truth' is not done once and for all; historical transformations and discontinuities are regular. Historical contexts are contingent. Authorized speakers are required to produce and reproduce knowledge in order to maintain it. This requires them to be situated in wider epistemic realities. In short, the analysis of citizenship metaphors should be about what metaphors *do* to the systems of representation and meaning and *how* they do it.

Metaphors are not ontologically prior to historical contexts or discourses as 'regimes of truth'. They are not outside of the historical contexts. They emerge in the very field of the battle for meaning and play their roles. They signify and materialize the concept of citizenship, they order and reorder it.

### Four: The role of audience(s)

The role of the reader/audience in the process of meaning production is largely neglected in constructivist thought. Readers' tacit knowledge structures and cognitive schemata are important ontological elements in materializing the world. Double hermeneutics, whereby a researcher (i.e. reader) also ques-

tions and takes into account his/her cognitive structures and tacit contextual knowledge during an analysis of someone else's text, is essential in researching metaphors.

Which metaphors will come into play and become dominant is dependent not just upon the discursive background, but also by the non-discursive one. Foucault (1972: 157) has described the non-discursive background in terms of 'an institutional field, a set of events, practices and political decisions, a sequence of economic processes that involve demographic fluctuations, techniques of public assistance, manpower needs, different levels of unemployment, etc.' Discourses in themselves cannot force. They acquire force through their influence on human actors in the form of research agendas, funding opportunities, focusing research energies, political issues, emerging social questions, trends etc. The success of metaphors as cognitive schemata that are organizing the world is dependent upon discursive and non-discursive factors. Contextual research of metaphors should take both into account.

The non-discursive background is central for determining the meaning of metaphors for the audience/reader. Ethos, pathos and logos are the classic Aristotelian rhetorical components of an argument, but far from enough to determine the creative/constructive function of a metaphor. Meaning is not given by ethos, logos and pathos, but is rather negotiated in the process of meaning creation between interlocutor and audience. By employing a political metaphor one does not just convince the audience/reader about the appropriateness of seeing an issue in certain way, but is also structuring it. So the process of meaning determination and meaning creation is mutually productive.

### **Five: Metaphor effectiveness**

Not all metaphors are equally effective. The effectiveness depends on shared social conventions, the authority granted to those that use them and on shared dominant background knowledge. The wrong metaphor at the wrong time has no effect. Also, not all metaphors have the same productive effects.

In summary, the lessons of new insights into metaphor theory and methodology for citizenship metaphors and migrations are the following: first, metaphors with which we describe citizens and citizenship (and consequently migrants) are not just other (different) words that denote the same content. With the change of metaphor a conceptual change also occurs. In this way, citizenship and citizens are constructed differently, sometimes anew, with features, obligations, rights and relationships that are different than in their previous conceptions. Secondly, these changes do not occur spontaneously; they are products of political struggles and constructed within the text-context relationship. Thirdly, different (new) constructions of citizens and citizenship change our perception of political reality, political relations and processes, in other words, the world. This is additionally important for the perception of migrants and migrations as social and political processes.

## **CITIZENSHIP AS METAPHOR: FROM BODY POLITIC TO ATOMS TO NETWORKS**

The conventional way of analysing citizenship metaphors would be to look for citizenship metaphors that have emerged over time and analyse them in their contexts. This paper, though, builds on a rather different theoretical perspective about citizens and citizenship. It holds that individuals are socially, politically and culturally embedded and does not treat them as lone players outside of their contexts. Every individual (and social concept, for that matter) is socially and politically embedded and thus dependent and reliant upon his/her social structures (Rončević and Makarovič 2010). We would like to change the conventional formula of researching citizenship metaphors and move away from researching citizens as metaphors in various contexts and introduce a new perspective: citizens as such are not metaphors,

their relations are. It is the relations the citizens are subjected to or relations that they (re)produce that define the role of the citizen. Different metaphors are used in history to describe/create relations that make the concept of citizen and citizenship. In this paper we therefore present a historical analysis of citizen relations as they have emerged in ontologically creative metaphors over time.

We will show that citizenship is a metaphor for the relationship between the citizen and the state, that in recent times this is far from an exclusive relationship between citizens and the state, that relationships have changed over time, and that they have been transformed from organic to legal to nonlinear differential network. From the perspective of the state, Poggi (2003: 39–48) has identified ten aspects of the relationship between states and citizens: citizens as subjects of the state, as taxpayers, as soldiers, as constituents, as sovereigns, as (co)nationals, as private individuals, as political participants, as spectators, and as equals. It is interesting to note that not all aspects have emerged simultaneously, that some still exist (e.g. as tax payers, as political participants, as spectators), while others have to a certain extent been changed (citizens as soldiers, citizens as equals) or forgotten altogether (citizens as constituents in the Hellenic and Roman sense where they were responsible for the city's very existence in the constructivist sense).<sup>1</sup>

Metaphors of citizenship and citizen are products of their time. The knowledge about citizen and citizenship that they produce, and the production of knowledge about them, are both embedded in the epistemic frame of an epoch. Thinking about citizen and citizenship is informed and structured by metaphors figuring in various discourses. This implies that our thinking about citizenship is possible only within the boundaries of our imagery of citizenship. In this respect, metaphors, with their carry over or transfer function, enable the transferring of meanings about citizenship and citizen from other discourses, thus enabling metaphor to perform its poetic function, where creativity and innovation in the conception can take place.

The origins of the metaphor of the organic relationship between citizens and the state can be found in ancient Greece. Especially in the age of Pericles the Athenian polis achieved an extraordinary amount of political unity and developed an organic analogy to express this unity (Hale 1971: 18). The Athenian citizen was only fulfilling himself as a member of the polis, as someone who takes part in the public affairs of the polis. This basically meant that discussion, debate, deliberating, election, holding office – participating actively in public life in general – meant being a citizen. The relations that a citizen had in the (political) community were a defining characteristic of his status. Women, children, foreigners and migrants were all prohibited from having those public relations.

The first examples of the human body as a metaphor to express the relationship of the unity between the state and citizens can be traced back to *Areopagiticus* (355 BC) of Isocrates: “For the soul of a state is nothing else than its polity, having as much power over it as it does the mind over body; for it is this which deliberates upon all questions, seeking to preserve what is good and to ward off what is disastrous; and it is this which of necessity assimilates to its own nature the laws, the public orators and the private citizens; and all the members of the state must fare well or ill according to the kind of polity under which they live” (quoted in Hale 1971: 19). Isocrates emphasized the participation of all citizens in the political life of the polis and the dependence of their welfare on the proper functioning of the constitution of the city.

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1 The perspective of citizens as constituents might be gone in the Roman and Hellenic sense, but the idea of the population being responsible for the existence of the city has carried on. The city in the sense of a constructed reality of formerly discrete and powerless individuals that constitute themselves first into juridically distinct, politically autonomous and militarily effective entity is present in the medieval West. This is later transformed into a population that does state-building and 'owns' a share of it as citizens. This aspect of the state-citizenship relationship is important for informing understanding of the status of migrants – those that come from other places and do not possess ownership or authorship of the political entity.

Plato in *The Republic* speaks of the 'healthy state' and the 'fevered state' (Book III),<sup>2</sup> while Aristotle (1996: 13) in *Politics* (Book I, 1253a, I, 4–5) says that "... it is evident that the state is a creature of nature and that man is by nature a political animal". This reaffirms two basic principles of the idea of the body politic: that society is a natural, not man-made creation, and that man's highest nature is to have a relationship with society, to be part of society, not an individual (Hale 1971: 21).

The idea of the body politic is made possible by Greek science, whose view of nature was generally accepted in Western thought until the Renaissance. In this view, the universe was created according to the most perfect model, a Living Creature. The life and the psychological order that an individual possesses is identical with the life and order of the polis and the Cosmos (Hale 1971: 23). It is important to note that ancient Greek, like other modern languages (including English), has two important meanings for the word 'nature' (*physis*). In one sense it is the sum of all created things, and in the other it is also a defining principle of a thing, as in the quality of a thing. This has an important consequence for our discussion about the idea of body politic as metaphor for citizenship. The state in this respect is metaphorically thought of as a human organism: each member of the state (i.e. citizen) has an important function which is natural and appropriate for both the part (i.e. citizen) and the whole of which it is a part (i.e. the state) (Hale 1971: 23). Aristotle (quoted in Hale 1971: 23) even says that the constitution of an animal resembles that of well-governed city-state. According to him there is no need for a special ruler with arbitrary powers in an ordered city, as there is no need for soul in each part of the animal body, because nature has taken care of the functioning of the body, so that it performs functions in a natural way (Hale 1971: 23–24).

In Hellenic and Roman times the close ties (including close family ties) of the polis were replaced by other modes of relationship for inclusion into society. Political morality based on membership of a polis as a natural relation of the whole and its parts no longer seemed an appropriate mode of inclusion for larger territories and empires. Political thinking went along with new political conditions, and Roman Stoics conceived political morality in terms of one's relations with other individuals and not with a polis. Seneca writes in the *95th Epistle to Lucilius* (quoted in Hale 1971: 26; see also Seneca 1995): "I can lay down for mankind a rule... for our duties in human relationships: all that you behold, that which comprises both god and man, is one – we are all parts of one great body. Nature produced us related to one another, since she created us from the same source and to the same end." Despite the shift in the source of political morality, the metaphor of body politic modelled according to the natural body is preserved.

The metaphor of organic society from the later Stoics was passed into the early Christian tradition. St. Paul in his *First Epistle to the Corinthians* makes a number of points which are similar to that of the Stoics. He "assumes of hierarchical order, established by God (or nature), of differentiated parts, all of which are necessary to the body and which ought not, therefore, to regard themselves as either independent of the body or as superior to other members" (Hale 1971: 29). This organic metaphor is frequently repeated as an admonition against disagreement and dissent among the churches.

St. Augustine in *The City of God* further developed the organic metaphor and introduced the idea of a mystical body (*corpus mysticum*) (Hale 1971: 31–32; see also Gierke 1913: 17–19). This body has, in contrast to the Athenian polis or the universe of the Stoics, no real meaning in this world, but is rather community of the saved. The story is about the spiritual body, Christ being the head and the members of the Church the body. The unity of the body and the head is achieved through sacraments, for those who have eaten the body of Christ in the form of eucharisteia are incorporated in his body. The process of transubstantiation is based on the metaphorical imagining of inclusion into the community of the saved by eucharisteia.

The debate about the mystical and real body of Christ continued throughout the Middle Ages (cf. Kantorowitz 1997). In the early Christian era both bodies were being kept apart, but in about the eighth

<sup>2</sup> Plato in the *Republic* also speaks of a metaphor of "fashioning" a happy city and he makes comparison to painting a statute (Zashin, Chapman 1974: 303).

century the concepts began to fuse. The body of the Church also ceases to be just a community of believers, but becomes a supreme ecclesiastical hierarchy whose head is the Pope. Papal supremacy is in ever stronger conflict with emerging national monarchies, whose response to this was the appropriation of the language of political theology and use of the body politic metaphor influenced by the recent rediscovery of Aristotle's *Politics*. Hale (1971: 38–39) outlines three possible responses to papal supremacy: either rulers acknowledged papal claims and identified the king or emperor as a heart and stressed the importance of this organ to the head, or they could define a distinct corpus naturale (secular body) with its own head, thus making things schizophrenic, or, most radically, they could maintain that only Christ, and not the Pope, is the head.

In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus published *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium*, in which he presented a heliocentric model of the world and its context. That work challenged the age-old view that the universe worked quite differently, a geo-centric model that exaggerated the importance of the Earth, and, by extension, the importance of human beings. The realisation that we, our planet, and indeed our solar system (and even our galaxy) are quite ordinary in heavenly terms, since there are very likely myriads of planetary systems, provided a sobering and unsettling revision. All the reassurances of the cosmology of the Middle Ages were gone, and a new view of the world, less secure and comfortable, came into being.

Sixteenth and seventeenth century England experienced political transformations that were directly linked to the new reference worlds of the Copernican revolution. No longer was the harmony of various parts the most powerful metaphor; the decay of the old cosmology and theology opening up a space for a new vision of a man.

The body-in-motion upon which he [Hobbes] builds his system is a symbolic figure. It represents the individual human being, but in a very special way: no longer he is a member of the body politic; no longer does he have a place in a hierarchical system of deference and authority; no longer do his movements conduce to universal harmony. Instead, the individual is alone, separated from his fellows, without a master or a secure social place; his movements, determined by no one but himself, clash with the movements of the other, identical individuals; he acts out chaos (Walzer 1967: 201).

As the medieval conception of the body politic as a living organism was coming to its end, new metaphors were being introduced. Locke insisted upon a new metaphor for society, a body politic as a joint stock company instead of living organism, where free individuals have their stakes (Hale 1971: 13).

Disharmonies in the body politic became easier to explore, and a new individualism was coming of age. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and their fellow thinkers were presented with the challenge of forging new political theories and doctrines based on these new scientific discoveries. In other words, the Copernican revolution provided a new worldview, a new epistemic reality according to which knowledge about the world was being re-created. It provided new principles, and new metaphors to orient and create political knowledge; it would later evolve into individualism and eventually liberalism (cf. Wolin 1960: 282; Walzer 1967: 203).

The Copernican revolution and subsequent new vision(s) of social and political relations brought a major change in the understanding of the relations between citizens. Metaphor changed radically. The concept of a social contract was introduced to capture the new metaphorical reality: no longer was the defining characteristic of the citizen its relations with the body as the whole, it was replaced by the relationship of legal obligation. Citizens were no longer defined by their relations and actions in the public sphere (ancient Greece), nor by their relations to the real or mystical body of the king (Middle Ages), or moral relations to each other defined by the religion in the form of the community of the saved. The new citizen was freed from organic and land-ownership relations: he was free, no longer attached either to his feudal lord or the king. His relations had to be (metaphorically) imagined anew.

The Newtonian world of mechanical motion became the new reference-world for new political thought, a new source of metaphors, analogies, and images. The metaphor of mechanical motion, clockwork mechanism, was appropriate for the time when people were – due to political and social transformations – literally set in motion. The metaphor of a clockwork mechanism not also described, but also prescribed, not just of man but also of the state. Hobbes took the metaphor very seriously and applied it to various political concepts. Nowhere is this better expressed than in the opening chapter of *Leviathan*:

For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? (Hobbes 1651/1996: 9).

In physics the system is called mechanical according to Newton “if and only if its basic entities are particles that move in orbit” (Landau 1961: 337). It is a closed system, consisting of discrete bodies, each possessing a specific set of properties (such as mass and position) that act over space and time in accordance with fixed law. The motion of the body is determined by the action of external forces and these actions forces arise from the action of other bodies in the system. In such system there is only lawful behaviour: from a definite configuration of particles there will always follow the same results; there are no alternatives and there is nothing any part of the system can do about it. (Landau 1961: 337) It is a completely predictable structure.

Accordingly, society came to be thought in terms of mechanics. Social processes were seen as determined processes, the motion (behaviour) of bodies (human beings) was preset and controlled according to the laws of nature. (Landau 1961: 338) Natural man, whose properties included natural rights, was directed by natural forces to form societies. A state was no more than a sum of discrete and elemental bodies.

Individuals became sovereign individuals, free and equal, with rights and duties in comparison with their previous societal position as subjects in estates. Because they were endowed with various absolute and unalienable rights and natures stemming from the gained importance of natural law and social contract theory, they were metaphorically thought of as of having the same weight, volume and value. They were imagined as atoms. As atoms that freely form bonds with other atoms. Atoms that have separate identities from each other, whose behaviour is governed by rights and duties. It is important to note the ontologically constructivist consequence of this new citizenship metaphor: because all individuals were envisioned as endowed with the same rights, this meant that they formed voluntary and no longer obligatory relationships in a community. Because they were free, brute political or physical force was no longer capable or adequate for holding a community together. The microphysics of power (Foucault 1990) and other mechanisms of forming bonds with loose atoms had to be metaphorically invented.

Out of this metaphorical structuring of citizens, two citizenship concepts emerged: citizenship as universal category and citizenship as historical category. Citizenship as universal category is related to the specific context in which the United States was created. It denotes that citizens as atoms are universally endowed with equal rights at the specific time of the creation of the United States. Citizenship as a historical category is, on the other hand, a European category, where in the famous 1950 formulation of T. H. Marshall, citizen is defined as the inheritor of a series of rights and responsibilities which have emerged over time.<sup>3</sup> Marshall's conception of the citizen is, despite his innovation in elevating it from the realm of political rights, still rather passive. The citizen is a recipient of rights through his status as a citizen which does not entail any activity. Passive citizenship is about claims and rights of protection, rarely duties. This is in contrast with Republican virtues of active citizenship where voluntary associations and citizens' public commitment are all important.

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<sup>3</sup> Marshall's (1950) distinctive contribution to the study of citizenship was to go beyond political rights and to introduce the concept of social rights.

These metaphoric imaginations of citizen relations, including T. H. Marshall's, have one thing in common: they are all imagined against the backdrop of territory or physical space. Moreover, metaphorical imaginations are wholly informed by methodological territorialism (cf. Scholte 2005) whereby territory is methodologically pre-imagined. Thus citizens and their relations are thought of as if their only reference was to the state and not any other association or allegiance going beyond mere state territory. It pretends that the concept of citizen is tied to the physical space and that is the major source of tension in today's globalised world. From the point of metaphors of relations of citizens, this signals a need for a major shift in metaphor to describe and construct new realities.

A territory delimited with borders, rooted in a physical space, is conventionally connected to the dominant concept of the state. The state is metaphorically thought of as a container. There are several strands of thinking about the state as a container: firstly, the state as a power container that is a legitimate source of power. As such, endowed with power, it maintains order and justice in a territory that is physically delimited by borders. The direct ontological consequences of this metaphorical imagining are that the borders of the state are seen as fixed and unchangeable, denying their historical, contextual and relational components. The borders of the state are not, according to this imagining, the results of social constructions and governance technologies. Secondly, the state is imagined as a container (and retainer) of wealth, that on one hand internally maintains good life, and externally tries to maximise its profits. In the era of globalisation, the imagination of wealth in a pile is a major oversimplification, as today's wealth is mainly relational, produced in synergic relations with other states. The role of the state is no longer to maintain wealth as such; it is rather to enable its citizens structural conditions for global social relations that can produce wealth. Thirdly, the state is also seen as a culture container or maintainer, connecting divergent cultural groups into what is conventionally called national culture. The consequence of this metaphorical imagination is that migrants, i.e. those coming from outside the container, are variously thought of and described as arriving in "waves", "rivers" or "flows" at the borders of the container. In some national contexts (e.g. in the Dutch), immigrants are even metaphorically imagined as allochthonous, taking the metaphor from geology and implying that they are not part of the society. As a rock is brought by the stream down the river from its original place (i.e. it is allochthonous), so the immigrants are from somewhere else and can always be pushed or forced back to their country of origin. Despite years of living in a society, they are not seen as part of the relations in a society and thus denied status of a citizen. If citizens are their relations, immigrants are barred from even entering into these relations.

In the world of globalised postnational states, where sovereignty is fragmented, eroded or even past its shelf life (Vodovnik 2011), the old metaphorical imaginations of citizens and citizenship are no longer appropriate. At best, they are causing tensions, and at worst they are destroying people's lives and hampering progress (Banjac 2010). These changes have major implications for the nature of citizenship within national communities, to the extent that the pact between the citizen and the state is undergoing a fundamental transformation and governments can no longer fulfil their share of the bargain. That citizenship in advanced industrial national-states is undergoing an important redefinition in several of its aspects is without question. The concept of moral obligations of citizens towards the body politic of the Roman times and Middle Ages is long gone. The legal obligations of citizens stemming from social contract and natural law might still be there as long as the current state is there, but they are also being eroded by social processes that have been transforming the very ontological existence of the world since the Peace of Westphalia (1648).

Due to globalisation processes, citizen relations are far from being exclusively with the state. The revolution in communication and information technology has brought an unprecedented change in human relations. They are not just faster, more intensive, cheaper and more frequent than ever before, above all they have become global in scale and scope. Time and space compression has occurred. Physical distances and physical obstacles (i.e. borders) are unimportant. If the state as a container had been a defining element of internal and external social relations of citizens since the 18th century, this has

radically changed. Today's citizens form dense networks of social relations across borders. Borders are rarely only separating, but are also connecting. The external borders of the state have long become internalised and mobile (Pikalo, Banjac and Ilc 2011). The internal/external divide has been radically re-articulated.<sup>4</sup> Out of all of these processes new forms of citizenship have emerged: environmental citizenship, translocal citizenship (Vodovnik 2011), global instrumental citizenship, multiple, overlapping citizenships, transnationalism as a citizenship, etc.

All these new citizenship forms have one thing in common: they are a radical and important change because they replace the old metaphorical imagination of citizen relations as imaginarily connected to the state's physical territory by citizen relations as a network that, irrespective of the physical territory, variably stretches across the globe. The old metaphors of citizen relations have been replaced by a new metaphor of a network that best describes and prescribes new (global) societal relations. In the world of global optimism and renewed hope in human (cosmopolitan) possibility of peaceful coexistence after 1989, the network metaphor was the most effective with respect to the new understandings of the audiences.

The network metaphor served two purposes: to describe and prescribe a new imagination for societal relations in the 21st century, but also to serve the ideological purpose of suggesting that all people can find their place in the network and are therefore in this respect equal. The network was supposed to be imagined as a democratic network, metaphorically imagined with respect to computer networks such as the internet. As such, the metaphor obscured the issue of social power relations. To reflect the issue of uneven and unequal social relations, a rather different metaphor of citizenship relations must be employed: a metaphor of differential networks that reflect different power positions and relationships within networks.

New citizen relations are not condensed into one single network. It is much more fruitful to think of citizen relations intertwined in numerous, overlapping networks of which the citizen is a part. Out of this new metaphorical fashioning of the relations of citizen other questions appear: the question of overlapping communities which are not territorially exclusive, but rather territorially promiscuous; overlapping global rights and duties – is it morally desirable or morally required to fulfil global obligations? In a global world with relations of citizens overlapping in deterritorialised networks, is the concept of homeland what it used to be?

## METAPHORS: THE PROSE OF THE WORLD

Historians often suggest that an era is best known by the metaphors used. In this paper we have briefly sketched the relationship between citizenship conceptions and metaphors employed for describing and prescribing citizen relations in various historical contexts. Our research has been limited to some historical shifts, when changes occurred that are still having a decisive impact on the way we perceive 'citizen' and 'citizenship'. The citizenship metaphors researched have primarily been employed not as language forms, but as cognitive schemata. They structure our systems of representation and meaning. They are often 'dead' metaphors, though far from 'dead' in terms of their effectiveness and productivity.

We have shown that by moving away from the conventional formula of researching citizenship metaphors and by introducing a new perspective of metaphors of relations we can gain a new perspective on citizenship concepts. The ontological creativity of metaphors for political reality has shown the centrality of the concept of citizenship to the understanding of political development throughout history. We have researched how metaphors of citizenship allow political language to free itself from the

<sup>4</sup> For the impact of this re-articulation on the level of European identity formation, see Toplak, Velikonja, Pikalo, Stankovič, Šabec, Komel (2011).

function of direct description and to set up a contingent relationship between words and reality. With this, imagination is freed from the constraints of objectivism, and new creations of the world can occur. The relationship between metaphors and objects is then a reciprocal construction in the disciplinary division of labour of the modern social sciences. Or to say it with metaphor, metaphors are actually the prose of the world we create in their image.

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## SUMMARY

### CITIZENSHIP AS METAPHOR

Jernej PIKALO

Namen članka je analizirati metafore, uporabljene pri predstavah o oblikah državljanstva. Odmika se od konvencionalne formule raziskovanja državljanov kot prisposodob v različnih kontekstih in uvaja novo raziskovalno perspektivo: razmerja med državljanji kot metaforami. Uvodoma oriše pet glavnih teoretičnih in metodoloških podmen, ki se navezujejo na preučevanje metafor. Drugi del članka obravnava kompleksnosti sprememb v konceptih o državljanstvu skozi metafore, ki v dobi globalizacije obsegajo vse od organskih do političnih, mehanističnih in večdimenzionalnih (regionalnih, globalnih, družbenih, seksualnih itd.).



R A Z P R A V E I N Ā L A N K I

E S S A Y S A N D A R T I C L E S



# BELONGING, MEMBERSHIP, AND MOBILITY IN GLOBAL HISTORY

Dirk HOERDER<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

### **Belonging, Membership, and Mobility in Global History<sup>1</sup>**

Belonging and membership in societies depend on resources, societal structures, and stateside frames rather than on postulated and essentialized identities. Throughout the ages migrants have changed societies and affiliations; globalization emerged in the 1490s when the tri-continental African-Asian-European worlds and the dual American continent became connected. Migrants moved translocally or transregionally – the “trans” emphasizes connections across dividing lines or spaces, to continuities created (or, perhaps, merely mentally constructed) by human agency. This essay approaches the topic from four angles: (1) migrants’ “funds of knowledge,” (2) newcomers’ “Otherness,” (3) power hierarchies, and (4) connectivity-inclusions-exclusions. In conclusion, belongings of globally mobile men and women will be discussed as transcultural rather than transnational.

KEYWORDS: migration, transnational, transcultural, globalization, Otherness, funds of knowledge

## IZVLEČEK

### **Pripadanje, članstvo in mobilnost v globalni zgodovini**

Pripadanje in članstvo v družbah nista toliko odvisna od predpostavljenih in esencionaliziranih identitet kot od sredstev, družbenih struktur in nacionalnih okvirov. V zgodovini so migranti menjali družbe in pripadnosti; globalizacija se je pojavila okrog 1490, ko sta se povezala trikontinentalni afriško-evropsko-azijski svet in dvojni ameriški kontinent. Migranti so se selili translokarno ali transregionalno – »trans« poudarja povezave z razločevalnimi črtami ali prostori v nepretrganost/kontinuitete, ki jih ustvarja (ali morda konstruira zgolj v duhu) človeški dejavnik. Pričujoči esej se teme loteva s štirih plati: (1) iz »zakladnice znanja« migrantov, (2) »drugosti« novih prišlekov, (3) hierarhije moči in (4) povezljivosti-vključevanja-izključevanja, pripadnost globalno mobilnih moških in žensk pa obravnava transkulturalno in ne transnacionalno.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: migracija, transnacionalno, transkulturno, globalizacija, drugost, zakladnice znanja

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## 0

“Belonging” – it is natural and deeply rooted as ideologues have often proclaimed. The empirical data suggest otherwise:

- In 8<sup>th</sup>- to 13<sup>th</sup>-century China, in the northern region of century-long settlement and rootedness soils were worn out: millions of families had to migrate southward.
- In the southwestern region of early German emigration, division of inheritance reduced small-holds to a size which made survival non-viable by mid-18<sup>th</sup> century.
- In the drought-stricken Sahel zone of the present, belonging to the lands and social relationships is becoming impossible.

“Home” – *Heimat* in German – or, more neutrally, the place and region of birth can be unsustainable as well as unfair and unsafe. Once resources become insufficient, societal structures unsupportable, or political institutions life-threatening, neither belonging nor membership appear as natural. Social cleavages – whether by class, kin group, gender, or generation – may push men and women out, may induce or force them to end their membership in the social group of birth: At different points in time elite exertions in the Fulbe societies and in those of the Germanies forced people to reflect on their options. Many decided for out-migration. So did peoples annexed by Central America’s Mexica – or “Aztec” – Empire, some of the Chinese Empire’s many peoples, and many others.<sup>2</sup>

Just as belonging, under the label of ethnic or national identity (singular), has been considered “natural,” the “global,” under the label “globalization,” has been said to be recent – the authoritative (or, perhaps, authoritarian) World Bank dated its beginning precisely to 1982 (Hopkins 2011: 30): Most historians agree that globalization dates from the 1490s when the tri-continental African-Asian-European worlds and the dual American continent (not yet named) became connected. (Earlier contacts from Asia, Europe, and Africa<sup>3</sup> across the Pacific and the Atlantic may have existed but, to our knowledge, without long-term consequences).

Internally the two separate worlds had been connected before: transcontinentally and, in maritime regions where people had developed high nautical skills, over-the-seas or transseas. I emphasize the “trans” rather than the older “inter” – as in *international* – because the latter requires two distinct entities separated by a demarcated border line, while “trans” points to the connections across dividing lines or spaces, to continuities created (or, perhaps, merely mentally constructed) by human agency.

I will approach my topic from four angles: (1) migrants’ “funds of knowledge,” (2) newcomers’ “Otherness,” (3) power hierarchies, and (4) connectivity-inclusions-exclusions.

I will conclude by defining belongings of globally mobile men and women as transcultural rather than transnational.

## 1

Migrants depart as fully socialized persons (unless, as children, accompanying parents – involuntarily perhaps – or being transported by force of strangers). Migrants thus carry their life-practices but not as “cultural baggage” to be discarded somewhere, rather as everyday ways of life in the frame of societal – perhaps elite-imposed – norms, spiritual beliefs, and patterns of interaction. Culture (singular), viewed as comprehensive and binding, in particular by those who benefit from a particular cultural set-up, need to be operationalized by its common members for everyday applicability and usage, to meet chal-

2 This essay is based on Hoerder (2002); Harzig, Hoerder and Gabaccia (2009).

3 The Norsepeople’s voyages to “Vinland” are documented. While coastal voyaging from East Asia via the Aleuts to the Pacific Coast of North America had been discussed repeatedly, possible African crossings of the Atlantic have received no attention (Hamdani 1994).

lenges life poses individually and collectively. For the repertoire of options to act “funds of knowledge” is a more useful concept than the umbrella term “culture.” To deal with issues they confront, residents and migrants, by selecting – hopefully – appropriate responses, draw on a range of traditional, recent, or on-the-spot invented strategies of experiencing, working, enjoying, and coping. The “Culture” may be essentialized as an unchangeable, prescriptive whole; “funds of knowledge” are a sum of applicable specifics from which particular options may be selected as appropriate to an issue at hand. Some such funds are specific to individuals (“human capital”), many require smaller or larger communities (“social capital”). Migrants carry their human capital with them/in themselves; they need to re-establish social capital which is place-, space-, and community-specific.<sup>4</sup>

Funds of knowledge, both as human and social capital, are gendered. Most societies globally – if with many variations – have assigned productive (paid) work to men and reproductive (unpaid) work to women. Men perform a specific craft and by social connotation a craft is skilled work, women cook and raise children – by social connotation raising a child is unskilled work. Placing clay or stones while building a palace in Sokoto or a cathedral in Paris thus is skilled, building the personality of a child is unskilled. It took women scholars to point out that the crafts-persons, creating pottery in the mobile Mande society, were women and that, where men in European societies were withdrawn from a family (by military service or imprisonment, for example) children continued their development while, when a mother was withdrawn (most often by death) child mortality skyrocketed.<sup>5</sup>

Our languages, labelled “mother tongues spoken in fatherlands” in the nation-state variant of polities, imply unquestioned ideologies and often lead research into the wrong direction or even prevent a question from being asked altogether. Languages and ideologies are interwoven. The term “migrants” is often implicitly and with ideological intention understood to refer to men. To recreate communities – one kind of belongings – after migration men *and* women are needed. In the limited number of cases globally and over time, in which only men migrate, they associate with local women – for emotional and sexual ties but, more importantly, to access the women’s social capital which, as “strangers,” the migrant men cannot enter or utilize (examples include the Normans, the fur traders in northern Canada, Fulbe pastoralists, Hausa traders, and others).<sup>6</sup>

Belongings, gendered and generational, or self-created and self-decided identifications (plural) – but never a fixed singular identity – thus are based on individual capabilities, social networks, and group constructions.

## 2

I will now turn from “belonging” to difference or “Otherness.” In-migrants – an open designation as opposed to the single-move, one-way, permanent “immigrants” – are different by practices, beliefs, dress, physiognomy. They are recognizable as such and, usually, they feel different. Such difference – non-belonging, non-membership, and resulting exclusion – has often and, empirically correctly, been equated with discrimination and victimization. However, agency and migrant strategies in the frame of receiving societies’ constraining structures and racial-ethnic-gender ascriptions may be understood from a concept of “Otherness as cultural resource.” Just as whiteness has been analysed as a resource in colonizer migrations, for men and women of subaltern position “foreignness or otherness is [or may be] one of the most substantial and tangible aspects of socio-cultural capital.” In a dialectical relationship, being

4 The concept of “funds of knowledge” was first developed by Emil W. Haury (1976 and 1986). On the processual charter of culture among migrants see Roberts (2006). On social capital see Hébert, Hoerder and Schmitt (2005).

5 The literature on gender and migration has become legion, if only in the last two decades. See for a summary Harzig (2001).

6 See for example on the fur trade Van Kirk (1980).

different permits both entry into a segment of the labour market – the migrants’ goal to be achieved – and their exploitation, a consequence to be avoided, if in any way possible. 19<sup>th</sup>-century rural migrants’ within and from Europe sought entry into receiving societies’ or polities’ un- and semiskilled labour market segments as pathway to a future with more, or even better options than available in their society of birth. So do migrants from rural to urban regions within Africa or from African societies to one of Europe’s societies today. In-migrant women and men “are hired precisely because they carry a different cultural baggage.” Demand for labour and thus socio-economic development cannot be and could not have been satisfied without the in-coming Others (Harzig 2005 and 2006).

In the present, for example, Otherness permits a female domestic worker “to situate herself outside the” receiving culture with its hierarchical status assignments, which inevitably place her at the bottom. She may take recourse to the memory of her social position at home – if not abject poverty – and pride herself in assuring her family’s survival through remittances. Mobile women (like men) need such resilience because “the race-class-gender systems of ‘importing’ cultures (North America, Europe, the ‘Middle East’) provide for ready access to stereotypes in order to structure and organize historical ‘knowledge’ and present ‘experience.’” Cultural markers – without reference to their funds of knowledge – are attached to the women, ascriptions and hierarchizations are explicit. In Rome, Italy, women from the Philippines are considered suitable for caretaking and more qualified household tasks since they are Catholic and speak Spanish or English (in addition to Tagalog). Somali women, who are black and arrive from Italy’s former colony, are considered inferior.<sup>7</sup>

“Otherness” permits insertion as well as exclusion. It creates a membership at the discretion of institutions experienced as arbitrary but following an employer-receiving society logic. It is, for many in-migrants, an unavoidable stepping stone. It is, for receiving societies, useful for corralling a reservoir of underpaid labour. Still, the economic benefit may be less than the subversive effect: Societies which rest on the claim that all are equal before the law undercut their very foundational principles. Societies which construct their national culture as superior find the underpaid engaging in processes of resistance and of adding new practices to allegedly “traditional” ways of life.

### 3

The discussion of usages of otherness has led us, quite perceptibly, to power hierarchies or, to emphasize agency also in this process, to hierarchization. The differences that women from the Philippines and Somalia experience among employers point to placement in inferior position,

- first, by racializing construction of a group by colour of skin,
- second, by historical construction: former violent (military) subjection, colonization,
- third, through religious difference or proximity,
- and, fourth, in result of the preceding, as regards present economic level, through imposed lower wages.

The poor – better, again to emphasize agency: the poorly remunerated, impoverished – are inferior by implication of our language connotations and social structures. Imposed and tradition-supported hierarchies and excluding structures are far cheaper instruments of power imposition than armies and police forces.

The history of forced migration systems – slavery in its many forms, indentured servitude, transportation of serfs, and the Stalinist-Fascist-and-South African forced labour and migration systems – indicated how construction of inferiority, actual imposition of power, and work for exploiters are entwined and mutually supportive.

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<sup>7</sup> Chell (1997). For a study of cultural markers of a migrant group in Kenya see Balaton-Chrimes (2011).

The history of nation-building indicates how assigned belonging is used by bureaucrat-ideologues and their enforcement apparatuses to impose forced repatriation or expulsion: Once “democratic” nations – a late 19<sup>th</sup>-century invention in contrast to “absolutist” dynastic polities – were constructed as monocultural (and unchanging from times immemorial), “nationals” and “minorities” began to be shifted around, Turks to the new Turkey, Greeks to the new Greece, Germans to the core region of its contracting territory. “The growth of the modern nation-state implied not only the naming of certain peoples as enemies of the nation, but also the expulsion of significant groups for whom the state would or could not assume responsibility. [...] Wars] schooled the new masters of the state apparatus: civilians could become dangerous enemies; [...] it was best to eject unwanted or menacing groups when they threatened to weaken the beleaguered nation.” The oft-used term “ethnic cleansing” implies that dirt is removed and the clean, pure elements remain. Internal ethno-cultural expulsion, severance of being part, is as much an aspect of nation-building as is the construction of external inferiors in colonies (Marrus 1985: 51).

In a worldwide perspective, migration “flows” are constrained by “global apartheid” (Richmond 1994). An industrialized northern, predominantly white segment (but not “hemisphere”) of the world excludes migrants of other colours of skin from societies further south and, until recently, less powerful. Not globalization as interconnectedness is new – new are the shifting power hierarchies from the few, comparatively small newly industrialized states (e.g. Japan, South Korea) of the 1980s to the rise of China-India-Brazil-Russia (BRIC) and the defection of investment (but not financial) capital from the old white core to the new other-coloured spaces of production.

These shifting economic, political, and military hierarchies lead to new directions of migration, new forms of inclusion and exclusion. The regime of global apartheid, a concept of the 1990s, is replaced by many apartheids and exclusions. Expulsions of non-citizens in Ghana, segregation of internal rural migrants in China’s expanding cities. The colonizer-colonized division, through a transitory phase of decolonization, and a (simplified) white vs. the rest-of-the world phase, is becoming multipolar. Migrations are multidirectional rather than predominantly south-north (the latter often along paths once established by the colonizers, but in reverse direction). Their imposition of colonizer languages and construction of transport routes for raw materials, plantation-regime-produced foods, and other products, in a side effect, created migration routes – created linguistic and travelling funds of knowledge appropriated by those viewed as “Others” (Hoerder 2002: Chap. 16, 19, 20).

## 4

Potential migrants need to cover the cost of their voyages. Since most have extremely few resources, they have to calculate routes and income-generating options after arrival very carefully. The 19<sup>th</sup>-century “to America” or the 20<sup>th</sup>-century “to Europe” is no more than a literary trope or an advertising slogan of states in need of labour forces. Self-willed migrants rely on connections and, ideally, known routes; refugees usually have far fewer possibilities to operationalize prior connections. Few potential migrants strike out as – the much-hyped “pioneers” who, in our languages, by implication “happen” to be male. Around 1900, 94 percent of the migrants to the U.S. declared as final destination a place where kin or acquaintances lived. Migrants from Senegal head for “France” because of familiarity with the language but settle in specific communities of earlier, culturally proximate migrants. These serve as anchor point and resource base to facilitate the immediate insertion into the respective local job-market (in a labour market segment commensurate with the migrants’ skills or lack of them) and who will help in stepwise acculturation. This strategy intends to prevent economic disaster and mental-physical rupture. Migrants did and do not cut belongings, they reduce or deactivate existing ones while intensifying or creating new ones. As much as they can, they try to avoid being “in between” or “in limbo.”

Still, it needs to be emphasized that migrants may receive correct information but, within their mental grids of meaning, cannot decode it. When South Slav migrants around 1900 wrote back home

that they could afford shoe polish, their relatives “knew” that they were living “like lords” since in the inhospitable home only lords could afford to wear shoes. Around 2000, people on an island off Senegal’s coast know that in Paris migrants are paid to clean streets and they know that they have capabilities to do better than that. Thus they migrate on the inference that a society that pays street-cleaners is endowed enough to pay people in more productive jobs (Hoerder 1996).

Thus, a core aspect of migration is connectivity: information flows, prepaid tickets, advice on where to cross a border. This benefits migrants and receiving society. In the 19<sup>th</sup>-century North Atlantic World’s “open doors”-regime, receiving states incurred almost no cost. In fact, though never acknowledged, they benefitted from the migrants’ human capital “paid for” by child-raising in the family-of-birth and training and educational systems of the society-of-origin. The migrants, rather than support the socialization of the next generation “at home,” contribute taxes to the receiving society. Comparatively easy inclusion regimes reduced costs for migrants and states. Exclusion regimes – which began with the exclusion from the U.S. of Chinese women in 1875<sup>8</sup> and were operationalized with the exclusion of dark East and olive South Europeans 1917-1921-1924 (Gabaccia 2005) – increase cost for all parties and institutions involved. One difference between excluding factors before and after the 1940s is the development of insurance-like social security systems. Newcomers have no dues-paying record. In European countries this could be glossed over in the 1950s, because migrant (rotatory guest) workers became dues-paying members (but not citizens) upon arrival. Once, from the 1980s, the traditional receiving states’ capital shifted to investment in low-wage societies elsewhere, not only did job options decline rapidly, the strain on the social security systems – intended for life-course crises and old age but not systemic problems – also increased rapidly. Rather than pro-actively adjust structures, segments of “western” societies blamed immigrants – the earlier anti-Semitism was remade into an equally racialized anti-immigrantism. What I have discussed for migrants reaching Europe and other segments of the Atlantic World, with variations applies to migrants reaching cities in China, or Brazil, Kenya, or Russia.

## 5

Migrants’ connectivity to their state of departure has been called “transnationalism” in the early 1990s, a term not quite as new as its catchwordy reception made it out to be. However, *historians* of migration – since the 1880s socialized in and bound to nation-state ideologies, perhaps were imprisoned in them – had reduced and nationalized such connections to nation-to-ethnic enclave moves: Chinese to Chinatowns, Germans to Little Germanies, and Africans to Black quarters. Multiple identifications and flexible selection between belongings was not what nation-building was about. The anthropologists, who coined the term “transnationalism,” referred to Filipino/a migrants and to refugees from Guatemala (Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton 1992). The former come from many regional and island cultures, from urban and rural backgrounds; many of the refugees were of Maya culture and had never been accepted as full members in what elites considered the Guatemalan nation. Furthermore, the terms assumes that migrants establish connections between nations while all empirical evidence shows linkages between communities, those of departure and those of destination (or several of them in sequence): connections are translocal.

Local places are embedded in economic regions and people are trained in skills that fit the regional jobs. To utilize their skills to the best, they (have to) select destinations with similar economies (or accept a process of deskilling). Thus they migrate transregionally<sup>9</sup> and carry this specific culture with them – but upon arrival are labelled by generalization, since the 19<sup>th</sup>-century usually a national one. North

8 The Page Act of 1875 was meant to “end the danger of cheap Chinese labor and immoral Chinese women” entering the U.S. (Peffer 1986: esp. p. 28).

9 On this level, data usually include women (and, if migrating, children). The data-bias towards migrating men occurs mainly when people are counted at international borders.

Germans, Rhinelanders, Saxons, and the many others became “Germans” (in an earlier period “Saxons” or “Swabians”) because none of their new neighbours could differentiate between backgrounds. If knowledge of the places of origin is even lower, ever larger blanket categories emerge: “Orientals,” “Africans,” “the Chinese.” This ascriptive “nationalization” of difference could prove useful in receiving polities that offered opportunities for political participation – in systems based on elections there is (or may be) power in numbers.

The translocal-transregional migrants, from the emergence of entry regulations from the mid-1870s via the “invention” of the passport (Torpey 2000) to the 1920s and after, had to deal with frames set by states – they move trans-state or, perhaps, inter-state. The term “transnational” conflates generalized cultures (with no conceptual place for people designated as “minorities”) with political structures. This, of course, is based on the ideology of nation-states, an elite-imposed concept of belonging that combines states, which since the Age of Revolution – at least in theory – treat every person as equal before the law, with a nation which hierarchizes a national majority over smaller groups on the same territory. “Nation-state” is an ideology, not an analytical frame. From migrants it demands unconditional surrender of difference to be admitted to the nation.

Thus, translocal and transregional migrants face inter-state frames and from the late-19<sup>th</sup>-century nationalization of educational systems and the 20<sup>th</sup>-century state-wide social security systems – both developments later in decolonizing societies – carry national-cultural and state-institutional practices with them (Hoerder 2012).

“Transcultural” provides the overarching perspective for the different spatial and structural levels (Hoerder 2010: Chap. 14). The spatial extent, to be determined empirically, is often layered: local, regional, state-wide/national, or transstate as in “the German-language region” or Maghreb societies – in the culture of departure as well as in the receiving one: through the entry regulations of, for example, France to a particular job-providing region and a community in a Marseilles or Paris suburb.

The concept of “transculturation” was first developed in distinct society-specific approaches in Cuba, in Brazil, and in Canada. A few open-minded U.S. scholars came to similar conclusions independently. The majority of knowledge-producers, to the 1970s, preferred the term “uprooted” for migrants’ experiences which fit the reigning ideology (in its numerous variants) but never the data. The reconceptualization of belonging and membership occurred from the 1980s (Ortiz 1940). And with the increasing range of destinations, faster transportation, and cheaper communication, migrants have become “global” and “local” or “glocal.” Thus the study of “transcultural lives in a globalized world” is the agenda for migration studies in the next years.

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## POVZETEK

### **Pripadanje, članstvo in mobilnost v globalni zgodovini**

Dirk HÖRDER

Empirični podatki o »pripadanju« izkazujejo tesno povezanost z viri v družbi rojstva ali bivanja. Na Kitajskem so se moški in ženske k boljšim virom selili že med 8. in 13. stoletjem; jugozahodna regija je zgodnje nemške emigracije izkusila sredi 18. stoletja; v sušnih predelih Sahela se dogajajo še danes – če navedemo samo nekaj primerov v času in kraju.

»Dom« ali kraj rojstva nas morda ne more preživeti in je lahko nepravilčen ali nevaren. Kadar viri – v kateremkoli zgodovinskem obdobju – postanejo nezadostni, družbene delitve na razred, sorodstveno pripadnost, spol ali generacijo pa nevzdržne, moški in ženske pretehtajo dane možnosti in se morda odločijo za selitev in s tem za spremembo pripadnosti.

Vsakršne začasne predstave o »globalizaciji« je treba nadomestiti z dolgotrajnimi perspektivami. Migracija prostore povezuje transkontinentalno in čezmorsko oziroma prekomorsko. »Trans« kaže na povezanost preko črte razlikovanja, na kontinuiteto, ki jo ustvarja (ali morda zgolj konstruira v duhu) človeška dejavnost, medtem ko tradicionalni »inter« – na primer internacionalno – zahteva jasne entitete, ločene z razmejivnimi črtami.

1. »Zakladnice znanja« migrantov: migranti odidejo kot socializirane osebe in »kulturne prtljage« ne zavržejo. Namesto tega jo uporabijo in se z njeno pomočjo spopadajo s težavami. Nekatere »kulturne prtljage« so lastne posamezniku (»človeški kapital«), druge potrebujejo manjšo ali večjo skupnost (»družbeni kapital«). Če migranti s seboj prinesejo človeški kapital, pa morajo znova vzpostaviti družbeni kapital, povezan s prostorom in skupnostjo. Pripadanje – po spolu ali generaciji – ali identifikacije (množina), ki jih ustvarimo ali za katere se odločimo sami – nikoli pa niso fiksna singularna identiteta – so tako utemeljeni na individualnih sposobnostih, družbenih mrežah in skupinskih konstrukcijah.

2. »Drugost« novih prišlekov: migranti so zaradi prepoznavne drugačnosti lahko diskriminirani. V omejujočih strukturah družb prejemnic in rasno-etnično-spolnem pripisovanju je migrantske strategije mogoče razumeti iz koncepta »drugosti kot kulturnega vira«; »drugost« dopušča vnašanje pa tudi izključevanje.

3. Hierarhije moči in pripadanja: Manjvredni položaji, ki jih zasedajo migranti, vključujejo rasizem, historično podrejanje in kolonizacijo, verske razlike ali podobnosti, zaradi vsiljenih nizkih plač pa tudi slabe življenjske razmere. Zgodovina oblikovanja naroda kaže, kako birokrati – ideologi določajo in instrumentalizirajo razlike. Svetovni migracijski »tokovi« so omejeni z »globalnim apartheidom«.

4. Povezljivost-vključevanje-izključevanje: potencialni migranti se povežejo s sidrnimi točkami in viri zgodnejših prišlekov. Enostavno sprejemanje s strani družbe prejemnice znižuje stroške vključevanja, medtem ko režimi izključevanja vsem vključenim stranem in inštitucijam povečujejo stroške.

5. Transkulturno pripadanje: medtem ko »transnacionalizem« poudarja nacijo in državo, pa se migranti gibljejo translokarno in transregionalno in se soočajo z notranjimi omejitvami držav, in sicer od poznega 19. stoletja z nacionalizacijo izobraževalnih sistemov, v dvajsetem stoletju pa z državnimi sistemi socialne varnosti. Iz tega razloga se v naslednjih letih na področju migracijskih študij v posameznih državah pripravlja študij »transkulturalnih življenj v globaliziranem svetu«.



# TEORETIZACIJA MULTIKULTURALIZMA IN ETNIČNE EKONOMIJE V LUČI OHRANJANJA KULTURNE DEDIŠČINE MED MIGRANTI

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## IZVLEČEK

### Teoretizacija multikulturalizma in etnične ekonomije v luči ohranjanja kulturne dediščine med migranti

Temeljna dilema prispevka je učinkovitost politike multikulturalizma v povezavi z drugim družboslovnim konceptom – etnično ekonomijo in njenimi vplivi na ustvarjanja in ohranjanja različnih kulturnih dediščin med migranti v kontekstu (nacionalne) države. Ali je etnična ekonomija povezana s procesi (re)produkcije kulturnih dediščin? V kakšnem odnosu do njihove (re)produkcije so politike multikulturalizma? Ali je uspešnost, učinkovitost politik multikulturalizma v odnosu do ustvarjanja in ohranjanja kulturnih dediščin povezana z etnično ekonomijo? Avtorici najprej definirata temeljne kategorije: multikulturalizem, etnično ekonomijo in kulturno dediščino ter jih nato primerjalno opazujeta v različnih družbenopolitičnih kontekstih, pri čemer je v prispevku pozornost namenjena tudi razliki med (neo)liberalno in (neo)korporativno državo.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: migracije, etnična ekonomija, multikulturalizem, kulturna dediščina

## ABSTRACT

### Ethnic Economy and Cultural Heritage in the Context of Multiculturalism

The basic dilemma of the paper is the effectiveness of the policy of multiculturalism in connection with another social science concept – ethnic economy – and their impact on the creation and preservation of various forms of cultural heritage among migrants in the context of the (nation-)state. Is ethnic economy associated with processes of the (re)production of cultural heritage? What is the relationship of policies of multiculturalism with these processes of (re)production? Is the success and effectiveness of policies of multiculturalism with respect to the creation and preservation of the cultural heritage connected with the ethnic economy? The authors first define the basic categories: multiculturalism, ethnic economy and cultural heritage, and then observe them comparatively in various socio-political contexts. The paper also focuses on the differences between the (neo)liberal and the (neo)corporate state.

KEY WORDS: migration, ethnic economy, multiculturalism, cultural heritage

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## UVOD

O multikulturalizmu kot teoriji, politiki ali praksi je bilo prelitega že obilo črnila in spregovorjenih nemalo besed. Vsaj v Evropi smo se naposlušali različnih zgodb tega izrazito modnega koncepta: od njegovih »odkrivanj«, definiranj in poveličevanj do razglašanj njegove »smrti«. Zakaj potem ponovno o multikulturalizmu? Prav zaradi njegove večplastnosti in vsepojavnosti. Ko koncept mislimo skupaj z drugimi družboslovnimi kategorijami, lahko odkrijemo izredno zanimive in uporabne relacije. Učinkovitost politike multikulturalizma v sodobnih, deklarativno demokratičnih »tako ali drugače« raznih državah, je tema, ki ji je treba vedno znova posvetiti pozornost. V pričujočem prispevku nas zanima učinkovitost politike multikulturalizma v povezavi z drugim družboslovnim konceptom – etnično ekonomijo in njenimi vplivi na ustvarjanja in ohranjanja različnih kulturnih dediščin med migranti v kontekstu (nacionalne) države. Ali je etnična ekonomija povezana s procesi (re)produkcije kulturnih dediščin? V kakšnem odnosu do njihove (re)produkcije so politike multikulturalizma? Ali je uspešnost, učinkovitost politik multikulturalizma v odnosu do omenjenega ustvarjanja in ohranjanja kulturnih dediščin lahko povezana z etnično ekonomijo? Da odgovorimo na vprašanja, je treba najprej definirati temeljne kategorije, s katerimi operiramo: multikulturalizem, etnično ekonomijo in kulturno dediščino ter jih nato primerjalno opazovati v različnih družbenopolitičnih kontekstih, pri čemer je v prispevku pozornost namenjena tudi razliki med (neo)liberalno in (neo)korporativno državo.

## MULTIKULTURALIZEM

Multikulturalizem temelji na ideji socialne pravičnosti, ki se jo danes pogosto reducira na »kulturno pravičnost«. Ob upoštevanju politične in družbene realnosti se je v praksi oblikoval kot iskanje načina, da se vsem ljudem, tudi tistim iz ranljivih skupin, zagotovi prijazno življenjsko okolje. Najprej je bil osredotočen na migracijsko-etnične vsebine, nato pa se je pri kritičnem multikulturalizmu prek meja koncepta etničnih/kulturnih manjšin razširil na pripadnike drugih ranljivih skupin. Pri kritičnem multikulturalizmu gre za enakomernejšo porazdelitev družbene in politične moči, oziroma naj bi se v primeru njune nenakomernosti vzpostavili mehanizmi, ki bi učinke te porazdelitve blažili in zmanjševali diskriminacijo.

Rabe pojma multikulturalizem je treba razumeti na vsaj treh pomembno različnih ravneh realnosti: na ravni konkretne kulturne/družbene prakse v pomenu raznolikosti,<sup>1</sup> na ravni politike in na ravni teorije.<sup>2</sup> Pričujoči prispevek se osredotoča na raven politike, kjer zasledimo rabo multikulturalizma v različnih kontekstih,<sup>3</sup> nas pa zanima multikulturalizem kot uradna državna politika do priseljencev. Eno od

1 Na ravni konkretne kulturne/družbene prakse se pojem multikulturalizem uporablja kot oznako konkretne kulturne/družbene diverzifikacije, kadar se v isti državi nahaja več etničnih in kulturnih skupnosti ali skupin. Gre za opis heterogenosti, raznolikosti, ki se jo zgolj opisuje in se ne spušča v analizo družbenih in političnih odnosov, delitve družbene in politične moči med skupnostmi in skupinami ter analizo družbenih in političnih položajev, ki jih imajo njihovi pripadniki. Pri tej rabi se izgubi povezava koncepta z določenimi ideologijami, programi ali doktrinami.

2 Več o multikulturalizmu kot teoriji in njegovi tematizaciji v kontekstu človekovih pravic in državljanstva glej Lukšič Hacin 1999; Lukšič Hacin 2012 in Sardoč 2011.

3 Prvič: v političnih programih in gibanjih, ki zagovarjajo spremembe obstoječih odnosov med dominantno večino in manjšinami po principih multikulturalizma, danes t. i. interkulturalizma (politična dogajanja v ZDA konec 19. stoletja in v prvi polovici 20. stoletja, šestdeseta in sedemdeseta leta 20. stoletja, vrenje v Vzhodni in Zahodni Evropi v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja). Sem sodijo tudi gibanja (npr. antiglobalistična), ki izhajajo iz kritike premis multikulturalizma in njegovega kategorialnega aparata, v prepričanju, da je že diskurzivno evropocentričen (Negri 2004). Gledano na ravni teorije se njihova kritika nanaša predvsem na korporativno, liberalno in levoliberalno rabo koncepta multikulturalizma, hkrati pa so v svojih razmišljanjih o globalnih družbenih in ekonomskih odnosih zelo blizu stališč avtorjev kritičnega multikulturalizma. Od njih se razlikujejo v tem, da gradijo nov kategorialni aparat, a v nove pojme skušajo ujeti podobne pomene in procese na podobne načine, to je

vplivnejših implementacij multikulturalizma<sup>4</sup> na tej ravni sta izvedla Banting in Kymlicka (2006: 56–57). Izhajajoč iz človekovih pravic sta definirala politiko multikulturalizma kot tisto, ki sledi naslednjim postulatam:

1. ustavno, zakonodajno ali parlamentarno zagotavljanje multikulturalizma na ravni države, regij ali občin;
2. vključitev multikulturalizma v šolske kurikularne programe;
3. vključitev etničnih reprezentacij in senzibilizacije ter multikulturalizma kot principov delovanja javnih medijev;
4. sodno ali s statuti in pravilniki dovoljene izjeme kodov oblačenja itd.;
5. dovoljeno dvojno državljanstvo;
6. financiranje etničnih/migrantskih organizacij in njihovih kulturnih aktivnosti;<sup>5</sup>
7. financiranje dvojezičnega izobraževanja ali izpopolnjevanja znanja maternih jezikov;
8. afirmativna akcija za preseganje odrinjenosti in pozicij nemoči priseljskih skupin v večinskem prostoru.

Politika multikulturalizma, razumljena s pomočjo navedenih osmih načel, v vseh točkah neposredno ali posredno zagotavlja ugodne razmere za ustvarjanja in ohranjanja različnih migrantskih kulturnih dediščin, od izpeljave v praksi pa je odvisno, ali so te dediščine marginalizirane in izrinjene iz družbenih/kulturnih prostorov večine, ki naj bi bila homogena, ali so vključene v korpus (re)prezentacij heterogenosti okolja, v katerem nastajajo in se ohranjajo<sup>6</sup> skozi vzajemne dvosmerne procese med t. i. večino in manjšinami, ki jih Vrečerjeva (2007) opredeli kot integracijo.<sup>7</sup>

## ETNIČNA EKONOMIJA

Koncept etnične ekonomije se je v Združenih državah Amerike razvil v sedemdesetih letih in se nadgrajeval vse do devetdesetih let, ko je bil tudi delno redefiniran. V devetdesetih letih, sploh pa po letu 2000, je postal zanimiv tudi za Evropo, med drugim tudi v kontekstu razmišljanj o uporabnosti etnične ekonomije za spodbujanje integracije t. i. migrantskih manjšin. Koncept se je idejno napajal v zgodnejših

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z zagovorom podobnih principov pravičnosti v zgodovinski in globalni perspektivi kot zagovorniki kritičnega multikulturalizma. – Drugič: kot uradne državne politike do priseljencev ter etničnih manjšin (etničnih skupin, etničnih skupnosti in narodnih manjšin) in skupnosti (narodov in nacij v (kon)federacijah). Tu se srečamo z različnimi politikami multikulturalizma. Če omenimo tri zelo različne primere politik, npr.: a) jugoslovanska politika v odnosu do narodnih manjšin in etničnih skupnosti (npr. Romi) na eni ravni in na drugi ravni politika urejanja odnosov med narodi in njihovimi kulturami v federaciji; b) kanadska, avstralska in švedska politika do priseljencev na ravni (nacionalne) države; c) politika EU na ravni odnosov med nacijami oziroma državami članicami EU in njihovimi kulturami. Formalno, a parcialno, so politike multikulturalizma uvedene tudi npr. v ZDA, Veliki Britaniji, na Nizozemskem, itd. V omenjenih relacijah se postavlja vprašanje o odnosu med multikulturalizmom, liberalizmom in federalizmom.

4 Več o odnosu med multikulturalizmom in državo blaginje glej v Vah Jevšnik in Lukšič Hacin 2008.

5 O državnem subvencioniranju teh organizacij v Sloveniji glej Žitnik 2008: 87–89.

6 Kot primer lahko navedemo zanimivo dejstvo, ki ga implicitno nakazuje npr. Janja Žitnik Serafin (2010), namreč da je kulturna dediščina Slovencev v Argentini po letu 1990 mnogo bolje reprezentirana v prostoru matične Slovenije kot pa v simbolnih prostorih heterogenega argentinskega okolja, v katerem nastaja.

7 V povezavi z multikulturalizmom kot uradno državno politiko do priseljencev se pogosto uporablja tudi izraz integracija. Vrečer (2007) opredeli integracijo kot dvosmerni proces vključevanja priseljencev v državo sprejema na način, ki slednjim omogoča, da v javnem življenju prakticirajo kulturo države izvora. »V primeru integracije lahko govorimo o učečih kulturah, ko se (prisilni) priseljenci učijo od večinske in drugih kultur, hkrati pa se slednje učijo od kultur (prisilnih) priseljencev. V primeru integracije govorimo o kulturnih izmenjavah in pojavljanju novih kulturnih oblik« (Vrečer 2010: 489).

analizah imigrantskih podjetij, v razpravah o t. i. posredniških manjšinah,<sup>8</sup> ki jih je prva uvedla Bonacich (1973). Temu se je pozneje pridružil koncept etnične enklave<sup>9</sup> (Light in Gold 2000; Zhou 2004), ki izhaja iz teorije o dvojnem trgu delovne sile (Wilson in Portes 1980, Portes in Bach 1985) in se od drugih konceptov razlikuje v svoji navezanosti na globalno prostorsko razporejenost. Koncept etnične ekonomije so naprej razvijali in opredelili Light in Karageogies (1994) ter Light in Gold (2000); nanašal se je na samozaposlitveno dejavnost imigrantov, njihove delodajalce, zaposlene (pripadnike iste etnije) in njihove družinske člane. Omenjena dvojica raziskovalcev je koncept uporabila za prikaz imigrantske aktivnosti pri ustvarjanju malih podjetij, ki nastajajo v specifičnih gospodarskih panogah, navadno v sektorjih, ki ne zahtevajo visoko izobraženega kadra. Med drugim sta ugotovila, da so v etničnih ekonomijah delodajalci hkrati (samo)zaposleni.<sup>10</sup>

Sistematičen pregled literature nam pokaže, da se koncept etnične ekonomije nanaša na vse samozaposlene iz katerekoli etnične ali priseljske skupine, na delodajalce ter zaposlene iz iste etnične skupine in njihove družinske člane. Etnična ekonomija obstaja, če etnična skupina vzdržuje zasebni ekonomski sektor, v katerem ima večinski lastniški delež, ne glede na to, ali potrošniki so ali niso pripadniki iste etničnosti. Koncept se posveča etničnim resursom in socialnim mrežam, ki se jih uporablja za vzpostavljanje in vodenje malega podjetja. Uporablja se ga za opis aktivnosti pripadnikov manjšin in priseljencev, zaposlenih v malih podjetjih in specifičnih ekonomskih sektorjih, po navadi v tistih sektorjih, ki so delovno intenzivni, a ne potrebujejo visoko izobražene delovne sile.

Iz različnih razprav in analiz lahko izluščimo dva tipa etničnih podjetnikov. Prvi tip so t. i. posredniške manjšine. Predstavljajo tiste etnične podjetnike, ki trgujejo med socialno elito in masami. Zgodovinsko so bili to migranti, ki so hoteli s svojim prenosljivim in gibljivim kapitalom oziroma poslom na hitro zaslužiti, nato pa denar reinvestirati drugje, po možnosti po povratku domov. Svoje poslovalnice so najpogosteje postavljali sredi revnih (manjšinskih) soseščin ali v osiromašenih urbanih okoljih priseljskih getov, ki so jih zapustile trgovine, servisne dejavnosti in poslovneži iz družbeno dominantne skupine. V zadnjem času so svoje dejavnosti razširili tudi med srednji sloj v premožnejše urbane soseške in predmestja. Prebili so se ne le v sekundarni, temveč tudi v primarni sektor ekonomije države sprejemnice. Podjetniki posredniških manjšin imajo malo pravih povezav z družbeno strukturo in družbenimi odnosi v lokalni skupnosti, v kateri opravljajo svoje ekonomske aktivnosti. Drugi tip etničnih podjetnikov so t. i. enklavni podjetniki. Mednje spadajo predvsem tisti, ki so akterji na področju etničnosti, etničnih družbenih struktur in lokacij. V preteklosti so svojo dejavnost opravljali v soseškah, kjer so prevladovali pripadniki njihove priseljske/etnične skupine. Hkrati so bili aktivno vpeti tudi v kompleksen sistem družbenih vezi in odnosov znotraj samovzdržujočih se etničnih enklav. Danes, ko je veliko etničnih enklav preraslo v multietnične soseščine in nove rastejo v premožnejših predmestjih srednjega sloja, posamezniki, ki se ukvarjajo z etnično ekonomijo, pogosto hkrati igrata obe vlogi: vlogo etničnega podjetnika posredniških manjšin in vlogo enklavnega podjetnika.

Vidimo, da se koncept etnične ekonomije, kot je bil izvorno definiran v ZDA, poleg ekonomske dejavnosti povezuje tudi z migracijskimi mrežami. Se pravi, da za etnično ekonomijo ni dovolj, da je lastnik priseljskega/manjšinskega porekla, ampak mora okoli sebe zgraditi migracijsko mrežo, kot jo poznamo iz razprav o transnacionalizmu.<sup>11</sup> Ker se koncept etnične ekonomije izvorno naslanja na teorijo o dvojnem trgu delovne sile (Wilson in Portes 1980; Portes in Bach 1985), na koncept socialnega kapitala

8 V izvirniku avtorica uporabi izraz *middleman minorities* (Bonacich 1973). Pojem se nanaša na populacijo migrantov, ki so rojeni v državi izvora in imajo status tujca v državi naselitve. V državi naselitve ustanavljajo mala podjetja v storitvenem sektorju in uživajo višji socialni status, kot ga običajno pridobijo imigranti.

9 V angleščini je uporabljan pojem *ethnic enclave economy*.

10 Gre za ustanavljanje podjetij delovnih migrantov, ki iščejo niše v obstoječi gospodarski situaciji. Pogosto dejavnost povežejo s svojimi socialnimi mrežami, morda tudi kulturnimi vzorci, ki so jih prinesli s seboj, in se prek tega vključujejo v gospodarsko dinamiko okolja, kamor so se priselili. Pri prehodu iz države v državo morajo delovni migranti pokazati veliko mero kreativnosti in inovativnosti.

11 Več o transnacionalizmu glej v Lukšič Hacin 2009.

in na politiko trga delovne sile, je izrazito ekonomistično orientiran, posredno pa se povezuje s teorijami identitetnih politik, transnacionalizma in globalizacije.

Kot je bilo uvodoma poudarjeno, se je razmislak o etnični ekonomiji začel v ZDA, nato je bil prenesen v Evropo. Zaradi razlik med (neo)liberalno in (neo)korporativno državo oziroma državo blaginje so bile nujne reinterpretacije koncepta.<sup>12</sup> Razin za Evropo in njene nacionalne države poudarja rigidnost delovnega trga in birokratske ovire kot glavne dejavnike, ki so povzročili, da je etnična ekonomija postala le pot, po kateri se je pripadnike ranljivih (migrantskih) skupin skušalo rešiti pred nezaposlenostjo s samozaposlovanjem, kar so spodbujale tudi državne (socialne) politike (Razin 2007: 617). Etnično ekonomijo se je s tem vključilo v integracijske politike za priseljence v državah priselitve predvsem zaradi domneve o njenem pozitivnem doprinosu k lažji integraciji prišlekov v države Evropske unije. Implementacija koncepta v Evropi tako ni usmerjena v ekonomijo in realizacijo pozitivnih tržnih aspiracij kot v ZDA, ampak v iskanje odgovora na vprašanje, ali lahko na etnično (priseljensko) podjetništvo gledamo kot na pot pozitivne integracije. Odgovora na to vprašanje še ni, saj je dinamiko prekinila gospodarska kriza, čeprav bi se morda pokazali pozitivni učinki. Morda pa gre pri tem le še za en tip izkoriščanja in marginalizacije.<sup>13</sup> Vsekakor znotraj integracijskih strategij ostaja neodgovorjeno vprašanje o razmerjih v praksi, ki se postavljajo med migrantskim/etničnim podjetništvom, državo blaginje in (neo)korporativno državo.

## KULTURNA DEDIŠČINA IN NJENA (RE)PRODUKCIJA

Razumevanje kulturne dediščine in njena »produkcija« sta procesa, odvisna predvsem od naše percepcije preteklosti. V strahu pred negotovo prihodnostjo se ljudje radi oziramo v preteklost, pri tem pa sta materialna in nematerialna dediščina posrednici med preteklostjo in sedanjostjo. Kulturna dediščina so: 1) stavbe, skupine stavb in območja, ki imajo z zgodovinskega, umetnostnega, znanstvenega, etnološkega ali antropološkega vidika izjemno splošno vrednost (Konvencija Unesca 1972), in 2) nesnovna kulturna dediščina, ki se prenaša iz roda v rod in jo trajno poustvarjajo družbene skupnosti in skupine kot odgovor na pripadajoče okolje, njihov odnos med naravo in preteklostjo (Konvencija Unesca 2003). Ločimo torej snovno (predmetno)<sup>14</sup> in nesnovno (nepredmetno) dediščino.<sup>15</sup>

Presoja dediščine sega od sentimentalne – laične, strokovne z namenom ohranjanja do kritične – znanstvene. Deklaracije Unesca ustoličujejo dediščino kot »najpomembnejše jedro kolektivne identitete in samospoštovanja, hranilo, enako pomembno kot hrana in pijača« (po Lowenthal 1998: 5). Bogata, avtentična, živa, kontinuirana dediščina naj bi bila tisti dejavnik, ki utrjuje predvsem etnično (nacionalno) zavest in identiteto, saj »dediščina vedno bolj izpričuje tisto, kar nas povezuje z drugimi, nekaj, kar pripada skupini oziroma definira skupino« (Lowenthal 1998: 67).<sup>16</sup> Ker vezi s skupnimi predniki

12 Več o razlikah med (neo)liberalno in (neo)korporativno državo glej v Esping-Andersen 1996; Esping-Andersen 2006 in Razin 2007.

13 Več o tem glej Vah in Lukšič Hacin 2011.

14 Snovna dediščina je premična in nepremična: stavbe, zgodovinski kraji, spomeniki, artefakti (manjši predmeti, umetniška dela), kulturne krajine.

15 Nesnovna dediščina se nanaša na nefizične značilnosti, prakse, reprezentacije, izraze, znanja, veščine; ustne tradicije in izraze; jezik kot osrednje sredstvo nesnovne dediščine; glasbo, ples, dramo in druge performativne oblike; družbene prakse, rituale in praznovanja; znanja in prakse, ki so povezane z naravo in veseljem; hrana in obleka; tradicionalne obrti.

16 K nesnovni kulturni dediščini sodi tudi literarna produkcija. Izseljenska literarna dediščina ima lahko pomembno vlogo pri utrjevanju etnične identitete v izseljenstvu. Vendar, kot ugotavlja Žitnik Serafin (2011), notranja odmevnost književnih del v okviru posamezne izseljenske skupnosti, ki je bila še do nedavnega tako pomembna za ohranjanje slovenstva v izseljenstvu, danes v vse bolj »razrahljanih« slovenskih izseljenskih skupnostih preprosto ne deluje več. Morda se bo izkazalo, da ima nekaj tako produktivna skupinska energija v slovenskem izseljenstvu ustrezno protitež v izjemni individualni motivaciji najprodornejših posameznikov, med njimi tudi

(posredno preko predmetov) utrjujejo skupinsko identiteto, jo je treba ohranjati, varovati, vzdrževati, negovati, celo ponovno vzpostavljati ali konstruirati na različnih ravneh. Dediščina je »hitro razvijajoča se industrija«, kot pravi Lowenthal (1998: xiii), industrija, ki je povezana z drugo, še hitreje rastočo gospodarsko panogo: turizmom. Še močneje pa je dediščina povezana z nacionalno pripadnostjo in identiteto. Prisivjanje dediščine (fizično, to je prostorsko ali zgolj simbolno) in ekonomsko-kulturna (iz) raba sta glavni gonili ohranjanja kulturne dediščine. Zakaj je tako? Zaradi konstruirane vloge in statusa dediščine. Povezovanje kulturne dediščine z oblikovanjem ter ohranjanjem individualne in kolektivne identitete, predvsem nacionalne, je že dlje časa močno izpostavljeno in izrabljeno tudi v evropskem političnem in javnem diskurzu. Posredno se »od zgoraj navzdol« oblikuje določena predstava o dediščini, ki pa ni za vse sprejemljiva. Obravnava dediščine kot nacionalne dediščine pa v bistvu pomeni homogenizacijo in manipulacijo dediščine.

Človek večinoma razmišlja o kulturni dediščini skozi družbeno in kulturno perspektivo kot o brezčasnem in nedotakljivem »svetem«, napolnjenem s simboli. Dediščino si prilašča ali zavrača v lokalnem, nacionalnem, supranacionalnem, regionalnem ali celo globalnem prostoru. Na drugi strani se vedno bolj uveljavlja kritična zavest, da je dediščina stvar izbire ali pa je lahko medgeneracijsko posredovana. Nikakor ni »usodno« predoločena ali dana, v veliki meri je naša lastna prilagodljiva iznajdba oziroma kreacija (Lowenthal 1998: 226). Dediščina je izumljena (kot so po Ericu Hobsbawmu izumljene tradicije), fabricirana, ni nekaj svetega, samonastalega in tudi ni homogena ter brezčasna, saj so predmeti, stavbe, prizorišča, najdišča in nematerialno razpoznavni za kulturno dediščino. Razni strokovnjaki, etnične ali verske skupine, lokalne skupnosti ali drugi posamezniki in skupine jim pripisujejo zgodovinsko, estetsko, družbeno, simbolno in tudi ekonomsko vrednost (Deanovič 2003: 6).

Kulturna dediščina je tako označena kot »heterogen skupek dobrin, ki je v toku časa in v procesu historizacije prepoznan kot prenašalec specifičnih kulturnih tradicij« (Rizzo in Throsby 2004: 984). Predmete in prakse zmeraj presojava za nazaj, v drugem časovnem in družbenem kontekstu. Torej, strokovnjaki, ki delujejo na poljih varovanja kulturne dediščine in njenega vrednotenja, za nazaj pripišejo »dediščinski« status objektom in praksam, ki tega statusa niso mogli imeti.<sup>17</sup> Pri tem je pomembno, da so profesionalci, ki delujejo v teh institucijah, usposobljeni obvladati različna orodja in pristope, ki jim omogočajo obravnavo in razumevanje raznovrstnih historičnih kontekstov in migrantskih pripovedi ter posledično raznolikosti kulturne dediščine.

Podobno kot to velja za človekove pravice, ki se uveljavljajo znotraj nacionalnih zakonodaj, se tudi politika varovanja kulturne dediščine uveljavlja v okviru nacionalnih držav. Z ustanavljanjem tako imenovanih migrantskih muzejev (v ZDA, Avstraliji, Kanadi, Veliki Britaniji, na Danskem in v nekaterih drugih evropskih državah (več glej <http://www.migrationmuseums.org/web/>) predvsem v osemdesetih in devetdesetih 20. stoletja je bila dana podlaga za ohranjanje in prezentacijo kulturne dediščine priseljencev, vendar so bili to še vedno posebni, pretežno zasebno ustanovljeni in vodeni muzeji, namenjeni priseljenjski kulturi in dediščini. Kot navaja Milharčič Hladnik:

Slovenskoameriške skupnosti v Združenih državah Amerike so v stotih letih ustanovile, zgradile, izoblikovale, gojile in krepile različne institucije, organizacije in oblike delovanja. Narodne domove in cerkve so slovenski priseljenci zgradili povsod, kjer so se naselili. K njim so spadale slovenske šole in sobotni tečaji slovenščine ter številne kulturne združbe, od pevskih zborov, otroških pevskih zborov, opernih zborov, dramskih skupin, orkestr

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sodobnih slovenskih izseljenjskih pisateljev, zlasti tistih, ki so se bili – brez opore na družbeno-kulturno mrežo slovenske priseljenjske skupnosti v njihovi novi domovini – prisiljeni najprej povsem samostojno uveljaviti v tujejezičnem govornem prostoru, šele nato pa so lahko s svojim literarnim delom vzbudili večjo pozornost tudi v matičnem slovenskem prostoru.

17 Da je nek element kulture prepoznan kot kulturna dediščina, to je ustvarjen kot tak, potrebujemo merila za vrednotenje kulturne dediščine (avtentičnost, ogroženost, ohranjenost, redkost, starost) in kriterije za določanje pomena te dediščine (ločimo spomenike lokalnega in državnega pomena, vzpostavljen je tudi Unescov register spomenikov mednarodnega, svetovnega pomena).

in ansamblov do časopisnih in radijskih hiš, založniških, muzejskih in knjižničnih institucij. V stoletju ohranjanja etnične identitete in kulturne dediščine so se s tem ukvarjale številne slovenskoameriške organizacije, bratske in sestrške zveze, krožki in društva. Člani so njihovo delovanje omogočali z rednim plačevanjem članarine in neutrudnim prostovoljnim delom (Milharčič Hladnik 2008: 58).

Priseljenci in manjšine so ostali nereprezentirani v sklopu nacionalnih dediščinskih institucij (muzejev, galerij, arhivov ipd.). Muzejsko dejavnost migrantskih muzejev so finančno z donacijami podpirali predvsem priseljenci sami, saj v državnem proračunu, namenjenem kulturi, te institucije niso bile prepoznane kot institucije »nacionalnega pomena«, in dediščina, ki so jo ohranjale, ni bila del nacionalne dediščine. Skopa javna sredstva so nadomestili prispevki etničnih skupnosti s pomočjo enklavne oziroma etnične ekonomije. Priseljenci so začeli nastopati kot akterji ohranjanja dediščine in so posledično želeli predstaviti svoje vrednotenje dediščine in lastno interpretacijo preteklosti (več o tem glej Szekeres 2002). Tukaj se moramo ustaviti ob vprašanju reprezentacije dediščine »drugega«. Izključitev dediščine priseljencev in manjšin iz korpusa dediščine nekega naroda in ignoriranje vprašanja reprezentacije dediščine posledično pomeni dvoje: institucijam, ki skrbijo za dediščino, jemlje kredibilnost in avtoriteto, saj izključujejo celotne skupine ljudi, na drugi strani pa se marginalizirane, odtujene skupine ljudi zatečejo k drugim manj verodostojnim fantastičnim pripovedim o preteklosti, ki jim manjka kritične presoje, in to z namenom, da zadovoljijo povpraševanje po bolj zgodovinsko podprtem znanju (Young 2002: 209) in da utrjujejo svojo identiteto.

Bolj kritični pogledi na vlogo dediščine v sodobni družbi, predvsem v povezavi s socialnim izključevanjem in (ne)enakostjo, so se pojavili ob prelomu tisočletja. Strokovnjaki za dediščino so začeli razpravljati o lastni vlogi, vlogi muzejev in drugih institucij in seveda vlogi dediščine v tej povezavi (Sandell 2002). Vzrok za to so bile družbene spremembe v rastočih večetničnih družbah in reevalvacija sicer samoumevnega multikulturalizma. Tako sta na primer v Veliki Britaniji konec devetdesetih let 20. stoletja policijsko rasistično nasilje<sup>18</sup> in odmevna preiskava, ki je temu sledila, sprožila širši razmislek in javno razpravo o pomenu britanskih institucij, njihovih struktur in politik do različnih pojavov rasizma in izključevanja določenega dela prebivalstva iz družbenih kulturnih in umetniških kontekstov (Young 2002: 206).<sup>19</sup> S tem se vračamo k vprašanju implementacije politike multikulturalizma in njenih posledic za družbo oziroma, gledano ožje, za (re)produkcijo (migrantskih) kulturnih dediščin. Politika multikulturalizma, kot sta jo definirala Banting in Kymlicka (2006: 56–57), se neposredno nanaša na aktivno spodbujanje (manjšinskih) priseljskih dejavnosti, tudi (re)produkcije heterogene etnične dediščine, in inkluzijo manjšinskih prostorov v prostore večine kot del njene raznolikosti. Kako to poteka v praksi držav, ki se ustavno ali zakonsko razglašajo za multikulturalne, in držav, ki multikulturalizem delno zakonsko implementirajo na drugih ravneh, pa nam kažejo zgornji razmisleki. Jasna je ugotovitev, da so med praksami različnih držav velike razlike in da se zadnje (ali prvo) vprašanje implementacije povezuje s količino in z naravo razpoložljivih finančnih virov. Po drugi strani vidimo, da je v številnih omenjenih situacijah etnična (enklavna) ekonomija tista, ki je omogočila (re)produkcijo migrantskih dediščin, in ne politika multikulturalizma. Hkrati pa spomnimo na dejstvo, da je tovrstna etnična ekonomija prisotna le v ZDA, saj je v državah članicah EU etnična ekonomija vpeta med strategije integracijske politike, področja, ki jih v ZDA pokriva etnična ekonomija, pa so v evropskih državah pogosto v domeni dejavnosti javnega/državnega sektorja.

18 Več glej Young 2002: 203–206.

19 Leta 2000 so Britanci ustanovili Komisijo za prihodnost multietnične Britanije (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain), ki jo je vodil Bhikhu Parekh. Komisija je izdala slavno Parekhovo poročilo o družbenih neenakostih in možnostih sobivanja v večetnični Britaniji (prav tam: 206).

## SKLEPNE MISLI

Kakšen je torej odnos med politiko multikulturalizma, etnično ekonomijo, (re)produkcijo kulturne dediščine in državo kot takšno? V razpravi smo videli, da na uvodoma zastavljena vprašanja ni enoznačnega odgovora in da je dinamika med izbranimi kategorijami odvisna od konteksta. Možnosti za institucionalizirano skrb za heterogeno kulturno dediščino, ki upošteva doprinos migrantov kot posameznikov, skupin in skupnosti okolju priselitve, so odvisne od principov delovanja družbe sprejema, točneje države kot njene politične organizacije, ki pomembno določa tudi principe delovanja ekonomije v državnih okvirih. Čeprav danes govorimo o globalnem kapitalu, po drugi strani ne smemo spregledati vloge in pomena, ki ga države še vedno imajo. V tem pogledu je treba upoštevati razliko med (neo)liberalno in (neo)korporativno državo. Za pričujočo razpravo je bistvena razlika v funkcioniranju države na ekonomskem področju v povezavi z davčno politiko, definicijo javnega sektorja in delitvijo denarja zanj. Za kaj in kako se državni denar porabi? Kako, po katerih kriterijih in komu se denar deli? Kakšni so ti kriteriji in kdo jih postavlja? Je pri delitvi denarja mogoča participacija vseh, ki denar prispevajo, in kolikšen je delež participacije? Pri slednjem je za pričujočo razpravo najpomembnejše, kakšne so možnosti za priseljence in (re)produkcijo njihovih (manjšinskih) dediščin.

Zgodovina (neo)liberalnih ZDA nam kaže, da že na prelomu devetnajstega v dvajseto stoletje v praksi naletimo na pojave, ki jih danes prepoznavamo kot etnično podjetništvo. Nov ni pojav, temveč teoretska kategorija, ki na specifičen način tematizira že stoletno prakso med migranti v ZDA. Na pojav so vplivale življenjske razmere, v katerih so se ljudje znašli, in so za lastno preživetje, varnost in kvalitetnejše življenje vzpostavili princip solidarnosti v navezavi na etničnost in kulturo. Sami so si zgradili potrebne (etnične) inštitucije in poskrbeli za njihovo preživetje. Etnični podjetniki so lahko neposredno usmerjali tok denarja. Prek trga so se lahko vzpostavile samooskrbujoče dejavnosti tudi v povezavi z (re)produkcijo kulturne dediščine. Politika multikulturalizma je bila, če upoštevamo našo definicijo, parcialno implementirana od šestdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja in je podprla preživetje raznolikosti in dediščin, gotovo pa ga ni vzpostavila. Ključna za (re)produkcijo kulturnih dediščin v ZDA v razmerah (neo)liberalne države je etnična ekonomija, multikulturalizem pa to le še utrjuje ter vpliva na (ne)vklučenost manjšinskih tradicij v družbene/kulturne prostore večine, ki se je vse do šestdesetih let 20. stoletja po predpostavki o inherentni večvrednosti WASP (White Anglo-Sakson Protestant) modela konstituirala kot homogena.

V Evropi je etnična ekonomija redefinirana, odtujena od liberalnega trga in vpeta med strategije integracijske politike, ki jih kontrolira država. Podjetja, ki bi bila lahko prepoznana kot zametki migrantske/etnične ekonomije, ne morejo imeti tako aktivne vloge pri ohranjanju migrantskih dediščin, kot se to dogaja v ZDA. Po eni strani so številne dejavnosti, ki so v ZDA tržne niše etničnega podjetništva, v evropskih državah v pristojnosti javnega/državnega sektorja. Poleg tega pa je razlika tudi v možnostih za samostojno razpolaganje z realiziranim finančnim presežkom, kar se povezuje z razumevanjem države, javnega sektorja in davčne politike. Ta ključno vpliva na finančni delež, ki etničnemu podjetniku ostane in o katerem lahko osebno odloča. V Evropi se preko davčne politike finančno napaja najprej državni proračun, nato pa se sredstva preko državnih mehanizmov deli med prejemnike. Na tej poti se izgubi neposredni vpliv etničnega podjetnika na tok denarja, hkrati s tem pa se poveča pomen politike multikulturalizma, pojavi pa se potreba po njeni obvezni implementaciji tako med kriterije za delitev proračunskega denarja kot tudi v same strategije delovanja in t. i. letne delovne načrte javnih inštitucij, ki skrbijo za (re)produkcijo dediščin. V primerih, ko se multikulturalizma ne upošteva, se denar deli med porabnike skladno z (nacionalnimi) stereotipi o homogeni nacionalni kulturi (in s tem tudi dediščini). V redkih državah je te stereotipe že uspelo zamenjati z novo multikulturno paradigmo, ki teži k ohranjanju raznolikosti družbenega/kulturnega okolja in k opolnomočenju ranljivih skupin – ne le z odpiranjem marginaliziranih niš, kjer bi manjšinske dediščine životarile, ampak z dekonstrukcijo t. i. večinskega prostora na način, da se omogoči (re)prezentacije njegove dejanske raznolikosti in heterogenosti. V razmerah držav članic EU so principi multikulturalizma (danes interkulturalizma) nujni prvi pogoj in edini

garant (re)produkcije migrantskih, manjšinskih pa tudi regionalnih in lokalnih dediščin, ki naj bi se jih vgradilo v hegemonsko razmerja vzpostavljanja kolektivnega spomina in konstrukcije (heterogene, raznolike) realnosti.

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## SUMMARY

### ETHNIC ECONOMY AND CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTICULTURALISM

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The basic dilemma of the paper is the effectiveness of the policy of multiculturalism in connection with another social science concept – ethnic economy – and their impact on the creation and preservation of various forms of cultural heritage among migrants in the context of the (nation-)state. Is ethnic economy associated with processes of the (re)production of cultural heritage? What is the relationship of policies of multiculturalism with these processes of (re)production? Is the success and effectiveness of policies of multiculturalism with respect to the creation and preservation of cultural heritage connected with the ethnic economy?

The authors first define the basic categories: multiculturalism, ethnic economy and cultural heritage, and then observe them comparatively in various socio-political contexts, while the paper also focuses on the differences between the (neo)liberal and the (neo)corporate state. They find that there are opportunities for institutionalised management of a heterogeneous cultural heritage which takes account of the contributions of migrants as individuals, groups and communities in the immigrant environment, depending on the principles of operation of the receiving society, or more precisely the state as its political organisation, which is also significantly impacted by the principles of operation of the economy within the state frameworks. For this discussion the main difference in the functioning of the state in the economic field is associated with tax policy, the definition of the public sector and the distribution of funds to it. Why and how is the state budget allocated? How, according to what criteria and to whom are funds distributed? What are these criteria and who determines them? Is participation in the distribution of funds available to all who contribute them, and how high is the level of participation?

At the end they find that the ethnic economy is crucial to the (re)production of cultural heritage in the USA, in conditions of a (neo)liberal state, while multiculturalism merely further consolidates it and results in the (non-)inclusion of minority traditions in the symbolic space of the majority, which up to the nineteen sixties was conceived of as homogeneous following the assumptions of the inherent superiority of the WASP model. In Europe, however, the ethnic economy has been redefined, alienated from the liberal market and stuck among strategies of state-controlled integration policy. Therefore the principles of multiculturalism (or today interculturalism) in the conditions in which we find them in EU Member States are a necessary precondition and the sole guarantor of the (re)production of migrant, minority and also regional and local heritage, which should incorporate them into heterogeneous conditions for creating a collective memory and the construction of (a heterogeneous, diverse) reality.



# THEORIZING THE POTENTIAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL ECONOMY APPROACHES IN STUDYING THE STRUCTURE OF ETHNIC ECONOMIES

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## ABSTRACT

### **Theorizing the Potential of Political Economy and Social Economy Approaches in Studying the Structure of Ethnic Economies**

The main goal of the present paper is to identify commonalities and differences in the structure of ethnic economies in Canada and Slovenia. Keeping in mind the theoretical and practical differences between the North American and European approaches to ethnic economies, we show the wider significance of the concept in the light of some important findings from Canadian political economy theory and praxis, Horvat's political economy approach and approaches common to various views in the social economy literature. Consequently, the evaluation of state integration in ethnic economies is also considered.

KEY WORDS: ethnic economy, comparative political economy, social economy, capitalism, transformation, Slovenia, Canada

## IZVLEČEK

### **Razprava o potencialu politične in socialne ekonomije v raziskovanju strukture etnične ekonomije**

Glavni cilj omenjega dela je prikazati skupne značilnosti in razlike v strukturi etnične ekonomije v Kanadi in Sloveniji. Upošteevajoč teoretične in praktične razlike med severnoamerškimi in evropskimi definicijami etnične ekonomije pokažemo širši pomen koncepta v soočenju z drugimi pristopi: teorijo in prakso kanadske šole politične ekonomije in politično ekonomijo Branka Horvata ter pristopom k socialni ekonomiji. Posledično je ovrednotena tudi vloga države v konceptu etnične ekonomije.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: etnična ekonomija, primerjalna politična ekonomija, socialna ekonomija, kapitalizem, transformacija, Slovenija, Kanada

## PROLOGUE

We believe that the methodological and theoretical gap between the North American and traditional European approaches to the study of ethnic economies has to be somehow overcome (for a valuable theoretical debate see Vah Jevšnik and Lukšič Hacin 2011). Moreover, the introduction of some kind

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of “open system methodology” or “pluralist approach” to methodology (see Dow 2007 and 2008)<sup>1</sup> to the field of ethnic economy will be an important issue of research in the near future. At this point, we are starting a debate and a basic comparison which we strongly hope will provoke further efforts in developing various new approaches to ethnic economies. Comparing Slovenian and Canadian ethnic economies, we evaluate the role of heterodox political economy in supporting ethnic economy studies, and specifically how social economy approaches may be interrelated with the operation of ethnic economies.

The value of using the new Canadian political economy approach is twofold. Firstly, it offers two different angles on the structures of contemporary ethnic economies: the immigrant and the Aboriginal economic system. The settlers’ economy and various forms of native economies have historically been two distinct economic worlds, although they have been closely associated throughout the Canadian history. Recognizing that the internal dynamics of small economies may operate differently vis à vis dominant capitalist production is an important additional recognition in the field of ethnic studies. Furthermore, it opens up a debate which may lead to possible new understandings concerning the development of disadvantaged communities in Slovenia. In fact, showing the internal dynamics of a small economy may provoke the criticism that marginalized economies operate in isolation from the mainstream economy. We have to deny this assertion at the very beginning, showing later on that the logic of different dynamics is a matter of preserving and not isolating marginalized communities. Intensive contacts with the dominant economic system are at the centre of investigation in the context of contemporary development models.

Horvat’s<sup>2</sup> political economy approach, similarly to its Canadian counterpart, may offer ethnic economy studies a reasonable explanation of transition processes in mainstream economies as happened in Eastern/Central European countries, the significance of class and property rights, and a critical evaluation and possible alternatives to the capitalist mode of production.

In addition to a heterodox political economy approach, important findings from the social economy approach are also needed to highlight new theoretical and practical views concerning ethnic economies. Commonalities are particularly evident with regard to the fact that many “alternative” models are focused on improving the lives of a particular community or group, depending on the angle from which the specific problem is approached: ethnicity, community, migration, race, etc. In some sense, as is the case with the political economy approach, we want to exclude dualism in theory and practice and show that all contemporary alternatives, even sometimes more radical ones, have to be open going forward and allow possible integration with the mainstream economy.

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1 Dow’s vision of open systems, as we will see later on, is applied to the development of methodological and theoretical issues concerning heterodox economics.

2 Although Horvat’s political-economic thought has many opponents, it also has many followers. Whether or not we agree with his specific approach to political economy, it is evident that he offered many alternatives to complex economic everyday reality. As an eminent economist he was well trained in several other academic disciplines such as political science, sociology, and philosophy. In economic terms, Horvat mainly dealt with “economic growth, economic cycles, theory of the labour-managed firm, political economy of modern societies, and ‘pure’ economic theory (Uvalič and Franičević 2000: xxii).” Nowadays specifically, his vision of the labour-managed firm is useful in studying cooperative movements such as Mondragon and others. In sum, he acted as a true heterodox economist seeking everywhere a more balanced model of development and a more just society as a whole. A unique combination of political and economic theory, Horvat carried on further into unified social theory (Horvat 1982). On the basis of his seminal work *The Political Economy of Socialism* (1982) the American Society of Economists nominated him for the Nobel Prize.

# POLITICAL ECONOMY AS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PRINCIPLE

## The “New” Canadian Political Economy

The first of the important traditions in the context of Canadian political economy is that of Harold Innis. Following Innis, the *staple thesis* focuses on the production of raw materials and their export base (see Innis 1956). The most important point of the Innisian tradition is the formation of the argument that Canada “was developed to exploit a series of raw materials for more industrially developed countries” (Clement and Williams 1989: 7). As Watkins (1989: 18) has noted, the export of a particular staple may have “potential spread effects or linkages” with other sectors in the home country or in larger metropolitan areas outside the home country.

Pentland (1981) and Macpherson (1953: 1985), on the other hand, represent the Marxist tradition. Pentland saw important systemic changes in Canadian development as changes in the labour market (in capital accumulation, importation and investment), but as Phillips (1981: vii) points out, he was not a conventional “Marxist” but mainly a scholar who was affected by the European and even American Marxist tradition. Perhaps Macpherson’s most important contribution is his academic work on theories of rights, democracy and property (Clement and Williams 1989: 9). As Watkins (1997: 25) states, “the new political economy is arguably a marriage of Innis and Marx, of staples and class. The staples bias affects the capitalist class /.../ it also affects the rest of the class structure.” Panitch (1981) is critical of this kind of marriage, pointing out the shortcomings of the dependency approach within the Innisian staple thesis, which is supposedly weak in analyzing class structure and relations between classes. Additionally, and similarly to Panitch, McNally (1981) rejects the potential of the Innis and Marx fusion, showing that Innis in fact largely adopts ideas from Smithian classical political economy, to which Marx was an opponent.

Following Loxley (2010: 143), the economy in northern Canada has remained largely a resource economy even to the present day. It is clear that the Innisian intellectual tradition is still relevant for contemporary investigation of development in the North. On the other hand, Loxley (1981: 163) points out from a class analysis point of view that the main reason for Aboriginal poverty in northern Manitoba was the penetration of capitalist economy in the North:

the burden of poverty /.../ is borne, not by capital but, as Marx emphasised, by ‘the working class and the lower middle class’. In Northern Manitoba these classes are predominantly white, relatively better off than their counterparts elsewhere in Manitoba, and frequently racist. The white proletariat does not generally recognize the common roots of its own exploitation and of native poverty, tending, instead, to see native people as a burden upon them through taxation. This /.../ has important implications for the forging of political alliances between these different segments of northern society (ibid.).

## The Legacy of Horvatism

Horvat’s vision of market socialism is not a pure negation of market functions but their regulation. One of the main goals of this approach is to minimize uncertainty on the market. On the other hand, as Horvat states, in capitalist economies “...production is subject to business cycles, many people are unemployed, monopolies and advertisement distort price and output structures, and economic welfare obviously is substantially lower than it could be otherwise (Horvat 1982: 329).”

Besides lowering the level of uncertainty within the economic system, another important development principle is that of *equity*. Regarding the mainstream mode of production which is mainly affiliated with the needs of a free market, and where the equity between producers and consumers in terms of capitalist development is not the main interest of development planners, the logic of operation in the

economy has to be oriented towards establishing more equal positions between producers and consumers. Equity among producers, in short, “implies equal access to the productive capital of the society.” (Horvat 1982: 229) Shaping the legitimacy of Horvatism on the macroeconomic level, capital is socially owned instead of state ownership. Each producer, according to self-management principles, has to be included in decision-making. Equity among consumers is related to even distribution of income (Horvat 1982: 330). Following the equity principle, Horvat additionally also recognizes equity among citizens, referring to the equal distribution of power and reasonable political participation (1982: 331).

Horvat equates the concept of property relations with that of production relations (Horvat 1982: 336). In his critique of private productive property he states that “the means of production are owned and controlled by a property-owning class who use that ownership and control to appropriate economic surplus. Capitalists receive a disproportionate share of income not for what they do or contribute but for what they *own*” (Phillips and Ferfila 1992: 25) (italics ours). Furthermore, capitalist property creates authoritarian relations in work organizations. In fact, the workforce is isolated from decision-making in organizations, from creating production processes etc. Additionally, ownership is separated from management in those organizations (ibid.). As Horvat (1982: 236) explains, “private property generates capitalism, and *state property* generates etatism – both of which are class systems” (italics ours). In the context of *social property*, in Horvat’s (1982: 236) view, nobody has to be excluded from using it, and moreover, it is a matter of equal access to the means of production. In fact, social property is somewhere between private and state property (ibid.). Social property rights are more a matter of a social relationship with regard to the means of production (Phillips and Ferfila 1992: 23). In economic terms, social property cannot be appropriated either from private bodies or collective counterparts (Horvat 1982: 237). In some sense, this is a “classless” (ibid.) theory of property.<sup>3</sup>

## Heterodox vs. Orthodox Tradition

Dow (2008: 18) argues that the heterodox approach is an “open-system ontology” allowing various interpretations of realities. Advocating methodological (structured) pluralism, he states that there is no concept of pure pluralism but they are some “temporal” categories which allow communication and the establishing of reference points (Dow 2007: 42). In fact, Dow’s argument refers to the notion that orthodox economics is largely determined by method and its axiomatic nature but, as is shown in Dow’s (ibid.: 43) final model, there are still possibilities for “communication” between orthodox and heterodox economics. Furthermore, O’Hara (2008: 269) sees heterodox political economy as a balancing act where “most heterodox economists /.../ simply see the need for a balance between capital and labour; industry and finance; men and women; ethnic groups; competition and monopoly; market and state; and durable fixed capital and the environment.”

Horvat’s approach to political economy was also largely heterodox, representing several valuable dimensions of his work, especially his idiosyncratic approach to Marxism (and consequently the well-known Wardian designation Marxism–Horvatism), his unusual critique of neoclassical economics and his multidisciplinary approach (Uvalić and Franičević (2000: xxii). On the other hand, with respect to Horvat’s critical stance towards the neoclassical position in economics, Bockman (2011: 88) has argued that he also “demonstrated an extensive knowledge of the neoclassical economic literature, especially

<sup>3</sup> In fact, the subject of the political economy of property is a distinction between various types of property rights: private, state (public), communal and social property. Unlike private and social, state property may be directly administrated and owned by the government or its bodies (and departments), such as a school board, for example. In Canada, the term Crown corporation denotes organizations which are structured similarly to private companies but whose ownership is in the hands of different levels of government (Phillips and Ferfila 1992: 22). Communal property may be referred as a right of “enjoyment”, or the “doctrine of ‘use rights’”, for example, in the case of the use of water (Phillips and Ferfila 1992: 24).

neoclassical discussions of socialism, as well as the current Western economic theories of price, interest, investment and planning.”

Originally, the orthodox/heterodox debate within Canadian political economy started with Innisian criticism of the neo-classical orthodox paradigm, largely based on Smithian and Veblenian political economy and Mackintosh's (as the “co-founder” of Canadian political economy) neo-classical approach to the discipline (Clement and Williams 1989: 7).

## BASICS OF ETHNIC ECONOMIES

Starting with Light and Gold's (2000: 4) basic explanation, an ethnic economy “consists of coethnic self-employed and employers and their coethnic employees.” The rest of the workforce, which is not part of the ethnic economy, is part of the general labour market. As the authors point out, the concept of an ethnic economy is based on three different traditions: firstly, the European tradition in historical sociology where Marx, Weber and Sombart recognized that modern capitalism has its origins in its ethnic, primitive counterpart (ibid.); secondly, the middleman minority theory relating to “old-fashioned” capitalism, which had not been penetrated by the modern one (ibid.: 7); thirdly, African American economic thinkers such as e.g. Booker T. Washington, who largely advocated the importance of economic power instead of political power in the sense that black people would much more easily achieve social and political equality on the basis of economic power (ibid.: 8).

Light and Gold (2000) draw a distinction between an *ethnic ownership economy*, an *ethnic enclave economy* and an *ethnic-controlled economy*. The first “exists whenever any immigrant or ethnic group maintains a private economic sector in which it has a controlling ownership stake” (Light and Gold 2000: 9). Business owners may be supported by family members as unpaid assistants, may have their own employees, or be self-employed. According to Light and Gold, the larger the size of the business, the more important it is; specifically, this type of ethnic economy refers to small and medium sized companies (ibid.: 25–27). In this sense, questions of ownership and property rights are of central importance. However, the ethnic-controlled economy instead of ownership places the parameter of control at the centre of investigation. In this case, coethnics express widespread economic power through the ethnic economy on the general labour market. In fact, coethnic employees exercise power through controlling significant parts of public administration jobs or private companies, for example, in order to secure better positions for their coethnic counterparts (Light and Gold 2000). The third example, the ethnic enclave economy, is in fact an ethnic ownership economy that “is clustered around a territorial core” (Light and Gold 2000: 24).

Valuable insight in terms of overcoming the gap between the North-American and European definitions is provided by Vah Jevšnik and Lukšič Hacin (2011), theorizing immigrant and ethnic entrepreneurship in the context of a welfare state background: (neo)liberalism in the United States and (neo)corporatism as accepted in Europe. In fact, according to the authors, it is crucial to take welfare regimes, generally categorised as corporative, social-democratic and liberal, into account (Vah Jevšnik and Lukšič Hacin 2011: 250). The (neo)liberal policy environment in North America also produces different views concerning the European definitions and views on the concept of social entrepreneurship. Even more specifically, and applying to Canada, there are important differences in defining the environments regarding Aboriginal peoples and the rest of the immigrant/ethnic communities. Of course, there is a general distinction between North-American and European definitions with respect to American (neo)liberal market principles and European social regulatory mechanisms, which are even more specifically divided into corporatism and social democratic models (see Vah Jevšnik and Lukšič Hacin 2011).

At this point, it is necessary to evaluate some additional dimensions concerning ethnic entrepreneurship and ethnic economy concepts. One important question is in what manner the North-American ethnic economy model can be valid in the European context. Vah Jevšnik and Lukšič Hacin (2011:

255) take the position that “when taking into consideration the specifics of the European nation-states and their (neo)corporative characteristics, the US-based approaches have a limited applicability.”

Another inconsistency concerning these two theoretical approaches is the distinction between ethnic economy, ethnic entrepreneurship, and ethnic business. According to authors who reflect the Schumpeterian view, an entrepreneur produces innovative ideas, while a businessman is a part of a production cycle to which he does not necessarily bring innovations. Furthermore, bearing in mind Light and Gold’s (2000) above-mentioned definition of ethnic economy, the concept does not contain development parameters for innovation (Vah Jevšnik and Lukšič Hacin 2011: 256). Again, as already mentioned, it is necessary to distinguish between ethnic and immigrant entrepreneurs (ibid.: 257) as the Canadian example shows. Furthermore, the concept of ethnic economy has to be fleshed out in order to point out the structure of the internal small economy and represent it as a true economic system, and not solely the positions of the individual entrepreneurs in it.

## THE SOCIAL ECONOMY PLATFORM

The social enterprise approach is a quite recent “social” invention related to the uncovering of the potential of various hybrid models of alternative economic concepts. As Defourny and Nyssens (2006: 7) argue, the social enterprise approach is not a substitute for other well-known concepts in the context of the third sector: the social economy, the non-profit sector and the voluntary sector. In fact, it is more a matter of dynamics in terms of operation activities inside the sector itself. Furthermore, it plays an important role as an integrator between these pillars, which serve as foundational elements of the concept. The social enterprise approach considers co-operative practices to be market activities and non-profit organizations as mostly oriented towards non-market operations. Generally speaking, there are two types of orientations: economic and social. In the context of economic activities, social enterprises may largely operate as normal enterprises partially dealing with production of goods and provision of services. Moreover, they possess a high degree of autonomy; for example, they might even receive public funding from public bodies. On the other hand, social functions are mainly oriented towards supporting community and collective action. The decision-making process is not, in contrast to regular enterprises, based on equity, but each member has a right to vote. At any rate, like other similar approaches, the participative nature of social enterprises is important in shaping different stakeholders’ initiatives. Last but not least, the maximization of profit and its total distribution is not the main goal of social enterprises – there are some limitations to profit distribution (ibid.: 6–7).

The social economy concept may generally embrace the following structures: *co-operative-style enterprises, mutual-type organizations and associations*. Co-operatives include agricultural and credit and savings cooperatives, consumer and insurance cooperatives etc. (Defourny 2003: 4). Some of them are quite profitable and competitive with other players on the market. As a part of the third sector, mutual-type organizations largely cover the needs in particular communities, for example, providing insurance services. Associations can be advocacy organizations in their nature, such as Greenpeace, and are recognized as associations, non-profit organizations, non-governmental organizations etc. (ibid.). In fact, the social enterprise approach certainly may also be counted under the mentioned definition. At any rate, social economy organizations follow principles that advocate community orientation instead of solely focusing on profit, autonomous managerial structures, democratic decision-making and a focus on people rather than capital (ibid.: 6).

In Canadian terms, the social economy may be divided, according to Quarter, Mook and Armstrong (2009), into the following components: social economy businesses, community economic development,<sup>4</sup> social enterprises, public sector non-profits, and civil society organizations. The social

4 Community economic development (hereinafter CED), mainly stands between the two options of its potentially

economy functions on the market, but at the same time, its operations are also based on carrying out social goals (Quarter, Mook and Armstrong 2007: 43). More specifically, with regard to market activities, some of them directly compete with private companies, while others operate by accessing gaps (niches). Credit unions and farm-marketing co-operatives compete with private companies in an equal manner (Quarter and Mook 2010: 10–11). CED initiatives also make some of their earnings on the market, but as Quarter and Mook (*ibid.*: 13) point out, they cannot reach such high levels of self-sufficiency as social economy businesses do. The most important organizations within the structure of any CED initiative are non-profit community development corporations established to support disadvantaged communities. As the authors additionally note, the government plays a crucial role in operating CED initiatives through Futures Development Corporations, ensuring funding support for them (*ibid.*: 15). The creation of a social enterprise through the structure of any CED initiative is a type of CED, supposing that organizations operate according to market principles with the goal of supporting their social dimension (*ibid.*: 14). Civil society organizations are oriented towards supporting their members and, on the other hand, operate in the name of the public. These are non-profit mutual associations with a specific focus on supporting economic issues and social principles. Those oriented towards the economic dimension include the following: business associations, unions, professional associations and consumer associations. Business associations are in fact an extension of the private sector and usually carry out work for the government and the public (*ibid.*: 16). Unions also serve their members' interests and are associated with other sectors of the economic system. Together with social movements, the organization's structure is often influenced by various government public policies (*ibid.*: 17). Having in mind a social dimension, religious congregations, as the most widely recognized civil society organizations, in addition to tending to spiritual needs also serve people living in poverty (*ibid.*: 17). Social clubs and socio-political organizations also largely operate in advocating public interests (*ibid.*: 17–18). The last group representing the social economy structure in Canada, public sector non-profits, function largely as “partners” with government agencies; their activities are largely dependent on government funding and its influence (*ibid.*: 15)

## **CED, GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT AND ETHNIC ECONOMIES IN CANADA**

The research ethos concerning the structure of ethnic economies in Canada has to be changed and transformed in at least two dimensions: the impact of transnationalism on the structure of ethnic economies and subordinate constitutive parameters (especially those concerning labour), and the impact of the different nature of ethnic economies, differentiating between the Aboriginal and other immigrant and ethnic economies. Additionally, we want to highlight the importance of external factors influencing the nature of ethnic economies. Ethnic communities are largely affected by globalization processes but,

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relevant views: filling the gap left by a dominant capitalist economy and, potentially, the transformation of the economy and society (Loxley 2007: 9). As Loxley (*ibid.*) points out, the potential of the CED model relating to its first principle lies in its eventual coexistence with capitalism and does not put into question the legitimacy of the state. On the other hand, in its vision of replacing the capitalist mode or establishing an alternative to it, it seems closer to methodological principles pictured by the “new” Canadian political economy, which does not even necessarily have a revolutionary character of transformation. At any rate, the essence of CED is the convergence theory, addressing the relationship between community resource use, community demands and community needs. Though mainly produced for a local/community environment, its outward focus is also present in the sense that a particular community may sell overproduction outside it (Lamb 2007: 64–65). Commonalities between the nature of ethnic economies and CED principles are seen mainly in the subsistence (self-reliance) character of both concepts.

at the same time, it is not possible to evaluate those impacts simply, owing to the fact that, for example, intensification of contacts always provokes changes in ethnic business and in the structure of ethnic economies.

There are two theories which can be used to explain transnational contacts of immigrant communities with the country of origin. As Fong, Cao and Chan (2010: 428) point out, the previously accepted theory of assimilation is now being confronted with the transnational view. The former explains the incremental reduction of socio-economic contacts of immigrant communities with the country of origin when immigrants have lived longer in the new country. On the other hand, the transnational view refers to the fact that immigrants in the modern world usually keep ties with the country of origin even if they have lived in the new one for a significant period of time (ibid.: 428–429). In fact, the social networks which have been established inside the ethnic economies as internal processes of the subsistence economy have been expanded and associated with existing networks on the international level. Fong, Cao and Chan's (2010) research concerning contacts of Chinese people and Asian Indians with their home countries partially negates the potential of the transnational view. This is surprising for at least two reasons: firstly, China and India are two of the most important drivers of the contemporary global economy; secondly, as the authors specifically emphasize, the Chinese and Indian people have widely expressed the potential for establishing social networks (Fong, Cao and Chan 2010: 445).

To continue with the political economy of transformation, there is an important difference in the structure of the immigrant labour force in contemporary Canada. In the past, immigrants came to Canada as a low-educated labour force, as a "reserve army"; nowadays the newcomers are well formally educated and possess expert high-tech knowledge (Satzewich and Wong 2003: 365). Generally speaking, the nature of Canadian capitalism has been changed largely due to the changing structure of the immigrant labour force. With regard to the emerging transnationalism, Light (2007: 6) refers to international social capital as having made transnational business far more sophisticated and less complex. Transnational migrants as the "new elite" are in a much better position in relation to their non-transnational coethnics. The internationalization of social capital, the ability to speak two languages fluently (bilingualism), and the ability to use information technology in communication make them top entrepreneurs in international business.

The Aboriginal economic system is very different to other ethnic economies in Canada. There is a constant clash with Canadian capitalism in terms of the possible integration of the two economic worlds and the nature of these integrative processes. In fact, taking the example of Canadian hydroelectric development, which is perhaps the best illustration of the Aboriginal-Canadian conflict in the modern era, Aboriginal economies have always been in confrontation with the state, province and hydroelectric Crown corporations. The structure of internal small economies largely depended on the power and potential for resistance in hands of state and provincial players and the Aboriginal communities themselves. At least three periods of Canada's hydro development have featured a clash between ethnic Aboriginal economies in relation to dominant capitalist production: the era of subordinate position and assimilation, the era of resistance, and the era of integration with the dominant capitalist production, or better said, the nature of resource extraction for the benefits of capitalist production. In fact, many scholars speak of the "penetration" of capitalism into Aboriginal economic systems, which has resulted in significant changes.

In the context of hydroelectric development in James Bay, Quebec, two projects significantly changed the nature of North-South Quebecois power relations. Firstly, the La Grande project crucially, in a negative manner, affected the life of local Cree and Inuit communities with regard to the ecological, social and economic development parameters. Secondly, the Great Whale project was blocked by a strong network of various players linking the affected Cree communities and their supporters, establishing a strong international coalition. The local Cree acted as transnational policy players in preventing their internal economies. Acting against the provincial government of Quebec and the provincial hydroelectric Crown corporation Hydro-Quebec (and in some sense also against the federal government),

the Cree of James Bay tried to mobilize support in Vermont, Maine and New York. Furthermore, their voice was heard in the European Parliament, the Vatican and the Barcelona Olympic Games, and at United Nations conferences in Rio and Vienna. Additionally, the Cree set up an important alliance with the Brazilian Kayapos who successfully gained the attention of the public concerning the destruction of the Brazilian rainforest (Rousseau 2000).

The Wuskwatim projects in northern Manitoba are one of the latest examples of possible integration of the two economic worlds, perhaps not the best one, but they highlight possible future solutions in terms of cooperation. At any rate, the main issue is the subject of compensation for flooding the territory and consequently destroying the Aboriginal land and more or less traditional way of life. In fact, it is a question of limitation of available resources for the Aboriginal ownership economy. Compensation is, on the other hand, largely a matter of integration into a dominant capitalist economy based on available resources (see Durnik 2009). With regard to new approaches to CED (in the context of sectorized support programs), the Government of Manitoba has decided to offer the First Nations the possibility of ownership of hydro dams constructed by the provincial Crown corporation Manitoba Hydro (Loxley and Simpson 2007: 31). The Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation of Nelson House decided to enter into a development agreement with Manitoba Hydro amounting to \$1.2 billion (a 33 percent share) in the construction of the Wuskwatim hydroelectric generation project (Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation Website 2011). On the basis of compensation, the NCN community established a Development Corporation through which several other companies, local media and restaurants opened their doors (Loxley 2010: 147).<sup>5</sup>

## **GOVERNMENT, SOCIAL ECONOMY INITIATIVES AND ROMA ETHNIC ECONOMY IN SLOVENIA: FORMATION OF THE ROMA UNDERCLASS**

The aim of this section is to hypothetically evaluate the possibilities of the Roma ethnic economy and other development concepts combined into a single development model. Each of them may offer some important additional insights into the complex poverty reality in the Roma community in Slovenia, but none of them is sufficient on its own to establish a truly effective development strategy.

It is largely impossible to investigate the structure and potential of the Roma ethnic economy in Slovenia based on previous analyses because no such investigation has been done yet. Additionally, in comparison with the Canadian Aboriginals, no economic development approaches have been used that might determine the path of Roma development. For this reason, a more thorough evaluation could be done by collecting new data. On the other hand, we can explore some partial findings concerning the Roma economy in Slovenia. Economic activities such as agriculture or gathering, processing and resale of secondary raw materials (paper, plastic, glass and above all metals) are economic activities common to the Roma community (Zupančič 2007: 228). Using state funding for self-employment initiatives, several individuals have employed family members for some period of time. They have been also initiatives which could find a place in future development of the Roma ethnic economy: (1) an idea for establishing companies based largely on employing Roma workers to maintain parks and public surfaces (in cooperation with social enterprises); (2) the possibility of ethnically-based entrepreneurship regarding the management of river embankments and sluiceways (Durnik 2011). Zavrtnik Zimic (2000: 843) points out that there is also an absence of Roma children in schools due to seasonal work.

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding joint ownership, there are two possible visions of the issue. The first one is as mentioned in the case of Wuskwatim; the second one is highlighted in the Peace of the Brave Treaty accepted by the Cree of James Bay and Quebec Government. This treaty offers no joint ownership as a solution but ensures to the Cree ownership of a land, support to traditional hunting, and jobs and supply ventures in hydro development.

According to Light and Gold (2000), even though the informal sector does not correspond to the main definitions of an ethnic economy, it is still a valuable concept for investigation, since they are inseparably interconnected. In fact, the informal sector in some sense supports the operation of ethnic economies. In this sense, especially for future research, it has to be considered in the context of establishing parameters for the Roma ethnic economic system. Another real issue will be how we can measure the size of the informal sector within the Roma community. As Light and Gold (2000: 40) find, the informal sector “consists of marginal and distressed workers and petty merchants.” It is not composed of registered economic activities but, on the other hand, informal business is in constant relation with the registered economy. The majority of workers in the informal sector are self-employed and are therefore engaged in ethnic ownership economy nonregistered structures (ibid.).


A fundamental transformation for the Roma economy occurred after the collapse of the communist states in East Central Europe and their entering the new economic model. Szélényi and Ladányi (2003: 6) express these fundamental changes in the context of Romany poverty in Csenyété (north-eastern Hungary): “During socialism almost all Romany men, and many women too, were employed. They were employed in the least desirable jobs, nevertheless they had jobs, a permanent flow of weekly or bi-weekly income as well as interaction at their workplace with non-Roma.” During the following decade, unemployment in the village of Csenyété was “total” (ibid.). The authors (as a consequence of de-industrialization in Hungary) noticed a turn in class formation from a “lower class’ of unskilled labourers in mining, steel and construction industry (rarely in agriculture)” (ibid.) to what they define as “underclass” formation (ibid.). The following parameters shape those people seen as underclass: (1) the underclass is homogenous, separated from the mainstream society; (2) members are seen as “useless” to society; (3) children are possible inheritors of poverty. As Szélényi and Ladányi’s (2003) work is of crucial importance for Roma in Hungary, Horvat’s heterodox political economy may have an impact on the understanding of the historical and economic conditions in the Slovenian transition and how the impact of transition has influenced the Slovenian Roma community. Moreover, Horvat (1982) (as a defender of social property) was an important critic of state socialism as it was practised in Hungary.

Above all, it is also necessary to evaluate the value of the social economy context for the development of the Roma ethnic economy. The Government of the Republic of Slovenia through the National Programme of Measures for Roma in the period 2010–2015 addresses many development problems in the Roma community, not solely the economic ones. Specifically, under the strategic goal of “reducing unemployment and increasing social inclusion and access to the labour market”, funding is specifically directed to support the development of social entrepreneurship and development projects (National Programme of Measures 2010). According to the report by Spear et al. (2010), the social economy platform in Slovenia faces several important shortcomings: (1) the state is too strongly involved in producing public goods; (2) the role of the social sector is not properly recognized by the state; (3) the overall contribution of the social economy to the national GDP is weak etc. Furthermore, social economy organizations do not have proper network support from the state agencies and individually.

Following the theory of ethnic economies in the US, and especially models of social economy and political economy in Canada, investigating the economic history of the country as specifically oriented towards that of ethnic groups may be a foundational element in investigating the potential and nature of ethnic economies in general. For example, all contemporary debates concerning the possible integration of small economies in Canada cannot be correctly understood without serious research into Canadian economic history. In addition to the other above-mentioned parameter, economic history is another issue which has to be considered in the future exploration of the ethnic economies approach in Slovenia.

In 2011, the International Labour Organization adopted the Convention on Domestic Workers, focusing on the rights of domestic workers who take the responsibility for the survival of their family members and households. One of the main benefits for domestic workers is recognition of their rights, which have to be equated with that of basic workers’ rights: clear rules of employment, the right to par-

ticipate in collective bargaining organizations such as trade unions (Convention on Domestic Workers 2011). This policy development has to be recognized as fundamental for the Roma community in Slovenia because it widens the existing employment platform for the Roma's overall future development and ethnic economy.



**Figure 1:** Hypothetical long-term model of development for Roma communities in Slovenia  
**Source:** Durnik (2011: 9).

## SYNTHESIS AND EPILOGUE

First of all, there are two important conclusions in mapping the differences between the Canadian and Slovenian cases. Canada expresses two radically different faces of the ethnic economy platform: the historically determined Aboriginal economic system and the immigrant ethnic economies which are strongly interrelated but also very distinct in their patterns. In Slovenia, there are differences in the structure of immigrant ethnic economies (especially workers from the countries of former Yugoslavia), for example, with respect to the Roma community. The latter, as we have seen, cannot be counted as an ethnic economic system, but we can speak about separate principles on which it could be based in the near future. We have consciously chosen the example of the Roma due to the fact that the Roma ethnic economy cannot be established and function without state intervention policies and a strong interrelationship with the social economy platform in Slovenia. Furthermore, when dealing with Roma poverty issues it is necessary to bring the discipline of political economy back to mainstream economics. Additionally, the poorly operational potential of the social economy platform has to be radically improved due to its necessary role for the economic development of the Roma community.

Logan, Alba and McNulty (1994: 693) state that the ethnic economy could be seen as an activity which assures some kind of economic advantage for co-ethnics. In our view, the advantage and secure position mainly have to be guaranteed in relation to the dominant system of production. Here, the nature of the welfare regimes (see Vah Jevšnik and Lukšič Hacin 2011) around the "ethnic" base largely determines the internal operation of ethnic economies. In fact, there are important differences within the European and North-American contexts. As we have seen, the Hungarian transition (although according to Lavigne (1999) a gradual one) – shock therapy in 1995 when the social-liberal coalition seized power and shifted from communism to neo-liberalism – influenced the socio-economic life of the Roma. On the basis of their investigation of socio-economic changes in the village of Csenyété,

Szelényi and Ladányi (2003) introduced the term *underclass* to illustrate the total exclusion of the Roma from the mainstream economy and society. Slovenia has chosen a different path of transition from Hungary's and has preserved some important social values incorporated in the new political economic systems. But the current socio-economic position of many Roma in Slovenia is close to the definition of an underclass – they are radically excluded from the mainstream political economic system. Furthermore, as a response to the global economic crisis it seems that governmental decisions are in recent years much closer to narrow previously gained social welfare gains. Above all, there are some differences and commonalities in the welfare regimes between Canada and the US. Light and Gold's analysis (2000) is based on the US liberal welfare regime which guarantees fewer barriers to ethnic entrepreneurship in comparison with European models (Vah Jevšnik and Lukšič Hacin 2011: 251). Canada too belongs in the liberal camp, investing less in social schemes in the fifty years after the Second World War than any other OECD country except the US. The Canadian social network is largely determined by the market, guaranteeing a low level of benefits to citizens (Brody 2003: 9). At any rate, as Brody (*ibid.*: 10) points out, "Canadians have prided themselves on their postwar social programs, especially universal health care, as a mark of Canadian citizenship, and as a defining public policy, which distinguishes them from their American neighbors." On the other hand, federal and especially provincial government intervention is important in supporting the social economy platform, which seems very strong in fighting poverty (see for example Loxley 2007, 2010; Loxley and Simpson 2007). Experts in Slovenia may find some useful knowledge in the functioning of the Canadian social economy platform.

Finally, with regard to the Roma in Slovenia it is worthwhile to speak about future development incentives which would stimulate the establishment of a new structure of the ethnic economy serving community economic development needs. There is open space for a pluralist approach combining various development models. As we have shown in Figure 1, the current Programme of Measures (2010) would be merely a starting point for future development of the Roma community, even though it has been planned broadly. We are witness to the fact that the state response to the current economic crisis in Slovenia is moving towards narrowing the gains of the welfare state. For this reason, thinking about alternative economic models for marginal groups will be an increasingly important issue.

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## POVZETEK

### **RAZPRAVA O POTENCIALU POLITIČNE IN SOCIALNE EKONOMIJE V RAZISKOVANJU STRUKTURE ETNIČNE EKONOMIJE**

Mitja DURNIK

Jure GOMBAČ

Avtorja v članku pokažeta, da je obravnavanje fenomena etnične ekonomije lahko veliko več kot le gola deskripcija strukture in razmerij znotraj nje. Z uporabo političnoekonomskega pristopa dodatno osvehlita odnos etničnega gospodarjenja do prevladujočega ekonomskega sistema ter znova postavita v ospredje nekatere parametre ekonomske misli, ki jih slednja v zadnjih letih zapostavlja: na primer vprašanje razredne strukture in lastninskih pravic. Poskus dodatne sinteze s koncepti socialne ekonomije pa ponuja možen razmislek o prihodnji vlogi etnične ekonomije v poskusih revitalizacije malih (lokalnih) ekonomskih sistemov. Primera Kanade in Slovenije kažeta na to, da je treba vsekakor nujno upoštevati tudi vlogo države v obravnavanju etnične ekonomije. V študiji primera Kanade avtorja izpostavita dve izrazito različni pojmovanji etničnega gospodarjenja: staroselskega, ki je nastajal stoletja (ločeno tudi tisočletja) in je do neke mere še vedno v konfliktu z državo in njenim kapitalističnim razvojem, ter prise-ljenskega, ki je bolj kompatibilen z njenimi smernicami razvoja. Bolj podroben vzpogled v razvoj romske skupnosti v Sloveniji pa pokaže, da ne moremo govoriti o celostni strukturi etnične ekonomije, temveč le o nekaterih njenih zametkih. Avtorja se strinjata, da gospodarjenje na etnični zasnovi vsekakor upošteva prevladujoči način produkcije v družbenem sistemu in se mu do neke mere tudi podreja oziroma z njim kohabitira.



# INSTRUMENTALIZACIJA ETNIČNOSTI ZNOTRAJ VEČNACIONALNIH DRŽAV: PRIMER KOLONIZACIJE SLOVENCEV V AVSTRO-OGRSKEM DELU NEKDANJE JUGOSLAVIJE

Damir JOSIPOVIČ<sup>1</sup>

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## IZVLEČEK

### **Instrumentalizacija etničnosti znotraj večnacionalnih držav: Primer kolonizacije Slovencev v avstro-ogrskem delu nekdanje Jugoslavije<sup>1</sup>**

Avtor v članku razpravlja o prisotnosti Slovencev na »avstro-ogrskem« območju nekdanje SFRJ s pomočjo koncepta politično motiviranega naseljevanja na za večnacionalne države strateško pomembna območja. Poleg komparativne analize popisnih metodologij, ki so zbirale razne jezikovne in etnične pripadnosti v obdobju od prvih modernih popisov sredi 19. stoletja do danes, avtor sistematično naslavlja vprašanje kvantitativne in statistične prisotnosti Slovencev na območjih, katerih teritorialne naslednice so federalne enote nekdanje Jugoslavije. Glavna skupina ugotovitev se osredinja na instrumentalizacijo etničnosti kot ključnega evidentiranega dejavnika planskih migracij s strani državnih centrov večnacionalnih držav (npr. Avstro-Ogrska, nekdanja SFRJ). Prispevek na podlagi analiz podatkov trdi, da se je motiviranost prebivalstva pripadati slovenski etniciteti bodisi skozi nominalno govorjeni jezik bodisi skozi izrecno etnično pripadnost ustvarjala in poustvarjala neodvisno od realnih migracijskih tokov.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Slovenci, Jugoslavija, demografska analiza, migracije, etničnost, etnična struktura, popisi prebivalstva

## ABSTRACT

### **Instrumentalization of Ethnicity within Multi-National Countries: the Colonization of Slovenes in the Austro-Hungarian Part of the Former Yugoslavia**

Through exploring politically motivated settlement into the strategically important areas of multi-ethnic countries, this article deals with the presence of Slovenes in the former Austro-Hungarian territory of ex-Yugoslavia. Apart from a comparative analysis of census methodologies, which had recorded data on linguistic or ethnic affiliation in the period after the invention of modern population censuses in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the author systematically examines the question of the quantitative and statistical presence of Slovenes in the successor states and territories of former Yugoslavia. The main group of arguments is concentrated around the idea of the so-called instrumentalization of ethnicity as a primary factor of planned migration by the state-centres of multi-ethnic countries (e.g. Austria-Hungary, former

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Yugoslavia). At the same time the paper argues that the motivation of either linguistic or ethnic affiliation to Slovene ethnicity evolved and developed independently of the actual migration flows.

KEY-WORDS: Slovenes, Yugoslavia, demographic analysis, migration, ethnicity, ethnic structure, population census

## UVOD

Nekdanji geografsko prostrani imperiji, ki so se zlasti v 19. stoletju intenzivno preoblikovali v večnacionalne države, so postali torišče tako imenovanih etničnih kolonizacij. To je med drugim veljalo tudi za habsburško monarhijo. Dežela enega pionirskih podvigov velikega modernega ljudskega štetja<sup>2</sup> z izjemno razvito statistično metodologijo je prav z lastnimi cenzusi prebivalstva ustvarila in poustvarjala tisto persistenco skupinskih zaznav in zagledanj domnevno jezikovno enotnih, oziroma vsaj dovolj od Drugega razločenih populacij, ki je v poznejših razdobjih etablirala samoumevnost in vnanjo razločenost posameznih etničnih entitet.

Slovenci kot takrat kompaktno naseljena etnična skupina, kar je seveda posledica specifičnega geopolitičnega razvoja in lokalne aplikacije prvin nacionalističnega gibanja ter jasne prostorske razločenosti do jezikovno dovolj diferenciranih »sosedov«,<sup>3</sup> so bili v marsičem primerni za kolonizacijo na novopridobljena območja pod habsburško dominacijo. Tu je šlo v prvi vrsti za širjenje Avstro-Ogrske na evropski prostor nekdanjega Otomanskega imperija, katerega se je oprijelo ime Balkan. Avstrija je vse od konca 18. stoletja prodirala na »Balkan«<sup>4</sup> s težnjo pripojiti gospodarsko zanimiva, a relativno zaostala območja, ki bi geostrateško bolj zaščitili avstrijske posesti v ozkem pasu ob Jadranskem morju. Fokus na današnji Bosni in Hercegovini ni bil edini. V »iredentističnih« ciljih Habsburžanov je visoko kotirala tudi Srbija. Ko je Avstro-Ogrska naposled leta 1878 zasedla Bosno in velik del Hercegovine, so se začela prva sistematična naseljevanja Slovencev na novoosvojeni prostor. To seveda ne pomeni, da se Slovenci kot kolonisti ali kako drugače niso naseljevali na območju Bosne in Hercegovine že prej. Seveda so se, vendar v manjšem obsegu, predvsem pa tja niso prihajali kot Slovenci, pač pa kot prebivalci dežel, v katerih so živeli pred množičnim izbruhom nacionalizma evropskega tipa (prim. Josipovič in Kržišnik-Bukić 2010: 15). Prav zato ne moremo govoriti o posamičnih naselitvah ali kolonizaciji Slovencev, ki bi časovno spadale pred sredo 19. stoletja.

Izhajajoč iz podmene, da je etničnost družbeno konstruirana, da torej ne more biti govora o kaki biološki podstati tega fenomena, je v smislu historično relativno pozno oblikovanih teoretskih predpostavk o tem toliko lažje razumeti njeno široko sprejeto »biološko« vsajenost. S tem so se vrata instrumentalizacije etničnosti na široko odprla. Ne glede na to, da so o etničnosti, rasah, razliknosti, ipd. razpravljali že mnogi antični misleci, pa tudi nekateri v srednjem veku (npr. Ibn Khaldun),<sup>5</sup> se je šele v

2 Prvo celovito ljudsko štetje v habsburški monarhiji je bilo izvedeno leta 1857 in je predstavljalo revolucionaren dosežek, ki se je metodološko globaliziral in katerega osnovne karakteristike so se do danes zadržale v večini nacionalnih popisnih metodologij. Pred tem štetjem so se sicer na manjših in bolj zaokroženih območjih že izvajala moderna štetja (npr. Švedska, Belgija), a se po geografskih razsežnostih in obsegu obdelav s habsburškim ne morejo primerjati (prim. npr. Gelo 1987: 106).

3 To je veljalo zlasti v odnosu do romansko, germansko in ogrsko govorečih, ne pa do slovansko govorečega sosodstva, kjer so pri etničnem razlikovanju glavno vlogo igrali drugi, zlasti politično-geografski kriteriji.

4 Ukinitve Vojne krajine, zasedba Bosne, Hercegovine in nekaterih drugih manjših območij pod nekdanjo otomansko vladavino.

5 Ibn Khaldun je že med letoma 1372 in 1379, torej v času »temnega« srednjega veka v Evropi in takrat že ugašajočem »cvetočem« islamskem svetu, v svojem znamenitem delu *Mukadima* odlično pojasnil dejavnike fizičnih razlik med prebivalstvom v različnih geografskih predelih. Poudarjal je, da rase ne obstajajo in da etničnih razlik ne smemo iskati v starozaveznih bibličnih razlagah o temnem Hamu in svetlem Semu, pač pa, da so zlasti postava in nekateri elementi obraznih potez ter pigmentacije posledica človekove izpostavljenosti in prilagoditve klimatsko- in fizično-geografskim razmeram in s tem povezanemu načinu življenja (prim. npr. Ibn Khaldun 2009: 24).

19. stoletju s sekundarnim izbruhom nacionalizma (tokrat evropskega tipa) kmalu, še v 2. polovici 19. stoletja, proti »primordialno-biologističnemu mainstreamu« oblikovala konkretnjša teoretična opozicija, utelešena zlasti v marksizmu. Vendar marksistično zavračanje »dejavnika« etničnosti kot faktorja kakršnih koli predpostavk za diskriminatorno vrednotenje populacij takrat ni moglo odvrniti »utemeljiteljev« instrumentalizacije etničnosti od vsakovrstnih zlorab in celo vsiljevanja zakonskih rešitev (prim. Sémelin 2009). Šele stopnjevana uzakonjena diskriminacija, ki je med drugo svetovno vojno privedla do šoa (holokavsta), je prinesla delno streznitev vodilnih političnih elit, ki so investirale v smeri sistematičnega teoretskega utemeljevanja etničnosti in zavračanja »rasnih teorij«. Ta proces je kulminiral v Barthovi teoriji etničnosti in mejnosti (Barth 1969). Vendar se zdi, da je pojasnitev etnične razlike vse pre malo ponotranjena celo v strokovnih krogih, da nevarnost vnovičnih eskalacij ni avtomatično odpravljena ter da so vedno znova nujne ponovne presoje in utemeljevanja ter sistematične diseminacije spoznanj.

V tem kontekstu lahko naseljevanje Slovencev na območju Balkana ugledamo popolnoma drugače. Če je slovenska »invencija tradicij« (po Hobsbawm in Ranger 1983) od druge polovice 19. stoletja sistematično gradila na historični in populacijski kontinuiteti Slovencev s Karantanci, pa čeprav se je Karantanija teritorialno skoraj v celoti razlikovala od današnjega območja Slovenije oziroma je nanj le mejila, je bila taka kontinuiteta pri npr. Kocljevi Spodnji Panoniji povsem spregledana.

Analiza etnonimov, ki so se uporabljali za »avtohtone« skupine prebivalstva v 18. in prvi polovici 19. stoletja, kaže, da so pri avtorjih in potopiscih prevladovali etnični nazivi, ki so odražali razumevanje tedanjih slavističnih avtoritet o slovanskem jeziku in slovanskih narodih. Za najštevilčnejšo »avtohtono« skupino prebivalstva na območju vzhodne Slavonije in zahodnega Srema se je najpogosteje uporabljalo splošno ime »Slavonci«, »Slovinci«, »Iliri«, pogosto pa se jih je razlikovalo le po veroizpovedi. Tujci, torej prebivalstvo, ki je tekom 18. in 19. stoletja prišlo iz drugih delov habsburške monarhije, iz nemških dežel ali iz krajev pod otomansko oblastjo, so v virih poimenovali z različnimi regionalnimi imeni, oziroma po državi, od koder so prišli (Lazanin 2008: 206).

Podobno je bila spregledana relacija do različnih teritorialnih enot iz druge polovice prvega tisočletja (npr. Vojnomirove kneževine v Posavju in Braslavove kneževine v Panoniji ter Slavonije in Srema, oziroma, kot smo videli zgoraj, celotnega Slovinja (prim. Josipovič 2005). Zato se, medtem ko danes govorimo o Slovencih na Balkanu, tako trdovratno reproducira vprašanje o avtohtonih in migrantih, čeprav je to popolnoma nesmiselno (prim. Šumi in Josipovič 2008).

## ANALIZA POPISNIH METODOLOGIJ IN STATISTIČNIH PODATKOV

Popisne metodologije so za območje nekdanje Jugoslavije v literaturi dokaj dobro obdelane. To velja tako za ozemlje današnje Slovenije (npr. Šircelj 2003) kot za ozemlje Hrvaške (npr. Gelo 1987; Gelo idr. 1998). Taka analiza glede na podatkovne možnosti še ni bila narejena za Vojvodino in Bosno in Hercegovino, čeprav so posamezni poskusi obstajali (npr. Hadžibegović 1997). Za območje nekdanje Avstro-Ogrske lahko črpamo in uporabimo popisne podatke za celotno današnje ozemlje Slovenije, Hrvaške, Bosne in Hercegovine ter Vojvodine, in sicer za popisne podatke v obdobju 1878–1919. Ti podatki zajemajo sremski del in banatski del Ožje Srbije (severno zaledje Beograda) in jugovzhodni del nekdanje Dalmacije, ki je danes v okviru črnogorskega Primorja (Boka Kotorska, Budva, Sutomore do zaliva Spič in rta Ratac pri Baru).

Za slovensko poselitev v sosednjih državah velja, da število in relativna gostota prebivalstva navadno upadata z oddaljenostjo od slovenske državne meje. Seveda pa še sredi 19. stoletja ni bilo tako. Fluktuacije, nestanovitnost, neodločenost ter izjemno visoka stopnja nepismenosti prebivalstva so namreč v popisne opredelitve iz let 1850 in 1851 prinesle vrsto pomanjkljivosti in nezanesljive rezultate.

Vse to je napeljalo avstrijski statistični urad, da je pripravil izvirno znanstveno metodologijo, vključno s kritičnim trenutkom popisa, in popis leta 1857 ponovil na celotnem ozemlju monarhije, pri čemer je opustil vprašanje pogovornega jezika, saj neposredno vprašano prebivalstvo niti ni vedelo, kaj odgovoriti (prim. Gelo 1987: 89–90; Josipovič 2011). O etnični pripadnosti pa seveda v nobenem od avstrijskih popisov v razdobju 1857–1910 ni bilo govora. Ker se je ogrski prostor po vzpostavitvi Avstro-Ogrske v nekaterih metodoloških pristopih k popisu prebivalstva razlikoval – npr. »pogovorni jezik« (*Umgangssprache*) v avstrijskem delu je bil na Ogrskem nadomeščen z »maternim jezikom« (*anyanyelv*).

Če smo torej rekli, da prebivalstvo v popisu 1850/51 pri marsikaterem popisnem vprašanju ni vedelo, kaj pravzaprav odgovoriti, se je položaj do konca 19. stoletja že močno spremenil. Z izjemo časovno in teritorialno manj stabilnih enot monarhije se je prebivalstvo historičnih regij ne glede na dejansko govorjeni jezik identificiralo z območjem svojega prebivanja. Tako so denimo na Hrvaškem in v Slavoniji kljub dejstvu, da so bile razširjene tri med seboj razločene jezikovne forme, prebivalci že spontano »svoj« govorjeni ali materni jezik pričeli imenovati »hrvaški«, s čimer so nadomestili dotedanji »domači« ali tudi »slovinski« v Slavoniji,<sup>6</sup> Istri in Dalmaciji. Izjema so postali prebivalci, ki so se priselili iz drugih regij ali drugih držav: ti so lasten govorjeni ali materni jezik največkrat poimenovali po prostorski entiteti, iz katere so prišli, ne glede na to, ali so bili govorci istih ali podobnih govorov. Če torej pripadnosti enemu od novoustanovljenih narodov iz revolucionarnega leta 1848 ni uspelo doseči novokomponiranim elitam, je to z nekaterimi izjemami (kot npr. v Medjimurju, v Istri, itd.) uspelo habsburškim popisom. Ti so utrdili »pripadnost« določenega prebivalstva določeni regiji in s tem k določenemu narodu. Po koncu 19. stoletja te determiniranosti nikomur več ni uspelo preseči, temveč se je še poglobila.

Po prvi svetovni vojni in razpadu Avstro-Ogrske se je spremenila tudi popisna metodologija novooblikovane Kraljevine SHS, oziroma od leta 1929 Kraljevine Jugoslavije. V tem obdobju je bilo poleg vprašanja o veroizpovedi prebivalstvu na popisu postavljeno vprašanje maternega jezika, na podlagi katerega se je sklepalo o narodnosti. Vendar pa med popisoma iz let 1921 in 1931 obstaja pomembna razlika v fazi obdelave podatkov. Čeprav so podatki popisa iz leta 1921 vsebovali tako kategorije veroizpovedi in podrobno kategorizacijo po »maternih jezikih«, je bila kategorija hrvaškega in srbskega jezika združena v »hrvaški ali srbski« jezik, vendar v to kategorijo »slovenski« jezik ni bil vključen. Popisna metodologija iz leta 1931 je šla v »združevanju jugoslovanstva« še dlje. Tako imamo podatke o maternem jeziku za leto 1931 razloženo obdelane le za manjši del ozemlja kraljevine (npr. za Savsko in Primorsko banovino), vsi preostali podatki pa so ostali neobdelani po državnih statističnih uradih in arhivih, saj jih je prehitela druga svetovna vojna. Poleg tedaj ustavno zapovedane »jugoslovanske narodnosti« je bila močna tendenca po izenačevanju navedb slovenski, hrvaški ter srbski jezik v eno skupino »jugoslovanskega« jezika, kamor je bil všteti takrat formalno neobstoječi makedonski jezik. Iz podobnih razlogov ni bil upoštevan niti bolgarski jezik, saj je imela Srbija v preteklosti nerazrešena ozemeljska vprašanja z Bolgarijo. Slednja je zahtevala »nazaj« vsa ozemlja, od vključno mesta Niš proti jugu in vzhodu, torej vsa ozemlja, kjer je prebivalstvo govorilo v makedonščini podobnem *torlakovskem* oziroma šopskem narečju. Gre za območje zunaj nekdanje Kneževine Srbije, oziroma za ozemlje, ki je Srbiji pripadlo po berlinskem kongresu leta 1878.

Po drugi svetovni vojni se je začela nova era jugoslovanskih popisov (1948–1991), v katerih se je prebivalstvu ob popisu prvič eksplicitno zastavilo vprašanje o narodni oziroma nacionalni pripadnosti. Od takrat pa vse do razpada skupne države leta 1991 je bil ta podatek stalnica vseh popisov. Naslednice jugoslovanske federacije so s popisnimi aktivnostmi nadaljevale, a so vprašanje o etnični pripadnosti vse, razen Slovenije, obdržale do popisnega leta 2011.

6 O »avtohtonih« »Slovincih« v Slavoniji glej tudi S. Lazanin (2008: 206).

## SLOVENCİ NA OBMOČJU NEKDANJIH HABSBUŠKIĐ DEĐEL NEKDANJE JUGOSLAVIJE

### a) Slovenci na Hrvaškem

V nadaljevanju pogledjmo gibanje števila Slovencev na Hrvaškem. V historično-geografskem smislu smo rekonstruirali ozemlja nekdanjih dežel in regij tako, da se z nekaterimi manjšimi izjemami prilagajajo območju nekdanje Socialistične republike Hrvaške (SRH) in Republike Hrvaške (RH) po letu 1991. Ko govorimo o obdobju habsburških popisov, ki v avstrijskem delu monarhije sistematično beležijo izjave prebivalstva o pogovornem jeziku v štirih popisih v obdobju 1880–1910, se ta metodologija nanaša na območje avstrijske Dalmacije<sup>7</sup> in na današnji hrvaški del Istre s Kvarnerjem. Preostali del Hrvaške obsega tako imenovano Bansko Hrvaško, ki vključuje hrvaška ozemlja pod ogrsko nadoblastjo. Gre za Ožjo Hrvaško in Slavonijo,<sup>8</sup> k njima pa smo priključili še Baranjo in Medjimurje ter ozemlje svobodne luke Reka. Na tem območju je bila uveljavljena ogrska popisna metodologija zbiranja podatkov o maternem jeziku. Iz tega izhaja, da podatki teh dveh območnih metodologij niso povsem primerljivi.

Seveda ni bilo mogoče popolnoma rekonstruirati današnjega ozemlja Hrvaške vse do leta 1880, saj se meje nekaterih upravnih enot ne ujemajo s poznejšimi republiškiimi in državnimi mejami. Vendar v primeru naše demogeografske in prostorske analize distribucije prebivalstva, ki je v popisih navajalo tak ali drugačen statistični atribut slovenstva, ta odstopanja ne igrajo pomembnejše vloge iz najmanj dveh razlogov. Prvič, kadar gre za vprašanje Slovencev z območja nekdanje Jugoslavije, gre za celostni pristop. Tudi če bi potencialno prišlo do kakšne večje zgotovitve slovenske poselitve nekega obmejnega območja, bi teh podatkov ne izgubili, saj bi se »prelili« v sosednjo analizirano teritorialno enoto. In drugič, območja, ki jih tradicionalno gosteje ali prevladujoče poseljujejo Slovenci, so skoncentrirana ob zahodnih hrvaških mejah, kjer pa smo imeli na voljo detaljne podatke in takih odstopanj ni bilo. Večja zagata je bil izostanek podatkov za območja pod italijansko okupacijo med obema svetovnjima vojnama. Takratni podatki italijanskega popisa za srednjo in južno Istro iz leta 1921 niso bili najbolj merodajni, saj so »slovansko« populacijo precej podcenili, tako da na teh območjih ni bilo mogoče govoriti o stvarnejših razmerjih med Slovenci in Hrvati. Po drugi strani so bili ogrski popisi na območju Medjimurja in

Preglednica 1: Prebivalstvo na območju današnje Hrvaške, ki je navedlo slovensko popisno opredelitev v obdobju 1880–2011 (vir: DZS RH)

slovenski	1880	1890	1900	1910
materni in pogovorni jezik	<b>24,811</b>	<b>26,261</b>	<b>28,766</b>	<b>28,269</b>
slovenski	1921	1931	1941	
materni jezik	<b>23,217</b>	<b>44,750</b>	-	
	1948	1953	1961	1971
slovenska	<b>37,858</b>	<b>43,191</b>	<b>39,103</b>	<b>32,497</b>
narodna pripadnost	1981	1991	2001	2011*
	<b>25,136</b>	<b>22,714</b>	<b>13,173</b>	<b>18,000</b>

(\*Podatek za leto 2011 je ocena, ki temelji na številu vpisanih v volilne imenike slovenske politične skupnosti na Hrvaškem (Josipovič in Kržišnik-Bukić 2010: 57.))

7 Brez Boke Kotorske, ki je bila po drugi svetovni vojni odvzeta Hrvaški in priključena Črni gori.

8 Pri Slavoniji ni vključen vzhodni Srem (hrv. Srijem, madž. Szerém), ki je bil po drugi svetovni vojni priključen k Vojvodini in nato *via facti* k Srbiji. Je pa vanjo vključena Baranja oziroma ozemlje med Dravo in Donavo, ki je po prvi svetovni vojni pripadlo Kraljevini SHS oziroma pozneje Kraljevini Jugoslaviji kot nekakšna kompenzacija Hrvaški za odvzem Srema.

Baranje pomanjkljivi, saj so v njih Slovenci označevani s pojmom »Vendi«. Ta oznaka pa ni imela vselej svoje popisne kategorije, zato ogrske statistike Slovence največkrat zajemajo v rubrikah »drugi«; pod opombo pa navajajo oceno o »razsežnosti« vendske populacije.

Iz preglednice 1 je razvidna stalna in relativno visoka prisotnost Slovencev na Hrvaškem, in sicer komparativno največja na območju nekdanjega habsburškega dela SFRJ, pa tudi nekdanje SFRJ same. Kljub temu da so za posamezna popisna leta veljala različna pravila in metodološka izhodišča, je razvidno, da število prebivalcev s »slovensko« jezikovno ali etnično opredelitvijo na Hrvaškem močno niha. To opozarja na tradicionalno visoko asimilatornost slovenske populacije, kar je tudi sicer značilno za populacije, ki se na neka območja priselijo. O zgodnji asimilatornosti priča tudi medvojni citat hrvaškega geografa Zvonimirja Dugačkega:

Doseljvanje Slovencev nima značaja kmečke *kolonizacije*. Naseljujejo se v glavnem v mestih, kjer dobivajo zaposlitev kot drobni trgovci, nameščenci in delavci. Njihovo število se je [na Hrvaškem] po prvi svetovni vojni več kot podvojilo, tako da jih je bilo leta 1931 v Banski Hrvaški 34.100. Od teh jih polovica živi v Zagrebu, preostali pa po večjih mestih in v zahodnih obmejnih okrajih. Slovenci se naglo prilagajajo *sorodnemu*, še posebno kajkavskemu okolju in se redno v drugi generaciji že popolnoma *asimilirajo* (Dugački 1942: 623; poudarki D. J.).

Število Slovencev na Hrvaškem je sodeč po statističnih podatkih doseglo dva viška. Prvega v obdobju med obema vojnama, ko je bil leta 1931 dosežen tudi absolutni višek okrog 45.000 ljudi. Drugi višek, ki se je doslej v literaturi največkrat navajal kot najpomembnejši, pa je bil tisti iz leta 1953 z okrog 43.000 opredeljenimi kot Slovenci (Preglednica 1). Od takrat se je kljub stalnemu priseljevanju število Slovencev na Hrvaškem do konca jugoslovanskega obdobja zmanjševalo. Po osamosvojitvi Republike Hrvaške leta 1991 je popisno število prebivalcev, (samo)opredeljenih kot Slovenci, leta 2001 doseglo »zgodovinski« nižek s komaj 13.000 osebami. O začasnem koncu upadanja absolutnega števila Slovencev na Hrvaškem bi lahko sklepali na podlagi relativno visokega števila polnoletnih prebivalcev, vpisanih v volilne imenike slovenske skupnosti, h katerim lahko prištejemo še okrog 30 odstotkov mladoletnih oseb, kar pomeni približno 18.000 oseb (Josipović in Kržišnik-Bukić 2010: 57; Preglednica 1), za katere lahko pričakujemo, da so se ob zadnjem popisu iz leta 2011 opredelile za slovensko bodisi etnično bodisi jezikovno pripadnost.

## b) Slovenci v Vojvodini

Zgodovinske prisotnosti Slovencev v Vojvodini, kakor običajno imenujemo del današnje Republike Srbije, ki je bil do konca prve svetovne vojne vključen v ogrski del habsburške monarhije, literatura, ki se ukvarja s pričujočo problematiko, tako rekoč ne obravnava. Podrobnejša analiza statističnih podatkov številnih različnih popisov zadnjega stoletja razkriva stalno prisotnost Slovencev na tem območju. V zvezi z analizo podatkov moramo opozoriti, da smo k območju Vojvodine šteli tudi nekdanjo hrvaško-slavonsko regijo Srem/Srijem,<sup>9</sup> medtem ko, da ohranimo teritorialno primerljivost podatkov, nekdanje ogrsko ozemlje »jugoslovanske« Baranje štejemo k Hrvaški.

Vojvodina je po številčnosti in historični prisotnosti Slovencev druga najpomembnejša regija na območju nekdanje SFRJ. Čeprav je podatke za leto 1910 iz prej navedenih metodoloških razlogov težko oceniti, se relativno visoko število Slovencev v Vojvodini gotovo ni pojavilo čez noč. To potrjujejo tudi podatki o priseljenih neposredno po prvi svetovni vojni. Upoštevajoč ocenjeni približno petdesetodstotni delež priseljenih po letu 1919 lahko dokaj zanesljivo ugotovimo število Slovencev v Vojvodini na okrog 5.000 leta 1910 (Preglednica 2).

<sup>9</sup> Vključno z okraji Šid, Mitrovica, Ruma, Petrovaradin, Karlovci, Pazova, vendar brez območja Zemuna, ki je bilo v obdobju 1948–1961 postopoma priključeno k Ožji Srbiji.

Preglednica 2: Prebivalstvo na območju današnje Vojvodine, ki je navedlo slovensko popisno opredelitev v obdobju 1910–2011 (vir: SZS SFRJ; RZS RS)

slovenski	1910	1921	1931	1941	1948	1953
materni jezik	<b>5,000</b>	<b>9,018</b>	<b>3,028</b>	-	<b>7,223</b>	<b>6,025</b>
slovenska	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011*
narodna pripadnost	<b>5,633</b>	<b>4,639</b>	<b>3,456</b>	<b>2,730</b>	<b>2,005</b>	<b>1,800</b>

(\*Podatek za leto 2011 je ocena, ki temelji na splošnem gibanju prebivalstva Vojvodine v obdobju 2001–2011; končni popisni rezultati v času oddaje rokopisa še niso znani; ocena za leto 1910 je pojasnjena zgoraj v besedilu.)

V obdobju Kraljevine SHS oziroma Kraljevine Jugoslavije so se na območju današnje Vojvodine zgodile pomembne demogeografske spremembe. Kot je bilo omenjeno že v metodološkem poglavju, je bil glavni namen popisa iz leta 1931 homogenizacija državnega jugoslovanstva, zato rekonstrukcije po jezikovnih popisnih kategorijah prinašajo različne vrednosti. Medtem ko jih po Krallertovih krajevnih podatkih lahko skupno naštejemo 1.150 (Krallert 1941), jih Kocsis in Kicošev postavljata na 3.028 (Kocsis in Kicošev 2004). Zaradi drugačne upravne ureditve na območju Zemuna (Zemun, Surčin, Batajnica, Novi Beograd), ki je spadal k hrvaškemu Sremu in širšemu območju Pančeva (Borča, Ovča, Krnjača) – ta je spadal v Temišvarski Banat – je prihajalo do znatnih odstopanj v ocenah in tolmačenjih števila slovenske populacije. V našem primeru smo dosledno rekonstruirali območje, ki je danes pojmovano kot Vojvodina. Dodatna težava so bile tudi »prekategorizacije« Slovencev v Slovake ali, še pogosteje, v Hrvate (vključno s Šokci in z Bunjevci). Vendar je potekal ta proces tudi v obratni smeri, in sicer, da so Slovake včasih prištevali k Slovincem.<sup>10</sup> To je še danes dokaj izrazit pojav na Madžarskem, ko se Slovenci sistematično v večji meri pojavljajo tam, kjer so večinsko zastopani ali znatno prisotni Slovaki (glej predhodno opombo; vir podatkov: MNS 2002).

Obdobje po drugi svetovni vojni je prineslo politično motivirano močno imigracijo v Vojvodino, zlasti na območje nekdanjih nemških naselbin v Banatu in Bački. Slovenci so v Banatu vzpostavili kar nekaj naselbin in bili prepoznavni tudi v širšem okolju. Medijsko najbolj popularno naselje je Gudurica, kjer je še danes znatno število Slovencev,<sup>11</sup> čeprav mnogo manjše kot v letih neposredno po drugi svetovni vojni (Preglednica 3).

Preglednica 3: Etnična struktura občine Gudurica v Banatu, Vojvodina, 1948 (vir: SZS SFRJ 1948)

SKUPAJ	Slovenci	Srbi	Makedonci	Madžari	Hrvati	Čehi
<b>1,474</b>	<b>498</b>	<b>379</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>23</b>
100,0%	33,80%	25,7%	17,2%	10,4%	8,8%	1,6%
Romuni	Nemci	Rusi	Črnogorci	Slovaki	Šiptarji*	Rusini
<b>15</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
1,0%	0,7%	0,3%	0,2%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%

(\*Uradna popisna nomenklatura je takrat Albance označevala z oznako »Šiptarji«.)

10 Med Slovaki in Slovenci obstaja, vsaj kar se tiče njihove demogeografske razprostranjenosti v nekdanjih ogrskih deželah, pomembna povezava. Kakor so Slovence dolgo sistematično šteli med novokonstruirano etničnost »Vendi« (kar bi ustrezalo opredelitvi »Prekmurci«, tako so Slovake, Slovence in Kajkavce označevali s *Tót* (v pomenu ‚tuj‘). Ko se je vzpostavila ločena statistična oznaka za Slovake, je povzročala zmedo in s tem odpirala polje dodatne manipulacije. Ženska oznaka za Slovačino je v slovaščini »Slovenka«. To je privedlo do tega, da so te Slovačinke (Slovenke) popisovalci preprosto uvrščali v kategorijo »Slovenci«. Obdelovalce podatkov ni zmotil niti pretirano visok delež žensk med »Slovinci« in primerjalno višji delež moških pri »Slovakih« (prim. vir: MNS 2002).

11 Popis prebivalstva iz leta 2002 v Srbiji je v Gudurici naštel 38 Slovencev oziroma 3,1 odstotka od 1.231 prebivalcev (vir: RZS RS, 2002). Približno dve tretjini je Srbov, ena desetina Makedoncev, Madžarov, Hrvatov in Romov pa je približno toliko kot Slovencev (ibid.).

Zaradi nadaljnega priseljevanja in visokega naravnega prirastka se je prebivalstvo Gudurice povečevalo in leta 1961 doseglo število 2.105 (vir: SZS SFRJ, 1961). Odtlej se je število zmanjševalo zlasti zaradi industrializacije, ki je pognala prebivalstvo z dežele v mesto. Število Slovencev pa je upadalo tudi zaradi prehodov v srbstvo in povratne migracije v Slovenijo (prim. opombo 11).

Ni pa bila Gudurica edino naselje z visokim absolutnim in relativnim številom Slovencev. Visok delež so takrat Slovenci dosegali tudi v občinah Plandište, Bela Crkva in Velika Greda. Vse te občine so bile razmeščene v bližini meje z Romunijo, tako da so bili Slovenci v Banatu pravi »krajšniki«. Po drugi strani pa je bila Gudurica po popisu iz leta 1948 edina občina v Vojvodini, kjer so imeli Slovenci demografsko večino. Ta večina se je sicer že v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja izničila zaradi povratne migracije v Slovenijo (Preglednica 3).

Slovenci v Vojvodini so svoj demografsko-statistični vrhunec dosegli že pred skoraj stoletjem, ko so se po popisu iz leta 1921 približali številki 10.000 (Preglednica 2). Nadaljnji statistično-demografski razvoj je zaznamovalo veliko nihanje v številu popisnih opredelitev, po letu 1948 pa sistematično upadanje. Po letu 1991 in razpadu nekdanje SFRJ se je število Slovencev vztrajno zniževalo, podatki iz popisa leta 2011 pa bodo po končanih obdelavah pokazali, ali se je ta trend spremenil. Po naši oceni se je upadanje števila Slovencev ustavilo oziroma vsaj upočasnilo in ga ocenjujemo na okrog 1.800 (Preglednica 2).

### c) Slovenci v Bosni in Hercegovini

Prav tako so Slovenci izjemno dolgo prisotni tudi v Bosni in Hercegovini. Tako kot v času Otomanskega cesarstva, imamo podatke samo o verski strukturi in ne moremo z gotovostjo trditi karkoli o prisotnosti Slovencev. Kljub temu da ne more biti dvoma, da se izraz »Slovenci« ali »Slovinci« v preteklosti ne bi pojavljal na sklenjenih večjih ali manjših območjih tudi po Bosni in Hercegovini, pa »statistični« začetek modernega slovenstva umeščamo šele v obdobje popisa 1910. O Slovencih v Bosni in Hercegovini je v historičnem in aktualnem kontekstu v svoji monografiji obširno pisala Vera Kržišnik-Bukić (2007), ki se je in se še tudi sicer veliko ukvarja s Slovenci na območju nekdanje SFRJ. Vendar izčrpnjših demogeografskih študij o Slovencih s tega območja še nimamo.

Popisi prebivalstva v Bosni in Hercegovini so si sledili v nekoliko drugačnem zaporedju kot v drugih delih monarhije. Prvi popis so Habsburžani izvedli leto dni po zasedbi Bosne in Hercegovine, torej leta 1879. Rezultati tega popisa so bili zelo hitro objavljeni, in sicer v dvojezični nemško-hrvaški verziji že leta 1880 v Sarajevu. Ta popis je prebivalstvo Bosne klasificiral le po religiji, sicer pa je bila njegova naloga le ugotoviti stanje »duš in hiš«. V samem popisu je precej napak, vsaj kar se veroizpovedi prebivalstva tiče, in zdi se, da so bila posamezna naselja pogosto kar skupinsko prisojena eni, drugi ali tretji veroizpovedi.<sup>12</sup>

Ker so naslednji popisi pokazali, da je šlo v mnogih primerih za večje napake (npr. neka vas je bila sprva popisana kot v celoti pravoslavna, ob naslednjih popisih pa v celoti katoliška, ipd.), tudi ne moremo zaupati sumarni popisni statistiki, ki je sicer točen seštevek mestoma napačno razvrščenih vnosov. Popis je namreč precenil število pravoslavnega prebivalstva, podcenil pa število rimokatolikov in Judov. Podobno tudi naslednja popisa iz let 1885 in 1895 nista uveljavljala drugačne metodologije, kot le vprašanje o veroizpovedi. Vsekakor pa se je že v mnogo večji meri prikazala kompleksnost bosenske in hercegovske etnične strukture.<sup>13</sup> Šele popis iz leta 1910 se je metodološko povsem približal ogrski

12 Popis iz leta 1879 je razlikoval med naslednjimi kategorijami veroizpovedi: »mohamedansko«, »grško-vzhodno«, »rimo-katoliško« in »izraelitsko«. Vse preostale veroizpovedi je združil v skupino »ostale veroizpovedi«, čeprav sta bili dokaj razširjeni tudi grko-katoliška in evangeličanska veroizpoved.

13 Bosna in Hercegovina sta zgodovinski pokrajini, od katerih Bosna (ca. 41.000 km<sup>2</sup>) zavzema severni in osrednji del celotne dežele, Hercegovina pa južni del (ca. 10.000 km<sup>2</sup>). Še v začetku 19. stoletja je Hercegovina obsegala

popisni inačici, saj je natančno popisoval tudi izjavljeni materni jezik prebivalstva. Tako je prvič postala mogoča popisna rekonstrukcija etnične strukture Bosne in Hercegovine in s tem ugotavljanje prisotnosti prebivalcev, ki bi se opredelili za govorce slovenskega jezika, oziroma, ki bi slovenščino navedli kot lasten materni jezik.

Za Slovence v Bosni in Hercegovini lahko za zadnje stoletje ugotovimo, da so svoj statistično-demografski vrhunec doživeli v prvi polovici petdesetih let 20. stoletja, torej v času socialistične Jugoslavije. Za to obdobje npr. Melik navaja 10.000 Slovencev (Melik 1954: 385), čeprav poznejši »definitivni« rezultati popisa 1953 beležijo znatno nižje število (6.300, Preglednica 4).

Preglednica 4: Prebivalstvo na območju današnje Bosne in Hercegovine, ki je navedlo slovensko popisno opredelitev v obdobju 1910–2011 (vir: FZS BiH)

slovenski	1910	1921	1931	1941	1948	1953
materni jezik	<b>3,108</b>	<b>4,682</b>	<b>4,462</b>	-	<b>4,338</b>	<b>10,000</b>
slovenska	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001*	2011*
narodna pripadnost	<b>5,939</b>	<b>4,053</b>	<b>2,753</b>	<b>2,190</b>	<b>1,200</b>	<b>1,100</b>

(\*Podatka za leti 2001 in 2011 temeljita na oceni trendov po razpadu nekdanje SFRJ.)

Glede na to, da po razpadu nekdanje SFRJ na ozemlju Bosne in Hercegovine vse od leta 1991 ni bilo celokupnega popisa prebivalstva, smo število Slovencev ocenili na podlagi trendov in predvsem dejstva, da je v državi divjala brezobzirna in brutalna vojna ter da je bil velik del prebivalstva izgnan, ubit ali prisilno preseljen. Tako smo največji upad ocenili za obdobje devetdesetih let. V zadnjem desetletju pa ocenjujemo, da se razmere niso toliko poslabšale, da bi bili vsi ali večina preostalih Slovencev primorani v eksodus. Sodeč po delovanju društev lahko pričakujemo tudi delno revitalizacijo in ne nujno upada števila opredeljenih za slovenski jezik ali narodnost, vendar je brez sistematičnih anket težko karkoli posplošiti. Omenimo še, da so bila najbolj tipična naselitvena območja Slovencev v Bosni in Hercegovini na območju večjih mest, npr. v Sarajevu in Banji Luki. Sledijo jim klasična rudarska središča (Ljubija, Ivanjska, Kakanj, Vareš) in industrijsko-železarski centri (Zenica, Tuzla). Poleg teh je bilo v Bosno na peripanonsko območje severno od Banje Luke (npr. Slatina pri Klačnicah, Ralutinac pri Prnjavorju) naseljenih tudi nekaj klasičnih kolonistov. Ti dve naselbini sta tudi edini v večinski pravoslavni okolici, druge pa so iz razumljivih razlogov pretežno v katoliškem okolju. Za konec poudarimo, da kljub prevladujočemu katoliškemu okolju, razen v Mostarju, Slovencev v Hercegovini skoraj ni. Razloge za to lahko iščemo v dejstvu, da je bila naselitev Slovencev zaradi njihovih znanj načrtno povezana z rudarsko-železarskimi kraji. Ti pa so bili tradicionalno v domeni katoliškega prebivalstva Bosne in Hercegovine, ki se je prav v teh predelih uspelo obdržati tudi v času turške anateme katolicizmu. Med katoliki sicer prevladujejo Hrvati, ni pa bilo malo niti Nemcev in pozneje Slovencev.

## ZAKLJUČEK

Proučevanje prostorske in številčne razmestitve prebivalstva, popisanega kot Slovenci bodisi po maternem ali občevalnem jeziku bodisi po narodnosti oziroma narodni pripadnosti, na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije je zahtevno podjetje. Prvič gre za izjemno pestre podatkovne zbirke, ki se med seboj metodološko razlikujejo, tako da je najprej treba preveriti kvaliteto s popisom zbranih statističnih podatkov. Drugič se kot izjemno pomembno vprašanje postavlja težava uskladitve prostorskega obsega

okoli 30.000 km<sup>2</sup>, saj je zajemala obsežna ozemlja na vzhodu, npr. večino poznejše Črne gore in Novopazarskega Sandžaka. Tako Bosna kot Hercegovina pa sta bili v času avstro-ogrske zasedbe združeni v enoten Bosenski vilajet (ejalet).

določenih enot. Tretja težava so manjkajoče serije podatkov, ki jih je treba argumentirano nadomestiti s približki, z nadomestki ali s projiciranimi vrednostmi. Šele po odpravi ali rešitvi teh treh sklopov težav je mogoče izvesti tako ali drugačno primerjalno analizo.

Iz predstavljenih analiz izhaja, da je ključni dejavnik pri kvantitativni prisotnosti neke populacije, v našem primeru Slovencev, na nekem območju v veliki meri rezultat geo-političnih oziroma politično-geografskih dejavnikov historično-geografskega razvoja. Ti dejavniki so predisponirali medregionalne in po razpadu večnacionalnih sistemov meddržavne relacije. Seveda med dejavniki migracij lahko glede na prostovoljnost ločimo med dvema glavnima skupinama. Ne glede na to, da v mirnodobnih razmerah (obdobja brez vojn ali oboroženih spopadov, konfliktov in incidentov, ne vključujoč pri tem globalne podnebne spremembe, dvigovanje morske gladine na priobalnih območjih, erozijo prsti, izgubo poljedelskih ali pašnih površin, vremenske ujme, ipd.) migracije mednarodne klasifikacije s pogojno izjemo azila označujejo kot prostovoljne, so bile prav migracije v mirnodobnem obdobju zlasti v večnacionalnih državah (Avstro-Ogrska, Jugoslavija, Sovjetska zveza, Kitajska) pogosto psevdo-prostovoljne (prim. Josipovič 2006: 88–89). Če le ni bilo drugačnih zakonskih omejitev<sup>14</sup> glede naseljevanja posameznih uradno razločenih skupin prebivalstva na določenih območjih, kjer je veljal poseben režim glede »rabe prostora«, so države vedno lahko v odločilni meri ustvarjale razmere, »primerne za selitev«. Na ta način se je npr. v nekdanji Jugoslaviji udejanila planska migracija v Banat in Bačko v Vojvodini in v še nekatere druge predele (prim. Petrovič 1987; Josipovič, 2006). Vendar pa je izjemno težko dokazati, da je bila migracija npr. v Banat in Bačko na domovanja izgnanih »Folksdojčerjev« prisilna migracija. Takratna povojna »nova ljudska« oblast je uvedla republiške kvote, ki pa so bile popolnoma nesorazmerne tako po območju odselitve kakor po območju doselitve.<sup>15</sup> Rezultat je bil tak, da se je v končni fazi v Vojvodino priselilo nad 90 odstotkov pogojno<sup>16</sup> pravoslavnih prebivalcev (od tega 75 odstotkov Srbov, 20 odstotkov Črnogorcev in 5 odstotkov Makedoncev) oziroma skupno nad 225.000 ljudi (prim. Gačeša 1984: 347). Znotraj banatske kolonizacije kot ključnega območja krepitve srbske etnične opcije v Vojvodini so se znašli tudi relativno številni slovenski naseljenci. Ti so v prvem desetletju po koncu vojne predstavljali kar 2.400 kolonistov v Banatu, med njimi se je relativno največji del naselil na območju izgnanih Nemcev v naselju Kudritz/Gudurica. Danes je tam le še kakih 30 prebivalcev, ki se eksplicitno opredeljujejo za Slovence, medtem ko jih je v celotni Vojvodini nad 2.000 (vir: RZS RS 2002).

Iz v pričujočem besedilu navedenih predpostavk izhaja, da se slovenstvo kot etnični fenomen večplastno producira in reproducira. Kakor ga ne moremo iskati pred »modernim« pojavom evropskega nacionalizma, tako ga prav iz tega razloga ne moremo umeščati v tako imenovano novo manjšino na Balkanu. Zlasti ne zato, ker se dogajajo vsaj trije vzporedni procesi: (1) po eni strani se kvantitativno zmanjšuje klasična oziroma tradicionalna slovenska manjšina, percipirana skozi trajektorije naseljevanja

14 Za Kitajsko in tamkajšnje migracijske procese znotraj in navzven glej npr. Bofulin (2011), za območja nekdanje Sovjetske zveze pa npr. Novikova (2008).

15 To nesorazmernost dobro ponazarja podatek, da naj bi npr. Hrvaška participirala v kolonizaciji Vojvodine z 9.000 družinami oziroma z nekaj manj kot 28.000 prebivalci. Že »interna« etnična delitev tega kontingenta pa je predvidevala naselitev le 5.500 hrvaških in kar 3.500 srbskih družin z območja Hrvaške (npr. Gačeša 1984: 347), kar je bilo seveda popolnoma neskladno z etnično strukturo Hrvaške. Kakor je osrednja beograjska oblast zagovarjala predvsem prosrbsko kolonizacijo Vojvodine, zlasti Banata in Bačke (Bara in Lajić 2009), tako je selektivno iz pasivnih krajev Hrvaške za preselitev »nagovarjala« srbsko prebivalstvo iz večinsko hrvaških občin, in obratno, hrvaško prebivalstvo zlasti iz severne Dalmacije, kjer so »ogrožali« srbsko večino (npr. Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš). Pri tem je bila previdna, saj si ni privoščila pretiranega naseljevanja Hrvatov v Bačko ali Srem, kjer so bili Hrvati vključno s Šokci in z Bunjevci močno zastopani in ki ju je šele tik po drugi svetovni vojni priključila v avtonomno pokrajino Vojvodino, to pa potem v Srbijo.

16 S pojmom »pogojno« mislimo na tedanjo splošno nenaklonjenost komunistične oblasti raznim cerkvam, zaradi česar so se mnogi prebivalci na popisih in v javnem življenju opredeljevali za ateiste, kljub temu pa popis iz leta 1953 v Vojvodini našteva le 2 odstotka ateistov oziroma ljudi, ki ne pripadajo nobeni veroizpovedi. Glede na masovnost povojne kolonizacije Vojvodine je upravičeno domnevati, da je priseljeno pretežno ruralno prebivalstvo zadržalo določene oblike verskega izražanja.

iz druge polovice 19. stoletja, kar je pričakovano, saj je to »usoda« vseh na etnično-teritorialnem principu kot enem od specifičnih posledic na evropskem nacionalizmu utemeljenih skupin; (2) po drugi strani gre za nesnovni razkol ali »cepitveno leziko« med tistimi člani slovenske skupnosti, ki jim ni do tradicionalnih izrazov manifestiranega slovenstva, in tistimi, katerim do tega je, in kar tudi sami dejavno poudarjajo s folklornim in z umetniškim delovanjem ter drugimi družabnimi prireditvami; in ne nazadnje (3) gre za demografski priliv »novih« pripadnikov lokalnemu slovenstvu, ki trčijo ob že obstoječi nasip nasprotujočih pomenov, vezanih na prehodnost oziroma neprehodnost etničnih razlik.<sup>17</sup> Če sta prvi in drugi vidik sodobnega slovenstva na Balkanu zunaj Slovenije še do neke mere predstavljiva tudi skozi materializirane prvine specifične etnične pripadnosti in osebnih ter skupinskih identificiranj, pa je tretji izrazito abstrakten, a nikakor ne ločljiv od prvih dveh. Ni namreč odvisen le od motivacije posameznega »novinca« ali skupinice posameznikov, koliko se bo vključeval-a v obstoječe procese ohranjanja spomina na davno obdobje naselitve v času geografsko prostranih večnacionalnih držav, temveč je to odvisno od konstrukcije »nasipov pomena« (po Šumi 2000: 179–181). V tem kontekstu je ob aktualno popularnih teoretskih paradigmah »večplastnosti« ali »multiplosti« »identitet« ter »hibridizacij« bolj lukrativno predvsem teoretsko analiziranje večplastnih oblik organiziranja perspektiv vsakokratnih udeležencev v etničnih razmerjih.

V pričujoči analizi smo pokazali, da se o slovenstvu na nekdanjih habsburških tleh nekdanje Jugoslavije zunaj Slovenije govori izključno skozi prizmo manj ali bolj oddaljene zgodovine priseljevanja v nova geografsko ločena okolja, ki navzven delujejo kot etnično razločena med prišleki in domačini. Ravno to pa je jedro težav in hkrati pot do alternativnega razumevanja »etničnega slovenstva« na območju nekdanje SFRJ. Še več: skozi prizmo zveličavnosti ekonomskih dejavnikov migracij se tako utrjuje eksplicitno neobjektivno »poročanje« o »naravi« tako selitev kot tudi etničnosti. Prav »ekonomskost« neke naselitve, ne glede na izobrazbeni ali socio-ekonomski profil naseljenca, vseljenca, doseljenca ali priseljenca je porok sistematičnega razločevanja in institucionalizirane diskriminacije. Ker v razmerjih čedalje bolj globalno poenotenega principa akumulacije kapitala ne more biti mesta izražanju nediskriminatorne individualnosti, pač pa le tiste, ki je v službi cirkulacije kapitala in ki je s tem podvržena potrošniški logiki, so tudi procesi etničnosti v danih družbenih razmerah v službi kapitalističnega tipa produkcije. To paradoksalno pomeni, da zaradi kapitalsko pogojene vsesplošne družbene dinamičnosti, ki je »stalnica« v večini »gospodarsko razvitejših« držav, prav odnosi zaščite in ohranjanja predmoderne presečne situacije *etnične taksonomije* podlegajo nedinamični in nekritični zaščiti domnevnih ali docela nestvarnih pridobitev takih predmodernih laično percipiranih etnično-narodnostnih razmerij.

Če torej sklenemo: ne gre za to, ali posameznik v sebi nosi potencial pripadanja različnim socialnim portfeljem, kar bi se v njihovi etnični parabolih lahko prištevalo ali uvrščalo denimo k večplastni identiteti takega posameznika, temveč gre za to, da se večplastnost in kompleksnost znotrajskupinskih odnosov manifestirata v pluralizaciji oblik organiziranja posameznikov v številne, pestre in izjemno heterogene socialno-etnične skupnosti. Šele s takim pristopom sta mogoča dedivinizacija etničnosti, ki se manifestira v iskanju »božjega delca« – prapočela specifične etničnosti – in preusmeritev k bistvu etničnosti, ki je proces simultanege notranjega in zunanjega intelektualnega, socialnega in ekonomskega razslojevanja.

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## SUMMARY

### INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ETHNICITY WITHIN MULTI-NATIONAL COUNTRIES: THE COLONIZATION OF SLOVENES IN THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PART OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Damir JOSIPOVIČ

The present analysis shows that when talking about Sloveneness in the ex-Yugoslav former Hapsburg areas outside Slovenia there were continuous discourses concentrating on less or more distant histories of immigration into the new geographically separated areas, which operated externally as distinguishing the newcomers from the natives. This type of discourse lies at the very core of the problem, but at the same time it is the pathway to an alternative understanding of 'ethnic Sloveneness' in the area of former Yugoslavia.

The omnipotence of economic migration factors is, moreover, strengthened by explicitly biased 'reporting' on the 'nature' of both migration and ethnicity. The purported 'economics' of a given settlement which disregard the educational attainments or socio-economic profile of the settler, immigrant, colonist etc. is a guarantee of systematic differentiation and institutionalized discrimination. Since in the circumstances of the globally unified principle of the accumulation of capital there is no possibility of expressing indiscriminate individuality except that of capital's primary concern, which is thus liable to the logic of consumerism, so are the processes of ethnicity in a given societal setting in service of the capitalist mode of production. In spite of capital-conditioned overall societal dynamism, the former, paradoxically, means that the relations of protection and preservation of premodern 'ethnic taxonomies' are subordinated by the rigid and uncritical protection of the supposed or completely intangible achievements of such premodern perceptions of ethno-national relations.

The main point of the argument is what is important is not the individual's inner potential of belonging to various social portfolios, which could be consequently ascribed to his or her alleged multiple identity, but the multiplicity and complexity of group's inner relations, which are manifested in a vast array of social organizational forms that evolve into numerous, diverse and extremely heterogeneous social-ethnic communities. Only by applying such apparatus it is possible to de-divinize the ethnicity, which is manifested in the seeking of a 'divine particle' – the ultimate origin of a specific ethnicity – in order to redirect to the core of ethnicity which lies in a process of simultaneous internal and external intellectual, social, and economic stratification and differentiation.

# DO THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN SLOVENIA FACE PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION?

Sara BREZIGAR<sup>1</sup>

COBISS 1.01

## ABSTRACT

### **Do Third Country Nationals in Slovenia Face Prejudice and Discrimination?**

Abstract: This article presents the results of a study on Third Country Nationals [TCNs] who live in Slovenia. The article focuses on discrimination on ethnic and racial grounds and explores whether TCNs experience discrimination on these grounds in five areas of their lives: housing, schooling, health care, the labour market and in contacts with public administration. The author identifies three factors that at least partially explain the different experiences and degrees of discrimination reported by interviewees. Key words: Third Country Nationals, ethnic discrimination, racial discrimination, prejudice, language

## IZVLEČEK

### **Ali se državljani tretjih držav v Sloveniji soočajo s predsodki in diskriminacijo?**

Članek ponuja vpogled v rezultate študije o državljanih tretjih držav, ki živijo v Sloveniji. Posebno pozornost namenja etnični in rasni diskriminaciji in ponuja odgovor na vprašanje, ali državljani tretjih držav doživljajo diskriminacijo na petih področjih svojega življenja – na področju šolstva, zaposlovanja in trga dela, zdravstva, v stikih z javno upravo ter pri urejanju stanovanjskega vprašanja. Avtorica opredeljuje tri dejavnike, ki vsaj delno pojasnjujejo, zakaj so nekateri intervjuvanci bolj izpostavljeni diskriminaciji kot drugi.

Ključne besede: državljani tretjih držav, etnična diskriminacija, rasna diskriminacija, predsodki, jezik

## INTRODUCTION

Several studies (Komac 2007; Pajnik et al. 2010; Medica 2010; Žitnik 2006; Zavrtnik Zimic et al. 2008) have been conducted on the situation of immigrants and their degree of integration into Slovenian society. Some of these studies (Brezigar 2007; Bešter 2007; Medvešek et al. 2009; Pajnik et al. 2010) have dealt at least partially with discrimination on ethnic grounds. However, most of the research on discrimination on ethnic grounds in Slovenia has been focused on the sphere of employment and the labour market, leaving almost totally unexplored other areas of an immigrant's life, such as housing or access to health care. Moreover, the focus of such research has always been on *ethnic* discrimination,

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rather than *racial* discrimination, since the dominant share of immigrants in Slovenia differ from the majority population on the basis of ethnic origin only, rather than racial traits (Klemenčič and Žagar 2004: 217–221, 295–296).<sup>1</sup>

The aim of this paper is to show, on the basis of a study conducted on a specific group of immigrants, namely third country nationals (TCNs),<sup>2</sup> the life experiences of TCNs living in Slovenia in five areas of their life (housing, schooling, health care, labour market and contacts with public administration). The focus of the paper is to determine whether TCNs experience discrimination due to their different ethnic and racial origin, and if they do, to identify the factors that most likely contribute to a different and/or less favourable treatment of TCNs or some subgroup of TCNs.

## THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN SLOVENIA

Although in the past decades more interest has been shown in the study of immigrants with Slovenian citizenship (Komac and Medvešek 2005; Josipovič 2006; Komac 2007; Bešter 2007), more recently the focus has shifted to groups of immigrants without Slovenian citizenship, who are commonly referred to as third country nationals (TCN) (Pajnik et al. 2010; Golja 2007, 2008; Medica et al. ed. 2010; Bešter and Medvešek ed. 2010), and special attention has been paid to their situation in the labour market (Pajnik et al. 2010; Brezigar 2010; Medica 2010). One of the reasons for this shift in research focus is obviously the drastic changes in the economic situation and the labour market in the past few years. After two decades of economic growth that was possible solely due to the large proportion of the immigrant labour force, mostly employed in less attractive and lower paying jobs, the severe economic downturn marked a new era in the life of immigrants in Slovenia. Unemployment rose, while the construction sector, which relies heavily on the work of immigrants, suffered a severe economic downturn, and a considerable number of large construction companies declared bankruptcy. As a response to this crisis Slovenia drastically reduced its immigrant quotas: while in 2008 the quota for immigrant workers was fixed at 32,000, in 2009 it amounted to only 24,000, and in 2010 it was further reduced to 12,000 (Pajnik et al. 2010: 157). These reductions were based on the premise that a large number of TCNs would leave the country once their temporary work permits and/or contracts expired and they would not be able to find another job. In 2009 the Government adopted a regulation that prohibits all seasonal work other than in agriculture and forestry (*Uredba o omejitvah in prepovedih zaposlovanja in dela tujcev*). Since the regulation explicitly limits the employment of TCNs from Kosovo, it also represents a case of clear (if indirect) discrimination based on ethnicity. Pajnik et al. (2010: 158) also report an increasing number of

1 According to Art. 1 of the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, racial discrimination is “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”. Ratcliffe (1994: 6) proposes the following explanation of the use racial and ethnic discrimination: in some environments ethnicity and ethnic origin are used as synonymous for race and racial origin. In Great Britain, for example, Pakistanis, Germans and Chinese are all referred to as ethnic minorities. Moreover, in countries such as Germany or Israel, where the memory of holocaust is still vivid, they strictly avoid the term race. On the other hand in the United States of America, where most theoretical frameworks on discrimination were conceived, they mainly use the term racial discrimination (Ratcliffe 1994: 6).

Ethnic discrimination can, however, be understood as a sub-type of racial discrimination: while ethnic discrimination is mostly based on ethnic origin, the definition of racial discrimination, as explained above, encompasses a component related to skin colour (Bulmer 1986: 54).

Although in Slovenia we mostly use the term ethnic minorities and therefore the term ethnic discrimination would be more appropriate, in this paper I decided to use the term racial discrimination, too, as suggested by Bulmer (1986). The main reason for this decision is to differentiate between those TCNs (see note 3) in Slovenia that experience discrimination because of the colour of their skin, and those who do not.

2 Third Country Nationals (TCNs) are according to the Slovenian Aliens Act nationals of all countries that are not members of the European Union.

patriotic groups and associations that promote the national values of “being Slovene” and *de facto* act against any form of diversity, including ethnic affiliation, as well as political initiatives requiring action to reduce the number of immigrants that “steal jobs” from the local population (Pajnik et al. 2010: 159). In such a hostile environment, it does not come as a surprise that the focus of research on immigrants shifted strongly towards TCNs and their situation in the labour market.

However, recent studies on TCNs have focused mostly on those employed in less attractive and lower paying jobs (Pajnik et al. 2010) or on workers in the construction sector (Medica 2010), those who were identified also by the media as those facing the most severe problems and who had immigrated mostly from the Balkans. These studies left unexplored the situation of a smaller number of TCNs – those migrating from other parts of the world, e.g. Africa or Asia, and performing other jobs that are not necessarily strictly on the lowest level of the employment pyramid. Moreover, the focus on the labour market being driven by severe economic problems overshadowed the question about what happens in other areas of an immigrant’s life, such as health, schooling or housing. Do TCNs in Slovenia encounter problems in these areas of their life, do they experience discrimination, or, e.g. how easily do they find an apartment? The aim of this paper is to explore these questions based on the results of the study “Integration of Third Country Nationals in Slovenia” that was carried out in 2008 and 2009 by researchers of the Institute for Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana, Slovenia.<sup>3</sup>

## METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study was based on an analysis of the legal framework that shapes integration processes in Slovenia and on a secondary analysis of statistical data and other relevant sources. The main part of the study consisted in conducting semi-structured interviews with individuals and focus groups. The target group was defined on the basis of a corrected snowball sample. In these interviews, data and perceptions on five areas of integration of TCNs were collected. These areas were defined as follows: housing, the labour market and employment, schooling, health care and contacts with public administration. The sample of TCNs comprised 13 males and 9 females, originating from the countries of the area of the former Yugoslavia, the countries of the Russian Federation, Asia, countries of the African continent, Brazil and Australia.

One of the main strengths of the study is that interviews with individuals and focus groups were carried out with two audiences: on one hand, experiences and perceptions of TCNs were collected through 21 individual interviews, as explained above; on the other hand, experiences and perceptions of the majority Slovenian population were collected through individual interviews and focus groups with civil servants, teachers and health professionals (40 interviewees altogether). The study therefore provides a mirror image, where perceptions of TCNs about the majority population can be combined with perceptions of the majority population about TCNs, thus facilitating a better understanding of the dynamics that shape the relationship between the two groups; this has an important impact on recognising and evaluating instances of discrimination, lack of discrimination or reverse discrimination.

Nevertheless, given the limited number of interviewees among the TCNs, it should be noted that the study represents a first step towards ascertaining the status quo of this population, rather than a conclusive study on their situation in Slovenia.

3 For additional details on the project see: Integracija državljanov tretjih držav, in Institute for Ethnic Studies, Research Activity, Finished Projects, 2009, <http://www.inv.si/Dokumenti/dokumenti.aspx?iddoc=602&idmenu1=258&lang=eng>, 10.1.2012.

While the study includes perceptions of both TCNs and the majority population with respect to integration, it is inevitable that this kind of inclusive methodology has a more theoretical than practical value when we focus on discrimination and unfavourable treatment alone. As previous qualitative studies (Brezigar 2007, 2007a) have shown, the majority population's ability to detect instances of discrimination is rather limited. Therefore, although TCN and majority population perceptions were all taken into account when ascertaining the situation of TCNs in Slovenia, instances of discrimination or unfavourable treatment cited in the forthcoming pages were predominantly provided by TCNs.

## MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ON DISCRIMINATION AND UNFAVOURABLE TREATMENT

The experiences of interviewees about their inclusion into and adaptation to Slovenian society collected in this study are both positive and negative. Cases of plain discrimination<sup>4</sup> and complaints about prejudice and stereotypes were exposed by some interviewees, especially in the field of the labour market, contacts with public administration and housing.

On the other hand, positive experiences of the Slovenian society's ability to manage diversity were also mentioned, although the interviewees made it clear that most instances were possible due to the personal initiative of the individual (civil servant, teacher, doctor, nurse) with whom they were in contact. This was most evident in the spheres of health care, education, and to a certain extent also public administration. However, the study showed that there is a complete lack of systemic solutions in the area of health care (Bofulin and Bešter 2010) designed to deal with the cultural and linguistic diversity associated with TCNs. Nevertheless, most problems in the area of health care are solved by members of the medical staff who use a language that TCNs understand (usually a version of Croatian or Serbian, or English), or by patients that provide translators, such as family members, friends, or employers.

A lack of systematic solutions is also evident in the area of schooling: since, for example, secondary education does not fall into the category of compulsory education, each secondary school can decide whether or not to accept a foreign pupil, whereas primary schools need to accept them and make the necessary arrangements to accommodate them (Medvešek and Bešter 2010: 211). While Slovenian teenagers are enrolled in the most desirable and exclusive secondary schools based on a predetermined selection process, TCNs do not engage in this kind of process and can be accepted in a school based on other criteria, such as the availability of spare places in classes (Medvešek and Bešter 2010: 212). If we assume that Slovenian children strive for the best and the most popular secondary schools and that such schools are the first to be fully enrolled, we can easily see how TCNs may face a limited choice of options when enrolling in secondary schools and may, therefore, face discrimination.

One important finding of the study was discrimination directed towards black people (in this paper referred to as racial discrimination), especially in the areas of housing and labour market. Black interviewees from Africa complained about racial discrimination and identified their skin colour as the disturbing element that led to instances of discrimination. These results show that despite the very limited number of black immigrants in Slovenia, racial discrimination is a *de facto* problem.

Such findings on discrimination directed towards black people also confirmed that TCNs cannot be regarded as a homogeneous group, but that different groups of TCNs face different dilemmas in all

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<sup>4</sup> Discrimination occurs when a person is treated unequally, and usually unfavourably, compared to another individual or group. To discriminate between two persons or two groups, therefore, means to differentiate between them, assigning different rights and duties, unless it can be demonstrated that there is an objective reason to justify such a differentiation. Discrimination on ethnic or racial grounds therefore occurs when an individual or group is treated less favourably than another group or individuals, due to their ethnic or racial origin.

five areas of their life under consideration in this paper. One question that naturally arose during the conducting of this study was why some interviewees or groups of interviewees, rather than others, had experienced and reported more cases of discrimination and other forms of different treatment due to prejudice and stereotypes. Another was why some interviewees reported severe cases of discrimination or even racism, while others did not have any complaints of the sort and reported mostly positive experiences in most areas of their life.

One partial answer to this question can be already provided by previous research on this topic. Theodor Adorno and his colleagues have, for example, pointed out that negative attitudes towards black people and Jews could be traced back to some personality traits of the offender (Adorno et al. 1950: 248–279). In the case of TCNs in Slovenia, some studies (Bešter 2007; Brezigar 2007) have inferred that there is a certain social stratification in terms of the likeability of ethnic groups in Slovenia, and Bosniaks, for example, are less easily integrated into Slovenian society than Croats (Komac ed. 2007). The group of TCNs included in this study is very diverse in terms of their education, occupation, state and continent of origin, fluency in the Slovenian language, mother tongue, appearance and colour of skin, cultural background and habits, etc. According to the results of this study, such a diversity among TCNs seems to be highly correlated with the diversity of experiences (positive and negative) that TCNs face. In other words, the personal characteristics of TCNs such as skin colour, place of origin or mother tongue seem to determine the kind of problems and challenges as well as positive experiences that they face while living in Slovenia.

In the course of this study, three main factors were identified that seem to have a key impact on the life of TCNs in Slovenia: race, neighbourhood and language. I will try now to clarify each one of them.

## RACE

Previous studies on immigrants in Slovenia focused mainly on discrimination on the basis of ethnicity rather than on racial discrimination. Hence skin colour was never identified as a key factor leading to discrimination in previous studies on immigrants and TCNs in Slovenia. One of the main findings of this study is that *race* – conceptualised mainly as “different skin colour” – plays an extremely important role in the occurrence of prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination. Those interviewees that have black skin face stereotypes, as well as pervasive prejudice and discrimination in their contacts with public administration, in the labour market and also in housing, as shown by the following example:

Interviewee 16, Africa: /... / I remember when I asked for a work permit, I went to the office to ask for the permit. As soon as I entered the office, I said “Hello”. And the lady asked: “Did you come for the work permit?” I said, yes. She said, “Excuse me, but we do not issue work permits to asylum seekers.”

In this instance, a TCN from Africa describes his experience with an official in public administration who, because of the colour of his skin, erroneously classified him as an asylum seeker. The interviewee believes that this would not have happened had he been white rather than black. The stereotype which in this case the interviewee was confronted with is the result of an error in thinking, because it represents an association of personal characteristics and features (of the person who came to the office) with features of a group of people (black customers that come to the office are usually asylum seekers). Walter Lippman (1922) pointed out that stereotypes are unreliable because they depict another person or group of people partially, inappropriately and in a biased manner. His view is that stereotypes are a kind of thought framework that distorts people’s perception of reality. They therefore represent an obstacle for the individual to perceive another person or groups as they really are, as opposed to the stereotype of the person or group to which the individual belongs.

Similar experiences were reported by black interviewees when seeking housing facilities:

Interviewee 22, Africa: /.../ But it is hard [to find an apartment]. If you are an African, it is hard. Ok, this is my side of the story. I don't know, each African has its own experiences. My experience is that it is also a little difficult. Because if they see you, they close the door. They tell you that someone came beforehand, and that they will call you. And then it is over. You have the money and you are prepared to pay, so I don't know why /.../.

Interviewee 16, Africa: /.../ finding a flat is difficult. This is one of the things that reminds you of the diversity that you bring as an individual. To find a flat in Slovenia it's a little bit awkward. Why do I say that it's a little bit awkward? In most instances, somebody can call for you, let's say your girlfriend or maybe a friend that is Slovenian. And he calls for you and the person will say: "All right, come to see the flat at 5 pm". If you accept the price and everything, you will agree with the proposal. But when you get there, at 5 pm, this person automatically sees that the person who called is not really the person seeking housing. The person who is looking for the flat is African, black-skinned. The whole context changes. This person will tell you that there are other candidates who will come to see the apartment and that if they won't rent it, they will call you. They will start telling you all sorts of stories just to turn you down. You automatically know that if you were the person who called, Slovenian, the flat would be automatically yours. Things change when they see that you are different /.../ I had [several] such experiences. And a lot of my friends have had such experiences. We know about this, this happens on a daily basis.

In the case of housing, we can conclude that black interviewees do not have to expose themselves to stereotypes or prejudice only, but also to plain discrimination. Again, the main reason seems to be the impact that the colour of their skin has on the interlocutor, when he is still a stranger, not even an acquaintance.

Although the problem of race was most felt by black Africans, an interviewee from Asia also reported that the darker colour of his skin was creating problems for him in his working environment:

Interviewee 11, Asia: /.../ in the end it was really a problem. /.../ for them [the employers] it was important that everything was taken care of, that this and this has been done. But, let's say, the workers were not so happy. But this is normal. For them it was – who is this black man, and he is in charge of us /.../.

We can therefore conclude that although the number of people that live in Slovenia and have a different, darker pigment of the skin (and especially if they are black) is probably statistically minimal and irrelevant, TCNs experience considerable racial discrimination, prejudice and stereotypes that affect their lives in a substantial manner, and that this kind of discrimination, prejudice and stereotypes may be directly linked to the pigment of their skin, i.e. their race.

## NEIGHBOURHOOD

A second factor that seems to have a substantial impact on the experiences of TCNs is the neighbourhood where they choose to live in Slovenia. Janja Žitnik (2006: 89) in her study on immigrants in Slovenia pointed out that the neighbourhood where immigrants live has a significant impact on their socio-economic status. However, while the interviewees in her study pointed out that living in immigrant neighbourhoods may be a burden for their future, TCNs interviewed in this study pointed to a different way in which the neighbourhood affects their life and integration into Slovenian society. In the present study the question that is most predictive of their experiences seems to be: Are people in this neighbourhood used to foreigners?

Some interviewees pointed out that ethnic diversity of the neighbourhood interacts importantly with how people in it will accept TCNs, and consequently, whether TCNs experience discrimination:

Interviewee 4, from a country in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: We have positive experiences, also because I came first to Bela Krajina. / ... /

Interviewee 3, from a country in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: People here are so open.

Interviewee 4, from a country in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: / ... / already in the past years they had a lot of mixed marriages, because it was just across the Kolpa [river]. They socialised a lot, already at that time they had a lot of contacts with Croats, everybody knew the language. Even the local dialect is a mixture of Slovenian and Croatian. So we did not have any problems with the language, people were much more open and they accepted us easily. Even now we are happy to go to Bela Krajina, because we are very well accepted. Unlike in other places, where they are less used to foreigners, [and] there were more problems with this.

As interviewee 4 explains, the ethnic heterogeneity of the neighbourhood is a contextual factor that determines how people in it will accept the TCN: in those neighbourhoods where immigrants or foreigners are already successfully integrated into society, TCNs are more easily integrated into the society and are accepted in a more positive way. These kinds of differences can be noted also at the institutional level: for example, if a TCN needs to solve a bureaucratic problem at an administrative unit where employees are not accustomed to dealing with TCNs, he or she may experience a less favourable treatment or obstacles, not necessarily due to the intended discrimination of the civil servant in question, but rather to her or his lack of familiarity with such cases, as shown by this example:

Interviewee 22, Africa: There they were all right. The problem is that they don't know, they have no experience with cases like me. I was there nearly half an hour and the employee was asking for advice on the phone... It's not like Ljubljana. In Ljubljana they deal with it quickly and have experience. There they don't. This year I applied for citizenship and I had to wait for five months, so they would change ... because they don't know. I understand this, because they don't have so many people like me. It's like this, but I understand.

Interviewee 6, Asia: At the municipal office for foreigners, for example, the employee did not know what to do with me. She had to make some enquiries, what procedure she should follow in my case, because they had no experience with /.../ before. I think that I was at that time the first one here /.../ at that time when we took care of the documents.

Also in the area of education, Medvešek and Bešter (2010: 210) reported that in urban places and in areas that have been traditionally more exposed to immigration, schools have more experience with immigrant children, whereas in rural places or schools immigrant children are a novelty. One of the interviewees even reported that, when trying to enrol her child in the local primary school, the child was rejected. Only after the school headmaster had been instructed by the Ministry of Education to accept the child was the problem solved. The Ministry of Education confirmed that the case was not an isolated one (Medvešek and Bešter 2010: 211), thus giving support to the hypothesis that at least institutional discrimination in the area of schooling is probably more present and pervasive in neighbourhoods that have less familiarity with immigrants.

Similarly, ethnic homogeneity of the neighbourhood in Slovenia seems to be most problematic for those TCNs that differ mostly from the majority population of the neighbourhood where they live – and skin colour is among those most visible means of differentiation from the majority population, as an interviewee explains:

Interviewee 7, Africa: Being African in a society of white-skinned people does not work very well, since occasionally there arise instances of racism. Let's say someone talks about you as a "black man" and that you "steal their jobs." Personally, it doesn't bother me too much, because I have my goal that is more important to me. / ... / There should be freedom of speech and so it is also in my workplace. I think that almost all my colleagues are immigrants from the Balkan countries. They do not understand English, so I am forced to speak mainly Slovenian.

This example suggests a tentative explanation of why the black people included in the study seem to experience more instances of discrimination compared to other interviewees. They seem to be worse off in two respects: firstly, because their colour of the skin makes their difference from the majority population more noticeable, and secondly, because the small numbers of blacks in Slovenia renders it impossible for them to find a neighbourhood where people are accustomed to such kind of diversity. It is in fact much easier to find a landlord or an employer who has rented a flat to or employed a TCN from Kosovo than a landlord or employer that has rented a flat to or employed a black from Africa.

## LANGUAGE

Language was reported to be a challenge and obstacle to integration into Slovenian society by several interviewees, in almost all spheres of their life that were under scrutiny in this study. Therefore, it seems that language could be rightly identified as the third factor that has a substantial impact on the experiences of TCNs in Slovenia. This should not come as a surprise, since language is a constitutive element of ethnic and national identity. The Slovenian national identity is based on several constituting elements, such as a common culture, common history and a defined settlement area. Nevertheless, language plays a particular role in the constitution of the Slovenian national identity. It is a landmark that defines the essence of being “Slovene”; it is a means of transmission of culture and identity through generations, as well as the means of communication of members of the Slovenian society. It is therefore not surprising that mastering the Slovenian language is very important for the integration of TCNs into Slovenian society.

Interviewees reported a number of difficulties associated with language in obtaining employment. One interviewee, for example, noted that the Employment Service of Slovenia does not keep records of the number of immigrants that cannot find jobs or work in the labour market because of their lack of proficiency of the Slovene language. Some interviewees reported that they could not find a job because of their poor linguistic skills, as the following example shows:

Interviewee 7, Africa: Well, every country has its own system for how to find a job. Firstly, I got the permit (work permit, author’s note) /.../. When I had obtained my permit, I registered at the Employment Service of Slovenia, where they were looking for a job for me, but they did not find one. The problem was that no one wants to employ you if you do not speak Slovene. The fact that I could not find a job because of the language seemed to be a big problem. The Employment Service enrolled me in a course in Slovene, and I finished that course. This was at the Faculty of Arts. At first I was enrolled in “Eurošola” for three months, and then it was another school in Bežigrad, where I took lessons for some time. I finished that course and passed the exam in proficiency in the Slovenian language for foreigners at the Faculty of Arts. Afterwards, I found a job.

In the area of housing, interviewees report that they had to ask their friends or girlfriends to call on their behalf and to make appointments to visit apartments that were being rented (Pirc 2010: 188).

In the area of education, linguistic skills are of paramount importance, since they impact the academic results of children in a significant way. A series of provisions have been adopted to help immigrant children to learn the Slovenian language. Such provisions range from simple “special attention” that educators in kindergartens should pay to immigrant children so they may learn the official state language, to additional lessons in the Slovenian language in primary schools that are especially tailored for immigrants (*Strategija vključevanja otrok, učencev in dijakov migrantov v sistem vzgoje in izobraževanja v Republiki Sloveniji* 2007: 4–20). However, even in the case of primary schools, teachers complain about the inadequacy of teaching materials (Bešter and Medvešek 2010: 221) for teaching Slovenian as a second language. Moreover, training for teachers in didactical skills that are needed to teach Slovenian as a second language has not been approached systematically (Bešter and Medvešek 2010: 217).

In the area of health care, language is always an issue. It seems that with patients who are able to speak English or some form of Serbian or Croatian or even a Slavic language, only minor problems arise, since the medical staff is able to adapt to these languages and in one way or another communicate successfully with the patients:

Interviewee 21, Asia: At the doctor's everybody speaks English /.../ but I am really surprised that they all speak English so well, in order to communicate /.../ So there are no problems.

Gynaecologist: For example, I have patients, let's say from Ukraine or Russia. They do not come with partners [to translate], because this is a Slavic language and we understand each other. And also they already know some basic Slovene. [There are] also some from the Czech Republic.

However, problems arise when the patient speaks only one other language, such as Chinese or Albanian, and the medical staff is unable to adapt to it. In these cases the patient needs to provide a translator (a friend, co-worker, boss, family member), since medical facilities are unable to adapt and no solutions are provided on a systemic level for such cases (Bofulin and Bešter 2010: 286). Despite the fact that the Act on Patients' Rights states that the patient has the right to be informed of his medical condition, treatment options, etc. (*ibid*), the consent forms signed by TCNs are universally in Slovene, although the medical staff explains what is written to the patient in a language that the patient understands (*ibid*). However, TCNs do not always understand what they are being told, and sometimes they do not show that they do not understand. In such cases, the "good will" practices that rely on the good will of doctors and patients rather than on systematic solutions may not be an adequate solution in diagnosing and healing processes:

Interviewee 18, Australia: /.../ and the doctor was speaking in Slovenian and I was still trying to speak Slovenian. And the Doctor told me everything in Slovenian and only now and then something in English. He spoke words in Slovenian and more words in Slovenian, then he said it English "Well, it is gonna hurt." ... Basically the communication was good, I decided to speak Slovenian with some patients, and if I didn't understand everything, it was probably my fault. Sometimes I said I didn't understand and if he could tell me in English /.../.

Interviewee 1, country from the area of former Yugoslavia: The attitude of doctors is good. There are no differences. I didn't have any problems, even if I didn't know [the language], frequently I didn't understand. I did not have health problems, I do not like to visit doctors.

Moreover, the similarity of the language spoken by TCNs to the Slovenian language is not always a positive factor that reduces the linguistic barrier between the TCN and his interlocutor, as shown by several examples in the sphere of health care. The opinion of an interviewee from Asia on the difficulties in communicating with public services is illustrative. When asked if she had faced any problems with the language she replied:

Interviewee 2, Asia: I had no problems. Bosnians who do not speak English have problems.

This statement confirms the findings of previous studies (Roter 2007; Brezigar 2007; Medvešek 2007; Žitnik 2006: 92) on the fact that immigrants in Slovenia are a heterogeneous group and that certain ethnic groups (and languages) are more welcome, while others have extremely low status among the Slovenian population.

## CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

The experiences of interviewees about their inclusion into and adaptation to Slovenian society collected in this study are both positive and negative. Cases of prejudice, stereotypes or discrimination were detected and blacks were identified as a subgroup of TCNs that faces particularly severe obstacles to integration into Slovenian society. Their experiences were particularly negative in the area of housing and the labour market, followed by contacts with public administration. Since most interviewees were relatively young (with no particular health issues) and had no children in primary or secondary schools, it would be premature to conclude that black TCNs in Slovenia do not face particular obstacles in the areas of schooling or health care. Further studies are therefore needed to explore the situation of black TCNs in education.

The practice of secondary schools that can decide on their own whether to accept a foreign pupil or not is highly questionable. Although secondary schools do not fall into the category of compulsory education, they are still state institutions, funded by the public, and not privately owned (and financed) facilities. They represent an important medium of integration for foreign teenagers and as such have an important role as state institutions. Systematic arrangements should be made in order to simplify the inclusion of foreign pupils in schooling at the secondary level and to overcome bureaucratic procedures that favour their segregation to the least popular schools and programs in the country.

Among the positive experiences exposed by interviewees were contacts with personnel in the health care system who are prepared to adapt to the needs of the patients. However, when such adaptation is not possible, because, for example, doctors or nurses are not able to speak the TCN's mother tongue, the whole burden of solving the problem rests with the patient, creating opportunities for misdiagnosis and mistreatment. Although no such cases were detected during this study, the issue should not be neglected, because some interviewees confessed to not having fully understood their doctors. Therefore, the patient should be offered the assistance of a proficient translator in all instances when his or her health may be compromised as a result of a misunderstanding *vis-à-vis* the doctor. Moreover, health care facilities that are most frequently used by TCNs should consider translating at least some of the forms that patients need to sign prior treatment or surgery in at least a few of the most frequent languages among TCNs. The same approach could be adopted for recommendations given to patients for some of the most common diseases. If these recommendations were written and translated, doctors and nurses would even save the time they usually spend trying to communicate with patients, and could devote such time to the following-up of patients' treatment, rendering health care more efficient and TCN-friendly.

Skin colour, proficiency in the Slovenian language and the openness of the neighbourhood towards ethnic or racial diversity have been identified as the three factors that best explain the extent and type of problems and challenges (prejudice, stereotypes, discrimination) faced by TCNs in this study.

Finally, although the study combines two audiences providing not only the perceptions of TCNs, but also the perceptions of individuals that work with TCNs, in two of the five areas under study, the perceptions of the majority population have not been completely included. In the area of housing no landlords were included in this study, while in the area of labour market no employers were interviewed. Although the reticence of employers towards participating in such studies is well known to researchers in the field, a study on the housing of TCNs that also included the perceptions of landlords would provide further data on their situation in this area and the challenges they face. In this area, one of the issues that could be explored is whether TCNs face discrimination due to systemic failures of the rule of law. In other words, it is possible that apartment owners are particularly inclined to discriminate against TCNs (and other groups of possible tenants) because their options in case of problems with tenants are severely limited and they are not willing to take any risks.

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## POVZETEK

### ALI SE DRŽAVLJANI TRETJIH DRŽAV V SLOVENIJI SOOČAJO S PREDSDOKI IN DISKRIMINACIJO?

Sara BREZIGAR

Članek ponuja vpogled v rezultate študije o integraciji državljanov tretjih držav (DTD), ki živijo v Sloveniji. Študijo so izvajali raziskovalci Inštituta za narodnostna vprašanja v letih 2008 in 2009 in je temeljila na 21 poglobljenih intervjujih z DTD in na izvedbi fokusnih skupin z večinskim prebivalstvom (40 intervjuvancev).

Namen prispevka ni celovito prikazati izsledke študije, temveč se osredotočiti le na en segment rezultatov – na ugotavljanje obstoja etnične in rasne diskriminacije DTD v Sloveniji. Prispevek ponuja odgovor na vprašanje, ali državljani tretjih držav doživljajo diskriminacijo na petih področjih svojega življenja – na področju šolstva, zaposlovanja in trga dela, zdravstva, v stikih z javno upravo ter pri urejanju stanovanjskega vprašanja.

Rezultati raziskave so pokazali zelo raznoliko sliko Slovenije. Nekateri DTD se soočajo s hudimi predsodki, stereotipi in diskriminacijo, drugi pa imajo v Sloveniji pretežno pozitivne izkušnje. Skozi analizo rezultatov raziskave je bilo mogoče izpostaviti tri dejavnike, ki pomembno vplivajo na to, ali bo imel posamezni DTD pozitivne izkušnje na petih navedenih področjih življenja ali pa se bo v večji meri soočal s stereotipi, predsodki in diskriminacijo. Dejavniki, ki torej na osnovi izsledkov te raziskave vplivajo na izkušnje DTD v Sloveniji, so: rasa, okolje in jezik.

Raziskava je pokazala, da se temnopolti državljani – torej tisti, ki se od večinskega prebivalstva že na prvi pogled najbolj razlikujejo po rasnem poreklu – v največji meri soočajo z drugačnim in neugodnim ravnanjem večinskega prebivalstva ter z diskriminacijo. Takšne izkušnje imajo predvsem pri reševanju stanovanjskega vprašanja in pri zaposlovanju. Zaradi majhnega števila temnopolnih DTD v Sloveniji, se le-ti niso pojavljali kot podskupina v predhodno opravljenih raziskavah na področju integracije in diskriminacije DTD. Izvedena raziskava pa navaja na razmišljanje, da se temnopolti DTD prav zaradi svoje drugačne polti soočajo z manj ugodnim ravnanjem in s specifičnimi težavami, s katerimi se drugi DTD sploh ne srečujejo ali pa se srečujejo redkeje.

Okolje je drugi dejavnik, ki močno vpliva na izkušnje DTD. Gre namreč za vprašanje, ali posamezni DTD v Sloveniji živi v okolju, kjer ima večinsko prebivalstvo že (pozitivne) izkušnje z DTD ali pa je v danem slovenskem okolju tak posameznik velika izjema. Izsledki raziskave so pokazali, da je integraci-

ja DTD manj problematična, če je okolje, v katerem živi DTD, bolj raznoliko in če imajo v tem okolju prebivalci, uslužbenci, državni uradniki in druge ciljne skupine že izkušnje z DTD. V takšnem raznolikem okolju so DTD sprejeti bolj pozitivno, se soočajo z manj birokratskih ovir, doživljajo manj diskriminacije in neugodnega ravnanja.

Jezik je tretji dejavnik, ki močno vpliva na izkušnje DTD. Načeloma imajo DTD, ki govorijo angleško ali vsaj jezik, ki je slovenščini zelo podoben, manj težav kot drugi DTD. Lažje najdejo zaposlitev in lažje komunicirajo z zdravstvenim osebjem in javno upravo. DTD vsekakor ugotavljajo, da je poznavanje slovenskega jezika izjemno pomemben dejavnik pri uspešni integraciji v ta prostor.



# SOCIAL AND SPATIAL ASPECTS OF ROOTS TOURISM IN SLOVENIA: THE CASE OF THE SLOVENE-AMERICAN DIASPORA

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## ABSTRACT

### **Social and Spatial Aspects of Roots Tourism in Slovenia: The Case of the Slovene-American Diaspora**

Roots tourism describes the phenomenon of return visits of emigrants to the country of origin or the country of their ancestors. This term has gained widespread academic attention but remains relatively unknown in Slovenia despite the country's considerable diaspora with over 300,000 persons of Slovene origin. The article focuses on roots tourism in the Slovene context and examines the social, cultural, and spatial aspects of visits by members of the Slovene-American diaspora to their homeland. The research, based on data collected by online questionnaires, included 150 respondents from 25 US states. As the analyzed data show, their visits had a significant impact on their sense of family/ancestral heritage and in some cases became an emotional 'pilgrimage' rather than a 'tourist journey'.

KEYWORDS: roots tourism, Slovene-American diaspora, Slovenia, visit characteristics

## IZVLEČEK

### **Družbeni in prostorski vidiki turizma iskanja korenin v Sloveniji: Primer slovensko-ameriške izseljenske skupnosti**

V svetu že uveljavljeni izraz »turizem iskanja korenin«, s katerim označujemo turistične obiske izseljencev in njihovih potomcev v državi prednikov, je v Sloveniji kljub dejstvu, da zunaj meja Republike Slovenije živi preko 300.000 oseb slovenskega porekla, še relativno nepoznan. Avtorja v prispevku uvodoma predstavita poglobitve značilnosti tega segmenta turistične industrije, v nadaljevanju pa podajata izbrane ugotovitve študije, ki je preučila družbene, kulturne in geografske vidike turističnega obiska slovenskih izseljencev in njihovih potomcev iz Združenih držav Amerike v Sloveniji. Raziskava, ki je bila opravljena s pomočjo spletnih anketnih vprašalnikov in je zajemala 150 pričevanj anketirancev iz 25 ameriških zveznih držav, je pokazala, da imajo obiski pomemben vpliv na dožemanje posameznikove družinske dediščine, zaradi česar so turistična potovanja v nekaterih primerih postala intenzivna čustvena romanja.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: turizem iskanja korenin, slovensko-ameriška izseljenska skupnost, Slovenija, značilnosti turističnih obiskov

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## INTRODUCTION

The tourism industry is a complex and segmented sector of the global economy, and a major contributor to national gross domestic products in both developed and developing countries. Due to the stiff competition for visitors, tourism destinations constantly strive to present new niche products and search for new market opportunities. In recent years, culture and heritage tourism, which can take many forms and which occurs at many different scales, has gained in popularity. This segment of the heritage tourism market capitalizes on curiosity about the past, but one component, dubbed “roots tourism,” concentrates particularly on specific and personal interests in family history and ancestral and ethnic heritage.

The term roots tourism, the derivation of which is further discussed below, describes the phenomenon of return visits to the homeland by emigrants and their descendants. Of the many immigrant groups in America, Slovene-Americans present a particularly appropriate population for an examination of roots tourism for a variety of reasons. Slovenia, newly independent in 1991 but long a well-recognized and cohesive ethnic homeland in Central Europe, has been sending emigrants, primarily to the Americas, for more than 150 years. It is estimated that the country, with two million inhabitants in 2010, has a diaspora of over 300,000 persons living on five continents (Prešeren 2001). Of this global Slovene diaspora, Slovene-Americans in the United States represent the largest group, consisting of over 176,691 persons in the year 2000 (U.S. Census of Population 2004).<sup>1</sup> The relatively large size of the Slovene-American diaspora, their high level of education and personal income, the persistence of institutions that remind Slovenes of their roots (the Roman Catholic Church, Slovene newspapers and websites, Slovene cultural heritage celebrations especially in and around Ohio and Pennsylvania) and the tendency of successive American-born generations to persist in their identity as Slovene-Americans have made this group a highly attractive population of potential tourists and tourist-service consumers with considerable purchasing power and strong personal motives to travel to Slovenia.

## THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT REFERENCES

While many migrants never return to their homelands, return visits by those migrants who do return can take several forms. Some migrants spend a period of time in the host country, improve their financial status and then return permanently to their country of origin. Other migrants view themselves as residents or even citizens of the new country and visit the homeland only for a short time – a few weeks or months every so often – always returning to their new home country. These latter visits may, with time, become limited because of newly established homes, families, and the inevitable assimilation process; thus these visits may take on the character of tourist visits, while still providing the migrants with important insights into their family and ethnic heritage. It is these latter tourist-like visits that are the focus of our research.

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1 In the time of research, the 2010 Census figures were not yet available. In 2000, the number of Slovene Americans had increased from the previous census in 1990 by 42 percent, largely because in 1990 the independent country of Slovenia did not yet exist. Slovenia was then still a part of the former Yugoslavia; therefore, in 1990 many Slovenes had declared themselves as “Yugoslavian,” but by 2000, they claimed Slovene ethnic identity (U.S. Census of Population 2004).

## Defining the phenomenon of roots tourism

While tourism is globally defined and conceptualized as a temporary migration away from the place of permanent residence, authors Tim Coles and Dallen J. Timothy (2004: 2–3) critique the unwillingness of tourism studies to theoretically explore the blurring of tourism and migration in the modern era. Occasionally, scattered populations of migrants have been dealt with as exotic subjects for ethnic tourism or as travelers who undertake religious or secular pilgrimages. But for the most part tourism (especially cultural tourism) has been viewed primarily as a means for visitors to observe out of the ordinary ethnic communities or indigenous groups, not as a venture aimed at better understanding one's own culture of origin.

The fact that globalization in the last decades has stimulated new forms of travel, migration and tourism, with production and consumption complexly bound together, has become appreciated only recently. It is a topic that cries out for research approaches that are cross-disciplinary in nature. Efforts to combine tourism with migration and diaspora studies have been relatively scarce until lately when scholars from sociology, anthropology, geography and other domains, such as tourism studies, have recognized the importance of cross-disciplinary interaction to the production of profound scientific contributions. Coles and Timothy (2004: 11) assert that modern tourism can best be understood as a vital medium through which post-national and post-sovereign relations may be resolved, as temporary travel "home" represents a strong socio-cultural glue which binds the home state with "its" migrants.

In the opinion of the geographer Wilbur Zelinsky (2001: 210), tourism manifested by the return visits of migrants to their country of origin can be considered as facilitating feelings of connection between people across geopolitical boundaries and, in some cases, across vast distances. Russell King and Anastasia Christou (2008: 10) also found origin-related tourism activities of significance, claiming that journeys to the land of the ancestors were primarily made in order to articulate one's "true" identity, one's sense of belonging to a historical community. Similarly, as stressed by Marjorie Esman (1984: 452–453), travel and tourism to the "home country" is used by some ethnic groups to (re-)assert, reaffirm and perform their heritage, therefore such tourism can contribute to ethnic preservation both in the emigrant community and in the home country.

These perspectives deepen the understanding of the meaning of emigrants' visits to their country of origin or to the homeland of their ancestors and it is this type of tourism that is becoming known as *roots tourism*. The first studies on this subject arose in the United States among the African-American population. Many authors, including Ellen Badone and Sharon R. Roseman (2004: 7), Paul Basu (2004: 150–151; 170–171), Kamari Maxine Clarke (2006: 80), Patricia de Santana Pinho (2008: 74–75), Katharina Schramm (2004: 149), Dallen J. Timothy and Jeanne Kay Guelke (2008: 1) and Timothy and Victor B. Teye (2004: 111), agree that interest in ancestral heritage travel was to a high degree stimulated by the novel *Roots – The Saga of an American Family*, written in 1976 by Alex Haley and by the subsequent film series based on the novel.<sup>2</sup>

Roots tourism has only recently gained notice as an important segment of the tourism industry and can be classified as one of the many forms of cultural tourism. Within its domain are activities connected with traveling to and discovering one's family history in the country of one's ancestors; roots tourism partially overlaps with other cultural tourism segments such as VFR (visiting friends and relatives) tourism, heritage tourism, nostalgia tourism, genealogy tourism and ethnic tourism. Cultural tourism sub-segments, such as genealogy tourism, have recently gained attention among government sponsored tourism offices because of the revenue that can be generated by specially focused tours. Genealogy tourism, enhanced by special government sponsored data-search services, is now considered a sophisti-

<sup>2</sup> The novel is based on a life story of African slave named Kunta Kinte, who was deported to the United States of America in the 18th century, and follows the lives of his descendants. As one of them, a seventh generation descendant, the author Alex Haley decides to travel to Africa in search of his ancestral heritage (Haley 1977).

cated niche product in countries known for their diaspora. These include Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Poland, Hungary and Germany (Garraway 2006; Timothy 2008: 126–127). The potential for expansion is great.

## The Slovene-American diaspora and visits to the homeland

The first large Slovene settlements in the United States were established in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when many of the agriculturally oriented regions in the southern part of the Habsburg Monarchy were facing poverty and economic stagnation. The United States, with its promise of jobs and land, was one of the first and major destinations for people from all parts of this region, including those from the Slovene ethnic territories. Economic stresses in central Europe following World War I produced a stream of Slovene migrants that lasted from 1918 to 1938. Yet another stream came in the post-World War II era, when some more educated and prosperous Slovenes, alienated by the swing towards Communism in Yugoslavia, left for the United States, Argentina and Australia.

Many authors have dealt with the Slovene-American diaspora from the historical, social, spatial and other perspectives over the last two decades (Drnovšek 1991; 1998; Friš 1997; 1999; Klemenčič 1995; 1999 and Klemenčič and Pugelj, 2009). However, limited work has been done on the subject of emigrant tourist mobility towards their homeland and on the contribution of this mobility to their sense of ancestral and cultural heritage.

One of such works was written by Darko Friš (1996), who carried out historical research on visits by Slovene emigrants to their homeland, but his study only focused on the period from the early 19<sup>th</sup> century to the beginning of World War II and consequently excluded tourist visits in the modern sense. According to Friš (1996), 19<sup>th</sup> century missionary priests were the first Slovene emigrants to the United States to visit Slovenia (at that time a part of Habsburg Monarchy). They went to visit their relatives and sometimes also to “recruit” new priests for missionary work in the United States. The first organized tourist trip from a Slovene emigrant community came from Westphalia, Germany, in 1922 and again in 1927. These visits were followed in 1929 by visits from Slovene emigrants to the Lorraine region of France (Slovenia was then part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Then in 1930, following small, self-organized trips from North America, the first large organized visit of Slovene-Americans to Slovenia was made. Soon there were Slovene tour operators established in Cleveland and more visits to Slovenia followed until 1938, when, during the war years, the political situation in Europe became unstable. Visits from the United States stopped, and did not resume until the 1950s.

Another contribution on more recent short-term mobility towards the homeland was made by Rado Genorio (1989), who had extensively studied several other aspects of Slovene-Canadian diaspora. In the chapter *Slovene-Canadian Immigrants and their Relations with the Homeland (Stiki slovenskih priseljencev v Kanadi z matično domovino)* he presents the results of his questionnaire-based survey, which indicates that 83 percent of the studied population visited Slovenia at least once after their settlement in Canada. He continues that almost one quarter of the studied population (24.8 percent) visits Slovenia on a yearly basis, with many among them spending their entire holiday exclusively in Slovenia. He states that most of these visits have a tourist character, although some people travel in order to permanently settle in Slovenia in the future (therefore they feel obligated to purchase a house or finance the maintenance of it, etc.). Genorio (1989: 133–134) concludes that such tourism mobility is especially important for younger generations of Slovene-Canadians, who can get better acquainted with the land of their ancestors, while at the same time these visits have significant economic impacts for the Slovene (at that time Yugoslav) economy.

Cvetka Kocjančič (2001) presented similar observations in her paper, which also deals with Slovene-Canadian community and concentrates specifically on its economic role in relation to Slovenia. She ascertains that the first generations of Slovene-Canadians in general contributed substantially to Slovene tourism with their visits, due to the relative financial prosperity which they achieved during their

life in Canada. She mentions various opportunities for potential improvements in the tourism mobility of Slovene-Canadians and points out the non-existence of travel packages that include destinations in Slovenia.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF SLOVENE-AMERICAN ROOTS TOURISM VISITS

### Research methodology

In order to define the motives and travel behavior of those who traveled from the United States of America to Slovenia to visit their relatives and/or friends and (re-)discover their ancestral heritage, we devised a survey. Given the dispersed distribution of the clusters of Slovene settlements in America, in order to get the largest number of respondents, we decided to make our survey accessible on the Internet and to promote it in the Slovene-American diaspora media, where the chances of attracting the relevant population were high. Although online accessible surveys may have potential disadvantages for researchers regarding the basic characteristics of the studied population (possible exclusion of the elderly segment of the population and high levels of incomplete questionnaires), the prevailing factor for the selection of their use was accessibility.

The survey, consisting of 22 questions, began by asking for the respondents' sex, age, location and proceeded to ask for details of the journeys made to Slovenia. The survey was made accessible online,<sup>3</sup> and a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) was defined for it.<sup>4</sup> Then, introductory letters containing a short explanation of the survey were sent to the main Slovene-American organizations in the United States: the American Slovene Catholic Union (KSKJ), the Slovene National Benefit Society (SNPJ) and the Slovene Women's Union of America (SWUA). All responded positively to our request and published the invitation to participate in the organizations' periodical newsletters.<sup>5</sup> All three newsletters are routinely issued and distributed to members in paper form or/and on the Internet in an online portable document format (PDF). As the Internet has proved to have an important role in the life of Slovene ethnic communities (Meden 2007; Milharčič-Hladnik 2008; Mikola and Gombač 2008), we additionally presented the invitation to participate in the survey in the online PDF newsletter of the Slovene community in Cleveland<sup>6</sup> and on the Internet site of the SNPJ, where the online survey was directly accessible. The survey was open between April 1, 2008 and January 15, 2009.

### Main findings of the survey

Altogether, 150 completed questionnaires were received from respondents, located in 25 U.S. states. The questionnaires were analyzed using univariate statistical analysis. Among the respondents, the age groups from 50 to 59 years and 40 to 49 years predominated (at 39.5 and 34 percent of the total respectively). Most of the respondents (64 percent of the total) were females. The geographic locations of these respondents reflected all the major population centers of the Slovene community identified by

3 The computer software used for the purpose of the survey was LimeSurvey 1.70+, available (open code) on March 1, 2008, online at: <http://www.limesurvey.org>.

4 The URL used for the survey was: <http://oskarserver.upr.si/limesurvey/index.php?sid=73536&lang=en>.

5 These newsletters were: *Amerikanski Slovenec*, published by KSKJ on October 22, 2008, *Prosveta*, published by SNPJ on July 2, 2008 and *Zarja / The Dawn* published by SWUA in August, 2008.

6 The *Cleveland Slovenian Newsletter*, edited by Phil Hrvatin on June 21, 2008.

Matjaž Klemenčič (2005: 113). The highest share of respondents came from Ohio (46 percent of total), of which 64 percent were from the Cleveland metropolitan area (including Euclid, Willoughby Hills, Mentor, Wickliffe, and Eastlake). Another 13 percent of the respondents came from Pennsylvania, with 8.5 of this 13 percent coming from the Pittsburgh metro area including Canonsburg and Coraopolis. Other states with significant shares of respondents were Florida and Illinois (both with 4.7 percent of the total) followed by California (4 percent of the total) and Minnesota (3.3 percent of the total). The complete spatial distribution of the respondents is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Spatial distribution of 150 Slovene-American respondents, located by the given postal codes.

### ***Motives for travel***

The clustered pattern of Slovene-American settlement is very likely linked to the high level of incidence of interest in family history revealed by this survey. According to Basu (2005: 134), interest in family history can be understood as a response to the increasingly multicultural nature of the so called “New World” societies that absorb one’s ethnic identity gradually and inevitably into the melting pot. Surrounded as it has usually been by a wide range of other ethnic clusters, the Slovene-American community has long endeavored to preserve its identity, not only by encouraging members to take part in ethnic religious parishes and social organizations and by publishing periodical newspapers, but also through cohesive settlement patterns as described by Klemenčič (1995: 82–107).<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, these impressive efforts on the part of the Slovene ethnic community for self-preservation do not reach all of those of Slovene derivation nor do they necessarily persist in successive generations who may no

<sup>7</sup> As Klemenčič’s historical research has shown, Slovenes in the United States usually settled closely together in urban areas, sometimes even according to the part of Slovene territory they originated from. This was of significant importance for their social life and sustenance of their identity (1995: 82–107).

longer speak the mother tongue or even be aware that Slovenia has played a role in their ancestry. For example, we have encountered second and third generation Slovene-Americans who are aware of having grown up with a unique food heritage but who no longer know the Slovene names for their favorite dishes, and some are unaware of where in Slovenia their families originated. In other words, there appears to be some decay over time of awareness of and interest in Slovene heritage.

Efforts to combat this loss of identity among Slovene-Americans and to encourage roots tourism have been organized in Slovenia and in the United States for some time. For example, since the late 1980s, for six weeks every summer the Slovene government has subsidized a Slovene language course in the capital, Ljubljana, for those in the second and third generations of the Slovene-diaspora. The rather demanding course is enhanced by efforts to create camaraderie among the (mostly) young people who come from Australia, Argentina, North America, and Europe and by efforts to introduce them to the country through well-planned excursions to many national landmarks.

In North America, in the vicinity of northern Ohio, the heaviest settlement of Slovene-Americans, there have long been tour companies that organize special excursions back to Slovenia both for those interested in visiting relatives and friends with whom they are in close contact and for those who no longer have contact with their Slovene roots but who would like to gain knowledge about their family history and perhaps establish some lasting contacts.

Our analysis of the data we collected through the survey shows that among our studied population the motives connected to roots tourism are by far the most important reasons for visiting Slovenia. The predominant motives for travel, together accounting for 72 percent of the responses, were "Visiting relatives and/or friends" and "Discovering my ancestral heritage". Visiting sights in Slovenia and its neighboring countries – activities generally covered by the term "Tourism" – also represented a significant motive for travel (22 percent), while "Business" and "Other" together presented the main motive to 6 percent of the studied population.

Our respondents elaborated on their ancestral heritage motives for visiting Slovenia in their comments at the end of the survey questionnaire. For example:

Visiting Slovenia is an attractive tourist opportunity for anyone. My special attraction is the connection with my heritage. Absent family to visit, it would decrease in attractiveness to visit.

(Respondent from Urbana, Maryland)

I was overwhelmed by the beauty and diversity of the Slovene landscape. Also significant was the fact that my brother and I looked like many of the Slovenes and reminded us of our aunts, uncles, and grandparents. We had never realized there was a "look" to Slovenes. If anything, we are even more proud to be Slovene now than before.

(Respondent from Painesville, Ohio)

I am so happy that I have discovered Slovenia as it is a hidden treasure. I never knew much about the country until I started researching my heritage.

(Respondent from Ormond Beach, Florida)

### *Average length of stay, frequency and mode of travel*

As Timothy (2008: 119) argues, one of the main characteristics of journeys made by people motivated by family and ancestral heritage is that they can entail traveling great distances. This was also evident from the studied data of the Slovene-American community. Slovene-Americans traveled overseas despite

the relatively high costs of air travel,<sup>8</sup> changed planes two or three times, due to the lack of direct flights between the United States and Slovenia, and experienced six or more hours of time change.

The relatively long average length of stay is partially a result of the distance traveled. As the distance from the country of permanent residence (the United States) and the country of origin (Slovenia) is large, people usually decided to stay for a longer period of time. In the case of our survey, the average length of stay in Slovenia was 12.2 days. Altogether 76 percent of the respondents stayed in Slovenia longer than one week.

Frequency of travel is again closely connected with the potential visitor's motives. People tend to travel more often to the destinations for which they have established a positive emotional attachment. As previously explained, the level of attachment to the visited place is high among those initially motivated by an interest in family and ancestral heritage. This is reflected in the frequency of journeys made by Slovene-Americans. Our survey showed that Slovene-Americans travel to Slovenia an average 2 or 3 times in a decade, with many exceptions to this "rule". Some of them visit Slovenia on a yearly basis; some only come every 10 years or less frequently.

Our survey missed some statistical information due to the fact that some Slovene-Americans hold dual (American and Slovene) citizenship and are therefore not registered as international tourists when they come into Slovenia but rather as Slovenes returning home from the United States. Similarly, the registries kept by hotels and guesthouses do not report reliable information on those holding dual citizenship to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. Although information on a visitor's country of residence is required, the custom is to register one with dual citizenship as a resident of Slovenia rather than of the United States of America. Reportedly, hoteliers do this in order to subtly encourage Slovene identity and return visits.

Our survey shows that Slovene Americans tend to self-organize their trips to Slovenia as individuals, couples or families (60 percent of total), while 22 percent traveled with a package tour organized by a travel agency.<sup>9</sup> A total of 18 percent of the trips were organized by a circle of friends, who then made the journey together as a group.

### *Social aspects of visits*

Our respondents provided information on how their experiences in Slovenia modified their sense of identity. Nearly 93 percent of the visitors reported positive impacts: many began to feel a closer kinship with their Slovene ancestry (58 percent), some wanted to learn more about their family history in Slovenia and elsewhere (29 percent), while only a few found their sense of identity with their adopted country of permanent residence strengthened (6 percent).

Strong emotional experiences were also evident from some of the respondents' comments on how the visit of their family contributed to their sense of cultural/ancestral heritage. Two such comments are representative of other similar comments:

8 According to the respondents' estimate the average cost of return airfare from Cleveland/Pittsburgh via London/Frankfurt/Zurich to Ljubljana was USD 1424.11.

9 It should be noted that 91 percent of the people who travelled to Slovenia with a travel agency stated they travelled with Kollander World Travel, the leading travel agency in the United States specializing in package tours of Slovenia and other neighboring European countries. The company is located in Cleveland, Ohio, and was established in 1923 by Slovene entrepreneur August Kollander, Sr. Along with simple airfare packages, Kollander organizes custom-designed tours on such themes as Slovene traditional dishes, local music and folklore entertainment, sometimes co-organized by Slovene and American organizations. They are the only agency to offer genealogy specialized tours, including attendance at formal genealogical conferences in Slovenia, together with access to archival records and training in their use (KWT 2008).

The visit made history come alive. I had heard about these people and the homestead and I was actually able to stand right there and see it with my own eyes. It was overwhelming, it brought tears to my eyes and I wanted so much to share this experience with my aunts living in the States.

(Respondent from Midland, Texas)

It would mean almost nothing without my family. I felt completely immersed in the Slovene culture – it was like walking in my Staramama's [Grandmother's] shoes for a month. She recently died; I had loved her so much; she always talked of her home in Slovenia. Just breathtaking to be taken in and accepted so readily into the everyday life of my extended family in such a beautiful place. It felt more like home than home feels!

(Respondent from Wickliffe, Ohio)

When asked if the visits to Slovenia had broadened their interest in world cultures beyond Slovenia, 46 percent of the respondents replied positively and another 17 percent said the Slovene visit had stimulated them to plan trips to other world locations. More than half of the respondents (57 percent) stressed that the visits to Slovenia relieved them of misconceptions and prejudices, as they became more understanding of why and how people are different. Perhaps most significant for the concept of roots tourism and its perpetuation is the fact that more than 80 percent agreed with the statement that their roots visits gave them ideas that will affect their future life positively. Some agreed that the Slovene experience left them more interested in civic participation back home, because they had renewed interest in fostering cross-cultural contacts.

In general, the Slovene-Americans we studied found their overall experience in Slovenia positive (62 percent). Among those who had negative experiences, some reported that the language barrier seriously inhibited their enjoyment of the experience (9 percent); others found service personnel unhelpful (7 percent). A few were seriously inconvenienced by the Slovene bureaucracy (5 percent) and others found the Slovene people hard to get to know (4 percent).

### *Geographic and cultural experiences*

Images of Lake Bled, its picturesque island and church with scenic mountains in the background are iconic to the Slovene diaspora all over the world. Images of Bled can be seen (in different forms) in Slovene ethnic clubs and individual homes throughout the Americas and in Australia. In Table 1, Column 1 depicts the popularity among the Slovene-American visitors of Bled and other geographical icons. The favored sites mentioned by the respondents include some of Slovenia's most well-known tourist

Table 1: Ten most popular geographic areas (Column 1) and cultural experiences (Column 2)

	Column 1: Geographic areas	Column 2: Cultural experiences
1.	Bled	Food / cooking / potica
2.	Ljubljana (Old town)	Folk groups / music / singing / polka / accordion
3.	Postojnska jama	Wine / wine cellars / beer / schnapps / coffee
4.	Piran	Concerts / festivals / atmosphere
5.	Triglav NP	Family gatherings / genealogy
6.	Portorož	Museums / galleries / castles
7.	Bohinj	Nature / walking / sport / countryside
8.	Škocjanske jame	Churches / religious life
9.	Koper	Visiting markets / fairs
10.	Škofja Loka	Souvenirs / handcrafts

Source: Survey, 2009.

destinations: the historic cities and towns of Ljubljana, Piran, Koper, and Škofja Loka received most of the attention; spectacular caves were popular – Postojnska jama, Škocjanske jame, as were mountain areas – Triglav National Park, Bohinj.

The Slovene-American visitors also described their most popular cultural experiences in Slovenia (Column 2). Among them, gastronomical products were placed at the top of the list (first and third in popularity). They were followed by ethnographic phenomena and events (second in popularity), such as concerts, museums, festivals and religious sites/events. Among other experiences prominently mentioned by the respondents were family and ancestral heritage, family gatherings and genealogical research.

## CONCLUSION

The intersection of migration, diasporas and tourism by migrants and explorations by an array of scholars from different disciplines has resulted in a phenomenon labeled roots tourism. We have presented selected aspects of Slovene-American tourism mobility motivated by interests in ancestral and cultural heritage. Analysis of our data has shown that such roots tourism has had a strong impact on the visitors' sense of family and ancestral heritage and has enhanced the individual's sense of identity as Slovene, even as they maintain their identity as Americans.

Our study demonstrates that roots tourism can have significant positive outcomes. Such diaspora travel can be regarded as a product of the evolution of ethnic identity preservation, which used to include socializing in ethnic clubs, worshiping at ethnically-oriented religious and community centers and reading periodical media in the language of the ethnic community. Now, with relative prosperity among younger generation ethnic communities, roots tourism travel to the homeland can be seen as a natural extension of earlier identity-reinforcing customs. But roots tourism has an experiential intensity that may be especially appealing to those who have no personal memory of the "Old Country," and have only fading pictures and an oral folklore about the "Old Country" that is rapidly vanishing with time. These roots journeys offer younger generations a unique, interactive, "hands-on" ethnic and ancestral heritage experience.

The roots tourism market segment could contribute added value to the tourism industry and could help to consolidate the overall importance of tourism in the service sector. Although no significant action on the national or private level has yet taken place, services specifically designed for roots tourism participants (electronic searches of church records, accessible short courses in language, translated vital statistics, and even affordable bed and breakfast accommodations in rural towns) are suggested as logical ways to expand the role of this niche tourism in the Slovene economy and strengthen the cross-national identity of the Slovene diaspora. At the same time the need for future research that will address the topic from the receiving family and friends' point of view of is required.

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## POVZETEK

### **DRUŽBENI IN PROSTORSKI VIDIKI TURIZMA ISKANJA KORENIN V SLOVENIJI: PRIMER SLOVENSKO-AMERIŠKE IZSELJENSKE SKUPNOSTI**

Miha KODERMAN

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Interdisciplinarno preučevanje migracij in izseljenskih skupnosti je pripeljalo do njihove obravnave tudi v sklopu s turizmom povezanih strok. Tovrsten pristop, ki vključuje interakcijo izseljenskih skupnosti v povezavi z njihovo turistično mobilnostjo, je relativno nov pojav, za katerega pa se je v znanstveni literaturi že uveljavil angleški izraz *roots tourism*. Termin smo v slovenskem jeziku prevedli kot 'turizem iskanja korenin', pri čemer smo sledili prizadevanju, da bi se čim bolj približali izvornemu poimenovanju besedne zveze, poleg tega pa smo z vključitvijo glagolnika (iskanja) skušali prispevati tudi k ohranitvi širokega pomenskega obsega.

Turizem iskanja korenin je s strani raziskovalcev različnih strok pojmovan kot 'družbeno-kulturna vez' (*socio-cultural glue*) in izpostavljen kot eden izmed najbolj aktivnih mehanizmov, ki povezujejo izvorno deželo z »njenimi« emigranti. Z obiski izvorne dežele se, kot ugotavlja Zelinsky (2001: 210), ljudje počutijo povezani ne glede na (geo-)politične meje in velike razdalje, zaradi česar bi lahko to turistično udejstvovanje označili kot pospeševalca družbenih interakcij in ga celo razumeli kot proces, preko katerega poteka »de-teritorizacija« kulture. Ta segment turizma se v zadnjih desetletjih zaradi specifičnih lastnosti, med katerimi je treba poudariti prav emocionalni (motivi za obiske temeljijo na spoznavanju in ohranjanju družinske in etnične dediščine) in pogostnostni (tovrstni obiski niso omejeni le na enkratni obisk, pač pa se potreba po njih vzpostavlja vedno znova, poleg tega pa je dolžina obiska zaradi prostorske ločenosti in razdalje daljša) vidik, vedno bolj uveljavlja znotraj sicer širokega spektra turističnih dejavnosti. Prve razprave o obiskih izvorne dežele izseljencev lahko zasledimo v povezavi z afriško-ameriško skupnostjo v Združenih državah Amerike, ki je od 16. stoletja nastajala s prisilnimi migracijami.

Zanimanje za preučevanje posameznikove dediščine in obiskovanje izvirne dežele prednikov je v veliki meri spodbudilo leta 1976 izdano literarno delo temnopoltega ameriškega pisatelja Alexandra Haleya z naslovom: *Korenine – saga o ameriški rodovini*, kateremu je sledila tudi odmevna televizijska serija z naslovom *Roots*.

Omenjena spoznanja so vodila avtorja prispevka k zasnovi študije, s katero je želel preučiti najrazličnejše vidike turističnega obiska slovenskih izseljencev in njihovih potomcev iz Združenih držav Amerike v Sloveniji. Omenjena izseljenska skupnost obsega preko 170.000 oseb slovenskega porekla in je poznana po dolgoletni tradiciji, precejšnji stopnji koherence, učinkoviti organizacijski strukturi ter splošnem prizadevanju za ohranitev slovenske identitete. Po končanem zbiranju pričevanj posameznikov s pomočjo spletnih anketnih vprašalnikov sta avtorja izbrana spoznanja strnila v pričujočo razpravo, ki povzema glavne značilnosti tovrstnih obiskov. Te sta predstavila v štirih tematskih sklopih, ki se nanašajo na motive za potovanje, povprečno dobo bivanja ter pogostnost in način potovanja, socialne vidike potovanja ter geografske in kulturne izkušnje.

Avtorja v zaključku ugotavljata, da je treba pojav turizma iskanja korenin deloma razumeti kot produkt evolucijskega razvoja oblik ohranjanja etnične identitete, ki so nekaj vključevale druženje v etničnih društvih in verskih središčih ter učenje slovenskega jezika in prebiranje najrazličnejših v slovenskem jeziku napisanih publikacij. Potovanja v domovino staršev oziroma prednikov v tem pogledu ponujajo nadgradnjo in so zlasti za mlajše generacije edinstvena življenjska izkušnja, ki jim na interaktiven način približa družinsko in narodnostno dediščino.



# MARGINALIZACIJA KOT KONTEKST ZA INTERPRETACIJO DELOVANJA SUBKULTURNEGA FESTIVALA NA LOKALNO SKUPNOST

Miha KOZOROG<sup>1</sup>

COBISS 1.01

## IZVLEČEK

### **Marginalizacija kot kontekst za interpretacijo delovanja subkulturnega festivala na lokalno skupnost**

Članek obravnava pozitiven odnos Tolmincev do mednarodnega festivala Metal Camp v Tolminu. Ta odnos je mogoče interpretirati z upoštevanjem marginalizacije območja (tudi zaradi izseljevanja). Festival operacionalizira turistično konstrukcijo območja, v kraj pripelje množice in kraj postavlja v središče določene predstavnosti geografije. Z njim domačini postanejo ponosni domačini. Predlagan je koncept »geografije marginalnosti«, v katerem je zaobjet tako emski občutek umeščenosti na obrobje kot s tem povezana produkcija geografskih imaginarijev, ki obstoječa geografska razmerja simbolno rekonstruira in redefinira.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: geografije marginalnosti, turizem, festival, subkultura

## ABSTRACT

### **Marginalisation as a Context for Interpreting the Impact of a Subcultural Festival on a Local Community**

The article discusses the positive attitude of Tolminians toward the Metal Camp international festival in Tolmin. This relationship can be analysed by taking into account the marginalisation of the area (also through emigration). The festival operationalises the tourism construction of the area, brings in a mass of visitors, and places the town at the centre of a certain imaginary geography. With it locals become proud locals. The concept of "geography of marginality" is proposed, which encompasses both the emic feeling of being located at the margin and the related production of geographic imaginaries which symbolically reconstructs and redefines existing geographic relations.

KEY WORDS: geographies of marginality, tourism, festival, subculture

V Tolminu se vsako poletje za teden dni kakim trem tisočem domačinov pridruži še trikrat toliko pripadnikov metalske subkulture. V kraj pridejo zaradi glasbenega festivala Metal Camp, domačini pa takrat s subkulturo sobivajo v mirnem sožitju. Da je prevladujoči lokalni diskurz o festivalu benevolenten, ni samoumevno, saj bi »drugačne« subkulture, *heavy metal* glasba, hrup, bruhanje in okoljska degradacija, kot pravijo Gibson, Connell, Waitt in Walmsley, prav lahko »izzvali konservativne poglede (nekaterih) ljudi, kakšno naj bi podeželsko življenje bilo (urejeno, belopolto, tiho, itd.)« (2011: 21). Članek premišlja

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kontekst, v katerem in zaradi katerega so Tolminci metalce sprejeli odprtih rok. Pokazati želim, da je za razumevanje odnosa domačinov do subkulturnega festivala treba upoštevati marginalizacijo območja, ta izkušnja pa vsebuje tudi emigracijo prebivalcev v večja središča. Metal Camp v nasprotju s praznjem obrobnega kraja uprizarja njegovo polnost in središčnost.<sup>1</sup>

V nasprotju s prevladujočim pogledom v študijah migracij, ki je usmerjen na tiste, ki (od)potujejo, bom pogled usmeril na tiste, ki ostanejo v krajih, ki jih mnogi zapuščajo – menim, da tudi to sodi med migracijske izkušnje.<sup>2</sup> Izkušnja kraja z vse manjšo dinamiko ljudi in dogodkov, kraja, kjer se torej »ne dogaja«, pri tistih, ki ostanejo, ustvarja občutek marginalnosti. Sprašujem pa se, ali ne vzbujajo prav ta tudi željo po središčnosti. Ildiko Erdei je na to željo pokazala s primerom spomenika filmskemu junaku Rockyju v srbskem mestecu Žitište (2011). V obrobne, demografsko prizadetem kraju v Banatu so lokalni prebivalci središčnost v obliki medijske pozornosti, večjega števila obiskovalcev, spodbujene ekonomije, itd., dosegli s Hollywoodom in ne s kako lokalno »tradicijo«, kar je sicer običajnejša praksa. Še več, s svojim lokalnim Hollywoodom so obkrožili svet – o njih so pisali mediji, posneli dokumentarni film, opazili so jih globalni »pomembneži«, itd., kar bi v sodobni zasičenosti z lokalnimi »tradicijami« (ki jih je polno v turizmu kot enim glavnih diskurzov »znamčenja« krajev) dosegli veliko teže. Toda k tej konstrukciji središčnosti lahko enako kot Hollywood prispevajo tudi veliko bolj marginalni globalni tokovi raznih subkultur. Če se namreč izkažejo za uspešne pri nagovarjanju obiskovalcev, zagotavljanju medijske pozornosti in iskanju poti za globalno kroženje lokacije,<sup>3</sup> jih bodo marginalizirani zelo verjetno vzeli za svoje. S tem pa bo spodbujena tudi odprtost za »drugačnost«, tako kot v tolminskem primeru za subkulturno drugačnost. Vendar pa v nasprotju z Ildiko Erdei, ki je v instrumentalizaciji popularne kulture (sicer povsem pravilno) videla možnost izhoda iz marginalnosti (2011: 297), sam nisem tak optimist, saj v procesih »znamčenja« prepoznavam predvsem simbolno prekrivanje marginalizirane realnosti, torej delo ideologije – bojim se torej, da festival ali spomenik prinašata predvsem predstavo središčnosti, ne pa tudi sprememb struktur, ki marginalnost generirajo.

Tezo postavljam na podlagi terenskega dela v Tolminu, ki je tudi moj domači kraj.<sup>4</sup> Kot »domačina« so me težave tega okolja nagovarjale ne zgolj raziskovalno, ampak veliko bolj osebno, včasih čustveno. Predvsem v zadnjih nekaj letih, ko v kraj ne prihajam več pogosto, so me nekdanji vrstniki večkrat vprašali: »Se boš kdaj vrnil?« To na videz preprosto vprašanje v sebi nosi grenkobo in stisko, ki kličeta po odgovoru: »Da, vrnil se bom.« Takšne pogovore spremljajo spomini na čas, ko se generacija še ni razselila

1 Čeprav so poleg metalskega potekali še številni drugi festivali, se osredotočam na tega, in sicer iz več razlogov: prvič, ker je ta največji; drugič, ker je najbolj »globalen«; tretjič, ker je metalska subkultura nemara najbolj »drugačna« (v prvi vrsti že zaradi »agresivne« glasbe).

2 V resnici so tudi tisti, ki ostanejo, pogosto del raziskav migracij, vendar najpogosteje v okviru stikov s tistimi, ki so odšli. V nasprotju s tem nas na tem mestu zanima gola izkušnja ostajanja na obrobju, torej tam, kjer se prebivalstvo prazni.

3 Z uporabo besede »globalno« ne mislim, da nekaj zares deluje globalno. Besedo uporabljam za opisovanje nadlokalnega »pisovanja« krajev, ki seveda nima nujno globalnih razsežnosti.

4 Etnografija je nastala v okviru doktorske disertacije na temo turizma v Tolminu, ki sem jo zagovarjal leta 2008, in podoktorskega ARRS projekta Festivali skozi pogled kulturne antropologije: Vloga novih festivalov pri ustvarjanju lokalnosti (2010–2012). Etnografija sestoji iz opazovanja z udeležbo (tako v času festivalov kot sicer), intervjujev z vidnimi predstavniki lokalne skupnosti in organizatorji festivalov ter analize medijev, publikacij in različnih javnih diskurzov. Terenski dnevnik sem najbolj intenzivno pisal med aprilom 2003 in oktobrom 2005, ko je nastalo 214 datumov z dnevniškimi zapiski, vendar pa sem tudi po tem obdobju v dnevnik sporadično zapisoval svoja opažanja. V navedenem obdobju sem opravil 22 formalnih polstrukturiranih intervjujev, ob teh pa je nastala še vrsta manj formalnih pogovorov, ki sem jih povzema v obliki dnevniških zapiskov. Med ARRS projektom sem prvič ali ponovno intervjuval organizatorje festivalov Soč'n fest, Punk Rock Holiday, Metal Camp in Soča Reggae Riversplash ali se z njimi pogovarjal. Leta 2011 sem se z namenom zbiranja etnografije udeležil festivalov Metal Camp in Punk Rock Holiday. Med etnografske izkušnje Tolmina moram dodati tudi avtoetnografijo, ki vključuje tako moje osebno (»domačinsko«) doživljanje kraja kot bolj »strokovno« začinjene izkušnje v obliki sodelovanja pri organizaciji festivala Kreativni tabor Sajeta in v pobudah Krajevne skupnosti Tolmin in lokalne turistične organizacije v smeri razmisleka o »festivalnem turizmu«.

in je bil Tolmin živahnejši (ali pa se nam je tak vsaj zdel, ker smo bili mlajši).<sup>5</sup> Povsem drugačno od običajnega mrtvila pa je bilo v zadnjih letih občutje kraja, ko je v njem potekal festival Metal Camp. Občutek polnosti, raznolikosti, živahnosti in gibanja je bil za nekatere domačine tako enkrat in dobrodošel, da je pod tem vtisom Krajevna skupnost Tolmin med festivalom leta 2011 za promet zaprla eno od osrednjih mestnih ulic in jo namenila prazničnemu druženju domačinov in obiskovalcev. Čeprav je sprejetje festivala plod daljšega procesa (glej Kozorog 2011), je treba nemara poglobitni razlog za naklonjenost festivalu iskati v procesih marginalizacije, povezanih z izseljevanjem in drugimi procesi praznjenja okolja, ki mu festival nastavlja obrnjeno sliko polnosti.

## »KAKO JE LEPO, KADAR TOLMIN NI TOLMIN«

Sporočilo iz naslova tega razdelka je organizatorjem Metal Campa izrekla neka domačinka (Močnik 2011: 16). Tolmin med festivalom res ni Tolmin. Metal Camp kraj povsem spremeni – logistično, zvočno, vizualno, estetsko, v turističnem in drugih pogledih; predvsem pa je povsod polno ljudi. Obenem pa ga ponese tudi v medije. S temi učinki bom poskušal pojasniti, zakaj je Tolmin med festivalom za številne Tolmince še posebej privlačen, kot govori naslovni citat in bodo pokazali tudi drugi domačinski diskurzi.

Prvi večji festival, ki je v Tolminu oral festivalsko ledino, je bil leta 2000 začetni festival reggae glasbe – Soča Reggae Riversplash.<sup>6</sup> Z njim je na sotočju rek Tolminke in Soče nastalo festivalsko prizorišče, na katerem je od leta 2004 potekal tudi Metal Camp. O obeh festivalih, ki so ju sicer organizirali nedomačini, so domačini v glavnem govorili z naklonjenostjo, čeprav v različnih obdobjih različno. Tako je bil v času vzpona reggae festivala, torej ko je bil ta najbolj množičen in medijsko izpostavljen, ta tudi najbolj cenjen; pozneje, ko ga je po množičnosti in medijski razvpitosti prekosil Metal Camp, pa je to postal slednji. Subkulture pri tem ocenjevanju niso bile ključni dejavnik, čeprav je pojav metalcev leta 2004 (predvsem) v cerkvenih krogih še zbujal nezaupanje. Po nekem pripovedovanju naj bi bili organizatorji Metal Campa prepričani, da so to nezaupanje ublažili tako, da so na festivalski oglasni deski objavili urnik maš v tolminski cerkvi, s čimer naj bi se z vernimi metalci približali tudi Cerkvi in lokalnim vernikom. Brez dvoma so tudi takšne male pozornosti festival približale Tolmincem, a vseeno bi razlog za benevolentni lokalni diskurz raje iskal v povečani »razvpitosti« Metal Campa od leta 2005 (seveda ob dejstvu, da so se metalci izkazali za nič bolj »nevarno« subkulturo kot rastafarjanci pred njimi).

Čeprav lokalni prebivalci niso monolitna skupnost in se mnenja o festivalih razlikujejo, pa je kljub temu prisoten neki splošni diskurz o festivalih kot nečem pozitivnem. Da bi preveril, ali to moje opažanje, ki je nastalo na podlagi številnih sporadičnih pogovorov z različnimi domačini, drži, sem za mnenje vprašal predstavnike lokalne policije, ki beleži pritožbe občanov. Policijski komandir mi je pojasnil, da je bilo v času vzpona reggae festivala, v letih 2003 in 2004, zanemarljivo malo pritožb lokalnega prebivalstva (intervju 8. 7. 2005). Tudi poznejši podatki tolminske policije pokažejo, da s festivali domačini niso imeli težav, saj je kljub povečevanju števila festivalskih dni (seštevek trajanja vseh poletnih festivalov v kraju) število pritožb ostajalo zanemarljivo: leta 2005 so v 16 festivalskih dneh zabeležili štiri pritožbe, leta 2006 v devetih dneh pet pritožb, leta 2007 v 23 dneh 11 pritožb, leta 2008 v 21 dneh osem pritožb, leta 2009 v 21 dneh osem pritožb in leta 2010 v 29 festivalskih dneh dve pritožbi. Pomočnik komandirja je pritožbe v glavnem povezal z glasnostjo glasbe, vse skupaj pa takole komentiral:

Kar se tiče pritožb hrupa, gre v večini primerov za ene in iste pritožnike, ki ne razumejo ali pa nočejo razumeti pomena festivalov za Tolminsko in so že tako konfliktne osebe in se ne prilagajajo življenju v svoji bližnji okolici.

<sup>5</sup> Zlasti živahna za tolminsko mladino so bila devetdeseta leta 20. stoletja, ko sta delovala prostora Sotočje in Maya ob reki Soči, ki sta poleg lokalne mladine privlačila tudi mlade od drugod (Kozorog 2009).

<sup>6</sup> V prvi ediciji še Soča Reggae Sunsplash.

Drugače se mišljenje domačinov iz leta v leto glede festivalov in njihovih pobud izboljšuje, saj so končno doumeli, da lahko z malo lastnega dela in iznajdljivosti tudi nekaj zaslužijo (osebna korespondenca 23. 9. 2010).

Pritožbe so bile torej opisane kot odklon od pravnega vedenja, tisti, ki to počnejo, pa so bili označeni kot domala deviantne osebe ... Čeprav takšno ocenjevanje meji že na politično nekorektnost, pa se strinjam glede ocene vse boljšega odnosa do festivalov, ne pa tudi, da je ta povezan (zgolj) z zaslužkom. Zanimivo presojo tega ponuja dokumentarni film *Radio Apokaliptiko* (Cvejič 2008), ki raziskuje prav fenomen tega velikega festivala v malem kraju. Edini domačin v filmu, ki se nad festivalom Metal Camp pritožuje (drugi o njem govorijo odobravajoče), si je namreč med zadnjim festivalom leta 2011, tako kot še več drugih (ne ravno mladih) Tolmincev, oblekel festivalsko majico. Še več, v teh »kostumih« so omenjena oseba in njegovi sosede »malo za šalo, malo zares« pripravili piknik, torej so po svoje obeležili dogodek v mestu. Nekoč »konfliktna oseba« torej festivala ni sprejela z namenom zaslužka, ampak preprosto zato, ker je v kraju praznovanja vreden dogodek.

Naklonjenost lokalnih prebivalcev so občutili tudi udeleženci festivala. Na spletnem forumu lokalne turistične organizacije sem lahko prebral mnenje z dne 11. julija 2010:

V Tolminu na Metal Campu sem sedaj že 3 leto zapored. Festival je super! Moram pa posebej pohvaliti prebivalce Tolmina, saj so zelo tolerantni in gostoljubni in predvsem, da nam »dovolite«, da lahko održujejo ta festival v tako lepem kraju. Se vidimo naslednje leto! Lep pozdrav iz Lendave in Maribora (<http://www.dolina-soce.com>; pregledal 18. 3. 2011)!

Tudi domačini so se javljali na spletnem forumu (navedbe so iz <http://www.lto-sotocje.si>; pregledal 17. 6. 2006). »Kakšne pravice imamo »domorodci«, ali smo tudi v tem primeru na repu?«, se je 9. 7. 2005, ravno v času festivala Soča Reggae Riversplash, spraševala prebivalka Tolmina. Čez dva dni ji je nekdo, ki se je predstavil kot »ljubitelj narave in glasbe«, odgovoril:

Vsem razžaljenim naj sporočim, da je ravno tako imenovani festivalski turizem, bolje rečeno mladinski turizem, pripomogel, da se je za en kraj, kot je Tolmin, slišalo daleč naokoli. Kdor pa hoče tovrstni turizem zaradi egoističnih vzgibov spodkopavati, pa bo moral zadevo prekleto dobro argumentirati. Prosim vse prizadete, da se vsaj enkrat v življenju zapeljejo dalj od Raštel<sup>7</sup> v Gorici in da postanejo strpnejši /.../.

V zgornjem dialogu lahko izpostavimo dva diskurza. Na eni strani se prebivalka sprašuje o pravicah tistih, ki živijo na tem območju in ga z uporabo besede »domorodec« opiše kot nekakšen »rezervat«, v katerem ljudje ne odločajo sami oziroma so glede odločanja »na repu«. V tem primeru gre brez dvoma za izjavo marginaliziranih. Toda tudi odgovor na njeno vprašanje, da so torej festivali naredili obrobni kraj (»en kraj«) razpoznaven, da se je torej zanj »slišalo daleč naokoli«, je diskurz marginaliziranih. Iskanje pozornosti je iskanje tistih, ki jim pozornosti primanjkuje.

Festivale so lokalnim prebivalcem približali tudi lokalni mediji, čeprav ne smemo spregledati, da tudi te ustvarjajo lokalni prebivalci. Lokalni mesečnik *EPI Center* je o festivalu *reggae* glasbe sicer prvič poročal šele leta 2003, pomenljivo pa je že sporočilo iz naslova takratnega prispevka: »Ali bo najodmevnejši tolminski festival prehitel Rock Otočec« (Rejec 2003)? Novinarka je tolminski festival torej primerjala s takrat največjim rock festivalom v Sloveniji in tako pokazala na veličino »domačega« dogodka. Najobsežnejša lokalna publikacija *Tolminski zbornik* pa je v zadnji ediciji festivalom posvetila kar celoten sklop. Lokalna novinarka je svoj prispevek nasloвила »Tolmin na svetovnem festivalskem zemljevidu«, in v njem zapisala:

Tako posebno in težko pričakovano leto 2000 za Tolminsko ni pomenilo le preloma tisočletja, ampak tudi prelom pri razvoju za to območje takrat še nove veje turizma. To je bilo namreč leto oziroma natančneje poletje, ko

7 Nakupovalna ulica v Gorici, kamor so po nakupih tradicionalno odhajali prebivalci obravnavanega okolja.

se je z organizacijo festivala Soča Reggae Sunsplash začel razvoj festivalskega turizma in obenem razpoznavnost Tolmina kot festivalskega mest(ec)a (Kranjc 2010: 207).

Zgovorna je sintagma postavljanja kraja na zemljevid, celo na svetovni zemljevid. Čeprav je že *reggae* pritegnil obiskovalce iz številnih evropskih držav, je Metal Camp dejansko prisoten globalno, vsaj če sklepamo po objavah in reklamah v glasbenem tisku od Azije do obeh Amerik. Seveda lokalni prebivalci s tem tiskom niso seznanjeni, lahko pa svoj kraj kot globalno vas doživijo že s pogledom na šotorišče festivala, prek katerega vihrajo številne nacionalne zastave. In Brajda v Tolminu je z razgledom na šotorišče med festivalom dejansko priljubljena razgledna točka domačinov.

Na lokalno zavest pa deluje tudi odmevi v nacionalnih medijih. Oba največja časopisa *Delo* in *Dnevnik* sta redno objavljala reportaže o Metal Campu. Novinar Ervin Hladnik Milharčič je celo reportažo, ki ni nastala med festivalom, ampak med njegovim siceršnjim obiskom Zgornjega Posočja, naslovil *Prva vojna, mleko in metal* (2010), torej po treh stvareh, o katerih so mu domačini z zadovoljstvom pripovedovali.<sup>8</sup> Odmevi v tisku, na TV in v drugih medijih, ki so v pozitivni luči predstavili »njihov« kraj, so bili torej pomembni za domačinsko konstrukcijo festivalov.

Veliki festivali v Tolminu pa niso potekali brez njihovega problematiziranja. Reggae festival, ki je oral ledino, je leta 2004 kot prvi občutil, kako pomembna je za domačine ekološka stran festivalov. Še zlasti, ker ti potekajo ob Soči, ki je za domačine pomemben identifikacijski krajinski simbol. Organizator namreč po koncu ni poskrbel za primerno čiščenje prizorišča, kar je v Tolminu še dolgo odmevalo. Ko sem pet dni po dogodku obiskal prizorišče, sem si v dnevnik zapisal, da so pritožbe nad čistočo stalna tema pogovorov mladih Tolmincev, ki so se ob poletnih dneh zbirali ob Soči. Nekdo je v pogovoru kot pozitivno stran festivala omenil, da je ta ekonomsko pomemben, drugi pa mu je nasprotoval s poudarjanjem »utrujenega« videza prizorišča in pokazal na nešteto drobnih smeti, ki so razpršene ležale naokoli. Dan pozneje mi je svoje mnenje zaupala tudi starejša prebivalka kraja: »Celotno kulturno dogajanje v Tolminu držijo pri življenju mladi in ravno zaradi mladih pride v Tolmin toliko ljudi. Zaživijo ulice, gostilne in trgovine ...« Toda njeno navdušenje nad festivalom je bilo do neke mere zmanjšano zaradi onesnaženosti okolja po tem konkretnem dogodku. Metal Camp, ki je bil prvič približno en mesec po tem neljubem dogodku, avgusta 2004, se je problematike očitno zavedal, saj so organizatorji poudarjali ekološko osveščenost in odnos do lokalne skupnosti. Glavna organizatorja, podjetji iz Ljubljane in z Dunaja, sta pomoč poiskala pri Klubu tolminskih študentov. Ko sem še pred začetkom predstavnika študentov vprašal, kako si predstavljajo, da bodo domačini sprejeli od reggae glasbe veliko bolj »agresivno« metal glasbo, je povedal, da organizatorji na prvo mesto postavljajo prav komunikacijo z domačini. Kot se je še izrazil, so želeli napraviti »mehkejšo« različico metalskega festivala: »Zato dajemo poudarek na naravi, na aktivnih počitnicah, raftingu in zato tudi naziv Metal Camp«, torej »metalsko kampiranje«. Festival je tudi v medijskih sporočilih lokalni skupnosti namenjal pohvale in jo razglašal za gostoljubno, s čimer se je domačinom gotovo priljubil bolj, kot če bi jim ne namenjal nobene pozornosti.

Domačini so obiskovalce Metal Campa sčasoma posvojili. To odraža tudi splošno razširjena lokalna oznaka »ta črni«, ki opisuje videz metalcev (črne obleke), obenem pa metalce v šaljivem lokalnem besednjaku podomačuje. Domačini pogosto omenjajo, da so metalci dobrodošli, ker so »kulturni«. Natakariča v nekem tolminskem baru je ob primerjanju različnih subkultur na različnih tolminskih festivalih metalce na primer opisala takole: »Metalci, sploh Skandinavci, so ful prijazni in bolj [kot kakšne druge subkulture, npr. rastafarjanci; op. M. K.] so kulturni.« Takšne izjave je po eni strani mogoče razumeti kot prizadevanje po zanikanju »divjosti« metalcev, na katero z imaginarijem sicer napeljuje sama subkultura. Toda »kulturnost« metalcev se v Tolminu pogosto meri tudi z ekonomskimi vatli. »Kulturni« so, ker si v gostilnah privoščijo obilna kosila, ker zasedejo vse prenočitvene kapacitete v hotelih in ker

8 Kot zanimivost naj navedem, da je nevladna organizacija Fundacija poti miru iz Zgornjega Posočja prek elektronske pošte tudi pozivala h glasovanju za Milharčičev članek kot »najboljši (najzanimivejši) članek o nevladnih organizacijah« (e-pošta prejel 22. 9. 2010).

ne sprašujejo za cene. Iz tega bi lahko sklepali, da je Metal Camp cenjen zato, ker pripelje največ turistov, med katerimi je veliko »bogatih severnjakov«, ki v kraju tudi veliko potrošijo. V tem primeru bi torej domačini festivale ocenjevali po ekonomskem učinku v lokalni skupnosti. Čeprav je ta vidik nedvomno pomemben, pa menim, da razlage ne izčrpa. Finančnega kapitala, ki ga prinaša festival, je deležen le ozek segment domačinov, pač tistih, ki so neposredno povezani s turizmom in z gostinstvom (ali pa »se znajdejo« in ob festivalu nekaj malega zaslužijo). Navsezadnje festival prinaša tudi nevšečnosti, saj v trgovinah nastajajo dolge vrste, spremeni se logistika kraja, onemogočena so določena gibanja, itd. Dvomim tudi, da bi domačini svojo ekološko skrb za simbolno pomembno reko Sočo tako zlahka prodali za denar. Razlog je torej (tudi) drugje.

Za Metal Camp ni značilno le to, da pripelje največ »bogatih« potrošnikov, ampak tudi, da so ti gostje od vsepovsod, od Braziliije do Avstralije, številni res tudi iz skandinavskih držav. Tega, da za neko subkulturo za teden dni postanejo globalno središče, se domačini zavedajo. To zavest jim, kot rečeno, vliva srečevanje tujcev od vsepovsod, obenem pa tudi nacionalni in lokalni mediji, saj ti festival poudarjajo kot izjemen (svetovni) dogodek v malem slovenskem kraju. Če lahko postavimo analogijo s tezo Benedicta Andersona o medijski konstrukciji narodov ([1983] 1998), imamo v tolminskem in podobnih primerih opraviti s postopkom, ko spremljanje medijev pri domačinih ne ustvarja predstave o nacionalni skupnosti, ampak predstavo, da so kot lokalna skupnost del nekega širšega (morda celo globalnega) konteksta. S festivali so torej domačini postali to, kar sicer najpogosteje zasledujejo skozi diskurz turizma – središče. Kot bom pokazal v nadaljevanju, pa je to iskanje središčnosti del nekega specifičnega konteksta – marginalnosti.

## MIGRACIJE IN GEOGRAFIJE MARGINALNOSTI

Festival, kot je Metal Camp, sproža specifično migracijo: v malo mestece (čeprav le za nekaj dni) pripelje mlade od vsepovsod. Ta množični obisk je popolno nasprotje običajnega doživljanja obrobne kraja, kjer so ulice pogosto prazne. V krajih, kot je Tolmin, lahko marsikateri prebivalec ugotavlja, da so njegovi vrstniki odšli drugam. Malo mestece na obrobju je torej marsikdo že zapustil, vanj pa se vrača le občasno (ali pa tudi ne).

Po mnenju sociologov je Slovenija sicer specifično družbeno okolje, zaznamovano z antiurbanimi bivanjskimi vzorci (Uršič in Hočevar 2007). Imaginarij vaše idile, »hribovit svet njiv in travnikov s cerkvicami na vrh« (Kučan 1998: 112), se je kot specifičen nacionalni imaginarij oblikoval zgodovinsko in ima za Slovence močan identifikacijski naboj. Kljub temu pa je trend selitev znotraj države usmerjen proti največjemu urbanemu središču Ljubljani<sup>9</sup> (in nekaterim regionalnim centrom). Posledica tega je demografski deficit na nekaterih obrobjih, kar sproža lokalne diskurze o marginalizaciji Slovenije zunaj Ljubljane. Tolminska je po tem tipična.

Sarah F. Green je ugotavljala, da ima beseda »marginalnost« določeno povezavo z »drugostjo« in »drugačnostjo«, eksplicitno pa »prikliče občutek neenakosti lokacije kot tudi neenakosti relacij« (2005: 1). Z usmeritvijo pogleda na lokacije je bolj kot o socialni in kulturni torej govorila o geografski marginalnosti (čeprav slednja običajno vključuje tudi prvo; Shields 1991). Slednja je tudi predmet pričujoče analize. Vendar pa bom v nasprotju z Greenovo, ki je raziskovala marginalnost obrobne grške pokrajine, v kateri so se ljudje prepoznavali kot po ničemer posebni (2005: 13), sam poudaril ravno to, da marginalnost sproža klice po specifičnosti, drugačnosti, posebnosti, kar je dejansko opazila tudi Greenova (2005: 13). Če to opišem s parafraziranjem njenih besed, gre za to, da občutek »drugosti« (zaradi »neenakosti relacij«) kar kliče po konstrukciji »drugačnosti« (torej specifičnosti – »ne-enakosti« – lokacije in »njenih« ljudi). Trdim torej, da zaradi občutka nekega pomanjkanja ali neenakovrednosti na obrobju nastajajo

<sup>9</sup> Pri tem se sicer mesto Ljubljana ne povečuje. Ljudje se najraje naseljujejo v individualne stanovanjske hiše v okolici mesta (Uršič in Hočevar 2007: 59, 92).

geografije, ki s simbolno konstrukcijo enkratnosti (in z njo središčnosti) težijo k preseganju tega občutka. Zato predlagam koncept »geografije marginalnosti«, s katerim razumem živete in občutene *geografije umeščenosti na obrobje*, ki so hkrati *imaginativne geografije*, ki omogočajo simbolno re-konstrukcijo obrobni krajev.

Tolminsko so v perspektivi dolgega trajanja oblikovali bližina državnih meja (v času Avstro-Ogrske, Italije, Jugoslavije in Slovenije), nizka stopnja investicij, slabe infrastrukturne povezave in drugi procesi marginalizacije. Ena od značilnih karakteristik območja je (bilo) izseljevanje prebivalstva, kar je bilo predmet številnih javnih razprav. Že v prvem *Tolminskem zborniku*<sup>10</sup> preberemo, da je prebivalstvo glede na čas pred drugo svetovno vojno upadlo za 7.352 oseb (Berginc 1956: 19). V naslednjem zborniku izveemo, da je bil demografski deficit med letoma 1869 in 1961 28,33-odstoten (Uršič 1975: 432). V sedemdesetih letih je bilo prebivalstvo ogroženo zaradi potresov (Dolenc 1980). Padanju števila prebivalstva pa ni bilo konca. V zadnjem obdobju, med letoma 2002 in 2009, je upadlo za 5 odstotkov, medtem ko je indeks staranja (razmerje med prebivalci, starejšimi od 65 let in mlajšimi od 14 let) v tem obdobju narasel s 116 na 155,7 odstotka (Predstavitev 2010: 8). To niso optimistični kazalci, kot tudi ne more biti optimistična njihova recepcija s strani prebivalcev.

Toda številke prikazujejo le del slike.<sup>11</sup> Rob Shields je zato v povezavi s samo-zamišljanjem lokalnih skupnosti govoril o emocionalnem razumevanju geografije (1991: 62–63). Geografije marginalnosti, kot jih predlagam, se torej oblikujejo skozi občutenja in vrednotenja lastne umeščenosti v svetu s strani ljudi na takšnem ali drugačnem geografskem obrobju (na katera objektivni kazalci seveda pomembno vplivajo). Eeva Berglund (2011: 194) je ugotavljala, da je geografije na obrobju težje spregledati kot v centru, saj jih ljudje bolj pogosto presojujejo. Ljudje z obrobja preiščajo lastno umeščenost, jo ocenjujejo in vrednotijo – občasno kot prednost, občasno kot slabost.<sup>12</sup> Na Tolminskem je bilo kot slabost večkrat poudarjeno izseljevanje mladih, predvsem študentov. Ker mladi v vse večjem številu odhajajo na študij, je poseben problem njihovo vračanje. Občutek, ki ga sproža trend nevrčanja, je za tiste, ki ostajajo, deprimirajoč, saj nastaja vtis o praznjenju nekega okolja. Na to so opozorili v društvu Umica iz Tolmina, ko so v letih 2003 in 2004 uprizorili peš hojo iz Ljubljane v Tolmin, da bi pokazali, da je vračanje študentov povezano s težavno (geografsko) izbiro. Kot so zapisali v prošnji za (sicer nerealiziran) tretji pohod leta 2005:

Ker je večina članov društva Umica študentov in smo vsi dobro seznanjeni s problematiko zaposlovanja in t. i. »begom možganov« v Gornjem Posočju, smo se odločili, da bo moto tega pohoda ravno ta problem. Naš pohod namreč simbolizira težavno pot domov, saj bo potrebno po razgibanem terenu prehoditi več kot 100 km. Med samim pohodom se bodo gotovo komu porajale misli, ali se ne bi bilo mogoče pametno ustaviti, mogoče celo vrniti nazaj v Ljubljano. Z odločenostjo in dobro voljo pa bomo dokazali, da se je moč vrniti v Tolmin. Simbolika tega pohoda je več kot očitna, saj je večina študentov po končanem študiju postavljena pred to isto dilemo. Ali se vrniti v Tolmin ali ostati v Ljubljani. Odločitev je težka in žal pogosto zmaga izbira lažje poti – vrnitev v Ljubljano. S tem pohodom želimo spodbuditi mlade, da se vračajo v Tolmin in tu tudi vztrajajo, hkrati pa bi tudi radi opozorili starejše generacije na dejstvo, da bi se mladi radi vračali, a kaj, ko ni dovolj prostih delovnih mest.

Geografije marginalnosti torej na eni strani oblikujejo določeni objektivni parametri, kot so razpoložljivost delovnih mest, oddaljenost od nacionalnega in drugih centrov, priseljevanje in izseljevanje, stopnja investicij, tokovi kapitala in informacij, itd., obenem pa se te geografije oblikujejo s pomočjo lastnih

10 Zbornik izhaja sporadično in predstavlja generalni portret območja.

11 Z vidika števil samo mestece Tolmin niti ne predstavlja dramatičnega trenda, saj se ljudje zaradi določenih možnosti zaposlitve v to območno središče tudi priseljujejo.

12 Lahko se na primer počutijo izključene iz procesov odločanja, medtem ko se obenem zavedajo številnih prednosti. Za Slovenijo je značilno mnenje, da je bivanje na podeželju privilegij, ker je tam čistejšo okolje, boljše možnosti vrtnarjenja in je človek v neposrednem stiku z naravo (glej Uršič in Hočvar 2007: 74, 78).

izkušenj, saj so ljudje obrobij pogosto izzvani k refleksiji lastne umeščenosti. Prav zaradi neprestanega tehtanja te geografije nikoli niso statične. V določenih situacijah se prikazujejo kot robne in izključujoče, spet drugič kot posebne in središčne. Zdi pa se, da poleg tega situacijskega tehtanja – ko npr. zima krepí občutek izključenosti, poletje pa s prihodom turistov ta občutek obrne (če izhajam iz tolminskega primera), obstaja tudi neka bolj strukturna povezava. Zdi se namreč, da občutek drugosti, ki je na obrobju vedno nekje prisoten (kljub temu, da ga v določenih situacijah občasno prekrije občutek središčnosti), prav spodbuja poskus redefinicije realnosti oziroma simbolnih razmerij.

Anthony P. Cohen je zapisal, da »popolnejša kot postaja centralizacija moči v centru, bolj ranljiva postaja periferija, ki svojo zaskrbljenost izraža z lokalizmom, ki poudarja posebnost njenega karakterja,« »vzdrževanje kulture [pa] postane učinkovit *raison d'être* obrobne skupnosti« (1982: 7). Toda v sodobnosti lokalnim prebivalcem nemara ne gre le za konstrukcijo lastne kulturne posebnosti (kar bi bil parohialen odgovor na marginalnost), ampak (vsaj včasih – kot v primeru Rockyja iz Žitišta) tudi za kanaliziranje globalnih kulturnih tokov z namenom konstrukcije videza kozmopolitske participacije v globalno »kultiviranem« okolju popularne kulture (kar bi bil kozmopolitski odgovor na marginalnost). Z globalnimi kulturnimi tokovi torej krožijo simboli, ki jih nekateri lokalni prebivalci podomačujejo in z referencami na lokalno pošiljajo »nazaj« v globalna okolja, da bi se z njimi vzpostavili kot nemarginalizirani, enakovredni del globalnosti, obenem pa kot posebni in središčni. Zdi se, da so Tolminci v Metal Campu prepoznali prav tak simbol.

## DISKURZ TURIZMA IN »ZNAMČENJE« KRAJEV

Obrobni kraji oziroma ljudje si torej prizadevajo oblikovati lastne geografije, s katerimi bi dosegali določeno simbolno enakopravnost in središčnost. Marsikje je torej bolj kot dilema »avtentičnosti« lokalne kulture postalo pomembno vprašanje učinkovitosti »lokalnih« (torej tudi lokaliziranih globalnih) simbolov v »krajinah popularizacije« (Anssi Paasi v Berglund 2011), torej v medijsko posredovanih konstrukcijah krajev. To je bolj težnja sodobnosti kot preteklosti in je močno povezana z »globalno zavestjo«. Kot je opazil Kevin Meethan, »ljudje bolj kot včasih konceptualizirajo ekonomske in družbene relacije na globalni ravni« (2001: 35). In ne le to. V sodobnem svetu so postale medijske in globalno krožeče podobe njegov bistveni del, po mnenju nekaterih filozofov (npr. Baudrillard 1999) pa celo edina prava realnost. V takšnem svetu so začeli številni lokalni akterji – posamezniki, skupine, institucije – delovati z zavestjo, da se lahko »njihovi« kraji (oziroma oni sami kot subjekti teh krajev) kot feniksi vzdignejo na globalno prizorišče in si tam zagotovijo določeno mesto, kar po navadi definirajo kot »razvoj«. Po navadi sicer nimajo potrebnega kapitala, da bi vlagali v infrastrukturo in z njo spreminjali lokacije, je pa zato vedno dosegljiva ekonomija simbolov, podob in sporočil. V tem pogledu je Ivan Kovačević pravilno ugotavljal, da je v danes povsod prisotnem oživiljanju »tradicij« nemara treba videti predvsem motiv mobilizacije pozornosti javnosti, seveda z upanjem na razvoj (v Erdei 2011: 284).

Kot je za obrobno območje severne Finske, regijo Kainuu, ugotavljala Eeva Berglund, je ob svojem terenskem delu ves čas srečevala ljudi in kraje, »željne promovirati določene podobe sebe in svojih domov« (2011: 199). V teh procesih »samo-znamčenja« igra še zlasti vidno vlogo turizem, saj prav ta industrija proizvede največ »kvazi-blagovnih znamk« (Berglund 2011: 200), s katerimi kraji in ljudje dosegajo njim potrebno središčnost in potrditev. To niti ne čudi, saj sta »kultura« (oziroma »tradicija«) in »narava« kot osrednja signalizatorja turizma povsod pri roki in zato tudi neizčrpani vir iskanja lokalnega razvoja. Pri tem instrumentaliziranju »kulture« in »narave« za samopromocijo pa nikakor ne gre zgolj za razvoj v ekonomskem smislu, ampak vedno tudi za sodobno produkcijo lokalne identitete, ki bolj kot na »korenine« stavi na (globalno) odmevnost lokalnosti. S turizmom in z drugimi oblikami »znamčenja« krajev je torej na delu ekonomija simbolov, ki nikoli ni zgolj ekonomija (v smislu zagotavljanja investicij v nek kraj, itd.), ampak tudi ideološki nagovor k pripadnosti obrobnemu, vendar tudi središčnemu kraju.

Tolminci za Metal Camp pravijo, da je dobrodošel tudi (ali predvsem) zato, ker je pomemben za razvoj turizma. Na festival nedvomno pride veliko ljudi in zasedejo vse prenočitvene kapacitete v kraju in okolici. Poleg tega so različni festivali v Tolminu dejavno ustvarjali lasten turistični imaginarij. »Jasno, da je Soča mamljiva in da je folku vseč narava in da tudi večina publike pride konec koncev ... [zaradi narave; dopolnil M. K.]«, je svojo izbiro lokacije pokomentiral organizator reggae festivala (intervju 16. 11. 2004). Sodobna festivalska produkcija z namenom konkurenčnosti poleg programov ponuja tudi obfestivalsko ponudbo in posebnosti prizorišč, zato funkcionira kot turistična niša – ali z besedami prvega reggae festivala: »Pred nami so trije dnevi koncertov, druženja, zastonjskega kampiranja z možnimi športnimi dejavnostmi (vožnja s kajakom, raftingom, gorsko kolesarjenje, canyoning ...) in seveda hlajenja v bistri Soči« (Soča Reggae 2000). Tudi Metal Camp ali »metalske počitnice« (*Headbanger's Holidays*), kot se festival tudi imenuje, je v svojih sporočilih za javnost poudarjal krajino ob Soči, predvsem pa v osrednjem festivalskem sloganu Hell over Paradise, v katerem je enega osrednjih simbolov subkulture (»pekel«) povezal z imaginarijem neokrnjene narave (»paradiža«). Toda kljub tej turistični konstrukciji festivalski turizem za to območje ni značilna turistična dejavnost (kot je to šport ali ribištvo), zato menim, da je poudarjanje turizma v izjavah domačinov mogoče razumeti tudi kot diskurz, ki ljudem pomaga kontekstualizirati nekaj novega, subkulturnega in drugačnega, vendar tudi močno pozitivnega, saj (enako kot turizem) ustvarja občutek središčnosti.

Oglejmo si status turizma v Tolminu: Občina Tolmin si je turizem kot lastno pot iz anonimnosti izbrala v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja. Izbira časa ni bila naključna, saj so se takrat vzpostavile številne nove relacije. Predvsem je nastala nova država, ki je sprva vzbujala določen, za lokalne iniciative spodbuden optimizem. Z novo državo se je redefiniral tudi center, ki je Tolmincem postal geografsko relativno blizu, nekdanje diskurze o centralizaciji Beograda in tokovih resursov »proti jugu« pa so na obrobju Slovenije zamenjali diskurzi o centralizaciji Ljubljane. Vendar pa to ni pomenilo preproste zamenjave enega centra za drugega, ampak oblikovanje neke povsem nove relacije med centrom države in njenim obrobjem. Bistvena razlika je bila ta, da nova kritika centralizacije ni več vključevala nacionalističnega diskurza. Proticentralistični diskurz tako ni več krepil nacionalizmov, temveč lokalizme. V tem kontekstu so tudi pobude za »razvoj« obrobni krajev izrazito krepile lokalne identitete. Spremenile pa so se tudi druge relacije. Slovenija si je prizadevala umestiti se v Srednjo Evropo, da bi se tako distancirala od Balkana. Toda poleg teh regionalnih teženj je v devetdesetih letih bliskovito in nemara še bolj intenzivno zakrožil občutek za globalno realnost. Ta okrepljeni občutek za globalno pa je izzval tudi lokalne identitete, saj so se tudi te poleg na nacionalni ravni začele vzpostavljati na nadnacionalnih ravneh. V globaliziranem kontekstu se je vsako lokalno okolje lahko po nečem vzpostavilo kot središčno – in to mimo nacionalnega centra. Vse te spremenjene relacije obravnavanega območja s svetom so spodbujale prizadevanja po »znamčenju« in ustvarjanju lokalnih prepoznavnosti, pri čemer je bil turizem ves čas prisoten kot tvorni diskurz. Za enega bolj markantnih lokalnih zgledov je poskrbel z entuziazmom domačinov ustvarjeni muzej v Kobaridu, ki je bil leta 1993 razglašen za evropski muzej leta – lokalna pobuda je v tem primeru dosegla pomemben vpis na »zemljevid«.

K izbiri turizma pa so pripomogle tudi lokalne relacije in lokalna preteklost. Tolmin z okolico je bil zgodovinsko namreč brez turistične tradicije; to je imelo Zgornje Posočje. V Jugoslaviji je bil Tolmin administrativno in vojaško središče, turistično središče območja pa je bil Bovec. Leta 1994 je občina Tolmin razpadla na tri manjše – Tolmin, Kobarid in Bovec – in tudi sicer je začel Tolmin v novi državi izgubljati svojo administrativno funkcijo. S tem se je na lokalni ravni povečala pripravljenost za ustvarjanje nove podobe mesta in občine Tolmin. Leta 2000 ustanovljena lokalna turistična organizacija je pri tem projektu izhajala iz predpostavke, da je kraj nepopisan list, na katerega je treba vtisniti povsem novo podobo:

[M]ed Tolminom in ostalimi destinacijami v Julijskih Alpah [je] precejšnja razlika. V celotni alpski regiji so že pred osamosvojitvijo okrog 80 % strukture obiskovalcev sestavljali tuji gostje. V Tolminu, z relativno veliko vojašnico, okoliškimi karavli in bližino državne meje, /.../, pa je večji del strukture obiskovalcev pomenila klientela, vezana na vojake ali zaposlene v vojski. /.../ Tolmin nikoli ni bil prava turistična destinacija. Za razliko od ostalih

centrov v naši alpski regiji si mora občina Tolmin turistično identiteto ustvariti povsem na novo (Humar idr. 2001: 10).

Turizem je torej na lokalni ravni ponujal možnost izhoda iz preteklosti v nove čase. Kot upanje za prihodnost ga niso razumele zgolj lokalne institucije, ampak tudi lokalni prebivalci (glej Krivec 2005: 33). Turizem je torej z lokalne perspektive ponujal upanje v razvoj. V nasprotju z nekaterimi spoznanji antropologije turizma, ki je v lokalnih pogledih na turizem prepoznavala predvsem neobdobja oziroma dejavnost, ki povzroča skrbi (za kritiko glej Stronza 2001: 262), se je torej v Tolminu kot neturističnem in obrobno kraju turizem kazal predvsem kot rešitev. Nemara je domačinom, ko govorijo o Metal Campu, prav zato diskurz turizma tako blizu. Tolmin se je z njim napolnil in globaliziral, zato je festival našel svoje mesto prav v tem pozitivnem diskurzu.

## ZAKLJUČEK

Osrednje vprašanje prispevka je, kako razložiti odnos Tolmincev do subkulturnega festivala Metal Camp. Čeprav bi prav lahko pričakovali nasprotovanje glasni, množični in kulturno »drugačni« dejavnosti, je bilo v kraju ob dogodku mogoče zaznavati predvsem veselje. Metal Camp v obrobni slovenski kraj ni prišel zgolj naključno, temveč zaradi predhodnih dejavnosti na festivalskem prizorišču in njegovih turističnih potencialov. Kljub historiatu festivalov v Tolminu, ki je bil za to, da so domačini festival sprejeli, nedvomno pomemben, sem razloge za domačinski odnos iskal v določenih širše delujočih procesih, to je v procesih marginalizacije, katerih del je tudi izkušnja izseljevanja. S primerom festivala pa sem želel pokazati, da marginalizacija ne prinaša le občutka »drugosti«, temveč vodi tudi v premišljanje in simbolno preurejanje lokalne umeščenosti z namenom konstrukcije neke simbolne središčnosti in enakosti. »Globalizacija« Tolmina, do katere je prišlo zaradi množice obiskovalcev iz različnih koncev sveta in medijske konstrukcije kraja, v sodobnem svetu nedvomno zelo tvorno nagovarja lokalni ponos. Ta je igral pomembno vlogo pri vzpostavljanju odnosa domačinov do festivala. Metal Camp je tako postal blagovna znamka Tolmina ter hkrati turistični magnet in emblem domačinov.

Izhajal sem iz vprašanja, zakaj so Tolminci tako benevolentni do subkulturnega festivala, in od tod prodiral k vprašanju marginalnosti. Toda prav lahko bi začel tudi z druge strani, torej z raziskovanjem marginalizacije območja in tamkajšnjih ljudi. Menim, da bi tudi v tem primeru prej ali slej prišel do festivala oziroma njegovega lokalnega statusa kot pozitivne pridobitve, in sicer kot do simptoma, ki govori o želji obrobja po središčnosti. Ali če za konec parafraziram spoznanje Berglundove (2011: 191), so »mediatiziran« imaginarij /.../ turistične industrije /.../, mednarodni glasbeni festival in druge »krajine popularnosti« /.../ prepleteni v srečevanjih z ljudmi in okolji /.../. Ti imaginariji so torej postali bistveni del bivanja na obrobju.

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## SUMMARY

### MARGINALISATION AS A CONTEXT FOR INTERPRETING THE IMPACT OF A SUBCULTURAL FESTIVAL ON A LOCAL COMMUNITY

Miha KOZOROG

In the small town of Tolmin in the Upper Soča Valley on the western edge of Slovenia, for a week each summer the approximately three thousand local residents are joined by three times as many members of the metal subculture. They come to the town for the Metal Camp music festival. The article focuses

on the reactions triggered in Tolmin by the festival. Local residents have accepted it as their own. The reason for their general goodwill toward Metal Camp is to be found in power relations at the national and wider levels. Since the area is struggling with emigration, the festival represents a cultural renewal. It seems that locals are favourably disposed toward it because it enables them to create a positive imaginary geography in regard to their local-global positioning. The article proposes the concept of “geography of marginality”, which encompasses both the emic feeling of being located at the margin and the related production of geographic imaginaries which symbolically reconstructs and redefines existing geographic relations.

K N J I Ź N E O C E N E

B O O K R E V I E W S



**Marie Macey, *Multiculturalism, Religion and Women: Doing Harm by Doing Good?*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2009, 209 pp.**

*Multiculturalism, Religion and Women; Doing Harm by Doing Good?* is a feminist and sociological critique of multicultural theory and its application to reality in the particular setting of Bradford, UK. Through empirical research, Marie Macey, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Bradford, goes back to the controversial question posed by Susan Moller Okin: 'Is multiculturalism bad for women?' (Okin 1999: 9–24), arguing that multiculturalism is not only bad for women from an ethnic minority, but also for liberal democracy, for the coexisting communities (majority and minority), and for the society as a whole. Through six chapters, she develops these arguments and tries to demonstrate the negative effects of multiculturalism as a political tool in different fields, questioning whether 'political correctness' can take priority over fundamental issues, such as: academia, by limiting many research findings; the law-making processes in the policy-making arena; and the blocking of professional practice.

The first part of the book provides the reader with an overview of multiculturalism's development as an answer to the cultural and religious diversity in society in the particular case of Britain. An awareness of social divisions and racism starting in the early 1960s led the British government in the late 1980s to implement a series of tolerance and non-discrimination social policies and practices from different ideological perspectives, such as assimilation, integration, cultural pluralism, and multiculturalism. The acceptance of the right of self-definition in the academic, policy, and practice spheres showed the growing influence of minority pressure groups operating from an anti-racist and multicultural framework. Thus the riots in 2001, perpetrated by Muslim Pakistanis, resulting from residential and social separation, led to the concepts of community integration and social cohesion emerging as the latest ideologies, based on the belief that interaction between groups and inter-ethnic mixing can reduce stereotyping and prejudice.

In the second and third chapters, Macey elaborates her main argument, dealing with the main omissions of multiculturalism regarding religion and women, while arguing how multiculturalism has influenced government decision-making in several areas, impacting on the professional practice of teachers, social workers and the police, so that women and children in minority communities are left more vulnerable to physical and mental abuse. Indeed, the current trend towards social integration, both privileging religion and promoting community cohesion, is controversial, because while giving more autonomy to ethno-religious leaders, governments also perpetuate rooted forms of discrimination against women. Moreover, when failing to realise that women are key elements in the transmission of culture and religion and giving more autonomy to leaders in patriarchal communities to define the group needs, multiculturalism facilitates male control over women, which helps to create a context that hides women's suffering and makes professionals reluctant to interfere in community affairs for fear of being accused of racism. Macey defends her point very warily, when stating that it is not religion *per se* that oppresses women, but its cultural interpretations, highlighting the negative effects of a multicultural approach on minority ethnic women living in Western societies, such as the impossibility to work in public institutions if they insist on wearing the *niqab*. Indeed, the disadvantages suffered by some minorities are not the result of discrimination of their differences, but of cultural/religious beliefs and the lifestyles. Thus, she questions the validity of blaming inequality only on racism and discrimination, while from her perspective there are other cultural aspects of some minorities fostering such disadvantages. Moreover, Macey touches on the development of *sharia*' courts in the UK and their negative impact on women, since these courts particularly affect family law. The logic of multiculturalism is used to defend certain types of violence against women, since its practice comes from the requirement to respect all cultures as equal and the principle of non-interference in minority cultures. Macey bluntly accuses the British legal and social policies of being gender-blind when permitting situations such as entitling polygamous marriages to full welfare benefits for all the wives and kids, or providing no social benefits for women brought into the country as brides, which forces them to accept the abusive conduct of their partners.

In the fourth chapter, through a series of examples, Macey develops her second argument; namely, how multiculturalism can be seen as a threat to liberalism and liberal democracy, a concept that highlights citizenship, equality and basic civil, political and social human rights, in seeking to protect the individuals. Macey bluntly and somewhat harshly tackles the issue of 'political correctness' in Western societies, which has led to the suppression or distortion of publicly available information, encouraging the hiding or covering up of wrongdoings by minorities, while fostering a feeling of exaggerated discrimination against Muslims. Indeed, she criticises how multiculturalism's influence in the public sector arena has an impact in the access to, and quality of, information, both essential to democracy.

Moreover, while multiculturalism prioritizes the group over the individual, liberal democracy functions the opposite way. This focus on 'the group' tends to push communities to maintain long-established country-of-origin-based traditions, which may collide with those of the host society. Thus, Macey poses the question of how far should liberal democracy tolerate groups whose cultures are intolerant or non-democratic.

The author also deals with the issue of the individual's moral equality, institutionalized in social, civil, and political rights. Indeed, equality of opportunity is not the same as equality of outcome. This is clearly obvious in women's restricted access to work, which is not usually imposed by the labour market, but by social norms about responsibilities for caring. Although Macey agrees with extending the application of human rights to groups not previously covered by legislation, she still has concerns regarding the exaggerated perception of discrimination and the increasing focus on proactive action or positive discrimination.

In the following chapter, Macey analyses the most important practical and theoretical problems of multiculturalism from the perspective of a feminist sociologist. These include cultural relativism, racialisation, essentialism, culture and identities, regarding their impact on women, young people, minority ethnic communities and society as a whole. Although this could be considered the most theoretical part of the book, since her aim is to demonstrate the effects of multiculturalism more practically, references to dense theoretical aspects are limited.

At this point, Macey justifies her argument that multiculturalism is not only bad for women, but for the whole society, since it neglects the 'white population', expecting the change to come from the majority. On the one hand, multiculturalism is accused of essentialism since it does not acknowledge the internal differences *within* minority groups, such as gender, age, etc. On the other hand, multiculturalism sees culture as something static. Thus, when encouraging the maintenance of the homeland culture, multiculturalism removes the minorities' responsibility of engaging with new ways of understanding the world, acting against the natural dynamics of cultures. Macey argues that multiculturalism 'legislates' for culture through policies and practices, at all levels of education, locking people into rigid reactionary cultural and religious categories, and emphasizing the ethnic and religious identity over other individual aspects. This is precisely the root of the clash between feminism and multiculturalism. As Okin questions in her book, what should be done when the claims of minority cultures or religions clash with the norm of gender equality endorsed (at least formally) by liberal states? (Okin 1999: 9)

Indeed, in Britain multiculturalism has had a negative effect on women, because it advocates for non-interference in 'community affairs'. However, multiculturalists argue that as long as individuals have the right to leave any oppressing community, there is no injustice in the system. Nevertheless, as Macey points out, one could wonder where the limits of coercion or brainwashing are and when oppression starts. Moreover, do women (in particular) have to renounce their culture in order to preserve their rights? Aside from material and financial limitations to women's agency, if a culture does not allow a woman to develop a sense of self, it is very unlikely that she will even consider the option of leaving.

Macey finishes the book by questioning the real effectiveness and results of multiculturalism, whose main aims (theoretically) are enhancing integration, reducing inequality, and achieving social justice and human rights via the public recognition of minority cultures. Nevertheless, as Macey and other authors such as Stephen Castle and Mark J. Miller (Castle and Miller 2009: 275) state, multicultur-

alism's main result has been to encourage social separation. Thus, after giving an overview of some of the problems previously explained, she concludes that in the current globalised world, multiculturalism is an unachievable and illogical project, and advocates for a true liberal democracy which respects the individual, promotes equal opportunities, and eliminates all sorts of discrimination.

All in all, *Multiculturalism, Religion and Women; Doing Harm by Doing Good?* could be classified as a feminist and sociological academic critique to multicultural theories. Nevertheless, besides the controversies of this topic and other concepts the author tackles (such as 'liberal democracy', 'assimilation', 'integration', etc.), the structure of the book (with a very basic historical introduction and a summarizing conclusion at the end of each chapter), the abundant use of examples based on her own experience and the use of an informal vocabulary position the book away from strictly academic literature.

Another important aspect brought up by Macey is the overstated weight given to multiculturalism as something essential to self-respect and agency, resistance to external threats to minorities, and the struggle for ethnic justice. Macey has a point in stating the impossibility to protect every culture, language, or religion existing in highly diverse societies, which besides representing less than 8% of the population are also highly diverse. Thus, if all these minorities cannot be 'protected', which ones are entitled to this protection? Only those that 'look different'? What about religious minorities within the white population? Is multiculturalism's concern for these groups the same as for the Muslim Pakistani minority, for instance?

Contrary to some authors, such as Will Kymlicka, Macey argues against multiculturalism as opposed to feminism and liberal democracy, in the sense that it disregards the individual rights of minorities (particularly women) and claims group rights not available to the rest of the population. As Kymlicka and others argue, many feminists support the same argument about gender equality and other group-specific rights and benefits (Kymlicka 1999). From this perspective, it can be argued that both multiculturalism and feminism struggle for a more inclusive conception of justice, challenging the traditional liberal democratic assumption that equality means identical treatment.

As Macey states, one would agree that one of the main controversies of multiculturalism lies in the fact of it becoming a public policy, as is happening in the UK. When it comes to multiculturalism being something bad for society as a whole, she focuses on the current trend of the British Government to maintain that diversity is positive for society, ignoring the economic burden of having to pay benefits to unemployed and unskilled people and polygamous families, the provision of interpreters and translators, or the millions spent in special programs directed at Muslims because of their potential involvement in terrorism. With regard to these last arguments, even though her point is to show how this public expenditures on minorities can be seen as unfair and excluding by the white majority (especially in times of crisis), which at the same time can be the source of potential conflict, it can be argued that the way Macey puts it, it might sound somewhat radical, if not actually against these minorities.

All in all, Macey manages to get the reader to reflect on whether multiculturalism 'unintentionally' actuates against the majority as well as minorities within minorities (such as women), and whether it encourages cohesion or separation. Lately the emphasis has been placed too much on the 'multi' and not enough on the common culture. Multiculturalism prioritizes race and ethnicity over gender and sexuality, emphasizing differences with an essentialised and romanticised view of minority cultures. There is thus a need to balance the rights of cultural minorities with those of society for social cohesion, as well as a need to rethink the democratic management of multicultural societies, where the personal, sexual, reproductive and family spheres must be addressed as central issues of any culture. A more cohesive agenda is needed where both minorities and majorities commit to diversity, highlighting the special efforts for minorities to adapt to the host culture if the need arises, and where cultures are not seen as static or monolithic blocks, but as different and changing. Britain, like many other countries, has to work harder to develop this necessary national identity, and forms of belonging to each other.

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Ester Serra Mingot

**Heath Wellman, Christopher & Philip Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is there a Right to Exclude?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, 340 pp.**

A quotation commonly attributed to the French essayist Joseph Joubert poignantly captures the driving idea behind Christopher Heath Wellman and Philip Cole's book: *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is there a Right to Exclude?*: "It is better to debate a question without settling it, than to settle a question without debating it?"

Wellman and Cole, professors of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis and the University of Wales, Newport respectively, set out to do just that with the question of "whether states have a unilateral right to control membership [or] whether individuals enjoy a fundamental right to freedom of international movement" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 7).

If we take the noun "debate" to mean, as the New Oxford American Dictionary defines it, "a formal discussion on a particular topic in a public meeting or legislative assembly in which opposing views are put forward", then Wellman and Cole's debate, publicly available in the reviewed volume, seems to fit the description flawlessly, for they put forward diametrically opposed views on the subject. As they state in their introduction: "Wellman defends a legitimate state's right to exclude outsiders, and Cole counters that countries have no moral right to prevent people from crossing their borders." (Wellman & Cole 2011: 2).

This novel approach lends the book its unique structure, which splits the book in half almost perfectly equally (143 versus 154 pages) between the two authors. In part one, titled "Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude", Wellman makes the case that "legitimate political states are morally entitled to unilaterally design and enforce their own immigration policies, even if these policies exclude potential immigrants who desperately want to enter (Wellman & Cole 2011: 13).

In the second part of the work, under the title "Open Borders: An Ethical Defense", Cole argues "against the moral legitimacy of immigration control" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 159). Only the acknowledgements and short introduction were written jointly by the two authors.

The argument they put forward is about, as the book's subtitle puts it, the "right to exclude" and whether "states possess that right, not how they should, in fact, use it under current global circumstances" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 8, my italics).

This is important to point out, as it makes clear the theoretical contribution the book seeks to make. The authors are focusing on their two radical positions, rather than considering compromise positions between the two, because "the two 'extreme' positions mapped out in this text describe the ethical territory on which any such intermediate positions must be based." (Wellman & Cole 2011: 7)

So, as Cole rightly argues (c.f. p. 163), while the majority of the available literature is centred around the question "What can morally justify a state in restricting migration" (ibid.), he and Wellman focus on the more fundamental inquiry "What gives the state the *right* to control immigration?" (ibid., italics in original). The answer to the latter question must form the theoretical basis for the former.

Wellman's answer is that states do in fact possess this right. His argument is, as he readily admits, straightforward and rests on three basic premises which we can therefore quote here in full:

(1) legitimate states are entitled to political self-determination, (2) freedom of association is an integral component of self-determination and (3) freedom of association entitles one to not associate with others. Based on this reasoning [he concludes] that legitimate states may choose to not associate with foreigners, including potential immigrants, as they see fit (Wellman & Cole 2011: 13).

He elaborates on each of these three points, explaining his view why states are entitled to self-determination and thereby to freedom of association as corporate political entities and not just as an aggregate of individual right holders, as "[i]nvoking individual human rights will not enable one to explain why it

is in principle wrong for an external body such as Sweden or the EU to forcibly annex a legitimate state like Norway" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 54).

Here, we see a major feature of Wellman's argument: the use of hypothetical scenarios (such as the EU's annexation of Norway) and the use of analogy. This leads Wellman to conclude that this right of association must, just as it does with individuals, entail a right *not* to associate: "Just as an individual has the right to determine whom (if anyone) he or she would like to marry, a group of fellow citizens has a right to determine whom (if anyone) it would like to invite into its political community" (ibid.).

This right, however, is just presumptive, in that it could potentially be overturned by other rights or concerns. So, after commencing to positively lay out his argument for a state's right to unilaterally control immigration, Wellman considers, in the latter half of his part, four cases made for open borders (by egalitarians, libertarians, democrats and utilitarians). All four, he suggests, "either do not establish a case in favor of open borders, or the one they provide is insufficient to outweigh a legitimate state's right to unilaterally design and enforce its own immigration policy" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 3).

He also considers the concrete situations of refugees and guest-workers as well as the issues of establishing an international institution with authority over migration and the permissibility of applying selection criteria as part of a state's immigration policy. In all cases, he shows "that none of those answers gives us any cause to doubt [the] more general thesis that legitimate political states occupy a privileged position of moral dominion over immigration" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 4).

It is worth mentioning that Wellman makes his positive argument first, while making the case against possible negating views later, while Cole chooses the opposite approach.

Cole, in the introduction to his half of the work, claims that "it is not a direct reply to the arguments Wellman has set out in the first part, but is rather setting out an alternative moral account of immigration as a contrast to his" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 161).

This claim, however, is unconvincing. Cole over wide stretches quotes Wellman's preceding part directly in order to refute his arguments and includes a sizable chapter titled "Wellman and Freedom of Association". This, apart from anticipating a reviewer's job (in a sense reviewing a partially self-reviewing book) reveals, as we shall see, a more fundamental flaw in the book's overall structure.

What follows is both a critical appraisal of two of Wellman's basic arguments as well as a presentation of the way they form the beginning of the negative arguments of Cole's thoughts.

What strikes me as essentially problematic with Wellman's argument is its basis in the idea of legitimacy. He is careful to restrict his claims to 'legitimate states', that is "only those regimes with a moral claim to rule have a moral right to political self-determination" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 15f).

In his view, "a regime is legitimate only if it adequately protects the human rights of its constituents and respects the rights of all others" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 16).

He goes on, in a footnote, to define human rights "to be individual moral rights to the protection against the standard and direct threats leading to a minimally decent life in modern society" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 55).

These three excerpts are reproduced here in full, as they form, the entire discussion of legitimacy in Wellman's argument. I find this basis very problematic, because it is nowhere near as stable as Wellman would like us to believe. While Cole (Wellman & Cole 2011: 234f) mainly criticizes Wellman on the "question of how the judgement of legitimacy is to be made" (and on this, Wellman is indeed silent), what strikes me as even more arguable is Wellman's distinction between the protection of human rights within the nation state and respecting them outside. This seems to constitute a form of ethical particularism, which undermines fundamentally the universality of human rights, which are awarded *qua* being human and not *qua* being a compatriot.

Cole seeks to show that "arguments developed within liberal political theory that claim to show that immigration restrictions exercised by liberal nation states are ethically justified [...] fail to be consistent with liberal theory's own central moral principles" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 159).

If liberal theory is based on a "commitment to ethical universalism and the principle of moral equal-

ity of humanity" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 210) then it can hardly be reconciled with a model in which "our obligations to our co-nationals come first" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 211).

He goes even further, in pointing out that the ethical particularism on which this communitarian view is based can't properly account for any of the content of moral obligations towards fellow humans:

In order to derive the content of universal human rights from the particularist perspective, I would have to work through my relations with humanity in general rather than work from a set of general facts about humanity. [...] It looks much more reasonable to say that I have moral obligations to my fellow human beings because of their humanity, not because I am in some kind of relationship with them. (ibid.)

This is a debatable point, as, for instance, Judith Butler, in "Frames of War" grounds her argument in precisely such a relationship with humanity in general.

An obligation does emerge from the fact that we are, as it were, social beings from the start, dependent on what is outside ourselves, on others, on institutions, and on sustained and sustainable environments, and so are, in this sense, precarious. (Butler 2009: 23)

Her critique of the different distributions of grievability rests firmly on this concept of precariousness, which, in turn, is based on the essential social (and thereby relational) nature of human existence.

The second objection to Wellman lies with his conception of freedom of association. Wellman uses the analogy of individual freedom of association to assert that it "seems hard to deny that the logic and morality of freedom of association applies in the political realm just as it does with our other relations" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 37)

Cole, in his negative argument against the right to exclude, makes the point that such an appeal to analogy is not enough to establish a state's right to exclude: "Whether or not the membership rules of any kind of association are ethically justified has to be established in relation to that kind of association, not by appeal to a "family resemblance" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 207).

He therefore argues that in the associations Wellman cites as analogous

there is what we might call an external "space" one can exit into, in most cases without any prospect of harm to one's life prospects, and without anybody seeking to prevent your entering that space. [...] But to exercise the right to leave a state, one needs another state to exit into – statelessness is a perilous condition [...] into which one cannot enter voluntarily: it is not a recognized political space at all. (Wellman & Cole 2011: 209)

This fraudulent analogy is the second 'fault line' which Cole finds in the arguments of Wellman in particular and in arguments for the right to exclude in general. To this, in the remainder of his part, he adds a third objection, that "the debates often neglect context, both past and present" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 159)

If the reader of this review has had the feeling that, after reading the preceding pages, most of my considerations have been with Wellman's argument and Cole's refuting of them, then this is precisely because this is how the vast proportion of the book reads.

Cole's approach is the opposite to Wellman's in that he begins his thoughts with a primarily negative critique, before setting out the "case for a universal human right to freedom of international movement." (Wellman & Cole 2011: 160)

The problem with this is, however, that apart from being rather short (only 13 out of 153 pages), this positive argument is nowhere near as elaborate or clear as either Wellman's initial argument or indeed Cole's criticism thereof.

Rather, it is based firstly on a negative argument, arguing that the view that mobility is not a universal human right is faulty because it neglects human agency and then going on to argue for "an idea

of membership of a global political community, such that to be a free and equal member of that global community, to be an equally powerful participant in it, is deeply connected with one's freedom of mobility throughout it" (Wellman & Cole 2011: 301).

This is a very confusing, and, as Cole himself admits, a "sketchy, if not flimsy, view" (ibid.) He argues that political thought needs to initiate bringing about such a utopian reality by "begin[ning] the process [of] how it can be made reality" (p. 306).

This rather unsatisfying conclusion becomes all the more so because there is no overreaching conclusion. All the book ends with is Cole's argument for open borders.

In my view, this structure greatly diminishes the value of the whole project. Upon consideration, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration* proves to be less a debate than a statement and an elaborate rebuttal.

Cole's part, even though he describes it as not being a "direct reply" to Wellman, proves to be just that over wide stretches. His part, in contrast to Wellman's (and despite the grave problems with his arguments as outlined above) could not stand alone, without the other.

This is even evident stylistically. Wellman quotes several of Cole's other publications, but never references Cole's part in the same book. Cole, however, quotes Wellman excessively in his critiques, which one can't help but feel is unfair, as Wellman is not awarded a chance to either defend himself and his arguments or to critique Cole's.

Undoubtedly such a defence would have been fascinating to read, but its lack unnecessarily diminishes the argument for open borders as it is presented not as valid on its own, but correct because the alternative is wrong.

A more fascinating structure could have been a presentation of both positive arguments in detail, followed by two rebuttals to the respective other position.

This critique of the structure of *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is there a Right to Exclude?* does however not diminish the overall force and intellectual clarity put forward by Cole and Wellman, which are for the most part erudite, clear and a fascinating introduction to a timely, necessary and often neglected debate.

The book itself, though, presenting mainly one positive argument and its critique, fails to debate the issue – which would have made this excellent book a truly outstanding project.

### References:

Butler, Judith (2009). *Frames of War. When is Life Grievable*. London: Verso.

David Himler

# NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA PRIPRAVO PRISPEVKOV ZA *DVE DOMOVINI* / *TWO HOMELANDS*

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urednika), kraj, založba, strani (primer: Drnovšek, Marjan (2004). Izseljenke v očeh javnosti. *Zbornik referatov 32. zborovanja slovenskih zgodovinarjev* (ur. Aleksander Žižek). Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 383–393.);

- c) pri člankih v revijah: priimek in ime avtorja, (leto izida), naslov članka, *naslov revije*, letnik, številka, strani (primer: Brightman, Robert (1995). Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification. *Cultural Anthropology* 10(4): 509–546.);
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- **Key words** (up to 5 words);
- **Article** (1. together with spaces it should not exceed 45.000 characters; 2. style of the entire text

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- When naming the author in brackets use the following form: bracket, surname, year, colon, pages separated by hyphen, bracket full-stop (Barthes 1999: 91–99); when naming more authors separate their names with semicolon and name them according to the year of publishing in ascending order (Said 1999: 98–99; Ford 2006: 14–45).
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  - b) articles in series: surname and name of the author, (year of publishing), *title*, *title of the volume* (name of the editor), place of publishing, publisher, pages (e.g. Drnovšek, Marjan (2004). Izseljenske v očeh javnosti. *Zbornik referatov 32. zborovanja slovenskih zgodovinarjev* (ed. Aleksander Žižek). Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 383–393.);

- c) articles in journals: name and surname of the author, (year of publishing), title, *title of the journal*, year, number, pages (e.g. Brightman, Robert (1995). Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification. *Cultural Anthropology* 10(4): 509–546.);
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When **citing in footnotes** authors should follow the instructions below:

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- Long **citations** (five lines or more) should be typed as an indented paragraph (with the use of "tab"), in italic, without quotation marks, the first line of the paragraph after the citation should not be indented; citation shorter than five lines should be included in the main text and separated with quotation marks, in normal font (not in italic); when naming the author within the text (not in brackets) for the first time, include both full name and surname of the author, then continue using only last name.

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- when the author is unknown, cite only the title of the article, web page address and date of viewing (e.g. Interaction: Some ideas, <http://home.earthlink.net/interaction.htm> (1.2.2008));
- in the first case state the author within the text, e.g. (Becker 2003), in the second case use the first word from the title of the article or source e.g. (Interaction).

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Heath Wellman, Christopher & Philip Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration:*

*Is there a Right to Exclude?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2011 (David Himler)

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