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EDMUND HUSSERL'S CONSTRUCTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE C-MANUSCRIPTS AND OTHER LATE RESEARCH MANUSCRIPTS

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Abstract

This study aims to underline some features in Edmund Husserl's concept of constructive phenomenology, particularly in the C-manuscripts (1929–1934) and also in other materials. For the author, the significance of this late work is that it contains Husserl's all four phenomenological methods, transparently and maturely developed, coordinated and interrelated, namely: static, genetic, generative, and constructive method. While the first three are limited to the possible attitude and are restricted to the

domain of possible intuitive givenness, the peculiarity of constructive phenomenology is to venture beyond the limits of intuitive accessibility in a phenomenologically legitimate way. Thus, it makes available the “supreme and final” metaphysical questions, and, ultimately, lays down the foundations of phenomenological metaphysics. In this study, I try to show how Husserl attempts to apply the constructive phenomenological method.

Keywords: Edmund Husserl, constructive phenomenology, C-manuscripts, phenomenological metaphysics.

Konstruktivna fenomenologija v C-rokopisih in drugih poznih raziskovalnih rokopisih Edmunda Husserla

Povzetek

6 Študija želi poudariti nekatere značilnosti pojma konstruktivne fenomenologije pri Edmundu Husserlu, zlasti v C-rokopisih (1929–1934) in drugih gradivih. Za avtorja članka leži pomen tega poznega Husserlovega dela v tem, da vsebuje vse štiri fenomenološke metode, transparentno in zrelo razvite, medsebojno povezane in koordinirane, in sicer: statično, genetično, generativno in konstruktivno metodo. Medtem ko se prve tri omejujejo na možnostno držo in zadevajo področje možne intuitivne danosti, je posebnost konstruktivne fenomenologije v tem, da se želi na fenomenološko legitimen način podati onkraj meja intuitivne dostopnosti. Tako omogoča »najvišja in končna« metafizična vprašanja in, vzpostavlja temelje fenomenološke metafizike. V študiji skušam pokazati, kako Husserl aplicira konstruktivno fenomenološko metodo.

Ključne besede: Edmund Husserl, konstruktivna fenomenologija, C-rokopisi, fenomenološka metafizika.

Das Absolute ist nichts anderes als absolute Zeitigung.
Edmund Husserl

Introduction

Husserl's so-called C-manuscripts are important documents in many aspects. They were meant to constitute a systematic work for publication under the working title (or one of its working titles) *The Origin of Time*. I think that one of the particular reasons for its special importance is the presence of four phenomenological methods in the work: the static, the genetic, the generative (Steinbock 1995), and the constructive (Fink 1988, Schnell 2006).¹ The first two were developed in detail in Husserl's works, while the clear outlines of the latter two also emerged. Generative phenomenology aims at concrete historical life, and constructive phenomenology eventually transcends the limits of possible intuitive givenness and tries to answer the "highest and ultimate" metaphysical questions in a phenomenologically legitimate manner. Of peculiar importance of the C-manuscripts is also the internal relationship between the four methods within the text.

7

This study aims to underline Husserl's notion of constructive phenomenology in the C- and other research manuscripts which he wrote in the same period. It is well known that, in his *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (August–October 1932), Eugen Fink, Husserl's assistant, wrote about "constructive phenomenology" in

1 In this essay, we use the conception of "constructive phenomenology" in a somewhat different sense as Schnell did. Schnell emphasized that in his interpretation "construction" is neither speculative nor metaphysical—in the traditional sense of the word—, but a necessary implication of the radicalization of phenomenological description (Schnell 2007, 23–26). This radicalization, in turn, does not bring us beyond the limits of possible intuition. In my interpretation—however—there is a sense of phenomenological construction in Husserl, according to which we can transgress those limits of possible intuitive givenness in a phenomenologically legitimate manner, in order to attain the ultimate questions of philosophy, such as the problem of immortality (or mortality) of the soul and existence of God.

a detailed and systematic way. Husserl read it several times between August 1932 and January 1933 and made extensive remarks and notes on his assistant's writing. Yet, Husserl got neither the idea nor the term "phenomenological construction" from his student. Both are found in his relatively early B II 2 manuscripts from the years 1907–1910 (see: Hua² 13, 5–9; Hua 42, 137–168). Fink influenced Husserl's concept of constructive phenomenology, but he was neither the exclusive nor the decisive source for Husserl.

Husserl applies constructive phenomenology on the level of the individual subject and of totality, of the Absolute (Hua 15, text No. 38), attempting to thematize the problems of birth and death (Hua Mat³ 8, texts, e.g., No. 21, 43, 94, 96). (He also deals with the problem of God himself in detail in his late E-manuscripts from the same period, the 1930s). We should take a closer look at how Husserl unfolds *apodictic implications* to construct and reconstruct what lies beyond the limits of the intuitively accessible. He tries to raise questions concerning individual immortality, the meaning of historicity, and the existence of God from a transcendental point of view, which differs radically from the classic, speculative metaphysics approach.

8

This essay aims to highlight the peculiarities of Husserl's notions of a phenomenologically founded metaphysics. It consists of three parts: 1) the context of C-manuscripts, 2) methodological layers in the C-manuscripts, and 3) constructive phenomenology in the C-manuscripts and other late materials.

1. The context of C-manuscripts

In 1928, Heidegger published Husserl's work *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (*The Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness* from the year 1905),⁴ which were edited by Edith Stein. Its main texts derived from the 1904/05 winter semester lecture entitled *Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis* (*Main Elements of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge*), a work to which Husserl returned from time to time, reworked it in 1917 with the assistance of Edith Stein,

2 Hua = *Husserliana* (Edmund Husserl: *Gesammelte Werke*).

3 Hua Mat = *Husserliana: Materialien*.

4 In the following parts of this paper: *Time-lectures*.

and which gained its final form in 1928. Husserl struggled with time, which motivated him to write the so-called Bernau manuscripts in 1917–1918, which had the working-title *Zeit und Individuation, eine Erneuerung einer rationalen Metaphysik nach den Principien* (*Time and Individuation: A Renovation of Rational Metaphysics Based on Principles*).⁵ After publishing the main parts of his *Time*-lectures from 1904–1905 in 1928, Husserl focused on the problem of time again. Heidegger himself also referred to the imminent publication of the Bernau manuscripts in his “Introduction” to the *Time*-lectures.⁶ Husserl had a three-volume work in mind concerning the problem of time, whereas the first volume would have comprised the *Time*-lectures, the second was to contain the Bernau manuscripts, and the third and last one the C-manuscripts. After asking Heidegger and Roman Ingarden who both refused, in 1929 he asked Eugen Fink to bring the Bernau manuscripts into the form of a systematic publication. Fink accepted the task, but never managed to carry it out.⁷ Still, Husserl believed he can fully concentrate on making the last and ultimate phases of his investigations concerning time, which were meant to be the C-manuscripts (*The Origin of Time*). Husserl worked on this project from 1929 until the late summer (August) of 1934, when he started to write the *Crisis*-book (Lohmar 2006, XIV).

9

In these years, along with the problem of time, Husserl had to deal with a series of other questions and topics which cannot be separated from his late efforts on working out the phenomenology of time. He wrote two major works in 1929: *Cartesian Meditations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. In 1929, on a summer vacation in Tremezzo, Italy, he read through Heidegger’s works *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* carefully, and recognized Heidegger’s critical attitude towards his understanding of phenomenology, and philosophy in general. Between 1929 and 1934, Husserl devoted his efforts most importantly to three philosophical projects: 1) the

5 Husserl’s letter to Heidegger (March 28, 1918; BW [= *Briefwechsel*] 4, 130).

6 Heidegger 1928, 367: “Weiterführende, besonders seit 1917 wieder aufgenommene, mit dem Individuationsproblem zusammenhängende Untersuchungen über das Zeitbewußtsein sind einer späteren Veröffentlichung vorbehalten.”

7 The Bernau manuscripts were laid in Eugen Fink’s drawer till 1969, when he gave them to the Husserl Archive.

German edition of *Cartesian Meditations*,⁸ 2) multiple attempts to write a several-volume systematic work on phenomenology,⁹ and 3) the C-manuscripts. In close connection with these projects, the late B- and E-manuscripts from the end of 1929 and from the first half of the 1930s, many of which formed part of the first two projects, must also be considered. This is the context in which the C-manuscripts are to be studied.

The 1904/05 *Time*-lectures had a rather static view on time. In the 1917–1918 Bernau manuscripts, as Rudolf Bernet said, genetic phenomenology appears “in full force” (Bernet 2010, 16). But in the Bernau manuscripts Husserl treated the formal and material aspect of a process as two, *principally separable* topics of the investigation. During the elaboration of genetic phenomenology in the 1920s, Husserl came to the insight that the formal and material side of temporal events cannot be separated (especially Hua 11). He utilized this consideration in the investigations of the C-manuscripts in a rich, careful, and wide-ranging way: formal and material moments and aspects of processes are intimately intertwined in the descriptions of temporality in this work. Everything takes place in the context of universal temporality. Husserl’s late philosophy, in my interpretation, took the form of a *process philosophy*, which emphasizes the dynamic character of reality, and according to which everything is in the state of perpetual becoming and evolution (cf. Paci 1964, Held 2010). As he said in the C-manuscripts: “The Absolute is nothing else than absolute temporalization.” (Hua 15, 670)

A very important feature of late A-, B-, E-, and C-manuscripts (from the 1930s) is that in these texts *constructive phenomenology* (the phenomenologically elaborated and grounded method to legitimately question beyond the limits of possible intuition) reached a comprehensive and transparent form. The idea, and also the expression of phenomenological construction, go back to the second half of the 1900s, around the years 1907–1908, but it reached its final form in the last working period of Husserl, in the 1930s.

8 Hua 15, Divisions I and III (editorial division).

9 Amongst others: Hua 15, Division II (editorial division). Cf. Kern 1973, XXXV–LXVII.

2. Methodological layers in the C-manuscripts

What makes the C-manuscripts a unique set of works in Husserl's career is his use of four different phenomenological methods in them; and efforts in the texts to connect these distinct methodological layers, the alternate forms of phenomenological analysis, with one another can be identified. The four methods are static, genetic, generative, and constructive ways of investigation, each of which serves as a "leading clue" ("Leitfaden") to the other, so to speak, "higher" one (Steinbock 2003, 289–325, especially: 301 ff.). This means that the "lower" level yields topics, themes, and phenomena to the "higher:" phenomena whose exact structure and background have to be disclosed and cleared up by those "higher-level" methods. The four methods together could reveal the phenomena in their fully concrete reality, and thus together fulfill the famous slogan and promise of phenomenological philosophy: "Back to the things themselves!" (Hua 19/1, 10).

A key concern of phenomenology is the "principle of all principles," according to which the only and exclusive source of legitimate cognition and knowledge is the "originally giving intuition" (Hua 3/1, 51; English: Husserl 1983, 44). However scientific, and thus epistemologically legitimate (or even intelligible), a theory can only be called theory, *in case it has a possible intuitive basis or grounding*. Husserl's main goal with the development of newer methods was to radicalize the "principle of all principles;" it was to widen the borders of possible intuition, to push the boundaries of the possible, scientifically articulated intuition further. The aim of perpetual radicalization of the phenomenological method was to explore the hidden depths of possible intuition, which could be thematized, conceptualized, and described in a scientifically rigorous manner.

The field of static phenomenology is the base of already clear and stable forms of sense and experience. In the static analysis, we face fully formed objects. The genetic method, as it were, "brackets"¹⁰ the concept of the object. The genetic investigation discloses everything in its radical temporality as a process or event; the genetic approach places everything within the context of

¹⁰ Phrasing of Tamás Ullmann (cf. 2010).

becoming and genesis. From the early 1920s onward, Husserl consistently made the distinction between temporal and genetic analyses. The temporal analysis, the phenomenological description of time-consciousness, aims at the purely formal aspect of a process or an event, while the genetic treatment focuses on the material side of the same temporal course (cf. Hua 11, 128). One of the most important results of the C-manuscripts is that it applies, consistently and systematically, the insight that the two aspects cannot be abstracted from each other, they are intertwined, intimately interpenetrating each other even within the context of time-consciousness.

12 During the development of the genetic method, however, the capacities of phenomenological access to the “things themselves” were far from being entirely used. The first signs of “generative view” in Husserl’s mind appeared in the first half of the 1920s, by which he sought to place everything on the horizon of concrete historical life (cf. Hua 14, 223). The generative approach aimed to show the phenomena as specifically as possible, to demonstrate that every phenomenon is embedded into a specific, historical, cultural, social, and even physical (collective physical)¹¹ process. Husserl gave a more systematic form to this methodological procedure in the 1930s (cf. texts of Hua 15, 29, 39, and 42). The name “generative” refers to the concrete historical, cultural life of generations, and to the process of “becoming” a “generation” (cf. Steinbock 1995, 3). But generative phenomenology remains within the borders of immanence, it still does not reach the ultimate forms of transcendence, the realm of “supreme and ultimate’ questions” (Hua 1, 182; English: Husserl 1960, 156); in the end, to questions related to the final *ethical* problems and values, to the fate of *soul* before birth and after death, and to the essence and existence of *God*. This was the task of *constructive phenomenology*, whose most important function was *to question beyond the limits of possible intuition as such*, in a phenomenologically legitimate (because phenomenologically-apodictically motivated) way. This method reached its most mature manifestation and articulation in the manuscripts of the 1930s, and especially in the C-manuscripts.

11 Cf. Hua 39, 181 (1932): “Das Wir hat seine kollektive Leiblichkeit.”

In the C-manuscripts, as mentioned above, all four methods—static,¹² genetic,¹³ generative,¹⁴ and constructive¹⁵—are present in a systematically interrelated and connected way, as the higher is built upon the lower, and the problem-fields of their scope partly overlap. There is a close, internal, and, from a certain point of view, a continuous connection between them. Although at the first look the C-manuscript appears as a less-organized, unsystematic collection of research manuscripts, in my interpretation, it is possible to unfold certain systematic tendencies, the main aim of which was to construct—or reconstruct—the most specific, ultimate phenomenon: *the Absolute itself, as a process*. Upon it, every other phenomenon and entity is dependent, and is, in the last analysis, its abstract moment. The ultimately concrete phenomenon, according to Husserl, is the Absolute.

Comparing the Bernau and C-manuscripts regarding their treatment of time-consciousness, perhaps the most characteristic feature of the latter, in contrast with the former, is the systematic and coherent effort to connect the subjective and intersubjective level of time-consciousness; to weave the strings of primordial and intersubjective genesis as close and strong as possible. The lower levels of the constitution turn out to be dependent moments of the higher; during the appropriately high level of constitutive analysis, it can be seen that the constitution of time and time-consciousness is embedded in a cultural, historical, and physical (collective physical) context. The subjective and primordial constitution is only an abstraction.

13

3. Constructive phenomenology in the C-manuscripts and in other late materials

As mentioned before, Husserl did not invent constructive phenomenology in the C-manuscripts or in the period of C-manuscripts; neither was it the

12 Hua Mat 8, 5, 154, 170 f., 259, 335, 420.

13 Hua Mat 8, 37, 131, 170 f., 210, 241 f., 274, 279, 352, 394, 420, 435.

14 Hua Mat 8, 155 f., 166 f., 177, 214, 217, 241, 275, 369 ff., 391–394, 406, 427, 436 ff., 443–446.

15 Hua Mat 8, 12, 19, 86, 158, 186, 211, 217 (footnote), 218, 222 ff., 226 f., 257 (footnote), 261, 263, 279, 326, 328 f., 340, 344 f., 350 f., 352 f. (in connection with genetic method), 357, 395, 409, 415 f., 420, 437, 441, 444, 446. Cf. Hua 15, 666–670.

result of Fink's influence. Husserl developed this method long before the 1930s: as early as the second half of the 1900s. However, the method reached its most coherent and matured state in the C-manuscripts and other manuscripts from that time, such as the late A-, B-, and E-manuscripts. The essential point of constructive phenomenology or phenomenological construction is to unfold the *principally invisible* in a phenomenologically legitimate way, which cannot be brought to an intuitive givenness for theoretical reasons. At a certain point, we reach the boundaries of possible intuitive givenness, but we can discover a set of *apodictic implications*,¹⁶ which motivate us in an apodictic way to perform phenomenological constructions, and thus to thematize the phenomena which cannot be presented in an intuitively completed or filled manner.¹⁷

14 Phenomenological construction (or constructive phenomenology) has many different fields and topics of application in Husserl's work, of which the four main types are: 1) constructions within the context of the eidetic method aimed at the ultimate, pure possibilities of appearance;¹⁸ 2) constructions aimed to disclose the *deepest, irreflexive layers of subjectivity*, which latter include *primal passivity*; 3) constructions directed at the *ultimate metaphysical facts*, which Husserl also calls primal or primordial facts (*Urfakta, Urtatsache*); and 4) constructions concerning the phenomenological Absolute (problems of historical teleology, God, immortality [or mortality] of the soul, freedom of will, and the highest ethical norms and values). These phenomena either avoid the sphere of possible intuition (as structures and phenomena of a primordial layer of subjectivity, of *primal passivity*, and the phenomenological Absolute) or articulate the most general conditions and structures of every possible

16 Hua 42, 570: "Apodiktische Implikation". Cf. also Fink 1988.

17 Phenomenological construction in this sense works in the following way: the answers to the "highest and ultimate" questions lie beyond the limits of intuitive accessibility; however, there are signs and indications which point to the direction to such answers, signs, which, unfortunately, could not be fulfilled, but which make possible certain constructive operations. For example: we can describe the teleological structure of subjectivity and world in a phenomenologically fully legitimate manner. On the basis of such a teleological structure, we can construct the idea of a perfect subject, who, in a peculiar way, belongs to the constitution of the teleology of subjectivity and world, who is their necessary constitutive consequence. Or we can construct also ethical ideals.

18 Cf., e.g.: Hua 41, 206, 286, 318, 321, 322, 351, 359.

manifestation (as eidetic constructions and primal metaphysical facts). Three topics out of the four appeared at a relatively early stage of Husserl's development: 1) constructions concerning the Absolute, in the lectures and research manuscripts of the period 1907–1910 (Hua 28, Ms. B II 2 [Hua 13, 42], Ms. B I 4 [unpublished]), and also *Ideas I* (1912) (Hua 3/1, 175 [footnote]); 2) constructions of pure possibilities related to the eidetic method (Hua 3/1, 147, 153); 3) primal or primordial metaphysical facts (Hua 3/1, 98).¹⁹ The last main domain of construction, aimed the deepest layer of subjectivity and primal passivity, is the only one which appeared in a well-developed, mature form in his late period, most importantly in the C-manuscripts. One more important goal of this late work was to systematically “excavate”²⁰ these layers and structures constituting subjectivity.

The main topic of phenomenological constructions in the C-manuscripts is the constructive-reconstructive disclosing of primal passivity and the structures of the deepest layers of subjectivity (primal *hyle*, primal ego [*Ur-Ich*, *Urich*, *Urmonade*], primal *kinaesthesia*, transcendental instincts). According to Husserl's standpoint in his late work, there are layers and structures of subjectivity which cannot be made visible by any other earlier phenomenological method in a legitimate way. They are pre-reflexive and irreflexive, they precede and avoid the scope of the phenomenological reflex. They can be thematized only in an *indirect* way; they can only be seen, “with the corner of our eyes.” The phenomenological construction aims exactly at this indirect thematic of pre-reflexive and irreflexive structures and moments of consciousness. The indirect themes are accompanied by a sort of *indirect apodicticity*. This kind of phenomenological construction unfolds the play of the primal ego and the primal *hyle* in the deep layer of subjectivity. In Husserl's descriptions, the primal ego turns towards the primal *hyle* with an instinctive

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¹⁹ “Obviously that does not imply that the necessity of the being of this or that present mental process is a pure essential necessity, that is: a purely eidetic particularity subsumed under an eidetic law; it is the necessity of a fact, and is called so because an eidetic law is involved in the fact and indeed, in this case, involved in the existence of the fact as fact.” (Husserl 1983, 103)

²⁰ Husserl even uses the term “archaeology” in this context (cf. Hua Mat 8, 23, 356 f.). Cf. also Lee 1993, 5, 77 f., 80.

movement of primal *kinaesthesia* (Hua Mat 8, 225). According to him, the primal, deepest pre-reflexive layer of time-consciousness is constituted in this instinctive, kinaesthetic movement of the primal ego (cf. Römer 2010, 88 f., 95 ff.). The sphere of primal *hyle*, its primal affective, influences the primal ego, and the primal ego's instinctive (primal instinctive [*urinstinktive*]))²¹ movements and actions in primal kinaesthetic processes, which, directed at this primal *hyle*, altogether make up the realm of *primal passivity*. The *primal ego* is not the pre-ego (*Vor-Ich*), whereas the latter is the center and agent of transcendental instincts; the primal ego is the ultimately constituting, entirely concrete transcendental agent, which precedes and avoids every reflection. It is the “speculative thought” of Husserl's late works.²² The base of primal passivity alongside with the primal ego is a speculative achievement of the C-manuscripts in a phenomenologically appropriate manner.

16 In his late period, Husserl connected the above-mentioned four types of phenomenological constructions in a systematic, coherent, consequent, and rational manner, which outlines the emerging of a well-articulated, structured *philosophy of process*. At its core, as László Tengelyi correctly observed, is his metaphysics one of facticity, the metaphysics of primal or primordial facts (Tengelyi 2014, 180–227). This metaphysics articulates and organizes every other moment and considerations of his philosophy in the 1930s. The most important and the highest amongst these original, primal facts is the *fact of the Absolute*. Its givenness, openness, dynamic contextuality, its processual, self-temporalizing, and self-unfolding nature are the most essential characteristics. The ultimate fact is that of the Absolute, which precedes and at the same time comprises every other fact and eidos (Hua 15, 385 f.; cf. also Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 2016, 212 f.).

The Absolute, in the end, is *God* himself. That being said, the most dominant feature of the Absolute is its (*processually* understood and interpreted) divine nature; God, who penetrates everything and who is immanent to everything (Hua 15, 381, 385). In Husserl's view, God is the ultimate context of every being

21 “Instinct” in the context of Husserl's late transcendental phenomenology means a purely passive teleological striving or trend of transcendental subjectivity. Cf. also Lee 1993.

22 Phrasing of Gábor Toronyai (cf. 2002).

and knowledge, who embraces every finite and particular entity, phenomenon, knowledge, and viewpoint. As a dynamic, processual super-context, he incorporates all lower forms and levels of the phenomenological absolute, such as the universal transcendental intersubjectivity and all the primal egos, as his dependent moments (cf. Lo 2008). He is the ultimate foundation of being, and also comprises every ultimate condition of all possible appearance and entities; the conditions for factual as well as essential (eidetic) entities.²³ Every primal ego with their primal passivity belongs to this Absolute in an immanent way; the transcendental instincts of these egos connect them into an instinctive community, and through those instincts, they are integrated into the historical, open life of the Absolute (Hua 15, 593–604). The transcendental instincts control the primal egos and their intersubjective community towards the Absolute (towards the ultimate, divine layer of the Absolute).

In the 1930s (among others in the late E-manuscripts), and also in the second half of the 1900s (Ms. B II 2, B I 4, Hua 28), *God* is the infinite aspect of subjectivity, a super-subject, who is inherent and immanent to every particular and finite subject,²⁴ as well as to the universal, infinitely open transcendental intersubjectivity. He unites in himself every opposite, contradictory feature and attribute in a dialectical way; he is personal and super-personal (non-personal) at the same time.²⁵ In Husserl's interpretation, the phenomenological analysis

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23 It is true that earlier Husserl claimed that even God is subject to the eidetic laws (in *Ideas*, for example), when he argued for the absolute precedence of *eidos* and eidetics. But in the 1930s Husserl's "metaphysics of primal facts" reached a mature form, and he revised then his earlier opinion concerning the relationship of facts and essences. In this late period, these ultimate or primal facts played a foundational role in his phenomenological metaphysics, and God became the highest and ultimate primal fact, who founds every other fact and *eidos*.

24 Cf. Hua 42, 168 (from Ms. B II 2): "Natürlich kann das All-Ich, das alle Ichs in sich und alle Wirklichkeit in sich und nichts außer sich hat, nicht wie ein empirisches Ich gedacht werden. Es ist unendliches Leben, unendliche Liebe, unendlicher Wille; sein unendliches Leben ist eine einzige Tätigkeit; und da es unendliche Erfüllung ist, ist es unendliches Glück. Alles Leid, alles Unglück, allen Irrtum lebt Gott in sich nach; und nur dadurch, dass er es im strengsten Sinne mitlebt, mitfühlt, kann er seine Endlichkeit, sein Nichtseinsollen überwinden in der unendlichen Harmonie, zu der es da ist. Gott ist überall, Gottes Leben lebt in allem Leben."

25 See: Hua 42, especially texts of Division III ("Metaphysik: Monadologie, Teleologie und philosophische Teologie;" editorial division). As Husserl emphasizes: "an

unfolds several direct and indirect ways to the divine region of transcendental subjectivity or God; most of them are related to the phenomenon of teleology, particularly *universal teleology*.²⁶ In Husserl's opinion, we have an immediate, intimate experience of God, of the divine dimension of subjectivity; but we can thematize and conceptualize God in a phenomenologically legitimate way only *indirectly*, only through the method of phenomenological construction; and fundamentally through the phenomenological investigation of teleological structures of the self-constitution of subjectivity (and intersubjectivity) and the constitution of the world. According to him, God gains his full and concrete access to the world through the particular, finite subjects, through residing in their particular, concrete point of view concerning themselves and the world.²⁷ Apart from concrete transcendental intersubjectivity, God cannot be concrete either (cf. Hua 15, 381).

In Husserl's opinion, in transcendental reflection, every monad, every transcendental subject represents a fixed, yet in a temporal sense dynamic (as

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autonomous philosophy [...] must necessarily lead to a philosophical theology and teleology—as a non-confessional way to God” (Hua 42, 259). Amongst the interpreters, Lee Chun Lo especially emphasizes that for Husserl the problem of God was a leading clue and the ultimate point of orientation of his entire philosophy throughout his whole career (Lo 2008).

26 Angela Ales Bello speaks of “five ways to God” in Husserl, parallelizing Saint Thomas of Aquinas (his “five ways to God”) and Husserl (cf. Bello 2009). The five ways in Husserl's philosophy according to Bello are: 1) the objective: the way of teleologies which are constituted in the world (25 ff.); 2) the subjective: the mirroring or reflection of God (and the teleologies created by Her/Him) as a transcendent pole in the transcendental ego (28 ff.); 3) the intersubjective way: the question of empathy and the notion of a divine monad (a Supreme Monad), of the Highest Monad, and the question of empathic connection with this divine monad (33 ff.); 4) the hyletic way: the instinctive directedness which is inherent to the instinctive constitution of the sensuous *hyle* and which—in the end—is directed towards God Himself (46 ff.); and last, but not least: 5) the ethical way, which shows God as an ethical ideal and as the ultimate metaphysical support of freedom (54 ff.). In my opinion, Husserl's two most important, most characteristic strategies to reach God are: through the phenomenological investigation of the constitution of teleology and *rational faith* (with regard to the latter cf., e.g., Hua 42, 242). George Heffernan treats Husserl's approach to the problem of God within the context of giving sense to life in a rational way (Heffernan 2019). In this context, I regard Mezei's contribution to this problem also very important (Mezei 1997).

27 Cf. Lo 2008, 168–173.

it dynamically processes itself) point of view in the system of the Absolute. In this regard, Husserl describes the transcendental egos, the monads, as *transcendental substances* (Hua Mat 8, 176 f.). These substances make up the concrete, historical life of the Absolute; they are the concrete and dynamic aspects, which the Absolute relate to its different parts, moments, entities, and events. In this metaphysical context, Husserl even admits the possibility of “metempsychosis” (“*Seelenwanderung*”): in his account, the transcendental monads continuously activate and deactivate themselves; they fall asleep (death, in the interpretation of the late Husserl, is just a deeper form of sleeping, from which we constantly awake), and awake on a higher level of transcendental development.²⁸

Indirectly, constructive phenomenology can treat even these highest and ultimate metaphysical questions. But the entire picture is far more complicated. There are no fully disclosed, entirely answered questions; there are no answers with ultimate, absolute interpretations. Every answer, every philosophical, scientific theory, and thought is embedded in infinitely open and always moving horizons of sense. The sense of the answers and of the theories we develop and prove is always incomplete and open. The ever newer and constantly enriching context, which is unfolded by philosophical and scientific research, reveals something new regarding the sense of philosophical and scientific thoughts and theses. Philosophical and scientific research, as Husserl always stated and emphasized, is *a never-ending story, an infinite approach to the ultimate truth*, which is an ideal that cannot be reached.

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The constructive phenomenology is capable of a productive and fruitful communication with positive, also with normal sciences, of unfolding the deeper phenomenological and metaphysical meaning of the latest, most recent scientific findings and discoveries, and integrating them into its always moving and infinitely open, processual system. It is perhaps the highest insight of

28 Hua Mat 8, 176 f.: “Die Monaden sind transzendente Substanzen, bezogen auf ihre transzendente Zustandszeitlichkeit, auf ihr Leben. Aber nur das spezifische Leben, das sich verweltlichte, enthält personale Einheiten als sich entwickelnde aus Passivität oder aus Aktivität, aus Unfreiheit oder Freiheit – wenn nicht jede Monade vielerlei Speziesleben hat, wobei noch der leibnizsche Gedanke einer transzendentalen ‘Entwicklung’ in der ‘Seelenwanderung’ zu bedenken wäre.”

phenomenology (of Husserl' and of phenomenology in general) that there is no ultimate context, except for the context of Absolute itself. This absolute context cannot entirely be disclosed or exhausted; it can only be revealed and described indirectly, always in a partial, finite, and incomplete way.

Conclusion

20 This essay had two main goals: on the one hand, we tried to demonstrate the systematic connection of the four fundamental methodological approaches of Husserl's phenomenology in the C-manuscripts; on the other hand, we attempted to show some basic peculiarities of Husserl's *constructive phenomenology*, which was the ultimate result of his efforts to radicalize phenomenological philosophy. The final aim of constructive phenomenology is to make such phenomena and topics accessible for phenomenology, which—for theoretical reasons—lie beyond the limits of possible intuitive givenness. The C-manuscripts document the systematic connectedness of the four phenomenological methods; within them, constructive phenomenology, which emerged in Husserl's work around the years 1907–1910 at the latest, reaches its most mature, most elaborate form.

We tried to show that phenomenological constructions radicalized and renewed phenomenology in a way that it could reach and thematize problems which earlier lied beyond its range; namely, problems of classical metaphysics and intuitively inaccessible, though otherwise proved and confirmed, findings of natural sciences. Husserl's constructive phenomenology is also capable of creating a fruitful communication between these remarkably different fields of human culture, metaphysics, and positive sciences; and at the same time of avoiding the failure that László Tengelyi called “naturalist autarcism,” a sort of naïve naturalist positivism.²⁹ Constructive phenomenology can integrate and utilize both in a philosophically legitimate and productive way.

This philosophical method demonstrates that all knowledge and every being is embedded in a wider context, and the different contexts are connected organically, in the form of an always widening universal network. It unfolds ever newer contexts, without turning to skeptical relativism. Contexts and

29 Cf. Tengelyi 2014, 17–19, 187, 212, 223 f., 419, 427, 431, 435, 549.

contextualization have their essential laws and connections with absolute validity. The ultimate context is that of the Absolute, which is accessible only partially and indirectly to our philosophical and scientific research; but we see this context of the Absolute always in a more and more exact and richer way in the infinitely open history of philosophy and science.

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DIE MEHRDEUTIGKEIT DER „FORMALEN ANZEIGE“ IM HINDEUTENDEN BLICK AUF *SEIN UND ZEIT*

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The Ambiguity of the “Formal Indication” with Regard to *Being and Time*

Abstract

This interpretation of the problem of the formal indication in its various methodological and thematic directions, which predominantly addresses Heidegger research and understanding, is carried out on the basis of a precise differentiation of seven main shapes that try to clearly present their rich ambiguity without exhausting

it. Since the formal indication plays a prominent role in the horizon of conceptual and theoretical formation of hermeneutic phenomenology, although it is not the subject of detailed elaboration and, therefore, not at the center of attention in *Being and Time*, it is advisable to unveil formal indications in the earlier texts, in order to throw a revealing glance at their subtle, but decisive significance in *Being and Time*, and the inter-connection with primary phenomena discussed therein.

Keywords: conceptualization, theory formation, formal indication, fundamental ontology, phenomenology.

Mnogopomenskost »formalne naznake« s pogledom proti *Biti in času*

Povzetek

26 Pričujoča interpretacija problematike formalne naznake v različnih metodoloških in tematskih smereh, ki jo prvenstveno spodbuja heideggrovska raziskovanje in razumevanje, je izpeljana na osnovi natančnega diferenciranja sedmih poglavitnih oblik, kakršne skušajo predstaviti njeno mnogopomenskost, ne da bi slednjo obenem izčrpale. Ker formalna naznaka igra odločilno vlogo znotraj obzorja pojmovnega in teoretskega formiranja hermenevtične fenomenologije, čeprav ni poudarjena tema izčrpane obravnave in zato ne zaseda osrednje pozornosti v *Biti in času*, je smiselno, če razodenemo formalno naznako v zgodnjih besedilih, da bi tako pridobili pogled na njeno skoraj nezaznavno, a tehtno pomenljivost in na njeno sovisje z obravnavo temeljnih fenomenov v *Biti in času*.

Ključne besede: konceptualizacija, oblikovanje teorije, formalna naznaka, fundamentalna ontologija, fenomenologija.

Einführung

„Das Problem der ‚formalen Anzeige‘ gehört in die ‚Theorie‘ der phänomenologischen Methode selbst; im weiten Sinn in das Problem des *Theoretischen* [...] des Phänomens des *Unterscheidens*.“ (GA 60, 55)¹ Es sei von Anfang an hervorzuheben, dass Heidegger nicht in einen tendenziellen Irrationalismus verfällt und nicht einmal für eine Sekunde auf seine unvermeidliche Verortung in der philosophischen Tradition des „Theoretischen“ verzichtet. Die Leitfrage und das Grundproblem liegen vielmehr darin, ob das theoretische Verhältnis zum zu erforschenden Phänomen das einzig mögliche ist. Ausgehend von der Fragestellung nach dem *Unterschied* in der Philosophie zwischen einem *theoretisch*-vergegenständlichenden Vorstellen und einem *theoretisch*-freilegenden Auslegen kommt diese Problematik ans Licht. Die Formalanzeige ist vorbehaltlos ein Problem, zumal weil Heidegger ihr keine ausführlich entfaltete Erörterung gewidmet hat. Die Begründung ihrer Notwendigkeit in der methodologischen Sphäre, die Bereiche ihres Gebrauches und wie genau sie in diesen verstanden wird, welche Stelle sie im Ganzen der Methodik übernimmt, in welchen Phänomenzusammenhängen sie vorkommt und welche ihre bestimmende Sachbezogenheit ist, ist nicht ganz eindeutig. Da die Formalanzeige der Methodik zugehört, ist sie immer in einen sie tragenden reichen thematischen Zusammenhang eingebettet, sofern Sache und Methode bei Heidegger wesenskonstitutiv untrennbar sind. Diesbezüglich können hier nur diejenigen Phänomene berücksichtigt werden, die unumgänglich für ein geeignetes Verständnis der Problematik sind. Ihre vielschichtige Mehrdeutigkeit erklärt sich aus dem Tatbestand, dass sie eine „bestimmte Methodenstufe“ (GA 9, 29) darstellt, die freilich „als Grundsinn der Ansatzmethode phänomenologischer Interpretation in jeder ihrer Vollzugsstufen [ist], und das immer ‚zugleich‘“ (GA 61, 141), weshalb sie verschiedene Aufgaben in verschiedenen Problemkreisen erfüllt. Die akribische Unterscheidung der Mehrdeutigkeiten lässt aber die Einheitlichkeit

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¹ Auf die Einflüsse aus der philosophischen Tradition ist hier zu verzichten. Für den Einfluss von Kierkegaards „indirekte[r] Mitteilung“ und Husserls „okkasionelle[n] Ausdrücke[n]“ vgl. Escudero 2010, 400, 405.

des Phänomens nicht verschwinden, weil es einfach um unterschiedlich akzentuierte Sinnrichtungen geht.

28 In den zu anvisierenden Bedeutungen erweist sich im Allgemeinen eine wesentliche Doppelstruktur des „Weg-von... und Hin-zu...“ (Coriando 1998, 31), die mit der eventuellen Einführung der ausdrücklichen Zirkelhaftigkeit in *Sein und Zeit* (SuZ) zugespitzt und komplexer wird. Diese sich immer wieder behauptende Doppelstruktur wurde in der Forschung bereits herausgestellt.² Die vielschichtige Polemik entsteht erst dann, wenn zu erklären versucht wird, was genau in dieser Doppelstruktur abgewiesen und worauf zugleich hingewiesen wird. Die exegetische Schwierigkeit ist kein Zufall, weil die Doppelstruktur nicht aus zwei für sich allein differenzierten und äußerlich zusammengebrachten Bestandteilen konstituiert ist. Denn sie gliedert eine aufeinander funktionell-verweisende und einander wesensbestimmende Zusammengehörigkeit des darin Verorteten. Hinsichtlich einer in der Forschungsliteratur höchst strittigen filigranartigen Thematik muss die aufmerksame Nähe zur Textgrundlage ein Erfordernis sein, denn ohne sie vermag kein Verständnisversuch sich davor zu hüten, aufgrund einer Unterschiedslosigkeit *verwechselnde* Einbeziehungen in die auszulegende Sache hineinzuschieben. Darin liegt das Motiv, dieses Thema in der hier anvisierten Weise neu herauszustellen. Die differenzierende Darstellung der ans Licht zu bringenden sieben Hauptausprägungen bzw. Sinnrichtungen der formalen Anzeige in ihrer Mehrdeutigkeit wehren gegen jene Verwechslung ab. Ihre differenzierende Einteilung erfolgt nicht im Sinne einer chronologischen Entwicklungsgeschichte des Begriffs „Formalanzeige“,³ wobei nicht ausgeschlossen ist, dass in bestimmten Epochen diese oder jene Sinnrichtung besonders deutlich vorrangig wird. Das Bestimmungskriterium der Unterscheidung ist eher sachlich-thematisch, wobei die Ordnung der Einteilung gemäß Aufgaben (1.–2.), Gebrauchsspielraum (3.), Richtungen (4.–5.) und Konstitutionsmomenten (6.–7.) erfolgt. Neben dem Titel des jeweiligen Paragraphen werden die entsprechenden Textstellen von SuZ in Klammern hinzugefügt, auf die der hindeutende Blick sich bezieht.

2 Vgl. Oudemans 1990, 89; Rodríguez 1997, 169; de Lara 2008, 186; Xolocotzi 2019, 85.

3 Vgl. dazu Imdahl 1994.

1. Grundlegung der sprachlichen Ausdrucksweise: begriffliche Abwehr und Kontrolle des terminologischen Präjudizes – terminologische Aufgabe (SuZ 6, 21, 37, 46, 57, 150, 300, 316)

Die Terminologie Heideggers in SuZ erscheint auf den ersten Blick zweifellos seltsam. Denn a) sie verzichtet absichtlich im Horizont ihrer Grundbegriffe auf die traditionelle *lingua franca* der Philosophie, b) sie zieht ganz gewöhnliche und „ontisch“ bekannte Wörter in Betracht um alsbald c) durch diese eine neue, ontologisch akzentuierte Sinnrichtung zu bahnen (z. B. Besorgen, Fürsorge, Sorge). Das hat einen Grund. In Heideggers erster Vorlesung wird ein entscheidendes Problem für seine nachfolgenden methodologischen Überlegungen gestellt: „Wissenschaft ist Erkenntnis; Erkenntnis hat Objekte [...] Sie stellt fest, objektiv fest. Eine Wissenschaft von Erlebnissen müßte diese also doch vergegenständlichen, objektivieren, d. h. gerade ihres nicht objektartigen Er-lebnis- und Ereignischarakters entkleiden.“ (GA 56/57, 76). Um diesem Problem zu entgehen, das u. a. aus der theoretisch-abstandnehmenden Einstellung der beschreibend-phänomenologischen Methode erwächst, versucht Heidegger, den nicht theoretischen Charakter des ganz primären und die Beschreibung fundierenden Sehens herauszufinden, das das faktische Leben in seinem vortheorietischen Vollzug führt. Aber selbst wenn das nicht vergegenständlichend-vorstellende Sehen gewonnen wäre, bestünde immer noch „das Problem der Formulierbarkeit des Gesehenen“ (GA 56/57, 111). Die Anforderung entsteht also angesichts der philosophischen Erfassbarkeit und Formulierbarkeit des Lebens in seinem eigengesetzlichen Wesenscharakter innerhalb seines nicht theoretischen Ursprungsbereiches. Die freilegende Destruktion der theoretischen Voraussetzungen hinsichtlich der Sachbezogenheitsart der statuierten begrifflichen Sprache bewegt sich deshalb im Horizont der Suche „nach dem Grundsinn der Methode, in dem das Leben sich als Leben lebendig erfaßt“ (GA 58, 248). Dieses befindet sich in einem seine Verhaltungen unausdrücklich tragenden Selbstverständnis, dessen Grundcharaktere in der hermeneutisch-phänomenologischen Aufweisung herauszuheben sind.

Erwächst das theoretische Verhalten aus dem vorontologischen Leben heraus, dann muss die in der Philosophie begrifflich und einstellungsmäßig

vorkommende Vergegenständlichung irgendeinen Grund im Leben selbst finden. „Das faktische Leben gibt sich in einer bestimmten *Deformation*.“ (GA 58, 240) Wenn es eine inhärente Neigung des Lebens aufgrund seiner unheimlichen Schwere selbst ist,⁴ sich selbst unausdrücklich auf eine objektartige Weise zu verstehen und sich so auszudrücken, sodass dieses ganz basale Selbstverständnis stillschweigend auf die philosophische Begriffs- und Theoriebildung übertragen wird, dann muss diese erklärungsbedürftige Lebenstendenz, in die selbstbezogene und sachbezogene Objektivierung abzufallen, rückgängig gemacht werden. Bewegt sich das Philosophieren zunächst im Horizont der begrifflichen Objektivierung, dann können die ihr geläufigen Begriffe nicht zu Hilfe gerufen werden, weil die Gefahr eines Mitmachens der darin implizierten objektivierenden Grundhaltung und des objektartigen Grundverständnisses der Wirklichkeit auftaucht. Die Objektivierung muss vielmehr einer kritischen Destruktion unterzogen werden. Dafür sind Auswahl und Verwandlung der philosophischen Terminologie erforderlich, zumal weil die philosophische Sprache kein neutrales
 30 Mittel ist, das frei von theoretischen Kompromissen wäre. „Unser Weg geht vom faktischen Leben aus“ (GA 60, 65), sodass ganz durchschnittliche und allgemein bekannte Termini im philosophischen Sachfeld aufgenommen werden, um sie als vorsichtige Begrifflichkeit aufzustellen. Offensichtlich sind die formalen Anzeigen *Begriffe*, die einen Anspruch auf die rigorose Erfassung des Wesentlichen erheben. Jedoch „[sind] diese Begriffe nicht eindeutig festgelegt, sondern sie deuten nur hin auf gewisse Phänomene [...] sie haben daher einen bloß formalen Charakter (Sinn der ‚formalen Anzeige‘)“ (GA 58, 248).

Die Formalanzeige als abwehrend-methodische Haltung gegen eine vorfixierte Terminologie und das darin etwa als Gegenstand vorgefasste Seiende integriert in sich drei Momente: a) die Einführung von philosophisch noch nicht terminologisch fixierten Ausdrücken, um „dem unkritischen Verfallen an bestimmte“ (GA 9, 11) gehaltliche Auffassungen zu entgehen,

4 Warum und wie der Vorrang des Sehens und seine philosophisch-wissenschaftliche Prägung im „Theoretischen“ entstanden ist und durchgeführt wurde, kann hier nicht thematisiert werden; vgl. GA 56/57, 35; GA 59, 24, 142; GA 60, 63, 81; GA 63, 90; GA 17, 82, 102, 115, 123, 271; GA 18, 271; GA 19, 24; GA 20, 61, 155, 162, 219, 253; GA 21, 8, 95, 213; GA 25, 291, 296; GA 26, 169, 234.; GA 27, 179.

die darin impliziert wären (Weg-von/Hin-zu); b) in diesen neuen Termini die Vermeidung des Mitbringens von unkritisch aufgenommenen sachhaltigen Bestimmungen des Phänomens (Weg-von); c) die Kontrolle über sich in diese neue Terminologie „möglicherweise“⁵ hineinschiebenden neuen Präjudizen (Hin-zu). Diese terminologische Kontrolle ist nicht bloß eine vorübergehende Übergangsstufe, sondern eine ständige Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber der eigenen Begrifflichkeit und der Möglichkeit eines sich einschleichenden objektivierenden Tendenz. *Formalanzeige meint die abwehrend-vorsichtige Haltung vor einer der Objektivierung entspringenden Begrifflichkeit und die selbstkritische Kontrolle bezüglich einer möglicherweise Präjudizen mitbringenden Terminologie.* Die volle Tragweite dieser gründlichen Gegenbewegung als die geeignete Herangehensweise, verdeckte Grundphänomene wegen der Objektivierung (Uneigentlichkeit) freilegen zu können, lässt sich beständig im Gedankengang von SuZ nachvollziehen. Da die Verdecktheit im nicht-theoretischen und im theoretischen Existenzvollzug den freien Blick auf das Phänomen versperrt, ist es keine Überraschung, wenn die zum Da-sein wesensgehörigen Phänomene und terminologisch neu geprägten Bezeichnungen wie „Sorge, Tod, Gewissen und Schuld“ (SuZ 311) auch die methodologische Rolle übernehmen, schon in ihrer Bezeugung die nächste Verdecktheit des uneigentlichen Daseins zu sprengen. So behält das für die uneigentliche oder sogar auch für die bloß durchschnittliche Ausgelegtheit „Negative“ wohl eine theoretische Fruchtbarkeit, die eine existenziale Positivität im „Negativen“ entdeckt, indem im Gegenzug dazu ein sich zeigendes Phänomen in seiner Ursprünglichkeit ans Licht kommen kann. Deshalb hat die formale Anzeige einen besonders deutlich befreienden Charakter im negativen Sinne, nämlich als die Befreiung von etwas. So ist sie als Wesensmoment der philosophischen Interpretation eine „*gegenruinant[e]*“ (GA 61, 178) Bewegung, wobei das spezifische Korrelat bzw. Wogegen noch genauer zu untersuchen ist.

31

5 „Methode‘ ist in formal anzeigender Bedeutung (z. B. ‚Weg‘) offenzuhalten für eigentliche konkrete Bestimmungen [...], zugleich mit dieser Gewinnung muß auch wieder das möglicherweise durch die formale Bedeutungsanzeige eingedrungene Präjudiz rückgängig gemacht werden.“ (GA 9, 9)

**2. Ansatzmethode gegen die lebensverwurzelte
Objektivierungstendenz und für die begriffliche
Formulierbarkeit des Lebens als nicht kategoriale
Gegenständlichkeit – *begrifflich-strukturelle Aufgabe* (SuZ 39, 44,
67, 75, 114, 154, 311, 426)**

32

Wie ist freilich ein Phänomensachangemessen zu suchen und zu formulieren, wenn dieses nicht den primären Charakter der Gegenständlichkeit hat, aber zugleich doch in eine philosophisch-*theoretische* Eruierung eingebettet ist? Der Befund des „*prohibitiven* (abhaltenden, verwehrenden) *Charakter[s]*“ (GA 61, 141) wird immer wieder hervorgehoben: fürs Erste gegen den Abfall an das objektivierende Selbstverständnis, in dem sich das Leben bei sich selbst je schon aufhält und aus dem es sich vollzieht. „Sofern alles im faktischen Leben erhellt, in irgendwelcher unausdrücklichen Rede steht, in unabgehobener faktisch ruinanter Interpretation ‚ist‘, liegt darin die Möglichkeit und faktische Notwendigkeit [...] der *formalen Anzeige* als Ansatzmethode der existenziellen kategorialen Interpretation.“ (GA 61, 134) Die Formalanzeige steht im Dienst der richtigen begrifflichen Formulierung der kategorialen bzw. existenzialen Erhellung des Seinssinnes des Lebens, und zwar im methodisch vorbereitenden Ansatz für seine Einrückung in das philosophische Untersuchungsfeld. „Es wird sich aber zeigen, daß durch die Explikation des faktischen Daseins das gesamte traditionelle Kategoriensystem gesprengt wird: so radikal neu werden die *Kategorien des faktischen Daseins* sein.“ (GA 60, 54) Die Formalanzeige ist doch ganz im Allgemeinen ein Begriff, jedoch nicht ein Begriff als Kategorie (Existenzial), obwohl diese doch im Rahmen des Seinssinnes des Lebens dank der Formalanzeige als Ansatzmethode gewonnen werden. Denn sie bahnt erst die nicht objektivierende Haltung für die Begriffsbildung der dadurch ermöglichten Interpretation des Seinssinnes des Lebens. Die Formalanzeige ist also nicht eine Existenzialie, sondern sie erlaubt die begriffliche Erfassbarkeit des zu Verstehenden und somit die sprachlich-strukturelle Formulierbarkeit der in sachlicher Angemessenheit heranwachsenden Begriffe. „Sofern die Problematik den Sinnursprung in der Existenz hat – diese selbst vollzugsgeschichtlich faktisch –, sind alle in dieser Problematik aufzudeckenden Sinnexplikate *Existenzialien*.“ (GA 60, 232) Diese auch „*existenzielle Begriffe*“ (GA 59, 37) und „*hermeneutische Begriffe*“

(GA 20, 313) genannten Existenzialien drücken keine vollzugsfreien Attribute, sondern jeweils lebendige Seinscharaktere der Daseinsverfassung aus, die das faktisch Daseiende immer konkret vollzieht, sofern dieses sich je schon vorontologisch in dem darin Indizierten aufhält: Lebensvollzug. Bezüglich der formal-apriorischen Existenzialien der Daseinsverfassung wäre es aber unangebracht über ein bleibendes Substrat zu reden, weil die analytisch-begrifflich gewonnene Formalität jener mitgängigen Wesensmomente im konkreten Existieren immer eigentlich oder uneigentlich, in dieser oder jener Existenzmöglichkeit vollzogen ist. Denn die Existenzialien stehen notwendigerweise in Bezug zu einem faktischen Vollzug, sodass jene nicht abstrakte Kategorien sind, sondern jeweils Seinsarten ausdrücken, die das Dasein *sie seiend* sich entwerfend so oder so zu übernehmen und geworfen je schon so oder so übernommen hat. Die begriffliche Formulierbarkeit der in das Daseiende zurückschlagenden Existenzialien wird durch die Formalanzeige ermöglicht, die im interpretierenden Mitvollzug die existenzielle Konkretion des sich dynamisch vollziehenden Daseins nicht vergegenständlicht. Formuliert sich also die *Kategorie* in der Form der *Aussage*-Struktur im Ort der *Urteilswahrheit* um der Erfassung des *Vorhandenen* willen, dann erweist sich die begriffliche Artikulation der *Existenzialien* in der Gestalt der *Formalanzeige*-Struktur gemäß der *Entdeckungswahrheit*, um das erschließend-entdeckende *Dasein* erfassen zu können. Es ist daher verwirrend zu behaupten, dass die „indicadores formales“ „el equivalente a los ‚existenciaros‘ de *Ser y tiempo*“ (Escudero 2010, 396) sind.⁶

33

Nun, alle Aussagen innerhalb der Daseinsproblematik im Zusammenhang der Fundamentalontologie „haben als ausgesprochene Sätze den Charakter der Anzeige: sie indizieren nur Dasein, während sie als ausgesprochene Sätze doch zunächst Vorhandenes meinen [...], sie indizieren das mögliche Verstehen und die in solchem Verstehen zugängliche mögliche Begreifbarkeit der Daseinsstrukturen“ (GA 21, 410). Die fest-vor-stellende Prädikation

6 Die *Existenzialien* sind in diesem Zeitraum schon begrifflich fixiert (vgl. GA 60, 232). Es ist übrigens nicht sauber, ohne irgendeine Differenzierung über „formal anzeigende Begriffsbildung“, „formal anzeigende Begriffe“, „formal anzeigende Artikulation“, „formal anzeigende Charakterisierung“, „formal angezeigte Phänomene“ und „formal anzeigende Kategorien“ zu sprechen (Cimino 2013, 203, 206, 208, 210).

ist die genuine Weise, eine Aussage über Vorhandenes im weitesten Sinne gemäß der Begrifflichkeit der Kategorien zu machen, weil es sich um ein Seiendes handelt, das hinsichtlich seiner Bestimmungen und Eigenschaften prädikativ abgeschlossen umgrenzt und festgelegt werden kann. Z. B. kann ein Objekt (auch ein „Subjekt“) das über es kategorial Ausgesagte nicht so oder so vollziehen. Natürlich kann der Mensch auch kategorial-prädikativ angesprochen werden, aber dann wäre er auf ein Objekt reduziert, wobei sein Eigenes verfehlt bliebe. Dass das Dasein im Wesentlichen ein existierendes Seinkönnen ist, das seine philosophisch freigelegten Seinscharaktere sie vollzugshaft aufschließend auf sich übernimmt, weil sie immer modifizierbare Weisen seines eigenen zu-seienden Seins sind, zeigt am einfachsten das Phänomen des hermeneutischen Als. Heidegger kann in SuZ dank der Formalanzeige die Erfassbarkeit und Formulierbarkeit des hermeneutischen Als gewinnen, das den primären Vollzugscharakter der Existenzialien ausdrückt. Die formalen Anzeigen sind im Bereich der *hermeneutischen* Als-Struktur der Ausgelegtheit sehr schön sichtbar, in der die verschiedenen Vollzugsweisen des vorthoretischen Verstehens und Verhaltens bzw. Sich-habens bei und mit den Seienden ohne Vergegenständlichung (z. B. Hämmern, Lieben) aus- und aufgewiesen werden. Im Rahmen der Formulierbarkeit ist die Formalanzeige die existenzialanalytische Alternative gegenüber der Weise, in der die Aussageform im *apophantischen* Als kategorial sich zu ihrem Gemeinten verhält.

34

„Die Frage nach dem existenzialen Grundcharakter des Daseins ist wesentlich verschieden von der Frage nach dem Sein eines Vorhandenen.“ (SuZ 181) Das Überspringen der Formalanzeige impliziert ein Verkennen der potentiellen Modifizierbarkeit der daseinsmäßigen Seinsverfassung und der dynamischen Bewegtheit des konkret zu übernehmenden und faktisch so oder so konkret übernommenen Lebensvollzugs, indem jene unter der feststellenden Prädikation als Vorhandenes gestellt wird. Weil das seinkönnende Leben nur im Vollzug *ist* bzw. *existiert* und sich dafür keine theoretische oder praktische Mühe geben muss, vorversteht es sich in seinem lebendigen Vollzug als das so oder so in diesem oder jenem Zu-Vollziehende, *insofern* es sich vollzieht. Das Wörtchen „insofern“ ist entscheidend, weil die Auslegung gemäß ihrer hermeneutischen Als-Struktur abstandlos zu, bei

oder mit dem Auszulegenden sich bereits befindet, in der sich das Dasein in seinem ganz hingeebenen Vollzug vorthoretisch prägt. Dieses kann nicht am Leitfaden der Aussage-Struktur festgestellt werden, weil die feststellende Intentionalität das vollzugshaft-vorontologisch Geöffnete überspringt und nicht auf die eigentümliche vollziehende Beweglichkeit eingehen kann, aus der die Eröffnung des intentionalen Spielraumes allererst entsteht, nämlich die ursprüngliche und in der Objektivierung übersprungene Urlebenserfahrung. „Die Notwendigkeit dieser Vorsichtsmaßregel ergibt sich aus der abfallenden Tendenz der faktischen Lebenserfahrung, die stets ins Objektmäßige abzugleiten droht und aus der wir doch die Phänomene herausheben müssen.“ (GA 60, 64) Kurz: die feststellende Aussage kommt zum selbstverständlich-alltäglichen Vollzugscharakter der existenzialen Lebensbestimmungen als Weisen-zu-sein zu spät. Denn sie kann diese nicht erreichen, und zwar nicht aufgrund eines zu überwindenden thematischen Mangels oder einer irgendwann zu verschärfenden begrifflichen Sauberkeit, sondern wegen ihrer eigenen methodischen Zugangs- und Behandlungsart des Thematisierten selbst, die von einer bestimmten und wieder als selbstverständlich genommenen Seinsidee (Gegenständlichkeit) getragen und geleitet sind. *Die Formalanzeige als sachangemessene Ansatzmethode macht die begrifflich-strukturelle Formulierbarkeit des nicht objektivierten Lebenssinnes aus, indem sie einen möglichen Abfall in die lebendige Neigung der selbstbezogenen und deformierenden Objektivierung verhindert.*

35

3. Bezugnahme auf das Ursprungsverstehen – sachbezogen-horizontaler Gebrauchsspielraum (SuZ 43, 52, 114, 116, 231, 313)

In welchem Phänomenkreis ist die Formalanzeige als terminologisch-begriffliche Zugangsart zuhause? Als vorsichtige Haltung hinsichtlich der verwendeten Terminologie und als Ermöglichung der begrifflichen Formulierbarkeit des nicht kategorial Feststellbaren steht die Formalanzeige nunmehr positiv „im Dienste der Aufgabe der Philosophie [...] des aufmerksam machenden Ursprungsverstehens“ (GA 59, 85). Die noch unbestimmt gelassene positiv-sachliche Richtung der Formalanzeige bekundet sich als ein *Verstehen*, das sein Korrelat im *Ursprung* bzw. im „Dasein“ (GA 59, 75) aus seiner abgefallenen „faktischen Lebenserfahrung“ (GA 59, 85) findet, sofern

„das Selbst im aktuellen Vollzug der Lebenserfahrung, das Selbst im Erfahren seiner selbst die Urwirklichkeit [ist]“ (GA 59, 173)⁷ – wir werden später sehen können, inwiefern die ausdrückliche Miteinbeziehung der thematischen Konstellation des Daseins in die prinzipienforschende Fragestellung nach dem Sein schon im Jahre 1921/22 (GA 61, 60) den Gebrauchsspielraum deutlich ergänzt, indem alles, was nicht gemäß seiner eigenen Seinsweise objektiv-abstandnehmend ursprünglich zu haben ist (z. B. die Zuhandenheit), die formalanzeigende Herangehensweise erforderlich macht. Nun, das bestimmte sachbezogene Gebrauchsfeld der Formalanzeige wird erteilt: Dasein in lebendiger Faktizität. Einige Textstellen erlauben dies zu problematisieren (vgl. GA 9, 11; GA 29/30, 425), denen gemäß der Gebrauchsspielraum der Formalanzeige uneingeschränkt sei, sofern sie die einzige sachgerechte Sprechweise im Horizont der philosophischen Formulierbarkeit wäre. Sie würde in diesem Sinne die „Wesensumgrenzung philosophischen Sprechens als solchen“ (Coriando 1998, 29) meinen.⁸ Diese Interpretation bleibt aber nicht problemfrei. In diesem Falle gäbe es keine philosophische Tradition und
36 Heidegger hätte keinen Gesprächspartner für seine (positive) geschichtliche Destruktion der philosophischen Tradition, in der zugleich die konkrete Auslegungsarbeit aufgrund ihrer wesenskonstitutiven Geschichtlichkeit unvermeidlich steht. „Seiendes kann in seinem Sein bestimmt werden, ohne daß dabei schon der explizite Begriff vom Sinn des Seins verfügbar sein müßte. Wäre dem nicht so, dann könnte es bislang noch keine ontologische Erkenntnis geben, deren faktischen Bestand man wohl nicht leugnen wird.“ (SuZ 7) Deshalb ist es umsichtiger zu behaupten, dass “hay que suponer que no se trata de toda forma posible de hacer filosofía, sino de la filosofía entendida como hermenéutica de la facticidad” (Rodríguez 1997, 162).

Heidegger beschäftigt sich mit dem „Sein, oder bestimmter, im Hinblick auf die Weise, wie solches ‚Sein‘ faßbar ist: [dem] ‚*Seinssinn*““ (GA 61, 58). Weil der Zugang zum Seinssinn aus dem zur Objektivierung tendierenden Leben selbst verbaut und so verborgen wird, worin das Leben ihm bezüglich aber

7 Diese Auffassung der Wirklichkeit entspricht noch nicht der Vorhandenheit von SuZ.

8 So auch van Dijk 1991, 89; de Lara 2008, 181.

zugleich ein vorontologisch verstehendes Verhalten erweist, muss das Leben zuerst in seinem Seinssinn bzw. seiner „Faktizität“ (GA 61, 114; GA 63, 7) als angesetzter Anfang hinsichtlich der Freilegung des Seinssinnes untersucht werden. Es geht letzten Endes darum, die feststellende „Subjektivierung“ und die darin mitspielende vorgestellte „Objektivierung“ abzubauen, beide auf ihr übersprungenes Ursprungsfeld zurückleitend, um die Frage nach dem Seinssinn methodisch sicherstellen zu können. Die methodische Abwehr angesichts einer vergegenständlichenden Herangehensweise, die notwendig die faktisch ursprüngliche und theoretisch unangetastete Lebenserfahrung als Enthüllungsort des Seinssinnes überhaupt verfehlen muss, birgt in sich schon den positiven Fingerzeig in Richtung auf die Sachbezogenheit der Formalanzeige und den so umgrenzten Gebrauchsspielraum. *Die Formalanzeige nimmt aus einer abwehrenden Begrifflichkeit und einer sachentsprechenden Formulierbarkeit auf das lebensbezogene bzw. daseinsmäßige Ursprungsverstehen Bezug.*

4. Tragendes und einer näheren Aufweisung bedürftiges Woraufhin im Horizont der sachgerechten Zugangsart zur Seinsauslegung – *entwerfend-vorwärtsgelende Richtung* (SuZ 8, 28, 35, 53, 116, 313, 314, 324)

37

Wo beginnen? Wie ist das philosophische Verstehen imstande, ein Phänomen in der rechten Weise zu fokussieren, sodass es nicht in einem fremden Lichte untersucht wird? Die Formalanzeige betrifft die terminologisch vor-sichtige und eine Objektivierung abwehrende *Zugangsart* zum begrifflich-formulierbaren Ursprungsverstehen. Dieses Vorgehen muss zugleich ausgehend von einer Vor-blicknahme auf das Phänomen in seinem naiv vorverstandenen Was-gehalt orientiert sein, weil uns ein Phänomen nie in einem Überhaupt-Charakter primär begegnet, sondern immer als dieses oder jenes in einer faktischen Verstehenssituation. Das macht „die sachhaltige Vorbestimmtheit“ (GA 62, 345)⁹ des Phänomens aus, nämlich als was es in seinem Gehalt aufgefasst wird. Am Leitfaden dieses naiv-vorbestimmten

⁹ Eine eingehende und sorgfältige Erläuterung über Blickstand, -habe und -bahn findet sich in de Lara 2008, 130.

Gehaltes etabliert sich der erfragende Hinblick, worauf das so verstandene Phänomen demontierend schrittweise ausgelegt wird. „Den methodischen Gebrauche eines Sinnes, der leitend wird für die phänomenologische Explikation, nennen wir die ‚formale Anzeige‘. Was der formal anzeigende Sinn in sich trägt, daraufhin werden die Phänomene angesehen.“ (GA 60, 55) Angesichts des genannten Sinnes, worin sich das verstehbare Sichzeigen von etwas *als* dieses oder jenes aufhält, bekundet sich die Formalanzeige als *sinntragende Vorzeichnung des sachhaltig vorverstandenen Phänomens und auch als die Perspektive, woraufhin die herangehende Auslegung es stellt. Die Formalanzeige hat einen anfänglichen und zugleich vorläufig-orientierenden Charakter, der jeweiligen phänomenalen Aufweisung noch entbehrend*. Z. B. bleibt der Sinn von Sein für die Hinblicknahme auf ihn noch aus, sodass er der Untersuchung die genaue Orientierung nicht geben kann. Es ist noch nicht bekannt, „welches Sein führend“ ist. Deshalb ist die „Direktive (formale Anzeige)“ der nicht invasive „Sinn von Sein“ (GA 62, 274) als ganz formaler Aufenthaltsort der Verständlichkeit überhaupt, ohne im Voraus das Verstandene (Sein) voreilig als Gegenständlichkeit zu setzen oder vorauszusetzen.

38

Bestimmt sich die jeweilige Methode und die dazugehörige Begrifflichkeit aus dem entsprechend zu behandelnden Sachverhalt hinsichtlich seines Seins (Sache-Methode), so ist die Legitimität der methodisch-begrifflichen Zugangsweise erst aus der Seinsverfassung des zu thematisierenden Seienden im Seinshorizont zu gewinnen. Heideggers Hauptthema ist ja nicht das Seiende, sondern „das *Sein* des Seienden“ (SuZ 35). Aber gerade das Sein und die Seinsverfassung des Seienden müssten allererst durch die geeignete Methode erfasst werden (Methode-Sache). Das ist klar zirkelhaft: die methodische Zugangsart entscheidet sich aus der jeweiligen Seinsverfassung eines Seienden und zugleich wird diese Seinsverfassung erst durch die adäquate Zugangsart gewonnen. Das ist ein Widerspruch, es sei denn, das immer auslegende Dasein befände sich bereits mit dem Sein des Seienden vorontologisch vertraut, und zwar aufgrund des Faktums des Seinsverständnisses. Darauf beruht die Notwendigkeit der Formalanzeige in der entwerfenden Vorzeichnung des Seinssinnes anhand eines als so oder so vorverstandenen Phänomens (in der alltäglichen Naivität). Im vorliegenden Zusammenhang wäre die wegweisende Behauptung zu verankern, dass „in der formalanzeigenden Vorwegnahme

dessen, was allererst in konkreter Analyse zum Aufweis gebracht werden soll, sich das Eigentümliche des hermeneutischen Zirkels [bekundet]“ (von Herrmann 1994, 276), der in SuZ erst im systematisch dargestellten Befund der Vor-Struktur des Verstehens und seiner Verwurzelung im zeitlichen Vor-Charakter der existenzialen Sorgestruktur verständlich wird. Die Möglichkeit der Vorläufigkeit gründet offensichtlich in einem Seienden, das in seiner eigenen Seinsverfassung das Strukturmoment des „Vor“ enthalten kann, d. h. das als Sorge wesensbestimmt ist.

Weil diese Vorwegnahme nicht nur dem philosophisch-auslegenden Denkvollzug als solchem gehört, sondern auch im Kontext des architektonischen Aufbaus und der darstellenden Exposition zu finden ist, kann sie auch „in methodisch-didaktischer Hinsicht“ (Coriando 1998, 29) aufgefasst werden. Hier ist Rede von der formalen Anzeige als einer konturgebenden Skizze, die einen deutlichen Charakter der durch weitere Erforschung zu beseitigenden Unvollständigkeit innehat, und zwar dank einer näheren Aus- und Aufweisung in der mitgehenden Auslegung durch die durchschnittliche Alltäglichkeit unterwegs zur Freilegung ihrer in der seinsverstehenden Sorgestruktur fundierten apriorischen Grundcharaktere. Der methodisch propädeutische Übergangscharakter ist freilich keine Äußerlichkeit: „*Formal angezeigt*“ heißt nicht, irgendwie nur vorgestellt, vermeint, angedeutet [...] sondern angezeigt so, daß das, was gesagt ist, [...] Richtung bestimmend, anzeigend, bindend“ (GA 61, 33) ist. Ihre Wichtigkeit für den methodisch gesicherten Anfang in einer sachgemäßen Zugangsart wird innerhalb der „*ontologische[n] Phänomenologie*“ (GA 61, 60) klar ins Zentrum eingerückt: „Gerade weil der *Zugangs- und Aneignungsvollzug* in Hinsicht auf ihren Gegenstand das *Hauptstück der Philosophie* ausmacht, bedarf es schon im Ansatz einer entsprechenden *formalen Anzeige* des Gegenstandes“ (GA 61, 113), sonst gäbe es keinen Anfangsort. Im Ursprungsverstehen wird das faktische Dasein in seinem Seinssinn eruiert, nämlich angesichts der Verständlichkeitsermöglichung des Lebensvollzugs aus ausgelegten und auslegenden Bewegtheiten (Weisen zu sein), die den jeweiligen Vollzug vorgängig mitgängig durchherrschen. Aus den trivialsten und der wasgehaltlichen Vorzeichnung bodengebenden Selbstverständlichkeiten und in gleichlaufender destruierender Auseinandersetzung ihnen gegenüber wird die

Faktizität sie mitgehend-auslegend im Hinblick auf ihre Seinsbestimmungen aus- und aufgewiesen. „In der Blicktendenz auf das jeweilige Dasein in seiner durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit ist die formale Anzeige der Vorhabe, ‚Faktisches Leben (Dasein) besagt: Sein in einer Welt‘, anschaulich auszuweisen.“ (GA 63, 85)

5. Sachliche Aneignung der hermeneutischen Situation hinsichtlich der konstitutiven Voraussetzungen – *situativ-rückwärtsgehende Richtung* (SuZ 150, 232, 310)

40 Wie kann die Philosophie den letztphilosophischen Anspruch erheben, den Seinssinn zu thematisieren, wenn er die vorausgesetzte und bodengebende Bedingung jeder Verständlichkeit überhaupt ermöglicht, die darüber hinaus faktisch in eine geschichtliche Situation eingebettet ist? „*Sinn ist das durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff strukturierte Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird.*“ (SuZ 151)¹⁰ Der Entwurf ist nicht abstrakt oder souverän, sondern er befindet sich gleichursprünglich auf interpretativen Voraussetzungen wegen seiner geworfenen Faktizität, sodass das Woraufhin zugleich rückwärts auf sein Wovonher hin eruiert werden muss, um jede Naivität fernzuhalten. Diese Selbsterhellung ist formalanzeigend auch im letztgenannten Sinne als vorsichtig-orientierende, weil die

10 Diese dem eigenen Auslegungsboden zugewandte Erhellung geschieht am Leitfaden von Vorhabe, -sicht und -griff, die vor und in jedem basalen Auslegungsanfang im Spiel sind. Die Vorhabe ist die vorverstehende, antizipierende, vorwegnehmende und begegnenlassende Erschließungsweise hinsichtlich des Gehabten, wozu sich die Untersuchung verhält. Die Vorsicht bezieht sich darauf, dass das Thematisierte immer im offenen Horizont einer geschichtlichen Ausgelegtheit und in einer möglichen Auslegbarkeit am Leitfaden eines bestimmten Seinsverständnisses, das über die Entdecktheitsweise entscheidet, betrachtet wird. Der Vorgriff erlaubt eine bestimmte Begrifflichkeit für die Auslegung des so Gemarkten. Das Verstehen eines Themas vollzieht sich immer im Bereich einer jeweiligen Weise, dieses im Denken und Sprechen auszulegen und begrifflich zu artikulieren. Die Begrifflichkeit ist zunächst nichts anderes als die vorherrschende Sprechweise, in der es sprachlich gehabt und sehen gelassen wird. Durch das methodisch-thematische Abbauen durch Vorgriff, Vorsicht und Vorhabe gelangt die phänomenologische Destruktion in die geschichtlich geprägte Grunderfahrung des vorverstandenen Seins, in der sein vorausgesetzter Sinn freigelegt wird.

Aufdeckung der eigenen und auszuweisenden Voraussetzung nur mittels einer destruierenden Auseinandersetzung mit der eigenen faktisch-situativen Gesetztheit geschieht, von der es thematisch *noch* kein Außerhalb gibt, sodass nur ein „*Rückspringen*“ (GA 64, 94) offen bleibt. Wird der Auslegungsanfang *anfänglich* problematisiert, dann gibt es für den Blickstand keine anderen Koordinaten als das faktisch geschichtlich-denkerische Überlieferte, durch die in ihm selbst sich schon befindende Problematisierung (Heideggers Untersuchung) erst die Blickschiebung auf einen anderen Sinnhorizont und der neue Blickstand aus diesem erfolgen können. Ist die hermeneutische Phänomenologie eine Auslegung, die u. a. darin besteht, das vorontologische Seinsverständnis ausdrücklich zu machen, in dem die eigene Untersuchung auch steht und von dem sie ausgeht, dann müssen die Vor-Strukturen in ihrem konkret vorausgehenden Gehalt aufgedeckt werden, um die tragende Leitidee des Seins auszuweisen. Die faktische Gebundenheit der philosophischen Untersuchung an eine Situation ist die zwanglose Folge des Tatbestandes, dass die Philosophie als konkrete Möglichkeit des Menschen auch dem Boden (sei es auch als Gegenbewegung) des faktischen Lebens entspringt. Diese *Bedeutung bewegt sich in einer methodologischen Ebene als Sache der Besinnung, sofern es genau darum geht, die konstitutiven Voraussetzungen des geschichtlichen Blickstandes ausdrücklich zu machen und sehen zu lassen*. Formalanzeigend führt die „methodisch interpretative *Gegenbewegung* bis zum faktischen Ausgang zurück, so zwar, daß jetzt das *Methodische*, d. h. ausdrücklich Vollzugshafte, als genuines zur Aneignung kommt“ (GA 61, 183), sofern die „*Standpunktfreiheit* [...] ausdrückliche *Aneignung des Blickstandes*“ (GA 63, 83) ist. In dieser rückbezogen-methodologischen Selbsterhellung wird vom spezifischen Untersuchungsthema provisorisch abgesehen, um die eigene Untersuchungslage in ihren geschichtlich geprägten Voraussetzungen zu thematisieren. Der Abbau der eigenen hermeneutischen Verstehenssituation (geschichtlich-faktisches Leben) führt also positiv zur *sachlichen* Anvisierung des voraussetzungsvollen und bodengebenden Blickstandes der Auslegung.

6. Freiseinlassen der Bezugsmannigfaltigkeit als Bewahrung des jeweiligen Vollzugssinnes der Sache – *intern-konstitutives Formalitätsmoment* (SuZ 67, 69, 309, 312)

Die hermeneutische Situation und das vorzeichnende Woraufhin der Auslegung halten das Phänomen in seine situative Bezogenheit und in seine darin zur Entscheidung gebrachte Erfahrungsweise hinein, die nicht notwendigerweise oder primär eine abstandnehmend theoretische Erfahrung sein muss. Z. B.: wie wird eine Katze in ihrem Sein *verstanden*, worauf wir uns *beziehen*, wenn wir mit ihr *spielen*? „Das Formale ist etwas Bezugsmäßiges.“ (GA 60, 63) Das „Formale“ der Formalanzeige steht in keinem Zusammenhang mit einer abstrahierenden Formalisierung, sodass diese irgendwann zu einer Entformalisierung kommen müsste. Eben weil die Formalanzeige „außerhalb des einstellungsmäßig Theoretischen“ (GA 60, 59) fällt, ist in diesem Phänomen „die Bedeutung von ‚formal‘ [...] *ursprünglicher*“ (GA 60, 59), und zwar aufgrund ihrer Einbettung in einem dem Theoretischen vorhergehenden Ursprungsbereich, nämlich dem vollzugsmäßigen Beisichsein des Lebens in seinem nicht abgehobenen vortheoretischen Selbstverständnis. Einer Forschungsinterpretation zufolge müssten die „formalisierte[n] Sinncharaktere“ irgendwann sich „*entformalisieren*“ lassen, „indem man in der Erste-Person-Perspektive der formal angezeigten Sinnrichtung nachgeht und die Konkretion erreicht“ (Cimino 2013, 211, 209). Es gibt einen inneren Widerspruch in dieser Auffassung: Weil hier die Formalität primär als die was-gehaltliche Bestimmung eines Seienden verstanden wird, müsste die nachträgliche Entformalisierung eine vorhergehende und gerade zu vermeidende vergegenständlichende Einstellung voraussetzen, sofern die Formalisierung nichts anderes als ein theoretisch-eingestellter Akt ist, von dem aber die Formalanzeige ausdrücklich abgegrenzt wird. Vielmehr spielt die Formalität nicht mit dem zu erfassenden bzw. begreifenden Gehalt (*Gehaltssinn*) zusammen, sondern eher mit dem Bezug (*Bezugssinn*), der für den Zugang zum Gehalt erforderlich ist. Die Formalität lässt den auf das was-gehaltliche Phänomen eingehenden und entdeckenden Bezug offen, um dadurch die zu vollziehende Bezugsrichtung für sein geeignetes Haben hervorzuheben (*Vollzugssinn*), ohne es im Voraus zu objektivieren. Diesbezüglich behauptet Rodríguez ganz zutreffend:

el sentido de una indicación formal, que es una expresión conceptual, universal, no es estar referido a una entidad objetiva dada [...], sino literalmente, *seguir una indicación* [...]; su vaciedad formal consiste precisamente en que indica un hacia dónde, no en presentar una entidad ‚formal‘. (Rodríguez 1997, 168)

Die Formalität erlaubt die „Explikation des Bezugsinns innerhalb seines Vollzugs“ (GA 60, 62), sodass die theoretisch-vorstellenden, theoretisch-auslegenden, praktischen, ästhetischen, herstellenden oder indifferenten Bezüge jeweils angesichts ihres entsprechenden Vollzugs zu ihrem Recht kommen können. Der Bezugssinn betrifft die sich erschließende Haltung gegenüber einem Seienden, aus der her dieses entdeckt und in seine Entdeckung so oder so eingerückt wird. So kann sich ein Phänomen mannigfaltig zeigen, indem die auf es zugehende Ausgerichtetheit diesem oder jenem Bezug entspricht. Z. B. ist der unausdrückliche Seinssinn, der den hinsehend-abstandnehmenden Bezugssinn verständlich macht, die vorherige Auffassung des Seienden als Gegenstand im Lichte der Seiendheit als Gegenständlichkeit. „Ein Blick auf die Geschichte der Philosophie ergibt, daß die formale Bestimmtheit des Gegenständlichen die Philosophie völlig beherrscht. Wie kann diesem Präjudiz, diesem Vorurteil vorgebeugt werden? Das leistet gerade die *formale Anzeige*.“ (GA 60, 63) Die Formalanzeige ist ein strategisches Manöver, das vor einer vorherigen Vergegenständlichung und einer selbstverständlich angenommenen Gegenständlichkeit behütet. Die Thematisierung muss sich mit der zugangsbestimmenden Bezugsweise beschäftigen, und zwar im Rahmen der sich selbst deformierenden faktischen Lebenserfahrung, aus der die Verkenntung der Bezüge bzw. der unausdrücklich zur Verabsolutierung gebrachte objektivierende Bezugssinn aufgeht. „Dieser Bezugssinn soll in der Schwebe gehalten werden, nicht in dem Sinne, daß er verschwindet, sondern so, daß er *eigentlich vollzogen wird*“ (Oudemans 1990, 94), sofern er *als* theoretischer Bezugssinn unter mehreren allererst entdeckt wird.

Durch die Entdeckung des verabsolutierten Bezugsinns in geschichtlicher Auseinandersetzung mit der Philosophie können andere Bezüge allererst in ihrer Möglichkeit und Verbergungsmotivation freigelegt werden. Da aus dem

Bezugssinn sich die Erfahrung und das darin sich artikulierende Erfahrene bestimmen, mag dadurch die Möglichkeit bewahrt werden, die genuine Weise des „Habens“ eines Phänomens nicht von Hause aus als theoretisch oder gar praktisch zu brandmarken, indem es Phänomene gibt, die nicht ursprünglich im so gearteten Verhalten gehabt werden, wie z. B. die völlig selbstverständliche Unauffälligkeit der Zuhandenheit, die nur ursprünglich zu erfahren bzw. zu haben ist, indem sie im Gebrauch am Leitfaden des hermeneutischen Als unthematisch bleibt. Zwar ist die Formalanzeige „äußerlich“ eine Aussage, die aber nach ihrer unumgänglichen Kenntnisaufnahme von der theoretisch-abstandnehmenden Bezugnahme von ihr weg weist, sodass ein Verbleib beim Aussagegehalt aus einem theoretischen Bezugssinn nur auf halbem Wege stecken bleibt. Um das *volle* Verständnis zu erreichen, muss sich der formalanzeigende Aussagegehalt auf den Vollzug übertragen, da gerade „der Vollzugscharakter noch frei bleibt“ (GA 60, 63). Denn „es bleibt also immer eine wesensmäßige Distanz zwischen dem indizierenden Begriff und dem konkreten Vollzug“ (Blust 1987, 195), der eigens vom Mitvollzieher des Aussagegehaltes zu übernehmen ist.

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„Ein Phänomen muß so vorgegeben sein, daß sein Bezugssinn in der Schwebelage gehalten wird. Man muß sich davor hüten, anzunehmen, sein Bezugssinn sei ursprünglich der theoretische.“ (GA 60, 63) Über das Schwebelassen wird behauptet, dass „l’indicazione formale è in Heidegger il metodo per svolgere una sorta di epoché fenomenologica sul piano espressivo-linguistico“ (Lazzari 2002, 127) und dass die Formalanzeige „sich mühelos mit der methodischen Strategie der phänomenologischen Epoché in Zusammenhang bringen [läßt]“ (Cimino 2013, 211). Dies ist bei allem Respekt irreführend. Heidegger geht es vielmehr um die Vermeidung der stillschweigend sich andrängenden Auslegungstendenz am Leitfaden der Vorhandenheit aus einer feststellenden Vorstellung, die in der Epoché „der Generalthesis der natürlichen Einstellung“ (Husserl 2009, 61) vorausgesetzt und in ihrer Bestrebung um unbeteiligt-hinsehenden Abstand zugespitzt wird, sofern „mit der Ausschaltung des Wirklichen [...] nicht die Wirklichkeit“ (GA 26, 229) in ihrer „Form Gegenstand“ (Husserl 2012, 80) als einzig zugelassene Seinsweise ausgeschaltet. Deswegen ist es nur folgerichtig und zwar erforderlich, dass Heidegger den existenziellen von dem eidetischen

Sinne der Formalität abgrenzt (vgl. GA 61, 33). *Das Formalitätsmoment lässt die Möglichkeiten der verschiedenen Bezugssinne frei werden, sodass darin der zu übernehmende Vollzug des im Aussagegehalt Enthaltenen betont wird, da das gehaltlich Angezeigte nur vollzugshaft genuin gehabt wird, wobei das Ursprungsverstehen erreicht wird.*

Es wäre aber auch zu unilateral zu sagen, dass „der Gehalt, die Bestimmungen des Gegenstandes, *nicht* das Thema sein [soll] [...] Es soll vielmehr darum gehen, daß der Gegenstand als solcher zwar nicht gegeben ist, dem Verstehensvollzug aber die Richtung anzeigt.“ (Oudemans 1990, 87) Erstens wäre ohne irgendeine Akzentuierung der Sachbezogenheit nur noch das sachentfremdete, bodenlose Gerede übrig, was mit der maßgebenden Sachverwurzelung der Fundamentalontologie unverträglich bleibt. Wohl ist das jeweilige Phänomen „als Thema einer *Betrachtung* [...] Gegenstand; das besagt aber nichts darüber, ob es das auch sein muß für die Erfahrungsart, in der es *da* ist und in der eigentlich die Analyse sich vollzieht“ (GA 63, 47). D. h. die thematische Sache von größter Wichtigkeit, diskutiert wird nur die Geeignetheit der theoretischen Bezugsweise, zumal wenn sie als die einzige betrachtet wird. Zweitens, das für die verstehende Kenntnisnahme präsentierte Phänomen muss da sein, und zwar in der einzigen für Heideggers Untersuchung verfügbaren Ausdrucksweise bzw. die Aussage gemäß einem theoretischen Bezugssinn. „Der äußeren ‚Grammatik‘ nach unterscheiden sich fundamentalontologische Sätze *nicht* von apophantischen Aussagen.“ (Coriando 1998, 31)¹¹ Doch ist aber das Phänomen als Aussagegehalt nur unvollständig dargestellt. Es wird in seiner echten Fülle erst durch den übernehmenden und den Bezugssinn modifizierenden Vollzug vervollständigt. Es kommt vor allem darauf an, die faktisch-seinsbezogenen Weisen-zu-sein durch die philosophisch-theoretische Aufweisung zum Vorschein kommen zu lassen und so für das den Vollzug fordernde Verstehen eine freie Blickbahn zu eröffnen. Dank der Freilegung der verschiedenen Bezugssinne ist die vollzugshafte Gewinnung des indizierten Phänomens in seinem konkreten

¹¹ Ob das auf einer „tendenziellen [...] Befreiung von der Grammatik“ (Coriando 1998, 31) beruht oder eine „Verlegung der Grammatik“ (Oudemans 1990, 85) meint, bleibt als Problem dahingestellt.

Gehalt zugänglich, weil gerade die Unvollständigkeit der „Aussage“ ertappt wurde.

7. Existenzieller Appell zur eigenständig-vollzugshaften Übernahme aus der indizierenden Wegweisung – *intern- konstitutives Anzeigemoment* (SuZ 36, 42, 295, 303)

46 Die Formalität des Bezugs bringt die Unvollständigkeit des dargestellten Phänomens mit sich, die nur im jeweiligen Vollzug vervollständigt wird. Das Phänomen plus sein Vollzug ist gerade das Angezeigte. Diese mitzudenkenden Einsichten sind schwer nachzuvollziehen, weil, sofern der theoretische Gehalt zur Kenntnis genommen ist und man ihn ausdrücklich zu vollziehen versucht, der theoretische Bezugssinn immer noch in Geltung und der Zugang zu ihm versperrt bleibt, da es letztlich nicht auf ein feststellendes Sehen ankommt, sondern auf ein Vollziehen, das jeder „jeseinig“ zu übernehmen hat. Z. B. kann man nicht einfach die selbstverständliche Unauffälligkeit des zuhandenen Gebrauches „sehen“, sondern nur in der Unaufmerksamkeit (!) erfahren. Deswegen können die offenbarten Sachen nur *formal angezeigt* und wesensmäßig nicht voll-kommen vor Augen gehalten werden, weil die Pointe darin besteht, dass die „Weise des *genuinen Gehabtwerdens*“ bzw. des „Zum-Haben-Bringens“ (GA 61, 18, 19) des jeweiligen Phänomens nur im Vollzug erreichbar ist. Diesbezüglich ermöglicht das Anzeigemoment eine doppelte Schwierigkeit zu überwinden, nämlich die Spannung zwischen a) einer von außen kommenden, aufrufenden Indikation, die auf das Dasein fällt, ohne einen theoretisch-feststellenden und vollzugshaft-normativen Charakter verteidigen zu wollen, und b) dem positiven Aufmerksammachen der gemeinig-eigenständigen Übernahme des Indizierten. In diesem Zusammenhang wird der existenzielle Anspruch der Formalanzeige ans Licht gebracht, indem ihre Betonung im übernahmefähig-vollzugshaften Aspekt der formalanzeigenden „Aussage“ fällt. Darin kommt eine „Vor-,kehrung“ (GA 61, 20) angesichts des Gehaltlichen zugunsten des Vollzugscharakters des Angezeigten zustande, weil das gemeinige Dasein selbst sich in die Verhaltens- und Verstehenssituation begeben muss, um das Indizierte konkret in seiner Fülle zu erfahren. Nicht nur der „Aussage“gehalt ist hier ausschlaggebend, obzwar dieser für das Verstehen wesensnotwendig gemäß dem Wie-Was-Gefüge ist, sondern

ebenso das durch einen Vollzug und im Vollzug zu erreichende Phänomen dank der Verwandlung des offen gehaltenen Bezugssinns. Das hat nur eine wohlbegründete Legitimität, weil das Thema der theoretischen Ausarbeitung Heideggers der faktische Lebenssinn des Daseins im Horizont der Seinsfrage ist, welches das über es Angezeigte eigenständig übernehmen kann: „Ich muß auch im Verstehen den definitiven Gehalt gerade in Beziehung setzen zu..., was besagt, der Gehalt, die Bestimmungen, die vom Gegenstand gegeben werden, dürfen gerade *nicht als solche Thema werden*, sondern das erfassende Verstehen hat der angezeigten Sinnrichtung nachzugehen.“ (GA 61, 32)¹² Die Weisung vom was-gehaltlichen Thema als solchem „weg“ und auf das darin Indizierte hin ist nicht eine Herabminderung seiner sachlichen Wichtigkeit und eine Einladung in das sachentfremdete Gerede, sondern gerade die Möglichkeitsbedingung dafür, sich in die Dimension zu versetzen, in der das Thema erst genuin zu haben ist. „Der Gehalt ist ein solcher, dessen Aneignung eine eigene *konkrete Vollzugsaufgabe* ist“ (GA 61, 61),¹³ nämlich in der faktischen Situation des Lebens.

Diese Erläuterung betrifft nicht die begriffliche Herangehensweise eines jeglichen Themas im ozeanischen Philosophiebereich, sondern nur „die existenziell formal-anzeigende prinzipielle Definition“ (GA 61, 32), in der die im eigenen Verstehensvollzug zu übernehmende Konkretion des gehaltlich angezeigten Phänomens „eine Aufgabe [...] darstellt“ (GA 61, 32), die „dem Einzelnen überlassen“ (GA 61, 134) bleibt. *Die lebensbezogene Schwierigkeit des Sicheinlassens in die zu vollziehende Konkretion aufgrund der objektivierenden Tendenz bedarf einer darauf orientierten Anzeige*, weil „das faktische Leben eigentlich immer auf der Flucht vor dem Prinzipiellen ist, dann kann nicht wunder nehmen, daß die zueignende Umkehr zu ihm nicht ‚so ohne weiteres‘ da ist“ (GA 61, 72). Die vollzugshafte Übernahme

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12 Z. B. angesichts des „ego cogito“ bei Descartes: „Nimmt man dagegen diesen Satz im Sinne einer *formalen Anzeige*, so, daß er nicht direkt genommen wird (wo er nichts besagt), aber auf die jeweilige Konkretion dessen, was er gerade meint, bezogen wird, so hat er sein Recht“ (GA 17, 250), nämlich das Phänomen des Sich-mit-Habens.

13 Das existenzielle Moment der Formalanzeige ist mehrmals betont worden, vgl. Blust 1987, 60; Oudemans 1990, 89; van Dijk 1991, 93; Coriando 2002, 14; de Lara 2008, 193; Escudero 2010, 414; Rubio 2011, 87, 93.

des durch den Gehalt einzuholenden und zu verstehenden Angezeigten wird im mit ihm wesensverbundenen Formalitätsmoment verankert. Weil das „Formale“ den Bezugssinn zum betreffenden Seienden offenlässt, kommt als seine Komplementierung der zu übernehmende Vollzug des Angezeigten um des Erreichens des geeigneten Verstehens willen zum Ausdruck. Z. B. diese Indikationsvalenz wird in SuZ im Phänomen der vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit deutlich herausgestellt. „Die *formale Anzeige* ist immer mißverstanden, wenn sie als fester, allgemeiner Satz genommen und mit ihr konstruktiv dialektisch deduziert und phantasiert wird.“ (GA 63, 80) Das nur deduktive Verfahren würde *in diesem hermeneutisch-phänomenologischen Zusammenhang* gegen die Verfolgung des formal Angezeigten im faktischen Existieren innerhalb einer Verstehenssituation stoßen und die Freilegung seines existenzial-ontologischen Ursprungsverstehens verhindern, das aus seinem sinntragenden Ort im seinsverstehenden Dasein entspringt und das auf das jemeinige Daseiende in seiner wesensausmachenden Zusammengehörigkeit zur Offenständigkeit in der Erschlossenheit des Seins überhaupt hineinzeigt.

48 Die zwei letztgenannten Bedeutungen werden einige Jahre nach SuZ merkwürdigerweise in einer Vorlesung (GA 29/30, 425–430) knapp und akribisch wiederaufgenommen. Hiermit schützt die formale Anzeige vor der sich leicht einschleichenden Unterschiedslosigkeit zwischen einer vorhandenen Eigenschaft und einem zu vollziehenden Existenzial, das wesentlich vollzugshafte Übernahmemöglichkeit in sich birgt. Die darin vorausgesetzte Grundunterscheidung zwischen den Seinsweisen der Vorhandenheit (im weitesten Sinne) und der Existenz begründet den existenziellen Appell an eine Verwandlung der jemeinigen Erschlossenheitsweise als eigentliches Da-sein,¹⁴ die im gelungen philosophischen Verstehen vom fundamentalontologisch Aufgezeigten mitbeschlossen liegt. Deshalb ist es zutreffend zu statuieren, dass die formalen Anzeigen „Bewegungsbegriffe [sind]: Sie initiieren methodisch eine hermeneutische Dynamik, die das Philosophieren in seiner Jemeinigkeit ‚bewegen‘ kann“ (Imdahl 1994, 320). Diese Bewegung kann nur aus der jemeinigen Aktualisierung des formalangezeigt Vorbereiteten und durch die Einlassung in die indizierte Verstehenssituation geschehen, in der gerade

14 Für eine vorwiegend ethische Interpretation vgl. Escudero 2010, 411 ff.

die Verhaltens- und Verstehensweise des Mich-habens (Erschlossenheit) sich ändert, weshalb die Bezugsweise (Entdeckung) des Seienden zugleich sich modifiziert. Denn die nächste Vertrautheit zwischen den Seienden als angeblich selbstverständlich daliegenden Vorhandenen wird hinsichtlich der Fraglichkeit des existierenden Da-seins und des Seins erschüttert, sodass in dieser abwendenden Blickrichtung, „weg“ von der beruhigenden Verabsolutierung der Vorhandenheit, das sich erschließende und entdeckende Da-sein in seiner Ausgesetztheit zu sich selbst, bei den nichtdaseinsmäßig Seienden und mit den Mitdaseienden positiv erfahren wird. Die Blickrichtung wendet sich letzten Endes auf die in den offenen Seienden überhaupt sich verbergende *Erschlossenheit des Seins überhaupt* hin, die gerade um der Offenbarkeit des Seienden willen verborgen bleibt.

Sie sind anzeigend, darin ist gesagt: Der Bedeutungsgehalt dieser Begriffe meint und sagt nicht direkt das, worauf er sich bezieht, er gibt nur eine Anzeige, einen Hinweis darauf, daß der Verstehende von diesem Begriffszusammenhang aufgefordert ist, eine Verwandlung seiner selbst in das Dasein zu vollziehen. (GA 29/30, 430)

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8. Fazit

Ohne den philosophischen „Schwindel“ dieses zirkelhaften Phänomenzusammenhanges leugnen zu können, stehen die sieben anvisierten Hauptprägungen als interpretatorische Koordinate im Dienst einer näheren Verständlichkeit der formalen Anzeige in SuZ. Nur skizzenhaft kann vorsichtig statuiert werden: Das Vorkommen der Formalanzeige in SuZ ist in einem vierfach verwurzelten und miteinander fundierten Sinnzusammenhang verständlich: 1) die Unmöglichkeit des abstandnehmend-hinsehenden Blicks, die Anwesenheits- und Begegnungsweisen in der selbstverständlichen Alltäglichkeit zu erfassen, sofern diese nicht „objektiv“ zu haben ist – *Destruktion der invasiven Objektivierung als fest-vor-stellende Prädikation*; 2) die wesentliche Unabgeschlossenheit des Da-seins im endlichen Seinkönnen, das in seiner faktisch immer zu vollziehenden Konkretion niemals „fixiert“ werden kann – *Reduktion im präservierenden Seinlassen als mitgehende*

Auslegung; 3) die Vor-Struktur des Verstehens und die hermeneutische Als-Struktur der Auslegung, deren Gesehenes und Ausgelegtes in der Daseinsthematik am Ursprünglichsten im vorontologischen Vollzug zu haben ist – *Konstruktion im konservierenden Sehenlassen als erläuternde Aufzeigung*; 4) die seinsverstehende Sorgeverfassung als Grundbestimmung des Daseins, das der rück- und vorwärtsgehenden Existenzbahn (Gewesenheit-Gegenwart-Zukunft) dank seines zeitlichen Sinnes offensteht – *das geworfen-entwerfende Voraus-setzen als Ursprungsbereich der Formalanzeige*.

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METAPHYSICS AND DEATH IN EUGEN FINK'S THOUGHT

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Abstract

The aim of the contribution is to present and then question the thesis of Eugen Fink, Husserl's last assistant and Heidegger's student, on the inability of metaphysics to deal adequately with the problem of death. According to Fink, metaphysics, even though it sees the problem of death as its "existential" motive, is unable to transform it into its own object, since metaphysical concepts crumble in the face of the unspeakable power of death. The fatal difficulty of metaphysics consists, however, in the attempt to

conceive death in “phenomenal” terms, that is, starting from the presence of the entity based on its individuation; in other words, metaphysical conceptualizations always confront the single thing at the root of the understanding of being as presence. The latter is divided into three fundamental moments: the rise between earth and sky of the entity in its presence; the revealing of things to man, an entity endowed with reason, and therefore the ever-human reference of the apparition of things; the placing of man at the center of the totality of entities in time. But the philosophical understanding of death can offer us the opportunity to turn to a non-phenomenal dimension, that of absence, from which it is possible to fully understand the original moment of the evidence of things in their individuation.

Keywords: Eugen Fink, metaphysics, death, presence, absence.

Metafizika in smrt v misli Eugena Finka

Povzetek

54 Priskevek predstavi in nato pod vprašaj postavi tezo Eugena Finka, Husserlovega zadnjega asistenta in Heideggrovega študenta, o nezmožnosti metafizike, da bi adekvatno obravnavala problem smrti. Po Finku metafizika, čeprav v tem problemu razpozna lastni »eksistencialni« motiv, smrti ne zmore spremeniti v svoj objekt, ker se metafizični pojmi razdrobijo spričo neizgovorljive moči smrti. Usodna težava metafizike namreč obstaja v poskus zajetja smrti s »fenomenalnimi« termini, se pravi, začeni s prisotnostjo entitete, temelječo na njeni individuaciji; z drugimi besedami, metafizične konceptualizacije se s posameznimi zadevami soočajo na osnovi razumevanja biti kot prisotnosti. Slednje sestavljajo trije temeljni momenti: dvig entitete v njeni prisotnosti med zemljo in nebom; razkrivanje zadev človeku kot entiteti, obdarjeni z razumom, in potemtakem zgolj-človeško razgrinjanje prikazovanja zadev; postavitve človeka v središče totalitete entitet v času. Toda filozofsko razumevanje smrti nam lahko ponudi priložnost, da se obrnemo k nefenomenalni razsežnosti, se pravi, razsežnosti odsotnosti, z vidika katere je mogoče popolnoma dojeti izvorni okoliščino razvidnosti zadev v njihovi individuaciji.

Ključne besede: Eugen Fink, metafizika, smrt, prisotnost, odsotnost.

Eugen Fink's examination of the problem of death involves different interpretive perspectives which unfold throughout his philosophical work. The first treatment starts from the analysis of the fundamental phenomena of human existence; the second sees death as an important moment for the elaboration of a shared pedagogical project based on common ideals of life; the third—and this is what I am going to discuss here in detail—concerns death as a criterion for judging the very history of metaphysics. But before we set out on this path, it would be good to start from Fink's apprenticeship at Edmund Husserl's school with an illustration of his discussions of the problem of death with his mentor.

Death and transcendental phenomenology

It is well known that Eugen Fink was Edmund Husserl's last assistant and that to their *synphilosophie* are to be attributed the five *Cartesian Meditations* edited by Husserl himself (to which Fink added a sixth), and therefore also *The Crisis*. It is, therefore, not only plausible, but certainly legitimate to suppose that the assistant, who had an unconditional esteem for his master,¹ knew very well what Husserl wrote in his notes drafted in the 1930s about the *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie*, i.e., the liminal problems concerning birth, sleep, and death. Although the treatment of death in Husserl's philosophy is neither extensive nor exhaustive,² there are many brief expositions of this problem. Certainly, their definition as *Randprobleme* does not appear congenial,³ as it

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1 In 1933, Fink wrote an article in defense of the master's transcendental phenomenology against the attacks of the neo-Kantians, entitled "The phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism," which Husserl preceded by a brief foreword in which he wrote: "At the request of the distinguished editorship of *Kantstudien*, I have carefully gone through this essay, and I am happy to be able to say that there is no statement in it that I could not make fully my own, that I would not explicitly acknowledge as my own conviction." (Edmund Husserl: "Vorwort," in Fink 1966, VII–VIII)

2 Cf. Dodd 2010, 51. Another interpreter, however, emphasizes that Husserl's thematization of birth, death, and sleep is a way to approach human finitude in a phenomenological transcendental way, showing birth, death, and sleep as limit-phenomena, intersubjective phenomena, and paradoxical phenomena (cf. Geniusas 2010).

3 As the curator of *Husserliana XLII* states (cf. Husserl 2013, XXIII).

could connote them as being secondary or marginal. But Husserl's intention is to think of them rather as extreme problems, precisely because they are located at the beginning and conclusion of conscious life, and therefore force phenomenology, both static and genetic, to its extreme possibilities. The question is, in fact, one of being able to phenomenologically grasp the cessation of life as a vital interest, i.e. as an activity of consciousness; hence, the fundamental question is that of the possibility of thinking about birth, sleep, and death at the moment of dissolution (or suspension in the case of sleep) of the intentional constitution of the world.

56 It is clear that birth and death are fundamental events of our existence within the *Lebenswelt*. The access that Husserl initially explores is that of the analogy with waking and falling asleep. Certainly, the problem is the lack of continuity of conscious life before and after waking up, as well as the loss of any possibility of consciousness with a "dreamless sleep [*traumloser Schlaf*]." The noematic correlates of unconsciousness [*Unbewusstsein*] are therefore *das Unbewusste*, the non-conscious, that is, what does not belong to the acts proper to the thinking, desiring, and evaluating consciousness. Husserl's attempt is, therefore, to try, through the analogy of sleeping, to make phenomenologically conceivable what lies beyond any datum and therefore any description, i.e., the subject before his experiential entrance into the world and disappearance as an experiential subject. This problem appears to concern the constitution of transcendental phenomenology: how can the transcendental self grasp the question of death, a fact belonging to the objective world?

It is evident that for the transcendental subject, its own death is unthinkable, and yet the subject has experience of death, knows it as an "event in the world of men" (Husserl 2013, 78–79), an event that happens in our world, which is primarily nature and physical corporeity. Husserl had already committed himself to the analysis of death by following this approach, and had, in 1916, written:

The objective world is the permanent being in objective time, and the subjects belong to the objective world as psychic subjects. But the objective world is world for my consciousness and a rule of my consciousness, and also of my empathized subjects. But I die, this or that one dies. (Husserl 2013, 17–18)

The world that stands before my intentionality is a world that lasts, that has time marked by objectivity, which provides the norm and criterion to my conscience; well, in this world, in which I am present together with others that are perceived empathically, one dies, that is, I die, another one dies. Certainly, this death that I meet in my observation of the world, precisely because of its *Naturhaftigkeit*, because it is marked by randomness and senselessness, is something irrational as opposed to the rational formation of life; it is basically a scandal for every reason, says Husserl, and here he, it would seem, “embraces” the Parmenidean thesis.

Therefore, there is a problem of accessibility to the phenomenon of death for the ego, which reflects it phenomenologically, that is, on the basis of transcendental reduction: it has the possibility to experience this phenomenon only through others, not by itself: my death is not an experience of mine. However, precisely because of the experience I have of my body, I can think of developmental trends that are specific to my ego: my aging, my progressive loss of bodily operational capacity, the decrease in strength, the reduction in vision. Thus, from a concrete point of view, writes Husserl, I can ultimately obtain a sort of prefiguration of death from my intersubjective worldly experience, which, we remember, is always an intermonadic experience:

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My death as a world event can only be constituted for me when I have experienced *the death of others* as physical-organic decay and disintegration, and ⟨as⟩ impossibility of the continuation of identifying empathy, ⟨as⟩ impossibility of experiencing life in streaming intentionality in presentation. *The death of others is the death that was previously constituted.* [...] Thus, I find my death as a world event, as a datum of experience on the way through other deaths; but as a transcendental ego it is me who constitutes the world with all the dying-ones, the dead-ones, and my human death. (Husserl 2013, 3)

This prefiguration also shows the inadequacy of the analogy with sleep or illness: I can fall ill, lose consciousness for a period of time, and at the end of this momentary unconsciousness return to my flow, the before and the present interspersed with that time when I was powerless. But death is something else:

“It’s over with me.” (Husserl 2013, 2) Now, it is clear that Husserl’s conception is marked by an extreme pre-eminence of the present, starting from the temporal constitution which is proper to the synthesis of the ego. This is the key that makes it possible to reconnect the past to the present at the moment of awakening, after the temporary interruption of the flow of consciousness in sleep, and that is not allowed when the interruption of the flow is definitive, in the dreamless sleep, a definition that brings us back to the Socrates of the *Apology*.

As we have already mentioned, Fink worked and collaborated closely with his master’s projects, officially embracing his lines of research, as shown by the closing of the essay entitled “What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish?” Here, after recalling that, thanks to intentional analysis, fundamental research fields open up to phenomenology, starting from the clarification of the “natural attitude,” to which he adds the fields of investigation concerning the constitutive problem, Fink writes:

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However, even the highest “metaphysical” problems, which in traditional philosophy have never arisen as problems that require commitment, but only as “theses” (like God, death, teleology, “meaning of existence,” etc.), do not lie outside of the horizon of the work of phenomenology. Even though these problems do not offer themselves to an initial grasp, even if a long and laborious way leads to them, still a philosophy which knows that in its self-understanding it is placed within the innermost essence of the spirit which precedes the world and all Being can never capitulate in the face of ultimate “irrationalities.” (Fink 1966, 178; English translation: Fink 1972, 27)

It is clear here that Fink’s intention is to follow the long path of the Husserlian method in order to arrive at the clarification of metaphysical problems which, as such, are not objects of our experience. But is this, in fact, his position? The notes, which he wrote at the same time, and which have been made accessible by recent publications of the *Gesamtausgabe*, show the young scholar’s doubts about the viability of this path. The reduction effectuates a “destruction of horizon” with the view to acquiring a “critical” terrain, on which

the perception analysis operates. This is how the hyletic data can be obtained and shown as belonging to a “wakened” ego, since only a waken ego has hyletic data in connection with its *Erlebnisse*. For this reason, “the phenomenological analysis of the unconscious (sleep, death, birth, and so on) cannot operate by constructing uniform sense fields” (Fink 2008, 116). The problem that Fink seems to be facing is an impossibility of the methodology adopted by Husserl in his fourth Cartesian meditation, i.e., to try to make everything familiar through forms of variation: for the states of unconsciousness, this approach cannot be considered valid, because here we are faced with the reinforcement of consciousness, which does not offer analogies with the intentional analysis of consciousness, which must be conceptually understood starting from its *Inständigkeit*, its insistence.

What approach, therefore, may be adopted in order to seek access to what is not given to conscience? Here, Fink begins to outline the path that would lead him to his sixth meditation: the phenomenological exhibition [*Aufweisung*] alone is not enough, indeed, it remains blind, while the speculative creation [*Schöpfung*] remains empty. It is thus necessary to find a unitary engagement, to open a new space for philosophical thought: “A philosophy that brings everything back to its original self-giving, excludes itself from the possibility of finding self-giveness there, where the common intellect does not presume any ‘space,’ of discovering stars in the skies which are not yet opened.” (Fink 2008, 117) It is no coincidence, then, that immediately afterwards Fink mentions the problem of the cosmos, understood as the Entity’s field of action [*Spielraum des Seienden*], which he now defines with the term *Umständlichkeit*, circumstantiality. Here, conscience can never be aware of such circumstantiality, since the latter remains unthematized and without the possibility of being thematized. But how can conscience address it? Fink takes as an example the description of silence. Can we think of defining it as an objective happening without sound? Certainly not, for it is silence that makes the presence or absence of sound possible. Silence, understood as a world situation, leads us to transcendence understood as the horizontality of the entity.

Therefore, if phenomenology wants to replace metaphysics by renewing its discussion of philosophical questions, it must be able to take on the constitutive problems such as birth and death, however undoubtedly complicated it is to

deal with them. Thus, Fink attempts to establish in fundamental points what can be achieved through transcendental phenomenology and what its limits are:

1. First of all, it is clear that birth and death are not objects, since they do not fall within the field of experience. Moreover, transcendental consciousness cannot be shown in its coexistential being, since constitution here cannot mean the plurality of the subjective *Erlebnisse*, in which an identity is constituted.

2. Therefore, it is evident that they are unattainable, both protentionally and retentionally, since consciousness always remains in the existence of its own flow.

3. The integrity of the transcendental flow of the *Erlebnisse* is a temporal unit absconding from the present [*entgegenwärtigende Zeiteinheit*].

4. The events of birth and death, as they are present, are always events of strangers to my ego.

5. For this reason, my death and my birth are necessarily a construction [*Konstruktion*], and not a constitution.

60 6. In this construction lies the problem of generative time and therefore the objective worldly time.⁴

Here, Fink's early, however concise, reflection on these themes is interrupted. It is possible to summarize it synthetically as a doubt about the possibility of making an object of an eidetic reflection upon what conscience is unable to thematize, especially because it is anchored to the vision, which considers presence as the Archimedean point, also for retention and protention. In this way, metaphysical questions, such as those of birth and death, risk being excluded from the possible access of transcendental phenomenology. In other words, prohibiting the speculative path would prevent Husserlian phenomenology from succeeding in bringing to completion the renewal of metaphysical thought. But, as we shall see, Husserl's approach is flawed, and links him to the same tradition from which he wanted to depart.

4 Cf. Fink 2008, 122–123.

Death from an anthropological point of view

Now, the time has come to focus on Fink's mature reflection upon the theme of death, and particularly upon what is the object of an anthropological perspective. Primarily, death presents itself to us as a phenomenon: it is something that happens before our eyes continuously. But what kind of a phenomenon is it? The phenomena that present themselves to us can never be exempt from a preliminary "existential" interpretation, that is, our access to them is guided by the self-interpretation of existence. This means that the philosopher, whenever he tries to grasp universality, can do so only because he has a certain amount of intimacy with himself that gives access to the phenomena to be interpreted. Philosophy itself, after all, can also be understood as an attempt to give answers, which arises from man's belonging to the enigma of his nature. Man has a continuous relationship with the mystery of his own existence, and this can be called the preliminary access to his own fundamental situation. This relationship is therefore man's most proper property: while the animal, according to the property of its being, can never reach a high degree of consciousness, only human nature happens continuously as an interpretation aimed at clarifying the mysteries of its own existence and of the world.⁵ This means, on closer inspection, that Eugen Fink is distancing himself from the transcendental phenomenology of his master, Edmund Husserl: man is never an *unbeteiligter Zuschauer*, a disinterested spectator, but he who continually gets involved by means of and with his interpretative action: "Man is a witness to the unfolding of his life, always bearing witness to it: in deeds and words; he interprets himself and these interpretations contribute to forming his own being." (Fink 1995, 93) This proximity to oneself, which is expressed in the uninterrupted interpretation of one's own existence, in which every man takes part, provides the formal structure, within which the interpretation of death occurs. However, one should not think that this intimacy with existence reintroduces traditional themes, such as the personality of the self and its relationship with freedom and historicity. Fink, on the other hand, intends to

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⁵ Eugen Fink explicitly refers to the concept of *Jemeinigkeit* in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (cf. Fink 1995, 98–114).

start from the fundamental phenomena of human existence, in order to see in concrete terms how, from time to time, the ipseity, freedom, and historicity of the ego take shape in the historical occurrence of the central phenomena of human existence.

62 Death is the first fundamental phenomenon to be examined analytically, because it is the one which opens to the essential constitution of our existence, finiteness. Our mortality, in fact, pervades every possibility of human existence, it is “the ownmost, non-relational possibility, which is not outstripped” and “certain,” as Heidegger writes (cf. Heidegger 1993, 264; English translation: Heidegger 1962, 309). But if we consider it as a possibility, we cannot consider it as something that comes from the outside, it is rather something, which lies inside the very being of man. Thus, the potentiality of death is a potentiality of no longer being possible, rather than being possible. As a properly human phenomenon, in that it does not belong to the animal or to God, death also determines man’s relationship to things present in the world. Thanks to the knowledge of finiteness, man is able to understand the essence of what is artificial, distinguishing it from what is natural and consequently mortal. It is therefore on the basis of this elementary anthropological knowledge that man goes so far as to ask himself about the origin of things, grasping the dependence of things upon their ontological determination. In other words: to understand the artificiality of something means to understand the relationship between being and nothingness: “Only a being, who in his own essence relates to nothingness, can understand what is created as created. And perhaps only a being open to nothingness can ‘create,’ ‘produce,’ ‘process.’” (Fink 1995, 116) In this sense, it is highly significant that Fink emphasizes how death, together with work and domination, reveals the ambiguous way, in which man relates to the world.⁶

The awareness of mortality, thus, acquires a particular primacy within man’s understanding of his own being and of the being of entities: in this knowledge, Fink sees the authentic actualization of the promise made by the

6 Cf. Fink 1995, 321. Cf. also van Kerckhoven’s essay (2003) on this subject. Recently published collective book of essays edited by Nielsen and Sepp (2019) is dedicated to the question of dwelling in reference to the essential worldly constitution of man.

serpent in the holy Bible: “eritis sicut Deus” did not mean that humans can achieve omnipotence, omniscience, and eternity, but that they can recognize the difference between the divine eternity and the caducity of things. Far from any “traditional” understanding of death, which created a mixture of elements taken from the animal world (disintegration of the body) and the divine world (eternal spark), Fink considers it necessary to access this phenomenon from a completely human perspective, avoiding distorting interpretations. To attain this access, it is necessary to start from the “case of death,” from the fact that we encounter in our lives someone who dies. Now, it is clear that this knowledge is only valid for the one who observes, while death is always the death of the one who dies; this is the meaning of the Epicurean sentence, according to which one cannot live one’s own death, but, in any case, it must be considered that in observing the death of others the certain and anguished understanding of one’s own death is always included: we recognize the phenomenon, which we see in the death of others, as something that invests others in the totality of their being; that phenomenon represents for them their own death. Upon deeper inspection, this means, however, that we truly understand our own death, not at the moment, in which we die, but in living, that is, during our own life: our own death becomes something, of which we are aware, above all, in the inner certainty that accompanies our entire life. This certainty cannot clearly be a lived experience, nor even an anticipated representation of future death as in Heidegger, but it consists in holding it before us every moment, while living our finiteness in constant waiting and in readiness.

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The metaphysics of death

But, regardless of the indisputable advances, which we make through the analytics of existence, the question of death becomes an essential step to clarify the ontological problem. In the face of death, it seems necessary to adopt a different ontological register, in order to give meaning and significance to the perishing of phenomena, that is, to their disappearance in their individuality, with a view to the understanding of entities in general. We have now come to the relationship between death and metaphysics, which marks the second part of our paper. Let us start from a basic consideration: every understanding of

the being of entities is constituted by their manifestation before our eyes, that is, by their presence.

64 This obvious assertion becomes extremely problematic when we use the same ontological register to deal with the problem of death. In other words, the question could be addressed in this way: can we use our understanding of the being of an entity that we encounter in the world in its phenomenality, or even the understanding of the totality of entities in the cosmic perspective, to be able to attain an appropriate access to the disappearance of entities from their phenomenality? It is not possible for me to explain here one of the most important themes of Fink's thought, the relationship between the singularity of the entity that comes to its phenomenality and the totality of the phenomena in their worldly constitution, and yet this crucial problem, for the history of metaphysics, does not affect the conception of death starting from the appearance of entities and the ontological register that comes from it. If it is true that being is always understood as "presence," it is also true that other essential aspects besides presence are connected to its phenomenal appearance. Fink refers to an image, dear to the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, the image of a tree that grows with its foliage towards the sky, in the light, but has solid roots that go deep into the dark ground, and remain inaccessible to the eye, and are nonetheless necessary for the tree to rise in the phenomenal world. Thus, the earth and the sky mark the boundaries of the space, within which it is possible to understand the presence of a tree, also temporally measuring its phenomenal duration, perceived—as all entities are—by the only entity who manages to understand ontologically what presents itself to the presence.

The understanding of being on the basis of presence is grounded in three essential traits: firstly, an entity's rising in its presence between the earth and the sky; secondly, the fact that things show themselves to an entity called "man," who is endowed with reason, and, therefore, the fact that appearances of things always have a human reference; thirdly, the fact that human experience is placed at the center of the totality of entities in time. Fink argues that, in order to look for new ways to develop phenomenology, it is necessary to rethink the very concept of *phenomenon*, especially the essential link that connects it to the subject's ability to perceive it. In order to reach this result, it is no longer necessary to start from man's external experience of things through

representation, but to venture on the search of an essential link between the being of the thing and its manifestation, and then to try to reach its being itself. Fink's way of arguing challenges centuries of modern philosophy, as he, renouncing the primacy of the subject and its worldly experience, tries to grasp the being-thing of the thing. Precisely this is the objective of the search for being-the-same, a search to grasp the assumption that makes every event experienced possible. This being-the-same should not be understood as the recognition of a kind of consciousness of everything that surrounds us, but rather as a reference to the relationship that a thing has with its being-itself, a relationship, which remains obscure to the eyes of the ego that represents it. This means that the representation can only touch the shell of what is shown to us and stop at the possibility of turning an entity into an object. Fink calls this mode of manifestation of the entity *Anschein*, appearance-for-me. Yet, if we observe critically, or rather speculatively, the possibility of such an apparition, we recognize that there is a dimension of luminosity that makes such an apparition possible. This apparition does not depend on human cognitive capacity, but on *Vorschein*, appearance-in-itself. With this latter concept, Fink's intent is to indicate the movement, through which the entity realizes its being by assuming a shape and border. With the arrival to its appearing-in-itself [*Zum-Vorschein-Kommen*], the entity enters in the world of distinctions, like a flower, which grows from the womb of the earth like a baby grows from his mother's womb. This appearing-in-itself is the presentation of the entity's own being. But, while the human representation of an entity is subject to randomness, its appearance is not necessary for its essence (there are unknown fish in the depths of the ocean as well as unknown plant species in impenetrable forests); appearance-in-itself is the intimate link with the essence of each manifestation.⁷

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Thanks to Fink's philosophical understanding of death, the links with the most obvious interpretations of death are broken, because we are now led towards a dimension that lies beyond the phenomenal world, an obscure dimension, that of absence. The heart of the problem of a philosophical interpretation of death is, thus, to understand the "negative" of death.

7 Cf. Fink 2018, 279 ff.

Ultimately, the problem of death is of fundamental importance in the attempt to overcome the understanding of being exclusively based on the phenomenal world, to finally arrive at the phenomenality of things. If death would simply be the passage to “nothing,” then Epicurus’ remedy would be effective, but instead we have a continuous relationship with the rising of things, which means, with the fact that something which previously was not there comes to manifestation, with the fact that something which previously belonged to the realm of non-being acquires evidence in the world of individuation.

In other words, it is clear that the question of death in Fink, besides being the subject of fundamental significance for a full understanding of the finiteness of human beings, is the gateway to trying to deal with the subject of nothing, as he himself wrote to his friend Jan Patočka in August 1969 in a letter, wherein he announced the imminent publication of *Metaphysik und Tod*, which he described as “a meditation in a failing attempt to think the nothingness, to which human death points as a silent, terrifying pointer” (Fink and Patočka 1999, 70)⁸

66 With the philosophical understanding of death, therefore, we attain a relationship with something, which is totally incongruent with the normal understanding of the being of things in the world, which is other than all representations that we have of being, because all our conceptual grids, which try to remove and exorcize the fear of death, are inadequate. But does man not already live in an understanding of reality which refers to something absent? Does what is imagined, dreamed of not open up the horizon of being other than mere presence? These “images” of reality, which may seem different from the usual understanding of being, belong to the same ontological structure of reality that is grounded in presence. Both the fictitious projection of a dreamlike inner world beyond death and the denial of the void opened by death seek to close the gaping chasm in the face of nothingness, since the first attitude seeks to inadmissibly broaden the understanding of being that refers to the phenomenal world, while the second blocks the way to this understanding,

8 It should be noted that, in his subsequent letter to Patočka, Fink describes his *Metaphysik und Tod* as being “without results [*ergebnislos*],” as being suitable for a “skeptical speculative.”

putting aside the fact that the understanding of death radically questions this meaning resulting from closure itself.

Fink's "cosmological" thesis about death is, therefore, that the dead individual compels us to reconsider the problem of man's being, because the problem of death opens a gap in the conception of the being of the self as individuation, since man's death entails precisely the erasure of this self. With death, self-affirmation disappears and the individual ceases to have his own singularity. For this reason, myths and religions seek to affirm the survival of these aspects through perceptions and experiences that the deceased supposedly have in the afterlife. Faith in the persistence of a person is the center of the belief in immortality. But, at the same time, death offers the possibility of leaving the experience of "truth" in the sense of un-concealment of the entity and of sinking into the dark and the undifferentiated.

The methodical significance of the analysis of death is based on a fundamental trait of human existence, not present in animals or in God, which has not been exposed, but above all on the fact that it refers to an unprecedented tension and to an enigmatic depth of the human understanding of being, truth, and the world. [...] Death is the most serious and terrible indicator that goes beyond the sphere of indication and dissolves the question of truth, which does not grasp what is individual. (Fink 1995, 204–205)

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Death, in the dimension of the direction, the "sense" to which it refers that we want to follow, provides us with a way to start philosophically understanding the phenomenality of phenomena, to try to broaden our gaze towards the continuous play of the coming-to-light of what was not yet and the disappearance-from-presence into the night of what is no longer. Ultimately, this is the cosmological horizon, within which it is possible to understand the phenomenon of death, to try to grasp the spatial and temporal co-belonging of our death and the exit from the light of transient things. It is said that matter does not end, but changes its form, so that a rock shattered by the waves becomes sand. But is it possible to apply this representation, upon which a certain ontological understanding is based, to man? Or is it necessary to get

out of the circularity between metaphysics and death, in order to be able to conceptually understand death?

The certainty achieved by the Cartesian cogito does not ensure an exit from the realm of perishability, quite the opposite: the subject who guarantees the certainty of *cogitata* with respect to the illusion of the outside world, has always known of its mortality. “The ego cogito is actually a fragile *res cogitans*.” (Fink 1969, 20) On the other hand, the wonder of the appearance of things, has as a counterbalance the terror of bearing-witness to their disappearance. The conviction, common to philosophy and science, that things hide their true nature from us, that something is hidden behind their appearance, also resides for Fink in the inability to come to a definitive agreement with death, to be able to understand it as a phenomenon, and this is because neither science nor philosophy succeed in grasping the connection between the end of man and the end of intra-worldly things.

68 Ultimately, the problem of death is of fundamental importance in overcoming the understanding of being that I have exclusively in the phenomenal world, or rather the phenomenality of things. The continuous relationship with the rise of things, with something coming to manifestation from the realm of non-being, means that, with death, through it, we arrive to the relationship with something that possesses total strangeness with respect to the normal understanding of being of things in the world, something other than all the representations that we have of being. For this reason, all our conceptual grids are inadequate to try to grasp and exorcize the fear of death. But does man not already live in an understanding of reality that refers to something absent as in the case of the imagined? Although such “images” may seem unconnected with reality, they do not highlight ontological structures in open contradiction with the obvious understanding of reality, to which we are accustomed.⁹

The usual statements regarding death concern the fictitious projection of a dreamlike inner world that lies beyond death and the denial of an emptiness traced with death. As has been mentioned, both possibilities seek to close the gaping chasm in the face of the tremendous nothingness, since the first affirmation seeks to inadmissibly broaden the understanding of being that

9 Cf. Fink 1978, 178. On these topics cf. Schmidt 1996.

refers to the phenomenal world, the other instead speaks of a closure of this understanding, putting aside the fact that the understanding of death radically questions this comprehension, this closure. Upon this ground, also the respectful but difficult duel with Heidegger took place during the seminar on Heraclitus. Here, Fink, on the basis of an interpretation of the “The Obscure” of Ephesus, interprets the earth, not as something phenomenal, and not even from a formal point of view, but symbolically, as a positive and real-life power, a power of re-enactment. In his dialogue with Heidegger, Fink tries to underline the opacity of the earth, on which the boundedness of the open domain of light rests. We mortals dwell on the opaque earth whose boundary is marked by light. The darkness is not the one of night, illuminated by the stars, but that of a closedness of the soil, into which no light is able to penetrate: “In contrast to the closedness of the earth, the dark of night has by itself fundamental illuminability.” (Heidegger and Fink 1979, 43)

It is clear that Fink, discussing the un-phenomenality of the earth, the un-phenomenality of the night,¹⁰ is trying to arrive through a metaphorical, almost mythical language to the speculative dimension, through which it would be possible to overcome the non-transparency of death, that is, of nothingness. This is the aspiration which Fink expressly states in front of Heidegger’s relentless questioning:

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Heidegger: With my questions, I would only like to get at the place from which you speak of another night.

Fink: If I have spoken of another, more original night, of the nightly abyss in explication of the sun fragment, I did so in preview of the death-life fragments. From there I have viewed the deeper sense of the phenomenon of closedness of the earth and in a certain way also of the sea as the boundary of the sun’s domain. Only when we first consider the relation of life and death will we see how the realm of life is the sun’s domain and how a new dimension breaks open with the reference to death. The new dimension is neither the domain of openness nor only the closedness of the earth, although the earth is an excellent symbol for

10 On this subject cf. the essay by Barbarić (2005).

the dimension of the more original night. Hegel speaks of the earth as the elementary *individuum* into which the dead return. The dimension of the more original night is denoted by death. That dimension, however, is the realm of death, which is no land and has no extension, the no-man's-land, ...

Heidegger: ... that cannot be traversed and that also is no dimension. The difficulty lies in addressing the domain denoted by death. (Heidegger and Fink 1979, 54)

The decisive confrontation takes place on this terrain: Heidegger thinks that only starting from the *there* [*Da*] of the *clearing* [*Lichtung*] a chance can be given to understand what is comprehensible of the darkness, while for Fink it is important to point out that, if we grasp the hiddenness [*Verborgenheit*] of the darkness starting from the *clearing*, we risk to consider the darkness only as the limit of openness.¹¹

70 Without the claim to utter any final words in what is only a mere sketch of the issue, it can be claimed in conclusion that for Fink the wisdom of thought must not be founded in the pure standing in the clearing, but rather as entering into the night of the earth.¹² The question of death contains in itself, therefore, the access, problematic and unattainable, through which it is possible not only to grasp, in all its concrete authenticity, the fragility of our existence, but also to try to approach the mystery of being and its relationship with nothingness.

11 "*Heidegger*: The dark is in a certain sense also the openness, if a light is kindled in it. This dark openness is only possible in the clearing in the sense of the *Da*. // *Fink*: I would suppose that we may think the concealment of the dark not only out of the relationship of clearing of the *Da*. There is the danger that one understands the dark only as boundary of what stands open, as the exterior walling of the open. I would like above all to indicate that a human relates himself at the same time to the open and to the concealing darkness." (Heidegger and Fink 1979, 130) Cf. Vetter's essay (2011) regarding the comparison between the thoughts of Heidegger and Fink in relation to the question of Nothing. For an overall phenomenological interpretation of the Heraclitus fragments cf. Ardovino's book (2012).

12 Cf. Fink 1977, 238.

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THE END OF THE METAPHYSICS OF BEING AND THE BEGINNING OF THE METACOSMICS OF ENTROPY

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Abstract

Bernard Stiegler has undertaken a renovation of philosophical concepts by taking account of thermodynamic and informational entropy and the counter-entropic tendencies that struggle against them. Such a renovation brings the question of locality into new focus, given the localized character of all such struggles, where this is distributed at various scales from the cellular to the biospheric and technospheric. This paper pursues this question of locality in two parts: the first finds resources for

such a renovation in Empedocles, and notes how these were repressed by Aristotle but resurrected by Sigmund Freud and Friedrich Nietzsche; the second stages a confrontation between Stiegler and Peter Sloterdijk, asking under what conditions the latter's immunological spherology could be brought into Stiegler's project, which we place under the umbrella of what we are proposing to call metacosmics.

Keywords: Bernard Stiegler, Peter Sloterdijk, Empedocles, metaphysics, entropy.

Konec metafizike biti in začetek metakozmike entropije

Povzetek

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Bernard Stiegler je filozofske pojme skušal prenoviti z upoštevanjem termodinamične ter informacijske entropije in protientropičnih tendenc, ki se z njima bojujejo. Takšna prenova v ospredje spet prinaša vprašanje lokalnosti, kolikor vse tovrstne boje zaznamuje krajevni značaj, kjer se kažejo na različnih ravneh od celične do biosferne in tehnosferne. Pričujoči članek vprašanje lokalnosti razčlenjuje v dveh delih: prvi del išče vire za takšno prenovo pri Empedoklesu in naznači, kako jih je Aristotel zatajil, a sta jih spet obudila Sigmund Freud in Friedrich Nietzsche; drugi del uprizarja soočenje med Stieglerjem in Petrom Sloterdijkom, pri čemer se sprašuje, pod kakšnimi pogoji je imunološko sferologijo slednjega mogoče spojiti s Stieglerjevim projektom, ki ga uvrščamo pod krovni pojem tistega, kar želimo imenovati metakozmika.

Ključne besede: Bernard Stiegler, Peter Sloterdijk, Empedokles, metafizika, entropija.

Introduction

What follows is an oblique attempt to say something about what locality means in relation to an account of what Bernard Stiegler has called a neganthropology,¹ divided into two halves rather roughly sutured together: the first part asks whether metaphysics could be conceived as the history of a repression of Empedocles starting with Aristotle, risking a new term, “metacosmics,” for what could follow this history; the second part asks what conceptual room might be opened up in this future history for an encounter between Stiegler’s exorganological neganthropology and Peter Sloterdijk’s immunological spherology. The paper arises in part from my longstanding interest in Stiegler’s work in general and in his interest in reinscribing philosophical concepts in terms of questions of entropy in particular, in part from what we can loosely call “political” complications emerging from his international project (which is a renewal in other terms of Marcel Mauss’s reflections on the fate of the national and international, but can additionally be conceived as a kind of response to Peter Szendy’s call for a new “geopolitics of the sensible;” Szendy 2013, 79), and in part from ongoing email and WeChat discussions I continue to have with Anne Alombert and Ouyang Man. As per usual, all responsibility for any failures of thinking lies with the author, but, beyond this standard disclaimer, is there anything worth saying, by way of setting the scene for a theater of locality, about this context of friendly discussion?

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This theatrical situation involving four individuals (not all known to one another) could obviously be conceived in terms of what Gilbert Simondon calls a process of collective individuation, specifically in the sense that four perpetually unfinished psychic individuation processes have been aiming via processes of one or another kind of analysis and synthesis towards a commonality of understanding and reason, an aim that, due to this very singularity, can only ever be asymptotic, the consequence of which is that the collective individuation process, too, remains perpetually unfinished—even if

¹ This paper was originally written for an STS conference at Nanjing University at which Bernard Stiegler was one of the keynote speakers.

all these processes are bound one day to be finished off. But these processes can also be described in terms of locality, whereby the locality that I am (or who I am) interacts with those localities who are Bernard, Anne, and Man, through this interaction generating a locality of the collective individuation process operating across the tertiary retentional supports of global digital networks. At the risk of sounding grandiose, we might describe this locality, distributed between Paris, Shanghai, and Melbourne, hence in a geophysical location no smaller than the limits of the biosphere itself, as a kind of cosmological sphere, characterized by a certain warmth, and within which Bernard's position might be conceived as in some way paternal, raising his philosophical progeny, or again, as a saint who inspires by his no doubt imperfect but still rationally miraculous exemplarity.

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I deploy these ingratiating metaphors not to flatter but to indicate the psycho-techno-anthropological multidimensionality involved in conceiving locality in terms of cosmologies harboring processes that are less a matter of the harmony of encircling spheres than of inwardly and outwardly spiraling tendencies: there is, after all, no such thing as a truly stable orbit, but only a relationship between gravitational and centrifugal forces; nor, more fundamentally, is there after general relativity any formation of the fabric of spacetime that is not either expanding or contracting (as Alexander Friedmann showed in 1922). Even at the level of the physics of space and time, then, there is no such thing as true stability.

Take “warmth,” for example: functionally speaking, the concept of warmth is not physical but biological, naming one of the conditions under which the negentropic processes of biological life can flourish safely, comfortably, and fruitfully, referring to the threshold limits of tolerability of atmospheric temperature (or water temperature for marine or fluvial life), in the struggle against the freezing cold (which indeed and in fact lowers the rate of physical entropy, but also kills the potential for biological life to temporarily thwart the entropic processes against which it struggles). In the case we are describing here, it is not a question of biological or endosomatic life but of noetic or exosomatic life, where “warmth” would thus be a metaphorical name for the psychosocial conditions in which exosomatic life can flourish safely, comfortably, and fruitfully. It is a question of the atmospheric conditions of transindividuation, that is, the conditions of what medium fills the apparent void between brains

and bodies, and gives it its character, an element we might also describe metaphorically in terms of nineteenth-century physics as a kind of *aether*.

This aether, however, is inaccessible to instruments of the Michelson-Morley type. In other words, it is a question of knowing something *after* physics. In regards to this “after physics,” it is worth recollecting that Aristotle begins his *Metaphysics* with a declaration tying desire and knowledge together at the heart of the nature (*physei*) of human beings: “All men by nature desire to know.” (Aristotle, 980a22) If this is a statement about metaphysics, which might be taken as “psychological” in the sense that it concerns desire, it nevertheless also counts as epistemological to the extent that Aristotle follows it by making a distinction between animals and humans on this score: the knowledge possessed by animals relies upon sensation and memory, and therefore on a *phantasia* that knows little of experience as such, *empeiria*. And this means, says Aristotle at the beginning of *Metaphysics*, that the human desire to know implies that *anthropoi*, that is, *oi thanatoi*, mortals, live by other means than the animals do, and specifically by the means of *tekhnē* and *logos*.

It is not at all difficult to see how this thought of two kinds of knowing possessed by animated beings—those whose *phantasia* is woven from perception and memory, and those who can rely not just on sensation but on the sensational experience that is *empeiria*, a possibility opened up by *tekhnē* and *logos*—is entirely congruent with the sensible and noetic souls described in *De Anima*. In other words, this consideration that opens up the long path of what will be called metaphysics—which attempts to get in view the whole of being, according to Heidegger, and which in modern philosophy becomes the question not of the being who desires to know but of the metaphysics of will—; this consideration begins with the delimitation of different planes of interaction between different kinds of individuals and their milieu, which we can rename in Stieglerian terms as the negentropic or endosomatic plane and the neganthropic or exosomatic plane.

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Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Freud as readers of Empedocles

It goes without saying that Aristotle did not himself refer to the negentropic plane, let alone the neganthropic, firstly because Aristotle *also* opens the path

of metaphysics by opposing the fixed sphere of heavenly bodies, which is to say the sphere of timeless “being,” with the sublunary world of temporal “becoming” characteristic of life *down here*. From the outset, these beings of *phantasia* that we are calling negentropic, and the beings of *empeiria* that we ourselves are and that we are calling neganthropic, are both *opposed* to a cosmic fixed sphere characterized precisely by the *absence* of any entropic tendency and therefore any struggle against it.

But rather than stopping at the absurdity of this anachronism, what happens if we instead follow this anachronistic line of thinking all the way to the end? Let us abandon well-trodden pathways into the question “what is metaphysics” and instead pose the question: *what conceptual absences prevented anything resembling negentropy from entering the Aristotelian conceptual universe?* One possible waystation to which such an unconventional path might lead is Aristotle’s dismissal of Empedocles, and specifically of two aspects of Empedoclean thought, both of which will be discovered two and a half millennia later, independently, by Nietzsche and by Freud.

When in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937) Freud discusses the struggle between Love and Strife, he differentiates the “cosmic phantasy” of Empedocles from what he himself seeks, which would be, on the contrary, “biological validity,” that is, *empeiria* valid across the negentropic biosphere, yet he acknowledges that the account of *philia* and *neikos* “approximates so closely to the psycho-analytic theory of the drives that we should be tempted to maintain that the two are identical,” that is, that these “two fundamental principles,” love and strife, amount to what Freud himself calls the drives of life and destruction, love and strife together producing a “process of the universe” conceived as a “continuous, never-ceasing alternation of periods, in which the one or the other [...] gain the upper hand” (Freud 1953–1974, vol. 23, 245–246).

And Nietzsche, in his lectures on the “pre-Platonic” philosophers, draws attention to these “drives [that] struggle with each other” and to the way in which this *duplicity* somehow arises from a “*oneness of all living things*” in which what “renders them asunder” somehow can also be what “presses them toward mixture and unification,” the result of “desire and aversion” as the “ultimate phenomena of life” (Nietzsche 2001, 115–116).

What both Nietzsche and Freud make clear is that what they see in Empedocles's doctrine of the struggle between *philia* and *neikos* is a genuine theory of tendency and counter-tendency, characterizing the universe insofar as it is the domain of life, in which the counter-tendency somehow emerges from out of the tendency and is locked with it in a spiraling transductive embrace. In *Metaphysics*, however, Aristotle sees in this Empedoclean account only a deficiency of analysis, a failure to make a clean cut between one concept and the other, so that, he says, Empedocles "in many cases [...] makes friendship segregate things, and strife aggregate them" (Aristotle, 985a24–25).

Where Freud and Nietzsche see the distinction between these two tendencies compositionally, for Aristotle the problem is the failure to adequately describe an analytical opposition. No doubt we could refer this Aristotelian reduction of the compositional to the oppositional to the replacement of *alētheia* by *orthōtes*, which for Heidegger was the hallmark of the fall into metaphysics. This would be to suggest that Aristotle dismisses Empedocles as lying conceptually on the wrong side of exactitude (whereas we would wish to argue, contra Heidegger, that this exactitude is precisely what opens up the possibility of an account of the composition of tendencies).

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But how is it that "mixture and unification" *can* arise from what pulls things apart, which is to say, how can a tendency towards proliferation and conservation of order arise from out of the tendency to disorder? Again, both Nietzsche and Freud note the extraordinary perspicacity of Empedocles in this regard. For Empedocles's solution to this problem is simply to conceive this counter-tendency as an effect generated by chance over time, that is, to conceive the negentropic possibility probabilistically. As Freud notes, in this way Empedocles really anticipates the theory of natural selection in biological evolution: "he also included in his theoretical body of knowledge such modern ideas as the gradual evolution of living creatures, the survival of the fittest and a recognition of the part played by chance (*tukhē*) in that evolution" (Freud 1953–1974, vol. 23, 245).

What Freud finds in Empedocles, in other words, are the same two ideas he learns from Helmholtz (via Brücke): natural selection (that is, Darwin's theory of the basis of endosomatic organogenesis) and entropy (or more specifically, for Freud, Helmholtz's distinction between free and bound energy, which will be

translated into his account of the life and death drives).² Much of what Freud refers to as metapsychology can be interpreted as the outcome of an attempt to conceive the fundamental significance of these two ideas for psychic life in a world that was yet to acquire the concept of negentropy as Schrödinger conceived it.

Nietzsche is even clearer that this is a matter of the possibility of order arising from disorder without design, or, in other words, Nietzsche sees that for Empedocles, purposiveness is not the cause but the effect of chance over time. A mere decade after the publication of *The Origin of Species*, Nietzsche, himself only twenty-five years old, describes Empedocles as “the *tragic* philosopher” (Nietzsche 2001, 113), and writes of him as providing these fundamental tenets of what he calls “materialist systems:”

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His main difficulty, however, is to allow the *ordered world* nonetheless to arise from these opposing forces without any purpose, without any mind, and here he is satisfied by the grandiose idea that among countless deformations and limits to life, some purposive and life-enabling forms arise. Here the purposiveness of those that continue to exist is reduced to the continued existence of those who act according to purposes. Materialist systems have never again surrendered these notions. We have here a special connection to Darwinian theory. (116)

In *Physics*, Aristotle evaluates this place of chance and natural selection in Empedocles, which Aristotle describes as the notion that it is merely a “coincident result” that we find ourselves with “the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food” (Aristotle, 198b25–28). But he concludes that it is impossible that this could be the outcome of chance or coincidence: such phenomena, he states, are evidently “for the sake of something,” and must therefore be taken as proof that “action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature” (199a5–8). With this dual Aristotelian dismissal of Empedocles, and specifically of

2 On the first, see Gay 1989, 34–35; on the second, see Laplanche 1976, 118–119.

– the notion of a compositional and transductive relationship of tendency and counter-tendency lying at the origin of the phenomenon of life;

– the notion that this negentropic tendency, giving rise to biological order (organic organisms), can be explained probabilistically (or improbabilistically) rather than in terms of pre-existing final causes;

the path towards a metaphysics of will founded on an oppositional logic was set.

Were things otherwise, had Aristotle not rejected Empedocles and the notion of counter-tendency, had he not rejected the notion that probability and selection could give rise to purposiveness rather than the other way around, what *else* might he have been drawn to conclude about the distinction and relationship between endosomatic beings limited to sensation, memory, and *phantasia*, and exosomatic beings open to *tekhnē*, *logos*, and *empeiria*? Putting such counterfactual questions to one side, the “end of metaphysics” might as well amount, we are proposing, to the end of the Aristotelian forgetting of Empedocles, an end that would be philosophically initiated by Nietzsche and Freud but prepared by Clausius, Boltzmann, Helmholtz, and Darwin, in ways that neither Nietzsche nor Freud could fully deal with, even though we might well describe their thinking as never fully successful attempts to think in precisely this direction.

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From metaphysics to metacosmics

Such resources already equip us with means sufficient to contest Heidegger’s account of the end of metaphysics as well as of Nietzsche’s place in that end. We may well see the history of metaphysics in terms of the fate of that “desire to know” with which Aristotle opens *Metaphysics*, and which eventually becomes, in Hegel, “the unity of knowing and willing,” and finally becomes, in Nietzsche (according to Heidegger), the “absolute subjectivity of the body; that is, of drives and affects; that is to say, of will to power” (Heidegger 1982, 147). For Heidegger’s Nietzsche, then, the final metaphysical reversal consists in folding the rationality of the *animal rationale* into these drives and affects, which Heidegger then presumes to be reducible to the level of *animalitas*.

But if we credit the notion of an end of the Aristotelian forgetting of Empedocles, then what Heidegger himself continues to forget is not *only* that these drives and affects are not at all “animal,” neither in Nietzsche nor in Freud, since they are instead what opens onto the very possibility of the desire to know as *logos* and *tekhnē*, but also that all of these, instinct, drive, desire, arise from those highly improbable, if not indeed singular (happening once ever) processes that inaugurate, in turn, negentropy and neganthropy. With this thought, we can take Heidegger’s own conclusion regarding the end of metaphysics as itself raw metaphysical material in want of complete reinterpretation:

The end of metaphysics that is to be thought here is but the beginning of metaphysics’ “resurrection” in altered forms; these forms leave to the proper, exhausted history of fundamental metaphysical positions the purely economic role of providing raw materials with which – once they are correspondingly transformed – the world of “knowledge” is built “anew.” (148)

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What does “raw material” mean here? It is not a matter of those simple elements such as copper or iron, to be dug up, smelted, and shaped into new inorganic but organized forms. Rather, these materials are more like those remnants of ancient life, whose highly complex (highly ordered) organic molecular constituents over eons gradually become the still highly complex hydrocarbons of oil and coal, the complexity of which makes possible their combustibility, that is, their possibility of releasing reserves of potential energy. Or, even more so, like those less ancient organic remnants that have been turned from biomass into necromass, at the microcosmic scale forming the humus, and at the macrocosmic scale the pedosphere, which is to say, the set of complex elemental components forming an essential precondition for the continued existence of the biosphere. In other words, Heidegger’s account of the fate of the history of metaphysics should be construed in terms of its constituting what Stiegler calls the *noetic necromass* (cf. Stiegler 2018, 107).

The interpretation of the end of metaphysics becomes a question, then, of *knowing* what is being left behind to form this noetic necromass, and what is

being resurrected from out of this complex humus that is at the same time the transindividual aether that forms the cosmic “element,” where this “knowing” must itself pass through the question of a future in which, indeed, the world of knowledge must be built “anew.” This raw material does not just consist in a set of hypotheses, arguments, and theorems to be pieced together in new ways like building blocks. For the Heidegger of 1942, it is a matter of seeing that the fate of metaphysics lies in “modern machine technology,” and that the question of what comes after that fate (in a lecture course devoted to the complex entanglement of “locality and journeying”) is that of the possibility of a new path:

For our thinking remains everywhere metaphysical, [...] because metaphysics first begins to achieve its supreme and utter triumph in our century as modern machine technology. It is a fundamental error to believe that because machines themselves are made out of metal and material, the machine era is “materialistic”. Modern machine technology is “spirit”, and as such is a decision concerning the actuality of everything actual. [...] It is just as childish to wish for a return to previous states of the world as it is to think that human beings could overcome metaphysics by denying it. All that remains is to unconditionally actualize this spirit so that we simultaneously come to know the essence of its truth. [...] Yet in truth, this “all that remains” is not the last escape route. Rather, it is the first historical path into the commencements of Western historicity, a path that has not at all been ventured into. (Heidegger 1996, 53–54)³

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This triumph of metaphysics as the spirit of modern machine technology described by Heidegger in 1942 is what *we* are describing as the fate of metaphysics at the end of the long history of the Aristotelian repression of the Empedoclean account of tendency and counter-tendency. In 1964, Heidegger will describe this in terms of the process by which philosophy “turns into the empirical science of man,” and describe how the empirical sciences of man are

3 We must also add that this lecture course is *also* devoted to *rejecting* a “spiritual” notion of art, which would be, precisely, to hold to a metaphysical conception. For this reason, Heidegger’s reference to “spirit” here becomes a question, and that question becomes our problem.

in turn bound to succumb to the dictates of cybernetics, by which “scientific truth is equated with the efficiency” of the effects of its application, so that “‘Theory’ means now: supposition of the categories which are allowed only a cybernetical function [...]” (Heidegger 1972, 57–58).

84 But Heidegger then adds: “[...] but denied any ontological meaning” (58). With this, as with everything he writes, Heidegger shows that he can only partly undo the Aristotelian repression: not because this cybernetical function *has* an ontological meaning but because Heidegger can never expose his notion of being to the tragic notion of tendency and counter-tendency unearthed in the wake of the second law of thermodynamics by Nietzsche and Freud. What Heidegger cannot see is that the *Da* of Dasein, and the fundamental *locality* of all knowledge and truth, arises from the fact that Dasein, the noetic soul, is engaged in a counter-entropic struggle not just through biological evolution but through what Alfred Lotka calls “exosomatic evolution” (Lotka 1945, 188), operating according to criteria that are always thermodynamically local and informationally idiomatic. To interpret this fate of knowledge, truth, and philosophy under cybernetics beyond metaphysics, therefore, is to interpret what this transformation of “language into an exchange of news,” of the arts into “regulated-regulating instruments of information,” and of the “ontologies of the various regions of beings (nature, history, law, art)” into the “operational and model character of representational-calculative thinking” (Heidegger 1972, 58–59)—it is to interpret what all of this means in terms of the irreducibly local struggle against both thermodynamic and informational entropy.

Our contention is that, if this is indeed a question premised on the necessity of knowing the future of knowledge itself, which means *building* that future—where this “building,” however, is not a matter of constructing it from building blocks but rather concerns a complete reinvention (a “transformation in our ways of thinking and experiencing, one that concerns being in its entirety;” Heidegger 1996, 166)—, then it must also pass through the formulation of that challenge that is to be found in the statement with which Freud concluded his treatment of Empedocles: “no one can foresee in what guise the nucleus of truth contained in the theory of Empedocles will present itself to later understanding” (Freud, 1953–1974, vol. 23, 247). Similarly, François Jacob ends *The Logic of Life* by noting that the scientific understanding of

endosomatic and exosomatic systems and processes might today be seen in terms of the cybernetical functions of “messages, codes and information,” but that tomorrow’s analysis may well “reconstitute them in a new space” (Jacob 1982, 324).

Such professions amount to versions of the Simondonian epistemological dictum that individuation ultimately remains unknowable because the only way of pursuing this knowledge is by individuating. The future guise of the Empedoclean “cosmic phantasy,” after the end of metaphysics, corresponds to a resurrection that leaves the physics of metaphysics behind in an act of anamnestic reinitiation that we are proposing to call the beginning of *metacosmics*, which would be less an anti-physics than an *a*-physics in the sense that Bataille refers to atheology (defined for instance as “the science of the death or destruction of God;” Bataille 2001, 166).

Such a metacosmics would delimit the conditions under which it would be possible to inaugurate what I have elsewhere called a “general theory of entropy,” whose generality would imply the *a*-systematicity of Bataille’s general economy more than Einstein’s general relativity. And it would thus aim to think, create, and take care of the sur-real cosmology whose prospects are first opened up in Stiegler’s concepts of anthropy, neganthropy, neganthropology, Entropocene, and Neganthropocene. It becomes a question, then, of meeting the obligation of justifying the necessity of this new term, “metacosmics,” not least in the face of the risks and dangers it may also contain of falling *back* into metaphysics: our suggestion is that, if there is such a justification, it lies in the question and the problem of neganthropological locality.

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Troubles of belonging

If locality is a question, it is firstly because we see the evidence of the problem of locality all about us: Peter Sloterdijk describes the twentieth century as “an era of political psychoses at whose core emerge [...] troubles of belonging” (Sloterdijk 2011, 187). From his spherological viewpoint, he sees such troubles as symptoms of no longer knowing who one is or who others are, since such forms of knowledge arise only “where a sufficient number of

good primary spheres blossom” (187), or to put it another way, where there are what Donald Winnicott calls transitional spaces in which what Stiegler calls processes of transindividuation can flourish neganthropically, that is, enchant worlds. The destruction of this kind of knowledge of who one is and who others are, which is to say (in Stiegler’s terms) its proletarianization, leads Sloterdijk to conceive modern nations as “asylums,” spaces of protection for the uprooted.

Today, however, “the uprooted” refers not just to the asylum *seeker* but to the local and the indigenous: we are all in want of asylum inasmuch as we are in want of being a *we*, for lack of the knowledge of *how* to form any such *we*, that is, any locality, in a twentieth century in which individuals are, as Sloterdijk puts it, “driven to undertake reformattings of the world [...] without first developing the psychic means to enable them to get acclimatized and familiarized with their new conditions of life” (187). In such a situation, according to Sloterdijk, “national asylums” possess only the limited function of entertaining “the necessary illusion of anchorage, of territorial immunity, of solidary integration, and wherever this asylum function does not operate, violence erupts” (189).

One question we might address to Sloterdijk is whether *nations* can any longer have even *this* minimal asylum function, and what *exactly* “territorial” means in the age of global networks. But if this serves to indicate the necessity of a gesture akin to Mauss’s attempt to overcome the division between the national and the international through the invention of a new process, nevertheless we can but agree with Sloterdijk, when he writes:

Even a left-wing cultural politics must take account of it, by assisting local impulses, or spherical needs, to find non-reactionary solutions. If it fails to fulfil this social and ecological mission, explosions will never fail to materialize. (190)

Almost always, such “troubles of belonging” are conceived in terms of a problematics of identity and difference, or same and other. But these *bipolar* forms of conceiving such disturbances and disruptions almost always prove to be anything but transductive. And these bipolar forms of

conceiving such troubles thus almost always end up designating enemies and scapegoats.⁴

We should instead conceive such troubles of belonging, troubles brought by the proletarianization of the knowledge of the *I* and the *we*, neither simply as symptoms of a deficiency of identity nor of a deficiency of difference. Sloterdijk indicates this necessity by suggesting that every human attempt to live together is “made of continuities and discontinuities,” contrary, he argues, to “the attempt to invert [this formula] and prop thought up essentially on discontinuities, as certain types of thought that stem from philosophies of difference suggest” (200–201). What results is an endless unwinnable war of pseudo-philosophies, perpetually “choosing diversity over normativity” but in the same stroke wanting to “choose unity over division,” and on and on, as if the struggle between tendencies could ever be reduced to such “choices,” a war that is waged on the terrain of culture but that can never succeed in perceiving the character or causes of *the cultural aether itself*, an aether amounting to a rich but now depleted noetic atmosphere emanating from the rich but now depleted soil of the noetic necromass.

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It would be false to conclude that so-called “philosophies of difference” are therefore outmoded, but we can nevertheless recognize that what remains to be found or re-found (to paraphrase Freud) are the terms with which to transform the relationships between identity and difference, or same and other, into relationships that are not just polar but transductive, or to find or re-find the terms with which to describe the finitude and openness of localities. Such terms will lead to a philosophy neither of identity nor of difference, but of tension and resonance, and of the perpetual possibility of their being lost.

4 What constitutes the bipolarity of a magnet? On the one hand, this is an informational relationship for the observer, in the sense that knowing the polarity of one end of a magnet directly *correlates* to information about the polarity at the other end. But this dependence does not amount to *interdependence*, which is to say transduction in Simondon’s sense, and for the same reason that the growth of the crystal does not truly rise to the level of an individuation process or a negentropic process: because the correlations entailed by this “relative information” are not functions that strongly correlate the parts to the whole, thereby contributing to its metastable persistence, unlike the *mutual interdependence* involved in the recursive loops and functional relationships of negentropic life.

There is more than one place to look in order to seek such a form of thinking. Anne Alombert, for example, has recently shown in a lecture given at Sussex that tension between individual and milieu is the very condition of the development of knowledge, and that the loss of knowledge induced by algorithmic performativity amounts to the collapse of that tension:

Indeed, the totally automated, self-regulated, and adaptive infrastructures which can be applied everywhere and are supposed to eliminate any kind of tension between individuals and their environments in fact prevent these individuals from encountering any specific tensions or from overcoming them through the invention of new local, collective and singular knowledge. As Canguilhem has shown, it is because tensions appear in their relation to their milieu that human living beings develop knowledge—knowing how to do, how to live and how to theorize—all of which are ways of resolving the problems encountered in the relationship with their milieu (technical shocks or social tensions). (Alombert 2019)

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Here, it would be necessary to enter further into the relationship between these (technical) shocks and (social) tensions. As Alombert argues, high-speed algorithmic performativity amounts to an elimination of the *tension* between organism and milieu that alone produces the knowledge that, as she puts it, enables *resolution* of the problems between the individual and its environment. It would then be a matter of articulating this thought with Simondon's attempt to reconceptualize information in a non-quantitative fashion, which, as Yuk Hui has shown, is based on conceiving information as a tension, within a cybernetic system, between a signal and a receiver, and where the production of significance amounts to the *resolution* of this tension (cf. Hui 2015), in turn relating this to Gilbert Simondon's notions of associated milieu and internal resonance or to Giuseppe Longo's notion of the bio-resonance strongly correlating the parts and the whole of anti-entropic systems. The basis of such articulations could only be that the significance to which the resolution of informational tension amounts equates to knowledge as a function of the relationship between organism and

milieu (and then a matter of knowing to what extent this articulated account is or is not mathematizable).

But what we must then also say is that this relationship between organism and milieu is itself a relationship between two scales of cosmic sphere. What does it mean to refer to different “scales of cosmic sphere”? Bernard Stiegler has in recent years been engaged in addressing this question, and he does so, in part, precisely by articulating Canguilhem’s concern with the technical form of life (as the noetic tension between the individual and the milieu) with Simondon’s concern with rethinking information and its theory, in addition to retaking Derrida’s notion of *différance* as distinguishable into two forms of the struggle against entropy (negentropic and neganthropic), on this basis reinterpreting the work of Whitehead (on the function of reason), Lotka (on exosomatization), and Winnicott (on transitional space and the transitional object) to outline a “hyper-materialist epistemology,” in which knowledge and the *desire* to know are construed as functions and faculties of a *sur-real cosmology*. In such a cosmology, we could say, the tension and resonance holding parts and whole within a metastable cohesion arise from the aesthetic or *cosmetic* sphere, conceived in a general sense as the socialization of desire, but where this requires profound analysis and interpretation (beyond the scope of this paper).

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Spherology as a pharmacology?

I would now like to give a few indications about how and why Sloterdijk’s spherological project might *also* be roped in to this metacosmic project. For this preliminary foray, scouting this foreign but not completely unfriendly territory (or perhaps it is better to say: the territory of our best frenemy), some precautions with respect to Sloterdijk may prove necessary, as might some modifications—or a thoroughgoing critique. Sloterdijk does not shy away from a rather wild form of “exaggerated” thinking that can be both a virtue and a vice, making it a delicate matter to pick out those kernels with the potential to cross-fertilize with Stiegler’s metacosmic neganthropology.

A fundamental starting point for comparing their work would be to acknowledge the significant overlap between Stiegler and Sloterdijk in terms of their conception of the complicated origin of the kinds of beings that we

ourselves are. On the one hand, Stiegler's notion of an originary default at the onset of technical life (or hominization) involves a fault that would be anything but a lack because it is the opening of the excessive character of noetic souls that would also be *exclamatory* souls:

This becoming-symbolic as *logos*, which only is in the course of its being ex-pressed, is what I call an *ex-clamation*: the *noetic* experience of the sensible is *exclamatory*. It exclaims itself before the sensible insofar as it is *sensational*, that is, experience of a *singularity* that is *incommensurable*, and *always in excess*. The exclamatory soul, that is, sensational and not only sensitive, *enlarges* its sense by exclaiming it symbolically. (Stiegler 2011, 133)

On the other hand, Sloterdijk undertakes a critique of Arnold Gehlen's notion that we begin as neotenic, helpless "deficient beings," arguing that this fiction conceals the fact that our initial openness means that:

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Homo sapiens is a basally pampered, polymorphically luxuriating, multiply improvable intermediate being whose formation resulted from the combined action of genetic and symbolic-technical forces. (Sloterdijk 2016b, 657–658)

In other words, both Sloterdijk and Stiegler offer accounts of the origin of the distinction of the noetic soul as a being of excess made possible by and making possible another kind of evolution beyond the biological: that of technical beings who are as such irreducibly excessive and symbolic.

In *Neither Sun Nor Death*, Sloterdijk describes the distinction between these two kinds of evolution—or two kinds of *différance*—in terms of a difference between two kinds of "special machines:" firstly, "autoplastic or autopoietic" "living machines," and then that second evolutionary process through which "man became more than a living machine, but also a sort of machine of the spirit, insofar as he has formed the possibility, in thought, of thinking and of letting the world emerge as world" (Sloterdijk 2011, 115–116). If Sloterdijk is describing a double emergence that seems to correspond to the advent of endosomatization and then

exosomatization, then this “coming-into-the-world” (emphasizing “beginnings more than ends”) that is also the Heideggerian emergence of the world-as-world (and ending with “modern machine technology *as spirit*”) also corresponds to the negentropogenesis and neganthropogenesis that each individual must traverse as a kind of double birth, which Sloterdijk describes as follows:

Because humans must not only be liberated from a mother, they also find themselves confronted with the challenge of entering into the “house of Being”. Coming-into-the-world is the philosophical formula for a biological event charged with an ontological character. (175)

Clearly there is something quasi-Heideggerian and something quasi-Winnicottian going on in this account: the entrance into world-as-world corresponds to a process of substitution for the first sphere, that is, the maternal sphere. If Sloterdijk holds to ontological rather than organological terminology, or, in other words, if he tends not to see this double sense of coming-into-the-world as the doubling of the endosomatic by the exosomatic, he nevertheless also does stress Heidegger’s understanding that “the question of Being emerges through questions of power and of technology” (118). Sloterdijk emphasizes the continuity of his thinking with Heidegger’s non-physical conception of space, which he says “broke the habit that consists in interpreting being-in from the angle of everyday physics, and showed that human being-in-something [...] must be interpreted as a standing-outside, an ecstatic positionality, or a being-held-on-the-outside” (176).

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This being-in in the form of an ecstatic positionality is also expressed as a kind of spatial *différance* (though he does not use this latter term) that opens up the possibility of a locality that is not just a space:

From the outset, what it [the sphere] thus expresses is the idea that all inhabiting implies a milieu of transference—or again, to employ Deleuze and Guattari’s jargon, a deterritorialization within a subsequent reterritorialization. One lives to the extent that one projects an elsewhere into a here. There is no place without a here-there difference. (249)

This Heideggerian-seeming *différance* of here and there, which opens up the possibility of a place and the whole proto-pharmacology of locality and journeying that occupies Heidegger in 1942, is then extended out to a Winnicottian-seeming liberation from and by the mother (thus opening up a “milieu of transference”), but where, as in Stiegler’s extension of the transitional object and transitional space beyond the confines of the good-enough mother, Sloterdijk turns this into a socio-technological pharmacology:

My theory of space formation in modernity is backed by the observation that, in the process of civilization, interiority gets replaced by exteriority. Otherwise said, it belongs to the essence of socio-technology to play with maternal capacities in non-maternal media. Modernity consists in finding technological substitutes for maternity, in every sense of the word. [...] Mothers, the bio-patrons, get replaced by artificial patronage systems. (215)

- 92 It would no doubt be possible to interpret this last statement metaphysically or non-pharmacologically,⁵ to the extent that it seems open to the possibility of being understood as constructing an *opposition* between bio-maternity and artificial patronage in non-maternal media. But it is also possible to understand this as precisely a description of the changing relationship to the external milieu that occurs when genetic forces are increasingly replaced by symbolic-technical forces, leading in “modernity” to a formation of space that is no longer just technical but techno-logical, and industrial—at every level of “reproduction.” Hence, we might also be tempted to conclude that Sloterdijk’s general account of reproduction implies a form of thinking that *exceeds* metaphysics while also responding to the imperative to overcome the division between the scientific and the philosophical in the direction of knowledge built “anew:”

5 Anne Alombert asked me this question (in correspondence after this lecture was delivered) by wondering if Sloterdijk’s account of “spherization” is equally an account of “de-spherization.” One way of approaching this question could be to ask what Sloterdijk means when he describes “all inhabiting” as implying “a deterritorialization within a subsequent reterritorialization.”

It is always necessary to question anew the phenomenon of how it is that life organizes its continuity. With which advanced fortifications, with which war-machines [...]? How do living systems manage to reproduce themselves? How do they make themselves a future? In this, philosophy converges with systemic concerns, and it does so, in the first place, under metabiological auspices. (221)

For Sloterdijk, such auspices mean that the

[...] anthropotechnical theory of space in contradistinction to that of physics resides in the fact that I define the container as autogenous, that is, as a surreal form of space, wherein several selves together constitute something that I call a sphere. This, precisely, is the space of psychic resonance. (222–223)

That these metabiological auspices imply an anthropotechnical account of the pharmacological character of noesis, and that, in the Anthropocene, this also has fundamental implications for a pharmacology of locality at the scale of the biosphere, is obvious from the following passage:

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I start from a strong ontological thesis: intelligence exists. This leads to a strong ethical thesis: there is a positive correlation between intelligence and the will to self-preservation. Since Adorno, we have known that this correlation can be questioned—that was the most promising idea of older Critical Theory. It started from the observation that intelligence can go in the wrong direction and confuse self-destruction with self-preservation. [...] What is on the agenda now is an affirmative theory of global co-immunity. It is the foundation of, and orientation for, the many and varied practices of shared survival. (Sloterdijk 2016a, 230)

Towards a neganthropological immunology

Sloterdijk's conception of spherological space, then, involves what he calls a "constitutive surrealism," an "original spatialization" that is also a "perpetual space-delusion" arising from the fact that human existence is a co-existence (cf.

Sloterdijk 2011, 260). In other words, here-there *différance* structures the noetic production of knowledge and reason as *functions* of neganthropic life that always occupies spheres that are themselves always delusional, that is, noetic dreams of one or another world-as-world, worlds whose fabric is conditioned by the mediating tension and resonance of an aesthetic atmospherics. It is for this reason that Sloterdijk refers to immunity, as can be seen in his attitude to the history of metaphysics:

I read classical metaphysics as a library of effective propositions about the globality of the world, where world is construed as an immune system. Ontology is therefore the first immunology. (181)

[C]lassical philosophy's premises were the premises of a theory of the space of shelter, and therefore of a cosmological and theological spherology, or even better of a sphero-immunology. (210)

94 Immunity is no doubt one of those dangerous “organic” metaphors upon which it is so easy and so common to fall back in attempts to conceive locality, whether pharmacologically or otherwise. But if it is true both that metaphors are *always* dangerous and that they are *unavoidable* (that metaphors themselves are pharmacological, in other words), then the responsibility falls to us to use metaphors *knowledgeably* (or quasi-causally). What would it take for the biological metaphor of immunity, and the pharmacology of its always-threatening auto-immunity, to be *worth the risk* and to make it knowledgeably serve a pharmacology of locality?

If the pharmacological character of the *pharmakon* ultimately stems from the anthropic and neganthropic *extension* (by other means) of the negentropic struggle against entropy, in the sense that it concerns the struggle against the elimination of improbabilities and the reduction of the improbable to the probable and the average, where these struggles involve not just life but the articulation of the living with the non-living, and if this question of probabilities and the improbable is always a matter of the conservation of the past that opens up the possibility of improbable and incalculable futures, then we are saying that, ultimately, the pharmacological character of the *pharmakon*

is *always* a question of ordered, retentional systems that open up protentional possibilities, possibilities of the transformation and diversification of order—new noetic dreams. From this, it follows that conceiving immunity beyond the danger of biological metaphoricity is a matter of reconceiving it in terms of retentionality. It is a matter of writing it as the *immuno-logical* with a hyphen, just as Stiegler refers to the *techno-logical* as the composition of *tekhne* and *logos* that opens up the possibility of what Heidegger in 1942 calls the spirit of modern machine technology.

The possibility of such an *immuno-logical* account can be opened up by reflecting on the “informational” mechanism of the biological immune function. Jean Claude Ameisen’s account of the “sculpture of the living” (Ameisen 2003), which Francesco Vitale enlists in the service of elaborating a Derridean “biodeconstruction” (Vitale 2018), makes clear that we have good reason to conclude that the immune system is nothing but a retentional system *separate* from the memory of the nervous system, an endosomatic system devoted to endosomatic memory (whereas the nervous system of human beings is an exosomatized system inseparable from exosomatic memory). It is only *through* this retention of *preceding but necessary* exposures to immunological risk that the immune system can function. In other words, the immune system is nothing more than a somatic system regulating the here-there difference between the endo- and the exo-, prone to auto-immune disorderliness due precisely to retentional and protentional errors and mishaps in the struggle to maintain improbable negentropy. (All this merits a much more extended treatment.)

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What would such a thought imply for a social psychology appropriate to any neganthropological approach? First, it implies that any account of the pharmacology of the “logic” of immunity and auto-immunity in exosomatization cannot avoid the question of the *logos* and more specifically of the “history” of tertiary retention. Second, it implies that, for this reason, it cannot avoid the question of *grammatization*, which is also to say, of proletarianization. But the latter should then be construed as the auto-immune tendency that destroys knowledge and leads to the regression of the sensational soul as it succumbs to the *sensationalist* tendencies that engender the panic behavior of crowds that lies behind so many contemporary troubles of belonging (cf. Stiegler 2011, 134). *Can we therefore conclude that what is*

missing from Sloterdijk's immunological spherology is a systematic account of grammaticization?

As for a “systematic account,” perhaps this is indeed missing, but, somewhat surprisingly, something like grammaticization is indeed discernible in his text (even if only “between the lines” in the sense that no major theses are drawn from it), and specifically in the way Sloterdijk treats psychoanalysis, which is to say the social psychology of desire. Having noted that “linear mentality [...] is a consequence of the letterpress [that] follows from the one-sidedness engendered by alphabetization” (266), having noted that with the invention of the phonetic alphabet, “the operative handling and observation of being takes a massive leap forward” (270–271) because the “Greek alphabet is the first triumph of analysis,” having noted that “with analytic success an interest for synthesis also comes to the fore, that is to say, the possibility [...] to write new things,” he concludes that analysis “*qua* process of elementarization is the preschool of synthesis” (271).

96 What Sloterdijk means by elementarization is more or less what Stiegler, reading Auroux, means by discretization: turning a temporal flow into discrete spatial elements that can be analyzed and reproduced. While Sloterdijk doesn't seem to see how this question of elementarization is *also* that of the grammaticization of *gesture* that lies behind the industrial revolution (which is Stiegler's stroke of genius, even if it comes from rereadings of Auroux, Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and the *Grundrisse*), which is to say behind what Sloterdijk calls “modernity” and what has more recently come to be called the Anthropocene, he does acknowledge that the nineteenth century was “shot through” with analysis “at the level of empiricism,” based on “the elementarization of the various domains of being” (271–272).

What is odd is that this whole account is merely a prelude to his assessment of psychoanalysis *qua* analysis:

But behind the pathos of professions of faith in the primacy of analysis what is dissimulated is an avowal of theoretical perplexity, because what psychoanalysis thereby admits, at bottom, is that its discipline has not accomplished any convincing elementarization. (274–275)

Now, we may well have a sense of what he means, if he is suggesting that, despite *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud could never really “discretize” the continuum of dreaming and the fluxes and flows of the unconscious mind, in lieu of which it all too easily succumbs to a kind of esoteric priestliness. But if this is the case, we first have to ask: is Sloterdijk making the error of imagining that in the systems and structures of desire, the elementary is necessarily *simple*, or is he ascribing this conceptual error to psychoanalysis itself?

However that stands, it is surely impossible, here, to avoid the significance of Freud’s nephew, Edward Bernays, or more particularly of all those who followed in his wake in the technosciences and pseudo-sciences of marketing. Surely Bernays and his heirs have been engaged in nothing other than an elementarization of dreams and desires, in order to produce a wholly unholy (wholly calculable, and hence unpriestly) “psycho”-“analysis,” the better to synthesize artificial dreams, an elementarization now carried out algorithmically on “big data.” Is this not precisely a question of the auto-immuno-logical production of what Sloterdijk calls “exoneuroses” (84), generated through those non-maternal media that are socio-technologies (now mostly via “social media” that are in fact anti-social)? But to really answer the question of Sloterdijk’s position, it would be necessary to properly study the third volume of his *Spheres*, on *Foams*, that is, on the infinitely-fine particularization of globally networked microspheres (which I have yet to do).

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It is a question, here, of producing the outlines of a socio-technical psychology for any possible neganthropology. In addition to the seeming deficiency of Sloterdijk’s account of the fate of what Stiegler calls grammatization, we can also wonder about the adequacy of his account of the maternal relationship as the “first sphere.” That this leads Sloterdijk to a several-hundred-page account of intra-uterine existence gives the reader a true sense of the risks entailed by his celebration of a “philosophy of exaggeration.” But this, too, is potentially ameliorable, for instance by referring to the first chapter of *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis*,⁶ where Jean Laplanche carefully traces the relationship between

6 Quite strangely, Derrida “presumes” this book to have been read by readers of “To Speculate – on ‘Freud,’” while himself ignoring Laplanche’s account of Freud’s translations and mis-translations of the Helmholtzian thermodynamics of entropy into the terms of the compositional topology of the life drive and the death drive (cf. Derrida 1987, 280 n. 15).

instinct and drive in Freud, and does so by drawing out its four constituent *elements* (but which he never connects to the four causes in Aristotle, though this would seem possible). Laplanche also suggests a kind of analogy between (1) instinct and wanting milk, (2) drive and sucking the nipple, and (3) desire and sucking the thumb (or, *supplementing* these elements, sucking the artificial dummy). In other words, more may remain to be said about the role of the maternal in any such socio-technical psychology, which will be *both closer to* and *more distant from* biology than any existing psychology (or, for that matter, any existing anthropology).

Leaving Laplanche to one side, one might say, more programmatically, that Sloterdijk is arguing that what Freud called metapsychology must be supplemented and deepened with a metabiology that would also be a metacosmology. To this we should also add, *conversely*, that what Vitale calls biodeconstruction must be supplemented with a psychodeconstruction that would also be a cosmodeconstruction: our argument is that this is the terrain on which a general theory of entropy, a neganthropology, an exorganology, and a metacosmics must be played out.

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If we are willing to indulge the possibility of believing in such a metacosmic project, it in no way involves delineating a “domain of being” but rather concerns the invention of a highly improbable future. We might conceive this future in terms of what the thinker whom Nietzsche in 1861 described as “my favourite poet” (Nietzsche 1996, 3), that is, Friedrich Hölderlin—Nietzsche observing in the same letter that Hölderlin “hated in Germans the mere specialist, the philistine” (4), a hatred of philistinism that we can see clearly expressed in the *Trauerspiel* concerning the suicide of Empedocles at Mount Etna—, has Empedocles say in the first version of this play (later filmed by Straub and Huillet): there, Empedocles expresses the hope that a path can be opened up, a resurrection producing new, highly improbable states of a cosmos in which “the green of earth will glisten once again” (Hölderlin 2009, 91). It is a matter of hearing in this hope for a glistening green the possibility of finding a way of caring not just for our biospheric negentropic fate, but also for our psychospheric and noospheric neganthropic fate, and a renewed capacity for receiving a sensational “glistening” that will open new exclamatory paths. Without a path towards such a multidimensional cosmic and cosmetic resurrection, the cellular

suicide that Ameisen sees as opening new voids in the sculpture of the living via the genetic milieu, and the anaphylactic endosomatic suicide that can occur when the retentional systems of the immune system overreact, and the psychic auto-immunity that can lead the thinker to abandon his own noetic gardening and instead contemplate the void of the volcano, and the civilizational suicide that Toynbee sees as inherent to what Valéry already saw as the mortal character of civilizations, will find a whole new counterpart in the technospheric suicide brought about by the pharmacological character of locality, now operated by automated tertiary retentional systems distributed at the macrocosmic level of the biosphere, destroying not just knowledge but also the desire to know.

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POJMOVANJE BITI PRI K. MARXU

SPODLETELOST MARXOVE KRITIKE HEGLA

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Povzetek

V pričujočem sestavku tematiziramo odnos med bitjo in mišljenjem, kakršnega najdemo v zgodnji Marxovi misli. Izkaže se, da kljub programskemu fokusiranju na »dejstva«, s čimer želi Marx prelomiti z idealizmom, mišljenje biti ne uspe zajeti. To se manifestira v aporijah, ki izmenično napotujejo na polaganje težišča na bit (koncept naravoraslosti) in na mišljenje (koncept ideologije). Zato je tudi nauk o odpravi odtujitve razklan z zahtevo, da subjekt mora in hkrati ne sme prevzeti nosilne vloge pri

njeni odpravi. Ista težava se zrcali v statusu proletarske revolucije, ki naj po eni strani izhaja iz »rešene uganke zgodovine«, tj. iz absolutne vednosti, hkrati pa naj absolutno vednost šele realizira. Izkaže se, da ideal konca odtujevanja ostaja abstrakten, zato lahko tako vsebino kot normativnost črpa le iz konflikta s predanim svetom.

Ključne besede: ontologija, filozofija zgodovine, K. Marx, G. W. F. Hegel.

Conceptualization of Being in K. Marx. The Failure of Marx's Critique of Hegel

Abstract

The article thematizes the relationship between the Being and thinking in Marx's early philosophy. It can be demonstrated that despite of a programmatic focus on "facts"—introduced to emphasize the rupture with German idealism—thinking is not able to reach the Being. This failure is manifested in several aporias of Marx's philosophy. On the one hand, the accent lies on the Being ("naturalness"), on the other, however, on thinking ("ideology"). Consequently, also the teaching about the end of alienation is split by the demand that the subject must, and at the same time must not, take a leading role in its elimination. The same problem is reflected in the status of the proletarian revolution, which, on the one hand, should have its mandate in the "solved mystery of history," i.e., in the absolute knowledge, on the other hand, however, this absolute knowledge is yet to be realized by it. The ideal of the end of alienation remains abstract and can get its content as well its normativity only from the conflict with the pre-existing world.

Keywords: ontology, philosophy of history, K. Marx, G. W. F. Hegel.

V naslednjih vrsticah bomo nagovorili nekatere probleme ontologije, kakršne lahko najdemo v zgodnji Marxovi filozofiji. Videli bomo, da jo zaznamuje aporija, ki priča o sistemski napaki pri koncipiranju odnosa med mišljenjem in bitjo. Po eni strani njegovi spisi izražajo brezkompromisno zahtevo po naslanjanju mišljenja na bit. O tem priča energična uporaba izraza »dejanski«: išče se »dejanski« človek, »dejanski« odnosi itd. Po drugi strani pa njegova misel biti ne zmore prenašati, zaradi česar projekt neizogibno spodleti.

Čeprav se Marxova misel konstituira skozi prelom s Heglovo, so njegove težave še najbolj podobne posameznim etapam izkustva naravne zavesti, ki jih Hegel opiše v *Fenomenologiji duha*. Če bi strnili napako Marxove filozofije, bi jo lahko opisali kot šibkost mišljenja, nezmožnost prenašanja biti. S Heglovimi besedami: »[Zavesti] manjka sila odsvojitve, sila narediti se za reč in prenašati bit.« (Hegel 1998, 334) Začeti bi morala z lekcijo, ki jo podata prvi dve poglavji *Fenomenologije*. Prav tu mišljenje počasi začne izgubljati averzijo do (tostranskega) človeka in (tega) sveta, kar postopoma pripelje do tega, da začuti »do njiju spokoj in ju more prenašati« (Hegel 1998, 125).

Preden pristopimo k tematizaciji opisane problematike, je potrebno opredeliti, na katerem horizontu bo potekala razprava o mišljenju biti pri Marxu. S tem bomo načrtali tako dinamiko razprave kot tudi opredelili njen domet.

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1. Horizont razprave

Ker se osredotočamo na Marxovo razumetje biti, ki ga filozofsko izoblikuje sprva skozi nadaljevanje in nato skozi kritiko Heglove misli, se omejujemo na ontološki horizont, ki njuno srečevanje zavezuje. Poglobljen uvid vanj ponujajo Heideggrove interpretacije Heglove filozofije, v katerih osvetli ključna izhodišča njegovega sistema. Za Heideggro je značilen ambivalenten odnos do Hegla, saj po eni strani ni objavil nobene celostne študije o tem avtorju, po drugi strani pa najdemo jasen kontinuum interesa za njegovo filozofijo.¹ Ta ambivalenca se lepo zrcali tudi v stališču, da Heglovo filozofijo zaznamuje »neverjetna plodovitost [...] in hkrati popolna dolgočasnost« (Heidegger 2009, 54).

¹ Za več o tem prim. Prole 2007.

V razpravi »Die Negativität. Das Nichts – der Abgrund – das Seyn« se previdno loti iskanja vstopne točke v Heglov sistem, ki mu bo dorasla, hkrati pa »bo ležala v njem samem, bistveno kot njegov nedostopen in ravnodušen temelj« (Heidegger 2009, 4). Pri tem kot fenomen, ki najbolj zgoščeno opredeljuje Heglovo razumetje biti bivajočega, izpostavi *negativnost* in ne, kot bi morda pričakovali, sam koncept biti. Izkaže se, da je to točka, na kateri najlažje prepoznamo, v čem Hegel zgreši možnost za izvirno mišljenje biti, saj se prav tu usodno določi odnos do nič. Negativnost namreč ne izhaja iz izkustva nič, pač pa je obratno, nič je razumljen iz *razlike zavesti*, tj. iz dejstva, da je »bistvo zavesti samozavedanje: vsak cogito je obenem cogito me cogitare« (Heidegger 2009, 76). Z drugimi besedami, Heglova filozofija nič »ne jemlje resno«.

104 V Heglovi filozofiji sicer srečamo tematizacijo biti in nič na neštetihih mestih, odnos biti in nič stoji v samem osrčju *Znanosti logike*. Toda tako bit kot nič sta tu razumljena skozi »predmetnost«, tj. na horizontu zavesti oz. samozavedanja. Govorjenje o niču tako pride korak prepozno, ko je »vse negativno, nično [Nichthafte] že žrtvovano« (Heidegger 2009, 14). Nič je, kot beremo na začetku *Znanosti logike*, dostopen le kot *praznost* mišljenja: »Nič zreti ali misliti ima nek pomen [...] in tako v našem zrenju ali mišljenju nič je (eksistira)« (Hegel 1991, 74). S tem pa je možnost mišljenja nič – »Misliti Nič pomeni: izkusiti resničnost biti in stisko [Not] bivajočega v celoti« (Heidegger 2009, 15) – že zamujena.

Zato bit v Heglovem sistemu ni tematizirana kot tisto, kar on imenuje »bit«, pač pa kot tisto, kar imenuje »dejanskost«: »bit' je temeljna beseda filozofije. Kar mi v tem bistvenem in hrkati v izhodiščnem zgodovinskem smislu imenujemo ,bit', pomeni za Hegla ,dejanskost'« (Heidegger 2009, 10). Ni naključje, da je ravno na tej točki Marx napadel Heglov sistem, išoč »dejanskega« in ne »fantastičnega« človeka, odnose itd. V tistem, kar je bilo v prvi polovici 19. stoletja »dejansko«, Marx namreč ni mogel, za razliko od Hegla, prepoznati udejanjenja *smotra*. Razlog je v tem, da biti, razumljene kot dejanskost, ne moremo razumeti brez *telosa*: »Tisto, kar mi, v skladu z začetki zahodne filozofije, imenujemo bit, se pri Heglu imenuje dejanskost; in to poimenovanje ni naključno, saj je pri Aristotelu ob koncu prvega začetka vnaprej določeno: *energeia* – *enteleheia*.« (Heidegger 2009, 50) Z drugimi besedami, Marx ni mogel v svetu najti niti najmanjšega enačaja med dejanskostjo in umnostjo.

Pomislek o podpisu *enteleheie* v dejanskosti z začetka 19. stoletja je legitimen. Toda Marx v svoji kritiki ni uspel razviti novega pojmovnega aparata, zato se mu Heglov ves čas vrača skozi zadnja vrata. Zaradi tega – kot bomo pokazali v tej razpravi – ne opazi, da obtiči v aporijah, ki zaznamujejo poskuse t. i. »narave zavesti« v razdelkih »Zavest« in »Samozavedanje« *Fenomenologije duha*. Povedano drugače, Marxova programska maksima materializma, da »zavest nikoli ne more biti kaj drugega kot osveščena bit, in bit ljudi je njihov dejanski življenjski proces« (Marx in Engels 1971b, 25) ni nič drugega kot napoved naivnosti, ki jih Hegel ne le razume, pač pa tudi zadovoljivo pojasni. Marxovo hrepenenje po stiku mišljenja z »dejanskostjo« posledično spodleti po njegovih lastnih kriterijih.

Videli smo, da se bo pričujoča razprava odvijala na horizontu kartezijanske redukcije biti bivajočega na predstavljenost predstavljenega. Ne smemo pregledati, da se je pot za to redukcijo pripravila že davno pred novim vekom, ko je, kot beremo, npr., v šesti knjigi *Nikomahove etike*, *aletheuein* duše postal v prvi vrsti *logizesthai*. S Heideggrovimi besedami: »kolikor se Vernehmen (nous) opredli kot mišljenje (logos – ratio, um), tedaj postane bit Gedachtheit – to pa je določenost biti, ki je v temelju tako ‚idealistične‘ kot ‚realistične‘ interpretacije nanašanja na bivajoče« (Heidegger 2009, 40). Ta premik je torej podlaga obeh, tako idealistične kot materialistične plati filozofskega stika med Marxom in Heglom. Gre za mišljenje tostran ontološke difference, kjer je nič vnaprej »žrtvovan«. Na ta način nič postane obvladljiv, udomačen, simboliziran, denimo, s pokopom kot negacijo negacije.

Vseeno je treba opozoriti, da je Heglova misel že preseгла naivno kartezijanstvo. V prvi vrsti je preseгла ontološko agonijo odzivanja na brezsvetnost refleksivnega subjekta, ki ga napoti na stvaritev sveta iz nič, *ex nihilo*. T. Hobbes, denimo, kreacijo vseh institutov socialnosti izpelje z družbeno pogodbo,² pri čemer mu »nič« predstavlja teorem naravnega stanja. Jakobinci in Marx za osvobajajoči »nič«, ki naj omogoči neovirani »fiat!«, že potrebujejo dejansko uničenje obstoječega sveta, revolucijo. V tem je med Heglom in Heideggrom celo neka vzporednica, saj znata oba s filozofsko hvaležnostjo sprejeti tisto, kar v neki

2 B. Ludwig opozori, da pri Hobbesu »ljudje, z ustvarjanjem Leviathana posnemajo božje stvarjenje človeka« (Ludwig 2008, 65). Na isti način, kot je bog ustvarjal s sebi lastnim »zgodí se« (*fiat*), morajo »ljudje ustvariti mir v svojem svetu s pomočjo sebi lastnega ‚fiat‘, tj. s pomočjo pogodb« (Ludwig 2008, 67).

dobi poda bodisi »bitna zgodovina« (Heidegger) bodisi »svetovna zgodovina« (Hegel). Tako je za Heideggerja bistvo človeka, »da je čakajoči, ki čaka bistvo biti s tem, da ga misleč varuje« (Heidegger 1967b, 370), za Hegla pa spoznanje, da človek »ne more preskočiti duha svojega ljudstva, tako kot ne more preskočiti zemlje« (Hegel 1999, 77). Obema mislecema je torej jasno, da pri svetu *ne* gre za to, »[...] da ga spremenimo«. Vsaj ne način, kot je to predvidel Marx.

E. Fink pojasnjuje zmožnost Heglove filozofije za spravo s svetom v okoliščini, da je vnesla ključne poteze antične ontologije v novoveško paradigmo:

Novi vek razume pojem prvenstveno kot nekaj subjektivnega; umnost primarno ni moč, ki bi vladala v bivajočem, pač pa ima le-to način biti subjekta; [...] za antično dojetje biti je bivajoče v samem sebi umno; pojem je *ousia in to ti en einai*; bistvo je v bivajočem samem. [...] Hegel obeh temeljnih pozicij zahodne metafizike ne poveže le na zunanji način, dejansko ju misli skupaj. (Fink 2010, 53)

106 V tem je Hegel nadaljevalec Aristotelovega spoznanja, da »[...] obstaja [...] um, ki je takšne vrste, da postane vse stvari [...]« (Aristotel 1993, 430a).³ Brez tega ne bi mogel razviti gibanja naravne zavesti, ki poganja tok celotne *Fenomenologije duha*, in ga pri tem razumeti kot »sebe izvršujoče ontologije« (Fink 2010, 53).

Paralelo med Heglovo mislijo in grštvom vidi tudi H.-G. Gadamer. Opozori na dolg, ki ga ima nauk o refleksijskih določilih iz *Znanosti logike* pri Platonovem nauku o prepletanju idej:

In v tem smislu je prva resnica Heglove logike platonska resnica, ki jo najdemo v *Menonu*, kjer preberemo, da je vsa narava medsebojno povezana, in da je torej pot sprave ene stvari pot sprave vseh stvari. Ni posamičnih idej in smoter dialektike je odpraviti neresničnost njihove ločenosti. [...] Zanj [tj. za Hegla, op. R. S.] so objektivni in refleksijski

3 V zvezi z odnosom mišljenja in biti pri Aristotelu velja omeniti tudi znamenito Heideggerovo interpretacijo petih načinov »resnicevanj« (*aletheuein*) duše, ki jih razgrne v šesti knjigi *Nikomahove etike*. Heidegger (npr., v marburških predavanjih v letu 1924/25; GA 19) pokaže, kako v teh načinih bivajoče »postane dostopno, se prisvoji in obvaruje« (Heidegger 1996, 30).

pojmi le različne stopnje istega razvoja. Pojma »biti« in »bistvo« se dovršita v nauku o »pojmu«. Kar se tu pokaže, je enotnost mišljenja bistva in biti, kar ustreza na eni strani Aristotelovemu, na drugi pa prav tako Kantovemu konceptu kategorije. (Gadamer 1980, 68)

Podobno kot Fink tudi Gadamer zaznava močno naslanjanje Heglove misli na antično tradicijo mišljenja bivajočega. In prav to ji omogoča, da jo lahko na tem mestu vzamemo, četudi je v temelju zavezana kartezijanski redukciji, za verodostojno referenco pri kritiki Marxove ontologije. Z drugimi besedami, kljub temu da bit (tako kot nič) razume na horizontu predmetnosti, je Hegel že zmožen prepoznati (npr. razsvetljenski) poskus snovanja novega sveta zgolj kot »krparijo človeškega uma« (Heidegger 1967a, 231).

2. Točka trka

Čeprav je materializem v osnovi ontološka agenda, ga Marx primarno ne artikulira na tej ravni. Njegov razkol s Heglom se pojavi na neki drugi točki, ne glede koncipiranja odnosa med mišljenjem in bitjo, temveč glede ocene udejanjenosti smotra v svetu. Celotno Marxovo fiksiranje na »dejanskost«, v čemer je materialnost njegove filozofije, je naknadno in podrejeno utemeljevanju razhajanja na tej točki. Ta punktualnost njunega razhajanja se zrcali tudi v okoliščini, da Marx gradi na zelo podobnem pogledu na dovršitev človekove eksistence, kakršen je Heglov. Kar je za tega življenje ob zadovoljitvi vseh bistvenih razsežnosti človeka, je za Marxa »popoln, zavestno in znotraj vsega bogastva dozrajšnjega razvoja nastali povratek človeka za sebe kot družbenega, tj. človeškega človeka« (Marx 1969c, 332). Ta »povratek« gradi na spravi, konceptualizacijo katere si prav tako sposodi pri Heglu:

Ta komunizem je kot dovršen naturalizem = humanizem, kot dovršen humanizem = naturalizem, je resničen razplet spora med človekom in naravo ter človekom, resničen razplet spora med eksistenco in bistvom, med upredmetovanjem in samopotrjevanjem, med svobodo in nujnostjo, med individuumom in redom. Komunizem je rešena uganka zgodovine in ve, da je ta rešitev. (Marx 1969c, 332–333)

Tekom razvoja Maxove misli se med avtorjema vseeno izoblikujejo nespregledljive razlike. Ena od njih je v (ne)dejanskosti tistega, kar Marx imenuje »rešena uganke zgodovine«. Heglov opis udejanjenosti smotra je prepuščen sproščenemu poletu Minervine sove, sodbi za nazaj: to naj bi bilo več ali manj duhovno stanje tedanje Evrope (pustimo kontroverze o koncu zgodovine zaenkrat ob strani). Gre za točko, do katere je pripeljal zgodovinski razvoj in jo lahko opišemo v vsej njeni polnosti, nizajoč institucije, zakonodajo, umetnost in druge upodobе duha tistega časa. Tej polnosti stoji naproti Marxova zadrega pri opisovanju »rešene uganke zgodovine«, saj ta temelji na perspektivi *pričakovanja* dovršitve dejanskosti, ki leži v prihodnosti. Zato je njen opis lahko le bodisi abstrakten bodisi negativen.

Marx tako govori o razmerah, v katerih lahko človek »spravi iz sebe vse svoje generične moči« (Marx 1969c, 379) in v katerih naj bi »na mesto stare meščanske družbe z njenimi razredi in razrednimi nasprotji stopila asociacija, v kateri je svoboden razvoj slehernega pogoj za svoboden razvoj vseh« (Marx in Engels 1971a, 613). Za to naj bi bila, med drugim, nujna »pozitivna odprava privatne lastnine« (Marx 1969c, 332) in konec odtujevanja, ki zagotovi »povratak človeka iz religije, družine, države itn. v njegovo človeško, tj. družbeno bivanje« (Marx 1969c, 333). To pa naj bi bilo možno le na osnovi »tiste teorije, ki razglša človeka za najvišje bistvo človeka« (Marx 1969b, 208). Vidimo, da Marx lahko smoter, ki naj ga sprava antagonizmov udejanji, zajame le s pomočjo abstraktnih (»generične moči«, »asociacija«, »povratak v družbeno bivanje« itd.) in negativnih (ne-»meščanska družba«, ne-»lastnina« itd.) orisov.

Poskus realizacije abstraktnih določil vselej prinaša velika tveganja. Danes najprej pomislimo na jamstva posameznika v odnosu do oblasti. Ker pa revolucija predvideva ravno odpravo posameznika (razumljenega kot *bourgeois*), ki nastopa kot glavna ovira za realizacijo človeške emancipacije, ni možno računati na tradicionalna jamstva, razvita v kontraktualistični tradiciji. Na konceptualni ravni taka jamstva naj ne bi bila niti potrebna, saj se obeta »asociacija, v kateri je svoboden razvoj slehernega pogoj za svoboden razvoj vseh« (Marx in Engels 1971a, 613). Če parafraziramo Rousseauja, se obeta ureditev, ki je »že samo s tem, da obstaja, vedno to, kar mora biti« (Rousseau 2001, 25).

Resda tudi drugi avtorji gradijo na abstraktnih principih, tako Kant, denimo, piše o večnem miru, v katerem so prav tako – sicer na neki drugi

ravni – odpravljeni antagonizmi. Vendar je to zgolj regulativna ideja, zenit, ki osmišlja dejanja tukaj-in-zdaj in za katero je vnaprej jasno, da ne bo nikoli *udejanjena*. Pri Marxu pa gre, nasprotno, za pričakovanje dejanske in dokončne spremembe. Na tem njegov koncept stoji in pade. Znan je Marxov očitek bivšim somišljenikom, da snujejo impotentne filozofske sisteme, domet katerih je, da gredo s frazami nad fraze. Toda sam prav tako nima ponuditi več kot fraze o »svobodnih asociacijah«, o »pozitivnem humanizmu« itd. Toda njegove fraze niso usmerjene zoper druge fraze, pač pa kličejo k revoluciji.

Revolucija naj odpravi svet, v katerem Marx ni zmožen videti niti sledu udejanjenosti smotra. Ta nezmožnost se lepo zrcali v diametralno nasprotni oceni človekovega odnosa do religije, čeprav jo opiše na domala identičen način kot Hegel. Tako zapiše, da četudi

samega sebe se zavedajoči človek, kolikor je duhovni svet [...] spoznal in odpravil kot samopovnanjanje, toisto vendar v tej samopovnanjeni podobi potrjuje in ga izdaja za svoje resnično bivanje, ga ponovno vzpostavlja, trdi, da je v svoji drugobiti kot taki pri sebi, da torej po ukinitvi npr. religije, potem ko spozna, da je religija produkt samopovnanjanja, vendarle najde svojo potrditev v religiji kot religiji. (Marx 1969c, 385–386)

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Okoliščina, da je subjekt »v svoji drugobiti pri sebi«, je jedro Heglove definicije svobode. Toda Marx v tem ne vidi razrešitve heterogenosti religije, nasprotno, še vedno mu ostaja – četudi sam zapiše, da subjekt v njej ostaja »pri sebi« – nekaj tujega. Vsako potrditev v »religiji kot religiji« namreč *a priori* razume kot izgubo človeka: »Čim več postavi človek v boga, tem manj obdrži v samem sebi.« (Marx 1969c, 303)

Ta pasus je lepa ilustracija okoliščine, da Marx ne preseže naivnega kartezijanstva, kjer je subjekt zgolj v neposrednem samonanašanju, v varnih nebesih abstraktnih miselnih figur, »pri sebi«. Ne zmore pa se prepoznati v kateremkoli obstoječem »produktu samopovnanjanja« in spoštovanje avtoritete takega samopovnanjanja, četudi povsem svobodno, je za Marxa lahko le hlapčevanje: »Luther je vsekakor premagal hlapčevstvo iz pobožnosti, ker je na njegovo mesto postavil hlapčevstvo iz prepričanja.

Zlomil je vero v avtoriteto, ker je restavriral avtoriteto vere.« (Marx 1969b, 201) Vse fenomene obstoječega sveta razume kot radikalno drugobit, ki jo lahko odpravi le revolucija, njihovo uničenje. Poskus prenosa te naivne predstave od domačnosti, dostopne le v abstraktnih naznačbah, v svet napoveduje nerešljive težave.

3. Od »misticizma« k »dejanskosti« in nazaj

Marx idealizmu pripisuje abstraktnost, ki naj ne bi preseгла ravni »fraz«. Vzrok za to vidi v okoliščini, da naj bi bil idealizem, rečeno metaforično, za 180 stopinj obrnjen v napačno smer: proč od »dejanskosti«. Zato si za nalogo zada poiskati izvoren stik mišljenja z dejanskim svetom, torej s krajem, kjer osvoboditev človeka edino šteje. Poskus zgrabiti ta tukaj-in-zdaj ga napoti k nadomestitvi idealistične perspektive z materialistično. Verjame, da je Heglova filozofija zgolj naivni »misticizem« (Marx 1969a, 60), zaradi česar v njem niti »običajna empirija nima za zakon svojega duha« (Marx 1969a, 60). Obračanje z glave na noge zahteva revizijo celotnega znanstvenega aparata. Retoriko »duha«, »zavedanja«, »samozavedanja« nadomesti retorika »dejanskosti«: dejanski človek mora odvreči dejansko hlapčevanje, v dejanskem svetu itd.

Absolutni idealizem je možno izpostaviti resni kritiki, denimo temu, da je v njem »vse negativno, nično [Nichthafte] že žrtvovano« (Heidegger 2009, 14), kar smo omenili v prvem poglavju. Toda očitek, da se ne meni za »dejstva« in »dejanskost«, je naiven. Videli bomo, da Marxovo hlastanje za dejanskostjo vodi v nerešljive *aporije*, ki jih poskuša držati skupaj prav »fantastični« umislek: eshatološka perspektiva. Ta je namreč tisto lepilo, ki ohranja Marxovo filozofijo kot plavzibilni teoretski koncept že stoletje in pol. Ne pojmovno dosledne izpeljave, pač pa sijaj evangelija je tisto, kar je nagovarjalo množice in zagotavljalo izjemno širitev nauka, hkrati pa s svojim bliščem prekrivalo zadrege Marxove ontologije.

Toda eshatološke perspektive in moralnih kategorij ni mogoče izpeljati iz še tako energičnega osredotočanja na materialno dejanskost. Na to zgoščeno opozori K. Löwith z naslednjimi besedami:

Dejstvo, da »zgodovina vsake dosedanje družbe« pokaže raznovrstna nasprotja med vladajočo manjšino in podvrženo večino, ne upravičuje

tolmačenja in ocene tega stanja kot »izkoriščanja«; še manj pa pričakovanja, da tistega, kar je bilo do sedaj dejstvo, v prihodnosti po nujnosti ne bo več. (Löwith 2004, 52–53)

Razredna nasprotja so dejstvo, temu ne oporeka nihče. In v tem tudi ni izvirnost Marxa. Toda tisto, kar je naredilo njegovo filozofijo tako propulzivno, da sta v nekem trenutku po marksističnih naukih živeli dve tretjini človeštva, pa je prav »temna sfera« in »resnica za zaveso«, izrečena v »mističnem« jeziku.

Marxovo fiksiranje na »dejanskost« primarno ne vznikne iz pomislov zoper Heglovo ontologijo, zoper njegov nauk o odnosu med mišljenjem in bitjo. Nikjer ne najdemo analiz pomanjkljivosti Heglove predsistemske ali sistemske filozofije. Nepremostljiv razkol izhaja, kot smo pokazali, iz okoliščine, da je Hegel pripravljen v (tedanjem) svetu prepoznati dejanskost *enteleheie*. Glede tega je ilustrativen stavek s konca *Predavanj o filozofiji zgodovine*: »Do tu je prišla zavest in to so glavni momenti oblik, v katerih se je ostvarilo načelo svobode, kajti svetovna zgodovina ni nič drugega kot razvoj pojma svobode.« (Hegel 1967, 333) Marxova odklonitev idealizma ne izvira iz kritike posameznih rešitev na ravni subjektivnega, objektivnega in absolutnega duha, temveč iz okoliščine, da Hegel v tedanjem svetu prepozna »ostvaritev načela svobode«.

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Tozadevno zadržanost lepo povzema Marxova sarkastična pripomba, da »ima družba preveč civilizacije« (Marx in Engels 1971a, 595) in izraža zgroženost nad neizmerno mizerijo nepreglednih množic tedanje Evrope. Na tej ravni mu ni mogoče oporekati. Toda ni samoumevno, da na osnovi tega pavšalno zavrne tudi idealistični pristop k mišljenju sveta. Marxu zadostuje zgolj disenz glede »ostvaritve svobode« v svetu, ki ga vidi v marsičem bolj razčlovečenega kot je bil fevdalni in sužnjelastniški. Prav to naj bi bil dokaz, da idealizem obtiči zgolj pri »idejah«, pri ukvarjanju z njihovimi medsebojnimi odnosi, nezmožen dostopa do »dejanskosti«.

Zato ima Heglov programski stavek, da je um »substancia, kot tudi neskončna moč, samemu sebi neskončna snov vsega naravnega in duhovnega življenja, kot tudi neskončna oblika, udejstvovanje te njegove vsebine« (Hegel 1999, 24), tudi v tem primeru za Marxa diametralno nasproten pomen. Mišljenje brez reference na »dejanskost« naj bi bilo obsojeno na blodenje. Pri Kantu se pretrganje vezi mišljenja s čutnostjo kaže

v antinomijah, pri Heglu pa v pripravljenosti podeliti certifikat smotrnosti takšnemu svetu, ki je po Marxu pogreznjen v najhujše barbarstvo. Toda v obeh primerih naj bi bil izvor napake isti: poskus mišljenja, da lahko samo sebi daje materijo. S tem zdrsne v tавтоloški proces verificiranja resničnosti fenomenov, ne da bi ti nosili podpis dejanskosti. Z Marxovimi besedami, zavest si »more umišljati, [...] da dejansko nekaj predstavlja, ne da bi predstavljala nekaj dejanskega« (Marx in Engels 1971b, 36–37). Zato je treba z glave na noge, najti je treba fundament, na katerem bo mišljenje suvereno slonelo.

Marx išče sidro mišljenja v proizvodnji dobrin. Proizvodnja sredstev za življenje je izhodišče njegove antropologije, na samem začetku *Nemške ideologije* človeka opredli kot edino bitje, ki proizvaja. Hkrati je to kraj, kjer nastajajo anomalije kapitalistične ekonomije, ki jih je Marx jemal kot dokaz nepomirljivosti antagonizmov. O zmožnosti ekonomije, da avtonomno ustvarja odnose med ljudmi, so pisali že mnogi, od A. Smitha do Hegla, ki v *Filozofijo pravice* vključi razdelek o občanski družbi. Originalnost Marxa pa je teza o ekskluzivnosti produkcije družbenih pravil, ki jo pripiše ekonomiji. Četudi si mišljenje umišlja, da samo nekaj predstavlja, dejansko vselej sloni na pogojih materialne proizvodnje.

Pomanjkljivosti tega pristopa Marx ne bo zaznal, saj frontalno odkloni celoten Heglov pojmovni aparat in zaradi tega zabrede prav v antinomije naravne zavesti iz prvega in drugega razdelka *Fenomenologije*. Išoč naslombo v »dejanskosti«, verodostojno mišljenje razume takole: »Zavest nikoli ne more biti kaj drugega kot osveščena bit, in bit ljudi je njihov dejanski življenjski proces.« (Marx in Engels 1971b, 25) Naj bo ta stavek še tako zdravorazumski, v hipu postane izvor nerešljivih zadreg, če ne upoštevamo »idealističnega« spoznanja, da mišljenje vselej soustvarja tisto, kar spoznava. Zato se Marxu pripetijo preskoki, ki jih ne zazna in ne more nadzorovati.

V prvi fazi, ko skuša zgolj slediti »dejanskosti«, hodi po stopinjah naravne zavesti iz prvega razdelka *Fenomenologije*, ki jo »sprevrnjeni svet« opozori na podobnost strukture zavesti in predmeta spoznavanja. Ko zasluti svojo vlogo pri ustroju predmetov, se odpravi na pot z začetka drugega razdelka *Fenomenologije*. Tu je v igri projekt svobode, ki jo naivno razume skozi vzpostavitev popolne pasivnosti objekta kot njegovo konzumpcijo. S tem ne

le ne doseže ravni uma v *Fenomenologiji*, niti na ravni pripoznanja se ne zna potrditi. Poskus neposrednega dostopa do »dejstev« vodi v preskakovanje med naivno predstavo, da mišljenje zgolj sledi biti, in predstavo, da jo mišljenje prosto kreira.

4. Aporije glede vloge mišljenja

To sta dve plati Marxove filozofije, ki ju ne moremo ločiti ene od druge. Toda med njima glede učinkovne zgodovine vlada velika asimetrija. Zgodovino je veliko bolj nagovarjala druga plat, po kateri je snovanje boljšega jutri zgolj v rokah tistih, ki hrepenijo po svetu brez izkoriščanja. Toda če naj bo revolucija zgodovinska nujnost, tedaj ne more biti v igri zgolj hrepenenje zatiranih in njegova realizacija preko revolucije. Revolucija mora imeti zgodovinski mandat, ki se ga ne da izsiliti, lahko ga ima ali pa nima. Zadrega je, da Marx potrebuje obe plati, vendar ju ne more medsebojno pomiriti. To se lepo zrcali v ambivalentnem statusu subjekta in zgodovinskosti njegovih dejanj.

Na eni strani Marx mora vpeljati subjekt kot tvorca zgodovinskega dogajanja. Če bi bili odnosi med ljudmi zgolj naravorasli, tedaj bi težko govorili o *eksploataciji* proletariata, saj bi bila tako lastnik kapitala kot delavec zgolj slepi, tj. a-moralni nasledek v materialnem porajane delitve dela. Eksploatacija bi bila usoda, ki po naključju izbere ene in ne drugih, ne pa krivica, ki je ni brez zavestne kršitve univerzalne človečnosti. Toda na drugi strani subjekt ne sme natopiti kot akter na ravni zgodovine, saj bi tedaj perspektiva revolucije ostala brez materialnega mandata. Če bi zanjo jamčil plan revolucionarjev in ne mandat zgodovine, bi se Marxov nauk postavil na konec dolge vrste »poboljševalcev človeštva«, ki nimajo v rokah ničesar drugega razen dobrih namenov. Le vztrajanje na zgodovinski nujnosti daje nauku znanstveni predznak in kvalificirano plavzibilnost. S tem seveda kapitalist neha biti svoboden subjekt izkoriščanja.

Mest, kjer lahko sledimo nenadzorovanemu preklapljanju med tema dvema platema, je mnogo. »Zavest kot osveščena bit« človeka priklene na njegov »dejanski življenjski proces«, ki ga v celoti določa, s čimer je tudi njegov »duhovni« svet le pasivni rezultat tega procesa: »Produkcija idej, predstav, zavesti je najprej neposredno vpletena v materialno dejavnost. [...] Predstavljanje, mišljenje, duhovno občevanje ljudi se tu kažeta kot direkten

izliv njihovega materialnega obnašanja.« (Marx in Engels 1971b, 24) Mišljenje (če naj bo znanstveno, tostran »fantastičnih« umislekov) nima nobenih kreacionističnih sposobnosti. Nobenega prostora ni za svobodno duhovno produkcijo (omike, kulture, morale, religije itd.), saj materialni odnosi določajo vse, od ustroja znotraj posamezne države do odnosov med njimi:

Medsebojni odnosi različnih nacij so odvisni od tega, do kod je vsaka od njih razvila produktivne sile, delitev dela in notranje občevanje. [...] Toda ne le odnos ene nacije do druge, ampak tudi vse notranje členjenje te nacije same je odvisno od razvojne stopnje njene produkcije in njenega notranjega in zunanjega občevanja. (Marx in Engels 1971b, 19)

Seveda mišljenje ni »direkten izliv« materialnega. Tega spoznanja ne podaja le celotna idealistična tradicija, pač pa se skriva kar v samem programskem izhodišču Marxove ontologije, ki je – po svoji strukturi – pravzaprav Heglovo. Začne z abstraktnim elementom, z »razvitostjo produktivnih sil«, ki se nato 114 razprši v konkretno proizvodnjo dobrin, v kateri so dejavni posamezniki, kar se koncu vrne v poenotenje, v »izliv« tej razvitosti odgovarjajočega »duha«. S tem je izrisana sopripadnost vseh treh elementov, med katerimi je tako odnos abstraktnega in konkretnega, kot tudi splošnega (»razvitost produkcijskih sil«), posebnega (konkretna in dejanska proizvodnja) in posamičnega (»duhovno občevanje ljudi«). Prav v slednjem momentu se proces proizvodnje *ve*, tj. postane *za-sebe*, ter se vrne iz razčlenjenosti v enotnost.

Vsega tega Marx ne sprevidi in duhovni »izliv« jemlje kot pasivni izdelek, ki pade, kot njegov materialni pendant, iz proizvodnega stroja. Zato tudi ne opazi, da mu v naslednjem hipu ta spregledani (aktivni) doprinos mišljenja k spoznavanju sveta uide in nastopi kot samostojen ekstrem. Začne govoriti o neovirani kreativnosti mišljenja:

Ljudje so si doslej vedno ustvarjali napačne predstave o samih sebi, o tem, kaj so ali naj bi bili. Po svojih predstavah o Bogu, o normalnem človeku itd. so urejali svoje razmere. Izrodki njihove glave so jim zrastle čez glavo. Pred svojimi stvori so se uklonili oni, tvorci. (Marx in Engels 1971b, 11)

V skladu s tezo o mišljenju kot »direktnem izlivu« ljudje ne bi smeli biti ustvarjalci »predstav o sebi«, saj tudi ustvarjalci načina proizvodnje, od koder te predstave ustvarjajo – tako Marx – niso.

Ljudje seveda so (so)ustvarjalci predstav o sebi, vendar ne vulgaren način, kot sugerira ta citat. Tudi v tem primeru Marx naredi napako, ki jo v Heglovem žargonu imenujemo izolacija in fiksacija momenta celote. Prav to Hegel očita razsvetljenski kritiki vere, ki Boga obravnava podobno kot Marx. Ko razsvetljenstvo izreče, da je Bog izdelek človeka – danes bi rekli: družbeni konstrukt –, s tem izolira »moment *početja* in o *nasebju* vere izreka, da je, češ, *le* nekaj [od] zavesti *proizvedenega*. Izolirano, *nasebju* protipostavljeno početje pa je neko naključno početje in kot neko predstavljajoče izdelovanje fikcij, – predstav, ki niso *na sebi*; in tako motri [razsvetljenstvo] vsebino vere.« (Hegel 1998, 290–291) Šlo naj bi le za izdelovanje »fikcij« oziroma »izrodkov«. Omika, vključno s konceptom Boga, seveda je produkt človeka. Kot je tudi zavest ozaveščena bit. Toda ne prvega ne drugega ne smemo razumeti na naiven način, saj zaidemo v aporije.

5. Subjekt med absolutno vednostjo in zgodovinskim akterjem

Marxova oscilacija med ekstremoma glede vloge mišljenja se pri pojasnjevanju zgodovinskega razvoja, ki naj z nujnostjo vodi do revolucije, prenese na vlogo subjekta kot zgodovinskega akterja. Šlo bo za preskakovanje med vlogo, ki mu jo determinira zgodovinski razvoj, tj. pasivno vlogo, določeno z materialno nujnostjo, ter aktivno vlogo revolucionarja, ki nima mandata v zgodovini in deluje (celo kot njen dovrševalec!) na osnovi svoje volje. Najdemo pasuse, ki dajo slutiti, da se Marx zaveda nemožnosti tega preskakovanja. Tako beremo v *Manifestu*, da

[k]omunisti torej praktično obravnavajo pogoje, ki so jih ustvarili dosedanja produkcija in občevanje, kot neorganske, ne da bi si domišljali, da je bil načrt ali usoda dosedanjih generacij, da jim dajejo material, in ne da bi mislili, da so bili ti pogoji neorganski za individue, ki so jih

ustvarjali. (Marx in Engels 1971b, 84–85)⁴

To je napisano na osnovi razlikovanja med nekom, ki je rešil »uganko zgodovine«, in nekom, ki svoje resnice še ne ve. Prvi ve za »neorganskost« odnosov, drugi jih jemlje še kot »organske«. To je točka nekakšnega »absolutnega vedenja«, ki pa je omejeno na pogled za nazaj. Je opazujoči in ne delujoči pogled. Če od njega preskočimo k delovanju, celo k izvršitvi *ključnega* dela zgodovine, tedaj temu pogledu še nekaj manjka, da bi lahko bil absoluten. Posledično takšen akter lahko deluje le »neorgansko«. Zato revolucija ne more imeti mandata absolutne vednosti. Zadrega je, da Marx subjektu kot akterju zgodovinskega dogajanja pripisuje dve različni vlogi, ki ju v pozivu k revoluciji skuša združiti. Predvečer revolucije obravnava kot stanje, ki je hkrati »organsko« in »neorgansko«. Ima ga za rezultat »načrta in usode« ter za situacijo, v kateri je treba ključno stvar zgodovine še izvršiti. Giblje se na ravni »uma v zgodovini« (Hegel) in hkrati na ravni »dobre volje« (Kant).

116 C. Schmitt dobro vidi naivnost združevanja teh dveh plati. Z mesta znanstvenega, tj. retrogradnega opazovalca zgodovine človeštva ni dopustno prestopiti na mesto zaključevalca tega razvoja in pri tem vztrajati, da se v znanstvenem smislu ni nič spremenilo. To, da se nam je izoblikoval celostni uvid v preteklost ni dokaz za privilegiranost snovanja prihodnosti. Schmitt pravi:

[...] od kod tista gotovost, da je ta trenutek nastopil in da je zares prišla zadnja ura buržoazije? Če raziščemo tisto vrsto evidence, s katero marksizem tu argumentira, prepoznamo samoorganizacijo, ki je tipična za heglovski racionalizem. Konstrukcija izhaja iz tega, da pomeni razvoj vedno bolj naraščajočo zavest, in v lastni gotovosti te zavesti vidi dokaz, da je pravilna. (Schmitt 1994, 54)

To jo opogumi, da »si sebe s svojim mišljenjem zamišlja kot konico razvoja«. Skratka, »da je neka doba zajeta v človeški zavesti, historični dialektiki služi kot

4 K. Marx, *Nemška ideologija*, podobna formulacija: »Ljudje niso producenti svojih predstav, idej ipd., ampak dejanski, delujoči ljudje, kot jih pogojuje določen razvoj njihovih proizvodnih sil in občevanje, ki tem ustreza.« (Marx in Engels 1971b, 24)

dokaz, da je prepoznana doba historično zaključena« (ibid.). Treba je sprejeti, da ima retorika rešenih ugank zgodovine in absolutne vednosti visoko ceno: s stališča akcije je zgolj impotenten pogled za nazaj.

6. Človeška emancipacija ali človek-zobnik?

Nekonsistentnosti bi se izognili, če bi revolucijo snovali kot projekt »dobre volje«, kot poskus realizacije etičnih načel, za katere skušamo dokazati, da so zavezujoči. Toda to je s stališča Marxa neoriginalen, »idealističen« pristop. Seveda poznavanje razmer, raziskovanje zgodovinskih procesov spada zraven in je pogoj za uspešnost takšne revolucije. Toda Marx s svojo historično referenco nima v mislih pragmatičnega uvida v zgodovinske »razmere«. Njegova prognoza revolucije ni izrečena v imenu *svobode* (raziskovanja in izvrševanja vzvišenih etičnih načel), temveč v imenu *nujnosti* (totalitete zgodovinskega procesa). To je nujnost, ki se bo pravzaprav šele z aktom revolucije verificirala kot nujnost, saj v primeru, da se izkaže njena nemožnost, pade vse. Ta razkol – med »zagotovo-bo« in »dejansko-je-bilo« – naj bi skupaj držala oscilacija subjekta, ki preskakuje iz filozofskega laboratorija na teren revolucije in nazaj. Prav na ta način, biti na dveh krajih hkrati, naj zagotovi *dejanskost* absolutnosti uvida, v imenu katere je treba delovati že vnaprej. Preskočiti bi morali lastno senco.

Ta dvojnost se izraža tudi v zadregah glede vizije emancipacije. Prva plat odnosa med bitjo in mišljenjem pripisuje slednjemu pasivnost. Duhovno življenje je le »izliv«, ki ga po vrnitvi človeka v njegovo generično življenje ne bo več – vsaj ne v podobi umišljanja, da takšno mišljenje »dejansko nekaj predstavlja, ne da bi predstavljalo nekaj dejanskega«. Ideologijo, ki je trenutno zbirno ime za človekovo duhovno udejstvovanje, tj. (buržoazno) filozofijo, moralo, kulturo itd., bo nadomestila »pozitivna znanost«. Ta bo neokrnjen izliv materialnih odnosov, ki bo dosledno vezan nanje in zato bo takšno mišljenje – vsaj po trenutnih kriterijih – nesvobodno.

Tudi če pustimo ob strani, kako razumeti (ne)svobodo na tem mestu, je povedano težko združljivo z vizijo, da bo lahko človek, če bo tako hotel, »lovec, ribič, pastir« ali – kot Marx humorно pripiše na rob rokopisa – »kritični kritik« (Marx in Engels 1971b, 40). Na svoj položaj, ki mu ga bodo odredili materialni odnosi, ne bo pripet zunanje, z nujo po preživetju na trgu dela, temveč notranje,

s samim konceptom mišljenja. To je težko združljivo z vizijo, da »danes delam to, jutri ono, da zjutraj lovim, popoldne ribarim, zvečer redim živino – in po jedi kritiziram –, kot mi pač prija, ne da bi kdaj postal lovec, ribič, pastir – ali kritik« (Marx in Engels 1971b, 40). Zdi se, da prva plat Marxove ontologije človeka priklene na njegov položaj bolj, kot ga kapitalizem. Tam lahko vsaj, seveda v okviru piškave (formalne) svobode sklepanja pogodb, kroži po trgu dela in dejansko nikoli ne postane ribič, lovec itd.

Druga plat ontologije, ki izolira kreacionizem mišljenja, ponuja zrcalno podobo pravkar opisane emancipacije. V tej perspektivi se bo mišljenje povsem ootreslo materialnega, ki je skozi delitev dela porajalo le spačeno mišljenje v podobi ideologije, prilagojene vsakokratnemu proizvodnemu načinu. Do sedaj si je namreč mišljenje lahko samo »umišljalo«, da je svobodno. Kako razumeti to osvoboditev iz besedil ni razvidno. Zdi se, da lahko nastopi le kot nekakšna inačica »idealizma«, v kateri bo mišljenje suvereno nad materialnim. Tako razumljena emancipacija pa je, kot zapiše Tiez, pravzaprav dovršeni kulturalizem: »na koncu torej stoji komunizem kot izvršeni kulturalizem« (Tiez 2010, 63). V tem smislu se de Berg vpraša, ali ni prav kapitalistično gospodarstvo uresničilo eksistencialne ločitve človeka od njegovega poklica, ki jo je obetal marksizem: »Kajti šele in prav meščansko-kapitalistična družba uresniči Marxovo vizijo, skladno s katero lahko človek, potem ko opravi svoje poklicne dolžnosti, hodi na lov, ribari, redi živino ali se posveča drugim prostočasnim dejavnostim, ki jih izbere sam.« (Berg 2007, 242)

Antinomije Marxove filozofije ne prežemajo le koncepta revolucije, njen odnos do materialnega mandata, temveč tudi njen cilj, emancipacijo človeka. Razumemo jo lahko tako kot ukinitve svobode človeka (vsaj kot si jo danes predstavljamo) kot tudi kot inačico nekakšne (meščanske?) emancipacije mišljenja v odnosu do sveta.

7. *Iustitia in njen pereat mundus*

Fenomenologija duha da tako v »Predgovoru« kot »Uvodu« jasno vedeti, da bo kritika Kantovega pristopa k spoznanju in delovanju v njej pogosta tema. Mnogi Heglovi interpreti (O. Pöggeler, L. Siep) strnejo osrednje filozofsko sporočilo *Fenomenologije* v spoznanju, da je treba dostop do fenomenov

vselej misliti na ravni *samozavedanja*, tj. skozi *ontološko* so-konstitucijo spoznanega s strani spoznavajočega. Kantova strategija stavi na *zavest*, na zgolj *spoznavnoteoretski* podpis spoznavajočega na spoznanem, v čemer ostane na pol poti. Po Heglu naj bi prav nerešljive aporije opozarjale na to izhodiščno napako. Na ravni spoznanja se pojavijo v podobi antinomij, pri delovanju pa v podobi delitve na analitiko in dialektiko praktičnega uma. Marx, podobno kot Kant, stavi na perspektivo zavesti, na »ozaveščanje biti«, zato so aporije glede vloge subjekta kot zgodovinskega akterja, nujnosti revolucije in koncepta emancipacije podobne tistim med analitiko in dialektiko praktičnega uma.

Kant s svojimi filozofskimi orodji ne zmore misliti notranjega odnosa med moralnim delovanjem in učinki tega delovanja. To ga vodi v težave. Po eni strani je prisiljen te plati z vso doslednostjo ločevati, saj mora pri moralnem delovanju stremljenje po srečnosti povsem obmolčati. Po drugi strani pa ju je prisiljen združevati, saj »[p]otrebovati srečnost, biti je tudi vreden, a je kljub temu ne biti deležen, kaj takega se nikakor ne more ujemati s popolnim hotenjem umnega bitja« (Kant 2003, 199). Moralnost je sicer *bonum supremum*, a ji vseeno nekaj manjka, da bi bila tudi *bonum consummatum*: srečnost. Toda stik med tema platema Kant lahko misli le zunanje, kot nekakšno seštevanje. Zato je tudi porok seštevanja zunanji, tj. postulat »nekega vzroka celokupne narave, ki je ločen od narave in vsebuje temelj te povezanosti [...]«, tj. »[...] natančno ujemanje srečnosti z nравnostjo« (Kant 2003, 225).

S tem je postavljen teren za nekontrolirano oscilacijo med obema platema, ki hkrati lepo opisuje oscilacijo, položeno v Marxovo filozofijo. Razgrne ga poglavje »Prenarejanje« v *Fenomenologiji duha*. V njem naravna zavest skuša delovati v okviru gabaritov Kantove moralne filozofije. To pomeni, da poskuša delovati skladno z moralnim imperativom, hkrati pa postulira »vzrok celokupne narave«, ki zagotavlja »natančno ujemanje srečnosti z nравnostjo«. Hegel opozori, da se to dvojje pravzaprav izključuje: »Ravnanje izpolnjuje zares neposredno tisto, kar je bilo prirejeno, da se ne dogaja in da naj bi bilo le neki postulat, le onstran. Zavest izreka torej to z dejanjem, da ji s postuliranjem ne gre zares« (Hegel 1998, 315). Zakaj delovati, če postuliramo sovpadanje med svetom in dolžnostjo? Oziroma, zakaj ustanoviti politično gibanje za dogodek, ki naj bi se zgodil po nujnosti? Z odločitvijo za izpeljavo revolucije se svobodno odločimo za nekaj, kar naj bi bilo tako ali tako nujno. Tako pri

Kantu kot pri Marxu se izoblikuje ista aporija: koncept delovanja (moralnega ali revolucionarnega) mora biti sestavljen iz dveh delov, toda če vzameš resno enega, negiraš drugega.

Začeli smo z ugotovitvijo, da je Marxov oris fokusa zgodovine le abstrakten in negativen. Toda ta soteriološka perspektiva, na kateri stoji in pade njegova filozofija, je le »fantastičen« umislek, po njegovih lastnih kriterijih. Znane so paralele med Marxovo filozofijo in krščanstvom. Tako Žižek ugotavlja, da je komunistična revolucija oblika apokalipse, »ki je izšla iz židovsko-krščanske tradicije in katere sekularizacijo je predstavljal komunistični projekt« (Žižek 2007, 155). Največjo propulzivnost, ki je mobilizirala njeno širitev, Marxova filozofija dolguje »frazam« – npr.: »vladajoči razredi naj le trepetajo pred komunistično revolucijo« (Marx in Engels 1971a, 629) – in ne prepričljivi znanstveni utemeljitvi projekta. V tem je bližje novozaveznemu gromovništvu – »Resnično, povem vam: Laže bo na sodni dan sódovski in gomórski deželi kakor tistemu mestu.« (Mt 10, 15) – kot znanstveni razgrnitvi materialne nujnosti zgodovinskega dogajanja.

120 Hegel na številnih mestih analizira strukturo abstraktnega najstva, zlasti vanj položeno težnjo, da ob realizaciji zdrsne v

[...] politični in religiozni fanatizem, ki uniči vsak obstoječi socialni red, odstrani vse posameznike, za katere se zdi, da želijo neki red, in zatre vsako organizacijo, ki bi se znova utegnila vzpostaviti. Ta negativna volja ima občutek svojega obstoja le v tem, da nekaj uniči; dejansko meni, da stremi k nekemu pozitivnemu redu, npr. k stanju obče enakosti ali občega religioznega življenja, toda dejansko ne stremi k njegovi pozitivni dejanskosti, saj le-ta takoj vpelje neki red, neko ločevanje institucij in posameznikov; toda prav to je tisto, iz česar uničevanja izhaja samozavedanje negativne svobode. Zato je lahko tisto, za kar meni da hoče, na sebi le abstraktna predstava; in uresničevanje tega je lahko vrtinec uničevanja. (Hegel 1970, 5)

Na abstraktnih izhodiščih žal »ni možen imanenten nauk o dolžnosti« (Hegel 1970, 135), zato Marx pri ilustraciji fokusa zgodovine lahko govori le o negaciji tega sveta (ne-»meščanska družba«, ne-»lastnina« itd.). Tudi

vzvišenost in veličino abstraktnih principov delovanja lahko merimo le po *tem* svetu, v pripravljenosti na njegovo negacijo, uničevanje. To je zaznati tudi pri Kantu, ki pri opisu odnosa moralnega zakona do življenja človeka tukaj-in-zdaj uporabi izraz »ponižanje«:

Moralni zakon, ki je edini resnično (in sicer v vseh pogledih) objektiven, pa popolnoma izključuje vpliv samoljubja na najvišje praktično načelo in neskončno prelomi s prevzetnostjo, ki predpisuje subjektivne pogoje samoljubja kot zakone. To, kar prelomi s prevzetnostjo v naši sodbi, pa nas ponižuje. (Kant 2003, 131–32)

V moralnem dejanju mora svet simbolno (Kant) ali dejansko (Marx) na kolena.

Moralnost nekega ravnanja temelji na nepatološkem motivu zanj, tj. na delovanju *iz* zakona, ki za opazovalca čutno ni zaznaven. Zato pri dejanjih, ki ne eskalirajo v konflikt in (samo)žrtvovanje, moralnost ni manifestirana. Ni evidentno, ali so bila izvedena v imenu prebivalca »kraljestva smotrov« ali v imenu kolaboranta, ki so ga mamljive limanice tostranstva napeljale k oportunističnemu spoštovanju predpisov. Le eruptivna dejanja, pripravljena na žrtvovanje sebe in drugih, so dejanja, kjer lahko *zremo* prepričanje akterjev, da so jim vzvišena načela vredna več kot mir za vsako ceno. Samo na takšen način – v konfliktu in žrtvovanju – lahko abstraktna dolžnost postane konkretna, afirmirana v svetu: skozi paradoks njegovega uničevanja. To je skupna lastnost vseh moralnih fanatizmov. *Iustitia* je misljiva le skupaj s *pereat mundus*. Pristajanje na obstoj sveta je vedno lahko osumljeno kot izdaja pravičnosti.

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8. Zaključek

Marxov projekt je moral spodleteti. Izhajal je iz kategorične zavrnitve Heglove teze, da je v svetu tukaj-in-zdaj udejanjena *enteleheia*. V tem sta sicer oba dolžnika razumetja biti – bit kot »*energeia* – *enteleheia*« (Heidegger 2009, 50) –, ki se oblikuje na začetku zahodne metafizike. Toda to zavrnitev je Marx nadaljeval s tezo, da v obstoječem svetu takšno udejanjanje *a priori* ni možno. Hegel naj bi naredil napako v tem, da je ves čas gledal proč od »dejanskosti«, ki jo je imel pred očmi.

Marxova rešitev naj bi bila, podobno kot Kantova, v tem, da mišljenje varno pričvrstimo na nekaj materialnega. Le tako lahko preprečimo njegove avanture, v katerih si umišlja, da je »samemu sebi neskončna snov vsega naravnega in duhovnega življenja, kot tudi neskončna oblika« (Hegel 1999, 24). Pred »fantastičnimi umisleki« se bomo zavarovali le, če ne bomo izhajali »iz tega, kar ljudje pravijo, si umišljajo, si predstavljajo, tudi ne od rečenega, mišljenega, umišljenega, predstavljenega človeka, da bi od tod prišli do ljudi iz mesa in kosti«. Nasprotno, izhajati moramo »iz dejanskosti dejavnih ljudi« (Marx in Engels 1971b, 25). S tem se Marx napoti v aporije prvega razdelka *Fenomenologije duha*. Tam se izkaže, da ni mogoče najti ničelne točke stika mišljenja z »dejanskostjo dejavnih ljudi«, nikjer se ne pojavi laboratorijsko pregledno »ozaveščanje biti«. Nasprotno, izkaže se, da mišljenje samo sebe ves čas prehiteva in pri vsakem spoznavanem predmetu najde tudi svoj podpis. Tega Marx ne upošteva, zato se ujame v zadrege, ki smo jih zgoraj predstavili na več ravneh.

122 Iskanje zanesljive povezave mišljenja in biti je trkanje na odprta vrata. Bit in mišljenje sta vselej že povezana, tudi v primeru najbolj »empiričnih« ugotovitev. Ker Marx frontalno zavrne Heglovo filozofijo zaradi njegovega, resda arogantnega enačenja dejanskosti in umnosti, ostane brez orodij, ki bi mu prihranila te težave. Zlasti ne opazi, da sam izreka tisto, pred čemer se želi zavarovati. Prepričanje, da je zavest biti zavest dejanskega življenjskega procesa, je v svojem jedru prepričanje, da je zavest zavest že-ozaveščene biti – torej samozavedanje – in s tem temelj (nereflektiranega) idealizma. Marx vztraja pri radikalnem ločevanju mišljenja in biti, kar vodi v nenadzorovano oscilacijo med dvema ekstremoma. Tako vzporedno ves čas gradi na tezi, da je misel »izliv« materialnega, in na antitezi, da mišljenje nadzoruje materialno, zaradi česar so si lahko ljudje »doslej vedno ustvarjali napačne predstave o samih sebi« in po njih »urejali svoje razmere«.

Izhodiščna napaka Marxa je v iskanju ničelne točke stika med mišljenjem in bitjo. To ga napoti na hlastanje za »dejstvi« in odklanjanje »mističnih rezultatov« idealizma, v katerem »[d]ejstvo, ki je za izhodišče, ni dojeta kot tako, ampak kot mistični rezultat« (Marx in Engels 1971a, 62). Ne zna spraviti skupaj sestavin, ki sta vselej že združeni in ju je razločil sam. Vizija odprave ideologije, ki naj bi zavojevala razumetje biti, in vizija odprave naravorasle

delitve dela, ki naj bi zavojevala mišljenje, je zgolj nesmiselno reševanje težav, ki jih nikoli ni bilo. Zato je tudi konstrukcija revolucionarne odrešitve vnaprej brezupen poskus preskoka lastne sence.

Revolucionarni boj ni Heglov boj za pripoznanje, temveč Avguštinov boj božje države za uničenje zemeljske države. To je boj, ki naj se ne bi končal z zmago (novega) gospodarja, pač pa s strukturno nemožnostjo gospodstva kot takega. Toda to je obetal prvi, materialistični narativ revolucije. Izvedel pa jo je drugi, voluntaristični. Zato lahko revolucija uspe le po njegovih merilih. Komunistične revolucije so se končale tako kot prejšnje, z zmago novega gospodarja, novih elit in novih nosilcev moči. V kakšni meri so te revolucije imele zgodovinski mandat, se vselej presoja naknadno. Če so imele kakšno zgodovinsko vlogo, so jo imele predvsem v oblikovanju socialnih držav (zahodne) Evrope.

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MED ČLOVEŠKIM IN ŽIVALSKIM

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Povzetek

Avtor prispevka se uvodoma sklicuje na odgovor Umberta Eca na vprašanje: »Zakaj filozofija?«, ki meri na razliko med človeškim in živalskim. Opirajoč se na Heideggrova predavanja z naslovom *Temeljni pojmi metafizike: svet – končnost – samota*, v katerih je zastavljeno vprašanje: »Kaj je svet?«, na katerega odgovorjajo slovite tri teze o »brezsvetnem« kamnu, o živali, ki naj bi bila »osiromašena sveta«, in o človeku kot »stvaritelju sveta«, avtor poda natančno analizo, pospremljeno s kritičnim premislekom, v

obrambo Heideggrovega stališča pred kritiko »antropocentrizma« in »kartezijanstva«, s katero prednjači Derrida. V sklepnem delu je razmerje med človeškim in živalskim posodobljeno s pomočjo Nancyjevega pojmovanja etike in odgovornosti.

Ključne besede: človeško, živalsko, etika, odgovornost, Heidegger, Derrida.

Between the Human and the Animal

Abstract

The author of the contribution begins with Umberto Eco's answer to the question: "Why philosophy?" which points to the distinction between human and animal. Based on Heidegger's lectures entitled *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, where the question: "What is world?" is answered through the famous three theses about the "world-less-ness" of the stone, of the animal as being "poor-of-world," and of the human being as the "creator of world," the author gives a detailed analysis, accompanied with a critical reflection in defense of Heidegger's position against Derrida's critique of "anthropocentrism" and "Cartesianism." In the final part, the author connects the conception of human-animal with the contemporary issue of ethics and responsibility with the aid of Nancy's philosophy.

Keywords: human, animal, ethics, responsibility, Heidegger, Derrida.

Knjiga izpred nekaj let – prvi del dela z naslovom *Filozofija in njene zgodbe. Antika in srednji vek*, v kateri različni avtorji predlagajo teme, dogodke, osebnosti, ki tvorijo filozofijo in njene zgodbe – se začne na neobičajen način z besedilom enega izmed urednikov. V tem primeru gre za Umberta Eca, ki ga je pri uredniškem podvigu spremljal Riccardo Fedriga, uvod, za katerega gre, pa lahko vzamemo kot premiso celotnega dela, saj se razteza čez vrsto drugače označenih strani, brez dodatne specifikacije, spisan je v lahkotnem slogu, ki naj predstavi sicer specialistično delo kar najširšemu krogu bralcev. Skratka, Ecov tekst nosi naslov »Zakaj filozofija?«, konča pa se s stavkom, ki odgovarja na to začetno vprašanje: »Zato ker sta mišljenje in filozofsko mišljenje tisto, kar ljudi razločuje od živali.« (Eco in Fedriga 2014, xvi)

Stavek vsebuje izjemno bogastvo, pri čemer ga emfatično poudarja in poganja tista tonaliteta imperativa, s katero podrejena propozicija, v tem primeru kavzalna, sama zmore držati pokonci celotno periodo (ali psevdoperiodo) – in to brez pomoči kakršnekoli glavne propozicije, ki v tem primeru umanjka. Ne bi bilo niti leno niti nekoristno poskusiti prehoditi vse poti mnoštva implikacij, da bi izostrili kaj, v omenjenem stavku, sploh pomeni misliti (kar lahko seveda razumemo kot filozofsko vprašanje – ali vsaj eno izmed filozofskih vprašanj – par excellence): kaj je razlika med mišljenjem in filozofskim mišljenjem? Ali ne bi bilo dovolj zgolj mišljenje, da bi razlikovali ljudi od živali? Mar je razlika med ljudmi in živalmi tista, ki utemeljuje filozofijo? Se je potrebno ukvarjati s filozofijo, da ne bi ostali živali? Ali je ta distinkcija obenem diskriminacija? O kakšni razliki govorimo? V stopnji? V naravi? Mar zadostuje že gola prisotnost filozofske misli za vzpostavitev razlike, ali pa je nemara potrebno, da takšna misel vendarle premisli samo to razliko (in jo v tem smislu vzpostavi, zatrdi, poglobi)?

Vsekakor, vsem tem vprašanjem bi lahko dodali še druga, odvisno pač od perspektive (antropološke, zoološke, religiozne itd.), s katere bi artikulirali prevpraševanje samega vprašanja. Tisto, ob čemer se bom sam zaustavil – še zlasti v luči tega, kar od vprašanja ostaja še vedno relevantno in utemeljujoče –, je vprašanje razlike med človekom in živaljo (oziroma med ljudmi in živalmi), pri čemer se bom poskušal ogniti vnaprejšnji predpostavljjenosti tega vprašanja, predvsem pa pogledati, na kakšen način bi ga sploh bilo mogoče postaviti.

I.

Skoraj po nujnosti stvari same se začetna točka naše razprave nahaja v predavanjih, ki jih je imel Martin Heidegger v zimskem semestru 1929/30 z naslovom *Temeljni pojmi metafizike. Svet – končnost – samota* (*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*), v katerih se razgrne, sicer na precej zaprt način, diskusija o mnoštvu različnih vidikov, na podlagi katerih bi bilo mogoče načrtati razliko med živaljo in človekom. In že na začetku velja pripomniti, da golo dejstvo mnoštva vidikov (Heidegger se z vsemi sooči z natančnimi argumentacijami) napeljuje k temu, da bi lahko sama ta distinkcija – singularna, absolutna, utemeljujoča – bila nekaj precej problematičnega v svoji singularnosti. In prav to je, vsaj po mojem mnenju, nekaj, kar ne nasprotuje tistemu, kar se prav tako lahko izpelje iz Heideggrovega teksta, ki, kot je znano, načena vprašanje živali začenši z nujnostjo odgovarjanja na vprašanje: »Kaj je svet?« (Heidegger 1983, 261), s čimer formulira tri slovite »teze«: 1. kamen (materialno-bivajoče) je brez sveta; 2. žival je osiromašena sveta; 3. človek je stvaritelj sveta (Heidegger 1983, 263). Mislim, da je dovolj dobro poznan izid te velike rekonstrukcije razlike – katere intrinzična filozofska težava sestoji natanko iz tega, da je v neposrednem, tj. v t. i. »občem razumu«, lahko zlahka razumljena skozi primerjavo na videz nezamenljivih elementov –, ki jo konec koncev začrta sam Heidegger, toda na takšen način, da se odpre cela vrsta nadaljnjih obravnavanj in kritičnih obdelav, kakršnih se loti, kot bomo videli, predvsem Jacques Derrida. Takšen izid je mogoče izpeljati prav iz zaključnih stavkov paragrafov, v katerih se razpravlja o drugi tezi, ki govori o živali kot osiromašeni sveta: »osiromašenost sveta« naj bi poudarilo »izvzetje možnosti manifestacije bivajočega« (Heidegger 1983, 390); osiromašenost živalskega sveta naj bi, z drugimi besedami, potemtakem sestajala iz dejstva, da »žival ima dostop do ... in sicer kot nečesa, kar dejansko je – toda *samo mi* smo zmožni eksperimentirati in manifestirati *kot bivajoči*.« (Heidegger 1983, 396) V tem smislu naj bi žival bila povsem odtegnjena dostopu do manifestiranja, do bivajočega *kot bivajočega*; toda zaradi tega še nismo, nadaljuje Heidegger, razumeli tega, kar se nanaša na živalskost, in če hočemo nadaljevati po tej interpretativni liniji, »takšna karakterizacija živalskosti skozi osiromašenost sveta ni genuina, saj niti ni izpeljana iz same živalskosti niti ne ostane v njenem

okviru, pač pa je izpeljana iz primerjave s človekom. Namreč, zgolj s človeške perspektive se žival kaže osiromašena sveta« (Heidegger 1983, 394), in »naša teza ,žival je osiromašena sveta' ostaja torej daleč od tega, da bi bila (ena ali edina) temeljna metafizična propozicija bistva živalskosti« (Heidegger 1983, 394).

Oscilacije, za katere sem predložil zgolj majhen primer in ki jih Heidegger vtisne na linijo, ki razločuje ali naj bi razločevala žival in človeka, so, kot je znano, mnoge in takšne, da bodo še dolgo odzvanjale. Temu botrujeta, tako se mi zdi, predvsem dva razloga: prvi, ki je verjetno bolj nesporazum kot razlog, sestoji iz tega, da ne smemo pozabiti, da cilj te dolge poti za Heideggrova sploh ni doseči bistveno določitev živali ali živalskosti, pač pa si pridobiti koncept, pojem »sveta«. Bistvena konstitucija živali in kamna skozi postavljene tri teze ni končni cilj, temveč je zgolj del določene strategije; nikakor ni namreč naključje, da se tisti del, ki je eksplicitno posvečen diskusiji teze »žival je osiromašena sveta«, v nadaljnjih paragrafi umakne diskusiji teze »človek je stvaritelj sveta«, ne da bi prišli do česa določenega, in sicer skoraj tako, kakor da bi teza obvisela v zraku: »Teza ,žival je osiromašena sveta' se mora [...] nadaljevati kot problem, s katerim se sedaj sicer ne moremo soočiti, bo pa vodila nadaljnje korake komparativnega opazovanja, torej avtentične ekspozicije problema sveta.« (Heidegger 1983, 396) Cilj torej že spočetka ni bil prevprašati živalskost ali celo odgovoriti na to vprašanje, pač pa je to bil pojem ali koncept »sveta« ter komparativna in potemtakem tudi instrumentalna funkcija dotične teze o »osiromašenosti sveta« ni nikoli umanjala, kaj šele, da bi bila postavljena na laž. Drugi, s prvim povezan razlog, pa sestoji iz tega, da Heidegger, če natančno sledimo njegovi poti, ni nikoli poskusil zaustaviti oscilacije, kvečjemu nasprotno, nikoli se ni ustavil pri njenem legitimiranju, če ne celo amplificiranju. Drugače rečeno, nikoli se ni zastavil cilj, da bi se trasirala ena sama linija, skozi katero bi se lahko vzpostavilo eno in edino razliko, kakor se tudi ni nikoli eksplicitno izreklo v prid kakršnekoli takorekoč hierarhične umestitve živali v razmerju do človeka.

Vsaj kar se tiče prvega razloga ali vsaj kar zadeva nesporazum, ki bi ga branje Heideggrovega teksta lahko porodilo, mislim, da nadaljnja argumentacija ni potrebna, da bi se pokazalo, kako nerazumevanje ali celo premik tega, kar je cilj nekega diskurza, lahko izmaliči in proizvede predsodke glede analitske

vsebine samega diskurza. Primer: umestitev Heideggra kot avtorja *Biti in časa* v vrste filozofov, ki pripadajo historičnemu toku medvojnega eksistencializma zgolj zato, ker je v tej knjigi pač govoril o »eksistenci«, je tako zelo neumestna, da niso umanjale ne replike in celo ne polemike s strani Heideggra samega. Glede drugega razloga pa je vprašanje precej bolj delikatno: tako na ravni dejanske umestitve (in, če že hočete, »sodbe«), ki jo lahko ekstrapoliramo iz samih Heideggrovih tekstov o živalskosti, kakor tudi na ravni različnih načinov, s katerimi se je te tekste interpretiralo in se jim je, pogosto prehitro, dodeljevalo določene tonalitete.

In prav temu dvojemu se želim sedaj posvetiti.

132 Nobenega dvoma torej ni, da je možno ali celo neizbežno razločiti človeka od živali; še več, če se nekaj takega, kot je »človek«, daje mišljenju – v vseh možnih oblikah, tudi zgodovinskih, v katerih se je dajalo –, potem je to omogočeno pod predpostavko obstoja identitete, ki se logično izpeljuje iz pozicije ene ali več razlik. Že »ene ali več razlik« ni nekaj ravnodušnega v ekonomiji diskurza, ki si zadaja ravnovesno prehoditi oscilirajočo linijo, ki ji je (po vsej verjetnosti) usojeno ostati takšna, kakršna pač je, namreč, trasirajoča razliko: dejstvo, da je v tem Heideggrovem predavanju, kakor tudi v drugih tekstih, moč najti več kot eno diferencialno točko, bi moralo biti dovolj dober motiv za nadaljevanje naloge, ne pa za neko določeno omahovanje ali netočnost, ali teoretsko težavnost, četudi vpričo nedvomno neodpravljljive kompleksnosti teksta. Tukaj bi se lahko poslužili prav določene možnosti pripisovati živali nekaj takšnega, kot je svet: na suhoparno vprašanje: »Ali ima žival svet ali ga nima?«, ki bi ga lahko zastavili Heideggru in ki ga on sam artikulira v svojih predavanjih, nikakor ni možno dati enoznačnega ali enostavnega odgovora (če je žival osiromašena sveta bi logika narekovala, da žival *ima* nek svet, čeprav osiromašenega). Vse pač zavisi od vidika, s katerega mislimo stvar samo, ne da bi obenem dopuščali prostor za relativizem. Če ga primerjamo z brezsvetnostjo kamna, potem žival nedvomno svet ima; od tod naprej pa, če ga primerjamo s človekom, se izkaže, da žival lahko tudi nima sveta; žival naj bi potemtakem imela in ne imela svet in naj ga ne bi imela, če bi se s »svetom« razumelo tisto, kar je lastno človeku. Kljub temu pa je osiromašena sveta: »v *žival* je vključen nek *imeti-svet* in nek *ne-imeti-svet*« (Heidegger 1983, 390), kakor potrjuje sam Heidegger v nekem pasusu, pri čemer dodaja, da protislovje sploh ne leži

na strani živali, temveč na strani pojma sveta, ki ni bil dovolj dobro določen. Šele od tistega trenutka dalje, ko bo svet določen v terminih »dostopnosti do bivajočega *kot takega*« (Heidegger 1983, 390), bo mogoče reči, da žival, ki »ima dostop do ... v smislu instinktivnega obnašanja [...] se prav zaradi tega *ne* nahaja na strani človeka, in *nima* sveta« (Heidegger 1983, 391).

Kljub temu da bi se ta distinkcija zdela – in v takšnih terminih tudi dejansko je – jasna, razlika vztrajno oscilira kot tisto, kar se ne sklada s celotnim diskurzom, namreč, kot – kakor se zdi, da sam Heidegger opaža – dejstvo pripisa nekaj ekskluzivno človeškega živali, ki naj tega sploh ne bi imela, ne da bi ji obenem lahko pripisali nič drugega ali drugačnega od »sveta«, po čemer bi jo lahko razlikovali od kamna. Onkraj dejstva, da se argumentacije, ki se vrtijo okoli navedenih »tez«, zdijo kot indici suhoparne, opozicijske razlike, gre predvsem za to, da izpostavimo, kako takšna razlika – nenehno v gibanju, kot smo videli, saj sili Heideggra k njenemu »suspensu« – nikakor ne sme biti obravnavana kot razlika v stopnji. To se potrjuje v načinu, kako je Heidegger še malce poprej opredelil »osiromašenost«, termin, ki ga nikakor ne smemo razumeti kot nek »imeti manj« v razmerju do nekega »imeti več« (Heidegger 1983, 289–292), temveč pomeni siromaštvo neko *odvečnost* (Heidegger 1983, 291), pri čemer onkraj pozitivnega pomena »odvečnosti« slednjega ne gre razumeti kot kvaliteto v razmerju do kvantitete.

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Če lahko potemtakem v prvem približku konstatiramo, da Heidegger razlike med živaljo in človekom ne postavlja v kvantitativnih terminih – če kaj, jo poskuša poglobiti v ekskluzivno *eksistencialnem* smislu oziroma na podlagi tega, kar opredeljuje kot »*bistveno opredelitev*« (1983, 275) –, potem bi bilo treba v tej smeri izključiti možnost, da gre za kontrast, ki bi temeljil na posestvu nečesa: jezika ali »kolikor«, na primer, ali pa palca roke v razmerju do šape, ali smrtnosti, kakor bi raznorazni »heideggrovski« primeri lahko nakazovali.¹

¹ Glede razlike med roko in šapo glej, poleg predavanj 1929/30, npr., *Kaj se pravi misliti?*: »Z roko ima svoj namen. Roka po običajni predstavi spada k organizmu našega života. Toda bistva roke se nikdar ne da določiti kot prijemalni telesni organ ali ga iz njega pojasnjevati. Prijemalne organe ima npr. opica, nima pa roke. Roka je neskončno – to je z brezdajnostjo bistva – različna od vseh prijemalnih organov: tac, krempljev, lovka. Le bitje, ki govori, tj. misli, ima lahko roko in roko dovršuje v rokovanju z deli.« (Heidegger 2017, 21) Glede razmerja med smrtnostjo in jezikom glej: »Smrtniki so tisti, ki lahko izkusijo smrt kot smrt. Žival tega ne zmore. Žival

Skratka, ne gre za vprašanje »več-ali-manj«, niti za vprašanje kvantitete, niti za vprašanje stopnje; in posledično ne gre niti za vprašanje hierarhije. Dejansko se Heideggrova analiza, ki se drži na nivoju rigorozno esencialističnega prevpraševanja, nahaja povsem zunaj kakršnekoli biologicistične kontinuitete, zunaj kakršnekoli individualistične razlike, ki bi jo bilo mogoče izpeljati iz takšnega konteksta, v katerem bi bili različni vidiki preprosto vključeni.² Prav tako tudi ne gre za razliko, ki bi jo bilo mogoče vzpostaviti na podlagi »imeti ali ne imeti svet«, kajti če »ima« človek svet zgolj, kolikor je »stvaritelj« sveta, potem je »imeti« živali v razmerju do sveta nekaj, kar sploh ni odločujoče: kot »stvaritev« svet ni stvar živali in toliko tudi živali ne moremo primerjati s človekom na podlagi homogenosti, ki je ni najti v nobenem momentu. Konec koncev sam Heidegger sklene, da bi morali tezo »žival je osiromašena sveta« celo »opustiti, saj – prav z obzirom na bistvenost same živalskosti – zapeljuje v zmoto, tj. proizvaja absurdno mnenje, da je biti-žival nekaj, kar za sebe in na sebi pomeni neko odvečnost in neko biti-siromak« (Heidegger 1983, 393). Mislim, da bi morali vsi takšni premisleki zadostovati za to, da se previdno držimo stran od 134 kakršnekoli antropomorfizacije živali kakor tudi od kakršnekoli hierarhizacije; ne za eno ne za drugo ni v Heideggrovem diskurzu prostora.

V tem smislu bi se razlika med živaljo in človekom izkazala za nekaj nemogočega: ne toliko zato, ker bi bila razlika neizpeljiva, temveč zato, ker bi si kljub neskončnemu številu razlik ne bilo mogoče zamisliti *ene* same razlike, ki bi bila enoznačno in nujno utemeljena v kontekstu homogenih kvalitete, in to prav zaradi tistega »imeti svet« človeka, znotraj katerega so vse razlike sploh možne.

II.

Heideggrov diskurz je nekaj, kar se je pogosto uporabljalo – še zlasti Derrida – kot primer vélike geste izključitve živali, izključitve in hkrati kontrasta, celo tudi kot hierarhične diskriminacije. Z ozirom na domnevno diskriminacijo

pa tudi ne more govoriti. Bistveno razmerje med smrtjo in govorico zablisle, vendar ostane nemišljeno.” (Heidegger 1995, 228)

2 Prim.: »Orisati moramo, ne to, kako se živali in ljudje razlikujejo med seboj glede na kakšen vidik, temveč to, kaj tvori *bistvo živalskosti* živali in *bistvo biti-človek* človeka.« (Heidegger 1983, 265)

se bo sledeča obravnava določenih Derridajevih tekstov morda zdela kot nekakšen nemajhen nesporazum glede vprašanja živali, še zlasti v razmerju do dejanskih Heideggrovih potez, ki se jih Derridajevo kompleksno branje na videz ogiba.³ In to ne toliko na analitični poti, ki jo Derrida prehodi po paragrafih ali propozicijah – v katerih se žival, živali in živalskost sporadično pojavljajo opisane ali označene glede na posebne attribute značajev in značilnosti, ki jim jih pripisuje Heidegger –, kolikor na ravni splošnih potez, ki temeljijo prav na takšni analizi, ki se nadeja najti, celo na aksiološki ravni, neko natančno in enoznačno Heideggrovo branje tega vprašanja. Drugače rečeno, tudi če bi se rekonstrukcija – precej detajlna in na široko zastavljena, čeprav razpršena po različnih tekstih –⁴ vseh Heideggrovih pozicij glede živali zdela prepričljiva in večinoma tudi sprejemljiva, bi se po drugi strani zdela problematična uporaba in kontekstualizacija, ki jo opravi Derrida zavoljo negativnega podčrtanja heideggrovske geste diskriminacije in podreditve živali človeku, ki naj bi bila skladna s kartezijsko tradicijo.

Neposrednemu ugovoru, da naj bi sam Heidegger postavil diferencialne poteze v primerjalnih terminih prav skozi tri teze o kamnu, živali in človeku, moramo takoj odgovoriti, da če obstaja primerjava, potem ne teče med različnimi elementi, ki se pojavijo v tezah (kamen, žival, človek), pač pa med tremi različnimi modalnostmi, v katerih bi bilo mogoče najti (ali ne najti) nekaj takega, kot je »svet«. Četudi tvegamo, da postanemo redundantni, je potrebno ta vidik jasno in glasno izpostaviti natanko zato, da ne bi zdrsnili v neko temeljno distorzijo, ki predsodkovno postopa pri vsem, kar sledi v zvezi s smerjo in smislom Heideggrovega diskurza, ki nikakor ne meri k vnaprejšnjemu zagotavljanju serije ontično diferencialnih elementov, od koder bi potem lahko prešel h konstrukciji gradacije različnih svétnosti (in posledično entitet), temveč »preprosto« k temu, da bi do konca premislil koncept sveta. Torej, ne klasifikacija sveta glede na »referente« (in posledično tudi samih

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3 S tega vidika in s posebnim ozirom na vprašanje živali pri Derridaju in Heideggru se vsekakor kaže obrniti na zadnje poglavje knjige *Figure dell'evento. A partire da Jacques Derrida* (Di Martino 2009, 133).

4 Derrida sam napotuje na reference v svojih tekstih (»v skoraj vseh mojih knjigah«), znotraj katerih obravnava vprašanje konflikta med živaljo in človekom (Derrida in Roudinesco 2004, 94).

referentov), temveč možnost definicije, kolikor je le mogoče enoznačne, glede tega, kaj je sploh svet. Naloga, za katero, kot je znano, ni mogoče ravno reči, da se izpolni, in o čemer sam Derrida na neki točki pravi: »Zame so najbolj zanimivi in obenem diskretni momenti te poti tisti, v katerih Heidegger na nek način pravi: konec koncev ne vemo kaj je svet! V osnovi gre za zelo nejasen koncept.« (Derrida 2006, 207)

Torej, če je vsa ta Heideggrova pot imela za cilj neko določeno razumevanje sveta in ničesar drugega, potem v trenutku, ko je ta cilj dosežen, na podlagi nerazpoložljivega koncepta sveta, sploh ni mogoče nadaljevati z diferenciacijo ali klasifikacijo elementov, ki so bili izbrani za določitev teh treh tez. Skratka, če Heidegger nima koncepta sveta, potem nima niti klasifikacije, reda, urejenosti relacij med kamnom, živaljo in človekom. In prav to je nekaj, kar ne uide Derridaju: »Te tri teze so teze o svetu. Niso teze o kamnu, živali, človeku, pač pa teze o svetu: treba je vedeti, kaj je svet, da bi se lahko izreklo te stvari.« (2006, 207) Verjetno bi zadostoval ta pasus, da bi odgovorili na problem tega, kako Heidegger pojmuje žival tako, da živali sploh ne pojmuje – v smislu, da 136 živali ne vključi v noben točno definirajoč kontekst –, kar pa spet ne pomeni, da živali »ne misli«, da je ne izprašuje in da ne prodira vanjo z vsemi možnimi instrumenti, tudi znanstvenimi (tistimi, ki so jih v tisti dobi ponudili Johannes Peter Müller, Wilhelm Roux, Frederik Buytendijk, Hans Driesch in še zlasti Jakob von Uexküll), toda ne da bi pri tem podal niti znanstveno niti povsem »metafizično« tezo glede živali. Tri »metafizične« teze so namreč najpoprej teze o svetu in kot take bi morale biti tudi obravnavane.

Izkaže se precej presenetljivo dejstvo, da se Derrida prepusti sklepom, ki se že na formalni ravni razlikujejo od tega, kar nam dajejo Heideggrovi teksti. Najpoprej glede asimiliranja Heideggrove pozicije z Descartesovo: "Tisto, kar bi rad pokazal, na seveda provokativen način, je, da je heideggrovski diskurz še vedno kartezijanski [...]. Heideggrova gesta ostaja, ne glede na vse, vsaj kar se tiče živali, globoko kartezijanska.« (Derrida 2006, 201) Tudi če pustimo vsa Heideggrova distanciranja – od *Bit in časa* do predavanj iz let 1929/30 – od Descartesove »metafizične« geste ob strani, se izkaže, da se Heideggrova in Descartesova pozicija glede vprašanja živali precej razlikujeta. V enem izmed slovitih pasusov, znotraj katerih Descartes vpelje svoja opažanja glede razlike med »ljudmi in živalmi«, lahko jasno vidimo, kako postopa znotraj točno

določenega konteksta, ki je daleč od kakršnekoli preokupacije glede *bistvene* določitve živali. V petem delu *Razprave o metodi* povzema svoja opažanja »od opisa neživih teles in rastlin [...] k opisu živali, in še posebej k opisu ljudi«, (Descartes 2007, 69) ki se nanaša na delovanje telesnih pojavov in potemtakem v kontekstu nikoli preizprašane biomehanične kontinuitete, ki naj bi jo potrjevalo dejstvo, da je stroj ali »avtomat« zlahka zamenljiv za žival, sama stroj ali žival pa ne za človeka, ker jima bojda manjka zmožnost za »odgovarjanje« in »spoznanje« (Descartes 2007, 83). Poleg homologacije živali in stroja, živega in neživega, je tudi celoten ustroj argumentov povsem nezdružljiv s Heideggrovimi tezami o svetu: Descartesov postopek namreč postopa v smeri identifikacije ene ali več specifičnih razlik v empirično konstituiranem *continuumu* in potemtakem z »znanstveno« metodo in duhom, ki nimata nobene zveze s tem, kar ima Heidegger v mislih z »bistveno določitvijo«, kolikor se slednja razlikuje od znanstvene propozicije, ki vzpostavlja razliko v stopnji.⁵ Tudi s tega vidika se nivelizacija Heideggrove in Descartesove pozicije ne more izkazati za nič drugega kot zgolj za nekaj navideznega in površinskega.

Še bolj bodejo v oči določena derridajevska branja, ki bi rada zapopadla ne samo diferenciacijo po stopnjah, temveč celo neko neizogibno hierarhično posledico. Najpoprej glede vprašanja smrti in umiranja, ki se mu Derrida večkrat posveča, četudi ne vedno z istimi argumenti. Na primer v *Aporijah*, kjer je vprašanje postavljeno v razmerju do možnosti, da bi človek stopal v odnos do smrti v nekakšni čistosti, iz katere je vsako drugo živo bitje izključeno (prim. Derrida 1996); določen argument in dotična kritika, ki se artikulirata predvsem okoli možnosti, rezervirane za človeka, da dostopa do smrti »kot smrti«, do smrti »kot take«. Vemo, da pri Heideggro – še zlasti v predavanjih iz let 1929/30 – *als-Struktur*, struktura »kot takšnega«, tvori jedro, okoli katerega se artikulira celotna refleksija sklepnega dela, tista, ki je posvečena tezi o »človeku kot stvaritelju sveta«, kjer je ilustrirana vez, ki artikulira možnost človeka, da ima dostop tako do sveta kot do bivajočega »kot bivajočega«. V tem smislu je tudi smrt nedostopna živali, kolikor ji pač manjka dostop do bivajočega kot bivajočega in posledično tudi do smrti kot smrti, tako da žival

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⁵ Glede radikalne razlike med znanstvenim in »krožnim« postopkom filozofije v razmerju do živali in zoologije glej: *Temeljni pojmi metafizike* (prim. Heidegger, 1983).

ne umre, pač pa preneha živeti, premine, pogine.⁶ Vse to so opažanja, ki so jih anticipirali še jasnejši in natančnejši pasusi, artikulirani okoli vsega tega, kar Derrida izpostavi kot čisto pravo diskriminacijo – neko zavestno, svobodno, in konec koncev tudi nasilno gesto.

Tako na primer Derrida sicer pravi v delu *O duhu*, da naj bi Heidegger prekinil z »antropomorfizmom, biologizmom in njegovimi političnimi učinki« (Derrida 1999, 64), da pa kljub temu ostaja nek določen nereduktibilni učinek diskriminacije v heideggrovskem konceptualnem ustroju:

Govoreč o teologiji, Heideggru zagotovo ne pripisujem pojma napredka, razumljenega evolucionistično, niti mu ne pripisujem pojma nekega dolgega razvoja, ki naj bi živalsko življenje usmerjal proti človeškemu svetu po neki lestvici biti. Toda besedi uboštvo in privacija implicirata hierarhizacijo in evaluacijo, pa naj se temu hočemo ali nočemo izogniti. Izraz »ubog na svetu« ali »brez sveta«, kot tudi fenomenologija, ki ga podpira, vključuje neko aksiologijo, ki je utemeljena ne le na ontologiji, temveč tudi na možnosti onto-logike kot take, na ontološki razliki, na pristopu k biti bivajočega, nato na prečrtanju prečrtanja, namreč k odprtju k igri sveta, najprej pa k odprtju k svetu človeka kot *weltbildend*. (Derrida 1999, 65)

Tukaj lahko vidimo, kako se potrdi in poglobi sodba, ki jo Derrida izreče glede Heideggrove obravnave živali. Sodba, ki bi jo lahko na prvi pogled zlahka sprejeli in vzeli nase, če le ne bi upoštevali tega, kar je bilo poprej rečeno glede dejstva, da manjka pojem sveta, s katerim bi sploh lahko primerjali dotično trojico kamen-žival-človek. Poleg tega sam Derrida, le nekaj vrstic poprej, izpostavi radikalno prekinitev z »antropomorfizmi in biologizmi«, tj. znanstvenimi modalnostmi analize, znotraj katerih se razmerja med bivajočimi

⁶ Nekaj bolj ali manj slovityh pasusov: »Smrt živali pomeni umreti ali prenehati živeti? Zaradi tega, ker je prizadetost bistveni del živali, slednja ne more umreti, pač pa zgolj preneha živeti, kolikor pač človeku pripisujemo umiranje« (Heidegger 1983, 388), podobno tudi: »Smrtniki so ljudje. Imenujejo se smrtniki, ker lahko umrejo. Umreti pomeni: zmoči smrt kot smrt. Samo človek umre. Žival pogine. Smrti kot smrti nima ne pred sabo ne za sabo« (2003, 188) itn.

konstantno odvijajo na podlagi razlik v stopnjah oziroma znotraj neke homogene dimenzije. Očitek, ki bi ga lahko naslovili na Derridaja, bi se lahko začel prav tukaj: če obstaja možnost za neko nujno primerjalno »hierarhijo« in »vrednotenje«, potem je enako nujno, da se primerjava odvije znotraj nekega določenega kontinuiranega obsega, kjer osiromašenost – za razliko od tega, kar pravi Heidegger v predavanjih 1929/30 – ne more pomeniti nič drugega kot nek manj v razmerju do nečesa več, kar pa nasprotuje temu, kar pravi sam Derrida. Skratka, če drži, da osiromašenost in privacija »implicirata« hierarhijo in vrednotenje, potem to velja na ravni jezika, skozi katerega se pogosto proizvajajo nesporazumi, ki pa jih v nekem analitičnem kontekstu lahko – in tudi moramo – postaviti pod vprašaj. Zdi se, kakor da bi se sam Derrida na koncu hotel vrniti na zdravorazumsko raven vsega tistega, kar je Heidegger, ne brez težav in nemara tudi ne brez nejasnih rezultatov, poskusil umestiti na neko drugo – recimo kar: filozofsko – raven bistvene določitve metafizičnega pojmovanja.

Poglobitev tovrstnega branja Heideggra lahko najdemo v Derridajevem tekstu, v katerem se vsebina sheme ponovi, z zaostritvijo izjemno precizne in pokroviteljske sodbe, ki tokrat zadeva nagibe, če ne kar namene, ki naj bi jih Heidegger imel glede namerne umestitve živali znotraj hierarhične lestvice, v kateri se znajde v podrejenem položaju glede na človeka. Tekom intervjuja, kot odgovor na določeno opažanje Jeana-Luca Nancyja, Derrida zatrdi, da je »heideggrovski diskurz o živali nasilen in sramoten, mestoma pa tudi protisloven,« in nadaljuje, da »v njem ni najti nobene originalne eksistencialne kategorije živali: očitno ni *Dasein* [...] Njegov enostavni obstoj uvaja nek princip nereda ali vsaj omejitve v konceptualnost *Sein und Zeit*.« (prim. Derrida in Nancy 1989) Živalskost je v tem smislu vnovič pripeljana do fundamentalno aksiološkega območja in reducirana na serijo vrednostnih sodb, celo na raven neke vrste osebne ontološko-kategorične »preference«, in sicer prav tista dimenzija živalskosti, v kateri je Heidegger – večkrat in, kot bomo kmalu videli, precej eksplicitno – prepoznal intrinzično »vrednost«; še več: natanko s striktno aksiološkega vidika se je Heidegger, tudi na »moralno« pomenljiv način, poskusil ogniti asimilaciji ali redukciji kakršnegakoli vidika ali značilnosti živalskosti na raven možne primerjave s človeškim – in to kakršne koli živali, kot bomo kmalu videli na primeru sokoljega vida in

pasjega voha. Zdi se, da to uhaja Derridaju, kljub temu da ima vse pod nosom: »Heidegger ne pravi preprosto ‚žival je osiromašena sveta (*weltarm*)‘,« kajti za razliko od kamna žival svet ima, pač pa »pravi: žival ima svet na način ne-imeti. Ampak ta ne-imeti ni več, v njegovih očeh, neka osiromašenost: manko sveta, ki naj bi bil človeški. In potemtakem: zakaj takšna negativna določitev? Od kod prihaja?« (Derrida in Nancy 1989)

140 Negativnost določitve drži, toda ne gre za *vrednotenje* – pripisovanje »bistvene« vrednosti – na podlagi primerjave, temveč za »preprosto« definicijo nekega območja, živalskega namreč, ki se, kot pravi sam Derrida – in se v tem, se zdi, ne zaveda lastnega izrekanja –, absolutno razlikuje od »sveta, ki naj bi bil človeški«, in je potemtakem neprimerljiv in nereduktibilen na kakršnokoli primerjavo (še toliko bolj aksiološko primerjavo) s človekom. Zdi se mi, da gre pri Heideggru za neko radikalno in nereduktibilno dimenzijo drugosti, s katero rokuje, ne toliko zato, da bi jo tematiziral ali analiziral, pač pa zato, ker je tako nujno terjala izostritev samega vprašanja pomena »sveta«. Spodrsrljaj, morda, to ja, z ozirom na to, kako občutljivejša bi morala biti njegova opažanja in trditve glede živali. In nemara je prav nujnost razjasnitve »negativnih določitev«, ne živali, temveč sveta, tista, ki je prisilila Heideggra, da je ubral določene »bližnjice« in opustil številne previdnosti, s čimer se je na koncu res proizvedel vtis, da se v predavanjih 1929/30 znajdemo pred postopnimi in klasifikatoričnimi primerjavami.

Toda vsaj meni se zdi, da v nobenem trenutku Heidegger ne gre v to smer, ali še bolje rečeno: dejansko je moč najti nekaj osnutkov zavoja v to smer, in to ne samo v omenjenih predavanjih. Na primer:

Rezultira, da obstaja soobstoj razmerja razlike v stopnji dostopa do biti – bolj, manj, manjši, večji, razmerje stopenj popolnosti. Toda že preprosta refleksija postavlja pod vprašaj dejstvo, da bi osiromašenost bila na sebi nujno tisto, kar je manj v razmerju do bogastva. Lahko bi veljalo tudi obratno. V vsakem primeru bi takšna primerjava živali s človekom z ozirom na osiromašenost in ustvarjenost sveta bila nekaj, kar ne dopušča nobenega vrednotenja ali sodbe v smislu popolnosti ali nepopolnosti – kolikor je pač takšna sodba prehitra in neustrezna. Namreč, znajdemo se v veliki zadregi, če, z ozirom na vprašanje glede

večje ali manjše popolnosti dostopnosti do biti, primerjamo sokolje oko ali voh psa s človeškim očesom in vohom. Tako hitro imamo pripravljeno pri roki vrednostno sodbo, po kateri je človek višje bitje glede na žival, kolikor je takšna sodba dejansko dvomljiva, še toliko bolj, če pomislimo, da lahko človek pade veliko globlje kot žival; žival se namreč ne more osiromašiti tako kot človek. Vsekakor, z ozirom na vse to rezultira prav nujnost »nečesa višjega«. Od koder lahko vidimo, da sploh ni jasno to, z ozirom na kar govorimo o višini in globini. Mar obstaja, nasploh, kolikor je bistveno, določeno »višje« in »nižje«? Je bistvo človeka višje od bistva živali? Vse to je dvomljivo že v obliki vprašanja. (Heidegger 1983, 286)

Kako zelo bi moral biti dvomljiv šele odgovor na takšno vprašanje, ki ga Heidegger prevprašuje natanko preko retoričnosti samega vprašanja, ki se nanaša na razliko po stopnji glede na tisto, kar je bistveno. Drugače rečeno: tisto bistveno – in to gre razumeti tudi formalno, onkraj vsakršnega sklica na primerjavo človeka z živaljo – ne more vsebovati nobene razlike v stopnji, nobene hierarhije in nobenega govora o »več« ali »manj«; zgolj »preprosta refleksija« in »prehitra in neustrezna« sodba lahko zadenejo ob tovrstne premisleke, vse do točke, da proizvedejo tisto »zadrego«, ki odmeva v tistem istem terminu, ki ga Derrida uporabi v trenutku, ko definira Heideggrovo diskriminatorno držo do živali. Vsekakor ni moč zanikati, da lahko z ozirom na »osiromašenost« in »ustvarjenost« sveta komu pade na pamet, da bi stvari sodil glede na »več« ali »manj« – in tega se seveda zaveda tudi sam Heidegger, ki svojim študentom zaradi tega poudari, da je »sicer res, da se v takšnih formulacijah izražajo neka razmerja in neka razlika, toda v nekem drugem vidiku. Katerem? Prav to je tisto, kar iščemo,« pravi, nato pa ponovi vprašanje – vprašanje, kaj naj bi razumeli pod izrazom »svet« –, za katerega smo videli, da bo ostalo brez odgovora vse do konca tega predavanja o živali.⁷

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⁷ In še nadaljevanje besedila, ki naj nedvoumno priča o Heideggrovi poziciji glede hierarhične klasifikacije živali: »Sicer drži, da smo tudi tukaj navajeni govoriti o višjih in nižjih živalih, toda v temelju bi bilo napačno meniti, da so amebe ali parameciji manj popolni od slonov ali opic. Vsaka žival in vsaka živalska vrsta je kot taka natanko enako popolna kot vsaka druga.« (Heidegger 1983, 287)

Da bi podkrepili tezo o definitivni distanci, ki jo Heidegger zavzema do tistega, kar bi lahko bila neka hierarhija in klasifikacija živečega na podlagi razlik, ki se artikulirajo znotraj iste dimenzije, skratka, razlik v stopnjah vitalnega ali vitalistično razumljenega kontinuumu, naj navedemo še eno predavanje, tokrat tisto, ki ga je imel v Freiburgu v pomladnem semestru leta 1936 o Schellingovem pojmovanju bistva človeške svobode:

Žival ne more nikoli izstopiti iz enotnosti določene pripadajoče stopnje narave. Tudi takrat, ko je žival maliciozna, ostaja zamejena znotraj določenih omejitev, znotraj določenih okoliščin [...] Človek pa je tisto bitje, ki lahko preobrne temeljne elemente lastnega bistva, svojo ontološko sopripadnost, in jo tako spreobrne [...] Zaradi tega človeku ostaja dvomljiv privilegij, da lahko pade pod žival, medtem ko žival ni zmožna perverzije lastnih principov. (Heidegger 1971, 249–250)

142 V vseh teh izjavljanjih, ki nas vsekakor varujejo pred tem, da bi Heideggrovo razmerje do živali reducirali na preprosto afirmacijo človeške večvrednosti, odzvanja nekaj celo še bolj pomembnega, kar Derridajeva interpretacija povsem zgreši. Namreč, gre za nekaj več kot neko zgolj generično občutljivost do živali, za golo pozornost na prag, ki razločuje in ločuje živalsko dimenzijo od človeške – prag, ki ni nikoli določen ali načrtan na podlagi analize zmožnosti, podobnosti, analogij in potemtakem v primerjalnih terminih, kljub temu pa venomer vzpostavljen z absolutno nereduktibilnostjo. Vse do točke, da principiuelno izključuje kakršnokoli stopnjo afinitete ali asimilacije. Vsekakor, na prvi pogled bi se lahko izkazalo za precej očitno dejstvo, da se prav na takšen način vzpostavlja neka absolutna superiornost, bolj ali manj prepričana in dogmatična, človeka nad živaljo. Toda takšna »superiornost« ne samo, da ni nikoli artikulirana – natanko zato, ker skupen teren med njima umanjka –, pač pa tudi ni umljiva. Rečeno drugače: to, kar pri Heideggru razlikuje človeško od živalskega, je neka nereduktibilna in morda tudi nemisljiva razlika (ali vsaj do sedaj nedomišljena), ki žival umešča, v razmerju do človeka, na določen položaj radikalne drugosti. V tem smislu, in to kljub Derridajevemu kritičnemu distanciranju, bi šlo za afirmacijo neke drugosti, ki se povsem izmika (diskurzu) istosti, saj ni niti prevedljiva niti (do)umljiva znotraj

koordinat tistega »meseno-falocentrizma« (prim. Derrida in Nancy 1989), v imenu katerega (ali preprosto skozi katerega) se drugost živečega, določenega živečega bitja, umešča kot funkcija »človeškega«. Gre, skratka, v implicitni Heideggrovi interpretativni liniji, za afirmacijo »razlike«, ki je ni mogoče zvesti na diskurz »istosti« ali *logosa*; razlike, ki utemeljuje drugost pred (v vseh smislih »pred«) vsakršno identiteto (prim. Derrida in Nancy 1989). Tista ista drugost, na katero se nanašajo mnogi Derridajevi teksti – ne brez reference na Levinasove nauke, ki naj bi se omejil na drugost drugega človeka –, ko jo poskušajo tematizirati tako, da je ne tematizirajo, s čimer se ognejo tveganju asimilacije, kolonizacije, domestikacije »drugega« s strani (diskurza) istosti.⁸

Izključno znotraj (diskurza) istosti bi dejansko bilo mogoče diskriminirati žival s pomočjo kvalitativnih in kvantitativnih sodb glede zmožnosti ali organskih podobnosti, glede večje ali manjše velikosti z ozirom na teleološko ali preprosto evolucionistično naravnost posameznikov ali vrst. In Derrida prepozna prav v takšnih pogoji možnost, da se ne zdrsne na pobočje antropomorfizmov ali političnih biologizmov, in prav na mejah in pragu tega, kar Heidegger začrta, prepozna zasledovanje takšne možnosti. Citat iz dela O

⁸Hiperbolični primer velike in mestoma tudi hiperbolične pozornosti, ki jo Derrida nameni dimenziji nereduktibilnosti vsakršne drugosti in končnosti, lahko najdemo v tekstu, ki se ukvarja z besedo, z besedo v njeni idiomatični, singularni, historični nereduktibilnosti, ki jo evocira njena lastna »telesnost« (prim. Derrida 2000, 25–26): »Naj gre za gramatiko ali leksiko, me beseda – kajti z besedo se ukvarjam – ne zanima, mislim, da lahko rečem, ne trn, besedo, če ne v telesu njene idiomatične singularnosti, tam, kjer se oblizne strast prevoda – tako kot lahko oblizne plamen ali ljubezenski jezik: približujoč se kolikor je le mogoče tako, da se v zadnjem trenutku odpove grožnji ali redukciji, potrošnji ali porabi, pustivši drugo telo nedotaknjeno, toda tako, da se na samem robu te odpovedi ali tega odmika prikaže drugi, ne da bi obudil ali oživel željo idioma, izvirnega telesa drugega, v luči plamena ali božanja jezika. Sicer ne vem kako, v koliko jezikov, bi lahko prevedli to besedo, lizanje (*lécher*), če bi želeli, da izreče to, da en jezik oblizne drugega, tako kot plamen ali božanje [...] Kaj pomeni ‚relevantno‘? To ima vse poteze tiste jezikovne enotnosti, ki ji udomačeno rečemo beseda, verbalno telo. Pozabljamo pa, prav zaradi udomačenosti, da kljub enotnosti ali identitete neodvisnost besede ostaja nekaj skrivnostnega, prekarnega, nenaravnega in torej historičnega, institucionalnega in konvencionalnega. Nobenih besed ni v naravi. Zdaj, poskusil bom pokazati, kako že sama beseda ‚relevantno‘ nosi v svojem telesu neko prevajalsko operacijo; gre za prevajalsko telo, ki trpi ali prikazuje prevajanje kot spomin ali stigmato neke strasti in nad katerim lebdi neka določena gloriozna avra ali avreola.« (Derrida 2000, 29)

duhu nam v tem smislu ne pušča nobenega dvoma: kljub temu da Heideggrove teze iz predavanj 1929/30 ne razpustijo lastne problematičnosti in ne razrešijo aporij, ki jih vsebujejo, »njihovo strategijo in njihovo aksiomatiko odlikuje izjemna konstantnost. Vselej gre za to, da se označi absolutno mejo med živim bitjem in človeškim *Dasein*«; ne samo da se obenem »distancira ne le od vsakega biologizma in vsake filozofije življenja (ter od tod od vsake politične ideologije, ki bi se lahko pri njima bolj ali manj neposredno napajala)«, pač pa tudi v »razmerju do rilkejevske tematike, v kateri se povezuje odprtje in živalskost. Nedvomno je potrebno priznati moč in načelno nujnost analiz, ki prelomijo z antropomorfizmom, biologizmom in njegovimi političnimi učinki.« (Derrida 1999, 64) Derrida sam potemtakem v Heideggrovem diskurzu prepozna tako to, da ohranitev živalske drugosti ne more izhajati iz neke »absolutne meje«, ki bi žival varovala asimilacije in posledične diskriminacije s strani človeka, kakor tudi to, da je takšno mejo Heidegger vendarle začrtal, četudi z nemara neogibno primerjalnim besednjakom (osiromašenost sveta, pomanjkanje »kolikor«), k čemur moramo dodati, da je to storil, če že ne brez vsakršne primerjave ali skupnega terena, vsekakor brez kakršnekoli hierarhizacije. Heidegger vseskozi ponavlja, da žival ima in nima sveta, uporablja torej pojem, ki si ga poskuša priskrbeti vse do konca, ko ga ne uspe ne ujeti ne skonstruirati (vsaj ne zares). In prav skozi tisti značilni »kolikor« bo žival nenazadnje izključena iz možnosti imeti svet in sveta, ki ga ustvarja človek. In tako bo morda, če naredimo še korak naprej, žival obvarovana – ne pa diskriminirana in ponižana na raven golega predmeta nasilja – v svoji lastni drugosti, v radikalni drugosti, za katero jamči, sledeč samemu Derridaju, tista absolutna meja, ki jo je bolj ali manj implicitno priskrbel Heidegger.

Lahko navedemo še en primer, tokrat sklicujoč se natanko na tisto implicitno Derridajevo referenco na Rilkeja v poprejšnjem navedku. V ta namen se je potrebno spomniti na drug univerzitetni kurz, ki ga je Heidegger v zimskem semestru 1942/43 posvetil Parmenidu, na koncu katerega se vprašanje odprtosti zastavlja skozi takšen primer, ki bi ga zlahka lahko umestili v serijo tistih, ki jih razvija v *Temeljnih pojmih metafizike* sklicujoč se na kuščarje, pikapolonice, čebele, opice, klope itd. Gre namreč za škranca in za to, kar zapečati vse tisto, kar je na zaprt način že izrekel glede odprtosti: »kamen (tako kot letalo) se ne more nikoli ne gibati ne navdušujoče dvigniti

proti soncu tako kot škrljanček, toda celo škrljanček ne more uvideti odprtosti. Preostane, da se vprašamo, kaj ‚vidi‘, kako vidi in kaj pomeni ‚videti‘, če mu pripišemo ‚oči.‘ (Heidegger 1982, 238) Vsekakor je način, na katerega nam je predstavljen ta primer, podoben vsem tistim, s katerimi smo soočeni ob drugih priložnostih, toda tukaj je tisto razločujoče prav kontekst: gre namreč za distanciranje od tega, kar Rilke pravi v osmi *Devinski elegiji* glede odprtosti, ki jo razume – vsaj kakor pravi Heidegger – kot »konstanten proces bivajočega v bivajočem med bivajočim, ki ga udejanja samo bivajoče in samo skozenj katerega se sploh lahko udejanji« (Heidegger 1982, 226). Natanko Rilkejeva »odprtost« je tisto edino in edinstveno okolje, znotraj katerega je bivajoče, v svoji celovitosti, izgubilo kakršnokoli sled biti: »Odprtost neoviranega procesa bivajočega se nikoli ne dogodi v svobodi biti, v svobodi, ki jo ‚bitje‘ nikoli ne bo zmožno uzreti, kolikor pač ravno zmožnost uzrtja sestavlja bistveno značilnost človeka in potemtakem bistveno in neprekoračljivo mejo med človekom in živaljo«; metafizična poteza načina, na katerega naj bi Rilke mislil odprtost, je po Heideggru evidentna in koherentna z zgodbo metafizike v njeni dovršitvi »pozabe biti«, ki naj bi bila »temelj biologizma in psihoanalize devetnajstega stoletja« in od koder naj bi vzniknil prav tisti »spregled vseh zakonov biti, ki ima za posledico monstruozno antropomorfizacijo ‚bitja‘, v tem primeru živali, in sovisno animalizacijo človeka« (Heidegger 1982, 226).

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Vidimo lahko, da sta tudi v tem primeru tako absolutna meja kot neprekoračljiva razlika utemeljena na imperativen način, toda s tem dodatkom, ki se lahko izkaže za zavajajočega in nevarnega za mišljenje, namreč, dodatkom kolokacije znotraj ene in iste dimenzije vsega, kar pač pade pod ime »živečega«, ali celo »bitja«. Nevarno za mišljenje oziroma mimobežno v razmerju do živali in tistega, kar bi lahko imenovali intrinzična digniteta živali:

V metafiziki in z njenim vplivom na znanosti se uganka živečega sprehaja neopažena, kajti živa bitja so bodisi napadena s strani kemije ali pa so premeščena na področje psihologije. V obeh primerih se zdi, kakor da se zasleduje uganko življenja, ki pa se je nikoli ne odkrije. In to ne samo zato, ker vsaka znanost ostaja vedno znova zvezana s tem, kar je predzadnje, tako da pred-postavlja zadnje kot prvo, temveč tudi zato, ker je bila uganka živečega že sprva opuščena. (Heidegger 1982, 238)

Vsekakor je Heideggrovo besedišče precej daleč od instanc (in nemara tudi neprevedljivo vanje), ki izpostavljajo drugost, nezvedljivost drugega na istega ali ki spodbujajo k reševanju in odgovornosti do drugosti kot take, kar lahko, po drugi strani, najdemo natanko v Derridajevih spisih, ki predstavljajo eno izmed redkih takšnih ognjevitih razprav – če že ne kar edinih – v nenehni aktualni prisotnosti in progresivni intenzifikaciji vprašanja drugosti. Mislim pa, da ni težko ugotoviti – čeprav Heideggrova intenca ni nikoli, vsaj ne na prvo žogo, želja po obrambi živali, živali v njeni drugosti, pred agresivno homologacijo in redukcijo na človeškost –, da če je možno reševanje živali, če je možno pripisovanje dignitete živali, če je za misel možno sprejetje dimenzije živalskosti v njeni polnosti in avtonomnosti glede na vsakršne antropomorfizacijo, če se da možnost, da bi uganka živečega ne ostala neopažena, skratka, da bi misel obrnila k uganki živečega v njegovi skrivnostnosti in absolutni drugosti, se vse to lahko dogodi samo pod pogojem, da se ohrani »bistvena in neprekoračljiva meja med človekom in živaljo«.

146 Iz tega izhaja precej vrtoglava opazka glede tega, kako Derrida pripisuje Heideggro – na podlagi nekaj njegovih tekstov, ki jih je zagotovo prebral, naštudiral, analiziral – in njegovemu odnosu do živalskosti in živali neko, če že ne aksiološko, vsaj emotivno naravnost, skratka, zavestno dodelitev neke vrednosti; kar ostaja precej daleč od tega, kar pravi in vseskozi ponavlja sam Heidegger v svojih tudi precej časovno oddaljenih tekstih. Da bi se ognili nesporazumu, lahko navedemo še en odlomek, ki izpostavlja to distinktivno »heideggrovsko« naravnost, ki je po Derridaju konstanta v celotni Heideggrovi misli, skoraj kakor da bi imeli opravka z nečim, kar sploh ne spada na področje mišljenja, skoraj kakor da bi šlo za dogmatizem, ki temelji na neki nezavedni in diskriminatorni aksiomati, ki je prav zaradi tega še veliko bolj nevarna:

Vsi poskusi dekonstrukcije, ki sem jih poskusil izvršiti na filozofskih tekstih, še zlasti Heideggrovih, sestojijo iz prevpraševanja tiste drže zavestne brezbržnosti v razmerju do tega, kar se generično imenuje Žival, vključno z načinom, na katerega takšni teksti interpretirajo mejo med Človekom in Živaljo. (Derrida in Roudinesco 2004, 93–94)

Vsaj v tem primeru se zdi, da je sodba »brezbrižnosti« precej nedoločljiva in brez substance, kajti nanaša se na neko partikularno konfiguracijo: tisto, zaradi katere naj bi ločitev človeka in živali imela eno samo omejitev, ki temelji na nekem »monolitnem« pojmu živali, medtem ko se pragi in meje, še zlasti znotraj živečega, vedno znova multiplicirajo in artikulirajo na verjetno neskončno mnogo načinov. Derrida sam pravi, da »vsekakor obstoji več kot zgolj ena meja, da obstaja več meja. Ne obstaja *ena* sama opozicija med človeškim in ne-človeškim. Pač pa obstajajo številni prelomi, heterogenosti in diferencialni mehanizmi med različnimi strukturami organizacije življenja.« (Derrida in Roudinesco 2004, 97–98) Onkraj takšnega opažanja številčnost meja nikakor ne izbriše tiste »radikalne diskontinuitete med tistimi, ki jih imenujemo živali [...] in človekom« (Derrida in Roudinesco 2004, 106). Ravno nasprotno, na določen način naj bi to ravno potrjevalo in utrjevalo dejstvo, da, če obstaja možnost – edina možnost je verjetno tista, ki utemeljuje vsakršno dejanje, vsakršen diskurz, ki se obrača na žival onkraj homologne, kontinuirane, antropomorfne perspektive –, takšna možnost ravno ne more izhajati iz neke absolutne meje. Toda natanko absolutna meja po nujnosti tvori vir tistega, kar bi lahko označili kot radikalno privzetje odgovornosti. Drugače rečeno: če obstaja možnost, da se obračamo na drugega kot drugega (treba bi bilo razumeti, do katere mere naj bi izraz »drugi kot drugi« ne bil povsem paradoksalen), na radikalno drugost drugega, ki je žival ali celo živeči v njegovi neskončni artikulaciji, potem takšna možnost ne more biti dojeta kot odgovornost, če ne v razmerju do tiste absolutne meje, tiste »bistvene in neprekoračljive meje«, ki je vsekakor bolj »radikalna« od vsakršne »diskontinuitete« (ki se ne more, če jo umestimo znotraj nekega kontinuuma, izraziti kot nič drugega kot ravno neka razlika v stopnji). Meja, skratka, ki ne bi opravila zgolj neke negativne funkcije preprečevanja vsakršne kontinuitete med človekom in živaljo, marveč bi lahko, natanko zaradi svoje lastnosti »bistvenosti« – v heideggrovski govorici rečeno: predznanstveno in predtehnično –, dala garancijo in rešitev nečesa, kar je bistveno, radikalno drugačno in potemtakem tvori temeljno potezo absolutne odgovornosti.

Da bi poudarili vse te premisleke glede odgovornosti – kolikor se je od neke prikradla sintagma »privzetje odgovornosti«; najprej se je potrebno otresti samega termina »privzetja«, saj na preveč določen način kaže prostor neke

individualne, subjektivne volje, in potemtakem prostor neke etike ali morale –, bi se rad sklical na tekst Jeana-Luca Nancyja z naslovom *Heideggrova »izvorna etika«*:⁹ v njem so podrobneje razložene določene usmeritve, še zlasti nanašajoč se na vprašanje odgovornosti, ki niso daleč od tega, kar želim tudi sam tukaj izpostaviti. Usmeritve, ki morda pomagajo pri osvetlitvi tiste spremembe pojma odgovornosti, po katerem se slednja – še preden se jo zvaja na implikacije (kaj šele na intence in konsekvence), ki jih subjekt v razmerju do svojega delovanja mora vzeti nase – sprva nanaša na konstitutivni značaj samega delovanja. Delovanja ne gre razumeti kot tistega, v razmerju do česar ima subjekt dolžnost (ali možnost, ali priložnost itd.) privzetja odgovornosti na podlagi kakršnegakoli etičnega ali moralnega predpisa in glede na kakšno določeno dejanje: »*Dasein* se odkrije kot tisto, kar mora tvoriti smisel natanko zato, ker je sam strukturiran glede na razmerje med njegovim biti-tu in biti-ta-tu, med bivanjem in eksistenco«; in »natanko to pomeni biti-telo svojega smisla in biti-smisel svojega telesa. Navsezadnje nobenega delovanja ni, niti delovanja kot mišljenja, ki ne bi bilo ,telo.« (Nancy 1996, 31) Izvornost delovanja, sledeč Nancyju, ni nekaj ločenega od živečega, ni ločena od tistega »telesa«, v katerem se zgošča pripadnost živečemu. V tem smislu se pojem odgovornosti (tvorjenja smisla in delovanja, ki predhajata vsakršen smisel in dejanje) lahko konstituira kot tisto, kar napotuje na izvor samega delovanja kot odgovora na živeče (in od njega), ki se začenja s samo instanco živečega v trenutku, ko se živečemu zgodi zmožnost lastne smrti, zgodi zmožnost dostopa do jezika, besede, misli, v trenutku, v katerem se vse, kar je v živečem določeno kot akcija/reakcija, okolijska interakcija, gibanje glede na dražljaj/odgovor itd., spremeni v delovanje. Drugače rečeno, če je delovanje vselej že odgovorno, potem je temu tako, ne zato, ker bi se nanašalo na neko normo ali na neke vrednosti (etične, praktične, produktivne itd.), pač pa zato, ker je delovanje vselej že odgovor, ki se nahaja v živečem, v »telesu«, kjer se odvija (in deluje), nujno utemeljujoč se in nanašajoč se na celovitost živečega:

9 *Heideggrova »izvorna etika«* je tekst, v katerem je poglobljena izvorna dimenzija odgovornosti kot tistega, kar nedvomno predhaja subjekt, etiko in celo ontologijo, vsaj sledeč določenim indikacijam, ki jih Nancy prevzame od Heideggrova in njegovega *Pisma o »humanizmu«*; bolj kot odgovornost v smislu nečesa privzetega ali nečesa, kar je šele treba privzeti, se tukaj odgovornost razume kot nekaj konstitutivnega za samo dimenzijo živečega (Nancy 1996).

Govoriti o spoštovanju življenja takoj razkrije vse težave, ki izhajajo iz iskanja določitve ‚življenja‘, ‚človeškega življenja‘, bolj ali manj jasno razločenega od ‚živalskega (in rastlinskega) življenja‘, njegove pogoje pripoznanja, dignitete itd. Tako lahko razumemo, zakaj vse težave, ki jih danes povzroča ‚bioetika‘ ali ‚človekove pravice‘, razkrivajo nujnost vrnitve k neki ontologiji delovanja: ne zato, da bi se te težave razrešile enkrat za vselej, pač pa zato, da bi se razumelo absolutni tvoriti-smisel delovanja, ki se postavlja, na primer, v pozicijo odločanja glede tega, kaj je ‚človeško življenje‘ – ne da bi bilo mogoče fiksirati to bitje kot nekaj definitivno danega. (Nancy 1996, 25)

V tem precej zgoščenem odlomku, ki ga najdemo v Nancyjevi refleksiji o Heideggrovi »izvirni etiki«, najde svoje mesto tisto, kar sam poskušam tukaj imenovati »odgovornost«, ki noče označiti zgolj subjektovega privzetja nekega delovanja, ki je proizvedlo določene izide in je imelo določene posledice, pač pa, rečeno z Nancyjem, tisto »izvorno« partikularno konfiguracijo, zaradi katere se delovanje vselej daje (znotraj živečega in kontekstualno glede na našo lastno smrtnost); v tem smislu bi se lahko tisto, kar Nancy označi kot »ontologija delovanja«, nanašalo na dejstvo, da prav delovanje – in čemur se bitje ne more ogniti niti v ne-delovanju, ki je vendarle oblika delovanja – sprejme in odpira tisto dimenzijo odgovornosti, znotraj katere smo kot živeči vselej že vpleteni.

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Vendarle se v tem celotnem odlomku nemara nahaja neka točka, ki jo Nancy prehitro prehodi, skoraj nekakšen zdrs iz enega nadstropja v drugega, pri čemer je odločilnega pomena natanko razlika, na podlagi katere bi se lahko »razumelo absolutni tvoriti-smisel delovanja, ki se postavlja, na primer, v pozicijo odločanja glede tega, kaj je ‚človeško življenje‘ [...]« (Nancy 1996, 25). Tukaj, med »absolutni tvoriti-smisel« in »v pozicijo odločanja glede tega, kaj je ‚človeško življenje‘«, se zdi, da Nancy umešča neko določeno voljo ali vsaj neko določeno dolžnost (»dolžnost odločanja«), ki bi jo bilo mogoče pripeljati nazaj do neke vnaprej konstituirane subjektivnosti, določene in določujoče, do nekega določenega subjekta volje ali dolžnosti. Nemara pa natanko tukaj – v razliki med absolutnim tvorjenjem smisla in ontologijo delovanja in »odločanja« – ni nobene možnosti nastopa subjekta, ki bi se lahko umestil na pozicijo odločitve.

Nemara se tukaj bolj kot prehod iz transcendentalne (potencialne) k empirični (dejanski) poziciji umešča nezmožnost razlikovanja med samimi momenti, sopripadnost obeh momentov, ki dajeta istočasno, strukturno in izvorno odgovornost, v kateri se »subjekt« takšne odgovornosti (tu-bit, smrtnik) znajde privzet v neko ne-subjektivno pozicijo. V trenutku, skratka, ko se daje dimenzija tvorjenja absolutnega smisla, se vselej že daje tudi tako odločitev in odločanje kot tudi sam smisel, in to toliko manj, kolikor se je že dal določen smisel, kakršenkoli pač je. Odgovornost ali odgovor je vselej že na delu *pred* vsakršnim privzetjem odgovornosti, odgovor je že dan pred zastavitvijo samega vprašanja in odločitev je že sprejeta pred njenim udejanjenjem. Tako kot v slovitih Nietzschejevi primeri s strelo, kjer dejanje luči ne potrebuje subjekta, na katerem bi se moralo utemeljiti, pač pa se subjekt izkaže kot tisto, kar se »prilepi zraven«. ¹⁰ Odgovor živečemu, ki smo mi sami kot živeči, kolikor obstajamo in ne moremo ne obstajati, torej ne nastane na podlagi zastavitve nekega vprašanja, neke instance: instanca in odgovor se dajeta strukturno v istem času, pred in zunaj kakršnekoli volje, odločitve, pravila in subjektivne formacije. Takšna odgovornost implicira neko »ontologijo delovanja«: v smislu, da smo pred samim subjektom, človekom, etiko, normo, kot živeči že umeščeni na kraj odgovora – odgovora na tisto živeče, ki mu ne moremo prenehati ne pripadati.

Primeri, ki smo jih navedli, potemtakem ne merijo na Heideggrovo pozornost ali simpatijo – povsem irelevantne zunanje nagnjenosti – v razmerju do »živali«, vseh skupaj ali zgolj nekaj njih, na primer tistih, ki jih je izbral kot eksemplarične primere; niti nimajo specifične funkcije popravka tistega emotivnega in intelektualnega nagiba, ki ga Derrida najde v heideggrovskih diskurzih, označujoč ga (z nedvomno moralno) sodbo in z izrazi, kot so, na primer, »nasilno in nerodno, mestoma protislovno«, »zavestno sprenevedanje« ipd. Če kaj, je njihova navedba pomembna, da premakne os, okoli katere se, pri Heideggro, artikulira – nedvomno bolj implicitno kot eksplicitno –

10 »Namreč, prav tako kot ljudstvo ločuje strelo od njenega bliskanja in slednje jemlje za *dejanje* (Tun), za učinek nekega subjekta, ki se imenuje strela [...] Toda takšnega substrata ni; za dejanjem, delovanjem, nastajanjem ni 'biti'; 'dejavnik' (Taeter) je dejanju samo primišljen, – dejanje je vse.« (Nietzsche 1988, 234) Glej tudi *Volja do moči*: »Subjekt ni nič danega, temveč nekaj pripesnjenege, podtaknjenege.« (Nietzsche 1995, 281)

določena poteza diskurza o živali, z namenom uvida, kako se ne samo njegov diskurz oddaljuje od tako imenovane kartezijanske linije (ki, če se spomnimo, eksplicitno diskriminira žival glede na človeka na podlagi neposredne primerjave in na podlagi skupnega terena, torej tistega, kar se nanaša na imetje določenih zmožnosti), temveč tudi to, da se vse primerjave (ali še raje: psevdoprimerjave) nikoli ne odvijajo v neposrednih terminih, kakor da bi šlo za to, da se soočita dve bitji ali dvoje ontičnih instanc na podlagi skupnih značilnosti, takorekoč znotraj istega »sveta«; nenazadnje pa še, da bi se izpostavilo, kako zelo so določene, premišljene in »mišljene« razdalja, razlika, tujost živali in človeka na absoluten in radikalen način.

V terminih heideggrovskega diskurza, skratka, ne bi bila mogoča nobena konfiguracija pozitivne artikulacije, noben individualni prehod, opisljiv ali imenljiv, skozi katerega bi bilo mogoče žival (neko žival) preobraziti v (nekega) človeka.¹¹ Nemara je prav ta de-artiklacija, ta absolutna distanca tista, ki tvori neke vrste nepogrešljiv pogoj ali predpogoj za kolokacijo človeka in živali v neko adekvatno sovpadanje, natanko skozi neko nepremostljivo distanco, ki instituiraa značaj absolutne drugobiti in s tem možnost neke prav tako absolutne odgovornosti. Žival, drugače rečeno, če jo izvzamemo iz vsakršne linije kontinuitete s »človeškim« in jo umestimo na raven neke absolutne drugobiti, bi tako pridobila natanko tisto dimenzijo drugosti, na katero je pokazal Derrida – še zlasti v svojih refleksijah gostoljubnosti – kot vir vsakršne odgovornosti. Torej

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11 Čeprav na dva zelo različna načina sta tako Peter Sloterdijk kot Giorgio Agamben poskusila najti točko, na kateri bi takšen sklep, takšna artikulacija med živaljo in človekom bila mogoča znotraj takorekoč heideggrovskega konteksta. V primeru Sloterdijka in knjige *Nismo še bili rešeni* še posebej, saj bi antropogeneza omogočila čisto pravi dostop do *Lichtung* s strani predčloveškega, ki se ukvarja z določenimi tehničnimi vprašanji, kot je, na primer, met kamna, ki naj bi v njegovem pogledu predstavljal »prvo formo teorije« in katerega učinkovitost naj bi kazala na »prvo stopnico post-živalske resnice«; takšne opazke omogočijo Sloterdijku trditev, da človek »ne izhaja ne iz opice (*singe*), kot menijo vulgarni darvinisti, niti iz znaka (*signe*), kot se je temu reklo v nadrealistični francoski besedni igri; če kaj, človek izhaja iz kamna« (Sloterdijk 2004, 142–148). Agambenova argumentacija iz *Odprto: človek in žival* pa se prehoda loti tako, da ga pripelje nazaj do Heideggrovih *Temeljnih pojmov metafizike*, saj prav v »globokem dolgčasu« najde tisti »metafizični operativ, v katerem se dogodi prehod od osiromašenosti sveta k svetu kot takem, od živalskega sveta do človeškega: vprašanje tukaj zadeva nič manj kot antropogenezo, postajanje živega človeka v *Da-sein*« (Agamben 2011, 69–77).

možnost privzetja razmerja do tistega, kar je »drugo«, brez kakršnegakoli nasilja, ki se pritihotapi zraven v vsakršnem poskusu asimilacije pod diskurz istosti, tj. redukcije, nasilja in uničenja drugosti kot take. Če potemtakem Heideggrov diskurz o živali – pod pogojem prepoznanja določene enoznačnosti v zgoraj navedenih primerih – nikoli ne izhaja iz afirmacije in bolj ali manj implicitne zavesti neke absolutne drugosti živali v razmerju do človeka, potem natanko zaradi tega lahko konstituira, na impliciten in enoznačen način, indikacijo ontološkega temelja vsakršnega razmerja, vsakršne drže, dejanja, diskurza, ki ga ima človek v razmerju do živali. V tem smislu bi tukaj šlo – in natanko zunaj kakršnekoli kontinuitete, evolucije, podobnosti ali stvariteljskega bratstva – za možnost določitve človeškega natanko kot tiste investicije v edinstveno in enoznačno odgovornost v razmerju do živega kot takega. In to na podlagi ontološke konstatacije, da je prav človeku – in nemara zgolj človeku – živeče dano, »kolikor je živeče«, »kot tako«, znotraj »sveta«.

152 Vsekakor, iz takšne ontološke konstatacije – ko smo določili podlago, na katero se opirajo modalnosti, s katerimi človek vzpostavlja razmerje do živali (ali celo do vsega živečega) – ne izhajajo nujno visoka, vrla, dobra čustva, tudi če razumemo njihov pomen, ne. Toda sploh ne gre za to, temveč za določitev in afirmacijo mesta določene človeške investicije »kot človeške«, ki temeljni na nemara edinstveni predpostavki, namreč, privzetju odgovornosti s strani tiste edine živali, ki je, če naj rečemo »kartezijansko«, interpelirana s strani živečega – in nemara enoznačno interpelirana – v tisto bitje, za katerega velja odgovor živečemu, bitje, ki je v položaju, da mora odgovoriti živečemu in odgovarjati za živečega.

Če, kot smo videli, takšna kolokacija človeka in človeškega v razmerje do živali in živečega, onemogoča – zaradi položaja na »absolutni meji« in zaradi radikalne razlike, ki od tod izhaja – kakršenkoli teoretski, praktični, politični učinek tega, kar spada pod kategorijo »antropomorfizma« ali »biologizma«, potem takšna kolokacija tudi ne more ne proizvesti določene transformacije tega, kar vztraja kot distinktivna dimenzija subjektivnosti. Drugače rečeno: v razmerju do tega, kar spada pod subjekt, subjektivnost, bi se živalska dimenzija, dislocirana onkraj absolutne meje drugobiti, razpršila do te mere, da bi se radikalno oddaljila od kakršnekoli »objektivnosti«. Če je namreč »žival« neko radikalno drugo, če je možno in celo nujno afirmirati absolutno

drugost vsakršnega živečega bitja ali živečega nasploh – glede na katerega mora tisto živeče, ki mu je dan svet ali ki svet ustvarja, prav tako absolutno nujno odgovoriti –, potem je »živali« prav tako onemogočena kolokacija v vsakršno »objektivnost«. Nikoli se ne odgovarja (za) določen(emu) objekt(u) razen v razmerju do drugega subjekta, nikoli ne bo nobena objektivnost terjala mojega odgovora in moje odgovornosti, kolikor je pač objekt nekaj, kar se umešča v notranjost, kar skupaj s subjektom tvori kontinuiteto, ki neogibno in faktično omogoča vsakršno vladanje, podrejanje in izkoriščanje, pogosto eksplicitno (prepogosto pa implicitno) legitimirano preko klasifikacije, hierarhizacije – in to brez vsakršne odgovornosti, kaj šele odgovora.¹²

V tem smislu, in za razliko od objektivnosti, drugost ne samo ne omogoča klasifikacij ali hierarhizacij, temveč tudi ne dovoljuje nobenega legitimacijskega aparata in dotičnih operacij, ki so omogočene v razmerju do nečesa, kar je – v dobrem in slabem, s pravico ali brez – v nižjem, manjvrednem položaju (četudi zgolj predpostavljenem). Suspenz, prekinitev z vsakršno kontinuiteto nujno prekine z vsakršno manjvrednostjo (ali večvrednostjo), suspendira vsakršno možnost opravičevanja vse do te mere, da postane delovanje – vse, kar se stori v razmerju do drugobiti živečega – nekaj, česar ni več mogoče legitimirati ali delegitimirati, upravičevati ali celo razložiti, temveč bistveno postane neka neposredna odgovornost, naravnana na tisto, čemur ne more ne odgovoriti in odgovarjati.

Veliko bolj sugestivno bi bilo, in verjetno tudi bolj prijetno in elegantno, če bi lahko našli drugačne načine, s katerimi bi bilo mogoče modificirati strukturo razmerij med človeškim in živalskim ali živalmi, živimi bitji; celo s tistim živim bitjem, ki on sam neogibno je. V tem oziru se Felice Cimatti, v svoji nedavno objavljeni knjigi, vrača k tisti perspektivi »imanence« – absolutno neprekinjene kontinuitete –, kakor sta jo predlagala in teoretizirala Gilles Deleuze in Félix Guattari. Gre za dimenzijo, ki si jo je šele treba pridobiti, še zlasti preko osvobajanja od »jaza«, od identitetne strukture, v kateri se govoreči subjekt znajde zaprt zaradi svoje lastne človeške pogojenosti biti »bitje govorice«, skratka, zaradi tega, ker ga preči presežek

12 V heideggrovski perspektivi se slednje lokalizira v območju tega, kar sam Heidegger imenuje s terminom »tehnika«, »moderna tehnika«.

»jezika«, ki vzpostavlja, utemeljuje neko transcendenco; po drugi strani pa se življenje živali odvija v samem trenutku odvijanja in potemtakem pod okriljem imanence (Cimatti 2013, 130). V tem smislu naj bi perspektiva osvoboditve za človeka pomenila pridobitev ali ponovno pridobitev živalske dimenzije in obenem opustitev transcendence, znotraj katere se strukturira subjektivnost: »Izkustvo imanence predpostavlja bodisi opustitev jezika, bodisi uporabo jezika, ki ne bi bil podvojen. To je človeška živalskost, imanenca« (Cimatti 2013, 184); vse to zavoljo tistega, kar sam – sledeč delu *Tisoč platojev* – imenuje »stvarjajoča involucija« (Cimatti 2013, 153; prim. Deleuze in Guattari 2006, 256, 357). Dejansko je ta diskurz precej jasen in prepričljivo priključuje na plan serijo argumentov in podob. Opis »imanence«, »postajanje-žival«, umanjkanje transcendence in subjektivnosti kažejo na teoretsko plavzibilno »polnost« sveta, ki naj bi – v nasprotju s tem, kar trdi Heidegger – bila značilna za žival, ne za človeka: »Človek – in ne žival – je tisti, ki mu manjka polnost sveta.« (Cimatti 2013, 160)

154 A ostaja odprto vprašanje, da takšnega izkustva imanence, takšne odpovedi transcendenci, ki naj bi se odvila znotraj »na nek način še vedno človeškega življenja, ki ne bi bilo več vezano na egoistično identitetno potrebo ‚jaza‘« (Cimatti 2013, 179), ni mogoče misliti drugače kakor znotraj tega, kar omogoča njegovo izrekanje in mišljenje – torej znotraj jezika in transcendence. Že sama zamisel o jeziku, ki ne bi bil »podvojen«, je verjetno bližje manku jezika kot nekemu radikalno drugačnemu jeziku od tistega, ki se – sledeč Heideggrovemu razmišljanju iz zadnjega predavanja *Temeljnih pojmov metafizike* – artikulira začenši z značilnim »kolikor« dostopom do biti; dostopom, zaradi katerega obstaja možnost »sveta«, »stvarjenja sveta« in nenazadnje samo »omogočiti-možnost«, od katerega zavisi sama možnost projekta pridobivanja imanence (Heidegger 1983, 530). V tem smislu bi »človeška živalskost, ki bi se konfigurirala na nivoju absolutne imanence,« pomenila obenem tudi umanjkanje vsakršnega odgovora in odgovornosti v razmerju do živečega kot takega, saj bi si jo podredilo samo živeče kot znak golega živečega brez vsakršnega pomena: »Človeška živalskost, če obstaja, se lahko pojavi samo po jeziku, kajti izključno ‚jaz‘ se lahko odreče subjektivnosti,« kakor si tudi izključno »jaz« lahko »želi polnosti, ki je sicer ni še nikoli spoznal, a jo vendarle ljubosumno gleda v živali,« pravi Cimatti,

s čimer naznanja začetno in hkrati končno (torej strukturno) točko tega procesa, namreč, da »jezik preneha biti znak in postane gesta, meso« (2013, 182).

Natanko v človeku in v strukturah, ki človeka identificirajo, ne kot pripadnika kakšne vrste, pač pa kot subjekta, se artikulirajo vsa vprašanja, ki zadevajo razmerje človeka in živali. Dejstvo je, da se znajdemo znotraj natanko tistih struktur, ki jih lahko vnovič s Heideggrom označimo s terminom »kolikor«, ki opisuje določen dostop do biti – do biti kot biti namreč – z vso dvojnostjo ali podvojenostjo jezika. Nisem prepričan, da je sploh mogoče argumentirati v prid ali proti takšnim strukturam, da si je sploh mogoče zamišljati prilagoditev ali osvoboditev od takšnih struktur, ali če sploh obstaja možnost, da bi jih bodisi dejansko bodisi zgolj konceptualno opustiti, kolikor se »človeško« zdi kot nekaj, kar pripada taistemu redu, tako da bi se vsakršen poskus odrešitve ali uporabe tega koncepta izkazal za jalovega.

Medtem – torej v naši transcendenci, v absolutni distanci, ki nas ontološko razločuje od »živali« in »živečega« – se taista transcendenca ne more ne artikulirati, in to prav v sebi lastnem dvojnem jeziku, tudi kot odgovor in odgovornost, kot odgovor živali in živečemu. Ne gre za odgovor, ki bi si ga lahko človek dal tako, da bi se pretvarjal, da je žival, »kolikor« je žival, kajti živalskost, ki je v človeku – živalskost v meni samem –, ne more biti nič drugega kot nekaj ločenega, daljnega, transcendentalnega. Nemara bi se v trenutku, ko bi se »človeško« hotelo razumeti kot sopripadno »živalskemu« ali celo identično z njim, obenem ne zmoglo pognati onkraj neke precej problematične artikulacije, kolikor jo pač strukturno preči natanko transcendenca, ki ne dopušča identifikacije ali asimilacije s preostalim živečim, z drugim živečim – razen preko nekega zgolj hipotetičnega ključa: *sem, morda, živeč*.

Morda naj – prej kot možnost neke hipoteze – ta »morda« deluje kot varuh nemožnosti utemeljene in potemtakem dokončne odločitve glede tega, kaj pomeni »živeči« v svoji absolutni drugobiti; distanca, nujnost odgovora: *sem, morda, drugi*. Na takšen način lahko ta »morda« ponovi odgovor in neskončno odgovornost do živali, »kolikor« je žival, do živečega, »kolikor« je živeče, v vseh njunih formah in fazah življenja – nenazadnje pa tudi samega življenja v njemu lastni drugobiti. In potemtakem ne govori za – zajemljiv, vendar

verjetno nezapopadljiv – zaton subjekta, temveč za njegovo subjektiviranje k odgovornosti, ki je ni mogoče ne izničiti ne izmeriti.

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NEUROSCIENCE CANNOT REACH EXISTENCE

A HEIDEGGERIAN CRITIQUE OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY

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Abstract

Neuroscience is not the key to understanding human existence. The author argues that neuropsychologists have carelessly confused and conflated being (existence) and beings (neurons), a problem described by German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Heidegger explains how the perspective of modern science has made a habit of conflating being and beings, thereby abandoning human existence. This can be seen in contemporary neuropsychiatry which attempts to explain depression and other

psychological disorders in terms of neurology. Doing so obscures any understanding of psychological phenomena. The author recommends that the method of existential phenomenological hermeneutics replace the now standard method of neuroscience for understanding psychological phenomena.

Keywords: neuropsychology, Martin Heidegger, hermeneutics, neurophilosophy, existentialism.

Nevroznanost ne zmore doseči eksistence. Heideggrovska kritika nevropsihologije

Povzetek

160 Nevroznanost ni poglavitni ključ za razumevanje človeške eksistence. Avtor zagovarja trditev, da so nevropsihologi nepremišljeno spremešali in združili bit (eksistenco) in bivajoče (nevrone), kar je problem, kakršnega je opisal nemški filozof Martin Heidegger. Heidegger namreč razlaga, da je s perspektivo moderne znanosti združevanje biti in bivajočega, ki spregleduje človeško eksistenco, postalo navada. To je mogoče uzreti v sodobni nevropsihiatriji, ki depresijo in druge psihološke motnje skuša pojasniti s pomočjo nevrologije. Slednje zamegljuje vsakršno razumevanje psiholoških fenomenov. Avtor predlaga, naj pri razumevanju psiholoških fenomenov metoda eksistencialne fenomenološke hermenevtike nadomesti standardno metodo nevroznanosti.

Ključne besede: nevropsihologija, Martin Heidegger, hermenevtika, nevrofilozofija, eksistencializem.

Introduction

The online reference site *Dictionary.com* has named “existentialism” the word of 2019. The website authors explain: “It captures a sense of grappling with the survival—literally and figuratively—of the planet, our loved ones, our way of life.” (cf. Holub 2019) The term has shown up in popular magazine, newspaper, and public radio headlines throughout the year, demonstrating a re-emergence of the term. From what I have gathered, it is used to refer generally to human mortality, though it has also been used to describe the imminent death of certain ethnicities, social demographics, and, at least once, the National Football League. While I am pleased to see a return of the term in general, I am unhappy to see how it has been handled by psychiatry and clinical psychology—primarily in the U. S. through the American Psychiatric Association, but also abroad.

Students and consumers of scientific literature quickly learn that psychology and other human sciences offer little in the way of help for those hoping to better understand questions of existence. (Perhaps this is why they have turned to *Dictionary.com*.) All meaning, increasingly it seems, can be traced to the nervous system. This is unsettling. Philosophers have even given a name to the unsettling realization that the mind is the brain: “neuroexistentialism” (Caruso and Flanagan 2018). Neuroexistentialism is both a name for the problem of hopelessness and the disciplinary umbrella under which such research is done—that is, neurosciences of existence. Under this new disciplinary umbrella, one finds psychologists, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers who demonstrate how human experiences of love, autonomy, and morality are reducible to neurological phenomena, definitively solving the problem(s) of meaning and existence. Today, I argue that neuropsychiatry and neuroexistentialism are not the solution; neuroscience and the objects it studies cannot reach existence or being (and I will focus only on the former). *Clinical psychology and psychiatry must not be replaced with applied neuroscience*. Instead, help can be found in the careful examination of human existentials, the unique structures that belong to existence. This requires the existential phenomenological hermeneutics of German philosopher Martin Heidegger

(1889–1976), which has in recent years been fruitfully applied to psychiatry (Aho 2019), health psychology (Whitehead 2019), and medicine (Aho 2018).

The problem I describe in neuroscience can be likened to an accounting mistake that sometimes occurs with double-entry bookkeeping.¹ Double-entry bookkeeping is a record-keeping term where a single entry is recorded into two separate ledgers. For example, if you borrow \$25 from a friend, then you list “minus \$25” in the *debt to be paid* ledger and “\$25” in the *cash-on-hand* ledger. Double-entry bookkeeping is helpful for tracking assets and liabilities, but it can get accountants into trouble in this scenario when a record is made in only one of the ledgers. This makes it difficult to remember what the \$25 credit *means*. It isn’t revenue in this example; it is outstanding debt.

162 In neuropsychology, double-entry bookkeeping is standard. In examining fear, for example, psychologists make an entry for a particular and concrete experience of being frightened, and another general statement about sympathetic nervous system activation (such as galvanic skin conductance). Trouble arises when psychologists forget where the entries have come from, and confuse the generalized neurological statement and concrete experience as one in the same. This has the unfortunate consequence of statements that begin with “fear is when the amygdala...” Fear cannot be understood (*Verstehen*) this way. Understanding requires an analysis of fear as fear—that is, fear as it is experienced.

In this article, the reader will find a Heideggerian critique of contemporary psychiatry. This includes a summary of Heidegger’s (2001) mid-Century critique of medicine and psychiatry, and an application of that critique to the increasingly biological and neurological descriptions of mental disorders among psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. These, the author argues, ignore that which is fundamentally amiss in mental disorder—that is, problems of existence. To that end, the article focuses, not on neuroscience writ large, but on those areas where neuroscience has been used to obscure existence.

1 The metaphor is taken from Heidegger (2001), see below.

Existential psychology

This article builds on the critique developed by many generations of existential psychologists, psychiatrists, and therapists including Binswanger (1956), Jaspers (1963), Boss (1979), Laing (1960), Frankl (2006), Fromm (1969), and others. Scholars Whitehead and Groth (2019) have recently drawn upon these figures to critique a biological approach to understanding human existence, and how it might be restored for research in humanistic psychology by recommending a shift to the humanities. They call for another counter-cultural revolution like the one that produced the existential literature and philosophy in the middle of the 20th century.

However, Whitehead, et al., do not specifically address *DSM-5*'s emphasis on the neurological and biological foundations of mental disorders. That is the focus of the present article.

Disease and illness

The distinction between disease and illness is an important one for this article. A disease is a biomedical abnormality and is represented by a pathogen. Diseases occur at the level of objective physical reality and are discovered by the tools of experimental science (e.g., microscope). An illness is the subjective and disorienting experience of falling out of one's normal routine and well-being. The reality of a virus is conferred by a bio-medical instrument or practice (tissue sample examined in the laboratory). That one feels tired and nauseated cannot be verified biomedically. These are changes to one's normal routine and signify illness.

Positive critique

This article follows Heidegger's (2001) method of positive critique:

Genuine critique is something other than criticizing in the sense of faultfinding, blaming, and complaining. Critique, as 'to distinguish,' means to allow the different as such to be seen in its difference. [...] In other words, true critique, as in this letting-be-seen, is something eminently positive. (76–77)

While readers will find a criticism of neuropsychiatry, the goal is to shine a light on what neuropsychiatry has ignored—that is, existence.

Heidegger's critique of modern science

The problem I am describing does not begin with neuropsychology, but many centuries earlier with Galileo. Before Galileo, things were what they were. An apple was an apple—something to grow, eat, and nefariously poison. A crate was a crate—something to hold apples. What Galileo saw were things—real, meaningful things—which he helped turn into objects. That is, the apple and crate in their objectivity.

164 The experiments of Galileo and, soon after him, Newton supposed that everyday things could be understood as objects—that is, in terms of measurable properties (such as mass and volume) that were acted upon by hidden forces (such as gravity and momentum). This required discarding irrelevant details about the cup such as its usefulness for holding wine or how well it fit into the cupboard. The end result is a universe where things are understood not as things but as objects. This is the platform of modern science, and its influence is not in question.

Students learn how to view things this way when they are taught the experimental method, and learn how to test the physical properties of things in their objectivity. It is unusual to encounter water bottles in terms of their melting points, but this is precisely what is accomplished with Bunsen burners. While holding the water bottle to the flame, students are not seeing the water bottle as a water bottle—that is, the manner in which they encounter the water bottle everywhere outside the laboratory. Instead, they view it as a bit of matter with measurable properties. To be fair, the precise utility of modern science is somewhat obscured in this example, but for this one may look to refrigeration, combustion engines, or the newest version of iPhone. However, even with these, their usefulness as things cannot be understood when viewed as objects. A refrigerator does not preserve meat; it can only cool the air. Preserving meat is something meaningful for which humans have used refrigeration. Modern science is a system of explanation; it cannot *use* things.

This can happen to humans, too. That is, humans can be viewed not as humans, but as objects (*Körper*; as behaviors, neural activity, etc.). The habitual practice of viewing humans as objects reveals itself in startling ways. Earlier this semester, a nursing student was giving a presentation about prenatal healthcare in a developmental psychology class. She was explaining the uses of hysteroscopy when a fellow student asked if hysteroscopes were painful. The student giving the presentation said no, and explained that it would be like having sex. The rest of the class nodded in solemn agreement.

In her simile, the student was comparing the penetration of a hysteroscope to that of a penis (or other sexual device) during intercourse. But the penetration of labia by the penis is only sexual intercourse in the most impersonal and objectified way. (Though this is precisely how sex was described by American psychologists William Masters and Virginia Johnson.)

This student would very likely receive a hysteroscope differently than the penis of her lover. Penal-vaginal intercourse can be viewed on many grounds of receptivity—e.g., passion, a sense of marital duty, or even violence. With passion one is inviting; with duty one is passive but willing; with violence one is resistant. Behaviorists will likely produce behavioral substitutes for each of these, though I suspect that they will not limit themselves only to behaviors. On one ledger they record a meaningful experience and, in another, a behavior. They would not, for example, say: “I was looking at behaviors today and came across a highly integrated repertoire which I have arbitrarily decided to name ‘sexual violence.’” Like modern science more generally, behaviorists begin with sex as sex, and only then move backwards by viewing sex in its objectivity as a behavior. Behaviorists use double-entry bookkeeping. They explain that everything is behavior, but they do not limit themselves to behavior in their investigations. They begin with something meaningful taken from the human world such as learning to play the piano; only then do they break it down into behaviors.

I will indulge in a final example before turning back to neuropsychiatry, though I hope readers will immediately recognize its relation: phrenology. Led by Franz Joseph Gall and others, phrenology was an attempt to tie human qualities such as benevolence, hope, and intelligence to brain regions. Though limited by religious concern and therefore unable to dive beneath the skull to

view the brain in its complicated depths, phrenologists contented themselves with a study of the skull.

The assumption behind the associationism of phrenology (and, later, the localization theory of neuropsychology) was that human qualities could be understood as measurable features of objects. For example, benevolence can be understood not on the ground of humanity, but on the ground of skull-formation—specifically that of Region 24: the knot at the front of the scalp. This is double-entry bookkeeping: one entry concerns meaningful human interaction, the other skull formation. The *nature* of benevolence cannot be ascertained by plumbing the depths of Region 24. What we find there is a surface geography of the cranium and perhaps a network of capillary beds in the flesh. But the phrenologist is not only doing phrenology but also metaphysics. By benevolence, he has in mind a particularly compassionate kind of regard for others. However, to understand this he looks not to compassionate regard as it emerges—that is, benevolence as benevolence—but to the surface of the skull and what he imagines lies beneath (i.e., the brain that is shaped to cause protrusions and indentations). This is benevolence as skull-formation.

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When neuroscientists and others mine the nervous system in an attempt to understand existence, what they are in search of has already been lost. What they find are objects—neurons, action potentials, connectomes—in their objectivity. Such works are fruitful in the investigation of neurons, action potentials, and connectomes, but are of no use if the goal is understanding human existing.

To understand human existence, we must go to where a person is at home, always wrapped up in some particular concerned regard to and inseparable from his or her world.

Heidegger's critique of psychiatry

The identification of states of being with brain states is familiar to those in the fields of psychiatry and clinical psychology. Since the third edition was published in 1980, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)*, which is used by clinicians to diagnose mental disorders, has used an increasingly biomedical model for explaining psychological disorders (1980).

The biomedical model has replaced the psychoanalytic drive-theory model of explanation (APA 1952; APA 1968).

The most recent iteration, *DSM-5* (APA 2013), continues down the pathway of biomedical explanation. The task-force explains: “The science of mental disorders continues to evolve. However, the last two decades since *DSM-IV* was released have seen real and durable progress in such areas as cognitive neuroscience, brain imagining, epidemiology, and genetics.” (5) They continue, “[s]uch an approach should permit a more accurate description of patient presentations and increase the validity of diagnosis (i.e., the degree to which diagnostic criteria reflect the comprehensive manifestation of an underlying psychopathological disorder)” (5). Here, we see that by “psychological disorder” the *DSM-5* task force has in mind an underlying pathogen, and diagnostic validity can be improved with advances in neuroscience, brain imaging, and so forth.

Bio-medicalization has its dissidents. *DSM-5* has been repeatedly criticized for its medicalization and somatization of psychological disorders. American philosopher of medicine Kevin Aho (2019) has explained that this has led to a “growing dependence on biological explanations which tend to downplay socio-historical factors” (3). Peter Kinderman, British psychologist and former president of the British Psychological Association’s division for clinical psychology, recommends that a psychosocial model replace the medical model (Kinderman 2014; Kinderman, Allsopp, and Cooke 2017). He suggests, for example, that “an effective way to reduce rates of mental health problems might be to reduce inequality in society” (2014, 39). In an open letter to *DSM-5* task force, Division 32 of the American Psychological Association provides four specific examples of how the newer biomedically validated diagnostic criteria have actually lowered diagnostic thresholds, making it easier to receive a diagnosis (Kamens, Elkins, and Robbins 2017). In some cases, exclusionary criteria have been removed (such as the bereavement exclusion for depression of Major Depressive Disorder). In others, diagnostic requirements have been reduced (such as with the number of symptoms required for the diagnosis of adult attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, ADHD).

Clinicians, for example, explain how depression is caused by a serotonin deficiency the way that scurvy is caused by a Vitamin C deficiency. By replacing

the deficient chemical, both disorders can be corrected. Vitamin C deficiency *explains* the organic imbalance, but cannot help us understand scurvy *as it is experienced* by a sick person. She is not merely lethargic, but unable to exist in the ways she had previously. A talented athlete will experience lethargy in a manner that is quite different from an unemployed couch potato. When citrus fruit is prescribed to and consumed by a scurvy patient, it is the Vitamin C deficiency that is corrected. It is a nutritional problem with a nutritional solution.

168 It is different with depression. The nature of depression can only be understood in the context of being depressed and is diagnosed this way. If a stay-at-home dad doubts the worthwhile nature of his responsibilities and begins to resent his kids, then this could be interpreted as a symptom of depression. In order to understand this, we must remain with being depressed *as* being depressed. However, the neuropsychiatrist who argues that dad is his brain must limit him or herself only to the brain. He or she explains how there is no resentment or children; there is only brain activity (serotonin reuptakes, amygdala, and autonomic nervous system activity). SSRIs do not target relationships with children; they target neurochemicals. Indeed, even “targeting” is an anthropomorphism which neuropsychiatrists should be careful to avoid. This is the position that has become popular among psychiatrists and clinical psychologists who view depression as a neurochemical imbalance.

This is not how psychological disorders work. Psychological disorders are diagnoses based on groups of reported subjective experiences (symptoms) and observable behavior (signs). To include some symptoms (such as embarrassment and pain) and exclude others (such as fatigue or hunger) in a disorder is a matter of *DSM* task-force debate and a committee vote and has nothing to do with biomedical discovery. In the 1920s, *Treponema pallidum* was discovered on post-mortem pathological investigation in the brains of psychiatric patients who had been diagnosed with hysteria and other advanced psychoses. When living patients were treated with Penicillin, along with the bacterial infection the hysterical symptoms dissipated. Penicillin is not a technique of behavioral modification; it cannot treat behavior. Penicillin is a biomedical agent and treats bacterial infections. The treatment of syphilis is likely to result in greater ease with social interactions from polite and unselfconscious conversation to sexual intercourse, but this does not make Penicillin an aphrodisiac.

If the nature of mental disorders such as depression is neurochemical, then the resentment of children would be irrelevant. But this is not how clinicians talk. They explain that SSRIs restore to fathers the joys of fatherhood. This is doublespeak or, as Heidegger (2001) has described it, double-entry bookkeeping.

The confusion of being and brain states was a recurring theme in *Zollikon Seminars*—a series of lectures and conversations between Heidegger and a roomful of Swiss psychiatrists. Heidegger explains,

When [...] the assertion is made that brain research is a fundamental science for our knowledge of the human being, this assertion implies that the true and real relationship among human beings is a correlation among brain processes. Indeed, it implies that in brain research itself all that happens is that one brain, as the saying goes, “informs” another brain in a specific way, and nothing more. Then, when one is not engaged in research during semester vacation, the aesthetic appreciation of the statue of a god in the Acropolis museum is nothing more than the encounter of the brain processes of the beholder with the product of another brain process, that is, the representation of the statue. Nevertheless, if during the vacation one assures oneself that one does not mean it that way, then one lives by double- or triple-entry bookkeeping. (2001, 95)

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Thinking is not neurological activity

My calculator does not think through a math problem. We wouldn't say that the calculator is thinking, even when it takes a moment before producing a sum and we can imagine digital neurons metabolizing glycogen. In cognitive science, however, we find the reverse occurring. Humans are said to compute sums the way calculators do. This is not thinking as thinking, but thinking as calculation and computation. When thinking is equated with computation, we have already vacated thought as it is sometimes (though certainly not always) occupied by human beings. It is no surprise neuroscientists have taken the next step and have transduced cognitive computation into brain activity. Its

familiarity to human being has already been lost. Thinking is a peculiarly human way of relating to problems of living. In order to understand it, it must be viewed as thinking (Heidegger 1976).

William James (1904) proposed a related approach when he argued that there is no such thing as consciousness. He explained that what we have instead are functions of experience (*gerunds*) which have been objectified into various categories (*verbs and nouns*). Instead of thinking, we think thoughts; instead of seeing, we see sights; and so on. He proposed that we begin by taking the entire undifferentiated event of experience as our starting point. He called this radical empiricism. It is in this spirit that I turn to the existential phenomenological hermeneutics of Heidegger.

Human existence

170 For Heidegger, an analysis of being cannot begin anywhere but being (or existence). This does not require a special laboratory, vocabulary, or mental preparation. It requires only that we meet people where they are existing. To understand being (or existence), Heidegger instructs his readers of *Being and Time* and his class of psychiatrists at the Burghölzli hospital to begin with simple, average, and everyday examples.

We understand that a human is always in a world (Heidegger's being-in-the-world). This world is not the heavenly body that rotates on its axis, but the familiar space and things in and through which you and I live. It is impossible to exist without world; the world is the open invitation to be—a bed inviting you to rest or desk inviting you to work. It is only in such a worldly context that “difficulty waiting one's turn” can be understood. Symptoms cannot be objectified without losing their intentional quality. Psychological disorders must be understood in context (Aho 2019) and on a case-by-case basis as problems of existing. For this, I recommend an existential-phenomenological hermeneutic case study method which I have described elsewhere.²

2 Article under review.

What this means for psychiatry and clinical psychology

The American Psychiatric Association (APA) currently lists a dizzying number of psychological disorders in its nearly 1,000-page manual (APA 2013; if one counts the appendices published online, the page number exceeds 1,000). The manual describes the signs and symptoms that define psychological disorders, as well as their recommended courses of treatment.

Since *DSM-III*, published in 1980 (APA 1980), the APA has remained committed to a neutral, biological understanding of psychological disorders (Aho 2018; Aho 2008). While the APA has abandoned the medical term “disease,” it remains clear that “disorder” is a euphemism for “disease.” However, as they are defined in *DSM-5* (APA 2013), the most widely used diagnostic manual in the world, psychological disorders are not diseases.

Diseases are visible to the tools of medical science such as blood tests and brain images, and they are defined in these terms. Gonorrhea is diagnosed not by the subjective experience of painful urination, but by laboratory analysis from a bacterial culture. Painful urination is a symptom of the disease, but should not be confused with the signs of the disease itself. It doesn’t matter how many gonorrhea symptoms I have; if the bacterial cultures—the diagnostic sign of gonorrhea—come back negative, then gonorrhea is not my affliction. When physicians treat patients for gonorrhea, they do not practice double-entry bookkeeping.

It is different with psychological disorders which combine, confuse, and conflate signs and symptoms. Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists count the number of signs and symptoms and, if they exceed a certain predetermined threshold (and the clinician is inclined to believe the patient), then a diagnosis is made. For example, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) may be diagnosed if an adult has experienced at least five out of nine symptoms. One of the symptoms is “has trouble waiting his or her turn.” As of this writing, there is no neurological test for ADHD. However, this does not keep psychiatrists and clinical psychologists from recommending a treatment which targets the patient’s neurochemistry. We may suppose this ADHD *pharmakon* targets the patient’s patience. We can be certain that if ADHD is ever discovered in the brain, then like neurosyphilis it will cease to be a psychological disorder and

become a brain disease. The treatment will not be directed at impatience or distraction, but the brain. It is worth noting that ADHD and other disorders are not discovered the way that neurosyphilis was discovered; disorders are invented.³

In his recent interview on National Public Radio (NPR 2019), former National Institute of Mental Health director (2002–2015) and psychiatrist Tom Insel urges medical providers to begin using the term brain disorders instead of mental (i.e., psychological) disorders. He explains how it is not necessary to understand, for example, the precise neural fabric of schizophrenia in order to begin thinking about it as a disease. Insel predicts that doing so will allow psychiatrists and clinical psychologists—now brain-disease-specialists—to make diagnoses years before the condition begins to affect the lives of the brain-disease-sufferers. Insel uses the examples of Alzheimer’s Disease and Huntington’s Disease to demonstrate how changes to the brain often predate psychological patterns by several years. Here we see that by disorder Insel means “disease.”

172 Insel’s reasons for doing so are uncompromisingly optimistic. Just as mortality rates for leukemia, AIDS, and cardiac disease have fallen precipitously since the nineties, he anticipates mental health professionals will soon be able to rein in the 47,000 deaths by suicide which occur each year, and 30% of all medical disabilities for which neuropsychiatric disorders are evidently responsible.

If psychological disorders are brain diseases, then the comparison to leukemia, AIDS, and cardiac disease is an obvious one. But cardiac disease, a natural process, does not a kill a person the way that a depressed person takes his or her own life, an act of will. For Insel, and the APA more generally, choosing to end your life is caused by psychological disorder the way that maternal genetics have caused the red (now gray) in my beard. Just as my beard cannot grow red without the genes for red hair, a person cannot attempt to take his or her life (successfully or unsuccessfully) without first being depressed (for a more detailed discussion of the medicalization of auto-homicide into suicide see: Szasz 2003).

3 Article under review.

Heart-attacks follow cardiovascular problems, and treating them requires knowledge of these systems. Suicide is the decision that death is preferable to life, and it requires knowledge of life and death—that is, it requires an understanding of human existence. Rather than predicting the probability of becoming depressed or anxious by scrutinizing brain-scans which are irrelevant to the diagnosis of each, mental health professionals could begin examining psychological disorders the way they are defined—that is, as problems of living (Aho 2019). Better still would be to avoid limiting the problems of living to those which have received the APA's rubber stamp (Stolorow 2018).

Every psychological disorder has a variety of possible symptoms, each describing a slight if problematic variation on living. Remember: the disorders are synonymous with their signs and symptoms. Trouble waiting my turn (in ADHD) does not occur without horizons of meaning. These would be a more appropriate place to start. While I routinely rattle the plastic push-bar of my shopping cart or distractedly thumb through the pop-culture magazines while waiting my turn in the grocery store check-out aisle, I can remember a time when I was not presenting at least three symptoms of ADHD. I was doing landscaping for the summer and my employer asked me to run an errand for him. In the context of my workday, I had no trouble waiting my turn; I would have waited in that air-conditioned line all afternoon if I had to. The wait interfered only with the tasks of mowing a dozen more lawns and blowing pine-needles from porches. It occurred in familiar world, and it is only within the context of this world that impatience (or its resolution) can be understood.

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Conclusion

DSM-5 has been criticized for its medicalization of subjective symptoms—that is, the assumption that psychological disorders are brain disorders despite lack of evidence (Aho 2018; Aho 2008; Frances 2013; Kamens, Elkins, and Robbins 2017; Kinderman, Allsopp, and Cooke 2017). If psychiatrists and clinical psychologists are serious about understanding psychological disorders, then they must take them as psychological disorders without combining, confusing, or conflating them with brain activity. The same goes for the study of psychological morality, ethics, and aesthetics. Reducing these to brain

activity ignores their distinctive natures. In order to understand psychological phenomena—among others, thinking, emotion, relationships, development, and therapy—psychologists must take these as psychological phenomena. In doing so, one quickly sees that a second ledger is hardly necessary.

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DISMORFNA TELESNA MOTNJA V FENOMENOLOGIJI, ESTETIKI IN PSIHIATRIJI

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Povzetek

V članku analiziramo dismorfno telesno motnjo in njene vidike na različnih znanstvenih področjih. Človek z dismorfno telesno motnjo občuti tesnobo zaradi neresnične ali dejansko obstoječe, a drugim zanemarljive napake na svojem telesu, čemur lahko v skrajnem primeru sledi, da stori samomor. Znanstvene discipline, ki se ukvarjajo s preučevanjem tega obolenja, so fenomenologija, estetika, medicina, psihologija in psihiatrija. V članku poleg navedbe dosedanjih spoznanj podamo tudi

lastne ideje, ki lahko razširijo spekter konstruktivno-kritične obravnave dismorfne telesne motnje. Osrednja misel v raziskavi je, da je v današnjem času potrebno večje upoštevanje filozofskih idej oziroma kritične refleksije ter fenomenološke in estetske interpretacije. Zgolj upoštevanje filozofskih dognanj lahko pripomore k večji preudarnosti drugih znanosti, saj si s tem pridobijo temeljitejšo samorefleksijo, kar lahko omogoči bolj poglobljeno razumevanje psihotičnih motenj in vodi k splošni blaginji ne samo bolnega posameznika, temveč tudi eksistirajočega sveta.

Ključne besede: dismorfna telesna motnja, filozofija, fenomenologija, estetika, psihiatrija.

Body Dysmorphic Disorder in Phenomenology, Aesthetics, and Psychiatry

Abstract

178 The article deals with the analysis of body dysmorphic disorder and its aspects in different scientific fields. A person with this disorder is preoccupied with one or more perceived defects or flaws in physical appearance that are not observable or appear slight to others, which can in extreme case lead to suicide. Disciplines studying this illness are phenomenology, aesthetics, medicine, psychology, and psychiatry. The author also introduces his ideas, which could widen the spectrum of constructive criticism that deals with body dysmorphic disorder. Today's era is in need of a greater consideration of philosophical critical reflection, as well as phenomenological and aesthetical interpretation. By taking into account philosophical discoveries, other sciences can become more knowledgeable, which can lead to their self-reflection. Thus, these disciplines are able to better understand psychotic disorders, which can contribute to the well-being of the ill individual and of the existing world.

Keywords: body dysmorphic disorder, philosophy, phenomenology, aesthetics, psychiatry.

1. Uvod: Zasidranost v temini duhá

Človek z dismorfno telesno motnjo (*body dysmorphic disorder*; v nadaljevanju DTM) doživlja tesnobo¹ zaradi izmišljene ali drugim zanemarljive napake na svojem telesu (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 242). Mogoče se je izraziti, da je s pozornostjo zasidran v strahoviti temini, ki mu jo povzroča bodisi telesna napaka, ki je drugi skoraj ne opazijo, bodisi neresnična telesna napaka. V primeru da napaka na zunanjem videzu dejansko ne obstaja, je potemtakem ta zgolj plod njegove domišljije. Človek ima lahko zaradi DTM prav tako nagnjenje k storitvi samomorilnega dejanja (ibid., 244). V članku se ukvarjamo: s korenito razčlenbo DTM; z umori, ki so pri osebah z DTM izvršeni zaradi njihovih psihičnih problemov; s primerjavo med estetiko, estetsko kirurgijo, fenomenologijo, psihologijo in psihiatrijo; z nemožno uresničitvijo temeljnega projekta sebstva; z utelešenostjo in korporealnostjo; z genialnim umetniškim ustvarjalcem in njegovim doživljanjem umetniškega izražanja; z družbeno vredno pogubljivo škodljivostjo psihične motnje; s preseganjem odnosa subjekt-objekt in posledičnim stanjem nedualnosti; z večjo mero estetske občutljivosti pri posamezniku z DTM; in tako naprej.

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Članek povzema temeljna spoznanja različnih znanstvenih strok o DTM. Poleg opisa določenih dognanj želimo ob posameznih tematikah podati tudi lastno filozofsko-kritično misel, ki osvetli nekatera vprašanja in s katero se morebiti začrtajo temelji za nadaljnja raziskovanja povezave znanstvenih gledišč in drugih problematik, ki se med seboj razlikujejo. Tako na primer prispevamo svoje razmišljanje k interpretaciji bistvenega projekta sebstva

1 V članku bomo, in sicer predvsem v poglavju »Fenomenološki svet dismorfne telesne motnje«, govorili o psihološkem pojmovanju tesnobe, ki jo doživlja človek zaradi DTM. Tako jo razume tudi fenomenolog David Mitchell, o katerem bomo več povedali v nadaljevanju. Ne gre za počutje tesnobe, kot ga pojmuje Martin Heidegger v prvem delu *Biti in časa*. Filozof Martin Uranič pravi, da Heidegger tukaj tesnobo razume, kakor da gre za odlikovano počutje z eksistencialno-ontološko strukturo, v katerem je *za-kar in pred-čim* tesnobe bit-v-svetu sama (Uranič 2013, 76). Pred čimer nam je v tesnobi tesno, je torej naša zmožnost biti-v-svetu (ibid., 74). Fenomen tesnobe nas v Heideggrovem smislu kot odlikovano počutje nagovarja k samolastni eksistenci (ibid., 76). Tesnobe v našem članku ne obravnavamo na takšen način, temveč je razumljena kot osebno počutje človeka v psihološkem smislu, ki lahko v skrajni instanci vodi do tesnobne motnje.

fenomenologa Davida Mitchella, ki se navezuje tudi na DTM. V navezavi na dvojce, tj. na DTM in umetniško ustvarjalnost, postavimo izhodišče, ki lahko vodi v (samo)preseganje posameznika, predmeta ustvarjalnosti in DTM. V članku se prav tako zavzemamo za korenitejšo povezanost med psihologijo oziroma psihiatrijo in filozofijo (oziroma estetiko in fenomenologijo), saj je dovršen del psihologije nastal iz filozofskih razmislekov in filozofske prakse, obenem pa je to ključnega pomena za možnost kakovostnega razvoja obeh strok. Zaradi tega je razvidno naše stališče, da samostojen razvoj vsake stroke posebej ne zmore dati toliko, kolikor bi lahko dala povezanost med njimi in medsebojno upoštevanje določenih vidikov tako enih kot drugih smeri. Psihologija ni edina, ki naj bi temeljiteje upoštevala filozofski vidik, temveč to velja tudi za sodišča in kazenske postopke, za kar se zavzemamo v fenomenološko obarvanem poglavju članka.

180 V študiji si želimo poudariti, da se v današnjem času lahko še zmeraj občuti močna delitev na različne znanosti, kot so na primer psihiatrija, psihologija in filozofija, čeprav se to po drugi strani mnogim raziskovalcem zdi zastarelo. Ne želimo zagovarjati, da je ta delitev upravičena in dobra za uspešen razvoj posameznih znanstvenih disciplin, temveč je naša želja, da zgolj poudarimo, kako ta razmejitev obstaja morda v večji meri, kakor bi jo nekateri raziskovalci pričakovali in hoteli. Določene znanosti v študiji obravnavamo enakovredno. Velik pomen dajemo dejstvu, da se filozofsko znanost v drugih disciplinah, na primer psihologiji in psihiatriji, še zmeraj v dovršni meri izpušča, zato v razpravi morda prevladuje občutek, da slednjo preveč favoriziramo, kar pa ne drži, saj presojava s stališča, da je sleherna izmed znanosti pomembna s svojega vidika in enakovredna drugim disciplinam znanstvenega področja.

2. Psihiatrični svet dismorfne telesne motnje

V petem in najnovejšem *Diagnostičnem in statističnem priročniku za duševne motnje* (v nadaljevanju *DSM-5*) je o dismorfni telesni motnji zapisano, da so ljudje s to motnjo obsedeni z eno ali več napakami oziroma pomanjkljivostmi na svojem videzu, ki jih drugi ne opazijo ali pa so zanje zgolj zanemarljive (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 207). DTM spada v področje obsesivno-kompulzivnih in podobnih motenj (ibid., xix). Pri posameznikih

z DTM je mogoče opaziti ponavljajoče se vedenje, ki se kaže, na primer, v neprestanem gledanju v ogledalo, pretiranem lepotičenju, praskanju kože in iskanju potrditve pri drugih ljudeh (ibid., 236). Ta obsedenost pogosto vodi do razvoja socialne fobije in izogibanja družbi (ibid., 207). Posamezniki z DTM lahko poleg teh motenj razvijejo tudi mejno osebno motnjo (ibid., 208) in blodnjava motnjo (ibid., 104). Ljudje z DTM so lahko popolnoma prepričani, da so napake na njihovem videzu resnične (ibid., 93). V enajsti in dopolnjeni verziji *Mednarodne klasifikacije bolezni* Svetovne zdravstvene organizacije je o DTM navedeno, da se njeni simptomi kažejo v siloviti nesposobnosti zdravega delovanja na osebno, družinsko, družbeno, izobraževalno, poklicno oziroma katerikoli drugem pomembnem področju (World Health Organization 2019).

Pomanjkljiva problematičnost psihološkega oziroma psihiatričnega pogleda na psihična obolenja se kaže v (velikem) neupoštevanju oziroma nepoznavanju filozofskih stališč. V *DSM-5* besedi »filozofija« in »filozofsko« nista niti omenjeni, kaj šele da bi avtorji *Priročnika* ob temeljnem filozofskem pogledu na psihične motnje šli v globine. V izpuščanju filozofskega vidika iz *DSM-5* lahko morda opazimo prezirljivost psihologije oziroma psihiatrije do filozofske znanosti. Z izpustitvijo se zanemari izjemno pomembno filozofsko gledišče, gledišče, s katerega se je razvil dovršen del psihološke misli. Lahko sicer rečemo, da gre za strogo medicinski priročnik, v katerem bi bila morda obravnavana interdisciplinarni širine pretirana, in da je v njem težko govoriti o zavestnem izpuščanju filozofskega vidika ali celo o neke vrste prezirljivosti do filozofske znanosti. Vendar lahko po drugi strani pridemo do takšnega sklepa na podlagi dogajanja v današnjem času, v katerem vlada določena splošna zaničljivost do filozofske discipline in podcenjevanje njenih ugotovitev. Družba se tako brez potrebne (filozofske) kritične zadržanosti uveljavlja kot »družba znanja« (Komel 2009, 5).

Zanimivo bi se bilo vprašati, ali bi psihologija oziroma psihiatrija pri praktični psihološki pomoči ljudem imeli tako veliko veljavo, če začetnik psihoanalize, Sigmund Freud, ali kakšnih podobnih teorije in prakse raziskovanja psihe ter pomoči ljudem v stiski ne bi bil zdravnik, temveč filozof. Preučevanje delovanja psihe in sočutna pomoč drugim nista nekaj, kar bi bilo tako zelo odmaknjeno od filozofije same. Filozof Pierre Hadot trdi, da je bila filozofija

v starogrških časih, za razliko od današnjih dni, dojeta kot nekaj izrazito praktičnega oziroma kot način življenja (Hadot 2009, 67). Učitelji določenih filozofskih šol so filozofijo živeli in ta vseživljenjski nauk poskušali prenesti na svoje učence. Življenjska filozofija je pomagala pri iskanju poti, kako se rešiti težav duhá oziroma trpljenja. Tudi azijska filozofija je v temelju večinoma usmerjena k pomoči trpečemu človeku, da bi našel pot iz vsakodnevne tesnobe in doživel poslednjo osvoboditev oziroma odrešitev v soteriološkem pomenu besede. Filozofinja Maja Milčinski pravi, da filozofija tam »ni dosežek ali cilj, pač pa ostaja proces, gibanje ter nenehno prizadevanje za resnico, osvoboditev, ki prinaša tudi radikalne spremembe v filozofih samih« (Milčinski 2013, 35).

182 V Freudovem pisanju se jasno vidi filozofsko-kritična misel. S tem želimo povedati, da bi bilo za psihoterapijo in druge psihološke znanosti primerno, da bi dajale filozofskim razmislekom večjo veljavo, če so tudi same v veliki meri utemeljene v filozofiji in če je bil oče psihoanalize v dobršni meri tudi filozof. Filozofsko-kritična refleksija se pokaže v Freudovih analizah tedanje družbe in tedanjega časa. Freud, med drugim, izrazito kritizira vpliv krščansko-katoliške religije na takrat živeče posameznike. Tako, na primer, zapiše, da je religija nevroza človeštva, njena moč pa se pri pacientih kaže kot nevrotična prisila (Freud 2004, 66). Na tej točki se s Freudom ne bomo niti strinjali niti mu oporekali, saj bi za to bila potrebna temeljita analiza religijskega oziroma religioznega vpliva na posameznika, kar ni naš namen.²

Današnja psihološka znanost želi biti zelo podobna naravoslovni znanosti. Filozofsko-kritično vprašanje je, ali je to sploh mogoče oziroma ali je mogoče psihološke motnje analizirati in popisovati na takšen način, kot to počenjamo s fizično oprijemljivimi obolenji, ki jih lahko človeško oko dejansko zazna. Čeravno lahko v psihologiji pride do kritično naravnane misli, ki obravnava širšo (družbeno) problematiko, to ni njen osnovni namen, saj se večinoma

2 Z omembo religije se smemo, med drugim, vprašati, ali so pristna religiozna izkustva vedno le oblike duševnih psihičnih blodenj, halucinacij in podobnih pojavov, kot jih kot take želijo mnogokrat prikazati psihologi oziroma psihiatri, ali morebiti kažejo na posameznikovo globlje doživljanje, ki ga ne moremo kar takoj označiti za patologijo. V *DSM-5* se zagotovo vidi napredek. Allison L. Almon zapiše, da se je religija oziroma duhovnost v *DSM* skozi čas iz patologije razvila v kulturni dejavnik (Almon 2011, 538). To je hvalevredno tudi zaradi fenomenološko zanimive barvitosti religioznih pojavov oziroma osebnih duhovnih doživljajev, ki v dobršni meri še zmeraj niso filozofsko raziskani.

ukvarja zgolj z analizo duševnih pojavov, njihovim razvojem in odkrivanjem načinov njihovega zdravljenja. Filozofija je morebiti lahko poleg drugih reči tista, ki razjasni širši družbeno-problematični okvir razvoja določenih psihičnih motenj, zakaj, na primer, depresija, kot pravi Robert Preidt, v družbi danes tako narašča, kot ni še nikoli doslej (Preidt 2018). Hkrati bi morda ravno tako smeli reči, da ima filozofsko-fenomenološko raziskovanje subjektovega intimnega doživljanja lastnih duševnih pojavov pomembno vlogo tudi pri njegovih psihičnih motnjah in trpljenju nasploh.

Preplet med filozofijo in psihologijo je ena izmed srčik, ki jo želimo v svojem članku postaviti v ospredje. S tem želimo opozoriti tudi na bistveno fenomenološko vlogo, ki jo slednja, skupaj z drugimi filozofskimi strokami, na primer estetiko, igra pri razčlembi in človekovem spoznavanju psihotičnih motenj. Borut Škodlar in Marina Zorman pravita, da se izraz »fenomenologija« v psihiatriji, psihopatologiji in psihoterapiji pogosto uporablja v anglo-saksonski psihiatriji kot izraz za preprost opis in naštevanje psihopatoloških pojavov (Škodlar in Zorman 2012, 43). Najvidnejša značilnost in obenem težava takšne fenomenologije je, da pojmuje psihopatološke pojave za samoumevne, dobro razložene in od vsebine neodvisne »objekte«. Pripíše jim realnost in statičnost, podobno predmetom v svetu, kot sta, na primer, miza ali jabolko. Človekovo psihično življenje, pravita Škodlar in Zorman, tako atomizira in popredmeti (ibid.). V članku se želimo ogniti takšnemu pojmovanju fenomenologije in se osredotočiti na filozofsko fenomenologijo, ki analizira človekovo subjektivno doživljanje pojavov v njegovi eksistenci oziroma v njegovem načinu biti-v-svetu in tega, kako se mu ta svet z vsemi svojimi (ne)tesnobnimi vidiki daje.

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3. Plastično-kirurški svet dismorfne telesne motnje

Anja Župan in Uroš Ahčan v članku »Dismorfna telesna motnja« zapišeta, da se bolniki z dismorfno telesno motnjo »[...] velikokrat odločijo za invazivne in manj invazivne lepotne posege, zato je pomembno, da jih zdravstveni delavci in osebje različnih estetskih centrov [lepotne ali plastične oziroma estetske kirurgije] prepozna in jih napoti na ustrezno obravnavo k strokovnjaku za duševno zdravje.« (Župan in Ahčan 2011, 50) Zavaljo izboljšanja svojega videza se ljudje z DTM primarno zatečejo v kozmetične in frizerske salone, studie za fitness, veliko pa

jih gre tudi k dermatologom in plastičnim kirurgom. Kar 50–70 % bolnikov obišče estetskega kirurga ali dermatologa, 26–58 % pa jih ima najmanj en lepotni poseg. Župan in Ahčan trdita, da se bolniki najpogosteje odločijo za rinoplastiko, liposukcijo ali povečanje prsi (ibid., 53). Vsled prepričanja obolelih za DTM, da je zunanji videz razlog za njihove težave, se zelo pogosto zatečejo k lepotnim kirurgom. Vendar to ni vzrok njihove motnje, saj govorimo o psihičnem obolenju, ki ima globlje korenine. Osebe s takšno boleznijo po plastični estetski operaciji z lastnim videzom večinoma še zmeraj niso zadovoljne. Veliko plastičnih kirurgov se pritožuje, da so jim ti bolniki zaradi svoje nezadovoljnosti po operaciji grozili tudi s tožbo (ibid., 54). Shauna Higgins in Ashley Wysong celo poročata o grožnjah, ki vključujejo fizično nasilje (Higgins in Wysong 2018, 45). Posledično se lahko zgodi celo umor estetskega kirurga. V poglavju »Fenomenološki svet dismorfne telesne motnje« v povezavi z bistvenim projektom sebstva obširneje obravnavamo problematike ubojev oseb z DTM, obsodb na sodiščih in kazenskih postopkov.

184 V Univerzitetnem Kliničnem centru Ljubljana poteka sodelovanje med kliničnim psihologom in plastičnimi kirurgi, ki lahko bolnika s sumom na DTM zaradi njegove morebitne diagnoze napotijo k psihologu in z bolnikom načrtujejo najprimernejši način njegove obravnave (Župan in Ahčan 2011, 55–56). V številnih zasebnih in kozmetičnih lepotnih centrih to ni tako, saj zbolelih za DTM mnogokrat ne prepoznajo in jih vsled tega tudi napak zdravijo. Župan in Ahčan poudarita, da bi bilo treba ugotoviti, kakšna je prevalenca DTM v Sloveniji in, še globlje, med bolniki estetskih kirurgov in dermatologov (ibid., 56). Trdita, da sta pomembna predvsem holistični pristop psihiatrov, dermatologov in estetskih kirurgov ter izdelava smernic obravnave obolelega za DTM za družinske zdravnike in druge specialiste, ki se ukvarjajo s kozmetiko in estetskimi posegi (ibid.). Na tej točki bi bilo vredno dodati, da bi bilo morda smiselno upoštevati tudi estetski in fenomenološki vidik DTM, ki bo predstavljen v naslednjih poglavjih in ki ga lahko ovrednotijo in predstavijo zgolj filozofi.

4. Estetski svet dismorfne telesne motnje

4.1. Vloga estetske občutljivosti pri dismorfni telesni motnji

Christina Lambrou, David Veale in Glenn Wilson so znanstveniki, ki si morda zaslužijo vzdevek *pionirji* na področju sinteze med filozofijo oziroma

filozofsko estetiko ter psihiatrijo in njenim dojetjem dismorfne telesne motnje. V članku »The Role of Aesthetic Sensitivity in Body Dysmorphic Disorder« postavijo hipotezo, ki pravi, da višja stopnja človeške estetske občutljivosti prispeva k nastanku in ohranitvi DTM (Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 8). Študija se ukvarja s temeljno premiso, da ljudje z DTM ne samo napačno zaznavajo estetska razmerja, temveč jih zaznavajo celo bolje od drugih in se znajo natančneje oceniti (ibid.). Podobno kot ljudje s to motnjo estetska razmerja zelo dobro zaznavajo tudi posamezniki, ki se ukvarjajo z umetnostjo in oblikovanjem (ibid.). Avtorji že od začetka raziskave predvidevajo, da je vzrok DTM v človekovem predelovanju čustev oziroma vrednotenju njegovega videza (ibid.). To se po končani empirični raziskavi, ki obravnava ljudi z DTM, ljudi, ki se ukvarjajo z umetnostjo in oblikovanjem, ter običajne ljudi brez DTM in umetniške/oblikovalne dejavnosti (*control group*; v nadaljevanju kontrolna skupina), izkaže za resnično (ibid.). Poudariti je potrebno, da so vsi udeleženci raziskave podvrženi istim pogojem (ibid., 9).

Ljudje z DTM in tisti, ki se ukvarjajo z umetnostjo in oblikovanjem, imajo jasne kriterije za stopnje privlačnosti, kaj je zanje bolj in kaj manj privlačno (Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 8). Estetska razmerja svojega obraza ter obrazov drugih in stavb ocenjujejo natančneje od kontrolne skupine (ibid.). Posamezniki z DTM bolje zaznajo svoj dejanski videz in posledično na njem hitreje opazijo določene napake (ibid.). Ta ugotovitev podkrepi idejo, da znajo bolj kritično opazovati in v večji meri cenijo umetnost. Spoznanja raziskave pravijo, da ljudje z DTM bolje zaznavajo kakor kontrolna skupina, ki svoj videz vrednoti višje od dejanskega (ibid., 8–9). V drugi raziskavi, ki so jo z depresivnimi študenti naredili Steven W. Noles, Thomas F. Cash in Barbara A. Winstead, se je pokazalo, da so ti pri presoji svojega videza, čeravno ga podcenjujejo, natančnejši od nedepresivnih študentov (Noles, Cash in Winstead 1985), v čemer se kaže določena podobnost z ljudmi z DTM. Nedepresivni študentje so, za razliko od depresivnih, svoj videz ocenili višje od, objektivno gledano, dejanskega videza (ibid.). Tisti, ki imajo rahlo ali srednjemočno depresijo, so v skladu z razlago depresivnega realizma³ pri vrednotenju najbolj pedantni

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3 Obstajajo raziskave, ki so ugotovile, da je depresivni posameznik v svojem presojanju boljši od nedepresivnega posameznika (Moore in Fresco 2012, 497). Depresivna oseba

(Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 9). Izjemno depresivni posamezniki z DTM pa pri zaznavanju ne kažejo nikakršne natančnosti. Študija Lambrou in drugih pokaže, da je lahko precenjevanje svoje privlačnosti pomembno za duševno zdravje, saj služi kot obrambni mehanizem pred depresivnimi motnjami in motnjami, ki imajo opraviti s telesno podobo (ibid.). Osebe z DTM sebi pri ocenjevanju lastnega videza niso naklonjene, kar pomeni, da jih zmotijo že neznatne napake in lahko zbolijo za depresijo (ibid.).

Verjetno je, da imajo pri močno izraženi DTM zaradi nenatančne primerjave svoje notranje podobe z objektivno, dejansko realnostjo strahovito izkrivljeno notranjo podobo telesa (Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 9). Posamezniki z najhujšo obliko DTM svojo dejansko podobo namreč zaznavajo najmanj precizno. Vprašanji, ki ostajata, sta, ali in kako depresija vpliva na natančnost zaznave. Kljub temu da so se bolniki z DTM v raziskavi pogostejše pogledali v ogledalo, to ni imelo vpliva na natančnost njihove percepcije (ibid.). Kvaliteta pogledovanja je morebiti pomembnejša od kvantitete. Ti posamezniki se pred ogledalo postavijo z bolj pedantnim očesom, s katerim se posvečajo napakam, ki jih zaznajo (ibid.). Ulrich Stangier, Stefanie Adam-Schwebe, Thomas Müller in Manfred Wolter so ugotovili, da so takšne osebe v prepoznavanju estetskih sprememb na obrazih drugih ljudi preciznejše od kontrolne skupine (Stangier, Adam-Schwebe, Müller in Wolter 2008). Tako kot umetniki in oblikovalci imajo natančnejšo percepcijo kakor kontrolna skupina, vendar v nasprotju z drugima dvema eksperimentalnima skupinama ob dojetanju svoje podobe občutijo manj užitka in več odpora (Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 9).

Posamezniki z DTM so svojo podobo ocenili nižje kot drugi dve eksperimentalni skupini, s kontrolno skupino pa so si delili podobne rezultate ocen pri ovrednotenju tujih obrazov in stavb (Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 9). V nasprotju s splošnim prepričanjem osebe z DTM od sebe ne zahtevajo upoštevanja višjih lepotnih standardov. Ne le da imajo, tako kot kontrolna skupina, zmeren ideal svojega videza, ampak upoštevanja višjih idealnih standardov ne zahtevajo niti od drugih ljudi niti od stavb. Za razliko od kontrolne skupine pri njih vlada večji razkol med zaznano samopodobo

naj bi namreč imela manj predsodkov pri predelovanju informacij (ibid.).

in svojo zaželeno idealno podobo (ibid., 10). Razklanost med trenutnim in idealnim stanjem podobe, ki jo imajo ti bolniki, je verjetni in odločilni vzrok DTM in nemira, s katerim gre motnja z roko v roki (ibid.). Ta razdvojenost, trdi Tory E. Higgins, okrepi možnost za razvoj depresivne motnje (Higgins 1987).

Lambrou in druga dva avtorja povedo, da lahko strategije zdravljenja, ki pripomorejo k izboljšanju (fizične in psihične) samopodobe, kot je to razvidno pri kontrolni skupini, ta razkol pri ljudeh z DTM učinkovito ošibijo in morebiti zapolnijo vrzel med dvema vrstama stanj podob (Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 10). Oboleli za DTM, umetniki in oblikovalci imajo višje postavljene standarde za privlačnost. *Raison d'être* tega je verjetno boljše razumetje estetskih razmerij. Zboleli za DTM so lastno mičnost ocenili veliko nižje od drugih dveh skupin empirične študije, kljub temu da so bile njihove ocene obrazov drugih istočasno primerljive z ovrednotenjem ostalih dveh skupin (ibid.). Fizična podoba je bila v raziskavi najpomembnejša vrednota zgolj za udeležence z DTM (ibid.). Zaradi visokega vrednotenja pomembnosti videza obstaja večja možnost za dojetje sebe ali drugega kot estetskega predmeta (Veale 2004). To vodi do verjetnega sklepa, da oboleli za to motnjo človeka hitreje dojemajo kot predmet (Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 10).

Lambrou skupaj z drugima avtorjema postavi hipotezo, da temeljitejše estetsko presojanje povzroči večje nagnjenje k razvitju in ohranjanju DTM (Lambrou, Veale in Wilson 2011, 10). Avtorji razprave povedo, da je razlog bolnikovega nemira vrednotenje njegove samopodobe in hkratno (nefunkcionalno) predelovanje čustev. S tem pokažejo na srčiko te simptomatičnosti in menijo, da bi bilo za psihiatre in druge, ki se ukvarjajo s pomočjo zbolelim za DTM, primerneje, če bi se tej srčiki bolje posvetili (ibid.). Večja estetska občutljivost pojasni, zakaj kliente z DTM vznemiri že najmanjša nepravilnost na njihovi podobi (ibid., 11). Študija obravnavanega empiričnega poskusa poudari pomembni novonastali dejstvi, namreč igranje pomembne vloge estetske občutljivosti pri DTM in morebitne koristne terapevtske strategije (ibid.). S tem prispevkom avtorji pokažejo na pomembno področje povezave med estetiko ter psihiatrijo in v določenem pogledu začrtajo temelje za bodoče raziskave.

4.2. Preseganje odnosa subjekt-objekt in terapija z umetniškim ustvarjanjem

Valentina Hribar Sorčan zapiše, da je umetnik s svetom v intersubjektivnem odnosu (Hribar Sorčan in Kreft 2005, 261). S pojmom intersubjektivnosti želi priti sodobna estetika onkraj odnosa subjekt-objekt, s čimer stopa v korak z dogajanjem v sodobni umetnosti, ki poudarja (inter)aktivni odnos med akterji umetniške ustvarjalnosti: med umetnikom, gledalcem in umetnino. Hribar Sorčanova pravi, da bi bil že čas, da se pojem intersubjektivnosti, ki se še vedno konstituira v dualističnem odnosu subjekt-objekt, zamenja s kakšnim drugim pojmom, na primer s pojmom *sočutenja* ali *sočutja* (ibid.). Xiaoyan Hu v svoji interpretaciji Kanta opiše, kako Kant dojema spontano ustvarjalno delovanje umetniškega genija; umetniški genij namreč med spontanim ustvarjanjem umetnosti doživlja estetsko svobodo (Hu 2017, 252). Morda bi smeli reči, da genij med ustvarjanjem presega svoje subjektivno doživljanje relacije med subjektom in objektom. Hu pravi, da geniji pri svojem kreiranju umetniških del izkušajo nekaj podobnega kot kitajski umetniki, saj v najvišjem stanju zatopljenosti pozabijo nase in na vse, kar bi jih motilo zunaj ali znotraj (ibid., 253).

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Na podlagi tega lahko morebiti sklepamo, da v svoji zatopljenosti posameznik pade v nedualistično stanje, ki ga Judith Blackstone imenuje stanje svobode, v katerem je naše izkustvo osvobojeno posameznih omejitev in pretočno (Blackstone 2006, 33). Nina Petek v navezavi na določene vidike azijske filozofije pojasni, da se je pri ukvarjanju z estetiko v Indiji pomembno zavedati, da gre za proces impersonalizacije oziroma univerzalizacije, ki omogoča preseganje vsakdanjih in banalnih občutenj, saj je estetska izkušnja nekaj, kar pripada ravni, ki je daleč nad profano (Petek 2014, 210). Gre namreč »za nekaj, kar je stalno, neomajno in transcendirata človeka, prostor, čas, posameznika pa navdaja z vedrino« (ibid.). Morda je opisana presežnost, do katere lahko vodi, kantovsko gledano, genialno udejanjanje v umetniškem ustvarjanju, obenem tudi umetnost, o kateri Heidegger trdi, da je izvor umetniškega dela in umetnika samega (Heidegger 2015, 52).

Ali smemo reči, da obstaja določena povezava med dismorfno telesno motnjo in presežnostjo, do katere lahko pride med umetniškim ustvarjanjem? Posameznik lahko DTM morda preseže z umetniško ustvarjalnostjo. Pogoj

za preseganje samega sebe, slike (če jo v določenem hipotetičnem primeru sprejmemo kot objekt, ki ga ustvarja posameznik) in DTM med kreiranjem slikovnega umetniškega dela je, da dejansko pride do transcendence teh, vključujočih se elementov. V primeru, da do nje ne pride, posameznik še zmeraj ostaja v stanju občutja tesnobe zaradi DTM. Terapija z umetniškim ustvarjanjem je potemtakem ena izmed možnosti, ki lahko osebi zmanjša njene duševne težave in poveča duševno zdravje (Heenan 2006, 182). Umetnica in obolela za DTM, Leigh de Vries, je v lastnem umetniškem delu prikazala najtemačnejše predele svoje duše (»Empower« 2016). Notranje ideje o zunanjem videzu, ki imajo nanjo uničujoč vpliv, ji je uspelo spraviti na plano. Naredila si je masko, ki je njen obraz prikazovala kot iznakažen zaradi velikega in izstopajočega se tumorja. S takšnim obrazom je hodila po ulici in snemala ogorčene poglede drugih ljudi. Umetniško izražanje ji je omogočilo novo spoznanje, da namreč ni tako neznosno grda, kot si je domišljala vse življenje, zaradi tega se ni več počutila tako osramočena. Umetnost takšne vrste ji je do določene mere pomagala preseči njene strahove in jo zblížati z drugimi ljudmi (ibid.).

Lahko se vprašamo, kaj bi se zgodilo, če bi kdo drug, ki trpi zaradi dejansko iznakaženega obraza vsled močno vidnega in izbočenega tumorja na obrazu, ponovil poskus Leigh de Vries in enako umetniško delo izvedel na lastni koži. V tem primeru seveda ne bi šlo za nošnjo maske, zgroženi pogledi drugih ljudi pa bi ostali. Velika verjetnost je, da pri tem posamezniku ne bi prišlo do zmanjšanja njegovega trpljenja, temveč bi se to morda celo povečalo. V tem primeru ne bi mogli govoriti o DTM, saj je ena izmed njenih osnovnih značilnosti nična ali majhna dejansko vidna telesna pomanjkljivost obolelega za DTM, vidni obrazni tumor pa je po drugi strani izrazito opazen. Tako bi se s tega gledišča terapija z umetnostjo morda izjalovila oziroma bi morebiti temu posamezniku povzročila še močnejše notranje *more*.

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5. Fenomenološki svet dismorfne telesne motnje

5.1. Temeljni projekt sebstva in dismorfna telesna motnja

David Mitchell se v svojem članku »Body Dysmorphia and the Phenomenology of Embodiment« s fenomenološkega gledišča ukvarja z raziskovanjem dismorfne telesne motnje (Mitchell 2016, 1). Mitchell pravi,

da je na telo mogoče gledati tudi z drugega gledišča, in sicer z gledišča, ki telesa ne obravnava kot snovno-biološkega in *predmetnega* (ibid., 7–8). Nov pogled pomeni napredek o DTM, kaj ta resnično je in kako deluje (ibid., 8). Razumevanje človeške utelešenosti lahko pripomore k spoznavanju DTM (ibid.). Sebastjan Vörös zapiše, da je utelešenost bistvena za vzpostavitev oziroma ohranitev človekove avtonomnosti (Vörös 2013). Utelešenost je razpeta na presečišču teorije in prakse, med pojmovanjem in doživljanjem: s prvega vidika se nanaša na *abstraktno* opredelitev temeljnih človekovih značilnosti, z drugega pa na ključno organizacijsko komponento *bivanjske* domene oziroma na živeto bistvo našega doživljajskega sveta (ibid.). Fenomenologija lahko razkrije, da nam telo pomeni nekaj nujnega in istočasno intimnega, ravno to pa osvetli temeljni projekt sebstva, ki, kot trdi Mitchell, zadeva tudi DTM (Mitchell 2016, 8). Govoriti je možno o ravni osrčja, ki je znanost ne priznava, tj. o ravni, na kateri dejstvenost, da *smo* to telo, vodi do bistvenega projekta sebstva, ki se nanaša na DTM (ibid.). Kaj ta projekt pomeni, pravi Mitchell (ibid.), lahko razumemo, če preučimo to, kar Heidegger imenuje *skrb*, ko ima

190 v mislih *bit tubiti kot skrb*, v smislu, da je tubit »bivajoče, ki mu v njegovi biti gre za to bit samo.« (Heidegger 1997, 265) Skrb pomeni bistveno in nujno zaskrbljenost glede nečesa, s čimer smo v odnosu. Torej se moramo pri tem *pomujati* zavoljo razumevanja dela nas samih. Fenomenologija razgrne dejstvo, da imamo telo, s katerim si delimo intimo, to pa vodi k nečemu, kar je podobno *skrbi* (Mitchell 2016, 8). S tem se razkrije človekov trud popolnega zaobjetja njemu pripadajočega telesa, kar ni bilo očitvidno s stališča, ki človeško utelešenost obravnava, na primer, na medicinski način (ibid.).

Mitchell pravi, da obstaja telesni vidik, ki je zvezan z nami samimi oziroma z našim sebstvom (*self*) (Mitchell 2016, 8). Projekt zaobjetja našega telesa je ukoreninjen v temeljni skrbi za to, kar *smo*, ravno to pa lahko navežemo tudi na DTM. Človekovo telo ima njemu samemu močno labilno podobo, saj se nenehno spreminja. Tesnoba zaradi telesne podobe je v osrčju DTM. Ta bojazen pred trenutnim fizičnim stanjem telesa pomeni temelj, ki se nahaja tudi v nemoči, da bi človek lahko trajno ohranil podobo lastnega telesa (ibid.). Fenomenologija sama prav tako ni zmožna dati človeku zagotovitve nenehne navzočnosti celovitosti njegovega telesa. Človek ima eksistencialno potrebo po popolnem zaobjetju in razumetju svojega telesa. Vprašanje je, kaj je tisto, kar človeku

onemogoča to zajetje pripadajočega živôta (ibid.). Jean-Paul Sartre zapiše, da struktura sveta zahteva, da ne moremo videti, ne da bi *bili sami videni* (Sartre 1958, 317). Katherine Morris ozavešuje povezave, ki jih naredi Sartre med sramom in drugimi pojmi, s katerimi se lahko poistovetijo trpeči za DTM, tj. pojmi *gnusa, odtujenosti* in *hrepenenja po nevidnosti*, hkrati pa poudari nemožnost razumetja *telesa-za-druge* (Morris 2013, 600). Fenomenološko preučevanje nam razjasni, kako močno izmikajoče se je nam samim naše telo (Mitchell 2016, 9). Uresničiti temeljni projekt sebstva, in sicer človeku uspeli v celoti zaobjeti telo, je neuresničljiva naloga. Do takšne ugotovitve pridemo s pomočjo fenomenologije. Ta projekt se v celoti navezuje na našo utelešenost (ibid.).

Husserl zapiše, da »me isto Telo, ki mi kot sredstvo služi za vso mojo zaznavo, obenem ovira pri zaznavi njega samega« (Husserl 2000, 167). Ljudje zmoremo preučiti vsakega od (trenutno) nevidnih vidikov določenega »običajnega« predmeta, ki ga obravnavamo (Mitchell 2016, 9). To velja ravno tako za predmete, od katerih ne moremo pričakovati, da nam bodo kadarkoli dani v celoti, da bi jih lahko temeljito preučili: mednje spada, na primer, tudi oblak. Nemočni in omejeni ostajamo v primeru našega telesa in njegovega celovitega zaobjetja. S tem mislimo na druge telesne profile, ki se zaenkrat izmikajo našim očem, na primer zadnji del glave (ibid.). Edith Stein domneva, da nam telo odreka svoj zadnji del z večjo trmo kot sama luna (Stein 1964, 38). Naša nesposobnost uvida nam skrivajočih se vidikov pripadajočega se živôta ima opraviti s samo naravo utelešenosti (Mitchell 2016, 9). Na podlagi fenomenološkega teoretiziranja Mauricea Merleau-Pontyja je razvidno, da sta premikanje naše točke pogleda, od koder gledamo, tj. našega telesa, in ohranjanje mirnega telesa hkrati nemogoča (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 79). Predmet je predmet, če in samo če je možno, da se človeku lahko oddalji in mu naposled izgine iz njegovega vidnega polja, pravi Merleau-Ponty (ibid., 78).

Telesu manjka pogoj *možne odsotnosti* (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 78), ki predmet napravi za predmet. Zavedati se je treba, da človek bistvenostno nikoli ne zmore do podrobnosti doseči in razumeti svojega telesa (Mitchell 2016, 9). Povedano z drugimi besedami, dejstvenost nam nemožne odsotnosti našega telesa, tj. tega, čemur Merleau-Ponty pravi *stalnost* telesa (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 80), vodi do naše omejenosti v tem, da bi si lahko popredmetili svoje telo oziroma ga napravili za nam z vsemi njegovimi vidiki dostopen predmet, zmožen

dovršenega zaobjetja (Mitchell 2016, 10). Zavaljo tega lahko ugotovimo, zakaj ni mogoče izpeljati temeljnega projekta sebstva, tj. popolnoma uvideti telesa takšnega, kot je. V navezavi na to je mogoče napraviti določene sklepe, ki so filozofsko zanimivi za naravo DTM. Nova filozofska spoznanja pomenijo povezave med osnovnim stanjem utelešenosti, temeljnim projektom sebstva in DTM, kar je v nasprotju s splošno uveljavljenimi medicinskimi ugotovitvami. Narava utelešenosti pomeni, prvič, bistveno intimo med nami samimi in našim telesom, ter, drugič, željo po *razumetju* lastnega telesa, željo, ki ne more biti izpolnjena, zaradi česar je možno doumeti, zakaj človek postane tesnoben in oboli za DTM (ibid.). Mitchell pravi, da je mogoče videti, kako uresničevanje temeljnega projekta sebstva, uresničevanje, ki ne more biti dokončano, vodi do človekove obsedenosti z njegovo telesno podobo (ki je še posebej vidna pri človeku z DTM) (ibid.).

192 Avtor trdi, da osnovna lastnost izmuzljivosti človekovega telesa okrepi njegovo močno negotovost o njegovem videzu in zaradi te negotovosti povzroči tesnobo (Mitchell 2016, 10). Tisto, kar ni popolnoma resnično – na primer vsled domišljije narejena podoba velike nepravilnosti na telesu, ki zelo odstopa od dejanske, manjše ali sploh nikakršne telesne podobe –, v posamezniku povzroči močnejšo tesnobo in grozo kakor tisto, kar je utemeljeno, na primer v mislih zajeta podoba telesne nepravilnosti, ki se ujema z resnično napako na telesu (ibid.). Oseba z resnično plešo na glavi po Mitchellu ne doživlja tesnobe zaradi izmuzljivosti svojega telesa oziroma zaradi te pomanjkljivosti na svojem telesu, saj je ta dejansko obstoječa. S tem želi povedati, da lahko nastanek najsrhljivejše tesnobe in najradikalnejšega strahu povzroči le tisto, kar ni popolnoma vidno, je zanemarljivo ali sploh ne obstaja, in ne tisto, kar je v življenju, objektivno gledano, dejstveno prisotno (ibid.). Izmuzljivost telesa, tj. njegova nenehna prisotnost, a obenem odsotnost njegovih določenih delov, torej povzroči to, čemur lahko rečemo najsrhljivejša tesnoba, ki omogoči nastanek DTM (Mitchell 2016, 10).

Mitchell na koncu članka pove, da se glede DTM še zmeraj gibljemo na ravni abstrakcije (ibid.). Toda ne glede na to lahko rečemo, da je standardni psihiatrični pogled na DTM omejen (ibid.). Avtor pri DTM obravnava vidik *telesa-za-nas* in ne *telesa-za-druge* (ibid.). Vsekakor je iz Mitchellovega pisanja očitno, da DTM pokaže na naš temeljni način biti-v-svetu; da bi motnjo dobro spoznali, pa so potrebne še nadaljnje (fenomenološke) raziskave.

5.2. Možna dopolnitev fenomenološke misli Davida Mitchella

Kot odgovor Mitchellu pravimo, da ima lahko hipotetični posameznik, zboleli za dismorfno telesno motnjo, močnejše duševne bolečine zaradi resnično obstoječega rahlo ukrivljenega prsta na roki, ki se mu skoraj ves čas nahaja pred očmi, kot oni, ki trpi za DTM zaradi namišljene napake na telesu, na primer pleše, ki je v resnici sploh nima. Rahlo ukrivljen prst je v tem primeru telesna pomanjkljivost, ki je drugi ljudje skoraj ali sploh ne zaznajo oziroma je za druge zelo zanemarljiva, posamezniku, ki ta prst ima in ga neprestano gleda, pa se zdi grozovit. S tega vidika se hipotetični primer sklada z definicijo simptomatičnosti DTM v *DSM-5* (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 242). Tako je bistveni projekt sebstva vsaj glede prsta na roki v celoti dokončan. Ukrivljen prst je posamezniku namreč v celoti dan in ga lahko s pogledom v celoti zaobseže. S tem želimo opozoriti na pomanjkljivo Mitchellovo izjavo, da lahko nastanek najmočnejše tesnobe povzroči zgolj tisto, kar ni popolnoma videno ali pa sploh ne obstaja, saj v našem primeru ukrivljen prst na roki oseba razločno vidi, objektivno gledano pa prst ne obstaja samo zanjo, temveč tudi za druge.

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V tem primeru posameznikov ukrivljeni prst ni izmuzljiv, tako kot je izmuzljiv, na primer, zadnji del glave, saj se mu prst skoraj neprestano daje. Zaradi njega vendarle občuti neizmerno tesnobo, ki gre z roko v roki z DTM. Po Mitchellu oseba z realno obstoječo telesno napako ne doživlja tako velike tesnobe, kot jo doživlja, če je napaka izmišljena oziroma plod njene domišljije (Mitchell 2016, 10). Z našim primerom ukrivljenega prsta bi tako lahko Mitchellove ugotovitve dopolnili. Seveda obstaja tudi možnost, da nekdo doživlja večje notranje bolečine zaradi resnično neobstoječe telesne napake od bolečin, ki jih doživlja zavoljo realno obstoječe napake na svoji zunanosti. V tem primeru ima Mitchell prav, in s tem se strinjamo. Mogoče je tudi, da posameznik čez nekaj časa svoj ukrivljen prst, ki se mu skoraj nenehno daje in mu je popolnoma razviden, v celoti sprejme in ga ne doživlja več kot nekaj strahovito groznega. Tako je o tem in o podobnih hipotetičnih primerih mogoče še premišljevati. Soglašamo z Mitchellovo trditvijo, da smo glede DTM še zmeraj vklenjeni v okove abstrakcije (ibid.). Toda ravno filozofsko-kritično mišljenje je tisto, kar je notranje dano le človeku, morda tisti ogenj,

zaradi katerega je Prometej še zmeraj priklenjen na skalovje in zaradi katerega nam je dana naloga, da se ga poslužujemo.

5.3. Predlog večjega upoštevanja fenomenologije v kazenskih postopkih

V poglavju »Plastično kirurški svet dismorfne telesne motnje« smo zapisali, da se mnogo plastičnih kirurgov pritožuje nad grožnjami s tožbami in nasiljem. Posledično je torej mogoče govoriti celo o umoru plastičnega kirurga, ki ga lahko zagreši oseba z dismorfno telesno motnjo. Iliana E. Sweis, Jamie Spitz, David R. Barry ml. in Mimis Cohen o zagrešitvi točno tega poročajo v svojem članku (Sweis et al. 2017, 951). Fenomenološko gledano lahko nemožnost uresničiti cilj bistvenega projekta sebstva navsezadnje vodi do umora. Osnovno fenomenološko doživljanje, kot je razvidno tukaj, ni tako nedolžno, saj lahko zaradi njega in možnega posledičnega pojava eksistencialne krize posameznik vsled kaznivega dejanja zabrede v hude težave.

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Temeljni projekt sebstva velja za vse ljudi, toda iz tega ne sledi, da bo zaradi njegovega nemogočega dokončanja vsak človek postal morilec. Na podlagi Mitchellove predpostavke je to vendarle možna posledica, zato je smemo reči, da bi se na sodiščih morda moralo bolj upoštevati fenomenološko gledišče posameznikovega doživljanja in njegovih mogočih posledic. Postavi se nam lahko vprašanje, zakaj se na sodiščih ob čedalje večjem upoštevanju psihiatričnega vidika oseb z duševnimi motnjami – kjer se na primer neprištevnemu storilcu, nevarnemu za okolico, kot kazenska sankcija lahko izreče zgolj varnostni ukrep obveznega psihiatričnega zdravljenja in varstva v zavodu, po kazenskem materialnem pravu pa za storjeno dejanje ni kazensko odgovoren (Šest 2017, 34) –, ne bi čedalje bolj upoštevalo tudi fenomenološkega vidika osebe oziroma njenega fenomenološkega doživljanja. S tem bi se v kazenskih postopkih določeni meri poznavanja politične filozofije ter logike oziroma logičskih argumentov in drugih filozofskih stališč dodalo tudi razumevanje filozofske fenomenologije, kar bi lahko morebiti pripomoglo k boljši sodni praksi.

5.4. Utelešenost, korporealnost in dismorfna telesna motnja

Thomas Fuchs v članku »The Phenomenology of Shame, Guilt and the Body in Body Dysmorphic Disorder and Depression« zapiše, da lahko s fenomenološkega stališča sram in krivdo razumemo kot čustvi, ki sta utelesili pogled in glas drugega (Fuchs 2003, 223). Pri človeku z dismorfno telesno motnjo je mogoče govoriti o pojavu odtujenosti njegove temeljne utelešenosti (*primordial bodiliness*), ki mu pravimo *korporealizacija*. Z vznikom korporealizacije pride do prekinitve spontanega izkustva oziroma izkustva utelešenosti. To se dogodi tako, da se telo, skozi katero živimo (naša utelešenost v telesu), spremeni v predmetno, *korporealno telo* oziroma *telo-za-druge*. Nasprotje med utelešenostjo in *korporealnostjo* nam lahko pomaga bolje fenomenološko razumeti določena psihična obolenja, ki so povezana s sramom in krivdo, med katerimi je DTM (ibid.). Utelešenost pomeni naš odnos s svetom, v katerem živimo s svojim telesom in prek njega. Korporealno telo je v nasprotju z utelešenostjo anatomski predmet medicine in fiziologije (ibid., 224). Med utelešenostjo in korporealnostjo vlada težko razumljiv odnos. Osnovna utelešenost človeka, ki svet dojema skozi telo, poteka v skladu s človekovim nenehnim delovanjem proč od njegovega skritega središča in v smeri obdajajočega okolja (ibid., 225).

Korporealnost se poraja, kadarkoli je to delovanje ohromljeno. Takrat je telo, skozi katero živimo in ki je drugačno od korporealnega telesa, korporealizirano kot nekaj nematerialnega (Fuchs 2003, 225). Na tej točki pride do spremembe v časovnosti: spontano življenje, neprestano stremeče k prihodnosti, doleti prekinitve, oseba je s pozornostjo nenadoma ukleščena med sedanjostjo in preteklostjo. Kot je razvidno, sta utelešenost in korporealnost med seboj prepletena v dialoški. Merleau-Ponty pravi, da pomeni *večpomenskost* »bistvo človeške eksistence, in vse, kar živimo ali mislimo, ima zmeraj več pomenov« (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 150). Fuchs v navezavi na Merleau-Pontyja trdi, da nam telo lahko razkrije temeljno *večpomenskost* človeške eksistence (Fuchs 2003, 225). Jedrna in predrefleksivna utelešenost ne ve za svoj obstoj. S tem ko predstavlja življenje samo, ostaja sama sebi skrita (ibid., 226). Podobno je nam samim tudi korporealno telo vidno le kot skupek posameznih delov. Moj obraz, trdi Fuchs, mi, na primer, ves čas ostaja skrit in *v ozadju* mojega pogleda

(ibid.). V tem se vidi podobnost z Mitchellovo opredelitvijo nemožnosti dokončanja temeljnega projekta sebstva (Mitchell 2016, 10). Z odtujenostjo utelešenega delovanja in z nastankom korporealizacije, pravi Fuchs, nastane človeško izkustvo *jaz-tukaj-zdaj* (Fuchs 2003, 226).

Fuchs pove, da sta občutka sramu in vidnosti pri posamezniku z DTM posebno pomembna za razumevanje patologije, povezane z našo zunanjo telesno podobo (korporealnim telesom) (Fuchs 2003, 234). Sram in zavedanje lastne vidnosti nastopita prvič približno v času pubertete, ko se telo spreminja in pridobi novo zunanjo podobo tudi zaradi spolnega dozorevanja. Človeka s to motnjo je nadvse strah njegove (domnevne) grdosti, ki se večinoma tiče zgolj njegovega obraza (ibid.). Paranoična oseba doživlja močan sram, strah pred lastno vidnostjo drugim in občutek, da ga ti neprestano opazujejo in zasmehujejo. Nemir, ki se poraja zaradi zunanje podobe telesa oziroma korporealnega telesa, spremeni tudi telo, skozi katero živimo (našo utelešenost) (Fuchs 2003, 234). Motnja takšne vrste temelji na velikem pomanjkanju samozavesti. Sram, ki ga človek občuti ob pogledu drugega, se ne more kar tako porazgubiti (ibid., 235).

196 Fuchs trdi, da telesni del, ki mu oseba z DTM posveča veliko pozornosti, onemogoča spontano delovanje osebe (Fuchs 2003, 235). Bolnik je introvertiran in v nenehnem odnosu do svojega telesa in samega sebe. Jasno postane, kako se sram, ki ga ima oseba z DTM, razlikuje od običajnega sramu (ibid.). Za razliko od bolnega zdravi osramočen človek, potem ko zapusti situacijo, v kateri je bil osramočen, vsaj delno spet pridobi izgubljeno samozavest (ibid.). Po drugi strani bolnik z DTM *dismorfni sram* doživlja znova in znova zaradi samozaverovane pozornosti nase in na druge. Za razliko od zdravega bolni človek v družbi ne zmore prenehati čutiti pogledov drugih ljudi, kako ga opazujejo, kar pomeni, da drugih posameznikov ne zna dojeti kot oseb, ki niso ves čas usmerjene proti njemu. Namesto tega sebe neprestano vidi skozi njihove oči in čuti vseprisotni in zaničljivi pogled: pogled *Drugega* (ibid.). Bolnik z DTM, zapiše Fuchs, ne more gledati skozi *metaperspektivo jaz-drugi*, saj je namreč pod vplivom vrednotenja drugih, ki je domnevno usmerjeno proti njemu samemu in ob katerem se počuti osramočenega. Takšno razvrednoteno samodojetje je obenem tudi korporealno (ibid.).

Človek z DTM ne zmore pobegniti iz začaranega kroga korporealizacije in počutja osramočenosti (Fuchs 2003, 235). *Telo-za-druge* pri njem

gospoduje nad telesom, skozi katero živimo v svetu (tj. nad utelešenostjo), in vodi do socialne fobije. Klienti z DTM kažejo večinoma znake občutljivosti, ambicioznosti in narcizizma (Phillips 1991). Počutijo se ogrožene, da jim bo nekako spodletelo na medosebnem področju (Fuchs 2003, 235–236). Fuchs zapiše, da korporealizacija telesa morda služi kot zaščita pred posameznikovim soočenjem s še globljo negotovostjo glede lastnega videza, sploh če govorimo o področju spolnosti (ibid., 236). Domnevna grdota morda namreč »upraviči« individuov poraz pri vzpostavitvi zdravega odnosa z drugim (ibid.). S korporealizacijo se tako morebiti izrazijo različni duševni boji človeka, ki se jim s tem uspe ogniti. Korporealizacija je v tem pogledu kot obrambni mehanizem storjena za ceno samoodtujenosti: pri ljudeh z DTM je namreč pogosto prisotna depersonalizacija utelešenosti in derealizacija (ibid.). Patološki sram tako ne pomeni le korporealizacije, temveč tudi odtujenost, ki jo povzročita nenehna samozavedanje korporealnega telesa in ločenost od drugih (ibid.).

6. Sklep: Družbeno vredna pogubljiva škodljivost motenj

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Dismorfna telesna motnja je motnja, za katero ljudje resnično trpijo in ki ima moč, da uniči dobršen del njihovega življenja. V članku je razvidno, koliko različnih znanstvenih strok si jemlje pravico DTM vzeti za svojo in jo interpretirati na samolasten način. Razvoj njenega preučevanja je v mnogih strokah še zmeraj v povojih. V članku smo želeli prikazati, kako se vidiki DTM kažejo na določenih znanstvenih področjih, obenem smo temu želeli dodati tudi lasten filozofsko-kritičen razmislek, ki bi lahko področje védenja o DTM morda še bolj razširil. V ospredju so bile bistvene ideje, kot so, na primer: da bi bilo za kakovosten razvoj določenih strok dobro, če bi se medsebojno bolj upoštevale oziroma v večji meri cenile spoznanja druga druge, s čimer imamo v mislih predvsem psihološko oziroma psihiatrično večje upoštevanje filozofskih dognanj; da vzrok za razvoj DTM ni nujno samo nemožnost dokončanja temeljnega projekta sebstva, saj se lahko motnja razmahne tudi takrat, ko je z določenega vidika v celoti uresničen ravno takšen temeljni projekt; da bi bilo v kazenskih postopkih potrebno večje upoštevanje fenomenološkega vidika; da se s terapijo z umetniškim

ustvarjanjem lahko zmanjša trpljenje, toda ne v vseh primerih; da je oseba z DTM bolj estetsko občutljiva; da sta z DTM povezana tudi utelešenost in korporealnost; in tako naprej. V sklepu lahko postavimo zaključne misli, ki se navezujejo na že velikokrat ponovljeno vprašanje. Mar nima duševno obolenje tudi specifične vrednosti za potrebe družbe?

Umetnica in obolela za DTM, Leigh de Vries, za svoje, v našem članku predstavljeno umetniško delo morda ne bi našla inspiracije, če ne bi imela DTM, kar pomeni, da posledično ne bi dala oziroma omogočila posebne estetske izkušnje gledalcem svojih umetniških projektov. Tudi letošnja dobitnica več nagrad grammy, Billie Eilish, slednjih morda ne bi dobila, če ne bi v življenju imela depresivne motnje, ki je eden izmed temeljev njene glasbene ustvarjalnosti in s katero se lahko poveže mnogo depresivnih ljudi. V intervjuju za revijo *Rolling Stone* je Eilish namreč odkrita glede svojega depresivnega obolenja, s katerim se je spopadala že nekaj let svojega življenja (Eells 2019). Poleg DTM in depresije obstaja še veliko drugih duševnih motenj, ki gredo z roko v roki z umetniškim ustvarjanjem. S tem ne trdimo, da ne gre za motnje, ki jih ni treba jemati resno, saj lahko ljudem omogočajo ustvarjalnega duha in prinašajo določene uspehe. Vsekakor jih je potrebno razumeti kot obolenja, ki lahko posameznikom uničijo življenje, zato je jih potrebno dojeti z vso resnobo. Toda zanimivo je, da so iste uničujoče motnje, ki zastrahujejo duha, hkrati lahko tudi povod za kreacijo družbeno cenjenega umetniškega dela. Na podlagi tega je torej mogoče opaziti razkol med škodljivostjo in vrednostjo psihičnih obolenj, razkol, ki ga dvolična družba velikokrat ignorira, saj je namreč najbolj ne zanima, če kdo zavoljo svoje in njim potrebne umetniške ustvarjalnosti tudi zelo trpi. Zanimivo bo videti, kaj se bo v prihodnosti zgodilo z Billie Eilish. Vprašanje je, ali jo bo depresivna družba zaradi lastne »požrešnosti« izgubljanja v njeni glasbi, s čedalje večjo potrebo po njenem umetniškem ustvarjanju in s tem po njeni depresivni motnji, na koncu koncev dobesedno pogubila.

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“LESS THAN TOUCHING”

NANCY’S PHILOSOPHY OF TOUCH FROM *CORPUS* TO *NOLI ME TANGERE*

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Abstract

The article deals with the philosophy of touch by Jean-Luc Nancy, one of the living legends of (post-)structuralism, whom Jacques Derrida in his book entitled *On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy* baptized as “the greatest philosopher of touch.” Nancy is known and renown as a philosopher who deals with a series of different phenomena, but if there is a *fil rouge* in his work, from the very first writings to the more recent works, it is precisely the issue of touch. Thus, the contribution focuses on the concept

of touch as developed by Nancy from *Corpus* to *Noli me tangere*, namely, from the novel conception of body to the attempt of grasping the elusive object of touch via various philosophical, linguistic, and artistic reflections.

Keywords: Jean-Luc Nancy, touch, haptic studies, philosophy, (post-)structuralism.

»Manj kot dotik«. Nancyjeva filozofija dotika od *Corpus* do *Noli me tangere*

Povzetek

Članek obravnava filozofijo dotika Jeana-Luca Nancyja, ene izmed živečih legend (post-)strukturalizma, ki ga je Jacques Derrida v svoji knjigi z naslovom *O dotiku: Jean-Luc Nancy* poimenoval »največji filozof dotika«. Nancy je znan in poznan kot filozof, ki se ukvarja z vrsto različnih fenomenov, toda če obstaja rdeča nit njegovega dela, od prvih, začetnih spisov pa vse do aktualnih, sedanjih del, potem je to natanko vprašanje dotika. Prispevek se zaradi tega osredotoča na pojem dotika, kakor ga je Nancy razvil od *Corpus* do *Noli me tangere*, namreč od novega pojmovanja telesa vse tja do poskusa zajetja izmuzljivega objekta dotika skozi serijo filozofskih, lingvističnih in umetniških refleksij.

Ključne besede: Jean-Luc Nancy, dotik, haptične študije, filozofija, (post-)strukturalizem.

Jean-Luc Nancy, the author of many immensely influential philosophical books, who had undergone heart transplantation operation and survived diagnosed long-term cancer, is one of the heroic last-men-standing of (post-)structuralism, together with Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Etienne Balibar, and others.

The once truly heroic times of structuralism stretch way back to its birth in the 1950s, its explosion in the revolutionary 60s, its spreading in the 70s, its European consolidation in the 80s, and its Americanization in the 90s, which also saw its “post-festum” in the form of what is nowadays labelled as “(post-) structuralism.” Whatever we think—be it affirmative or negative—about (post-) structuralism, one cannot negate that it was one of the most fruitful periods in the history of thinking, which always happens in waves, and as a tide of the sea of spirit, which now touches and overflows the material ground, gradually retracts back. The founding fathers of structuralism are: first and foremost the linguists that followed Ferdinand de Saussure in his endeavor of founding linguistics as a science of language, from Jakobson, Benveniste, Barthes, to Derrida; then Lévi-Strauss with his new approach in anthropology based on linguistics; after him, a new reading of Marx captained by Althusser and a new reading of Freud lead by Lacan; furthermore, a new view on history, knowledge, and power by Foucault; a new philosophy by Deleuze; new literary theories, etc.

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Lacking a better concept, the term “structuralism” encompassed and stuck for all of them; it is a term that was born on the inside, but was used from the outside, from the Anglo-Saxon perspective, in order to intellectually and theoretically—but also academically and geopolitically—segregate this new paradigm of thinking where no-one of the above mentioned ever wanted to be called “structuralist”—and least of all “post-structuralist”—while the trend still goes on with etiquettes like “French Theory,” or “Continental Philosophy” that designates both French and German authors from the English point of view.¹ Anyhow, the “French school of thought” (another name, perhaps the least problematic) with its dozen or so names, had a lot of offspring (cf. Deleuze

¹ In the *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* one can find this problematic definition of “structuralism,” starting with the assertion that it “is the belief that phenomena of human life are not intelligible except through their interrelations. These relations constitute a structure, and behind local variations in the surface phenomena there are constant laws of abstract structure.” (Blackburn 2008, 353)

2004): from the Althusserian camp came Balibar, Rancière, Badiou; from the Lacanian Miller and Milner, among many others; and from Derrida's school the protagonist of our story, Jean-Luc Nancy.

As we can see, everyone had his own *maître*—to employ the French term that designates “master” and “teacher” at the same time—, a *maître* of thinking who is necessary for this most liberal of activities, thus depicting the perhaps most fundamental paradox of philosophy: in order to have freedom of thought, one necessarily needs the conceptual constraint of a teacher; or, to put it briefly, in order to master philosophy, one needs a master of philosophy, a “master-teacher,” a *maître*. And Jean-Luc Nancy is most definitely such a *maître* who enables one's own thinking *with*—and not *against*—others, a figure of connections, crossroads, commons, etc., an author whose regular references include not only classical philosophers, but also many of those from the “enemy camp,” whom his more notorious colleagues usually like more to “deconstruct & destroy” than to “think & rethink.”

206 And this is precisely the stance that I want to hold towards Nancy himself while re-thinking his philosophy of touch as developed from *Corpus* to *Noli me tangere*, from his first, novel experimental conception of body to the attempt of grasping the elusive object of touch via a series of philosophical, linguistic, and artistic reflections.

I.

Nancy graduated in philosophy in 1962 and after teaching in Colmar became assistant at the Institute of Philosophy in Strasbourg in the revolutionary year 1968. In '73, he received his Ph.D. with a dissertation on Immanuel Kant and German idealism under the supervision of Paul Ricoeur and was afterwards promoted to *Maître de conférences* at the Strasbourg University for Humanistic Sciences. In the 1970s and 80s, he was guest professor at many renowned European and American universities, and in 1980, he and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe organized a conference dedicated to Derrida and politics at the International Cultural Centre of Cerisy-la-Salle with the title *Les Fins de l'homme* (*The Ends of Man*), a collaboration that was the springboard for

the *Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le politique*.² In 1987, he received his *Docteur d'État* from the University of Toulouse-Le-Mirail under the supervision of Gérard Granel and under the tutelage of Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida with a work published in 1988 as *L'Expérience de la liberté* (*The Experience of Freedom*), an investigation of the singular experience of freedom that is first and foremost “in-finity of thinking” (cf. Nancy 1988). However, his own personal and professional “experience of freedom” came to a stop due to serious medical issues—a heart transplant and a cancer diagnosis—that prevented him from teaching, but not from thinking, since many, if not all of his most known writings are dated from this last period, including *L'Intrus* (*The Intruder*), a personal and philosophical reflection on his own experience of heart transplant published in 2000 (cf. Nancy 2000b).

Nancy's first two books—both from 1973—, *La Remarque spéculative* (*The Speculative Remark*) and *Le Titre de la lettre* (*The Title of the Letter*, in collaboration with Lacoue-Labarthe), are about Hegel and Lacan, and precisely show, in both instances, what I meant above with the statement that Nancy is a “thinker-with:” a critical reflection on the “speculative concept” of *Aufhebung* in Hegel (cf. Nancy 1973a)³ and the first serious study of Lacan's concept of signifier as a meta-linguistic *la lettre* (cf. Nancy 1973b), which were and still

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2 The *Center for Philosophical Research of Politics* was dedicated to a purely philosophical, non-empirical analysis of politics, based on the assertion that philosophy itself—even if pure ontology—is always already marked by politics. This center had guested many important names, such as Claude Lefort and Jean-François Lyotard, but it had to close its doors in 1984 due to certain reasons that were addressed publicly by the two co-founders under the title “*Chers Amis: A Letter on the Closure of the Political*” (cf. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 143–147).

3 Hegel was introduced in France especially thanks to the famous series of lectures held in Paris by Alexandre Kojève entitled *La Philosophie religieuse de Hegel* (*Hegel's Religious Philosophy*), later published under the title of *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (*Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*), focusing on an interpretative reading of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (cf. Kojève 1980), and followed by many of the most prominent intellectuals of the period: André Breton, Brice Parain, Eric Weil, Georges Bataille, Henry Corbin, Jacques Lacan, Jean Hyppolite, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Wahl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Leiris, Patrick Waldberg, Pierre Klossowski, Raymond Aron, Raymond Queneau, Robert Mariolin, Roger Caillois, Taro Okamoto, Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt.

are regarded as the distinctive trademarks of a “hyper-structuralist” approach.⁴ Nancy’s stance towards both: reading with, but a critical reading, an inherent reading that tries to push the thing at stake even further than the original author intended or was able to, a push towards the limits of a paradigm, and of thinking itself—a small excess of thinking, an almost intangible reminder that thinking is not something that is given for granted or grounded once and forever—, but first and foremost a thinking *with*, not *against*.

For instance, Hegel’s concept of *Aufhebung* as *the* “speculative remark” that marks the crucial center of his philosophical system, understood as a mastodontic self-development of spirit in nature, art, religion, and philosophy, where each phase abolishes the previous one by incorporating it in its own logic, until we reach the absolute spirit, which in turn incorporates all the previous stages, their concepts, and contradictions—except for one, namely the concept and contradiction of *Aufhebung*, as if everything can well be dialectically *aufgehoben*, but the dialectics of *Aufhebung* itself: “*aufheben* does not capture itself, it does not close in itself and thus avoids its own identification; *aufheben* insists, persists, moves beyond itself, goes out of itself, slides through the text, untouched, so to speak, not preserved nor eliminated.” (Nancy 1973a, 58) *Aufhebung* can, therefore, function as a synonym for Hegel’s dialectics, and at the same time the name for Hegel’s error that shows, paradoxically, the exit from Hegel’s system—an opening at the very point of foreclosure, the explosive in the middle of the cement that holds the system together, and the outer border of conceptuality itself that cannot be conceptualized but on the inside.

This struggle, an almost neurotic obsession to find an exit from the “Platonic cave” in general and “Hegel’s system” in particular, which politically coincides with the search for an exit from the post-war capitalistic ideology of the period, is one of the distinctive hallmarks of structuralism (cf. Milner 2002), where each and every author proposed his or her own way out—Althusser’s was

4 Jean-Claude Milner states that there are two reasons why Lacan can be considered “hyper-structuralist,” one derived from the general public perception, and the other more pertinently posed as a question of paradigm: first, due to his infamous *Séminaires*, which were public performance-lectures; and second, due to his appropriation of the linguistic “sign” and its complete replacement by the concept of “signifier” (cf. Milner 2002).

révolution, Badiou's *événement*, Derrida's *deconstruction*—, including Nancy, who at a certain point of his thought gambled everything on the concept of *corpus*.

II.

Corpus, a philosophical and linguistic experiment in thinking the body, since for Nancy *corpus* evokes, first and foremost, a plurality of meanings: *corpus* as a body, as bodies in singular and plural, any-body but also this-body, this-body-here, but also infinitely more and less than a or any body, like, for instance, the bodies of atoms (*corpora*), a *corpus* of texts, a military *corpus*, the body-politics, etc.: “The *body*, this is how we invented it. Who other in the world knows it?” (Nancy 2000a, 8) The body is something that “we,” the Westerners, have invented as we invented the “soul,” the “mind,” the “spirit;” either we affirm the latter against the former as Plato did (cf. Plato 1997) or reverse the relation by affirming the former against the latter as Nietzsche did (cf. Nietzsche 2011), but in both instances we miss the point—as we miss it if we simply affirm the plurality of meanings of the body against a meaning that is one and only, or vice-versa, by evoking *corpus Christi* and the *hoc est enim corpus meum*.

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This initial linguistic saturation of the phenomenological body has one primary purpose: to destitute the immediacy of the body, to show how the body matters, but not as mere matter, not as something biological or physiological, and especially not as something certain and assured, as opposed to soul, spirit, mind:⁵ “The body is a stunned, shattered certitude. Nothing more proper, nothing more foreign to our old world. [Corps est la certitude sidérée, mise en éclats. Rien de plus propre, rien de plus étranger à notre vieux monde.]” (Nancy 2000, 9) A proper body, a foreign body—

5 From this perspective, one could say that Nancy's initial attempt is directed against Merleau-Ponty and, at the same time, also a further development by the former of what the latter did in his two major works, namely: in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, where consciousness is inherent to a sensory world, “the system in which all truths cohere” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, xiii), and in *The Visible and the Invisible*, where he moves towards the concept of “flesh” denoting “what has no name in any philosophy” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 139).

étrange *corps étrangers*—“strange foreign bodies,” as Nancy puts it, means that a body is not something given, clear, homely, but rather something strange and foreign, “‘the body’ is our naked anxiety [‘le corps’ est notre angoisse mise à nu]” (Nancy 2000, 10)—and “how naked we are!” he cries afterwards—, when we want to affirm our bodies against meaning, religion, ideology by denuding ourselves, by making our bodies seen to the point where exhibitionism coincides with voyeurism, and both with “pornoscopia.” (Do I really need to give the example of Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Tinder, and other social media?)

210 If we can't get to the body through a mere opposition with the soul—as Descartes did, about whom Nancy wrote in his *Ego sum* (cf. Nancy 1979), and in other writings—, how, then, can we grasp what is bodily in the body? Nancy's solution: the body is always already outside itself, and the soul, or mind, or spirit is the way how the body goes beyond itself, out of itself, an out-of-itself-ness of the body—spirit not as an external foreignness, but rather as an inner one where, however, one can come back to oneself only through the experience of another body that goes through the same externalization. Here, one cannot not think about Nancy's *L'Intrus*, the already mentioned essay about his experience of heart transplantation (cf. Nancy 2000b). And this self-realization of the body through the other—and its own otherness—has no way of abolishing the outer-ness of its own experience, no *Aufhebung* of the body into the concept is possible, so that the body is, structurally speaking, in the final analysis, the same as *Aufhebung* itself: the body is the embodiment of *Aufhebung*.

III.

If we say “body” and its “other,” we eventually also say “sexuality,” a body that is marked by sexual difference through the incision of the signifier, the latter precisely the topic of Nancy's *Le Titre de la lettre*, while the former the title of a lecture he has given at the centenary of Lacan's birth: *L'« il y a » du rapport sexuel* (*The “There Is” of the Sexual Relation*), the accent on the question of the *il y a* in Lacan's “there is no sexual relation:”

Sexual difference [la différence sexuelle] is not a difference between two or more things, where each would exist as ‘one’ (one sex): it is neither a difference in species, nor a difference between individuals, nor a natural difference, nor a difference in grade, nor a cultural difference or a difference in gender. It is the difference *of* sex [la différence *du* sexe] inasmuch as it differs from itself. Sex is, for every living sexual being, and in all senses, a being that differs from itself: a differentiating as differentiating itself in concordance with all the plurality of elements and complex becoming denoted by ‘man/woman,’ ‘homo/hetero,’ ‘active/passive,’ etc. And differentiating (itself) inasmuch as the species thus multiplies the singularity of its ‘representatives.’ (Nancy 2003a, 30–31)

Nancy’s *différer* echoes the logic of Derrida’s *différance*: sex is at the same time that which is differed, and that which differs, a difference that anticipates its own parts, the principle of differentiating, the differentiation itself—before we arrive at its different entities. The problem being—and here Nancy apparently follows Lacan rather than Derrida—that the very principle of differentiation is always already marked with sexual difference, is always already “sexualized,” inasmuch as “sexuality” is precisely the name of the difference par excellence:

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Sexuality is not a special kind of species in relation to the genus of relation, but rather it is the relation that has its integral extension or exposition in sexuality. We could say: sexuality relates that which is at stake in the relation [le sexuel rapporte ce qu’il en est du rapport], but its relation [*rapport*, here meant both as “rapport” and as a “report”]—its balance and its story—does not totalize, and does not close. (Nancy 2003, 26)

Again, as we can see, there is a structural equivalence between, on the one hand, the body, which is the corpoReal (if I’m allowed to coin a new term combining the French word for the “body,” *corps*, and the Lacanian concept of the Real) embodiment of the impossibility of a conceptual *Aufhebung*, and, on the other hand, sexuality that marks the body with this impossibility, which is, in the final analysis, why the Lacanian *il y a du rapport sexuel* is supplemented

and must be thought together with its scandalous counterpart of *il n'y a pas du rapport sexuel*.⁶

How can we, then, speak—or write—about such a sexualized body that cannot be *aufgehoben* into a concept? That is precisely what is at stake in Nancy's *Corpus* as a philosophical and linguistic experiment in thinking the body, or rather, as he himself puts it, "writing the body:" "Writing not *about* the body, but rather writing *the* body. Not corporeity, but rather the body. Not the signs, images, codes of the body, but rather, again, the body. [Soit à écrire, non pas du corps, mais le corps même. Non pas la corporéité, mais le corps. Non pas les signes, les images, les chiffres du corps, mais encore le corps.]" (Nancy 2000, 12) This is, or at least was, Nancy adds, the "program of modernity," whereupon nowadays there is no program anymore, just television programs where one can watch a multitude of bodies—and corpses—from whence "a necessity, an urgency" emerges, demanding that peculiar "writing the body" that pushes it to the extreme: "It is in this manner that the body is again on the limit, on the extreme: it comes from a distance, and the horizon is its multitude that is arriving. [De cette manière encore, le corps est en limite, en extrémité: il nous vient du plus loin, l'horizon est sa multitude qui vient.]" (Ibid.) And as the "body is on the limit, on the extreme," so must "writing the body" be extreme: "Writing: touching the extremity [Écrire: toucher à l'extrémité.]" And Nancy's question, and challenge, is precisely: "How therefore to touch the body, instead of signifying it or making it signify? [Comment donc toucher au corps, au lieu de le signifier ou de le faire signifier?]" (Ibid.)

The question is clear, critical, punctual—the answer not so much, at least at first, since instead of the Lacanian "letter" (*la lettre*) we are first given the Derridean "writing" (*écriture*), which, however, structurally holds the same

6 Lacan, in book XX of his seminars entitled *Encore*, develops the concept of *jouissance* ("pleasure"), as opposed to mere *plaisir* (both meaning "pleasure" in English, German, and other languages), in order to demonstrate the conditions of possibility for a sexual relation that is, at the same time, possible and impossible: possible, if reduced to *plaisir* (as described by Freud with the "pleasure principle"), but at the same time impossible if practiced through the excess of *jouissance* (again with Freud: the "beyond of the pleasure principle"); both theses have their ontological basis in Lacan's reading of Plato's *Parmenides*, from which he tried to extrapolate the logic of non-relationship between being and non-being (cf. Lacan 1998).

place: “Writing isn’t signifying [Écrire n’est pas signifier],” which is the same as if saying that Lacan’s concept of signifier is not the same as the Derridean concept of “writing.” Furthermore: “We ask: How are we to touch upon the body? Perhaps we can’t answer this ‘How?’ as we’d answer a technical question. [On a demandé: comment toucher au corps? Il n’est peut-être pas possible de répondre à ce ‘comment’ comme à une demande technique.]” Meaning: “the question of ‘touch’ is not a technical question, is not a question of “touching,” but something else, namely: “But, finally, it has to be said that touching upon the body, touching the body, *touching-happens* in writing all the time. [Mais ce qu’il faut dire, c’est que cela – toucher au corps, toucher le corps, toucher enfin – arrive tout le temps dans l’écriture.]” Identifying “touching” with “writing” allows to re-pose the question of “touching the extremity.” “Maybe it doesn’t happen exactly *in* writing, if writing in fact has any side. But along the border, at the limit, the tip, the furthest edge of writing nothing *but* that happens. Now, writing takes its place at the limit. So, if anything at all happens to writing, nothing happens to it but *touch*. [Cela n’arrive peut-être pas exactement dans l’écriture, si celle-ci a un ‘dedans’. Mais en bordure, en limite, en pointe, en extrémité d’écriture, il n’arrive que ça. Or l’écriture a son lieu sur la limite. Il n’arrive donc rien d’autre à l’écriture, s’il lui arrive quelque chose, que de toucher.]” And the final point is of the utmost importance: “More precisely: touching the body (or some singular body) *with the incorporeality* of ‘sense.’ And consequently, *to make the incorporeal touching*, to make of meaning a touch. [Plus précisément: de toucher le corps (ou plutôt, tel et tel corps singulier) *avec l’incorporel* du ‘sens’. Et par conséquent, de *rendre l’incorporel touchant*, ou de faire du sens *une touche*.]” (Ibid., 12–13)

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As we can see, the concept of touch as developed from the reflection on the body understood as *corpus*, is Nancy’s answer to—and a step forward from—both Derrida and Lacan, at least as far as the relation between language and the body is concerned. And that is why he returns to it over and over again in his works that followed *Corpus*, especially by playing on the double meaning of the word *sens*, that works in French and many other languages (English, Italian, Spanish, etc.): *sense* pertains to the “senses” as the “sensorial,” but *sense* also means “meaning”—and touch touches precisely this extremity where both senses of sense make sense of the body and language at the same time.

IV.

In the year 2000, at the turn of the century and the millennia, Derrida published his *Le Toucher: Jean-Luc Nancy (On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy)*, dedicated to his friend and his philosophy of touch, whom he held in such high regards that he baptized Nancy nothing less than “the first great thinker of touch.”

By a happy historical coincidence, the English translation of Derrida’s *On Touching* and *The Book of Touch* edited by Classen came out in the same year of 2005, a year that can very-well mark the birth of haptic studies, a field dedicated to the study of touch through a combination of anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, film studies—but first and foremost philosophy. Philosophy had its own long tradition of thinking the senses where, however, the senses of sight and hearing always prevailed as the “more theoretical senses” (as Hegel, for instance, puts it in his *Lectures on Aesthetics*), not to mention the Ancient Greek *theoria*, or the Christian *vox* of conscience.⁷ It is noteworthy that Derrida originally published his book in the year 2000, but it was actually a reworking
214 of an earlier essay from the beginning of the 1990s, itself published as *On the Work of Jean-Luc Nancy* in English as the introduction to a special issue of the *Journal of Modern Critical Theory* dedicated to Nancy. The interesting thing is that Derrida’s interpretation of Nancy’s work as the first haptic philosophy came well before the later explicitly addressed the issue of touch in his later works, most prominently and explicitly in his “essay on the resurrection of the body” from 2003 entitled *Noli me tangere*—a title given not without irony, at least if we think it as being addressed to Derrida’s take on his philosophy.

⁷ It is in this sense indicative that Derrida, who in his own “linguistic turn,” as developed in *Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in Husserl’s Phenomenology*, put forward the thesis that not only linguistics, but all metaphysics is “phonocentric” due to the linking of the problem of “presence” with the phenomenon of the “voice” (cf. Derrida 2011), revisited his own theory in *On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy* through a detailed reading of the history of the philosophy of touch from Plato and Aristotle to Husserl and Heidegger, and from Merleau-Ponty onward, culminating in Nancy’s philosophical *corpus*, and especially in *Corpus* itself. Derrida thus proposed a thesis denouncing the whole history of metaphysics—especially phenomenology—as being essentially “haptocentric,” i.e., centered on the anthropomorphized and hierarchized conception of touch linked to the human hand as the privileged organ of touching (cf. Derrida 2005).

Nancy here develops a new, original theory of touch based on his previous reflections on the issue of the body from the *L'Intrus* and *Corpus* onwards (and backwards). Thus, as *Corpus* starts with the *hoc est enim corpus meum*, so does *Noli me tangere* begin with the resurrected body of Jesus Christ as rendered in the New Testament, more precisely in the scene where the resurrected Christ first appears to Mary Magdalene (John 20: 1–18):

Early on the first day of the week, while it was still dark, Mary Magdalene went to the tomb and saw that the stone had been removed from the entrance. So she came running to Simon Peter and the other disciple, the one Jesus loved, and said, "They have taken the Lord out of the tomb, and we don't know where they have put him!" So Peter and the other disciple started for the tomb. Both were running, but the other disciple outran Peter and reached the tomb first. He bent over and looked in at the strips of linen lying there but did not go in. Then Simon Peter came along behind him and went straight into the tomb. He saw the strips of linen lying there, as well as the cloth that had been wrapped around Jesus' head. The cloth was still lying in its place, separate from the linen. Finally the other disciple, who had reached the tomb first, also went inside. He saw and believed. (They still did not understand from Scripture that Jesus had to rise from the dead.) Then the disciples went back to where they were staying. Now Mary stood outside the tomb crying. As she wept, she bent over to look into the tomb and saw two angels in white, seated where Jesus' body had been, one at the head and the other at the foot. They asked her, "Woman, why are you crying?" – "They have taken my Lord away," she said, "and I don't know where they have put him." At this, she turned around and saw Jesus standing there, but she did not realize that it was Jesus. He asked her, "Woman, why are you crying? Who is it you are looking for?" Thinking he was the gardener, she said, "Sir, if you have carried him away, tell me where you have put him, and I will get him." Jesus said to her, "Mary." She turned toward him and cried out in Aramaic, "Rabboni!" (which means "Teacher"). Jesus said, "Do not hold on to me, for I have not yet ascended to the Father. Go instead

to my brothers and tell them, 'I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.'"⁸

It is a telling fact that this scene has taken on a name of its own: past and contemporary usages of *Noli me tangere* are similar to the *Last Supper* or the *Crucifixion of Christ* in the sense that it has acquired an almost independent currency in Christian iconography. However, Nancy's interpretation of this scene is part of his larger project of a "deconstruction of Christianity" (cf. Nancy 2005)—"a movement of analysis [...] and at the same time of displacement and transformation" (Nancy 2003b, 10)—, i.e., a secular or non-confessional re-appropriation of the issue of the body and—especially—touch.

216 A re-appropriation because one can find already before the text of the *New Testament* similar usage of the motif, like, for instance, in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, where Oedipus, just before his apotheosis, addresses his daughters Antigone and Ismene in the same vein as Jesus addresses Maria Magdalena, namely, with the words "Follow me, but do not touch me"—the only difference being philological: in *Oedipus at Colonus* the more rare Greek verb πᾶνω is used, meaning more "touching the surface," while the χᾶπτω of the Greek original *New Testament* means not only "touch" but also "refrain" or "stop" (a meaning that is lost in the Latin Vulgate since *tango* has a strong meaning of "touching" and "touching" only). And a re-appropriation that states that the motif of *Noli me tangere* perhaps played on the larger issue of touch, as can be discerned, among other things, also from the many, many secular examples inspired by the scene.⁹

However, and in order to do justice to Nancy's own stance towards philosophical thinking, I want, at this point, to make a juxtaposition between two scenes: the first, in which Jesus Christ stops Mary Magdalene from touching him with his μή μου ἅπτου command, and the other, the almost perfect reverse scene featuring Doubting Thomas, who is invited by Jesus Christ to place a finger in his wound (John 20: 24–29):

Now Thomas (also known as Didymus), one of the Twelve, was not with the disciples when Jesus came. So the other disciples told him, "We have seen the Lord!" But he said to them, "Unless I see the nail marks in his hands and put my finger where the nails were, and put my hand into

his side, I will not believe.” A week later his disciples were in the house again, and Thomas was with them. Though the doors were locked, Jesus came and stood among them and said, “Peace be with you!” Then he said to Thomas, “Put your finger here; see my hands. Reach out your hand and put it into my side. Stop doubting and believe.” Thomas said to him, “My Lord and my God!” Then Jesus told him, “Because you have seen me, you have believed; blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed.”

Both scenes, the one featuring Mary Magdalene and this one with Doubting Thomas, respectively evoke contradictory tendencies regarding the issue of doubt and touch. In the first passage, the desire to dissolve doubt through touch is stopped by a gesture that itself pertains to the domain of touch; the gesture is complemented by the sentence “do not touch me” that not only provides certainty but also demonstrates a peculiar relation between touch and language. In the second passage, the discursive doubt articulated by Thomas’ questioning the resurrected body of the Christ is shattered through a silent, speechless, penetrating touch: certainty achieved at fingertip. Due to their dramatics it is no coincidence that both scenes can be found in religious iconography, renaissance paintings, theater pieces, movies, etc., where they appear not only as representations of faith and doubt colliding with the realm of the senses, but also as allegories of a certain fragility of sense-certainty. Moreover, in the Mary Magdalene scene, touch is dismissed as a source of doubt, while language, embodied in the phrase *Noli me tangere*, provides its counterpart, faith’s certainty; while in the doubting Thomas scene touch functions as a source of empirical certainty that has to supply not only what the subjects sees and hears, that is, the resurrected body of Christ, but also, and more importantly, the meaning of his words, touch thus functions as a supplement to language. Therefore: on the one hand there is the scene of the proverbially doubting Thomas touching Jesus’ wound to empirically check the evidence provided by his eyes and ears, while on the other hand there is the scene of the resurrection in which Jesus appears to Mary Magdalene and does *not* permit her to touch him, but rather demands a leap of faith: “Faith consists in seeing and hearing where there is nothing exceptional for the ordinary eye

and ear. It knows to see and to hear *without tampering*.” (Nancy 2003b, 22) Faith demands belief without tactile corroboration, for it is precisely touch with its direct tactility that expunges the truth, which is by definition something intangible.

218 The opposition, here, runs between the untouchable and the touchable, the realm of the intangible and the realm of the tangible, with touch itself marking the dividing line, and that is why Nancy can say that the μή μου ἅπτου—in any variant or language we take it: from the Latin *Noli me tangere* to the English “Do not touch me”—does not only address or represent the issue of touch here at stake, but rather embodies touch itself with its own haptic quality: “To say it in one word and to make a word-play out of it—difficult to avoid—‘do not touch me’ is a phrase that touches, that cannot not touch, even outside all context [Pour le dire d’un mot et en faisant un mot – difficile à éviter – ‘ne me touche pas’ est une phrase qui touche, qui ne peut pas ne pas toucher, même isoler de tout contexte];” or, simply put, “do not touch me,” even if we take it outside any given social, cultural, religious context, “touches,” since it “announces something of touching in general where it touches at the sensible point of touching [Elle énonce quelque chose du toucher en général ou elle touche au point sensible du toucher],” at that sensible point where both meanings of *sens* coincide, at that “point that it constitutes par excellence (it is *the* point of sensibility) and that is constituted in it as the sensible point [à ce point sensible qu’il constitue par excellence (il est en somme ‘le’ point du sensible) et à ce qui en lui forme le point sensible];” and this point is precisely “the point where touch does not touch, must not touch in order to exercise its touch (its art, its tact, its grace) [Or ce point est précisément le point où le toucher ne touche pas, ne doit pas toucher pour exercer sa touche (son art, son tact, sa grâce)],” best exemplified in the way in which art can touch us up to “the point where the space without dimension that separates that which touch brings together, the line that divides touch from the touched and therefore touch from itself [le point ou l’espace sans dimension qui sépare ce que le toucher rassemble, la ligne qui écarte le toucher du touché et donc la touche d’elle-même].” (Nancy 2003b, 25)

Sensibility from the regime of the touchable, corporeal, bodily, and sense from the regime of the untouchable soul, spirit, mind, concept ... both

coincide in touch as the sense of sensibility: sensibility can make sense only on the presupposition of the sense of tact, which is the condition *sine qua non* for a sensorial being (since without touch no other sense is possible).

This haptic point where “touch must not touch” in order to exercise its power (or rather: “art, tact”) is why, in contrast and conversely at the same time, the *sensibility of sense* and the *sense of sensibility* (in one word: *sense*) is in linguistic and philosophical accord with itself, since *sense* does not mean an either-or of body or mind, but rather both at the same time, namely, the *bodily activity of making sense* and the *thinking activity of sensing*.

And this insistence on the haptic experience—on the *intangible meaning of touch* and the *tangible meaning of sense*—can perhaps show us a way out of the debacle we find ourselves in within this senseless word, where by dissolving all distance—through contemporary communication touch-technology promising more “contact” (*con-tact*)—we have also, so it seems, dissolved closeness itself. “Keep in touch” is, therefore, not a phrase to be used lightly.

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WHAT IS AURA?

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Abstract

The article discusses some of the key notions of Walter Benjamin's famous essay *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (1936). The author emphasizes that the importance of Benjamin's work with regard to the question of "aura" in the contemporary, post-modern constellations of the cultural logic of late capitalism lies in the idea of reading, writing, talking, thinking, and watching films. This can perhaps serve as a model for "saving our souls" in the age of nihilism, epitomized

by the mass media of communications, i.e., the informational-communicational paradigm.

Keywords: Walter Benjamin, art, film, technology, image, the political.

Kaj je avra?

Povzetek

Članek obravnava nekatere temeljne razsežnosti znamenitega eseja Walterja Benjamina z naslovom *Umetnina v času, ko jo je mogoče tehnično reproducirati* (1936). Avtor poudarja, da z vidika vprašanja »avre« v sodobnih post-modernih konstelacijah kulturne logike poznega kapitalizma poglavitni pomen Benjaminovega dela leži v ideji branja, pisanja, razgovarjanja, razmišljanja in gledanja filmov. To morda lahko služi kot nekakšen model za »rešitev naših duš« v obdobju nihilizma, kakršnega zaznamujejo množični mediji komunikacije, se pravi, informacijsko-komunikacijska paradigma.

222 *Ključne besede:* Walter Benjamin, umetnost, film, tehnika, podoba, politično.

Introduction

What is *aura*? After more than eight decades, this question still haunts us, just as it did at the time of the first publication of Walter Benjamin's famous essay. Although someone may say that this question has long since been resolved, I deem it to be more "open," more disturbing and more provocative than one might imagine. Why? Simply, because we should keep the remembrance of *it* in the current age of *the catastrophe of certainty: world* as the work of artistry of the *technosphere*.¹ Is this not a catastrophe?

The aim of this article is to propose the thesis that we should retain the notion of "aura," even if that contradicts the letter of Benjamin's essay. Especially visual arts, as well as their theory and practice, must "keep it in *mind*." Why is that so? In order to answer this question, we have to develop a certain kind of conception, wherein the idea of *reading, thinking, understanding, then writing, talking/speaking ... watching movies* also, should be exposed. This would also lead us to a specific political philosophy connected with the visual possibilities of contemporary art. What is the reason for this kind of approach?

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I think we should keep in mind the last sentences of *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*. The whole of Benjamin's effort is concentrated in a finely lapidary prose. "Mankind [...] as an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods" (Benjamin 2019d, 20) is something we find incarnate in contemporary features of fascism all around us. Where? In the "psycho-technique of controlling our desires, in the real ontology of conquering these desires by an apparatus of control" (Paić 2018, 397), i.e., in the "brain washing," to which we voluntarily submit. That is—right at the place where "the society of control" (Deleuze) has replaced "the disciplinary society" (Foucault).

I really do find Benjamin's words prophetic. "Mankind [...] as an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods"—is certainly present in the technosphere! That is also something which is linked to fascism "creeping"

1 "Technosphere" is a concept developed by the Croatian philosopher Žarko Paić. Among many descriptions and definitions of *it*, I have chosen this one—from an interview—as being the most appropriate: "I call 'technosphere' that new constellation of relationships between machine, animal, and human in the age of network dominance as a social entropy of global capitalism." (Paić 2014)

in our streets. “This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art.” (Benjamin 2019d, 20) Thus, the notion of *aura* should be transferred from the area of aesthetics to “the cultural logic of late capitalism” (Jameson). Because we may, in doing this, find some new tools—or, better still, weapons—to fight the “certainty of the future” that Benjamin already disclosed near the end of his life. Namely, in his *Thesen über den Begriff der Geschichte* (*Theses on the Philosophy of History*) he declared that (*homogenous, empty*) history as perpetual progress leads to—*catastrophe*. This is the well-known image of Paul Klee’s *Angelus Novus*:

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His face is turned towards the past. Where *we* see the appearance of a chain of events, *he* sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble and hurls it before his feet [...] a storm is blowing from Paradise, it has caught itself up in his wings and is so strong that the Angel can no longer close them. The storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the rubble-heap before him grows sky-high. That which we call progress, is *this* storm. (Benjamin 2019c, 6)

This passage from thesis IX, also written in fine lapidary prose, discloses everything. We are caught on the way to *catastro...*, beg your pardon, the *future*. So, what is the purpose in keeping the concept of *aura* alive nowadays? Primarily, its role should be in “taking our time.” This “taking time” is simply connected with what we have already mentioned, i.e., *the idea of reading, writing, talking, and thinking*—accompanied by *watching movies*—as a model for “saving our souls.”

This article traces the idea that the concept of “aura” still has something to say in a world wherein *the ideology of the end of all ideologies* is dominant. Also, it points to some moments in Benjamin’s thought that can supply us with some weapons against so-called “cultural politics,” by utilizing some ideas already present in his work in the 1930s. Aura is still present all around us. The point is that—*we should turn it against the grain*. Contrary to understanding it a kind of a sign for the loss of its contemplative power in the field of the arts, I will try to use this concept for certain political

purposes. Concerning my understanding of *the political*, I will also link it to my understanding of “*philosophy* in the age of the *Denkverbot*” (cf. Žižek 1998, 11–19). Benjamin should be taken as a contemporary philosopher of politics. He should also be understood as some kind of a visual artist through his “dialectical images of thought.” Would it be too much of an effort? Probably ... but you cannot know *until you actually try it* (Joe Strummer)!²

Aura and technology

What if there is no reality outside of the scientific-technological (media) construction? There really is nothing new in saying that we live in the informational-communicational, or media, or transparent *society* (if such a thing as society exists, following the neo-conservative de-evolution from the end of the 1970s!?). Benjamin’s text *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (1936) introduces a certain theory, it’s probably better to say a “philosophy of art,” under the circumstances of the technological developments of modern society in general. Although “a work of art has always been reproducible” (Benjamin 2019d, 2), it was not until after the invention of photography that the character of art itself changed drastically. Benjamin states:

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During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence. The manner in which human sense perception is organized, the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as well. (Benjamin 2019d, 5)³

That is the key for understanding Benjamin’s concept of “aura.”

Once again, what is *aura*? Benjamin’s first definition of this fundamental

2 The notion is taken from the song by Joe Strummer and The Clash “Know Your Rights” from the album *Combat Rock* (1982). The song actually declares: “Oh, know these rights [...] Number three: You have the right to free speech / As long as You’re not dumb enough to *actually try it*.”

3 This is also the main argument in Yves Michaud’s analysis (cf. 2004).

concept in his ontology is to be found in an earlier work, *A Short History of Photography*. When he speaks about the artistry of the Parisian photographer David Atget, Benjamin accentuates the loss of traditional representative art, i.e., painting. Painting was always a kind of a sacred ritual in attempting to capture the spirit of reality, its aim being to depict it. “Catharsis through mimesis”—this is how it is possible to define its purpose from the standpoint of the Aristotelian origins of aesthetics. This is also present in Benjamin’s definition:

What is aura? A peculiar web of space and time: the unique manifestation of a distance, however near it may be. To follow, while reclining on a summer’s noon, the outline of a mountain range on the horizon or a branch, which casts its shadow on the observer until the moment or the hour partakes of their presence – this is to breathe in the aura of these mountains, of this branch. (Benjamin 2019a, 16)

226 The work of art, at its beginnings, was somehow connected to its sacred purpose. Its origin lies in ritual. But this should not be excluded from the natural human urge to reach a spirituality which transcends the immanence of pure life. This act of transcendence is included in the human desire to create. Creation belongs, consequently, to the sphere of reflection and self-consciousness. Thus, art is necessarily connected to philosophy. *To think is to create*. From the beginning of humankind onwards, the work of art was meant to be some kind of language as an emanation of the human spirit’s desire to reach divinity. So, the work of art has an *aura*. It connects that which is near with that which is distant. In doing so, the magic of “transcended life” happens. Benjamin tries to supply the work of art with this “auratic character.” Namely, “the work of art” has in its “here and now,” in its unrepeatability, an *aura*, such that this is its fundamental ontological concept.

But what happens to the “aura” in the age of mechanical reproducibility? To say it most simply—it is lost. This loss of “aura,” however, for Benjamin means that we inaugurated the era of post-aesthetic art. That is the main thesis in Danko Grlić’s analysis of the adventure of Benjamin’s thinking (cf. 1984). The possibility of mechanical reproduction necessarily leads to the theory

and praxis of post-aesthetic art. This conclusion also includes a problematic solution to this state of things, i.e., that the hope of emancipation lies in the class consciousness of the proletariat (here, Benjamin follows György Lukács's main thesis from his work *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein*, 1923). This was due to Benjamin's acquaintance with historical materialism of the early 1920s. That, along with his inheritance in Jewish Mysticism, makes up the twofold methodological key to his thought in general. The masses have become—in this new ontological constellation—the new recipient and historical subject of *post-aesthetic art*. Such a constellation, therefore, presupposes that the aura has become unsuitable for the age of the mechanical reproduction of “artefacts.” Once again, what happened to αὔρα? This ancient Greek term means breeze, wind, expiration of air, glow... In the Latin tradition, it means *aura honoris*—a tiny ray of light; in medieval medicine “aura” means an uncomfortable state before an epileptic attack. In the Kabbalah, *aura* was like a space of Ether that surrounds humans. But after all, it became something that represents a poetical, spiritual approach to things. In the traditional work of art, aesthetic objects look back to their creator, they return the gaze to the author.

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For Benjamin's analysis, it is important to note that “aura” represents “a human trace.” That is something which is forgotten and comes from humanity as such. In the whole of Benjamin's thought, “aura” brings back human “remembrance.” This remembrance is, of course, something different from the category of memory. Because the latter is necessarily connected with computational thinking and mind; it is known by the abbreviation RAM in computer technology.

Works of art are received and valued on different planes. Two polar types stand out; with one, the accent is on the cult value; with the other, on the exhibition value of the work. (Benjamin 2019d, 7)

Where does this “exhibition value of the work” come from? Undoubtedly, from the first art that exhibits characteristics of mechanical reproducibility, i.e., *photography*. Photography replaced painting with many more options for representing the reality to which it is directed, concerning the ontological intentions of art matters. Painting was still meditatively oriented in the

uniqueness and unrepeatability of artistic creation. Such a kind of eternal authenticity of an aesthetic object needs to be put into ideal circumstances for its receptivity and appreciation, and is determined by a well-educated, refined audience. It also needs solitude as a precondition for the truthful experience of an artwork. To summarize Benjamin's position on the "auratic" work of art, we can say that it is "oriented towards the past." Consequently, it should be negated as such. Because its goals and aims are incompatible with the technological era of the mass consumption of all goods, including cultural artefacts at every level. Two artistic areas have become decisive in this diagnosis for a progressive political and artistic stance. These were photography and the most influential 20th-century art form—*film*. Cinematography defines all the contours of mechanical reproduction. Technological reproduction opens up the possibility of collective receptivity, which is not contemplatively focused, but relaxed and easy, and does not need to be seriously reflected in any theoretical frame or scientific exactness. The remnants of "auratic" artworks were written-off by Benjamin's progressive, i.e., communist stance, and called-off as some kind of *l'art-pour-l'art* "theology of art" (Benjamin 2019d, 6).

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But does Benjamin really write-off all of the so-called "auratic artefacts"? Along this analysis, we intend to show that things are not so simple. Furthermore, we can recognize many examples and appearances of *aura* in today's digitally developed movies.⁴

Is there an aura in film as artform?

Before we direct our analysis towards cinematography as a post-auratic medium, let us again pay attention to photography. The Apparatus—as it would be called by Foucault and Agamben respectively—included in it "gives a last, mortal punch to the relation between the present and the eternal," as Grlić said (1984, 36). It is in photography that the value of visibility, as well as the possibility of its reproduction, begins to hold back cult values. The praxis of photography is closely connected with tectonic changes in capitalist industry and the ideology that accompanies it. But what are the most important

4 This is one of the main theses in Boris Groys's analysis (cf. 2008).

consequences of this connection? In an ontological sense, we are witnessing the fact that *the image* replaces *the word*. Visuality, and almost only *visuality*, becomes the instrument of cognition. Pictures, on the other hand, need a supplement in words.

The camera becomes smaller and smaller, ever readier to capture transitory and secret pictures which are able to shock the associative mechanism of the observer to a standstill. At this point the caption must step in, thereby creating a photography which literarises the relationships of life and without which photographic construction would remain stuck in the approximate. (Benjamin 2019a, 19)

Benjamin's diagnosis says that the medium of photography inherently has this compatibility with written words. (Much later, we can see how the words are intertwined with moving pictures in Jean-Luc Godard's masterpiece *Histoire(s) du cinéma*; 1988–1998. Literally, literature literarizes pictures!) In a political framework, this means that the working class became the subject of writing, i.e., the author—first in newspapers, then at higher levels of artistic expression. Photography is a medium that thinks. Pictures think. The thought is not existent just in the raw material of a moving picture, but is already present in photography. For that purpose, we can add to the discussion Eduardo Cadava's explorations on photography, which could be a proper supplement for Deleuze's film theory (cf. 2002).

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But no one can deny that Benjamin gives film the role of the great destructor of the auratic and aesthetic arts. Its main goal is to give the final and ultimate blow to the sacredness of an artistic *aura*. Films are the paradigm of post-aesthetic art, and they are completely intertwined with the receptivity of viewers, as the latter interiorize all the characteristics of socially useful value. At first sight and fundamentally, in films the “aura” of the actor disappears. There is no physical connection between the actor and the viewer. The actor acts for an apparatus.

In 1932 Rudolf Arnheim saw “the latest trend... in treating the actor as a stage prop chosen for its characteristics and ... inserted at

the proper place.” With this idea something else is closely connected. The stage actor identifies himself with the character of his role. The film actor very often is denied this opportunity. His creation is by no means all of a piece; it is composed of many separate performances. (Benjamin 2019d, 9–10)

In any case, the “aura” of the actor is evaporating. The whole Aristotelian tradition of catharsis has been put into question. Of course, Benjamin follows the path that was traced by his friend Bertolt Brecht and his *dialectical theater*. Owing to the montage technique in film narrativity, the scenes are fragmented and separated from each other. In contrast with *aura*, which is dedicated to the “here and now,” the whole process of filmmaking is cut into temporal pieces and fragmented because of the *montage* techniques. Film, with its technical/technological instruments, breaks up the *fundamentum* of auratic artistry.

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Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling. With the close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended. (Benjamin 2019d, 15–16)

By the camera’s technical/technological possibilities, by its driving, by cuts and static pictures, by its slowing and accelerating of pictures, by its zooming and its diminishing of vision, the film explores the optical unconscious as psychoanalytic theories were revealing the instinctively sub/unconscious.

The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses. (Benjamin 2019d, 16)

In other words, film removes every kind of separation, unknowingness. It deprives us of any kind of aesthetic self-indulgence and artistic self-satisfactory

impulses that cannot be found in the everyday. That is to say in our profane (cf. Agamben 2007), *wirkliches Leben* (there is no adequate English word for “wirklich!”). Benjamin uses the visually seductive comparison for this kind of “de-aurisation,” namely, the one between painter and cameraman. He compares them with magician and surgeon. This excerpt reads:

In short, in contrast to the magician—who is still hidden in the medical practitioner—the surgeon at the decisive moment abstains from facing the patient man to man; rather, it is through the operation that he penetrates into him. [...] Magician and surgeon compare to painter and cameraman. The painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, the cameraman penetrates deeply into its web. (Benjamin 2019d, 13)

Thus, the painter/magician marks those practices of auratic-aesthetic art, while surgeon/cameraman here stands for the post-aesthetical demarcation and “constitution of the world” (to use a Heideggerian-like idiom). In the longer run, the masses bring with themselves new forms of reception. But the most questionable in Benjamin’s thesis is his insistence that this fact—i.e., the mass-participation in evaluating the works of art—changes the social circumstances in art and in politics for the better. He presupposes that the masses react progressively and critically to the content of films. (That means, contrary to the meditative and speculative stance towards masterworks of painting.) But, unfortunately, *this is not true*. The case is quite the opposite! We are witnessing nowadays scenes where the masses are truly dedicated to the most conservative and retrograde views in the media and in the arts. We can say that the masses are even inclined to some fascist tendencies in our multicorporate capitalism. Darko Suvin would say concerning these matters:

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As movement, fascism is a reactionary mobilisation of petty-bourgeois and peasant masses put into service of capitalist repression. State power was conceded to it by the top capitalist conglomerates as a more efficient agent of mass agitation, repression, and economic restructuring. (Suvin 2017, 273)

The reaction of the so-called the “everyday consumer” to movies is, according to Benjamin, anti-elitist.

The film makes the cult value recede into the background not only by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one. (Benjamin 2019d, 19)

Film creates the *organon* for the poetry of everydayness. Contrary to academic aesthetics, movies supply us with a reality that is not separated from our usual experiences. In film, the work of art takes the function of social activism. But... does this neglect the fact that the contemporary viewer most often does not have any kind of progressive attitude towards social and political movements? That s/he is seduced by the power of pictures impregnated with banality and stupidity? I find an example of this in the Croatian movie *Broj 55* (No. 55; 2014).⁵ It is a kind of a proof that could serve to show how auratic art still dominates in the digital era and is submitted to the conservative purposes contained in it.

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The “aura” as a determining factor of the metaphysical history of philosophy

Walter Benjamin’s role in the history of philosophy is mainly—ambivalent. No one can deny that he, somehow, belongs to the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory of Society, along with Bloch, Marcuse, Horkheimer, Fromm, and especially his personal friend, Theodor W. Adorno. But, on the other side, he was firmly embedded in the Jewish religious tradition; Gershom Scholem is the most important witness to Benjamin’s debt to the Kabbalah and Messianic theology. Furthermore, we can say that his genius could, in the long run, be placed within the prophecy of postmodernity. Many of his lucid predictions have been realized in the theory of the so-called “postmodern condition” (Lyotard, Harvey).

5 Cf. my review of the film in: Krivak 2015, 303–306.

Benjamin was, also, always opposed to the tradition of Western metaphysics. As his counterpart in this line of thinking, Martin Heidegger, he stands in the deepest critical position towards its heritage. But what Heidegger had in mind concerning metaphysics was its demise. Although the fate of metaphysics is the fate of Western thought (“the fate of life,” after all), for the great philosopher of ontology, its demission should be followed by a preparation of that which “has to come.” That is to say, of *der andere Anfang* (the Other Beginning). Heidegger’s philosophy, in the last period of his thinking, is directed towards the future, that is to say “openness” (*Erschlossenheit*). He somehow “takes part in a spiritualist séance” of calling the spirits of undefined “things to come,” and takes that as *the task of thinking*.

Benjamin’s stance towards metaphysics is ambivalent. His use of words is much more associated with Kant and Nietzsche’s approaches. In his study on *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* (1928), metaphysics is related to a complete experience which brings to the fore the opposition between the figures of *symbol* and *allegory*. Thus, Benjamin finds “the place of emptiness between Being and Time” (Paić 2017, 121). Allegory, for him, represents a new discourse language of the historical rubble-heap, i.e., of the ruins, caused by the ideology of progress. In his time, Benjamin tried to counterpose—to this “single catastrophe” of progress—a specific and particular theory of salvation. That salvation is directed towards—the Past. As his famous ninth thesis of *Theses on the Philosophy of History* (1939–1940) tells us a story about Paul Klee’s “Angel of History,” the proper item which we should consult in search of salvation for the soul is—*the past!* What the future brings with itself is nothing but—*catastrophe*. Once again, let us remember Benjamin’s famous “*image of thinking*”:

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There is a painting by Klee called Angelus Novus. An angel is depicted there who looks as though he were about to distance himself from something which he is staring at. [...] His face is turned towards the past. Where *we* see the appearance of a chain of events, *he* sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble and hurls it before his feet. [...] But a storm is blowing from Paradise, it has caught itself up in his wings and is so strong that the Angel can no

longer close them. The storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the rubble-heap before him grows sky-high. That which we call progress, is *this* storm. (Benjamin 2019c, 5–6)⁶

Using this kind of argumentation, Benjamin becomes the *tenant-lieu* (placeholder)⁷ of a particular “metaphysics.” We can say that—along with the fundamental concept of *aura*—another Concept (*Begriff*) takes its place in the *universum* of his theoretical strategy. That is—“the dialectical image.” This concept means that metaphysics should be hibernated/“frozen” in its historical moving backwards. Benjamin is a historical governor of *the new discourse of the image*, in the technological age of the end, or even death, of metaphysics. His enterprise is a peculiar “new enchantment” (counterposed to Weber’s theory of disenchantment, *Entzauberung*). In the profane regime of contemporaneity, metaphysics has not evaporated or gone away. Benjamin’s language is a decisive breakthrough to the essence of things, an intuitive recognition of that which is at “the core of Being” and its presence (παρουσία). What is the meaning of the concept of “the dialectical picture” (*das dialektische Bild*)? The picture is crystalized at a standstill, where the moment of its truth has been captured. The essence of metaphysics is the essence of those specific *dialectical images*.

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Excursus on fragmentation

Benjamin can be regarded as a witness to “the short history” of the demission of the Whole (cf. Čekić 2018, 130). The abovementioned depiction of the

6 There is also Laurie Anderson’s version of this thesis on the album *Strange Angels* (1989), in a song entitled “The Dream Before”: “Hansel and Gretel are alive and well / And they’re living in Berlin / She is a cocktail waitress / He had a part in a Fassbinder film / And they sit around at night now / Drinking schnapps and gin / And she says, ‘Hansel, you’re really bringing me down.’ / And he says, ‘Gretel, you can really be a bitch.’ / He says, ‘I’ve wasted my life on our stupid legend / When my one and only love was the wicked witch’ // She said, ‘What is history?’ And he said, ‘History is an angel / Being blown backwards into the future’ / He said: ‘History is a pile of debris / And the angel wants to go back and fix things / To repair the things that have been broken / But there is a storm blowing from Paradise / And the storm keeps blowing the angel / Backwards into the future / And this storm, this storm is called / Progress.’”

7 As could have probably been said by Jacques-Alain Miller, in Miller 2019.

Angelus Novus is his main testament to this fact. Palpably influenced by Franz Rosenzweig's book *Der Stern der Erlösung* (*The Star of Redemption*; 1921), Jewish thinkers of the era (Adorno, Benjamin, Scholem) began to speak differently than the old school of thought inaugurated by the German Classical Idealism. The starting point consisting of the Absolute was no longer convincing in the epoch wherein new technologies came to the fore. It has become necessary to develop "new modes of thinking." The picture of modernity as a whole was broken into pieces. Against the Hegelian scientific-philosophical system, there appeared a multiplicity of artistic and philosophical perspectives which have put this scientific certainty into question. Rosenzweig insisted that reality is fragmented, comprised of many individualities that stand against each other. The monumental *Ge-Stell* of the German (Hegelian) Idealism has become doubtful. Kant and Hegel were the last thinkers who wrote *Aesthetics* without being artists or *connoisseurs* of art in its embodiments. Th. W. Adorno, in his *Negative Dialectics* (and *Minima Moralia*), has declared that "The Whole is un-truth/ful" (i.e., *false*).

That which Walter Benjamin—in his crucial essay *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*—calls the ruins, as a matter of fact, are fragments of "the old world" which began to fall apart in an unstoppable process. That becomes evident with the appearance of film and the loss of *aura*. He uses the technique of *constellations* as a model for this kind of new thinking, in order to reach the meaning of events that were beginning to happen in the wake of a complete defragmentation of the old world. These *constellations* are part of "montage-like constructivism." The latter technique—appearing after the historic avantgardes and the birth of technological reproducibility: objects, buildings, texts, and pictures (fragmented, broken, dispersed, and expelled from their usual contexts)—should be re-composed into *new constellations*. For Benjamin, these "constellations" are strictly critical towards the old conceptual patterns and systems. These figures form contingent and changeable patterns of thought. Every construction of these constellations should be used as one permutation among innumerable other possible configurations, connections, and correspondences (cf. Čekić 2018, 135). Benjamin's constructivist principle of thinking presupposes "the stoppage of thought" (the standstill picture), which brings about some kind of a *shock* that crystalizes it like a *monad* (fundamental term of Leibniz's philosophy). That is the meaning of the concept

of “a dialectical picture.” Benjamin frequently used the example of the Dadaist art as a paradigm for the effect which films brought to the fore. The common denominator for both of the phenomena is “cognitive Shock.” The artistic manifestations of Dada became the focal point of a scandal, in a manner that attacks the perception of viewers, just like it was the case with movies shortly thereafter. For Benjamin, the birth of cinematography is decisive because it has the possibility to provoke every kind of human response, where the so-called “optical unconscious” becomes a constitutive element. Jovan Čekić says that “[w]hen, with Hitchcock, avantgarde shock was replaced by *suspense* and mental images—as Deleuze concludes—then we leave the representation for some kind of things” (Čekić 2018 136), and embark upon the textures as *a network* of relations between the phenomena. The *montage*, as a major film technique, predicts *a network* with multiplicity and unrecognizability of knots.

The effects of photography and movies are not only asserted in the fact that the masses become decisively important. Much more fundamentally, *the loss of aura* and the “de-territorialization” (Deleuze) of the original was the sign

236 Benjamin already recognized in his famous essay:

In photography, exhibition value begins to displace cult value all along the line. (Benjamin 2019d, 7)

Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie. (ibid., 14)

Nevertheless, we can stress here the other conclusion: “But cult value does not give way without resistance.” (ibid., 7) Before explaining this, let us recall with a bit more depth Benjamin’s fundamental deduction of *aura*. For with the “loss of aura,” for the first time in history, the work has been redeemed from its parasitic existence in ritual, replacing itself, and displacing itself into *the political*. It is not just that the “aura” has been demised, but—with this destruction of the auratic function—the arts become equal with the liberation of material facts from its “shell.” This shell was not only immanent to the field of the sacred and artistic. It was necessarily connected with material conditions

in the production of commodities and social relationships. The whole reality should be “re-territorialized” and saved from the prison-world, depicted specifically in Foucault and Bentham’s *panopticon*.

This “flâneurism” through fragments was very enjoyable for Benjamin (cf. Grøtta 2015). The demise of the *Whole* was his diagnosis for the advent of *photography and film* (which especially came to the fore in “the age of its mechanic reproduction”). Modernity has come to an end. We should not regret this end, we should feel “no remorse” (Motörhead compilation from the year 1984!). Chaos, brought about in theory by art and essayistic philosophy, will serve us, as Benjamin predicted, as some kind of weapon against capitalism and... fascism.

But what about the aura? Do we have to keep it nowadays, and for what purpose? If I can jump to some conclusion much before the end of the analysis employed here, the answer for keeping the aura lies precisely in the aforementioned. The *aura of reading, understanding, writing, talking, and thinking* as a model for saving our souls should find its way in the *re-politicization* of the arts in the age of “the cultural logic of late capitalism.” There is no other way to *keep* this important term—*alive*.

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The work of Benjamin in the age of *visual studies*

What role does Walter Benjamin have in the contemporary social and artistic framework? Where does his theory touch upon the essence of times in which we live? We can answer these questions by drawing, or at least sketching, the picture of contemporary art. Namely, its paradox is that it lives in an age where the visual culture of media is the dominant mode of artistic production. Contemporary art belongs to the interdisciplinary area of studying cultural phenomena. Particularly, its place is inside the visual arts as different regimes of visual representation and creation of new identities. And culture? “Culture has become an event of the total performance of life itself.” (Paić 2014) *Visual studies* and *Bildwissenschaft* (science of pictures) are part of the so-called “pictorial turn” (W. J. T. Mitchell and Gottfried Böhm). What does that mean for our approach to the matter of the essence of art nowadays? The picture in the age of technical/technological reproduction is replicated, multiplied...

it is informational-communicational. As a matter of fact, contemporary art became the “integrated spectacle of pure image” (Debord) beyond human/inhuman relationships. W. J. T. Mitchell’s concept of “the pictorial turn” has been fulfilled by the latest bio-scientific developments. Basically, on such a platform, we can say that life and technology are inseparably connected in a new experience of *visuality*.

The communicational regime of signs in contemporary media points to the fact that *visuality* and *visualization* are new forms of telematic presence. (Flusser and Weibel, as cited in: Paić 2008, 20)

In *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, Benjamin has described the idea of artwork in its technological reproducibility with “the loss of aura.” But new art as media-art has much more to do with *aura* than simply refer to it. The very notion of art has already become some concept of life itself. All these facts are strictly connected with the technological character of arts.
238 But should we ascertain that technology today is *the condition sine qua non* of art?

Benjamin’s efforts must be analyzed inside the totality of technology as a kind of a metaphysical framework for the understanding of contemporary art. Although he is aware of the revolutionary potentialities of art becoming a part of mass-reception, we should be careful regarding the real possibilities and consequences of these changes. Danko Grlić says that “the anticipatory power for all authentic art” lies in its potentiality to keep “what is resistant, revolting, and critical towards actuality” (Grlić 1984, 42). Does technology, after all, gives us freedom? Undoubtedly, it does make things function much “easier.” But it also posits some boundaries to the true self-realization of man. How can this be explained?

When freedom is reduced to liberties, we are in the position of blindly following the rules of “Capitalism as Religion” (the title of a famous fragment by Benjamin).⁸ When we take “voluntary servitude” (E. de La Boétie) as

⁸ The following lines are a statement on this made by Stiff Little Fingers in the song “Suspect Device” from the album *Inflammable Matter* (1979): “They take away our

something normal, we agree that technology and the culture of images are all we need. We take *pictures of everything*, take *selfies*, and use others “*surf-techniques*” upon digital textures as some kind of wishful “thinking” and behavior. That happens when the “liberties,” i.e., the un-freedom, are taken for granted... when such “a state of things” has becomes “normal, practical, efficient...”

But what, for Benjamin, should be the real role of art as a liberating weapon? Against the functional usefulness, the false non-conflict, and the manipulative pseudo-harmony...? The art of photography, and especially film, should serve us as the “liberating weapon.” Because, as Heinz Paetzold had said, film has introduced a kind of “an unreflected pseudo-aura” (cited in: Grlić 1984, 52). That was not just in the case of the media-creating star-system, but, for better reasons, also in the artistic creativity of real moviemakers that made film the “form that thinks” (Bergman, Fellini, Godard, and Deleuze are the best examples of these efforts). Technique/technology should have the function of articulating the “meaning” which could be transferred by films/artworks. Because art—in its finest moments—transcends “the sphere of necessity” (which Hegel defines as “civil society,” *Bürgergesellschaft*). Artistic experience transcends the boundaries of its temporal facticity and social reality. Benjamin is aware of these facts, as was his friend/theoretic rival Adorno, who introduced the category of “culture industry,” in order to explain what happens when artistry is included in cultural regimes of organizing all activities for the goals of capitalism. Benjamin recognized this in the *Theses on the Philosophy of History*:

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For what he [i.e., the historical materialist; M. K.] surveys as the cultural heritage is part and parcel of a lineage [Abkunft: descent] which he cannot contemplate without horror. It owes its existence not only to the toil of the great geniuses, who created it, but also to the nameless drudgery of its contemporaries. There has never been a document of

freedom / In the name of liberty / Why can't they all just clear off / Why can't they let us be / They make us feel indebted / For saving us from hell / And then they put us through it;/ It's time the bastards fell.”

culture, which is not simultaneously one of barbarism. And just as it is itself not free from barbarism, neither is it free from the process of transmission, in which it falls from one set of hands into another. (Benjamin 2019c, 5)

Adorno, in his *Negative Dialectics*, says that “the experience of the art recipient really needs, primarily, ‘coming out,’ and, if you wish, alienation, that is happening as subjection of a subject to a discipline of artwork itself” (as cited in: Grlić 1984, 73). The artwork, also for Benjamin, cannot be reduced to concrete, empirical, socio-political tasks, it should keep a kind of an *aura*, at least in its political sense. But the artist should fight against the taking of the free time from the workers, which is the entrepreneurship of the culture industry. Free time has, therefore, become the extension of alienating the working time.

240 But what we should fundamentally find unsupportable in Benjamin’s theory is the division between the aesthetic, *auratic* art and the post-aesthetic art of mass reception. The aesthetical as such cannot successfully be negated by something that is ideological-political and technological. As Danko Grlić would say, the artistic itself is the place where the inherent *revolutionary power* lies. Although Benjamin—in his own individually suggestive manner—rejected parasitic aesthetical, academic, self-indulgent indoctrination, he has not precisely formulated the essential alternative. That is understandable owing to his fragmented way of thinking. We can say, with Danko Grlić, that “there is no fight between aesthetics and ideology, but between *both of these parasites* and *art* itself” (Grlić 1984, 79).

Finally, what is Benjamin’s statement on visuality as such? Can an image be the ultimate horizon for knowledge regarding art in the age of mechanical reproduction? This was depicted in his famous fragment on Baudelaire entitled “Zentralpark”:

The course of history, seen in terms of the concept of catastrophe, can actually claim no more attention from thinkers than a child’s kaleidoscope, which with every turn of the hand dissolves the established order into a new array. There is profound truth in this *image*. The

concepts of the ruling class have always been the mirrors than enable the *image* of “order” to prevail. The kaleidoscope must be smashed. (!)
(as cited in: Grøtta 2015, 164)

Instead of a conclusion: The preserved concept of *aura* in the age of the digital

What is “the breaking of the silence” (of thinking) in Benjamin’s discourse? *The power of image over language*. For a German thinker of Jewish origin, the magical word is *aura*. Benjamin thinks in *images of thought* rather than in concepts! In them, there appears space-time for an understanding of Being different than the overwhelming nihilism of world history. The category of “aura” is the modern supplement for what was “sacred” and is basically connected with the growth of a new society, determined by the self-development of technologies. Instead of the “auratic” characteristics of traditional art, film and photography are directed towards a fragmented subject of collective reception. But despite Benjamin’s conclusion that we are witnessing “the loss of aura,” namely:

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[...] that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic process whose significance points beyond the realm of art (Benjamin 2019d, 4),

his stance towards this fundamental concept of his thinking on art is ambivalent. Besides, on the one hand, being the concept that was abandoned in the new age of mechanical reproduction, on the other hand, he still needs it as a kind of a salvation for the failure of humanity as such.

With the appearance of photography and film—both visual arts confirm the verdict of the predominance of image over language—, we are confronted with the overcoming (*Aufhebung*) of the difference between the artwork and life itself. For Benjamin, aesthetic liberation from the constraints of traditional art—consisting in the power of the masses and their participation in modern technology—needs to be fulfilled by complete, i.e., *political liberation*. Thus, some kind of conclusion to this paper will be inherently linked to his explicit

devotion to the political revolution. Of course, this is in accordance with the *epilogue* to the famous essay. The concept of “aura” should somehow be resurrected from its burial in the visual arts of technological reproduction!

Boris Groys’s “profane illumination” of Benjamin’s “politicization of art”

Walter Benjamin directed all his efforts—not only in his theoretical writings, but also in his tragic fate—against a deadly enemy, *fascism*. *Theses on the Philosophy of History*, which are regarded as his testamentary work, are completely dedicated to the building of his own specific philosophy of history, based on “historic materialism.” That should be decisive in his fight against the seemingly invincible praxis of the fascist movement. In the thesis VIII, we read:

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The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “emergency situation” in which we live is the rule. We must arrive at a concept of history which corresponds to this. Then it will become clear that the task before us is the introduction of a real state of emergency; and our position in the struggle against Fascism will thereby improve. (Benjamin 2019c, 5)

So, how is it possible to create “a real state of emergency”? By following the order to politicize art as such. That was also the goal of the historical avantgarde in the first three decades of the 20th century. German philosopher of art, Boris Groys, developed this thesis in his book *Topology of Art* (*Topologie der Kunst*; 2003; cf. also Groys 2008, 53–65). For him, Benjamin’s concept of *aura* is in reality the product of the modern technology of reproduction. In other words, and paradoxically at first sight, “aura” comes to life at the moment of its disappearance. How could this be possible? And how is this connected with Benjamin’s explicit words about its loss in the age of mechanical reproduction? Although the original has its place and time in the “here” and the “now,” while its copy is “outside of here and now,” it is, strictly speaking, without space and without history. Reproduction as *de-territorialization* and *re-territorialization* (Deleuze’s terms) decides the status of aura in contemporary art.

Boris Groys arrives at the conclusion that technological reproduction as such does not include aura or its disappearance, or its loss, but its disappearance or loss, even its decay, happens when the new aesthetic taste of the masses is established, which consciously replace the origin with its copy (Groys 2008, 63).⁹ There are two appearances of this inclusion of the masses in this process. The “aestheticization of politics” in Nazism, for Groys, is merely a *simulacrum*, or a copy of the mass as an object excluded from real scientific-technological development. For Benjamin, as was stressed by Groys, communism has solved the riddle of history. The reason for this conclusion lies in the fact that this political-social movement has placed the masses in their right position. That is, the proletarian masses have become the subject of history after “the end of history.”

Communism is the legitimate successor of the avantgarde artistic movements, because avantgarde art, in its radical destruction of tradition, has made possible “the return of aura” as a figure of “profane illumination” by its consent to the scientific-technological faith of the self-development of new media. Communism opens up the possibility of regaining “the open work” (a term used by U. Eco) in which, with the loss and disappearance of aura— the new certainty of *aura* has achieved resurrection. On the other hand, as an art copy of an inauthentic myth and the secularized religious-cult staging of “the beautiful” and “the sublime” in modern times, Nazism/fascism is the real regime of the death of aura in the arts of mass-spectacle (this was later developed by Guy Debord in *The Society of Spectacle*).

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Groys is, thus, (at least) the supporter of “a coming back” of *aura* in the arts of installation and the performative-conceptual turn epitomized by *visual arts* in *the age of images*. He follows Benjamin’s idea of “the politicization of arts,” which concludes the author’s essay. Let us recall these words again:

“*Fiat ars—pereat mundus*,” says Fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that

9 “If reproduction makes copies out of originals, installation makes originals out of copies. Our modern way of approaching art can by no means be reduced to a ‘decay of aura.’ Rather, the modern enacts a complex play of removing from sites and placing in (new) sites, of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, of removing aura and restoring aura.” (Groys 2008, 63)

has been changed by technology. This is evidently the consummation of “*l’art pour l’art*.” Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art. (Benjamin 2019d, 20)

Final words

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We all know “*the power of images*.” We have seen it at work in Leni Riefenstahl’s famous film *Triumph of the Will* (*Triumph des Willens*; 1935). In this aesthetically perfectly designed movie, she uses all of the inherent possibilities of the moving camera, as well as the montage techniques (the “optical unconscious,” as Benjamin would have probably said), creating thus a monumental, artistically inventive work of art (a *Gesamtkunstwerk*, Wagner would say). The film, with its formal brilliance, epitomizes *the image’s will to power*, and is magically imposed upon us with its many technological strategies, which lately became usual (useful) as codes for a re-reading and re-thinking of the new language of film. Hitler, on the one side, and the masses of 700,000, on the other, make up two protagonists in the perfectly manipulative propagandistic machinery (*Machenschaft*, as Heidegger would have probably said in the 1930s!). This was a real masterpiece by a very talented author. From the first scenes of the plane’s arrival—with NSDAP leaders and Hitler landing at Nürnberg for a meeting of *the party*—to the diabolically nocturnal torchlight-parade at the meeting’s ending, all is posited in servitude to the divine ideal, incorporated in the motto: “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer.”

What is the other pole of this *power of images*? In the book *Modern Times. Essays on Temporality in Art and Politics* (2017), Jacques Rancière gives a description that perfectly fits Benjamin’s argument at the end of *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*:

I wish to make this point about his conflict of modernities by looking at a short sequence of a film, namely Dziga Vertov’s *Man with*

a Movie Camera (*Chelovek s kino-apparatom*, 1929). This film [which was obviously familiar with Benjamin's revolutionary film theory; M. K.] is a part of a project that was widely shared at the time by Soviet avant-garde artists, in spite of their divergences; the project of breaking the separation between art and life, of using the means of art no more to produce art works destined to the enjoyment of art *connoisseurs* or *Bourgeois aesthetes* but to create new forms of collective life. It is a revolutionary film [...] (Rancière 2017, 70)

But, as Rancière lucidly continues, it is revolutionary not because it is a movie *about* revolution. Furthermore, it is not a “simple work of art” belonging to an art-field called “cinema” and dedicated to the representation of “a social event” (like something that is marketed nowadays through the so-called “social networks”), which is known in history as the October Revolution. What is *Man with a Movie Camera* in reality? Rancière argues that this movie is an activity which, among other activities, is constituting communism. Not communism as a political system, but as a “new fabric of common sensible experience” (Rancière 2017, 70–71). Wasn't this also the idea of visibility and images in Benjamin's philosophy of art? Vertov—as if he would be an unconscious follower of Benjamin's theory—does not represent communism as a result of planned organization and a hierarchy of tasks. On the contrary: Vertov has created—with the array of all the then-known technologies of mechanical reproduction!—the common rhythm/beat of all human activities. But, also technological...

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* * *

Finally, what is the place of Walter Benjamin and his ultimate essay *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* within the philosophical *theory of images*? Furthermore, what is *aura* in today's constellations of the “cultural logic of late capitalism”?

For the most part, its significance lies in our *idea of reading, writing, talking, and thinking*. We can add also... *watching movies*. This is a kind of a model for “saving our souls” in the age of nihilism, epitomized by the mass media of communications, i.e., the informational-communicational paradigm. The

phenomenon of *visuality* as such is not something bad, or good, in its own right. If we take seriously the predicaments detected in Deleuze and Guattari's last book, *What is Philosophy?* (1991),¹⁰ we should also take very seriously the perils of "the creeping fascization" all around us, notably in the last few years.

They have proposed the philosophical task of gaining a certain type of "a non-fascist existence." The connection between capitalism and schizophrenia should be broken by a new way of defining the activity of philosophy. Was that not also Benjamin's intention in the final words of his essay on... *aura*? It could be said that this essay is not about "aura," but is dedicated to the necessary task with which we are confronted today. That is... *fascism*. To recognize *it* everywhere around (and between) us is a matter of urgency. This must not be postponed.

Walter Benjamin, "the sad melancholic, but uncompromising fighter for justice" (Grlić 1984, 86), stands with us in this task. The writing of Benjamin is a human's cry over "the traumatic consciousness of the existential disaster of the individual and his/her community" (Paić). He gives us enormous encouragement not to surrender to it.

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MED KADROM IN MONTAŽO

KONCEPT ČASA V FILMSKI TEORII IN PRAKSI ANDREJA TARKOVskega

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Povzetek

V prispevku je predstavljeno, da Tarkovski čas razume kot subjektivno kategorijo, ki je ne moremo meriti in ki je vezana na našo izkušnjo življenja. Filmska podoba ima posebno zmožnost, da lahko ta čas dobesedno ujame. Ker ujeti čas režiserju služi kot osnovni material za ustvarjanje, je ustvarjanje filma na določen način kiparjenje v času. Čas, ki je v kader ujet, nosi svojo specifično napetost, ki ji avtor pravi »pritisk časa« in ki gledalcu omogoča, da čas, ki teče v kadru, začuti. Tarkovski se poslužuje

določenih tehnik, ki mu omogočijo, da ujame čas z njegovim naravnim pritiskom: najbolj znano sredstvo je »dolgi kader«. Zaradi tega razloga se tudi oddalji od klasične sovjetske teorije montaže, ki montažo razume kot temelj filma, in na primarno mesto namesto nje postavi posamezen kader.

Ključne besede: Andrej Tarkovski, film, čas, kader, montaža.

Between Shot and Montage. The Concept of Time in Film Theory and Practice of Andrei Tarkovsky

Abstract

250 The paper presents Tarkovsky's understanding of time as a subjective category that cannot be measured and is connected with our experience of life. The film image has the specific ability to literally capture time. Because the director can use captured time as the basic material for artistic creation, the filmmaking process is, in a certain sense, sculpting in time. Time which is captured in a shot has a tension that Tarkovsky calls "time pressure" and which makes it possible for the viewer to feel the flow of time in the shot. Tarkovsky uses different techniques to capture time with its natural pressure: the best-known technique he uses is the "long shot." This is the reason why he distanced himself from the classic Soviet theory of montage, according to which montage is the foundation of cinema: he replaced montage with the "single shot" as the primary element of cinema.

Keywords: Andrei Tarkovsky, cinema, time, shot, montage.

1. Uvod

V filmski teoriji koncept časa od nekdaj igra zelo pomembno vlogo. Različni filmski avtorji in teoretiki so k problemu časa pristopali na najrazličnejše načine ter mu tudi pripisovali različno stopnjo pomembnosti. Za ruskega režiserja Andreja Tarkovskega (1932–1986) je čas osrednjega pomena. Kakšno mesto zaseda koncept časa v njegovi filmski teoriji, je razvidno že iz naslovov njegovih del in del o njem. Edina knjiga, ki jo je sam napisal z namenom, da bo izdana, nosi naslov *Ujeti čas* (1986),¹ njegovi zbrani dnevniki pa so bili posthumno izdani pod naslovom *Čas v času* (1991).² Dokumentarni film, ki ga je Tarkovski posnel v sodelovanju s Toninom Guerro in prikazuje njune pogovore med iskanjem primernih lokacij v Italiji, ki bodo uporabljene za snemanje filma *Nostalgija*, nosi naslov *Čas potovanja* (1983).³

V pričujočem prispevku bom poskusil predstaviti mesto, ki ga koncept časa zaseda v filmski teoriji in praksi Tarkovskega. Da bi oris kar najbolje uspel, se ga bom lotil v treh korakih. V prvem bom predstavil, kako Tarkovski razume čas: videli bomo, da čas razume kot neizmerljivo subjektivno kategorijo. V drugem koraku bomo pogledali, kako takšno razumevanje časa zaznamuje njegovo teorijo filma. V tem delu se bom osredotočil na zmožnost kamere, da čas ujame in shrani, avtorju pa ta ujeti čas nato služi kot material za ustvarjanje. V tretjem koraku bom predstavil še, kako je teorija časa v praksi zaznamovala metodologijo dela Tarkovskega. V tem delu se bo pokazalo, da njegova odločitve za »dolge kadre« ne temelji le na estetskih preferencah, temveč gre tudi za intelektualno odločitev na podlagi lastne teorije, ki zavrača primarnost montaže.

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2. Andrej Tarkovski in čas

Za Tarkovskega koncept časa ni bil le teoretičen problem, ki ga moramo raziskati, ampak ga je težil na osebni ravni. V svojem dnevniku je 15. februarja

1 Delo je izšlo leta 1986 v nemščini kot *Die versiegelte Zeit* (*Zapečateni čas*; takšen je tudi naslov v ruščini in francoščini) in leta 1987 v angleščini kot *Sculpting in Time* (*Kiparjenje v času*). Slovenski prevajalec Igor Koršič se je odločil za naslov *Ujeti čas* (1997).

2 V angleščini *Time Within Time*. Tarkovski je svojim dnevnikom dal naslov »Martirologija«.

3 V italijanščini (originalni naslov) *Tempo di viaggio*, v angleščini *Voyage in Time*.

1972 zapisal: »Dolga leta me je mučila gotovost, da nas v sferi Časa čakajo najbolj izjemna odkritja. O času vemo manj kot o čemer koli drugem.« (Tarkovsky 2018, 58)

Tarkovski je na čas gledal podobno kot Henri Bergson, ki se je s časom ukvarjal v delih *Ustvarjalna evolucija* in *Snov in spomin*. Po njegovem mnenju je družba dejanski čas potegnila iz abstraktnega sveta v prostorski svet in ga začela meriti z urami in s koledarji. Za Bergsona to ni resnični čas, saj resnični čas po njegovem mnenju ne more biti izmerjen in dokumentiran na striktno matematičen način. »Za oba, tako Bergsona kot Tarkovskega, je ‚resnični‘ čas notranje življenje človeka in ga ne moremo meriti, lahko ga le čutimo skozi zavest.« (McSweeney 2015, 43) Čas je primarno vezan na zaznavo sveta in je v tem smislu vselej subjektiven. Moj subjektivni čas je torej točno to: moj čas. Terence McSweeney, predavatelj zgodovine filma in televizije na Univerzi Solent, pravi, da je čas, kot ga razumeta Bergson in Tarkovski, »neprekinjeno spreminjajoč se in utripajoč tok posameznih dogodkov« (McSweeney 2015, 43).

252 Tarkovski se strinja, da človek lahko »je« le tako, da je v času, in njegova zavest lahko »je« le na način, da je v času. Tako na primer pravi: »Čas, v katerem živi človek, mu daje priložnost, da se prepozna kot moralno, k iskanju resnice obvezano bitje.« (Tarkovski 1997, 46) Zavest biva (se odvija) v času. A tisto, kar je za Tarkovskega še pomembnejše, je to, da »dejanski čas« biva v zavesti. To, kar zares je čas, je življenjska atmosfera »jaza«, ki izgine, če se pretrga vez med osebo in eksistenčnimi pogoji zanjo. Ko Tarkovski pravi, da človek potrebuje čas, da se konstituira, da uresniči svojo osebnost, v prvi vrsti ne govori o linearnem toku časa (zaporedju »zdajev«), ki človeku omogoča, da nekaj stori, izpelje. »Zgodovina in evolucija še nista Čas.⁴ Obe sta posledici.« (Tarkovski 1997, 45) Čas je za Tarkovskega v subjektivnem »odvijanju« zavesti. Ker je dejanski čas ta individualni čas v zavesti, smrt avtomatično pomeni tudi smrt individualnega časa. Čas, v katerem je (se odvija) zavest, lahko torej merimo in mislimo, dejanskega Časa, ki se odvija v zavesti, pa ne moremo. V

4 Tarkovski besedo »čas« pogosto piše z veliko začetnico, v dnevniku jo na nekaterih mestih zapiše celo kot »ČAS«, a je ne uporablja dovolj konsistentno, da bi lahko brez dvomov trdili, da je »Čas« subjektivni čas, ki ga ločimo od objektivnega časa, kakršnega, na primer, meri ura. Z veliko začetnico ga sam pišem tam, kjer želim eksplicitno poudariti to razliko.

tem smislu Bergson pravi, da dejanskega časa ne mislimo, temveč ga živimo (prim. McSweeney 2015, 43).

Pomembno je torej predvsem dvoje. To, čemur Tarkovski pravi »čas«, je subjektivni, individualni, notranji čas, ki ni izmerljiv, in, ker je živ, v človekovi zavesti teče s spreminjajočo se hitrostjo ter omogoča in zaznamuje zaznavo sveta okoli nas. Če umremo, umre z nami. Druga pomembna stvar pa je ta, da je Čas v zavesti in zavest v času. Res je, da tu s »čas« mislimo dva različna koncepta časa, a zdi se, da iz te formule Tarkovski kasneje izpelje, da je za avtentično umetniško (filmsko) podobo nujno, da je podoba v času in da je Čas v podobi.⁵ Iz te formulacije pa izhaja njegova znana fraza (in naslov izdanih dnevnikov): *Čas v času* (*Time Within Time*).

3. Ujeti čas

Fotoaparat ujame moment, določen trenutek v času, ki je teoretično (če bi bili pogoji idealni) na fotografiji ujet za večno. Analogno s tem primerom videokamera ujame čas. To je za Tarkovskega ključno načelo filmske umetnosti in od tod tudi ime za slovensko izdajo njegove teoretske knjige. S filmom človek dobi možnost zadržati čas, z njim manipulirati (ga reproducirati, upočasnjevati, vrteti nazaj ...) in ga za vselej shraniti v kovinske škatle za filmske kolute.⁶ Čeprav se tudi nekatere druge umetnostne zvrsti odvijajo v času (gledališče) in celo na določen način shranijo čas (posneta glasba), pa je film edinstven v tem, da fiksira dejanski čas. Film fiksira Čas. Čas v dejanski obliki, kot ga poznamo iz vsakdanje zaznave. V popolnoma enaki obliki, kot se dejanski Čas odvija v zavesti, se odvija v kadru, v filmski podobi. In kakor v zavesti, bo tudi Čas v filmu vselej individualni Čas, saj kamera postane dobresedno oko: skupaj z očesom in zaznavo tudi tok časa pripada kameri in ne več objektivni naravi

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5 Povezava med »čas-zavest« in »čas-umetniška podoba« je za Tarkovskega ključna zato, ker sam kot bistvo umetnosti, in še posebej filma, razume ravno to, da ji uspe posnemati življenje tako natančno, da ga občinstvo občuti kot dejansko življenje. Filmska podoba bo zares »umetniška« torej, če je gledalec skoraj ne bo mogel ločiti od prvoosebne izkušnje vsakdanjega življenja.

6 Posebej zanimivo je, da Kris Kelvin v filmu *Solaris* na Solaris s seboj vzame v kovinsko škatlo spravljeno rastlino v prsti. To bo njegov spomin na Zemljo. Tokrat je v kovinsko škatlo ujet in shranjen prostor.

(prim. Martin 2005, 86). Tudi druge umetnosti se torej lahko odvijajo v času, a le film je zmožen tega, da se Čas odvija v njem. V intervjuju, ki ga je leta 1982 v Italiji s Tarkovskim opravil Tony Mitchell, je Tarkovski dejal:

Zame je film edinstven v svoji dimenziji časa. To ne pomeni, da se odvija v času – enako velja za glasbo, gledališče in balet. Mislim na čas v dobesednem smislu. Kaj je sličica, interval med »Akcija« in »Rez«? Film fiksira realnost v smislu časa – gre za način shranjevanja časa. Nobena druga oblika umetnosti ne more na tak način fiksirati in shraniti časa. Film je mozaik, sestavljen iz časa. (Gianvito 2006, 77)

Film zato med drugim ni prenosljiv v literaturo ali gledališče. V intervjuju iz leta 1986 je Tarkovski dejal, da filma *Žrtvovanje* (1986) ne bo prenesel v gledališče, ker bi ga moral popolnoma spremeniti, popolnoma prilagoditi specifičnim zakonitostim gledališča, ki časa ne more zadržati (prim. Gianvito 2006, 181).

254 Tarkovski seveda ni bil ne prvi ne edini, ki je spregovoril o tem ključnem aspektu filma. McSweeney pravi, da je bil že *Prihod vlaka na postajo Ciotat* (1896), ki sta ga posnela brata Lumière, dobesedno ujeti čas. Gledalci so namreč lahko vsak dan (film naj bi predvajali nekaj dni zapored) odšli v gledališče pogledat isti prihod vlaka na postajo. Ljudje so neposredno občutili, kako je bil čas dobesedno ujet in prikazan vsak dan znova. Še pomembneje pa je, da je bil posnetek neobdelan in neprekinjen, kar je omogočilo, da so gledalci začutili že znan življenjski ritem časa. Poleg režiserjev so v diskusiji o času sodelovali tudi mnogi teoretiki. André Bazin, francoski filmski kritik in teoretik, ki je med drugim pisal tudi o »mumifikaciji časa« in naj bi ga, po besedah filmske kritičarke Maje Turovskaje, v povojnem času brali skoraj vsi ljubitelji filma, je v svojem delu *Kaj je film?* dejal: »Sedaj je podoba stvari prvič tudi podoba njihovega trajanja, lahko bi rekli mumificirana sprememba.« (Bazin 2005, 15) Tudi Gilles Deleuze, ko govori o Tarkovskem, zapiše: »Čas postane temelj temeljev filma, kot zvok v glasbi, kot barva v slikarstvu.« (Deleuze 1989, 288)

Četudi so mnogi režiserji in teoretiki govorili o konceptu časa kot bistveni zakonitosti filma, je Tarkovski edinstven v tem pogledu, da je nanj stavil prav vse in da čas ni zaznamoval le njegove teorije, temveč je popolnoma zaznamoval njegov praktični pristop k snemanju filmov. Turovskaja, ki je Tarkovskega tudi

osebno dobro poznala, je sama dejala: »Čas je bil ključni koncept za celoten pristop Tarkovskega k filmu.« (Turovskaya 1989, 85) Zaznamoval pa je tudi njegov pogled na umetnost in umetnikovo odgovornost ter posledično vplival na njegovo celotno življenje.

Čas, ujet in ohranjen v resničnih oblikah in pojavih, je za Tarkovskega bistvo filmske umetnosti. V *Ujetem času* pravi, da je filmska podoba opazovanje življenjskih dejstev v toku časa, »organiziranih primerno oblikam življenja samega in ob upoštevanju njegovih časovnih zakonitosti« (Tarkovski 1997, 53). In ravno s shranjevanjem časa »se je človek dokopal do matrice realnega življenja« (ibid., 49). Robert Bird, profesor za slovanske jezike in literaturo na univerzi v Chicagu, je v delu *Andrej Tarkovski: Elementi filma* duhovito, a pomenljivo dejal, da sta scenarij in scenografija le pasti, v kateri se ujame čas (prim. Bird 2008, 171).

4. Kiparjenje v času

Za razliko od drugih oblik je film zmožen zajeti in uprizoriti tok časa, ustaviti čas, ga skorajda posedovati v neskončnosti. Rekel bi, da je film kiparjenje časa. (Gianvito 2006, 100)

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Kiparjenje v času (*Sculpting in Time*), kar je med drugim angleški naslov teoretske knjige Tarkovskega, je prispodoba, ki jo Tarkovski uporablja za opis režiserjevega dela. Tako kot je za kiparja osnovni material velik kamen ali velik kos lesa, marmorja, je za režiserja material dobesedno čas. Tarkovski sledi Aristotelovemu konceptu, da dokončano umetniško delo potencialno vselej že obstaja v materialu (prim. McSweeney 2015, 21). Tudi Michelangelo je v tem smislu dejal, da je kos marmorja živ in ima neskončno tridimenzionalnih možnosti.⁷ Kipar si že vnaprej predstavlja končano delo, ki je vselej že vsebovano v bloku marmorja, njegova naloga pa je, da od bloka marmorja

⁷ Nekateri Michelangelovi kipi so ohranili dele osnovnega bloka materiala. *Suženj* (*Atlas*), npr., načeloma velja za kip iz serije nedokončanih, ki naj bi krasili grobnico papeža Julija II, vendar nekateri strokovnjaki (npr. Valerio Mariani) menijo, da je Michelangelo namenoma ohranil dele bloka kot del svojevrstne umetniške izkušnje, ki kaže na ustvarjalni proces kiparja (prim. McSweeney 2015, 24–25).

odstrani vse dele, ki niso del njegove predstave, in tako ostane (in nastane) umetniško delo: kip. Tarkovski pravi, da po popolnoma analognem principu režiser iz bloka časa (svojega materiala), ki je sestavljen iz nerazčlenjenega kompleksa življenjskih resnic, odstrani »vse nepotrebno in ohrani samo tisto, kar bo postalo sestavina njegovega bodočega filma. Izbiranje, ki je skupno vsem umetnostim.« (Tarkovski 1997, 50) Z drugimi besedami: režiser iz bloka (svojega individualnega) časa odstrani vse, kar ne sodi zraven, in obdrži (ter zadrži) v kadru le Čas, ki bo del filma.

Ideja Tarkovskega za (teoretično) idealni film je bila, da bi kot originalni material uporabili celotno dolžino posameznikovega življenja, ki bi bilo posneto na filmski trak sekundo po sekundo od rojstva do smrti. Material bi bil torej (subjektivni) čas, ujet na milijone metrov filmskega traku. Iz njega bi režiser potem odstranil vse, kar ni del njegove ideje umetniškega dela, ki ga ustvarja, in ohranil 2500 m filmskega traku: ohranil (ustvaril) bi uro in pol dolg film. Oziroma, kot pravi McSweeney: »Režiser nato kot kipar, ki prej skrito vsebino osvobodi iz spon marmorja, ustvari film.« (McSweeney 2015, 22)

256 Tarkovski pravi, da tudi če bi isti material (milijone metrov filmskega traku, na katerega je posneto celotno življenje neke osebe) dali različnim režiserjem in jim naročili, naj iz njega naredijo uro in pol dolg film, bi bili vsi filmi popolnoma različni. Razlike bi gotovo nastale tudi zaradi izbire dogodkov ter mnogih drugih dejavnikov, a še bolj zanimivo in ključno je to, da bi razlike nastale zaradi tega, ker različni režiserji drugače razumejo čas in film.

Vedno boste prepoznali montažo *Bergmana*, *Bressona*, *Antonionija*, *Kurosawe*, *Fellinija*. Nikoli jih ne boste z nikomer zamenjali, kajti zaznava časa, ki jo ima vsak od njih in ki jo izražajo v ritmu svojih filmov, je vedno ista. (Tarkovski 1997, 93)

Prav v navezavi na »režiserjevo kiparjenje« je madžarski filmski kritik Béla Balázs dejal, da sta kamen na pobočju hriba in Michelangelov kip oba iz kamna: ne razlikujeta se v substanci, forma je drugačna (prim. Balázs 1952, 161). V tem smislu sta za Tarkovskega življenje in film oba čas, le forma je drugačna.

5. Pritisk časa

Podoba je torej filmska podoba v pravem pomenu besede takrat, ko (za razliko od fotografije in slike) ne le živi/se odvija v času, temveč tudi (ujeti) Čas živi/se odvija v njej. Čas, ki je ujet v kader, lahko čutimo. Tarkovski ta pojav imenuje *pritisk časa*. Čas teče skozi vsak kader, kakor da bi imel svoj avtentičen utrip, notranji ritem, ki ga lahko ne le vidimo, temveč natančneje začutimo ali izkusimo: »Na enak način, kot je na podlagi zibanja trstičja mogoče ugotoviti, kakšen je tok reke, kakšen pritisk je v njej, lahko gibanje časa prepoznamo na podlagi toka procesa življenja, ki je poustvarjen v kadru.« (McSweeney 2015, 26–27)

»Suverena dominantna kinematografične podobe je ritem, ki izraža tok časa v notranjosti filmskega kadra.« (Tarkovski 1997, 86) Dejansko gre za to, da avtor ustvari občutek časa (ritem) z natančno obravnavo posnetkov, kompozicije, teksture, objektov, dolžine kadrov, gibanja kamere, igranja, glasbe in drugih zvokov: vse to vpliva na občutek življenjskih procesov in toka časa. Zanimivo je, da Tarkovski vseeno poudari, da so te prvine le spremljevalne, saj so lahko tudi odsotne, ne da bi njihova odsotnost onemogočila občutek toka časa v filmu kot celoti. Lahko si namreč zamislimo film brez igralcev, glasbe, scenografije in celo montaže. Ne moremo pa si zamisliti filma brez občutka časa, ki teče. Čutimo torej sam tok časa. Če ta občutek časa zanemarimo, film ni več film, temveč postane le skupek drugih umetnosti (npr. sosledje fotografij ob spremljavi glasbe), pravi Tarkovski. V kadru ujet čas, ki ga *občutimo*, je torej pogoj in obenem edinstvena odlika filma.

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Kinematografično podobo režiser ustvari *med snemanjem*: s skrajno natančnostjo in z izrednim čutom v kader ujame ritem, pritisk časa, ki ga želi (in je del njegove vizije, kakšen naj bo ritem filma) in ki ga bodo gledalci nato, če bo režiser uspešen, čutili. Ta pogled Tarkovskega, da mora avtor pritisk časa (in celoten ritem) v kader *ujeti* med snemanjem, si velja zapomniti, ker, kot bomo videli kasneje, nasprotuje precej ustaljenemu pogledu, da avtor ritem filma *ustvarja* z montažo.

Ker režiser, če naj v filmsko podobo ujame pristno izkušnjo življenja (življenje samo), v kader poskuša ujeti lastno izkustvo vsakdana, bo, ker je to način človekove zaznave, v kader ujel svoj subjektivni, individualni tok časa. Zato Tarkovski lahko trdi, da je dovolj, da vidi en sam kader (ne montaže

več kadrov), pa bo vedel, kdo je njegov avtor. Ključno je torej to, da je kader napolnjen s časom in da je v njem specifična napetost, intenzivnost, pritisk časa, ki ga gledalec čuti in ki, kot bomo videli kasneje, določa ritem filma.⁸

Kako zaznamo čas v kadru? Ta poseben občutek časa dobimo, kadar skozi dogodke začutimo poseben pomen kot pritisk, težo resnice. Kadar z absolutno jasnostjo čutimo, da to, kar vidimo v kadru, ni popolno, ampak se nanaša na nekaj, kar se izraža zunaj kadra, v neskončnosti. Skratka, nekaj, kar se nanaša na samo življenje. (Tarkovski 1997, 89)

Tarkovski pravi, da je tudi film kot neskončna odprtost umetniške podobe veliko več kot le to, kar vidimo, in gre onkraj idej, ki jih je vanjo spravil avtor.

258 Kakor življenje, ki je vedno fluidno in spreminjajoče se in omogoča občutenje in interpretacije za vsak trenutek vsakomur po svoje, tako pravi film s pravilno posnetim časom na filmskem traku presega meje kadra in živi v času, prav tako, kot čas živi v njem. (Tarkovski 1997, 89)

Tu je nakazano, da se pritisk časa razkriva na dva načina: delno je razkrit preprosto kot življenje, posneto s kamero, delno pa je razkrit šele v interakciji z gledalcem.

6. Dolgi kader

Louis Giannetti v svojem slovarju filmskih izrazov za dolgi kader zapiše: »Dolgi kader, *lengthy take*, *long take* (kritiški izraz): kader z nenavadno dolгим trajanjem.« (Giannetti 2008, 574)

Dolgi kader je preprosto zelo dolg neprekinjen »posnetek«, ki se pojavi v filmu. Če bi morali naštet elemente, ki so najbolj značilni za filmski slog

⁸ Tarkovski je, medtem ko je s Toninom Guerro potoval po Italiji, pozorno opazoval ljudi, da bi v prihajajočem filmu (*Nostalgija*) lahko svoj glavni lik posnel v za Italijane nevtralnem, italijanskem ritmu, toku časa (prim. Bird 2008, 173–174). Ker je avtorjeva percepcija časa vselej individualna, mu je to seveda uspelo le deloma, zato je *Nostalgija* vseeno posneta veliko bolj v tipičnem ritmu njegovega lastnega časa kot pa v ritmu (prebivalcev) Italije.

Tarkovskega, bi verjetno v prvi vrsti omenili: počasen tempo, dolgi kadri, voda. Tarkovski je znan po uporabi dolgih kadrov, ki so skozi njegovo kariero postajali vse daljši.⁹

FILM	Povprečna dolžina kadra v sekundah
<i>Ivanovo otroštvo</i> (1962)	17,2
<i>Andrej Rubljov</i> (1967)	26
<i>Solaris</i> (1971)	28
<i>Zrcalo</i> (1975)	23,2 ¹⁰
<i>Stalker</i> (1979)	63,2
<i>Nostalgija</i> (1981)	58,2
<i>Žrtvovanje</i> (1986)	74,1

Tabela 1

(Vir: McSweeney 2015, 46.)

André Bazin in Tarkovski se strinjata, da je dolgi kader najboljša oblika snemanja. Razlog je seveda vezan na njuno razumevanje bistva filma, ki zadeva občutek pritiska časa, ki je ujet v kader; občutek časa, s katerim je kader napolnjen, zares pride do izraza namreč v dolgem kadru. Kader, ki traja, na primer, 3 minute, bo gledalcem omogočil, da v odvijanju kadra pritisk časa začutijo v dejanski, življenjski obliki, v kakršni je bil ujet v času snemanja. Kratek, trisekundni kader te možnosti nima. Dolgi kader dopušča, da ga napolni Čas, s tem pa ga vselej napolni tudi duhovna napetost. Spomnimo se enega najbolj znanih kadrov Tarkovskega, ko protagonist Andrej Gorčakov na koncu *Nostalgije* poskuša na drugo stran praznega bazena prenesti svečo, ne da bi ta na poti ugasnila. Gorčakov pot opravlja kar trikrat, in sicer v enem osemminutnem kadru. Poljski režiser Krzysztof Kieślowski je dejal, da je ta prizor čudežen (prim. McSweeney 2015, 46). Ne samo da je v ospredju seveda

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9 Najdaljši kader je iz filma *Žrtvovanje* (v 145 minutah je le 120 kadrov): prizor »posaditve drevesa« z začetka filma traja 9 minut in 26 sekund (prim. Green 1993, 14).

10 Povprečje je občutno skrajšano predvsem zaradi vstavljenih dokumentarnih posnetkov, brez njih povprečje kadra tudi v tem filmu sega skoraj do 60 sekund. Film vključuje veliko kadrov, daljših od 1 minute, 7 kadrov, daljših od 2 minut, in 3 kadre, ki so daljši od 3 minut (prim. McSweeney 2015, 46–47).

vprašanje »Ali mu bo uspelo?«, ampak prizor deluje močno, ker vključuje napetost, dramatičen vrh, ki je zavrt v duhovni preizkus in gesto vere. Vse to se odvija popolnoma neprekinjeno v dejanskem času, ki prav zato, ker je dejanski, kaže na življenje samo.¹¹ Še bolj ključno je to, da je kader dovolj dolg, da začutimo čas, ki se odvija v njem. McSweeney gre tako daleč, da pravi, da dolgi kader omogoči gledalcu, da na platnu vidi življenje, to pa se ne zgodi zato, ker dolgi kader izreka življenje, temveč kratko malo zato, ker dolgi kader je življenje (prim. McSweeney 2015, 45–46). Z rezanjem in montažo, uporabo več kadrov, posnetih z različnih strani, in s podobnimi pristopi bi morda sicer lahko povečali navidezno dramatičnost, a na račun avtentičnosti pristne življenjske izkušnje.

V Stalkerju pa sem hotel, da med posnetki ne bi bilo časovnega preskoka. Želel sem, da bi se čas in njegovo potekanje razodela, da bi ostala znotraj vsakega kadra, da bi montaža kadrov označevala napredovanje dejanja in nič več, da bi ne bilo časovnih deviacij; nisem želel, da bi čas deloval kot mehanizem selekcije in dramatičnega organiziranja gradiva. Želel sem, da bi vse delovalo tako, kot da bi bil ves film posnet v enem samem posnetku. (Tarkovski 1997, 139–140)

Včasih lahko posamezen kader zajema cel prizor. Zajema lahko celotno dramsko epizodo z začetkom, razvojem in koncem. Danes obstaja tudi že kar nekaj filmov, ki so bili posneti v enem samem dolgem kadru. Pravzaprav jih je že dovolj, da poznamo izraz za specifičen žanr: *one-shot feature film*. Za nas je pomembno, da omenimo dejstvo, da je prvi celovečerni film, ki je bil kadar koli posnet v enem samem kadru, film *Ruska barka*. Leta 2002 ga je posnel Aleksander Sokurov, ki ga ljudje pogosto navajajo kot naslednika Tarkovskega. Poleg tega, da sta oba iz ruske šole filma, jima je očitno skupno to, da verjameta v dejstvo, da je čas ključen koncept v teoriji filma in da ga je najlažje ujeti prav v dolgem kadru. Sokurov je o času in Tarkovskem dejal:

11 Oleg Jankovski, ki je igral Gorčakova, je povedal, da mu je v povezavi s to sekvenco Tarkovski dejal: »Oleg, bom povedal drugače. Stvar je v tem, bi lahko – ja! ja! – ti, Oleg! – prikazal celotno človeško življenje v enem kadru, brez montaže, od začetka do konca, od rojstva do samega trenutka smrti?« (McSweeney 2015, 45–46)

Največji režiserji našega časa so odkrili eno samo lastnost kinematografije, ki so jo do določene mere lahko razvili: čas. Tok časa je bil glavni objekt raziskovanja v njihovem poklicu. [...] Pri Tarkovskem in Bressonu se pojavi specifično kinematografski koncept, ki nastane iz pristno vizualnih metod in je zato zmožen obstajati kot dejanska kinematografska resničnost, ki je noben drug medij ne zmore poustvariti. Tarkovski je bil brez dvoma del boja za rojstvo resničnega filma. (McSweeney 2015, 48)

Poleg tega, da dolgi kader omogoča času, da v njem prosto teče, in gledalcu, da začuti njegov pritisk, obstaja še en pomemben aspekt dolgega kadra. Posamezen kratek dogodek v dolgem kadru ne postane izoliran, temveč ostane del konteksta, širšega dogajanja v kadru, s tem pa se ohrani interpretativna odprtost filmske podobe, ki je za Tarkovskega zelo pomembna. Tarkovski, na primer, pogosto uporablja dolge kadre, v katerih dogajanja ni veliko, le kamera počasi drsi v eno smer. V takšnih kadrih se pogosto zgodi dogodek, ki ga je načeloma težko (ali nemogoče) pojasniti: vrata se sama odprejo ali zaprejo, steklenica se prevrne, kozarec pade z mize ... Če bi bil ta dogodek izoliran v svoj lasten kratki kader, bi dobil navidezno pomembnost, ki bi presejala njegovo dejansko pomembnost: deloval bi preveč simbolično, vsiljevala bi se njuja po interpretaciji. Če dogodek ostane del dolgega kadra in predstavlja le njegov majhen del, bo le dodal k poetičnosti, magičnosti vzdušja, ritma, pritiska časa, ki ga gledalec čuti. Umetnik na takšen način lahko vlije nenavadnost tako predmetom, ki jih dobro poznamo, kot tudi vsakdanjim dogodkom. Že znan predmet ali dogodek tako dobiva novo, neznano podobo. Tarkovski je bil prepričan, da je človek postal skoraj imun na nenavadnost, na tujstvo, na čudnost in čudežnost, umetnik pa lahko nam dobro poznan predmet (kozarec) in nam dobro poznan dogodek (padec kozarca z mize) ponovno naredi tuj, zanimiv in čaroben. »Ena od nalog umetnika je torej ta, da osveži telo in duha, da lahko znova občutimo neverjetno lepoto in nenavadnost življenja.« (Robinson 2006, 148)

Tisto, kar je skupno obema omenjenima značilnostma dolgega kadra, ki Tarkovskega, Sokurova in druge avtorje privlači – zmožnost občutenja pritiska časa ter ponovna vzpostavitev tujosti in čudovitosti sveta okoli nas –, je, da

kinematografično podobo pušča (interpretativno) odprto. Nariman Skakov v svojem delu *Film Tarkovskega: Labirinti prostora in časa* pomen odprtosti dolgega kadra strne takole:

Dolgi kader ostane odprt in ne pusti, da bi ga zaprli (zmontirali), temveč stremi k neprekinjeni prisotnosti. Gledalca vabi, da opusti narativni okvir in motri čas v njegovi čisti obliki – da locira »ČAS v ČASU«. (Skakov 2012, 2–3)

Vsi režiserji seveda ne delijo mnenja, da je dolgi kader najboljše sredstvo za prikaz filmske podobe. Orson Welles je o dolžini kadrov v filmih Michelangela Antonionija dejal:

Nerad premlevam stvari. To je eden od razlogov, da me Antonioni dolgočasi – to prepričanje, da ker je kader dober, bo še boljši, če ga še naprej gledaš. Antonioni naredi cel prizor nekoga, ki hodi po cesti. In misliš si »No, te ženske že ne bo nesel do konca ceste«. Ampak *jo* nese. In ona nato odide in ko je že odšla, ti še naprej gledaš cesto. (Welles in Bogdanovich 1993, 103–104)

Lahko si predstavljamo, kaj bi Welles menil o zgoraj omenjenem prizoru iz *Nostalgije*, ko Andrej Gorčakov osem minut prenaša svečo z ene strani bazena na drugo. Ironično je, da ima tudi Orson Welles v svojih filmih veliko dolgih kadrov,¹² a Welles dolgi kader uporablja za narativne namene. Dolgi kader v Hollywoodu torej služi zgodbi. Zdi se, da Welles Antonioniju očita predvsem rabo dolgega kadra v estetske namene, kar je značilno za »poetsko estetiko« evropskega umetniškega filma. Wellesov očitek Antonioniju, da ne ustavi kadra tudi po tem, ko bi ga ostali režiserji verjetno že, bi bil verjetno še bolj na mestu za Tarkovskega. Tarkovski je bil namreč mnenja, da se bo gledalec, če avtor kader preveč podaljša, res začel dolgočasiti, a bo, če ga nato podaljša še bolj, ponovno dobil zanimanje in začutil moč časa v kadru (prim. Martin 2005, 49).

12 Še posebej je zanimiva ironija, da André Bazin Orsona Wellesa primerja prav z Michelangelom Antonionijem, ko oba hvali zaradi njunih dolgih kadrov.

Če se pri Wellesovi kritiki zdi, da napada specifičen tip dolgega kadra (ali specifično rabo, namen dolgega kadra), seveda obstajajo tudi kritiki, ki dolgi kader zavračajo kategorično. Kot bomo videli, Sergej Eisenstein, pripadnik formalizma in sovjetske šole montaže, dvomi v potrebo po tem, da kader, potem ko je že naredil vtis na gledalca, kažemo še naprej, in dodaja, da dolgi kadri kažejo na pomanjkanje umetniške inteligence.

7. Montaža

Da bi lahko razumeli pogled Tarkovskega na odnos med kadrom in montažo (povezovanje kadrov med seboj), je dobro, da najprej pogledamo sovjetsko »klasično« teorijo montaže.

7.1. Sovjetski formalizem in klasična teorija montaže

Filmski ustvarjalci in teoretiki so si že od samega začetka zgodovine filma prizadevali, da bi bilo sporočanje zamisli in čustev s pomočjo novega medija čimbolj učinkovito. Sovjetski ustvarjalci so v 20. letih 20. stoletja v ta namen razvili teorijo tematske montaže. Vsevolod Pudovkin je trdil, da se *pomen* ustvarja s sopostavitvijo kadrov in ne v posameznem kadru. Združitev kadrov bi lahko prikazali z naslednjo formulo: $A, B = AB$ (povezava kadra A s kadrom B ustvari asociacijo, ki izhaja prav iz njune kombinacije). Lev Kulešov je izvedel eksperiment: posnel je veliki plan (*close-up*) igralca s popolnoma nevtralnimi izrazom na obrazu. Nato je ta kader povezal s tremi različnimi kadri. Prvič ga je povezal z jušnikom, drugič s krsto z ženskim truplom in tretjič s kadrom male deklince med igro. Gledalci so bili nad vsemi tremi kombinacijami navdušeni: po njihovem mnenju je igralec zelo dobro ekspresivno podajal lakoto (v prvem primeru), globoko žalost nad izgubo ljubljene osebe (v drugem) in očetovski ponos (v tretjem primeru) (prim. Giannetti 2008, 172–173). Kulešov je poleg tega, da je znanje profesionalnih igralcev povsem odveč, želel pokazati, da pomen ustvarjajo asociacije, ki jih povzroča sopostavitev dveh ali več kadrov. Za Kulešova in Pudovkina je sekvenca (in z njo ves film) predvsem skonstruirana in ne toliko posneta. Pudovkin in drugi sovjetski formalisti so bili mnjenja, da »le s sopostavljanjem velikih planov predmetov, tekstur, simbolov in drugih izbranih podrobnosti

lahko filmski ustvarjalec ekspresivno posreduje idejo, ki jo izvleče iz nediferencirane zmede resničnega življenja» (Giannetti 2008, 175).

264 Sergej Eisenstein je, kakor že Heraklit, verjel, da bistvo obstoja tiči v nenehnem spreminjanju. Prepričan je bil, da je valovanje narave dialektično, da je posledica konflikta in sinteze nasprotij: »Vsako nasprotje vsebuje seme lastnega uničenja v času, je bil prepričan Eisenstein, in ta trk nasprotij je mati gibanja in spreminjanja.« (Giannetti 2008, 175) Po Eisensteinovem mnenju je naloga umetnosti, da ujame dinamični trk nasprotij, ki za umetnost ni le predmet njene obravnave, temveč je tudi njeno metodološko načelo. S Pudovkinom in Kulešovom se sicer strinja, da je montaža temelj filmske umetnosti, a se teoretsko od njiju nekoliko oddalji. Ni se strinjal z njunim konceptom *povezanih kadrov* in je predlagal dialektično montažo: konflikt dveh kadrov (teza in antiteza) tvori popolnoma nov pojem (sinteza). Povezava kadrov A in B ne ustvari njune skupne pomenske vrednosti AB (Pudovkin in Kulešov), temveč kvalitativno popolnoma nov faktor C, kar bi v obliki formule ustrezneje zapisali: $A, B = C$. Vidimo torej, da ta teorija (precej v slogu emergentizma) pravi, da montaža ustvari nekaj, kar presega goli »seštevek«, združitev kadrov. Teorija montaže neposredno nosi posledice v praksi. V Eisensteinovih filmih so kadri, ki si sledijo, dejansko nasprotujočih si trajanj, oblik ter osvetlitev in predstavljajo cel nabor predvsem intelektualnih sunkov in odbojev, usmerjenih k ideološki trditvi avtorja (prim. Giannetti 2008, 176–177). Poleg tega je za Eisensteina značilna metaforična montaža. V filmu *Stavka* (1925), na primer, kombinira kadre delavcev, ki jih streljajo s strojnici, in podobe volov, ki jih koljejo. Avtor s prisposodobito izraža svoje mnenje (ideologijo) o specifičnem problemu, ki ga želi izpostaviti.

7.2. Tarkovski in montaža

Že na prvi pogled lahko vidimo, da je v večini primerov mnenje Tarkovskega ravno nasprotno Eisensteinovemu. Bistvo njunega razhajanja tiči v različnih pogledih na to, ali je temelj filma posamezen kader ali montaža. Tarkovski je seveda, kot smo videli, na strani (dolgega) kadra.¹³ Prepričan je, da film

13 Dober pokazatelj njunih različnih pristopov k teoriji in praksi filma je, da Eisensteinov film *Križarka Potemkin* (1925) vsebuje približno 1500 kadrov (povprečno

ni narejen na montažni mizi, ampak »se kinematografična podoba ustvarja med snemanjem in obstaja le v notranjosti kadra« (Tarkovski 1997, 87). Kot smo videli, je za Tarkovskega ključno to, da čas napolni kader. Čas, ki je ujet v kadru, ustvarjalcu narekuje takšno ali drugačno načelo montaže. Tokovi časa, ki so po naravi v temelju različni, se ne morejo spojiti. Subjektivni dejanski čas ne more biti spojen z objektivnim, kot med seboj ne morejo biti spojene cevi z različnim premerom, pravi Tarkovski. Montaža je torej odvisna od časa v kadru in ne obratno. Če Eisenstein manipulira čas z montažo, Tarkovski pravi, da montaža le združuje kadre, ki so že napolnjeni s časom, v živ enoten organizem. Tarkovski Eisensteinu očita (kot mu očitajo tudi mnogi drugi) prav to, da z montažo (manipuliranjem, strukturiranjem, urejanjem ...) kadrov in časa podobo ustvarja preveč manipulativno in ji tako sam podeljuje pomen. Omenili smo primer, kjer streljanju delavcev ob bok postavi pokol volov. Metaforična izenačitev delavcev in volov natančno sugerira idejo avtorja in gledalca tako pušča v pasivnem stanju, potem ko je razvozlal avtorjev intelektualni načrt. Dolgi kader Tarkovskega, ki ostaja interpretativno odprt, pa človeku da možnost, da se v svetu, ki mu ga avtor kaže, naseli in ga raziskuje sam (prim. Martin 2005, 49). Tarkovski v *Ujetem času* pravi: »Tako, po moje, Eisenstein odreka pravico gledalcu čutiti na svoj način to, kar vidi na zaslonu.« (Tarkovski 1997, 90) Kot smo videli, gre za Tarkovskega vsak skrbno posnet posamezen (dolgi) kader sam onstran idej, ki jih je imel avtor, in tako ostaja odprt v neskončnost. Če je Eisensteinova formula montaže $A, B = C$, bi formulo Tarkovskega lahko zapisali kar $A = C$ (prim. Robinson 2006, 144). To zaprtost podobe je Einsteinovi teoriji očital tudi režiser Stan Brakhage, ki pravi, da je teorija »rezanja in lepljenja« preveč zastavljena tako, da kreativnost črpa iz intelektualnosti, to pa s seboj prinese potrebo po razumevanju, medtem ko dolgi kader deluje na emocionalni ravni in ravno zato ostaja odprt.¹⁴

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Tarkovski daje prednost posameznemu kadru pred montažo do te mere, da se pogosto izogne tudi precej konvencionalnim smernicam montaže. Stanley Kubrick in Francis Ford Coppola se značilno lotevata montaže z izjemno

dolgih le 2,9 sekunde), kar je več, kot jih je Tarkovski uporabil v svoji celotni filmografiji (prim. McSweeney 2015, 54).

14 V tem smislu dajeta na račun montaže prednost dolgemu kadru tudi Bernardo Bertolucci in Theodor Dreyer (prim. Robinson 2006, 148).

natančnostjo, ki pogosto pride do izraza pri njunem čudovitem rezanju in montiranju narativno vzporednih dogodkov, ki se odvijajo istočasno. Kamera ponavadi skače z enega dogodka na drugega in ponovno nazaj, kar ustvarja občutek, da se dogodka odvijata istočasno (prim. Robinson 2006, 148). Še en konvencionalen pristop je, da kadre povežemo *na vzročnoposledičen način*: v prvem kadru oseba A ustreli osebo B, v drugem kadru jata preplašenih ptic zleti iz krošnje drevesa, v tretjem kadru pa vidimo konja, ki preneha jesti travo in pogleda v smer poka. Čeprav so si kadri časovno sledili, so z vzročno-posledično logiko prikazali tri dogodke, ki so se zgodili v »trenutku« poka pištole. Tarkovski na koncu *Nostalgije* prikaže Domenica, ki se v Rimu protestno zažge, in Gorčakova, ki v Toskani hodi čez bazen. Čeprav se dogodka odvijata istočasno (to izvemo iz konteksta zgodbe), se Tarkovski ne odloči niti za prvi pristop (med dogodkoma ne želi preskakovati, ker bo uničil edinstven pritisk časa, ki je ujet v posameznem dogodku, posnetem v enem kadru) niti za drugega (vzročno-posledična montaža vzporednih dogodkov je možna le, če so kadri dovolj kratki, da še vedno dajejo občutek istočasnosti). Tarkovski dobesedno odvrti en katarzičen vrh, nam da čas, da začutimo pritisk časa, ki teče v njem, in nato še drugega.

Bistvo montaže je pri Tarkovskem torej v tem, da s časom napolnjene dele združi v celoto in nič več. V *Ujetem času* to zapiše tako: »Iz tega sledi, da je montaža način spajanja koščkov v funkciji pritiska časa, ki je navzoč v vsakem izmed njih.« (Tarkovski 1997, 89) Celoten proces ustvarjanja filma – planiranje, snemanje, montaža, postprodukcija – je zanj v službi ujetega časa. Občutek in ritem, ki ju avtor zasleduje, vselej že obstajata, avtor ju mora med snemanjem le ujeti in nato vse nadaljnje procese prilagoditi tako, da ne zmoti in pokvari v kadre ujetega pritiska časa. Prav zato, ker ne sme zmotiti ujetega pritiska časa, avtor nikakor ne sme z montažo od zunaj vsiljevati intelektualnih idej, kakor to počne, na primer, Eisenstein.

Tarkovski je mnenja, da bo montaža uspešna šele, če je gledalci ne bomo opazili. Najti moramo intrinzične vzorce v že posnetem materialu in jih ohraniti. Idealna različica montaže ne poruši organske povezave med različnimi prizori in sekvencami, temveč deluje, kakor da kadri v sebi že vsebujejo montažo. Organska povezava med prizori, ki deluje kot vnaprej dana (ali vsaj namignjena) montaža, je torej skrita v *podobnosti* pritiska časa, ki ga

posamezni kadri vsebujejo. V *Zrcalu* (1975) se vsa narativnost filma umakne na sekundarno mesto in dovoli pritisku časa, da narekuje vrstni red kadrov, potek zgodbe in posledično način montiranja.

Tarkovski je bil v povezavi s svojim napadom na montažo včasih narobe razumljen. Sam pravi, da je pritisk časa ujet v posameznem kadru, in obenem piše o tem, da tok, pritisk časa teče iz kadra v kader (zato montaža v nekaterih primerih ni možna). Iz tega razloga so nekateri kritiki pod vprašaj postavili celoten dvoboj med kadrom in montažo. Gilles Deleuze o tem problemu, ki naj bi ga Tarkovski zanemarljivo, v knjigi *Film 2* pravi:

Zdi se, da [Tarkovski] sprejema klasično alternativo med kadrom in montažo ter da je močno naklonjen kadru. Vendar je to le površinski videz, saj sila ali pritisk časa presega meje kadra in montaža sama deluje ter živi v času. (Deleuze 1989, 42)

Ključ do razumevanja teoretskega dvoboja med kadrom in montažo se skriva v ritmu filma.

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8. Ritem

Montaža sestavi skupaj kadre s podobnim pritiskom časa in tako času omogoči, da teče iz kadra v kader. Temu pravimo *ritem filma* (lahko tudi le prizora, sekvence). Načeloma je torej ritem filma enotnost vtisa, ki ga čutimo skozi različne kadre, a Tarkovski v *Ujetem času* kot primer za ponazoritev, da montaža ni potrebna za ritem filma, navede desetminutni film Pascala Aubiera, ki je v enem kadru. Film najprej pokaže mirno naravo, nato se »virtuozno vodena kamera približa« in nam pokaže malo pikico med grički, za katero se izkaže, da je v travi speči človek. Film nenadoma odkrije svoje dramatično jedro. »Kot da bi naša radovednost pospešila tok časa; s koraki divje zveri se priplazimo do njega in vidimo, da je mrtev.« (Tarkovski 1997, 87) Še več, človek je bil umorjen. Bil je upornik. Asociacije nas napotijo k podobnim dogodkom, ki pretresajo današnji svet, pravi Tarkovski. »Spomnim se, da v tem filmu ni nobene montaže, nobenega igranja, nobene scenografije. Dramaturgijo organizira zgolj ritem časa v kadru, ki je že sam po sebi dovolj kompleksen.« (Tarkovski 1997, 87)

Robinson pravi: »Za Tarkovskega je ritem filma prihajal iz kadra, kiparjenja znotraj časa kadra, namesto da bi bil vsiljen od zunaj z montažo.« (Robinson 2006, 147) Zaviranje in pospeševanje časa na umetne načine – z uporabo rezanja in lepljenja kadrov – bo doseglo samo, da bo tok časa deloval izumetničeno in gledalci ga ne bodo mogli prepoznati kot avtentičen tok časa, kot življenje.

Tarkovski v *Ujetem času* opisuje primer težavnega montiranja v *Zrcalu*. Obstajalo naj bi kar več kot dvajset različic filma. Zdelo se je že, da se filma ne bo dalo zmontirati, to pa bi v skladu z njegovim pogledom pomenilo, da so *med snemanjem* zagrešili nedopustne napake. Film ni imel notranje povezave, logike, enotnosti. Delov filma se nikakor ni dalo sestaviti skupaj na način, da bi film »deloval«. Tarkovski je bil mnenja, da je do tega prišlo, ker jim med snemanjem ni uspelo ujeti pristnega pritiska časa, ki bi ga bilo mogoče iz kadra v kader povezati z montažo. Še enkrat je pregledal popolnoma vse posnetke, slehernega posebej, da bi odkril, v katerih je ujet čas, ki ne deluje pristno, avtentično. Pogledal je tudi dokumentarni material, ki ga je nabral in ga želel vključiti v film. Za problematičnega se je izkazal dokumentarni posnetek vojakov, ki prečkajo jezero Sivaš. Ugotovil je, v čem je bil problem: posnetek ni bil dokumentaren, temveč zaigran. Posnetek zato ni deloval naravno in se ni mogel vključiti v ritem sekvenc, ki jih je Tarkovski pripravljal (prim. McSweeney 2015, 59–60). Posnetek je zamenjal in film se je sestavil in zaživel. »In ko se je, hvala Bogu, to zgodilo, ko se je film postavil pokonci; kakšno olajšanje smo začutili vsi! Zrcalo je ponovno odkrilo in oblikovalo čas, ki je tekel skozi vsakega od njegovih kadrov.« (Tarkovski 1997, 89) Montaža je bila (popolnoma) odvisna od pravilnosti dela med snemanjem, pravi Tarkovski. Če čas ni dosledno ujet v kader, smiselna montaža (z avtentičnim, življenjskim tokom časa) ne bo možna.

9. Zaključek

Film torej ne teče po zaslugi montažnih spojev, ampak njim *navkljub*. Če režiser pravilno začuti naravo toka časa, ki je fiksiran v posameznih koščkih, v nespojenih kadrih, ki so bili pred njim na montažni mizi, in montira na podlagi tega občutka, bo film gotovo uspešen v svoji avtentičnosti. Navidezni paradoks, ki se skriva tu, je, da bo gledalec zaznal avtentičnost časa, če ga bo prepoznal kot svojega, četudi je pravzaprav avtorjev.

Tukaj se pojavi neka neizogibna težava. Denimo, da želim, da bi se čas v nekem kadru pretakal dostojanstveno in neodvisno, zato da gledalec ne bi občutil nobenega nasilja nad svojim zaznavanjem, da bi se po svoji presoji in okusu predal ustvarjalcu, da bi občutil filmsko gradivo kot svojo lastno izkušnjo, da bi si ga prisvojil in ga asimilirал, kot bi to storil z neko novo osebno izkušnjo. Kar naenkrat se pojavi protislovje! Kljub vsemu se ustvarjalčeva zaznava časa manifestira kot neka vrsta nasilja nad gledalcem, v smislu, da gledalcu vsili svoj notranji svet. (Tarkovski 1997, 92)

Ritem je režiserju lasten in prikazuje njegovo zaznavo življenja. Vsak režiser ima tako svoj ritem in Tarkovski pravi, da je zmožnost gledalčeve prilagoditve avtorjevemu ritmu pogoj za to, da se gledalec naseli v avtorjev svet in da film uspe kot prava umetnost. Ko bo gledalec avtorju verjel, mu zaupal in njegov svet vzel za *svojega*, bo avtentičnost ujetega časa občutil kot svoj Čas: kot življenje, ki ga pozna.

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ANTHROPOCENTRIC AND NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVES OF *PROTEUS ANGUINUS*, AXOLOTL, *VAMPYROTEUTHIS INFERNALIS*, AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS

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Abstract

The article addresses the axolotl, the human fish, and the deep sea squid, their living environments, and the relationships with man or man with these animals that live in different worlds than man, but that at the same time inhabit the same planet, where we coexist in mutual dependence. The author examines human approaches to these animals, which expand from exhibiting the fear of the unknown, of the “power of Nature,” and the theoretical admiration to the exercises of human dominance, be

it in the form of hero fairy tales or biopower of regenerative medicine. The author reflects upon the question, how to conceptualize relations between entities in non-anthropocentric terms. She questions the eventual posthumanist perspective, which leads to the comprehension of the functional living and non-living systems as connected machines. While classical relationships between man and animals are based on non-equal power forces and are anthropocentric, the recognition of the environments of different species, which first marked the alienation particularly of some species from man, is at the same time the key to finally recognize the operability of various systems, which are actually connected.

Keywords: posthumanism, postanthropocentrism, regenerative medicine, biopower, animal aesthetics, axolotl, *Proteus anguinus*, *Vampyroteuthis infernalis*, dragons, ecosystem.

Antropocentrični in neantropocentrični pogledi na *Proteusa anguinusa*, aksolotla, *Vampyroteuthisa infernalis* in na njihove okolijske sisteme

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Povzetek

Članek obravnava aksolotla, človeško ribico in globokomorskega lignja, njihova življenjska okolja in odnose s človekom oziroma človeka s temi živalmi, ki živijo v drugih svetovih kot človek, vendar obenem naseljujejo isti planet, kjer soobstajamo v medsebojni odvisnosti. Avtorica analizira človeške pristope k tem živalim, ki se raztezajo od izkazovanja strahu pred neznanim, pred »močjo Narave« in teoretskega občudovanja do izvajanj človeške dominacije, najsibo v obliki junaških pravljic ali regenerativne medicine. Avtorica se ukvarja z vprašanjem, kako konceptualizirati odnose med entitetami na ne-antropocentričen način. Za ta namen premisli posthumanistično perspektivo, ki vodi k dojetju dejanskih funkcionalnih živih in neživih sistemov kot povezanih mehanizmov. Če so klasični odnosi med človekom in živalmi osnovani na ne-enakih razmerjih moči in so antropocentrični, je ravno prepoznanje okolij različnih živih vrst, ki je sprva zaznamovalo odtujenost zlasti določenih vrst od človeka, hkrati tisti ključ, ki omogoča končno prepoznanje operativnosti različnih sistemov, ki so pravzaprav povezani.

Ključne besede: posthumanizem, postantropocentrizem, regenerativna medicina, biooblast, živalska estetika, aksolotel, *Proteus anguinus*, *Vampyroteuthis infernalis*, zmaji, ekosistem.




Image 1

The cover of Vilém Flusser's book *Vampyroteuthis Infernalis*, illustrated by Louis Bec.

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For centuries there were stories told and depicted about giant squid or octopus ship attacks. The first known photograph of the giant squid (*Architeuthis*) from Logy Bay, Newfoundland, 1873, shows a dead squid hung on a stand. It is a picture of a powerless corpse and not of a powerful monster as portrayed in the tales. When Vilém Flusser was working on his book *Vampyroteuthis Infernalis*, on the vampire squid from hell, he wrote in a letter to Dora Ferreira da Silva from January 29, 1981: "Please let me tell you of the project that moves me at

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The article is motivated by the art project *Neotenous dark dwellers (Lygophilia)*, curated by Annick Bureaud, in which Robertina Šebjanič researches the culturalization of the Mexican axolotl and the Slovenian *Proteus anguinus* as animals that love darkness and places inhospitable for humans.

the moment. Twenty or thirty years ago, a giant cephalopod was fished out of Pacific waters, of difficult taxonomic classification (among the octopi and decapods), which received the name *Vampyroteuthis Infernalis*.” (Flusser 1987, 136) Flusser then wrote, in continuation of that letter, that the “beast,” as he called it, inhabits the abysses between 3 and 8,000 meters. The first pictures of an 8-meter-long adult giant squid to be taken in the wild were only produced in 2004 and 2006, in Japan, at a depth of 900 meters. In 2006, the first video of a 12-meter-long animal in its natural habitat was recorded in California. Before that, in 2005, the Melbourne Aquarium bought a 7-meter-long squid preserved in a block of ice. Adult giant squid measures up to 13 metres in length, which is the maximum length of the males; the females reach up to 10 meters. Claims about the existence of a 20-meter-long specimen of the giant squid, therefore, have not been proven. Compared with the giant squid, the vampire squid is a small animal—it measures about 30 centimetres in length. It is estimated that the natural habitat of the giant squid is in the range of 300 to 1,000 metres below the water surface, while the vampire squid lives at a depth of 600 to 900 meters.

274 Both squids survive deep sea conditions, within the oxygen minimum zone. Some giant squids live captured in aquariums worldwide, while the vampire squid survives only up to two months in captivity. The vampire squid belongs to the class cephalopod, but is not a squid. The inner side of the arms and tentacles of the giant squid are covered with suction cups, while the vampire squid has suckers only on the distal half of the arms. The vampire squid is actually a passive animal that feeds mostly on bits of organic debris. When attacked, in order to save energy, it diverts the attack away from the central areas with glowing arm tips far above its head. When a predator eats off an arm tip, the vampire squid regenerates it.

This quality, however, is not so relevant for human society, because the animal is not able to live in captivity and scientists cannot do regenerative medicine research. In this regard, it is different to the axolotl. Axolotl is a sort of salamander, the natural habitat of which—the swampy, dark freshwater lakes of the Mexico Valley—is endangered because of urbanization. Axolotl, therefore, is an endangered species in the wild. Axolotl is a close relative of the tiger salamander, but has external gills and a caudal fin. And yet, even though it is colloquially called a walking fish, it is not a fish. Today, axolotls

are extensively used for scientific research because of their ability to regenerate limbs. Axolotl has been researched for over 150 years.

Humans aim to obtain the knowledge and the techniques to be able to achieve that kind of regeneration for the human species. This objective is oriented towards the notion of the regenerative body, which is supported by the recent rise and promises of biotechnology. Eugene Thacker was among the first to point to the new comprehension of the body introduced with tissue engineering: “Tissue engineering is able to produce a vision of the regenerative body, a body always potentially in excess of itself.” (Thacker 1999, 183) Because tissue engineering is able to surpass current transplantation problems, it is our tomorrow. With regenerative medicine, the economy of body parts (transplantations, xeno-transplantations) has been replaced by the economy of auto-regeneration (regeneration of tissues from one’s own cells), which is cyclic and proliferative (productive of a great number of cells with their division) (ibid., 182). Perhaps even the bold ambition to re-grow whole human organs or limbs is not so remote. Salamander, axolotl, human fish, and vampire squid have the ability to re-grow a whole limb if cut. It is a challenge to comprehend this function, but the interesting thing is that it is actually not foreign to humankind. During foetal development, while the foetus is immersed in a wet milieu similar to that of salamander, this function is in full operation. The human liver can re-grow after damage. The function of re-growth is related to the process of scarring, which protects the body from its dissolution into the external environment and the invasion of the world into the body. Re-growing and scarring stand in opposition, they are dialectical identities. There have been reports (as for instance by Lee Spievack from 2008) that a cut finger has successfully re-grown with matrix treatment. As reported, it was important that the body, wounded during the process of “healing,” was preserved opened. Such acknowledgements force us to rethink the issues of identity, body, growth, healing, life, etc., which are, at least within the Western context, generally comprehended as self-contained entities and not according to their structural relations. Such is also the prospect of the regenerative body, a body able to re-grow its own parts and treat its own diseases, a body in a constant process of rejuvenation (cf. Tratnik 2017, 77–94).

The regenerative body, which some animals have, is for humans a wish to be possibly attained with biotechnology, which has become a relevant instrument

of biopower as the power over life. In his famous examination of biopower, Michel Foucault highlighted the importance of the historical shift regarding the relations between politics and life, which he located between the ancient era of sovereign power and the modern era of biopower, “when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies” (Foucault 1978, 143). In the modern era of biopower, the social body has the right to ensure, maintain, or develop its life: “the ancient right to *take* life or *let* live was replaced by a power to *foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death” (Foucault 2009, 138). The new regime supported the affirmative politics of life and over life:

Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate domination was death, but with living being, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body. (Foucault 1978, 142–143)

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The political technologies that ensued—investing in the body, health, modes of subsistence and habitation, living conditions, and the whole space of existence—only proliferated. Therefore, regenerative medicine, which is oriented towards regeneration of life, is particularly relevant for modern society. Foucault recognized such relevance already for medicine in general (he paid much attention to the birth of the clinic): “for capitalist society it is the biopolitical that is important before everything else; the biological, the somatic, the corporeal. The body is a biopolitical reality; medicine is a biopolitical strategy.” (Esposito 2008, 27) Foucault analyzed the emerging institutionalization of medicine in the context of normalizing society, when power took possession of life, or at least took life under its care, in the course of 19th century, a time when “medicine becomes a political intervention-technique with specific power-effects. Medicine is a power-knowledge that can be applied to both the body and the population, both the organism and biological processes, and it will therefore have both disciplinary effects and regulatory effects.” (Foucault 2003, 252) The role medicine gained for biopower has only been intensified with the emergence of biotechnology.

Humans subject the world and use it for its own production. Martin Heidegger paid attention to the being of entities encountered in the environment. The world is for one “present-at-hand” (German *vorhanden*), or it is “ready-to-hand” (German *zuhanden*). The first option means a “simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand.” (Heidegger 1962, 48) The second is remarkably interesting for this discussion. Heidegger resisted calling different entities in the world as just things, because some “‘things’ never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves” (ibid., 97–98). The equipment, for instance, of a room—inkstand, pen, ink, paper, furniture, etc.—has its equipmentality, in terms of its belonging to other equipment. It has an assignment, or reference, of something to something—the “in-order-to.” Equipment thus shows itself only in dealings, cut to its own measure. The “in-order-to” is therefore constitutive for the equipment we are employing in time. The hammering uncovers the specific *manipulability* (German *Handlichkeit*) of the hammer. The kind of Being the equipment possesses Heidegger called “*readiness-to-hand*” (German *Zuhandenheit*). If one just looks, one cannot discover and understand the readiness-to-hand at the outward appearance. But, “when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character” (ibid., 98). Does human body also comprise the “readiness-to-hand” and what does this kind of sight at the human body, directed by the “readiness-to-hand” mean? How does it lead to the eventual manipulation of it? And finally, has the “present-at-hand” ever existed for the researchers of the human body? These were some of the central questions I addressed at another occasion (cf. Tratnik 2017, 1–54). For this discussion, the relevant questions are similar, but applied to the animals addressed here. Do the *Proteus anguinus* and axolotl comprise the “readiness-to-hand” and is it possible at all to look at “Things just ‘theoretically,’” as Heidegger supposed, so that “we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand” (Heidegger 1962, 98), in the case of these animals?

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Heidegger furthermore linked the “ready-to-hand” with the notion of work. Equipment has an orientation, a “towards-which” of its usability, to the work. One is at work on something. The “ready-to-hand” leads to production. “The production itself is a using of something for something.” (Ibid., 99–100)

Heidegger also referred specifically to the notion of nature and explained how the “ready-to-hand” applies in this case:

“Nature” is not to be understood as that which is just present-at-hand, nor as the *power of Nature*. The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’. As the ‘environment’ is discovered, the ‘Nature’ thus discovered is encountered too. If its kind of Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, this ‘Nature’ itself can be discovered and defined simply in its pure presence-at-hand. (Ibid., 100)

Speaking in Heidegger’s terms with reference to our case, we can formulate the question: what is the readiness-for-use of axolotl? For humans, as we’ve seen, it is its instrumentalization for scientific research because of its regenerative ability. And, another question arises: what would be the bare presence-at-hand in the case of axolotl?

278 *Proteus anguinus*, or the human fish, also has regenerative abilities and exhibits neoteny, similar to axolotl. It lives in the caves of the Karst regions of Slovenia, Croatia, and Herzegovina, reaching high age, up to sixty or even seventy years. It is rather rare to find in its natural environment. It gets sexually mature only after fourteen years and it takes four months for the larva to resemble the adult animals. Statistically, only two embryos out of several hundred eggs survive in the wild. In captivity, the first time they managed to get progeny was in 2016, when twenty-two whelped, twenty-one of which they have managed to keep alive until today. The human fish is actually no fish, it belongs to the family Proteidae and to the genus *Proteus*. Because it lives in total darkness, it has adjusted to these conditions. It has very sensitive photoreceptors, chemoreceptors, mechanic- and electroreceptors, and can orient itself using the Earth’s magnetic field. It has stunted eyes. Charles Darwin mentioned it as an example of the reduction of bodily structures due to disuse. The first scientific description and the name *Proteus anguinus* were given by Joseph Nicolai Laurenti in 1768. The first anatomical examination was conducted not much later by Carl Franz Anton Ritter von Schreibers, in Vienna, to whom the specimens were sent by Žiga Zois. After von Schreibers exhibited the animal in London and Paris, it became globally

known and specimens were then sent, from Slovenia, worldwide. However, the animal was mentioned about a hundred years earlier, in 1689, by Janez Vajkard Valvasor in his work *The Glory of the Duchy of Carniola* (Slovene *Slava vojvodine Kranjske*) as the whelp of the dragon.

Because they did not have scientific knowledge at their disposal, the compatriots of Valvasor had their own explanations of natural phenomena. For them, it was best not to disturb the supernatural beings in power in order to avoid their outbursts of rage. Local people told Valvasor that a dragon in the mountain intermits the flow of the spring water of the creek Bela near Vrhnika and that it would be dangerous to disturb it. Valvasor aimed to find a scientific explanation for the phenomenon in question. He was also told that white water that issues twice a day from the mountain had healing effects for scabies and itching. He suggested the spring should be used. He recommended removing the rocks from the source of the springs to get the water running constantly and to be able to water the cattle. Yet the locals told him that this would outrage the dragon who would then come out with the mountain collapsing about him. Indeed, a peasant told Valvasor that a young dragon had, in fact, once emerged from the source causing a collapse of the mountain. Thousands of people saw this (he claimed). In his book Valvasor commented that he could not stop himself laughing, when he heard this “new Cartesian or Paracelsus and fairy-tale-teller” who was even referring to witnesses (Valvasor 1977, 96). Afterwards, Valvasor talked to the postman Hoffmann from Vrhnika who informed him that it was he who had caught the dragon and had taken it home where it was hung on display. Valvasor wrote: “it turned out, as I had already conjectured myself: that the alleged dragon was barely a foot long and resembled a lizard. In short, it was a kind of worm and vermin [...]. And simple folk want to create a dragon out of it, by all means!” (Ibid.) This is to be believed to be the first mention of the *Proteus anguinus*.

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However, according to folk tales, there were many other frightening dragons thought to be living in the mountains of Slovenia. A dragon from the underground cave of Menina planina in Styria was supposed to cause many problems for people from Bočna because the river Dreta floods when the dragon opens its mouth (cf. Zupanc 1960). The dragon from Žirovski vrh (Žiri in the Upper Carniola) was said to be an enchanted lord of the castle—under

a spell which caused heavy flooding of the Sora river—and still waiting to be released from the cave (until which time he frightens children). Another tale recounts how a bandit was given a choice between a death sentence and a visit to the cave of Huda luknja in Peca, Carinthia. He chose to go to the bottom of the cave, where he met the dragon and was only just rescued from it (cf. Brenkova 1992, 31–32). The unknown world of caves and incomprehensible phenomena were formerly explained in non-scientific terms. Valvasor, in contrast, aimed to scientifically study such phenomena. With his research on the Cerkniško jezero, the intermittent lake that had always created agitation (“The Fourth Book” of *The Glory of the Duchy of Carniola*), he achieved international scientific recognition—becoming a member of the Royal Society, London, in 1687. The investigation of the Bela spring was part of this research. Valvasor’s modern approach asserted rational reasoning. With the preposition to make good use of natural features, i.e., recognizing their “readiness-at-hand,” he as well exhibits instrumental reasoning.

280 Today, the *Proteus anguinus*, the human fish, is a hallmark of Slovenia’s natural heritage. It is a symbol of the natural beauty of the country and, because the animal is extremely sensitive to pollution, of the intactness of Slovenia’s nature. Reconsidering the human fish in Heideggerian terms, its usefulness applies to tourism and for political goals—it is the hallmark for a mountainous unpolluted country. Linked to that and also because of its rareness it is also a national signifier. Furthermore, it serves political strategies to promote protection of natural heritage and sustainable economy. These cases of usefulness are not exactly accordant to the notion of readiness-to-hand as discussed by Heidegger regarding the cases of equipment and their use in a rather physical form of work, actually to be done with the use of hands, but the notion of usefulness was taken more broadly. However, in all cases the usefulness applies to producing benefits for the human species. The question remains, how to conceptualize the relations between entities in non-anthropocentric terms?

An early 20th century zoologist and one of the first theoreticians of ecology, Jakob von Uexküll, who was also a relevant reference for Heidegger, discussed different sorts of environments (1934). He differentiated between the subjective world of animals, *die Umwelt*, and the rather objective environment, *die Umgebung*, which he did not find of interest because he emphasized that there

is no objective space *per se*. Instead, there is only a forest-for-a-woodcutter, a forest-for-a-botanic, a forest-for-a-wanderer, etc. The animals, however, operate within their respective *Umwelts*. The bee, the tick, and the fly that we observe neither move in the same world nor share the same world with us—the observers. In *die Umwelt*, the world and the animal are intrinsically, or existentially, linked. Uexküll considered the case of a tick. The fundamental aspects of the structure of *die Umwelt*, the environments that are valid for all animals, can be derived from the example of the tick. Out of the egg crawls a not yet fully developed little animal that, even in this state, can already ambush cold-blooded animals such as lizards, for which it lies in wait. Once the female has copulated, it, the eyeless and deaf creature, finds its way to the warm-blooded animal from which it pumps a stream of warm blood. Uexküll ascertained that the tick uses its sense of smell and has no sense of taste. It takes in any liquid, so long as it has the right temperature. For the tick it is existentially relevant to get the meal: after getting it, the tick will fall to the ground, lay its eggs, and die. The tick gets into a “functional cycle as a subject and the mammal as its object” (Uexküll 2010, 50).

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More precisely, in *die Umwelt* there are carriers of characteristics, or of significance. In semiology, these would be marks (German *Merkmalträger*), which are also carriers of meaning (German *Bedeutungsträger*). These carriers are everything that interests an animal. An animal has receptive organs that are assigned to perceive the mark (German *Merkorgan*) and to react to it (German *Wirkorgan*). If one would exchange the tick with a giant squid, one can easily imagine that the squid would have an interest in the ship in the same way the tick is interested in the mammal. The squid would take the ship as an object in its *Umwelt*. It would suck on it with the numerous suckers on its tentacles. Finally, it would take it down into its world. Flusser considered the vampire squid in its environment, which is the very depths of the ocean, and the ocean as a place that is “brimming with life,” where four-fifths of the biomass is found and where the largest organisms live:

The lowest level, the ‘benthos,’ is the ultimate destination of all life on earth. It is there where all vital energy generated by plankton goes, and where all fertilizing cadavers go. The organisms that inhabit

the 'benthos', such as walking, swimming and digging animals, form the final link in the chain of life that encircles the planet. There are no plants in this region, only animals that are similar to plants. And Vampyroteuthis dominates this region: he is the lord of all life. So this is the vampyroteuthian environment, his habitat: the centre of the world. The great hole that sucks in all of life. It is permanently vivified by the manna rain that falls constantly. It is eternal night, illuminated by the living rays emanated by the living creatures. And eternal 'son et lumière', a show of infinitely variable luminosity and sonority. (Flusser 1987, 69)

The squid and its environment are in this case not ready-at-hand and not merely present-at-hand. This perspective presents human fear of the unknown and the inhabitable, as well as admiration of the unusual and the powerful.

282 With the concept of dynamically sublime Immanuel Kant reflected upon nature as power. He defined power as "a capacity that is superior to great obstacles" (Kant 2000, 143). It is called force (German *Gewalt*), or domination—if it is also able to overcome the resistance of something that itself possesses power. "Nature considered in aesthetic judgement as a power that has no domination over us is dynamically sublime." (Ibid.) The aesthetic judgement of the sublime is essentially related to relations of power. When Kant enumerated the cases from nature, such as the threatening cliffs, thunder clouds, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes, etc., he concluded that "the sight of them only becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, as long as we find ourselves in safety" (ibid., 144). According to Kant, this takes place because we "discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature" (ibid., 144–145). Therefore, as Kant continued, this analysis of the sublime as ascribed to power seemed to run counter to the imagined representation of God as exhibiting himself in anger in the forms of thunder, storm, earthquake, etc. Furthermore, if we were to, then, imagine, in our minds, having any superiority over the effects of such power, it would seem sacrilegious. In submitting to religion, generally, it seems that adoration with bowed head,

remorseful and anxious gestures, and voice are the only appropriate codes of conduct in the presence of God. Therefore, Kant concludes, “sublimity is not contained in anything in nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within us and thus also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us)” (ibid., 147).

It was very relevant for folks in the past times to express the capacity for resistance in the tales, where they measured themselves against the all-powerfulness of the supernatural creatures and situations. The brave third son to identify with had the courage to enter the other, underground world, when the ground opened up before him and was then able to rescue the trapped princess and, perhaps, also the old woman under a spell. The brave juvenile defeated the dragon from the cave or the monster from the lake that was about to eat the princess. The production and circulation of these hero tales were modes of operating with the unknown and horrible dark world full of beasts and monsters, a way of overcoming, in the folk’s minds, the resistance of something that possess power and a way of establishing man’s domination over something horrible, which also meant overcoming man’s own fears.

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For Flusser, however, the objective is not to resist or to “defeat” the squid/ the beast. He assumes different perspectives of the environment, where *Vampyroteuthis* lives, whereat “[e]nvironments are just as much mirrors of the organism as the organism is a mirror of the environment” (Flusser 1987, 70). Flusser unfolds three perspectives. According to one, the abyss is a Paradise with shiny red, yellow, and silver crabs, a garden that whispers, shines, and dances, a delight of *Vampyroteuthis*, where he can enjoy the fruits. According to the second perspective, the abyss is Hell—for us, who “see a cold black hole under a crushing pressure, full of fear and turmoil, inhabited by viscous and repugnant creatures that eat each other with pincers and teeth” (ibid.). And then there is the perspective of “objective” science. The abyss is a particular habitat inhabited by *Vampyroteuthis*, but inhabitable for man. To “discover” the vampire squid, we first need to get used to the unusual (cf. ibid.). So, how can these two species meet, if they do not live in the same world?

It is difficult for us to catch Vampyroteuthis in nets for fishing as well as those for knowledge. Both of us live separated by an abyss. The atmospheric pressure that he inhabits would crush us, and the air we breathe would suffocate him. If we manage to incarcerate his relative in aquariums in order to study them, they tend to commit suicide, devouring their own tentacles. But we are ignorant of our own behaviour, should he manage to drag us to the deep and incarcerate us under his glass domes in order to observe us. (Ibid., 23)

284 We literally live in different worlds, Flusser concluded, which also explains why he took up and subjected the case of the vampire squid to examination. “There is no ‘general world’ or ‘objective universe’ which is common to both. Such abstract world of science does not exist. If we find Vampyroteuthis, it is within our world that we find him. We do not find him as existence, but as object.” (Ibid., 73) The drawing of the giant squid found in Newfoundland in 1877 speaks of this kind of meeting of man and squid well. Flusser even wrote about existential difference, which is the difference between, said in Heideggerian terms, both of our beings-in-the-world, for which no mutual embrace could ever alter such difference, and thus: “Every attempt to transform Vampyroteuthis into a human complement is a betrayal of human existence, a dangerous romanticism. It is pointless to try to minimize this: Vampyroteuthis is our Hell.” (Ibid., 79)

Here, we are confronted with the impossibility of these two species meeting in any manner other than in a subject-object relationship, which is a relationship of subordination, be it from the human’s or from the animal’s perspective. It is no coincidence that Flusser—who had been influenced by Heidegger, who built upon Uexküll’s theory, which corresponded so well with that of Kant—came to such a conclusion. Uexküll believed that with the interconnectedness of the subject with the object, in *die Umwelt*, biology finally connected with Kant’s philosophy by emphasizing the decisive role of the subject, because there can be no time and no space without a living subject (cf. Uexküll 2010, 52).

Is there any other way to conceive of the vampire squid, the human fish, or the axolotl as in the ways of culturalization of these living creatures as examined so far? When Heidegger considered that in the case one would understand

“Nature” as just present-at-hand, “the Nature which ‘stirs and strives,’ which assails us and enthralls us as landscape, remains hidden” (Heidegger 1962, 100). Can one consider the entities in the world not only from the perspective of usefulness at all? How to think the world in non-anthropocentric terms?

If considering the usefulness of things means usefulness for man, it exhibits an anthropocentric mind-set. Another concept must be found in order to explain the mode of relations between objects in a non-anthropocentric perspective. This mode might be the functionality they have for each other and the (eco)systems.

Object-oriented ontology is a contemporary philosophical school that aims at the objective to turn away from anthropocentrism of the subject-oriented ontology, as introduced by Kant. They claim objects exist independently of human perception. Levi R. Bryant, a contemporary philosopher, who believes his notion of a machine is different from Heidegger’s, who claimed that the machine always needs a creator or an operator, is not that far from that Heidegger’s thought regarding “Nature”, which stirs, strives, and assails us, with the concept that Bryant has addressed as “a machine.” His conceptualization of machine is broad; as he claims, “a tree is no less a machine than an airplane” (Bryant 2014, 16). A machine is an entity that dynamically operates on inputs producing outputs. Bryant, as a materialist social and political philosopher, is interested in how the geographical features of the material world play an important role in social relations and organization of societies. Living and non-living structures operate as machines. For Bryant, it is crucial that machines “are formative of human action, social relations, and designs in a variety of ways that don’t simply issue from humans themselves” (ibid., 22). If we consider a tree as a machine, he believes, our comprehension is very different from the one where we consider it as an object with certain properties: “Rather than regarding the tree as a structure of qualities or properties inhering in a subject, we instead approach it as a system of operations performing transformations.” (Ibid., 38) Thus, according to Bryant, the proper question for any machine is: “What does it *do*?” (Ibid., 39) A tree is not a static object, but a processual machine that gets some inputs and produces outputs: the tree transforms the flow of water, the soil nutrients, the light and the carbon dioxide that passes through the tree.

The Karst region is the youngest geographical area of the Earth, therefore also the human fish has “arrived” to the caves relatively recently, evolving from an inhabitant of the surface waters, similar to the black salamander, into the species it is today. This most likely took place only after the withdrawal of the glaciers less than 10,000 years ago. The Karst limestone caves can be considered a good example of machines as comprehended by Bryant since they organize the life contained within them, including the human fish. Furthermore, the caves connect to other machines such as different sorts of water flows, which move in and out, and also shape them—their channels, halls, the water drips that form stalactites and stalagmites, etc. The running waters, however, further connect the machines of the caves with the machines of the outside world, thereby assuring the quantity and the quality of water. The machines of the farms and the cities are connected to the running and underground waters, the fertilizers that enter the soil, get into the waters and also get into the caves. The lives of the people are connected to the lives of the human fish. The wellbeing of the human fish in the caves depends on environmentally sustainable living of man.

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Contrary to the human fish, the vampire squid has not transformed much during its evolution, which does not mean that it cannot rapidly change or become extinct. Today, however, the vampire squid and his abyss are not the horrible man is to be afraid of; the dangers are centered elsewhere. They are to be considered relationally, i.e., as regards the quality of relations between entities, between entities and their environmental systems, between different environmental systems, and between them and the ecosystem. For instance, man is not only the greatest stimulator of a regeneration of life, but also the most invasive of all species on Earth.

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POSTHUMANISTIČNA ZNANOST

HUSSERL, SELLARS, MODERNO NARAVOSLOVJE IN KONCEPT ČLOVEKA

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Povzetek

Besedilo obravnava razmerje med človeškim izkustvom in moderno naravoslovno znanostjo. Pri artikulaciji teh dveh polov in njunega razmerja se besedilo opira na filozofijo Edmunda Husserla in Wilfrida Sellarsa. V članku so obravnavani Husserlovi in Sellarsovi argumenti glede vprašanja epistemološkega razmerja med življenjskim svetom in moderno znanostjo, pri čemer se polemiko med avtorjema nazadnje razreši v prid Sellarsovi poziciji, torej v prid diskontinuiteti med znanostjo ter človeškim

izkustvom in v prid posthumanistični naravi znanstvenega izkustva. Nazadnje je problematizirana subjektivna pozicija tega, ki zavzame epistemološko perspektivo moderne znanosti. S tem vprašanjem se razprava vrne k Husserlu, in sicer k njegovi konceptiji strukture utelešenega izkustva. S tega stališča skuša pojasniti, kako človek v kontekstu moderne znanosti lahko zavzame posthumanistično pozicijo v razmerju do sveta in samega sebe.

Ključne besede: Edmund Husserl, Wilfrid Sellars, življenjski svet, znanstvena podoba, posthumanizem.

Posthuman Science. Husserl, Sellars, modern natural science, and the concept of man

Abstract

The paper discusses the relation between human experience and modern natural science. The two domains and their relationship are examined with reference to the thought of Edmund Husserl and Wilfrid Sellars. Husserl's and Sellars' differing arguments with regard to the epistemological relationship between lifeworld and modern science are confronted. The polemic is steered in favor of Sellars' position by affirming the discontinuity between the two epistemological domains and in favor of the posthuman nature of scientific experience. Lastly, the paper problematizes the subjective position of the one who takes up the epistemological perspective of modern science. With this enquiry, the discussion again turns to Husserl and explores his conception of the structure of embodied experience. Such a viewpoint is used as a starting point for the clarification of how in the context of modern science man can take up the posthuman position in relation to the world and himself.

Keywords: Edmund Husserl, Wilfrid Sellars, lifeworld, scientific image, posthumanism.

*Kako lahko dojamemo smisel neke znanstvene izjave,
ki eksplicitno zadeva neko danost sveta, ki je postavljena
pred pojavitvijo mišljenja ali celo življenja – se pravi,
ki je postavljena kot zunanja vsaki človeški obliki razmerja do sveta?*

Quentin Meillassoux

*Lahko ideja, ki jo imamo
o človeški osebi oziroma o samih sebi,
preživi pohod znanstvenega odkritja?*

Jean-Pierre Dupuy

Uvod

Pričujoče besedilo izhaja iz določene slutnje, ki jo očitno delim s tako raznovrstnima mislecema, kot sta Meillasoux in Dupuy. Izhaja iz opažanja, da je moderna naravoslovna znanost v vedno večji disonanci z načinom mišljenja o svetu in nas samih, ki je starejše in dozdevno bolj domače, z mišljenjem, ki se zdi bližje našemu neposrednemu izkustvu in za artikulacijo katerega sta v večji meri odgovorni filozofija in humanistične znanosti. Razkorak med tema dvema oblikama mišljenja je bil na takšen ali drugačen način že preučen s strani skorajda vseh vidnejših figur moderne epistemologije. Epistemološki pogled na ta problem je seveda pomemben, vendar se lahko nanj obrnemo tudi z nekoliko drugačnega zornega kota, v luči katerega se začnejo porajati presenetljiva in nenavadna vprašanja o načinu obstoja vsakogar, ki se poslužuje teh disonantnih oblik mišljenja. Naj torej strnem slutnjo, ki jo bom tekom tega besedila poskušal razviti: moderna znanost in starejši »humanistični« diskurz ne predstavljata le dveh oblik izrekanja dejstev o svetu in nas samih, ki bi ju lahko medsebojno primerjali izključno glede na podobnost oz. ustreznost svojemu predmetu. Omogočata namreč dva različna odnosa, ki ju lahko zavzamemo do samih sebe, in odpirata dve perspektivi na svet, ki ju lahko zavzameta le dve povsem različni vrsti opazovalca.

Mislim, da s tega zornega kota vprašanje o možnosti človekovega preživetja pohoda znanstvenega odkritja pridobi na pomenu in teži. Posthumanistične narave moderne znanosti torej ne gre iskati zgolj v spektakularnih učinkih, ki jih obljublja ali že ima kot družbeni dejavnik. Dejstva, da znanstveni pogled in tehnološki objekti prodirajo v neposredno okolje našega življenja in v naša

lastna telesa, da znanstvena reprezentacija sveta omogoča transformacijo naše fiziološke konstitucije, medsebojnih odnosov, produkcijskih okvirjev in družbenih oblik, seveda ne gre zanemariti. Toda tu sledim vprašanju, ki se glede najbolj vidnih učinkov znanosti in tehnologije v naših življenjih zdi manj pereče in bolj spekulativno, a se morda tako zdi le zaradi manka konceptualnih okvirjev, v katerih bi ga lahko bolje zastavili. Gre mi za vprašanje, kako *način mišljenja*, ki je značilen za moderno znanost, vstopa v razmerje s starejšimi oblikami mišljenja, ki do velike mere še vedno uokvirjajo naše razumevanje samih sebe in našega položaja v svetu, na podlagi katerih artikuliramo razloge za svoja dejanja in vrednotimo cilje svojega delovanja.

292 Tekom razprave se bom osredotočil predvsem na dela dveh avtorjev, Edmunda Husserla in Wilfrida Sellarsa. Oba problem zastavita z osnovno delitvijo pojma izkustva na dvoje: Husserl razloči med *življenjskim svetom* in *svetom galilejske znanosti*, medtem ko Sellars razloči med *manifestno* in *znanstveno podobo človeka-v-svetu*. Ta dva konceptualna para sta, kot bom pokazal, dovolj podobna, da se lahko njuni poziciji srečata v zanimivi polemiki, hkrati pa skrivata tudi določene pomembne razlike v epistemoloških in metafizičnih izhodiščih. Dialog med omenjenima avtorjema, do katerega v neposredni obliki nikoli ni prišlo, nas lahko pripelje, če že ne do nedvoumnih odgovorov glede statusa človeka v našem svetu, vsaj do zametkov nove filozofske pozicije, s katere se šele zares lahko postavi vprašanje o možnosti njegovega izginotja in opazuje nenavadne prehode, ki ga morda spremenijo do nerazpoznavnosti.

1. Zgodovina pozabe: Husserl in vrnitev k življenjskemu svetu

1.1. Matematizacija narave

Slutnja o shizmi med znanstveno koncepcijo sveta in svetom našega vsakdanjega izkustva bo sama po sebi ostala na ravni meglenih predznanstvenih intuicij, dokler si ne pridemo na jasno, kaj natančno mislimo z izrazoma, med katerima vidimo prepad. Kljub temu da je Husserl najbolj znan po utemeljitvi fenomenologije kot filozofske metode neposrednega preučevanja struktur zavesti, v njegovem opusu najdemo tudi razmeroma obsežno in zelo vplivno raziskavo zgodovine naravoslovnih znanosti, ki je namenjena razmejitvi dveh

metodološko in metafizično razlikujočih se domen preučevanja. Tako v *Krizi*¹ Husserl naše izkustvo razdeli na dve domeni: življenjski svet na eni in *svet galilejske znanosti*² na drugi strani (prim. Husserl 2005, 68).

Kriza je kot eno izmed utemeljitvenih fenomenoloških del še posebej zanimiva ravno zato, ker ne začne neposredno z lastno domeno preučevanja, ampak nas poskusi najprej osvoboditi iz primeža neke druge, fenomenologiji tuje, bralcu pa verjetno veliko bolj domače oblike izkustva. Husserl torej verjame, da moramo njegov življenjski svet razumeti v kontrastu in tudi nekakšnem konfliktu z metodološkimi in metafizičnimi predpostavkami moderne znanosti. Kot je že implicirano z izrazom *svet galilejske znanosti*, nas zato vzvratna pot do življenjskega sveta vodi nazaj do prvih korakov, ki so jih misleci 17. stoletja napravili pri konstrukciji metode nove znanosti o naravi.

Ko beremo o bistvenih značilnostih moderne znanosti, se praviloma poudarja njena empiristična naravnost: pozornost na opazovana dejstva in metoda indukcije. Nasprotno pa Husserl kot bistveno potezo moderne znanosti vidi ravno v nekakšni pozabi dejstev, ki so najbližje »pravemu«³ empiričnemu izkustvu. Prva poteza rojevajoče se moderne znanosti ni v vrnitvi k izkustvu po dolgem obdobju dogmatičnega branja antičnih avtorjev in intelektualne dominacije teološke misli, ampak v *konstrukciji nove vrste izkustva*, skozi katerega je narava, kakršno poznamo danes, šele postala izkustveno dana. Po Husserlu je empirizem v širšem smislu³ za sodobno znanost sicer vsekakor pomemben, a se ključni impulz, ki znanost požene v tek, porodi iz nove interpretacije tega, kaj za znanstvenika sploh lahko šteje kot veljavno izkustvo. Pravi oče moderne znanstvene revolucije je zato Galileo Galilej,⁴ saj je prvi

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1 Celoten naslov tega dela se glasi: *Kriza evropskih znanosti in transcendentalna fenomenologija*. V nadaljevanju se nanj vedno sklicujem z okrajšavo *Kriza*.

2 Ta izraz je za razliko od življenjskega sveta moj in ne Husserlov. Husserl sicer obsežno govori o Galilejevi matematizaciji narave, vendar Galilejevega odkritja ne bi označil z mojim izrazom, saj po njegovem v zadnji instanci ne obstaja na isti način kot obstaja življenjski svet.

3 Torej ne kot epistemologija, ki najbolj gotovo evidenco išče v izkustvu čutnih dat, vednost o vsem drugem pa razume kot indukcijo, izvršeno na tej primarni izkustveni ravni, ampak kot epistemologija, ki resničnost teorije sicer presoja glede na izkušena dejstva, a ideje izkustva ne razume nujno v smislu posameznikovega privatnega čutnega izkustva.

4 Tu bi veljalo pripomniti, da Husserl do neke mere zavestno poenostavlja zgodovino

osnoval načrt za tisto, čemur Husserl pravi *matematizacija narave* (prim. Husserl 2005, 36).⁵

Galilej je po Husserlu revolucionarni pionir moderne empirične znanosti in hkrati tudi največji platonist svojega časa.⁶ V določenem pogledu je Platonove nastavke še radikaliziral, saj za antičnega misleca čutna realnost predstavlja nekakšno podobo idealne realnosti, medtem ko Galilej idealizira sam empirični svet (prim. Husserl 2005, 35). Kaj konkretno torej novoveška idealizacija čutnega sveta pomeni?

V prvi vrsti to, da znanstveni opis narave opusti vsakdanje deskriptivne pojme, s katerimi opazovalec izraža svoje čutno izkustvo opazovanega predmeta. Pojmi, kot so »barva, zvok, vonj in podobno« (ibid., 44), s katerimi izražamo lastnosti tega, čemur Husserl pravi »čutne polnosti« (ibid.), torej tega, kar se človeškemu opazovalcu kaže v neposrednem čutnem izkustvu, od Galileja naprej ne veljajo več kot legitimni znanstveni opis prostorsko-časovne realnosti, temveč jih nadomestijo geometrični pojmi. Geometrični prostor Husserl razume kot konstrukcijo prostorskih razmerij in oblik, ki se jim čutno zaznane oblike lahko le bolj ali manj približajo.

Galilejeve metode v njegovem času sicer niso bile nekaj novega. Ključni korak na poti k vzpostavitvi specifično moderne znanosti je v njegovi drzni konceptiji celotnega realno obstoječega prostorsko-časovnega sveta kot sveta idealiziranih oblik, ki jih opisuje geometrija. S tem so geometrične lastnosti

vzpostavitve metod modernega naravoslovja. Kot izpostavlja Moran, Husserl Galileju pripisuje izčiščeno in dovršeno razumevanje znanstvenih principov, ki je plod diskusije in sodelovanja širšega kroga mislecev (prim. Moran 2012).

5 Za natančnejšo obravnavo postopnega procesa matematizacije narave glej: Koyré 1988. Za razliko od Husserla, ki pri obravnavi galilejske znanosti pozornost usmeri na epistemološko razmerje med neposrednim izkustvom in konstrukcijo okvira znanstvenih dejstev, Koyré poudarek postavi na ontološko razliko med vrstami teles in prostorov, ki jih v svetu najdeta moderni in predmoderni človek. Po njegovem mnenju je ključna poteza razvoja nove znanstvene podobe sveta, ki teče od Kopernika do Newtona, premik k *uniformnemu svetu*, ki na vseh svojih ravneh deluje v skladu z istimi temeljnimi zakonitostmi delovanja. Predmeti v tem svetu se za razliko od aristotelskega kozmosa ne razlikujejo več kategorično, tj. glede na nereduktibilne kvalitete ali svoje lastno individualno bistvo, ampak le glede na matematično določljivo pozicijo v prostoru in organizacijo sestavnih delov.

6 Podobno pozicijo zagovarja Alexandre Koyré, glej: Koyré 1943.

idealnih teles postale razumljene kot lastnosti materialnega sveta, kakršen je na sebi, empirična izkustva pa so postala koncipirana kot bolj ali manj natančne aproksimacije teh lastnosti.

Vendar tega koraka tako rekoč ne bi bilo mogoče izvesti izključno na podlagi geometrijske abstrakcije od čutnega izkustva. Husserl zato poudarja ključni pomen razvoja *meritvenih tehnik*, ki omogočajo natančnejše opazovanje empiričnih pojavov, predvsem *kvantifikacijo* lastnosti, ki so se iz perspektive čutne zaznave manifestirale kot izključno kvalitativne in posledično nemerljive lastnosti. Po Husserlu je tisto, kar dela moderno znanost eksaktno, ravno uporaba meritvenih instrumentov. Vendar eksaktna ni le zato, ker bi meritveni instrumenti omogočali videti več in bolj natančno, ampak predvsem zato, ker meritve vnaprej usmerja ideja geometrično določene realnosti, lastnosti katere znanstvenik aproksimira v svojih meritvah (prim. *ibid.*, 43).

Geometrizacija narave in meritvene tehnike tako omogočijo formalizacijo merjenih količin in zapis odkritih soodvisnosti v obliki matematičnih formul. To je Galilejevo ključno odkritje, ki je v moderni zgodovini predstavljalo temelj za nadaljnji razvoj znanosti in je v sodobnem času postalo skorajda stvar zdravega razuma. Husserl nam z zgodovinskega stališča poskusi obuditi ravno občutek za nenavadnost, skorajda »čudežnost« (ibid.) omenjenega odkritja, da je namreč mogoče univerzalno veljavna kavzalna sovisja ali, če uporabim bolj sugestivni izraz, zakonitosti narave iskati v matematično formaliziranih sovisjih med merljivimi količinami, kot so prostorska razdalja, masa, pospešek in podobno.⁷

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Nenavadna poteza matematizacije narave, ki je omogočila takšno vrsto razlage in napovedovanja pojavov, je bila ravno zaradi osupljivih znanstvenih uspehov, ki so se začeli naglo vrstiti od Newtonovih prebojev naprej, v določenem smislu pozabljena, saj je začela delovati kot implicitna predpostavka za vsakršno raziskovanje narave. Husserl opozarja, da je z razvojem vedno bolj sofisticirane aritmetike znanstveno mišljenje postajalo vse bolj »tehnično«, s

⁷ Husserl sicer natančno razčleni številne korake v procesu matematizacije narave, ki poteka od konstrukcijske geometrije prek aritmetične aksiomatizacije geometrije do koncepcije znanstvenega eksperimenta kot potrditve oz. ovržbe aritmetično izražene naravnega zakona. Za bolj natančno obravnavo Husserlove analize matematizacije glej, npr.: Garrison 1986, Moran 2012 in Ströker 1997.

čimer je prekinilo zadnjo vez z naravo, ki še ni bila matematizirana. Znanstvena misel lahko tako računa z aritmetičnimi simboli, ne da bi se morala vprašati o smislu svojih izjav, torej o tem, na kaj se njene izjave v zadnji instanci nanašajo (prim. Husserl 2005, 65). To velja tudi za eksperimentalno plat moderne znanosti, saj tudi ta rezultate svojega opazovanja razume le še kot potrditev ali ovržbo matematično formuliranih zakonitosti (prim. ibid., 66). Metode meritve, zastavljanja eksperimentov in manipulacije z aritmetičnimi simboli se tako lahko prenašajo iz roda v rod kot nekakšni tehnološki artefakti, medtem ko se dejanja, s katerimi so bili postavljeni okviri takšne znanosti, in nenazadnje svet, v katerem so bila izvršena, umikajo v pozabo.

Če hočemo razumeti pravo vsebino znanstvenih odkritij, jim moramo po Husserlu torej slediti nazaj k tistemu svetu, v katerem so znanstveniki naleteli na svoja prva odkritja in na podlagi katerega so izoblikovali tehnike meritve in idealizacije – svet, adekvatni opis katerega naj bi moderna znanost nenazadnje tvorila, a ga je s pozabo svojih izvorov in pogojev le prekrila z njegovo idealizirano matematično podobo.

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1.2. Življenjski svet

Z vzratnim zgodovinskim gibanjem od odkritja naravnih zakonitosti v obliki matematičnih formul do prvih predpostavk, s katerimi raziskovanje narave začrta Galilej, po Husserlu nenazadnje dospemo do tega, čemur pravi *življenjski svet*. Življenjski svet ni nekaj, kar bi naše znanstvene teorije lahko preprosto nadomestile. Še vedno namreč deluje v ozadju naših prepričanj in tvori temelj naših nadaljnjih raziskav. Za fizika je, na primer, to »okolje, v katerem vidi svoje meritvene instrumente, sliši udarjanje taktov, ocenjuje videne veličine itn., okolje, za katerega ve, da se nahaja v njem skupaj z vsem svojim početjem in vsemi svojimi teoretskimi mislimi« (ibid., 151).

Življenjski svet je torej svet čutne zaznave, na katerega se neprestano sklicujemo vsi, vključno z znanstveniki. Vendar čutne zaznave v Husserlovem smislu ne gre razumeti kot gole recepcije čutnih dražljajev niti zgolj kot dojemljivosti za čutne kvalitete, kot so barve vidnih instrumentov ali zvok udarjanja taktov. Po Husserlu v prvi vrsti zaznavamo objekte same, pri čemer se dražljajev in čutnih kvalitet lahko zavemo le naknadno, z abstrakcijo od objekta neposredne zaznave.

Življenjski svet je domena tistega, kar je »v zaznavanju izkušeno kot ‚ono samo‘« (ibid., 159).⁸ Življenjski svet pa ne vključuje le objektov samih, ampak tudi njihove podobe, abstrakcije in nenazadnje tudi znanosti, kolikor se na takšen ali drugačen nanašajo na objekte prvega reda (prim. Husserl 2005, 139).⁹

Problem, ki ga v moderni znanosti vidi Husserl, zato ni isti kot problem, ki ga je izpostavil Locke, ko je opozarjal na odsotnost t. i. sekundarnih oziroma čutnih kvalitete v naravoslovnih teorijah.¹⁰ Omenjena odsotnost je sicer pomenljiva, a se za njo skriva še bolj temeljni problem, ki fascinira Husserla, namreč to, da moderna znanost v zadnji instanci nikoli ne govori o objektih, kot so dani v zaznavi, saj so njihove lastnosti na takšen ali drugačen način reinterpreterirane kot aproksimacije kvantitativnih vrednosti znanstvenih formul. Bistvena lastnost moderne znanosti je ravno v tem, da se vsaj neposredno *ne* nanaša na objekte.

Zato se zdi, da res obstaja nekakšna nepremostljiva shizma med znanostjo ter človeškim izkustvom in da lahko v zadnji instanci pozicijo realnosti zavzame le ena izmed obeh strani. Husserl zato v nasprotju s prevladujočo tendenco moderne misli skuša dokazati, da realnost ni na strani znanosti. Po njegovem je to, kar znanost v resnici počne, produkt in sestavni del življenjskega sveta.

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Husserlov argument je preprost: če priznamo, da geometrično idealizirane konstrukcije kot take niso nikoli dane v izkustvu, temveč gre pri takšnih entitetah za miselni konstrukt, potem moramo enak status pripisati tudi svetu, ki mu moderna znanost pripisuje realni obstoj. Rezultatov moderne

8 Husserlova koncepcija danosti je sicer bolj niansirana. Za natančnejšo razčlenitev Husserlove fenomenalne danosti glej: Soffer 2003, 306.

9 Za natančnejše razpravo o Husserlovi koncepciji in metodi analize življenjskega sveta glej, npr.: Alves 2013, Carr 1970, Moran 2012 in Ströker 1997).

10 Stališče, po katerem gre pri Husserlovem življenjskem svetu v prvi vrsti za sekundarne kvalitete oz. kvalitete neposredne čutne zaznave, zagovarja David Carr (prim. 1970, 333). Carr tako pride do zaključka, da Husserl pod svojim konceptom življenjskega sveta neupravičeno združuje dve heterogeni domeni: kvalitete neposredne zaznave na eni strani ter lingvistično in kulturno posredovane objekte na drugi (prim. ibid., 337). Toda med obema domenama ni nikakršnega protislovja, če upoštevamo, da življenjski svet sestoji iz fenomenov, ki so lahko izkušeni »kot oni sami«. Kot oni sami so lahko izkušeni tako objekti »neposredne« čutne zaznave kot tudi »posredovani« kulturni objekti, ki se v tem smislu na isti način razlikujejo od objektov znanstvenih teorij (prim. Husserl 2005, 133).

znanosti zato ne smemo razumeti kot nekakšne podobe na sebi obstoječega matematično določenega sveta, ampak kot orodja, ki omogočajo »v neskončnost razširjeno anticipacijo« pojavov v življenjskem svetu (Husserl 2005, 71). Znanstvene teorije lahko razumemo kot *orodja anticipacije* tudi v razliki do *pomena pojmov vsakdanje govorice*, ki se dejansko nanašajo na zaznavne predmete, medtem ko so znanstvene formule na drugi strani računski pripomočki, s katerimi kartografiramo objekte življenjskega sveta in napovedujemo njihova sosledja. Naša matematično-znanstvena orodja so lahko sicer izjemno uporabna, vendar je njihova moč omejena na površinska razmerja med objekti življenjskega sveta in zato ne morejo nikoli transformirati naših osnovnih intuicij o teh objektih in našem mestu med njimi. Kolikor mislimo nasprotno, po Husserlu delamo napako, da »za pravo bit jemljemo to, kar je *metoda*« (ibid., 72).

2. Zgodovina konflikta: Sellars in prednost znanstvene podobe

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Dihotomija med življenjskim svetom in svetom galilejske znanosti je v mnogih pogledih podobna konceptualni dvojici, po kateri je znana druga ključna figura naše diskusije. Wilfrid Sellars vpelje razliko med *manifestno* in *znanstveno podobo človeka-v-svetu*, da bi se, podobno kot Husserl, vprašal o njunem medsebojnem razmerju.

Po Sellarsu gre pri znanstveni in manifestni podobi za dve »obliki izkustva sveta« (Sellars 1962, 5). Izraza *podoba* torej ne smemo vzeti preveč dobesedno, saj med podobo in odslikanim predmetom ne vlada enostavno razmerje podobnosti. Podobo po Sellarsu tvori sistem pojmov in pravil njihove rabe, temeljna vloga katerih je *reprezentacija*. Ta vloga se razlikuje od številnih drugih vlog, ki jih lahko privzame jezik, npr.: izražanje zahtev, igranje iger itd. Sellarsov pojem podobe označuje torej tisto vrsto naše govorice, ki ji lahko pripišemo takšno ali drugačno resničnostno vrednost. Če o Sellarsovih podobah govorimo kot o oblikah izkustva sveta, potem moramo izraz *izkustvo* razumeti v najširšem možnem smislu, saj je to nerazločljivo od načina *koncepcije* sveta, impliciranega v oblikah njegove lingvistične reprezentacije.

V čem se torej podobi razlikujeta? Imeni sta tudi tu lahko nekoliko zavajajoči, saj vsekakor ne gre za to, da bi manifestni podobi človeka v

svetu manjkalo racionalnosti ali prefinjenosti, ki jo najdemo v znanstveni reprezentaciji sveta. Pri obeh podobah gre za konceptualna sistema z bogato razčlenjenimi pojmi ter z razdelanimi pravili aplikacije in sklepanj. Če govorimo o konfliktu med znanstveno in manifestno podobo, torej ne govorimo o razsvetljenski zgodbi o boju med metodično artikulirano vednostjo in naivnostjo zdravega razuma ali človeške domišljije.

Bistvena razlika med podobama se tiče *vrste entitet*, o katerih lahko govori določena podoba. Manifestna podoba namreč ne postulira entitet, ki jih ni mogoče opazovati. Pojmi manifestne podobe se tako vedno nanašajo bodisi na predmete, ki so dostopni našemu neposrednemu izkustvu, bodisi na takšna ali drugačna razmerja med izkustveno manifestnimi entitetami. Tisto, kar družijo vse zgodovinske stopnje manifestne podobe, je dejstvo, da sta v okvirih manifestne podobe tako človek kot svet razumljena kot *manifestna*, tj. kot *pojava, dostopna neposrednemu izkustvu*.

Po drugi strani pa znanstvena podoba govori izključno o entitetah, ki same po sebi niso dostopne za izkustvo, entitetah, kot so kvarki, elektromagnetna polja, nevroni ali črne luknje. Tovrstni predmeti in njihove lastnosti se kot takšni ne pojavljajo, ampak jih znanost *postulira*, da bi razložila kavzalne zakonitosti manifestnih pojavov. Opazujemo jih lahko le v prenesenem pomenu, tj. s pomočjo observacijskih instrumentov, delovanje katerih mora biti razloženo v znanstveni teoriji, da lahko njihove rezultate postavimo v korelacijo z nezaznavnimi entitetami znanstvene podobe.

Opazimo lahko, da je mogoče velik del praks, ki jih sicer umeščamo med znanosti, razumeti v okvirih manifestne podobe, saj gre za sistematično iskanje korelacij, regularnosti in razmerij med entitetami, ki jih srečujemo v svetu manifestnih, tj. izkustveno danih predmetov. Husserl bi na tej točki pristavil, da moramo na ta način razumeti *prav vse* znanstvene prakse. Njegova ključna poanta, s katero sem zaključil prejšnje poglavje, je ravno v zanikanju dejanskega obstoja nezaznavnih entitet, ki jih postulira znanost, in v konceptiji pojmov takšnih entitet kot računskih pripomočkov, s katerimi razlagamo in napovedujemo manifestne pojave. Znanost tako izgubi status podobe s svojim lastnim odslikanim predmetom, saj predstavlja le elaboracijo našega razumevanja razmerij med manifestnimi predmeti.

Bistvena razlika med pozicijama Husserla in Sellarsa je v tem, da se slednji postavi na drugo stran konflikta med manifestno in znanstveno podobo. Da bi pravilno razumeli razloge za njegovo odločitev, pa si moramo najprej natančneje ogledati, zakaj do konflikta med podobama sploh pride.

Kot sem že izpostavil, se znanstvene teorije od miselnih sistemov manifestne podobe razlikujejo po tem, da postulirajo objekte in njihove lastnosti, ki niso dostopni neposredni čutni zaznavi. Toda te lastnosti vendarle morajo biti na določen način dostopne človeškemu izkustvu, saj so teorije znanstvene podobe konec koncev prav tako empirične. *Explanandum* znanstvenih teorij nenazadnje tvorijo pojavi, s katerimi se srečujemo v okvirih manifestne podobe. Med postuliranimi objekti znanosti in manifestno podobo mora torej obstajati določena vez.

Vlogo te vezi opravljajo *korespondenčna pravila*, ki določenim pojavom manifestne podobe pripišejo njihove postulirane ustreznike, praviloma v obliki matematičnih modelov. Primer takšnega korespondenčnega pravila bi bil:

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Temperatura plina	$\Leftrightarrow$	Povprečna kinetična energija
v domeni D je x		v molekuli v domeni D je y^{11}

Sellarsova pozicija temelji na specifični interpretaciji stavkov, ki izražajo tovrstno razmerje med opazovalnimi trditvami manifestne podobe in teoretskimi trditvami znanstvene podobe. Če bi lahko takšne trditve razumeli kot popoln prevod iz enega jezika v drugega oziroma kot identifikacijo referenta dveh trditev, bi se znanstvene teorije izkazale za nič drugega kot okrajšave trditev opazovanja in indukcije v okvirih manifestne podobe.

Pravila korespondence po Sellarsu ne izražajo popolnega prevoda. Razlog za neskladje med pojmi manifestne in znanstvene podobe je v tem, da so lahko znanstveni opisi pojavov v določenem smislu natančnejši od opisov manifestne podobe, saj pravila korespondence lastnosti postuliranih objektov koordinirajo tako s čutnimi lastnostmi kot z rezultati meritvenih instrumentov, kot sta mikroskop ali pospeševalnik delcev.

¹¹ Prim. Sellars 1974, 448.

Če pristanemo na dejstvo, da objekti znanstvene in manifestne podobe niso identični v strogem smislu, to po Sellarsu še ne pomeni, da opisov in razlag pojavov, ki jih najdemo v obeh podobah, med seboj ne moremo primerjati. Kljub temu da takšna pravila ne morejo tvoriti čvrstega mostu med podobama, kakršnega bi dobili s popolnim prevodom, nam po Sellarsu omogočajo vsaj nekakšno primerjavo razlagalne moči obeh pojmovnih okvirov.

Z natančnejšim opisom, ki ga omogoča znanstveno besedišče, lahko v določenih primerih odkrijemo zakonitosti, ki jih v okvirih manifestne podobe preprosto ne bi mogli opaziti. Sellars to ilustrira na primeru zlata, za katerega se izkaže, da se v zlatotopki (zmes dušikove in klorovodikove kisline) ne topi vedno z isto hitrostjo. Določeni kosi zlata se topijo s konstantno hitrostjo x , drugi pa s konstantno hitrostjo y . S stališča manifestne podobe so tako kosi zlata kot okoliščine, v katerih jih topimo, videti identični, zato variacija v hitrosti topljenja ne more biti razumljena drugače kot zgolj naključna lastnost zlata. Znanstvena teorija kemijskih procesov lahko manifestno zlato korelira z dvema različnima konfiguracijama mikroentitet, ki se v istih pogojih topljenja obnašajo različno. S stališča znanstvene podobe lahko tako variacijo v hitrosti topljenja zlata razložimo glede na univerzalne zakonitosti, ki držijo za konfiguracije mikroentitet, iz katerih je zlato zgrajeno (prim. Sellars 1962, 21).

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V tem smislu lahko za znanstveno podobo rečemo, da je v funkciji opisa in razlage pojavov *boljša* od manifestne. Dobre znanstvene teorije po Sellarsu ne bodo le sistematizirale regularnosti, ki jih lahko opazimo v okvirih manifestne podobe, ampak bodo odkrile zakonitosti tudi tam, kjer imamo s stališča manifestne podobe opravka le z naključni odkloni od pričakovanega poteka dogodkov. Predstavljajo torej natančnejši opis in boljšo vzročno razlago pojavov od tistih, ki jih je mogoče oblikovati v okvirih manifestne podobe.

Pravil korespondence zato po Sellarsu ne smemo razumeti kot *prevod*, ampak kot *redefinicijo* pojmov manifestne podobe. Takšna pravila trdijo, da lahko pojem iz manifestne podobe v njegovi vlogi zaznave oziroma observacije preprosto *nadomestimo* z določenim pojmom iz znanstvene podobe.¹² Namesto

12 V tej potezi moramo prepoznati Sellarsovo pravo kritiko *instrumentalizma* (torej stališča, po katerem znanost predstavlja zgolj kalkulacijski pripomoček za napovedovanje in obvladovanje zaznanih pojavov). To je relevantno v navezavi na Husserlovo pozicijo, saj Gail Soffer, na primer, trdi, da Husserlove pozicije ne

da bi takšna pravila govorila o korelaciji ali identiteti objektov manifestne in znanstvene podobe, nas pravila korespondence učijo, da objekti manifestne podobe preprosto ne obstajajo. Ko koordinirajo razmerje med podobama, v resnici koordinirajo način, na katerega lahko upravičeno opustimo uporabo določenega segmenta manifestne podobe. S tem nas učijo, da so nezaznavne fizikalne entitete ne le tisto, kar v resnici *obstaja*, ampak tudi tisto, kar v resnici *vidimo*. Učijo nas, kako zamenjati ne le vrsto razlage, ampak osnovne deskriptivne pojme.

Če se to na prvi pogled zdi popolnoma protislovno, je to zaradi splošno uveljavljenega prepričanja, da je človeška zaznava nujno čutna. Sellars predlaga stališče, ki je protiintuitivno v najbolj dobesednem pomenu, saj trdi, da bi lahko pojme, s katerimi izražamo čutno zaznane lastnosti stvari, preprosto zamenjali s pojmi objektov in lastnosti, ki čutni zaznavi niso dostopni. Sellars bi tako ta dozdevni paradoks zagotovo označil za nekaj navideznega, saj medtem ko čutne kvalitete po njegovem vsekakor so bistveni element človeške zaznave, *pojmi, ki te kvalitete izražajo, niso*. Pojemovni okvir, v katerem artikuliramo naše zaznavno izkustvo, je po Sellarsu lahko povsem drugačen od besedišča čutnih lastnosti, ki ga najdemo v manifestni podobi.

Husserl in Sellars očitno govorita o isti točki preloma med človeškim izkustvom in znanstveno vednostjo. Kljub temu da med konceptoma življenjskega sveta in manifestne podobe obstajajo pomembne razlike, vidimo, da se argumenti glede pravega razmerja med znanostjo in človeškim izkustvom pri obeh mislecih srečajo na ravni istega problema.¹³ Medtem ko Husserl v

smemo razumeti kot instrumentalistične, še posebej, če poleg Krize upoštevamo tudi njegova druga pomembnejša dela, kot so *Logične raziskave*, *Ideje I* ali *Formalna in transcendentalna logika* (prim. Soffer 1990, 87). Husserl namreč v teh delih o matematično-znanstvenem mišljenju ne govori le kot o abstrakciji od življenjskega sveta, ampak tudi kot o posebni vrsti intencionalnosti, ki sama po sebi razodeva *nov aspekt realnosti*. Toda tu bi pripomnil, da kljub tej premestitvi poudarka Husserl v vseh naštetih delih vztraja pri prepričanju, da je konstitucija znanstvenih objektov naknadna konstituciji življenjskega sveta in da zato znanstveno spoznanje nima možnosti posega v osnovne opredelitve objektov življenjskega sveta (prim. Husserl 1969, 323). Ravno to pozicijo spodbija Sellarsov znanstveni realizem.

13 Sellars torej s svojimi argumenti za znanstveni realizem skoraj neposredno odgovarja na Husserlovo problematizacijo matematizacije narave, kakor opaza Rouse (prim. 1987, 229).

izogib pozabi življenjskega sveta trdi, da je vsebina znanstvenih propozicij (v določenem smislu) zvedljiva na človeško zaznavo (v izvorno fenomenološkem pomenu), Sellars poskuša pokazati, zakaj temu ni tako. Po njegovem mnenju se vsaj z vidika razumevanja moderne znanosti ravno takšna »pozaba« zdi nujna. Fenomenološki poskus »degeometrizacije narave« in ponovne utemeljitve znanstvenih konceptov na podlagi človeškega izkustva stoji in pade na predpostavki, da znanost opravlja zgolj vlogo iskanja regularnosti v toku že poznanih pojavov. To predpostavko Sellars prepričljivo zavrne.¹⁴

3. Znanost brez človeškega izkustva, svet brez ljudi

Kljub temu da smo manifestno podobo in življenjski svet v določenem smislu pustili za sabo, se zdi, da moderna znanost in Sellarsova filozofija nista veliko spremenili. Znanstveniki še vedno uporabljajo svoja čutila in še vedno lahko oziroma morajo uporabljati koncepte manifestne podobe, kolikor želijo, da bi jih širša skupnost razumela. Za seboj smo morda pustili človeško izkustvo določene dobe, nikakor pa ne človeka kot takega. Na podlagi navedenih argumentov bi moderno naravoslovno znanost res težko povezoval z dramatično zvenečim izrazom »posthumanizem«. Toda v Sellarsovi zgodbi pride do pomembnega zapleta.

Manifestna podoba ni le eden izmed možnih pogledov, ki jih lahko privzamemo do sveta, ampak tudi okvir, v katerem je človek prvič začel razmišljati o samem sebi in – kolikor to zmožnost štejemo kot bistveno človeško lastnost – v določenem smislu tudi prvič postal človek. Če bi človek posedoval popolnoma drugačen konceptualni okvir za razumevanje samega sebe, bi zato očitno tudi »postal popolnoma druge vrste človek« (Sellars 1962, 6). V redkih, a pomenljivih Sellarsovih zapisih lahko opazimo, da njegov projekt utemeljitve avtonomije znanstvene podobe preganja slutnja, da bi »na točki izginotja manifestne podobe njeno usodo delil tudi človek kot tak« (ibid., 19).

¹⁴ Kolikor Husserlova fenomenologija temelji na analizi življenjskega sveta, ki se fundamentalno razlikuje od metod naravoslovne znanosti, je od obravnavanega problema odvisna legitimnost Husserlovega filozofskega pristopa v celoti. Kolikor opisa fenomenov ne moremo izvajati neodvisno od njihove znanstvene konceptualizacije in razlage, lahko v Sellarsovem znanstvenem realizmu vidimo kritiko transcendentalne fenomenologije kot takšne. Več o tem v: Christias 2018.

Zakaj naj bi bila torej nadomestitev manifestne podobe z znanstveno pomembna v tem smislu? Lahko bi rekli, da zato, ker uporabe določene podobe ne smemo razumeti le kot opisa sveta, ki bi ga lahko presojali izključno glede na podobnost oz. ustreznost predmetom ali glede na njegovo razlagalno moč. Upoštevati moramo tudi dimenzijo te podobe kot *prakse z realnimi učinki v svetu*.

Uporaba obeh podob se po Sellarsu sicer ne razlikuje glede na njuno splošno funkcijo. Pri obeh gre v temelju za poskus kategorizacije osnovnih objektov, ki sestavljajo svet, in za razumevanje možnih interakcij med njimi. Razlikujeta pa se glede pojma človeka, saj ta za razliko od znanstvene v manifestni podobi nastopa kot »osnovni objekt«.

Biti osnovni objekt določene podobe sveta pomeni biti nekaj, »kar ni lastnost ali sestav česa bolj temeljnega« (ibid., 9). Iz tega sicer ne sledi, da bi bilo v okviru manifestne podobe povsem nepojmljivo človeka razgraditi na njegove fizične sestavne dele. Pomeni pa to, da človeške osebe v njenem edinstvenem načinu obstoja ni mogoče razumeti s pomočjo kompleksnih interakcij med njenimi sestavnimi deli, ampak le kot *enovito celoto*, ki je vselej nekaj več oziroma drugega od svojih sestavnih delov.

Sellars nikoli ne ponudi dokončne definicije tega, kaj naj bi človeška oseba kot osnovni nereduktibilni objekt res bila. A našteje nekaj bistvenih lastnosti, po katerih se razlikuje od drugih vrst objektov manifestne podobe. Ljudje naj bi tako bili bitja, ki so lahko »impulzivna ali predvidljiva glede lastnih odločitev; sledijo lahko starim načelom ali si postavijo nova; stvari lahko počnejo iz navade ali razmišljajo o alternativah; lahko so nedorasla ali pa imajo izoblikovan značaj« (ibid., 11). Sellars parcialne orise strne v misli, da je človek »bitje z intencami« (ibid., 40). Intenc ne gre razumeti kot nekakšnih psihičnih dodatkov k človekovi fizični konstituciji, ampak v smislu osnovne značilnosti človeške osebe *kot celote*: človek kot enovito bitje v svojem vedenju izpričuje sposobnost opazanja svojega okolja, sprejemanja odločitev ter komunikacije o razlogih za svoja prepričanja in odločitve.

Zlahka si predstavljamo ne tako odmaknjeno obdobje v človeški zgodovini, v katerem človek še ni bil edini predstavnik osebnega načina obstoja, ali možnost bolj starodavne oblike manifestne podobe, v katerem so bile »človeške« osebe pravzaprav edini osnovni gradnik sveta. Veter in dež sta bila tako nekoč morda izraz bolj ali manj jasnega namena nevihte, s katero je bilo mogoče stopiti v

dialog in jo poskusiti pomiriti. Za »sekularizacijo« človeškega izkustva sicer ne potrebujemo znanosti, vsaj ne znanosti v Sellarsovem smislu. Vendar lahko v okvirih manifestne podobe svet razosebimo le do določene točke, saj bo v njej nujno ostala vsaj ena oblika osebe, namreč *mi sami*. Ali lahko s tega vidika razumemo znanost kot zadnji in dozdevno paradoksn korak, ki iz naše podobe sveta prežene še zadnjo obliko osebnega obstoja?

Zdi se, da nam Sellars ponudi konceptualna orodja, s katerimi bi to lahko dosegli, pri čemer bi se rešitev problema depersonalizacije človeka izkazala za veliko manj dramatično in paradokсно, kot se lahko zdi. Vse, kar bi po njegovem mnenju morali storiti (in pri tem skušajmo za hip pozabiti na monumentalnost dejanske izvedbe takšnega projekta), je rekonstruirati kategorije, s katerimi opisujemo človeško vedenje, »z osnovnimi pojmi znanstvene podobe, tako kot lahko denimo pojme biokemije rekonstruiramo s pojmi fizike osnovnih delcev« (ibid., 39). Toda tudi ta projekt, prve korake katerega lahko opazimo v sodobni kognitivni znanosti in nevrologiji, lahko po Sellarsu trči ob nepričakovane meje še pred njegovo empirično izvedbo.

Problem ima opraviti z dvojno naravo pojmov, s katerimi opisujemo človeške osebe. Ko namreč o neki osebi povemo, da »je želela storiti A, njena dolžnost je bila storiti B, bila pa je prisiljena v dejanje C« (ibid., 39), s tem ne opisujemo le določenih dejstev, ampak počnemo še nekaj drugega. Ko govorimo o človeških osebah, naše izjave nikoli niso preprosti opisi, saj poleg deskripcije dejstev te osebe hkrati tudi umeščajo v intersubjektivno mrežo pomenov, dolžnosti in razlogov. Ne gre le za to, da bi *poleg* deskripcije človeških oseb lahko zavzeli tudi perspektivno držo, ampak da je v sami deskriptivni vsebini človeka vsebovana tudi *normativna dimenzija*, ki s pričakovanji in zavezami tvori človeško skupnost: »V tem oziru lahko povemo, da nereduktibilnost osebnega predstavlja nezmožnost redukcije najstva na bitnost.« (ibid., 39) Zato Sellars predlaga drugačno razrešitev antagonizma med manifestno in znanstveno podobo:

[K]onceptualni okvir oseb ni nekaj, kar bi morali spraviti z znanstveno podobo, ampak nekaj, kar je treba tej podobi priključiti. Da bi torej dopolnili znanstveno podobo, jo je treba obogatiti, ne z novimi načini izrekanja dejstev, ampak z jezikom intencij skupnosti in

individuumov, tako da s tem, ko o dejanjih, ki jih nameravamo storiti, in o okoliščinah, v katerih so storjena, razmišljamo v znanstvenih pojmi, svet, kakor je pojmovan v znanstveni teoriji, neposredno povezujemo z našimi smotri in iz tega sveta naredimo naš svet in ne več tuj dodatek k svetu, v katerem živimo. (ibid., 40)

Zgornji odstavek je zanimiv z več vidikov. Po eni strani šele tu vidimo, zakaj po Sellarsu sploh pride do odtujitve med znanostjo in človeškim izkustvom. Znanstvena podoba se lahko zdi kot tuj dodatek k svetu, v katerem sicer prebivamo ljudje zato, ker se še nismo naučili dovolj tesno preplesti objektov, o katerih govori znanost, z logiko naših smotrov. Po drugi strani odlomek preseneti in verjetno marsikoga razočara, ker tako hitro zaključi diskusijo, ki bi si zaslužila natančnejšo obravnavo.¹⁵ Ali bomo v znanstveni podobi res tako zlahka prepoznali okoliščine naših dejanj, še posebej pa ta dejanja sama? Ali so človeški smotri, glede na to, da so, kot Sellars sam prizna, vezani na podobo človeka kot bitja z intencami, res lahko enostavno priključeni znanstveni podobi?

Glede na to, da je bil zgornji odstavek Sellarsova zadnja beseda o tovrstnih problemih, bom v zaključku tega poglavja na ta vprašanja poskusil odgovoriti sam, pri čemer upam, da mi bo uspelo nekoliko razviti izhodiščno slutnjo o antagonizmu med znanstveno podobo in človeškimi osebami s sredstvi, ki jih ponuja sama Sellarsova filozofija.

Vrnimo se k človeku kot osnovnemu objektu manifestne podobe. Ta *osnovnost* ima očitno vsaj dva smisla. Po eni strani je človek osnovni objekt zato,

15 DeVries pojasnjuje to potezo s trditvijo, da lahko »vsako posamezno osebo opišemo z znanstvenim besediščem, brez sklicevanja na osebe kot nereduktibilne logične subjekte, vendar ne moremo popolnoma opustiti govora o osebah, saj v tem primeru ne bi bilo tistih, ki bi to situacijo opisovali« (deVries 2012, 12). Če iz naše govorice izgine pojem človeške osebe, ki je zavezana normam govorice, med drugim tudi logičnim pravilom, ki so bistvena za kakršnokoli reprezentacijo sveta, potem z njim izgine tudi znanost, ki je konec koncev »produkt človeške aktivnosti« (ibid., 14). Vendar se mi takšna razlaga ne zdi zadovoljujoča, saj Sellars s svojo funkcionalistično koncepcijo mišljenja poskuša ravno pokazati, da mišljenje ni nujno produkt človeške aktivnosti. Znanstvena podoba je po njegovem avtonomna le v primeru, da nam v njenih okvirih uspe razložiti mišljenje neodvisno od sklicevanja na nereduktibilne osebe manifestne podobe (prim. Sellars 1962, 28).

ker gre za enovito celoto v *deskriptivnem* smislu. Nobena druga vrsta objektov se ne vede tako, da bi izkazovala zmožnost mišljenja, sprejemanje odločitev ali izražala osebni karakter. Človek lahko misli, se odloča in izraža samo kot enovita celota – ali pa sploh ne. Na drugi strani imamo človeka v *normativnem* smislu, torej nabor zmožnosti in praks, ki jih od človeka pričakujemo, kolikor naj ga obravnavamo kot udeleženca intersubjektivne skupnosti človeške vrste.

Posebnost manifestne podobe ni v sami normativni dimenziji človeka, ampak v specifičnem *ujemanju* med njegovo normativno in deskriptivno dimenzijo. Kot sem že nakazal, je v resnici je že na sami deskriptivni ravni skrita določena normativnost. Manifestne lastnosti oz. zmožnosti namreč niso le stvar človeka kot objekta opazovanja, ampak tudi raven, na kateri bo manipulacija s človekom proizvedla specifično človeške učinke. Na misel lahko, npr., vpliva le druga misel in na osebnostni značaj le drug značaj, tako kot so naši predniki prišli do (vsaj v njihovem času veljavnega) zaključka, da na vremenske pojave lahko vplivajo le drugi vremenski pojavi in ne človeška komunikacija. Če ne bi bilo tega ujemanja, bi se porušil sam koncept človeka kot osnovnega objekta, saj bi se njegove zmožnosti in lastnosti izkazale za sestavljene iz kompleksnejših, »nečloveških« procesov. Ujemanje med deskriptivno in preskriptivno dimenzijo pojma človeka bi lahko strnili v krožni definiciji: človek je to, kar se z njim lahko počne, človeško ravnanje z njim (seveda ne nujno v etičnem smislu) pa bo proizvedlo človeške odzive. Bistveno je, da v tej krožnosti ne vidimo šibkosti definicije, ampak izraz dejanskega procesa konstitucije človeka, kakršnega smo vajeni v okvirih manifestne podobe.

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Situacija, ki je omogočala njegovo konstitucijo, se spremeni z nastopom znanstvene podobe. Ko vanjo vključimo človeka kot enega izmed objektov, razpade na mnoštvo faktorjev, ki ga sestavljajo. Rekonstrukcija koncepta človeka v nevrofizioloških okvirih zahteva, da v njegovo jedro vstopijo objekti, ki se ne vedejo človeško. Narava njegove intencionalnosti in potek njegovega mišljenja sta od tu naprej odvisna od procesov, ki sami po sebi niso izraz človeške osebe v celoti.

Zakaj torej človeških oseb ni tako enostavno priključiti znanstveni podobi? Očitno ne zato, ker bi se pod znanstvenim pogledom neposredno spremenile njegove človeške značilnosti. Sestavni deli človekovega telesa lahko v pravih konfiguracijah še vedno izpričujejo vedenje manifestnega telesa. Niti ne gre za to,

da kompleksnih fizičnih sistemov ne bi mogli obravnavati z normami, ki pritičejo človeku. Problem se skriva v tem, da človeške značilnosti postanejo opazne znotraj popolnoma novega registra in tako tudi manipulabilne na nov način.

Bomo lahko v znanstveni podobi še prepoznali obrise človeških oseb? Do neke mere morda že, kolikor namreč na tej ravni še vedno najdemo bitja, ki so sposobna razmišljanja o svojih dejanjih in okoliščinah. Toda če želimo znanstveno podobo preplesti z našimi smotri, ne smemo pričakovati, da bodo skozi ta proces ohranili svojo človeško obliko. V prehodu iz manifestne v znanstveno podobo človeške misli in smotri oz. intence morda preživijo, vendar za bitja znanstvene podobe to niso več izrazi nedeljive človeške osebe, ampak so le še določene izmed okoliščin njihovega delovanja, s katerimi lahko manipulirajo po kanalih, osvobojenih normativnih struktur, ki so diktirala konstitucijo človeka.

308 Človekovo preživetje v okvirih znanstvene podobe je torej nekaj globoko dvournega. Po eni strani moderna znanost lahko deluje v funkciji podobe človeka-v-svetu ravno zato, ker seciranje človeka na njegove sestavne dele še vedno dopušča enotnost tiste konfiguracije, ki je omogočala konstitucijo človeka manifestne podobe. V tem smislu znanost od nas ne zahteva, da bi, z Wordsworthovimi besedami, ubijali zato, da bi lahko secirali. Po drugi strani ravno naše naraščajoče znanstveno razumevanje konstitucije človeka v njeno krožno gibanje vpelje tako rekoč še en obrat.

Vprašanje, če se to gibanje nazadnje stakne s svojo izhodiščno točko ali pa nas nepreklicno vodi stran od človeka manifestne podobe, je morda preuranjeno. Odgovora zagotovo ne bodo prinesla le nova znanstvena odkritja, saj se problem zares pokaže šele na ozadju določene filozofske perspektive. Zato morda obstajajo tudi filozofski razlogi, da se iz Sellarsove perspektive problem lahko pokaže le v obliki skrivnostne slutnje.

4. Ustvarjalci podob in druge oblike življenja

Sellars je imel največje težave pri artikulaciji posthumanistične narave znanstvene podobe morda zato, ker je na svoje podobe gledal preveč »znanstveno«, torej izključno v registru *teoretične reprezentacije sveta*. Človek je namreč po njegovem v podobi prisoten izključno kot objekt oziroma kot

teoretični model inteligentnega bitja, kakršnega naj bi predstavljal sam. To vnese v koncept človeka določeno razpoko, namreč razpoko tistega, kar v moderni misli poznamo pod izrazoma »subjekt« in »objekt«. Sellars se zato bojuje s podobnimi paradoksi, ki mnogokrat nastopijo v moderni obravnavi človeka, saj mora v primeru človeka priti ravno do sovpadanja objektivne in subjektivne plati. Celotna zgodba razmerja med znanostjo in človekom je torej odvisna od našega razumevanja tega sovpadanja.

Do paradoksnega sovpadanja, o katerem govorim, ne pride le v prehodu iz manifestne v znanstveno podobo. Kot sem nakazal v prejšnjem poglavju, ima že sama manifestna podoba konstitutivno vlogo za človeka, kakršnega bomo našli v njenih okvirjih. Človek manifestne podobe je bistveno samozavedajoče se bitje, ki prepozna mišljenje kot specifiko lastne oblike obstoja in na tej podlagi tudi tvori specifičen odnos do sveta in drugih ljudi. Kot takšen se zato v okvirih manifestne podobe, ki takšno mišljenje omogoča, šele »prvič sreča sam s seboj in v resnici šele postane človek« (Sellars 1962, 6).

Drugič se človek sreča s samim seboj z nastopom znanstvene podobe, kjer ravno njegove manifestne človeške značilnosti zbledijo v prid drugim. Kot sem zagovarjal v prejšnjem poglavju, ne gre preprosto za to, da bi znanstvena podoba v primeru človeka bolje opisovala svoj objekt kot manifestna. Behavioristična psihologija nas, na primer, lahko marsikaj nauči glede specifičnih vzorcev človeškega mišljenja. Do temeljnega premika pa pride šele z nastopom kognitivne nevroznanosti, saj ta zamenja osnovne kategorije, ki so do tedaj okvirjale opazovanje človeškega vedenja. Pri prehodu iz manifestne v znanstveno podobo gre torej predvsem za to, da se človek kot objekt novega načina mišljenja radikalno spremeni, saj je na podlagi novega samorazumevanja dejansko zmožen novih oblik vedenja, medtem ko mu njegova manifestna narava morda ni več dostopna.

Obe podobi torej izpričujeta isto paradokšno strukturo: človek se vanju postavi kot objekt, še preden v tej obliki sploh obstaja kot subjekt. Kako lahko pride do takšnega prehoda? Mislim, da nas to vprašanje vodi onkraj meja Sellarsove filozofije. Dokler na podobi gledamo le kot na obliki reprezentacije objektov v svetu, bomo v tem prehodu lahko videli le paradoks, ki spodbija njuno lastno logiko. Toda morda bi bilo za pravo razumevanje teh nenavadnih

prehodov potrebno preseči tudi specifično dihotomijo med subjektom in objektom.

Glede tega gre v dialogu med obravnavanima avtorjema zadnjo besedo nazadnje nemara prepustiti Husserlu. Njegovo razumevanje življenjskega sveta se namreč na pomemben način razlikuje od Sellarsovih podob. Njegovo vrnitev k življenjskemu svetu lahko sicer razumemo kot zanikanje novosti znanstvene podobe ter kot poskus njene redukcije na vsebine človeške zaznave in na specifično človeške kategorične strukture izkustva. To je, kot sem poskušal pokazati v začetnih poglavjih, korak v napačno smer. Vendar lahko v Husserlovi filozofiji zasledimo še povsem drugačno smer »vrnitve«, namreč poskus vrnitve k tisti obliki človeškega obstoja, ki še ni razcepljena na subjekt kot nosilec reprezentacije in objekt kot tisto, kar je reprezentirano v svetu.¹⁶

310 Kot drugo plat tega razcepa Husserl odkrije »dvojno delujoči razum, ki se po eni strani z eksplicitnim samoovedenjem razlaga v normativnih zakonih, po drugi strani pa deluje naskrivaj, namreč s tem, ko deluje kot razum, ki je konstitutiven za vselej nastajajočo smiselno podobo ‚nazorno okolje‘« (Husserl 2005, 131). Človeka bomo zlahka razločili kot enega izmed objektov v svetu, če ostanemo na ravni razuma v prvem smislu. Če pa se spustimo na raven dinamike vselej nastajajoče konstitucije podob, bomo morda našli le še mišljenje, ki je koekstenzivno z okoljem, v katerem se giblje, tj. mišljenje, ki ne dovoljuje več nobenega pogleda od zunaj niti se morda ne pusti več pripisovati človeku.

Seveda bi spekulacija o nekakšnem skritem razumu ostala razmeroma prazna, če je Husserl ne bi podprl s številnimi fenomenološkimi analizami. Tu bom izpostavil le eno izmed smeri pristopa k problemu, namreč tisto, ki se tiče utelešene narave človeške zaznave (prim. *ibid.*, 198-232).¹⁷

Če že govorimo o nekakšnem subjektu, ki prebiva v življenjskem svetu, potem moramo po Husserlu nujno upoštevati njegovo utelešenost, torej

16 S tega vidika bi lahko vztrajali pri Husserlovi opredelitvi življenjskega sveta kot *predznanstvenega*, opredelitvi, ki jo glede razmerja med *objekti* življenjskega sveta in moderne znanosti sicer upravičeno problematizira Elisabeth Ströker (prim. 1997, 201).

17 Za tukajšnje potrebe sicer zadostuje obravnava Husserlovih izpeljav iz *Krize*, vendar velja omeniti, da Husserl vlogo telesa v zaznavi bolj obširno obravnava v *Idejah II* (prim. Husserl 1989, 30-168).

dejstvo, da svoje telo uporablja kot organ zaznave. Husserl s tem ne izpostavlja trivialne ugotovitve, da, na primer, brez očes preprosto ne bi zaznavali vidnih aspektov sveta. Gre mu prej za specifično strukturo zaznave kot takšne, ki onemogoča, da bi se kadarkoli kristalizirala v statično podobo sveta.

Kot sem že nakazal zgoraj, zaznave ne gre razumeti kot preproste recepcije čutnih dražljajev. Čutni dražljaji se v zaznavi ne pojavljajo kot takšni, dejstvo, da lahko iz relativno bornega nabora informacij v trenutku razberemo objekte z določeno zgodovino in pričakovanimi načini vedenja, pa priča o tem, da čutna zaznava ni nekaj neodvisnega od kategorij našega mišljenja. Do tega kantovskega zaključka prideta tako Husserl kot Sellars in v tem oziru oba vplivata na prevladujoče sodobne teorije zaznave.

S tega vidika se pravzaprav lahko zdi nenavadno, da Sellars še vedno razume zaznavo kot konstrukcijo nekakšne podobe, ki odslikava stanja dejanskih predmetov v svetu. To je (vsaj dozdevno) mogoče zato, ker vztraja pri tem, da so v zaznavi na delu le tiste kategorije, ki se tičejo vedenja opazovanih predmetov, oziroma tiste kategorije, ki se v pomembnem smislu *ne* tičejo vedenja samega opazovalca.

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Na tem ozadju se pokaže *tour de force* Husserlovega koncepta utelešenosti. Lastnosti objektov zaznave so po Husserlu prepletene s *kinestezami*, torej z aspekti našega izkustva, ki jih izražamo v obliki »jaz gibljem« ali »jaz delam« (Husserl 2005, 134). »Kategorije« (če jim lahko še vedno tako rečemo), ki se nanašajo na našo lastno telesno aktivnost, so torej ravno tako del konstitucije objektov. Globine trodimenzionalnega prostora in dejstva, da imajo objekti v tem prostoru skrito hrbtno stran, ne bi razumeli na isti način, če se ne bi sami gibal v prostoru in svojega gibanja usklajevali s predmeti, ki jih v njem srečujemo.

To odkritje se lahko zdi trivialno, a le če izpred oči izgubimo radikalne konsekvence, ki iz njega sledijo. Ne gre namreč le za to, da moramo za bolj celovit opis našega izkustva objektom naše zaznave priključiti tudi naše namene in navade ravnanja z njimi oz. kinesteze, ki jih tvorijo. Gre za to, da *objekti kot taki ne morejo obstajati brez kinestetične podporne strukture*. »Samo tedaj namreč, ko jaz, puščajoč igrati svoje kinesteze, doživljam sopotekajoče prikaze kot sopripadne, se ohranja zavest ene [...] stvari v aktualni prezenci.« (ibid., 198)

Objekt lahko ohranja svojo specifično identiteto šele v korelaciji z našimi zmožnostmi gibanja v razmerju do njega in manipulacije z njim. Objekt je

v tem smislu povsem subjektiven, a zgolj če nemudoma pristavimo, da je subjekt povsem objektiven, saj so ne le njegove teoretične misli, ampak tudi njegova stremjenja in praktični nameni v zadnji instanci del enovite strukture življenjskega sveta, ki omogoča pojavitev objekta. Zato Husserl o sebstvu in predmetnosti ne govori več kot o dveh razločenih entitetah, ampak kot o »jaz-polu« in predmetnem polu izkustva (prim. *ibid.*, 210). Obravnava jih torej kot *dva aspekta izkustva*, ki ju lahko razločimo le z abstrakcijo, saj bi v nasprotnem primeru izgubili izkustvo samo.

Je Husserl s to potezo obvaroval človeka pred njegovo dezintegracijo v znanstveni podobi? Zanimivo je, da so njegov koncept utelešenosti in konsekvence, ki sta jih iz njegovih izhodišč potegnili Heidegger in Merleau-Ponty, dandanes ponovno oživel ravnó na področju nevroznanosti in umetne inteligence. Še posebej je zanimivo, da ta koncept služi obema poloma razprav glede možnosti znanstvenega preučevanja človeka. Na eni strani imamo tako zagovornike nove paradigme v kognitivni nevroznanosti, ki pod praporjem t. i. enaktivizma zagovarjajo, da bi fenomenološki uvidi lahko vodili k novemu razumevanju delovanja živčnega sistema, predvsem v smislu tesnejše integracije njegovih motoričnih in senzoričnih centrov (prim. Rosch, Thompson in Varela 1991; Noë 2004). Na drugi strani pa imamo kritike vsakršnih tovrstnih poskusov, ki iz zadevnih fenomenoloških uvidov črpajo ravnó razloge, da znanstveni pogled in sredstva tehnološke manipulacije nujno ostajajo v antagonističnem razmerju do bolj avtentično človeške oblike mišljenja in bitivsvetu (prim. Dreyfus 1992; Dupuy 2009).

Tu se ne bom spuščal v vprašanja možnosti konstrukcije teoretičnih ali konkretnih robotskih modelov utelešene kognicije. Bi pa na tem mestu naslovil implicitno predpostavko marsikatere linije napada na znanstveno podobo človeka. Dreyfus, na primer, verjame, da se mehanicistični redukciji upira v imenu bolj avtentične oblike človeškega izkustva in samorazumevanja (prim. Dreyfus 1992, 277). Verjame tudi, da smo zastavek v tej igri mi sami in da je nevarnost znanstvenih modelov inteligence v tem, da vstopijo v proces konstitucije nas kot subjektov in predrugačijo odnos, ki ga tvorimo do samih sebe (prim. *ibid.*, 280).

Dreyfus sicer pravilno identificira razlog za nevarnost, vendar se moti glede tega, o kom fenomenologija utelešenega izkustva dejansko govori. Že samo

dejstvo, da znanosti priznava zmožnost transformacije človeškega izkustva, pod vprašaj postavlja njegov ideal avtentičnosti. Predvsem pa pozablja, da se je že Husserl zavedal problematičnosti identifikacije subjekta utelešenega izkustva s človekom (prim. Husserl 2005, 223).

Kolikor ostanemo na najbolj osnovni ravni utelešene subjektivnosti, bomo težko prepoznali specifično človeške lastnosti. Z izrazom »telo« Husserl ne označuje našega ali kateregakoli specifičnega telesa, ampak – kot rečeno – določeno funkcionalno sovisje med kinestezami in čutnimi vtisi, ki je na delu v naši zaznavi. Zato fenomenološki koncept utelešenosti ostaja na ravni splošnosti, ki nas gotovo družijo vsaj z določenimi drugimi živimi bitji. Dokler ostajamo zgolj na ravni najbolj temeljnih struktur utelešenega izkustva, se s tem morda bolj približamo ravno tem drugim življenjskim oblikam kot človeku.

Splošnost strukture utelešenosti ne pomeni le nedoločenosti kategorije življenjskih oblik, ki jo lahko izpričujejo. Pomembnejši smisel te splošnosti je v *dinamizmu* strukture utelešenosti, ki je Husserl nikoli ni premislil do njenih skrajnih konsekvenc. Glede tega se moramo obrniti h kasnejši fenomenološki tradiciji, zlasti k Merleau-Pontyju, ki je Husserlov koncept telesa postavil v središče svoje filozofije.

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Husserl se je, kot rečeno, že sam zavedal, da naši zaznavi vlada dinamika, s katero objektivni in subjektivni pol izkustva vzajemno transformirata drug drugega. Že tako skromen akt, kot je premik pogleda z enega objekta na drugega, na primer zahteva, da novi čutni vtisi vstopijo v korelacijo z novo pozicijo očesa, nov zaznani objekt pa prikliče nove možnosti nadaljnjega raziskovanja in manipulacije. Vsak tovrstni akt zaznave torej zahteva modifikacijo tega, čemur Merleau-Ponty pravi *telesna shema*¹⁸ (prim. Merleau-Ponty 2006, 114). Merleau-Ponty z ozirom na plastičnost struktur naše zaznave napravi še ključen korak naprej. Husserl bi možnost transformacije telesne sheme omejil na prilagajanje vselej istih zaznavnih organov in gibalnih zmožnosti na nove situacije. Merleau-Ponty pa opazi, da se telesna shema ne spreminja le kot funkcija gibanja subjekta skozi njegovo okolje, ampak tudi kot funkcija

18 Koncept telesne sheme pri Merleau-Pontyju lahko razumemo kot ustreznik oziroma poglobitev Husserlove koncepcije zaznave kot procesa korelacije med kinestetičnimi in čutnimi izkustvi.

razširitve meja njegovega telesa oz. kot funkcija gibanja zunanjih objektov skozi njegovo najbolj intimno notranjost. To pomeni, da se lahko, na primer, slepec nauči uporabljati palico tako, da pri tipanju z njeno konico ne zaznava več palice same in mu o pozicijah objektov ni več treba sklepati na podlagi njene dolžine, ampak se lahko osredotoči neposredno na objekte v svojem okolju, pri čemer mu o dolžini palice priča le še neposredna zaznava njihove oddaljenosti. Palica v tem primeru ni več »objekt, ki bi ga slepi zaznaval, ampak [...] podaljšek telesa« (ibid., 168). Variabilnost naše telesne sheme torej pomeni tudi, da objekti ne nastopajo le kot objektivni poli našega izkustva, ampak lahko privzamejo tudi funkcije strukturnih členov telesne sheme same.

Zgornji primer sicer jasno ilustrira ta proces, vendar nas lahko zapelje k zaključku, da gre za izjemen oz. patološki pojav. Merleau-Ponty poskuša, nasprotno, pokazati, da tudi subjekti z neokrnjeno zaznavo in mobilnostjo v svojo telesno shemo neprestano integriramo raznovrstne proteze, brez upoštevanja katerih bi naše izkustvo ostalo povsem nerazumljivo.¹⁹ Zanimivo pa je, da se Merleau-Ponty iz takšne perspektive nikoli ni eksplicitno lotil raziskovalnih praks moderne znanosti, da tem praksam ostaja nenaklonjen in da v zvezi z njimi ostaja zavezan Husserlovi prenačljivi kritiki (ibid., 11).

Naj se za zaključek vrnem k problemu razmerja med moderno znanostjo in človeškim izkustvom: v razpravi sem poskušal pokazati, da Husserlova

19 Merleau-Ponty navaja tudi primere povsem vsakdanjih predmetov, ki jih praviloma opazimo zgolj kot sredstva, s katerimi si pomagamo manevrirati skozi vnaprej poznane situacije. Toda takšnih predmetov ne smemo razumeti zgolj kot orodja, ki bi bila do drugih zaznanih predmetov v zunanjem odnosu sredstva do cilja, saj lahko ti predmeti rekonfigurirajo našo telesno shemo in s tem spremenijo način, na katerega se kaže celotna situacija. »Neka gospa, ki brez preračunavanja ohranja varnostno razdaljo med peresom na svojem klobuku in objekti, ki bi ga lahko zlomili, dobro ve, kje je njeno pero, tako kot mi čutimo, kje je naša roka. Če znam voziti avto, in ga usmerim v neko ulico, vidim, da bom lahko prišel skozi, ne da bi mi bilo treba primerjati širino ulice z velikostjo avtomobila, in prav tako vstopim v prostor, ne da bi velikost vrat primerjal z velikostjo svojega telesa. [...] Če se navadimo na klobuk, na avto ali na palico, to pomeni, da se vanje namestimo, ali da jih vključimo v prostorskost lastnega telesa. Navada izraža našo zmožnost širjenja biti v svetu ali pa spreminjanje našega bivanja z dodajanjem novih instrumentov.« (2006, 160)

fenomenologija glede tega problema odpira zanimivo pot razmisleka, ki pa ji ne sledi do konca zaradi prenatrjene kritike znanstvene misli. O moderni znanosti bi veljalo razmisliti kot o dejavnosti izdelovanja in rabe raznovrstnih mišljenjskih protez, ki vključuje posluževanje nadomestnih organov zaznave, delovanja in morda nenazadnje tudi umetnih oblik tistih procesov, ki zaznavne in motorične organe integrirajo v enovit sistem.

Dokler na znanstvene prakse gledamo kot na golo konstrukcijo simbolnih reprezentacij, bo med heterogenimi sistemi naših teoretičnih podob sveta vedno zijal nerazložljiv prepad, prav tako pa bo vselej ostajala potreba po redukciji bodisi objektov znanosti bodisi objektov človeškega izkustva na drugo stran prepada. Nenazadnje v teh okvirih morebitna transformacija človeškega izkustva in načina njegovega obstoja lahko ostajata le na ravni meglene slutnje. Zdi se, da ta vprašanja sama zahtevajo drugačno filozofsko perspektivo.

Tekom razprave sem poskušal pokazati, da se morda do takšne filozofske pozicije lahko prebijemo s soočenjem Husserlove misli z njenimi najdoslednejšimi kritiki, kakršen je Sellars. Fenomenologija morda v tem soočenju izgubi svoj privilegij kritičnega odmika od uvidov in postopkov raziskovanja moderne znanosti.²⁰ Po drugi strani se lahko ravno s te nove pozicije izkaže za vir najostrejših uvidov v konstitucijo in konsekvence

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20 Fenomenologija torej izgubi status apriorne refleksije o konstituciji znanstvenih domen, ki bi lahko potekala neodvisno od konkretnega znanstvenega raziskovanja. V *Krizi* Husserl sicer zagovarja predvsem kritični odmik od sveta galilejske znanosti in ne njegove utemeljitve. Vendar na drugih mestih jasno izrazi prepričanje, da fenomenološka analiza življenjskega sveta oziroma subjektivnih aktov njegove konstitucije lahko utemelji osnovne metode posebnih znanstvenih disciplin in zariše meje domen njihove aplikacije (prim. Husserl 1980, 10). Husserl torej fenomenologije ne razume le kot teorije subjektivne pojavnosti, ki bi stala neodvisno od empiričnega raziskovanja narave. Specifično nalogo fenomenologije vidi v utemeljitvi temeljnih znanstvenih pojmov v razmerju do njihove domene aplikacije, ki je sama po sebi »intuitivno dana artikulacija izkustvene realnosti, ki predhaja vsakršnemu mišljenju in s tem tudi vsakršnemu znanstvenemu teoretiziranju« (ibid., 1), kot takšna pa je domena empirične znanstvene discipline dostopna izključno fenomenološki analizi. Sellars prepričljivo pokaže, da moderna naravoslovna znanost ne odkriva le novih dejstev, kategorična struktura katerih bi lahko bila poznana vnaprej. Refleksija o naravi znanstvenih konceptov in metod je zato naloga znanstvenega mišljenja samega, saj znanstveno raziskovanje ne odkriva zgolj novih dejstev, ampak lahko privede tudi do odkritja novih in nepričakovanih domen, v okvirih katerih razlagamo in nenazadnje tudi vidimo svet.

znanstvene vednosti. S tega vidika lahko razumemo enega najbolj kriптиčnih zapisov Merleau-Pontyja:

Fenomenologije nikoli ne bi moglo biti pred drugimi filozofskimi podvigi racionalistične tradicije in pred koncepcijo moderne znanosti. Saj vendar meri razdaljo med našim izkustvom in to znanostjo. Kako bi bila lahko do znanosti indiferentna? Kako bi lahko fenomenologija prišla prej? (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 29)

Če mi je v razpravi svojo pozicijo uspelo prignati onkraj meja, ki jih fenomenološka tradicija postavlja okoli človeka in njemu lastnega izkustva, bi lahko to ubesedili tudi nekoliko drugače: fenomenologija, če ji še vedno lahko tako rečemo, v resnici meri razdaljo med dvema oblikama življenja in njima ustreznima oblikama izkustva. Omogoča nam torej, da s svežimi očmi postavimo vprašanje, ali človek, njegove zmožnosti ter projekti in življenjski svet, ki mu pritiče, nemara niso življenjska oblika, ki smo jo že pustili za seboj.

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REVIEWS | RECENZIJE

Marijan Krivak: FILOZOFIJA OTPORA.

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UDC: 130.2

From the title of the book onwards, the author of *Philosophy of Resistance* clearly and precisely articulates what philosophy represents for him: among other definitions (love for wisdom and the art of producing concepts), it is primarily *resistance*, because one of the fundamental problems of philosophy—freedom—takes its form only through resistance, which ontologically precedes every (definition of) power. In that sense, relying heavily on Deleuze's philosophy which states that the only thing left to us in the world of entropic orders by societies of control, Krivak's book is a peculiar philosophy of resistance that is at the same time a diagnosis of the age we live in. It represents at the same time resistance to the meaninglessness and inconceivability of the world, resistance to the ecstasy of futile communication, resistance to the metastases of historical carcinogenicity, resistance to the dominant biopolitical paradigm, the economic and political logic of neoliberalism and the fascistogenic society we live in, resistance to "homogeneous empty time" (as articulated by Benjamin), postmodern fascism as well as ideology of the "knowledge society," and ultimately resistance to the common-spread idea that philosophy is unnecessary in today's world.

Through the nine texts that comprise the book, Krivak brings forth a variety of analyzes, ranging from thematizing emancipatory potentials of Rancière's philosophy, through the inevitable Foucault's contribution, and theses on specific mechanisms of power and resistance as a series of localized strategies, to Nancy and his seminal understanding of the community. The main authors and philosophers he discusses are, besides the already mentioned, Deleuze, Agamben, Esposito, and Badiou, thus making the whole circle in providing the overview of contemporary philosophy. The first chapter of the book is, therefore, theoretically the most coherent and philosophically most inventive, and it begins with the elaboration of the very concept of philosophy, prompted by Alain Badiou's book *Metaphysics of Real Happiness*. Namely, if philosophy is the way to reflect on the truth of life, which has become a technological purpose, a scientific norm, and a mere calculation, then philosophy, as a "speech" about the meaning of truth, is at the same time a philosophy of resistance to such calculative world.

320 In order to understand today's socio-political constellation, it is primarily important to understand the techno-scientific set of information and communication technologies, and the circumstance that they largely determine the postulates of contemporary politics, which is covered in the chapters on biopolitical theory as well as the paraesthetic speech as addressed by Foucault, and in the "interlude" "About Language" where Krivak asks to what extent language is the dispositive or generic essence of man, i.e., how to maintain the link between language and thinking. Namely, the process of releasing language as a generic being of man and of reaching with language into true world is also a resistance to the ruling paradigm of language, which has undergone "viral pathology," that is, which is being infected by the virus of ecstatic communication (Baudrillard)—the cosmos of meaning has turned into a "chaos of expression." Language, therefore, is a dispositive contaminated by the logic of a self-created web of chatter, murmur, semblance of communication, and the struggle against this is an attempt to return to the original sense of *logos*.

The specific emphasis of the philosophical part of the book lies on the technical nature of human existence, starting from the problem of freedom and the model of emancipation, whereby we come to a paradoxical situation

of acting without a subject or to political revolutions that in the era of entropy of the global order became essentially national-religious counter-revolutions. The author questions how is it possible resist this social maze in an entropy state ruled by the network as a fluid term for a world, in which the fundamental philosophical question concerns how to think the difference between the political and politics, if action today is controlled by post-human networks of rhizomatic capitalism, and in which politics has given rise to the pseudo-event media spectacle.

This is the theoretical framework for the last chapters of the book dealing with art in the most applicable sense of the word—with film, painting, and literature—, where Krivak historically re-contextualizes Julije Knifer's anti-painting and Mihovil Pansini's anti-film, but perhaps the most important chapter in the book is dedicated to Branko Schmidt's film *Metastases*, an adaptation of Allen Bovic's novel. It is precisely in *Metastases* that *hic et nunc*, here and now, we witness the fascistoidness of the social space in which we live in its utter nakedness, as well as the innumerable nationalist-ideological appeals. Although it is the only non-philosophical text in the book, it seems to embody all those theoretical constructs on issues of power, community-building, metaphysics of happiness, and social emancipation that we have respectively seen with Rancière, Agamben, Foucault, Deleuze, and Nancy. In fact, what is politically an ongoing risk of freedom, is the risk of taking responsibility for changing the situation and, in general, of making sense in the time of the collapse of the global order. In short, when it comes to a philosophy of resistance, "it is time for a politics of events of absolute freedom." The author clearly shows that the logic of the world-historical progress of the cyber-governance system and the new ways of legitimizing capitalism in the 21st century leads to all forms of suspension of the basic ideas of modern politics such as freedom, equality, justice, and solidarity. And this is not just a formal defense of human and civil liberties, because it politically no longer provides the condition of possibility for a new theory of action—it basically concerns the possibility of thinking itself, not at the end of history, but at the end of historically prevalent patterns of social changes.

Therefore, it is justified to keep repeating the question of Rastko Močnik *How much fascism?* from his eponymous book, which Krivak often cites in his

texts, and not without reason. The process of a deconstruction of politics is, on the one hand, the only thing left of the great history of Western metaphysics if we are to preserve the classical idea of the common good, the idea of a society in which freedom, equality, and justice have power, and at the same time, on the other hand, it is necessary to constantly question the historical epistemological paradigm of “postmodern fascism,” which may have been militarily defeated but not defeated as a historical practice, as a political method, and a thought-pattern. The clero-fascism of the sacralization of war and the necro-fascism of cultural and financial clientelism continue to be cornerstones of Croatian statehood. *Philosophy of resistance*? Yes, if it is a genuine impulse to conquer the enclaves of righteousness in an impotent and euthanized society trapped in the figures of oblivion and ideological discourses of the enchantment of the real state of affairs.

Tonči Valentić

**Žarko Paić: NEOLIBERALISM, OLIGARCHY AND POLITICS OF THE
EVENT: AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS.**

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If the task of philosophy has traditionally been defined as the task of thinking the time in which it takes place, then attempting to rethink the essence and modernity of the epoch in which we live today is a very challenging task. The question of human essence as a necessary pre-condition of any philosophy concerns, in fact, how one relates to oneself. In this sense, one of the most prominent Croatian philosophers, Vanja Sutlić, in his book *Essence and Contemporaneity* (originally published half a century ago), lapidary concludes that the basic task of contemporary philosophy is the thought of reaching into the historical composition of being human and being itself. To reach the essence of the modern world philosophically—that is the task of true thinking. Precisely in the wake of such a predicament arises the new book by Žarko Paić *Neoliberalism, Oligarchy and Politics of the Event*, symbolically subtitled: *At the Edge of Chaos*. In the wake of the abovementioned uneasiness regarding the determination of the contemporary world, Paić gives a very precise and unambiguous formulation: the title itself indicates that in order to understand today's socio-political constellation, it is necessary primarily to understand the

techno-scientific set of information and communication technologies, and to grasp that they largely determine the postulates of modern politics.

In the effort to respond to this aporia, Paić critically refers to numerous contemporary theories of sovereignty, the spiritual crisis of Europe, the metapolitics of identity, and the post-history biopolitics, leading a dialogue with fundamental thinkers in comprehensive, studious, brilliantly argued, and multifaceted chapters, as well as reflecting on the 21st century “philosophical classics”—from Kojève to Carl Schmitt, from Rancière to Badiou. As the author himself points out, this book deals with “an analysis of the effects of a global order that governs the environment through the logic of a self-generated network. The system is, however, formally based on a framework of liberal democracy. But in reality, ideas of freedom are transformed into their opposite. Instead of establishing the power of a sovereign people, the rule of the corporative constituted elites is at work.” This is precisely the main aspect of Paić’s reflections: if in many previous books the emphasis was on the technical character of human existence, the starting point here is the problem of freedom and the so-called political deficit, according to the model of a (Derridean-like articulated) “dehumanized desert:” “the uniformity of the technically shaped space necessitates the uniqueness of abstract time.”

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Here, Paić extensively discusses the idea and crisis of Europe, its political future during the reorganization of empires, the civil war, and total mobilization at a planetary level, political theology, and attempts to think events beyond the metaphysical “big story” regarding philosophy of politics for the new age, and oligarchic rule in the age of today’s networked societies. In this sense, contextualization, i.e., an analysis of the rule of corporate elites as a contemporary form of oligarchy, becomes crucial. Namely, if neoliberal capitalism is the result of techno-scientific advancement and dispensation of a liberated desire, it means that “the desire for wealth and power destroys all the spiritual virtues that modern humanity has set as the goal of its own meaningful action.” The context of a re-humanizing of the humanity has become archaic, rather than introducing us to the intricate social labyrinth of entropy that governs the network as a fluid term for a world, in which the fundamental philosophical question concerns how to think the difference between the political and politics, if action today is controlled by post-human

networks of rhizomatic capitalism, and in which politics has given rise to the pseudo-event media spectacle.

Starting primarily from Foucault's insights on biopolitics, but also by deepening his analysis of the psycho-techniques of controlling desire and deconstructing criticism of political economy, Pać formulates the thesis that the oligarchic model of political and cultural governance today is the result of the ups and downs of mass political movements, which means that, *in ultima linea*, he rightly believes that in the age of transnational corporations and the cybernetic model of market management in today's neo-liberal 21st century there is no basis for a "revolution" or subversive upheaval, because the disappearance of the notion of society also disintegrates the solidarity of class and social actors. This is also the main backbone of this book, with many erudite chapters meandering through. For the issue of freedom, it is crucial to reflect on "political theology," that is, to transform all metaphysical categories of sovereignty into concepts of the political work of autonomous human freedom, while it is self-evident that the author's primary interlocutors are Foucault and Carl Schmitt, to whom he devotes a whole chapter on the logic of the state of emergency and catechetic of history within political theology. Certainly, the more careful reader will quickly notice that many of the constituent themes and theses are present in Pać's earlier books—e.g., the problem of culture as ideology and multiculturalism, art in the age of digital anti-humanism, the dominance of spectacle in the time of the collapse of the metaphysical structure of the world—, but this also deepens with a whole new set of topics: the re-articulation of the political and the general thinking of politics in the entropy network.

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As in the previous books, from the *Posthuman Condition*, through *Freedom Without Power*, all the way to the *Third Country*, *Totalitarianism*, and, finally, the grand project of the *Technosphere* in five volumes, one of the most important achievements of this book is the consciousness about the creation of a new categorical apparatus, because the essence of man can no longer be determined upon the classical humanist tradition of philosophy, and here we necessarily return to some of the congenial insights from the already mentioned Sutlić's book. Pać is aware that without transcending the classical interpretive framework, not only can we not describe the world we live in, but

we cannot even philosophically articulate it. That is why this book is also a sort of a “manual” for how to navigate through the distribution of technological-political power, where the source of power comes into play with the question of the limits of human freedom. And precisely this freedom is “powerless:” by losing its ontological meaning to politics, it also loses the foundation of that universally political one. The only remaining solution is to establish a theory of an upcoming event beyond all metaphysical differences in contemporary history, a “futurological opinion” beyond the desubstantialized utopia.

326 The logical question that arises primarily here is: what are the real alternatives to de-politicization and re-politicization? Politics is, as Paić rightly points out, the constant risk of freedom, the risk of taking responsibility for changing the situation and, in general, of making sense in the time of the collapse of the global order. But without the illusions of human power, the reach of democracy, sovereignty—“all that remains is to think political and politics beyond the small stories of micro-utopias and the macropolitics of identity.” In earlier argumentation, the author put it determinedly: “It is time for the politics of events of absolute freedom.” It is precisely this event that “neither happens fatefully nor is owned by the subject of radical change in the world.” Namely, the logic of the world-historical progress of the cybernetic system of governance and the new way of legitimizing capitalism in the 21st century unequivocally leads to the suspension of fundamental ideas. Modernity policies include freedom, equality, justice, and solidarity. Paić is also quite right in insisting that this is not merely a formal defense of human and civil liberties, because it politically no longer allows the condition for a new theory of action—it is essentially a matter of choice itself; not at the end of history, but at the end of historically ubiquitous patterns of social change.

In this context, the concept of events as defined by the author has nothing to do with the attempts to open up the space of opportunity in the aesthetic, political, and ethical realms (starting from Deleuze to Badiou) or to think the “second beginning,” as was the case in Heidegger’s thought. Therefore, the event must be thought beyond all mysticism of coming in terms of hope and expectation of a salvage return to the sources. Paić is aware that in his theoretical attempts it is not easy to build a new matrix or a new platform of power to counter the technosphere, which is not a defeatist move at all, but

a very clearly articulated awareness that the thinking of the political “today” should be freed from false belief in the Messianic deliverance and from the autonomous action of the monstrous power of the technosphere “which reduces everything” human “to the applications, functions and structures of the inhuman.” The oligarchic power of the elites in modern times is almost evenly distributed across the global order, regardless of political differences and cultural values. That is why we are talking about the network of power, in which the fundamental problem is that “the politics of oligarchy and meritocracy as a post-democratic struggle to preserve privileges in the frozen state of elite rule over social classes is happening as an ethical-legal consensus on the permanent reforms of the same.”

In conclusion, this book is a true philosophical reflection upon the proper meaning of politics and freedom, upon the classic idea of the common good, the idea of a society in which freedom, equality, and justice have power. In the wake of Derrida’s writings, Paić accurately observes that this process of the deconstruction of politics is all that remains of the great history of Western metaphysics. The aforementioned philosopher Sutlić allegedly said on one occasion: “If a man can no longer be a Casanova or a Don Juan, he can become a good engineer and sleep with his machine,” which is not only a witty and humorous, but also a gloomy summary of the state of affairs in today’s world, the world as technosphere that is both our “essence” and “contemporaneity.” Paić’s significant book, with a highly articulated philosophical categorical apparatus, addresses this problem with crystal clearness and precision.

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Tonči Valentić

**Paulina Sosnowska: HANNAH ARENDT AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER.
PHILOSOPHY, MODERNITY, AND EDUCATION.**

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UDC: 165.62Arendt H. Heidgger

The book *Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger*, authored by the Polish philosopher Paulina Sosnowska, assistant professor at the Faculty of Education of the University of Warsaw, is a meticulously researched and engagingly written discussion of the relationship between two of the most intriguing thinkers of the turbulent 20th century, whose works to this date endure as a substantial source of philosophical inspiration, despite—and, indeed, because of—the circumstance of evoking sometimes diametrically opposed, mutually irreconcilable responses. Although the personal pathways of Arendt and Heidegger bear witness to a lifelong intimate bond, which was able to withstand—after the end of the love affair—the hiatus of the holocaust, their intellectual relation continually (r)evolved under the sign of the initial nonreciprocity: whereas the writings of Arendt reveal the careful, if (not) rather concealed efforts of a—paradoxically articulated—(n)ever un-faithful student, Heidegger as one of the formative university teachers scarcely, if (not) only covertly took notice of her coming-to-prominence, of her accomplishments. Instead of attempting to elaborate—upon the re-presented, pre-supposed background of the teacher's

thought—the influence of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology on the development of Arendt’s political theory, Sosnowska—in a certain “reversal” of the pedagogical rapport (subtly indicated in the title)—re-traces, giving preference to the perspective of the student, seeking, through(out) Arendt’s entire oeuvre, for underlying convergences and fundamental divergences, for in-commensurable in-congruences with Heidegger, but (thereby) avoiding also the potential pitfalls of a biographical “explanation” of the conceptual, the conditions (of possibility) for the philosophical dimension of the relationship between both authors, insofar as it, as already the subtitle of the study suggests, concerns the problematic of education within the modern—as well as the present-day (post-?modern?)—world.

330 Sosnowska, thus, takes the relation between Arendt and Heidegger—between their respective philosophical stances regarding the matters at hand—under consideration as a particular paradigm for a universally challenging re-questioning of the educational role of philosophy. However, should in (philosophical) thinking still exist, especially after and amid the ruins of the frightful caesura of 20th-century totalitarianisms, a glimmer of hope for a pedagogical promise, also its complex implications for the historical and contemporary context(s) of (political) action require special and specific attention.

The first part of the book is, therefore, dedicated to a deliberation upon the notion of education within the Western philosophical tradition. Sosnowska circumscribes the often in-explicitly intricate demarcation of a pedagogical component within philosophy through three comprehensive conceptualizations, which were not only of immense importance for Arendt’s thought, but have also had a profound cultural and social impact. The parallelization of Heidegger’s ontological and Arendt’s political reading of the Greek idea of *paideia*, as embodied in Plato’s illustrious allegory of the cave, opens up the gateway toward an account of the dispute on *Bildung* among the proponents of the neo-humanist ideals of liberalism, the predominant of whom was Wilhelm von Humboldt, that subsequently, at the dawn of the 19th century, lead to the foundation of the German university. Whereas various interpretations of *paideia* and *Bildung* directly address the issue of education, the analysis of (early) Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, as elucidated in

Being and Time, touches upon it, emphasizing at once the ethical relevance of authentic existence and the lack of an adequate approach to (intra)human plurality, only in an inter-mediate(d) manner. However, from Arendt's—from the Arendtian—viewpoint, the philosophical promise(s) for education, the striving for freedom, individuality, and authenticity, remained unfulfilled—or had been betrayed—, not primarily because of flawed or failed (political) concretizations—Heidegger's (albeit temporary, yet perplexing) ideological entanglement with National Socialism is a famed, an infamous “example”—, but due to the catastrophic break denoting the eventuation of tradition.

Before venturing (toward) the question of a beginning, the second part of Sosnowska's book, with constantly more consummate aspects encompassing the conflicting “conversation” between Arendt and Heidegger, deals with the crossroads, whereat philosophy and education—in their inter-relation, in their inter-relatedness with politics—have found—or lost?—themselves with regard to—the author cites Arendt—“the broken thread of tradition” (81 ff.), the confrontation with which triggered a thorough re-thinking of thinking itself. Whilst, on the one hand, Heidegger's thinking of being after the so-called “turn,” through the estrangement from the previous existential categories and therewith from philosophy as such, wholly withdraws from the political—or, at least, endeavors to do so—, Arendt's thinking of action, on the other hand, prompted by the unprecedented experience of the emergence of totalitarian movements in the 20th century demanding description beyond traditional patterns, without reservation faces the challenges posed by the plurality of the public sphere. The discussed authors' contrasting, but complementary readings of Aristotle, of *phronesis* and *sophia*, to a great degree additionally illuminate both Arendt's indebtedness to the motivation and the movement that, through the (polemically) received incentive by the teacher, guided her to work, to write “with Heidegger and against him” (126). Although Arendt's political philosophy rests upon the construction of dichotomies, such as the ones between life and world, between the private and the public, the searching for freedom, of central significance also for her comprehension of modernity, for her conception of alienation prevalent within it, above all renders homage to the multispectrality of human existence: “In Heidegger the collective subject (the they) veils the conditions of realization of human freedom; in Arendt the

plurality of the people is an ontological condition of actualization of human freedom: the faculty of beginning, potentially given to us with the new beginning of our birth.” (147)

332 In the final part of the book, Sosnowska, upon the basis of preceding reflections, explores the consequences the situation, where classical tradition cannot deliver any solutions, may convey for what totalitarian cataclysms had bequeathed to posterity as the pedagogical task of philosophy. Thus, as if (almost) by necessity of the debated problematic itself, the author is compelled to quest, with—and beyond—Arendt, for (ostensibly un-likely) allies among her predecessors and her successors alike, who—in one way or another—surpass (through) the confinement of the “Heideggerian” con-text(s): on the one hand, Johann Gottfried Herder’s remarks on finiteness and historicity, on linguality and intersubjectivity, as well as, on the other hand, genealogies of (bio)political power by Michel Foucault and of state of exception by Giorgio Agamben (continue to) offer fundamental contributions to the function of philosophical critique for the preservation of essential plurality determining the human condition. However, as Arendt’s renowned elucidation of the “case” of Adolf Eichmann demonstrates, the perpetually threatening connection between non-thinking and the banality of evil, against (late) Heidegger’s recourse into contemplation, calls for a thinking as “a phenomenon of everydayness” (194) that does not—and will not—shy away from the affairs of the human(e) world.

The treatise of Paulina Sosnowska not only convincingly discloses different facets and layers of the philosophical relationship between Arendt and Heidegger, but by re-posit(ion)ing the question of education at the heart of confounding inter-communication between philosophy and politics also—in the concluding chapters—relevantly discusses the precarious circumstances, in which contemporary universities (and other academic institutions), under the immense pressure of the marketization of entire society, struggle to maintain the (former?) ideals of (scientific) autonomy. The extraordinary achievement of the book *Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger* that deserves attentive readers both among the scholars of the two authors as well as among pedagogues interested in the philosophical dimension of educational efforts exhorts, by re-awakening the promise of thinking, of its potentiality, of its potency, to

the “vigilance”—but by no means to a “vigilantism”—of thoughtfulness in a thoughtless, dark time.

Since the destiny of a review lies in submitting a mere—more or (rather) less suitable—sketch of the book’s thematic abundance, maybe the re-sounding words of a poet, of Robert Frost’s poem “Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening,” nonetheless can, with regard to Sosnowska’s work, propose—how many times heard? how many times hearkened to?—a fitting end, a beginning: “The woods are lovely, dark and deep, / But I have promises to keep, / And miles to go before I sleep, / And miles to go before I sleep.”

Andrej Božič

CONVERSATION | RAZGOVOR

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Małgorzata Hołda

THE WELCOMING GESTURE OF HERMENEUTICS IN CONVERSATION WITH ANDRZEJ WIERCIŃSKI'S *EXISTENTIA HERMENEUTICA*

Existential Hermeneutics. Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World (2019) is an unrivalled piece of literature by a distinguished and internationally acclaimed scholar in philosophical hermeneutics, theologian, and poet. This outstanding *tour-de-force* breaks new ground in philosophical and theological studies, showing that by thinking-the-difference hermeneutics displays its prodigious welcoming gesture toward the exploration of the heterogeneous nature of thinking. This gesture has far-reaching consequences. The book's recognition of the empowerment of thinking that ensues from *Differenzdenken* (Wierciński 2008, 162–204) is an undisputable rejuvenation of philosophical hermeneutics' contribution to the humanities. Investigating the obvious, but often neglected, or undervalued connections between philosophy and theology, the author divulges the multitudinous ways, in which the two disciplines reveal the pervasiveness of the hermeneutic character of human existence.

The book's two clearly defined parts are expressive of the thoughtful discernment of the most prominent aspects of contemporary hermeneutic thinking. Part one, "Hermeneutic Discovery of a Theological Insight: Toward a Hermeneutic Philosophy of Religion," draws extensively from the authors representing the seemingly divergent fields of philosophical hermeneutics

and theology, and manifests their interweaving character. Readers are thus introduced to the important interactions between the philosophical and theological horizons of hermeneutic thinking. Part two, "Poetic Disclosures: Language as the Medium of the Hermeneutic Experience," probes deeply into the nature of language while demonstrating its belonging together with Being. The concluding section, "Hermeneutic Challenge: The Future of Hermeneutics," is a one-of-a-kind reflection on the challenges philosophical hermeneutics faces in the third millennium with its portentous interest in analytical philosophy to the detriment of hermeneutic investigation.

336 Spanning a considerable range of philosophical and theological themes, from the issue of transcendence, understanding, and self-understanding, through metaphysics, forgetfulness of Being, Trinity, atheology, and the pivotal Incarnation as the empowerment of thinking-the- difference, part one gives full value to the matters at hand. As a result, we are invited to partake effusively in critical engagements with a whole panoply of thinkers tackling the above-mentioned themes: Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur (the icons of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics), as well as the less known figures of two German philosophers: Gustav Siewerth and Bernhard Welte. On the theological pole, Wierciński involves us in a thrilling dialogue with the medieval figures of Ignatius of Antioch, Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, and Richard of St. Victor, as well as the renowned contemporary theologians: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, and the somewhat less glaring Walter Kasper.

The first part's fecundity is a real challenge. Its four distinct sections render topics perceptibly knit into a captivating fabric of the intersections between philosophical hermeneutics and theological investigation. Deploying hermeneutics to reinvigorate the central areas of Christian theology, part one introduces the reader to the main precepts of the hermeneutic philosophy of religion. Its first subsection, "The Hermeneutic Retrieval of a Theological Insight: *Verbum Interius*," is an astute elucidation of Gadamer's language-oriented hermeneutics, whose universal aspect can be encapsulated as the *verbum interius*: "not the word that is the subject of philosophy of language or linguistics, but the inner word, the core of Augustine's teaching on the Trinity" (60). Musing on the indivisibility of thinking and language, Wierciński

ascertains, after Gadamer, that “to be means to exist in language” (60; cf. Gadamer 2000, 468). Speaking, thus, is not viewed here in terms of speech acts and their singularity, in accordance with the guidelines of general linguistics and represented by F. de Saussure, Sapir-Whorf, J. L. Austin, R. Jakobson, and others (not disregarding their staple contribution to the development of an understanding of human speech), but much more openly as “dwelling in the totality of meaning” (62). Following Gadamer, Wierciński contends that: “Every lingual expression is grounded in that totality, which encompasses all individual expressions and overcomes them. The statement ‘*Being that can be understood is language*’ might be interpreted as participation in that totality of meaning, and not as lingual idealism.” (62)

Existing in language, a human being is continuously confronted with language’s essential powerlessness and incompleteness. This acute sense of inexpressibility is closely connected with human finitude. The lack of the possibility to express everything we want and the way we want to does not mean that we are incapable as human subjects, but makes us aware that “Being does not allow itself to be definitively articulated. We are always on the way to Being and, therefore, on the way to language.” (72–73; cf. Heidegger 1959, 242, 262; see also Gerald L. Bruns 1989) The limitedness of language is evocative of the limits of our being-in-the-world. As Wierciński explains, it is exactly the pain of not being able to express everything that “brings us to hermeneutics”. And thus, the human pursuit of expression is at the same time the quest for Being: “This never-ending search for language is finite in its nature. The hermeneutic experience mediates infinite and finite being, and as such, is a lingual enactment of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.” (63)

To find the fitting word, to mediate between what is finite and what is infinite is hermeneutics’ first-ever task. Wierciński picks up on language’s insufficiency, as well as its propensity to partake in the incessant quest for the right way to express itself, and, via the recourse to the universality of the hermeneutic enterprise, advances his original approach to what language consists in. His input into the study of language is not yet another theory of language, but a contribution to our understanding of the essence of language—its nature—in relation to Being. The ontological footing of his reflection awakens us to see beyond the purely linguistic investigation. In an understanding of the lingual

character of Being, we experience language as both “bridge and barrier” on our way to Being (61), and, in consequence, we can better grasp the very texture of human existence as hermeneutically immersed in language.

338 This most challenging part of the book, which dexterously reinvigorates the discussion of speaking, thinking, and Being as belonging together, helps us appreciate the role of *the unsaid* in the presence and the formation of *the said*. Reminding us of Gadamer’s weighty words in this respect: “What is stated is not everything. The unsaid is what first makes what is stated into a word that can reach us” (Gadamer 2000, 504), the author boosts our interest in the intricate nature of language. His account of the essence of language is not, however, an avowal of the places of indeterminacy, intentional silences, or the inescapable incongruities in speech performance and communication, which might be taken as the prominent examples of *the unsaid*. Rather, following Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s contentions, the author aids us on the way to reach out for the unveiling to ourselves of the inextricable liaison of language and Being, wherein the recognition of the primordial interplay of *the said* and *the unsaid* is of central importance. He makes the message of his text resonate powerfully with Heidegger’s high-ranking words: “*Das Gesagte ist das Dürftige, das Ungesagte erfüllt mit Reichtum*” (Heidegger 1991, 249), and inspires us to explore thoroughly the role of *the unsaid* alongside *the said* in disclosing Being, the thinking of Being.

Wierciński argues that by reinstating the import of the theological insight into the universality of hermeneutics, through his reflection on *verbum interius*, Gadamer (“without being a theologian”) initiates a creative engagement with the nature of language as placed in the onto-theological perspective. Gadamer’s pioneering move testifies to theology’s and philosophy’s intrinsic connection (recuperated in contemporary philosophy), and prepares the ground for the beckoning of subsequent, lavish avowals of the disclosures of Being. Wierciński’s ample argumentation not only demonstrates the unique path of thinking about language offered by Gadamer, but hinges on the author’s own insight into the interconnection between the Triune God, the Holy Spirit, and the nature of language, encouraging us to interrogate the question of language even more extensively. The author highlights that associating (and thereby leaning) the hermeneutic priority of language to the medieval theology of the Trinity,

Gadamer uncovers that: “The inner mental word is just as consubstantial with thought as is God the Son with God the Father.” (Gadamer 2000, 418; see also Plieger 2000, 187–192) The consubstantiality of thought with the inner word, as reflecting the consubstantiality of God the Father and God the Son—the Word, is of no small significance. It heralds a complete shift of the formerly existent paradigm of thinking about thought and speech. Crucially, Gadamer’s unearthing of the trinitarian theology as figuring the interrelation between speech and thought (73) underwrites hermeneutics’ claim to universality, as it stresses the ubiquitous nature of language. The analogy between *Verbum Dei* and *verbum interius* opens up an original perspective which acknowledges language as situated where it has always been—in the co-belongingness of speaking, thinking, and Being. This angle of vision is a first-rate instance of hermeneutics’ recognizing of that which has been there already, approving of its inquiry into what *is*, rather than merely devising or speculating on what *can be*.

Tracing Gadamer’s unprecedented philosophical take on language back to St. Augustine, Wierciński sensitizes us to the uniqueness of a hermeneutically afforded insight. He reasons that Gadamer’s hermeneutic view of language, founded on Augustine’s *verbum interius* developed in *De Trinitate* revolutionizes our understanding of the nature of language. While doing so, the author takes us on an important, enlightening tour of exploration through Augustine’s thinking. He expounds that Augustine conceptualizes the relationship between the sign (*signum*) and the word (*verbum*) via drawing on the Stoic distinction of inner (λόγος ενδιάθετος) and outer word (λόγος προφορικός), and applies this differentiation in a new Trinitarian context (cf. Müll 1962, 7–56). Most significantly, as it is emphasized, we owe to Augustine’s investigation of language not only an illumination of theological truths, but the very backdrop to the hermeneutic inquiry into the co-belongingness of thinking, speaking, and understanding. Elaborating the relevant citations from Augustine in Latin, Wierciński explains the gist of this belonging-together thus: “Thinking proceeds via an inner word, a spontaneously generated act of understanding. When we speak, we give voice to the word of the heart.” (81)

Augustine’s distinction between the inner word and the word we speak is interconnected with a recognition of the processual and temporal nature of knowledge. The temporal character of human knowledge and existence, as

different from the divine, entails the human word's powerlessness. The clash between the powerlessness of the human word and the power of *Verbum Dei* is the space for a hermeneutic reconnaissance. Very rightly, Wierciński names Augustine's contemplation of the relationship between the three Persons of the Holy Trinity (and its impact on human understanding) the hermeneutics of love. In a radical manner, he convinces us that it is the divine charity that enables us to interpret and to understand:

With knowledge of things (*rerum notitia*) and knowledge of languages (*linguarum notitia*) we can better interpret scriptural signs, both literal (*signa propria*) and figurative (*signa translata*). The interpretation of Scripture is made possible by the divine charity. Augustine's hermeneutics is the hermeneutics of love. The gap between the human and the divine, the eternal and the temporal, the word and the thing is bridged by the charity. (81)

340 The reflection on Augustine's hermeneutic interrogation of language is taken even further by an eloquent reference to his involving triads: "Augustine sees an image of the divine Trinity in human cognition, the triad of memory (understanding), intellect (knowledge), and will (love); lover, beloved, and love; object, vision, and attention, etc." (84) The aforementioned quotation is one more instance of the author's unflagging quest for an ever deeper understanding of the interconnectivity between philosophical hermeneutics, theology, and phenomenology.

Wierciński's deliberation on language is a compelling inquiry into the dialogical nature of understanding. "The conversation that we are" (Gadamer 2000, 378; cf. Hölderlin 1946) happens diagonally: arching over the past and the present, language is both the medium of our search for Being and the possibility for Being's disclosure. And horizontally, language as "the *Vollzug* of the self-disclosure of Being" (89) enables the self to reach over to the Other, also oneself as the other. Bringing Gadamer, Heidegger, Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Lonergan, and other thinkers into a conversation over the nature of language, the author also enhances our acknowledgement of the interconnection between language and Tradition.

The search for Being is not disenfranchised from the dialogues of the past, just on the contrary, we are immersed in Tradition's interplay of past and present, and our understanding involves and is guarded by the manifold and versatile voices of Tradition. The interrogation of the intimate relationship between language and Tradition leads to an expanded understanding of the inextricability of philosophical and theological insights—one of the book's major concerns, and one of its most inspiring accomplishments. As a matter of fact, it is the unity of language and Tradition that leaves no doubt about the import of viewing the fields of philosophy and theology as profoundly intersecting and abundantly cross-fertilizing. Here is one of the monograph's most illuminating passages that make the truth about the two disciplines' mutual permeability conspicuous:

Hermeneutics is not only between the human and the divine, it is also between philosophy and theology. Hermeneutic philosophy must engage theology which grounds and permeates the Western Tradition. Conversely, the theological Tradition is incomprehensible without philosophy. This is not just a historical consideration: The subject-matter of hermeneutics, *die Sache selbst*, is theological. Hermeneutics is not theology, but it must be open to theology if it is to be receptive to the voices that constitute the Tradition that we are. (88–89)

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Through this involving reflection on the nature of language and philosophy-theology reciprocity, Wierciński directs us to his central thesis of hermeneutics' universal character. The gist of the author's extended interrogation of *verbum interius* as the foundation for hermeneutics' universality can be best encapsulated in his own, enlightening words:

The *verbum interius* is the ground and *modus experiendi* of Being. The nature of language needs to be rethought in the light of the uncovering of the *verbum interius* as the ground of the universality of hermeneutics. The "inner" of *verbum interius* is not a spatial "inner." The procession from the *verbum interius* to the *verbum exterius* is not a movement through space, but a procession in time, an ecstatic self-transcendence. (89)

Thanks to Wierciński's exceptionally meticulous scrutinization of the thinking-understanding-speaking interconnection, the (to the uninitiated) at-first-sight impervious concepts of *verbum interius* and language as the self-disclosure of Being are aptly straightened out. The inner word proceeds to its externalization not in terms of space, but is happening in time in the form of an "ecstatic self-transcendence." The *ek-stasis* of *verbum interius* is what we grasp as its articulation in speech. The occurrence of its self-transcendence is concomitant with understanding. Understanding cannot be taken as an act which is exterior to language, just on the contrary, it happens *in* and *through* language. Therefore, we can state that being the "binder" between *verbum interius* and *verbum exterius*, understanding does not have an extraneous character, its oneness with thinking and speaking is unambiguous.

Wierciński's discussion of *verbum interius* also entails an explication of the hermeneutic input in postmodern thinking. With real zest, the author introduces us to his cutting-edge concept of bridging the traditional and the current thinking, to the effect of reinstating our thinking about God's
342 transcendental otherness:

In its confrontation with post-metaphysical thinking, thinking the difference has special significance for the hermeneutic conception of tradition, thus acting as a bridge builder between the varied current philosophical positions. The theological confrontation with classical thinking-the-difference and the recently-modern and contemporary-postmodern thinking-the-difference can be understood as an answer to the challenge of opening up to 'thinking' openness to God's transcendental otherness—and thus to the traces of the transcendent—and not just to its becoming a disinterested functionary of God. (108)

Revitalizing, after Gadamer, the view of language as fundamentally ontological and based on its interconnection with the mystery of the Trinity, the book leads us out of the narrowness of the thinking of language as a mere communicative tool, and inspires us to see the lingual character of Being:

Similarly to the Word as the second person of the Trinity, who as the Son proceeds from the Father and becomes the incarnated Word, thus allowing us to access the mystery of the Trinity, the human word makes it possible to see the true Being of things (*das Sein des Seienden*) in their linguistic appearance. (180)

Section two, “Thinking Hermeneutically: Opening toward Transcendence as the Imperative of Self-Understanding,” of the first part contains an engrossing reflection on Balthasar’s theology, Gadamer’s hermeneutics of art, and Celan’s poetry. It opens with “The Hermeneutics of the Gift: Mutual Interaction Between Philosophy and Theology in Hans Urs von Balthasar.” Exploring Balthasar’s hermeneutic theology of the gift, Wierciński reminds us that Balthasar was not only greatly influenced by Aquinas, but also by the philosophy of Ferdinand Ulrich, G. W. Friedrich Hegel, and Gustav Siewerth. The author places special accent on the fruitful Balthasar-Siewerth collaboration and friendship. Exemplifying the mutuality of the relationship between philosophy and theology through this remarkable intellectual exchange, he deepens our awareness of the richness of the cross-influences which have marked the two disciplines ever since their inception. Espousing the seminal import of the Swiss theologian for our understanding of theology/philosophy co-inspiration, Wierciński underlines Balthasar’s role in rediscovering and furthering the theological/philosophical liaison as rooted in Thomas Aquinas. Unquestioningly, it is through Aquinas that we can acknowledge the two fields as “expressing one in two distinct ways” (cf. Hoping 1997), deploying their own methods, but also “ordered toward one another” (148; cf. John Paul II 1998, §§ 43–44). The hermeneutic reiterating of the medieval tradition constitutes a significant part of the study of the proximity of theology and philosophy. The section’s main text and its exceptionally rich footnotes demonstrate this closeness via a discussion of the whole range of personal interactions between Balthasar, Siewerth, Ulrich, and Erich Przywara, as well as Balthasar’s momentous disputes with Hegel, Jean-Luc Marion, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Barth.

The Balthasar-Marion debate, as presented by the author, deserves a closer look. Wierciński maintains that the thesis of theology’s deployment of

philosophical thinking needs no special argumentation, and asserts that Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology, which attempts to keep the two disciplines completely separate, has been criticized as doing crypto-theology (cf. 162; see also: Janicaud 1991; Derrida 1987, 1991). He writes:

Marion's critique of ontotheology and his call to think God outside the question of Being are based on a wrong understanding of Being and the essence of God as *causa sui*. For that reason, the assumption that God should be conceived without Being or outside of Being—which inevitably leads to a rejection of ontotheology—needs to be questioned again too. (161)

344 Wierciński stresses that Balthasar's theology offers a convincing counterpoint to Marion's philosophical reservations, stating that for the former "interpretation of the *analogia entis*, God is not outside Being. The self-transcendence of God (*ekstasis*) belongs intrinsically to Being. The fact that metaphysics underlies theology does not contradict the autonomy of the faith. Faith must be rational." (161) Endorsing Balthasar's standpoint and pinpointing the deficiency of Marion's phenomenological approach to the question of transcendence, the author explains that phenomenological analysis does not warrant consistency in a methodological severance of theology and philosophy "without renouncing the phenomenological range of the phenomenon that is to be thought" (162).

It is impossible to do justice to the unusual richness of all the themes tackled in the second subsection of part one, "Thinking Hermeneutically: Opening Toward Transcendence as the Imperative of Self-understanding." Undeniably, the reflection on Gadamer's hermeneutics of art is a piece of hermeneutic artistry in its own right. We should like to proceed to the subtlety and powerfulness of Wierciński's interpretation of poetry, which is the most thought-provoking passage of this part. Placing his reflection on Celan's poem "Tenebrae" (187–202) here is the author's bold and well-grounded move. Opening us toward transcendence, theology cannot limit itself to the facile aspects of the human being's religiosity, or his/her basic awareness of eschatological matters, rather, it aims to embrace the whole of a human being's

experiencing of his/her existence in the face of the Absolute. The horrors of the Holocaust—the inconsolable, ever-bleeding wounds—call for a reconfiguring of the relationship between God-and-a-human-being. Celan’s seemingly blasphemous reversal of the prayer’s subject/object: “Pray, Lord, pray to us [...]” requires a novel insight into the inexpressibility of a human being’s drama and theo-drama. Hermeneutics allows us to acknowledge the most astounding configurations of God’s and human being’s intimacy, as well as the most abysmal, acute, or even subversive de-liaisons between Deity and humanity. The hermeneutic discernment of the theological issues is capable of deepening our understanding, as Wierciński accentuates, of “our matter with God,” and, at the same time, helps us avoid any oversimplifications or banalizations of the most fragile texture of being *homo religiosus*. The author’s interpretation of Celan’s poem is most influential. Not only does it meaningfully contribute to his extensive explication of the hermeneutic, perspicacious look into theology, but it also, by touching on language’s inappropriateness, insufficiency, and limitedness in the face of a dehumanized world, anticipates a hermeneutic interrogation into the nature of language as revealed in poetic disclosures, as well as of the theme of the lingual character of understanding, as developed in part two of the book.

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Section three of part one is an extremely condensed presentation of the dispute over Heidegger’s hermeneutics of existence by Welte and Siewerth. It begins with the question of God. Heidegger’s two disciples see the import of the question of God in Heidegger’s moving backwards through the idea of Being to metaphysics’ basic premise. Siewerth’s ceaseless endeavor (his “theologically empowered metaphysics”) to reconcile Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics with classical metaphysics via a systematic engaging of Heidegger with Thomas Aquinas, is contrasted with Welte’s hermeneutic-phenomenological theology and his seeing of Heidegger’s posing the question of God “as the most delicate attempt to express the unsayable, without hurting it by doing so” (Welte 1975, 276). In time, as Wierciński notices, the two thinkers’ responses to Heidegger become increasingly polemical, diverse, and non-univocal. The author leads us through those complexities to the point where he places Welte’s and Siewerth’s differing interpretations of Heidegger next to the issue of the forgetfulness of Being.

Such thorough investigation of Siewerth's and Welte's dialoguing with Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics is undeniably the author's original contribution to the ongoing "Heidegger's matter," especially bearing in mind that the English-speaking readership is less acquainted with the literature of, and on, the two philosophers (mostly in German), and of their productive conversations with Heidegger. Accentuating Welte's and Siewerth's concern with the uncovering of the traces of transcendence and their insistence on the human being's self-fulfillment as taking place within this horizon, Wierciński develops fully this section's central problematic—the hermeneutic thinking's openness toward the transcendent dimension of human existence—, and, at the same time, provides one of essential features of *existentia hermeneutica*.

346 The ensuing elucidation of Siewerth's "metaphysics as the empowerment of thinking" is an impressive presentation of the German philosopher's recondite path. The author stresses that for Siewerth "the thinking about Being under the aspect of the difference of Being is the culmination of metaphysical speculative thinking" (292). To give a synopsis of the nooks and crannies of Wierciński's inspirational and detailed account of Siewerth's metaphysics in a few lines would definitely not do justice to the depth of both the "forgotten" thinker's hermeneutics and the equally captivating commentary. Nevertheless, the affinities and contrasts between Heidegger and Thomas Aquinas that Siewerth, and Wierciński after him, pinpoint, leave no doubt about the salient nature of Siewerth's input in the development of the critical thinking about Being and the forgetfulness of Being. Let the following quotation of this frontline analysis speak for itself:

As a theologically illumined metaphysics, it takes "the word of Revelation" as the word that "announces itself in the historical human space that is already illuminated in its understanding of Being." In this theologically empowered metaphysics, Siewerth tries to think the Being of beings, the *actus essendi*, as the mediating center between Being and God, between contingency and necessity. (306; cf. Siewerth 2003, 82)

The comprehensive examination of Siewerth's engagement with Heidegger and his forming of an ingenious path as an answer to the question of Being is the author's powerful manifesto to the exigency of "cultivating the piety of

thinking in our questioning” (310). This stance is magnified by the section’s concluding sentence: “The historicity of thinking and the forgetfulness of Being indicate the perspective in which the relation between Being and truth must be thematized and re-addressed always anew” (310), which necessitates us to choose a dedicated re-thinking and re-articulating of the forgetfulness of Being as a genuine response to the call of thinking which is *existentia hermeneutica*’s essence and its ultimate responsibility.

The fourth subsection of part one, “Understanding as the Happening of Truth,” scrutinizes the question of the primordially of understanding, which is hermeneutics’ true locus. Addressing the radicality of questioning and the problematic of Tradition, Wierciński makes us sensitive to the interlocking character of understanding and Tradition, explaining the latter’s indispensable role in forming and transforming understanding:

What matters in philosophy, is the radicality with which human beings question their own Life (*Lebensverständnis der eigenen Gegenwart*). It is precisely this “existential understanding of one’s present life,” which needs to be brought back to life. Therefore, what becomes essential is not the further elaboration of ontology, but the understanding of understanding as intimately involved and integrated into Tradition (*Überlieferung*). (314)

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To understand means to understand in relation to Tradition. In this light, hermeneutics and philosophy shine forth as pursuing the same goal: philosophy’s fundamental task and hermeneutics’ central preoccupation coalesce in their exigency of reaching out for understanding as immersed in Tradition and acknowledging its irresistible impact. The commonality of philosophical and hermeneutic pursuit urges the author to remind us of philosophy’s first and foremost challenge:

The ethos of a philosopher is to rescue the True. Understanding ἀ-λήθεια as unconcealedness, places it in the dialectic horizon of concealment (*Verbergung*) and unconcealment (*Entbergung*), and opens

up a world in which things are made intelligible for human beings in the first place. (314)

Elucidating hermeneutics' intermediary position in relation to understanding, Wierciński, after Gadamer, accentuates that "hermeneutics is not interested in the procedure of understanding, but in the clarification of the conditions in which understanding takes place" (Gadamer 2000, 295). Vitaly, hermeneutics' non-prescriptive approach to understanding avows its temporal character. The temporality of understanding makes us aware of the limitedness of our cognition. If human understanding happens in the basic structure of cognition's limitedness, we also need to grasp that understanding is always conditioned by its pre-suppositional nature. Each time we endeavor to understand, our understanding rests on its fore-structure (fore-having, foresight, fore-conception), and thus, we cannot speak of understanding in terms of an isolated, atemporal singularity, and/or homogeneity.

348 The undeniable axis of *Existentia Hermeneutica* is the interrelatedness of language and human understanding. Language does not exist outside of Being and Being embraces the lingual dimension of one's being a human being. As Wierciński puts it soundly: "Human Dasein resides within language: 'Language is the house of Being.' [cf. Heidegger 1977b, 217] Therefore, language is a constitutive aspect of the human being. We are not in a position of stepping outside of language. It is not we that speak, but 'language that speaks,' (*die Sprache spricht*).'" (317; cf. Heidegger 1959, 32) In this place of the book, the author resumes the discussion of Gadamer's assertion of the import of *verbum interius*, dealt with in the earlier sections, and electrifies us with one of his momentous statements. This time not only reinvigorating our comprehension of Gadamer's disclosure of the linguality of human understanding, but also problematizing Heidegger's theo- and a-theo-logical position:

However, the Gadamerian retrieval of *verbum interius* renews the young Heidegger's project of a phenomenological and hermeneutic rehabilitation of medieval theology. Hermeneutics must never forget that the remembering of language was effected through the retrieval of a theological insight. Heidegger's contention that a theist cannot think

Being is thrown into question by his own legacy. (317; cf. Heidegger 1983, 8–9)

Bringing in proximity Gadamer's recourse to the theological notion of *verbum interius* (in the context of his not being a theologian), and the Heideggerian a-theist stance, as arising, but also diverting from his Christian theological roots within a reconfiguration, broadens the scope of the reader's apprehension of the convergences and dissimilarities of the two thinkers' ontological hermeneutics, as well as the idiosyncrasies of their philosophical paths. It is one of the ways, in which the author expands our hermeneutic sensibility and guides us appealingly through that which pertains to hermeneutic existence.

Wierciński claims that *verbum interius*, as the *modus experiendi* of Being, allows us to dwell in the truth about Being's self-disclosive nature, as enacted in language. It is indispensable at this point to mention the author's insights, stemming from the employment of Heidegger's hermeneutics of existence and the German thinker's rejuvenation of the ancient Greek notion of *aletheia*. To see Being and language through the prism of Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics illuminates the two further, as indissoluble, and invites us not only to comprehend Being's self-disclosure as happening in language, but also to acknowledge its limitedness. The author explains:

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Fusing horizons, we go beyond something that is already familiar to us. In the interplay of that which is understood (*das Entborgene*) and that which is veiled and in need of being disclosed (*das Verborgene*) we realize that our access to that which wants to be disclosed is *in* and *through* language. (321)

Not everything is accessible, but that, which is, is disclosed *in* and *through* language. The limitedness of our access to Being lies in the powerlessness of language. As human beings, we are confronted with the lack of the ultimacy of understanding, as it is stranded between the human (thus contingent, provisional, and finite) mode of being and the unlimitedness of the divine. We find ourselves in the position of having less power to express "what is" than

we would like to possess. Language mediates between that which is veiled and that which is unveiled; however, it is not being done to the fullest. The author spells it out thus: “We discover that language itself lives in the in-between of concealment and unconcealment, *im Zueinandergehören von Verbergung und Entbergung*.” (321)

Language’s living in the in-between of concealment and unconcealment directs us to *existentia hermeneutica*’s other important in-betweenness. Spanning the distance between the self and the Other, language partakes in distinct modes of Being: familiarity and strangeness. It is through hospitality, including linguistic hospitality, that we cross the barrier between us. Abolishing the divider that happens in conversation becomes the genuine space for *con-version*, as a result of which we do not remain the same we were before. Conversation’s welcoming gesture is at the same time hermeneutics’ welcoming gesture. It is *in* and *through* conversation that we experience our lives as *existentia hermeneutica*. Conversation is the true texture of hermeneutic existence.

350 What is most significant is that in conversation we become “bound to one another in a new community” (326). The phenomenality of the encounter in conversation is not about “putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view but being transformed into a communion” (326). The communion, the attunement to and the following of the *Sache selbst*, that happens in conversation, inspires us to appreciate fully the otherness of the Other without needing to subjugate or dominate him/her: “Hospitality and responsibility describe the basic characteristic of a human being dwelling in-between familiarity and strangeness in the mode of διά-λέγειν, of welcoming the difference and the richness of the relationship with the Other.” (325) To cover the initial distance between the mineness and otherness requires the appropriating of original meaning. The encounter with the unknown—the human being or the text (as the author highlights)—is a reminder that the path to understanding leads via the confrontation with otherness. Quoting Gadamer’s reminiscences of his last conversation with Heidegger, Wierciński makes us feel the extent of the drama when conversation comes to an end, and, in this way, he takes us to the very heart of the assertion about the lingual nature of understanding. When we *con-verse*, we can hope that, led by conversation, we can reach out for an ever-growing understanding:

There is something terribly distressing when the conversation is over. It is a defeat of hermeneutics; a defeat of hope and optimism that we can come to an understanding. As long as we allow ourselves to be led by a conversation, we can maintain a positive trajectory of being on the way to understanding. (326)

What is most crucial, is our continuous being on the way to understanding, in our incessant and intimate conversation with the world, the Other, and oneself as the other. The non-finality of understanding shows that the extension of the way on which we are is, at the same time, the expansion of who we are. In the true Gadamerian spirit, we can talk of the consequential and meaningful increase in Being (*Zuwachs an Sein*; cf. Gadamer 2000, 135–136). The question of understanding situates us in the very center of Gadamer’s hermeneutics of conversation. Writing about Gadamer’s radicalization of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of existence, Wierciński makes us aware of the import of Gadamer’s getting near the question of Being to the challenge of understanding. This enables us to see the essence of Gadamer’s hermeneutic enterprise as a practical philosophy of interpretation and understanding.

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The author’s shaping influence on both the hermeneutically sensitive and the hermeneutically aloof reader can be fully discerned when he quotes Gadamer’s lines on understanding as an adventure. Understanding is dangerous, but it also affords unique opportunities. One cannot but follow the glamorous truth of Gadamer’s view of understanding as action which “always remains a risk” (332). The challenge, adventure, and risk that are involved in understanding, and which Gadamer endorses, inspire us to acquaint ourselves further with his practical philosophy.

The horizon of understanding encompasses lived human experience. Gadamer in the first place locates understanding in the practical dimension of our lives. Concerned with rejuvenating the importance of *phronesis* for hermeneutics (cf. Gadamer 1994, 332), Gadamer considers practical wisdom as the very one which gets us near to understanding *par excellence*, and calls it “the condition of any theoretical knowledge” (339). Undeniably, Gadamer’s hermeneutics, as oriented toward factual historical life, promotes *phronesis* as hermeneutic virtue (cf. Gadamer 1998). One of the vital achievements

of this section of the book is the accentuation of the Heideggerian legacy in Gadamer's formulation of his hermeneutics of practical wisdom. The author explains that, following Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity with an emphasis of the momentarily concrete, Gadamer sees hermeneutic understanding as an application of that which needs to be understood in the interpreter's factic life (cf. Gadamer 2000, 310–321; 1991, 1986).

352 Bearing in mind the above and other gripping passages which explicate the significance of *phronesis* in our experiencing of understanding, we could venture a thesis that for Gadamer understanding and practical wisdom (excellence rather than art) are isomorphic. Following Gadamer, Wierciński contends: "Existential situatedness, which takes seriously one's own life and one's particular hermeneutic situation is the condition *sine qua non* of any understanding." (341) The author elucidates the applicability and effectiveness of hermeneutic interpretation as grounded, each time, in the concreteness of our existential situation, and emphasizes that mediating "between universal and particular, *φρόνησις* is a hermeneutic virtue, which capacitates the interpretation and reasoning" (342). It must be accentuated that we owe to the author an unprecedentedly exhaustive elaboration of Gadamer's deployment of *phronesis* in his hermeneutic philosophy. The inclusion of dialogue as the locus of understanding makes Gadamer's approach far more embracing, and, in fact, bespeaks the core of the human way of understanding. The reciprocity (which dialogue occasions) is a precious experience of partaking in reasoning. Thus, it is not only the dialectics of the general and the particular (the virtue-oriented attitude), which illuminatively prompts understanding, but the hermeneutic conversation with its unique possibility of exposing and confronting differing opinions to the effect of a better understanding of the issue at hand.

Gadamer's dialogical model of understanding makes us aware that, while coming to an understanding "here and now," we participate in meaning rather than create it. This is of vital significance, since hermeneutics, as Gadamer stresses, is not about devising a method, but about "describing what is the case" (349). Discovering and describing "what is," or "what the case is," transforms the way we think about interpretation and understanding. One of the stirring, though perhaps less noticeable aspects of Gadamer's illumination of understanding (as mentioned by the author), is the philosopher's distinction

between experience and insight. Quoting Gadamer's enthralling lines, Wierciński animates our imagination to see the transformative power of insight which "always involves an escape from something that had deceived us and held us captive. Thus, insight always involves an element of self-knowledge and constitutes a necessary side of what we call experience in the proper sense. Insight is something to which we come." (Gadamer 2000, 350)

By contrast to this less prominent facet of Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy of understanding, the issue of finitude, pronounced in mighty and varied ways, draws our attention unwaveringly, if not disquietingly. Gadamer, Heidegger, and Ricoeur (whose philosophical path is chosen to instantiate the dilemmas of philosophy/theology interconnectivity in the subsequent section) insist on the out-and-out importance of finitude for human understanding. Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics of facticity, Gadamer's hermeneutics of conversation, and Ricoeur's textual hermeneutics are connected by the very thread of meditating on human finitude. Following in the author's footsteps, we may pause and think of the three thinkers' contribution, through their hermeneutics of finitude, to our awareness of how we understand what happens to us when we understand and, crucially, how our understanding is determined by our finite being, and thus, we can be closer to the central precept of an understanding of our existence as *existentia hermeneutica*.

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Section four of part one, "The Heterogeneity of Thinking: Paul Ricoeur, the Believing Philosopher, and the Philosophizing Believer," offers a riveting re-opening of the vexing quandary around the philosophy and theology connection/disconnection. Wierciński makes two important claims about Ricoeur in this respect. Firstly, he compares Ricoeur's position to Kant's. The author poses an open-ended question, leading us to the possible answer by stating the following: "For Kant, whatever truth may occur in theology, it is subordinated to the criterion of philosophical rationality. One may legitimately ask whether a similar subordination covertly determines Paul Ricoeur's work in the philosophy of religion." (355) Secondly, he suggests that the danger of transgressing the barriers between the two disciplines in Ricoeur seems to be overcome in his oscillating "around a creative coexistence of the two disciplines by keeping to a rigorous methodological division" (356). Wierciński comes at this point to a more general formula, which could guide us in the matter of

avoiding the situation of one of these disciplines having to subsume to the other:

On the one hand, a philosopher can continuously deepen his sensitivity to philosophical problems as he engages the Scriptures. On the other, a theologian implementing the methodological apparatus of philosophy can reach a more profound understanding of theology and his own personal religious conviction. (356)

354 The stance framed in this way wins us over to the author's decidedly clear and convincing way of thinking about the uneasy relationship between philosophy and theology. Engaging the Scriptures enables a philosopher to deepen his sensitivity to philosophical problems. And this applies not only to moral matters—the issues of guilt, responsibility, justice, and love, which the author mentions while discussing Ricoeur's philosophically and theologically underwritten reflection. Becoming more sensitive works to the effect of a far more extensive attitude, which involves standing up against all compartmentalization in thinking as such, while embracing the discomfiting topics that need to be reflected upon. Satiated with aporias and paradoxes, embodying disquieting and highly tangled *hi-stories*, the Scriptures invite the reader to delve deeper into the more subtle meanings of human reality, and to a continuous effort to think and to re-think the possible and the impossible, the sacred and the profane, the acceptable and the unacceptable. This is what Wierciński very aptly names “thinking appropriated by the possibilities contained in the biblical texts” (373). To forsake such possibilities would be unwise for a thinker, and would disavow the adventure of thinking *per se*. By the same token, when a theologian deploys philosophical methodology, he/she can benefit from a re-thinking of the theological issues against the *doxa* of the so-far existing thinking. In this anti-schematic approach, all points of contention, tackled with the aid of philosophical methodology, can be illuminated to the effect of a novel rendering of the already savored, thus building a culture of reflective, mature, and open Christianity.

Therefore, right from its beginning, the section on Ricoeur's concomitant paths of a believing philosopher and philosophizing believer, is

both an excellent instance of the possibility of a non-subsuming relationship between philosophy and theology as well as an incentive to develop our thinking about this recurring problematic. Without a shadow of a doubt, Wierciński's voice attests to the topicality of the philosophy/theology (dis) engagement. Being one of its prevalent ideas, this issue (alongside many others) bespeaks the book's relevance in the overall framework of today's philosophical discourse (cf. Wierciński 2010). Suffice it to mention the controversial issue of crypto-theology in Jean-Luc Marion's philosophy—his open admission to the Catholic provenance, while defending the position of a believing philosopher.

The heterogeneity of thinking, represented by the philosophers discussed in the book and unmistakably by the author himself, brings us anew, in the later sections of part one, to the phronetic dimension of the philosophical enterprise. The varied ways of realizing the philosophical ethos bespeak the phenomenality of thinking. Phronetic sensibility presupposes an openness to, and an acknowledgement of the unfamiliar, the contradictory (Ricoeur's seminal deliberation on the conflict of interpretations), or even the hostile, as well as the conducive employment of that which is at variance with our thinking (Gadamer's famous insight into conversation's interlocutors: "This means, however, constantly recognizing in advance the possibility that your partner is right, even recognizing the possible superiority of your partner. Is this too little?"; Gadamer, 1997, 36).

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It is only through thus defined openness that we can experience the abundance and unending nature of interpretation and understanding. A prudent approach to thinking puts us in the position of an unflattering research of all that might enrich, cultivate, or refine it without setting out limits, without instant rejection of other thinking on the grounds of ideological, religious, or other differences. The undulating interconnection/disconnection between philosophy and theology throughout the history of the two disciplines resonates with the lesser or greater appreciation of the positive fruits of thinking-the-difference. The diverse ways of the realization of thinking-the-difference by key hermeneuticians who figure in the book encourage us to embark on a never-ending journey to uncover what thinking consists in. Ricoeur's capability of thinking-the-difference was the begetter of either overtly philosophical or outwardly theological texts. Heidegger's contesting of his religious roots,

while recycling and re-appropriating his theological thinking, resulted in the possibility of a new beginning—the a-theological thinking. Gadamer's rehabilitation of medieval thought (taking over where Heidegger had set it aside), and his ingenious probing into the nature of language through the Augustinian notion of *verbum interius*, entailed not only a novel approach to language but proved the philosopher's thought to be a witness to thinking-the-difference. The inseparability of thinking the theological from the philosophical pole occasioned a milestone insight into the lingual nature of Being, as well as contributed greatly to linguistic thinking.

356 Wierciński's prescient claim about the permeability and inseparability of philosophical and theological thinking intones many themes. While the exceptional diversity and profundity of the issues of Christian theology that he elaborates can be viewed as a *vade-me-cum* of the thinking faith—a wellspring of knowledge in its own right—, *in* and *through* those themes the author sensitizes us incessantly to the concomitancy of the rootedness of the hermeneutic investigation in Tradition and its unending, meaning-laden openness to new interpretations. It is the movement backward to the roots of philosophical/theological thinking and the movement forward toward a recognition of new interpretive possibilities that propel hermeneutic interrogation. Negotiating between past and present, engaging various thinking traditions, mediating between the already known and the new, hermeneutics creates a space for advancing human thinking in its primordial need to understand “what needs to be understood.” It is only by respecting and employing the multitudinous traditions and currents of thinking, also divergent and contradictory, that we are enabled to unearth what otherwise would have been inaccessible to us. Through an enticing examination of the interweaving paths of philosophy and theology, Wierciński leads us on our way to understand ourselves, our-being-in-the-world, fostering, thus, our drawing-near to an understanding of Being.

“The courage to ask and the humility to listen,” which the author puts forward as the program for thinkers—philosophers and theologians alike—, encompasses not just the blossoming of thinking in the interactions between philosophy and theology, but also the more attentive, more nuanced attitude to the problematics within the two disciplines. Wierciński's skillful alerting us to the value of hospitable dialoguing with different traditions, and culturally

pre-determined viewpoints through the example of Ricoeur's propounding of Christian plurivocity cannot go unnoticed. It is only through our humility in listening to many existing voices, no matter how perturbing and regardless of their provenance, that we can grow in thinking and grow as thinking beings. The idea of being humble in the confrontation with thinking that is different from ours, even if likely to cause resistance at the initial stage, is the only pathway to the more profound insight into what thinking and understanding are. The courage to ask is the philosophers' daily bread. One would not be a philosopher, if one did not dare to pose questions. Asking questions, however, should not amount to a self-complacent dwelling in the charm of one's intellectual prowess, but should be oriented toward a genuine investigation of *die Sache selbst*, in the confrontational/collaborative way with Others who possibly can always think differently.

The humility to listen encompasses the bitter realization that one can err. It involves a possibility for and exigency of transformation. We need to be humble enough to understand fully that the other name for humbleness is an unlimited *effata*. And thus, our minds are elevated to grasp the truths which would otherwise remain unattended, or even inaccessible. The unending circle of question and answer, into which we should allow ourselves to be drawn, according to Heidegger, is also the very space of realizing that we cannot have the last word.

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The way Gadamer understands the word goes beyond the signifying function of the word and toward the word as a realization of thinking. As such, it is never the last word, because thinking is always thinking further, there is always something more to think of and to say. (144)

The last subsection of part one, "The Courage to Ask and the Humility to Listen," cogently titled "Thinking Imprisoned: a Captive Mind Tortured by the Demands of the Technological Age," is an outstandingly lucid precis of what hermeneutic endeavor consists in. Thanks to its nuanced and evocative manner, this involving resume casts a spell on the reader to consider and reconsider hermeneutics in the full variety of its characteristic traits. The titled "captive mind" resonates both with Milosz's non-fiction work of the same title, and "the

invincible mind” from his poem “Incantation,” the interpretation of which we encounter in the later part of this book. That is of no small importance, as in this way, Wierciński highlights anew the contrast between the unlimited, one could even say, untamed capacity for thinking with the human predicament in the post-metaphysical age, marked by an acute loss of contemplative thinking. Locating in poetry the chance for the restoration of the non-calculative thinking, the author reveals to us his concern thus: “Our age is profoundly affected, nay dominated, by calculative thinking, and we have thus lost our aptitude for an authentic way of awaiting the παρουσία.” (393; cf. Heidegger 1977a, 91)

358 This section is also a powerful witness to the primacy of *phronesis* in philosophical hermeneutics. When the author speaks of hermeneutics’ distinctly personal character, he stresses that interpretation does not happen outside of the human existential situation but is entrenched in it and is tested by it. What is most vital, is interpretation’s transformative aspect, the import of which the author ascertains in the following way: “It is not an expression of the thirst for power and profit but a search for a deeper understanding of the need for personal change in our life.” (388) The unlimited, dignifying, non-calculative, and non-violent approach to interpretation that hermeneutics incites, and Wierciński forefronts, takes us to the heart of hearts of the hermeneutic enterprise. Entertaining the limitless possibilities of interpretation, hermeneutics holds human thinking in the highest respect, it values the courage to re-address, re-think, and re-interpret the already interpreted. Hermeneutics’ boundaryless horizon, as the author accentuates, bespeaks the human need to include the excluded, and “places itself in the service of those voices that are suppressed and denied expression” (388). Open to the opposing, disquieting, but also excluded and suppressed voices, hermeneutics does not cease to display its welcoming gesture to embrace ambiguity, insecurity, and incompleteness. In this way, it is able to avoid the fossilized, methodological assertions, and situate interpretation and understanding where it truly belongs—in life.

The author’s reflection on the humility to listen provides an interesting connection between both parts of the book. Poetry is undeniably the locus of the many and confusing voices. Instead of standing outside of language and human experience, the poet stands in the very center of what happens and what needs to be put into words. The multiple voices that reach him/her partake

in the continuous procession of meanings: the unexpected, the unadjusted, the impenetrable, etc. We may guess that the smaller size of part two, "Poetic Disclosures: Language as the Medium of the Hermeneutic Experience," is dictated by the author's fidelity to the requirements of the two parts' differing content. Doing justice to the enormity of the issues dealt with in the first part, the author allocates respectively a due number of sections and subsections constitutive of this part's subject matter. This capacious approach mirrors the breadth of the issues that need to be expressed under the heading of "The Hermeneutic Discovery of a Theological Insight." Being a true treasure-trove, this part generously shares with us the theological intuitions in hermeneutic thinking.

By comparison, the shorter part two does not have its own impact diminished. Rather, its strength lies in the issuing of an invitation to indulge in the beauty of the unexpected (that is poetry's crucial role), but above all, in the beauty of language as the medium of the hermeneutic experience. Whereas part one explicates what hermeneutic existence is, part two displays the power and powerlessness of language in conveying the essence of *existentia hermeneutica*. The fragility of *conditio humana* and the assumed finesse of poetic language are shown respectively by these two parts as Being's meaningful disclosures.

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The second part sets the scene for an understanding of poetry's capacity to encapsulate the nature of language. It is through its full acknowledgement of language's metaphoricity that poetry lets us approach the crux of an understanding of the phenomenon of language. The author acquaints us here with three important observations. The *energeia* that is released in the interplay of concealment and unconcealment becomes the true fodder for poetic artistry. Furthermore, what originates poetic activity, is a poet's staying in continuous awe with "what is." And finally, as the author affirms, poetry plays a unique role by accompanying us in our search for personal identity while we are listening to the confusing voices that we are.

Without a shadow of a doubt, Wierciński's reflection on poetry is not only a beautiful, meditative chant of Being, beauty, and love, reflected in his interpretations of the many pieces of poetry that appear here. Far more importantly, his unprecedented take on poetry is an impressing meditation on the hermeneutic condition of being a poet. This novel approach eschews

seeking another theory for poetic discourse. The author does not devise a new methodology of interpretation, but reaches out for what poetry's nature consists in. In his hermeneutic phenomenology of poetic artistry, pondering on the question of what poetry is, the author visibly etches its many and surprising dimensions. Far from being a facile and sentimental poetry enthusiast, he takes us to where we do not expect to be taken. The idea of a poet's witnessing to poetry—the undeniable axis of part two—is at the same time one of the instances and summits of the author's thinking-the-difference. Wierciński asserts that a poet is not merely a skillful craftsman/craftswoman, generating enticing strings of words. Rather, he/she speaks from the Reality which is beyond him/her, and takes from what is not his/hers, but from the reservoir of poetry. Pursuing beauty and truth, a poet is incessantly tormented, and is never left to feel at ease with what presents itself as poetry's texture: "The life of a poet is a struggle for the shaping of his/her poetic existence. It is a life of constant tension between loyalty and betrayal." (441)

360 Poetry is a witness to the exterior reality, but also, or even in the first place, to the reality of the inner self. The author contends that

[...] poetry can be described as a specific kind of 'doing anthropology,' a kind of access to all possible knowledge about man as such. The connection between poetry and anthropology manifests itself most openly in those poetic descriptions which have the exploration of the nature of man as their primary object, thus coinciding with the object of anthropology. (443)

Poetry indefatigably poses this topical query: what does it mean to be a human being? Over and over again, it attempts to resolve the questions of our humanity: our uncertainties, dilemmas, any sudden and dramatic changes of fate. But also, it is a mirror to our conscience, it guards us and protects that which we deem most precious as human beings. The author states firmly: "Poetry is, therefore, a school for one's humanity. It reminds us that it is retained in everydayness. It speaks to a human being's conscience so that it would not betray itself." (435) He impresses us with his discernment and appreciation of poetry's grandiose role: "Poetry is a zealous search for a 'magic formula' in

which the whole truth about our existence could be accommodated and shine out brightly.” (441)

Musing on the “intangible phenomenon” of being a poet, Wierciński emphasizes that the phenomenality of being a poet cannot be easily explained. Intangibility does not refer to the seemingly ephemeral world of the poetic creation as if disengaged from the troublesome reality outside. On the contrary, one can say that a poet is closer to reality than an average human being. The author ascertains:

We can understand poetry as being an awakening to reality. Poetry, as opposed to versification as such, is a testimony to a specific kind of perception of reality that is, to a life that hovers between being lived ascetically and just taking sensual pleasure in reality. This perception puts the world, as experienced by the poet, into words. The language of poetry is the house in which the poet has made his/her home; there is no better way of referring to the poet’s perception of reality. (439; cf. Heidegger 1990, 26 ff.)

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It is not only that poetry absorbs and evokes human sorrow, pain, joy, bliss, and ecstasy, but it “can stir up the woundedness of man, in order to awaken him/her to being attentive in his/her existence” (444; cf. Heidegger 1963, 35). Poetry testifies profoundly to the hermeneutic understanding of a human being as a historical and lingual being. *Existential hermeneutica* is a poetic existence since in poetry the linguality and historicity of Being come in a condensed, satiated, and excessive form. The author reminds us of Heidegger’s illuminating words: “Language is the house of Being,” and accordingly, we may say: poetry is the home to Being. It nurtures Being, makes it blossom and flourish, it invites Being to dwell in Itself:

Poetry brings important intuitions which enrich an understanding of our capabilities and ourselves, clarifying the understanding of a human being as a fundamentally historical and lingual existence in time. It is in the journey toward the future that the human person discovers the richness of his/her existence and tries, in a continual interpretative effort, to reach self-understanding. (432)

Poetry invites us to continue unwaveringly the interpretative enterprise of our being-in-the-world.

Being a poet means being summoned to be a witness to poetry. And therefore, we can also speak of a poet as the one who experiences a spiritual call. The spiritual vocation comes from above, from the beyond of what is accessible. In this sense, begetting poetry is a hermeneutically understood access to the divine and to Being:

The hermeneutics of poetic statements illuminates the phenomenon of being a poet, yet without mastering the mystery that surrounds the poetic state. The hermeneutics moves near the authentic core of being a poet by understanding that the poetic existence is intimately in touch with its personal foundations in Being—by way of being a unity that springs from metaphysical thinking. Being at home in the dimensions of what is wrapped in mystery is in fact what frees us to think about being a poet, by alerting us to the limits of language as well as the poet's own *conditio humana*. (442)

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Appropriating the message of one of the numerous poems cited by the author—Milosz's "On Prayer"—, we can say that a poet is the "velvet bridge" (434) between the divine and the human. In the recognition of what is, only he/she can be the bridge, or cross the bridge. And this cannot happen on its own accord. Wierciński speaks of Milosz in terms of an instrument and his recognizing himself to be an instrument as such. Various voices come, find their habitat in a poet, and go. He/she is continuously and ultimately open to both the good and the disquieting voices. They perturb him, intervene, compel the poet to be put into words. Milosz gives a sigh; he wishes for the good voices, and not the evil ones. But the poet does not choose for himself/herself, he/she is chosen. The insight afforded by hermeneutics allows us to see the theological perspective of poetic creativity. To be a poet is to be chosen, like the Bible's prophets who had their will "bent" to God's.

Wierciński convinces us that: "Being a poet takes hold of a man or woman and challenges them; it requires him/her to approach themselves critically, hence also, to be critical in their appraisal of whether they are, or are not,

poets.” (443) This “taking hold of” means to be a captive. Captivated by poetry’s power, the poet yields to it, responds to it. Poetry challenges a poet to partake in its reality. The many voices a poet recognizes to be him/her cannot be quenched, as all of them are him/her: “The purpose of poetry is to remind us how difficult it is to remain just one person, for our house is open, there are no keys in the doors, and invisible guests come in and out at will.” (406)

Each time anew, and also in astonishing ways, the poet enters a hermeneutic conversation with him/herself, the Other, and the world. The author reminds us of the indispensability of human experience in uncovering the hermeneutic truth of our existence. This is a process of hope, of embracement of what we are, of shunning any form of despair:

Poetry accompanies these most intimate encounters, saving the unique experience of being in a concrete human being, protecting it from the oblivion that encroaches upon it by means of generalization. Hence the poet is “the enemy of despair, a friend of hope,” together with all the shades of the struggle as long as he/she is on the way. (438)

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In lieu of concluding remarks, one cannot but express an amazement at *Existentia Hermeneutica*’s stupendous breadth of themes, which makes us, at the same time, continually marvel at the unlimited possibilities of a human life to be lived to the fullest. Bringing philosophy, theology, and poetry into conversation, the author pays tribute to the grandeur of human thinking, expressed in its versatile and astounding ways. If a poet’s “vocation is to contemplate Being,” as Milosz says, and Wierciński emphasizes, we may say: and so, it is prodigiously the call of philosophy and theology. Thanks to this most comprehensive inquiry into human existence, we can fully appreciate the truth of the human mind as invincible. Our human need of intellectual expressiveness takes diverse and unforeseeable forms. Thinking with Wierciński, which is a delightful experience of contemplative thinking (*existentia hermeneutica*’s wellspring and intent), we can enjoy the fruits of an embracement of the interweaving paths of philosophy and theology, and appreciate poetry as their valuable partner. Philosophy, theology, and poetry

alike aim to investigate what is within our experience of being-in-the world (*In-der-Welt-sein*) and our being-with (*Mitsein*).

Human existence as *existentia hermeneutica* is at the same time and profoundly *existentia interpretativa*. As human beings, thus finite beings, we are always experiencing insatiability and insufficiency, while continuously attempting to describe and interpret the reality we live in: “The call to interpret is ontological, ethical, and transcendental for it points to our roots in other worlds: It demands a personal response not only to being-there but to being-grateful to Being.” (493) All the dimensions of interpretation mentioned herein find their culmination in the realization of being as being-grateful to Being. Gratitude is the only adequate response. *Existentia hermeneutica* teaches us to be thankful, and even more vitally and all-embracingly to view gratitude as our mode of being-in-the-world. And thus, we cannot but acknowledge our indebtedness to the author for revisiting the roots of thinking in its co-belongingness with understanding and speaking. We are thankful for an invitation to scrutinize the riveting sides of thinking-the-difference: the philosophical and the theological poles, since in thinking-the-difference we can experience the empowerment of thinking, to which *Existentia Hermeneutica* splendidly testifies.

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Following Wierciński’s response to the question of the future of hermeneutics, we can firmly state that in the technological age which luxuriates in various communication media, we are challenged by an increasing emptiness and ineffectiveness in communicating our true being to the Other. Hermeneutics as the art of conversation issues a constant call to make us participate in “an engaging con-*versation* that turns one’s face toward the face of the other” (485). Conversation influences profoundly the way we live in the world and the way we live with others. By living our lives as a conversation, we continuously confront ourselves and others in the truth of our being-in-the-world. Recognizing the ubiquitous nature of conversation, Wierciński’s reflection on the poetic disclosures of Being is, at the same time, an avowal of poetry’s capacity for conversation. Addressing us, poetry frees our participation in what is being disclosed. To remain immune is impossible. And thus, the author’s meditation on poetic disclosures shines forth as the book’s crowning achievement, instantiating what is happening while Being discloses itself to us.

Through its emphasis on the exigency of dialogue in our lives (interpersonal, inter-cultural, inter-religious), hermeneutics speaks to our lived experience and awakens us to take up a conversation as the last chance to protect ourselves against the self-inflicted destructiveness of the technological age (cf. Gadamer 2002). Through the praxis of dialogue, hermeneutics predisposes us to a constructive tolerance and openness to otherness. Therefore, as the author powerfully puts it, living each time anew in an ongoing dialogue, we experience hope as our *modus existendi*. In this way, undeniably, hermeneutics is the philosophy of hope and the philosophy of future. In its orientation toward the future, hermeneutics can be said to display a particular kind of *visione anticipatrice*, a capability of a constant openness to unexpectedness, while endorsing its ability to listen to, respect, and learn from the voices of the past.

Wierciński's hermeneutic inquiry into the import of the various voices as participating in the disclosure of Being engages a reflection on language which does not rest on our controlling it as a means of communication, or on our mastering of it, but on language as disclosing Being. In the polyphonic nature of Being, what poetry witnesses to, theology contemplates, and philosophy conceives, is orchestrated in the magnificent symphony of an understanding of our being-in-the-world, of our "encounter with the truth of Being" (*pulchre, bene, recte*), to which *Existential Hermeneutica* is a perceptive and incomparable witness.

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IN MEMORIAM

UDC: 165.721

Mario Kopic

EMANUELE SEVERINO (1929–2020)

Naši mrtvi nas čakajo, kakor zvezde na nebu čakajo,
da mine noč in z njo naša nezmožnost,
da jih uzremo, če nismo v temi.

Med sodobnimi filozofi je bil tisti, ki si je lahko najbolj upravičeno nadel ničejanski naziv času neprimerne filozofa (*der unzeitgemäße Philosoph*), gotovo italijanski filozof Emanuele Severino. Toda njegova neprimernost času, njegova nesodobnost, je veliko bolj radikalna od tiste, ki jo je razglašal Friedrich Nietzsche. Kajti tisto, kar je italijanski filozof postavil pod vprašaj, ni čas sedanjosti, pred katerim bi dajal prednost preteklosti ali prihodnosti, temveč čas kot takšen, prepričanje, da stvari nastajajo oziroma se pojavljajo iz nič in se v nič vračajo. Zato je vse njegovo filozofsko prizadevanje težilo k temu, da razkrinka to prepričanje – prepričanje, ki sprejema identiteto bivajočega in nič –, pri tem pa je razkrinkalo smisel celotnega Zahoda, katerega izražanje, ne glede na to, ali je teološke, znanstvene, ekonomske ali pa politične narave, samo potrjuje metafizično prepričanje o identiteti bivajočega in nič, torej najradikalnejši nihilizem. To je namreč nihilizem, ki ne prizadeva zahodne civilizacije šele v njenem zatonu, ampak nihilizem, ki jo ustoličuje in jo kot takšno sploh šele omogoča.

Po Severinu lahko ta bistveni nihilizem opišemo z le nekaj besedami, od njegovega razumevanja pa je odvisna usoda Zahoda in zdaj že celotne Zemlje. Te besede pa so naslednje: misliti, da stvari niso (ko še niso bile rojene ali proizvedene, ali ko izginejo ali so uničene), pomeni misliti, da so stvari – oziroma tisto, kar ni nič – pravzaprav nič. To je misel, ki se je rodila z grško metafiziko in je potem vodila in poenotila celotno zgodovino Zahoda. Ker je zahodna družba zrastle v okviru te bistvene določitve mišljenja, je v določenem smislu konstitutivno nesposobna doumeti njen smisel. »Opažati se začenja neskončna nemoč civilizacije moči. Odkrivati se začenja smrtonosna bolezen. Toda komu mar za to? Zahod je ladja, ki se potaplja, na kateri se nihče ne meni za luknjo in kjer si vsi vneto prizadevajo za to, da bi bila plovba čim bolj prijetna; na njej se jim ljubi razpravljati le o neposrednih problemih, problemom pa priznavajo smisel samo, če je mogoče že slutiti posebne postopke reševanja teh problemov. Ampak ali resničnega zdravja morda ne moremo doseči ravno zato, ker ne znamo odkriti resnične bolezni?«

370 Toda že Platon je v peti knjigi *Države* na Sokratovo vprašanje, ali je spoznanje pravzaprav spoznanje nečesa, kar je (*on*), ali nečesa, kar ni (*me on*), z Glavkonom odgovoril, da je spoznanje nečesa, česar ni, pravzaprav nemogoče. Platon pri svojem poskusu tega in takšnega nakazovanja absolutne nasprotnosti med nečim in ničem že zapušča resnico biti (*verità dell'essere*): ko mislimo na možnost, da neka stvar utegne ne biti, po Severinu že mislimo, da ne-nič (*non-niente*), bivajoče (*ente*), stvar, je nič (*niente*). To je norost Zahoda (*follia dell'Occidente*), zabloda, ki zaznamuje nosilni steber zgodovine metafizike in obenem zahodne civilizacije. V središču vseh Severinovih dognanj je prav trditev, da obstaja nujno sovpadanje med našim verovanjem, da je nastajanje (*divenire*) – tj. nastanek in odhod v nič – dejansko, in pa skrajno norostjo. Naše temeljno verovanje, ki ga delimo vsi, če smo prebivalci Zahoda, je, da je »svet« prostor nastanka. Smo namreč prebivalci dobe, v kateri – če ne verjamemo več, da onstran nastajanja sveta obstaja Bog – vse bolj in vse močnejše verjamemo, da je edina dejanskost svet nastajanja. Prepričanje, ki ga vsi mi kot prebivalci Zahoda delimo, namreč da stvari izhajajo iz niča in se vračajo v nič, je povezano z nujnostjo skrajne norosti, saj je povezano z nujnostjo prepričanja, *da so stvari nič*. To je odločilna poteza Severinovih del: prepričanje, da stvari, oziroma ne-nič, izhajajo iz niča in se vanj vračajo, je istovetno s prepričanjem, *da stvari so*

nič. Prepričanje, da je *bivajoče nič*, je prav *skrajna norost* ... Simptom norosti je konstituiran s tem temeljnim tipom duševne bolezni – klinično velikokrat preverjene –, v kateri je individuum obsojen na to, da je nič oziroma je kot nič izpostavljen opazovanju. »Naša civilizacija« obravnava to poudarjeno potezo duševne bolezni kot odtujitev ali alienacijo; pri tem ne upošteva, da je tisto, kar se izraža v duševni alienaciji kot prepričanje, da smo nič, pravzaprav temeljna misel »naše civilizacije« – prepričanje oziroma volja do tega, da so stvari, ne-nič, pravzaprav nič. »Stvari«, se pravi, ne tisto, kar je abstraktno, temveč aspekti, forme, določeni in konkretni dogodki sveta. Seveda nihče od prebivalcev Zahoda ne prepozna samega sebe v prepričanju, da so stvari nič. To prepričanje konstituira *nezavedno* naše civilizacije. Toda če obstaja to nujno sovpadanje med verovanjem nas kot prebivalcev Zahoda in prepričanjem, da so stvari nič, tedaj je izvorni smisel Zahoda in njegovih nosilnih stebrov, smrti in vojne, prav *volja* do tega, da so stvari nič.

Prostor Severinovega mišljenja uokvirjajo številna dela, kot so: *Izvirna struktura* (*La struttura originaria*, 1958), *Bistvo nihilizma* (*Essenza del nichilismo*, 1972), *Prebivalci časa* (*Gli abitanti del tempo*, 1979), *Usoda nujnosti* (*Destino della necessità*, 1980), *Jarem* (*Il gioco*, 1989), *Slava* (*La Gloria*, 2001), *Temelj protislovja* (*Fondamento della contraddizione*, 2005), *Smrt in zemlja* (*La morte e la terra*, 2013), *O smislu nič* (*Intorno al senso del nulla*, 2013), *Zgodovina, radost* (*Storia, gioia*, 2016) ...

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Bil je izjemno ljubezniv in uglajen človek, imel je globok in muzikaličen glas in se je vedno pojavljal v družbi svoje šarmantne žene. Spominjam se, kako je nekoč v Neaplju skupaj s kolegom Vattimom tekkel za avtobusom in pri tem prehitel mlajšega kolega. Tedaj se je zdelo, kot da je »močna misel« večnosti zmagala nad »šibko mislijo« nastajanja. Toda takšno priznanje je zavrnil, saj zanj gibanje v prostoru tako ali tako ni obstajalo: »... And like this insubstantial pageant faded, / Leave not a rack behind.« (Shakespeare)*

Prevedla Seta Knop

* Slovenski prevod Otona Župančiča: »In kot je zginil nični ta sijaj, / vse mine brez sledu.« (*Vihar*, IV. dejanje, 1. prizor.)

MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

The journal *Phainomena* welcomes all submissions of articles and book reviews in the field of phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophy, as well as from related disciplines of the humanities. Manuscripts submitted for the publication in the journal should be addressed to the editorial office, the secretary of the editorial board, or the editor-in-chief.

The journal is published quarterly, usually in two issues. The tentative deadlines for the submission of manuscripts are: March 31, for the June issue; August 31, for the November issue.

The submitted manuscript should preferably be an original paper and should not be concurrently presented for publication consideration elsewhere, until the author receives notification with the editorial decision regarding acceptance, required (minor or major) revision(s), or rejection of the manuscript after the concluded reviewing procedure. After submission, the contributions are initially evaluated by the editorial office and may be immediately rejected if they are considered to be out of the journal's scope or otherwise unfit for consideration. The ensuing process of scientific review, which can—provided that no additional delays occur—take up to 3 months, includes an editorial opinion and a double-blind peer review by at least two external reviewers. The articles that do not report original research (e.g.: editorials or book reviews) are not externally reviewed and are subject to the autonomous decision of the editor-in-chief or the editorial board regarding publication. When republishing the paper in another journal, the author is required to indicate the first publication in the journal *Phainomena*.

The journal publishes original papers predominantly in Slovenian, English, French, and German language, as well as translations from foreign languages into Slovenian. Authors interested in the publication of their work in another language should consult the editors regarding such a possibility prior to the submission of the manuscript. Before publication, the texts are proofread with regard to guidelines and formatting, but the authors are responsible for the quality of language.

The manuscripts submitted in the MS Word compatible format should not exceed 8,000 words (ca. 50,000 characters with spaces) including footnotes. The submission should include a separate title page with the author's full name, academic qualification, institutional affiliation(s), and (email) address(es), bibliography of referenced works at the end of the main body of text, and an abstract of the article (accompanied by up to 5 keywords) in the language of the original as well as in English translation (100–150 words).

374 The contributions should be formatted as follows: Times New Roman font style; 12 pt. font size; 1.5 pt. spacing (footnotes—in 10 pt. font size—should, however, be single spaced); 0 pt. spacing before and after paragraphs; 2.5 cm margins; left justified margins throughout the text. Instead of line breaks please use internal paragraph indentations (1.25 cm) to introduce new paragraphs. Do not apply word division and avoid any special or exceptional text formatting (e.g.: various fonts, framing, pagination, etc.). Footnotes and tables should be embedded using designated MS Word functionalities. Do not use endnotes. Notes should be indicated by consecutive superscript numbers placed in the text immediately after the punctuation mark or the preceding word.

The author should use **boldface** for the title, subtitle, and chapter titles of the manuscript, and *italics* for emphasis and interpolations of foreign words or phrases, as well as for the titles of cited books and journals. Double quotation marks—in the specific typographical format of the text's original language—should be used for the citation of articles published in journals and collective volumes, as well as for the quotations enclosed in the contribution. Single quotation marks should be used only to denote material placed in double quotation marks within the citation. Any block quotation of 40 or more words should be denoted with additional 1.25 cm margin on the left and separated from the main text by a line space above and below the paragraph (without

quotation marks, 10 pt. font size). Omissions, adaptations, or insertions within citations should be indicated with square brackets.

As a general rule, please use the (shorter) lengthened hyphen (the en-dash) to denote a range of numbers (e.g.: 99–115) or a span of time (e.g.: 1920–1970). The (longer) lengthened hyphen (the em-dash) can be used (only) in the English language to indicate an interruption in thought or an interpolated sentence (e.g.: “[...] thus—for instance—Aristotle says [...]”). The standard hyphens (-) can be (in the English language) used for compound nouns, adjectival phrases, or between repeated vowels.

The author of the paper is required to adhere to the author-date source citation system according to the rules of *The Chicago Manual of Style*. Within the in-text parenthetical reference the date of publication immediately follows the quoted author’s name, the indicated page number is separated by a comma, e.g.: (Toulmin 1992, 31); (Held 1989, 23); (Waldenfels 2015, 13). The bibliography list at the end of the text should include all referenced sources in alphabetical order of the authors’ surnames, as in the following example:

375

Held, Klaus. 1989. “Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit.” In *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*, edited by Otto Pöggeler, 13–39. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Toulmin, Stephen. 1992. *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 2015. “Homo respondens.” *Phainomena* 24 (92-93): 5–17.

Only exceptionally other reference styles can be accepted upon previous agreement with the editor-in-chief or the guest editor of the issue.

The authors are expected to submit a consistent manuscript free of typographical, grammatical, or factual errors. The author bears the responsibility for the content of the contribution submitted for publication consideration within the journal *Phainomena*.

NAVODILA ZA PRIPRAVO ROKOPISA

Revija *Phainomena* sprejema prispevke in recenzije s področja fenomenološke ter hermenevtične filozofije in tudi sorodnih disciplin humanistike. Za objavo predlagane rokopise naj avtorji naslovijo neposredno na uredništvo, tajnika uredniškega odbora ali glavno urednico revije.

Revija izhaja štirikrat letno, navadno v dveh zvezkih. Okvirna roka za oddajo prispevkov sta: za junijsko številko 31. marec, za novembrsko številko 31. avgust.

Predloženi rokopis naj bo (prvenstveno) izvirni znanstveni članek, ki ne sme biti predhodno objavljen ali ponujen v objavo pri drugi reviji, dokler po zaključenem recenzijem postopku avtor ne prejme obvestila z uredniško odločitvijo glede odobritve, zahtevanih (manjših ali večjih) sprememb ali zavrnitve objave rokopisa. Prispevek po oddaji najprej pregleda uredništvo in lahko takoj zavrne njegovo objavo, če ne ustreza programski usmeritvi revije ali na kakšen drugačen način ni primeren za obravnavo. Nadaljnji postopek znanstvene recenzije, ki lahko, če ne pride do dodatne nepredvidene zamude, traja 3 mesece, vključuje uredniško mnenje in »dvojno slepo« strokovno oceno najmanj dveh neodvisnih recenzentov. O objavi rokopisov, ki ne temeljijo na izvirnem znanstvenem raziskovanju in zato niso podvrženi zunanji recenzentski obravnavi (npr. uvodniki ali knjižne ocene), avtonomno odloča glavni urednik ali uredništvo. Ob ponovni priobčitvi članka v drugi reviji mora avtor navesti prvo objavo v okviru revije *Phainomena*.

Revija objavlja izvirne znanstvene avtorske članke zlasti v slovenskem, angleškem, francoskem in nemškem jeziku ter prevode iz tujih jezikov v

slovenski jezik. Avtorji, ki bi svoje delo morebiti želeli objaviti v drugem jeziku, naj se o tem pred oddajo rokopisa posvetujejo z uredništvom. Pred objavo uredništvo besedila sicer lektorsko in korekturno pregleda, vendar je avtor sam odgovoren za kakovost in neoporečnost uporabljenega jezika.

Rokopise je potrebno predložiti v računalniškem formatu, združljivem s programom MS Word. Besedila naj, upoštevajoč opombe, ne presegajo 8000 besed (ca. 50000 znakov s presledki). Oddana datoteka mora biti opremljena s posebno naslovno stranjo z avtorjevim polnim imenom, akademskim nazivom, ustanovo zaposlitve ali delovanja in naslovom (elektronske pošte), bibliografijo navedenih del na koncu osrednjega dela besedila in povzetkom prispevka (s 5 ključnimi besedami) v jeziku izvirnika in v angleškem prevodu (100–150 besed).

Besedila je potrebno oblikovati takole: pisava Times New Roman; velikost 12 pik; razmik med vrsticami 1,5 pik (opombe – velikosti 10 pik – z enojnim razmikom); 0 pik razmika pred in za odstavkom; robovi 2,5 cm; leva poravnava celotnega teksta. Med odstavkoma naj ne bo prazne vrstice, temveč naj bo naslednji odstavek naznačen z zamikom vrstice v desno (za 1,25 cm). Avtorji naj pri pisanju ne uporabljajo deljenja besed in naj se izogibajo posebnemu ali nenavadnemu oblikovanju (npr. rabi različnih pisav, okvirjanja, številčenja ipd.). Opombe in tabele je potrebno v besedilo vnesti s pomočjo ustreznih urejevalnih orodij programa MS Word. Uporabljane naj bodo izključno sprotne opombe, ki naj bodo označene z zapovrstno oštevilčenim nadpisanim indeksom in levostično postavljene takoj za ločilom ali besedo.

Naslov, podnaslov in poglavja rokopisa je potrebno pisati **krepko**, medtem ko se za poudarke in vstavke tujih izrazov ali fraz ter za naslove navedenih knjig in revij uporabljajo *ležeče črke*. Z dvojnimi narekovaji – v tipografski obliki, značilni za izvirni jezik besedila – se označuje naslove člankov, objavljenih znotraj revij ali zbornikov, in dobesedne navedke. Enojni narekovaj naznanja gradivo, znotraj navedka označeno z dvojnimi narekovaji. Daljši navedek (40 ali več besed) je potrebno izločiti v samostojen odstavek z dodatnim desnim zamikom (za 1,25 cm) in s prazno vrstico nad in pod njim (brez narekovajev, velikost pisave 10 pik). Izpuste iz navedkov, njihove prilagoditve ali vrivke vanje označujejo oglati oklepaji.

Obojestransko stični pomišljaj se praviloma uporablja za nakazovanje številskega obsega (npr. 99–115) ali časovnega obdobja (npr. 1920–1970),

medtem ko obojestransko nestični pomišljaj naznanja prekinitev miselnega toka ali vrinjeni stavek (npr.: »[...] tako – denimo – Aristotel pravi [...]«). Podaljšani obojestransko stični pomišljaj (—) je značilen (predvsem) za angleški jezik. Stični vezaj (-) se lahko, v skladu z ustaljeno rabo, zapisuje med sestavnimi deli zložen, pri kraticah ipd.

Avtor prispevka naj pri sklicevanju na vire in literaturo upošteva znotrajbesedilni način navajanja v skladu s pravili Čikaškega stilističnega priročnika (*The Chicago Manual of Style*). Kazalka v okroglem oklepaju neposredno za navedkom prinaša priimek avtorja in letnico objave, ki jima sledi z vejico razloženo napotilo na stran znotraj citiranega dela, npr.: (Toulmin 1992, 31); (Held 1989, 23); (Waldenfels 2015, 13). Bibliografski seznam na koncu besedila naj vsebuje vse navedene enote, urejene po abecednem vrstnem redu priimkov avtorjev, kakor je razvidno iz spodnjega primera:

Held, Klaus. 1989. »Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit.« V *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*, uredil Otto Pöggeler, 13–39. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.


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Toulmin, Stephen. 1992. *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 2015. »Homo respondens.« *Phainomena* 24 (92-93): 5–17.

Samo izjemoma je mogoče, po vnaprejšnjem dogovoru z glavnim ali gostujočim urednikom revije, uporabiti drugačne načine navajanja.

Pričakuje se, da bodo avtorji predložili dosledno in skrbno pripravljen rokopis brez tiskarskih, slovničnih in stvarnih napak. Avtor nosi odgovornost za vsebino besedila, predanega v obravnavo za objavo pri reviji *Phainomena*.




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
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