

DERAILING MODERN DEMOCRACIES: THE CASE OF YOUTH ABSENCE FROM AN INTERGENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Elderly people in the developed world are generally the strongest growing age group and their political clout has increased significantly due to these demographic trends. As both young people and the elderly are important beneficiaries of key public policies (e.g. education, care), the competition for already insufficient resources is fierce and may result in either fabricated or true intergenerational conflicts. The purpose of this paper is to explore ways contemporary representative democracies suffer from legitimacy issues related to political participation and the representation of underrepresented groups, primarily young people, as well as to discuss approaches allowing alienated groups to become fully involved in the political process. The article initially explains the evidence behind claims of the emerging new social and consequently political conflict between young people and the elderly, primarily signalling the reversed flow of intergenerational transfers in high-income countries with lower fertility rates. After detailed scrutiny of the problems of legitimacy and representation as related to generational inequity, the article concludes with a discussion about approaches to improving agency and revising the political structure so as to allow for inclusive governance processes and a more democratic polity.

Keywords: youth, political participation, political representation, intergenerational dialogue

DERAGLIAMENTO DELLE DEMOCRAZIE MODERNE: IL CASO DELL'ASSENZA DEI GIOVANI NELL'OTTICA INTERGENERAZIONALE

SINTESI

Le persone anziane nel mondo sviluppato sono generalmente la fascia di età con il più alto tasso di crescita e il loro peso politico in seguito a queste tendenze demografiche è aumentato in maniera significativa. Poiché i giovani e gli anziani sono entrambi importanti beneficiari delle principali politiche pubbliche (per es. istruzione, sanità), la competizione per le già insufficienti risorse è agguerrita e può portare a conflitti intergenerazionali costruiti ad arte o reali. Lo scopo del presente articolo è di esplorare i modi in cui le democrazie rappresentative contemporanee risentono dei problemi di legittimità associati alla partecipazione politica e alla rappresentanza di gruppi sottorappresentati, principalmente dei giovani, nonché di discutere di approcci che permetterebbero ai gruppi alienati pieno coinvolgimento nel processo politico. L'articolo inizialmente spiega le prove a sostegno delle asserzioni sulla formazione di un nuovo conflitto sociale e, di conseguenza, politico tra i giovani e gli anziani, innanzi tutto segnalando il flusso inverso di trasferimenti intergenerazionali nei paesi ad alto reddito e tassi di natalità più bassi. Dopo un esame approfondito dei problemi di legittimità e rappresentazione in relazione all'inequità intergenerazionale, l'articolo conclude con una discussione sugli approcci al miglioramento del servizio e revisione della struttura politica allo scopo di permettere processi di governance inclusiva e una politica più democratica.

Parole chiave: giovani, partecipazione politica, rappresentanza politica, dialogo intergenerazionale

THE PROBLEM OF INTERGENERATIONAL INEQUITY AND THE WAY IT RELATES TO LEGITIMACY ISSUES

Regardless of the fact that young people today comprise the largest generation in history with 1.8 billion individuals (ICPD, 2014, 1),¹ 85 per cent of them live in developing countries (The Economist, 23 January 2016). Just as their peers in the developing world, young people in developed countries are exploring strategies to master the challenges erected by the needs and circumstances of preceding generations. Despite being better educated, more equipped to harness information provided by the ICT advancements, and enjoying freedoms their predecessors could barely have imagined, they are less likely to be employed² and are likely to face a labour market with rules that are rigged against them. These concerns are relevant regardless of the definition of youth,³ which is becoming progressively more challenging and individualised (Bradley and van Hoof, 2005), consequently exposing deficiencies of policy making based on age-group boundaries and the politics it in general rests on. In addition, because the social conditions and other relevant factors of the members of these groups differ, they can hardly be viewed as cohesive or homogeneous; after all, intra-group differences are sometimes even greater than diversity between groups. However, significant general patterns based on age may be observed, as individuals within different age-groups share some distinct challenges that impede upon their ability to participate in society on an equal footing.

Contrary to young people in the developing world, elderly people in the developed world are generally the strongest growing age group and young people are the ones losing in relative numerical importance. The weight of older⁴ and middle-aged people in Europe has increased significantly whereas young people are a diminishing group as a percentage of the total and the adult population (see Kohli, 2010). The number of minors between ages 0 and 18 decreased from 1970 to 2000 by almost one quarter and this unfavourable demographic trend⁵ (see Figure 1), co-created by the change in longevity of life (life expectancy) of the present-day elders, introduced completely different structural challenges than the ones the working-age population and young

people faced in the late 1960s. Young people will therefore have to participate more and for longer periods of time during their professional careers, are projected to enjoy shorter retirement periods with a less extensive set of rights, and are currently exposed to severe hostilities in their quests to find non-precarious jobs (see Samek Lodovici and Semenza, 2012).

Young people also face severe pressures from their social environments to build their careers and organize their lives even though they are still likely to be in education or in their early professional careers and only partially embedded in the labour market (Kohli, 2010). Bradley and van Hoof (2005, 246) thus talk about fractured, precarious, and lengthened transitions young people take into the world of work, as caused by the changes in the structure of labour market opportunities, policies promoting flexibility among the labour force, rapidly rising cost of housing and other relevant factors. This is inherently related to uncertainty in the transition to adulthood as economic instability and temporal uncertainty makes young people deeply uncertain and unable to commit in terms of long-term binding decisions related to partnership and parenthood (see Mills and Blossfeld, 2009, 106–108).

The problems outlined above contribute to the increasing disconnection of young people from institutional politics and democratic life in general (Hoff, 2008; Deželan, 2015;), far more than the life-cycle theory of political participation predicts (see Nie et al., 1974). The absence of younger generations from key democratic processes makes their interest less represented, limits the potential of public policies, and delegitimizes the entire political community. In the context of fierce competition for insufficient resources this can also result in a fabricated or true intergenerational conflict, which tends to be abused in the political party arena. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore ways contemporary representative democracies suffer from legitimacy issues related to intergenerational inequity and its effects, disparity in the way contemporary political institutions fit to patterns of citizenship of different age-groups, as well as to identify mechanisms to facilitate inclusive governance processes and more democratic polity.

1 International Conference on Population Development's methodology defines youth as a group of individuals aged between 10 and 24 (ICDP, 2014).

2 More than 15 per cent of young individuals in high-income countries are not in education, employment or training (NEET). For middle-income countries this rate is 25 per cent (The Economist, 23 January 2016).

3 As a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to independent adulthood and interdependence as members of community, youth is a challenging category to define in terms of age. On the other hand, age is the easiest way to define this group, particularly in relation to education and employment (UNESCO, 2017). Depending on the context different authorities and different international governmental and non-governmental organizations use different definitions of youth, from 15 to 24 for statistical consistency across regions, to more flexible definitions in various national contexts and supranational contexts ranging from 15 to 29 (European Youth Strategy) and even from 15 to 35 (African Union) (EC, 2017; UNESCO, 2017).

4 We define older people, particularly in the European context, with the age of 60 since this is for now an approximation of a retirement age. Retirement is posited as an important social division point when individuals leave the labor market and become increasingly more dependent on state services (see Kohli, 2010).




Figure 1: Population structure by five-year age groups and sex, EU-28, 1994 and 2014 (% share of total population) (Eurostat, 2016).

ARE CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES LEGITIMATE?

The generational inequity argument

Changing demographic situation described above has led many researchers to discuss the existence of a new social conflict based on age (e.g. Kohli, 2010; Tremmel, 2008; 2010; Goerres, 2010). As a consequence of the pacification of the class battle by granting workers certain assurances of social stability, including the institutionalisation of retirement funded through public social security funds (Kohli, 1987) age proves to be pivotal for public entitlements and obligations. Public redistribution is built on a sequence of clearly delimited periods of life (Kohli, 2010) and the elderly have become the main beneficiaries of the welfare state. This in itself is not problematic since all individuals will live through life stages according to an institutionalized schedule (Kohli, 2006, 458) and various treatment of age groups can therefore be morally justified due to their distinctive needs (see Daniels, 1988). However, despite the perennial model of the old supporting the young –

a pattern valid throughout human history – Lee and Mason (2014) find evidence that in high-income countries with lower fertility rates the net flow of resources is now reversing from young to the old. With public spending favouring pensions and health care for the elderly over education for the young, the age-group distribution described above suddenly becomes generational redistribution (as societal generations have fixed membership, are determined by being born in a certain time period, and share the same historical experience; see Kohli, 2006, 458) that suffers from the lack of equity.

As there are no legitimate grounds for the unequal treatment of different societal generations, the sharing of burdens among them becomes unfair and unjust since not every generation can expect to receive the same treatment as the preceding and the following ones at each stage of life (Kohli, 2006, 463). As the unequal position of generations in distributions of burdens is increasingly creating grounds for a new (social) conflict, conditions form that will additionally drive young people from the political process completely.

The political participation argument and its link to legitimacy

If the interpretation of democracy is rule by the people, then the question of who participates in political decisions becomes the nature of democracy itself (Verba and Nie, 1972, 1). As a form of government in which the people rule and which entails a political community where there is some form of political equality among the people (Held, 2006), participation holds a special place. This is also the *raison d'être*, in its various forms, defended on the grounds that it comes closest to achieving one or more of the following fundamental values or goods: rightful authority, political equality, liberty, moral self-development, common interest, a fair moral compromise, binding decisions that take everyone's interest into account, social utility, the satisfaction of wants, and efficient decisions. Democracy offers the consent of the governed as the most compelling principle of legitimacy and the basis of political order (Held, 2006, ix). And regardless of the debates about the most appropriate model of democracy, it is clear that political participation is and always has been a prerequisite for every democratic system.

Macedo and others (2005, 4–6) provide a set of contemporary arguments for robust citizen engagement in democratic process that focus on its relevance for the functioning of democratic communities. First, wide civic engagement improves the quality of democratic governance. Knowledge of the citizenry's interests is a vital requirement for democratic decision-making, and the preferences of citizens are generally presented by making use of various modes of participation. Second, participation can improve citizens' lives since it holds value in and of itself, because the self-government of the people is supposed to involve the exercise of distinctive human capacities and is an intrinsically noble enterprise. John Stuart Mill argued that participation is a form of learning together because making binding public decisions strengthens citizens' active faculties, exercises their judgment, and gives them familiar knowledge about the subjects they have to deal with (see Levine, 2007, 41). Third, Macedo and others (2005, 5) stress the importance of participation in voluntary and non-profit organisations, as membership in groups and involvement in social networks correlate to higher individual satisfaction with the quality of individual and community life. Fourth, the condition of democratic life is not fulfilled by the fact that government by the people alone returns the best form of governance; it also implies that a government is legitimate when the people as a whole participate in their own self-rule. In cases when important groups of citizens

are substantially less active and influential than others are the conditions of collective self-rule are eradicated, and the political order suffers from problems of legitimacy.

As democratic developments transformed the decision-making processes and ensuing implementation that were traditionally associated with the government and public administration, the focus tilted towards the mechanisms and actors of governance themselves. Contemporary modes of governance in the democratic West supplement traditional institutional forms of governing and channels with the coordination of social systems, public-private relations, and increasing reliance on informal authority. And even though democracy and good governance do not necessarily go hand in hand (Fukuyama, 2013, 9), the central notion of "public" governance is the application of new modes of activities in order to enable the participation of all relevant stakeholders in the political process (Bevir, 2010). It is participation that spurs the broadening of responsibility for the decisions adapted to each and every citizen and their commitments towards society, thereby fostering public political competences and improving collective decision-making (Nekola, 2006). And participation in the governance processes also allows for the latent or manifest conflicts between social groups to get resolved openly in a non-zero-sum manner (Pierre and Peters, 2000).

The broadly accepted expression "the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is" (Verba and Nie, 1972, 1) thus directly links democracy and participation. The majority of contemporary models of democracy⁶ rely on high levels of popular participation and encourage the participation of a knowledgeable citizenry with a sustained interest in the governing process. This in effect provides the best mechanism for the articulation of interests, performs an educative role among citizens and is an essential mechanism of citizen influence on decision-makers, which is directly linked to the responsiveness of governments (O'Neill, 2009, 7). The abovementioned set of normative and empirical arguments therefore accentuate the relevance of political participation of all groups of population for the legitimacy of a democratic regime and the quality of a democratic polity. In fact, it also heavily impacts the level of political representation.

The political representation argument

The principle of equity can be linked to political participation through political representation. Specifically, one of the best ways to increase political equity

6 Even the most elitist or "thin" conceptions of democracy consider the political participation of citizens as necessary, despite usually being restricted to voting in general elections for the selection of political representatives (O'Neill, 2009, 7). "Thick" conceptions go beyond elitist views of Schumpeter and alike and enshrine widespread political participation as a necessary precondition for the existence of a democratic polity.




Figure 2: Voter turnout in parliamentary and EU parliamentary elections for the EU, Eastern European and Western European countries compared to the global average (IDEA, 2015).

to increase the total number of people who participate in order to ensure that the least active are better represented (Levine, 2007, 22–27). There is plenty of evidence to back up the claim that as long as young people's participation in politics remains low, they should expect to get relatively little from the government (Martin, 2012, 107), because there will be very little incentive for politicians to focus on policies that benefit them. Although other age groups can also represent youth interests, the accumulated empirical evidence shows that this is not the case (see Macedo et al., 2005; Martin, 2012).

Political participation therefore has a direct link to political representation. We can examine representation through several lenses: the symbolic (the meaning a representative has for the represented), the descriptive (the degree of resemblance between the representative and the represented), and the substantial (the actions taken in the interest of the represented) (see Pitkin, 1967), but even though the bulk of attention is usually paid to substantive representation, there are instances in which the other forms are of particular importance. Mansbridge (1999) stresses the importance of descriptive representation for marginalized and

disaffected groups that distrust other, relatively more privileged citizens. In such cases, these groups feel that their political preferences must be represented by someone who belongs to the same group in order to establish adequate communication in the context of mistrust.

The huge distrust young people have in institutional politics has exacerbated the growing alienation of this segment of the population from electoral politics and the institutions of representative democracy.⁷ The recent economic crisis and subsequent austerity measures, placing a disproportionate burden on young people, have made this situation even worse (see Georgallis and Moyart, 2014). Based on the presented normative and empirical arguments establishing a link between public policies and political representation, having political representation improves the chances of relating to and engaging in the political process (see Mansbridge, 1999; Pitkin, 1967). Looking from the demographic perspective, the youth demographic is the group that tends to be the most affected by these processes, as the ability of other age-groups, primarily the elderly, to influence policy makers is increasing due to their numerical advantage. Improving the political

⁷ To explore the factors causing alienation of youth from institutional politics see Smets and Van Ham (2013), Soler-i-Martí (2015), Putnam (2000), Dalton (2009), Norris (2002), Hooghe and Stolle (2005), Macedo et al. (2005), Rosanvallon (2008) etc.

representation of youth through various institutional mechanisms or through supporting agency-related programmes has the potential to establish more enabling conditions for young people to relate to and engage in the political process, as well as decrease the tendency of political actors to portray politics as an intergenerational zero-sum game for resources.

THE EVIDENCE BEHIND THE LEGITIMACY PROBLEM

Declining political participation

Participation in decisions about a common fate is neither fully granted nor exploited. Macedo and others (2005, 6) claim there is an abundance of scientific evidence indicating that political institutions are more responsive to those who mobilise. This taps into a very relevant problem of political participation that was conventionally the lowest with the youngest and the oldest groups of population due to features inherent to each life cycle. The normal distribution changed, thus also altering the cohort of citizens who are actively engaged in the formulation, passage, and implementation of public policies. As high participation rates are vital for the health of democracies regardless of ideological viewpoints, many are concerned about the general downward trend in political participation across the democratic world, voter turnout in particular. A gradual drop in a few percentage points per decade has accelerated dramatically since the 1980s and presents a major challenge to democracies across the world (López Pintor et al., 2002).

Official statistics that are available for most of the world's democracies support these observations, and they are particularly valid in the case of European countries (see Figure 2). Regardless of communist or non-communist legacies, official statistics have indicated that the decline has been particularly evident in the post-1990s period. Compared with Western European countries, the countries of the former communist bloc still clearly perform worse, with an average turnout in national elections of less than 60 per cent, and with factors affecting turnout that are different from more established democracies (see Kostadinova and Power, 2007).

Insufficient participation levels neither uniformly affect all societies nor equally affect all sub-groups of the population. Age has proven to be one of the strongest predictors of participation (see Zukin et al., 2006; Stolle and Hooghe, 2009) and can now be used to indicate whether a person will vote or not. The data found by the European Parliament Election Study 2014 (see Schmitt et al., 2015) portray a shocking landscape of voter abstention across Europe, particularly among

the youngest cohorts of eligible voters. The EU28 level of absenteeism on EP elections was higher than 70 per cent for the 16/18-24 age group, and only fractionally below 70 per cent for the 25-29 age group. This is a staggering disparity compared with the 47.9 per cent turnout of voters aged 65 and older, and it indicates the widespread absence of young people from EU institutional politics. Even though comparisons between EP and national elections are very difficult and complex due to the second-order nature of the former (see Reif and Schmitt, 1980), the general pattern of youth being substantially less participative is replicated. The level of young people absenteeism remains surprisingly high, and the gap between young people and other age groups changes marginally. Young people prove to be alarmingly absent from national elections: in the EU 28 area almost 60 per cent of eligible voters between 16/18 and 24 opted not to vote in the last election (see Figure 3).⁸

Numerous studies (e.g. Verba and Nie, 1972; Dalton 1996; 2009) indicate that the gap between young and elderly voters has widened considerably across the democratic world. The fact that young people are increasingly detached from traditional politics and structures is further emphasized when looking at the willingness of young people to stand as candidates in a political election, which is far less frequent than for other age groups (see Deželan, 2015). This severely reduces the pool of potential future political representatives, thus making democratic systems more vulnerable. Other modes of conventional political participation have revealed the same patterns; i.e. significantly lower overall levels of participation of young people in campaign activities, frequency of contacting officials, being part of political organizations, etc. (see Moyser, 2003, 179). Young people are thus the least active age group virtually across all participation areas in the European countries (see also Goerres, 2010, 215). This is particularly evident in a decrease in party membership among young people (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2004; Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Cross and Young, 2008), thus hindering political parties' recruitment and mobilisation functions and having a seriously negative effect on the political representation of young people. Participation in institutional politics is therefore undeniably skewed against youth and the challenge is how to get young people more involved, as their absence from institutional politics presents a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the political process.

The representation deficit

The representation figures do not improve the grim image contemporary democracies are facing in the long run. The low numbers of young national par-

8 To analyze the factors behind this form of absenteeism at the individual level see Snell (2010).




Figure 3: Voter absenteeism in elections to the European parliament (EP) and national parliaments for EU28 (Did you yourself vote in the recent European Parliament elections? “Did not vote”; Did you yourself vote in the (NATIONAL ELECTIONS)? “Did not vote”) (Schmitt et al., 2015).

liamentarians demonstrate the impact of low youth participation levels and reinforce patterns of distrust towards political institutions (see Mansbridge, 1999), as policies are generally made for youth and not by youth. In addition to the already mentioned low membership levels of young people in political parties, there are several reasons behind such low representation levels in parliaments, among them the minimum eligibility age requirement, especially in the case of upper houses, unfavorable electoral systems with few elements of proportional representation,⁹ as well as the general tendency to opt for experience when it comes to politics, as this tends to be implicitly linked to competence (IPU, 2014). This last factor also indicates the general inclusiveness of the political structure towards inferior social groups, either in terms of power or in terms of numbers. To be precise, taking into account parliaments across the globe, there is a clearly positive statistically significant correlation between the levels of representation of young people and women in lower and upper houses (IPU, 2014, 15).

Research has shown that the percentage of parliamentarians younger than 30 in national parliaments

across OECD states is higher than 2 per cent only in exceptional cases (see Tremmel, 2006, 211). In its latest study the IPU (2014, 7) stresses that on average only 1.9 per cent of deputies in single and lower houses and 0.3 per cent of deputies in upper houses are below the age of 30. The share of members of parliament below the age of 30 exceeds a 10 per cent threshold only in four countries (Ecuador, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and alarmingly one-third of all the single and lower houses, and more than 80 per cent of the upper houses, have no members of parliament below the age of 30 at all. A look at the representation of age groups in national parliaments shows that institutional politics rests in the hands of groups where power concentrates, although the position of genders is more balanced within the age group of MPs below the age of 30 compared to other age groups. To be precise, 0.9 per cent of women compared to 1 per cent of men aged below 30 occupy a seat in a national parliament across the world (see Table 1) (IPU, 2016).

Deželan (2015) provides collaborating results as the national parliaments of the selected countries reveal even lower levels of youth representation. Over-

⁹ IPU (2014, 7) study of youth political representation observes that countries with proportional representation systems elect approximately twice as many young parliamentarians as mixed systems and 15 to 20 times as many young parliamentarians as majoritarian systems.

Table 1: Levels of representatives in national parliaments according to age and gender (Source: IPU, 2014; 2016).

National parliamentarians below the age of 30		Female national parliamentarians below the age of 30	
12.3%	Sweden	7.3%	Ecuador
10.9%	Ecuador	6.5%	Tunisia
10.5%	Finland	5.4%	Sweden
10.1%	Norway	4.2%	Finland
7.1%	Andorra	3.9%	Suriname
6.6%	Italy	3.7%	Ethiopia
6.5%	the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia	3.6%	Andorra
6.1%	Denmark, Ethiopia	3.5%	Costa Rica, Italy
5.9%	Cuba, Suriname	3.4%	Canada
5.8%	Chile	3.0%	Norway
5.6%	Bhutan, Slovenia	2.9%	Cuba
5.2%	Somalia	2.8%	Serbia, Denmark
5.0%	Latvia	2.5%	Chile
4.8%	Serbia	2.4%	Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago
4.7%	Canada	2.3%	Austria
4.6%	Austria	2.0%	Uruguay
4.2%	Kyrgyzstan	1.9%	Argentina
3.9%	Brazil	1.7%	Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg
3.5%	Costa Rica	1.6%	Iceland
3.4%	Gambia, Guatemala	1.4%	Somalia, Albania
3.3%	Bulgaria, Luxembourg, San Marino	1.3%	Rwanda
3.2%	Iceland	1.2%	Afghanistan
3.1%	United Kingdom	1.1%	Nicaragua, United Kingdom, Indonesia
3.0%	Uruguay, Zimbabwe	1.0%	Hungary, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Vietnam, Estonia
2.9%	Indonesia, Malta	0.9%	India, Niger, Algeria, Portugal
2.8%	South Africa	0.8%	China, Germany, South Africa
2.7%	Georgia, Netherlands	0.7%	Philippines, Sudan, Georgia, Belgium, Netherlands
2.5%	Germany, Paraguay, United Arab Emirates	0.6%	Ireland, Uganda
2.4%	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela	0.5%	Romania, Sri Lanka
2.3%	Argentina	0.4%	Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Brazil
2.2%	India, Portugal	0.3%	Spain
2.1%	Albania	0.2%	Japan, France
2.0%	Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Sudan	0.2%	France
1.8%	Niger	0.0%	Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia And Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic Of The Congo, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia (The), Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States Of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, United Republic Of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe
1.7%	Israel, New Zealand, Philippines		
1.6%	Afghanistan, Morocco		
1.5%	Switzerland		
1.3%	Montenegro, Russian Federation, Rwanda		
1.2%	China, Ireland, Viet Nam		
1.1%	Algeria, Nicaragua, Uganda		
1.0%	Equatorial Guinea, Greece		
0.9%	Burundi, Spain		
0.8%	Armenia, Japan		
0.7%	Croatia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia		
0.6%	United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia		
0.5%	Myanmar		
0.4%	Australia, Syrian Arab Republic		
0.3%	Bangladesh		
0.2%	France		
0.0%	Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Cape Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Thailand, Tuvalu, United States of America		

all, only 0.5 per cent of parliamentarians are younger than 30 in the examined parliaments, and only 0.1 per cent are below the age of 25. Even more disturbing is the fact that although there is a higher number of parliamentarians in the age group of 35 to 39, only 3.4 per cent of deputies are below the age of 35. These results additionally show the persistence of the patriarchy in these representative bodies, as the proportion of young female parliamentarians is rarely higher than one in four. In line with the symbolic as well as descriptive representation arguments (Pitkin, 1967) the comparatively higher absence of young females from young males in representative politics thus creates even fewer incentives for young women to participate in the political process, become a political representative, and influence public policies.

Conventional institutional politics and the changed political imaginary of youth

Political imaginary of individuals is becoming more heterogeneous due to broad societal changes in advanced democracies (Goerres, 2010, 209). Since in liberal democracies citizens are free to participate in politics and political participation encompasses an array of political actions,¹⁰ in practice not all actions are pursued with equal probabilities. While the conventional forms of political actions widely popular at the dawn of the liberal democratic era are somewhat in decline, other forms of participation are emerging (e.g. participation in single-issue organizations, non-institutionalized forms of participation that do not require long-term commitment, internet activism) (see Norris, 2002). Some argue (e.g. Inglehart, 1995) these changes are caused by a broad societal process of post-modernization. Due to the shift towards post-modern values, individuals strive for post-material goods. In addition, the declining control of the state as a bureaucratic authority and the weakened social control of religion promotes individualization (Goerres, 2010, 210) which goes hand in hand with declining trust in government and identification with political parties (Dalton, 2004).

While some believe the decline in participation is a sign of political apathy (see Wattenberg, 2012) and declining engagement in civic life caused by depleting social capital (see Putnam, 2000), there is a bulk of evidence that participation patterns are changing with younger generations, as their link (or participation channel) has significantly altered (e.g. Norris, 2002; Dalton, 2009; Rosanvallon, 2008). That young people are getting more and more detached from traditional politics and structures (Riley et al., 2010) has already been established in previous sections; however,

the sheer numbers of people participating in various modes of unconventional political participation suggest we are not living in an age of political apathy and citizens' withdrawal into the private sphere (Rosanvallon, 2008, 19); we have been witnessing a growing wave of protest politics (see Norris, 2002; Dalton, 1996; 2009), which is displayed when citizens challenge the usual way of doing politics. Young people stand on an equal footing to other age groups in such unconventional forms of politics. Still, there is little proof of the assumed general pattern of young people being more active than other age groups (Barnes et al., 1979).

While acknowledging that particularly participation in institutional politics is at an undesirable level, the repertoire of the actions available for participating in the political process has changed dramatically. Protest politics seems to be particularly attractive to young people nurturing post-materialist values, cause-oriented participation, and ultimately also different (citizen engaged) citizenships (see Dalton, 2009). Norris (2002, 215) thus argues that political activism has been reinvented by the diversification in agencies, repertoires, and targets of political action. The Internet allows these new agencies of political action with a set of innovative repertoires of political expression at their disposal to disrupt 'politics as usual'. It offers significant potential to mobilise groups of individuals in issue-oriented campaigns, as it allows for disparate groups of individuals, with diverse and fragmented political identities, to connect (Chadwick, 2006, 29; Martin, 2012, 108), and also facilitates the formation of issue-based organisations of young people due to the reduction of communication costs, easier access to official sources, and the emergence of crowdfunding, crowdsourcing, and networking practices made possible by technological innovations (Martin, 2012, 110).

With the rise of web 2.0 and social media outlets in particular, there is no doubt that new forms of mass communication have proven more appealing to young people, who are also more willing to experiment with them (Martin, 2012, 102). The way young people are informed about political issues and the way they communicate with others is different than other age groups. Young people are much more likely to gain political information on the Internet, as well as edit and collate different sources of news (Martin, 2012, 105; see Figure 3). Reading and posting about civic or political issues on websites is clearly a form of engagement that young people pursue more actively than other parts of the population. They are more inclined to post their opinions about civic and political issues through blogs and social networks. Eurostat (2015) data on the frequency of taking part in online consultations or vot-

¹⁰ From voting and participating in organizations (political parties, trade unions, NGOs, etc.) to participating outside of organizations (contacting a public official or politician, signing a petition, taking part in demonstrations, buying or boycotting a product for political reasons, etc.).




Figure 4: Online political participation by age groups (percentage of individuals) (Data source: Eurostat, 2015).

ing to define civic or political issues, such as urban planning, signing an online petition, or engaging in political deliberation over a certain issue, additionally show that young people in fact do participate politically more over the Internet.

The Internet facilitates the formation of issue-based organisations of young people due to the reduction of communication costs, easier access to official sources, and the emergence of crowdfunding, crowdsourcing, and networking practices allowed by technological innovations (Martin, 2012, 110). The Internet allows civil society actors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks, to carry out a variety of activities aimed at influencing policy-makers and others through public campaigning, activism, and lobbying (see Ostling, 2014). As such, the Internet has allowed these new agencies of political action, with a set of innovative repertoires of political expression at their disposal, to disrupt 'politics as usual'. The emergence of the Occupy movement, 15M movement, Avaaz.org, Global Exchange, The Dolphin Project, Save Darfur coalition, etc. showcase the opportunities for new and reinvented networks of individuals to mobilise supporters, lobby representatives, network with like-minded organisations, and communicate with traditional media fortresses online in order to influence public or private actors at all levels.

As the political identity and attitudes of young people are less and less shaped by their social ties to their family, neighbourhood, school, or job, but more by the manner in which they participate in the social networks that they co-create, we observe a phenomenon of networked individualism in which the Internet, and particularly social media, take on a central role in the political engagement of individuals (Rainie and Wellman, 2012). These are more likely to participate in non-hierarchical networks, are project-oriented, and enact their social relations through social media. Changed participation patterns and citizenship norms have clear generational implications since younger generations demonstrate a greater inclination toward elite-challenging behaviour while older generations tend to display legitimizing behaviour towards institutional politics (Dalton, 2009; Goerres, 2010). The demise of the dutiful young citizen is, therefore, a long-term process that is shaped by broader economic and social forces that may be characterised by a more individualised, self-actualising, and critical individual, which Loader et al. (2014, 145) call the *networked citizen*. The *networked young citizen* reflects a positive relationship between social media use and political engagement, with the potential to influence longstanding patterns of political inequality (Xenos et al., 2014), implies a change in the process of political

socialisation (Vraga et al., 2014), is mobilised through mass demonstrations against growing social inequalities, such as *Indignados* and *Occupy*, and rejects the political class by participating in the formation of political parties, such as the Italian *Movimento 5 Stelle*, Spanish *Podemos*, or the German *Piratenpartei* (Sloam, 2014). As it is clear that the emerging generations of networked citizens are more and more sceptical of the political class and existing political institutions, it is instrumental to address the following questions in order to reduce the gap between (traditional) political institutions and actors and the emerging forms of (networked) young citizens.

WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE TO GERONTOCRACY?

The case of the superior numerical advantage of older generations (see Binstock, 2000) raises increasing warnings about the closing window of opportunity for implementing reforms to the welfare state in order to accommodate the needs and habits of young people (see Kohli, 2010).¹¹ This thinking inherently translates into senseless debates about the “war of generations,” the “grey power,” and “pensioner’s democracy” in European countries (Goerres, 2010, 207). Although such rationales are very simplified and are based on set of very limited perceptions of representative politics (see Tormey, 2015), there are political actors trying to address older generations as a cohesive one-dimensional voting force, which in effect has also an immense influence on the policy-making process (e.g. parties of the pensioners, in some countries successfully competing almost exclusively on the salient topic of pensions). Such signals from the political process may cause artificial hostilities in the political arena, and more importantly also generally spur on real conflicts in political communities due to issues connected to the declining voice of young people as exerted through democratic participation. That being said, we must not disregard the fact that age segregation of groups inherent to public policy making, as indicated by Larkin and Newman (1997), tends to have damaging long-term effects for the functioning of democracy (e.g. zero-sum game perception of the struggle for resources, intergenerational hostilities, decreasing political deliberation capacity of the political community). Since insufficient resources and fierce competition for them between various social groups put less powerful generations on the losing end, the principle of intergenerational justice and the dialogue between generations promise to affect this distribution of resources and life opportunities in a more balanced way.

Participatory approaches, stemming from the assumption that the public should exercise more direct

influence on the processes of governance than offered by representative democracy, confer to an individual the right to participate in the activities of effective decision-making about the common future through individual or collective action. In order to achieve this, citizens need more direct-participation opportunities, the capacity for societal self-regulation must be improved, and the public administration must be properly educated. As Skocpol (2003) and Hooghe and Stolle (2005) have acknowledged, at least part of the blame should be placed on the political structure and mass membership organizations that stopped investing in mobilization and grassroots activities because of their increasing professionalization; but also due to transformation of the nation state and the role of the state itself (see Tormey, 2015). A substantial push is needed on the side of political structure to bring marginalized young people back into the mainstream political process; however, much political tokenism and paternalism persists in the ways authorities address this issue its clear link to legitimacy of political institutions and office holders. Governmental actions addressing these issues tend to have implementation problems and suffer from shelving projects and proposals due to shrinking budgets and the unnecessary politicization of ideologically diverse political interests or even daily political bickering.

It also seems that a large part of young people’s micropolitical action is outside the mainstream political process (see Marsh et al., 2007) and that the emerging trends of individualized collective action (see Tormey, 2015) and the emergence of the networked citizens (see Xenos et al., 2014) do not go hand in hand with the institutions of representative government and liberal democracy. However, we must still acknowledge the agency issues that contemporary young people exhibit. Regardless of the hostility of the political structure in contemporary representative democracies, there is the need to extend citizenship education beyond school curricula to provide students with practical opportunities to apply citizenship education in their school and community activities. This requires a modified definition of citizenship education, participatory school culture, and teaching methods that would draw upon a range of formal and non-formal approaches that enable young individuals to develop democratic attitudes and values so as to actively participate in society. It also entails the need for the appropriate professional development of civic educators in both formal and non-formal educational environments and a set of various activities that promote civic education, political and digital literacy, and more broadly, democratic political socialization. At the same time we must stress that these

11 Sinn and Uebelmesser (2001) indicate that, taking into account both demography and age-specific voting participation, a welfare reform in Germany could be democratically enforced only until 2016, because at that point the majority of the voting population was still below the indifference age.

sets of mechanisms should by no means be the same for the entire youth demographic, since many who do not participate in politics are not disinterested apathetics who could not care less about the public affairs happening around them. As the empirical evidence demonstrates, they can also be insufficiently informed, disempowered because of the barriers to participation they face, as well as simply be distrustful because the performance and actions of the politi-

cal class does not meet their expectations (see Snell, 2010). Bearing that in mind, only a coherent set of carefully designed measures improving the political structure as well as the agency issues can lead to the meaningful participation of young people in the political process, ensure the more substantive representation of their interest, and consequently reverse the trend of the fading democratic legitimacy of liberal democracies.

IZTIRJENJE MODERNIH DEMOKRACIJ:
PRIMER ODSOTNOSTI MLADIH SKOZI MEDGENERACIJSKO PRIZMO

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POVZETEK

V razvitem svetu starejši navadno veljajo za najhitreje rastočo starostno skupino. Posledice demografskih sprememb hkrati pomenijo tudi pretakanje vse večje numerične moči v politično moč. Ker so tako mladi kot starejši pomembni koristniki ključnih javnih politik, ki se nanašajo na blaginjo (t.j., izobraževalna politika, zdravstvena politika, oskrba), se tekmovanje za omejena sredstva lahko prenese na politično polje in manifestira kot navidezen ali dejanski medgeneracijski konflikt. Namen tega prispevka je pregledati plati, po katerih sodobne predstavniške demokracije trpijo za pomanjkanjem demokratične legitimnosti, predvsem ko gre za vprašanja politične participacije in predstavništva podprezentiranih družbenih skupin, kot je na primer mladina. Prispevek prav tako razpravlja o pristopih, ki omogočajo omenjenim družbenim skupinam, da postanejo polno vključeni v politične procese, še posebej ko gre za institucionalno politiko. Razprava se osredotoča na pristope opolnomočenja posameznikov in preoblikovanja politične strukture, da bi ta omogočala vključujoče procese vladanja in nasploh bolj demokratične politične institucije.

Ključne besede: mladina, politična participacija, politično predstavništvo, medgeneracijski dialog

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