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DIGNIT AS
Revija za človekove pravice
Slovenian journal of human rights
ISSN 1408-9653
Rational Disagreement Targets
Matjaž Potrč
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Potrč, M. (2018). Rational Disagreement Targets, Dignitas, št. 59/60, str. 235-
250.
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DIGNITAS n Rational Disagreement Targets
1
AbSTRAcT
There are two implicitly present views about the targets of ra-
tional disagreement. If one takes conciliation as a strategy con-
cerning rational disagreement, then the target in the wide sense 
of the word is propositions. On the other hand, if one takes jud-
gments to be targets of rational disagreement, then the accom-
panying strategy is that of non-conciliation. This last strategy is 
closer to the nature of rational disagreement in terms of its phe-
nomenology and rationality.
Key words: rational disagreement, conciliation, non-conciliati-
on, propositions, judgments
Predmeti razumnega nestrinjanja
POvzeTek
Glede predmetov razumnega nestrinjanja obstajata dve stališči. 
Če razumemo spravljivost kot strategijo pristopa k razumnemu ne-
strinjanju, so predmeti tega nestrinjanja – v najširšem pomenu te 
besede – propozicije. Če pa po drugi strani kot predmete razumne-
ga nestrinjanja razumemo sodbe, je strategija, ki takšno nestrinjanje 
spremlja, odločnost. zadnja strategija je bližje naravi razumnega ne-
strinjanja ter njegovi fenomenologiji in racionalnosti.
Ključne besede: razumno nestrinjanje, spravljivost, odločnost, 
propozicije, sodbe
1 
University of Ljubljana, matjaz.potrc@guest.arnes.si.
Rational Disagreement Targets
Matjaž Potrč
1

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DIGNITAS n Filozofija
Rational disagreement
People often disagree. If arguments are involved, then the inte-
resting ones are not emotionally heated squabbles, but an exchan-
ge of views that are rationally supported and involve the parties’ 
respect for each other. When Putnam
2
 mentions such a disagree-
ment with his colleague, he says he holds him in great esteem as a 
human being and praises the qualities of his character. but he also 
states there are differences between them that cannot be bridged 
with respect to a certain issue. before coming back to rational di-
sagreements in philosophy, we will take a quick look at the area 
of jurisprudence. Rational disagreement seems to be the basis of 
procedure in legal practice. What are the cases in question like? A 
presumption is that your fellow lawyer in a dispute is rational, i.e. 
that both you and him follow objectively verifiable procedures. 
but the two of you disagree about the truth of p. The prosecutor in 
penal law argues for p, whereas the defence argues for ¬p. both are 
rational, and they presume other parties to be rational as well. but 
once they have heard all the arguments of other parties, they still 
stick to their convictions. After having heard everything from the 
defence, the prosecutor continues to cling to their belief in p. Di-
sagreement seems to be the basis of legal procedure. It also seems 
that non-conciliation – insisting on one’s views or positions and 
not abandoning them in the face of a challenge from the opposite 
player – is the rational choice in that area. Whatever the move of 
the other party, it does not seem to be a suitable rational choice to 
abandon one’s beliefs. On the contrary, a good lawyer has to stick 
to their guns and retain their beliefs, even though these may be 
shattered by the party that defends the opposite view in a proce-
dural dispute. It also seems that legal procedure consists of assu-
ming and playing roles so that deep down the judgment of the la-
wyer, if there is one, disciplines the situation where the opposing 
positions guide a given dialectics. That is how I see the situation 
with legal discourse, although my knowledge mostly comes from 
legal cases as portrayed in several Tv series and in ‘whodunnits’. I 
will now switch to the case of philosophy with which I am slightly 
better acquainted. but before embarking on this, I need to stress 
the procedural embracing of non-conciliation in legal practice, 
which seems to be a bird of a different feather than conciliation’s 
2 
H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History. cambridge, 1981.

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DIGNITAS n Rational Disagreement Targets
take on rationality that is mostly proposed by philosophers. How 
does this attitude come about in philosophy? I will consider this 
and then argue that non-conciliation is and should be a strategy 
appropriated by philosophers as well. Matters about rationality 
and about the phenomenology of peer disagreement will occu-
py the centre of the exercise. cases of respectful philosophical 
disagreement, though, in contradistinction to legal cases, are not 
procedural and instead feature a commitment to one’s beliefs that 
are not necessarily needed for the legal procedure to be satisfied.
Philosophical disagreements
In order to understand rational disagreement and given that 
I work in this area, I will concentrate on the case of philosophy. 
A characteristic of philosophical work is that people are in dis-
pute about practically any specific topic you may choose. Let me 
mention just one example off the top of my head. Some people 
think that there are essences of things, while others dispute this. 
Those who subscribe to essences are again in disagreement about 
whether these are to be searched for in concrete entities, such as 
this cat and that other kitten. Their opponents dispute this and 
see essences in something such as the idea of a cat given that, as 
they say, each particular cat may perish and because a cat as an 
entity is vague. On the other hand, the idea of a cat persists all 
along and during conceptual and empirical changes. At each car-
ving of the joints there will be disagreement about which route 
to take. This seems to be the basis of philosophical endeavour. In 
contradistinction to legal practice, disagreement in philosophical 
discussion involves a substantive commitment and is thus not me-
rely procedural.
The difference between rational disagreement in the practice 
of law and in the practice of philosophy is that the practice of 
penal law opts for the irreducible difference of views to be ma-
intained, whereas the now widely practiced and almost official 
procedure of philosophy also argues in defence of each particular 
view, but then mainly opts to give way to the peer with whom one 
is engaged in dispute so that the differences can be smoothed out. 
Philosophers tend to believe that this is required so that the de-
mands of rationality are taken care of. I will argue that, as matters 
stand, the practice of rational disagreement in philosophy actual-

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DIGNITAS n Filozofija
ly does not end up in agreement but that the philosopher’s real 
work is to fight for their view, following their own best take on the 
epistemic evidential basis available to them.
3
 This is supported by 
the dialectics of the philosopher’s judgment, which is rooted in 
benign incoherence. Judgment, and especially philosophical jud-
gment, namely comes from a tension that arises between several 
forces producing it. Given that these forces are active from the 
background which is not transparent to the judger, and which is 
not explicitly there before their consciousness, there is some su-
pport for this judgment that is not completely accessible to the 
judger. This applies to both of the parties involved in a rational 
disagreement. So the rationality of philosophical argumentation 
rests upon an insight hidden in the background that forms the 
judgment of each of the parties. The insight that supports each 
party’s judgment thus disciplines explicit argumentation which 
happens in a philosophical debate. Notice that philosophical di-
sagreements are to some extent similar to moral disagreements 
where people feel they are involved in a procedure where quite a 
lot seems to be at stake.
conciliation
The main approach to the phenomenon of rational disagree-
ment encountered today is that of conciliation. The presupposi-
tion is that, if parties to a dispute are rational, they have to reali-
se that no party has an advantage with respect to the opposite 
party. Accordingly, they will be happy to abandon their original 
beliefs in order for objective rationality requirements to be satis-
fied so that one does not end up in the subjective arbitrariness of 
one’s belief or again in an outright contradiction with respect to 
the other party. The example that is usually given
4
 involves two of 
us having lunch together, trying to calculate the amount of cash 
we are due to pay the waiter. I appreciate you as being rational 
and fairly good in matters of practical maths. You have the same 
respect for me. Now, we engage in the calculation. My result is 
$42, and your result is $46. We are ready to reconcile our views 
3 
T. Horgan and M. Potrč, Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rational-
ity, (forthcoming). 
4 
D. christensen, Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy, Philosophy Compass, 
2009, 4/5, 756-75; D. christensen and J. Lackey, The Epistemology of Disagreement, Oxford 2013.

239
DIGNITAS n Rational Disagreement Targets
in view of our former opinions. However, we do not conclude 
that the right result would lie in the middle, namely $44. Instead, 
we abandon the initial results we arrived at and start calculating 
again. This is the form of conciliation that, as it seems, rationality 
requires from us. The idea is then that rationality further requires 
us to embrace the tactics of conciliation in other disputes as well, 
such as typical philosophical disputes such as the one mentioned 
about the essence of a cat. Rationality requires us, the reasoning 
goes, to abandon our beliefs and to reconcile. Here we see the 
surrounding symmetrical challenge: recognising you as a peer, I 
implicitly allow for my view not to be any better with respect to 
yours. And something similar goes for your view. Hence rationa-
lity requires us, as already stated, to reconcile by abandoning our 
original beliefs.
Non-conciliation
However, from the practice of philosophical disputes we can 
see that people do not go for conciliation. They respect each other 
as able reasoners, that is true. but they do not move in the directi-
on of conciliation. Instead, they go for non-conciliation, namely, 
they stick to their guns. In philosophy, you will very rarely see 
someone asserting that the essence is in specific cats then embra-
cing the view that the essence of a cat resides in the idea of a cat. 
In most cases, people would prefer to stay with their former beli-
efs and try to provide further arguments in support of their views 
in the face of a challenge by a peer. Their beliefs in the thesis they 
started with may be weakened as they listen to counter arguments. 
Yet, after a while, they search for their own arguments in defence 
of their thesis and so the strength of their belief increases. It is 
also quite unusual and not in line with the bulk of philosophical 
practice to opt for a middle-of-the-road solution: just what could 
someone who believes the essence is in particulars and someone 
else who believes the essence is in ideas find as a basis for com-
mon ground? One may say that a non-conciliation strategy that 
guides philosophical cases of rational disagreement opts for a ver-
sion of rationality that does not embrace exclusionary choices, 
and that it instead puts the stress on the ethics of belief
5
 based on 
5 
W.k. clifford, The ethics of belief [1877]. In: T. Madigan, ed., The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays, 
Amherst 1999, 70–96; P. van Inwagen, It is Wrong, everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to believe 

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DIGNITAS n Filozofija
one’s evidential take on the matters at hand. It is a rationality dee-
ply rooted in epistemological sensibility, leaning upon evidential, 
first-person commitments as the basis of this sensibility. Note that 
a commitment to some basic beliefs in the case of rational disagre-
ement occurs in philosophically respectful disputes which does 
not happen in either procedural disagreements such as those il-
lustrated by legal practices, nor in the case of differing estimates 
concerning a restaurant bill. No deep commitment to the content 
which is argued for is present in these cases, and that is exactly 
what usually happens in philosophical disagreements.
Phenomenology
What happens in a dispute involving rational disagreement? In 
order to consider the situation, one may have to take recourse to 
phenomenology, i.e. to the qualitative what-it’s-like take upon the 
practice of rational disagreement. A fact is that one treats one’s 
peer with whom one engages in a dispute as one’s global peer, 
i.e. as someone rationally respectable in the wide area under dis-
pute. The same applies to the other party: they treat you as their 
global peer as well. This is part of the phenomenology of rational 
disagreement. Another part is that, by treating one’s adversary as 
a global peer, one does not treat them as one’s local peer. Namely, 
one is in disagreement with the party in relation to this specific 
question, although one respects them concerning their rationali-
ty and their expertise in the wide area under dispute. Yet, in fact, 
one tends to treat the other party as one’s local inferior, and with 
respect to them, one experiences the feeling of one’s own local 
superiority. This is the phenomenology of peer disagreement, i.e. 
how one feels as one engages in rational disagreement in philo-
sophy. I treat you as an able philosopher, and thus as my global 
peer. but because I accept that the essence of entities resides in 
concrete tokens, and realising that you see the essence inhabiting 
the abstract realm of ideas, I treat you as my local inferior. I have 
respect for you concerning the overall question of rationality. Ho-
wever, concerning this specific question, you appear to me to be 
locally skewed. Phenomenology, as it seems, supports the non-
conciliation strategy in rational disagreement. each of us conti-
Something upon Insufficient evidence. In J. Jordan and D. Howard-Snyder, eds., Faith, Freedom and 
Rationality, Lanham, 1996, 137–153.

241
DIGNITAS n Rational Disagreement Targets
nues to stick to our guns, although all the arguments have been 
made and mutually fully considered. This is different from how 
conciliation views this area. The phenomenology is then that of 
local peerhood: one is supposed to treat one’s adversary in a phi-
losophical dispute not simply as one’s global peer, but also as a lo-
cal peer. This then gives one a reason to abandon one’s belief, and 
the same applies to one’s adversary as well. Yet such a conciliatory 
strategy does not seem to be supported by one’s phenomenology 
for the case of respectful philosophical disputes, contrary to dif-
ferences in the restaurant bill maths case. In this last case, there is 
indeed no dispute that is committed to, the trait that enables con-
ciliation and the abandoning of one’s belief, inviting both parties 
to go back to the drawing board and newly start their practices.
The target of rational disagreement: propositions
The main target of rational disagreement – does it centre on 
propositions or on judgments? The answer is that two deeply dif-
ferent approaches are involved here. In short, the usual approach, 
aiming to justify beliefs that are supposedly involved in a rational 
disagreement, centres on propositions as its target. You and I then 
disagree about the proposition in question. As already mentioned, 
you assert p and I assert -p. What are propositions? A range of inter-
pretations is available. They may be whatever is common to sen-
tences of a kind, or again they may be material, or ideal. Further, 
they may reside in the mind, or in some objective state outside the 
mind. Whatever they are though, propositions have the following 
properties: they do not involve phenomenology, the rationality in 
accordance with them subscribes to explicit tractable reasoning 
and considers a breach of this as a case of a hard, malign contradic-
tion. The propositional perspective is objective, proceeding from 
the third-person point of view. The embraced strategy is then that 
of conciliation. The beliefs involved are measured according to a 
probabilistic quantitative approach, they are supposed to come in 
degrees and they are then given the name of credences. epistemic 
justification is mainly that of beliefs with externalist reliabilism as 
a justificatory strategy. A justificatory environment is wide, local 
or global. The epistemic basis is explicit propositional content wi-
thout any background involved. If principles are involved in the 
exercise, their mode and effectiveness are explicit.

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DIGNITAS n Filozofija
Judgments
The judgmental approach is contrary to the propositional 
approach to rational disagreement. It is strange that this approach 
has not recently been appreciated for it goes along with the sepa-
ration between the objective, propositional and psychologically 
rooted judgmental ways to proceed. However, if you think about 
it for a while, judgment is really the stuff involved in the pheno-
menon of rational disagreement. The target of disagreement is 
then the judgment. A phenomenology is involved here, which as 
we have explained comes in local and global peerhood variants 
whereby the local variant is the feeling of one’s superiority. The 
rationality involved accepts the implicit background effectiveness 
of principles/attitudes and their benign constitutive incoherence. 
The perspective taken is the evidential, first-person kind. The stra-
tegy embraced is non-conciliation. The beliefs involved are mea-
sured according to their quality so that we talk about the strength 
of a belief, which comes down to one or zero beliefs, not to gra-
des of beliefs. epistemic justification goes along with judgments, 
and a justificatory strategy is evidentialism. The justificatory en-
vironment is narrow and transglobal. The epistemic basis is the 
implicit morphological content and background. The mode of the 
effectiveness of principles is indirect and implicit via chromatic 
illumination from the morphological background. Here is a sum-
mary of the differences between the propositional and judgmen-
tal approaches to rational disagreement:
the target of 
disagreement
proposition judgment 
phenomenology none global and local 
peerhood, with their 
combinations
rationality explicit tractable 
reasoning or a 
hard, maligned 
contradiction 
implicit background 
effectiveness 
of principles/
attitudes and benign 
incoherence
perspective taken third-person objective first-person 
subjective, evidential
strategy embraced conciliation non-conciliation

243
DIGNITAS n Rational Disagreement Targets
beliefs quantitative 
probabilistic 
estimation of belief, 
credences
strength of belief; 
quality
epistemic justification 
of 
beliefs judgments
justification strategy reliabilism evidentialism
justificatory 
environment
wide: local, global narrow: transglobal
explicit or implicit 
epistemic basis
propositional 
content, explicit, no 
background
morphological 
content, background
mode of effectiveness principles are present 
explicitly, their mode 
of effectiveness is 
explicit
chromatic 
illumination by 
principles from the 
background, implicit
Propositions or judgments
The target of disagreement: propositions or judgments. The 
main issue here concerns the target of disagreement: are these 
propositions or are we dealing with judgments? However they 
may be interpreted, propositions are independent of mind: they 
may be Platonic ideal entities or even symbols of language of tho-
ught. In any case, they differ from judgments in that they will not 
involve any psychological background implicit forces. We take it 
that rational disagreement deals with judgments: the parties invol-
ved differ in their judgments on which propositions are correct 
or true, not with respect to the propositions. The main reason that 
we regard the target of rational disagreement, especially in philo-
sophy, to be judgments is that these not only involve beliefs but 
beliefs that one is committed to, in some deep sense of the word. 
The question is whether the beliefs that are central to the discussi-
on here go together with the propositions. The answer is that be-
liefs may be well centred in propositions, yet this would succeed 
without any deep commitment, and this then puts the intrinsic re-
lation of belief into question as well, allowing for conciliation and 
therewith the related abandoning of a belief. If a belief appears 
in a judgment, then the commitment to it and a non-conciliation 
strategy offers itself.

244
DIGNITAS n Filozofija
Phenomenology: none, or once again local and 
global peerhood with their combinations
A proposition-centred approach concerning rational disagre-
ement will not really involve any phenomenology. This may be 
easily understood given that propositions, as already noted, do 
not involve any psychological ingredients. There may indeed be 
an attitude to a proposition. but, if one takes this route, a dispu-
te in a rational disagreement is not about the attitude and more 
about the proposition. conversely, if judgments are the target of a 
rational disagreement then psychological ingredients are consti-
tutively involved in whatever is under consideration. In this case, 
it is natural that phenomenology will be present. And phenome-
nology is indeed involved, one considers the opponent as a glo-
bal peer (which applies to both conciliation and non-conciliation 
strategies), or as a local inferior (this applies to the non-conciliati-
on strategy only).
Rationality: explicit tractable reasoning or a hard, 
malign contradiction on one side, and again the 
implicit background effectiveness of principles/
attitudes and benign incoherence on the other
If the target of rational disagreement is a proposition, then the 
rationality involved tends to be conceived in the manner of ex-
plicit tractable reasoning. Disputed propositions are an outcome 
of an inferential process. If the reasoning has some bumps in it, it 
is supposed that rationality is not really being pursued anymore 
so that one ends up with a hard, malign contradiction that tears 
the positions involved apart. Indeed, given that you argue for p 
and that your opponent argues for -p, this seems to be an outri-
ght contradiction. Accordingly, proposition-centred rationality is 
exclusivist: either you follow the rules or you end up in contra-
diction. However, if you decide judgment is the target of rational 
disagreement you will allow for a kind of incoherence given that 
the judgment is a result of several incompatible forces that end 
up being there in a unique hopper. but then you can take this 
incoherence to be of a weak and benign nature, and for that one 
allows for the assertive nature of a judgment. Further, a judgment 

245
DIGNITAS n Rational Disagreement Targets
does not require the explicit following of rules since it rests upon 
the implicit background effectiveness of principles and rules that 
find themselves in the judgment-producing hopper. A judgment 
is actually rooted in weak benign incoherence because without 
the tension of several forces in the background it would be unable 
to enter the scene.
The perspective taken: third-person objective  
or first-person subjective, evidential
If a proposition is the target of rational disagreement, then the 
perspective taken is objective and from the point of view of a third 
person, say, who is not directly involved in the dispute. If a jud-
gment is the target of rational disagreement, the perspective in-
volved will instead be a subjective, first-person view. A judgment 
namely involves you directly, it is not made from an objective dis-
tance. In fact, your judgment’s evidential support follows normati-
ve justificatory perspective contextual parameters.
6
 Moreover, on 
the other hand there are the normative justificatory perspective 
parameters of your peer. This pushes the situation in the direction 
of non-conciliation.
The strategy embraced: conciliation  
or non-conciliation
If a proposition is the target of rational disagreement, you will 
embrace a strategy of conciliation since you will try to avoid a 
malign kind of contradiction. If a judgment is your target, you will 
instead lean towards the strategy of non-conciliation. It is finally 
your judgment and you will normally try to adhere to it. This is 
especially important in view of the epistemic justification of your 
judgment because once an epistemic justification comes from the 
evidential sensitivity it will be difficult for you to share this episte-
mic sensitivity with your peer.
6 
M. Potrč and v. Strahovnik, Justification in context, Acta Analytica, 2005, 2, 91–104.

246
DIGNITAS n Filozofija
beliefs: quantitative probabilistic estimation of 
belief, credences, or the strength of belief with its 
quality
The propositional approach views propositions as being asses-
sed by beliefs. but these beliefs are assessed through probabilistic 
estimation procedures so that beliefs themselves appear as partial 
beliefs, with the name of credences. In contrast, the judgmental 
approach takes beliefs to be one or zero matters. It does not allow 
for grades of belief, and instead goes with the strength of a belief. 
The strength depends upon evidence. We all believe that Aristotle 
was the teacher of Alexander the Great, and that bled is a town 
in Slovenia. Our belief in this latter assertion is stronger than that 
in the former assertion given that we have much more evidential 
support for the latter one. Strength of belief is a qualitative notion 
that cannot be reduced to quantitative degrees of belief.
epistemic justification of beliefs  
or of judgments
epistemic justification may target beliefs if we take the propo-
sitional approach. epistemic justification may also be that of jud-
gments. There will be different strategies for each of these. If a pro-
position is the target of rational disagreement, then justification 
of the belief involved may be offered as coming in degrees. The 
belief will not be primarily evidentially committed to as happens 
in a judgment, and will instead come as a probability estimation 
of the matter involved. The justification of a belief in the case of a 
judgment will be more a matter of yes or no. One either judges p 
to be the case or one judges p not to be the case. Then one does 
not lean on estimated quantitative degrees of one’s belief. The be-
lief that happens in judgments, as we have claimed, is a matter of 
one’s commitment.
Justification strategy: reliabilism or evidentialism
The justification strategy that goes hand in hand with proposi-
tions will normally involve reliability, which is an externalist way 
to proceed. On the other hand, the justification strategy for a jud-

247
DIGNITAS n Rational Disagreement Targets
gment will tend to embrace evidentialism.
7
 evidence is namely 
the justification you have for your judgment. If a belief targets a 
proposition, then it seems natural that the relation between that 
belief and proposition – that proposition being either an abstract 
entity or a concrete fact of the matter – will be externalist. This 
means that a belief will naturally target some external, causally 
or in some similar manner accessible reality. The justification will 
then follow that externalist route. If a belief is basically involved 
in a judgment, then the justification relation in question will be 
evidentialist for one’s commitment will move into the centre of at-
tention. Justification in the case of a judgment relies on evidence, 
on whatever seems reliable to the one who is judging.
The justificatory environment: wide local  
or global, or again narrow and transglobal
The justificatory environment for propositions will be externa-
list and thus wide. It will happen in the local environment first. 
Given that there will be counterexample cases such as fake barns, 
the external environment will then be taken more broadly as the 
global environment. If judgment is our departure, then the enviro-
nment involved will be narrow and transglobal. This all goes well 
with evidence as the justificatory departure. One may start with re-
liabilism as an externalist justification. Justification will then come 
through the direct relation to proposition as something objective 
– there will be an objective relation between the belief and pro-
position as a form of an objective entity or state. However, once 
reliability encounters counterexamples the environment involved 
needs to be extended to the global and, further, to the transglobal 
one.
8
 We started with a wide externalist relation, and finished up 
with a narrow qualitative evidentialist relation.
7 
D. Henderson, T. Horgan and M. Potrč, Transglobal evidentialism-Reliabilism, Acta Analytica, 2007, 
22, 281–300.
8 
D. Henderson and T. Horgan, The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science 
and Conceptual Analysis, Oxford, 2011, M. Potrč, Justification Having and Morphological content, 
Acta Analytica, 2000, 24, 151–173.

248
DIGNITAS n Filozofija
explicit or implicit epistemic basis: propositional 
content, explicit, with no background; or again 
morphological content with the background 
involved
Propositions require an explicitly present epistemic basis whe-
re the content involved is the propositional content without any 
background playing a major role in supporting it. If judgment is 
our departure, then the epistemic basis will be implicit. It will in-
volve background morphological content.
9
 This is indeed what 
seems to go together with the nature of a judgment. Notice that a 
judgment, as we have claimed, proceeds from a tension and this 
is the tension between several principles that prompt its coming 
into existence. The conflict between these principles, of which 
there are several, so that pluralism is involved, does not succeed in 
a judgment in a direct, explicit manner. The plurality of principles 
involved is effective from the psychological and normative back-
ground that constitutes the judgment.
Mode of effectiveness: principles are present 
explicitly, their mode of effectiveness is explicit; 
or again the chromatic illumination by principles 
from the background is implicit
Propositions will be supported by principles that need to be 
explicitly present. If they are to be effective in embracing propo-
sitions, principles must be explicitly present. belief then seems 
to centre on some independent reality in a direct manner, which 
then involves an estimation of degrees in which belief encounters 
this reality. If judgment is our departure, then principles will be 
involved in an implicit manner. They will be effective from the 
background so they will chromatically illuminate the holistic jud-
gmental situation. We have claimed that a judgment is rooted in a 
tension between several principles that find themselves in a situ-
ation. These principles are effective from the background of the 
9 
T. Horgan and M. Potrč, The epistemic Relevance of Morphological content, Acta Analytica, 2010, 
25, 155–173; M. Potrč, Morphological content, Acta Analytica, 1999, 22, 133–149; T. Horgan and J. 
Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, cambridge, MA, 1996.

249
DIGNITAS n Rational Disagreement Targets
judger’s cognitive ability and normative sensibility
10
 (Foley 1993, 
Horgan and Potrč 2006), such that they provide the force in direc-
tion towards the judgment by illuminating it from that backgro-
und. In fact, if beliefs are taken to be targeting propositions then 
it is hard to understand just what leads to the phenomenon of 
rational disagreement. We take it that this phenomenon is rooted 
in the background implicit knowledge of the judger, with his ten-
dency to remain with his initial view and to refine it.
RefeRences
William k. clifford, The ethics of belief [1877]. In: T. Madigan, ed., The Ethics of Belief and Other 
Essays. Amherst: MA: Prometheus 1999, 70–96.
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DIGNITAS n Filozofija