

**Journal of Ethnic Studies — Treatises
and Documents**

**Revija za narodnostna vprašanja — Razprave
in gradivo**

**Ethnicity Today
Eastern and Western Approaches**

**Etničnost danes
Vzhodni in zahodni pristopi**

**Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana
Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana**

Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana
Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana

Ethnicity Today

Eastern and Western Approaches

Etničnost danes

Vzhodni in zahodni pristopi

**Revija za narodnostna vprašanja — Razprave in
gradivo 21**

**Journal of Ethnic Studies — Treatises
and Documents 21**

Ljubljana, december 1988

REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA – JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES
Razprave in gradivo – Treatises and Documents

251YU ISSN – 0251

UDK – UDC 323.1 (058)

Gesla – key words

etničnost – ethnicity, nacionalizem – nationalism, manjšine – minorities, človekove pravice – human rights, bikulturnost in dvojezičnost – biculturalism and bilingualism, asimilacija – assimilation, regionalizem – regionalism

Izdajateljski svet – Council of publishers: Andrej Caserman, Rudi Čučinovič (predsednik – president), mag. Silvo Devetak, Hajos Ferenc, dr. Vladimir Klemenčič, dr. Peter Klinar, mag. Vera Klopčič, Amalija Petronio Bertoni

Urednika – Editors: Silvo Devetak (glavni urednik – Editor-in-Chief) – Marko Rogač (odgovorni urednik – Editor-in-Charge)

Uredniški odbor – Editorial Board: dr. Borut Bohte, dr. Darko Bratina, mag. Silvo Devetak, Boris Jesih, dr. Savin Jogan, dr. Vladimir Klemenčič, mag. Miran Komac, dr. Avguštin Malle, Sonja Novak Lukanovič, dr. Ernest Petrič, dr. Janko Pleterški, Marko Rogač, Janez Strgar

Prevod povzetkov – Translation of summaries: Meta Gostinčar, Marko Rogač

Zunanja oprema – Layout: Jože Brumen, dipl. ing. arh.

Izdal – Edited by: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja – Institut for Ethnic Studies (predstavnik – representative: prof. dr. Vladimir Klemenčič)

Založil – Published by: Uradni list SRS (zanj odgovarja – Director: Peter Juren)

Revijo sofinancira – Co-financed by: Raziskovalna skupnost Slovenije – Research Community of Slovenia

Naklada – First Printing: 800 izvodov – 800 copies, marec – March 1989

Tisk – Printed by: Edvard Usenik, prepisovanje in razmnoževanje, Ljubljana

Naročnine – Subscription Office: ČZ Uradni list, naslov – address: 61000 Ljubljana, Kardeljeva c. 12, telefon – telephone 224-323, žiro račun za SFRJ – Drawing account for YU: 50100-603-40323, žiro račun iz tujine – Drawing account from abroad: 50100-620-107-25731-2795/2

CONTENTS — KAZALO

Editors' preface	5	Beseda urednikov	6
Zvonko Lerotić:			
Instead of introduction: from demos to ethnos	7	Namesto uvoda: od demosa do etnosa	7
Silvo Devetak:			
Ethnic policies in contemporary industrial, pluralistic societies	9	Narodnostne politike v industrijskih pluralističnih družbah	9
Anthony D. Smith:			
Social and cultural conditions of ethnic survival	15	Socialni in kulturni pogoji narod- nostnega preživetja	15
Eric R. Wolf:			
Ethnicity and nationhood	27	Etničnost in nacionalnost	27
Dušan Janjić:			
The nation	33	Narod	33
Robert H. Jackson:			
Jurisprudence and multi-ethnic states	39	Pravna veda in mnogonacionalne države	39
Yves Plasseraud:			
Lumières et ombres de l'identité ethnique	49	Svetlobe in sence narodnostne identitete	49
Rodolfo Stavenhagen:			
Ethnocide or ethnodevelopment: the new challenge	61	Etnocid ali etnorazvoj: nov izziv	61
Fred W. Riggs:			
Modes of ethnicity	71	Vrste etničnosti	71
Theodor Veiter:			
Political notion of ethnicity	91	Politični pomen etničnosti	91
Vjeran Katunarić:			
The interethnic relations in contemporary Yugoslavia	103	Mednacionalni odnosi v sodobni Jugoslaviji	103
Sergej Flere:			
The ethnic attitudes of youth in Yugoslavia	113	Odnos mladih v Jugoslaviji do narodnostne identitete	113
Sreća Perunović:			
Ethnicity and culture — people or nation	123	Etničnost in kultura	123

Leokadia M. Drobizheva: Historical memory and national self-awareness	133	Zgodovinski sponin in narodna zavest	133
S. I. Vainshtein: Historical ethnography in the structure of Soviet ethnographic science	139	Historična etnografija v sovjetski etnografski znanosti	139
M. N. Guboglo: Bilingualism in alien ethnic environment: problems of study ..	147	Dvojezičnost in etnično tuje okolje – problemi učenja	147
O. B. Naumova: Contemporary ethnic process in Kazakhstan	153	Sodobni etnični proces v Kazahstanu	153
Virginia R. Dominguez: The management of otherness ..	161	Nova taktika drugačnosti	161
Katherine Verdery: Are regional stereotypes ethnic?	169	Ali so regionalni stereotipi etnični?	169
Peter Gstettner: An intercultural field of learning is cleaned up	175	Interkulturno polje izobraževanja očiščeno	175
Cesare Poppi: Markers of distinctiveness	181	Znamenja posebnosti	181
John H. Moore: Ethnos and ethnic process on the North American Plains	193	Etnos in etnični proces v Severno- ameriški preriji	193
Irena Šumi: The Ethnic Question	209	Etnično vprašanje	209
Marinka Lazić, Janez Stergar: Bibliographies and biographies of the workers of the Institute for Ethnic Studies in the year 1988 ..	215	Bibliografije in biografije delavcev Inštituta za narodnostna vprašanja v letu 1988	215
A brief information on the Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana ...	225	Kratka informacija o Inštitutu za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana ...	225
Abstracts	229	Sinopsisi	229

EDITORS' PREFACE

The present publication includes selected papers mostly prepared for the scientific encounter on „Ethnicity in contemporary process“ organized in the frame of the 12th International Cogress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences held in Zagreb from 24th to 31th July, 1988.

The conviners of this meeting were Silvo Devetak (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia), Leokadija M. Drobizheva (Institute of Ethnography of USSR Academy of Science) and Katherine Verdery (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA).

The selection of papers included in this publication was made by the above mentioned conviners and Dušan Janjić (Institute for Social Sciences, Beograd, Yugoslavia), Zvonko Lerotić (University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Yugoslavia) and Fred W. Riggs (University of Hawaii, Honolulu, USA).

We sincerely hope that this publication will inspire further research as well as generate new ideas and approaches concerning the role of ethnicity in contemporary world and bring about necessary solutions to these issues in accordance with specific historical, economic, social and other circumstances in different multicultural societies and geographic regions.

*Editors:
Silvo Devetak
Marko Rogač*

Ljubljana, November 1988

BESEDA UREDNIKOV

V pričujoči publikaciji je predstavljen predvsem izbor člankov, ki so bili napisani za znanstveno srečanje z naslovom „Etničnost v sodobnosti“ organizirano v okviru 12. Mednarodnega kongresa antropoloških in etnoloških znanosti. Ta je bil v Zagrebu od 24. do 31. julija 1988.

Sklicatelji omenjenega srečanja so bili Silvo Devetak (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, Jugoslavija), Leokadija M. Drobizheva (Inštitut za etnografijo pri Sovjetski akademiji znanosti) in Katherine Verdery (John Hopkins University, Baltimore, ZDA).

Pri izboru člankov so poleg zgoraj navedenih sklicateljev srečanja sodelovali tudi Dušan Janjić (Inštitut za družbene znanosti, Beograd, Jugoslavija), Zvonko Lerotić (Univerza v Zagrebu, Zagreb, Jugoslavija) in Fred W. Riggs (Univerza na Havajih, Honolulu, ZDA).

Iskreno upava, da bo publikacija, ki je pred vami, spodbudila nadaljnja raziskovanja ter porajala nove ideje in pristope glede vloge etničnosti v sodobnem svetu in s tem prispevala k prepotrebnim rešitvam teh vprašanj v skladu s historičnimi, ekonomskimi in socialnimi specifičnostmi ter drugimi okoliščinami v različnih večkulturnih družbah in zemljepisnih regijah.

Ljubljana, november 1988

*Urednika:
Silvo Devetak
Marko Rogac*

ZVONKO LEROTIĆ

Fakulteta političkih nauka, Zagreb

INSTEAD OF INTRODUCTION: FROM DEMOS TO ETHNOS

Nation, people and ethnic community are three interconnected social groups and three quite different aspects of social facts. A nation can be considered the key aspect of the modern community, the aspect which differs from the state and economic units, forming out of interests and power. The nation is an entity based on interest and power, but its key integrative power is ethnicity. Ethnic community can be historically formed through living in a joint group over a long period, but it can also be formed and is, in last two centuries, being formed through all kinds of common social life. After the American society and Union of states has been created, its culture, language, and even ethnicity have been later created. This came as a result of a basic law of which we are aware of in everyday life and about which we have a certain experience: social units of all kinds, specially the associations based on interests and political reasons often turn into forms of loyalty and closeness to which we refer as the community with ethnic features. It is long lasting and voluntary process.

Supposing that a nation is political entity, the meaning of the term nation can be fully explained if we trace the essential meanings of the notion the people. The modern conotation of the term people includes three basic characteristics of social life:

- 1. People is a **demos**, or a group of citizens of a state, members of a church or of a society, even civilisation or culture.*
- 2. People as **plebs** is a community of low classes; it is a common people, therefore of low status, reputation, wealth and power.*
- 3. People as **ethnos** is historically permanent. collective identity of a community or social group.*

*Nation is the modern integrative principle of these three aspects or characteristics of people. People as **ethnie** is a unique entity and community, it can not be said for low classes and people as **demos**. **Ethnie** is the most distinctive historically created entity, with the strong social power. Power is viewed as force capable of resisting destruction coming within and outside the community.*

Some sociologist, like Weber and Malinowski, refer to ethnicity as the common ethnical character. The ethnical character is what is original to ethnicity, not existing as a community but as a factor making the associations into communities of all kinds

easier. In this context ethnicity leads to the question of geneses not at the narrow biological sence, but in the sense of faith, belief and justification of what makes life of the community unique, being deep in the people to maintain the community as their high, even highest value.

In order to grasp full comprehension of the meaning of ethnical community it is necessary to determine the essence of a difference as such, or what is a common factor to social differences between peoples. We have to determine what is a common feature of a people, being something special differing it from the others. The people which is to a certain extent already an „abstract“ ethnical community since it is no longer integrated through blood relations but throug spiritual and emotional bonds, can be defined as Weber does, as group of people who nourishes a subjective belief in the common origin, on the basis of similarity in their appearance or customs, or both, or on the basis of a memory of colonization and migration, so that this belief becomes important for supporting the idea of community forming.

The question is how to explain the force of ethnicity in the constitution of people, as a subjective belief in common origin. It could be said that ethnicity builds up its force on belief in effciencie of the „prime cause“. For exemple, the father of the first, from God, elected community, as described in the Bible, the belief on primordial community (Marxism), belief on the existence of protolanguage... This is enough to illustrate the intellectual potential of man availing him to consider something explained, becamng fully aware if he finds the cause effciencie or ethiology of things existing and the cause as a principle of the very begining of life. The collective spirit of the people is searching for its inner binding force believing in the prime cause, the basis of their origin which gives an explanation for identity of all forms of the existence of communities and peoples through the history.

It may be concluded that people is a historical community characterized by the same experience of itself in various periods of history remaining in its identity always the same, which can participate in historical events and turbulences because it has its own inner time and history which makes it always the same and enables it to have a continuous identity or an experience of sameness in the changes of social life. A people as *ethnos* has its own identity which does not originate from incompatibility to other different communities but from the fact that it possesses the same inner durability, the time which does not change but stands still, which is a foundation of the creation of identity binding people together in different historical conditions and in different periods of time. Ethnicity, also, can be used to explain the durability of the experience of sameness of the people living for centuries.

The existence of a non-historical ethnical identity, experiencing the history of political and social struggles living it and transferring it to a new generations, is a condition for the existence and development of all societies and all kinds of states and cultures. Without the experience, memory and life of an unchangeable subject, it is not possible to recollect memories, and experiences of historical events and have the opinion and long awareness about all these.

So, the-essential of the ethnic community is the lasting of its identity with no changes in it, and what is decisive for its identity in the beginning, it explains the creation of its stages later on, irrespective of what external events occured and when. Ethnicity therefore reveals to the people the overall quality of its history and structure: its real property, economy and language politics, friends and ennemies, aspirations and interests so that the experience of the community appears as the essence of a willingness for separate national existence.

SILVO DEVETAK

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana

ETHNIC POLICIES IN CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL, PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES

Multicultural countries are exercising different ethnic and cultural policies, depending on their historical experiences and actual political, economic and other circumstances. External factors have less influence on these policies.¹ The policies are in many aspects the consequence of the vitality of the non-dominant ethnic groups. In cases where these groups developed the consciousness of their ethnic identity and have in this spirit elaborated diversified ethno-political programmes and effective ethnic movements as well, their claims have a greater chance to be taken into consideration. In fact in these conditions the dominant ethnic community would be much more inclined to make attempts to rescue the basic social relationships ensuring its domination by adopting compromising solutions on the terms of the non-dominant ethnic groups.

But the dominant ethnic group would very rarely accept structural social changes which would endanger its status of priority in cases where the changes were proposed by peaceful (i. e. parliamentary, democratic) methods. Unfortunately experience has shown that such changes were accepted many times because the dominant group was forced to do so, being unable to resist successfully the armed forces or political and social perturbances provoked by internal and very rarely by international circumstances.

It is very difficult to elaborate some kind of valuable typology of ethnic policies. In general it is possible to divide them between those whose principle feature is the repudiation of the existence of ethnic groups and of the pluralistic nature of a given society as such, and the other which have admitted this fact but have in practice developed various approaches to the management of interethnic and other types of relations in the ethnically pluralistic societies.

The latter policies could be further divided according to their political and ethnic goals, between those whose objectives are aimed at protecting the individual and the others which have, in addition, developed the protection of the ethnic community as a collective entity, as a rational for their existence. This division usually corresponds to

¹ One of the rare examples is the autonomy of thirteen provinces in the south of Philippines which was agreed upon on Dec. 23, 1976 in Tripoli.

the division between countries which are ensuring only the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination of the citizens and their equality before the law, and the others which besides this try by so-called reverse discrimination (e.g. special measures) to ensure also the maintenance and progress of ethnic groups which constitute their societies.

The ethnic policies could be classified also according to the division of those which provide only the constitutional and legislative provisions aimed at ensuring the equality of different ethnic factors of the given society, and the others which are trying to obtain these goals by endeavouring to create also other conditions for the unhampered ethnic and cultural life of the minority as, for instance, economic, environmental and similar conditions that characterise the contemporary industrial and pluralistic society. Differences between ethnic policies exist also in that they may confirm that the non-dominant ethnic groups are a constituent element of the given multicultural society or that they passively tolerate their cultural, political and similar claims.

Finally we could classify ethnic policies under two general headings: „negative“ and „selective“ policies. But immediately I must underline that it is very difficult to elaborate a precise typology of these policies if we look at them from this point of view.

The most distinctive are two negative policies: the policy of nonrecognition of ethnicity in any form and the policy of assimilation. The first policy is exercised in different forms. In most cases it is reflected in the non recognition of any rights or status of ethnic groups. All such societies have in common the assertion that they are ethnically homogenous and that they „consciously deny to ethnic groups any special collective rights or they even deny the very existence of these groups“². These policies are in some cases the consequence of historical events³ or of recent political decisions in particular countries which see in this the way for the creation of the overwhelming hegemony of the leading ethnic elite⁴. But many states which otherwise do not confirm the existence of ethnic groups living in them, implicitly recognise the existence of the ethnic factor by adopting legal provisions aimed at prohibiting discrimination against citizens or individuals on various ethnic or other grounds⁵. The principle of non-recognition of the ethnic diversity emanates from the notion of the sovereignty of people in the framework of the so called united national state (nation-state) which has been developed in the 18th and 19th centuries. The realisation of this notion in the last century has provoked the assimilation of many cultures and the extermination of even more minority (or even majority) languages, for instance, in Europe⁶. This at first glance „liberal“ notion is in fact often a skilful coverup for the hegemonistic tendencies of the dominant group or, more precisely, its elite.

2 See: P. L. van der Berghe, Protection of ethnic minorities, A critical appraisal, in: Wirsing, Protection of Ethnic Minorities Comparative Perspectives Pergamon Press, New York 1981.

3 For instance, the non recognition of Kurds and Armenians in Turkey.

4 Typical example is Bulgaria who until the sixties recognises the existence of the Macedonia and until the eighties the existence of the Turkish minority in the country.

5 Such legislation was adopted practically by all the states who became members or acceded to the Pacts of human rights by 1966.

6 We have in mind the fate, for instance, of occitan, welsh, scot, catalan, britton or similar languages.

In countries which formally recognise different ethnic groups a variety of possible relations of their elites towards the minority groups exist. For the „negative“ policies we could propose this typology:

- (a) internal colonisation
- (b) assimilation
- (c) ethnocide
- (d) genocide

Each of these policies has a specific historical, economic, political, social and cultural characteristic. The common starting point of all of these policies is the official non-recognition or the repudiation of ethnic differences. All these notions are based on the cultural homogeneity of the national state in which citizens are directly incorporated as individuals. The differences between these policies are to be found in the extent to which particular states institutionalised the rights of minority groups besides the rights of the individuals belonging to them. The logic of the group rights and of their incorporation in the state is completely different from those which are based on the individual as the only subject of the state constituency⁷. It is important to bear in mind that in the countries where the dominant ethnic groups identifies itself with the state any ethnic policy always would be in the interest of this group in all states where the leading groups are substantially numerically stronger than other groups and this is a case more or less of all multicultural countries.

The multicultural countries that recognise the existence of ethnic differences usually have in their constitutions or legislation provisions for implementing the principle of international law of equality of citizens before the law and of the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, language and ethnic or national origin. In any case this relates, as we have already seen, to the citizens as individuals. But difficulties begin when it would be necessary to ensure by positive action the equality and non-discrimination of ethnic groups as collectivities and to give them a status of a constituent factor of the state.

In order to achieve this goal many western countries have developed the notion of the so-called affirmative action, according to which it would be necessary, by adopting special measures, to provide, not only formal but also factual equality. The affirmative action is a voluntary attempt to eliminate the categorical aspects of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race, caste, or, in recent times, sex, age etc.⁸. Glaser and other theoreticians do not accept this notion, and are of the opinion that it represents a disguised, paternalistic approach towards the non-dominant ethnic groups and it creates an animosity between the majority and the minority. The latter is according to their opinion proved by the establishment of special bureaus, commissions, vice-presidential posts etc. for the minorities while the members of the majorities are directly incorporated in the state. „This animosity is a substantial characteristic of the colonialism – in this case the internal one“⁹.

The basic dilemma seems to be what is the function of the state. Of fundamental importance is if the state has an equal stand towards all its citizens without any

7 See: P. L. van der Berghe, *supra* note 2, at 348.

8 Ibidem, pp. 351–352.

9 Ibidem, pp. 352–353.

distinction, for instance, as to race, colour, language, ethnic or national origin. But many times or even regularly this is not the case. The multicultural state is in the hands of the strongest i. e. the greatest nation and its ruling class. Consequently, this as a rule exercise control over all the principle attributes of the state such as administration, army, police, diplomatic corps etc. The protection of the minorities is therefore in many states only a smokescreen for disguising domination by the majority groups. Even if one accepts goodwill on the part of those in power the results of their activities are mostly negative for the minorities¹⁰.

Under the term consociation some theoreticians would like to define the ethnic policy which is exercised by some western constitutional democracies e.g. Belgium, Switzerland and Canada¹¹. This concept relates to a system of governing that has institutionalised the proportional ethnic representation and the comprehensive negotiated system of compromises and equilibrium between ethnic groups which are supposed to be equal. Although the concept of „community life“ is many times shown as stable democratic pluralism it is in fact sometimes a fragile and unstable system, working well only in particular circumstances which unfortunately very rarely obtain. This system in many situations reduces to the establishment of the conservative cartel of ethnic elites which participate in power and by giving in this way the priority to their class rather than to the ethnic interests¹².

In those socialist countries where on the basis of the recognition of ethnic diversity claim to exercise the policy of guaranteeing equality to their different ethnic groups the regimes add to the mentioned elements of ethnic policy in the western countries some ideological ingredients but in substance they are facing similar problems to the capitalist countries. The recent events in USSR (Kazakhstan, Azarbeidjan, Armenia, Baltic Republics etc), Yugoslavia (Kosovo etc), Bulgaria (the repudiation of the Macedonian and Turkish minorities etc), China (the disturbances in Tibet), Ethiopia (the problem of Eritrea etc) show among other things how fragile these systems of interethnic relations are in the conditions of the contemporary multiethnic industrial societies.

In conclusion I would like to emphasise the importance also of scientific theoretical work for fulfilling the needs of finding out in the future adequate means of developing interethnic relations in multicultural societies of the contemporary world, in accordance with the phenomenon of the revival of ethnicity and in accordance with new economic, technological and other dimensions which constitute the substance of the industrial and post-industrial contemporary societies. New concepts in policymaking could be elaborated on the basis of the following elements:

- (a) the adequate policy should include all the elements of the identity of the contemporary ethnic group, from language and culture to economy and the protection of the environment.
- (b) the ethnic groups should have the opportunity to participate in decision making concerning the issues mentioned above.

10 Ibidem, pp. 353.

11 the corner stones of this theory were set up by LEHMBRUCH and LIJPHART. See: G. LEHMBRUCH, *Proporzdemokratie*, Monk, TUBINGEN 1967; A. LIJPHART, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977.

12 P. L. van der Berghe, *supra* note 2, at 349.

- (c) the relations between minorities and majorities must be based on equality and on genuine common interests without paternalism. mere humanism or ideological premises of the majorities' ruling elites.
- (d) all these factual situations and intentions should be reflected in the constitutional, political and legal system of the multiethnic state and in its economic, cultural demographic and other policies as well.

But in any case the specific way of implementing these principles would rely on the specific historical, socio-economic and cultural circumstances in different regions of the world in particular states as well.

INŠTITUT ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA – INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC STUDIES

YU – 61000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, p. p. 318; tel. 210-964
ima na razpolago naslednje knjige in brošure:
offers you the following publications:

Drago Drušković: Carinthian Slovenes:

some Aspects of their Situation. – Ljubljana 1973 6.000 din (2,5 DEM)

Janko Jeri – Gorazd Kušej – Svetozar Polič: The special Statute
(Annex to the London Memorandum of Understanding);

Ljubljana 1974 2.400 din (1 DEM)

Die Slovenen in Karnten = Slovenci na Koroškem.

Celovec/Klagenfurt – Ljubljana 1974 9.600 din (4 DEM)

Twenty Years Overdue: Slovene and Croat Minorities in Austria.

Ljubljana 1976 2.400 din (1 DEM)

Sodobna vprašanja slovenske in hrvaške manjšine v Avstriji.

Ljubljana 1976 4.800 din (2 DEM)

Actual Questions of the Slovene and Croat Minorities in Austria.

Ljubljana 1976 4.800 din (2 DEM)

Aktuelle Fragen der slowenischen und der kroatischen

Minderheit in Österreich. – Ljubljana 1976 4.800 din (2 DEM)

Minorities: Bridge among the Nations. – Ljubljana 1980 6.000 din (2,5 DEM)

The Italian and Hungarian Nationalities in the

Socialist Republic of Slovenia. -- Ljubljana 1983 4.800 din (2 DEM)

Madžari in Slovenci: sodelovanje in sožitje ob

jugoslovansko-madžarski meji. – Ljubljana 1987 60.000 din (25 DEM)

Magyarok és Szlovének: Együttélésük és együttműködésük

a jugoszláv-magyar határ mentén. – Budapest 1987 13.000 din (5 DEM)

Šolstvo za Slovence na Koroškem –

sožitje ali ločevanje? Ljubljana 1988 24.000 din (10 DEM)

Minority Education in Carinthia – Co-existence or Fragmentation

(Selected Documents). – Ljubljana 1988 24.000 din (10 DEM)

ANTHONY D. SMITH

The London School of Economics and Political Science
University of London

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF ETHNIC SURVIVAL

It is only recently that social scientists have concerned themselves with the issue of ethnic survival. Historians had naturally come across the problem of the factors involved in the survival or dissolution of *ethnie*, but social scientists were slow to appreciate the importance of this question. That importance is not only intrinsic; it is also vital to our understanding of both nations and stratification. For it is within the context of ethnic formations that strata and classes evolve and come into conflict; and conversely, the interplay of strata and classes is an important factor in transforming and renewing *ethnie* and nations.

The meaning of „Ethnic survival“

The subject of ethnic survival and dissolution is vast. It embraces every continent and several epochs of history; depending on how one defines the central concepts, its ramifications are wideranging and complex. It is therefore necessary at the outset to limit the scope of this discussion by a rather selective use of examples from different epochs and areas (mainly the Middle East and Europe), and by focussing on the question of how *ethnie* renew themselves. I shall accordingly deal rather cursorily with several factors that require much more sustained investigation, and concentrate on those aspects that are immediately relevant to problems of ethnic selfrenewal, notably those concerned with popular participation and mythmaking capacity.¹

But, first, what do we mean by terms like „ethnic survival“ and „ethnic dissolution“? Does not such a formulation imply a rather „instrumental“ manner of approaching ethnicity, one which fails to grasp the inner significance for the participants of

¹ That similar phenomena can be found in other areas, notably Africa, India and the Far East, is clear; but the rather different social organisation and religious traditions in these areas may require some modification of emphases, if not approach. Some modern examples of the interplay between religious mobilisation and social change in Asia can be found in D. F. Smith (1974).

„ethnic ties“? This would only be true if one accepted a rather extreme „primordialism“ which saw ethnicity as a natural datum and *ethnie* as fixed quantities „out there“, indestructible building-blocks of humanity. Such a view finds no support in the historical record, which is full of variation in ethnic experience, including ethnogenesis, ethnic transformation, ethnic renewal, and ethnocide. This is not to imply that ethnicity is such a malleable resource and *ethnie* are so ephemeral and situational that it becomes almost impossible to speak of „ethnic survival“. There are enough durable and long-lived *ethnie*, and sufficiently strong and pervasive ethnicity at that, at least in some cases, to allow us to pose the problem of „ethnic survival“. Besides, it is a problem that, both in the past and today, exercised the minds of many members of ethnic communities whose decline was viewed with alarm.²

To pose the problem of „ethnic survival“ in a way which might yield fruitful answers, it is first necessary to define the concept of *ethnie* and ethnic ties. „Ethnos“ in ancient Greek referred originally to the „band“ or „tribe“ (of friends, warriors, Lycians, — in Homer) and thence to any group that lived together and shared a common history and culture in virtue of an alleged common ancestry. *Ethnie* are not blood groups, they are culture-communities based on fictive descent ties, a genealogical myth. Myths are, in fact, essential to ethnicity, as are symbols, values, traditions and memories. Indeed, one might define an *ethnie* as a named human group of common fictive ancestry and historical memories, shared culture and territorial associations, and sentiments of solidarity. (This last may vary considerably as to intensity, durability and social penetration). While not every *ethnie* needs to be in possession of „its“ territory all the time, it must feel a link with, and be associated with, a particular „homeland“, a territory which it, and others, regard as historically linked with the particular *ethnie*. This is true even of diaspora communities like the Greeks, Armenians and Jews. Ethnicity is not some vague, ethereal or purely emotional quality; it has concrete dimensions, of which „land“ is one, and a vital dimension.³

It follows from the above definition that when one poses problems of „ethnic survival“, it is primarily to the culture, historical memories, ancestry myths and sentiments of solidarity that one must address oneself. When we speak of „ethnic transformation“ or „ethnic survival“, we are primarily interested in the patterns of maintenance and change of „myth-symbol“ complexes, of memories, traditions and values. Of course, there is a demographic dimension; myths, symbols and memories refer to individuals and groups (and places and epochs) and are narrated and believed by people. But it is the fund of symbols, myths, memories and values, which define a given population as an *ethnie*, irrespective of the real provenance (which may have been forgotten) of different segments of the historical community.⁴

It is, of course, a hazardous and often subjective undertaking to try to determine the boundary between ethnic „survival“ and „transformation“. As we shall see, different elements change at differing rates, so that while we may legitimately speak of

2 For a discussion of rival approaches to „ethnicity“, and the possibility of synthesizing them, see McKay (1982); cf. A. D. Smith (1984a).

3 The symbolic and fictive-genealogical aspects of ethnicity are also stressed by Horowitz (1985, ch. 2). For a fuller discussion of my basic approach, see A. D. Smith (1986, Part I) and A. D. Smith (1981a).

4 For the concept of „myth-symbol“ complex, see the seminal work by Armstrong (1982), which also concentrates on the pre-modern Christians and Islamic worlds, but deals only cursorily with the ancient world.

„survival“ along some dimensions, it would be more appropriate to speak of „transformation“ along others. Names like Egypt or Persia may be long-lasting, for example, even when much of the cultural content of „Egyptian-ness“ and „Persian-ness“ has been more or less radically transformed. Language, religion, symbolism, ancestry-myths change at different rates, and in some cases more profoundly than in others. The area bristles with conceptual and methodological difficulties.

Identity-maintenance and dissolution

Nevertheless, some preliminary remarks can be made to open up discussion in this area. No attempt is made here to be comprehensive. Instead, I shall focus on the modes of „self-renewal“ of *ethnie*, and the particular place occupied by participatory election myths. But first it may be useful to list a few of the main factors relevant to the larger problem of „ethnic survival“ and „dissolution“.

1. *Autonomy and subjection*: The most obvious factor, and the one usually cited by nationalists, is that of foreign rule and the need for „self-determination“. What is alleged here is that one of the pre-conditions of „ethnic survival“ is self-rule, because „authenticity“ is only possible in a condition of „autonomy“. This is, in fact, a modern philosophical position, one favoured by Rousseau, Kant and their followers; but it finds little correspondence with historical or contemporary fact, unless of course one defines „authenticity“ to include (or logically to entail) „autonomy“, in this special philosophical sense. In practise, many *ethnie* have survived more or less intact under foreign rule, especially when organised as *millets* in a polyethnic empire, as the Greeks and Armenians were under the Ottoman empire. (That they also suffered oppression, neglect, etc. is another matter; the question here concerns only the degree of survival of their central patterns of myth, symbol, memory, tradition and values). Even today, it is possible for *ethnie* included within larger states to maintain their basic cultural patterns, despite the ravages of „modernisation“ and an alien state; one thinks of the Basques and Catalans under Franco's rule, or the Tamils and Sinhalese under British rule.⁵

This is not to imply that autonomy, and more especially a history of independent statehood, is not an important source of ethnic maintenance and even self-renewal. Operating as folk memory, often heavily idealised, an epoch of independent statehood, often associated with heroic kings and lawgivers, and appearing from afar as a „golden age“, can frequently serve as a model for ethnic regeneration, after a period of decline and transformation. This suggests that such folk memories, important as they are, do not in themselves promote the retention of ethnic identity patterns; they function rather to guide ethnic self-renewals and ethnicist movements of restoration, as with the nationalist movements of self-renewal among the Slovaks and the nations of Yugoslavia.⁶

5 On the Basques and Catalans, see Payne (1971) and Heiberg (1975). For the Sri Lankan situation, see Horowitz (1985, 132–4, 244–6). For the European philosophical tradition of autonomy, see Kedourie (1960); on „authenticity“ in Herder, see Berlin (1976).

6 On the rise of Slovak nationalism, see Brock (1976); the classic account of the rise of nationalism in south-eastern Europe, remains Stavrianos (1961); cf. Singleton (1985).

2. *Rootedness and exile*: Another frequently cited factor is residence. Again, it is part of the nationalist vision of a world of distinct nations that each should not only occupy „its own“ historic territory, but that, since a nation's energy and creativity springs from the „soil“, its identity depends on a close and lasting symbiosis with the „homeland“. Rootedness is therefore viewed as a precondition of national survival, while exile is seen as a „living death“. Again, the ideology is true only by a special, almost tautological reading; „exile“ in this sense implies spiritual deracination. But, historical facts suggest another possibility: exiled *ethnie* (or their elites) certainly undergo some change in their cultural patterns, but to compensate for their physical removal, often seek to strengthen their traditions and memories. This was certainly the case with armenians and Jews; just as it was exile that impelled many greek intellectuals to seek to recover their „roots“ in antiquity.⁷

Again, this does not mean that residence in a territory which has come to be regarded as the „homeland“ (which, in origin, is quite often a conquered territory, if one goes far enough back in time) is not vital to the retention of ethnic ties and culture-patterns. For one thing, homelands delineate, if only roughly in pre-modern epochs, the boundaries of the community in relation to „strangers“; for another, they furnish the „poetic landscapes“, the pictures and images of cultural association, which form so important a part of the cultural heritage of *ethnie* and nations, even of those whose members reside far from the homeland, in „exile“. A certain, perhaps unmeasurable part, of an *ethnie's* cultural patterns are formed and maintained through continual interaction of the population with the peculiar features of the landscape and the location.⁸

3. *Immigration and isolation*: The issue at stake here is the degree to which isolation from external populations and their cultures is conducive to ethnic survival. This was certainly the prescription of the more extreme nationalists, particularly in Germany; but we also find intimations of the idea from the Old Testament and Rome's early rejection of foreign cults from Asia to the Spanish *limpieza de sangre* in the sixteenth century. In practice, the injection of foreign elements, both people and ideas, often enhances ethnic survival, by modifying traditional ways and beliefs to meet changing external conditions. Nationalists, despite their rhetoric, have often borrowed ideas and practices from their neighbours; the Meiji Japanese reformers did so on a fairly large scale, albeit selectively. The question of ethnic survival arises only where the scale of cultural borrowing and/or immigration into the community is such as to imperil the very existence of its fund of myths, memories, traditions and values.⁹

A case in point is the question of Greek identity. The early nationalists were convinced of a demographic and cultural continuity between the population of ancient and modern Greece. That a Greek identity exists is not in question. The issue concerns the provenance of that identity, whether Byzantine or (ancient) Hellenic. It was an issue that left a profound mark on Greek politics in the nineteenth and early

7 For the Greek case, see the essay by Koumariou in Clogg (1973), and for the Armenians and Jews, see Armstrong (1982, ch. 7).

8 I have discussed in more detail these „poetic landscapes“ in A. D. Smith (1986, ch. 8); for other aspects of „national territory“, see A. D. Smith (1981b).

9 For the Völkisch writers' rejection of the „alien“ in Germany, see Mosse (1964); for racist ideas in Spain and other European countries, see Poliakov (1974).

twentieth century; but its ramifications go much deeper. The decisive question was the degree to which any continuity could be discerned between the Greek population and culture under late Roman and early Byzantine rule, and the population and culture in Greece and Ionia under middle and late Byzantine rule. Given the massive influx of Slavic migrants from the north into Greece in the sixth and seventh centuries, how can we speak of „continuity“ between ancient and medieval „Greece“? The latter can only figure as a geographical expression, but no longer as a cultural and demographic one. Against this argument, was the continuity implied by the name, the language (despite changes) and the Hellenised form of Christianity known as a Greek Orthodoxy with its Greek liturgy and concepts. In other words, a measure of cultural continuity (including ancestry and other myths) can coexist with considerable demographic discontinuity, even if the continuity was confined to the elites, mainly in Constantinople.¹⁰

4. *Religious conservatism and conversion*: This example raises the further problem of the role of religion in assuring ethnic survival. If it is not solely a question of demographic reproduction and continuity, perhaps the answer to our problem of ethnic survival can be found in the resistance of religious traditions to external pressures and change. That is undoubtedly what many religious leaders believe, as they exhort their flock to remain faithful to ancestral beliefs and mores. Again, the Greek example will serve. At the time of the 1821 revolt, the Patriarch and many senior Orthodox clergy in Byzantium exhorted their followers not to join; they rightly feared that success in that venture would undermine their position as guardians, not only of the faith, but of ethnic tradition and even ethnic survival, at least in the form that they knew and recognised.¹¹

This last phrase is vital. The fact is that ethnic forms, though long-lasting, do change and are transformed. Even in pre-modern eras, a *particular* religion may not be necessary for the maintenance of ethnic identity. A people may „change its religion“, and yet remain identified by themselves and others as the same people. Of course, the change within that identity has been profound. When the Persian Sassanid empire fell to the Arabs in 642, and Iran was gradually Islamised over the next three centuries, Persian identity did not disappear: a name, a sense of difference from the Arabs and others, memories of Sassanid glory, various myths and legends, remained to set the Persians apart. Succeeding Persian dynasties, notably the Saffarids and Samanids, did much to revive a sense of Persian greatness, albeit in Islamic garb. Indeed, it was under the Samanids and the succeeding Buyyid dynasty, that New Persian developed and with it the glories of Persian poetry and history, notably Firdausi's *Shah-nama*. All this was accomplished at a time when the state religion of Sassanid Persia, zoroastrianism, went into popular decline and became the preserve of a cultured minority in Iran itself. Hence, religious conversion, far from destroying an *ethnie* and its sense of identity, may actually revive it in new forms.¹²

10 For a preliminary discussion of this vexed issue in modern Greece, see Campbell and Sherrard (1968, ch. 1); cf. the essay by Mango in Clogg (1973). On late Byzantine Greece, see Armstrong (1982).

11 See on this Frazee (1969).

12 On these dynasties and their „Persian“ identity, see Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. IV (1975) and Morgan (1988, ch. 2).

Indeed, religious conversion may sometimes stand at the cradle of ethnic formation. A case could be maintained for this in respect of both Polish and Russian origins. The conversion to Roman Catholicism of the Piast dynasty in 966, and of Vladimir of Kiev in 988, are often taken to mark the effective beginning of their respective ethnic communities, along with the formation of their polities. Such conversions may, indeed, be viewed as political manoeuvres against political rivals; but their effects go far beyond immediate circumstances of state or dynastic strengthening. By creating a myth of royal conversion, the former tribes and cities are given a dynamic and distinctive *mythomoteur* which „ethnicises“ the religion, makes it the property and expression of the people and its rulers; and thereby infuses both with a sense of being „chosen“ to do God's work.¹³

5. *Hierarchy and participation*: A final factor, among the many that might be discussed, is the role of social penetration in maintaining a sense of ethnic identity and its cultural patterns.

Generally speaking, it is the upper strata which „bear“, in Weber's sense, the values and traditions of the community. Indeed, in many cases, we hardly stop to ask about the ethnic identification of the vast majority of an area's inhabitants in pre-modern eras, i. e. the peasants and herdsmen. They stand as mutes to the ethnic dramas played out by the elites; and quite often the latter recognise little or no sense of cultural identity with peasants who are tenants or serfs, even where in some „objective“ sense (e. g. language or religion) they share some of their culture. This was certainly true of several areas in Eastern Europe, though the extent of aristocratic cultural exclusiveness is disputed.¹⁴

It is sometimes thought that this failure to strike deep ethnic roots in the countryside and in the lower classes, can explain the decline of *ethnie* and even their dissolution. Certainly, a growing social and cultural remoteness from the Assyrian peasantry played its part in weakening the sense of Assyrian identity in the seventh century B. C. But it is only one of several factors which must be invoked to give a satisfactory explanation of the dissolution of the Assyrian *ethnie*. It may also help to account for the eventual demise of ancient peoples like the Hittites and Philistines, who ruled over other ethnic groups and constituted „lateral“ aristocratic *ethnie*, faced with waves of tribal immigration bringing new cultures.¹⁵

Yet we should not be misled by these examples. Several „lateral“ and extensive *ethnie*, such as the Arya in India, or the Magyar knights, were able to perpetuate large elements of their cultural patterns and later incorporate into that culture large numbers of tribes and peasants possessing other, if less well-defined, cultures, usually through political action and state structures. On the other side, more „vertical“ and demotic *ethnie*, whose lower strata were much more prone to participate regularly in the culture of the elites, and who were often enthused with a sense of cultural „mission“, have not always proved able to maintain that culture; one thinks of the Sumerian and Phoenician city-states, and the somewhat different case of the Coptic

13 For the concept of *mythomoteur*, see Armstrong (1982); on the Russian case, see Pipes (1977).

14 This is Gellner's contention in Gellner (1983, ch. 2); but see Sugar (1980) and Pearson (1983) for some variations.

15 For the Assyrian case, see Roux (1964, chs. 19–23); for the Phoenicians, see Moscati (1973). I have discussed the question of their eventual dissolution in A. D. Smith (1986, ch. 5).

culture in Egypt, which has survived but as a minority in the land of its origins, the majority having adopted both Islam and Arab culture, though of a quite separate variety.¹⁶

This suggests that popular participation in the ethnic culture offers no guarantee of ethnic survival. At the same time, a refusal by aristocratic elites to share, or impose, their culture on the countryside and the lower strata, poses problems of ethnic self-renewal, and makes the „lateral“ *ethnie* vulnerable to other elites or immigrants bearing a more salvatory and participant culture.

Modes of ethnic self-renewal

It is clear that none of the factors briefly reviewed above can of themselves account for the survival or dissolution of *ethnie*. But what they suggest are various modes of regeneration, through which *ethnie* can prolong their identities, albeit with important changes in their patterns of culture. For what threatens ethnic survival most are the twin dangers of ossification and attenuation. This, I would argue, was what drained Assyrian identity of its vitality; on the one hand, attenuation of the Assyrian-ness of that culture through the influx of Aramean-speakers and Aramean culture, and on the other hand, too close a dependence of Assyrian religion and culture on the state and Babylonian religious models, creating an ossified political and ritualistic culture.¹⁷

When we consider those instances of *ethnie* where survival was ensured, it becomes clear that various mechanisms of self-renewal are at work. They include:

1. *Religious reform*: Given the fundamental importance of religion in maintaining ethnic identity in pre-modern eras, the ability of an ethnic religion or ethno-religious community to renew itself through religious reform becomes pivotal. This is not to say that religious reformation is the main or even a necessary condition of ethnic survival; or that it will ensure such survival. Over the long term, even a successful religious reform may fail to stem ethnic decline, particularly where a degree of ethnocide is practiced by powerful neighbours or rulers. This was the case with the priestly reforms among the Samaritans in the fourteenth century; by the seventeenth century the community was in decline in Palestine, Egypt and Syria.¹⁸

Nevertheless, other factors being favourable, religious reform represents one of the main ways in which *ethnie* renew themselves; and it is no accident that a number of early nationalist movements were preceded by movements of religious reform, notably in southeast Asia and the Middle East.¹⁹

Given the strong „ethnic colouring“ of even the world-religions in particular areas, and the dangers of ossification, notably through excessive emphasis on priestly ritual, the influence of religious reform on ethnic identity and survival, should occasion no

16 For the Coptic case, see Atiya (1968, Part I) and Wakin (1963); for the distinction between „vertical“ and „lateral“ *ethnie*, see A. D. Smith (1986, ch. 4).

17 This is implied in Roux (1964); cf. Oppenheim (1977).

18 For the Samaritans today, see Strizower (1962); and for their medieval priestly reforms, cf. Encyclopedia Judaica (1971: under „Samaritans“).

19 On which, see Wertheim (1958); and Sharabi (1970).

surprise. At the same time, the content of that reform needs to be considered; the more salvationist, yet textual, the reform, the greater the chances of a religiously-inspired ethnic renewal.

2. *Selective borrowing*: *Ethnie* are always undergoing some degree of change, and are normally subject to periodic external influence. One habitual mode of ethnic self-renewal is through culture contact, and especially the guided borrowing of ideas and practices from other, perhaps technologically more advanced, cultures. The stimulus of hellenistic culture undoubtedly helped to renew the Jewish community in Palestine in the three centuries before Jesus and shape both Cristianity and Rabbinic Judaism²⁰. The conflict in Judea over the pace of hellenisation under the Seleucids reflected this problem of selective borrowing. Similar concern surfaced two millennia later in the Ottoman empire. Again, the question revolved around the degree to which Western ideas and institutions provided appropriate models for a polyethnic empire subjects to Islamic cultural patterns; the era of Tanzimat reflected the need to contain borrowed elements within a traditional framework. In this case, the borrowing came too late to preserve the empire, but it paved the way for the resurgence of a Turkic identity based on a neglected culture and despised memories.²¹

3. *Incorporation and participation*: The opening up of an *ethnie* to wider strata may also serve to renew the fabric of the community. Thus the Safavid Shi'ite regime in Persia drew in more of the Iranian populations, especially the Persians, in a way that earlier Islamic regimes in Iran had failed to do. Such opening up by the State we may term „incorporation“. It is not to be confused with the „participation“ from below of lower strata in a demotic community. Here there is a genuine movement of the lower classes, often against the elites, as the socio-religious movement of Mazdak was directed against the Persian Sassanid state in the fifth century, and in turn provoked the repressive reforms of Chosroes I.²²

One of the ways in which „lateral“ *ethnie* can prolong themselves is through bureaucratic incorporation of middle and lower strata. The classic examples are the French and English kingdoms in the later medieval era. It was the state, based on the elite culture of the dominant *ethnie*, which diffused the fund of ethnic myths, memories and traditions to outlying areas and lower social strata, not without class and regional conflict. Nevertheless, the outcome was successful from the standpoint of the French and English elites and their cultural survival, even if minority cultures were not completely absorbed. From the medieval era to the modern, it is possible to trace a continuity in terms of French and English language, symbolism, mythology and historical memory, despite all the changes in form and content which each have undergone.²³

At the other end of the spectrum, we find those „vertical“ communities, in which popular participation has periodically generated an extraordinary enthusiasm, and in which an almost missionary zeal has from time to time overwhelmed the social order

20 For this influence, see Tcherikover (1970).

21 This is analysed in Berkes (1964); for the revival of a „Turkic“ identity, see Lewis (1968, especially ch. 10).

23 See generally on this, Seton-Watson (1977) and Armstrong (1982). For ethnic myths in England, see MacDougall (1982).

and spilled out into the wider political arena. Such, of course, are the socio-religious movements which founded the Jewish and Arab communities and fuelled their migrations, and which reappeared from time to time in both communities, ensuring their survival in change. Such movements are often bound up with the appearance of charismatic leaders, who are later treated as heroic exemplars of a „golden age“, now lost but perhaps, with effort, capable of restoration... These are the Mosaic or Davidic eras, or the Age of the Companions.²⁴

4. *Myths of election*: Linked to these mobilising religious movements are those characteristic myths which define a special role for the ethnic community, one that sets them apart from others. The sense of being favoured and chosen by the gods or by God, made its appearance quite early in human history. At first, it seems to have been a „holy land“, or simply, as in ancient Egypt, „the land“. The lands of Sumer and Akkad acquired this special character by the late third millennium B. C., but it is unclear how far these early civilisations regarded themselves as sacred (as opposed to sacred centres Within each). The first great example of a whole community being treated as „chosen“ was, of course, the children of Israel; and in time, Canaan, the promised land, acquired a similar sacred character, along with its former Jebusite stronghold and now Israelite capital, Jerusalem.²⁵

From the Jews, the sense of election passed to various Cristian and Islamic peoples: Amharic Ethiopians, Copts, Armenians, various Shi'ite sects, Druse, etc., as well as Byzantine Greeks, Russians, Irish, English, French and many others. This sense of chosenness and special destiny was also fed by the ethnocentrism typical of pre-modern *ethnie*, such as could be found in ancient Greece, Egypt and Persia, where the centrality and superiority of one's community was widely taken for granted. The combination often produced a missionary fervour, which simultaneously set the elect apart, while driving them to seek converts by example or the sword, as in early Christianity and Islam. In the Christian case, the sense of election was quickly separated from any ethnic dimension (though it later re-emerged in several Eastern versis of Christianity); whereas in the Islamic case, it was the sense of Arab election which played a major mobilising and sustaining role, even in periods of disunity and decline.²⁶

Myths of election, once formulated, play a key role in ensuring the survival, if not the continuity, of ethnic identity. Even they, however, may not be able to assure ultimate survival and rebirth. The Copts, for example, underwent a long period of decline in their own land; though in the last century they experienced something of a religious revival, linked to their original monastic traditions, they have not been able to stem their own marginalisation in an Islamic Egypt. The same was true over long periods for the Irish, Greeks, Persians and Chinese, until the advent of nationalism revitalised their sense of identity and gave their myths of election a new, if secularised, lease of life. On the other hand, failure to formulate such a myth, as seems to have happened in Phoenicia and Assyria, despite all their ethnocentrism, undermined their capacity to withstand adversity in war and division at home. There was nothing to sustain their identity, nothing with which to interpret their destiny.²⁷

24 For the Arab Islamic movement, see Lewis (1970); for the Jewish case, see Seltzer (1980).

25 On this, see Zeitlin (1984, especially chs. 3, 6-7). For some intimations of „chosenness“ in relation to the land in Sumer and Akkad, see Roux 91964).

26 See on this Carmichael (1967); for the „ethnisation“ of eastern Christianity, see Atiya (1968).

27 On some of these election myths, see A. D. Smith (1984b). On modern Coptic history, see the essay by Meinardus in Arberry (1969).

Crisis and choice

What emerges from the preceding brief analysis is the importance of mobilising myths for ethnic self-renewal. This is obvious in the case of the more „vertical“ demotic *ethnie*, where common cultural patterns and a sense of solidarity pervade all strata and regions of the community, and where there is a tradition of popular participation. But we also find such mobilising myths at work among the „lateral“ aristocratic communities, particularly where their sense of position, including their class situation, is bound up with a sense of religious mission against infidel enemies, as with the Hungarian knights against the Turks. Sometimes, an aristocratic *ethnie* may manifest ambivalence towards a mobilising myth of election, particularly if it emanated from the artisan or peasant strata; many French aristocrats in the early fifteenth century, while welcoming English defeats, were suspicious, even hostile, to the mission of French election proclaimed by Joan of Arc to the Dauphin.²⁸

This example suggests that what determines the emergence and role of mass mobilising myths of election in ensuring ethnic self-renewal, is the combination of a salvation tradition with periods of danger and crisis for the community. The case, analysed by Weber, was the prophetic and Deuteronomic movement in ancient Israel and Judah. In a situation of recurrent crisis and danger from the conflicts between Egypt, Aram and an expanding Assyria, from the ninth century B. C. to the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar in 587 B. C., there emerged twin revivalist movements, the one priestly, the other prophetic, urging the renewal of Israel's Covenant with God, the core of its election myth. The oracles of the classical prophets, and the reforms of Josiah, were premised on the belief in a „holy people“ inhabiting a sacred land, on condition of fulfilling divine commands which included the retention of a distinctive life-style, traditions, values and symbolism. It was this election myth, evoked by an adverse international situation, that thereafter helped to sustain a flagging sense of identity, particularly in the diaspora.²⁹

This example also illustrates the importance of individual and collective choices. There were, after all, other conceivable responses to crisis; some of the kings of Israel and Judah made them, to their detriment, and bought about further decline in morale and assimilation to pagan ways. The crisis of the Byzantine empire after 1204 served to reinforce the election myth of the Greek Orthodox, by stressing the hellenic aspects of its culture and identity; even though the choice was made on religious grounds, it strengthened the sense of election of the Greeks as the imperial dominant *ethnie*.³⁰ Similarly, the choice of a „Byzantine ideology“ (of the Third Rome) by Ivan III and his successors, though no doubt a predominantly political calculation, served to undergird the dynastic ideology of the redeemer-Tsar and his sacred church and people. At any rate, the choice of this election myth had profound consequences for the rising tide of Russian ethnic solidarity.³¹

28 On which, see Warner (1983).

29 See Zeitlin (1984, chs. 6–7).

30 See Baynes and Moss (1969, chs. 1,9) and Armstrong (1982, 178–81).

31 See the essay by Baron Meyendorff and Baynes in Baynes and Moss (1969), and by Cherniavsky in Ranum (1975). For a recent analysis of some election myths, notably in America, see O'Brien (1988).

In this essay, I have only sketched in some of the main factors which influence ethnic survival and self-renewal. A more detailed examination of these factors, and their effects for ethnic transformation, would demand a volume. But I hope I have been able to provide some pointers for future discussion, and highlight the role of mobilising election myths and popular participation in ethnic self-renewal.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arberry, A. J. (ed) (1969): *Religion in the Middle East: Three Religions in Concord and Conflict*, Vol. I: Judaism and Christianity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Armstrong, J. (1982): *Nations before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- Atiya, A. S. (1968): *A History of Eastern Christianity*, London, Methuen.
- Baynes, N. and Moss, H. (eds) (1969): *Byzantinism, An Introduction to East Roman Civilisation*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Berkes, N. (1964): *The development of secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, Mc Gill University Press.
- Berlin, I. (1976): *Vico and Herder*, London, Hogarth Press.
- Brock, P. (1976): *The Slovak National Awakening*, Toronto, Toronto University Press.
- Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. IV (1975): *The period from the Arab invasion to the Saljuqs*, (ed. R. N. Frye), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Campbell, J. and Sherrard, P. (1968): *Modern Greece*, London, Benn.
- Carmichael, J. (1967): *The Shaping of the Arabs*, New York, The Macmillan Company.
- Clogg, R. (ed) (1973): *The Struggle for Greek Independence*, London, Macmillan.
- Encyclopedia Judaica* (1971): Jerusalem, Keter Publishing Company.
- Frazee, C. A. (1969): *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-52*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Gellner, E. (1983): *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Heiberg, M. (1975): „Insiders/Outsiders: Basque Nationalism“, *European Journal of Sociology* 16, 169-93.
- Horowitz, D. (1985): *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press.
- Kedourie, E. (1960): *Nationalism*, London, Hutchinson.
- Lewis, B. (1968): *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, B. (1970): *The Arabs in History*, 5th Edition, London, Hutchinson & Company.
- McKay, J. (1982): „An exploratory synthesis of primordial and mobilisationist approaches to ethnic phenomena“, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 5, 395-420.
- MacDougall, J. (1982): *Racial Myth in English history: Trojans, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons*, Montreal, Harvest House.
- Morgan, D. (1988): *Medieval Persia, 1040-1797*, London and New York, Longman.
- Moscato, S. (1973): *The World of the Phoenicians*, London, Cardinal, Sphere Books Ltd.
- Mosse, G. (1964): *The Crisis of German Ideology*, New York, Grosset and Dunlap.
- O'Brien, C. C. (1988): *God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
- Oppenheim, L. (1977): *Ancient Mesopotamia, Portrait of a Dead Civilisation*, rev. edition by Erica Reiner, Chicago and London, Chicago University Press.
- Payne, S. (1971): „Catalan and Basque nationalism“, *Journal of Contemporary History* 6, 15-51.
- Pearson, R. (1983): *National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945*, London, The Macmillan Press.
- Pipes, R. (1977): *Russia under the old Regime*, London, Peregrine Books.
- Poliakov, L. (1974): *The Aryan Myth*, New York, Basic Books.
- Ranum, O. (ed) (1975): *National Consciousness, History and Political Culture*, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press.

- Roux, G. (1964): *Ancient Iraq*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Seltzer, R. M. (1980): *Jewish People, Jewish Thought*, New York, Macmillan.
- Seton-Watson, H. (1977): *Nations and States*, London, Methuen.
- Sharabi, H. (1970): *Arab Intellectuals and the West; the formative years, 1875–1914*, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press.
- Singleton, F. (1985): *A short History of the Yugoslav Peoples*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1981a): *The Ethnic Revival*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1981b): „States and homelands: the social and geopolitical implications of national territory“, *Millennium* 10, 187–202.
- Smith, A. D. (1984a): „Ethnic persistence and national transformation“, *British Journal of Sociology* 35, 452–61.
- Smith, A. D. (1984b): „National identity and myths of ethnic descent“, *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 7, 95–130.
- Smith, A. D. (1986): *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Smith, D. E. (ed) (1974): *Religion and Political Modernisation*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Stavrianos, L. S. (1961): *The Balkans since 1453* New York, Holt.
- Strizower, S. (1962): *Exotic Jewish Communities*, New York and London, Thomas Yoseloff.
- Sugar, P. (ed) (1980): *Ethnic diversity and conflict in Eastern Europe*, Santa Barbara, ABC-Clío.
- Tcherikover, V. (1970): *Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews*, New York, Athenaeum.
- Wakin, E. (1963): *A Lonely Minority, The modern story of Egip's Copts*, New York, William Morrow and Company.
- Warner, M. (1983): *Joan of Arc*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Wertheim, W. F. (1958): „Religious reform movements in South and South-east Asia“, *Archives de Sociologie des Religions* 9, 53–62.
- Zeitlin, I. (1984): *Ancient Judaism*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

ERIC D. WOLF

Herbert Lehman College and Graduate center
City University of New York

"ETHNICITY AND NATIONHOOD"

A hundred years ago many liberals and socialists heard and expected that a liberal or socialist internationalism would put an end to the array of competitive nation-states. Very much contrary to these expectations, nation states have multiplied in the modern world. New nation-states have emerged through the break-up of empires and culture spheres predicated on other principles of organization. Contrary to expectations, too – and contrary especially to the predictions that modernization would put an end to ethnic exclusivity, groups and clusters of groups passionately dedicated to the politics of ethnicity have also proliferated. Everywhere, the expansion of citizenship has seemingly been accompanied by the emergence into the public sphere of social and cultural entities that define themselves through claims to differential ancestry and use these claims to mark out distinctive social trajectories. Since World War II, moreover, many previously quiescent ethnic groupings are waging armed struggle to win political autonomy or to set up sovereign states of their own. Indeed, some people have argued that World War III has already begun – of 120-some wars going on at present, 86 or 72 percent involve conflicts between states and ethnically marked populations within them. Wars between sovereign states account for less than 3 percent of such struggles and insurgencies 15 percent (Nietschmann, 1987).

Not only have both nation-states and ethnic groupings multiplied, but the odd and distinctive phenomenon that marks them both is that claims to autonomy or sovereignty are advanced and fought over in terms of kinship. To be precise, these terms are not based on the actual genealogical reckoning of demonstrated genealogical linkages, but on the basis of imputed, stipulated kinship. Such claims of stipulated kinship, in the service of establishing what Benedict Anderson (1983) called „imagined communities“, are based on an ideology of common substance supposedly connecting all the claimants to ethnic or national identity. That common substance is imagined to pass down the generations partly through biological transfers, „descent“, and partly through the handing down through the generations of a valued, culturally learned „tradition“. As different scholars have pointed out, this kind of ideology tends to fuse biology and socially acquired heritage, to establish each such social entity as a monad, separate and distinctive from all other such monads, each possessing an essence that

marks it off from others possessed of different essences. The ideology „naturalizes“ these distinctions, establishing them in the nature of things; and this common-sensical view of the nature of things is placed in the service of claims to exclusiveness and priority, monopoly and precedence.

These claims, often real enough to the participants, require analysis — and that analysis has been one of the major concerns of the anthropological sciences. We understand, as scientists, that such claims to the possession of eternal essences are based on fictions. We know, for one, that such groups claiming commonality through descent change over time. We also know that they become salient under certain determinate circumstances, or recede into oblivion at other times. We also know that such entities have always existed in the presence of other ethnicons, peoples, nations; that they mix and fuse with others, both biologically and culturally; and that — therefore — social and cultural entities and identities are not given, but constructed in the very maelstrom of change and upheaval. We are thus instructed to be attentive to the precise ways which construct and relinquish claims to identity under the pressure of complex forces, processes, that underwrite, maintain, exacerbate or cool ethnic assertion.

How nations are constructed — socially, economically, politically, and in communicative terms — is now much better understood than before — say — the 1930's and World War II. Social historians, studying history „from below“ as well as „from above“ have shown us how politics, the law, the army, the educational system were re-shaped to shape in turn new systems of hegemonic national cultures — to make Britons of Disraeli's two hostile nations; to turn peasants into frenchmen (Eugene Weber); to make Italians to inhabit a new unified Italy; to turn the 50 odd German principalities into a German Reich. (It should perhaps be remembered in this context that the entire problematic of Ferdinand Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* which still haunts sociological inquiry is an extrapolation from the unwilling incorporation of Schleswig into the Bismarckian empire). We have also learned a lot from the models of social scientists who have shown how the successive formation of nations into nation-states took place in relation to each other. The advances of some core-states in the developing world system constrained the opportunities for their followers, and dictated the development of new national responses among the second and third cohort of new entrants. Thus the symbolic forms of nation-building have been remarkably similar, even as the various nations were consigned to quite different positions in the distribution of power and control over „the conditions of production“.

The symbolic forms of national-formation have been quite similar (flags, emblems, holidays, monuments, songs, theatre; the construction of a national aesthetics; resurrection and reformulation of literature, oral and written; exaltation of a standard language — see e.g. Mosse, 1975). Yet these forms have been introduced under different conditions, involving — as Antonio Gramsci understood so well — historically strategic alliances of classes and segments of classes that wield hegemony both over internal and external relations of the state.

When we look at ethnic phenomena (in the sense of efforts to underwrite the solidarity of groups through appeals to commonalities of descent and tradition), we are faced with a much wider range of circumstances that generate what seem to be similar effects. Ethnic phenomena arise under the impact widely different promptings.

A first step towards understanding them, therefore, is to look at them in different situations, to portray them in their very different scenarios.

A first scenario is that of groupings ordered by kinship among other groupings ordered by kinship, characterized not only by descent and affinity, but — in the absence of an overarching state — by autonomous processes of fission and fusion. An example of this is furnished by Maurice Godelier (1982) in his study of the Baruya of the Eastern New Guinea Highlands. Forming once part of a cluster called Yoyue, they broke with them in hostile action and fissioned off, invading territory occupied by other people, incorporating some of them while driving out others. The resultant federation of clans, held together by the initiation cult brought by the invading newcomers, constitutes the people now known as the Baruya.

A second scenario for the formation of ethnically defined groupings is furnished by situations along the expanding frontiers of European expansion, under the aegis of mercantile „capitalism“. Thus in North America local clusters of people formed ethnically defined alliances, such as the Iroquois, the Ottawa, the Chippewa, to take advantage of opportunities in the trade for furs and hides. In the ensuing military competition among European powers for control of the new continent, such macrobands were also able for a time to exploit their positions in the local balance of power. Similar situations obtained on the edges of the Dutch, French and Portuguese advance in Brazil; on the ever widening frontier of the slave trade in Africa; and on the Siberian frontiers of the Russian fur trade. Temporarily, but only temporarily, ethnogenesis here took place under conditions of relative autonomy, as yet unhampered by the political, legal, and military constraints of colonialism. It was accompanied, indeed underwritten, by lively exchanges of goods and information among the participants, giving rise to notable examples of cultural creativity as the result of interchange.

This kind of scenario comes to an end with the establishment of state dominance and control over territories, with defined territorial limits. From this perspective, one of the functions of the hegemonic state is to inhibit the processes of fusion and fission, as much as the securing of control over rival internal and external sovereignties. States, of course, stake out claims to a monopoly of power that can be realized only partially, thus causing the effective exercise of sovereignty to be distributed quite unevenly in both space and time. Yet, because one of the important functions of states is to secure „the conditions of production“ (Borochoy, 1937) (to construct the social, economic, political, legal and ideological infrastructure that renders expanding production possible), states also penetrate into localities and regions, curtailing local autonomies and subjugating their upholders, but also offering new opportunities and opening new lines for social mobility. In either case, the formation of ethnic clusters — either constrained in their functioning or privileged under changed circumstances — must now go forward in an active interchange with the state. Thus in Spain political centralization favored Castile and dampened the development of the Basque country and Catalonia. In France, Paris subjugated the many other „Frances“ (Braudel, 1984) and curtailed the autonomy of the maritime towns. But integration can be quite uneven: in Britain, the conquest of Ireland subjugated the Gaelic-speakers to a class of Anglo-Irish landlords, while in Scotland warfare broke the back of the Scottish landed class, but opened up the road to an alliance of Scottish merchants with the City of London.

What spells subjugation for some, opens up opportunities for others. Some opportunities are economic, most notably in trade. A type example is furnished by Abner Cohen's study of the emergence of Hausa cattle traders in Nigeria who secure their control over trade routes and transactions through the development of an especially pious, ethnically-based, Islam (1969). Similar commercial diasporas, giving rise to ethnically defined networks, occur elsewhere (Curtin, 1984). Other opportunities are political/bureaucratic, offering points of entry to ethnic groups that master the appropriate skills of literacy and professionalism, e.g. „Nyasalanders“ (Malawians) in Central Africa (Epstein, 1958), Creols in Sierra Leone (Cohen, 1981), Garifuna in Belize (Wright, 1986). Still other ethnically defined networks may straddle several domains, as did the Scots who moved into Asian commerce, railroad construction, missionary activities and into the cadres of empire in the 19th century. (In that context it is worth remembering that a whole cult of Scottish nostalgia and ethnic identity as noble savages was invented in the late 18th and 19th centuries — see Trevor-Roper, 1983).

A quite different scenario born of constraint and opportunity marks the emergence of ethnic markers in the labor markets of the capitalist world. The advances and retreats of industries with different requirements for the elements of production, including labor, and the segmentation of work processes into distinctive operations create very different circumstances for populations of workers. The type case that would show the rest of the world what to expect in the future was early industrial Britain, where proletarianization of the English working class went hand in hand with the large-scale immigration of Irish workers, much resented and allocated at lower pay to the more menial occupations. The burgeoning demand for labor on plantations around the world led, first, to the wholesale export of African slaves, later to „the second slavery“ of Indian and Chinese contract laborers, and still later to the contracting of multiple „available“ ethnic groups (for a recent Central American example, see Burgois, 1988). Expanding industry in North America was heavily fed by the city-ward movement of Afro-American ex-slaves after the Civil War. Since the end of World War II, Europe—previously a major exporter of people — has become a region of immigration. Göran Therborn summarizes the effects of this as „the Old World turned New“, but „getting the worst of both worlds, the underclass ghettos of the New while keeping the traditional cultural closure of the Old“ (1987, p. 1187). Lest we fall into a misplaced methodological individualism — looking at the migrant as an individual agent, and forgetting the folks he or she left behind, the remittances sent home, the active connections woven across oceans between sending and receiving areas — we must come to see the new ethnic economics and politics as connecting regions of the so-called core with regions of the periphery as quite new, and often emergent, cultural phenomena.

Finally, there is the scenario of ethnic assertion in secessionist rebellions against dominant states. I have already mentioned that two thirds of the wars going on in the world at the present time are between Third World states, most of them created in the 20th century, and so-called minorities, ethnic cluster both new and old fighting to gain autonomy or set up independent states, or to defend their resources against invasion by their putative co-citizens. The Niskito in Nicaragua, the Xawthoolei in Burma, the Tamil in Sri Lanka, the Palestinians in Israel, the Maya in Guatemala are only a few of these. One might hazard the guess that war is one of the most effective ways of

intensifying ethnicity. For obvious reasons this is a process not easily studied, but worth the anthropologist's attention. I will mention here only the outstanding study (1985) by David Lanof how the Shona rebels, during the conflict that created an independent Zimbabwe, constructed for themselves an identity as quasi-reincarnations of royal warriors of the past, by developing links of communication, through the agency of spirit mediums, with the *mhondoro*, the spirits of the dead Shona kings and chiefs. Not every example is as dramatic as this; but the re-formulation and innovation of tradition under the aegis of ethnic ideologies is an on-going process in the modern world.

In conclusion, let me state my conviction that, if we are to understand the range of phenomena just touched on in this presentation, we shall also have to revise our time-honored conceptions of the concept „culture“. Perhaps that concept, too, is a legacy of a time when we thought in essentialist terms, of each Volk, each people, with a distinctive culture, a characteristic mode of integration, its own world view. This manner of apprehending culture very much beget the question of just how unity and integration was achieved, under what circumstances, and with what degree of uniformity or differentiation. We need to substitute for this all too easy view of cultural homogeneity a much more organizational perspective. It will mean looking at culture-making and re-making in terms of particular, specifiable processes of organization and communication, always deployed in contexts „of different interests, oppositions, and contradictions“ (Fox, 1985, p. 197). (Recently Fredrik Barth /1983, 1987/ has taken up Robert Redfield's notion of a „social organization of tradition“ /1956/, while Hobsbawm and Ranger have pointed out how often traditions are invented as „responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition“ /1983, p. 2/). We are challenged to comprehend culture always „in the making“ (Fox, 1985), to learn to comprehend just how in the midst of on-going action the protagonists combine old and new practices into ever renewed and ever new figurations.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, Benedict, 1983, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London
- Barth, Friderik, 1983, *Sohar: Culture and Society in an Omani Town*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
-, 1987, *Cosmologies in the Making: A Generative Approach to Cultural Variation in Inner New Guinea*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Borochov, Ber, 1937, *Nationalism and the Class Struggle: A Marxian Approach to the Jewish Question*, Poale-Zion, New York.
- Bourgois, Philippe, 1988, „Conjugated Oppression: Class and Ethnicity among Guaymí and Kuna Banana Workers“, *American Ethnologist*, v. 15, no. 2, pp. 328–348.
- Braudel, Ferdinand, 1984, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th – 18th Century*, vol. 3, Collins, London.
- Cohen, Abner, 1969, *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa*, University of California, Berkeley.
-, 1981, *The Politics of Elite Culture: Explorations in the Dramaturgy of Power in a Modern African Society*, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Curtin, Philip D., 1984, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

- Epstein, A. L., 1958, *Politics in an Urban African Community*, Manchester University Press for Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Manchester.
- Fox, Richard G., 1985, *Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making*, University of California Press, Berkley.
- Godelier, Maurice, 1982, *La production des Grands Hommes*, Fayaed, Paris.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J., and Terence Ranger, 1983, *The Invention of Tradition*, Past and Present Publications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Mosse, George L., 1975, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich*, Howard Fertig, New York.
- Nietschmann, Bernard, 1987, „The Third World War“, *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, v. 11, no. 3, pp. 1–16.
- Redfield, Robert, 1956, *Peasant Society and Culture*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Therborn, Göran, 1987, „Migration and Western Europe: The Old World Turning New“, *Science*, Sept. 4th, v. 237, pp. 1183–1188.
- Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 1983, „The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland“, in Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger eds., *The Invention of Tradition (op. cit.)*, pp. 15–41.
- Wright, Pamela, 1986, *Language Shift and the Redefinition of Social Boundaries among the Carib of Belize*, Ph. D. dissertation, Graduate School, City University of New York.

DUŠAN JANJIĆ

Inštitut za društvene nauke, Beograd

THE NATION

1. The origin of the term „Nation“ and the consequences of the present terminological confusion in theoretical discussion of the concept of „Nation“

In theoretical discussions of social phenomena, and of the nation in particular, numerous disturbing and often funny situations arise from the misuse of language as a means of communication.

These situations arise from the ambiguity of key terms used in the research and dissemination of ideas related to the nation, and from the ambiguity of the term „nation“ itself. These terms are often used, moreover, without any precise definition of the meaning attached to them by individual authors and particular social, class, national, cultural and other „environments“, or scientific disciplines. As a result of this terminological uncertainty and frequent confusion, the real problems are often hardly touched upon.¹

Much of the established terminology tends to confuse the nation with other phenomena, in particular with the state.² The term „nation“ is so widely used in contemporary discussion to mean the state that other terms – most often the word „nationality“ (nationalite) – are frequently employed to denote what was originally understood by the term „nation“.³

The source of these difficulties lies in the very concept of „the nation“, which belongs to that group of ideas which have been perhaps least clearly and coherently defined. Indeed, one peculiarity of the concept is that the word „nation“ existed even before the formation of the communities which are defined as nations in the modern sense of the word.⁴ On this point there is relatively broad agreement. Serious disagreement begins, however, as soon as the attempt is made to define the origin of the word „nation“. Most authors, correctly in my opinion, trace the origin of the

1 Jerzy Wiatr, Osnovni problemi teorije nacije, „Ideje“, Beograd, 6/1971, str. 23.

2 Jean Jacques Chevallier, L'idée de nation et l'état (L'idée de nation, „Presses universitaires de France“, Paris, 1969, p. 4.

3 Pierre Mauge, Contre L'Etat – nation, „Editions Denöel“, Paris, 1979, p. 50; Pierre Vilar, La Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne, I, „Flammarion“, Paris, 1962, pp. 31–36.

4 Mario Albertini, L'idée de nation (L'idée de nation, „Presses universitaires de France“, Paris, 1969, p. 5.

word to Roman times, but some consider that it originated in the sixteenth century and only gained its modern meaning in the seventeenth century⁵, or, alternatively, that it originated at the start of the fifteenth century in France during the hundred years war.⁶

„Natio“ is a Latin word derived from the verb „nasci“ (to be born) and its participle „natus“ (born). The Latin word „natio“ implied some idea of origin which was essentially independent of individual will. The nation is a community in the sense that an individual is born within it and receives its language and customs.⁷

Via the Romance languages, but above all due to the fact that Latin remained the common language of the „educated“, ruling classes ~~es~~ throughout Europe until the eighteenth century, the term „natio“ passed into international use.⁸

To the Romans „natio“ meant „a foreign tribe“, and its political significance was thus linked with the principle „translitio imperii“ and the definition of Roman citizenship. The nation in this sense simply meant the origin, although in political practice ethnicity became a criterion of discrimination.⁹

After the great migrations of the sixth to tenth centuries there followed a period of relative stabilisation during which the differences between European communities were increasingly marked by language and customs. The word „nation“ then began to assume the meaning of a natural community occupying a definite territory. In this period the nation was generally considered as something quite distinct from power. Nationality bore little relation to politics and its requirements.¹⁰

The term „nation“ has been used in its modern sense since the fourteenth century, although it was already being used during the thirteenth century, by Dante for example, to describe groups of foreign merchants. In Universities such as Bologna, Padua and Pavia, and in the councils of the Roman Catholic Church, a „nation“ denoted a group with broadly similar linguistic or territorial origins. In Paris, for example, the University was divided into four nations of which the first three (French, Picardian and Norman) coincided exactly with the three relatively distinct cultural and ethnic „profiles“ of northern France, while the fourth, „natio anglica“, which included the English, Germans and Scandinavians, emphasised the relatively homogeneous origins of the Germanic tribes irrespective of their geographical dispersion.¹¹ In Italy, however, the term was used to denote regional origin as in, for example, „nazione fiorentina“ or „nazione milanese“. ¹² The term „nation“ had thus already taken on many of the meanings which characterise modern nations.

From the seventeenth century, initially in France, but later in Germany and Italy, the term „nation“ gradually acquired a political connotation and came to mean those

5 Dr. Jovan Djordjević, *Osnovna pitanja federalizma danas*, izdavačka zadruga „Politika i društvo“ SOJ, Beograd, str. 156.

6 Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda, „Jugoslovenski Leksikografski zavod“, Zagreb, tom 4, 1968, str. 455.

7 Pierre Margue, *Contre L'Etat-Nation*, „Editions Denoel“, Paris 1979, p. 37.

8 Dr. Josip Gunčević, *Nacionalitet s materijalne i formalne strane*, „Sklad“, Zagreb, 1935, str. 5; Rudi Rizman, *Marksizam in nacionalno vprašanje*, „Cankarjeva založba v Ljubljani“, Ljubljana, 1980, str. 35–37.

9 Frederico Clabod, *L'idea di nazione*, „Editori Laterza“, Bari, 1974, pp. 20–21.

10 Pierre Margue, *Contre L'Etat-Nation*, „Editions Denoel“, Paris, 1979, pp. 37–43.

11 Dragoš Kalajić, *Nacionalizam i evropeizam*, „Delo“, Beograd, 10/1977, str. 1017.

12 Frederico Chabod, *L'idea di nazione*, „Editori Laterza“, Bari, 1974, p. 21.

who ruled. It was thus used to describe „the King and the nobility“. Although Montesquieu also referred to the „Jewish nation“ and the „German people“, the concept of the „nation“ gradually became associated with the state. The dictionary of the Academie Francaise of 1694 thus defined „nation“ as a common term signifying „all inhabitants of the same state, the same country, who live under the same law and speak the same language“. Turgot, however, protested against this new usage and demanded that the word should continue to be used to denote „a group of families and peoples who speak the same language“, as distinct from a „state“ or „a people living in the same territory and subject to the same authority“.¹³

During the enlightenment of the late eighteenth century, coinciding with the establishment of modern states on the ruins of traditional monarchy, the word „nation“ finally passed into the sphere of ideology and acquired a meaning which legitimised and justified the authority of the state or confirmed its territorial needs and aspirations.¹⁴

The word „nation“ was used in Diderot's „Encyclopedia“, for example, to denote the rising „Third Estate“, and was later identified with the French bourgeois revolution. It was indeed the bourgeois revolution which finally confirmed the modern political meaning of the term „nation“.¹⁵ The French revolution adopted the word as a means of distinguishing the Third Estate – the great majority of the people – from the privileged aristocracy, or insisted that only the Third Estate could claim to represent the nation¹⁶. At the same time the word nation was taken to mean that there were no longer Alsations, Basques, Bretons or Provencales, but only Frenchmen. It expressed the demand for unity and indivisibility of the nation.

In the first few months of the revolution, despite this desire for unity, a relatively liberal policy was adopted towards non French languages spoken on French territory. This was demonstrated by the Constituent Assembly's decision of 14. January 1790 that its legislation should be translated into the various idioms then in use in France. As early as 1793, however, this liberal policy was discontinued. The French language – the King's French – became both a symbol of and a means of consolidating the Republic. It was, in fact, the language of the bourgeoisie which came to lead the revolution and the language of Paris, and thus served to cement the new national unity. All this, however, was ignored by several million people, which provoked Barrere, in a speech dated 27. January 1794, to condemn all those who did not speak French as „barberian nations“ destined to extinction. But since the propagation of the French language was left to the state, the French nation, in so far as it sought prevalence throughout the whole territory of the old Kingdom, had to identify itself with the French state. During the eighteenth century then, conceptions gradually changed so that the very idea of the (French) „nation“ came to be almost completely identified with the (French) state.¹⁷ Indeed, especially during and after the French revolution, the state „confiscated“ the national idea and the word „nation“ came to

13 Pierre Margue, *Contre L'Etat-Nation*, „Editions Denöel“, Paris, 1979, pp. 44–5.

14 Ibid, p. 45.

15 Rudi Rizman, *Marksizem in nacionalno vprašanje*, „Cankarjeva založba v Ljubljani“, Ljubljana, 1979, str. 40–43.

16 Sieyes, *Cu'est-ce que le Tiers État*, Paris, 1789 (Pierre Margue, *Contre L'Etat-Nation*, Editions Denöel, Paris, 1979, p. 46).

17 Sieyes, *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat*, Paris, 1789 (Pierre Margue, *Contre L'Etat-Nation*, „Editions Denöel“, Paris, 1979, pp. 46–50.

mean „populus“ (ie. the membership of a political entity)¹⁸. This also implied, however, a subtle alternation in the meaning of the word „state“ to the extent that nowadays the idea of a „nation-state“ is frequently confused with the very concept of the state.¹⁹ The incorrect classification of nations as „states“ and states as „nations“ thus became even more widespread.

The romantic philosophers rebelled against this tendency to use the term „nation“ to describe states as well as particular communities. They made a clear distinction between nations, which they defined as communities or moral and cultural groupings, and „national states“ (stato nazionale), a term which they brought into popular usage, meaning states which had come into being as a result of the triumph of the „national principle“ (principio di nazionalità), which the romantics held to be the highest principle in the life of the people.²⁰

The differences between the French revolutionary and romantic interpretations of the meaning of „nation“ have still not been resolved and it is therefore true that a complete „crystallisation“ of the meaning and use of the term has still not been achieved. In both English and French, for example, it is quite normal for the term „nation“ to be given a political meaning, while, in American literature especially, it is even regarded as being identical to the state. In English, however, the word „nation“ has many meanings: a social, historical community of people with the same territory and economic structure and a specific culture and language; the inhabitants of a certain territory living under a single government and administrative system – country, state; a people, a tribe of north American indians belonging to a given confederation, the territory of such a tribe.

The current terminological confusion is a reflection of the complexity of the social phenomenon known as the „nation“. It expresses a rich mass of genuine observations, but also many serious misinterpretations of their significance. It can even be said that there is relatively little controversy and confusion about the observation, identification, definition and naming of the many varied external manifestations of various aspects of the nation, but rather more controversy over what constitutes its real essence.²¹

The terminological confusion also results from the impossibility of fully expressing the rich and varied life of the nation in any definitive or even loose theoretical framework. The problem is not therefore restricted to anyone school of thought or the result of the lack of scientific objectivity in certain countries which suffer from „the sickness of nationalism“, although it may present a more serious obstacle to discussion of the real problems in some schools of thought and certain countries.²²

The consequences of this confusion are manifold. It makes it difficult if not impossible to understand and theoretically define the concept of the nation in all its complexity and the many varied forms of its existence and appearance. It also gives rise to important „extra-theoretical“ problems, such as the ideological manipulation of

18 Yves Person, *Jezički imperijalizam i kolonijalizam „Marksizam u svetu“*, Beograd, 10/1977, str. 238.

19 Maks Veber, *Privreda i društvo*, I, „Prosveta“, Beograd, 1976, str. 334.

20 Frederico Chabod, *L'idea di nazione*, „Editori Laterza“, Bari, 1974, pp. 22–3.

21 A report by a study group of the R.I.I.A. (Nationalism, Oxford, 1939, pp. 17).

22 Cesare Luporini, *Prekidi i kontinuitet u najnovijem Althusserovom delu (Aktuelne rasprave o državi, „Marksizam u svetu“*, Beograd, 5/1982, str. 74).

theoretical concepts for political or class purposes.

The clear and precise definition of terms and the concepts they express is not a mere convention but the *conditio sine qua non* of all dialogue, and therefore of scientific and theoretical discussion of social phenomena such as the nation. Concepts are not, in any case, empty abstractions but abstract expressions of real phenomena. To be precise, they pin-point the essence of social and political processes.

Clear concepts are neither universal and eternally valid „models“, nor „pure categories“ which can replace reality and observation. They are merely tools for making statements and undertaking research and going beyond what is already known. They are aids to the understanding of complex empirical data. Thus, despite its many negative consequences, terminological confusion prompts the search for its resolution, in this case, the attempt to clarify the meaning of the term „nation“ and to use it relatively consistently. It might also be added that the clear definition and consistent usage of the term will point to some of the problems which need to be resolved in order to gain a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of the subject.

2. The (in)possibility of defining „Nation“

The terminological confusion which distinguished debate about the meaning of the word „nation“ was made still more complex by the fact that, starting from the first attempt to arrive at a theoretical definition (that of Pascal Mancinnia, professor of law at Torino University in 1851), the number of possible definitions rapidly increased. This multiplication of definitions was partly the result of „linguistic habits“, but was also, and more importantly, due to real difficulties in finding a definition of „nation“ which would reflect the variety and complexity of the phenomena it denoted. An additional problem was created by the contradictory nature of (scientific) opinion itself and by differences of methodological approach to the study of the nation.²³

There were many other reasons inherent in the very nature of nineteenth century scientific thought, above all the tendency to search for universal laws and the belief that it would be possible to establish all-encompassing, generally accepted and absolutely perfect scientific definitions from which there could be no theoretical or practical exceptions. This effort was seriously limited, however, by the very discipline of scientific knowledge, its specialisation and the limits imposed by methodology, which meant that only certain elements of social phenomena could be stressed and explained within the strict limits of the given scientific discipline – even if the existence of other elements was acknowledged. This is the problem of the partialisation of knowledge, which most often restricts the subjects of analysis even when, as in the case of the nation, we are dealing with a complex whole.

Despite many attempts to define the meaning of „nation“ it can still be regarded as true that, „No one has yet succeeded in producing a valid definition of what exactly a nation is. Nor will anyone ever succeed, for the wisest definition can be empirically disproved“.²⁴ This state of affairs has convinced many authors that the

23 Jerzy Wiatr, *Osnovni problemi teorije nacije*, „Ideje“, Beograd, 6/1971, str. 41.

24 Arnold Kunzli, *Opijum nacionalizma*, „Praxis“, Zagreb, 4/1968, str. 318–9.

defining — and even the discussion — of concepts is a futile and unnecessary exercise.²⁵

It seems to me, however, that this problem should be approached from the opposite side. It is also valid that, „The nation is one of the many concepts of which we know the meaning until someone asks us, but which we cannot simply and coherently explain“.²⁶ It is indeed partly mythical, but also real.

At all events, the very existence of so many definitions of the nation is itself confirmation of the fact that a nation is a complex social phenomena. Major theoretical differences arise when the attempt is made to define, examine, evaluate and name the „internal bonds“ which join people in a national community. The evaluation of these connections is, however, vital to the definition of every social phenomena, and therefore of the nation. One of the tasks of scientific research is to resolve this difficult problem in order to create at least a common „grammar and syntax“ and the minimum necessary consensus on the theoretical framework of the debate. That is not possible if the nation is spoken of as an automatically understandable category. The nation cannot be understood in isolation from other social phenomena and it therefore follows that every current definition of the nation must be seen as relative, but we should not go to the other extreme. To refrain from the attempt to define the nation would be to add to the confusion and make all study and understanding of the concept impossible.

25 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke*, tom VII, Leipzig, 1910, str. 373; Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, *Sociološke studije*, „Školska knjiga“, Zagreb, 1980, str. 29; Roman Rybarsky, *Narod i klasa*, Warszawa, 1926, str. 1346 (Jerzy Wiatr, *Osnovni problemi teorije nacije*, „Ideje“, Beograd, 6/1971, str. 26); Henrik Walecki, *W kwestii zydowskiej* (Wybor pism., t. 2, Warszawa, 1967, str. 206.

26 W. Bagehot, *The origins of the nation*, London, 1874.

ROBERT H. JACKSON

University of British Columbia
Dept. of Political Sciences, Canada

JURISPRUDENCE AND MULTI-ETHNIC STATES

State and ethnicity

We naturally think of ethnicity as having a life of its own independent of the state. Race, color, language, religion, customs, or geographical origins define people regardless of what governments, laws or constitutions say.¹ People acquire characteristics of race or color involuntarily by biological descent. They learn to speak a language in the family — even if they learn to write it at school. Religions, customs and other ethnic identities and practices are usually acquired in similar non-political ways.

A moment's reflection, however, discloses that we cannot think of ethnicity for long before the state begins to intrude. Consider race. Shared physical characteristics can easily influence social attitudes and behaviour. A particular race can be esteemed, another despised. This may be reflected in political and constitutional standing in a state. Laws may discriminate in favour of the esteemed and against the despised. A political struggle might ensue to reduce discrimination or to maintain it. History provides countless examples. The contemporary world offers as many.

The same can be said of religion or language. A very significant part of European political history involves religion: theocratic states; schisms; reformations; wars of religion; religious discrimination or toleration. For centuries religion was an issue of inescapable public significance which governments could not ignore. Religious obligations, liabilities, liberties and eventually rights were embodied at one time or another in European constitutions, laws or administrative regulations. What can be said of religion can be said also of language. Is the language tolerated? Can it be taught outside the home? Can it be a medium of instruction in schools? Can judicial proceedings be conducted in it? Can it be used for communicating with public officials? Can it be broadcast on radio or television? Is it an official language?

Many other illustrations could be given but I hope this will suffice to establish the first point which is that state and ethnicity are commonly entangled often to the extent that it is virtually impossible to consider the one without the other.

What are the main implications of ethnicity for the state? This is a complicated question and I have the space for only a simple answer. Ethnicity is a perceptible and often visible characteristic which inevitably makes it a public rather than merely a

private phenomenon. It is usually shared by large numbers of people: ethnic markers differentiate substantial population groupings in multiethnic states. Moreover, perceptible ethnic differences are often reinforced by social behaviour: people of common ethnicity choose either voluntarily or as a result of compulsion to interact more intensively with themselves than with others. Once we begin to speak of significant numbers of people with publicly distinctive characteristics which shape social behaviour we are into the world of the state.

Since ethnicity is a way of life that usually can be conducted successfully only in public it is of interest to state authorities. The state may even awaken ethnicity in people — as when democratic politicians make ethnic appeals in order to win elections or repressive politicians create ethnic scapegoats. Once politicians are interested in something we can be certain that laws and regulations will not be far behind. In short, because it is inherently a political phenomenon ethnicity inevitably captures the attention of the state.

What are the main implications of the state for ethnicity? The quality of ethnic life can be affected for better or worse by public authorities. The state can grant the ethnos constitutional standing, great or small, or deny it. Unless the state is indifferent to ethnicity, government laws and administration will affect it. And even if they are blind to ethnicity public policies may still influence ethnic life unintentionally — as when laws in some Western states forbidding the carrying of concealed weapons interfere with the cultural life of Sikh males who are bound by their religion to wear ceremonial swords. Neglect is unlikely in a democratic age such as our own when the state derives its legitimacy from the people. Democratic politicians are far more likely to react to ethnicity and transact with it. The state can enable the ethnos or disable it and will almost always regulate it one way or another, lightly or heavily, directly or indirectly, intentionally or inadvertently.

Constitution and ethnicity

What have constitutions to do with ethnicity? This question is not asked as often as one would expect in today's world of pervasive ethnic awareness. This appears to be owing at least in part to a disciplinary division of labour between jurisprudence and social science: legal theorists have neglected ethnicity and social theorists have not devoted a great deal of attention to constitutional issues. The two subjects usually have not been brought together within the same analysis.²

Since the term is employed in various ways we must be clear what „constitution“ signifies for the purposes of this discussion. A framework of non-instrumental rules which govern public life including the conduct of the rulers and which cannot easily or arbitrarily be changed by them or by anyone else is what I consider a constitution

1 For a concept of „ethnicity“ in terms of these indicators see Robert H. Jackson, „Ethnicity“, in Giovanni Sartori, ed. *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), pp. 227–228.

2 For two noteworthy exceptions see L. S. Lustgarten, „Liberty in a Culturally Plural Society“, in A. Philips Griffiths, ed., *Of Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and Claire Palley, *Constitutional Law and Minorities*, Minority Rights Group Report No. 36 (London, 1978).

properly so-called to be. Constitutional rules are significantly independent of rulers. Rules also govern constitutional change. A constitutional state is a rule-based political order whatever particular shape the rules might take from one country to the next. In such a state primary rules – e.g., parliamentary procedures – structure the writing of secondary rules – e.g., parliamentary statutes.³ The latter in turn establish regulations – delegated legislation in parliamentary governments – according to which public policy is administered and enforced. The point of a constitution is obviously to confine the exercise of state power within a legitimate framework of non-instrumental procedures. Ideally a constitutional government operates in accordance with political liberty and the rule of law.

This definition postulates a constitution as a part and indeed a central part of a political way of life understood and subscribed to by all who are subject to it: constitutionalism. We speak of such constitutions as normative or substantial which is the case by and large in Western democracies. However, some constitutions are never institutionalized. They are merely nominal with no real purchasing power on human conduct. This has proved to be the case with many constitutions in the Third World. Finally, there is a class of constitutions which are merely semantic: a mask on power.⁴ The word „constitution“ in this usage denotes an apparatus of power and not a framework of noninstrumental rules. Arguably this has been the case at least until recently with the constitutions of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union – although it may now be changing with the advent of glassnost and perestroika.

Constitutions obviously have implications for ethnicity and vice versa. Constitutional language may accommodate and legitimate ethnicity, as in the case of linguistic communities under the 1982 Canadian Constitution Act discussed below. It may be blind to ethnicity which has generally been the case historically in Britain and the United States. Or it may recognize ethnic categories but seek to control and confine them: the fate of non-white racial groups in the apartheid legal order in South Africa.

A constitution can gain or lose legitimacy from those who identify with particular ethnic communities. If a national population is divided along ethnic lines, a constitution can make provision for ethnic liberties, rights and privileges or fail to do so. If ethnic communities are protected by a constitution they might become loyal to the constitutional order. If they are denied constitutional standing or discriminated against by law, they will be unable to claim the assistance of the state by constitutional right. They may come to resent laws which neglect, dishonour or hobble them.

A sizeable repertoire of constitutional devices for multiethnic states is available today. I only have the space to summarize them.⁵ Some deal with territorial group autonomy: federalism, regionalism, devolution and various forms of administrative decentralization and local government. Some focus on political representation, including separate electoral rolls and seats for different ethnic groups, proportional representation, bicameralism with communal representation (usually in upper chambers), ethnic group veto powers in legislatures on issues of constitutional amendment, and

³ For a somewhat different conception of primary and secondary rules see H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), ch. V.

⁴ These distinctions are from Karl Loewenstein, „Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age“, reprinted in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, ed., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), p. 154.

⁵ They are reviewed in Palley *op. cit.*

even special communal legislative bodies. Some concern ethnic group participation in executive decisionmaking, such as formal or informal power sharing, ethnic representation in executives and the civil service. Various other devices aimed at protecting the personal or family law of minorities, the ways of life of aboriginal peoples, and the ethnic association of immigrant communities have also been developed.

Constitutions and ethnicity have come into contact in three different political contexts since the end of the Second World War. Decolonization in Asia, Africa and Oceania involved the attempt to institute written constitutions which aimed at least in part at accommodating the multiethnic society – „primary ethnicity“ – which had formed within the framework of many colonial jurisdictions. The British in particular attempted to find appropriate constitutional devices for accommodating the plural society.⁶ The second context was unprecedented non-Western immigration into Western Europe and North America – „secondary ethnicity“ – induced partly by European decolonization – as when non-European holders of British passports entered Britain from South Asia or East Africa – and partly by European economic union and prosperity – as when some Turks migrated north into labour scarce Germany in search of employment.⁷ The third context is the constitutional accommodation of traditional nationalities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – particularly Yugoslavia. Although this experience is very important, I am not sufficiently conversant with it to comment.

Decolonization continued „the epidemic of constitution-making“ after the war which according to Karl Loewenstein „has no parallel in history“.⁸ The following remarks are confined to the African experience. Many independence constitutions in former British colonies disclosed an attempt to accommodate ethnicity by various constitutional devices. The British Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government considered the multi-ethnic society to be a central feature of many colonies and analyzed various constitutional approaches to it including federal government, communal representation, proportional representation, the cumulative vote, and legislative bicameralism, among others.⁹ These devices in various combinations were experimented with in different places. Speaking generally, an attempt was usually made to determine the particular measures best suited to individual countries. Subsequently, this constitutional thinking developed into a distinctive theory known as „consociationalism“.¹⁰ A recent target of consociational thought is South Africa and the extremely difficult – some would say impossible – problem of finding constitutional arrangements for extending political participation to blacks without threatening whites.¹¹

⁶ See Martin Wight, *British Colonial Constitutions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).

⁷ The handy distinction between „primary“, „secondary“, and „tertiary“ ethnicity was drawn to my attention by Fred W. Riggs, „Memorandum to Participants in IPSA Round Table on Problems of Ethnic Terminology“, (Marc 1988).

⁸ Loewenstein op. cit., p. 149.

⁹ See *Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies* (London: Hansard Society, 1953), ch. 5.

¹⁰ See W. A. Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) and Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

¹¹ See Arend Lijphart, *Power-Sharing in South Africa*, *Policy Papers in International Affairs*, No. 24 (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1985).

Most of this constitutional engineering proved unsuccessful, however. The reasons why are complex and not yet fully understood. I can only summarize a few of the more familiar explanations.¹² One reason clearly was the haste of constitutional decolonization. Entire populations which had been ruled as colonial subjects in a more or less authoritarian manner were suddenly asked to operate as citizens according to new democratic constitutions imported from abroad. Constitutions and cultures were often incompatible. Few indigenous people were familiar with the practice of modern constitutional self-government. Important ethnic groups frequently had no desire to be part of a larger constitutional order unless they could dominate it. Otherwise, they preferred to possess an independent state of their own. The possibility of living together peacefully with other ethnic groups under a common citizenship was an alien idea which presupposed a level of toleration that often did not exist. Ethnonationalism sometimes threatened weak multi-ethnic states and resulted in civil discord and sometimes outright civil war. In short, those who were expected to behave in accordance with the new constitutions usually were not sufficiently trained, equipped or disposed to do so. The constitutions were nominal rather than real.

A second historical point of contact between constitutionality or rather legality and ethnicity has been immigration into Western states from various parts of the non-Western World with the result that the populations of these states are increasingly multi-ethnic and often multiracial. This development has rightly been characterized as „one of the most important social changes that has occurred . . . since the war; every reasonably populous (Western) state now has ethnic minorities of considerable size within its borders.“¹³

Since the states which received this immigration were already significantly rule-based in their system of government the resulting problem was not that of creating constitutional government in the first place but only of adapting constitutional and legal practices to the new sociological reality. Although this adaptation has not been as easy or as successful as one might hope and continues to present many problems, it has not been as difficult as establishing constitutionalism in non-Western multi-ethnic states. The new culturally distinctive and often visible minorities raised the following kinds of question: shall the immigrant groups be (i) subjected to inferior legal status, (ii) allowed the same liberties and rights as everyone else, or (iii) granted special legal status and rights? (I exclude policy responses such as assimilation, relocation and various other domination devices which are not „constitutional“.)

It has not been uncommon in some Western countries to subject economic migrants to inferior legal standing on the grounds that their residence in the country is only temporary and their permanent domicile and citizenship is accordingly elsewhere. Turks in Germany and North Africans in France have been dealt with in this manner. The policy begins to prove unworkable, however, once such groups become settled as second or third generations into what increasingly appear to be permanent enclaves of second class legal standing – the historical problem of the ghetto. This raises serious moral and political questions in a democratic state.

The response of extending citizenship to members of ethnic minorities on the

12 See the outstanding review in Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), ch. 15.

13 Lustgarten op. cit., p. 97.

same basis as everyone else is the classical liberal solution best exemplified by the American experience. The problem with it from the viewpoint of the ethnic groups concerned is its blindness to the reality that such groups have significant public needs which are different from those of the general population and which raise constitutional or at least legal questions. Shall members of the minority be entitled to practice their culture if it conflicts with existing law? Do they have reasonable grounds to claim legal exemptions if such conflicts occur? Or must they resign themselves to their minority standing in a society dominated by a different culture? The problem with the liberal solution is that it presupposes only one public life – the life of the whole political community of the state – and relegates everything else to the world of private individuals and groups. Yet, as I have argued, it is usually difficult for ethnic minorities to live their collective lives within a framework of wholly private association.

From his examination of the Law Reports of England and the United States L. S. Lustgarten has raised some questions that arise in liberal-individualist legal systems which come into contact with secondary ethnicity.¹⁴ Are ethnic minorities entitled to political representation, government employment, or places in educational institutions in proportion to their share of the relevant population? Should ballot papers be printed in minority languages? Should ethnic minorities be beneficiaries of affirmative action programmes in education and employment? Should linguistic minorities be granted licenses to broadcast on radio and television in their own languages. Should religious minorities be entitled to establish and administer their own schools? Should they have a claim on state educational funds? Should local educational authorities be required to provide bilingual education for linguistic minorities? Should the personal law of Moslems be legally recognized by the state? Should polygamy be lawful for adherents of religions which tolerate it? Should a Nigerian immigrant mother who made incisions on the cheeks of her two sons in a ceremony of tribal induction be charged with assault? Must Sikh males who are required by their religion to wear beards be denied employment regulated by hygiene requirements which oblige workers to be clean shaven? Should teenage Moslem girls attending mixed, coeducational schools be entitled to physical education classes without boys? Should a Moslem schoolteacher in a public school have leave to attend a Mosque during school hours on Friday without prejudice to his salary or employment?

Limitations of space thankfully prevent an inquiry into these issues. I can only conclude this section with some general questions the answer to which would influence the answers given to the more specific questions noted above. Should non-Western immigrants in a Western liberal-individualist state be granted whatever legal exemptions and immunities are necessary for them to continue to enjoy their ethnic way of life? If so, what are the limits of such legal accommodation?¹⁵ Lustgarten suggests the following limits: ethnic practices should be accommodated unless they are „wholly impractical“ or they result in „severe physical abuse or worse“. He cites suttee and female circumcision as examples of the latter. Alternatively, should they be expected to forgo their ethnic ways whenever they conflict with established legal practice. Since Western governments have admitted such immigrants in substantial

14 Lustgarten *ibid.*, pp. 98–101.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 101.

numbers one might argue that this commits them to a fair degree of legal toleration of their ethnic way of life. On the other hand, since these immigrants have elected to immigrate, one might assume on the contrary that they should be prepared to suspend their culture in conflicting situations out of respect for the laws and practices of their new political home and its majority culture. Other things remaining equal, left wing parties in Western countries tend to take the former view, right wing the latter.

Lustgarten concludes his analysis by noting that the „methodological individualism“ of American and British law provokes these questions by tending generally to „deprecate“ ethnic identity and loyalty „unless centered upon the state“. In liberal theory dating to Hobbes there cannot be more than one public. Yet ethnicity cannot thrive on a doctrine which consigns it to the private world.

Constitution-mongering in multi-ethnic states

Can ethnic pluralism coexist with a united polity? Can a constitutional democracy accommodate more than one public? Can it extend constitutional and legal recognition beyond individuals or the public at large to ethnic minorities? The recent constitutional experience of one Western country might provide at least an intimation of an answer. Canada in the past two decades has been undergoing what can only be called a constitutional revolution a significant part of which is a response to both primary and secondary ethnicity.¹⁶

The Canadian constitution since its origins in 1867 has made provision for the existence of two founding peoples: the English majority and the French minority. The device of federalism enables francophone Canadians concentrated in Quebec to possess their own provincial government. They have also been able to exercise strong influence historically through the federal electoral and party systems to secure their position alongside the English-speaking majority at the centre of the Canadian state. The high court – at first the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain and since 1949 the Supreme Court of Canada – has also served as a bulwark of Franco-phone rights and autonomies. Although there have been moments of real uncertainty and even crisis – as in the late 1970s when the Government of Quebec threatened to separate from the rest of Canada – institutions such as these have enabled French-Canadians to preserve and promote their way of life for well over a century within the larger framework of a Canadian state.

The Canadian constitutional tradition has also been responding more recently to secondary ethnicity fostered by a shift of immigration away from Europe and towards various parts of the non-Western world. Since the 1960s Canadian Governments have developed policies of multiculturalism to accommodate immigrant communities including newer and more visible racial minorities. During the same period the aboriginal peoples have awakened politically and now form another distinctive strand of Canada's multi-cultural fabric. Although they refer to themselves as „first nations“ they are excluded constitutionally from the traditional conception of the two founding peoples. They are jostling for constitutional status and rights along with every other secondary

¹⁶ For an unrivalled overview see Alan C. Cairns, *Constitution, Government and Society in Canada* ed. by Douglas E. Williams (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988).

and tertiary ethnic group. However, they do have treaty and other historically recognized rights and claims connected to land which sets them apart from such groups constitutionally and legally.

Canadian politicians speak warmly of Canada as a „community of communities“ which they like to contrast with the „melting pot“ of the United States. The idea can give rise to noble political rhetoric, such as the following statement made by a Canadian Prime Minister in 1961: „Canada is a garden... into which has been transplanted the hardiest and brightest flowers of many lands, each retaining in its new environment the best of the qualities for which it was loved and prized in its native lands“. ¹⁷ This is a rhetoric which obviously is receptive and encouraging to ethnicity.

In 1982 a new constitution act was adopted which contains a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is a major constitutional innovation on the American model and marks a radical although not complete and therefore ambiguous departure from the previous tradition of parliamentary sovereignty based on the British model. The Charter goes well beyond the American practice of rights based jurisprudence. It makes provision not only for traditional civil and political liberties but also for multiculturalism, minority language education rights, and native people's rights. A very significant „equality rights“ section provides every individual Canadian with „the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability“. Moreover, the same section „does not preclude any law program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability“. ¹⁸ Another section reads as follows: „This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.“ ¹⁹ And a further section acknowledges the traditional treaty or other rights of aboriginal peoples. ²⁰ This is clearly the constitutional language of ethnic minority enfranchisement.

The Canadian constitution today is more than ever a political and legal arena — some would say battleground — of conflicts among numerous and assorted groups over legal rights and status. Canadian elected and appointed officials endlessly interact in various forums from the highest levels of the state to the lowest with almost countless representatives of the underlying multi-ethnic society. Today such conflicts are not only between federal and provincial governments and the primary language groups but also among the aboriginal peoples, various secondary immigrant groups, and beyond that women's and handicapped groups and even gays and lesbians who see the Charter as a constitutional vehicle — perhaps even weapon — for promoting their ways or ideologies of life. Anyone who surveys the Canadian political scene today cannot fail to be struck by the quantity of constitutionally inspired politics. Just as there is little if any philosophical coherence in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — so also is there little cohesiveness in the politics it has fostered.

17 Quoted by The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Guide for Canadians (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1982), p. 29.

18 Constitution Act, 1982, section 15 (emphasis added).

19 Ibid., section 27.

20 Ibid., section 25.

But arguably this cacophonous process is one way of governing a geographically far flung, diverse, politically and legally mobilized multi-ethnic society with civility and toleration and without recourse to domination devices, assimilationist measures or other instruments of anticonstitutionalism.²¹ Canada appears to be moving as rapidly as any Western country in the direction of a new kind of state in which there is a high degree of constitutional and legal accommodation of ethnicity. It is driven by an official ideology of multiculturalism and the claims of non-European immigrant groups and aboriginals. It is also a testimony to the fundamental significance and substance that constitutions and laws can possess in an open polity. They are about as far from mere superstructure as one could imagine.

Jurisprudence and ethnicity

Constitutional and legal theory has traditionally given little attention to ethnicity or indeed to groups in general. Instead, it has focused on individuals. This is particularly true of American and British jurisprudence. Legal personality, liberties, immunities, rights, obligations, privileges and so forth are possessed by persons, whether real or notional—i.e., corporations. On the other hand, there is a minor jurisprudential literature which views the body politic as a *communitas communitatum* in which the group is the „right-and-duty bearing unit“²² This idea brings to mind Medieval Europe before the modern Leviathan smashed the numerous intermediate authorities which mediated between the individual and the state. I do not wish to imply that this old jurisprudence is directly relevant to the mobilized, rights-based multi-ethnic constitutionalism of the present day. If we are to understand the contemporary multi-ethnic state jurisprudentially, however, we have to learn to think in terms of the constitutional and legal status of intermediate groups.

What does the terminology of ethnicity look like from a jurisprudential perspective? A way to address this question is by thinking of constitutions and laws as one set of norms—the state—which intersect another set—multi-ethnic society. The intersection creates a normative conflict which in a constitutional state needs to be resolved peacefully and in a way that enables both the authority of the state and the public life of the group to continue. Politics is of course one very important means of attempting to resolve the conflict. Another device, however, is law. The two are entangled, of course, and the accommodation process may take the form of constitutional politics as in Canada.

The intersection of the constitutional state and the multiethnic society is marked at least in the English language by a distinctive syntax. Words which belong to the vocabularies of law and morals are used at the intersection as nouns or verbs: e.g., autonomies, entitlements, liberties, equality, justice, rights, privileges, discrimination, accommodation and so forth. This indicates that the issues at stake are fundamentally

21 See the insightful analysis in Alan C. Cairns, „The Canadian Constitutional Experiment“, *op. cit.*, pp. 229–256.

22 F. W. Maitland, „Moral Personality and Legal Personality“, reprinted in David Nicholls, *The Pluralist State* (London: Macmillan, 1975), Appendix C. Also see David Nicholls, *Three Varieties of Pluralism* (London: Macmillan, 1974) and Otto Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, trans. by F. W. Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

moral and legal. Words belonging to ethnic terminology are used as adjectives or adverbs to modify these fundamental categories: e.g., cultural autonomy, language rights, racial equality, racial discrimination, ethnically affirmative action, and so on. Ethnicity therefore operates linguistically as a qualifier on legal or moral issues. The issues pertain not to individuals as such or to the state as a whole but rather to a particular kind of collectivity within the larger overall framework of the state. This in turn suggests that the primary question is the rightful public place of ethnicity within the state: which ethnic norms are lawful and constitutional, and which—if any—are not?

In this syntax the state or rather the political goods of the state—security, order, justice, liberty, equality—take precedence over ethnicity, but in such a way as to accommodate rather than to deny ethnic norms. In other words, it indicates a state which is civil and tolerant as regards ethnic groups. Political pluralism, ethnic accommodation, minorities rights, affirmative action, and the like capture the character of such a multi-ethnic state. The various sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which deal with ethnicity may be a case in point. In such a state the vocabulary of ethnicity has penetrated moral and legal discourse as positively value-loaded terminology. This clearly is the opposite of the discourse of ethnic domination or assimilation which denies legitimacy to ethnicity and uses law to hobble or undermine it.

Ethnicity is not unregulated or beyond the reach of law in a pluralistic state. It is not a world of ethnic anarchy. The state acknowledges the ethnos but at the same time subjects it to constitutional or legal rules—the ethnos is within the state and not outside. Regulation must always be rooted in consent, however. Government cannot interfere arbitrarily in the life of the ethnos or seek to confine it beyond that which is generally necessary to protect the state and is consistent with the rule of law. For example, state intervention in the ethnos could only be justified by superior constitutional values—such as protection of the public against terrorism or an apprehended insurrection. The life of an ethnos is not an absolute value. But an ethnically accommodating state will always have very good reasons before it seeks to impose its will. Likewise, the ethnos must always forbear from excessive acts of hubris which threaten to undermine the civil condition.

The brief foregoing analysis has some implications for the *Intercocata Glossary of Concepts and Terms used in Ethnicity Research*. The Glossary specifies that politics is among the „contents“ of ethnicity and that ethnic actors and administrative officials are among the „levels of intentionality.“ However, it makes no specific mention of either constitutions or law—which are not identical to politics or administration.²³ Presumably this is owing to the sematic extension of „politics“ which includes „constitution“ and „law“. However, I believe that specification is necessary to increase the analytical discrimination of the intercocata model. The above comments are offered as a suggestion of some constitutional and legal concepts which could be added to the glossary to begin to explore this sub-field of ethnic terminology.

23 Fred W. Riggs, ed. *Ethnicity: Intercocata Glossary*, International Conceptual Encyclopedia for the Social Sciences, Vol. 1 (Hawaii: International Social Science Council, 1985), pp. 6–7.

YVES PLASSERAUD

Paris

LUMIÈRES ET OMBRES DE L'IDENTITÉ ETHNIQUE

Depuis quelques années, les colonnes des journaux sont remplies de nouvelles concernant des affrontements entre minorités ethniques ou nationales et Etats-Nations. Des musulmans des Philippines aux Arméniens du Karabagh en passant par les Miskitos du Nicaragua, bien que le public en soit rarement conscient, ce sont toujours des problématiques analogues que l'on rencontre.

Ce troisième prurit d'émancipation (le premier peut être considéré comme ayant été européen entre 1848 et 1918, le second ayant abouti à la décolonisation des années 1947-1962) menace souvent d'éclatement les Etats-Nations en gestation du tiers-monde et parfois, géopolitique oblige, la paix mondiale.

Les racines du militantisme d'émancipation.

L'explication de ces combats — souvent perçus comme archaïques et fratricides — c'est dans les écrits des intellectuels „engagés“, dans les manifestes, les poèmes ou les chansons plus que dans le déroulement de l'Histoire elle-même qu'il faut la rechercher. Il faut plonger dans la multitude de textes généralement indigestes que suscitent tous les mouvements nationaux pour y découvrir les mots clés.

Qu'y lisons-nous? L'appel de la dignité bafouée, le cri de révolte contre ce qui est ressenti comme la négation du droit à la libre expression identitaire ou à l'auto-détermination. D'un groupe à l'autre avec des termes souvent semblables, c'est une immuable dénonciation de l'ostracisme qui, selon les époques et les pays, sous des

* Il est aussi, bien sûr, plus près de nous, au sein même de nos Etats industrialisés de civilisation occidentale des „peuples en lutte“ et, pour ne pas toujours avoir la violence de celle des Basques de l'ETA ou des Irlandais de l'IRA, leur affirmation n'en pose pas moins de nombreuses questions. Entre les groupes au militantisme bruyant comme les Bretons et ceux en voie d'assimilation avancée comme les frisons de RFA, tous les degrés d'affirmation identitaire se rencontrent. Citons quelques exemples pris à dessein hors de la Yougoslavie: Alsaciens, Bretons, Cornouaillais de Grande Bretagne, Corses, Ecossais, Féroéens, Gallois, Gitans, Lapons, Occitans, Québécois, Valdôtains, Sardes et en Amérique du Nord tous ceux qui, des noirs aux indiens, vivent un „ethnic revival“.

apparences variées, s'exerce à l'encontre des personnalités collectives des peuples.

Longue est la litanie — non limitative — des modes d'oppression.

- Colonialisme traditionnel. Passé de mode, il ne se rencontre plus que dans des territoires isolés et de petites dimensions,

- Répression. Les dissidents politiques et religieux et les ethnies ou nations fidèles à leur particularisme la subissent, notamment en Iran, de façon plus ou moins larvée,

- Aliénation culturelle et linguistique. Basques, Occitans germanophones du Haut-Adige italien ou Slovènes d'Autriche . . . ,

- Oblitération. Les Kurdes de Turquie (rebaptisés pour les besoins de la cause „turcs montagnards“), les Assyro-chaldéens de Syrie . . . ,

- Refus du territoire. Les Tatars de Crimée . . . ,

- Interdiction d'Etat. Les Palestiniens . . . ,

- „Assignation collective à résidence“. le refus du „voyage“, dont les Roms (Gitans) sont victimes un peu partout . . . ,

- Assimilation. La plupart des minorités ethniques d'Europe sont, à des degrés divers, en train de perdre leur spécificité par rapport à la culture dominante de l'Etat-Nation qui les englobe,

- Néo-colonialisme. Le Vanuatu — les anciennes Nouvelles-Hébrides — est, comme la majorité des pays du tiers-monde, passé sans transition du statut colonial à l'indépendance formelle assortie d'une complète tutelle économique,

- Exode. Les Corses ou les Sardes acculés à s'„absenter“ par manque d'emplois sur leurs îles vides mais potentiellement riches . . . ,

- Racisme. Les travailleurs émigrés (maghrébins en France, Turcs en RFA) le subissent jour après jour . . . ,

- Génocide. Les Indiens Caraïbes totalement exterminés en quelques décennies par les conquérants espagnols (après avoir eux-mêmes anéanti leurs prédécesseurs Arawaks) préfigurent malheureusement peut-être le sort d'autres ethnies indigènes du sous-continent,

- Discrimination. Officielle en République d'Afrique du Sud, occulte au Pérou et dans beaucoup d'autres pays, elle est plus répandue qu'on ne le pense,

Ces diverses formes d'oppression sont issues de théories qui refusent le pluralisme et la différence. Qu'elles aient nom jacobinisme, unité nationale, totalitarisme, mission civilisatrice, dictature du prolétariat ou société de consommation, on y découvre, à des degrés divers, une même indifférence pour les individus réels. Albert MEMMI, juif tunisien, est parmi ceux qui ont, (en français dans son cas, langue de son „acculturation“), le plus intensément exprimé le malheur du colonisé. Dans un petit livre célèbre¹ „Portrait du colonisé“, il brosse d'une plume alerte en phrases courtes et percutantes la silhouette universelle du colonisé tel que le voit le colonisateur et tel qu'à la longue, il finit par se voir lui-même. „Confronté en constance avec cette image de lui-même, proposée, imposée dans les institutions comme dans tout contact humain, comment n'y réagirait-il pas? . . . Il finit par la reconnaître, tel un sobriquet détesté mais devenu un signal familier“².

Dialectique diabolique, celle au terme de laquelle un individu en arrive à ne plus

¹ Jean-Jacques PAUVERT. Paris, 1966.

² Op. cit. p. 125.

être, dans sa propre conscience, que ce que l'intérêt d'autrui lui dicte de penser de lui-même. La plus verrouillée des prisons est celle que l'on porte en soi et l'imposition, au plan collectif, d'un comportement névrotique est l'un des mécanismes de toute oppression.

Mais rien n'est éternel et parfois, sous l'effet conjugué de facteurs internes et externes, un jour arrive où la coupe est pleine. Une fièvre apparaît, ce sont les „années de braise“, celles où, silencieusement encore, la révolte gronde.

Or, nous sommes dans une période où l'identité culturelle des Etats est un concept à la mode. Les Etats-Unis envisagent de faire de l'anglais, ce qui n'a pas été le cas jusqu'à présent, la langue officielle, les Japonais renouent avec leur passé symbolique un temps acculé et les Français avec F. Braudel se penchent avec anxiété sur la santé de la „personne France“ chère à Michelet³. L'identité des uns servant toujours de révélateur à celle des autres, il y a de grandes chances que minoritaires ou dominatrices, les identités fassent encore plus parler d'elles demain qu'elles ne l'ont fait hier.

Dans la société médiatique qui est la nôtre, gens de communication et politiques agitent les mots et les concepts en tous sens, leur donnant la signification qui les arrange sans toujours se préoccuper des répercussions des idées avancées dans le feu du débat.

Or, dans ce domaine, les mots ne sont pas neutres et les idées peuvent faire mal. Nous voudrions, dans les lignes qui suivent, tenter de fournir une analyse des effets de la poussée actuelle des identités ethniques*.

I — IRREEMPLACABLE DIFFERENCE

Depuis des siècles, les „Etats-Nations“ ont fonctionné comme des machines à broyer, assimiler et digérer les peuples. Pour créer une identité (stato) nationale, ils se sont employés à éroder et réduire les identités préexistantes des peuples ou ethnies soumis ou conquis. La France qui a su absorber — mais non réellement digérer — près d'une dizaine d'ethnies allogènes est exemplaire à cet égard.

Si les vieux Etats européens ont tous, peu ou prou, utilisé la même technique d'assimilation progressive in situ, d'autres, plus récents, ont procédé différemment. Dans un premier temps, conquête territoriale et asservissement (parfois génocide) des autochtones, ensuite „importation“ d'immigrants qu'un „melting-pot“ bien rodé était censé, décennie après décennie, digérer et acculturer. Les Etats-Unis fournissent ici, on l'aura deviné, l'exemple type.

Alors même que, selon l'une ou l'autre technique, se construisaient ainsi des „Etat-Nations Ersatz“ à grand renfort de „mythes fondateurs“⁴, un mouvement d'expansion industrielle impérialiste militait dans le même sens dans les pays colo-

* Nous examinerons ici à dessein le cas des pays des situations qui, en occident, ne sont pas actuellement en état de crise ouverte.

³ Fernand BRAUDEL, *L'identité de la France*, Arthaud, Flammarion, 1986.

⁴ Les mythes fondateurs ont présidé à la création d'Etats-Nations en Allemagne (mythes germaniques), Grèce (Missplonghi), Tchécoslovaquie (manuscrit de Kralove Dvor), Russie („dit“ du Prince Igor), Turquie (Touranisme), etc, mais aussi aux Etats-Unis, dans une optique, il est vrai, toute différente.

niaux: l'éradication des particularismes (langues, coutumes, goûts, mesures...) et la constitution d'un marché homogène vaste et facile à l'impérialisme capitaliste a été analysée par des auteurs aussi différents que les austro-marxistes Otto BAUER ou Ber BOROKOV⁵ ou le linguiste français „Nouvelle Droite“ H. GOBART⁶.

Droits de l'homme et droit à l'identité collective

Cette „fusio“ des nations, ethnies ou groupes différenciés a longtemps été ressentie par les „centres“ (Londres, Madrid Paris...) comme naturelle et seulement porteuse de progrès. La certitude de faire le bonheur de peuples „mineurs“ en les civilisant (par absorption) était alors un leit-motiv de la bonne conscience occidentale au nom de la fameuse „mission civilisatrice“.

Et puis, le „droit à la différence“ s'est imposé⁷, la massification généralisée n'a plus fait recette et, au fil des ans, l'idée de personnalité collective des peuples lancée au début du XIX^e siècle par les intellectuels „ossianistes“⁸ s'est imposée. Les droits de L'homme sont ensuite venus prendre le relais. Une mauvaise conscience a remplacé la bonne et Basques ou Iroquois⁹ ont commencé à se voir — en théorie — reconnaître certains droits collectifs.

Il est largement admis de nos jours que combattre les expressions de la personnalité collective d'un peuple n'est en fait que du racisme „à l'envers“, ce que nous appellerions du „racisme d'inclusion“ (par opposition au „racisme d'exclusion“ qui tend à rejeter un groupe en invoquant précisément des caractéristiques ethniques réelles ou supposées. C'est le cas par exemple de l'antisémitisme).

Chaque peuple, pense-t-on aujourd'hui, a, par essence, un droit imprescriptible à son intégrité culturelle, à la préservation de son „système symbolique“ propre pour reprendre la formule d'Yves PERSON. L'acculturation forcée qui porte pour les ethnologues le nom d'ethnocide est, on le réalise de mieux en mieux aujourd'hui, une forme éminemment perverse de la fameuse guerre culturelle.

Un peuple qui perd sa langue et la mémoire de son histoire devient durablement vulnérable et handicapé. Alors que le „changement“ volontaire et individuel de langue peut être pour un individu source d'enrichissement et d'épanouissement (cas des immigrants aux Etats-Unis ou des juifs faisant leur Alya vers Israël), pour un peuple il en résulte au contraire souvent en traumatisme dont les traces sont longues à s'effacer. Baisse de la créativité et de l'adaptabilité, alcoolisme, criminalité, telles sont quelques-unes des manifestations de ce qu'à l'instar d'Albert MEMMI, nous nommerons l'aliénation culturelle.

Qui n'a remarqué que les pays qui, à l'instar de la Suisse, laissent les gens vivre et travailler dans la langue qu'ils parlent spontanément („comme le bec leur a poussé“ dit-on en dialecte „switzerdutch“) sont souvent plus créatifs, paisibles, prospères et

5 Cf Otto BAUER, La question des nationalités et la social-démocratie, 2 tomes, Ed. Ouvrières, 1988 (pour la traduction) et A. YAARI, Le défi national, 2 tomes, Anthropos 1978, 1979.

6 H. Gobard, L'aliénation linguistique, Flammarion, 1976.

7 A. TOFFLER, The Third Wave.

8 L'Ecosais Mc PHERSON en inventant Ossian et ses récits mythologiques ouvrit la voie à une floraison de renaissances nationales. Cf. Note supra sur les mythes fondateurs.

9 Les traités signés par la France ou le Royaume-Uni avec les nations conquises n'ont jamais été respectés.

même heureux que ceux à qui la langue a été ravie. A contrario, les psychologues ont observé une corrélation évidente entre un certain nombre de tares sociales invalidantes — notamment l'alcoolisme — et l'aliénation linguistique. Le cas de la Bretagne est exemplaire à cet égard¹⁰.

Plusieurs Etats commencent à réaliser les dommages qu'une longue politique d'oppression identitaire entraîne dans des secteurs importants de leur population et les reconnaissances linguistiques obtenues dans des contextes aussi différents que les Républiques et régions autonomes de Yougoslavie, le Pays de Galles, les Iles Feroë ou le Québec préfigurent peut-être une évolution plus générale. Les organisations internationales, elles-mêmes, qu'il s'agisse de l'ONU¹¹, de l'UNESCO, du Conseil de l'Europe¹² ou du Parlement Européen¹³ ont publié à cet égard des textes sans ambiguïté.

Mais sans doute faut-il aussi appréhender le phénomène sous un autre angle plus „technique“.

Entropie ou polymorphisme

De nombreux sociologues surtout américains l'ont noté, poussée universelle à la massification et mouvement d'affirmation¹⁴ „differencialiste“ paraissent s'affronter brutalement en un combat multiforme depuis des décennies. Comme deux plaques continentales portées l'une vers l'autre par la dérive des continents, ces vagues de fond produisent par leur confrontation des ébranlements analogues aux secousses telluriques au plan de l'univers géologique.

Pourquoi ces convulsions et pourquoi maintenant? Outre les sociologues, cette question et pourquoi maintenant? Outre les sociologues, cette question agite, depuis quelques années tout particulièrement, les biologistes et les épistémologues.

*La massification**

En France, c'est le philosophe Michel Sères¹⁵ qui nous semble avoir fourni l'explication la plus satisfaisante de la massification des sociétés humaines. Il y voit l'une des manifestations de la marche universelle à l'entropie. Ce principe qui constate la dégradation inéluctable de toute forme d'énergie (les physiciens disent que l'entropie est toujours croissante) „permet au prix d'une extrapolation hasardeuse de prévoir l'affaiblissement général de l'univers, condamné à terme à s'effondrer dans une grisaille

* Nous donnons ici à ce terme le sens d'érosion des différences.

10 P. CARRIER et al. Permanence de la langue bretonne. De la linguistique à la psychanalyse. Institut Culturel de Bretagne, 1986.

11 Acte final de la conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (Helsinki).

12 Recommandation 928 de l'Assemblée Parlementaire.

13 Résolution votée par le Parlement Européen sur les langues et cultures des minorités régionales et ethniques de la CE. J.O.C.E., C.318 du 30 novembre 1987.

14 Voir notamment Alvin TOFFLER, *The Third Wave* William MORROW, New-York, 1980.

John NAISBITT, *Megatrends*, Warner Books, New-York, 1982.

15 Voir en particulier *La Traduction*, Hermes III, Ed. de Minuit, Paris, 1974.

d'où toute structure aura disparu¹⁶.

Constatant que, loin d'être „accidentelle“, la permanente régression des différences s'opère en fait toujours sous l'effet conjugué du progrès technique et de la volonté délibérée des gouvernements¹⁷, Michel Sères en est venu à parler à propos de l'„Establishment“ mondial d'un Pouvoir de la mort ou Thanatocratie.

Jusqu'à présent, les biologistes opposaient à ce raisonnement analogique l'irréductibilité du vivant à la matière inerte. La logique du monde physique et celle du monde biologique seraient à les en croire distinctes, rendant intransposables leurs rationalités respectives.

Or, depuis quelques années, les travaux des thermodynamiciens – notamment ceux de I. Prirogine¹⁸ – donnent à penser que le monde vivant n'est peut-être pas fondamentalement différent du monde inanimé. Notant que c'est la dynamique même de la matière inanimée qui a provoqué l'apparition de ce que nous appelons „la vie“, certains en viennent à conclure que ce ne serait pas seulement le vivant („L'organisé s'organisant soi-même“ selon Kant) qui serait capable de se défendre contre l'entropie, mais bien tout système doué de la capacité de se structurer de façon élaborée. La complexité d'une structure quelconque constituerait en fin de compte son moyen de défense contre la dégradation d'énergie.

Polymorphisme et survie.

Pour tout système, lutter contre l'entropie, fabriquer de la „néguentropie“, équivaudrait dans cette hypothèse à s'adapter et à se structurer pour répondre à la complexité des atteintes du milieu. L'autorégulation, l'homéostat, et en fin de compte le polymorphisme, seraient ainsi les mécanismes clés de l'évolution et de la survie.

Pour reprendre les termes employés par des généticiens français: „On ne dira jamais assez l'importance de la diversité biologique des organismes en général, des êtres humains en particulier... Cette diversité, c'est elle qui forme la richesse de l'espèce et lui donne son énorme potentiel d'adaptation“¹⁹.

Ceci étant, pour ce qui est de l'espèce humaine, nombreux sont ceux qui pensent avec Jacques Ruffié que l'évolution proprement biologique approche de son terme. „Le surhomme maintes fois évoqué tient de la légende. Si tant est qu'il fut possible, son heure est passée. Depuis longtemps, l'évolution a quitté la phase organique et les modifications encore promises dans ce domaine sont pour notre espèce ridiculement modestes“²⁰. L'humanité entre donc dans une phase où ses différences ne pourront plus guère être que culturelles. Elle opérerait un saut dans le monde de la pensée, faisant du domaine mental et spirituel le champ privilégié de son évolution à venir.

16 A. JACQUARD, *Eloge de la différence*, Seuil, Paris, 1978, p. III.

17 Les peuples ont les gouvernements qu'ils méritent et nous avons déjà évoqué le caractère „réductionniste“ des nations occidentales.

18 F. GROS, F. JACOB, P. ROYER, op. cit. p. 276.

19 Op. cit. p. 277.

20 J. RUFFIÉ, *De la biologie à la culture*. Flammarion, 1976, p. 568.

De la biologie à la culture.

Constatons d'abord avec F. Gros, E. Jacob et P. Royer l'unité du monde vivant et l'interdépendance de tous les éléments composant la biosphère. L'homme s'insère dans la chaîne écologique et ses pratiques culturelles ne sont en fait que la représentation pensée d'un comportement en soi analogue à celui de tous les autres êtres vivants.

De là à penser que la diversité qui, comme le disent les auteurs du rapport précité „est à la fois le résultat et le moteur de l'évolution biologique“²¹, est aussi indispensable dans le domaine cultural, il n'y a qu'un pas, que de nombreux chercheurs se croient actuellement autorisés à franchir.

Ainsi, venant de conclure que la richesse génétique est faite de sa diversité, A. Jacquard écrit: „Il semble clair que cette constatation dépasse le champ de la biologie: la richesse d'un groupe est faite „de ses mutins et de ses mutants“ selon l'expression d'Edgard Morin“²². Le monomorphisme culturel au même titre que le monomorphisme biologique représenterait un appauvrissement, contribuant à cette entropie généralisée dont nous parlions plus haut.

Tout se passe en fait comme si au moment de basculer dans le „trou noir de la mort culturelle“, le corps social se révoltait et se mettait à sécréter des sortes d'„anticorps“ à l'entropie.

Sans doute n'y a-t-il aucun lien direct entre le militantisme arménien et la réflexion de biologistes comme J. Ruffe, mais au fond leurs motivations sont identiques: notre survie impose de rejeter la massification, de retrouver son identité profonde, de sortir des voies de la monotonie dissolvante, et de redonner ainsi au monde sa bigarrure et sa richesse. Une foule de mutations culturelles permettant de faire franchir à notre monde une nouvelle étape, d'atteindre un nouveau palier d'adaptation, de quitter, dirait Laborit, notre „cerveau de paléocéphale“, seraient l'instrument d'une telle réidentification.

II – LES DANGERS DE L'IDENTITÉ

L'identité serait-elle dans ces conditions le sésame de notre temps et, une fois vaincues les réticences réactionnaires, serait-ce une ère de paix et de bonheur qui s'ouvrirait?

C'est ce que pensait en 1915 le futur Président tchécoslovaque Benes écrivait: „La nation tchèque, profondément idéaliste et humanitaire, poursuivait par sa vie, par son travail séculaire, le noble but d'arriver à une haute conception religieuse et morale de l'existence. Toute son activité se concentrait dans une recherche fiévreuse des idéaux philosophiques et moraux de bonheur, de justice et d'humanité. Elle ne désirait que vivre en paix pour remplir cette tâche historique“. C'est aussi en un sens la logique à laquelle souscrivait Pierre Maugué dans un ouvrage qui a fait date intitulé précisément „Contre l'État-Nation“²³.

Toutefois, même si l'on admet que l'affirmation des différences est peut-être de

21 Op. cit. p. 277.

22 A. JACQUARD, op. cit. p. 206.

23 Denoël, 1979.

nos jours la meilleure chance de survie de sociétés où les mots de liberté et d'invention ont encore un sens, ceci ne doit pas faire oublier que l'affirmation identitaire poussée à son paroxysme est aussi un facteur puissant de déstabilisation sociale.

A — Identités et exclusion

Deux situations différentes doivent être envisagées ici.

Il faut tout d'abord considérer le cas des Etats généralement „neufs“ et composés de plusieurs ethnies comme cela se rencontre souvent dans le tiers-monde (que l'on songe à la Birmanie ou au Nigéria).

Dans de tels Etats, l'exacerbation progressive — endogène en général mais souvent aussi stimulée de l'extérieur pour des raisons politiques — du sentiment „national“ minoritaire ne peut à l'évidence qu'entraîner à plus ou moins long terme des tendances centrifuges de la part des groupes concernés. Une telle évolution, alors même qu'aucune conscience stato-nationale n'a encore eu le temps de forger une identité commune au niveau de l'Etat, aura inéluctablement pour résultat de raviver des antagonismes ethniques et de réveiller des querelles de voisinage à peine assoupies.

Comme les Etats en cause défendent énergiquement leur existence et leur intégrité à l'encontre de mouvements développant eux-mêmes, cela doit être noté, des thèmes stato-nationaux concurrents, des affrontements sanglants ne sont guère évitables. On risque d'aboutir alors à des situations de type Biafra ou Ethiopie dont le caractère trafique et stérile n'est que trop évident.

Dans les vieux Etats-nations, la situation est généralement différente. Ainsi, en France, en Grande-Bretagne ou en Espagne par exemple, il existe une majorité de la population qui se ressent essentiellement française, britannique ou espagnole (avant d'être occitane ou galloise ou andalouse)*.

Face à la montée de mouvements „identitaristes“ ou „nationalistes“ affirmant et revendiquant brutalement une culture différente de celle du centre, celle-ci, ou plutôt certains de ses membres, manifestent souvent une irritation croissante qui, avec le temps, finit par se muer en chauvinisme national. Ce stato-nationalisme induit adopte naturellement une coloration symétrique de celle des mouvements auxquels il s'est opposé.

On aboutit alors à une situation du type suivant: la majorité „centrale“ devient chauvine et met l'accent sur les racines, les ancêtres et les morts. Les minoritaires en lutte se crispent à leur tour au nom des mêmes valeurs. Chaque camp renforce ses défenses identitaires et affûte son arsenal symbolique. Il faut d'ailleurs noter que, de part et d'autre, une telle évolution n'est d'ailleurs pas sans confort et chacun y trouve au fond son intérêt.

Dans les vieux Etats-nations d'occident, il est cependant un secteur de la population qui occupe dans ce paysage une situation fautive et inconfortable: il s'agit de ceux dont l'identité n'est pas vraiment voulue, mais bien plutôt subie; ceux qui, loin de revendiquer leurs différences, craignent que celles-ci ne leur soient reprochées; c'est-à-

* Contrairement à ce qui se passe par exemple en Yougoslavie.

dire les étrangers, les apatrides et plus généralement tous ceux pour qui le pays en cause est une terre d'asile*

Il faut en outre noter que la crispation nationaliste au niveau de la conscience stato-nationale représente souvent la pierre angulaire de mouvements politiques extrémistes. Il en allait ainsi du Péronisme en Argentine ou du Nazisme en Allemagne. Il en va ainsi du „Le Penisme“ en France. A noter que dans ce dernier cas, la revendication — apparemment paradoxale — souvent mise en avant par Jean-Marie Le Pen de son origine bretonne représente seulement la matérialisation d'un enracinement et la volonté de compléter son image par une composante „noroise“. La „petite patrie“ ne sert en l'occurrence, selon une tradition bien française, (comme chez Barrès ou Maurras) que de support à la grande et „vraie“ patrie: la France**.

Ce risque de dérapage de l'identité est suffisamment important pour que, d'un point de vue concret, l'„ethnicité“ soit maniée avec d'innombrables précautions par ceux, journalistes et politiques qui font profession de flatter les identités ethniques. Mais il est encore d'autres périls de l'identité...

B — La dialectique identité-racisme

Historiquement — on ne s'en souvient plus assez à l'heure actuelle — la notion de droits de l'homme est fondée sur le postulat de l'existence d'un Homme en soi reconnaissable par delà les différences ethniques ou culturelles. C'est l'un des apports fondamentaux de la philosophie des lumières que d'avoir — sur la base des principes de l'eschatologie chrétienne — élaboré une doctrine laïque de l'universalité de la nature humaine.

Au XVIII^e siècle, à l'encontre des principes développés par des penseurs comme Condorcet ou l'Abbé Grégoire, Joseph de Maistre, bien représentatif en cela de la pensée contre-révolutionnaire, pouvait écrire: „J'ai vu dans ma vie des Français, des Italiens, des Russes, etc; je sais même, grâce à Montesquieu, qu'on peut être Persan: mais quant à l'homme, je déclare ne l'avoir rencontré de ma vie; s'il existe, c'est bien à mon insu“.

Cette défense des particularismes au détriment de la référence à l'universalité de la nature humaine et aux droits éminents de celle-ci, cette apologie sans limites de l'ethnicité (le *Volksgeist* de Herder) est l'un des fils directeurs de la pensée ultra-conservatrice jusqu'à nos jours. C'est exactement la même philosophie que développent les „Nouvelles Droites“ européennes dans les nombreuses publications qui, pour ne pas toujours se présenter sous leur propre drapeau, n'en ont pas moins une influence importante²⁵.

* Ajoutons que l'antisémitisme accompagnant toujours les prurits de nationalisme droitiers, les Juifs entrent également dans la catégorie des groupes „à risque“.

** C'est là précisément ce qui, dans l'histoire de France, a opposé les „régionalistes“ d'avant 1918 aux „autonomistes“ des années ultérieures.

24 Il est fréquent qu'en vertu de la théorie des anticorps évoquée plus haut, les identités en cause aient atteint un stade avancé d'érosion et ne soient plus revendiquées que par les intéressés eux-mêmes et par un mouvement délibéré de leur intellect.

25 P. A. TAGUIEFF, *La force du préjugé*, La Découverte, Paris, 1988.

Les enseignements des Nouvelles Droites

Pour les tenants de cette „Nouvelle Philosophie“, comme pour leurs devanciers (des penseurs allemands des années 1880-1930), les droits de l'homme sont une invention „diabolique“ de la pensée judéo-chrétienne visant pour l'essentiel à permettre aux faibles et aux rusés de prendre le pas sur les forts et les crédules. On aura notamment reconnu sous ses dénominations transparentes la traditionnelle opposition droitère entre les sémites réputés fourbes et perfides et les aryens (rebaptisés indo-européens depuis 1945 pour des raisons manifestes!) naturellement droits et candides.

L'habillage scientifique que la littérature contemporaine et occidentale a donné à la pensée ethno-biologique et le fait que le terme de „différence“ remplace désormais celui de „hiérarchie“ ne changent rien au fond du problème. Le „différencialisme“ en question n'est en réalité qu'une nouvelle mouture du vieux racisme biologique inventé par Gobineau, Houston Steward Chamberlain et autres Vacher de la Pougé, et utilisé dans les conditions que l'on sait par des disciples qui eurent nom Alfred Rosenberg ou Moeller von den Bruck.

Ceci étant, échaudés par les „événements“ de la dernière guerre mondiale, les penseurs des Nouvelles Droites Européennes ont enterpris la reconquête spirituelle de l'occident par le biais plus discret de la culture. La science de la Rasse (Rassenkunde) des précurseurs est aujourd'hui présentée comme du „différencialisme ethnique“, le droit à la différence, détourné de sa fonction initiale devenant un moyen de faire, sans en avoir l'air, l'apologie de la hiérarchie des cultures (entendues au sens de races selon la terminologie d'avant 1945). Ce langage codé est ce que la Nouvelle Droite appelle de la métapolitique.

Le caractère déguisé, l'origine anglo-saxonne (Cyril Burt, Arthur Jensen...) d'apparence objective et scientifique des thèmes de la Nouvelle Droite ont séduit maints intellectuels et, dans des pays comme l'Espagne, la France ou l'Italie, nombreuses sont aujourd'hui les publications grand-public qui incorporent — parfois de façon occulte²⁶ — une dose plus ou moins considérable de philosophie néo-droitère. Le risque est par conséquent important, pour les adeptes non avertis de la différence, de tomber dans le piège fort adroitement tendu par les penseurs-militants de l'Ordre Nouveau.

Rien d'étonnant, dans ces conditions, à ce qu'une frange droitère des mouvements ethnistes et autonomistes ait sympathisé avec des intellectuels reconnus qui leur offraient — sur un plateau — une présentation séduisante et nouvelle de leur combat. C'est en Bretagne, en Flandre et en Normandie, pour ce qui est de la France, que cette influence est la plus manifeste²⁷.

L'impact — très réel — de la pensée des Nouvelles Droites sur les idéologies jacobines — ou d'Etat — est a priori plus surprenante. Pour comprendre ce que le néo-paganisme anti-judéochrétien et „Européaniste“ de celles-ci peut avoir eu de séduisant pour les nationalistes français ou allemands, il faut se souvenir que ces doctrines ont d'autres composantes. Parmi celles-ci, le culte de la force, de la volonté, de la pureté de la race et de la protection du territoire contre les allogènes fournit par exemple de bonnes bases idéologiques tant à l'ultra-libéralisme (la fréquente référence

²⁶ L'entrisme est une des techniques favorites de la Nouvelle Droite.

²⁷ Y. PLASSERAUD, *Ethnisme et extrême-droite*, Article 31, Février, 1987.

à Nietzsche) qu'à la xénophobie anti-immigrés. Une telle influence est notamment forte sur les mouvements nationalistes en Allemagne, au Danemark, en France ou aux Pays-Bas.

Droits de l'homme et droit des peuples

Depuis la fin de la première guerre mondiale, la notion de droits des peuples a — avec des hauts et des bas — connu une faveur croissante. Les traités de paix des années 20 (Trianon, Versailles, Lausanne...) en posèrent les bases en Europe et la pensée anti-impérialiste du tiers-monde d'après 1945 (W. Dubois, A. Césaire, K. Nkrumah...) en donna une nouvelle version qui, plus „heureuse“ que sa devancière, devait aboutir à la vague de décolonisation que connut le monde entre 1947 (Inde) et 1962 (Algérie).

Or, contrairement à ce qui aurait dû le cas, droit des peuples et droits de l'homme ne font pas toujours bon ménage. Dans la fièvre nationaliste, les penseurs-patriotes ont parfois tendance à oublier les seconds en exaltant les premiers. On l'a encore vu tout récemment lors de la guerre Iran-Irak où des adolescents furent allègrement sacrifiés au front sur l'autel de la patrie!

Au plan philosophique même, la question, n'est pas toujours claire. Les thuriféraires des droits des peuples ont parfois tendance à „excuser“ certaines pratiques humainement inadmissibles au nom du respect de l'ethnicité du groupe en cause. Interrogé récemment par le mensuel français *Globe*²⁸ concernant la tolérance à manifester vis-à-vis des „coutumes étrangères qui portent atteinte aux droits des individus“, Alain de Benoist, directeur de la revue *Nouvelle Ecole*, répondit de façon significative que: „... la décolonisation s'est faite au nom du principe du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes. Ce principe de souveraineté ne souffre aucune exception“.

De même, certains penseurs de la Nouvelle Droite passent sur les excès d'une application stricte de la Charia (loi islamique) au nom du droit à la différence de la nation arabe²⁹. Ici aussi, l'ethnicité — qui, à la limite, permet de couper la main du voleur ou recommande l'infibulation des petites filles — même si elle peut séduire les tenants d'une philosophie machiste et hyper-autoritaire, ne saurait être reçue sans examen sérieux.

Par ailleurs, sur un registre un peu différent, une frange de l'extrême Gauche pro-palestinienne (européenne mais aussi proche-orientale et même japonaise) développe, de conserve avec une extrême Droite qu'elle joute, un anti-sionisme fortement teinté d'antisémitisme³⁰.

On rejoint ici le problème du dérapage de la conscience ethnique vers un rejet de l'autre que nous avons eu l'occasion de mentionner ci-dessus.

²⁸ *Globe* N° 30, Juillet-Août 1988, p. 21.

²⁹ Voir par exemple le magazine belge *Vouloir* d'avril 1985 et *Éléments* N° 48-49 Tiers-mondisme et cause des peuples et un bon article de synthèse de Jean-Yves CAMUS, *Extrême-Droite Française, La tentation de l'Islam intégriste. Le droit de vivre*, Nov-Déc. 1987.

³⁰ On se souvient de l'attentat commis à l'aéroport de Lod par un commando gauchiste japonais.

Conclusion

L'examen auquel nous venons de nous livrer laissera peut-être le lecteur perplexe. Le soulèvement identitaire actuel serait donc tout à la fois pour nos sociétés une chance exceptionnelle et une terrible menace. Refuser la remontée des identités nous précipiterait vers une mortelle massification, favoriser celle-ci ressusciterait les antagonismes que nos sociétés occidentalisées ont endormis au nom du progrès.

La dialectique ainsi présentée est certes diabolique, mais, à bien y regarder, peut-être n'est-elle pas en fait aussi „verrouillée“ qu'il y paraît.

C'est peut-être une présentation trop schématique du processus qui donne une impression d'impasse. En fait, si trop d'identité est manifestement dangereux, un peu de celle-ci s'avère en général très utile.

La solution pourrait par conséquent consister à donner — à temps — aux identités la liberté d'expression à laquelle elles ont droit avant qu'elles ne se crispent dans une militance agressive.

Simultanément, un enseignement de la tolérance sur l'acceptation des différences pourrait contribuer à juguler les germes toujours présents du racisme et de la xénophobie.

RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN

El colegio de Mexico, Mexico

ETHNOCIDE OR ETHNODEVELOPMENT: THE NEW CHALLENGE

The backlash of development

A major and as yet unresolved task in the development process is to achieve that people really do become the beneficiaries of capital investments, technological innovations and modernization in general. As a recent World Bank publication formulates it, the time has come for „putting people first“. It has been known for several decades now that development projects, the introduction of a monetary economy in subsistence agricultural systems and other elements of modernization, may have harmful and negative effects on large masses of the population, particularly traditional communities and indigenous and tribal peoples. But development planners and practitioners have often preferred not to become too aware of these issues. These used to be dismissed as the „inevitable social costs“ of development, and it was expected that their effects would be transitory and that the affected populations would soon become incorporated into the benefits of the modernization process and would enjoy higher and more desirable standards of living.

Alas, reality has been unkind to the modernizers. The harm that has been wreaked upon countless millions of people around the world by „modernization“ and „development“ has yet to be fully documented and digested. From desertification and deforestation, through pollution and intoxication, to pauperisation, marginalisation, social polarisation and dependency, the effects of so-called maldevelopment or perverse development probably add up to one of the major human tragedies of our time. To be sure, this is not what modernizers have intended, and there is no denying that numerous benefits to sundry populations have indeed occurred. But then, as so many recent evaluations and post-hoc studies have shown, such benefits have much too often accrued to only a small segment of the target population, to specific social classes or even subgroups within these classes. A frequently cited case in point is the „green revolution“ and similar rural development schemes, which have only rarely made prosperous farmers out of poor peasants and have most often than not condemned the already poor to further and often harsher poverty. (See the studies carried out by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), under the direction of Andrew Pearse).

Internal colonialism and ethnocide

A particularly heavy burden has befallen numerous ethnic minorities as well as tribal and indigenous peoples in a large part of the world. As a result of conquest and colonization, they have generally come to occupy a position of clear-cut subordination and domination within the countries in which they live, a situation which may be defined as internal colonialism. In recent decades, after centuries of exploitation and marginalization, not only have many of them become the economic victims of all sorts of development schemes, but in many cases they have been physically destroyed as viable groups. Quite frequently their collective disappearance as identifiable communities is not simply a regrettable by-product of development, but actually the stated or implicit policy objective of the development planners. In contrast to the weaker social classes (peasant, artisans, workers in traditional manufactures, small traders, specialists in obsolete services, or simply members of communities in depressed areas) who suffer the backlash or the unintended consequences of development, in many cases ethnic groups are the victims of a deliberate strategy of destruction by the State or a country's dominant elites.

This process has been called cultural genocide or ethnocide, and it is a widespread phenomenon in the contemporary world.

Ethnocide entails two principal aspects; one is economic and the other is cultural. Economic ethnocide is imbedded in the theory and practice of development. It means that all pre-modern forms of economic organisation must necessarily disappear to make way for either private or multinational capitalism or state-planned socialism or mixes thereof. Cultural ethnocide (perhaps a tautology) means that all sub-national ethnic units must disappear to make way for the overarching nation-state, the Behemoth of our times. Development and nation-building have become the major economic and political ideologies of the last quarter century or more. Both of them, as traditionally expounded by statesmen and academics alike, have been ethnocidal in that they imply the destruction and/or disappearance of non-integrated, separate ethnic units. This is frequently carried out in the name of national unity and integration, progress and of course development.

Governments generally tend to deny that they commit ethnocide or the like. The concept, after all, has a rather distasteful implication. They usually affirm that their policies are intended to improve the situation of this or that distinct ethnic group, that their aim is simply to grant backward or traditional or marginal or primitive groups (the terms used may vary from region to region) the same rights and opportunities as everyone else. Sometimes, however, State policies are clear: minority ethnic groups must assimilate or intergrade for the good of the country, and of course for their own good. Examples abound in the North and the South, in the East and the West. Public opinion has been aroused in recent years about genocide of Amerindians in Guatemala and Paraguay (the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has received complaints and published special reports on these cases, some of which have also been brought to the attention of the UN Commission of Human Rights). In Bangladesh, the Chittagong Hill Tribes' resistance to encroachment by outsiders has been violently repressed and in Indonesia the government's transmigration program from the overcrowded central to the less populated outer islands has brought enormous hardship to the original peasant populations. The struggle of the Australian Aborigines for their land rights has become a major political issue in that country, and

has also been brought to international attention in fora of the United Nations and elsewhere. In Namibia, the Bushmen have been driven off their lands, in Ethiopia the Eritreans fight for their independence, and in the Sudan the Christian populations of the South resist forced Islamization by the dominant Northerners. The Kurds in Western Asia have not ceased their struggle for an independent homeland and the Berbers in North Africa resist Arabization. In Western Europe, the best known case is that of the Basques, but it is by no means the only one. The Roma have been hounded by most European governments for centuries. In Eastern Europe, recent years have witnessed the persecution of the Hungarian minority in Rumania and of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. Multi-national Yugoslavia has its share of ethnic problems with the Albanians of Kosovo, whereas in the Soviet Union, the plight of the Jews and of other minorities (Crimean Tatars) has been amply documented. In the United States, Chicanos and Native American Indians, as well as native Hawaiians and Inuit (territorial minorities, to be distinguished from later immigrant minorities) have suffered and resisted (to a certain extent) ethnocidal policies designed to hasten their assimilation into the dominant mold. And in Canada, only recently have Indian rights been considered as a political and constitutional issue.

The list could go on, for there is hardly a country in the world (not even monoracial Japan) in which there aren't one or several ethnic groups or *ethnies* which have been the victims of ethnocide. Not to mention hundreds, if not thousands, of distinct peoples who have simply disappeared definitely from the face of the earth during the centuries following the colonial expansion of Europe. Ethnocide may be defined, briefly, as the process whereby a cultural distinct people (usually termed an *ethnie* or an ethnic group) loses its identity due to policies designed to erode its land and resource base, the use of its language, its own social and political institutions as well as its traditions, art forms, religious practices and cultural values. When such policies are carried out systematically by governments (whatever the pretext: social progress, national unity, economic development, military security) then such governments are guilty of ethnocide. When the process occurs due to the more impersonal forces of economic development, cultural change and modernization, yet not guided by any specific government policy, it is still ethnocidal as to its effects but may be labeled, in sociological or anthropological terms, simply social change or acculturation.

This distinction between two forms of ethnocide does not lack importance even though the end result may be the same: the disappearance or significant diminution of the group. Governments, as was stated before, do not generally like to be accused of ethnocide; and when social change occurs „spontaneously“, so to speak, in which an *ethnie* tends to disappear as such, it is of course better for everybody concerned to attribute this cultural fact to the „invisible hand“ of history. Thus, nobody is to blame. But when governments are responsible for ethnocidal policies, and when such policies are carried out without the consent and the participation of the *ethnies* involved, then it is likely that the State incurs in specific violations of internationally recognized human rights, as shall be pointed out below.

Social, economic and cultural change are of course universal phenomena: no people ever remain static and unchangeable over any length of time. Intercultural influences and diffusion are also universal processes, which take place even when States attempt to eliminate them or maintain them at a strict minimum (eg. Japan before the Meiji Restoration, China between Liberation and the Four Modernizations, Iran under

Khomeini). These processes are fairly natural and should not be considered as ethnocide. The latter occurs only when due to such changes (whether consciously imposed or spontaneous) an ethnic group loses the capacity to reproduce itself socially and biologically as an ethnic group and becomes unable to maintain its culture as a creative tool for the solution of collective problems and the satisfaction of its own primary material and spiritual needs. Thus there is a clear difference between social, cultural and economic change in which every human group in the modern world is caught up willynilly, and ethnocide.

I started out by saying that many economic development projects may be labeled as ethnocidal, even when ethnocide is not clearly their objective. If economic development is to serve the people, then ethnocidal development should be considered a contradiction in terms. Yet it occurs frequently for two principal reasons. Firstly, many development projects and programs are designed for reasons which have little to do with the well-being of the people, but rather with political, financial, external interests etc., and their execution will mainly benefit technocrats, bureaucrats, ambitious politicians or multinational corporations. Secondly, those responsible for development projects and programs are usually fairly ignorant about the situation of ethnic minorities, do not particularly care about the problem and usually hold such groups in contempt. This is particularly the case when the dominant State ideology is based on the concept of a single nation which rejects, and lacks respect for, those other heteronomous ethnies.

Whereas most countries in the world are multi-ethnic, few States acknowledge this fact and even fewer have developed specific legal safeguards and policies for the protection of the ethnic minorities within their borders. Governments generally argue that by providing equal rights and opportunities to all of their citizens they are respectful of the cultural specificities of particular ethnies. This is of course not entirely correct and it usually doesn't work out that way. Most States have an explicit or implicit assimilationist bias and despite the formal recognition of fundamental liberties and individual human rights, ethnic minorities are usually at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the State. This is particularly the case as regards indigenous and tribal peoples, who are not, strictly speaking, ethnic minorities at all.

Indigenous and tribal peoples

Indeed, indigenous peoples may be defined as follows, according to a special United Nations report:

Indigenous populations are composed of the existing descendants of the peoples who inhabited the present territory of a country wholly or partially at the time when persons of a different culture or ethnic origin arrived there from other parts of the world, overcame them and, by conquest, settlement or other means, reduced them to a nondominant or colonial condition; who today live more in conformity with their particular social, economic and cultural customs and traditions than with the institutions of the country of which they now form part, under a State structure which incorporates mainly the national, social and cultural characteristics of other segments of the population which are predominant.

E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.566, p. 10

As for tribal populations, the definitions vary, but they generally include relatively small, geographically isolated social units who have maintained only occasional contact

with the State or the dominant society and who preserve their own specific social organization which differs from that of the majority population. Usually, theirs is a subsistence economy at low technological level. In some parts, as in India, tribes enjoy a special legal status and are the object of specific tutelary legislation (the „scheduled tribes“). In other parts, as in some African countries, a tribe is an identifiable ethnic unit which distinguishes itself from other similar units yet interacts freely with the rest of the national society (they would be called nationalities in some European countries).

A common feature of many indigenous and tribal peoples is that their traditional habitat has only recently become the object of „national development planning“. Areas which used to be remote and isolated from national decision-making centers, have now become „poles of growth“, reserves of vast amounts of sometimes strategic mineral and other natural resources, the sites of costly dams and mining enterprises, the targets of land development and settlement schemes. For technocrats and planners, multinational corporations or poor, landless squatters, such areas have become a „new frontier“. The best known of such regions is of course the vast Amazon basin in South America. But there are similar, albeit smaller, areas in the jungles, mountains and savannahs of many Third World countries, and recently in the Arctic region as well.

In the scramble for land and riches, it is usually forgotten that many of these areas have their traditional inhabitants and owners, namely, the indigenous and tribal populations. When the expanding frontier and the merry development planners reach the territory of these peoples, conflicts usually occur, which sometimes may become violent. Many indigenous and tribal communities have been physically exterminated by the expanding frontier. The best known case, sung by poets and idealized by Hollywood, is the American Wild West. But this seems to be no longer of major concern (except to the American Indian people themselves), because it was over and done with by the end of the nineteenth century. But similar events have occurred and are occurring in the Amazon, in southern Chile and Argentina, in Central and Southern Africa, in India and Bangladesh, in the mountain regions of Thailand and the jungle areas of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, in the deserts of Northwestern Australia.

The first and principal onslaught on the way of life of indigenous and tribals is the attack upon their land and their ecological resource base. The loss of land and territory has contributed to wipe out many peoples around the world. It is probably the principal factor in the ongoing process of ethnocide of which they are the continuing victims. For indigenous and tribal peoples, land is not only a productive resource, an economic factor. Land is habitat, territory, the basis for social organization, cultural identification and political viability; frequently associated with myth, symbols and religion. Land is the essential element in the cultural reproduction of the group.

Development planners and indigenous and tribal peoples continue to clash over the issue of land; what for the former is simply a factor in economic calculus, for the latter constitutes a vital necessity for survival. Land development – or „aménagement du territoire“ as the French would say – stands in stark contradiction to the significance of land to indigenous and tribal peoples. As long as this contradiction is not solved, ethnocide will continue in the name of development.

Besides the issue of land, ethnocide proceeds by other ways and means: the monetary economy which creates new consumer needs, brings in new products and

displaces old ones, the disappearance of traditional occupations and the penetration of wage labor into the economy; the national school system which not only introduces the official or dominant language but also other values and attitudes which replace traditional ones. In short, the process of modernization and secularization (so dear to the development sociologists of the fifties and sixties) has contributed to irreversible ethocide in many parts of the world.

Only during the last few years, perhaps since the middle seventies, have governments and official agencies become aware of the human implications of savage, impersonal, technocratic development. States are now in order that the human and social factors of development plans must be carefully studied and taken into consideration before any major policy decisions are taken. The World Bank has now decided to make credit for major development projects in the Third world contingent upon safeguards for the well-being of tribal peoples. Governments have been pressured into passing legislation for the protection of indigenous and tribal cultures and communities. Unfortunately, very frequently such safeguards and legislation exist on paper only.

International human rights and ethnocide

The international community has not been insensitive to the problems raised by ethnocide and the persecution of ethnic minorities by so many States throughout history, but its efforts have been only partially successful so far. Between the two world wars, the League of Nations attempted to establish an international regime for the protection of national minorities, principally in central and eastern Europe. The results were far from satisfactory, and the League's minority protection system was declared inoperative after the Second World War.

The United Nations Organization has not fared much better, yet there are a number of legal instruments in the UN system which bear directly upon the situation of ethnic minorities and indigenous and tribal peoples. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, while not directly concerned with minorities, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, national origin and other factors. For some, this was considered sufficient to guarantee equal rights to all individuals. The UN Convention against Genocide is directed against the deliberate physical extermination of human ethnic group (it was directly inspired by the Holocaust of the Jews in Nazi Germany), but it stops short of mentioning cultural genocide or ethnocide.

The UN Sub-commission for the Prevention Of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities has been working for many years on a draft declaration of the rights of ethnic minorities, but it has not yet been able to reach an agreement. In the meantime, the rights of ethnic minorities are only referred to in Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966, which reads:

„Article 27. In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.“

This article has been considered by some observers as not being strong nor precise enough to effectively guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities. It still refers to individual and not to collective or group rights. Yet the preservation of ethnies, particularly in the face of ethnocide, requires the recognition and codification of collective rights, not only individual human rights. This is a step which the UN has not yet wished to take, at least as far as ethnic groups are concerned. That is why many ethnies, and particularly indigenous peoples, reject the provisions of Article 27 and claim protection under Article 1 of both the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (both Covenants were adopted by the General Assembly at the same time). The fact that Article 1 is the same for both instruments shows the importance that the General Assembly attributed to it. Drawn directly from UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 (Declaration on Decolonization), Article 1 states:

„Article 1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.“

The right of all peoples to self-determination is now considered to be a fundamental, universal human right to be applicable only to colonial territories and definitely not to peoples within an established independent State, when this State adheres to generally accepted human rights practices. Yet many ethnies in the world (whether ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples) do consider that the right to self-determination should also apply to them. Indigenous peoples in particular, distance themselves from the concept of „ethnic minority“ as considered in Article 27 of the ICCP (quoted above), claim the right to be labeled a „people“ in the full sense of the word, and therefore demand the right to self-determination established in Article 1 of the two international Covenants.

This argument has been wielded by representatives of indigenous peoples in the Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the UN Sub-Commission, which has been meeting yearly since 1982 (except in 1986) to discuss a possible declaration of rights of indigenous peoples, as distinct from a declaration of rights of ethnic minorities. Indigenous and tribal peoples have also been the subject of Convention 107 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), adopted in 1957. This Convention, well-meaning as it was at the time of its adoption, and inspired mainly by the situation of the Indians of South America, has been criticised for its paternalistic tone and assimilationist bias. This is the reason why the ILO itself has decided to revise and update Convention 107, a process which should be accomplished by ILO's General Conference in 1988.

The ethnocide which is occurring among so many ethnic minorities and indigenous and tribal peoples around the world, stands in direct convention of a number of international human rights instruments, despite the fact that ethnocide or cultural genocide as such is not explicitly considered in any of them. Thus, the defence of the rights of these peoples has become an international human rights issue. It is not a question of anthropological romanticism, or of conservative opposition to progress, or of a reactionary negation of the realities of capitalist development and the class struggle in dependent countries, or even more, a subversive if not downright pro-imperialist attack upon the unity of the national state, as some critics might argue. It is

simply a question of basic human rights, as relevant to thousands of distinct peoples and hundreds of millions of human beings in all parts of the world.

Ethnodevelopment

No one has understood this better than the ethnic minorities and indigenous and tribal peoples themselves. While their resistance to ethnocide and genocide is as old as these destructive practices, the political organizations of many of these peoples, at least on the international scene, is a fairly recent phenomenon. Many minority peoples have lobbied the United Nations since its inception for their particular interests. Some of them did so more or less effectively since the days of the League of Nations. For example, the Armenians to seek redress for genocide at the hands of the Turkish state; the Kurds for independent statehood; the black South Africans for deliverance from apartheid; the Palestinians, Namibians, Saharouis and others for self-determination and independence; the Timorese for liberation from Indonesian annexation; the Puerto Ricans for an end to American domination. Some of these „cases“ may be considered as part of the decolonization process, initiated in the UN in 1960. Others, however, are the result of more complex historical situations and require more imaginative and innovative solutions.

A specific case in point refers to indigenous and tribal peoples, most of whom are now considered to be a part of established, internationally recognized independent states. The first international NGO conference on indigenous peoples and their rights took place at the UN in Geneva in 1977. One of the prime movers of this important event was the International Indian Treaty Council, an organization of North American and Canadian Indians who maintain that they represent independent, sovereign nations who had signed international treaties with the U. S. and Canadian governments in the nineteenth century, which had been unilaterally violated and abolished by these governments, against the interests and the will of the indigenous peoples involved. This conference was followed by another NGO conference held in Geneva in 1981, and attended by representatives of many other indigenous groups of the American continent. While not all of these peoples could base their arguments on a history of broken treaties, their social and economic situation was similar and their demands coincided.

In 1975 a number of indigenous organizations: North and South American Indians, native Hawaiians, Inuit (Eskimos) from Canada and Alaska, and Sami (Lapps) from Northern Europe decided to organize the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. This organization has adopted a declaration of indigenous rights, it has held several international assemblies and it has been present at numerous international meetings at which it has cogently argued its case. Other regional and sub-regional indigenous organizations have likewise been active internationally, particularly in North, Central and South America. Social scientists and workers of voluntary service agencies (including religious groups) who over the years have been closely associated with indigenous and tribal groups have also held meetings and made public statements, such as the Declaration of Barbados II of 1977, in which they question traditional State myths and development wisdom and call for new approaches. In 1981, UNESCO and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) sponsored an expert meeting on ethnocide and ethnodevelopment in Latin America, which produced a document called

the „Declaration of San José“. UNESCO later went on to organize similar meetings in Africa and Europe.

The gist of all these activities by intergovernmental, non-governmental, academic and indigenous bodies has been the recognition of the need for a new approach to the problematique of economic and social development of ethnically distinct peoples within the context of the modern so-called national state. As against policies which lead to ethnocide or preserve internal colonialism, there has arisen a call for self-determination, autonomy and ethnodevelopment. This means basically that indigenous and other ethnies demand the right to decide about their own affairs, to participate in the decision-making bodies and processes where their future is discussed and decided; to political representation and participation; to respect for their traditions and cultures; to the freedom to chose what kind of development, if any, they want. Ethnodevelopment means that an ethnie, whether indigenous, tribal or any other, maintains control over its own land, resources, social organization and culture, and is free to negotiate with the State the kind of relationship it wishes to have.

Ethnodevelopment, like the concept of self-reliant development, means looking inward, it means finding in the group's own culture the resources and creative force necessary to confront the challenges of the modern, changing world. It does not mean autarchy or self-imposed isolation, and much less retreat into a museum of „tradition“, though ethnies that may wish to remain isolated (as some tropical forest tribes in the Amazon basin) should by all means be free to enjoy the basic human right of isolation. Ethnodevelopment does not mean political secession or separatism from an existing State, though a people which aspires to nationhood and independence (such as the Kurds) should by all means be free to exercise the right of self-determination, as formulated by the United Nations. Ethnodevelopment does not mean breaking-up existing nations and subverting the process of nation-building (a major task of our time, particularly in the Third World), but rather redefining the nature of nation-building and enriching the complex, multi-cultural fabric of many modern States (such as India, Sri Lanka or Nicaragua), by recognising the legitimate aspirations of the culturally distinct ethnies which make up the national whole. Ethnodevelopment does not mean blurring the very real social and economic class divisions which characterize the modern world capitalist system by stirring up some artificial „tribalism“ but rather it assumes that not only class but also ethnic identity and community are socially intergreating principles. Thus classbased social movements in the modern world can only benefit and improve their performance if they recognize the validity and legitimacy of ethnic demands (such as has occurred in the revolutionary movement in Guatemala or the struggle in Northern Ireland). Ethnodevelopment, finally, means rethinking the nature and objectives of local-level development projects, from hydro-electric dams to the introduction of plantation crops by keeping in mind, first and foremost, the needs, desires, cultural specificities and grass-roots participation of the ethnic groups themselves.

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja – Institute for Ethnic Studies
 YU – 61000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, p. p. 318
 ima na zalogi še – offers you:

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja – Razprave in gradivo
Journal of Ethnic Studies – Treatises and Documents

7–8/1976 (Slovenska in hrvaška manjšina v Avstriji – Slovene and Croat Minorities in Austria)	20.000 din (8 DEM)
9–10/1979 (Varia)	20.000 din (8 DEM)
11–12/1980 (Varia, bibliografija – Bibliography)	16.000 din (6,5 DEM)
13–14/1981 (Zaščita manjšin v mednarodnem pravu – The Protection of Minorities in international Law, Varia)	20.000 din (8 DEM)
15/1982 (Narodnosti v Jugoslaviji – Minorities in Yugoslavia)	24.000 din (9,5 DEM)
16/1983 (Slovenska manjšina v Italiji – Slovene Minority in Italy)	24.000 din (9,5 DEM)
17/1984 (Varia)	20.000 din (8 DEM)
18/1986 (Vzgoja in izobraževanje v večkulturnih družbah – Education in Multicultural Societies)	24.000 din (9,5 DEM)
19/1986 (Varia)	20.000 din (9,5 DEM)
20/1987 (Varia)	20.000 din (9,5 DEM)

FRED W. RIGGS

Political Science Department
University of Hawaii

MODES OF ETHNICITY

0. Contexts for understanding ethnicity

Considerable misunderstanding in the discussion of modern ethnic processes can be attributed to the prevalence of different contexts for thinking about ethnic phenomena and problems. My thinking on this subject is based primarily on the experience of compiling a conceptual glossary for „ethnicity research“ (A 1).¹ The paper makes no attempt to offer new data or to document its proposals. Rather, it is a kind of mapping exercise. My goal is to suggest a way of interpreting the many diverse concepts found in research on ethnicity so that they can become mutually intelligible. After revision on the basis of comments from readers, illustrative documentation may be added and, if the results seem useful to ethnicity researchers, the next might then be published.

0a. Contextuality. In the American literature ethnicity is associated with contrasts between members and non-members of a given culturally defined community. The term „minority“ is often used as a synonym, thereby implying the existence of a „majority“. In this sense, the existence of an ethnic group often reflects attitudes and behaviours of non-members as much as it does the self-identification of members. Some authors go so far as to insist that it is always the attitudes of outsiders that lead to the development of ethnic identity.²

1. INTERCOCTA GLOSSARY: CONCEPTS AND TERMS USED IN ETHNICITY RESEARCH. Published under the Auspices of the International Social Science Council, Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis, with the financial assistance of UNESCO. (privately printed and distributed from the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii). Code numbers for concepts defined in this glossary are given, in brackets, after technical terms used in this paper. Concepts not included in the glossary are marked with a bracketed asterisk: (*).

2. The concept of an „American Indian“, is instructive. It was created by Europeans when they falsely identified the peoples of the New World. The original inhabitants thought of themselves only in terms of innumerable „tribal“ names and could scarcely conceive of themselves as a single community – certainly they had many very different cultures. Only after they became a recognized „minority“ in their own lands when European settlers swamped them, did they become „ethnized“ and learn to think of themselves as „Indians“. Similarly the contemporary notion of „blacks“ in America is a product of their oppression by a predominantly „white“ society. As these examples suggest, an ethnic community may actually contain many different cultures amalgamated under a single heading.

By contrast, in the European ethnographic tradition, it is more customary to identify culturally defined communities as independent entities that can be studied apart from their social environment. Most of them have a long history and well-established self-identity. Their cross-cultural interactions are, of course, recognized but they are given lower priority. Nevertheless, in both approaches there is interest in problems that arise whenever a cultural community exist as a sub-system within a larger society.

Here I shall emphasize both the „endo-perception“ (HED 1) based on how members of an ethnic community view themselves and the „exo-perception“ (HEM 1) which characterizes the opinions of outsiders. In other words, ethnicity involves a contextually defined fractional community that is viewed by others, and views itself, as culturally and socially distinctive. Although ethnic communities normally do have their own cultural identity and may be studied as closed systems, „ethnicity research“, as I understand it, treats them as open systems involved in relationships with outsiders.

Ob. Modernity. The basic modern norm of „equality“ applies to these relationships and provokes anger when it is violated. By contrast in pre-modern societies inequality was accepted and hierarchic values prevailed. Thus under the rule of empires, where sovereignty was viewed as a royal property, everyone was treated as a „subject“ and conquered peoples were enslaved or treated as serfs. No matter how much they resented oppression or struggled for liberation, they could scarcely do so in the name of equality because the notions of popular sovereignty, of citizenship and of social justice had no standing in the philosophies that prevailed in those times.

No doubt traditional values and social structures remain in the world today, but for the most part the assumptions of „modernity“ prevail everywhere — namely notions of citizenship and the sovereignty of the people rather than of the rulers. This is true, I think, in both capitalist and socialist countries, as it is throughout the third world. It supports a broad distinction between „modern“ and „traditional“ forms of ethnicity. In this paper I shall focus attention on modern ethnicity, although a few comments on traditional modes will be appended. Most writers on ethnicity have modern ethnicity in mind although, understandably, historians give more weight to pre-modern formations.

Oc. Revisionist/Defensive Dimension. Another important dimension of variation applies to all modes of modern ethnicity. It concerns the degree to which ethnic communities feel satisfied or dissatisfied with the status quo. When they are dissatisfied they promote fundamental changes and adopt a wide variety of strategies, ranging from peaceful non-violent protest to revolutionary struggles and terrorism. We may classify all of these demands for change as „revisionist“.

By contrast, ethnic communities are sometimes satisfied with the status quo and struggle to maintain and consolidate it, or to protect it from attack. Again, the methods of struggle may range from peaceful cultural and political action, as by encouraging assimilation or tolerating cultural diversity, to violence directed at the suppression of minorities — e. g. in pogroms, ethnocide, and even genocide. It is useful to view them together as examples of a „defensive“ orientation. Admittedly this term is not precise but others like „protectionist“ or „conservative“ appear even less suitable. We need to distinguish the peaceful/violent dimension that characterizes different ways of acting from the goals to be attained: i. e. whether to maintain and

consolidate the existing power structure, or to bring about fundamental changes sought by those not in power. I shall use the „defensive/revisionist“ dichotomy to refer to the latter dimension.

In the rest of this paper I shall suggest a taxonomic framework for understanding the diverse contexts of ethnicity, emphasizing those that are modern while paying marginal attention to others that are traditional. I shall try to identify both revisionist and defensive attitudes in each case, and also explain the types and significance of „non-ethnic minorities“. The following six basic rubrics will be considered:

1. Basic Modes: Primary Ethnicity
2. Basic Modes: Secondary Ethnicity
3. Compound Formations
4. Non-ethnic Minorities
5. Traditional Formations
6. Marginal Contexts

1. Basic modes: primary ethnicity

A fundamental distinction can be made between the ethnic situation that prevails in the Old World (Europe, Asia and Africa) and what prevails in the New World (North and South America, Australia and New Zealand). In the Old World context we usually assume the existence of *homelands* (PA 2) as a focus for both ethnographic and ethnic research. Most discussion of „nationalism“, for example, presuppose a homeland. In the New World context, however, homelands are not usually presupposed. By contrast, where immigrant minorities are widely *dispersed* (PIP1) through a population, and there are no well defined homelands, interest typically focuses on problems of assimilation vs. retention of distinctive cultural features; problems of fair treatment vs. discrimination.

A distinction is sometimes made between „political“ and „cultural“ ethnicity. It is easy to see the political aspects of nationalism and its cultural aspects are less conspicuous, yet surely there. By contrast, where no homeland is involved and „nationalism“ appears to be an empty notion, cultural aspects are more self-evident, yet political aspects are also present. The political/cultural distinction, therefore, scarcely enables us to make the contextual contrast between homeland and non-homeland based ethnicity.

At a simple terminological expedient, I shall refer to homeland based nationalist movements and phenomena as „*primary ethnicity*“. By contrast, where no homeland is in mind — of course immigrants have their ancestral homelands outside the country to which they have migrated — it is convenient to speak of „*secondary ethnicity*“. (For an earlier use of these terms see the ANNEX) After deeper investigation we may find more satisfactory terms for this distinction, and I welcome any suggestions for preferable terms. Meanwhile, however, I shall use these terms on a provisional basis. Please remember that the geographical dichotomy has many exceptions: primary ethnicity can be found in the New World, especially among its original inhabitants, Native Americans or Australian Aborigines, for example. Similarly, secondary ethnicity can be found in the Old World — Algerians in France, Indians in England, peoples of Curacao and Suriname in the Netherlands, Turkish workers in Germany and Switzerland, etc.

1a. Primary Ethnicity the words „nation“ and „nationalism“ apply only to primary ethnicity. However, they have acquired a wide variety of meanings depending on their revisionist or defensive orientation. In the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, for example, as equalitarian ideas spread among the various Slavic peoples (Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenians, Serbs, Macedonians, Greeks, etc.) nationalism came to refer to revisionists movements designed first to secure cultural autonomy (especially for different religious preferences and language practices) and later to secure political independence as new „nation states“. In this perspective it is appropriate to speak of „ethnonationalism“ (KU 25).

By contrast, in Western Europe, especially in England and France, nationalism assumed more defensive orientation, not only to safeguard the full independence of established national states, but also to assimilate conquered minorities and convert them to the dominant mode of life. In this sense also American „nationalism“, as expressed in the „melting pot“ ideal, involved the intention of the dominant English-speaking community to consolidate a new nation by assimilating all of the immigrant minorities into a common „American way of life“. This concept might be referred to as „state-nationalism“ or even as „patriotism“(*).

When discussing nationalism, therefore, we should distinguish between its defensive and its revisionist forms. It is futile to insist that „nationalism“ should be used for only one of these forms when, clearly, the term often applies, paradoxically, to both.³

3. For a discussion of the diverse meanings of „nation“ see my „What is Ethnic? What is National? Let's Turn the Tables, „*Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*. At one extreme, Philip White argues that „nation“ should be used only in the sense of a nation-state, as in the United Nations, whereas Karl Aun holds that it can properly be used only in its cultural ancestral sense of an ethnonation. These two usages represent dialectically contrasting perspectives of the defensive vs. the revisionist ethnonation.

After completing the first draft of this paper in June 1988 I discovered the great work by Emerich K. Francis, *Interethnic Relations: An Essay in Sociological Theory*. (New York: Elsevier, 1976), 432 pages. In it he put forward two similar concepts which he also called „primary“ and „secondary“ ethnicity. Because his analysis elaborates and usefully supplements material in my paper, I am reproducing several pages from Francis' book in which his concepts are explained and used in a series of propositions. This material is taken from the final chapter which contains a systematic set of definitions and propositions based on the empirical data and case studies presented in the earlier chapters.

The main difference between Francis and myself is a matter of emphasis. I stress the geo-political factors which generate primary and secondary ethnicity, whereas he uses the typical consequences of these dynamic elements as a basis for his classification. The distinction becomes evident in Francis' Proposition 51, where he asserts that „annexation or collective transfer are more likely to lead to the formation of primary ethnic groups,“ and „migration“ to the development of secondary groups. I have, instead, defined primary groups as those with an ancestral homeland, and secondary groups as those resulting from migration. I view the consequences of these formative processes as highly probable but not necessary.

Because of his emphasis on consequences, however, Francis defines „primary ethnic groups“ as those which „continue to function in the host society as closed subsocieties...“ (Def. 46); whereas he identifies „secondary ethnic groups“ as „subgroups of the host society whose members participate directly... in some dimensions...“ (Def. 45). Because the correlation between causes and consequences is very high, it may make little practical difference which of these definitions are used. My own preference, however, is to say that when annexation or collective transfer (primary

1b. Levels. It is important, moreover, to identify different levels of „nationalism“ depending on the objective situation of ethnic communities. At the lowest level we find some primary communities that do, indeed, have deep historical roots for their culture (language, religion, history) but have become so overwhelmed by a dominant society that they no longer constitute a majority in their original „homeland“.

An interesting example may be found in my home state of Hawaii. The original Polynesian inhabitants, in almost total isolation from the outside world, developed a remarkably sophisticated culture of their own. This culture has now been swamped by intruders from the outside world and they now constitute a minority dispersed among a much larger population of non-Hawaiians. In this context, some Hawaiian activists demand the restoration of their ancient rights and privileges, perhaps on the analogy of those American Indians in the U.S. mainland who have, by treaty, been able to exercise some degree of authority within ancestral lands reserved for their exclusive use, i. e. as „reservations“. They often identify themselves as members of the „Hawaiian Nation“.

However, many Hawaiians do not see this goal as very realistic or desirable. Instead, they demand some degree of cultural autonomy and political privileges within the framework of a broader American society. They have already achieved an important step in this direction through the creation, by constitutional amendment, of an Office of Hawaiian Affairs within the State of Hawaii. It is governed by an elected council all of whose members must be Hawaiians, and only ethnic Hawaiians can vote for candidates to serve on this council. No doubt many unresolved questions and disputes have arisen, but nevertheless the Hawaiians have achieved a measure of recognition as a special people with privileges not available to any other minority in Hawaii.

We may refer to any such people who claim such special privileges as a „subnation“ (ST 1) and when such claims are recognized they become an „autonomous subnation“, or „ethnic autonomy“ (ST 6). Many subnations, however, have much more status and dominate a political jurisdiction which is their homeland. The clearest examples are found in „multi-nation states“ (SOM 6): Germans, French and Italians in

ethnicity) has occurred, the formation of „closed subsocieties“ usually results, whereas when migration leads to the appearance of (secondary) ethnic groups, then incomplete „participation“ in the life of the host society normally results.

Although the primary/secondary distinction can help us to clarify a host of conceptual and terminological problems involved in research on ethnic processes and problems, it appears not to have been picked up in the current literature — at least, I have not run across it except in one book, J. Krejci and V. Velimsky, *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981). They refer to Francis' distinction as „heuristically fruitful“ (p.), but rely mainly on the distinction between „cultural“ and „political“ nations attributed to F. Meinecke. Actually, Francis offers a very similar distinction which he refers to as „ethnic“ vs. „demotic“ nation. Both types of „nation“ occur, of course, in the context of primary, but not of secondary, ethnicity. I might add that important categories identified in my paper, notably „compound formations“ and „non-ethnic minorities“, are not covered, as such, in the treatise by Francis although, no doubt, some of his empirical data in fact refer to phenomena that belong to these categories.

Switzerland, for example, or Armenians, Estonians, Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks in the U. S. S. R. We may refer to them as „dominant subnations“ (ST 2). The term „ethno-nation“ has been used for this concept but since it also has several other meanings, it is equivocal and can be used unambiguously only if the context clearly shows which of its senses the author has in mind.

No doubt many dominant subnations are content with the status quo and adopt a protectionist or defensive attitude. I do not know enough about the local situation to be sure, but I would suspect that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians could be classified in Yugoslavia. However, in some cases dominant subnations are dissatisfied and become revisionist, perhaps demanding full independence as a state-nation. A good example is the Francophone community in Quebec. Although they completely dominate their provincial government, there is a powerful Quebecois movement demanding full independence. So far as I know, there are no established terms to make this distinction. If we wanted to make it in order to analyze the causes of the difference, we might distinguish between „defensive“ and „revisionist“ subnations.

When an ethnic community dominates a state that is recognized by the United Nations, it is frequently referred to as a „nation“. However, as noted above, subnations have also appropriated this term for themselves, and it is most often used in the popular sense of a „state“ or, redundantly and ambiguously, a „nation-state“. We might most clearly indicate what we have in mind by using a term like „state-nation“. This term could be interpreted unambiguously to mean an ethnonation, like the Danes, Japanese, French, or Poles, who dominate an independent state in the world community.

A state composed of only one ethnic community is called a „mono-ethnic state“ (SID 1). The ideal of a state-nation presupposed that it is also a monoethnic state. To maintain such an ideal, some countries — Japan, for example — make it almost impossible for anyone who is not of Japanese ancestry to become a Japanese citizen. Nevertheless, many non-Japanese do reside in Japan. By contrast, although France is clearly a state-nation, it has so many ethnic minorities that it can scarcely claim to be a mono-ethnic state. In fact, virtually all countries in the world today are „multi-ethnic states“ (SID 3).

When a single ethnic community (subnation) dominates a state-nation, we might call the polity an „ethnostate“ (SIM 3). The dominant ethnonation in such a country may actually constitute only a small part of the population. To take an extreme example, consider the Union of South Africa which is dominated by a small Afrikaner minority that oppresses many ethnic communities within its boundaries. In a case like this, the subordinated nations hope to come to power as a majority. Of course fear of this eventuality drives the dominant community to extreme measures, including its abhorred „apartheid policy“ (SE 85).

Consider also countries like Ethiopia, which is dominated by its Amharic minority, Burma by its Burmese community, and the Sudan by its Arabic speaking Muslims. In each of these cases minority nations are engaged in chronic revolt, demanding autonomy, independence, or boundary changes — they cannot, as in South Africa, hope to dominate the state, nor achieve real equality of status in a „convictional state“ (SIM 1). The „dominant nation“ (ST 2) in an ethnostate typically has a protectionist orientation, seeking to safeguard its power and to assimilate or destroy the minority nations that challenge its pre-eminence. By contrast, of course, the

subordinated subnations are typically revisionist and seek fundamental changes designed to establish autonomy, independence, or annexation to a different state of which they constitute an enclave.

1c. Colonies. Although in today's crowded world no „empty“ lands open to settlement can be found, it is historically relevant to mention a kind of primary ethnicity that might easily be confused with the secondary type. This involves the settlement of frontier territories by „colonist“ (*). Although they are migrants, they have no intention of assimilating to another culture. If, perchance, aboriginal inhabitants already occupy the frontier zone, they simply push them aside or destroy them, preempting their lands. Their goal is to expand the frontiers of the homeland.

However, especially when the frontiers were discontinuous with the homeland, new „nations“ typically came into existence and, eventually, sought their independence. The American example is well known: 13 British colonies in North America declared their „independence“ in 1775 and, after a war of secession, created the United States. Other British colonies were founded in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and are now independent countries in the Commonwealth. Similarly, during the 19th century, Spanish colonies in Latin America successively detached themselves from their homeland, synthetically creating new „nations“.

Of course, there are marginal cases. British colonists in Uganda and Southern Rhodesia were unable, finally, to dominate or displace the indigenous inhabitants and they have now become, themselves, subnations in these newly independent countries. The future of South Africa remains highly problematical, but it is difficult not to believe that, in the long run, the white South Africans will also become an ethnic minority in that troubled land. Comparable struggles are taking place in New Caledonia today between French colonists and the native population. In these cases, we might speak of „transplanted primary ethnicity“(*). Here we see how recent nations have been formed, by contrast with the normal situation in which ethnic homelands have ancient foundations.

An even more exceptional phenomenon involved the Zionist movement that led to the settlement of Jewish colonists in Palestine. In this case, exceptionally, the colonists had no homeland, but sought to create (or re-create) one. After they had established Israel as a state and a national homeland, they proceeded to conquer adjacent lands that were to have been reserved for the development of a Palestinian homeland. The current troubles in the occupied territories manifest, in a classic form, the demands of an ethnonation for political independence.

2. Basic modes: secondary ethnicity

Let us now consider the parallel manifestations of secondary ethnicity. Again, a major distinction can be made between the secondary ethnic communities who are *revisionist*, protesting their status and agitating for change, as contrasted with those that are *protectionists* because they are fully satisfied with the status quo. American students of ethnicity are preoccupied with problems involving revisionist ethnic communities. Because the United States is largely populated by immigrants and the descendants of immigrants, it is extremely multi-cultural. The dominant cultural

community for a long time was „Anglo American“, and immigrants of non-Anglo origins rose socially and politically only when they accepted the values and way of life of this community.

Immigrants communities were torn between conflicting goals. Some sought to retain their ancestral culture and a kind of subnational autonomy but the majority chose to assimilate. However, for various reasons, they often found that assimilation was blocked, often by resistance from the dominant Anglo community. They saw themselves as members of a lower class subject to discrimination and oppression. Revisionism, therefore, normally took the form of demands for equality of opportunity and „affirmative action“ to give them the opportunity to rectify past injustices and attain all the privileges of equal citizenship. Sometimes, however, it also took the form of demands for cultural autonomy in a way that resembles that of sub-nations, as mentioned above. This has produced movements to legitimize multi-culturalism, with separate schools, churches, minority language mass media, and a host of ethnic organizations. The interdisciplinary field of „ethnic studies“ has developed in the United States with a primary focus on the problems leading to these protest movements.

By contrast, members of immigrant communities who assimilate to the dominant Anglo-American way of life and became successful economically, socially and politically, have little reason to protest the status quo. Nevertheless, many of them still feel a sentimental attachment to their original homeland outside the United States. To celebrate their origins and to achieve a sense of special status and identity, they often support cultural activities such as festivals, dances, language study, sports events, and religious ceremonies. These activities are so devoid of protest and controversy that they attract little interest among students of ethnicity and tend to be ignored. Nevertheless, in a comprehensive analysis of modes of ethnicity, these defensive forms of secondary ethnicity should not be overlooked.

2a. Motives for Immigration. An important reason for differences in the attitudes toward assimilation of immigrant communities can be found in the original reasons for their migration. Most came as hopeful immigrants, seeking a better life in the hostlands to which they have come. Although the majority were eager to assimilate to the dominant culture in order to enhance their prospects for living a good life, some came as political or religious refugees expecting to establish small enclaves of cultural autonomy where they could perpetuate their own preferred lifestyle. A classic case in America involves the Amish peoples. The Russian Old Believers have also established themselves in scattered communities around the world. They cling tenaciously to their traditional life-styles and resist efforts to bring them into the mainstream of American life.

By contrast with voluntary immigrants, many came unwillingly as victims of the slave trade. It was inherent in their status that they should be oppressed and angry about their depressed status in the New World. Others came as convicts sentenced to exile: the most notable case was that of Australia. Many immigrants from Asia to America during the 19th century came under short-term contracts as plantation workers or members of labor gangs. Their experience was intermediate between that of the immigrants and the slaves.

Minority status in America was, of course, as much affected by the attitudes of non-members as by the motives of the immigrants. Thus, whereas Europeans found assimilation quite possible, especially by the second generation, those who came from

Africa and Asia suffered racial discrimination that hampered their ability to assimilate for many generations.

I cannot elaborate a typology for all the types of secondary ethnicity found in the New World. Hopefully these familiar examples will provoke further analysis with a view to establishing categories of comparability from which studies can be made that will enhance our ability to theorize and to predict the forms of behavior typical of the secondary modes of ethnicity. At least it helps us understand the contrasts to be found between dispersed immigrant communities, some of which are quite defensive in their postures whereas others are strongly revisionist.

Moreover, one typically finds a great many „ethnic organizations“ (NEN 3) within the same secondary ethnic community. They often express mutually contradictory attitudes and goals, covering the full gamut from revisionist to defensive. This heterogeneity of attitudes found within secondary ethnic communities contrasts significantly with the greater homogeneity of perspectives found among members of subnations subject to the primary modes of ethnicity.

2b. Old World Manifestation. Although primary ethnicity is the dominant mode in the Old World and absorbs most of the attention of ethnicity researches in these countries, often working under the heading of „nationalism“, secondary ethnicity also occurs in this area. In the metropolises of empires, for example, one finds many former subjects of their dependent territories who have immigrated on a more or less permanent basis. Because of the shortage of unskilled laborers in Western Europe, a considerable number of „guest workers“ have been imported from Mediterranean countries. Although the subnations of the USSR typically have their own republics and autonomous regions as homelands, there are several recognized nationalities that lack them: the Germans and the Gypsies, for example. We should, I think, recognize them as manifesting secondary modes of ethnicity.

Within multi-national states, moreover, there is a good deal of internal migration so that some members of each ethnic community can be found outside of their homelands. One thinks, in the Soviet case, of Georgians and Armenians living in the RSFSR, and of Russians living outside of this republic. The same phenomenon is replicated in other countries – consider, for example, the case of the Sikhs in India, many of whom live outside their homeland in the Punjab. The situation of these peoples as migrant minorities differs significantly from that of the subnations who seek autonomy or even independence. They have no choice but to accept permanent status as a minority in their „hostlands“ (PA 4).

Different terms have been used for these dispersed minorities, e.g. „ethnic minority“, „ethnic group“, and „national minority“ (ST 8). Unfortunately these terms are equivocal and often have other meanings. I have suggested „marginalized nationality“ but this term may be too narrow insofar as it implies subordinated status. In fact, members of a dispersed minority, especially when they come from a pre-eminent homeland, may be especially privileged as guest residents. Sometimes this has grave political repercussions. For example, in Nigeria many Ibos living outside of their homeland in the Eastern Region (Biafra) occupied privileged posts in the North. They were ultimately driven out in 1966 after thousands had been massacred. We do need a better term: perhaps „dispersed minority“ (*) could be used, reserving „marginalized minority“ for those in a subordinated position, and „privileged minority“ for those

occupying high status position. However, as the Ibo case illustrates, the status of a dispersed minority can suddenly and tragically change from privileged to marginalized status.

Not all migrants view themselves as permanent parts of a larger society. Among them we might mention the colonists (see #1 c above) who seek, originally, to extend the boundaries of their homeland, displacing the original inhabitants of the lands where they settle. Although they might be viewed as „immigrants“, we understand them better as newly formed subnations, under the mode of primary ethnicity.

Other migrants are better thought of as constituting „non-ethnic minorities“ – see #4 below. Still others fall into a marginal category – e.g. officials administering conquered territories – see #6 below. I think they ought not to be analyzed under the heading of secondary ethnicity, even though their presence is based on migration from a homeland. Before discussing these phenomena, however, let us look at some of the „compound formations“ (*) which combine features of primary and secondary ethnicity.

3. Compound formations

The identification of primary and secondary forms of ethnicity provides only a starting point. However, this start enables us to sort out various combined or *compound* types of ethnic community.

Sometimes primary and secondary orientations co-exist in the same community. For example, among the Hawaiians there are some who speak of the „Hawaiian Nation“ and promote restoration of a condition in which Hawaiians would, again, dominate and prevail in the Hawaiian Islands. However, in view of their minority status as a small fraction of the population, a larger number of Hawaiians accept the fact that they have become inescapably a part of contemporary American society, as though they were somehow „immigrants“ in their own land. Because they feel underprivileged and abused, they demand assistance in developing themselves as fully equal Americans – a typically secondary revisionist orientation. However, there are also some Hawaiians – no doubt a minority of them and they are the more successful ones – who make no such demands but, nevertheless, revel in their cultural heritage, study the Hawaiian language and traditions and enjoy its music, dances, and artistic achievements – hence a secondary defensive mode.

Much more often the primary and secondary modes are compounded in a territorial sense – i.e. part of an ethnic community lives securely in a homeland, while others are dispersed as migrant minorities in different hostlands. This type of *compound formation* arises when members of a primary ethnic community emigrate from their homeland and settle elsewhere as members of a secondary ethnic community. It would be surprising if they lost contact with their relatives and friends in the homeland, or if they did not try to retain much of their ancestral culture. Of course we can focus on each segment of such a compound as separate primary and secondary communities. However, it is also useful, I think, to conceptualize them as a whole because their parts do influence each other in many complicated ways, and we can understand these variations more easily when we have a concept for the compound as a whole.

3a. *Relation to States.* A fundamental distinction between types of compounds can be made on the basis of the contemporary global system of sovereign states. Some compounds are *intra-state* (*) and others are *trans-state* (*). A good example of an intra-state compound might be the Georgians, most of whom live in Soviet Georgia, but many can also be found scattered, as a small minority, in other parts of the Soviet Union. The notion of a *trans-state ethnic community (TEC)* (NEK 5) may be illustrated by the Ukrainians, most of whom live in the Ukrainian S.S.R. but many have also migrated to live elsewhere, especially in North America. To avoid a cumbersome phrase for this concept, which will be used quite often here, I shall use the convenient acronym, „TEC“. Of course any given TEC may also contain an intra-state compound: for example, Soviet Armenians form an intra-state compound in the Soviet Union, and they also belong to a global Armenian TEC. We may refer to members of a compound community residing in their homeland as a „*home community*“ (PIK) and those who have left it to live elsewhere in hostlands as „*dispersed communities*“ (PIP 1). Typically members of a dispersed community constitute dispersed minorities in their hostlands.

Many variables can be applied to the study of compound ethnic communities, including both the intra-state and trans-state varieties. Here I shall limit my remarks to TECs because their involvement in the politics of international relations makes them especially interesting. We should distinguish between the ethnic and state linkages found in TECs. „*Ethnic linkages*“ (OU 1) involve relations between a home community and its dispersed members. By contrast, „*state linkages*“ (*) involve relations between governments and the components of a TEC.

Linkages can be positive or negative. When positive, they involve mutual support and cooperation, when negative, mutual antagonism. They can also be neutral, involving little positive or negative affect, in which case they tend to dissolve and become meaningless. Of course different members of a TEC may express contrasting attitudes: let us call them „*polarized*“ (*) when strongly positive and negative linkages are found in the same TEC. By contrast, when virtual unanimity among members of a TEC, their views are „*congruent*“ (*). Positive congruence means that good relations exist between the home and dispersed communities of a TEC; negative congruence means that members of a dispersed community agree in rejecting their homeland.

The political status of a homeland strongly influences the character of relationships in a TEC. If the homeland is a mono-ethnic state – the ideal type of a „*nation state*“ – attitudes in the dispersed community and homeland toward each other are likely to be „*consistent*“ (*), i.e. the same toward both the state and the home community. However, when a homeland belongs to a subnation in a multi-ethnic state, attitudes found in its dispersed community are often „*inconsistent*“, usually positive toward the homeland but negative toward the state containing the homeland. When such feelings are strong, they lead to „*transnational ethnic struggles*“ (*) – see # 3b.

Sometimes a TEC contains more than one homeland. A classic example involves nations that have been artificially divided as a result of international politics: North and South Korea; East and West Germany; Western and American Samoa; Poland during its period of partition, from the late 18th to the early 20th century. They have been called „*multi-state nations*“ (SUM 2). Dispersed members of such a TEC may, ambivalently, have positive attitudes toward one part of a dismembered homeland and negative attitudes toward another. In rare cases a „*stateless TEC*“ (SUD 3), containing no homeland, may be able to create or recreate one. The Jewish Diaspora and the birth of Israel after the second World War provides the most familiar example.

3b. *Transnational Ethnic Struggles*. I cannot hope to categorize all the many types of TEC, but a few words may be devoted to a particularly important current and controversial type involving „transnational ethnic struggles“. I am currently planning a roundtable on this phenomenon to be held in London during the next conference of the International Studies Association, in March 1989. The idea covers revolutionary or nationalist movements within a homeland when they receive support from members of its dispersed community. For example, the Tamil in south India; Sikhs struggling for political independence in India receive help from Sikhs living outside of India; Palestinians struggling to create an independent homeland receive support from Palestinians living in exile; the Irish Republican Army, striving to change the status of Ulster, receives support from Irishmen living in the United States. There are many other examples, and there are important differences among them, but they share significant features.

The frequency and violence of transnational ethnic struggles has been increasing in recent years. The phenomenon is scarcely new, but the intensity and strenght of these struggles appears to be growing. Why should this be so? To answer this question we need to pay more attention to the phenomenon of TECs. Surely the size and number of TECs is increasing in today's global system. The dispersal of populations has been facilitated by modern transportation and relatively open boundaries. Modern communications enable members of a TEC to keep in touch with each other. Growing political and economic grievances in a homeland provoke emigration.

Although most emigrants are preoccupied with the effort to solve the problems facing them in the hostlands to which they have migrated, some remain closely linked to their original homeland and they may choose to support the activists in these homelands who are seeking radical change. Even if they opt for assimilation in their hostlands, they may find themselves frustrated by non-acceptance and barriers such as differences of language, religion and cultural norms. Out of such frustrations they may look back to their homeland and become involved in its struggles. Although primarily interested in assimilation, they may also, ambivalently, agree to support activists in their own homeland. Consequently, even though they do not personally become activists, they may give financial and moral support, establish training camps and refuges, supply weapons, etc.

Moreover, activists who suffer repression in their homelands often find safety and „breathing space“ abroad, where they also secure help from sympathetic fellow ethnics. Most governments, preoccupied with domestic problems, pay little attention to the activities of minority groups involved in transnational ethnic struggles, thereby giving them a relatively free hand to do as they wish. Although there are many case studies of this phenomenon, it has not attracted much systematic attention. Once we recognize it as an important mode of compound ethnicity, I expect that it will attract a growing volume of research interest.

4. Non-ethnic minorities

We often use the word „minority“ as a synonym for „ethnic group“. However, in a discussion of modes of ethnicity it is important to point out that not all minorities have the properties associated with ethnicity. We can simplify the analysis of ethnic processes by excluding them from our treatment. However, they are intrinsically

important and interesting, and they do belong to the broad discipline of ethnography, if not to its subfield of ethnicity research. This discussion of modes ethnicity can be strengthened by pointing out some non-ethnic categories, thereby clarifying our focus on what is properly ethnic.

4a. Primordial Cultures. If the sense of a minority being part of a larger society is viewed as the distinctive feature of ethnicity, then we can see that even today there remain in some countries isolated primordial cultures that live in their traditional habitat with virtually no outside contact. The traditional work of ethnology and cultural anthropology involved close study of such isolated cultural communities. They still provide an important field of study for ethnography but, I think, they do not belong to the field of research on ethnicity.

However, it must be added that increasingly even the most isolated primordial or tribal societies have come into contact with the outside world. Because of such contacts they become ethnicized. As this process takes place, the traditional sphere of ethnographic research merges, by imperceptible stages, into the newer sub-field of ethnicity research. The existence of this distinction is clearly made in the organization of this ICEAS, where a separate series of symposia on ethnicity has been organized separately from the rest of the congress where subjects of ethnological but non-ethnic interest are also attended to.

4b. Sojourners. There is another, very modern, type of non-ethnic minority which I shall refer to as „sojourners“ (*). These are temporary visitors from one country who live in another. They retain their original citizenship, frequently visit their homeland and maintain strong economic and social ties with it. The most conspicuous type of sojourner is the tourist who simply passes through a host country. The phenomena and problems associated with tourism are attracting more and more attention because of their economic and environmental significance. However, they do not belong to the field of ethnicity research.

Much more importantly, there are now a host of business men, diplomats, military personnel, journalists, missionaries and contract workers of all kinds who live abroad for relatively long periods of time. Although they may have a major impact on the country where they live, they are not studied under the heading of ethnicity. I recall making a bibliographic search for references dealing with minorities in Thailand only to discover that, although there is a substantial literature on its Chinese, Indian and Muslim minorities, virtually nothing has been written about its American and European minorities who, nevertheless, have had a profound influence on the country, and also display extremely interesting subcultural features. Because these communities are not classified as „ethnic“, I believe, they have eluded study as a cultural group or „minority“.

It is important to distinguish among sojourners between those in a privileged position and those who feel oppressed. More attention has been paid to the latter category. Erico Yamamoto, whose dissertation I helped to supervise, has written a fascinating account of the early Japanese contract workers in Hawaii. They thought of themselves as sojourners who would return home after completion of their contracts. Later on, however, some of them decided to remain in their hostland and, at that time, the process of ethnicization began to occur. Similarly, many of the contemporary „guest workers“ who have moved to Europe from Mediterranean countries under

temporary contracts have decided to remain, thereby forming ethnic communities. In contemporary Saudi Arabia, by contrast, a large part of the population consists of contract workers who are not permitted to remain. Thus government policy prevents the development of ethnic communities among these minority workers.

An important distinction may be made between „home-based sojourners“ (*), whose income is derived from sources in their homelands, and „host-based sojourners“ (*), whose income arises from their activities in a hostland. Diplomats, military officers, journalists and missionaries belong to the former category, business men and contract workers to the latter. However, the distinction is not always clear. Foreign business men working for transnational corporations have a kind of ambivalent status. Although they derive their income from activities based in the land where they are guests, they may receive their salaries from the overseas headquarters of the companies that employ them. Foreign students, similarly, are frequently supported by their home institutions or families, but they often also receive subsidies in their hostlands. Although most such students eventually return home, a substantial number decide to remain and become ethnicized in the lands where they have studied.

An important distinction can also be made between the status of sojourners. Many are more privileged than the average person in their hostlands. However, others are exploited and poor. This category includes plantation workers and contract laborers who are imported, on a temporary basis, to serve the needs of the host country. In Saudi Arabia a majority of the population are now sojourners working under short-term contracts. Although they may not enjoy the working conditions, a high level of compensation induces them to accept such assignments.

The homeland orientation of sojourners is usually enhanced by the policies of their home governments which often intervene on their behalf when they are abused – or thought to be abused. This creates a type of „anchored-TEC“ (*) in which the members of a given ethnic community dispersed outside the homeland, as sojourners, do not experience ethnicization within the context of the hostlands where they live. For this reason, perhaps, they should not even be thought of as TECs.

Sojourners should, nevertheless, be studied in the context of TECs. Whenever sojourners experience misfortunes or mistreatment, their home governments may sharply intervene. During the classic age of imperialism, many such interventions occurred. The unequal treaties imposed on China during the nineteenth century offer many examples. In some cases, no doubt, the sojourners themselves acted in such a way as to provoke hostilities and thus to provide a pretext for foreign intervention. By contrast, sojourners who are especially privileged include those played dominant roles as imperial conquerors, administrators, and business men – see# below. Their attachments to imperial homelands were especially strong.

5. Traditional formations

This paper has focused attention on modern forms of ethnicity, where the underlying notion of equality provides a context for evaluating relations between different cultural communities. By contrast, traditional societies presupposed hierarchies in which the oppression of subordinated castes, slaves, sefrs, etc. was rationalized as part of the natural order of things, and often had religious sanctions. No doubt analogies can be drawn between the pitiful situation of subordinated communities in traditional societies and that status of ethnic communities in the world today.

However, in my opinion the analysis of ethnicity becomes confused whenever we try to mix together the treatment of subordinated groups in pre-modern and modern societies. No doubt research on these communities should be an important theme within the disciplines of history and ethnography. However, the field of ethnicity research has plenty to do within the context of modern societies where the norms of equalitarianism prevail. The field simply becomes overloaded when it also attempts to deal with inter-group relationships in pre-modern societies. Of course, one might add that a full understanding of contemporary ethnicity does require, as this paper has attempted to show, a deep historical understanding of the origins of its various modes.

I should also admit that the distinction between pre-modern and modern contexts is much more difficult to draw in the Old World than in the New. In the former it is natural for European ethnographers to start with primordial communities and ancient civilizations, gradually expanding the scope of inquiry to include ethnic relations. It focuses then on primary ethnicity and especially on ethno-social organisms (ESOs) in which the distinction between primordial cultural identity and contemporary ethnic identity is easily obscured because no sharp lines can be drawn between different stages which gradually merge into each other. The distinction is much easier to draw in the New World where these lines are much more sharply drawn.

6. Marginal contexts

Although the general distinction between modern and pre-modern modes of ethnicity seems clear enough, the boundary between these categories is fuzzy, and some marginal types are worthy of special attention. They also generate, incidentally, special kinds of pseudo-TEC patterns.

The first type seems to lack a generic term. I shall refer to them as the „*sahibs*“ (*) an Indian word for Europeans applied, generally, in dependent territories to imperial officials or masters. These are members of a dispersed community who serve their homelands as rulers in a conquered domain. Although many of them did in fact settle in the lands they ruled, their primary loyalty and linkages remained with their homelands. Today this type of sojourner has almost vanished, but a residual group of „*expatriates*“ (*) remains in some countries. Their lowered status and more permanent residence — often involving intermarriage — has resulted in a tenuous form of ethnicization. At least, it would be interesting to include them under the heading of ethnicity research.

A different kind of quasi-sojourner resulting, in the main, from imperialism involves the widespread migration of traders and merchants from one third world country to another. In pre-modern societies we often find niche based communities where ethnic specialization of function was viewed as mutually beneficial. One example is the Chinese Muslim community. During the 19th century, they became traders within the empire, mediating between sheep herders in Tibet and Western merchants in the Chinese cities under domination of the Western powers. Because this arrangement was mutually beneficial to the Chinese and the Muslims, it became quite stable and well institutionalized.

By contrast, in many contemporary third world societies alien merchants serve important entrepreneurial functions, but they are cross-pressured by severe contradic-

tions between their own aspirations and their precarious status as virtual hostages of the dominant ethnic community. Familiar examples include the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, the Jews in many countries. They become what I call „*pariah entrepreneurs*“ (*). Although permanently settled as members of a minority group, they retain strong international ties which help them succeed as entrepreneurs.

However, their status as outsiders or aliens and discriminatory laws against them prevent their assimilation and keep them in a politically subordinated and volatile position. The Chinese in Thailand have been much studied ethnographically, as an almost closed community. However, their traditional culture has been affected so much by their precarious status and transnational linkages that it is better to view them as an ethnic minority. However, their ethnicity is strongly qualified by their precarious status, which justifies their treatment as a quasi-sojourner mode of ethnicity. In the extreme case of Indians in Uganda, they were suddenly uprooted during the tyrannical regime of Idi Amin, at which time some returned to India, but most emigrated to England.

Some relatively modern institutions also have a quasi-traditional character. For example, in the United States nineteenth century political machines served as a transitional institution. They created patronage/client systems which mediated between immigrants and the state. Thus they afforded a kind of modern niche for immigrant groups. Although they were associated with corruption and favoritism, they also helped ethnic minorities accept the frustrations involved in their subordinated status.

Modernization and the spread of social welfare programs have dissolved political machines and exposed minority peoples to the state bureaucracy in an impersonal universalistic mode. Since they are often unable to understand how to cope with bureaucratic procedures, this has led to considerable frustration, bitterness and, I believe, the proliferation of revisionist ethnic organizations.

In traditionally oriented hierarchic (feudal?) societies, symbiotic relationships between higher and lower status roles were stable and offered stability due to the inheritance of roles from parents to children. In modern equalitarian industrialized societies, by contrast, increasing social mobility means that children often follow different occupations from their parents. As a result, niche-based minority status becomes very problematic, leading to instability and social disruption. This may accentuate the importance of TECs since frustrated individuals who would normally prefer to assimilate turn, instead, to their homelands as an alternative route to personal achievement and security.

The mapping of primary and secondary modes of ethnicity, an understanding of the differences between modern and pre-modern modes, between defensive and revisionist orientations, between non-ethnic and ethnic formations, and recognition of various types of compounds between the primary and secondary modes should help us identify and place particular cases in contexts which will enhance comparability and promote the development of a genuinely scientific approach to ethnicity research.

EXCERPT FROM E. K. FRANCIS, INTERETHNIC RELATIONS. N. Y. Elsevier, 1976. pp. 396-400

b. Formation, Maintenance, and Dissolution of Ethnic Groups

The laws governing the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of ethnic groups differ according to their type.

Members of ethnic groups participate indirectly in the host society by virtue of their direct participation in the ethnic group. They may also participate directly in the host society in some dimensions. In this respect a basic distinction exist between **primary** and **secondary** ethnic groups.

Definition 45. By „secondary ethnic groups“ we understand subgroups of the host society whose members participate directly in the host society in some dimensions, particularly on the level of *commercium*, but indirectly through the mediation of the ethnic group in other dimensions, particularly on the level of *commensalitas* and *connubium*.

By „*connubium*“ we understand the rediness to establish affinal kinship ties through inter-marriage.

By „*commensalitas*“ we understand convivial activities, such as visiting, eating and feasting together, and associating for games and entertainment. *Commensalitas* also presents the most

By „*commercium*“ we understand a purely functional cooperation for practical ends as pertaining mainly to the economic sphere.

Proposition 50. When individual ethnic suffer deprivations because of differential treatment in the host society, they tend to form and maintain secondary ethnic groups to compensate for these deprivations. To this end, separate institutions are created and upheld that exercise partial social control over the group members.

Definition 46. By „primary ethnic groups“ we understand viable corporate units which, after their transfer from the parent to the host society, tend to continue to function in the host society as closed subsocieties able to satisfy the basic social needs of their members. Participation of their members in the host society accordingly tends to be indirect in all dimensions.

Proposition 51. Whereas migration is more likely to lead to the formation of secondary ethnic groups, annexation or collective transfer are more likely to lead to the merge of primary ethnic groups.

Annexation or collective transfers are likely to involve viable regional subsocieties. Under modern conditions, migration generally involves individuals or small groups. „Collective transfer“ implies that viable societal units are being transferred bodily together with their property and institutions and/or, upon arrival, are permitted to reconstitute themselves as a viable subsociety after their traditional pattern.

Proposition 52. Economic factors tend to be of paramount importance in the formation of secondary ethnic groups; political factors in the formation of primary ethnic groups.

Proposition 53a. The formation of secondary ethnic groups begins with the creation of new institutions of their own. As they have no chance of achieving political autonomy and/or economic autarchy, their efforts are concentrated on satisfying the more intimate social needs of their members and on establishing social controls with regard to *commensalitas* and *connubium*.

Proposition 53b. Primary ethnic groups start the process of adaptation to the host society with a full set of institutions necessary for their functioning as a viable subsociety. They tend to lose these gradually, first in the political sphere then in the economic sphere.

Proposition 54a. Members of secondary ethnic groups are not so much concerned with the preservation of their separate collective identity as with the enjoyment of social rewards on equal terms with the charter members of the host society. (cf. Proposition 36).

Proposition 54b. Members of a primary ethnic group are mainly concerned with its maintenance, which depends on the strength of separate institutions and on the preservation of distinctive characteristics. They do not clamor for equal treatment with the majority of the host society, but for the recognition of their separate collective identity (cf. Proposition 35).

Proposition 55. Members of a secondary ethnic group are more inclined to assimilate to the host society than are members of a primary ethnic group, unless they are prevented from doing so by lack of acceptance on the part of the natives and/or by social controls that the ethnic group is exercising over its members.

Proposition 56. The social controls exercised by secondary ethnic groups over their members tend to be more feeble than those exercised by primary ethnic groups because of the more comprehensive institutions at their disposal.

Proposition 57. The removal of disabilities, economic advancement, and the toleration of cultural and/or somatic distinction tend to promote the dissolution of secondary ethnic groups. In the case of primary ethnic groups, however, provisions for the prevention of discrimination tend to increase the probability of their maintenance.

Proposition 58. Secondary ethnic groups are likely to be formed and maintained under the following conditions:

1. There must be sufficient opportunities of communication between dispersed ethnics and sufficient freedom of movement to permit the concentration of a relatively large number of them in one locality.
2. Communication with the parent society must be restricted, and the chance of returning home must be limited, so that the ethnics can find satisfaction of their basic needs only within the host society.

(Four other „conditions“ suggested by Francis are omitted here)

Proposition 59. Differences in the ethnic origin and the specific culture content of the host and the parent society have no significant influence on secondary ethnic-group formation.

Proposition 60. Whenever members of a parent society are transferred as individuals into a host society that is not isomorphic with the parent society with regard to essential elements of the social structure, then — under the conditions of free mobility — the transferees will not be able to take their place directly in the host society, and will therefore tend to form a secondary ethnic group.

Proposition 61. Whenever members of a parent society are transferred as individuals into a host society that is isomorphic with the parent society with regard to essential elements of the social structure, then — under the condition of free mobility — the individuals transferred will be able to take their place directly in the host society, and thus no secondary ethnic group will be formed.

Proposition 62. Whenever large groups of transferees are being subjected to special regulations by the authorities of the host society, limiting their free mobility, the probability increases that they will form separate ethnic or pseudoethnic groups, even if they would otherwise be able to take their place directly in the host society.

Proposition 63. After a secondary ethnic group has been dissolved by virtue of losing its members to the host society, the former members and/or their descendants still tend to be socially identified with the ethnic group. The dissolution of a secondary ethnic group thus is most likely to lead to its transformation into an ethnic category.

Proposition 64. Provided that the host society is of the modern type, lack of isomorphism most commonly occurs when the parent society is of the agrarian type.

Migrants to urban industrial section of a modern society are frequently recruited from rural sections either of their own society or of other modern societies that have preserved a premodern, usually agrarian character, or from foreign countries of the agrarian type.

Proposition 65. The resistance put up by agrarian societies (or agrarian sections of modern societies) against the pressures of nationalization and industrialization that threaten their traditional way of life tends to be expressed in ethnic terms.

Proposition 66. Industrialism tends to weaken ethnic solidarities; agrarianism tends to preserve them, in case of conflict even to strengthen them.

Proposition 67. The chances that transferees are integrated collectively into the host society and that form a relatively closed and self-sufficient ethnic group increase if their parent society is of the agrarian type.

Proposition 68. Primary ethnic groups tend to emerge and to maintain themselves in a modern society under the following conditions:

1. Parent and host society are sufficiently heteromorphic with regard to essential elements of their structure, so that their respective members can be readily differentiated in ethnic terms.
2. The population transferred from the parent society and/or significant sections of the host society resist the direct integration of the transferees into the host society.
3. The population transferred is sufficiently large and cohesive to be able to reconstitute itself as a relatively closed and viable subsociety of the host society.
4. The host society has the capacity (mainly economic) of accommodating the new addition to its population as a segregated collectivity within its boundaries.

Proposition 69. A primary ethnic group is most likely to emerge and maintain itself if it is of the agrarian type; for in this case, it is in the best position of satisfying basic economic and social needs with a minimum of reliance on the resources of the host society (cf. **Proposition 66**).

Proposition 70. Partial acculturation to the host society need not bring about the dissolution of a primary ethnic group — in fact, it may help to maintain it — as long as the traits of the host culture are accepted collectively.

Proposition 71. Primary ethnic groups are less likely to be dissolved through loss of members than to be transformed into secondary ethnic groups through the gradual loss of separate institutions, and especially through the modernization of the economy.

Proposition 72. When primary ethnic groups are granted generous protection against the loss of their demographic and cultural substance, they are likely to give up resistance against economic change and thereby to expose themselves to those processes that transform them into secondary ethnic groups.

THEODOR VEITER
Austria

POLITICAL NOTION OF ETHNICITY

I. Preliminary remarks

Ethnicity is in the first line a sociolinguistic notion and therefore described in books and studies on sociolinguistics. Frederick Erickson (Philadelphia, Pa.) says in his small article in a newest and very important handbook on sociolinguistics¹, that „ethnicity“ is a term, whose definition is elusive, because there is a considerable overlap between the English terms „ethnicity“, „nationality“ and „race“ and the german word „Volk“². But also the german word „Ethnizität“, generally not often used, with the exception in certain treatises on the Slovenes in Carinthia as by Albert F. Reiterer³ who begins histor historically in regard to the term ethnicity (Ethnizität) with the arabian theory of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1408) and his notions of *Assabya nasab* and *Umma* (mostly translated in European languages as „nation“, if translated with „nation“, but also identified as „ethnicity“, the term comes from the Greek plural noun „ethnoi“ and refers to the tribes and nations of the ancient world which were not Hellenic (e. g. Thracians, Persians, Egyptians), but nor „nation“ (a Latin word) nor „Ethnos“ are in every case bound to a separated culture or language. Generally „ethnicity“ means a self-presentation and group identification and if we speak today of the notion „ethnic“ or „ethnic“ we mean regularly a special origin or derivation combined with culture (not only civilisation which ist not identic with culture).

The own language of an ethnic group can be a characteristics of ethnicity, but, as it has been proved recently by Harald Haarmann⁴ in a book describing only ethnicity and language, a special language is not always a symbol of ethnicity. There exist ethnic communities which have the characteristics of their ethnicity without a language of

1. Erickson, Frederick, Ethnicity, in: Ammon, U. /Dittmar, N./ Mattheier, Klaus J., (eds.) Sociolinguistics, Berlin-New York (Walter de Gruyter) 1987, First Volume, 91–95.
2. In certain cases the word „Volk“ is not translated in English in the USA and in Canada: Veiter, Theodor, Volk, Ethnic Group and Region, in: Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Charlottetown (University of Prince Edward Island), vol. IX, no. 2, 1982, 161–183.
3. Reiterer, Albert F., Doktor und Bauer, Klagenfurt /Celovec (Drava)/ Slovenski Znanstveni Institut 1985.
4. Haarmann, Harald, Language in Ethnicity. A View of Basic Ecological Relations, Berlin (Mouton de Gruyter) 1986.

their own (as certain tribes or „peoples” in South Africa and in Namibia⁵ or the Jews in the Soviet Union⁶ or also certain members of the German ethnic minority in Poland⁷. And also the problem of dialects must be seen because many dialects are considered as separate languages, but often only as sub-groups of languages without a special ethnical distinction, what is in a very serious manner described by Leos Šatava⁸ or Gunnemark/Kenrick⁹.

Ethnicity can also be in connection with basic ecological relations, also with the use of nuclear power or with the social conflict, whatever this can be¹⁰.

„Ethnicity” is now an often used word in various languages, but not seldom used without a serious interpretation of the notion and only for polemics against on ethnical thinking as we can see in a new book of an alemanic writer in the Austrian province of Vorarlberg, Markus Barnay¹¹.

It is necessary to underline, that the notion „ethnic identity”, today used especially in the U.S.A., but also in Eastern and Western Europe¹², is in no way identic with „ethnicity”, but can be a completion and a supplement to „ethnicity”.

-
5. *Hilf, Rudolf/Richardson John* (eds.) *Sudafrika. Krise und Entscheidung*, 2 vols, Wien (Braumüller) and München INTEREG) 1987.
 6. *Horak, Stephan*, *Guide to the Study of the Soviet Nationalities. Non Russian Peoples of the USSR*, Littleton, Col. (Libraries Unlimited) 1982.
 7. See the articles in: *Przeglad Polonijny*, Warszawa (Polska Akademia Nauk), 1988 in the 14th year; *Klimaszewski, Boleslaw* (ed.), *An outline History of Polish Culture*, Warszawa (Wydawnictwo Interpress) 1984; *Veiter, Theodor*, Polen und die Flüchtlings- und Wanderungsproblematik, in: *AWR-Bulletin*, Wien, Nr. 1987, 1–14.
 8. *Šatava, Leos*, *Autochtonni mala etnika v Evrope*, 2 vols, Praha (Ustav pro etnografii a folkloristiku Československe akademie ved – odborové středisko vědeckých informací) Zpravodaj koordinované síte vědeckých pro etnografii a folkloristiku, 1987.
 9. *Gunnemark, Erik/Kenrick, Donald* (eds.), *A Geolinguistic Handbook*, 1985 edition, Gothenburg (published by the author in Gothenburg/Göteborg) 1986; see also *Breton, Roland*, *Les Ethnies*, Paris (PUF) 1981, German edition, Vienna (Braumüller) 1983.
 10. *Fisher, Dietrich*, *Preventing in the Nuclear Age*, Totowa, New Jersey (Rowman & Allanheld publishers) 1984.
 11. *Barnay, Markus*, *Die Erfindung des Vorarlbergers. Ethnizitätsbildung und Landesbewußtsein im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Bregenz (Vorarlberger Autorengesellschaft) 1988. Barnay fights against the development of the term „ethnicity” and means, that „ethnicity” leads to the hate against races and to xenophobia and discrimination of the members of other ethnic groups.
 12. *Liebkind, Karmela*, *Minority Identity and Identification Processes: A Social Psychological Study*, Helsinki (The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters) 1984; *Fried, C.*, *Minorities: Community and Identity*, Dahlem Konferenzen, Berlin (Springer-Verlag) 1983 (Collection of various articles, especially „Identity as a Complex Network” by M.-La Pradelle de Latour, 79–95); *Fishman, Joshua A.*, *The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival*, Berlin-New York (Mouton) 1985; *Veiter, Theodor*, *Die Identität Vorarlbergs und der Vorarlberger*, Wien/Vienna (Zraumüller) 1985.

II. Politics and the relation to ethnicity

The political science, in German also „Politologie“ (politology, but this expression is not usual in English), belongs as a branch to the sociology („political sociology“) and the political discourse¹³ can be an essential part of the ethnic struggle which dominates today as „ethnic revival“¹⁴ many of the relations between States, but also between peoples (ethnic communities) all over the world as in Sri Lanka¹⁵ in Austria in regard to the situation of the Slovenes of Carinthia¹⁶ in France¹⁷, in the Western Sahara (R.A.S.D.)¹⁸, on the Horn of Africa¹⁹, in South Tyrol and in others regions of Italy²⁰, in Northern Ireland²¹ and so on. The ethnic conflict belongs generally to the

13. Gumperz John, Discourse strategies, Cambridge, U. K., 1982.
14. Allardt, Erik, Ethnic Revival. Implications of the Ethnic Revival in Modern Industrialized Society, Helsinki (Societas Scientiarum Fennica) 1979.
15. See the six volumes on the Tamils, edited by the Schweizerische Zentralstelle für Flüchtlingshilfe, the Swiss Caritas and other humanitarian organizations in Switzerland, Luzern and Zurich (Caritas) 1984; Schwarz Walter, The Tamils of Sri Lanka, London (MRG Report no. 25) 1975; Wolff Joerg, Die Spannungen in Sri Lanka zwischen Singhalesen und Tamilen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Bonn, no. B 26/83, 2d July 1983.
16. Inzko, Valentin (ed.), Geschichte der Kärntner Slowenen von 1918 bis zur Gegenwart, Klagenfurt/Celovec (Hermagoras Verlag) 1988; Grafenauer, Bogo, Slovensko narodno vprašanje in slovenski zgodovinski položaj, Ljubljana (Slovenska Matica) 1987; Veiter, Theodor, Das österreichische Volksgruppenrecht seit dem Volksgruppengesetz von 1976. Rechtsnormen und Rechtswirklichkeit, Wien/Vienna (Braumüller) 1979; Gstettner, Peter, Zwanghaft Deutsch?, Klagenfurt/Celovec (Drava/SZI) 1988; Koroški Slovenci v Avstriji včeraj in danes, Ljubljana – Celovec 1984, 2d. ed. 1985; Hödl, Günther and co-eds., Lage und Perspektiven der österreichischen Volksgruppen, Wien (Österreichische Rektorenkonferenz) 1988; Tichy, Heinz, Unterricht und Bildung in den Volksgruppensprachen, Wien/Vienna (Braumüller) 1987.
17. Maugue, Pierre, Contre l'Etat-Nation, Paris (Denoel) 1979; Philipponneau, Michel, La grande affaire. Décentralisation et Régionalisation, Paris (Calmann-Levy) 1981; Serant, Serant, Paul, La France des minorités, Paris (Robert Laffont) 1965; Barniaudy, M., Le problème de l'enseignement des langues régionales, Paris (Commission des affaires culturelles de l'Assemblée nationale) 1963.
18. Hodges, Tony, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, Metuchen, N. J. & London (The Scarecrow Press) 1982.
19. Fenet, Alain, Cao-Huy Thuan and other co-eds., La Corne de l'Afrique, Questions nationales et politiques internationale, Paris (L'Harmattan) 1986; Petrič, Ernest, Od Cesarja do Voditelja. Etiopija včeraj, danes, jutri Ljubljana (Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica) 1988; Lewis, I. M. (ed.), National Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa, London 1982.
20. Olmi, Massimo, Italiani dimezzati, Napoli (Edizione Dehoniane) Veiter, Theodor, Bibliographie zur Südtirolfrage 1945–1983, Wien/Vienna (Braumüller) 1984, second vol. (1984–1988), Vienna 1988.
21. Hechter, Michael, Internal Colonialism, Berkeley (University of California Press) 1975; Tadjman, Franjo, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, New York (Columbia Univ. Press) 1981; Petersen, William, The Background to Ethnic Conflict, Leiden (E. J. Brill) 1979; Jackson, Harold, The two Ireland, A dual study of inter-group tensions, London (MRG, report no. 2) 2d ed. 1979.

politics and probably the world peace could be better guaranteed, if there the political powers and the political trends and movements would more take into account the ethnical situation within their spheres of influence. Therefore politics and ethnicity are in a relatively close connection. One cannot speak of a difference between politics in a democratic-liberal State (as it is predominant in Western Europe, in Canada, in the U.S.A., in Australia and in a little part of Africa and Asia) and in a so-called socialist State (in reality a communist State) in Eastern Europe, partly in Asia, America and Africa) and in the more or less fascist and rightist States and in the so-called presidential republics (South-America, Africa), if one considers the attitude against ethnic minorities and linguistic groups. In certain cases the politics against ethnic groups, also linguistic minorities, can be more liberal and resilient in a totalitarian State (as in Yugoslavia, Hungary) as in a State with the liberal-democratic system of the ruling power of political majorities (e. g. in Austria, in France, in Italy).

It is self-evident, that all ethnic groups which possess their own „ethnicity“ wish to have as much of political influence as it is possible. Ethnicity and politics are linked the one to the other.

In the majority of the States of the world minorities (ethnic, linguistic, religious) exist and in Europe – East and West – only a little number of States have not ethnical or linguistic minorities: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Ireland, perhaps also Andorra. And in other continents mono-ethnic States don't nearly not exist. For this reason the policy of the States or of the leading circles and political parties have very much to do with ethnic or linguistic minorities. Not seldom such political minority problems can be dangerous for the stability of the politics within a State, as in Belgium, where the conflict of Les Fourons/Voeren²² lead recently to a crisis of the government, or in Rumania²³. The policy referring to ethnic minorities and communities has many consequences also in regard to the juridical structures. Certainly, there exist laws in favour of the ethnic minority groups as in Austria with the Ethnic Groups' Act of 1976²⁴ or in the Yugoslav Federal Constitution and in the Constitutions of the provinces (pokrajine) and the various Socialist Republics²⁵ or also in Italy with the article 6 of the Constitution of 1947 concerning exclusively linguistic minorities and not ethnic groups²⁶. But also in such States the juridical reality differs

22. See the review „Le Foron“, périodique d'action et de combat de l'Action fouronnaise a. s. b. l., mouvement pour le retour des Fourons a la Province de Liege, edited by Jean-Louis Xhonneux, B-3791 Remersdael; Stassen, Albert, La situation des dialectes dans les Fourons, in: Europa Ethnica, Vienna/Wien, no. 4/1987, 185–189.

23. Balog, Arpad, Histoire demythifiée de la Roumanie, Paris (La Pensée Universelle) 1979; Zolcsak, Istvan, and other eds., Memorandum of the Transylvanian World Federation to the Congress and the Government of the U.S.A., Sao Bernardo do Campo/Sao Paulo 1987 (with maps).

24. published in various languages by the Federal Chancellery in 1977, with the title „The Legal Status of Ethnic Groups in Austria“ in English (Federal Law Gazette No. 396/1976).

25. Ustavi i ustavni zakoni (with commentaries by S. Lepotinec, B. Majić and D. Pavić) Zagreb (informator) 1974; Jončić, Koča, Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia, Beograd (Međunarodna Politika) 1974, 2d ed. 1982; Petričević, Jure, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije Brugg, Switzerland (Verlag Adria – Knjižnica Sloboda no. 5) 1983.

26. Piller Puicher, G., La Repubblica non tutela le minoranze linguistiche con apposite norme, Sappada (AIDLCM, Atti del Congresso) 1976; Ambrosini, Giangiulio (ed.), Costituzione Italiana, Torino (Giulio Einaudi) 1975.

from the laws and their content widely. Policy is not only an endeavour of the law-makers and the constitutional scholars and jurists, between law and justice is in many States a great difference, and one must be suspicious against the parliaments and the law-makers, because the wording of the laws (also of the international Conventions which are binding law between the ratifying States) is very often interpreted in another sense as the authors of such instruments it had meant. Policy is very often law-transgressing, this especially in relation to ethnic, linguistic and also religious minorities. The religious minorities have for us an importance only as, at the same time, linguistic or ethnic minorities what is the case in many countries as Turkey, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Soviet-Russia and so on. The religious policy of a State is in many cases connected with the minority politics²⁷.

It must be said, that in certain socialist countries the political power is not based on parliamentary institutions but on the communist party or on another decisive political party as in the Soviet Union, in Rumania, in the GDR (SED) or in Bulgaria. Politics and minorities lead to an interdependence between these non-parliamentary institutions and the minorities. The membership of the minorities to such a totalitarian party can be a very solid and effective protection of such an ethnic group.

And in this regard the ethnicity is nearly permanently emphasized by the ethnic minorities and ethnic groups since the notion „ethnicity“ exists. If we don't refer to the „umma“ as it does Albert F. Reiterer in his book, quoted in annotation no 3, we can almost say, that the expression ethnicity dates from the beginning of the use of the French expression „ethnie“ (recently also used in Italians as „etnia“) and created by Vacher de Lapouge with his book „Les selections sociales“, adopted by Georges Montadon with his review „L'Ethnie Francaise“ which is published in Paris in 1988 in the 53d year. An English translation of „ethnie“ is not yet usual, but one finds occasionally the term „ethnics“. In German „Ethnie“ can be found scarcely as in a book of Koppelmann²⁸. In a impressing manner prof. Guy Heraud²⁹ and late Heinz Kloss³⁰, the two most recognized researchers in this field have written on definitions of „ethnicity“ in relation to „ethnie“, but also Francois Fontan³¹ with his term „ethnisme“, a political term, must be mentioned here. Regional ethnic organizations as the Basques speak now also of ethnicity and mean their ethnic identity which they would protect and develop as in the monthly „Euskadi Information“³².

27. See Acta Baltica, until now 68 vols., Königstein/Ts; Grulich, Rudolf, Glaubenszeugen heute, Munich (Kirche in Not/Ostpriesterhilfe) 1987; Grgič, Jožica, Odnosi med Vatikanom in Jugoslavijo po letu 1960, Ljubljana (Delavska enotnost) 1983; Luchterhandt, O., Religionsfreiheit, in: Menschenrechte in den Staaten des Warschauer Paktes, Bonn, (Bundestagsdrucksache Nr. 11/1344, January 1988; see also the very numerous issue of „Conscience et Liberte“, Bern/Switzerland, and „Glaube in der Zweiten Welt“, Zofingen, Switzerland (G2W).

28. Koppelmann, H. L., Nation, Sprache und Nationalismus, Leiden (Sijthoff) 1956.

29. Heraud, Guy, L'Europe des ethnies, 2d ed., Paris (Presses d'Europe) 1973.

30. Kloss, Heinz, Grundfragen der Ethnopolitik im 20. Jahrhundert, Wien/Vienna (Braumüller) and Bad Godesberg (Wissenschaftliche Verlagsanstalt) 1969; Kloss, Heinz, Nation, in: Sociolinguistics, 1987. 1987, see footnote 1, 102–109.

31. Fontan, Francois, Ethnisme. Vers un nationalisme humaniste, Nice and Frassinio (Cuneo) 1961 (edited by the author).

32. Euskadi Information, Bayonne (mouvement de Liberation Nationale Basque) Nos. 53–58/1988.

III. Ethnicity and language policy

As said above, ethnicity or ethnic identity don't suppose in each case a proper language or a proper dialect. There exist various people and ethnic communities without a proper inherited language and one must consider, that certain ethnic communities and peoples have lost the use of their inherited language and use – mostly for practical and economic or professional reasons – another language as the language of their own. We quoted e. g. the Jews in the Soviet Union who are certainly a people with an ethnic identity which is not the same as the ethnic identity of the Russians (Great Russians) but who speak Russian. In Poland the Germans, how numerous they may be, are regarded as „autochthones“ but they don't more speak German because it is prohibited to found schools with German as teaching language and also in the catholic churches the use of German is not allowed. Nevertheless they are culturally Germans. And in Ireland the Gaelic language is used only in certain remote regions as the Gaeltacht, but the generally used language is English, and nobody can have a doubt that the Irish are an ethnic community, a separate people with an ethnic identity strongly different from the English ethnic identity³³. Other examples can be found also in other countries.

Language policy has nearly no importance if there is a State with only one language spoken within the population of this State. Such a State has no problems with ethnic communities, but unilingual States are the exception, this especially beyond Europe. But also in Europe unilingual States are rare: Iceland, Monaco, Liechtenstein and other Micro-States³⁴. Not even Portugal is absolutely monolingual and for this reason it has autonomous regions (Madeira, Acores)³⁵. And Norway is divided in the linguistic regions of Rigmål and Landsmål.

Therefore the language policy is an important part of the general policy within a State. Certainly, Harald Haarmann is right, if he treats the topic „Language in Ethnicity“ – one should speak better of „Language and Ethnicity“ – and ethnicity has very much to do with language policy. But the ethnic aspects go much farther as linguistic aspects, if one deals with ethnicity. The language is only one of the aspects of ethnic behaviourism and ethnic properties, to the ethnic qualities, and therefore to the notion of „people“ in an ethnic sense belong other qualities as culture and cultural heritage and the conscienceness of a special historical background, also in certain cases birth and origin. Share culture and a distinctive language style are not necessarily

33 *Krejčí, Jaroslav and Velimsky, Vitezslav*, Ethnic and political nations in Europe, London (Croom Helm) 1981, with an appendix on the „ethnopolitical situation“; *Francis, Emerich K.*, Interethnic relations. An essay in sociological theory, Amsterdam (Elsevier) 1977; *Nelde, Peter H.*, Research on Language Conflict, in the Handbook „Sociolinguistics“, quoted in foot-note 1, 607–612; *Fishman, Joshua A.*, Identity: Personal and Socio-cultural, Uppsala (Committee for multi-ethnic research) 1982.

34 *Veiter, Theodor*, Regionalism and Microstates, in: Regional Contact, no. 1/1987, Copenhagen (The Foundation for International Understanding) 1987, 42–55; *Vellas, Paul*, Les Etats exiguës en droit international public in: Rev. gen. d. dr. intern. public, 1954.

35 *Ferreira, Fernando Amancio*, As regioes autonomas na constituicao Portuguesa, Coimbra (Livraria Almedina) 1980.

defining attributes of ethnicity. This is also recognized by the Soviet theory on ethnocultural processes in various more or less official publications³⁶. The term „ethnic group” is larger than the term „language group”, although the newest researches of the Council of Europe and of the European Parliament of the E(E)C on ethnicity deal especially with the linguistic aspects³⁷. Ethnicity belongs to the ethnic communities and the ethnic groups and here in the first line the ethnic minority groups or the so-called „nationalities” in multi-national (poly-ethnic) States. Such multinational States are e. g. Switzerland, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, India, Canada, Belgium and so on. Their *raison d'être* is the cooperation and the harmony between the dominant people as ethnic community resp. between the various „nationalities” as it is shown in the glossary of the UNESCO³⁸ and in other glossaries elaborated by multinational States as Yugoslavia³⁹. Ethnicity can serve also as a means to preserve the world peace, because the ethnic conflicts have destroyed many States in the past and can be a great danger also today⁴⁰. The politics in regard to ethnic groups and peoples, based on the notion of ethnicity in a political sense is in modern times decisive for the maintenance of peace and therefore also for the preservation of mankind⁴¹.

-
36. Grigulevich, I. R. and Kozlov, S. Ya., *Ethnocultural Processes and National Problems in the Modern World*, Moscow (Progress Publishers) 1979.
 37. Council of Europe, Doc. CPL (22) 4, and ACPL 4.221; Parlement Européen. Commission de la Jeunesse, de la Culture, de l'Éducation, de l'Information et des Sports, Rapport W. Kuijpers, PE 105.139/rev. II, 10 avril 1987. The last report of the Council of Europe, Commission of Local and Regional Authorities, was nearly unanimously adopted on 17/18, March 1988.
 38. Harmsen, Hans, *Wörterbuch demographischer Grundbegriffe – Deutsch, Französisch, Italienisch, Englisch*, (Hamburg Universität, Deutsche Akademie für Bevölkerungswissenschaft) 1960; Winkler, Wilhelm (ed.), *Mehrsprachiges demographisches Wörterbuch*, Hamburg (Union internationale pour l'étude scientifique de la population) 1960; see also the reports and draft resolutions of Franz Count *Stauffenberg* of 1987 and 1988 for a Charter to protect the ethnic communities within the Member States of the EP.
 39. Goljas, Janko, *Petjezični glosar ustave in samoupravljanja SFRJ*, Ljubljana (Društvo znanstvenih in tehničnih prevajalcev Slovenije s sofinanciranjem Kulturne skupnosti Slovenije) 1976.
 40. Cassese, Antonio and Jouve, Edmond, *Pour un droit des peuples*, Paris (Berger-Levrault) 1978, with many documents; Taifel, H., *Gruppenkonflikt und Vorurteil*, Bern 1982.
 41. Moens, Gabriel, *Equality for Freedom*, Wien/Vienna (Bräumüller) 1976; Salvi, Sergio, *Patria e Matria*, Firenze (Vallecchi) 1978; Vukas, Budislav, *Etnične manjine i međunarodni odnosi*, Zagreb (Školska Knjiga) 1978; Veiter, Theodor, *Europas Schicksalsweg 1947–1987: Vom Nationalstaat zum Frieden zwischen den Völkern*, in: No. 7 of the *Schriftenreihe der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, Graz (University) 1987/88, and Munich (Mittel-europäische Quellen und Dokumente, vol. 19) 1987.

IV. Ethnicity and regional politics

The term „region” means, juridically and also politically, since the various Conferences on Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, especially the Conferences of Galway and Innsbruck 1975 and the declarations of Bordeaux of 1978, and since the constitutions of the (non-governmental) Assembly of the Regions of Europe (the name was changed in 1987 from the former name Council of the Regions of Europe), a congruent and homogeneous closed territory with certain historically and geographically given borders, this also beyond the political frontiers, with a population which have distinct characteristics (culture, economics, traffic, history) and is synoptical, relatively small, if the population will cultivate its traditional culture⁴². In Europe such regions are partly also juridically established, this also in the constitutional law and with the name „region” as in Italy⁴³, in Denmark⁴⁴, in Spain⁴⁵, meanwhile in France regions exist under this expression, but without regional characteristics⁴⁶ (excepted Corsica) and in Austria the juridical term „Region” can be found only in a Federal Law on foreign workers and means administrative districts which are certainly not regions in what a sense this could be⁴⁷. The expression „region” is not decisive. E. G. in Denmark the new so-called counties (communes) are certainly regions in the sense of this report and also of the theories of the Council of Europe⁴⁸ and the Canadian „Provinces”, which have partly also ethnic characteristics, are regions in its proper sense⁴⁹, insofar as they are not to extended, but there must

42. *Regionalismus in Europa*, 4 vols, München/Munich (Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit resp. INTEREG) 1981 (vol. I + II) resp. 1983 (vol. III + IV); Veiter, Theodor, Region, in the Sociolinguistic Handbook, s. foot-note 1; Enloe, Cynthia H., Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, Boston (Little, Brown & Camp) 1973; Polakovic, Esteban, La formación del ser nacional (La etnogenesis), Buenos Aires (Lumen) 1978; Kardelj, Edvard, Nation und internationale Beziehungen, Beograd (STP) 1975.
43. Pizzorusso, Alessandro, Il pluralismo linguistico tra Stato nazionale e autonomie regionali, Pisa (Pacini) 1975; Weibel, Ernest, La création des régions autonomes à statut special en Italie, Genève (Droz) 1971.
44. See: The Regional Level. Countries in Denmark, Copenhagen and Odense (The Association of Country Councils in Denmark) 1978.
45. Arevalo, Manuel Clavero, España; desde el centralismo a las autonomías, Barcelona (Planeta) 1983; the various statutes of the autonomous regions are published by Enrique Orduno Rebollo within the Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, Madrid, 1979.
46. Gras, Christian, et Livet, Georges, Régions et régionalisme en France du XVIII^e siècle à nos jours, Paris (PUF) 1977; Philipponneau, op. cit., footnote 17.
47. Report on the educational and cultural problems of minority languages and dialects in Europe, Doc. 4745 of June, 12, 1981 of the Council of Europe; Morin, Jacques-Yvan, Liberté nationale et fédéralisme, Montréal (Thémis) 1964.
48. Conseil de l'Europe, Resolution 192 (1988) (1) sur les langues régionales ou minoritaires en Europe, adoptée le 17 mars 1988/Resolution 192 (1988) (1) on Regional or minority languages in Europe; Entschließungsantrag Franz Ludwig Graf Stauffenberg an das Europäische Parlament betreffend eine Volksgruppen-Charta vom 9. 3. 1988 mit ausführlicher Begründung vom 1. 3. 1988; Resolutions adopted by the Second General Conference of the European Regions, Strasbourg 19–20 nov. 1987.
49. Bienvenu, Rita M., and Goldstein, Jay E., Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada, Toronto (Butterworths) 1985; Rapport Parent, vols. 1–5, Québec (Ministère de l'éducation) 1966; see especially the review „Canadian Ethnic Studies”, 1988 in the 20th, year, published in Toronto, Ontario.

be distinguished between regions and the local member-States in Federal States. The „Laender“, „Cantons“, „Provinces“ and other Federal units within a Federal State can be, if they are small enough, also „regions“ as in Austria the provinces of Vorarlberg and Carinthia, in Germany Saarland or the cities of Hamburg and Bremen, in Switzerland the cantons of Glarus, Jura, Zug or the half-cantons of Appenzell or Basel, but, for instance Bavaria or Lower Austria are not regions, they are too great and are divided into various regions (Franken, Schwaben, Oberbayern, Niederbayern; Waldviertel, Weinviertel etc). Within the Land Vorarlberg, which can be considered as a region, there are little regions of their own as the region of the Montafon-valley or the Bregenzerwald and within the German region „Schleswig“ (as a part of the Land Schleswig-Holstein) exists a Frisian region (the administrative district Nordfriesland)⁵⁰.

The problem is, if „regions“ and the tendencies to create regions on a juridical level („regionalism“, „regionalisation“), especially in the case of frontier-transgressing regions – with which the Council of Europe deals in a special Organisation, the AGE – can belong to the question of ethnicity. This is a political question too. It is not necessary that a region is also linked to a certain ethnic group, an ethnic community (people) in the sense of the two International Covenants on Human rights of 1966⁵¹, because in many cases for the identification of such a region it is sufficient to ascertain, that the population has their own history, culture and ancestral soil⁵². Such regions without an ethnic characteristics exist in a great number as the Tennessey Valley (with its Tennessey Valley Authority), South-Australia, New Zealand, Sicily, Korfu, Rhodos, the Muhl-Viertel in Upper-Austria, Svalbard/Spitzberg, since the expulsion of the Germans also Wolhynia, the Danzig Region (Gdansk), and so on. But very more numerous are regions, if juridically constituted or not, with an ethnic characteristics, or almost any linguistic characteristics of their own. Frontier-transgressing regional organizations as the ARGE Alpe-Adria with the membership of the SR. Croatia, and the SR Slovenia, but also Friuli and Carinthia, the ARGE Alp (with regions as South-Tyrol, Trentino, Lombardy, North Tyrol etc.), the Euregio (between Germany and the Netherlands), Alpazur, Pyrenees, Regio Basiliensis etc. have inter alia ethnic characteristics or almost linguistic aspects and without these characteristics they would not be regions.

50. Steensen, Thomas, Die friesische Bewegung in Nordfriesland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 2 vols, Neumünster (Karl Wachholtz Verlag) 1986; see also the review „Nord Friesland“ (monthly), published by the Nordfriisk Institut, Braist/Bredstedt, NF 1988 in the 21st year; Festschrift Dr. F. Paulsen zum 75. Geburtstag, Bredstedt (Nordfriisk Institut) 1984; Steensen, Thomas, Die Nordfriesen und ihre Sprache, in: Regional Contact, Copenhagen, Nr. 1/1988, and the „Frisian News Items“, Columbus, Ohio, in 1988 in the 44th year.
51. UN-Documents A/RES/2200 (XXI) of December 16, 1966; Ermacora, Felix (ed.), Internationale Dokumente zum Menschenrechtsschutz, Stuttgart (Reclam) 1971; Robertson, A. H., Human Rights in the World, Manchester (Manchester Univ. Press) 1972.
52. Kimmich, Otto, Das Recht auf die Heimat, Bonn (osmipress) 1978; Veiter, Theodor (ed.), Vertreibung, Zuflucht, Heimat/Expulsion, Refuge, Domicile, Wien/Vienna (Braumüller) 1962; Lengereau, Marc, Le droit a la Heimat, Grenoble (these univ. de Grenoble, Science Politique) 1970; Veiter, Theodor, Le droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes et leur droit au foyer natal, in: Scritti in onore di Manlio Udina, Milano (Giuffrè) 1975; Rabi, Kurt (ed.), Das Recht auf die Heimat, München/Munich (Robert Lerche), 5 vols. 1959–1963; Doskocil, Walter, Recht auf die Heimat. Pflicht zur Heimat, München/Münich (Ackermann-Gemeinde) 1964;

Existing regions, if legally constituted or not, within a State and not frontier-transgressing are in many cases in the sense of the ethnic identity mainly based on an ethnic or linguistic background. One may quote the great part of the (legally constituted) regions in Italy, in Spain, in Denmark (in regard to South-Jylland, Bornholm, the Faeroer-Islands, Greenland) for a great part in the Soviet Union with the autonomous districts (AYTOHOMHAR OBLASTI), in certain Republics as the Baltic Soviet Republics, which were in violation of the International Public Law occupied by the Soviet Union⁵³, the autonomous regions (pokrajine) in Yugoslavia, certain insular regions belonging to the Council of the insular regions of the Council of Europe and so on. Ethnicity and regionalism (regions) are in many cases in close connection one to the other and in all these cases the politics have a certain role, e. g. in regard to the preservation of such regions as a part of the whole sovereign State, to which they belong. Not yet resolved conflicts as the conflict in and on Cyprus, which is nearly exclusively a ethnic conflict⁵⁴, prove that this argumentation is right.

V. Ethnicity and the politics of self-determination

The right to self-determination, occasionally declared also as a right of self-determination, what is not very exact, (*droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes*, *Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*, *diritto dei popoli alla auto-determinazione*, *derecho de autodeterminacion de los pueblos*, *pravo na samoopredjeljenje*) is a political right of „all peoples” as it is the content of the article one of the two International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966, where it is said⁵⁵:

1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international econo-

Veiter, Theodor, The Rights of Nationalities and Ethnic Groups to their Ancestral Soil, in: Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, vol XIII/1, Spring 1986; Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, Problemes et Perspectives des Etats a ethnies multiples, Tokio (Universite des Nations Unies) 1986; Petrič, Ernest, Das Recht auf die Heimat kot pojem mednarodnega prava, 2 vols, thesis University of Ljubljana, 1964.

53. *Kalnins, Ingrida, Baltic Tribunal against the Soviet Union July 25 & 26, 1985, Copenhagen, Rockville, Maryland (World Federation of Free Latvians) 1986 (with detailed bibliography).*
54. *Loizos, Peter / Hitchens, Christopher, Cyprus, Report No. 30, 2d ed. London (MRG), 1978; Human Rights. Turkey's Violations of Human Rights in Cyprus, Nicosia (Greek) (Cyprus Bar Association) 1986; Cyprus after the Turkish invasion. They make a desert and they call it peace, (Greek) Nicosia (Union of the Municipalities of Cyprus) 1983 (?); Whitaker, Ben/ Zulch, Tilman (eds.), Die Nationalitätenpolitik der Republik Türkei, Göttingen and Vienna (Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker) 11. 5. 1987 (results of an international Hearing, organized by a jury, composed of five members; Nejatigil, Zaim M., The Turkish Republic in Perspective, Lefkosa (Turkish part of Nicosia) (Tezel) 1985, Turkish standpoint, with maps and documents; Application by Cyprus against Turkey No. 8007/77, decision of Commission of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 10 July 1978.*
55. See: Human Rights. A compilation of international instruments of the United Nations, New York (UN - A/CONF' 32/4) 1967.

mic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect this right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The word „peoples“ means not States, but the ethnic communities all over the world, generally described as „peoples“ (in German *Volker*“, in French „*peuples*“, in certain slavic languages „*narod*“, in Italian „*popoli*“). The literature on the right of, or better: to self-determination is very numerous and we can here quote only the most important publications, of which in the first line the book, written in Spanish, by *Obieta Chalbaud*⁵⁶ which is the best research of this topic existing until now. But there are also much other books and publications in the most important languages of the world⁵⁷.

Without doubt, the meaning of the „self-determination“ is not always clear. And for this reason the UN adopted a kind of authentic interpretation with the Declaration of the General Assembly of October 24, 1970, no. 2625 (XXV). There is said, that not only the secession or the change of sovereignty can be a fulfilment of this right, but also self-government (autonomy)⁵⁸ and every other kind of a legal system. In every case the right of resp. to self-determination is bound to the ethnic identity and belongs to the fact of ethnicity. Without an ethnic identity and without ethnicity cannot exist a right of all peoples (peoples as ethnic communities) to self-determination. The politics of the States must recognize this right as binding law (*ius cogens*) and nearly all States have adopted and ratified the two Covenants with their article one.

Certainly, the tenor of the right to self-determination is not absolutely clear. Many authors and especially the leaders of ethnic minorities (ethnic groups) in the States with a majority of an other people, which dominates the whole State declare often, that the right to self-determination (or: of self-determination) is only the right to secession, the right to leave the State, where the minority lives, with the territory (ancestral soil), therefore the change of sovereignty (from one State to another or by creating a new independent State). But secession cannot be realized, after the charter of the UN or following the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975⁵⁹, if there would be further violations of the world

56. *Obieta Chalbaud*, Jose A., *el derecho humano de la autodeterminacion de los pueblos*, Madrid (tecnos) 1985.

57. *Calogeropoulos-Stratis*, *Le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-memes*, Bruxelles (Bruylant) 1973; *Bulajić*, Milan, *Pravo na samoopredjeljenje u društvu naroda i ujedinjenim nacijama (1917–1962)*, Beograd (edited by the author) 1963; *Johnson*, Harold S., *Self-Determination within the Community of Nations*, Leiden (Sijthoff) 1967; *Sureda*, A. Rigo, *The evolution of the right of self-determination*, Leiden (Sijthoff) 1973; *Veiter*, Theodor, *Grundgedanken zum Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Südtiroler*, in: *Festschrift für Viktoria Stadlmayer*, Innsbruck 1988 (to be published).

58. *Buchheit*, Lee C., *Secession. The legitimacy of Self-Determination*, New Haven & London (Yale Univ. Press) 1978.

59. *Tretter*, Hannes (ed.), *KSZE, Vienna (Bohlau) 1984 (documents)*, there much bibliography; *Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa Entstehung, Verlauf und Dokumente*, Wien/Vienna (Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten) 1986.

peace and of the peaceful cooperation between the peoples. In the past many cases of realization of the self-determination and of the politics leading to such realizations were in the same time violations of the same right of the other peoples, if there was a secession. One must here think to the cases of South Tyrol, the Sudeten-Germans, the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes who came with their ancestral soil in 1919 to Italy, the genocide in East-Timor, and so on.

In reality the so-called external right to self-determination, which means secession and change of sovereignty, is nearly exclusively connected with the violation of the same right to self-determination of peoples or – mostly – ethnic minorities which now come under the dominance of the peoples exercising their own right of or to self-determination. Only in singular cases, especially if there exists ethnic groups on the border of the „national“ States of the same language or ethnic characteristics, the secession and the change of sovereignty is effectively a fulfilment of the right to self-determination (this would be the case, if a Kurdish sovereign State would be established and in similar cases).

The content of the right to self-determination is, generally, to see as the internal right to self-determination. That means autonomy as it exists e. g. in Puerto Rico, in Québec, in federal structures, in the case of regional autonomies. The ethnic politics must accept, that autonomy (with a local parliament, a local administration, a local government, local road connections and in certain cases also other traffic provision, with a certain economic self-subsistence) is the best solution in regard to ethnic tensions. The ethnic conflict⁶⁰ can in such a way be avoided and ethnicity is then the means to the peace not only between States, but also between peoples.

60 MacMillan, C. Michael, Language Issues and Nationalism in Quebec, in: Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Fall 1987, 229–247; Wisard, Francois, Le Jura en Question, Lausanne (Le livre politique); Glazer, Nathan, Ethnic Dilemmas 1964–1982, Cambridge, Mass. and London U. K., (Harvard Univ. Press) 1983.

VJERAN KATUNARIĆ

University of Zagreb
Department of Sociology, Zagreb

THE INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY YUGOSLAVIA: SOME THEORETICAL NOTES AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

A theoretical approach to the multinationalism

The persistence of the ethnic boundaries in the contemporary societies is one of the major concerns of the modern macrosocial theories (Eisenstadt, 1985). That is the central focus of the theoretical works and the empirical research on contemporary multiethnic and/or multinational socialist societies as well. The impressive revival of the „national question“ there becomes both the reason for questioning the old paradigms of societal integration and the object of some fascination for social scientists. In paraphrasing Lenin, Connor (1984), for example, put in that „the (national) form becomes the father of the (socialist) content“.

As for contemporary Yugoslav society, at least two major sources of the national question must be considered. Although these are very complex, because they originate out from a long history as well as various structural patterns of the Yugoslav society, two relatively separate sets of factors responsible for the formation of today's nationalisms in Yugoslavia can be described.

The first source of contemporary multinationalism stems from the heterogeneity of the ethnic groups and their different historical paths. For a very long time the Yugoslav space has been divided into various parts belonging to the foreign empires. Both the nationalistic tendencies of particular ethnic groups and their longing towards the integration into a common southslavic society have been working in the same time somewhere since the beginning of the second half of nineteenth century. The double identity and the strategies appropriated to its pulsation have never disappeared, even when these groups have been established as the major units of Yugoslav society. They varied their tactics depending on how far the existing situations have been seen as favourable, primarily by their leaders and elites (Petranović, 1980; Banac, 1984).

The second source stems from the process of development of the ideological legitimacy of the Communist party in Yugoslavia. Since the twenties in this century, under a direct influence of the Comintern, the Party has reformulated the principle of internationalism in terms of favouring the national emancipatory movements, as the most important „tactical goal“ (Perović, 1984; Vlačić, 1986). In the long term, it meant an anticipation of political policentrism based on the autonomy of the national units within the state. The process of reforming the strong centralized, soviet-type

state was starting in the fifties already, although the whole process was controlled by Tito and the central federal elite, for the sake of equilibrium (Bilandžić, 1985). After Tito's death, however, the policentric tendencies became much stronger, producing the conflicts between the elites. In that way, both the ideological landscape and the organizational pattern of the Party assimilated the patterns of the historical and structural diversity of the Yugoslav society. There is a clear amplitude of the Party's strategy towards internationalism, which has started with transnationalism but ended up with multinationalism, without having a new formula of managing over the fairly autonomized national elites.

Generally, the convergence between societal and political patterns of multinational development reestablishes the ethnic group or nation as the central category of macro-social dynamics. The nation, thus, can be defined as a three-functional social system the pattern of which is generated from a general type of social system which is characteristic for a global context. Such a definition is deduced from the tradition of social system theories (Parsons, 1966; Deutsch, 1972; Loomis-Dyer, 1976; Luhmann, 1986), as well as from a theoretical contribution in anthropology which I will comment on in the conclusion part of my paper. The three-functional pattern contains the functions of economy, polity, and culture of a society ordered in a way which is determined by the general type of social system or the social-economic formation. In the western societies, the economic function (and elite) has the primacy over other two functions (and elites as well), which is determined by the characteristics of capitalistic system; besides, the relationships between functions or elites there imply certain portions of relative independence. In the eastern societies, but, the political function has a clear primacy as well as controlling prerogatives over the other functions. In both cases, therefore, the nations are historically circumscribed and culturally homogenized spaces of a politically and economically defined system. When the order of three functions goes to change, as it is the case today in those eastern societies where the tendencies towards free market economy and political democracy arise, the eastern nations are going to be alike western, „bourgeois nations“, tackling the issue of national self-determination which is typical for the classical period of western democracies formation.

In that way, Yugoslavia today is a country with a great variety of national units. Slovenia and Croatia, for example, did more on the economic development and political democracy thanks to the fact that the political elites there have reduced their authoritarian control over the other elites as well as over the non-political institutions in the society. It is still the national strategy, but of a different kind. The market economy and political democracy perspective gives more power to these nations, than the old system of central planning and redistribution. The other national units count more on status quo perspective, and that is the reason why the political elites there still predominate: these are supposed to ensure the constant share of their units in the system of central redistribution. This dichotomous context is not final. The contradictory processes of re-strengthening the nations are continuing on, the options of both sides are interpenetrating and creating the mixed and confused national patterns on both sides.

The empirical hypotheses

In approaching to the empirical research topic on social structure, interethnic

relationships and perceptions in Croatia in 1984, I was operating with two hypotheses:

- (1) The policy of decentralization with policentric prospect, which has been operationalized through an at least near equal share of power resources (socioeconomic positions, political influence, and educational attainments) among both national-ethnic elites and lower strata of the national-ethnic groups, did remove the characteristics of the „ethnic stratification“ (i. e. clear social inequalities between national-ethnic groups).
- (2) As a consequence of such a policy, the interethnic perceptions manifest no or just a low degree of ethnocentrism and ethnic distance related.

Of course, these hypotheses are based on the assumption that there is a stable and relative static system of the resources production and allocation. One must notice here, but, that the developmental changes – first of all such as introducing the market economy which is a strongly selective mechanism of allocation of the resources – should be shaking down the existing system of the interethnic equilibrium. Then the existing societal positions of the groups as well as their boundaries become questionable, which provokes further the ethnocentric feelings and nationalistic tendencies of the groups in all of the three functional dimensions. Anyway, the processes of change in this type of society are mainly initiated, directed, and controlled by the political elites of the national-ethnic groups.

The results of the empirical research

On a sample of 3,453 respondents in Croatia, the variable of national-ethnic affiliation was intersected by the variables of social stratification, and that of the attitudes on the significance of the place of origin, preferred partners in social networks, and finally that on the ethnic distance. Such analysis serves to elucidate the broader context our hypotheses belong to.

1. Social stratification and national-ethnic groups

The national and ethnic groups are broadly dispersed among various social strata in Croatia (table 1). More specifically, the dispersion is largest among the major groups: Croats, Serbs, and „Yugoslavs“ (a nationally neutral group). It is important to note here that both Croats and Serbs are fairly represented within three upper strata or functional elites, i. e. political leadership, business class, and professional ideologues („system intellectuals“). It is not the case, but, for the minor groups: Muslims (mainly concentrated within the category of the unskilled workers), and Albanians (mainly artisans). The latter fit into the pattern of ethnic stratification, while the first are represented in each strata nearly according to their share into the general population of Croatia. (One exemption is with Serbians who are slightly overrepresented in the upper social strata).

When comparing the share of the groups in the membership of the Communist party (table 2), as well as in its three-levels hierarchy (table 3), the picture is following: Serbs, „Yugoslavs“, and Montenegrins are overrepresented, while the other groups are slightly underrepresented. However, the shares of the groups within the hierarchical structure of the Party are more proper (excepting the Serbs who are slightly overrepresented).

It is evident, therefore, first, that the major groups deal with pattern of a „fair

share" of power and, second, that the policy of the Party towards policentrism has been effectuated by avoiding the socio-economic and political discrimination. It is also evident, but, that such a policy was not directed towards some minor ethnic groups as well. These groups have not been seen as important in solving the „national question“ in Croatia; traditionally, the relationships between Croats and Serbs are both most important and most sensitive.

Because only Croats and Serbs are the strategical targets of the policy of non-discrimination, our first hypothesis can be only partially confirmed. The preponderances of the Serbs here and there do not challenge this statement seriously, because their shares are far from being large and irritating – whereas an ideal pattern of power sharing is certainly impossible to achieve. The „success“ of the Communist party policy against discrimination here is particularly impressive when it is compared, for example, with that of Soviet Communist Party, concerning the relationships between Russians and non-Russians there (Connor, 1984).

2. Some attitudes of the national and ethnic groups

It is a common place of this kind of research in the socialist countries that is far from easy to get the plausible answers of the respondents on the sensitive questions like that of ethnic and national feelings (Shlapentokh, 1982). In order to approach to the core of plausibility of the respondents attitudes, some indirections have been employed in the following questions.

On the question how far the respondents feel themselves attached to their place or area of origin, the political functionaries are those who expressed the strongest attachment to their area of origin (table 4). This attitude can be, at least partially, explained by the fact the procedure of electing the functionaries for the higher posts within the Party, is conditioned by the initial support which must be given to them by the local party organization in their area of origin. Such a support is, nevertheless, most important, since the further procedure is more automatized according to the electoral rules of the nomenclature. On the other side, the least attachment has been expressed by the private artisans and managerial class, which may indicate on a merely utilitarian or economic rationality orientation of these strata. The professionals have expressed a relative strong localist-nativist orientation. It is usualy for them to growing up, completing the education, and taking the employment in the cities, where the majority of them is born. (Until several years ago the waves of political campaigns against the „immorality“ of the professionals have been conducted aiming to their immobility, i. e. they do not want to leave their cities in searching for an employment regardless of the value of the jobs offered to them in rural sides).

One can suppose here that parochialism in the attitudes of the majority of social strata is determined mainly by the territorial immobility which is produced by the nature of this type of social system. It certainly contributes to the feeling of the attachment to the traditional categories of social affiliation, where the fixation of the importance of the local place is organically bounded with the detachment to the ethnic and national groups (Zaslavsky, 1982).

When asked about whom to contact with in seeking for help in the situation of crisis, all groups gave similar answer (table 5). In the of disease, they would ask for help their spouses or kins. In the case of having the problems on the job, they would

ask their colleagues for help. The exemptions are found in Muslims who are less prone to ask for help to their spouses, while Albanians and Slovenes are, reversely, strongly bounded with their spouses in crisis situations. These data indicate on some differences of the pattern of social networking within the groups. It seems that the pattern of network in Muslims is determined by both situational and cultural factors; namely, the majority of them belong to the contingents of seasonal manual workers in Croatia where they came from rural areas of Bosnia in which the old patriarchal tradition, which does not legitimate the partnership between man and woman, is still strong. The Albanians are mainly craftsmen with a family enterprise, where both spouses are involved in the job, so that they are the social partners in the same time. The primary importance of the spouse by Slovenes, then, is probably due to the values and life-style of a group who is highly placed within social pyramid, i. e. to the monogamous egalitarianism of the upper middle class marriage.

Finally, the ethnic distance is measured by a variant of the Bogardus scale (Owen, Eisner, and McFaul, 1981). When asked which groups are more preferable in terms of cooperating in work with them, the majority of the respondents answered that such a question is not of importance to them. Because of that, I will present and comment only the parts of positive answers, i. e. the preferences expressed by the groups (table 6).

The major groups – Croats, Serbs, and „Yugoslavs“ – have the following preferences: Croats and „Yugoslavs“ prefer mostly the members of their own groups, while Serbs prefer mostly „Yugoslavs“. Besides, Serbs prefer the members of their own groups as well as Croats in nearly equal portions. In common, taking the preferences of other groups into account, the „Yugoslavs“ are the most preferable group. The connotation of this group has to do with neutrality as well as symbolic patriotism of the word „Yugoslav“, which does not clash with the ethnocentric feelings. Also, both the ethnocentric and particular outgroup preferences have not been expressed in an exclusive way.

The similar data have been found in a general yugoslav survey on ethnic distance attitudes (Pantić, 1987). Although such a picture cannot be taken as completely plausible and invariant neither, it manifest certain psycho-social ambiguity typical for the populations of the modern societies which have appropriated the egalitarian principle as one of the basic elements of democratic ideology (Janowitz-Bettelheim, 1964; Bastide – van den Berghe, 1957). The acceptance of the egalitarian norms, as well as universalistic values in general, must not be hypocritical, for it can depend on situations. Particular in the conflict and tensional situations, people can react sensitively, when the norms of the equality among groups are going to be discredited. The prevalence of the conformistic acceptance of the egalitarian norms in the periods of peace between the groups must not be the sign of camouflaging of a deeply rooted and exclusive ethnocentrism neither: even the frustrative conditions and authoritarian tendencies in personal life are not supposed to be translated automatically into the attitude of ethnic hostility (Katunarić, 1987).

The evidence about the attitudes calls for a more complex explanation of the plausibility of our second hypothesis. First, the structural dimensions of ethnic closings exist indeed, particularly when we add to the data on declining rates of the interethnic marriages in Yugoslavia since the end of seventies (Petrović, 1986). Second,

the structural conditions of closurings must not be reflected onto the level of ethnic consciousness, since the rates of the reported preferences in terms of the ethnic distance are relatively low. The conformistic acceptance of the official ideology of egalitarianism softens in a way the ethnocentric tendencies among middle and lower social strata. In general, their attitudes look like an unclear copy of the attitudes of the elites. In a socialist society, it depends primarily on the political elites, i. e. how they interpret the situations what kind of political messages they emit to the population. In Yugoslavia, for example, it is mostly important how the political elites interpret the events and transmit the informations concerning the seemingly conclusive development of the Yugoslav federalism, which involves the process of redefining the national boundaries within.

Conclusion: Nationalism as a modern replication of an archaic structure?

Our empirical evidence does not reach too far: it reflects only the weakness of a modern ideology, i. e. its attempt to rearrange a long terms process of structuring the boundaries of the independent sociocultural and political units which we call nations. The seeming cycles of the histories of two Yugoslavias, which have started with the transnational patterns of societal integration, but ended up with a clear multinationalistic dissipation – belong to the cumulative register of national formations elsewhere.

In the context of contemporary controversies between modernistic and primordialistic approaches to the national phenomenon (Smith, 1986), I would put some notes in favour of the primordialistic side. Namely, the crystalization of national society into a pattern of three-functional system – which tends to be economically self-sufficient, politically autonomous, and culturally self-referential – manifests rather a deep-rooted potential of structuration of the post-primitive societies already. It refers to the capacities of the ethnic groups. They have generated as early all of the three functions necessary for their surviving in an, in principle, unlimited time-span. Here I recall on the substantial contribution of the opus of George Dumézil, who has reconstructed the mythologies of the indoeuropean ethnic groups in terms of systemic or three-functional approach (Dumézil, 1973; 1979). He recognized the symbolic functions of the economic, political, and cultural „good“, while sociologists today describe in a homologous way the leaders, elites, and subsystems as necessary functions for integrating and developing the societies, as well as their historical identities.

The contemporary multinational socialist societies cannot avoid the deterministic matrix of structuration of nations neither. One must notice here, but, that the sequences of re-ordering of three functions, i. e. the changeability of the ranks of functions, are not completed yet. It refers to the role of cultural elites who have not been yet on the top of the pyramid of power in the history of societies up to now. Although both the indoeuropean myths and modern social system theory have given the primacy to the function of culture in the society, it is merely a projection of transcendental meaning of creativity. The real functions of national cultures since early teocracies up to modern industrial era are prevalent: they serve as symbolic patterns of identification of a local society which is builded up on the economic and political patterns – as well as patterns of social structure – typical for a large number of local societies, i. e. their „systemic“ features. It means that the notion of the functional

primacy of culture is either an intuitive tendency of the old and new constructors of national myths or an idealistic fallacy which we may call the weberian: namely, the creative force of the cultural ideas in the beginning of a new epoch is neutralized and routinized during the long period of reproduction of that epoch and its local societies. Along with that, the genetic substance of culture is substituted by the uniformistic patterns of structuration of society, and these do not need the fertilization of the new cultural ideas any more.

Nevertheless, the creative power of a nation which would contradict to its self-defensive power and the energy of self-conservation is still an utopian perspective. The behavior of the national cultural elites in the old and new Yugoslavia can serve as good examples for that: their transnational orientation has been withering away when the conflicts between national elites had arisen. Then they recurred to the strong nationalistic standpoints taking the roles of the collective memorists, sophistic interpreters, as well as ceremonial priests who surround the national political leaders.

Whether, therefore, a further development of any nation can be atypical in the sense that it could diverge from the „systemic history“ and its global comprehensiveness (Tiryakian, 1985)? That strongly depends on the relationships (and the ratio within!) between the cultural cores which produce more of pluralistic patterns of society than the existing multinational societies, on one side, and polit-economic patterns which produce the uniform structures of the local societies as well as strengthen their autarchic elements, on the other side. In other words, the creative or transcendental core of culture is the only stair within the mythical building of national history which could help to exit out of its boundary. It does not mean the need for wiping out the nations or ethnic groups either, but to transcend them with different and certainly richer forms of society, where the national unit is only one of the different forms of societal units and the old structures and identities are continued up by a whole bunch of the new structures and identities. The basic conditions for that is, of course, a continuous enlargement of the number of places where the creative ideas and actions originate from. It is the only possible way of living of a society where the culture might have the functional primacy. The other forms of national surviving, namely those in the world of economic and political competition which impose the darwinistic rules up to the nations, especially to the smaller ones, imply new conflicts and lethal consequences. If the history of nations and global societies is only the succession of political elites and functions by the economic ones or vice versa, then there is no obstacle for the enormous expansion of power systems and its opponents of the same kind, regardless whether we speak about multinational Yugoslavia or multinational world in general.

REFERENCES

- Banac, I. 1984: *National Question in Yugoslavia*. Cornell University Press.
Bastide, R. – P. van den Berghe 1957: „Stereotypes, Norms, and Interracial Behavior in Sao Paulo, Brasil“, *American Sociological Review*, 22, pp. 689–694.
Bilandžić, D. 1985: *Historija SFRJ (A History of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia)*. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.

- Connor, W. 1984: *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*. Princeton University Press.
- Deutsch, K. 1972: *Nationalism and Social Communication*. The M.I.T. Press.
- Dumézil, G. 1973: *Mythe et épopée*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Dumézil, G. 1979: „Od mita do povijesti“ (From Myth to History). *Kulturni radnik*, 3, pp. 113–124.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. 1985: „Macro-societal Analysis – background, development, indications“. In: *Macrosociological Theory* (S. N. Eisenstadt, H. J. Helle Eds.). Sage.
- Katunarić, V. 1987: „Autoritarizam, etnocentrizam, seksizam i društvene grupe“ (Authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, sexism, and social groups), *Sociologija*, 4, pp. 603–610.
- Janowitz, M. – B. Bettelheim 1964: *Social Change and Prejudice*. Free Press.
- Loomis, Ch. P. – E. D. Dyer 1976: *Social Systems*. Schenkman.
- Luhmann, N. 1985: *Soziale Systeme*. Suhrkamp.
- Owen, C. A., H. C. Elsner, and T. R. McFaul 1981: „A Half Century of Social Distance Research“. *Sociology and Social Research*, 1, pp. 80–90.
- Pantić, D. 1987: „Karakteristike društvene distance kod zaposlenih u društvenom sektoru SFRJ“ („The characteristics of social distance by those employed in social sector in Yugoslavia“). *Sociologija*, 4, pp. 559–603.
- Perović, L. 1984: *Od centralizma do federalizma* (From Centralism to Federalism). Zagreb: Globus.
- Petranović, B. 1980: *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1982* (A History of Yugoslavia 1918–1982). Beograd: Nolit.
- Petrović, R. 1986: „Ethnically mixed marriages in Yugoslavia“. *Sociologija. Special Issue. Beograd*. Pp. 229–240.
- Shlapentokh, V. 1982: „The Study of Values as a Social Phenomenon: The Soviet Case“. *Social Forces*, 61, pp. 403–417.
- Smith, A. D. 1986: *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Basil Blackwell.
- Tiryakian, E. A. 1985: „On the significance of de-differentiation“. In: S. N. Eisenstadt and H. J. Helle Eds., pp. 118–134.
- Vlajčić, M. 1986: „Komintern, KPI i nacionalno pitanje“ (Comintern, CPY, and National Question). *Male teme*, 3–4, pp. 405–453.
- Zaslavsky, A. 1982: *The Neo-Stalinist State*. Sharpe.

Table 1: *Social strata and national-ethnic groups (in percentages)*

Political	Croats	Serbs	Muslims	„Yugoslavs“	Slovenes	Albanians
functionaries	71.6	17.7	.2	8.2	6.2	–
Managers	76.3	12.6	.3	8.6	.8	–
„System intellectuals“	72.5	11.9	.7	10.5	.2	–
Professionals	77.7	7.5	.3	10.8	.5	–
Skilled workers	66.8	13.7	.2	16.6	.2	.2
Unskilled workers	64.4	18.4	6.0	9.7	.5	–
Craftsmen	74.7	5.8	2.0	12.1	.5	3.5
Peasants	83.7	11.2	–	2.7	–	.2

Table 2: *National-ethnic groups and membership in the Communist Party (in percentages)*

	Member		Former member		Non-member	
Croats	37.4		3.7		58.9	
Serbs	56.0	67.9	6.5	60.6	37.4	78.1
Muslims	19.6	21.9	13.7	23.4	66.7	10.7
„Yugoslavs“	44.0	.8	5.1			2.0
Slovenes	40.6	5.3	6.0	6.6	50.0	4.4
Montenegrins	77.8	1.0	—	—	59.4	1.1
Albanians	—	1.1	—	—	22.2	.2
		—	18.2	—	81.8	.5
				1.5		

Table 3: *National ethnic groups according to three levels of political hierarchy (in percentages)*

	Commune level	Regional level	Republic level
Croats	72.7	79.3	69.5
Serbs	21.4	13.8	24.8
Muslims	.5	—	—
„Yugoslavs“	2.3	1.7	1.9
Slovenes	—	1.7	1.9

Table 4: *Social strata and their attachment to their place of origin (in percentages)*

	Place of origin	Area of origin	Actual place living	Actual area living	Other place	Else
Polit. func.	31.7	42.2	17.9	1.1	6.0	.4
Managers	38.1	30.1	22.0	3.5	2.4	.7
„System int.“	43.1	30.0	15.0	3.4	5.2	1.1
Professionals	49.6	30.6	12.0	2.1	3.2	—
Clerks	51.2	23.3	17.8	2.8	2.8	.7
Skilled workers	45.5	32.1	15.1	1.7	1.3	2.0
Unskilled workers	51.8	29.0	12.9	3.3	—	1.3
Craftsmen	45.9	25.5	22.4	2.4	1.7	.3
Peasants	59.8	30.2	6.9	.9	—	.3

Table 5: *National-ethnic groups and their partners in crisis situations (in percentages)*

	Spouse	Relatives	Neighbors	Friends	Colagues	Others
Croats	39.8	6.5	1.8	14.0	44.0	6.6
Serbs	32.1	4.1	1.4	12.5	54.8	4.9
Muslims	29.4	9.8	2.0	9.8	54.9	2.0
„Yugoslavs“	38.7	5.3	.7	18.0	39.3	8.0
Slovenes	53.1	—	—	9.4	46.9	3.1
Montenegrins	50.0	5.6	—	33.3	33.3	5.6
Albanians	72.7	9.1	—	9.1	18.2	18.2

Table 6: *The most preferred partners in work (in percentages)*

	Albanians	Monten.	Croats	„Yugos.“	Muslims	Slovenes	Serbs
Croats	.6	7.2	24.3	16.3	1.1	9.9	5.7
Serbs	—	2.0	8.7	21.5	.7	5.2	8.1
Muslims	—	6.3	8.3	31.3	6.3	6.3	4.2
„Yugosl.“	.5	1.3	6.1	26.1	1.1	5.3	3.7
Slovenes	—	—	30.8	15.4	—	46.2	—
Monteneg.	—	—	—	—	—	13.3	—
Albanians	6.3	—	25.0	25.0	—	—	6.3

SERGEJ FLERE

Univerza Novi Sad
Pravni fakultet, Novi Sad

THE ETHNIC ATTITUDES OF YOUTH IN YUGOSLAVIA

1. Introduction*

The idea of Yugoslavs being – or becoming – a single ethnic entity has a history that is more than a century old. It started mainly with the vision of harmoniously resolving Serbo-Croatian relations, but it expanded to include other groups as well. This idea of unity was part of the official ideology of the first Yugoslav state (1918–1941), the formula being Yugoslavia as a single „tri-tribal“ people. The idea of ethnic unity lost much of its plausibility during this period, because most of the South Slav Nationalities had already been constituted, the general conditions were unfavorable, with ethnic differences becoming a source of social conflict and, in particular, because the idea of ethnic unity was politically instrumentalized.

This idea of Yugoslav ethnic unity was not part of the ideology promoted by the Communist-led National Liberation Movement during World War II or of the postwar period. Instead, there was the formula of the „brotherhood and unity“ of Yugoslav nations, encompassing the idea of each nation's affirmation and the parity of national groups, with loyalty to Yugoslavia as a whole guaranteeing this parity and ensuring some common functions of the social system.

Although the South Slav nationalities are today an established fact, along with other national groups living in Yugoslavia, and although the histories of these groups' nationhood are very different, the idea of Yugoslav ethnic unity persists, at least as an undercurrent.

In the postwar period, the Yugoslav identification remained for unusual and exceptional cases. This was true until the 1981 population census showed that 5.4 % (1,219,000) of Yugoslavia's inhabitants opted for the Yugoslav identification in the ethnic sense, making it a phenomenon which could no longer be regarded as marginal. Its distribution was unevenly concentrated – mainly in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (8 % of the population in each opted for this identification). It was also found to

* The author expresses his gratitude for comments received and help in the refining of the English text to Dr. Oscar Eggers and Dr. Jeff Longhofer of the Dept. of Sociology, University of Missouri-Kansas City, USA.

be more concentrated among the younger and the more educated. (Vušković: 1982).

In our research we wanted to determine the present extent and certain structural traits of the Yugoslavist orientation among young Yugoslavs, distinguishing in our focus between declarations of actual belonging (where objective circumstances, particularly ancestry, are expected to play a major role) and preferences and strivings as to ethnic identification (where statements are more expected to express subjective, emotional and volitional aspects).

2. Problem

Ethnic belonging is usually taken to be an objective, ascriptive trait of a person's status. But as E. Renan remarked in the last century, ethnic belonging also has a subjective, volitional dimension. (E. Renan: 1882). Not only can a person change his nationality, but whole new ethnic groups may appear, while others disappear, merge etc. Of course, these possibilities are always structured by objective circumstances, but there is a dialectic between objective and subjective (in particular volitional) elements within these processes.

In view of the changing attitudes to the nature of Yugoslav identity as noted in the Census of 1981, we wanted to know more about how this is manifested among young Yugoslavs, as the young are often the vehicles of new trends. In a wider survey of the social position, attitudes and values of Yugoslav youth (Vrcan et al.: 1986) the matter of ethnic (national) identity was also considered.

3. Method

This survey was carried out in late 1985, on a sample (N = 6250) representing Yugoslav youth population aged 14 to 27. The sample construction recognized five contingency strata: secondary school students, university students, employed, unemployed and youth active in agriculture. Other criteria and steps were also applied to achieve a representative sample, combining stratifying and random procedures. The interview was conducted in the language chosen by the respondent within a range of expected languages in the different communities.

The questionnaire covered most areas of relevance to drawing a social, political and psychological profile of Yugoslav youth.

The survey was organized by Zagreb University's Institute for Social Research and by the Center for Research, Documentation and Publishing attached to the Union of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia.

The results were processed electronically.

Two questions were posed directly to obtain data on the ethnic identity of youth in Yugoslavia. Respondents were first asked to declare to which nation they belonged (national adherence), and then, they were asked what their preferred national identification was, irrespective of objective conditions and constraints. The second question was designed to determine the extent of latent Yugoslavism, in contrast to the dominantly ascriptive nature of declaring national adherence.

4. Findings

a. *Ethnic identification and Preference*

The aggregate results of the answers to the two questions are presented in Table I.

TABLE I: *Declaration of nationality (national belonging) and Declaration of national preference*

Declaration of National Preference	Declaration of Nationality					
	Serb	Croat	Slovene	Maced.	Monten.	Alban.
Serb	31	0	0	0	0	0
Croat	0	40	0	0	0	0
Slovene	0	0	67	0	1	0
Macedonian	0	0	0	41	0	0
Montenegrin	0	0	1	0	32	0
Albanian	0	0	0	0	0	78
Muslim	0	0	0	0	0	1
Yugoslav	4	1	1	0	1	0
Other	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total	9	7	6	4	1	7
N = 6 149						
	Muslim	Yugoslav	Other groups	No answer	Other ans.	TOTAL
	0	42	1	21	4	27
	0	25	1	23	7	17
	0	10	1	9	11	8
	0	29	0	22	7	9
	0	45	0	16	7	3
	1	3	0	14	3	8
	20	43	1	29	5	8
	0	68	1	18	7	16
	0	40	33	23	4	3
	2	36	2	20	6	
(in percents)						

Note: The next - to - the - last horizontal category („Other“) pertains to national groups (minorities) other than Albanians (Hungarians, Romanians, Italians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Turks etc.) or ethnic groups which do not have the status of a national group (Romanies, Wallachs etc.) or to where a non-national (non-ethnic) regional or similar identification was expressed in the answer. The next - to - the - last column („Other answers“) registers only answers which did not pertain to national (ethnic) entities.

It should be noted that a large number of respondents either did not wish to answer the second question (on ethnic preference) or gave answers which were out of context. This probably means that the degree of identification was not particularly strong or that the question had no meaning for them. The latter could partly imply an overcoming of (the narrower forms of) ethnic identification without it leading to a Yugoslavist identification. The incidence of such answers was particularly high among those identifying themselves as Slovenians and it was the lowest among those identifying themselves as Albanians.

The major finding in Table I is that 16 % of our respondents declared themselves to be ethnic Yugoslavs. That is a finding which has not been noted either in official postwar censuses or in empirical surveys. The last census, however, did find a higher concentration of respondents declaring themselves ethnically as Yugoslavs among the young, among the more educated and in certain geographic regions. (Vušković: 1980).

Also, more than one third of the young Yugoslavs declared that they would prefer to call themselves Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense were it not for objective constraints. This constitutes a major difference in the distribution of answers regarding objective and preferred adherence, suggesting the presence of a hidden, latent Yugoslavist orientation among a large number of young people in Yugoslavia. Of those who do not call themselves Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense of the term, Yugoslav preference can most commonly be found among Montenegrins, Muslims and Serbs. The least preference is found among young Albanians and the number is also relatively low among young Slovenians. A situation has appeared where among the young members of certain Yugoslav nationalities only a minority wishes to style itself according to what they declare as their objective adherence, this being the case of Muslims, Montenegrins, Serbs, Croats and Macedonians. We find that the „objective“ nationality is also the most commonly preferred among young Albanians (78 %), and young Slovenians (67 %).

The profile of the young people who declare themselves as Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense may be interesting, in particular if we are not dealing with a transitory and ephemeral phenomenon but with one which may indicate certain in-depth integrational processes. It should be noted here that more than four fifths of those who preferred to declare themselves as Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense come from groups in which Serbo-Croatian is spoken as the basic language of communication, as the native tongue.⁽¹⁾ This certainly influences the attitude to this phenomenon of those who do not prefer Yugoslavism as an ethnic identification and who at the same time speak another language as their own. The latter may have an adverse attitude towards those who do declare themselves as ethnic Yugoslavs, being afraid that the „would be Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense“ would one day stigmatize those who do not accept such an ethnic view and that the „would be-s...“ could attempt to negate the idea of Yugoslavia as a „community of equal nations and nationalities.“

b. Structural Sources of Ethnic Yugoslavism

Data in Table II indicate some of the structural sources of contemporary Yugoslavism: (1) the republics and provinces from which those with such an orientation are recruited, and (2) the extent to which an ethnically heterogeneous background (parents of different nationality) contributes to this phenomenon.

The figures in the last column of Table II show the relative extent of the Yugoslav identification and Yugoslavist orientation by republics and provinces. Compared to the Yugoslav average, Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a contradictory picture. There is an above-average difference between the Yugoslav identification (low) and the Yugoslavist orientation as latent Yugoslavism (high). More than half of the respondents accept the Yugoslavist orientation as preferred identification, but few are ready to renounce their national identification in the narrower sense. This finding is understandable if we bear in mind the traditional prominence of the Yugoslav idea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the „Young Bosnia“ movement at the beginning of the century). But

Table II: *Declaration of nationality as Yugoslav, declaration of national preference as Yugoslav, parents national belonging by regions*

Parents Ethnic Back ground Region	Non-id- entical	Yugoslav	Serbs	Croats	Slovenes	Macedon.
Yugoslavia	34/51(8)	100/65	4/43	4/26	—	—
Bosnia and Herz.	58/66(8)	100/67	9/44	5/41	—	—
Montenegro	42/58(5)	—	—	—	—	—
Croatia	39/54(10)	99/59	12/38	2/22	—	—
Kosovo	12/31(1)	—	—	—	—	—
Macedonia	2/48(1)	—	—	—	—	0/28
Slovenia	12/14(10)	—	—	—	0/10	—
Serbia	35/53(6)	100/70	3/44	—	—	—
Vojvodina	36/58(12)	100/71	3/42	8/59	—	—
Monteneg.	Albanians	Muslims	Hungar.	Rumanians	Other ident.	TOTAL
—	—	—	—	—	2/25	16/36
—	—	9/47	—	—	12/26	8/52
2/38	—	0/29	—	—	69/59	11/40
—	—	—	—	—	0/37	16/31
—	0/1	—	—	—	3/32	1/6
—	—	—	—	—	12/24	2/29
—	—	—	—	—	39/28	4/11
—	—	—	—	—	2/63	19/50
—	—	—	3/30	0/17	0/59	14/47

Note: Data for groups of 5 % and more in the entire sample and samples for the regions are presented only, with the exception of „non-identical background“ and „other identical“ national background of parents which are presented irrespective of their relative size. The number before the slash in every column denotes the percentage of respondents from that region who declare themselves as Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense, whereas the number behind the slash denotes the number who preferred that identification. The number in the first column in parentheses denotes the percentage of respondents who declared themselves to be of ethnically mixed parentage.

we should remember that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a community with three traditional ethnicities, of which the Muslims have only recently attained this status.

We also find a rather large difference between true and preferred national identification in Montenegro. This is primarily due to the fact that official recognition of Montenegrin nationhood came only recently. Those who prefer Yugoslav identifi-

cation in that case most often have parents of identical national background which is neither Montenegrin nor Muslim (usually Serbian and Croatian). While tending towards Yugoslavism, the youth of Montenegro are not ready to renounce their recently acquired nationhood.

We see that in Croatia the Yugoslavist preference is on a par with the average for the entire sample, but is significantly lower among respondents who state that both their parents Croatian. Since, historically speaking, both the origin and greatest contestation of the idea of Yugoslavism came from Croatian lands, the level of its acceptance today is relevant. We may conclude that in this region when the ideas of Yugoslavism is accepted, it is relatively more often accepted to the full and the difference between the level of declaration of Yugoslavism as an ethnic identification and as a preference is narrower.

At the time of the data collection, Kosovo was a specific area, and the conditions for conducting the survey may not have been fully present. Here, the general acceptance level of the Yugoslav ethnic option is the lowest among the observed regions of Yugoslavia. This is especially evident among respondents whose both parents are ethnic Albanians. The incidence of the Yugoslav option is somewhat higher (although still below the average) amongst youth who are from mixed marriages and is almost up to the Yugoslav average among those whose parents are of „other identical national background“ (usually Serbians). Because the latter account for only a small part of the Kosovo sample, this does not change the overall picture for Kosovo. The fact that Kosovo youth adhere the least to the Yugoslav identification (in the overt and in the covert ethnic sense) can be explained by the late national awakening of Kosovo Albanians, with its romanticist and sometimes secessionist traits.

In Macedonia, too, we observe a rather low level of national identification in the Yugoslav sense. This can be explained by the fact that Macedonians only recently gained acceptance as a nationality, and that the Yugoslav idea does not have a long tradition in this land. Significantly higher is the level of preferential Yugoslavism, explainable by the Macedonians' satisfaction with the state of affairs where they are accepted as equals in the community of Yugoslav nations.

In Slovenia, we again note a very low level of Yugoslavism as an ethnic identification and a moderately low level of Yugoslavism as a preferential identification. Respondents of Slovenian ancestry never declare themselves as Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense. However, answers to this effect come from respondents whose parents are of non-identical nationality or of other nationalities. As for preference, we find that the answers regarding Yugoslavism come primarily from those whose parents are both Slovenians: one out of every ten respondents of Slovenian parentage wishes to be an ethnic Yugoslav. In other words, the tide of Yugoslavism did not completely bypass this region.

There are different reasons why Slovenian youth do not accept a Yugoslav identification to a greater degree: basically it is a matter of a stable attitude as to what Yugoslavia should be – political union in the form of a (federal) state, with no assimilation in the cultural realm, particularly as it regards language. Ivan Cankar, the celebrated Slovenian writer, expressed this idea before World War I, correcting some of the positions of Slovenian Social Democrats. (Cankar: 1956, 71). There are other reasons why Slovenians do not accept ethnic Yugoslavism, and they have to do with current problems in the functioning of the Yugoslav society. The country's social crisis has also manifested itself as an alienation of Slovenian youth from dominant institu-

tions and values. (Vrcan et al.: 1986).

We find that the idea of Yugoslavism is most strongly manifested in Serbia proper (only as preferred identification is it negligibly higher in Bosnia and Herzegovina). It seems that the youth who adhere to the Yugoslavist idea have declared their parents to be Yugoslavs too, and we find that in Serbia proper it is the youth of Serbian parentage who adhere least to the Yugoslav identification.

Historically, the prominence of Yugoslavism in Serbia may, at first glance, be an unexpected or at least a new phenomenon, in view of the traditional greater Serbia ideology and strategy as it was formulated by I. Garašanin in the 19th century. „Greater Serbia“ was to encompass all lands where Serbs live. In order to achieve this, it would have to encompass parts of other nations. The idea of Yugoslavia as a multinational, pluralist state at the time did not gain much support. A new turn came in the 1930's when the idea of „Yugoslav integralism“ („unitarism“) was instrumentalized as a formula for giving legitimacy to an autocratic regime sometimes labeled as to its ethnic content as „greater Serbian hegemony“. The Yugoslav idea was given a bad name during this period and ethnic Yugoslavism ceased to be acceptable to any of the major factors or groups. With such a historical background, the fact that the Yugoslavist orientation is gaining support and plausibility among Serbs may cause mistrust among others, particularly among the elderly who may interpret it on the basis of past events.

Lastly, the data for Vojvodina show that in this nationally most complex region of Yugoslavia there is an above-average preference for Yugoslavism coupled with a slightly below average level of Yugoslav ethnic declaration. Though it is not clearly visible from the data in Table II, the Yugoslav preference does have significant support among ethnic groups clustered as „other national groups“ (particularly among Bohemians and Ruthenians. This indicated that the Yugoslav preference is not only a matter of Serbs and Croats, or even only of Slavs (2), but rather has the dimension of a special type of social relationship characteristic of the normative order in Yugoslavia, centering on the idea of self-management.

In contrast to preference, as latent Yugoslavism, Yugoslavism as factual national identification can be found in Vojvodina mostly among those who declare their parents to be ethnic Yugoslavs or who come from ethnically mixed marriages (which are most common in Vojvodina).

How important has the role of ethnically mixed parentage been in the appearance of a youth ethnically declared as Yugoslav?

In our sample, one out of every twelve respondents comes from an ethnically mixed marriage. This figure is somewhat underestimated because some of the respondents from ethnically mixed marriages declared their parents to be Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense. According to the data presented in Table II, the number of mixed marriages is highest in Vojvodina – and indeed it is: 30 % in 1984 (Petrović: 1985: 60) – Followed by Croatia and Slovenia, whereas it is lowest in the more traditionalist regions of Kosovo and Macedonia where such marriages are rare. – The number of mixed marriages accounts for 13 % of all marriages (according to the 1981 Census). (*Statistički bilten* 1295, 1984).

The study of the influence that parental nationality has upon young people's national identification as Yugoslavs is hampered by the respondents declaration that their parents are also Yugoslavs by ethnic identification. To some extent, this is psychological projection. Some parents might give the same response, but certainly not

Ethnically non-identical parentage is, on the whole, a conducive factor toward identification as an ethnic Yugoslav, but it is certainly not the only cause. At the level of the entire sample, twice as many young people with parents of different nationalities declare themselves as ethnic Yugoslavs, while the ratio for preferred identification is somewhat less pronounced in comparison with the overall average. But the relevance of this factor is not the same in all the observed regions. In Vojvodina and Slovenia the influence of parental ethnic heterogeneity is much more important in this respect than in other regions. However, with regard to preferred identification, which we regard as latent Yugoslavism, nowhere do we find that an ethnically mixed ancestry plays an important part. Other studies show that ethnic Yugoslavism is higher in ethnically mixed regions and local communities. (Vušković: 1982; Raič: 1982).

What would happen if we turned our relationship around and posed the question in the following manner: what kind of ancestry do those of Yugoslav identification or preference have? We would find that some 30 % come from ethnically mixed marriages and that 15 % of those who prefer such an identification are of ethnically mixed parentage. Therefore, mixed parentage is a more important factor in identification than in preference, as one might theoretically expect.

The number of people who prefer Yugoslavism is more than double that of people who unconditionally accept it as an ethnic identification. But this relationship is not the same for all regions or for those of different ethnic extractions.

In view of what has been said about declaring one's parents ethnic identification (as being possibly a projection of the respondent's own attitude) it may be surprising that all such respondents (who declare their parents to be Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense) do not declare themselves to be ethnic Yugoslavs as well. This may be an indication that the Yugoslav ethnic identification has, in a sense, been institutionalized and that the young do not always experience it as something new, original and autonomous. This may come as a surprise given the present institutional circumstance where the Yugoslav identification is not an officially recognized nationality. These young people (who declare their parents but not themselves to be Yugoslavs) may again be turning toward more narrow identifications, as being historically more reliable, more defined and more meaningful. In a crisis situation such a tendency would be more plausible.

A second trend which may be noted at the level of Yugoslavia as a whole is that Yugoslavism is opted for – especially as a preferred identification – by respondents whose parents belong to larger nationalities. Size itself is of relevance here, but so are the historical circumstance that originally linked Yugoslavism to the Serbo-Croatian relationship and the regions where this language is spoken. Today we may also view Yugoslavism, at least *in nuce*, as a type of social relationship, based on free association, parity and self-management. Therefore, we note the presence of the Yugoslavist orientation in almost all national groups (the situation for certain smaller ones cannot be discerned from Table II).

Respondents whose parents are Serbs and Croats were observed to show a greater Yugoslavist orientation when residing outside Serbia proper and Vojvodina in the former case and outside Croatia in the latter,

In our sample, Slovenians, Muslims and Albanians by parentage do not declare themselves as Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense, but they do express, to varying degrees, a Yugoslav ethnic preference.

It has already been noted by other authors (Dugandžija: 1984) that historically Yugoslavism has been concentrated among intellectuals, the free professions, and among all those who needed views broader than the ones provided by traditional ethnic *weltanschauungen*. (Dugandžija: 1984, 81). In contrast to the peasantry, the bourgeoisie and even the greater part of the intelligentsia, Yugoslavism appeared as a somewhat nebulous, too loosely defined concept which did not provide sufficient symbolic content or reliability. It is relevant, therefore, to determine the importance of stratification here (Corrected correlation coefficient = .27) indicating a moderate connection between social status and ethnic non-orientation as Yugoslav. A Yugoslav preference increases from one-fifth of the respondents who have not finished elementary school to approximately two-fifths of those who have finished secondary school or more. When considering the basic social groups („contingency strata“) the analysis showed that the Yugoslav orientation and identification was strongest among university students, but differences themselves were not significant.

The older respondents in the youth sample were somewhat more oriented towards Yugoslavism, though it is known that, on the whole, the youth are more Yugoslavist oriented than the general population.

Females were moderately more likely to opt for a Yugoslav ethnic identification (41 %) than males (32 %).

As for social background (parents' occupations), no significant influence was found.

5. Discussion

The Yugoslav nationality does not at present exist as a constituted entity. Our findings cannot, in this respect, serve as a definite basis for a conclusion, but they may be an indication that we are witnessing events which are not just ephemeral or a fad, but rather a historically conditioned process of ethnic melting which could, over a period of time, bring about a constituted and stabilized Yugoslav nationality. This is not to say that the process would be a repetition of those that occurred a few centuries ago in France or in the last century in the German lands.

Even if a Yugoslav nationality were to be constituted, presuming the circumstance were favorable, it could be nothing else than one of the many ethnic communities on Yugoslav soil. As a relatively young ethnic entity, the Yugoslavs would not necessarily be free of all romanticist attributes. There are at present no possibilities for their hegemony, as they are often the object of stigmatization.⁽³⁾ There is nothing to guarantee that with the change in their social position – not in view today – their psychological attitude toward other nationalities would not change as well. It is more probable that we will not see the complete formation of Yugoslavs as a nationality. Historical experience tells us as much. The biographies of people who in their youth adopted a Yugoslavist orientation often reveal a difficult and and painful sobering process, with transferrals to narrower identifications. In difficult, crisis moments, the more narrow identifications showed themselves to be more reliable, offering more symbolic shelter. Today's great cultural, ideational heterogeneity of the young in Yugoslavia (Vrcan et al.: 1986) also speaks against the possibility of constituting a Yugoslav ethnicity, i.e. it indicates that this type of declaration is an act of volition, unbacked by cultural homogeneity. The historical development of the nationalities of

Yugoslavia is very uneven and they might be, in very different degrees and modes, willing to be assimilated into a wider entity. There is also the question of the language of the Yugoslav nationality; as it is implicit that it would be Serbo-Croatian a solution not acceptable to others.

Finally, let us pose a few hypotheses concerning the inner meaning of Yugoslavism as an identification for part of the youth of Yugoslavia:

— some may opt for Yugoslavism as a form of protest against what they see as the fragmentation of the Yugoslav state. (Čimić: 1982):

— Yugoslavism may express a yearning for a true human community in which no mediation would exist, where relations among men would not be conditioned by partial interests. Yugoslavism, in this sense, is a movement toward a non-nation utopia. In this respect, Yugoslavism can be close to a secular religiosity where mystical unity would deliver Yugoslavs from present day difficulties.

Both of these hypothetical types of Yugoslavism, were they to expand, might give rise to something Yugoslav terminology calls „unitarism“ (the negation of national diversities and autonomy). But that is not necessarily the path any successful Yugoslavism will take.

END-NOTES

1. According to the 1981. Census, of those who declared themselves as Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense, 94 % considered Serbo-Croatian as their mother tongue. (Statistički bilten 1295).
2. On the basis of the 1981 Population Census Raič concluded that the Yugoslav ethnic identification can, in Vojvodina, be traced to allethnic extractions present in that region. (Raič: 1982).
3. D. Bilandžić described the growth of the Yugoslav ethnic identification in the 1981 Census as a sign „something being wrong with society“, as a „not normal phenomenon“ (Vjesnik, May 8, 1982). J. Vidmar, the noted dean of Slovene cultural life, saw those identified as Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense as „completely undeveloped, narrow-minded and uneducated people.“ (Teleks, Feb. 10, 1983, 15).

REFERENCES

1. Cankar, I. (1956). Esecji, kritike i feljtoni. Beograd: Prosveta.
2. Čimić, E. (1982). Politika kao sudbina. Beograd: Mladost.
3. Dedijer, V., Božić, I., Čirković, S. and Ekmečić, M. (1974). History of Yugoslavia. New York: Mc Graw Hill.
4. Dugandžija, N. (1984). Jugoslavenstvo. Beograd: Mladost.
5. Petrović, R. (1985). Etnički mešoviti brakovi u Jugoslaviji. Beograd: Filozofski fakultet.
6. Raič, A. (1982). „Jugoslaveni u Vovodini“, Naše teme, 10. (XXVI).
7. Renan, E. (1882). „Qu'est ce que c'est qu'une nation?“, Paris.
8. Statistički bilten 1295. (1984). Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku.
9. Teleks (Feb. 9, 1983). Ljubljana: Delo.
10. Vjesnik May 8, 1982. Zagreb: Vjesnik.
11. Vrcan, S., Aleksić, J. Dundžerović, R., Flere, S., Radin, F., Ule, M. (1986). Položaj, ponašanje i svet mlade generacije Jugoslavije. Zagreb–Beograd: Institut za društvena istraživanja and Center za istraživačku, dokumentacionu i izdavačku delatnost SSOJ.
12. Vušković, B.: (1982) „Tko su Jugoslaveni?“ Naše teme, 10. (XXVI).

SREČA PERUNOVIĆ

Institut za migracije i narodnosti, Zagreb

ETHNICITY AND CULTURE — PEOPLE OR NATION

If the above title is taken as a question, the answer will be: both people and nation. But not as identical concepts. On the contrary, the present paper assumes that the categories of people and nation can, and should, be discriminated.

How, then, is the kind of answer given in the first sentence at all possible? It is possible, first of all, because of a certain overlap of the contents of the two concepts in the elements singled out here (ethnicity and culture) from a whole range of elements that are traditionally linked with the definition of these concepts (including language, religion, territory, etc.). The principle of pluralism, derived from the principle of equality of peoples, is the highest value in the modern world. The interest in questions of ethnicity is very closely related to this.

Any theoretical approach necessitates clearly defined terms -- in discussions of ethnicity (which have been going on for some twenty years now) as much as in any other field. Even now, „ethnicity seems to be a new term“ (Glazer & Moynihan, 1976: 1). McKay and Lewins (1978) point out „the need for a conceptual clarification of some of the terminology used in discussing ethnicity“ (Martinelli, 1986: 197). „For example, Isajiw (1974) found twenty-seven definitions of ethnic group, and no doubt a few more have been added since his analysis.“ (Martinelli, 1986: 196).

Before stating how we shall use the term ethnicity in this paper, we shall first refer to some other authors and their uses of this clearly theoretically multifaceted and variously understood term. For some authors, ethnicity is identified with the ethnic community, as for Roger Martelli (Lerotic, 1984: 94). Others equate it with ethnic identity (Edwards and Doucette, 1987) or ethnic group (McLellan, 1987). For Talcott Parsons, „ethnicity is a primary focus of group identity, that is, the organization of plural persons into distinctive groups, and, second, of solidarity and the loyalties of individual members to such groups.“¹

Referring to the views of A. Smith, J. M. Leclercq, J. Bromley, M. Weber, and

1. T. Parsons. Some Theoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trends of Change of Ethnicity, 1976: 53.

others, Z. Lerotić defines ethnicity as that characteristic of a people or some other type of community which helps to distinguish it from others and on which the community builds its identity (Lerotić, 1984: 94). This is also the approach that we shall take in this text. Such a characteristic is typical of a people, and it is interesting to note that a nation, even when it begins as a political community (that is, when it does not grow out of a given people but is formed by some other processes), tends to form an ethnicity (Lerotić, 1984: 94).

People and nation are concepts involved in quite a serious terminological entanglement, and different views have been expressed on the signification of the two concepts. Sometimes, their synonymy is stressed: nation, state, government, people (Wright, 1964: 451); at other times, the superfluity of the distinction between people and nation is noted (Rizman, 1987: 22–23; Lukić, 1983: 19–24); and there are those who claim that there is no generally valid definition of nation (Hudoletnjak, 1987: 251).

Authors who distinguish people and nation view a people as a product of a historic process which appears during the transition of the primitive community into class society. A people is a community inhabiting a particular territory and sharing a common culture, language and past. „Cultural complementarity is the most suitable material for the making of a people, since it carries in itself a very strong awareness of social continuity, of duration made possible by many complementary elements, such as similarities of language, same homeland, specific social relations, struggle for survival, etc.“ (Lerotić, 1984: 156).

This paper will not venture its own distinction of the concept of people and nation. The distinction is more or less consistently made in the literature (despite certain opposing views, such as those expressed by R. Rizman, 1987, R. Lukić, 1983, etc.) and is used here to show the pluralist structure of the nation (with respect to culture and ethnicity) in contrast to the views of national culture as a uniform phenomenon and of nation as an ethnically homogeneous entity.

As regards the concept of culture, we shall accept the definition which sees it as the totality of man's social activity (Čaldarović, 1967: 413), leaving aside the great variety of use of that concept.

The fact that the concept of culture is linked with the concepts of both nation and people needs no special mention.

Authors who recognize the linkage between the nation and bourgeois society (in Yugoslavia, they include Kardelj, Lerotić, Janjić, Šušteršič, Ičević, Rakić, Pleterški, Koprivnjak, Perić, and others) all distinguish the concept of people and nation. Some even note that all serious attempts at defining the nation must start from this distinction (Lerotić, 1985: 50). D. Janjić recalls numerous definitions which followed the earliest theoretical attempt by Pascal Manzinni in 1851 (Janjić, 1987: 50).

We shall accept the definition of a nation as a historical, socio-economic and cultural-political community formed under particular conditions of social division of labour (Lerotić, 1985: 50). Put differently, „the nation is a result of social division of labour in the capitalist era, or a process of unification of people within a particular linguistic and cultural community in a struggle for their economic and cultural assertion, which is at the same time the struggle for such a distribution of the surplus product that will make possible the economic and thus also cultural establishment of the nation“ (Janjić, 1980: 225). A nation, notes Z. Lerotić, emerges as a community

which, unlike a people, carries the idea of the community as a value; it introduces into society the principle of unity, integrality and self-determination (Lerotić, 1985: 50).

Two points are important for our consideration and these can be stated as follows:

(a) a nation appears in the process of unification of people in a society which has overcome the pre-capitalist modes of production;

(b) a nation is characterized by the principle of unity.

The first of these points makes, as a rule, for a heterogeneous structure of the nation; the second reflects the homogenizing trend.

Many texts about the nation, be they theoretical, journalistic or political, characterize the nation by culture. Culture is recognized as one of the key factors of national preservation and identity. The special character of a nation, its colour as it is often called, is expressed by language and culture. The existence of different nations using the same language is an exception that does not invalidate the rule itself.

Of course, the nation cannot be reduced to a cultural construct. Similarly, it cannot be reduced to an ethnic community in which language or culture would be decisive criteria (Lerotić, 1984: 99). Still, it is generally agreed that a nation has a desire for the possession and development of its own (national) culture, unique and distinct from other national cultures. It is also implicitly accepted that a national culture is traditionally more or less preserved whole, transmitted to the nation in a form that is integral and untouched by time.

When a nation is threatened, its culture and language become crucial in the struggle against assimilation and for the preservation of national existence. In this situation, the vital importance of the national culture and language becomes most evident. The national culture is then most readily accepted and felt as an integral whole, an undivided and undifferentiated entity which belongs to all members of the nation and is possessed, or at least consciously felt, by all of them. Emotional ties with the nation, through the national culture (and language), can become the dominant feeling which shapes the attitudes, thinking and behaviour of individuals. Characteristically, individuals are ready to exalt the virtues of their nations with regard to specific qualities („the beauty of our language, our folk songs, our literature“), durability („our nation's millennial history“), exclusivity of the „national context“ („only this nation could have produced such a work“), rank („our way of life is superior“, „our customs are better“), personalities belonging to the nation („he is our poet, because he was born here, although he lived in a foreign country and wrote in a foreign language all his life“). This way of thinking reflects the view of national culture as a homogeneous whole, which it actually is to a high degree. That is why we find definitions of the nation in terms of (among other things) a shared culture (Wright, 1964: 451).

Culture stimulates the emergence and development of the nation; at the same time, it is a product of collective living in a national community (Janjić, 1980: 66). On the other hand, since a people is the structural mainstay of the nation, cultural differentiation must often be assumed.² Modern societies are, thus, characterized by

2. Z. Lerotić. „Pitanja polazišta teorijske rasprave o naciji“ in „Međunacionalni odnosi danas“, 1979: 47.

3. J. Steward. Teorija kulturne promene. 1981: 115.

new types of national patterns, embracing the nation as an entity while at the same time leaving room for extreme socio-cultural differentiations on the horizontal line.³ As noted by J. Steward, differences between subcultures have by no means been eliminated even in the United States, despite its highly developed communication media, high living standards, and comparatively high degree of socio-economic mobility. However, the process of levelling has gone so far, especially in the cities, that subcultural differences are easily underestimated and shared forms of behaviour on the national scale are overestimated.⁴

The nation thus appears as both the multiplicity of cultures and as a cultural individuality, an entity that has a distinct identity and is recognized as different from other entities.⁵ This dual and contrastive property of nations is frequently ignored, especially where the homogenizing efforts in society are very strong. The recognition of the heterogeneous character of the nation is one way to tap the wealth of differences. Studies of ethnicity in multiethnic communities are part of the effort in this direction. As Melvin L. Kohn notes, cross-cultural research „need not treat each nation as a homogeneous entity“,⁶ as nations do not exist in an international vacuum, or as Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) put it, „we do not contend that nation-states are closed systems“. The nation lives, among other things, on achievements that are international, and today even universal and global.⁷

A theoretical attempt to solve the question of heterogeneity of nations, the relation between the dominant national entities and their segments, has been made by Robert Lafont (1968). His theory of the dialectics of national structures is based on the distinction between the primary nation (e. g., Bretagna) and the secondary nation (e. g., France, United States, etc.).⁸ Applying his concept of the level of socio-cultural integration to the internal structure of modern nations, Julian Steward takes the distinction between national patterns and socio-cultural segments as the most important criterion of internal differentiation.⁹ According to this approach, there are two main types of socio-cultural segments – the so-called vertical split, including ethnic minorities, and the so-called horizontal split, dividing segments in terms of occupational and class differences.¹⁰ Viewing the issue of culture and nation in the modern world in the perspective of the class structure of society, one cannot but agree with J. Steward that a higher class forms a distinct entity in many respects, particularly with respect to the way of life, which forms an international higher-class culture.¹¹ Similarities and affinities in the way of life are established without regard for the nationality and territory.

Processes of homogenization take place also within a given nation. There are three main sources of the common denominator of the national culture in Steward's view: main national institutions, common cultural heritage, and mass communication media. The most powerful of the three factors working towards the levelling of subcultural

4. J. Steward, *ibid.* 1981: 113.

5. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1979: 47.

6. M. L. Kohn, „Cross-National Research as an Analytic Strategy“, 1987: 715.

7. Z. Lerotić, *Nacija*, 1984: 233.

8. R. Rizman, *Marksizam i nacionalno pitanje*, 1987: 6–7.

9. J. Steward, *ibid.* 1981: 111.

10. J. Steward, *ibid.* 1981: 114.

11. J. Steward, *ibid.* 1981: 123.

differences in the direction of uniformity are the mass media.¹² Steward mentions also the family (and patterns of upbringing of children) as a factor that many modern anthropologists regard as an important force for the formation of the so-called national character.¹³

Side by side with the processes of homogenization, we must consider also the respect for cultural specificities vs. insistence on uniformity. We must weigh the view that national homogenization produces the nation as a great achievement of social progress,¹⁴ as against the view that any totalization, including national, should be opposed. While the insistence of each nation on its national, including cultural, individuality vis-a-vis other nations is incontrovertible, the situation within the nation (regarding its own specific segments) is by no means as clear. From the perspective taken in this paper, it can be said that the nation appears at a particular level of historic development through processes of homogenization of its ethnic segments and that, in this sense, peoples are „nations of the future“. In other words, processes of national consolidation involve also a certain degree of ethnic and cultural homogenization. The statement to the effect that the national culture is an element that bears upon the emergence and development of a given nation and that at the same time that national culture is the product of that community appears contradictory at first sight. The first part of that statement seems to imply that national culture is something that historically precedes the nation and that the nation cannot be „responsible“ for the particular shape of the cultures of its ethnic segments or of the national culture at higher or lower levels of uniformity. The resolution of the contradiction is to be found in the second part of the statement, where the emergence of both the nation and culture is seen as a process. This is the reason why the notion of the building of a nation is ambiguous in most authors. It refers to the emergence and formation of a nation from an amorphous community of people, as well as to the emancipation of a nation through the development of a political, economic, cultural and social system of its own.¹⁵

An important contribution to the study of these processes in culture can come from ethnology and folklore studies. A new approach to folklore and tradition, as noted by the Yugoslav ethnologists, provides an insight into several historic layers of culture and into contacts and partial overlap of different cultures.¹⁶ In fact, quite a number of disciplines can contribute to this end.

From the standpoint from which we are considering this question, it can be said that the nation is, as a rule, a cultural plurality. The culture of „the contemporary heterogeneous societies is itself a heterogeneous culture“ (Bauman),¹⁸ but the tendency towards homogenization – which is a crucial tendency in a nation – often dismisses this characteristic of the national culture. It should be said that the use of

12. J. Steward, *ibid.* 1981: 126.

13. J. Steward, *ibid.* 1981: 131.

14. V. Koprivnjak, in „Nacionalno pitanje u jugoslavenskoj teoriji i praksi – doprinos E. Kardelja“, 1980: 657.

15. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1984: 9.

16. D. Rihtman-Auguštin, „Istraživanja folklor i kulturna praksa“, 1979: 18.

17. A. Flaker, „Suvremena hrvatska umjetnička kultura i nacionalna tradicija“, *Forum*, 1979, br. 12: 1161.

18. Z. Bauman, *Kultura i društvo*, 1966.

the term „national culture“ is justified by the existence of the national culture as a new entity. For national culture develops as an entity, totality, well-defined *novum* with its specific characteristics. It follows from this that the recognition of national specificities is actually a denial of ethnic, cultural and other types of uniformity on the supranational plane. National identities help to secure the richness of culture and promote counter-unification processes. But as already noted, the national principle can itself act in the direction of unification, levelling off the cultures of its different segments. Conversely, it can equally well open up possibilities for the expression of ethnic/cultural differences of its individual segments. If the national culture should grow out of the denial of the cultures of its ethnic segments, it would actually weed its roots and open the door to cultural colourlessness and indifference, which, depending on the „building material“ of the contemporary international culture (spread primarily through the mass media of the dominant nations and cultures), may in the last analysis lead to a situation in which nothing but the name of the particular national culture will survive.

Just as the denial of an individual nation means the destruction of its life, so also the denial of ethnic segments means totalization in the name of a „pure“ principle of nationhood, with very similar or identical „Saharan“ effects. Yugoslav ethnologists took a new approach to their discipline some ten years ago,¹⁹ presenting modern folklore as an element that could „oppose the equalizing tendencies of bureaucratic cultures“. As Bausinger puts it, folklore offers alternative forms of culture and life.²⁰

We take the view that it is by no means a mechanical linkage of capitalism and nationality to say that the „bourgeois society is a base without which, in Marx's and Engels's interpretation, the nation cannot develop its 'self-awareness' without economic concentration and unification, without the destruction of localism and regionalism, and, understandably, without a degree of cultural and spiritual homogenization, especially in the sphere of the standard language.“²¹

Among the scholars of bourgeois orientations, we find a tendency to expand the meaning of the nation and to base it in the culturally and linguistically homogenized population within a given state.²² This is the clearest and strongest theoretical expression of the homogenizing tendency. The history of modern nation-states shows that the centralist tendencies to achieve uniformity are the key elements of the contemporary practice.²³ Unification is carried out as the dispossessing of the subjected and peripheral parts of their history, „their depersonalization in all respects in which they differ from the centre (language, tradition, customs, way of life, value system, etc.).“ For Talcot Parsons, the existence of the religious, racial and ethnic pluralism within one and the same nation is self-evident,²⁴ but the nation is primary, and its ethnic segments with their characteristics are something that needs to be

19. I. Lozica, „Metateorija u folkloristici i filozofija umjetnosti“, 1979: 41.

20. D. Rihtman-Augustin, *ibid.* 1979: 18.

21. B. Hudoletnjak, „Čovjek i nacija“, 1987: 257.

22. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1984: 36.

23. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1984: 67.

24. D. Janjić, *Država i nacija*, 1987: 210.

25. Ricardo Petrella, in D. Janjić, *ibid.* 1987: 210.

26. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1984: 264.

27. T. Parsons, in Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1984: 73.

neutralized. One is therefore not surprised to read his statement: „There is an enormous benefit for society which derives from linguistic uniformity. . . Both of the twentieth-century 'superpowers' build their societal communities on a level far above the mere ethnic foundations and it is logical that they should have adopted unitary languages.“²⁷

The culture of each nation is a cultural complex,²⁸ while the nation needs to achieve also on the communicative and cultural level. A national culture, though itself a rounded entity in some way, owes its existence to the cultures of its ethnic segments, from which it grows and develops. Thus, the national culture is itself a plurality of cultures, and the only question that one must ask is whether a nation can afford this pluralism – and if it can, to what extent, in view of its political interest in being an entity, its economic interest in balancing the tension deriving from the economic sphere, and its cultural interest in maintaining, fostering and developing its specific national culture.

For most authors, „the building of the nation determines processes of internal democratization and strengthening of political integration of the economic and social forces of the nation and its cultural homogenization“.²⁹ The nation has the capability to give national unity to a number of peoples,³⁰ uniting them into one through the action of some factors which remain beyond our grasp (some of them being perhaps irrational), but what is important to note is that in most multiethnic communities the dominant political group imposes its cultural patterns on the other groups.³¹ From this, there follows the homogenization of society on the societal plane. Since cohesion is decisive for the functioning of the state, the state secures „state nationalism“, whose consequences are cultural and national unitarism.³² This unitarism strives to obliterate in the collective consciousness all traces of the process of creation of this type of unity. To illustrate this, Z. Lerotić quotes the French author Ernest Renan: „In the tenth century, in the first heroic poems which are such a perfect mirror of the times, all the inhabitants of France are Frenchmen. . . The idea that conquest was the key to all this does not even occur to anyone.“³³

The starting point of this paper, discrimination between the concepts of people and nation, has been developed here to highlight the tendency immanent to the nation, though not to the people, namely, the tendency to homogenization. Our approach has enabled us to view the national culture not only from the outside, in relation to other cultures (as commonly and justly viewed by many authors), but also from the inside, in relation to its constituent segments. It is then seen that the national culture is multi-layered and complex and that its relation to its ethnic segments is certainly not without significance. Quite the contrary, it is at least as significant as the preservation of the national cultural identity in relation to other cultures or to some dominant nation/culture. In this light, the pluralism of national cultures and the pluralism of the cultures of ethnic segments within a given nation

28. M. Čaldarević, „Društvena kultura i idejna nadgradnja“. 1967: 406.

29. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1984: 9.

30. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1984: 94.

31. Z. Lerotić, Načela federalizma i višenacionalne države. 1985: 140.

32. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1985: 116.

33. Z. Lerotić, *ibid.* 1985: 47.

appear as elements of the struggle against uniform colourlessness and cultural insignificance.

LITERATURE:

1. Barth, Fredrik. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Boston: 1969.
2. Bauman, Zygmund. *Kultura i društvo*. Beograd: Prosveta, 1966.
3. Bausinger, Hermann. „Zur kulturalen Dimension von Identität“ in D. Rihtman-Augustin „Istraživanje folklor i kulturna praksa“ Narodna umjetnost, 1979. br. 16.
4. Edwards John; Doucette, Lori. „Ethnic Salience, Identity and Symbolic Ethnicity“. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 1987, No 1.
5. Čaldarević, Mladen. „Društvena kultura i idejna nadgradnja“ in „Osnovi nauke o društvu“. Beograd: Rad, 1967.
6. Erlich, S. Vera. *Jugoslovenska porodica u transformaciji – Studija u 300 sela*. Zagreb: Liber, 1979.
7. *Ethnicity – Theory and Experience*, ed. by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan. Harvard University Press, 1976.
8. Glazer, Nathan; Moynihan, p. Daniel. *Introduction – in Ethnicity – Theory and Experience*. Harvard University Press, 1976.
9. Hudoletnjak, Boris. „Čovjek i nacija“. Naše teme. Zagreb: izvanredni broj, 1987.
10. Hutnik, Nimmi. „Patterns of ethnic minority identification and modes of social adaptation“. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 9 No 2, April 1986.
11. Ičević, Dušan. *Kuda ide nacija*. Beograd, 1986.
12. Isajiw, W. „Definitions of Ethnicity“ in Mc Lellan J. „Religion and Ethnicity: The Role of Buddhism in Maintaining Ethnic Identity Among Tibetans in Lindsay, Ontario“. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 1987. No 1.
13. Janjić, Dušan. *Otvoreno pitanje nacije*, Beograd, 1980.
14. Janjić, Dušan. *Država i nacija*. Zagreb; Informator, 1987.
15. Kardelj, Edvard. *Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja*, Beograd, 1973.
17. Kohn, L. Melvin. „Cross-National Research as an Analytic Strategy“. *American Sociological Review*, 1987. No 6.
18. *Kulturni identitet mladih jugoslavenskih migranata u Francuskoj*. – zbornik radova. Beograd/Parijs, 1986.
19. Lenjin, V. I. *Socijalizam i nacionalno pitanje*. Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1977.
20. Lerotić, Zvonko. *Nacija*. Zagreb: Globus, 1984.
21. Lerotić, Zvonko. *Načela federalizma višenacionalne države*. Zagreb: Globus, 1985.
22. Lukić, D. Radomir. „O razlici između naroda i nacije“. *Gledišta*, 1983. br. 1–2.
23. Lozica, Ivan. „Metateorija u folkloristici i filozofija umjetnosti“. *Narodna umjetnost*, 1979. br. 16.
24. McLellan, Janet. „Religion and Ethnicity: The Role of Buddhism in Maintaining Ethnic Identity Among Tibetans in Lindsay, Ontario“. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 1987. No 1.
25. McKay, J.; Lewins, F. „Ethnicity and Ethnic Group“ in Martine Ili Phylis „A test of the McKay and Lewins ethnic typology“. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1986. No 2.
26. Martinelli Phylis. „A test of the McKay and Lewins ethnic typology“. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1986. No 2.
27. *Nacionalno pitanje i socijalizam*. Beograd; Rad, 1982.
28. *Nacionalno pitanje u jugoslavenskoj teoriji i praksi – doprinos Edvarda Kardelja*, Banjaluka, 1980.
29. *Living in two cultures – seminar*, Hanaholmen, Helsinki, 1986. Strasbourg, 1988.
30. Parsons, Talcott „Some Theoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trends of Change of Ethnicity“ in „Ethnicity – Theory and Experience“, 1976.
31. Rakić, Radomir. „O pomovima ethnos“, „narod“, „nacija“. *Gledišta*, 1983. br. 1–2.
32. Rizman, Rudi. *Marksizam i nacionalno pitanje*. Beograd, 1987.
33. Richtmann-Augustin, Dunja. „Istraživanje folklor i kulturna praksa“. *Narodna umjetnost*, 1979. br. 16.

34. Rothchild, Donald. „Interethnic conflict and policy analysis in Africa“. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1986. No. 1.
35. Steward, Julian. Teorija kulturne promene. Beograd: BIGZ, 1981.
36. Šuvar, Stipe. Nacionalno i nacionalističko. Split: 1974.
37. Sutlić, Vanja. „Narod i mišljenje na narod – Narod i nacija“. Kulturni radnik, 1981. br. 6.
38. Weber, Max. Privreda i društvo. Beograd: Prosveta, 1976.
39. Wright, Q. in A. Dictionary of the Social Sciences. ed. by. Julius Sould; William L. Kolb. The Free Press, New York, 1964.

LEOKADIA M. DROBIZHEVA

USSR Academy of Science

HISTORICAL MEMORY AND NATIONAL SELF-AWARENESS

As is known, every new generation turns to the past to comprehend not only its connections with what came before, but also its present interests. This has always been so. But at any historical stage there comes a time when historical figures or events evoke a special interest. The last few decades have led many, if not the majority of the peoples to exhibit increased attention to the past. This has clearly coincided with the growth of their national self-awareness. Therefore it is expedient, both scientifically and practically, to consider the question of the relationship between a people's historical and national self-awareness. The author will also try to define the place of historical memory in the system of historical self-awareness and to outline its practical manifestations among the Soviet peoples on the basis of data of ethnosociological research.

The conception about the historical past is a component of national self-awareness, if it is understood broadly – not only as the national identification of people, but also as the „we-image“ as a whole, i. e., a conception about its features, its past and present and its national interests connected with it. At the same time, the conceptions and knowledge of the members of a concrete entity about their past, including their knowledge of legends, traditions and established historical facts, in the author's opinion, is not tantamount to historical self-awareness. Such knowledge and conceptions can rather be described as historical memory. It is an indispensable part of culture, of continuity, which stabilizes an ethnos. Historical memory is a specific cultural potential of a people. It can be used, and sometimes it is really used in the interests of the people and sometimes in the interests of certain social groups. It is known that during the Second World War politicians, writers and the propaganda media turned to the memory of the outstanding Russian army leaders Alexander Nevsky, Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov in an effort to mobilize the potential of all society to the acceleration of socio-economic development. Soviet writers and public opinion turn to the memory about the positive labour traditions of peoples.

Regrettably, historical memory can be used not only for progressive purposes. Sometimes it is invoked to deepen „historical roots“. This leads to an upsurge of national sentiments, and it is highly important what actions are thus stimulated. National sentiments leaning on historical memory may arouse „admiration“ for the

past and self-opposition to other peoples, i.e., may have negative consequences. But they may also stir up patriotic sentiments, infuse people with a sense of dignity and prompt them to take intensive labour, social and cultural actions. To use a figure of speech, historical memory resembles ingots of precious metal which can be used both as the armours of conquerors and as the flagstaffs of banners which unite peoples, or as adornments which diversify people's day-to-day life.

It is actualized historical memory, which brings about popular unity, that, in the author's opinion, is the historical self-awareness of a people. In other words, it is not only people's knowledge about events and phenomena of the past, but also their attitude to these events and phenomena, as well as the behaviour which stems from such knowledge and attitude. Thus, just as in national self-awareness as a whole, three elements are to be found in the historical self-awareness as its part (or its element) – cognitive, emotional-evaluative, and regulative.

The historical memory and historical self-awareness of members of a certain entity do not coincide with national self-awareness on all points. Knowledge about the past of all mankind, including about its early, pre-ethnic stages of development or, for instance, about the international aspect of the class struggle clearly goes beyond the bounds of national self-awareness. This knowledge helps to realise the place and role of one's people in the historical process, but does not form part of the knowledge about one's people, of the „we-image“.

What then actualizes historical memory? What makes it, conventionally speaking, an active element of national self-awareness? Above all, national interests, which, as is known, are usually an expression of social interests. It is not an accident that it is primarily the intelligentsia which represents and disseminates historical knowledge and gives it an ideological and political form, thus helping historical figures or events of the past to become a banner and a symbol consolidating the nation. At the same time, historical the nation. At the same time, historical and national self-awareness becomes mass self-awareness only when it is disseminated among all social strata of the people. Researchers in many countries assume that national and historical self-awareness gains a truly mass scope when education is placed within the reach of everybody and when national ideas are widely propagandized by the mass media among all sections of the population. Of course, this does not mean that in the past the population did not practise national self-identification and had no conception about the past. As is known, there were no ethnic entities without names and self-awareness, and patriotism in the name of the people has been displayed by individuals at all times. In the modern sense, mass national self-awareness is exhibited when all or the majority of the members of a concrete human entity have a historically authentic knowledge about their people, have adopted the attitude to its values ideologically institutionalized by the state or leading groups and are prepared to act in the name of common aims and interests, i.e., when the realization of the interests of one's nation, or people is there.

The data obtained in the course of a representative ethnosociological research under the project „Optimization of the Socio-Cultural Conditions of the Development and Drawing Together of Nations in the USSR“, carried out by the Department of Ethnosociological Research of the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the years 1971–1976 and 1979–1981¹ among the Russians in the RSFSR

1. The research was headed by Yu. V. Arutyunyan. Concerning the programme see Yu. V.

and other republics, the Uzbeks, Georgians, Moldavians and Estonians show the wide dissemination of historical self-awareness as part of national self-awareness. The community of historical destiny is among the basic signs of the individuals' self-identification with their peoples. For instance, the Russians in the RSFSR placed this factor after language close in significance to general traditions, customs and professional culture. And it was of greater importance to them than, for instance, place of residence or external similarity. Among some nationalities in the course of identifications the significance of the community of the historical past increases as they lose other ethnodifferentiating features.

One of the indicators of historical self-awareness is interest in the literature about the past of one's people. Judging by the results of the interviews, attention to this literature is great among all peoples. The question sheet emphasized literary subjects to which the respondents were to express their attitude. In terms of the interest aroused by it literature about the past of one's people took first place among the Georgians, second among the Uzbeks, third among the Estonians and fourth among the Russians. But among the Russians first place was taken by literature about the military events of the Second World War — also part of history.

The popularity of the literature about the past of one's people to a certain extent helps form a judgement about the people's historical memory. Information about historical and cultural events registered in myths, legends, traditions, ballads, songs, folk stories and then in professional historical and literary works has been handed down from one generation to the next. The volume of historical memory in each individual or social group depends on education, breadth of general cultural knowledge and in some people even simply on the retentive power of their memory. But the actualization of cultural events and phenomena depends on certain circumstance, above all, on social situations, which activate and sometimes sharpen national self-awareness. For instance, historical memory is usually more active among non-numerous peoples. During the ethnosociological expeditions to Georgia the Moscow researchers were struck by how well the Georgians know events of their history and take pride in their people's cultural figures and their works. And everyone — not only the intelligentsia, but also factory and office workers, elderly people and the younger generation — is well informed about all this. Later, these impressions found reflection in the generalized results of the interviews: practically no one among the Georgians found it difficult to answer a question about outstanding national leaders, and this knowledge, as a rule, showed a wide scope.

The interview programme, conventionally speaking, had no „fan“ as regards historical questions. In fact, there only a question about outstanding figures to which the respondents felt particular attraction and a question about their literary interests. But answers to them frequently assumed the form of lively stories. People shared their deep innermost impressions. The generalized results of the interviews showed that among the foremost figures (artists, scientists, writers, etc.) the Uzbeks and Moldavians mentioned historical leaders five times as often as scientists (the Georgians — even six times) and twice as often as cultural figures. The Russians named historical leaders

three times as frequently as scientists. But it should be borne in mind that the name of V. I. Lenin, which, more often than not, was given by people of different nationalities, was categorized as a classic of Marxism-Leninism. If it were included among the historical leaders, the share of the named historical leaders compared to scientists, writers and other categories would rise still higher. Such deep and broad historical memory cannot have been developed exclusively by basic education and the mass media. It has been formed, as shown by the stories, by the family, relatives and friends.

As a rule, cultural and historical events are realized not just as part people's past. These events create a subjective feeling of connection, of the continuity of traditions. And, on the whole, the realized attitude to historical events and values and the feelings connected with such an attitude are a manifestation of national self-awareness.

History knows many cases in which around the names of historical or cultural figures was created an aura of national heroes, and they became symbols of national movements.

Among the outstanding leaders the Russians, Uzbeks and Moldavians named writers, poets, artists and composers twice as often as scientists. Cultural figures of their nationalities were named by 80 per cent of the interviewed Georgians and Russians and by over a half of the Moldavians and Uzbeks. It can be asserted that cultural figures form a stable part of the peoples' historical memory.

Particular popularity has been gained by outstanding men in literature and art among the peoples whose professional culture has been in intensive formation in the last few decades. They have become a symbol of national pride. Highly indicative examples are furnished by the colossal popularity of the Kirghiz writer Chingiz Aitmatov, who has become one of the favourite prose-writers among all Soviet peoples, of the Avar poet Rasul Gamzatov and of the Moldavian dramatist Ion Drutse. The popularity of national writers is shown by the colossal circulations of their works and of the screen and stage versions of these works. It is a form of recognition of their creative achievements. Characteristically, on the year of the 50th birth anniversary of Aitmatov, according to the results of a study of relevant registry office materials made by S. I. Karakeyeva, many newly born boys in Kirgizia were given his name. That was a clear manifestation of their national sentiments.

In the 1970s and the 1980s there was a symptomatic interest in the history and culture of one's people, which assumed the form of visit to historical and ethnographic museums. According to the data of an international survey conducted by the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences (Vienna Centre) under UNESCO, in which the author took part, in Estonia the Museum of History and Archaeology was visited once a year and more frequently by 54 per cent of the interviewed Estonians, the Museum of Folk Art and Ethnography by 43 per cent and historical monuments by 72 per cent. The interest in historical monuments and museums is particularly great among the more educated population groups. The same survey has established that in over a half of the families the parents usually encourage their children to read historical books and to watch historical films. Most probably, it is a manifestation not only of a desire to convey to their children general cultural knowledge, but also to instil in them a national self-awareness.

The stable maintenance among the people of the interest in their history is also shown by the fact that during the interviews with the Moldavians 70 per cent of the

respondents said they wanted to have the number of radio and television programmes devoted to the history of their people increased.

Historical memory includes not only events of long-gone days, but also those of more recent times and to a certain extent even current events. This is why we speak of current history. The interest in the present-day life of one's people is inherent in all peoples, but it stood out with particular clarity among the national groups which live among other ethnoses. According to data generalized by V. K. Malkova of the Institute of Ethnography, in 1975 every 100 Azerbaijanians who lived in Georgia subscribed to 270 copies of newspapers published in Azerbaijan, every 100 Armenians to 112.4 copies of newspapers published in Armenia and every 100 Byelorussians to 164.2 copies of newspapers published in Byelorussia. Every 100 Uzbeks who lived in Tajikistan subscribed to 84.4 copies of newspapers published in Uzbekistan. Such an interest in the life of one's nation apparently points to the realization by people of their connection with their nation, to the feeling that they have a share in its achievements.

Apparently, the „cultural arsenal“ included in historical memory, just as events of the historical past and of the „historical present“, forms just as important a part of the „we-image“ as the conception about some typical features of the people — what is referred to as the national self-stereotype. It is, as it were, the potential reserve of national self-awareness. It may start working, actuating and directing human actions, or it may remain in abeyance — depending on the situation. In the modern conditions, when the basis of national self-awareness or, in more concrete terms, traditional culture, especially among the European peoples, has been narrowing, the role of historical memory has been increasing. Furthermore, national self-awareness not infrequently stirs memories of the past, which are far from always adequate to the original variants.

The major potential of national self-awareness enables the state, for purpose of social progress, to choose from it what it finds particularly effective in a concrete situation. For instance, in the conditions of the current restructuring Soviet public opinion strove to intensify the Russians' orientation to labour by recalling the labour traditions of the old industrial centres. Patriotic sentiments mounted following an appeal to preserve cultural relics. At the same time, efforts were made to fuse ideologically institutionalized national self-awareness with Soviet patriotism, common to all peoples of the USSR.²

Attempts to hyperbolize the self-awareness of Russians for isolationist purposes by the leaders of the informal organization Pamyat (Memory) have incurred public denunciation³. In contrast, the appeal of Russian writers, for instance, Valentin Rasputin, to „revive“ the lofty moral principles of the Russians, to bring about an upsurge of national sentiments in the name of the improvement of our life has found support among various strata of society. Georgia's public figures have tried to make the realized national cohesion of the Georgians help to combat negative phenomena such as corruption and moral deformations. The Soviet Central Asian peoples prize the

2. *Kommunist* (The Communist). 1987, No 13, p. 9.

3. See the newspapers *Komsomolskaya pravda*, May 22, June 27, 1987; *Sovetskaya kultura*, June 18, 1987; *Vechernyaya Moskva*. September 7, 1987; the magazine *Ogonyok* May 21, 1987, etc.

respect of others. Efforts were made to use this distinction as a mechanism of increasing people's sense of responsibility and to raise the labour productivity.

The national self-awareness, formed and grown, constitutes, as it were, part of the spiritual arsenal of the modern peoples. It may remain in abeyance, potential. But, given certain social conditions, it may assume active forms. The positive or negative meaning of such activity depends above all on the aims of human actions. When national interests are concentrated on self-centred aims actualized national self-awareness may set peoples apart, lead to manifestations of localism and seclusion, and complicate the relations between nations. Active national self-awareness, the realization of historical responsibility to one's people and pride for it against the background of people's direct social concern for the success of their activity strengthens their labour and social enthusiasm and may further the progress of the nation and society as a whole.

The use of the spiritual potential of every nation accumulated by its national self-awareness and the actuation of this potential for the benefit of progress is a complex but exceedingly important task facing society.

S. I. VAINSHTEIN

USSR Academy of Science

HISTORICAL ETHNOGRAPHY IN THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET ETHNOGRAPHIC SCIENCE

The relationship between ethnography (ethnology) and history is one of the major problems facing ethnographic science and attracting serious attention of scholars in the USSR and abroad. One of the manifestations of this interest was a representative symposium „Historical Ethnology Today“, held in Vienna in 1982 and participated in, among others, by Soviet ethnographers¹.

Soviet ethnography was long dominated by the view that its entire subject matter made it a historical science². Therefore historical ethnography was not identified as a special area in it. However, the ethnographic study of our time, which not infrequently had purely applied tasks and which has been gradually gaining in intensity, especially since the late 1940's, has led to a certain specialization of historical and ethnographic research and to the more and more frequent use of the concept of „historical ethnography“. Its content being fairly uncertain, it was interpreted in different ways. This question has exhibited particular acuteness in recent times. This has been due to the efforts to prepare for publication the first marxist conceptual terminological glossary – a joint effort of the academies of sciences of the USSR and the GDR – under the general editorship of Yu. Bromley (USSR) and H. Strobach (GDR)³.

For instance, in his work of 1961 S. P. Tolstov said that historical ethnography was the entire area of ethnographers' historical research ranging from the prehistoric era to our time⁴. In his university textbook „Ksnovy etnografii“ (Fundamentals of

1. *Historische Ethnologie heute (Historical Ethnology Today)*. Hrsg. K. Wernhart. Horn-Wien, 1985.

2. S. P. Tolstov. *Sovetskaya shkola v etnografii (soviet School in Ethnography)*. – *Sovetskaya etnografiya (Soviet Ethnography)*. 1947, No. 2, pp. 14–15.

3. A ten-volume *Svod etnograficheskikh ponyatiy i terminov (Glossary of Ethnographic Concepts and Terms)* is in preparation.

4. S. P. Tolstov. *Nekotorye problemy vseмирной istorii v svete dannykh sivremennoy istoricheskoy etnografii (Certain Problems of Word History in the Light of the Data of Modern Historical Ethnography)*. – *Voprosy istorii (Problems of History)*. 1961, No 11.

Ethnography), published in 1968, S. A. Tokarev defined historical ethnography as a „special area of ethnography“ limited to the study of „ancient and extinct peoples“⁵. But the many publications by Soviet ethnographers which have appeared in the last few decades and which, judging by their titles, are devoted specially to historical ethnography, show that, in the main, they deal not only and not so much with „ancient and extinct“ peoples as with the more or less distant past of the living peoples⁶.

The vagueness of this term apparently induces some ethnographers to renounce its use altogether. For instance, it does not occur in the handbook „Vvedeniye v etnografiyu“ (Introduction to Ethnography), by R. F. Its, although it contains a special section treating of the conceptual apparatus of ethnography⁷: M. A. Chlenov, proposing his scheme of division of ethnographic science, did not include historical ethnography in it either⁸. In one of their recently published articles Yu. V. Bromley and M. V. Kryukov arrived at the correct conclusion that the subject matter of ethnography has research zones which go beyond the bounds of historical science proper and that the most important area of ethnography is historical ethnography, which „includes above all ethnic history“⁹, but the content of this concept as a whole is not disclosed by them.

The study of this question undertaken by the present author in the course of work on the entry „Historical Ethnography“ for the aforementioned Glossary with due account of the orientations of research by Soviet scholars in this field¹⁰ has brought him to the conclusion that historical ethnography covers the entire part of the subject matter of ethnography which is included in historical science. Thus, historical ethnography as a special branch (discipline) of ethnographic science incorporates a number of subdisciplines, which study the ethnogeny, ethnic history and ethnography of the extinct ethnoses, the genesis and history of the traditional forms of every day folk life and culture (in the case of preclass society of all culture in the broad sense of the word), and the formation and evolution of economic-cultural types and historical-ethnographic areas¹¹.

5. S. A. Tokarev. *V vvedeniye (Introduction). — Osnovy etnografii (Fundamentals of Ethnography)*. Ed. by S. A. Tokarev. Moscow, 1968.

6. T. A. Zhdanko. *Ocherki istoricheskoy etnografii karakalpakov. Rodo-plemennaya struktura i rasseleniye v XIX-nachale XXv. (Essays in the Historical Ethnography of the Karakalpak. Clan-Tribal Structure and Settlement in the 19th Century and the Early 20th Century)*. Moscow-Leningrad, 1950; S. I. Vainshtein. *Istoricheskaya etnografiya tuvintsev. Problemy kochevogo khozyaystva (Historical Ethnography of the Tuvinsians. Problems of Nomad Economy)*. Moscow, 1972; Ya. V. Chesnov. *Istoricheskaya etnografiya stran Indokitaya (Historical Ethnography of the Countries of Indochina)*. Moscow, 1973.

7. R. F. Its. *Vvedeniye v etnografiyu (Introduction into Ethnography)*. Leningrad, 1974.

8. M. A. Chlenov. *O vnutrennem chlenenii etnograficheskoy nauki (Concerning the Internal Division of Ethnographic Science). — Aktualnye problemy etnografii (Relevant Problems of Ethnography)*. Moscow, 1973.

9. Yu. V. Bromley, M. V. Kryukov. *Etnografiya: mesto v sisteme nauk, shkoly, metody (Ethnography: Place in the System of Sciences. Schools, Methods)*. — *Sovetskaya etnografiya*. 1987, No. 3, p. 48.

10. S. Arutjunov, Y. Bromley. *Historisch-Ethnografische Forschungen in der UdSSR (Historical Ethnographic Research in the USSR)*. — *Historische Ethnologie heute*, pp. 19–133.

11. See S. I. Vainshtein. *Istoricheskaya etnografiya v strukture etnograficheskoy nauki (Historical Ethnography in the Structure of Ethnographic Science)*. — *Sovetskaya etnografiya*. 1987, No. 4, p. 79.

The foregoing leads to the conclusion that the study of „ancient and extinct peoples“, which S. A. Tokarev thought was the only task of historical ethnography, is only part of the research zone of this area of our science, forming a specific subdiscipline-palaeoethnography. The latter term has already long been adopted in Soviet ethnographic science, although it was not infrequently associated only with archaeological research being carried out by ethnographic institutions, and even when palaeoethnographic problems were not even raised.

The subject matter of historical ethnography also includes historical research zones of such borderline areas of ethnography as ethnic art history, ethnopscychology, ethnolinguistics, ethnodemography, ethnogeography, etc. It may be asked, perhaps historical ethnography should also include the field study of the disappearing forms of folk everyday life and culture, characterised mainly by realia of the 19th and the early 20th centuries, or even survivals of older epochs down to the prehistoric? Strictly speaking, if these relic phenomena of old traditional culture are studied as practised by the population (even if they are kept only in the memory of very old people) they all in one form or another exist in our present-day life („living old times“) displaying the entire complexity of its connections with the past. This does not by far contradict the fact that the purposeful field study of the relic forms of every day life and culture is carried out above all for developing questions of historical ethnography, forming the key component of its source study base.

Present-day Soviet research in the field of historical ethnography shows fairly substantial differences in the degrees of development of its individual subdisciplines. Thus, undeniable successes have been attained in the study of problems of primitive state¹², of the ethnogeny and ethnic history of a number of peoples¹³, of the history of their economy, social organization, and beliefs¹⁴, and in the compilation of historical-ethnographic atlases¹⁵. However, it has to be admitted that in the field of cultural and genetic research, especially in the study of the processes of formation of ethnic cultures and economic-cultural types and in the development of the regularities of these processes and of the procedure of their study has been achieved much less

-
12. M. O. Kosven. *Ocherki istorii pervobytnoy kultury* (Essays in the History of Primitive Culture). Moscow, 1953; Yu. I. Semyonov. *Kak vzniklo chelovechestvo?* (How Did Mankind Come into Existence?). Moscow, 1966; B. A. Frolov. *Chisla v grafike paleolita* (Numbers in the Graphic Art of the Palaeolithic). Novosibirsk, 1974.
 13. R. G. Kuzeyev. *Proiskhozhdeniye bashkirskogo naroda* (The Origin of the Bashkir People). Moscow, 1974; *Ethnogenez narodov Severa* (The Ethnogeny of the Peoples of the North). Moscow, 1980.
 14. M. V. Kryukov. *Sistema rodstva kitaytsev* (Kinship System of the Chinese). Moscow, 1972; *Problemy istorii obshchestvennogo soznaniya aborigenov Sibiri* (Problems of the History of the Social Consciousness of the Aborigines of Siberia). Leningrad, 1981.
 15. *Istoriko-etnograficheskiy atlas Sibiri* (Historical-Ethnographic Atlas of Siberia). Ed. by M. G. Levin and L. P. Potapov. Moscow-Leningrad, 1961; *Russkiye. Istoriko-etnograficheskiy atlas* (The Russians. Historical-Ethnographic Atlas). Ed. by S. P. Tolstov. Moscow, 1967.

than in other areas of historical ethnography¹⁶. But works by scholars abroad, as a rule, give these major and interesting questions of historical ethnography still less attention.

The reasons for the retardation of cultural and genetic studies are sufficiently complex and can hardly have one explanation in all cases. Some of them will be discussed here. One of the reasons which the author classes with the basis goes back to the underestimation and even negation of the possibilities of the cultural and genetic school in ethnography developed at the boundary of the 20th century, especially in Western science. As is known, this school originated in the works of 19th-century evolutionists, who pioneered the historical study of folk culture, of the regularities of its development and of the genesis of its individual components. However, the theory of the evolution of human culture, so clearly reflected in works by Edward Tylor, James Frazer, Lewis Henry Morgan, and its other researchers, with their conception about progress as the basis of development, in the conditions of the reaction of Western philosophers to Marxism at the turn of the century incurred criticism on the part of a number of schools and current in ethnography. F. Boas, the followers of his „historical school“, „diffusionists“, „functionalists“ and exponents of other currents were largely right in criticizing the weaker aspects of one-sided evolutionism. At the same time, Boas evolved a number of very important methodological questions of the study of the genesis of folk culture and of the perfection of the field research procedure. Boas said that if history were to be understood, it was not enough to know what things were like, it was necessary to know how they had come to be so.¹⁷ But, Boas's contrasting to the regularities of the historical process of the relativist conception of the plurality of unique ethnic cultures and of their multilinear development, his virtual renunciation of the comparative method and his underestimation of ethnographic facts for the reconstruction of culturogenesis eventually precluded him and his pupils from creating any integral picture of the genesis of the cultures of the peoples of the world, for which he on many occasions appealed for sincerely aspired. This paradox of Boas's creative endeavour has been aptly summed up by Claude Levy-Strauss: „... to those who reproach him of having failed to re-create the history of a certain aspect of civilization, to which he nevertheless devoted the greater part of his life, he gave the following heroic answer: regrettably, we don't have a single fact which would shed light on development in these fields“.¹⁸ But then, alas, it has to be admitted that not Boas alone thought so. This idea is shared by many living Western ethnographers (and not by them alone!) carried away by structuralism, system-typological and other new

-
16. A number of valuable and interesting investigation have been carried out in this field, too, but they are concerned mainly not with the genesis of ethnic cultures, but with the origin and evolution of individual common forms of culture-agriculture, cattle-breeding, deer-raising, family and marriage. See B. V. Andrianov. *Drevniye orositelny sistemy Priaralya* (Ancient Irrigation Systems of the Aral Area). Moscow, 1969; S. A. Semyonov. *Proiskhozhdeniye zemledeliya* (The Origin of Agriculture). Leningrad, 1974; V. A. Shnirelman. *Proiskhozhdeniye skotovodstva: kulturno-istoricheskaya problema* (The Origin of Pastoralism: A Cultural-Historical Problem). Moscow, 1980; Yu. I. Semyonov. *Proiskhozhdeniye braka i semyi* (The Origin of the Family and Marriage). Moscow, 1974; G. M. Vasilevich, M. G. Levin. *Tipy olenovodstva i ikh proiskhozhdeniye* (Types of Deer-Breeding and Their Origin). — *Sovetskaya etnografiya*. 1951, No. 1.
17. F. Boas. *The Methods of Ethnology*. — *American Anthropologist*. 1920, Vol. 22, No. 4.
18. C. Levy-Strauss. *Anthropologie structurale* (Structural Anthropology). Paris, 1958.

currents in ethnography. At the same time, modern Western ethnology exhibits an increasingly mounting interest in problems of historical ethnology, considered above all within the framework of such currents as ethnohistory and cultural history. The noticeable increase of interest in these problems found expression in the course of the aforementioned special international symposium „Historical Ethnology Today“, „Ethnohistory and Cultural History in Vienna“, by K. Wernhart; „Toward the Clarification of the Concept of „Historical Anthropology“,“ by G. Weiss; „The present Situation in Historical Ethnology in the FRG“, by U. Braukämper, „Does Historical Ethnology Exist in France?“, by B. Rupp-Eisenreich; „The Future of the Past in British Social Anthropology“, by I. Lewis; „The Present Situation in Historical Ethnology in the USA“, by J. Vansina, and other papers contained a serious analysis of the state of historical ethnology in modern Western science, of its achievements and serious problems.¹⁹

In contrast to Western ethnology, the majority of the exponents of the Soviet ethnographic school, who relied in their studies on Marxist methodology, constantly gave considerable attention to the historical method of folk culture forms they studied. Well-known Soviet scholars — S. P. Tolstov, A. P. Okladnikov, S. V. Ivanov, M. G. Levin, L. P. Potapov, B. A. Rebakov, M. V. Kryukov, to mention but seven — have made a notable contribution to the study of the history of the formation of the ethnic cultures of the peoples of the world. But, as said earlier, in the last few decades the interest in such research among Soviet ethnographers has considerably declined, although several valuable investigations have been carried out in this field and, what is particularly gratifying, some of them have been conducted by scholars of non-Russian soviet republics. Among the latter a special reference should be made to the original and very interesting work by V. M. Batchayev devoted to the basic problems of the genesis of the ethnic culture of the Balkars and the Karachai.²⁰

The methods of study of ethnoculturogenesis practised by Soviet researchers reject the weaker aspect of evolutionism — the idea of the one-sidedness of the cultural and historical process, of its exclusive development from the simple to the complex. Development may also assume many-sided forms, be considerably influenced by diffusions, proceed not only from the simple to the complex, but also in the opposite direction, and, more frequently, show a combination of the two, externally similar phenomena may not only have a common element, but also different origins and perform different functions, etc.²¹

19. K. Wernhart. Ethnohistorie und Kulturgeschichte in Wien; G. Weiss. Zur Kärung des Begriffes „Historische Anthropologie“; U. Braukämper. Gegenwärtige Situation der „Historische Anthropologie“; B. Rupp-Eisenreich. Gibt es eine historische Ethnologie in Frankreich?; I. Lewis. Die Zukunft der Vergangenheit in der Britischen Sozialanthropologie; J. Vansina. Gegenwärtige Situation der Historischen Anthropologie in USA. — Historische Ethnologie heute. Horn-Wien, 1985.

20. B. M. Batchayev, Iz istorii traditsionnoy kultury balkartsev i karachayevtsev (From the History of the Traditional Culture of the Balkars and the Karachai). Nalchik, 1986.

21. It will also be noted that the „classical“ evolutionists practically never turned even to the key problems of the genesis of ethnic culture, but studied predominantly primitive culture and its survivals among modern peoples and the origin of the family and religions.

Soviet historical ethnography has registered substantial achievements in the development and use of the comparative historical method, which plays a fundamental role in the study of the genesis of ethnic cultures and their individual components, including in the reconstruction of their archetypes, i.e., the oldest, original forms, and their subsequent evolution. This method is based on the conception of the historical development of all forms of folk culture — the conception which obeys a number of general regularities. This development proceeds unevenly both due to internal (endogenous) processes, determined above all by socio-economic factors, and to diffusion — the cultural influence of other ethnoses. Some innovations which have penetrated from the outside shortly become extinct, others form an organic part of culture participating in its further genesis (the basic factors are functional requirements, ecology and stereotypes of traditions). Innovations of endogenous and exogenous (diffusive) origin, which have entered culture in certain historical epochs and participating in its further genesis, form historical and genetic strata. They can be identified only by a comparative historical analysis and have both relative and absolute chronology. The use of the comparative historical method also presupposes comparative typological analysis both at the synchronic and at the diachronic (historical typology) levels.²²

The study of the genesis and evolution of ethnic cultures is impossible not only without the identification of their historical genetic strata and without the consideration of ecological factors in this process, but also without the study of the role of economic-cultural types as a whole.

The procedure of such research, employed in a number of the author's works²³, will be left out here. It will only be indicated that the procedure of cultural and genetic research requires further perfection, in particular, an improvement of the methods of relative and absolute chronologization of the historical-genetic strata of traditional everyday life culture and of the methods of integral use of archaeological,

22. Concerning the use of the comparative historical method see A. I. Pershits. *Problema sravnitel'no-istoricheskogo sinteza* (Problem of Comparative Historical Synthesis). — *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1980, No. 4; etc.

23. See S. I. Vainshtein. *Problema proiskhozhdeniya olenovodstva v Yevrazii* (The Problem of the Origin of Deer-Breeding in Eurasia). — *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1970, No. 6; 1971, No. 5; S. I. Vainshtein. *Problema genezisa tuvinskoy narodnoy kultury* (Problem of the Genesis of Tuvian Folk Culture). — *Problemy altaistiki i mongolovedeniya* (Problems of Altaic and Mongolic Studies). Elista, 1972; S. I. Vainshtein. *Problema proiskhozhdeniya i formirovaniya khozyaystvenno-kulturnogo tipa kochevykh skotovodov umerennogo poysa Yevrazii* (The Problem of the Origin and Formation of the Economic-Cultural Type of the Nomad Cattle-Breeders of the Temperate Zone of Eurasia). — *Doklad na IX Mexhdunarodnom kongresse antropologicheskikh i etnograficheskikh nauk* (Paper Presented at the 9th International Congress of the Anthropological and Ethnographic Sciences. Chicago). Moscow, 1973; S. I. Vainshtein. *Istoriya narodnogo iskusstva Tuvy* (History of the Folk Art of Tuva). Moscow, 1974; S. I. Vainshtein (in co-authorship with M. V. Kryukov). *Sedlo i stremya* (Saddle and Stirrup). — *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1984, No. 6; S. I. Vainshtein. *O nekotorykh zakonomernostyakh genezisa etnicheskikh kultur* (Concerning Certain Regularities of the Genesis of Ethnic Cultures). — *Genezis i evolyutsiya etnicheskikh kultur v Sibiri* (Genesis and Evolution of Ethnic Cultures in Siberia), Novosibirsk, 1987; S. I. Vainshtein (in co-authorship with V. A. Korenyako). *O genezise iskusstva kochevnikov: avary* (Concerning the Genesis of the Art of Nomads: the Avars). — *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1986, No. 1.

written, linguistic, anthropological and other sources, alongside ethnic cultures in particular, the role in these processes of the interaction between subethnic and superethnic components of culture, formed in the conditions of different economic-cultural types, have not been sufficiently researched. Broadening the source study base of cultural and genetic research necessitates new methods of collecting field materials in the present conditions²⁴.

24. See S. I. Vainshtein. Kulturno-geneticheskoye napravleniye v etnografii i polevyie issledovaniya (Cultural and Genetic Current in Ethnography and Fields Studies). — Vsesoyuznaya sessiya po itogam polevykh etnograficheskikh i antropologicheskikh issledovaniy v 1984—1985 g. Tezisy dokladov (All-Union Session Devoted to the Results of Ethnographic and Anthropological Field Studies Carried Out in 1984—1985. Abstracts of Papers). Ioshkar-Ola, 1986.

M. N. GUBOGLO

USSR Academy of Science

BILINGUALISM IN ALIEN ETHNIC ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS OF STUDY

(Ethnic Surveys in the USSR)

In analysing the ethnic composition of a country, territory, republic, region, district or any other administrative unit, researchers are often faced with a problem of terminology and definition, that is how to identify diverse groups of people occupying the same territory in keeping with the standard scientific hierarchy of ethnic communities. The most popular terms in this case are national minorities, national, ethnic, local, ethnic-area, ethnically dispersed, ethnographic, minor groups. These definitions are bound to identify a section of the population which, on the one hand, represents a subethnic category, i. e., fragments of the national nucleus (nations or peoples), and on the other, specifies a group of the population outside the framework of the basic nationality living in a given administrative unit. However, alongside of the above distinct groups with a set of common traits, there are individual representatives of other nationalities in some republics which have not been associated with any specific group. In this sense, even in few monoethnic states or in some Soviet republics with approximately monoethnic parameters, there is always a certain amount of people of other nationality.

Therefore, on a larger scale it appears feasible to identify population sections either living in native or alien ethnic environment.

The goal of this study is to outline some features of the linguistic environment against the background of alien ethnoses, formulate questions and prospects of study on the example of Soviet republics.

This task is quite rational since, according to the 1979 census, about 50 million people, or almost one-fifth of the entire population (including 33.6 per cent of Armenians, 22.8 per cent of Tajiks, 19.3 per cent of Kazakhs and 17.4 per cent of Russians¹) lived outside the boundaries of their national formations.

Living in alien ethnic environment demands a knowledge of the second language. More often than not the language of the specific environment, or the one adopted as a means of nationwide communication, serve this purpose. There is widespread evidence

1. S. I. Brook. *Naseleniye mira. Etnodemograficheskiy spravochnik* (Population of the World. Ethno-Demographic Reference Book). Moscow, 1986, 2nd ed., p. 148.

that in alien linguistic environment, the second language is used more extensively than at home, in a native ethnic environment. Among Soviet nationalities bilingual peoples living in the confines of their republics and autonomous regions accounted for 16.9 per cent and those outside for 37.6 per cent, that is 2.2 times as much. For the non-Russian population the figures are 37.8 per cent and 57.4 per cent.

In the USSR the presence of alien ethnic medium is not regarded as an exception for many nationalities, Russians included.

All the Russians living in Soviet national republics (23.9 million according to the 1979 census), as well as the Russians of the Russian Federation constitute a section of the Russian ethnos. However, the Russians living in the republics have specific traits that appeared owing to joint living and long contacts with indigenous peoples. In 1970-1979, the share of Russians with a good command of a second language (bilingual Russians) grew from 3.2 per cent to 3.7 per cent in the Soviet Union, while in the union republics (except for the Russian Federation) the figures are 15.4 per cent and 18.1 per cent.

With the overall growth by 6.5 per cent of the Russian population in the USSR in the same period, the number of bilingual Russians increased by 24.1 per cent. The figures for the union republics are 12.2 per cent and 32.7 per cent.² As the number of second language speakers grew faster than the overall number of the Russians it is clear that there was an urgent need for the Russian-national bilingualism. Ethnoso-sociological surveys of speech habits in alien ethnic environment showed that, first, not in all cases a conscious approach towards learning the second language could be identified, second, few localities could boast of a well-organized system of education, and third, it was not easy for the non-Russians and the non-indigenous people to choose a second language.

The first impression of ethno-linguistic processes in alien ethnic medium is justified and trivial all the same. Indeed, hardly anyone dares to question the theory about the greater scope of knowledge of the second language in alien ethnic environment as compared to native environment. Yet the USSR's linguistic map is so multi-coloured that at closer scrutiny one is able to identify a series of exceptions from general rules governing the formation of bilingualism in foreign ethnic environment. For example, in a number of cases, the knowledge of a second language or quite conscious switch over to it is weaker in alien ethnic environment than in the native one. Calculations showed that each of the indigenous people living in the Volga basin (Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash, Udmurt, Mordovian and Mary autonomous republics) preserve their native language „at home“ more than outside its boundaries. This regularity, judging by the census, is relatively standardized both in the cities and in the countryside.

The only exception in the general linguistic situation is constituted by the Udmurts. In the Udmurt Autonomous Republic, the share of the Udmurts who consider Russian to be their native tongue totals 22.7 per cent, and in the cities of the Tatar and Bashkir autonomous republics these figures are 17.1 per cent and 18.5 per cent.³

2. Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 g. IV tom. Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniya SSSR (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census. National Composition of Soviet Population). Moscow, 1973, vol. 4.

3. For more detail see: Guboglo, „The Leninist Nationalities Policy and Problems of the Language of Inter-Ethnic Communication“. In: *Torzhestvo leninskoy natsionalnoy politiki*. Cheboksary, 1972, pp. 359-380.

Thus, we see the universality of reverse-proportional ratio between the share of nationals in alien ethnic environment and the latter's desire to learn a second language. This exception (or a deviation) needs a thorough study.

The 1960's and 1970's showed that 14 national groups of Russians in Soviet republics increasingly need to learn the language of indigenous nationality of a respective republic. In some cases, the problem of encouraging the non-Russians in Soviet republics to learn Russian becomes urgent. In education, for example, they have to choose, on the one hand, between the local basic language and Russian, and, on the other, the problem is how to put their native language on the curriculum. As a result, a section of non-Russian national groups develop, along with national Russian speech habits, the so-called national bilingualism, or a combination of their own national language and the language of the republic's indigenous population. Three-lingual groups can be added to that category. Such a linguistic plurality does not only bring positive results. This is particularly true of cases when a child who enters a school speaks better the language of his own national group. At school he attends classes in the indigenous language, and in addition, some in Russian so that he could go over to Russian in senior grades. In addition to three above languages (native, Indigenous and Russian) children from the 5th grade began to take a foreign language which causes overstrain and narrows their chances to do well in other subjects. As a result, children living in alien ethnic environment leave school with inadequate knowledge for entering secondary specialized or higher learning establishments. Therefore, linguistic plurality aggravates competition on the threshold of higher education and creates artificial barriers on the way of natural socio-professional structure. This also has an adverse effect on the policy of improving educational standards and professional mobility and on the atmosphere of inter-ethnic relations in general.

There are cases in the USSR, when some nationalities changed their national groups by force of historical circumstances: there are the Ukrainians in Moldavia and vice versa. Mutual exchanges between national groups are common among peoples of the Volga area, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Task studies revealed that on mixed ethnic territories, the language pattern of a national group, including its speech habits, depends not only on the distribution character and many situational factors, but also on the nature of communication ties between the national group and its national nucleus. Ethno-sociological surveys among the Moldavians living in the Ukraine and the Ukrainians living in Moldavia showed that in some Moldavian villages in the Ukraine bilingual Moldavians speak Moldavian more willingly than their counterparts living in Moldavia. In addition, the ethnicity of the Moldavians in the Ukraine was more emphatic than that of the Ukrainians in Moldavia. A comparative analysis of information flows between indigenous people and national groups that branched off (in terms of territory), i.e., between the Moldavians in Moldavia and the Ukraine and the Ukraine and between the Ukrainians of the Ukraine and Moldavia made it possible to draw a number of conclusions. It seems that the Moldavian nation retains the ethnicity and originality of Moldavian culture in the villages of Ukraine's border areas. Following this strategy, the ministries and departments of Moldavia elaborate plans to supply the Ukrainian Moldavians with textbooks, education guides, Moldavian fiction literature, periodicals and special-purpose radio and TV programs. Thus, target-oriented arrangement of information about the Moldavian culture in Moldavia impedes assimilation of national groups within alien environment.

Spontaneous factors are also at work in these processes along with special „care“, that is a well-organized policy of preserving ethnicity in alien ethnic environment.

Analyses of ethnic and linguistic conditions of the Koreans living in Uzbekistan showed that in small Korean communities people tend to communicate with more often in their native language. This is where spontaneous rather than well-organized factors come into play related as they are to linguistic and ethnic nostalgia.

As was noted, life in the alien ethnic environment affects correlation between linguistic components of bilingualism proper: language competence, speech habits and linguistic requirements.

While in some cases language competence exceeds speech habits, in many cases there is a drastic shortage of language competence. For example, clusters of Moldavians were identified in some Moldavian villages which, despite their good command of Russian, speak it only occasionally. In contrast, a group of Russians with poor command of Moldavian had to communicate with rather often in Moldavian, especially as regards northern areas of Moldavia with a dense indigenous population.

To sum up, well-coordinated results of statistical calculations and ethno-sociological research give us more confidence in the correctness of our estimations and more incentives to search for new ways, problems and tasks facing studies of diverse ethno-linguistic processes, alien ethnic environment included.

Speaking about control over contemporary national relationship and development and intercourse between languages of Soviet peoples, we put special emphasis on the fact that in a number of republics direct inter-ethnic contacts between nationalities speaking different languages come only second and third (after school) in terms of influence on language competence and speech habits. The factor of geographic location is also important, although it was long underestimated in relevant works.

In addition to traditional inversely-proportional dependence between the share of the national group in a specific foreign environment and the scope of its involvement in the sphere of the second language (either Russian or any indigenous) attention should be focused on the study of mutual links between other factors: historical, socio-cultural, psychological.

In a vast realm of ethno-sociological research, the study of basic types and directions of bilingualism in alien ethnic environment is very urgent. The motives behind this are a dynamic picture of republics' ethnic composition characterized by growing monoethnicity in some areas and mounting polyethnicity in others. In this context the tasks set before researchers are strongly affected by contradictory dynamics of ethnic composition, for example, shrinking polyethnicity in some republics coupled with an increase in the overall number of nationalities alien to the indigenous environment.

Comparing factors that are at work in ethno-linguistic processes in two ethnic media, we will be able to work out a differentiated approach towards language policies in various regions of the country, different situations and among diverse national groups.

There is a need for certain recommendations to provide incentives for choosing between the first and the second language.

In larger terms, representatives of 14 indigenous nationalities face the urgent task of taking up the second language, i. e., improving their Russian or learning it from scratch.

The nationalities of autonomous republics, regions and districts, as well as nationalities without their own territorial administrative formations and national groups living in alien ethnic environment are also confronted with the problem of preserving their native language. In this context what really counts is the qualitative aspect or the problem of good command and use of the literary language of their own nationality.

We need to undertake special-purpose research to take into account the regularities accompanying deviations in modern ethnolinguistic processes. We must bring under the spotlight a wide range of heterogeneous typological situations and sources.

O. B. NAUMOVA

USSR Academy of Science

CONTEMPORARY ETHNIC PROCESS IN KAZAKHSTAN

Today, Kazakhstan is one of the most multinational republics in the Soviet Union, with several scores of peoples which have different languages, culture and history.¹ The motley ethnic make up of Kazakhstan took several centuries to become such. Beginning from the 15th century the Tatars began to make encroachments on Kazakhstan; in the 16th–19th centuries its northern and northeastern regions were settled by the Russians (peasants and Cossacks), southern regions by the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Dungans and Uighurs. However, until the end of the 19th century, the penetration of alien ethnic elements had practically not disturbed the dominating position of the Kazakhs in the entire territory of Kazakhstan.² From the second half of the 19th century, peasants began to colonize Kazakhstan. Colonization became especially intensive at the turn of the century. Among the settlers there were Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and ethnic German peasants. The flow of settlers was so intensive that the 1926 census showed reduction of the share of the Kazak to 57 per cent, with Europeans accounting for 34 per cent of the total population. The next wave of migration to Kazakhstan was involved by the Second World War. At that time groups of ethnic Germans from various regions of the Soviet Union were moved to Kazakhstan. Many peoples came to Kazakhstan in the 1950's during a drive for the

1. This paper is written on the basis of field data gathered by this author in 1980–87, and the data provided by the Kazakhstan Group of Central Asian Expedition of the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1986, 1987), headed by S. V. Cheshko. The data of the 1979 Census are taken from, *Chislennost i sostav naseleniya SSSR po dannym Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda* (Number and Makeup of the Population of the USSR. Data of 1979 National Census. Moscow, 1985). Data on mixed marriages at 1979 only pertain to families with one spousal pair (families of this type constitute 85 per cent of families in Kazakhstan).

2. N. Ye. Bekmakhanova. *Formirovaniye mnogonatsionalnogo naseleniya Kazakhstana i Severnoy Kirgizii* (Formation of the Multinational Population in Kazakhstan and Northern Kirgizia), Moscow, 1980; Bekmakhanova. *Mnogonatsionalnoye naseleniye Kazakhstana i Kirgizii v epokhu kapitalizma* (Multinational Population in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia in the Epoch of Capitalism). Moscow, 1986.

development of Virgin Lands. As a result, in 1959 the Kazakhs constituted only 30 per cent of the republic's population, and Eastern Slavic peoples 52 per cent.

In recent time, there was no substantial migrations to Kazakhstan and ethnic composition of the republic stabilized. According to the 1979 census, Kazakhstan accounts for 5.29 million Kazakhs (81 per cent of the Kazakhs living in the USSR), 5.99 million Russians, 900 thousand ethnic Germans, 898 thousand Ukrainians, 313 thousand Tatars, 263 thousand Uzbeks, 181 thousand Byelorussians as well as the Uighurs, Koreans, Azerbaijanians, Dungans and other peoples each constituting less than 1 per cent of the local population. The contemporary ethnic structure of Kazakhstan is as follows: through natural growth the share of the Kazakhs increased to reach 36 per cent, Eastern Slavic peoples account for 48 per cent, the Germans 6 per cent, and small groups of Asian peoples such as the Uzbeks, Uighurs, Dungans, Azerbaijanians and Tatars make up 6 per cent. The remainder 4 per cent are the Koreans and other small groups which were not specified in the census; they are the Tajiks, Kirghiz, Kurds, and other from the Asian section of the country, and non-Slavic European peoples such as Moldavians, Baltic and Volga area peoples.

All these peoples are distributed very unevenly in the republic. This fact makes an imprint on the ethnic processes occurring in various regions of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, one can distinguish three conventional regions with specific ethnic distinctions: (1) the central, northern and north-eastern regions dominated by the Europeans (Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Byelorussians). This is especially evident in Karaganda Region (14 per cent of Kazakhs, 76 per cent of Europeans, 3 per cent of Asian peoples); (2) southern regions with a remarkable share of small ethnic groups of the Asian origin. The most indicative case is the Chimkent Region (51 per cent of Kazakhs, 25 per cent of Europeans, 19 per cent of Asian peoples); (3) western regions dominated by the Kazakhs (in the Kzyl-Orda Region there are 76 per cent of Kazakhs, 17 per cent of Europeans, 1 per cent of Asian peoples). In addition to national distinctions, these regions differ in the level of urbanization, which has a direct influence on the character and intensity of ethnic processes. In the above regions, the share of urban population in 1979 was as follows: 85 per cent in the Karaganda Region 62 per cent in Kzyl-Orda Region and 40 per cent in Chimkent Region.

Contemporary ethnic processes in Kazakhstan are determined by two main, and to a certain extent contradictory, tendencies: (1) the urge to develop national cultures, ethnic consolidation and (2) social and cultural merger of various peoples. This is explained by the socio-economic and political basis which is common to all peoples in Kazakhstan. Former socio-economic differences, cultural and historical traditions, number of the population make very diverse the forms of these processes and determine the superiority of certain trends in ethnic development.

The Kazakhs are the indigeneous people of Kazakhstan, who were mostly nomads in the past. Most of them continue to live in the countryside (69 per cent). National consolidation of the Kazakhs was completed in Soviet time. During this process the national Kazakh culture emerged and continues to develop.

In the sphere of every-day culture, the Kazakhs are now losing traditional elements and are acquiring unified, international forms. This objective process, which is occurring the world over, was caused by profound socio-economic transformations of the Kazakh society over the past century. In postwar years, the process strongly intensified owing to a large influx of multinational European population. Disappearan-

ce of various elements of traditional Kazakh culture takes place all over the republic and is especially intensive in the areas with predominant European population. Today, housing and clothes of the Kazakhs in the northern and central areas virtually lack national distinctions. More traditions are retained in food, but national cuisine has also borrowed much from European food. Rituals become simpler, and behavioural norms are changing. In southern and western Kazakhstan, in some of purely Kazakh regions, ethnic specifics of the Kazakh culture are still strong, including folk crafts, which are forgotten in the north, and a very viable material culture. In their every-day life, the Kazakhs observe many traditional customs and rituals.

Linguistic processes in the Kazakh society, specifically the development of the Kazakh-Russian biligualism, also have different rates in the north, west and south of the republic. While in Karaganda Region 67 per cent of the Kazakhs have a good command of Russian, only 37 per cent speak Russian in Kzyl-Orda and 35 per cent in Chimkent Region. In the north, the Kazakh children, the young and the elderly people speak Russian not only in communication with other nationalities but often among themselves. Russian is often spoken in the family. In the south Russian is only used for international communication; pre-school children and elders usually do not speak Russian.

Despite intensive ethnic contacts and the involvement of the Kazakhs in integrational and inter-ethnic processes, there is no noticeable erosion of the Kazakh ethnos. There is virtually no linguistic assimilation of the Kazakhs: 99 per cent of them consider the Kazakh to be their native tongue; the figure is slightly less in the regions with a considerable share of the Russians (95 per cent in Karaganda Region). The number of mixed marriages is also insignificant, constituting only 8 per cent. However, mixed marriages usually do not lead to ethnic assimilation, because according to historico-cultural tradition only the Kazakh men make mixed marriages and their children take as a rule the nationality of their father. We estimate that in 75 per cent of cases the children born into mixed families claim to be the Kazakhs. As a result, in the interval between several recent censuses the number of the Kazakhs grew by 25 per cent.

Ethnoconsolidating processes remain to be the main ones of the Kazakh ethnos today. There are dialect distinctions between the Kazakhs of the north-eastern, southern and western areas. But this is not a hindrance for their communications. The development of the Kazakh literary language, the Kazakh literature, professional art, and the mass media have become a powerful catalyst for the ethnic consolidation of the Kazakhs. Cultural distinctions are eroding between three formerly, isolated regions – the Kazakh zhuzes and tribes. The process involves the merger of traditional local elements of Kazakh culture and evolution of forms common for various groups of the Kazakhs, mainly through introduction of urban international culture. Today, one would fail to distinguish, for example, women from various tribes by headgear, because traditional *kimishek* (differently cut in each group) is worn no more, either in the north or in the south.

Ethnoconsolidating processes among the Kazakhs have led to some changes in their ethnic consciousness. Some subethnic survivals and distinctions caused by different rates of introduction in the life of subethnic groups of standard forms of culture are regarded by the Kazakhs as local peculiarities of a single Kazakh ethnos. Affiliation

to a specific tribe or Zhuz exists at the lowest levels of the Kazakh ethnic consciousness. The Kazakh national self-identity has become prevalent. The growth of national self-identity, involved by the development of Kazakh culture, internal consolidation of the Kazakhs, and to a certain extent, by fast erosion of ethnic features of traditional every-day culture, has evoked strong interest of the Kazakhs in their history, including ethnogenesis, clan and tribal division and to zhuzes as components from which the Kazakh ethnos evolved. If previously Kazakhs could recapture their historic roots from traditions and legends retained by the older generation in the villages, today the main source of such information is scientific historical and ethnographic literature and fiction, television and cinema which substitute local information links.

Ethnoconsolidating processes are also characteristic of the Russians who are the most numerous European people in Kazakhstan. There is virtually no cultural difference now between the old Russian settlers and the newcomers. Russian ethnographic groups that took shape in the 18th–19th centuries in Kazakhstan³ – „stone workers“ (Bukhtarma), „Poles“, Uralian, Siberian and Semirechye Cossacks – have lost many of their cultural distinctions. Despite the fact that ethnic consciousness of subethnic groups still survives and that Russian old settlers are often opposed to newcomers, our observations show that in some regions there emerge the element of self-consciousness of the „Russians of Kazakhstan“.

In the alien ethnic environment, other Slavic peoples merge with the Russians, as well as other minor groups of European peoples. The process is characteristic of other regions of the USSR.⁴ Every third Russian family in Kazakhstan is a mixed family. Most of the mixed marriages are made between Russians and other Europeans. In most cases children born into such families consider themselves to be Russian.

Ethnic assimilation of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians by the Russians is very intensive in Kazakhstan. Among these peoples the share of mixed marriages is very high (76 per cent for the Ukrainians and 82 per cent for the Byelorussians). In most of such families one of the spouses is Russian. The Ukrainians in Kazakhstan marry Russian 2.4 times more often and Byelorussians 2.9 times more often than people of their own ethnos. Children in such families prefer to be called Russians.

Ethnic assimilation of the Slavic population also occurs in non-matrimonial relations. Linguistic assimilation is suggested by the fact that in 1979 59 per cent of Ukrainians and 62 per cent of Byelorussians claimed the Russian language to be their native tongue. In multinational regions of northern Kazakhstan, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian languages have virtually gone out of use. Very often the Ukrainians and Byelorussians claim themselves to be Russians, though they know about their Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationality.

Non-Slavic Europeans in Kazakhstan are assimilated by the Russians mainly through mixed marriages, the percentage of which is very high (85 per cent for Moldavians, 89 per cent for Lithuanians, 95 per cent for Letts). Most of such mixed marriages are with the Russians.

3 „Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian Population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan“. In: *Narody Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana*. 2. Series „Narody mira“. Moscow, 1963, pp. 662–695.

4 *Sovremennyye etnicheskiye protsessy v SSSR* (Contemporary Ethnic Processes in the USSR). Moscow, 1977, p. 503; Yu. V. Bromley. „Contemporary Ethnosocial Processes within East Slavic Peoples of the USSR“. In: *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, 1985, No. 4, p. 5.

The German population of Kazakhstan has evolved from several ethnographic groups (colonists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, settlers who came from Volga, Ukraine and Caucasus in the 1940s) having certain ethnocultural and linguistic peculiarities, as well as a specific ethnocultural consciousness. In the multinational environment of Kazakhstan and with mixed settlement of different ethnographic groups of the Germans, their cultural distinctions have vanished, and they began to claim themselves to be Soviet Germans. At present, the Germans live throughout Kazakhstan, but the largest communities are in Tselinograd, Kokchetav, Karaganda and Kustanai regions (10 to 13 per cent of the population). Ethnoconsolidating processes under the conditions of dispersed settlement of the Germans have taken place inside individual local groups and possibly lead to the formation of new ethnographic groups of the Germans in Kazakhstan. A more detailed estimate requires further studies.

Dispersion of the Germans explains a high rate of mixed marriages among them (50 per cent of mixed marriages including 70 per cent with the Russians). About two-thirds of children born into German-Russian families claim themselves as Russians, and thus sever the ethnic German line.

Considerable linguistic assimilation of the Germans can be illustrated by the following figures: in 1979, 35 per cent of the Germans claimed Russian as their native tongue, though this does not mean that they lose their ethnic consciousness. In southern regions of the republic with a lesser percentage of the Russians, the above figure is lower than in northern and central regions. Thus, if in Karaganda Region 38 per cent of the Germans claim Russian as their native tongue, in Chimkent Region only 23 per cent do so. In nationally mixed settlements, where the Germans appeared only in the 1940s, the German youth often do not know the German language and Russian becomes a family language. In the old German settlements, their native language is used in the family, at work places and in social life. In such settlements other nationalities also have a certain command of the German language.

All European groups in Kazakhstan have a very high level of internationalization of every-day culture which virtually lacks ethnic specifics and ethnodifferentiating function. The mass media and spread of „mass culture“ standardize many forms of their spiritual culture. These processes affect even such a conservative sphere of culture as religion. In multinational regions of Kazakhstan with the declining role of religion and growing tolerance, Orthodox Slavs and Lutherans Germans often pay no attention to confessional differences. In the absence of Orthodox priests all worship for the Orthodox fold can be performed by a Lutheran pastor. A certain share of believers from among the German Catholics baptize their children at Orthodox churches.

Culture unification processes are facilitated by high urbanization of the European population. According to the 1979 census, 74 per cent of the Russians, 60 per cent of the Ukrainians, and 56 per cent of the Byelorussians in Kazakhstan lived in the cities. While only 45 per cent of the Germans live in the city, urban lifestyles have widely spread in their rural settlements. The same thing is characteristic of other European peoples.

Many direction of ethnic processes occurring within the European groups in Kazakhstan (from assimilation to consolidation) are reflected in the dynamics of their numerical growth. Between the past two censuses the number of the Russians grew by 8 per cent, Germans by 5 per cent, and Ukrainians and Byelorussians went down respectively by 4 and 8 per cent.

Ethnic processes are slightly different within small groups of Asian peoples (the Uzbeks, Uighurs, Azerbaijanians, Tajiks, Dungans) and culturally similar Tatars.

The position of Tatars in this group is quite peculiar. Of all these peoples, Tatars are the most „Westernized“, and by their culture they occupy an intermediate position between the two biggest peoples in Kazakhstan, the Russians and the Kazakhs, and are assimilated by either of them, chiefly through mixed marriages. Already in the 19th century small groups of Chalakazakhs (descendants of Tatar men and Kazakh women) appeared in Kazakhstan. High dispersion, high level of urbanization of the Tatars (73 per cent) explain a high share of mixed marriages among them even today (62 per cent, of which 44 per cent are with a Russians spouse, 27 per cent with a Kazakh spouse). Children born into such families prefer to be called Russians or Kazakhs, rather than Tatars. Linguistic assimilation also affects the Tatars: 22 per cent claim Russian as their mother tongue; 68 per cent have a good command of it. As for ethnocultural specifics, traditional every-day culture has been substantially modified by the Kazakh culture, and even today in the countryside the survivals of Tatar and Kazakh cultures have very much in common.

Other Asian groups in Kazakhstan undergo virtually no assimilation. Their small numbers give a relatively high percentage of mixed marriages (from 23 per cent for the Uzbeks to 44 per cent for the Azerbaijanians), but because of confessional prejudices mixed marriages are concluded by men rather than women and the children from such marriages choose the nationality of their father. Linguistic assimilation is also insignificant. About 91 per cent of Azerbaijanians and 98 per cent of the Tajiks report their native language as a mother tongue. Russian is also spoken by them, but not so often as by the Europeans of Kazakhstan. Usually, Russian is well known by young and middle-aged people. The share of people speaking the Kazakh language is very small and declining. Despite this fact, contacts with the Kazakh population grow, but Russian is increasingly often used for communication.

At present, the entire Asian groups in Kazakhstan are growing closer to the Kazakhs. Their traditional culture retains ethnic features, but also imbibes many elements of the Kazakh culture. The researchers of the Uighurs stress the intensity of this process within this people⁵. Within the Uzbeks in Kazakhstan, this process is much slower because of their strong relations with their main ethnos.⁶ Conservation of traditional cultures within the group is largely explained by a low level of urbanization, a detached rural way of life, which is also characteristic of small cities.

Peoples and national groups live in Kazakhstan in close contact rather than in isolation. The processes of their ethnic development, some of which have been discussed in this paper, modify interethnic relations in the republic, optimize these relations or evoke contradictions between individual nationalities.

5 G. M. Iskhakov, A. M. Reshetov, A. N. Sedlovskaya. „Contemporary Ethnic Processes within Soviet Uighurs“. In: *Etnicheskiye protsessy u natsionalnykh grupp Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana*. Moscow, 1980, pp. 74–93.

6 A. N. Zhilina. *Uzbekek Del-Kazakhstanban (Az etnokulturalis folymatok problemajához)*. A III. Bekescsabai Nemzetközi Neprajzi Nemzetiségkutató konferencia előadásai (1985, október 2–4). I Budapest-Bekescsaba, 1986, pp. 331–345.

Emerging interethnic contradictions can be alleviated or aggravated by the state policy. Specifically, in the past several decades contradictions became more critical. The former leadership of the republic headed by Kunayev created favourable conditions for the Kazakh nation: key posts in the party, state, administrative, legal, scientific and educational institutions were primarily given to the Kazakhs, and the Kazakh youth enjoyed privileges in entering higher educational establishments.

Disregard for the interests of other nationalities in the republic, and cases of the Kazakh nationalism aggravated relations between the Kazakhs and the Russians, the Kazakhs and the Germans, etc. As a result, non-indigenous population moved to new places from some regions of Kazakhstan. Under these conditions, in December 1986 when the former leadership was deposed, people responsible for stagnation in the economy and wishing to retain the status quo and privileges inspired an outburst of nationalistic sentiment, specifically among the student heated by the slogans of „a hurt nation“.

Let us stress that the nationalities policy of the previous leadership impaired not only relations between nations, but affected the internal development of the Kazakh ethnos. Promotion according to kinship, revived clan and tribal relations. Government post were primarily given to people from southern regions, which evoked opposition between south and north. This showed immaturity of consolidation processes among the Kazakhs. However, the ratio between the subjective and objective factors in ethnic development, interaction of ethnic processes and inter-national relations require further in-depth studies.

VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ

Duke University, Durham, USA

THE MANAGEMENT OF OTHERNESS: »ETHNICITY« IN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL

I want to argue in this paper *against* the simple acceptance of ethnicity as „the fact of“ cultural or social differences among sections of the human population, and *for* an understanding of ethnicity as a particular attitude towards cultural or social difference. I shall take ethnicity to be a constructed objectification carrying assumptions about people's rights to Self-determination and about relative degrees of Otherness. I shall argue that it is something that says as much about the mainstream population of a country as it does about its „ethnic group“ members, because it reveals the extent to which Otherness is not just constructed but also actively managed. I shall develop my argument by examining a particular „ethnic“ political development taking place in the United States today, drawing from it an analysis of „ethnicity“ in the U.S., and using those insights to look at Israeli society – thereby, suggesting how this argument might have analytic utility and value in a comparative framework.

In May of this year, when many people were not really looking, the State legislature of Louisiana passed a bill declaring Cajuns an official minority, and adding them to the list of the state's official and legal minority populations, which already included more than a million „Blacks,“ and much smaller numbers of „skimos,“ „American Indians,“ „Hispanics,“ and „Orientals.“ Adding Cajuns to that list meant that at least half the state's population of 4 million would be labelled *minority*. Much could be made of that emergent oxymoron. Yet the press found it a news story not so much because still another section of the population was being singled out as minority and, thereby, made eligible to receive special government funds but, rather, because something about declaring Cajuns a minority sounded wrong, in fact, fabricated.

Consider the terms of discussion. Mary Schmich of the *Chicago Tribune*, writing from the state's capital, reported it in a tone that made it hard to know whether she was reporting the disbelief or actively partaking in it. „When Raymond 'La La' Lalonde,“ she began, „started lobbying for his pet proposal a few weeks ago, a lot of legislators dismissed it as a 'ha-ha' bill. Declare Cajuns an official minority, just like blacks? Ha, ha. Grant Cajuns affirmative actions status, just like blacks? Ha, ha. Allow Cajuns to compete for the 10 percent of state government contracts that are

reserved for minority contractors? Ha, ha, ha" (*The Hartford Courant*, May 29, 1988). How could Cajuns, she went on to explain the "joke" and the reported outrage, "descendants of French colonists expelled from Canada more than 200 years ago — be called a minority . . . when Edwin W. Edwards, the most popular governor in the past 50 years, was a Cajun? When John B. Breau, one of Louisiana's U.S. senators, is a Cajun? When Cajuns run many of the state's southwestern parishes? When blackened redfish, a Cajun dish dear to the yuppie palate, has become so trendy that the state has to restrict the harvesting of redfish? "If all of these things are true — one could hear people saying — don't they indicate that Cajuns are mainstream, rather than socially and politically peripheralized? How then — was the implicit question — could they be a minority population?

Reportedly, many blacks, including at least one vocal state senator, have charged that this is "a very schrewd, diplomatic, vicious way of trying to water down affirmative action" policies primarily aimed at correcting long-standing injustices and inequalities suffered by black Americans. Reportedly, too, Lalonde, has seemed puzzled by the disbelief, and is quoted as saying: "I want to do something for my people. I don't want to take anything away from the blacks. I simply want to give the Acadiens the same opportunities." He has often added that Cajuns have frequently been mocked in school for their Cajun accent in English, have suffered the indignity of being called names in bars, schools, and military camps, and have especially in the past been very poor and socially discriminated against by the "Anglos and the French Creoles" of the State.^{aa}

Some of the details of this case are worth pointing out here. (1) The discussion is not about whether Cajuns are an identifiable unit — a people — within the larger society. (2) The debate is about who should be eligible to receive, directly and indirectly, resources set aside by the government to counteract the consequences of racist ideologies and practices that have plagued American society. "Minority" in the U.S. has long been short for racial minority — i. e. seen as different from the way the majority population of the country sees itself racially, that is, seen as non-white. (3) In black opposition, at least to this bill, the assumption is clearly that Cajuns are white and, therefore, not a *racial* minority. (4) The sense of fabrication comes from the fact that it is the state's legislature, and not a team of scientists, that is making these pronouncements — deciding not just that Cajuns indeed exist as an identifiable and separable group but also what kind of group it is. Most people, at least in the United States, assume that peoplehood — other than citizenship in a contemporary nationstate — is inherited, determined by the "facts" of one's ancestry, and not man-made. Legal intervention in the definition of what people are smells of fabrication and hidden agendas. (5) Culture is not the reason for Lalonde's actions, public disbelief or opposition, or the legislature's vote; belief in a history of unequal opportunities and a perception of the need to compete for scarce resources loom much larger as explanations.

Whereas, until about twenty years ago, assimilation into the mainstream was pushed ideologically as necessary for social and economic success, since the American Civil Rights movement and the creation of Affirmative Action policies assimilation is neither the sole goal nor the sole legitimated strategy. Knowingly claiming distinctive and longstanding Otherness has emerged as a legitimate, or at least alternative and potentially advantageous, way to relate to others in society and to present one's

individual or collective Self in dealing with government agencies. This Cajun case is but one example, a very recent example, of what I take to be an integral component of all so-called ethnic processes – what I am here calling „the management of one's own Otherness.“

Ethnicity – in all of the forms of which we frequently speak today, ethnic identities, ethnic group membership, ethnic pride, ethnic culture, ethnic food, ethnic politics, or ethnic stratification – presupposes a belief in the separable and identifiable „peoplehood“ of a sector of the human population. That in itself is a human construction worthy of analytic consideration. How and why do people group themselves and/or are grouped by others as constituting *a people*? In the discursive and nondiscursive practices that create and validate that belief in a sense of peoplehood, Otherness is simultaneously being established and validated.

But ethnicity is not just about the presupposition of peoplehood or the construction of Otherness. We have long had other popular and analytic concepts to refer to collectivities – race, nation, class, caste, community, tribe, people, culture, religious community, language group – and they have all had their social and political histories as well as philological derivations. Conceptualizing these collectivities as ethnicity signals a change in our individual and social attitudes towards a certain kind of Otherness – themselves signalling changes in how our societies manage Otherness, changes in who has enough power to enter the game of management, and in whether or not there are enough available resources to make the work of management feel worthwhile.

In this recent Cajun case, it is significant and noteworthy that a self-identified Cajun himself introduced and lobbied for the bill declaring Cajuns a minority in Louisiana, and that much of the opposition focused on the fact that two major political figures in the state today are also self-identified Cajuns. The latter promotes the image of actual power in the hands of at least individual Cajuns. The former shows that at least one Cajun has the skill, opportunity, and power to use governmental institutions to his „people's“ advantage. The resulting image is that of a successful struggle for Self-determination and the employment of the institutional system to back it up.

This stands in marked contrast to what we are probably used to most – what I am here calling *Other-determination* of a collectivity – where the collective identity of some people is in some fundamental way determined by other people who see them as Other and have the power to employ the institutional system to back them up. In the U.S. context, the people most frequently subjected to Other-determination of Self have been Americans of varying degrees of African descent, since blackness was a EuroAmerican construction arising in a particular socioeconomic context where it signalled that the person was, had been, or could be enslaved, after the abolition of slavery, would come to signal descent from people who had once held the lowest place in society. Throughout part of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, at least a third of the states of the United States defined by law the boundaries of categories described as racial. Most statutes concerned the majority population's apparent need/wish/interest in separating „white“ from „black,“ though in some states, especially states with Asian workers and immigrants and some surviving Native American (American Indian) populations concern was extended to them as well (2).

Lalonde's use of the Louisiana legislature felt strange because it appeared on the

surface to treat Cajuns like those whose Otherness has long been defined and managed by the State – while Cajuns have until now been considered an ethnic group, rather than a minority. And yet what made it strange – once we look beneath the surface – was that behaviors currently considered legitimate for ethnic groups in the U. S. and associated with being white in the U.S., such as Self-determination, were used by Cajuns *acting as an ethnic group* to manage the jural-political system to make them a legal minority. The result – a contradiction in terms.

Despite the sometimes loose use of the term ethnic to refer to racial minority groups, I want to argue here that ethnicity implies – in the U.S. context at least – that a group of people have socially-sanctioned power to go quite far toward Self-determination. Thus, (1) that is more a euphemism, than an accurate depiction, when applied to groups of people that the American majority regards and treats as a racial minority; and (2) that to a very large extent it did not exist prior to the late 1960's in the U.S. I submit that ethnicity is an objectification of a *Particular* attitude and policy towards collective Selfhood and collective Otherness and that it is not synonymous with „peoplehood,“ culture, or Otherness itself.

Take Israel as an alternative scenario with some superficial similarities to the U.S. The State of Israel was created with the goal of bringing together Jewish people then dispersed throughout much of the world and without an independent, autonomous country they could call their own. Importantly, the movement rested on the belief that there is such a thing as „the Jewish people,“ and not just that there are Jewish people (like blond people, left-handed people, or well-educated people). Thus, Zionism rested on something long taken for granted – a sense of peoplehood – which in itself, by definition, implies a sense of collective Selfhood and a sense of other people's individual and collective Otherness.

Many different aspects of the experience of Diaspora Jewry and the history of the relationship of Jewishness to the State of Israel seem to revolve around issues concerning the *management of Otherness*. Jews have long believed and felt that their collective identity stems from a particular history and a particular historical relationship with the Biblical God, and not from others' perceptions, stereotypes, and representations of them. But for centuries – especially since the Diaspora – they have also felt themselves vulnerable and always at least potentially subject to the non-Jewish majority's attitudes, policies, and institutions. Throughout much of the past 2000 years in quite a few regions of the world, Jews have definitely been treated as Other and managed in a manner very much like that of „racial minorities“ in the U.S. today. In fact, for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was not uncommon to find even legal references to Jews in the United States as „the Jewish race.“

The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe saw a movement for Jewish *emancipation* whose fundamental goal was to seek a way (or ways) to end their Otherness and to minimize, if not quite end, the power of non-Jews to manage the nature and status of their collectivity. Over the years, assimilation, Marxism, and Zionism have all been seen by different groups of Jews as approaches worth trying towards furthering that goal. I believe „ethnicity“ is the newest of these that must be added to that list – not meaning that only now is there recognition of Jews as an identifiable collective identity but, rather, that in the U.S. context a half- (and, not full-) assimilationist attitude is now considered legitimate by the society at large,

leaving substantial room for group Self-determination. Talking about Jews as a separate race has certainly disappeared from the mainstream. In fact, in the last twenty years, most of the discussion about Jews by Jews and non-Jews alike concerns the extent to which Jews are a religious group versus an *ethnic group*.

A different scenario plays itself out in Israel – a country founded on the belief that there is a collective Self, a collectivity, known as the Jewish people and that they deserved to manage themselves rather than always be subjected to management by others. The achievement of independence allowed for that goal of Self-management but now put Israeli Jews in the role of managing Otherness as well. What were to be the boundaries of the Self and who or what would be Other? And, not secondarily, what kinds of collectivities were these and are they parallel? In the last 40 years, a sizeable amount of time and energy has gone into deciding which groups of people who claim to be Jewish are to be accepted as Jews. The Ethiopians – Falashas – have captured the world's attention in the past few years, but they are only the most recent of a list that includes Benei Israel (from India), Karaites, Russians, Black Hebrews, Samaritans, and American converts to Reform and Conservative Judaism. The peoplehood of the Jews may have been simply assumed by the leaders of the Zionist movement, but the establishment of a state for Jews made it clear that the assumption of peoplehood – no matter how long it may have existed – did not exempt them from the perceived need to manage both Self and Otherness.

What could „ethnicity“ be in such a country? To have allowed for ethnicity in Israel from the outset would have undermined the emerging Jewish state in two ways: (1) To have done anything other than push for total (often even forced) assimilation of the Jewish immigrants into the more veteran Jewish society already in place would have undermined the sense of one peoplehood, one significant Self, on which Zionism rested. Social, cultural, and linguistic Differences were deliberately seen as *passing* phenomena imposed on the Jewish people by the necessity of life in the Diaspora. (2) To have viewed Arabs in Israel as an *ethnic group* would have meant granting them much more equality in a State intended for „the Jewish people,“ and acknowledging much more of a right to Self-determination than the Jewish State, long used to Jewish-Arab violence, could comfortably grant.

It is in this analytic framework as well that we can understand the public and common denial of Palestinian peoplehood on the part of many (most?) Israeli Jews. The majority, mainstream North American population peripheralizes certain sectors of the population by *making* them *racial* minorities with little or no regard for Self-determination; the majority, mainstream Israeli population dismisses any Palestinian claims or demands for Self-determination by *making* them non-Jewish *minorities* (*miutim*), stressing the existence of religious differences among them, and denying their claim that they, too, are one people.

Government discourse and practice towards cultural differences among Israeli Jews have definitely changed since the early 1970's – signalling a change in the management of Otherness – but they still differ significantly from what we have in the U.S. Not trivially, the term *kvutsoi ethniot* (a sociological phrase taken literally from the English for ethnic groups) is not comfortably used to refer to anything in Israel – even today 40 years after the founding of the State and some 15 years of growing assertiveness on the part of Jews of non-European origin. The term *edot* is used instead to refer to communities of long-standing regional ties and social bonds

primarily, though not exclusively, among Jews. The fact that it is rarely used to refer to non-Jews contributes to the feeling that it is a Jewish thing, that it is unlike ethnicity — as we observe it elsewhere — and that it, therefore, does not challenge the sense of peoplehood of the Jews.

The Israeli situation, then, differs from the U.S. situation in that, while they both exclude certain sectors of society from the perceived mainstream — indexed by calling them minorities — Israeli society even today does not really allow for „ethnicity“ even within the Jewish majority. *Adatut* (the phenomenon of edot within the Jewish people) is now publicly recognized and partially legitimated, but I doubt it is simply a matter of semantics that *ethnicity* (even in its Hebrew equivalent) is considered foreign in Israel. In this sense, then, „ethnicity“ does not exist in Israel today, though Otherness is very much a factor to be managed and the boundaries of the collective Self very much always in need of definition. It is as if the public somehow knows, along with government officials and academics, that ethnicity is not just reference to cultural or regional differences or even to the existence and management of Otherness but, rather, an attitude and a policy regarding those differences (and the clustering of people with those differences) that accepts, to a substantial degree, the worth and value of Self-determination.

„Ethnicity,“ I am therefore arguing, is the product of specific sociohistorical circumstances that may or may not exist in different societies. Where „national“ unity is at a premium and fragmentation is feared, ethnicity cannot emerge and may even be suppressed. Where sections of the population are systematically excluded from the mainstream, labelled minorities, and even definitionally controlled, the result is Otherness imposed by the mainstream, not ethnicity. Distinctions between collective Selves and collective Others exist, and have existed, everywhere. The same is true of power differentials. What makes ethnicity a particular form of management of Otherness is that it exists in a climate that expects, legitimates, and validates a great deal of Self-determination. Local, grassroots leadership and initiatives matter, but only in a climate that recognizes their worth and grants them legitimacy.

NOTES

1. This essay is based on extensive long-term fieldwork in both Louisiana and Israel during the past 13 years. I have so far published separately about both, though increasingly I see the utility of explicitly comparing them with each other.
2. To give but three short examples, consider the following three legal definitions adopted by the legislatures of Virginia, Missouri, and Florida well into the twentieth century but before the thrust of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s:

Virginia statute #1-14, repealed only in 1975 — Every person in whom there is ascertainable any Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person not a colored person having one-fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be deemed an American Indian; except that members of Indian tribes, existing in this Commonwealth having one-fourth or more of Indian blood and less than one-sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians.

Missouri statute # 563.240, adopted in 1953 and finally repealed in 1969, phrased it differently — No person having one-eighth part or more of negro blood shall be permitted to marry any white person, nor shall any white person be permitted to marry any negro or person having one-eighth part or more of negro blood; and . . . the jury trying any such case may determine the proportion of negro blood in any party to such marriage from the appearance of such a person.

Florida statute #741.11, adopted in 1957 and like Missouri's repealed only in 1969, was straightforward and simple – The word „negro,“ „colored,“ „colored persons,“ „mulatto“ or „persons of color,“ when applied to persons, include every person having one-eighth or more of African or negro blood.

Neither the Civil Rights movement nor its aftermath in the 1970s eliminated Other-determination of collective identities altogether or the institutional creation, perpetuation, and management of them. There continues to be a sense of Otherness – Otherness from the self-proclaimed white majority – that, I believe, is the fundamental meaning of the concept of minority. The United States Supreme Court has thus far refused to declare racial classification itself unconstitutional, although it is very clear that it considers discrimination on the grounds of race unconstitutional.

True, it is no longer considered acceptable to perceive members of these collectivities as merely passive, but Other-determination still dominates in cases of sections of the populations regarded as racial minorities. The state legislature in Louisiana, for example, recently changed its law defining blackness and whiteness, largely due to political and social activism within the legally non-white population of the state. Whereas the statute in 1970 – then considered a liberalization of the state's laws – had effectively defined as legally black/colored anyone with more than one-thirty-second (1/32) „Negro blood,“ the 1983 statute now allows parents to designate the race of their children. Note, however, that the new law adds that parents may designate the race of their children only as long as it does not go against what the legislators called „the preponderance of evidence.“ Presumably someone other than the parents would have the right, power, and authority to decide what is „the preponderance of the evidence.“

Likewise, it was government bureaucrats and the institutions they work for that between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s created the racial category known today in the U.S. as Hispanic. Few people realize that. The creation of a Hispanic racial category was coupled with the establishment of a number of Affirmative Action policies aimed specifically at that category, and it led to a search for identifiable local organizations through which resources could be channeled and identifiable local leaders who could serve as lobbyists for the newly-created minority group. The result is that few, including some of those lobbyists themselves, understand that the creation of this new minority group came about because government agencies were uncomfortable accepting many Puerto Ricans' and Mexican-Americans' self-portrayal as white. In the 1960 census, most Puerto Ricans appeared as white. No „Puerto Rican“ racial category appeared on the forms they were asked to fill out – just white, black, or Oriental/Asian. By 1970, the U.S. Census included „Puerto Rican“ as a racial option. While that severely limited Puerto Ricans' choices of self-determination – given that they were among other things from Puerto Rico – it gave the appearance of Self-labelling. The country may no longer be willing to just arbitrarily and blatantly manage those sectors of the population regarded as Other, but being labelled a racial minority remains synonymous with quintessential Otherness and very limited, if any, Self-determination.

KATHERINE VERDERY

Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore USA

ARE REGIONAL STEREOTYPES ETHNIC?

This essay looks at a phenomenon most of us would probably not classify as „ethnic“ and asks why we would not so classify it, even though in many respects it fits that label. The phenomenon is the widespread attribution of regional stereotypes within a single society — in this example, Romania. The stereotypes define persons coming from different regions as very different from each other: as having different customs, different foods, different personality types, different dialects or patterns of speech. Under many circumstances, differences in custom, in character, and in speech would qualify as ethnic differences. Why do they appear not to, in the case of regional stereotypes? What do regional stereotypes have in common with ethnicity, and what distinguishes them from it? The answer to this question may seem obvious, but I am not certain that it is. I ask it in order to cast light upon the way we analyze ethnicity — what kinds of things go into our classifying a phenomenon as ethnic? Ethnicity is not, after all, a „real“ category but an analytic one. It is we, more than our respondents, who call something „ethnic.“

The regions that appear in Romanian stereotypes are the three major historical regions of contemporary Romania, each of which had some degree of political autonomy in earlier times: Transylvania, Moldavia, and the southern region, mostly referred to now as Oltenia. Each region contains an ethnically mixed population, a majority of Romanians co-residing with Germans, Hungarians, Turks, Bulgarians, Gypsies, Serbs, and others.

The stereotypes of the different regions arise in many settings, such as in casual conversation within families, and at parties including outsiders like myself. My examples come largely from Transylvania, where I have spent most of my time, and this means that my examples focus on the contrast between Transylvania and Oltenia, with little said about Moldavia. Exposure to the other two regions convinces me, however, that reference to these stereotypes is very common there as well, although with different values assigned to the images that are used, as will be clear below.

One of the most common ways in which the stereotypes arise is in the form of jokes, such as the following:

1) An Oltenian visitor to Transylvania loses his way and stops a local peasant for

directions: „Is this the road to Arad? “ The Transylvanian thinks for a long time with great concentration, then replies, „No, it's the road *from* Arad.“

- 2) The same themes of slowness and dullwittedness show up in a joke pairing Transylvanians with Oltenians (and told to me in Moldavia). An Oltenian goes to a doctor to ask for an operation on his brain, complaining that it is too full of ideas and it races too fast; he wants it calmed down a bit. The doctor takes a large chunk out of his brain, sews him up, and when the man regains consciousness, asks him how he feels. The Oltenian replies, in a thick Transylvanian accent, „Just fine.“
- 3) A Transylvanian and an Oltenian are in prison, awaiting execution. The fateful day comes, and the gibbet is erected next to a river. The Transylvanian is strung up first, but the knot in the rope is tied too loosely, and he slips out, leaps into the river, and swims away. The Oltenian pleads with the executioner, „This time please tie it more tightly, because I can't swim.“ (This is the Transylvanian version; I heard this same joke told in Oltenia, where the Oltenian was the one who got away.)

These kinds of jokes are of basically the same genre as a large set of jokes in which *Romanian* identity is juxtaposed with – and clarified against – the identities of other nationalities. These jokes (and they are not peculiar to Romania) have a standard form: a Romanian, a German and a Frenchman, or a Romanian, an American, and a Russian. Both „regional“ jokes and „national“ jokes put the problem of identity on the stage and rehearse the images appropriate to it. Both kinds of jokes are, I suggest, „ethnic“ in the sense that they project a world divided up into different kinds of „people“ whose characteristics are thought to be of real significance and who must be clearly set apart.

Jokes present ethnic stereotypes in their most compact form, but such stereotypes often arise in ordinary conversation. For example, some close friends of mine, a couple in a village in which I worked, had a lengthy quarrel in my presence. The wife was complaining to her husband that he never took her side against their married son, while the husband argued that parents should stay out of their children's affairs. After much dispute, the husband turned to me and said, „The problem is really that she doesn't get along with her daughter-in-law,“ the wife interrupting to affirm, „I've always treated her well, never given her a single reason to complain, yet all I have to do is mention the word 'Oltenian' and my son assumes that I hate his wife.“

What struck me in this scene was that the wife's invocation of „Oltenians“ appeared to have no place in the domestic matters being argued, yet it was clearly central. The wife's problems with her daughter-in-law (born in Oltenia) were very often phrased in terms of the defects of Oltenians. The regional contrast seemed to have become the idiom for expressing domestic conflict in this family, and the reason why was clear enough: the wife wanted, in some fundamental way, to exclude or expel her daughter-in-law from the household by identifying her as NOT LIKE US, as DIFFERENT and therefore not *of* us. She wanted her son to herself – and expressed this as wanting more or less to keep the family Transylvanian. In her desire to eliminate this interloper from the family hearth, she found the handiest device to be a regional stereotype that made the daughter-in-law into an Other. This is a very common procedure in *ethnic* encounters, all over the world.

Numerous other persons commented to me about Oltenians and Oltenia in a

stereotypic and judgmental way. For example, I had a number of exchanges in which Transylvanian professors described job opportunities in Bucuresti, which they invariably turned down, saying things like „We Transylvanians don't much like Bucuresti. The people there are introverted, byzantine. We don't feel at ease among them.“ or „The people there have such a rapid tempo, such floods of talk! We're more even-tempered, slower, calmer. Oltenians will quarrel furiously for an hour and then suddenly kiss and go off arm in arm; they're so unpredictable.“ Transylvanians see themselves as deeper, more reserved, and more rational; they see Oltenians as more superficial, impulsive, and emotional. Once, towards the end of a ceremonial dinner in Transylvania, an Oltenian visitor grew misty-eyed and said, „At times like this I am deeply moved“; the others responded with cries of „Balkans! Balkans!“ At a dinner party, an Oltenian married to a Transylvanian kept referring to her husband as „that German of mine“ — even though he too is Romanian — and describing his orderliness, his dedication to learning and culture, and his cautious nature, all of which she contrasted with her own impetuous, unruly, adventuresome style. These are only a few of a large number of encounters in which regional stereotypes were expressed to me or, in my company, to others.

As with the jokes, these spontaneous comments are often inconsistent in the image they present of the different regions. That is, the same joke may be told by Oltenians and Transylvanians, shifting only the role of „hero“ and retaining the stereotypes intact, as with the joke about the quick-witted swimmer who escaped hanging. Again, the woman in the couple whose family quarrel I recounted used an uncharacteristic stereotype of Oltenians as cold, distant, like Germans, unfriendly and inhospitable. It is far more common for Transylvanians to present Oltenians as *hot* rather than *cold*. But what is more important than consistency of the images is the impulse to *draw a boundary* distinguishing between two *kinds of people* — the basic move in all systems of ethnic interaction: a division into „we“ and „they.“

This observation suggests that both regional stereotypes and ethnic identities form subsets of processes in which general *social* identities are negotiated and assigned, through moves that create solidarity and exclusion. What makes analysts view one set of such moves as „ethnic“ and not another?

One answer might be that in the existing literature on ethnicity, ethnic differences are usually associated with differential access to some kind of scarce resource, or with patterned relations of groups to resources that are differentially distributed, sometimes but not always in a discriminatory way. The classic illustration of this is Fredrik Barth's famous paper on ethnic relations in Pakistan (Barth 1956), where each of three ecologically distinct zones has its distinctive ethnic adaptation. It might be argued that regional stereotypes do not seem to conform to such a pattern, and when they do, we get an ethno-regional movement such as the ones in Scotland and Brittany. I would disagree: I suspect that Romanian regional stereotypes are very much tied to systematic differences in how each region is incorporated into the Romanian state, differences that have existed in one form or another since the regions were joined into a single state (1859 and 1918/20). The national division of labor by regions after World War I could be grossly characterized as follows: industrial production — largely Transylvania; intellectual and cultural production — largely Moldavia; political control — largely Oltenia. (Obviously, all these activities were distributed in all three regions; I am talking about modal tendencies, not absolutes.) The difference between Transylvania

and Oltenia is not unlike that between, say, Catalonia and Castile, in Spain (and *those* differences are clearly seen as ethnic).

This regional specialization still obtains, to some extent, the importance of southern predominance in politics having become even greater with highly centralized Party rule than it was under the so-called democratic politics of the 1920s and 30s. Out in the provinces, regional stereotypes are, among other things, intentionally centrifugal: they protest the domination of Bucharest. I have a totally unsupported and untestable hunch that regional stereotypes are generated disproportionately in the provinces, rather than the capital, and that they constitute an insistent reminder that Romania is NOT all just one big Bucharest. Many of the jokes I hear in Transylvania that present Transylvanians as laconic or slow-witted are recounted with pleasure, the sort of pleasure that accompanies setting oneself off from a place one doesn't approve of. It is a source of positive pride to be of few words in a country dominated by an Oltenian politics so *full* of words, words many Transylvanians find meaningless.

All of this is meant to suggest that the ecological differences characteristic of many ethnic systems also exist with distinctive regions, associating each of them with disparities in advantage and differences in socio-economic niche as is often the case with ethnic differences. The regional stereotypes are also associated with and reflect earlier political statuses and allegiance, just as we find with many ethnic identities. Finally, the regional identifications I have been describing are, like ethnic identities, part of an ideological system in which the world is understood as fundamentally divided up into different kinds of „people“ having different sorts of characteristics. So if regional and ethnic identities share all this, why do we distinguish them?

In the case I have been describing, perhaps the obvious answer is that despite recognizable distinctions in lexicon and pronunciation, all Romanians share a speech community. Having the same language, they are therefore all part of one group, perhaps distinguishing among themselves in some harmless way at the regional level but not *as ethnics*. But it seems to me that this answer reveals more than it intends to. In the first place, similarities of language are no grounds for assuming ethnic homogeneity, as the Latin American countries make clear. Chileans and Argentines share a language, but if you try to tell them they are a single ethnic group, you may not live to report their reply. In the US, Blacks and American Indians speak English as do whites, but they clearly are not in the same ethnic group. The point is an obvious one: we cannot assume *a priori* that linguistic homogeneity means ethnic homogeneity.

When we *do* assume this — when we assume that because everyone is speaking Romanian, regional stereotypes are not ethnic — we do so from the point of view of particular political and cultural elites. The important thing about Transylvanians and Oltenians, as compared with Chileans and Argentines or Catalans and Castilians is that within Romania, there exists no regional elite with sufficient power and incentive to insist that the differences are significant — to insist that they are *ethnic* differences. The matter of language is important here not because it is shared but because those persons most likely to have a stake in insisting upon ethno-regional differences include the educated elites, for whom language is a major social resource. These are the kinds of people who need a public oriented to their problems and solutions; for these people, a defense of language is a way of laying claim to tremendous resources, such as the allocation of massive funds for new educational systems and preferential access to jobs. Efforts to establish Black English as a separate language show that one can

claim these resources even without mutual unintelligibility of language. When one is politically intent upon making a separation, linguistic sameness need not pose an obstacle, although if linguistic difference exists, it is a particularly useful vehicle.

What I am suggesting is that regional stereotypes *are* (or can be) ethnic, if we look chiefly at the *social processes* that accompany them – the processes of attributed identity, solidarity, and exclusion; of differential resource endowments; of resistance to centralization; of assuming that „peoplehood“ (rather than age, or gender, or class) is the fundamental definer of the social world. If regional identifications are not seen as ethnic, this is from a particular vantage point that conclusively defines *what constitutes a significant difference*. A definition of this sort – and therefore the definition of ethnicity – is *political*. Who makes those political decisions has a lot to do with whether regional stereotypes are or are not seen to be ethnic. Usually, what prevails is the definition provided by the holders of state power, which will stand as long as regional elites do not challenge that definition. In some instances regional elites may acquire enough of a political base to argue that they are „different enough“ to advance political demands on ethnic grounds. Such instances underscore how ethnicity is part of the politics of culture, not of „objective“ distributions of customs or language or differential ecological endowments. If scholarship is not simply to reaffirm what power-holders have already established, our task should be to outline the parameters of the politics of culture, with analyses of the distribution of power in society and the place allowed (or disallowed) for claims that rest on a cultural base labeled „ethnic“. The point I hope to make here is that science must inspect the relation of its categories to power, in hopes of serving the broadest possible distribution of power rather than narrow interests of a top elite.

PETER GSTETTNER

Austria

AN INTERCULTURAL FIELD OF LEARNING IS CLEANED UP

Lost chances in Carinthia, Austria

After years of coming and going and of continuing protests, the Austrian Parliament, in June 1988, came to a decision of greatest moment and with negative consequences for intercultural social life on the level of the local community and the schools: in the most southerly federal province of Austria, Carinthia, where an ethnic minority (once a „majority“) speaking Slovene as its mother tongue has been settled for about 1000 years and for about 100 years has been fighting for its survival in the face of constant pressures to assimilate and Germanise, in this area it is planned to introduce a school system similar to apartheid, starting in autumn 1988. The German and Slovene-speaking primary school children, who so far, as a result of local tradition have been taught together, will henceforth be divided according to „linguistic criteria“ and taught in separate groups and classes ⁽¹⁾.

The parliamentary parties' political justification for this decision is that these segregationist measures would remove a long-standing conflict between the German-speaking majority and the Slovene-speaking minority, and that the intention was to satisfy both groups according to the principle „each to his own“. The sociological principles that have objected to this approach from the very beginning are, however, based on completely different premises. One of these premises states that there is no genuine „minority problem“ in this region, and that the ethno-political conflict about the school-language, and indeed about bilingualism in general as an aim of intercultural learning, is only a pretence construct, although one of real-politik.

All the definitions of the problem and the identifiable areas of conflict mentioned are due to social processes which are marked by a permanent state of crisis resulting from technological upheavals, rationalisation, impoverishment in frontier regions and

1) The background and historical development of the conflict dealt with here are presented in detail in two books: P. GSTETTNER und D. LARCHER: *Zwei Kulturen, zwei Sprachen, eine Schule*. Klagenfurt/Celovec 1985. P. GSTETTNER: *Zwanghaft Deutsch? Klagenfurt/Celovec 1988*. Both books can be obtained from the author or directly from the publishers (Drava-Verlag/Naša knjiga, Paulitschg. 5-7, A-9020 Klagenfurt/Celovec).

agricultural areas, the threat of mass unemployment, the tendency towards monopolies in the world markets, the exploitation of the third world, etc. The consequence is that the forces of economic and socio-political integration in society are all on the wane, which is also shown by the fact that increasing numbers of groups are disintegrating, or at least threatened by social ostracisation.

The present government's policy of „the turning point“ has helped to portray the declining ability of society to integrate economically as a conflict of cultures or interests between and within ethnic groups. The topic is now indeed a „minority question“ or a linguistic quarrel. The minority which speaks or feels differently is excluded as alien, and is put under increased pressure to assimilate. It is then accused of an ostensible lack of willingness to adapt and integrate into the majority society: it should simply speak German if it wants to be accepted and understood by the majority.

Whilst the economic and social causes of the conflicts in society are denied, the latently present ethnocentricity can be lived out as „patriotism“ on the one hand or as an aggressive xenophobia on the other. These potentials then affect the actually existing and historically developed ethnic differences in the manner of an amplifier, acquiring its direction as a result of political propaganda work: the politically thematised conflict is in fact directed and encouraged in such a way that the state is required to act; the state, the political parties, the „Strong man“, the elected representatives etc. are now called upon to act, to step in, to define solutions to the conflict, to regulate language, to order segregation.

In this tense climate all the educational institutions have an important duty to provide enlightenment and understanding, even if these institutions alone can never solve the underlying social conflicts. Nevertheless they can have a positive influence upon the intellectual and cultural climate in the Province, since they have a part to play in the decision as to whether future generations will continue to be brought up in the spirit of insensitive ethno-centricity and traditional enemy figures, or whether they will be sensitised to new forms of community life oriented towards mutual understanding on the basis of intercultural openness and curiosity. The educational institutions could develop best and furthest in these last-mentioned directions if they themselves could practice daily a form of life that approaches closest the desired social norm; and this brings us to the priority for a common bilingual education in all family, school and professional educational contexts; to this purpose sociology remains willing to provide argumentation and cooperation. However, the realisation of this concrete utopia in Carinthia is prevented by the historical passions and the products of irrational fears as a result of an irrational policy, which reaches its peak in the propagation of the permanent „Abwehrkampf“ (the fight by a volunteer army after World War I against Yugoslavian forces to keep southern Carinthia as part of Austria).

For years now, political propaganda has been aimed at making the Slovene minority responsible for the „unrest in the Province“ and for the „lack of rights for German Carinthians“: it is claimed that the Slovenes have established themselves in the border areas out of all proportion to the ethnic numerical strength; that there are a large number of Slovene businesses, banks, cooperatives and cultural institutions, whereby „German Carinthians have been excluded from jobs; in the Slovene schools it is claimed that there is a „monopoly for Slovene teachers“ – according to the propaganda used by the German nationalists in the school dispute.

Actual or imagined threats are shored up ideologically by recourse to social demagoguery and enemy figures tarnished by prejudice. The local Carinthian history is an ideal basis for the recourse to such aspects, in that the German nationalist ideology has for the last 100 years used the enemy figure of the „Slovene“ in order to gloss over its own various identity crises, in order to strengthen the inner integration of „Germanity“ and in order to anchor the nationalists' own claim of „One people, one Empire (Reich), one language“ in the consciousness of the authority-trusting masses. This process is carried out with more or less differentiation and division of labour: one time the old anti-slavic emotions are stirred up, and we are reminded that „the slavs“ (who in the Nazi era belonged to the category of „sub-humans“ (Untermenschen)) have already tried twice to tear Carinthia in two in order to take possession of the bilingual area by force. Another time the new anti-communist emotions are roused, and anyone who professes membership of the Slovene ethnic group is stamped as belonging ideologically to the communism of the partisans and Tito. In all this the official political groups often leave the propagation of the „tough“ language to the neo-fascist and extreme right wing groups: final solution ideas, „enough is enough“ slogans, the call for a strong hand, inundation fantasies, calculations of the amount of foreign infiltration and control, demands for apartheid, etc., are generally not devised at party headquarters. However, once the mood has been set in this way – not least by appealing to dark and violent instincts –, then official politics can rely on this mood, can amplify it whenever it fits into the plan, and can also subdue it if it brings back all too clear memories of the politicians' own brown (= Nazi) past or present.

The sociologists who have been involved intensively with the Carinthian majority/minority problem since 1980 unanimously believe that a common bilingual education is the best means of meeting the demand for intercultural learning. No method of pupil-separation and partition according to a linguistic basis of organisation can replace the feeling of living and learning together provided by a common educational experience in school – even if the separate teaching is polished up by „integrative measures“ afterwards. Investigations which have also been carried out in other multicultural societies have shown

- that the conscious learning of two languages does not represent a fundamental difficulty for children;
- that two languages can be learnt at the same time without any difficulty, given good didactic organisation;
- that the good mastery of the mother tongue significantly simplifies the learning of the second language.

It is a fact that the politicians responsible in Carinthia not only lack any sociological or linguistic competence, but are also closed to any and every scientific argument. This circumstance reinforces the status-quo, in which the Slovene language is far from enjoying equal worth or equal status in public dealings. As a result, the children with Slovene as mother tongue are handicapped by conditions that prevent the development of a high learning motivation: In official Carinthian political culture, not only is bilingualism thought very little of, the Slovene language itself is discredited and its speakers subjected to many prejudices.

For Slovene-speaking children the emotional strain begins with the registration for school, with the question of whether the parents act on the necessity to declare their

language, and register the child for bilingual teaching with the school director. For most children this method of registration represents the first socialisation hurdle, a hurdle which is made all the more difficult by the fact that there is only one bilingual public kindergarten in the whole of Carinthia.

As a result of the absence of bilingual kindergartens insecurity and strain arrive early in the parental home. Later, this pressure is by no means relieved in the parental home, since the teaching staff at the bilingual schools is itself in a position where it feels constantly subject to suspicion and discrimination as „Slovene nationalist“ and „communist“. The school authorities reinforce this psychological pressure on the teachers of the second language, or at least they do nothing to improve the climate and to inform the public of the high value of bilingual education.

If as a result of the organisation measure of segregation the Slovene-speaking children experience an additional educational devaluation of their mother tongue, so that it is finally used merely as a private language (the language of home and farm), then the negative consequences of such a deficient socialisation can easily be predicted:

- Under pressure to assimilate, and hardly secure in this own Slovene mother tongue, the pupil's ability to learn German without difficulty is seriously endangered. Given the utmost importance for scholarly success of the ability to speak and communicate well, the danger exists that the ground is prepared for an adverse identity development.
- If the linguistic identity of the children is not recognised, if the child is not able to communicate or count upon understanding through its own mother tongue in relevant school situations without difficulty, then the child's feeling of his own worth is seriously handicapped and most probably also damaged.
- Leaving aside the psychological and social handicaps that the child suffers as a result of deficient socialisation conditions, a injured feeling of one's own worth can become a further fundamental cause of school problems and of later personality problems.

Unconditional respect for and the equal treatment of linguistic identity are ethnical and psychological postulates that are basic to any intercultural education and should not be affected by the parents' language. The new school provisions in Carinthia have imposed their reactionary segregation programme in the face of these postulates. This move will prove to be of great consequence in the future:

Firstly, the children of the majority population will be isolated from the rest of the common cultural inheritance, they will be „freed“ from hearing (or even joining in) their neighbours' language. The majority will be released from the obligations that arise from the fact that it too is responsible for the development of a peaceful culture of community and bilingualism.

Secondly for the Carinthian Slovenes as a minority, the way is paved for a solution which will finally get rid of all the problems that are ascribed to the very existence of this ethnic group: once the Slovenes are set apart, fenced off, identifiable in isolated groups and in parallel school classes, and have become the object of special integrative measures, then sooner or later (probably sooner) they will themselves prefer to be invisible in order to avoid the continuous stigmatisation; ie. they will want to make themselves unrecognizable, even smaller, more modest, more insignificant, to the point where they disappear by themselves — and thus the „final solution“ to the

ethnic group question will come about all by itself.

The perspective that Carinthia will in this way become „Slovene-free“ in a few years cannot be very beneficial to the image of the Austrian Republic, especially since Austria is aiming for an honourable position within the European Community, in a union of states which is increasingly beginning to think upon its multicultural base and its intercultural future opportunities.

CESARE POPPI

University of East Anglia, Norwich

MARKERS OF DISTINCTIVENESS: ETHNICITY AND CULTURE IN SOUTHERN TYROL

The Paper I am going to present differs in title and content from the one announced in the Conference programme.

Instead of focusing exclusively on cultural policies among the Ladins and specifically on the forms taken by the relationship between 'custom' and 'tradition' in the Val di Fassa, I will conduct a comparative analysis of cultural policies in the Southern Tyrol.

I shall still keep the Ladins at the core of my argument, as the perspective on the ethnic confrontation in Southern Tyrol from that side is heuristically more interesting than the usual, dichotomizing view on 'German' and 'Italian' ethnicity in the area.

In particular, I will illustrate how cultural policies implemented by the German-, the Italian- and the Ladin-speaking groups in the Southern Tyrol are aimed at building 'markers of distinctiveness' singling out in the first instance each ethnic group from the others.

On the other hand, I will show how the German- and the Italian- speaking majorities in the area have to build an altogether different set of boundary-markers vis-a-vis the 'German' and the 'Italian' cultural hinterland laying at their external border.

Such articulation of external- and internal-oriented boundary-marking policies is not to be found among Ladins, who are instead busy building up a consistent set of boundary-markers with regard to both their former fellow Tyroleans and the external world.

That difference will be argued to be due to the different standing of the three ethnic groups within the Southern Tyrolean area on the one hand, and in the context of the Austrian, German and Italian State-formations on the other.

The historical synthesis presented in the first part of the paper will show how the developments of the 'national question' in the XIX century led to the crisis of the time-old Tyrolean cultural *koine* and to the raise of 'ethnicity' as the identification of markers of distinctiveness.

In the Conclusions it will be argued that ethnic boundary-reinforcement, far from being the product of deep cleavages between different cultural formations, is instead

stronger in areas where cultural affinities are to be recorded both in the historical and in the contemporary perspective.

That realization, in turn, calls for a theory of differentiated responses with regard to the problem of how, in an ethnic context involving *both* State-supported and State-less groups, ethnic boundaries are perceived and implemented.

1 – The historical Tyrol as a cultural formation

The Ladins of the Val di Fassa are a *territorial minority* settled in the Southernmost valley departing from the Sella massif at the heart of the Dolomites, in the Eastern Alps.

Following a long process of assimilation by neighbouring German- and Venetic-speaking populations, nowadays only approximately forty-thousand Ladins still speak idioms of the Ladin family: eight thousand of them live in the Val di Fassa,

Although linguistically closely related to the Romance-speakers of the Graubünden in Switzerland and to the Furlan-speakers of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the Ladins of the Val di Fassa have been adjoined to the multiethnic, multicultural political unit known as the 'historical Tyrol' since the division of the XIII century.

The Tyrol functioned for many centuries as the *trait-d'union* between the Transalpine German and the Cisalpine Italian cultural areas. Located in-between two of the most influential cultural formations in Europe, it was for century a melting pot in which cultural, social and political elements pertaining to the two worlds met, mixed and finally gave birth to a unique, distinctive cultural formation bearing the influence of both the Northern European and the Mediterranean civilizations.

The Church and the Aristocracy moved their personnel between adjacent cultural areas, irrespective of ethnic and linguistic affiliation, so to promote multilingualism amongst the elite in the urban centres.

In the XIV century a wave of migration from Southern Germany brought into the Welschtyrol – i. e. the Venetic-speaking Tyrol – strong contingents of miners who nowadays still constitute German-speaking enclaves in the majority Italian-speaking Province of Trento.

Migrations, linguistic and cultural assimilation, reciprocal influences and other processes of that kind went on for centuries.

Borrowing and lending in all social realms occurred at the intersections – were they of a geographical, historical, political or social nature – between different groups.

Communities that shared the same language might be organized under different principles of political organization, whereas, on the contrary, groups with different ethnic and linguistic ascendancies were brought together under the same political and economical organizations.

Likewise, traditional legal and jural practices brought South of the Alps by German-speaking immigrants, *de facto* survived the attempt by the local authorities to bring the newcomers under the rule of a Roman-type jural system.

The evidence for the persistence through time of a process of exchange of cultural items such as those mentioned above can be gathered at all levels of the social organizational realms.

Moreover, besides the strictly formalized, institutional elements mentioned above, a circulation of cultural traits pertaining in the first instance to the informal areas of

cultural practices went on in the remotest valleys at the periphery of the political and administrative centres located in the lowlands.

Such a process is particularly evident in the case of the Ladins: progressively withdrawing towards the inner core of the Dolomite bastions as the process of assimilation by the dominant cultural areas went on, squeezed in-between the Venetic and the German-speaking majority, the Ladins forcibly had to assimilate, in turn, traits from both sides of the watershed.

Language itself, with its layers over layers of influences from Rhaetic, 'Celtic', Venetic, German and finally 'Italian' idioms shows the degree of assimilation – both in the active and the passive sense – undergone by the Ladins throughout their history (Heilmann).

In their dealings with their neighbours, the Ladins practiced a high degree of multilingualism: while Ladin was spoken within the valley communities, German and Italian idioms were the linguistical currency on the fringes of the Ladin territory.

Besides exchanges and reciprocal influences at the structural level, borrowing, lending, and 'trading' of cultural traits went on at the level of the superstructural cultural realms between all three linguistical groups.

As I have showed elsewhere, folk mythologies and practices originating in different groups travelled across ethnic and linguistical boundaries, over a vast area progressively including the whole Alpine region and according to a complex network involving linguistical, symbolical and ideological processes (Poppi, 1986).

In synthesis it is possible to talk about a 'Tyrolean Cultural *Koine*' cross-cutting linguistical boundaries, irrespective of what were to become, later on, the markers of ethnicity in the area.

To affirm the existence of a 'Tyrolean Cultural *Koine*' is not to deny differences – say I concede even 'contrasts'? – between different groups in the area.

Differences did in fact exist between what can be – rather vaguely – described as 'Italian' and 'German' cultural formations within the area.

Yet, a clear cut line consistently parting and grouping under a comprehensive cultural and ethnic label – say – social, economical, political and symbolical traits, appears to be rather difficult to draw.

Attempts such as the one conducted by Cole and Wolf (1974) to systematically relate *ethnic* dissonances between 'German' and 'Italian' communities in the Southern Tyrol to a consistent contrastive set of *cultural* traits fall short – in my view – of taking into consideration the vast shadowy area in-between the brightly contrasting overtones where dissonances appear blurred and faded.

As I have argued elsewhere, the pairing of 'ethnicity' and 'culture', that is to say the methodological assumption that they are necessarily and systematically to go together, leads to a vicious circle in which dichotomies in the one area necessarily appear co-terminous and consistent with dichotomies in the related field (Poppi, 1988).

The pairing of the 'ethnic' and of the 'cultural' under the same inventory is the result of specific, historically determined processes and not, *per se*, the sociological property of the relationship between social groups, nevermind how different.

In the Tyrol, in particular, no 'ethnicity' would have been possible without the raise of the modern State formations North and South of the Alps, and no demand to produce evidence of a distinct 'cultural identity' would have taunted the Ladin social

formation once their fellow Tyroleans were compelled to decide – so to speak – to become either ‘Italians’ or ‘Germans’.

2 – The crisis of Tyrol: nationalism and language

The crisis of the manifold ‘Tyrolean Cultural *Koine*’ outlined above is an historical phenomenon dating back – roughly speaking – to the second half of the nineteenth century, when all over Europe the ‘National Question’ became paramount in the wake of the crisis of the Absolutists State and, for the Tyrol in general, of the Augsburg Empire.

At the time of the Napoleonic campaigns at the end of the XVIII and at the beginning of the XIX century, the Tyrolean peasantry fought the French armies in the name of a united, Roman Catholic and Augsburg-loyal Tyrol.

German-, Ladin- and Italian-speaking Tyroleans fought side by side ‘for the Emperor and the Motherland’ a war that was to be the last to see them united against a common enemy.

In the last quarter of the XIX century the ferments of nationalism started penetrating the Tyrol, reshuffling the balance of loyalty from the Tyrol to ideas of *Italianita* and *Deutschtum*.

Overall, while the German-speaking peasantry soon came to somewhat identify the Tyrolean cause with the pan-Germanist ‘National Question’, in the Welschtyrol – that is to say in the Southern areas where Venetic idioms of the Italian family were spoken – it was above all the newly-born Italian entrepreneurial bourgeoisie (and to an extent the numerically even weaker urban working class) that saw in the Italian cause of national unification a chance to get rid of the political and economical burdens of the Augsburg Empire.

In the Welschtyrol the rural population remained largely either untouched by nationalist propaganda of both sides, or else clinged to the idea of a unified Tyrol loyal to the Augsburg.

As nationalist militants started coupling nationalism and ethnicity, so to suggest a partition of the area according to national-ethnic lines, a ‘scramble for the Ladins’ began, both sides arguing that the Ladins were in fact either Italian or German ‘hybrids’.

It is not possible to follow here the complex arguments put forward by both sides in their claims, nor time allows to enter into details concerning the often confused and contradictory relation the Ladins entertained with German and Italian nationalism.

Suffice it to say that in view of the partition the Ladins were the last in Southern Tyrol to give up hopes of and claims to an undivided Tyrol, as that appeared to be the only way to avoid being partitioned into separate administrative autonomous units (Alcock 1970, Palla 1987, Richebuono).

Those hopes and those claims came to nothing: nowadays the Ladins of the Dolomites are split within two Regions and three Provinces, two of the latter being Autonomous Provinces with special provisions and statutes to ward off interference by the State and by the neighbouring administrative units.

For the purposes of the present paper it is noticeable that since the very beginning the question of the national affinities of ethnic groups in Southern Tyrol took the form of a debate on language.

The 'national nature' of the language spoken by the various communities in South Tyrol was taken as the objective, watertight proof of their ethnic (and therefore 'national') identity.

Nationalist vindications had it easy to argue that the German- and Italian- idioms spoken in the Tyrol were the ultimate markers of distinction, so that the new national boundaries had to be drawn accordingly.

'Language' as the most abstract, time-persistent cultural trait was taken as the living evidence of the national affinities of the communities under dispute.

Linguists became busy working out 'language' as the foremost bearer of national consciousness. In the years leading to the First World War the issue of which language ought to be taught in the State-financed schools of the Welschtyrol became one of paramount importance.

But what about Ladin? Was it simply one amongst many of the Italian dialects, was it a language in its own right, or was it rather an ancient language heavily influenced by either Italian or German, so to legitimize the incorporation of its speakers within either nation-State?

When in 1873 a leading linguist thoroughly argued that Ladin idioms were to be considered as belonging to a distinct language-family of the Neo-latin kind, the foundations for a distinct 'Ladin identity' in the terms posited by the very historical situation were cast (Ascoli 1873).

Thus, the Ladins could finally legitimize their presence – and future historical destiny within the contending State-formations – as an autonomous, distinct ethnic group.

It is not by chance that Article Six of the Italian Republican Constitution talks about minorities in Italy – and their right to have their needs acknowledged and tutelated by the State – in terms of '*linguistical minorities*'.

The very fact that the 'ethnic' – or the 'cultural' – labels do not figure in the provisions of the State for the minorities living within its administrative territory tells a great deal about the way boundaries are drawn and distinct social groupings are single out.

Such point of view is nowadays proper of the attitude the three ethnic groups show toward the maintenance and the implementation of language as the chief marker of identity.

Indeed, the right to use German as an official language in all sectors of the Public Administration, including the judiciary, has been one of the most disputed issues of the complex package of autonomy rights acknowledged by the Italian State to the Province of Bozen.

Likewise, in their turn, the Ladins of the Province of Trento are busy claiming full educational public services in Ladin so to match the situation of their fellow-Ladins of the Province of Bozen, where rights to education in Ladin have been granted to a greater extent.

In a situation of relative cultural homogeneity, as it was the case in Southern Tyrol in the last century, 'language' provided the clearest-cut, less controversial and convertible marker of a distinct identity.

Once that major, most visible boundary, had been put firmly into place at the borders between the outer- and the inner-group, then the road was paved leading to the implementation of a number of other similar markers of ethnicity.

3 – Cultural policies, ethnicity and culture in Southern Tyrol

One of the major consequences of the recognition by the Italian State of the ethnic character of the Trentino-South Tyrol, culminating in the arrangements of the Post World War II period that granted a large degree of autonomy for the Provinces of Trento and Bozen, was the planning and the implementation of cultural policies aimed at stressing in the first place the distinctiveness of each Province vis-a-vis the other.

Moreover, the majority groups having as their political, economical and geographical background a fully developed Nation-State – that is to say the Trentini and the South Tyrolians – developed cultural policies aimed at differentiating themselves from the bulk of their fellow speakers to the North and the South of the watershed. The markers of cultural and ethnic identity presented to *internal* and *external* referents are built of different materials in a way consistent with the direction of their aim.

The German-speaking majority in the Province of Bozen appeals to its German affinities in vindicating autonomy from the central administration. In so doing it has sought throughout the difficult phase of the negotiations of the autonomy package the support of the Austrian State and of German cultural associations by appealing to German international cultural solidarity.

Historical and cultural affinities to- and affinities with the German world are also put forward when justifying the attitudes, of separatedness and distinction vis-a-vis the former Welschtiroler fellows in the Province of Trento.

At the same time, on the other hand, the image of the South Tyrol promoted in the German cultural world is that of a distinct cultural formation not to be merged with the 'German' world at large.

Following the post-War reconstruction of the local economy, tourism in the Alps has emerged as the most viable alternative to the irreversible crisis of mountain economy.

Nowadays, the income from tourist activities and what is left of the traditional mountain economy (itself linked double-way to the fortunes of the tourist industry), has made of the former Tyrol one of the highest pro-capita income areas of Europe (Lichtenberger 1975).

The image of a culturally and historically distinct Tyrol is promoted as an additional arrow, not devoided of political implications, to the bow of the local tourist industry in folklore, architecture, music, the mass media and the like.

For the South Tyrolians, 'Tyrol' is still today a powerful marker of a distinct cultural formation, firmly entrenched within the cultural mythologies of the German mainland and leisure industry as the Southern Land of Sun, Mountains and Jodeln.

Thus, the *ethnic* Tyrol, as it appears nowadays on the cultural map of Europe, is rather different from the *historical* Tyrol.

It in fact includes the Ost-, the Nord- and the South Tyrol, that is to say the German-speaking sections alone of what constituted in the past the unified Tyrol inclusive of the Welschtyrol.

The reshaping of the frontier between the Italian and the Austrian nation-States has – so to speak – handed over the notion of an historical, political and administrative Tyrol to a new identity, defined by its *ethnic* character, whereby by 'ethnic' is to be understood its allegiance to the German cultural world.

South of the provincial border between Bozen and Trento the presentation of

cultural identity toward the *external* and the *internal* frontiers varies accordingly, although it does take over different contents.

With regard to their Sudtiroler neighbours the Trentini stress their affinities with the Italian cultural hinterland.

Yet, the preoccupation to avoid being confused and merged with a different cultural and ethnic unit comes for the Trentini not so much by the confrontation with their German-speaking neighbours, as language alone is there to ward intruders off the borderline.

Rather, their concern is to differentiate themselves from their neighbours to the South – the 'Italians' properly understood, whose language and culture show a great deal of continuity with their own.

The effort to create a distinguished 'Trentino cultural identity' cannot rely entirely upon the claim to *ethnic* distinctiveness, as far too obvious would be in that case the historical – and therefore ethnically speaking rather dubious – nature of the Southern boundary of the Province.

Were the claim to autonomy made to rest entirely upon 'ethnic' arguments, as it is feasible in the case of the German-speakers of Sudtiro, the very foundations of the autonomist ideology would be seriously threatened.

Under such conditions, the reasons put forward by the Trentini for their autonomist claims are mainly of a 'cultural' nature.

In recent years, the Provincial Administration of Trento has been implementing an image of the Trentino as 'a bridge across Europe'. On a number of official speeches and publications the Trentino has been described as 'the heart of Mitteleuropa' – the middle section of the European territory where German; Italian and Slav cultural traditions met and mingled for centuries.

Whether or not such image – and the numerous cultural initiatives of a political and cultural nature that go with that – do in fact correspond to a rather optimistic idea about the placement of the heart in the Mitteleuropean organism (or less) is a matter that does not concern this paper.

For the present purposes what is relevant is that no mention of the 'Tyrol' is currently made in the official political and cultural discourses of the Province of Trento.

Firmly entrenched within the Italian State formation and yet in need to legitimize its claim to autonomy, the Trentino ideology claims its own cultural distinctiveness by representing the area as a transnational, culturally 'mitteleuropean' formation.

'Tyrol' as a marker of distinctiveness is bypassed altogether – handed over to the German-speaking neighbours who have vindicated (an won) its symbolical implications on ethnic grounds as their own. Cultural policies in Trentino jump across regional issues altogether and go straight for the big, European target, vindicating for the Trentino a leading role as the forerunner of a future European integration.

What constitutes the mark of distinction of Trentino vis-a-vis the bulk of the Italian speaking cultural formation, is thus not its role within a multi-ethnic, historical Tyrol, but rather more ambitiously its role within Europe, historically legitimized – it might be added – by the period of Augsburg domination when Trentino, far from being the heart, was indeed the Southern frontier of the Empire.

We have so far briefly analyzed the state of the matter with regard to the claim to the recognition of distinctiveness of the two majority groups within the Trentino-

Sudtirolo.

We have noticed that the division of the ethnic labour prompts Trentini and Sudtirolo to play a double-hedged game according to whether a distinct identity is to be vindicated at the *internal* or at the *external* boundary.

In that respect, the case of the Ladins is somewhat different.

Unlike German- and Italian-speakers they have no National State to whom they can call upon to see their claims to autonomy recognized and implemented.

The appeals put forward by the Ladins of the Dolomites, and more specifically by the Ladins of the Val di Fassa, to international agencies – such as the European Court in Bruxelles and the United Nations – have had no practical results.

Moreover, the fact that they enjoy different degrees of tutelage in the three Provinces between which they have been partitioned (a tutelage that comes to nothing at all in the Province of Belluno) does not help to create a common policy toward the reinforcement of the ethnic boundary.

While in the Province of Bozen the full recognition of the *ethnic* status of the administrative area had to forcibly take the 'Ladin Question' into account in view of regulating the relations between the German- and the Italian-speaking majority groups, in the Province of Trento the existence of an *ethnic* question was never acknowledged despite Ladin efforts to do so.

Having failed to obtain their objectives many times over, the Ladins were left with the problem of creating – each valley community on its own account – their own territorial, cultural and ethnic boundaries since none was provided by State sanctioned policies.

Somewhat contented with the umbrella provided by the Sudtiroler Volkspartei – the interclassist, majority political party that has fought for the recognition of the rights of the German-speakers in Sudtirolo in exchange for Ladin political loyalty – the Ladins in the Bozen Province have to a large extent dropped their claims to full Ladin autonomy or unification.

The valleys of Gardens, Badia and Marebbe, although threatened of fast assimilation by the ever-expanding German influence in the area – have found their ethnic identity granted by definition and sanctioned by law in the set of provisions made for them at the Provincial level.

Elsewhere, in Fassa, Livinallongo and Cortina d'Ampezzo, the claim to distinctiveness and the fight for recognition have no institutional grounding, and are therefore entirely a matter of local militant cultural policies aimed at reinforcing and implementing those markers of ethnicity that nobody is prepared to take for granted.

While the Ladins of the Bozen Province have no problems in being acknowledged as a separate group by their German speaking-neighbours who are only too eager to grant the Ladins a high ethnic profile so as to reinforce *their own* claims to autonomy, the Ladins of the Val di Fassa must in the first place reinforce the boundaries of ethnic distinctiveness as their Venetic- and Italian-speaking neighbours are not prepared to acknowledge their existence as a separate group.

In the post-World War Two period, the struggle for recognition in the Val di Fassa has been conducted on a number of different issues.

In the first place there has been the struggle over language and education. Since 1976 the Provincial Administration has agreed to make Ladin the first language in kindergartens and to provide a weekly hour of teaching of 'Ladin Language and Culture' in primary schools. The Ladin political organization is now claiming the

extension of the weekly lesson, having as the ultimate objective the recognition of Ladin as *the* teaching language in primary schools.

A number of steps have been taken to boost Ladin out of the ghetto of primary linguistic intercourse at the level of the family and the village so to grant it the status of an official language.

Besides private initiative to name houses, hotels, shops and other public places with Ladin names, town councils in the Valley have now restored Ladin toponyms in road signalling. Ladin toponyms will also figure in the forthcoming official map of the Province of Trento.

The revival of the 'Ladin Question' at the grassroot level is most noticeably illustrated by the reappraisal of practices pertaining to popular culture that had become obsolete in the period after the II World War, when the Valley underwent a series of major, dramatic social and economic changes.

As I have analysed elsewhere (Poppi 1983, 1 & 2), folk calendrical events such as the Carnival are being deliberately revived by institutional and semi-institutional agencies and associations aiming at bringing back the 'authentic' traits of 'Ladin Culture'.

What survived the process of social and economic change in the form of *customary* practices, themselves constantly changed and adapted to meet the requirements of new social contexts, is now being reshaped to produce a distinct, supposedly 'unchanged' and therefore 'authentic' traditional Ladin culture.

During the crowded winter and summer tourist seasons the Valley becomes a stage upon which Ladins perform rituals of cultural authenticity representing elements of the 'traditional' way of life, mythology and folklore, so to build the boundaries of ethnic distinctiveness otherwise blurred and overshadowed by the growth of a tourist industry that has assimilated the Val di Fassa to the social landscape of European holiday resorts.

In that sense 'ethnicity' is increasingly more a matter of *representation*: elements of the precontemporary way of life, wiped off the scene by the process of social and economic change, are re-produced and presented as specifically 'Ladin'.

In general, the adjective '*Ladin*' has come to qualify and designate objects and practices previously devoided of ethnic significance: architectural and artistic styles in painting and carving, cooking recipes, Carnivals and Masks have all come to bear the mark of ethnic distinctiveness.

The process through which ethnicity becomes a *subject of representation* was most clearly displayed during the 1986 pan-Ladin parade held in Ortisei to celebrate the 'Second Ladin Millennium'.

On that occasion, episodes of 'Ladin' history from the Roman Conquest to the present were staged and paraded in the streets side-by-side with scenes from Ladin mythology and folk practices. 'Ladin Cultural Identity' come to the forefront in the form of symbolical – and therefore representable – markers of distinctiveness, so to support the claim to recognition in face – and in spite of – the Italian- and the German-speaking majorities in the region.

As the older generations, still loyal to the idea of a bygone, unified Tyrol, slowly give way to younger Ladin generations, the identification of the Ladins with the historical Tyrol weakens.

The need for a distinct, unique and exclusive identity promotes *ethnicity* as a comprehensive system of boundary markers encompassing all fields of social life.

The very fact that language as the safest and foremost of such boundary markers is itself under threat by the infiltration in all areas of social intercourse, calls for reinforcement from all quarters.

Yet, the process of homogenization to the world at large that changed the social and economic scene of the Valley in the last fifty years or so, renders the task rather tantalizing.

Under such circumstances a realm of 'Ladin Culture', representable and re-producible at will, is created and shaped after those amongst the traits of the traditional culture that are available to such treatment.

Unlike their German- and Italian-speaking neighbours, the Ladins have no need to differentiate the implementation of boundary-markers according to whether they are meant for the 'internal' or for the 'external' frontier.

Forced by historical circumstances to give up the only goal that might have saved them from partition – i. e. the idea of a unified Tyrol – and confronted with the fact that that very idea had been appropriated by their German-speaking neighbours and set at their external frontier, the Ladins could do no better than playing the game along and search for *their own* markers of distinctiveness.

Unlike their Italian- and German-speaking neighbours, the Ladins do not have to face the homogenizing pressures coming from the national-State cultural hinterland.

The building of the ethnic frontier demands a thoroughly consistent, unitary set of markers warding off – so to speak – all intruders, irrespective of ethnic affinities.

Yet, the pervasive, encompassing assimilation of Ladin culture and society to the World System – ever stronger in view of the growth of the tourist industry – finds the Ladins in want of a specific, clear-cut cultural identity to set at the ethnic borders.

Nor can they, following their luckier neighbours, monopolize historical and national ascendancies appropriated by the nation-States backing the demands of their respective minorities at the borders.

The Ladins can thus only resort to a pool of internal resources, that is to say to the re-presentation and the re-production of cultural traits that the very same historical process leading to the collapse of Tyrolean inter-ethnic identity has disposed of.

4 – Conclusions

In recent years literature on ethnicity has increasingly focused its attention onto a series of phenomena having to do with the search for 'cultural distinctiveness' (Peterson Royce 1982, Gross 1978, Gubert 1976 – the latter with specific reference to ethnic identity in the Trentino-South Tyrol).

The effort produced by minority groups to retain, implement or even create anew a distinctive *image* of their culture, vis-a-vis the surrounding majority society, is specifically recorded in situations of ethnic confrontation in which marks of distinction are a necessary requisite to legitimize claims to various forms of tutelage and positive discrimination from the State and its agencies.

The promotion of 'cultural distinctiveness' is moreover proper of ethnic contexts in which the level of the conflict is relatively low.

Low conflict levels, in turn, seem to be proper of situations in which a relatively high degree of social, economical and political homogeneity between ethnic groups is to be found.

When and where the ethnic struggle does not take the form of a struggle against

ethnic *discrimination*, there each ethnic minority – paradoxically as it might sound – conducts a struggle for the *recognition* of its distinctiveness and separatedness from both other minorities and the non-ethnic majority.

In other words: once the process of economic, political, and cultural assimilation within the wider societal frame has done away with the very foundations of negative discrimination by rubbing off, so to speak, all (or many) ethnic distinctive characteristics at the cultural level, then a new phase of the ethnic struggle begins.

Not only the markers of ethnic distinction – or, rather, what is left of them – are once again brought to the forefront, but claims are also put forward for them to be acknowledged by the State, in turn called upon to implement policies of *positive discrimination*, so that the markers of distinction themselves might be salvaged from ultimate assimilation.

As the case of the Ladins of the Val di Fassa illustrates, the need for 'cultural distinctiveness' is the direct result of the process of integration (and assimilation) of the minority group within the majority society, or, rather, of the threat that the process posits for the survival of the Ladin social formations as a distinct unit within the Trentino-South Tyrol region.

As it has been observed, the growth of an ethnic awareness and the ensuing struggle for recognition under circumstances leading to increasing assimilation and homogenization between the in- and out-group, is directly proportional to the degree of integration reached by the minority group itself (Allardt 1979: 48).

That type of remark works as a corollary to the by now seemingly widely shared view that

'...ethnicity can only happen at the boundary of 'us', in contact or confrontation or by contrast with 'them'.' (Wallman 1979: 3, but also – of course – Barth 1969).

Following that view of ethnicity as an interactive, relational social phenomenon, more recent literature has analysed the relationship between ethnicity and the rise of the modern Nation State, pointing out that the one is unthinkable without the other (Gellner).

The case of the ethnic confrontation in Southern Tyrol confirms both theories of ethnicity: Italian-, German- and Ladin-speaking groups, having shared for centuries many cultural traits, at the end of the XIX century parted ways under the influence of the impending National question.

From then onwards a rush started towards the appropriation of cultural traits claimed to be exclusive and unique of each group, to be set at the borders as markers of ethnicity.

Yet, as we have seen, the German- and the Italian-speaking group are implementing a differentiated policy of distinctiveness according to whether such markers are to be set at the internal or at the external frontier.

The Ladins, on the contrary, are implementing a thoroughly consistent policy of distinctiveness.

The difference is due to the different relationship that the three ethnic groups maintain toward their neighbours on the one hand and the hinterland represented by the Italian and Austrian nation-State, (and by the Italian and German cultural areas at large) on the other.

The existence of such an articulation suggests that the nature of the relationship

between the contending groups *as well as* the nature of the relationship between them and the Nation State formation are crucial in determining which markers of distinctiveness – amongst many – will be selected in the process of boundary-marking.

If the formation of a realm in which the 'us' and the 'them' can be singled out as different is a result of the historical process, then it must also be argued that ethnicity in that sense is not simply the result of that process, but also a function of the different institutional nature – be it a Nation-State or a State-less community – that the 'us' and the 'them' take over as the process moves on.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alcock, A. E., 1970, *The History of the South Tyrol Question*, London.
- Allardt, E., 1979, Implications of the Ethnic Revival in Modern, Industrialized Society, *Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium*, 12.
- Ascoli, G. I., 1873, Saggi Ladini, *Archivio Glottologico Italiano*, 1.
- Barth, F., (ed.), 1969, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Cultural Differences*, Boston.
- Cole, J., and Wolf, E., 1974, *The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley*, New York.
- Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism*, London.
- Gross, F., 1978, *Ethnics in a Borderland: an Enquiry into the Nature of Ethnicity and Reduction of Ethnic Tensions in a One-time Genocide Area*, Westport.
- Gubert, R., 1976, *L'Identificazione Ethnica: Indagine Sociologica in un' Area Plurilingue del Trentino-Alto Adige*, Udine.
- Heilmann, L., Popoli e Lingue nella Formazione dell'Entità Culturale Atesina, *Mondo Ladino* 3/4, 1983: 23–69.
- Lichtenberger, E., *The Eastern Alps*, Oxford.
- Palla, L., 1986, *I Ladini fra Tedeschi e Italiani – Livinallongo del Col di Lana 1918–1948*, Venezia.
- Peterson Royce, A., 1982, *Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity*, Bloomington.
- Poppi, C., 1983 (1), *We are Mountain People: Tradition and Ethnicity in the Ladin Carnival of the Val di Fassa*, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Cambridge.
- Poppi, C., 1983 (2), Coutume, Ethnisme et Tradition: formes de perpétuation dans le Carnaval Ladin du Val di Fassa (Dolomites. Italie du Nord) *anon.*, *Le Carnaval, la Fête et la Communication*, Nice.
- Poppi, C., 1986, Il Tipo Simbolico Uomo Selvaggio: Motivi, Funzioni e Ideologia, *Mondo Ladino X – Studi in Onore di Luigi Heilmann*.
- Poppi, C., 1988, *The Third Factor: Cultural Affinities and Ethnic Dissonances in Southern Tyrol*, unpublished manuscript.
- Richebuono, G., 1982, La Presa di coscienza dei Ladini, *Ladinia* VI, 95–154.

JOHN H. MOORE

The University of Oklahoma, USA

ETHNOS AND ETHNIC PROCESS ON THE NORTH AMERICAN PLAINS

In 1982, Bruce Trigger encouraged ethnohistorians to emphasize the study of „change“ in ethnological and archeological data, although he did not specify what kind of change we should be studying (1982: 1). In the same paper, however, Trigger denied that change could „be inferred from general ethnological principles“ (1982: 13). I might introduce the present paper, then, as an attempt to accept Trigger's charter, while disregarding his cautions about ethnological theory. In fact, I wish to advocate the particular benefits of conceiving change in the abstract as „ethnic process.“ I will do this both by inducing toward general ethnological principles, which I will define, and by inferring from these principles to concrete illustrations from the North American Plains.

I should emphasize at once that I do not claim to have discovered the theories or processes I will discuss here. For the most part, I have merely collected together various theoretical ideas and tendencies which have appeared in the ethnohistorical literature over the last several decades. But I will argue, most emphatically, that taken together these ideas and tendencies constitute an integrated and well articulated structure of theories about history, about language, and about archeology. As parts of a new synthesis, they constitute a powerful theory for explaining many aspects of Plains ethnohistory which presently seem puzzling.

I will try to outline these problems in a useful manner, focussing on the Great Plains, and separating the issues into three categories: 1) historical 2) linguistic and 3) archeological. After initially considering some logical aspects of the problems, I will then present some specific illustrations from my own recent work on the Cheyennes.

Some Logico-Empirical Problems

Waldo Wedel himself, one of the developers of the „direct historical approach,“ cautioned against extrapolating too far backward in time when approaching „the unknown through the known, the prehistoric through the historic“ (Strong 1935: 6). In the first chapter of *Prehistoric Man on the Great Plains*, Wedel warned that „the number and reliability of historical records drops off rapidly before the year 1800... so that it is no longer safe to apply modern tribal names to the earlier groups“ (W.

Wedel 1961: 7). Anyone who has tried to follow a particular tribe from the North American Plains back through the early documents is aware of the problems involved. On the 1805 maps of Lewis and Clark, for example, perhaps half of the entries do not correspond clearly to known historical tribes (See Figure 1). Even earlier, the tribes named by Carver and the Verendryes are somewhat less familiar, while the tribes named in the Jesuit Relations are the least familiar of all (Carver 1976, Wood 1981, Thwaites 1896). Helen Tanner's recent atlas provides an excellent cartographic illustration of how tribal affiliations become more and more problematic as one works back in time (1986).

Unfortunately, many ethnohistorians have made it their professional business to connect these groups of unknown affiliation with tribes known historically, so that lengthy debates have raged, for example, over whether the Kilitian, the Monsoni and the Muskegoes were Cress or Ojibwas (A. Greenberg and Morrison 1982: 77). Many other such assertions and debates have unfolded over the last several decades (W. Wedel 1961: 278-311, M. Wedel and DeMallie 1980). In all such cases, the temptation is to seize upon various kinds of etymological and geographical information, and even the biographical data of narrators, to make a case for one relationship or another. And all too frequently, an ethnohistorian invents a methodology in an *ad hoc* manner for a particular problem, and then never uses the same methodology again (Delanglez 1941). The end purpose of such efforts, also unfortunately, seems merely to be the demonstration of a relationship between a known and an unknown group, to the satisfaction of the author and perhaps other participants in the debate.

Even when such efforts are successful, however, I feel that the more interesting question, and the more important one, is left unexamined: What kind of social, historical or *ethnic process* is represented in the relationship between two named groups? Why are they listed as separate groups on one document and a single group on another? Did one group merely absorb the other, or are there different kinds of historical processes which might have occurred? My point is that it is more important to understand the *nature* of the connection, than to recognize that a connection exists.

While the comparative examination of historical documents often leaves many named groups with no known affiliations, as in Figure 1, the opposite problem exists in examining the results of analysis in historical linguistics, as in Figure 2. In this case, as we work backwards in time, we do not have too many groups, but too few. And in fact the farther back we go, using the more-or-less standard techniques of historical linguistics, the fewer groups we have.

In the science of historical linguistics, much effort has gone into the construction of genetic diagrams or family trees — phylogenies of related languages. And we should remember that each node on a genetic diagram such as Figure 2 is supposed to represent not merely an abstract relationship, but a real language community from earlier in time. As Mary Haas put it, „Every protolanguage was in the same way once a real language, whether or not we are fortunate enough to have written records of it“ (Haas 1969: 32). In his recent book, *Language in the Americas*, Joseph Greenberg expresses the same idea, referring to each node as a „common source“ for descendent or „daughter“ languages (J. Greenberg 1987: 5).

Linguistic evidence from the Old World, however, indicates that in addition to there being protolanguages which have surviving daughters, there are also *extinct* languages which have no direct descendents, so that the total number of spoken

languages in the past is larger than that represented only by the proto-languages. But in the New World there are apparently no written records of languages extinguished before the Columbian period. Consequently we cannot look at documentary evidence to determine such things as phonological interference or loan words from these languages, as we can with linguistic evidence from the Old World. That is while we can document certain kinds of ethnohistorical and linguistic relationships between the Hittites or Sumerians (both speaking extinct languages) and their neighbors, we cannot do the same in North America (Thomsen 1984, Macqueen 1986). How many extinct languages there might have been in North America, what their structures were, and how their speakers might have interacted with proto-Algonquians, for example, or proto-Athabaskans, is now difficult or impossible to tell.² All we can say for sure is that the phylogenetic tree diagrams shoving North American proto-languages are misleading when they imply that the linguistic and cultural picture in the past was more simple than it is now. These diagrams are also misleading when they imply that the process by which new languages are created is necessarily a slow and gradual one, analagous to the doctrine of „gradualism“ in biological evolution. Alternatively, a model of linguistic change might be offered which is more analagous to Eldredge and Gould's model of „punctuated equilibrium,“ in which short periods of drastic and rapid linguistic reorganization are followed by long periods of relatively minor change (Eldredge and Gould 1972).

The archeological evidence in North America contradicts both the historical and linguistic evidence. While the historical documents indicate that there were more named groups, „tribes,“ in the ethnohistorical period than now, and while historical linguistics implies a steadily-diminishing number of languages as we retrogress in time, archeological evidence indicates that the number of distinct „cultures,“ as evidenced from their material remains, has been about the same, at least since the Archaic (Jennings 1968: 128–129, Stoltman 1978).

There is, however, an important similarity between archeological and documentary evidence. Both show *discrete* historical units which are *bounded in time*, not ones which change gradually from some ancient prototype, as in the linguistic model. Typically, a prehistoric culture known to archeologists *begins* in some geographical or ecological region, consolidates, expands and develops to maturity, and then disappears, at least in that region. Harvey, for example, has provided an excellent description of the origin, maturation and dispersion of Oneota culture in northwestern Iowa, giving careful attention to ecological factors and political environment. Like most archeologists, however, she finds it problematic to determine whether Oneota was a „new“ culture, or whether the culture-bearers had migrated from elsewhere (Harvey 1979: 220–233).

A general, underlying problem in the archeology of North America, a classic question on this continent as elsewhere, is how and why, within a framework of general cultural diversity, do discrete and identifiable cultures in a particular region arise, consolidate, grow to maturity and then disappear? This cultural question is in some ways equivalent to the obvious but profound question which Darwin asked in biology, why are there discrete species in nature, instead of a continuum of infinitely diverse individuals? In the case of culture, we want to know not only why there are discrete populations representing homogeneous cultures, but how the geographical patterns of distribution can change through time. In what cases do these patterns reflect the movements of populations, as opposed to the diffusion of culture across

societal boundaries? Apparently the situation in North America, of discrete and coexisting cultures, existed for hundreds if not thousands of years before Columbus. It seems significant that while the cast of characters has changed, the number of characters has remained about the same (compare Figures 3 and 4). And we have the problem of connecting the complex pattern shown by archeology with the linguistic picture, which shows increasing simplicity toward the past, and with the documentary picture, which shows increasing complexity, at least for the past 500 years. Related to all these problems is another classic problem in archeology: whether archeological „cultures“ are the same as ethnological „societies.“ That is, if one could travel back in time and visit Harvey's „Oneotas,“ would they be found to constitute an ethnic and linguistic unit, as well as an archeological one?

Three Seminal Articles

I want to suggest here that the solution to many of these problems of articulation among historical, linguistic, and archeological data can be found in three explicit though much-neglected articles published over the past several decades. They are similar in their theoretical suggestions, although different in their ethnographic illustrations. The earliest and most important of these is Roger Owen's 1965 article, „The Patrilocal Band: A Linguistically and Culturally Hybrid Social Unit.“ Next in chronology is Susan Sharrock's 1974 articles, „Crees, Cree-Assiniboines, and Assiniboines: Interethnic Social Organization on the Far Northern Plains,“ and most recent is the article by Patricia Albers and Jeanne Kay, „Sharing the Land: A Study in American Indian Territoriality“ (1987). I wish to make the extravagant claim that these articles, taken together, represent a synthetic theory which has the potential for solving a wide array of problems in ethnohistory. This theory centers around what Owen called the „hybrid band.“

Owen said that the hybrid band results „when two social structures characterized by utterly unrelated languages find themselves geographically, or socially, contiguous“ (1965: 685). In his article he presents five ethnographic examples of multilingual and multicultural bands, none of them from the North American Plains, and discusses the social, linguistic, cultural, and biological consequences of hybridization. He emphasizes intermarriage as the mechanism for inter-band amalgamation.

In her article, published a decade later, Susan Sharrock considers several ethnohistorically-known „Cree and Assiniboine“ bands by reference to their ethnic, linguistic, territorial, cultural and societal characteristics. She identifies three forms of interrelationship in these bands which she calls „Early Alliance, Intermarriage and Polyethnic Coresidence and Fused Ethnicity“ (1974: 95). Somewhat hesitantly, she places these forms in a developmental sequence, although she largely draws merely the taxonomic conclusion that „interethnic social organization be interpreted on the basis of two independently varying criteria — ethnicity and coresidence“ (1974: 95, 117).

In their very recent article, Albers and Kay document in detail the multi-lingual and multi-cultural character of the so-called „tribes“ of the northern Plains and western Great Lakes in the ethnohistorical period. These authors emphasize the manner in which groups shared territory and resources among themselves, even during periods of intense warfare. Their examples undercut, to a considerable extent, the idea that named entities from ethnohistorical times, „tribes,“ can be defined in terms of an

exclusive territory as drawn on a map of political boundaries. They show instead, that the area they examine was a congeries of hybrid groups of various kinds, living together in various stages of alliance and intermarriage and in complex patterns of hostility and intermittent warfare.

The strength of all these articles is their emphasis on the band as an analytic unit, rather than the tribe or nation. All in all, I think that ethnohistorians, with the notable exception of Wood (1971: 70, Wood and Downer 1977), have exhibited a misplaced obsession with so-called tribal entities, and have neglected the importance of the component residence bands, which are in many ways more important. The „tribes“ or „nations“ which have received so much attention in scholarly literature were often merely temporary political alliances among bands which were themselves much more stable than the tribes in their membership, more complex in their structure, and more fundamental in their economic functions. It is at the band level, for example, that attention is paid to matters of ecology and domestic economy, and that the process of hybridization through intermarriage actually begins. Here extended families are structured and ranked among themselves, labor is divided in the family by age and sex, and schedules of hunting and collecting activities are worked out. It is bands not tribes which generate concerns about ecological resources, adjust their populations to suit the circumstances, and first perceive the benefits to be gained from inter-band or inter-tribal alliance.

For most of the year, national identity is irrelevant to the local nomadic band, which plans its own involvement in a variety of shared economic and social activities. And many bands, being multi-lingual and multi-cultural, could and did change allegiance from one tribal nation to another very quickly. From my own research, for example, I note five „Teton“ bands enlisting in the Cheyenne nation in ethnohistorical times, and three „Cheyenne“ bands ending the free period enrolled on reservations as Brules' and Oglalas (Moore 1987: 204–250). And I know from browsing government censuses that there are many other such examples from other reservations in these early days.

As a group, the three articles mentioned above not only draw attention to the importance of bands in general, but also show the importance of a particular kind of band, the hybrid or multi-cultural unit. They demonstrate convincingly that such groups are not mere oddities, but are a regular part of ethnohistory. George Grinnell, for example, has listed twenty-eight „foreign tribes“ who intermarried significantly with the Cheyennes, including a group of Blackfeet men, supposedly „enemies“ of the Cheyennes (Grinnell 1962, I: 39–40, 1900: 72). In reviewing the ethnohistorical literature, it seems odd that the only group whose hybrid nature has been emphasized is the Me'tis, perhaps because it is an Indian-European hybrid, not an Indian-Indian hybrid (Giraud 1986, Brown and Peterson 1985).

I am arguing here that all the hybrid situations on the Plains deserve the same attention as the Me'tis, because hybridization is not merely a peculiar and occasional event, but a major mechanism for social, linguistic and political change in the prehistoric and ethnohistorical periods. But what are the motivations for the creation of such groups? That is, when the mechanism of hybridism is unleashed, what are the motivations of the two contributing groups? And what is the particular form of the interaction? Although two mechanisms for hybridization are often mentioned in Plains ethnohistory – intermarriage and adoption – I would argue that the latter is merely a variety of the former. Seldom were foreigners adopted who were not also intermarried.

The three articles cited above concur that intermarriage was very important for creating alliances which facilitated trade and military alliances. And these two motivations — trade and alliance — are made very explicit in the historical documents themselves, both by the authors of the documents and by their informants. A third motivation, the avoidance of incest, is equally important, but more subtly and more difficult to assess.

Human societies usually rationalize the incest taboo both on biological and sociological grounds, although the categories of restricted mates are highly variant among different groups. The nomadic pastoralists of the Plains usually conceptualized their exogamy bilaterally, as the avoidance of marriage between any two persons who were known to be related consanguinally by any connection at all. By contrast, among the larger-scale, sedentary societies of the Middle Missouri and eastern North American, a clan system was maintained which rigidly defined potential mates by reference to a unilineal kin system, and thereby sustained a viable marriage pool for men and women reaching adulthood.

In a pastoral band of several hundred persons, however, incest avoidance was a more severe problem, as we can see from a consideration of the mathematics of the situation. Suppose, for example, we begin with a normal Plains marriage arrangement in which a cohort of siblings in a band marries another cohort to which they are not related. Without going through all the mathematical operations, let me only note the conclusion that after only two generations of subsequent endogamy in the band, forty years or so, everyone in the youngest generation is a sibling or cousin to everyone else, even discounting kinship extension and differences in fertility, which might make the situation occur even earlier.

Plains Indians, then, had to marry out of the band to avoid incest. And because contiguous bands usually contained relatives, a young person might have to find a spouse at considerable distance. So it is not only that young people were *pulled* into marrying „foreigners“ by the opportunities for trade and political alliance in the ethnohistorical period, they were also *pushed* by the necessity of avoiding incest.

The same kind of mathematics used to show the consequences of incest taboos can also be used to show the linguistic impact of only a few intermarrying spouses. Suppose, for example, that a band of two hundred persons comprises only four foreign grandmothers. Normally on the Plains, these would have been sisters or cousins to each other married to the sons of leading men to endorse some alliance for trade or warfare. After only four generations in a band of stable population, 120 members of the band ($8 + 16 + 32 + 64$), 60 per cent, would on average be descended from one of these grandmothers. That is, it would be perfectly possible for the last surviving grandmother of the four to witness the day in which the majority of the band would be descended from „foreigners.“ Obviously, the potential is great in this situation for many of these descendants to be bilingual, especially if contact were maintained and additional spouses obtained from the foreign band.

Hybrid Bands Among the Cheyennes

The overall importance of paying attention to hybrid bands first became apparent to me in the course of some recent ethnohistorical research, mostly reported in my book, *The Cheyenne Nation: A Social and Demographic History* (1987). When I began

my field and archival investigations, in 1980, I was only aware that one of the Cheyenne bands, the Sutaio, was said to be an adopted people, and that another, the Wotapio, was alleged by Mooney's informants to have Siouian origins. After further research, however, I discovered that not just one, but five Cheyenne bands had Siouian origins, while two others had resulted from Arapaho intermarriage, one band each were the consequence of Arikara and Mandan intermarriage, and possibly another band had resulted from Kiowa intermarriage. In fact, only one of the eleven or so Cheyenne bands, called the Tsistsistas, Bessie Band or Cheyennes Proper, was said to consist entirely of the descendents of „real Cheyennes.“

Looking at tribal nations contiguous to the Cheyennes, the situation at first glance seems to be similar. The Kiowas have one band called the „Kiowas Proper,“ in addition to comprising an „Arikara Band“ and the so-called „Kiowa Apaches“ (Mooney 1898: 227–230). The Arikaras had a „Crow Band“ and a „Cree Band“ (Fletcher 1907: 86). I suspect that thorough research into the individual band histories of other Plains tribes, beginning with the etymologies of their band names, would reveal a picture similar to that of the Cheyennes.

While investigating the cheyenne case, working slowly back through time, I discovered a period in the seventeenth century when proto-Cheyenne bands existed in a rather complex ethnic situation similar to the one described by Albers and Kay, in which many bands were apparently bilingual and bicultural. In my book I show that it was from this congeries of bands with confusing ethnic identities, each one known by several different „tribal“ names in historical documents, that the Cheyenne Nation was formed. But what do we mean specifically when we say that a nation like the Cheyennes „was formed“ or „came into existence“ at a particular time?

It is now over a decade since the publication of Morton Fried's book, *The Notion of Tribe*, and by now nearly every ethnohistorical scholar has an opinion on his criticisms of „tribe“ as traditionally defined. Many people agree with Fried that the orthodox definition, emphasizing a shared language, territory, political structure, and so on, cannot be defended within some ethnographic contexts. Others, however, myself among them, continue to insist that the idea of tribe, I use the term „tribal nation“ in my book, is useful for doing ethnohistory. My Cheyenne researches have convinced me, however, that all of us, pro-tribe and anti-tribe alike, are correct as regards the ethnohistorical period on the Plains. Some named groups on early documents are „tribes“ even by the most rigorous definitions, and others are not. While the general trend on the Plains is for nation-building in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, some groups were farther along in this process than others, while a few were even dissembling from a former condition of nationhood.

The question of why this cultural and political variability exists on the Plains should be conceived, I think, as an issue of dynamic *process*, not of taxonomy. That is, it is foolish to ask the question whether all the named groups on the American Plains were tribes or not. Some were and some weren't. The problem with Fried's critique of the concept is that he attempts to apply the same definition of „tribe“ to societies which are in radically different stages of development. While groups such as the Cheyennes and Kiowas had all the social requisites necessary for recognition as a tribe, and were busy obliterating former linguistic and cultural differences among their constituent bands, other groups such as the Tetons and Comanches were in much

earlier stages of the same process, still exhibiting considerable variation and disorganization. Still other groups, despite the general nation-building trend on the Plains, were rapidly disintegrating and dispersing, such as the Arikaras and Dhegiha Sioux.

One anecdote which illustrates very effectively the contrast between Anglo expectations of finding „tribes“ on the Plains, and the realities of ethnic hybridism comes from the Stephen Long expedition of 1820. In September, the expedition encountered on the Arkansas River an Indian camp comprising „... different nations here associated together, and consisting of Kiawas, Kaskaias, or Bad-hearts, Shiennes (sometimes written Chayenne,) and Arrapahoes“ (James 1823: 175). Approaching some men of the group, James continues, „One of us asked an individual, if they were Kiawas, and was answered in the affirmative; he asked a second if they were Kaskaias, and a third if they were Arrapahoes, who both also answered affirmatively“ (James 1823: 195–198).

Another striking example of heterogeneity, this one better documented, is the so-called „Dog Soldiers“ who rose to historical prominence as raiders along the Platte River Road in the Middle of the nineteenth century. They were a bilingual group, according to Hayden's report of 1863. He said: „They are at peace with the Dakotas, and have become so intermarried now, that it is hardly probable that they will ever break their friendly relation. So many of them speak the Dakota language, that their own language is not used at the present time in diplomatic affairs“ (Hayden 1863: 277). Tall Bull, a principal leader of the Dog Soldiers, was said by George Bent to have one Lakota and one Cheyenne parent, which Bent said was typical for Dog Soldiers (1968: 339). When the empty Dog Soldier camp on Pawnee Fork was captured in April of 1867, the desert tipis were inventoried in a military manner and the Indian scouts described 111 of the tipis as „Cheyenne“ and 140 as „Sioux“ (Carroll 1978: D16–172). At its height, the emerging Dog Soldier nation comprised several thousand people (Moore 1987: 197–204).

The institutional accoutrements of nationhood collected by the Dog Soldiers are also interesting. John Prowers, a white trader married into the Southern Cheyenne peace faction, reported that by 1865 the Dog Soldiers had „drawn off“ from other Cheyennes and refused to have anything to do with them (Prowers 1865: 144–145). At about this point in their development, the Dog Soldiers symbolized their separation from the Southern Cheyennes and Teton Sioux by holding their own Sun Dance in the center of their newly-defined territory in western Kansas (Creel 1879).

It is interesting and significant that Cowie also reports a Sun Dance as the signal for the establishment of a new nation by another ethnically diverse group of northern Plains pastoralists, mostly Crees and Assiniboinés, in 1868 (Sharrock 1974: 112–115). Comparatively across the Plains, it seems that the Sun Dance is consistently the marker for a strongly integrated tribal polity, a tribal nation. Indeed, from a political perspective, the religious content of a Sun Dance is almost irrelevant. What is important is that the ceremony demands the attendance of the bands who are members of the nation, and Sun Dances require the arrangement of these bands into a tribal circle. After the bands have signalled their membership in the nation by arriving at the ceremonies, from a political perspective it almost doesn't matter what takes place under the ceremonial arbor. The symbolism of the tribal circle itself is important for politics, not the ritual paraphernalia. How odd that Wissler could have studied the

Sun Dance comparatively in such detail, but missed the main point — that the Sun Dance provides the main rationale for various and sundry bands, many of them bilingual and multi-ethnic, to demonstrate by their participation in the Sun Dance, their membership in a tribal nation (Wissler 1921).

Conclusions

The very essence of the theory of ethnogenesis, as applied to North America, is the idea that the same conditions which produce a political consolidation among diverse bands also create a discrete and homogeneous language, as well as a homogeneous inventory of material culture as perceived by the archeologist. With this in mind, let us go back to the three original problems laid out in this paper, relating to the lack of fit among extrapolations to the past based respectively on documentary, linguistic and archeological evidence. If in fact the names of polities, language phylogeny, and similarity of material culture all result from the processes of ethnogenesis, then the theory of ethnos has the potential for reconciling the differences among these three classes of cultural data.

Of the three, I think that the pattern of tribal and band names appearing on early documents is most vulnerable to the theory of ethnogenesis. Why do groups appear, disappear, and reappear on early maps and documents with such rapidity? The answer I think is that they are undergoing ethnic processes of various kinds — ethnogenesis, transformations, ethnogeny and assimilation. Named groups in the documents are constantly renaming themselves, inventing new ethnonyms, or else being renamed by other groups, as a consequence of participating in ethnic processes. In my recent book, I try to show how documentary clues can be used to discover ethnic processes at work among Cheyenne bands, and I believe that there are similar documentary clues for uncovering ethnic processes among other Plains groups.

Concerning linguistic opportunities provided by theories of ethnogeny, there are considerable risks involved with abstract theorizing, in part because of the controversies surrounding the postulations of Bickerton and his supporters concerning the consequences of the multilingual situation (Goodman 1985). But nevertheless, stable multilingual situations — the primordial linguistic stew — is well documented not only for North America, but also for other continents (Rhodes and Todd 1981, Yallop 1982: 27–30, Morphy 1979: 2–7). The controversy comes in postulating that creoles and pidgins derived from this stew might represent the origins of many if not all languages and language families. So when we point to the ethnogenic situation, the hybrid band, as an entity capable of inaugurating rapid linguistic change and perhaps a new language, we must be careful to specify what kind of change we are talking about.

First of all, the ethnogenetic band, in the first generation, most likely comprises a mutually bilingual situation, rather than manifesting a pidgin or creole language, although Sharrock and Wolfart both present evidence for „the formation of a marginal (pidgin or creole) language“ (Sharrock 1974: 117). By now a great deal is known about this kind of situation, both from historical studies of written languages like English, which underwent an accelerated hybridization with French in the thirteenth century (Baugh and Cable 1951), and also from the observation of modern languages such as Chicano Spanish, in which it is possible to say, for example, „Si va take una

muchacha el dominant role," in a manner strikingly parallel to Middle English (Penalosa 1980: 58). Wolfart has noted the same kind of „extensive borrowing“ between Cree and Ojibwa (1973: 1317).

But unfortunately for those who wish to postulate that North American languages are capable of very quick phylogenetic divergence, gradualism is still deeply entrenched in the historical linguistics of North American languages. The dominant idea still is that the important nodes of Amerind languages, proto-Algonquian, proto-Hokan, etc., are several millenia removed from the present day. However, the rapidity of change in some languages observed in modern times argues that these nodes could have been much more recent, and the theory of ethnogeny suggests a social mechanism for rapid language change — a situation in which everyone is mutually bilingual, resulting in a new negotiated language, characterized by extensive changes in phonology, morphology, and syntax (Polome 1983, Auer 1984).

The whole idea of linguistic nodes might also be in line for revision. Although much-maligned, the idea of *mischsprache* has been supported by Mary Hass, who quotes Boas as saying that „it is not possible to group American languages rigidly in a genealogical scheme in which each linguistic family is shown to have developed to modern forms, but we have to recognize that many of the languages have multiple roots“ (Haas 1969: 84, Boas 1929: 7). Of the many recent examples of promiscuous speech diffusion which might be cited, especially striking is the case reported by Rhodes, in which speakers of Mitchif exhibit a French noun morphology and a Cree verb morphology (Rhodes 1977).

For interpreting archeological data, the theory of ethnogenesis seems already implicit in many of the syntheses attempted by North American scholars. Like the ethnos, an archeological horizon is seen by North Americans to have a beginning, a period of consolidation and expansion, and a terminus when the people apparently migrate, are transformed into a new ethnos, or become assimilated into other groups. The data and description of American archeology is, I think, already highly congruent with the notion of ethnos, although the vocabulary is very different.

-
- 1.1. My special thanks to Patricia Albers and Helen Tanner for personal discussions which led to the writing of this paper. For their critical comments, I wish to thank Ray Bucko, Jeffery Hanson and Susan Vehik.
 2. Personal communication, Joseph Greenberg, November, 1987.




Figure 1. „Tribal“ names from Lewis and Clark (Moore 1987: 61). Underlined names have clear continuity to later historical times.




Figure 2. Phylogenetic tree of some Amerind languages. Based on information from Greenberg 1987, Michelson 1912 and Goddard 1979.




Figure 3. Archaic cultures known from the archeological record, from Schlesier 1987: 113–115.




Figure 4. Historically-known Plains societies, according to Murdock and O'Leary 1975: 2.

REFERENCES CITED

- Auer, J. C. P. 1984 *Bilingual Conservation*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Baugh, Albert C and Thomas Cable 1951 *A History of the English Language*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Bent, George 1968 *Life of George Bent*. Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
- Boas, Franz 1929 *Classification of American Languages*. Language 5: 1-7. 1983 *Ethnic Processes*, Soviet Ethnographic Studies No. 3. Moscow: Social Sciences Today, USSR Academy of Sciences.
- Brown, Jennifer and Jacqueline Peterson 1985 *The New Peoples*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
- Carroll, John M. 1978 *General Custer and the Battle of the Washita: The Federal View*. Bryan, TX: Guidon.
- Carver, Jonathan 1976 *The Journals of Jonathan Carver*. Edited by John Parker. St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press.
- Creel, Lt. Heber 1879 *Ethnography and Philology of the Cheyenne Indians* (manuscript). Gilcrease Museum Archives; Tulsa, Oklahoma.
- Delanglez, Jean 1941 *Hennepin's Description of Louisiana*. Chicago: Institute of Jesuit History.
- Eldredge, N. and S. J. Gould 1972 *Punctuated equilibria; an alternative to phyletic gradualism*. In *Models in Paleobiology*. T. Schopf, ed. Pp. 82-115. San Francisco: Freeman Cooper.
- Fletcher, Alice 1907 *Arikara*. In *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico* (2 vol.). Frederick W. Hodge, ed. Pp. 83-86. Washington DC: Government Printing Office.
- Giraud, Marcel 1986 *The Me'tis in the Canadian West* (2 vol.). Univ. of Nebraska Press.
- Goddard, Ives 1979 *Comparative Algonquian*. In *The Languages of Native America*. Lyle Campbell and Marianne Mithun, eds. Pp. 70-132.
- Goodman, Morris 1985 *Review of Roots of Language by Derek Bickerton*. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 51 (1): 109-136.
- Greenberg, Adolph M. and James Morrison 1982 *Group Identities in the Boreal Forest: The Origin of the Northern Ojibwa*. *Ethnohistory* 29 (2): 75-102.
- Greenberg, Joseph 1987 *Language in the Americas*. Stanford Univ. Press.
- Grinnell, George B. 1900 *The Indians of To-day*. New York: Duffield. 1962 *The Cheyenne Indians* (2 vol.). New York: Cooper Square.
- Haas, Mary R. 1969 *The Prehistory of Languages*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Harvey, Amy E. 1979 *Oneota Culture in Northwestern Iowa*. Iowa City: Office of the State Archeologist.
- Hayden, F. V. 1863 *Contributions to the Ethnography and Philology of the Indian Tribes of the Missouri Valley*. *American Philosophical Society Transactions*, new series, no. 12. Philadelphia, PA.
- Jennings, Jesse D. 1968 *Prehistory of North America*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Macqueen, J. G. 1986 *The Hittites*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Michelson, Truman 1912 *Preliminary Report on the Linguistic Classification of Algonquian Tribes*. Bureau of American Ethnology Annual Report no. 28. Pp. 221-290.
- Mooney, James 1979 *Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press (1898).
- Morphy, Frances 1979 *Djapu, a Yolngu Dialect*. In *Handbook of Australian Languages*, vol. III. R. M. W. Dixon and B. J. Black, eds. Pp. 1-189. Canberra: The Australian National Univ. Press.
- Murdock, George P. and Timothy J. O'Leary 1975 *Ethnographic Bibliography of North America*, vol. 5. New Haven: Human Relations area Files Press.
- Penalosa, Fernando 1980 *Chicano Sociolinguistics*. Rowly, MA: Newbury House.
- Polome, Edgar 1983 *Creolization and Language Change*. In *The Social Context of Creolization*. Ellen Woolford and William Washabaugh, eds. Pp. 126-136. Ann Arbor: Karoma.
- Prowers, John 1865 *Testimony in Sand Creek Massacre Investigation Report*. Senate Executive Document no. 26, 39th Congress, 2d Session. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Rhodes, Richard A. 1977 *French Cree - A Case of Borrowing*. In *Papers of the eighth Algonquian Conference*. William Cowan, ed. Pp. 6-25. Ottawa: Carleton Univ. Press.
- Rhodes, Richard A. and Evelyn M. Todd 1981 *Subarctic Algonquian Languages*. In *Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 6. Subarctic. June Helm, ed. Pp. 52-85. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution.

- Schlesier, Karl 1987 *The Wolves of Heaven*. Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
- Stoltman, James B. 1978 Temporal Models in Prehistory: An Example from Eastern North America. *Current Anthropology* 19 (4): 703-729.
- Strong, William D. 1935 *An Introduction to Nebraska Archeology*. Smithsonian Institution Miscellaneous Collections vol. 93, no. 10.
- Tanner, Helen H. 1986 *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
- Thomsen, Marie-Louise 1984 *The Sumerian Language*. Copenhagen Studies in Assyriology vol. 10. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.
- Thwaites, Reuben Gold 1896 *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*. Cleveland: Burrows Bros.
- Trigger, Bruce C. 1982 Ethnohistory: Problems and Prospects. *Ethnohistory* 29 (1): 1-19.
- Wedel, Mildred M. and Raymond J. DeMallie 1980 The Ethnohistorical Approach in Plains Area Studies. In *Anthropology on the Great Plains*. W. Raymond Wood and Margot Liberty, eds. Pp. 110-128. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
- Wedel, Waldo R. 1961 *Prehistoric Man on the Great Plains*. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
- Wissler, Clark 1921 *The Sun Dance of the Plains Indians*. Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History no. 16.
- Wolfart, H. Christoph 1973 Boundary Maintenance in Algonquian: A Linguistic Study of Island Lake, Manitoba. *American Anthropologist* 72 (5): 1305-1323.
- Wood, W. Raymond 1971 *Biesterfeldt: A Post-Contact Coalescent Site on the Northeastern Plains*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- 1981 *The Explorations of the La Verendryes in the Northern Plains, 1738-43*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
- Yallop, Colin 1982 *Australian Aboriginal Languages*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

IRENA ŠUMI

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja/Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana

THE ETHNIC QUESTION

Some reflections upon the 12th ICAES Symposia dealing with ethnic problematics (Zagreb, July 24–31, 1988).*

In attempting to provide an overview on the papers presented in symposia dealing with the ethnic and related questions at the 12th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences held in Zagreb last year, the contribution of Fred W. Riggs (Univ. of Hawaii) can serve as a starting point. His paper titled *Modes of Ethnicity* certainly offered a most decisive answers concerning the phenomena of ethnicity and the ethnic. According to Riggs, ethnicity can be determined with respect to the contrasts as felt by the members and non-members respectively of given distinguishable communities. Thereby the contextuality of individual situations, the majority-minority relations, and the qualities and contents of *endo-perception* (self-understanding) as opposed to *exo-perception* (understandings of non-members) are treated as decisive. Among the most dynamic variables that characterize modern *ethnicities*¹, the author has placed the universal norm of *equality*, which is the main diacritic between the *revisionist* and *defensive* outward behavior of a given ethnos; the former is marked by struggle for realization of equality, and the later by defence of the achieved *status quo*.

Riggs goes on with a systemization of the existing ethnic situations in the modern World on three primary orders, the *primary*, *secondary*, and *tertiary ethnicity*. Some situations, however, he qualifies as non-ethnic (eg, the religiously determinable) or compound, the *traditional* and *marginal*, according to a set of criteria, such as various existing levels of nationalism, which he conceives of as dependent of the objective situation of a given ethnic community; the relation between the community and state; *transnationality*, etc. In order to deal with thus conceived orders, Riggs introduces a number of categories, eg. *ethnonationalism*, *state nationalism*, *dominant subnation*, *ethnostate*, the distinction between *homeland* and *hostland* in dealing with migration processes, the category of TEC (*Trans-state Ethnic Community*), etc.

While we would think Riggs' treatise on equality as a universal maxim, well-founded in European tradition of political history, and therefore characteristic of ethnic processes in modern World extremely important – and not coincidental for the author, who is a distinguished scholar in political science – this courage, universal

* A more extensive overview of the 12th ICAES will be published in Slovene in the forthcoming issue of ANTHROPOS, Ljubljana, vol. 1988, No. 1.

¹ For possible conceptual differences between *ethnos* and *ethnicity* as opposed to *ethnie*, see Anthony D. Smith (London School of Economics, Great Britain), *Social and Cultural Conditions of Ethnic Survival*, in this volume.

systemization of current ethnic processes was met with some skepticism on the part of non-American members of the symposium. Though the briefly described paper, included in this volume, was delivered at the **CURRENT ETHNIC PROCESSES** symposium, the main debate on Riggs' conceptualizations was held in the **ETHNIC TERMINOLOGY** symposium, presided by the author himself. Riggs' contribution is closely linked to an international scientific project currently underway, sponsored by UNESCO, known as **THE INTERCOCTA GLOSSARY, INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTUAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES**. At the time of the congress, three drafts were completed: the American, the French, and the Soviet. The **GLOSSARY** project is an attempt towards collecting, systemizing, and eventual unification of technical terminology in ethnic research. While the Soviet draft glossary remains tightly locked within the known theoretic frames of social evolutionism, the stress on ethnogenesis, and the concept of culture such as fits the trefoil systemization (reduction?) of human phenomenon on the material, the social, and the spiritual, the differences between the American and the French draft glossaries are of single importance and may well develop into a fruitful battlefield for future endeavours of **INTERCOCTA** glossary teams. Namely, the most striking and evident difference between the two drafts is the ambition of the later to present the **exact historical provenience** of the terminology discussed, and the firm linking of the **fixated meanings** of the terms to the historic development of social sciences in France and Europe; with such conceptualization, an essential quality is being achieved, which partly exceeds the frames of a glossary: a clear and systematic comparison is thus rendered possible among the many and sometimes equivalent systems of marcation developed within various, subsequent or synchronic, theoretical orientations. The American draft, on the other hand, aimed towards searching for, and defining a set of terms and syntagms, whose primary ambition is to embody non-value-bound, non-theory-bound, or even, non-ideology-bound technical glossary. While there cannot be serious doubts as to the need for developing such terminology, the orientation of the American team is somewhat reminiscent of the historical ambitions within American social sciences tradition which have time and again concentrated on creating new, holistic systems of marcation, inevitably, of course, backed with new, (somewhat exceedingly) holistic theoretic background. In the light of two issues, central in American social sciences (anthropology) for decades, namely the issue of historicism on the one hand, and the issue of Europocentrism on the other, we can state that every „new“ system of marcation inevitably reduces historic experiences which underlay the phenomena under inspection, and therefore renounces their actual complexity. There can be no doubt that the model of three orders of ethnic communities, the primary, the secondary, and the tertiary, is highly adequate as a theoretic model, and that it may as well prove to be highly operational in certain ways (among the authors in this volume, **Robert H. Jackson** incorporated, and commented upon some of the concepts included in both the American **INTERCOCTA** glossary version and those presented in Riggs' paper); but it should also be kept in mind that the model actually **reduces the historical** by way of creating a hierarchy, based on a kind of age-area hypothesis: the predominant European experience is thus inevitably treated as primary stratum, while little or none terminological apparatus has been incorporated to indicate at least the fact that in historical as well as in essentialist terms, European model of social evolution was **forced upon** the rest of the World, whose current transformations are being classed as

tertiary. In short, the American version of the glossary insists, while bringing about extremely important conceptions and terminology, on the here-and-now point of view; hopefully, with the feedback of European versions, it can add also the historic dimension. Nevertheless, the endeavours of Riggs and the American team, Eric de Grolier and the French team, and the Soviet team are to be classed as the most significant contribution of the conference, the part of it that dealt with ethnic problematics.

As stated above, these reflections easily fell into the body of problematics of cultural relativism, a hot issue ever since the 20's, and especially after World War II in American anthropology; we may for purposes of this discussion somewhat grimly nod at the fact that currently, the relativist stress seems to get transferred from classical anthropological heterology, once embracing largely the so-called „primitive“ or „under-developed“ societies, to the warming up of East-West relations. The symposia, jointly organized by Soviet and American scholars, were too many to go unnoticed; and as it is hardly surprising, such was also the symposium we wish to briefly review: the already mentioned, marathonic CURRENT ETHNIC PROCESSES symposium (presided by S. Devetak, Institut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana; L. Drobizheva, The Academy of Sciences of the USSR; and K. Verdery, The Johns Hopkins University, USA). A good half of papers included in this volume were first presented there.

Political contextuality, however, did not remain confined to the level of organization; to the contrary, a number of papers presented at the CURRENT ETHNIC PROCESSES symposium speculated that the terms *ethnos* and *ethnicity* possess explicit political contents. Virginia R. Dominguez (Duke University, USA) challenged the concept of the ethnic in context with the concept of minority on the example of Louisiana's Cajuns, and compared their situation to that in modern Israel, in her paper titled *The Management of Otherness*. The Cajuns, offsprings of French Canadians in the Southeast from the days before the Revolution, which have recently acquired the status of an ethnic minority in Louisiana, are in all „cultural“ respects representative for American mainstream society. Their newly acquired status, which carries along certain privileges and bonuses granted by the federal and state authorities, was reported to have revolted Blacks and other deprived social groups. This situation the authoress paralleled to the one in Israel, where the Arabic segment of the population is not only denied to possess characteristics (and status) of an ethnicity, but for sake of ideological premises, large cultural differences among Jewish population of various provenience are being ignored. The phenomenon of the ethnic thus is not, according to Dominguez, „the fact of cultural or social differences among sections of human population“, but rather „a particular attitude towards cultural or social difference“, and by extent, a question of the „management of Otherness“. The term itself, ethnicity, is thus just a recent substitute for various older terms defining what she finds to be primarily the differences in political treatment of various groups.

Katherine Verdery had in her paper also concentrated on the relation between the ethnic and culture. By examining the data obtained in field work in Romania, she had addressed herself to the problem of possible ethnic character of certain regionally maintained features she summarized as *stereotypes*. Verdery's final point made in a refreshing, unrestrained, but nevertheless concise paper was that *ethnos* and *ethnicity* definitely are political categories; the potential transsubstantiation of the regional into ethnic should be, according to Verdery, more carefully studied from the point of view

of self-images present in a regional population, and not limited to the understandings (and realizations) of narrow elites that function as factors of consolidation. The authoress had managed to outline an opposition of considerable originality when compared to more usual dilemmas in distinguishing, say, the ethnic from the national, the national from that of state, etc (in the present volume, Dušan Janjić /University of Belgrade/ and Sreča Perunović /Institut za narodnosti i migracije, Zagreb/, whose papers were not presented at the symposium in question, deal with these). A similar line of analysis could perhaps be applied to our home studies of Slovene ethnic minorities in neighbouring countries, as Miran Komac (Institut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana) showed in his paper², which was due to the absence of the author not presented at the congress.

The question of culture as related to ethnicity was dealt with in a series of papers. The tendency of rendering legitimacy to the ethnic in contrast with older tendencies in anthropology, which concentrated on the concept of culture, was recognizable in the contribution of Jean E. Jackson (MIT, Cambridge, USA). In the paper titled *Linguistic Exogamy in the Northwest Amazon and the Concept of Culture* (for technical reasons not included in this volume) dealing with indigenous population of Northwest Amazon, she had argued against the perpetuation of the concept of culture and its classical connotations. By producing evidence that linguistic homogeneity does not condition the existence of „traditional“ political systems, as it does not modern political entities, she went on to state that culture therefore is not a natural fact, but a dynamic process entirely in the hands of its protagonists, and that a successful economic and social system is the frame within which the protagonists build the contents we refer to as culture. Jackson thus categorically negated the old anthropological view, according to which all social (family, clan, inter-clan, political, economical...) relations are subject to static, traditional culture of taboos and similar „irrational“ principles.

Comparable results, though within different methodological and theoretical frame, and based on data from a different social setting, were presented by John H. Moore (University of Oklahoma, USA) in the paper titled *Ethnos and Ethnic Process on the North American Plains*. Not unlike Jackson, Moore has challenged the old (Eurocentric!) concept of classical tribalism of American Natives in the Plains within past two centuries and a half. Initially, Moore comments the many disparities with regard to tribal names and locations in early reports and considers the archaeological evidence as well as the linguistic. The inevitable exogamy of various groups (due to historical subsistence routines predominantly small in number, and due to universal prohibition of incest) lead to formation of bi- and sometimes multilingual communities. The *nation-building processes* in the Plains could have, and have indeed, resulted in both atomization of larger groups as well as in forming of *tribal nations* within relatively short periods of time. Moore's paper has thus not only relativized certain classical anthropological concepts, such as tribe, but also introduced an explicitly

2 *An Interdisciplinary Model for Ethnic Minorities Research*. To be published under title: *Kaj se dogaja znotraj manjšin? Antropologizacija zgodovine kot metodološki prispevek k proučevanju slovenskih nacionalnih manjšin*. Teorija in praksa (Ljubljana), XV 1988/9-10, pp. 1938 - 1242.

dynamic understanding of ethnic process. Furthermore, as Moore has treated his subject according to some Soviet ethnogenetic methodologies, we would venture to say that Marxist approach is, if not the only one, certainly a powerful instrument for introducing historical perspective into a vast body of data on North American Natives, the one field that anthropology, and social science in general, owes so much: an organized historical perspective that finally tells something of inter-group relations, which were marginalized or neglected in classical monographies on various groups.

While Moore's paper presented a firm, balanced relation between the ethnic and the cultural, some authors have on the other hand called for revitalization of the later concept. Eric R. Wolf (City University, USA), had in his paper titled *Ethnicity and Nationhood* defined the concept of culture as „... a legacy of time when we thought in essentialist terms“, and stressed the need for a „more organizational perspective“. Theodor Veiter, the doyen of Austrian and European minority experts, also called attention to the concept culture, which is not reductable to ethnicity, much as language is not, in his paper titled *Political Notion of Ethnicity*. A similar point was made also, among others, by Cesare Poppi (University of East Anglia, Great Britain) in his paper on the Ladins titled *Markers of Distinctiveness*.

Our home, Yugoslav problematics was represented in the symposium by the paper titled *The Ethnic Attitudes of Youth in Yugoslavia*, authored by Sergej Flere (University of Novi Sad). His highly informative and carefully presented study of the emergence of new ethnic identity among Yugoslav youth, who in certain percent tend to give up their national identity for sake of general, Yugoslave affiliation is in this volume complemented with the analysis of the same phenomenon authored by Vjeran Katunarić (University of Zagreb).

It was the later issue that caused some debate in the all too short discussion upon the closing of symposium. The new, Yugoslave „ethnic“ identity was presented as an evidence in support of the thesis of rapid transformations within ethnic processes; there has even been an opinion heard that an individual may possess several ethnic identities. Such and the like arguments may at least serve — despite their striking methodological inaccuracy — as a proof that acute problematics is being worked upon; in stark contrast, however, it has been heard from the part of Soviet members of the symposium that it is the task of ethnologists to determine whether a group is ethnic or not in order to support, or negate, the ethnic claims of various groups. Needless to say, this particular understanding of applicative science was received with vigorous objections.

A comparably determined point was made, though more categorically still, by Indian anthropologist M. Singh (paper not included in this volume). The term ethnicity nowadays stands to signify what are basically racial differences in India which were back in colonial times also legitimized as such, he stated in the discussion. His argumentation provoked numerous contradictions, despite the comprehensiveness of his point, which can also be paralleled to that of the Cajuns: there is hardly anything complicated in the fact of substituting the attribute „racial“ for that of „ethnic“, as there is hardly anything difficult to grasp about the fact that Cajuns have won the application of the only legal instrument within their reach, the juridical status of ethnic minority, in order to affirm their distinctive self-understanding. The argumentation to the contrary, however, insisted on categorical contents of technical terminology, at the absence of any attempts to bring home another important point: namely, the

distinction between the theory and *praxis*, what may be understood as the inability of the (ahistoric?) social science to differentiate clearly among the various levels of the public, the political, the journalistic, and the juridical on the one hand, and the theoretical systemizations and models on the other.

Let us then summarize: the discussion about ethnicity and ethnos at the CURRENT ETHNIC PROCESSES symposium of the 12th ICAES had in a rather awkward manner interlaced a number of understandings and systems of marcation, whereby mutual translations were largely absent. Nevertheless, the papers included in this volume, and supplemented with selected contributions not presented at the congress (or those presented at other symposia), expose a few important dilemmas: first of all, the question of culture in relation to ethnos and ethnicity. The old anthropological concept of culture, once conceived of as an entity composed of evenly distributed elements of personality, traditions, ceremony, cooking, language, political orientations, religion... and whatnot, is now more and more seen as a particular, extremely dynamic quality of human groups, more a catalyst than a solid substance. From such a point of view, time-honored (ethnological) concepts like, say, „way of life“ became vague, and their inherent static quality problematic. The more holistic, anthropological perspective proved that it can articulate dilemmas of the kind. Should we conclude with a diagnosis, let us hazard to say that it is the political that is gaining attention in social science. In a world of warming-up of relations between yesterday's obstinate oppositions this can be, considering the dialectic of all human, hardly a surprise.

MARINKA LAZIĆ

JANEZ STERGAR

Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana

BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND BIOGRAPHIES OF THE WORKERS OF THE INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC STUDIES IN THE YEAR 1988

In order to provide an up-to-date information on the research work of the IES, the editorial board has decided to publish a bibliography of the workers of the Institute that comprehends a one-year survey of the accomplished work.

The present issue includes also the biographies of the new workers; the rest of them were published in the 19th and 20th issue of the Journal of Ethnic Studies.

The bibliography is divided into two clusters – the published and the unpublished works. Dissertations, M. A. theses and research projects are the first among the unpublished works, whereas the units within each cluster are arranged in alphabetical order. The bibliographic data of the published units have been limited only to the most essential ones. Such classification was adopted in order to make the bibliography easily surveyable.

The titles of the published works are printed in bold type, the unpublished expert works and papers delivered at different meetings are printed in italics.

The established abbreviation RiG denotes the works that were published in *Revija za narodnostna vprašanja: razprave in gradivo* = Journal of Ethnic Studies: Treatises and Documents. Concerning the booklet *Ponižani in razžaljeni* (The Debased and Offended), only the second, revised and bilingual, edition was ranked into the bibliography, despite the fact that the first, monolingual edition, was published in the same year.

BIBLIOGRAFIJE IN BIOGRAFIJE DELAVCEV INŠTITUTA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA V LETU 1988

Po odločitvi uredništva, da vsako leto bralce naše revije seznanimo z bibliografijo sodelavcev INV, objavljamo drugi enoletni prikaz opravljenega dela.

Biografije smo vključili le pri novih sodelavcih INV, medtem ko so bile ostale objavljene v 19. in 20. številki RiG-a.

Bibliografijo smo razvrstili v dva sklopa in sicer v objavljena in neobjavljena dela. Med objavljenimi so na prvem mestu disertacije, magistrske naloge in raziskovalne

naloge, v okviru posameznega sklopa pa so dela razvrščena po abecedi. Pri opisu objavljenih del smo uporabili skrajšan bibliografski opis. Tako razvrstitev smo sprejeli predvsem zato, ker bibliografija obsega le eno leto in je kljub temu dovolj pregledna.

Naslovi objavljenih del so natisnjeni v polkrepkem tisku, neobjavljena strokovna dela in referati so v kurzivnem tisku, v opombah pa so ostali podatki, ki pojasnjujejo posamezno enoto.

Pri bibliografskih enotah, ki so bile objavljene v Reviji za narodnostna vprašanja: razprave in gradivo = Journal of Ethnic Studies: Treatises and Documents, smo uporabljali uveljavljeno kratico RiG. Pri brošuri Ponížani in razžaljeni, pa smo upoštevali samo drugo predelano, dvojezično izdajo, čeprav je izšla prva, enojezična, v istem letu.

SILVO DEVETAK

Alpe-Adria as a multinational region. – Journal of the Society for Slovene Studies (Edmonton), 10, 1988, 1, str. 27–35

Diriti e doveri nelle società pluriculturali. – V: Popoli e radici culturali. – Vicenza: Edizioni del Rezzara, 1988. – str. 123–134

The equality of nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia: successes and dilemmas. – Wien: Braumüller, 1988, 136 str. – (Ethnos; 32)

Etnički konflikti i socialističko društvo. – Sveske (Sarajevo), 1988, 22–23, str. 45–52

Kome je potreban razdor : odgovor na tekst M. Milenkovića „Silvo Devetak na pogrešnom megdanu“. – Politika (Beograd), 26. 5. 1988, str. 18

Kdo ogroža obstoj Jugoslavije. – Delo (Ljubljana), 7. 5. 1988, str. 27

Manjšine in pravice: povabljen k razmišljanju. – Delo (Ljubljana), 13. 2. 1988, str. 24

Minority education in Carinthia – co-existence or fragmentation (selected documents) / (ed. Silvo Devetak, Majda Šulc, Boris Jesih). – Ljubljana: Institute for Ethnic Studies, 1988, 160 str.

Načelnost ali pragmatizem? : povabljen k razmišljanju. – Delo (Ljubljana), 30. 1. 1988, str. 36

National minorities and cultural – educational cooperation between Yugoslavia and its neighbours. – Europa Ethnica (Wien), 1988, 1, str. 6–9

Nerešena vprašanja evropskih manjšin tlijo pod pepelom. – Primorski dnevnik (Trst), 23. 2. 1988, str. 2

Nerešeno manjšinsko vprašanje na avstrijskem Koroškem: beseda urednika; V: Šolstvo za Slovence na Koroškem – sožitje ali ločevanje? – Ljubljana 1988, str. 4–12

Pravice (in dolžnosti) manjšin v večkulturnih družbah. – RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 17–25. Izšlo 1988

Razdruževalni dejavnik v jugoslovanski skupnosti : sovjetski koncept razporejanja nacionalnih pristojnosti ne velja več. – Naši razgledi (Ljubljana), 15. 1. 1988, str. 18–19

Razprava v duhu strpnosti in iskanja novih prvin. – Primorski dnevnik (Trst), 18. 2. 1988, str. 4

Reč je o konstrukcijama: povodom teksta pod naslovom „Najveća pretnja opstanku Jugoslavije je unutar naših granica“. – Politika (Beograd), 8. 5. 1988, str. 20

- Silvo Devetak o izjavah ministra Maccanica. – Primorski dnevnik (Trst), 6. 10. 1988, str. 3
- Sodobne dileme demokratičnega socializma: kaj nas krepi, kaj ločuje? – Delo (Ljubljana), 7. 5. 1988, str. 25
- Šolstvo za Slovence na Koroškem – sožitje ali ločevanje? / (ur.) Silvo Devetak, Majda Šulc, Boris Jesih. – Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 1988, 269 str.
- The unsolved minority question in Austrian Carinthia: a word from the editor. – V. Minority education in Carinthia – co-existence or fragmentation (selected documents). – Ljubljana, 1988, str. 3–9
- Vedno glasneje za svoje pravice. – Primorski dnevnik (Trst), 13. 3. 1988, str. 3 (Intervju)
- Doktorska disertacija: *Manjine i Ujedinjene nacije – nove mednarodnopravne tendencije*. INV, 1988, 562 str. + 40 str. bibliografije. – Pravna fakulteta Univerze v Sarajevu
- Ethnic aspects of the yugoslav crisis*. – Predavanje v Österreichisches Ost- und Südost-Europa Institut, 25. 10. 1988
- Ethnic policies in multicultural societies*. – Referat na 12. svetovnem kongresu antropologov in etnologov v Zagrebu, 24.–31. 7. 1988
- European minorities and human rights*. – Referat na mednarodni konferenci „Human rights and religious freedom, for peace in the spirit of Helsinki“, Veneto, 3.–6. 2. 1988
- Novi pristupi zapadne Evrope manjinama*. – INV, 1988, 45 str.
- Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje v luči socio-ekonomskega in političnega razvoja Slovenije oziroma Jugoslavije*. – Referat na simpoziju „Dve kulturi za jutrišnjo Evropo“, Benetke 12.–13. 12. 1988

META GOSTINČAR CERAR

Rojena 18. 2. 1955 v Ljubljani. Na Filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani je 1982 diplomirala iz umetnostne zgodovine in angleščine. Kot bibliotekar je delala v Jugoslovanskem centru za teorijo in prakso samoupravljanja v Ljubljani, od leta 1986 pa na INV.

Izbor na novo pridobljenih knjig v knjižnici INV. – RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 277–280. Izšlo 1988

BORIS JESIH

- Apovnik Pavel. Grilec Matevž. Haderlap Maja. – Kdo je kdo med Slovenci na avstrijskem Koroškem: poskusni snopič. – Ljubljana, 1988, str. 9–10, 24, 26 (Soavtor)
- Minority education in Carinthia – co-existence or fragmentation (selected documents) / (ed. Silvo Devetak, Majda Šulc, Boris Jesih). – Ljubljana: Institute for Ethnic Studies, 1988, 160 str.
- Pogled v socialno strukturo koroških Slovencev. – RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 185–206. Izšlo 1988
- Slovenci na avstrijskem Stajerskem. – Vestnik koroških partizanov (Ljubljana), 22. 1988, 3–4, str. 55–62

Konceptualizacija prostora in narodnostna manjšina. – Goriški letnik (Nova Gorica), 15–16, 1988

Rezija/Resia: zapis o ljudeh na zahodnem obrobju slovenskega etničnega ozemlja. – RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 141–156. Izšlo 1988

Magistrska naloga: Slovenska narodnostna manjšina v Italiji. – INV, 1988, 254 str. – Fakulteta za sociologijo, politične vede in novinarstvo, Ljubljana.

Raziskovalna naloga: Kultura in identiteta narodnostne manjšine: (primer Slovencev v Videmski pokrajini). – INV, 1988, 96 str.

Raziskovalna naloga: Politična socializacija pripadnikov slovenske manjšine v Italiji. – INV, 1988, 99 str.

An interdisciplinary approach to an ethnic minority research. – Referat na 12. svetovnem kongresu antropologov in etnologov v Zagrebu, 24.–31. 7. 1988 (brez udeležbe), 8 str.

Možnosti za enoten nastop slovenske manjšine v Italiji ob ohranjanju pluralističnih interesov. – INV, 1988, 17 str.

Emigracija – Zveza beneških izseljencev – razvoj slovenske narodnostne manjšine v Videmski pokrajini: razvoj od leta 1968–1980 I. del. – INV, 1988, 125 str.

Emigracija – Zveza beneških izseljencev – razvoj slovenske narodnostne manjšine v Videmski pokrajini: od leta 1980–1988. – II. del. – INV, 1988, 102 str.

SAMO KRISTEN

Baski. Škoti. – V: Ponižani in razžaljeni = Erniedrigte und Beleidigte. 2. erw. Aufl. – Šentjakob/St. Jakob i. R., 1988

Ocena: Lujo Tončič-Sorinj: Erfüllte Träume. Kroatien – Österreich – Europa. – Wien; München: Almathea Verlag, 1982. – 479 str. – Zgodovinski časopis (Ljubljana), 42, 1988, 2, str. 308–310

Trst spomladi 1945 v luči italijanskih pričevanj. – RiG (Ljubljana) 1987, 20, str. 223–234. Izšlo 1988.

Raziskovalna naloga: Tržaška kriza spomladi 1945 v luči zavezniških, italijanskih in jugoslovanskih pričevanj. – INV, 1988, 102 str.

Tržaška kriza maja in junija 1945 v pričevanju jugoslovanskih sodobnikov. – INV, 1988, 44 str.

MARINKA LAZIĆ

Rojena 25. 3. 1949 v Velikih Blokah. Diplomirala na Pedagoški akademiji v Ljubljani smer knjižničarstvo – zgodovina. Na INV zaposlena od leta 1977; opravlja dela in naloge višjega knjižničarja.

Bibliografije in biografije delavcev INV v letu 1987. – RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 261–269. Izšlo leta 1988

Chronological Review of the Selected Bibliography of the Author (1979–88). – V: Silvo Devetak: The Equality of Nations and Nationalities in Yugoslavia. – Wien, 1988, str. 133–136

KARMEN MEDICA

- Armenci. Eritreji. Kurdi. Palestinci. Staroselci afriškega juga. — V: Ponižani in razžaljeni = Erniedrigte und Beleidigte. 2. erw. Aufl. — Šentjakob/St. Jakob i. r., 1988
- Socialno demografske značilnosti slovenske Istre po letu 1945. — RiG (Ljubljana) 1987, 20, str. 81–104. Izšlo 1988.
- Raziskovalna naloga: *Narodnostna in migracijska problematika Slovenske Istre*. — INV, 1988, 123 str.
- Kulturna identiteta narodnostno mešanega ozemlja Slovenske Istre*. — INV, 1988, 48 str.

RENATA MEJAK

- „A magyarok és szlovénok — együttműködés és együttes határ mentén“ c. kutatásról. — Naptár/’88 (Murska Sobota), 1987, str. 35–42. — Izšlo 1988
- Narodnostna politika in procesi demokratizacije na Madžarskem. — Komunist, (Ljubljana), 7. 10. 1988 stran 21–22
- O nekaterih vprašanih ohranjanja slovenske manjšine v Porabju. — Vestnik koroških partizanov (Ljubljana), 22, 1988, 3–4, str. 63–72
- Slovesna narodnost v Porabju — položaj, problemi, možnosti vzgoje in izobraževanja. — RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 111–126. — Izšlo 1988
- Informacija o položaju slovenske manjšine v Porabju*. — INV, 1988, 40 str. (Gradivo za posvet, Medakademijski odbor pri SAZU za proučevanje nacionalnih manjšin)
- Prispevki k spoznavanju slovenske manjšine v Porabju*. — INV, 1988, 96 str.
- Razvoj narodnostnega šolstva v Porabju po letu 1945*. — INV, 1988, 26 str.

SONJA NOVAK LUKANOVIČ

- Bilingual education in Yugoslavia: some experiences in the field of education for national minorities/nationalities in Yugoslavia. — Journal of multilingual and multicultural development (Avon), 9, 1988, 1–2, p. 169–176
- Dvojezična osnovna šola v Prekmurju: kam in kako potem? — RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, št. 105–110. Izšlo 1988
- Ocena: Pre-primary education in some european lesser used languages: review of Helen o Murchu's book. — Baile Atha Cliath, 1987. — Regional Contacts (Copenhagen), 1988, 1, p. 88–90
- Dvojezična osnovna šola: kam in kako potem?* : obdelava podatkov ankete: II. del. — INV, 1988, 9 str.
- Dvojezična osnovna šola: kam in kako potem?* — III. del. — INV, 1988, 10 str.
- Equality of the nations and nationalities national minorities in the field of education — some experiences of Yugoslavia*. — Referat na AERA Conference, April 5–9 1988 New Orleans Louisiana. — (American educational research association annual conference) (brez udeležbe)
- Experiences in bilingual education in Slovenia*. — Referat na 11th Conference „Europe of regions“ — regionalism in practise. — Copenhagen, June 23–27, 1988

Šolstvo za Slovence na Koroškem – sožitje ali ločevanje? / (ur.) Silvo Devetak, Majda Šulc, Boris Jesih. – Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 1988, 269 str.

Raziskovalna naloga: *Možnosti političnega povezovanja manjšine z novimi političnimi gibanji v Avstriji.* – INV, 1988, 68 str. + pril.

Manjšinska problematika v avstrijskem parlamentu po izvolitvi slovenskega poslanca (od novembra 1986 do novembra 1988). INV, 1988, 18 str. + pril.

Primerjava reševanja manjšinskega vprašanja na avstrijskem Koroškem in na Južnem Tirolskem s posebnim poudarkom na manjšinski zakonodaji. – INV, 1988, 21 str.

VLADIMIR KLEMENČIČ

Rojen v Ljubljani 10. 7. 1926. Leta 1951 je diplomiral na filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani iz geografije, etnologije in narodne zgodovine s sociologijo, leta 1957 doktoriral z disertacijo Pokrajina med Snežnikom in Slavnikom, leta 1972 izvoljen za rednega profesorja. Od leta 1960 je predstojnik Katedre za družbeno geografijo na FF. 1962–1980 je bil direktor Geografskega inštituta univerze v Ljubljani, 1985–87 predstojnik Oddelka za geografijo.

V zadnjih tridesetih letih je opravljal funkcije podpredsednika in predsednika Geografskega društva Slovenije ter podpredsednika Zveze geografskih društev Jugoslavije. 1978–80 je bil predsednik Izvršilnega odbora Raziskovalne skupnosti Slovenije. Dejaven v strokovnih telesih Raziskovalne skupnosti Slovenije, Republiške skupščine Slovenije in RK SZDL Slovenije. Od 1988 vodi mednarodnega projekta univerz Ljubljane, Celovca, Vidma in Trsta „Tromeja“. Kot gost je predaval na evropskih univerzah in univerzah v ZDA in Avstraliji. Je dopisni član geografskih društev Italije, Münchna in Poljske ter častni član srbskega in makedonskega geografskega društva. Je dopisni član Inštituta za Jugovzhodno Evropo v Münchnu in Nemške akademije za proučevanje prostora in planiranje pokrajine. Za kritično vrednotenje popisov po občevalnem jeziku je dobil nagrado sklada Borisa Kidriča. Prejel je več jugoslovanskih odlikovanj in plaketo Tržaške pokrajine.

Kot raziskovalec prostorskih, socialno-ekonomskih in demografskih problemov narodnostno mešanih območij je že od študentskih let sodeloval z INV in objavljaj tudi v publikacijah inštituta. Svet INV ga je 21. 11. 1988 izvolil za vršilca dolžnosti ravnatelja Inštituta za narodnostna vprašanja.

Bibliografija za leto 1988 je podana le v izboru.

Causes of social-geographic changes and valuation of urbanization in rural-urban migrational processes in Slovenia. – Development and redistribution of population and labour force in agrarian regions of european socialist and capitalist countries. Greifswald 1988, str. 43–54. – (Greifswalder geographische Arbeiten; 6)

Celovec. – Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zv. Ce–Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 17–20. (Soavtor)

Die Deutschen in der Statistik des jugoslawischen Slowenien zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen. V: Geschichte der Deutschen in Bereich des heutigen Slowenien 1948–1941 = Zgodovina Nemcev na območju današnje Slovenije 1848–1941. – Wien; München, 1988, str. 241–247 (Schriftenreihe des Österreichischen Ost-und Südosteuropa Institut; 13)

- Djekše. — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zv. Ce—Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 270–271.
- Dobrla vas. — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zv. Ce—Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 275.
- Družbeno-gospodarska preobrazba slovenskega prostora. — V: XXIV. Seminar slovenskega jezika, literature in kulture, 4.–16. julij 1988. — Ljubljana, 1988, str. 179–190. Ponatis: Vestnik koroških partizanov (Ljubljana), 22, 1988, 3–4, str. 40–54.
- Državna meja na območju SR Slovenije in obmejna območja kot nov geografski fenomen. — RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 57–79. Izšlo 1988.
- Koroški pedagoški model dvojezičnega šolstva — paradoks sodobne Evrope. — Naši razgledi (Ljubljana), 37, 1988, 3, str. 67–68.
- Problemi evropskih manjšin na primeru Slovencev v Italiji in Italijanov v SRS. — Primorski dnevnik (Trst), 28. 4. 1988, str. 11.
- Slovenes in Australia.* — Predavanje v Canberri, Avstralija, julij 1988. 9 str. + 4 zvd. (Soavtor Mateja Račič)

VERA KLOPČIČ

- Enakopravnost narodov in narodnosti v pravnem sistemu SFRJ (aktualni trendi). — Pravniki (Ljubljana), 43, 1988, 5–7, str. 357–362.
- Jugoslovanstvo in „jugoslovanstvo“ — pristopi v aktualni strokovni publicistiki. — RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 235–246. Izšlo 1988.
- Medunacionalni odnosi u jugoslovenskom društvu. — Sveske (Sarajevo), 1988, 22–23, str. 277–286.
- Romi. — V: Ponižani in razžaljeni = Erniedrigte und Beleidigte. — 2. erw. Aufl. — Šentjakob/St. Jakob i. R., 1988.
- Raziskovalna naloga: *Pravni položaj narodnosti: uresničevanje narodnostne enakopravnosti v delu pravosodnih organov v SRS.* — INV, 1988, 65 str.
- Antifašizem. — Referat za srečanje „Fašizem in antifašizem danes“, Strunjan 10. 11. 1988, 9 str.
- Možnosti za internacionalizacijo šolskega vprašanja na avstrijskem Koroškem. — INV, 1988, 29 str.
- Posebne pravice otroke. — Referat na mednarodnem simpoziju „Ljudska prava i nacionalne slobode“, Sarajevo 23.–24. 10. 1988, 12 str.

MIRAN KOMAC

- Kaj se dogaja znotraj manjšin? Antropologizacija zgodovine kot metodološki prispevek k proučevanju slovenskih nacionalnih manjšin. — Teorija in praksa (Ljubljana), 25, 1988, 9–10, str. 1238–1242.
- Furlani. Slovenci. Ladinci. Korzičani. — V: Ponižani in razžaljeni = Erniedrigte und Beleidigte. — 2. erw. Aufl. — Šentjakob/St. Jakob i. R., 1988.
- Kanalska dolina/Val Canale. — RiG, (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 157–183. Soavtor: Salvatore Venossi. — Izšlo 1988.

Konceptualizacija prostora in narodnostna manjšina. – Goriški letnik (Nova Gorica), 15–16, 1988

Rezija/Resia: zapis o ljudeh na zahodnem obrobju slovenskega etničnega ozemlja. – RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 141–156. Izšlo 1988

Magistrska naloga: Slovenska narodnostna manjšina v Italiji. – INV, 1988, 254 str. – Fakulteta za sociologijo, politične vede in novinarstvo, Ljubljana.

Raziskovalna naloga: Kultura in identiteta narodnostne manjšine: (primer Slovencev v Videmski pokrajini). – INV, 1988, 96 str.

Raziskovalna naloga: Politična socializacija pripadnikov slovenske manjšine v Italiji. – INV, 1988, 99 str.

An interdisciplinary approach to an ethnic minority research. – Referat na 12. svetovnem kongresu antropologov in etnologov v Zagrebu, 24.–31. 7. 1988 (brez udeležbe), 8 str.

Možnosti za enoten nastop slovenske manjšine v Italiji ob ohranjanju pluralističnih interesov. – INV, 1988, 17 str.

Emigracija – Zveza beneških izseljencev – razvoj slovenske narodnostne manjšine v Videmski pokrajini: razvoj od leta 1968–1980 I. del. – INV, 1988, 125 str.

Emigracija – Zveza beneških izseljencev – razvoj slovenske narodnostne manjšine v Videmski pokrajini: od leta 1980–1988. – II. del. – INV, 1988, 102 str.

SAMO KRISTEN

Baski. Škoti. – V: Ponižani in razžaljeni = Erniedrigte und Beleidigte. 2. erw. Aufl. – Šentjakob/St. Jakob i. R., 1988

Ocena: Lujo Tončič-Sorinj: Erfüllte Träume. Kroatien – Österreich – Europa. – Wien; München: Almathea Verlag, 1982. – 479 str. – Zgodovinski časopis (Ljubljana), 42, 1988, 2, str. 308–310

Trst spomladi 1945 v luči italijanskih pričevanj. – RiG (Ljubljana) 1987, 20, str. 223–234. Izšlo 1988.

Raziskovalna naloga: Tržaška kriza spomladi 1945 v luči zavezniških, italijanskih in jugoslovanskih pričevanj. – INV, 1988, 102 str.

Tržaška kriza maja in junija 1945 v pričevanju jugoslovanskih sodobnikov. – INV, 1988, 44 str.

MARINKA LAZIĆ

Rojena 25. 3. 1949 v Velikih Blokah. Diplomirala na Pedagoški akademiji v Ljubljani smer knjižničarstvo – zgodovina. Na INV zaposlena od leta 1977; opravlja dela in naloge višjega knjižničarja.

Bibliografije in biografije delavcev INV v letu 1987. – RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 261–269. Izšlo leta 1988

Chronological Review of the Selected Bibliography of the Author (1979–88). – V: Silvo Devetak: The Equality of Nations and Nationalities in Yugoslavia. – Wien, 1988, str. 133–136

KARMEN MEDICA

- Armenci. Eritrejci. Kurdi. Palestinci. Staroselci afriškega juga. — V: Ponižani in razžaljeni = Erniedrigte und Beleidigte. 2. erw. Aufl. — Šentjakob/St. Jakob i. r., 1988
- Socialno demografske značilnosti slovenske Istre po letu 1945. — RiG (Ljubljana) 1987, 20, str. 81–104. Izšlo 1988.
- Raziskovalna naloga: *Narodnostna in migracijska problematika Slovenske Istre*. — INV, 1988, 123 str.
- Kulturna identiteta narodnostno mešanega ozemlja Slovenske Istre*. — INV, 1988, 48 str.

RENATA MEJAK

- „A magyarok es szlovenok — együttmuködes es együtteles a határ menten“ c. kutatásrol. — Naptar/’88 (Murska Sobota), 1987, str. 35–42. — Izšlo 1988
- Narodnostna politika in procesi demokratizacije na Madžarskem. — Komunist, (Ljubljana), 7. 10. 1988 stran 21–22
- O nekaterih vprašanih ohranjanja slovenske manjšine v Porabju. — Vestnik koroških partizanov (Ljubljana), 22, 1988, 3–4, str. 63–72
- Slovesnka narodnost v Porabju — položaj, problemi, možnosti vzgoje in izobraževanja. — RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 111–126. — Izšlo 1988
- Informacija o položaju slovenske manjšine v Porabju*. — INV, 1988, 40 str. (Gradivo za posvet, Medakademijski odbor pri SAZU za proučevanje nacionalnih manjšin)
- Prispevki k spoznavanju slovenske manjšine v Porabju*. — INV, 1988, 96 str.
- Razvoj narodnostnega šolstva v Porabju po letu 1945*. — INV, 1988, 26 str.

SONJA NOVAK LUKANOVIČ

- Bilingual education in Yugoslavia: some experiences in the field of education for national minorities/nationalities in Yugoslavia. — Journal of multilingual and multicultural development (Avon), 9, 1988, 1–2, p. 169–176
- Dvojezična osnovna šola v Prekmurju: kam in kako potem? — RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, št. 105–110. Izšlo 1988
- Ocena: Pre-primary education in some european lesser used languages: review of Helen o Murchu's book. — Baile Atha Cliath, 1987. — Regional Contacts (Copenhagen), 1988, 1, p. 88–90
- Dvojezična osnovna šola: kam in kako potem?* : obdelava podatkov ankete: II. del. — INV, 1988, 9 str.
- Dvojezična osnovna šola: kam in kako potem?* — III. del. — INV, 1988, 10 str.
- Equality of the nations and nationalities national minorities in the field of education — some experiences of Yugoslavia*. — Referat na AERA Conference, April 5–9 1988 New Orleans Louisiana. — (American educational research association annual conference) (brez udeležbe)
- Experiences in bilingual education in Slovenia*. — Referat na 11th Conference „Europe of regions“ — regionalism in practise. — Copenhagen, June 23–27, 1988

JANEZ STERGAR

- Celovec.** — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zvezek Ce—Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 17–20. (Soavtor. Podpis: R./edakcija/.)
- Čebulj, Avguštin.** — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zvezek Ce—Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 106.
- Domej, Ignac.** — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zvezek Ce—Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 306.
- Domej, Teodor.** — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zvezek Ce—Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 306.
- Dvojezičnost v zamejstvu.** — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zvezek Ce—Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 406–408. (Soavtor. Podpis: R./edakcija/.)
- Enciklopedija Slovenije,** 2. zvezek Ce—Ed, Ljubljana 1988./1. natis/. (Urednik strokovnega področja — zamejstvo).
- Geselnik. Artač Hanzi. Benetik Rudi. Feinig Anton.** — Kdo je kdo med Slovenci na avstrijskem Koroškem: poskusni snopič z geselnikom. — Ljubljana 1988, str. 4–8 in 11. (Soavtor)
- H Gospe sveti in v Celovec.** — Tabor (Ljubljana), 32, 1988, 9, str. 253–255. (Vodnik)
- Kdo je kdo med Slovenci na avstrijskem Koroškem: poskusni snopič z geselnikom /** ur. Janez Stergar, Majda Šulc. — Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 1988, 29 str.
- Literatura.** — V: Šolstvo za Slovence na Koroškem — sožitje ali ločevanje? Ljubljana /1988/, str. 255–268. Prirejen ponatis iz: Koroški Slovenci v Avstriji včeraj in danes, Ljubljana—Celovec 1984 (1. izdaja), str. 305–318. (Soavtorja: Borut Marjan Šturm in Nataša Stergar. Priredila: Majda Šulc.)
- Literature.** — V: Minority education in Carinthia -- Co-existence or Fragmentation (:Selected Documents:). Ljubljana /1988/, str. 145–159. Ponatis iz: Koroški Slovenci v Avstriji včeraj in danes, Ljubljana—Celovec 1984 (1. izdaja), str. 304–318. (Soavtorja Borut Marjan Šturm in Nataša Stergar.)
- Na pot po Koroškem.** — Tabor (Ljubljana), 32, 1988, 2, str. 55.
- Narodnostna problematika v osnovnošolskih učbenikih spoznavanja družbe in zemljepisa v SR Sloveniji.** — RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 247–260. Izšlo 1988
- Podjuna — med Peco in Svinjo planino.** — Tabor (Ljubljana), 32, 1988, 5–6, str. 166–167. (Vodnik).
- Poročilo o finančnem poslovanju Slovenske matice v letih 1986 in 1987.** — Glasnik Slovenske matice, Ljubljana, 11, 1987/88, 1, str. 9–11 in 40.
- Predstavitev narodnostne problematike v osnovnošolskih učbenikih.** — Zgodovinski časopis (Ljubljana), 41, 1987, 4, str. 699–716. Izšlo 1988
- Pregled s Koroško povezanih obletnic v letu 1989.** — Koroški fužinar (Ravne na Koroškem), 38, 1988, 4, str. 41–45.
- Rož je prvi v vencu treh dolin.** — Tabor (Ljubljana), 32, 1988, 4, str. 126–127. (Vodnik.)
- Štiri poti med koroške Slovence.** (Vodnik.) — Vestnik koroških partizanov (Ljubljana), 22, 1988, 3–4, str. 73–101.
- „Tam, čjer teče bistra Zila“.** — Tabor (Ljubljana), 32, 1988, 7–8, str. 208–209. (Vodnik.)
- Uredniško pojasnilo. Antonič Mihael (Mihi). Arneitz Metodija. Bister Feliks Johann. Bizjak (Bisjak) Pavel. Blajs Jože. Boročnik Mirko. Brumnik Franc. Čebul Avguštin. Domej Ignac. Domej Teodor Robert. Dumpelnik Marko. Einspieler Franc. Haderlap**

Andrej. — Kdo je kdo med Slovenci na avstrijskem Koroškem: poskusni snopič z geselnikom. — Ljubljana 1988, str. 2–3, 9, 10, 12–16, 18–20 in 25.

Raziskovalna naloga: *Zveza slovenskih organizacij na Koroškem – ZSO*. 1. del. — INV, 1988, 56 str. + 12 str. opomb + 6 str. bibl.

Kronologija koroških Slovencev za leto 1986. — INV, 1988, 7 str.

Kronologija koroških Slovencev za leto 1987. — INV, 1988, 7 str.

MAJDA ŠULC

Rojena 18. junija 1952 v Murski Soboti. Končala gimnazijo v Murski Soboti, diplomirala na Filozofski fakulteti, smer A (nemščina), B (slovenščina). Zaposlena na INV od 1. julija 1985. Od 1986 vodja INDOK-a.

Aktualna tema (v Avstriji): komentar — Informator INV (Ljubljana), 1988, št. 1–3, 4–5, 6, 8, 9, str.

Apovnik Pavel. Artač Hanzi. Bégusch Franc. Fantur Peter. Grilc Matevž. Haderlap Maja. — Kdo je kdo med Slovenci na avstrijskem Koroškem: poskusni snopič z geselnikom. — Ljubljana, 1988, str. 9–11, 20, 24, 26 (Soavtor)

Arbeitsstein Ernst. Boschitz Jože. Brežjak Franc. Budin Lenčka. C (Č)egovnik Stanko. Čertov Folti. Čertov Franc. Čertov Jožica. David Franc. Detela Lev. Dolinšek Tone (Tonči). Druškovič Drago ml. Dumpelnik Hubert. Feinig Tatjana. Ferk Janko. Hrobath Milica. — Kdo je kdo med Slovenci na avstrijskem Koroškem: poskusni snopič z geselnikom. — Ljubljana, 1988, str. 10, 14–19, 21, 29

Celovski zvon. — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zvezek Ce–Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 22

Družina in dom. — Enciklopedija Slovenije, 2. zvezek Ce–Ed, Ljubljana 1988, str. 383

Kdo je kdo med Slovenci na Avstrijskem Koroškem: poskusni snopič z geselnikom / ur. Janez Stergar, Majda Šulc. — Ljubljana: Institut za narodnostna vprašanja, 1988, 29 str.

Minority education in Carinthia — co-existence or fragmentation (selected documents) / (ed. Silvo Devetak, Majda Šulc, Boris Jesih). — Ljubljana: Institute for ethnic studies, 1988, pp. 160

Ocena. Koroški fužinar 1988, št. 4: zanimivo branje. — Vestnik koroških partizanov (Ljubljana), 22, 1988, 3–4, str. 148–149.

IRENA ŠUMI

Filipinski staroselci. Avstralski staroselci. Južnoameriški Indijanci. Severnoameriški Indijanci. Inuiti. Severni Frizijci. Irci. Madžari. Makedonci. — V: Ponizani in razžaljeni = Erniedrigte und Beleidigte. 2. erw. Aufl. — Šentjakob/St. Jakob i. R., 1988

Nekateri vidiki povojnega položaja ameriških staroselcev v ZDA. — RiG (Ljubljana) 1987, 20, str. 35–40. Izšlo 1988

Severnoameriški staroselci danes. — 9 oddaj, Radio Trst A, april–junij 1988

Some special usages in ethnic terminology in Yugoslavia. – Referat na 12. svetovnem kongresu antropologov in etnologov v Zagrebu, 24.–31. 7. 1988

Stiki Kanalske doline z matico in slovensko Koroško v obdobju po zadnji vojni (1945–1985). – INV, 1988, 52 str.

NADA VILHAR

Socialno ekonomski procesi na narodnostno mešanem območju v Prekmurju v okviru regionalnega razvoja Pomurja. – RiG (Ljubljana), 1987, 20, str. 93–104. Izšlo 1988

Raziskovalna naloga: Ekonomsko-demografski razvoj madžarske narodnosti v Prekmurju z vidika regionalnega razvoja. – INV, 1988, 98 str.

Raziskovalna naloga: Prikaz razvoja gospodarstva po panogah na narodnostno mešanem ozemlju na Koroškem v obdobju od leta 1973 dalje prikaz razvoja turističnega gospodarstva. – INV, 1988, 57 str.

Socialno – ekonomska struktura prebivalstva na narodnostno mešanem območju Prekmurja. – INV, 1988, 62 str.

Zaposleno prebivalstvo na narodnostno mešanem območju na Koroškem z vidika dnevne migracije. – INV, 1988, 43 str.

A BRIEF INFORMATION ON THE INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC STUDIES, LJUBLJANA

The Institute for Ethnic Studies (IES), *Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja* (INV) in Ljubljana is a specialized institution, which in an interdisciplinary way investigates the various aspects of the national and ethnic-minority problems in Yugoslavia and abroad, thus highlighting historical factors, sociopolitical processes which affect the status and the development of individual nations, nationalities and minorities, their economic situation and development as well as their language problems, their culture and education.

There are at the IES two closely associated groups whose work runs parallel to one another, namely a group of researchers and another group of those working in the information-documentation center for national and ethnic studies and problems of neighbouring countries; their duties complement one another and they are often interrelated.

The present Institute is one of the followers of the partisan **Scientific Institute** (*Znanstveni inštitut*, founded on 12th January, 1944, on the free partisan territory in slovenian mountains) and of the prewar **Minority Institute** (*Manjšinski inštitut*, active in Ljubljana from the middle of the twenties).

Research Work

Systematic acquiring, deepening and spreading of the theoretical and practical knowledge in the field of ethnic problems and the transfer of the obtained results to social practice, represent the basic activity of the IES.

The research activities of the IES can be divided into the following topics:

- interethnic relations in SFR of Yugoslavia and especially the status and rights of national minorities (nationalities) in our multicultural society;
- parts of Yugoslav nations living as ethnic minorities in neighbouring countries, especially Slovene minority in Italy, Austria and Hungary;
- recent development in regard of the improvement of the protection of ethnic minorities through international activities, especially within the system of UN, European institutions and through the activity of non-governmental international organizations.

The research is organised:

- within the framework of different research projects – those of the Institute itself as well as the Yugoslav and international ones – which interlink individual research studies of both national and ethnic-minority problems, integrating them into unified and systematic in-depth presentations not only of the status of the nations, nationalities or ethnic minorities but also point at possible directions of their future development;

- within the framework of a specialist program (organized yearly) for shorter studies, commentaries and information about diverse topical aspects of the ethnic issues which are often used as the basis for subsequent research work;
- supplemented by the inclusion and co-operation in individual actions or scientific-research projects of international institutions, organizations and bodies (e. g. OECD/CERI, the Committee for cultural and social studies of Europe, the UNESCO program, the IIIrd Committee for International Relations Alpe-Adria) in well-developed international relations and in cooperation with related institutions and organizations, which include the ethnic and minority problems in their activities.

INDOC-center

Information-documentation activity is very important at the IES. The newspaper documentation, which has been collected during several decades, the historical and current archives, documents and the acquisitions of the specialized Institute Library represent a unique collection (about 30.000 books, 100 m of the historic archives, 600.000 documentation – units).

The information-documentation service does not only form the basis for our research, specialist – and publicity activities, but are of an open type as well. Besides, the IES is building up a computer information system and intensive connections with the institutions which research the ethnic and minority problem both in our homeland and abroad.

Public activity

Every year we publish one number of the only specialized journal for ethnic problems in Yugoslavia „*Revija za narodnostna vprašanja/Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies/Treatises and Documents*“. The journal comprises articles of collaborators of the Institute and other Slovenian, Yugoslav and foreign specialists for nationality and ethnic-minority problems, written mostly in English or in Slovene/Serbo-Croat, with longer summaries in one of the world-languages, which makes it accessible to a broader circle of readers (for available volumes see the list on the page 70).

Every year the information-documentation service prepares together with the Republic's Committee for Information of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia 10 issues of the bulletin „*Informator*“ printed in the Slovene and Serbo-Croatian languages, by which we try to inform the readers constantly about the novelties in all fields of the work of the IES.

The IES, in compliance with the financial possibilities, also issues publications of a smaller extent in the Slovene language and if possible in other languages as well, by which we are trying to ensure a better acquaintance of the people with the problems we are occupying ourselves with and with the results of our work (see the list on the page 14). The IES Members publish a number of studies and articles in various periodicals and specialised book-editions; the bibliography of the year 1988 can be found on the previous pages.

Scientific meetings and lectures represent a complementary activity of the IES in the shape of direct contact with the problems which are being treated and with the different specialists who are dealing with them. From time to time they are organized

for special rounded off thematic units. Every time we try to invite the largest possible circle of specialists to cooperate for example: conference Education in multicultural Societies, in co-operation with OECD/CERI in 1985).

More often we organize lectures or thematic discussions entitled: „Ethnic problems in the contemporary world, with special attention paid to the problems of the Slovenian minorities in the neighbouring countries.“ The selected lecturers, specialists from Yugoslavia and abroad, contribute to the current information of the Slovene and Yugoslav public from different aspects of the national and ethnic-minority problems and help by their knowledge and expertise also directly to increase the ability of the younger collaborators of the Institute.

The Staff

Despite the fact, that the personal of the IES counts only twenty people, we manage to cover the following fields of ethnic research: socio-linguistics, sociology, politology, legal status of minorities, economic aspects, history and ethnology. Several well-known slovenian researchers of the aforementioned disciplines have made their scientific careers on this Institute; to mention only the heads (directors) of the IES: Lojze Ude and dr. Lavo Čermelj (alternative in the period from 1948 to 1959), Drago Druškovič (1959–1974), dr. Janko Jeri (1975–1979), mag. Silvo Devetak (1979–1988) and prof. dr. Vladimir Klemenčič (from 1988).

ABSTRACTS — SINOPSIS

DEVETAK Silvo, M. D. jurist, collaborator of the Institute for ethnic studies, YU 61000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26

Key words: ethnically mixed regions, development, nationalities, interethnic relations.

ETHNIC POLICIES IN CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 9–13

En (En, Sn)

The concept of the „protection of minorities“ does not work properly when applied to the multicultural societies where differences exist among ethnic groups (national or ethnic minorities, „migrant workers“ and others). Therefore it is necessary to develop — in addition — new approaches to this issue, especially through the elaboration of adequate policies in political, economic, cultural and other fields. These possibilities are examined.

SMITH Anthony D., Ph. D. sociologist, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC 2A. 2 AE, Great Britain

Key words: ethnic processes, social conditions, cultural conditions, ethnic survival

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF ETHNIC SURVIVAL

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 15–26

En (En, Sn)

This important field of „ethnic survival and transformation“ is vast, but relatively unexplored. It is also vital to our understanding of modern nationalism. Several factors are relevant here: the degree of autonomy enjoyed by ethnic; residence or exile from the „homeland“; immigration and cultural isolation; conversion and religious conservatism; and the degree of participation by lower strata. Various modes of self-renewal have helped to maintain ethnic identity in pre-modern eras. They include religious reform, selective cultural borrowing, mass incorporation and participation, and mobilising myths of election. Such salvation myths may emerge in prolonged crises to strengthen a flagging ethnocentrism, as collective responses to dangers.

DEVETAK Silvo, mag. iur., sodelavec Inštituta za narodnostna vprašanja v Ljubljani, YU 61000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26

Gesla: narodnostno mešana področja, razvoj, narodnosti, mednacionalni odnosi

NARODNOSTNE POLITIKE V SODOBNIH INDUSTRIJSKIH PLURALISTIČNIH DRUŽBAH

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 9–13

En (En, Sn)

Koncept „zaščite manjšin“ se izkaže za neustreznega, če ga apliciramo na večkulturne družbe, v katerih obstajajo razlike med narodnostnimi skupinami (narodne ali etnične manjšine, „migracijska delovna sila“ in drugi). Zato je nujno razviti nove pristope k obravnavi tega vprašanja, zlasti preko razdelave adekvatnih pristopov na političnem, ekonomskem, kulturnem in drugih področjih. Te možnosti so predmet pričujočega prispevka.

SMITH Anthony D., dr. sociologije, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC 2A 2 AE, Great Britain

Gesla: etnični procesi, družbeni pogoji, kulturni pogoji, narodnostno preživetje

SOCIALNI IN KULTURNI POGOJI NARODNOSTNEGA PREŽIVETJA

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 15–26

En (En, Sn)

Področje „etničnega preživetja in transformacije“ je obširno, vendar relativno slabo raziskano. Pomembno pa je predvsem za razumevanje modernega socializma. Faktorji, ki jih je potrebno upoštevati, so sledeči: stopnja avtonomije, ki jo uživa etnija, bivanje ali pregon z območja „homelanda“, imigracija in kulturna izolacija, spreobrnitev in religiozni konzervatizem in stopnja participacije nižjih slojev. Različne vrste samoobnove so v predmodernih obdobjih pripomogle k ohranitvi narodnostne identitete – predvsem verske reforme, selektivno povzemanje tujih kultur, množično vključevanje in participacija in volitve, ki imajo močan mobilizacijski naboj. Tovrstni odrešitveni miti, ki krepilno vplivajo na etnocentrizem, se često pojavljajo v obdobjih podaljšanih kriznih situacij kot kolektivni odgovor na nevarnosti.

WOLF Eric R., Ph. D., Herbert Lehman College and Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA

Key words: ethnicity, nation, relations, economic development

ETHNICITY AND NATIONHOOD

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institut for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 27–32

En (En, Sn)

Contrary to expectations, both nations and ethnic groupings have multiplied in the 20th century. The paper will seek the beginnings of an explanation in the unevenness of economic changes, and in the resulting competition for economic and political resources. Case material is presented from North America, South America and Europe.

JANJIĆ Dušan, Ph. D., Institute for Social Sciences, 11000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Narodnog fronta 45

Key words: ethnicity, nation, terminology, policy

THE NATION

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institut for ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp.33–38

En (En, Sn)

Ethnicity (ethnia, ethnicall group, ethnic community and people) and especially nation (as a particular, specific and total community) are „nomadic“ categories. All problems related to them contribute to the existence of terminological confusion relating to terms „ethnicity“, „nation“, „nation-state“ or „state-nation“. Definition is not possible either once for all or in terms of a summary definition. In the modern civil society it is very important that the relation between nation and state is denominated. The state has joined the nation only to enclose it and, eventually, swallow it. Thus, critics of the theory or similarity between nation and state, and critics of reality and concept of the „state-nation“ itself, show that there are pluralities of national and cultural identities.

WOLF Eric R., dr., Herbert Lehman College and Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA

Gesla: etničnost, država, odnosi, ekonomski razvoj

ETNIČNOST IN NACIONALNOST

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 27–32

En (En, Sn)

V nasprotju s pričakovanji se je v 20. stoletju povečalo število narodov in etničnih skupnosti. Avtor članka išče vzroke za to v težnjah za ekonomsko in politično prevlado, ki so posledica neenakomernega ekonomskega razvoja. Podani so primeri iz Severne in Južne Amerike ter Evrope.

JANJIC Dušan, dr., Inštitut za društvene nauke, Jugoslavija, 11000 Beograd, Narodnog fronta 45

Gesla: etničnost, država, terminologija, politika

NAROD

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 33–38

En (En, Sn)

Etničnost (etniija, etnična skupina, narodnostna skupnost in ljudstvo) ter zlasti narod (kot posebna vrsta celostne skupnosti) so „nomadske“ kategorije. Iz njih izvirajoči problemi so vir in srž terminološkega nereda, predvsem v zvezi s pojmi „etničnost“, „narod“, „narodna država“ in „državni narod“. Zanje ni moč najti obče veljavnih in jedrnatih definicij. V sodobni civilni družbi je treba čim jasneje razmejiti odnos med narodom in državo. Država se je z narodom združila z namenom, da bi ga omejila in nato še presegla, pogoltnila. Kritika istovetnosti države in naroda kot tudi kritike realizacije in same koncepcije „državnega naroda“ so dokaz o obstoju različnih nacionalnih in kulturnih identitet.

JACKSON Robert H. Ph. D., The University of British Columbia, Department of Political Science, C 472 - 1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, B. C., Canada, V6T 1W5

Key words: jurisprudence, ethnic groups, laws

JURISPRUDENCE AND MULTI-ETHNIC STATES

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo - Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 39-48

En (En, Sn)

Ethnicity is a phenomenon not only of sociological but also of legal and constitutional importance. Most contemporary states must address ethnic issues and many do this not only political but also by legal and constitutional means. The terminology of ethnicity should therefore be able to take account of relevant constitutional discourse. A preliminary analysis is made of ethnic terminology from the view-point of jurisprudence and related civil sciences.

PLASSERAUD Yves, Membre du Bureau du Groupement des droits des Minorites, 75015 Paris, 60 Rue Violet, France

Key words: ethnic identity, masification, entropy, human rights

LUMIÈRE ET OMBRES DE L'IDENTITÉ ETHNIQUE

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo - Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 49-60

Fr (En, Sn)

The present paper discusses different aspects related to formation of ethnic and personal identity as regards their promotion or hindrance, respectively. The issue is treated in the light of the concepts of masification, entropy, polymorphism, biology, culture, racism and from the standpoint of human/national rights and legislation/law.

JACKSON Robert H., dr., The University of British Columbia, Department of Political Science, C472 - 1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, B. C.; Canada, V6T 1W5

Gesla: pravna veda, etnične skupine, zakoni

PRAVNA VEDA IN MNOGONACIONALNE DRŽAVE

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo - Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 39-48

En (En, Sn)

Etničnost ni le sociološki, temveč tudi pravni in ustavni fenomen. Ker se večina sodobnih držav sooča z etničnimi vprašanji tako po politični kot po pravni in ustavni plati, bi morala biti tovrstna terminologija sposobna adekvatno povzemati ustavni diskurz. Članek analizira osnove etnične terminologije s stališča pravnih znanosti.

PLASSERAUD Yves, Membre du Bureau du Groupement des droits des Minorites, 75015 Paris, 60 Rue Violet, France

Gesla: narodnostna identiteta, masifikacija, entropija, človekove pravice

SVETLOBE IN SENCE NARODNOSTNE IDENTITETE

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo - Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 49-60

Fr (En, Sn)

Avtor v prispevku obravnava različne vidike, ki so povezani z oblikovanjem narodnostne in osebnostne identitete ter s pogoji, ki pospešujejo ali zavirajo vzpostavitev le-teh. Problematiko osvetljujejo skozi koncepte masifikacije, entropije, polimorfizma, biologije, kulture, rasizma ter s stališča človekovih/narodnostnih pravic in zakonodaje/prava.

STAVENHAGEN Rodolfo, professor, coordinator, United Nations University Project on Ethnic Minorities, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico

Key words: ethnocide, ethnodevelopment, economy, culture, relations

ETHNOCIDE OR ETHNODEVELOPMENT: THE NEW CHALLENGE

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 61–69

En (En, Sn)

The present paper deals with economic and cultural aspects of ethnocide; each of them is illustrated with a number of cases from current political life. The author's opinion is that the ultimate outcome of the two aspects is the same: disappearance or great numerical decrease of members of an ethnic minority/group. Different sorts of ethnocide are analysed from the standpoint of human rights: the latter also serve as a point of departure of the second part of the treatise on ethnodevelopment, which is proved by several convincing arguments – social, political and ethnical.

RIGGS Fred W., Ph. D., Political Science Department, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, USA

Key words: ethnicity, modes of ethnicity

MODES OF ETHNICITY

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 71–89

En (En, Sn)

Three significantly different modes of ethnic expression depend on a social/geographic status of populations. Primary ethnicity, found mainly in the Old World, is oriented to populations concentrated mainly in their original homelands. Secondary ethnicity, found mainly in the New World, presupposes a population composed of immigrants and their descendents, intermingled with others in the lands of settlement, but dissatisfied with their status and mobilized for protest. The tertiary mode also prevails among immigrant groups who, however, are content with assimilation and celebrate their ethnicity as a recreation and source of pleasure. There are also „non-ethnic minorities“ who do not see themselves as a part of the society in which they happen to be living.

STAVENHAGEN Rodolfo, profesor, koordinator, United Nations University Project on Ethnic Minorities, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico

Gesla: etnocid, etnorazvoj, ekonomija, kultura, odnosi

ETNOCID ALI ETNORAZVOJ: NOV IZZIV

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 61–69

En (En, Sn)

Avtor določi dva aspekta etnocida: ekonomskega in kulturnega ter z vrsto primerov iz aktualnega političnega dogajanja ponazori vsakega od obeh. Ugotavlja, da je končni izid pri obeh isti — izginotje ali občutno številčno zmanjšanje pripadnikov etnične manjšine/skupine. Različne variante etnocida analizira s stališča človekovih pravic, ki jih vzame za izhodišče drugega dela razprave o etnorazvoju. Zanj navede vrsto tehtnih argumentov — družbenih, političnih ali etničnih.

RIGGS Fred W., dr., Political Science Department, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, USA

Gesla: etničnost, vrste etničnosti

VRSTE ETNIČNOSTI

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 71–89

En (En, Sn)

Vrsta in način izražanja etnične pripadnosti sta predvsem posledica socialnih in geografskih pogojev bivanja določene populacije. Pojem primarne etničnosti, značilen predvsem za Stari svet, se nanaša na prebivalstvo, ki kontinuirano naseljuje področje svoje prvotne domovine. S sekundarno etničnostjo, značilno predvsem za dežele Novega sveta, označujemo populacijo, sestavljeno iz priseljencev in njihovih potomcev, ki so se v novem okolju sicer že pomešali z drugimi prebivalci, a jih združuje aktivno izražanje nezadovoljstva s položajem, v katerem se nahajajo. Terciarna etničnost je značilna za tiste skupine, ki so se sprijaznile z asimilacijo in jim ohranjanje etnične tradicije pomeni le še del kulturnega in zabavnega življenja. Poleg teh obstojajo še „ne-etnične manjšine“, ki se ne definirajo kot del družbe, v kateri slučajno prebivajo.

VEITER Theodor, prof. dr., University of Innsbruck, Austria

Key words: ethnicity, policy, laws, interethnic relations

POLITICAL NOTION OF ETHNICITY

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 91–102

En (En, Sn)

Ethnicity is not only a sociolinguistic and ethnical notion, but is also connected with the juridical structures of ethnic diversity. It belongs therefore also to the various forms of realisation of the juridical protection of ethnic communities and especially of ethnic and linguistic minorities all over the world, because there is almost no State, without such minorities (recently called „ethnic groups“). Ethnicity as a political term belongs also to the notion of „ethnic identity“. Ethnic identity is the characteristics of each people and is therefore very different from the characteristics of the State, which is generally a nation and only a juridical system within the international public law. Ethnicity leads to a mutual understanding between ethnic communities (peoples) and can guarantee world peace.

KATUNARIĆ Vjeran, Ph. D., Department of Sociology, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Yugoslavia

Key words: interethnic relations, Yugoslavia, resources, historical evolution

THE INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY YUGOSLAVIA

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 103–112

En (En, Sn)

Data of the distribution of political, economic and cultural resources among national and ethnic groups have been analysed. The interpretation puts the data in the context of the historical evolution of the strategies of political (sub)elites and the formation of social structure of the population of respective national-ethnic groups. An interdisciplinary theoretical outlook on the persistence of interethnic boundaries in a socialist society is offered.

VEITER Theodor, prof. dr., University of Innsbruck, Austria

Gesla: etničnost, politika, zakoni, mednacionalni odnosi

POLITIČNI POMEN ETNIČNOSTI

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 91–102

En (En, Sn)

Etničnost ni zgolj sociolingvističen in etničen pojem, povezan je tudi s pravnimi strukturami etnične raznolikosti. Odvisen je torej od različnih oblik pravne zaščite etničnih skupin in, še posebej, etničnih in jezikovnih manjšin po vsem svetu, saj skoraj ni države, ki ne bi imela manjšin (danes imenovanih „etnične skupine“). Etničnost kot politični termin obsega tudi področje „narodnostne identitete“, ki je lastna vsakemu ljudstvu in zato zelo drugačna od značilnosti države, ki izvira od naroda in ima značaj pravnega sistema v okviru mednarodnega prava. Etničnost vodi k vzajemnemu razumevanju med različnimi narodnostnimi skupnostmi in je kot taka porok svetovnega miru.

KATUNARIĆ Vjeran, dr., Fakultet za sociologijo, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Jugoslavija

Gesla: mednacionalni odnosi, Jugoslavija, dobrine, zgodovinski razvoj

MEDNACIONALNI ODNOSI V SODOBNI JUGOSLAVIJI

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 103–112

En (En, Sn)

Članek analizira razporeditev političnih, ekonomskih in kulturnih dobrin med narodi in narodnostmi v Jugoslaviji. Podatke interpretira v kontekstu zgodovinskega razvoja strategij političnih (pod)elit in formacije socialne strukture prebivalstva obravnavanih narodnoetničnih skupin. Ohranjanje etničnih meja v socialistični družbi je obdelano z interdisciplinarnega teoretičnega vidika.

FLERE Sergej, Ph. D., School of Law, University of Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, 21000 Novi Sad, V. Perića Valtera 1

Key words: ethnic identity, youth, Yugoslavia, statistic, Yugoslavism

THE ETHNIC ATTITUDES OF YOUTH IN YUGOSLAVIA (THE QUESTION OF YUGOSLAVISM)

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 113–122

En (En, Sn)

In Yugoslavia ethnic identity is usually taken to mean belonging to one of the different ethnic groups that make up this country. But a moderate resurgence of Yugoslav ethnic identity has been noted recently. This research project studies it among youth, where it is more prominent. It was found that 16 % of the respondent identified themselves as ethnic Yugoslav and 36 % said they preferred this identification. Geographic distribution and ethnic background were found to influence the respondent's acceptance of Yugoslavism more than other social status dimensions.

PERUNOVIĆ Sreća, Ph. D., Institute for migrations and nationalities, Yugoslavia, 41000 Zagreb, Trnajska bb

Key words: ethnicity, culture, relations

ETHNICITY AND CULTURE

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 123–131

En (En, Sn)

The author proceeds from the standpoint that culture is a very important category in the consideration of ethnicity. In view of the closeness of the category „ethnicity“ to the categories „people“ and „nation“ in contemporary usage, in this paper the author emphasizes the need to respect the differences between these concepts. This distinction makes it possible to arrive at some precise consequences in consideration of the relations among culture and ethnicity; culture and nation, etc.

FLERE Sergej, dr. iur., Pravni fakultet, Jugoslavija, 21000 Novi Sad, V. Perića Valtera 1

Gesla: narodnostna identiteta, mladina, Jugoslavija, statistika, jugoslovansktvo

ODNOS MLADIH V JUGOSLAVIJI DO NARODNOSTNE IDENTITETE

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 113–122

En (En, Sn)

Narodnostna identiteta v Jugoslaviji običajno pomeni pripadnost enemu od narodov in narodnosti, ki živijo v tej deželi. Vendar je v zadnjem času moč opaziti rahlo oživljanje jugoslovanstva. Pričujoča raziskava je bila izvedena med mladimi, ki jih ta pojav še posebej zaznamuje. Ugotovljeno je bilo, da se je 16 % anketiranih opredelilo za Jugoslovane, 36 % pa jih je menilo, da bi jim bila tovrstna opredelitev ljubša. Geografsko in narodnostno poreklo v veliko večji meri vplivata na odnos do jugoslovanstva kot ostali socialni faktorji.

PERUNOVIĆ Sreća, dr., Institut za migracije i narodnosti, Jugoslavija, 41000 Zagreb, Trnjanska bb

Gesla: etničnost, kultura, odnosi

ETNIČNOST IN KULTURA

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 123–131

En (En, Sn)

Avtorjevo izhodišče predstavlja prepričanje, da je kultura zelo pomembna kategorija za razumevanje pojma etničnosti. Z ozirom na sorodnost kategorij „etničnosti“, „ljudstvo“ in „narod“ v sodobni rabi, avtor opozarja na nujnost upoštevanja razlik med temi pojmi. Le s pomočjo pravilnega tolmačenja opisanih kategorij je moč definirati bistvene kvalitete razmerij med kulturo in etničnostjo, kulturo in narodom itd.

DROBIZHEVA Leokadia M., Ph. D. historian, deputy director of the Ethnographic Institute at Soviet Academy of Science, Moscow, USSR

Key words: history, ethnic identity, USSR, mass media, state policy

HISTORICAL MEMORY AND NATIONAL SELF-AWARENESS

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 133–138

En (En, Sn)

The paper analyses relationship between historical memory, historical consciousness and ethnic identity. Historical memory is knowledge and ideas shared by members of ethnic communities concerning their past. Using the data of ethno-sociological studies on the USSR's peoples the author demonstrates how under the conditions of cultural modernization and growth of national consciousness historical memory performs compensatory functions. Attention is given to the role mass media and state policy play in this respect.

VAINShteIN S. I., Ph. D., Soviet Academy of Science, Moscow, USSR

key words: historical ethnography, USSR

HISTORICAL ETHNOGRAPHY IN THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET ETHNOGRAPHIC SCIENCE

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 139–145

En (En, Sn)

The author defines historical ethnography as a particular discipline of ethnography embracing the portion of its subject-matter which is common with history. The main areas of historical ethnography include ethnogenesis, ethnic history, ethnography of no longer existant ethnic groups, origin and history of traditional forms of everyday life and popular culture as regards pre-class society – all forms of culture, origin and evolution of subsistence types and historic-ethnographic regions. Cultural-genetic studies are characterized as a major direction of historical ethnography.

GUBOGLO M. N., dr., Soviet Academy of Science, Moscow, USSR

Key words: bilingualism, inoethnic environment, USSR

BILINGUALISM IN ALIEN ETHNIC ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS OF STUDY

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 147–151

En (En, Sn)

This paper is dedicated to language life of population in an inoethnic environment. Some questions and perspectives are shown. The paper is based on census and ethnological data, examples from member republics of the USSR. The main conclusion is that the study of the basic types and directions of development of bilingualism in inoethnic environments is becoming more urgent. This actual trend in contemporary research work is connected with the dynamically changing ethnic composition of republics – for one part of them, an increased rate of monoethnicity is typical and for the other, vice versa – an increase in polyethnicity.

DROBIŽEVA Leokadija M., dr. zgodovine, namestnik direktorja Etnografskega inštituta sovjetske Akademije znanosti, Moskva, SZ

Gesla: zgodovina, narodnostna identiteta, SZ, množični mediji, državna politika

ZGODOVINSKI SPOMIN IN NARODNOSTNA ZAVEST

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 133–138

En (En, Sn)

Članek analizira razmerje med zgodovinskim spominom, zgodovinsko zavestjo in narodnostno identiteto. Zgodovinski spomin je tisto posebno znanje, ki izvira iz skupne preteklosti pripadnikov določene narodnostne skupnosti. Opirajoč se na izsledke etnosocioloških študij o sovjetskih ljudstvih, avtorica prikaže, kako historični spomin v pogojih kulturne modernizacije in naraščanja nacionalne zavesti opravlja kompenzacijsko funkcijo, pri čemer še posebej osvetli vlogo množičnih medijev in državne politike.

VAINSHTAIN S. I., dr., Sovjetska akademija znanosti, Moskva, SZ

Gesla: historična etnografija, SZ

HISTORIČNA ETNOGRAFIJA V SOVJETSKI ETNOGRAFSKI ZNANOSTI

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 139–145

En (En, Sn)

Avtor razlaga historično etnografijo kot posebno vrsto etnografije, ki se tematsko navezuje na zgodovino. Osnovna področja historične etnografije so: etnogeneza, etnična zgodovina, etnografija izumrlih etničnih skupin, izvor in zgodovina tradicionalnih oblik vsakdanjega življenja in ljudske kulture v predrazredni družbi, kakor tudi vse oblike kulture, izvor in razvoj obstoječih etničnih skupin in zgodovinsko-etnografskih regij. Kulturno-genetske študije predstavljajo temeljno usmeritev historične etnografije.

GUBOGLO M. N., dr., Sovjetska akademija znanosti, Moskva, SZ

Gesla: dvojezičnost, etnično tuja okolja, SZ

DVOJEZIČNOST IN ETNIČNO TUJE OKOLJE – PROBLEMI UČENJA

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo, – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 147–151

En (En, Sn)

Pričujoči članek odpira nekatera vprašanja in perspektive jezikovnega življenja ljudi, ki prebivajo v etnično tujih okoljih, pri čemer se opira na popise prebivalstva in izsledke etnoloških raziskav v sovjetskih republikah. Ugotavlja predvsem, da študij osnovnih tipov razvoja dvojezičnosti v etnično tujih okoljih postaja vse večja nujnost. Ta aktualni trend v sodobnem raziskovalnem delu je odraz hitre dinamike sprememb v etnični sestavi republik – medtem ko nekatere postajajo vse bolj monoetnične, druge, nasprotno, težijo k polietničnosti.

NAUMOVA O. B., dr., Soviet Academy of Science, Moscow, USSR

Key words: ethnic processes, USSR, assimilation

CONTEMPORARY ETHNIC PROCESS IN KAZAKHSTAN

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 153–159

En (En, Sn)

The processes of ethnic consolidation are characteristic of the Kazakhs, as well as the group of Russians and Germans in Kazakhstan. All the European groups there are drawn to the Russians, and the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and some small non-Slav groups are even assimilated by them through ethnically mixed families, linguistically too. The group of Asian peoples (that is the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, the Azerbaijanians etc.) are drawn by contrast to the Kazakhs, but their linguistic and physical assimilation is slight. The culture of the Kazakhstan's European population in a large measure has lost its specificity and contains many international elements.

DOMINGUEZ Virginia R., prof., Department of Cultural Anthropology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA

Key words: ethnicity, otherness, policy, Israel, USA

THE MANAGEMENT OF OTHERNESS

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 161–167

En (En, Sn)

The objectification of ethnicity in academic and public life in the US and Israel in the last 20 years signals a shift in the management of „otherness“, and not the emergence of new ethnic processes. Alternative constructions of „otherness“ are apparent in discursive and nondiscursive practices, in governmental and non-profit institutions before the 1970's in both countries and still appear, in a submerged form, in contemporary public discourse. At stake are the right to collective identities, and the discursive means of asserting or denying group dominance despite official assertions of ethnic pluralism. The paper argues that these formal and official mechanisms are now more important bases for ethnic processes in the US and Israel than are grass-roots organisations and local encounters.

NAUMOVA O. B., dr., Sovjetska akademija znanosti, Moskva, SZ

Gesla: etnični procesi, SZ, asimilacija

SODOBNI ETNIČNI PROCES V KAZAHSTANU

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 153–159

En (En, Sn)

Procesi etnične konsolidacije so značilni tako za Kazake kakor za Ruše in Germane, ki prebivajo v Kazahstanu. Vse tam živeče skupine Evropejcev se polagoma približujejo Rusom, Ukrajinci, Belorusi in nekatere manjše neslovanske skupnosti pa so celo izpostavljeni jezikovni in etnični asimilaciji, ki se generira prvenstveno skozi narodnostno mešane družine. Azijska ljudstva (Uzbeki, Tadžiki, Azerbejdžanci itd.) pa se, ravno nasprotno, bolj približujejo Kazakom, vendar je pri njih jezikovna in fizična asimilacija šibkejša. Kultura evropskega dela prebivalstva Kazahstana je v veliki meri izgubila svoj specifični značaj in vsebuje mnogo elementov internacionalnosti.

DOMÍNGUEZ Virginia R., prof., oddelek za kulturno antropologijo, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, ZDA

Gesla: etničnost, drugačnost, politika, Izrael, ZDA

NOVA TAKTIKA DRUGAČNOSTI

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 161–167

En (En, Sn)

Akademsko in javno priznanje drugačnosti v ZDA in Izraelu v zadnjih 20 letih ni začetek novega etničnega procesa, temveč je predvsem znamenje radikalnih sprememb v taktiki upravljanja z „drugačnostjo“. V okviru vladnih in neodvisnih institucij obeh dežel se že od leta 1970 v bolj ali manj prikriti obliki v javnih občilih pojavljajo nove in drugačne razlage „drugačnosti“. Tarče kritike so predvsem pravica do skupinske identitete in najrazličnejša sredstva za izražanje ali nasprotovanje organiziranim težnjam po prevladi, čeprav obe državi uradno priznavata etnični pluralizem. Članek polemizira s stališči, da so ti ameriški in izraelski formalni in uradni mehanizmi trenutno bolj pomembna osnova za razvoj narodnosti kot pa lokalni spopadi in gibanja za ohranitev narodnostnih korenin.

VERDERY Katherine, Ph. D., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA

Key words: regionalism, ethnicity, Romania, stereotypes

ARE REGIONAL STEREOTYPES ETHNIC?

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institut for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 169–173

En (En, Sn)

In contemporary Romania; many jokes and offhand comments focus on the differences among inhabitants of Romania's three regions (Moldavia, Oltenia, Transylvania). Moldavians (for example) are said to be more spiritual than the others, Transylvanians more solid and disciplined, Oltenians more quick-tempered. The stereotypes resemble differentiations in ethnic or national stereotyping by Romanians and others. This paper takes up the question of whether regional stereotypes should or should not be seen as ethnic processes; that is, it uses regional stereotypes to ask what, exactly makes us see certain processes as ethnic. Reference is made to the different roles of the regions in Romanian history, to the hierarchization of contexts within which ethnic identifications are meaningfully attributed to others, and to the relation of ethnicity to state formation.

GSTETTNER Peter, prof. dr., Institut für Weiterbildung, Universität für Bildungswissenschaften Klagenfurt, A-9010 Klagenfurt/UBW, Universitätsstrasse 65, Austria

Key words: ethnic segregation, Slovene minority, ethnic identity, minority education, Carinthia

AN INTERCULTURAL FIELD OF LEARNING IS CLEANED UP

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institut for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 175–179

En (En, Sn)

The political decision to shore up ethnic (linguistic) segregation in the educational sector by means of organisational measures to form (nationally homogeneous) groups and divisions of school classes, is discussed in the light of current social developments. The example of Carinthia, Austria, and the Slovene ethnic group living there is used to demonstrate how majorities create and separate off minorities by means of the construction of ethnocentric enemy-figures. Negative prognoses are made concerning the socialisation of members of the minority, and in particular for the development of their ethnic identity. The setting up of motivational barriers and contact restrictions in the intercultural learning domain of the school will have a restrictive effect on the entire potential for cultural development in the family and the community.

VERDERY Katherine, dr., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA

Gesla: regionalizem, etničnost, Romunija, stereotipi

ALI SO REGIONALNI STEREOTIPI ETNIČNI?

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 169–173

En (En, Sn)

V sodobni Romuniji kroži veliko šal in sarkazmov na račun razlik med prebivalci treh območij — Moldavije, Oltenije in Transilvanije. Za Moldavijce, na primer, velja, da so bolj duhovni od drugih, Transilvanci bolj trdni in disciplinirani, Oltenijci pa temperamentnejši. Ta predstava je odraz etničnih in nacionalnih stereotipov, kakršni so v veljavi v Romuniji in tudi drugje. Pričujoči prispevek poskuša odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali naj se regionalni stereotipi obravnavajo kot etnični procesi, oziroma, zakaj natančno so določeni procesi etnično obarvani. Pri tem se opira na različne vloge, ki so jih omenjena tri področja odigrala v romunski zgodovini, na hierarhično razvrstitev kontekstov, znotraj katerih poteka etnična identifikacija in, končno, na odnos med etničnostjo in državnostjo.

GSTETTNER Peter, prof. dr., Institut für Weiterbildung, Universität für Bildungswissenschaften Klagenfurt, A-9010 Klagenfurt/UBW, Universitätsstrasse 65, Avstrija

Gesla: narodnostna segregacija, Slovenska manjšina, narodnostna identiteta, izobraževanje manjšine, Koroška

INTERKULTURNO POLJE IZOBRAŽEVANJA OČIŠČENO

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 175–179

En (En, Sn)

Odločitev politike, da z organizacijskimi ukrepi kot so nacionalno homogene skupine in oddelki šolskih razredov, podpre etnično (jezikovno) segregacijo v izobraževanju, je v pričujočem članku obravnavana v luči aktualnega družbenega razvoja. Primer Koroške, Avstrije, in tam živečih Slovencev ponazarja večinsko prevlado in ločevanje manjšine od večine s pomočjo etnocentričnega ustvarjanja sovražnikov. Kar zadeva socializacijo pripadnikov manjšine in še posebej razvoj njihove narodnostne identitete, so napovedi mračne. Uvajanje motivacijskih pregrad in komunikacijskih omejitev v interkulturnem sektorju šolstva bo nedvomno imelo restriktiven učinek na kulturni razvoj družine in skupnosti.

POPPI Cesare, Ph. D., University of East Anglia, Norwich, Great Britain

Key words: ethnicity, custom, tradition, Ladin culture

MARKERS OF DISTINCTIVENESS

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 181–192

En (En, Sn)

Starting with the theoretical distinction made by Hobsbawn in 1983 between „customs“ and „tradition“, the paper illustrates how the preservation and revitalization of Ladin culture falls between the two ways of handling ethnic identity. The cultural policies of the Ladin Cultural Institute attempt to link up „customary“ and „traditionalizing“ approaches spontaneously practised by actors of the social process. The production of audio-visuals by the Institute and RAI (State TV) provides a means to cope with social change and promote ethnic awareness.

MOORE John H., Chair and Assoc. Prof., Department of Anthropology, The University of Oklahoma, 455 West Lindsey, Room 521, Norman, Oklahoma 73019, USA

Key words: ethnic processes, Indian people, USA

ETHNOS AND ETHNIC PROCESS ON THE NORTH AMERICAN PLAINS

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 193–208

En (En, Sn)

In addition to providing a rich social and aesthetic life for Indian people, pow-wows and giveaways also have an important subsistence function. Not only do these events provide food and goods for needy people, but the distribution of prestige goods symbolizes a network of shering relationships which is year-round in its significance. Participation in these networks serves as a hedge against the difficulties generated by the unemployment and poverty which are typical of modern American capitalism.

POPPI Cesare, dr., University of East Anglia, Norwich, Great Britain

Gesla: etničnost, običaji, tradicija, Ladinska kultura

ZNAMENJA POSEBNOSTI

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 181–192

En (En, Sn)

Izhajajoč iz teoretičnega razlikovanja med „običaji“ in „tradicijo“, ki ga je leta 1983 uvedel Hobsbawn, so v članku opisane značilnosti ohranjanja in revitalizacije ladinske kulture, ki združuje metode obeh načinov ohranjanja narodnostne identitete. Inštitut za ladinsko kulturo poskuša v okviru svoje narodnostne politike združiti „običajski“ in „tradicijski“ pristop, ki ju spontano izvajajo različni akterji socialnega procesa. Inštitut s sodelovanjem državne televizije (RAI) pripravlja posebne filmsko-govorne oddaje in s tem olajšuje potek družbenih sprememb ter skrbi za razvoj narodnostne zavesti.

MOORE John H., chair and assoc. prof., Department of Anthropology, The University of Oklahoma, 455 West Lindsey, Room 521, Norman, Oklahoma 73019, USA

Gesla: etnični procesi, Indijanci, ZDA

ETNOS IN ETNIČNI PROCES V SEVERNOAMERIŠKI PRERIJI

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo — Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 193–208

En (En, Sn)

Razne folklorne prireditve in sejmi za Indijance niso le družbena in estetska popestritev, pač pa tudi pomemben vir sredstev za življenje, ki revnim zagotavlja hrano in druge dobrine. Taka prodaja prestižne robe, ki se odvija skozi vse leto, je zelo pomembna, saj sodelovanje v mreži dajanja in jemanja vsaj delno blaži težave, ki jih prinašata revščina in brezposelnost, značilna pojava moderne ameriškega kapitalizma.

ŠUMI Irena, B. A. ethnologist and sociologist, junior researcher at the Institute for Ethnic Studies, YU 61000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, POB 318

Key words: the 12th ICAES symposia, ethnos, ethnicity, political notions of ethnicity, culture-ethnicity controversy

THE ETHNIC QUESTION. Some Reflections Upon the 12th ICAES Symposia Dealing With Ethnic Problematics (Zagreb, July 24 – 31, 1988).

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana, No. 21, pp. 209–214

En (En, Sn)

The papers presented at the 12th ICAES in Zagreb, in symposia dealing with ethnic problematics, generally stressed the political connotations of the ethnic; aside to this issue, the relation between the old anthropological concept of culture and the concept of ethnic was called attention to in several papers presented. Examined is also an international project of creating glossary for ethnic research.

LAZIĆ Marinka, Librarian, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana

STERGAR Janez, senior researcher, Institute for Ethnic Studies, YU – 61000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, POB 318

Key words: ethnicity, Yugoslavia, Slovene minorities, bio-bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND BIOGRAPHIES OF THE WORKERS OF THE INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC STUDIES IN THE YEAR 1988

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, No. 21, pp. 215–224

En, Sn (En, Sn)

The bibliography of the workers of the Institute for Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana comprehends a one-year survey of the accomplished work. The biographies of the new workers are included as well. The bibliography is divided into two clusters: the published and the unpublished works.

ŠUMI Irena, dipl. etnolog in sociolog, mladi raziskovalec na Inštitutu za narodnostna vprašanja, YU – 61000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, p. p. 318

Gesla: simpoziji 12. kongresa ICAES, etnos, etničnost, politične kvalitete etničnega, odnos med kulturo in etničnostjo

ETNIČNO VPRAŠANJE. Pogledi na simpozije o etnični problematiki na 12. kongresu ICAES (Zagreb, 24.–31. julij 1988)

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 209–214

En (En, Sn)

Prispevki, predstavljeni na 12. ICAES v Zagrebu so v simpozijih, posvečenih etnični problematiki, poudarjali predvsem politične konotacije etničnega; poleg tega pa so mnogi obravnavali tudi odnos med klasičnim antropološkim konceptom kulture in etničnostjo. Poročilo o simpozijih obravnava tudi mednarodni projekt glosarija za raziskovanje etnične problematike.

LAZIĆ Marinka, višji knjižničar, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana

STERGAR Janez, višji raziskovalni sodelavec, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, YU – 61000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, p. p. 318

Gesla: etničnost, Jugoslavija, slovenske manjšine, bio-bibliografije

BIBLIOGRAFIJE IN BIOGRAFIJE DELAVCEV INŠTITUTA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA V LETU 1988

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja, Razprave in gradivo – Journal of Ethnic Studies, Treatises and Documents, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana 1988, št. 21, str. 215–224

En, Sn (En, Sn)

Bibliografija sodelavcev Inštituta za narodnostna vprašanja v Ljubljani vsebuje enoletni prikaz opravljenega dela. Vključene so tudi biografije novih sodelavcev. Bibliografije posameznih sodelavcev so razvrščene v dva sklopa: objavljena in neobjavljena dela.