219
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M  –  
T H E  T E N S I O N  T O  
( C O ) E X I S T  I N  R E L I G I O U S 
A N D  I D E O L O G I C A L 
P L U R A L I T Y
A n j a  Z a l t a
Introduction1
In the age of social networks and digitalization, we are experiencing 
accelerated development in the globalization of religious ideas, one of 
the causes and consequences of which is the de-traditionalization of 
local religious characteristics. Parallel to this process, we can observe 
an ignorance and non-recognition of religious heterogeneity and di-
versification in the broader social reality within traditional religious 
world systems and an ignorance of the particularities of new religious 
transformations and mutations created by new technologies. More than 
two decades ago, the English sociologist Grace Davie problematized 
the idea of how the religious message is changing with the advent of in-
formation and communication technologies. She pointed out that the 
transmission of religious messages via various social networks and me-
dia reaches a much larger number of people than in physical form, but 
is perceived differently by the religious community. Religious memory 
is consolidated with the help of these different technologies, but at the 
1 Research leading to this article was done with the support of the research program Problems 
of Autonomy and Identities in the Time of Globalization (P6-0194), funded by ARIS. 
https://doi.org/10.35469/poligrafi.2025.518 Poligrafi, no. 119/120, vol. 30, 2025, pp. 219–239
P o l I G R A f I
220
same time, it also changes as religious messages are customized to the 
respective medium.2
The fact is that information and communication technologies have 
had a significant impact on changing the religious practices of individu-
als in recent decades, as many people, especially the younger generation, 
do not distinguish between offline and online life, since they combine 
both and see this as the basis of their social existence.3 It is these young-
er generations, especially Generation Z (Gen Z, people born between 
1997 and 2012), that we will focus on in this article.
It is perhaps good at the outset to distinguish between religion online 
and online religion, which is helpful when looking at different religious 
practices in the digital sphere.4 The former concerns websites created to 
preserve the traditional authority of an already institutionalized religion. 
The information on these websites is conveyed according to doctrine, 
and with the help of the Internet, religious content is now available to 
a wide range of users anytime, anywhere. Unlike religion online, online 
religion creates a platform where individuals can express their opinions, 
communicate with each other, share their religious experiences, and 
even perform rituals together. Online religion therefore represents or 
establishes the Internet as a new way or medium in modern society.
The Internet represents “a highly competitive market,”5 which reach-
es a much broader audience, including in terms of religious production 
and offering. In the age of digitalization and because of the emergence 
of new media cultures, that is why we must not ignore the fact that one 
of the reasons for the transformation of the physical form of religious 
dissemination toward digitalization is certainly competition. In that 
2  Grace Davie, Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates (oxford: oxford University 
Press, 2000).
3   Heidi A. Campbell, “The Rise of the Study of Digital Religion,” in Digital Religion: 
Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds, ed. Heidi A. Campbell (london: 
Routledge, 2013), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203084861; Christopher Helland, “Ritual,” in 
Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds, edited by Heidi A. 
Campbell (london: Routledge, 2013).  
4   Helland, “Ritual.” 
5  Marcel Klapp, “‘That’s Where I Get Reach!’: Marketing Strategies of a Salafi Influen-
cer on YouTube and TikTok,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 18 (2024): 12, https://doi.or-
g/10.1163/22117954-bja10089.
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
221
way, individual online users choose their religious beliefs and practices 
according to what is on offer, from traditional, already institutionalized 
religions to new religious movements and modern spiritual trends. on 
the other hand, there is an opportunity for religious providers that offer 
traditional religious institutions and specializations, as well as religious 
innovations or interpretations of traditional religious models and ideas. 
one such example is the offering of online Salafism.
A particular contribution of this paper is to highlight the key factors 
that different Muslim communities in Europe, as well as European so-
ciety more broadly, need to address in order to engage younger genera-
tions through the use of new technologies and to consider the changes 
in religious memory and the challenges these changes entail. This article 
refers to some of the existing materials on online Salafism in Europe. 
We have also examined publications on online Salafism in Slovenia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysis results from synthesizing the col-
lected data with doctrinal content, using a socio-cultural methodologi-
cal approach. This contributes to understanding the social challenges of 
moral and religious diversity and provides a basis for reflecting on how 
to design platforms for inclusive citizenship and creative coexistence. 
Such platforms can serve as a foundation for good practices and policies 
to regulate a morally and religiously plural society. 
The Diversity of Salafism and its Entry into the Digital Sphere
Since Salafism is a complex phenomenon and it is difficult to reach 
a consensus on what the term itself means, we will first define the term 
as we understand it and as we will use it in our work. We will then 
show why it is important to consider this kind of issue in the light of 
religious changes and tensions with the wider European society. We 
will also draw attention to the tensions that digital Salafist platforms 
also bring to traditional Muslim communities in Europe, on the one 
hand, and to understanding their critique of secular regimes and liberal 
democracy on the other. We will review some of the important theories 
and research that have analyzed this topic in recent years and point to 
the content that confirms our thesis.
P o l I G R A f I
222
online religious communities are a key to analyzing the transfer of 
religion into the digital sphere. These are interactive communities that 
promote two-way communication through various forms of informa-
tion and communication technologies, such as chat rooms (“chat cor-
ners”) and comments under online postings. The aim of these rooms 
is to ask questions and find answers on religious topics. The online 
religious community also plays an important role as an identity net-
work, giving users a sense of shared identity and uniting them in a 
particular religious tradition.6 In this sense, the Internet is becoming a 
key medium for maintaining a common religious identity, and Salafism 
has also found its niche in the digital sphere. Research into the discur-
sive techniques used by Salafi preachers and/or Salafi influencers on 
social networks is very popular, particularly with regard to understand-
ing the re-traditionalization and radicalization of religious thought. The 
research on this topic, which we will discuss in this article, is mainly 
concerned with their strategies and practices. 
Since digitalization enables a global presence without physical con-
tact, the traditionally defined physical boundaries of individual reli-
gious schools and practices are losing their validity for many. This is 
particularly true for younger generations, who participate in religious 
teachings online regardless of their geographical location and/or tra-
ditional affiliation with a particular religious school. In the search for 
meaning and belonging, the supplementing or shaping of religious 
truths results in ambiguous identities among younger generations of 
Muslims in Europe and beyond. Salafist opinion makers know how to 
utilize the Internet effectively.
In recent years, numerous interdisciplinary research studies and 
publications have appeared on the topic of Salafist online activists, fo-
cusing primarily on the role of the Internet in radicalization to jihadism 
or examining the representations of non-jihadist Salafist groups, indi-
vidual preachers and social networks, digital media and online forums.
6   Asep Muhamad Iqbal, “When Religion Meets the Internet: Cyber-Religion and the Se-
cularization Thesis,” Jurnal Komunikasi Islam 6, no. 1 (2016): 19, https://doi.org/10.15642/
jki.2016.6.1.1-28.
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
223
of course, the interpretation of Salafist online activities also requires 
a precise knowledge of the dynamics, cultural contexts, and particulari-
ties in order to avoid falling into generalizations that lead to simplistic 
prejudices about Islam and Muslims and the potential conflicts that 
extremists and radical politicians harbor. However, it is right to take a 
critical look at certain forms of Salafism that develop a similar dynamic 
and seek to create sharp tensions with the wider society, in our case that 
of Europe. 
In order to avoid these generalizations, it is necessary to explain 
the concept of Salafism itself, which is extremely complex and whose 
use and application depend on the contexts and interpretations. Very 
different movements are summarized under this common label, from 
apolitical religious movements to reformist political and activist, even 
violent movements.
Salaf, Salafis and Salafism
The word salaf itself means “to follow” – “to go before.” Al-salaf-al-
salih were the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, the orthodox 
founders of the religion, and the term itself encompasses the first three 
generations of Muslims.
The first Salafis (al-salaf-al-salih) developed a method (manhaj) to 
help them in their search for religious truth. We know that the Islamic 
tradition does not draw from a single source, namely the Qur‘an (the 
book of revelation in which, according to Muslim belief, the angel Jibril 
(Gabriel) conveyed the word of God to the Prophet), but also from the 
Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet), the Hadith (the oral traditions 
attributed to the Prophet), the fiqh (the jurisprudence) or Madahib 
(the schools of law), and the Sharia or code of law that governs various 
aspects of Muslim life.7 Although these “sources” have contributed to 
7  In this paper, we try to distinguish between the so-called Islamic identity, which is a field 
of theology that focuses on the foundations of Islam with an emphasis on the primary sources 
of the faith, such as Islamic law, theology, philosophy, Islamic education, or the interpretation 
of the Koran. The specific forms and expressions of Muslim identity can be understood on the 
basis of the cultural, social and political background of Muslims and the transformation of 
religious thought into different socio-cultural environments in different periods of history.
P o l I G R A f I
224
the emergence of the so-called “Islamic traditions,” they are not equally 
important. of all the sources, the most important is undoubtedly the 
Qur‘an, which Muslims regard as the first, most authoritative source of 
normative Islam, which of course also applies to the ideological con-
struction of the first three generations of Muslims (al-salaf-al-salih).
This is also what the Salafist movements advocate today. The cen-
tral point of reference is God and the Qur‘an, and the desire of mod-
ern Salafists is to return to the original or so-called authentic Islam. 
As a result of this search for authenticity, Salafism today represents a 
movement within Sunni Islam that is extremely exclusivist and inter-
nally stratified. Salafists share with other Muslims the recognition of 
the Qur‘an as divine revelation and Muhammad as the last prophet of 
God, but they generally reject development and change – be it theo-
logical, doctrinal, institutional, or ritual, which of course leads to many 
paradoxical situations in the modern world, such as the use of modern 
technologies and social networks to spread their influence, which seems 
to contradict the original idea of returning to the time and space of the 
first Muslim communities. But of course, things are not that simple.
As Stemmann points out, the modern Salafist movements entered 
the political arena as part of a project to revitalize Muslim thought 
based on the authors Jamal al-Din al-Afgani and Muhammad Abdo, 
who were impressed by the progress of the West at the end of the 19th 
century. They wanted to renew Islam on the basis of the moderniza-
tion and rationalization of Muslim thought, while at the same time 
reviving the practices of the first Muslims and the companions of the 
Prophet Muhammad. This movement coexisted with a minority sect 
that followed the teachings of Saudi Arabia‘s Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and 
adopted the concept of Salafism, and the reformist Salafism of Afghani 
and Abdo gradually transformed into a nationalist movement.8
Salafism thus formed the ideological foundation of Saudi Arabia and 
spread the Salafist ideology throughout the Muslim world, partly thanks 
to the strong financial support of the royal court. financial donations 
8   Juan J. Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and Radicalization of Mus-
lim Communities in Europe,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 3 (2006): 2, 
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria_sept06/meria_sept06_a.pdf.
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
225
are used to finance the construction of mosques, pay religious employ-
ees, fund translations of important Salafi theologians and ideologues, 
provide scholarships for students of Islamic sciences, etc.9
The gap between reformist and academic Salafism and militant or 
“jihadi” Salafism, which emerged during the Gulf War when Saudi 
Arabia cooperated with the US on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, leading 
to the radicalization of many Salafists, who until then had represented 
an apolitical pietism, is important for our understanding of the dy-
namics within the Salafist movements.10 This radicalization emphasizes 
the fight against unbelievers (kafir) as a religious duty, and the concept 
of takfir (calling someone an unbeliever) becomes a source of conflict 
between Salafis and a model for the search for the “other,” not only 
outside but also within the Muslim community.11 This leads to tensions 
and friction among Muslims themselves, as takfir becomes an instru-
ment with which any regime, including a Muslim one, can be fought. 
later in the paper, we will relate this concept to the potential tensions 
that arise between Salafi movements and the wider European society.
Quintan Wiktorowicz offers a three-part stratification of Salafist 
movements. He identifies Salafists who are exclusively concerned with 
the transmission of religious teachings and avoid political activities on 
the one hand, and political activists and jihadists who legitimize the 
use of violence and violent means to achieve their goals on the other.12
Classifications may vary, but the purpose is to point out that there 
are different approaches that indicate heterogeneity in the understand-
ing and interpretations of Salafi thought, so it is very important to 
analyze the individual cases in the context of socio-cultural, politi-
cal and historical and theological relations. Salafism is not a mono-
lithic category, and although Salafism is only a minority phenomenon 
among European Muslims, it has a major influence on various Muslim 
9  Peter Mandaville, Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence 
on Islam (oxford: oxford University Press, 2022).
10  Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (london: Penguin Books, 2016); 
Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence,”2, also olivier Roy, L’Islamisme radical (Paris: 
Hachette, 1987).
11  Ibid., 2
12  Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
29, no. 3 (2006): 207, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004.
P o l I G R A f I
226
communities in Europe and is increasingly appealing to young people 
as it represents a strong religious alternative.
The Appeal of online Salafism for Younger Generations
According to Stemmann, Salafism in Europe appeals to that part of 
the population that has been bypassed by the reform-oriented Muslim 
movements in Europe. one such reform movement is the Tabligh 
movement, for example, which preached a sophisticated form of or-
thodoxy where the key was distance from non-orthodox society, visit-
ing poor neighborhoods, appealing to migrant workers who had no 
cultural access to European society, etc. However, they did not succeed 
in adapting to the generations of young Muslims educated in Europe.13
Young Muslims in Europe often have problems finding their iden-
tity, as it is shaped by various directions, guidelines, and models that 
question traditional authorities and come into conflict with their dog-
matic framework. It is obvious that the old traditional models of reli-
gious teachings and practices are not sufficient for the younger genera-
tions, nor is the method and transmission of knowledge, because it is 
the youth, especially Generation Z (Gen Z), whose social and political 
life is characterized by social networks. As already mentioned, in recent 
years, the innovative digital platforms of Salafi ideologues have pro-
vided new opportunities for communication with a virtual audience, 
leading to the formation of what Abdulmajid calls an “online religious-
doctrinal ecosystem.”14
A 2021 survey by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) found 
that the largest Salafist online accounts in English and Arabic have au-
diences in the tens of millions, “with cumulative cross-platform follow-
ings of 117 million and 109 million, respectively.”15
13   Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence,” 6.   
14   Adib Abdulmajid, “Salafi-Influencers on Social Media: Analytical Study of the Discourse 
of Neo-Salafi Preacher,” Living Islam: Journal of Islamic Discourses 6, no. 2 (2023): 178, https://
doi.org/10.14421/lijid.v6i2.4489.
15   Milo Comerford, Ayad Moustafa, and Jakob Guhl, Gen-Z & the Digital Salafi Ecosystem: 
Executive Summary (london: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2021), accessed May 23, 2025, 
https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Executive-summary.pdf.
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
227
last year (2024), the Institute for Strategic Development (ISD) 
analyzed a wide range of social networks such as facebook, Twitter, 
TikTok, YouTube, Telegram, and a number of standard websites in 
Arabic, English, and German. They recorded around 3.5 million posts 
on almost 1,500 networks and accounts and gained a comprehensive 
insight into what they call “the digital Salafi ecosystem” and the way it 
works. According to their data, Salafi profiles in English and Arabic have 
several million followers, with a total of 117 million international fol-
lowers for Arabic profiles and 109 million for English profiles. Profiles 
in German have around 3 million followers. When investigating the 
servers, they found that six Discord servers alone have almost 5,000 ac-
counts (member accounts), which function as “closed groups in which 
activists can discuss theology, coordinate attacks on other servers and 
open new accounts on other social networks.”16
According to the MENA Research Center, the number of posts in 
Salafist online communities doubled between october 2019 and July 
2021, an increase of 112 per cent. In German-speaking countries, the 
increase is 77 per cent.17 According to their data, Salafist online forums 
are extremely successful in appealing to young people (Gen Z), which 
comprises around 1.2 billion people under the age of 30.
So what is it that appeals to young Muslim seekers that traditional 
institutionalized religious authorities can‘t answer or don‘t know?
It is typical for Salafists to network informally and globally or trans-
nationally. According to Pall and De Koning, the informal nature of 
Salafi activism is important in order to understand why the global Salafi 
message has met with such a massive and positive response in different 
local contexts and has developed into a global trend involving preach-
ers, scholars and laypeople whose aim is to revitalize Islam based on 
a utopian vision of the way of life and work of the first generation of 
Muslims.18 It is this utopian version that clearly calls on young Muslims 
16  Comerford, Moustafa and Guhl, Gen-Z & the Digital Salafi Ecosystem.
17  MENA Research Center, “online Salafists in Europe on the Rise,” october 19, 2022, 
accessed May 23, 2025, https://www.mena-researchcenter.org/online-salafists-in-euro-
pe-on-the-rise/.
18  Zoltan Pall and Martin de Koning, “Being and Belonging in Transnational Salafism: Infor-
mality, Social Capital and Authority in European and Middle Eastern Salafi Networks,” Journal 
P o l I G R A f I
228
to look for alternatives in order to face modern society and its chal-
lenges. When we speak of challenges, we do not only mean confronting 
the permissive behaviors that Salafi preachers know how to exploit (the 
issue of lGBTQ rights, sexual permissiveness, alcohol consumption, 
etc.), but also the negative consequences of social problems caused by 
racism, discrimination, Islamophobia, etc. A young European Muslim 
with roots in the Middle East, North Africa, or Central Asia, for exam-
ple, finds himself/herself in a crisis of belonging and forms a kind of 
hybrid identity, as he/she is no longer “connected to the cultural envi-
ronment of his parents or grandparents.”19 And this, of course, is the 
appropriate niche for the Salafists’ altered interpretation of sacred texts, 
teachings, and practices, as well as their applications and interpretations 
of utopian Muslim society. 
In his study of Salafist influencers on social media, Adib Abdulmajid 
highlights certain factors that favor the popularity of Salafist preachers. 
These include poor access to education, especially Islamic knowledge 
on practical and theoretical religious issues. The lack of this knowl-
edge leads to frustration and allows seekers to cling to ideological ad-
vice, opinions, and instructions.20 Those who do not receive answers to 
important theological and practical questions from their religion are 
forced to search the Internet. The problem is not only that there are 
no satisfactory answers offered by local religious experts in the field. 
Bad European policies are adding to the tension, as in the case of the 
headscarf affair in france, which led to discrimination against young 
Muslim girls who were not allowed to attend public schools because of 
their headscarves. Many of these young Muslim girls have chosen to at-
tend religious schools that are not recognized (accredited) by the state, 
which means that the education they receive is not valid on the labor 
market. With such and similar ill-conceived measures and consequenc-
es, parallel systems of study or education are created that offer greater 
or lesser tensions with society in general, are ignorant of European de-
mocratization processes and are not in favor of ideological and religious 
of Muslims in Europe 6, no. 1 (2017): 77, https://doi.org/ 10.1163/22117954-12341338.
19  olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 79.
20  Abdulmajid, “Salafi-Influencers on Social Media,” 178.
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
229
pluralism. of course, this is also carefully utilized by Salafist influencers 
on the Internet for their recruitment.
The Problem of Salafist Influencers and the Emergence of Tensions 
with the Wider Society
According to Tariq Ramadan, European Muslims experiencing a 
new society have no choice but to go back to the beginning and study 
the foundations of their religious tradition in order to delineate and dis-
tinguish between what is immutable (thabit) and what is mutable (mu-
taghayyirat) in their religion to facilitate reflection on the possible adap-
tation to the new society.21 The search for the roots of the first Muslim 
communities on the basis of applied methods and new technologies is 
also skillfully exploited by Salafist influencers, and often leads to social 
tensions both in the Muslim communities themselves and in European 
society as a whole.
Salafists use a wide range of formats to informally engage with differ-
ent groups through various platforms, broadcasts, preaching channels 
and informational videos that offer answers to questions of doctrine and 
prescriptions on the correct or ethical way of life, including the ques-
tion of attitudes toward the public, questions on gender roles, family 
propriety, eating habits, dress, education, social interaction, child rear-
ing, etc. In the following, we will point out their dualistic schemata of 
the clean-dirty, right-wrong type, as well as the usual Salafi opposition 
to the Islamic establishment, which is also of particular importance be-
cause it leads to tensions and division with other Muslim communities. 
In this context, it is worth mentioning the concept of hākimīyā (the 
question of God‘s rule of sovereignty), by which they only recognize the 
sovereignty of God at the political level and not that of nation-states.22 
Pall and De Koning cite as the main reason why Salafists rely almost 
exclusively on informal connections the fact that Salafist preachers view 
21  Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (oxford: oxford University Press, 
2004), 145, see also: Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (oxford: 
oxford University Press, 2009), and  Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Mo-
dernity (leicester: The Islamic foundation, 2011). 
22  Abdulmajid, “Salafi-Influencers on Social Media,” 187.
P o l I G R A f I
230
formal institutions as often causing divisions among Muslims, while 
Islam strives to unite Muslims into one body.23 Salafism regards formal 
religious institutions as harmful religious innovations (bida) that did 
not exist at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the first Muslims 
and therefore lead Muslims astray from the right path. They are then 
loyal to their organizations and not to God. Salafists, therefore, feel 
called to be the unifying transnational and global phenomenon that 
will unite all Muslims into a single unified Ummah. At the same time, 
they selectively pick out the apostate Muslims, and also problematize 
the nationalization of mosques and Muslim cultural centers, etc. 
The aim of Salafi influencers is to present themselves as connoisseurs 
of true Islam, as role models who are close to the Salaf and therefore 
have a legitimate authority to interpret religious truths and rules. Salafi 
influencers on the Internet use various concepts that reveal the basic 
tenets of Salafi doctrine and that are linked to the fundamental sources 
of the Islamic religion, though they have developed their methodology, 
which deals with key doctrinal issues, in a peculiar way, in a kind of 
neo-Salafi style. What does this mean? The methodology is still based 
on the fundamental Islamic concepts of the early Muslim community, 
such as tawhid or the belief in the oneness and unity of God, and bida 
(invitation to believe), but the key concepts of the Islamic religion can 
be radicalized under certain Salafist interpretations to such an extent 
that they pose challenges to peaceful and creative coexistence with the 
wider society and can also be levers for violent action. There are cer-
tainly concepts that require caution and sensitivity in interpretation, 
particularly kufr (disbelief ) and tughyān (idolatry). According to the 
MENA Research Center, the identification of and incitement against 
non-Muslim believers, such as Jews and Christians, takes place in the 
English and German-speaking Salafi communities. Among Arabic-
language posts, however, Salafi forums focus on the search for Shiites 
and Sufis.24
Actual or perceived anti-Muslim incidents and debates (e.g. about 
banning headscarves) are used for this purpose and polarize or serve to 
23  Pall and De Koning, “Being and Belonging in Transnational Salafism,” 83.
24  MENA Research Center, “online Salafists in Europe on the Rise.”
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
231
create greater tensions with the environment and the wider European 
society. It is about the problem of the religious illiteracy of the general 
public,25 which generates Islamophobic discourse, and, on the other 
hand, the political illiteracy of many young Muslims who, due to the 
hybridity of their identities, search for solid charismatic personalities 
to show them how to deal with the “problematic nature” of European 
society (secularization, modernization, pluralization, Western liberal-
ism, etc.). The adjustment difficulties of young European Muslims of 
Generation Z, who have been passed over by traditional madrassas or 
who are not addressed by traditional preachers who are unfamiliar with 
the dynamics of European society and culture, lead them to seek their 
role models on the Internet – and the newly emerging Salafi influenc-
ers know how to address the grievances of young European Muslims 
with populism and instant answers, but with enough charisma to be 
followed by the masses.
To avoid generalizations and simplistic interpretations, it is neces-
sary to again address the split between reformists and militant Salafists 
that we have mentioned above. While reformist Salafism rejects vio-
lence, it still preaches a version of Islam that favors a complete break 
with “unholy Europe.”26 Both Salafist political activists and jihadists use 
social networks, especially YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram, to recruit 
young people for their religious and ideological beliefs. The organiza-
tion Kicksafe notes that Salafism draws on elements of pop culture to 
reach young people, using videos as a basic propaganda tool and even 
designing computer games (one such extreme jihadist form of com-
puter video game involves beheading the enemy). 
It is perhaps interesting to mention the example of the specific Salafi 
subculture called the “Islamogram” community, which is also consid-
ered extreme (radical) digital Salafism. It has more than 160,000 mem-
bers and borrows from the culture of the extreme right, propagating the 
“Aryan interpretation of Islam” and creating a kind of neo-Nazi Salafist 
community, and Salafist jihadists adapt the language and aesthetics of 
25  By the term “religious illiteracy,” we mean the ignorance of diversities and dynamics within 
Muslim societies.
26  Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence,” 6–7.
P o l I G R A f I
232
neo-Nazis, including the fact that they call themselves national socialist 
Salafists. The “Islamogram” often attack liberal Muslims and democ-
racy, lGBTQ+ and gender rights, is against feminism, and euphemistic 
concepts such as “cultural Marxism,” “wokism,” etc.27 on the other 
hand, recent ISD research has shown how extreme white nationalists 
have adopted jihadist tactics such as fiqh al-dima (jurisprudence of 
blood).28 It is more than obvious that this is a mutation of the memory 
and complete religious and political illiteracy of the new generations, 
who selectively choose their political and identity factors and combine 
them according to the modern “pick and mix” method, thus creating 
a religious bricolage identity that is paradoxically in complete ideolog-
ical and religious opposition to the Muslims of the first generations 
(al-salaf-al-salih).29
To counter Salafist propaganda on the Internet, the Kicksafe or-
ganization has produced the brochure “Salafism on the Internet, 
Recognizing Propaganda Strategies – Escaping Manipulation,” which 
is available online through open access.30 This kind of approaches and 
tools are more than welcome, since Salafist influencers use clear black 
and white strategies, and value systems based on clear rules and com-
mandments that have to be followed unconditionally; they advocate 
the consolidation of group identity and cohesion, but at the same time 
they are very harsh toward Islamic orthodoxy, the traditional models 
of transmission of religious knowledge and practices advocated by the 
27  Comerford, Moustafa and Guhl, Gen-Z & the Digital Salafi Ecosystem.
28  Ibid., see also: Pia Müller, Stefan Harrendorf, and Antonia Mischler, “linguistic Radicali-
sation of Right-Wing and Salafi Jihadist Groups in Social Media: A Corpus-Driven lexicomet-
ric Analysis,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 28 (2022): 203–244, https://
doi.org/10.1007/s10610-022-09509-7; Ineke Roes, “Should We Be Scared of All Salafists in 
Europe? A Dutch Case Study,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 3 (June 2014): 51–63, and lise-
lotte Weiten and Tahir Abbas, Critical Perspectives on Salafism in the Netherlands (The Hague: 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)), April 2021.
29  Such ideological overlaps recently occurred with online influencer Andrew Tate, who con-
verted to Islam due to his admiration for certain forms of conservative, patriarchal religious 
practice.
30  Klicksafe, Salafist propaganda online, accesed April 23, 2025, https://www.klicksafe.eu/
en/salafismus; see also: Aida Kassaye and Anja van Heelsum, “Muslim organisations’ Response 
to Stigmatisation in the Media,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 9, no. 1 (2020): 96–118, https://
doi.org/10.1163/22117954-BJA10001.
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
233
religious establishment, and of course toward secularization, laiciza-
tion, pluralization and other processes that European societies are fac-
ing. Whether and to what extent Salafi ideology can or wishes to join 
the casual consensus of all the social actors in European society is what 
we will try to answer below.
Salafist Influencers and the Social Challenges  
of Moral and Religious Diversity
What John Rawls calls “the fact of rational pluralism” is based on 
the realization that rationality has its limits in deciding issues of ul-
timate importance, though the so-called “overlapping consensus” on 
fundamental public values is a precondition for the existence of plu-
ralistic societies.31 The challenge for these modern pluralist societies, 
however, is to ensure that everyone can perceive the basic principles 
of the political community as legitimate. If this does not happen, we 
have parallel systems in religiously and ethnically plural societies that 
are in tension with each other (e.g. Salafists and their interpretation of 
European secular society, and the need for the implementation of the 
Sharia (code of law) to govern various aspects of Muslim life with no 
separation between private and public in terms of religious presenta-
tions). Regulating moral and religious diversity is therefore one of the 
most important challenges facing modern societies, and “laicization” is 
an essential component of a liberal democracy.
According to Maclure and Taylor, laicization is based on two major 
principles, equality of respect and freedom of conscience, as well as on 
two operational methods that enable the realization of these principles: 
the separation of church and state and the neutrality of the state to-
ward religions.32 The authors make a clear distinction between laiciza-
tion and secularization. According to them, laicization is a process by 
which the state affirms its independence from religion, and one of the 
31  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4.
32  Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Laïcité et liberté de conscience (Montreal: Éditions du 
Boréal, 2010).  
P o l I G R A f I
234
components of secularization is the decline of the influence of religion 
on social practices and behavior in the life of the individual.33
However, the concepts that deal with the degree of separation of 
religion and state in Europe are very heterogeneous. With very different 
definitions of secularism and various theories of secularization, as well 
as historical and political backgrounds, we need to consider historical 
factors that have shaped the understanding, interpretation and practical 
implementation of a concept of the separation of “religion and state” 
in a particular time and space. Above all, we need to trace the applica-
tion and dissemination of these concepts in practice, so that we do not 
maintain the interpretations of the concepts without analyzing their 
impact on social reality. According to Kerševan, the secularization of the 
state and state power is related, on the one hand, to the independence 
of absolutist rulers from the church and, on the other, to the require-
ment—arising from the Protestant Reformation—that state power be 
autonomous from the church. If there are several recognized religions 
in the country, then the state, law, and morality (at least in terms of 
fundamental questions) must be independent of any religion, because 
only then are they acceptable to all citizens.34 Hashemi asks, for exam-
ple, whether “secularism means anti-clericalism, atheism, deconstruc-
tion, state neutrality and equal distance from all religions, the rejection 
of religious symbols in the public sphere, the separation of public and 
private spheres, the complete separation of religion and politics, or a 
closer separation of state institutions from the influence of religion.”35 
Secularism in Europe is usually measured and evaluated in comparison 
to the two most prominent models of the Western tradition: the french 
model, which is relatively hostile to religion, and the American model, 
which is relatively friendly to religion. Complementing what has just 
been said, Cesari defines secularism as the various Western political cul-
tures that contextualize and historicize the two main principles of secu-
larism: the protection of law for all religions and equidistance between 
33  Ibid.
34   Marko Kerševan, Sociologija – Marksizem – Sociologija religije (ljubljana: Znanstvena 
založba filozofske fakultete, 2011), 81.
35   Nader S. Hashemi, Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory 
for Muslim Societies (oxford: oxford University Press, 2009), 104.
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
235
state and religion. These two principles are constantly interpreted with-
in specific political cultures that ultimately shape the societal expecta-
tions of the role of religion in the public sphere and in society.36
In the case of Europe, these expectations are above all (but not al-
ways) the separation of church and state and the privatization of re-
ligion. It is true that this Western experience is at the heart of most 
theories of secularization that refer to Western countries. But, although 
secularism has “Christian roots,” as Charles Taylor writes, “it is a mis-
take to think that this limits the application of its formula to post-
Christian societies.”37 It is therefore necessary to find alternative mod-
els and to take into account the religious experiences and processes of 
individual countries and societies. Each country can develop its own 
model, according to its interests and needs (priorities and norms), but 
with the awareness that it does not bow to “cultural relativism” when 
it comes to respect for human rights and religious pluralism (among 
other things). When we address the issue of Salafism in Europe, we are 
often confronted with interpretations of Islam as an alternative to secu-
lar politics. The idea of the “secularization” of Islam is often understood 
as a reformation of Islam. It seems that Islam is incompatible with secu-
larization and democracy unless it undergoes fundamental theological 
reforms. According to oliver Roy, such an understanding ignores the 
fact that Catholicism has never undergone a fundamental theological 
reformation (which would mean the “triumph of Protestantism”), but 
has nevertheless been able to adapt to modernity.38 In Europe, we en-
counter various Salafi tendencies that oppose any kind of change and 
adaptation. They also often embody a dualistic (de)-vision, live in a par-
allel existence and have no need for social interaction with the broader 
societies, including with the majority of Muslims in Europe, who find 
what is mutable (mutaghayyirat) in their religion to facilitate adaptation 
and creative coexistence with others.
36  Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 3–14.
37  Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava 
(New Delhi: oxford University Press, 1998), 31.
38  olivier Roy, “Islam in the West or Western Islam? The Disconnect of Religion and Cultu-
re,” The Hedgehog Review 8, no. 1–2 (2006): 129.
P o l I G R A f I
236
Concluding Remarks 
As we have seen, Salafism represents global Islam with its norms that 
erase cultural identity specificities and appeal to younger generations of 
Muslims. It does not use the same methodology for putting religious 
teachings into practice as traditional religious institutions and authori-
ties. Indeed, Salafism challenges traditional authorities and traditional 
ways of disseminating religious knowledge and has replaced traditional 
mosques and religious schools with digital platforms due to its integra-
tion into the digital reality and the hybridity of its identity. Salafist 
religious influencers proclaim clear and unambiguous messages calling 
for a return to the original Islam, including reading and implementing 
the true sources of Islam and respecting the true tradition. They derive 
their charisma from the belief that they are in possession of the original 
Islamic knowledge, and due to the limited religious education of the 
younger generations (we have mentioned Gen Z), they are the most 
convenient reference as they use online networks and digital platforms. 
The rhetoric of Salafi preachers is aligned with the key questions posed 
by young people‘s hybrid identity, and their answers and examples of 
how to live as a true Muslim are accessible anytime and anywhere.
In the global community (ummahs), they offer new or fresher (re-
freshed) religious products to the new generations with the help of new 
technologies, which are alien or avoided by traditional authorities. In 
this environment, a broad spectrum of different groups inspired by 
Salafism has formed – from apolitical scholars to online activists and 
violent extremists. They have a monopoly on the online networks that 
the traditional religious establishment cannot achieve, or at least not to 
the same extent.
In this context, political and activist Salafism present a wide range 
of ideas, one of which is to offer an alternative to the secular state. The 
central problem for them continues to be the question of Islamic law 
in Europe. Conflicts such as the question of the introduction of Sharia 
law naturally seem insurmountable and defend the thesis of the “clash 
of civilisations.” Therefore, it is equally important to be aware of the 
conflicts within the European Muslim societies caused by the challeng-
es, social standards, and conditions of living in Europe. It is therefore 
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
237
crucial to understand the heterogeneity and plurality of (among oth-
ers) Muslim societies in Europe, with an emphasis on the distinction 
between different Salafi branches and their worldviews. 
B i b l i o g r a p h y
Abdulmajid, Adib. “Salafi-Influencers on Social Media: Analytical Study of 
the Discourse of Neo-Salafi Preacher.” Living Islam: Journal of Islamic Discourses 
6, no. 2 (2023), 177–199. https://doi.org/10.14421/lijid.v6i2.4489.
Campbell, Heidi A. “The Rise of the Study of Digital Religion.” In 
Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds, ed-
ited by Heidi A. Campbell, 1–20. london: Routledge, 2013. https://doi.
org/10.4324/9780203084861. 
Cesari, Jocelyne. Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in 
Liberal Democracies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Comerford, Milo, Ayad Moustafa, and Jakob Guhl. Gen-Z & the Digital 
Salafi Ecosystem: Executive Summary. london: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
2021. Accessed May 23, 2025. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2021/11/Executive-summary.pdf.
Davie, Grace. Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates. oxford: ox-
ford University Press, 2000.
Hashemi, Nader S. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a 
Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies. oxford: oxford University Press, 2009.
Helland, Christopher. “Ritual.” In Digital Religion: Understanding Religious 
Practice in New Media Worlds, edited by Heidi A. Campbell, 25–39. london: 
Routledge, 2013.
Iqbal, Asep Muhamad. “When Religion Meets the Internet: Cyber-Religion 
and the Secularization Thesis.” Jurnal Komunikasi Islam 6, no. 1 (2016): 19. 
https://doi.org/10.15642/jki.2016.6.1.1-28.
Kassaye, Aida, and Anja van Heelsum. “Muslim organisations’ Response 
to Stigmatisation in the Media.” Journal of Muslims in Europe 9 (2020): 96–118. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/22117954-BJA10001.
Kerševan, Marko. Sociologija – Marksizem – Sociologija religije. ljubljana: 
Znanstvena založba filozofske fakultete, 2011.
Klapp, Marcel. “‘That’s Where I Get Reach!’: Marketing Strategies of a Salafi 
Influencer on YouTube and TikTok.” Journal of Muslims in Europe 18 (2024): 
3–25. https://doi.org/10.1163/22117954-bja10089.
P o l I G R A f I
238
Klicksafe. “Salafism on the Net.” Accessed April 23, 2025. https://www.klick-
safe.eu/en/salafismus.
Maclure, Jocelyn, and Charles Taylor. Laïcité et liberté de conscience. Mon-
treal: Éditions du Boréal, 2010.
Mandaville, Peter. Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia‘s 
Global Influence on Islam. oxford: oxford University Press, 2022.
Maher, Shiraz. Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea. london: Penguin 
Books, 2016.
MENA Research Center. “online Salafists in Europe on the Rise.” octo-
ber 19, 2022. Accessed May 23, 2025. https://www.mena-researchcenter.org/
online-salafists-in-europe-on-the-rise/.
Müller, Pia, Stefan Harrendorf, and Antonia Mischler. “linguistic Radicali-
sation of Right-Wing and Salafi Jihadist Groups in Social Media: A Corpus-
Driven lexicometric Analysis.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 
28 (2022): 203–244. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-022-09509-7.
Pall, Zoltan, and Martin de Koning. “Being and Belonging in Transnational 
Salafism: Informality, Social Capital and Authority in European and Middle 
Eastern Salafi Networks.” Journal of Muslims in Europe 6 (2017): 76–103. http://
doi.org/10.1163/22117954-12341338.
Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. oxford: oxford 
University Press, 2004.
Ramadan, Tariq. Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation. oxford: ox-
ford University Press, 2009.
Ramadan, Tariq. Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity. leicester: 
The Islamic foundation, 2011.
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
Roes, Ineke. “Should We Be Scared of All Salafists in Europe? A Dutch Case 
Study.” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 3 (June 2014): 51–63.
Roy, olivier. Secularism Confronts Islam. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007.
Roy, olivier. L’Islamisme radical. Paris: Hachette, 1987.
Roy, olivier. “Islam in the West or Western Islam? The Disconnect of Reli-
gion and Culture.” The Hedgehog Review 8, nos. 1–2 (2006): 127–132.
Stemmann, Juan J. Escobar. “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and Radical-
ization of Muslim Communities in Europe.” Middle East Review of International 
Affairs 10, no. 3 (2006): 1–14. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/me-
ria_sept06/meria_sept06_a.pdf.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” Stud-
ies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–239. https://doi.
org/10.1080/10576100500497004.
O N L I N E  S A L A F I S M
239
Taylor, Charles. “Modes of Secularism.” In Secularism and Its Critics, edited 
by Rajeev Bhargava, 31–53. New Delhi: oxford University Press, 1998.
Weiten, liselotte, and Tahir Abbas. Critical Perspectives on Salafism in the 
Netherlands. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 
2021.