conversation
UDC: 801.73
Małgorzata Hołda
The Welcoming Gesture of Hermeneutics
In Conversation with Andrzej Wierciński’s Existentia 
Hermeneutica
Existentia Hermeneutica. Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World 
(2019) is an unrivalled piece of literature by a distinguished and internationally 
acclaimed scholar in philosophical hermeneutics, theologian, and poet. This 
outstanding tour-de-force breaks new ground in philosophical and theological 
studies, showing that by thinking-the-difference hermeneutics displays its 
prodigious welcoming gesture toward the exploration of the heterogeneous 
nature of thinking. This gesture has far-reaching consequences. The book’s 
recognition of the empowerment of thinking that ensues from Differenzdenken 
(Wierciński 2008, 162–204) is an undisputable rejuvenation of philosophical 
hermeneutics’ contribution to the humanities. Investigating the obvious, but 
often neglected, or undervalued connections between philosophy and theology , 
the author divulges the multitudinous ways, in which the two disciplines reveal 
the pervasiveness of the hermeneutic character of human existence. 
The book’s two clearly defined parts are expressive of the thoughtful 
discernment of the most prominent aspects of contemporary hermeneutic 
thinking. Part one, “Hermeneutic Discovery of a Theological Insight: Toward 
a Hermeneutic Philosophy of Religion,” draws extensively from the authors 
representing the seemingly divergent fields of philosophical hermeneutics 
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and theology, and  manifests their interweaving character. Readers are thus 
introduced to the important interactions between the philosophical and 
theological horizons of hermeneutic thinking. Part two, “Poetic Disclosures: 
Language as the Medium of the Hermeneutic Experience,” probes deeply 
into the nature of language while demonstrating its belonging together with 
Being. The concluding section, “Hermeneutic Challenge: The Future of 
Hermeneutics,” is a one-of-a-kind reflection on the challenges philosophical 
hermeneutics faces in the third millennium with its portentous interest in 
analytical philosophy to the detriment of hermeneutic investigation.
Spanning a considerable range of philosophical and theological themes, 
from the issue of transcendence, understanding, and self-understanding, 
through metaphysics, forgetfulness of Being, Trinity, atheology, and the pivotal 
Incarnation as the empowerment of thinking-the- difference, part one gives 
full value to the matters at hand. As a result, we are invited to partake effusively 
in critical engagements with a whole panoply of thinkers tackling the above-
mentioned themes: Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur 
(the icons of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics), as well as the less 
known figures of two German philosophers: Gustav Siewerth and Bernhard 
Welte. On the theological pole, Wierci ński involves us in a thrilling dialogue 
with the medieval figures of Ignatius of Antioch, Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, 
and Richard of St. Victor, as well as the renowned contemporary theologians: 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, and the somewhat less 
glaring Walter Kasper.
The first part’s fecundity is a real challenge. Its four distinct sections 
render topics perceptibly knit into a captivating fabric of the intersections 
between philosophical hermeneutics and theological investigation. Deploying 
hermeneutics to reinvigorate the central areas of Christian theology, part one 
introduces the reader to the main precepts of the hermeneutic philosophy 
of religion. Its first subsection, “The Hermeneutic Retrieval of a Theological 
Insight: Verbum Interius,” is an astute elucidation of Gadamer’s language-
oriented hermeneutics, whose universal aspect can be encapsulated as the 
verbum interius: “not the word that is the subject of philosophy of language or 
linguistics, but the inner word, the core of Augustine’s teaching on the Trinity” 
(60). Musing on the indivisibility of thinking and language, Wierciński 

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ascertains, after Gadamer, that “to be means to exist in language” (60; cf. 
Gadamer 2000, 468). Speaking, thus, is not viewed here in terms of speech acts 
and their singularity, in accordance with the guidelines of general linguistics 
and represented by F. de Saussure, Sapir-Whorf, J. L. Austin, R. Jacobson, 
and others (not disregarding their staple contribution to the development of 
an understanding of human speech), but much more openly as “dwelling in 
the totality of meaning” (62). Following Gadamer, Wierci ński contends that: 
“Every lingual expression is grounded in that totality, which encompasses all 
individual expressions and overcomes them. The statement ‘ Being that can be 
understood is language’ might be interpreted as participation in that totality of 
meaning, and not as lingual idealism. ” (62) 
Existing in language, a human being is continuously confronted with 
language’s essential powerlessness and incompleteness. This acute sense of 
inexpressibility is closely connected with human finitude. The lack of  the 
possibility to express everything we want and the way we want to does not 
mean that we are incapable as human subjects, but makes us aware that “Being 
does not allow itself to be definitively articulated. We are always on the way to 
Being and, therefore, on the way to language. ” (72–73; cf. Heidegger 1959, 242, 
262; see also Gerald L. Bruns 1989) The limitedness of language is evocative of 
the limits of our being-in-the-world. As Wierci ński explains, it is exactly the 
pain of not being able to express everything that “brings us to hermeneutics” . 
And thus, the human pursuit of expression is at the same time the quest 
for Being: “This never-ending search for language is finite in its nature. The 
hermeneutic experience mediates infinite and finite being, and as such, is a 
lingual enactment of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. ” (63)
T o find the fitting word, to mediate between what is finite and what is infinite 
is hermeneutics’ first-ever task. Wierci ński picks up on language’ s insufficiency, 
as well as its propensity to partake in the incessant quest for the right way 
to express itself, and, via the recourse to the universality of the hermeneutic 
enterprise, advances his original approach to what language consists in. His 
input into the study of language is not yet another theory of language, but a 
contribution to our understanding of the essence of language—its nature—in 
relation to Being. The ontological footing of his reflection awakens us to see 
beyond the purely linguistic investigation. In an understanding of the lingual 
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character of Being, we experience language as both “bridge and barrier” on our 
way to Being (61), and, in consequence, we can better grasp the very texture of 
human existence as hermeneutically immersed in language.
This most challenging part of the book, which dexterously reinvigorates 
the discussion of speaking, thinking, and Being as belonging together, helps 
us appreciate the role of the unsaid in the presence and the formation of the 
said. Reminding us of Gadamer’ s weighty words in this respect: “What is stated 
is not everything. The unsaid is what first makes what is stated into a word 
that can reach us” (Gadamer 2000, 504), the author boosts our interest in the 
intricate nature of language. His account of the essence of language is not, 
however, an avowal of the places of indeterminacy, intentional silences, or the 
inescapable incongruities in speech performance and communication, which 
might be taken as the prominent examples of the unsaid. Rather, following 
Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s contentions, the author aids us on the way to reach 
out for the unveiling to ourselves of the inextricable liaison of language and 
Being, wherein the recognition of the primordial interplay of the said and the 
unsaid is of central importance. He makes the message of his text resonate 
powerfully with Heidegger’ s high-ranking words: “ Das Gesagte ist das Dürftige, 
das Ungesagte erfüllt mit Reichtum” (Heidegger 1991, 249), and inspires us to 
explore thoroughly the role of the unsaid alongside the said in disclosing Being, 
the thinking of Being.
Wierciński argues that by reinstating the import of the theological insight 
into the universality of hermeneutics, through his reflection on verbum interius, 
Gadamer (“without being a theologian”) initiates a creative engagement with 
the nature of language as placed in the onto-theological perspective. Gadamer’s 
pioneering move testifies to theology’s and philosophy’s intrinsic connection 
(recuperated in contemporary philosophy), and prepares the ground for the 
beckoning of subsequent, lavish avowals of the disclosures of Being. Wierci ński’s 
ample argumentation not only demonstrates the unique path of thinking about 
language offered by Gadamer, but hinges on the author’s own insight into the 
interconnection between the Triune God, the Holy Spirit, and the nature of 
language, encouraging us to interrogate the question of language even more 
extensively. The author highlights that associating (and thereby leaning) the 
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Gadamer uncovers that: “The inner mental word is just as consubstantial with 
thought as is God the Son with God the Father. ” (Gadamer 2000, 418; see also 
Plieger 2000, 187–192) The consubstantiality of thought with the inner word, 
as reflecting the consubstantiality of God the Father and God the Son—the 
Word, is of no small significance. It heralds a complete shift of the formerly 
existent paradigm of thinking about thought and speech. Crucially, Gadamer’s 
unearthing of the trinitarian theology as figuring the interrelation between 
speech and thought (73) underwrites hermeneutics’ claim to universality, as it 
stresses the ubiquitous nature of language. The analogy between Verbum Dei 
and verbum interius opens up an original perspective which acknowledges 
language as situated where it has always been—in the co-belongingness of 
speaking, thinking, and Being. This angle of vision is a first-rate instance of 
hermeneutics’ recognizing of that which has been there already, approving of its 
inquiry into what is, rather than merely devising or speculating on what can be.
Tracing Gadamer’s unprecedented philosophical take on language 
back to St. Augustine, Wierciński sensitizes us to the uniqueness of a 
hermeneutically afforded insight. He reasons that Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
view of language, founded on Augustine’s verbum interius developed in De 
Trinitate revolutionizes our understanding of the nature of language. While 
doing so, the author takes us on an important, enlightening tour of exploration 
through Augustine’s thinking. He expounds that Augustine conceptualizes the 
relationship between the sign ( signum) and the word ( verbum) via drawing 
on the Stoic distinction of inner ( λόγος ενδιάθετος) and outer word ( λόγος 
προφορικός), and applies this differentiation in a new Trinitarian context (cf. 
Müll 1962, 7–56). Most significantly, as it is emphasized, we owe to Augustine’s 
investigation of language not only an illumination of theological truths, but 
the very backdrop to the hermeneutic inquiry into the co-belongingness of 
thinking, speaking, and understanding. Elaborating the relevant citations from 
Augustine in Latin, Wierciński explains the gist of this belonging-together 
thus: “Thinking proceeds via an inner word, a spontaneously generated act of 
understanding. When we speak, we give voice to the word of the heart. ” (81)
Augustine’s distinction between the inner word and the word we speak is 
interconnected with a recognition of the processual and temporal nature of 
knowledge. The temporal character of human knowledge and existence, as 
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different from the divine, entails the human word’s powerlessness. The clash 
between the powerlessness of the human word and the power of Verbum Dei 
is the space for a hermeneutic reconnaissance. Very rightly, Wierciński names 
Augustine’s contemplation of the relationship between the three Persons of 
the Holy Trinity (and its impact on human understanding) the hermeneutics 
of love. In a radical manner, he convinces us that it is the divine charity that 
enables us to interpret and to understand:
With knowledge of things ( rerum notitia) and knowledge of 
languages ( linguarum notitia) we can better interpret scriptural 
signs, both literal ( signa propria) and figurative ( signa translata). The 
interpretation of Scripture is made possible by the divine charity. 
Augustine’s hermeneutics is the hermeneutics of love. The gap between 
the human and the divine, the eternal and the temporal, the word and 
the thing is bridged by the charity. (81)
The reflection on Augustine’s hermeneutic interrogation of language is 
taken even further by an eloquent reference to his involving triads: “ Augustine 
sees an image of the divine Trinity in human cognition, the triad of memory 
(understanding), intellect (knowledge), and will (love); lover, beloved, and 
love; object, vision, and attention, etc.” (84) The aforementioned quotation 
is one more instance of the author’s unflagging quest for an ever deeper 
understanding of the interconnectivity between philosophical hermeneutics, 
theology, and phenomenology.
Wierciński’s deliberation on language is a compelling inquiry into the 
dialogical nature of understanding. “The conversation that we are” (Gadamer 
2000, 378; cf. Hölderlin 1946) happens diagonally: arching over the past and 
the present, language is both the medium of our search for Being and the 
possibility for Being’s disclosure. And horizontally, language as “the Vollzug 
of the self-disclosure of Being” (89) enables the self to reach over to the Other, 
also oneself as the other. Bringing Gadamer, Heidegger, Augustine, Aquinas, 
Duns Scotus, Lonergan, and other thinkers into a conversation over the 
nature of language, the author also enhances our acknowledgement of the 
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The search for Being is not disenfranchised from the dialogues of the past, 
just on the contrary, we are immersed in Tradition’ s interplay of past and present, 
and our understanding involves and is guarded by the manifold and versatile 
voices of Tradition. The interrogation of the intimate relationship between 
language and Tradition leads to an expanded understanding of the inextricability 
of philosophical and theological insights—one of the book’ s major concerns, and 
one of its most inspiring accomplishments. As a matter of fact, it is the unity of 
language and Tradition that leaves no doubt about the import of viewing the 
fields of philosophy and theology as profoundly intersecting and abundantly 
cross-fertilizing. Here is one of the monograph’s most illuminating passages that 
make the truth about the two disciplines’ mutual permeability conspicuous: 
Hermeneutics is not only between the human and the divine, it is 
also between philosophy and theology. Hermeneutic philosophy must 
engage theology which grounds and permeates the Western Tradition. 
Conversely, the theological Tradition is incomprehensible without 
philosophy. This is not just a historical consideration: The subject-
matter of hermeneutics, die Sache selbst, is theological. Hermeneutics is 
not theology, but it must be open to theology if it is to be receptive to the 
voices that constitute the Tradition that we are. (88–89)
Through this involving reflection on the nature of language and philosophy-
theology reciprocity, Wierciński directs us to his central thesis of hermeneutics’ 
universal character. The gist of the author’s extended interrogation of 
verbum interius as the foundation for hermeneutics’ universality can be best 
encapsulated in his own, enlightening words: 
The verbum interius is the ground and modus experiendi of Being. 
The nature of language needs to be rethought in the light of the 
uncovering of the verbum interius as the ground of the universality of 
hermeneutics. The “inner” of verbum interius is not a spatial “inner.” 
The procession from the verbum interius to the verbum exterius is not 
a movement through space, but a procession in time, an ecstatic self-
transcendence. (89)
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Thanks to Wierciński’s exceptionally meticulous scrutinization of the 
thinking-understanding-speaking interconnection, the (to the uninitiated) 
at-first-sight impervious concepts of verbum interius and language as the self-
disclosure of Being are aptly straightened out. The inner word proceeds to its 
externalization not in terms of space, but is happening in time in the form of 
an “ecstatic self-transcendence.” The ek- stasis of verbum interius is what we 
grasp as its articulation in speech. The occurrence of its self-transcendence is 
concomitant with understanding. Understanding cannot be taken as an act 
which is exterior to language, just on the contrary, it happens in and through 
language. Therefore, we can state that being the “binder” between verbum 
interius and verbum exterius, understanding does not have an extraneous 
character, its oneness with thinking and speaking is unambiguous.
Wierciński’s discussion of verbum interius also entails an explication of 
the hermeneutic input in postmodern thinking. With real zest, the author 
introduces us to his cutting-edge concept of bridging the traditional and 
the current thinking, to the effect of reinstating our thinking about God’s 
transcendental otherness:
In its confrontation with post-metaphysical thinking, thinking the 
difference has special significance for the hermeneutic conception 
of tradition, thus acting as a bridge builder between the varied 
current philosophical positions. The theological confrontation 
with classical thinking-the-difference and the recently-modern 
and contemporary-postmodern thinking-the-difference can be 
understood as an answer to the challenge of opening up to ‘thinking’ 
openness to God’s transcendental otherness—and thus to the traces 
of the transcendent—and not just to its becoming a disinterested 
functionary of God. (108)
Revitalizing, after Gadamer, the view of language as fundamentally 
ontological and based on its interconnection with the mystery of the Trinity, 
the book leads us out of the narrowness of the thinking of language as a mere 
communicative tool, and inspires us to see the lingual character of Being:  

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Similarly to the Word as the second person of the Trinity, who as the 
Son proceeds from the Father and becomes the incarnated Word, thus 
allowing us to access the mystery of the Trinity, the human word makes 
it possible to see the true Being of things ( das Sein des Seienden) in their 
linguistic appearance. (180)
Section two, “Thinking Hermeneutically: Opening toward Transcendence 
as the Imperative of Self-Understanding,” of the first part contains an 
engrossing reflection on Balthasar’s theology, Gadamer’s hermeneutics of 
art, and Celan’s poetry. It opens with “The Hermeneutics of the Gift: Mutual 
Interaction Between Philosophy and Theology in Hans Urs von Balthasar.” 
Exploring Balthasar’s hermeneutic theology of the gift, Wierciński reminds 
us that Balthasar was not only greatly influenced by Aquinas, but also by the 
philosophy of Ferdinand Ulrich, G. W . Friedrich Hegel, and Gustav Siewerth. 
The author places special accent on the fruitful Balthasar-Siewerth  collaboration 
and friendship. Exemplifying the mutuality of the relationship between 
philosophy and theology through this remarkable intellectual exchange, he 
deepens our awareness of the richness of the cross-influences which have 
marked the two disciplines ever since their inception. Espousing the seminal 
import of the Swiss theologian for our understanding of theology/philosophy 
co-inspiration, Wierciński underlines Balthasar’s role in rediscovering and 
furthering the theological/philosophical liaison as rooted in Thomas Aquinas. 
Unquestioningly, it is through Aquinas that we can acknowledge the two fields 
as “expressing one in two distinct ways” (cf. Hoping 1997), deploying their own 
methods, but also “ordered toward one another” (148; cf. John Paul II 1998, 
§§ 43–44). The hermeneutic reiterating of the medieval tradition constitutes 
a significant part of the study of the proximity of theology and philosophy. 
The section’s main text and its exceptionally rich footnotes demonstrate 
this closeness via a discussion of the whole range of personal interactions 
between Balthasar, Siewerth, Ulrich, and Erich Przywara, as well as Balthasar’s 
momentous disputes with Hegel, Jean-Luc Marion, Martin Heidegger, and 
Karl Barth.
The Balthasar-Marion debate, as presented by the author, deserves a 
closer look. Wierciński maintains that the thesis of theology’s deployment of 
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philosophical thinking needs no special argumentation, and asserts that Jean-
Luc Marion’s phenomenology, which attempts to keep the two disciplines 
completely separate, has been criticized as doing crypto-theology (cf. 162; see 
also: Janicaud 1991; Derrida 1987, 1991). He writes: 
Marion’s critique of ontotheology and his call to think God outside 
the question of Being are based on a wrong understanding of Being and 
the essence of God as causa sui. For that reason, the assumption that 
God should be conceived without Being or outside of Being—which 
inevitably leads to a rejection of ontotheology—needs to be questioned 
again too. (161)
Wierciński stresses that Balthasar’s theology offers a convincing 
counterpoint to Marion’s philosophical reservations, stating that for the 
former “interpretation of the analogia entis, God is not outside Being. The self-
transcendence of God ( ekstasis) belongs intrinsically to Being. The fact that 
metaphysics underlies theology does not contradict the autonomy of the faith. 
Faith must be rational. ” (161) Endorsing Balthasar’ s standpoint and pinpointing 
the deficiency of Marion’s phenomenological approach to the question of 
transcendence, the author explains that phenomenological analysis does not 
warrant consistency in a methodological severance of theology and philosophy 
“without renouncing the phenomenological range of the phenomenon that is 
to be thought” (162).
It is impossible to do justice to the unusual richness of all the themes 
tackled in the second subsection of part one, “Thinking Hermeneutically: 
Opening Toward Transcendence as the Imperative of Self-understanding.” 
Undeniably, the reflection on Gadamer’s hermeneutics of art is a piece of 
hermeneutic artistry in its own right. We should like to proceed to the subtlety 
and powerfulness of Wierciński’s interpretation of poetry, which is the most 
thought-provoking passage of this part. Placing his reflection on Celan’s 
poem “Tenebrae” (187–202) here is the author’s bold and well-grounded 
move. Opening us toward transcendence, theology cannot limit itself to the 
facile aspects of the human being’s religiosity, or his/her basic awareness of 
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experiencing of his/her existence in the face of the Absolute. The horrors of the 
Holocaust—the inconsolable, ever-bleeding wounds—call for a reconfiguring 
of the relationship between God-and-a-human-being. Celan’s seemingly 
blasphemous reversal of the prayer’s subject/object: “Pray, Lord, pray to us 
[…]” requires a novel insight into the inexpressibility of a human being’ s drama 
and theo-drama. Hermeneutics allows us to acknowledge the most astounding 
configurations of God’s and human being’s intimacy, as well as the most 
abysmal, acute, or even subversive de-liaisons between Deity and humanity. 
The hermeneutic discernment of the theological issues is capable of deepening 
our understanding, as Wierciński accentuates, of  “our matter with God, ” and, 
at the same time, helps us avoid any oversimplifications or banalizations of the 
most fragile texture of being homo religiosus. The author’s interpretation of 
Celan’s poem is most influential. Not only does it meaningfully contribute to 
his extensive explication of the hermeneutic, perspicacious look into theology, 
but it also, by touching on language’s inappropriateness, insufficiency, and 
limitedness in the face of a dehumanized world, anticipates a hermeneutic 
interrogation into the nature of language as revealed in poetic disclosures, as 
well as of the theme of the lingual character of understanding, as developed in 
part two of the book.
Section three of part one is an extremely condensed presentation of the 
dispute over Heidegger’s hermeneutics of existence by Welte and Siewerth. 
It begins with the question of God. Heidegger’s two disciples see the import 
of the question of God in Heidegger’s moving backwards through the idea 
of Being to metaphysics’ basic premise. Siewerth’s ceaseless endeavor (his 
“theologically empowered metaphysics”) to reconcile Heidegger’ s ontological 
hermeneutics with classical metaphysics via a systematic engaging of 
Heidegger with Thomas Aquinas, is contrasted with Welte’s hermeneutic-
phenomenological theology and his seeing of Heidegger’s posing the 
question of God “as the most delicate attempt to express the unsayable, 
without hurting it by doing so” (Welte 1975, 276). In time, as Wierciński 
notices, the two thinkers’ responses to Heidegger become increasingly 
polemical, diverse, and non-univocal. The author leads us through those 
complexities to the point where he places Welte’s and Siewerth’s differing 
interpretations of Heidegger next to the issue of the forgetfulness of Being. 
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Such thorough investigation of Siewerth’s and Welte’s dialoguing with 
Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics is undeniably the author’s original 
contribution to the ongoing “Heidegger’s matter, ” especially bearing in mind 
that the English-speaking readership is less acquainted with the literature of, 
and on, the two philosophers (mostly in German), and of their productive 
conversations with Heidegger. Accentuating Welte’s and Siewerth’s concern 
with the uncovering of the traces of transcendence and their insistence on the 
human being’ s self-fulfillment as taking place within this horizon, Wierciński 
develops fully this section’s central problematic—the hermeneutic thinking’s 
openness toward the transcendent dimension of human existence—, and, at 
the same time, provides one of essential features of existentia hermeneutica.
The ensuing elucidation of Siewerth’s “metaphysics as the empowerment of 
thinking” is an impressive presentation of the German philosopher’s recondite 
path. The author stresses that for Siewerth “the thinking about Being under the 
aspect of the difference of Being is the culmination of metaphysical speculative 
thinking” (292). To give a synopsis of the nooks and crannies of Wierciński’s 
inspirational and detailed account of Siewerth’s metaphysics in a few lines would 
definitely not do justice to the depth of both the “forgotten” thinker’ s hermeneutics 
and the equally captivating commentary. Nevertheless, the affinities and contrasts 
between Heidegger and Thomas Aquinas that Siewerth, and Wierciński after 
him, pinpoint, leave no doubt about the salient nature of Siewerth’s input in the 
development of the critical thinking about Being and the forgetfulness of Being. 
Let the following quotation of this frontline analysis speak for itself: 
As a theologically illumined metaphysics, it takes “the word of 
Revelation” as the word that “announces itself in the historical human 
space that is already illuminated in its understanding of Being. ” In this 
theologically empowered metaphysics, Siewerth tries to think the Being 
of beings, the actus essendi, as the mediating center between Being and 
God, between contingency and necessity. (306; cf. Siewerth 2003, 82)  
The comprehensive examination of Siewerth’s engagement with Heidegger 
and his forming of an ingenious path as an answer to the question of Being 
is the author’s powerful manifesto to the exigency of “cultivating the piety of 

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thinking in our questioning” (310). This stance is magnified by the section’s 
concluding sentence: “The historicity of thinking and the forgetfulness of 
Being indicate the perspective in which the relation between Being and truth 
must be thematized and re-addressed always anew” (310), which necessitates 
us to choose a dedicated re-thinking and re-articulating of the forgetfulness 
of Being as a genuine response to the call of thinking which is existentia 
hermeneutica’s essence and its ultimate responsibility.
The fourth subsection of part one, “Understanding as the Happening of 
Truth, ” scrutinizes the question of the primordiality of understanding, which 
is hermeneutics’ true locus. Addressing the radicality of questioning and the 
problematic of Tradition, Wierciński makes us sensitive to the interlocking 
character of understanding and Tradition, explaining the latter’s indispensable 
role in forming and transforming understanding:
What matters in philosophy , is the radicality with which human beings 
question their own Life ( Lebensverständnis der eigenen Gegenwart). It 
is precisely this “existential understanding of one’s present life,” which 
needs to be brought back to life. Therefore, what becomes essential 
is not the further elaboration of ontology, but the understanding of 
understanding as intimately involved and integrated into Tradition 
(Überlieferung). (314) 
To understand means to understand in relation to Tradition. In this 
light, hermeneutics and philosophy shine forth as pursuing the same goal: 
philosophy’s fundamental task and hermeneutics’ central preoccupation 
coalesce in their exigency of reaching out for understanding as immersed 
in Tradition and acknowledging its irresistible impact. The commonality 
of philosophical and hermeneutic pursuit urges the author to remind us of 
philosophy’s first and foremost challenge: 
The ethos of a philosopher is to rescue the True. Understanding 
ἀ-λήθεια as unconcealedness, places it in the dialectic horizon of 
concealment ( Verbergung) and unconcealment ( Entbergung), and opens 
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up a world in which things are made intelligible for human beings in the 
first place. (314)
Elucidating hermeneutics’ intermediary position in relation to 
understanding, Wierciński, after Gadamer, accentuates that “hermeneutics 
is not interested in the procedure of understanding, but in the clarification 
of the conditions in which understanding takes place” (Gadamer 2000, 295). 
Vitally, hermeneutics’ non-prescriptive approach to understanding avows its 
temporal character. The temporality of understanding makes us aware of the 
limitedness of our cognition. If human understanding happens in the basic 
structure of cognition’s limitedness, we also need to grasp that understanding 
is always conditioned by its pre-suppositional nature. Each time we endeavor 
to understand, our understanding rests on its fore-structure (fore-having, fore-
sight, fore-conception), and thus, we cannot speak of understanding in terms 
of an isolated, atemporal singularity, and/or homogeneity.
The undeniable axis of Existentia Hermeneutica is the interrelatedness of 
language and human understanding. Language does not exist outside of Being 
and Being embraces the lingual dimension of one’s being a human being. As 
Wierciński puts it soundly: “Human Dasein resides within language: ‘Language 
is the house of Being.’ [cf. Heidegger 1977b, 217] Therefore, language is a 
constitutive aspect of the human being. We are not in a position of stepping 
outside of language. It is not we that speak, but ‘language that speaks, ’ ( die Sprache 
spricht).” (317; cf. Heidegger 1959, 32) In this place of the book, the author 
resumes the discussion of Gadamer’s assertion of the import of verbum interius, 
dealt with in the earlier sections, and electrifies us with one of his momentous 
statements. This time not only reinvigorating our comprehension of Gadamer’s 
disclosure of the linguality of human understanding, but also problematizing 
Heidegger’s theo- and a-theo-logical position:
However, the Gadamerian retrieval of verbum interius renews the 
young Heidegger’s project of a phenomenological and hermeneutic 
rehabilitation of medieval theology. Hermeneutics must never forget 
that the remembering of language was effected through the retrieval of 
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Being is thrown into question by his own legacy. (317; cf. Heidegger 
1983, 8–9)
Bringing in proximity Gadamer’s recourse to the theological notion 
of verbum interius (in the context of his not being a theologian), and the 
Heideggerian a-theist stance, as arising, but also diverting from his Christian 
theological roots within a reconfiguration, broadens the scope of the reader’s 
apprehension of the convergences and dissimilarities of the two thinkers’ 
ontological hermeneutics, as well as the idiosyncrasies of their philosophical 
paths. It is one of the ways, in which the author expands our hermeneutic 
sensibility and guides us appealingly through that which pertains to 
hermeneutic existence.
Wierciński claims that verbum interius, as the modus experiendi of Being, 
allows us to dwell in the truth about Being’s self-disclosive nature, as enacted 
in language. It is indispensable at this point to mention the author’s insights, 
stemming from the employment of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of existence and 
the German thinker’s rejuvenation of the ancient Greek notion of aletheia. 
To see Being and language through the prism of Heidegger’s ontological 
hermeneutics illuminates the two further, as indissoluble, and invites us not 
only to comprehend Being’s self-disclosure as happening in language, but also 
to acknowledge its limitedness. The author explains: 
Fusing horizons, we go beyond something that is already familiar to 
us. In the interplay of that which is understood ( das Entborgene) and 
that which is veiled and in need of being disclosed ( das Verborgene) 
we realize that our access to that which wants to be disclosed is in and 
through language. (321)
Not everything is accessible, but that, which is, is disclosed in and through 
language. The limitedness of our access to Being lies in the powerlessness of 
language. As human beings, we are confronted with the lack of the ultimacy 
of understanding, as it is stranded between the human (thus contingent, 
provisional, and finite) mode of being and the unlimitedness of the divine. We 
find ourselves in the position of having less power to express “what is” than 
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we would like to possess. Language mediates between that which is veiled and 
that which is unveiled; however, it is not being done to the fullest. The author 
spells it out thus: “We discover that language itself lives in the in-between of 
concealment and unconcealment, im Zueinandergehören von Verbergung und 
Entbergung. ” (321) 
Language’s living in the in-between of concealment and unconcealment 
directs us to existentia hermeneutica’ s other important in-betweenness. Spanning 
the distance between the self and the Other, language partakes in distinct 
modes of Being: familiarity and strangeness. It is through hospitality, including 
linguistic hospitality, that we cross the barrier between us. Abolishing the divider 
that happens in conversation becomes the genuine space for con- version, as 
a result of which we do not remain the same we were before. Conversation’s 
welcoming gesture is at the same time hermeneutics’ welcoming gesture. It is in 
and through conversation that we experience our lives as existentia hermeneutica. 
Conversation is the true texture of hermeneutic existence.
What is most significant is that in conversation we become “bound to one 
another in a new community” (326). The phenomenality of the encounter in 
conversation is not about “putting oneself forward and successfully asserting 
one’s own point of view but being transformed into a communion” (326). The 
communion, the attunement to and the following of the Sache selbst, that 
happens in conversation, inspires us to appreciate fully the otherness of the 
Other without needing to subjugate or dominate him/her: “Hospitality and 
responsibility describe the basic characteristic of a human being dwelling in-
between familiarity and strangeness in the mode of διά-λέγειν, of welcoming 
the difference and the richness of the relationship with the Other.” (325) To 
cover the initial distance between the mineness and otherness requires the 
appropriating of original meaning. The encounter with the unknown—the 
human being or the text (as the author highlights)—is a reminder that the 
path to understanding leads via the confrontation with otherness. Quoting 
Gadamer’s reminiscences of his last conversation with Heidegger, Wierciński 
makes us feel the extent of the drama when conversation comes to an end, and, 
in this way, he takes us to the very heart of the assertion about the lingual nature 
of understanding. When we con- verse, we can hope that, led by conversation, 
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There is something terribly distressing when the conversation is over. 
It is a defeat of hermeneutics; a defeat of hope and optimism that we can 
come to an understanding. As long as we allow ourselves to be led by a 
conversation, we can maintain a positive trajectory of being on the way 
to understanding. (326) 
What is most crucial, is our continuous being on the way to understanding, 
in our incessant and intimate conversation with the world, the Other, and 
oneself as the other. The non-finality of understanding shows that the 
extension of the way on which we are is, at the same time, the expansion of 
who we are. In the true Gadamerian spirit, we can talk of the consequential 
and meaningful increase in Being ( Zuwachs an Sein; cf. Gadamer 2000, 135–
136). The question of understanding situates us in the very center of Gadamer’ s 
hermeneutics of conversation. Writing about Gadamer’s radicalization of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of existence, Wierci ński makes us aware of the 
import of Gadamer’s getting near the question of Being to the challenge of 
understanding. This enables us to see the essence of Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
enterprise as a practical philosophy of interpretation and understanding.
The author’ s shaping influence on both the hermeneutically sensitive and the 
hermeneutically aloof reader can be fully discerned when he quotes Gadamer’ s 
lines on understanding as an adventure. Understanding is dangerous, but it 
also affords unique opportunities. One cannot but follow the glamorous truth 
of Gadamer’s view of understanding as action which “always remains a risk” 
(332). The challenge, adventure, and risk that are involved in understanding, 
and which Gadamer endorses, inspire us to acquaint ourselves further with his 
practical philosophy.
The horizon of understanding encompasses lived human experience. 
Gadamer in the first place locates understanding in the practical dimension 
of our lives. Concerned with rejuvenating the importance of phronesis for 
hermeneutics (cf. Gadamer 1994, 332), Gadamer considers practical wisdom 
as the very one which gets us near to understanding par excellence, and calls 
it “the condition of any theoretical knowledge” (339). Undeniably, Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, as oriented toward factical historical life, promotes phronesis 
as hermeneutic virtue (cf. Gadamer 1998). One of the vital achievements 
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of this section of the book is the accentuation of the Heideggerian legacy in 
Gadamer’s formulation of his hermeneutics of practical wisdom. The author 
explains that, following Heidegger’ s hermeneutics of facticity with an emphasis 
of the momentarily concrete, Gadamer sees hermeneutic understanding as an 
application of that which needs to be understood in the interpreter’s factic life 
(cf. Gadamer 2000, 310–321; 1991, 1986).  
Bearing in mind the above and other gripping passages which explicate 
the significance of phronesis in our experiencing of understanding, we could 
venture a thesis that for Gadamer understanding and practical wisdom 
(excellence rather than art) are isomorphic. Following Gadamer, Wierci ński 
contends: “Existential situatedness, which takes seriously one’s own life and 
one’s particular hermeneutic situation is the condition sine qua non of any 
understanding. ” (341) The author elucidates the applicability and effectiveness 
of hermeneutic interpretation as grounded, each time, in the concreteness of 
our existential situation, and emphasizes that mediating “between universal 
and particular, φρόvησις is a hermeneutic virtue, which capacitates the 
interpretation and reasoning” (342). It must be accentuated that we owe to the 
author an unprecedently exhaustive elaboration of Gadamer’s deployment of 
phronesis in his hermeneutic philosophy. The inclusion of dialogue as the locus 
of understanding makes Gadamer’s approach far more embracing, and, in fact, 
bespeaks the core of the human way of understanding. The reciprocity (which 
dialogue occasions) is a precious experience of partaking in reasoning. Thus, it 
is not only the dialectics of the general and the particular (the virtue-oriented 
attitude), which illuminatively prompts understanding, but the hermeneutic 
conversation with its unique possibility of exposing and confronting differing 
opinions to the effect of a better understanding of the issue at hand.
Gadamer’s dialogical model of understanding makes us aware that, while 
coming to an understanding “here and now, ” we participate in meaning rather 
than create it. This is of vital significance, since hermeneutics, as Gadamer 
stresses, is not about devising a method, but about “describing what is the case” 
(349). Discovering and describing “what is, ” or “what the case is, ” transforms 
the way we think about interpretation and understanding. One of the 
stirring, though perhaps less noticeable aspects of Gadamer’s illumination of 
understanding (as mentioned by the author), is the philosopher’s distinction 

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between experience and insight. Quoting Gadamer’s enthralling lines, 
Wierci ński animates our imagination to see the transformative power of 
insight which “always involves an escape from something that had deceived us 
and held us captive. Thus, insight always involves an element of self-knowledge 
and constitutes a necessary side of what we call experience in the proper sense. 
Insight is something to which we come. ” (Gadamer 2000, 350)
By contrast to this less prominent facet of Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
philosophy of understanding, the issue of finitude, pronounced in mighty and 
varied ways, draws our attention unwaveringly, if not disquietingly. Gadamer, 
Heidegger, and Ricoeur (whose philosophical path is chosen to instantiate the 
dilemmas of philosophy/theology interconnectivity in the subsequent section) 
insist on the out-and-out importance of finitude for human understanding. 
Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics of facticity, Gadamer’s hermeneutics of 
conversation, and Ricoeur’s textual hermeneutics are connected by the very 
thread of meditating on human finitude. Following in the author’s footsteps, 
we may pause and think of the three thinkers’ contribution, through their 
hermeneutics of finitude, to our awareness of how we understand what 
happens to us when we understand and, crucially, how our understanding 
is determined by our finite being, and thus, we can be closer to the central 
precept of an understanding of our existence as existentia hermeneutica. 
Section four of part one, “The Heterogeneity of Thinking: Paul Ricoeur, 
the Believing Philosopher, and the Philosophizing Believer,” offers a riveting 
re-opening of the vexing quandary around the philosophy and theology 
connection/disconnection. Wierci ński makes two important claims about 
Ricoeur in this respect. Firstly, he compares Ricoeur’s position to Kant’s. The 
author poses an open-ended question, leading us to the possible answer by 
stating the following: “For Kant, whatever truth may occur in theology, it is 
subordinated to the criterion of philosophical rationality. One may legitimately 
ask whether a similar subordination covertly determines Paul Ricoeur’s work 
in the philosophy of religion.” (355) Secondly, he suggests that the danger of 
transgressing the barriers between the two disciplines in Ricoeur seems to be 
overcome in his oscillating “around a creative coexistence of the two disciplines 
by keeping to a rigorous methodological division” (356). Wierci ński comes at 
this point to a more general formula, which could guide us in the matter of 
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avoiding the situation of one of these disciplines having to subsume to the 
other: 
On the one hand, a philosopher can continuously deepen his 
sensitivity to philosophical problems as he engages the Scriptures. On 
the other, a theologian implementing the methodological apparatus of 
philosophy can reach a more profound understanding of theology and 
his own personal religious conviction. (356)
The stance framed in this way wins us over to the author’s decidedly 
clear and convincing way of thinking about the uneasy relationship between 
philosophy and theology. Engaging the Scriptures enables a philosopher 
to deepen his sensitivity to philosophical problems. And this applies not 
only to moral matters—the issues of guilt, responsibility, justice, and love, 
which the author mentions while discussing Ricoeur’s philosophically and 
theologically underwritten reflection. Becoming more sensitive works to the 
effect of a far more extensive attitude, which involves standing up against all 
compartmentalization in thinking as such, while embracing the discomfiting 
topics that need to be reflected upon. Satiated with aporias and paradoxes, 
embodying disquieting and highly tangled hi- stories, the Scriptures invite the 
reader to delve deeper into the more subtle meanings of human reality, and to 
a continuous effort to think and to re-think the possible and the impossible, 
the sacred and the profane, the acceptable and the unacceptable. This is 
what Wierci ński very aptly names “thinking appropriated by the possibilities 
contained in the biblical texts” (373). To forsake such possibilities would be 
unwise for a thinker, and would disavow the adventure of thinking per se. By the 
same token, when a theologian deploys philosophical methodology, he/she can 
benefit from a re-thinking of the theological issues against the doxa of the so-
far existing thinking. In this anti-schematic approach, all points of contention, 
tackled with the aid of philosophical methodology, can be illuminated to the 
effect of a novel rendering of the already savored, thus building a culture of 
reflective, mature, and open Christianity.
Therefore, right from its beginning, the section on Ricoeur’s 
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both an excellent instance of the possibility of a non-subsuming relationship 
between philosophy and theology as well as an incentive to develop our 
thinking about this recurring problematic. Without a shadow of a doubt, 
Wierci ński’s voice attests to the topicality of the philosophy/theology (dis)
engagement. Being one of its prevalent ideas, this issue (alongside many others) 
bespeaks the book’ s relevance in the overall framework of today’ s philosophical 
discourse (cf. Wierciński 2010). Suffice it to mention the controversial issue of 
crypto-theology in Jean-Luc Marion’s philosophy—his open admission to the 
Catholic provenance, while defending the position of a believing philosopher.
The heterogeneity of thinking, represented by the philosophers discussed 
in the book and unmistakably by the author himself, brings us anew, in the 
later sections of part one, to the phronetic dimension of the philosophical 
enterprise. The varied ways of realizing the philosophical ethos bespeak the 
phenomenality of thinking. Phronetic sensibility presupposes an openness 
to, and an acknowledgement of the unfamiliar, the contradictory (Ricoeur’s 
seminal deliberation on the conflict of interpretations), or even the hostile, 
as well as the conducive employment of that which is at variance with our 
thinking (Gadamer’s famous insight into conversation’s interlocutors: “This 
means, however, constantly recognizing in advance the possibility that your 
partner is right, even recognizing the possible superiority of your partner. Is 
this too little?”; Gadamer, 1997, 36). 
It is only through thus defined openness that we can experience the 
abundance and unending nature of interpretation and understanding. A 
prudent approach to thinking puts us in the position of an unflattering research 
of all that might enrich, cultivate, or refine it without setting out limits, without 
instant rejection of other thinking on the grounds of ideological, religious, or 
other differences. The undulating interconnection/disconnection between 
philosophy and theology throughout the history of the two disciplines resonates 
with the lesser or greater appreciation of the positive fruits of thinking-the-
difference. The diverse ways of the realization of thinking-the-difference by key 
hermeneuticians who figure in the book encourage us to embark on a never-
ending journey to uncover what thinking consists in. Ricoeur’s capability 
of thinking-the-difference was the begetter of either overtly philosophical 
or outwardly theological texts. Heidegger’s contesting of his religious roots, 
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while recycling and re-appropriating his theological thinking, resulted in 
the possibility of a new beginning—the a-theological thinking. Gadamer’s 
rehabilitation of medieval thought (taking over where Heidegger had set it 
aside), and his ingenious probing into the nature of language through the 
Augustinian notion of verbum interius, entailed not only a novel approach to 
language but proved the philosopher’s thought to be a witness to thinking-the-
difference. The inseparability of thinking the theological from the philosophical 
pole occasioned a milestone insight into the lingual nature of Being, as well as 
contributed greatly to linguistic thinking. 
Wierciński’s prescient claim about the permeability and inseparability 
of philosophical and theological thinking intones many themes. While the 
exceptional diversity and profundity of the issues of Christian theology that he 
elaborates can be viewed as a vade-me-cum of the thinking faith—a wellspring of 
knowledge in its own right—, in and through those themes the author sensitizes 
us incessantly to the concomitancy of the rootedness of the hermeneutic 
investigation in Tradition and its unending, meaning-laden openness to new 
interpretations. It is the movement backward to the roots of philosophical/
theological thinking and the movement forward toward a recognition of new 
interpretive possibilities that propel hermeneutic interrogation. Negotiating 
between past and present, engaging various thinking traditions, mediating 
between the already known and the new, hermeneutics creates a space for 
advancing human thinking in its primordial need to understand “what needs 
to be understood.” It is only by respecting and employing the multitudinous 
traditions and currents of thinking, also divergent and contradictory, that we 
are enabled to unearth what otherwise would have been inaccessible to us. 
Through an enticing examination of the interweaving paths of philosophy and 
theology, Wierciński leads us on our way to understand ourselves, our-being-
in-the-world, fostering, thus, our drawing-near to an understanding of Being.
“The courage to ask and the humility to listen,” which the author puts 
forward as the program for thinkers—philosophers and theologians alike—, 
encompasses not just the blossoming of thinking in the interactions between 
philosophy and theology, but also the more attentive, more nuanced attitude 
to the problematics within the two disciplines. Wierciński’s skillful alerting us 
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pre-determined viewpoints through the example of Ricoeur’s propounding of 
Christian plurivocity cannot go unnoticed. It is only through our humility in 
listening to many existing voices, no matter how perturbing and regardless of 
their provenance, that we can grow in thinking and grow as thinking beings. 
The idea of being humble in the confrontation with thinking that is different 
from ours, even if likely to cause resistance at the initial stage, is the only 
pathway to the more profound insight into what thinking and understanding 
are. The courage to ask is the philosophers’ daily bread. One would not be a 
philosopher, if one did not dare to pose questions. Asking questions, however, 
should not amount to a self-complacent dwelling in the charm of one’s 
intellectual prowess, but should be oriented toward a genuine investigation 
of die Sache selbst, in the confrontational/collaborative way with Others who 
possibly can always think differently.
The humility to listen encompasses the bitter realization that one can err. 
It involves a possibility for and exigency of transformation. We need to be 
humble enough to understand fully that the other name for humbleness is an 
unlimited effata. And thus, our minds are elevated to grasp the truths which 
would otherwise remain unattended, or even inaccessible. The unending circle 
of question and answer, into which we should allow ourselves to be drawn, 
according to Heidegger, is also the very space of realizing that we cannot have 
the last word. 
The way Gadamer understands the word goes beyond the signifying 
function of the word and toward the word as a realization of thinking. 
As such, it is never the last word, because thinking is always thinking 
further, there is always something more to think of and to say. (144)
The last subsection of part one, “The Courage to Ask and the Humility to 
Listen, ” cogently titled “Thinking Imprisoned: a Captive Mind Tortured by the 
Demands of the Technological Age,” is an outstandingly lucid precis of what 
hermeneutic endeavor consists in. Thanks to its nuanced and evocative manner, 
this involving resume casts a spell on the reader to consider and reconsider 
hermeneutics in the full variety of its characteristic traits. The titled “captive 
mind” resonates both with Milosz’s non-fiction work of the same title, and “the 
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invincible mind” from his poem “Incantation,” the interpretation of which we 
encounter in the later part of this book. That is of no small importance, as in 
this way, Wierci ński highlights anew the contrast between the unlimited, one 
could even say, untamed capacity for thinking with the human predicament in 
the post-metaphysical age, marked by an acute loss of contemplative thinking. 
Locating in poetry the chance for the restoration of the non-calculative thinking, 
the author reveals to us his concern thus: “Our age is profoundly affected, nay 
dominated, by calculative thinking, and we have thus lost our aptitude for an 
authentic way of awaiting the πα ρουσία. ” (393; cf. Heidegger 1977a, 91) 
This section is also a powerful witness to the primacy of phronesis in 
philosophical hermeneutics. When the author speaks of hermeneutics’ distinctly 
personal character, he stresses that interpretation does not happen outside of 
the human existential situation but is entrenched in it and is tested by it. What 
is most vital, is interpretation’s transformative aspect, the import of which the 
author ascertains in the following way: “It is not an expression of the thirst for 
power and profit but a search for a deeper understanding of the need for personal 
change in our life. ” (388) The unlimited, dignifying, non-calculative, and non-
violent approach to interpretation that hermeneutics incites, and Wierci ński 
forefronts, takes us to the heart of hearts of the hermeneutic enterprise. 
Entertaining the limitless possibilities of interpretation, hermeneutics holds 
human thinking in the highest respect, it values the courage to re-address, re-
think, and re-interpret the already interpreted.  Hermeneutics’ boundaryless 
horizon, as the author accentuates, bespeaks the human need to include the 
excluded, and “places itself in the service of those voices that are suppressed 
and denied expression” (388). Open to the opposing, disquieting, but also 
excluded and suppressed voices, hermeneutics does not cease to display its 
welcoming gesture to embrace ambiguity, insecurity, and incompleteness. In 
this way, it is able to avoid the fossilized, methodological assertions, and situate 
interpretation and understanding where it truly belongs—in life.
The author’s reflection on the humility to listen provides an interesting 
connection between both parts of the book. Poetry is undeniably the locus of 
the many and confusing voices. Instead of standing outside of language and 
human experience, the poet stands in the very center of what happens and what 
needs to be put into words. The multiple voices that reach him/her partake 

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in the continuous procession of meanings: the unexpected, the unadjusted, 
the impenetrable, etc. We may guess that the smaller size of part two, “Poetic 
Disclosures: Language as the Medium of the Hermeneutic Experience,” is 
dictated by the author’s fidelity to the requirements of the two parts’ differing 
content. Doing justice to the enormity of the issues dealt with in the first part, 
the author allocates respectively a due number of sections and subsections 
constitutive of this part’s subject matter. This capacious approach mirrors the 
breadth of the issues that need to be expressed under the heading of “The 
Hermeneutic Discovery of a Theological Insight. ” Being a true treasure-trove, 
this part generously shares with us the theological intuitions in hermeneutic 
thinking.
By comparison, the shorter part two does not have its own impact 
diminished. Rather, its strength lies in the issuing of an invitation to indulge in 
the beauty of the unexpected (that is poetry’s crucial role), but above all, in the 
beauty of language as the medium of the hermeneutic experience. Whereas part 
one explicates what hermeneutic existence is, part two displays the power and 
powerlessness of language in conveying the essence of existentia hermeneutica. 
The fragility of conditio humana and the assumed finesse of poetic language 
are shown respectively by these two parts as Being’s meaningful disclosures.
The second part sets the scene for an understanding of poetry’s capacity 
to encapsulate the nature of language. It is through its full acknowledgement 
of language’s metaphoricity that poetry lets us approach the crux of an 
understanding of the phenomenon of language. The author acquaints us 
here with three important observations. The energeia that is released in the 
interplay of concealment and unconcealment becomes the true fodder for 
poetic artistry. Furthermore, what originates poetic activity, is a poet’s staying 
in continuous awe with “what is.” And finally, as the author affirms, poetry 
plays a unique role by accompanying us in our search for personal identity 
while we are listening to the confusing voices that we are.
Without a shadow of a doubt, Wierci ński’s reflection on poetry is not 
only a beautiful, meditative chant of Being, beauty, and love, reflected in 
his interpretations of the many pieces of poetry that appear here. Far more 
importantly, his unprecedented take on poetry is an impressing meditation 
on the hermeneutic condition of being a poet. This novel approach eschews 
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seeking another theory for poetic discourse. The author does not devise a 
new methodology of interpretation, but reaches out for what poetry’s nature 
consists in. In his hermeneutic phenomenology of poetic artistry, pondering 
on the question of what poetry is, the author visibly etches its many and 
surprising dimensions. Far from being a facile and sentimental poetry 
enthusiast, he takes us to where we do not expect to be taken. The idea of a 
poet’s witnessing to poetry—the undeniable axis of part two—is at the same 
time one of the instances and summits of the author’s thinking-the-difference. 
Wierciński asserts that a poet is not merely a skillful craftsman/craftswoman, 
generating enticing strings of words. Rather, he/she speaks from the Reality 
which is beyond him/her, and takes from what is not his/hers, but from the 
reservoir of poetry. Pursuing beauty and truth, a poet is incessantly tormented, 
and is never left to feel at ease with what presents itself as poetry’s texture: “The 
life of a poet is a struggle for the shaping of his/her poetic existence. It is a life 
of constant tension between loyalty and betrayal. ” (441)
Poetry is a witness to the exterior reality, but also, or even in the first place, 
to the reality of the inner self. The author contends that 
[…] poetry can be described as a specific kind of ‘ doing anthropology , ’ 
a kind of access to all possible knowledge about man as such. The 
connection between poetry and anthropology manifests itself most 
openly in those poetic descriptions which have the exploration of the 
nature of man as their primary object, thus coinciding with the object 
of anthropology. (443)
Poetry indefatigably poses this topical query: what does it mean to be a 
human being? Over and over again, it attempts to resolve the questions of our 
humanity: our uncertainties, dilemmas, any sudden and dramatic changes 
of fate. But also, it is a mirror to our conscience, it guards us and protects 
that which we deem most precious as human beings. The author states firmly: 
“Poetry is, therefore, a school for one’ s humanity. It reminds us that it is retained 
in everydayness. It speaks to a human being’s conscience so that it would not 
betray itself.” (435) He impresses us with his discernment and appreciation 
of poetry’s grandiose role: “Poetry is a zealous search for a ‘magic formula’ in 

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which the whole truth about our existence could be accommodated and shine 
out brightly. ” (441) 
Musing on the “intangible phenomenon” of being a poet, Wierciński 
emphasizes that the phenomenality of being a poet cannot be easily explained. 
Intangibility does not refer to the seemingly ephemeral world of the poetic 
creation as if disengaged from the troublesome reality outside. On the contrary, 
one can say that a poet is closer to reality than an average human being. The 
author ascertains:
We can understand poetry as being an awakening to reality. Poetry, 
as opposed to versification as such, is a testimony to a specific kind of 
perception of reality that is, to a life that hovers between being lived 
ascetically and just taking sensual pleasure in reality. This perception 
puts the world, as experienced by the poet, into words. The language 
of poetry is the house in which the poet has made his/her home; there 
is no better way of referring to the poet’s perception of reality. (439; cf. 
Heidegger 1990, 26 ff.)
It is not only that poetry absorbs and evokes human sorrow, pain, joy, bliss, and 
ecstasy, but it “can stir up the woundedness of man, in order to awaken him/her to 
being attentive in his/her existence” (444; cf. Heidegger 1963, 35). Poetry testifies 
profoundly to the hermeneutic understanding of a human being as a historical 
and lingual being. Existentia hermeneutica is a poetic existence since in poetry the 
linguality and historicity of Being come in a condensed, satiated, and excessive 
form. The author reminds us of Heidegger’s illuminating words: “Language is 
the house of Being, ” and accordingly, we may say: poetry is the home to Being. It 
nurtures Being, makes it blossom and flourish, it invites Being to dwell in Itself: 
Poetry brings important intuitions which enrich an understanding of 
our capabilities and ourselves, clarifying the understanding of a human 
being as a fundamentally historical and lingual existence in time. It 
is in the journey toward the future that the human person discovers 
the richness of his/her existence and tries, in a continual interpretative 
effort, to reach self-understanding. (432) 
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Poetry invites us to continue unwaveringly the interpretative enterprise of 
our being-in-the-world.
Being a poet means being summoned to be a witness to poetry. And 
therefore, we can also speak of a poet as the one who experiences a spiritual 
call. The spiritual vocation comes from above, from the beyond of what is 
accessible. In this sense, begetting poetry is a hermeneutically understood 
access to the divine and to Being:
The hermeneutics of poetic statements illuminates the phenomenon 
of being a poet, yet without mastering the mystery that surrounds the 
poetic state. The hermeneutics moves near the authentic core of being 
a poet by understanding that the poetic existence is intimately in touch 
with its personal foundations in Being—by way of being a unity that 
springs from metaphysical thinking. Being at home in the dimensions 
of what is wrapped in mystery is in fact what frees us to think about 
being a poet, by alerting us to the limits of language as well as the poet’s 
own conditio humana. (442)
Appropriating the message of one of the numerous poems cited by the 
author—Milosz’s “On Prayer”—, we can say that a poet is the “velvet bridge” 
(434) between the divine and the human. In the recognition of what is, only 
he/she can be the bridge, or cross the bridge. And this cannot happen on its 
own accord. Wierci ński speaks of Milosz in terms of an instrument and his 
recognizing himself to be an instrument as such. Various voices come, find 
their habitat in a poet, and go. He/she is continuously and ultimately open 
to both the good and the disquieting voices. They perturb him, intervene, 
compel the poet to be put into words. Milosz gives a sigh; he wishes for the 
good voices, and not the evil ones. But the poet does not choose for himself/
herself, he/she is chosen. The insight afforded by hermeneutics allows us to see 
the theological perspective of poetic creativity. T o be a poet is to be chosen, like 
the Bible’s prophets who had their will “bent” to God’s.
Wierciński convinces us that: “Being a poet takes hold of a man or woman 
and challenges them; it requires him/her to approach themselves critically, 
hence also, to be critical in their appraisal of whether they are, or are not, 

363
poets.” (443) This “taking hold of” means to be a captive. Captivated by 
poetry’s power, the poet yields to it, responds to it. Poetry challenges a poet 
to partake in its reality. The many voices a poet recognizes to be him/her 
cannot be quenched, as all of them are him/her: “The purpose of poetry is 
to remind us how difficult it is to remain just one person, for our house is 
open, there are no keys in the doors, and invisible guests come in and out at 
will. ” (406)
Each time anew, and also in astonishing ways, the poet enters a hermeneutic 
conversation with him/herself, the Other, and the world. The author reminds 
us of the indispensability of human experience in uncovering the hermeneutic 
truth of our existence. This is a process of hope, of embracement of what we 
are, of shunning any form of despair: 
Poetry accompanies these most intimate encounters, saving the 
unique experience of being in a concrete human being, protecting it 
from the oblivion that encroaches upon it by means of generalization. 
Hence the poet is “the enemy of despair, a friend of hope, ” together with 
all the shades of the struggle as long as he/she is on the way. (438)
In lieu of concluding remarks, one cannot but express an amazement 
at Existentia Hermeneutica’s stupendous breadth  of themes, which makes 
us, at the same time, continually marvel at the unlimited possibilities of 
a human life to be lived to the fullest. Bringing philosophy, theology, and 
poetry into conversation, the author pays tribute to the grandeur of human 
thinking, expressed in its versatile and astounding ways. If a poet’s “vocation 
is to contemplate Being, ” as Milosz says, and Wierciński emphasizes, we may 
say: and so, it is prodigiously the call of philosophy and theology. Thanks 
to this most comprehensive inquiry into human existence, we can fully 
appreciate the truth of the human mind as invincible. Our human need of 
intellectual expressiveness takes diverse and unforeseeable forms. Thinking 
with Wierci ński, which is a delightful experience of contemplative thinking 
(existentia hermeneutica’s wellspring and intent), we can enjoy the fruits of 
an embracement of the interweaving paths of philosophy and theology, and 
appreciate poetry as their valuable partner. Philosophy, theology, and poetry 
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alike aim to investigate what is within our experience of being-in-the world 
(In-der-Welt-sein) and our being-with ( Mitsein). 
Human existence as existentia hermeneutica is at the same time and 
profoundly existentia interpretativa. As human beings, thus finite beings, we 
are always experiencing insatiability and insufficiency, while  continuously 
attempting to describe and interpret the reality we live in: “The call to interpret is 
ontological, ethical, and transcendental for it points to our roots in other worlds: 
It demands a personal response not only to being-there but to being-grateful to 
Being.” (493) All the dimensions of interpretation mentioned herein find their 
culmination in the realization of being as being-grateful to Being. Gratitude is 
the only adequate response. Existentia hermeneutica teaches us to be thankful, 
and even more vitally and all-embracingly to view gratitude as our mode of 
being-in-the-world. And thus, we cannot but acknowledge our indebtedness 
to the author for revisiting the roots of thinking in its co-belongingness with 
understanding and speaking. We are thankful for an invitation to scrutinize the 
riveting sides of thinking-the-difference: the philosophical and the theological 
poles, since in thinking-the-difference we can experience the empowerment of 
thinking, to which Existentia Hermeneutica splendidly testifies.
Following Wierci ński’s response to the question of the future of 
hermeneutics, we can firmly state that in the technological age which 
luxuriates in various communication media, we are challenged by an 
increasing emptiness and ineffectiveness in communicating our true being 
to the Other. Hermeneutics as the art of conversation issues a constant call 
to make us participate in “an engaging con- versation that turns one’s face 
toward the face of the other” (485). Conversation influences profoundly the 
way we live in the world and the way we live with others. By living our lives as 
a conversation, we continuously confront ourselves and others in the truth of 
our being-in-the-world. Recognizing the ubiquitous nature of conversation, 
Wierci ński’s reflection on the poetic disclosures of Being is, at the same time, 
an avowal of poetry’s capacity for conversation. Addressing us, poetry frees 
our participation in what is being disclosed. To remain immune is impossible. 
And thus, the author’s meditation on poetic disclosures shines forth as the 
book’s crowning achievement, instantiating what is happening while Being 
discloses itself to us.

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Through its emphasis on the exigency of dialogue in our lives (inter-
personal, inter-cultural, inter-religious), hermeneutics speaks to our lived 
experience and awakens  us to take up a conversation as the last chance to protect 
ourselves against the self-inflicted destructiveness of the technological age (cf. 
Gadamer 2002). Through the praxis of dialogue, hermeneutics predisposes 
us to a constructive tolerance and openness to otherness. Therefore, as the 
author powerfully puts it, living each time anew in an ongoing dialogue, we 
experience hope as our modus existendi. In this way, undeniably, hermeneutics 
is the philosophy of hope and the philosophy of future. In its orientation 
toward the future, hermeneutics can be said to display a particular kind of 
visione anticipatrice, a capability of a constant openness to unexpectedness, 
while endorsing its ability to listen to, respect, and learn from the voices of the 
past. 
Wierciński’s hermeneutic inquiry into the import of the various voices as 
participating in the disclosure of Being engages a reflection on language which 
does not rest on our controlling it as a means of communication, or on our 
mastering of it, but on language as disclosing Being. In the polyphonic nature 
of Being, what poetry witnesses to, theology contemplates, and philosophy 
conceives, is orchestrated in the magnificent symphony of an understanding 
of our being-in-the-world, of our “encounter with the truth of Being” ( pulchre, 
bene, recte), to which Existentia Hermeneutica is a perceptive and incomparable 
witness. 
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