Anthropos 55 (2): 195–213 | issn0587-5161 | e-issn2630-4082 
A Posthumanist Social Epistemology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Epistemic Injustice 
Justin Simpson 
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley,usa justin.simpson@utrgv.edu 
©2023 Justin Simpson 
Abstract. This paper seeks to intervene in environmental ethics and social epistemology. Within a predominant strand of environmental ethics, one witnesses accounts based on nonhumans’ ability to suffer, and consequently, the passivity of nonhumans. On the other hand, social epistemology is often not social enough insofar as it does not include nonhumans. Seminal accounts of epistemic injustice often conceal or exclude the possibility that nonhumans can be subjects of knowledge and victims of epistemic injustice because of an an­thropocentric bias that maintains propositional language is a neces­sary condition for knowledge. By presenting a non-anthropocentric, corporeal epistemology, this paper reveals a more affirmative account of nonhumans as epistemic agents with tacit, embodied knowledge. To prevent epistemic depreciation turning into ethical indifference or wrongdoing, this paper focuses on whether it is possible to com­mit epistemic injustices against nonhumans. In particular, this paper arguesthathumanscancommitfourth-orderepistemicexclusion,tes­timonial injustice, and testimonial smothering against nonhumans. 
Key Words: posthumanisms, social epistemology, epistemic injustice, nonhuman knowers 

Posthumanisticna socialna epistemologija: 
o možnosti necloveške epistemskenepravicnosti 
Povzetek. Namen tega prispevka je poseci v okoljsko etiko in socialno epistemologijo. V prevladujocem delu okoljske etike smo prica opi­som,kitemeljijonazmožnostitrpljenjanecloveškihbitijinposledicno na njihovi pasivnosti. Po drugi strani pa socialna epistemologija po­gosto ni dovolj socialna, saj ne vkljucuje neljudi. Temeljna dela o epi­stemski nepravicnosti pogosto prikrivajo ali izkljucujejo možnost, da so lahko neljudje subjekti vednosti in žrtve epistemske nepravicnosti 
https://doi.org/10.26493/2630-4082.55.195-213 
zaradi antropocentricne pristranosti, ki trdi, da je propozicionalni je­zik nujni pogoj za vednost. Z obravnavo neantropocentricne, telesne epistemologije prispevek prinaša afirmativnejši opis necloveških bitij kotepistemskihvršilcevstiho,utelešenovednostjo.Kerželimoprepre-citi,dabiseepistemskorazvrednotenjesprevrgloveticnobrezbrižnost ali napacno ravnanje, se prispevek osredotoca na vprašanje, ali je mo-gocezagrešitiepistemskokriviconecloveškimbitjem.Trdimozlasti,da lahko ljudje zagrešijoepistemsko izkljucitev cetrtegareda,pricevalsko nepravicnost in pricevalsko zatiranje necloveških oseb. 
Kljucne besede: posthumanizmi, socialna epistemologija, epistemska nepravicnost, necloveški znalci 
From Peter Singer (2011) to Ralph Acampora (2006) and Cynthia Willett (2014),onewitnessesenvironmentalethicsthat attendtononhumansuf­fering, and consequently, nonhuman passivity. While important in cer­tain contexts, such accounts can inadvertently reinforce the same prob­lem they are attempting to address. As ecofeminists such as Karen War­ren (1990) and Val Plumwood (1993, 2002) contend, the indifference to, subjugation of, and violence against nonhumans were historically jus­tified according to a human-nonhuman dualism that presents humans as active, communicative, and intelligent, while nonhumans are passive, non-communicative, and unintelligent. With so much at stake in terms of climate change and the sixth mass extinction, this paper pursues an alternative, more affirmative, environmental ethic that attempts to ‘make us feel the possibility of a thought that goes beyond human thought, to make us sensitive to other modes of thought that dwell at the edge of thought’ (Despret and Meuret 2016, 27). Developing upon Karen Barad’s posthuman performativity, this paper submits that nonhumans are epis­temicagentswithtacit,embodiedknowledge.Topre-emptepistemic de­preciation resulting in ethical indifference and/or harm to nonhumans, this paper seeks a more ‘capacious’ epistemology – a more social, so-cialepistemology(Alaimo2008,251).Feministsocialepistemologistsfirst enlarged epistemology by replacing an abstract, self-sufficient epistemic agent with situated, interdependent epistemic agents (Grasswick 2004). However, socialepistemology remains not socialenough insofar as it not only does not include, but often excludes, nonhumans from considera­tion. This paper argues for the inclusion of nonhumans in the epistemic community and considers whether it is possible for humans to commit epistemic injustices againstnonhumans.Inparticular, this paperargues that humans can commit fourth-order epistemic exclusion, testimonial injustice, and testimonial smothering against nonhumans. 

Fourth-Order Epistemic Exclusions – The Self-Imposed Lacuna in (Social) Epistemology 
To open a space for a more capacious epistemology that allows one to take seriously the possibility of nonhuman testimonial injustice and smothering, it is worthwhile to begin by arguing for the possibility that humans can commit fourth-order epistemic exclusions against nonhu-mans. Fourth-order epistemic exclusion is an extension of Kristie Dot­son’s third-order epistemic exclusion, which she articulates through a retelling of Plato’sAllegory of the Cave.In her retelling, Dotson imagines mobile people feeding the fettered people in the cave from the right. The leftmost fettered person would thereby be the only person that has not experienced a human sound to their left. The leftmost fettered person, Dotson explains, ‘has the ability to detect something about the larger so­cial world none of the other members can detect in quite the same way’ (Dotson 2014, 130). Yet, these experiences are excluded from being seri­ously acknowledged by the larger epistemological system, which orients one’s instituted social imaginary and grounds epistemic resources. Since the epistemological system was developed based on the shared experi­encesofthefettered people,andtheleftmostperson’sexperiencesarenot a common, shared experience, their experiences are dismissed as either ‘nonsensical [...], dangerous, [or] impossible’ (pp. 130–131). 
This epistemic exclusion is a recalcitrant problem. The very epistemic resourcesthatwoulddetectandchangethisthird-orderexclusionarepart of the resilient epistemological system that itself makes the exclusion. In Dotson’s words, the system reveals ‘what the system is prone to reveal, thereby reinforcing the idea that one’s system is adequate to the task, when one is actually stuck in a vicious loop’ (Dotson 2014, 132). More­over, the epistemic resources would only be able to capture these aspects iftherewerefundamentalchangestotheepistemologicalsystem.Asthey are,theepistemicresourcesareunableto ‘shedlightonwhytheyareinca­pable of accounting for the farthest left-fettered person’s insight’ (p. 131). Rather than a hypothetical example, Dotson maintains that third-order epistemic exclusions are much more common. Indeed, they are ‘the stuff “culture clashes” are made of’ (p. 131). 
Instead of an intraspecies clash between human cultures, fourth-order epistemic exclusions refer to interspecies clashes that result from the dif­ferences between humans and nonhumans. Instead of homogenizing the human group by excluding the testimony of the leftmost person, fourth-order epistemic exclusions homogenize the entire group of life forms. Fourth-order epistemic exclusions effectively reinforce anthropocentri­cism. Like Dotson’s account, nonhumans are revealed only according to whatthehumansystemispronetoreveal.Embodimentisreducedtohu­manembodiment,knowledgepracticesarereducedtohumanknowledge practices,andworldsarereducedtothehumanworld. Sincenonhumans are not humans, the possibility that they are intelligent with their own onto-epistemic practicesisexcluded asnonsensible,dangerous,orim-possible. 
The additional order of exclusion is not intended to assert that one or­der of exclusion is worse than the other. Rather the point is simply to avoid attempting to locate nonhumans to the left or right of the leftmost human. Either location would be problematic. On the one hand, placing nonhumans to theleftoftheleftmostfettered humancreatesacommon­ality between nonhumans and the leftmost humans, which has histori­cally justified sexism and racism (Warren 1990; Jackson 2020). On the other hand, placing nonhumans on the same line assumes a continuity between humans and nonhumans, but one that is defined by humans. Making a similar point, Yogi Hale Hendlin (2019, 353) writes: 
Whilecertainlyothercreaturesbehavesimilarlytohumansinmany ways, their processes and orientations are fundamentally different. Not worse, just different. The pernicious inertia of homogenizing consciousness and intelligence onto a single spectrum, usually hi-erarchized, prevents acknowledging a pluralistic understanding of these faculties that creates a multidimensional approach. 
The notion of nonhuman fourth-order exclusions seeks to recognize these non-hierarchical, non-absolute differences and hold accountable the homogenization of consciousness and intelligence as well as the ex-clusionof nonhuman consciousnessand intelligence (Gunnarsson 2013). 
More specifically, fourth-order epistemic exclusions involve a human epistemological system that inherently fails to recognize and dismisses the ability of nonhumans to detect something about the larger world, which is to say,they understand something that humans do not and have different modes of intelligence. For instance, reflecting on his dog, Aldo Leopold writes, ‘I delight in seeing him deduce a conclusion in the form of a point, from data that are obvious to him, but speculative to my un­aidedeye’ (Leopold1970,67).Fourth-orderepistemicexclusionscanalso involve denying the epistemic and ontological differences between hu­mansandnonhumans,whichresultfromdifferencesinbiology,anatomy, physiology,evolutionaryhistory,environment,andsociality(Ingold2013; Morizot 2021). 
Inacertainsense,nonhumansdonotinhabittheexactsamecaveashu-mans, nor do they engage in the same practices to understand the cave. Jacob von Uexküll (2010) defends a similar claim, maintaining that the different bodies, functional cycles, and subjective aims of nonhumans engender different epistemic and worlding practices. Each nonhuman transforms a world into a world of species-specific tones and meanings basedon its body andbiology (Schroer 2019). To use Uexküll’s famous example (Uexküll 2010), since the subjectiveaimofatick is to survive by feedingonthebloodofmammals,thetick’sworldconsistsofbutyricacid, bodywarmth,andfolliclesize.Thebutyricacidawakensthesleepingtick onthetreeandnotifiesittodropfromtheleaf.Thefolliclesizeprovidesa pathfortheticktofindthemammal’sskin.Furthermore,itscausaltheory is different because of its different corporeal sense of spatiality and tem­poralityaswellasitsdifferentworldofparticularmeaningfulentities.The tickengagesindifferentpracticesofdifferentiatingandknowinghowthe meaningful objects in its world interact. That is, the tick has a different epistemology and a different understanding of the world. Fourth-order epistemic exclusion, though, denies this difference in understanding as well as epistemology and ontology. 
Rather than a speculative concern, fourth-order epistemic exclusions aremuchmorecommonduetotheprevalenceofanthropocentricepiste­mologicalsystems. Oneformofthisanthropocentricbiasistheassertion that formal propositional/conceptual language is a necessary condition forknowledge.InadditiontoDescartes’systemofclearanddistinctideas, this bias has taken the form of Plato’s or Socrates’ demand for proposi­tional/conceptual justification. Epistemic anthropocentricism, however, is not limitedto modernand ancient epistemologicalsystems.It can also be found in seminal accounts within social epistemology. 
For instance, Kristie Dotson states that epistemic violence involves the refusal of an ‘audience to communicatively reciprocate alinguistic ex­change, owing to pernicious ignorance. Pernicious ignorance should be understood to refer to any reliable ignorance that, in a given context, harmsanother person (orsetofpersons)’(Dotson2011,238;italicsadded). Thisdefinitionrulesoutthepossibilitythatnonhumanscanbesubjectto epistemicviolencebymakingtheparticipationin(propositional)linguis­ticexchangesandpersonhoodanecessarycondition.Furthermore,Gaile Pohlhaus claims that ‘[k]nowing requires resources of the mind, such as language’ (Pohlhaus 2012, 718). Since many animals lack formal lan­guage and other conceptual criteria, this would suggest that they cannot beknowers.Additionally,MirandaFricker(2007,1;italicsadded)initially describes testimonial injustice as resulting in a ‘deflated level of credibil­ity to a speaker’s word.’ Testimonialinjusticeconsequently doesnotseem applicable to nonhumans because they are not speakers of words. The above examples thus effectively exclude or dismiss the intelligence and epistemic agency of nonhumans as nonsensical and impossible. 
Even figures making important steps forward in animal ethics can be seen implicitly reinforcing anthropocentric assumptions. Paul-Mikhail Podosky(2018)submitsanother-orientedformofnonhumanhermeneu-tic injustice, which occurs when a human listener’s conceptual frame­work and structural identity prejudices objectify nonhumans and ulti­mately prevent humans from understanding nonhuman experiences and oppression.Hermeneuticjustice,ontheotherhand,involvestherecogni­tion of nonhuman experiences and moral dignity, which ‘can only be ap­propriatelyrealized throughlanguage’ (Podosky2018,227;italicsadded). Byliberating wordsso that they can fullyreach their ‘expressivecapacity,’ Podosky contends that one can overcome hermeneutic oppression and help liberate animals (p. 226). 
Although it is certainly true that particular conceptual schemas can be oppressive, Podosky’s claim that language is the only way to know, and therefore the only solution, is itself oppressive and hegemonic. Like a totalizing, foundational discourse, Podosky’s solution could serve as a ‘mechanism of de facto repression of at least some of the experiential di­mensions of the situation’ (Cheney 1998, 120). That is, Podosky underap­preciates other modes of human knowing in the form of affective, bod­ily, and emotional engagements with the world. Such an oversight can result in concealing the tacit, embodied knowledge ofnonhumans. Mak­ingananalogous point inthe contexts of humans,Alexis Shotwell(2017, 
79) writes, ‘focusing on propositional knowledge as though it is the only form of knowing worthconsideringis itself aform ofepistemicinjustice’ because it neglects embodied epistemic resources. Additionally, Mihaly Héder and Daniel Paksicontend that‘[s]cienceeducationforcesustoig­nore our tacit and personal knowledge and commitments in an effort to be more objective, more exact. [...] This leads to questioning the exis­tential knowledge of animals and its continuity with our own tacit and explicit knowledge’ (Héder and Paksi 2018, 63). 
Moreover, Podosky implicitly reinforces a human-nonhuman dualism inwritingthat‘[n]onhumananimals donothavesocialpower;they can­not impose functions, they cannot change norms, and they cannot con­verse to sway the minds of those who wish to eat them’ (Podosky 2018, 225). But why can nonhumans not converse, albeit not in a conventional human way, with humans? Similarly, animal rights organizations have presentedtheirmissionas ‘givingavoicetothevoiceless.’Suchaframing, however, assumes an anthropocentric view that only ‘accepts a human-centered definition of voice’ (Adams 2010, 311). Such a definition con-cealstheexpressive,agentialabilitiesofnonhumans.Theseshortcomings demonstrate how applying concepts from social epistemology to non-humans alone is insufficient. The anthropocentric and dualistic assump­tions within social epistemology must also be simultaneously jettisoned. 

The Possibility of Nonhuman Testimonial Injustice 
With reason to question the limitations of predominant human episte­mological systems, it is now possible to argue that humans can com­mit testimonial injustice against nonhumans. Such an argument will re­quire expanding/transforming the epistemological system to recognize nonhuman intelligence and epistemic practices as well as tacit, corpo­realknowledge.Inherseminalbook,EpistemicInjustice,MirandaFricker contends that testimonial injustice stems from a listener’s negative iden­tity prejudices about the speaker. For instance, a listener’s sexist and/or racist prejudices distort their perception of the speaker, ultimately de­flating the speaker’s credibility and epistemic competence. Due to this deflation, the listener fails to believe or seriously consider the speaker’s testimony. Whiletheprimary harmofepistemicinjusticeisthatthe ‘sub­ject is wronged in her capacity as a knower,’ the specific harm associated with testimonial injustice is that the ‘subject is wronged in her capacity asagiverofknowledge’ (Fricker2007,44).Accordingly,thecasefornon­humantestimonialinjusticedependsondemonstratingthefollowing:(1) nonhuman are knowers and subjects of knowledge; (2) they can convey this knowledge to humans; and (3) humans hold negative identity preju­dices about nonhumans. 
Quantum physicist Karen Barad’s posthuman performativity is partic­ularly helpful in making the case for nonhumans as subjects of knowl­edge because it disrupts the division between ontology and epistemol­ogy, matter and meaning, body and mind. In their words, ‘being and knowing, materiality and intelligibility, substance and form, entail one another’ (Barad 2007, 375). Barad presents an ontology of knowing that underscores how matter matters in terms of how bodies performatively affect meaning and knowledge practices. Inspired by Neil Bohr’s inter­pretation of quantum mechanics, this ontology of knowing is based on Barad’s account of intra-actions. Unlike interactions, which presuppose pre-existing, discrete, and independent entities, an intra-active account begins with ‘practices/doings/actions’ that are performative and consti­tutive (Barad 2008, 122). Intra-actions such as scientific observations do not merely reveal a pre-existing hidden state of, or truth about, an exter­nalentity.Theyareboundarydrawingpracticesthatenactanagentialcut, separatingagencyofobservationfromobservedagency. Theintra-action makesthelattermatterinparticularwaysbydifferentiallyconstitutingits boundaries, meaning, properties, and agential abilities while simultane­ously excluding other ways from mattering. Even observations are intra-action in that the observation affects what is observed. When measuring an atom with a fixed and rigid ruler, for instance, the ruler differentially constitutes the phenomenon resulting in an atom-as-particle with a de­terminate position. Since the atom would not be the same without the ruler, the atom-as-particle – like every phenomenon – is an entangled relationofdifference. Theatom ‘includesthe apparatusthathelpsconsti­tute it’ (p. 472). Intra-actions therefore do not only cut things apart, they alsosimultaneouslycutthingstogether. Inadditiontoentanglingbodies, intra-actions entangle matter and meaning. The concept and meaning of ‘position’ are constituted in relation to a specific material apparatus – the ruler. Ingeneral,Barad(2008,132)maintainsconceptsarealwaysembod­ied, being entangled with ‘specific physical arrangements.’ 
Such an ontology of knowing creates space for a non-anthropocentric, corporeal epistemology that acknowledges nonhumans as knowers, sub­jects of knowledge, and epistemic agents. Barad (2007, 147) writes that ‘practices of knowing cannot be fully claimed as human practices, not simplybecause we use nonhuman elements inour practices, but because knowing is a matter of part of the world making itself intelligible to an­other part.’ Putdifferently, human epistemic practices represent onlyone form of knowing – one instance of the world making itself intelligible to another part. Nonhumans can also be knowers because ‘phenomena do notrequirecognizingmindsfortheirexistence’ (p.361).Ontheonehand, nonhumans also engage in discursive practices. Following Foucault’s use of discursive, Barad asserts that they co-constitute what can count as meaningful.Theydonotmerelydescribetheworld. Nonhumansactively engageinknowledgepracticesthat co-constituteworldsinthe processof making sense of it. On the other hand, nonhumans can be knowers with knowledge that manifests in their differential responsiveness to, and di­rect material engagement with, the world. Such a claim disrupts the tra­ditional, anthropocentric understanding of knowledge as a correspon­dence between a propositional, linguistic thought and the world. Rather, this more-than-human, corporeal knowledge involves a correspondence between body and world. 
To justify this claim, Barad provides the example of brittlestars. Rela­tives to starfish, brittlestars are brainless and eyeless echinoderms with ten thousand spherical calcite crystals on their five limbs and central body. These crystals function as tiny lenses that focus light onto its nerve bundles. Together these create a complex optical system like the compound eye of an insect. Despite not having eyes, Barad maintains that ‘they are eyes.[...][I]tsvery being is a visualizing apparatus. The brittlestar is a living, breathing, metamorphosing optical system’ (2007, 375).Thebrittlestar’s activitiesareboundarydrawingpracticesthatenact an agential cutthatperformativelydifferentiates the brittlestar (subject) from its environment (object), and further differentiates its environment into parts (objects). These bodily practices make a world intelligible to the brittlestar. They allow the brittlestar to make sense of and discern (without a brain and ideas, mind you) the parts of its environment. By maintaining a level of visual acuity, the brittlestar can successfully de­tect shadows,track food,find hidingspots,and flee predators. Giventhat these are matters of life and death, brittlestars are concerned epistemic agents with an interest in knowing and acting in the right way. 
The brittlestar’s knowledge is reflected in its achieved embodiment and differential responsiveness. There is not a firm and fixed separa­tion between a brittlestar and its environment. The brittlestar’s material-discursive intra-actions enfold the environment into its being. The brit­tlestar is ‘constantly changing its geometry and its topology – autono­mizing and regenerating its optics in an ongoing reworking of its bod­ily boundaries’ (Barad 2007, 375). In addition to changing its position by moving around, the brittlestar actively reworks its body in relation to its environment. It can change colour based on whether it is day or night, break off an endangered arm to distract a predator,and regrow that limb. Thishistoryofspecificintra-actionswiththeenvironmentis‘writteninto their materialization, their bodily materiality holds the memories of the traces of its enfoldings’ (Barad 2007, 383). The brittlestar’s knowledge, in other words, is embodied. This differential re-materialization engenders internal metrics that co-produce a specific meaningful world. As Rosi Braidotti(2013,60)putsit,livingmatterisintelligentbecause ‘itisdriven by its informational codes, which deploy their own bars of information.’ Hence, like how brittlestars do not have eyes but are eyes, brittlestars do not have knowledge, their body is a crystallization of knowledge. Their knowledgeisdynamicallyentangledwiththeirbody’smaterialconfigura­tion, whichis itself entangled withthe changing materiality of the bodies that populate their world. 
Michael Polanyi and Leopold each separately substantiate the claim that nonhumans are knowers. Polanyi’s work on tacit and embodied knowledge (Polanyi 1962) eschews the view that beliefs must take the form of propositions that are explicitly represented through language. Accordingly, nonhumans can also have beliefs in the world in the form of existential commitments. Nonhumans believe that there is a world, and that this world is a particular way. To survive, animals must success­fully navigate the world, which depends on an accurate understanding of the world. They must know the difference between what is nourishing and what is dangerous. Additionally, they must track the truth amidst different and changing situations. Commenting on Polanyi’s work on nonhuman tacit knowledge, Héder and Paksi note how ‘[t]rue knowl­edge is an achievement of a living being’s heuristic action to adapt, to stay alive, to be successful. By true knowledge a living being can create a contact with reality for its benefit. A fish has true knowledge when it cansuccessfullydifferentiatebetweenapreyand abait’ (Héderand Paksi 2018, 60).Leopold submitsthatnonhumans canintelligently draw infer-encesabouttheworlddespitelackingtheformal,conceptualsystemsthat allow humans to make rational deductions. Again, reflecting on his dog, Leopold(1970, 67) describeshow ‘[h]epersistsintutoring me [...]inthe art of drawing deductions from an educated nose.’ For example, the dog caninferabird’sdirectionbasedon ‘thestorythebreezeistelling’ (p. 59). 
Although this nonhuman knowledge might not be linguistically artic­ulable, it nevertheless resembles accounts of explicit human knowledge. For instance, it ‘open[s] up a meaningful realm of experience’ (Noë 2005, 289). These resources also resemble good epistemic resources insofar as they help nonhumans ‘understand, investigate, and know about specific partsandparticularaspectsoftheworld’byforegroundingcertaindetails (Pohlhaus2012,717).Indeed,thecontinuedexistenceofanorganism,and the species, attests to their competency as knowers and the accuracy and reliability of their sense-making activities. 
This embodied knowledge and corporeal correspondence between body and world are not necessarily given but can be the achievements of nonhumans as individual epistemic agents that actively inquire into the world as well as change and learn over time. Barad’s contention that intra-actions are a congealing of agency and that a nonhuman’s history of intra-actions is written into their materialization does not entail that nonhumans are determined by this history. Due to the exclusionary na­ture of intra-actions, in which some ways of mattering are excluded, the world is never completely given, nor (dis)closed. For Barad, the world is anopen-endedprocessofbecoming,inwhich‘possibilitiesdonotsitstill. [...] [N]ew possibilities open up as others that might have been possible are now excluded’ (Barad 2007, 234). Subsequent intra-actions can con­sequently re-configure, re-entangle, and re-constitute the organism and itsenvironment. Eachorganism,thatis,isanopen-ended,relationalpro­cess of becoming. Each can change over time such as how the brittlestar transforms its topology in relation to its environment. 
More specifically, while materialized knowledge can come in the form of genetic inheritance and instinctual dispositions, nonhumans are not simplyintelligentmachinesgovernedbypre-programmedgeneticknowl-edge, which is entirely given, fixed, and complete (Ingold 2001). Making a similar point, Héder and Paksi (2018, 61) note how ‘during its ontogen­esistheanimalmustmakeheuristic efforts todevelop itsgenetic heritage into real skills.’ There isagapbetweengeneric, genetic knowledge and its application to a singular, unique environmental situation. Through the individual’s heuristic efforts, nonhumans bridge this gap to determine how to apply it to this situation and ultimately develop skills. Moreover, the experience of bridging this gap can affect their epistemic resources (Ingold 2001). It is these efforts that provide reasons to think that non-humans can be learners and their tacit knowledge can be acquired. Fur­thermore, scientific research recently investigatedwhether magpies were self-conscious and had a concept of self. Using the mirror test, a sticker or dot was painted on their forehead. The magpies were then placed before a mirror to see if they would try to remove the sticker or dot, which would imply that they recognized themselves in the mirror – that the reflection is a reflection of themselves. When the mirror test was conducted on magpies, only some of them passed the test. As Vinciane Despret(2016, 101–103)notes,the factthat somefailedshows that ‘[t]he dispositive does not determine the behavior that is acquired; rather, it creates the occasion for it. [...] [T]he dispositive is a necessary but not sufficientcondition[...].’ In other words,the failures revealed that the acquisition of self-consciousness was an individual achievement of the successful magpies. The success was neither an artificial product caused by the external environment and the researchers, nor a necessary conse­quence of the magpies’ genetic, biological nature. It was something they individually acquired – something they learned. 
Notonlydoesanorganism’shistoryofintra-actionsnotdetermine and foreclose its future, but it can also open new possibilities. Turning to Henri Bergson’s concept of duration, one witnesses how the past inter­penetrates the present to generate novel possibilities. For instance, dura­tion can result in the sensory-motor system becoming more complex. As Alia Al-Saji (2010, 156) explains, the ‘complication of material structure canproliferatetheroutesbywhichanexcitationmaydevelop,atoncede­layingtheimmediatereactionandpermittingadifferentmotorresponse.’ It is the delayofdurationthatopensdifferentpossibilities.And itisthese possibilities that give an ambivalence to nonhuman life, which in turn necessitates choice. As Emanuele Cocciamaintains, there is not a perfect harmony in nature, between organism and environment, such that or­ganisms automatically tend toward the Good and always make the right decision.Asheexplains,‘[e]veryspeciesisaconsciousactor,capable[...] of mistakes and bad choices’ (Coccia 2021, 155). The good choice and the right belief are therefore an individual achievement of the nonhuman as an epistemic agent. Moreover, insofar as nonhumans and their existen­tial commitments can change, it is then plausible to consider a series of such achievements as a corporeal learning process that occurs over time through their iterative intra-actions with others. 
With reason to regard nonhumans as epistemic agents and subjects of knowledge, it is worthwhile to press the point that they can also be epis­temic authorities. As Leopold’s reflections about his dog convey, while formallinguisticsystemsprovideparticularadvantagesforhumans,non­human modes of knowing are superior in different respects and pro­vide access to different aspects of the world (Taylor 1986). For example, Leopold (1970, 59) contends that ‘[t]he dog knows what is grouseward betterthanyoudo.Youwilldowelltofollowhimclosely’.Likewise,Robin WallKimmererofteninvokesnonhumanssuchasliliesandsweetgrassas epistemic authorities – as teachers. As she explains, ‘[i]n the indigenous view [...] [humans] are referred to as the younger brothers of Creation, so like youngerbrothers wemustlearn from ourelders. Plants werehere firstontheearthandhavehadalongtimetofigurethingsout’(Kimmerer 2013, 346). 
The case for nonhuman testimonial injustice now depends on show-ingthatnonhumanscanconveytheirknowledge.Sincemostnonhumans lack propositional language, this claim requires extending the sense of testimonybeyondtheexplicitarticulationofbeliefs.MirandaFrickerher-self intimates such anextensionina footnote, writinghow testimony can ‘include not only cases of telling but also cases of expression to an in­terlocutor of judgements, views, and opinions’ (2007, 50). Put differently, testimony can also include the bodilyexpressionofinformation. Nonhu­manscanprovidethistypeoftestimony.AsLeopoldwrites,‘[l]ikepeople, my animals frequently disclose by their actions what they decline to di­vulge in words’ (Leopold 1970, 83). This disclosure can include sounds such as when a dog whimpers or barks. It can also include bodily move­ments and behaviour. For instance, Leopold’s dog conveys to him the di­rection of a bird through ‘the cock of his ears’ (Leopold 1970, 59). More-over,Kimmerer’sframing of nonhumansas teachers ispremisedonthe possibility that they can convey this knowledge. She notes that while one can expect a verbal answer to a human question, ‘[p]lants answer ques­tions by the way they live, by their responses to change; you just need to learn how to ask’ (Kimmerer 2013, 159). Nonhumans are consequently neither unintelligent nor non-communicative. 
Withthissaid,onepotentialdifferencebetweenhumanandnonhuman testimonyisintentionality.Ahumanspeakertypicallyprovidestestimony withtheintentionthatthelistenerwilluptakeitandpossiblychangetheir beliefs or actions. Yet, there seem to be cases in which the bodily expres­sion of nonhuman testimony is intentional. A dog can make noises to go outside or alert others of the arrival of a guest or stranger. Ravens have been observed pretending to be injured (Despret 2016, 127). Insofar as the imitation of an injury is a type of deception, imitative bodily expres­sions are premised on not only the recognition that the other has mental states, but they are the intentional and active attempt to change, in this case mislead, those mental states. 
Additionally, Plumwood (2002, 182) recounts how ‘[a] young wombat I used to play vigorous chasing games with would sulk if he did not win; he was an expert at feinting and manipulating a playmate’s expectations, often feigning deceptive disinterest prior to mounting a surprise attack’. 
Plumwood continues, noting that ‘[a]ll these behaviours require sophis­ticated higher-order intentionality’ (p. 182). 
Finally, nonhuman testimonial injustice depends on the existence of negative identity prejudices. While Fricker focuses on cases of sex­ism and racism, humans also have negative identity prejudices against nonhumans. As Peter Singer (2011) argues, moral speciesism discounts the moral standing of nonhumans because they are not members of the human species. Extending Singer’s concept, there also are cases of epistemic speciesism, which involve discounting the epistemic compe­tence of nonhumans simply because they are not human. For instance, Rene Descartes’ (1971) Discourse on Method presents humans as think­ing things, while nonhuman animals are mere extended things. Hu­mans have an interior life consisting of self-conscious experiences and thoughts. Because humans possess language, humans are free and sub-jectsofknowledge.Articulatingananthropocentricpropositionalepiste­mology,Descartes ultimatelymaintains that knowledgeinvolvesexplicit, linguistic articulations –clear and distinct ideas. Meanwhile, animals are reduced to machines determined by the laws of nature. Not only do they not possess knowledge of the world (because this requires propositional language),buttheyaredevoidofexperience. Animalsare simplypassive, unintelligent matter. If speciesism and the ghost of Descartes continue to haunt the contemporary world, it is plausible that there exist negative identity prejudices against nonhumans. In summary, given that nonhu­man animals are knowers, givers of knowledge, and can be subject to negative-identity prejudices, it follows that it is possible for humans to commit testimonial injustice against nonhumans. 

Nonhuman Testimonial Smothering 
Why are cases of nonhumans providing testimony to humans not more prevalent, though? One reason could be nonhuman testimonial smoth­ering. According to Kristie Dotson, testimonial smothering is form of ‘coerced silencing’ that occurs when a speaker truncates the content of their testimony due to the listener’s testimonial incompetence or unwill­ingness to uptake the testimony (Dotson 2011, 245). The speaker’s testi­mony consequently only contains content that is accurately intelligible based on the listener’s perceived competence or willingness. Nonhuman testimonial smothering would thus involve nonhumans truncating their testimony due to a perceived testimonial incompetence or unwillingness of humans to uptake their testimony. 
The possibility of nonhuman testimonial smothering is revealed by an experimentinvolvingpsychologistIrenePepperbergandAlex,agreypar-rot from Gabon. Pepperberg successfully taught Alex to use language to speak,describe,count,andclassify.WhenAlexfirstinadvertentlyuttered anew sound, Pepperberg respondedtoAlexas ifhehad intentionally made this sound to make a comment or make a claim on her. The sound became a word that ‘signifies something for the parrot because it has sig­nifiedsomethingfortheresearcher’ (Despret2008,125).TokeepAlexin­terestedinlearning,Pepperbergwouldgivehimrewardsforcorrectlyde­scribingornaming the object. ForDespret(2008,125),thereward ‘trans-latesforAlexastherightto “want” andtakeapositioninrelationtowhat is offered to him.’ Alex ultimately picked up on how making a sound im­pacted the scientists, influencing their actions. He learned that he could use language to influence Pepperberg by saying ‘“come here,” “I want to go to that place,” “no,” “want this”’ (p. 126). For example, sometimes Alex didnot want therewardofferedand would indicatethathewould rather go on a walk, to which Pepperberg would comply. Pepperberg’s recog­nition of Alex as a subject and her involvement in the experiment was ultimatelythekey tothesuccessbecauseparrots donothaveareferential conception of language, but a pragmatic conception of language, which ispremisedontheabilitytoinfluencetheirenvironment. Hence,thesuc­cess depended on Pepperberg being receptive to Alex as a subject and subordinating ‘her desire to what makes sense for Alex in the matter of speaking’ (Despret 2008, 127). In doing so, she was able to ask questions that mattered to Alex and would solicit a response. 
Butwhy did science not make this discovery before? Despret helps an­swer this question by noting how scientists often control the conversa­tion. Experiments often take the form of making the test subject ‘submit tothetheoriesthatguideresearch,submittotheproblemthatisimposed on them in the manner in which the researcher constructs and defines it’ (Despret 2008, 131). Moreover, scientific objectivity requires scientists to be impartial, bracketing anything subjective or personal so that they do not bias the experiment’s outcome and invalidate its universality. The goodscientistislike anautomaton,whichaccordingtoDespret’setymol­ogy, is ‘one who is moved by itself, and only by itself, that is the one who will not be moved, put into motion by others. In sum, it is the one who will not be affected, and therefore who will not affect’ (p. 117). In the case of previous objective and impartial experiments with parrots, it is there­fore possible the problem was that for the parrot it seemed like they were addressing no one. Parrots, Despret (2008, 125) explains, ‘cannot speak if they don’t feel they are speaking to someone.’ That is, there would be no reasonfortheparrottolearntouselanguage,orprovidetestimony,since it would not have affected the detached, objective scientist. Putting it in Dotson’s words, it is therefore plausible that nonhumans might truncate their testimony,orprovide no testimonyatall,because of the perceived unwillingness of humans to engage in communicative exchange and/or the perceived epistemic incompetence of humans to track the truth of their testimony. 
Outside the laboratory, nonhuman testimonial smothering could oc­cur in pet-owner relationships. Due to an owner’s indifference, neglect, or abuse, the animal would not have a reason to provide testimony be­causetheyhavelearnedthatitwillnotmakeadifferencetotheindifferent owner. Or, worse yet, they might have good reason not to provide testi­mony because of previous instances in which it resulted in abuse. Both cases would lead the animal to truncate a portion, or all, of their testi­mony. 

Conclusion 
Disruptingtheresiliencyofamaladjustedepistemologicalsystemwillnot beeasy. AsDotsonexplains,the‘[f]etteredpersonstotherightofthefar­thest left prisoner will need to extend extraordinary amounts of credibil­ity to the farthest left prisoner’ (Dotson 2014, 132). This paper has sought to justify extending credibility to nonhumans as subjects and givers of knowledge with their own onto-epistemic practices, thereby making the nonsensical a little more sensible and the impossible a little more pos­sible. ‘Staying with the trouble’ of nonhumans entailed challenging an­thropocentric epistemologies and the human-nonhuman dualism, while recognizing the non-hierarchical differences between human and non-humanknowledgesandonto-epistemicpractices(Haraway2016).Byrec­ognizingnonhumansasepistemicagents,thispaperattemptedtotrouble humanepistemologicalsystems,expandsocialepistemology,andprovide a means to hold humans accountable for epistemic injustices committed against nonhumans. 
Toendonapositivenote,itisworthbrieflyreflectingonthevalueofin­cluding nonhumans in the social, epistemic community. Due to their bi­ological, anatomical,and environmental differences, nonhuman animals not only have different perspectives and knowledges, but also different epistemic and worlding practices. By appreciating these differences, hu­mans can come to have a better understanding of the world. As Uexküll notes,‘[theforest]ishardlygraspedinitstruemeaningifwerelateitonly to ourselves. [...] The meaning of the forest is multiplied a thousandfold if one does not limit oneself to its relations to human subjects but also includes animals’ (Uexküll 2010, 142). In other words, recognizing and engaging with nonhumans as knowers promises an inter-species form of strong objectivity (Harding 1991; Alcoff 2008). 
Making a similar point, Kimmerer writes that ‘[w]e Americans are re­luctant to learn a foreign language of our own species, let alone another species. But imagine the possibilities. Imagine the access we would have to different perspectives, the things we might see through other eyes, the wisdom that surrounds us. We don’t have to figure out everything our­selves: there are intelligences other than our own, teachers all around us’ (Kimmerer 2013, 58). 
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