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VSEBINA / INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS

Mojca Cerkvenik: <i>Intorno la Difficoltà di ben tradurre</i> (1743): Gian Rinaldo Carli e la traduzione 321 <i>Intorno la Difficoltà di ben tradurre</i> (1743): <i>Gian Rinaldo Carli and Translation</i> <i>Intorno la Difficoltà di ben tradurre</i> (1743): <i>Gian Rinaldo Carli in prevajanje</i>	Željko Boneta: Relationship between Religious Socialization in Childhood and Actual Religiosity in Student Age: The Case of Croatian Students from the University of Rijeka 387 <i>Connessione tra socializzazione religiosa nell'infanzia e religiosità attuale in età studentesca: il caso degli studenti Croati dell'Università di Fiume</i> <i>Povezave med religiozno socializacijo v otroštvu in aktualno religioznostjo v študentskih letih: primer hrvaških študentov Univerze na Reki</i>
Mojca Kumin Horvat & Januška Gostenčnik: Slovenian Dialectal Diversity as Presented in the Slovenian Linguistic Atlas 333 <i>La diversità dialettale slovena presentata nell'Atlante linguistico sloveno</i> <i>Slovenska narečna raznolikost v Slovenskem lingvističnem atlasu</i>	Marjan Hočevár, Sanja Bojanić & Tomaž Bartol: Istria as a Site and as a Subject Matter in the Production and Organization of Regional Knowledge: Bibliometric and Sociological Analysis 405 <i>L'Istria come sito e come soggetto nella produzione e organizzazione del sapere regionale: analisi bibliometrica e sociologica</i> <i>Istra kot kraj in kot predmet obravnave v produkciji in organizaciji regionalnega znanja: bibliometrična in sociološka analiza</i>
Marija Jurić Pahor: »Najprej mi, potem vi« koroški Slovenci spričo terorja in nasilja nad Judi v času nacionalsocializma 347 <i>»Prima noi, poi voi«: gli sloveni carinziani alla luce del terrore e della violenza contro gli Ebrei ai tempi del nazionalsocialismo</i> <i>»First Us, Then You«: Carinthian Slovenes in the Face of Terror and Violence against the Jews in the Time of National Socialism</i>	Milica Vuković-Stamatović: »Accessing the EU is Like Running on a Treadmill in the Gym«: How the EU Accession Process is Metaphorically Presented in the Online Media of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 427 <i>»Accedere all'UE è come correre sul tapis roulant«: la presentazione metaforica del processo dell'adesione all'UE nei media digitali in Serbia, Montenegro e Bosnia-Erzegovina</i> <i>»Pristop k EU je kot tek na tekalni stezi v telovadnici«: metaforično predstavljanje procesa vključevanja v EU v digitalnih medijih v Srbiji, Črni gori ter Bosni in Hercegovini</i>
Reza Dehghani, Rahmat Hajimineh & Hossein Rassouli: The Effect of Cultural Policies in Reza Shah's Period on the Status of Religious Minorities' Schools in Sanandaj (Jews and Christians) 367 <i>Gli effetti delle politiche culturali del periodo di Reza Shah sullo status delle scuole delle minoranze religiose (degli ebrei e cristiani) a Sanandaj</i> <i>Učinki kulturnih politik v obdobju Reze Šaha na položaj šol judovske in krščanske manjšine v Sanandadžu</i>	

Teodora Stanković: Competing Interests of the European Union and Russia in the Western Balkan Countries with a Comprehensive Analysis of Economic Leverage 449
Interessi contrastanti dell'Unione Europea e della Russia nei paesi dei Balcani occidentali con un'analisi complessiva della leva economica
Konkurenčni interesi Evropske Unije in Rusije v državah Zahodnega Balkana s celovito analizo gospodarskega vzvoda

Igor Ivanović: Advertising Discourse and the Pertaining Ethnography: An Ethnographic Case Study Conducted in Montenegro 465
Ricerca etnografica del discorso pubblicitario: un caso di studio etnografico condotto in Montenegro
Etnografska raziskava oglaševalskega diskurza: etnografska študija primera v Črni gori

Jana Arbeiter & Maja Bučar: Global Partnership in Response to Covid-19 481
Partenariato globale nella risposta al covid-19
Globalno partnerstvo kot odgovor na covid-19

Kazalo k slikam na ovitku 497
Indice delle foto di copertina 497
Index to images on the cover 497

INTORNO LA DIFFICOLTÀ DI BEN TRADURRE (1743): GIAN RINALDO CARLI E LA TRADUZIONE

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SINTESI

*Il contributo ha l'obiettivo di illustrare e valorizzare i punti salienti delle riflessioni espresse da Gian Rinaldo Carli nella dissertazione *Intorno la difficoltà di ben tradurre* (1743). Lo studioso capodistriano focalizza il proprio ragionamento sulle peculiarità ovvero sul genio delle lingue e rifiuta l'imposizione di regole e modelli universali poiché questi non garantiscono la buona riuscita della traduzione. Riconosce, invece, la necessità di optare per un approccio traduttivo più o meno libero, a seconda dell'intento della traduzione. L'analisi degli aspetti indicati e la contestualizzazione dei ragionamenti di Carli, che derivano dalla sua esperienza di traduttore della *Teogonia* di Esiodo, comprovano le sue approfondite conoscenze pure nel contesto della più aggiornata cultura della traduzione del Settecento.*

Parole chiave: Gian Rinaldo Carli, traduzione, traduttologia, *Teogonia*, Esiodo

INTORNO LA DIFFICOLTÀ DI BEN TRADURRE (1743): GIAN RINALDO CARLI AND TRANSLATION

ABSTRACT

*The article sheds light on some topical reflections on the translation process as presented by Gian Rinaldo Carli in the treatise *Intorno la difficoltà di ben tradurre* (1743). In his exposition, the Capodistriano scholar focuses mainly on the genius or spirit of languages (*il genio delle lingue*) and instead of universal rules, which in his opinion do not contribute to the success of translation, suggests choosing an approach allowing more or less freedom or fidelity to the source text, depending on the purpose of translation. The analysis of the mentioned aspects and the contextualization of Carli's thoughts, which derive from his own experience in translating Hesiod's *Theogony*, show that he can also be considered an expert of the translation guidelines and discussions of his time.*

Keywords: Gian Rinaldo Carli, translation, translation studies, *Theogony*, Hesiod

INTRODUZIONE

Nel 1744 viene pubblicata presso l'editore Recurti di Venezia la *Teogonia ovvero la generazione degli dei d'Esiodo Ascreo. Tradotta per la prima volta in verso Italiano dal Conte Gianrinaldo Carli Giustinopolitano. Con Annotazioni, e tre Lettere critiche*. Una copia di quest'opera, autografata dall'autore, è oggi conservata presso la Biblioteca del Ginnasio di Capodistria a lui intitolato. La traduzione con testo greco a fronte è preceduta da diverse premesse redatte nell'estate del 1743, tra le quali vi sono tre dissertazioni in forma epistolare. La prima, *Intorno la difficoltà di ben tradurre*, riporta alcune riflessioni sulla difficoltà della traduzione ed è indirizzata a padre Michelangelo Carmeli, professore di ebraico e lingue orientali all'Università di Padova, che Carli frequenta negli anni degli studi universitari per perfezionare le conoscenze del greco e dell'ebraico. A seguire troviamo una seconda lettera, *Intorno ad Esiodo*, incentrata sui problemi della biografia di Esiodo e dedicata a Girolamo Tartarotti, e infine, una terza, *Intorno alla Teogonia*, dedicata al cugino Girolamo Gravisi, nella quale viene trattato il problema filosofico dell'origine degli dei.

Il presente articolo si propone di illustrare le riflessioni di Gian Rinaldo Carli sulla traduzione contenute nella prima delle tre premesse alla *Teogonia* con l'obiettivo di valorizzare i punti salienti del testo considerando in particolare la loro attualità, in quanto spesso lo studioso si sofferma su problematiche ancora non del tutto risolte, come ad esempio la scelta tra una traduzione creativa che tende all'adattamento alla lingua e cultura ricevente o una traduzione più aderente al testo originale, che sono state e sono tutt'oggi rilevanti nel contesto degli studi sulla traduzione. La dissertazione di Carli viene indicata come significativa da diversi studiosi dell'autore e delle sue opere nonché da studiosi di storia e teoria della traduzione (Apih, 1973; Mattioli, 2001; Laurenti, 2016), tuttavia fino ad oggi non è ancora stata oggetto di approfonditi studi.

LA TRADUZIONE DELLA *TEOGONIA* NEL
CONTESTO DEGLI STUDI DI GIAN RINALDO
CARLI NEL PERIODO 1739-1744

Dal novembre 1739 Carli è impegnato negli studi presso l'Università di Padova, dove si reca a seguito dell'ottenimento di una borsa di studio messa a dispo-

sizione dalla città di Capodistria. A Padova¹ studia le lingue latina, greca e francese e approfondisce gli studi di storia e legge; presto entra anche a far parte della rinomata accademia patavina dei Ricovrati². Nella corrispondenza intrattenuta con l'abate Bini, Carli racconta di dedicarsi ai componimenti poetici solamente nel tempo libero e di essere impegnato soprattutto nello studio delle leggi, del greco, nella lettura di libri moderni e di antichi filologi nonché nella raccolta dei materiali per la dissertazione sulla spedizione degli Argonauti che si accingeva a preparare e che vedrà le stampe nel 1745 (Apih, 1973). Spiega inoltre di recarsi per tre giorni alla settimana da padre Michelangelo Carmeli, il quale lo assiste nello studio del greco e dell'ebraico. Gli anni degli studi a Padova trascorrono all'insegna delle indagini sulla storia istriana, incoraggiate da Apostolo Zeno, in particolare sulle origini e le vicende mitiche e storiche della civiltà istriana, conformemente agli indirizzi delle nuove metodologie storiografiche fondate su metodo critico ovvero su un'adeguata documentazione e un rigoroso accertamento della validità delle singole asserzioni (Apih, 1973).

È pertanto ragionevole pensare che per Carli in quel momento l'attività traduttiva non rappresentasse l'occupazione principale ma fosse complementare allo studio delle lingue antiche, alla ricerca storica e fosse, con molta probabilità, anche un'esercitazione sul linguaggio e sullo stile. La traduzione di Esiodo e la redazione delle tre lettere introduttive nascono in un periodo in cui Carli si dedica allo studio di autori classici, anche questa, attività perlopiù funzionale alla stesura dell'opera sulla spedizione degli Argonauti, considerata dall'autore stesso il lavoro più importante della sua giovinezza. L'ampia erudizione e l'interdisciplinarietà che lo caratterizzano lo portano ad affrontare in questo periodo anche il tema del melodramma nelle *Osservazioni sulla musica antica e moderna* (1743), al quale seguirà la riflessione sul teatro nel saggio *Dell'indole del teatro tragico* (1744)³. Si tratta di testi che assieme alla dissertazione sulla traduzione approfondiscono lo studio di forme linguistiche, poetiche, musicali e della rappresentazione teatrale nella prospettiva del rapporto tra i modelli dell'antichità e la realtà moderna, e gli permettono di entrare nel vivo del dibattito sul rinnovamento e di acquisire rilievo nel mondo delle lettere.

1 Oltre al fondamentale studio di Apih (1973) sulla formazione culturale di Gian Rinaldo Carli, sul periodo padovano si veda il contributo di Del Negro (1997).

2 Nel 1748 sarà eletto Principe dell'Accademia dei Ricovrati, ne migliorerà l'organizzazione e grazie al suo contributo l'istituzione vedrà un periodo di nuovo splendore. In merito all'operato di Carli nell'ambito delle Accademie, soprattutto capodistriane, si veda gli studi di Žitko (1997; 2004).

3 Degli stessi anni è anche la tragedia *Ifigenia in Tauri*, composta nel 1743, stampata e recitata a Venezia nel 1744. In una lettera del 1755, indirizzata al Conte Giammaria Mazzucchelli, Carli includerà alcune osservazioni sull'*Ifigenia* di Euripide unitamente alla traduzione in versi delle scene più interessanti, al fine di rafforzare le riflessioni espresse nella dissertazione sul teatro (Carli, 1787b).




Immagine 1: Frontespizio del volume *La Teogonia* con dedica autografa dell'autore (Biblioteca del Ginnasio Gian Rinaldo Carli di Capodistria).

La volgarizzazione della *Teogonia* avrebbe potuto, infatti, portargli notorietà, visto che all'epoca ancora non si disponeva di una versione italiana, seppure Anton Maria Salvini si fosse già cimentato in una traduzione che fu però stampata dopo quella di Carli, nel 1747, a Padova, in versione trilingue greco-latino-italiano. Tocchini (2004), nel suo studio sulla religione degli antichi nell'Italia dei Lumi e i culti misterici in Carli e in Filangeri, ipotizza che questa anticipazione da parte di Carli abbia portato a polemiche che avrebbero influito sfavorevolmente sulla diffusione della sua traduzione di Esiodo e ciò avrebbe avuto una ricaduta negativa anche sulla fama e la diffusione delle tre disserta-

zioni in premessa. In più, come evidenziato da Apih (1973, 60) nel suo studio sulla formazione culturale di Carli, "questa traduzione si può anche considerare un contributo agli interessi classicisti dell'ambiente universitario padovano ed al fervore di studi greci che faceva allora di Venezia il principale centro di questa disciplina". Non solo, come già accennato, Carli a Padova è allievo di Carmeli, che dal 1744 ricoprirà la cattedra di greco e lingue orientali contribuendo alla rinascita degli studi di greco all'Università di Padova dopo un periodo sfavorevole, nel quale l'insegnamento di greco e latino erano stati accorpati in un'unica cattedra⁴ (Cantoni, 2001).

4 Come illustrato da Cantoni (2001, 209), nel Settecento a Padova rinascono gli studi classici e nel 1744 viene ripristinata una specifica cattedra di greco e lingue orientali dove opera Michelangelo Carmeli, "studioso che avvertì l'istanza di rendere le opere dei classici patrimonio condivisibile oltre le cerchie di eruditi e accademici. Significativamente, in tale prospettiva il suo interesse si rivolse prevalentemente alle opere drammaturgiche. Dopo aver pubblicato nel 1742 sotto pseudonimo il *Miles gloriosus* di Plauto, sua fu l'impresa di tradurre tutto Euripide, che apparve in 20 tomi tra il 1743 e il 1754, cui nel '52 affiancò anche il *Pluto* di Aristofane". A Carmeli sarebbe poi succeduto Melchiorre Cesarotti, particolarmente sensibile alle nuove correnti di pensiero diffuse dal movimento illuminista.

La *Teogonia* tradotta da Carli ebbe successivamente al 1744 almeno altre tre edizioni ovvero nel 1787 in *Delle opere ecc.*, con diverse correzioni e integrazioni per quanto riguarda la lettera introduttiva a padre Carmeli; nel 1794 in *Parnaso de' poeti classici d'ogni nazione*, dove appare senza le tre lettere introduttive e senza testo greco a fronte (presente in entrambe le edizioni curate da Carli) ma con un'introduzione del curatore, il letterato Andrea Rubbi; e nel 1839 in *Parnaso straniero*, con l'Avvertimento del traduttore e le tre dissertazioni introduttive nella loro versione del 1744, anche in questo caso la traduzione compare senza testo greco a fronte mentre in conclusione è corredata di note e di un indice dei nomi propri contenuti nella *Teogonia* di Esiodo, presumibilmente predisposti dal curatore Francesco Zanotto (Carli, 1787a; 1794; 1839a; 1839b).

DIFFUSIONE E INFLUENZE DELLA DISSERTAZIONE INTORNO LA DIFFICOLTÀ DI BEN TRADURRE

Per quanto concerne specificatamente la diffusione della dissertazione sulla difficoltà di ben tradurre e il seguito che ha avuto negli anni successivi alla prima pubblicazione, Apih (1973) rileva alcuni interessanti riscontri, seppure non particolarmente significativi in termini specificatamente traduttologici.

Tra questi troviamo un giudizio sulla traduzione di Orazio di Francesco Borganelli, espresso da Carli nella propria dissertazione, che originò quasi cinquanta anni dopo una polemica tra Carli e l'accademico fiorentino Clementino Vannetti⁵, autore delle *Osservazioni intorno ad Orazio*. Vannetti (1792, 115) indirizza infatti all'abate Saverio Bettinelli una dissertazione sopra le satire ed epistole di Orazio tradotte dall'arcade marchigiano Francesco Borganelli, nella quale spiega di aver letto con stupore uno "strano giudizio" del celeberrimo letterato, il signor conte Gianrinaldo Carli, intorno al volgarizzamento di Borganelli, contenuto proprio nella prima delle tre lettere critiche premesse alla *Teogonia*. Carli (1744, XV) definisce quella di Borganelli una delle migliori traduzioni di Orazio, seppur con alcune manchevolezze dovute a un'ostinata fedeltà, in quanto il traduttore "legato anche alla rima ha fatto tutto ciò, che far potevasi in tal mestiere". Dopo aver riportato la traduzione in italiano di alcuni semplici versi della V Epistola, loda certe soluzioni adottate da Borganelli, per le quali ritiene che egli sia riuscito a trovare un buon equilibrio tra il *genio* della lingua latina e di quella italiana, e ne critica altre, riguardanti le scelte lessicali, il metro e la rima. Vannetti (1792, 116) si meraviglia del giudizio di Carli; secondo lui, la traduzione di Borganelli avrebbe spento la forza e la bellezza del testo e non ne avrebbe reso il giusto senso. A sostegno del giudizio di indebolimento e mala interpretazione del testo segue quindi una disamina dei difetti della versione di quest'ultimo.




Immagine 2: Prima pagina della dissertazione *Intorno la difficoltà di ben tradurre*, contenuta nel volume *La Teogonia*, di G. R. Carli (Biblioteca del Ginnasio Gian Rinaldo Carli di Capodistria).

La discussione di Carli sul tradurre viene successivamente ricordata anche da Lorenzo da Ponte nel 1828, in un'orazione sulla letteratura italiana rivolta ai suoi allievi e amici in occasione del suo 79° compleanno, come riportato nel III volume delle sue *Memorie* datato 1830, dove in nota, per ribadire l'importanza della figura del traduttore, specifica:

Quelli che non conoscendo nè le bellezze degli originali, nè quelle de' differenti idiomi, riguardano i traduttori, come letterati di secondo ordine, non hanno, per cangiar opinione, se non a leggere il Magalotti (lett. famil.) il Bettinelli (tom. 8. pag. 221) il Conte Carli (t. XVI. p. 9.) (e Redmond del Mard. t. 3. lett. phil. p. 55.) Io credo con essi che un ottimo traduttore non vaglia meno che un ottimo scrittore originale. (Da Ponte, 1830, 91)

⁵ A tal proposito si veda quanto riportato da Pasini (1903) sul carteggio tra Vannetti, Bettinelli e Carli, risalente al 1793.

Da Ponte riprende così il ragionamento espresso da Carli (1744, II) nel primo punto della sua dissertazione, riferito ai traduttori spesso considerati figure secondarie rispetto agli autori, perché pigri o incapaci di dedicarsi alla produzione di opere originali.

Nei primi decenni del Novecento compare nell'Annuario del R. Liceo scientifico 'Gian Rinaldo Carli' di Pisino per l'anno scolastico 1930-31 un breve scritto con fine divulgativo dal titolo *La dottrina e l'arte del Conte Gian Rinaldo Carli nella traduzione della Teogonia di Esiodo*, nel quale l'autore Gennaro di Nuzzo⁶ afferma che le originali osservazioni di Carli sulla traduzione, come anche quelle sulla figura e sull'opera di Esiodo, vengono riprese da Giacomo Leopardi⁷ nella sua premessa alla traduzione della *Titanomachia di Esiodo* (di Nuzzo, 1932).

Nel 1817, nel periodo delle sue prime prove poetiche di rilievo, Leopardi si cimeterà infatti nella traduzione di un passo della *Teogonia* di Esiodo, la *Titanomachia*, che secondo il suo giudizio si contraddistingue per la sua semplicità e sublimità mentre ritiene l'opera nel suo complesso poco apprezzabile⁸. Nel tradurre farà riferimento alla versione della *Teogonia* di Carli e sceglierà soluzioni traduttive analoghe, riprendendo letteralmente, in diversi passaggi, la traduzione di Carli (Mazzocchini, 2005). Nel preambolo Leopardi (1817a) tratta la figura e l'opera di Esiodo⁹, una buona parte è però dedicata all'analisi di alcuni principi relativi alla traduzione di testi classici. Il poeta si sofferma sul concetto di fedeltà nella resa italiana, sulla valutazione di alcune traduzioni e sulla convergenza presente o mancata tra gli stili di autori e rispettivi traduttori polemizzando in particolare, e a tratti in maniera incoerente, riguardo alla traduzione dell'*Eneide* di Virgilio per opera di Annibal Caro, ritenuta troppo italianizzata, eccessivamente lontana dal carattere dello stile dell'autore.

Come spiega Mazzocchini (2005), è molto probabile che Leopardi abbia letto la traduzione di Carli contenuta nel XVI volume delle *Opere*, tuttavia, l'influenza del volgarizzamento di Carli non viene mai dichiarata dal poeta, che sceglie di intro-



Immagine 3: Ritratto di Gian Rinaldo Carli, Bartolomeo Nazari, 1749 (Wikimedia Commons).

duire alcune soluzioni carliane solamente in ultima fase ovvero successivamente a una propria stesura della traduzione. Come precisato: "La traduzione del Carli orienta spesso l'*interpretatio* leopardiana del testo greco e detta frequentemente non solo alcune scelte lessicali isolate, ma interi segmenti di frase; è, inoltre, il canovaccio costantemente riconoscibile anche quando Leopardi vi opera i suoi

6 Dagli Annuari del R. Liceo scientifico 'Gian Rinaldo Carli' di Pisino per gli anni 1926–27 e 1930–31 risulta che di Nuzzo fu insegnante di lettere italiane e latine presso tale istituto dal settembre 1927 all'agosto 1931.

7 Apih (1973, 62) presume che Carli abbia introdotto nella dissertazione sulla difficoltà del tradurre pure un giudizio su un volgarizzamento della *Batracomiomachia* di Omero (del quale, tuttavia, a seguito dell'analisi effettuata, non troviamo riscontro) in seguito impugnato da Leopardi nel suo *Discorso sulla Batracomiomachia* (1815), nel quale il poeta indicherebbe Carli come Rubbi. In verità, è più probabile che Leopardi citando Rubbi si riferisse al curatore della raccolta *Parnaso de' poeti classici d'ogni nazione*, visto che proprio il decimo tomo datato 1794, nel quale compare la traduzione della *Teogonia* di Carli, comprende altresì la *Batracomiomachia* tradotta dall'abate Antonio Lavagnoli. Nella prefazione a quest'ultima, Rubbi scrive che quella di Lavagnoli è per lui la migliore traduzione italiana della *Batracomiomachia* mentre Leopardi (1817b, 60) la ritiene fredda, letterale e poco elegante. Ciononostante egli si cimeterà in una ritraduzione del poemetto Omerico, a cui lavorerà in diverse riprese a partire dal 1815, attingendo in maniera importante dal volgarizzamento di Lavagnoli (Condello, 2016).

8 Secondo Mazzocchini (2005) vi è un'alta probabilità che tale valutazione derivasse da quella espressa da Rubbi nella premessa alla traduzione di Carli, contenuta nel X tomo della raccolta *Parnaso de' poeti classici d'ogni nazione*, volume tutt'ora presente nella Biblioteca di casa Leopardi (Condello, 2016).

9 Mazzocchini (2005) ipotizza che Leopardi avesse potuto trarre notizie sulla questione esiodea dalla seconda epistola di Carli posta in premessa alla traduzione della *Teogonia* ristampata nell'edizione in più volumi delle sue opere. Il tomo XVI delle *Opere* dello studioso capodistriano compare infatti tra i volumi registrati nel Catalogo della Biblioteca Leopardi (Campana, 2011).

pur notevoli scarti metrico-sintattici e le sue ardite soluzioni retoriche” (Mazzocchini, 2005, 17).

Ciononostante, il confronto con la traduzione carliana rivela, secondo lo studio di Mazzocchini, un netto distacco della versione di Leopardi, che riprende le suggestioni del modello classicista settecentesco e lo ripropone in una propria, originale veste retorico-stilistica. Le riflessioni teoriche sulla traduzione troveranno poi nell'Ottocento sviluppi originali proprio nelle idee di Leopardi, soprattutto come risultato del forte collegamento tra poetica, poesia e teoria della traduzione, il che dimostra come la pratica della traduzione abbia influito in maniera importante sulla poesia di questo autore.

LE RIFLESSIONI DI GIAN RINALDO CARLI SULLA TRADUZIONE

Lo scritto nel quale Gian Rinaldo Carli presenta le proprie considerazioni derivate dall'esperienza pratica di traduttore della *Teogonia* è scandito in sedici punti¹⁰, che articolano il ragionamento supportato da esempi e commenti a traduzioni di testi classici nonché ricco di rinvii a considerazioni di altri autori e studiosi che precedentemente avevano riflettuto sulla specificità della traduzione.

Le riflessioni sulle problematiche e i metodi traduttivi riguardano esclusivamente traduzioni di testi letterari, classici greco-latini, e fin dall'*Avvertimento* iniziale Carli (1744) si schiera a favore dell'arricchimento linguistico difendendo la necessità di ricorrere a neologismi, in particolare a parole composte, grecismi come “occhi-amorfa, bracci-rosea, alt-imperante e simili”, che egli si trova a introdurre nella versione italiana della *Teogonia* non trovando equivalenti adatti che potessero riflettere “la mente dell'Autor greco”. Specifica inoltre che tali espressioni composte non possono essere sostituite da sinonimi perché contraddistinguono la persona descritta, ne specificano le caratteristiche individuali, e mantenerle significa anche essere fedeli all’“anima dell'Autore” e conservare così la forza d'espressione degli autori antichi. Seppure i Padri della lingua italiana, Dante, Boccaccio e Petrarca, non essendo stati traduttori dal greco, non abbiano utilizzato espressioni del genere e nemmeno voci e forme composte entrate in uso successivamente, dopo la diffusione di termini derivati dalle discipline scientifiche, queste contribuiscono all'arricchimento dell'italiano e Carli considera tale “accrescimento” sempre auspicabile.

Per quanto riguarda i criteri seguiti nella traduzione dichiara di aver guardato ai più bravi Anton Maria Salvini e Scipione Maffei. Ammette in conclusione all'*Avvertimento* di aver trovato delle difficoltà nel tradurre alcune espressioni greche per l'oscurità del poema e per l'impossibilità di fare riferimento a traduzioni precedenti, e si augura che altri possano migliorare la traduzione in futuro. Specifica altresì che le citazioni latine che compaiono nelle note al testo sono tratte dalla traduzione latina di Jean Le Clerc (Amsterdam, 1701), sulla quale si era basato per predisporre la propria traduzione.

L'epistola indirizzata a padre Carmeli si apre con un elogio alla sua eccellente traduzione dell'*E-cuba* di Euripide, la prima delle diciannove tragedie tradotte da Carmeli che a Carli piacque tanto da stimolare in lui “lo spirito di tradurre”. Carli (1744, I) giudica Carmeli un eccellente traduttore che sa ritrovare le espressioni giuste in italiano, tanto da suscitare dubbi nel lettore “se il testo italiano sia traduzione del greco, oppure il greco dell'italiano”. La traduzione di Carmeli sarà successivamente commentata anche nella corrispondenza con il cugino Girolamo Gravisi, che nell'ottobre del 1743 in una lettera a Carli esprimerà alcune osservazioni sulla traduzione del verso 21 del Prologo (Flego, 1997).

Pur ammettendo di aver alcune volte criticato i traduttori che scelgono la traduzione perché non in grado di comporre opere originali, Carli spiega di aver sempre ritenuto la professione del traduttore tra le più difficili. Muove una critica a coloro che pretendono di definire delle regole su come tradurre, in quanto queste non garantiscono una buona traduzione: “o traducete con libertà poco badando al sentimento del vostro Autore e niente all'ordine delle parole, oppure, come altri pretendono, trasportatelo parola a parola; che sempremai comparirà egli ne' vostri scritti in maschera, ma in una maschera la più deforme del mondo” (Carli, 1744, III).

All'epoca vi era un'ampia diffusione di traduzioni definite *belles infidèles*, che privilegiavano la resa nella lingua d'arrivo e trasformavano notevolmente il testo originale al fine di ottenere sul lettore lo stesso effetto che aveva in mente l'autore e pertanto di adattarlo secondo il gusto del tempo, spesso senza tenere conto del contesto culturale e linguistico di provenienza dell'opera. Si tratta di “traduzioni che in nome dell'eleganza e dell'attenzione nei confronti della lingua di arrivo, modificano il testo

10 Ai fini del lavoro di analisi presentato in questo paragrafo sono state prese in esame entrambe le versioni dell'epistola di Carli sulla difficoltà della traduzione ovvero la prima versione pubblicata nel 1744 e la seconda pubblicata nel 1787, contenente ampie integrazioni ai punti VII e XIII. Lievi aggiornamenti rispetto alla versione del 1744 sono stati apportati anche in altri passaggi della dissertazione sulla traduzione pubblicata nel 1787, tuttavia questi non sono particolarmente rilevanti in quanto non modificano o non integrano significativamente le posizioni originarie espresse dall'autore. In entrambe le versioni due punti successivi del testo risultano numerati con V.

originale e talvolta lo alterano per rispondere ai canoni dominanti nella cultura d'arrivo" (Laurenti, 2016).

In Europa, a partire dal Classicismo e dal Neoclassicismo primeggiano così le traduzioni orientate all'adattamento del testo tradotto ai criteri estetici dell'epoca e soprattutto in Francia, autori e scrittori, per conquistare il lettore adattano le proprie opere originali e le traduzioni al gusto prevalente, in quanto "l'epoca di Luigi XIV era dominata dalla convinzione che il costume e le norme della vita sociale avessero raggiunto in quegli anni una tale perfezione da dovervi adeguare qualsiasi prodotto culturale che ne fosse estraneo" perciò "ogni elemento proveniente da altre culture veniva addolcito e modernizzato, vale a dire, francesizzato" (Laurenti, 2016; Guglielmi, 2002, 160). Tuttavia, nello stesso periodo vi sono pure traduzioni di testi letterari predisposte secondo principi opposti al modello delle *belles infidèles*, più fedeli al testo originale e conseguentemente vengono formulate anche proposte di regole per tradurre.

Guardando più specificatamente all'Italia del Settecento osserviamo una forte predilezione per la cultura e la letteratura francese. Vengono tradotte molte opere dal francese o opere che sono state tradotte in Francia, spesso senza fare riferimento all'originale, unicamente sulla base della traduzione francese. Troviamo anche due correnti di pensiero per quanto concerne le traduzioni: da un lato vi sono coloro che promuovono un approccio più libero alla traduzione e chi, come Maffei, predilige una traduzione più fedele all'originale (Laurenti, 2016).

Successivamente, agli inizi dell'Ottocento, sarà il filosofo e teologo tedesco Friederich Schleiermacher a elaborare ulteriori considerazioni sull'idea riguardante l'approccio più o meno aderente al testo di partenza nel suo discorso *Sui diversi metodi del tradurre* (1813), una delle più importanti riflessioni sulla traduzione, e indicherà due diversi metodi di tradurre. Nel primo caso il traduttore lascia in pace l'autore originario e chiede al lettore di fare uno sforzo per avvicinarsi e comprendere l'autore del testo, mentre nel secondo caso viene privilegiato il lettore in quanto l'autore originario viene privato della propria alterità per avvicinare il testo al lettore della traduzione (Laurenti, 2016; Morini, 2007; Nergaard, 2014). Entrambe le operazioni sono secondo Schleiermacher molto ardue e non conciliabili ovvero scelto uno dei due percorsi, questo va rigorosamente seguito senza la possibilità di passare all'altro nell'ambito della medesima traduzione.

Carli (1744, III) individua in sostanza due ragioni della difficoltà del tradurre: "La prima sta nella difficoltà d'esprimere il genio dell'una lingua nell'altra;

e la seconda in quella di rappresentare il carattere legittimo di quell'autore che si trasporta". Il diverso *genio* delle lingue, concezione determinante, anche questa derivante dal pensiero francese, che influenza fortemente le riflessioni dell'epoca sulla traduzione, è dato dalla diversa *armonia* delle lingue "la qual è prodotta da quel tale accozzamento con cui si legano le parole; e da quelle tali parole, che risalto danno al concetto" (Carli, 1744, IV). Nel ragionamento Carli (1744, III–IV) ricorre all'esempio di una traduzione in greco o latino di una novella di Boccaccio. Se il traduttore si servisse dell'armonia della frase italiana ne verrebbe fuori una pessima traduzione, un pessimo greco o latino; ma anche seguire esclusivamente il *genio* della lingua greca o latina "riducendo a questi confini le opere del Boccaccio" non rappresenta la soluzione migliore in quanto i contenuti e la struttura potrebbero non risultare alterati ma i modi di dire, le sfumature dei concetti non sarebbero più gli stessi. Con tagli, aggiunte, alterazioni il traduttore si allontana dall'intenzione dell'autore per assecondare il *genio* della lingua in cui traduce, rischiando di alterare lo spirito dell'autore.

Tutto ciò è conseguenza della diversità delle lingue e da qui la significativa osservazione di Carli (1744, IV–V) sulla necessità di assecondare le specificità proprie di una lingua diversa: "tutte le nazioni hanno una particolare maniera di parlare, e d'esprimersi, e che noi scrivendo in lingua diversa ci vestiamo d'un carattere che non è nostro, ma ch'è però talmente necessario per quella lingua con cui si scrive, che senza d'esso languirebbe ogni nostro attentato".

D'altra parte l'armonia viene inevitabilmente a mancare, portando a una perdita della forza espressiva, anche quando si è fedeli alla lingua del testo di partenza e si traspongono concetti comuni a diverse lingue. La riflessione di Carli si sofferma a questo punto su un altro aspetto pregnante in contesto traduttivo ovvero sui modi di dire. Inizialmente lo studioso constata che è possibile trasporre diverse espressioni e modi di dire in altre lingue quando il concetto è comune a tutte le lingue. Diverse lingue hanno però modi specifici per esprimere determinati concetti e tali espressioni sono ottenute con l'unione di parole che danno la migliore sfumatura al significato e sono disposte secondo un'armonia diversa per ogni lingua (Carli, 1744, VI).

A determinare il *genio* delle lingue sono quindi anche caratteristici idiomatismi, che spesso possono creare difficoltà nella traduzione "siccome in quella lingua in cui sono propri fanno mirabilmente risplendere il concetto; così trasportarli in un'altra di cui sono forestieri, estremamente l'oscurano, e l'avviliscono" (Carli 1744, XI). Riguardo a questa osservazione Carli (1744, XI–XII) si serve di un esempio

ovvero della traduzione dal greco dell'espressione con cui Ecuba si rivolge a Ulisse, letteralmente: "O cara barba", che padre Carmeli, allontanandosi dal testo originale ragionevolmente tradusse con "caro Ulisse" perché corrisponde meglio al *genio* della lingua italiana. La traduzione letterale in questo caso non avrebbe reso il senso visto che il modo di dire usato dagli antichi si rifaceva all'abitudine dell'epoca di toccarsi la barba prima di chiedere un favore o fare una richiesta. La dissertazione prosegue con altri esempi riguardanti i modi di dire in lingua greca, che trasposti in italiano tramite una traduzione letterale non hanno lo stesso significato e diventano espressioni improprie. D'altra parte però, Carli (1744, XII) constata che discostamenti dal testo per assecondare il *genio* della lingua nella quale si traduce potrebbero portare ad accuse di infedeltà e la questione concernente un approccio più o meno libero o fedele nella traduzione verrà in seguito ripresa diverse volte.

Il ragionamento di Carli comprende altresì una riflessione puntuale sull'armonia delle lingue. Ritenevi siano concetti che non hanno forza espressiva di per sé stessi, che ricevono forza e risalto dall'armonia della lingua in cui sono concepiti. Per spiegare l'idea dell'effetto dell'armonia, Carli (1744, VII; 1787a, 17–18) si serve della metafora del violino, che avrà un'armonia diversa a seconda delle modifiche subite dagli elementi che lo compongono (la forma, la lunghezza delle corde, ecc.), fino ad arrivare a compromettere tale armonia e persino a recare noia e avversione all'ascoltatore. Lo stesso accade con le lingue, infrangendo l'ordine delle parole svanisce l'armonia, il concetto perde forza o si dissolve, e a conferma di questa idea Carli (1744, VII–VIII) riporta un'ampia citazione dal trattato *De Sublimitate* di Dionisio Longino¹¹, nella quale viene illustrato come modificando le parole e quindi l'armonia si pregiudica la composizione.

Tenendo conto delle considerazioni fino a qui espresse, Carli si chiede chi possa essere così audace da definire delle regole che permettano di conservare il *genio* della lingua anche in parole espresse in lingue diverse. Concordando con quanto già espresso da Scipione Maffei nel volume

*Traduttori italiani*¹², prima di definire delle regole sarebbe più opportuno, secondo Carli (1744, X), esaminare il *genio* delle diverse lingue, considerare le espressioni, le parole, le forme e fare attenzione che con le varie modifiche e alterazioni non se ne disperda il carattere. Infine, constata nuovamente che l'armonia e il *genio* di tutte le lingue consistono nella specifica disposizione delle parole, proprie e particolari di quella tale lingua, che se cambiate e alterate la disposizione nella traduzione, né l'armonia né il loro *genio* si conservano (Carli, 1744, X–XI).

Carli riflette quindi sulla scelta di un approccio letterale o più libero nel processo traduttivo (1744, XIII) e si chiede quale sia la soluzione migliore per trasporre il *genio* e l'armonia della lingua da cui si traduce. In tal senso considera le soluzioni di diversi traduttori che traducendo si sono allontanati dal testo di partenza e di altri che invece hanno scelto di essere fedeli all'opera originale. Riporta l'esempio di alcuni versi di Teocrito tradotti in latino da Virgilio, che adatta la traduzione al *genio* della lingua latina, come anche alcuni versi dell'Odissea tradotta da Orazio¹³, entrambi esempi di traduzioni più libere rispetto al testo di partenza, che Carli ritiene legittime e riuscite, perché facendo proprio il concetto espresso dai due poeti, questo acquista pregio e bellezza anche nella lingua d'arrivo.

Il ragionamento prosegue con una critica ai traduttori che invece si ostinano a rimanere fedeli al testo originale, con l'intento di provare che "traducendo il testo secondo il *genio* d'una qualche lingua volgare è di necessità d'abbandonare la forza, e l' *genio* della lingua da cui e' si trasporta; come al contrario traducendo parola per parola non abbiamo il *genio* nè dell'una, nè dell'altra" (Carli, 1744, XVII). A tal riguardo compara due diverse traduzioni dei versi di Orazio tratti dalla V Epistola, tradotti in italiano dal già citato Borganelli e in francese da André Dacier¹⁴. Come precedentemente illustrato, Carli riconosce le manchevolezze della traduzione italiana in versi, con la quale si tenta di far risaltare il pregio del testo originale "a forza di fedeltà", ma è ancora più critico verso quella

11 In realtà l'opera risalente al I sec. d. C., una delle più significative dell'antichità nel campo dell'estetica, è ritenuta di autore ignoto. Il documento viene generalmente indicato come Anonimo del sublime o come Pseudo-Longino.

12 La citazione introdotta in questo punto della dissertazione è tratta dall'opera *Traduttori italiani o sia notizia de' volgarizzamenti d'antichi scrittori latini e greci, che sono in luce. Aggiunto il volgarizzamento d'alcune insigni iscrizioni greche e la notizia del nuovo Museo d'iscrizioni di Verona, col paragone fra le iscrizioni e le medaglie*, stampata nel 1720 a Venezia, per Sebastian Coleti.

13 Il commento sulla traduzione dei primi due versi dell'Odissea contenuti nella *Poetica* di Orazio compare alle pagine 28 e 29 nella versione rivista e significativamente integrata al punto VII dell'epistola sulla difficoltà del ben tradurre pubblicata in *Delle opere ecc.*, tomo XVI.

14 Laurenti (2016) indica come autrice della traduzione dei versi di Orazio Madame Dacier, tuttavia, Carli (1744, XVI; 1787a, 31) cita come traduttore M. Dacier e presumibilmente intende *monsieur* Dacier, marito di Anne Le Fèvre Dacier. La nota a piè di pagina nell'epistola di Carli rimanda infatti al tomo quarto dell'opera *Oeuvres d'Horace*, stampata ad Amburgo nel 1733, dal titolo completo *Oeuvres d'Horace en latin et en françois avec des remarques critiques et historiques Par Monsieur Dacier* (Dacier, 1733). I versi e le righe citate da Carli sono alle pagine 74–76.

francese in prosa, non riuscita perché per nulla in grado di riproporre il componimento oraziano¹⁵ (Carli, 1744, XV–XVI).

La suddivisione tra coloro che sono a favore della fedeltà al testo originale e coloro che prediligono la libertà risale ai tempi antichi e spesso le scelte dei traduttori non vengono ritenute soddisfacenti, ecco perché vengono proposte traduzioni nuove, rivedute e migliorate, di opere già tradotte, conseguenza necessaria e indispensabile, secondo Carli, del ben tradurre. Tra gli esempi di traduzioni riproposte, Carli (1744, XIX) cita anche quelle delle opere di Omero che Andrea Divo Giustinopolitano stampò a Venezia nel 1537, benché già tradotte da altri precedentemente. In seguito, visto il gradimento del pubblico, queste furono ristampate più volte con revisioni e modifiche apportate da altri traduttori¹⁶.

Un'ulteriore questione cruciale a incidere sull'esito della traduzione è secondo Carli l'affinità tra autore e traduttore perché "tutti non possono perfettamente tradurre tutto, e che un solo carattere d'un traduttore, non possa accomodarsi giammai alla diversità de' caratteri di tutti gli altri" (Carli, 1744, XXI). La diversità dei caratteri incide sulla traduzione quando il traduttore cerca di adattare l'autore alla propria indole e la traduzione non risulta fedele perché "lo scrittore è in altro carattere trasformato" (Carli, 1744, XXII). Se invece il traduttore asseconda eccessivamente il carattere diverso dell'autore, la traduzione risulterà forzata e non naturale e quindi non piacevole per il lettore.

Nel passaggio successivo Carli (1744, XII–XIII) ribadisce la propria critica verso coloro che pretendono di definire regole e imporre modelli ideali da seguire, sostenendo, ad esempio, che in poesia sia da imitarsi solamente Petrarca, come se il suo stile possa adattarsi ai diversi caratteri degli altri autori e viceversa tutti gli autori possano adattarsi al suo. In verità, però, non tutti hanno la fortuna di potersi adattare allo stile petrarchesco e nonostante ciò possono esprimersi in forme diverse altrettanto valide.

In questa parte Carli si sofferma approfonditamente sull'impossibilità di tradurre la poesia, il genere più impegnativo, poiché i poeti "hanno nel numero legato un'armonia più sensibile, un'espressione dalla prosa diversa, come diversa hanno pure la maniera di pensare, e di riflettere; non ponno che ridurre il Traduttore ad una totale disperazione d'eseguir bene il suo officio" (Carli, 1744, XXIV). Il testo rinvia nuovamente a esempi concreti di traduzioni dei versi di Omero, in particolare a quella di Salvini, più fedele, e a quella di Madame Dacier¹⁷, più libera e creativa. Secondo Carli, la traduzione di Salvini è quella che tra le due riesce a riportare il senso delle parole dette dal poeta, sebbene mettendo in secondo piano la forma per l'impossibilità di essere riprodotta in tutto nella lingua d'arrivo. Sarebbe quindi errato pensare che sia possibile trasporre in volgare il carattere dei poeti greci o latini o il *genio* della loro lingua, come è errato pensare di poter gustare pienamente il carattere dell'autore o il *genio* dell'altra lingua grazie alla traduzione (Carli, 1744, XXV). Tuttavia Carli ritiene l'italiano la lingua più adatta alla trasposizione del carattere degli autori e del *genio* delle lingue greca o latina, che per la consonanza con queste ultime ha un forte vantaggio sulle altre lingue, pur non riuscendo a imitare la forza prodotta dall'armonia della poesia greca e latina¹⁸.

In conclusione alla propria riflessione sulla difficoltà della traduzione, Carli (1744, XXV–XXVI) è ben consapevole del fatto che non sia possibile formulare regole definitive che possano servire a tutti, viste le problematiche legate alla diversità delle lingue e del carattere degli autori. Per tradurre nel miglior modo possibile, il traduttore dovrebbe avere una sottile sensibilità, il "fino gusto" rispetto alle specificità della lingua dalla quale traduce e allo stesso tempo dovrebbe essere in grado di valutare se il carattere dell'autore che traduce si adatta al suo, per poter così ritrovare al meglio nella lingua d'arrivo i "colori" che possono far risaltare il concetto e l'immagine data nella lingua straniera. Il ragionamento termina con la constatazione che

15 Carli (1787a, 32) integra questo punto nella versione contenuta in *Delle Opere ecc.* per sottolineare quanto siano importanti la scelta e la collocazione delle parole nel formare l'armonia specifica di una lingua nonché per evidenziare la difficoltà e quasi l'"impossibilità di rappresentare con la traduzione il genio dell'autore, e la forza delle parole medesime". Aggiunge e commenta anche alcuni versi della *Merope* di Maffei, tragedia in versi sciolti che ebbe molto successo in Europa, di cui loda l'armonica collocazione delle parole e la buona resa in italiano. Il testo fu tradotto in francese da Voltaire, versione che Carli (1787a, 32–34) giudica mal riuscita perché non presenta l'armonia del testo originale, anche per le diverse caratteristiche della lingua francese, meno poetica dell'italiano e più vicina a "una prosa metrica rimata".

16 Sulle traduzioni di Andrea Divo e le edizioni latine delle opere di Omero nel XVI e XVII secolo si veda l'approfondimento di Štoka (2016).

17 Filologa e traduttrice francese, Anne Le Fèvre Dacier è una figura di spicco nella Querelle degli Antichi e dei Moderni. È autrice delle traduzioni in prosa dell'*Iliade* (1699) e dell'*Odissea* (1708), attraverso le quali vuole far conoscere Omero tra coloro che non lo conoscono o non possono apprezzarlo nella lingua originale. Fu membro dell'Accademia dei Ricovrati.

18 In merito alla difficoltà della traduzione di testi poetici, nella versione rivista della dissertazione contenuta in *Delle Opere ecc.* troviamo una significativa integrazione al punto XIII, pagine 46–51, nella quale Carli illustra ampiamente i limiti delle traduzioni di versi dal greco e dal latino in italiano, dovuti alle differenze relative al metro, al ritmo, alla specificità della sintassi. Le sue affermazioni sono sostenute da riferimenti a traduzioni come anche a versi tratti da componimenti originali.

nel tradurre non è opportuno optare per soluzioni estreme e pertanto né restare necessariamente fedeli al testo di partenza né tradurre con la massima libertà, ma è necessario di volta in volta individuare la soluzione migliore a seconda dell'intento del traduttore, che conseguentemente sceglierà se rimanere fedele, tradurre con libertà oppure preferire una via di mezzo.

CONSIDERAZIONI FINALI

I punti nodali della riflessione sulla difficoltà della traduzione toccano, in sintesi, quattro questioni fondamentali: la difficoltà di conservare nella traduzione il *genio* specifico di ogni lingua, la necessaria affinità tra autore del testo originale e traduttore per la buona riuscita della traduzione, il rifiuto verso l'imposizione di regole o modelli da seguire che possano servire per tutti, la necessità di scegliere un approccio traduttivo più o meno libero, che sia conforme all'intento della traduzione.

La questione riguardante l'idoneità di un approccio alla traduzione più libero o più fedele rispetto al testo originale trova ampio spazio nell'ambito delle discussioni in corso nel Settecento in Italia. Come Carli, pure l'ecclesiastico e accademico della Crusca Paolo Gagliardi, autore del *Discorso delle Traduzioni* (1757) e Melchiorre Cesarotti, in quegli anni, riflettono sulle modalità e difficoltà traduttive e in particolare sul *genio* specifico di ogni lingua, sulle specificità di diversi autori e la sensibilità del singolo traduttore, toccando anche la questione dell'intraducibilità del testo poetico (Laurenti, 2016; Mattioli, 2001).

Riguardo all'idea di optare per una strategia traduttiva in linea con l'intento del traduttore troviamo riscontro, ad esempio, negli anni 1794 e 1795, nell'opera di Melchiorre Cesarotti, che terminò e pubblicò una versione in prosa e una in versi dell'*Iliade* proprio con due diversi scopi: la traduzione in prosa, letterale e accompagnata da un approfondito apparato critico, aveva l'obiettivo di far conoscere Omero in tutti i suoi aspetti, mentre la traduzione in versi, più vicina a una riscrittura, è un adattamento ai canoni dell'epoca, che ha l'obiettivo di far gustare il testo al lettore del Settecento.

La scelta tra una tendenza orientata all'aderenza al testo di partenza e al mantenimento delle sue specificità linguistiche per cui il lettore percepisce di essere di fronte a una traduzione, e una tendenza naturalizzante, che avvicina il testo originale al lettore adattando la traduzione alle convenzioni linguistiche e culturali della lingua di arrivo, diverrà uno degli aspetti fondamentali nell'ambito delle riflessioni sulle modalità traduttive e degli studi traduttologici, e rimane tutt'oggi una questione di rilievo. Se ne sono infatti occupati, tra gli altri, gli studiosi Umberto Eco, Eugene Nida, Gideon Toury, Lawrence Venuti.

È possibile pertanto concludere che le riflessioni di Carli esposte nella dissertazione *Intorno la difficoltà di ben tradurre* confermano la sua piena consapevolezza rispetto alle molteplici specificità da considerare nell'attività traduttiva, facendolo così rientrare nel contesto della più aggiornata cultura della traduzione settecentesca, che come constatato da Mattioli (2001) vede la compresenza di diversi approcci a seconda del rapporto verso la tradizione classica e le correnti moderne di rinnovamento.

INTORNO LA DIFFICOLTÀ DI BEN TRADURRE (1743): GIAN RINALDO CARLI IN PREVAJANJE

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POVZETEK

Pisatelj, zgodovinar in raziskovalec Gian Rinaldo Carli je avtor razprave z naslovom Intorno la difficoltà di ben tradurre, v kateri opisuje težave, ki nastajajo v procesu prevajanja. Besedilo je bilo leta 1744 objavljeno v epistolarni obliki, in sicer kot predgovor njegovega prevoda Heziodove Teogonije v italijanščino. Carlijeva razmišljanja zadevajo predvsem razlike in specifičnosti posameznih jezikov ter vpliv le-teh na proces prevajanja. Ob tem je avtor posebej kritičen do tistih, ki zagovarjajo opredeljevanje pravil za prevajanje, saj le-ta ne zagotavljajo uspešnosti pri prevodu. Po drugi strani pa izpostavlja potrebo, da se vzpostavi ravnovesje med prostim prevajanjem in prevajanjem, ki zvesto sledi originalnemu besedilu, skladno z namenom prevajalca. Članek obravnava poglobljene Carlijeve refleksije o postopku prevajanja, da bi predstavil in osvetlil besedilo, ki v času izdaje ni bilo širše prepoznavno in do danes še ni bilo deležno poglobljenega preučevanja (Laurenti, 2016). Carlijeva razprava ponuja številne, danes še vedno aktualne iztočnice o težavah, ki nastajajo pri prevajanju besedil, o različnih jezikovnih posebnostih in vplivu značajev ter slogov različnih avtorjev in prevajalcev na prevode, kar potrjuje njegovo široko poznavanje področja prevajalstva v 18. stoletju.

Ključne besede: Gian Rinaldo Carli, prevajanje, prevodoslovje, Teogonija, Heziod

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SLOVENIAN DIALECTAL DIVERSITY AS PRESENTED IN THE SLOVENIAN LINGUISTIC ATLAS

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ABSTRACT

The article presents the various factors responsible for the current dialectal diversity of the Slovenian language – natural geographic features of the Slovenian territory and the political and ecclesiastical division of the Slovenian territory. This is followed by a description of the fundamental work of Slovenian dialectology, i.e. the Slovenian Linguistic Atlas (Slovenski lingvistični atlas; SLA), and a presentation of the treatment of entries in SLA and a presentation of two software tools (SlovarRed and ArcGIS) used for the digital management of dialect material and the making of language maps.

Keywords: Slovenian dialects, Slovenian Linguistic Atlas (SLA), geolinguistics, information technology in linguistics, Geographic(al) information system (GIS)

LA DIVERSITÀ DIALETTALE SLOVENA PRESENTATA NELL'ATLANTE LINGUISTICO SLOVENO

SINTESI

Il contributo espone i vari fattori determinanti l'attuale diversità dialettale della lingua slovena – oltre alle caratteristiche naturali geografiche anche la divisione politica ed ecclesiastica del territorio sloveno. Seguono la presentazione del lavoro fondamentale della dialettologia slovena, ossia dell'Atlante linguistico sloveno (Slovenski lingvistični atlas; SLA), l'illustrazione dell'elaborazione delle voci nello SLA, e la descrizione dei due strumenti software (SlovaRed e ArcGIS) usati per la gestione digitale del materiale dialettale e la realizzazione delle cartine linguistiche.

Parole chiave: dialetti sloveni, Atlante linguistico sloveno (SLA), geolinguistica, tecnologia dell'informazione e linguistica, Sistema informativo geografico (GIS)

INTRODUCTION¹

The Slovenian language is highly differentiated in terms of dialects, which is the result of various intra- and extralinguistic factors. From the synchronic point of view, the Slovenian language is categorised into seven dialect groups: Lower Carniolan (dolenjska n. s.), Littoral (primorska n. s.), Rovte (rovtarska n. s.), Carinthian (koroška n. s.), Upper Carniolan (gorenjska n. s.), Pannonian (panonska n. s.) and Styrian (štajerska n. s.), which are in turn divided into 47 dialects with subdialects. Subdialects are further differentiated into small areas called local dialects, which are the smallest systemic unit in the classification of dialects. The dynamic geography of Slovenia has been found to be one of the most important factors in the division of the Slovenian language. Natural barriers such as mountain ranges, valleys, forests and swamps prevented contact and thus communication between people, which accelerated linguistic differentiation, including the formation of dialects and subdialects.

The article (cf. Kumin Horvat & Gostenčnik, 2017) first presents the various factors responsible for the current dialectal diversity of the Slovenian language. This is followed by a description of the fundamental work of Slovenian dialectology, i.e. the Slovenian Linguistic Atlas (*Slovenski lingvistični atlas*; SLA), and a presentation of the treatment of entries in SLA, i.e. the structure of the commentary, the ways of mapping and a presentation of two software tools (SlovarRed and ArcGIS) used for the digital management of dialect material and the making of language maps.

DIALECTAL DIVERSITY OF SLOVENIAN LANGUAGE

The main factor in the dialectal differentiation are the natural geographic features of the Slovenian territory, i.e. hill ranges, mountain ranges, valleys, impenetrable forests, swamps, watercourses. The dialectal division was further accelerated by the political and ecclesiastical division of the Slovenian territory, which shaped the communication and movement of the population for centuries (Logar, 1996, 4). The rich dialectal diversity has also been influenced by the proximity of the Slovenian language to non-Slavic languages or dialects: German, Friulian, Italian and Hungarian, the effects of which are noticeable in sentence intonation, lexis, syntax and partly in phonetics (Logar, 1996, 3). A relatively small colonisation by non-Slovenian settlers, who eventually assimilated, and Turkish incursions in the area of Bela Krajina also had a minor influence on the formation of dialects.

The first differentiation of the Slovenian language dates back to the early years of its formation out of Proto-Slavic, as a result of the arrival of Slavs to the Eastern

Alps in two migratory waves – from the north across the Danube to the Klagenfurt Basin, and from the south along the Sava, Drava and Mura rivers up to the Alps and the Karst plateau. Following the settlement at the end of the 6th century, the south-eastern and north-western Slovenian dialect areas were formed by the end of the first millennium. The Pannonian (panonska n. s.), Styrian (štajerska n. s.), Lower Carniolan (dolenjska n. s.) and Upper Carniolan (gorenjska n. s.) dialect groups arose in the first area, while the Carinthian (koroška n. s.), Littoral (primorska n. s.) and, as the youngest, Rovte (rovtarska n. s.) arose in the (north-)west (Zorko, 1998, 115).

Subsequently, the dialectal division of Slovenian was influenced by other geographic and historical factors, which cannot be examined in isolation as they were often intertwined – political and ecclesiastical administrative divisions of territory often followed natural boundaries and determined migratory and transport flows. For example, the extent of štajerska dialects (narečja štajerske n. s.) and subdialects was determined by centuries-old political and ecclesiastical administrative divisions that were mostly based on mountain ranges, hill ranges and rivers, so the division between the Upper Carniolan (koroška n. s.) and Styrian (štajerska n. s.) dialects still follows the former regional border between Carniola (koroška n. s.) and Styria (štajerska n. s.), from the Kamnik Alps to the Zasavje hills in the south-east (Logar, 1996, 392).

Another dividing line is the mountain chain Snežnik–Javorniki–Hrušica–Nanos, which forms a boundary between the Lower Carniolan (dolenjska n. s.) and Inner Carniolan dialects (notranjsko n.) in the south-east and the group of Rovte dialects (rovtarska n. s.) and the Inner Carniolan dialect (notranjsko n.) in the north-west. Similarly, the mountain chain Kanin–Stol–Mija–Matajur represents a boundary between the Upper Soča (obsoško n.) and dialects of Slavia Veneta (beneško-slovensko n.) (Logar, 1993, 6).

Some dialects are spoken in smaller areas formed due the geographic isolation of their speakers in valleys surrounded by tall mountains. The Resia dialect (rezijansko n.) is spoken in Resia, a mountainous alpine valley in the Italian province of Udine, and is separated from the Upper Soča dialect (obsoško n.) in the east by the high Kanin mountain range, which is also the state border between Slovenia and Italy, and from the Ter dialect (tersko n.) in the south by the steep and high Muzec chain. In the north, the Resians are separated from the people of Zilja in Carinthia by a wide and hilly belt now inhabited by Romance-speaking Friulians. The Resian valley is thus only open towards the west, i.e. the Friuli region, which has no Slovenian population, and Friulians have been the closest contact of Resians for

¹ The article has been produced based on research results within the i-SLA – Interaktivni atlas slovenskih narečij (i-SLA – Interactive Atlas of Slovene Dialects) project (L6-2628, 1. 9. 2020 – 31. 8. 2023), co-financed by the Slovenian Research Agency under the P6-0038 programme (1. 1. 2004 – 31. 12. 2021).

centuries (Logar, 1996, 232). Similarly, the formation of the Kropa local dialect (*krajevni govor Kroke*) was determined by the geographic confinement to the narrow valley of the Kroparica stream at the foot of the Jelovica plateau (Škofic, 2019, 15). The diversity of the Posavje local dialects (*posavski govori*) of the Zasavje region (the towns of Trbovlje, Zagorje and Hrastnik) is also the result of confinement to individual basins surrounded by a hill range reaching up to 1000 metres above sea level (Medved & Smole, 2005, 71).

Extensive swampland and forests also played an important role in the dialectal differentiation of Slovenian in the past. Thus, the boundary between the Upper Carniolan (*gorenjska n. s.*) and Lower Carniolan dialects (*dolenjsko n. s.*) runs along the once impassable Ljubljana Marshes (Logar, 1993, 7); in the Sora Plain, communication was prevented by extensive, almost impenetrable forests, giving rise to the boundary between the Upper Carniolan (*gorenjska n. s.*) and Rožte dialects (*rovtarska n. s.*). The delimitation is sharp, with no transitional local dialects, as forests used to separate the areas of Kranj and Medvode from the town of Škofja Loka and its vicinity, which then had a mixed Slovenian-German population (Logar, 1993, 7). A similar role was played by the forests of Kočevje and the geographic remoteness of being on the far side of the Gorjanci range in the formation of the dialects of Bela Krajina, a region separated from the rest of Slovenia on one side and connected to the neighbouring Croatian lands on the other (Logar, 1996, 79).

In addition to the above-mentioned natural factors, the dialect landscape of the Slovenian language has been shaped by other factors: the ecclesiastical and political administrative divisions, colonisation, Turkish incursions, economic ties between towns and regions etc.

The territories of individual parishes (if old enough) are often the areas in which individual local dialects developed as, historically, it was the parish centre that became the administrative and political centre shaping transport and communication among people (Logar, 1993, 6). For example, the Upper Savinja dialect (*zgorñjesavinjsko n.*), which is part of the Styrian dialect group (*štajerska n. s.*), was formed in a territory that was the property of the Benedictine monastery of Gornji Grad in the 12th century; similarly, the delimitation between the Upper Savinja (*zgorñjesavinjsko n.*) and Central Styrian (*sredñjsavinjsko n.*) local dialects runs along the line that used to divide the territories of two ancient parishes: Laško and Ponikva (Logar, 1993, 6). Parish borders also defined the boundaries of the Dolinsko variant of the Prekmurje dialect (*dolinski govor prekmurskega narečja*), which covers the area of the former ancient parish of Turnišče (Novak & Novak, 1996, XI); moreover, parish borders correspond with the boundaries of the local dialect of Juršinci (*krajevni govor Juršinci*), which is part of the Prlekija dialect (*prleško n.*) (Škofic, 2004, 104).

The former (as well as current) political administrative division has left its mark on the Slovenian language area, drawing sharp borders between dialects. For example, the western boundary of the Savinja dialect (*savinjsko n.*) is also the eastern boundary of the Upper Carniolan dialect (*gorenjska n. s.*), following the former regional border between Carniola and Styria running from the Okrešelj cirque via the Ojstrica mountain to the Črnivec pass and Menina Planina and Čemšeniška Planina plateaus (Logar, 1996, 48). Similarly, the boundary between the Inner Carniolan (*notranjsko n.*) and Kras dialects (*kraško n.*) dates back to the time of the so-called Great Carantania, when this was the dividing line between the Friulian and Istrian marches. In the Vipava Valley, the boundary follows the delimitation of feudal dominions, which was placed on the Vrtovinšček stream at the end of the first millennium (Logar, 1996, 66). The boundary between the eastern and western versions of the Slovenske Gorice dialect (*slovenskogoriško n.*), which belongs to the Pannonian dialect group (*panonska n. s.*), follows the historical border between Carantania and Lower Pannonia, which ran along the line Marija Snežna – Sveta Ana on the Kremberg hill–Sveta Trojica–Vurberk at the Drava river (Koletnik, 2001, 38).

One of the factors in the dialectal differentiation is also more recent colonisations, especially the settlement of non-Slavic colonists – which gave rise to, among others, the Bača subdialect (*baško podnarečje*) and Selca dialect (*selško n.*): the hilly and wooded uninhabited area along the upper reaches of the Bača river and its tributaries in the Littoral region was colonised by German farmers from Pustertal in Tyrol around 1250 at the latest. This territory then belonged to the Tolmin dominion of the Patriarchate of Aquileia.

A decisive role in the creation of some Slovenian dialects was played by Turkish incursions, which heavily influenced the linguistic landscape of the Bela Krajina region, where the composition of the population started to change in the 15th and 16th centuries. It should be noted that geographic obstacles separated Bela Krajina from the rest of Slovenia, enabling stronger links with the neighbouring lands on the other side of the Kolpa river. It is thus understandable that Bela Krajina got its first Slavic population from the same direction as the neighbouring area in Croatia. Until the 13th century, Bela Krajina was a Croatian land in terms of politics, culture and transport. Only after that, it became part of the area of Slovenian political and cultural linguistic influence (Logar, 1996, 79). The Turkish incursions caused the native, at least partly Slovenised population of Bela Krajina to abandon their old homes and start to retreat north over the Gorjanci range. This applies especially to the lowlands and areas around the Kolpa river, while the inhabitants of higher, remote hilly areas most likely stayed, also accepting refugees arriving from the south. On the other hand, the partly evacuated parts of Bela Krajina were settled by refugees from the Croatian regions of Lika, Dalmatia and

Bosnia. Today's local dialects of Bela Krajina (belokranjsko n.) have thus developed based on the mixing of the old population with refugees from the south and more recent Slovenian immigrants (Logar, 1996, 79).

The above-mentioned examples demonstrate how the dialectisation of the Slovenian language area has been accelerated by different factors limiting or preventing communication between people in one way or another. On the contrary, the economic factor had a distinct unifying function: for example, the area around Tolmin and along the Idrija river was a special administrative unit of the Patriarchate of Aquileia. In matters of administration and trade, it therefore had permanent transport connections to centres in the west: Udine, Cividale del Friuli, Aquileia, the road to which ran through the village of Srednje and the valley of the Idrija river. On the other hand, trade and, even more so, mountaineering connected the Tolmin region to the Bohinj and Selca valleys (Ramovš, 1931, 45). Economy thus had a decisive impact on the gravitation of the population in some places – this is how the Kropa local dialect (krajevni govor Kroke) was formed. Kropa, which was at the height of its iron industry from the 16th to the mid-19th century (having two foundries and several ironworks), attracted significant labour force from as far as Carinthia and the Selca valley; both the mixing of the population and the diversity of their local dialects naturally had a decisive impact on the formation of the local dialect (Škofic, 2019, 17).

Dialectisation was often influenced by a combination of multiple factors mentioned above. This can be exemplified by the local dialects on both sides of the Slovenian-Croatian state border in the very south of Slovenia, where Slovenian dialectology has only recently started to treat this interconnected area as a homogenous unit, regardless of the contemporary state border. In the territory of the Čebrenka and Kostel dialects (čebrenško in kostelsko n.) of the Lower Carniola dialect group (dolenjska n. s.), the Čebrenka and Kolpa rivers, independent of the official authorities and state borders, have been a unifying factor that has linked the lives and thus the language of the inhabitants, while the surrounding high peaks, extensive forest areas and, later (17th century), the immigration of Shtokavian Orthodox populations have further hindered ties with the neighbouring regions, further solidifying internal links. (Gostenčnik, 2020a, 371) The Čebrenka dialect (čebrenško n.) is located along the Čebrenka river, along the upper reaches of the Kolpa river and partly in

the Gorski Kotar region of Croatia. In spite of the (state) border as a political dividing line, the area of these local dialects represents a continuum in terms of language history (Gostenčnik, 2018, 11), which is now reflected particularly in the linguistic and dialectal characteristics of the local dialects in question. Further south-east, along the upper reaches of the Kolpa river and in the Gorski Kotar region of Croatia, lies the Kostel dialect (kostelsko n.) (Gostenčnik, 2020a, 353). It directly borders the Čebrenka dialect in the west, the mixed Kočevje local dialects (mešani kočevski govori) in the north and the Southern Bela Krajina dialect (južnobelokranjsko n.) in the north-east. In the south, the Kostel dialect (kostelsko n.) extends to the town of Ravna Gora (with the Chakavian language area south of this border); in the south-east, it is separated from the East Goran local dialects of the Kajkavian dialect group of the Croatian language by the village of Blaževci (Gostenčnik, 2020a, 355).

Today's diversity of the Slovenian language area is illustrated by the very dynamic colours on the map of Slovenian dialects.

SLOVENIAN LINGUISTIC ATLAS (SLA)

SLA – the fundamental work of Slovenian dialectology – is being made at the Fran Ramovš Institute of the Slovenian Language at the SAZU Research Centre (ISJFR ZRC SAZU) in Ljubljana. Along with the dictionary, the normative guide and the grammar, this is one of the fundamental linguistic reference works. It is characterised by presenting language from the perspective of the geographic scope of individual linguistic phenomena. The atlas examines systemic organic idioms of the Slovenian language as they are spoken within and beyond the borders of Slovenia. The SLA covers all areas where Slovenian dialects are spoken; the network of localities includes 417 local dialects,² of which 339 are within the borders of Slovenia, 41 are in Austria, 28 are in Italy, 7 are in Croatia, and 2 are in Hungary (Gostenčnik, 2016, 50).

SLA was designed in 1934 by Fran Ramovš, a comparative linguist and dialectologist, and the first year of preparations coincides with the year of the publication of the *Linguistic Atlas of Polish Subcarpathia* (*Atlas językowy polskiego Podkarpacia*) by Mieczysław Małecki and Kazimierz Nitsch, which Ramovš used as a model. He followed the example of the Polish atlas especially when preparing the questionnaire³ even though the Polish atlas

² The full list of localities in the SLA network is available at: http://www.fran.si/203/sla-slovenski-lingvisticni-atlas-2/datoteke/SLA2_Kraji.pdf.

³ The questionnaire of the *Linguistic Atlas of Polish Subcarpathia* originally comprised 700 questions but was later expanded to 1000 questions. Only the material that exhibited phonetic, lexical or morphological differentiation was included in the geolinguistic examination (Kumin Horvat, 2016, based on Reichan & Woźniak, 2004, 12–13).



Figure 1: Geolinguistic presentation of the Čebranka and Kostel dialects (Gostenčnik, 2020b, 138).




Figure 2: Map of Slovenian dialects (authors: Tine Logar and Jakob Rigler (1983), amended by members of the Dialectology Section of ISJFR ZRC SAZU (2016)) (Source: SLA – Karta narečij (2022)).

is regional in type,⁴ while the Slovenian atlas is national. Despite an early start, the SLA fieldwork, i.e. the collection of dialect material, only started after the Second World War. The original SLA network of localities was foreseen as comprising 230 local dialects, but the collection of material in the field soon showed that the dialectal differentiation of the Slovenian language area is much greater, so this number of local dialects would not suffice to cover all the characteristics of dialects. This is why new localities were added to the network over the years.

The figure below shows the network of data points, which appears fairly dense at first glance, but there are still areas where the data points are spaced rather far apart,⁵ though most dialects are covered very well.

In all 417 local dialects, the material has been obtained with the same questionnaire, which includes 870 numbered questions and numbers no fewer than 3000 units when combined with supplementary questions.⁶ The questions are given as standard equivalents (e.g. V001 *las* 'hair', V025 *roka* 'arm, hand', V129A *hiša* 'house', V175 *šola* 'school', V197 *koruza* 'maize'), based on which an explorer in the field uses the so-called survey method to formulate a suitable question without suggesting the answer to the informant (e.g. What do you call what people have on their heads? – *las* 'hair', What do you call the part of the body used for eating and writing? – *roka* 'hand').

The gathering of material in the field started in the mid-20th century, with Tine Logar as the main explorer. It was originally planned that a single explorer would collect all the material so that a uniform acoustic filter would be employed, but it soon turned out that this would not be possible due to the extent of the questionnaire and the plethora of local dialects included. This is why the gathering of material was taken up by Logar's graduates at the Faculty of Arts at the University of Ljubljana, and later by other linguists,⁷ especially dialectologists. Answers are written in the so-called Slovenian phonetic transcription, which has undergone changes over the years. The current dialect transcription is based on the phonetic transcription for the Slavic Linguistic Atlas (OLA) with additional

graphemes for Slovenian dialectal phonemes and is presented in full in the introductory chapters of the Atlas (Kenda-Jež in SLA 1, 27–30, and in SLA 2, 27–31).⁸

The material is kept at the Dialectology Section of ISJFR ZRC SAZU in Ljubljana, in multiple formats. In part, the material is written on cards and stored in a so-called card index, where cards containing answers are ordered by individual questions. The entire card material, totalling 884,000 cards, is also scanned. The second part of the material is kept in a notebook collection (also digitally in the form of scans), which is located on an internal shared drive of the Dialectology Section of ISJFR ZRC SAZU – this material is ordered by locality. For some local dialects, the material is available both in card and notebook form; for others, only one of the formats is available. The notebook collection varies in terms of the orderliness of the material – one part of the material is completely unproblematic, with numbered questions and answers, while the second part comes in a rather problematic form for processing. This is because the answers are written in the notebooks sporadically, just as the explorer acquired them in the field, so they are sometimes not even numbered and are hard to find.

Because the SLA dialect material is still being collected – data points that are unrecorded so far are mostly those outside the state borders of Slovenia – it is now kept in the form of so-called electronic notebooks, i.e. Microsoft Word documents, which best facilitates further processing in terms of readability and management of the material.

TREATMENT OF ENTRIES IN SLA

Every entry included in SLA 1 and SLA 2 has:

- a commentary, where the dialect material is analysed and commented upon;
- a symbol- (and isogloss-)based map where the material is presented using the geolinguistic method;
- an index, i.e. material accompanying the map for the entire network of localities, presented in the Slovenian phonetic transcription.⁹

4 The *Linguistic Atlas of Polish Subcarpathia* is the first atlas of the Polish language. M. Małecki and K. Nitsch, Polish dialectologists, began preparations for a regional atlas of the Polish language where the examination of a geographically small area would demonstrate methodological, technical and content possibilities for mapping, thus enabling researchers to get well prepared for a general dictionary of Polish dialects. The area of Subcarpathia, which lies at the contact point between the Polish, Czech and Slovak language areas, was chosen for geolinguistic examination for multiple reasons. Due to its location, historical factors and migratory waves, it is highly differentiated and thus suitable for linguistic analysis, which is reflected in the grammatical and particularly the lexical diversity of the local dialects of the area (Reichan & Woźniak, 2004, 10–11).

5 Such areas are, for example, the westernmost part of the Prlekija dialect (prleško n.), the Mežica dialect (mežiško n.) etc.

6 Supplementary questions can be phonetic (for example, V730 asks about reflexes of the unstressed yat, and its supplementary questions are the cues črepinja 'shard', lenoba 'laziness', lesnika 'crab apple', levica 'left hand', plenica 'nappy', resnica 'truth' etc.), morphological (for example, V607 *hči* 'daughter' includes supplementary questions for the entire paradigm of this noun) or semantic in nature (for example, V618 *ujna* 'aunt, mother's sister' asks about the different meanings of this lexeme). The full SLA questionnaire is available at: http://bos.zrc-sazu.si/c/Dial/Ponovne_SLA/P/03_1_Vprasnica_STEV.pdf (Ponovne objave).

7 Their respective native local dialects have been explored by, for example, Francka Benedik, Janez Dular, Martina Orožen, Vera Smole, Marija Stanonik, Vlado Nartnik, Jože Toporišič, Ada Vidovič Muha and Zinka Zorko.

8 See: http://www.fran.si/203/sla-slovenski-lingvisticni-atlas-2/datoteke/SLA2_Foneticka-transkripcija.pdf.

9 Example: the entry *sredinec* 'middle finger' (SLA 1.2, 2011, 106).




Figure 3: Network of data points in the Slovenian Linguistic Atlas (SLA 2.1, 13).

Example of commentary structure

In this section, the structure of a commentary (see also Škofic in SLA 2.2, 16–17) is presented using an example of a commentary from the second volume of the Atlas (SLA 2), which includes lexis belonging to the *farming* semantic field, for *vodnjak* ‘well’ (SLA 2.2, 317–320, authored by Vera Smole and Mojca Horvat). The first point presents the semantic features of the material and the related issues, which are mostly based on the variation of the denotatum at hand across Slovenian regions.

The second point of the commentary, i.e. the morphological analysis,¹⁰ analyses all the lexemes recorded for a

particular meaning, presenting their morphemic structure¹¹ as well as their origin. Some lexemes have not been analysed morphologically because they are unclear.¹²

The special features of a map when compared to other maps are presented in the third point, which lists each lexeme that is recorded in only one local dialect. For each local dialect, no more than two lexemes are mapped on the map, so this section also shows any so-called third and subsequent lexemes in individual points, which are not marked with a symbol on the map.¹³

To clarify many an issue, answers had to be found in additional literature relevant only to the commentary in question, so the fourth point lists bibliographic information about this.

¹⁰ On the morphological analysis methodology, see Škofic in SLA 2.2, 52–58.

¹¹ Example of the morphemic structure of lexemes: *studeneč* ‘spring’ < **stud-e-n-ěč-ě* ← **stud-e-n-ě* ‘cold’ (adj.), which is related to **stud-ě* ‘cold’ (noun), **stud-i-ti* ‘to make cold’; *šteplh* < *(*štepix*)-ě ← MHG *stübich*, *stubich*, Austrian Bavarian *Stübich* ‘type of back basket’ with Bavarian German pronunciation (-b- > -p-) (I ≥ u in T039, T041, T049, T050, T051 T052, T053, T331, T333, T337, T340, T415; I ≥ o in T055) (Smole & Horvat in SLA 2.2, 317).

¹² Example of lexemes with unclear origins: *lucterna* ‘well’, unclear, perhaps related to *šterna*, *plunkovec* ‘well’, unclear, perhaps **plun-ěk-ov-ěč-ě*, related to the verb *plunkati* ‘to emit short, hollow sounds when liquid is flowing’, which is derived from **plu-ti* ‘to swim’ with an interpolated imitative -n- like in *plundra* ‘slush’ (the entry for *plunkati* in Snoj, 2003, 457), or perhaps **plunk-a-v-ěč-ě* derived from the onomatopoeic verb **plunk-a-ti* (like *plūnka* ‘harp, zither’ (Bezljaj, 1995, 62) or perhaps **plunk-a-v-ěč-ě* in relation to *pljuniti* ‘to spit’, *plunkati* (Smole & Horvat in SLA 2.2, 317–318).

¹³ For more on the SLA mapping method, see SLA 2.2, 18–19.




Figure 4: Example of sketch for SLA V162B.01 vodnjak.

The fifth point enables the development of an internal and external network of connections between the volumes of the SLA as it lists cross-references to maps dealing with a similar topic (for example, the commentary for *vodnjak* 'well' includes a cross-reference to the commentary for *studenec* 'small spring'. This point also mentions other linguistic atlases, which cover the Slovenian language area in its entirety (e.g. *Obščeslavjanskij lingvističeskij atlas* – OLA, *Atlas Linguistique de l'Europe* – ALE) or just a part of it (e.g. *Slovenski dialektološki leksikalni atlas slovenske Istre* – SDLA-SI). There are also cross-references to the atlases of neighbouring languages that may cover a part of the Slovenian language area, i.e. *Atlante linguistico italiano* – ALI, *Atlante storico-linguistico-etnografico friulano* – ASLEF, *Új Magyar Nyelvjárás Atlasz* – UMNyA and *HJA (Hrvatski jezični atlas)*.

The sixth point is of particular interest to ethnologists as it provides an additional clarification of the topic from an ethnological point of view, accompanied by a sketch of the mapped denotatum with some regional variants.

Example of map

On the map, dialectal lexemes for the meaning 'enclosed space or container, usually underground, for collecting and storing large quantities of drinking water' appear in continuous areas, with the most extensive one being *studenec*, while another frequent expression is *pod*. The expressions *štep* 'well', *štirna* 'well', *poč* 'well' and *štern* 'well' also appear in continuous areas.

Since 2013, SLA has been freely available online; as a PDF book, it is published on the ISJFR website (<http://sla.zrc-sazu.si/>), where non-Slovenian users can avail themselves of a table (SLA 2.1, 24–26) with all the entries in nine languages (Slovenian, English, German, French, Italian, Friulian, Russian, Croatian, Hungarian) to help them locate the question or lexeme they are interested in.

SLOVARRED AND GIS

The digital management of the dialect material and the making of language maps are conducted using two software tools, i.e. SlovarRed and ArcGIS.

The computer software tool was originally intended for the making of terminological dictionaries but now also serves as a database for the Slovenian Linguistic Atlas. The database is designed as an organised system for all data related to the SLA material. It also contains subdatabases, e.g. a subdatabase of recorders, a subdatabase of place names, a subdatabase of the geographic coordinates of the localities included in the network etc. The dialectal data entered in the database are verifiable owing to a link to the database of scanned card and notebook material, which is saved on a separate server (Škofic, 2008, 98).

Dialect material has been entered into SlovarRed in Slovenian phonetic transcription using the ZRCOLA input system.¹⁴ Material that has already been collected and is located in the card and notebook index is copied to SlovarRed in citation form, i.e. in the phonetic transcription that was used at the time of recording, even though the transcription has changed over the years. This means

¹⁴ The ZRCOLA input system has been developed at the Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Ljubljana (www.zrc-sazu.si). The input system for linguistic use is free of charge and freely accessible – it is available at <http://zrcola.zrc-sazu.si/>.



Figure 6: SlovarRed 2.1 software tool with material for sredinec ‘middle finger’.




Figure 7: View of the scan of an original dialectal record.

that phonetic records are not harmonised, so a purely lay comparison between individual indices may lead to incorrect interpretations.¹⁵

The figure below shows a screenshot of SlovarRed, with the entry *sredinec* ‘middle finger’ selected.

For each lexeme or data point, a double click on the far left of the screen displays the scanned original record of the entered material either on a card or in a notebook.¹⁶ The chosen entry is *oko* ‘eye’.

The SlovarRed database is connected with the ArcGIS program, which is in turn connected with a geographic information system (GIS) that displays the interpreted language data on a language map. ArcGIS enables different ways of mapping, i.e. of displaying language data on a map. It was developed for SLA in cooperation with members of the ZRC SAZU Institute of Anthropological and Spatial Studies, based on data provided by GURS (Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia) (Škofic, 2008, 98). ArcGIS enables one to freely add different layers. The screenshot below shows a map drawn in ArcGIS for *sredinec* ‘middle finger’ (SLA 1.1, 107), which has been added a layer with dialects.

The final language map as found in the published version of *Slovenski lingvistični atlas 1 – človek (telo,*

bolezni, družina) (Slovenian Linguistic Atlas 1 – Human (Body, Illnesses, Family)) looks like this:

Some maps are based not only on symbols, but isoglosses as well. This is made possible by the ArcGIS program with the option of manually drawing isoglosses, which has been utilised to enrich the expressiveness of a map itself or to highlight a certain phonetic or sometimes morphological phenomenon. The isogloss on the map for *oko* ‘eye’ (SLA 1.1, 59) presents and demarcates the area where the so-called tertiary shift of the circumflex has taken place, which is an accent innovation characteristic only of the displayed local dialects, not of Slovenian in general.

FRAN AND I-SLA

Since 2014, SLA has been available for browsing as part of the Fran web portal (www.fran.si), which is a portal of the ZRC SAZU Fran Ramovš Institute of the Slovenian Language and contains all fundamental dictionaries for Slovenian. Currently, it integrates 32 dictionaries (eleven general, two etymological, five historical, fourteen terminological, six dialect dictionaries), one linguistic atlas, two language

15 For the non-tonemic Inner Carniola local dialect SLA T155 Trnovo (Ilirska Bistrica), there are multiple records, including one from 1974, which is written in the old phonetic transcription – material for V826 *oko* ‘eye’: *okū* ‘eye’, and another from 1984, which is written in the new transcription: *o’ku*: ‘eye’. At first glance, it might wrongly be concluded that the local dialect used to have tonemic accentuation and no longer has it.

16 While both the card and notebook indices are digitised, only the scanned card material is (partly) linked to SlovarRed for the time being.




Figure 8: Map from SLA 1.1 in the ArcGIS program with a dialect layer added.




Figure 9: Map from SLA 1.1, 107, sredinec 'middle finger' (authored by Mojca Horvat).




Figure 10: Map from SLA 1.1, 59, *oko* 'eye' (authored by Januška Gostenčnik).

counselling services and numerous links to external language corpora, so it functions like one huge dictionary. It can be characterised as presenting Slovenian from the perspective of its different versions in terms of varieties, time and space. The portal enables searching through all dictionaries simultaneously or limiting the search to only one dictionary or atlas that the user is interested in. Search results enable clicking between dictionaries, so it is possible, for example, to jump from the dictionary of standard language to historical dictionaries, terminological dictionaries or the linguistic atlas.

Moreover, an interactive version of the Atlas, the so-called e-SLA, is in the making at the Institute; it is being prepared by Jožica Škofic, a dialectologist, and Jernej Vičič, a language technologist. The idea of the interactive linguistic atlas has already been presented in public (Škofic, 2013, 95–111), so only its essential characteristics are noted here. It involves the preparation of a "truly interactive linguistic atlas by using the XML format and basing

it on the interconnectedness of different databases, while undoubtedly upholding the fundamental importance of a judicial (in terms of linguistic theory) analysis of the language material (in this case, the lexis of Slovenian dialects presented in the "traditional" linguistic atlas) upgraded with researcher- and user-friendly electronic tools" (Škofic, 2013, 95–111). The intention is for the planned atlas to present and integrate data from databases so as to enable 1. adding or removing views of data on a map – e.g. switching different layers on and off; 2. selecting the mapped data on a given map; 3. direct browsing through data from the SlovarRed database; 4. linking to audio and video recordings from selected local dialects; 5. linking to online dialect dictionaries; (e. g. Narečna bera, 2013) 6. linking to online dialectological corpora; (cf. Govorni korpus Koprive, 2020) 7. linking to online information on the author of the record, the place¹⁷ and bibliographic information on the research into particular local dialects; 8. switching between the map, commentary, index and morphological analysis etc.

17 E. g. information on the locality of the local dialect of Horjul (horjulsko n.) (cf. Wikipedia, 2022).

SLOVENSKA NAREČNA RAZNOLIKOST V SLOVENSKEM LINGVISTIČNEM ATLASU

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POVZETEK

Narečna raznolikost slovenskega jezika je metodološko dovršeno predstavljena v temeljnem delu slovenske dialektologije, tj. v Slovenskem lingvističnem atlasu (dalje) SLA, katerega prvi zvezek je izšel leta 2011, drugi pa leta 2016. SLA prinaša v jezikoslovni luči interpretirano predmetnost iz celotnega slovenskega jezikovnega prostora. V njem je narečno gradivo prostorsko prikazano na t. i. besednih jezikovnih kartah in razloženo v strukturno enotnih komentarjih. Na primeru izbranih jezikovnih kart in komentarjev bodo v članku prikazane metode dela pri SLA, v okviru tega pa tudi posamezne fonetične, besedotvorne in leksične zanimivosti slovenskih narečij. Od leta 2014 je SLA prosto dostopen na inštitutskem spletnem portalu Fran (www.fran.si), ki vključuje tudi vse preostale temeljne jezikovne priročnike slovenskega jezika. V pripravi je tudi interaktivni atlas oz. i-SLA.

Ključne besede: slovenska narečja, Slovenski lingvistični atlas (SLA), geolingvistika, informacijske tehnologije v jezikoslovju, Geografski informacijski sistemi (GIS)

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»NAJPREJ MI, POTEM VI«: KOROŠKI SLOVENCİ SPRIČO TERORJA IN NASILJA NAD JUDI V ČASU NACIONALSOCIALIZMA

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IZVLEČEK

Avtorica se v prispevku s pomočjo Althusserjevega koncepta interpelacije in na podlagi časopisnega ter obsežnega spominskega in avtobiografskega gradiva sooča z operacijo »introjiciranja« nacistične antisemitske ideologije pri koroških Slovencih; v soju pozornosti je zlasti obdobje med letoma 1933 in 1941. Posebno pozornost posveča odzivom koroških Slovencev na preganjanje, nasilje in odstranjevanje (ne le) judovskega prebivalstva iz javnega, socialnega in gospodarskega življenja ter ugotavlja, da je nacistična antisemitska ideologija vzbujala tudi nestrinjanje in odpor. O tem govorijo tudi primeri pomoči in solidarnosti, na primer »prva antihitlerjanska akcija« žensk – okoličank proti »arizaciji« in pregonu judovske trgovine/družine Scharfberg iz Železne Kaple, skrivanje judovskega otroka, raznolika pomoč pri pobegu in transgeneracijske vezi. Prispevek poudarja, da predstavljajo avtobiografski viri pomemben korektiv takratnemu tisku, še zlasti osrednjemu časopisu koroških Slovencev, ki je zagovarjal izrazito antisemitska stališča. Ugovarja predpostavki, da bi v takratnih besedilih ali stališčih koroških Slovencev »zaman iskali mest, ki izražajo solidarnost s preganjanimi Judi«.

Ključne besede: ideološka interpelacija (Althusser), nacionalsocializem, antisemitizem, koroški Slovenci, Judje, preganjanje Judov, avtobiografski viri

»PRIMA NOI, POI VOI«: GLI SLOVENI CARINZIANI ALLA LUCE DEL TERRORE E DELLA VIOLENZA CONTRO GLI EBREI AI TEMPI DEL NAZIONALSOCIALISMO

SINTESI

Utilizzando il concetto di interpellanza di Althusser e sulla base del materiale tratto da quotidiani, memorie e testi autobiografici, nel presente contributo l'autrice affronta l'operazione di »introiezione« dell'ideologia antisemita nazista tra gli sloveni carinziani, mettendo in evidenza in particolare il periodo tra il 1933 e il 1941. Essa presta particolare attenzione alle reazioni degli sloveni carinziani alle persecuzioni, alle violenze e all'allontanamento (non solo) della popolazione ebraica dalla vita pubblica, sociale ed economica, e rileva che l'ideologia antisemita suscitò anche disaccordo e resistenza, come lo dimostrano vari esempi di aiuto e solidarietà, ad es. la »prima azione anti-hitleriana« delle donne contro l'»arizzazione« e la persecuzione della bottega/famiglia ebraica degli Scharfberg di Železna Kapla (Eisenkappel), il tentativo di nascondere un bambino ebreo, vari aiuti per favorire la fuga, i legami transgenerazionali. Nel contributo si sottolinea che le fonti autobiografiche rappresentano un importante correttivo nei confronti della stampa dell'epoca, in particolare del principale quotidiano degli sloveni carinziani, che sosteneva visioni spiccatamente antisemite, e si oppone al presupposto che nei testi o negli atteggiamenti degli sloveni carinziani di allora »avremmo cercato invano punti che esprimessero solidarietà con gli ebrei perseguitati«.

Parole chiave: interpellanza ideologica (Althusser), Nazionalsocialismo, antisemitismo, sloveni carinziani, Ebrei, persecuzione degli ebrei, fonti autobiografiche

UVOD¹

Leto in pol pred začetkom druge svetovne vojne, 12. marca 1938, je nacistična Nemčija anektirala Avstrijo. Z dejavno pomočjo avstrijskih nacistov je postala takratna »Ostmarka« del nemškega rajha; ime Avstrija je bilo izbrisano iz uradne rabe. Že na predvečer 12. marca so domača nacistična združenja po vsej Avstriji organizirala bučne množične shode, oblast so še ponoči prevzela deželna, regionalna in lokalna vodstva Nationalsocialistične nemške delavske stranke (NSDAP). Med vsemi avstrijskimi zveznimi deželami je prav na Koroškem oblast najprej prešla v nemške roke (Domej, 1988, 24). Esesovske in esajevske enote so v noči iz 11. na 12. marec zasedle vsa javna poslopja glavnega mesta Celovec, deželno vodstvo Domovinske fronte in Kmečke zveze (Bauernbund). Zavzele so tudi redakcijo *Kärntner Tagblatta*, založniško hišo Carinthia in poveljstvo nad policijskim komisariatom, ne da bi naleteli na kakršen koli upor (Wadl, 1988, 62). To pomeni, da so bili Avstrijci oziroma Korošci pri nacističnem prevzemu oblasti pomembno soudeleženi, še preden so nemške čete prestopile meje Avstrije. Z anšlusom, kot se imenuje priključitev (v smislu besede aneksija iz lat. *annexio*: spajanje, pripajanje) in ki je postal zgodovinski pojem, se je v Avstriji in še posebej na Koroškem uveljavil nacistični sistem, ki so mu že leta pred tem pripravljali pot domači nacisti. Zanj so značilni skrajni nemški nacionalizem, totalitarizem, antiliberalizem, antimarksizem ter izrazit rasizem in antisemitizem, ki sta se po prevzemu nacistične oblasti v Avstriji, všteti Koroški, vse bolj prepletala in izpričevala v terorju in nasilju nad Judi. Sem gre prišteti tudi pravcati katarakt odredb, odlokov, ukazov in prepovedi, s katerimi se je začel postopek, ki naj bi Jude dokončno izmijal iz nemško percipirane družbe in jih napravil popolnoma brezpravne. Fizično nasilje je bilo nato samo še postaja na poti, ki je bila začrtana novembra 1938, zavestno in javno. Se stavlja vprašanje: Kako so se koroški Slovenci soočali s tem procesom, ki je bil glede na to, da je nacizem propagiral večvrednost »arijske rase«, uperjen tudi proti drugim manjšinam (npr. Romom in Sintom, fizično in duševno prizadetim) in končno njim samim. To vprašanje predstavlja (znanstveno doslej še neobravnavani) izziv, ki skuša dognati, kako so se pripadniki slovenske narodne skupnosti na Koroškem, ki so bili z anšlusom sami vrženi iz privajenega družbenega okolja in izpostavljeni nepredvidljivim in nasilnim izkustvom, odzivali na preganjanje, nasilje in odstranjevanje (ne le) Judov iz javnega, socialnega in gospodarskega življenja. V tem kontekstu bo obravnavano tudi vprašanje, kako in do kakšne mere so »introjicirali« nacistično antisemitsko ideologijo in če je ta vzbujala tudi nestrinjanje in odpor.

Vprašanjem se bo razprava približevala s pomočjo Althusserjevega teoretskega koncepta ideološke interpelacije, znanstvene in strokovne literature, ki se nanaša na zastavljeno temo, ter na podlagi spominskega in avtobiografskega gradiva. Avtorica je ob okoli 20 pregledanih spominih in pričevanj, ki so izšli v knjižni obliki, v raziskavo vključila še 59 intervjujev (pričevanj), ki so jih v okviru Avstrijskega dokumentacijskega arhiva avstrijskega odporništv opraviili Helena Verdel, Mirko Messner in Andres P. Pittler in so osredotočeni na obdobje 1920–1945 (Obid & Rovšek, 1991) ter okoli 150 življenjepisov, ki so med letoma 1993 in 2004 izšli v 12 knjigah serije *Tako smo živeli* in jih je v sklopu Krščanske kulturne zveze in Slovenskega narodopisnega inštituta Urban Jarnik v Celovcu uredila Marija Makarovič. Čeprav so ti življenjepisi zasnovani iz etnološke perspektive, so odprtega značaja in se nanašajo na celotno življenjsko obdobje pričevalcev, čas nacizma in odnos do Judov in judstva sta v njih ogovorjena le v primeru, če so ju pričevalci izrecno tematizirali. V raziskavi so upoštevani tudi še nekateri drugi avtobiografsko zaznamovani viri, ki so izšli v zbornikih, revijah ali tudi v literarni obliki.

»INTROJICIRANJE« NACISTIČNE ANTISEMITSKE IDEOLOGIJE

Iz časopisnih in avtobiografskih gradiv (spominov, pričevanj, odlomkov iz življenjepisov in literature) izhaja, da so se (narodno opredeljeni) koroški Slovenci ob anšlusu hipoma ali vsaj zelo hitro zavedali, da zadobiva protislovenstvo, ki se je začelo konec 19. stoletja kot »nemškokoroška« tradicija, v času »anšlusa« stopnjevano in dotlej še nesluteno nasilno razsežnost. Zanimivo je, da so to razsežnost večkrat povezovali z rasnim antisemitizmom, to je s sovražno nastrojenostjo proti Judom, ki sovпада z idejo, da so Judje jasno razločna in manj vredna oziroma nevredna rasna skupina. Temu je botrovalo dejstvo, da je Adolf Hitler na začetku leta 1933 v Nemčiji prevzel oblast. Znan je bil kot fanatični sovražnik Judov in vsega judovskega. Po Michaelu Marrusu (1987, 36) je treba presežek, ki je tradicionalni antisemitizem preoblikoval in radikaliziral, iskati v Hitlerju, ki je iz osebne obsesije napravil državno zadevo. Na to opozarja tudi *Koroški Slovenec*, osrednji, krščanskosocialno usmerjeni časopis (tednik) slovenske narodne skupnosti na Koroškem, ki je 5. aprila 1933 zapisal, da so v svetu začele krožiti vesti o »strahovitem nasilju« nacistov proti Judom. Vodilni nemški politiki, tako list, so te vesti preklicali, vendar niso utihnile, »nakar se je Hitler odločil za prav svojevrsten korak: napovedal je vojno nemškemu židovstvu«. V te namene je sklical poseben odbor, ki je »izdelal poseben bojni

¹ Razprava je nastala v okviru raziskovalnega programa Razsežnosti slovenstva med lokalnim in globalnim v začetku tretjega tisočletja (P5-0409), ki ga financira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Slovenije (ARRS).

načrt². Antisemitizem je Hitler uporabil za utrditev na novo vzpostavljene oblasti in ga, kot (odobravajoče) naglašala *Koroški Slovenec*, načrtno izrabljala za gospodarski bojkot³, ki je sovpadal z zastrašujočimi prizori represije in predstavlja začetek nacističnega preganjanja Judov v Nemčiji (Benz, 2000, 24–25).

Pomenljivo je, da je *Koroški Slovenec* že ob priložnosti bližajočih se koroških občinskih volitev 24. aprila 1932 takšne nasilne prizore zaslutil, saj so zanj pomenili signal, da nacisti, ko bi prišli na oblast, ne bodo ostali pri privajenih antisemitskih deklaracijah, temveč bi te vnašali ne le v protijudovsko, temveč v specifični obliki tudi v širšo protimanjšinsko politiko. Zato, kot sugerira list, nanjo ne velja čakati, ampak jo je treba predvideti. O koroški nacistični stranki, ki je tedaj kandidirala (in prejela dva poslanska mandata), je zapisal, da se »hoče prikupiti posebno naši mladini« s tem, da ji obeta brezskrbno življenje, udeležbo na dobičku vseh velikih podjetij, agrarno reformo, splošno starostno oskrbo itd., »ne pove pa, da to hoče dati samo Nemcem«.⁴ Hkrati je z namigom na programsko predvideni družbeni položaj Judov v Nemčiji – domala na dan deset let prej, kot opaža Avguštin Malle (1992, 32) – kot zadnjo konsekvenco napovedal pregon koroških Slovencev:

*Kdor ni nemške krvi (točka 4., 5. in 6. njihovega programa), nima nobenih državljanskih pravic, ampak je tujec med njimi, ki ga smejo vsak čas izgnati, pa naj ima posest ali je nima (točka 7.). Vse rojene Slovence, ne samo zavedne, bi torej čakalo pregnanstvo, ako narodni socialisti pridejo do moči.*⁵

Vodstvo koroških Slovencev, ki je merodajno sooblikovalo svoje glasilo, se je zavedalo, kako nacistična stranka oziroma ideologija, ki jo ta zastopa, lahko zagrabi subjekta, natančneje koroškega slovenskega subjekta. Louis Althusser je v svojem slovitem spisu o ideoloških aparatih države za ta pojav vpeljal psihoanalitični pojem »interpelacije«. Ta je po njegovem neločljivo spojen z ideologijo, in sicer z vsako, torej tudi nacistično. »Ideologija interpelira posameznike v subjekte« (Althusser, 2000, 95). Ideologija je po njegovem mogoča le prek kategorije subjekta in subjekt je konstitutiven za obstoj ideologije. Althusser delovanje ideologije razume kot natančno določeno »operacijo«, ki ji sam pravi »interpelacija«, a jo je mogoče zajeti tudi s

pojmom »introjiciranje«⁶: ideologija naslavlja individuume (naslavlja jih vse), ki se na interpelacijo odzovejo, s čimer postanejo subjekti te ideologije (Althusser, 2000, 99). Ali z drugimi besedami: v svoj notranji svet vključijo »introjekte« – vrednote, norme, pravila, stališča, prejeta od drugih: družbe, učiteljev, družine – in se vzpostavijo kot subjekti. Poudariti velja, da procesa subjektivacije⁷ nikakor ne gre zreducirati na individualni psihizem, saj je utelešen, materializiran v dejanskem delovanju družbenega polja. Poteka prek aparatov države, v okviru katerih deluje tudi ideologija.

Althusser razlikuje med represivnimi (represivni aparati države – RAD; zlasti vojska in policija) in ideološkimi aparati države (IAD; cerkev, šola, družina, mediji ipd.), za katere sta značilni določena soodvisnost in povezanost, pa čeprav z jasno akcentuacijo: prvi delujejo pretežno s silo (in v manjši meri z ideologijo), drugi pa pretežno z ideologijo. Vsi ideološki aparati države prispevajo po Althusserju k reprodukciji kapitalističnih razmerij eksploatacije in, kot velja dodati, nasploh k vsakemu »hegemonskemu odnosu«, tudi takšnemu, ki ga – kot na Koroškem – usmerjajo nacionalizmi: »[N]acionalizem kot hegemonski odnos ne le vsiljuje članom svojih idej, ampak jih tudi uči, kako govoriti, kaj misliti, koga sovražiti, s kom stopati v zaveznitvo [...]« (Pušnik, 2011, 40). IAD šole ima pri tem v spregi z družinskim aparatom ključno vlogo. Otroke zagrabi že v otroškem vrtcu in jim od otroškega vrtca naprej, leta in leta, ko je otrok najbolj »dostopen« in »ranljiv«, vtepa v glavo »spretnosti«, ovite v vladajočo ideologijo (npr. jezik, državljsko vzgojo, telesno vzgojo) (Althusser, 2000, 81).

Nacizem je tipski primer načrtne in strateške uporabe ideoloških aparatov države, ki jih je uveljavljal tudi z represivnimi aparati države, to je z nasiljem, ukazi, določili, zakonskimi ukrepi, cenzuro. Koroški Slovenci so predvideli protislovenske ukrepe nacistov, kot so jih v Tretjem rajhu dejansko uresničili. Ker so znotraj koroških slovenskih organizacij in društev igrali pomembno vlogo tako duhovniki kot katoliška verska pripadnost njihovih članov, so bili občutljivi tudi na vse, kar so povezovali z odtujitvijo »skupnosti« Cerkev. *Koroški Slovenec* je tako proti koncu leta 1933 pozorno zabeležil razvoj znotraj protestantske cerkve (največje veje krščanstva v nacistični Nemčiji), ker si je večinski del njenih članov – gibanje »nemških kristjanov« – prizadeval za introjiciranje vere, kakor jo je predvidevala nacistična antisemitska ideologija. Zapis je zanimiv tudi zaradi tega, ker implicira kritiko te ideologije in

² *Koroški Slovenec*, 5. 4. 1933: Hitler je napovedal vojno – Židom, 2.

³ »[Z] gospodarsko vojno hoče Hitler židovstvo prisiliti, da ukine svoje izkopavanje ugleda Nemčije v svetu,« je zapisal *Koroški Slovenec* (5. 4. 1933).

⁴ *Koroški Slovenec*, 13. 4. 1932: Nasprotne stranke v pravi luči, 1.

⁵ *Koroški Slovenec*, 13. 4. 1932: Nasprotne stranke v pravi luči, 1–2.

⁶ Leta 1909 je madžarski psihoanalitik Sándor Ferenczi vpeljal v psihoanalizo izraz »introjicija«, ki označuje nezavedni proces sprejemanja in ponotranjenja večinoma averzivnih zunanjih realnosti, pogledov, vrednot, norm itd. v lastni jaz (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, 235–237).

⁷ Althusser izrecno opozarja na etimologijo izraza *subjectus*, *suĵet*, in jo teoretsko izkorišča: »subjekt« je etimološko »tisti, ki je podvržen, podrejen; podložnik; v francoščini je ta pomen jezikovno še živ (Močnik, 1999, 12).

ponazori, kako ta ideologija prek monopolizacije ideoloških aparatov države preobraža individuume in družbene prakse, jih nacificira in hkrati konstruira »Jude« kot edinstven in vseprisoten vir Zla.

[Z]ahtevajo [...], da naj postanejo protestantske cerkve agitatorski hrami narodnega socializma in njegovega kljukastega križa. Nadalje zahtevajo, da se morajo spremeniti cerkveni obredi [...] Lotili so se sv. pisma in ga skušajo ponemčiti s črtanjem vseh onih odstavkov, ki so v kateri koli zvezi z judovskim ljudstvom tedanje dobe. »Nemški kristjani« hočejo, da bo protestantska cerkev čisto nemška in arijska cerkev. Ne samo duhovniki ne smejo biti židje, tudi kot verniki so židje izključeni. [...] Najradikalnejša struja »nemških kristjanov« zahteva nadalje, naj se v šolah prepove čitanje in razlaganje sv. pisma stare zaveze, češ da se pripovedovanje židovskih bajk ne sklada s častjo nemškega naroda.⁸

O šoli kot ideološkem aparatu države in njeni vlogi pri nacifikaciji govori tudi Franc Rehsman, tiskar, rojen leta 1928 v Ledincih pri Šentjakobu v Rožu, ko se spominja, kako je nadučitelj kmalu po »anšlusu« učence pri tedaj običajnem jutranjem zboru presenetil:

Ko smo stali šolarji na šolskem dvorišču v štirikotniku, je zažgal pripravljeno grmado. Med nagovorom je začel trgati knjige in jih metati v ogenj. Poudaril je, da so to knjige z judovsko in slovansko-azijsko vsebino in da so velikonemški ideji nevarne. V političnih urah smo slišali o nordijskem bajeslovju in o vrednosti nordijske svetle čiste rase in manjvrednosti ljudi judovskega pokolenja in tudi o ne toliko vrednih vzhodnih slovanskih in azijskih plemenih. (Rehsman, 1994, 156)

Joško Tischler, ki je bil tedaj ob Francu Petku politični voditelj koroških Slovencev, kasneje pa dolgoletni predsednik Narodnega sveta koroških Slovencev in ravnatelj Zvezne gimnazije koroških Slovencev, se v svojem življenjepisu spominja, da je bila na gimnaziji v Beljaku (Peraugymnasium), na kateri je takrat poučeval, »pod novim režimom prva prireditel »sežiganje učbenikov« na šolskem vrtu ob obvezni navzočnosti vsega profesorskega zbora in vseh učencev« (Tischler, 1989, 187). Že 10 dni pred tem, 20. aprila 1938, na rojstni dan Hitlerja, so učbenike, ki jih je kot narodu škodljive opredelila nacistična oblast, sežgali tudi na šolskem dvorišču celovške gimnazije (Danglmaier

& Koroschitz, 2015, 133). Lipej Kolenik, rojen leta 1925 v Šmarjeti pri Pliberku kot kmečki sin, kasneje partizan, po vojni pa vseskozi aktiven na političnem, kulturnoprosvetnem in gospodarskem področju koroških Slovencev, v svojih spominih navaja, da so sežgali tudi šolsko knjižnico v njegovi rojstni vasi, »v šolski knjižnici pa so se prikazali »Mein Kampf« in druge nacistične knjige« (Kolenik, 1998, 36–37).

Nacifikacija oziroma nacistična antisemitska ideologija, ki naj bi jo introjicirali subjekti, da bi se v njej prepoznali, pa ni delovala samo represivno, s pomočjo »palice«, »temveč tudi« vablivo, s pomočjo »korenčka«. Helena Kuhar - Jelka⁹ se spominja, da so koroški Slovenci (v zaledju Železne Kaple) zaradi globalne gospodarske in finančne krize ter posledično obubožanja prebivalstva in brezposelnosti upali, »da bo res napočil boljši čas, ker bo Hitler vsem priskrbel delo, kmete pa bo rešil dolgovi«, vendar so se hkrati bali, »da nam Slovincem preti ista usoda kot Židom« (Kuhar, 1984, 18). Podobno Janko Urank (2004, 165)¹⁰ navaja, da je kmalu po anšlusu na Koroško prispel »Hilfszug Bayern«, bavarški oskrbovalni konvoj, ki je nudil brezplačno prehrano. V spomin so se mu vtisnile besede starejšega moža iz Apač, ki je takrat ves zadovoljen dejal: »Hijtlar pa j' še 'dobr čovak, m' je še moke dav.« Urank pripominja, da so nekateri že tedaj domnevali, da so nacisti moko, sol, polento in druga živila »pobrali itak iz avstrijskih, predvsem judovskih zalog«.

»JUDEN UND KRÜPPEL VORTRETEN!«

Antisemitsko razpoloženje se je od leta 1933, ko je Hitler v Nemčiji prevzel oblast, tudi na avstrijskem ozemlju močno stopnjevalo in doseglo svoj začasni vrhunec ob in po »anšlusu«. Kmalu so bile judovske verske občine, sinagoge in molitnice postavljene pod nadzor gestapa, v izložbah trgovin sta visela kljukasti križ in napis »arijska trgovina«, pred judovskimi trgovinami so bile postrojene nacistične straže, ki so kupcem onemogočale, da vstopijo vanje. Bojkot judovskih trgovin pa ni prizadel le Judov, temveč vse ljudi, ki so pri njih kupovali. Pričevalec Otto Friessner, takrat mlad socialdemokrat, se nanaša na marec 1938, ko pravi, da so bile v Beljaku označene vse »judovske trgovine« z napisom »Jud«. Prepovedano je bilo nakupovati pri Judih. Ljudje, ki so to vseeno tvegali, so bili poklicani na zagovor. Na lastne oči je videl, »kako so tri ali štiri ljudi, ki niso bili Beljačani, vodili po glavnem trgu. Okoli vratu so imeli obešeno tablico, na kateri je pisalo: »Ta arijska svinja kupuje pri Judih« (Haider, 2007, 33). Za Jude

⁸ Koroški Slovenec, 6. 12. 1933: Poganstvo v Nemčiji, 1.

⁹ Helena Kuhar (1906–1985), rojena v Lepeni, dekla in kmetica. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bila partizanka – njeno partizansko ime je bilo Jelka. Po vojni se je do visoke starosti udejstvovala v Slovenskem prosvetnem društvu Zarja v Železni Kapli, kjer je bila med drugim pobudnica folklorne dejavnosti, in v koroškoslovenskih organizacijah, še zlasti v Zvezi slovenskih žena.

¹⁰ Diplomski trgovec Janko Urank (1920–1990), rojen v Galiciji, kmečki sin, po letu 1945 diplomski trgovec v Celovcu, direktor Koroške zdravstvene organizacije (Kärntner Gebietskrankenkasse), podpredsednik Narodnega sveta koroških Slovencev.

je to bil jasen in očiten znak, da so nezaželeni, za ostale prebivalce pa svarilo, kaj jim lahko preti, če se še naprej družijo z Judi.

O šikaniranju Judov in odvzemu njihovih pravic govori tudi poplava odredb in zakonov, ki jih je vpe-ljal nacistični režim: Judom je bil prepovedan odhod iz rajha¹¹, oddati so morali vse dragocene predmete, niso več smeli obiskovati kulturnih predstav, kot sta kino in gledališče, nositi »koroškega gvanta« ali druge s koroškim nemštvom povezane narodne noše, svoja bivališča so lahko zapustili le še ob točno predvidenem urniku, ločili naj bi se od svojih arijskih (zakonskih) partneric ali partnerjev. Judom je bil prepovedan obisk javnih šol, učitelji, zdravniki in odvetniki niso več smeli opravljati svojega poklica (Danglmaier, 2021, 24). Največja kavarna v Celovcu – Moser – je imela na oknu pritrjeno opozorilo: »Židje niso dobrodošli!«¹² O ukrepih glede izključitve Judov iz javnega življenja so pričale tudi klopi v parkih z napisom »samo za Arijce« ali prepoved obiska mestnih kopališč (Danglmaier & Koroschitz, 2015, 221). Judje po anšlusu niso bili več razumljeni kot subjekti, ki imajo znotraj države zajamčene določene pravice in svoboščine; prenehala je njihova enakopravnost z drugimi. Storilci in storilke v avstrijskih gauhih »Ost-marke« (Avstrije), kamor so prištevali tudi Koroško, z javnimi poniževanji in žalitvami Judov, ter prvimi, nekontroliranimi »arizacijami« niso le izražali veselja nad anšlusom, temveč so ta dejanja, se zdi, koristili tudi kot možnost, da dokažejo pripadnost doslej avstrijskega prebivalstva »Tretjemu rajhu« in jasno antisemitsko in nacistično nastrojenemu kolektivu »nemštva« (Matzer, 2021, 79).

Čeprav so nacistične oblasti po anšlusu začele izvajati represijo tudi nad koroškimi Slovenci, ta zanje sprva ni pomenila splošnega posega v uresničevanje obstoječih državljanskih pravic. Prva, takoj po anšlusu uporabljena metoda je bila preganjanje vodilnih Slovencev, zaradi zelo šibke posvetne intelligence, v glavnem duhovnikov. Že 25. avgusta 1938 je za posledicami zapora umrl župnik Vinko Poljanec, ki velja za prvo žrtev nacizma med koroškimi Slovenci; gestapo ga je aretiral že 12. marca 1938.¹³ Nacistične oblasti so ob odstranjevanju voditeljev merile tudi na takojšnjo odstranitev slovenščine iz javnega življenja in šol. Slovenska društva so v letih 1938–1941 načeloma lahko delovala, če so v svoja pravila prevzela »arijski paragraf« in »načelo vodje« (Führerprinzip; tj. führerjeva beseda je zakon). Ne glede na to pa je že leta 1938 prišlo tudi do prvih

prepovedi slovenskih društev (Domej, 1988, 50–53). Ko so bili z napadom na Jugoslavijo 6. aprila 1941 odstranjeni zadnji zunanje-politični zadržki, je nacistična politika začela tudi s sistematičnim uresničevanjem cilja, da Slovenci na Koroškem kot narodna skupnost izginejo.

Pri uveljavljanju niza rasističnih in antisemitskih praks je odigrala nemajhno vlogo tudi Hitlerjeva mladina, nacistična mladinska organizacija, ki so ji bile poverjene tudi represivne naloge. Ludvik Lesjak, rojen leta 1930, kmet, ki je bil med letoma 1979 in 1991 občinski odbornik Enotne liste (EL) Rožek, je v tej funkciji »ostro protestiral« proti predlogu počastitve svojega nekdanjega učitelja Hansa Arneitza, »mladinca«, ki mu je »nacistični režim poveril nalogo, da je nas [šolarje] nadzoroval«. »Svoj protest sem utemeljeval s tem, da je kot visok vodja pri *Hitler-Jugend* mladino zastrupljal, jo vodil na napačna pota s tedanjimi apeli ob nedeljah, nalašč med mašo motil bogoslužje in s pesmijo *Hängt die Juden samt die Pfaffen an die Wand* [Obesite Jude skupaj s farji na zid] prispeval svoj delež k nacistični politiki, se pravi k holokavstu« (Lesjak, 2000, 185). Valentin Polanšek (1925–1978), rojen leta 1928 v Lepeni pri Železni Kapli, v svojem avtobiografskem romanu *Križ s križi* navaja prav to »pesem«, ki so jo mladi fantje v rjavih srajcah in črnih kratkih hlačah kriče prepevali, ko so po anšlusu »marširali« skozi železnokapelski trg, kamor je orožnik iz sosednje vasi prignal žensko z vzdevkom »Gojzarka«. Po trgu in okolici so začeli odstranjevati »ljudi, ki jih vsled duševnih ali telesnih hib niso prištevali k polnovrednim članom družbe; to se je skrivoma dogajalo vsa leta, odkar je vladal kljukasti križ« (Polanšek, 1980, 36–37).

Podobno navaja Polanškov pisateljski kolega Janko Messner (1921–2011), da je bil tik po anšlusu v celovski gimnaziji priča temu, kako so rjavosrajčniki s kljukastim križem na rokavih sklicali dijake in profesorje v zbor: »Juden und Krüppel vortreten! (Židje in pohabljeni naj stopijo naprej!). Bili so na kraju samem suspendirani« (Messner, 2000 [1971], 229; Messner, 1991, 112). Helena Kuhar (1984, 20) pa se spominja: »Za Židi so prišli na vrsto betežni, pohabljeni ljudje.« A tudi Romi in Sintí. »Ko je prišel Hitler leta 1938, je bilo s cigani konec. [...] Šele kasneje smo zvedeli, da so skoraj vsi postali žrtve v Hitlerjevih *kaceti*h« (Neimenovana, 1998, 102). To zelo nazorno izhaja tudi iz spominov Ane (Nani) Olip, rojene Jug leta 1923 pri Užniku na Selah, ko govori o ženskem koncentracijskem taborišču Ravensbrück, v katerem je sama »dvakrat ušla smr-

11 Že na večer 11. marca 1938 so domače enote SS in SA zasedle koroške meje, da bi preprečile odhod Judov iz države. Kmalu zatem so morali Judje oddati svoje potne liste (Danglmaier & Koroschitz, 2015, 220).

12 Koroški Slovenec, 6. 4. 1938: Celovec–Klagenfurt, 3.

13 Vinko Poljanec je bil od leta 1901 kaplan in od leta 1908 župnik v Škocjanu v Podjuní. V okviru koroške slovenske narodne skupnosti se je udejeval na več področjih: kot politik je bil v letih 1921–1927 (dve mandatni dobi) poslanec v koroškem deželni zboru, kasneje je kot gospodarstvenik zastopal koroške Slovence v Koroški kmetijski zbornici. Med letoma 1932–1937 je bil predsednik Slovenske krščansko-socialne zveze (leta 1934 preimenovane v Slovensko prosvetno zvezo), od leta 1937 dalje je bil njen podpredsednik (Dolgan, 2009).

ti«. V njih ob Judinjah posveča sorazmerno veliko pozornosti tudi Rominjam in Sintinjam ter zločinom nad otroki (Jug – Olip, 2012).

Učitelji so dobili po anšlusu glavno vlogo pri ideologizaciji in »rasoslovni« interpelaciji šolske mladine. Temelj za to so bili med drugim posebej v ta namen pripravljeni »Delovni listi za nacionalnopolitični pouk«. Delovni list »Rasna sestava nemškega naroda« je imel na začetku naslednji Hitlerjev citat: »Celotno izobraževalno in vzgojno delo rasno čiste narodne države mora biti kronano s tem, da zavest za raso in občutek za raso instinktivno in razumsko vžge v srca in možgane mladine, ki mu je zaupana« (Nav. v Koschat, 2018, 101). V delovnem listu *Politika dednega zdravja nacionalsocialistične države* pa je govora o »nevarnosti dedno bolnih in manjvrednih za narodno celoto«, ker to slabijo in z dednim prenašanjem lahko »prerasejo zdravi del naroda« (Koschat, 2018, 101–102). Pot od takih misli do prisilne sterilizacije in morilskih evtanazijskih ustanov ni bila dolga.

Velja poudariti, da je nacistična rasna ideologija na račun telesno in duševno prizadetih – a tudi na račun Judov ter Romov in Sintov (kot bo še prikazano) – vzbujala med koroškimi Slovenci (tudi) odpor, ni jih zares zgrabila. Po Žižku (2010, 36) ideologija človeka »drži« šele, ko človek med njo in realnostjo ne čuti nobenega nasprotja, to je, ko uspe ideologiji določitev načina njegovega vsakdanjega izkušanja realnosti same. Ideologiji je lastno to, da vsiljuje učinek očitnosti, »evidence kot evidence [...] pred katerimi vselej in naravno reagiramo tako, da vkliknemo (glasno ali v »tišini zavesti«): »To je vendar evidentno! Tako je! Res je!« (Althusser, 2000, 97).

Na vrzel med nacistično ideološko podobo ljudi s telesno ali duševno anomalijo kot rasno manj ali nič vrednih in realno, vsakdanjo izkušnjo z njimi opozarja že omenjeni Polanškov zapis o »Gozzarki«, iz katerega izhaja, da ta podoba tri šolarje – deklico in dva fanta – iz slovensko govorečih okoliških železnokapelskih grap nikakor ni zajela do te mere, da bi jih »zaslepila«, se jim vsilila kot »evidenca«, saj so se »Gozzarki« spontano približali, ko so zaslišali njen presunljivi jok in jo – sedečo v pritlični veži orožniške postaje – tolažili, ji priskrbeli nekaj hrane in čakali skupaj z njo, vse dokler je niso odpeljali (Polanšek, 1980, 36–37). Podobno velja za člane Vinkelnove domačije v Lepeni¹⁴ v odnosu do sorodnice in pomočnice Maričke, ki »ni znala govoriti, [b]lebetala je samo nerazumljive besede« (Kuhar, 1984, 20). Ponjo so prišli žandarji. »Marička se je tresla po vsem telesu. Nobeno ugovarjanje ni

pomagalo, morala je z njimi. Ob odhodu je žandar omenil, da taki ljudje niso nič vredni. Vsi smo jokali za Maričko« (Kuhar, 1984, 20). Josef Greibl, rojen leta 1929, ki je kot otrok živel v Šentpetru pri Šentjakobu v Rožu pri teti, se spominja, da je tudi v hiši pri teti živel umsko in telesno prizadeta ženska. Ime ji je bilo Fani. Bila je hčerka njegovega strica iz prvega zakona. »Stric bi jo pravzaprav moral prijaviti uradu. A raje so jo doma skrivali in tako je preživela vojno« (Sticker, 2018, 231).

Le nekaj mesecev po anšlusu, poleti 1938, so v občini Šentjakob v Rožu po naročilu rajhovskega gaua (pokrajine) Koroške po »rasoslovnih« kriterijih premerili in fotografirali okrog 3.200 oseb. Popisali so tisoče podatkov in prišli do zaključka, da pripada večina družin iz občine »slovanskemu rodu«, zato so jih označili z (manj vrednim, »narijskim«) rdečim minusom – nasprotno pa so dobili »nemški« občani rdeči plus, kar je pomenilo, da so bili uvrščeni v kategorijo »arijski« (Koroschitz, 2018, 195–206). Pomenljivo je, da domačini o »meritveni akciji« kasneje (skorajda) niso govorili. Do nedavnega niti proučevalci nacizma niso vedeli zanjo (Koroschitz & Sticker, 2018, 9). Ob doslej edinem znanem zapisu, v katerem je omenjena meritvena akcija,¹⁵ velja prišteti še zapis Franca Resmana, ki je bil tedaj kot provizorični odbornik in zastopnik Slovencev v občini Ledince (mejila je na občino Šentjakob v Rožu) tudi v komisiji, pristojni za ljudsko glasovanje za »ponovno združitev« Avstrije z nemškim rajhom, 10. aprila 1938. Takole pravi v svojih spominih (Sticker, 2018, 227–228):

V Št. Jakobu, kjer se niso tako »dobro« odrezali, so morali prebivalci k neki komisiji, kjer so jim jemali kri.¹⁶ Reklo se je, da preiskujejo, če so dro arijci« (Resman, 1971, 162). Občina Šentjakob ni postala takoj »Führergemeinde«, ker ni dobila 100 odstotkov potrditev za priključitev, temveč je to postala šele s pritiskom. Bivši dolgoletni šentjakobski podžupan Franc Rasinger, roj. 1925, se je v intervjuju z Ajdo Sticker celo spomnil imen tistih dveh pogumnežev – Majerjevo Mici in Franca Kneza – iz Svaten, ki sta se pri glasovanju upala nakrižati »NE« – »dokler ju ni moč pištole prisilila, da sta še enkrat, tokrat »pravilno« glasovala.

Mogoče je sklepati, da je šlo pri »rasoslovni« meritveni akciji za nekakšen povračilni ukrep proti ljudem, o katerih so (domače) nacistične oblasti menile, da niso

14 Pri Vinkelnu v Lepeni se je rodila tudi Maja Haderlap, avtorica slovitega romana *Angel pozabe* (2012), v katerem posveča svojem te domačije, zlasti babici in očetu, s fokusom na čas nacizma in travmatizacij, povezanih z njim, posebno pozornost. V romanu se večkrat nanaša tudi na svojo veliko teto Heleno (Leni) Kuhar – Jelko, rojeno Haderlap.

15 Gre za zapis Micke Miškulnik iz leta 1994 (prim. citat v Koroschitz & Sticker, 2018, 9).

16 »Rasno znanstveni popis« šentjakobskega prebivalstva se je osredotočal na merjenje glave, določanje telesne višine, barve kože, las in oči, dolžine nosu ipd. Iz popisa so izpeljevali sklepe, na primer, kateri rasi »preiskana« oseba pripada. Delež »arijske krvi« so kodificirali nürnberški zakoni iz leta 1935, ki so protijudovski zakoni, a so zadevali tudi Rome in druge »rasno manj vredne ljudi« (Bpb, 2020).

zmožni popolne subjektivacije (podreditve), da se jih trdovratno drži nek uporniški preostanek. Trije pričevalci so to akcijo, v katero so bili tudi sami neposredno vključeni, povezovali z zloglasno nacistično antisemitsko politiko: »Morda so med nami iskali Jude ali pa je to bila že prva priprava za izselitev [pregon],« se sprašuje Micka Miškulnik, rojena leta 1929 na Reki pri Šentjakobu (Miškulnik, 1994, 128). V intervjuju z Ajdo Sticker Maria Jobst, rojeno leto 1925, ta ugiba: »Morda so mislili, da sem Judinja. [...] da so tudi moji starši Judi.« (Sticker, 2018, 230) Valentin Müller, rojen leta 1929, se spominja in pomenljivo pripominja: »Reklo pa se je že: »Judje iščejo«. Ampak tukaj na podeželju ni bilo Judov« (Sticker, 2018, 233).

PREGANJANJE JUDOV IN »ARIZACIJE« JUDOVSKIH PODJETIJ

Že marca 1938 so nacistične oblasti aretirale in zaprle veliko število ljudi, med njimi tudi precej Judov, zlasti nosilce javnih funkcij, člane vodstva judovskih verskih občin in lastnike večjih judovskih trgovin. Jude so od aprila 1938, še zlasti pa v času novembrskega pogroma leta 1938, deportirali v tri koncentracijska taborišča: Dachau, Buchenwald in Sachsenhausen (Danglmaier & Koroschitz, 2015, 226). Terezija Pörsch, rojena Kramer leta 1931 pri p. d. Janšju v Holbičah pri Škofičah, se spominja, da se je njena sestra Marica, ki je bila takrat vzgojiteljica v neki judovski družini na Dunaju, kjer je živela velika večina Judov v Avstriji in je bilo nasilje nad njimi še posebno kruto, leta 1938 vrnila domov na Koroško, ker so »odrasle člane odvedli v kacet, fanta pa je sestra pripeljala s seboj. Nekaj časa smo ga skrivali, potem pa je prišel ponj njegov sorodnik in emigriral z njim v Anglijo« (Pörsch, 1999, 179).

Marica Kramer in njena družina sta se posledic svojega dejanja zavedali, saj so nacistične oblasti sprejemale izjemno stroge prepovedi nudenja pomoči Judom, iz pričevanja njene sestre Terezije pa še izhaja, kako zelo se je bala, ker so v njeni družini skrivali tudi »mlajšega človeka«, ki mu je uspelo pribežati »iz Dachaua« in ga osebno ni poznala. Starši so ji zabičali, da za nobeno ceno ne sme nikomur povedati, »da se ta neznanec skriva pri nas«, a ga je odkrila njena sošolka iz pronacistično usmerjene družine, ko je prišla nepričakovano k njej na obisk: »Na srečo se je takrat še vse dobro izteklo, lahko pa bi bilo zelo hudo« (Pörsch, 1999, 178). Kdor se je odločil, da bo ščitil Jude – ali poredke pobegle taboriščnike –, je moral žrtvovati svoje običajno življenje, stopiti na pot ilegale in pogosto delovati proti sprejetim družbenim normam v svojem okolju. Živeti je moral v strahu, pred ovadbami, pred aretacijo, pred deportacijo v taborišča, pred tem, da bo ogrožena tudi njegova družina (Steiner Aviezer, 2010, 2). Dejansko je bila tudi družina Kramer aprila 1942 pregnana v taborišče Hesselberg.

Deportirani Judje (večina izmed njih je bila prav v Dachauu) so se lahko vrnili iz taborišč po nekaj tednih ali mesecih, pod pogojem, da so pristali na »arizacijo« (nasilni prenos podjetij, trgovin ipd., ki so v lasti Judov, na Arijce in posledično za razjudenje, *Entjudung*, gospodarstva) ali »likvidacijo« (ukinitve podjetij) in na to, da po vrnitvi iz taborišč zapustijo nemški rajh (Verdnik, 2014). Kmalu je sledil nov val aretacij, ki so ga spremljali zaplembe judovskega premoženja, zaprtje judovskih trgovin, razpustitev judovskih društev in zasramovanja Judov. Pa ne le v Avstriji, ampak tudi na Koroškem, kjer je po uradnem ljudskem štetju iz leta 1910 živelo 341 Judov, od tega 71 odstotkov v Celovcu, 18 odstotkov v Beljaku in preostali del v drugih okrajnih mestih in trgih Koroške (Walzl, 1987, 63).

Čeprav je nekaterim judovskim družinam na Koroškem ob začetku 20. stoletja uspel družbeni vzpon (odpirale so trgovine, manjše industrijske obrate), Judje niso imeli vidnejšega vpliva na gospodarsko, kulturno ali politično življenje v deželi. In to kljub dejstvu, da so izkazovali močno afiniteto do kulture večinskega naroda; del Judov se je tudi aktivno udeležil »koroškega obrambnega boja« (Walzl, 1987, 130–131; Danglmaier, 2021, 15–18). Judje so bili vse bolj izpostavljeni antisemitskim pritiskom in marsikdo, ki judovski veri ali judovski etničnosti ni pripisoval pomembne vloge, se ni razkril kot Judinja ali Jud. O tem pričata tudi porast izstopov iz judovske vere in dejstvo, da se število deklariranih Judov do »anšlusa« ni povečalo, temveč zmanjšalo (Danglmaier, 2021, 21–24; Walzl, 1987, 65–66).

Pred »anšlusom« pa se ni stopnjeval le antisemitizem, temveč tudi antislovenizem.

Primer judovske družine Scharfberg (Železna Kapla)

V pričevanju Helene Kuhar je objavljen odlomek, ki mu botruje njena izkušnja nasilja in izključevanja v poslopju stare šole v Železni Kapli, kjer se je že ob in po anšlusu nahajala postojanka sklada Zimske pomoči (Winterhilfswerk). Ker so v njej »razdeljevali med revne družine stare obleke, obuvala, sladkor in moko«, je bila tedaj vselej »nabito polna žensk« (Kuhar, 1984, 18). Pri vratih je stal žandar in jih razporejal. Ko je Helena prišla na vrsto, jo je »pogledal v oči in sporočil v sobo: »Ta je Slovenka!« Zgrabil jo je za vrat in jo »s tako silo pahnili od sebe«, da se je »opotekla in butnila v žensko« za njo: »»Poglej, Slovenka ničesar ne dobi,« so ponavljale ženske. [...] »Ti ničesar ne dobiš, ker si že na črni listi,« so odgovarjale.« (Kuhar, 1984, 19) Helena Kuhar je bila »zmedena in obupana«. Pohitela je v trgovino judovske družine Scharfberg, ki se je leta 1930 naselila v središču Železne Kaple in kjer so poceni prodajali oblačila, blago, gume in sukanec (več o družini Scharfberg prim. Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008). Tam je trgovki pripovedovala, kako so ravnali z njo. Marianne Scharfberg, rojena Spierer – njej, njenemu

možu Josephu in petletnemu sinu Kurtu so nacistični oblastniki že odvzeli imetje in pravice –, ji je odgovorila s precizno slutnjo: »Da, gospa Kuhar, vsi bomo prišli na vrsto, najprej mi, Judje, potem vi, Slovenci.«¹⁷ Ko se je gospa Kuhar naslednjič napotila v trgovino Scharfberg, je visela nad vrati že tabla z novim, z nemškimi črkami napisanim imenom, kar je v njej vzbudilo *unheimlich* (nedomačno) občutje:

»Le kaj se je zgodilo?« sem pomislila.
Za prodajno mizo je stala ista prodajalka [mlada domačinka Neži Jerič, op. avt.].
»Dober dan,« sem jo pozdravila, »kje je gospa Schaf« [Scharfberg, op. avt.]?
»Heil Hitler,« je hitro odzdravila in boječe pogledala okoli sebe. »Včeraj so jo odpeljali. Nove gospodarje imamo. Nemce.« In glasno je vprašala: »Kaj želite?« (Kuhar, 1984, 19)

Nov lastnik, ki je začel »gospodariti« v znani in tudi v širših okoliških vaseh priljubljeni judovski trgovini (gospa Scharfberg se je s svojimi strankami pogovarjala tudi slovensko, kar pomeni, da si je slovenščine priučila), je bil Fritz Engel, »zaslužen nacist« iz Celovca. Iz aktov izhaja, da je bila razlastitev družine Scharfberg uradno končana do avgusta 1938 (Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008, 46). 10. septembra 1938 je v Celovcu izhajajoči tednik *Alpenländische Rundschau*, ki je bil blizu nacistični ideologiji, objavil vest:

*Železna Kapla. Očiščena uši [entlaust]. Naš kraj je pred prevratom gostil Juda Josefa Scharfberga kot trgovca. Zdaj je SS-Scharführerju in strankarskemu tovarišu Friedrichu [Fritzu] Englu, ki ga dobro poznajo obiskovalci Breithofnerjeve koč na Svinški planini, uspelo, da prevzame trgovino Juda. S tem je Železna Kapla očiščena Judov [entjudet] in osvobodjena takšnih nadležnih poljskih državljanov.*¹⁸

Verjetno si je Fritz Engel Scharfbergovo trgovino dejansko prisvojil že ob »divji arizaciji« takoj po prevzemu nacistične oblasti (Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008, 46). Nacisti so namreč že pred prevzemom oblasti razpolagali s seznammi, na katerih so bila navedeni imena, kraji in poklici »judovskih« žrtev (po kriterijih

nürnberških zakonov iz leta 1935). Na teh seznamih sta bila imenovana tudi Joseph in Marianne Scharfberg, a tudi Mariannin oče Matthias Spierer, ki je vodil trgovino v Velikovcu (Verdnik, 2014, 75–80). Pred poroko Marianne in Josepha Scharfberga je Spierer odprl tudi trgovino v Železni Kapli, ki pa jo je kmalu po prihodu zakoncev prepustil zetu Josephu (Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008, 46).

Nacistične oblasti so zakonitost »divje arizacije« Scharfbergove trgovine verjetno potrdile naknadno¹⁹ – po kratkem komisarskem vodenju, pri katerem so običajno določili kupno ceno judovskega imetja in preverili »primernost« osebe, ki je »arizirala«. Komisarski postopek vodenja je imel značaj napada na judovska podjetja in trgovine. Judovski lastniki so morali te, potem ko so oddali ključke in blagajniško knjigo, v nekaj minutah zapustiti. Ni jim bilo dovoljeno, da bi kar koli vzeli s seboj, tako da so mnogi izmed njih po opravljeni »arizaciji« ostali brez sredstev za preživljanje (Walzl, 1987, 155), kar nazorno potrjuje tudi Philomena Müller, rojena Petschnig, ki je Scharfbergovim pomagala v trgovini, občasno pa skrbela tudi za njihovega sina (Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008, 47).

Družini Scharfberg ni posvečen le en sam avtobiografski dokument, in sicer spominsko pričevanje Helene Kuhar, kot sta prvotno domnevala Koroschitz & Rettl (2008, 18). Znano je, da je tudi Franc Kukovica, učitelj, šolski ravnatelj in kulturnopolitični delavec, rojen leta 1933 v Zgornji Plaznici v občini Železna Kapla – Bela, v svojih spominih namenil trgovini judovske družine Scharfberg nekaj besed. Njegova starša sta v njej velikokrat nakupovala in trgovec mu je »vedno podaril kak bonbon«. Trgovino so, tako Kukovica, leta 1938, še preden je vstopil v osnovno šolo, »nenadoma zaprli« in judovske družine »nikoli ni več videl« (Kukovica, 2006, 45). Da je šlo za »arizacijo«, je Kukovica obsežneje preciziral v videointervjuju z Georgom Trasko (Traska, 2014). Nekaj desetletij kasneje – marca 2008 – se je Kukovica srečal s potomci družine Scharfberg iz Izraela in ZDA v Železni Kapli (skupaj jih je prispelo 13). Tam so člani Slovenskega prosvetnega društva Zarja otvorili razstavo o judovski družini Scharfberg. Z razstavo so obeležili stoletnico društva, hkrati pa tudi spomin na leto 1938 ter na nacistično preganjanje in izgon družine. Kukovica je njenim potomcem ob tej priložnosti podaril svojo pričevansko knjigo.²⁰

17 Tako so na panoju razstave *Tu smo bili doma ... / Wir gehörten hierher ...* leta 2008 v Železni Kapli zgladili naslov (Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008, 17), ki je v pričevanju Helene Kuhar – Jelke podan takole: »Da, gospa Kuhar, vsi pridemo na vrsto. Najprej Židje, potem Slovenci, potem ...« (Kuhar, 1984, 19).

18 *Alpenländische Rundschau*, 10. 9. 1938: Eisenkappel, 11. Tako Joseph Scharfberg kot tudi njegova žena Marianne sta bila poljska državljana. Oba sta se rodila leta 1904 v Galiciji. Še kot otroka sta zaradi antisemitskih izgrediv v Galiciji skupaj z ožjimi in širšimi svojci pribegnili v Avstrijo.

19 Za »arizacije« pristojna Poslovalnica za premoženjski promet (Vermögensverkehrsstelle), ki je imela svojo podružnico tudi v Celovcu, je bila ustanovljena 18. maja 1938 na Dunaju (Ferihumer, 2019).

20 Glej fotografijo in obsežne informacije v zvezi z otvoritvijo razstave *Tu smo bili doma ... / Wir gehörten hierher...*, ki sta jo pripravila Werner Koroschitz in Lisa Rettl, na spletni strani Slovenskega prosvetnega društva Zarja.

Že leta 1982 je Valentin Polanšek v drugem delu svojega romana *Bratovska jesen*²¹ zapisal, kako pretreseni so bili »ne samo tisti«, ki so bili v trgu Železna Kapla »živa priča«, temveč tudi »okolščani«, ko so izvedeli, »kako so židovskega trgovca poniževali, ga suvali in odgnali v vsej javnosti, kakor da je najhujši zločinec« (Polanšek, 1982, 141). Opisuje ga kot »mirnega, zase s svojo soprogo živečega človeka«, ki je prodajal blago po »znatno nižjih cenah« kot drugi (Polanšek, 1982, 141). Dejansko je družina Scharfberg gojila prisrčne in tesne vezi s prodajalko Neži Jerič, najstarejšo od sedmih otrok domače slovenske družine,²² a tudi z njenim najmlajšim bratom Ludvikom, rojenim leta 1931, s katerim je bil zelo prijateljsko povezan sin Kurt. Najintenzivnejše stike pa je družina Scharfberg gojila s sorodniki, zlasti z družino Spierer iz Velikovca (Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008, 34–35, 41–43).

Polanšek se v svojem romanu nanaša tudi na Fritzja Engla, ki mu je nadel vzdevek »Bengel«. Opisuje ga kot »zagrizenega« in »prekaljenega nacista iz systemske dobe« (med letoma 1934 in 1938), ki se je »ugneznil« v »napolnjeni trgovini« in je še v civilu nosil »črne jahalne hlače in svetle škornje SS uniforme«. »Sam »Heil Hitler« ga je bil« (Polanšek, 1982, 141–142). Že (bolj nemškonalno usmerjeni) Kapelčani so ga, tako Polanškov prvoosebni pripovedovalec, »s prevdnostjo sprejemali«, slovensko govoreči okolščani pa tem bolj. Dekleta in žene iz okoliških krajev so, tako pripovedovalec, proti Englu organizirale celo »prvo antihitlerjansko akcijo«, ki je imela v ozadju »osebno okoriščenje, a je bila prekleto odkrito naperjena proti izgonu Juda Josefa Scharfberga«. Ko je bila v medtem že bivši judovski trgovini »razprodaja na široko, so prihrumeli okolščani in izbirali ter kradli nacistu«, češ: »On je vse od poštenega Juda ukradel, mi pa smo njemu vzeli« (Polanšek, 1982, 142).

Dejansko so se že spomladi leta 1938 na Koroškem pojavili prvi znaki odpora proti nacizmu, ki so bili še posebej zaznavni v takratni »zaledni« občini Bela, ki so jo leta 1939 združili s tržno občino Železna Kapla. Kljubovalnost zoper nacistično oblast se je izpričevala večinoma v prikritih oblikah odpora. Zgoraj navedena »antihitlerjanska akcija« žensk spada mednje, zagotovo tudi dejanja, ki so povzročila, da se je v občini Bela na plebiscitu 10. aprila 1938, ki je »anšlus« s skorajda stodstotnim »Ja« zgolj še formalno potrdil,²³ opazno velik delež prebivalstva opredelil proti njemu. Od 1.436 volilnih upravičencev jih je 32 glasovalo z

»Ne«, 13 pa neveljavno. Toliko očitnih protiglasov z izjemo Bistrice pri Pliberku niso zabeležili v nobeni drugi slovensko govoreči občini. V občini Železna Kapla, torej v trgu samem, so zabeležili od skupaj 763 volilnih upravičencev 5 protiglasov in 1 neveljaven glas.²⁴

Ti podatki potrjujejo protinacistično naravnost slovensko govorečih okoličanov, v sozvočju pa so tudi s spomini, pričevanji in novejšimi znanstvenimi dognanji, ki dajejo vedeti, da so bile ženske v kapelškem zaledju zelo aktivne. »V predelu Železna Kapla – Sele – Borovlje in Žitara vas so od novembra 1942 do januarja 1943 aretirali več kot 200 moških in žensk, skoraj polovica jih je bilo žensk, in to dejstvo marsikoga preseneča« (Entner, 2018, 11). Ko so 13. oktobra 1944 v »podokrajju Železna Kapla« v tovarni celuloze na Rebrci imeli sestanek, na katerem je bil sprejet dogovor o organizacijskem delu v okviru Osvobodilne fronte (OF), je bilo na njem prisotnih »veliko ljudi, predvsem žensk«, ki so bile pripravljene, da partizanom pomagajo predvsem pri zbiranju hrane in oblačil pred bližajočo se zimo (Linasi, 2010, 176). Pomembno vlogo je pri tem odigrala Helena Kuhar, ki je že leto dni pred tem aktivneje posegla v partizansko življenje. S pomočjo večje skupine žensk je zgradila krajevno informacijsko mrežo (Leben, 2003, 46). Bila je v stalni zvezi s kurirji, oskrbovala je partizane s hrano in jim dostavljala potrebščine, ki jih je nabirala po trgovinah, pri čevljarju, peku, sedlarju in drugod. »Hodila je v Kaplo skoraj že legalno nabavljati to in ono za OF: Pri nemškem zobozdravniku, baje osminkem ali šestnajstinskem Židu,²⁵ je dobivala marsikaj kar dobesečno za one v gozdu« (Polanšek, 1982, 258). To potrjuje tudi Helena Kuhar, ki svojemu zobozdravniku, »nemškemu državljanu«, v pogovoru z Lisbeth N. Trallori posveča daljši odstavek (Kuhar, 1985, 144). 12. oktobra 1944 je odšla v partizane, ki so se jim pridružili tudi njen sin Peter in nečaka Tonči in Zdravko. Ni naključje, da jo sin Peter v svojih spominih večkrat omenja (Kuhar, 2009), nečak Tonči ji posveča celo posebno poglavje (Haderlap, 2007, 94–104). Iz njegovih spominov tudi izhaja, da je v šolskem letu 1942/43, ko je obiskoval peti razred osemrazrednice v Železni Kapli, sedel v »predzadnji klopi skupaj z Albertem Mackom, Simonom Oraschejem in Ludvikom Jeričem« (Haderlap, 2007 63).

Ludvik (Ludwig) Jerič je po vsej verjetnosti najmlajši brat Neži Jerič, ki je bila do »arizacije« zaposlena v

21 Andrej Leben (2015, 129) je o Polanškovih romanih zapisal: »Vsi Polanškovi romani so prežeti s podatki in dogodki, imeni žrtev nacizma, partizanskih borcev in krajev ter napisani z namenom, da ohranijo spomin na dobo nacizma, njegovih žrtev in na upornišvo prebivalcev v jugovzhodnem delu Koroške.«

22 Družina Scharfberg ji je tudi omogočila, da se je izšola za trgovski poklic.

23 99,7 odstotka Avstrijcev je glasovalo za »anšlus«.

24 Koroški Slovenec, 20. 4. 1938: Zvestoba za zvestobo!, 2.

25 Na tretji konferenci v Wannseeju 27. oktobra 1942 so se nacistični voditelji v zvezi s sprejeto »končno rešitvijo Judov« dogovorili še o odprtem vprašanju »mešancev«, ki so dotlej predstavljali relativno zaščiteni kategoriji ljudi. Sklenili so, da se mešance 1. stopnje sterilizira, mešance 2. stopnje (z enim judovskim starim staršem) pa se ima za Nemce (več o tem v Lisciotto 2006/2007).

trgovini Scharfbergovih, in tesen prijatelj njihovega sina Kurtija. Ko so bili potomci in sorodniki družine Scharfberg leta 2008 osrednji gostje Slovenskega prosvetnega društva Zarja v Železni Kapli, je bil Ludwig Jerič ob njih in jih je spremljal.²⁶ Njegov nečak Josef Novak jim je takrat v spomin na leto 1938 in »njihove avstrijske korenine« izročil namizni prt, ki ga je Marianne Scharfberg podarila njegovi teti Neži Jerič, shranila pa ga je njegova mati Terezija Novak, rojena Jerič. Ob tej priložnosti je Novak povedal, da je bil Joseph Scharfberg politično zelo razgledan in seznanjen z »usodo« njegovega deda, očeta prodajalke Neži Jerič. Februarja 1934, v času Dollfußovega režima, je bil ded vpleten v »državljansko vojno« in zaprt (Novak, 2008). Bil je, kot kaže, »republikanec« (pristaš Avstrije kot republike) in socialdemokrat – tako kot sta to bila tudi Helena Kuhar in njen mož Peter: »Nosili smo znamenja treh puščic in redno hodili na sestanke« (Kuhar, 1984, 12). Tri puščice niso simbolizirale le boja delavskega gibanja proti avtoritarni stanovski vladi in kapitalizmu, temveč tudi boj proti nacizmu, ki je bil v okolju Železne Kaple že takrat zelo močno občuten in izrazito protislovansko/protislovensko in antisemitsko nastrojen. Velja pripomniti, da so bili Scharfbergovi poljski državljani in Judje hkrati.

Koroschitz in Rettl navajata, da so bile uslužbenke do Scharfbergovih zelo lojalne. Še zlasti Neži Jerič je z velikim osebnim tveganjem pomagala pridobiti nazaj nekatere predmete, ki so si jih prisvojili esesovci. Njena hčerka je pozneje dejala, da »mami ni uvidela, da bi se [Engel] vsedel kar v postlano gnezdo. Scharfberg je ponoči prišel po kartone [v katere je mati skrivno spravila blago]. Podobno se spominja tudi druga hči Neži Jerič, ki prav tako poudarja, da se njena mati ni mogla sprijazniti s tem, da so »čez noč vrgli Scharfberga iz trgovine« in da je bil »čez noč kar naenkrat Engel novi šef« (Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008, 48).

Upor proti esesovcu Englu, ki je z navidezno legitimnim razlogom dobil priložnost, da se okoristi z ropanjem oziroma prilastitvijo trgovine in imetja družine Scharfberg, poleg tega pa je z nacističnimi sotorilci resno ogrožal tudi obstoj domačih in drugih koroških Slovencev, se je v poteku časa še stopnjeval. Po Englovem vpoklicu v nemški Wehrmacht leta 1939 je »arizirano« trgovino vodila njegova žena Margarethe Engel. Maja 1945 jo je jugoslovanska partizanska vojska aretirala in od takrat je pogrešana (Koroschitz & Rettl, 2008, 46).

Družina Scharfberg je jeseni oziroma proti koncu leta 1938 uspela pobegniti v Palestino (Haifo), kjer si je morala popolnoma brez sredstev zgraditi novo življenjsko eksistenco.

»UVOD V GROZNO APOKALIPSO«

Preganjanje Judov v Avstriji je že marca 1938 sprožilo »val samorov«, ki je bil nespregljiv do te mere, da so o njem poročali tudi slovenski časopisi.²⁷ Koledar Družbe sv. Mohorja (Celovec), ki je leta 1939 izšel v Celju, za mesec marec 1938 navaja, da si je na Dunaju vzelo življenje okrog 100 Judov.²⁸ Val skrajnega obupa ob predvidevanju najhujšega je zajel ob Judih tudi nemalokateri Nejudi, še zlasti izpričane protinaciste. Joško Tischler se v svojem življenjepisu spominja: »Ob zasedbi Avstrije si je profesor zgodovine J. K. [pravilno: Karl Kmeth] prerezal žile in se tako umaknil zaporu«, ²⁹ Tischlerja samega je gestapo za krajši čas »vtaknil v beljaški zapor« (Tischler, 1989, 187), 20. februarja 1939 pa je prejel še telefonsko obvestilo, naj nemudoma preneha s poučevanjem na beljaški gimnaziji.³⁰ Pozitivne spomine na profesorja Kmetha je desetletja kasneje izrazil njegov judovski učenec Leo Fischbach in dejal, da je na beljaški gimnaziji vladalo izrazito antisemitsko vzdušje (Haider, 2008, 96–97). Že 27. novembra 1933 se je v konferenčni sobi beljaške gimnazije ustrelil judovski profesor matematike in fizike Ernst Singer; »globoko občutene besede slovesa« mu je na gimnaziji takrat izrekel prav profesor Kmeth.³¹ O ozračju »tistega usodnega jutra 12. marca 1938«, ko sta se križala zmagoslavje in obup, je učitelj in šolski ravnatelj Mirko Srienc, ki je bil takrat gimnazijski dijak v Celovcu, zapisal: »Stojim pred najvišjim oknom Marijanišča in gledam dol na Velikovo cesto. Vojaki še v avstrijskih uniformah, a s trakom kljukastega križa, se objemajo s civilisti in vse je v zmagoslavnem razpoloženju [...] Dogajali pa so se tudi tragični dogodki. Profesor Gottlieb von Tannenheim se je v svoji vili na podstrešju obesil« (Srienc, 2006, 266–267).

Že pičli poldrugi mesec pred tem, konec januarja 1938, ko so se – tako Srienc – že povsod po celovških cestah in tudi pred Marijaniščem slišali »Sieg-Heil! klici«, je v celovski stolnici pridigal »sloviti jezuit pater [Friedrich] Muckermann proti oblastnikom v tretjem rajhu« in govoril »o rasizmu, o evtanaziji, o uničenju judovske rase [...]« (Srienc, 2006, 266). Helena Kuhar

26 Prim. fotografije in podnapise, ki so nastali ob priložnosti otvoritvene prireditve razstave *Tu smo bili doma ... / Wir gehörten hierher...*, na spletni strani Slovenskega prosvetnega društva Zarja. Med potomci in sorodniki ni bilo več Kurtija Scharfberga, ker je že pred tem umrl. Navzoči pa so bili njegova žena, njuni trije otroci in precej vnukov.

27 Prim. npr. Ponedeljski Slovenec, 14. 3. 1938: Val samorov na Dunaju, 2.

28 Koledar Družbe sv. Mohorja za leto 1939: Letopis, 103.

29 Iz kronike beljaške gimnazije (Peraugymnaisum) izhaja, da je 14. marca 1938 naredil samomor profesor zgodovine in geografije dr. Karl Kmeth (Haider, 2008, 74–75).

30 Sledil je odlok deželne šolskega sveta z dne 24. februarja 1939, ki je Jošku Tischlerju odkazal »službovanje v področju dež. šolskega sveta na Predarlskem«. Prim. Koroški Slovenec, 8. 3. 1939: Prof. dr. J. Tischler premeščen, 2.

31 Freie Stimmen, 2.12.1933: Zum Tode des Professor Singer, 8.

je v času »anšlusa« prisostvovala pogovoru mladega fanta, očitno nacistu, z gostilničarko, ki ji je napovedal prav ta razvoj. Iz pogovora je ujela besedo »raj« in se obrnila k njima: »»Prosim, kaj pomeni, da bo [Hitler] napravil raj?« »Tega ne veš?« je odvrnil mladenič očita-joče. »Turistične domove bo zgradil in parke za divjad, sami bogati ljudje bodo prišli. Koroška bo postala raj.« Pogledal jo je, se režal in dodal: »Prej pa bomo Koroško očistili gnoja« (Kuhar, 1984, 17). Helena Kuhar je pomislila, da bi »ta gnoj utegnili biti jaz«, in še naprej prisluškovala pogovoru: »Vsi Židje morajo zginiti. Kdor ni za narod mora zginiti. Vsi ljudje črnih oči – proč z njimi! To ni nemško pleme« (Kuhar, 1984, 17).

S podobnimi mislimi se je – po napadu nacistične Nemčije na Poljsko 1. septembra 1939 – soočala tudi Johana Sadolšek – Zala (1923–2013), kmečka hči, rojena v Lobniku pri Železni Kapli, ki je bila v času druge svetovne vojne prav tako kot Helena Kuhar partizanka in kasneje sekretarka Antifašistične fronte žena (AFŽ), predhodnice današnje Zveze slovenskih žena na Koroškem. Spominja se, kako sta dva moška po izpustitvi iz Dachaua kljub strogi prepovedi vseeno pripovedovala, kaj sta doživela v taborišču in »kaj Hitler vse zganja«: »Nasploh so se spravljali na Jude, Poljake, Slovence in vse manjšine« (pomenljiv je vrstni red) (Sadolšek, 1985, 124). Ta vrstni red potrjuje tudi vidni kulturni aktivist in šolani pevec Šimej Martinjak iz Šentjakoba v Rožu, ki je bil prav na dan napada na Poljsko aretiran in odveden v Buchenwald. V svojem pričevanju naveda, da je v taborišču zaradi sistematičnega pretepanja, trpinčenja in izgaranja z delom prišlo ob življenje največ Judov in Poljakov, ki so jim sledili taboriščniki raznih slovanskih in drugih narodnosti (Martinjak, 1983, 153–155). Da so nacisti še posebej kruto mučili in trpinčili Jude, Poljake in Ukrajince, se spominja tudi Franc Lienhard, rojen leta 1910 v Libuči pri Pliberku, ki ga je ljudsko sodišče (Volksgesichtshof) v Berlinu 21. januarja 1943 obsodilo na dvoletno zaporno kazen, nakar je bil do konca vojne še jetnik več koncentracijskih taborišč. Že v kaznilnici v Berlinu – Moabitu je bil pred obsodbo priča, kako so v klet v verigah »pripeljali nekega polžida iz Poljske«: »Prosil me je za malo kruha, dal sem mu ga in kave tudi. [...] Rekel je: »Obsojen sem na smrt. Josef mi je ime« in globoko verni Lienhard mu je odgovoril: »Molil bom zate, mogoče čaka mene isto« (Lienhard, 1992, 285). Kmalu nato je Lienhard v kaznilnici v Görlitzu videl, kako so bili v zid vbetonirani obroči, nanje pa priklenjeni Poljaki in Ukrajinci. »[B]ili so tako pretepeni, da jim ni bilo videti oči. Mislil sem, da sem v peklu« (Lienhard, 1992, 285).

V romanu *Bratovska jesen*, s katerim je pisatelj in učitelj Valentin Polanšek postavil trajni spomenik leta 1944 padlimu bratoma – partizanoma Domnu (Cirilu Šorliju) in Matevžu (Jožefu Šorliju) iz Lobnika (obeh se v svojem pričevanju spominja tudi Johana

Sadolšek – Zala [Sadolšek, 1985, 135–136]), slednji, Matevž, pravi, da je njegova odločitev, da dezertira iz nemške vojske, padla prav na Poljskem. Kot koroškemu Slovencu se mu je upiralo, da v »hitlerjanski uniformi« pomaga uničevati Poljsko, »domovino slovanskih bratov«, vsekakor pa se mu je uprlo, ko je videl, kako so obravnavali Jude: »Spustili so se nad Žide kot zveri na ujeti plen. Nagnali so judovske duhovnike, obstopili so jih in zbegani rabini so morali drug drugemu rezati dolge brade. S častitljivim molkom so možje izvedli nemški ukaz. Nemci pa so se zabavali in jih gnjavili z gnojnico surovih opazk in poniževanj« (Polanšek, 1982, 6). Jožef Šorli – Matevž velja po Janezu (Ivanu) Župancu – Johanu (1915–1943) z Obirskega za drugega koroškega Slovenca, ki je vstopil v partizane (Linasi, 2010, 50).

Rasni antisemitizem in sovraštvo do Judov sta dosegla svoj začasni vrhunec v »kristalni noči«, kakor se je v zgodovino nasilja nacistov zapisal novembrski pogrom leta 1938 nad Judi, tako poimenovan zaradi razbitih izloženih oken trgovin v lasti judovskih trgovcev. Pogrom se je začel v noči iz 9. na 10. november 1938, na Koroškem pa 10. novembra zjutraj (Danglmaier & Koroschitz, 2015, 226). Predstavljal je začetek sistematičnega uničevanja judovskega prebivalstva, prelomnico, ki je vodila v holokavst.

Na Dunaju so bili pogromaši med najbolj temeljitimi, saj so v najkrajšem času zažgali in opustošili 42 sinagog in molilnic. Poleg tega so oropali okoli 4000 trgovin in 2000 stanovanj, če že niso bila arizirana, torej odvzeta judovskim lastnikom in izročena tako imenovanim »arijskim«. Vsega skupaj je bilo na Dunaju aretiranih 6547 Judov, od tega okoli 4000 deportiranih v koncentracijsko taborišče Dachau (Hecht et al., 2008, 35). Med njimi je bila tudi družina Adler, pri kateri je – kot se spominja Marta Kreutz, rojena Trampuš 23. oktobra 1923 v Dobu pri Pliberku – kot kuharica delala njena teta Tilka. K Rebernikovim, kjer je bila teta doma, je Marta Kreutz posebno rada zahajala, ker jim je z Dunaja pošiljala pakete z raznolikimi igračami, s katerimi so se otroci igrali. Družina Adler je postala žrtev »arizacije«. Vse premoženje so jim vzeli. V »tisti usodni kristalni noči« so hoteli oropati tudi sobo tete Tilke, kamor je po naročilu judovske družine spravila nekaj dragocenosti, a ji je »le uspelo prepričati drhal, da je vse njeno«. Adlerjevi so preživeli, ker so bili »pravočasno opozorjeni, naj se umaknejo v Združene države« (Kreutz, 2001, 53).

Toda ne le na Dunaju, tudi drugod po Avstriji so uničevali sinagoge in judovsko lastnino ter zaplenjevali trgovine, hiše in stanovanja. V Celovcu so »izpraznili« in razdejali komaj leta 1923 ustanovljeno judovsko molilnico in stanovanja bolj znanih judovskih družin, na kar je kljub strogi cenzuri opozoril *Koroški Slovenec*.³² Prav tako so pogromaši opusto-

32 Koroški Slovenec, 16. 11. 1938: Umor nemškega diplomata, 3.

šli in oropali judovske vile ob Osojskem in Vrbskem jezeru (Koroschitz, 2018, 187). Nacistični koroški deželni svetnik Ernst Dlska in nacistični deželni glavar Wladimir Pawlowski sta bila že tedaj prepričana, da bi lahko načrtovani koroški obmejni znanstveni inštitut – predstavljal naj bi antipod znanstveni dejavnosti ljubljanske univerze in dokazoval povezanost Gorenjske in Koroške z Veliko Nemčijo³³ – namestili v dveh opustošenih in kmalu nato razlaščenih judovskih vilah v Vrbi; to sta bili vili Giebelhaus in Seehof (Koroschitz, 2018, 187). Že marca 1938 so nacisti v nekakšnem roparskem napadu razlastili trgovino z mešanim blagom, ki sta jo vodila Lotte Weinreb, rojena Friedländer, in Isidor Weinreb na Platzgasse 14 (današnji Gasometergasse 6) v Celovcu. »Arizirana« je bila v korist Koroškega Heimatbunda z Maier - Kaibitschen na čelu, ki je že pred tem imel manjšo hišo/pisarno »sredi judovske četrti« (v Bäckergerasse), z »arizacijo« pa si je pridobil večjo in prostornejšo. Ob Heimatbundu so v njej delovali še oddelki Deželnega obmejnega urada (Gaugrenzlandamt) in Nemške naselitvene družbe (Deutsche Ansiedlungsgesellschaft), skupaj torej tri specializirane organizacije za zatiranje in pregon koroških Slovencev; vsem trem je načeloval Maier – Kaibitsch (Walzl, 1987, 188–189; Verdnik, 2014, 132–136).

Na Koroškem so s posebno ostrino izvajali pogrome v Celovcu in Beljaku (Danglmaier & Koroschitz, 2015, 227). Tonči Schlapper, rojen leta 1924 na Vašinjah,³⁴ ki je takrat v Celovcu obiskoval srednjo tehnično šolo (oddelek za strojogradnjo), v svojih spominih pravi, da je novembra 1938 »prvič doživel vso brutalnost nacističnega režima, in sicer nad židovskimi prebivalci«:

Čez cesto pri naši šoli je stala hiša, iz katere so skozi okna in duri leteli predmeti hišne opreme – od radia do slik in šivalnega stroja – in živalsko tuljenje SA-jevskih tolp se je razlegalo po vsej okolici. Nihče se ni uprl temu divjanju, ti trpinčeni ljudje so slišali še kako dodatno psovko: »Judensau!« in slično. To je bil uvod v grozno apokalipso, ki je v naslednjih letih vojne sledila kot holokavst v fizičnem uničevanju židovskega ljudstva. (Schlapper, 2004, 52)

Janko Urank je tedaj obiskoval gimnazijo v Celovcu in v razredu so se pripravljali na maturo. »Ko je prišla zloglasna »Reichskristallnacht« so učence iz vseh razredov – tudi razredov drugih šol – »gnali na Novi trg«, takrat trg Adolfa Hitlerja, in jih postavili v vrste. Pristaši/člani Hitlerjeve mladine (Hitlerjugend) so začeli kričati »Juda, verrecke«, »Pogini Jud! Pogini Jud!«. »Tam na vogalu, kjer je danes [to je leta 1988] [trgovina čevljev] Grohar, je bila židovska trgovina Friedländer.³⁵ Esajevci so metali pohištvo iz prvega nadstropja, vlečali ženske za lase, jih zmerjali in tako dalje, in mi osemnajstletniki smo morali vse to gledati. To so razglasili za »prireditve« (Urank, 1991, 110). »Tega grozotnega dejanja [pogroma] nisem mogel dojeti, dokler v poznejših letih nisem doživel še hujših reči« (Urank, 2004 [1988], 166). Tudi Ana Zablatnik, rojena Safran leta 1923 v Bilčovsu, se spominja, kako so ljudje, ki so se vračali iz Celovca, »pravili, kako so tam Žide tolkli, jim razbijali stanovanja, metali dragocene reči na cesto [...] vmes pa so jih zmerjali, suvali ter pljuvali. Tedaj se je marsikdo zgrozil, kaj je to in kaj še bo« (Zablatnik, 1996, 84).

Že 6. decembra 1939 je *Koroški Slovenec* podal naslednjo bilanco o nasilni odstranitvi Judov iz gospodarstva in posledično iz javnega življenja Avstrije: »Skupno je bilo v Avstriji 25.898 židovskih podjetij [...] Od teh podjetij je bilo 21.143 ukinjenih, 4755 podjetij odslej vodijo arijci. [...] Kmetijskih posestev so imeli Judje 401, od teh so prevzeli Arijci 394 posestev.«³⁶ Likvidacij in »arizacij« judovskih podjetij na Koroškem, ki jih je bilo precej (prim. Verdnik, 2014), list skorajda ne omenja. Le pri zelo podrobnem branju je bilo mogoče odkriti naslednji podatek, skrit med vestmi, ki se nanaša na mesto Borovlje, središče Roža: »Trgovino žida Ludovika Dickstein so zaprli in se bo isti vsled nastalih razmer preselil v druge kraje, trgovino pa bo vodil bržkone novo imenovani komisar.«³⁷

Naključje je hotelo, da je avtorica tega prispevka prav v času pisanja teh vrstic uspela pridobiti področno nalogo iz zgodovine *Antisemitizem in koroški Slovenci*, ki je bila leta 2005 opravljena na Zvezni gimnaziji in zvezni realni gimnaziji za Slovence v Celovcu. Avtorica naloge, v resnici obsežne pionirske raziskave, je Mirjam Malle.³⁸ Raziskava vključuje tudi

33 Obmejni inštitut, znan kot Inštitut za raziskovanje dežele Koroške (Institut für Kärntner Landesforschung), ki so ga ustanovili šele oktobra 1942, je od vsega začetka sledil ekspanzionističnim ter agresivnim političnim in demografskim ciljem, odbijal pa naj bi tudi morebitne ozemeljske zahteve Slovenije (Koroschitz, 2018, 187, 189; Ferenc, 1971).

34 Tonči Schlapper je bil dolga leta tajnik Slovenske prosvetne zveze v Celovcu, odbornik Zveze slovenskih organizacij in častni predsednik Zveze koroških partizanov. Kot lastnik elektropodjetja je živel v Šentjakobu v Rožu.

35 Gre za trgovino z mešanim blagom »Zum Storch« v Pernhartgasse 1, ki sta jo po smrti svojega očeta Maxa Friedländerja leta 1927 podedovala njegova otroka Josefina in Emil Friedländer. Ta trgovina je postala žrtev zapletenega postopka »arizacije«; kar več »zaslužnih« nacistov se je je hotelo polastiti (Verdnik, 2014, 110–118).

36 Koroški Slovenec, 6. 12. 1939: Odstranitev židov iz gospodarstva, 2.

37 Koroški Slovenec, 4. 5. 1938: Ferlach-Borovlje, 3.

38 Iskrena hvala ravnateljici Zveze in zvezne realne gimnazije v Celovcu mag. Zalki Kuhling, tamkajšnji profesorici dr. Tatjani Koncilia ter njeni sestri in avtorici Mirjam Malle, da so mi omogočile in posredovale skenirano kopijo področne naloge, ki je nastala na pobudo in pod mentorstvom profesorja zgodovine Janeza Zwittera-Tehovnika.

poglavje o trgovini, ki sta jo v Borovljah od septembra 1931 vodila zakonca Ludwig in Lilli (Angelina) Dickstein, vključno z izvlečki iz intervjujev, dokumenti in fotografijami, ki so bili opravljeni ali pridobljeni v Borovljah, na Dunaju, v Münchnu in Tel Avivu (Malle, 2005, 20–28 in 74–81). Iz raziskave izhaja, da je bila trgovina Dicksteinovih, ki je imela od štiri do pet zaposlenih, »likvidirana« na podoben način, kot je bila »arizirana« trgovina Scharfbergovih. Dickstein je moral ob likvidaciji na vrat na nos podpisati dokument, ki mu je od 26. aprila 1938 prepovedoval vstop v lastno trgovino (Malle, 2005, 24; prim. tudi faksimile dokumenta na straneh 74–75). Komisarski upravitelj trgovine Ludwiga Dicksteina je bil do njene »likvidacije« Franz Kurasch (Verdnik, 2014, 213). Razpuščeno trgovino je prevzel sosednji trgovec – konkurent Kometter in se z njo okoristil tudi v obliki »velike razprodaje« (Malle, 2005, 24). O tem govorijo tudi oglasi, ki so bili 29. aprila in 1. maja 1938 objavljeni v dnevnikih *Kärntner Tagblatt* in *Freie Stimmen*. Vsi so identični in se glasijo: »Trgovina Kometter, Borovlje, išče prizadevne prodajalce. Aranžerji izločb in večšine v čevljarški branži in manufakturi imajo prednost. Pisni predlog z življenjepisom.«

Zakonca Dickstein sta se po likvidaciji njune trgovine »preselila« na Dunaj, se spomladi 1940 znova vrnila v Borovlje, kjer jima je s pomočjo domačih »tihotapcev« (dveh Boroveljčanov in treh Tržičanov) uspelo prek Jugoslavije priti v Palestino. Od premoženja, ki sta ga imela v Borovljah, jima ni ostalo nič ali skorajda nič (Malle, 2005, 24–25).

ANTISEMITIZEM IN KOROŠKI SLOVENCİ

Nedvomno tudi koroški Slovenci pred antisemitizmom niso bili imuni. Avgustin Malle, ki je proučeval glasilo *Koroški Slovenec* v letih pred »anšlusom«, navaja, da je tu in tam priobčevalo prispevke, ki so pozitivno govorili o nacizmu. Opozarja pa, da je list ob priložnosti »objave mladega človeka« zavračal in pojasnjeval cilje nacizma. Dopisnik je namreč menil, da si ne more kaj, da ne bi občudoval predvsem gigantskega boja nacizma v Nemčiji proti gnilobi in razdrapanosti družbenih razmer. Nadalje je dopisnik zapisal, da je »nacizem iz gospodarskega življenja izločil nevarni element židovske sebičnosti in profitarstva in židovstvu pustil le še dobroto nemškega gostoljubja«, ³⁹ kar po Malleju dopušča sklep, »da so se občasno pojavljale tudi med koroškimi Slovenci prvine militantnega antisemitizma in nacistične miselnosti« (Malle, 1992, 41). Malle nadalje opazuje, da je dopisnik »govoril z besednim zakladom »Koroškega Slovenca«« (Malle, 1992, 43). Tega je od leta 1928

dalje merodajno sooblikoval Vinko Zwitter, tajnik Slovenske krščansko-socialne zveze za Koroško, leta 1934 preimenovane v Slovensko prosvetno zvezo. Julija 1936 je postal Zwitter založnik, izdajatelj in odgovorni urednik *Koroškega Slovenca*. Izpod njegovega peresa je nastalo veliko člankov za *Koroškega Slovenca*, ki so bili včasih podpisani s polnim imenom ali pa, pogosteje, s kraticami: ro., ko., r., k., dro (Gruškovnjak, 2020, 8, 11). Zwitter je deloval v tesni povezavi z Rudolfom Blümlom, ki je bil v avtoritarni stanovski državi Avstriji zastopnik škofa in Cerkve v koroškem deželnem parlamentu. Poleg tega »je bil dr. Blüml vodja slovenskih duhovnikov, dr. Vinko Zwitter⁴⁰ pa je imel vodilno vlogo pri laikih in Katoliški akciji« (Till, 2017, 300). Socialdemokratsko in zmernokatoliško usmerjeni predstavniki in aktivisti koroških Slovencev, a tudi del duhovnikov, ki politike »katoliške akcije« niso odobraval ali bili do nje skeptični, niso imeli vpliva na avstrijsko stanovsko politiko, kar je imelo za posledico ostro idejnopolitično ločnico med koroškimi Slovenci (Petek, 1979, 167–189).⁴¹ Franc Petek govori o prevladi »Blümllove linije Katoliške akcije«, ki so jo dominirali »mladi« (Petek, 1979, 179, 180). Ta »linija« se je, tako predpostavka pričujočega prispevka, izpričevala tudi v odnosu do Judov.

Blüml je Katoliško akcijo, ki jo je ustanovil papež Pij XI. leta 1922 z okrožnico *Ubi arcano*, nato pa jo razvijal še z vrsto drugih okrožnic (velik vpliv je nanjo imela tudi enciklika *Quadragesimo anno*, ki jo je papež Pij XI. objavil maja 1931), leta 1951 opisal takole: »Je sodelovanje laikov pri hierarhičnem apostolatu Cerkve. Celotna Katoliška akcija pa je kakor fronta, ki stoji proti brezbožni fronti satanovi. Katoliška akcija hoče izvojevati, da se ljudje odločijo za Kristusa v vsem svojem življenju« (v Till, 2017, 293). Gre za dikcijo, ki je napeljevala na konspirativni antisemitski diskurz o Judih kot edinstvenem viru zla, ki se je v zgodnjem dvajsetem stoletju razširilo zlasti v Nemčiji, a je imelo neposreden vpliv tudi na ideologijo političnega katolicizma na Slovenskem, še zlasti znotraj najbolj radikalnih političnih skupin ob koncu tridesetih let – mladinskih organizacij Katoliške akcije, kot so tako imenovani »mladci« Ernesta Tomca in »stražarji« Lamberta Ehrlicha (Pelikan, 2015, 64–65). Gre za diskurz, ki je v Judih lociral tako personifikacijo moči kapitalizma kot tudi boljševizma in – povezano s tem – univerzalno in vseprisotno grožnjo, ki jo velja odstraniti. O tem govori tudi *Koroški Slovenec*, ko 20. aprila 1938 predoča odrešilno moč nacizma v boju proti dobičkarjskim Judom, ki jim ni mar za delovno ljudstvo in raje favorizirajo »razredno miselnost« kot pa blaginjo in »pomirjajočo« občost:

³⁹ Koroški Slovenec, 7. 2. 1934: Pismo in odgovor, 1.

⁴⁰ Vinko Zwitter (1904–1977) je leta 1928 na Dunaju končal študij na Visoki šoli za svetovno trgovino.

⁴¹ Čeprav se Franca Petka pogosto označuje za »liberalno usmerjenega« vodilnega politika koroških Slovencev v poplebiscitni dobi, sam v svojih spominih na več mestih poudarja, da se ni »štel za liberalca« in da so mu bili »bliže socialdemokrati« (Petek, 1979, 93–95).

Delavci so prej živeli od milosti židovskih delodajalcev in je njihovo delo ovirala razredna miselnost, narodni socializem pa je odstranil žide in razrede ter s tem osvobodil delavca. / Prva parola narodnih socialistov kot vladne stranke se je glasila: odpraviti je treba brezposelnost, spraviti v obratovanje vsa podjetja, dati množici v roke več denarja in s tem zvišati njeno moč.⁴²

Takšen diskurz seveda nima nič opraviti z marksizmom, saj je bil – v sozvočju z dikcijo nacizma – naperjen proti družbeni skupini Judov, ki ji je pripisano sprieno bistvo. Poleg tega je v skladu s »protimarksistično« strategijo bralstvu predlagal, naj se ne druži z ljudmi, ki utelešajo »revolucionarni proletariat«. Sem *Koroški Slovenec* prvenstveno prišteva »boljševike« in marksiste, ki jih – zelo podobno kot nacizem – vedno znova enači z Judi: govori o »boljševizmu« kot »delu židovstva«,⁴³ »židovskem boljševizmu«,⁴⁴ Trockem kot »židu večne revolucije«⁴⁵ in celo o »Stalinu Groznem«, ki je »smatral za potrebno, da čim prej razredči židovske vrste in zmanjša njihov vpliv na sovjetsko javno življenje«. ⁴⁶

26. oktobra 1938 je *Koroški Slovenec* poročal, da iz Italije »beži veliko število tamošnjih židov z ozirom na zadnje vladne odloke v katoliško Cerkev in prosi krsta«. To, da so bili ti odloki tesno povezani z Mussolinijevo razglasitvijo rasnih zakonov 18. septembra 1938 na Velikem trgu v Trstu, list zamolči. Ti zakoni so zadevali Jude in potrebo po njihovi izključitvi iz javnega življenja. Zanje je Mussolini izjavil, da niso Italijani in da ne spadajo mednje (Podbersič, 2016, 843). List je sicer zaznal, kako se je Judom pripisana nadmoč spreminjala v nemoč, vendar na način, ki s posmehljivim prizvokom potrjuje konsistentnost antisemitske ideologije: »Ves čas od postanka Cerkve so bili katoličanstvu sovražni. Bili so voditelji liberalizma, socialne demokracije in boljševizma, lastniki in uredniki brezverskih ustanov in nenravnega tiska. Sedaj pa jim Cerkev postaja zadnje zatočišče.«⁴⁷ Ob koncu leta 1938 uvodničar »ro.« Judom naprti »krivdo«, da narodi »danes krvavijo iz tisočih ran«, pripiše jim celo »krivdo« za lastno »usodo«. Govori o »strašni prerokbi«, ki se »prvič uresničuje«: »Njegova kri naj pride na nas in na naše otroke!«⁴⁸ Judje so obtoženi pogubnih namer in sprevrženih daritvenih obredov. Percipirani so kot

ljudstvo, ki ga določa trajno brezdomstvo, a hkrati kot velesila, ki je segala in sega po tujih ozemljih ter se ne more nikoli nasititi ali pomiriti. Nauk, ki ga je učilo to ljudstvo, »ljudstvo s pečatom večnega Ahasvera«, v svoji dobi, postaja, tako »ro.«, »danes njegova sodba in obsodba. Hotelo je silo in ima silo. Hotelo je sovrašтво in ima sovrašтво. Hotelo je imperializem in ima imperializem.«⁴⁹ Sledi zaključek: »V svojem jedru je antisemitizem ali protižidovstvo težnja narodov, da se rešijo ahasverskega prokletstva, in želja po novem, lepšem sožitju narodov in kontinentov.«⁵⁰

16. oktobra 1940, ko je preganjanje Judov bilo že na poti h končnemu cilju, je *Koroški Slovenec* priobčil članek, v katerem v navezavi na knjigo »slovečega Nemca Greentrupa« pravi, da je za Jude »preznačilno«, da izhajajo brez maternega jezika, pa čeprav ta predstavlja »kri narodnega telesa«, »npravno in kulturno vrednoto«. »Nič jim ne hasknejo knjige nekdanjih vrednikov, polne modrosti in globine, pozabljena je velika njihova preteklost.« »Narod poudarjenega materializma so, rafinirano iznajdljivi v svetu gospodarstva in trgovine, a brez duše in zato brez kulture.« Ponovno jih označuje kot ljudi brez domovine, ki »živijo danes svoje nemirno življenje drugim v napotje in sebi v sramoto«. ⁵¹

Čeprav antisemitsko nastrojeni članki v *Koroškem Slovincu* dajejo misliti na Hitlerjev *Mein Kampf*, v katerem je natančno lociran sovražnik, ki spodkopa nemški narod, nemško kulturo in nemško blaginjo, velja poudariti, da se ti članki v pregledanem obdobju (od leta 1933 do izida zadnje številke 26. 3. 1941) ne pojavljajo sistematično ali zelo pogosto, denimo v vsaki drugi ali tretji zaporedni številki. Prav tako v njih ni moč zaslediti zahtev po uvedbi antisemitskih ukrepov, pa čeprav se z njimi strinjajajo. Tako pisec »ro.« v svoji drugi Potopisni črtici iz Nemčije, ki jo je spisal 28. aprila 1938 v Hamburgu, opravičuje ukrepe zoper *Entartete Kunst*. Z izrazom, ki se ga ponavadi sloveni z »degenerirana« ali »izrojena« umetnost, ki jo za razliko od nacizma asociira zgolj z Judi: »Tudi vas bi navdušilo, ko bi videli, kako nova Nemčija odločno zavrača ves židovski kram v sliki, kipu in knjigi in voli samo svoje narodno blago.«⁵² Minuciozno in mestoma z neprikritim odobravanjem so v *Koroškem Slovincu* zabeležene vesti o množični

42 *Koroški Slovenec*, 20. 4. 1938: Pot nemškega gospodarstva, 3–4.

43 *Koroški Slovenec*, 17. 2. 1937: Boljševizem – delo židovstva, 2.

44 *Koroški Slovenec*, 14. 4. 1937: Sinova enega očeta, 1.

45 *Koroški Slovenec*, 7. 4. 1937: Neizprosni Stalinov boj proti Trockiju, 1.

46 *Koroški Slovenec* (r.), 12. 1. 1938: Židovski duh, 1.

47 *Koroški Slovenec*, 26. 10. 1938: Židje bežijo v katoliško Cerkev, 3.

48 *Koroški Slovenec* (ro.), 28. 12. 1938: »Njegova kri naj pride na nas in na naše otroke!«, 1. Gre za besede iz Matejevega evangelija (Mt 27,25), ki so bile več stoletij zlorabljene v namene podpihovanja sovrašтва do Judov.

49 *Koroški Slovenec* (ro.), 28. 12. 1938: »Njegova kri naj pride na nas in na naše otroke!«, 1.

50 *Koroški Slovenec* (ro.), 28. 12. 1938: »Njegova kri naj pride na nas in na naše otroke!«, 1.

51 *Koroški Slovenec*, 16. 10. 1940: Kri narodnega telesa, 3.

52 *Koroški Slovenec* (ro.), 4. 5. 1938: Potopisna črtica iz Nemčije II, 2.

izločitvi Judov iz javnega življenja v raznih evropskih državah, kot na primer: »Židovstvo v Rusiji kopni [...] Vedno manj je židov, ki jih je revolucija posadila v mastne službe«;⁵³ »Poljska začena nastopati proti židom, katerih šteje nad 3 milijone«;⁵⁴ »Tudi Italija izganja žide«;⁵⁵ »Do 15. septembra [1938] je odpotovalo skupno 70.000 [avstrijskih] židov. Göringova obljuba [...] da bo temeljito izčistil dunajsko mesto, se torej v polni meri izvaja.«⁵⁶

Pomenljivo je, da Judje v *Koroškem Slovencu* nikdar niso označeni s pojmom »rasa«. Očitno so se urednik in pisci dobro zavedali, da je nacistična rasna teorija ločevala večvredno arijsko raso od manj vrednih ras, kamor so ob Judih prištevali tudi Slované. Poleg tega antisemitsko nastrojeni prispevki v *Koroškem Slovencu* niso bili napisani z namenom, da bi podprli nacizem (pa čeprav so soustvarjali razmere za tako imenovano *Endlösung*). Prej se zdi, da so njihovi avtorji antisemitizem povzemali iz nacističnega ideološkega arzenala, da bi ga koristili v svoje lastne namene. Antisemitizem je bil tudi med koroškimi Slovenci pripravno ideološko orožje, ko je veljalo braniti »organsko enotnost« naroda/narodne skupnosti in se je v te namene imanentno družbeno protislovje (razredna razlika) projiciralo v zunanji moteči »neorganski« element, v Juda (Žižek, 1987, 46).

Čeprav je klerikalno-konservativna usmerjenost med koroškimi Slovenci že pred nacistično dobo vsebovala dobršno mero antisemitizma, ta v političnem življenju narodne skupnosti nikoli ni dosegel tiste stopnje, ki jo je imel pri nemškonacionalnih organizacijah na Koroškem (Domej, 1988, 74). Na to zgovorno opozarja tudi Vinko Zwitter, rojen leta 1904, ko svoj sicer izrazito antisemitsko nastrojeni prispevek na temo »Židovskega duha«, ki je bil objavljen 12. januarja 1938, začena takole: »Juden hinaus!«, ta klic iz dijaških let mi je v spominu, ko so takozvani arijski dijaki z vikom in krikom navalili v takozvano univerzitetno avlo [dunajske univerze] in tiral židovske dijake s silo iz šolskih prostorov. Nam slovanskim slušateljem je bila ta protijudovska borba nemškega dijaštva nekam nepojmljiva [...].«⁵⁷

Nemškonacionalne organizacije in društva so že od časa monarhije in dosledno tudi v obdobju prve avstrijske republike imela v svojih društvenih pravilih določilo, da Judje ne smejo biti njihovi člani. Koroške slovenske organizacije »arijskega paragrafa« niso predvidevale vse dokler jim ga ni predpisala nacistična oblast« (Domej, 1988, 74). Enako velja tudi za organizacije in društva avstrijskih socialdemokratov (Klössch, Scharr & Weinzierl, 2004, 105).

Pomenljivo je tudi, da nacizem pri Slovencih na Koroškem ni sprožil novega vala sovraštva do Judov, prav nasprotno, to sovraštvo se je »po marcu 1938 ublažilo« (Domej, 1988, 74). Upravičena je domneva, da sta k ublažitvi antisemitizma med koroškimi Slovenci (so)prispevala anticipacija lastnega etnocida in genocida ter s tem povezano neodobravanje nacizma: Slovenci bi lahko bili izpostavljeni najhujšemu preganjanju – tako kot Judje. Čeprav Domej zaznava ublažitev koroškega slovenskega sovraštva do Judov po marcu 1938, pravi, da bi »zaman iskali mest, ki izražajo solidarnost koroških Slovencev s preganjanimi Judi« (Domej, 1988, 74). Podatki iz spominov, pričevanj in drugih avtobiografskih virov, predstavljenih v tem prispevku, te trditve ne potrjujejo. Prav nasprotno. Ta besedila predstavljajo pomemben vir za prevpraševanje nacistične antisemitske ideologije, s katero se je znotraj slovenske narodne skupnosti spogledoval prvenstveno *Koroški Slovenec*, pa še to nemalokrat skozi prizmo njegovega urednika (brez podpisa ali s podpisi v obliki kratic, kot so ro., ko., r., k., dro). Mirjam Malle navaja, da je našla »številne dokaze z visoko verbalno agresivnostjo« prav v *Koroškem Slovencu*, znatno manj tovrstnih dokazov pa v *Nedelji* in *Koledarju Mohorjeve družbe* (Gantar Godina 2016, 100; Malle, 2005, 28–40).

Da v spominskih zapisih in refleksijah (skorajda) ni bilo mogoče najti antisemitskih izjav, gre pripisati dejstvu, da so avtobiografska besedila *per definitionem* bližja faktom, ki jih določa sprega z resnično doživetjo, pogosto tudi zelo travmatično dejanskostjo, v povezavi z življenjem ali življenjskim obdobjem avtoric ali avtorjev. Ti fakti niso nekaj fiktivnega, namišljenega, fantomskega, kot je to v obravnavanem primeru nacistična antisemitska ideologija, ki predpostavlja Jude kot abstraktno, neoprijemljivo in vseprisotno grožnjo, kot negativni princip *per se*, temveč so realnost, ki jo v primeru citiranih avtobiografskih izjav in zapisov določa tem besedilom inherenten subjektivni pogled. Ta je neposredno povezan z izkustveno realnostjo in osebno resnico *pričevanja*, kakor jo implicirata tudi pojma *spomin* in *spominjati se*. Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika besedo *spominjati* izrecno opredeli kot »1. povzročati, da se komu kaj iz preteklosti znova pojavi v zavesti: [...]; 2. delati, navadno z besedami, da kdo česa ne pozabi« (Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika, 2014). Tudi spomin, ki ga iz memorije⁵⁸ prikliče tako imenovana *talking cure*, iz katere je nastala osnova psihoanalize, je preiskovanje preteklosti, da bi se človek s pomočjo govora spopadel s travmatično izkušnjo.

53 Koroški Slovenec, 5. 1. 1938: Židovstvo v Rusiji kopni, 1.

54 Koroški Slovenec, 30. 3. 1938: V enem stavku, 1.

55 Koroški Slovenec, 7. 9. 1938: Tudi Italija izganja žide, 2.

56 Koroški Slovenec, 28. 12. 1938: Avstrijskih židov je bilo ..., 1.

57 Koroški Slovenec (r.), 12. 1. 1938: Židovski duh, 1.

58 K razločku med memorijo in spominom Jurić Pahor (2007; 2019, 8–18).

Ena izmed bistvenih značilnosti (zlasti ekstremne) travmatizacije je nezmožnost naracije. V navezavi na Alfreda Lorenzerja je mogoče govoriti o *desimbolizaciji* kot »izgonu iz jezika, ekskomunikaciji, odstranitvi iz konteksta razumevanja«; povezana je s procesom potlačitve, ki preide v »scensko agiranje« (Jurič Pahor, 2006 in 2011). O pojavu je dokaj lucidno spregovoril Florjan Lipuš v svojem romanu *Boštjanov let*. Boštjanova (in v ozadju tudi avtorjeva) zgodba ima korenine v otroškem doživetju, ki ga je povzročila deportacija matere v nacistično taborišče Ravensbrück, od koder se ni več vrnila:

Po odhodu matere [...] se mu je zaprlo v grlu, težnost se je zajedla v jezik, klada mu je legla na usta, in Boštjan je potehmal povsem umolknil, [...] govoril lje! le, kadar ni šlo drugače. [...]. Boštjan je govor umaknil navznoter, a v njem samem je govoril neprestano, švigalo po udi in skoz glavo, govorilo, govorilo, in dosti pozno je spoznal, da to ni govorjenje, temveč so glasne slike, so slikoviti glasovi, so prizori, ki se porajajo, ponavljajo, se izpod kože jemljejo. (Lipuš, 2003, 113–114)

ZAKLJUČEK

Utihnile so ptice, utihnila je vas je naslov knjige, ki jo je napisala Ana Jug – Olip. Podobno kot Lipuš je tudi Jug – Olip potrebovala več desetletij, da je spregovorila o tem, kaj je zanj pomenil čas nacionalsocializma, predvsem pa tudi žensko koncentracijsko taborišče Ravensbrück, ki ga je preživela. S svojim pričevanjem je ustvarila knjižni spomenik tudi Judinjam, Rominjam in njihovim otrokom. Podobno kot Lipušev *Boštjanov let* implicira tudi naslov knjige Jug – Olip odločitev za »let«, na kar napeljuje tudi podatek, da je Jug – Olip tudi avtorica majhne knjižice (življenjepisa), v katero so vpisani Gregorčičevi verzi »Ujetega ptiča tožba« (Tolmajer, 2011, 171). Tudi ti verzi nosijo v sebi spoznanje o bivanjskem nasilju in simbolni pomen »vzleta« ali »leta«. V mitologiji so okriljena vsa bitja, ki simbolizirajo preseganje danega, odlepljenje od »tal«, celo »vstajenje« iz pepela (na primer ptič Feniks), dajejo pa misliti tudi na »majhno Cigančico«, ki jo je videla Jug – Olip plesati po hodniku ravensbrüške barake, kot da bi hotela »poleteti, dvigniti se od tod«: »Deklica je plesala, a njen obrazek ni bil nasmejan« (Lipuš, 2003, 128; Jug – Olip, 2011, 89–90).

Bližino ali solidarnost do Judov so – z izjemo tiška, še zlasti *Koroškega Slovence*, ki se je kot osrednji dnevnik slovenske narodne skupnosti v letih pred anšlusom in do konca izhajanja marca 1941 zelo

približal nacistični antisemitski ideologiji, odobral pa tudi izločitev Judov in judovstva iz javnega življenja po vsej Evropi – v spominih in avtobiografskih zapisih izpričevali nemalokateri koroško-slovenski avtorji. Iz njih izhaja, da so bližino do Judov – v smislu »etike obličja«, ki implicira intersubjektivno relacijo, prizadevanje, skrb in odgovornost za drugega (Lévinas, 1998) – izkazovali predvsem tiste posameznice in tisti posamezniki, ki so bili z Judi v osebnih, tudi delovnih stikih in/ali so se neposredno srečavali z nasiljem nad njimi.

Iz pregledanega spominskega gradiva, vključno literarnega, izhaja, da številni koroški slovenski avtorji – pričevalci, deloma pa tudi osebe, na katere se nanašajo, do terorja in nasilja nad Judi v času nacizma (obravnavano je obdobje do leta 1941) niso bili ravnodušni, prej nasprotno. Pogosto so ju povezovali s svojo lastno (pričakovano ali realno) »usodo«. Tematizirali so osebno vez do Judov (tudi preko generacij), sežiganje učbenikov, dozdevno nevarnih za »čistost arijskega duha«, razvrednotujočo in razčlovečujočo asociativno povezavo Judov s Slovani/Slovinci, duševno prizadetimi in pohabljeni. Ogovarjali so tudi samomore Judov in drugih ljudi ob priključitvi Avstrije »veliki Nemčiji«, pogrome nad Judi novembra 1938, skrajnost nasilja, ki so mu bili Judje izpostavljeni na bojnem polju, v zaporih in drugod. Za Jožefa Šorlija so bili zločini nad Judi celo sprožilni moment za uresničitev svoje namere, da dezertira iz nemške *Wehrmacht* in se priključi partizanom.

V pregledanih spominskih in pričevanskih zapisih (skorajda) ni bilo mogoče najti stereotipov, ki bi implicirali namerno antisemitsko usmerjenost ali sovražnost do Judov. V številnih besedilih tematika Judov ni bila naslovljena, čemur botruje zlasti razlog, da se ne omejujejo na čas nacizma, temveč zaobsegajo celotno življenjsko dobo pričevalk in pričevalcev, pogosto iz etnološke avto/biografske perspektive (npr. 150 besedil iz zbirke *Tako smo živeli*). Antisemitizem je bil konstanto prisoten v koroškem slovenskem tisku, še zlasti v *Koroškem Slovincu*, ki je kot osrednji tednik do konca svojega izhajanja marca 1941 izstopal z izrazitim antisemitizmom. Če je za ta tednik mogoče reči, da je nacistično antisemitsko ideologijo dodobra »introjiciral«, to za spominska in pričevanska besedila ne velja. Prav nasprotno, ta besedila, ki temeljijo na osebnih izkušnjah, predstavljajo pomemben in doslej še neupoštevani korektiv predpostavki, da bi zaman iskali mesta v takratnih besedilih in stališčih koroških Slovencev, ki izražajo solidarnost s preganjanimi Judi. Ali z drugimi besedami: omogočajo vpoglede, ki jih iz uradnega gradiva ni bilo oziroma ne bi bilo mogoče rekonstruirati.

»FIRST US, THEN YOU«: CARINTHIAN SLOVENES IN THE FACE OF TERROR AND VIOLENCE AGAINST THE JEWS IN THE TIME OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

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SUMMARY

Drawing on Althusser's concept of interpellation, various newspaper articles, and extensive memoir and autobiographical material, the author explores the "introjection" of Nazi anti-Semitic ideology among Carinthian Slovenes, focusing on the period between 1933 and 1941. The author pays particular attention to Carinthian Slovenes' reactions to the violence against and the persecution and removal of (not only) the Jewish population from public, social and economic life, whereby she notes that Nazi anti-Semitic ideology also aroused dissent and resistance. This is illustrated through several examples of solidarity and support, such as friendly transgenerational ties, the "first anti-Hitler action" of the local women against the "Aryanisation" of the Jewish store and the persecution of its owners – the Scharfberg family – from Eisenkappel/Železna kapla, hiding a Jewish child in the family environment, or offering assistance in escaping, which included "smuggling" the expropriated merchant couple – the Dicksteins – from Ferlach/Borovlje over the border to Yugoslavia, from where they managed to escape to Palestine. The testimonials by Carinthian Slovenes speak of the pogroms against Jews in November 1938, which they had personally witnessed, the extreme brutality of violence, and the mass murders of Jews on the battlefield, in prisons, and elsewhere. In Jožef Šorli's case, the crimes against the Jews in Poland triggered his decision to desert the Wehrmacht and join the Partisans. Carinthian Slovenes often linked the "fate" of Jews to their own fate – be it expected or real. They spoke of the burning on 30 April 1938 of school textbooks said to be threatening the "purity of the Aryan spirit" and of the dehumanising associative link between the Jews and the Slavs/Slovenes, the retarded, the crippled. With her book of testimonies, Ana Jug-Olip, a survivor of the Ravensbrück women's concentration camp, builds up a literary monument to not only the Slovene women (and men) of Carinthia, but also to the Jewish women, the Romani women, and their children. The article demonstrates that autobiographical sources constitute an important corrective to the press of the time, especially to the weekly Koroški Slovenec, which up until its closedown in March 1941 advocated strongly anti-Semitic views, partly drawn from the Nazi ideological arsenal. The article thus disproves the belief that in the texts or statements of Carinthian Slovenes of the time, "one would search in vain for views expressing solidarity with the persecuted Jews".

Keywords: ideological interpellation (Althusser), national socialism, anti-Semitism, Carinthian Slovenes, Jews, persecution of Jews

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THE EFFECT OF CULTURAL POLICIES IN REZA SHAH'S PERIOD ON THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES' SCHOOLS IN SANANDAJ (JEWS AND CHRISTIANS)

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ABSTRACT

After assuming power in 1925, Reza Shah promoted and strengthened nationalism in Iran and moved toward nation-building and enhancing national unity. Since the very beginning of his rule, the Reza Shah government paid contributions to foreign and national schools belonging to religious minorities with the intention to gradually oblige them to follow the Ministry of Education's programs. The present research has adopted a descriptive-explanatory approach, taking advantage of primary sources, not available to the previous authors, in order to analyze Reza Shah's cultural policies and the effect of these policies on the position of Jewish and Christian minority schools in Sanandaj.

Keywords: Reza Shah, Sanandaj, Kurdistan, Minority schools, nationalism, Iranian Jews and Christians, national curriculum

GLI EFFETTI DELLE POLITICHE CULTURALI DEL PERIODO DI REZA SHAH SULLO STATUS DELLE SCUOLE DELLE MINORANZE RELIGIOSE (DEGLI EBREI E CRISTIANI) A SANANDAJ

SINTESI

Dopo aver preso il potere nel 1925, Reza Shah promosse e rinforzò il nazionalismo in Iran, adoperandosi in questo modo per la costruzione della nazione e l'unità della società multi-etnica iraniana. Sin dai primi giorni, il governo di Reza Shah concesse fondi alle scuole delle minoranze religiose, sia straniere che statali, con l'intento di obbligarle gradualmente a seguire i programmi del Ministero dell'Istruzione. La presente ricerca ha utilizzato un approccio descrittivo-esplicativo, avvalendosi di fonti primarie non disponibili in passato ai ricercatori, per analizzare le politiche culturali di Reza Shah e il loro impatto sulla posizione delle scuole delle minoranze ebraiche e cristiane a Sanandaj.

Parole chiave: Reza Shah, Sanandaj, Kurdistan, scuole delle minoranze, nazionalismo, ebrei e cristiani iraniani, curriculum nazionale

INTRODUCTION

Kurdistan has historically been inhabited by various ethnic and religious denominations and peoples. As a result of its geographical and economic location, the city of Sanandaj, in the center of Iran's Kurdistan Province, in particular, has traditionally accommodated significant communities of Sephardic Jews and Chaldean (Assyrian) Christians. During the Qajar Period (1796–1921), the existence of religious minorities in Sanandaj drew the attention of French religious missionaries and cultural institutions to the city and thus they began establishing their own schools there. Accordingly, the French Lazarists established the first modern school in Sanandaj in 1894 (Nateq, 1990, 93). Sometimes later, a special school for the Jewish community was established in Sanandaj by the French Alliance Israelite. These schools taught modern sciences and foreign languages, especially French language to their students. As a result, some Muslim families in Sanandaj were encouraged to send their children to be educated in these schools.

Since these schools were administered through people's donations and French contributions, the Qajar government made little interference in their educational content, curriculum, and methodologies. Upon the assumption of power by Reza Shah and specially the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, however, this state of affairs changed; i.e., the state contributed financially to these minority religious schools and accepted to pay for some of their expenditures. In return, these schools were now required to follow programs and curriculum set forth by the Iranian Ministry of Education. This meant that these schools were required to teach the Persian language and literature and Iranian history and geography to their students. By examining new archival sources, the present research endeavors to review the effect of Reza Shah's

cultural and educational policies on schools belonging to religious minorities residing in Sanandaj, particularly by its Chaldean Catholics and Alliance Israelite School.

It is noteworthy that, in recent years invaluable works have been published regarding the religious minorities' schools in Iran, such as those studies by Homa Nateq (Nateq, 1990; Nateq, 1996), Abutalib Soltanian (Soltanian, 2010, 57–80; Soltanian, 2011, 63–84), and Aniseh Sheikh Rezaei (Sheikh Rezaei, 1992, 95–109). In addition, Nour al-Din Ne'mati and Mazhar Edway (Ne'mati & Edway, 2013, 153–172), in their joint article have reviewed the effects of the modern education system on Jewish schools in Iran. Nonetheless none of the mentioned studies have dealt so much with the status of religious minorities' schools in the city of Sanandaj during Reza Shah's reign and have only sufficed themselves with providing a brief history of the construction of such schools in this city. The present research has adopted a descriptive-explanatory approach, taking advantage of primary sources particularly archived documents, not available to the previous authors, in order to review and analyze Reza Shah's cultural policies and the effect of these policies on the position of Jewish and Christian minority schools in Sanandaj.

THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN
SANANDAJ'S HISTORY

Sanandaj is the capital city of Iranian Kurdistan Province which was established during reign of Ardalans (as a vassal to the Persian Safavid Dynasty) in 1636 by Suleyman Khan Ardalani. The geographical location, climatic condition, and economic advantages of Sanandaj not only attracted the Muslim Kurds (both Sunnis and Shiites) to the city, but also attracted some followers of other Abrahamic religions, such as Jews and Christians.¹ For

¹ The history of the presence of Jews and Christians in Iran goes back to 3,000 years ago when they were forced to migrate from Jerusalem and the Holy Land to Assyria, Babel, and central and western parts of Iran during a couple of consecutive decades. In 750 BC and almost 200 years before the establishment of the Achaemenid Dynasty, for instance, a group of Jews were enslaved and brought to Gilliard Region which nowadays is called Damavand Reign. After the conquest of Babel by Cyrus the Great in 539 BC, Jews were allowed to return to Jerusalem and Canaan, which were part of the Achaemenid territory and reconstruct the Solomon's Temple. However, some of them remained in Iran and maintained their religion and culture freely (Foltz, 2013, 77). The Bible has referred to Cyrus the Great's tolerance towards the Jews. Therefore, they consider him as one of the saviors of Jews (The Book of Ezra 1, 2–3, Nehemiah & Ester 7). The emergence of Christianity in Iran dates back to the time of Parthian Empire. Between 70 AC to 80 AC, some Mesopotamian cities, such as Arbela, Odesa, and Nusaybin, which were parts of the Parthian Empire converted to Christianity. Since people in these cities were Aramaic/Syriac speaking and had lingual and cultural affiliations with Syriac-speaking cities in the Roman Territory, such as Antioch, inviting people to convert to Christianity was developing very rapidly. In addition, Syriac-language Jews were concentrated in Mesopotamia and western parts of Iran. Meanwhile, the primary Christian missionaries, who were trying to promote the new religion, were speaking the same language. The Acts of the Apostles refers to Median and Parthian people who had traveled to Jerusalem on the occasion of Pentecost Celebrations (Roshdi, 2006, 14–16). Unlike Syriac-speaking communities in Mesopotamia and coasts of the Persian Gulf, in which Christianity was flourished rapidly, this religion was not so common among Aryans and in the Iranian Plateau up to at least 2nd century AD. The issue of language was the main obstacle for the flourishment of Christianity. In addition, the lower levels of culture, arid climate of central Iran, and lack of the Greek philosophical traditions – like the one developed in Roman Empire and Mesopotamia, were man obstacles that hindered the development of Christianity in the Iranian Plateau. When Christianity was adopted as the official religion in the Roman territories and Zoroastrianism became the state religion in Iran, the Sassanid Dynasty prevented the promotion of Christianity in its territory (Roshdi, 2006, 18–19). Concurrent with the promotion and development of Christianity in Syriac-speaking cities and Jewish communities in Mesopotamia and Western Iran, Christianity was gradually adopted by Assyrians and Armenians, which were parts of the Parthian Empire, in 2nd century AD. Therefore, Assyrians and Armenians were first communities who welcomed Christianity. It can, therefore, be argued that the beginning of the development of Christianity in Iran is intertwined with the history of this country. In other words, we can say that first Christians were living in the Iranian territory (Bradley, 2008, 197).

this reason, Sanandaj was not a religiously homogenous city when the Qajars emerged as rulers of Iran. In this regard, one of the local historians of that period in 1901 referred to Sanandaj as a city with “diverse communities” (Ne’mati & Edway, 2013, 17). Considering the fact that western parts of Iran, and especially Kurdistan, have been a key center for the Jewish culture and community in Iran and the Middle East (Kohan, 2013, 189)², the Jews have attached such special importance to the city of Sanandaj that they have referred to it as a “small Jerusalem” (Kohan, 2013, 190). There are, however, different assessment regarding the number of Jewish and Christian families living in Sanandaj. James C. Rich, the British politician and diplomat who traveled to Iran in 1820, reported that 50 Chaldean Catholic and 200 Jewish families were living in Sanandaj (Rich, 2002, 198). A century later, Vladimir Minorsky mentioned that there were 60 Chaldean Catholic and 500 Jewish families in Sanandaj in 1918 (Minorsky, 2007, 67). Razmara, a military commander of the Reza Shah Period, elaborated on the geographical situation and location of Kurdistan and reported that 50 Christian and 300 Jewish families were residing in Sanandaj (Razmara, 1941, 24). Then there is another report dating back to Reza Shah’s period which puts the Jewish and Christians number of the city up to 3,000 and 1,500 respectively (Mohseni, 1948I, 111).

Religious minorities residing in Sanandaj, including Jews and Christians, were free in observing their religious rituals and had their own peculiar worshipping centers. Christians had a church in Sanandaj which had been constructed over the ruins of the older church in 1840 (Minorsky, 2007, 77) and “Muslims could hear the sound of its bell every morning and evening” (Vaqa’at-e Negar-e Kurdestani, 2002, 17). The Jews meanwhile had three synagogues in Sanandaj and had a separate cemetery, which was 300 years old (Kohan, 2013, 191).

Eugène Boré, the leading Lazarist French missionary, during his time in Iran, writes that Iranian Christians, as a religious minority in a majority Muslim society, enjoy proper freedoms and in comparison, to other religious minorities such as Jews and Zoroastrians, have a better living condition (Boré, 1840, 272). Such was the state of affairs in Sanandaj, too³.

During Reza Shah’s reign, there were also records that Iranians of Jewish and Christians minorities were employed in governmental offices. In 1929, for instance, a Christian was the head of the Sanandaj Post Office and a couple Christians had been employed in the Financial Department of the city (NLAI, 1935, sheet 2). Employment of some members of the Jewish and Christian communities in governmental organizations in Sanandaj can arguably be considered as one of the main consequences of the establishment of modern French schools during the Qajar Period and the enhancement of literacy rates among religious minorities in the city. Also, it can be regarded as an indicator of the elevation of their social position during the Reza Shah Period.

HISTORY OF FOREIGN SCHOOLS IN IRAN AND KURDISTAN DURING THE QAJAR PERIOD

The first modern-styled European schools in Iran were established during the Qajar dynasty for Chaldean-Assyrian Christians outside Iranian Kurdistan in the city of Urmia and nearby villages in 1838 by Protestant American missionaries. Due to the lower population of Christians in Kurdistan, the first Lazarist School was established in Sanandaj with delay, i.e., in 1894. The school was run by Reverend Father Hilarion Montague, head of the Lazarists in Iran. This school was mostly involved in teaching the French language and its expenses were covered by Lazarists in Tehran

2 The city of Ur, located in Mesopotamia, is the birthplace of Prophet Abraham and Jews consider themselves as this prophet’s descendants. Therefore, this city is considered as the second sacred place by Jews. In addition, Jews were often forced to migrate to Mesopotamia by Assyrians and Babylonian monarchs as a result of which a relatively huge community of Jews was established in this region. When Cyrus the Great conquered Babylonia, some of these Jews did not return to Jerusalem and preferred to remain in Babylonia, which had become part of the Achaemenid Empire. Some of them preferred to migrate to western parts of Iran and reside in cities such as Ctesiphon, Jondishapour, Shush, Ahwaz, Shoushtar, Hamadan, and Nahavand. They established a township in Isfahan called “Yahoudieh” (Miskawayh Razi, 1987, 257). Tombs of great Jewish prophets are spread throughout the western cities of Iran. There are 17 such tombs in Iran, such as the tomb of Daniel in Shoush, the tomb of Isaiah in Isfahan, the tomb of Ezekiel in Dezful, the tomb of Esther and Mordechai in Hamadan, and the tomb of Kedar in the city of Qeydar in Zanjan Province. The existence of such tombs has been another motivation for the continuous presence of Jews in western parts of Iran since old times (Fawzi Tuyserkani, 2016, 72–73). After the emergence of Christianity, Jewish communities in Mesopotamia and western Iran converted to the new religion. In fact, early Christian missionaries were Syriac/Aramaic speaking and had lingual and cultural commonalities with the people of these regions. Meanwhile, green and flourished cities of western Iran, compared with arid deserts of central Iranian Plateau, were more attractive for Jews and Christians. People in cities of western Iran were less religiously biased and Jews and Christians preferred to live in the western parts of Iran, which were proximate to the territory of Roman Empire and their fellow-religion people. Upon the acceptance of Christianity by Armenia in the beginning of the 4th century AD, an epicenter of Eastern Church was created in Caucasus which was gradually extended in west and northwest of Iran. As a result, large groups of people converted to Gregorian Christianity in different cities of Azerbaijan, such as Tabriz, Urmia, and Salmas. Following the migration of Armenians to western parts of Iran and centers of political power such as Isfahan and Hamadan, the number of Christians in Iran increased dramatically. As a result of these migrations, Armenians form the greatest number of Christians in contemporary Iran (Foltz, 2013, 131).

3 Sanandaj was traditionally the key trade centers in western Iran and located on its main trade routes (Minorsky, 2007, 67). The majority of Jews residing in Sanandaj were therefore involved in trade and commercial activities accumulating extensive wealth (Oubene, 1983, 345).

Table 1: Number of Jewish and Christian Communities' Schools and their Students and Teachers.

Academic year	Number of schools				Number of students				Number of graduated students				Number of teachers			
	Jewish Alliance		Chaldean Christians		Jewish Alliance		Chaldean Christians		Jewish Alliance		Chaldean Christians		Jewish Alliance		Chaldean Christians	
1928–1929	1	-	1	-	148	-	51	-	-	-	4	-	6	-	7	-
1929–1930	1	1	1	-	90	45	63	-	-	-	-	-	10	1	6	-
1930–1931	1	1	1	-	193	41	70	-	2	-	4	-	7	1	7	-
1931–1932	1	1	1	-	202	45	80	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	6	-
1932–1933	1	1	1	-	220	47	97	-	6	-	1	-	12	-	7	-
1933–1934	1	-	1	-	178	-	132	-	4	-	4	-	6	-	6	-
1934–1935	1	-	1	-	180	-	126	-	3	-	5	-	7	-	6	-
1935–1936	1	-	1	-	164	-	104	-	9	-	-	-	10	-	5	-
1936–1937	1	-	-	-	135	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	8	-	-	-
1937–1938	1	-	-	-	144	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-
1938–1939	1	-	-	-	154	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-
1939–1940	1	-	-	-	190	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-
1940–1941	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1941–1942	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(Nateq, 1996, 203–204). In a report written by Lazarist authorities, which provides statistics over the number of Lazarist schools in Iran in 1905, it is mentioned that “there is a school for Catholic Armenians” in Sanandaj “with 2 teachers and 25 pupils” (Nateq, 1996, 219).

In their initial stage, the Lazarist schools in Iran had a 4-year curriculum with courses on Old and Modern Syriac language, religious scriptures, French language, Persian language, mathematics, history, geography, history of philosophy, religious jurisprudence, religious tenets, and songs (Nateq, 1996, 171). In the beginning, Lazarist schools were mostly concentrated on religious education and religious promotion among the Christian community in Iran in order to compete with American Protestant missionaries. Nevertheless, these schools gradually moved towards adopting a temporal approach and incorporated the curricula on modern sciences and foreign or indigenous languages. As a result, many Muslims, too, were attracted by these schools.

Alliance Israelite School was another school established by religious minorities in Sanandaj during the Qajar Period. Preparations for the establishment

of the first branch of Alliance Israelite School in Iran were made during Naseraddin Shah's trip to Paris in 1872. However, their first school was not established up until 1898 - during Muzaffareddin Shah's reign. In 1898, the first boys-only Alliance Israelite School was established for Jews in Tehran. It should be mentioned that a couple of years before the establishment of this school, Jews residing in Sanandaj dispatched a letter to the Alliance Israelite in Paris and requested for the establishment of a school in their city so that they can enhance their social position (Levy, 1960, 772). The Hamadan branch of Alliance Israelite schools was opened in 1900. One year later, the Isfahan branch was inaugurated (A'lame Yahoud, 1954). In 1904, Alliance Israelite also opened its branches in the Iranian cities of Shiraz, Kermanshah, and Sanandaj (Nateq, 1996, 140–146). The Sanandaj branch was administered by a couple, the Hayouns, who had previously been involved in teaching activities under the supervision of instructors in the Isfahan branch (Nateq, 1996, 145). The Christian community of Sanandaj did not however welcome the establishment of the Alliance Israelite School in

this city. According to a report by the head of Lazarists in Sanandaj, "There are a lot of Jews in the city of Sennah (Sanandaj) and they have opened a big school in this city that teaches all languages. This is a great danger for Christians" (Nateq, 1996, 147). Sometime after the establishment of the Alliance Israelite School in Sanandaj, another branch of this school was opened in the city of Bijar. Such schools were established through the contributions of *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, a Paris-based international Jewish organization. As a matter of fact, providing cultural and economic support for the Jews all around the world was the main objective of establishing such schools (Ne'mati & Edway, 2013, 88).

As reported by Ahmad Moqbel, who was the agent of the Education Department of Kurdistan in 1922, in addition to the two state schools of Ahmadiyah and Ettehad in Sanandaj, there were two other schools in this city, one belonging to Christians and the other to the Jews. This report also refers to the dire financial condition of the Alliance Israelite School in Sanandaj at the time. Moqbel's report then suggests that Alliance Israelite in Tehran and the French embassy should be encouraged to "pay their contributions to the Sanandaj branch as before" (NLAI, 1922, Sheet 6–7).

In table (1) the number of schools, students, and teachers from the Jewish and Christian communities have been shown in a categorized form by the years of the reign of Reza Shah.

During that time, many Muslims, and especially the rich families of Sanandaj, were used to send their children to any of these two schools. Most Muslim children were, however, sent to the Jewish schools. One of the reasons that Muslims were interested in Alliance Israelite schools was the fact that the curriculum did not have or promote Judaism.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF REZA SHAH'S INITIATIVES AND POLICIES FOR IRANIAN NATIONAL UNITY

Iran's exposition to western civilization dates back to pre-19th century. When Iran experienced consecutive and irreparable failures in its wars with Russia, however, Iranian identity was faced with various challenges and crises. Between 1801 and 1828, Iranians signed two agreements of Golestan and Turkamanchai with Russia as a result of which Iran lost large swaths of its territory in Caucasus. This failure threatened Iran's national authority and the country's dispersed political power as a result of which Iranian political, social, and economic life was fundamentally transformed.

Iranian society in the 19th century was a multi-ethnic society comprised of ethnicities such as Persians, Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, Turkmans, Gilaks, etc. In addition to ethno-cultural differences, Iranians were also divided along the sectarian lines of Shiism and Sunnism. Muslims and non-Muslims of Iran had also their own

differences. At the same time, old differences between nomadic life and urban/rural life have always been considered as a source of division within the Iranian demographic, political, and economic structure and have created complicated dilemmas for the country. These features along with linguistic differences created an image of 19th-century Iran, which was a multi-ethnic, dispersed, and often nomadic society. Despite all these divergences and ethno-religious difference, Iranian society had managed to maintain its existence and unity as an ancient country. Before the wars of early 19th century between Iran and Russia, Iranian integrity and unity had been maintained, because of the existence of ancient structures of governance in the country. In addition, there were firm cultural and civilizational bonds, such as the Persian language and common history, which had connected various Iranian ethnicities (Atabaki, 2001, 80).

Following Iran's humiliating defeat from Russia and the loss of extensive swaths of its territory, Iranian society was faced with a crisis and its structural unity was undermined. Iran's failures from Russia were vitally important incidents, because these failures influenced Iranian political and ideational structure. These failures were not limited to just politico-military spheres or merely loss of territorial integrity of the country. Following the conclusion of Turkamanchai Agreement, however, a legal basis was created in Iran-Russia relations and in the foreign policy of Iran which is referred to as "positive balance". This imposed policy forced Iran to give balanced politico-economic concessions to Russia and Britain. The policy of "positive balance" continued even after the collapse of Qajar Dynasty and it was pursued even during the Pahlavi Period and up to the eve of the Oil Nationalization Movement. It was only in a short period of time, i.e. during the premiership of Amir Kabir, that Iran adopted a policy of "negative balance". During this short period, Iran did not give any concessions to foreign powers and adopted an independent policy toward them.

During the whole 19th century, Iranian foreign policy was influenced by the bipolar paradigm of Russia and Britain. These two countries had totally extensive influence in Iran. As a result, other actors and powers were unable to practice any influence in Iranian politic-economic affairs. As a matter of fact, all efforts by Iranian politicians and leaders to introduce a third power into Iranian political and economic affairs and reduce the influence of Russia and Britain were doomed to failure (Ali Soufi, 2010, 213). In several occasions in 19th century, for instance, Iranian politicians endeavored to provide opportunities for getting American and French governments involved in political affairs of their country. However, Russia and Britain synergized their efforts and prevented the American and French governments from playing any role in Iran (Homa Katouzian, 2007, 231–232).

Iranian intellectuals and statesmen were greatly concerned of all these issues during the whole 19th century. They were looking for solutions to get rid of these problems and move the country toward progress and development. These mental and practical endeavors resulted in the formation of a reform movement. Reformists such as Abbas Mirza, Qaem Maqam Farahani, and Amir Kabir were forerunners of this movement all of whom were statesmen of the Qajar Period. These individuals were concerned about their country and its development. They are considered as early Iranian nationalists who advocated the existence of a powerful central government with a mighty and permanent army.

Following Iran-Russia wars and the evolution of reformist movement, the Iranian social identity – which was an amalgamation of ancient traditions, eastern monarchism, Islamic thought, and Shiism – underwent tremendous shifts. Influenced by European worldviews, which were promoted by Europe-educated thinkers and statesmen, the Iranian society resorted to a new identity based on nationalism. Iranian nationalism was, at the outset, a reaction to aggressions of great colonial powers and adopted an anti-despotism nature in its internal and domestic dimension (Katem, 1999, 65). Influenced by orientology and thoughts of theorists, such as Schlegel, Gobineau, and Gustav Le Bon, Iranian educated classes – the majority of whom had received modern Western education – used nationalism and ethnic consciousness as instruments for creating an integrated national unity (Vaziri, 1991, 214).

Iran's humiliated status and its comparison with past grandeur, especially the ancient-times grandeur, had created a nostalgic feeling among Iranian elites which was dependent on public, intellectual, and political mobilization for saving the country from its current state of affairs. This consciousness toward past Iranian history and the grandiose of this history along with feeling humiliated because of the current condition of the country are reflected in the works of poets, writers, and political elites of Iran both before and after the Iranian Constitutional Movement (Ahmadi, 2011, 145).

In such an atmosphere, Islam was highlighted as a collective identity rather than a religious ritual tradition which should have been used for strengthening the nationalism. Confrontation with Arabs and omission and marginalization of clergies – pursued with whatever intention – created a kind of radical and intolerant nationalism which was fascinated with the grandeur of ancient Iranian monarchies. This nationalism stood against Islam. Its outcome was nothing but efforts for undermining the Islam (Homa Katouzian, 1981, 125). This kind of nationalism attached great importance to national identity. It prioritized national identity over all subnational,

lingual, local, or regional identities. Based on this principle, which is deemed as a kind of political ideology, the only accepted form of governance was national governance. It highlighted history, culture, shared mythology, official language, common bitter or sweet memories, etc. Iranian national identity and Iranian nationalism were, therefore, formed during political upheavals of the 19th century and concurrent with developments such as the Constitutional Revolution and World War I (Atabaki, 2006, 190).

This new identity was formed within the context of history. Developments such as World War I, foreign interference, efforts to impose the so-called 1919 Agreement on Iran, decadence of authority of the central government, emergence of separatist groups and local resurgent factions, made it necessary to establish a powerful central government, modern military forces, bureaucratic infrastructures, and ultimately create national unity (Amanat, 2017, 433–434). Egalitarianism, freedom-seeking spirit, and romantic nationalism were inspiring forces for the first generation of Iranian intellectuals and their efforts for introducing change and reform throughout the country. However, Iranian intellectuals emerging after World War I were influenced by developments in Germany, Italy, and Portugal. These groups of intellectuals considered political authoritarianism and lingual nationalism as necessary and efficient factors in the materialization of their dreams (Atabaki & Zürcher, 2006, 93).

They believed that European-based pattern of development exemplifies an integrated society explicitly formed according to concepts of nation and state. They also argued that only an authoritarian and integrated government can introduce reform in society and, at the same time, protect the country's unity and territorial integrity. As a matter of fact, different societies were dreaming of establishing powerful and competent governments in the post-World-War-I period. Due to crises in modern structures of identity, this dream was evolved immediately after World War I. Various intellectuals, including Hussein Kazemzadeh Iranshahr, Mahmud Afshar Yazdi, Ahmad Kasravi, Malek al-Shoara Bahar, Ali Akbar Siasi, and Seyed Hassan Taqizadeh – despite their different attitudes – believed that democratic dreams and visions of the Constitutional Revolution are not so much attractive and cannot settle the problems. Therefore, they argued that society should move toward establishing an intellectual and reformist dictatorship in order to get prepared for accepting a social revolution (Vahdat, 2002, 129).

Such a system – referred to as the National State – was the outcome of a confluence of nationalism and statesmanship. From one hand, this system was

an advocate of the empowerment and enhancement of the state authority. From the other hand, it was endeavoring to create an identity-making and a unity-promoting atmosphere according to which all cultural elements were required to pursue a prevalent official norm (Vincent, 1992, 134). In such circumstance, Reza Khan rose to power and various groups of intellectuals and statesmen welcomed his ascendance in the political hierarchy. In addition, Reza Khan – like many military leaders of the 20th century – had a special personality and a peculiar military discipline which were compatible with views and attitudes of the intellectuals of that period (Ansari, 2003, 48).

Reza Khan had clearly witnessed foreign interference in Iranian affairs during the Qajar Period. He had seen how Iran had been occupied by states that were at war with each other during World War I. Therefore, Reza Khan knew how to build a modern Iran which can protect its independence based on the pattern that had turned out to be common in the post-World-War-I period. This pattern was based on the concept of modern state supported by its powerful army derived from Iranian nationalism.

Appealing intellectual effects of the Constitutional Movement and emergence of western-educated classes among the ruling elites were major factors that encouraged Reza Shah to move the country toward modernization. Nevertheless, we cannot deny Reza Shah's role in the establishment of Iranian modern army, integration of Iran, unification of dress codes, development of roads, ratification of the law of compulsory military service, establishment of National Organization for Civil Registration, etc. and their effects on the creation of national unity in the country. Undoubtedly, these initiatives were not rooted in Reza Shah's military spirit. Rather, they were the crystallization of wishes and ideals of intellectuals who believed that the only way to follow Western civilization is getting distanced from religious traditions prevalent in Iranian society (Foran, 1992, 349).

Iranian nationalism was crystallized in the cultural behavior of the Pahlavi Dynasty within the context of xenophobic approaches and through expressing hatred toward whatever element deemed as non-Iranian. Later on, European culture was excluded and Islamic culture along with Arabic language was put at the center of these assaults (Safaei, 1978, 91). According to Reza Shah's pattern of identity, centralism was the means for introducing modernism into Iranian society. It was deemed as the proper context for giving legitimacy to the ideology of nationalism. In this period, the state-oriented outlook was basically concentrated on seeking a unity and an integrity whose ultimate purpose was creating a theoretical framework for

unifying the tribes, groups, and factions living in a specific geographical domain or ruled over by the state and government (Kashani-Sabet, 2002, 162).

In pursuing his modernist objectives, Reza Shah was mainly influenced by Mostafa Kamal Atatürk and his plans and programs for modern Turkey. Influenced by the Turkish leader's thoughts and initiatives, Reza Shah pursued his secularization and Westernization policies. Reza Shah had several important similarities with his Turkish counterpart and followed his example: military dictatorship, development of militaristic spirit in the society, and promotion of extremist nationalism (Atatürk was promoting pan-Turkism in Turkey and Reza Shah advocated a kind of nationalism based on ancient Iranian history and a return to pre-Islamic Iranian civilization). During this period, both Iran and Turkey adopted policies based on Westernization patterns and the example of European countries. Modernization pattern in both countries were based on authoritarian development. As a result, modernization was imposed on both societies from top to the bottom. Both Iran and Turkey were moving toward secularism, albeit with different paces in each country. In Turkey, this process was accompanied with anti-religion practices. However, anti-religious practices in Iran were not as severe as those in Turkey (Volkan, 2017, 223).

In his only foreign trip in June 1924, Reza Shah travelled to Turkey and adopted most of the modern and secular policies of the Turkish leader. Some of these policies are as follows: he established numerous state-controlled schools throughout the country which undermined the position of religious schools supervised by clerics; he substituted traditionally-educated judges with lawyers that had received academic and Western-type education; he revoked the prerogative right of clerics in establishing notary offices and transferred this right to non-religious individuals; he controlled the number of clerics and reduced their number through implementing the law of the unified dressing code and making it compulsory upon clerics to participate in exams in order to receive the permission to wear the cleric's cloths and turbans; he prohibited or limited the observation of many religious rituals, such as Ta'zieh Rituals which were practiced on the occasion of Imam Hussein's martyrdom; he confiscated religious endowed properties on behalf of the state; and he prohibited Iranians from wearing the Pahlavi hat after his return from Turkey and made compulsory upon people to wear international hats (Movasaghi, 2001, 156–157).

Despite similarities between Reza Shah and Atatürk in pursuing their Westernization and secularization policies, a comparison of their initiatives indicates that these initiatives are greatly different

in terms of intensity and diversity. Atatürk, for instance, introduced some initiatives which were not implemented in Iran. Some of these initiatives were as follows: declaring Turkey as a laic state; revoking the religious hierarchy and religious position of Sheikh al-Eslam; shutting down the Khanqahs (buildings designed specifically for gatherings of a Sufi brotherhood); prohibiting the use of religious symbols; formulating a European and anti-Islam civil law; changing the Turkish alphabet and calendar; making it mandatory to recite Quran, prayers, and Azan in Turkish language; and substituting Friday with Sunday as the Sabbath (Koca, 2020, 359). In fact, it was impossible to carry out such initiatives in Iran. Unlike the religious position of Sheikh al-Eslam, which was a state-controlled position, the Shiite *Marjaeyat* had been an independent institution during the whole history of Iran. Therefore, Reza Shah was unable to revoke the position of Shiite *Marjaeyat*. In the Turkish civil law, which was mainly derived from the Swiss laws, men are not allowed to have more than one wife; women are eligible to have the right of divorce; Muslim women are allowed to marry with non-Muslim men; men and women are considered as equal, including in their ransom and inheritance; people are free to change their religion; Muslims and non-Muslims are deemed as equal; and Islamic penal laws are revoked (Coskun Can, 1997, 168). Iranian civil law was ratified by parliament in 1928. Despite the fact that general provisions of Iranian civil law were mainly translations from French laws, legal issues that deal with personal affairs were derived from Islamic law and jurisprudence (Makki, 1994, 323).

NATIONALISM, CULTURAL HOMOGENIZATION, AND EDUCATION SYSTEM

According to intellectuals of the Reza Shah era, the existence of different tribes and multiple ethnicities in Iran is considered as one of the major threats against the Iranian national unity.

Therefore, they argued that after establishing order and serenity in the country, the government, as its most important responsibility, is to promote nation-building principles and strengthen the bases of national identity through advancing the idea of nationalism. The intellectuals also believed that the establishment of modern state in Iran requires less cultural diversity and greater tribal homogeneity. Intellectuals and cultural officials during Reza Shah's reign consequently considered national unity as the eradication of all existing differences in terms of lifestyle, dress code, language, etc. This perception of national unity, which can be described as 'cultural homogenization', was concentrated on creating a totally united and homogenous nation through combining the diverse ethnicities, languages, and religious sects existing in the country.

Statesmen and intellectuals of Reza Shah's era were quite aware of the historical role of the Farsi language in strengthening national unity amongst all Iranian peoples (Atabaki & Zürcher, 2004, 246). They believed that the existence of different local languages and dialects among Iranians was a serious obstacle to establishing a centralized political system and achieving national unity in the country (The Cambridge History of Iran, 1991, vii, 231). Therefore, they argued, the government was required to mobilize all its material, spiritual, and propaganda potentials for the development of Farsi in those regions of the country which did not speak Farsi.⁴

As a matter of fact, Reza Shah's government and many intellectuals of that period were mainly concentrated on centralism and national unity among different Iranian ethnicities. According to them, concentration on nation-building and cultural homogenization among different Iranian ethnicities through promoting and strengthening the Farsi language was the best way to achieve these objectives.

As a result of the existence of an ancient-history-based nationalistic ideology, western-oriented and secular modernization objectives and programs, and national unity ideals, Reza Shah put the

4 Due to ethnic and lingual diversity in Iran, the concept of nation in this country is a multi-ethnic and imbalanced concept. According to demographic statistics of Iran in 1930s, Persians comprised some 70 percent of the country's population. Azeris with 15 to 17 percent of Iranian population were the second largest ethnic group in Iran. Sunni and Shiite Kurds living in west of Iran constituted 5 percent of the country's population and were the third largest ethnic group in Iran. Arabs living in southwest of Iran and Baluchis residing in southeast of country constituted 3 and 2 percent of the Iranian population, respectively (Hafeznia, 2002, 147). According to the census, 98 percent of Iranian population were Muslims out of which 90 percent were Shiites and 8 percent were Sunnis. After Muslims, Christians constituted 0.87 percent of the Iranian population and were deemed as the second religious group in the country. Zoroastrians and Jews constituted 0.56 and 0.58 percent of the country's population, respectively (Iranian Statistics Center, 1951, 8). Various Iranian ethnicities have always considered Persian language as their common cultural asset. This language has unified different ethnic groups and religious denominations living within the boundaries of cultural geography of Iran. All of them have played their role in the development of the Persian language. During the Constitutional Movement and following the development of printing industry and circulation of newspapers in Iran, the Persian language went through a simplification process and was further promoted in different parts of the country. During Reza Shah's reign, Ministry of Education, Academy of Persian Literature, and mass media contributed to the omission of alien terminologies from the Persian language. Through coining new terminologies, these institutions introduced new standard words and the Persian language was used as the official language in the education system of the country (Safaei, 1977, 66).

education reform on the top of his political and social agenda of modernization program in Iran (Rahmanian, 2016, 214).⁵ By taking advantage of educational mechanisms and prerogative monopoly on determining the form and contents of education materials (Matthee, 2007, 335), the government was trying to transfer its preferred values regarding the favourable social identity to its citizens (Akbari, 2014, 271).

In order to promote the government-sponsored ideology through public schools, the state had to practice its prerogative control over educational programs, the curriculum and textbooks. During this period and concurrent with the establishment of public schools in different parts of the country, especially ethnical regions such as Kurdistan, the government imposed constraints on private and foreign schools and religious educational institutions and practiced its prerogative control over the compilation of textbooks.

FOREIGN AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO FOLLOW THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION'S PROGRAM DURING REZA SHAH'S REIGN

By the end of the Qajar dynasty, an integrated educational system had not been formed in the country, and the Qajar rulers had little involvement in the management of administration of schools.

Furthermore, Iran's geopolitical position turned this country into the epicenter of competitions between its two major neighbors, i.e. Russia in north and UK in south. During 19th century, Russia's policy was concentrated on getting access to the Persian Gulf. Russians did whatever they could to materialize the abovementioned objective, i.e. war with Iran in the early decades of the 19th century and annexation of Caucasus cities to Russia based on Golestan and Turkamanchai Agreements; expanding Russia's influence in Central Asia and annexation of some cities of this region to the Russian territory through imposing Akhal Agreement on Iran; and dividing Iran between Russia and Britain based on 1907 Agreement. The British policy in the 19th century was concentrated on protecting its extensive and huge colony in India. As a result, Iran's foreign policy – and even its domestic policy – was totally influenced by these two states. The only sphere in which other European states, such as France and the US, were allowed to participate was the sphere of education and religious missionary activities. In fact, there was no comprehensive education system during the Qajar Period. As a result, Western Christian missionaries were provided with an opportunity to establish public education and charity centers and pursue their religious education and propagation objectives as freely as possible. Christian missionaries arrived in Iran during the reign of Mohammad Shah Qajar. The French Lazarist Catholic missionaries along with two protestant missionaries

5 Ancient Iranian history refers to the pre-Islamic history of Iran. This ancient history is divided into two periods: the period before the arrival of Aryans in Iran; and the period after their arrival. Pre-Aryan ancient Iranian history is associated with the names of civilizations existing in Iranian Plateau which are dated back to as much as 5,000 years BC. For instance, we can refer to the civilization of Shahr-e Soukhteh (or burned city) in Sistan and Elam Civilization in Khuzestan which lasted from 4,000 BC up to 1,000 BC; Jiroft Civilization in Kerman, Tepe Hissar Civilization in Damghan, Tepe Sialk in Kashan, Uratu Civilization in Azerbaijan, etc. Since 1,000 BC, migrant Aryan tribes resided in Iranian Plateau (Diakonoff, 2001, 65). Among Aryan tribes residing in Iranian Plateau, the Medes were the first one that established a state headquartered in Hamadan, west of Iran, from 713 BC up to 550 BC. Establishment of the Median Empire is considered as a turning point in the ancient Iranian history, because it was the beginning of the Aryans' surge toward establishment of ruling dynasties, which continued afterwards (Pigulevskaya *et al.*, 1974, 12–13). In 550 BC, Cyrus captured the Median territory. He was the head of Pars Tribe, an Aryan tribe and a relative to the Medes. From 545 BC up to 539 BC, Cyrus captured major cities such as Balkh, Merv, and Sogdia and laid the foundation of an extensive kingdom. In 539 BC, he conquered Babylon, the politico-cultural center of the ancient Near East, and established the biggest kingdom of the world up to that time. After defeating Nabonidus, the last Babylonian king and conquering Babylon in 538 BC, Cyrus issued his famous charter, known as Cyrus Cylinder. The Cyrus Cylinder can be considered as the first charter of human rights. Achaemenid Empire reached its greatest extent during the reign of Darius I. the Achaemenid Dynasty was toppled by Alexander III of Macedon (also known as Alexander the Great). He defeated Darius III, the last Achaemenid king, in several wars in Mesopotamia. The final defeat happened in Darband in 330 BC as a result of which the Achaemenid Dynasty came to an end. When Alexander died confrontation and rivalry began among his successors. Finally, a Seleucid-Hellenic empire was established in Iran in 312 BC by Seleucus. Alien Seleucid Empire ruled over Iran for almost 150 years. In 247 BC, however, Arsaces I of Parthia, the leader of one of the Parthian tribes known as Parni Tribe, separated Parthia from the Seleucid Empire and declared its independence. Parthia was located in southeast of Caspian Sea and Arsaces I was ruling over this territory. After Arsaces I, his brother Tiridates I, defeated the Seleucid army and recaptured the lost cities and territories of the Achaemenids. He established the Parthian Empire in 238 BC. During the reign of Mithridates I, the Parthian Empire reached to greatest extent of its power and revived Achaemenid territory. Ruling over Iran for 470 years, the Parthian Empire had the longest reign of a dynasty in the ancient Iran. Following the defeat of the last Parthian monarch, Artabanus V, in a war with Ardahir Babakan, founder of the Sassanid Empire in 224 AD, the Parthian Empire was collapsed and substituted by the Sassanid Empire (Wiesehöfer, 2001, 198–201). During its reign, the Sassanid Dynasty had colossal civilization achievements for Iran and the world. Sassanid monarchs ruled over Iran from 224 AD up to 651 AD, when their dynasty was overthrown by Muslim Arabs. Following the collapse of the Sassanid Dynasty, the era of ancient Iran came to an end and the Islamic Period began in the country (Pigulevskaya *et al.*, 1974, 67). Iranian romantic nationalists of the 19th and 20th centuries have always depicted Iran's ancient history as a period of grandeur and glory – unlike the Islamic Period of Iranian history. Following archeological discoveries in Iran and decoding the Iranian ancient history by orientalist and Iranologists, such images and ideas were introduced in Iranian books and the education system of the period of Constitutional Movement. When the Pahlavi Dynasty was established, the Iranian government adopted the promotion of Iranian ancient history as its official ideology.

from UK and US came to Iran and were granted the license of doing religious and educational activities in the country (Torabi Farsani, 2011, 83).

Out of these 3 missionaries, the American one managed to establish its first school in Iran in January 18, 1836. Since then up to the end of Qajar Period, numerous schools were established in different Iranian cities by European and American missionary groups. Supported by the embassies of their respective countries in Iran, these missionary groups were involved in intensive competitions for receiving concessions from the Iranian government and gaining influence among minority Christians, especially the Armenians and the Assyrians (Soltanian, 2011, 69–70).

Contrary to modern education system adopted by missionary groups, Iranian education system was mainly based on traditional patterns supervised by religious clerics. Higher education was pursued in religious seminary schools. Influenced by modern education system in Europe, some statesmen of the Qajar Period gradually embarked on expanding modern education throughout the country and established modern schools, first, in major cities and then developed such schools in other parts of Iran. This important development was further intensified after the establishment of Dar al-Fonoun in 1852 (Mahboubi Ardakani, 1991, 408).

Despite extensive efforts for promoting the modern education system, only a small fraction of Iran's population was literate on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution. It was an indicator of the fact that modern education system cannot be promoted so easily in a religious and traditional society like Iranian society. In other words, mere sporadic efforts by a couple of people who were acquainted with modern education system were not sufficient for the development of this modern system throughout the country. Promotion of this modern education system was dependent on an all-out support by the state and required a formulated and regulated education plan. During the Constitutional Revolution and the formation of Iranian Constitution, Iranian politicians and intellectuals realized the importance and necessity of promoting such a modern education system. Article 19 of Iranian Constitution stipulated: "Based on the laws of Ministry of Education, schools should be established by the state and through allocating public funds. Compulsory education is a must and all schools should be supervised and managed by the Ministry of Education." (Etehadieh, 1982, 97)

There were several articles in the Iranian Constitution which emphasized on the importance of public education. There were some provisions in the Constitution which highlighted that public education should be compulsory and free of charge. In 1911, Iranian Parliament ratified the Education Law which was comprised of 28 articles (Etehadieh, 1982, 99). Ministry of Education had relatively good achievements during this period. As a result of these efforts, the number of Iranian students increased from 57,000 in 1923 to 257,000 in 1936. During the same

period, Iran had 11,370 teachers and 4,901 schools. In 1940, there were 497,000 students, 13,646 teachers, and 8,237 schools in the country (Ivanov, 1978, 86).

While modern education system was expanding in Iran, the number of religious and seminary schools was dwindling. In the education year of 1924–1925, for instance, there were 282 religious schools, and 5,984 students went to these schools. However, in the education year of 1940–1941, the number of such schools and students who went to these schools reduced to 206 and 784, respectively. There were only 249 teachers in these seminary schools in the education year of 1940–1941 (Ivanov, 1978, 87).

Reduction of students in religious schools and increased number of students in modern schools were directly related to Reza Shah's educational and cultural policies. These policies were concentrated on introducing secularism to education system of Iran and undermining the influence of clerics in the educational affairs of the country and reducing their role in this sphere. Emphasizing on sports and military exercises, the modern education system was, in fact, an anti-thesis to the old and traditional education system in Iran.

Considering the fact that the budget of Jewish and Christian schools was provided by local people and the contributions of European countries, especially the French embassy, these schools enjoyed some independence in running their own affairs and adopting their own training syllabus.

This independence of finance and budget continued throughout the Qajar period and there were much opposition in accepting the government's official curriculum and education system by the foreign-run schools. As mentioned in Moqbel's report on Kurdistan in 1922, the two schools of Jewish and Christian minorities in Sanandaj did not implement the program introduced by the Ministry of Education: "Ministry of Education's program has by no means been implemented in these two schools and they are seriously reluctant of accepting this program". Elsewhere in his report, Moqbel refers to his negotiations with managers of these schools by convincing them to implement the Ministry of Education's program (NLAI, 1922, Sheet 7). Certainly, Iran's government at the time was unable at first to make any interference in running the affairs of these schools and any such interference was faced with strong opposition from the French embassy. On March 14, 1922, for instance, the French embassy sent a letter to Prime Minister Qavam al-Saltaneh and complained over the increased interferences of Education Department of Kermanshah in the affairs of the Alliance Israelite School there. In this letter, the French embassy threatened that "if instructions are not issued to prevent the head of the Education Department of Kermanshah from making any interference in the affairs of the Alliance Israelite School, necessary serious measures will be adopted by my government" (Farahani, 2006, 329). In another letter addressed to Qavam al-Saltaneh, the




Chart 1: Statistical Comparison of Students at Jewish and Christian Schools in Sanandaj during the Reza Shah Period.

French embassy expressed its surprise over the closure of another branch of Alliance Israelite schools and emphasized that this school acts according to instructions issued from France. In this letter, the French embassy had urged the Iranian government to allow the reopening of this Alliance Israelite school and the resumption of its activities under the protection of the French government. The letter then ended with a somewhat threatening tone that could result in retaliatory actions by the French government: “I deem it as unnecessary to further remind His Highness over this issue” (Farahani, 2006, 373).

With Reza Shah’s ascendance to power in 1925, however, the state’s non-interference in the affairs of foreign and religious minority schools came to an end. It came to an end since most of Reza Shah’s actions were rooted in his desire to practice his control and supervision on all state affairs, particularly the government’s control over the education system and the implementation of a unified curriculum as set by the state (Menashri, 1992, 137).

In order to practice its control on the curricula of religious minorities’ schools, the Reza Shah’s government, since the very beginning of Reza Shah’s rise to power, allocated some monthly financial contributions to these schools. These contributions came to the minority religious schools provided that their education syllabus would be compatible with the ratified program of the Ministry of Education including teaching Persian language and Iranian history and geography. Meanwhile, Ministry of Education’s inspectors were occasionally dispatched to these schools in order to test students in those fields (Nateq, 1996, 113).

In its report of December 16, 1926, to the Ministry of Education, the Kurdistan Education Department pointed out that a monthly contribution of 50 Tomans is paid to the Chaldean Catholics School in Sanandaj and “currently, education in this school is pursued according to the

Ministry of Education’s program and all aspects of this program, except education of Koran and Islamic scriptures, are observed there”. In this report, it has been pointed out that since students of this school are Jews and Christians, they have been allowed to learn their own religious books instead of Koran and Islamic texts. “Education Department is pleased with this success and it is expected to be honored by His Highness”, the report concluded (NLAI, 1926, Sheet 8). In 1929, Esfandiyari, the head of the Education Department of Kurdistan, in another report writes on the condition of the Chaldean Catholics School in Sanandaj complaining that this school cannot simply be run by only 55 Tomans of monthly state contributions. Referring to his efforts for convincing the Christians residing in Sanandaj to increase their donations to the school, Esfandiyari reiterates that the Christian community of the city has promised to “form a commission in near future in order to allocate some monthly donations to the school from students’ tuitions, contributions by rich individuals, and revenues obtained from the sale of alcoholic drinks”. Esfandiyari made a visit to that school and upon finding out that the Christian community “has accommodated one of their priests in this school and that priest has used the school as his personal house”, he became angry and ordered the priest to gather his belongings and leave the school immediately (NLAI, 1935, Sheet 1–2). The content of this document indicates that the Education Department of Sanandaj has practiced its supervision over the affairs of religious minorities’ schools in that city, through occasional dispatching one of its inspectors. Generally speaking, during Reza Shah’s reign, the government did accept to bear some expenditure of religious minorities’ schools, provided that it can have total control over their education syllabus and methodology. In fact, compatibility of these schools’ curricula with the Ministry of Education’s programs has been one of the preconditions for receiving the state contributions.

TEACHING THE PERSIAN LANGUAGE IN FOREIGN AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND CHANGING THEIR NAMES

Enhancement and expansion of the Persian language was one of the main missions of the official education system during Reza Shah's reign. It was considered as one of the major pillars of nationalism in order to strengthen national unity. Therefore, establishment and expansion of educational institutions in different parts of the country, especially in tribal regions, became significantly important (Dehqani *et al.*, 2017, 153). In a confidential letter to the Ministry of Interior Affairs on February 27, 1932, the governor of Kurdistan considered "the establishment of numerous schools in the city and villages and dispatching teachers from the capital to these schools" as a 'necessity'. Because the people of Kurdistan "as a result of receiving basic educations, finally are estranged from their Kurdish language and are no longer familiar with this language" (NLAI, 1931, Sheet 3).

For the promotion of the Persian language in tribal regions, the Reza Shah government did not merely suffice itself to the establishment and development of state schools in these regions. Rather, it created constraints for the usage of local languages in tribal regions and endeavored to dispatch non-indigenous teachers, who had no familiarity with the indigenous local languages in tribal areas" (Rasouli *et al.*, 2016, 85). In a circulation, issued on September 6, 1928, the Kurdistan Department of Education instructed all governmental and non-governmental schools as follows: "All school staff are obliged to observe measures for the promotion of the Persian language so that both teachers and students speak the Persian language specifically" (NLAI, 1928, Sheet 19).

Efforts for using the Persian language for educational purposes were not limited to state schools. On October 13, 1927, Ministry of Education issued a circulation that required all foreign and national schools belonging to religious minorities to "teach the Persian language to Iranian children, including Muslims, Armenians, and Assyrian, since grade one". This circulation emphasized that schools that refuse to comply with this order would be closed (NLAI, 1936d, Sheet 25). When this circulation was issued, these schools' authorities requested the Ministry of Education to exempt them from complying with its provisions. They argued that it is not common to speak the Persian language in regions in which Armenians and Assyrians are living. Therefore, they requested from the Ministry of Education to exempt these schools from observing this law and allow them to start teaching the Persian language to their students from grade three. Ministry of Education, however, rejected their request and emphasized that students "should start their education with the Persian language since the first year, i.e.

when they are 7 years old" (NLAI, 1936d, Sheet 25). A study on the curricula of religious minorities' schools in the city of Sanandaj indicates that these schools have followed the provisions of the above-mentioned circulation. According to this study, teachers in the Alliance Israelite school of Sanandaj in June 1929 taught the Persian language reading and essay writing to their students as follows: 14 hours for Grade one; 8 hours for Grade two; and 6 hours for Grades three and four (NLAI, 1936e, Sheet 3).

Establishing the Academy of Persian Language and changing the foreign names of many shops, centers, and schools were amongst the government's initiatives in this regard (Hekmat, 1976, 146). As some sources have indicated, Reza Shah hated European terminologies. For example when traveling to the city of Khorramabad in 1929 Reza Shah visited the Alliance Israelite school and was seriously infuriated upon hearing the foreign name of this school (Valizadeh, 2003, 226). In 1934, the Ministry of Education issued a circulation addressing the provincial Education Departments and urged them to oblige Armenian, American, and Alliance schools change their names and "based on their location and position, adopt a Persian name for themselves – for instance, adopt the name of one of the Iranian historical figures". This circulation recommended the provincial Education Departments "implementing this initiative immediately and reporting the outcome of their efforts in this regard" (Ettela'at, 1934, 8). Accordingly, "Le Lycée Franco-Persian" was renamed as "Razi High School"; Saint Louis School was renamed as "Tehran School"; 'Jeanne d'Arc School' was renamed as "Manouchehri School"; 'American School for Girls' was renamed as "Nourbakhsh School"; 'American School for Boys' was renamed as "Alborz High School", and the 'French Alliance' was renamed as "Ettehad School" (NLAI, 1934a, Sheet 1). Before the issuance of the above-mentioned circulation, the Chaldean Catholics School in Sanandaj had been renamed as 'Pahlavi Primary School'. In 1935, the Alliance Israelite Primary School of this city was renamed as Ferdousi School (NLAI, 1934b, Sheet 8). After a year, however, the Alliance Israelite School of Sanandaj, like other Alliance schools throughout the country, was changed to "Ettehad" (Yearbook of the Education Department of Kurdistan 1936–1937, 1937, 172).

INSUFFICIENT BUDGETS TO RELIGIOUS MINORITIES' SCHOOLS AND EFFORTS FOR CLOSING THEM

Concurrent with the development of the state-run schools in different regions of the country, the government was dissatisfied with the performance of foreign and religious minorities' schools, especially




Image 1: The Christian Community of Sanandaj's request for reversing the decision to change the Pahlavi Chaldean School into a State School (National Library and Archives of Iran, Document Code No. 14372/297).

their programs for teaching languages such as French and Hebrew. By allocating insufficient budgets to these schools, therefore, the government tried to undermine their activities and force their students to register in state schools. Accordingly, the government always ignored the demands of Christian and Jewish communities for increasing the state contributions allocated to their schools. In 1927, the Jewish community wrote a letter to the Ministry of Education and requested for an increase to the budget of Jewish minority schools, "which have been teaching based on programs put forward by the respectful Ministry of Education". In their letter, the Jewish community had requested for a monthly contribution of 30 Tomans for each of their schools in the cities of Bushehr and Yazd and 20 Tomans for each of their schools in the cities of Sanandaj, Hamadan, Golpaygan, and Rasht. The Ministry of Education, however, rejected

this request and emphasized that "we do not have surplus credits for such expenditures" (NLAI 1936f, Sheet 31).

Referring to the Jewish community's request from the Ministry of Education "to allocate a monthly contribution of 100 Tomans to the Alliance Israelite School in the current year", the Education Department of Kurdistan argued that the budget for 1929 has been finalized and ratified and their request is "unacceptable and meaningless" (NLAI, 1936f, Sheet 34). In the same year, i.e., 1929, the Jewish community of Sanandaj wrote another letter to the Ministry of Education and observed: "It is almost 10 years that Alliance Israelite Committee has been unable to provide the required budget for this school. We have managed to run this school for 8 years. However, the Jewish community with a population of almost 2,000 poor individuals is no longer able to meet this school's financial requirements

such that the school is on the verge of the impending closure". At the end of their letter, the Jewish community had requested the Ministry of Education to provide their school with sufficient contributions (NLAI, 1936f, Sheet 2–3).

In the same year, the Jewish community wrote a private letter directly to Reza Shah and requested the monarch to help them. The Special Royal Office sent their request to the Ministry of Education and the Department of Public Education of that ministry replied their letter as follows: "Due to lack of necessary credit, no proper and effective measures can be adopted for the time being"; however, in order to prevent any interruption in the education of the Jewish community's children, it urged the Education Department of Kurdistan to register these children in state schools (NLAI, 1936f, Sheet 37). The Education Department of Kurdistan's letter of January 1930 to the Ministry of Education indicates that state schools in Western Iran "especially in Hamadan, Kermanshah, Kurdistan, and Qasr-e Shirin, accepted to register the children of Jewish and Christian communities" and a large number of them were studying in state schools (NLAI, 1936f, Sheet 48). This document specifies that parents of Jewish and Christian children in many parts of Iran, including Kurdistan, due to their economic and financial problems and high costs of studying in their communities' peculiar schools, have refused to register their children in such schools and instead have registered them in state schools that provided free-of-charge education to children.

In its letter of February 12, 1930, to the Ministry of Education, the Jewish community of the city of Bijar wrote: "Due to the reduced budget and lack of necessary credits to pay the teachers' salaries, our school is rapidly moving toward dissolution". Elsewhere in their letter, they emphasized the fact that "we have repeatedly, by writing either to the local education department or directly to the Ministry of Education, requested for contributions to our schools in order to prevent their closure; unfortunately, we have received disappointing answers in all these correspondence". During this period, the letter pointed out that, "education has been provided for all towns and villages throughout the country; unfortunately, this miserable Jewish community has totally been deprived of benefits of such an initiative". "Based on the law of equality", therefore, they request the Ministry of Education "to pay due attention to their community's school in the annual budget of 1931" (NLAI, 1936f, Sheet 49–50). Rejection of their request by the Ministry of Education urged them to raise similar demands in upcoming years to receive budgets for handling the chaotic condition of their schools. In 1936, for instance, the Kurdistan Jewish community requested the Ministry of Education to allocate a monthly contribution of 300 Rials to their school. As usual, the Ministry of Educati-

on once again rejected their request under the pretext of "lack of credits". However, the Ministry ordered the Education Office of Garous (Bijar) "to register children of the Jewish community in state primary schools so that they can continue their education easily" (NLAI, 1936g, Sheet 3–6).

In its letter of June 21, 1936, to the Ministry of Education, the Education Department of Kurdistan wrote that the Pahlavi National Primary School in Sanandaj, which belonged to the Chaldean Catholics, "receives a monthly contribution of 550 Rials from the state. For two years, we have, through numerous correspondents, endeavored to increase this sum. Unfortunately, we have so far been unable to achieve our objective and nothing has been done in this regard. In the current year, this school had 4 students in grade 6 all of whom have failed to pass final exams". Therefore, "it is no longer required to waste the state budget. For this reason, it is proposed that either the state's contributions to this school are cut and its grade 5 and grade 6 classes are dissolved or the credit allocated to this school is raised and it is turned into a state primary school" (NLAI, Document Code No. 16254/297, 1936, Sheet: 1). Issuing necessary instructions, Ministry of Education urged the Chaldean Catholics School of Sanandaj to turn into a state school. Consequently, the Christian community of Sanandaj wrote a letter to the Ministry of Education and complained of instructions issued by that ministry. They requested the Ministry of Education's officials to allow them to maintain their independence as a primary school and as a national educational institute and increase state contributions to this school (NLAI, 1936c, Sheet 4–6).

In 1936, the Education Office in the city of Saqqez, in Iranian Kurdistan, ordered the closure of a newly established Jewish primary school, which taught the Hebrew language. This school had been constructed by the Jewish community of the city. Authorities closed this school because, as they argued, "teaching the Hebrew language to students, who are under 7 years old, is contrary to educational laws and regulations" (NLAI, 1936b, Sheet 4). For this reason, the Jewish community of Saqqez wrote a letter to the Ministry of Education and protested against "the total closure of the Jewish Hebrew School of Saqqez by the head of the Education Office of this city" (NLAI, 1936b, Sheet 5). Ministry of Education, however, wrote a letter to the Education Department of Kurdistan and observed: "It is necessary to order all children of the Jewish community of Saqqez to get registered in the state primary school of that city and report the results to the Ministry of Education immediately" (NLAI, 1936b, Sheet 6).

These documents indicate that, during the Reza Shah's reign, the government has totally welcomed the closure of national schools belonging to religious minorities. The government cut its contributions,




Image 2: The request of the Jews of Garous for receiving financial contribution for the Alliance Israelite School and its rejection by Ministry of Education (National Library and Archives of Iran, Document Code No. 14224/297).

particularly financial, to Jewish and Christian schools under various pretexts in order to have those schools closed and force Jewish and Christian communities to register their children in state-owned schools. Despite its numerous financial problems and reduction of state contributions to religious minorities' schools,

the Jewish community's school in Sanandaj survived up to the end of the academic year of 1939–1940. However, lack of any reference to the statistics of this school in the *Yearbook of the Ministry of Education* indicates that it had been closed during the last year of Reza Shah's reign.




Chart 2: Statistical Comparison of Students at Jewish and Christian Schools in Sanandaj during the Reza Shah Period.

CONCLUSION

After assuming power in 1925, Reza Shah promoted and strengthened nationalism in Iran and moved toward nation-building and enhancing national unity. Since the expansion of public education within the context of schools was one of the key instruments for creating a national identity, the government underlined the issues of culture and education and practiced a monopolized prerogative control over the curricula in both state and non-state schools. Since the very beginning of his rule, Reza Shah paid contributions to foreign and national schools belonging to religious minorities with the intention to gradually oblige them to follow the Ministry of Education's programs. What's more interesting is that under Reza Shah's rule, the Ministry of Education tried to enforce these minority-religious schools to teach the Persian language and Iranian history and geography as a compulsory curriculum. Findings of the present research indicates that although Jewish and Christian minorities' schools in Sanandaj followed the instructions of the Ministry of Education, the government was not so much interested in the expansion of these schools and the continuation of their activities. By refusing the repeated requests of the authorities of Jewish and Christian minorities' schools for increasing the state contributions to these schools, the government prepared the context for their closure and absorbing their students in the state-run schools. Despite the fact that the government had adopted such a policy and although religious minorities' schools were severely suffering from a lack of financial resources, Jewish and Christian minorities' schools in Sanandaj were

not totally closed. However, the government was trying to close these schools under different pretexts. Generally speaking, it can be argued that concurrent with the expansion of state schools throughout the country during Reza Shah's reign, the government adopted different initiatives to constrain the activities of non-state schools and even have them closed in order to practice its monopolized control over the nation's education system. The Chaldean Catholics and Alliance Israelite schools in Sanandaj were not an exemption from this procedure and government policies of the time. Adoption of such a policy resulted in changes in the names of these schools based on nationalistic and pan-Iranian policies and the government's educational programs. Meanwhile, the perilous economic condition of religious minorities' schools in Sanandaj and pressures exercised by state institutions, such as the Ministry of Education, forced the Jewish and Christian communities of this city to close their schools and register their children in state schools.

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UČINKI KULTURNIH POLITIK V OBDOBJU REZE ŠAHA NA POLOŽAJ ŠOL JUDOVSKÉ IN KRŠČANSKE MANJŠINE V SANANDADŽU

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POVZETEK

Reza Šah Pahlavi, splošno poznan kot Reza Šah, si je v prvi polovici 20. stoletja načrtno prizadeval za krepitev in širjenje nacionalizma ter kulturne homogenizacije v Iranu, ki naj bi pripomogla k izgradnji države ter k intelektualni in duhovni enotnosti iranske večetnične družbe. Osrednji pomen izobraževalnih institucij za razvoj državne nacionalistične in ideologije in dogme v tem obdobju ter vladni monopol nad vsebino in obliko izobraževalnega sistema sta poganjala nadaljnje utrjevanje in širitev mreže javnih šol. Reza Šah je s svojimi politikami začel v ta namen spodbujati popoln vladni nadzor nad nacionalnim kurikulumom in njegovim izvajanjem v tujih in državnih šolah, še zlasti v tistih, ki so vključevale populacije verskih manjšin, s čimer je poskrbel za brezizjemno izvajanje programov, ki jih je določalo Ministrstvo za izobraževanje. Pričujoča raziskava skuša na osnovi arhivskih dokumentov in virov podati pregled ciljev in postopkov oblikovanja politik, ki jih je za nejavne šole določala vlada Reze Šaha, obenem pa preučiti učinek teh politik na državne šole judovskih in krščanskih manjšin v mestu Sanandadž (v iranskem Kurdistanu).

Ključne besede: Reza Šah, Sanandadž, Kurdistan, manjšinske šola, nacionalizem, iranski judje in kristjani, nacionalni kurikulum

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS SOCIALIZATION IN CHILDHOOD AND ACTUAL RELIGIOSITY IN STUDENT AGE: THE CASE OF CROATIAN STUDENTS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF RIJEKA

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ABSTRACT

After the collapse of socialism, Croatia experienced a religious revival and became one of the most religious ex-socialist countries. Religion and religiosity went from a privately tolerated but socially undesirable fact to becoming part of social normalcy, and formal religious socialization became a dominant pattern of raising children. The paper analyzes the relationship between religious socialization in childhood and actual religiosity in student age based on an online survey conducted in 2021 on a sample of students at the University of Rijeka (N=624). The results reveal a departure from the experience of primary socialization, which is dominantly manifested as secularization.

Keywords: (non)religious socialization, actual religiosity, socialization agents, students, secularization, Croatia

CONNESSIONE TRA SOCIALIZZAZIONE RELIGIOSA NELL'INFANZIA E RELIGIOSITÀ ATTUALE IN ETÀ STUDENTESCA: IL CASO DEGLI STUDENTI CROATI DELL'UNIVERSITÀ DI FIUME

SINTESI

Dopo il crollo del socialismo, la Croazia ha vissuto una rinascita religiosa ed è diventata uno dei paesi ex socialisti più religiosi. La religione e la religiosità, da un fatto privatamente tollerato ma socialmente indesiderabile, sono diventate parte della normalità sociale e la socializzazione religiosa formale è diventato il modello dominante di educazione dei figli. Il testo analizza la connessione tra socializzazione religiosa nell'infanzia e religiosità attuale in età studentesca, sulla base di un sondaggio online condotto nel 2021 su un campione di studenti dell'Università di Rijeka (N=624). I risultati rivelano un allontanamento dall'esperienza della socializzazione primaria, che si manifesta prevalentemente come secolarizzazione.

Parole chiave: socializzazione (non)religiosa, religiosità attuale, agenti di socializzazione, studenti, secolarizzazione, Croazia

INTRODUCTION¹

Religiosity has undergone dramatic changes in ex-socialist countries over the past half-century, which cannot be reduced to a common denominator. Some of these countries today, according to most indicators, are among the most religious countries in Europe (e.g., Poland and Romania), while others (e.g., the Czech Republic and Estonia) are at the forefront of secularism (Inglehart, 2021). The strength of the religious revival in ex-socialist countries depends on the role of religion and confessional organizations in the history and culture of a particular society, as well as the modernization processes within them. The World Values Survey (WVS) (Inglehart, 2021) and the European Values Survey (EVS) (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019) still place Croatia among ex-socialist countries with a high level of religiosity despite secularization trends. Understanding current and future trends of people's attachment to religion and the Church is not possible without an analysis of the intergenerational transmission of religiosity in a specific social context.

The following text² will attempt to determine the prevalence of different patterns of religious socialization (RS) and connect them to the students' actual religiosity (AR). The paper is structured as follows: a brief review of sociological analyses of RS is followed by a review of traditional and AR in Croatian society in the socialist and post-socialist periods, with an emphasis on the religiosity of the youth. The central part of the paper deals with the analysis of the results of empirical research, problematizing the connections between patterns of (non)religious socialization and AR, and the students' assessment of the influence of agents on their attitudes toward religion.

RELIGIOUS SOCIALIZATION

In fundamental texts (Prout & James, 1997), the new sociology of childhood justifiably criticizes classical socialization theories because children are treated as mere objects of the socialization process. The new paradigm considers that socialization is not a one-way process, and children are not passive objects that adults, primarily parents, shape "in their image and likeness". It should be noted that this critique least affects the process of early family RS because the only option for a child is to accept their parents' religion (Bruce, 1999). In other words, "religiosity without personal decision" is at play in early childhood (Vrcan, 1980). Sociologists mostly agree that the family is a key factor in RS (Petts, 2009; Petts & Desmond, 2016;

Regnerus & Uecker, 2006; Roberts & Yamane, 2012; Sherkat, 2003; Thiessen, 2016; Vermeer, 2014; Voas, 2015). Parents decide whether to raise children of that age: (non)religiously; (not) to include them in the religious community; (not) to practice faith together; (not) to enroll them in religious education, etc. "The family is the place where the intergenerational transmission of religious beliefs and practices takes place and thus is of crucial importance for the persistence and continuation of religious traditions and communities" (Vermeer, 2014, 402). Therefore, the theory of social learning is the most common theoretical starting point for an RS analysis. "Primary socialization mechanisms (i.e., family) are critical for how and why children approach religious or secular worldviews" (Thiessen, 2016, 9). Research has found that parental instruction, everyday family religious atmosphere, and the quality of child-parent relationships increase the chance of successful transmission (Petts, 2009). By maintaining social ties with families with a similar worldview, parents place their children in the earliest childhood in a broader (non)religious atmosphere of primary socialization and thus (pre)select potential friends (Kelley, 2015). Parents have the opportunity to prevent children's potential alienation from the family worldview by increasing socialization pressure, e.g., by enrolling children in religious schools or in religious education classes and thus ensure the continuity of the family RS. The transmission of religiosity is more successful when there is religious homogamy, i.e., when parents' attitudes about religion are harmonized and when parents' messages are supported by their consistent religious behavior (Bader & Desmond, 2006; Petts, 2009; Roberts & Yamane, 2012; Sherkat, 2003). Parents are role models for their children ("significant others"), and research has found great intergenerational similarities in religious identification, belief, and behavior (Gvozdanović et al., 2019; Petts, 2009). Proponents of this approach, which we might call the persistence perspective (Wasburn & Adkins Covert, 2017), argue that childhood patterns and preferences resist life distractions and persist into adulthood and play a key role in shaping one's (non) religiosity (Petts & Desmond, 2016; Thiessen, 2016; Vermeer, 2014).

As children grow older, parental control weakens, and the influence of peer groups, the school, and the media (Lövheim, 2012), whose worldview may be at odds with that of the family, strengthens (Vermeer, 2014). Children/young people are becoming increasingly active actors "in the construction and determination of their own social lives, the lives of those around

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2 The following abbreviations appear in the text: RS= religious socialization; ARES= attending religious education at school; AR= actual religiosity; RSR=religiously socialized respondents; PRSR= partially religiously socialized respondents; NRSR= non-religiously socialized respondents.

them and of the societies in which they live" (Prout & James, 1997, 8). Critical periods "adolescence and emerging adulthood are life stages often characterized by religious instability, but also ones that play a key role in the development of a religious identity" (Petts & Desmond, 2016, 241). In the analysis of the political socialization process, the thesis that includes the possibility of deviating from the parental worldview is called the lifetime openness perspective (Wasburn & Adkins Covert, 2017). People during their lives may change their religion or become more or less religious in relation to socialization in their childhood. However, confessional conversions in Western societies are relatively rare (Vermeer et al., 2011), and people mostly choose a partner and environment that shares their denomination (Sherkat, 2003).

Changes in the level of individual religiosity occur more frequently. This may be due to changes in the social context, such as the pronounced growth of AR in Croatian society after the collapse of socialism (Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 2010). The instability of religiosity is related to the period of late adolescence or emerging adulthood, when there may be a weakening but also a strengthening (Hill, 2009; Petts & Desmond, 2016) of religiosity among youth. Most research has found that a more common pattern is a decrease in religiosity associated with enrollment in higher education and separation from parents. For example, Uecker et al. (2007) found that participation and identification among young adult Americans have declined by 30–40%. Studying is considered the most critical period for maintaining the religiosity adopted and practiced in childhood (Petts & Desmond, 2016). Regnerus & Uecker (2006) detected the reasons for erosion in a weak family RS, the strengthening of individual freedom, peer influence, and opportunities to independently choose activities in a new environment that are contrary to previous religious upbringing (e.g., debauched hedonistic life, drug use, premarital sexuality). Sherkat found the cause of turning away from religion in the negative impact of atheism-prone professors of humanities and social sciences, as opposed to "college professors, hard scientists – physicists, mathematicians, biologists, engineers, and so on – [who] tend to express orthodox religious beliefs, and they attend church and maintain religious affiliations" (Sherkat, 2003, 161). Uecker et al. (2007) hold the view that the expansion of the cognitive horizon leads to the questioning of traditional religious values but that higher education per se is not secularized. The authors believe that American universities are becoming places of vital religiosity and that postmodern discourse favors religion and spiritualism. Although acknowledging that "religious involvement is simply not a priority among this generation of young adults" (Uecker et al. 2007, 1686), the authors argue that "faith simply remains in the background of students'

lives as a part of who they are, but not a part they talk about much with their peers or professors" (Uecker et al., 2007, 1683). American research argues that this is a temporary decrease in religious participation while spirituality continues to rank high in student life (Hill, 2009; Mayrl & Oeur, 2009; Uecker et al., 2007). By getting married, some of them will become religiously active again (McNamara & Abo-Zena, 2014; Petts, 2009; Petts & Desmond, 2016), yet they admit that the share of young people with this life path is on the decline.

Collet Sabe (2007), starting from Davie's thesis on "believing without belonging," holds that the consequence of the process of individualization is the removal of young people from traditional religiosity, but not from spirituality. The author believes that traditional socialization institutions (school, family, and church) are in deep crisis because they are blindly adhering to the classic socialization pattern that treats children and youth as passive objects, which young people resist and create new religious identities. Mere teaching of religious content at school, far from everyday experience, was appropriate for the parents' RS but not for their children. The author believes that the transmission of religion can be successful only if the religious content coincides with the everyday experience of young people.

Voas (2009), on the other hand, argues that the youth's distancing from religion cannot be explained either by current life circumstances (studying) or by individualization that leads to the discovery of new religions. New generations of young people are becoming increasingly indifferent to religion, and, with age, they will not become more religious. Based on the results of the European Social Survey, the author claims that "each generation in every country surveyed is less religious than the last" (Voas, 2009, 167). He calls the dominant European trend *fuzzy religiosity*, whereby this term refers to "maintaining a certain loyalty to tradition, albeit in a rather unrelated way" (Voas, 2009, 161). It is a generational phenomenon of deviation from religion; "it is a staging post on the road from religious to secular hegemony" (Voas, 2009, 167). Vermeer (2014) found the cause of the weakening of youth religiosity in the mismatch of religious ideas and institutional church practice, while Bagg and Voas (2010) reported a weakening of parents' participation and a change in social desirability, i.e., increasing acceptance of secular culture.

American research (Hill, 2009; Petts, 2009; Mayrl & Oeur, 2009) found that despite the current suspension of religious behavior, most young people claim that religion is an important and very important aspect of their lives (McNamara & Abo-Zena, 2014; Petts & Desmond, 2016). British research reveals a different picture. Voas and Crockett (2005) determined that the majority (63% of boys and 58% of girls) of young

people believe that religion does not affect their lives. In British society, unlike in American society, religion has become irrelevant in everyday life, and non-religiosity is socially acceptable.

Religion is simply not very often on the British mind – whether God exists or not, He plays very little role in the lives of most people. And yet, despite the lack of daily interference, Christianity has not disappeared from the backdrop of society, with a majority of Britons holding to a belief in some sort of God and identification as some sort of Christian. (Bagg & Voas, 2010, 108)

RELIGIOSITY IN SOCIALIST CROATIA (YUGOSLAVIA)

In order to comprehend the current context of Croatian society, which is vital for understanding the specifics of its RS (Kelley, 2015; Vermeer et al., 2011), it is necessary to briefly indicate the changes in religiosity in the socialist period, during its collapse and the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia in the 1990s and after the establishment of the Republic of Croatia.

Religiosity, until the end of World War II, in the predominantly agrarian Croatian society, had the attribute of a normal social fact, and the largest religious organization – the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), was an important public cultural and political factor (Vrcan, 2001). With the establishment of the socialist order, the position of religion and the RCC began radically changing. The time had come “for the systematic ghettoization of religion and more or less constant institutional supervision and pressure on religion, as well as the systematic favoritism of atheism and non-religiousness in general” (Vrcan, 2001, 59). The systematic atheization of society is a consequence of (1) the ideological agenda of the Communist Party; (2) “unresolved relations” between the RCC and the communist movement, characterized by a long tradition of intolerance and mutual stigmatization; and (3) tacit legitimacy given by the RCC in Croatia to the pro-fascist Independent State of Croatia during World War II. (Perica, 2002). From the very beginning, the RCC marked the communist movement as one of the greatest evils of the time,³ while religion was marked by the communist authorities as opium for the people.⁴ In the war’s aftermath, the relationship between the government and the top of the local RCC hierarchy varied from open conflict to cooperation (Zrinščak, 1993; Mithans, 2020). In the first wave, the socialist regime drastically limited the

rights of the RCC, nationalizing part of its property and acting repressively against priests, especially those compromised in the war. Sociologist of religion and priest Ivan Grubišić stated that the second-class social position of religion was visible in the prohibition of public religious rites, media ignorance of religion, atheistic ideologization of education, discrimination of practical believers in employment, prohibition of wearing religious symbols in the army, etc. (Grubišić, 1993). The strained relations between the two elites eased in the late 1960s and soon turned into politically mutually beneficial cooperation, culminating in a socialist leader’s first official visit to the Vatican in 1971 – the meeting between the SFRY President Josip Broz Tito and Pope Paul VI. Grubišić (1996) noted that ordinary citizens – practical believers – benefited the least from the improvement of relations between the elites. The incompatibility of communist political engagement and religiosity led to the social marginalization of practical believers and the rejection or concealment of practicing religiosity among those who aspired to social promotion. On the contrary, by witnessing one’s own faith, an individual consciously chooses a marginal social position (Grubišić, 1996). The consequence of the systematic atheization of society, which weakened considerably in the 1980s, is exogenously induced secularization.

The second factor that acts as an endogenous cause of secularization is the modernization of Croatian society. The territory of Croatia was on the margins of the first wave of European modernization processes, which affected it only lightly and with great delay. The main actor in the second (socialist) wave of modernization was the Communist Party, which sought to shape society in accordance with its ideological postulates. In the beginnings of “socialist construction,” the epicenter of modernization initiatives was narrowed to the voluntary decisions of a group of ideologically enlightened revolutionaries, who based their legitimacy on the merits of war, which, of course, is not a guarantee of modernization success. Biological laws inevitably impose the need for the “routinization of charisma” (Weber) so that a key role in the system is taken over, as time has shown, by an inefficient bureaucratic apparatus. Despite many weaknesses, socialist modernization has radically changed the structure of Croatian society (Županov, 1995). It should be emphasized that some Croatian regions are more strongly affected by modernization processes than others, which has left visible differences in religiosity (Boneta, 2000; Boneta & Banovac, 2007; Marinović-Jerolimov & Zrinščak, 2006; Vrcan, 2001).

³ For example, in the appendix (Syllabus) of the encyclical of Pope Pius IX *Quanta Cura* from 1864.

⁴ The phrase *opium for the people* follows from the Enlightenment critique of religion as a means by which the cunning elite manipulated the ignorant populace. It is a distorted interpretation of Marx, who uses the phrase *opium of the people*, criticizing social conditions (“inverted world”), in which religion is an illusory way of overcoming inhuman conditions, “the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering” (Marx, 1992, 244).

Neither the systematic atheization of society nor the socialist (semi)modernization has significantly disrupted the traditional religiosity, which is mostly present and deeply rooted in the population. The share of the confessionally unidentified during the period of socialism never exceeded one-fifth of the population. "4% of the population claimed no confessional affiliation in the Zagreb region in 1968, 6% in 1972, 15% in 1982, and 20% in 1989. At a national level, 12.5% of respondents declared that they did not adhere to any confession in 1953 and 18% in 1989" (Hazdovac Bajić et al., 2020, 45).⁵ The religious atmosphere is present in the vast majority of families during the holidays, participation in three key religious rituals (baptism, wedding, funeral) is almost ubiquitous, and two-thirds of respondents were religiously raised (Vrcan, 1980).⁶ Informal and formal RS, with the aim of maintaining traditional religiosity, are part of the experience of the majority of the Croatian population, which leads Vrcan to conclude that, during the period of stable socialism, the population was "connected with thousands of threads to religion and church" (Vrcan, 1980, 283).

Unlike traditional religiosity, AR was a characteristic of a distinct minority part of society. Practicing believers are largely recruited from politically deprived social groups – the working class⁷ and the peasantry. Secularization processes at the individual level are visible in the gap between traditional religiosity and AR, the dissolution of dogmatic belief, and reduced religious participation mainly of women, the elderly, villagers, and those with lower education (Vrcan, 1980). The most common strategy in the conditions of systematic atheization of society was the hibernation of the actual, publicly expressed religiosity while maintaining the traditional connection with religion and the church.

Research conducted at the end of the socialist period found that young people are "more affected than their parents by the process of separation from religion and church" (Marinović, 1988, 197). In addition to confessional identification, in all indicators, AR is a characteristic of the minority of young people⁸ (Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 2010). Students are less religious than the average young person, noting that neither the religiosity nor the

non-religiosity of young people" are "homogeneous and consistent" (Marinović, 1988, 197).

RELIGIOSITY IN A NEW CONTEXT

Although expelled from the public sphere, religiosity – or rather confessionalism – in socialist Yugoslavia was the most important distinguishing marker between three ethnic groups: Croat = Catholic; Serb = Orthodox; Bosniak = Muslim (Sekulić et al., 2004; Vrcan, 2001). Identification of national and confessional identity is a characteristic of the eastern Croatian regions, which border Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. In the bloody disintegration of multiethnic and multi-confessional Yugoslav society in the early 1990s,

religions and major confessional communities, in particular Serb Orthodoxy, Catholicism among Croats and Bosnian Islam, were neither major nor independent social and political actors, and although these conflicts were basically of a political nature, they were directly involved, included, and intertwined in different ways and to different degrees, but also consciously engaged on opposite sides. (Vrcan, 2001, 20)

After the war and the change in the confessional structure of Croatian society from biconfessional to monoconfessional, the RCC in Croatia "collects dividends" (Ferrari) for its engagement in dismantling socialism, opposing Greater Serbia politics, and supporting the new ruling party (Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ). With the collapse of socialism, "religion penetrated the emptied public square mainly in the form of an overbearing and universally binding cultural and symbolic system, which practically at least determined the boundaries of political, cultural, moral, and even symbolic normality and abnormality" (Vrcan, 2001, 21). Government policy became pro-religious (Kelley, 2015) with desecularization intent. The state and the RCC signed four cooperation agreements (in 1996 and 1998) by which the RCC, as the largest religious community with the largest number of followers, received numerous concessions and privileges.⁹

5 "According to the 1953 census, 'only' 10% of the Slovenian population and 12% of the entire Yugoslavian population declared themselves atheists, which so disappointed the authorities that Yugoslav censuses no longer included questions about religious affiliation" (Mithans, 2020, 426).

6 The data are taken from research conducted in the Zagreb region in 1972 (Vrcan, 1980). Interestingly, Vrcan found that the vast majority of Communist Party members (or those who wanted to) were baptized (91.3%) and attended church religious education (67.8%).

7 It is paradoxical, given the proclaimed goals of socialism, that a group whose interest the system should advocate accepts the only socially permissible "cultural and symbolic system of an extrasystemic nature" (Vrcan, 1986, 70).

8 A survey conducted in 1986 found that there were significantly more non-religiously (47.2%) than religiously (28.3%) declared. Only one-fifth (19.6%) of young people believed in the existence of God, and more than half (56%) did not believe. One-fifth (21.4%) also attended Mass at least once a month, and almost half (45.3%) of young people never attended Mass (Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 2010).

9 The RCC was given back most of the property confiscated during socialism; it was provided with funds from the state budget for the support of the clergy, the work of religious teachers in schools, the work of religious schools and colleges, the state (co)finances the construction and maintenance of churches, etc. The signed contracts are often subject of public criticism because there is no clear record of the funds given by the state to the RCC due to the wastefulness in the construction of church buildings, etc.

From a politically insignificant, the Church becomes a respectable political factor with its public activities: above all, the speeches of high church dignitaries and careful assessment of reality. ... The Church [...], even when it may not intend to do so, sets cultural criteria. It is present in the family, at school, even in the parliament. Politicians not only respect it but also 'court' it. (Cifrić, 1995, 820)

At the individual level, there is a strengthening of AR, so the share of the non-religiously identified almost doubled (41%–73%) in ten years (1986–1996), and the share of the nonreligious decreased three times (37%–13%).¹⁰ We find almost the same direction and scope of change in belief and participation (Marinović-Jerolimov, 2000). Research results are further supported by censuses, in which nine out of ten Croatian citizens declare themselves Catholics, while only every twentieth declares themselves to be agnostics or atheists.

Researches reveals that there was a large increase in all indicators of religiosity among young people between 1986 and 1999 (Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 2010). An additional impetus for the religiousization of the socialization atmosphere is the reintroduction of confessional religious education in primary and secondary schools (school year 1991/92).¹¹ The intention of this introduction was “to secure the cultural transmission of religious values to young generations” (Hazdovac Bajić et al., 2020, 40). Given the students’ response, it can be concluded that the goal has been achieved because nine out of ten students (Marinović, 2018) attend Catholic religious education at school (ARES), which is an obvious indicator that religiosity is becoming the dominant pattern of primary sociali-

zation.¹² The share of ARES in the transition to high school decreases after children have received the holy sacraments (confirmation and holy communion).

Fifteen years ago, two opposing trends emerged at the global level – people exposed to changes in the social context in some ex-socialist countries became more religious, while at the same time, in developed countries, they became less religious (Inglehart, 2021). However, current research has found changes in ex-socialist countries as well. “Formerly communist countries continue to be the main locus of growing religiosity ... (but) ... the resurgence of religion in ex-communist countries was losing momentum” (Inglehart, 2021, 15). A secularization trend in Croatia is visible in the weakening of indicators of church religiosity, while identification¹³ is continuously highly expanded (79%). Between the first and third EVS, the share of regular practitioners decreased from half (52.5%) to one-third of respondents (34.9%), with a growing gap between identification and participation, so there are more than twice as many regular practitioners as those who identified themselves as a religious person (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019). The biggest decline was related to trust in the Church as an institution, in which almost two-thirds of respondents (62.8%) had high and very high trust in 1999, while in the last survey, their share was slightly higher than one-third (38.4%). Weakening occurs according to the secularization pattern, with greater religiosity of women, those with lower levels of education, and those from smaller settlements (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019). Although these changes may be indications of changes in the social climate in the direction of reducing social desirability,¹⁴ they are not reflected in the scope of ARES.¹⁵

10 Data on drastic changes in religiosity in Croatian society between 1986 and 1999 can only be partly explained by the democratization of society, as the pressure of systematic atheism of the regime in the 1980s weakened considerably. Certainly, when explaining the changes, one should take into account the literal (war) and existential economic insecurity, but also the informal pressure of systematic theization of society that promotes new norms of social desirability.

11 Confessional religious education is conducted in public schools but is under the jurisdiction of religious communities. The aim of the subject is teaching in the faith and evangelization, i.e., introducing students to belief and participation and strengthening of their connection with religion and religious community (Marinović, 2018). An illustration of the ambitions of the RCC to present itself as a universally binding cultural and symbolic system is also visible in religious education textbooks, where “Catholic (Christian) religion is not presented as one of the existing worldviews in the world (Croatia), but as the only true religion” (Marinović, 2018, 140). Although textbooks start from the idea of tolerance, Marinović finds that they convey “not the acceptance of difference but the correction of atheists and prevention of atheism, by evangelization” (Marinović, 2018, 146).

12 Therefore, not enrolling a child in religious education classes in elementary school can have, as a consequence, the non-conformist separation from the group. In high school, the situation changes because students have the option of choosing an alternative elective subject (Ethics).

13 The scale of religious self-identification used by EVS is questionable in terms of content because on the nonreligious side of the instrument, it offers two (convinced atheist and nonreligious person), and on the religious side, only one modality (religious person). The scale does not include the possibility of positioning indecisive and indifferent respondents.

14 The change in the zeitgeist is also visible in the statistical data on the decline in the share of the religious in relation to civil marriages. The share of religious marriage dropped from 64.7% (in 2000) to 42.3% twenty years later (Statistical report, 2021).

15 There are large regional differences in the number of students who attend religious education at school. School religious education is attended by more than ninety percent of primary school pupils in seventeen counties (out of twenty-one), but also in only four when it comes to secondary school. The lowest number of pupils attending religious education is in the Istria (66%) and Primorje-Gorski Kotar Counties (75.5%) (Index.hr, 2018).

Diagnoses of the religiosity of young people in Croatian society have determined that: (1) it oscillates more in times of transition than the religiosity of other cohorts (Gvozdanović et al., 2019; Marinović-Jerolimov, 2000; 2002); (2) intergenerational differences are reduced due to a slight increase in the religiosity of the youth and a slight decline in the religiosity of the elderly (Črpić & Zrinščak, 2010; Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 2010); (3) students are the least religious part of the youth (Boneta, 2016; Ilišin, 2014; Marinović-Jerolimov, 2002), which at the same time means that they are the least religious part of the population;¹⁶ (4) the stabilization of conventional religiosity is at play, but also that in the last ten years, there has been a noticeable downward trend in all indicators of AR (Boneta, 2016; Lavrič, 2021); (5) students' AR indicators are inconsistent with their ARES; (6) that there is structural and ideological religious polarization among the youth in Croatia, more strongly than in other countries of Southeast Europe (Lavrič, 2019). Structural religious polarization, i.e., the increase and proportional equalization of the categories of atheists and convinced believers, is taking place in Croatia due to the decrease in the share of religious people. "Secularizing tendencies can lead to a defensive reaction of the remaining believers... The mechanism of cultural defense works in such a way that a religious group, in a situation of internal threat, unites and strengthens its religious identity" (Lavrič, 2019, 134).

Since the empirical research was conducted at the University of Rijeka (UNIRI), and more than half of the respondents grew up in the regions of Istria and Primorje, it is necessary to briefly indicate the specifics of religiosity in these regions. Throughout history, denominationalism was not a *differentia specifica* of the three ethnicities in contact (Croatian, Slovenian, and Italian), so it could not be a supporting part of the politicized Croatian ethnic identity. In them, relations between the communist government and the RCC were, to a lesser extent, fraught with problems because a significant part of Croatian and Slovenian Catholic priests collaborated with the partisans during World War II (Petešić, 1982) and participated in the Paris negotiations on the demarcation between Italy and Yugoslavia. Under socialism, these regions modernized faster and thus secularized faster than the Croatian average (Boneta, 1989; 2000). After the collapse of socialism, these regions also experienced the revitalization of religiosity, but at a lower intensity than in other regions (Marinović-Jerolimov & Zrinščak, 2006) and with a lower level of politicized religiosity (Boneta & Banovac, 2007; Vrcan, 2001).

METHODOLOGY

The aims of this paper are: (1) analysis of the patterns of students' (non)religious socialization in their childhood; (2) analysis of the relationship between these patterns and their actual religiosity; (3) analysis of students' perceptions of the influence of individual socialization agents on their attitudes toward religion.

Based on previous research, the following hypotheses have been formulated:

H1: Most respondents have the experience of family religious socialization and/or religious education.

H2: The level of students' actual religiosity is lower than the population average and the youth average.

H3: The experience of (non)religious socialization affects the level of actual religiosity.

H4: Socio-demographic variables will influence (non)religious socialization in line with the secularization theory.

Kelley (2015) finds that in predominantly religious societies, which includes Croatian society, the religious environment has a greater effect on the intergenerational transmission of religiosity than all other factors, even family RS. Kelley claims that, in this environment, the effect of social desirability (conformism) will play an important role in RS. Because of that:

H5 Respondents who attended religious education at school and were not socialized religiously or non-religiously in the family will be more similar to religiously than non-religiously educated respondents in their actual religiosity due to the high level of religiosity in Croatian society.

Measuring instruments

Religious socialization is an independent variable operationalized by two indicators. The first is family upbringing in the faith with three modalities of response: 1. *No, I was raised non-religiously*; 2. *They raised me to be neither in favor nor against religion*; 3. *Yes, they raised me religiously*. The second is ARES with three modalities: 1. *No, never*; 2. *Yes, in primary school*; 3. *Yes, in primary and secondary school*. Based on these two variables, a composite variable, **patterns of (non)religious socialization in childhood**, was created, which has three modalities. The first modality includes **non-religiously socialized respondents (NRSR)** who have no experience of either family or school RS. The second modality includes

16 A comparison of data from national surveys of the population (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019), youth (Gvozdanović et al., 2019), and students (Ilišin, 2014) at the national level reveals that the share of religiously identified students (57.3%) is significantly lower than among young people (69%) and in the population (79%). There are fewer full-time practitioners (21.1%) among students than in the population (34.9%) and twice less than among young people (44%). The reason for such a more frequent religious participation of pupils is partly related to the obligations of school religious education.

respondents who were not raised by their parents to be either in favor or against religion but who, as part of their education, attended religious education – **partially religiously socialized respondents** (PRSR). The third modality is **religiously socialized respondents** (RSR), who have experience with both types of RS.

Four indicators of *actual religiosity* (AR) are dependent variables. Religious self-identification was measured on a five-point scale: 1. *Convinced atheist*; 2. *Much more inclined to disbelieve than to believe*; 3. *I do not know, I cannot assess*; 4. *Much more inclined to believe than to disbelieve*; 5. *Convinced believer* (Čulig, Kufrin & Landripet, 2007). Religious belief was analyzed through belief in four dogmas: 1. *There is a God*; 2. *God created the world*; 3. *There is Heaven and Hell*; 4. *God is the source of moral precepts and duties*, to which three-point scales were added: 1. *I do not believe*; 2. *I doubt it*; 3. *I believe*. Participation was measured with the frequency of attending Mass with possible answers: 1. *Never*; 2. *Only on major holidays*; 3. *Several times a month*; 4. *At least once a week*.¹⁷ The importance of faith in life is measured with the question: *To what extent does living in accordance with the teachings of faith represent your desirable life goal?* A five-point Likert-type scale was added to this ranging from 1. *Completely undesirable* to 5. *Extremely desirable*.

The influence of agents was measured with two instruments. In the first, the respondents were asked to assess the level of influence of their *mother, father, other relatives, and school religion teachers* on their attitudes toward religion. In a separate question, they needed to single out an agent that decisively influenced their views on religion.

The following socio-demographic variables were used: *sex, size of their childhood settlement, childhood region*,¹⁸ *the highest level of education of their mother and father, year of university study, and scientific field of study*.

Data collection and sample

The paper is based on the results of an online survey conducted in the second half of 2021 on a sample of UNIRI students¹⁹ (N = 624) whose characteristics are shown in Table 1. Data were processed in the statistical package SPSS 24 at the level of univariate and bivariate analysis.²⁰ The research procedures were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Teacher Education, UNIRI.

RESULTS

Religious socialization

The vast majority of respondents have experience of formal and/or informal RS, confirming thereby H1; however, there are almost twice as many of them attended religious education at school as those raised in the faith (Table 2). Only one in twenty respondents were raised as an atheist, while there is an equal share of those raised in the faith and those who grew up in a family environment that encouraged neither religiosity nor atheism. ARES is the expected continuation of RS in the family,²¹ but it is a characteristic of both one-half of the atheistically raised and more than four-fifths of neutrally raised respondents.

The most numerous category in the composite variable *patterns of (non)religious socialization* are RSR (47.1%), followed by PRSR (43.3%), and NRSR (9.1%). Since ARES is present to the same extent as baptism (90.9%) in all three parenting patterns, it can be concluded that most parents want their children to receive the sacrament of confirmation and first communion, which is not possible without ARES.

Statistical analyses found that four socio-demographic variables influence the socialization pattern in line with the secularization thesis (H4). Statistically significant differences were found with respect to sex ($r_s=.097^*$), childhood county ($r_s=.157^{**}$), size

17 For respondents who never go to Mass, we will use the term *abstainers*, for those who do so only on major holidays (Easter and Christmas) *occasional believers*, and the answers several times a month and weekly in chi-square analyzes are grouped into *regular practitioners*.

18 The respondents filled out the county where they grew up. Considering the established differences in the social context of certain Croatian regions, which are the consequences of different historical experiences, and the intensity of the modernization and secularization process, this variable was recoded into two variables in statistical processing. The first category included participants from counties afflicted by direct warfare in the 1990s, in which ethno-confessional identification is more pronounced, and the second category included students from counties in which there was no direct warfare. In the second, we distinguish respondents who grew up in the Istria and Primorje-Gorski Kotar Countries (Istria and Primorje), regions that were more affected by modernization and secularization processes, and respondents from other Croatian counties.

19 Students from the following University constituents participated in the research: Faculty of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Economics and Business, Faculty of Engineering, Faculty of Humanities and Social Studies, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Maritime Studies, Faculty of Tourism and Hospitality Management, Faculty of Teacher Education and Department of Informatics.

20 Spearman's correlation test, Chi-square tests, t-tests, and analysis of the variance were performed. In ANOVA, a test of homogeneity of the variance was performed, the F-ratio was tested, and post-hoc multiple comparison tests were performed. The Scheffe test was used in the case of homogeneous variances, and the Tamhane T2 test in the case of inhomogeneous variances. Due to spatial restrictions, the statistical values of p in all analyses will be presented with the notation * for $p < 0.01$ and the notation ** for $p < .001$.

21 There is a significant statistical correlation between informal and formal RS ($rs=.423$)

Table 1: Respondents' socio-demographic characteristics²² (%).

<i>Area of primary socialization</i>			
Afflicted by direct warfare	21.3	Istria and Primorje	59.1
Not afflicted by direct warfare	78.7	Other parts of Croatia	40.9
Scientific field		Sex	
Technical sciences	26.4	Female	71.2
Social Sciences	73.2	Male	27.1
Father's education		Mother's education	
Elementary school	3.5	Elementary school	4.0
Three-year high school	17.6	Three-year high school	12.7
Four-year high school	46.0	Four-year high school	44.2
College	11.7	College	10.6
University	20.8	University	28.5
Settlement size		Year of study	
Up to 1.000	19.6	First	40.1
1.001 – 10.000	35.1	Second	17.3
10.001 – 100.000	24.8	Third	17.9
100.001 and above	20.4	Fourth	13.0
		Fifth	11.1

Table 2: Family upbringing in the faith and attending religious education at school.

		No, never	Yes, in primary school	Yes, in primary and secondary school	Total
No, I was raised non-religiously	% row	48.3	31.0	20.7	100.00
	% total	2.3	1.4	1.0	4.7
They raised me to be neither in favor nor against religion	% row	14.9	34.1	51.0	100.00
	% total	7.1	16.2	24.3	47.6
Yes, they raised me religiously	% row	1.0	14.5	84.5	100.00
	% total	0.5	6.9	40.4	47.7
Total	% total	9.8	24.6	65.6	100.00

of settlement ($r_s = -.174^{**}$), and the education level of the mother ($r_s = -.151^*$). The share of male students (13.7%) who were raised non-religiously is almost twice as high as that of female students (7.7%), which supports the thesis on differential gender socialization (Voas, 2015). RS is the predominant pattern (62.0%) in the smallest settlements, while nonreli-

gious upbringing in them is an anomaly (<2%). RSRs are the majority only in families where mothers have the lowest level of education, while PRSRs dominate in other families. Respondents who grew up in counties with direct war experience (60.9%) were mostly religiously educated, while PRSR is the most numerous category (43.6%) in "peaceful areas."

²² Percentages of students who did not answer the question are not shown, except in cases where the number of abstainers is indicative.

Table 3: Religious self-identification.

	UNIRI 2015	UNIRI 2021	EVS Croatia 2017 ^a	Youth Croatia 2018 ^b
Convinced atheists	14.2	12.9	5.4	8
Much more inclined to disbelieve than to believe	17.5	23.7	9.5	
I do not know, I cannot assess	15.1	18.1	6.8	22
Much more inclined to believe than to disbelieve	30.9	25.8	78.3	69
Convinced believers	21.4	19.6		

^aNikodem & Zrinščak, 2019; ^bGvozdanović et al., 2019**Table 4: Patterns of (non)religious socialization and religious self-identification.**

	Convinced atheists	Nonreligious	Undecided	Religious	Convinced believers
NRSR	31.0	44.8	6.9	8.6	8.6
PRSR	16.4	32.3	24.5	19.3	7.4
RSR	5.8	14.3	13.9	36.1	29.9
Total	12.7	25.0	17.9	26.2	18.2

Finally, there is a difference in RS between adult respondents in Istria and Primorje and those adults in other parts of Croatia ($r_s = .176^{**}$). In Istria and Primorje, there are more PRSR (46.3%) than RSR (40.9%), while among others, there are more RSR (56.5%) than PRSR (39.2%).

Religious self-identification

The distribution of responses shown in Table 3 reveals that more respondents were placed on the religious (44.4%) than on the nonreligious (37.7%) side of the scale, while one in six respondents was undecided. On both sides of the scale, there are more moderate than extreme modalities. Changes between research from 2015 (Boneta, 2016) and this research on the same student population reveal weaker processes of structural religious polarization compared to those that Lavrič (2019; 2021) found among Croatian and Slovenian youth.²³ In line with H2, students are significantly less religious (-33.9%) than the general population average (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019) and the youth average (-24.6%) (Gvozdanović et al., 2019).

We also find secularization tendencies in the expansion of self-identification. Respondents whose fathers have the lowest level of education ($r_s = -.105^*$) and who grew up in “war counties” ($r_s = .146^{**}$) are more religious. Interestingly, a mild but statistically significant association ($r_s = .097^*$) was found between the study type and identification. Contrary to Sherkat’s findings (Sherkat, 2003), UNIRI social science students are placed more in religious (47.8%) and less in nonreligious categories (33.7%) than technical science students (35.2% religious and 45.4% nonreligious), although there is no difference between them in the RS pattern.

Statistical analysis (Table 4) reveals that, in line with H3, the RS experience to a significant extent ($r_s = .431^{**}$) determines the current (non)religious identity of the two categories that were exposed to consistent agent information in childhood (NRSR and RSR). However, in both categories, we find a deviation from primary socialization; in this case, it is higher among RSRs, of which one-third do not fit into religious categories. At the same time, the move away from family socialization is a characteristic of just under a fifth of NRSRs. The

23 The religious part of the scale recorded a decline (-6.9%), while the nonreligious part increased (+4.9%), with both extreme modalities recording a slight decline. Changes in the direction of greater secularization are visible in all indicators of religiosity. Although the analysis of structural ideological and religious polarization is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that, in the context of politicized religiosity in Croatian society, the decline of religiosity strengthens ideological polarization.

Table 5: Testing differences in religious belief with respect to patterns of (non)religious socialization.

		N	M	SD	df	F	Post-hoc
<i>There is a God</i> (Tamhane)	1. NRSR	58	1.72	.790	2	54.919**	1<2<3
	2. PRSR	270	2.09	.807			
	3. RSR	294	2.61	.656			
<i>God created the world</i> (Tamhane)	1. NRSR	58	1.45	.654	2	53.851**	1<2<3
	2. PRSR	270	1.70	.805			
	3. RSR	294	2.30	.787			
<i>God is the source of moral precepts</i> (Tamhane)	1. NRSR	58	1.43	.678	2	50.892**	1.2<3
	2. PRSR	270	1.66	.801			
	3. RSR	294	2.26	.822			
<i>There is Heaven and Hell</i> (Tamhane)	1. NRSR	58	1.45	.626	2	48.123**	1<2<3
	2. PRSR	270	1.80	.782			
	3. RSR	294	2.31	.763			

Table 6: Patterns of (non)religious socialization and attending Mass.

	Never	Only on major holidays	Several times per month
1. NRSR	91.4	6.9	1.7
2. PRSR	58.9	35.9	5.2
3. RSR	20.4	48.6	31.0
Total	43.7	39.2	17.0

most dispersed group are PRSRs, of which, contrary to H5, almost half are nonreligious, and an additional quarter is undecided.

Religious beliefs

More than half of the students believe only in the existence of God (51.4%), with a quarter (27.2%) doubting and a fifth not believing (21.3%). Acceptance of other fundamental beliefs of RCC deviates even more from the experience of RS. Students mostly do not believe in the claim that God is the source of moral precepts and duties (41.5%), and they mostly doubt the claim of the existence of Heaven and Hell (33.7%). The distribution of answers about the belief in the existence of God also confirms H2 because the surveyed students believe in it much less (-30.4%) than the general population (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019).²⁴

ANOVA reveals that RSR differs from the other two categories because more respondents believe in all four dogmas (Table 5). However, it should be emphasized that, here too, more than half of them believe only in the existence of God, while half of them demonstrate uncertainty and disbelief when it comes to the remaining three beliefs. PRSRs mostly believe in the existence of God (37.0%), while slightly fewer doubt it (34.4%) and do not believe in it (28.5%), while most of them do not believe in the remaining three claims. Despite ARES, and contrary to H5, the majority of PRSRs are more similar to NSRRs than RSRs.

Religious participation

To what extent does RS manifest itself in church religious behavior during student years? Most students belong to the category of abstainers who never go to

²⁴ There is no comparison with beliefs among young people because there are no such variables in the research by Gvozdanović et al. (2019).

Table 7: Testing the differences in the desirability of living in accordance with the teachings of the faith with regard to the pattern of (non)religious socialization.

	N	M	SD	df	F	Post-hoc
1. NRSR	58	1.97	1.228	2	55.668**	1<3 2<3
2. PRSR	271	2.24	1.156			
3. RSR	293	3.21	1.274			

Table 8: To what extent have your attitudes toward religion been influenced by.

	Not at all	A little	Somewhat	A lot	Significantly	M	SD
Your mother	25.5%	17.5%	25.8%	21.2%	10.1%	2.73	1.319
Your father	32.5%	19.9%	23.9%	17.3%	6.2%	2.45	1.274
Other relatives	35.9%	16.0%	24.4%	16.5%	7.1%	2.43	1.312
Teachers of religious education	36.5%	21.2%	22.0%	14.1%	6.3%	2.32	1.269

Mass, followed by the category of occasional practitioners who do so exclusively on major holidays, and less than a fifth are regular practitioners (Table 6).

In line with H3, the participation frequency was statistically significantly related to RS ($r_s=.506^{**}$). Not attending Mass is the characteristic of the majority of NRSRs and PRSRs, while most RSRs do so only on major holidays.

Students are generally the most religiously passive part of Croatian society (H2), as they regularly attend Mass twice less than the population average (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019) and two and a half times less than the youth average (Gvozdanović et al., 2019). Statistical analysis reveals that, in line with H4, female students attend Mass more regularly ($r_s=-.115^*$), those from settlements with up to 10.000 inhabitants ($r_s=-.204^{**}$), and those whose adults in war-stricken counties ($r_s=.185^{**}$). Interestingly, the test reveals a statistically significant relationship ($r_s=-.139^{**}$) between participation and the year of study. As the year of study increases, the share of abstainers increases while the number of regular Mass participants decreases. The share of regular participants among first- and second-year students is twice as high (20%) than among fifth-year students (10.1%).

Importance of religion in life

The importance of religion in the life of the respondents was measured by the desirability of living in accordance with the teachings of their faith. The

result is in line with the responses of highly religious European countries (Voas & Day, 2010), as more than a quarter of respondents (29.0%) consider it a desirable life goal. However, for the majority of respondents (42.9%), it is an undesirable and completely undesirable life goal, and for a quarter, it is neither a desirable nor an undesirable (28.0%) life goal. In the extreme categories of the scale, there are three times more of those who are completely undesirable than those who are extremely desirable.²⁵ We notice two differences in relation to the research results found among American students (Sherkat, 2003). A considerable part of our respondents distances themselves from religion in participation but also in the importance they attach to it in life. Differences suggesting distance from religion during studies have also been noted. ANOVA ($F_{(6,13)}=5.004^{**}$) found that first-year students ($M=2.96$) show a lower level of undesirability of this goal than students in the fifth ($M=2.30$) years of study. No differences were found with regard to the region where the students grew up.

In line with H3, the RS experience affects ($r_s=.384^{**}$) the desirability of living in accordance with the teachings of the faith (Table 7). However, the findings contradict H5 because the NRSR and PRSR categories classify this life goal as undesirable on average ($M<2.5$), which makes both categories different from RSR. Even with RSR, the mean value does not exceed 3.5, which means that it is placed in neither a desirable nor an undesirable life goal. Specifically, for less than half

²⁵ In line with H2, we come across a difference even here because, at the national level (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019), there are twice as many respondents (63.9%) who claim that religion is important and very important in their lives.

Table 9: Testing the differences in the importance of agent influence with respect to the pattern of (non) religious socialization.

		N	M	SD	df	F	Post-hoc
<i>Influence of the mother</i> (Tamhane)	1. NRSR	58	2.38	1.400	2	108.115**	1<3 2<3
	2. PRSR	270	2.04	1.036			
	3. RSR	294	3.43	1.172			
<i>Influence of the father</i> (Tamhane)	1. NRSR	58	2.40	1.426	2	63.143**	2<1<3
	2. PRSR	270	1.87	1.032			
	3. RSR	294	2.98	1.218			
<i>Influence of other relatives</i> (Tamhane)	1. NRSR	58	1.52	.863	2	66.022**	1<2<3
	2. PRSR	270	2.01	1.150			
	3. RSR	294	2.99	1.286			
<i>Influence of the school religious education teacher</i> (Tamhane)	1. NRSR	58	1.24	.823	2	46.980**	1<2<3
	2. PRSR	270	2.11	1.222			
	3. RSR	294	2.75	1.209			

of RSRs, this is mostly and extremely desirable (45.9%), and for a quarter of them, it is a completely or mostly undesirable life goal (25.5%). More than half of the remaining two groups of students classify life in accordance with the teachings of the faith as undesirable and just over a tenth as a desirable life goal.

Influence of agents on the respondents' attitudes toward religion

The arithmetic means of the answers (Table 8) reveal that the respondents consider the influence of all primary and secondary socialization agents on their attitudes toward religion, except the mother, to be weak. The most numerous answer in all items was *not at all*, and only a few more assessed the influence of the mother as *somewhat*.

We have previously determined that there are connections between RS and AR patterns, with a trend of religious passivation in the PRSR and RSR categories. Since NRSRs have distanced themselves the least from the content of socialization in childhood, does this mean that they recognize the greater influence of socialization agents compared to the other two categories? Analysis of the variance (Table 9) reveals that this is not the case, as NRSRs assess the influence of both parents as weak with a tendency toward moderate, and the PRSRs assess the influence of their parents as even weaker. RSRs recognize the greatest influence of agents, although even here, only the mother's influence leans toward significant influence.

When asked an additional direct question about the decisive influence, almost half of the sample (46.3%) replied that no one has decisively influenced their views on religion, one-quarter mentioned their family and its members (25.6%), and one-tenth the Church (10.7%), religious education teachers (8.3%), and other influences (9.0%). The RS pattern is also related to this variable ($r_s = -.298^{**}$). Two-thirds of NRSRs (69.0%) claimed that no one has decisively influenced them, and a fifth (22.4%) acknowledge the influence of family members. Also, the majority of PRSRs (55.6%) claimed that no one has had a decisive influence on them, and one-tenth of the respondents stated: the Church and religious education teachers. The majority of RSRs (38.8%) stated the key role of family members, but it should be noted that the share of those who claimed to have created their own views on religion in this category is only slightly lower (33.7%). The intersection of this response with self-identification reveals a twofold assessment of the influence of the Church and religious education teachers ($r_s = -.237^{**}$). Convinced atheists (21.5%) and non-religious (16.7%) obviously cite them as a form of a negative and RSRs as a positive influence.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Traditional religiosity is constantly present in Croatian society, so even the half-century marginalization of religion and the church in socialism did not seriously disrupt it. The collapse of socialism

has led to a “radical deprivation of religion” (Vrcan, 2001), and the RS is an integral part of growing up for the vast majority of respondents (H1). For some parents, enrolling children in religious education at school is a continuation of family socialization, while others do so to ensure that children receive the holy sacraments, and the transmission of religiosity becomes part of formal socialization. The fact that more than half of parents who practice atheistic education also enroll their children in religious education speaks of an ingrained tradition but also points to the power of social conformism.

The RS experience affects the differences in all analyzed students’ AR indicators (H3). In addition to maintaining the worldview and patterns of behavior mediated by socialization, we find a different degree of deviation from them in all categories. A slight deviation from the experience of primary socialization in NRSRs is found in the belief in God and self-identification and very weak in participation. On the other hand, a significant part of RSRs distances itself from religion and the Church, albeit on a more modest scale than suggested by Voas and Crockett’s (2005) findings. Distancing is less visible in self-identification and belief in God and more in disbelief and doubt in remaining dogmas and sporadic participation in Masses. From the aspect of the success of the transition to religiosity, the most interesting category is PRSR. This research does not confirm Kelley’s thesis, from which H5 was derived because neither the predominantly religious national context nor the ARES experience prevented the majority of PRSRs from becoming religiously passive during their student years and even completely distancing themselves from religion and the Church. This supports the thesis that RS, and especially ARES itself in the absence of family upbringing in religion, is not a guarantee of AR at student age.

More than half of PRSRs are nonreligious in all AR indicators, which makes them, contrary to H5, more similar to NRSRs than RSRs. Secularization tendencies are also found among RSRs in all AR indicators. Distancing oneself from a religious worldview in which the majority is, at least formally (ARES), socialized is most evident in not accepting life in accordance with the principles of faith as a life goal that even the majority of RSRs do not consider desirable.

In their research of political attitudes, Boehke, Hadjar, and Baier (2007) argue that parents whose worldview is marginal to the *zeitgeist* of a particular society will seek to reduce or eliminate external influences in primary socialization to make the transmission of family values more successful. Applying an analogy in the analysis of RS in a highly religious Croatian society, it was to be expected that NRSRs

would recognize the greater influence of parents in shaping their attitudes than RSRs. However, the results reveal just the opposite – NRSRs recognize the crucial family influence twice, and the PRSRs even four times less than RSRs. It would be expected that PRSRs would adhere to the socially dominant pattern, i.e., be as religious as the RSRs; however, most of them are “going against the current.” More successful transmission of religiosity is associated with the recognition of stronger family influence and, according to previous findings (Petts & Desmond, 2016), the greater influence of the mother. Distancing oneself from religion and the Church is associated with minimizing the influence of all agents of socialization and emphasizing autonomy in creating attitudes about religion, which fits into the concept of individualization and self-socialization characteristic of late modernity.

To explain the weak AR of UNIRI students, it is not enough to take into account the level of secularization in the area of primary socialization of the majority of respondents (Istria and Primorje) because only a tenth of respondents had no RS experience in their childhood. Moving away from religion and the Church is clearly a generational phenomenon (Voas & Crockett, 2005) because students are generally less religious than the average population (H2). Furthermore, it is evident that passivation and indifference towards religion grow with the year of study, which means that students, emancipating themselves from family influence and control, in new life circumstances move away from worldviews and patterns of behavior from childhood.

A number of questions arise about the reasons for the observed trends and possible further directions of change, and the answers to them go beyond the spatial limitations of this text. Are secularization trends among students an indication of “a self-reinforcing spiral of secularization” (Kelley, 2015)? Do global changes in the socio-cultural context of growing up mediated by new technologies (Lövheim, 2012), shape students’ worldview more strongly than the content of traditional RS? Is it a transient decline in religiosity at this stage of life, which will be reversed by establishing one’s own procreation family, or is it the opposite – the level of religiosity within a particular cohort in life unchanged (Voas, 2015) and the majority of current students are Christians only nominally? Is it a diffusion of moral evolution coming from developed countries, whose students represent the avant-garde and hint at future secularization trends (Inglehart, 2021)? Will, according to the principle of stratified diffusion (Willmot and Young), student attitudes and patterns of behavior expand to other young people and, in the future, become a normative posi-

tion in society? Is there a partial change in patterns of social desirability that leads to ideological and religious polarization at play?

The not-so-distant past warns us that one should be very careful in predicting further trends of people's attachment to religion and the Church in this region. The deep-rooted equality of the confessional and the national identity carries with it the smoldering potential of conflict, a convenient means to which the elites resort for the purpose of political mobilization and gaining legitimacy (Vrcan, 2001).

Finally, the limitations of this study arising from the specificity of the sample and the region in which the research was conducted should be emphasized.

Students whose patterns cannot be mechanically replicated on all young people were interviewed, but, at the same time, it should be borne in mind that this is a group from which the social elite will be recruited tomorrow, which will dictate the rhythm of future social changes. Furthermore, UNIRI has a regional character, and although the region variable is statistically weakly related to indicators of religiosity, it should be emphasized that the largest part of the surveyed students grew up in the counties with a lower level of religiosity. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the finding that, for a significant part of students, regardless of regional affiliation and despite the RS experience in childhood, "religion plays a very minor role (if any) in their lives" (Voas, 2009, 164).

POVEZAVE MED RELIGIOZNO SOCIALIZACIJO V OTROŠTVU IN AKTUALNO RELIGIOZNOSTJO V ŠTUDENTSKIH LETIH: PRIMER HRVAŠKIH ŠTUDENTOV UNIVERZE NA REKI

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POVZETEK

Po razpadu socializma je Hrvatska doživela verski preporod in postala ena izmed najbolj religioznih nekdanjih socialističnih držav. Vera in religioznost sta iz zasebno toleriranega, a družbeno nezaželenega, postali del družbene normale, uradna verska socializacija pa prevladujoča oblika vzgoje otrok. Prispevek analizira povezavo med vzorci (ne)religiozne socializacije in religioznostjo v študentskih letih, in sicer na podlagi spletne ankete, ki je bila izvedena leta 2021 na vzorcu študentov Univerze na Reki (N=624). Glede na vzorec socializacije ločimo tri kategorije: (1) versko socializirane anketirance, ki so jih starši vzgajali versko in so hodili k šolskemu verouku; (2) delno versko socializirane anketirance, ki so hodili k šolskemu verouku, vendar jih starši niso vzgajali ne versko ne neverško; (3) anketiranci, katere so starši vzgajali neverško in niso hodili k šolskemu verouku. Rezultati razkrivajo, da socializacijski vzorec pomembno vpliva na razlike med vsemi analiziranimi kazalniki religioznosti študentov. Ob ohranjanju svetovnonazorskih in vedenjskih vzorcev, sprejetih s socializacijo, ugotavljamo odstopanje v vseh kategorijah. To odstopanje se večinoma kaže kot oddaljevanje od vere in cerkva anketirancev, ki imajo na podlagi svojih izkušenj eno ali obe obliki verske socializacije. Niti visoko religiozen nacionalni kontekst, niti izkušnja uradne religiozne socializacije, nista zagotovilo za religioznost v študentskih letih, če družinske religiozne socializacije ni bilo. Odmik od svetovnega nazora, v katerem je večina vsaj formalno socializirana, se najbolj kaže v nesprejemanju življenja po načelih vere kot zaželenega življenjskega cilja.

Ključne besede: (ne)religiozna socializacija, aktualna religioznost, dejavniki socializacije, študenti, sekularizacija, Hrvatska

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ISTRIA AS A SITE AND AS A SUBJECT MATTER IN THE PRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION OF REGIONAL KNOWLEDGE: BIBLIOMETRIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This study maps, visualizes, evaluates and interprets scientific papers in journals dealing with the site (place) and subject-matter of Istria. The approach is interdisciplinary. The data were taken from the Web of Science (WoS) citation database, processed with the VOSviewer program, and analytically evaluated. The occurrence and distribution of terms in titles and abstracts of articles clustered in characteristic groups of related studies are assumed as topics and agendas. Granulation of clusters reveals differences in research approaches across and within disciplines. Within the natural sciences, distinctive bio- and geological clusters emerge. Social sciences and humanities permeate each other in a single cluster, with marked terminological heterogeneity. The main conclusion is that Istria's epistemic contexts and methodological approaches manifest themselves on four contextual levels: 1. Istria as a site is one of many topics in a wider context within the natural sciences; 2. here can also be the subject of single narrow and specific topics; 3. nation-specific (state-) can be found in various disciplines; 4. the social sciences and humanities are associated with diverse multicultural, cross-border related topics. The analysis of the organization and production of knowledge suggests that the multifaceted and elusive regional character of scientific endeavors co-shapes Istria's evolving specific supranational sociocultural identity.

Keywords: region Istria, knowledge organization, regional knowledge, science mapping, bibliometrics, epistemic cultures

L'ISTRIA COME SITO E COME SOGGETTO NELLA PRODUZIONE E ORGANIZZAZIONE DEL SAPERE REGIONALE: ANALISI BIBLIOMETRICA E SOCIOLOGICA

SINTESI

Questo studio mappa, visualizza, valuta e interpreta articoli scientifici in giornali che trattano del sito (luogo) e del soggetto dell'Istria. L'approccio è interdisciplinare. I dati sono stati presi dal database Web of Science (WoS), elaborati con il programma VOSviewer e valutati analiticamente. La presenza e la distribuzione di termini nei titoli e nelle sintesi di articoli raggruppati in gruppi caratteristici di studi correlati sono assunti come soggetti e agenda. La granulazione dei cluster rivela differenze negli approcci di ricerca tra e all'interno delle discipline. All'interno delle scienze naturali emergono distinti cluster bio- e geologici. Scienze sociali e umanistiche si compenetrano in un unico cluster, con marcata eterogeneità terminologica. La conclusione principale è che i contesti epistemici e gli approcci metodologici dell'Istria si manifestano su quattro livelli contestuali: 1. l'Istria come sito è uno dei tanti argomenti in un contesto più ampio all'interno delle scienze naturali; 2. qui può anche essere oggetto di singole tematiche ristrette e specifiche; 3. la specificità della nazione (stato) può essere trovata in varie discipline; 4. le scienze sociali e umanistiche sono associate a diversi temi multiculturali e transfrontalieri. L'analisi dell'organizzazione e della produzione di conoscenza suggerisce che il carattere regionale sfaccettato ed elusivo degli sforzi scientifici co-forma l'identità socioculturale specifica sovranazionale dell'Istria in evoluzione.

Parole chiave: regione Istria, organizzazione della conoscenza, conoscenza regionale, mappatura della scienza, bibliometria, culture epistemiche

INTRODUCTION¹

How to approach the bibliometric (scientometric) review, assessment and interpretation of the published production of (scientific) knowledge on the subject matter of Istria and about the site/area of Istria? This is a narrower question within a broader dilemma about the situational (site-specific) nature of knowledge production, its reception and publication, and about “where knowledge happens”. Science, after all, is always tied to particular times and sites.

Any such attempt necessarily involves limitations, some sort of selectivity, and a standardized procedure for dealing with the diverse material or types of documents. Although limited in many ways, the assessment of periodicals as indexed in (international) databases is the most standardized indicator of scientific output. The limitations are several, for example, the coverage of only relatively recent knowledge production (twentieth century, and onwards) and the inevitable disciplinary incongruence (or even bias) when comparing the natural sciences² on the one hand, and social sciences and humanities on the other hand, particularly on the account of specific publishing practices in scientific disciplines³. Monographs cannot be retrieved and analyzed very systematically, for several reasons. Scopus and WoS contain monographs by only selected (international) publishers and are in this respect partial. The general epistemological observation that “the distance between disciplines can in some cases appear small, in terms of subject matter, but be large in terms of methodology or perspective” (McNeill, 1999, 315) is particularly relevant in the case of Istria. Namely, the validity of science mapping in order to evaluate research lies in large part in the databases’ representativeness of the scientific activity studied. Databases WoS and Scopus focus mostly on journals and much less on other means of scientific knowledge diffusion. Yet, communication practices in science differ and are reflected in the ‘epistemic cultures’ of research fields (Mongeon & Paul-Hus, 2016).

The purpose of this study is to map, visualize, evaluate and interpret scientific articles involving Istria in journals. To this effect, one could also consult the increasingly powerful Google Scholar and Google Books ‘search engines’. However, retrieval procedures in Google can specifically focus only on

document titles where it is not possible to disambiguate between the many publications that Google indexes. If one browses complete full-texts one is challenged by overwhelming tens of thousands of records where a search term can come about anywhere in a publication, also only in some very minor random contexts. Whereas, theoretically, it is possible to use Google Scholar for research evaluation, such an analysis would be extremely time-consuming requiring considerable manual intervention, even on a very small dataset of books (Mingers & Meyer, 2017).

These books on Istria are predominantly a subject of Croatian, Slovenian and Italian bibliographies, which are not analytically comparable with each other. One must here consult national bibliographic collections, which also catalog historical works of relevance, which is especially the case with the Italian library catalogs. Ranking of scholarly publishers of books would involve difficult procedures of a detailed matching, cleaning, and standardizing procedure for publisher names and titles, on top of that, an access to unique datasets would be required. The unclear selection criteria in databases can be particularly detrimental for the researchers with national or regional interests (Zuccala *et al.*, 2015). For example, some studies suggest that books from Central Europe are not recognized or are cited mostly by colleagues from their own countries. Despite the great importance of books in social sciences and humanities, bibliometric studies have shown that the share of cited authored and the edited books is nevertheless constantly declining (Jokić *et al.*, 2019).

As the assessment of books alone would require an expert knowledge of this subject, we resorted to a method of limiting our consideration only to scientific journals. Being aware of such limitations especially in the fields of the Social sciences and humanities, we have nevertheless detected a quite vigorous growth of articles in these fields in the more recent period. Thus, the method of science mapping (bibliometrics, scientometrics)⁴ and visualizations that we employ in this study can efficiently map only records in databases. To our knowledge, such or a similar study on the subject of specific supranational socio-cultural and spatial assemblages has not yet been conducted.

1 This study was conducted in the frame of research fellowship (May 15 – July 15, 2022) at the Center for Advanced Studies of Southeastern Europe, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia (Marjan Hočevár). It was partly supported by the Slovenian Research Agency (Grant P5-0181, Marjan Hočevár; Grant P4-0085, Tomaž Bartol).

2 By ‘natural sciences’, we refer to agriculture, biology, earth science, materials science, medicine, etc. The category of ‘social sciences and humanities’ includes arts (it can also be referred to as ‘arts and humanities’).

3 The still-vivid epistemological dilemmas about universality, objectivity, and rationality go beyond the purpose of this study (see e.g. Reed, 2010; Bojanić, 2017).

4 In the metrics of science there is no strict delineation between these concepts. Development of science can be mapped using different methods. We use the term bibliometrics which is the most established. Scientometrics and informetrics are also used.

The approach is interdisciplinary, linking science mapping and analytical sociological considerations (Gläser & Laudel, 2004; Sooryamoorthy, 2020). The purpose is to map, visualize, evaluate and interpret scientific articles. Our quantitative method employs a program (VOSviewer) which enables a more general overview of the circumstances of a site where elusive narratives on the subject matter of Istria have been shifting over time. This method allows some interpretive dimensions of 'big data analytics'.

For the sociological interpretation of clusters thus visualized, we used an analytical framework based on the theoretical *concept of epistemic cultures* in the production of scientific knowledge (Knorr Cetina, 1999; Knorr Cetina, 2007; Cohendet et al., 2014). Tentative reliance on this concept allows for a certain qualitative interpretation of cluster visualization, connection networks, terminological features, and other data. We start from the basic methodological premise of the *logic of knowledge organization and information retrieval* (Hjørland, 2013). We take into account affirmative epistemological arguments about site-specific organization, production and dissemination of knowledge. On a regional scale, culture has shaped scientific endeavor and, in turn, scientific practices have been instrumental in forming identities (Livingstone, 2010). In this case study, we presume that the authors, regardless of topic, research perspective, disciplinary and epistemological orientation, communicate the term *Istria* (noun) or *Istrian* (adjective) in the title and/or abstract. This is the common denominator in this study, which determines the relationships between (major) groups and subgroups of research agendas based on journal publication patterns and authors' terminological choice. The terms *Istria* and *Istrian* are heuristically considered as *research element* and all articles as *Istrian corpus*.

The structure of the article is as follows: in Chapter 2, we outline the background and motivation in tackling the combined bibliographic-sociological analysis of Istria. We start from the assumption that the elusive character of the Istrian entity produces specifics in the production of scientific knowledge that can be quantified and then interpreted. Whereas very numerous similar bibliometric analyses, which involve science mapping and big-data-related visualizations, address nation states, it is very difficult to find related studies which focus on particular regions/sites characterized by dual (or even threefold) supranational attributes which are characteristic of Istria. In Chapter 3, we explain the methodological design and research instrument (Data processing, and software VOSviewer) and highlight methodological limitations. In the fourth chapter, we visualize the extracted data and analytically evaluate the findings. In the concluding chapter, we summarize the basic

considerations regarding knowledge organization and information retrieval with regard to different epistemic cultures in support of further research in 'Istrian studies'.

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW: ISTRIA AS AN ELUSIVE SUBJECT MATTER AND ISTRIA AS A SITE

Istria has been, as many researchers point out, an elusive and fluid subject matter, concept, descriptor or entity in time and space (Peršolja, 2020; Frykman, 2003). Elusiveness is more or less characteristic of the entire disciplinary spectrum of natural sciences, social sciences and humanities in the treatment of socio-cultural or geo-physical artifacts, phenomena and processes in Istria (e.g. *Istrian region*, *Istrian peninsula*, *Istrian dialect*, *Istria basin*). However, this characteristic is more pronounced in qualitative, also non-positivist (critical) approaches to the treatment of Istria in social sciences, arts and humanities. In the context of epistemic characteristics of disciplines, it can be generally argued that natural sciences deal mostly with factual natural phenomena, which are located within the physical environment of Istria. Social sciences and humanities deal with the social and cultural phenomena and processes of Istria. One of the purposes of our empirical experiment is to detect the possible overlap of epistemic principles, i.e. the treatment of Istria as a subject matter and the treatment of matters within the (site) of Istria. We start from the established definition in sociology and cultural geography, on permeation of 'physical space' (site) and 'social space' (habitus). Social space is understood as a physical, multiscale expression of social relations and interdependencies (Knoblauch & Löw, 2020; Bourdieu, 1996; Silber, 1995). An important, even key element for Istria has been the perceived character of supranational social space (also referred to as transnational space, transborder zone/region, contact societies/spaces etc.). The processual logic produces somewhat elusive multidimensional space and social compositions within concrete physical localities (Božić & Kuti, 2019; Mlinar, 2001; Bufon, 2002; Stjepanović, 2018). Such a social/physical space, discussed in the articles on Istria within the social sciences and humanities, is characterized by a permeation of local, regional, national and transnational levels within different socio-cultural processes.

The Istrian knowledge corpus extends from nomothetic (generalized) to idiographic (particularistic) bibliographic units with numerous research agendas and approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, within and among disciplines. Elusiveness of Istrian subject matter and site with numerous contingencies pose a challenge to the definition of (scientific) knowledge organization and production about Istria.

In terms of disciplinary demarcations, to name just a few: historiographic, geographic, linguistic, demographic, socio-cultural, geo-political, geotectonic etc., the boundaries or borders in various spatial and social meanings and usage have been shifting, over time. For example, Istria as a *research element* of a wider scale is contingent on biotic or physiographic traits, which go beyond Istria. Another example would be period-specific demarcations that are historically and geographically not connected or associated with current state or understandings of Istria. In addition, as stressed above, this elusiveness and fluidity may present a particular challenge for researchers in the social sciences, and humanities who deal with human populace, socio-spatial changes and processes and their artefacts (Paasi, 2021; Schroer, 2019). Here, the subject matter may be somehow influenced by researcher's social-value-driven observation, which could be, in some research agendas and at times, politically (ideologically) 'charged'. When interpreting the published corpus of Istrian scientific knowledge, it is necessary to take into account this aspect already at the level of the usage of terms by authors.

In general, how do researchers name, describe and define the site of *Istria*? Often, they refer to this fluctuating social, cultural and/or geographical area just as *Istria*, and more rarely as *Istrian peninsula* (also *Istria peninsula*), which is, however, a more common notion in natural sciences where the researchers frequently emphasize the physical-geographic designation *peninsula* (with precincts also sometimes open to discussion). It is also noticeable that the (non-) adjective use is related to the national affiliation of authors, where, for example, authors use the form 'Slovenian Istria', 'Croatian Istria', 'Southern Istria', etc. Describing Istria as a site or as a research topic or agenda, both as a noun *Istria* and adjective *Istrian*, authors thus use many different terms, with specific meanings and (disciplinary) emphases, such as e.g. *region*, *border zone* or *contact area* (with various adjectives). As expected, *social space* designations as defined above are markedly more characteristic in Social sciences and humanities in various contexts of specifically *Istrian regionalism*, either as a fact, perceived reality or as a part of modern processual mechanism in the intertwining of supranational integration and autonomy (Agnew, 2018; Pike, 2007; Hočevár, 2017). The frequency of regional occurrences in the published scientific corpus indicates that Istrian subject matter is included in contemporary studies and thinking about space, place, and scale as relational and habitual rather than as territorial or spatially bounded entity.

Istria is an interesting subject to investigate – in terms of knowledge organization and information retrieval in databases – precisely because of the

intertwining of the elusiveness of the subject matter and/or the geographical area (Table 1).

Let us state here that the aim of this study is not to review the myriad of the above listed and all other possible situational contexts. Neither is our study a review of all articles on Istria, but of certain bibliographic parameters in this literature. A review would be an entirely different enterprise, a study on its own and involving an assembly of 'istriologists' or Istrian specialists, working on, both imagined (interpretative) and factual (explanatory) based 'istrianism' or 'istrianity' within the various fields of science. Here, we do not encroach on the domain of historians, regionalists, geographers, geologists and other scholars who have already explored Istria in comprehensive publications, for example, Darovec (1992, 2009), Matijašić (1993), Klemencić & Bufon (2014), and in numerous specialized studies (Gortan Carlin & Lovrinić, 2021; Schellenberg, 2021; Maletić et al., 2014). There is no direct connection in the literature between biblio- or scientometric and conceptual treatments of Istrian subject matter. Authors in the field of social sciences and humanities often, but only indirectly, refer to epistemological, methodological and terminological dilemmas, either when studying specific topics within sub-disciplinary Istrian specialty, e.g. geography (Staut, Kovačič & Ogrin, 2007; Bufon, 2002) or, vice versa, when they thematize more general aspects of changing epistemic practices (Jačetić Andersen, 2021; Schellenberg, 2021). Regarding the thematization of qualitative approaches (in combination with quantitative ones), Adam & Podmenik (2005) presented a field research project in Slovenian Istria, in the context of the application of inclusive research designs in the Slovenian social community. Rašić Bakarić (2005) performed a cluster analysis of the location of the elusive regional level of Croatian Istria while Čučković (2012) discussed northwestern Istrian topography in the context of unclear and conflicting historical records. In connection with methodological problems in the empirical research of Istrian subject matter with regard to the issues of geography, identity or linguistic delimitation, the topics of tourism (Sedmak, 2021; Brščić et al., 2020) and regional data are especially prominent (Čok, Kavaš & Zimmermann, 2016).

In bibliometric or science mapping studies, Istria has not been investigated as such but only detected as a term (concept, topic). In an editorial using Vosviewer-based evaluation of the journal *Tourism and Hospitality Management*, Istria was detected along Dubrovnik as the most frequent place where tourism-related studies in Croatia were conducted (Janković & Perić, 2021) and was also identified as a keyword in conceptual clusters of social sciences, natural sciences, and humanities in study addressing Croatian scientific bibliography (Schatten, 2013).

Table 1: Occurrence of characteristic nouns and adjectives in phrasal association with Istria/Istrian (articles in the Web of Science).

Phrase	Occ.	Phrase	Occ.	Phrase	Occ.
"area of Istria"	12	"Istria Croatia"	129	"Istrian peninsula"	96
"Istria area"	1	"Croatian Istria"	18	"Istria peninsula"	20
"Istrian area"	1	"Istria in Croatia"	4	"peninsula of Istria"	3
"Istrian coast"	32	"Istria county"	25	"peninsula Istria"	2
"coast of Istria"	13	"Istrian county"	5	"Istria region"	20
"coastal Istria"	2	"county of Istria"	3	"Istrian region"	16
"Istria coast"	1	"Slovenian Istria"	42	"region of Istria"	15
"territory of Istria"	4	"Slovene Istria"	30	"region Istria"	4
"Istrian territory"	1	"Istria Slovenia"	5		

Similarly addressing a national bibliography, Istria was detected as one of the keywords frequently used in the journal *Acta Geographica Slovenica* (Urbanc et al., 2014). A journal dedicated to Istrian studies (*Acta Histriae*) was noticed as one of the journals (indexed by Web of Science and Scopus) where historians from Poland publish their works (Osiński, 2014) while a MSc thesis employed a bibliometric approach in an analysis of the journal 'Vjesnik Istarskog arhiva' (Journal of Istrian Archive) (Sabolić, 2020). In life sciences, Istrian coast was mentioned in a study on marine mucilage (Türkistanli et al., 2021), and Istrian olive oil in a review on research trends of geographical origin of oils (Tahir et al., 2022) or assessment of olive oil tourism (Hernández-Mogollón et al., 2019). As mentioned, in those studies, Istria was only identified in the full texts of these documents. It has never featured as a topic of a bibliometric analysis on its own.

In order to geographically/spatially frame our further examination of possible science-mapping articles, we searched for other multilingual and 'transborder' entities or regions, in connection with bibliometric science mapping, and possibly indexed by citation databases Scopus or Web of Science. We checked those involving historical parts of northern Italy and especially Austria (Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the final period), for example, Banat (Vojvodina), Bessarabia, Bukovina, Burgenland, Galicia (Eastern), Transylvania, Trentino, Tyrol (also as South Tyrol / Alto Adige). Only one document used such approaches: a bibliometric study using Bukovina as an example (Shyliuk, 2019). As a complement, we also examined the contexts of some other regions, for example, Alsace, Catalonia, Crimea, Flanders, Friesland, Lapland, Lusatia, Masuria, Pomerania,

and Schleswig-Holstein. In this case, we detected only such studies which involved the subjects of Flanders and Catalonia but without specific reference to supranational, multicultural or transborder contexts. These two regions are simply too large, too populous and scientifically too productive to be assessed along other regions on the same scale. Except for the aforementioned study on Bukovina, none of these studies employed a supranational entity as a subject of a bibliometric research.

The terms transboundary or cross-border have also been used in agricultural sciences, with regard to the Istrian sheep and exchange of genetic material. In this sense, the conflicts are likely of a more amorous nature. Here, an important share of articles uses the adjective Istrian which refers to the indigenous (autochthonous) Istrian Pramenka (*sl: istrska pramenka, hr: istarska pramenka*), and to a lesser extent to the Istrian shorthaired hound (*hr: istarski kratkodlaki gonič, sl: istrski kratkodlaki gonič*). The races of domestic animals (both farm- and companion animals) which have gained a recognized designation are not necessarily confined to an area. This is a limitation of our study. Nevertheless, the number of such articles is not so high. After all, this adds an additional 'flavor' to the region of Istria, which has landed its name to a myriad of phenomena and activities of a very wide nature.

MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY

The study uses Web of Science (WoS) citation database as the main source of data while the sociological interpretation supplements the quantitative (visualized) analysis, which is based on data extraction from WoS. Scopus database could also be used, however,

there are some methodological limitations involving Scopus. Our retrieval procedure involves the terms in the abstracts and article titles. Here, Scopus does not disambiguate between English-language- and parallel-language-titles in the title-search-field. In this field, it provides both titles. Parallel-language terms are thus also counted which produces many duplicate items, which considerably skews the clustering and visualizations. This is particularly the case in the subject areas of Social Sciences and Arts and Humanities where many articles are published in non-English languages.

Thus we used WoS-based abstracts and titles. Their co-occurrences are structured into a map. Such maps can be interpreted as a proxy for a discipline what was investigated, for example, on the case of psychology by Flis & van Eck (2018). The study involves original research and review articles. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a limitation of both citation databases; therefore this study only focuses on the subject of Istria as being reflected in scientific periodicals (journals/serials). We included the entire period of the Web of Science database and examined all records indexed by the database up until May 2022.

Search statement:

ab=(istria or istrian) or ti=(istria or istrian)

Refined by: Document types: Article or Review article (n=1,043 as of May 2022).

The initial procedure was thus to design the optimal search statement, presented above (syntax or query). In the case of Istria, this was straightforward as it only involved the two essential terms: *Istria* and the adjective *Istrian*. Here, however, some 'manual' disambiguation was necessary. In the preliminary assessment, we identified several articles, which addressed the ancient Greek-Roman city Istria in Danube delta (Romania) as well as Romanian writer Dora d'Istria. We could not withdraw such records by simply excluding the geographical term Romania because there is an additional complication of an ancient mix-up of Istria peninsula and Danube and erroneous accounts of it flowing into the Adriatic (Vedriš, 2012). On top of that, there are Romanian scientists who participate in a research on the tiny Istro-Romanian linguistic group in Istria in Croatia. Therefore, all unconnected records relating to Istria in Romania had to be found and excluded manually.

Text data mining (terms in the titles and abstracts)

Visualizations were conducted by using the program VOSviewer, 2022 version 1.6.18 (Van Eck & Waltman, 2022). In order to correctly visualize text maps we cre-

ated a thesaurus whereby we excluded generic terms in the structured abstracts (e.g., aims, design/methodology/approach, objective, paper, results⁵). The natural language processing algorithms consist of various steps, for example, a noun phrase unification. Accents are removed from characters, upper case characters are converted to lower case, plural noun phrases are converted to singular. Here, some limitations apply and some errors are possible.

This program groups terms into clusters of items represented by circles of specific colors. Items with a higher weight are larger than items with a lower weight. An item may belong to only one cluster. It is more strongly linked to the items in that cluster. The position of items in the cluster indicates relatedness. However, an item may also have links to items in other clusters. These links are represented by lines. Clustering techniques are presented in more detail by Waltman et al. (2010).

Bibliographic data mining (journals and countries)

Bibliographic data of interest were, in our case, also the principal journals as well as the countries of an author's affiliation - i.e. the address of an author's institution. With the help of this programme we arranged the journals into clusters according to Bibliographic coupling (relatedness of journals based on the number of references two journals have in common). The number of articles in a journal are reflected in a size of a circle pertaining to a journal. Again, the possible links to other clusters are represented by lines.

The countries of an author's affiliation are arranged by way of co-authorship. The size of a circle again reflects the number of articles produced by authors in a particular country. The strength of links (the width of lines) shows the intensity of collaboration between countries.

Average time of the manifestation of an item

The maps can also be arranged through the overlay visualization by way of a specific color scale (seamless shading). In our case, the colors indicate the average occurrence of an item in time (year). If the items are colored in blue-color palette it means that the average year is older. If the occurrence of an item is more recent then the colors are reddish. The very recent subjects of interest are thus red and are represented by small circles, on account of still low counts of novel terms.

⁵ For example, on a few instances we found that the form *istria* was converted to the form *istrium* which in fact does not exist. In this case, we used thesaurus in order to map *istrium* to *istria*. The procedures are explained in detail in the manual (Van Eck & Waltman, 2022) so we present only the essential methodological procedures.

RESULTS

At the very beginning we should note that all terms are presented in lower-case form, irrespective of grammatical rules (hence *istria*, *italian* etc.). This is the array in the program itself, also in order to eliminate possible confusion while referring to acronyms or when presenting terms in different languages with different capitalization rules.

Text data (Titles and abstracts)

Preliminary exploratory visualizations were established on broader scopes of research. The 1,043 articles were assessed for those terms, which come about at least 10 times, based on the 60% of the most relevant terms (default setting by the program). The program defined 319 such terms among the total of 29,200 terms. These contexts are shown in three clusters of (inter)related disciplinary research approaches (Figure 1). Two left-hand clusters (A, B) are located closer to each other indicating (inter)related epistemologies and methodologies within natural sciences⁶ (and related sub-disciplines). When the authors (A) designate the site/area in the abstract or title, they often specify it as *istrian peninsula*, although this term in this cluster is less prominent than some specific ones (e.g. *condition*, *species*). In this cluster, Istria features as a site/location of research (as a-matter-of-fact) or as a part of a wider geographical or geological study area (*Adriatic sea*, *basin*, *coast*), and not as the subject matter itself. The distinctiveness and at the same time interconnectedness between the two natural science clusters indicates the different logic of organization and production of knowledge in comparison with social sciences, and art and humanities.

Cluster C is located separately, exhibiting only weak links with research in clusters A and B. This combined 'social sciences and humanities' cluster is markedly more heterogeneous and not distinctive enough for the program to perceive it as two separate ones. We can hypostasize that the result of the presentation agrees with the observations of analysts of epistemologies and methodologies that the variability and heterogeneity of socio-cultural contexts does not allow more confined approaches, which also complicates interdisciplinary research practice. Analytical narrative character goes also on the account of the strong utilization of qualitative methodologies in social sciences and humanities (Cohendet et al., 2014; Aagaard Hansen, 2007). Cluster C therefore contains or combines both basic perspectives of Istria as a subject matter (*identity*, *history*, *century*, *clture*, *church*, *war*, *architecture*), and Istria as

a site (*place*, *territory*, *town*, *Slovenian Istria*, *region*, *land*). Despite the implicit treatment of 'regionalism' that we noticed in the primary full-texts of articles, the notions associated with this broad term are not clear. Our assumption is that the multifaceted notion of region is already a self-evident context of the common socio-cultural framework in Istrian case studies and is not additionally emphasized as a geographically delimited area (site).

As we will explain in more detail below, the two notions of 'social space' (*habitus*) and 'physical space' (site) of Istria well illustrate the epistemological and methodological features of clustering by scientific fields.

On closer observation of topics in each cluster and in accordance with the utilization of the concepts of disciplinary organization of knowledge (Hjørland, 2013) and epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina, 1999), we tentatively label⁷ the clusters as:

A – Biosciences (and related)

B – Geosciences (and related)

C – Social sciences and humanities (and related)

The maps are dense so not all details can be discerned. Using the utilities of software, we arranged the maps according to optimal principles of a 'broader picture' which invariably entails some trade-offs (limitations). Respectively, analytical interpretation is also limited, so findings may be tentative rather than definitive. The program is, however, dynamic and so we employed the utility of zooming-in and zooming-out in order to show details. The interpretation partly considers this extended possibility. Let us then have a closer look at one exemplary term - *limestone*. (see, the upper left-hand part of the map below Fig. N clusters 10 occ).

The links with physical geography and geology (within B) are self-evident. *Limestone* is also linked with agriculture and biosciences (A), and social sciences and humanities (C) through terms such as *building*, *place*, *Venice*, *Trieste* and *wall*. i.e. places where the limestone from Istria was used. This applies mostly to the architectural part of the humanities where connection, albeit weak, between research treatments of Istria is demonstrated. However, in the 'political and 'social' part of C Istria is essentially a subject matter.

Of course, in all such maps there are also 'generic' or instrumental terms, which are characteristic of research methods and materials in a particular discipline (left-hand clusters: *condition*, *content*, *sample* ..., right-hand cluster: *context*, *century*...). All terms are established by the program, based on the default

⁶ We reiterate from the introduction section: by 'natural sciences', we refer to agriculture, biology, earth science, materials science, medicine, etc.

⁷ This is only our exploratory categorization. Even the classification systems in Scopus, WoS, and Frascatti are not always in reciprocal agreement.



However, what are then the more detailed research approaches, such as crop-up within the

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


Figure 3: Clusters of related research topics based on detailed granulation.




Figure 4: Zoomed-in detail of the Figure 4 (Biosciences).

generic (instrumental) terms are no longer present and are replaced by more specific ones, therefore detailed accents come to the fore (Figure 3).

We can still perceive, largely, the three original principal clusters as in Figure 1. Now, these clusters

are more detailed and rearranged into additional 'sub-clusters' (four in natural sciences and two in social sciences and humanities) which also overlap, on account of similar research approaches. Below left, the terms are dispersed in two clusters (A1, A2).

Above, there are also two clusters (B1, B2), as well as in the right-hand part of the map (C1, C2). Some terms are positioned more towards the center of the map, possessing characteristics which are thematically shared among different clusters. Map is very dense given its range of 1,471 terms. Most small and/or overlapping terms are not visible.

Let us now examine more closely each of the clusters by zooming-in central areas of the map. Lower part of Figure 3, now zoomed in in Figure 4 shows strong traits of research in animal production (A1, below: *ewe*, *lactation*, *milk* ...) as well as topics of genetics and plant production (A2, above: *wine*). In this cluster, there are also concepts related to human health and medicine which are located close to the social topics (later, Figure 6). Here we get a more obvious insight into preferred terms across the sciences. We can assume that these could be the topics and approaches that are linked or may possess interdisciplinary potential. Medicine (and public health) is not perceived as a separate cluster. It is connected with biology as in some other studies (Carley et al., 2017) whereas in research involving larger population aggregates (e.g. capitals of nation states) medicine features as a separate cluster (Hočevár & Bartol, 2021). We assume that the elusive character of Istria as a multifaceted vaguely demarcated 'social space' can explain the modest weight of the field of medicine, at least in part. Relatively small urban centers with scattered settlements are administratively tied to the jurisdictions of individual countries, so not much immediate medical research has been linked with Istria.

At the very top, we also note a generic term *concentration* that comes about more frequently in this biological-agricultural cluster but is (methodologically) also strongly linked with the themes of the physical geography and geology above (Figure 5: B1, B2). In clusters A1 and A2, we can note specific names in the context of appellation of origin, with many articles dedicated to the indigenous (autochthonous) Istrian breed of dairy sheep. The pramenka breed (*istrska pramenka* (sl), *istrska pramenka* (hr), in Italian sometimes as *istriana* or *carsolina*) is specifically mentioned in several articles. In the rest, it can be inferred. *Istrian cattle*, *goat*, and *shorthaired hound* are also mentioned in articles although not visible in the Figure 4. Several terms are linked with wine and olive oil.


In Figure 5, there are also two distinctive groups of themes. The themes below (B1) are close to agriculture, hence the contexts of soil science (e.g. *contaminant*, *harvesting*, *nitrogen*). We can observe notes of meteorology (e.g. *degrees*, *precipitation*, *temperature*) and aquatic or marine ecosystems (e.g. *salinity*, *northern Adriatic sea*). The B1 topics then converge towards more geologically themed

issues in B2 such as *flysch* and *limestone*, and finally paleontology (e.g. *dinosaur footprint*, *jurassic*). At the very right-hand part of this map these B2 topics then meet the social sciences and humanities (e.g. *excavation*, *pottery* in Figure 6).

Whereas the A and B clusters are not so clearly separated and show many mutual links, the C group (Figure 6) is quite clearly separated from both, excepting some interdisciplinary research and publication of shared interest. The terms in Figure 6 are also divided into two groups (C1, C2) although very much permeated and linked to each other. The permeation of diverse topics in these two groups shows that the delineation between the social sciences and the humanities does not figure in the same way as in geo- and biosciences (natural sciences), where separate clusters are formed. From the marked difference in the formation of separate clusters for the natural sciences compared to the permeation of topics in the social sciences and humanities, we can conclude that the subgroups of the basic cluster explain more differences in qualitative (C1) and quantitative methodologies (C2) in studying specific subjects. This is in connection with different epistemic cultures, the organization of knowledge, and production and communication of knowledge in publications.

In the very left, C1 approaches geology (e.g. *excavation*). Cluster C1 is also more homogenous. It is strongly associated with historical architecture (e.g. *cathedral*, *church*, *façade*, *museum*, *tower*). Cluster C2 is more diverse. It shows sub-themes of (socio) linguistics expressed in terms such as *bilingualism*, *idiom*, *dialect*, *local dialect*, *speaker* (below) as well as demographic and political history more to the right. At the very right, there are many terms relating to the turn of the 19. century and (post) World War I (e.g. *aspiration*, *Austrian littoral*, *emperor*). Many terms are related to Slovenes, Croats, and Italian minorities, obviously linked to language-issues as well as the more general (political) history.

At this point, we need to put some emphasis on the characteristics of such visualizations. Using this program, only the terms which come about with a certain frequency are shown. If a topic is terminologically very clear-cut and not subject to many adjectival forms then such a topic or term will feature in the map quite prominently. This is the case with the term *church*. On the other hand, terms possessing many adjectives will all be counted separately. This is, for example, the case with the adjective *italian* which is in our map linked to many nouns, such as (*italian* (i.) *authority*, *i. city*, *i. community*, *i. culture*, *i. fascism*, *i. government*, *i. language*, *i. minority*, *i. national minority*, *i. occupation*, *i. population*). Such circles are small and mostly invisible because of overlap. While in this map there is no term *Italians* as such, there are, however, terms *Croats* and *Slovenes* which come about in far fewer



topics' which is not the case. There is an interesting detail. The term *pope* is located at the far end of the 'political' part of the map whereas the term *church* is in this map linked with architectural heritage (and art) and not with ecclesiastical polity.




Figure 7: Research topics from Figure 3 presented by average occurrence of a topic in time.

These terminological examples demonstrate the elusiveness of the 'social space' of Istria, expressed through a corpus of periodical publications in the social sciences and humanities. Interpretation of cluster visualization in the Vosviewer program therefore requires a considerable amount of general knowledge, as some connections may seem strange or illogical at first glance.

Similarly, the *tourism*- and *tourist*-related terms become much dispersed in detailed maps constructed on thousands of occurrences. Sometimes *tourism* or *tourist* are employed in the same adjectival meaning (e.g. *tourism destination*, *tourist destination*, *tourism product*, *tourist product*). This can skew visualizations as such terms are then represented by small circles giving impression that less has been published to this end. We can enumerate some terms that authors use, as identified by distinct phrasal terms by the program: *agrotourism*, *Croatian nautical tourism*, *rural tourism*, *sustainable tourism*, *tourism destination*, *tourism development*, *tourism experience*, *tourism product*, *tourist board*, *tourist destination*, *tourist offer*, *tourist product* etc.

An interpretation of such maps must not be too emphatic. As already mentioned, it requires some good level of understanding of the granularity of

the topic within Istrian subject matter and the site. In big-data analytics, not every particularity must be decoded. What is important are the generalized patterns of research which are in the case of these maps quite obvious and self-explanatory to a specialist in the subject matter of each of the clusters representing disciplines and fields of science in the many diverse forms.

Let us now complement Figure 3 with an information on what was the average occurrence of these concepts in time (Figure 7). Time analysis shows research weight and trend of a particular research agenda or topic over time.

We reiterate that the map is dense and topics overlap, therefore we enumerate some items, which are not visible. We can note that the topics pertaining to physical geography and geology have somehow matured. This is indicated by colors of the blue palette, which indicate earlier average publication years of such articles. There are nevertheless some very recent research accents in the upper left, for example, *delta-c*, *delta-o*, *oxygen*, *heavy rainfall*, *precipitation*, *surface water*. These accents show that the importance of climatological events is also being reflected in Istrian studies. Certain topics relating to agriculture within biosciences are



Social sciences and humanities (right-hand side of Figure 7), on the other hand, display much more recent research flows which are shown in the colors of the red palette. It is also self-explanatory that the studies involving the topic of *Yugoslavia* are past their prime. However, more distant past linked with *Austria-Hungary* is attracting more recent research attention. It is understandable that the dynamic, fluid and indeed elusive character of social phenomena and processes (which are necessarily tied to historic trajectories and events) presupposes a lower degree of predictability of 'emerging topics' or 'hot topics' in the social sciences and humanities. The occurrence of topics over time is also influenced by other factors: paradigmatic changes, funding policies, networks of researchers, stronger or weaker orientations of research teams or individual researchers

We may now recoup the clusters and sub-clusters in Figure 3 as follows:

A2 plant production (horticulture, viticulture), genetics, biomedicine

B1 Ecology (*environmental sciences, meteorology ...*)
B2 Physical geography (*geology, paleontology ...*)

C1 Art history (archeology, architecture, art ...)
C2 Political & social history (general history, social history, demographics, linguistics ...)

We reiterate that the above classification is open-minded. We have mentioned earlier, that in categorization schemes, there are sometimes weak parallels even between Scopus and Web of Science let alone between other classification systems. Some systems,




Figure 9: Publication of articles per different journal titles (main part of the figure) and yearly growth of articles (Inset).

for example, place architecture within the Social Sciences and not Humanities.

Journals

In WoS, 1,043 respective original articles (series with ISSN number) were retrieved as of May 2022. The 2021 counts are not yet complete because of a temporary status of some papers (e.g. online first). Figure eight shows visualization of the links between journals as determined based on references these journals share. Only the journals with at least three articles are shown in the map. We can notice clusters of distinctive similarities. Journal *Annales* (Series Historia et Sociologia) is located in the central position that attests to its central role in Istrian studies. Journals *Annales* and *Acta Histriae* cover an especially important part of the studies pertaining to social sciences and humanities. There are important links between both journals. Several fields of science share well-defined clusters. Lower-left part of Figure 8 connects geological and paleontological journals (green). In the center (blue cluster), there are strong accents on marine topics. Many of those journals are not visible therefore, we present them in Inset A in more detail. Further to the right, there are biological issues, which meet agricultural topics and respective journals. These are presented in Inset B.

We can note an important share of articles in the national and regional journals from Croatia and

Slovenia. This is to an extent comprehensible given regional significance of the topic. The regional nature of Istrian research is a part of the broader issue of the production and organization of scientific knowledge, which includes publication patterns. In the case of Istria, “regionality as a social process” can be both a geographical and an analytical category (Schroer, 2019). It can be approached in a way that analyzes rather than assumes the boundaries and character of different regional spaces (Finnegan, 2008: 372).

Similar patterns have also been observed in other studies addressing publications of regional significance (Bartol et al., 2022). While the proximity between coauthors (Apolloni et al., 2013) is important, the national (regional) journals have even higher significance in Central European countries on account of the common historical background (Jokić et al., 2019). In addition, scientific output also depends on the surface area and number of inhabitants of a region (Abramo et al., 2014). Some authors therefore suggest that bibliometric studies offer remarkable possibilities to chart the diverse and complex intellectual structure of regional studies (Mehmetcik & Haksas, 2022).

It is obvious that the Istrian subject matter and site gained ‘momentum’ with the start of the publication of two key regional journals. Regional production, organization of knowledge and publishing therefore has a critical scientific weight. We assume that without the existence of two journals, *Annales* and *Acta Histriae*,




Figure 10: Research areas in WoS in the scope of which at least 20 articles were published.

the total account of social science and humanities articles on Istria would be much lower, also due to the bias or certain 'preferential' criteria of editorial policies of certain international journals of renown.

Nevertheless, many such articles are published outside the regional (three nation states) scope, only that the dispersion is very high and scattered across many journals (Figure 9). High counts of *Annales* and *Acta Histriae* can be clearly seen on the left-hand side of the vertical axis. Figure 9 shows only those journals with at least two articles per journal title (horizontal axis). On top of that, several hundred other journal titles published only one single article. This figure presents a distinctive trait of distributions in bibliographic studies: a long tail of random publications in very diverse journals in many different fields of science follows a core of publications that are central to a particular topic. The Inset in figure shows yearly growth of articles since 1990. Before that period, only a few articles in total count were published. Again, the totals for 2021 are not yet comprehensive given some delay of input in WoS database.

In WoS, all journals are mapped to subject areas, which represent a broad (generalized) scope of a journal so we also wished to ascertain which subject areas the most were frequently assigned to such journals (Figure 10). This figure presents those areas with at least 20 articles. A journal can be assigned to one or more areas therefore; the scores in the figure cannot be sum-

marized. For example, the journal *Annales* is mapped to the research area of *Arts Humanities Other Topics* whereas *Italian Journal of Animal Science* is mapped to *Agriculture* as well as *Veterinary Sciences*, and journal *Quaternary International* to both *Geology* and *Physical Geography*, etc. Again, the principal areas in Figure 10 are followed by a 'tail' of miscellaneous areas, which have also addressed Istria as a site of interest (e.g. *Cell Biology* or *Computer Science*).

Countries of authorship

Regarding the publishing patterns, we also wished to investigate what are the authorship characteristics of articles that address issues related to Istria. To this end, we created co-authorship maps, based on an address that authors provided in their articles (Figure 11). As expected, the countries (nation states) with substantially higher contribution of articles are Croatia, Slovenia and Italy that also exhibit the strongest co-authorship (width of lines). In order to omit only random authors, we included such countries from which authors contributed at least two articles.

There were over 30 such countries. Again, some are not shown because of overlap. On top of co-authorship links, map also shows time dimension of average contribution. Croatian articles are, on average, just slightly 'older' than Slovenian articles. Contributions from Italy are in the middle of the scale. We can note recent con-




Figure 11: Research areas in WoS in the scope of which at least 20 articles were published.

tributions of countries, which co-authored two or three articles. As said in the beginning, such maps are only telling the situation as it is at the time of this analysis. Given the very vigorous recent yearly growth (inset in Figure 9), the color shades are prone to constant evolution.

With this sub-analysis, we should mention analytical limitations. We encountered a couple of errors in the Web of Science database. On just a few occasions, a country was not assigned correctly to a city. Such errors cannot be discounted in big-data analytics, as researchers cannot be expected to physically double-check thousands of individual pieces of data in downloaded files. We can also refer to a particularity of the Web of Science database, which counts England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as separate entities. Challenges of geographical retrieval and geographical representation are also an issue in Scopus database (Hočevár & Bartol, 2021).

To wrap up our analysis, we can summarize the most frequent scales of the occurrences of the many Istrian epistemic contexts and methodological approaches to the subject matter and site of Istria in articles. Istria can be one of many components in a wider research scope (1), whereas in some other articles only a narrower and specific Istrian topic or agenda is investigated (2). In addition, the examination of Istria can possess national or country-specific accents (3). Finally, Istria can encompass the many facets of multicultural, cross-boundary, contact-area and similarly

designated themes. In this analysis, we refer to them as regional, in the context of long-term socio-cultural processual logic of integration and autonomy dynamics (4). Whereas the first three approaches are relevant in all fields of science, the last one is characteristic only, or for the most part, of the social sciences and humanities. Roughly, and in a general 'bourdieusian' socio-cultural explanatory perspective, we can say that the first three scales refer to the physical space and the fourth to the social space (habitus) of Istria.

Wider contexts (1)

Describing Istria as a place or topic of research, both as a noun *Istria* and adjective *Istrian*, authors use many different concepts. Istria as a research element of wider zones is contingent on, among others, biotic or physiographic traits that go beyond Istria. We enumerate a few examples where the authors refer to Istria and nearby regions:

Gulf of Trieste and the coast of Istria, Istria and the Croatian Littoral, Istria as contact area of the northwestern Dinarides and Adriatic foreland, Istria and northern Adriatic islands or, alternatively, Istria and Kvarner islands, Veneto-Friuli and Istrian coast, Croatian karst (in Dalmatia, Istria, Gorski Kotar), Istria and coastal Croatia, a part of North Adriatic area of Croatia.

Some other contexts: Istria is mentioned among the Mediterranean areas of Croatia or in the frame of tectonic subsidence from the Gulf of Trieste to the Dalmatian coast. In many such studies, the perimeter of Istria not an issue as the characteristics under observation (for example, geological and meteorological phenomena) overlap with adjacent zones. In such, it would not be correct to refer to Istria as a transborder region. It features merely as one of approximate geographical units, which share characteristics in a certain strip of land. In terms of using the terms *area of Istria* or *region of Istria*, there is not much difference between the various disciplines.

Narrower contexts (2)

While the above examples present references to Istria in wider contexts, other studies; by comparison, focus on narrower units, for example: *specific coastal areas of Istria, rural parts of Istria, inland Istria, south-eastern, southernmost part, north-eastern Adriatic region*. The detailed areas are more frequently investigated in the scope of natural and physical sciences, or geography:

Istrian karst, flysch area of Istria, drainage area of a stream, landslides in Istria, White, Gray and Red Istria, etc.

In terms of shoreline, the authors opt for adjectives either littoral or coastal, although littoral is more frequently used as a noun in a territorial sense (Austrian Littoral, Slovenian Littoral (Primorje).

Country-specific contexts (3)

Research can address a country-specific part what can also be permuted:

Southeastern part of Slovenian (also Slovene) Istria, Slovenian region of Istria, Istrian region of Croatia, Croatian region of Istria, region of Istria in Croatia.

It is interesting that in the contexts of Slovenia the notion of Slovenian Istria is much more frequently emphasized than Croatian Istria as if it were somehow accepted that 'the Istria' is mostly represented by Croatia and that the Slovenian part must be especially underlined. In Croatian contexts, Istria is usually only supplied with Croatia, in parentheses. Croatian contexts can also outline a county (županija), in administrative contexts. But the consistency is again lacking. The texts refer to the *County of Istria, Istria County, Istrian County*. These minor issues may impact the retrieval of such documents by less cognizant authors wishing to investigate Istria.

Regional-specific: multi-cultural, cross-boundary, supranational contexts (4)

Istria is also investigated, in a wider sense, in the social sciences and humanities, for example, in archeology and history, as a 'contact zone' in prehistoric or Venetian period, or a 'contact area' between Croats, Italians, and Slovenes, also linked to the migration of laborers from diverse ethnic backgrounds to coastal cities. These contacts intensified after the fall of Venice and the short-lived Illyrian Provinces when the entire area (including Trieste and far beyond) was conferred to Austria. In related contexts, women migrating traders from rural hinterland of Istria (Savrinkas; hr, sl: Šavrinke) are frequently mentioned, in such cases often in relation to selling goods in Trieste (hr, sl: Trst, it:Trieste, de:Triest). In many such settings, the multicultural (multilingual) nature of rural Istria is mentioned, sometimes with accents also on urban areas, traumatic episodes in the 20th century notwithstanding. In the more recent period, Istria is here circumstantial. Namely, the contact area for migrating (commuting) laborers transpires along the entirety of the Slovenian-Italian border with Istria representing only a share.

This part of the Upper Adriatic has always been very complex (Bufon, 2009). To mitigate possible conflicts, cross-border cooperation is now promoted also within the expanded European Union (Kropej, 2013). Such cooperation can, for example, also focus on the conservation of nature where political issues are left aside (Mackelworth, Holcer & Lazar, 2013).

Finally, we must refer to the limitation of place names in information retrieval. In Istria, there are quite a few medium-sized towns. Sometimes, the authors will refer to such towns, in the titles of articles or abstracts without ever mentioning Istria. The slight Italian area (Muggia) is hardly ever investigated in the context of Istria. If at all, it is referred to just as Muggia, without Istria being mentioned. And there is also the topic of Trieste (Trst) and Rijeka (Fiume), two larger cities frequently mentioned along with Istria, although not being located in Istria but just outside its historic (as well as geographic) area, at exactly opposite sites. Our research has not been expanded with those cities if Istria was not specifically mentioned. Such limitations are inevitable in many studies that focus on geographical units, especially cities (Hocevar & Bartol, 2021).

CONCLUSION

We approached the evaluation and interpretation of published knowledge on the subject of Istria and the site/area of Istria in an interdisciplinary manner. We employed science mapping, visualization, evaluation, and analytical interpretation of research- and

review-articles in journals. The data were extracted from the WoS database. We used quantitative visualization (VOSviewer). The occurrence and distribution of terminology used by authors in titles and abstracts allowed us to provide tentative explanation about the context of topics and agendas in the corpus of Istrian research. In addition to the emergence of concepts, we also examined bibliographic indicators of where articles are published and the countries in which authors are located. Conceptually, we based our analytical interpretation of the visual representations on two epistemological starting points: first, the site-specific or regional nature of knowledge production and organization, and second, the assumption of different epistemic cultures that are discipline-specific, especially when it comes to the many different approaches to the subject matter of Istria. We hypothesized that these two starting points are particularly appropriate for the elusive sociocultural and spatial character of the “Istrian entity.”

The concepts given as topics and agendas were found to be distributed among three basic clusters of related disciplinary research approaches. Roughly speaking, the subject matter of Istria is distributed fairly evenly between the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the natural sciences and humanities, on the other. The formation of two distinct clusters within the natural sciences (biosciences and geosciences), and only one but conceptually heterogeneous cluster in the social sciences and humanities clearly indicates differences in research approaches (epistemologies). A more detailed analysis of the distribution of knowledge in clusters shows granulation, including how concepts (topics, agendas) are connected: into four sub-clusters within the natural sciences and two within the social sciences and humanities. Analysis of average occurrence by topic over time reveals further disciplinary characteristics. While natural science topics are already established and show earlier average publication patterns (with the exception of animal genetics and climate-related topics), research streams in the social sciences and humanities are much younger.

This indicates that journal articles are playing an increasingly important role in the social sciences and humanities - as a “pathway” for disseminating research results. The journals *Annales* and *Acta*

Histriae cover a particularly important portion of studies primarily related to the social sciences and humanities, although many articles, especially in *Annales*, also reflect broader and comprehensive research interests with interdisciplinary links to the natural sciences.

At the otherwise elusive regional scale Istria, culture has been instrumental in shaping scientific endeavors. In turn, scientific practices have also been instrumental in the formation of new sociocultural identities. In Istria, “regionality as a social process” can be both a geographical and an analytical category. It can be approached in a way that analyzes rather than presupposes the boundaries and character of place. Significantly, the effect observed in the co-authorship maps is based on an address that the authors provided in their articles. As expected, the countries (nation states) with a much higher contribution of articles are Croatia, Slovenia and Italy, which also have the strongest co-authorship.

With a detailed analysis of the terms in the clusters, we have confirmed, at least preliminarily, our assumption about the nature of the Istrian subject matter and the site. Istrian studies diverge in their examination of characteristics of physical space (place) and social space (habitus). Mutual permeation or interpenetration, albeit limited, is evident in the connections between concepts and, more generally, between disciplinary approaches.

The main finding of this study is that the epistemic contexts of Istria and the methodological approaches to the subject and site of Istria manifest themselves at four contextual levels or scales. First, Istria may be one of many components in a broader (“non-Istrian”) field of research. This is characteristic of the natural sciences. Second, the scope of narrower and specific topics or agendas involving only some specific sites in Istria is also a characteristic of the natural sciences and only partially of the social sciences and humanities. Third, the study of Istria that includes one of the three national or country-specific emphases is a feature of all disciplines. Fourth, Istria also encompasses numerous and heterogeneous facets of multicultural, cross-border, contact zone, and similarly designated themes, most of which belong to the social sciences and humanities.

ISTRA KOT KRAJ IN KOT PREDMET OBRAVNAVE V PRODUKCIJI IN ORGANIZACIJI REGIONALNEGA ZNANJA: BIBLIOMETRIČNA IN SOCIOLOŠKA ANALIZA

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POVZETEK

Študija pregleda in analitične interpretacije objav o Istri (z bibliometrijskimi/scientometrijskimi poudarki in rabo vizualizacijskega programa VOSviewer) je interdisciplinarno naravnana in se osredotoča na znanstvene članke v revijah (periodiki), indeksirane v bazi podatkov Web of Science. Pojme, njihovo pojavnost, razporeditev in povezanost v gruče (grozde) smo privzeli kot teme oz. pristope. Z naslonitvijo na koncepta o „epistemskih kulturah“ (Knor-Cetina, 1999, 2007) ter „organiziranosti in produkciji znanja“ (Hjørland, 2013) smo analitično ovrednotili kvantitativne kazalce. Najbolj splošna ugotovitev je, da večplasten in tudi „izmuzljiv“ regionalni značaj znanstvene produkcije so-oblikuje proces specifične družbeno-kulturne entitete. Konkretnije ugotovitve izhajajo iz grafičnih prikazov (vizualizacije). Teme/pristopi se po disciplinarni sorodnosti razporejajo v tri osnovne gruče: dve naravoslovni področji (v širšem smislu) na eni strani ter družboslovje/humanistiko na drugi. Področje naravoslovja predstavlja bio- in geološka skupina. Družboslovje in humanistika izkazujeta medsebojno prežemanje s hkratno pojmovno heterogenostjo. Analiza granulacije kaže na razlike v raziskovalnih pristopih med in znotraj disciplin, tudi časovno. Medtem ko so naravoslovne teme „starejše“ oz. uveljavljene (z izjemo novejših genetike in podnebnih tem), družboslovje/humanistika izkazujeta za razgibano rast objav ter raziskovanje novejših fenomenov in procesov. Avtorji družboslovnih in humanističnih ved torej vedno pogosteje objavljajo tudi znanstvene članke. Reviji Annales in Acta Histriae pokrivata pomemben del družboslovja in humanistike, Annales pa je tudi vir naravoslovnih in interdisciplinarnih vsebin, kar se nakazuje z osrednjim položajem v mreži. Tematike lahko analitično uvrstimo v preučevanje fizičnega prostora/območja (naravoslovje) in družbenega prostora/habitus (družboslovje in humanistika). Podrobnejša analiza pokaže tudi disciplinarna prekrivanja in odstopanja. Epistemski konteksti in metodološki pristopi k predmetu preučevanja in območni umeščenosti Istre se manifestirajo na štirih ne nujno hierarhičnih kontekstualnih ravneh in se deloma prekrivajo. A: Istra kot tematika širšega konteksta, kar je značilnost naravoslovja (npr. Istra in severni Jadran, Istra in Kvarner). B: kot predmet obravnave v specializiranem kontekstu (npr. istrski kras, obala). C: kontekst (treh) nacionalno (državno) specifičnih poudarkov, kjer je „slovenska Istra“ posebej poudarjena, kar pri „hrvaški Istri“ ni značilno, ali pa se tam povezuje s pojmom županija. D: zadnji kontekst, ki obsega številne in heterogene vidike večkulturnih, čezmejnih, kontaktnih in podobnih tem, pretežno v družboslovju in humanistiki (npr. večkulturnost).

Ključne besede: regija Istra, organizacija znanja, regionalno znanje, kartiranje znanosti, bibliometrija, epistemske kulture

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»ACCESSING THE EU IS LIKE RUNNING ON A TREADMILL IN THE GYM« HOW THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS IS METAPHORICALLY PRESENTED IN THE ONLINE MEDIA OF SERBIA, MONTENEGRO, AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we investigate the metaphors conceptualising the process of the accession of the Western-Balkan countries to the European Union, in the online news articles published in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a corpus comprised of 150 articles (104,806 words), we identified the expressions which were the instantiations of various conceptual metaphors with ACCESSION as the target domain. The accession, a dynamic process in itself, was generally presented via dynamic metaphors (travelling, entering a house, schooling, etc.); however, the dynamics of the processes presented via these metaphors was almost always contextually reduced (the travelling was long, slow or endless; the person entering the house could not move past the doorstep or they found the door closed or just slightly open; the student did not finish school or did not make progress ...). The more frequent metaphors were a continuation of the conventional patterns from the earlier period, whereas the less frequent metaphors proved more creative.

Keywords: conceptual metaphor, metaphorical expressions, the EU-accession process, critical discourse analysis, media discourse, the Western Balkans

«ACCEDERE ALL'UE È COME CORRERE SUL TAPIS ROULANT»: LA PRESENTAZIONE METAFORICA DEL PROCESSO DELL'ADESIONE ALL'UE NEI MEDIA DIGITALI IN SERBIA, MONTENEGRO E BOSNIA-ERZEGOVINA

SINTESI

Nel contributo si esaminano metafore utilizzate per concettualizzare il processo dell'adesione all'UE dei paesi dei Balcani occidentali negli articoli di notizie online pubblicati in Serbia, Montenegro e Bosnia-Erzegovina. Nell'ambito di un corpus di 150 articoli (104.806 parole) abbiamo identificato espressioni che erano istanziazioni di varie metafore concettuali con adesione come dominio bersaglio. L'adesione, di per sé un processo dinamico, veniva generalmente presentata tramite metafore dinamiche (viaggio, ingresso in una casa, istruzione ecc.), ma la carica dinamica dei processi descritti da queste metafore era quasi sempre contestualmente ridotta (il viaggio era lungo, lento o infinito; la persona che entrava nella casa non riusciva a oltrepassare la soglia oppure trovava la porta chiusa o aperta di appena uno spiraglio; lo studente non completava l'istruzione oppure non faceva alcun progresso...). Le metafore più frequenti erano continuazioni di modelli convenzionali del periodo precedente, quelle meno frequenti invece dimostravano più creatività.

Parole chiave: metafora concettuale, espressioni metaforiche, processo di adesione all'UE, analisi critica del discorso, discorso mediatico, Balcani occidentali

INTRODUCTION

The metaphorical conceptualisations of the European Union, of the candidates for the EU membership and of the very process of the EU accession, have been studied by a considerable number of papers, written mainly from the perspective of critical discourse analysis. Most of them dealt with the integration processes of the candidates who eventually became the EU members – these always had a clear accession perspective and the process itself lasted for a decade at most. The term *Western Balkans* has changed its meaning – it started as a geographical term but has recently become a political one, given that it now excludes the countries which are geographically situated in the Western Balkans but which have joined the EU – Slovenia and Croatia (Petrović, 2009, 33). The journey of the Western-Balkan countries (we use the term in the latter meaning) to the EU has already lasted for quite some time; still, the end of the negotiations is not in sight and their outcome is rather unpredictable. Despite the outward assurances and promises, the hope of these countries actually joining the EU has diminished over the past few years – what is safe to conclude at this point is that their fast integration into the EU is certainly not plausible. With this backdrop in mind, it is no wonder that the conceptualisation of the EU-accession process of these countries is rather different from that of the former candidates. The difference may, arguably, also be observed in how this process was perceived at the beginning of the EU journey of the Western-Balkan countries and how it has been seen as of late. Bearing this in mind, we believe that there is a need to critically analyse the conceptualisation of the EU accession of these countries in the recent period. To address this need, in this paper we study the conceptual metaphors representing the EU-accession process in a corpus of news articles published in 2018 in the online media of several Western-Balkan countries – Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the light of the above, the following research questions guided our study:

1. Which metaphors are most frequently used to represent the EU accession of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the online media of these three countries?
2. How is the accession, which is essentially a dynamic process, specifically conceptualised in the online media of these three countries, in the light of the stagnation in the EU expansion process?
3. How does the evaluative content of the metaphors representing the current EU-accession processes of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the online media of these countries, differ from the metaphors representing the accession of these and other countries in the previous period?

In order to answer these questions, we will first present the theoretical framework for this study, which includes a brief review of the conceptual metaphor theory and critical discourse analysis. The theoretical part of the paper ends by presenting the previous research on the related topics.

Conceptual metaphor

The definition of metaphor from the point of view of cognitive studies is very different from that offered from the perspective of stylistics or rhetoric. The latter view metaphor as a figure of speech which rests on comparison and differentiate it from *simile*, a related figure which does the same but signals the comparison with the words such as *as* or *like*. Thus, from the point of view of stylistics and rhetoric, the utterance *Achilles was a lion in the battle* contains the metaphor *lion*, while the utterance *Achilles was as a lion in the battle* contains the simile *as a lion* (Kövecses, 2002). However, according to the theory of conceptual metaphor proposed by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), both the utterances contain instantiations or linguistic realisations of the same conceptual metaphor – PERSON IS A LION or, more specifically, BRAVE PERSON IS A LION, resting on the analogy between the *source domain* (in this case LION), which is more concrete and arises from the empirical plane, and the *target domain* (in this case (BRAVE) PERSON), which, in comparison, is more abstract.

Conceptual metaphor, therefore, is a cognitive structure that has concrete realisations in language – these realisations may be called *linguistic metaphors* (Steen, 1999). Thus, one conceptual metaphor typically corresponds to several linguistic metaphors – some are regularly used (such as those found in: *She is lion-hearted* or *She is a real lioness*), while others can be more ephemeral, coined for a specific context and occasion (as in the example found in Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian (BCMS) – *Kida kao lav* (cf. Ljubavna adresa, 2019) (English: *He/she bites as a lion*)). This applies not only to linguistic metaphors, but also to the conceptual ones – some are more embedded in language – for example, the conceptual metaphor MONEY IS LIQUID/WATER, which has the following linguistic realisations: *inflow*, *outflow*, *liquidity*, etc., while, on the other hand, the conceptual metaphor MONEY IS A BEAUTIFUL WOMAN (cf. Politika.com, 2013) is unusual and may be creatively used in a certain context. However, the discourse power of both conventional and creative metaphors should not be underestimated.

Many metaphors are universal (as is the metaphor MONEY IS LIQUID/WATER, referred to above, which is similarly realised in a number of languages), while others are more shaped by the culture and context from which they originate (Goatly, 1998; Kövec-

ses, 2010; Zhang, 2013). Thus, for example, Perović (2017) observes that the metaphor LOVE IS A FLOWER is quite universal, while the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A MEADOW FLOWER, which is narrower, might be more local, i.e. more specific (Perović found it in the language of Montenegrin students). Generally speaking, the more general the metaphor, the more universal it is, and *vice versa*.

Conceptual metaphor pervades thought and the process of thinking is, essentially, metaphorically organised (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The linguistic realisations of metaphors are only the reflections of our thoughts (Lakoff, 1987) and, most often, we use them unconsciously and automatically. Thus, conceptual metaphors whose realisations we find, for example, in public discourse, are often the reflections of the established ideologies – it is important to explain, analyse and deconstruct these, so as to shed light on the intentions of the discourse participants and on the processes through which these may be perpetuated. This can be done through applying a critical perspective in discourse analysis.

Critical discourse analysis

A critical approach to discourse is almost always socially engaged in some manner, since the critical discourse analyst takes a certain position in relation to the text they are analysing and sends a message to the society in the form of its critique. Theorists present critical discourse analysis as a set of approaches to socially engaged discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2005a), as a programme or school (Wodak, 2002), or simply as a critical perspective in discourse analysis (van Dijk, 2001). Usually, this approach requires interdisciplinarity (van Dijk, 2001; Wodak, 1989) and so the analyst applying this perspective goes beyond the formal framework of linguistics. Thus, the methodology, i.e. the wide range of the methods which are used in critical discourse analysis (CDA), has emerged from the dialogue of different disciplines (Fairclough, 2005b).

A critical discourse analyst departs from the premise that language is not a mere means of expressing social phenomena, i.e. that language is not only their mirror, but also their constitutive factor. In other words, language is not only a reflection of the social inequalities where they normally exist, but it also actively participates in their creation and propagation. One of the many themes that critical discourse analysts deal with is the inequality of participants in communication in terms of their position in the social hierarchy (e.g. member of a higher class – member of a lower class, manager-worker, etc.) or the hierarchies imposed by certain social situations (e.g. teacher-student, doctor-patient, etc.), which affect the choice of topics, length of turns/deliveries, order of speakers, etc. (Vuković, 2014). Critical discourse analysts deal with the language used to talk about vulner-

able groups, as well as the language used by vulnerable groups. Whenever inequality is talked about in discourse or this inequality is reflected in it, there is a possibility to approach that discourse critically.

There are three main directions in the critical analysis of discourse. Fairclough is one of the most significant authors within critical discourse analysis (Blommaert, 2005) and his theory is known as the theory of social discourse. Fairclough's three-dimensional model of analysis includes the simultaneous analysis of text, discourse practice (origin, distribution, use of text) and social practice, i.e. the wider social context (Fairclough, 1992; 1995a; 1995b; 1996; 2000; 2001). Text analysis includes the methods of systemic functional linguistics, as well as semiotic and interdiscursive analysis. At the level of social practice, analytical concepts include those such as speech acts and coherence, as well as intertextuality, as a mixture of texts and also as a mixture of genres and cultural elements (Fairclough, 1995a) – the latter is sometimes referred to as interdiscursivity (Sheyholislami, 2001; Blommaert, 2005).

Another important CDA representative is Teun van Dijk with his sociocognitive method. While Fairclough's methodology is sociologically anchored, van Dijk positions his model in the cognitive disciplines. This model also has three components: discourse – social cognition – society (van Dijk, 1993a; 1993b; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2006). The first and the third components correspond to Fairclough's text and social practice, while the second component mediates between discourse and society (Fairclough, 1995a).

Wodak (2002; 2007) establishes a third important model in the critical analysis of discourse, which is based on the socio-historical method. Its starting point is that discourse should be interpreted in the context of its historical events, i.e. a certain time and space.

CDA has also received some criticism. On the one hand, the variety of the theories underpinning it (Henderson, 2005) and of its methods (Orpin, 2005), the lack of objectivity (Widdowson, 2004), as well as the imprecision of its methodology (Frantz, 2003), are among the criticisms that fundamentally question this approach (Haig, 2004). On the other hand, critical discourse analysts respond that the analyst is always inevitably involved in the constitution of the discourse that they are analysing (de Beaugrande, 2006) and argue that researchers should not ignore the inequalities observed in and perpetuated by language (van Dijk, 1993a; 2001).

Critical analysis discourse and conceptual metaphor

Many critical discourse analysts define metaphor and identify its structure in terms of the source and the target domain, following the principles of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory. However, unlike Lakoff & Johnson (1980), these analysts typically reject the position that conceptual metaphors are used only unconsciously and

automatically. Instead, they argue that the choice of metaphor may deliberate, i.e. that it may be motivated in various ways and that it is of importance to study the discourse purposes of metaphor (Charteris-Black, 2004). Steen (2008) also discusses the possibility that some metaphors may be chosen consciously and deliberately, and calls them *deliberate metaphors*. Apart from these, it is also of significance for critical analysts to investigate metaphors which are used unconsciously and automatically, as these can reflect the established ideologies and be propagated and perpetuated through language.

Zinken et al. (2008) distinguish primary conceptual metaphors from *discourse metaphors*, whereby the difference is based on the fact that the former are universal, i.e. they are common to different languages and mainly rely on the physical experience, while discourse metaphors are more context-dependent, have an ideological basis and are marked by strategic use. Most of the metaphors studied by critical discourse analysts are actually discourse metaphors – so are the metaphors that conceptualise the EU-accession process as travelling or entering a house, for example, since these metaphors are largely shaped by the socio-cultural context and are not purely based on a bodily experience.

Critical approaches to metaphor in discourse typically use the methods of corpus linguistics, pragmatics and qualitative discourse analysis, since such an analysis examines the instantiations of metaphors in authentic language and their direct co-text, as well as the wider social context. Thus, for instance, Musolff (2015) investigates the metaphors that dehumanise immigrants in public discourse and, *inter alia*, reveals that immigrants may be conceptualised as a *flood*, within the broader conceptual metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE A NATURAL DISASTER, as *leeches* (IMMIGRANTS ARE PARASITES), while their arrival may be perceived as an *invasion* (IMMIGRATION IS AN ACT OF VIOLENCE). Similarly, Santana (2015) deals with the conceptualisation of Latino immigrants in the USA and finds a number of dehumanising metaphors in readers' comments on articles published in the online media – among the realisations of the conceptual metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS, the author finds the following: *cockroaches, grasshoppers, leeches, pests, dogs, vultures, deer to be hunted*. As we can see, conceptual metaphors for immigrants and their realisations can be explicitly dehumanising and clearly reflect a racist ideology.

A somewhat deeper deconstruction than the one needed in the cases above, may be required to reveal the ideologies on which some metaphors are based. Thus, Semino et al. (2017) explore the metaphors that conceptualise cancer and conclude that the experience of this disease is often represented as a STRUGGLE or WAR. The authors point out that such a choice of the metaphor might have a negative effect on the patients, as the patients may feel that the outcome of the disease

depends on them and that they are to blame and be responsible if they are losing such a 'battle'. Another example comes from the study of Radić-Bojanić & Silaški (2012), who investigated sports metaphors in political discourse and discovered that they could often be used manipulatively – for example, an excessive use of metaphors drawing from the source domain of FOOTBALL in politics may, to an extent, exclude from such a discourse an average woman who does not follow football too much and is not particularly familiar with its terminology, while most men can understand such metaphors spontaneously and instantly. Furthermore, Bratić & Vuković-Stamatović (2017) dealt with the conceptual metaphor of WOMAN IS A CAR, i.e. its realisations in the internet discourse of the Western Balkans (some of the instantiations of this metaphor were the following: *How far has she travelled?; Is it expensive to maintain her?; She looks like a Ferrari; She has good airbags*, etc.). The authors state that women in this discourse are understood as an object (a car) that belongs to a man, which points to an imbalance of power between men and women, and is a reflection of the established way of thinking in the language and culture of the investigated part of the Western Balkans. This metaphor is, therefore, critically commented on in order to contribute to the deconstruction of the sexist ideology on which it is based. Vujković (2019) does the same, analysing animal metaphors depicting women on Montenegrin websites (e.g. WOMAN IS A CAT and WOMAN IS A FISH) and concludes that these metaphors emphasise the physical and sexual characteristics of women while simultaneously backgrounding their other qualities.

Similar approaches, with some variations, can be found in the papers by Musolff (2004; 2006; 2010; 2015; 2016), Charteris-Black (2004; 2006; 2011; 2018), Hart (2008; 2018), Koller (2004; 2005), Semino (2008), among others. We apply such an approach in this paper, as our goal is to critically investigate the conceptualisation of the EU-accession process in the public discourse of a part of the Western Balkans and to reveal the ideologies which form the basis of such conceptualisations.

Earlier research

One of the authors whose frequent topic of research was the metaphorical conceptualisation of the EU and the EU-accession is Musolff. In the EUROMETA corpus, which comprises articles from the German and the British press, Musolff (2004) determined that the EU integration processes were metaphorically depicted via a series of different scenarios with the following keywords: ROAD – MOVEMENT – SPEED, GEOMETRY – GEOGRAPHY, TECHNOLOGY – BUILDING, GROUP – CLUB – CLASS, SCHOOL – DISCIPLINE, LOVE – MARRIAGE – FAMILY, LIFE – HEALTH – STRENGTH, GAME – SPORT, WAR – FORTRESS – BAT-

TLÉ, PERFORMANCE – SHOW, NATURE – TIME. Thus, *inter alia*, the EU could be perceived as a *house*, which is being built, equipped, or renovated, or as a *family*, whose child is the *euro* currency.

One part of this type of research comes from the authors from the former membership candidates. Horolets (2003) investigates the Polish press and finds metaphors which depict the EU as a *club* and the accession as a *journey*. She also studies some more culturally-specific metaphors representing the EU – one of them sees it as the *Babylonian tower* – an overly ambitious plan of humans that is doomed to fail, while another represents it as an *apocalyptic beast*. Drulák and Königová (2007) studied the EU metaphors in the discourse of Czech civil servants – the authors find the *container*, *movement* and *balance* metaphors. They notice that through more intense contacts with the EU, the perception of the EU changes – for instance, the frequency of the container metaphors decreases over time. Petraškaite-Pabst (2010) investigates the EU metaphors in the Lithuanian and in the German political discourse and finds that the dominant metaphors are those with the source domains of *house*, *transport*, *family* and *disease*. She points out that these metaphors in the Lithuanian discourse mainly come from the previous discourse on the EU from other countries, but that they were also adapted to the Lithuanian political discourse.

The metaphors conceptualising the EU accession of the Western-Balkan countries have also been investigated. The following short review is certainly not exhaustive. Šarić (2005) deals with the integration of Croatia into the EU and concludes that the accession was usually presented as a JOURNEY OR MOVEMENT, where Croatia was conceptualised as a PASSENGER and the EU as the journey's FINAL DESTINATION. Another model that was frequent in the data was the model in which the EU was represented as a HOUSE OR BUILDING. Both these models were noted in the research on the EU accession of other, non-Balkan countries (for instance, in Musolff, 2004). In her research on the metaphors presenting Croatia's accession, Škara (2009) arrives at similar results.

Petrović (2009) devotes an entire book to this topic. In it, she mostly deals with the discourse on the EU in Slovenia, but also covers the EU-accession processes of Serbia and Croatia to an extent. In her analysis, which applies both linguistic and anthropological methods, Petrović concludes that the EU treats the Balkans as *the Other*, which must prove its *European-ness* before joining the EU, and which is perceived as subordinated and marginalised. The metaphors likely come from the EU public discourse and are reproduced by the local politicians in an uncritical way and without problematisation (Petrović, 2009, 26). The EU is clearly behaving *paternalistically* towards the Balkans, *pushing* it further south, beyond its symbolic

borders of Europe (Petrović, 2009, 40–47). Even the name itself, *Western Balkans*, does not mention or evoke Europe.

In a similar way, Šarić (2010) deals with the conceptualisation of the Balkans and concludes that the term Balkans, which originally had a geographical character, has become a cultural-identity label. In the Serbian media, Šarić argues, *Balkans* is used more often as an identification label for Serbia than it is used as an identification label for Croatia in the Croatian media, where this term is perceived negatively. Šarić (2014) also studies the metaphors in the Croatian media discourse on the EU. In case of the dynamic conceptualisation, the emphasis is on the process of joining itself, while in other metaphors the EU is more perceived as a static entity, the author concludes (Šarić, 2014, 183). She also argues that, on the one hand, this discourse, as a thematically determined one, inevitably contains certain conventional metaphors – such as the *journey* metaphor. On the other hand, less conventional metaphors, such as the metaphors of illness and health, tend to be much rarer – these are sometimes culturally specific and indicate an attitude of a certain author/politician/group/people/country towards joining the EU.

Barčot (2016) studies the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY in the interviews and speeches of Zoran Milanović, former Croatian Prime Minister, on the topic of joining the EU, from the period of just before and during the entry of Croatia into the EU. Werkmann & Buljan (2013) further deal with the discourse on the EU in Croatia, analysing a corpus of newspaper articles. They study how the conceptualisation of the EU in Croatia changed over time – some source domains proved to be constant, but with different categories in focus, while some new domains also appeared over time. That is exactly what we expect in our analysis and how we justify our revisiting the topic of the EU-accession discourse.

Đurović (2013) studies the metaphors of the EU as an UNFINISHED BUILDING and HOUSE in the public discourse of Serbia – Serbia is at the THRESHOLD of that house and in the periods when progress is noted, it is in its LOBBY. Furthermore, Đurović & Silaški (2012) analyse the metaphor of TRAFFIC LIGHT on Serbia's path to the EU – the *green* and the *red lights* are the signals that Serbia receives from the EU, regulating the movement of this country along the EU's path, which is thus strictly controlled from the outside. The same authors (2014) also study the SCHOOL METAPHOR in the discourse on Serbia's accession to the EU. Serbia is presented as a STUDENT, while the EU is shown as a TEACHER, which points to the marginalised status of Serbia and the dichotomy in how the two are presented. Kapranov (2016) is another author who studies the integration of Serbia into the EU – this time in the discourse of the Twitter posts of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He finds that this discourse is organised around the models of *travel*, *positive mood*, *support of the United Kingdom*, *regional cooperation*, *disappointment* and the *European family*, and concludes that the Brexit process did not impact the discourse of the future enlargement of the European Union.

Vuković-Stamatović, Bratić & Babić (2021) study the *game* and *sport match* metaphors in the online media articles on the EU integrations published in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They find that, on the one hand, the EU is typically presented as the dominant player who is winning, or as a referee. On the other hand, the Western Balkans are shown as the underdog, a player losing a match, or even as a playing field. There is a great imbalance in power between these two discourse participants, the authors argue.

Vuković-Stamatović (2021) studies how the Western Balkans are conceptualised in the online media discourse of the same three countries. The study is based on a corpus of 137 articles and the author finds that the Western Balkans are deeply marginalised in this discourse, given that there is a stark contrast in the roles assigned to the EU and to this region in the metaphors analysed. An expanded version of this corpus is used for the present study, but this time, as suggested earlier, the focus is not on how the Western Balkans are perceived but on how the EU-accession process itself is conceptualised.

As can be seen in this brief review, not much literature focuses on the EU integrations of Bosnia and Herzegovina – this can be explained by the fact that these processes are much less advanced in that country than in the other regional countries, and the fact that this country has yet to receive an official candidate status. Still, the public discourse of the region and of the EU has been referring to this country as a potential EU member for quite some time now. Likewise, not much literature has been devoted to the EU integrations of Montenegro, even though this country has the most advanced integration processes in the region. The fact that we cover both these countries in our corpus is thus of importance, as more light will be shed on how the EU processes are seen across the region. The details of how we do it for the purpose of this study are given in the next section.

CORPUS AND METHODOLOGY

The corpus analysed in this paper consists of 150 articles taken from Serbian, Bosnian and Montenegrin online news portals during 2018. We used two search engines to collect the articles – *Naslovi.net* and *Google*, and our first search criterion was the acronym "EU". During 2018, we periodically read texts selected on the basis of this criterion (several times a month) and included in the corpus those articles that

were primarily about the EU, that is, the accession of the Western-Balkan countries to the European Union. This is how we got the aforementioned corpus of 150 articles from the online news portals on the topic of the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU, which has a total of 104,806 words (the list of the articles is attached). The articles were downloaded from a total of 31 online portals: *B92*, *BBC Serbian*, *Beta*, *Bijeljina Online*, *Blic* (including the special editions for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for Montenegro), *Brotnjo*, *CDM*, *Dan*, *Danas*, *Dnevni Avaz*, *DW*, *Fokus*, *Fonet*, *FOS Media*, *Index*, *Informer*, *Kurir*, *Mondo*, *N1*, *Nova Ekonomija*, *Novi Magazin*, *Novosti*, *Pobjeda*, *Politics*, *Portal Analitika*, *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, *RTS*, *Sputnik*, *VOA* and *Vijesti*. We noticed that identical texts or texts with minor changes (shorter versions, language adjustments) were often published on the different news portals of these three countries – due to this, when referencing the source texts we indicate the portal from which they were taken and not necessarily the portals on which they may have originally appeared.

We carefully read the corpus in order to identify realisations of the conceptual metaphors that represent the process of the EU accession. We checked their metaphoricity using the MIPVU methodology (Steen et al., 2010), which meant determining the lexical units in the mentioned realisations, determining the meaning of those lexical units in the context, and then comparing that meaning with their basic meaning. In case these contrasted, i.e. there were differences between the contextual meaning and the basic meaning of the lexical units, such units were marked as metaphorical. In this way, we collected linguistic metaphors, i.e. realisations of the conceptual metaphors.

In the next step, based on the linguistic realisations that we previously identified, we defined the conceptual metaphors, which was not difficult considering the previous research on the EU enlargement discourse. We singled out those which had ACCESSION (TO THE EU) as their target domain and classified them according to the source domains.

For the analysis and the presentation of the results, we use the so-called *hybrid* approach (Deignan, 2016), which means that we analyse the realisations of the conceptual metaphors using a corpus and apply a discourse approach, i.e. we analyse and present metaphors in their context (which is quoted, typically in the form of excerpts). The analytical apparatus we apply is the critical analysis of metaphors in discourse, as presented earlier in the theoretical part of the paper.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS

In the following analysis, we present and analyse the metaphors in the order of the frequency of their linguistic realisations in the corpus. As expected, the

conventional metaphors were the most frequent – these were also found in the enlargement discourses from the previous period. In the concrete excerpts in which they were found, the emphasis was on the duration of the process and the difficulties encountered in its implementation. More creativity was found in the less frequent metaphors.

As stated in the theoretical review, the process of entry into the EU is usually presented as a *journey* of the countries candidates to a destination, which is the EU in this case. Šarić (2014) finds this metaphor “conventional” in the EU discourse, since it is practically inevitable in it. It was the most frequent in our corpus, with 365 instantiations. Given that this metaphor has been widely studied in the literature, here we will pay our attention to its submetaphors and realisations which have characterised the discourse of the latest stages of the EU integrations in the selected three Balkan countries. Let us look at the following:

1. *“I have no illusions, I know that the European public opinion is not ready for the integration of the Western Balkans and I understand that we have a long **journey** ahead of us. However, the expansion it is not contradictory to the consolidation of Europe. I even think that the continuation of the expansion is in the interest of Europe. The alternative to that would be us waiting for the breakout of a new big crisis,” said Đukanović. (Vijesti, 11/13/2018) [Nemam iluzija, znam da evropsko javno mnjenje nije spremno na integraciju Zapadnog Balkana i shvatam da je pred nama dug **put**. Međutim, proširenje nije kontradiktorno konsolidaciji Evrope. Ja čak mislim da je nastavak procesa proširenja u interesu Evrope. Alternativa tome je da čekamo izbijanje nove velike krize”, naveo je Đukanović.]*
2. *We have, practically, been **travelling** to Europe and on that **road**, we have been “reforming” ourselves (every day in every aspect) for 18 years already, but, the bottom line is that we have **moved** very little. (Dan, 12/02/2018) [Mi u Evropu praktično **putujemo** i na tom **putu** se „reformišemo” (svakog dana u svakom pogledu) već 18 godina, ali kad se podvuče crta, saldo je da smo malo **odmakli**.]*
3. (Headline) CCI: Bosnia and Herzegovina holds a record in how slow it is **approaching** the EU (Dnevni Avaz, 21/05/2018) [(Naslov) CCI: BiH rekorder u sporosti **približavanja** EU]
4. *She emphasised that **road** to the EU is not simple at all ... (CDM, 2/07/2018) [Ona je naglasila da **put** ka EU nije ni malo jednostavan ...]*

As can be seen, the journey to the EU is presented as a long, difficult, slow and complex one. The metaphor of the journey is mostly realised through the more specific metaphors ACCESSION IS A LONG AND SLOW JOURNEY OR ACCESSION IS A JOURNEY WITH OBSTACLES. These metaphors also appeared in the earlier discourses on the accession of the former candidates, however, in the discourse on the accession of the countries of the Western Balkans, they are much more frequent and best reflect the political essence of that process. They are usually accompanied by a specific emotional evaluation – typically, that of despair, fatigue and frustration of the new candidates and, occasionally, irony. When addressing the problems arising in the journey to the EU, Balkan politicians sometimes emphasise that there is no alternative to that journey and thus almost issue threats – for instance, in excerpt 1, the President of Montenegro Đukanović says that a major crisis will break out if the journey to the EU does not get a clear perspective. Excerpt 2 suggests that the journey is about the reforms but these are ironically perceived (in quotation marks, followed by a well-known quote from famous regional film, which is mostly associated with negative and ironic contexts), and it is also concluded that the path travelled is rather short.

The journey to the EU is often discussed from the perspective of the first person plural, as is the case in the first two excerpts above (we have a long journey ahead of us; ...us waiting for the breakout of a new big crisis (1); we have been travelling, we have been reforming, we have moved (2)). The speaker, thus, experiences themselves as one of the passengers or a fellow traveller, which is something with which the reader of a regional news portal may easily identify.

Furthermore, the speed and the dynamics of the journey is often emphasised through the epithets accompanying the linguistic realisations of the journey metaphor – thus, a great number of the excerpts contain words which suggest slowness. Such is the case in excerpt 3, where Bosnia and Herzegovina is ironically characterised as a recorder-holder in slow motion (amongst the otherwise slow Balkan countries). In excerpt 4, it is pointed out that the road to the EU is not easy, and the same message of complexity may be found in the excerpts which refer to the obstacles encountered in it. These obstacles are conceptualised in various ways:

5. *For some eight or nine years already we have been given the condition which the EU formulates as “the key priority”, which is a pleonasm, and that is to give Kosovo away. We will give it to them, but we will not **move** a **step** closer... (Sputnik, 28/07/2018) [Mi već osam-devet godina imamo uslov koji EU formuliše kao “ključni prioritet”, što je pleonazam, a to je dati Kosovo. Mi ćemo ga dati, ali se nećemo **pomeriti** ni **korak** ...]*

6. Aleksandar Vučić will **climb the Everest**, but this will not be a mountaneering but a political feat of the President of Serbia, who, commenting on the EU's strategy for the Balkans released last Tuesday, said that to Serbia it poses "**an obstacle as big as the Himalayas**." [Aleksandar Vučić će se **popeti** na Everest, ali to neće biti alpinistički, nego politički podvig predsjednika Srbije, koji je, komentarišući u prošli utorak objavljenu novu strategiju EU za Zapadni Balkan, izjavio da ona Srbiji postavlja „**prepreku visoku kao Himalaji**“.]
7. Do Bosnia and Kosovo have a true European perspective with respect to the **blocks** in political terms? (B92, 30/05/2018) [Imajuli Bosna i Kosovopravuevropskupertpektivu s obzirom na političke **blokade**?] Macron's **road-ramp** to the Western Balkans? (DW, 18/04/2018) [Makronova **rampa** Zapadnom Balkanu?]

In the corpus, the obstacles are lexicalised in different ways and it is mostly suggested that they are almost insurmountable and that the outcome of the journey depends on surmounting them – thus, for example, Serbia faces an obstacle *as high as the Himalayas* (6), which indicates the most dangerous feat for the bravest mountaneers, which may also result in death (A TRIP TO THE EU IS CLIMBING THE HIMALAYAS). Although the Himalayas are a natural obstacle, the responsibility for this obstacle is not vested in a *force majeure*, but in the EU as an actor with agency in this discourse and, so, the Serbian President rejects the responsibility and fully attributes it to the EU. Although the EU, according to him, sets enormous obstacles, “he will climb Everest” – the promise of an almost superhuman feat is not unusual for politicians; what is particularly interesting here is that Vučić himself performs that ascent, equating himself with the state. Furthermore, the situation is similar in case of the road *ramps* and *blocks* (excerpts 7 and 8), which also suggest a complete interruption of the journey, which is controlled by the EU itself. The EU, as the setter of the roadblocks and ramps, has the characteristics of an agent, while the passengers are passive participants in the journey. In addition to the various obstacles presented through nouns, sometimes using *brakes* while travelling is also referred to, which can also be understood as one of the problems encountered in the journey and suggests its possible interruption, as is evident in the following examples:

9. In addition, the German news agency points out, Spain is **putting on the brakes** and will accept the reception of new members only if the status of Kosovo is defined in such a way which prevents the rebel Catalans from using the recognition

of Kosovo as an example against Madrid; they also point out that this is complicated and that it will last for a long time. (Informer, 18/05/2018) [Osim toga, ističe nemački servis, Španija **koči** i hoće prijem novih samo ako se status Kosova definiše tako da pobunjeni Katalonci priznanje Kosova kao države ne mogu da iskoriste kao primer protiv Madrida, uz ocenu da je to komplikovano i da će trajati dugo.]

10. The European Commission proposed that, in the future, all technical decisions be adopted by a qualified majority instead of consensus every member, as was the case up until now, which some countries, including Croatia, used as to **put the brakes on** and blackmail our country in the negotiation process. (Novosti, 15/08/2018) [Evropska komisija skrojila je predlog da se ubuduće sve tehničke odluke donose kvalifikovanom većinom, a ne konsenzusom svih članica, kao do sada, što su pojedine države, uključujući i Hrvatsku, koristile da **koče** i ucenjuju našu zemlju u pregovaračkom procesu.]

Unlike the obstacles which were presented as nouns, where the agent does not have to be in the foreground (as in excerpt 7), in the case when verbs and verbal phrases are used to the same purpose, the culprit is always clearly designated and is in the position of the topic/theme (in relation to the comment/rheme) – that is usually some specific EU country, depending on the case. The transport vehicle used by the Western Balkans is controlled by the EU, given that it is the EU which has the ability to use the brakes – the Balkan countries are once again presented as passive passengers driven by the EU, which directs and stops the journey at its own discretion. In excerpt 10, the EU is even portrayed as a blackmailer (more on that particular metaphor may be found in Vuković-Stamatović, 2021).

In public discourse, the EU integrations are conceptualised not only as a slow and difficult journey with obstacles but, ever more often, as an *incompletable* journey, which discourages the passengers to the point of thinking that they should abandon it:

11. A great number of Austrian and German news outlets reported the reaction of the Minister of Defense of Serbia, Aleksandar Vulin, who said that “if Kosovo is crucial for the EU, then we should **go** our separate **ways**,” and based on this statement concluded that Serbia is thinking about **leaving** the EU **road**. (Novosti, 22/05/2018) [Veliki broj austrijskih i nemačkih medija preneo je reagovanje ministra odbrane Srbije Aleksandra Vulina da, „ako je Kosovo ključno za EU, treba da **krenemo** svojim **putem**“, te iz ministrove izjave izveli zaključak da Srbija razmišlja o **napuštanju** evropskog **puta**.]

12. *We are forbidden from even thinking about the termination the European road and at the same time we are clearly told that we won't arrive at the destination. That's something like running on a treadmill in the gym.* (Vesti-online, 23/05/2018) [Zabranjuje nam se i da pomislimo na prekidanje evropskog puta, a jasno nam se kaže da na cilj nećemo stići. To je nešto kao trčanje na traci u teretani.]

Although discouraged and defeated, from its passive role of undergoing a journey which is controlled by someone else, the Balkan passenger takes over the active role and holds agency, but only when cornered and when it accepts that the membership is improbable; when *running on a treadmill in the gym* (12), regardless of the effort, the runner remains in the same place.

In the discourse of the EU integrations, the conceptualisation of the journey as a long one with obstacles was certainly present before but, in the public discourse of the Western Balkans, these metaphorical models have become much more dominant and are instantiated through more different realisations. What differentiates this discourse from the one of the former membership candidates is that an intrinsically dynamic metaphor of travel is presented in such a way that its dynamics is very often contextually reduced.

As in the case of journey metaphor, presenting the EU as a house or a building into which new members are entering is another conventional conceptualisation of the EU integrations. In our corpus, this conceptual metaphor had 140 instantiations, which include the following lexicalisations: *entry/entering, door which is ajar, open/closed door, neighborhood, yard, hall, doorstep, house foundation*. The mappings, therefore, are as follows: the EU is a house/home, the candidates want to become new members of the household, the door is an obstacle to the entry, i.e. the accession, and the waiting in front of the door or in the hall is parallel to the political waiting for the EU membership.

In contrast to the discourse of the EU-accession of the earlier membership candidate, in the public discourse of the three Balkan countries the dominant models now are: the EU door is closed/only little ajar, the candidates are waiting at the doorstep or in the lobby, and the entry, i.e. entering, is long-lasting and with obstacles. In the case when accession is represented as entering the EU-house, the more general metaphor is ACCESSION IS MOVEMENT, whose submetaphors are the previously described metaphor ACCESSION IS A JOURNEY and the metaphor ACCESSION IS ENTERING A HOUSE.

As has been said, the EU is very often presented as a house whose door is closed for new residents, i.e. in which new residents are not welcome:

13. Until democracy is really established, I don't believe we can become a member, even when Europe opens its door again, and that door is right now closed and will remain closed for a number of years. (Vijesti, 7/15/2018) [Dok se zaista ne uspostavi demokratija ne vjerujem da možemo postati član, čak i kad Evropa jednom ponovo otvori vrata, a ta vrata su trenutno zatvorena i biće zatvorena jedan duži niz godina.]
14. For the first time, opening the Brussel's door is not "a movable target". (Dan, 11/02/2018) [Otvaranje briselskih vrata po prvi put nije „pokretna meta“.]
15. We don't think that we should stand, kneel and pray for the EU door to open. (Vijesti, 22/05/2018) [Mi ne mislimo da treba stojati, klečati i moliti da se otvore vrata EU.]

In excerpt 13, it is said that the EU door will be closed for a long time. The EU is personified, which is frequently the case in political discourse (NATION IS A PERSON and THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS IS A PERSON). In the examples where the *opening* of the door is referenced, it is the EU which has full agency and control over this act. However, in the excerpts mentioning the *closed door*, the culprit is typically not expressed and is left backgrounded. Likewise, the constructions in the excerpts 14 and 15 do not expressly mention the agent. Thus, the responsibility of the EU is not explicitly evoked and the acts of closing and opening the door are presented as processes which do not depend on the will of any of the actors. Additionally, in excerpt 14, there is one more metaphor, that of the *moving target* – what was destination in the metaphor ACCESSION IS A JOURNEY is now presented through an analogy with shooting at a target, which belongs to broader metaphor ACCESSION IS WARFARE. The combination of different metaphors in the same excerpt is typical of this discourse.

The asymmetry in the roles of the EU and that of the Balkans is particularly visible in excerpt 15 – it is stated that the Western Balkans, basically, can only stand, kneel and pray for the door to open, which is rejected as undignified. Although this course of action is rejected, it is still something that the speaker has thought about. As with the journey metaphor, it is the length of the accession process which is emphasised and its dynamics that is contextually reduced.

Game and sports metaphors are rather popular in political discourse (Callies, 2011), where politics is perceived as a competition governed by certain rules. Howe (1988) points out that such metaphors often simplify political processes, which themselves are unpredictable and often entropic – through these metaphors the said processes are given order, rules and clear roles for a limited number of players. Therefore, it is not unusual that in our data there are excerpts in which the EU

and the Western Balkans are presented as players in the game, i.e. in the accession sport (they feature a total of 41 occurrences in the corpus). We will consider several excerpts containing some representative instantiations of these metaphors:

16. *However, even though the EU's **game** so far has been called the door is open, Macron has decided to close it—at least for a moment.* (Blic, 22/04/2018) [No, dok se **igra** EU dosad zvala vrata su otvorena, Makron je rešio da ih zatvori – bar na trenutak.]
17. *Their approach is “don't do what we do, you do what we tell you to do.” I feel those are double standards and hypocrisy. We are tired from **the little games**.* (Pobjeda, 14/09/2018) [Njihov pristup je “ne radite što mi radimo, radite što vam kažemo”. Osjećam dvostruke standarde i hipokriziju. Umorni smo od **igrica**.]
18. *The **match** for the EU without deadlines* (headline) (Radio Slobodna Europe, 6/02/2018) [**Utakmica** za EU bez rokova (naslov)]

In excerpt 16, two metaphors are used, that of game and that of the already commented metaphor of the door – we have already said that the combination of metaphors is not uncommon in this discourse. In the excerpts 16 and 17, the roles of the players are not equal. Thus, in 16 the EU determines the name of the game and how it is played – it is ironically said that “the EU's **game** so far has been called *the door is open*”. In 17, the EU plays *the little games* – in BCMS, *igrica* is the diminutive form of *igra* (game) and this diminutive form has negative connotations in this context. This points to manipulation and hypocrisy of the EU as a player, which is literally referred to in the remaining text of the excerpt. In the excerpts, game is not seen as a joyful activity, in which more or less equal players compete under fair conditions, but rather as a game in which one player is the judge and the organiser of the game, and the other player is a completely passive participant, which frustrates them (“we are tired of games”). In addition, games and little games are primarily reminiscent of children, i.e. their use suggests the immaturity of the participants in the process – at least the participant who does not control the game, i.e. its rules (in the corpus, the metaphor WESTERN BALKANS ARE AN IMMATURE PERSON is often used – it is, for instance, instantiated in the headline: *The countries of the Western Balkans are “immature for the EU”* (Vijesti, 12/02/2018), which supports this observation; we did not focus on this metaphor in the present paper as our topic here is solely the conceptualisation of the accession process, but we have studied it in more details in Vuković-Stamatović (2021)).

Excerpt 18 once again underscores the uncertainty of joining the EU, i.e. the long-lasting nature of that process. The *match*, in contrast to *game/little games*, however, refers to more mature and serious players, as

well as to the chance that a Balkan player achieves a good result in an organised sports match (sport implies fair play). Nonetheless, even if the Balkan players play well, they cannot win the game that has no end – thus, the headline in 18 suggests hopelessness and frustration, which is an evaluative content that we often find in the metaphorical expressions of the EU-discourse in the countries of the Western Balkans.

The metaphor of *war*, i.e. struggle, is also common in political discourse. In principle, all the metaphors we have presented so far, including this one, can be said to be conventional for political and the EU discourse. The *war* metaphor is rather similar to the previous metaphor and the EU and the Western Balkans are presented as warring parties. The Balkan countries are in a position to fight for the status of Europeans, i.e. the two sides are unequal once again. There were 18 realisations of this metaphor in the corpus. Here are some excerpts containing them:

19. *Accessible negotiations are a very difficult **fight**, which does not depend only on our team.* (Vijesti, 20/12/2018) [Pristupni pregovori su vrlo teška **borba**, koja ne zavisi samo od našeg tima.]
20. *At the same time, the EU Commissioner for the Enlargement Johannes Han made it clear last Sunday, in both Belgrade and in Podgorica, that the accession does not fall from the skies, but that one should **fight** for it, the daily Kurir wrote.* (DW, 12/02/2018) [Istovremeno je komesar EU za proširanje Johanes Han prošle nedelje i u Beogradu i u Podgorici jasno stavio do znanja da pristup ne pada s neba, već da se za njega valja **izboriti**, piše dnevnik Kurir.]
21. *France and several other EU members even wanted to completely ignore the communication of the EC on enlargement in the conclusions of the June EC meeting, what would have been a harsh **blow** to the whole process.* (Vijesti, 11/06/2018) [Francuska i još par članica EU su želeli čak u potpunosti da ignorišu u zaključcima junskog Evropskog saveta komunikaciju EK o proširenju, što bi bio **veliki udarac** za čitav proces.]

The accession is seen as a *difficult fight* (19), which may receive *harsh blows* (21), and as an outcome for which the Western Balkans must *fight* (20). As we can see, the metaphorical expressions are present in the nominalised and impersonal constructions, which background the opponent against whom the Western Balkans *should fight*, as the EU commissioner suggests, i.e. usually this opponent is not explicitly identified. In 20, there is another metaphor – the metaphor that suggests that the accession is a gift, which is another message of the EU commissioner. Although the commissioner uses a negative sentence, the presupposition remains the

same and it implies that the Western Balkans assume that the accession will happen on its own, as a gift, without its more active participation.

There are a number of correspondences in how *war* and *game* metaphors are used in the corpus, which is not unusual, given that the parallel use of the *GAME* and the *WAR* domains is common in language (game is often conceptualised as war). The focus, again, is on the difficulties of the process and the problems that characterise it, as well as on the asymmetry between the two sides. One side inflicts blows and makes the fight difficult, while the other takes the blows and can reach the goal only through fighting. In fact, it is not always clear who the enemy is – is it an invisible enemy – the EU, is it perhaps a higher power, or are the Balkans fighting themselves? Such an undefined struggle can be manipulatively used in political discourse.

However, regardless of how unequal a fighter the Balkans may be, the very notion of fight implies a more active role than the one they play when presented as passengers whose vehicle is driven by someone else and/or whose journey is controlled by obstacles, or as people waiting at the door which someone else should open. The same goes for the *game* metaphor. However, the question is of whether the Western Balkans want to play a more active role at all – the EU, through the metaphor of accession as a gift from the skies, suggests that the Balkan countries expect the accession to come without their active contribution.

The conceptual metaphor *ACCESSION IS SCHOOLING* has already been studied Silaški & Đurović (2014), as presented earlier in our review of previous research. This metaphor is less conventional than the previous ones. The mappings are as follows: the EU is presented as a teacher, while the Balkans are a student, typically a bad student who receives criticism and bad grades from the teacher. The schooling corresponds to the accession process, while passing the exams corresponds to making some progress in the accession process. And, vice versa, bad grades reflect stagnation or a step back in the process. Once again, the contextual emphasis is on reducing the dynamics of the process. This metaphor was instantiated 12 times (through the metaphorical expressions which translate to: *student*, *entrance exam*, *class*, *homework assignment*, *graduation thesis*). Let us consider several excerpts:

22. *We will get into the next (school) **grade**, but as weaker **students*** (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 27/05/2018) [Preći ćemo u sledeći **razred**, ali kao slabiji đaci]
23. *First, it is necessary to do all **homework** at home, primarily this applies to those candidates which have progressed the furthest in the process, and these are Montenegro and Serbia, and only then, when all criteria are met, it is possible to talk about a more precise, more concrete accession date.* (Radio Slobodna Europe, 26/05/2018)

[*Najpre je potrebno završiti sve **domaće zadatke** kod kuće, pre svega se to odnosi na one kandidate koji su otišli najdalje u procesu, a to su Crna Gora i Srbija, a tek potom, kada budu ispunjeni svi kriterijumi, moguće je baviti se preciznijim, konkretnijim, datumom pristupanja.*]

24. *The offer, which should be of the type which “cannot be refused”, is that Montenegro and Serbia (exactly in this order), could become full members in 2025, on the condition that they **pass all entrance exams**.* (Dan, 11/02/2018) [Ponuda, koja bi trebalo da bude od one vrste „koja se ne odbija” glasi da bi Crna Gora i Srbija (navedene su baš ovim redom), punopravne članice mogle da postanu 2025, pod uslovom da **polože sve prijemne ispite**.]

The Western Balkans are presented as *weak students* who barely manage to reach the next *grade* (it is unclear which grade they are in and how many grades there are), who have to complete *homework* and pass the *entrance exam*, which are the conditions imposed by the one who controls the learning process, i.e. the accession process. A more certain perspective is offered in excerpt 24 – however, we should add that the EU quickly denied that such an offer ever existed and confirmed that the procedure was still without deadlines (and remains so to this day).

In this metaphor, the emphasis is not on the process of learning as a positive activity through which the Balkan countries could make progress, but only on the process of the examination, i.e. on the testing of the students. Thus, the most unpleasant aspect of the entire schooling process is foregrounded. It is also suggested that the process of acquiring knowledge should be done by the Western Balkans themselves – they should complete their homework, at home, as suggested, prepare for the entrance exam, do a graduation thesis (which implies fairly independent work), etc. As in the metaphor in which it was assumed that the Western Balkans expected membership as a gift from heaven, the EU sends the message that it expects progress from the Balkans, but progress that should be achieved independently.

The metaphor *ACCESSION IS A STORY/FAIRYTALE* had 8 realisations in the corpus (its instantiations translate to: *story*, *talk*, *fairytale*, *happy end*). The accession is here characterised as a sad story or an atypical fairytale, since it has a sad ending:

25. *A sad Balkan **story** in which the actors are Berlin, Sofia, Prague and the Hungarian commissioner* (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 18/01/2018) [Tužna balkanska **priča** u kojoj glume Berlin, Sofija, Prag i mađarski komesar]

26. Translated into **fairytale** terms, that would look like this: "Once upon a time, there was a bridegroom who was cursed to wait for years for an answer from a girl to whom he had proposed. And so, for years he had to stand under her magnificent balcony. And he was not allowed to seek new love or to look at another princess. And so, he grew old while waiting..." For 18 years now, Serbia has been standing still before the EU gate, waiting. We don't know if the story will have a **happy end**, but many who were young and enthusiastic in the year 2000, no longer believe in **fairytale**s. Fortunately, the bride is not so young, healthy and attractive any more. (Standard, 24/05/2018) [U prevodu na rečnik **bajki**, to bi izgledalo ovako: „Bio jednom jedan mladoženja, koji je osuđen na prokletstvo da godinama čeka na odgovor devojke koju je zaprosio. I godinama tako morao je da stoji ispod njenog velelepnog balkona. I nije smeo da potraži novu ljubav niti da se okrene za drugom princezom. I tako je ostario u čekanju..." Srbija već 18 godina tapka pred kapijom EU čekajući. Ne znamo da li će sve ovo imati **srećan kraj**, ali mnogi koji su bili mladi i orni te 2000. godine, već odavno ne veruju u **bajke**. Na sreću, ni mlada udavača više nije tako mlada, jedra i atraktivna.]

The excerpt 26 is particularly interesting, as it contains an entire allegory – a membership candidate is compared to a bridegroom who has been waiting for years for an answer from the girl he had proposed to – the EU. The bridegroom eventually grows old and there is no happy ending. By presenting the accession as a story, i.e. a fairytale, it is suggested that the process is actually a simulacrum – a pretence.

The conceptual metaphor which conceptualises the accession as a *family* process has been studied earlier (e.g. Musolff, 2004). There were 7 instantiations of this metaphor, which translate to: *relative*, *family*, *extended family* and *possessive parent*. What marked all its instantiations is that the Western Balkans were presented as an inferior family member. The mappings were as follows: the EU is the parent or a wealthy relative, the Western Balkans are relatives, and the accession is the joining of the family members. However, the relative who is to join the family is not very welcome. Let us look at the following excerpts:

27. And, as the French diplomat explains, that will not mean the entry of the new "poor" **relatives** who will expect money from of the EU budget while also sending new one migrants to the Union. (Novosti, 18/05/2018)

[I kako je objasnio francuski diplomata, da to neće značiti ulazak novih "siromašnih **rođaka**" koji očekuju novac iz budžeta EU, a šalju nove migrante u Uniju.]

28. Europe is wrong to constantly impose its choice as our own, treating the Balkan people as immature, which ultimately makes us unfree. Acting that way, like a possessive **parent**, it does not allow the Balkans to grow up, finding among its nations constant favourites and constant culprits, which is not good for either the Balkans or for Europe. (Politika, 18/05/2018) [Evropa greši kad nam stalno nameće svoj izbor kao naš, tretirajući balkanske narode kao nezrele, što nas u krajnjem čini neslobodnim. Upravo na takav način, poput **posesivnog roditelja**, ona ne dozvoljava Balkanu da odraste, nalazeći među njenim narodima i stalne miljenike i stalne krivce, što nije dobro ni za Balkan ni za Evropu.]

In excerpt 27, the relative is characterised as a *poor* one and as expecting money from their wealthier family. Although the utterance is negative (the diplomat says that the accession will not mean that), the potential arrival of new poor cousins is conceptualised anyway. At the same time, this excerpt also features a *container* metaphor (suggested through *entry*). Thus, the EU is seen as a home which gets a new household member – a poor relative. As suggested earlier, the EU assumes that the Western Balkans expect gifts – this time it is clearly stated that they expect money from the EU budget, while also suggesting that they will not earn it.

In excerpt 28, the Western Balkans are labelled as an *immature person*, a metaphor we mentioned earlier, while the EU is represented as a *possessive parent*, suggesting that the Balkans are a child. The implication is that a parent has the right to raise and control their immature child and that they know what is best for them. However, the *possessive parent* also points to something else – however immature the Balkans may be, it is still a child of the EU – and a typical parent loves their child. The possessive parent, however, despite loving their child, does not allow it to grow up, which is a situation that does not lead to progress.

The metaphor ACCESSION IS INVESTING has 8 realisations in the corpus, which translate to *investment* and *afford*:

29. A geostrategic **investment** of the European Union (DW, 7/02/2018)

[Geostrateška **investicija** Evropske unije]

30. All was additionally and vividly explained by the commentator of the "Deutsche Welle", Christof Haselbach, who said that the EU cannot **afford** the Western Balkans but it must not give it up to the influence of Russia and China. (Vesti-online, 23/05/2018) [Sve nam je dodatno i plastično objasnio komentator „Dojče velea“ Kristof Hazelbah, koji kaže da EU sebi ne može da **priušti** Zapadni Balkan, ali ne sme da ga prepusti uticaju Rusije i Kine.]

Through this metaphor, the process of the accession is seen as an economic transaction, where the EU spends money and buys something, which some see as an investment (29) and others as an overpriced trade (30). The Western Balkans equate to goods that can be bought and sold.

Other metaphors had fewer realisations in relation to the previous ones – we will dedicate some space to them as these are, typically, creative metaphors with strong evaluative content. We will present those which had at least two realisations and were found in different texts, which shows that these were not one-off, i.e. completely ephemeral, metaphors.

ACCESSION IS SALVATION is one of the metaphors which was used by Balkan politicians:

31. (Headline) Đukanović: *Politics of expansion is lifesaving for the EU too* (CDM, 11/12/2018)
[(Naslov) Đukanović: *Politika proširenja je spasosna i za EU*]
32. (Headline) Dačić: *The only salvation for the EU is that the Western Balkans join it* (Politika, 9/07/2018)
[(Naslov) Dačić: *Jedini spas za EU je da u nju uđe zapadni Balkan*]

In excerpts 31 and 32, the metaphors were instantiated in the headlines, which demonstrates their importance and prominence. The mappings were as follows: the accession is salvation, the Western Balkans are a saviour, the EU is in trouble and it needs someone to save it. What is interesting in this case is that the accession is the salvation for the EU (in the context of the Brexit) and not for the Western Balkans. The roles are reversed for the first time and so the Balkans have a chance to save the EU – at least that is how some prominent regional politicians see the situation. Such messages are mostly meant for the local audience.

The next excerpt, features the metaphor ACCESSION IS UNDERGOING A CALVARY, among other metaphors:

33. (Headline) *Those who have entered, have entered: Brussels prescribes a new calvary for membership to Serbia ... This message says – you will undergo a calvary and, yet, this will not guarantee that you will enter the EU. So, this message by itself is very discouraging for all those who have hoped for some future status of an EU member. On the other hand, for the Balkan countries which still have not joined the EU, the Brussels' argument which says "if you do this and that, your European perspective will be stronger", is greatly weakened. What is actually said by this is – we want to keep you in a state of suspended animation and you should still continue to fulfil our conditions, but do not expect to enter the EU," Pavić explains.* (Sputnik, 30/08/2018)

[(Naslov) *Ko je ušao, ušao je: Brisel Srbiji propisuje novu golgotu do članstva ... Ova poruka govori – proći ćete kroz golgotu, a opet je pitanje da li ćete ući u EU. Dakle, ova poruka je sama po sebi vrlo obeshrabrujuća za sve koji su se nadali nekom budućem statusu člana Evropske unije. Sa druge strane, kada je reč o zemljama Balkana koje još nisu ušle u EU, ovim je u velikoj meri oslabljen onaj argument Brisela koji glasi „ako uradite to i to, vaša evropska perspektiva će biti pojačana“. Ovim je zapravo rečeno – mi želimo da vas držimo u stanju suspendovane animacije i da vi i dalje ispunjavate naše uslove, ali nemojte da očekujete da ćete ući u EU“, objašnjava Pavić.]*

Once more, the mappings point to the problems and difficulties in the process, the accession is seen as martyrdom, where the process of the metaphor is of a religious nature (the Passion of Jesus). In this context, the EU is implicitly the oppressor. Martyrdom, however, does not guarantee the accession. Additional metaphors which may be found in the excerpt above include that of the EU as a house (e.g. "those who have entered, have entered", "enter the EU") and that of the Western Balkans as a person in a state of suspended animation. The latter draws from the domain of health/disease. Other realisations relying on this domain present the accession as a half-alive or a dead animal:

34. *Mr. Sarazzin, someone once said that the EU enlargement is like a decapitated chicken – it still runs, but it is actually dead. Would you agree?* (DW, 31/05/2018)
[*Gospodine Zaracin, jednom je neko rekao da je proširenje EU kao obezglavljeno pile – još trči, ali je zapravo mrtvo. Slažete li se?*]

In 34, the mappings involved present the accession as a small animal, not particularly representative for its intelligence. The chicken is running headless, i.e. it is taking senseless and frenetic actions, and has no future. It is a morbid image – the accession is here also presented as a kind of martyrdom. The culprit for the beheading of the chicken is completely backgrounded and the candidate countries are not even mentioned.

The accession was also conceptualised as experimentation (ACCESSION IS EXPERIMENTING). The EU conducts the experiment, while the Western Balkans passively undergo it:

35. *It is very important that everyone, including us here and especially our partners, realise that neither Montenegro nor the Western Balkans are a terrain on which one can experiment, they are not a terrain on which you can prescribe what is mandatory to apply and what should be seen through the glasses*

suggested by someone from some other international address. (Radio Slobodna Europe, 14/07/2018) [Jako je važno da svi, i mi ovdje i posebno naši partneri shvate da ni Crna Gora ni Zapadni Balkan nije teren na kojem se može eksperimentisati, nije teren na kojem možete propisivati šta je obavezno primijeniti a šta treba gledati kroz naočari koje vam sugeriše neko sa druge međunarodne adrese.]

36. (Headline) *THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMM PARTICIPATED IN A MEETING IN RUSSIA The Balkans are suitable for experiments (Dan, 12/10/2018) [(Naslov) PREDSEDNIK AMM-A UČESTVOVAO NA SKUPU U RUSIJI Balkan pogodan za eksperimente]*

In 35–36, the Western Balkans are actually presented as a field where an experiment is carried out, while its citizens are, implicitly, guinea pigs – usually, experiments are carried out on animals, as beings of lesser value than humans, whose lives may be risked for the sake of some common good, or, if the experiment involves people, they are necessarily volunteers. However, the excerpts do not suggest willingness on the part of the Western Balkans to participate in the experiments. The utterance in 35 is actually negative but, as in the previous cases which featured negative constructions, the conceptualisation that the Western Balkans are actually a field for experimentation is still present. The experimentation itself implies certain risks for the guinea pig, as well as the control of the experimenter. The outcome of the experiment is always uncertain – the reason why experiments are conducted is to see what happens.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We will organise this part of the paper around the research questions asked in the introduction. We will also relate our conclusions to the results from the previous literature.

The first research question posed in this paper is which metaphors were the ones most frequently used to describe the process of the accession of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the European Union, in the online media of these three countries. The following metaphors turned out to be the most common ones: ACCESSION IS A JOURNEY, ACCESSION IS ENTERING A HOUSE, ACCESSION IS A PLAYING GAME, ACCESSION IS FIGHTING, ACCESSION IS JOINING THE FAMILY, and ACCESSION IS SCHOOLING. We can call these metaphors conventional for the discourse of the EU accession as they were all recorded as frequent in the earlier research of that type of discourse: all the mentioned metaphors were noted by Musolff (2004); the journey metaphors were studied by Horolets (2003), Drulák & Königová (2007), Šarić (2005), Škara (2009), Petraškaite-Pabst (2010), Kapranov (2016), and Barčot (2016); the metaphor of the EU as a house was investigated by Drulák &

Königová (2007), Petraškaite-Pabst (2010), Đurović (2013), Šarić (2005), and Škara (2009); further, Silaški and Đurović (2014) dealt with the metaphor of schooling; while the family metaphor was analysed by Petraškaite-Pabst (2010) and Kapranov (2016). In our study, the less frequent metaphors were: ACCESSION IS A STORY/FAIRYTALE, ACCESSION IS INVESTING, ACCESSION IS UNDERGOING A CALVARY, ACCESSION IS EXPERIMENTING, ACCESSION IS A HALF-ALIVE/DEAD ANIMAL and ACCESSION IS SALVATION. With the exception of the metaphor featuring a half-alive animal, which could be subsumed under the script LIFE-HEALTH-STRENGTH, studied by Musolff (2004), these latter metaphors have not, to our best knowledge, been investigated in the earlier research, and so one of the concrete contributions offered by this paper might be that. Our conclusion is the same as the one reached by Werkmann & Buljan (2013): in the discourse of the EU accession, some domains remained constant but different categories rose to prominence over time, while some new domains appeared as well.

The second research question was how the accession, which is essentially a dynamic process, is specifically conceptualised in the internet media of the three mentioned countries, in the view of the stagnation in the expansion of the European Union. Most of the results from the literature come from the research on the EU-accession discourse from the first decade of this century – our results differ somewhat from those and are closer to the results of the more recent studies. In our data, the context usually reduces the dynamics of the process: the accession, thus, may be presented as a journey but the emphasis is on its slowness, uncertainty, complexity, etc., with the countries of the Western Balkans encountering obstacles at every step of the way (the non-dynamic nature of the journey was also pointed out by Đurović and Silaški (2012), in the analysis of the traffic light metaphor, which had two realisations in our corpus). Similarly, the accession can be presented as entering a house, but door to the house is typically closed. The accession process may also be perceived as playing a game or fighting, but the game/fight turns out to be a never-ending show-down of unequal competitors. The Western Balkans are also seen as bad students, who barely progresses to the next grade. Furthermore, the accession takes on a half-life state, i.e. it is in a state of suspended animation, with little hope of returning to normal life. All these metaphorical representations point to the non-dynamic nature of the accession process.

The last research question refers to how the evaluative content of the metaphors from our corpus differs from the metaphors representing the accession of the former EU-membership candidates. The conclusions of our analysis are similar to those

of Kapranov (2016) – the recent EU-accession metaphors are organised around the discursive model of disappointment, while in the earlier discourse there was mostly a positive mood. The discourse in which the metaphors were realised in our corpus also suggests fatigue, a sense of injustice, and frustration.

The results, thus, show that some domains have remained constant, i.e. the same, compared to the previous period, but also that the prominent metaphorical models have changed somewhat. Namely, the current prominent models involve: a traveller who gets nowhere, a guest standing at the door, a game in which you cannot win, a fight in which you only get punched, a meeting with a family that rejects you, and a school where one does not make it, or barely makes it, to the next grade. The EU-accession process is making little progress or not moving at all, or is simply being simulated – the whole process might even be seen as a *simulacrum*. Nowhere is this simulacrum more noticeable than in the metaphor *ACCESSION IS A STORY/FAIRYTALE*, one of the more creative metaphors from the corpus, which has not been studied in the literature so far, to our best knowledge. Politicians from the region, as well as those from the EU, agree to this simulacrum, while the journalists themselves rarely try to deconstruct it critically.

The discursive context of the realisations of a significant number of metaphors from the corpus points, therefore, to a lack of dynamics in the accession process, while the evaluative content points to disappointment and fatigue. Either the EU or a

higher power is presented as the culprit, while the responsibility of the Western Balkans, i.e. their politicians, is backgrounded, which was to be expected since the media mainly reported the statements of the regional and local politicians. At the same time, any small progress actually made in the process is usually attributed individually and directly to certain politicians, i.e. to their political parties. Such discourse strategies of highlighting the good and downplaying the bad in “us” are typical for political discourse in general (van Dijk, 2001). What is not typical for every political discourse and what was observed in this study, as well as in earlier research (Petrović, 2009; Vuković-Stamatović, 2021), is the subordinate position of the Western Balkans – this is not only a consequence of the specific political situation in which the Western Balkans are the requesting party, but is also a consequence of a more historical view of the Balkans as less valuable compared to the West in general, a view that was indirectly expressed by many politicians and journalists from the region.

As we have seen, the accession is predominantly represented as difficult and uncertain, with little or without any possibility of resuscitation. Only one metaphor from the corpus was different from this – the metaphor *ACCESSION IS SALVATION*, which two Balkan politicians used to send a message to the EU on how to overcome the Brexit crisis; these two politicians have tried, consciously or unconsciously, to reverse the image and the role of the Western Balkans in the process of the European integrations. Will such a discourse become more prominent in the future, only time can tell.

»PRISTOP K EU JE KOT TEK NA TEKALNI STEZI V TELOVADNICI«:
 METAFORIČNO PREDSTAVLJANJE PROCESA VKLJUČEVANJA V EU V DIGITALNIH
 MEDIJAH V SRBIJI, ČRNI GORI TER BOSNI IN HERCEGOVINI

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POVZETEK

V prispevku predstavljamo konceptualne metafore s ciljno domeno *PRISTOP K EU*, primere katerih smo našli v korpusu 150 spletnih novinarskih člankov, objavljenih v Srbiji, Črni gori ter Bosni in Hercegovini leta 2018. Za analizo tega korpusa 104.806 besed smo uporabili tako kvantitativne kot kvalitativne metode, metaforičnost izrazov pa smo preverjali s postopkom za prepoznavanje metaforičnih besed MIPVU. Analizirali smo najpogostejše metafore znotraj njihovega sobesedila (odlomki iz korpusa) pa tudi širši (družbeni in politični) kontekst. Za najpogostejše so se izkazale konvencionalne metafore: *PRISTOP JE POTOVANJE*, *PRISTOP JE [KOT] VSTOP V HIŠO*, *PRISTOP JE IGRANJE IGRE*, *PRISTOP JE BOJ*, *PRISTOP JE PRIDRUŽEVANJE DRUŽINI* in *PRISTOP JE ŠOLANJE*. V korpusu pa je bilo najti tudi manj konvencionalne in ustvarjalnejše metafore: *PRISTOP JE ZGODBA/PRAVLJICA*, *PRISTOP JE KALVARIJA*, *PRISTOP JE EKSPERIMENTIRANJE*, *PRISTOP JE NAPOL ŽIVA/MRTVA ŽIVAL* in *PRISTOP JE ODREŠITEV*. Kritična analiza je pokazala prevlado metaforičnih modelov, ki izpostavljajo problematičnost in negotovost procesov vključevanja, kot tudi njihovo nedinamičnost. Diskurz, v katerem so se pojavljale metafore pristopa k Evropski uniji, kaže na utrujenost, občutek krivičnosti in frustracijo med zahodnobalkanskimi kandidatkami za članstvo v EU. V nasprotju z zgodnejšim diskurzom o pristopu k Evropski uniji, ton katerega je bil na splošno pozitiven, so preučevane metafore nastajale v povezavi z diskurzivnim modelom razočaranosti.

Ključne besede: konceptualna metafora, metaforični izrazi, proces vključevanja v EU, kritična analiza diskurza, medijski diskurz, zahodni Balkan

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COMPETING INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA IN THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES WITH A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC LEVERAGE

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to use the economic mechanisms to analyse the influence of the European Union (EU) and Russia in the Western Balkan countries (WBC). A comprehensive analysis is carried out in the sense of economic indicators examination (trade, foreign direct investments, energy market analysis). Results indicate that the dominant EU influence in the WBC, induced by the strong economic impact, has been weakened due to the EU's procrastination surrounding the enlargement strategy, thus leaving plenty of room for rapid consolidation of pro-Russian tendencies and aggravation of the geopolitical component. Data were calculated on the basis of relevant statistical databases and surveys.

Keywords: geopolitics, European Union, Russia, Western Balkans, energy, trade, investments

INTERESSI CONTRASTANTI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA E DELLA RUSSIA NEI PAESI DEI BALCANI OCCIDENTALI CON UN'ANALISI COMPLESSIVA DELLA LEVA ECONOMICA

SINTESI

Questo articolo mira a utilizzare i meccanismi economici per analizzare l'influenza dell'Unione Europea (UE) e della Russia nei paesi dei Balcani occidentali (WBC). L'analisi completa viene condotta attraverso l'esame degli indicatori economici (commercio, investimenti diretti esteri, analisi del mercato energetico). I risultati indicano che l'influenza dominante dell'UE nel WBC, indotta dal forte impatto economico, è stata indebolita a causa della procrastinazione dell'UE che circonda la strategia di allargamento, lasciando così molto spazio per un rapido consolidamento delle tendenze filo-russe e l'aggravamento della componente geopolitica. I dati sono stati calcolati sulla base di banche dati statistiche e indagini pertinenti.

Parole chiave: geopolitica, Unione Europea, Russia, Balcani occidentali, energia, commercio, investimenti

INTRODUCTION

The results of the Ukrainian crisis and the Russian annexation of Crimea significantly strengthened the geopolitical attitude and tendencies of Russia, particularly in its relations with the European Union (EU) (Smith Stegen, 2011; Haukkala, 2015; Forsberg & Haukkala, 2016; Romanova, 2016; Freire, 2020). This issue escalated, especially with the recent large-scale Russian invasion and war in Ukraine (February 2022). In recent years, it has been shown that the vulnerable region of the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, Kosovo*) has become an inspiring and suitable polygon for EU-Russia geopolitical competition. This is particularly emphasized since the EU made the decision to slow down the integration process. At the same time, Russia took this opportunity to increase its influence in some of the Western Balkan countries (hereinafter referred to as the WBC), striving to undermine EU objectives in the WBC (Wesslau & Wilson, 2016; Panagiotou, 2021). The presence of both actors in the WBC is seen through the pretty intertwined influences of several mechanisms: economic dependence and economic benefits, cultural and historical ties, social perception and media influence, etc. (Zorić, 2017; Stojarová, 2020). With the newest geopolitical challenges and the Russo-Ukrainian war, this intertwined influence tends to be much more pronounced.

Consequently, this paper aims to analyse and present the geopolitical influence of the EU and Russia in the WBC region within the context of their geopolitical competition, particularly focusing on the effective impact of economic leverage and energy geopolitics. Moreover, a special emphasis in the paper is given to the reflection of the Ukrainian crisis (which resulted in war) on the situation in WBC in recent years, since it turns out that this period of time coincides with the stalemate in WBC's EU integration process. Both the EU and Russia invest in the WBC, but the analysis performed in this work shows that there is a significant gap between the facts and perceptions when concerning the economic benefits of the WBC. Moreover, some authors claim that Russia cannot impose real economic and military strength on the region, and, thus, it applies alternative soft tools-based tactics (Stronski & Himes, 2019). It certainly seems that Russia is strongly present in this region, which is an important transit route for Russia's gas, but on the other hand, being an ideationally important part of the Slavic and Orthodox world. Consequently, the fragile WBC region perceives a permanent geopolitical risk, possible ethnic conflict, economic and political instability, and poor governance (Zorić, 2017; Panagiotou, 2021). In particular, it is necessary to observe that Russia has differentiated its policy toward the countries in

the region. There is a strong influence towards Serbia, keeping it far from NATO, similarly as in Bosnia, through the influence of Serbia and Bosnian Serbs. Although Montenegro is a NATO member, Russia tends to use political influence in the Montenegrin divided society to control political situation and, as a result, to discredit its status in NATO. The fact that Serbia does not recognize Kosovo opens up other sources of tension and geopolitical games in the region. The EU needs to reinforce its determination on enlargement, given that inactivity and hesitance have obviously led to fatigue and Euroscepticism.

This paper answers a general research question on how the energy geopolitics between the EU and Russia, as well as the Ukrainian crisis, influenced WBC and its EU integration. More specifically, has the WBC region become a hostage of EU-Russia geopolitical relations and to what extent? It seems that the aggravation of relations between the EU and Russia and the war in Ukraine affected particular countries in the observed region and certainly slowed down EU integration process. The next question that arises is whether the impact of economic benefits on the WBC can compete with the geopolitical interests. Has the hesitancy of the EU integration caused democratic backsliding and, consequently, a further slowdown in the EU accession process, which is then used by Russia to activate nationalism in some countries in the Western Balkan region?

The methodology of the research is based on primary and secondary sources. Namely, as a primary source, statistical databases (Eurostat, UN Comtrade) are used for selection, processing, and analysis of the data, while the previous research results presented in the relevant literature, as a secondary source, are considered to additionally substantiate the appropriate conclusions that correspond with the analysed data. This research methodology has been applied through three layers. The first segment of this work concerns observations and analysis of the geopolitical and liberal components between the EU and Russia, pointing out the enormous growth of the geopolitical component in their relations, which consequently led first to serious tensions and then to the war in Ukraine. The second segment examines the phenomenon of increased geopolitical tensions that spill over to the global scene, and consequently affected the countries in the immediate vicinity, such as the WBC. In the third layer, the extensive study and analysis of the data (economic impact indicators including the impact of energy trade), show a strong influence of both the EU and Russia on the WBC. Particularly interesting are the cases of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, so these are consequently considered in more detail.

Therefore, the paper will provide answers to the specified research questions by using the presented




Chart 1: EU energy trade with Russia (Source: Author's calculations based on Eurostat database).

methodology. In that sense, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework for EU-Russia relations and their competing goals. Section 3 discusses the confronting economic and geopolitical influence of the EU and Russia. Based on the statistical data, it also brings an analysis and comparison of economic influence in the WBC region. The discussion on the achieved impacts and its efficiency, together with the conclusions, are given in Section 4.

EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS: BETWEEN GEOPOLITICAL AND LIBERAL TENDENCIES

EU-Russia relations are characterized by several socio-cultural and historical ties, intensive economic cooperation, particularly in the field of energy trade, and consequently, pretty intertwined geostrategic interests (Le Billon, 2004; Boyd-Barrett, 2017; Haukкала, 2018). In this relationship, the EU has been commonly seen as a community with shared values, such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and liberal trade agreements. The Russian attitude is seen through the emphasized national interests and self-perception of a superpower that dates back to early history, as evidenced by the current war in Ukraine.

The relations between the EU and Russia are significantly shaped by two different paradigms, namely the liberal and the realist. These two concepts belong to the general theory of international relations where the realist approach concerns the domain of high politics, putting in the limelight the self-interests and issues crucial for the state's survival and security, while the liberal approach focuses on the domain of low politics, with a focus on mutually beneficial socio-economic cooperation. Russia primarily follows

the realist paradigm, where geopolitical positioning motivates using oil and gas as 'weapons' toward the dominance of the international geopolitical scene as a primary objective.

Liberal component in EU-Russia relations

The liberal approach in describing EU-Russia relations strongly emphasizes the great extent of the economic interdependence between the two actors. Russia is a very important trade partner for the EU, being the main supplier of energy resources and the third-largest trading partner in general. Certainly, the energy issue dominates in the EU-Russia relationship. The EU is highly dependent on the imports of gas and oil, which are of high importance for its economy. The EU imports 53% of the energy that it consumes, including almost 90% of its crude oil, 66% of its natural gas, and 42% of its solid fuels (Eurostat, 2020). Obviously, the EU has been using its economic potential to provide the necessary energy resources through cooperation with Russia, being the main EU supplier covering approximately 40% of the gas, 33% of the crude oil, and 29% of the solid fuels (Siddi, 2019). The share of energy products in total EU imports from Russia is given in Chart 1 for the period 2016–2020 (calculated based on the Eurostat database). For instance, observe that Russia provides one-third of the EU's gas imports (close to 40% in 2016 and 2017), which is about 60% of Russia's total gas exports (Casier, 2020). Due to the high energy interdependence between the EU and Russia on energy, energy security is of the highest importance for both the EU and Russia; the EU needs to secure the energy supply while Russia needs to secure energy distribution to the EU.




Chart 2: a) EU import of energy from Russia versus EU total export to Russia (Source: Author's calculations based on Eurostat database); b) Accumulated FDI flows from EU to Russia (Source: Central Bank of Russia).

Great parts of the gas pipelines to the EU and Turkey run through Ukraine. However, these pipelines are old and require significant investment to maintain the infrastructure or to build new pipelines through Ukraine. Russia has been working on alternative projects such as Nord Stream 2 (to double the capacity of the existing Nord Stream) and Turkish Stream (Vihma & Wigell, 2016; Siddi, 2019). However, the finalization of the North Stream 2 project has been halted due to the current war in Ukraine.

Russia has also significant benefits from its economic trade with the EU. In the last few decades, Russia's economic power has been significantly raised through energy exports to the EU, strengthening Russia's confidence as a global power. Russia also imports other goods from the EU (food, machinery and vehicles, manufactured products, etc.). The comparison of the EU's imports of energy from Russia and the EU's exports of other goods from the EU to Russia is shown in Chart 2a (calculated based on the Eurostat database). Energy imports certainly dominate, but the EU's exports of other goods are quite significant as well. When observing the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Russia, the EU participates with nearly 75% of the total FDI stocks (Casier, 2020). Chart 2b presents the accumulated FDI flows according to the directional principle from the EU to Russia from 2014 to 2018.

From the presented analysis, it can be concluded that the liberal component of EU-Russia relations is certainly influential, with an emphasis on the strong interdependence in the field of energy. Furthermore, we may observe that this liberal component when expressed in the total trade amounts cannot be considered even approximately constant since it is subject to significant variations as a consequence of the geopolitical component's influence. Due to the strained geopolitical attitudes between the EU and Russia starting from the 2014 and Ukrainian crisis

and EU sanctions imposed on Russia, the liberal component recorded a significant decline with almost halved trade in 2015 and 2016 (Chart 2a). Certainly, the year 2022 will bring a drastic change regarding the liberal component. Therefore, both geopolitical and liberal approaches need to be considered in understanding the EU-Russia relations, as well as their reflection on the current global situation.

Geopolitical component in EU-Russia relations

As the economic power of Russia has been increased over the years based on energy exports primarily to the EU, the Russian geopolitical component has also significantly increased, becoming the main strength of Russian foreign policy (Smith Stegen, 2011; Romanova, 2016). Russia has been using energy resources as the main tool in developing a concept of energy geopolitics with the aim of strengthening its position as a dominant global player. At the same time, such a concept is exploited to guide its political relations with the EU. Hence, Russia has turned its energy politics toward the realist/geopolitical approach, using energy as the means of showing power (Donnelly, 2008; Smith Stegen, 2011; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Wilson, 2019). The geopolitical approach of Russia is also motivated by the perception that the EU's main foreign policy, which is often in compliance with US directives, can endanger its national interests. The concept of energy superpower became a driving force of Russian foreign politics and it was used to convince its neighbouring countries (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) to direct energy transit through Russian territory and make many countries dependent on its energy supply.

From the EU perspective, the liberal component of energy relations has also been affected by the growing geopolitical component over time. The EU

was faced with its weaknesses, perceiving Russian energy dependence as a potential threat that needs to be mitigated by unanimous actions. At the same time, Russia continues and enhances its partnership with China, since China opens the possibility to make losses in the Russian economy. Moreover, Russia and China signed a thirty-year contract for gas supply. On the other hand, it is interesting that the EU adopted a strategy toward China just recently in 2019, in the sense of observing China as an economic competitor, systemic rival, and strategic partner (Bermann, 2021). Earlier, the European Commission was more focused on providing fair competition between EU companies than dealing with the unfair competition between EU and Chinese companies.

When considering the dependence on energy resources, it can be emphasized that there are differences between the member states, and thus, with the variety of interests and needs, it is difficult to create an efficient EU foreign policy (Siddi, 2017). Moreover, the EU countries in the neighbourhood of Russia and Turkey have different perceptions compared with Western countries (Siddi, 2017; Siddi, 2019, 3). In general, the EU has been trying to diversify its energy imports, with a particular focus on the regions of the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa. For the EU, it was highly important to set up pipelines across the Caspian Sea and to create an opportunity to use the energy resources in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. On the other hand, Russia has been protecting its interests and has acted against such ideas, even asking for support from Iran. An alternative supply route from Saudi Arabia to Mediterranean countries has been foreseen through the territory of Syria, but the civil war in Syria prevented such an opportunity (Vihma & Wigell, 2016).

Russia has taken countermeasures by launching the Nord Stream 2 and Southern Stream projects. Moreover, Russia's interest in the previously mentioned regions rich in energy resources (including the Middle East and energy-rich regions in Africa) is for those regions to remain unstable. In parallel, the EU plan for diversification of supply routes raised concerns in Russia, which also strives to provide alternatives for gas exports, open new energy markets, and foster long-term contracts with China. These intertwined interests between the EU and Russia have greatly increased the geopolitical component of their relations (Romanova, 2016; Wilson, 2019).

Therefore, the liberal component of EU-Russia relations has acquired a tone of economic nationalism. Moreover, the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 has increased geopolitical competition between the EU and Russia beyond the energy issue, opening broader political confrontations. The Maidan movement

in winter 2013–2014 came with the aspirations of Ukrainian political elites toward closer integration with the EU and a strong distrust of Russia. As a consequence, the regime in Ukraine was changed. Ukraine strongly turned toward the EU, which was a breaking point for Russian actions: the annexation of Crimea and the conflicts in the Donbas region. Hence, Russia was keen on not letting Ukraine become closer with the western EU countries and perceived the Ukrainian crisis as a threat to its sovereignty. The EU also raised security concerns for its members in the neighbourhood of Ukraine and increased NATO activities in this region. In large, the Ukrainian issues brought intensive tensions between Russia and the EU, with an emphasized perception of mutual threat, which culminated in the war in February 2022.

After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, EU-Russia relations have been burdened by the EU sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 (Casier, 2016; Boyd-Barrett, 2017; Siddi, 2019; Casier, 2020), with just the minimum level of cooperation that significantly affects trade, especially in 2015 and 2016 (Chart 2a). The Russian economy was affected by sanctions, recording a 1.5% drop in GDP in 2015 (Vihma & Wigell, 2016). Thus, Russia needed to find alternatives for collaboration and to increase its domestic production. Regarding gas supply, as mentioned earlier, Russia signed a thirty-year contract with China, assuming two supply routes with a capacity of close to 70 bcm per year (Romanova, 2016). The latest occurrences, including the war in Ukraine, provoked the newest sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia in 2022, being significantly more severe and with outcomes that will certainly complicate their further relations.

As a conclusion of this part, we can say that Russia's self-confidence has been strengthened after the Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea. Russia is pretty determined in its aspiration to act as a strong geopolitical player, emphasizing the hard power context. Russia particularly uses energy and military power to keep its neighbours as close as possible. Consequently, countries such as Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia are subject of high tensions between the EU and Russia. The EU, on its side, fosters a soft approach to geopolitics (soft power), based on common values, norms, and multilateralism principles (Vihma & Wigell, 2016; Nitoiu & Sus, 2019). Moreover, the EU fosters the concept of 'circles of friends' by imposing its economic power (Dembińska & Smith, 2021, 250). The opposing interests of the EU and Russia have created opportunities for geopolitical games in vulnerable regions, and geopolitical tensions between the EU and Russia have been overflowing through the WBC in recent years.

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE EU AND RUSSIA IN THE WBC

The EU has shown certain hesitancy and lack of harmonized determination toward the accession of WBC, especially since 2014, when the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, stated that there will be no enlargement in the next five years (Zorić, 2017; Smith et al., 2021). The overall perception of the slowdown trend of the EU enlargement has influenced the rise of Euroscepticism in the WBC. In recent years, the EU has been focused on internal challenges, such as the economic crisis, Brexit, the refugee crisis, etc., leaving plenty of room for Russia to impose its geopolitical influence and involvement in the WBC region. Another problem is the lack of internal sense of reforms within the WBC, which implies insufficient adaptation of rules and norms to the behaviour and informal practices in the WBC and thus ineffective implementation (Rant et al., 2020). EU accession is still the main political objective of the WBC, but there are other competing interests in the region, both in the political and economic context. In particular, Russia has taken the opportunity to increase its influence in some parts of the WBC, making the situation more complicated.

Certainly, Russia has a great interest in the Balkans, which is part of a traditional and cultural strategy to support 'fraternal' Slavic, particularly Orthodox nations (Samokhvalov, 2019). However, Russia's attitudes regarding the situation in the WBC are often influenced by the relations and competition with Western Europe. Moreover, Russia's interests in WBC increase only when the EU intensifies its actions in the region. Hence, Russia cares about its image as a great power and seeks any room left to be 'part of the game' (Samokhvalov, 2019; Secrieru, 2019; Panagiotou, 2021). This is especially emphasized after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, when Russia strengthened its geopolitical attitude, striving to impose its involvement in other regions. Moreover, in the last decade, Russia has invested significant resources in the WBC, including energy policy, but it has also explored even more relevant soft tools of influence, such as cultural, historical, and religious ties and elements, as well as shaping public opinion through the media. In the current circumstances, it can be expected that Russia will need support from friendly-oriented countries such as Serbia, which may strengthen the ties with the countries in the WBC.

It is important to emphasize that for Russia, a huge influence in the Balkans has a twofold significance. On the one hand, this region has a historically significant and geostrategic location:

it has access to the Mediterranean Sea, it is close to the Middle East, and most importantly, it is not yet integrated into the EU, although it is partly involved in NATO. Therefore, one of the goals is certainly to prevent EU and NATO enlargement. Thus, Russia has a great motivation to keep the geopolitical game in the Balkans open. One of the most powerful alternative tools that Russia utilizes in this region is religion, through the influence of the Orthodox Church. For instance, regarding the EU-Russia rivalry in Serbia, we have an atypical situation where the political elites formally proclaim the strategy for EU integration while the Church strongly proclaims traditional norms and values represented by Russia. As a consequence, Serbia has not followed EU sanctions against Russia, although it is an EU candidate country.

During this period of intensive EU-Russia geopolitical rivalry, the WBC expected to be faster integrated and accepted in the EU. However, French President Emmanuel Macron frequently repeated the statement that the EU needs the reform before further enlargement. As a consequence of such politics, the EU imposed requirements on the candidate countries that were not asked by the previous candidates (Petrovic & Tzifakis, 2021, 158). Although there was a perception among several EU officials that the WBC could become a new chessboard for geopolitical games, the EU did not provide enough support for WBC integration and did not act in a way to observe the WBC as its vital geopolitical interest (Petrovic & Tzifakis, 2021, 160).

Consequently, the EU leaves significant space for Russia to politically and culturally influence this part of the WBC and to be very actively present in the region, since the EU's foreign policy toward Russian influence in the region is very passive. Moreover, the EU's attitude towards the WBC caused democratic backsliding. Namely, it has been shown that the average level of democracy in the region decreased by 9% (Gafuri & Muftuler-Bac, 2021, 267). Although the EU has a great economic impact and investments in the WBC, the effects on the improvement of the democracy level seem to be not satisfactory. Obviously, the priority of the EU was the support for maintaining stability and a conflict-free situation in the WBC instead of strengthening the mechanism for sustainable democracy (Gafuri & Muftuler-Bac, 2021, 268), which empowered the autocratic leadership in this region. In fact, the EU itself has been facing global democratic backsliding, including right-wing populism. To sum up, all of the mentioned arguments, made the WBC region pretty vulnerable to the third-factor influence, especially the influence of Russia.




Chart 3: WBC import and export from Russia (in \$ millions) (Source: Data selected from UN Comtrade).

Analysis of economic indicators of the EU and Russia in the WBC

In the sequel, the analysis will be done to examine whether the EU is sufficiently economically present in the WBC or whether it leaves plenty of room for Russia to achieve political impact through economic influence.

In order to provide a broader picture, we will observe all WBC countries. In that sense, it is important to emphasize that the countries of the Western Balkans have different statuses related to their accession to the EU: Montenegro has opened

all 33 screened negotiating chapters, of which three have been provisionally closed; Serbia is also in the negotiation process with 18 out of 35 negotiating chapters opened (two of which have been provisionally closed); Bosnia is a potential candidate country. North Macedonia and Albania gained candidate status, while Kosovo is a potential candidate.

With the aim of analysing and comparing the economic indicators of the EU's and Russia's influence in the WBC, we have first considered the amounts of imports and exports from and to the EU and Russia, respectively. Chart 3 provides the trade data between WBC and Russia, while Chart




Chart 4: WBC import and export from EU (in EUR millions) (Source: Data selected from Eurostat database).




Chart 5: Trade between Montenegro and Russia (in \$ millions) (Source: Author's calculations based on UN Comtrade database).

4 provides the trade data between WBC and EU, expressed per country. It can be observed that among WBC, Serbia has the highest trade amounts with both the EU and Russia. Particularly, Russia is one of the important export partners for Serbia, because Serbia signed a trade agreement with Russia in 2000 (as a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Additionally, in 2019 Serbia signed a favourable free-trade agreement with Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), thus increasing the economic trade with Russia and especially providing Serbia large export to Russia. According to this free-trade agreement, Serbia exports 95.5% of domestic products without custom duties. Hence, Russia opens the trade space to Serbia within its economic capabilities. Certainly, Serbia has a stable and long-term trade partnership with Russia (Petrović, 2020; Stanojević, 2020). Despite the significant efforts of Russia for strengthening traditional collaboration with Serbia, the main export partners for Serbia, in 2019 for instance, were Germany (12% of share), then Italy (10% of share),

Bosnia and Herzegovina (7% of share), Romania (6% of share), and on the fifth place Russia with 5% of share (Statista).

In Chart 3, we also may observe a significant drop in WBC imports from Russia per country, particularly in 2016 that comes along with the weaker economic situation in Russia and sanctions. Trade between the WBC and EU, when observed per country, has been constantly growing since 2010 (Chart 4).

Let us separately observe trade between Montenegro and Russia (Chart 5). Montenegro is the smallest in the WBC, with the highest potential for EU integration. We should note that since 2014, as a result of Montenegro's adoption of EU sanctions against Russia, both imports and exports have been significantly lower than in previous years.

The comparisons between the EU and Russia regarding trade with WBC in the period from 2010 to 2020 are illustrated in Charts 6 and 7.

It can be concluded that the EU represents a dominant and vital trade partner for the WBC.




Chart 6: Total WBC import from EU and Russia (Source: Author's calculations based on UN Comtrade database).




Chart 7: Total WBC export to EU and Russia (Source: Author's calculations based on UN Comtrade database).

Moreover, we can observe the constantly growing trend of both imports and exports from and to the EU, which has tended to double since 2010. The WBC imports from Russia are significantly lower, with an even declining trend from 2010 to 2020. Moreover, the EU's share of total imports and exports with the WBC among all other trade partners is dominant with an average of approximately 70% participation when considering total imports of WBC, and approximately 80% participation

in total exports from the WBC to other countries (UN Comtrade). Note that the stronger economic relations between the EU and individual WBC have been fostered through Stabilisation and Association Agreements. The trade amounts may significantly vary among the countries, which also depends on the size of a country.

Furthermore, when observing FDI in the WBC, FDI from the EU has once again dominated Russian investments over the last decade. The EU




Chart 8: FDI from EU in 2016 (Source: Author's calculations based on Eurostat database).

represents the main source of FDI, leaving Russia's FDI far lower than the total amounts from the EU member states, especially in the case of Serbia and North Macedonia. For instance, FDI from the EU to the WBC in 2016 is shown as a percentage of total FDI in Chart 8. It is obvious that the majority of FDI comes from the EU. Observe that when analysing Russia's FDI, it can happen that a certain part of FDI is hidden in domestic investments by companies established in host countries. However, this is an interesting issue that requires deeper analysis.

If we additionally observe Serbia and Montenegro (Chart 9), we can see that the Russian FDI in Montenegro is much more pronounced than in Serbia (in comparison with the EU, particularly in the period 2010–2015). Namely, by 2015, Russia had pretty large investments in Montenegro, being among the largest foreign investors, with more than 30% of Russian-owned companies. Russian involvement was also significant in the sectors of real estate and tourism, as one of the main economic sectors in Montenegro. EU investments in Montenegro are mainly focused on the sectors of energy, telecommunications, and banking.





Chart 9: Comparing FDI in Serbia and Montenegro from EU and Russia in EUR million (Source: National bank of Serbia and Central bank of Montenegro).




Chart 10: Serbian import: energy versus total import from Russia (Source: Author's calculation based on UN Comtrade database).




Chart 11: WBC energy import comparing to total import from EU (Source: Author's calculations based on Eurostat database).

Surprisingly, despite much closer relations between Serbia and Russia, Russian FDI in Serbia seems to be far below the EU's investments. However, it has also been rapidly increased from 2016 to 2019. Additionally, Russian investment has intensified recently in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, particularly in the Republika Srpska entity (Tepavčević, 2015; Vlček & Jirušek, 2019). Apart from Russia, the WBC is more open to other foreign investments,

for instance from China, which has been pretty active in this region. Although there is an intention to increase the influence of both Russia and China in the WBC region, in the economic sense, China is dominantly focused on the infrastructure, which is important for the economic development of the region, and at this moment, there is no overlap in the areas of interest between Russia and China in the WBC region.

Influence in the energy sector

In the WBC region, Russia plays an important role in the energy sector regarding oil and gas supply and investments. Therefore, energy is the main economic tool for Russia to impose its influence even in the Western Balkan region (Stronski & Himes, 2019). In particular, when it comes to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia, Russia's supply of natural gas covers more than 80% of the demand. The supply route of natural gas to Serbia goes via a gas pipeline through Ukraine and Hungary. As shown in Chart 10, Serbia's energy imports represent a dominant part of the total imports from Russia.

Besides the pipelines, leading Russian state companies like Gazprom and Zarubezhneft have been pretty involved in the WBC energy market, especially in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, benefiting from privatisation in the region and gaining significant stakes in the energy sectors. For instance, Gazprom Neft gets control over a stake in Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), the oil and gas company (Stronski & Himes, 2019). The Russian state oil company, Zarubezhneft, has been significantly active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly through its presence in the Bosnian-Serb entity, the Republika Srpska. Back in 2007, Zarubezhneft took over Brod Oil Refinery and Modriča motor oil plant, and local retailer Nestro Petrol. The investments were approximately \$60 million since 2016 (Stronski & Himes, 2019), but the refineries continue to operate, which is important for the employees and also very important for Russia and its presence in the WBC. The Russian oil company has a monopoly in this area and exclusive rights to extract oil and gas in the Republika Srpska entity (Turčalo, 2020).

Montenegro is not dependent on Russian energy; it is not even connected to the Russian transmission network, as well as Kosovo and Albania. WBC energy imports from the EU, on the other hand, can be considered low in comparison to total imports from the EU (Chart 11). Thus, the security of energy supply is of utmost importance not only for the EU but also for the WBC. In order to decrease energy dependence from Russia and to secure the energy supply for South Europe, there is an urgent need for the development of trans-European energy networks through the realization of major supply projects such as the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, and Turkish Stream (Turčalo, 2020). The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline could be of the utmost importance for Albania. This stream should be connected to the Trans Adriatic pipeline, to transport gas from Azerbaijan through Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic Sea to Italy. In this scenario, Albania may act as an energy

hub with a strategically important position in the European energy market.

Based on the previous analyses, we can conclude that Russia's economic influence and leverage in WBC is overshadowed by that of the EU, except partially in the energy sector. Most of the WBC has neglected relations with Russia regarding both the economic and energy trade. Even among the strongest Russian allies, Serbia, Montenegro, and the Republika Srpska entity, the economic influence is far below that of the EU, which manages to assure its economic predominance. On the other hand, despite the mentioned facts and low share of economic leverage, Russia succeeds in being present in the region, at least partially and locally, through the energy sector, tourism, and real estate. Moreover, the perception of Russia's presence is much higher than what can be evidenced from the analytical data. That means that the EU, with its somewhat inert enlargement politics, leaves too much room for Russia, while Russia, with its sharp geopolitical determination, uses even minimal opportunities with maximal utilization.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The first part of this section will briefly answer the research questions, and then more elaboration and explanation will be given through the discussion. In the paper, it has been shown that increased geopolitical tensions between the EU and Russia regarding the Ukrainian crisis (escalating to war) have consequently led to intensified geopolitical games that have significantly affected the WBC, especially when considering the slowing down of the EU integration process and democracy backsliding. The direct EU-Russia relationship and their growing geopolitical tensions, which spilled over on a global level, have significantly led to other crises and caused a number of problems in the EU, e.g., the problems with Syria and the refugee crisis. Such a situation has certainly influenced the attitude that led the EU to hesitancy towards further enlargement until internal problems are resolved. Economic cooperation has been considered in this paper as a particularly important indicator of influence, interactions, and greater geopolitical interest. The presented analyses targeting different aspects of trade and investment from the EU and Russia in the WBC, substantiated by carefully selected and processed statistical data, have shown that while the EU has been widely economically present, the evident hesitation regarding the enlargement strategy has left room for economic cooperation between the WBC and Russia, thus increasing Russia's presence and its geopolitical influence. Obviously, plenty of room has been left

for Russia to impose its influence on the WBC, with a particular emphasis on Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, the geopolitical component is becoming dominant and has achieved a decisive influence in the geostrategic struggle over the WBC.

Therefore, in the WBC, there is a situation where 'other options' become increasingly considered. Democratic backsliding with reawakened nationalism has caused the highest level of instability in the last fifteen years. It is important to note that this nationalism masks the economic benefits that WBC receives from the EU. Obviously, the EU, with its soft power, has certain shortcomings in geostrategic games with Russia as hard power, and in order to have successful coordination of political influence, the EU needs to pay much more attention to the WBC as a part of its own geopolitical context. Namely, being a geographical and political part of Europe, EU stability significantly depends on the stability of the WBC, especially given the fact that the deepening problems in the WBC make the EU constantly involved in possible conflicts. Obviously, the EU should have followed the examples of Romania and Bulgaria also in the case of WBC. At the time when Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU, their economies, rule of law, and many other parameters were not in line with the EU standards. However, by integrating Romania and Bulgaria, the EU has ensured significant stability in the region and avoided the possibility of political games and conflicts through third-party external influence. Of course, it created other problems for the EU

and made the EU more hesitant about further enlargement. On the other hand, when considered from the geopolitical point of view, especially in light of the Ukrainian case, we can say that their membership provided much more positive effects in the sense of political stability and economic development. Namely, the economies of these countries have grown significantly, and they are now ahead of all the WBC economies. The countries can adopt standards faster and easier as EU members, being more controlled and with positive interaction with other member states. In other words, there are no 'other options', but fast progress within the EU community.

For future research, it would be very interesting and important to extend the entire context to include the impact of the US with respect to EU-Russia relations that consequently affect the situation in the WBC. Indeed, the passive role of the US from 2016 until 2020 additionally helped Russia's position. Thus, greater US engagement is needed. Based on the public announcements, the new US administration currently takes a more active role in geopolitical events in the WBC, which will hopefully affect all aspects of problems considered in this work, including the intensification of EU integration. Furthermore, the EU needs to make a detailed plan for the intensive integration of the WBC in its official policy framework. Fast actions by the EU and the USA in the WBC are required because of the very complex situation in Ukraine and possible further reflections and escalations in the WBC.

KONKURENČNI INTERESI EVROPSKE UNIJE IN RUSIJE V DRŽAVAH ZAHODNEGA BALKANA S CELOVITO ANALIZO GOSPODARSKEGA VZVODA

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POVZETEK

Namen pričujočega prispevka je preko ekonomskih mehanizmov analizirati vpliv Evropske unije in Rusije v državah Zahodnega Balkana. Celovita analiza zajema preučevanje ekonomskih kazalnikov, kot so trgovina, neposredne tuje naložbe in analiza energetskega trga. V raziskavi je posebna pozornost namenjena refleksiji situacije v Ukrajini na države Zahodnega Balkana v zadnjem desetletju. Zanimivo je, da to časovno obdobje sovпада z zastojem v integracijskem procesu v državah Zahodnega Balkana. Posledično je krhka regija Zahodnega Balkana postala predmet geopolitične konkurence med Evropsko unijo in Rusijo, kar dodatno povečuje geopolitično tveganje v Evropi. Situacija je dodatno zapletena zaradi različnih geopolitičnih orientacij v regiji, ob upoštevanju, da so nekatere države članice NATO, druge pa so precej podvržene ruskemu vplivu. Rezultati analize ekonomskih podatkov kažejo, da je prevladujoč vpliv Evropske unije v državah Zahodnega Balkana, ki ga povzroča močan gospodarski vpliv, oslabil kot posledica odlašanja Evropske unije s strategijo širitve, kar pušča veliko prostora za hitro konsolidacijo proruskih tendenc in zaostrovanje geopolitične komponente. Raziskava je potekala skozi tri plasti. Prva plast se nanaša na variacije geopolitičnih in liberalnih komponent v odnosih med Evropsko unijo in Rusijo. Druga se osredotoča na geopolitično komponento, ki vpliva na regijo Zahodnega Balkana. V tretji plasti raziskave so analize podkrepljene z eksperimentalnimi rezultati.

Ključne besede: geopolitika, Evropska Unija, Rusija, Zahodni Balkan, energija, trgovina, investicije

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ADVERTISING DISCOURSE AND THE PERTAINING ETHNOGRAPHY: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC CASE STUDY CONDUCTED IN MONTENEGRO

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to analyse advertising discourse, as a form of social and linguistic phenomenon, from the theoretical point of view and then use this information to answer the question of why some advertisements in Montenegro are better at getting their message across and consequently attracting new/retaining old customers, while other advertisements seem to struggle with the precisely same task. To be able to answer this question, we designed and conducted ethnographic research in Montenegro in 2021. The question shall be answered from the perspective of customers and companies.

Keywords: advertising discourse, social targeting, ethnographic research, communication modes, genre

RICERCA ETNOGRAFICA DEL DISCORSO PUBBLICITARIO: UN CASO DI STUDIO ETNOGRAFICO CONDOTTO IN MONTENEGRO

SINTESI

Questo lavoro si propone come obiettivo l'analisi del discorso pubblicitario come forma di fenomeno sociale e linguistico. L'analisi è stata eseguita prima dal punto di vista teorico, dopo di che le informazioni teoriche raccolte sono state utilizzate al fine di rispondere alla domanda sul motivo per cui alcune campagne pubblicitarie in Montenegro hanno più successo a trasmettere i loro messaggi e ad attirare nuovi utenti oppure a mantenere quelli esistenti, mentre altre non riescono ad ottenere un successo simile. Per rispondere a questa domanda, nel 2021 abbiamo progettato e condotto una ricerca etnografica in Montenegro. Risponderemo a questa domanda dal punto di vista degli utenti dei servizi e delle aziende.

Parole chiave: discorso pubblicitario, targeting sociale, ricerca etnografica, modalità di comunicazione, generi

ADVERTISING AS A MULTIATTRIBUTE CONSTRUCT AND ITS BUILDING BLOCKS

Before we delve into our ethnographic study and try to answer why some advertisements are more conducive to success than other, let us define some key concepts related to advertising and elaborate on the theories pertaining to this phenomenon. These theories will help us in our quest to properly define advertising. Many of these theories are “borrowed” from older and more established scientific fields such as psychology, sociology, sociolinguistics, etc. Nevertheless, they enabled us to deepen our understanding of advertising, its setting and key concepts. According to the Embodied Motivated Cognition (EMC), the three key concepts in advertisements are: receiver, message, and channel. A receiver is typically an individual who is actively engaged in message processing. We must not forget that there are a lot of accidental receivers who may be able to subconsciously process the message to a degree, but for the purposes of our paper, a receiver is an individual who actively mentally interacts with an advertising message delivered through a channel. A message is psychologically meaningful information of some varied motivational significance that activates cognitive processes within the mind of a receiver. A platform that is used to deliver such psychologically meaningful advertising message of the potential motivational significance is called a channel. Such platform is usually commercial in its nature, which brings us to a very important distinction found in our definition of advertising. Typically, advertising is a subcategory of marketing and commercial socio-linguistic construct mediated through mass media and aimed at inciting reactions from the target audience. This definition leans on the definition offered by Richards & Curran (2002) and it should be understood as a broad definition of the phenomenon which is not easy to define because it has many intended and unintended effects on different domains of our lives.

Apart from the EMC, another theory that is used in the analysis of advertisements is the Multiattribute theory where Ajzen & Fishbein (1972) posited that the attitude “ A_{it} ” towards an advertisement is established by multiattribute summation which can be represented as $A_{it} = \sum b_{ad} a_{ad}$, where “ a_{ad} ” is the attribute and “ b_{ad} ” is the belief that such attribute can be linked with such advertisement. Thus, any attribute will be given more/less priority (multiplied as a function of the abovementioned formula) depending on the relative strength of the corresponding belief. Other attributes can be added to this formula such as social norms, scientific facts, availability of opportunities, source credibility/likeability, awareness, knowledge level, etc. which may exert more or less influence on our attitudes towards different advertisements. For instance, we may see an ad and may have a very positive opinion about using a pesticide, because it can serve the purpose of eliminating the

pests that can cause trouble for our harvest. Thus, our intention to buy a pesticide after seeing the ad should be clear and should lead to the purchase. However, we may be dissuaded by the fact that pesticides are detrimental to our environment, which means that even though we liked the ad and generally agree with its message, the result is not the purchase of the said pesticide. This is the example where one subjectively dominant attribute may prevail over several other attributes. This is the case of advertising involvement (Krugman, 1972) where there is a positive correlation between the receiver and the advertising message, with no or low psychological reactance, but a negative outcome in terms of the advertisement intention to sell a product and customer’s wish to purchase the product. This means that advertisements need to clad themselves with as many positive attributes as possible to entice customers to perform an action and associate them with positive notions. According to the Associative Learning Theory, for customers to be able to associate two notions when they appear together it is necessary to initially repeat them as frequently as possible (ad wear-in). Repetition is necessary because it facilitates, through conscious recollection, retrieval of previously encoded information within consumers’ explicit memory. However, too much repetition is detrimental because it may cause an “ad wear-out”, which is usually presented as an inverted “U” shaped curve (Nordhielm, 2002), which will turn an ad into a consumer distracter that will be devalued. Repetition of an advertisement usually yields two results if we take into consideration only the customers who want to be actively engaged. Once the message is actively perceived, individuals with high need for cognition (NFC) will mentally elaborate and process the message which will be the stepping stone for their attitude formation. Individuals with low NFC will only take into consideration the number of message elements. This has several interesting repercussions important for the advertising industry. Attitude decay in high NFC receivers will be less prominent when compared to low NFC receivers. High NFC receivers will be most affected by the substantive (information) appeal of an ad rather than the cosmetic (affective) appeal of an ad. This is not to say that affective appeal is less important since, according to the Elaboration Likelihood Model designed by Petty & Cacioppo (1981), emotions are important for all persuasive messages such as advertisements and serve as a mediator leading to the formation of brand attitude and positive/negative brand perception.

ADVERTISING AS A GENRE

To properly identify advertisements and find their place in our society we must define them from the perspective of genre. Genres are sometimes notoriously difficult to define since they do not like to be constrained and they prefer to defy exact definition. The reason why



Image 1: Tymes Square, New York (Photo: Joshua Earle, joshua-earle-X_roZ7toBJY-unsplash).

advertisements are a particularly slippery case is due to their nature. Almost inevitably, advertisements exemplify several genres at once. This is not contradictory, since there is nothing mutually exclusive in the fact that an advertisement can be a piece of discourse, which contains a story, provocation, joke, cartoon, etc. Furthermore, we must not forget that proper genre identification involves non-verbal elements of communication. That is why some advertisements are completely without language, or language is of secondary importance. Therefore, advertisements as a genre need to be described in terms of their texts and contexts. Advertisements must also be perceived through the prism of society. This means that advertisements will change together with the society to which they relate and are an integral part of. Therefore, certain advertisements seem inappropriate today or even offensive and/or racist. They were not meant to be offensive and/or racist at the time they were made, but the change in our perception made certain advertisements utterly inappropriate. Another example of how advertisements change is exemplified through an anecdote which tells us that numerous tourists from capitalist countries, 30-40 years ago, were struck by the absence of advertisements advertising goods in Montenegro. They would flip through different newspapers

and sometimes would not find a single advertisement. However, as Eastern European societies changed, advertisement genres equalised and turned us into a global ad village. Today we have a situation where, while abroad, we can see an advertisement that is identical to the advertisement in our home country, just partially adapted or translated into the local language. In this context, we can speak about globalisation and the homogenisation of advertisements, markets and even whole communities and societies which would otherwise have less mental overlap.

According to the Collins Concise Dictionary, advertising is “the promotion of goods and services through impersonal media” or “the activity or profession of producing advertisements for commercial products or services”, according to the Oxford Dictionary. The character of advertising was dramatically changed with the advent of radio and then television advertising, since these two means of communication made advertisements more accessible and varied than the two definitions above. Advertisements now range from a simple pop-up screen promoting “quality” goods and services to a multi-million Super Bowl commercial. With so much variety, it is very difficult to pinpoint the defining feature of modern advertisement

as a genre. One of the main features, which separates advertisements from similar genres, is their function, which is usually to convince people to perform a certain activity, usually to purchase a particular product. However, there are numerous examples of different advertisements, which do not sell anything, but, for instance, plead us to eat more healthily to avoid health issues. Additionally, apart from being there to persuade us to buy something, advertisements may also be used to inform, warn, or amuse us (Lenderman, 2009; Lerman & Shefrin, 2015).

To make things linguistically “worse”, in terms of finding that crucial feature that distinguishes advertisements from related genres, other genres, such as poems, may become advertisements if they are used in a particular way. Advertisements which can be sung are not something unheard of. Another issue, which further complicates the definition of advertising, is the fact that the term “function” can be understood from the perspective of the sender, which may not be the same as the perspective of the receiver. Additionally, there are usually numerous senders and countless receivers each with their own perspective of what the function of that particular advertisement may be. It can be argued that, regardless of its form, all functions of advertisements are typically in the service of one main function, and that is to sell goods and services. One way, or at least the first step, out of this definitional conundrum would be to define advertisements as a genre which shares numerous features and draw upon different other genres. Thus, we will conclude that the further a given instance of a genre moves away from this prototypical standard, the less likely it is to be classified as an advertisement. If we accept this line of reasoning, we must be ready to tolerate fuzzy, dubious, and borderline cases between different concepts, because the prototypical ads will vary from one individual to another, and different cultures and periods will differ in their interpretation of a typical instance. This yardstick interpretation will be used to define categories of advertisements.

Apart from being linguistically volatile, advertisements exhibit social volatility as well. An advertisement or a message may be exceptionally successful in one market, only to miserably fail in another one. For instance, if sign conventions exhibit significant differences, because of different cultural norms, accepted patterns of behaviour, experiences, or expectations, this may lead to the intended advertising message being misunderstood. Generally speaking, this is why advertisers cannot fully control the perception of their messages. They can only hope they understand that market to a sufficient level so as to be able to predict the verdict of the audience. This occurs because the public reworks commercial messages promulgated by the advertisers to their own liking. Thus, we may conclude society also influences both the advertisements and the advertisers. The opposite is valid as

well. Advertising is a powerful tool which affects our identity and tries to appeal to it by creating a more intimate connexion between the message it promulgates and the recipient communities. The use of the plural here is deliberate because advertisers have more and more consumer pools that are used to tailor their advertisements to different social/consumer/age groups. This is particularly important in this day and age when advertisers at their disposal have huge quantities of digital data which enable them to personalise their advertisements and categorise their target audiences. This targeted advertising enables its message to focus on particular expectations, experiences and aspirations of different social groups making its affective appeal salient to individual customer identity.

ADVERTISING CATEGORIES

To properly define advertisements, we also must define their categories. This categorisation can be done along the line of the “hard sell” and “soft sell” advertisements. Hard sell advertisements are those which are created to make a direct appeal to potential receivers. Prototypically, these advertisements have been represented through a man in a suit shouting directly to the camera how this product is something never seen before, something which should inevitably be part of your life. On the other side, soft-selling advertisements rely on the implicative value of the atmosphere they want to create. In this category of advertisements, the sender usually does not resort to direct advertising, but s/he is trying to create a positive aura around their products. Usually, in this type of advertisement, we can see young, fit, and perfectly happy people, since their lives are much better with the product. In this type of advertisement, you will almost always encounter, for instance, young people basking happily on a tropical beach. Even though direct sunlight can give people headaches and skin burns, this will never be the implicative value of this type of advertisement.

According to Bernstein (Bernstein, 1974), another type of classification is between “reason” and “tickle”. Reason ads give people different incentives for purchase. This category of advertisements tries to persuade you that product A is much better than other products. On the other hand, tickle advertisements try to strike a chord with the numerous receivers in terms of humour and mood. This distinction between reason and tickle advertisements is very important for cigarette ads. Since cigarette manufacturers cannot give any good or healthy reason why somebody would consume cigarettes, they must turn to tickle advertisements to avoid questions pertaining to health and to emphasise other elements. These can be social elements, for example, showing a group of people smoking together and laughing. Luckily, this category of advertisements is forbidden in many European countries.

Advertisements can also be categorised according to medium i.e., according to different means of mass communication such as the internet, radio, television, and different kinds of printed materials. What is interesting about this type of advertisement categorisation is that a medium is at the same time an enabler and a limiter. A medium enables advertisements to be transmitted to numerous customers which would otherwise be unreachable. At the same time, this medium may limit the availability of an advertisement since different people use different means of mass communication. Many ads are affected by the medium in which an ad appears (Myers, 1999). That is why we have the difference between an advertisement on trains and a roadside advertisement. Advertisements on trains can be more detailed and contain more text because it is expected that commuters will have more time to analyse and read this category of advertisements. On the other side, roadside advertisements, almost inevitably, must be concise because the potential receiver will be able to see them for several fleeting seconds only. Along the same lines, newspaper advertisements cannot rely on music and moving pictures, but for television ads, these two elements are of essential importance. To partially remove these limitations, sometimes advertisements refer their receivers to seek more information on the product on an internet site.

When it comes to the “quantity” of an advertisement we can also make a distinction between “short copy” and “long copy”. Short copy advertisements usually employ the technique of sudden burst, meaning the advertiser does not want to give you sufficient time to think about some product. They want you to buy their product right here, right now. On the other side, a long copy of an ad wants you to have more time because the purchase of, for example, more expensive items merits longer consideration. Similarly, long copy and slow drip campaigns want to invoke an aura of respectability and give you an ample amount of time.

All these categories aside, probably the most important category for advertisers is the categorisation of ads by consumer (Myers, 1999). The advertising industry spares no effort on attempts to categorise people and then target them effectively. This categorisation can be done through traditional surveys, focus groups and internet cookies which, more or less secretly, inform advertisers about our online behaviour, habits and visited sites. Sometimes advertisers categorise people depending on their personality, city, country, neighbourhood or parish, lifestyle, socioeconomic class, or gender. This all makes sense since some products are more likely to be considered and bought by women than by men and vice versa.

ADVERTISING AS DISCOURSE

To properly understand the internal mechanisms of language and certain acts of communication, we must view text, context, and language holistically, through the perspective of discourse and social analysis. In this paper, text is used to denote different linguistic forms, which we usually artificially and temporarily separate from context to analyse it. Any study of language must take context into account because there are no acts of communication without participants, intertexts, paralanguage and substance. Context has several constituents such as participants with their feelings, opinions, and beliefs. Each participant is a part of the context and, at the same time, both the creator and the observer of it. Furthermore, they are usually described as senders and receivers, which is not always the same as addressers and addressees. The sender of a message may be an advertising agency, but the addresser may be the person who relays the message. On a related note, the receiver may be anyone who “unintentionally” sees the advertisement, whereas the addressee is the person for whom such advertisement is intended. Another constituent would be intertext, a text that the abovementioned participants perceive as related to other discourse, but that affects their interpretation of the text under consideration. The third constituent is paralanguage expressed (in speech) as facial expressions, gestures and (in writing) choice of fonts. The fourth constituent, which is of linguistic relevance for this paper is the substance or the media, which relays music, pictures, and text. In terms of substance, oral communication is transmitted by sound waves and a written language is carried by different symbols and signs which contain a propositional content that, depending on the context, may yield different meanings. Symbols and signs are primary substances of language, which are related and may be relayed by secondary substances such as DVDs, radio waves, coaxial cables, or digital input/output systems. For example, a news broadcast is first written, then spoken and then broadcast by satellite. Although it may seem trivial, the choice of substance is sometimes of vital importance. Thus, advertisers who want to reach the younger population almost inevitably must choose the internet as the primary substance of ads (Cowden, 2014). This is true because the younger population seldom uses print media to collect new information (Taylor, 2013). Additionally, advertisers must consider the state of literacy, usually computer literacy, of their potential receivers. What is interesting about substance is the fact that ancient civilisations invested a lot of effort to transition from oral to written culture. Now we have a slightly different tendency to prefer oral com-

munication and even the typical representatives of written communication, for instance, books, yield ground to audiobooks. Similarly, with the advent of sound recording, we have a new transition which is sometimes called a “secondary orality” (Ong, 1982). Advertisements are disseminated across space and time, and they usually come to us as sound and pictures. Therefore, we can say that secondary orality gave birth to advertising in its modern sense. This is visible because even printed advertisements have the style of spoken communication. Advertisers want to communicate their ideas in a fast and effective manner, with a lot of omissions and implications just like a speaker would do in his or her regular communication with somebody else.

As we can see from the previous text, advertising is an intricate area to navigate, affected by a diverse assortment of things. Thus, to have successful advertising nothing must be left to chance. Even seemingly trivial things can be very important. This can be illustrated in terms of the physical position of an ad in a newspaper because newspaper advertising placement can affect each ad’s visibility, and if you go through advertisements in the newspapers in Montenegro and the region, you can see that certain companies prefer to place their advertisements closer to the top of the page or the bottom of the page or even right next to the list of obituaries. This is the case where advertising occurs within other discourse, meaning it is embedded in that other discourse to which they make no direct reference. In this case, we can talk about accompanying discourse and in this situation, advertisers try to create new meanings through manipulation or by chance. One of the best examples of the creation of new meanings through manipulation is the case of different cigarette ads. In Montenegro, it is prohibited to advertise tobacco products directly and openly. That is why different distributors of tobacco products “accidentally” place their ads on different prominent places such as money trays, where you leave your money when you want to pay for some product in a shop. Since these props are not paid for, they are not considered advertisements within our legal framework, rather they are viewed as “physical job aids”. However, you are bound to see this type of advertisements because you want to see where you are placing your money.

RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND PERTAINING ETHNOGRAPHY

Having defined or at least explained all the aforementioned linguistic and social features of advertising, we can turn our attention to the qualitative research we conducted in November and December 2021. The rationale behind this research was as follows. If advertising is such a slippery case in terms of its definition, if the same advertisement may be successful in one market,

but fail miserably in another one, what makes some advertisements in Montenegro more successful in terms of their outreach to the customers?

Our research is based on a modified Arnould et al. (2006) methodological approach. We opted for this approach because it best suited our needs and particular circumstances and it also, most importantly, allowed for a scientifically relevant and valid consumer ethnography. This methodology best suited our needs because, as opposed to the macro and micro-level ethnographic approaches that try to “enter consumers’ minds” and “analyse consumers’ feelings” respectively, we decided to go for a middle or meso-level approach that places emphasis on tacit knowledge intertwined with cultural context co-constructed by consumers behaving as intentional actors. This is very important for our paper since advertising as a linguistic and social phenomenon should also be construed as a culturally situated practice exercised by consumers. Let us elaborate more on our methodological approach.

First, we needed to identify the research question that we seek to answer. Since we are interested in advertising, within the commercial sector, we wanted to see why some advertisements are more successful than other. According to consumers, what are the best advertisements and why?

Second step: we needed to determine locations to conduct the participatory research. The ethnographic interview is an exceptionally useful tool if we want to investigate the relevance of an ad or a set of ads in a market over time. For our ethnographic research, we set the target of interviewing between 550 and 750 consumers from different parts of Montenegro. The rationale behind this range is linked to our previous research (Ivanović, 2020), where we noticed that both qualitative and quantitative data, after taking into consideration at least 300-400 data points/observations/interviews, seem to level out at an acceptable rate which allows for scientifically valid conclusions to be drawn. We opted for a maximum variation sample involving a population that will be as varied as possible in order to extract information from different age groups, communities, people of different employment/marital/social status, ethnicity, religion, etc. This sampling technique allowed us to detect recurrent patterns which cut across variations. We managed to interview and observe 662 people (357 females and 305 males) from three different cities in Montenegro and of different age (the youngest was 16, the oldest 71). Our interviews were performed in three major Montenegrin cities: Podgorica (capital city + central part of Montenegro), Bijelo Polje (the biggest city in the north of Montenegro) and Bar (the biggest city in the south of Montenegro). The interviews were recorded so as to create a reliable database which could be transcribed and (re)analysed later. These elements were implemented in order not to skew the results of our research.

The third step could be titled “Adopting a participant-centred approach”. In terms of the third step, the in-situ interview, we opted for a slightly different approach when compared to some other ethnographic interviews. Rather than impose questions and maybe subliminally direct interviewees regarding their responses, we opted for an interview where we would listen to consumers express their opinions and beliefs. We would start our semi-structured in-depth interviews with an open-ended question like “Which type of advertisement do you prefer?” that would serve as a non-directive prompt and a conversation starter, and all interviewers were instructed to “remove” themselves as much as possible and let the consumers talk. We wanted to simulate a natural flow of communication, outside of a controlled research environment, to encourage our interviewees to be as honest as possible. Moreover, interviewers were instructed to repeat certain key phrases uttered by the interviewees to elicit additional information without seeming too inquisitive or willing to steer the conversation in one direction or another. Furthermore, they were asked to listen for key phrases and observe and note reactions, emotions, and the overall affective states of their respondents. It was of particular importance that our interviews seemed honest, unintrusive and produced at least some level of emotional response in interviewees because it is assumed that such conversations are more honest and bring about “affective subjectivity” (Arnould & Wallendorf, 1994). All interviewers were our second-year students of the master’s studies at the Faculty of Philology, University of Montenegro. They were from the three above-mentioned cities and were familiar with the cultural milieu, which gave them a nuanced understanding of the context. They were instructed to randomly choose their respondents bearing in mind that on average there should be an equal number of female and male respondents, roughly equally distributed across different age ranges. If the interviewer was given consent, along with the interviews, we were collecting (recording) data, and this was followed by data analysis during which we were seeking for patterns, identifying outliers, and paying particular attention to reflection statements produced by the interviewees. All interviewees consented to being recorded and their data analysed under the condition of respecting confidentiality, maintaining anonymity, and observing the Montenegrin Personal Data Protection Law. Finally, interviewers were asked to write dated and descriptive analytic memos, observer notes, logs, diaries, etc. as an extension to the research briefly describing the interviewers’ process of thinking, customers’ affective state, key moments, interesting observations, and line of reasoning (Miles et al., 2019).

DATA ANALYSIS

Data aggregation was followed by their thematic analysis. The analysis was facilitated by the use of Provalis Research’s QDA Miner. The main aim of our analysis was to make sense of the aggregated textual data to make some assertions (Bailey, 2018). Our data analysis was split into two interlinked stages: data organisation and analysis proper. The connective tissue that binds these two stages is iterative-inductive coding as a way of labelling and categorising phenomena (O’Reilly, 2012). Iterative refers to the repetitive nature of our analysis while inductive refers to our aim of drawing a certain conclusion based on the data we collected. The iterative-inductive coding enabled us to identify emerging patterns within respondents’ answers (Madden, 2017). After reading and rereading our transcripts, and by using the constant comparative method, we believed our transcripts had reached theoretical saturation where no new information seemed to emerge from the coding cycle. Our interview-related coding scheme consisted of six core categories:

- Code IN (initial thoughts/notions/ideas) – the initial stage of the interview
- Code HE (hesitation, hedging) – overcoming the face-threatening aspect of the interview
- Code TH (thoughts on a particular advertisement) – the expressive stage of the interview
- Code AR (affective response) – the affective stage of the interview
- Code AS (advertising situatedness) – the contextual stage of the interview
- Code LI (linking situatedness to personal, familial, and cultural experiences) – the final stage of the interview.

After organising our data according to the applied codes, we were ready to see what the most important patterns or key topics are. We would classify something as a pattern if it fulfilled two criteria. First, it needed to frequently emerge in our data and, maybe, more importantly, to have a high degree of observed and annotated emotional response (based on the analytic memos).

RESEARCH RESULTS AND THE INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESS; CUSTOMERS’ SIDE OF THE STORY

Based on the analysis and our research, in this section, we will try to describe what ingredients went into the making of the five top advertisements our respondents selected as a perfect blend of advertising, affective, linguistic and/or social elements. This section will talk about what ingredients go into successful advertising from the standpoint of consumers and companies.

Very early in the analysis, it became clear that one of the recurring themes is that our respondents never view advertisements in isolation. It is always within a context. What the context will be, depends on numerous personal and external factors, but advertising is always viewed through a prism of other elements, financial, social, political, situational, etc. A vast majority of respondents were able to recollect their favourite advertisements more readily if an emotional element was present during the first encounter with such advertisements. What is additionally interesting and noteworthy is that those respondents seemed like they were re-experiencing emotions while talking about their favourite advertisements.

Another salient pattern that emerged quickly was that the more the advertised message corresponded to consumers' concept of self-identity, the more it was readily accepted by such consumers. Self-identity as a collection of most prominent beliefs in terms of self-referent cognition enabled advertisements to be internalised and become a part of consumers' mental microcosm. This means that if an ad becomes a metonym for consumers' values, beliefs, opinions, honesty, etc. it stands a better chance of being accepted by them and become their "window to the world" (Aniskina & Ukhova, 2015). Advertisements, by being accepted by a community, remove interpersonal boundaries and are generally better suited for the market. In our concrete case, customers repeatedly emphasised the value of advertisements that promoted familial bonds, happiness and bring about richer customer meaning-making. Another important element pointed out by our interviewees is that more successful advertisements are better at overcoming psychological reactance, i.e., consumer scepticism which is usually at its highest level if advertisements show overt persuasive intent and are perceived as excessively self-serving.

This is linked to another very important variable that emerged from our interviews when discussing advertising, emotion. While analysing our results, we used the emotional response model made by Mehrabian & Russell (1977) which revolves around the three dimensions of emotions: pleasure, arousal, and dominance (PAD). The pleasure dimension ranges from exceptionally positive to exceptionally negative feelings. The arousal dimension refers to the state of excitation and dominance varies from weak to powerful. The analysis of our interviews shows that emotions are significant factor in terms of brand learning and advertising. Our respondents naturally preferred advertisements which elicited positive emotions combined with the state of moderate excitement.

To reach these two states, advertisements needed to be properly encoded and mentally processed. In our case, proper processing of advertisements depends on synchronous activation of nondeclarative emotional memory and conscious explicit memory. This means that our respondents were able to better recollect an advertisement that produced an emotional response coupled with high involvement conditions such as "healthy" scepticism and a higher level of persuasion knowledge. This emotional response caused the customer to mentally encode such advertisement and form either a positive or negative attitude. Thus, emotional responses and associations serve as a mental framework within which the message is processed, and an attitude formed.

When it comes to the advertisements our interviewees rated as the most favourable, one important variable that emerged from our research was the interplay of different ad modes. This is because different modes of advertising seem to be more conducive to getting our attention (Zulkifly & Firdaus, 2014). Getting our attention is one of the most difficult tasks the advertisers need to overcome. How to get our attention and involvement in the sea of other stimuli vying for the same attention span? Our data showed that many consumers paid more attention to those advertisements where different ad modes were singing in unison to better express the intended message. The modes of advertisements can be expressed as the choice between the following means of communication: language, music, and pictures. Each of them can be subdivided into sub-modes. For example, pictures may be in the form of a photograph, still or cartoon. In many ads, music and pictures are the essence of communication. Picture and music give new meanings and connections to ads and together with language create a powerful combination aimed at persuading and making claims. There is an ongoing debate about whether language is the dominant mode of communication and music, and pictures serve, at best, as the secondary mode of communication, supporting the dominant one. In this paper, we will support the opinion that, for some types of ads, we cannot talk about primary and secondary modes of communication. All modes are equally important. That is why it is very important to see the structure of the ad because some ads are simply generated in such a manner that it would be futile to assign more significance to any mode of communication (Danesi, 2006). This can be best illustrated by an example of what our respondents thought was the best ad of 2021. In order not to infringe on any copyrights, our example will be sufficiently general, but not too general because we want to keep the essence of the advertisement in question.

Context: A telephone company unveils its latest offer, it offers an unprecedented number of text messages, completely free of charge, if you subscribe to a new data plan. The advertisement initially shows only one sentence "Pazi da se ne zakucaš". The literal translation in English would be meaningless, but the translation of the context of the sentence is "Watch out, don't hit a road sign". An additional explanation is required here. In the Montenegrin language, the verb "zakucati" means to knock (on the door) or to hit something due to not paying attention or not being able to avoid it. But it can also be interpreted as "to text too much", so the wordplay should now be clearer, thus the extended translation in English would be "watch out, don't hit a road sign/don't text too much", because you can text anybody for free. This is the language part of the advertisement. After 15 seconds the main protagonists (a family) of the advertisement hit the sign and hopefully learn their lesson. The advertisement finishes by reiterating the initial premise "texting free of charge".

Music: It is accompanied by music, which is initially slow-paced, but the rhythm explodes when the pedestrians (the family) hit the road sign.

Video: The video shows this family walking down the street paying no attention to anybody or anything, just texting their respective numerous friends saying how awesome it was to have an unlimited number of text messages, completely free of charge.

In this short example, you can clearly see the interplay between language, music, and pictures. It would be almost impossible to have the same short and effective advertisement if the advertisement did not have all three means of communication. This relation between the three means of communication reinforces the pun allowing the ad to be humorous in its nature. Here, it is possible to see how the effect of the advertisement is not about any of the three major modes alone, but about their interplay. In this advertisement, the message is boosted by music and pictures. The highest-rated advertisements (based on our research) use music to better convey the subtleties of their messages. In addition, music can vary its pace which can allow an advertisement to become a fast burst or slow drip type. Unlike language, and since music has no typical semantics, music can be interpreted in numerous ways which means that numerous receivers can interpret an ad in their own manner and still get the original message. For an individual, a piece of music may evoke a certain emotion, and create a sense of "happiness" or "an impending doom", but these reactions will vary between different social groups and different individuals. Therefore, advertisers must be very careful in terms of the selection of music for their advertisements. That is why advertisers favour any mode of communication which is predictable in the sense it can be clearly predicted it will evoke a positive mood. Since music is a mode of communication which is indeterminate, advertisers sometimes prepare different scores with the different combinations of instruments, rhythm, and harmony for different markets. An additional benefit of the music in advertisements is that actors can remain silent, and the music is sometimes much better at formulating the impression than the words. All these elements put together seemed to be the winning formula for advertisers.

COMPANIES' SIDE OF THE STORY

In this section, we will try to explain what theoretical and practical considerations went into the creation of, based on our research, the highest-rated advertisements. Thanks to these "customer distant" data, we managed to learn (thanks to the willingness of the three companies owning the intellectual rights to these top five advertisements to share their customer-distant data with us) about the background of these five advertisements and what happened to them before they became socially engaged and publicly visible. So, how does it all function? Before an advertisement can be seen by the public, it must go through numerous revisions as an "internal" advertisement. It is an interesting process where the initial form of an advertisement sometimes drastically changes in terms of wording, images, and overall tone. Some advertisements are toned down, i.e., their messages are attenuated if the management deems them to be too expressive or at high risk of being misinterpreted by (potential) customers. The whole process of message attenuation is based on politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1978; 1987) which is based on the concept of "face" created by sociologist Ervin Goffman (1955). Within politeness theory marketing departments focus on how to choose different politeness strategies based on their rational assessment of a social situation to be able to successfully navigate different social or market(ing) situations. Politeness theory has chiefly been scrutinised through the perspective of face-to-face communication, but in our paper, we will use it within the context of advertising as mediated communication. Since this paper deals with advertisements as a form of mediated communication, one important distinction arises as opposed to face-to-face communication. Marketing departments



Photo 2: “Watch out, don’t hit a road sign” (Foto: Azat Satlykov, azat-satlykov-XgHZzKdgVKc-unsplash).

can plan their communication and politeness strategies and generally have more control over message production in pursuit of relational goals. However, once the customers see the advertisement, marketing departments must tread very lightly because most of the communication (nonverbal) cues are filtered out and because they are unable to see customers’ facial expressions and body language in general, which puts them in danger of misinterpreting (especially face-threatening) certain situations. Therefore, in these advertisements, companies try to present themselves as a model (legal) person who seeks to achieve its goal(s) through making rational choices and avoiding face-threatening acts. In general, a face-threatening act is any act which may be (subjectively or objectively) interpreted by a customer as negative to his/her face. This means marketing departments must be aware that under certain circumstances some activities will be perceived as face-threatening, while under some other

they will not. According to Goffman (Goffman 1967), face is maintained when a person’s presentation and self-management are internally consistent. For the purpose of our paper, we would add that marketing departments need to be externally consistent as well, i.e., this consistency has to be shown towards the customers, otherwise “a company’s face” will not be successful in terms of its social production. Additionally, face helps in the formation of company-customer integration which serves as a social bond preventing communication spinoffs/detours which could direct such delayed communication into an unpredictable or undesirable direction (Ivanović, 2020). This is not to say that unexpected communication twists and turns do not exist in the company-customer communication or that they are utterly undesirable. Companies just want to be in control as much as possible, even though complete control is unattainable. Even though Goffman considers mediated communication as “merely



Photo 3: Brainstorming (Foto: Marvin Meyer, *marvin-meyer-SYTO3xs06fU-unsplash*).

situated" (1967) or "situation-like" (1979), this makes mediated communication even more interesting to analyse because of additional challenges imposed by the lack of traditional mutual monitoring present in face-to-face communication. However, mediated communication in advertising is not completely devoid of mutual monitoring since different aspects of advertisement visual identity: colours, font style and size, images, etc. can serve as mutual monitoring which enables interactants to identify, structure and maintain concerted social interactions, share a mediated copresence and shape their social experience.

Which ad-related politeness strategy a company will use depends on the weightiness which can be defined as an evaluation of a social situation in terms of the seriousness or "the weight" of a face-threatening act. The social situation will be evaluated in terms of social presence which measures the degree of contextual involvement in a communication exchange

between the speaker and the hearer. Another element which will be evaluated is the degree of imposition which represents the level of one's interference with somebody's free will. The third evaluated element is related to the concept of social power which measures the extent of rights which enable the speaker to impose his or her will and alter the communication plans of the hearer. Companies will, almost invariably, try to assess all these elements as soon as the advertisement development/production starts and the more successful this initial assessment is, the more advantageous the outcome in terms of customer interest, satisfaction, retention, etc. should be. When talking about strategies, tentativeness strategy is very important for the companies, and therefore, during the new ad creation process, particular emphasis is placed on two elements: how to promote/sell a service or a device and how to be pragmatically competent. This means marketing departments need to be ready to convey a message with

all its nuances to customers of different socio-cultural backgrounds. This is where, for instance, tentativeness and hedging are convenient mitigating devices which can be used to attenuate the full illocutionary force and the full semantic value of a particular word, phrase or structure (Strauss & Parastou, 2014; Paul, 2017). Hedging in the top-rated advertisements from our research is mostly represented through modal verbs and verbs with modal meanings which are the dominant force for carrying a more or less hedged meaning since “even when modal forms convey speaker-external meanings, these are often given interpersonal significance by the particular context in which they appear, usually as part of a tentativeness strategy” (Preisler, 1986).

Whether a company will opt for a targeted or general advertising depends on numerous factors, but, for the highest-rated advertisements of our research, the most important market considerations are:

- purchasing power: companies will more readily target higher purchasing power groups since this means a higher chance of a return on investment,
- long term profitability: companies are also eager to tap the trove of long-term profitability by targeting, for instance, whole families, which may not be financially rewarding in the short term but is perfectly sustainable in the long term,
- target availability: companies are more willing to target easily reachable and/or wider audience, since more people, in theory, means more visibility/potential customers,
- ad “packaging” and branding expenses: companies need to find a way to present both old and new services/technologies as brand new regardless of the fact whether that service/technology is indeed the most recent one, coupled with the three most pertinent intercultural dimensions:
- threat avoidance, face preservation and power distance: the degree to which an ad may be perceived as socially threatening, awkward, acceptable, equal, or desirable,
- individual vs. group: whether a company should target individuals with certain tastes, traits, characteristics, personalities, etc. or it should be an “umbrella” advertisement,
- neutrality, masculinity, or femininity: the degree to which a company should emphasise/tone down male or female elements.

It is worth mentioning that the seven points are just a rough guide to how the three companies mentioned in the text above generally define their priorities and not something which is an immutable law. If these points are obviously (to a marketing department) not relevant or feasible, companies will usually invest their time and money into general or generalised advertising. However, if they are feasi-

ble, companies will almost invariably move to the next step which is product/advertisement categorisation because categorisation helps in predicting future customers’ behaviour and this predictability is what companies will try to achieve and anticipate. Similar is with people, social categorisation or self-categorisation usually entails gradual adoption of different norms and values postulated by that social group. Norms and values, as parts of social consciousness, are structured hierarchically, pursuant to their importance, into a value system. Our yearning to belong to a group usually leads to us being more susceptible to accepting that group’s rules. Thus, if an ad is properly categorised to suit the needs and expectations of a particular social category, it is more likely to succeed in achieving its purpose. It is worth mentioning that such categorisations are a dynamic process and companies are aware of the transient nature of different categories. Due to this transient nature, these three companies will always make several batches of advertisements which are suitable for different groups of society. If that is not possible or desirable, advertisements will be, for instance, toned down and expensive items and services will be shown without prices, coupled with images of ordinary people who may or may not be able to afford that product. These three companies also try to keep a low distance, especially with ads targeting teenagers, where the companies want to present themselves as “friends”, the ones that support familial and positive social bonds.

CONCLUSION

Our data analysis showed that the reasons some advertisements resonate better with customers are as follows: advertisements must not be socially passive, but an active social player that will energise their relationship with customers and make it more interactive; advertisements need to be meaningful to customers in order to instil significance into the brand-customer relationship; advertisement-customer relationship needs to facilitate social/experiential exchanges via multiple touch points, since customers usually base their purchases on extended evaluation and advertisement-customer relationship needs to be groomed over time, which presents a challenge because all the components of that relationship dynamically change over time. Advertisements that fulfil all the above-mentioned conditions or come close to fulfilling them are far more likely to be successful with customers and produce the desired outcome (contract/subscription extension, purchase of a device, etc.). To be noticed and overcome the filter posed by the subjective perception, advertisements need to be able to inspire a receiver to make a bridging association that will serve as a link between

the ad message and his/her personal interests/life/hobbies, etc. Once the ad is seen as relevant, and becomes the part of the receiver's mental domain, it is more likely to lead to the formation of customer commitment. Commitment is the resistance and resilience of the customer's belief system regarding a brand. Commitment building is one way of how advertisers fight against consumer scepticism which mostly emanates from the consumers' increased knowledge and awareness related to advertisers' tactics and motives.

From the commercial perspective, almost all companies agree that the most obvious element of an advertisement is its visual identity. Pictures, colours, and other non-lexicalised visual cues are the best attention-grabbing tools, thus, they may be of paramount importance in terms of the success of an advertisement (Lee & Ahn, 2012). Similarly, language relies more and more on the meaning it extracts from interaction with pictures. The relative power of pictures has increased, and most advertisements try not to be too narrative. Fundamentally, advertisements are more and more nonverbal because people simply do not have time or do not want to have time to read anything longer than a short paragraph. In the world of advertising, time is literally money, because every second counts and every additional second can cost an advertiser millions. Pictures enable compressed storytelling and can convey a message in an amount of time which is usually shorter than it would take us to read through a text. This pictorial perspective is used to convey the most common advertising theme: our products bring people together and make their lives better. However, despite all the invested effort advertisers will probably never be able to fully control the meaning of their advertisements because advertisements by their nature are polysemic and the audience is free to construe the message in various ways. This is one of the "beauties" of advertising because identical messages can be perceived in a drastically different manner in different communities, societies, or countries. This means advertisers need to be on their



Photo 4: Advertising – social media (Foto: Sara Kurfess, sara-kurfess-6lcT2kRPvnl-unsplash).

toes all the time and try to anticipate all possible outcomes and steer their message towards the most favourable one. Based on our research, probably the most frequent path towards a favourable outcome is the following one: ad saliency overcomes scepticism and inattention caused by the sheer quantity of stimuli our brains are exposed to. In turn, if the

great filter of inattention is overcome, this may lead to an increase in brand awareness and visibility. Ideally, these elements lead to an increase in brand knowledge and loyalty. Brand knowledge and loyalty usually manifest themselves as willingness to purchase. This is, more or less, along the lines of reasoning of the AIDA hierarchy model.

In terms of our ethnographic research, it showed that advertising is the field that lends itself well to ethnography. This is because advertising should not be viewed in isolation, without the people who are its receivers, moderators, and mental consumers. However, as with any research, our research had certain limitations, with the following two being

the most salient: time frame and sample size. Even though we spent almost half a year performing different steps of the study (three months for the design and preparation; two months for the implementation and field work and one month for the analysis), as with any study interested in repeated observations of the same variable, the observed period could have been longer. In terms of the sample size, larger sample size, coupled with a longer observation period, would provide more conclusive and generalisable data. However, this was the best research format and duration given the resources we were able to muster under the circumstances.

ETNOGRAFSKA RAZISKAVA OGLAŠEVALSKEGA DISKURZA:
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POVZETEK

Oglasi so sestavni del našega življenja, a so nekateri oglasi na eni strani izjemno uspešni, drugi pa ne dosežejo svojega cilja. Namen prispevka je bil zato razumeti, kateri so elementi diskurza, ki ločijo uspešne oglase od tistih, ki to niso. Da bi našli odgovor na to vprašanje, je bila opravljena etnografska raziskava v treh črnogorskih mestih. Anketiranci so bili ljudje različnih starosti, porekla in stopenj izobrazbe, zato da bi zagotovili reprezentativni vzorec, ki bi nam omogočal znanstveno utemeljene posplošitve. Po opravljenih intervjujih z več sto intervjuvanci in obdelavi pridobljenih podatkov prispevek ponuja več ugotovitev. Prvič, veliko število anketirancev ocenjuje kakovost oglasa glede na njegovo konotacijo in denotacijo. Drugič, uspešen oglas pri opazovalcu nujno povzroči pozitiven čustveni odziv, tj. prejemniku sporočila. Tretjič, oglasi, ki ustvarijo uspešno sintezo besedila, slik in glasbe, veliko bolje pritegnejo pozornost današnjega občinstva. Konec koncev so med najuspešnejšimi oglasi tisti, ki prebudijo našo prirojeno željo po pripadnosti skupini in občutku, da jih drugi razumejo.

Ključne besede: oglaševalski diskurz, socialno ciljanje, etnografsko raziskovanje, načini komuniciranja, žanri

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GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19

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ABSTRACT

The paper analyses the response of the international development system aimed at offsetting the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in less developed countries through the prism of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We apply a mixed-method approach, comparing the response of the international development system to the international cooperation targets under Goal 17 of the SDGs. The results of a comparative-historic analysis, the conceptualization and operationalization of key concepts, the case-study analysis, a secondary statistical analysis, and a secondary sources analysis indicate that the tools envisaged by SDG 17 for its implementation (increase of several financial resources for development, debt relief, COVAX, etc.) have not been adequately used by the international community to counter the impact of COVID-19 on development.

Keywords: Sustainable Development Goals, SDG 17, COVID-19, global partnership, development cooperation, COVAX

PARTENARIATO GLOBALE NELLA RISPOSTA AL COVID-19

SINTESI

Nel contributo si analizza la risposta del sistema di sviluppo internazionale volta a compensare gli effetti della pandemia di COVID-19 nei paesi in via di sviluppo attraverso gli Obiettivi di Sviluppo Sostenibile - OSS (Sustainable Development Goals - SDGs) che guidano l'Agenda 2030 per lo Sviluppo Sostenibile. A questo scopo viene utilizzato un approccio a metodo misto che confronta la risposta del sistema di sviluppo internazionale con i traguardi di cooperazione internazionale previsti dall'Obiettivo 17 dell'Agenda. I risultati di un'analisi storico-comparativa, la concettualizzazione e operazionalizzazione dei concetti chiave, l'analisi di casi di studio, un'analisi statistica secondaria e un'analisi di fonti secondarie indicano che i mezzi previsti dall'OSS 17 per la sua attuazione (aumento di risorse finanziarie per lo sviluppo, riduzione del debito, COVAX ecc.) non sono stati adeguatamente utilizzati dalla comunità internazionale da poter combattere l'impatto del COVID-19 sullo sviluppo.

Parole chiave: obiettivi di sviluppo sostenibile, OSS 17, COVID-19, partenariato globale, cooperazione per lo sviluppo, COVAX

INTRODUCTION¹

The widespread COVID-19 pandemic, declared in March 2020, has shaken and changed the very foundations of the international community, with serious implications not only for health systems, but also for economic and social systems in several countries. With its far-reaching (global) negative impact, the pandemic also exposed fundamental flaws in the international development system (Carver, 2020; Svetličič, 2021), where existing problems were only exacerbated (Prebilič & Kukovič, 2021; Caballero & Arbiol, 2022), seriously affecting sustainable development. As such, it affected the blueprint for international development, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015).² This means that “the coronavirus pandemic puts societies to the test: it is a test of political leadership, of national health systems, of social care services, of solidarity, of the social contract” (The Lancet Public Health, 2020a). It tests our commitment to internationally agreed long-term strategies.

The key objective of this paper is to look at the current progress in implementing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 17, which aim to improve the implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. The goals and targets, which have been set, are in serious danger of remaining unfulfilled. This is not only or primarily the result of pandemic. While the pandemic may provide governments with a convenient excuse for inaction, we also claim that the international community has not sufficiently internalised the SDGs to provide the resources necessary for their implementation.

We aim to analyse the international development system’s response to SDG 17. The paper seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. What kind of development strategy is envisioned through the SDGs?
2. How is the international development system responding to the crisis and how is it helping the developing countries worst hit by COVID-19? Was their response in line with the spirit of the SDGs?
3. What are the implications of COVID-19 on the global partnership, as specified in Goal 17 of the SDGs, and what does this mean for the overall implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development?

Based on the literature review and comparative-historic analysis, the paper starts with a brief presenta-

tion of the origins of the SDGs and offers some facts on the effects COVID-19 has had on its implementation. This is followed by a theoretical framework seeking to understand the importance of implementing SDGs and global partnership, based on the descriptive method, as well as on the conceptualization and operationalization of the key concepts used. The more detailed analysis of the complexity of international partnership through the prism of SDG 17 is divided into two parts. First, we analyse secondary statistical data and perform an analysis of secondary sources to show the financial trends associated with tackling the post-pandemic crisis. This is based on the assessment of trends in the Official Development Assistance (ODA), remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI), debt and trade. Secondly, by using the case study method, we review the success of the COVAX Facility as a joint effort of global partnership in mitigating the spread of COVID-19 within and among societies. The paper concludes with a discussion of the main findings and answers the principal question of our research.

BACKGROUND

Back in 2015, the international community agreed on a set of goals to guide governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and many other (national and international) stakeholders in their (development) activities until 2030. The 17 SDGs and 169 targets, defined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015), encompass a wide range of ambitiously set targets for our common future that are expected to significantly improve the entire world in many areas, from eradicating poverty to reducing inequality, protecting the environment and biodiversity, global peace, and increasing international cooperation. While some experts may have doubts about the reality of such complex and ambitious goals and targets (e.g., Mathers & Deonandan, 2018; Kunčič, 2019), going so far as suggesting that SDGs could be understood as utopian global politics without adequate global means (Eskelinen, 2021), all governments have officially committed to their implementation, both at the national and international level.

This has made the SDGs a blueprint for a better and more sustainable future and the 2030 Agenda a (new) global development agenda with a focus on the needs of future generations and the declarative universality of goals. The SDGs provide a framework for understanding the interconnectedness of economic, social, and environmental systems where well-planned, coherent contributions through global partnerships are neces-

1 The article is the result of the “Slovenia and its actors in international relations and European integrations” (P5-0177) re-search programme.

2 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 70/1 on 25 September 2015.

sary for meaningful (and successful) global development (Jahan, 2016; Conceição et al., 2020; Elavarasan, 2022).³ These are shared goals, based on a set of principles, values, and visions necessary for a successful global development agenda that centres on people and the planet.

However, the world needed a major “existential shock” to truly understand how interconnected the various systems in our societies are. COVID-19 revealed that direct effects on one system are difficult to contain, inevitably spilling over to other societal systems (Svetličič, 2020; Brglez et al., 2022). The pandemic triggered by COVID-19 has caused a global economic and social crisis for the first time (Conceição et al., 2020), forcing countries to face steep recessions and a decline in per capita income, increased poverty rates, and greater inequality (Leal Filho et al., 2020; Rahman et al., 2020; Sumner et al., 2020). Despite the clearly negative spill over effects that the pandemic had in various areas, this multifaceted crisis forced countries at the outset to shift their focus to their own socio-economic (and health) issues, rather than on the SDGs and global partnership and solidarity.

Since the pandemic began two years ago, there has been much research on how COVID-19 influenced the SDGs. We can divide it into three major categories:

- a.) Research providing an extensive analysis of impact of COVID-19 on achieving SDGs and the short- and long-term effects on SDGs (Barbier & Burgess, 2020; The Lancet Public Health, 2020b; Naidoo & Fisher, 2020; Shulla et al., 2021, etc.)
- b.) Research analysing challenges for SDGs in countries of the Global South (Narayan et al., 2020; Banerjee, 2021; Bottan et al., 2021; Fagbemi, 2021; Huq & Biswas, 2021; Zhang et al., 2021; Janssens et al., 2021; Kansime et al., 2021; etc.)
- c.) Research analysing how COVID-19 influenced specific SDGs (Fenner & Cernev, 2021; Jaiswal & Jayakumar, 2021; Qadeer et al., 2022, etc.)

However, what we think the literature is lacking is a specific study or review discussing the role of SDG 17 in post-pandemic recovery and keeping the world on track towards a more sustainable future through the implementation of SDG 17.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The SDGs represent a conceptual shift in the global development perspective, offering countries the oppor-

tunity to rise above the limitations of the international development system, which has often been defined by a clear division between the rich, developed Global North and the poor, developing Global South. This duality and classic framework of political and economic cooperation, which until recently dictated the behaviour of states, was often based on the pretext of solidarity and altruism toward the Global South. It was understood as a *sine qua non* of the modern international development agenda and rarely challenged (Reuveny & Thompson, 2007; Steffen et al., 2015). This is why, in theory, SDGs should be understood not just as a popular academic buzzword or a 21st century fad that generates academic citations, but as a step forward from the one-dimensional development agenda of the 20th century (Pradhan et al., 2017), which has failed to address increasing poverty and inequalities between and within countries (Milanovic, 2012; Sumner, 2012; Gore, 2015), and a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to development.

The foundations of the SDGs were laid as early as the late 1970s and 1980s. These years were marked by the spread of newer, alternative visions of development and the use of the definition of sustainable development in the Brundtland Report. When 20th century development strategies in less developed countries failed to deliver desired outcomes, such as the promised stability, economic growth and (economic) development, criticism of development that focuses solely on economic growth began to grow (Offer, 2000; McNeill, 2007). By the end of the 20th century, it became clear that people are not merely a means to promote production and prosperity (UNDP, 1990) and that human well-being should be placed centre stage when preparing development strategies (Sen, 1987).

This was the context in which the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were developed.⁴ These can be understood as an implicit critique by individuals and organizations from the Global South, i.e. that benefits of globalization are extremely unevenly distributed and that the costs of policies that increase the economic benefits of developed countries are borne by all actors in the international community, especially less developed ones (Carant, 2017). However, despite ambitiously promoting a global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and establishing a global strategy with quantitatively measurable indicators for successfully meeting the eight MDGs, the international community has failed to do so (Sianes, 2017). Despite its efforts, the MDGs remained deeply embedded in the development framework of the North-South divide, in which global partnerships were more of a catchphrase than a reality. The MDGs were meant

³ The basic premise of the SDGs is that in order to achieve them by 2030, working in silos should be avoided.

⁴ The eight MDGs on which countries agreed in 2000 were focused on combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women.

only for the Global South to follow (Marten, 2019), proving once again that countries of the Global South were still treated as unequal partners that needed to change and improve, leaving the Global North to be the one prescribing development strategies.

The failure to reach the MDGs, the increasing number of global challenges (e.g., economic and environmental crises), and vocal appeals from the Global South for an equal distribution of burdens, led to the modernization and rearrangement of the current development agenda. The SDGs should not only be understood as a mere successor of the MDGs, but also a step towards an “ideal” liberal international order, where every country is responsible for actions in areas, which are of “critical importance for the humanity” (UN, 2015, 5) and where the global partnership is understood as a two-way process, with each partner bearing specific responsibilities. With 17 SDGs, the international community has committed to a development strategy and mode of international (development) cooperation that should be inclusive and “leave no one behind” (Helgason, 2016). This was already indicated in the inclusive process of conceptualising and creating SDGs and is very deeply rooted in the 2030 Agenda, especially in SDG 17,⁵ which is explored in this article.

SDG 17 is the most complex goal in the 2030 Agenda, focusing on strengthening the means of implementation and revitalizing the global partnership for sustainable development. It has 19 targets and 25 indicators (cf. UN SDG Tracker, 2020), calling on countries, the private sector, and civil society to build inclusive partnerships in order to align their actions, policies and means in five categories, as seen in the Figure 1.

The strengthened global partnership envisioned in SDG 17 became the *modus operandi* for cross-sectoral, national, regional, and international cooperation in pursuit of all SDGs by 2030. It follows the conceptual logic of the systems approach to sustainable development,⁶ which states that achieving and maximizing the goals only from one system (e.g., economic, social or environmental) does not lead to sustainability because it does not take into account the impacts on the other systems (Barbier, 1987). The trade-offs between the different goals in these three systems must therefore be balanced to achieve sustainable development (Barbier & Burgess, 2017).




Figure 1: Means for the implementation of sustainable development per SDG 17 (Source: Own elaboration).

This can also be extended to the operational logic envisioned in SDG 17, where strengthened cooperation and shared responsibility among countries and other stakeholders are of key importance. Why? Such an approach creates synergies between the expertise and resources, needed for the achievement of SDGs at the national and international level (Detomasi, 2014; Besheim & Simon, 2017). SDG 17 could therefore be understood as the fulcrum for achieving all other SDGs, providing a number of tools for enhancing finance, technology, capacity building, trade, policy and institutional coherence, needed for the implementation of the SDGs as a whole (UN, 2015). Most importantly, it offers a one-way ticket towards a more sustainable future that cannot be imagined without an effective global partnership.

COMPLEXITY OF INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS: COVID-19 AND SDG 17

SDG 17 is the most comprehensive and complex goal, as it addresses the conditions necessary for the implementation of all previously set goals. However,

⁵ The shortened name for SDG 17 is “Partnerships for the Goals”, whereas its full name, “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development”, very clearly reveals its main objective. For further details, see UN (2015).

⁶ The systems approach to sustainable development highlights the importance of interconnectedness of economic, environmental, and social systems. It was first employed by Barbier (1987) through the Venn diagram representation, where the intersection of the goals from three systems depicts sustainable development. Therefore, an economic system should consider its impacts on biodiversity and biological productivity, good governance, and social stability when trying to be efficient, equitable, and aimed at poverty reduction (Barbier & Burgess, 2017). Even though the systems approach to sustainable development has certain limitations (e. g. how the trade-offs among the goals should be made) (Barbier & Markandya, 2012), synergies between different economic, social, and environmental goals are important (Elliott, 2006; Constanza et al., 2016).

no global partnership or international cooperation can exist without the necessary resources that are also required to fully implement the 2030 Agenda. Yet, the issue is not only the financial costs,⁷ but also, as revealed through specific SDG 17 targets, the issue of human resources, access to technology and knowledge, the ability to participate on an equal footing in the international markets, etc. The UN even envisaged “inclusive partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society, built upon principles and values, a shared vision, and shared goals that place people and the planet at the centre, are needed at the global, regional, national and local level.” (UN SDG Tracker, 2020). Under SDG 17, the blueprint for strengthening multilateralism, building partnerships among diverse stakeholders, and the implicit indication that combating global crises cannot be solved by limited, national(istic) attitudes is, however, equally important.

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only put tremendous pressure on health systems around the world, but also on the international economy, leading to an increase in poverty, hunger, and inequality and slowing progress toward a more sustainable future as envisioned in the 2030 Agenda (Lee et al., 2020; Leal Filho et al., 2020). Focusing on achieving the SDGs calls for urgent global cooperation and providing assistance to those countries most in need (Cheng et al., 2021), whose issues will be likely overlooked in the aftermath of the pandemic (Zhou & Moïnnudin, 2021). Which is why the following sub-chapters are focused on the analysis of financial aspects of tackling the post-pandemic crisis and a review of the COVAX Facility, as an example of the global partnership, created in a joint effort to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.

Sharing the financial burden after COVID-19

SDG 17 is a goal that was designed to accelerate progress in other goals through collaborative efforts, shared burdens, and global partnership (Elavarasan, 2022), where sharing the financial burden is of crucial importance. Given that goals to end poverty, protect the environment, and support the well-being were already off track before the pandemic, the need for global partnerships is of crucial importance. Coping

with the pandemic has increased pressure to secure sufficient funding for various government interventions, not only in the health sector but also in the national economy. As a result of the economic crisis and budgetary freezes, tax and fiscal revenues in government budgets have declined, putting severe pressure on less developed countries. This has increased the challenge of target 17.1,⁸ which calls for more national resources to implement the SDGs. Some authors even believe that “there will be not enough money or attention to banish poverty and inequality, expand health services and overturn biodiversity loss and climate change, all by 2030” (Cheng et al., 2021, 13). While spending at the national level has been increasing, several international sources have decreased the amount of funds dispersed. What is certain is that COVID-19 is widening the pre-pandemic financing gaps to achieve the SDGs (UNCTAD, 2022a).

We firstly analyse ODA, which has traditionally been a source of funding to mitigate the immediate effects of various crises and is known to be an especially important part of the global response to any kind of humanitarian disaster. As a response to COVID-19, it was hoped that both national and international donors would increase their ODA contributions, helping to address the pandemic and implement SDG 17.⁹ As a first response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, several claims suggested that redirecting ODA funds towards helping developing countries to improve their capacity to respond to health crises was crucial. Yet, there were no open commitments to increasing ODA volume at the time (OECD, 2020a). At several fora, heads of international organisations appealed to protect and, if possible, increase the 2019 ODA level (DAC CSO Reference Group, 2020; European Commission, 2020; OECD, 2020b; IMF, 2020). A positive response to such initiatives came from various international organisations, which re-directed some of their funds towards COVID-19 crisis,¹⁰ as well as organised special joint emergency funds to which individual countries could add their contribution. At the level of individual donors, only scarce information was available, mostly on re-directing already planned ODA to the health sector; however the long-pledged 0.7% of GNI has not been achieved, not before, during, or after the pandemic, as shown in Table 1.

7 The first four targets of SDG 17 address various funding sources, from the mobilization of domestic finance to meeting the “old” target for international development assistance of 0.7% GNI.

8 Target 17.1: Mobilize resources to improve domestic revenue collection. UN definition: Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection (For more, see UN SDG Tracker, 2020).

9 To adequately respond to the aftermath of the pandemic, the international development system should fully implement all development assistance commitments under SDG Target 17.2 and share the risks and burdens within global partnership, assisting countries most in need.

10 The World Bank, for example, has prepared an “emergency package” of USD 12 billion; the IMF activated USD 50 billion through its rapid disbursing emergency financing facilities (Moreira da Silva & Moorehead, 2020).

Table 1: ODA 2019–2021 Trends (Source: OECD, 2022).

	2019	2020	2021
ODA (USD)	152.8 billion	162.2 billion	178.9 billion
% of donors' GNI	0.30	0.32	0.33
Increase compared to the previous year	/	3.5%	4.4%

ODA in 2021 remained at 0.33% of donors' combined GNI – unchanged from 2020, despite the 4.4% increase in real terms from 2020 (OECD, 2022). However, it is very important to note that despite an increase in overall ODA levels between 2020 and 2021, in 23 out of 29 DAC donors,¹¹ this increase was mostly due to donated vaccine doses, which were reported as ODA and amounted to 3.5% of the total ODA (Tew & Breed, 2022; OECD, 2022).¹² If we exempt COVID-19 vaccine donations from ODA, the increase from 2020 would only be 0.6% in real terms (OECD, 2022). What is interesting is that COVID-related ODA spending for 2020 and 2021 was mostly not allocated to specific countries; rather, it was used either for vaccine research or other funds, related to COVID (Tew & Breed, 2022).

In addition to ODA, remittances have become an increasingly important source of finance for development. The UN acknowledges that facilitating remittance flows at low cost will not only support the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, but also the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs (UN, 2015). In the past, remittances have contributed to the alleviation of poverty (Masron & Subramaniam, 2018), to improved access to water, food, medicine, housing, and clean energy (Gyimah-Brempong & Asiedu, 2014; Ndiaye et al., 2016; Ebadi et al., 2018; UN, 2019a), to promoting entrepreneurship (UNDP, 2016), and empowering women (Sambo, 2016; UN 2019b). In 2020, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries were expected to decline by around 20%, marking the sharpest decline in recent history (World Bank, 2020).

However, remittance flows defied predictions and their decline in 2020 – compared to 2019 – was only 1.6% (World Bank, 2021). Even though it was estimated that compared to 2019, when remittances amounted to \$554 billion, the 2020 number would be only \$445 billion (ECDPM, 2020), remittance flows in 2020 reached \$540 billion (World Bank, 2021). Despite very bleak estimates, this is consistent with the evidence

that remittances are known to be excellent automatic stabilizers that often regulate production and consumption, especially among the poorest (Combes & Ebeke, 2011). After the initial fall, which can be attributed to several factors¹³, migrant workers tried to support their families at home despite the economic effects on their lives, as shown by Kpodar et al. (2021).¹⁴

If the predictions for the remittance flows proved too pessimistic, the same cannot be said for the FDI and global value chains, which were very much affected by COVID-19 (UN, 2020a, 58–59). Global FDI flows were forecasted to decrease by up to 40% in 2020, from their 2019 value of \$1.54 trillion, according to the World Investment Report 2020 (WIR) (UNCTAD, 2020). However, the world FDI inflows in 2020 declined by 35% to \$1 trillion, from \$1.5 trillion in 2019 (UNCTAD, 2021). Despite predictions that FDI inflows to developing countries would be hit especially hard in 2020, as export-oriented and commodity-linked investments were among the most seriously affected, the biggest decline in 2020 was reported in the inflows to developed economies (UNCTAD, 2021). FDI fell in developed economies by 58% (UNCTAD, 2021), with the biggest decline within the European Union (73%) (Moosa & Merza, 2022, 3).

The relatively quick return of the global FDI flows in 2021 (growth of 64%, compared to 2020, amounting to \$1.58 trillion in 2021) (UNCTAD, 2022b) can be attributed to the high level of interconnectedness of the international economy and the extensive recovery measures, undertaken in developed countries. Their economies recovered much better than those of developing countries, opening the door to FDI flows as well: three quarters of the global increase (64%) of FDI inflows happened in developed countries. On the other hand, overall FDI to developing countries continued to decrease (-8% in 2020) (UNCTAD, 2021). Yet, big asymmetries of inflows remained: Asian countries were the most resilient and inflows in China

11 In 2020, ODA rose only in 16 DAC donors and fell in 13 (Ahmad & Carey, 2021).

12 Vaccine donations, which are counted as ODA, were offered to countries in need only when DAC members had an excess of their domestic supply (Schütte, 2022), which is especially worrying from the perspective of global partnership.

13 Such factors included lock-downs in developed countries, where migrant workers suffered disproportionately because of their temporary contracts or losing their jobs or even their right to stay in a host country, having to rely on their saving to sustain themselves.

14 The study, made by Kpodar et al. (2021, 16), shows that for a 10% rise in COVID-19 cases per million in a population, a 0.3 percentage point increase in remittances would occur after five months after the initial fall due to the COVID-19 shock.

actually increased by 6%. But FDI inflows to African countries fell by 16% and by 45% to Latin America and the Caribbean (UNCTAD, 2021). In 2021, FDI inflows to developing economies increased by 30%; however this was again mainly due to the increase in Asia,¹⁵ whereas the increase in FDI flows in other developing countries was much smaller (UNCTAD, 2022a).

This suggests that another important stream of funding for development and consequently SDGs' implementation had decreased. COVID-19 caused a collapse in FDI flows to sectors that are relevant for the implementation of the SDGs in developing countries (UNCTAD, 2021). Many least developed countries (LDCs) are dependent on FDI in extractive industries, many small island developing states are dependent on investment in tourism, and landlocked developing countries are disproportionately affected by supply chain blockages. But as the WIR rightly acknowledges (UNCTAD, 2020; 2021; 2022), the COVID-19 crisis only compounded several SDG-relevant issues, including already insufficient private investment in SDG-relevant sectors in developing countries. Current (foreign) investment in SDG sectors, especially in developing countries, is too low and was not growing at the sufficient rate even before the pandemic (UNCTAD, 2022a). Sustainability financing¹⁶ largely bypasses them and SDG-specific investment policies are not being rolled out fast enough. This situation is compounded by the impact of the COVID-19 crisis, which risks subordinating progress on the SDGs to the priority of economic recovery (UNCTAD, 2020, 39; Moosa & Merza, 2022).

Debt rescheduling/cancellation needs to be mentioned, not only because meeting the payment significantly affects the national budgets of highly indebted developing countries. One of the SDG 17 targets addresses debt management¹⁷. In 2022, 58% of low-income and least developed countries (LDCs) are currently assessed as being at high risk of external debt distress or already in debt distress (Estevão & Essl, 2022). In 2020, we likewise witnessed the largest debt surge since World War II, with global debt rising to \$226 trillion (Jain, 2022). Rising debt-service costs di-

minish fiscal space for countercyclical measures and for investments in long-term structural transformation and the SDGs (UNCTAD, 2020, 127).

What is of particular concern is growing private sector debt: traditionally, public and private debt were similarly proportioned. However, following the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, private debt escalated to 139 per cent of GDP of developing countries (UN, 2020c, 139). The WB Development Committee and the G20 Finance Ministers therefore endorsed the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) in April 2020 in the response to a call by the WB and the IMF to grant debt-service suspension for 2021 to the poorest countries to help them manage the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic¹⁸. However, the initiative was somehow disappointing, since it only suspended debt service payments for 48 out of 73 eligible countries to participating bilateral creditors, amounting to \$10.3 billion between May 2020 and June 2021 (IMF, 2021)¹⁹. At the same time, private creditors did not participate in the debt service suspension on equal terms (Jain, 2022). We can thus agree with the Shadow Report of EURODAD (Fresnillo, 2020) that DSSI is merely postponing repayment pressures instead of cancelling debts. The Report warns “DSSI-eligible countries are already scheduled to repay USD 115 billion of debt in 2022–2024, just when their suspended 2020 payments come due”. So, while at first sight the Initiative looks positive, there are many caveats attached which seriously diminish its effectiveness.

At the start of 2020, it was expected that trade issues would be one of the key areas of focus for advancing the 2030 Agenda, since one of the important targets within SDG 17 has a 2020 deadline.²⁰ The importance of trade-related issues for developing countries in generating the resources necessary for implementing the SDGs lies in the fact that trade issues have two explicit targets²¹ to be met. Yet, even pre-COVID trends suggest that the world is far from implementing these targets. In reality, the international trade and its multilateral regime are suffering from a complex set of issues, only exacerbated by the pandemic (UN, 2020c).

An earlier, more pessimistic WTO scenario even projected that world trade would fall by 13% to 32% in

15 It is important to note that six economies account for more than 80% of FDI in Asia and that Asia's FDI inflows account for 40% of global FDI (UNCTAD, 2022a).

16 Under this category, UNCTAD includes investments in the energy sector, where most of the investment in new, sustainable energy sources is occurring in developed countries (UNCTAD, 2020).

17 17.4 Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress.

18 The main goal of the DSSI is to allow poor countries to concentrate their resources on fighting the pandemic and safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of millions of the most vulnerable people. Borrowers commit to use freed-up resources to increase social, health, or economic spending in response to the crisis (World Bank, 2022).

19 This was just a quarter of the amount the G20 announced the DSSI would deliver.

20 Target 17.11. Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries' (LDCs) share of global exports by 2020.

21 Target 17.10 Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda.

2020. In June 2020, the WTO Trade outlook predicted a fall of trade volume by 12.9% (WTO, 2020a), which proved a too pessimistic estimate (Arriola et al., 2022). In fact, global trade fell by 9.6% only in 2020 and was already rebounding in 2021. It increased by about 13% compared to the pre-pandemic figures, proving the global trading system was more resilient than expected (WTO, 2021; UNCTAD, 2022c). The WTO was particularly concerned with the impact of COVID-19 on least developed countries (LDCs), since their participation in global trade had already been declining in 2019, in clear contradiction to Target 17.11. Their decline was sharper than the world average, resulting in a 35% drop in LDC service exports and 12% decline in their exports of goods in 2020 (WTO, 2022a; UNCTAD, 2022c).²² Considering that LDCs depend on a limited number of export items²³ and are often highly dependent on a small number of markets, they therefore have a higher risk of being exposed to external shocks. For several LDCs, top destination markets include those that were among the worst affected by the outbreak of COVID-19 (i.e., China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) (WTO, 2020b). This meant a sharp decline of export earnings²⁴. On the import side, many LDCs depend on the import of food and medical equipment and were thus worried about different trade restrictions/export bans undertaken by some countries.

The WTO's Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation called upon LDCs to enhance their requests for trade-related technical assistance activities, resulting in 80 capacity-building activities, which were accrued out in 2021 (WTO, 2022b). However, the question remains whether these kinds of activities, where 30% take the form of e-learning courses, accelerate trade in LDCs. We only analysed the targets related to the financial flows, yet others show no more encouraging data. When looking at the policies, undertaken by the developed countries, the obvious self-interest stands out. Some rhetoric took place on global fora, but at most, only minor shifts in the re-allocation of development assistance to the health sector were implemented. Debt relief was insignificant, with FDI and trade mostly bypassing the LDCs. This suggests that not only is SDG 17 out of reach, but

due to its importance for the overall implementation, the overall SDG agenda is increasingly becoming an illusion. Still, there are certain positive examples of international cooperation, which were prompted by COVID-19, raising hopes that the ideals of solidarity within the global community have not been lost at times of crisis. We consequently analyse the case of COVAX in more detail to see if such initiatives really provide us with possible models of future global public-private cooperation.

The case-study of tackling COVID-19 through global partnerships: the example of the COVAX Facility

With the global pandemic, many health challenges, which the global community has been trying to overcome for years, have been put on hold. Although some slow progress has been made in increasing life expectancy, lowering child mortality, eradicating a wide range of diseases, sanitation and hygiene, COVID-19 has diverted the attention from these problems and shifted focus to responding to health emergencies.²⁵

The COVAX Facility was a very promising enterprise. Launched in June 2020, it offered a ray of hope for combating COVID-19 and trying to contain the worsening spill-over effect in other systems. The COVAX Facility was developed as a key vaccine pillar of the Access to COVID -19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, leading a global risk-sharing mechanism for the pooled procurement and equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, co-led by the World Health Organisation (WHO), GAVI, and the Coalition of Epidemic Preparedness Innovation (CEPI) (GAVI, 2020; CEPI, 2020; Peacock, 2022).²⁶ Its goal in early 2020 was to accelerate the development and production of new COVID-19 health technologies (WHO, 2020) and enable access to vaccines for countries that were unable to secure direct agreements with vaccine manufacturers (Sharma et al., 2021). Unsurprisingly, these were (and still are) mostly countries that the World Bank classifies as low and lower middle-income countries.²⁷

Even though on paper, the COVAX facility could be regarded as a prime example of public-private partnership, envisioned and promoted within the SDG 17, the reality of it is far from perfect. The pandemic not only

22 Even South-South trade was affected similarly to global averages (UNCTAD, 2022c).

23 Preliminary data, gathered by WTO (2020c), suggested that trade value has plunged for LDC exporters of petroleum and minerals, manufacturing items (e.g., clothing), agricultural products (e.g., horticulture exports) and services exports (tourism revenues).

24 Bangladesh suffered an 83 per cent decline in its textile exports in April 2020 in comparison to 2019, Ethiopia lost 80 per cent of its flower exports to European markets (WTO, 2020b).

25 As reported in the Sustainable Development Report, only Sweden, Norway, Australia, Israel and Luxembourg have already achieved SDG 3, whereas 101 countries still face major challenges regarding this Goal and 51 countries face significant challenges (Sachs et al., 2020).

26 Policy issues are overseen by WHO; CEPI is responsible for coordinating the development and manufacturing of the vaccine, whereas AVI is responsible for procurement and delivery (Rutschman, 2021a).

27 Countries of the global South are in the international development system commonly classified into categories according to the level of income, measured by gross national income per capita, which were developed by the World Bank in the 1980s and are gradually updated.

revealed the global shortage of health workers and the need for better public health preparedness (UN, 2020a, 31), but it also exposed the unilateral action of some countries, both in securing individual short-term needs (preventive equipment)²⁸, as well as using their wealth to claim primary rights to vaccination or/and medicines solely for their own citizens.²⁹ The global partnership and shared responsibility of COVAX can therefore be challenged on grounds of stakeholder participation, policy formulation and its implementation.

At the level of stakeholder participation, the main concern is an existing large power imbalance between high-income and upper middle-income countries that are able to self-fund their participation in COVAX and lower middle-income countries and low-income countries, which have to rely on the “good will” of wealthy nations and pharmaceutical companies to donate funds or vaccines (Emanuel et al., 2021; Rutschman, 2021b). Self-funded participating countries were able to freely distribute doses of the vaccine domestically according to their own rules, whereas funded (low and lower middle-income countries) had to use the global framework, designed by the WHO (Rutschman, 2021b). This was especially challenging for two reasons. Firstly, the national policies of self-funding participating countries, where, for example, Israel made it very difficult for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to access the vaccines. Similarly, the Taiwanese found it very challenging to secure COVID-19 vaccines due to the so-called “One China” policy (Dyer, 2021; Zhong & Schuetze, 2021). Secondly, the countries with poor(er) economic development were not able to purchase vaccines and depended on vaccine donations from wealthy nations and vaccine delivery by the pharmaceutical companies. This led to very low vaccination rates (Eccleston-Turner & Upton, 2021; Emanuel et al., 2021; Rutschman, 2021b; OHCHR, 2022). By 2022, less than 14% of people in low-income countries had received a single dose of COVID-19 vaccine, compared to almost 70% vaccinations in high-income countries (OHCHR, 2022). Even though COVAX set its goal to deliver 1.8 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine to 92

low-income countries in 2021 (WHO, 2021a), recent data shows that COVAX has shipped only around 1.3 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines to 87 low and lower-middle income countries to date (WHO, 2022). What is even more worrying is that 82% of all doses of the vaccine delivered to low-income countries were shipped by COVAX (ibid.) and not by self-funding countries donating vaccines, as recommended by COVAX. This suggests that the measure was only a provision on paper, not living to its potential.

At the level of policy formulation and implementation, vaccine nationalism was front and centre. The main contributors to COVAX were too short-sighted to see the potential global risks. Their actions were often led by protectionist, populist, and sometimes even xenophobic political decisions (Wong, 2021; James & Valluvan, 2020). Even though vaccines were donated to COVAX, a lot of countries and vaccine manufacturers poorly adhered to the principles, decided under COVAX (GAVI, 2022). Firstly, 30% of donated doses in the low and middle-lower income countries were delivered through bilateral arrangements, rather than through COVAX, as envisioned (de Bengy Puyvallée & Storeng, 2022). Secondly, as the analysis by de Bengy Puyvallée & Storeng (2022) shows, not only were shared doses actually delivered only when donor countries had already vaccinated their adult population with two doses in the second half of 2021, there was also a gap between pledged and delivered donations.³⁰ Moreover, donations “have [far too often] been ad hoc, provided with little notice and short shelf lives”, which made it difficult for the recipient countries to implement the vaccination (WHO, 2021b). Despite COVAX’s principle of allocating vaccine donations according to pre-defined rational criteria, geopolitical factors and national self-interest often prevailed (de Bengy Puyvallée & Storeng, 2022). COVAX proved to be another developmental mechanism embedding the “old” donor-recipient relationship of modern international development system, where national interests, influence, and soft power are at the forefront (Arbeiter et al., 2019; Almeida, 2020). With vaccine diplomacy,³¹ pursuing commercial interests³²

28 As reported by the World Trade Organization, the restrictions on personal protective equipment (e.g. masks, gloves and protective clothing) and on the means of production of medicines and medical equipment (respirators) have been firstly imposed in Asian, Arab and European countries, the United States and many Latin American, Eastern European Countries (WTO, 2020a).

29 President Donald Trump, for example, wanted the primary rights for the COVID-19 vaccine for the United States of America. It was reported that Trump administration offered a German medical company “a large sums of money” for exclusive access to a COVID-19 vaccine (Oltermann, 2020).

30 They point to the United States, which announced massive donations, delivering only 43% of its pledge by the end of 2021, despite claiming global leadership in pandemic response (de Bengy Puyvallée & Storeng, 2022, 6).

31 China, for example, donated all of its doses bilaterally to like-minded countries, with which it already cooperates at the political and economic level, in order to strategically build its reputation and position itself towards the global North (Huang, 2021; Lee, 2021).

32 On the one hand, vaccine manufacturers were selling vaccine doses at full prices to wealthy nations, who then decided whether to donate them to COVAX, which not only benefited the manufactures but also countries in which those manufacturers are based (Vanity Fair, 2021). On the other hand, wealthy nations (the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Norway) in 2020 rejected the proposal of India and South Africa, made to the World Trade Organisation, to temporarily suspend intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines and technologies, so as to make them accessible to low and lower-middle income countries (Usher, 2020).

and vaccine nationalism, the limitations of the Bretton Woods development system³³ were simply translated to COVAX and its policy formulation and implementation. Instead of a win-win solution, COVAX became an instrument for zero-sum geopolitical power play, deepening inequality, poverty and the gap between the global North and South (Choi, 2021; Wong, 2021).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The SDGs bring together different aspects of human development – from poverty, economic growth, education and health – and are more important now than ever. If we fail to implement the set goals and targets, income losses will cause vulnerable segments of society and families to fall below the poverty line and deepen inequalities around the world (UN, 2020b). However, the international community already faced an annual SDG investment gap of USD 2.5 trillion in 2019 (UN, 2020b), leaving the SDGs far from implementation. The SDGs remain based on a voluntary effort, although UNDP monitors the progress. This means that the coronavirus pandemic was also a test of our commitment to internationally agreed long-term strategies, which essentially aim to prepare the world to deal more effectively with crises of this kind.

The analysis shows that, in many instances, the implementation rate of SDGs was too slow even before the COVID-19 outbreak. Despite clear dedication to sharing the financial burden, we so far primarily see the already dedicated funds being redirected towards covering increased health expenditures, not really upping the game as initially promised by the international (development) community. As we have shown, even the small increase in ODA flows is mainly due to the donations of COVID-19 vaccines. There is still a lack of will-power to truly commit to the global partnership principles and come up with necessary funding. The pandemic has shown where the fundamental weaknesses of our international (development) community lie. The reaction of the international community demonstrates how quickly global commitments (like SDGs) are forgotten. The focus is on protecting and solving an individual (national) situation, especially, if the

strategy, instrument, or goal are not mandatory with clear consequences and penalties for the countries. Such behaviour is frustrating, since we are faced with a global crisis, which is currently also compounded by the war in Ukraine. Still, we tend to seek a national response, ignoring that “historic crisis requires a fast, massive and coordinated global response to protect all people, save lives and tackle the economic fallout. Now is the time for international solidarity and leadership, not isolation; to reach out more internationally, not less” (EU, 2020b).

SDGs are still on the international agenda, yet the commitment demonstrated so far by the individual countries is in line with the pessimistic view that regardless of the impact of the COVID-19, the SDGs had and have a poor chance of being implemented as envisaged. Despite several international appeals, plans for recoveries and actions, we still witness a lack of willingness to jointly address global issues. As the analysis shows, there is insufficient readiness to truly commit to the internationally agreed norms and rules. Consequently, this not only undermines the implementation of SDGs, but results in the inability of the countries to deal with today's and future systemic challenges. COVID-19 did not trigger more intensive international development cooperation that would provide additional stimuli for SDG implementation. Rather, it seems to have revealed several negative attributes of the international community, which reflect a high level of individualistic behaviour of some of the key global powers.

Even though the international (development) system would like to understand SDG 17 as a foundation for achieving all the other SDGs, the tools which it provides were not adequately used in combating COVID-19 effects. A lot of the solutions put on the table by the international community (debt relief, COVAX, etc.) once again reflect the division between the global North and South, which is only widening due to COVID-19. National interests, influence and soft power were once more at the forefront, showing that SDGs will not be able to stand the test of time until development actors are ready to admit that changes are needed in both halves of the world.

33 We define the Bretton Woods Development System as a system created after World War II by the countries of the Global North, which used ODA as a pretext to strengthen their economies and ensure the unimpeded flow of commodities and capital from the Global South. ODA served, of course, to promote economic development in the poorer regions and countries of the world but was also mainly used to broaden and strengthen political alliances, position themselves geopolitically, and strengthen the position of Global North countries in the international community.

GLOBALNO PARTNERSTVO KOT ODGOVOR NA COVID-19

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POVZETEK

Cilji trajnostnega razvoja (CTR) predstavljajo ključno strategijo za globalni razvoj do leta 2030. Njihovo uresničevanje ni odvisno le od pripravljenosti vseh držav, da se jim zavežejo, ampak tudi od globalne solidarnosti, ki pomaga financirati potrebne aktivnosti na različnih področjih, zlasti v primeru manj razvitih držav. Članek analizira odziv mednarodnega razvojnega sistema na učinke pandemije covid-19 v manj razvitih državah, skozi prizmo CTR. Z uporabo mešanih metod, članek primerja odziv mednarodnega razvojnega sistema z zastavljenimi cilji mednarodnega razvojnega sodelovanja skozi prizmo CTR 17. Na podlagi zgodovinsko-primerjalne analize, konceptualizacije in operacionalizacije ključnih konceptov, analize študije primera, sekundarne statistične analize in analize sekundarnih virov, rezultati kažejo, da mednarodna skupnost za zmanjšanje vpliva covid-19 na razvoj, ni ustrezno uporabila predvidenih orodij, ki so predvideni za implementacijo CTR 17 (npr. povečanje finančnih sredstev za razvoj, odpis dolga, COVAX itd.). CTR so še vedno pomembni, vendar je pomanjkanje zavezanosti, ki so jo doslej pokazale posamezne države, skladno s pesimističnimi mnenji, da imajo CTR omejene možnosti za uresničitev, ne glede na vpliv covid-19 na mednarodni razvoj.

Ključne besede: cilji trajnostnega razvoja, CTR 17, covid-19, globalno partnerstvo, razvojno sodelovanje, COVAX

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SLIKA NA NASLOVNICI: *Gian Rinaldo Carli – koprski zgodovinar, pisatelj in ekonomist (1720–1795), Bartolomeo Nazari, 1749* (Wikimedia Commons).

INDEX TO IMAGES ON THE COVER

FRONT COVER: *Gian Rinaldo Carli – Capodistrian historian, writer and economist (1720–1795), Bartolomeo Nazari, 1749* (Wikimedia Commons).

