THE THOUGHT OF LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN IN CONTEXT
CRITICAL ESSAYS AND MATERIALS
PHAINOMENA
Revija za fenomenologijo in hermenevtiko Journal of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics
34 | 134-135 | November 2025
Witold Plotka & Andrej Božič (Eds. | Ur.)
THE THOUGHT OF LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN IN CONTEXT
CRITICAL ESSAYS AND MATERIALS
KONTEKSTI MISLI LEOPOLDA BLAUSTEINA
KRITIČNE RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO
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PHAINOMENA 34 | 134-135 | November 2025
The Thought of Leopold Blaustein in Context Critical Essays and Materials
Konteksti misli Leopolda Blausteina Kritične razprave in gradivo
TABLE OF CONTENTS | KAZALO
INTRODUCTION | UVOD Witold Plotka
The Thought of Leopold Blaustein in Context. An Introduction	5
Konteksti misli Leopolda Blausteina. Uvod
CRITICAL ESSAYS | KRITIČNE RAZPRAVE Aleksandra Gomulczak
Phenomenology from the Standpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School	25
Fenomenologija s stališča lvovsko-varšavske šole
Amadeusz Citlak
Leopold Blaustein's Unique Phenomenological-Psychological Thought.
The Psychological Perspective	53
Edinstvena fenomenološko-psihološka misel Leopolda Blausteina. Psihološka perspektiva
Witold Plotka
How Technology Shapes Our Experience. Blaustein on Mediated Phenomena	79
Kako tehnologija oblikuje naše izkustvo. Blaustein o posredovanih fenomenih
Wojciech Starzynski
Between Critique and Affirmation. Blaustein's Functional Metaphysics of Culture	101
Med kritiko in afirmacijo. Blausteinova funkcionalna metafizika kulture
Hicham Jakha
Did I Just See Romeo Commit Suicide? Meinong and Blaustein on Theater 137
Ali sem ravnokar videl Romea storiti samomor? Meinong in Blaustein o gledališču
Daniele Nuccilli
Intentionality and the Perceptual World. Husserl, Schapp, and Blaustein on the Content of Sensations	163
Intencionalnost in zaznavni svet. Husserl, Schapp in Blaustein o vsebini občutkov
Magdalena Gilicka
Leopold Blaustein vs. Edmund Husserl. Active Consciousness and the Search for Essence	187
Leopold Blaustein vs. Edmund Husserl. Aktivna zavest in iskanje bistva
Filip Borek
Blaustein's Phenomenological Psychology. Between Husserl and Stumpf 215
Blausteinova fenomenološka psihologija. Med Husserlom in Stumpfom
Filip Golaszewski
Blaustein's Humanistic Psychology in a Hermeneutical Key	239
Blausteinova humanistična psihologija v hermenevtičnem ključu
MATERIALS | GRADIVO Leopold Blaustein
The Lived Experience of God in Hebbel's Dramas (§ 1)	265
Doživljanje Boga v Hebblovih dramah (§ 1)
Leopold Blaustein
Reviews of Ajdukiewicz's and Kotarbinski's Publications	271
Oceni publikacij Ajdukiewicza in Kotarbinskega
Leopold Blaustein
Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer	279
Prispevki h psihologiji obiskovalca kina
Leopold Blaustein
On the Tasks of Humanistic Psychology
O nalogah humanistične psihologije
323
Leopold Blaustein
Review of Ingarden's The Literary Work of Art	355
Ocena Ingardnovega dela Literarna umetnina
Leopold Blaustein
The Imaginative Work of Art and Its Way of Manifestation	365
Domišljijska umetnina in način njene danosti
Leopold Blaustein
Carl Stumpf	371
Carl Stumpf
Leopold Blaustein
On Apprehending Aesthetic Objects	375
O dojemanju estetskih predmetnosti
Leopold Blaustein
On the Perception of the Radio Play	397
O zaznavanju radijske igre
IN CONVERSATION | V RAZGOVORU
Malgorzata Holda
An Odyssey into the Ethical Self. In Conversation with Laura Colombino's Kazuo Ishiguro and Ethics	471
Odiseja v etično sebstvo. F razgovoru s knjigo Kazuo Ishiguro in etika Laure Colombino
Manuscript Submission Guidelines Navodila za pripravo rokopisa
483 487
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.1 UDC: 130.121Blaustein
The Thought of Leopold Blaustein in Context
An Introduction
Witold PtOTKA
Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Woycickiego St. 1/3, building no. 23, PL-01-938 Warsaw, Poland
witoldplotka@gmail.com | w.plotka@uksw.edu.pl
The thematic issue of Phainomena. Journal of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics contributes to ongoing research on the heritage of early phenomenology by filling the gap in scholarship on Leopold Blaustein (19051942 [?]). This volume collects essays on and critical studies of his ideas, accompanied by a selection of English translations of his texts. As such, it is the first anthology that presents a collective effort to widen our knowledge of this scholar.
Blaustein is often connected with the phenomenological movement because of his academic training. After all, he was educated by, among others, Roman
This text was supported by the National Science Center, Poland, as a part of the SONATA BIS program (No. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108) within the research project on The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
Phainomena 34 | 134-135 | 2025
Ingarden (1893-1970)—a prominent member of the Gottingen Circle—and he took part in Edmund Husserl's (1859-1938) lectures and seminars during his fellowship stay in Germany. It is precisely in this context that Blaustein is mentioned by Guido Kung. In a chapter on Ingarden, included in Herbert Spiegelberg's The Phenomenological Movement, Kung refers to the beginnings of Ingarden's academic career in Poland, and he remarks that Ingarden "[...] could provoke no genuine discussion, and he did not succeed in arousing interest in phenomenology" (Spiegelberg 1994, 224); in this regard, Blaustein is called by Kung "an exception" who, upon recommendation by Ingarden, studied under Husserl in Germany (Spiegelberg 1994, 262, fn. 69). While Blaustein is commonly classified as a phenomenologist by contemporary scholars,1 it is far from clear to what extent Blaustein was indeed a phenomenologist. This leads to the question of the reasoning behind this classification.
In order to address this question, it is helpful to refer to Spiegelberg's book again. In the "Introduction" to his book, Spiegelberg (1994, 2-6) considers the problem of where to draw the line between phenomenologists 6 and non-phenomenologists, and he considers four criteria. Firstly, we can refer to self-declarations of members of the movement. If this is insufficient, we can, secondly, consider recognition by others, say, key figures, groups of insiders or outsiders. Both criteria, though plausible, can lead us to surprising and ultimately fallible results. For instance, we can recognize a scholar as a phenomenologist on the basis of her direct declaration or her students' statements who took part in their teacher's lectures, although no widely accessible textual evidence is provided. One may ask, are the students' declaration reliable? Or maybe textual evidence is not widely accessible? For this reason, both criteria are problematic, and because of this, Spiegelberg considers a third criterion; more precisely, we can decide on certain objective factors or features that are to be determined by historians. Those factors or features may encompass necessary and sufficient requirements, in order to classify a certain form of philosophizing as phenomenology. By doing so, we
1 For more on this issue see, e.g.: Wolenski 1989, 310, fn. 11; Rosinska 2001; Miskiewicz 2009; Pokropski 2015; Nuccilli & Lewandowski 2024; Jakha 2025. For more on the critical examination of this classification, see Plotka 2024.
Introduction | Uvod
can address problems that arise with the first and second criteria; however, the requirements we define can have a limited range, and can thus be questioned by others. Finally, with respect to the fourth criterion, following Spiegelberg, we can combine all three listed criteria, and attempt to avoid the difficulties listed above.
With all of this in mind, what exactly determines the idea of comprehending Blaustein as a phenomenologist? After all, we may argue, he did not formulate any clear-cut declaration that he is a phenomenologist, nor did any other group make that claim. Moreover, given his critical account of some of Husserl's ideas, including the method of phenomenology, it is hardly plausible to recognize him as a phenomenologist in the strict sense. Of course, some may argue that labels in philosophy are pointless or even dangerous, for they are limiting. More importantly perhaps, this is also not the way we do phenomenology. By contrast, phenomenology allows things themselves (and not labels) to guide scholars. Therefore, we shall not restrict our criteria; instead, we will remain open to how things manifest themselves as such. This volume offers to adopt an analogous approach to look at Blaustein's ideas themselves: let 7 these very ideas guide us to understanding the complexity of his thought, be it phenomenological or not. Things, however, do not manifest themselves without the right context, and we do not look at them from the point of view of a God's Eye; thus, also for Blaustein's ideas we should account for them from a certain point of view or in a relevant framework. In order to trace this framework, it is worth beginning with some notes on Blaustein's life.
It can be argued that difficulties in understanding Blaustein's ideas stem partly from his biography and partly from the diversity of his original studies in philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy. Blaustein was a Polish scholar with Jewish roots born in 1905 in Lvov (Lwow, now Lviv in Ukraine).2 There, he studied at Jan Kazimierz University, roughly in the years 1923-1927. At that time, the university was the epicenter of original research being done by the Lvov-Warsaw School, a multidisciplinary school of thought that covered topics in, among other areas, logic, philosophy of science, mathematics, and descriptive psychology. As already mentioned, Blaustein's teacher in Lvov was
2 For an overview of Blaustein's biography, see Rosinska 2001, 16-23.
Phainomena 34 | 134-135 | 2025
Ingarden, but the central figure of his education was, without doubt, Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), a student of Franz Brentano (1838-1917), who developed the project of descriptive psychology.3 Another important figure was Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890-1963) who developed the so-called directival theory of meaning, used by Blaustein in his research. Under Twardowski's supervision, Blaustein wrote a doctoral dissertation on Husserl's theory of intentionality.4 In 1925, while editing the final version of the dissertation, he went to Freiburg im Breisgau where he took part in Husserl's lectures. Later, he referred to these lectures and his private exchanges with Husserl, in order to address some details regarding the whole-part theory (Blaustein 1928, 83; Plotka 2026, 97-98). Blaustein's reading is rather critical, and it aims at arguing that it is difficult to explain how the ideal is instantiated in the psychic.
In the year 1927-1928, Blaustein once again traveled to Germany, this time to Berlin. His stay in Berlin can be regarded as one of the milestones of Blaustein's philosophical development at that time. There, he met, among others, Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), and Kurt 8 Lewin (1890-1947), who helped Blaustein to broaden his knowledge on Gestalt theory; additionally, he took part in lectures of Eduard Spranger (1882-1963), a student of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), who inspired Blaustein to develop the project of humanistic psychology. In Berlin, Blaustein published a book on Hebbel's dramas, which utilizes noetic and noematic analysis.5 After his return to Lvov, Blaustein harshly criticized phenomenology, claiming that it ultimately has to be developed as an empirical discipline about types (not essences) of lived experiences. This criticism resulted in some tensions between him and Ingarden who favored eidetic phenomenology. At the end of the 1920s, Blaustein also worked on two book projects finalized at the beginning of the 1930s.6 Both books discussed and developed an original theory of presentations. The term "presentation" is a key notion within Brentano's and
3	For more on this project, see: Citlak 2019, 1049-1077; 2023, 1665-1681; 2025.
4	See Blaustein 1928. The book was published recently in English translation in: Plotka 2026, 21-108.
5	See Blaustein 1929; see also the English translation of Section 1 of the book in this volume.
6	See Blaustein 1930; 1931.
Introduction | Uvod
Twardowski's field of descriptive psychology. Blaustein held that the Brentano-Twardowski theory had to be redesigned, in order to cover specifically aesthetic experiences, e.g., contemplating a painting, a sculpture, watching a theater play or a movie, etc. His point was that all aesthetic experiences involve specific types of presentations—classified by him as imaginative, schematic, and symbolic presentations7—that cannot be reduced, following Brentano and Twardowski, to any combination of presentations, judgments, and feelings.
Blaustein developed this line of reasoning in the 1930s by including new fields of aesthetics. At that time, he widely used the idea of the imaginative world of art to show that our experience of art creates a specific object, i.e., the world that is inherently present in, say, a theater play or depicted in a painting. Pushing his studies further, Blaustein published a book on the cinemagoer's experience of film in 1933 and, in 1938, another short book on the phenomenology of perceiving a radio drama.8 In these texts, Blaustein argued that aesthetic experiences are sui generis and therefore cannot be reduced to any form of our everyday experience. Watching a movie or listening to radio are technologically mediated experiences that shape our sense of the world. 9 As a result, Blaustein attempted to describe how our psychic life is essentially embedded in worldly factors, and this embeddedness is made possible by our lived body that co-constitutes our experience of art. In his texts, he discussed the ideas of, among others, Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Moritz Geiger (1880-1937), and Wilhelm Schapp (1884-1965). Of course, he also engaged with members of the Lvov-Warsaw School, not only with Twardowski or Ajdukiewicz, but also with, for instance, Walter Auerbach (1900-1942 [?]), Zofia Lissa (1908-1980), Stanislaw Ossowski (1897-1963), Mieczyslaw Wallis-Walfisz (1895-1975), and Tadeusz Witwicki (1902-1970). Although Blaustein was active in the academic environment of Lvov—e.g., he cooperated with the Polish Philosophical Society—, he did not get a position at the university. His studies in aesthetics were planned to be ultimately summarized in a longer study, Die ästhetische Perzeption, written in German, which was completed
7	For an overview of Blaustein's theory, see Rosinska 2013. See also texts collected in: Blaustein 2005.
8	See editions of both studies included in this volume.
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in 1939 just before the outbreak of World War II, but the manuscript of this monograph was lost during the war. We know that Blaustein, together with his wife, Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein and their son, was relocated to the Janowska Ghetto in Lvov during the German occupation. His exact date of death is unknown. He likely died in 1942, but some mention 1944 as well. Blaustein left more than 100 texts, including books, research articles, short reports, and reviews.9 In one of his texts, Ingarden (1963, 88) noted that Blaustein's death was a great loss for the Polish academic community, and he assessed Blaustein's contribution highly.
By and large, this rich, though divergent, context of Blaustein's academic training and his original studies from the 1920s and 1930s require detailed studies. The fact that Blaustein's ideas were shaped in the context of different traditions—the early phenomenology of Husserl and the Göttingen Circle, the Lvov-Warsaw School, Gestalt theory, humanistic psychology, the Graz School, etc.—makes it difficult to account for his original readings regarding the key figures of his time. However, this diversity also presents a unique opportunity 10 for us to understand how early phenomenology was developing in the 1920s and 1930s outside Germany. Blaustein's ideas are complex, for he was a scholar who bridged the gap between different paradigms and traditions. It is precisely for this reason that his ideas require contextualization and thorough analysis. There is also another reason in favor of this approach. Some may say that in the scholarly literature, the legacy of early phenomenology is often connected exclusively with Husserl and the reception of his philosophy in the first decades of the 20th century in Germany. The story concerning early phenomenology, however, is much more complicated, multi-layered, and less obvious than this Husserl-centered perspective may suggest. This is clearly seen in Blaustein's work. His thought was influenced by various traditions. When he joined Husserl's classes, his theoretical background, which was rooted first and foremost in the Brentanian-style descriptive psychology, certainly determined his view of phenomenology.
As shown, Blaustein's ideas resonated with and were shaped in different philosophical and psychological frameworks. Because of this divergent context,
9 See the bibliography of Blaustein's works in: D^browski 1981, 246-252.
Introduction | Uvod
Blaustein's philosophy does not fit clear-cut classifications. By examining his contribution, we may be able to overcome the Husserl-centered narrative about how the phenomenological movement evolved in the first decades of the 20th century. Without doubt, this approach promises interesting results. Only by exploring different frameworks that shaped Blaustein's inquiries, and by seeking new research perspectives that widen his ideas, are we in a position to understand his original standpoint adequately as well as his contribution to contemporary debates. Therefore, studies on Blaustein and his works have much to offer to contemporary readers, leading us to rethink an important part of the history of European philosophy. I do not hold that Blaustein is a key figure of phenomenology or the Lvov-Warsaw School; my point is that, in order to rethink the basics of these and other traditions, it is helpful to leave the mainstream line of reading key texts and to look at our common heritage from the point of view of peripheries, which are too often neglected in contemporary scholarship. Due to this approach, we are able to deepen our knowledge, not only of the peripheries, but also of the center. What, then, can Blaustein offer us today?	11
First of all, studies on Blaustein's thought can contribute to our understanding of how the leading ideas of philosophy or psychology of the 19th and 20th centuries migrated and ultimately were reshaped in new intellectual environments. This idea requires a commentary. Without doubt, ideas are abstract objects; however, they are present or manifest themselves in the world and they are able to resonate with us because of real and individual objects, say, books, lecture courses, and private exchanges with concrete scholars. Thus, ideas are embedded in our life-worlds, in our social and historical context, and in our interactions with others. The history of ideas often consists in tracking how these abstract objects were shaped by accidental circumstances or within concrete biographies. It is safe to say that ideas do not travel, but scholars do. With potential clarification in mind, let us note that popularizing an idea in a certain intellectual environment can mean transferring it from one place to another. How is that possible? Let us assume that we take lecture notes or we copy a course book during our fellowship stay at a guest institution and later, after we come back to our home institution, we lend out our notes or new books to someone else, and, by doing so, we popularize new accounts, which
Phainomena 34 | 134-135 | 2025
thus far were absent among our colleagues; this makes it possible for ideas also to migrate, so to speak, together with real and individual scholars. Moreover, scholars can bring new ideas to their own intellectual environments, which can eventually lead to the confrontation of new and foreign ideas with those that are well established and thoroughly discussed. This confrontation is the ultimate basis for merging new ideas or reshaping "migrating" ideas. All these borrowings, imports, new establishments, or reformulations make ideas still a vibrant and fruitful tool in understanding our life-worlds. Of course, these considerations are very general, but they lead us to important consequences.
Given the sketched theoretical framework, it is thought-provoking and illuminating to investigate how the leading ideas of philosophy or psychology of the 19th and 20th centuries, for instance, phenomenology, descriptive psychology, Gestalt theory, and analytic philosophy, evolved and changed due to Blaustein's academic activities. As noted above, he travelled to Germany, in order to study under the leading figures of mainstream currents of his times; however, in Lvov, he was well trained in descriptive psychology and in the 12 analytical approach. After his return to Poland, he discussed new ideas with his colleagues at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov, and these discussions, not to mention new publications, made a confrontation of different philosophical approaches possible. Moreover, the fact that in Lvov he was educated also by Ingarden, a member of the Gottingen Circle, makes the whole situation even more compelling, leading us to questions of how early phenomenology was used and reshaped outside Germany.
We can also ask about Blaustein's career given his Jewish origins; after all, in his letters to Twardowski, Blaustein suggested that he had problems with financing his stay in Berlin because of his Jewish origins. More than a decade later, because of this, he (and his family) was relocated to the ghetto where he died. His biography shares the tragic fate of many Jewish scholars who were unable to continue their research after World War II. Next, given that ideas are essentially embedded in our life-worlds, we can explore the institutional background of how some ideas are examined. For instance, Blaustein's studies on cinema did not get any institutional support, whereas his research on radio experiences was supported by Polish Radio; this help enabled him to use a broader scope of methods while studying relevant experiences (e.g., using
Introduction | Uvod
questionnaires). Did this support make his research more efficient? Would it be possible to conduct his new projects without this support? In any case, here and in the other cases listed above, Blaustein's life and work are regarded as a nodal point for further inquiries into the history of ideas, not limited to the context just highlighted.
Certainly, scholarship on Blaustein's legacy fills the gap in ongoing studies regarding the history of ideas, but his contribution can also be examined outside of this historical context. Here, a few routes can be taken. First, Blaustein's account of intentionality is worth exploring. After all, his doctoral dissertation extensively discusses Husserl's theory of intentionality, and the main train of thought seems to lead us toward an object-directed, rather than a medium-centered account of the intentional relation. This, however, situates Blaustein close to the East Coast account of the noema, and can ultimately provide additional arguments against the West Coast reading.10 Of course, one can still examine to what extent Blaustein's theory of intentionality can be used with respect to the noesis-noema structure, given that he focuses more on Husserl's early theory developed in Logical Investigations. Second, pushing this line of 13 reasoning forward, Blaustein may provide arguments for taking into account sensations as an important factor in our lived experiences. Husserl, as it is well known, classifies sensations as hyletic data and, by doing so, banishes this element from his investigations; instead, he looks to examine noetic-noematic structures. By contrast, for Blaustein, who in this regard follows Stumpf, lived experiences are founded on presenting contents that are understood as sensations; with a focus on this factor, however, we are able to develop phenomenology fully based on how we experience the world on a very basic level. One may argue that this approach can lead us toward interesting results. Third, Blaustein provides us with arguments in favor of a non-transcendental account of consciousness, which is popular among contemporary scholars. Needless to say, he does not believe that reduction guarantees us access to pure consciousness as such; rather, we should refer to the results of other non-philosophical disciplines, in order to understand consciousness adequately.
10 For more on both accounts, see, e.g.: Follesdal 1982, 73-80; Smith & Mclntyre 1982; Drummond 1990.
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In this sense, Blaustein may be regarded as a proponent of a certain model of naturalizing phenomenology. Finally, we can examine to what extent Blaustein's ideas can be discussed in the context of today's debates within different disciplines, for instance, in media studies or aesthetics. In this regard, Miskiewicz (2009, 187) suggests that Blaustein's theories can be discussed in the context of McLuhan's "the medium is the message" and Wollheim's account of "seeing-in"; however, she does not provide solid arguments in favor of such readings, which leaves us some room for new accounts of Blaustein's philosophy.
We may conclude that reading Blaustein's works and writing studies about his ideas can contribute not only to the history of philosophy, but to examining numerous problems as well.
As mentioned above, in Ingarden's (1966, 88) assessment, Blaustein's "achievements are not without significance, and should not be forgotten or wasted." With the present volume, Ingarden's wish, at least in part, can be fulfilled. The texts gathered here examine and contextualize selected issues 14 raised by Blaustein. The volume is divided into two parts: the first contains critical essays on Blaustein's thought and its context, while the second includes English translations of his studies originally written in Polish, German, and French.
The first part encompasses nine essays, beginning with Aleksandra Gomulczak's paper. Her work examines how phenomenology resonated within the Lvov-Warsaw School, i.e., the philosophical environment, in which Blaustein formulated his ideas. Gomulczak presents a broad perspective on the School and its relationship to phenomenology. She explores the School's methodological basics, juxtaposing them with Brentano's account of philosophy, and analyzes the way Husserl and Twardowski organized their teaching processes. Gomulczak discusses the diverse approaches of the School's members to Husserl's phenomenology, emphasizing that the School did not accept phenomenology uncritically. She addresses specific criticisms formulated by scholars, such as Blaustein, Ajdukiewicz, and Bochenski. The paper also situates the School (and its account of phenomenology) within the context of other trends in the analytical tradition, including the Vienna Circle and British philosophers.
Introduction | Uvod
Amadeusz Citlak also accounts for Blaustein's thought within the context of the Lvov-Warsaw School, but specifically from a psychological viewpoint. Citlak examines the extent, to which Blaustein's ideas remain relevant today, for instance, within phenomenologically oriented psychology (Gallagher, Marbach, Varela, Zahavi) and humanistic psychology. The paper shows that Blaustein was interested in understanding the specific person and, by examining this phenomenon, aimed to provide a theoretical basis for the humanities. Citlak also suggests that Blaustein can contribute to cultural psychology, presenting him as a forerunner of humanistic psychology (Maslow and Rogers). Another topic explored extensively by Blaustein, which is important for contemporary psychology studies, is the phenomenon of perception. Citlak discusses possible developments of Blaustein's ideas in this regard.
Witold Plotka's paper focuses on Blaustein's account of mediated experiences—phenomena which are co-constituted by non-mental factors. More precisely, Plotka examines the experiences of the cinemagoer and the phenomenon of listening to the radio. In both types of experience, technology clearly shapes the relevant phenomena. According to Plotka, Blaustein utilizes 15 two parallel methodological approaches to examine technologically mediated experiences: a humanistic approach and phenomenology. The humanistic approach provides an ontological framework, while phenomenology helps one to examine the ways of manifestation. The paper addresses also the question of the role of the body and environment in technologically determined experiences. Plotka's work deepens our understanding of Blaustein's philosophy in light of contemporary philosophy of technology. Technology is regarded by Blaustein as a domain of culture, specifically as cultural artifacts.
The issue of culture is further discussed in Wojciech Starzynski's paper entitled "Between Critique and Affirmation. Blaustein's Functional Metaphysics of Culture." Starzynski argues that Blaustein developed a metaphysics in his philosophy, which questions the idea that Blaustein's philosophy should be understood as ontologically neutral. The paper juxtaposes Blaustein with Ingarden, showing that Blaustein developed a non-speculative, though normatively rich, account of culture and value. Such a conception was rooted in Ingarden's project put forward in The Literary Work of Art. In order to justify his point, Starzynski refers to Blaustein's reviews of Ingarden's work,
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his pedagogical writings, his theory of humanistic psychology, and his studies on Hebbel. Ultimately, Blaustein is presented as a philosopher who developed the theory of intentionality in a functional manner, thereby not rejecting metaphysics, but reinterpreting it thoroughly.
Hicham Jakha's paper centers on aesthetics; more precisely, it accounts for the phenomenon of theater experience and explores the problem of how one refers to objects of this kind of experience. In order to explore this issue, Jakha situates Blaustein's philosophy in relation to Meinong's theory of assumptions. Meinong, a member of the School of Brentano, developed his original theory rooted in the ontology of fictional objects. The paper adopts two complementary perspectives: the phenomenological and the ontological one. Blaustein adopted the phenomenological view and explored the presentations that build one's experience of watching a theater play; in this vein, Blaustein classified this kind of experience as illusionary. Meinong, in turn, adopted the ontological view and examined assumptions, which were understood as phenomena situated between judgments and presentations. In Jakha's eyes, 16 Meinong's ontological approach supplements Blaustein's phenomenological account; both perspectives are necessary to account for the constitution of ficta.
Two further papers juxtapose Blaustein with Husserl. In "Intentionality and the Perceptual World," Daniele Nuccilli offers a systematic approach toward the theory of intentionality by examining how the phenomenon of perception should be described, including its parts and essence. Nuccilli juxtaposes the accounts of Husserl, Schapp, and Blaustein regarding the contents of sensations. The paper begins with an analysis of Husserl's early lectures on logic and theory of knowledge, arguing that these lectures mark a crucial shift in the development of Husserl's theory of intentionality, moving from Logical Investigations to Ideas I. The key notion analyzed by Nuccilli is the idea of materia prima. In this context, Schapp is presented as a critic of Husserl: for Schapp, sensations present the thing directly to consciousness, while intentionality plays a secondary role. Blaustein, too, seemed to emphasize the thing indicated in relevant perceptual acts.
Magdalena Gilicka focuses on Blaustein's account of Husserl's eidetic phenomenology. She situates her discussion within the context of Ingarden's
Introduction | Uvod
reading of Bergson's critique of essentialism. In Gilicka's view, Husserl's eidetic phenomenology should also be read in the context of Bergson who appears to be a missing link in examining the legacy of eidetic phenomenology. Gilicka discusses Blaustein's thesis that Husserl's eidetic intuition should be understood as a kind of schematic representation, where the object is given indirectly. As a result, Blaustein, according to Gilicka, was skeptical about Husserl's eidetics.
Filip Borek explores Blaustein's psychology. He combines historical and systematic perspectives by situating Blaustein in the context of Husserl and Stumpf. Borek rightly observes that Blaustein was familiar with both approaches to phenomenology, having studied under both Husserl and Stumpf. From a systematic viewpoint, the study addresses the question of phenomenology's subject matter. According to Borek, for Husserl, phenomenology concerns the real content of consciousness, while for Stumpf, it focuses on the contents of sensations. The paper explores Stumpf's criticism of Husserl's Ideas I with respect to the notion of hyletics and its noetic-noematic approach. Borek's reading is nuanced and shows that Blaustein cannot be regarded as a mere follower of either Husserl or Stumpf. For Blaustein, descriptive psychology 17 encompasses functional psychology and phenomenology in the Stumpfian sense, yet it remains close to Husserl's views as well.
The part that contains critical essays concludes with Filip Golaszewski's paper, which also concerns psychology. However, unlike the studies by Citlak and Borek, Golaszewski offers a hermeneutical reading of Blaustein's humanistic psychology. More precisely, Golaszewski focuses on Blaustein's late project of humanistic psychology, which is rooted in the ideas of Dilthey and Spranger. This discipline, in Blaustein's account, concerns humanistic reality that is founded in relevant experiential wholes of higher order. Golaszewski analyzes Blaustein's writings on Goethe and Hebbel as readings in humanistic psychology that adapt the tools of hermeneutics. Moreover, he juxtaposes Blaustein's psychology with hermeneutics by tracking down key concepts, such as the hermeneutic circle and understanding. According to Golaszewski, Blaustein appears to be a philosopher who examined the humanistic reality by searching for the deeper meaning of cultural artifacts and lived experiences.
In addition to critical essays, the thematic issue of Phainomena gathers English translations of Blaustein's works. Given that his texts were published
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a century ago, often in discontinued journals or by niche publishers, one can notice a problem with accessibility of these writings to scholars. The second part addresses this problem. It contains a selection of Blaustein's texts originally published from 1929 until 1939. All texts show a variety of topics discussed by him, including theoretical investigations into the basics of aesthetics, his innovative research on cinema and radio, as well as his views regarding other approaches, e.g., concerning Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbinski (who both were prominent members of the Lvov-Warsaw School), Ingarden (Blaustein's teacher in Lvov), and Stumpf (whom Blaustein met during his fellowship stay in Berlin), not to mention his critical assessment of humanistic psychology. The part collects texts in historical order. It contains texts originally published in the Polish, German, and French languages. In what follows, I will present main points of the translated texts; however, I will not discuss them the historical order, but will divide them into three groups: the first group includes texts on the use of different methodological tools in aesthetics, the second group contains translations of Blaustein's original studies on cinema and radio, and 18 the last group shows the context of his philosophy by situating his thought in relation to other scholars and research projects.
To begin with, the first group includes the 1929 text, published as the introductory section of Blaustein's book The Lived Experience of God in Hebbel's Dramas, originally written in German. The text was written during Blaustein's stay in Berlin. It adopts phenomenological tools in examining lived experiences on the basis of Hebbel's dramas. The text shows that these tools omit the fallacy of psychologism by focusing on the noetic-noematic correlation while describing phenomena connected to God. Blaustein's book is hardly accessible today, yet the translated fragment shows not only his interest in literature, but also his original fusion of phenomenology and descriptive psychology. The 1937 text "The Imaginative Work of Art and Its Way of Manifestation" was published originally in German as well. It presents Blaustein's aesthetics in nuce by providing the basic vocabulary, central ideas, and main arguments, which are fully elaborated in other texts. This short overview was designed to show that perceiving a work of art is a complex phenomenon, which requires one's attention to notice all the nuanced relations that manifest themselves within it. Ideas presented in the 1937 text are explored also in the 1938 article "On
Introduction | Uvod
Apprehending Aesthetic Objects." This study shows that aesthetic experiences cannot be limited to artworks, since they concern everyday or natural objects as well. Blaustein argues that what makes these experiences unique is the complex structure of acts that are directed toward their objects. The article can be regarded as an informative introduction to Blaustein's aesthetics as it presents first and foremost the theoretical basics of his approach. Nonetheless, the text includes also some examples, which illustrate the main points of his theory.
The second group of texts published in this thematic issue includes Blaustein's writings, in which one can find an application of the method as discussed in his theoretical contributions. The 1933 short book Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer examines lived experiences of film spectators. Blaustein is interested here in the lived experiences' nature and structure by describing how sensations lived by the cinemagoer become imaginative experiences of certain objects that, in turn, are inherent to the imaginative world presented in films. The text is a detailed analysis of relevant phenomena, but, in order to make his point and to justify his theories, Blaustein disputes also with the mainstream 19 scholars of his time, for instance, with Schapp, Geiger, and Witasek. Likewise, the 1938/39 book On the Perception of the Radio Play, published originally in Polish and French, uses descriptive tools to analyze technologically determined aesthetic experiences. Blaustein argues that radio plays are given in perceptual acts, which he calls "acousion." This form of experience consists of presenting its objects directly as if in the acoustic space. While listening to the radio, one apprehends auditory sensory data and, on this basis, directly experiences heard objects. In order to show this, Blaustein utilizes his idea of imaginative presentations that function as presentations of objects, which are inherent in the imaginative world of art. In this text, one finds the analysis of attention as one of the central phenomena in aesthetics.
The last group of texts includes translations that show the context of Blaustein's thought by referring to his account of different traditions and theories. The longest text in this group is the 1935 article, originally published in Polish, "On the Tasks of Humanistic Psychology." This study is rooted in Blaustein's stay in Berlin, where he met Spranger, a student of Dilthey, who developed his original research program at the intersection of the humanities
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and psychology. The published translation shows that Blaustein was sympathetic with the attitude of humanistic psychology, although he critically assessed metaphysical claims of this subsection of psychology. The text is a detailed analysis of the concept of experiential wholes of higher order. Blaustein defends the view that humanistic approach is necessary to understand the complexity of human psychic life. Next, Blaustein's reviews (from 1930) of Ajdukiewicz's and Kotarbinski's books present a unique perspective concerning his account of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Both Ajdukiewicz and Kotarbinski were students of Twardowski who contributed to the School significantly. They presented original theories, including a directival theory of meaning (Ajdukiewicz) and reism (Kotarbinski). Worth noting is that Ajdukiewicz was Blaustein's teacher in Lvov who influenced his student broadly with regard to the concept of meaning, which, in turn, helped Blaustein to critically elaborate Husserl's theory of meaning as discussed in Logical Investigations. Reviews published here present Blaustein's position within the Lvov-Warsaw School. Furthermore, his 1935/37 review of Ingarden's book on the literary work of art presents 20 how Blaustein regarded Ingarden's theory. Ingarden, like Ajdukiewicz, was Blaustein's teacher in Lvov. Although there are some common points between both scholars, differences are still significant. The review published here gives an insight into the relationship between Ingarden and Blaustein. Generally, Blaustein seems to agree with Ingarden on many points, including Ingarden's critique of psychologism in literature; however, he expresses some doubts, for instance, in respect to ontological issues in Ingarden's theory of literature. The 1937/38 text on Stumpf adopts a different approach than the review of Ingarden. The text was written as a post-mortem note and for this reason one cannot find any critical remarks regarding Stump's philosophy. The text is nonetheless important, since it shows Blaustein's debt to Stumpf's thought. The note is a summary of Stumpf's life-long philosophical development, and it presents an attempt to situate this scholar within the leading trends of philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries.
All translations published in the present thematic issue aim at making Blaustein's legacy more accessible. Together with critical essays, this volume is an important step toward deepening our knowledge of early phenomenology that is rooted in different polemics, borrowings, criticisms, and new developments.
Introduction | Uvod
Acknowledgement
I am grateful to the Editorial Board of Phainomena. Journal of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics for accepting the idea of publishing a thematic issue dedicated to Blaustein's thought.
Bibliography | Bibliografija
Blaustein, Leopold. 1928. Husserlowska nauka o akcie, tresci iprzedmiocie
przedstawienia [Husserl's Theory of Act, Content, and Object of Presentation]. Lwow: Nakladem Towarzystwa Naukowego z Zasilkiem Ministerstwa Wyznan Religijnych i Oswiecenia Publicznego.
---. 1929. Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen. Berlin: Verlag Reuther & Reichard.
---. 1930. Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studyum zpogranicza psychologii i estetyki [Imaginative Presentations. Study on the Borders of Psychology and Aesthetics]. Lvov: Wydawnictwo Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie.
---. 1931. Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne. Badania zpogranicza
psychologji i estetyki [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations. Study on the Borders of Psychology and Aesthetics]. Lvov: Nakladem Przegl^du Humanistycznego.
---. 2005. Wyborpism estetycznych. Ed. by Zofia Rosinska. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.
Citlak, Amadeusz. 2019. "The Problem of Mind and Mental Acts in the Perspective of Psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw School." Philosophical Psychology 32 (7): 1049-1077. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1647410.
---. 2023. "Brentano's Psychology and Kazimierz Twardowski School: Implications for the Empirical Study of Psychological Phenomena Today." Psychological Research 87: 1665-1681. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-022-01744-1.
---. 2025. "The Problem of Conceptual Coherence in Psychology: Where Should We Look for a Proper Psychological Theory?" Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Online First. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000310.
D^browski, Mieczyslaw Andrzej. 1981. "Bibliografia prac Leopolda Blausteina." Roczniki Filozoficzne 29 (1): 244-254.
Drummond, John. 1990. Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Follesdal, Dagfinn. 1982. "Husserl's Notion of noema" In Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science, ed. by Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall, 73-80. Cambridge (MA)—London: MIT Press.
Ingarden, Roman. 1963. "Leopold Blaustein—teoretyk radia i filmu." Zeszyty Prasoznawcze 4 (3): 86-93.
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Jakha, Hicham. 2025. "On Charles's 'Quasi-Fear': A Perceptual-Phenomenological Defence of Thought Theory." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 56 (3): 213-234. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2025.2479442.
Miskiewicz, Wioletta. 2009. "Leopold Blaustein's Analytical Phenomenology." In The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy. Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy, ed. by Sandra Lapointe, Jan Wolenski, Mathieu Marion, and Wioletta Miskiewicz, 181-188. Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2401-5_13.
Nuccilli, Daniele, and Rafal Lewandowski. 2024. "Husserl, Ajdukiewicz, and Blaustein on Meaning." Horizon: Studies in Phenomenology 13 (1): 95-114. https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2024-13-1-95-114.
Plotka, Witold. 2024. The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein: Descriptive Psychology, Phenomenology, and Aesthetics. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-63685-1.
Plotka, Witold (ed.). 2026. Leopold Blaustein, Studies on Edmund Husserl's
Phenomenology: Supplemented with Letters to Kazimierz Twardowski, trans. by Witold Plotka and Rafal Lewandowski. Leiden, Boston (MA): Brill. https://doi. org/10.1163/9789004729322.
Pokropski, Marek. 2015. "Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content." Studia Phaenomenologica 15: 93-103. https://doi.org/10.5840/studphaen2015156.
Rosinska, Zofia. 2001. Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediow [Blaustein. A Conception of the Reception of Media]. Warsaw: Proszynski i S-ka.
---. 2013. "The Model of Aesthetic Experience. The Theory of Leopold Blaustein." In 20th Century Aesthetics in Poland. Masters and Their Followers, ed. by Krystyna Wilkoszewska, 74-94. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper.
Smith, David Woodruff, and Roland McIntyre. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1994. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. With the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. Third revised and enlarged edition. Dordrecht—Boston (MA)—London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Wolenski, Jan. 1989. Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Dordrecht— Boston (MA)—London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Critical Essays
THE THOUGHT OF LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN IN CONTEXT
KONTEKSTI MISLI LEOPOLDA BLAUSTEINA
Kritične razprave
Original scientific paper Izvirni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.2 UDC: 130.121:1
Phenomenology from the Standpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School
Aleksandra Gomulczak
Faculty of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Wieniawskiego 1, 61-712 Poznan, Poland
aleksandra.gomulczak@amu.edu.pl | gomulczak.a@gmail.com
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to examine the views on phenomenology developed by representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School (henceforth: LWS). The paper shows that, firstly, there is a significant genetic connection between the LWS and Husserl's phenomenological movement. Secondly, members of the LWS have developed a coherent understanding of phenomenology, which they regard as an autonomous philosophical science of essence. They particularly appreciate the
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fact that phenomenologists are committed to making clear distinctions. However, they are skeptical about the reliability of Wesensschau, as it is based on immediate
insight rather than deduction or induction. Furthermore, they consider the works of phenomenologists to be obscure. Thirdly, their criticism of phenomenology is similar, though less radical, to that offered by analytic philosophers, such as Moritz Schlick, Gilbert Ryle, and Rudolf Carnap.
Keywords: Lvov-Warsaw School, Wesensschau, criticism of phenomenology, philosophical styles, analytic-continental divide.
Fenomenologija s stališča lvovsko-varšavske šole
Povzetek
Namen prispevka je raziskati poglede na fenomenologije, kakršne so razvili predstavniki lvovsko-varšavske šole (v nadaljevanju: LVŠ). Članek pokaže, da, prvič, obstaja pomembna genetska povezava med LVŠ in Husserlovim fenomenološkim 26 gibanjem. Drugič, člani LVŠ so razvili koherentno razumevanje fenomenologije, ki jo dojemajo kot avtonomno filozofsko znanost bistev. Posebej cenijo dejstvo, da se fenomenologi zavzemajo za jasna razlikovanja. Vendar so skeptični glede zanesljivosti Wesensschau (zrenja bistev), saj temelji na neposrednem uvidu in ne na dedukciji ali indukciji. Dela fenomenologov se jim, nadalje, zdijo zamegljena. Tretjič, njihova kritika fenomenologije je podobna, četudi manj radikalna, kot tista, ki so jo vanjo uperili analitični filozofi, kakršni so Moritz Schlick, Gilbert Ryle, and Rudolf Carnap.
Ključne besede: lvovsko-varšavska šola, Wesensschau, kritika fenomenologije, filozofski stili, razcep analitično-kontinentalno.
Aleksandra Gomueczak
Introduction
The Lvov-Warsaw School (henceforth: LWS), established by Kazimierz Twardowski, and the phenomenological movement initiated by Edmund Husserl are both rooted in the philosophy of Franz Brentano (Kriegel 2017, 9-11). Phenomenology has been associated with the so-called continental tradition of 20th-century philosophy (see Rosen and Leiter 2007; McCumber 2011), whereas the LWS has long been classified as representative of the analytic tradition (see Skolimowski 2024; Woleñski 1989). Nonetheless, Twardowski's students exhibited a variety of diverse philosophical interests, including descriptive psychology and phenomenology. Overviews of the reception of phenomenology in the LWS can be found in Küng (1993), Woleñski (1997), Glombik (2011), Plotka (2017), and Lukasiewicz (2020). There are studies that trace the influence of Husserl on various LWS members, for example, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (Olech 1995), Stanislaw Lesniewski (Smith and Mulligan 1982), and Leopold Blaustein (Miskiewicz 2009; Plotka 2024). One can also observe a growing interest in the relationship between the LWS and Roman Ingarden 27 (Richard 2020; Brožek and Jadacki 2022). However, there is another significant aspect related to phenomenology and the LWS that has not received sufficient attention. Namely, the members of the LWS produced several works that introduce, discuss, and criticize phenomenology as a distinct philosophical movement and school.
This paper aims to answer the following questions. How do the LWS members view phenomenology? Do their analyses allow for the reconstruction of a relatively coherent view of what phenomenology is from the LWS's standpoint? If so, is this view comparable to that of other analytic thinkers, such as Moritz Schlick (1979), Rudolf Carnap (1959), and Gilbert Ryle (2009a; 2009b)?
The paper is divided into four parts. In the first part, I outline the legacy of Brentano reflected in the schools of Husserl and Twardowski as discussed
This paper is part of the research project no. 2020/37/N/HS1/02292 funded by the National Science Center, Poland. The author would like to thank Prof. Anna Brozek and the anonymous reviewer for their comments, which helped improve the initial version of the paper.
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by members of the LWS. In the second part, I present the interpretations of phenomenology offered by the LWS members. The third part examines the LWS's criticism of phenomenology. Finally, the fourth part compares their criticism with that of Schlick, Ryle, and Carnap.
1. The legacy of Brentano: Husserl's and Twardowski's philosophical "schools"
Husserl and Twardowski were both students of Franz Brentano. They commenced their philosophical inquiries within the field of descriptive psychology and expressed interest in each other's work (see Cavallin 1997). Most notably, they both exerted significant influence, which contributed to the development of philosophical schools or movements. Although the philosophies arising from Twardowski's and Husserl's teachings differ considerably, the LWS members highlighted their common origins and drew parallels between the environments fostered by these two philosophers. The first comparison was made by Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz (1913) who concluded his paper on the phenomenological school with the following remark:
Meinong, Twardowski, Stumpf, and Husserl originated from the school of Franz Brentano. Due to this shared point of departure, they and their students, despite contemporary differences, constitute one large philosophical group. If the phenomenological school were to be classified under any contemporary philosophical group, it should undoubtedly be associated with this one rather than any other. (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 262.)1
Tatarkiewicz wrote his paper in 1913, before the development of the "Warsaw," i.e. the logical-mathematical branch of the LWS.2 Therefore, he was discussing the "Lvov School," which has made significant contributions to descriptive psychology (see Citlak 2022). Descriptive psychology is indeed
1	All translations from Polish come from the author of the paper, unless stated otherwise.
2	On the so-called "logical-mathematical" and "psychological-semiotic" branches of the LWS, see Brozek et al. 2021, 25-26.
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associated with phenomenology in the "widest sense" (see Spiegelberg 1994, 6). However, the Warsaw branch of the LWS, which included figures, such as Jan Lukasiewicz, Stanislaw Lesniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and Alfred Tarski, diverged from its origins and pursued its own path, in which mathematical logic played a fundamental role (Kotarbinski 1958, 737). In this context, the Warsaw branch would hardly be considered part of the same "philosophical group" as phenomenology. The internal development of both the LWS as well as phenomenology should be considered, when drawing such general comparisons.
Nevertheless, the "genetic" link between the LWS and the phenomenological "school" was also acknowledged by Kotarbinski (1958, 741), Ajdukiewicz (2006, 252-253), and Jozef M. Bochenski (1994, 11). The existence of such a connection explains why some members of the LWS became interested in Husserl. Twardowski frequently encouraged students to complete internships abroad. Some of them attended lectures and seminars by Husserl in Gottingen and Freiburg im Breisgau: Stefan Blachowski, Bronislaw Bandrowski, Ajdukiewicz, Blaustein, Henryk Mehlberg, and Roman Ingarden,3 although not all of them were equally interested in phenomenology (Plotka 2017, 82). 29 Kotarbinski regarded Blaustein as a philosopher who "combines native tradition with phenomenology" and as the "leader" of the group of Twardowski's students influenced by Husserl and Ingarden (Kotarbinski 1958, 741).4
Blaustein compared Twardowski's and Husserl's schools, focusing on their respective approaches to teaching philosophy. In 1925, he spent a few weeks in Freiburg im Breisgau, where he attended Husserl's seminars and lectures on phenomenological psychology (Plotka 2024, 22). In one of his papers, Blaustein described Husserl's approach to philosophical education. First, philosophy students should acquire a broad knowledge base across the natural sciences, mathematics, and history (Blaustein 1930, 240). Second, Husserl was opposed to being overly familiar with philosophical literature, as it hinders creativity. He
3	Ingarden began his philosophical studies under Twardowski, but he decided, after becoming familiar with phenomenology, to write his doctoral thesis under Husserl's supervision (Ingarden 1968, 114-115).
4	Among the members of this group, Kotarbinski (1958, 741) mentioned Salomon Igel, Walter Auerbach, Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein, Izydora D^mbska, Henryk Mehlberg, and Tadeusz Witwicki.
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advised limiting reading to only classical and prominent works. The primary goal of philosophical studies is to gain an understanding of philosophical problems, rather than the history of philosophy. Third, students should focus on independent work, which consists of observing and describing phenomena "in the way, in which they impose themselves on us" (Blaustein 1930, 240). According to Blaustein, these rules resembled those of Twardowski.5
However, there are also several significant differences, some of which influenced the reception of phenomenology in the LWS. Blaustein stressed that Husserl's seminar was not organized or systematic, and it lacked discussions, compulsory dissertations, and colloquia. Finally, and most notably, Husserl had a "tendency to train students to become his co-workers in phenomenology, and only those who follow this path, according to Husserl's admission, gain his genuine attention" (Blaustein 1930, 240).
The final aspect highlights the crucial difference between Husserl's and Twardowski's teaching. Firstly, Twardowski did not impose any philosophical doctrine on his students, nor did he expect them to use any specific philosophical 30 method (Twardowski 1999b, 27). However, he expected them to follow methods that he considered scientific; for example, following Brentano, he rejected the metaphysical speculation characteristic of post-Kantian German idealism (Twardowski 2015c, 40). Secondly, he stated that his primary aim was of a "methodical" nature, namely, to teach his students to articulate themselves clearly, to properly justify their statements, work rigorously, and think independently (Twardowski 1999b, 27). Consequently, his students applied and developed a variety of methods across all philosophical disciplines, from descriptive psychology to mathematical logic (see Brozek etal. 2021). D^mbska argued that what sets the LWS apart from other philosophical "schools," including phenomenology, is that Twardowski's students did not share any philosophical doctrine or worldview, but rather a way of philosophizing and a common scientific language (D^mbska 1948, 17).
In contrast, the phenomenological movement, at least in its early stages, appears to be more unified in its approach to philosophical issues and,
5 On the main elements of Twardowski's philosophical program, see: Twardowski 2015a; 2015b. See also: Wolenski 1989, 24-26, and Brozek, Gr^dzka, and Nowicki 2024.
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crucially, in the specific philosophical method that is the core of Husserl's project (Husserl 1983, XIX-XX; Reinach 2012, 143). Nevertheless, differences emerged within Husserl's philosophy and between him and his students, especially with Husserl's turn toward transcendental idealism in the first volume of Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (henceforth: Ideen I). Over time, phenomenology also became a highly diverse movement, which Paul Ricoeur described as a history marked by "Husserlian heresies," since Husserl's works did not establish any orthodoxy (Ricoeur 2004, 182). Still, despite the development of various "phenomenologies" by Husserl's students, the phenomenological method remained at the heart of the movement (Spiegelberg 1994, 677-679).
2. The idea of phenomenology
Herbert Spiegelberg distinguished two "methodic principles" essential to phenomenology: (1) direct intuition as the source and final test of all knowledge, and (2) insight into essential structures as a genuine possibility and a need of philosophical knowledge (Spiegelberg 1994, 5-6). I will show that the LWS members also identified those principles as the core of phenomenology. The most significant remarks regarding this topic were made by Tatarkiewicz (1913), Blaustein (1928; 1928-1929; 1930), Ajdukiewicz (1973; 2006), Czezowski (1969; 2004), and Bochenski (1956; 1965). Their works enable us to draw a relatively coherent picture of what phenomenology is from the perspective of the LWS. Of course, there are differences regarding certain details, which I point out when necessary. I must also emphasize that their works on phenomenology, apart from those of Blaustein, are mainly introductory in nature. LWS members discussed phenomenology in textbooks and papers with the aim of placing it within the context of other philosophical movements.
Overall, they considered phenomenology an autonomous philosophical discipline that has its own specific object of study and methods. Specifically, it is a purely theoretical and descriptive "science of essence" that relies on intuitive a priori cognition. The primary method of phenomenology is the intuition of essence (Wesensschau), which involves performing the so-called
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reduction (suspension of the "general thesis of natural attitude"). The first aim of phenomenology is to describe and differentiate between the essences and to uncover a priori laws that govern them. The second aim is to establish the fundamental basis for all science.
2.1. Philosophical science of essence
According to the LWS members, Husserl accepted the principle of empiricism that experience is the ultimate source of knowledge, but he rejected the view that there is only one type of experience, namely empirical perception (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 42-43; Blaustein 1930, 236; Bochenski 1956, 130). Besides individual objects given in empirical perception, there are also essences (Wesen) of those objects, which are given directly in intuition. The proper task of phenomenology is to distinguish between and describe those essences (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 260; Blaustein 1930, 236; Ajdukiewicz 1973, 4648; Bochenski 1956, 137). Thus, the LWS members defined phenomenology 32 as a "philosophical science of essence," which aligns with Husserl's approach from 1913 (see Husserl 1983, XX).
But what are those essences, which can only be apprehended directly in intuition? The prevailing view among the LWS members is that essences are some kind of ideal entities like Plato's forms (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 43; Czezowski 2004, 65; Bochenski 1965, 130). A more detailed explanation of the essence as an object of phenomenological inquiry was provided by Tatarkiewicz (1913, 257-260) and Bochenski (1965, 25-26). First, the essence relates only to certain aspects or elements of a particular object, which are revealed in intuition when the object is stripped of all contingent aspects. Second, the essence is indifferent to whether the object exists; it concerns the "what" of the object (Bochenski 1965, 17, 24-25; Tatarkiewicz 1913, 260). This explains why, according to Bochenski, "one might call this essence the fundamental structure of the object in the sense of the whole underlying content" (Bochenski 1965, 26). Third, the fact that the essence is directly given in intuition underpins the fundamental principle of phenomenology: "go back to the things themselves" (Bochenski 1956, 135). These "things" are whatever appears to our consciousness as immediately given, what we "see" in consciousness, and those are the "phenomena," the essence
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of which a phenomenologist seeks to apprehend (Bochenski 1956, 135-136). Furthermore, Tatarkiewicz described the essence as something that precedes the distinction between logical and psychological, general and individual, real and ideal (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 260). By considering essences as the focus of phenomenological inquiry, Husserl outlined an entirely new "neutral" domain of research, which is non-constructive, unlike other sciences (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 257-258), meaning that essences are given directly and are not derived from experiential data. What is particularly noteworthy about Tatarkiewicz's interpretation is that he did not understand essences merely as ideal entities (in contrast to real entities), as Ajdukiewicz, Bochenski, and Czežowski did. Unlike Blaustein, Tatarkiewicz emphasized that the essence should not be confused with a general object, as essences precede the distinction between general and individual (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 260). Instead, Tatarkiewicz sought to grasp what lies behind Husserl's conception of the essence as "irreal" (see Husserl 1983, XX), which is substantial to the idea that phenomenology is presuppositionless. The essence cannot be characterized by qualifications, such as real-ideal, individual-general, or anything similar, as all these are 33 contingent. This is why phenomenology requires a special procedure, namely, reduction. In order to "see" the essence, a phenomenologist must suspend all that is contingent, all that is given in the so-called natural attitude.
As an eidetic science, phenomenology differs from the factual sciences, which are based on sensible experience. However, there are also other eidetic sciences besides phenomenology, which may be formal or material. Formal eidetic sciences include logic and mathematics, whereas material eidetic sciences comprise geometry and phenomenology (Blaustein 1930, 236; Bochenski 1956, 137). The eidetic sciences constitute the foundation for all factual sciences, since all the latter make use of logic and mathematics (Bochenski 1956, 137). Phenomenology, as the science of essence, is considered the foundation for all science, including other eidetic sciences, since all of them incorporate essence as a component (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 258-262; Blaustein 1928-1929, 166a; Ajdukiewicz 2006, 254; Bochenski 1956, 135).
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2.2. The phenomenological method: Intuition of essence, reductions, distinctions
The exposition of the phenomenological method was challenging for the LWS members. Tatarkiewicz argued that Husserl's works are not sufficiently clear, and thus it might be better to reconstruct the method from the works of his students (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 258-259). Blaustein stated that, in order to understand phenomenology, one must first grasp what phenomenological reductions are, which is not an easy task given the complexity of the conceptual framework surrounding them (Blaustein 1930, 235). Finally, Bochenski emphasized that Husserl did not provide a concise account of his method, and the "occasional methodological observations in his writings are not always easy to understand" (Bochenski 1965, 16). Furthermore, Husserl described phenomenology as both a doctrine and a method, and it is doubtful whether "a purely methodological idea can be distinguished at all" (Bochenski 1965, 16). Nonetheless, they managed to identify and describe the basic features of 34 the phenomenological method.
The principal goal of phenomenology is to describe and distinguish between essences. However, to "see" the essence, one must employ and practice the specific procedure called Wesensschau—the intuition of essence (Blaustein 1930, 236; Ajdukiewicz 1973, 43; Bochenski 1956, 130).6 Since the intuition of essence is direct, it does not rely on either deduction or induction (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 259; Ajdukiewicz 1973, 43). According to Bochenski, the phenomenological method "neither explains by means of laws nor deduces from any principles, instead it fixes its gaze directly upon whatever is presented to consciousness, that is, its object" (Bochenski 1956, 136). The fact that intuition is a direct source of knowledge of the essence leads phenomenologists to assume that this method arrives at theses, which are undoubtedly certain (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 43).
6 Ajdukiewicz, Blaustein, and Bochenski employed the term Wesensschau to signify the intuition of essence. This is noteworthy, because, according to Plotka (2021, 258), the term does not appear in Husserl's works until his lectures on phenomenological psychology from 1925. Blaustein attended those lectures, and it is possible that at least Ajdukiewicz adopted the term from his writings. However, he does not cite his works.
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However, in order to gain such an insight into the essence, one must suspend the so-called "general thesis of natural attitude" (Blaustein 1930, 236). In a natural attitude, one experiences both the empirical world and the world of values. Humans are part of this world and assume its existence. A phenomenologist suspends or "brackets" all propositions derived from this thesis, including the assumption of the existence of the world. This is what phenomenologists call "reduction" or eno^. Ultimately, everything transcendent in relation to "pure consciousness" is subjected to reduction. The intuition of essence becomes the intuition of phenomena of pure consciousness, which is a "residue of the phenomenological eno^" (Blaustein 1930, 237). However, suspending the thesis of natural attitude does not mean rejecting the propositions that follow from it. Phenomenologists simply do not make use of them. According to Blaustein, phenomenology in the Husserlian sense is a "descriptive science of ideal essences of pure consciousness" (Blaustein 1930, 237). A similar description of the intuition of essence and the reduction was given by Tatarkiewicz who clearly distinguished between phenomenology and descriptive psychology, since the latter is a science of real, mental facts, 35 the science of reality, whereas the former is an "eidetic" science (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 261-262).
It appears that the LWS members did not clearly differentiate between eidetic and transcendental reduction. The exception was Bochenski (1956, 136-138) who actually distinguished three stages of reduction: historical, eidetic, and transcendental (Bochenski 1956, 137). First, one sets aside philosophical tradition, for phenomenologists are not interested in other people's thoughts. Second, one carries out the eidetic reduction, the "bracketing" of existence. Everything contingent, inessential to the "whatness" of the object is being suspended (Bochenski 1965, 16-17). This includes the results of all scientific knowledge, since it assumes the existence of the object (Bochenski 1956, 137-138). The last step is the transcendental reduction, which means that one brackets not only existence, but everything that is not a correlate of the subject's pure consciousness. All that remains of the object is what is given to the subject's consciousness. The concept of transcendental reduction is not easily understood, as it is rooted in Husserl's doctrine of intentionality and cannot be explained apart from it (Bochenski 1956, 138). That is why Bochenski later
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claimed that transcendental reduction "can hardly be considered a method of any general significance" (Bochenski 1965, 16). Ultimately, the LWS members contended that the employment of reduction led Husserl to transcendental idealism (Blaustein 1928, 82; Ajdukiewicz 2006, 254; Bochenski 1956, 151).7
In the context of Wesensschau, the LWS members emphasized the significance of the distinctions involved in this process. According to Tatarkiewicz (1913, 260), distinctions are essential for differentiating between various essences and for developing the typology of "essences, meanings, contents, objects, acts, and entities." He described what he called „the method of distinctions" as an analysis that identifies the features of each type of object and the relationships between them (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 258). In this sense, phenomenological investigations may amend the statements of various sciences, which often assume as directly given what is not (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 259).
The LWS members observed the similarity between the phenomenological method of distinctions and analyzing away the ambiguity of expressions. They also noted that this practice is not new and is fundamental to philosophy in 36 general. Nevertheless, phenomenologists have given it primary importance (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 260-261; Ajdukiewicz 2006, 253-254). Moreover, Bochenski stated that they "endowed it with remarkable refinement and purity, and have quite consciously employed it as the essential procedure" (Bochenski 1956, 153). It appears that the systematic use of the method of distinctions is the most valued aspect of phenomenology for the LWS. For example, Ajdukiewicz (2006, 254) emphasized that phenomenologists contributed to clarifying significant concepts in the special sciences by removing ambiguities and introducing subtle distinctions that were "desperately needed," especially in the humanities.
7 In his criticism of Husserl's theory of presentations, Blaustein sketched an argument against transcendental idealism, which he based on the analysis of sensations. Blaustein argued, against Husserl, that sensations are not part of the intentional act, but are part of what he called "the phenomenal world." It is given through transcendent perception, although directly, immediately, and adequately. If sensations are not part of the act of consciousness, but may be accessed directly and adequately, it becomes harder to justify the standpoint of transcendental idealism (see Blaustein 1928, 71-78). The limits of the paper do not allow me to go into detail about Blaustein's arguments. The topic of Blaustein's criticism of Husserl was recently thoroughly elaborated by Plotka (2024).
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As an example, he refers to Ingarden's analyses in The Literary Work of Art (see Ingarden 1979), which exerted a substantial influence on literary theory (Ajdukiewicz 2006, 254).8 It is in this context that one should read a somewhat intriguing remark: that "what phenomenologists call the intuition of essence, one may also call a careful scrutiny into the meanings of words" (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 44-45). Tatarkiewicz also noted that the method of distinctions involves demonstrating the ambiguity of expressions. He argued that the consequences of making distinctions are crucial, as only such a method results in theories free from equivocations and confusions (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 260-261). Bochenski stressed that this procedure is purely descriptive and involves point-by-point elucidation: "although it is not easy to practise, the use of the phenomenological method by Husserl and his pupils has shown that it provides a wide scope for extraordinarily fruitful research" (Bochenski 1965, 137).
The appreciation of the method of distinctions is not surprising given the importance that the LWS members attached to the clarity of speech (see Twardowski 1999a) and, consequently, to the analysis of concepts, which became one of the main philosophical methods used by Twardowski's students 37 (Ajdukiewicz 2006, 252).9 Furthermore, the description of this method, presented, for example, by Lukasiewicz (2022), bears similarities to the phenomenological method as described above:
To give a logical analysis of some concept, that is, of some abstract object, means finding all its features and examining the relations among them, with a particular attention to the necessary relations, that is, singling out the constitutive and consecutive features. (Lukasiewicz 2022, 7.)
8	A similar appreciation of this work was expressed by Blaustein. Although he did not accept Ingarden's ontological assumptions, he argued that the book is filled with valuable observations, inquiries into semantics, and the theory of presentations, and in its entirety, it is a work of fundamental importance (Blaustein 1937, 101b).
9	Moreover, the most significant of Twardowski's results are described in terms of distinctions; for example, the distinction between object and content of presentation, and the distinction between action and product (see Wolenski 1989, 35).
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Thus, the analysis of a concept involves: (1) identification of all its features; (2) differentiation between constitutive (essential) and consecutive (contingent) features; and (3) examination of the necessary relations among those features. According to Lukasiewicz, the "only correct" view regarding the nature of concepts is that they are ideal entities in Plato's sense (Lukasiewicz 2022, 4). The similarity between conceptual analyses performed by Twardowski's students and phenomenological distinctions was observed by Ingarden (1973, 7). One must, however, remember that the analysis of concepts does not involve reduction, although it may involve abstraction from contingent features of the object. Recently, Jadacki and Brozek (2022, 55-64) delivered a thorough comparison between the phenomenological method (in Ingarden's version) and the conceptual analysis developed by the LWS.
3. Criticism of phenomenology
Most of the works, in which the LWS members discussed phenomenology, 38 except for Blaustein, were introductory. They generally did not provide in-depth analyses of the phenomenological method or its application in actual philosophical works. Nevertheless, the LWS members made remarks that allow us to identify two main targets of their criticism of phenomenology (and phenomenologists): the idea that intuition is a reliable source of cognition, and the manner, in which phenomenologists express their views and justify their claims.
3.1. Against the intuition of essence as a legitimate philosophical method
Criticisms of the intuition of essence were delivered by Blaustein (19281929), Ajdukiewicz (1936; 1973), and Bochenski (1993). Blaustein rejected the essence as a legitimate object of phenomenological inquiry and, thus, the method of Wesensschau. He assumed that the validity of the phenomenological method depends on whether one can demonstrate the existence of essences, which he identified with general objects (Blaustein 1928-1929, 164b).
Firstly, it is an empirical fact that an intentional act may be directed toward a general object, which can even be described as "an intentional object of some
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mental act." However, this is actually a description of this very act, not of some kind of transcendent object that exists independently (Blaustein 1928-1929, 165a). Secondly, Wesensschau is said to be the method that allows one to "see" the essences and is the only way to determine whether they exist (Blaustein 1928-1929, 164b). However, the intuition of essence is not perception; rather, it is a so-called "schematic presentation" (Blaustein 1928-1929, 164b). In order to illustrate this point, let us suppose one perceives an empirical object, such as a picture of a square: because of this observation, the idea of a "square in general" appears in one's mind. Such an idea, based on this perception, is a schematic presentation (Blaustein 1931, 74).10 Through Wesensschau, the supposedly essential features that are fulfilled in the presenting content of the intentional act are chosen intuitively. Blaustein argues, however, that although intuition may be adequate, it does not provide the criterion that would allow one to differentiate between essential and inessential features. Therefore, it lacks demonstrative value and cannot justify any statement about the existence of essences (Blaustein 1928-1929, 165a). As a result of these considerations, Blaustein concluded that essences cannot be legitimate 39 objects of phenomenological enquiry. He asserted that what is directly given in perception are "lower species," in other words, types of objects. These types are given in perceptions through abstraction from certain contingent features of individual objects (Blaustein 1928-1929, 165a). That is why he argued that "phenomenology is possible only as an empirical, descriptive science of types (lower species) of experiences of pure consciousness, and not as an a priori, descriptive science of higher species as ideal objects" (Blaustein 1928-1929, 165b).11
Another critic of eidetic intuition was Ajdukiewicz who argued that Wesensschau does not meet the criteria of the scientific method, which requires scientific results to be intersubjectively communicable and verifiable
10	For a precise description of the concept of schematic presentation and its role in Blaustein's philosophy, see Plotka 2024, 209-211.
11	Plotka (2021, 255-258) argues that Blaustein's criticism does not so much concern Husserl as Ingarden. Husserl ultimately understands the essence as irreal rather than ideal. This is why he introduced the reduction, which suspends the question of existence.
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(Ajdukiewicz 1936, 19). These principles state that anyone with the necessary competence should be able to, first, understand the statements produced by any science and, second, reproduce scientific procedures and their results (Ajdukiewicz 1936, 19). He admitted that applying these principles limits the scope of philosophical enquiry to the extent that methods, such as Wesensschau or the Bergsonian intuition—although they hold value in their own domain—, are not acceptable within these limits. Ajdukiewicz's criticism can be contrasted with Czežowski's view, which regarded methods relying on intuition and employing an extended notion of empirical experience as scientifically valid. Such methods are simply not yet as developed as those of the natural sciences (Czežowski 1969, 27). Czežowski and other LWS members did, in fact, allow reliance on intuition, at least in the field of values, in their analyses of certain axiological facts (see Brožek 2015).
Finally, Bochenski offered a generally positive evaluation of phenomenology, suggesting that there are notable similarities between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. For instance, both movements emphasize the necessity of 40 analysis and strive for objectivity. Phenomenologists, like analytic philosophers, are also interested in the analysis of language. Nonetheless, he criticized the fact that phenomenology relies on direct intuitive insight rather than logical reasoning, which is unacceptable to analytic philosophers (Bochenski 1993, 40-41).12
3.2. Against obscure philosophical style
The postulates of the clarity of speech and justification of statements are essential elements of Twardowski's philosophical program (Wolenski 1989, 36-41; Brožek et al. 2021, 194, 237). Twardowski was convinced that even the most complex philosophical problems can be expressed clearly, if a philosopher has the ability to think clearly himself (Twardowski 1999a, 257). Hence, it is not surprising that the LWS members used the principle of clarity to assess philosophical works and movements, and phenomenology was no exception.
Tatarkiewicz raised this objection against Ideen I, arguing that Husserl's "arrangement of issues, expression, and terminology makes the introduction
12 Bochenski (1985) also criticized continental philosophers for not learning and applying mathematical logic in their philosophical analyses.
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to phenomenology difficult" (Tatarkiewicz 1913, 258). Blaustein also observed that Polish philosophers oppose the form, in which Husserl's views are presented, since it lacks "sufficient clarity and scientifically satisfying exactness" (Blaustein 1930, 233). What additionally contributed to the problems of understanding phenomenology is that Husserl did not publish much, and his students applied the enormous methodical and conceptual apparatus that is only available in Husserl's manuscripts (Blaustein 1930, 235).13 The obscurity of Husserl's writing was also observed by Kotarbiñski who juxtaposed it with Twardowski's style of philosophizing. He stated that Husserl's analyses of intentional objects are "deeper" than Twardowski's; however, this depth lacks clarity, whereas Twardowski, in the case of conflict between depth and clarity, always chose the latter (Kotarbiñski 1958, 741). Finally, Lukasiewicz wrote rather maliciously that, while he was impressed by Husserl's antipsychologistic project outlined in the first volume of Logische Untersuchungen,14 he was disappointed with the second volume, for it contained "an obscure philosophical chatter, which repelled [him] from all German philosophers." He added: "I was surprised that such a big difference may occur between two volumes of the same work." 41 (Lukasiewicz 2013, 65-66.)
The accusation of obscurity was also raised by Ajdukiewicz who contended that the arguments produced by authors, such as Husserl and Bergson, were expressed in inexact, evocative language, full of metaphors. The proper language for philosophy should be structured upon modern logic; it should contain strictly defined rules and meanings (Ajdukiewicz 1936, 19-20). He also went up against Husserl's student, Martin Heidegger, by accusing him of having
[...] a caricatural tendency toward verbal hypostases and the creation of neologisms, which replace the lack of clear meaning with suggestive expressions. In effect, we are left with a largely incomprehensible whole,
13	Blaustein regularly raised the issue of the ambiguity and the obscurity of Husserl's concepts. He argued that Husserl unjustifiably extends the meanings of the concepts of intentionality, consciousness, and sensation, which leads to the emergence of contradiction in his theory (Blaustein 1928, 84-88).
14	Husserl's arguments against psychologism exerted an enormous influence on the LWS (see Wolenski 1997, 155-156).
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which, however, can evoke a certain mood and has a semblance of depth. (Ajdukiewicz 2006, 254.)
Ajdukiewicz remarked that Heidegger's thought reflects a shift in German philosophy of the time. Namely, German philosophers abandoned purely theoretical issues related to ontology and epistemology in favor of "life philosophy," which aims to understand the meaning of human life (Ajdukiewicz 2006, 255-256). However, because this philosophy relies on an "obscure and irresponsible metaphysics," it tends to cause disapproval among scholars trained in precise and responsible scientific work (Ajdukiewicz 2006, 256). He also noted a simultaneous emergence of the opposition to life philosophy, a philosophical movement that may be called "scientific philosophy." It seeks to incorporate the principles of the strict scientific method into philosophical work. Its proponents include the members of the Vienna Circle in Austria, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred N. Whitehead in the UK, as well as the LWS members in Poland (Ajdukiewicz 2006, 256). Even in the 1937 paper by 42 Ajdukiewicz, we therefore find quite an early expression of the chasm that emerged in 20th-century philosophy, which we now know under the name of the analytic-continental divide.15
A positive view of Husserl's philosophical style was expressed by Bochenski. He agreed that Husserl is "not always easy to understand" (Bochenski 1965, 16), but believed that Husserl's works are difficult to read "not so much because of inadequacy of expression as from their theme," and that Husserl "is a model of precision as a philosophical writer and reminds one of Aristotle in this respect" (Bochenski 1956, 131). Bochenski's overall assessment of Husserl's writings remains positive, since they
[...] contain such a host of penetrating and subtle analyses that it seems doubtful whether this wealth of knowledge has yet been completely utilized or even put into circulation. His works may come to rank as a classical source for future philosophy. (Bochenski 1956, 132.)
15 The history and the significance of the analytic-continental divide have recently become a growing field of study. See, for example: Chase and Reynolds 2011; Vrahimis 2013.
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He especially valued Husserl's early work presented in Logische Untersuchungen, for it contains the theory of meaning, the theory of pure grammar, the concept of the category of meaning, and the part-whole theory, which he considered "one of the most valuable achievements of contemporary philosophy" (Bochenski 1956, 135). Unlike Ajdukiewicz, Bochenski appreciated Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, especially the analyses of the concept of time. However, he asserted that Heidegger failed to achieve his own goals, since he wanted to derive general ontology from the subject, which is unattainable (Bochenski 1994, 26-27).
4. Analytic philosophers on phenomenology
Like the LWS members, other thinkers, representing the early analytic tradition, offered criticisms of phenomenology. The detailed elaboration of their arguments exceeds the scope of this paper, so I will limit myself to presenting only the main points.16
One of Husserl's fiercest opponents was Moritz Schlick who argued 43 against what he called an "idealistic" turn in philosophy, which abandons the concept of knowledge developed by empirical science. Representatives of this turn, William James, Henri Bergson, and most notably Husserl, seek to establish intuition as the ultimate source of philosophical knowledge. Being immediate and direct, intuition does not rely on quantitative symbolic-mathematical methods (Schlick 1979, 144). Schlick argued, however, that knowing comes about by comparison of the new object with the object that is already known, by a reduction of the former to the latter, a rediscovery of the one in the other. An object is apprehended when it is assigned a correct place in one's knowledge pattern, and this is done through concepts and symbols. According to Schlick, the essence of knowledge is conceptual and quantitative. By contrast, in intuition, one is confronted with a single object, without relating it to anything else. This process has no resemblance to knowledge at all (Schlick 1979, 144-146). Finally, about Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen, he wrote that "it is not through intuition that the truths contained in the book
16 The criticism of phenomenology by analytic philosophers is discussed in: Marion 2003; Chase and Reynolds 2011, 2017; Vrahimis 2013.
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are elicited, but rather precisely through a skilled process of coordination, classification and description; not through 'contemplation of essences' but by methods of comparison and symbolization" (Schlick 1979, 150-151).
In the cradle of analytic philosophy, Gilbert Ryle rejected the core elements of Husserl's project: the intuition of essence, transcendental reduction, the notion of intentionality, the idea that immanent perception is a source of immediate and evident cognition, and the assumption that phenomenology is a foundation of all science (Ryle 2009a, 179-181). He argued that phenomenology can and should be reduced to the "philosophy of psychology," which is to analyze propositions that contain concepts of psychic functions, such as "Jones knows or believes such and such" (Ryle 2009a, 185). Moreover, he rather maliciously stated:
The proprietary method claimed for Phenomenology is a sham, and Phenomenology, if it moves at all, moves only by the procedures by which all good philosophers have always advanced, the elucidation of concepts, including consciousness-concepts. (Ryle 2009b, 229.)
44
Finally, one must mention the notorious "elimination of metaphysics" presented by Carnap who conducted what he called a logical analysis of Heidegger's statement: "Nothing itself nothings," and concluded that it is, in fact, a meaningless pseudo-statement (Carnap 1959, 69-70). Essentially, his argument relied on the assumption that only statements that are empirically verifiable and whose method of verification is known have meaning. Such statements must either consist of words referring to objects accessible empirically or be deduced from the so-called protocol (or observation) statements that have already been accepted (Carnap 1959, 62-65). Although Carnap's criticism did not directly address phenomenology, he contended that
[...] logical analysis [...] pronounces the verdict of meaninglessness of any alleged knowledge that pretends to reach above and behind [empirical] experience. This verdict hits, in the first place, any speculative metaphysics, any alleged knowledge by pure thinking or by pure intuition that pretends to be able to do without experience. (Carnap 1959, 76.)
Aleksandra Gomueczak
He concluded by noting that what remains of philosophy is the method of logical analysis, limited to either eliminating meaningless words and pseudostatements or to clarifying meaningful concepts and propositions, in order to establish logical foundations for factual science and mathematics (Carnap 1959, 77).
From this brief overview, it can be argued that the main targets of analytic philosophers' criticism align with those of the LWS. However, it is important to emphasize that the members of the LWS developed their arguments and ideas independently of their Western counterparts (see Wolenski 1989, 295-302). Furthermore, Austrian and British philosophers appear to be more radical in their judgments than Polish philosophers. Carnap, Ryle, and Schlick rejected the idea that intuition could be a source of knowledge in any sense. Ryle and Schlick downgraded valuable elements of Husserl's phenomenology to the analysis of concepts and regarded it as no novelty. Ultimately, Ryle reduced phenomenology (and descriptive psychology) to the analysis of statements about psychological facts. Carnap deemed the statements that are not empirically verifiable to be meaningless, thereby, in a sense, radicalizing the 45 accusation of obscurity. Additionally, he reduced all philosophy to the analysis of those concepts that may prove useful to science.
Conclusion
The LWS members represent a relatively coherent standpoint with regard to phenomenology. First, due to shared origins in the Brentano school, they provided comparisons between Husserl's and Twardowski's approaches to teaching philosophy, showing significant similarities and differences. This genetic connection contributed to the interest in phenomenology among the LWS members. Second, they regarded the method of eidetic intuition as the core of phenomenology, valuing the distinctions involved in the process of identifying and describing essences. This is probably because it resembles the analysis of concepts, a method fundamental to Twardowski and his students. Thus, their interpretation of phenomenology aligns with Spiegelberg's (1994). However, they criticized the very idea of the intuition of essence (Wesensschau) as a reliable method of philosophical inquiry. The exception was Czežowski
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who allowed certain intuitive insights as a legitimate method of philosophizing. They also condemned the "philosophical style" of phenomenologists' work, which they found to be obscure.
Despite criticism, the LWS members regarded phenomenology as an important philosophical movement with notable contributions, particularly Husserl's arguments against psychologism and the use of distinctions. The most favorable views on phenomenology were expressed by Tatarkiewicz and Bochenski. The latter appreciated not only Husserl, but also Heidegger, which is uncommon in the analytic tradition. Finally, the LWS members' view of phenomenology overlaps significantly with that of other analytic philosophers. The similarity concerns both the criticism as well as the valuable aspects of phenomenology. In this way, their work may serve as a certain confirmation of the chasm that emerged in 20th-century European thought between analytic and continental philosophy. The chasm had, in a sense, already been observed by Ajdukiewicz in 1937.
Taking the adduced into consideration, what is exceptional about the LWS 46 compared to other analytic groups17 is that their criticism, which addresses the core features of the Husserlian phenomenology, did not prevent them from discussing and adopting various ideas promulgated by Husserl. In this sense, the reception of phenomenology in the LWS is quite rich, as was noted by Blaustein (1930, 233). The topic and the scope of this paper do not allow for a further elaboration on this issue. The literature provides an account of various traces of Husserlian inspirations in the LWS (see: Küng 1993; Wolenski 1997; Olech 1995; Miskiewicz 2009; Glombik 2011; Luksiewicz 2020; Plotka 2024). However, this area still requires systematic research. In particular, the so-called "Lvov phenomenological circle," a group of Twardowski's students gathered around Ingarden, which included Blaustein, Ginsberg-Blaustein, Igel, Auerbach, and Tadeusz Witwicki (Plotka 2017, 87), requires further investigation. In their works, one finds significant references not only to Husserl and Ingarden, but also to other prominent phenomenologists, such as Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, and Moritz Geiger.
17 On the "modest" reception of phenomenology in British analytic philosophy and in the Vienna Circle, see: Marion 2003; Vrahimis 2013; Chase and Reynolds 2017.
Aleksandra Gomueczak
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Review scientific paper Pregledni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.3 UDC: 165.62:159.954
Leopold Blaustein's Unique
Phenomenological-Psychological
Thought
The Psychological Perspective
Amadeusz Citlak
Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Psychology, Jaracza 1, 00-371 Warsaw, Poland
acitlak@wp.pl \ acitlak@psych.pan.pl | ^
Abstract
The article focuses on several selected aspects of Leopold Blaustein's philosophical and psychological thought, which have a unique significance in the context of the Lvov-Warsaw School and could be an essential voice in the contemporary discourse on mental phenomena. This concerns: firstly, Blaustein's proposal to combine descriptive psychology with phenomenology; secondly, humanistic psychology as a unique proposal encompassing an originally understood subject matter of research
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and a comprehensive methodology; thirdly, the underestimated role of perception in shaping various types of experiences and attitudes (aesthetic, religious, etc.). Although Blaustein was primarily a philosopher, his works were also directly concerned with psychology, and from this perspective, I try to understand the selected aspects of his thought. Despite the passage of time, these are achievements of great importance for philosophy and potentially for contemporary psychology.
Keywords: humanistic psychology, mental phenomena, theory crisis, phenomenological psychology, Brentano school.
Edinstvena fenomenološko-psihološka misel Leopolda Blausteina. Psihološka perspektiva
Povzetek
Članek se osredotoča na več izbranih vidikov filozofske in psihološke misli Leopolda Blausteina, ki imajo edinstven pomen v kontekstu lvovsko-varšavske šole 54 in bi lahko predstavljali bistven glas v sodobnem diskurzu o mentalnih fenomenih. To zlasti zadeva: prvič, Blausteinov predlog povezovanja deskriptivne psihologije s fenomenologijo; drugič, humanistično psihologijo kot edinstven zasnutek, kakršen vključuje izvirno razumljeno vsebino raziskovanja in vsestransko metodologijo; tretjič, podcenjeno vlogo zaznavanja pri oblikovanju različnih tipov izkustva in zadržanj (estetskih, religioznih itd.). Čeprav je bil Blaustein prvenstveno filozof, se njegova dela tudi neposredno dotikajo psihologije in s tovrstne perspektive skušam razumeti nekatere vidike njegove misli. Kljub minevanju časa gre za dosežke izrednega pomena za filozofijo in morebiti tudi za sodobno psihologijo.
Ključne besede: humanistična psihologija, mentalni fenomeni, kriza teorije, fenomenološka psihologija, Brentanova šola.
Amadeusz Citlak
Introduction
The main purpose of this article is to present the most important theoretical achievements of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Kazimierz Twardowski (founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School), as well as their uniqueness, particularly in the context of contemporary psychological thought. Blaustein's philosophical interests primarily encompassed issues at the intersection of psychology and philosophy, including phenomenology, perception, judgement, and aesthetic experience.
In the first part of the text, I discuss Blaustein's position within the Lvov-Warsaw School with regard to the evolving views of its representatives and the wide spectrum of theoretical perspectives. This section also explains why Blaustein and his works enjoyed interest primarily among Polish philosophers and to a lesser extent among Polish psychologists. I then present his key achievements, such as the proposal for a descriptive psychology combined with a phenomenological approach, his original proposal for a humanistic psychology, and the importance of perception in aesthetic experience. I 55 attempt to demonstrate that Blaustein's works, despite the passage of time, still represent an attractive conceptual device that could enrich theoretical and philosophical discourse on the border of psychology and phenomenology.
I also hop e that this article will fill a gap in the presentation ofthe psychological branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which remains underappreciated in world literature (usually dominated by the school's philosophical-logical tradition). This gap also applies to Polish literature, where Blaustein is unfortunately often overlooked. It is worth emphasizing that, as one of the few representatives of Twardowski's school, he advocated combining the philosophy of Franz Brentano and phenomenology with psychological issues. Blaustein's philosophy reveals not only the complexity of descriptive psychology that was then developing in Poland (as well as in Central and Eastern Europe), but also its vitality.
Blaustein and the Polish school of psychology
Leopold Blaustein (1905-1942/44?) belongs to the third generation of students of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, as a result of which he was influenced by his most mature and formed philosophical views
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(Plotka 2024). He joined Twardowski's school after a period of major disputes concerning psychologism in logic, rejected by Edmund Husserl in Logische Untersuchungen (1900-1901), whose work changed the approach to psychology among many students of the Polish school. However, this does not mean that, in the later period, the philosophical beliefs in the Lvov environment were shared by everyone in the same way; the reality was quite the opposite. In the interwar period (1918-1939), Twardowski's school experienced its greatest flourishing and development (Lapointe et al. 2009; Wolenski 2018). It was a mature formation with recognized scientific achievements in Europe. This is evidenced not only by international publications, but also by the fact that just before (or during) the outbreak of the Second World War, many of them moved to other universities in the world.1 Considering the peripheral location of Lvov within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and to the great centers of philosophy in Western Europe, this is evidence of the relatively high position of the Polish philosophical environment, in which Blaustein studied (Brožek et al. 2015).
During his studies at the Faculty of Philosophy of Jan Kazimierz University 56 in Lvov (1923-1927), Blaustein attended lectures by professors representing various trends of thought within the Twardowski school. His most significant teachers were Twardowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Roman Ingarden. It was mainly due to them that Blaustein became interested in analytical philosophy, psychology, and phenomenology, which later constituted a common area of his research, including aesthetic experience. However, the inspirations and sources of Blaustein's scientific formation went far beyond the Polish environment. In 1925, he went to Freiburg for one semester to study phenomenology with Husserl. After obtaining his doctoral degree in 1927, he went to Berlin on a several-month scholarship, where he participated in research and lectures by, among others, Carl Stumpf and the founders of Gestalt psychology: Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Kohler. Blaustein sought
1 Alfred Tarski became a professor of logic at Berkeley University, Jan Lukasiewicz moved to the Royal Academy of Science in Dublin as a lecturer in logic, Edward Poznanski went to Hebrew University, Jozef Bochenski went to the University of Freiburg, Henryk Hiz became a professor of linguistics at Pennsylvania State University, Henryk Mehlberg went to the University of Chicago taking over the philosophy department after Rudolf Carnap.
Amadeusz Citlak
to establish closer cooperation between them and the Lvov philosophical community, debating with German scientists and providing them with important Polish scientific works (e.g., Twardowski, Jan Lukasiewicz) (Plotka 2020b, 2023; 2024).
The Lvov-Warsaw School is not a uniform entity; it is not distinguished by one leading theory shared by all or most of its representatives. The distinguishing feature was how to conduct philosophical research, within which various theories (philosophical, logical, sociological, psychological) could be formulated (Wolenski 1989). Blaustein's scientific image within the Lvov-Warsaw School can, therefore, be assessed differently depending on the point of reference. Regardless of this, his position among philosophers is unquestionable, while his position among psychologists of the Twardowski school reflects the problems that this branch of the school faced in the history of Polish humanities (Rosinska 2005; Rzepa 1992; Wolenski 2019).
In Polish literature, such representatives of psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw School as Wladyslaw Witwicki, Stefan Baley, Stefan Blachowski, Mieczyslaw Kreutz, Andrzej Lewicki, and sometimes Tadeusz Tomaszewski (Rzepa 57 1997; 1998), are usually mentioned. However, Polish psychology overlooked Blaustein for many years. This is due to at least three reasons.
Firstly, after Husserl rejected psychologism and Twardowski's students accepted his position, the Polish school substantially revaluated the subject matter of philosophical research. Initially, Twardowski, following Brentano, treated the new empirical psychology as a chance to legitimize philosophy, including logic and the theory of knowledge (Rzepa and Stachowski 1993). Twardowski's first works were philosophical and psychological in nature, and he never abandoned these interests. His first doctorate was promoted by W. Witwicki, a psychologist. In 1904, he visited scientific centers in Europe (Paris, Prague, Berlin, Gottingen, Giesen, Graz, Wurzburg, Halle, and Leipzig), and, in 1907, he established a laboratory of experimental psychology at the University of Lvov. He taught both disciplines and educated the first generation of Polish psychologists who took over post-war Poland's most important psychology departments.2 However, the anti-psychological turn
2 Witwicki at the University of Warsaw from 1919 (S. Baley joined him in 1934),
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weakened interest in psychology, and the school's philosophers turned mainly toward logical and phenomenological research. On the other hand, despite their initial connections with philosophy, the psychologists mentioned above increasingly turned toward the world of empirical psychology, dominated by experiment, measurement, and observation (Citlak 2023).
Secondly, the transformation of psychology in the USA additionally strengthened this process. The strong position of behaviorism, progressive reductionism, the atomization of research, and the focus on seemingly "hard" empirical data did not favor the development of descriptive psychology, pushing it more and more into subjective research of (seemingly) lower scientific value (Pickren and Rutheford 2010). Even such a large and significant research programs of psychology of the time as was Wilhelm Wundt's program of two-way psychology (experimental and historical-cultural) did not develop among American psychologists, and was forgotten in Europe (Greenwood 2003, 2003a; Jovanovic 2021).
Thirdly, the shape of the humanities and science (including psychology) 58 in Poland after 1945 was influenced by the new Soviet government, which marginalized Twardowski's school as a relic of the bourgeoisie (Kuliniak et al. 2018). Unfortunately, it almost eliminated the achievements of the Lvov-Warsaw School psychology from the public discourse. One of the painful examples was the attitude of T. Tomaszewski, a student of M. Kreutz (a student of Twardowski), who, after taking over the department of psychology in 1948 at the University of Warsaw, became an active opponent of the old school and a propagator of the ideologization of psychology (Stachowski 2010). The sharp edge of criticism was directed, among other things, against introspection, praising the Soviet physiological psychology and psychology of work (Koczanowicz and Koczanowicz-Dehnel 2021). Blaustein's proposals did not fit these trends, so they found no followers among Polish psychologists. Moreover, the fact that his works were philosophical in nature meant that it was more difficult for Polish psychologists to perceive him as a psychologist.
Kreutz at the University of Wroclaw after World War II, Blachowski at the University of Poznan from 1919, Czezowski at Stefan Batory University in Vilnius (now Lithuania) and at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun after WW2.
Amadeusz Citlak
Unfortunately, in addition to the profound changes in Polish psychology after 1989, its Westernization did not weaken, but only gained in strength. After a period of censorship and control by the communist authorities, Polish psychology applied the standards of Western psychology with great commitment, without paying much attention to its own scientific heritage in this area (Citlak 2023a). Excessive optimism and a lack of criticism toward scientific novelties—criticism typical of the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School (Rzepa 2019; Rzepa and Stachowski 1993)—significantly contributed to the Americanization and "colonization" of Polish psychology after 1989, to which other countries of Eastern and Western Europe also succumbed (Dobroczynski and Rzepa 2019).
Paradoxically, however, Blaustein's thought fits well into a certain space of contemporary—not only Polish—psychology, which for some time now has been demanding new proposals in the theory and philosophy of psychology. Contrary to appearances, Blaustein's thought is in some respects more relevant today than it was a hundred years ago.
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Relevance of Blaustein's descriptive psychology
The value of psychology as proposed by Blaustein can clearly be seen against the background of difficulties that contemporary psychology is struggling with. One of its most significant dilemmas is the problem of research replication. This applies even to recognized psychological theories with empirical support. In 2015 and 2018, two international projects tested the chances of replicating previously obtained research results (Nosek et al. 2018). In the first case, the replication coefficient was about 30%, and in the second, it was about 50%. For an empirical science that prides itself on experiment and measurement, this is a poor result that no scientific discipline would like to achieve. However, the problem is not new; it has been identified before, although only the current accumulation and widespread availability of research published in international journals has shown the deep problems of empirical psychology. The first reaction of its representatives was to correct the statistical methods, which were considered to be imprecise (Wasserstein et al. 2019). It quickly transpired that the problem lies deeper, namely in constructed theories. The weakness is not
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so much statistics, but the theory and philosophy of psychology (Fiedler 2017; Morawski 2019). Often, there is no strict logical connection between theories and the hypotheses derived from them, which means that the obtained results only partially support or contradict the adopted hypotheses (it is not known to what extent). Moreover, the main variables of various theories also have unclear or imprecise definitions. A common problem is combining variables with completely different ontological statuses and then trying to explain the connections between them using definitions or entire theories taken from other scientific disciplines. Conceptual frameworks for psychological research were/are very often provided by psychiatry, sociology, and currently also neuroscience (Coltheart 2006; Wann 1964). Of course, this does not have to be a mistake, but taking over conceptual instruments from other sciences leads to profound semantic shifts and to focusing on problems of a slightly different type than would result from the nature of the phenomenon being studied.
The problem is particularly acute in the case of mental phenomena, the ontological status of which does not allow for an uncritical acceptance of 60 the methodology and conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences (Brandl 2021; Taieb 2023; Uher 2019). At the end of the 19th century, Franz Brentano and Wilhelm Wundt presented two different conceptualizations of mental phenomena: Brentano in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) and Wundt in Physiological Psychology (1874). Wundt was convinced that mental phenomena, in addition to their temporality, also have a feature of intensity that can be measured and expressed using the language of mathematics, ensuring psychology a strong place in science. Brentano indicated intentionality as the main feature without being overly concerned with the measurement problem. Wundt created a bridge between psychology and the natural sciences, while Brentano opened up a field of research that went beyond the paradigms of the natural sciences, allowing emerging psychology to create its language and original definitions. The subsequent history of this discipline showed that the approach of Wundt turned out to be more attractive, and Brentano was marginalized as a philosopher more than the true founder of empirical psychology (Meyer et al. 2018). But the problem of such a one-sided approach was signaled many times, especially since the idea of measurement, based on the principle of isomorphism (mathematical quantities and the relationships
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between them represent/correspond to psychological quantities and the relationships between them), had very weak theoretical foundations (Michell 2021). The research results generated in this way, i.e., based on the definitions of variables often taken from other sciences, plus the measurement mentioned above, were destined to lead to a general crisis sooner or later.
I devote more space to this problem, because Blaustein's proposals fit perfectly into the theory crisis despite the passage of more than a hundred years. It is worth mentioning that in international discourse, it has been proposed to overcome the crisis by, for example, adopting capacious theories, i.e., those covering the largest possible group of variables that the accepted paradigm would explain. In one of the more discussed proposals, Michael Muthukrishna and Joseph Henrich suggest an evolutionary paradigm covering beliefs, convictions, emotions, behavior, etc. (Muthukrishna and Henrich 2019). In turn, Klaus Oberauer and Stephan Lewandowsky, analyzing psychological theories, claim that one of the solutions would be the mathematical and logical modelling of theories, which would increase their coherence and connection with possible hypotheses (Oberauer and Lewandowsky 2019). However, even 61 these proposals do not consider the different ontological statuses of variables that cannot be explained in a similar manner. Furthermore, the logical/ mathematical modelling of the theory still leaves open the problem of the nature of these variables. In other words, the fundamental problem concerns the insight into the essence of psychological phenomena and the possibilities of their definition (Green 2021).
In the case of mental phenomena, and therefore psychology par excellence, the main source of reaching them invariably remains introspection, understood as innere Wahrnehmung. Given the difficulties outlined above, Brentano's main statements regarding descriptive psychology are applicable, and should be used in building a conceptual base that could be applied to build hypotheses and theories and, at a later stage, to design research. Among Twardowski's students, Blaustein was one of the most interested in using descriptive psychology to analyze specific phenomena, such as aesthetic experience like the perception of a radio play or film. The use of descriptive psychology, as proposed by Blaustein, is fundamental to the definition of mental phenomena (Citlak 2025). In its basic assumptions, it remains consistent with Brentano,
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Twardowski, and Dilthey (although he used their works, while at the same time maintaining a critical attitude; Plotka 2020). This type of psychology allows us to identify, describe, classify, and distinguish types as well as to capture the components of phenomena. This is indisputably the starting point for any further research. Blaustein, moreover, slightly broadens the scope of research by including products as an additional source of empirical data, as was proposed by Twardowski (Twardowski 1912). Furthermore, Blaustein fully accepts experimental research, which he treats as an extension of the achievements of phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology. We then obtain two separate "methods" or two separate "phases" of research, although complementary to each other (Blaustein 1930, 5). Both of these have different goals, i.e., description and explanation. Descriptive psychology does not go beyond the obvious/evident data from introspective experience (Plotka 2023).
An additional advantage of his proposal is the inclusion of the findings of phenomenology, which, despite a rather critical assessment (Plotka 62 2024), he treated as an essential tool of his research. Blaustein was more in favor of the analysis of the content and types of empirical consciousness, the empirical subject and its experiences, than—as Husserl wanted—the analysis of pure consciousness, the essence of experiences, going beyond the empirical subject (Husserl 1925/1968). Descriptive psychology should be an empirical psychology and a development or extension of phenomenology; it was to be a descriptive psychology with a phenomenological tinge, close to Husserl's phenomenological psychology from 1925. Leaving aside the differences between them, the very fact of including phenomenology in psychological empirical research brings Blaustein, to some extent, closer to the phenomenological psychology that developed after Husserl's death (Miskiewicz 2009; Plotka 2017).
Blaustein's research proposal, which focuses on the experiences of the empirical subject, corresponds well with the problems I mentioned above. The theoretical and definitional deficiencies of 21st-century psychology are currently so visible that for some time, it has been explicitly postulated to accept the phenomenological approach as an essential condition for experimental research. Both descriptive and phenomenological psychology
Amadeusz Citlak
can provide basic (still missing) knowledge about the specificity of many studied variables, their features, structure, quality, etc., and thus knowledge necessary for the correct planning of cause-and-effect research (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012). However, these are not obvious or universally accepted explanations and proposals. This problem is deepened by the multi-layered nature of some variables, not to mention certain "wholes." Blaustein says: "Elementary psychic experiences are originally given in wholes of a higher order. Only the psychological analysis of these wholes reveals to us the elementary experiences that are part of them." (Blaustein 1935, 36.) Unfortunately, grasping these wholes is becoming increasingly difficult due to the increasing atomization of research.
The only way to order these problems is through descriptive psychology based on subjective experience and the phenomenological approach, which is focused—as Blaustein postulates—on consciousness/empirical subject. Followers of the phenomenological approach in psychology propose, among other strategies, research on people trained in phenomenological reduction so that they can provide introspective reports without unnecessary, stereotypical 63 interpretations of this experience (Gallagher 2003; Lutz et al. 2002; Varela et al. 2001). In order to increase the objectivity of introspective reports, they propose procedures that allow for the transition from the first-person perspective to the third-person perspective, such as the mathematization and formalization of the language of the utterances (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012; Marbach 1993).
In other words, Blaustein's proposals indicated a possible direction of research, not only philosophical, but also psychological, almost a hundred years ago; unfortunately, this was a direction forgotten or at least underestimated. As I mentioned, Blaustein is not the only figure in the Lvov-Warsaw School who was close to this project. However, Blaustein explicitly combines two traditions and focuses on the empirical subject, integrating the descriptive and the phenomenological approaches with further experimental research based on causal explanations. In light of the problems with defining mental phenomena and suggestions formulated by phenomenological psychologists, descriptive psychology with Blaustein's phenomenological tinge seems, therefore, not only relevant, but interdisciplinary, reminding us that a real and adequate study of mental phenomena cannot give up its philosophical background.
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Uniqueness of Blaustein's humanistic psychology
One of Blaustein's more interesting projects is the proposal of humanistic psychology, which he derived to a large extent from Wilhelm Dilthey's Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie (1894) and the works of his student Eduard Spranger. However, Dilthey was interested in legitimizing historical and humanistic sciences by using psychology, and this proposal of humanistic psychology should be read in the light of a broader hermeneutical program, rather than as a proposal of an independent psychological project. Such legitimizing foundations were to be provided by the analysis/understanding of man's inner experience and thus by combining verstehende Psychologie with the hermeneutics of cultural life and descriptive psychology (Przyl^bski 2012; Bollnow 1980). Dilthey emphasizes man's cultural and social embeddedness, which eludes atomistic analysis or isolated cause-and-effect relationships. Religion, customs, art, and language, together with the individual subject, create Strukturzusammenhang, which should be studied holistically, not reduced to 64 simplified explanatory mechanisms. However, the abstractness and generality of Dilthey's claims, and the saturation with a certain kind of metaphysics, were met with sharp criticism by Hermann Ebbinghaus who accused him of misunderstanding empirical psychology (Ebbinghaus 1896; see also Galliker 2013). It is hard not to agree with at least some of Ebbinghaus's accusations, especially since a certain kind of distancing can also be seen in Blaustein's proposal for humanistic psychology from 1935 (distance from metaphysics, excessive abstraction, ambiguity). Nevertheless, Dilthey's proposal to include such psychology in the humanities became a lasting conviction of the Polish philosopher who gave it an original and unique meaning.
There are a few features that distinguish Blaustein's humanistic psychology. Firstly, according to him, humanistic psychology provides the humanities with "a basis for understanding a specific person," "it is an auxiliary science of the humanities," and creates "psychological foundations for the humanities" (Blaustein 1935, 51). The matter at stake is not so much the legitimization of the humanities as obtaining psychological foundations for them. Secondly, such psychology as an object of study has "an individual psyche [...] not some mystical collective psyche." It concerns primarily the specific, empirical
Amadeusz Citlak
research rooted in subjective experience. Thirdly, this psychology focuses on the subject embedded in relations with the social environment (other people, groups) and—similarly to Dilthey—the symbolic, cultural environment (i.e., the physical or psychophysical products, as Twardowski would say). It encompasses the space of an individual creating reality and embracing it. Fourthly, contrary to Dilthey, Spranger, and others, Blaustein postulates the adoption of such methods as understanding, interpretation, analysis, and introspection as well as observation, experiment, survey, and statistics, i.e., methods typical of explanatory/subjective/genetic psychology. Such an extensive methodology results from the belief that humanistic psychology "examines the psyche of a person living within the humanistic reality," which "is identical to the natural reality." This reality includes the human world, but is studied from an "anthropocentric point of view [...]; it consists in the fact that the humanities are interested in the world, only insofar as it is a person, his creation, the space, in which he creates" (44). The perspective of Blaustein—a thoroughbred empiricist—may be somewhat surprising, considering that he was, after all, a phenomenologist. But this, among other points, testifies to the 65 originality of his humanistic psychology.
The uniqueness of Blaustein's humanistic psychology, however, goes much deeper and concerns an aspect that has not yet, to my knowledge, been considered in literature. Namely, the fact that the phenomenological perspective allows him to not only go beyond reductionist tendencies, but, in combination with the theses contained in the text from 1935, also allows him to conduct research in a style that is reminiscent of the contemporary so-called indigenous approach, and can be, thus, considered as a research proposal leading to the formulation of grounded theories. This is possible, if the researcher considers a broad methodological spectrum, including methods of natural sciences; and this is something that Blaustein does. In indigenous psychology (Allwood and Berry 2006; Kim and Berry 1993), the local, geographical, and ethnic nature of psychological processes is taken into account. The world of the subject's experiences always remains part of a broader spectrum of connections as a unique system of variables conditioned by such a dynamic and original network of dependencies that one cannot expect their exact replication in another place or time. Indigenous psychology/psychologies offer original, local explanations
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and theories of psychological phenomena, they may be similar, although they are not identical. Indigenous psychology is currently an essential voice in cultural psychology (Kim et al. 2006) and, above all, in postcolonial discourse, in which marginalized and previously unnoticed important and original conceptualizations come to the fore (Hwang 2005). They force us to verify some theories developed in Western culture (mainly Western Europe and the USA) and promoted as mental or discursive calques for an allegedly fuller understanding of "other social entities" (Ting et al. 2025). Interpreting locally/ geographically embedded empirical data in light of psychology understood in this way gives voice to real experience, which only then becomes more understandable. This approach is close to grounded theories, which arise when the research derives its claims solely from the subject of the study, without apodictically imposing foreign concepts and taking over their definitions, for example, from other ready-made theories. In the analysis process, concepts should somehow emerge on their own; the researcher reads them and does not construct them.3 Blaustein sees it as being similar to this:
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In mental life, we encounter various experiential wholes of a higher order, which include elementary experiences. [...] Observing mental life, a psychologist finds these wholes, analyses them, and detects their components but does not construct them from elements. (Blaustein 1935, 38 [italics added by A. C.].)
A little earlier, Blaustein writes: "Elementary mental experiences are originally given in higher-order wholes." (38.) "These experiential wholes stand out against the background of the whole of mental life as something separate in a quite distinct way." (39.) This is a complex of experiences that is
3 An example close to Blaustein and the Lvov-Warsaw School could be the analysis of the work of the Polish-Jewish Galician artist Bruno Schulz. For decades, he was attributed with a masochistic disorder and destructive masochism, using conceptual categories of Western European psychology and psychiatry from the beginning of the 20 th century. However, his masochism looks different in light of the psychological theory derived from Twardowski's school, established in Galicia at that time: it is a positive and constructive masochism, which could have been the source of Schulz's inner strength and balance, and is much closer to the categories of contemporary cultural psychiatry (see Citlak 2025a).
Amadeusz Citlak
not distinguished, using some separate abstraction, but it is a "natural" whole, "originally found" (34). Mental wholes are the cause of behavior, tendencies, and skills, and lead to the creation of mental, psychophysical, and physical products as well as being responsible for social relations, etc. Their feature is intentionality (in the sense of intention), as well as teleology, similar to, for example, Adler, for whom—claims Blaustein—the purposefulness of behavior can be seen in light of a person's life plan (striving to increase the sense of life power). Analysis of the components of larger wholes should not separate the former from the latter, because they lose their meaning. When describing, for example, the components of an experience, it should be remembered that they are always "originally given in higher-order wholes. Psychological analysis of these wholes reveals to us the elementary experiences that are part of them." (36.) Such an approach minimizes reductionist tendencies and places the interpretation of psychological facts considering broader conditions. Firstly, this appertains to subjective conditions (psychological experiences are always subjective, not anonymous); otherwise, the study may indeed lead to "the discovery of important and interesting laws, but this study 67 deals with psychological life as if artificially created, stripped of any specific connection with the surrounding world" (36). And secondly, it places the interpretation of psychological facts under the viewpoint of extra-subjective, situational, and complex conditions, because "each time the difference in the situation and intentional object causes the difference in experiences" (36). Certainly, the phenomenological attitude and respect for the object of study without first imposing ready-made categories helped Blaustein formulate the abovementioned statements. His proposal undoubtedly paints a picture of psychology practiced in a way that is close to the indigenous tradition. Furthermore, it seems to create appropriate foundations for formulating theses typical of grounded theories, in which existing empirical data can "speak" without first applying ready-made concepts or theories.
It is also worth mentioning that Blaustein's humanistic psychology from 1935 is also clearly different from the humanistic psychology we know from the works of the classics of this trend, e.g., Abraham Maslow or Carl Rogers. On the one hand, there are mutual similarities (Nawrocki 1996), such as the focus on human subjectivity, going beyond the determinism of psychoanalysis
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and behaviorism, focusing on the current experience of the subject, and to some extent also accepting the phenomenological attitude in the analysis of the experience itself. On the other hand, however, it is anthropocentric in nature with an emphasis on man's cultural and social embeddedness. Compared to Maslow or Rogers, Blaustein's conceptual apparatus is—to put it mildly—different. Let us take, for example, the flagship concepts of humanistic psychology, such as self-actualization, the actualization of individual potential, the good nature of man, self-growth, the focus on human needs, or self-esteem. They are simply absent in Blaustein. He also does not use as a foundation or background for psychological claims any particular vision of human nature, as in American humanistic psychology, in which elements of Far-Eastern philosophy play an important role, including the belief that man is good by nature and so are his motivations (DeRobertis 2013). This thesis has significantly influenced the shape of humanistic psychologists' theory and therapeutic activity; it is not just an addition to the whole (Cain 2003). Blaustein lived in a different time, in another culture, and his proposal 68 for humanistic psychology should be assessed for what it is: an indigenous proposal for humanistic psychology, just as the version of the American humanistic psychology of Maslow, Rogers, Perls, and others is indigenous (geographically and culturally limited). However, the American project found followers and funds, while the Polish did not. The popularity and scope of the former's influence do not yet prove its greater credibility, especially since its immanent features are a priori statements, taken from the "outside," which the Polish researcher avoids, relying on the data of empirical experience. Blaustein tries to create a strictly scientific project and, to a much lesser extent, a model supporting therapeutic goals (it is not a result of the therapist's reflection). He treats humanistic psychology as a science that creates psychological foundations for the humanities, foundations for understanding human functioning, which the humanities also deal with, although in their typical way. It is an "auxiliary science of various humanities" (51). It somewhat resembles something that in psychology is called psychological humanities complementary to psychological science (Teo 2017), with the difference, however, that Blaustein's proposal also includes methods used in psychological science—and this makes his project even more unique.
Amadeusz Citlak
The forgotten role of perception
Finally, I want to draw attention to (or rather signal) an interesting aspect of Blaustein's thought, namely the importance of perception in shaping attitudes. It takes up a lot of space in his works (Blaustein 1930, 1930, 1931a, 1936, 1938; Plotka 2020b), so out of necessity, I will focus only on a narrow aspect of this issue. Perception's role in shaping attitudes is one of the more neglected topics in favor of research regarding emotions and beliefs/judgments. In practice, attitudes are usually analyzed with respect to these two dimensions (emotions and judgments) plus behavior. In scientific discourse (psychological, philosophical, sociological), perception takes up a relatively marginal place, which is unfortunate because, as Blaustein shows, it can determine attitudes in a very subtle way. Furthermore, its analysis could provide explanations not present from the perspective of emotions or judgments. In the "Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym [The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience]" from 1936, Blaustein emphasizes that the central part of aesthetic experience is the emotionally tinged perception of the object of the experience. Perception 69 and emotions are the main components of such an experience, while judgments and will play a somewhat secondary role (although also important). The content of the aesthetic experience and its course depend on the type of perception, and it is not only about whether it is long-term (perception of a play) or momentary (perception of an image at a given moment). It is about distinguishing the quality and type of perception: perceptive, imaginative, and significative (i.e., using a sign, e.g., linguistic, while reading a literary work). In each case, perception includes other elements: a) perceptions, b) perceptions and imaginative representations based on them, c) perceptions and significative representations based on them. In the case of a), such objects, as architecture or a natural phenomenon, are given; in the case of b) and c) in addition to the perceived object, an object presented indirectly is also provided, i.e., imaginatively or significatively.
Perception is undoubtedly one of the important factors responsible for the formation of an emotional attitude toward an object. This happens, Blaustein claims, not only when judgments are formed in this process, e.g., concerning the meaning of the work or the intention of the author of the work. This also
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happens when only impressions and feelings arise. In addition, "in imaginative perception [...] and significative perception directed at fictional objects, suppositions, and quasi-judgments occur" (Blaustein 1936, 139). Whether we perceive the real or fictional world is not so important at this point. However, it is essential that perceptual processes underlie the attitude toward the object of perception, and the attitude does not have to be related to forming a judgment. Moreover, perception itself influences how the object will be shaped in the aesthetic experience. "The number and type of features that reach the consciousness of the person who knows them depend not only on the objective properties of the object, but also on the course and type of perception." (141.) The creative nature of perception is clearly visible, for example, in imaginative representations, without which it is impossible to properly understand not only aesthetic experiences, such as the reception of art, but many others, such as religious experiences (Blaustein 1930, 6). Religious experiences include a set of various feelings closely related to imaginative perception, which usually concerns either the visual religious art or facts that cannot be captured by an 70 image, but in representations as kinds of mental representations. Religious experience is one of the most complex mental experiences, in which representations and imaginative perception play a vital role. It is difficult to say at present, however, how the specificity or strength of religious attitudes is shaped based on this type of perception, because apart from the general theoretical outline, Blaustein's works have not been developed in this respect, much less transferred to empirical practice. However, already based on the theoretical foundations themselves, it is clear that the significance of the types of perception can determine the strength of religious attitudes and the accompanying emotions arising as a result of religious experience, which is often connected with aesthetic experience or is simply an aesthetic experience at the same time.
In this context, it seems particularly interesting to me that Blaustein articulates not only the diverse feelings of experiences that are aesthetic, religious, etc. (including quasi-feelings; Blaustein 1931a), but also the diverse nature of beliefs, such as judgments and quasi-judgments/suppositions arising as a consequence of different types of perception. This opens up an interesting and, above all, an important area of theoretical and empirical
Amadeusz Citlak
exploration concerning the sources (or causes) of the durability of attitudes based on quasi-judgments/suppositions (also on quasi-feelings). The proposed perspective indicates an extensive area of psychological phenomena that has no proper place in contemporary empirical or theoretical psychology; to put it bluntly, it practically does not exist, because the entire tradition of Brentano's psychology and his followers with a rich conceptual instrumentarium concerning judgments or representations has been pushed to the margins, while the available and dominant conceptual apparatus is too poor to analyze this issue in detail. Witwicki empirically demonstrated the importance of a very similar issue in the Lvov-Warsaw School, when he analyzed religious beliefs using the concept of supposition (Witwicki 1939/1959): suppositions can constitute a permanent component of religious attitudes, which can dominate logically justified and coherent judgments while being the basis of illogical beliefs and even permanent religious attitudes (this also applies to aesthetics and ethics). However, Blaustein's works deepen the subtlety of distinctions and link attitudes with the type of perception itself. I believe that the analysis of perception and aesthetic experience in this light allows us to 71 assume that different types of perception can also play an essential role in other areas of our lives, including experiences that are religious, political, etc. The conceptual apparatus could promote a better understanding not only of the nature of these phenomena or the distinguishing of their components, but also help identifying possible sources of the durability of some attitudes, their excessive rigidity and resistance to change, which is closely related to such problems as radicalism, uncritical attitudes, and beliefs. However, this would require the continuation of theoretical considerations initiated by Blaustein and the verification in empirical practice. Their explanatory and predictive potential seems significant, especially today, in a pictorial reality when social attitudes increasingly emerge independently of the logical coherence of beliefs and judgments.
Conclusions
Leopold Blaustein belongs to the third generation of the students of Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. He expressed one of
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the most representative research positions of this school's psychology at the beginning of the 20th century. He combined descriptive psychology with phenomenology, which played a key role in studying mental phenomena in Twardowski's school. Among the psychologists of this school, such as Witwicki, Baley, Blachowski, Kreutz, and Lewicki, it is not easy to find a figure with such an apparent involvement in both trends, especially since he did it in an original way. The intellectual formation of the Polish researcher also had a broader context, resulting from the influence of Husserl, Gestalt psychologists, and Dilthey. However, what distinguishes Blaustein is his critical stance toward his masters.
Blaustein's works not only testify to a very original approach to such problems as combining psychology with phenomenology or the analysis of aesthetic experience, but also reveal the extraordinary erudition and intuition of the Polish philosopher, which allowed him to create several still relevant theoretical proposals in both philosophy and psychology. Blaustein's thought remains relevant despite the passage of almost a hundred years. I have presented it in three areas of contemporary psychology, which, due to 72 the marginalization of the descriptive and the phenomenological approach, is currently struggling with difficulties that require at least referring to the basic assumptions of this discipline present in Brentano's tradition. Brentano and his students (including Husserl and Twardowski) represent a position that is more or less directly discussed today in psychological science in the context of the problem of theory and identity of psychology, including the study of mental phenomena. These problems could be solved (at least to some extent) with the help of descriptive psychology combined with phenomenological methodology.
Blaustein's psychological-phenomenological approach also allowed him to present an original project of humanistic psychology, one of the most characteristic features of which is the combination of the methodology of the humanities with the methodology of the natural sciences. The project inspired by Dilthey's work, in Blaustein's implementation, offers wider descriptive and explanatory possibilities. All the more so, because Blaustein understands the reality of human activity and nature as the subject matter of his psychology. This project also has clear features of indigenous psychology and could serve— after appropriate development—as a philosophical-theoretical substantiation
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of research typical of grounded theories. Despite its similarities to American humanistic psychology, it is ultimately an innovative, original project that constitutes an interesting, although forgotten, alternative to already known theories in this field.
An equally interesting (and the most extensive) area of Blaustein's research is aesthetic experience. In this article, I have only drawn attention to a particular aspect of this problem: the significance of perception in shaping aesthetic experience. Blaustein's main claims in this area allow us to assume that a thorough analysis of perception could provide valuable information or theoretical foundation for empirical research on the significance of perception in other experiences, including shaping social attitudes (religious, ethical, political). Contemporary psychological or sociological theory does not have an adequately precise conceptual background that would allow for detailed analyses of this problem. However, the conceptual apparatus concerning perception, representations, and judgments is still available in the Brentano school, which Blaustein also represented (despite modifications and a critical attitude).	73
In summary, I would like to emphasize that the Lvov-Warsaw School derived from Twardowski or the phenomenological psychology stemming from Husserl, despite the passage of time, still offer important theoretical propositions, especially today, when the problem of mental phenomena demands moving beyond the methodological paradigms limited mainly to the natural sciences.
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Original scientific paper Izvirni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.4 UDC: 130.121:004
How Technology Shapes Our Experience
Blaustein on Mediated Phenomena
Witold PtOTKA
Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Woycickiego St. 1/3, building no. 23, PL-01-938 Warsaw, Poland
witoldplotka@gmail.com | w.plotka@uksw.edu.pl
Abstract
The article aims to interpret Blaustein's phenomenology of aesthetic experiences from the perspective of the philosophy of technology. In order to do this, I sketch some parallels between today's inquiries into the nature of technology and Blaustein's accounts of experiences of the cinemagoer or the phenomenon of listening to the radio. The study is divided into 5 sections. In section 1, I explore the question of why the framework of the philosophy of technology can be useful in reading Blaustein's
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writings. Section 2 presents Blaustein's two main research strategies, while analyzing the phenomenon of technology, i.e., the humanistic and phenomenological methods. Moreover, the question of the compatibility of both approaches is examined. Next, in section 3, different phenomena from the field of the aesthetics of media are analyzed, in order to show to what extent technology mediates one's conscious experiences. Section 4 turns toward the question of the body and environment in technologically determined experiences. Finally, in section 5, the main elements of Blaustein's philosophy of technology are examined.
Keywords: technological artefacts, aesthetic experiences, embodiment, quasispace, Leopold Blaustein.
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Kako tehnologija oblikuje naše izkustvo. Blaustein o posredovanih fenomenih
Povzetek
Članek želi Blausteinovo fenomenologijo estetskega izkustva interpretirati z vidika filozofije tehnologije. S takšnim namenom začrtam nekaj vzporednic med današnjimi raziskovanji narave tehnologije in Blausteinovimi obravnavami izkustva obiskovalca kina ali fenomena poslušanja radia. Študijo sestavlja 5 razdelkov. V razdelku 1 se ukvarjam z vprašanjem o tem, zakaj je okvir filozofije tehnologije lahko uporaben pri branju Blausteinovih del. Razdelek 2 predstavi dve Blausteinovi poglavitni raziskovalni strategiji pri analizi tehnoloških fenomenov, tj. humanistično in fenomenološko metodo. Obravnavam tudi vprašanje združljivosti obeh pristopov. V razdelku 3, nadalje, analiziram različne fenomene s področja medijske estetike, da bi tako pokazal, do kolikšne mere tehnologija posreduje pri zavestnih izkustvih. Razdelek 4 se spoprime z vprašanjem telesa in okolja znotraj tehnološko determiniranih izkustev. Nazadnje, v razdelku 5, raziščem temeljne elemente Blausteinove filozofije tehnologije.
Ključne besede: tehnološki artefakti, estetsko izkustvo, utelešenje, kvazi-prostor, Leopold Blaustein.
Witold Peotka
1. Introduction
The present article attempts to determine the conceptual and methodological framework for a reading of Blaustein's writings from the perspective of the philosophy of technology. Since ancient Greece, the question of technology has been addressed by philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, or, more recently, Comte, mainly at the margins of ongoing debates (e.g.: Dusek 2006, 39-52, 114-116; Franssen, Lokhorst, and van de Poel 2024). Nonetheless, starting with the industrial age, and now in the middle of the digital age, scholars are perfectly aware that technology is an important factor that shapes human beings, our world(s), social structures, not to mention policy (e.g.: Fellows 1995; Olsen, Selinger, and Riis 2009; Olsen, Pedersen, and Hendricks 2009; Vallor 2022; Bouabdeli 2024). Without exaggeration, one may claim that the philosophy of technology is one of the mainstream trends in the humanities today.1 Generally, the subject matter of this philosophical subdiscipline is the phenomenon of technology in its different manifestations; the thematic scope here is very wide, and includes 81 such issues as the nature of technology, the manifold meanings of what we understand by technology or technological artefacts, the relation between technology and science or design, technological knowledge, not to mention ethical and social problems connected to technology (e.g.: Ihde 1993; Dusek 2006; Irrgang 2008; Franssen, Lokhorst, and van de Poel 2024). In this paper, I refer to this discipline, in order to deepen our understanding of Blaustein's ideas.
1 Contemporary philosophy of technology has a strong institutional background, as in the 1970s the Society for Philosophy and Technology was established (Ihde 1995, 8; 2004; Dusek 2006, 2), providing a great boost to new inquiries into the nature of technology.
This work was supported by the National Science Center, Poland, as a part of the SONATA BIS program within the research project (No. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108) on The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology. I would like to express my gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers of the journal for their helpful suggestions and insightful comments.
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Blaustein's central focus was what we might call philosophy of mind; more precisely, he adopted the methodological tools of descriptive psychology in examining the intentional structures of our experiences, especially aesthetic experiences.2 His approach can be classified as phenomenological in the broad sense, i.e., he attempted to describe what it is like to experience certain (aesthetic) phenomena. His writings were published in the 1920s and 1930s, and they explored, among other things, the following problems. What is the intentional structure of experiences, such as contemplating a painting or watching a theater play? How can we describe the perceptual basis of aesthetic experiences? What is it like to watch a movie or listen to the radio? In the literature, scholars—including Rosinska (1999, 207-218; 2001, 22-23), Miskiewicz (2009, 182, 187), Brudzinska (2010, 11), and Ciccotti (2014, 147-161)—agree in emphasizing Blaustein's pioneering achievements in the field of philosophy of media, film, and radio. But media are generally technologically constituted phenomena.3 Thus far, however, there is no study of how Blaustein's analysis of mediated experiences or phenomena can be read 82 from the viewpoint of the philosophy of technology. The present study aims to fill this gap, and by doing so, my ambition is to show that Blaustein's ideas concern technologically mediated phenomena; this approach was hitherto not discussed in the scholarly literature.4 Additionally, given that a large part of contemporary philosophy of technology refers to Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutics (e.g.: Ihde 1990; 2004; Verbeek 2005), Blaustein,
2	For more on Blaustein's philosophical approach, see: Miskiewicz 2009; Pokropski 2015; Plotka 2020b; 2021; 2023a; 2023b; Nuccilli and Lewandowski 2024; Jakha 2025. For more on the issue of the Lvov-Warsaw School and descriptive psychology, see Citlak 2019; 2023; 2025. For an overall discussion of Blaustein's philosophy, see Plotka 2024.
3	For a critical assessment of such attempts, see tastowiecki 2016, 167-185.
4	A marginal yet important remark is necessary here. When Blaustein formulated the basics of his approach and when he later adopted it in the field of media, i.e., in the 1920s and 1930s, philosophy of technology was not a separate discipline within philosophy as it is today. For this reason, the article draws parallels between Blaustein and today's examinations, but it has to be noted that Blaustein cannot be classified as a philosopher of technology tout court. Rather, this article attempts to determine an interpretative framework to present Blaustein's phenomenology as part (in a loose sense) of contemporary philosophy of technology.
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who formulated his theories in the 1920s and 1930s, may be regarded as a blind spot in the history of the phenomenology of technology. To be clear, I do not wish to show to what extent Blaustein's philosophy can be regarded as a precursor or innovative in respect to the later philosophy of technology. Instead, the aim of this study is a reconstruction of Blaustein's philosophy as focused on the issue of technology, which is understood mainly as tools that shape our experiences as mediated experiences.
In order to explore parts of Blaustein's philosophy and phenomenology of technology, the article is structured as follows.5 In section 2, I examine the basics of two methodological approaches toward technology described by Blaustein, namely, the humanistic approach and the phenomenological approach. Whereas the former conceives technology first and foremost as artefacts, the latter focuses on experiences. In section 3, I discuss Blaustein's thesis that technology mediates our experience. In this regard, I also explore his descriptions of how technology shapes our experience, e.g., in regard to theater, cinema, and radio. Following that, in section 4, the idea that technology shapes our environments is analyzed. What is crucial here is Blaustein's idea that technology changes our experience of 83 the lived body. Finally, in section 5, I summarize parts of Blaustein's philosophy that can be read in the key of the question of technology.
2. Exploring technology: Two methodological approaches in
Blaustein
Blaustein works out two research strategies to study technology, which can be classified as (1) humanistic and (2) phenomenological methods, respectively.6 The central difference between these two approaches lies in their
5	It should be noted that some questions regarding Blaustein's philosophy of technology cannot be addressed in this study. For instance, Ellul (1990) considers patterns of rule-following behavior or rule-governed systems to be the very nature of technology; to put it briefly, one can adopt Ellul's approach and ask to what extent Blaustein's use of rules of descriptive psychology, its aims, and detailed procedures can be regarded as technological in their nature. Furthermore, given that Blaustein was a student of Stumpf who made use of experimental methods, one may interpret Blaustein's experiments as technologically engaged practices. These questions, though important, are not my concern here.
6	Importantly, these categories are not used by Blaustein himself, as he prefers to write
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focus: whereas the former method investigates technological artefacts (broadly understood), the latter enables one to examine first and foremost experiences, and only secondarily objects correlated with these experiences. Interestingly, the humanistic approach is widely discussed by Blaustein (1935; 1935/37), and he explicitly claims that it is worth examining the phenomenon of technology; however, he does not use this approach and leaves it as a methodological framework. In turn, the phenomenological approach is not only discussed in regard to its aims, phases, and subject matter, but it is also broadly used by Blaustein in regard to many technological phenomena. In what follows, I will discuss both approaches, and against this background, I will inquire into their possible compatibility.
Generally, the humanistic method consists in describing reality as studied by the humanities. It has a clear subject matter, i.e., the real world; nonetheless, it is comprehended from a specific anthropocentric viewpoint (Blaustein 1935/37, 143a-143b). This means that the world is in the focus of this approach, insofar as it is a product of or the material (of other products) for human actions. In 84 short, the humanistic approach accounts for the world as understood through the lens of the action-product correlation: the world is a universal milieu of human actions that functions as correlated with their products (Blaustein 1935, 55-56). The accent put by Blaustein on the action-product correlation goes back to Twardowski (1999, 104) who in his 1911/12 essay on this topic noticed an uncontroversial linguistic correlation between certain verbs and nouns, for instance, "to think" and "the thought" or "to lie" and "the lie," etc. Verbs in these, and similar, pairs designate an activity (action), whereas nouns designate a product of the related activity. Twardowski's idea is to generalize this distinction, and as a result he divides actions and products into three classes: (1) physical (e.g., "to run" and "the run," etc.); (2) psychical or mental (e.g., "to think" and "the thought," etc.); and (3) psychophysical (e.g., "to note" and "the note," etc.). Next, Twardowski (1999, 116-120) differentiates between (1) enduring and (2) non-enduring products as follows: enduring products
about "the humanities" (Blaustein 1935/37, 143a), "humanistic psychology" (Blaustein 1935, 33-34), or "descriptive psychology" (Blaustein 2011, 209-210). The latter label can be understood as an equivalent for a broadly understood phenomenology; for more on this classification, see Plotka 2024, 133-137, 291-298.
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last longer than the respective action, which originates the product (e.g., a remark as a product of the action of noticing), while non-enduring products stop existing with the actions themselves (e.g., the run happens only, if one is running). Blaustein makes broad use of these distinctions.
Blaustein's humanistic approach enriches the researched field by accounting for the world as the field of action-product correlations. Thus, one can describe different levels of the world constituted by, and through, human actions. Indeed, for Blaustein (1935/37, 143b), the humanistic approach opens a rich field that includes (1) human individuals, (2) (organized or unorganized) groups of human individuals, (3) products of human individuals, (4) products of groups of human individuals, and, finally, (5) sets of such products. The last group is also very broad, and it includes everyday objects (e.g., tools), meaningful products (e.g., poems, theories, paintings), aesthetic (non-practical) products (e.g., a literary work of art), customs (which are understood by Blaustein as types of actions of human individuals), and structures of social organizations (e.g., political systems) (Blaustein 1935/37, 143b-144a).7 In this very context, Blaustein (1935/37, 144a) explicitly holds that technology is a set of different 85 types of products. He adds that the organization of products in a certain set can vary depending on tasks and viewpoints adopted as governing rules. Moreover, thus understood sets of products can form a kind of hierarchy. With these ideas in mind, Blaustein's key insight regarding the humanistic approach toward technology lies in comprehending technology as physical, mental, and psychophysiological products that may endure or not, depending on the relevant action. As a result, Blaustein's view on technology seems to be nuanced, not limited to physical artefacts, but comprehending, e.g., plans, schemas, ideas, as (durable/non-durable and mental/non-mental) products. From this point of view, a radio (a durable product) is correlated with a certain broadcast (a non-durable product) that is comprehended by relevant actions (ways of understanding radio). Here, technology forms a web of artefacts (durable products), mental, as well as psychophysiological products, not to
7 Following Nawrocki's (1996, 140) summary, this account enables one to ask about
(1) psychic acts understood as mental actions, (2) psychophysiological products (correlated with relevant mental actions), (3) an individual's attitude toward a certain product, and (4) a social relation, which determines someone's experience.
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mention relevant actions. Finally, Blaustein (1935, 34) classifies this approach as holistic.
The phenomenological account, in turn, is focused first and foremost on lived experiences or phenomena. This method is descriptive, analytical, intuitive, and it adopts inductive-deductive procedures, which aim at formulating laws governing different types of lived experience. It is descriptive, as it serves to identify and name basic elements of lived experiences. As such, it is analytical, as it enables one to break up lived experience taken as a whole composed of parts. This is possible by limiting perception to intuition and due to one's focus on what is intuitively given. On the basis of drawn differences, one inductively connects observations and formulates a hypothesis that is confirmed or verified by other experiences. Ultimately, one aims to formulate general laws, which explain relevant phenomena. To be clear, Blaustein's account of phenomenology is closer to Brentano's descriptive psychology, and it marks a clear break with Husserl's eidetic approach. In this vein, Blaustein is clear that, thus conceived, the procedure concerns types, i.e., generalized species, and not 86 (as for, e.g., Husserl or Ingarden) essences (Plotka 2020a, 157-161).8 Blaustein uses this strategy, for instance, in his 1930 book, Imaginative Presentations,9 and in other texts on aesthetics (see Blaustein 2005). Its ultimate task is to examine, as Blaustein (1937, 245-249) puts it, the ways of manifestations (Gegebenheitsweise) of the objects given in lived experiences. With this phrase, he holds that the experienced object given in relevant lived experience has specific ways of manifesting; it appears in a certain way, and in order to study lived experiences adequately, one has to describe the presented object as it is presented.
As suggested, Blaustein uses this methodological procedure to analyze technology. After all, the phenomenon of technology is manifested in different
8	Blaustein accounted for Husserl's essences as hypotheses, which is problematic. Elsewhere, I have shown that Husserl's eidetics can be formulated in the key of metaphysical neutrality; however, a closer examination has shown that Blaustein's criticism was directed (most plausibly) toward Ingarden who in his early papers adopted a metaphysical account of essences as timeless entities. See Plotka 2021, 255258.
9	See Blaustein 1930. A summary of Blaustein's method can be found in Plotka 2024, 39-40.
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lived experiences, which are given while using technological devices, and while being in a technologically determined environment. In this regard, Blaustein's point is to show how technology is experienced by describing and analyzing the very experiences themselves. After all, any technological artefact is somehow experienced, and one's aim here is to break up this very experience as a composition of basic parts, and to formulate—first in the form of hypotheses, and later as rigid theses—laws that explain to us the phenomenon of technology. From his earliest text, including his doctoral dissertation on Husserl's theory of intentionality, Blaustein (1928) operates with a tripartite structure of the mind, i.e., (1) act, (2) content, and (3) object. The fact that technological devices are objects of one's experiences results in different modes of how content is constituted and apprehended by the act. To phrase it differently, technology shapes our experience by constituting different contents that are apprehended by one's act. For instance, while listening (act) to the radio (object), one experiences impressions of sounds (content) that are apprehended by the very act of listening. With this in mind, it is clear that Blaustein's central idea in the context of technology lies in understanding this 87 very phenomenon as a mediatory factor of our experiences. Before I turn toward this point, however, an important question has to be addressed: are the two approaches complementary or rather in competition?
As already mentioned, Blaustein does not use the humanistic approach in regard to the phenomenon of technology, although he suggests a promising conceptual framework to understand it. At the same time, he extensively uses the phenomenological method (as defined above). Does this mean that for him both approaches cannot be combined? Although he does not answer this question directly, he refers to the metaphilosophical rule that one ought to use different methods as and when needed to allow for the efficient study of relevant subject matters (Blaustein 1935, 52-53). Given this, one can argue that the approaches are complementary in regard to technology: whereas the humanistic approach offers a rich ontology that enables one to understand technology as complex sets of objects (products) correlated with relevant actions, the phenomenological approach enables one to study experiences and the "how" of technological artefacts. Arguably, this combination mirrors Ihde's (1990, 21) idea to combine phenomenology (the study of experiences)
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with hermeneutics (understanding as a basic phenomenon) in studies on technology. If one were to set Blaustein in Ihde's strategy, the two research methods described by him—the humanistic and the phenomenological one— would suit the dual approach in studies on technology: one treats technology as somehow understood, since it is situated in an anthropocentric perspective (taken as a product of human actions), yet without excluding that technological artefacts or products shape our experience. All things considered, Blaustein's dual perspective seems to be an adequate and efficient tool for describing the phenomenon of technology.
3. Technology as a mediatory factor: The "how" of technology
Ihde (2009, 23) argues that, in order to understand what technology is, and how it shapes us and our worlds, one has to operate, as he puts it, with "interrelational ontology," i.e., the view "that the human experiencer is to be found ontologically related to an environment or a world, but the interrelation gg is such that both are transformed within this relationality." In this context, he also refers to Husserl's theory of intentionality that, put simply, consciousness is consciousness of "something," but technologies nuance this understanding as "[technologies can be the means by which 'consciousness itself' is mediated. Technologies may occupy the 'of' and not just be some object domain." (Ihde 2009, 23.)
In this section, I argue that Blaustein's phenomenology of technological consciousness can be understood from Ihde's point of view. As we will see in the following, Blaustein examined different aesthetic phenomena that manifest themselves as technologically mediated, yet shaping consciousness itself, e.g., the phenomena of watching a movie in the cinema or listening to the radio: how do technologies shape these phenomena?10 Thus, for him, the central factor that has to be investigated here is the "how" (or Ihde's "of"), i.e., the ways, in which technologies shape one's experience. Importantly, what I do not account for here is the question of Blaustein's descriptive analysis of mediated experiences in comparison to other scholars of his times, e.g.,
10 For a summary of Blaustein's aesthetics, see: Rosinska 2011, 199-208; 2013, 74-94.
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Heider's account of perceptions as mediated experiences. This topic requires a separate study.11
Let me start with a few examples. In his studies on the phenomenon of cinema, Blaustein (2005, 121-122) holds that one's experience is determined by the ways of composing single images and their compositions (e.g., a set of scenes) in movies; this, however, is strictly connected to the ways of using a camera, i.e., a technological tool that captures or records images.12 If the image captured or recorded by a camera can be classified as beautiful, one experiences aesthetically valuable appearances of captured or recorded objects. Additionally, if a certain sequence of images is well, i.e., smoothly, composed (the "how"), the movie merges all the scenes and adds further aesthetic factors and values to one's experience. The point here lies in the unitary character of this very experience: technology (e.g., the way the camera films objects and actors) determines the "how" of one's experience (e.g., well-composed, smoothly connected images experienced as aesthetically valuable). To reiterate, the experience is constituted by the mediatory technology: camera and film (tape). Another clear example of the technologically mediated phenomenon 89 concerns music and its use in movies. If the images projected at the cinema screen are well (the "how") coordinated with the music, one can experience pleasure in observing these fragments. Blaustein (2005, 111) holds that music brings about in cinemagoers certain emotional states, which he describes as moods. Of course, the melodies may be cheerful, sad, lively, or solemn, however, generally, music helps one in experiencing cheerful moods, if music is composed in a major key, while sad moods are brought about with a minor
11	In 1926, Heider published a paper on "Thing and Medium," which explored a psychological relation of sensations and images in perception. See Heider 1959, 1-34. Heider, in parallel to Blaustein, considered technological devices (Heider [1959, 20] writes, e.g., about thermometers, barometers, electrical measuring instruments) as mediator-like elements; however, contrary to Blaustein, Heider adopts a genetic approach that consists in reconstruing the chain of conditions that result in the relevant experience. There is no evidence that Blaustein was familiar with Heider's studies; however, a further study could result in identifying parallels and differences between their accounts. For the sake of brevity, I omit this topic. I am thankful to the anonymous reviewer of the journal for bringing my attention to this author.
12	For more on Blaustein's account of media, see: Plotka 2024, 259-290; 2025, 556-579.
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key. This phenomenon is evident, if one first watches a movie with music and then without it: the transition from the former state to the latter is described by Blaustein as "enormous," and he holds that one feels "a strange alienness," if the music is absent.13 Once again, music and the way it is used in the movie (the "how") is technologically founded, but experiences of music are already mediated, although one may not notice that fact.
Blaustein describes comparable phenomena in regard to listening to the radio. His key insight in this regard is to examine "how" sounds in a radio broadcast determine one's experience of listening to the radio (Blaustein 2005, 146). Technology here clearly determines one's experience, as a broadcast is formed as a sequence of sound phases that are perceived by the listener in a certain composition, and thus in an already defined order. Two sounds recorded at the same time could be difficult to hear as two sounds; for this reason, sounds have to be planned as a sequence, and the how of their composition plays a crucial role. As a result, one experiences sounds and apprehends them as, e.g., sounds of something. To put this phenomenon in more technical words, one 90 hears (or apprehends) sounds as acoustic or auditory content, and these very sounds are what one "truly" hears; as such, experienced sounds function as representing factors in one's experience. But one does not hear sounds per se, but as sounds of something, e.g., the sound of a ringing phone or the rumbling of a departing train. In this regard, Blaustein notices a shift in focus: one does not hear "mere" sounds, but rather, e.g., a phone ringing or a train departing, and all these things are heard "directly." He describes this shift as "objectifying" heard sounds (Blaustein 2005, 150).14 Stated differently, the listener changes
13	"The enormous significance of the influence of music in the whole experience of the cinemagoer will be appreciated only by someone who has had the opportunity to watch a silent film without the company of music. A goer accustomed to musical illustration then feels a strange alienness to what is happening on the screen, it seems to the goer that some shadows appear and disappear there, not living people, the facial expressions are rather comical." (Blaustein 2005,113.) Blaustein (2005, 108) also notices that actors use different mimics in silent and sound movies; this change is, of course, technologically mediated.
14	A parallel phenomenon was noticed by, among others, Messer (see 1908, 40-41). For him, one's sensations refer to the object, if they are "interpreted objectively" (die objektive Deutung der Empfindung). Messer described a phenomenon of remembering sounds that are interpreted and, thanks to this, are sounds of something. He writes
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her attitude toward what is experienced. Precisely for this reason, the "how" of sounds, i.e., the way, in which they are composed in a radio broadcast, shapes one's experience.
In his studies on listening to the radio, Blaustein describes an interesting phenomenon that illustrates the above-described dependence. To begin with, he asks about the relation between where the microphone is placed during recording and one's experienced appearance of sound spaces (Blaustein 2005, 150). He holds that the way the sound director manipulates the microphone determines the listener's experience of something apprehended as close or distant from "here" (i.e., from the place where the action of the radiobroadcast takes place) or as moving toward or away from "here." Another example is the phenomenon of hearing a gong that suggests time passing within the represented action of the broadcast (Blaustein 2005, 151). According to Blaustein, while hearing the gong one immediately perceives this sound as time passing. Voice actors can also manipulate the way how they are speaking or using non-verbal sounds (e.g., a sigh of relief, speaking very fast to emphasize one's irritation), in order to present relevant mental states; of course, the point 91 here is how the voices are recorded.15 Finally, the broadcast can use the radio announcer's commentary to determine one's experience; this technological factor is mediated directly in one's experience (Blaustein 2005, 155). By and large, the examples just listed show that one's experience is embedded in technological factors that shape this very experience directly: recording technology produces a new, mediated form of human hearing.
Thus far, Blaustein's exemplary descriptions reveal the embeddedness of human experience in technologically mediated factors. These factors, as shown
of remembering the train's sound. I am thankful to the anonymous reviewer of the journal for bringing my attention to this study.
15 "A voice may sound as if it is 'tired,' 'apathetic,' 'intense,' 'energetic,' 'gentle,' 'firm,' it may reveal—regardless of the meaning of what is said, but in connection with the situation—anxiety, depression, excitement, agitation, anger, concern, despair, love, amazement, delight, humility, embarrassment, joy, compassion, contempt, etc. [...] A voice also reveals the age, gender, and temperament of the speaker, the way in which they express themself—their 'personal culture.' A voice, which might be 'soft' or 'hard,' resonant or hoarse, etc., can also cause the listener to like or dislike the speaker." (Blaustein 2005, 167.)
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above, include first and foremost technological devices, e.g., camera, cinema, radio. With these examples in mind, one may ask a more general question: how does technology shape one's experience? What "way" is technology experienced? In order to address these questions, one must turn toward the phenomenon of attitude described above in regard to objectifying sounds. For Blaustein, in general, any object of aesthetic experience is accessible due to a specific attitude. It is true, as Miskiewicz (2009, 186) noticed, that "[f]or Blaustein, perceiving an object is always observing an object with a certain attitude." In the case of technologically mediated experiences, one is determined to comprehend certain contents as related to relevant objects. For instance, while listening to a radio drama, one has to apprehend sounds as sounds of relevant objects that are parts of the represented action. This attitude allows one to be immersed in technologically mediated experience, be it watching a movie or listening to the radio. If this way of perceiving is somehow broken or interrupted, one experiences technology, as Blaustein shows, in the modus of "alienness." An example of this interruption is the earlier example of one watching a movie 92 without music and experiencing this absence as "alien" (Blaustein 2005, 113). Additionally, the darkness of a cinema hall during the screening of a movie puts one in a specific attitude with respect to it.16 An analogous phenomenon is manifested while listening to the radio: while apprehending sounds as sounds of something, one changes one's attitude toward them and is ultimately focused on the represented world of the broadcast, which, however, is not present in the same place where one is listening to the radio; instead, this world inherent to the radio broadcast is "alien" to our surrounding world. In sum, one's immersed experience of mediated objects manifests itself in the modus of alienness, if this very experience is interrupted.17
16	"The darkness of the cinema hall, which is indispensable for technical reasons, has effects that are more than technical. It makes it easier for the goer, or even forces her, to concentrate on the screen, it performs the indicated isolation, and prevents the artificial intrusion of the imaginary world into ours, which is what some strive for in the theater, painting, or sculpture. The significance of this isolation is significant." (Blaustein 2005, 101.)
17	The idea that disrupted technology-mediated experiences can be described as "alien" can be read in parallel to Heidegger's philosophy of technology; for Heidegger,
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4. Technology as embodied and embedded phenomenon
The conclusion of remarks on how, according to Blaustein, technology is experienced leads to two important topics in the field of philosophy of technology, i.e., the issues of embodiment and environment. After all, as shown above, the experience of "alienness" refers to one's embodied experiences and to the world (environment). Today's scholars, including Ihde (1990, 44-58; 2002; 2009, 23), Grau (2002, 151-173), or Lettow (2011, 110-117), convincingly argue in favor of comprehending technologies as embodied and embedded in certain environments. Of course, the central idea here is not a trivial observation that technology affects our bodies or environments, but that the intentional relation between the experiencing subject and an object is already mediated as the body and the life world are correlated by the means of technology. This relation is often characterized as transparent, and one is immersed in this lived experience. A typical example of this relation, discussed by Ihde (1990, 47-48), is looking through a window; this mediated phenomenon remains unnoticed, until it becomes 93 opaque. Nevertheless, these shaping factors can be identified and analyzed in careful descriptive analysis of relevant experiences. This is precisely how Blaustein approaches these topics.
In order to show that technology reshapes one's experience of the body, Blaustein describes different aesthetic phenomena. To begin with, a plain example is contemplating a painting (a technological artefact) that affects me to occupy a suitable position, in order to observe the painting as a whole; here, one's body becomes a zero-point of the perceived orientations of spatial objects.18 While contemplating a painting, one attempts to take the same bodily
technological tools appear to the agent as absent, if they are broken. Heidegger analyzes this phenomenon in regard to the topic of "readiness-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit). See Heidegger 1962, 98-102. For more on this issue, see, e.g., Ihde 1990, 31-32.
18 "Whenever I perceive the world around me, I only perceive one part of it. There are other imperceptible parts of this world beyond what I can perceive. The part I am able to perceive, in which I exist at the moment, is filled with a larger or smaller number of spatial objects. My body is, of course, one of these objects. I get bored with the world around me, so I escape from it. After a while, I am in a totally different part of it, which is filled with totally different spatial objects. One object in particular was
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position as the artist had while working on the work art. Blaustein (2005, 98) holds that "[a] painter must take a position sufficiently distant from the painted object or objects, to be able to encompass their entirety at one glance, otherwise the painting will be unclear in terms of spatiality." This remark concerns the artist's body; however, it also shows that one who contemplates the painting should find an optimal position while contemplating the artwork. Next, if we notice that the painting functions here as a technologically determined object, we can see that it functions as the means, through which one acts in the world as an embodied subject. A comparable phenomenon was analyzed by Blaustein in regard to cinemagoers. One is more immersed in the showing (i.e., one focuses one's attention more easily on the screen), if one's body is well situated in relation to the cinema screen. In the Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer, one reads as follows:
Even when the film is not very interesting, thanks to the darkness in the cinema hall, involuntary attention is focused on the film, as long as the goer is perceiving the screen at all. If the film is interesting, the focus of attention is exceptionally strong and long-lasting; the world around one disappears for the goer as rarely happens otherwise. This also depends partly on the place in the audience that the goer occupies. For instance, the visual field of a goer sitting on the balcony is usually not as completely limited to the screen as that of a goer sitting on the ground floor. (Blaustein 2005, 102.)
To reiterate, technologies (how a movie is projected onto the cinema screen or how the cinema hall is constructed) are here the means, by which the cinemagoer experiences movies. This holds also for the phenomenon of listening to the radio. While listening to a radio broadcast one may want to be alone, in order to focus one's attention; to be immersed in the broadcast, one may close one's eyes, and this, as Blaustein (2005, 175) puts it, "desire for
there, however, and must be here too. And that object is my body, which I could not escape from even if I tried. Consequently, my body occupies the central position in the apprehension of any of my spatial relations. Something is behind something else and something is in front of it, something is to the left and something is to the right, depending on the position my body occupies." (Blaustein 2011, 217.)
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darkness" intensifies one's experience of radio. Again, this is necessary, because of the technological mediation.
For Blaustein, technology also reshapes one's sense of space. This phenomenon is clear in how the body may be projected into the imaginative world of art. A basic level of this experience is evident in contemplating a painting. Blaustein discusses a painting by Jacob van Ruisdael, in which one sees a windmill by a river, and he notices that the landscape represented by the painting contains a series of spatial characteristics. As he puts it, "[a]fter all in Ruisdael's painting some objects are higher, others lower, one behind the windmill, the other in the front of the windmill, one closer, the other far away, one to the right, the other to the left" (Blaustein 2005, 128-129). Thus, the objects represented by the painting are oriented, as if they were in the world that surrounds us. Of course, the system of orientation has its center, i.e., a zero-point, just like the embodied experience described above. However, in the painting there is no body; it is rather invisible or, more precisely, transparent. The body is in fact the zero-point of orientation in the imaginative world, i.e., the world imaginatively presented while contemplating Ruisdael's painting. 95 And thus, objects seem to be placed closer or farther from "me," meaning "my (projected) body." The same holds for the experience of watching movies. The camera occupies a certain point in space, which seems to be the zero-point of orientation, i.e., the body of the perceiver: some objects move closer to "me" or "my body," whereas other objects are farther from "me" or "my body" (Blaustein 2005, 98). For Blaustein, the space constituted in these phenomena has a property of quasi-spatiality, i.e., it is composed of objects interrelated, as if they were real objects in the surrounding and spatial world. All in all, the objects of the world are organized as if oriented in relation to the projected body. Yet, the body is "invisible" or "transparent," since it is the zero-point of all orientations; as such, it is not given, but enables or gives other objects.
Blaustein is clear that this "alienness" of mediated experiences is determined by the technologically reshaped environment: (1) a painting shapes the experience of quasi-spatiality with a frame that suggests the system of spatial orientations; (2) a sculpture introduces this "alienness" with the plinth that serves to emphasize that even if, say, the marble is part of the same surrounding world as the world of the viewer, the figure represented in the
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marble is not part of the same world (Blaustein 2011, 218); (3) in the theater, this quasi-spatiality is possible due to the scene and the curtain that marks the border between "my" world and the imaginative world of art; finally, (4) in the cinema, this is possible due to the darkness of the cinema hall and the black spaces around the screen (Blaustein 2005, 130). In all these and similar cases, technological artefacts or manipulations of the environment (a frame, a plinth, a curtain, switching off the light, etc.) are the means that are interrelated with, and connected to, the body within one's intentional directedness toward an object.
5. Conclusion
The present study was an attempt to look at Blaustein's phenomenology of media, understood as a part of his aesthetics, as a variety of philosophy of technology. This task originated with the prevailing opinion in the scholarly literature about the pioneering character of his achievements in the field of 96 media studies (e.g.: Rosinska 1999, 207-218; 2001, 22-23; Miskiewicz 2009, 182, 187; Ciccotti 2014, 147-161); however, media, including cinema and radio, have to be considered technologically constituted phenomena. Thus, given the growing interest of phenomenologists in the issue of technology (e.g.: Ihde 1990; 2004; Verbeek 2005), it is not only compelling, but important to consider the juxtaposition of Blaustein's work with selected ideas from the field of philosophy of technology. Of course, in order to accomplish this task, one must draw parallels and analogies between today's readings regarding technology and Blaustein's descriptions that were formulated almost a century ago. Although some topics had to be put aside, including the question of Blaustein's use of experiments in his descriptive psychology or the topic of the technique of methodological procedures, I examined selected issues that enabled us to look at Blaustein as a philosopher who explored technological devices that shape our experiences or phenomena. How, then, can his account be summarized?
First of all, given the output of section 2, (1) Blaustein offered two research strategies to explore technology: (a) humanistic and (b) phenomenological. (2) The former comprehends technologies very broadly as products of
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relevant actions, including (a) mental, (b) psychophysiological, and (c) physical products, whereas (3) the latter addresses the ways of manifestation of technologies in one's lived experiences or, to phrase it differently, what it is like to experience technologically mediated phenomena. As shown, (4) both methods can be understood as compatible, since the humanistic approach enables one to formulate a rich ontology of technologies, whereas the phenomenological method allows for detailed descriptions of relevant experiences. In fact, (5) Blaustein widely examined the "how" of the "ways'" in which technology mediates one's experiences, including—as shown in section 3—(a) cinemagoers' experiences and (b) the phenomenon of listening to the radio. Next, (6) he described the "how" of phenomenology with a specific attitude that one adopts, though as a fully transparent attitude, while being immersed in technologically mediated experience; however, (7) if this experience is interrupted, one experiences technology in the modus of "alienness." Finally, following section 4, (8) we have seen that for Blaustein technology is both (a) embodied and (b) embedded. Of course, the presented description is a sketch, and would, as such, require further detailed analyses; 97 nonetheless, this reading of Blaustein's phenomenology of media shows how, from his point of view, technology shapes our experiences. In the end, such a reading reintroduces Blaustein into the theoretical landscape of today's debates and proves the originality of his interesting, albeit neglected ideas.
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Nuccilli, Daniele, and Rafal Lewandowski. 2024. "Husserl, Ajdukiewicz, and Blaustein on Meaning." Horizon: Studies in Phenomenology 13 (1): 95-114. https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2024-13-1-95-114.
Olsen, Jan Kyrre Berg, Evan Selinger, and Soren Riis (eds). 2009. New Waves in Philosophy of Technology. Basingstoke—New York (NY): Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230227279.
Olsen, Jan Kyrre Berg, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Vincent F. Hendricks (eds.). 2009. A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology. Malden (MA): Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444310795.
Plotka, Witold. 2020a. "From Psychology to Phenomenology (and Back Again): A Controversy over the Method in the School of Twardowski." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (1): 141-167. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097- 01909620- x.
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---. 2020b. "Leopold Blaustein's Descriptive Psychology and Aesthetics in Light of His Criticism of Husserl." In Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe: Main Figures, Ideas, and Problems, edited by Witold Plotka and Patrick Eldridge, 163-185. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3030-39623-7_10.
---. 2021. "A Critical Analysis of Blaustein's Polemic Against Husserl's Method." Husserl Studies 37: 249-270. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-021-09292-z.
--- . 2023a. "Ingarden and Blaustein on Image Consciousness." Studia
Phaenomenologica 23: 89-114. https://doi.org/10.5840/studphaen2023235.
---. 2023b. "The Origins and Development of Leopold Blaustein's Descriptive Psychology: An Essay in the Heritage of the Lvov-Warsaw School." History of Psychology 26 (4): 372-390. https://doi.org/10.1037/hop0000241.
---. 2024. The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein: Descriptive Psychology, Phenomenology, and Aesthetics. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-63685-1.
---. 2025. "On the Phenomenology of Media in the 1930s: Blaustein on Cinema and Radio Experiences." Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 45 (3): 556-579. https://doi.org/10.1080/01439685.2025.2500882.
Pokropski, Marek. 2015. "Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content." Studia Phaenomenologica 15: 93-103. https://doi.org/10.5840/studphaen2015156.
Rosinska, Zofia. 1999. "Biernosc i aktywnosc. Z dziejow badan nad recepj mediow: Leopold Blaustein [Passivity and Activity. From the History of Studies on the Reception of Media: Leopold Blaustein]." Przeglqd Filozoficzne—Nowa Seria 8 (1): 207-218.
---. 2001. Blaustein. Koncepcja odbioru mediow [Blaustein. A Conception of the Reception of Media]. Warsaw: Proszynski i S-ka.
---. 2011. "Leopold Blaustein's Aesthetics." Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2): 199-208.
---. 2013. "The Model of Aesthetic Experience. The Theory of Leopold Blaustein." In 20th Century Aesthetics in Poland. Masters and Their Followers, edited by Krystyna Wilkoszewska, 74-94. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper.
Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1999. On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy. Edited by Johannes L. Brandl and Jan Wolenski. Amsterdam—Atlanta (GA): Rodopi.
Vallor, Shannon (ed.). 2022. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology. Oxford—New York (NY): Oxford University Press.
Verbeek, Peter-Paul. 2005. What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design. Translated by Robert P. Crease. University Park (PA): The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Original scientific paper Izvirni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.5 UDC: 13:130.121
Between Critique and Affirmation
Blaustein's Functional Metaphysics of Culture
Wojciech Starzynski
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Ul. Nowy Swiat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland
wojciech.starzynski@ifispan.edu.pl
Abstract
The article reconsiders Leopold Blaustein's philosophy by focusing on his critical stance toward metaphysics. While Witold Plotka interprets Blaustein as a philosopher of metaphysical neutrality, I argue that Blaustein should rather be seen as a critic of metaphysical idealism who nonetheless develops a minimal and functional form of metaphysical reflection. This reflection is grounded not in ontological assumptions, but in the implicit meaningfulness of anthropological experience. The article examines
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four domains—intentionality, humanistic psychology, aesthetics, and education—and includes a final boundary-case analysis of religious spirituality, in order to clarify the scope and limits of Blaustein's functional metaphysics. Drawing on his critique of Ingarden and his own educational writings, I argue that Blaustein's philosophy ultimately points toward a non-speculative, yet normatively rich conception of culture and value. His project, although critical of traditional metaphysics, remains open to a constructive transformation of metaphysical thinking rooted in human experience and practical reason.
Keywords: Blaustein, metaphysics, intentionality, phenomenology, culture.
Med kritiko in afirmacijo. Blausteinova funkcionalna metafizika kulture
Povzetek
Članek filozofijo Leopolda Blausteina pretresa tako, da se osredotoča na njegovo kritično držo glede metafizike. Medtem ko Witold Plotka Blausteina interpretira 102 kot filozofa metafizične nevtralnosti, jaz zagovarjam mnenje, da moramo Blausteina videti kot kritika metafizičnega idealizma, ki obenem vendar razvije minimalno in funkcionalno obliko metafizične refleksije. Tovrstna refleksija ne temelji na ontoloških predpostavkah, temveč na implicitni pomenljivosti antropološkega izkustva. Članek obravnava štiri področja - intencionalnost, humanistično psihologijo, estetiko in izobraževanje - in nazadnje obsega analizo mejnega primera religiozne spiritualnosti, da bi tako razjasnil domet in meje Blausteinove funkcionalne metafizike. Sklicujoč se na njegovo kritiko Ingardna in na njegove pedagoške spise, trdim, da Blausteinova filozofija navsezadnje izpričuje nespekulativno, a normativno bogato pojmovanje kulture in vrednote. Četudi kritičen glede tradicionalne metafizike, Blausteinov projekt ostaja odprt za konstruktivno transformacijo metafizičnega mišljenja, kakršno je zakoreninjeno v človeškem izkustvu in praktičnem umu.
Ključne besede: Blaustein, metafizika, intencionalnost, fenomenologija, kultura.
wojciech Starzynski
Introduction: Between critique of metaphysics and
reconstruction of the philosophy of experience
The purpose of the present article is to analyze Leopold Blaustein's philosophical position through the lens of his stance on metaphysics. At first glance, Blaustein appears as a consistent critic of all forms of metaphysical thinking—a stance articulated most clearly in his reviews of Roman Ingarden's The Literary Work of Art, where he questions not only the notion of metaphysical qualities, but also the ontological and eidetic foundations of phenomenological methodology. However, a close reading of his texts does not support the straightforward conclusion that his philosophy is purely anti-metaphysical.
The article begins by examining the three versions of Blaustein's review of Ingarden's The Literary Work of Art, showing that they contain not only a critique of what he regards as metaphysical assumptions, but also key elements of Blaustein's own philosophical position. These texts ultimately reveal a systematic attempt to reconstruct the foundations of the philosophy 103 of culture, grounded in his consistent appeal to Kazimierz Twardowski's thesis about the tripartite structure of intentionality. This thesis becomes the basis for Blaustein's redefinition of the relationship between object, intentional content, and the individual's cognitive or affective stance.
The subsequent sections of the article show how Blaustein develops this foundation in four directions: (a) the modernization of the theory of intentionality in a functional spirit; (b) the elaboration of humanistic psychology as an auxiliary science for the philosophy of culture; (c) the application of these developments to aesthetics and education as distinct domains of value formation; and (d) the reinterpretation of phenomenology's foundations—not as a philosophy of ideal entities, but as a philosophy of types of lived experience. Section V provides a boundary-case analysis (religious spirituality) designed to expose the limits and operational criteria of the proposed minimal metaphysics.
These strands of thought converge in the central question: is it possible to reconstruct, within Blaustein's work, a form of metaphysics that does not take the shape of a doctrine of substances or ideal entities, but rather of a reflection
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on the structures of experience, culture, and value? Throughout this article, I will use the term "metaphysics" in this deliberately modest and functional sense.
In recent literature, this problem has been addressed most comprehensively by Witold Plotka who interprets Blaustein's position as a consistent attempt to maintain metaphysical neutrality—a stance that, in Blaustein's own view, allows him to avoid the metaphysical consequences of the Husserlian idealism, while preserving key methodological insights of phenomenology. In this respect, I agree with Plotka's criticism of the readings proposed by Marek Pokropski and Krzysztof Wieczorek, which treat Blaustein's notion of the "phenomenal world" as implying a two-world metaphysics (see: Plotka 2024, 169-171, 185-189; Pokropski 2015, 97; Wieczorek 2006, 161). In my view as well, the idea of a phenomenal world can be understood in a strictly phenomenological and methodologically motivated way, without committing Blaustein to any ontological doctrine about levels of being.
At the same time, however, I consider the general label of "metaphysical 104 neutrality" to be only partially adequate. Firstly, it risks suggesting that Blaustein merely suspends metaphysical questions, whereas I argue that he transforms them into a minimal and functional reflection on the structure of experience, culture, and value. Secondly, in the Polish debate, the influential label of "analytic phenomenology" has been applied to Blaustein himself. As Plotka shows, this term is understood by Marek Pokropski as designating a combination of Twardowski's logical analysis with Husserlian phenomenological description, whereas Wioletta Miskiewicz uses it to characterize a type of analysis typical of early phenomenology in the period of the Logical Investigations. Yet, precisely because the label "analytic phenomenology" is employed in such a loose and heterogeneous way by Pokropski, Miskiewicz, Wolenski, and Rosinska, it tends to obscure the specific profile of Blaustein's work, and Plotka—in my view, convincingly—points out its shortcomings (see: Plotka 2024, 7-10, 295-296; Pokropski 2015, 94; Wieczorek 2006, 161; Wolenski 2011, 77; Miskiewicz 2009, 181; Rosinska 2005, XVII). I agree with this criticism. Symptomatically, it is Plotka who then introduces the notion of Blaustein's "metaphysical neutrality" as his own interpretative proposal. Although this proposal is not intended to align Blaustein with logical empiricism, the very phrase "metaphysical
Wojciech Starzynski
neutrality" can, especially against the background of the Lvov-Warsaw tradition, suggest a strong anti-metaphysical stance. In my view, it therefore risks obscuring, rather than illuminating the minimal and functional kind of metaphysical reflection that is at work in Blaustein's account of experience, value, and culture. For reasons of convenience, I will still occasionally speak of the "Lvov-Warsaw school" when referring to this broader tradition. Yet, in reconstructing Blaustein's position I follow Ingarden's own suggestion that one should distinguish between a Lvov descriptive-phenomenological current and a separate Warsaw logical-analytic current, and I take Blaustein to belong primarily to the former rather than to the latter.1
Rather than reading Blaustein simply as a philosopher of metaphysical neutrality or as an "analytic phenomenologist," I therefore propose to interpret his position as that of a critic of metaphysical idealism who nonetheless elaborates a minimal and functional form of metaphysical reflection. This reflection is grounded not in ontological assumptions, but in the implicit meaningfulness of anthropological experience, and it finds its clearest expression in Blaustein's theories of aesthetic experience, humanistic psychology, and pedagogy.	105
By focusing on these domains—especially the educational writings, which have been largely overlooked in prior literature—, I aim to reconstruct Blaustein's philosophy as a functional metaphysics of culture, in which the very process of experiencing, valuing, and forming the self assumes a structural role
1 Like most authors, Plotka follows the now standard historiographical label of the "Lvov-Warsaw school." Ingarden, by contrast, explicitly resisted this unified designation. In his 1936 survey of contemporary Polish philosophy, he distinguishes between a Lvov current, rooted in Twardowski's descriptive psychology and phenomenology, and a Warsaw logical-analytic current closer to logical positivism. Within the former, he lists, among others, a "young generation of pupils devoted to him (T. Witwicki, M. Lutman-Kokoszynska, I. D^mbska, L. Blaustein, Mehlberg, Auerbach)" who continue to work "for the most part in the domain of descriptive and experimental psychology" (Ingarden 1974, 102). In a later letter to Henryk Skolimowski (1967), Ingarden returns to this opposition in even sharper terms, stating that he does not count Twardowski and those of his pupils who remained "descriptive psychologists to the end" among representatives of Polish analytical philosophy (see Ingarden 2023, 277). On the reading adopted here, this two-fold map of Polish philosophy supports placing Blaustein on the Lvov side of the tradition and cautions against interpreting him as an early representative of an "analytic phenomenology" modelled on the procedures of the Warsaw logicians.
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once occupied by metaphysical doctrines of substance or essence. This reading aims to complement and also critically extend the perspective articulated by Plotka, offering an alternative conceptualization of Blaustein's relation to metaphysics in light of his broader cultural and psychological project.
I. Blaustein's critique of Ingarden and the problem of metaphysical qualities from a perspective of minimalist functional realism
The point of departure for reconstructing Leopold Blaustein's philosophical stance is his critical reading of Roman Ingarden's Das literarische Kunstwerk, carried out over the course of the 1930s. His three successive reviews (Blaustein 1930a, 1932, 1937) can be regarded not merely as assessments of a close colleague from the Lvov circle, but as components of an autonomous philosophical project shaped under conditions of polemical engagement. These texts reveal both the contours of Blaustein's opposition to metaphysics and the outlines of a positive alternative theory of aesthetic experience, grounded in a modernized theory of intentionality.2
Already in his 1930 review, Blaustein notes that Ingarden develops his project within the framework of phenomenology and its central discovery of intentionality, building on Twardowski's tripartite model of mental acts. As Blaustein writes:
2 See Plotka 2024, section 8.4.2, 228-234. Plotka focuses primarily on Blaustein's reviews of Das literarische Kunstwerk, analyzing them in relation to Ingarden's theory of the purely intentional object. His reading emphasizes Blaustein's distance from Ingarden's ontological framework and frames Blaustein as an advocate of metaphysical neutrality. In this article, however, I pursue a different aim: rather than reinterpreting Blaustein through the lens of his proximity to, or divergence from, Ingarden, I focus on reconstructing Blaustein's own critical stance toward certain forms of metaphysics and ontology, as a starting point for what I interpret as a positive, albeit minimal, metaphysical commitment in his writings. This perspective allows for an alternative account of Blaustein's philosophical project—one that highlights his attempt to articulate the structural conditions of cultural and value experience without fully abandoning metaphysical reflection.
Wojciech Starzynski
The distinction between act, content, and object of representation and judgment, developed and elaborated by Twardowski, Husserl, and Meinong, provided the basis for recognizing the multilayered nature of the literary work. It made it possible, first and foremost, to distinguish the layer of linguistic symbols, that is, the so-called text, from the layer of meanings, [...] and both of these layers from the layer of intentional objects of these experiences—that is, from the fictional world of persons and events that is "spoken of" in the literary work.3
Nevertheless, Blaustein disagrees with the metaphysical development of these assumptions as he understands them. In the same review, he writes polemically: "The fact that the author assumes the existence of ideal concepts will make his theory unacceptable to all those who are inclined—like the Reists, for example—to apply Ockham's razor."4 By detaching the literary work
3	"Dokonane i opracowane przez Twardowskiego, Husserla i Meinonga rozroznienie aktu, tresci i przedmiotu przedstawienia i s^du dostarczyly podstawy do zauwazenia wielowarstwowosci dziela literackiego. Pozwolily one odroznic mianowicie przede wszystkiem warstwy symbolow j^zykowych, czyli tzw. tekst, od warstwy znaczen, [...] a obydwie te warstwy od warstwy przedmiotow intencjonalnych tych przezyc, tj. od swiata fiktywnego ludzi i zdarzen, o ktorym 'mowa' w dziele literackiem." (Blaustein 1930a, 453.) All translations are by the author of the article.
4	"Fakt, iz autor zaklada istnienie idealnych poj^c, uczyni jego teoj niemozliw^ do przyj^cia wszystkim tym, ktorzy sklonni s^ jak np. reisci—poslugiwac si§ brzytw^ Ockhama." (Blaustein 1930, 454.) As Plotka notes: "Blaustein did not accept this response and later spoke against Ingarden's concept of essence on several occasions, postulating the application of Ockham's razor to essences treated metaphysically as existing general objects." (Plotka 2024, 117-118.) In the context of the debate with Husserl, Plotka responds to Blaustein's doubts by insisting on the non-metaphysical status of essences in phenomenology. In his view, once essences are understood as the invariant structures of experience, rather than as independently existing general objects, both the ontological and methodological worries raised by Blaustein lose their force. "In phenomenology," he writes, "essences simply do not have a metaphysical nature. This allows us to reject both the ontological and methodological doubts raised by Blaustein." (Plotka 2024, 122; see also 177 for a similar formulation.) I agree that, from a Husserlian point of view, phenomenological essences need not be construed as metaphysical entities. Yet, Blaustein's persistent reservations show that such a programmatic clarification does not, for him, settle the issue. His demand is not merely for a different "label" for essences, but for a different way of investigating them. Rather than accepting the Husserlian assurance that essences are non-metaphysical,
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from its concretization and from the psychological experiences of author and reader, Ingarden, in Blaustein's view, adopts ontological commitments that culminate in the positing of metaphysical qualities—a move Blaustein finds unconvincing:
A literary work is by its very nature a multilayered creation; its four layers—namely, phonetic formations, meanings, the objects represented in the literary work, and schematized appearances—form an organic whole and serve as the foundation for the "polyphonic harmony" of aesthetic values, to which are added what the author refers to as "metaphysical qualities," such as tragedy, sublimity, and the like. (The concept of metaphysical qualities is, to me, one of the most obscure ones in this work.)5
In the 1932 review, Blaustein further refines his position. While acknowledging the centrality of the layer of intentional objects—a point on which he partly concurs—, he gives greater emphasis to the layer of meaning, corresponding to the content within the intentional structure:
The author of this review has sought, in several readings, to render plausible from the reader's perspective the thesis that among the three layers of the literary work, the most important is the layer of intentional objects—delineated and defined only fragmentarily and schematically by the psychologically understood layer of meanings, which itself is also incompletely and ambiguously determined by the layer of signs.6
Blaustein calls for a more functional approach: one that treats essences as structures emerging within concrete acts of experiencing, valuing, and cultural formation, and that tests their validity by reference to the dynamics of anthropological reality. In this sense, his critique of Husserl and Ingarden is inseparable from his attempt to develop a minimal and functional metaphysics of culture.
5	"Dzielo literackie jest z istoty swej wielowarstwowym tworem, cztery jego warstwy (mianowicie tworow fonetycznych, znaczen, przedstawionych w dziele literackiem przedmiotow i schematyzowanych wygl^dow) tworz^ organiczn^ calosc i sluz^ jako podstawa 'polyfonicznej harmonji' wartosci estetycznych, do ktorych dol^czaj^ si§ tzw. przez autora 'jakosci metafizyczne' jak np. tragizm, wznioslosc itp. (Poj^cie jakosci metafizycznych nalezy do najbardziej niejasnych dla mnie w tern dziele.)" (Blaustein 1930a, 453.)
6	"Autor niniejszej recenzji staral si§ w kilku odczytach uprawdopodobnic z punktu widzenia czytelnika tez^, iz z posrod trzech warstw dziela literackiego najwazniejsza
WojciECH Starzynski
Once again, Blaustein reiterates his reservations about the vagueness of the concept of metaphysical qualities, which Ingarden situates as a higher-order moment in the constitution of the work:
Each of the layers contributes to the work its own distinctive material and its own aesthetic values, while all of them together—especially the layer of objects—contribute to the emergence of what the author calls, though not entirely clearly for the reader, "metaphysical qualities," such as sublimity, tragedy, comedy, and so on.7
The most complete articulation of Blaustein's critique appears in his 1937 review, where—remaining consistent with his anti-metaphysical stance—he systematically expands his objections. Having initially questioned the unclear notion of the so-called "metaphysical qualities" (as defined by Ingarden) in each of his reviews, he now shifts his focus and explicitly characterizes several foundational elements of Ingarden's theory as metaphysical in nature. In particular, he reconstructs what he sees as Ingarden's underlying metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions in relation to the problem of the intersubjectivity of the literary work:
In order to preserve the intersubjective identity of the meaning layer, the Author adopts a series of metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, in particular: (a) the existence of ideal concepts; (b) the non-self-sufficient existence of meanings as creations of subjective operations (these creations—as we already know—come into being through such operations, but once constituted, they continue to exist even if not conceived by any subject); (c) the capacity to cognize ideal concepts, for only by apprehending the content of such ideal concepts can the reader re-actualize the meaning of a sentence in the same way
jest warstwa przedmiotów intencjonalnych, wyznaczona i okreslona w sposób fragmentaryczny i schematyczny przez psychologicznie zrozumian^ warstwç znaczeñ, ro^miež niezupelnie i niejednoznacznie wyznaczon^ przez warstwç znaków." (Blaustein 1932, 347.)
7 "Každa zas z warstw wnosi do dziela swój swoisty material i wlasne wartosci estetyczne, wszystkie zas razem, a szczególnie warstwa przedmiotów, przyczyniaj^ siç do powstania tzw. przez autora, a niezupelnie jasnych dla czytelnika 'jakosci metafizycznych,' jak wznioslosc, tragizm, komizm, itp." (Blaustein 1932, 348.)
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as the Author intended—this meaning being itself an actualization of given ideal concepts; (d) the possibility of knowing the identical literary work despite the fact that the reader—just like the Author—can grasp the work only in one of its concretizations, and these concretizations— as the Author himself admits—differ from one another and generally realize the work inadequately, constantly adding elements which the creator did not assign to the work.8
Rather than limiting himself to formulating his primary objection to Ingarden's theory and while deploying an anti-metaphysical version of Ockhams razor, Blaustein outlines an alternative solution grounded in intentional psychology and in the privileging of the layer of meanings that constitute the "fictitious world." This proposal dispenses with the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions he attributes to Ingarden and instead affirms the possibility of intersubjective identity on the basis of linguistic and psychological regularities:
110	An alternative way of preserving the intersubjective identity of
the literary work—one that does not require these metaphysical and epistemological assumptions—may be to assume that a literary work is a system of sentences in a given language, created through the subjective operations of the author and fixed in writing or by other means. When the reader is oriented toward that language, and understands the sentences of that language, they intentionally grasp the fictitious world determined by those sentences. The identity of this world, as grasped
8 "Chc^c uratowac intersubjektywn^ identycznosc warstwy znaczeniowej, Autor przyjmuje szereg metafizycznych i epistemologicznych zalozeñ, w szczególnosci a) istnienie poj^c idealnych, b) niesamoistne istnienie znaczeñ jako tworów subjektywnych operacyj. (Twory te—jak juž wiemy powstaj^ dzi^ki tym operacyom, lecz po utworzeniu istniej^ nadal, chociažby nie byly pomyslane przez žaden podmiot), c) zdolnosc poznawania poj^c idealnych, gdyž tylko dzi^ki uj^ciu zawartosci idealnych poj^c može czytelnik dziela literackiego w identyczny sposób reaktualizowac sens zdania, który mu nadal Autor, a który jest aktualizacy^ danych idealnych poj^c, d) možnosc poznawania identycznego dziela literackiego mimo, iž czytelnik—podobnie zreszt^ jak twórca dziela uj^c može dzielo tylko w jakiejs z jego konkretyzacyj, a konkretyzacye te—jak Autor przyznaje rožni^ si§ mi^dzy rožni^ si§ mi^dzy sob^ i przewažnie nieadekwatnie realizuj^ dzielo, dodaj^c nadto stale do niego szereg rzeczy, których twórca dzielu nie nadal." (Blaustein 1937, 100b.)
wojciech Starzynski
by various readers, is guaranteed by the uniformity of the sentences made available to them, and by the fact that, when oriented toward the given language, they understand the sentences according to the same directives. Where these directives fail, various interpretations of particular sentences or sentence complexes may arise; nonetheless, in the overall experience, all readers grasp the same fictitious world, since such failures occur only in rare cases of ambiguity or the like.9
The dispute thus outlined does not revolve around the recognition of the intentional and stratified nature of the literary work—Blaustein fully endorses this—, but rather around its ontological and epistemological grounding. In response to the acceptance of ideal concepts, the non-self-sufficient existence of meanings, and the possibility of knowing an identical literary work independently of its concretizations, Blaustein proposes an approach more closely aligned with functional psychology and the phenomenology of lived experience. This, in turn, becomes the starting point for the development of his own theory, which he elaborates within the framework of his aesthetic investigations.
II. Aesthetics as an analysis of dynamic structures of meaning and the problem of ontology
Already in his reviews of Ingarden's work, Blaustein signals the need to shift from an ontologically grounded conception of aesthetic values and the literary work to a functional analysis rooted in the structure of experiential
9 "Tak^ drog^ do uratowania intersubjektywnej identycznosci dziela literackiego, nie wymagaj^c^ tych metafizycznych i epistemologicznych založen, jest može przyjçcie, iž dzielo literackie jest utworzonym dziçki subiektywnym operacjom tworcy i utrwalonym na pismie lub w inny sposob systemem zdan pewnego jçzyka, oraz iž przy nastawieniu czytelnika na ten jçzyk, gdy rozumie zdania danego jçzyka, ujmuje on intencyonalnie wyznaczony przez te zdania swiat fiktywny. Identycznosc tego swiata, ujçtego przez rozmaitych czytelnikow, gwarantuje rownoksztaltnosc zdan, ktore s^ im dane, oraz fakt, iž przy nastawieniu na dany jçzyk rozumiej^ te zdania w mysl tych samych dyrektyw. Gdzie te dyrektywy zawodz^, powstaj^ rozmaite interpretacje danych zdan lub zwi^zkow zdan, w caloksztalcie jednak ujmuje wszyscy czytelnicy ten sam swiat fiktywny, gdyž dyrektywy zawiesc mog^ tylko w rzadkich wypadkach wieloznacznosci." (Blaustein 1937, 101a.)
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acts. This orientation finds a fuller development in his original aesthetic writings, particularly in Imaginative Representations (Przedstawienia imaginatywne), where we find a clear attempt to "purify" the descriptive language of any ontological assumptions. This move, however, does not signal a retreat of systematic ambition; on the contrary, Blaustein proposes a nuanced methodology for the study of aesthetic phenomena, grounded in a phenomenologically oriented psychology.
In the aforementioned work, when Blaustein distinguishes between the material and formal object, he is quick to clarify that "this distinction has nothing to do with the difference between an object existing independently of an act and one existing dependently upon the act; it is purely methodological and carries no ontological weight."10 This interpretative gesture clearly demonstrates that Blaustein forgoes assigning any ontological status to works of art, and instead grounds the entire analysis in the constitutive functions of mental acts.
Moreover, Blaustein offers a detailed discussion of the quasi-causality and quasi-reality of the represented world in art, emphasizing that causal relations 112 within the represented world—such as walls being torn down by battering rams on screen (cf. Blaustein 1930b, 23)—are only possible within dynamic appearances and do not possess ontological status. Anything that appears spatial, temporal or causal in the represented world must be qualified as "quasi-": "Worlds of imaginary objects may be deceptively similar to our own. Yet, all of their properties—except those belonging to them as imaginative objects—are held under the proviso of quasi-."11
This anti-ontological shift, carried out in the spirit of applying Ockham's razor, finds its justification in the intentional analysis of acts. At the same time, Blaustein defends himself against the charge that his descriptions carry ontological implications. He writes: "We have only seemingly been dealing
10	"Odrožnienie przedmiotu materyalnego i formalnego nie ma nic wspolnego z odrožnieniem przedmiotu istniej^cego niezaležnie od aktu i przedmiotu istniej^cego zaležnie od aktu, to tež posiada wyl^cznie znaczenie metodyczne, nie ma zas žadnego waloru ontologicznego." (Blaustein 1930b, 11.)
11	"Swiaty przedmiotow imaginatywnych mog^ bye do naszego swiata ludz^co podobne. Wszelkie jednak wlasnosci procz wlasnosci przysluguj^cych im jako przedmiotom imaginatywnym—posiadaj^ one z zastrzeženiem quasi." (Blaustein 1930b, 24.) See Plotka 2024, 226-232.
Wojciech Starzynski
with imaginative objects; for imaginative objects do not exist either realistically or in any other way, and they have not been the actual topic of discussion."12
The description of the "object" thus functions merely as an instrument for analyzing the act itself:
In describing them, I was describing—by way of a detour through the description of intentional objects—the matter of imaginative acts [...]. Therefore, the explanation of the meaning and source of the quasi-qualification [...] is to be sought exclusively on the side of the acts, not within the ontological sphere.13
In this way, Blaustein consequently dispenses with the need for an ontology of the aesthetic object, and instead proposes a psychological phenomenology of experience, in which the artwork is understood as a function of the dynamic organization of imaginative acts.
The question of intersubjectivity—so central to Ingarden—is also reconfigured by Blaustein. He acknowledges that intersubjective imaginative objects can be ascribed identity (for example, the "same" Venus de Milo), although this identity does not stem from their being grounded in idealities or metaphysical qualities. Rather, it seems to derive from a function of communicative agreement—although Blaustein remains cautious here: "The meaning of this 'identity' is difficult to explain. [...] In any case, the explanation of the problem must be sought on the side of the acts, and not in any ontological sphere."14
As a result, we may say that Blaustein proposes a form of minimalist metaphysics—or rather, a phenomenological-psychological methodology—,
12	"Albowiem tylko pozornie zajmowalismy siç przedmiotami imaginatywnemi; przedmioty bowiem imaginatywne nie istniej^ ani realnie ani w žaden inny sposob i nie o nich byla dotychczas mowa." (Blaustein 1930b, 24.)
13	"Opisuj^c je, opisywalem na drodze okrçznej poprzez opis przedmiotow intencyonalnych materyç aktow imaginatywnych [...]. To tež wyjasnienia sensu i zrodla owego zastrzeženia quasi [...] szukac nalezy wyl^cznie po stronie aktow, a nie w sferze ontologicznej." (Blaustein 1930b, 25.)
14	"Jaki jest sens tej 'tožsamosci,' trudno wyjasnic. Poniewaz chodzi tu o przedmiot imaginatywny, a wiçc nieistniej^cy—wyjasnienia zagadnienia szukac nalezy w kazdym razie po stronie aktow, a nie w jakiejkolwiek sferze ontologicznej." (Blaustein 1930b, 48.)
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in which notions, such as "identity," "causality," "spatiality," and "value," are conceived as functions of the structure of lived experience, rather than as properties of autonomous entities.
All this leads to a general conclusion: Blaustein's aesthetics dispenses with the notion of ideal being as the foundation of the artwork, rejects aesthetic value as an object, and abandons ontological analysis altogether, treating it as a form of speculation. In its place, he offers a refined analysis of acts and their organization—one that proves sufficient to account for both the aesthetic experience and the intersubjective recognition of the artwork's identity.
In his other aesthetic writings, Blaustein continues the anti-metaphysical orientation already present in his reviews of Ingarden. For Blaustein, the forms of an artwork are not ontological structures, but functional arrangements that organize experiential acts. He states explicitly:
The aesthetic experience, although we perceive it as a rest, as a relaxation after hardship, requires considerable activity from us,
sometimes even extraordinary spiritual dynamism. It is by no means
enough to look at a beautiful landscape, to listen to good music, to watch a beautiful film, for an aesthetic experience to arise.15
This activity concerns both the reactive and perceptual dimensions of the experience:
Yet, not only in these reactive components of aesthetic experience, but already in the perceptual ones—in those in which the seemingly passive reception of the aesthetic object takes place—does the activity of the aesthetically experiencing subject manifest itself.16
15	"[D]oznanie estetyczne, mimo, iž odczuwamy je jako odpoczynek, odpr^ženie po trudach, wymaga od nas znacznej aktywnosci, niekiedy nawet niezwyklej dynamiki duchowej. Nie jest bynajmniej tak, iž wystarczy patrzec na piçkny krajobraz, sluchac dobrej muzyki, widziec piçkny film, by powstalo przežycie estetyczne." (Blaustein 1938, 4.)
16	"Ale nie tylko w tych reaktywnych skladnikach doznania estetycznego, lecz juž w perceptywnych, w tych, w ktorych dokonuje siç na pozor wyl^cznie bierny
wojciech Starzynski
Recalling Ingarden, Blaustein emphasizes the significance of the literary work's status within the aesthetics:
It is well known that literary works of art are the source of many aesthetic experiences. Until recently, little attention had been paid to what a literary work actually is. [...] This difficult problem was brought to the attention of aestheticians and literary theorists by the Polish scholar Roman Ingarden.17
However, Blaustein offers a different solution from Ingarden's. For him, the concrete perception and its quality condition the emergence of aesthetic values:
In the works of Roman Ingarden cited above, the reader will find numerous further confirmations of the claim that the same literary work may be apprehended in different ways depending on the course of the reader's experience, which obviously affects the richer or poorer grasp of its aesthetic values. A full apprehension of the work and its aesthetic merits thus requires great activity and skill on the part of the reader.18
Blaustein's aesthetics, thus, turns out to be a theory of the dynamic organization of experience, in which the work of art possesses no independent being, but functions as a point of reference within an intentional, perceptual-affective framework. Aesthetic values are not ideal entities, but "occur" within a well-formed structure of acts, expressing his commitment to a functional metaphysical minimalism. This is particularly evident in On the Apprehension
odbior przedmiotu estetycznego, objawia siç aktywnosc czlowieka przezywaj^cego estetycznie." (Blaustein 1938, 4.)
17	"Wiadomo, iz literackim dzielom sztuki zawdziçczamy wiele doznan estetycznych. Do niedawna malo zastanawiano siç nad tym, czym jest wlasciwie dzielo literackie. [...] Ten trudny problem uswiadomil estetykom i teoretykom literatury polski uczony Roman Ingarden." (Blaustein 1938, 18.)
18	"W cytowanych dzielach Romana Ingardena znajdzie czytelnik liczne dalsze dowody twierdzenia, ze to samo dzielo literackie moze bye zaleznie od przebiegu przezyc czytelnika rozmaicie ujçte, co oczywiscie wplywa na bogatsze lub ubozsze uchwycenie jego estetycznych wartosci. Peine ujçcie dziela i jego walorow estetycznych wymaga wiçc duzej aktywnosci i umiejçtnosci czytelnika." (Blaustein 1938, 24.)
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of Aesthetic Objects (O ujmowaniu przedmiotow estetycznych), where a positive project of aesthetic phenomenology emerges—one that, though still cautious toward classical metaphysical questions, is no longer merely descriptive. Here, we find a mode of valuation and normative reflection on culture, its function, and the conditions of its reception, which may be interpreted as a proposal for a minimalist metaphysics of culture.
Blaustein writes:
Since in aesthetic experience the object appears as endowed with certain aesthetic qualities, and the quantity and kind of these qualities that reach the consciousness of the experiencer depend not only on the objective properties of the object, but also on the course and type of perception—it is up to us, and not only to the creator of beauty, how much of the beauty of nature and art we absorb into ourselves, how much we notice, how much we feel.19
This aspect of aesthetic activism introduces an axiological and quasi-ethical dimension to the description of aesthetic experience. With reference to Ossowski, Blaustein speaks of "aesthetic color-blindness" as a kind of civilizational illness that deprives life of depth and the possibility of escape into a world of higher experiences:
Beauty, due to such a mode of consumption, loses nothing; rather, it is the life of the aesthetically color-blind person that is impoverished—one who often seeks joy where only the illusion of it beckons, and passes by those sources, which could bestow lasting emotion upon him.20
19	"Skoro w doznaniu estetycznym przedmiot wystçpuje jako wyposazony w pewne walory estetyczne, a ilosc i rodzaj tych walorow, ktore dochodz^ do swiadomosci doznaj^cego zalež^ nie tylko od obiektywnych wlasciwosci przedmiotu, ale rowniez od przebiegu i rodzaju percepcji to od nas, a nie tylko od tworcy piçkna zalezy, ile piçkna przyrody i sztuki w siebie wchloniemy, ile go zauwazymy, ile odczujemy." (Blaustein 1938, 28.)
20	"Piçkno z powodu takiej jego konsumpcji nie traci niczego, ubožeje natomiast zycie daltonisty estetycznego, ktory szuka radosci czçsto tam, gdzie tylko zludny jej pozor
wojciech Starzynski
Equally significant is the intensity and spiritual engagement that Blaustein attributes to the aesthetic experience. This experience is both active and transgressive, allowing one to distance oneself from the concerns of everyday life and transition to another dimension of experience. This may be interpreted as a functional equivalent of an "escape" into the ideal realm—a minimal form of metaphysical elevation: "Indeed, during an aesthetic experience we forget our worries and life pursuits; we 'live in the moment,' as the Polish aesthetician Stanislaw Ossowski writes—rather than in the past or the future."21
It is also worth noting that, for Blaustein, the apprehension of a work— especially, a literary one—depends on the spiritual competence of the recipient. This renders the act of reception not merely a psychological fact, but also an axiologically relevant activity:
A full grasp of a work and its aesthetic qualities therefore requires a great deal of activity and skill on the part of the reader. The lack of such capacities means, for instance, that some readers of masterpieces fail entirely to apprehend them as masterpieces.22
By way of conclusion, it can be said that in his independent aesthetic writings—unlike his earlier polemic with Ingarden's ontological position— Blaustein develops his own conception of aesthetics as an active, evaluative, and culture-generating experience. And although he consistently denies the aesthetic object an ontological status, his affirmation of aesthetic experience, cultural competence, and valuation amounts to a subtle, reduced, but nonetheless genuine metaphysics of culture.
kusi, a przechodzi obok takich jej zrödel, ktöre trwalym wzruszeniem hojnie obdarzyc go mog^." (Blaustein 1938, 29.)
21	"Wszak w czasie doznania estetycznego zapominamy o naszych troskach i d^ženiach zyciowych, 'zyjemy chwil^,' jak pisze polski estetyk Stanislaw Ossowski—a nie przeszlosci^ lub przyszlosci^." (Blaustein 1938, 3.) See Plotka 2024, 197, note 795.
22	"Peine ujçcie dziela i jego waloröw estetycznych wymaga wiçc dužej aktywnosci i umiejçtnosci czytelnika. Ich brak sprawia np., že niektörzy czytelnicy arcydziel nie ujmuj^ ich zupelnie jako arcydziela." (Blaustein 1938, 24.)
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III. Humanistic psychology as the core of a functional project and a metaphysics of culture
The programmatic article "On the Tasks of Humanistic Psychology" ("O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej") is one of the most compelling synthetic expressions of Blaustein's philosophy. Despite his explicit distance from classical metaphysics, Blaustein does not reject the question of the structure and meaning of culture; rather, he reframes it as a functional and differentiated analysis of the experiencing person within symbolic forms and collective cultural structures.
Blaustein begins by distancing himself from metaphysical formulations of humanistic psychology:
The above formulation of the tasks of humanistic psychology rests in many respects on its classical representatives, Dilthey and Spranger, while diverging from them in others—specifically, in its tendency to avoid certain concepts burdened with metaphysical assumptions or semantic ambiguity.23
This polemical stance has naturally suggested to later commentators that Blaustein, like Twardowski, should be regarded as being straightforwardly "anti-metaphysical."24 In my view, however, this picture needs to be nuanced.
23	"Powyzsze ujçcie zadan psychologji humanistycznej opiera siç w licznych punktach na klasycznych jej przedstawicielach, Dilthey'u i Sprangerze, odbiegaj^c w wielu innych, a to w tendencji unikania pewnych pojçc, obarczonych zalozeniami metafizycznemi lub wieloznacznosci^." (Blaustein 1935a, 57.)
24	For the historical context of this project, see Plotka 2024, 72-77. Plotka reconstructs Blaustein's lecture on Spranger and Dilthey, delivered on October 6, 1934, at the 335th plenary meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society, and reports Twardowski's reaction: the paper was "well prepared," but "misleading in regard to its content" (Twardowski 1997, 365). He interprets this remark as indicating that Blaustein's project of humanistic psychology could in principle be reduced to Twardowski's descriptive psychology, rooted in the distinction between actions and products, and that Blaustein's anti-metaphysical attitude is directly grounded in his teacher's philosophy. At the same time, Plotka emphasizes that the published version of the lecture offers an original synthesis of Twardowski's approach with that of Spranger and Dilthey, and can be regarded as the beginning of the Polish tradition of humanistic
Wojciech Starzynski
Twardowski's stance was closer to Brentano's critical attitude toward speculative metaphysics than to the radical anti-metaphysical program later associated with the Warsaw logicians. He remains open to the possibility of a positive, carefully circumscribed metaphysics, and it is in this more nuanced sense that Blaustein's own project of humanistic psychology and cultural analysis can be understood, not as a rejection of metaphysics, but as a search for a minimal and functional metaphysical framework adequate to anthropological and cultural reality.25
psychology, anticipating later developments in Maslow and Rogers (see also Nawrocki 1996, 139-142).
25 On this point, I follow a line of interpretation that treats both Brentano and Twardowski not as straightforward enemies of metaphysics, but as proponents of a positive and methodologically constrained metaphysics. In Brentano's case, his lifelong "moral and metaphysical teachings" (Jacquette 2004, 17) are explicitly retained within an empiricist framework: descriptive psychology functions as an entry point to a unified philosophical science, and his later reistic ontology, with its parsimonious categories of concrete substances and accidents, together with his value theory and natural theology, amounts to a substantive metaphysical position, rather than a dissolution of metaphysical questions (see: Albertazzi 1996, 47-60; Kriegel 2017; Sauer 2017; Chrudzimski and Smith 2004). For Twardowski, the 1895 inaugural lecture ("Wyklad wst^pny w Uniwersytecie Lwowskim") is decisive. There, he first characterizes philosophy as a science of mental (spiritual) phenomena—a definition that applies to psychology, logic, ethics, and aesthetics—, but immediately adds that it does not apply to metaphysics, which investigates neither sensory phenomena as such nor mental phenomena. Metaphysics, he argues, concerns a different kind of object, above all relations (causal, spatial, temporal, logical, etc.), which cannot be reduced to either physical or mental phenomena, and are nonetheless intimately connected with both; questions about the origin and structure of the world, the connection of soul and body, the dependence or independence of mind on matter, or the teleological ordering of reality all properly belong here. Against positivist attempts to deny metaphysics any significance, Twardowski insists that these problems can and should be treated scientifically—by means of careful analysis and the same inductive and deductive procedures that guide the natural sciences—and that metaphysics thus conceived forms a necessary complement to the philosophical disciplines grounded in inner experience (see Twardowski 2013b, 457-467; Brozek and Jadacki 2014, 27-28). A concrete illustration of what he takes to be a properly metaphysical problem is his essay "Metaphysics of the soul," where the dispute over the subject of mental life is framed in terms of whether—beyond successive experiences—there exists a substance, of which mental phenomena would be accidents (against the Humean or Fechnerian asubstantialism and against materialism) (see Twardowski 2013a, 119-125). As Dariusz Lukasiewicz has shown, this conception can be read within a broader Brentanian context:
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Blaustein's rejection of metaphysically burdened terminology, however, does not imply epistemological skepticism or the abandonment of ordered accounts of human reality. On the contrary, he builds the structure of humanistic psychology as a form of knowledge about the cultural human being—one who is not reducible to a reactive organism, but manifests as a dynamic center of acts, values, and experiences. Within this framework, he introduces the concept of the person:
When I introduce the concept of "person" in defining the tasks of humanistic psychology, I am not referring to a metaphysical self; rather, I understand it [...] as a psycho-physical individual, endowed with numerous structurally interconnected dispositions and tendencies toward experiencing and behaving.26
It is precisely this structurality and differentiation of experiential dispositions that forms the foundation of a functional anthropology of culture—an anthropology open both to the investigation of individual psychological differences as well as to the shared conditions that constitute the human world as a cultural world.
Polish metaphysics in the Twardowskian tradition inherits Brentano's commitments to intentionality, a pre-Kantian conception of truth, and ontological realism, while seeking to develop a scientifically disciplined, non-speculative metaphysics, rather than to abandon metaphysical reflection altogether (Lukasiewicz 2009, 26-28). A related tension is diagnosed by Roman Ingarden who argues that the Warsaw logistic movement, despite its "basic hostility toward metaphysics," in fact advances robust metaphysical theses about reality—for example, in Kotarbinski's reism—, which Ingarden explicitly qualifies as a form of "dogmatic metaphysics," even if Kotarbinski himself would probably refuse to recognize them as such (Ingarden 1974, 101-102). From this angle, the rhetorical call to "avoid metaphysics" is best understood as a rejection of speculative Metaphysizismus, not of any scientifically disciplined metaphysics (see: Wolenski 2017, 53; Plotka 2024, 16). It is against this background that Blaustein's project may be read not as an anti-metaphysical liquidation of traditional problems, but as an attempt to articulate a minimal, functionally oriented metaphysical framework adequate to humanistic and cultural reality.
26 "Gdy wprowadzam przy okresleniu zadan psychologji humanistycznej poj^cie 'osoby,' nie chodzi mi o metafizyczn^ jazn; pojmuj^ j^ [...] jako psychofizyczne indywiduum, wyposazone w liczne strukturalnie powi^zane dyspozycje i sklonnosci do przezyc i zachowan si§." (Blaustein 1935a, 44.)
Wojciech Starzynski
In Blaustein's account, culture is not a set of objects, but a network of collective products, each with its own enduring structure: "Civilization, science, law, language, art (not only folk art), etiquette, religious ritual—all of these are likewise collective creations."27
This distinction between individual (e.g., Shakespeare's drama) and collective (e.g., a democratic system of government) cultural products enables Blaustein to grasp the objective dimension of culture without invoking metaphysical entities. Cultural structures are the product of human activity, yet they extend beyond the individual—they constitute a domain, in which the individual may define oneself, transcend oneself, and participate.
In this sense, humanistic psychology not only studies the person, but also presents the person as a point of intersection between the orders of experience, value, and collective form. Blaustein does not construct a metaphysics in the classical sense; rather, he develops a metaphysics of culture as a functional account of transcendence through participation—through acts of experiencing, creation, and identification with values.
Grounded in the reconstruction of the "essence of psychic phenomena" and 121 in the reading of the human being as a cultural individual, this project reveals a distinct normative dimension: it speaks not only to what the human being is, but to what constitutes the human being within a world of meanings, structures, and values. In this sense—despite his declared distance from ontology—, Blaustein constructs a positive, functional metaphysics of the person and of culture, which proves relevant both to the analysis of aesthetic experience and to the understanding of the individual's relationship with the collective.
Against this background, functional humanistic psychology transforms metaphysics into a reflection on the structure of higher-order experiences, their role in the constitution of personhood, and their relation to values:
In concluding this descriptive characterization of higher-order experiential wholes, it is worth recalling the point emphasized by Dilthey— namely, that these wholes, or their phases, are most often accompanied by a sense of their value or significance for the whole of psychic life. Experiences
27 "Cywilizacja, nauka, prawo, j^zyk, sztuka (i to nie tylko ludowa), etykieta, rytual religijny s^ wi^c rowniez wytworami zbiorowemi." (Blaustein 1935a, 46.)
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associated with friendship bear the mark of greater importance than, for instance, those connected with listening to radio broadcasts.28
Here, value and meaning emerge as central categories—though Blaustein initially approaches them with caution:
[...] the reason for avoiding such fundamental concepts for German humanistic psychology as "meaning" or "value" was rather their ambiguity. I do not exclude the possibility that, after numerous and difficult semantic analyses, it might become feasible to render, for instance, the term "meaning" suitable for scientific use.29
Despite this initial reserve, in his analysis of higher-order experiences Blaustein not only acknowledges that such experiences are subject to valuation, but also maintains that their value is constituted in relation to the person and to their life as a whole. This relational dimension forms a kind of rooted metaphysics—a metaphysics of subjective embeddedness: "From 122 the standpoint of the various higher-order experiential wholes, individual experiences acquire differing values and differing vital significance."30
In this context, Blaustein explicitly invokes the thesis of Ingarden who emphasized the necessity of linking experience to the person:
28	"Na zakonczenie tej deskryptywnej charakterystyki calosci przežyciowych wyzszego rzçdu godzi siç zwrocic jeszcze uwagç na podkreslan^ przez Diltheya okolicznosc, že calosciom tym resp. ich fazom towarzyszy najczçsciej poczucie ich wartosci, wažnosci dla caloksztaltu žycia psychicznego. Przežycia zwi^zane z przyjazni^ nosz^ na sobie piçtno wiçkszej donioslosci, niž np. przežycia, zwi^zane z sluchaniem audycyj radjowych." (Blaustein 1935a, 42-43.)
29	"[Pjrzyczyn^ unikania tak podstawowych dla niemieckiej psych ologji humanistycznej pojçc, jak pojçcie sensu lub wartosci, byla raczej ich niejasnosc. Nie wykluczam možliwosci, že po licznych i trudnych analizach znaczeniowych, udaloby siç przygotowac np. termin 'sens' do naukowego užytku i že naležy to uczynic, s^dzç jednak, že zadania psychologji humanistycznej okreslic možna bez odwolywania siç do tego terminu." (Blaustein 1935a, 55.)
30	"[...] z punktu widzenia rozmaitych calosci przežyciowych wyžszego rzçdu poszczegolne przežycia przybieraj^ rožn^ wartosc, rožn^ wažnosc žyciow^." (Blaustein 1935a, 43.)
wojciech Starzynski
One of these points was rightly raised by Prof. Roman Ingarden, according to whom their essential feature is their connection to the person, with the task of humanistic psychology being to grasp experiences as expressions or discharges of that person.31
Blaustein not only endorses this view, but extends it into a relational theory of psychic wholeness: "I regard higher-order experiential wholes as artificially isolated from the originally natural psychological whole—that is, from the psychic life of a concrete human being, most intimately tied to the behavior of that human being."32
In this way, Blaustein proposes a model grounded in psychic phenomenology—one that goes beyond purely descriptive analysis. It does not merely reconstruct the structure of experience, but imbues it with meaning in biographical, cultural, and functional contexts. This approach articulates a positive, reduced metaphysics of culture and personhood—one not based on hypostases, but on the functionally structured psychic life, its internal configurations, and its axiological orientations.
IV. Education as a functional metaphysics of culture: The pedagogical complement of Blaustein's project
One can venture to say that in Blaustein's philosophy, education constitutes a kind of functional metaphysics of culture, where pedagogy complements in a unique way his minimalist philosophical project based on humanistic psychology, act-based phenomenology, and the tripartite structure of intentionality. It appears that Blaustein's theoretical concept finds its full expression in his pedagogical texts, such as those concerning out-of-school education, discipline, and laziness.
31	"Na jedn^ z nich zwröcil slusznie m^ uwagç Prof. Roman Ingarden, wedlug ktörego istotn^ ich wlasciwosci^ jest ich zwi^zek z osob^, przyczem zadaniem psychologji humanistycznej ma bye ujçcie przezyc jako 'wyladowan tej osoby." (Blaustein 1935a, 43.)
32	"[Ujwazam calosci przezyciowe wyzszego rzçdu za cos sztucznie izolowanego z pierwotnie naturalnej calosci psychologicznej, jak^ jest zycie psychiczne konkretnego czlowieka, zwi^zane najscislej z zachowaniem siç tego czlowieka." (Blaustein 1935a, 43.)
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In his reflections on out-of-school education, Blaustein emphasizes the importance of the intellectual and spiritual activity of the adult, which is the basis for maintaining vital energy, developing personality, and integrating with society. Referring to the concept of Charlotte Buhler, he writes: "The efficiency and productivity of a person's work depend on their vital energy and on their experience and intellectual development. Intellectual and spiritual needs and functions sustain a person's vitality longer than would correspond to a purely biological course."33
Blaustein adds: "By maintaining the intellectual activity of the adult learner, one can also sustain their vital energy, [...] give meaning to their life, and increase their satisfaction with life."34 Education, according to Blaustein, does not change the adult's character, but, by instilling a worldview tied to their emotional life, it redirects the objects of their commitment and volition.
Blaustein's concept of discipline is based on the understanding of obedience as a dynamic relationship of the individual toward society and 124 the educator who must reconcile the necessity of educational compulsion with the student's freedom and spontaneity. He writes: "We say that person A is disciplined with respect to person B, if they carry out their orders, whereby this discipline can be blind, voluntary, or forced."35 This formulation grounds the concept of discipline, not in the mere fact of submission, but in the modality of the relational stance—its voluntariness, compulsion, or mechanical conformity—, thus enabling a psychological and ethical evaluation of educational authority.
In line with humanistic psychology, he also considers the broader social context of this phenomenon in terms of dynamic exchange of life power and
33	"[...] wydajnosc i sprawnosc pracy czlowieka zaležy od jego energii žyciowej (witalnosci) oraz od jego doswiadczenia i rozwoju intelektu. Potrzeby oraz funkcje intelektualne i duchowe utrzymuj^ aktywnosc žyciow^ czlowieka dlužej, niž by to odpowiadalo przebiegowi czysto biologicznemu." (Blaustein 1935b, 27.)
34	"Przez podtrzymanie aktywnosci mysli doroslego 'wychowanka' podtrzymac tež možna jego energiç žyciow^, [.] nada siç jego žyciu sens, zwiçkszy jego zadowolenie z žycia." (Blaustein 1935b, 27.)
35	"Powiemy, iž osoba A jest karna wzglçdem osoby B, jesli wykonuje jej zlecenia, przyczem karnosc ta može byc slepa, dobrowolna lub przymusowa." (Blaustein 1936a, 5.)
WojciECH Starzynski
affect: "One can be disciplined not only toward a person, but also toward a group of people, a society of which one is a member."36 He explains: "The increase in the power of an organization intensifies the discipline of its members [...]. The fact that membership in a given organization is voluntary or compulsory does not yet determine the type of discipline toward that organization."37
In his reflections on laziness, Blaustein emphasizes that the acquisition of knowledge or physical skills requires systematic effort on the part of the pupil and that this effort serves not only cognitive aims, but also character formation: "The acquisition of knowledge or certain physical skills requires systematic work from the pupil, and this work is at the same time one of the most excellent means of character formation."38 He warns that this work is often hindered by laziness, which he defines, not merely as a psychological state, but as a trait opposed to the ideal of the active and creative person: "Laziness is a feature of passive people."39 The task of combating it falls especially to the modern educator, whose ideal is the formation of an active and creative citizen.
Blaustein's pedagogical approach leads him to a detailed, phenomenologically 125 grounded analysis of the psychological causes and effects of laziness. He enumerates its main causes as follows:
[...] a) emotional indifference toward the goal of the activity, b) impossibility of achieving the goal at a later time, c) difficulty of the
tasks to be performed, d) unpleasant associations connected with the tasks, e) fatigue, etc., f) experiencing pleasant or unpleasant affects, g) coercion exerted to compel the execution of certain activities.40
36	"[...] karnym možna bye nie tylko wobec jakiejs osoby, lecz röwniez wzglçdem pewnej grupy ludzi, spoleczenstwa, ktörego jest siç czlonkiem." (Blaustein 1936a, 10.)
37	"Zwiçkszenie mocy organizacji potçguje karnosc czlonköw [...]. Okolicznosc, czy przynaleznosc do pewnej organizacji jest dobrowolna czy przymusowa, nie decyduje jeszcze o rodzaju karnosci wobec tej organizacji." (Blaustein 1936a, 10.)
38	"Uzyskanie zas wiadomosci lub pewnych sprawnosci fizycznych wymaga od wychowanka systematycznej pracy, przyczem praca ta jest zarazem jednym z najznakomitszych srodköw ksztalcenia charakteröw." (Blaustein, 1936b, 5.)
39	"Lenistwo jest cech^ ludzi biernych." (Blaustein 1936b, 5.)
40	"[...] a) obojçtnosc uczuciowa wzglçdem celu czynnosci, b) niemožnosc zrealizowania celu w pözniejszym terminie, c) trudnosc czynnosci, ktöre nalezy
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In the spirit of humanistic psychology, Blaustein treats each of these causes, not as fixed traits of the child, but as dynamic and modifiable aspects of their lived experience. In cases of emotional indifference toward the goal of a task, the educator should awaken the pupil's engagement by suggesting or demonstrating the meaningfulness and value of the work. Where the goal appears unattainable in the future, Blaustein recommends changing or adjusting the task to suit the child's abilities—an approach that presupposes individual attention to their capacities and developmental stage. When tasks are experienced as difficult, he advises dividing them into smaller, more manageable steps that lead progressively toward the intended result. For unpleasant associations linked to a task, Blaustein proposes creating a more positive and secure atmosphere of learning, avoiding punishment and excessive pressure. In cases of fatigue or affective overload, he suggests alternating the activity with one that is more stimulating or suited to the child's interests, thereby reawakening motivation. Finally, in situations involving coercion, the educator should rationalize the demand, explain its 126 purpose, and provide room for choice and autonomy in execution, helping to foster a sense of internal motivation and responsibility.
The pedagogical complement to Blaustein's theory thus lies in his proposal for an educational methodology grounded in a phenomenological understanding of the pupil's psychological life. He emphasizes the need to reconcile the necessity of educational discipline with the promotion of autonomy, freedom, and meaningful engagement. In this light, education becomes a key vector of his functional metaphysics of culture—aiming at the integral development of the human person through the cultivation of both reason and character.
V. Boundary case: Religious spirituality as a structure of experience
In his analysis of Hebbel's dramas presented in Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen, Blaustein develops the tenets of his humanistic psychology avant la
wykonac, d) przykre kojarzenia, l^cz^ce siç z wykonywanemi czynnosciami, e) zmçczenie itp., f) przezywanie przyjemnych lub przykrych afektow, g) przymus, wywarty celem sklonienia do wykonania danych czynnosci." (Blaustein 1936b, 13.)
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lettre, extending them to encompass the specificity of boundary experiences— namely, religious experiences. In line with his methodological commitments, Blaustein refrains from adopting ontological-metaphysical assumptions about the "spirit," and confines himself to a descriptive and functional account of experiential structures. Nevertheless, his interpretation of Hebbel's dramas goes beyond mere psychological reconstruction, incorporating elements of valuation and even a model of authentic religiosity.
Blaustein maintains the tripartite structure of intentional experience (act—object—content) also in relation to religious experience. He introduces a distinction between religious experiences in the strict and the broad sense, emphasizing both their subjective and objectifiable aspects. As he writes: "Religious experiences in the strict sense of the word are all psychic experiences whose intention is directed toward God as their intentional object."41 At the same time, he also acknowledges a broader category: "Religious experiences in the broader sense of the word are also those whose intentional object is different from God, but which stand in some other relation to God."42	127
Blaustein underscores the importance of analyzing not only the act of experiencing, but also its content and intentional correlate. This leads to a noematic investigation aimed, as he puts it, at "the cognition of God as he is grasped and understood in individual religious experiences, the knowledge of the attributes and functions ascribed to God (or to the gods) in particular religious experiences."43
Through this descriptive framework, Blaustein continues the phenomenological project in the field of religious experience, focusing on how the divine is constituted in consciousness and what structural features define
41	"Gotteserlebnisse im engeren Sinne des Wortes sind also alle psychischen Erlebnisse, deren Intention sich auf Gott als ihren intentionalen Gegenstand richtet." (Blaustein 1929, 2.)
42	"Gotteserlebnisse im weiteren Sinne des Wortes sind aber auch alle diejenigen, deren intentionaler Gegenstand zwar von Gott verschieden ist, die aber in irgendwelcher anderen Beziehung zu Gott stehen." (Blaustein 1929, 2.)
43	"[...] die Erkenntnis Gottes, wie er in den einzelnen Gotteserlebnissen erfaßt und begriffen wird, die Kenntnis der Attribute und der Funktionen, die Gott (resp. den Göttern) in einzelnen religiösen Erlebnissen zugeschrieben werden." (Blaustein 1929, 2.)
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such constitution. His approach remains rigorously intentional, yet open to the rich variability of the noematic contents and affective dimensions involved in religious life.
Blaustein pays special attention to the drama Maria Magdalena, analyzing the character of Klara as an example of childlike and feminine religiosity. Klara prays:
But you are gracious. You are merciful! I wish I had a faith like the Catholics, so I could give you a gift! I would empty my whole piggy bank and buy you a beautiful gilded heart and decorate it with roses.44
Blaustein comments: "Here we see a pure, deep feeling of gratitude toward God that seeks a symbol, striving for expression."45 For Blaustein, Klara's religiosity exemplifies an authentic mode of religious experience—one that does not stem from theological instruction or mystical contemplation, but from a natural, childlike emotional relation to the world. As he observes:
A large part of humanity—the children and those who are like children—believe in God as a family father. That is why they address Him so personally, as if speaking informally, believing Him to be always present, concerned with their little worries.46
Blaustein emphasizes that such individuals are not mystics, but rather express a pure sense of childlike feeling: "And yet they are not mystics; they simply surrender to their pure childlike feeling. [...] And without being
44	"Aber du bist gnädig. Du bist barmherzig! Ich wollt, ich hätt einen Glauben wie die Katholischen, daß ich dir etwas schenken dürfte! Meine ganze Sparbüchse wollt' ich leeren und dir ein schönes, vergoldetes Herz kaufen und es mit Rosen umwinden." (Blaustein 1929, 46.)
45	"Wir sehen hier ein reines, tiefes Gefühl der Dankbarkeit Gott gegenüber, das ein Symbol sucht, nach Ausdruck ringt." (Blaustein 1929, 46.)
46	"Ein großer Teil der Menschheit - die Kinder und solche, die den Kindern gleichen - glaubt an Gott, als einen Familienvater. Darum sprechen sie ihn so persönlich an, duzen ihn gewissermaßen, glauben ihn immer gegenwärtig, sich mit ihren kleinen Sorgen beschäftigend." (Blaustein 1929, 46.)
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Christs, they feel themselves to be sons and daughters of the Father in heaven."47 Crucially, he notes that this kind of faith lacks cosmological abstraction: "They have no notion of the immense vastness of the world, of the universe. That is why they do not tremble before God, even when they fear Him."48 Through this analysis, Blaustein suggests that genuine religiosity may arise from emotional immediacy and existential trust, rather than from doctrinal knowledge or metaphysical speculation.
In Genoveva, Blaustein notes that the religious experiences of the title character and of Golo bear a metaphysical dimension, although not in a doctrinal form. He writes: "The plot of the tragedy is thus metaphysically anchored and at the same time presents a depiction of the era that reveals to us the innermost essence of the spiritual life of a great epoch."49 Genoveva, though passive, becomes a figure of spiritual purification, suffering, and forgiveness: "Like the Savior, she too will suffer, and, like him, will neither moan nor complain. And in doing so, the burden of humanity's sins will once again be erased for a thousand years."50 Golo, by contrast, is "only an instrument of the world's will,"51 and his tragedy lies in the fact that, though unconsciously, he 129 enacts a historical plan without understanding its metaphysical significance.
In Herodes und Mariamne, Blaustein identifies not only psychological depth, but also a profound religious and cultural anchoring. As he writes: "The tragedy is metaphysically anchored, its problem elevated to a cultural problem; it takes place at a turning point in the world process."52 This
47	"Und dabei sind sie keine Mystiker, sie geben sich nur ihrem reinen Kindesgefühl hin. [...] Und ohne Christusse zu sein, fühlen sie sich als Söhne und Töchter des Vaters im Himmel." (Blaustein 1929, 46-47.)
48	"Von der ungeheuren Größe der Welt, des Universums haben sie keinen Begriff. Darum schaudern sie nicht vor Gott, auch dann nicht, wenn sie ihn fürchten." (Blaustein 1929, 47.)
49	"Die Handlung der Tragödie ist also metaphysisch verankert und entwirft zugleich ein Zeitbild, das uns das innerste Wesen des geistigen Lebens einer großen Periode enthüllt." (Blaustein 1929, 30.)
50	"Wie der Heiland, so wird auch sie selbst leiden und, wie er, weder jammern noch klagen. Und dadurch wird wieder einmal die Sündenlast der Menschheit auf ein Jahrtausend getilgt werden." (Blaustein 1929, 31.)
51	"[...] nur ein Werkzeug des Weltwillens [...]." (Blaustein 1929, 30.)
52	"Die Tragödie ist metaphysisch verankert, ihr Problem ist zum Kulturproblem
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anchoring is further developed through the temporal and symbolic setting of the drama: "It is the time around the birth of Christ, a transitional period just before the sunrise of a new idea that will come to rule the world."53 The conflict between Herod and Mariamne unfolds within a symbolic circle encompassing "the entire world of that time and everything that moved it."54 At the center of this tragic conflict stands the figure of the woman treated as property—a recurring motif in Hebbel's plays, as Blaustein notes (Blaustein 1929, 16). Through this interpretation, Blaustein demonstrates that religiosity in literature can function as an expression of deep metaphysical tensions and cultural transformations, elevating individual psychological conflict to the level of epochal significance.
This represents a specific instance of a functional metaphysics of culture, in which religious experience appears as one of the most complex forms of psychological life, shaping both morality and existential meaning. In this sense, Blaustein does not construct an ontological metaphysics of the spirit, but, rather, within the framework of humanistic psychology, enables a descriptive 130 account of religious experiences as meaning- and value-generating structures embedded in the life of the individual and cultural community.
VI. Conclusion: Phenomenology, Husserl, and the positive metaphysics of culture
From the perspective of a holistic reading of Blaustein's thought, his attitude toward phenomenology appears to be critically loyal as well as functionally transformative. Blaustein did not reject Husserl's phenomenology, but subjected it to a rigorous methodological and epistemological scrutiny. In a 1928 paper, he explicitly stated that phenomenology could make sense as an empirical, descriptive science of types of experience, rather than as an a priori ontology of ideal beings. Addressing the concept of Wesensschau, Blaustein
emporgehoben, sie spielt sich in einem Wendepunkt des Weltprozesses ab." (Blaustein 1929, 16.)
53	"Es ist die Zeit um Christi Geburt, eine Übergangsperiode unmittelbar vor dem Sonnenaufgang einer neuen Idee, die die Weltherrschaft erringen wird." (Blaustein 1929, 16.)
54	"[...] die ganze damalige Welt und alles, was sie bewegte [...]." (Blaustein 1929, 16.)
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offers a psychological interpretation that challenges its foundational role in phenomenological method.55
In other words, Blaustein does not deny the heuristic significance of intuition in highlighting essential features of a presented content. However, he questions the claim that such intuitive acts provide apodictic insight or proof. For Blaustein, Wesensschau should be understood as a form of schematic representation whose value lies in its suggestive and exploratory capacity, not in its epistemological certainty. This reorientation is emblematic of his broader project of reworking phenomenology within a framework of descriptive psychology and empirical grounding.
Thus, Blaustein proposes a reinterpretation of the foundations of phenomenology toward a descriptive psychology that does not rely on controversial eidetic intuitions, but on a systematic description of intentional acts in their full functionality. This does not mean, however, that Husserl as a philosopher was not an important figure for Blaustein. On the contrary, he regarded Husserl as one of those thinkers who, despite all theoretical problems, initiated a new form of reflection upon consciousness and its structures. It can 131 be said that Blaustein remains in a relation of creative transformation toward Husserl, moving from an idealizing ontology or transcendental phenomenology to, in his view, a much more constructive and concrete epistemology of acts and their cultural products. What is worth quoting, however, in the context of the metaphysical dimension of Blaustein's thought, is that in his very personal recollection of a conversation with Husserl, he evokes an extremely powerful and dramatic vision of philosophy as an ethical human mission, with which, in a way, he seems to identify:
"Philosophy is heroism," Husserl said. Only from ethical or religious motives can one arrive at philosophy. Philosophy is the moral
55 See Blaustein 1928, 164-165: "Tzw. 'Wesensschau' zas wydaje siç bye pewnym rodzajem przedstawien schematycznych. [...] Rožni siç tem, iž doboru cech, spelnionych w tresci prezentuj^cej, dokonuje na zasadzie ich istotnosci resp. nieistotnosci, przyczem dobor ten dokonuje siç intuicyjnie. [...] Niew^tpliwie intuicya može dokonac trafnie doboru pewnych cech jako istotnych [...], ale nigdy nie ma pewnosci, že dobor jest trafny, ani tež nie ma možnosci scislego odrožnienia trafnych wyborow od innych."
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task of mankind. God is waiting for it. [...] He who has understood his mission and task does not remember himself, he is not concerned with the fact that he was the discoverer, he does not argue, he is silent when it comes to the question of authorship. Someone like this works in the consciousness, unshaken by anything, that God is waiting for his work.56
This poignant testimony—of both Husserl and Blaustein—points to the existence of a deeply ethical and spiritual motivation for philosophizing, which Blaustein also links to the tradition of Twardowski's Lvov school:
When I began my university studies in philosophy, Professor Twardowski told us about the priesthood of the philosopher, about the fact that philosophers should only be people who stand very high in ethical terms. Edmund Husserl seems to me to be such a dignified priest of philosophy, worthy of deep reverence.57
We can, therefore, conclude that Blaustein's reflection does not simply reject metaphysics, but points toward its profound transformation. What emerges is not a metaphysics of substance, essence, or transcendence, but a positive metaphysics of culture: one that operates through the structural description of human experience, the normative functions of values, and the spiritual products of intentional life. In this sense, Blaustein's metaphysics is not imposed from above, but arises "from below"—from within the forms of lived, affective, and cognitive activity, as they are manifested in domains, such as art, education, interpersonal understanding, religion, and ethical self-realization. Metaphysics, thus reconfigured, ceases to be a speculative discourse about
56	"'Filozofja jest bohaterstwem', powiedzial Husserl. Tylko z pobudek etycznych lub religijnych mozna dojsc do filozofji. Filozofja jest zadaniem moralnem ludzkosci. Bog na ni^ czeka. [...] o tem, ze kto zrozumial misjç swoj^ i zadanie, ten nie pamiçta o sobie, temu nie chodzi o to, iz on byl odkrywc^, ten nie polemizuje, ten milczy, gdy chodzi o kwestjç autorstwa. Ten pracuje w swiadomosci niezachwianej niczem, ze Bog czeka na jego dzielo." (Blaustein 1930c, 241-242.)
57	"Gdym rozpocz^l studjum uniwersyteckie filozofji, prof. Twardowski mowil nam o kaplanstwie filozofa, o tem, ze filozofami bye winni wyl^cznie ludzie, bardzo wysoko pod wzglçdem etycznym stoj^cy. Takim dostojnym kaplanem filozofji, godnym czci glçbokiej, wydaje mi siç Edmund Husserl." (Blaustein 1930c, 242.)
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absolute being, and becomes an analytic of meaning and value, a grammar of spiritual formation. It no longer answers the question of what there is, but instead addresses how things become meaningful, how values are experienced, and how these can be shaped, preserved, or transformed within the cultural processes.
In this light, Blaustein's position aligns closely with phenomenology at its best: not as a transcendental philosophy of ideal entities, but as a rigorous and life-oriented description of experience. Yet, it is also distinct in its pedagogical and normative orientation, and in its cultural grounding. It is a phenomenology that does not transcend the world, but commits to it —through a disciplined attention to forms of meaning, to affective and cognitive regularities, and to the moral vocation of philosophy as a work of clarity, responsibility, and human dignity. Such a vision places Blaustein not only as a critic of metaphysics in its traditional guise, but also—perhaps unexpectedly—as a metaphysician of the human condition, one who sought not to escape the world, but to understand and uplift it.
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Original scientific paper Izvirni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.6 UDC: 130.121:111.1
Did I Just See Romeo Commit Suicide?
Meinong and Blaustein on Theater
Hicham Jakha
Institute of Philosophy, The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Al. Raclawickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland
hichamjakha97@gmail.com
Abstract
I analyze the aesthetic experience of theatergoers in light ofMeinong's "assumptions" and Blaustein's "imaginative presentations," taking Brentano's "universality thesis" as the background of my analyses. I argue that "presentations" and "judgments" go hand in hand, as far as theater experience is concerned. To put forth my main argument, I follow a two-fold line of reasoning: phenomenological and ontological. On the phenomenological level, Blaustein's imaginative presentations, I argue, are
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self-sufficient. Nonetheless, on the ontological level, the theater's represented objects emerge as having a two-sided structure that undermines the phenomenological simplicity of presentations. By characterizing represented objects' ontology in this manner, I admit Meinong's assumptions as a fourth class of mental phenomena, and, beyond the frameworks of both Meinong and Blaustein, incorporate judgments into the aesthetic experience of theater.
Keywords: Alexius Meinong, Leopold Blaustein, theater, phenomenology, ontology.
Ali sem ravnokar videl Romea storiti samomor? Meinong in Blaustein o gledališču
Povzetek
V članku estetsko izkustvo obiskovalcev gledališča analiziram v luči Meinongovih »domnev« in Blausteinovih »domišljijskih predstav«, pri čemer si za ozadje razpravljanja jemljem Brentanovo »tezo o univerzalnosti«. Zagovarjam mnenje, 138 da se »predstave« in »sodbe« skladajo, ko gre za gledališko izkušnjo. Z namenom podkrepitve argumentacije sledim dvojni smeri razgrnitve: fenomenološki in ontološki. Na fenomenološki ravni so po mojem mnenju Blausteinove domišljijske predstave samozadostne. Vendar se za predstavljene objekte gledališča na ontološki ravni izkaže, da imajo dvostransko strukturo, ki spodjeda fenomenološko enostavnost predstav. S tem ko na takšen način opredelim ontologijo predstavljenih objektov, priznam Meinongove domneve kot četrti razred mentalnih fenomenov in sodbe, onkraj tako Meinongovega kot Blausteinovega miselnega okvira, vključim v estetsko izkustvo gledališča.
Ključne besede: Alexius Meinong, Leopold Blaustein, gledališče, fenomenologija, ontologija.
Hicham Jakha
Introduction
The present article tackles the conceptions of "assumptions" and "imaginative presentations" and their applicability to "theater," drawing from the philosophies of Alexius Meinong and Leopold Blaustein,1 treating presentations and assumptions as two distinct kinds of mental phenomena delineating one's aesthetic experience of theater plays. At the heart of my analyses is Franz Brentano's "universality thesis," according to which his three classes of mental phenomena (presentations, judgments, and emotions) always go hand in hand.2 To be more explicit, I attempt to uphold Brentano's universality thesis, without rejecting outright Meinong's Annahmen (assumptions) as a fourth class of mental phenomena. In so doing, I argue against Blaustein's rejection of judgments and their role in constituting imaginative presentations, while incorporating Meinong's assumptions as "pretended judgments," necessary for the "internal" constitution of represented objects. A key reference here is Irena Filozofowna's criticism of Blaustein's imaginative presentations,3 which will be the point of departure for my systematic analysis 139 of theater experience/objects in Blaustein and Meinong.4 Furthermore, beyond
1	Blaustein studied under such influential figures as Kazimierz Twardowski and Edmund Husserl, which incidentally made the task of classifying his philosophical corpus difficult (see: Wolenski 1989; Pokropski 2015; Miskiewicz 2009; Plotka 2021a; 2023, etc.). His main area of research was aesthetics, with his "imaginative presentations" theory being one of his notable contributions to the field. Blaustein's connection to Meinong is a mediated one. Both can be classified as Brentanian scholars, and both personally knew and worked with Twardowski's ideas (for more on Meinong's place within Polish philosophy, see Jadacki 2017).
2	Although the universality thesis concerns all three mental phenomena, I focus chiefly on the universality of presentations and judgments.
3	For more on the Filozofowna-Blaustein debate, see Plotka 2021b.
4	A point of clarification is in order. I will not delve deeper into Meinong's understanding of imaginative presentations. Rather, I will concentrate my analysis on Filozofowna's
This work was supported by the National Science Center, Poland, as a part of the SONATA BIS program (No. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108) within the research project on The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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Meinong's framework, I argue the case that genuine judgments are a necessary supplement to imaginative presentations, further supporting the Brentanian universality thesis. In order to put forth my thesis, I follow a two-fold line of reasoning: phenomenological and ontological.5 On the phenomenological level, presentations, in the way they are manifested in experience, are self-sufficient. However, as we depart from the basic presentive level of imaginative perception, the objects of said perception—i.e., represented objects—emerge as having a distinctive ontological structure, namely "two-sidedness," that undermines the phenomenological self-sufficiency of presentations.
Let us suppose you are in the theater to see Romeo and Juliet. You "see" Romeo and Juliet conversing on the theater stage. You "see" a world that is, for all intents and purposes, real. But what is it that theater spectators "see"? Do they see Romeo, Juliet, and their world? Or do they rather see actors acting out the play's scenes? It is natural to treat spectators' experiences of theater to revolve around the latter. That is to say, in its most basic form, theater experience involves basic "perception."6 The spectator attends to the 140 theater's "gestures," "sound-effects," etc. Naturally, they attend to these features in relation to the actor s/objects presented on stage (cf. Melinger and Levelt 2004; Novack and Goldin-Meadow 2017). The ways, in which spectators perceive the theater, are explained by empirical psychology (cf. Rutherford and Kuhlmeier 2013). However, what do spectators do with the "content" of their perceptions? Various accounts have been developed trying to answer this
criticism of Blaustein, using elements from Meinong's philosophy (primarily from his Annahmen). It is important to note that Meinong does not explicitly reject Brentano's universality thesis, but he, too, primarily refers only to assumptions.
5	By "phenomenology," I understand what Brentano, Blaustein, and the Husserl of Logical Investigations would call "descriptive psychology." This is to be distinguished from Husserl's phenomenology as presented in his Ideas I. In distinguishing ontology and phenomenology, I intend to draw a distinction between two levels of inquiry: phenomenology qua descriptive psychology places an emphasis on first-person experience, and ontology focuses on the "objects" experienced, attempting to determine their ontic status, formal structure, etc.
6	"Perception" shall be understood as being "cross-modal," i.e., as involving not only seeing, but also hearing (and possibly touching and smelling). For a view of cross-modal perception, see Driver and Spence 2004.
Hicham Jakha
question,7 but not much has been said specific to theater (Hamilton 2019). The formulation of theater perception in terms of natural perception implies that the latter's passivity extends to the former. In that case, Blaustein and Meinong are right in conceiving of theater experience as being based on imagination. Adhering to its phenomenological simplicity, imaginative presentation is a mental phenomenon, in which the spectator simply perceives the theater's world, somehow involuntarily. The presentation is imaginative, for it is to be distinguished from perceptual presentation, where the perceived objects are mind-independent. Nonetheless, the question raised earlier also affects Blaustein's and Meinong's accounts of imaginative presentations. It is safe to say that theater spectators do not merely perceive naturally; there is also the "imaginative" component. How should we, then, account for the "imaginative" in imaginative presentations? To put it in Hamilton's terms, what do spectators do with the content of their imaginative presentations? In my view, in order to provide an adequate answer to these questions, we need to look beyond phenomenology. To clearly see the distinctiveness of imaginative objects, we need to engage their ontology.8	141
With this goal in mind, my article is structured as follows. First, I will start with an exposition of presentations in Blaustein (I) and Meinong (II). In III, I will systemically compare the conceptions of Blaustein and Meinong, devising Filozofowna's criticism of Blaustein. In a nutshell, I will argue that, phenomenologically (i), Blaustein's imaginative presentations are tenable. That said, I will argue, the ontology (ii) of the theater's represented objects raises a challenge to Blaustein's and Meinong's view of imaginative presentations' self-sufficiency. In so doing, I will uphold Brentano's universality thesis, while— contra Brentano—defending Meinong's Annahmen as a fourth class of mental phenomena.
7	Cf. Levinson's (1997) "concatenationist" theory of musical works and Carroll's (2008) conception of movies.
8	Imaginative objects and fictional objects differ in the mode, in which they are accessed. Whereas imaginative objects are conditioned subjectively (placing an emphasis on the first-person point of view), fictional objects are conditioned objectively, i.e., with regard to the objective side of experience.
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I. Blaustein on presentations
Since both Meinong and Blaustein refer to Brentano's "presentations" (Vorstellungen), we can begin our deliberations with him. According to Brentano (1995), when we speak of a presentation, we do not mean what is presented, but rather the "act" of presenting. "Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term." (60.) Brentano conceives of presentations as being different from other "psychic phenomena," such as "judgments" and "emotions." Presentations are the most basic of the three. All that it takes for a presentation to take place is for an individual's intentional act to be directed toward a certain object. Which kind of presentation is at stake, does not really matter. For instance, we could be imagining, perceiving, or remembering the object of presentation. Judgments and emotions are based on presentations. The former allow us to concede or deny the existence of the object of presentation, whereas the latter consolidate our feelings toward it.
142 Therefore, both judgments and emotions are closely tied to presentations (cf. Huemer 2019).9
Blaustein shared many of Brentano's ideas. For instance, he shared Brentano's posit that presentations are "[...] special, simple, intentional mental act[s]" (Blaustein 2011a, 210).10 Blaustein also shared Brentano's posit that presentations are "non-extended" (cf. Blaustein 1928, 69-70). Nevertheless, it would not be appropriate to characterize Blaustein as a strictly Brentanian follower. Blaustein rejected Brentano's in-existence thesis, according to which intentionality is to be reduced to the "mental in-existence of the object."11 Blaustein's motivation behind rejecting the aforementioned Brentanian thesis is Twardowskian. To be more explicit, Blaustein relies on Twardowski's
9	See also Kriegel 2018.
10	Bokiniec uses in her translation of Blaustein's Przedstawienia imaginatywne the term "representation," not "presentation." Presentation is a more natural translation of Brentano's "Vorstellung" and Blaustein's "przedstawienie." I adhere to this terminology throughout my article.
11	Whether Brentano indeed subscribes to immanentism is irrelevant to the problematics of my current article. See Kriegel (2018) for a comprehensive study of Brentano's philosophy.
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threefold distinction amongst act, content, and object of presentation, in order to defend his critical position. Basically, Blaustein was opposed to Brentano's immanentism thesis due to its conflation of the object of the presentation act with its content (cf. Blaustein 1928, 5-6). In his reformulation of Brentano's ideas, Blaustein held a view of presentations as being based on "sensations." Accordingly, "[...] every presentation is a sensation (the act of sensation) or is based upon a sensation or sensations" (Blaustein 1926/27, 193b). Along with Brentano, Blaustein maintained that presentations do indeed present objects, but since presentations are based on sensations, sensations are non-intentional (Plotka 2024, 43).
Moreover, Brentano was insistent upon the intertwining of his three classes of mental phenomena. He argued that "[...] the three classes are of the utmost universality; there is no mental act in which all three are not present. There is a certain ubiquity pertaining to each class in all of our conscious life." (Brentano 1995, 206.) Blaustein did not accept Brentano's universality thesis. He gives "schematic" and "symbolic" presentations as concrete examples of mental acts that do not involve judgments. When experiencing a schema or a 143 symbol, we do not reject/accept the existence of these objects, hence Blaustein's rejection of Brentano's thesis (cf. Blaustein 1931a, 2). In defense of his position, Blaustein refers to Meinong's "Annahmen" (assumptions) and their role in various aesthetic experiences. In his Przedstawienia imaginatywne, Blaustein explores the possibility of reducing the experience of watching a theater play to "illusion" (cf. Blaustein 2011a, 231-233). Were this possibility to obtain, it would indeed warrant that we admit the presence of both presentations and judgments. Nevertheless, we do not regard theater plays as making true/ false assertions. Such phenomena, Blaustein argues, are best characterized by Meinong's assumptions, treating them as "phantasy experiences" situated between presentations and judgments (cf. Meinong 1910, 3; 1983, 12). Running along Meinongian lines, Blaustein argues that judgments are "object-directed" and are marked by the presence of "convictions," whereas assumptions lack convictions. Accordingly, a theater spectator does not judge whether the world depicted on-stage is true/false; rather, they assume the world depicted therein is merely fictional. Adopting such an approach, the spectator's emotions toward represented worlds/objects become neutralized (cf. Blaustein 2011a, 232). The
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experience of the theater spectator, Blaustein maintains, negates Brentano's assertion that presentations and judgments are present in every mental act (Plotka 2024, 45-46).
All in all, while Blaustein's take on presentations follows Brentano in many respects, it departs from him in other important respects. The main thing that characterizes Blaustein's theory of mental phenomena is his rejection of Brentano's universality thesis. In this regard, Blaustein follows Meinong, and maintains that imaginative presentations involve assumptions, not judgments. In the following, I will analyze in more detail Meinong's take on presentations. Afterward, I will systematically compare Blaustein's and Meinong's approaches to imaginative presentations/assumptions in light of theater experience.
II. Meinong on presentations
Like Blaustein, Meinong is also connected to Brentano. Meinong's connection to Brentano is manifested in the former's adoption of the latter's descriptive psychology, in order to put forth his (Meinong's) novel theory of the object (Schubert Kalsi 1987, 4). Meinong, too, cannot be depicted as a faithful follower of Brentano's. In clear opposition to Brentano's classification of experiences, Meinong advocates for two classes of experience: "intellectual" and "emotional" (see Dewalque 2018). With respect to Brentano's theory of intentionality and its (alleged) immanentism, Meinong approaches the problem of immanent objects with the help of Twardowski's distinction between object and content (Jacquette 2015, 11). According to Meinong, presentations are part of lived experiences (Erlebnisse); thus, they are to be classed under intellectual experiences. Following Brentano, Meinong posits that presentations are given immanently. Moreover, presentations are understood by Meinong to be the basis of all lived experiences. Unlike Brentano, however, Meinong does not conceive of object-directedness as being a constitutive element of intentionality, as far as experiences are concerned. Be that as it may, Meinong argues that experiences usually involve reference to an object (cf. Marek 2024). With regard to presentations, Meinong holds that they always function in conjunction with other experiences (emotions, judgments, assumptions, etc.), taking these experiences to be more complex
Hicham Jakha
than basic presentations. Nonetheless, presentations "directly" refer to their objects (Raspa 2005, 96). Therefore, in Meinong's formulation, presentations are "immediate" and "passive" (cf. Meinong 1910, 233-246, §38; 1983, 170178, §38).12
In order to better illustrate the Brentanian background of Meinong's philosophy, it will be helpful to trace two phases in his thought. In the early Meinong, we can find a strong adherence to Brentano. In his early studies on David Hume, Meinong did not abide by the object-content distinction and treated the object of presentation (Vorstellungsobjekt) and the immanent object (immanentes Objekt) alike as being subsumed under the umbrella term "object" (Objekt) (cf. Meinong 1878, 234). In Logik, written in collaboration with Hofler, Meinong sees the necessity of the object's transcendence to account for intentionality. Thus, Meinong breaks with Brentano's mental in-existence in favor of Twardowski's content-object distinction, restricting immanence to the content (Inhalt) and transcendence to the object (cf. Hofler 1890, 6-7).13 Congruently, in his subsequent texts, Meinong clearly puts forth his formulations on presentations in the context of the content-object distinction 145 (Plotka 2024, 84-86).14
If we move on to a more concentrated analysis of Meinong's presentations, he distinguishes between two pairs of definitions, one adhering to the presentation's "category" ("concrete"/"abstract") and the second specifying its "division" ("particular"/"general"). A presentation can be categorized as concrete, if it presents all the properties of its object; a presentation that fails to do so is abstract. A presentation's particularity is determined by whether it refers to an "individual" object; a presentation that does not is general. Accordingly, Meinong treats presentations pertaining to "outer perception" as being both concrete and particular (he also adds the term "intuitive" [anschaulich] to their determination) (cf. Meinong 1889, 213-214; 1910, 247-251). Amongst abstract presentations Meinong lists "concepts." Surprisingly, he does not treat
12	See also Findlay 1963, 5-6.
13	It is worth noting that a distinction between content and object can also be found in the earlier Meinong, but it can be safely asserted that he later admits Twardowski's distinction as being more elaborate than his own (Jacquette 2015, 11).
14	See, e.g., Meinong 1978a, 141-143; 1910, 233-246.
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all abstract presentations to be "non-intuitive" (unanschaulich), positing that we can talk of "abstract intuitions" and "intuitive concepts." The intuitiveness of concepts is brought forth by their being comprised of "partial presentations" and their place within a "unified complex" (Komplexion). In his "Hume-Studien II," Meinong argues that the "essence" of concepts can be found in their content (Inhalt). In other words, presentations are "built" through partial presentations, which highlight different properties within their content (Meinong 1882, 660). The abstractness of partial presentations, in turn, is down to "abstraction," the method, according to which some properties of the object are spotlighted at the expense of other blurred properties.15 Therefore, a concept is a "complex" presentation that synthesizes different, simpler presentations within one "mental unity." Being produced thusly, concepts can be said to share the structure of phantasy presentations (Meinong 1889, 165-166). In the event that the synthesis of partial presentations into a unified mental unity fails, the resultant complex is "non-intuitive" (unanschaulich) (ibid., 210-211).16 It is noteworthy that Meinong holds presentations' "manifestness" highly. In 146 his account, in the presence of parts' incompatibility (Unverträglichkeit) (e.g., when an object is depicted as having contradictory properties), presentations lose their sense of manifestness (ibid., 210). Similarly, Twardowski approaches concepts as presentations whose images cannot be synthesized into a single whole. However, this does not force Twardowski to do away with presentations of incompatible properties. For example, if one fails to imagine a round square, one can still refer to the object with the use of a concept. In Twardowski's view, the image of a round square is a synthesis of a basic presentation that, together with a presenting judgment, gives rise to a unified whole, i.e., a concept (Plotka 2024, 86-89).17
By and large, Meinong's approach to presentations is shaped by his relationship to, primarily, Brentano. These considerations have shown that Meinong, like Blaustein, engaged with the Brentanian/Twardowskian
15	See Chrudzimski (2007, 55-64) for a critical evaluation of Meinong's theory of abstraction.
16	Twardowski would later adopt this theory.
17	Cf. van der Schaar 2015, 81-83. For more on Twardowski's position, especially as it relates to Meinong's presentations, see 1995. See also Raspa 2023.
Hicham Jakha
arguments, in order to mold his own approach to lived experiences. In the following section, I will shift my attention to imaginative presentations, assumptions, and judgments in Meinong and Blaustein in the context of theater experience. In particular, I will attempt to answer the following: are imaginative presentations possible without judgments?
III. Assumptions, judgments, and imaginative presentations
Blaustein was familiar with Meinong's writings, from which he adopted various elements. Apart from his incorporation of Meinong's assumptions into his own aesthetic deliberations, it can be argued that Blaustein also adopted Meinong's "Phantasievorstellungen," on the basis of which Blaustein established his "przedstawienia imaginatywne"1S Blaustein, in reference to Filozofowna's criticism (see, e.g., 1931a; 1931b), appeals to Meinong's assumptions, in order to argue against Brentano's universality thesis.19 According to Blaustein, Brentano is wrong in positing that his three classes of mental phenomena always go hand in hand. Blaustein's criticism is specifically directed toward the phenomenological inseparability of presentations and judgments. In order to back his position, he devises the aesthetic experience of theater spectators and its peculiarity. While watching a play, one experiences imaginative presentations that can evoke aesthetic experiences. Roughly put, Blaustein's point is that theater spectators do not make true/false judgments about the objects constituting the imaginative world on stage. This leaves us only with presentations. In any case, Blaustein concludes that the example of the theater spectator compellingly makes the case for an experience that does not conjoin presentations and judgments. If the theater spectator does not judge the imaginative objects/world on stage, what is it they are doing? It is certainly not the case that they are doing nothing, in the sense that they would be passive recipients of contentless presentations. Invoking Meinong's concept, Blaustein argues that what the theater spectator does is not judging, but assuming that the imaginative objects on stage and their world are
18	To be clear, there is no textual evidence to back this claim. Nevertheless, Blaustein's familiarity with Meinong, especially with his theory of assumptions, suggests that the motivation behind Blaustein's concept might have been Meinongian.
19	For details of Blaustein's response, see 1931b.
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merely fictional (Blaustein 2011a, 232).20 Meinong's assumptions, therefore, are conceived of as a distinct kind of mental phenomena placed somehow neatly between presentations and judgments (cf. Meinong 1910, 3), which can account for phenomenological interaction with imaginative presentations in a way that preserves the fiction-reality dichotomy.
Blaustein's reliance on assumptions, in order to rule out judgments from the domain of aesthetic experiences, can be approached from two perspectives: (i) phenomenological and (ii) ontological. On the phenomenological level, I argue, Blaustein's imaginative presentations do not need judgments to function properly. That said, on the ontological level, Blaustein's imaginative presentations raise a number of issues. Nevertheless, I do not think an outright rejection of imaginative presentations follows from their ontological shortcomings. Contra Filozofowna (see 1931b), it is phenomenologically cogent to admit imaginative presentations as a sui generis class of mental phenomena, in order to explain the (phenomenological) distinctness of these presentations from, say, perceptual presentations (i.e., perceiving real objects). Indeed, this is 148 the motivation behind Blaustein's descriptive account of presentations.
(i) Phenomenology
Blaustein's phenomenology of "perception" takes into consideration the nature of the objects perceived and their intentionality. Accordingly, two kinds of perception are emphasized: "observative" and "imaginative." Observative perception is linked to "everyday phenomena"; basically, real, mind-independent objects are observatively perceived. Imaginative perception is peculiar, for it involves both strictly and imaginatively perceived objects. The strictly perceived object is the "presenting object," and the imaginatively perceived object assumes the role of the "represented" object within a certain fiction. For instance, while watching Romeo and Juliet, our perception— strictly speaking—is directed toward the presenting objects on stage, i.e., the actors qua natural persons, props, etc., utilized to depict the play's scenes. Our interaction with Shakespeare's fictional objects can be explained by virtue of
20 For Blaustein, presented judgments are a form of presentations; in this case, one does not require a judgment, but only that one presents it to oneself.
Hicham Jakha
our imaginative perception of said objects, treating them as represented objects within the work-world. We do not imaginatively perceive the natural persons acting out the play's scenes; rather, we imaginatively perceive Romeo, Juliet, and their world being represented on stage (cf. Blaustein 2011b, 237).
Blaustein's phenomenological insights can also provide us with a solid framework for the "presentationality" of Romeo and Juliet and its relation to the perceiving subject. A spectator perceiving the imaginative objects within the play, i.e., Romeo, Juliet, etc., is "situated" within the work-world. They see the actors fully in character, reciting the script of Shakespeare's play. In line with the two kinds of perception outlined above, the spectator's perception presents both the intentional object of the play as well as their "relation" to the represented objects within. The spectator can be so immersed in the play that they start to notice certain relations that connect them with the objects represented on stage. For instance, as soon as Romeo walks to the front of the stage, the spectator might imaginatively characterize this move as denoting a spatial relation between them and Romeo; "Romeo is getting closer to me," the spectator might notice. The imaginary wall that separates 149 the spectator from Romeo's world appears to be lifted. In which case, the wall seems to go only one-way, restricting Romeo's interaction with the audience and allowing spectators—at least imaginatively—to establish spatial relations with the play's characters. The spectator's spatial relations to the play's world are peculiar. On the one hand, the spectator's body is genuinely related to the natural persons/props on stage. But, when an actor edges closer to them, they do not go: "Oh look! Actor x (using their real name) is getting closer to me." Rather, the spectator perceives the actor's movements as being those of, say, Romeo. Accordingly, it is as if spatial relations obtain between Romeo and the spectator. "As if" is the key in describing the kind of relation that obtains between real and fictional objects. While the relation that obtains between the spectator and the actors qua natural persons is phenomenologically real, the one obtaining between the spectator and the actors qua ficta is merely "quasireal" (cf. Blaustein 2011a, 215-221).21
21 The same parameters that govern spatial relations also govern the spectator's
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To further cement the phenomenological distinctiveness of theater and its experience, we can devise Blaustein's "attitudes." These attitudes complement the two kinds of perception explored earlier. Explicitly, Blaustein analyzes three attitudes that play a major role in determining imaginative presentations; these attitudes are: "natural," "imaginative," and "signitive" (Blaustein 2011a, 216). The spectator's attitudes may change as they adjust their perception. For example, while attending to the play's presenting content, the spectator's attitude is natural. The attitude that immerses the spectator in the aesthetic experience of watching a theater play is the imaginative one. While in this attitude, the spectator is fully immersed in the work-world, suspending temporarily existential judgments. As far as spectators are concerned, the imaginative presentationality of the play is phenomenologically real. It is within this attitude that assumptions function properly. Adopting the imaginative attitude, the spectator assumes the play's world is real, that the two protagonists are really Romeo and Juliet, that the props on stage are real objects that can be found in the real world, etc. In a nutshell, the spectator's imaginative attitude 150 facilitates their assumptions. The spectator's aesthetic experience is closely connected with their attitudes. The spectator's imaginative attitude might be interrupted by a fellow spectator opening a bag of chips, in which case a shift to the natural attitude takes place, as aesthetic attention is no longer on the work-world. The shift in attitude is accompanied by a shift in perception, from the imaginative to the observative.
All things considered, Blaustein's descriptive analyses serve to illustrate the phenomenological distinctiveness of imaginative presentations. The spectator's aesthetic experience of the play can be adequately explained in terms of Blaustein's phenomenology. As a result, his imaginative presentations are equipped with a solid phenomenological foundation. Nonetheless, Blaustein's imaginative presentations may warrant ontological treatment, especially as we tend to the play's represented objects. Once we delve into the domain of fictional objects, we notice that these entities are not as simple and basic as
"temporal" relations to the work-world. Blaustein distinguishes, within temporal relations, between "static" and "dynamic" appearances. The relations obtaining between the theater spectator and the work-world are dynamic (cf. 2011a, 219-220).
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Blaustein's theory of imaginative presentations suggests. In the following, I will attempt to show that imaginative presentations must appeal to something over and beyond basic presentations, in order to account for the ontological complexity of fictional objects.
(ii) From phenomenology to ontology
In summary, Blaustein relies on Meinong's assumptions, in order to argue against Brentano's universality thesis. I take issue with both Blaustein's rejection of Brentano's thesis and his appropriation of Meinong's Annahmen.22
In her early works, Filozofowna devises Meinong's Annahmen in the way that, I think, Meinong himself intended them to be understood.23 Instead of categorically contrasting assumptions and judgments in a way that completely cuts off any links between the two (as Blaustein understands Annahmen), Filozofowna treats these two as being connected components within the wider aesthetic experience of theater.24 According to her, an assumption is basically a "pretended judgment" (sqdna niby) (Filozofowna 1935, 180, fn. 15).25 Pretended ^ judgments parallel genuine judgments, for they (pretended judgments) can be either "affirmative" or "negative" (Plotka 2024, 250). Therefore, judgments—be they pretended or genuine—are cardinal for the functioning of presentations. Filozofowna criticizes Blaustein's conflation of presentations and judgments. In his view of imaginative presentations, Blaustein delineates the objects of presentation as being such-and-such and hence being determined in a certain
22	Please note that Über Annahmen is not a study in ontology. It is rather a study in descriptive psychology (philosophy of mind, in today's terminology). Later on, I will attempt to read Meinong's Annahmen along ontological lines, making references to his theory of objects, which is considered to be his prized contribution to ontology.
23	It is worth noting that Filozofowna was first interested in assumptions from the standpoint of actors. Later, she turned her attention to assumptions from the perspective of spectators. In his Über Annahmen, Meinong appears to refer to both perspectives, i.e., to what actors assume (cf. 1983, 85; 86; 295) and to what spectators assume (cf. ibid., 96; 224).
24	Filozofowna wrote her doctoral dissertation on actors' actions in theater, devising Meinong's Annahmen (see 1935).
25	Here, Filozofowna follows Witwicki's terminology as used in his Psychologja (cf. 1925, 332).
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way. This is a categorical mistake, for it is judgments that allow us to ascribe properties to objects, not presentations. The latter are passive, in the sense that their mere function is to present something, suspending any judgments regarding its qualitative endowments, which would otherwise render it more complex than a mere presentation. Furthermore, contra Blaustein, Filozofowna (1931b, 64) argues that what facilitates the function of "intending" an object of presentation to be such-and-such are judgments, not the "matter" of the presentation act. In defense of her critical stance, she provides an example of a person who mistakes a passer-by for their friend. It is only after the passerby gets closer and is visibly not their friend does the perceiver realize the inaccuracy of their perceptual presentation. But the perceptual presentation as well as the presenting content remain the same prior to and after the perceiver realizes that the passer-by is not their friend. What changes after the perceiver becomes aware of their misidentifying presentation is that the presenting content is apprehended differently. To put it in Filozofowna's terms, prior to their realization of the occurrence of a misidentification, the perceiver makes an 152 "affirmative judgment," namely that they see their friend approaching; following their realization of said misidentification, the perceiver adjusts their initial judgment and makes a "negative judgment," namely they do not see their friend approaching (Filozofowna 1931b, 64-65). Therefore, in Filozofowna's view, presentations are concerned with "objects," i.e., the objects about which they are, whereas judgments apprehend these objects as being such-and-such, and in so doing a positive or negative value is ascribed to them (Filozofowna 1931a, 188). In light of these considerations, Filozofowna concludes, it is not right to conceive of imaginative presentations as a sui generis class of presentations, for they are after all grounded on basic presentations and judgments, just like Brentano and Twardowski upheld (Plotka 2024, 251).26
Meinong, I argue, understood Annahmen in a similar fashion. At the risk of sounding repetitive, Meinong considers assumptions to constitute a sui generis class of (intellectual) mental phenomena situated purposefully between presentations and judgments. The purpose of situating assumptions between presentations and judgments lies in his treatment of assumptions as being more
26 See also Plotka 2021b.
Hicham Jakha
complex than presentations and less committal than judgments (cf. Meinong 1983, 12). While Blaustein explicitly subscribes to assumptions as being less committal than judgments, it is not clear whether he accepts assumptions as being more complex than presentations. Blaustein treats presentations as being simple, intentional acts. Adhering to the simplicity of presentations and Meinong's characterization of assumptions, Blaustein's imaginative presentations in fact infringe his overarching view of presentations as being both simple acts and independent ofjudgments. To wit, it appears that Blaustein did not give his incorporation of Meinong's assumptions sufficient thought. In other words, by incorporating Meinong's assumptions, Blaustein can no longer say that imaginative presentations are independent, simple intentional acts, for assumptions are more complex than mere presentations, albeit being less committal than judgments. Thus, Blaustein's adoption of assumptions, in order to account for imaginative presentations, draws him closer to judgments and pushes him farther from presentations; the exact same effect that, I presume, he sought to avert through assumptions. This, I maintain, further demonstrates that imaginative presentations refer to basic intentional presentations and 153 judgments, or at least something weaker than judgments, yet more complex than presentations, as Meinong would say.
Moreover, one could find in Meinong's Uber Annahmen supporting arguments in favor of reading assumptions as forming some sort of bridge that connects presentations and genuine judgments; and, by implication, arguments against Blaustein's denial of said bridge. Annahme is not a passive intentional operation like a presentation. Rather, it is an active intentional operation, on the basis of which one could arrive at genuine judgments. Therefore, assumptions can be devised as practical, methodological tools that one can use to process theories and refine human cognition.
Assumption can be thought of phenomenologically as a preparation for certain kinds of judgments [...]. An assumption is something we make in order to be able to reach a judgment, in a process of thought that phenomenologically is not yet but may in some instances be on its way to becoming a judgment. (Jacquette 2015, 50.)
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As indicated by Jacquette, Meinong's assumptions are an important phenomenological tool, through which mere hypotheses are transformed into knowledge. To assume is to entertain a possibility that may be actualized. To assume is to have a judgment in mind; a judgment that may or may not materialize. Even if the judgment does not materialize, the epistemic role assumptions play is praiseworthy. The denial of a judgment is as important for epistemology as is its positive affirmation. In Filozofowna's conception of assumptions and judgments, "belief" or "conviction" is emphasized (cf. 1931a, 190-191). This, of course, follows Meinong's original characterization of assumption as being "a judgment without belief" or that "a judgment is an assumption with the addition of belief" (Meinong 1983, 242). Thus, what separates assumptions and judgments is the presence/lack of "belief."
Returning to the matter at hand, I take issue with Blaustein's assertion that a theater spectator does not judge the fictional world depicted on stage, but, rather, assumes it is fictional (cf. Blaustein 2011a, 232). In this respect, I would like to draw an ontological distinction between two "aspects" relevant 154 to worlds of fiction: (a) "inside" and (b) "outside." A play, or any work of fiction for that matter, is endowed with the inside and outside aspects. The inside aspect includes all and only the objectivities ascribed to the fictional world by its author/creator. For example, in the inside aspect of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, Romeo dies after drinking the poison. This state of affairs takes place inside the world created by Shakespeare. Meinong's characterization of assumptions in terms of the "antithesis of yes and no"27 is preserved, for the play's inside aspect can be evaluated with respect to the determinations explicitly or implicitly specified of the play's characters.28 For instance, it
27	See Meinong 1983, 98.
28	The inside aspect of the play can be characterized, a la Meinong, as the object of assumptions, namely "objectives" or "propositions," to use Russell's term. Like judgments, assumptions are positive or negative by virtue of the positivity/negativity of their objectives (cf. Meinong 1983, 98). Please note that objects of judgment, according to Meinong, are also objectives. But it is important to draw an ontological distinction between these two. As I argue in the text, the outside aspect of the play involves judgments, hence their objectives are ontologically distinct from their inside counterparts; the latter's truth value is contingent upon a representational work, whereas the former's is ontologically independent.
Hicham Jakha
is either true or false that Romeo outlived Juliet.29 Romeo and Juliet is also endowed with an outside aspect. We can speak of numerous "facts" that obtain outside of the work-world. For instance, it is literally (and not merely internally) true that Romeo and Juliet was created by Shakespeare, and it is literally true that Romeo and Juliet are fictional objects. A similar distinction between ficta's "constitutive" and "extraconstitutive" properties can be found in Meinong (cf. Meinong 1972, 176). Accordingly, what I termed "inside" objectivities are equivalent to Meinong's constitutive properties, e.g., Romeo is a pure lover; this is a major property that constitutes Romeo. Apart from constitutive properties, Romeo can also be said to possess extraconstitutive (outside) properties that define his external qualitative character as a fictum, e.g., Romeo is a character created by Shakespeare.
Following Blaustein, a spectator is expected to assume the fictionality of Shakespeare's play. I beg to differ. The spectator does not assume the fictionality of Shakespeare's world; they rather judge it as being so. The fictionality of Romeo and Juliet is not assumed within the work-world. Put differently, the fact that the play is fictional is not contained within Shakespeare's work. Thus, 155 it is not an inside (constitutive) fact that obtains within the work-world and fails to obtain outside it. Au contraire, the fictionality of Romeo and Juliet is a fact that obtains outside Shakespeare's work-world and fails to obtain inside it. As has been stated previously, outside propositions that involve ficta and their world are literally true. Therefore, adhering to Meinong's reasoning, the play spectator genuinely judges the fictionality of the work-world, for it is literally true that Romeo and Juliet is fictional. In terms of Annahmens epistemological utility, we gain genuine knowledge by judging Shakespeare's play as fiction and not, say, non-fiction.
In my view, the spectator's assumptions should be restricted to the inside aspect of the fiction. What, in fact, the spectator assumes inside the work-world is the reality, not fictionality, of Romeo and Juliet. Inside the work-world, Romeo and Juliet are described according to the norms and principles of reality.
29 That said, the (in)famous problem of indeterminacy also affects the inside aspect of theater plays. We can talk of numerous properties that Romeo neither possesses nor fails to possess.
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The fictional world Shakespeare created is internally as real as our world is externally. Therefore, the spectator assumes, for the sake of aesthetic vividness, that the world, in which Romeo blindly falls in love with Juliet and tragically puts an end to his life in pursuit of her love, is real. They assume that Romeo is an ordinary man, and Juliet is an ordinary woman. They assume the meaning of the concepts included in the fiction has the same meaning they do in our world; that "love" is the same love we ordinarily talk about, that "tragedy" is the same tragedy we are familiar with in real life, etc. It is by virtue of assuming that the world of Romeo and Juliet is as real as ours that spectators are able to develop emotional connections to entities that are otherwise remote. In short, it is the "assumption of reality" that makes Romeo and Juliet relatable, and the tragedy depicted therein all the more touching. It is these (inside) assumptions that define the represented content of imaginative presentations. Blaustein in particular falls prey to a category mistake by equating the fictional and the assumptive. As I have argued above, the external fictionality of imaginative presentations is a matter of genuine judgment, not assumption, and fictional 156 worlds in general can include both judgments (relative to their outside aspect) and assumptions (relative to their inside aspect).
Conclusion
In the article, I have tackled Meinong's assumptions and Blaustein's imaginative presentations, taking "theater" as a study case. I devised Filozofowna's Meinongian criticism of Blaustein, in order to put forth my thesis. I have systematically analyzed Meinong's and Blaustein's ideas on two levels, the phenomenological and the ontological one. On the phenomenological level, I have demonstrated that Blaustein's descriptive analyses of presentation, perception, and attitudes have the potential to adequately account for the experience of theater spectators. However, Blaustein's phenomenology is limited in the way it approaches the objects of imaginative presentations. I have proposed supplementing Blaustein's phenomenology with ontological considerations that delimit the constitution of imaginative objects.
Analyzing his rejection of judgments in favor of Meinong's assumptions, I have argued that Blaustein did not follow Annahmen in the way Meinong
Hicham Jakha
intended, for the latter established assumptions as a mediary class between presentations and judgments. To that end, Meinong advocated for assumptions as potential pre-judgments. Therefore, it is clear that Meinong did not rule out the instantaneous presence of presentations and judgments in favor of assumptions. I have posited that Filozofowna's understanding of Annahmen as "pretended judgments" is more in line with Meinong's, for she, too, bridges presentations and judgments. Further, I have attempted to both defend Brentano's universality thesis and incorporate Meinong's Annahmen into imaginative presentations (while keeping the two separate, of course). I have shown that Blaustein's explanation of the spectator's aesthetic experience of theater along the lines of assumptions is misleading. To make my case, I have appealed to an ontological distinction between the "inside" and "outside" aspects of imaginative presentations. Inside a play, the spectator imports what I called "principles of reality" into the fictional world of their experience. Everything that is imported from reality into fiction is a matter of assumption. Since fictional objects are constituted internally (inside the fiction), Filozofowna's description of Annahmen as "pretended judgments" is a propos.	157
Indeed, the constitution of ficta can be described in terms of intentional ascriptions; hence, the ascribed properties are only pretended of ficta.30 Nonetheless, acts of ascription are not basic, presentive acts, for well-individuated objects are determined via these acts. Rather, they are complex, yet not as complex as genuine judgments, for they do not bring into our ontology independent objects. It is, therefore, more appropriate to link assumptions to judgments than to presentations, as Blaustein does. A further argument in favor of the latter was raised with regard to ficta's "outside" aspect. Beyond Meinong's framework, I have argued that imaginative presentations' outside objectivities are a matter of genuine judgment. It is, for example, genuinely true that Romeo
30 It is worth noting that Meinong's theory of objects does not treat außerseiende entities' Sosein as being dependent on intentional acts. Thought can only be said to "grasp" independently constituted entities (cf. Meinong 1978b, 153-154). However, a different version of Meinongianism can be discerned from his Über Annahmen, where außerseiende entities like ficta possess the properties they are assumed, hence pretended intentionally or linguistically, to have (cf. Kroon 1992). The intentional constitution of ficta's inside aspect is compatible with the latter Meinong, but not the former.
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and Juliet was created by Shakespeare. This is not a mere assumption that is relatively true; it is absolutely true, and for that it is a genuine judgment. I have maintained that Blaustein infringes my proposed distinction, as he takes the theater spectator to assume the fictionality of the work-world. Blaustein's move constitutes a category mistake, for we genuinely judge the (outside) fictionality of the work-world, and we pretendedly assume its (inside) reality.
To answer my article's problematic, imaginative presentations require both assumptions and judgments. This does not entail that assumptions/judgments are "parts" of imaginative presentations. Rather, along with Blaustein and Meinong, imaginative presentations are basic, and assumptions/judgments are essentially separate. The problem with imaginative presentations, in my view, is that they are ontologically non-selfsufficient, for they require assumptions and judgments to be fully comprehensible.
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Review scientific paper Pregledni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.7 UDC: 130.121:159.9
Intentionality and the Perceptual World
Husserl, Schapp, and Blaustein on the Content of Sensations
Daniele Nuccilli
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Nam. Jana Palacha 2, 116 38 Prague, Czech Republic
Nuccilli.Daniele@ff.cuni.cz
Abstract
In the article, I investigate the role of sensation in the manifestation of the world in perceptual experience, as conceptualized through three distinct phenomenological approaches: those of Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Schapp, and Leopold Blaustein. I begin by examining Husserl's Göttingen lectures, reconstructing his account of the intentional structuring of the perceptual world, with particular emphasis on the immanent dimension that shapes the interpretation of sensory content. I then turn to
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Schapp's theory of presentation-qua-Darstellung, highlighting his original claim that sensations themselves directly present objects to consciousness, fusing the properties of things with their appearance without requiring the interpretative intervention of an intentional act. Finally, I consider Blaustein's position, which maintains the centrality of intentionality, but situates sensations outside of the intentional act, functioning as mediators, through which the external world is apprehended and interpreted.
Keywords: phenomenology, perceptual world, intentionality, content of sensations, manifestation.
Intencionalnost in zaznavni svet. Husserl, Schapp in Blaustein o vsebini občutkov
Povzetek
V članku raziščem vlogo občutka pri manifestaciji sveta znotraj zaznavnega izkustva, kakor je bila konceptualizirana znotraj treh različnih fenomenoloških 164 pristopov, in sicer pristopov Edmunda Husserla, Wilhelma Schappa in Leopolda Blausteina. Najprej obravnavam Husserlova göttingenska predavanja in rekonstruiram njegovo dojetje intencionalnega strukturiranja zaznavnega sveta, pri čemer se posebej osredotočim na imanentno razsežnost, ki opredeljuje interpretacijo čutne vsebine. Nato se obrnem k Schappovi teoriji predstave-kot-Darstellung in poudarim njegovo izvirno domnevo, da občutki sami neposredno predstavljajo predmete za zavest, s tem ko lastnosti stvari spojijo z njihovim pojavljanjem, ne da bi pri tem terjali interpretativno intervencijo intencionalnega akta. Nazadnje obravnavam Blausteinovo stališče, ki zagovarja središčnost intencionalnosti, a občutke situira zunaj intencionalnega akta kot funkcionalne posrednike, s pomočjo katerih dojemamo in interpretiramo zunanji svet.
Ključne besede: fenomenologija, zaznavni svet, intencionalnost, vsebina občutkov, manifestacija.
Daniele Nuccilli
Introduction
The article analyzes how the world manifests itself in perception. More precisely, I consider Edmund Husserl's, Wilhelm Schapp's, and Leopold Blaustein's theories of perception. The phenomenon of perception is one of the central topics in Husserl's philosophy, beginning with his earliest texts from the 1890s (Husserl 2004, 123-156). Here, I consider Husserl's theory of perception as it is developed in the Göttingen lectures between 1904 and 1907.1 This period is the time of Husserl's intense research and teaching stemming from the Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations) (Spiegelberg 1994, 111), leading his students to form the so-called Göttingen and Munich circles (Schapp 2025; Conrad 2024, 111-122; Schuhmann 1977, 103). In Göttingen, Husserl works on a reformulation of his idea of phenomenology that ultimately leads toward the transcendental turn of Ideen I (Ideas I).2 In this reformulation, perception plays a central role.
In the present paper, I also focus on Schapp and Blaustein. Schapp was one of Husserl's first doctoral students in Göttingen. In his 1910 Beiträge zur 165 Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung (Contributions to the Phenomenology
1	It is noteworthy that this choice has more of a systematic than a historical justification. As rightly pointed out by Vongehr and Giuliani (2004, xiii), in the lectures of the 1904/05 winter semester, the theory of perception offered by Husserl is still formulated outside of the transcendental reduction; moreover, bodily kinaesthesia are omitted in the lectures. Both elements (reduction and the body) will become increasingly central to Husserl in later years, but are absent or marginal in Schapp and Blaustein. However, analyzing these lectures can help us to identify some elements that the three authors do have in common.
2	A crucial moment of this turn are the lectures Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge of winter semester 1906/07, in which one finds the first systematic introduction of the phenomenological reduction (Husserl 2008, 206 f.). For more on the transcendental turn, see: Cobb-Stevens 1990; Mohanty 1978; Zahavi 2017, 51-76.
This work was supported by the National Science Center, Poland, as a part of the
SONATA BIS program within the research project (No. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108) on The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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of Perception), he explores the question of how the world manifests itself in consciousness through sensations. In this context, he offers an original interpretation of the perceptual act, giving rise to a theory of ideas that influenced some leading figures of the phenomenological movement.3
Next, I refer to Blaustein and his account of perception. Blaustein was a member of the Lvov-Warsaw School, an analytically oriented school established due to Twardowski's teaching activities beginning in 1895.4 At the time, Blaustein, a student of Twardowski, had an opportunity to attend some of Roman Ingarden's lectures in Lvov, but he also participated in Husserl's lectures in Freiburg for a few weeks in 1925.5 After his return to Poland, he worked on his doctoral dissertation, which was written under Twardowski's supervision and published in 1928 under the title Husserlowska nauka o akcie, tresci i przedmiocie przedstawienia (Husserl's Theory of Act, Content, and Object of Presentation). The theory of the content of presentations—and more generally, the question of how external objects manifest themselves in the sensory content of presentations—is central to Blaustein's critical reading of 166 Husserl's theory of intentionality.
The aim of this article is to examine mutual relations between perception, the world, and sensory contents as discussed by Husserl, Schapp, and Blaustein. Even though their ideas offer interesting insights into the topics of perception and intentionality, there is no systematic study of the mutual relations among these authors. Of course, the differences between Schapp's and Husserl's theories of perception are discussed by, e.g., Laasik (2025) and Rolf (2004), but Schapp's methodological considerations and his theory of presentation-qua-Darstellung6
3	Traces of this influence can be found in central texts of phenomenological Platonism, such as: Hering 2021; Ingarden 1925; Spiegelberg 1930.
4	For more about the Lvov-Warsaw School and its analytic approach, see: Wybraniec-Skardowska 2018; Wolenski 2017. For more on Blaustein within the Lvov-Warsaw School, see Plotka 2023b; 2024.
5	See Blaustein 1928, 83.
6	The terms presentation qua Vorstellung and presentation qua Darstellung aim to resolve a translation misunderstanding that appears in secondary phenomenological literature. Typically, Vorstellung, a term referring to a form of an object's presence to consciousness through a sensation or content that manifests certain aspects of it, is translated as presentation. On the other hand, Darstellung, a term referring to the way an object itself presents through perceptual, sensory, or some other intuitive content,
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have never been discussed in scholarly literature. Similarly, it is true that the issue of Blaustein's interpretation of Husserl's theory of intentionality has recently been addressed by, e.g., Pokropski (2015) and Plotka (2020; 2023a; 2024), but the question of how Blaustein understands the perceptual world remains unexplored. The present study, therefore, offers an overview of how these three scholars understand the perceptual world in the context of the problem of intentionality. To this end, I will proceed as follows: I identify the central topics of Husserl's theory of perception in the Gottingen lectures, showing how he understands the constitution of the perceptual world in the intentional act—more precisely, in the context of the interpretation of sensory contents (section 1); I highlight the differences from Husserl's position and the critical aspects that emerge in Schapp's phenomenology of perception and in his theory of presentation-qua-Darstellung (section 2); next, I examine Blaustein's account of the perceptual act and his description of how the external world is manifested, especially in light of his critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality (section 3); and, in conclusion, I highlight the main differences between the three theories.
1. Husserl's theory of perception: Sensations, intentionality, and
manifestation
In the Gottingen years, Husserl focuses on acts of "perception, sensation, imagery, representation, and memory" as starting points for the study of higher intellectual acts (Husserl 2004, 3). Consequently, the phenomenon of manifesting the world in the perceptual act becomes a central theme in his theory of intentionality. In what follows, I will focus on the lectures delivered in the period 1904-1907.7
is translated as representation, in order to avoid confusion. Now, without delving into complex linguistic considerations, I believe that in any case, the term representation is not suitable for expressing what Schapp means by Darstellung. However, one cannot overlook the long-standing tradition of translation, so it seems reasonable to continue translating Vorstellung as presentation. For this reason, I have decided to highlight, using the specific German terms, the instances where presentation refers to a Vorstellung and where it refers to a Darstellung. 7 For more on this, see Husserl 1997; 2004; 2008.
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In his 1906/07 Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie (Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge), Husserl begins with two questions: "In which way are sensations conscious in perception?", and: "What is the character of apprehending?" (Husserl 2008, 241). In order to address these questions, he provides a schematic list of three concepts of consciousness understood as (1) lived experience, (2) intentional consciousness, and (3) position-taking. These forms of consciousness correspond to three layers of the perceptual act. Let us consider the example of perceiving a tree. When we perceive a tree, we have a perceptual lived experience, in which the tree "stands before our eyes" (Husserl 2008, 243). According to Husserl, in this case sensations are not, so to speak, what is seen; rather, the tree is what is seen as it manifests itself from the perceived side. Nevertheless, sensations—for example, the color sensations arising with perceiving the tree—are experienced in some way, and even known by consciousness, but only in a form, in which they are not yet related to this very object; instead, they are given in a pre-reflective and implicit manner. Husserl describes this stage as a "pre-phenomenal lived experience" 168 (Husserl 2008, 244), identifying it as the first type of consciousness (1). The pre-phenomenal represents a fundamental form, occurring at the sensory level, of our knowledge about the world. However, in the pre-phenomenal stage, the sensory data still do not have the quality of perceptual givenness. In order to have this kind of givenness, according to Husserl, a second form of consciousness is required: intentional consciousness (2), which is described as an act of attention directed toward the sensory data, allowing it to be apprehended as a manifestation of something. In this regard, Husserl states:
Not all experiences are intentional experiences. Color content may be a representative (Repräsentant) in a perception, therefore, in an intentional experience, but it is not itself any such experience. It is the bearer of a consciousness, but not itself consciousness—consciousness in the present sense. (Husserl 2008, 246.)
With such apperception, attention is directed toward what is present in the lived experience as sensations, and it animates these sensations so that they can be apprehended as the manifestation of a thing (in our case, a tree). In this way, consciousness can "refer" to a specific objectivity manifesting itself in perception.
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Nonetheless, perception is not fully described, if Husserl's third concept of consciousness—position-taking (3)—is not considered. Thanks to
apperception, we attentively grasp the object that manifests itself. It is in this attentive experience that we direct ourselves toward the object with an intentional act, whether of joy, belief, or judgment, thereby taking a position regarding that object. This shows that at the foundation of every position-taking, there is a presentation-qua-Vorstellung of the perceived object. In this regard, Husserl writes: "We can say that each act requires a 'presentation' (Vorstellung) as a foundation, an objectifying apperception that originally makes its objectivity 'presentational' (Vorstellung) to it, brings it to consciousness." (Husserl 2008, 247.) For an intentional act to be directed toward a perceived object, this very object already has to be present for consciousness as a lived experience through sensations, and, additionally, an intentional reference must have already been constituted through attention (intentional consciousness), one that apprehends those sensations as the object's presentation. This form of presentation, which makes the object present for consciousness, provides the basis for position-taking by an intentional act. In the layering within 169 the perceptual act, sensations thus assume a representational function (repräsentative Funktion), that is, they present the object to consciousness. Sensations underlie any manifestation of the object. However, its manifesting as that specific object—in our example, the tree—depends on apperception and on the way, in which this apperception is intended. Finally, the quality of the act depends on the position-taking.
Thus far, I have discussed the layered structure of the perceptual act from the perspective of intentionality. Now, I will turn to the role of sensations as the content of manifestation, a theme central to both Schapp and Blaustein. In order to address this issue, we have to refer to Husserl's lectures from 1904/05 and 1907. In the 1904/05 lectures, Husserl emphasizes the distinction between Mach's "doctrine of sensations" and his own phenomenology of perception. According to Husserl, Mach's central fallacy lies in the misidentification of the content of sensation with the perceived object. A phenomenological analysis of the perceptual act reveals, however, that sensations—or the complex of sensations present in lived experience—serve as manifestations of the object's properties. These properties are manifested contents (präsentierte Inhalte)
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apprehended through Meinen. Meinen is the act of intention that interprets sensations as the manifestation of something. In this way, sensations are transformed into sensory contents that manifest the object's properties (see Husserl 2004, 11-12). Thanks to the perceptual act, then, a perceived color or shape is apprehended as a manifestation (Präsentant) of the color- and shape-properties of that particular object (see ibid., 24).
The modality of manifestation, therefore, depends on the interpretation of sensations by consciousness. Every perceptual presentation is characterized by the possibility that a complex of sensations may be interpreted by one or several intentional acts as the manifestation of an objective unity. This objective unity includes various determinations that are not actually present in sensations, but co-intended through the apprehension. The manifestation of this very object as a presentative horizon, transcending the immediately given sensory content, thereby occurs through what Husserl—drawing on a term from 19th-century associationism in psychology—calls "manifestation by contiguity."8 To address the problem of the existence of merely co-intended aspects of the 170 object, Husserl assigns a dual function to sensations: one and the same sensory content can be (1) the starting point for an immediate and direct manifestation (the perceived color through the manifesting sensation of the felt color) (ibid., 34) or (2) the starting point for a mediated and indirect manifestation, such as one pre-delineating the color of the back side on the basis of the perception of the front side. The first form of manifestation is classified by Husserl as "by similarity" (durch Ähnlichkeit), while the second is defined as "by contiguity" (ibid.). The manifestation by similarity is based on the direct and intuitive correspondence between the manifesting sensation and the property of the manifested object. In contrast, the manifestation by contiguity is based on a reference to something that can only be "inauthentically" grasped and is not grounded on a sensory manifestation. In the absence of similarity between the presenting and the presented, the manifestation of non-immediately present moments of the object is only possible due to signs. In this regard, Husserl writes:
8 For a possible connection with Hume's philosophy with regard to this concept, see Melle 2002, xxiii.
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A multiplicity of intentions that refer beyond, of intentions that are non-intuitive and not essentially grounded in the content offered by the presenting contents, latches on to the authentic intuitions and is fused with them in such a way that the expanded object still asserts itself as an object that is itself-present [...]. The bond here is such that the actually presented determinations appear analogous to signs [...]. (Ibid., 37.)9
Thus, in the perceptual act, sensations, which are interpreted by consciousness as the manifestation of a thing and its determinations, allow various unmanifested aspects of the thing to be included in this very act. A further specification of how the thing appears in perception can be found in the lectures now known as Ding und Raum (Thing and Space). While considering the schematic constitution of the thing in perceptual acts of consciousness, Husserl identifies two opposing moments in the appearance of the thing: space and matter. Space is composed of the bodily form and the determinations of the thing (surfaces, angles, edges); matter is composed in turn of the qualities that fill the space—the colorations that extend over the surfaces along with the tactile determinations (smoothness, roughness, stickiness). The visual and tactile determinations that allow space to manifest itself correspond to materia prima. In materia prima, visual and tactile determinations represent different layers. If the perception is taking place through visual sensations, the visual determinations form the first layer and are given in an "authentic" manner, while the tactile determinations form the second layer and are given in an "inauthentic" manner. Conversely, if access is through tactile sensations, the tactile determinations compose the first layer and are given in an "authentic" manner, while the visual determinations compose the second layer and are given in an "inauthentic" manner (Husserl 1997, 55-56). Despite the difference in clarity, however, "the strata are not mounted on top of one another; on the contrary, they interpenetrate or intersaturate. They thoroughly coincide in virtue of the identity of the corporeal space." (Ibid., 62.) Materia
9 Precisely this definition of a sign-structure in perception shows that the dichotomy developed in the sixth of the Logical Investigation between "intuitive presentation" and "signitive presentation" is here rearticulated into the dichotomy between "authentically presented" and "inauthentically presented" (Vongehr and Giuliani 2004, xxvii).
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prima, composed of the interpenetration of the tactile and visual layers, is a spatially filled unity providing the initial perceptual basis for the constitution of the thing. On this perceptual basis, further determinations of the thing are then set up, such as, for example, sound or noise, or even weight and other empirical properties that do not lead back to particular primitive sensory contents. For Husserl, these further determinations represent materia secunda (ibid., 56), whereas he defines the contents of materia prima as presentational contents (darstellenden Inhalte). He further specifies the authentic/inauthentic distinction as follows (cf. Husserl 1997, 60 f.):
Accordingly, the inauthentic appearance breaks down into two moments or parts: 1) the one includes that of the object which does not come at all to authentic appearance, and 2) the other includes that which indeed comes to authentic appearance visually but not tactually. The front side is seen; it pertains to the authentic appearance. It is not perceived tactually, and so of it only the complex of visual determinations, but not the complex of tactual ones, comes to authentic 172	appearance. (Husserl 1997, 61; translation slightly modified.)
Speaking of the inauthentic manifestations of materia prima, Husserl provides the example of a hand resting on a white sheet of paper. In this case, considering visual experience, the whiteness of the sheet is authentically perceived due to the sense of sight, while its roughness is only inauthentically perceived, that is, in a mediated way. To achieve its authentic perception, we have to shift from the look of the roughness perceived visually to the roughness actually felt with the hand, which then becomes authentically perceived content (see ibid., 62).
What has been said thus far allows us to outline, even in a condensed form, Husserl's account of the perceptual act in the Gottingen lectures.10 More importantly, however, it enables us to introduce a problem that is crucial for
10 I have left out considerations regarding kinaesthesis, which were already introduced in Thing and Space (see Husserl 1997, 131 ff.), because neither Schapp nor Blaustein take them into account in their investigations of intentionality. Blaustein, however, does discuss the problem of bodily movements within his aesthetics. For more on this issue, see Plotka 2024, 240-247.
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both Schapp and Blaustein. Both authors—albeit in different ways—seek to clarify, through their respective theories of perception, the relationship between sensations and the stratified presentation of objects of the external world as these objects are given to consciousness either through a direct manifestation (Schapp) or an intentional apprehension (Blaustein).
2. The theory of presentation-qua-Darstellung in Schapp's phenomenology of perception
Schapp's Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung is a peculiar work within early phenomenology. Despite Schapp's claims of being profoundly inspired by Husserl's lectures and by the debates within phenomenological circles (see Schapp 2013, 1-10),11 his work does not discuss the structure of intentional acts in any depth, nor does he offer a theoretical delimitation of such concepts as subject, object, consciousness, lived experience, or intentional content. It has been noted in the scholarly literature that this lack stems from Schapp's greater interest in the lifeworld and his shift toward a phenomenological focus on external reality, rather than on conscious experiences or on the subjective givenness of the intentional object (see Rolf 2013, vii). It could even be said that Schapp simply takes Husserl's theory of intentionality for granted and explores the aspect of the phenomenology of perception that remains unexamined in Husserl's Göttingen lectures: the topic of the thing as res materialis. There are, indeed, some hints toward this topic in the first section of the lectures on Thing and Space. However, during the Göttingen years, this theme is not fully developed (see Claesges 1973, xix-xx) and is only unfolded in the second chapter of Ideen II (Ideas II) (see Husserl 1989, 31 f.).12 This continuity is clear
173
11	In the preface to the Beiträge, Schapp writes: "The work I present here descends from E. Husserl's circle of ideas. In it, we take into account not only logical research, but also the great impulses I received during the three years, in which I attended Husserl's courses and exercises, and in which I took part in various personal confrontations with him and the circle of his students. In the writing of this work, he was always at my side with his advice. I cannot really judge in detail how much of my arguments derive from these personal impulses. I only hope that I have not written anything that I have not seen for myself." (Schapp 2013, page not indicated—the preface is unnumbered.)
12	For a detailed discussion of the transcendental nature of the constitution of the material thing, see Trizio 2021, 151 f.
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both thematically and linguistically. Linguistically, Schapp refers to sensations as Darstellenden (presentative), echoing Husserl's term darstellende Inhalte from his analysis of materia prima. Thematically, in the Beiträge Schapp aims to show that the reality of the thing—its material structure—manifests directly through sensations. That said, Schapp considers both the status and the role of sensations in the manifestation of the thing differently from Husserl.
The differences between Husserl's Göttingen lectures and Schapp's Beiträge regarding the role of sensations in the manifestation of the external world can be grouped into four key points: (1) the interpretation of the internal relation between a thing's properties and the sensations, through which they appear to perception, which Husserl describes as "manifestation by similarity"; (2) the distinction between immediately sensed properties (e.g., colors, tones, tactile qualities) and those inauthentically given through them (e.g., hardness, weight), corresponding to Husserl's layers of materia prima and materia secunda; (3) the status of non-perceived aspects of the world, such as hidden sides or internal structures, which are apprehended through intentional 174 acts—linked to Husserl's notion of "manifestation by contiguity"; and (4) the relationship between the world's manifestation and its reality, addressing the connection between consciousness, phenomena, and the world itself. In what follows, I will discuss these points.
According to Schapp, every visual perception is characterized by the perception of colors: even when we close our eyes, in the darkness of night, or when we are blinded, we still perceive colors (see Schapp 2013, 65). He, therefore, asks why, in certain circumstances, things manifest themselves through colors, and in others we see only indistinct patches of color. In order to answer this, he distinguishes between "sensed color" (empfundene Farbe) and "adherent color" (anhaftende Farbe). Sensed color involves shifting light, shadows, and other visual phenomena that do not concern the thing itself, whereas adherent color persists in perception beyond these fluctuations and assumes a distinguishable form, thereby presenting the thing. In order for the thing to manifest itself in perception, Schapp argues, a balance must be maintained between the fluctuating phenomena of light and shadow and the phenomena belonging to the thing itself. For example, in the case of a helmet shining in the sun, in order for the grey of the helmet to be perceived, it should
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not be overshadowed by the play of reflected light. Regarding this point, Schapp specifies that such reflections and other transient phenomena belong to the realm of "mere sensations" (bloße Empfindungen), while the stable elements, manifesting the thing, belong to the realm of perceptions (Wahrnehmungen). In order for the thing to manifest, the accessory phenomena must remain in the realm of sensations, while the elements belonging to the thing, and thus presenting it, must emerge from the realm of sensations and reach the realm of perceptions, where sensory elements acquire stability and structure, forming a unified experience of the thing (Schapp 2013, 76 ff.; Laasik 2025, 27). As a result, according to Schapp (and in contrast to Husserl), the sensed color is not the basis for any form of presentation; rather, it must be excluded from intentional consciousness, in order for the adherent color to present the thing. Moreover, Schapp overcomes Husserl's notion of "manifestation by similarity": the Husserlian distinction between a presenting sensed color (sensation) and a presented perceived color (accomplished by an intentional act of perception) is rearticulated into the distinction between a presenting perceived color (perception) and the material characteristics of the thing (reality).	175
This brings us to point 2. In his account of how the world manifests through sensations, Schapp identifies a manifestative order in perception, one that has a normative character (see Summa 2025). He distinguishes two levels here—the presenting properties (Darstellendes), such as color, sound, and tactile sensations, form the first perceptual layer, while the presented properties (Dargestelltes), including spatial determinations as well as physical and material characteristics like rigidity, elasticity, or internal structure, are arranged on the second layer (cf. Laasik 2025, 30 ff.). Although there are some cases, in which second-layer characteristics may be presenting, it never happens that first-layer characteristics are presented (see Schapp 2013, 41-42). This dual structure recalls Husserl's materia prima, but whereas in Husserl the second layer of materia prima was a fulfillment of the first layer, derived from being integrated through intentional experience or subsequent perception, for Schapp both layers are inextricably linked in the same perceptual experience and are immediately given. This is due to Schapp's synaesthetic approach, according to which properties typically given through other senses, such as weight or hardness in touch, can manifest in a single synaesthetic experience, such as seeing or hearing (see Summa 2025, 50).
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For instance, Schapp argues that even with our hands in our pockets, we can see a range of the qualities of things that present themselves to our eyes and are inherently different from color and extension. "We see if something is smooth like the brass of a lamp, if it is rough like our clothing, if it is liquid like water or coffee, if it is solid like a cup, if it is homogeneous like an apple or granular like a table, if it is sticky like honey or slightly viscous like ink." (Schapp 2013, 19.) By citing these various examples, Schapp aims to demonstrate that "despite the fact that sight 'authentically' perceives only colors" (ibid., 38), color is not all that we see; even through the visual perception of a single object, "properties, such as elasticity and lucidity, become so highly presentable [vorstellig] that we have them before us in the flesh and blood" and so faithfully that "it makes no sense to ask whether they can be perceived in a more immediate form" (ibid., 21). Schapp also extends this analysis of perception to other senses, showing that we can grasp an object's composition and shape through sound and touch, without relying on associative or memory-related processes (see ibid., 47).
Form and materiality, perceived directly, are what comprises the object's 176 character a parte obiecti. However, to organize what is presented into a unified manifestative pole, we also need an element a parte subiecti, which Schapp calls "observing perception" (beobachtende Wahrnehmung) (ibid., 65), a kind of perception that "is not satisfied with what is offered to it [das Gebotene], with what shows itself, but wants to know how what is observed is in truth [...]" (ibid., 66). The thing in its unity and character is given thanks to this "observing perception," which does nothing more than immerse itself in what manifests itself, letting it unfold to its full extent (see Nuccilli 2025, 110 f.). The thing is thus a correlate of this more awakened form of perception—one that offers us knowledge of the thing in its individuality and character (see Schapp 2013, 123), thanks to the internal references between presenting and presented properties.
With respect to point 3, it can be noted that Schapp is far from Husserl's notion of "manifestation by contiguity." Whereas for Husserl the thing is configured as a mixture of intentional acts within the interpretative apprehension, in which some aspects are authentically given and the others are inauthentically given, for Schapp, the thing is given in its entirety and character in every perceptual manifestation of it, and for this reason is authentically given (see Nuccilli 2025,
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107 ff.). This happens without the intervention of any integration by intentional consciousness (cf. Summa 2025, 47 f.), but only through an effort of observing perception to remove the impediments facing it.
Here, the difference in the configuration of the perceptual object is based on a divergent concept of phenomenon and of the relationship between consciousness and the external world. Thus, this line of reasoning leads to point 4. For Schapp, a phenomenon is not a reliable form of manifestation of the thing, i.e., one that allows perception to know it; instead, it is something deceptive that permits no access to the thing. He accordingly distinguishes between the mere phenomenon (bloßen Phänomen) and the thing: a mere phenomenon is that which concerns "the luminous formations, the glow, the reflection, the distance manifestations, the bluish streaks, the masses, that distance gives instead of things" (Schapp 2013, 92). Things, on the other hand, are the ones that clearly exhibit a form of material interaction with each other and display regularity in these interactions. Phenomena, then, do not have the status of things, in the sense that they do not bring to manifestation any aspect of the thing. This, of course, helps us to understand why Schapp makes 177 no mention of Husserl's theory of adumbrations. At the same time, it is a sign of a different way of conceiving the relationship between the apprehension of the thing by consciousness and its manifestation to the senses. Although in the final section of the Contributions, dedicated to the idea in perception, Schapp employs the concept of Meinen in a way similar to Husserl—explaining how the intuitive manifestation of the thing is apprehended by consciousness—, a structure that for Husserl is fundamental to perceptual experience is entirely overlooked in Schapp's account, for the intentional act that interprets sensations given in presentations is missing altogether (Rolf 2004, 90).
What emerges here is a structural divergence in how Husserl and Schapp conceive the manifestation of the world through sensation. In Schapp's account, the thing appears through its sensory givenness: sensuous data disclose the thing in its full concreteness, encompassing both physical features and intentional meaning. Sensations present (in the sense of darstellen) the thing directly to consciousness; intentionality plays a secondary role, primarily in clearing the perceptual field of distortions or contingent interferences. In contrast, for Husserl the sensuous content—understood as the basis of presentations
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(in the sense of Vorstellung)—must be grasped within an intentional act for the thing to appear as such. Thus, sensations do not themselves manifest the object, but provide the material, upon which intentionality operates. The object is not simply comprised of the presenting sensations, but is intended as such—given in a Vorstellung that draws it into immanent consciousness as a unity of sense within a horizon of possible adumbrations. In Schapp, then, the sensation presents the thing in the external world; in Husserl, it presents the corresponding property of the thing to the immanent gaze of consciousness.
3. Blaustein's critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality and his account of perceptual presentations
Blaustein's view of the role of sensations in the manifestation of the external world can be seen as comparable or even similar to Schapp's; nevertheless, the two approach the central topic from different angles. As we have seen in section 2, while Schapp addresses the issue of perception mainly in the context of the object and its material reality, Blaustein's assessment of Husserl's theory of intentionality focuses primarily on how one should conceive the modes of apprehension and interpretation of sensations within lived experiences (see Pokropski 2015, 96).
In the writings of the first (theoretical) period of his research activity, i.e., just after his visit to Freiburg in 1925, Blaustein often deals with Husserl's phenomenology by taking a predominantly critical approach (see: Blaustein 1928; 1928/1929; 1930; cf. also: Plotka 2021 252; 2023a, 106-108; 2023b, 382383; Pokropski 2015, 94; Nuccilli and Lewandowski 2024). Regarding the topic of the manifestation of the external world in perception and presenting content of sensations, one of the most interesting texts is his doctoral dissertation on Husserl's Theory of Act, Content, and Object of Presentation (Husserlowska nauka o akcie, tresci iprzedmiocieprzedstawienia; 1928). The text is structured into three sections. The first section is dedicated to reconstructing the history of the problem of act, content, and object before 1900, with a focus on the positions of scholars, such as Brentano, Twardowski, Cornelius, and Meinong (see Blaustein 1928, 6-22). The second section concentrates on the analysis and elucidation of the central concepts of Husserl's theory of intentionality (see ibid., 22-65). The third section presents a critical assessment of Husserl's
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theory of intentionality, in which Blaustein articulates his own account of the presentation of the external world in perception, contrasting it with Husserl's theory of adumbrations (ibid., 62-93).
In order to understand Blaustein's account of intentionality and the manifestation of the world in presentations through sensations, it is first necessary to examine the key aspects of his interpretation of Husserl's theory of intentionality as developed in the second section of his dissertation. There are three main concepts of Husserl's theory of intentionality that are discussed by Blaustein: (1) the concept of consciousness; (2) the concept of lived experience; and (3) the concept of intentional act. In his analyses of these concepts, Blaustein mainly addresses the following issues: (a) the differentiation between the various notions of consciousness that Husserl identifies in Logical Investigations and Ideas I (see ibid., 23 ff.); (b) Husserl's account of lived experience in relation to these different notions of consciousness, particularly concerning what may be included within lived experience and the types of lived experiences that can be distinguished (see ibid., 24 ff.); and (c) the role of sensations within the intentional act—specifically, the relation they establish 179 within lived experience to the properties of objects, and how the structure of the intentional act, as an apprehension and interpretation of sensations, should be understood.
According to Blaustein, lived experiences are parts that form the stream of consciousness understood as a whole—namely, they are the events that shift from moment to moment and are interwoven in various ways to form the unity of consciousness. However, in addition to these experiences, consciousness also includes their concrete and abstract components (see ibid., 26). What is decisive for Blaustein in this regard is that, according to Husserl, only the contents of consciousness can be lived through (durchlebt)—never external objects. Consequently, the notion of lived experience refers exclusively to events experienced in immanence. For this reason, Husserl rejects any distinction between a lived experience and the act of living through that experience. He accordingly does not differentiate between sensation or sensing as an act and sensation as content, since his aim is precisely to relocate, within the domain of immanent perception, what in Brentano's account had belonged to external experience. According to Blaustein, this implies two things: the sensation that
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results from the perception of a property of an object, such as the sensation of color, must be part of the lived experience; and to be lived through is the property, not of the object, but of the sensation of color itself, since the actual component of consciousness, with which the intentional act is associated, is precisely the sensation of color, which is only a correlate of color as a property of the object.
With the ideas discussed above in mind, Blaustein develops—in the third section of his book—a critical assessment of Husserl's theory of the act, content, and object of presentation. His analysis refers to five fundamental claims, which synthesize the presuppositions or the background that underlies Husserl's account of intentionality: (1) consciousness is the source of psychic lived experiences as a coherent and continuous stream or flow; (2) lived experiences include both intentional acts and sensations; (3) intentional acts are apprehensions and interpretations of sensations; (4) it is not justified to differentiate between a sensation as an act and a sensation as content; (5) it is necessary to differentiate between sensations and object-properties (ibid., 180 64-65). In addressing the fourth and fifth claims, Blaustein outlines how the presentations of the external world in perception ought to be conceived in his view. These two claims are crucial for us, but before I address them, it is useful to summarize the issues that Blaustein identifies in the first three claims.
To begin with, for Blaustein the first claim falls into a vicious circle, since lived experiences are defined as consciousness, but consciousness is defined as a set of lived experiences (see ibid., 71). Next, the second claim is equally problematic, because sensations, being non-intentional and egoalien (ichfremd), cannot be part of consciousness, which includes only ego-related (ichlich) acts (ibid., 67; see Pokropski 2015, 97). Finally, the third claim, though partly valid, lacks precision: sensations can only be apprehended or additionally interpreted, depending on whether they directly present object-properties or are intended as part of a broader object that is not fully presented (Blaustein 1928, 73-74).
All of the claims that Blaustein ascribes to Husserl are connected. Blaustein's assessment of the fourth claim follows his view of sensations as alien to the ego (ichfremd). The assessment of the fifth claim, in turn, follows the third claim that sensations can only be apprehended or additionally interpreted. Moving
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from the fifth to the fourth claim, he explains that the distinction between different acts of perception implies a distinction within the field of sensations. Some sensations are apprehended—that is, they are intentional, although they relate to transcendent objects of absolutely adequate perception. Others are interpreted—they refer to spatial forms, appear as existing within spatial relations, and belong to the spatiotemporal world as objects of transcendent rather than immanent perception. And it is with respect to this distinction that Blaustein presents his conception of the manifestation of the external world in perception.
According to Blaustein, the world is composed of two layers: "the first layer is a set of presenting contents, is interpreted as a side (visible to us at a given moment) of the second layer, a set of material objects" (ibid., 75). He defines the former as the "phenomenal world" and the latter as the "material world." The phenomenal world is a world of colors, sounds, smells—of sensecontents that are, however, spread over a two-dimensional space. These sensecontents have two peculiar characteristics: (a) they have a specific function in relation to the second layer of the world, and are therefore defined with 181 respect to it as presenting contents; and (b) they have no form of mutual causal relationship. The phenomenal world is thus a changeable world made up of surfaces and colors in various forms and gradations that change size and position in the perceptual field without any kind of causality governing these changes. Moreover, the phenomenal world can never be given to us in its entirety; instead, we are faced only with fragments of it in a horizon of other fragments not yet perceived. According to Blaustein, this world is apprehended by our perceptions, and as such is the intentional object of our acts (cf. ibid.; see Pokropski 2015, 98). The phenomenal world is given to us directly and is therefore apprehended. On the other hand, the material world cannot be apprehended, since it always presents itself to us (to put this issue in a metaphorical way) through the phenomenal filter. The transition from the phenomenal to the material world takes place, when interpretation intervenes as a supplement to apprehension: two-dimensional sense-contents are interpreted as colored surfaces belonging to a totality of other surfaces that constitute a three-dimensional object, thereby disclosing the external world in a manner Blaustein defines as "relatively adequate" (ibid.). Sensory
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data that previously appeared as varying without any causal connection are now grasped as concatenated in the manifestation of the object, which is also embedded in causal relations in the material world. Nonetheless, as Blaustein states: "Phenomenal objects do not exist in the material world, but in the phenomenal world that presents this material world." (Ibid., 76.)
Blaustein's articulation of the concept of the phenomenal world accordingly serves to challenge early Husserl's theory that sense-contents are part of lived experience. According to Husserl, in Blaustein's eyes, sense-contents are found in the phenomenal world, but only in the interpreted phenomenal world do they fulfill the function of presenting content, thereby allowing us to represent the properties of the real world. Blaustein thus accepts Husserl's distinction between sensations and the properties of objects, but he develops it differently: he accounts for the realm of sensations as located in an interregnum between consciousness and the external world—in the two-dimensional sphere of the phenomenal world. In this way, Blaustein dissolves the vicious circle inherent in Husserl's theory, in which sensations and intentional acts are both integrated 182 into lived experience and thereby belong to consciousness. Sensations, in Blaustein's view, are distinct from the properties of objects, not because they belong to the immanent realm of intentional consciousness, but because they occupy a different layer within the presentation of the world in perception (see ibid., 78).
Having changed the status of sensations and having recognized them as transcendent objects of apprehension, Blaustein assesses the fourth claim. Husserl bases the rejection of the distinction between sensible act and perceived content on his interpretation of sensations as lived experiences. In his perspective, sensations are not presented in specific intentional acts, but rather lived through. According to Blaustein, however, the concept of sensation is ambiguous and can be understood as an act of perception, as content, or as an object of apprehension (see Pokropski 2015, 98-99). This distinction, which Husserl overlooks, raises a crucial question: how can an intentional act grasp an object as a whole, while interpreting sensations merely as manifestations of its properties? In order to address this question, Blaustein indicates two solutions. Either the intentional act immediately identifies the sensation with the object's property or there are two distinct acts—one that apprehends and
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interprets the sensation, and another that directs itself toward the object. According to Blaustein, however, whether there is only one act or two different acts, sensation must always be understood as a transcendent content that is apprehended and interpreted by an act for the purpose of bringing the objects of the external world to presentation to consciousness (cf. Blaustein 1928, 81).
Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to clarify how different phenomenological perspectives conceptualize the role of sensation in the manifestation of the world within the perceptual act. I have explored how this issue is addressed by Husserl, Schapp, and Blaustein, focusing on the relationship between sensation, intentional acts of consciousness, and the external world. At the systematic level, both Schapp and Blaustein reject the emphasis on immanence in Husserl's initial conception of perception. This also affects the issue of the intentional status of sensations. For Schapp, sensations are the sole medium, through which things present themselves to consciousness, since the properties of the object and its manifestation are fused together. Where sensation fails to manifest anything, we remain in the realm of mere phenomena; where sensation manifests something, we enter the realm of perception and access to the "things themselves." Sensations play a central role in the self-manifestation of the thing to consciousness, without involving any intentional act aimed at the sensible level, in order to constitute the thing as a unity of sense. In Schapp's view, this does not exclude intentionality, but rather places its emergence at a later moment: it arises through the manifestation of the idea, which grasps the thing, once it has already been presented intuitively.13 The situation is quite different in the case of Blaustein. He does not deny the importance of intentionality in the manifestation of the external world through sensation. Rather, he seeks to address a problem inherent in the theory of intentionality Husserl develops in his Gottingen lectures—namely, the reduction of sensations to elements entirely absorbed within the intentional act. For Blaustein, sensations remain outside the intentional act, but can be apprehended and interpreted by it in
13 See Schapp 2013, 130ff.; Nuccilli 2020, 70 ff.
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such a way as to allow the properties of external objects to be manifested to consciousness. This is made possible through the mediation of the phenomenal world, which can be understood as the mode, in which external things appear. Sensations thus function as presenters of external objects, providing the basis, upon which the intentional act can be directed toward the things themselves.
Both Schapp's and Blaustein's positions present themselves as alternatives to Husserl's transcendental turn, which takes shape especially in the Gottingen lectures, beginning with those of 1906/07. Whereas for Husserl sensations become means for manifesting only when, through the apprehension achieved by the intentional act, they are revealed as oriented toward the presentation of the external properties of things, for Schapp and Blaustein they are presenters in their own right: for the former, sensations function in a direct and complete sense, and for the latter, they function in a mediated form shaped by the interpretative function of the intentional act. In Husserl's case, the purely psychological-descriptive dimension is suspended along with the external status of sensations; in contrast, for both Schapp and Blaustein, it retains a 184 decisive and central role. This methodological aspect, however, would require further discussion beyond the scope of the present work.
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Review scientific paper Pregledni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.8 UDC: 165.62:159.942
Leopold Blaustein vs. Edmund Husserl
Active Consciousness and the Search for Essence
Magdalena Gilicka
Adam Micki ewicz University in Poznan, Ul. Wieniawskiego 1, 61-712 Poznan, Poland
magdalenagilicka@o2.pl | ^
Abstract

The article presents Husserl's conception of imaginative variation and intentional consciousness while considering the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein. The Polish philosopher's critical analyses regarding the validity and feasibility of the operation of variation as well as Husserl's account of consciousness, on the one hand, reveal shortcomings in Blaustein's philosophical reflections, and, on the other hand, nonetheless lead us to points of convergence between their concepts. What emerges in
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Blaustein's thought is, alongside his philosophical maturity and independent scholarly approach, an interesting application of Husserlian categories.
Keywords: consciousness, imaginative variation, intentionality, constitution, perception.
Leopold Blaustein vs. Edmund Husserl. Aktivna zavest in iskanje bistva
Povzetek
Članek predstavi Husserlovo pojmovanje imaginativne variacije in intencionalne zavesti, pri čemer se osredotoči na filozofijo Leopolda Blausteina. Tako kritične analize poljskega filozofa glede veljavnosti in izvedljivosti operacije variacije kot tudi Husserlovo dojetje zavesti, na eni strani, razkrivajo pomanjkljivosti Blausteinovih filozofskih refleksij in, na drugi strani, kljub vsemu nakazujejo točke konvergence med njunimi pojmovanji. Tako se v okviru Blausteinove misli, ob njegovi lastni filozofski zrelosti in samostojnem znanstvenem pristopu, razgrne zanimiva aplikacija 188 husserlovskih kategorij.
Ključne besede: zavest, imaginativna variacija, intencionalnost, konstitucija, zaznavanje.
Magdalena Gilicka
When I began my university studies in philosophy, Professor Twardowski spoke to us about the priesthood of the philosopher, about how only people ofthe highest ethical standards ought to become philosophers. To me, Edmund Husserl seems to be just such a dignified priest of philosophy, worthy of the deepest reverence.
Leopold Blaustein, "Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia"
1. Introduction: Mutual motivations
The article is based on the philosophical premises of the thoughts of Bergson (1859-1941) and Ingarden (a supporting, secondary thread; 1893-1970), Husserl (1859-1938), Twardowski (1866-1938), and Blaustein (1905-1942 [?]). Such a compilation of ideas should not come as a surprise to readers with a preliminary familiarity with early 20th-century philosophical thought, for these thinkers shared a certain intellectual kinship marked by mutual respect.
Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, both of whom "grew" from the philosophical soil cultivated by Franz Brentano, are brought together, as it were, in the thought of Leopold Blaustein—not in the sense of attempting to reconcile their views, but rather in the way his work reflects both lineages. At this stage, it is premature to assess, which of these thinkers exerted a greater influence on the philosopher, for a greater degree of critique directed at a particular thinker does not necessarily imply distance from his ideas.1
The inspiration for the thematic focus of the present paper arises from Husserl's concept of intentional/transcendental consciousness, though considered within a specific contextual framework; namely, the interest here lies in the perpetual activity of consciousness, which in the case of Husserl's eidetic phenomenology, through a series of eidetic transformations, enables the grasping and apprehension of pure possibilities. The eidetic context has
1 Marek Pokropski, in his article titled "Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content," emphasizes that the uniqueness of Blaustein's thought lies in the synthesis of Twardowski's and Husserl's thought (Pokropski 2015, 94).
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been deliberately chosen here, in order to expose a certain "liberality" within the rigor of the phenomenological method; the context of examining a range of pure possibilities, which Husserl refers to as intentional eidetic horizons, nonetheless sets for itself the lofty task of uncovering a universal a priori (Husserl 1960, 70-71).
The eidetic phenomenological framework shall hence serve as the point of reference for reflections on the aforementioned philosophers. However, the ultimate "outcome" of the inquiry is to be the notion of active consciousness, understood as the ceaseless work of the knowing subject who does not settle for a naive attitude or for a habitual and superficial apprehension of what is epistemically presented. As will become evident, similar general methodological assumptions led the thinkers considered here to entirely different conclusions—although without any diminishment of the significance of any of them.
I also intend to demonstrate that each of the said thinkers presupposed the essentially constitutive role of active consciousness, and this was never 190 understood as a "petrified" or constrained consciousness. The process of constituting the object or of arriving at pure essences was, in Husserl's case, a kind of "juggling" of various forms of experiences grounded in originary presentational intuition. One must bear in mind, however, that each of the thinkers developed their own perspective on the very concept of consciousness. The verb "presupposed" in the opening sentence of this paragraph is employed here in a specific sense—it should be taken the least literally, and indeed functions more as a working hypothesis of this article. My intention is to show that these thinkers were searching for some kind of permanence within change, certain universal strata of consciousness that would "constitute" constancy amid the variability and instability of perceptual apprehensions.
In the first part of this study, I shall turn to the concept of Henri Bergson and his notion of the "average form," while also presenting Roman Ingarden's perspective on the issue. In the next section, I shall outline the principal tenets of Husserl's eidetic method with particular attention given to phenomenological tools, such as eidetic reduction and its constituent operation, imaginative variation (the operation of varying). I shall then present the arguments of Kazimierz Twardowski, which offer an interesting perspective on the epistemic
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order between purely conceptual and object-directed thinking, particularly from the viewpoint of perception and imagination. In the final and most crucial part of the study, I shall focus on the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein whose thought I shall attempt to synthesize with the analyses of the thinkers discussed earlier in the paper.
2. Bergson: The germination of "essential" thought
Roman Ingarden, a student of Husserl, must necessarily be mentioned here: firstly, as a proponent of the impracticability of Husserl's imaginative variation (whether it is justifiably so, cannot to be judged here);2 and secondly, for his ontological analysis of the content of ideas presented in his magnum opus, the three-volume Controversy over the Existence of the World (Spor o istnienie swiata), a work that critically analyses Henri Bergson's denial of the real existence of essence, which Bergson himself terms the "average form."
Ingarden interprets the French intuitionist's understanding of essence as follows: "[...] it [essence; M. G.] is merely the product of the cinematographic mechanism of the intellect, relative to the functioning of the schema, to which, in reality, nothing corresponds. According to Bergson, in reality there exists [...] a continuous stream of becoming [...]." (Ingarden 1963, 139; my translation.) How are we to understand these cinematographic intellectual operations? To phrase it by using Husserlian terminology, in the course of temporal perception of a given object, we apprehend it from various sides, frame by frame, forming a sequence of views, or, to revert to Bergson's own language, we fix them in the form of "snapshots" attributed to specific temporal moments of the thing (it is important here to distinguish the persistence of the object itself from the temporality of its perception or imagination).
This intellectual stance, in Bergson's view, possesses a certain power of "integration" of the mental photographs thus created. It is unsurprising that these images, as mental fixations, need not exhibit common elements in comparison. Ingarden, interpreting Bergson, writes: "These momentary snapshots show great differences among themselves. Therefore, we select
2 See Gilicka 2023, 7-30.
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only those properties that occur in the majority of them and are similar to one another [...]." (Ingarden 1963, 140; my translation.) It is precisely this similarity that Bergson terms the "average form," which he considers to be wrongly equated with essence. The latter, in his view, constitutes no real entity. This is not to say, of course, that Bergson deemed all epistemological reflections on essential knowledge of beings to be absurd. Quite the contrary, his epistemological aspirations are remarkably close to those of Husserl. As John-Francis Phipps writes in his article "Henri Bergson and the Perception of Time": "The true purpose of knowledge is to know things deeply, to touch the inner essence of things via a form of empathy." (Phipps 2004.) The objects of our cognition are endowed with a kind of immanent essence. But what, then, is this "empathy"? It is the fundamental operation of the seasoned metaphysician. One might liken it to a doctor who, when examining a patient, uses available medical tools, such as a stethoscope, to auscultate the object and delve into its innermost depths. In both cases, there is a striving toward a goal that is difficult to reach via surface-level inspection. In the case of the metaphysician, that goal 192 is to "grasp the inner essence of the thing" (Phipps 2004). As Bergson himself wrote, again cited by Phipps: "A true empiricism is that which proposes to get as near to the original itself as possible, to search deeply into its life [...]." (Phipps 2004.)
For Bergson, the life drive, which is irrational, constitutes the essence of the world. Reason is too "ossified" to be able to know reality. In Creative Evolution, Bergson writes: "Life, we have said, transcends finality as it transcends the other categories. It is essentially a current sent through matter, drawing from it what it can. There has not, therefore, properly speaking, been any project or plan." (Bergson 1922, 279-280.)
Yet, does this not raise a fundamental difficulty regarding the very selection of the "average form": how are we to know that this, rather than some other set of elements, is precisely the one that determines the essence of a specific object? Where lies the margin of error in determining the "average form"? I also wonder how, on the grounds of Husserlian philosophy, we might justify that, faced with various transcendent beings, some changing in time, others atemporal, some appearing in variable profiles due to their three-dimensionality and always accessible only in two-dimensionality, we are capable of condensing them in
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such a way as to grasp them as manifestations, in which something objective, namely essence, is presented? How does constituting consciousness manage such difficulties? In this regard, Bergson's reflections prove illuminating and instructive.
The Polish phenomenologist, addressing these concerns, writes:
To regard some "average form" of various changes of an object as its individual essence is, naturally, an error. But to seek in it an essence is not so much an intellectual illusion relative to the operation, as a mistake of the philosopher. That average form must, of course, in some indeterminate approximation, be embodied in each phase of transformation, or in each object, of which it is the "average form." Yet, it need not be identified with the essence. [...] As such, it is necessarily entirely relative in its content [...]. It may therefore possess ever-different content depending on which specimens are considered from the viewpoint of "averageness." (Ingarden 1963, 144; my translation.)
Ingarden further underscores Bergson's error in unconditionally and consistently equating the average form with essence. This form, he claims, would belong to every object of cognition at any moment of its change, even if it is apprehended with insufficient clarity. Determining such a form does not, in this sense, provide grounds for recognizing it as a reliable and indubitable source of knowledge. The fact that certain features recur during the object's manifestation from various angles does not necessarily mean that they constitute its essence.
The founder of phenomenology in Experience and Judgment, which encompasses Husserl's late work and was published posthumously, also emphasizes the crucial role of repetition in essential access to objects—an aspect that constitutes the genetic dimension of transcendental phenomenology. In §5 of this work entitled "The retrogression from the self-evidence of judgment to objective self-evidence," we read that the genetic approach to knowledge involves "[...] production through which judgment and also knowledge in their original form, that of self-givenness, arise—a mode of production which, no matter how often it is repeated, always yields the same result, the same cognition" (Husserl 1973, 23). Of course, merely stating repetition is insufficient. "The Same" is not some kind of proposition that accompanies
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specific, individual cognitive acts. As Husserl explains, the element of repetition of what is "the Same" has nothing to do with the real components of acts. As the philosopher writes, "the Same" is "[...] an 'immanent' moment of such nature that in repetition it is self-given as the identical moment of the repetitions" (Husserl 1973, 23-24). What is repeated lies beyond time and reality. It is something irreal. It belongs to the sphere of immanence, and at the same time cannot be treated as anything concrete. "The Same" is a repetition grounded in identity—a kind of internal irrealism of that, which is repeated.
In conclusion of these preliminary reflections, which serve as a prelude to what follows: a given object of perception may represent various content configurations and, accordingly, different average forms. Moreover, objects belonging to the same kind often differ significantly in their specific properties. How, then, can we grasp the average form as essence? The objects of the world would, under such a conception, be characterized by an unstable essential constitution. Ingarden rightly labels this view "nonsense," for it would contradict the very notion of essence (Ingarden 1994, 147).
3. Husserl's eidetic method
At this point, we encounter a moment of conceptual collision between the thought of Bergson and that of Husserl, particularly in relation to the technique of imaginative variation, the mechanism of which appears perhaps to be lacking in the French philosopher's deliberations. What imaginative variation in Husserl's phenomenology is can be explained by the words of Wladyslaw Strožewski (1933), a student of Roman Ingarden. In his book Logos, wartosc, milosc (Logos, Value, Love) he writes:
On the [...] final level we attempt to determine whether the property p is necessary for the identity (essence) of the object under examination. In order to do so, we leave behind the domain of empirical generalizations and essential universals, and pass over into the realm of imagination. Here, we carry out what is known as imaginative variation. This consists in imagining all possible alterations of the object in question and examining at which point it ceases to be itself, "explodes," and loses its identity. (Strožewski 2013, 210-211; my translation.)
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The Husserlian imaginative variation allows us to uncover a highly significant impossibility. If we return to our initial, rather serious doubts, namely, how it is possible to determine the essence of an object that presents itself from various perspectives and is always given to us in a two-dimensional context, then, in a certain sense, imaginative variation both confirms the legitimacy of our concerns and simultaneously transforms them into a positive argument. We must accustom ourselves to the fact that the worlds opened up by Husserl's perspective pertain to forms of imagination that are distinct from those encountered in the "everyday" perception of reality (Essom-Stenz and Roald 2025, 41). Through the process of imaginative variation, we are led to conclusions that reveal both the vast potential of constituting consciousness as well as its limitations and constraints. It also demonstrates something of paramount importance: the laws of logical thinking cannot be broken, and Husserl had no intention of doing so. The results of imaginative variation ought to include such insights as those explicitly mentioned by Strožewski, which fit rightly into the thematic framework of the present inquiry: "[...] it is impossible 195 to imagine an object in space that does not diminish in size as it moves further away from us; [...] it is impossible to view a three-dimensional object from all sides at once" (Strožewski 2013, 211; my translation). The same applies to the intuition of temporal transcendence: we are unable to present to ourselves the temporal course of its duration, unless we grasp this course as a succession of overlapping segments (Strožewski 2013, 211).
The procedure of imaginative variation grants us a particular form of certainty: the object of presentation, in its specificity, possesses a set of properties that are strictly its own; these particular properties, and no others, can be ascribed to it. It is through this means that the eidos is revealed. The entire "mechanism" of variation (variieren), as an analytical procedure aimed at attaining "pure thought-objects," is also conducted by the phenomenologist in Cartesian Meditations. As Husserl explains, in perceiving a given object and undertaking the operation of variation, one may be guided by a certain cognitive liberty; colloquially speaking, one may let the imagination roam freely. Given the rigor of phenomenological cognition and its associated rules, this is a rather surprising approach to the matter. What must remain evident,
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however, so that imagination does not alter the very nature of the perception, is the context of perceiving precisely this and not another object. One might say that Husserl permits, in a particularly intriguing respect, a manipulation of transcendence—understood immanently.
Thus, a transcendent object, subjected to the free play of creative imagination and presenting itself, for instance, in various shapes or color variants, will allow constituting consciousness to isolate what was previously referred to as "the Same"; it will reveal that which remains unchanged amidst change, that which guarantees the object's identity.3 In the introduction to this study, I spoke of a certain "liberality" of the eidetic method, which here finds its clarification: this "freedom" of permissible fantasy ultimately leads to something that is to be certain and indubitable.4
In Cartesian Meditations, the German phenomenologist writes:
In other words: abstaining from acceptance of its being, we turn the factual perception into a pure possibility, one among others that are quite "optional" as pure possibilities but are possible perceptions. We might say that we move the actual perception into the sphere of the nonactual, of "as if," which provides us with "pure" possibilities free from everything that would restrict them to this or that fact. In the second case we keep these possibilities, not as restricted to co-given factual states of the ego, but solely as completely free "imaginable possibilities" of phantasy. (Husserl 1960, 70.)
All such acts of fantasy must be completely detached from any reference to the ego. Here, Husserl grants total, yet simultaneously limited, freedom and stipulates that these "acts of imaginative immersion (hineinphantasieren)" must bear no connection to any factual aspects of our existence. The perception, being an integral part of these acts of fantasy, rests solely on pure possibilities, untainted by facticity. "Perception, the universal type thus acquired, floats in the air, so to
3	See Husserl 1968, 73.
4	Manusz Moryn writes: "The founder of phenomenology was not so much interested in the very structure of eidos [i.e., its formal ontology] as in the benefits arising from eidetic appearances [...] from eidetic apprehension, negation can never follow." (Moryn 1998, 17; my translation.)
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speak—in the atmosphere of pure phantasiableness" (Husserl 1960, 70), Husserl continues. This kind of operation allows us to arrive at the general essence of perception, cleansed of all empirical, psychophysical references. The eidos of perception constitutes a specific set composed of its unique components: these are the ideal perceptions as the ultimate outcomes (to use colloquial language) of those free acts of fantasy, acts, which must still be bound to the original perceptual content.5 Such essential analyses have a universal dimension and can be applied to every kind of cognition and perceptual experience.
This brings us, in turn, directly back to the issues of intuition. As in Bergson, so too in Husserl, there is no path other than that of intuition (albeit differently explicated),6 in order—that is, through a direct immersion in the object—to reach the essence of the object subjected to eidetic analysis (regardless of how that essence is ultimately conceived). The pure thought-objects repeatedly mentioned above, as the result of freely conducted acts of fantasy, appear by way of intuitive givenness. The essence of imaginative variation therefore lies in epistemic indubitability, in the self-givenness of the object of apperception.
Husserl states:	197
The variation being meant as an evident one, accordingly as presenting in pure intuition the possibilities themselves as possibilities, its correlate is an intuitive and apodictic consciousness of something universal. The eidos itself is a beheld or beholdable universal, one that is pure, "unconditioned"—that is to say: according to its own intuitional sense, a universal not conditioned by any fact. It is prior to all "concepts", in the sense of verbal significations; indeed, as pure concepts, these must be made to fit the eidos. (Husserl 1960, 71.)
5	See Husserl 2012, 245.
6	Apart from the above, we can also provide another example of understanding the notion of "intuition" as conceived by Bergson. The term was also used by J. W. Dawid in a lecture on Bergson's philosophy, delivered in Lwow in 1913: "1-0. Intuition is to be a direct cognition through the senses or introspection, in contrast to definition or description. No description, no drawing can provide an adequate image of Paris—one must see it; one must experience the corresponding feeling. [...] 2-0. Intuition is the grasping of particular features, the discovery of meaning in a multitude of dispersed facts, their synthesis, their proper configuration." (Dawid 1914, 5; my translation.)
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An intriguing perspective on the epistemic order between merely conceptual and objectual thinking, within the framework of perceptual and imaginative experience, is presented by Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Worth emphasizing as a significant point of the present deliberations is the fact that Twardowski did not employ Husserl's method of eidetic reduction. Naturally, there was a certain shared analytical concern (especially in relation to topics from the period of the Logical Investigations), yet Twardowski's approach was more centered on the logical analysis of the structure of acts.
4. Blaustein: Legacy and the synthetic richness of thought
Blaustein, albeit a philosopher who openly engages with the thought of scholars from his immediate intellectual milieu, nonetheless demonstrates philosophical independence. As a continuator of their thought, he develops their concepts further on his own terms. Let us now examine the fruits of these implications in his philosophy, bearing in mind the chosen epistemological context: reflections on the active conception of consciousness, the possibility of eidetic intuition, and the essential laws correlated therewith. In this section, I undertake a comparative analysis, establishing an internal polemic between the thought of Husserl and that of Blaustein.
Let us turn to Blaustein's perspective regarding Husserl's eidetic method. Before doing so, however, we shall consider his reading of the Husserlian conceptualization of consciousness. In his work "Husserlowska nauka o akcie, tresci i przedmiocie przedstawienia" ("The Husserlian Doctrine of Act, Content, and Object of Presentation"), the philosopher offers a thorough critique of Husserl's definitional understanding of consciousness, as formulated in Logical Investigations and, to a degree, in Ideas I. Blaustein disagrees with the German philosopher on several points, including, notably, that he considers it mistaken to classify sensory impressions as psychic experiences—the latter, in Blaustein's view, belong to the phenomenal world and are extra-conscious; only intentional acts qualify as psychic experiences. It is thus erroneous, Blaustein argues, to define consciousness as a "weave of psychic experiences," since sensory contents, not being psychic experiences, are not components of consciousness
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(instead, they are objects of transcendent and adequate perceptions). From the outset, Blaustein's conception of consciousness becomes apparent; it is simply a stream of psychic experiences, understood as intentional acts (with impressions excluded). As he writes in the doctoral work:
For if experiences are exclusively intentional acts, then consciousness, being their stream, comprises them as its real constituents, psychic and intentional acts, and remains in that specific relation to the "I," which Husserl names Ichlichkeit. This does not exclude the possibility that certain psychic processes, states, and the like may also be included within consciousness. (Blaustein 2013b, 193; my translation.)
As Witold Plotka observes in his monograph on Blaustein's philosophy, Leopold Blaustein i jego fenomenologia. Žrodla i konteksty (Leopold Blaustein and His Phenomenology: Sources and Contexts), the philosopher conceives phenomenology as a "descriptive psychology that employs the method of phenomenological reduction, which amounts to conceiving it as a descriptive eidetics of pure experiences of consciousness, grounded in eidetic intuition 199 (Wesensschau)" (Plotka 2021a, 55-56; my translation).7 Following Plotka's interpretation, and in the spirit of critical analysis, I shall present two stages in Blaustein's approach to the eidetic method.8 I will not analyze Blaustein's stance on the eidos or the essences of general objects themselves. It is worth
7	See also Plotka 2024.
8	Blaustein described Husserl's eidetic analysis in the following manner: "According to empiricism, he recognizes as the ultimate principle that every primordial intuition (originär gebende Anschauung) is the legitimate source of knowledge, and that everything, above all empirical data, should be accepted as given to us and within the limits in which it is 'given' [...]. In opposition to the empiricists, Husserl maintains that, alongside individual empirical objects given in empirical intuition, there are also individual data given in eidetic intuition—essences of those individual objects. According to Husserl, each individual object is assigned, in his view, a certain eidos. He emphasizes that everything that belongs to the essence of a given individual may also belong to another individual. Any statements made about an individual object are, in a sense, accidental, whereas statements made about it, insofar as it possesses a particular essence, and not another, are necessarily a priori. As a consequence, Husserl postulates, alongside empirical sciences concerned with facts, a priori eidetic sciences." (2013a, 226; my translation.)
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noting, however, that Blaustein, in his radical repudiation of Husserl's general essences, fails to maintain full scholarly integrity, accusing Husserl of precisely that which the founder of phenomenology explicitly warns against in the Logical Investigations—namely, the hypostatization of ideas (see §7, Logical Investigations, Volume II, Part I). As Plotka rightly points out, Blaustein rejects Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction and moves toward conceiving phenomenology as descriptive psychology based on inductive generalization.
In his self-review entitled "Proba krytyczej oceny fenomenologii" ("An Attempt at a Critical Assessment of Phenomenology"; 28 April 1928), Blaustein articulates a position that echoes Roman Ingarden's doubts regarding the selection of features in the process of Wesensschau (eidetic intuition): why should certain features, rather than others, constitute the epistemic apprehension of general objects? Blaustein argues:
If this psychological interpretation is correct, then Wesensschau is something every person can and does experience. Yet, simultaneously, it becomes doubtful whether it can truly bear evidential value. Undoubtedly, intuition may successfully select certain features as essential from among those fulfilled by the presenting content, and its heuristic value must not be underestimated; however, one can never be certain of the correctness of this selection, nor can one strictly differentiate correct from incorrect choices. (Blaustein 1928, 164b-165a; my translation.)
This schematicity, as Blaustein argues elsewhere, hinges upon the problem of inadequacy in presentations, which he elaborates more fully in Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki (Imaginative Presentations. A Study on the Border of Psychology and Aesthetics). An inadequate presentation arises, when certain elements of the presenting content correspond to only some aspects of the intended object (Blaustein 1930, 57).9 We are thereby confronted with what may be called a simplified
9 At this point, it is worth mentioning Blaustein's concept of the dual-layered "world surrounding us," which possesses spatio-temporal qualities (e.g., distance relations, shapes, etc.). It consists of complexes of non-spatial impressions that are the objects of
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problem of the "partiality" of the object. A question immediately emerges: is the eidetic method truly concerned with apprehending the general through such means?
These doubts, however justified, must be confronted with a response grounded in the phenomenological method as devised by its founder. First and foremost, the Husserlian conception of consciousness must be revisited—the conception, which Blaustein critically engages with in his "Husserlowska nauka o akcie [...]," a work based on his doctoral dissertation supervised by Kazimierz Twardowski. This Husserlian exposition of consciousness, particularly as presented in Ideas I, offers a counterpoint to Blaustein's reservations. By assigning ontological primacy to consciousness performing the epoché, Husserl relativizes being to consciousness, which, after transcendental reduction, becomes so-called pure consciousness, a domain of individual being devoid of ontically (and ultimately epistemologically) transcendent content. In §49 of Ideas I, Husserl writes:
[...] consciousness considered in its "purity" must be held to be a self-	201
contained complex of being, a complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip, to which nothing is spatiotemporally external and which cannot be within any spatiotemporally complex, which cannot be affected by any physical thing and cannot exercise causation upon any physical thing—it being presupposed that causality has the normal sense of causality pertaining to Nature as a relationship of dependence between realities. (Husserl 1983, 112.)
immanent perceptions. The phenomenal world, given to us in adequate perceptions, consists of sensory contents of three-dimensional space—for example, sound or smell impressions—, which Blaustein refers to as presenting contents. As the philosopher writes, we never experience the entirety of this world, which appears to us fragmentarily and manifests itself in objects of presenting acts. The second layer of the surrounding world consists of material objects, which are spatial and, crucially, cannot be reduced to impressions. (2013b, 196). For Blaustein, presenting contents constitute the effective part of the act; while adopting Husserl's notion of the intentional, transcendent object, he also emphasizes the turning of the act toward that object. A problematic and pressing issue, which Blaustein never fully resolved, is the category of spatiality—how that which is spatial is composed of non-spatial impressions (Plotka 2021a, 124-125).
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The entire surrounding world, situated in time and space, the knowing subject and its "human I," all constitute merely "intentional" beings—entities dependent entirely on the constitutive accomplishments of pure consciousness. As Husserl further notes, this world is given in intuition "only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appearances: beyond that it is nothing" (Husserl 1983, 112). Witold Plotka, in his book Fenomenologia jako filozofia mniejsza. Rozwazania wokol sporow o metodg Husserla (Phenomenology as the Lesser Philosophy. Reflections on Husserlian Methodological Debates), draws attention in the chapter entitled "The Transcendental Turn and the Absolute of Consciousness" to an aspect crucial for our discussion: the constitutive activity of pure, absolute consciousness. The problem Blaustein identifies—namely, the proper selection of features constituting the general object—must, considering the phenomenological conception, shift its weight from the ontological-objective domain to the subjective domain. The mutual correlation of consciousness (its object-directedness aimed at the constitution of meaning) and being cannot lead to their reduction to one another, as they 202 differ fundamentally in their modes of givenness. Plotka's words aptly capture our reflections:
While the object itself can never be given in its entirety hic et nunc, the modes of its givenness—cogitationes—are presented absolutely. Here, absoluteness equates to certainty, and thus to the indubitable status of the apprehended object—or, more precisely, the subject. (Plotka 2019, 111; my translation.)
On the one hand, we face the imperfect objective world and, on the other hand, the absolute consciousness, whose processes are indubitable, and which constitutes "the condition of all reality" (Plotka 2019, 111; Husserl 2003, 20).
The aforementioned constitutes one argument concerning the selection of features forming the eidos, not as an empirical being of the material world (from which we must, according to Husserl, withdraw our naive gaze), but rather, through aiming at Husserlian transcendentalism, as something given in intuitive, intentional insight into essence. A further argument moderating the issue lies in Husserl's assertion that this source-giving consciousness, enabling the apprehension of essence, does not act spontaneously, but as a
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"contemplating" consciousness that develops this capacity through a form of training. As he writes in §69 of Ideas I, "The Method of Perfectly Clear Seizing Upon Essences," the apprehension of the essence is gradual and procedural. He states:
The intuitions of single particulars serving the seizing upon essences may be already clear to an extent which allows for acquiring an essentially universal moment which, however, does not extend as far as the guiding intention; clarity is lacking on the side pertaining to more detailed determinations of the essences combined with (what had been attained), consequently there is a need to bring the exemplificatory single particulars nearer or to provide anew more suitable ones in which the confusedly and obscurely single traits intended to stand out and, consequently, can become given with maximum clarity. (Husserl 1983, 156-157.)
Thus, a methodological aspect arises here—we can use previously established results of conducted eidetic intuitions (Wesensschau) for the 203 purposes of current clarifications. Husserl is aware, therefore, that the tools he proposes for grasping the eidos require a particular kind of skill.
Let us now turn to another claim by Blaustein, which he made in his self-review. The philosopher believes that the outcomes of Wesensschau are a kind of schematic representations (Blaustein 1928, 164b). This raises the question of how one should understand this schematicity. Of course, the creator of phenomenology himself provides a certain "recipe" for arriving at the eidos, but have Blaustein's assumptions about the schematic nature of the eidetic method not been undermined by the foregoing argument? Acts that originally present essences, which are not real objects, but rather a kind of synthesis of apprehensions given in the process of variation, are not acts of sensory perception (although Husserl, in his 1925 summer semester lectures titled Einleitung in die phänomenologische Psychologie, emphasized that the process of operative variation is rooted in the experience of the surrounding world). As Witold Plotka writes about imaginative variation in his already cited work, "'seeing' is a mental operation that consists in forming an open multiplicity of variants, which take a given experience as a model and free themselves from
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empirical determinations in pure fantasy" (Plotka 2021a, 70; my translation). Therefore, "seeing" does not mean optical seeing, but rather aims at immediacy (Plotka 2021b, 262), aprioricity, and the self-presence of that which appears "before our eyes" as a "synthetic unity" devoid of metaphysical interpretation— the process of variation indicates that the eidos is not an immutable being existing in a transcendent world of ideas, as Plato thought (Plotka 2021a, 69). In any case, Blaustein's statements about the procedural nature of Wesensschau simplify the interpretation Husserl gives in his explanations of the method, if not outright transform it.
In the next step, let us briefly refer to Kazimierz Twardowski, a scholar who had a tremendous impact on Blaustein's philosophical path. Twardowski did not use the eidetic method, but instead worked within the tradition of analytical philosophy. What connects our topic in this study is the approach to the constitution of concepts and the founder of the Lvov- Warsaw School's stance on the constitution of objects in consciousness, which Twardowski understood as a set of acts (not contents), as has already been explicated earlier 204 (Wolenski 1986, 35).
Husserl, as a proponent of the presuppositionless method, believed that concepts (descriptive method) are the result and aim of the researcher, and therefore do not precede the phenomenological insight into essences (see the earlier citation from Cartesian Meditations). In contrast, both Twardowski and Blaustein disagreed with Husserl's notion that philosophical reading is unnecessary. In "O naocznosci jako wlasciwosci niektorych przedstawien" ("On Directness as a Property of Certain Representations"), Blaustein explains:
Someone might object that we commit a circulus vitiosus by presupposing a priori that certain types of representations are direct [...]. This objection, however, is not valid. For we are not examining which types of representations are direct, but rather, assuming that at least some of them are definitely direct, we attempt to determine what this directness consists in. (Rosinska 2005, 24; my translation.)
Later in the text, Blaustein—as a supporter of descriptive psychology (who treats phenomenology in the same way, eliminating essential investigations from it)—explains that accepting some representations as direct is based
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on trusting the scientific achievements of psychologists, not on an arbitrary judgment of the knowing subject. Our knowledge, based on aesthetic experience (based on representation or being a representation itself), also refers to this conviction (Rosinska 2005, 25). It is difficult to place such a view within Husserl's phenomenological thought, although Blaustein, in a spirit more closely aligned with it, argues that it is through intuition that we can grasp the essence of a given object. Such knowledge, once established, is expressed conceptually. As Zofia Rosinska writes, Blaustein "attaches great importance to the analysis of concepts and then to their consistent use in the meanings assigned to them" (Rosinska 2005, XVIII).
Let us note, however, a certain polemic with Husserl's reflections as presented in Ideas I: "Prejudices make people remarkably easy to satisfy with respect to theories. [...] psychology, so proud of being empirical, is enriched here, as in all intentional spheres [...] with invented phenomena, with psychological analyses which are no analyses at all" (Husserl 1983, 4142). Husserl's arguments in the further part of this passage are based on the conviction that the error of "psychological" thinking is the identification of 205 pure essences with concepts, which are "creations of thought." Thus, Husserl asks, in the context of numbers: "But are not cardinal numbers [...] what they are regardless of whether we 'form' them or not form them?" (Husserl 1983, 42). If we return to Blaustein's ideas, it can be said that his focus on Twardowski and Brentano, according to Plotka centered on the method of analysis and description of psychic phenomena, blocked him from the method of variation leading to the "irreal" grasping of eidos—he was unable to recognize that irreality described by Husserl,10 which may also be a result of failing to recognize the difference between the phenomenological (essential) content of an act and its lived (effective) side. Plotka writes: "[...] when he follows Twardowski and combats Brentano's psychologism, pointing to the radical transcendence of the intentional object over the act, he does not
10 Edmund Husserl writes: "We call real in a specific sense all that which, in real things in the broader sense, is, according to its sense, essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position; but we call irreal every determination which, indeed, is founded with regard to its spatiotemporal appearance in a specifically real thing but which can appear in different realities as identical [...]." (Husserl 1973, 265-266.)
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identify this thesis as an eidetic law, but rather as a descriptive one" (Plotka 2021a, 128; my translation).
This again outlines a key aspect of "seeing"; this work has already discussed the phenomenological intuition of essence at length. With regard to Kazimierz Twardowski and his concept of consciousness, it is worth emphasizing that he, while criticizing ontological psychologism for conflating mental products and acts, nevertheless sided with methodological psychologism as an important attempt to overcome Brentano's psychologism and its mental in-existence of the object in consciousness, including the reduction of objects of consciousness to mental entities and the identification of concepts with their designata. Thus, Blaustein's mentor carried out an analysis of acts of consciousness in terms of acts, products, concepts, and objects: "[...] psychic products can have properties whose relations can be determined a priori, that is, independently of the results of psychology [...]. [.] in general, we learn about the existence of psychic products through internal experience and inferences drawn from it." (Wolenski 1985, 40; Wolenski 1986, 6.) It is worth noting that Twardowski's reflections were closer to Husserl's static 206 phenomenology. He did not use eidetic analysis, but he sought a reliable description of the structures of consciousness, which can be seen as an attempt to describe its "pure" forms; he also conducted semantic analyses in this respect (Wolenski 1986, 7; Husserl 1983, 41-42). Blaustein, on the other hand, more inclined toward the genetic variant of phenomenology, combined Twardowski's search for "pure" structures of consciousness during the analysis of the constitution and perception/ mode of appearance of the aesthetic object with the aspect of active, temporal consciousness. And it is this latter aspect that we shall turn to in the following reflections.11 In his lecture delivered at the Third Polish Philosophical Congress in Krakow in 1936 and entitled "Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym" ("The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience"),12 Blaustein writes:
11	In this work, we will not discuss in further detail Blaustein's criticism of Twardowski's concept in terms of his division of representations into images and concepts. It is worth mentioning that Blaustein followed his teacher's distinction between the act, content, and object of presentation. However, he considered his theory of the division of presentations to be underdeveloped in terms of the clarity of the chosen division criterion (Plotka 2021a, 138-139).
12	An interesting perspective on the genesis of Blaustein's philosophical reflections in the context of aesthetic considerations can be found in Plotka's article entitled "On
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Perception and the emotions associated with it are essential components of aesthetic experience [...]. The main types of perception result from differences in their course and the differences in their experiential structure [...]. The perception that forms part of the aesthetic experience may be—regarding its course—a momentary experience or a prolonged process. (Rosinska 2005, 136; my translation.)
What particularly interests us here is the aspect of the active subject of perception. This initially sounds somewhat paradoxical, since perception is, for the philosopher, an act grasping wholly adequate representations and a form of intuitive presentations. Thus, insofar as it refers to currently experienced objects of presentation, it would have a passive character. However, Blaustein does not deny the aesthetic experience an active character on the part of the perceptual-subjective domain. The philosopher points to the temporal aspect of the intentional aesthetic experience. One must also consider the nature of the work, with which we are dealing—whether we are experiencing so-called dynamic works of art (e.g., film) or their static variants (e.g., painting).
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This subjective activity is based on the possible multiaspectuality of attitudes during the process of constituting the aesthetic object. On the other hand, the temporal span of the experience reveals its passive character (Plotka 2021a, 155-156). At this point, a comparison with Husserl's concept of passive genesis of activity, described in the Cartesian Meditations, is unavoidable. Here too, this passivity should not be taken as a kind of constitution in its merely passive form. It is rather an expression of activity, in the sense of conscious givenness. A given object, despite its initial givenness a priori—within the synthesis of passivity—presents itself in the various modes of consciousness each time as a case of active grasping. Its particular properties, components, etc., may be subject to change—through explicative acts. "While these [active syntheses; M. G.] are making their synthetic products, the passive synthesis that supplies all their 'material' still goes on," writes Husserl in the Meditations, thus emphasizing the fundamentally active nature of both syntheses (Husserl
Two Themes in Leopold Blaustein's Aesthetics" (2022). The author advances the thesis that the sources of Blaustein's phenomenological thought are to be found not so much in Husserl himself as in Twardowski and Brentano.
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1960, 78). In this sense, what is passive is not inert, but rather foundational. After all, Husserl wrote that the ego is not determined by itself, but only within the limits of its own potentiality: "I can always do so again" (Husserl 1960, 60-61), and thus it defines itself only in an evident relation to what it knows or can know, and also, thanks to habituality related to intentional acts, to what it already knows and retains as its "permanent possession." In paragraph 33 of the Cartesian Meditations, where the concrete I as monad and the problem of its self-constitution are expounded, Husserl defines the concreteness of the ego through its assimilation of objects as existing via acts of positing or taking a stance, where this existence is correlated with the enduring possession of the ego. This enduring possession of the I—the I as "the pole of its permanent determinations"—is precisely that habituality, by virtue of which what is presumed attains, for the ego, the status of something that endures (Husserl 1960, 67-68, 72-73; Gilicka 2020, 440).
If we again return to Blaustein, the presenting content given in aesthetic experience may be grasped differently depending on the subject's attitude, 208 which also determines the existential status of the aesthetic object. The latter may consist of several of its "correlated" variations (e.g., the events of a film's plot may be perceived as quasi-real or as genuinely real hic et nunc). Thus, it must be noted that the passive and active spheres, as in Husserl, interpenetrate, with aesthetic experience beginning from passive perception, which serves as a basis for further acts of constitution. This aspect is also emphasized by Aleksander Serafin in his work "Fenomen w architekturze: wobec dykusji na temat architektury fenomenologicznej" ("Phenomenon in Architecture: On the Debate about Phenomenological Architecture"), when, referring to Blaustein's concept, he draws attention to the active role of the experiencing subject during the constitution of the aesthetic object and the crucial character of the perceptual process in this context (Plotka 2014, 523).
A dependency of this kind is also found in Husserl's thought, particularly in his concept of passive genesis, which provides the objectual repeatability, by virtue of which we may delve even deeper into explicative understanding of the "phenomena" accessible to us in intentional, spontaneous acts (Husserl 1960, 79-80). A similar issue regarding active and passive synthesis was also discussed by Thomas M. Seebohm (1934-2014). He wrote:
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The question now is how intentionality, which presupposes active synthesis, relates to intentionality that is passive synthesis. First and foremost, it should be emphasized that all acts of imagination, in which experiences are presented, refer to something that is not originally given in the phase of the present. Thus, they transcend this field and its "immanent" spatiality. (Seebohm 1994, 81; my translation.)
However, the question of how the subject in aesthetic consciousness grasps Gestalt qualities, in order to constitute the aesthetic object, cannot be fully explicated in this paper. In any case, the conceptualization of perception and of the modes of givenness of artworks developed by Blaustein demonstrates phenomenological tendencies, although it is difficult to classify it as strictly phenomenological.
5. Recapitulation
Let us commence our conclusion with an attempt to situate Blaustein's concept within the framework of research characteristic of Husserl's eidetic 209 method and, more broadly, phenomenology. Asking what may have motivated Blaustein to raise certain objections to Husserl (without focusing on personal issues), or thereby suggesting that Husserl's thought was distorted, we should pay attention to the autonomy of Blaustein's philosophical reflection and his selective appropriation of terms and themes from "the phenomenological bag" that aligned with his own perspective on the analysis of the modes of givenness or appearance of objects in intentional consciousness. Indeed, a difficulty arises from a certain rigidity in the thought of the phenomenologist, who seemed to overlook Husserl's evolving conception of consciousness, intentionality, and even the category of transcendence, which, starting from the Logical Investigations (where the intentional object is understood as transcendent) and continuing through Husserl's later works, reveals a changing context that explains the notion of constitutive intentional consciousness.
Had Blaustein moved away from interpreting the key categories central to this article strictly within the framework of the Logical Investigations, focusing not merely on terminological changes (Plotka 2021a, 122), he might have recognized an essential shift in Husserl's understanding of intentionality
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(including the theory of intentional content). This might have led him to attempt to situate the noema within the structure of the intentional relation, since he clearly acknowledged this issue in "Husserlowska nauka o akcie, tresci i przedmiocie przedstawienia," where he wrote:
Above all, the relation of the noema to the intentional object as such is unclear. Although everything suggests they are identical, doubts arise from the fact that, according to the Logical Investigations, the intentional object as such is identical with the real object, whereas the noema, as something ideal, is distinct from the real object. (2013b, 211; my translation.)
We now turn to the next thread of this paper where, for Husserl, concepts, taken as pure ideas, as meanings, are secondary expressions of the constitutive acts of consciousness. Their emergence must always be grounded in an eidos— something that undoubtedly appears in intuition, something necessarily characterized by a certain kind of givenness in the strictest sense of the word. Husserl's view requires that concepts be just as ideal and pure as the general entities, which serve as their eidetic archetypes. In Blaustein, we observed the opposite relation—he calls for a trust in the concepts themselves. The Polish philosopher consistently distances himself from essential and eidetic analyses, offering a critique of the categories of intentional essence and meaning essence. Yet, at the same time he is clearly aware of the necessity of phenomenological inquiry into how intentional objects appear in consciousness and the search for a foundation for the legitimacy of knowledge.
The objections presented in this paper from Blaustein, as well as the attempt to counter them, particularly regarding the feasibility and validity of conducting imaginative variation, using Husserl's own arguments, further emphasize the need to complement Blaustein's thought with essential analyses of consciousness. It is also important to note also that the texts used to rebut Blaustein's criticisms are from beyond the period of the Logical Investigations. Nevertheless, this does not contradict the assumption made at the outset: that both the founder of phenomenology and Blaustein developed their own conceptions of active consciousness, each attempting to draw from givenness that which is pre-given in variability and the multiplicity of modes
Magdalena Gilicka
of appearance, while simultaneously drawing upon its own intentional
resources.
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Plotka, Witold. 2019. Fenomenologia jako filozofia mniejsza. Rozwazania wokói sporów o metodg Husserla. Warszawa: Liberi Libri.
---. 2021a. Leopold Blaustein i jego fenomenologia. Zródia i konteksty. Warszawa: Wydawcnictwo IFiS PAN.
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---. 2022. "On Two Themes in Leopold Blaustein's Aesthetics." Filozofia Nauki 30 (2): 141-157. DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2022.002.
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Pokropski, Marek. 2015. "Leopold Blaustein's Critique of Husserl's Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content." Studia Phaenomenologica 15: 93-103.
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Rosiñska, Zofia (ed.). 2005. Leopold Blaustein. Wybórpism estetycznych. Kraków: Universitas.
Seebohm, Thomas Mulvany. 1994. "Intentionälitat und passive Synthesis. Gedanken zu einer nichttranszendentalen Konzeption von Intentionälitat." In Husserl in Halle. Spurensuche im Anfang der Phänomenologie, ed. by H.-M. Gerlach and H. R. Sepp. Frankfurt am Main—Berlin—Bern—New York—Paris—Wien: Peter Lang.
Serafin, Aleksander. 2014. "Fenomen w architekturze: wobec dykusji na temat architektury fenomenologicznej." In Wprowadzenie do fenomenologii. Interpretacje, zastosowania, problemy. Vol. 1, ed. by W. Plotka, 519-535. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.
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Strozewski, Wladyslaw. 2013. Logos, wartosc, miiosc. Krakow: Wydawnictwo ZNAK. Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1898. Wyobrazenia i pojgcia. Lwow: W komisie Ksi^garni H.
Altenberga; Drukarnia Zakladu Nar. im. Ossolinskich. Wolenski, Jan. 1985. Filozoficzna szkoia Iwowsko-warszawska. Warszawa: Panst. Wydaw. Naukowe
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Original scientific paper Izvirni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.9 UDC: 165.62:1
Blaustein's Phenomenological Psychology
Between Husserl and Stumpf
Filip Borek
University of Warsaw, Doctoral School of Humanities, Krakowskie Przedmiescie 26/28, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland | Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Patkova 2137/5, 182 00 Praha 8 - Liben, Czech Republic
filip.wojciech.borek@gmail.com
Abstract
The article explores the idea of psychology and phenomenology in Blaustein's writings as well as its relation to two conceptions of phenomenology: Husserl's and Stumpf's, respectively. The article is divided into five sections. In section 1, a historical background of the reception of Husserl's and Stumpf's ideas in Blaustein is discussed. Section 2 concerns the conception of phenomenology in Husserl and in Stumpf regarding its subject matter. Section 3 discusses the ambivalent status of
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phenomenology in Blaustein's theoretical project. Section 4 confronts Blaustein's understanding of phenomenology with that of Husserl and of Stumpf. Section 5 summarizes the discussion of the similarities and differences between Blaustein, on the one hand, and Husserl and Stumpf, on the other hand. I argue that with regard to the question of the subject matter of phenomenology, Blaustein is closer to Husserl's phenomenology rather than Stumpf's.
Keywords: phenomenal world, phenomenology, hyletics, psychology, Blaustein, Husserl, Stumpf.
Blausteinova fenomenološka psihologija. Med Husserlom in Stumpfom
Povzetek
Članek raziskuje idejo psihologije in fenomenologije v Blausteinovih spisih ter njen odnos do dveh koncepcij fenomenologije: tako do Husserlove kot do Stumpfove. Prispevek sestavlja pet razdelkov. Razdelek 1 obravnava zgodovinsko ozadje recepcije 216 Husserlovih in Stumpfovih idej pri Blausteinu. Razdelek 2 se ukvarja s koncepcijo fenomenologije pri Husserlu in pri Stumpfu glede na njeno predmetno vsebino. Razdelek 3 je posvečen ambivalentnemu statusu fenomenologije znotraj Blausteinovega teoretskega projekta. Razdelek 4 sooča Blausteinovo razumevanje fenomenologije s Husserlovo in s Stumpfovo koncepcijo. Razdelek 5 povzame obravnavo podobnosti in razlik med Blausteinom, na eni strani, ter Husserlom in Stumpfom, na drugi strani. Zagovarjam stališče, da je z vidika vprašanja o predmetni vsebini fenomenologije Blaustein bližji Husserlu kakor Stumpfu.
Ključne besede: fenomenski svet, fenomenologija, hiletika, psihologija, Blaustein, Husserl, Stumpf.
Filip Borek
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to situate Leopold Blaustein's philosophy in the context of Edmund Husserl's and Carl Stumpf's writings. This task is important for historical and systematic reasons. First of all, Blaustein visited Husserl in 1925 in Freiburg im Breisgau, and participated in his seminars and lectures there. Blaustein also devoted his doctoral dissertation (as well as several papers) to Husserl's philosophy. In 1927/28, Blaustein received a fellowship in Berlin, where he attended, among others, Stumpf's courses.1 These historical connections require a detailed commentary on how Blaustein comprehended both Stumpf's and Husserl's theories, especially their conceptions of phenomenology and its proper subject matter.
From a systematic point of view, there is the issue of how to classify Blaustein's philosophy. Some scholars define Blaustein's philosophy as a form of "analytic phenomenology," comprising the method of phenomenological description and logical analysis,2 while others interpret Blaustein's project simply as a mere reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology.3 However, the very 217 claim that Blaustein was a phenomenologist is not self-evident. Furthermore, while the Husserlian background in Blaustein's thought is well-explored in the scholarly literature on Blaustein,4 the connection with Stumpf in this regard is almost entirely neglected. Recently, Witold Plotka argued convincingly in
1	For a more detailed overview of Blaustein's biography, see Plotka 2024.
2	Cf.: Wolenski 1989, 310 fn. 11; Pokropski 2015, 94. This suggestion is, however, strongly misleading, since "logical analysis" is rather marginal in Blaustein (Plotka 2024, 4).
3	Cf.: Rosinska 2005, xvii; Wieczorek 2006, 157-158; Smith 1994, 157; van der Schaar 2015, 12. For an overview of different ways of classifying Blaustein's philosophy, see Plotka 2024.
4	Cf.: Rosinska 2005; Wieczorek 2006; Pokropski 2015; Gilicka 2015; Plotka 2021a, 2021b, 2024.
This work was supported by the National Science Center, Poland, as a part of the
SONATA BIS program (No. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108) within the research project on The
Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw
School and Early Phenomenology.
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favor of a more nuanced reading of Blaustein's project, claiming that it is an original synthesis of different trends in the psychology and philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries. Due to the complexity of all these theories, Plotka proposes to classify Blaustein's project as a "phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology" (Plotka 2024, 114) or "descriptive psychology with phenomenological background" (ibid., 294),5 emphasizing the embeddedness of Blaustein in the Brentanian tradition, and the necessity of psychological elements in Blaustein's project. Since both Husserl and Stumpf developed their own variants of phenomenology, a crucial question arises: is the "phenomenological background" in Blaustein's thought understood from a Husserlian point of view or is it closer to that of Stumpf?
This unwritten chapter in the scholarship on Blaustein—the only exception being Plotka's reading, which emphasizes the strong affinity between Blaustein and Stumpf—seems to be a symptom of a broader neglect regarding Stumpf's position in the context of Polish philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on the Lvov-Warsaw School. Stumpf was a 218 colleague of Twardowski, and the latter incorporated many elements of Stumpf's thought into his philosophy, referring to and commenting on Stumpf's texts during his seminars and lectures (Twardowski 1999, 22). Apart from Blaustein and Twardowski, there was a strong interest in Stumpf's philosophy among Twardowski's students, including Salomon Igel, Eugenia Ginsberg, Mieczyslaw Kreutz, and Stefan Baley (who worked together with Stumpf in Berlin on the psychology of music and acoustics). Thus far, this sub-current of psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw School has not received sufficient attention.6 In this regard, my further aim here is to fill this clear gap.
In order to address the question of the "phenomenological" in Blaustein's philosophy, first, I analyze the main points of the Husserl-Stumpf debate
5	For more on Blaustein's relation to phenomenology and psychological projects of his times, see Plotka 2020, 141-167; 2023, 372-390.
6	Although Stumpf is often mentioned as an important figure in the context of Twardowski's philosophy, there is no systematic study on the relationship between Stumpf and Twardowski or, more generally, between Stumpf and the Lvov-Warsaw School. For an overview of psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw School, see: Rzepa 1997, Citlak 2023.
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on the idea of phenomenology (section 2). Husserl criticized Stumpf's position, treating it as a parallel to his own hyletics. In his reply, Stumpf, who was enthusiastic about Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen, almost entirely rejects Husserl's transcendental project. Next, I present a sketch of Blaustein's phenomenological psychology (section 3). I focus exclusively on the subject matter of psychology and phenomenology, but without going into details regarding methodological issues. My task is to determine the main difficulties one can identify in delimiting the proper field of Blaustein's psychology. Furthermore, I attempt to determine the similarities and differences between Blaustein's approach, on the one hand, and Husserl's and Stumpf 's projects, on the other (section 4). The task of the last part of the present study is to examine the problem of who Blaustein is closer to—to Husserl or to Stumpf?
2. Phenomenology in Stumpf and Husserl
Stumpf supervised Husserl's Habilitationsschrift in Halle in 1886. In the winter semester of 1886/87, Husserl attended Stumpf's lectures on psychology (Stumpf 1999). He dedicated his Untersuchungen to Stumpf, and discussed in detail his theory of parts and wholes in the "Third Investigation." As Husserl's correspondence with Stumpf shows, they were close friends. However, despite their common philosophical roots, namely the philosophy of Franz Brentano, and some commonalities, especially to be found in the first edition of Untersuchungen, their philosophical projects are certainly divergent. In my overview of the Stumpf-Husserl debate on the nature of phenomenology and psychology, I focus on questions that are essential for understanding Blaustein's position regarding this debate.7 First, I focus on the idea of phenomenology, as it is presented by Husserl in his Untersuchungen, and its interpretation and assessment by Stumpf. Next, I discuss the idea of phenomenology in Stumpf's writings and its uniqueness in contrast to both psychology and Husserl's phenomenology (before and after Husserl's transcendental turn).
In Untersuchungen, Husserl introduces a new type of method and science, the purpose of which is to ground all other sciences, especially psychology
7 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Husserl and Stumpf, see especially: Rollinger 1999; Fisette 2015b.
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and logic. This new science is called phenomenology, and its aim is to investigate "the experiences of thinking and knowing" (Husserl 1970a, 166). As metaphysically "neutral research," it has,
[...] as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of human or animal experients in the phenomenal world that we posit as an empirical fact. (Ibid.)
220
Although this kind of research is essentially different from psychology as a natural science, in the first edition of Untersuchungen, Husserl still describes phenomenology in terms of "descriptive psychology," (ibid., 176) not abandoning this term until 1903.8 The very reason why Husserl ultimately avoids referring to his project as "psychology" is to distinguish it from genetic psychology as a form of causal-explanatory natural science.
The initial understanding of phenomenology as a kind of descriptive psychology becomes problematic not only on the methodological level, but also regarding the delimitation of the proper field under investigation in this new discipline. In the first edition of Untersuchungen, Husserl maintains that the proper phenomenological field consists exclusively of the "real (reell) content" of consciousness, excluding all "intentional content." Although Husserl finds it impossible to speak of the real content of acts without referring to the objects that are intended in these acts (ibid., 171), intentional objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) does not belong to the "narrow phenomenological sphere" (ibid., 174).9 Further, this phenomenological
8	Hua XXII, 206-208: "die Phänomenologie ist nicht ohne weiters als 'deskriptive Psychologie' zu bezeichnen." It is, however, worth remembering that Husserl himself maintained—after the transcendental turn—the possibility of so-called "phenomenological psychology."
9	It is worth noting that, in the second edition of Untersuchungen, Husserl
significantly expands the scope of phenomenology and describes it as "the theory of experiences in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real (reellen) or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them" (Husserl 1970b, 343). In this sense, phenomenology covers both the "objective" as well as "subjective" side of lived experience in their dissoluble correlation. On the question of delimiting
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sphere does not overlap with the sphere of psychic phenomena in Brentano's sense. For Brentano, the very fundament of the delimitation of the mental sphere is a distinction between psychic and physical phenomena. Husserl rejects this distinction and criticizes Brentano for ignoring several important differences concerning lived experiences (Husserl 1970b, 94-95). One of the most important insights that has an enormous significance for constructing the idea of phenomenology is the distinction between sensory contents or sensations and the objects that are intended through these contents. For Brentano, sensory contents (such as the sensation of red) are physical phenomena, and hence they do not belong to the subject matter of psychology. While for Brentano the act of sensing (das Empfinden) is different from "what is sensed" in it (das Empfundene), for Husserl the sensing itself and what is sensed coincide. As we will see later on, Husserl's account of sensation is challenged both by Stumpf and Blaustein.
Although Stumpf is sympathetic to the project of phenomenology as developed by Husserl in the first edition of Untersuchungen, and he recognizes the contribution of the latter not only to descriptive psychology, but also 221 to epistemology, ontology, and logic (Fisette 2015b, 322), he disagrees with Husserl with regard to his idea of replacing descriptive psychology with phenomenology. Stumpf's critique of Husserl's bias toward psychology aims at demonstrating that—although descriptive psychology indeed has priority over genetically oriented psychological research and could be pursued independently of the latter (Stumpf 1906, 25)—descriptive and genetic psychology are but two different approaches to the same subject matter. For this reason, Husserl's dissociation of descriptive psychology as a different field of investigation from genetic psychology is simply misleading. It is even more problematic, if one is aware of Stumpf's understanding of phenomenology as a discipline distinguished from both descriptive and any other kind of psychology. In this respect, there is an important difference between Stumpf and Husserl with regard to the idea of phenomenology. Stumpf's dissociation of phenomenology from psychology could be read also as a critique of the
the phenomenological field and the aporias, to which this initial understanding of phenomenology inevitably leads, see Zahavi 2017.
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second motive mentioned above that pushes Husserl to make a distinction between psychology and phenomenology.
What does Stumpf mean by phenomenology? Stumpf classifies phenomenology as a kind of analysis that investigates the "ultimate elements of sensory phenomena (sinnliche Erscheinungen)" (Stumpf 1910, 186).10 By "sensory phenomena," Stumpf understands contents of sensations (Inhalte der Sinnesempfindungen) such as sensory qualities (colors, tones, smells, etc.), their relations and spatiotemporal configurations (which are co-perceived in these qualities), and so-called sensory feelings (Gefühlsempfindungen), e.g., pain or bodily pleasure. The phenomena belong neither to the physical world of material objects (which fall under the umbrella of physics and are governed by causal relations)11 nor to psychic life. Thus, phenomenology itself belongs neither to the natural sciences nor to human sciences. Since the distinction between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften is a fundamental distinction that underlies the classification of sciences, phenomenology cannot be comprehended as a form of science in the proper 222 sense. It is rather—as Stumpf calls it—a "pre-science" (Vorwissenschaft) (Stumpf 1906, 39; Stumpf 2012, 270).12 The question of the distinctiveness of phenomenology, not only from natural sciences, but also from any kind of psychology, deserves a closer look, since it is also important in the context of Blaustein's philosophy.
In his treatise "Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen" (Stumpf 2018), Stumpf defends the view that psychology as a study of psychic acts is distinct from the study of sensory phenomena (in contrast to, e.g., Ernst Mach's phenomenalism). According to Stumpf, psychology is not necessarily phenomenon psychology, but it is possible also as a functional
10	In contrast to R. Brian Tracz, the English translator of "Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen" (Stumpf 2018), I render the German term "Erscheinung" as "phenomenon" instead of "appearance."
11	The idea that the subject matter of physics should be identified with sensory phenomena, which at that time was proposed, e.g., by Ernst Mach, was radically criticized by Stumpf, especially in Stumpf 1906.
12	This understanding of phenomenology as a "pre-science" (Vorwissenschaft) in Stumpf should be contrasted with the understanding of phenomenology as a "fundamental science" (Grundwissenschaft) in Husserl.
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psychology. As such, it is a study of the structural laws (Strukturgesetze) of psychic functions. The latter is the basic subject matter of psychology and is defined as acts (Akte), states (Zustände), or lived experiences (Erlebnisse). What is intended here is a group of such psychic acts—perceiving, noticing, imagining, judging, etc. Although phenomena and psychic functions are intermingled with each other and create a real unity, since functions "work" on phenomena, they are essentially heterogenous (Stumpf 2018, 10). Hence, sensory phenomena and the laws governing them are not the subject matter of psychological research.
Stumpf's argument in favor of dividing phenomenology and (functional) psychology is twofold:13 logical and, as we can put it, "empirical." First, no predicate from the sphere of sensory phenomena (the only exceptions are temporal determinations) may be transmitted into the sphere of psychic functions, and vice versa. It belongs to the essence of tone, for instance, that it has a specific intensity. Among these essential features, however, one cannot find the property of being heard. From this point of view, sensory phenomena without functions are logically possible (functions without phenomena are also 223 possible, though not without any content). Second, Stumpf shows that psychic functions and sensory phenomena can (they do not necessarily have to) vary independently from each other: a change or modification in sensory phenomena does not lead necessarily to any change in psychic functions; additionally, there can be a change of psychic attitude without a corresponding change in the content of sensory phenomena (ibid., 15). Therefore, there is no strict and absolute parallel between sensory phenomena and psychic functions—and, to reiterate, phenomenology cannot be confused with descriptive psychology.
Phenomenology and descriptive psychology in Stumpf's thought are a kind of research that strives to formulate general laws about its subject matter, i.e., sensory phenomena and psychic functions, respectively. Such general laws are obtained, not only by means of inductive reasoning, but first and foremost by means of the peculiar type of intuition that Stumpf calls, using Husserl's term, "Wesensschau." Notably, Stumpf's phenomenology and psychology
13 For a more detailed discussion of Stumpf's arguments and their impact on other philosophers and scientists, see especially Fisette 2016.
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contain some a priori cognitions and, hence, cannot be reduced to a mere Tatsachenwissenschaft;14 this topic, however, does not concern us here.
According to Stumpf, Husserl's early phenomenology, i.e., from the first edition of Untersuchungen, is but descriptive psychology, which in turn is a type of regional ontology (Stumpf 1939, 185). For Stumpf, Husserl's tendency to avoid the term "psychology" is a certain bias. Husserl changes his position in Ideen I. At the beginning of Ideen I, Husserl delimits the field of transcendental phenomenology by distinguishing it sharply from the field of psychology. The latter is defined by two features: it is an (1) empirical science (therefore a science of "matters of fact" in Hume's sense) of (2) real entities or processes. Stumpf disagrees with Husserl on this definition of psychology. According to Stumpf, psychology neither is nor ever was a science that wants to accumulate mere facts, nor does it proceed in a purely inductive manner. Psychology— since Aristotle—, besides inductive reasoning, can and must include "essential" or "structural laws" (ibid., 194). In this sense, descriptive psychology is or at least involves as its part a type of regional ontology. Hence, Husserl's notion of 224 psychology in Ideen I is too narrow.15
In Ideen I, Husserl refers explicitly to Stumpf's idea of phenomenology as follows:
Stumpf's phenomenology would correspond to what was determined above as hyletics, with the qualification that our determination of the latter is essentially conditioned in its methodological sense by the encompassing framework of transcendental phenomenology. On the other hand, the idea of hyletics carries over eo ipso from phenomenology to the terrain of an eidetic psychology which, on our construal, would suit the Stumpfian "phenomenology." (Husserl 2014, 171.)
14	The most detailed discussion of the question of a priori cognition is to be found in § 13 of Stumpf's posthumously published Erkenntnislehre (Stumpf 1939). For more on the problem of the intuition of essences in Stumpf and Husserl, see: De Santis 2011 and Pradelle 2015.
15	For Stumpf, the subject matter and aim of transcendental phenomenology, as it is presented in Ideen I, is no less confusing. For more on Stumpf's critique of Husserl's transcendental turn, see: Fisette 2015b and Rollinger 1999.
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Husserl conceives Stumpf's phenomenology as a counterpart of what he calls "hyletics" (Hyletik). Generally, hyletics is the study of the domain of sensations, insofar as they are material for intentional apprehensions and are distinct from them. Nonetheless, Stumpf's phenomenology as a pre-science of sensory phenomena could be regarded precisely only as a counterpart, and not as an equivalent of hyletics. Stumpf's phenomenology could only be a part of eidetic psychology (eidetische Psychologie), and not of transcendental phenomenology, although there is a parallel between them. Furthermore, Husserl's comparison is to some extent misleading and does not capture the original character of Stumpf's phenomenology. As Robin Rollinger correctly observes, for Stumpf the subject matter of phenomenology is identified with "contents of sensations," not with sensations themselves (which are the subject matter of psychology) (Rollinger 1999, 95). One has to take into account, as will be discussed below in section 4, that Husserl simply ignores such a difference. The parallelism between Stumpf's phenomenology and Husserl's hyletics is, therefore, strictly limited.
Stumpf and Husserl disagree on the proper subject matter of phenomenology. 225 Stumpf rejects Husserl's correlationism, which he understands as a form of "parallelism." According to Stumpf, if there is an unconditional parallelism between noesis and noema, if they always vary with one another, then it makes no sense to postulate different laws for the noetic and noematic sides of consciousness, respectively. The laws governing the noematic pole are, therefore, reducible to those of the noetics. Thus, it is impossible, according to Stumpf, to distinguish such phenomenology from functional psychology (Stumpf 1939, 195-196). In contrast to Husserl, Stumpf opts for a form of "interactionism," which is "more consistent with [his] critical realism" (Fisette 2015b, 352).16 For Stumpf, sensory phenomena are not a priori correlated with either possible or actual consciousness as a locus of their appearing. One
16 Stumpf calls himself a "critical realist" (Blaustein's letters to Twardowski, December 11, 1927) also in one of his conversations with Blaustein. However, one can argue that Stumpf's position—since it is close to that of Logische Untersuchungen, which, in turn, involve some sort of "proto-transcendentalism" (Zahavi 2017, 45)—also involves some "proto-transcendental" elements. Even if these issues are important, they are beyond the scope of my paper.
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can even claim, paraphrasing Stumpf's (critical) commentary on Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as "phenomenology without phenomena ' (Stumpf 1939, 192), that Stumpf's phenomenology is a "phenomenology without appearing."
3. Phenomenology and psychology according to Blaustein
Blaustein's philosophy is not easy to classify. Is it a form of descriptive psychology or rather a revised version of Husserl's phenomenology? Blaustein (1930a, 229-330) places himself explicitly in the Brentanian tradition, to which one can count Husserl, Twardowski, Stumpf (Blaustein calls these three philosophers "descendants of Brentano"; Plotka 2024, 134), and Meinong. The importance and continuity of Brentano's school are also stressed by Stumpf (Stumpf 2012, 254). Blaustein shares with other Brentanians at least two fundamental claims: philosophy is a rigorous science, and it is metaphysically neutral, which involves giving priority to describing (Beschreibung, Deskription) 226 over explaining (Erklärung) phenomena. For Blaustein, descriptive psychology or phenomenology should be, then, a descriptive and metaphysically neutral discipline. With these ideas in mind, one may ask: is Blaustein's philosophy a descriptive psychology in the sense of Brentano or rather descriptive psychology qua phenomenology in the sense of Husserl? Or maybe it is phenomenology in the sense of Husserl, but after the transcendental turn?
In the following, I discuss Blaustein's attempt to determine the field of descriptive psychology. I put emphasis on the elements that may be essential for its interpretation as a phenomenological psychology and that will enable us to see to what extent Blaustein is close to Husserl and Stumpf. I argue that Blaustein reads Stumpf's phenomenology as an eidetic-psychological counterpart of Husserl's hyletics and, in this sense, that Blaustein integrates Stumpf's phenomenology into a broader descriptive psychology.
In his reading of Husserl, Blaustein relies almost exclusively on Untersuchungen and Ideen I (Blaustein 2021 [1928], 186).17 Blaustein defines
17 In a review of the published version of Blaustein's doctoral thesis, Roman Ingarden claims that Blaustein ultimately even blurs the difference between Untersuchungen and Ideen (Ingarden 2013 [1929], 220).
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phenomenology as a "material eidetic discipline" (Blaustein 2013 [1930a], 227) that descriptively investigates "the essences of pure lived experiences" (ibid., 228) or "ideal essences of lived experiences of pure consciousness" (Blaustein 1928/29, 164b). However, such phenomenology, according to Blaustein, is not possible. Thus, Blaustein does not endorse the view that phenomenology is the "material eidetic science of the essences of pure lived experiences." For Blaustein it is rather possible only as an "empirical descriptive science of types (the lowest genera) of experiences of pure consciousness and not as a priori science of higher essences as ideal objects" (Blaustein 1928, 165b). What does phenomenology thus reinterpreted involve?
During the years 1928-1931, Blaustein was working on a complex and detailed "theory of presentations" (Plotka 2024, 28), although one may also note his talk on "different attitudes toward the surrounding world" given in 1926. The theory of presentations, which emerges specifically from the discussion of the relation between content, object, and acts of consciousness, is constructed within the framework of the Brentanian tradition. This theory 227 is even explicitly labeled by Blaustein as "a part of descriptive psychology [psychologia deskryptywna]" (Blaustein 1930b, 5 [2011, 209]). As such, this enterprise is psychological in nature and is close to Brentano's project and its methodological psychologism.18 Nevertheless, Blaustein's idea of psychology does not overlap with the psychology of Brentano. The topic that one may be tempted to establish as the distinctive mark of Blaustein's psychology in contrast to Brentano's work is the phenomenological character of the former.
If one is justified in classifying Blaustein's project as "phenomenological," what is, then, its proper phenomenon? For Blaustein, the field of psychology includes not only contents and acts of psychic life, but also objects. Therefore, Plotka suggests labeling this as "object-oriented psychology" (Plotka 2024, 135). The "objective" direction of research is, for instance, expressed in Blaustein's work on the experience of God in Christian Friedrich Hebbel's dramas, where Blaustein writes:
18 On the relation between Blaustein and Brentano, see Plotka 2024, 41 ff.
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This noematic investigation deepens that of the lived experiences themselves. Because it is precisely the way, in which the objective presents itself in the subjective, how God is reflected in the singular individuals, that justifies the differences between lived experiences of God. (Blaustein 1928, 2.)
228
This noematic orientation, which supplements noetic-functional research, could be treated as a genuine phenomenological account in Blaustein's psychology (Plotka 2024, 135). However, it is far from clear if the objects (even as noemata) can be included in Blaustein's descriptive psychology. This question is difficult, for Blaustein does not define the scope of descriptive psychology explicitly. The proper object of descriptive psychology in Blaustein's sense can only be inferred based on how Blaustein practices it.
In Przedstawienia imaginatywne (Imaginative Presentations; Blaustein 1930b), Blaustein focuses, not on the objects, but solely on the psychic acts with their moments, i.e., act-matter and act-quality (Blaustein explicitly uses Husserl's terminology here). Although Blaustein constantly refers to the objects intended in acts, they are not regarded as the genuine subject matter of his descriptive-psychological study. What is really at stake in such descriptions is not the object itself, but rather the act-matter, by which we are directed toward this or that object and in such-and-such a way (Blaustein 1930b, 7 [2011, 210]). Blaustein speaks in this context of the "object-oriented study of acts" (ibid., 25 [2011, 222-223]). This tendency in describing the act-matter (which is a dependent part of the whole psychic act alongside act-quality) stems from the methodological difficulties of describing the act-matter alone. Something analogous was expressed already in Husserl's Untersuchungen (Husserl 1970a, 171).19
The field of psychological research is, however, not limited to the study of acts (or functions in the sense of Stumpf). One of the main problems of Blaustein's theory of presentations is the question of the relation between presenting content and intentional object in terms of the adequacy or inadequacy of this relation. Presenting content (trescprezentujqca) is simply the content of
19 See Zahavi 2017, 43.
Filip Borek
sensations (play of colors, smells, etc.), through which we apprehend some objects (e.g., one apprehends red patches as an apple, etc.). The question of the relation between content and object should be taken into consideration alongside different attitudes (nastawienia) toward our surrounding world. The question of attitudes understood as "dispositions to certain psychic facts" with regard to their quality, content, and/or objects (Blaustein 1926/27, 192b) belongs to the domain of descriptive psychology as well (ibid., 193). The field of descriptive-psychological research should also be enriched by the question of different attitudes toward the surrounding world and the question of how the change of attitudes affects our experience of the world with regard to the relation between presenting content and intentional objects.
The problems that Blaustein has in mind here can be illustrated by appealing to his analysis of the experience of the cinemagoer, as described in his book Przyczynki do psychologji widza kinowego (Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer; Blaustein 1933). Blaustein's aim in this text is to analyze the phenomenon of watching movies in a cinema. When one watches a movie, what one "genuinely" sees are different shapes and colors on the movie screen 229 (Blaustein 1933, 7). However, one's attention is usually not directed toward these rapidly moving images (Blaustein calls them "phantoms"); what one really experiences are rather different things and persons that one apprehends through these images. This kind of perceiving (which Blaustein calls "imaginative presentation") of the characters on the screen has an imaginative object as its target-object, which is presented via the flux of different images (ibid., 10). Certainly, one can switch one's attention from the movie and focus on the play of colors and shapes on the screen, one can, further, apprehend these as some features of the processes in the material world, but one may also wonder to what extent the displayed figure resembles the object that is displayed on the screen. These differences in the relation between the presenting content and the object intended through it are to be found also in "regular" perception as well.
Blaustein distinguishes five types of attitude (although the list is not necessarily complete), which are different with regard to the "layers" (warstwy) of the surrounding world, and which are disclosed in this or that attitude; thus, he lists the following attitudes: (1) toward the uninterpreted phenomenal world
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(swiat zjawiskowy; the world of sensory contents); (2) toward the interpreted phenomenal world (the world of appearances; widoki, wyglqdy); (3) toward the material world (the world of three-dimensional bodies); (4) toward the physical world (the world of atoms, etc.); (5) toward the world of things in themselves.20 What is of importance here is neither the classification nor the exact character of these layers, but rather their "status." Are they treated by Blaustein as some kind of hypostasized levels of one, singular reality? Do they create a chain of, e.g., mimetic relations, each level being a copy of another one? As the text clearly states, this is not the case for Blaustein. He describes different attitudes in regard to their correlates, which are treated precisely only, insofar as they are intentional correlates of different attitudes (Blaustein 1926/27, 192b). Hence, the theory of attitudes, which is formulated by Blaustein only in nuce, does not interpret these layers in a metaphysical manner; therefore, it does not presuppose any thesis either about their factual existence or about their mode of existence.21 In my view—in contrast to Pokropski (2015, 97) or Wieczorek (2006, 161)—, Blaustein's descriptive psychology remains metaphysically 230 neutral.
The question of attitudes in Blaustein has its direct link to Stumpf. Blaustein holds that our natural and naive attitude is attitude no. 3, as listed above. Usually, we are intentionally directed toward three-dimensional things-substances, like chairs, trees, stones, etc. All other attitudes are artificial and adopted for concrete purposes. The same holds for attitudes toward the phenomenal world. Where do we encounter such attitudes? Blaustein's answer is of great importance here: the attitude toward the phenomenal world is adopted: (1) in psychology; (2) in phenomenology, in the sense of Stumpf; (3) in hyletics, in the sense of Husserl; (4) by impressionist painters (Blaustein 1926/27, 193a; Blaustein 2021 [1928], 187). However, Blaustein does not equate Stumpf's
20	Blaustein provides neither any example of such things, nor gives any further explication of this term. It is, however, probable that he took this notion in Kant's sense as a kind of limit-concept.
21	Blaustein (1930b, 10) claims that the problem of factual existence and mode of existence is rather an epistemological problem. In his dissertation on Husserl, he claims that the question of the existence of different layers of the surrounding world is the matter either for a "metaphysician" or for an "epistemologist" (Blaustein 2021, 290).
Filip Borek
phenomenology with Husserl's hyletics, but treats it only as an analogon, since the former could be treated solely as a hyletics in an eidetic-psychological sense. What distinguishes Stumpf's phenomenology from Husserl's transcendental hyletics is the method of epoche, which "excludes" consciousness from the whole empirical world (Blaustein 2013 [1930a], 230). This fragment is not only important, when it comes to Stumpf's influence on Blaustein alone, but also regarding the question of delimiting the proper field of descriptive psychology. Psychology also deals with the phenomenal world (which in Blaustein is treated as presenting content), and therefore includes what is precisely excluded as a subject matter in Stumpf's psychology. This rich concept of psychology seems to be close to Husserl's phenomenology.
4. Blaustein: A Husserlian or a Stumpfian?
As we have seen above, the issue of the Husserl-Blaustein relationship is well-discussed in the scholarly literature, whereas the question about Stumpf's position in Blaustein's psychology has not been properly discussed thus far. 231 According to Plotka, Stumpf had a strong impact on Blaustein's philosophy, wherein two topics are crucial: (1) the rejection of a purely a priori psychology as well as the emphasis put on the necessity of observations and experiments; and (2) the concept of the phenomenal world (Plotka 2024, 61). In the following, I focus only on the latter topic, and I argue that there is a clear affinity between Blaustein's and Stumpf's ideas regarding the phenomenal world. They both also used parallel terms: "swiat zjawiskowy" (Blaustein) and "Erscheinungswelf (Stumpf). Although the similarities are clear, Blaustein does not accept some of the consequences that arise with Stumpf's ideas.
Arguably, Blaustein coined the term "swiat zjawiskowy" as a translation of the German "Erscheinungswelt" a term that was used by Stumpf (2018, 87; also 1892, 478). This hypothesis is put forward by Plotka (2024, 59). Blaustein's concept of the phenomenal world undergoes an analogous de-subjectification, much as Stumpf's "Erscheinungswelf does when framed as the world of sensory phenomena. However, it is important to note that this de-subjectification is not taken in a strong metaphysical key, but in a descriptive key. The phenomenal world and its contents are not, as Husserl claims, really
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(reell) comprised of the structure of consciousness. They are instead on the "objective side" of consciousness; after all, they are given to consciousness, and are not in consciousness. The study of the phenomenal world is, hence, not the study of the immanent content of acts, but of something transcendent to consciousness, yet still given adequately.
Yet, it is not clear whether Blaustein shares Stumpf's idea that sensory phenomena are—at least logically—independent of psychic functions directed at them. For Stumpf, this logical independence and real independent variability should not be confused with its realness, since phenomena are real only as contents of functions, because the concept of reality (Wirklichkeit) stems precisely from the psychic sphere (Stumpf 2018, 87). In this respect, Stumpf follows Husserl's metaphysical neutrality, as discussed in Untersuchungen.22 The question is rather the following: could the phenomenal world be described without using the terms taken from the field of psychology in Stumpf's sense? Does the study of psychic functions enrich the insights developed by the study of the phenomenal world?
232 Though these questions cannot be easily solved in the case of Blaustein, it is evident that Blaustein treats the sensory phenomena as correlates of specific intentional functions and attitudes that delimit the horizon of the possible scope of these functions. The question that is decisive here is as follows: do the sensory phenomena vary parallelly to the changes in psychic functions or can they vary—at least to some extent—independently from each other? I do not think, however, that one is able to fully answer this question based on Blaustein's published writings. Nevertheless, Blaustein's concept of the phenomenal world displays many similarities with Stumpf's Erscheinungswelt as the proper object of his phenomenology: (1) it is given, not in consciousness, but for consciousness; (2) it cannot be a real part of Erlebnis, but is transcendent to it; (3) it is given adequately and evidently; (4) it is not what we are normally (both in everyday life as well as in sciences) directed to; (5) it is treated in a metaphysically neutral manner.
22 Stumpf explicitly refers to the "Appendix" to the sixth of the Logical Investigations and its § 8, where Husserl defines reality, not in terms of what is "external to consciousness," but in terms of what is "not merely putative" (Husserl 1970b, 348).
Filip Borek
Blaustein is well aware of Stumpf's distinctions—from his "Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen"—between phenomenon psychology and functional psychology (Stumpf 2018, 81).23 And thus, phenomenon psychology rejects any possibility of the direct givenness of psychic acts and treats only sensory phenomena as immediately given data, from which one can at last infer the acts; in turn, functional psychology claims that either some psychic acts or all psychic acts are immediately and directly given. Blaustein follows in the steps of Brentano, Twardowski, Husserl, and Stumpf, and adheres to the possibility and necessity of the study of directly given psychic acts. In this sense, Blaustein agrees with Stumpf, but, unlike the latter, does not postulate another discipline for the study of sensory phenomena. Therefore, Blaustein's descriptive psychology seems to encompass both functional and phenomenon psychology, without reducing phenomena to functions or vice versa. Blaustein does seem to include the phenomenal world in his psychology, and in this sense, he does not accept the classification of sciences (and pre-sciences) outlined by Stumpf and his dissociation of psychology and phenomenology. The question remains: could the phenomenal world be investigated only as a correlate or 233 content of different psychic functions or could it be an independent subject matter in itself for another type of study? Blaustein does not seem to de facto dissociate these two directions of psychological research. If it is de jure possible in his project, it can be answered only hypothetically. Based on Blaustein's writings, it seems more probable that the study of the phenomenal world has its only value in the face of the study of it within the context of psychological ("functional") issues and therefore, in this respect, Blaustein's philosophy is closer rather to Husserl than to Stumpf.
5. Conclusion
In my paper, I have discussed Plotka's characterization of Blaustein's project as "descriptive psychology with phenomenological background" or "phenomenological psychology." In section 2, I described the relationship between Husserl and Stumpf, with special emphasis on the question of the
23 For this distinction in Blaustein, see: Blaustein 1930b, 10 [2011, 212]; 1931, 181.
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subject matter of phenomenology and psychology. In section 3, in turn, I characterized the idea of phenomenology and psychology in Blaustein, highlighting ambiguities with regard to their subject matter. I put forward the hypothesis that this "phenomenological background" could be understood, not only in the sense of Husserl, but also in the sense of Stumpf's "Phänomenologie." As shown in section 4, Stumpf's idea of phenomenology— that is based on its delimitation from psychology—is not, however, what decides as to the phenomenological character of Blaustein's psychology. In this sense, phenomenology in Blaustein should be understood as rooted in Husserl rather than in Stumpf. Nevertheless, there are some ideas that connect Stumpf's phenomenology with Blaustein's project of descriptive psychology, like the concept of the phenomenal world. The idea of the phenomenal world treated as the content of sensations is the clearest connection between Blaustein and Stumpf. On the other hand, Blaustein presents a very broad notion of psychology, which includes the phenomenal world, but this idea is rejected in Stumpf's psychology. The proper significance of Stumpf for Blaustein 234 should not be sought after in his phenomenology itself, but rather in his general philosophical project that encompasses phenomenology, psychology, his theory of sciences, or his experimental research project. In this sense, Blaustein's descriptive psychology has much in common with Stumpf. However, all these methodological issues invite further research.
Ultimately, the question raised at the beginning of my article, whether Blaustein's project is closer to Husserl's or to Stumpf's phenomenology, turns out to be partly inadequate. Stumpf's phenomenology is a pre-science that aims at formulating general laws about the sensory contents and the relations between them, which is a domain of neutral study dissociated from psychology; the latter, in turn, is the study of the structural laws of psychic functions. Psychic functions are de facto related to sensory phenomena, and to some extent even "stem" from them and "operate" upon them; and yet these two disciplines and the laws they formulate are distinct and irreducible to each other. For Blaustein, sensory contents are distinct from psychic functions as well, and they do not belong to the psychic world either; and yet—unlike Stumpf—he treats such phenomenology or hyletics as a part of descriptive psychology, without falling into the error of psychologizing sensory contents. In other words,
Filip Borek
Blaustein's descriptive psychology encompasses functional psychology and phenomenology in the Stumpfian sense. Regarding its broadness, Blaustein's phenomenological descriptive psychology seems to be closer to Husserl's project of phenomenology.
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bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. ---. 1906. "Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften." In Abhandlungen der KöniglichPreußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1-94. Berlin: Verlag der Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften. ---. 1910. Philosophische Reden und Vorträge. Leipzig: Verlag von Johannes Ambrosius Barth.
---. 1939. Erkenntnislehre. Erster Band. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth. ---. 1999. "Syllabus for Psychology." In R. Rollinger, Husserl's Position in the School of
Brentano, 285-310. Dordrecht: Springer. ---. 2012. "Carl Stumpf: A Self-Portrait." Trans. by D. Trippett. In C. Stumpf, The
Origins of Music, 218-295. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ---. 2018. "Appearances and Psychic Functions." Trans. by R. B. Tracz. In The Sources of Husserl's "Ideas I", ed. by A. Staiti and E. Clarke, 81-114. Berlin—Boston: De Gruyter.
Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1999. On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy.
Ed. by J. L. Brandl and J. Wolenski. Amsterdam—Atlanta: Rodopi. Wieczorek, Krzysztof. 2006. "Leopolda Blausteina interpretacja swiata zjawiskowego."
Studia z Filozofii Polskiej 1: 151-163. Wolenski, Jan. 1989. Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers. Zahavi, Dan. 2017. Husserl's Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental
Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ---. 2021. "Applied Phenomenology: Why it is Safe to Ignore the Epoché." Continental Philosophy Review 54: 259-273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-019-09463-y.
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Original scientific paper Izvirni znanstveni članek
DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.10 UDC: 801.73:1
Blaustein's Humanistic Psychology in a Hermeneutical Key
Filip GotASZEWSKI
Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Dewajtis 5, 01-815 Warsaw, Poland
philipgolaszewski@gmail.com
Abstract
The article explores Blaustein's humanistic psychology as a form of hermeneutics. In particular, I analyze Blaustein's concept of "humanistic reality" (rzeczywistosc humanistyczna) and "experiential wholes of higher order" (catosci przezyciowe wyzszego rzçdu) in light of Dilthey's and Spranger's hermeneutical ideas, taking the methodological emphasis on understanding as the background of my analyses. I argue that Blaustein's approach to psychic life through cultural artefacts adapts a
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hermeneutic circle wherein individual human understanding and humanistic reality mutually constitute each other. In this respect, I discuss Blaustein's applications of this methodology in his accounts of Goethe's and Hebbel's literary works. Although Blaustein never explicitly employed hermeneutical terminology, his theoretical framework incorporates three key hermeneutical elements: methodological interpretation, literature as expression of inner life, and circular understanding between parts and wholes.
Keywords: humanistic psychology, interpretation, hermeneutic circle, hermeneutics, humanistic reality.
Blausteinova humanistična psihologija v hermenevtičnem ključu
Povzetek
Članek obravnava Blausteinovo humanistično psihologijo kot obliko hermenevtike. Posebej analiziram Blausteinovo pojmovanje »humanistične resničnosti« 240 (rzeczywistosc humanistyczna) in »izkustvenih celot višjega reda« (caiosciprzezyciowe wyzszego rzçdu) v luči Diltheyevih in Sprangerjevih hermenevtičnih idej, pri čemer si za temeljno ozadje analize jemljem njuno metodološko poudarjanje razumevanja. Zagovarjam mnenje, da Blaustein pri svojem pristopu k psihičnemu življenju s pomočjo kulturnih artefaktov privzema hermenevtični krog, znotraj katerega se individualno človekovo razumevanje in humanistična resničnost medsebojno konstituirata. Blausteinovo aplikacijo tovrstne metodologije obravnavam v kontekstu njegovih razmišljanj o Goethejevih in Hebblovih literarnih delih. Čeprav Blaustein hermenevtične terminologije nikdar ne uporablja na izrecen način, njegov teoretski okvir vsebuje tri ključne hermenevtične elemente: metodološko interpretacijo, literaturo kot izraz notranjega življenja in krožnost razumevanja delov in celote.
Ključne besede: humanistična psihologija, interpretacija, hermenevtični krog, hermenevtika, humanistična resničnost.
Filip Golaszewski
1. Introduction
The aim of the paper is to present a part of Leopold Blaustein's philosophy as a form of hermeneutics. By hermeneutics I understand, following Michael N. Forster and Kristin Gjesdal, "the theory of interpretation and understanding" (2019, 1). I will show that one of Blaustein's theories—called by him humanistic psychology—incorporates some topics that allows one to classify it as a theory of interpretation and understanding. Blaustein has often been characterized as a phenomenologist (Pokropski 2015), a psychologist (Czerkawski et al. 1998) or, more specifically, as a descriptive psychologist (Rzepa 1992; Citlak 2023; Plotka 2023); however, a classification of his work as hermeneutics is nearly unexplored in scholarly literature.1 By reading Blaustein in a hermeneutical key, then, my ambition is to understand his philosophy in a relatively unexplored field. Next, as I will argue in the following, Blaustein's approach may shed more light on some basic terms of hermeneutics, including the idea of interpretation itself. In order to show this, I will focus on Blaustein's theory of humanistic psychology, which not only emphasizes understanding as a 241 fundamental element of psychological investigations, but also postulates the
1 In this context, a noteworthy exemption is Zofia Rosinska who attempts to read Blaustein from a hermeneutical point of view. She writes: "There is a recognizable similarity to hermeneutics in Blaustein's attitude. This similarity manifests itself in the consciousness of adopted prejudices." (Rosinska 2013, 76.) For her, in Blaustein's aesthetic theory this type of consciousness plays a crucial role in the process of constituting the aesthetic object (Rosinska 2013, 79-80). Rosinska (2013, 76) states that consciousness of adopted prejudices represents an "attitude that is characteristic of the whole of" Blaustein's philosophy. Of course, following Istvan M. Feher, the idea of prejudice is indeed important for hermeneutical traditions, since "without prejudices in terms of pre-understanding and pre-judgments, there is no understanding at all" (Feher 2016, 383). I agree with Rosinska's standpoint; however, her analysis primarily focuses on Blaustein's psychology of cinemagoers and listening to the radio (Rosinska 2001, 62), which are absent in the present article.
This work was supported by the National Science Center, Poland, as a part of the SONATA BIS program within the research project (No. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108) on The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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use of interpretive methods in examining cultural artefacts, and, by claiming this, establishes a methodological framework that incorporates the logic of the hermeneutic circle.
In this study, I do not explore the historical context of Blaustein's connections with the hermeneutical tradition. Nonetheless, a few remarks can be helpful in this regard. Blaustein's humanistic psychology was significantly shaped by Wilhelm Dilthey's and Eduard Spranger's hermeneutical ideas.2 There is also another historical reason to juxtapose Blaustein's approach of humanistic psychology with these scholars. Blaustein met Spranger during the time he spent in Berlin in 1927/28 (Plotka 2024, 65). Spranger was Dilthey's student and a proponent of his teacher's theory of geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie. To reiterate, I do not consider here the historical issue of Blaustein's encounter with Spranger, however, it can be noted that this meeting was not without importance for further development of Blaustein's philosophy. One may hold that Blaustein merely outlined a theoretical framework of humanistic psychology, but never applied it in practice. This is Witold Plotka's point who writes:
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One can argue that Blaustein suspended the project he had discussed and left it in his writings as a mere research idea that was never developed; at best, it was applied in a limited scope, e.g., in regard to the cinema experience or to observing a theatre play. (Plotka 2024, 70.)
Plotka is right in holding that the idea of humanistic psychology was applied in a limited scope in Blaustein's work. However, even before the 1935
2 Terminological complexities arise regarding descriptive psychology, a term employed by both Brentano and Dilthey with distinct meanings, as Guillaume Fréchette (2020) notes. While Blaustein distinguishes between descriptive and humanistic psychology, employing the former in works like Imaginative Presentations (Blaustein 1930; Blaustein 2011), following Brentano's and Twardowski's approach, his 1935 work critically aligns Brentano's presentation-focused psychology with Wilhelm Wundt's investigations (Blaustein 1935, 48), positioning both outside the humanistic psychology's scope. The term "psychologia humanistyczna" is Polish translation of Spranger's "geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie," although Dilthey never employed this terminology (Blaustein 1935, 3). Effectively, Dilthey's descriptive psychology (in German: beschreibende Psychologie) corresponds to what Blaustein and Spranger term humanistic psychology. For more on the classification of Blaustein in the context of descriptive psychology, see: Plotka 2023, 2024.
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text on humanistic psychology was published, Blaustein wrote texts that can be interpreted (albeit with some reservations) in the key of humanistic psychology. Here, one may point out Blaustein's book, The Lived Experience of God in Hebbels Dramas (Blaustein 1929), and his essay "Goethe as a Psychologist" (Blaustein 1932). I will argue that these texts can be read in the key of Blaustein's humanistic psychology, and, as such, they also reveal the hermeneutical dimension of his philosophy.
Applying the term "hermeneutics" with regard to Blaustein's humanistic psychology may not seem self-evident, as he never employed this terminology. Nevertheless, I believe there are significant theoretical similarities between Blaustein's psychological project and hermeneutics. First and foremost, they both emphasize understanding as a key of their theories. Next, they underline the methodological idea of circular understanding that is spelled out as the hermeneutic circle. According to Jens Zimmermann, "the hermeneutic circle, the interpreting movement between a part and a whole, is intrinsic to human knowing" (2016, 473). Another point that connects both traditions is how literature is comprehended; namely, it is an expression of psychic life. I will 243 focus on these three topics, and, by exploring them, I attempt to address the question: what does it mean to characterize Blaustein as a hermeneutical scholar?
To do this end, in section 2, I examine his project of humanistic psychology by focusing on the key idea of humanistic reality (rzeczywistosc humanistyczna) and on the concept of experiential wholes of higher order (calosci przezyciowe wyzszego rzgdu) that constitute this reality. I argue that understanding humanistic reality invariably relates to understanding the individual human being, and vice versa; one can comprehend an individual person only in the context of humanistic reality itself. This connection introduces what can be called a kind of a hermeneutic circle in Blaustein's humanistic psychology. Next, in section 3, I analyze Blaustein's texts on Goethe and Hebbel in the key of humanistic psychology. I argue that Goethe's and Hebbel's works are read as manifestations of general psychological principles and experiences. In this context, Blaustein follows Dilthey and Spranger. Literature functions as the aesthetic materialization of inner life that can be elucidated through interpretive methodology. Furthermore, in section 4, I show that Blaustein's humanistic
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psychology can be considered as hermeneutics that not only corresponds with Dilthey's and Spranger's ideas, but also anticipates some points of Martin Heidegger's, Hans-Georg Gadamer's and Paul Ricoeur's projects. In conclusion, I indicate a potential extension of Blaustein's hermeneutics that goes beyond humanistic psychology and encompasses the narrative dimension explored by Ricoeur in his later writings.
2. Humanistic reality and the circle of meaning
It is helpful to define Blaustein's humanistic psychology with its subject matter, and contrast it with a non-humanistic approach. And thus, humanistic psychology examines the psychic life of human beings living in humanistic reality. This theory focuses on experiences emerging in correlation with parts of humanistic reality. By contrast, a non-humanistic psychology examines experiences apart from their relationship to humanistic reality. It focuses rather on physical, chemical, and quantitative features of experiences that are 244 comprehended as atomic entities, which do not emerge in relevant relations (Blaustein 1935, 56). Admittedly, both types of psychology examine the psychic life of human beings, but, as shown, account for it differently. The difference lies in taking into account or omitting what Blaustein called the humanistic reality. In what follows, I examine this concept on the basis of section 5 of Blaustein's "On the Tasks of Humanistic Psychology," and his 1933 talk entitled "On the Reality Examined by the Humanities" (see Blaustein 1935; 1935/37). Both texts present comparable approaches.
To begin with, for Blaustein (1935/37, 143a), the humanities refer to the same reality as natural sciences, but their perspectives are different. The humanities adopt an anthropocentric approach, and, by doing so, account for reality as constituted by human beings and grounded in historicity (Blaustein 1935/37, 143b; 1935, 44). Generally, objects in humanistic reality can be apprehended from three points of view (Blaustein 1935/37, 144a). First, the static point of view, which is classified as synchronic and non-temporal, and which consists in disconnecting parts from the processual whole. Second, the dynamic viewpoint, which is diachronic and perceives objects as interconnected temporal processes and parts of larger wholes. Finally, the typological point of
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view examines elements in relation to general types that describe them. In this context, Blaustein holds that while psychology commonly employs the static approach, the dynamic perspective is more adequate for the humanities. He comprehends static and typological approaches as supplementary methods, wherein the dynamic approach serves as the foundational methodology (Blaustein 1935/37, 144b). This emphasis on dynamism was rooted in the nature of the psychology's subject matter, i.e., the human psyche.
The manner, in which Blaustein conceives psychic life, can be traced back to the hermeneutical tradition. After all, Dilthey (1977, 31) characterizes the psychic as a dynamic nexus of inner experiences that appears in a constant flux. Similarly, Spranger (1980, 10) describes psychic life as a subjective nexus of experiences. Blaustein concurs with both accounts, but he distinctively argues that humanistic psychology approaches the psychic nexus indirectly, namely through experiential wholes of higher order that he understands as intentional products of human actions (Blaustein 1935, 48). Certainly, the term of "experiential wholes of higher order" is one of the key terms in Blaustein, although the term itself remains relatively vague.	245
Blaustein's account of humanistic reality can be understood in the framework of parts and wholes. After all, Blaustein characterizes psychic life as fundamentally relational: "Psychic life, being a natural psychological whole, is most closely linked with human behavior and, from a biological perspective, appears rather as a part than as a whole." (1935, 34.) Conversely, the humanistic approach treats psychic life itself as the experiential whole of higher order, within which one can distinguish partial experiential wholes of higher order, since experiential wholes "remain in close dependence on the entirety of a given individual's psychic life, of which they constitute a fragment" (Blaustein 1935, 56). At the same time, these wholes emerge from elementary experiences.3 As a result, Blaustein operates with a complex mereological view of humanistic reality; for him, humanistic reality is a whole of (partial) wholes, and these parts are parts of larger wholes. Certainly, this mutual relationship between psychic life and humanistic reality manifests itself through concrete
3 For Blaustein, "one can distinguish various elementary experiences within the psychological wholes" (1935, 39).
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human activities. Thus, human activities within humanistic reality represent manifestations of psychic life—specifically, these activities are founded on the experiential wholes of higher order that appear in the psychic flux. The activities, in turn, generate what Blaustein terms "products" (wytwory)— tangible and intangible outcomes of one's engagement with one's environment:
The human individual lives in the humanistic reality and relates to its components, to themselves and other people, to various groups of people, to various products and sets of products, as well as processes taking place on them, and to complexes of these processes. Against the background of this relation, experiential wholes of higher order appear in psychic life—namely experiences being the cause of existence of discussed products. (Blaustein 1935, 48.)
The significance of the products lies in their dual nature: they emerge from experiential wholes and constitute elements of humanistic reality, which, in turn, shapes one's psychic life. This circular relationship refers to the mutual 246 constitution of individual psychic life and collective humanistic reality through the mediated products. Given this foundational role of products in Blaustein's theory, the question how to classify products arises. Blaustein (1935/37, 143b) divides products into five distinct groups:
1.	utility objects (e.g., tools, buildings);
2.	meaningful products (e.g., poems, paintings, scientific terms, maps);
3.	products that serve to constitute aesthetic experience, but are without semantic role (e.g., musical pieces, mosaics);
4.	habits (traditional actions);
5.	state institutions and national structures.
Products can be connected within certain complexes that can be apprehended from specific points of view, forming, e.g., technology, literature, or religious rituals (Blaustein 1935/37, 144a). Furthermore, parts of humanistic reality encompass both individual human beings and groups of human beings; finally, there are products of their activity and groups of such products (Blaustein 1935/37, 143b).
One may note that Blaustein's account of humanistic reality—as constituted on the activity of human beings and products that emerge on this basis—adopts
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a kind of circularity connecting all the elements. For him, one approaches individual human beings as parts of humanistic reality. Next, the reality is composed of products that emerge with the relevant activity. At the same time, these products are necessary to understand human beings as such. To phrase it differently, products of humanistic reality constitute the basic term here, and all are essentially connected. As a result, one may argue that Blaustein adopts what can be called a kind of a hermeneutic circle that appears in understanding humanistic reality.
Also, the idea of interpretation, which is explored by Blaustein, connects him with hermeneutics. After all, his humanistic psychology applies methods of interpretation4 to humanistic reality. As is well known, Dilthey marks a methodological difference between natural sciences and the humanities. The former adopt the method of explanation, while the latter are based on interpretation. In hermeneutics, interpretation is the "process by which we intuit, behind signs given to our senses, that psychic reality of which it is the expression" (Dilthey 1972, 232). Thus, interpretation is the method that is primarily applied to study of cultural artefacts and texts, although Dilthey 247 (1972, 236-238) holds that it relates to all manifestations of human spirit
4 Blaustein writes: "Humanistic psychology should embrace methodological pluralism, utilizing any approach that can advance understanding of its subject matter. This includes introspective and retrospective description, psychological analysis, self-understanding and understanding of others and products of their activity, interpretive analysis of creative works, experimental research, behavioral observation, questionnaires, statistical analysis, and comparative methods. Both insight-based methods (einsichtige Methoden) and inductive approaches can serve humanistic psychology in fulfilling its mission of understanding human experience." (Blaustein 1935, 23; emphasis added.) Although Blaustein acknowledges that humanistic psychology employs various methods, he emphasizes that understanding is among the most important: "Given that humanistic psychology studies experiential wholes of higher order that are intentionally directed toward humanistic reality and its components, its methodology is naturally dominated by internal experience (introspection and retrospection), description and psychological analysis, and the understanding of oneself, others, and products of their activity." (Blaustein 1935, 23; emphasis added.) The concept of understanding emphasized in this passage refers to the act of interpreting humanistic reality as mediated through experiential wholes of higher order, such as cultural artefacts that are products of mental activity.
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(Geist).5 In turn, explanatory psychology uses the method of explanation, and therefore adapts the humanistic viewpoint (Dilthey 1977, 24, 120). While Spranger (1980, 34) shares these views, for Blaustein the situation is more nuanced. Blaustein holds that, while products emerge with individual psychic activity, they invariably contain traces of general psychic rules. By analyzing products, therefore, one also analyzes the psychic life that lies, so to speak, in the background. Generally, Blaustein uses this approach in his texts on Goethe and Hebbel that I will analyze in the following.
3. Personhood as a lived whole: From psychology to art, and back
To recapitulate, Blaustein's humanistic psychology postulates the use of the method of understanding in interpreting humanistic products, such as poems or novels, in order to shed light on general laws that govern psychic life.6 This methodological approach is exemplified in Blaustein's "Goethe as a Psychologist," where he examines Goethe's dramas and novels as humanistic 24Q products, and in The Lived Experience of God in Hebbel's Dramas, where Hebbel's dramatic works serve for studying specific kinds of experiences. Both texts account for art as a medium that enables one to access inner experience: Goethe's works reveal general psychological laws through poetic insights, while Hebbel's dramas represent the experience of God through fictional characters' activities. I claim that both Blaustein's texts can be read, though in a limited scope, as practical applications of the methods of humanistic
5	The concept of spirit is one of the key concepts in Dilthey's philosophy, although one can doubt, if it is defined clearly. As Rudolf Adam Makkreel states, this concept relates to the Hegelian idea of the objective spirit: "A productive nexus or system produces common products whose sense or value is taken for granted by its participants. By conceiving ofhistory as itself a productive nexus, Dilthey allows himself to reappropriate Hegel's concept of objective spirit. History produces its own objectifications which provide the basis for retrospective understanding." (Makkreel 2003, 497.)
6	According to Plotka, we can interpret "selected (cultural) artefacts as products of related mental phenomena" (Plotka 2024, 57). The term "products of mental phenomena" refers to Kazimierz Twardowski's distinction between psychic products and actions or functions (Twardowski 1965, 243-244). In this approach, psychic products are understood as results of mental activity. As Plotka suggests, based on Twardowski's distinction, we can consider cultural artefacts in Blaustein's philosophy as examples of psychic products.
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psychology. The examination of artistic products that are grounded in humanistic reality functions as a bridge to understanding inner experience. I think that this analytical approach reveals Blaustein's significant alignment with the hermeneutical tradition. He adopts the method of interpretation applied to literature, in order to reveal its hidden psychic traces. But, as we will see, Blaustein's approach to the role of the author's personhood differs from Dilthey's and Spranger's hermeneutics.
To begin with, both of Blaustein's texts seem to owe an intellectual debt to Dilthey and Spranger. In Poetry and Experience, Dilthey posits that vital forces manifest themselves through artistic imagination, arguing that Goethe's poetry emerges directly from lived experiences (Dilthey 1922, 179). Through poetic expression, each experience undergoes artistic transformation; as a result, the transformation creates a framework wherein individual life events assume universal form (see Dilthey 1922, 184, 196). These observations align with Dilthey's (1977, 105) assertion that biography constitutes "the most philosophical form of history," a thesis for which Goethe's work serves as the primary illustration in his essays on descriptive psychology. 249 Spranger interrogates Goethe's worldview by interpreting his philosophical perspectives through his poetic works, while emphasizing their unsystematic nature (Spranger 1933, 19-22). Blaustein's interpretation of Goethe's novels and dramas exemplifies Dilthey's thesis, articulated in Descriptive and Analytic Psychology, that access to personal psychic nexus emerges through understanding individual human development (Dilthey 1977, 87, 94). In his works, Goethe presents the general, dynamic psyche based on his own lived experience (Blaustein 1932, 350). According to Blaustein, Goethe's "own personality contained all kinds of psychic types, being unique, versatile, and rich" (Blaustein 1932, 363). A comparable idea is formulated by Spranger, for whom the source of Goethe's philosophical insights derives not from theoretical studies, but from the richness of his lived experience (Spranger 1933, 2).
In Blaustein's eyes, Goethe captures the psychological unity of the person through introspection and observation (Blaustein 1932, 350, 364). For him, Goethe portrays external human actions as a mirror that enables self-realization of one's mistakes (Blaustein 1932, 355). This observation points to the connection between inner life and human action, the latter being the
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manifestation of wrongly directed power. Blaustein claims that experiential wholes of higher order serve as tools, allowing us to redirect our psychic strength toward certain goals, and in this sense their role aligns with Alfred Adler's theory of power (Blaustein, 1935, 40).7 Blaustein reads Goethe's works—primarily his dramas and novels—as sources of penetrating psychological insights about the nature of human motives and actions. According to Plotka, "Goethe's writings were of interest for Blaustein as the basis of the psychological description of complex psychic structures—not because of Goethe's private life" (Plotka 2024, 59). Like Spranger, Blaustein emphasizes the unsystematic nature of Goethe's psychological observations (Blaustein 1932, 349-350), while noting their remarkable accuracy and anticipation of scientific psychology's findings (Blaustein 1932, 350). According to Blaustein, Goethe is not a psychologist in the strict sense of the term. Rather, he possesses extraordinary intuition and a remarkable capacity for both introspection as well as observation of others' lives (Blaustein 1932, 364). Significantly, Goethe's primary concern centers on personhood as a developmental and existential whole (Blaustein 1932, 350250 355, 362). For Blaustein, Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters Apprenticeship (Goethe 1995) illustrates that personhood constitutes itself through the integration of character, tendencies, desires, habits, and environmental factors. Through his artistic work, Goethe presents the general dimensions of individual psychic life.
The experience of life emerges as a central topic also in Blaustein's analysis of Hebbel's dramas. As already noted, Blaustein is particularly interested in
7 According to Blaustein, Goethe's approach to the relationship between the lived experience and psychology can be perceived through lenses of Adler's and Wladyslaw Witwicki's theories (Blaustein 1932, 355). Adler's psychological theory rests on "the unity of the individual, an attempt is made to obtain a picture of this unified personality regarded as a variant of individual life-manifestations and forms of expression" (Adler 1925, 2). The similarities between Goethe's psychological insights and Witwicki's theory of cratism are particularly salient. Witwicki's cratism posits movement as the externalization of internalized psychic will (Witwicki 1933, 290): an individual's psychic character manifests through regularities in their actions (Witwicki 1933, 323). According to Teresa Rzepa, Witwicki's psychological theory exemplifies a humanistic approach (Rzepa 1990, 225). Although Witwicki develops his theory independently of Adler, their psychological frameworks share similar assumptions regarding the role of power in psychic life (Witwicki 1933, 231).
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different types of lived experiences of God, and, in order to examine these phenomena, he holds that lived experiences are illustrated through the examples of fictional characters presented by Hebbel in his dramas. While Blaustein does not portray Hebbel as a psychologist, he approaches Hebbel's works similarly to his analysis of Goethe's works. Thus, Hebbel's texts, in Blaustein's eyes, offer insights into human psyche. Plotka claims that Blaustein's "[...] aim was not to interpret Hebbel's work as such or his personal faith" (Plotka 2024, 58). In The Lived Experience of God in Hebbel's Dramas, Blaustein openly claims that he focuses on the noematic analysis of the experience of God where God is understood as an intentional object experienced by various dramatic characters (Blaustein 1929, 1).8 Thus, for Judith—the main character in the drama of the same title—the experience of God manifests as a psychoanalytical study of unconscious erotic drives (Blaustein 1929, 9). Marianne—a character from a different drama—centers her relationship with God on trembling (Blaustein 1929, 20), while Benjamin from The Diamond instrumentalizes his fear of God (Blaustein 1929, 55). Furthermore, Frigga from Nibelung perceives God as a non-polytheistic force of nature (Blaustein 1929, 23). In a similar 251 way, Blaustein portrays other characters from Hebbel's works. To reiterate, Blaustein's primary focus remains, not on religion itself, but on subjectivity manifested through religious experience (Blaustein 1929, 2).
If one reads Blaustein's book about Hebbel's dramas through the lens of humanistic psychology, it is easier to understand Blaustein's central task. He is clear that biographical analysis should be excluded from the humanistic psychology's scope (Blaustein 1935, 50). Blaustein even refers to his own text about Goethe, in order to underline that the poet is not a psychologist (Blaustein 1935, 50-51, fn. 34). His hesitation to equate artistic expression with authorial personhood reflects a justified methodological caution. Such direct equation would lead to the psychologistic fallacy, exemplified in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics.9 As Dilthey (1966, 244) notes, Schleiermacher's approach
8	It can be noted that Blaustein has in mind the intentional attitude toward God gained through intentionally grasped fictional object, which are the characters of Hebbel's dramas. In this context, one may observe the occurring problem of intentional identity that was analyzed by Peter Geach (1967). Blaustein does not discuss this issue.
9	Traditionally, psychologism is considered as a standpoint in the field of logic.
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aimed to understand the author better than he understood himself.10 Since humanistic psychology aims to grasp general psychic rules, it should focus neither on individual biography nor on the sensitivity of the author of the artistic work. This shift in focus marks a divide that can be drawn between Blaustein and the hermeneutics of Dilthey (or Schleiermacher).
To summarize, The Lived Experience of God in Hebbel's Dramas and "Goethe as a Psychologist" present Blaustein's general approach to the study of psychic life. In both texts, art functions as a mediative expression of personhood, operating on two distinct levels within humanistic psychology. Firstly, by examining individual human experience, Goethe's characters embody general psychological tendencies, while Hebbel's characters manifest the inherent religious dimension of human existence. Secondly, by analyzing cultural artefacts, both works exemplify literature's role within what Blaustein terms humanistic reality. Based on the example of these two texts, one can observe that Blaustein's approach to literature is comparable (though, surely, not identical) with the approach adopted in hermeneutics. In what follows, I am 252 going to determine to what extent Blaustein's humanistic psychology should be considered as a hermeneutical project.
4. On the hermeneutical background of humanistic psychology
Given the results of sections 2 and 3, it is not an exaggeration to hold that there are (at least) three hermeneutical topics that can be traced back to Blaustein's humanistic psychology: (1) a methodological emphasis put on interpretation; (2) the use of literature as the expression of inner life; and, finally, (3) the hermeneutic circle. Threads 1 and 2 are already present in Dilthey's project of descriptive psychology, while thread 3 appears there in a preliminary form, although it was developed later by, for instance, Heidegger
However, as Vladimir N. Bryushinkin observes, "psychologism and antipsychologism are not true or false answers to a certain epistemological question, but more likely are research programmes" (Bryushinkin 2000, 39). In that sense, one can also talk about psychologism in the hermeneutical tradition.
10 There is disagreement among hermeneutical authors regarding the role of the author in the process of textual interpretation. However, I am referring here specifically to Dilthey's and Schleiermacher's approaches.
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and Gadamer. Now, step by step, I will examine these three topics in Blaustein's project.
First, let me look at the concept of interpretation in Blaustein's humanistic psychology. While hermeneutics is the theory of interpretation,
[the] philosophical hermeneutics is usually taken to indicate a more specific mode of hermeneutics that looks either to questions that arise regarding the understanding of interpretation as such (and so as they arise independently of any particular domain of interpretive practice) or else to questions of interpretation as they are seen to be central to philosophical inquiry. (Malpas 2015, 1.)
As shown in section 2, Blaustein's humanistic psychology certainly contributes to the issue of interpretation and understanding, and can thus be classified as a form of hermeneutics. Here, Blaustein's approach is akin to Dilthey's and Spranger's humanistic approaches. For Dilthey, interpretation is a psychological notion (Ricoeur 1991, 105). Its function is to understand the inner life of a human being; it "describes the main types of the course 253 of emotional events" (Dilthey 1977, 68). In general, for Dilthey, descriptive psychology serves to understand "the great types of human life as they are directed toward goals, and individualities" (Dilthey 1977, 72). This approach is taken by Spranger (1980, 21). However, Dilthey points out the importance of the "general biography of the type" (Dilthey 1977, 94) that is essential for understanding the "matured and completed human type" (Dilthey 1977, 94). Blaustein is skeptical about Dilthey's concept of the typical man and the involvement of biography in psychology. According to him, a humanistic psychologist cannot ignore individual differences between people (Blaustein 1935, 50). Still, humanistic psychology has to make a certain generalization of type, and therefore: "by a 'typical man' humanistic psychology generally means an adult, civilized person, abstracting only from more subtle differences, such as the level of education, gender, disposition, etc." (Blaustein 1935, 50). For this reason, Blaustein cannot be put in line with Dilthey's approach.
Second, as shown in section 3, Blaustein's humanistic psychology uses literature, while studying the psychic life. How this point can be accounted for within hermeneutics? According to Jonathan Culler, hermeneutics initially
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focused on a mimetic model based on generic norms. In the 19th century, there occurred, as Culler puts it, a psychological shift in hermeneutics that lied in the conceptualization of "literature as expression of an author" (Culler 2019, 308). Culler holds that the 20th-century hermeneutics was confronted by the following dilemma:
Once the mimetic model of literature is displaced by an expressive model, the question arises, what does the work express: the thinking of the author, the spirit of the age, the historical conjuncture, the conflicts of the psyche, the functioning of language itself? (Culler 2019, 311.)
Blaustein's humanistic psychology offers a distinctive response to the question posed by Culler. According to Blaustein, humanistic psychology provides a basis for analyzing cultural artefacts, while the study of specific cultural artefacts is the subject for "the theory and history of literature, art, customs, state, etc." (Blaustein 1935, 51-52). For Dilthey, hermeneutics is primarily interested in the study of cultural artefacts, since the text is the most coherent expression of inner life (Dilthey 1972, 238). Blaustein adapts this approach, but calls it a psychological analysis. Nevertheless, his approach cannot be classified as a method that is used by an explanatory, behavioral, or even developmental psychology. None of these disciplines account for texts as meaningful expressions of the subjective psychic life. By contrast, this is one of the aims of Blaustein's humanistic psychology.
The hermeneutical tradition—from Schleiermacher, through Dilthey and Spranger, to Gadamer and Ricoeur—treats texts as the primary subjects for interpretation. However, the notion of interpretation differs among hermeneutical scholars. While for Schleiermacher and Dilthey it is a psychological notion, for Gadamer it is primarily a dialogical act that connects text and reader (Romer 2016, 136-137). Ricoeur underlines the semantic independence of the text and through that argues that interpretation is not solely a psychological process. The text is involved in symbolic structures, and these structures cannot be reduced to psychological expressions of intentions and desires (Piercey 2016, 541). In this context, Blaustein seems to align more closely with later hermeneutical thinkers than with Dilthey and Schleiermacher. He underlines the independence of psychological laws
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from the individual human being. The primary role of interpretation is not to understand the individual human being as an incorporation of general rules that govern psychic life. Nevertheless, to grasp these rules, following Blaustein, one has to treat texts as an expression of hidden subjective laws that need to be interpreted, in order to manifest themselves.
Finally, the last topic I want to discuss here is the idea of the hermeneutic circle. This concept was developed by Heidegger and Gadamer, but it was present in Dilthey's hermeneutics in a preliminary form as well (Grondin 2016). Georgia Warnke holds:
The classical hermeneutic circle refers to the process of understanding a text and describes that process as an activity of understanding its initial parts in terms of anticipating the meaning of the whole of the text and continually revising this anticipation of meaning on the basis of an accumulating understanding of its parts. (Warnke 2019, 245.)
Originally, the idea of the hermeneutic circle was used to describe how the understanding of texts proceeds. However, this idea can be used in a 255 broader context outside the scope of literature. Charles Guignon noticed that "life understood as meaningful in turn makes it possible to see that the hermeneutic circle structures human existence in much the same way that understanding a text has a circular structure" (Guignon 2016, 203). Essentially, the idea of the hermeneutic circle was elevated to the level of methodological self-awareness by Heidegger's hermeneutics for whom: "Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted." (Heidegger 2001, 194.) This circular logic lies at the heart of the hermeneutic circle, and, at the same time, describes the structure of all understanding. The act of interpretation always presupposes a possible meaning that can be interpreted. In this context, Gadamer holds that "a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something" (2004, 271). The concrete meaning, which emerges within the act of interpretation, is not a priori determined, but remains in front of the reader, resembling the vast openness of the horizon extending along the landscape line. According to Gadamer, the hermeneutic circle involves the prejudice of completeness that "implies not only this formal element—that a text should completely express its
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meaning—but also that what it says should be the complete truth" (Gadamer 2004, 294).
In Blaustein's humanistic psychology, the idea of the hermeneutic circle does not appear directly. Blaustein's framework follows Dilthey's analysis of the relationship between subjective parts of experience and the wholeness of the psychic nexus. However, Blaustein directly examined the correlation between parts of the psychic and the lived wholeness of experience. For him, general description of lived experiences is deduced from individual lived experiences, while general psychic rules allow one to understand this experience. Furthermore, artefacts or humanistic products serve as parts of the lived experience in correlation with the wholeness of psychological rules, which is called a psychological type. In this sense, one can point to the protype of the hermeneutic circle in Blaustein's humanistic psychology. Jussi Backman claims that:
[...] the basic dynamic of the hermeneutic circle [...] implies that the context is itself never static but dynamic, always in the state of temporal and historical becoming. Every meaningful experience is approached in terms of a "preunderstanding" consisting of earlier interpretations and articulations of relevant earlier experiences. There is no experience without "presuppositions." (Backman 2016, 56.)
In section 2, I have shown that the dynamic approach focused on the temporal correlation between parts and the whole is the proper attitude for humanistic psychology. According to Backman, the temporal dynamism of the given context is the essential feature of the hermeneutic circle. Similarly, in Blaustein's humanistic psychology, general psychic rules and artefacts offer a preunderstanding in the context of individual human being's experiences.
Interestingly, one can also consider a more nuanced implementation of the idea of the hermeneutic circle, which resembles (to some extent) Heidegger's and Gadamer's positions. From this point of view, one can account for Blaustein's humanistic reality by analogy with the open horizon of interpretation. According to Blaustein, all the artefacts and individuals exist within humanistic reality. Therefore, this reality is the point of reference for all acts of interpretation. Each and every artefact should be interpreted in context
Filip Golaszewski
of the greater whole, the latter being humanistic reality itself. One may say that completeness of interpretation is presupposed in the horizon of humanistic reality. Therefore, humanistic reality plays a comparable role as Gadamer's prejudice of completeness. Furthermore, in this sense, interpretation of any artefact is already understood in the context of humanistic reality, which resembles Heidegger's observations about the circularity of all understanding.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this study was to read selected writings by Blaustein in a hermeneutical key. To conclude, Blaustein's humanistic psychology clearly includes three hermeneutical topics. His project of humanistic psychology is aimed at comprehending the wholeness of a person based on the analysis of fragmented psychic flux, navigating the circle of meaning. Furthermore, Blaustein's approach to inner life is based on the method of interpretation. External expressions serve to elucidate the psychological principles guiding individual human beings. However, in this respect, Blaustein diverges from the 257 Schleiermacher-Dilthey tradition and proceeds in the direction explored by the 20th-century hermeneutical scholars. According to Blaustein, the interpretation of human actions performed within humanistic reality is not directed toward understanding individual human beings per se, but rather in light of general psychological typologies of lived experiences. Finally, Blaustein's humanistic psychology can be applied to the interpretation of literature and, as one may assume, other cultural artefacts, such as musical compositions, cinematic works, or theatrical performances. In this context, Blaustein's project clearly follows the classical Diltheyan hermeneutic trajectory, integrating the act of interpretation with textual expressions of human consciousness.11 By and large, one can consider Blaustein as a hermeneutical philosopher. Therefore, one can discern that Blaustein's affiliation with the hermeneutical tradition is not
11 Indeed, Blaustein analyzed different aesthetic phenomena, e.g., the cinemagoer's experiences or the phenomenon of listening to the radio. However, he did not classify these considerations in the key of humanistic psychology, but instead included his studies in the field of descriptive psychology. For more on this issue, see: Rosinska 2013; Plotka 2024.
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merely historical in nature. The presence of Dilthey and Spranger in Blaustein's writings resulted in a theoretical project with an extensive scope of interests, represented by the concept of humanistic reality. In this approach, Blaustein not only adopts the method of interpretation, but also consciously navigates the contours of the hermeneutic circle, while analyzing cultural artefacts.
Finally, it is worth considering the following question: how can we define Blaustein's hermeneutics? According to Rosinska, one can interpret Blaustein's account of media as an example of what she calls "hermeneutical resistance" (Rosinska 2001, 32). This attitude consists in inquiring about the deeper meaning of cultural objects. Blaustein's interest in the experience of media surely represents this attitude. I think that it is justified to hold the same for his humanistic psychology. Blaustein's general approach toward humanistic reality consists in searching for the deeper meaning of cultural artefacts and human lived experiences. Blaustein's theory is ultimately focused on the reconstruction of meaning hidden both in the psychic nexus and in the humanistic reality as such. In this sense, it is closer to hermeneutics than to a 258 descriptive-psychological approach.
At the end, it may be worth pushing my reading further by a contextualization of Blaustein's humanistic psychology with regard to the development of today's hermeneutics. Of course, I already determined some affinities with Gadamer and Ricoeur. However, Blaustein's interests both in literature as well as the psychic life encourage one to ask about the role of narrative in the study of humanistic reality. After all, Ricoeur's later conception of narrative identity and his method of narrative understanding (see Ricoeur 1984, 4; 1992, 113— 115) seem to be a natural extension of Blaustein's humanistic psychology understood as hermeneutics. It is even more justified to examine these issues given the fact that "[t]he structure of narrativizing is that of the hermeneutic circle" (Keane and Lawn 2016, 201). The concept of the narrative appears not only in Ricoeur's hermeneutics, but also in contemporary psychology, where it is interpreted as a cognitive scheme organizing human cognition (Trzebinski 2002, 6). Given this divide between Ricoeur's hermeneutics and contemporary psychology, the concept of the narrative appears to be a bridge that connects both fields. With this idea in mind, a further examination of Blaustein's humanistic psychology can focus on its relationship to the narrative-oriented
Filip Golaszewski
hermeneutics. The concept of the narrative focuses on dynamism in psychic life, allowing us to understand the process of personal development. Blaustein's emphasis on the dynamic approach as being the primary method for analyzing humanistic reality seems to naturally correspond with the concept of the narrative.
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Materials
THE THOUGHT OF LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN IN CONTEXT
KONTEKSTI MISLI LEOPOLDA BLAUSTEINA
Gradivo
Translation Prevod
UDC: 27-277.2
The Lived Experience of God in Hebbel's Dramas (§ 1)
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from German by Filip Borek Abstract and keywords prepared by Filip Borek
Abstract
The text seeks to define the term "lived experience of God" and delineate the scope of investigating this concept in the context of Friedrich Hebbel's dramas. The meaning of the lived experience of God is established through the lens of intentionality. In a narrow sense, lived experiences of God are those experiences, in which God is the direct and proper intentional object. In a broader sense, lived experiences of God include experiences whose intentional object is not God, but is nonetheless related
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to God. The experience of God is studied both in its noetic as well as its noematic character.
Keywords: lived experience of God, intentionality, Friedrich Hebbel, noematic investigation, psychology.
Doživljanje Boga v Hebblovih dramah (§ 1)
Povzetek
Besedilo skuša opredeliti termin »doživljanje Boga« in obmejiti domet raziskave tega pojma v kontekstu dram Friedricha Hebbla. Avtor skuša pomen doživljanja Boga določiti skoz prizmo intencionalnosti. V ožjem smislu so doživljaji Boga tista izkustva, pri katerih je Bog neposreden in svojski intencionalni predmet. V širšem smislu doživljaji Boga vključujejo tudi izkustva, pri katerih intencionalni predmet ni Bog, a se vendar nekako nanaša na Boga. Izkustvo Boga avtor obravnava tako v njegovem noetičnem kot v njegovem noematičnem značaju.
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Ključne besede: doživljanje Boga, intencionalnost, Friedrich Hebbel, noematska raziskava, psihologija.
Leopold Blaustein
[| 1]1 § 1. The problem
The problem, to which this work is dedicated, was formulated in the introduction as follows: What kinds of lived experience of God [Gotteserlebnisses] do we find in Hebbel's dramas? The following remarks are intended to explain briefly the meaning of this question, without raising the problems of philosophy of religion in all their breadth and depth.
It is a generally recognized fact in psychology that psychic lived experiences are characterized by a constitutive feature called "intentionality." This means that all psychic lived experiences have [innewohnt] an inherent intention toward something, namely toward their intentional object. In presentation, something is presented; in judgment, something is affirmed or rejected; in love, something is loved; in hatred, something is hated; in desire, something is desired, etc. Therefore, in every psychic lived experience there is an inherent direction toward a certain object, a kind of immanent reference to an object of one kind and no other. God can also be the intentional object of psychic lived experiences. He can be presented by us; we can formulate judgments about 267 him, believe in him or doubt him; we can love, fear, or hate him, etc. Among the variety of psychic lived experiences, those just mentioned deserve the name of "lived experiences of God" in the first place. "Lived experiences of God" in the narrower sense of the word are, therefore, all psychic lived experiences whose intention is directed toward God as their intentional object. Lived experiences of God in the broader sense of the word, however, are also all those, the intentional object of which is not God, but which bear some other relationship to God. For example, when we wish for something from God, reproach him,
1 [This translation indicates original pagination directly in the text in square brackets; all page numbers refer to: Blaustein, Leopold. 1929. Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen. Berlin: Verlag Reuther & Reichard.]
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center, Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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ask him for something, repent, confess to him, etc. If we want to get to know the lived experiences of God as experienced by Hebbel's dramatic characters, we must examine the way they present him, how they judge him, whether they believe in him or doubt in his existence, whether they honor, love, fear, or hate him, but also what they wish and demand from him, etc. The study of the lived experience of God is followed by the consideration of its intentional object as such. The aim of this noematic2 investigation is knowledge of God as he is grasped and understood in individual lived experiences of God, knowledge of the attributes and the functions that are attributed to God (or gods) in individual religious lived experiences. For we are only interested in how God is thought about, not how he really is—whether one believes in him or doubts in his existence, but not whether he exists or not. All of this is almost always done through metaphorical [| 2] comparisons that are understood more or less literally by the figures in question. We must also pay attention to these images—especially natural and anthropomorphic analogies. This noematic study deepens that of the lived experiences themselves. For it is precisely the 268 way, in which the objective presents itself in the subjective, the way, in which God is reflected in the individual, that gives rise to the differences between the lived experiences of God. Subsequently, all psychophysical functions, in which the experience of God finds its expression, must be examined—in other words, prayer and all relevant acts of worship. For these are also typical of the lived experience of God. It is even more important to recognize the significance of the lived experience of God in the entire spiritual life [Seelenleben] of the individual dramatic characters. They can possess a kind of hegemony that can increase to sole dominance or play a completely secondary, insignificant role. In order to properly assess their power and depth, the actions that are motivated by them must also be explored. For, like all lived experiences, religious lived experiences can also become motivating forces for action, especially because they are closely related to a person's ethical attitude. Thus, repentance, penance, etc., become religious experiences. Finally, specifically religious experiences, such as visions, revelations, etc., if they occur anywhere, must also be explored.
The disposition (the ability) of a human being to have a lived experience
2 "Noema" here means the intentional object as such.
Leopold Blaustein
of God in the narrower and broader sense can be called, in short, one's "lived experience of God (singular)." This terminology creates an ambiguity that is insignificant, as the meaning is always clearly determined by the context of a sentence. In order to remedy this problem even more radically, I will use the singular form of this noun to designate this psychic disposition, where possible, and the plural form to refer to the actual psychic phenomena [Erscheinungen]. One's lived experience of God can remain roughly the same throughout one's life, but it can also change. These changes may follow one another in stages or occur suddenly. In the first case, we speak of one's religious development, in the second of a religious rebirth, whereby only changes in a positive direction are meant. However, one's lived experience of God can also die off slowly or suddenly. Related to this is the question of how the experience of God came about. It can be inherent in one's life from childhood or it can appear for the first time at a mature age. We must pose all these questions of the lived experiences of God in relation to Hebbel's dramatic characters, if we want to come to know them.
Before we proceed, we must note one more thing. We are only interested 269 in the denominational differences of the individual figures, studied insofar as they have had an influence on the shaping of the individual lived experience of God. For psychic individuals are the subject matter of our study, and not religions. Considerations of the history of religion are completely out of its scope.
Translation Prevod
UDC: 801.73
Reviews of Ajdukiewicz's and
KOTARBINSKI'S PUBLICATIONS
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from Polish by Filip Golaszewski Abstract and keywords prepared by Filip Golaszewski Bibliography edited by Filip Golaszewski
Abstract
Blaustein reviews two publications by representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's On the Meaning of Expressions (1931) and Tadeusz Kotarbinski's Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge (1929). The examination of Ajdukiewicz's publication focuses on semantic theory developed through motivational relations between sentences, language directives, and inferential substitutivity relations. Blaustein's analysis addresses the distinction between verbal
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and intuitive derivation, disposition toward a language, and definition of synonymy through inferential substitutivity. With respect to Kotarbinski's publication, Blaustein analyzes the integration of the reist ontology with epistemological realism across semantic theory, epistemology, formal logic, and scientific methodology. The reviews examine both the theoretical contributions and the methodological approaches of both philosophers. They also identify specific limitations in metaphysical assumptions and applicability beyond formal logical systems.
Keywords: Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbinski, expression, meaning, motivation relations, reism.
Oceni publikacij Ajdukiewicza in Kotarbinskega
Povzetek
Blaustein ocenjuje publikaciji spod peresa dveh predstavnikov lvovsko-varšavske šole: O pomenu izrazov (1931) Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza in Gnoseologija: Znanstveni 272 pristop k teoriji vednosti (1929) Tadeusza Kotarbinskega. Prikaz Ajdukiewiczevega dela se osredotoča na semantično teorijo, ki jo pisec razvija s pomočjo razgrnitve motivacijskih odnosov med stavki, jezikovnih smernic in predpostavljenih substitucijskih odnosov. Blausteinova analiza zadeva razlikovanje med verbalno in intuitivno izpeljavo, disponiranost glede jezika in definicijo sinonimije na podlagi predpostavljene substitutivnosti. Pri obravnavi dela Kotarbinskega Blaustein analizira integracijo reistične ontologije z epistemološkim realizmom na področjih semantične teorije, epistemologije, formalne logike in znanstvene metodologije. Oceni se dotikata tako teoretskih prispevkov kot metodoloških pristopov obeh avtorjev. Obenem identificirata določene omejitve glede metafizičnih domnev in glede uporabnosti onkraj formalnih logičnih sistemov.
Ključne besede: Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbinski, izraz, pomen, motivacijski odnosi, reizem.
Leopold Blaustein
[| 455]1 Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz, O znaczeniu wyrazen [On the Meaning of Expressions]. Offprint from the Memorial Book of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov, Lvov 1931, 47 pp.
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz wrote a significant treatise on defining the meaning of expressions, a problem that poses considerable difficulties for grammarians and philosophers who work within semantics.2 This book can contribute, especially in its critical part, to the elimination of certain outdated and erroneous views. Such views persist, for example, in numerous grammar textbooks. Moreover, Ajdukiewicz's treatise in an original manner paves the way to replacing these erroneous views with accurate and precisely formulated ones. After distinguishing various ways of using the word "meaning," Ajdukiewicz limits his considerations to "meaning" in the narrower sense. He correctly draws attention to the necessity of relativizing the meaning of expressions to language. Ajdukiewicz also remarks on the ambiguity of expressions in quotation marks and on the threefold sense of the expression: "to speak Polish." These remarks can contribute significantly to removing a series of inaccuracies 273 usually committed in semantic research. What follows is a critique of the associationist theory of meaning. Ajdukiewicz formulates associationist theory much more favorably than this is usually done. Associationist theory has long been abandoned by philosophers, but is sometimes maintained by linguists. Nevertheless, Ajdukiewicz convincingly demonstrates that this theory cannot be maintained even in such a modified form. With respect to the question of
1	[This translation indicates original pagination directly in the text in square brackets; all page numbers refer to: Blaustein, Leopold 1930. "[Review of] Ajdukiewicz Kazimierz, O znaczeniu wyrazen' and "[Review of] Kotarbinski, Tadeusz, Elementy teorji poznania logiki formalnej i metodologji nauk" Przegl^d Humanistyczny 5 (4-5): 455-458.]
2	[See Ajdukiewicz 1931 [1978]].
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center,
Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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the psychological mechanisms underlying the use of certain phrases as verbal expressions, Ajdukiewicz aligns with [Edmund] Husserl's position. According to Husserl's view, the meaning of a given expression (as a type) in a certain language is the type, under which the intention attached to meaning content must fall. The correlation between the type and linguistic intention ensures that the phrase functions as an expression within a specific language, rather than being ambiguous across multiple languages. Interestingly, Ajdukiewicz is inclined to accept the existence of universals. Universals are conceived as objects of a different order than objects whose existence is recognized only by [Tadeusz] Kotarbinski's reism. Ajdukiewicz also subjects [John Stuart] Mill's theory of connotation to analysis and critique. However, Ajdukiewicz believes that Mill's theory provides the correct methodological approach for determining meaning.
Ajdukiewicz's definition of meaning is based on motivational relations between sentences, and between intuitive representations and sentences. This approach also employs the concept of disposition to use a language;
274 Ajdukiewicz defines this disposition in terms of specific motivational relations. Ajdukiewicz limits further considerations to languages with established and unambiguous vocabulary, syntax, and motivational relations. This allows him to introduce the concept of language rules. These rules express the motivational relations for each sentence. Disposition toward a certain language consists of readiness to proceed according to the rules established by that language. Ajdukiewicz further distinguishes verbal derivation from intuitive derivation. If we accept certain sentences on the basis of accepting other sentences, then we deal with verbal derivation. In every other case, we deal with intuitive derivation. Using language rules, Ajdukiewicz defines synonymy as inferential substitutivity. Applying the schema for definition by abstraction, he obtains a definition of the meaning of a given expression E in language L. This is the property of expression E, which is common to all expressions synonymous with expression E in language L, and only to those. Finally, Ajdukiewicz gives an interpretation of the so-called "intentional nature of acts" and "matter of the acts." [| 456] These interpretations are supposed to reduce the readiness to react to certain representations with belief in a certain sentence about the object of representation. However, Ajdukiewicz does not clarify whether this
Leopold Blaustein
readiness remains at the mental disposition level or whether it actually becomes a conscious experience. One may accept Ajdukiewicz's account, noting that it lacks clarity with respect to individual properties of the representational intention.
Ajdukiewicz's logical argumentation and technical definitions employ rigorous formal distinctions and systematic terminology. This methodological rigor makes the treatise difficult to read, but Ajdukiewicz's book remains comprehensible. The arguments addressing objections to the proposed definition of synonymy are particularly difficult to follow. The definition of meaning that emerges from Ajdukiewicz's abstractive method provides little insight into the actual nature of meaning. This limitation persists unless one considers Ajdukiewicz's constructive proposals developed through his critique of associationist theory. Ajdukiewicz's results are all the more interesting, as they open promising epistemological perspectives. It is more difficult, however, to judge what their significance will be for the semantics of ethnic languages. This is because ethnic languages are based on an artificial language model that is not exclusively deductive, but has an unambiguously established 275 vocabulary, syntactic rules, and directives. However, ethnic languages resemble to a lesser or greater degree a logically ideal language. Every rigorous science strives toward the creation of such a language. Therefore, one can assume that knowledge of the ideal language structure is beneficial for understanding ethnic languages. The entirety of Ajdukiewicz's arguments seems convincing, apart from the distinction between verbal derivation and intuitive derivation (and meanings), which perhaps requires certain supplements.
[ | 456] Kotarbinski, Tadeusz, Elementy teorji poznania logiki formalnej i metodologji nauk [Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge]. Lwow: Wydawnictwo Zakladu Narodowego Imienia Ossolinskich 1929, VIII + 483 pp.
The development of Polish philosophy in the last thirty years [in the 20th century] has given it a distinctive profile that, in terms of prevailing tendencies and methods, differs from philosophical traditions in other countries. This methodological separation from international philosophical trends created considerable difficulties in teaching philosophy at Polish universities. The
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available textbooks differed significantly in both approach as well as content from the philosophical principles being taught and implemented in university lectures. In order to address this pedagogical gap, three comprehensive philosophical textbooks have recently been published: Wladyslaw Witwicki's treatise on psychology; Tadeusz Kotarbinski's book on epistemology, logic, and methodology; and Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz's history of philosophy. The publication of original Polish textbooks in these philosophical disciplines should be welcomed with recognition. They fill a significant gap in Polish academic literature and express the increasingly mature independent tendencies of Polish philosophy. The most original among these textbooks is Kotarbinski's book.3
The originality is clear in Kotarbinski's selection of topics in his new textbook. The first section includes discussions of language, specifically semantic theory. Semantic research is actively pursued in Poland, although from widely different theoretical perspectives. The second part addresses issues [| 457] of the theory of knowledge. The third section introduces readers 276 to the basics of formal logic. The fourth section provides an overview of the general methodology of sciences. The fifth section examines the distinctive characteristics of the major scientific disciplines. The [reviewed] textbook, intended for persons preparing for examination of the "main principles of philosophical disciplines," focuses primarily on those branches of philosophy that are recognized in Poland as meeting scientific standards. The textbook also includes essential psychological observations. This material is discussed primarily in relation to the theory of knowledge. Another distinctive feature that makes this book representative of contemporary Polish philosophy is Kotarbinski's approach to philosophical problems, which emphasizes absolute clarity and precision in both thought and expression. Kotarbinski aims to expose certain murky, but traditionally sanctified problems as illusory. Finally, one can find in this book results obtained by Polish scholars, particularly in the third part of the publication devoted to logic.
However, Kotarbinski's individual intellectual approach gives the publication its remarkable quality. The publication does not read like a mere compilation
3 [See Kotarbinski 1929 [1966)]].
Leopold Blaustein
of various philosophical positions. When Kotarbinski presents other scholars' views, he expresses them in his own distinctive way of expression, and provides original analysis of individual positions. This approach undoubtedly compromises the historical accuracy of Kotarbinski's account. The method usually enhances the clarity of his exposition of philosophical problems. Kotarbinski's original views are contained in the semantic, epistemological, and methodological sections. Kotarbinski's reism comes to the foreground in semantics and ontology. His radical realism appears in epistemology. Reism provides a unifying perspective throughout the entire publication. This unification is also largely responsible for giving the book the character of a cohesive philosophical treatise rather than a conventional textbook. Many philosophical systems turn out to be essentially textbooks, compilations of foreign views equipped with more or less original contributions from their creators. In Kotarbinski's case, the textbook turns out to be an interesting philosophical system. However, this systematic approach did not work to the advantage of either the textbook or the system itself. The textbook exceeds the appropriate difficulty level, given that it was originally intended as an 277 introduction to philosophical disciplines. For advanced students and other readers, who already possess some familiarity with philosophical issues, the book will serve as a valuable repository of philosophical knowledge that has been critically examined and originally interpreted. The textbook format allowed Kotarbinski to include material that might not have found a place in other types of philosophical publications. For example, analysis of the humanities was included. However, the textbook format prevented Kotarbinski from discussing freely and extensively those issues that were closest to his heart and regarding which he had the most expertise to offer. Consequently, Kotarbinski has been criticized for treating various issues with unequal emphasis. One might, therefore, regret that urgent pedagogical requirements prevented this textbook from developing organically. The most valuable textbooks emerge naturally, when they represent the culmination of an author's lifelong academic achievements. This kind of culmination would previously be announced in a series of monographs.
Despite these shortcomings, which result more from external circumstances than from any fault of Kotarbinski's, the publication presents itself impressively.
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It enriches Polish philosophical literature with a book [| 458] of extraordinary value. This textbook will undoubtedly influence future Polish philosophical publications. Kotarbinski's book will either provoke theoretical objections or stimulate further research on the basis of the results contained in it. Reism, in particular, encounters strong resistance, because it radically challenges established ways of thinking. An accurate analysis and critique of reism—as it seems to me—is contained in Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's critical study, published in volume 33 of Przeglqd Filozoficzny [ThePhilosophical Review]. However, this is not the right place for a substantive examination of Kotarbinski's numerous original views. Kotarbinski's views are expounded concisely and clearly in his absorbing publication, which merits attention not only from specialists, but also from all those who value authentic philosophical culture.
Bibliography | Bibliografija
Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz. 1931. O znaczeniu wyrazen. Lwow: Wydawnictwo Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie.
278 ---. 1978. "On the Meaning of Expressions." Trans. by J. Giedymin. In Kazimierz
Ajdukiewicz, The Scientific World-Perspective and Other Essays, 1931-1963, ed. by J. Giedymin, 1-34. Dordrecht—Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Kotarbinski, Tadeusz. 1929. Elementy teorji poznania logiki formalnej i metodologji
nauk. Lwow: Wydawnictwo Zakladu Narodowego Imienia Ossolinskich. ---. 1966. Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Trans. by O. Wojtasiewicz. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Translation Prevod
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Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from Polish by Witold Plotka Abstract and keywords prepared by Witold Plotka Bibliography edited by Witold Plotka
Abstract
The text aims to describe the experiences of the cinemagoer by analyzing complexes of lived experiences as being composed of presentations, feelings, and judgments. These experiences are discussed with regard to the status of sensations and the object constituted by the goer. The study examines the types and features of experiences expressed by film characters by scrutinizing the theory of sympathy (Einfühlung). Moreover, the status and meaning of music in the cinemagoer's lived experiences is
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explored; in this respect, the author argues that music is an important factor in shaping the goer's mood. The text determines non-aesthetic and "semi-aesthetic" factors, which are combined in the cinemagoer's lived experiences, and inquires into the status of the world of cinematic art.
Keywords: aesthetic experience, feeling, pleasure, presentation, assumption, cinematic art, imaginative world.
Prispevki h psihologiji obiskovalca kina
Povzetek
Besedilo skuša opisati izkustvo obiskovalca kina z analizo sklopa doživljanja, kakršnega sestavljajo predstave, občutja in sodbe. Doživetje kina je obravnavno z vidika statusa občutkov in predmeta, ki ga obiskovalec pri tem konstituira. Študija tipe in poteze izkustva, kakor ga izražajo filmski liki, raziskuje s pomočjo teorije sočutja [vživljanja] (Einfühlung). Blaustein, nadalje, pretresa tudi status in pomen glasbe pri 280 obiskovalčevem doživljanju kina, pri čemer poudarja, da je glasba pomemben faktor pri oblikovanju gledalčevega razpoloženja. Besedilo opredeljuje ne-estetske in »pol-estetske« faktorje, kakršni se združujejo pri doživljanju kina, in pretresa status sveta kinematografske umetnosti.
Ključne besede: estetsko izkustvo, občutje, užitek, predstava, domneva, kinematografska umetnost, domišljijski svet.
Leopold Blaustein
[| 5]1 § 1. Introduction
Anyone interested in the psychic life of human beings can approach the study of its manifestations in two ways. And thus, one can focus on some kind of lived experience as the subject matter of one's study, e.g., memories or aesthetic feelings, identify these lived experiences in various situations, and study their properties and functions. However, one may also take a different path for one's studies and attempt to understand the lived experiences of all kinds that occur in a certain type of situation, e.g., the situation, in which a cinemagoer finds oneself during a film screening. We will adopt this second path in the following study, the task of which is to partially shed more light on the psychology of the cinemagoer. It will be partial for two reasons. Firstly, only some selected issues that can be correctly classified as problems of the psychology of the cinemagoer will be addressed in these investigations; secondly, some of the questions that I raise will have to be left open, as they would require more research or would be dependent on certain general questions in the field of psychology, which have not yet been conclusively solved.	281
The psychology of the cinemagoer is the psychology of a person participating in a cinema screening, lasting, say, 1/-2 hours. One's lived experiences during this time are undoubtedly dependent not only on the stimuli provided by the screen, but also, among other things, on his past [experiences]. The nature of one's lived experiences during a screening is, as it seems, influenced by previous lived experiences produced by advertisements of the film, etc., experiences lived through while watching films, which one had previously seen, the frequency of such lived experiences, as well as the mental state, which the
1 [This translation indicates original pagination directly in the text in square brackets; all page numbers refer to: Blaustein, Leopold. 1933. Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego. Poznan: Poznanskie Towarzystwo Psychologiczne.]
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center, Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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goer adopted immediately prior, whether one was nervous or cheerful, tired or fresh, etc. General mental dispositions, one's intelligence, temperament, one's established beliefs and aesthetic inclinations are also not without consequence. The influence of all this will remain, in principle, outside the scope of our investigations. I will completely omit discussion of the influences of lived experiences [| 6] in the cinema in relation to the entirety of one's mental life or the examination of what kind of films have stronger, weaker, positive, negative effects, what the preferences of the cinema audience are and thus desires for films of this or that type, how the understanding of film affects a child, etc. All these issues, which are worth considering and examining in the psychology of the cinemagoer, as they inquire into causal relationships, about the genesis of certain lived experiences or about certain statistical comparisons, require different research methods than the description of the set of lived experiences experienced by the cinemagoer who watches the products of the contemporary film industry, with particular emphasis on the sources of the pleasure one experiences. In this 282 regard, we are also not interested in the problems of cinema aesthetics, which attempts to determine "specifically cinematic" factors, arguing about the line that the development of cinema should follow. Investigations devoted to the psychology of the cinemagoer are not investigations in the field of aesthetics; however, their results may become a starting point for aesthetic explorations.2
2 The view that psychological investigations are the starting point for aesthetics is shared even by supporters of non-psychological aesthetics. "Die Ästhetik ist eine gegenstandsorientierte Wissenschaft—der Zugang zur Ästhetik führt über die Psychologie. [Aesthetics is an object-oriented discipline—access to aesthetics leads via psychology.]" (Geiger 1928, VIII.)
Leopold Blaustein
I. Presentations and Their Objects § 2. Sensations lived by the cinemagoer
The cinemagoer as such experiences only visual and auditory sensations.3 Any tactile, gustatory, or muscular sensations experienced [by the cinemagoer] are not related to watching what is happening "on" the screen, and therefore they do not come into play here.
a) The visual sensations of a cinemagoer rarely provide one with colors, most often only various shades of neutral colors, [| 7] the play of light and shadows. These sensations come from the phantoms, which are constantly changing, covering the screen. One perceives the colors of these phantoms either as properties of objects seen imaginatively "on" the screen or as phantoms covering these objects, i.e., shadows and lights flashing on them.
Volkelt claims that when one looks at a drawing made in neutral colors, one perceives the trees drawn as green or brown, the clothes as colorful, the faces as having the color of body. The specific Gestalt quality that the 283 drawing has is connected with the certainty that one could at any moment make present to oneself the real colors of the given objects. The certainty of this possibility is not a conscious act; it is not given in a conscious way at all. Rather, it is implicitly present in the Gestalt quality that the black-and-white drawing possesses. "Das Grün des schwarz-weissen Baumes ist mir in der Weise der 'Gewissheit der Möglichkeit' gegenwärtig." (Volkelt 1920, 186.)4 Without examining the question of whether Volkelt is right with regard to drawings, let us ask whether something similar occurs in the goer of a black-and-white film. The people I asked about this, and I myself, were unable to state anything of this sort. In this situation, we do not perceive objects as colored, nor do we have a sense of the possibility of perceptually presenting these objects as colored. How else could this [colorful] manifestation [of
3	The so-called lower senses require contact with an object. (Cf. the distinction between "Kontaktsinne" and "Fernsinne" in Kulpe 1921, 74). The cinemagoer lacks this contact, which is why one does not experience the sensations of the lower senses.
4	["The green of the black and white tree is present to me in the way of 'certainty of possibility'."]
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images] be provided? Probably only in appropriate perceptive or imaginative images. The former is impossible, and the latter is difficult to uphold, and almost never takes place. On the other hand, there is a readiness in us to significatively think that these trees are green or the sky is blue, if someone would ask us about it or if such a question would have arisen in us. Seemingly, however, this is not what Volkelt had in mind, since he believes that colors are "mitgesehen" in such situations.
[| 8] b) It would be wrong to think that, given the limitation of the sensations received by the cinemagoer to visual and auditory ones, the cinemagoer only grasps the colors and shapes of objects seen "on" the screen, and the noises and sounds they make. In his contributions to the phenomenology of perception, Schapp (1910, 12 ff.) describes how the world appears when it is given only in colors, and how it appears when it is given only by means of sounds, etc. The results of his descriptions can be applied accurately to what the cinemagoer sees and hears, with the proviso that the goer usually only has neutral colors, although in countless shades,5 and that usually a sound film does not provide 284 one with all the noises and sounds that one would naturally hear in a given situation, but only certain selected ones. On the screen, therefore, we see not only the colors of the brass lamp, clothes, coffee, honey, but also the smoothness of this lamp, the roughness of the clothes, the fluidity of the coffee, the viscosity of the honey. We see this especially when these objects are in motion, when honey sticks to the objects it has come into contact with, e.g., with the trousers of a comically unlucky character, or when coffee spills from a glass awkwardly held by this character. We see the smoothness of a brass lamp thanks to the specific luster of this object, the softness or hardness of canvas thanks to the various folds, in which it is arranged. According to Volkelt (1920, 194), we even see the sharpness of a sword, the wetness of stones, the smoothness of a dance floor, the elasticity of a spring. But, when we see sugar, we do not see its sweetness; when we see a rose, we do not see its fragrance, just as we see its softness, when a disappointed lover crushes this gift from an unfaithful beloved in their hand. We only know that sugar is sweet, that a rose has a smell,
5 Neutral paintings also have specific decorative values, as Ingarden rightly emphasizes in: Ingarden 1931, 333.
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when we see the facial expression of a child eating sugar or a person inhaling with delight the fragrance of a rose.
[| 9] When a cart loaded with iron bars is pulled along an uneven road, according to Schapp (1910, 12 ff.), we have the unevenness of the road as directly given, along with the weight of the cart, the type of load, etc., even if we do not see the cart or the road at a certain moment. The sound produced by the collision of two objects will betray their hardness or softness. We identify the cart that we hear from a distance with the cart that we see when it gets closer. When we see only the interior of the house "on" the screen, but certain rustles and murmurs come from outside, parts of the imaginary space that are invisible at the moment are filled with things; we know that a storm is raging outside, we hear the rustle of trees swaying in the wind, the beating of rain or hail on the pavement and roof, and we do not have to imagine tree, pavement, roof, and rain.
This is not the place for a closer analysis of how these apparently nonvisual or non-auditory properties6 are given to the senses of sight or hearing. Schapp believes that these properties are directly seen, Volkelt that they are 285 "sinnlichergänzend mitgesehen,"7 both are opposed to the view that phantasy or the combination of what is seen with associated memory impressions play any role here. These are difficult questions, which cannot be addressed within the scope of the psychology of the cinemagoer, because they belong to the field of general psychology. For the psychology of the cinemagoer, only this circumstance is important: although one experiences only visual and auditory sensations, objects on the screen are also given to one as smooth, liquid, elastic, wet, etc., that objects are given to one, although one does not see them, one only hears them, etc. I am inclined to the view that this is in fact the work of visual and auditory sensations, and the acts of presentation and judgment that interpret them,8 and not the work of phantasy or associated secondary images.
[| 10] c) This does not exclude the possibility that sometimes the visual
6	I call these properties "apparently non-visual or non-auditory," because I believe that the words "smoothness," "stickiness," "hardness," etc., denote features that can be given not only tactilely, but also visually or auditorily.
7	["[S]een together as sensorily complementing."]
8	Cf. my treatise: Blaustein 1928, § 32.
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and auditory sensations experienced by someone may be joined by associated secondary images of the same or other senses, e.g., olfactory. Witasek (1904, 185) even believes that the aesthetic pleasure of a painted rose necessarily includes the presentation of its scent and that the association evokes a secondary sensation of scent as soon as the stimulus provided by the eye is sufficiently vivid. The same can sometimes be experienced by a cinemagoer if one is not an audile or an extreme visualizer (Blachowski 1919, 31). Thus, a cinemagoer perceptively experiences only visual and auditory sensations. Despite this, one also grasps properties of imaginative objects that are mainly given in other senses, such as smoothness, roughness, and which can also be grasped with the help of sight or hearing. Moreover, a cinemagoer can perceive properties, such as smells, which the senses of sight and hearing cannot provide at all, thanks to associated secondary olfactory images, etc.9
§ 3. The observation of a film and its object
286 a) Sensory content given in visual sensations is arranged into certain wholes, called presenting content. For the cinemagoer, however, they do not present the reproducing object, i.e., the screen together with the phantoms covering it, but play the role of appearances of imaginative objects or reproduced objects, depending on the viewer's attitude. When watching scientific films or film weeklies, the goer is focused on reproduced objects, in other films— basically on imaginative objects, rarely only on the reproduced ones, [| 11] e.g., when one knows the cities, mountains, buildings, etc., which constitute the background of the action [of the film] or sometimes in historical films. Reproducing objects are given to one in perceptive images, imaginative or reproduced objects—in imaginative images.10
b) "Observation" in the broader meaning of the term is usually only a series of systematically successive perceptions of a certain object. However, there is
9	It should be added to the above argumentation that the role of the reproducing object is played by phantoms on the screen, objects that are exceptionally "volatile," "non-massive," "non-corporeal," and "fleeting," and that some of these properties are transferred to the imaginary objects, which in turn make them similar to the objects of daydreaming.
10	Cf. my treatise: Blaustein 1930, passim.
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nothing preventing us from also referring to a series of imaginative presentations as observation, experienced together with attention in the cinema.11 A cinemagoer thus observes everything that happens in the imaginative world appearing "on" the cinema screen. One perceives the sensory content given to one as appearances of mountains, cities, streets, people, etc., and one observes everything that happens to people, cars, etc., against the background of these mountains, streets, and interiors. The goer can observe these events thanks to a series of appearances appearing on the screen, where of course only snippets of these events are given to one in the appearances, only certain phases of them. These appearances change often and quickly, which is why we talk about the snapshot nature of film images. Thanks to this snapshot nature, the cinemagoer does not sense the absence of words (a meaning) (Irzykowski 1924, 127).
The conditions of observation in the cinema are partly different from those in other circumstances, which also explains the goer's interest in film. A cinemagoer can view a given object from various viewpoints. A painter must limit herself to presenting the object from only one viewpoint (Cornelius 1921, 22); even in ordinary life, the possibilities of observation from different 287 viewpoints [| 12] are sometimes more limited than in the cinema. A film shows us a crowd raging with anger from the viewpoints of various people who are part of the crowd, from the viewpoints of observers placed above the crowd (from a bird's eye view), or even below the crowd, when we see only the feet of rushing people. A painter must take a position sufficiently distant from the painted object or objects (Cornelius 1921, 23) to be able to encompass their entirety at one glance; otherwise, the painting will be unclear in terms of its spatiality. A film director may not take this [adequate distance] into account; one may present a human face or some other objects so that their image fills the entire screen, and after a moment this object will appear at an appropriate
11 We speak of "observation" in the stricter sense of the term only where these series of perceptions are made for research purposes. This meaning is what Twardowski seems to have in mind in his treatise "O metodzie psychologii" (Twardowski 1910, 10). One could argue that, in this sense too, a cinemagoer observes, because one follows objects on the screen, for example, in order to learn the fates of film characters. However, a cinemagoer cannot observe individual, quickly disappearing images, but the imaginary objects given in them.
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distance among other objects, this enables the appropriate location of the fragment, which previously was shown from a close-up. Similarly, when we perceive the world around us, we focus our attention on different objects, but then we cannot freely bring it closer and enlarge it, as a film does. An analogy would rather be provided by observing objects in the theater or in ordinary life through binoculars, because in this way we achieve a closer and enlarged object, and by doing so, we limit the visual field solely to that object. But in the theater or ordinary life, we make our own choices about which objects we want to look at more closely, while a cinemagoer cannot constitute their activity in this respect. The value of a film depends to a large extent on whether the film directs the goer's attention in accordance with their interests, aroused by the images so far. If this is the case, the goer hardly feels the aforementioned passivity.
It is precisely by showing fragments, isolating details, cutting out, by enlarging, reducing, or changing the usual perspective to another, by changing the usual pace to a faster or slower one (Irzykowski 1924, 83, 146)—all of this 288 makes the observation of things and events in the cinema sometimes more interesting, even if these things and events are not interesting in themselves. [| 13] Slow-motion shots or sped-up projection of a film onto the screen are particularly interesting for psychological analysis. While watching them, the goer can clearly distinguish two different rates of the passage of time, and realize that there in the imaginary world time now passes at a slower or faster pace than in the real world, in which the goer finds herself (Blaustein 1930, 21 ff.). This phenomenon cannot be found, for example, in the theater, where only the time between parts [of the play] or scenes sometimes passes faster, and not the duration of the action on the open stage.
c) In the context of observation in the cinema, it is worth noting that despite the two-dimensionality of the screen, on which phantoms appear and disappear, imaginary objects are viewed by the cinemagoer in a three-dimensional space; there they are grouped in front of his body—not in front of the one sitting in the audience, but in front of the body, which is unconsciously and invisibly projected into that imaginary world (Blaustein 1930, 18 ff.). These objects are perceived by the cinemagoer not as "one-sided, partial, shell-like, shifted in perspective in relation to us, different in their changes"—as Oleksiuk
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characterizes objects viewed in the attitude toward their appearances in his so-far unpublished work on the so-called perceptual judgment—"but [they are perceived] as identical in themselves, versatile, full in their depth, having back sides and interiors."
Just as these objects are located in the background or are close by, to the left or to the right, so also the sounds and noises that reach us from this imaginary world come from far away or close by, from above or below, from the left or the right. The objects seen on the screen are moving, and thus, with good synchronization, the location of the sounds and noises made by these objects changes. Sometimes, we hear the sounds and noises of objects that have not yet appeared or that have already disappeared from the screen. The strength of the sounds, the tempo, the rhythm, etc., contribute to the fact that we experience what K[arl] Lange calls—perhaps not entirely adequately—"musikalische Bewegungsillusion" (Lange 1907, 110 ff.).12 We hear [| 14] thus how certain objects move away or approach after they have disappeared or before they appear on the screen. Objects appear to us in principle as correlated with distance. Similarly, sounds and noises have a strength that usually corresponds 289 to the distance, from which they come. Of course, this is not about distance relative to the body of the cinemagoer. After all, it is only the screen that is closer to the cinemagoer sitting in the first row than to the goer sitting in the last row. As I have already said, the objects seen "on" the screen, which are perceived imaginatively, are grouped in front of the goer's body projected into that world; [this projected body] is invisible and at the same distance from the perceived objects as the camera was from them when capturing the shots (Blaustein 1930, 18). This imaginary spatial world, which is revealed "on" the screen, appears itself as an unfamiliar visitor in the space surrounding the goer, and it is not in any spatial relations to the latter. This is also why, when a train on the screen is barreling straight toward the goer, the goer does not fear for her life; when at the end of the screen the ship partially disappears, the goer does not search for the rest of it on the walls. One does not see a destroyed ship then, but half of the ship. This does not require a phantasmic supplementation of the seen half of the ship with the other; this is no different than in everyday life,
12 ["[M]usical illusion of movement."]
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where objects partially disappear beyond our visual field. After all, we perceive them as whole objects, and not as pieces of objects. The space revealed on the screen in the background has no boundaries, it stretches into the distance, if it is open (e.g., a desert landscape, the sea); the edges of the screen are sharp, but they clearly indicate that they hide the "continuation" of the imaginary space and the objects, which fill this space. If the screen is covered with an image of an object whose contours merge with the screen boundaries, the boundaries no longer indicate this "continuation" (which Lipps (1914, 156 ff.) criticizes in the context of the images that he analyzes from these viewpoints, and which a film operator should also avoid). [| 15] The foreground "boundary" of imaginary space is different from its lateral edges and its depth. It is not sharply closed like the side boundary, nor does it extend endlessly forward (but it is given as the depth). The psychological situation is in this respect analogous to that, in which we observe the world around us; it should be emphasized, however, that the visual field of a cinemagoer has different contours from the normal visual field, and that objects or their parts seen between the eye and the 290 screen are not perceived as a continuation of the imaginary world.
Lange claims that in the cinema we see movements,13 but not space. "Die Personen huschen mit ihrer Bewegung flächenhaft, wie Schemen an uns vorbei... Die Bewegung brauchen wir uns nicht hinzudenken, denn wir sehen sie wirklich. Den Raum dagegen müssen wir uns hinzudenken, denn in Bezug auf ihn findet keine optische Täuschung statt" (Lange 1907, 267-268.)14 It seems to me that Lange is wrong. Perhaps he was right about the films available 50 years ago, when he was writing his book. I recall, moreover, that I myself felt the same way, when I was in the cinema for the first time. Normally, however, a cinemagoer accustomed to watching films perceives the imaginary space visually as having three dimensions, without the help of phantasy, as Lange15 claims.
13	We will not deal with the psychological analysis of perceiving movements in the context of cinema. It has been experimentally studied many times.
14	["In their movement, the persons drift past us listlessly, like apparitions ... We do not need to contrive the movement, since we really see it. However, we must contrive space, for in relation to it no optical deception takes place."]
15	It is perhaps worth noting a certain prediction of this aesthetician, which did not
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[| 16] I mentioned above that the spatial world revealed to us on the screen has found itself as an unfamiliar visitor in the world around us. This applies to film even more than, for example, to painting. A painting can sometimes serve as a decoration of the surroundings, but a film image never plays this role. In the case of a painting, isolation from the surroundings is marked by the frame, which can be designed in such a way that it becomes a part of the surroundings as a part of its environmental structure. The role of the frame in a film image is played by the darkness around the screen, isolating the imaginary world in a more perfect way than picture frames. The darkness of the cinema hall, which is indispensable for technical reasons, has effects that are more than technical. It makes it easier for the goer, or even forces her, to concentrate on the screen; it performs the indicated isolation and prevents the artificial intrusion of the imaginary world into ours, which is what some strive for in theater, painting, or sculpture. The significance of this isolation is important; according to Utitz, it is even a condition for being an aesthetic object.16 It is also one of the reasons for the aesthetic attitude of the goer, in which one perceives objects in terms of their beauty or ugliness.	291
We have said of this isolation that it is largely the result of the darkness surrounding the screen. It is an interesting phenomenon that, whenever the screen is also covered with darkness in connection with the action, e.g., after the lights in a mine are turned off, the goer feels as if the film has been
turn out to be true. Namely, he writes that the future addition of sound to films will lead to goers experiencing the illusion that they are dealing with nature, and not with a work of art. The accidental circumstance that this nature will be projected onto the surface of the screen will be insignificant, just as viewing natural beings through binoculars does not deprive the goer of the awareness that they are viewing real, natural beings. With the removal of the strong obstacle to illusion, consisting in the lack of appropriate noises connected with moving objects, such as the clatter of a train, the shouts of a crowd, nothing will stand in the way of experiencing illusions (Lange 1907, 267-268). This mistake by Lange results from his erroneous view that the occurrence of certain so-called "illusionsstorende Elemente [illusion-interrupting elements]" depends on whether we perceive certain objects as real or as imaginary. It depends on the subject's attitude, not on the objective properties of the object seen. (Cf. Blaustein 1930, 38. In § 33 of this work, I discuss the issue of whether the cinema viewer experiences illusions or an aesthetic illusion.) 16 See Utitz 1927; also in: Dessoir 1925, 614 ff.
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interrupted; the dark screen merges into one whole with the dark hall, the imaginary world of the film disappears. The situation is somewhat different in a sound film when voices reach us from a dark screen, but in this situation the goer also feels uneasy and must help herself with phantasy, in order to throw some hidden imaginary world into the darkness surrounding her.
d) When observing objects or events, we do so with attention. A cinemagoer, too, while observing everything that happens "on" the screen, focuses her attention on it. [| 17] This is almost never voluntary attention, but involuntary. Even when the film is not very interesting, thanks to the darkness in the cinema hall, involuntary attention is focused on the film, as long as the goer is perceiving the screen at all. If the film is interesting, the focus of attention is exceptionally strong and long-lasting; the world around one disappears for the goer as rarely happens otherwise. This also depends partly on the position in the audience that the goer occupies. For instance, the visual field of a goer sitting on a balcony is usually not as completely limited to the screen as that of a goer sitting on the ground floor. However, the section of the imaginary world seen "on" the screen 292 is large enough for attention to be focused on various parts of it, on this or that character, or on the background. In this respect, too, the activity of a cinemagoer is largely limited. The focus of the goer's attention on this or that detail is decided by the [film's] action, the director,17 and occasionally the goer may free herself from their influence and focus her attention, e.g., on the background or on a character that is not in the foreground at a given moment. Something similar also happens, e.g., to a theatergoer, when one suddenly stops observing a person who is currently active and follows the facial expressions of a person who is passive in a given situation.
§ 4. The role of secondary and non-visual presentations in watching a film
In describing the experiences of a cinemagoer, we have so far only drawn attention to certain perceptive images with simple sensory content experienced by someone, namely visual and auditory sensations, to the sometimes
17 The art of good montage is precisely to direct (in psychological terms) the goer's attention naturally.
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associated simple memory images of these or other senses, and to imaginative presentations based on these visual sensations. Do presentations of other types, i.e., phantasy, memory, schematic, [| 18] symbolic,18 and significative presentations play no role in the psyche of a cinemagoer?
a) Phantasy sometimes plays a certain role in the experiences of the cinemagoer. After all, the goer perceives a whole series of images, between which there is often no continuity. The main character of the film reads a letter, gets into a car, the car speeds through the night, stops in front of their house, etc. However, we do not see the character leaving their apartment; we do not see the entire journey the car takes, nor a scene of them getting out of the car, walking up the stairs, entering the apartment, etc. Do we fill in the missing scenes imaginatively? This happens sometimes, though rarely. Operations of phantasy take place in particular, when the director wishes so—when the director only marks and consciously interrupts certain scenes. This happens in crime films, in order to create the mystery of who committed the crime, in erotic films, where the image disappears when a moment of heightened intimacy or intensity approaches. Sometimes the film directly challenges us to 293 fill in the images seen on the screen with imaginative ones. For instance, it only shows shadows on the wall or outside the window, forcing us to guess what is happening in the room—showing the faces and eyes of people watching something with suspense that the film does not show us, but that we can guess at. In addition, we rarely supplement the images we see with phantasy during the screening, if only because we do not have time, because we are busy watching more and more new images appearing on the screen. The role of phantasy in the situations discussed above resembles the role of phantasy in Volkelt's (1920, 210-211) "supplementary phantasy," which is active when watching images.19 When an image contains some biblical, legendary, or historical content, it is understood—according to Volkelt—only when, in
18	Cf. my treatise: Blaustein 1931, passim.
19	[Volkelt] distinguishes from supplementary phantasy what he calls "umspielende Phantasie," which concerns some indefinite, volatile, and fleeting images. The concept of this phantasy, which is supposed to be active rather when viewing the works of Dürer, Rembrandt, and Klinger than Holbein, Rubens, and Hildebrand, is not entirely clear.
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addition to the presented [| 19] moment of action, we imaginatively present the previous and next moment. As Volkelt himself points out, this can happen without harm to the aesthetic experience, not only with the help of phantasy presentations, but also in a shortened and unclear way with the help of "presentations of meaning."
While discussing the role of phantasy in the experiences of cinemagoers, it is worth emphasizing that young adolescents draw rich material and stimuli for their dreams from films, which are so characteristic of childhood and adolescence, whereas for adults who have lost to some extent the ability to daydream, films are a certain artefact that satisfies their need to travel to other countries and life situations different from their real ones.
b) Memory also plays a certain role in the experiences of the cinemagoer. It supplements the background of the film action, if the surroundings or cities are familiar to the goer, and it supplements the action itself, if the script is a summary of a novel known to them. These supplements can be made in the form of secondary images or by way of signification. In principle, the presence 294 of recognizable objects, whether the surroundings, streets, buildings, or actors, is alien to the overall experience of the cinemagoer, and as such it does not merge with these experiences into a whole; rather, it leads to a change from the attitude toward the imaginary world to the attitude toward the reproduced or reproducing world. This does not apply to recognitions of other types, which are coherently connected with the stream of experiences of the cinemagoer. When, for instance, the film introduces more people of the same sex in the first images, the goer often distinguishes these people from each other in clear instances of recognizing when observing subsequent images. Similarly, recollections of past moments of the action of the film are closely connected with the rest of the experiences of the cinemagoer.20
[| 20] c) In the stream of lived experiences of a cinemagoer, schematic and symbolic presentations undoubtedly sometimes appear, if the objects appearing "on" the screen schematize or symbolize something. Symbolic presentations
20 A relatively small share of secondary images in the experiences of the cinemagoer reduces their role as a factor in the aesthetic experience, discussed, among others, by Groos 1902, 85 ff.
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are more frequent than schematic ones, because of the significant role that symbols and allegories play in cinematographic art. However, the analysis of these film symbols and allegories is rather a matter of film aesthetics, and not the psychology of the cinemagoer.
By understanding the subtitles, letters, or sentences spoken by people "on" the screen, the cinemagoer experiences signitive presentations. The breaks in viewing the imaginary world caused by the display of these subtitles do not interfere with grasping the continuity of events, despite the lack of continuity in observation.21 It is similar with perceptual presentations, when, under the influence of fluctuations in attention, I interrupt my observation. I observe horses running in a race. For a moment, I look at the excited audience, then return to observing the horses, which are already in a different place. Nevertheless, I perceive their current movements as a continuation of those seen before. In cinema, this is all the easier, because the events in the imaginary world do not continue during this break, because, despite the break in observation, no links in the chain of observed events escape it. Because of these pauses, cinema images resemble secondary images that have such breaks 295 (Witwicki 1925, vol. 1, 214). By means of judgments or assumptions, as it seems, the content of the subtitles is "put" in the mouths of the speakers in a silent film, since the subtitles are usually not perceived at the same time as the speakers are viewed.
§ 5. Types of objects viewed by the cinemagoer
We already know what kind of presentations the cinemagoer experiences, and how one makes objects present to oneself. Now, [| 21] let us ask what kind of objects one makes present to oneself, because the kind of these objects may explain the wide scope of the various experiences of the cinemagoer (cf. §§ 9 and 10).
Wallis-Walfisz, while discussing groups of aesthetic objects that are not works of art, lists, among others, things and natural phenomena, activities,
21 We are not interested in the question of whether the inscriptions interfere with aesthetic experiences.
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human lives and institutions, and technological products.22 Cinema provides us with the appearances of all these objects.
a)	Film shows us the beauty of nature, delights us with appearances of sunsets, moonlit nights, golden waves of grain, the sky before a storm—gives us the appearance of things that we do not observe in ordinary life due to various difficulties, e.g., the seabed, exotic flora, the starry sky viewed through a telescope. It also draws our attention to things that we pass by without a thought, e.g., the beauty of snow-covered trees or a romantic view of city roofs. It also shows us extraordinary events in nature: floods, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. Film spreads before us all the charms of nature, not only its shapes, lights, and sometimes colors, but also movements (bodies of water, animals, clouds) and bird calls, the rustling of trees, the sound of sea waves, the murmur of rain. It cannot provide only the scent of flowers, the taste of fruit, the sensations of temperature, touch, or the breeze, or perhaps only exceptionally in the form of associated secondary sensations. Nature affects all the senses, nature in film only some. Non-color film takes away the colors
296 of plants, animals, etc., but not the shades of colors or the play of light and shadow.
b)	Human bodies, their beauty, comedy, and strength, human bodies while dancing, working, and running—these are the other types of aesthetic objects that the cinemagoer perceives. The shared rhythm of the collective work of rowers, the beautiful jump of a skier, the gymnastic exercises of thousands of people, horse races, military parades, carnival processions, street gatherings, [| 22] groups of people interacting with each other with exquisite politeness, crowds of amused children—all this appears on the film screen.
c)	Moreover, cinema provides us with the appearances of architectural and technical constructions, such as pyramids, skyscrapers, Hindu temples, Renaissance palaces, the appearances of magnificent bridges, ships, air squadrons performing beautiful acrobatics, tall factory chimneys, and radio towers. Other images combine the beauty of animated machines with the rhythm of human work, showing the path taken by telegrams or the creation of
22 Wallis-Walfisz 1931b, 783-802. One may draw numerous examples from this article. The author, however, forgets about cinema completely.
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a newspaper in a printing house. Film can show us everything that constitutes the beauty of technical products, the purposefulness of construction, the simplicity and clarity of construction and fragmentation, the specific beauty of materials, the beauty of shapes, the rhythm resonating in the whole, the monumentality or filigree of dimensions (Wallis-Walfisz 1931b, 783-802).
d)	But cinema can provide more than what can be perceived in regular conditions. It enables the "visibility of invisibility"—as Irzykowski (1924, 25 ff.) puts it—it shows, for example, marvelous transformations of a man into an animal, an artificial human being, talking animals, fairy-tale wonders and fears, ghosts, or miracles of Hindu yogis.
e)	Similarly to the beauty of nature and the human body, technology, human play and work, the works of fine arts, i.e., products of architecture and sculpture, painting (decorations), and artistic industry can be admired by the cinemagoer. In addition to the arts created mainly for the eye, music has also become a "supplier" for cinema. The cinemagoer perceives all these wonders most often in passing, accompanying the people in the film on a journey by train (views from the window), ship, or plane, on walks through 297 fields and meadows, on mountain trips, in car rides along streets flooded with illuminated advertising at night. However, another aesthetic object usually comes to the forefront—human characters, human life and its strange fates, human happiness and despair. [| 23]
II. Higher Intellectual Functions and Emotional Experiences
§ 6. Experiences, in which the understanding of film takes place
a) The cinemagoer perceives not only a series of loose images presenting individual objects and events, but perceives these individual events as components of a larger whole, as parts of the action.23 It is not enough for the cinemagoer to perceive individual images, one must also understand their connection with the whole. This understanding takes place in acts of
23 The action consists of parts (acts), those of episodes, episodes of scenes, and those of many cycles of images, taken from one point of view—the so-called film set.
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judgment, based on imaginative presentations, and therefore devoid of the moment of conviction, i.e., in assumptions (Meinong 1910, passim). Already when seeing individual images, the cinemagoer assumes, for example, that the film character is reading a letter from his fiancée. Seeing him getting into the car in the next image, one assumes that the letter contained a call to come immediately. Thanks to these assumptions, the action is combined for the goer into a certain whole, the past parts of which are given to one in memories, the present ones are observed, and the future ones are awaited. These memories, observations, and expectations include assumptions, and these memories and expectations most often rely solely on these assumptions; they usually lack the participation of reproductive or productive images.24
b) Understanding the action of a film is not always easy, and not every person is able to do it. A small child does not; one is usually given only loose images, without grasping the connection between them. But adults sometimes fail to achieve understanding as well. This depends to a large extent on the level of one's intelligence, to which, for example, according to Wiegner (1931, 298 10), the function of understanding is assigned. As I have already [| 24] pointed out at the beginning, the issue of developing the ability to understand films requires an experimental attitude. Various incoherent films pose difficulties in understanding them for the cinemagoer. Certain difficulties are caused, e.g., by interweaving several plot lines with each other; for example, one cycle of images shows how relief forces struggling with difficulties make their way to a besieged fortress, and another how the defense of the fortress is taking place, with the images from both cycles appearing on the screen alternately. Other difficulties arise, because the temporal order of the images does not always coincide with the temporal order of the action of the film. For instance, interjected stories told by people cause the currently watched action to be perceived as past. Subtitles play an important role in this regard; therefore, people who do not read fast enough to read subtitles or who do not understand spoken words complain about not understanding the film's action. Particular difficulties in understanding are caused by certain original films, which use unusual montages, e.g., a contemporary composition or a combination
24 In this respect, I rely on Auerbach's recently published research on memory.
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of several images. Other difficulties are caused by film censorship, which sometimes requires the omission of certain elements of the action or changes in the meaning of subtitles. Understanding the action also depends to a large extent on understanding the mental states of the people presented in the film; we will now deal with [this phenomenon].
§ 7. Types of experiences and psychological traits expressible on
the screen and the means of expressing them
a) Regardless of the result of the dispute on how the experiences of other people are understood, it can be stated that these experiences are given to us thanks to the facial expressions, gestures, and bodies of these people, and thanks to the sounds made by them, whether in the form of shouts or in the form of meaningful sentences, and thanks to the various psychophysical products of these people in the form of letters, etc. A silent film uses primarily facial expressions, gestures, and bodies, supplementing them with subtitles; a sound film also uses facial expressions and body in addition to various sounds
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and songs, supplementing them with sentences uttered by the people in the film.
[| 25] b) A reading of works on facial expressions and body, e.g., Piderit (1886) or Krukenberg (1913), introduces us to the rich inventory of mental states that facial expressions can express without the help of verbal utterances. E.g., the movement of the eyes can make the gaze tired, apathetic, lively, energetic, gentle, restless; depending on the direction, a gaze may be secretive, pedantic, full of delight. The ability of the eyes to express mental states or character traits is enhanced by opening or closing them, wrinkling the forehead when looking at something, the play of tears, on which the shine of the eyes depends, etc. The comportment of the mouth can give the face a bitter or sweet, fierce, contemptuous, searching expression. Our face also owes its ability to express certain mental states to the facial expression of the nose (flaring nostrils), hand gestures, etc.
Among human character traits, which can be expressed through facial expressions, gestures, and body, including race and age, we find, above all, permanent dispositions, such as cleverness, stupidity, arrogance, pride, submission, etc. A bitter person has a shrunken face, covered with wrinkles
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and furrows. A balanced, cheerful person has bright eyes radiating with joy, calm, and slow movements. The inventory of momentary emotional states that can be expressed in this way is inexhaustible. These include fear, depression, a mood of excitement, agitation, concern, despair, astonishment, delight, humility, shame, contempt, joy, etc. The means of expressing mental states also include yawning, moaning, sobbing, gnashing of teeth, whispering, screaming, singing, laughter, or smiling, which can be embarrassed, joyful, playful, or ironic. Various feelings can manifest themselves naturally or in a clearly restrained form; overcoming physical pain or anger has a specific facial expression. Facial expressions also reveal to us the effort, with which certain actions are performed, whether with increased strength or with fatigue, exhaustion due to excessive exertion. [| 26] Certain actions or facial expressions, such as kissing, eating (the pleasant or unpleasant taste of a dish, satiety), eavesdropping on a stranger's conversation, etc., have particularly clear and unmistakable expressions.
The most limited is the inventory of intellectual experiences expressed 300 through facial expressions, gestures, and body. It consists primarily of attention, sudden recollection of something, the quality of judgment (confirmation or denial with the head), and the very fact of intense thinking, of mental work. Generally speaking, however, the possibility of expressing intellectual experiences, especially the content of thoughts through facial expressions and body is very limited, which leads to the hegemony of the emotional sphere over the intellectual sphere in film, as Ingarden (1931, 335) writes.
c) Moreover, feelings also have intellectual content (a "central and peripheral factor of feeling" according to Witwicki (1925, vol. 2, 14 ff.)), which is available not due to facial expressions and body, but due to the situation, knowledge of the stimuli that caused the given feelings, due to the subtitles, etc. Knowledge of the situation in which certain persons find themselves, the stimuli to which they react, is, next to facial expressions, etc., important to the cinemagoer's understanding of the film characters. That is why a cinemagoer who came after the screening had already begun often does not understand at all or partially the facial expressions of the film characters, but after watching the film again from the beginning, one understands much more; movements
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that were previously meaningless now become meaningful. Sometimes, the goer may become uncertain about what feelings the imaginary person is experiencing. Feeling alien feelings may, similarly to thinking alien thoughts, be accompanied by doubts as to whether these alien thoughts and feelings are really as they are thought, as they are felt. Sometimes, the cinemagoer thinks that the imaginary person is experiencing something, but the signs of these experiences may be "ambiguous." The spoken word or inscription (letter, etc.) helps then; its role is not limited to expressing the intellectual life of imaginative persons, but serves also [| 27] to express and disambiguate their feelings. Just as facial expressions and gestures alone are sometimes not enough to know the type of feeling experienced by the imaginative person, subtitles alone or an oral statement may not be enough to evoke the conviction that this very person experiences certain feelings if they are not accompanied by appropriate facial expressions. If someone says they are suffering, whereas we would not know it from their face and, on the contrary, their eyes laugh at us—we suspect them of being insincere. This is sometimes planned with purpose by the screenwriter and the actor (insincere characters, irony etc.), and sometimes the result of 301 poor, unconvincing acting by the actor. It should also be noted that acting on stage, in a film, etc., takes into account—as Lange (1907, 300 ff.) rightly emphasizes—a compromise between the naturalness of facial expressions and their clarity for the goer. The actor consciously changes their movements to turn partly toward the goer, changes their gestures, sometimes intensifying slight movements of the face into a distinct grimace, and changes their speech for various reasons. Nevertheless, certain ambiguities remain for the goer, which are often removed—as we shall see—, as far as emotional experiences are concerned, by another important factor, namely, the music which accompanies the film (cf. § 8).
As we have stated, facial expressions, gestures, and body are the most important factors in the goer's understanding of the richness of the emotional experiences of film characters. These factors fail when it comes to the content of thoughts, intellectual experiences, and the intellectual content of feelings, and here they are partly replaced by the spoken word and subtitles, the situation, knowledge of the stimuli to which a given person reacts, playing a similar role in facilitating the understanding of facial expressions and gestures to what the
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context of a whole sentence plays in grasping the meaning of an individual expression.
Theater uses a combination of words and mimicry, a work of literature uses only words, a silent film only mimicry, a sound film uses both, but with a clear emphasis on mimicry. Therefore, not only silent films, but also [| 28] sound films, if they are not an imitation of theater, can be said to be characterized to a large extent by a predominance of the emotional sphere over the intellectual— although to a lesser extent than silent films.
§ 8. The role of musical illustration in the overall experience of the cinemagoer
a) We have already said that in film it is usually the human being, one's character, one's strange fate, which comes to the fore. They are reflected in one's feelings, and the fact that film can show them indirectly contributes to the pleasure that film evokes in goers. This is in accordance with the trend in aesthetics that Geiger (1908, 323) calls "organic aesthetics," according to which nature and art are aesthetically valuable because of the "life content" (Lebensgehalt) that is revealed in them. This revelation, the expression of feelings in the film in a way that is understandable to the cinemagoer and in a way that arouses their empathy, their sympathy, is facilitated to a large extent by the music that accompanies the film.
The hegemony of the emotional sphere over the intellectual one in film means that the goer's participation in the film's action depends mainly on their understanding of the emotional states of the characters, on their properly empathizing with these feelings, and on their co-experiencing (to a certain extent) these moods and feelings. The music, which accompanies the film, if properly selected, contributes significantly to both. The melodies can be cheerful, sad, lively, or solemn—accompanying the actions of people who attempt to communicate these moods with their facial expressions and sometimes with their statements; the melodies make this task much easier. When a film takes the goer to a café, to war, to a revue theater, to some ceremony, the right music perfectly puts the goer in the right mood— something the image of a silent film without any music, singing, etc., would not be able to do to the same extent. When [| 29] the main character of the
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film rejoices when one suffers or longs, when they pass from one emotional state to another, when feelings are agitated or calmed, the music marks these mental metamorphoses, expressing cheerful moods in a major key, sad moods in a minor key, using dissonance as a means of bringing about a sudden change of mood, e.g., when it comes to disturbing the peace, silence, and weather (Reiss 1922, 44).
b)	If we consider that the "content" of music is moods (R[ichard] Wagner), it will seem natural to us that it is closely connected with film. After all, what Wagner said about music, that it is exclusively the language of feelings, can be applied to a large extent—as we have seen (§ 7)—to silent films, and to some extent also to sound films. Thus, nothing is more natural than combining these two languages, expressing feelings, in order to make this expression more explicit, to give it greater "insight" into the goer's psyche. Silent films provide only visual images. Sound films also provide murmurs, songs; they renounce music only when spoken words come to the fore. Usually, music should even be prioritized with regard to its ability to express moods. Playing the flute
will convey the mood aroused by fields and meadows, rather than playing 303 only natural sounds. In music, as in film, tragedy, sublimity, and charm can manifest themselves, so it comes as no surprise that music can be tuned to any film action. There is no comedy, wit, or irony in music, because they require intellectual elements (Reiss 1922, 52-53); there is only humor in the sense of a mood full of cheerfulness and playfulness. Similarly, in film comedies, the spoken word seems more indispensable than in tragedies. Sometimes, however, a good comedic effect is achieved by a serious musical piece contrasted with something frivolous taking place in the scene.
c)	In addition to the just-mentioned connection between music and film as a means of expressing feelings, there are also certain differences, which make film and music complementary in this respect. According to Volkelt's view, the feeling that [| 30] the aesthetically experiencing person feels can be experienced in two ways: a) as a so-called presented feeling and b) as a real feeling. Music and songs have the ability to arouse feelings of the latter type, while visual arts and literature, apart from songs, rather arouse feelings of the former type. Tones have the ability to go through us. "Die Tone scheinen in
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uns hineinzuklingen, sich in unser Ich hineinzuwuhlen,"25 writes Volkelt. Something similar cannot be said about spatial Gestalts. They stand at a certain "distance" from us. This is why the feelings expressed by tones merge more with our actual experiences than feelings, which are expressed by spatial Gestalts (Volkelt 1920, 58). The longing expressed by music puts us in a longing mood; the longing expressed by the facial expression of a painted figure only arouses our understanding, the presentation of this feeling. In the cinema, we have a combination of both. Music usually arouses real feelings, the visual image on the screen usually presents feelings. When the imaginary character is jealous or despised, their sight arouses analogous feelings in the goer, only if one oneself was recently or is currently in a similar life situation. Music, in turn, allows the appearance of real feelings, e.g., joy, even if the goer's life situation does not encourage one to do so. We have already mentioned the projection of the goer's body into the imaginary space. Through the music, the goer is immersed into this imaginary world emotionally; one succumbs to the mood of a ball thanks to Strauss's waltzes—one wishes to dance, as if one were 304 oneself at the ball that the film screen presents.
d) All this explains the enormous influence of music on the psyche of the cinemagoer. It is known that the use of music in the theater intensifies the viewer's feelings (the scene of the mother's death in Ibsen's Peer Gynt). In regard to film, it can be said that without the help of the strong tone of a trumpet, without the sound of the flute, film could not evoke certain moods at all—it could not have the exciting effect [| 31] of increasing our energy and will to live, which is achieved by the rising melody line, nor could it lower any resulting psychological tension, introduce calm, or arouse depression and helplessness of will, which is the work of the falling melody (Reiss 1922, 41). It is known that the desire to break the monotony of everyday life is often a motivator for seeking aesthetic experiences. The ally of film in satisfying this desire is music, sometimes awakening pleasant, cheerful moods, other times serious and depressed, sometimes awakening in the heart of the listener complaint, pain, longing, and sadness, other times feelings of tenderness, delight, strength, and triumph, giving someone, whom the monotonous reality of life has deprived
25 ["The tones are lost in us, they are lost in one ego."]
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the opportunity to develop their feelings, the opportunity to get to know that wealth of emotional experiences, of which one is capable (Witasek 1904, 134-135). The enormous significance of the influence of music in the whole experience of the cinemagoer will be appreciated only by someone who has had the opportunity to watch a silent film without musical accompaniment. A goer accustomed to that accompaniment, in the absence of it, will feel a strange alienness in what is happening on the screen; it seems to the goer that some shadows appear and disappear there, not living people, and the facial expressions are rather comical. The great importance of music in cinema is usually overlooked, because the goer's attention is so strongly focused on the visual apprehension of the images that one hardly hears the music; sometimes, one is not even aware of the familiarity of the piece being played at the time. Schopenhauer could extend his contempt for opera music to film music, as in cinema the goer likewise cannot devote themselves exclusively to listening to the music—it even recedes into the background. In fact, one could separate the musical piece from the film, usually without harming the music, but with great harm to the film.	305
It is interesting that music, acting as if it were hidden, is an excellent "interpreter" of the feelings of film characters. When music comes to the forefront, as in opera, e.g., when a film character expresses their feelings of anger through song, the music fulfills its role [| 32] much worse; the goer relaxes, the tension caused by the mimicked presentation of anger and the accompanying appropriate musical illustration disappears, with the goer not listening to it with clear attention.
e) The connection between film, especially silent film (sound films are also silent at moments), and music is also facilitated by the subordinate role of words both in music and in film. Music expresses emotional states; it is indifferent to the events that caused them. Film expresses emotional states, showing in addition the events that caused them; film and music are indifferent to the intellectual reflections that accompany events and feelings, which precede them or follow them. A novel or drama sometimes reflects in great detail the battle of thoughts in the main character's psyche, while film is limited to reflecting the battle of feelings with the help of music, even using an oral statement or a subtitle to inform the goer of a battle of feelings rather than a battle of thoughts.
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Not only is music an ally of film, but also, conversely, for certain people film is an ally of music. As is commonly known, and as P[hilip] E[wart] Vernon's survey has shown, music evokes a series of free associations, often very pleasant ones. This distracts attention from the music itself, and this is why more musical people attempt to suppress such associations. In particular, when music is similar to the sounds and events of the outside world, listeners experience visual interpretations of it, similar to daydreams.26 Now, in the cinema, film satisfies this need, providing listeners with images and diverting them from listening attentively to the music. This circumstance, of course, deepens the connection between music and film, making it psychologically natural.
f) In this regard, the value of program music as a musical illustration of film should be emphasized, regardless of the controversial aesthetic value of program music in general. [| 33] Program music leverages musical painting, which consists in using appropriate rhythms, sound colors, and harmonies to illustrate certain external events, storms, fights, birdsong, animal voices, 306 rustling, and noises of machinery, etc. Program music also tries to imitate, more or less successfully, the murmur of a stream, turbulent waves, the howling of the wind, the patter of rain, the clatter of horses, etc. Certain instruments have a special ability to evoke certain moods, e.g., the lute—a solemn mood, the sounds of trumpets or fanfares—a ceremonial, victorious mood, horns bring to mind hunting in a forest grove, the sounds of the clarinet and oboes create an idyllic atmosphere. The above examples, compiled by Reiss, prove, according to him, that "the color of sound has a great associative capacity and, due to certain atmospheric analogies, can become an emotional symbol." The programmatic nature of this music, as Reiss writes, can be understood twofold: either as the ability of music to paint and reproduce sensual images, events, and phenomena, or as the most generally understood ability to awaken certain emotional states in the soul of the listener. The first direction is technically possible, but contradictory to the essence of music (Reiss 1922, 58, 65 ff., 67 ff., 80 ff.). With regard to film, program music is useful in both senses as a musical illustration. In a silent film, it can replace natural sounds; it can also be
26 Vernon 1930, 50-63. The essay is summarized in Kwartalnik Psychologiczny 2 (4).
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performed in a sound film by incorporating these sounds into a larger musical whole, awakening certain emotional states in the psyche of the cinemagoer.
The above arguments lead us to the conclusion that the connection between film and music is psychologically natural for various reasons, and it is an indispensable factor in understanding the psyche of the cinemagoer.
§ 9. Non-aesthetic emotional states of the cinemagoer
Investigating further the emotional experiences of the cinemagoer, we will consider the various sources of the cinemagoer's pleasure. [| 34] It is not only about aesthetic pleasure; after all, the fact is that aesthetic pleasure is not the only element that the cinemagoer experiences, and they do not go to the cinema solely in pursuit of it.27
a) Among the non-aesthetic feelings that emerge in the cinemagoer, erotic ones come to the fore, which is the result of the filmmakers' clear desire to evoke arousal in the goer. Experiencing such arousal does not yet cause the cinemagoer to stop having aesthetic experiences. However, in accordance with gg^ numerous aestheticians, e.g., Witasek (1904, 221), I believe that aesthetic experiences themselves do not contain such desires, just as they do not contain the appetite that sometimes arises for the cinemagoer due to dishes shown on the screen.
The result of the tendencies present in the film or the inconsistency of the goer's moral, social, etc., beliefs with the views of the film's creators is the positive or negative moral reactions that sometimes appear in the goer, e.g., patriotic enthusiasm, moral disgust, etc. These reactions may not only be emotional, but also intellectual, e.g., when the film includes moral, social, etc., reflections, called, e.g., by Groos (1902, 93), "extra-aesthetic associations."
27 While considering the emotional experiences of the cinemagoer, I will first discuss their non-aesthetic states, and then their aesthetic and "semi-aesthetic" experiences. Attempting to clearly distinguish between non-aesthetic and aesthetic feelings would exceed the scope of this work. In the following examination, therefore, the main point will be to state that the cinemagoer experiences certain experiences, without examining whether these experiences are aesthetic or not. On the issue of semi-aesthetic experiences, see Blaustein 1931, 133.
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b) Another type of non-aesthetic pleasure, often experienced by the cinemagoer, is the pleasure of getting to know unknown cities, countries, and human customs through film, especially if they are exotic or famous, if one has read or heard about them. In such cases, seeing India, the Paris Opera, and the Niagara Falls [| 35] on the screen satisfies the tendency to visualize, which prevails in our psyche (Blaustein 1931, 30 ff.). However, this pleasure is clearly lacking when the setting of the film is already very familiar. The delight in a film decreases significantly when the goer watches a historical film set in ancient Rome or an exotic one set in South Africa for the sixth time in a row. The triviality of the film's action often causes these feelings to come to the forefront, arousing delight in the film. Views of unknown countries and buildings seen in the cinema, thanks to their beauty, arouse aesthetic pleasure. However, regardless of their beauty, perceiving them for the first time has a specific emotional charm for the goer. The sight of torches in the mountains, carried at night by people searching for lost tourists, is always beautiful, and yet seen for the first time it arouses stronger sensations than for the second or 308 third time, and this difference in intensity is not explained solely by a dulling of the aesthetic sensation. The pleasure in question is so strong that Irzykowski could rightly write: "One goes to the cinema not for artistic sensations, but sincerely to see something new and revel in some cinematic achievement" (Irzykowski 1924, 61).
But it is not only the imaginative perception of things that were never seen before that has the charm of novelty for the cinemagoer. There is a need in us to see things imaginatively that we have already seen directly in perception. That is why we like to look at photographs of people we know, a film against the background of landscapes and cities we know. Irzykowski rightly emphasizes that art generally restores the moment of wonder, the moment of "first sight" (Irzykowski 1924, 27). Irzykowski writes that, e.g., he liked gymnastic exercises in the cinema better than in reality, explaining this with the so-called "mirror law," which consists in the desire to see things and matters in isolation from reality (Irzykowski 1924, 29). However, two things should be distinguished here: [| 36] the pleasure of seeing things in isolation from reality, and the pleasure of imaginatively perceiving something for the first time, which interests us now.
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However, it is not only pleasant for us to perceive imaginative objects, which we have already seen perceptually, but also, conversely, to naturally perceive objects, which we have only perceived imaginatively so far. Among the experiences of a cinemagoer, we will often find desires for the perception of countries, cities, celebrations, etc., perceived imaginatively with pleasure on the screen.
c)	While discussing the issue of what it means to understand a film, we drew attention to the fact that a cinemagoer performs certain mental operations. The successful accomplishment of these operations is a source of pleasure for the cinemagoer. This pleasure is absent, whenever these operations are ineffective, i.e., whenever the goer does not understand the film's action. The goer clearly feels this, when the film is "too difficult" for them or when it is illogical, when it contains contradictions. This causes a certain dissatisfaction in the goer, while grasping the plot of a "more difficult" film arouses clear satisfaction. A cinemagoer is also dissatisfied, when the script is banal, when there is no need to think, to guess, which is one of the most common sources of dissatisfaction
of a cinemagoer with a film. The disadvantage of a banal film is that it weakens 309 the goer's tension—one's curiosity about what will happen next, what fate has in store for the characters. This tension is weakened by the goer himself, even when watching an unconventional film, if, having arrived late for the beginning of the screening, one first watches the end of the film, and then its beginning. In this way, one deprives oneself of much of the pleasure of watching a film; the end of a film before watching its beginning, which undermines numerous fanciful desires and wishes concerning the fate of the characters, assumptions about their fate, or anxiety or joyful anticipation one might otherwise feel. In place of these experiences, there is then a cool guess as to what the unknown links of the film action will be. The fact that the cinemagoer often watches [| 37] the film from the middle, which, for example, the reader of a novel does not do (one does not read the second volume before the first one), indicates that the film's action is often something secondary for the goer. Its various other values come to the fore, which is also evidenced by the desire to watch the film a second time, which is often done by the goers.
d)	The tension of the cinemagoer and any related experiences, such as the aforementioned desires, assumptions, anxieties, and expectations, intensify,
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not unlike the intellectual operations discussed earlier, the activity of the cinemagoer. The mental work of the goer, their psychological activity, is one of the main reasons why one likes to spend time in the cinema. Postponing discussion of the relation of this pastime to ordinary activities and to fun until later (cf. § 10), we will now focus on the numerous subjective emotional states of the goer as a goer, [states, which are] connected with this activity. Such states are, on the one hand, the goer's liveliness, on the other, fatigue—boredom with the monotony of a given film or films of a relevant type in general. Whether the states of the former or the latter type occur in the goer depends on the type and value of the film and on the goer's past (which and how many films one has watched), on one's sensitivity and expectations. Positive states of the former kind—relating to the goer's liveliness—are usually connected with the desire to prolong the state of watching the film, the desire for the film not to end yet, for it to last longer. States of the latter type, in turn, result from the goer's dulling of the stimuli flowing from the screen, which is the result of frequent visits to the cinema, and mass production of films, which thus often 310 provide similar stimuli, repeating the background, action, etc. Sometimes, however, these states of weariness and boredom are rather the effect of the goer not "being in the mood," consisting in the lack of an appropriate mental attitude toward the imaginary world, usually under the influence of thoughts, feelings, and desires related to the goer's life, their hopes and worries, which interrupt the experience of watching the film, under the influence of which [| 38] the film seems to be stupid, lifeless, boring. Watching a film requires— as we already know—a strong concentration of the goer's attention. This is impossible if the thoughts, feelings, or desires discussed above occur. We will emphasize now that the subjective emotional states of the goer considered above are sometimes joined by others, such as invigoration, relief, shock, a sense of happiness, depression, a feeling of intoxication, elation, or a feeling of triumph.28 These are emotional states that are the result of strong aesthetic experiences.
Finally, it is worth considering the feelings of admiration or similar feelings experienced by a cinemagoer for the creators of the film, for the director,
28 Volkelt 1904, 66; Wallis-Walfisz 1931a, 618-624.
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actors, the screenwriter, etc. In order to experience these feelings, the focus on the imaginary world must be suspended for a moment. It is interesting that this admiration appears precisely, when the cinemagoer is most absorbed in the film, when the experienced feelings reach the peak of their intensity. However, I have the impression that both intellectual reflections and emotional experiences related to the creators of the film occur less often in a cinemagoer than, for example, in a theater viewer, because the lack of the physical presence of the performers makes them less aware of their existence.
e)	The share of non-aesthetic factors in the unity of the cinemagoer's experiences seems to be larger than in the case of a person enjoying other arts. Does this not make aesthetic experience impossible? Not necessarily; their significant share in the unity of experiences in the cinema, even in terms of quality and intensity, does not have to—as Witasek also states—deprive the experience of its aesthetic character. However, they should not dominate; they should not exceed the intensity of aesthetic experiences, they should be part of the unity without coming to the forefront of attention. In this role, according to Witasek, they deserve to be called "pseudo-aesthetic" factors 311 ("pseudoästhetische Genussfaktoren"). However, when they come to the fore, when they appear in isolation [| 39] from the rest of the experiences, aesthetic feelings lose their leading position; the unity of experience no longer has a uniform aesthetic character (Witasek 1904, 234-235). This often happens to
the cinemagoer either because of oneself or because of reasons inherent in the film itself, in the intentions of its creators who are not always interested in evoking aesthetic experiences in the goer.
f)	A cinemagoer is not always aware that the pleasure one experiences while watching a film is not an aesthetic pleasure. It does not emerge with the beauty of the film, but with its other values. This is why cinemagoers often experience dilettantism in their aesthetic experience. According to Geiger, it is characterized by two circumstances: 1. a work of art evokes experiences, which do not arise with the value of the artwork as such, but with something else (ethical, patriotic, religious, erotic feelings), 2. these inadequate experiences are considered to be truly aesthetic experiences. Less common among cinemagoers, however, is another type of aesthetic dilettantism, which is characterized by a transition from an extroverted attitude toward the work
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of art ("Aussenkonzentration"—as Geiger (1928, 4, 13 ff.) puts it) to an introverted attitude, in which the work of art becomes only a means of daze ("Rauschmittel"), used to evoke feelings in the goer, which the goer delights in. The former mental attitude is specifically aesthetic—the latter is typically amateurish, and occurs particularly often in those listening to music or reading lyrical poetry. The context of watching a film, as described above, is not very conducive to the development of the latter attitude, i.e., the introverted attitude, and this explains its rather rare occurrence in the cinemagoer.
§ 10. Aesthetic and "semi-aesthetic" experiences of the
cinemagoer
a) According to Lange, we experience aesthetic experiences only through hearing and sight.29 According to him, [| 40] we deal with art precisely, where there is an attempt to evoke pleasure in the creator or the experiencer through one of these two main senses, without any other direct goals (Lange 1907, 46, 56). The cinemagoer owes their sensations—as we have seen—exclusively to the senses of sight and hearing, while the creators of the film strive to give the experiencer pleasure. It is no wonder, then, that aesthetic experiences are important among the experiences of the cinemagoer. Although Irzykowski (1924, 197) rightly writes that cinema primarily satisfies the hunger of the eyes, hearing is also used in cinema to constitute aesthetic experiences (cf. § 8). Therefore, in addition to literature, which may provide a plot, all arts that create for the eye and ear, such as dance, can become providers for film. To these are added nature, technology, the human body, play, the work of individuals and the masses, thus providing—as we have seen above (cf. § 5)—the most diverse objects capable of evoking aesthetic pleasure with their beautiful appearances.30 All these objects reach the screen captured in a certain
29	The issue of the influence of the images derived from the lower senses on aesthetic experience is a controversial issue, also studied experimentally. Cf. Kulpe 1921, 74.
30	Witasek (1904) distinguishes—as it is well known—five groups of aesthetic objects: 1. simple sensory content, 2. Gestalt qualities, complexes, 3. objects consistent with the norm, 4. objects expressing mental states and moods, 5. objectives (events, situations, etc.). All groups can be found among aesthetic objects that reveal themselves to the cinemagoer. The third type has not yet been specified in the above analyses. It is
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way by the camera. Photography, as we know, becomes a separate art, and the way, in which these objects are recorded by the camera on the film strip, largely determines whether the beauty of their appearances will impose itself on the goer or not. In addition to the sources of the goer's dissatisfaction with film already discussed, dissatisfaction with poor photography is one of the most common. Another source [| 41] of dissatisfaction is the poverty of the background. In the cinema, the goer is not satisfied with the sight of one or a few beautiful objects; one desires richness and variety in this respect.
A cinemagoer, therefore, undoubtedly experiences aesthetic feelings, evoked by the beauty of the appearance of objects perceived on the screen. However, this perception cannot be long-lasting due to the rapid change of images, due to their snapshot nature. This circumstance means that aesthetic enjoyment of the beauty of objects "on" the screen has a different character than, e.g., perceiving paintings or even natural objects, provided that the goer can perceive them for a longer period of time from a certain perspective. It is rather like perceiving, e.g., a landscape from a moving train. Thus, one cannot uncover here new beautiful details, new views of the whole, there is no 313 intensity of delight, no full blissful duration in perceiving a beautiful object. A cinemagoer—as we already know (§ 3)—is limited in the freedom to choose objects that one wishes to perceive attentively, and the time for which one can perceive given objects; neither depends on the goer at all. An aesthetically sensitive goer often feels this, regretting that a certain film image has already passed, being angry at the excessively fast pace of the displayed images.
Nonetheless, film provides compensation to the goer in the form of the possibility of an imaginative perception of objects in motion. It has already been mentioned that perceiving objects in a closed imaginative world, separated from the surrounding spatial and temporal world, gives us a special aesthetic pleasure. Film enables the imaginative perceiving of a movement, e.g., a herd of horses in a rush, cars, trains, airplanes going through beautiful
often present in cinema; e.g., watching typical characters played by extras gives the goer considerable pleasure. By showing us, e.g., a crowd watching a spectacle, the film draws our attention to certain characteristic characters, e.g., typical spinsters, laughing picnickers, flirting suburban couples, etc. The cinemagoer is less pleased by the tiresome stereotyping of film characters, which is also often encountered.
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surroundings, a human body in action, etc. The dynamics of movement, shown in the film not in one moment, as in painting or sculpture, but in all of its characteristic phases, is a source of numerous aesthetic experiences for the goer, among others when the director has properly exploited the rhythmic values of movement, has given it the right tempo. In particular, the short musical pieces [| 42] present the aesthetic values of the rhythm of movement on the screen, in harmony with the rhythm of the accompanying music.
Another factor that stimulates the goer to aesthetic delight is the composition of individual images, regardless of the beauty of any image. A film or certain parts of a film can be compared to a melody. The whole has a specific aesthetic value, independent of the aesthetic value of individual images. Especially at the beginning of a film, we sometimes encounter such compositions of images which are intended, e.g., to synthetically present the character and mood of a certain large city, jungle, factory life, war, some bygone historical era, or quiet life in the countryside, or on some distant island in the ocean. The right choice of fragments, their proper ordering, sometimes their proper contrasting, often 314 arouses the goer's delight, regardless of whether the goer could analytically give an account of the reasons for the delight—for this composition of images merges for one into a unified whole, to which one responds with an aesthetic experience.
The aim of such compositions of images is usually to evoke a suitable mood in the goer, to introduce one into the setting of the film's action. A film can achieve this, among other things, thanks to the special property of certain appearances of awakening certain emotional moods in the goer. Other emotional reactions, even in the form of the presented feelings, are aroused, e.g., by narrow medieval streets, rather than by the wide streets of contemporary large cities, by views of endless deserts, rather than by the peaks of rocky mountains. The atmospheric values of appearances are rightly exploited by the director to intensify the goer's moods or to help one to understand the feelings of the film's characters. A friendly, cheerful southern landscape or a harsh and sad northern one, the magical charm of night in the forest, the horror of heavy, dark clouds gathering in the firmament, monotonous, hopeless rain, treetops swayed by the wind and storms, or sea waves hitting a rocky shore ineffectively sometimes play a role similar to that played by musical illustration in the overall experience of
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the cinemagoer (cf. § 8). Besides, not only nature, but also technical products or crowds of people can serve as [| 43] a factor that intensifies the mood, as a symbol of feelings. The atmospheric presentation of the landscape seen, etc., and especially its symbolic presentation, depends on the goer, on one's mood, one's phantasy, ability to sympathize,31 etc. The cinemagoer usually does not have this freedom; the atmospheric presentation and symbolic interpretation are imposed on the goer by the film, one can at best remain deaf and blind to the intentions of the film, not understanding the symbolic role of the blooming fields, the connection of the autumn landscape with the film's action. Finally, one can understand the director's intentions, but not feel them emotionally due to the banality or inadequacy of the symbols.
Some believe that participating in the beauty of nature is desirable only if it is closely connected with the film's action. This postulate can be understood as a demand for consistency with the mood, but even a loose connection is enough. For instance, views of nature from a moving car, in which the film's main character is driving somewhere, often serve as a pleasant diversion. It sometimes happens that a cinemagoer dazzled by the beauty of the Alps, for 315 example, changes their attitude toward the imaginary world, moving to the attitude toward the reproduced world, admiring the real Alps, possibly wanting to see Alps perceptually. The same applies to the beauty of the human face and the human body. A cinemagoer captivated by it often admires the beauty of the actress or actor, forgetting for a moment about their imaginary role. From the point of view of film aesthetics, Irzykowski seems to be right in claiming that a beautiful face can have a pleasant effect in the cinema, like any beauty, but it is not a "cinematic sensation" (Irzykowski 1924, 193). From the point of view of psychology, however, the aesthetic experiences of the cinemagoer should also be noted. The aesthetic experiences of the cinemagoer mentioned above are joined by the experiences evoked by the musical illustration, which will not be discussed in more detail, and the experiences evoked by the action.
[| 44] b) A cinemagoer can participate in the film action in two ways. One can perceive the events that take place, as if through the eyes of one or more
31 One can sympathize not only with the experiences of other people, but also with inanimate objects. Cf. Kulpe 1921, 85.
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film characters, sympathizing with their position and feelings, or (possibly simultaneously) look at everything with one's own eyes, with the eyes of an observer who sympathizes, takes a position for or against. In the first case, one sympathizes with the feelings of the film characters (experiencing the so-called "Einfuhlungsgefuhle"); in the second case, one empathizes with the film characters (experiencing the so-called "Anteilsgefuhle") (Witasek 1904, 149). Experiences of these feelings are of course dependent on the satisfactory acting of the actors. Bad acting disturbs the goer in this respect and is another potential source of dissatisfaction with a film. Psychologists and aestheticians have devoted numerous studies to the feelings of "sympathizing."32 At this point, we can just state that they occur in the cinemagoer and that they occur in two forms, determined, among others, by Volkelt. The goer can— excluding the participation of one's own self—present them to oneself as the feelings of strangers. In this case, the subject's participation ("Miterregtheit des Subjekts") occurs only in the form of a feeling that one could experience such feelings oneself in an analogous life situation. However, there is a more 316 subjective sympathy; the goer feels, as if one were embodied in an alien character.33 The fact that the goer, thanks to sympathizing with the psyche of the characters, creates numerous phantasy feelings, which are never or rarely experienced personally, is another important source of pleasure experienced by the cinemagoer. Speaking of sympathizing with alien mental states, it is worth emphasizing the particularly interesting psychological situation, in which some imagined characters grasp the emotional states of other imagined characters, and the goer knows about it and co-experiences this sympathy of, e.g., a mother with the feelings of her child.
[| 45] Based on these feelings of "sympathy" with alien mental states, the goer experiences numerous feelings, such as empathy or antipathy, compassion, anger, contempt, and indignation toward certain imaginary characters, or respect for them and a sense of friendship. The goer rejoices in the success of a character one likes and is saddened when they fail. Experiencing these
32	A summary of the various theories on this topic can be found, among others, in Neumann 1908, 53 ff.
33	Volkelt 1920, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, 58. Also Külpe supports a similar distinction ("einfache und sympathische Einfühlung") (Külpe 1921, 94).
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various feelings greatly increases the goer's mental activity (cf. § 9). It is interesting that when experiencing the most diverse feelings just described, the cinemagoer does not always forget oneself entirely, because sometimes, namely when the experiences of the imaginary character remind one of one's own current, recent, or future difficult experiences, the film arouses intensified thinking about oneself.
In addition to the feelings already mentioned, the cinemagoer sometimes experiences complex emotional states, in which one feels the sublimity, tragedy, or comedy of certain situations, the charm or humor of certain people, etc. The goer particularly often experiences a feeling of comedy, especially the comedy of situations, characters, figures, and their movements, and thanks to subtitles and films with spoken words, also the comedy of language.
c) Various experiences caused by, e.g., one film constitute a closed whole limited in time by the beginning and end of the screening, and sometimes interrupted, to the goer's dissatisfaction, by breaks in the projection, and thus in the aesthetic experience.34 This whole constitutes an interruption of the course of everyday activities of everyday life, and moreover, if the film delights 317 with its aesthetic value, it can constitute a holiday break, can put the goer in the "Sunday mood," which is mentioned by, among others, Lange (1907, 296-297). In everyday life, the overwhelming majority of matters and events have connections with human life; they pose a danger for some and disturbing hope for others, requiring concentration, [| 46] readiness to defend oneself, or nervous effort. In the cinema, the goer perceives matters and events in an imaginary world; one is not a part of this world, and, in this regard, one is not free but not apathetic either (Germans speak of "freies Schweben über den Dingen"35). Despite the lack of connection between these events and one's life and struggle for existence, one reacts to them with vivid feelings; creative mental activity is evident in one's aesthetic experiences. Aesthetic experiences are characterized by complete suspension of the received impressions ("ein reines Sichhingeben an die Erscheinung, ein völliges Sichanschmiegen an den
34	Intermissions in the theater take place after complete sequences of action, whereas interruptions in the cinema are random and irritating to the goer.
35	["[F]loating above things freely."]
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Eindruck"36—as Utitz writes (1927, 234)). Of course, sometimes the goer remains a passive, reluctant observer, namely when the film surprises one with its worthlessness. However, when watching a good film, the goer leaves the cinema joyfully excited, and returns to their activities rested. Any break in everyday life, even if filled with active attitude, is a rest, as long as it completely distracts us from our regular daily activities and worries for a certain time. Being in an imaginary world, just having such a break, is an important factor in mental rest and relaxation. The "I"—figuratively speaking—projected into the imaginary world as an observer, returns to the real world rested, refreshed, and pleasantly excited. This metaphoric description suggests that the processes of watching a film are a kind of play. However, this idea is not correct and should be rejected both in relation to watching a film in particular and to any aesthetic experience in general. Aesthetic pleasure is—as Geiger (1908, 234) emphasizes—joy in certain objective values, the pleasure in fun is joy in one's own skill and independence. The partial analogy of the goer's experiences with the mental states experienced during some games (tension and expectation 318 during betting and lottery games, the activity of phantasy when solving riddles) concerns rather non-aesthetic states of the cinemagoer. There is, however, a certain aesthetic theory that can be perfectly [| 47] applied to the experiences of the cinemagoer, if the values of the film give them a distinctively aesthetic character. It is Schiller's theory of aesthetic appearance, which emphasizes the pictoriality and unreality of the aesthetic world.37
36	["[A] simple surrender to the appearance, a complete attachment to the impression."]
37	Its [i.e., the world's unreality] consequences are characterized by Geiger as follows: "dass wir im aesthetischen alle Fülle des Lebens erleben können, im reicheren Ausmasse, in tieferer Verknüpfung, in rücksichtloser Hingabe, als im gewöhnlichen Leben und doch wegen ihrer Scheinhaftigkeit ohne Verantwortung; dass wir aus der Alltagswelt herausgehoben werden in eine andere, in ihrer Weise doch nicht weniger wirkliche Welt, dass die Gefühle, die wir der Scheinwelt gegenüber erleben, die Frucht mit dem Handeln, die Wut über die Niedertracht des Bösewichts—mit den Gefühlen des wirklichen Lebens verwandt und doch nicht dieselben Gefühle selbst sich" ["that in the aesthetic world the fullness of life can be experienced to a greater extent, in a deeper relationship, in direct devotion than in everyday life, and yet without responsibility for its appearance; that we are transferred from the everyday world to another world, no less real in its own way, that the feelings we experience toward the illusory world, the
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However, a film does not always have qualities that arouse deeper aesthetic experiences in the goer. Geiger (1928, 47 ff.) distinguishes between "Oberflächen-" or "Amüsement-wirkung" and "Tiefenwirkung"38 of art. The aim of the former is the momentary pleasure of the goer; the aim of the latter is to surprise the goer and make one happy. A film often aims only to provide entertainment to the goer, in whose psyche there do not then appear those various feelings, in the description of which we have emphasized that they are the effect of intense, deep aesthetic experiences (cf. § 9). In each of these two psychological situations, the entirety of the experiences of the cinemagoer has a different character, a different coloring, and other experiences come to the fore. These two psychological situations, though having different values from the aesthetic point of view, are equally justified from the psychological point of view, as Geiger himself admits.
It should not be assumed that the various sources of pleasure for the cinemagoer distinguished in the above descriptions evoke separate, simultaneously experienced pleasures. On the contrary, one can point out a fusion of various components of the cinemagoer's experiences into one whole, 319 a fusion especially of emotional experiences. This fusion rejects the atomic character of the wholeness of the goer's experiences, and it constitutes a different character [| 48], e.g., when non-aesthetic emotional states come to the fore under the influence of an entertaining or biased film, or when an aesthetically valuable film evokes strong aesthetic experiences, constituting, as it were, a variety of the unity of experiences, in which its other components serve only as a psychological basis for the aesthetic experience.
Following the example of representatives of psychological aesthetics, I have tried to analyze the entirety of lived experiences experienced by the cinemagoer (similarly to the lived experiences experienced when contemplating works of other arts), and I attempted to distinguish its parts. The unity of these
fruits of our actions, anger at iniquity—are connected with feelings of true life, but in themselves are not the same feelings"] (Geiger 1908, 320). The above characterization is therefore—as we see—in accordance with what we found in the description of the experiences of a cinemagoer. It probably applies to him to a greater extent than to a listener of music, a person viewing works of architecture, sculpture, and even painting.
38 ["[S]urface" or "amusement effect," and "depth effect."]
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experiences, and especially the unity of these numerous types of pleasure as complex aesthetic experiences, consists in the fact that everything that is called aesthetic experience satisfies certain elementary needs of mental life, especially the need for an emotionally tinged viewing (Volkelt). This need in today's man is largely satisfied by film, and therefore the field of the psychology of the cinemagoer deserves—I believe—thorough investigation, to which the above descriptions are to be a small contribution.39
Bibliography | Bibliografija
Auerbach, Walter. 1933. "O przypomnieniach." Przeglqd Filozoficzny 36 (1-2): 107-147.
---. 1935. "Zagadnienie wartosci poznawczej s^dow przypomnieniowych." Kwartalnik
Psychologiczny 7: 33-40. Blaustein, Leopold. 1928. Husserlowska nauka o akcie, tresci iprzedmiocie przedstawienia. Lwow: Nakladem Towarzystwa Naukowego z Zasilkiem Ministerstwa Wyznan Religijnych i Oswiecenia Publicznego. ---. 1930. Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studyum zpogranicza psychologii i estetyki. 320 Lwow: Wydawnictwo Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie. [Partly reprinted in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wyborpism estetycznych, ed. By Zofia Rosinska, 40-68. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 1931. Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne. Badania z pogranicza psychologji i estetyki. Lwow: Nakladem Przegl^du Humanistycznego. [Partly
39 One of the main tasks of the psychology of the cinemagoer, which can be set up after examining the totality of the goer's experiences caused by the stimuli flowing from the screen, is to highlight among them those experiences that occur exclusively in the cinemagoer, which distinguish the goer from the theater viewer, from the reader of a novel, from the listener of music, from the person observing works of art, from the person acting practically in life, etc. This can be done, among other ways, by comparing the totalities of experiences, described first in an exhaustive manner, occurring in these different situations, and it is not excluded that the differences between them will not consist in the appearance of some particular experiences or some specific modification of them, but in the difference in the structure of the totalities of experiences occurring in given situations.
Another task of the psychology of the cinemagoer is to track the changes caused by the transformations of the film in the totality of the experiences of the cinemagoer. Just as the experiences of a person contemplating naturalistic paintings are partly different from those of a person contemplating expressionistic paintings, similarly, in the event of significant changes in film technology, the experiences of a cinemagoer at that time will differ from those one experiences today.
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reprinted in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wyborpism estetycznych, ed. By Zofia Rosinska, 69-91. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.]
Blachowski, Stefan. 1919. Odtworcze wyobrazenia wgchowe w stosunku do wzrokowych i stuchowych. Lwow: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne.
Cornelius, Hans. 1921. Elementargesetze der bildenden Kunst. Grundlagen einer praktischen Ästhetik. Leipzig—Berlin: B. G. Teubner.
Dessoir, Max (ed.). 1925. Lehrbuch der Philosophie. Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten. 2 Bände. Berlin: Ullstein.
Geiger, Moritz. 21908. "Ästhetik." In Systematische Philosophie. Mit Beiträgen von W. Dilthey, A. Riehl, W. Wundt, W. Ostwald, H. Ebbinghaus, R. Eucken, F. Paulsen, W. Münch und Th. Lipps, ed. by Paul Hinneberg, 311-351. Berlin: B. G. Teubner Verlag.
---. 1928. Zugänge zur Ästhetik. Leipzig: Der neue Geist Verlag.
Groos, Karl. 1902. Der ästhetische Genuss. Giessen: J. Ricker.
Ingarden, Roman. 1931. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft. Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag. [Reprinted in: Ingarden, Roman. 1965. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Mit einem Anhang von den Funktionen der Sprache im Theaterschauspiel. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.]
Irzykowski, Karol. 1924. Dziesiqta muza. Zagadnienia estetyczne kina. Krakow: Krakowska Spolka Wydawnicza.
Krukenberg, Hermann. 1913. Der Gesichtsausdruck des Menschen. Stuttgart: Verlag von Ferdinand Enke.
Külpe, Oswald. 1921. Grundlagen der Ästhetik. Ed. by Siegfried Behn. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel.
Lange, Konrad. 21907. Das Wesen der Kunst. Grundzüge einer illusionistischen Kunstlehre. Berlin: G. Grote.
Lipps, Theodor. 21914. Ästhetik. Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst. Zweiter Teil. Die ästhetische Betrachtung und die bildende Kunst. Hamburg—Leipzig: Verlag von Leopold Voss.
Meinong, Alexius. 21910. Über Annahmen. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
Neumann, Ernst. 1908. Einführung in die Ästhetik der Gegenwart. Leipzig: Verlag von Quelle & Meyer.
Piderit, Theodor. 1886. Mimik und Physiognomik. Detmold: Meyer.
Reiss, Jozef Wladyslaw. 21922. Problem tresci w muzyce. Warszawa—Krakow— Lublin—Lodz—Poznan: Naklad Gebethnera i Wolffa.
Schapp, Wilhelm. 1910. Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Göttingen: W. Fr. Kaestner.
Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1910. O metodzie psychologii. Przyczynek do metodologii porownawczej badan naukowych. Warszawa—Lwow: Sklad glowny w ksi^garni E. Wende i Ska (T. Hiz i A. Turkul), H. Altenberg. [Reprint in: Twardowski,
321
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Kazimierz. 1965. Wybranepisma filozoficzne, 205-216. Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.] Utitz, Emil. 1927. "Ästhetik und Philosophie der Kunst." Jahrbücher der Philosophie 3: 306-332.
Vernon, Philip E. 1930. "The Phenomena of Attention and Visualization in the
Psychology of Musical Appreciation." British Journal of Psychology 21 (1): 50-63. Volkelt, Johannes. 1920. Das ästhetische Bewusstsein. München: Beck. Wallis-Walfisz, Mieczyslaw. 1931a. "O doznaniu estetycznym." Wiedza i Zycie 6 (8-9): 618-624. [Reprinted in: Wallis, Mieczyslaw. 2004. Wyborpism estetycznych, ed. by Teresa Pçkala, 116-122. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 1931b. "O swiecie przedmiotow estetycznych." Wiedza i Zycie 6 (11): 783-802. [Reprinted in: Wallis, Mieczyslaw. 2004. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Teresa Pçkala, 6-20. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] Wiegner, Adam. 1931. "W sprawie definicji psychologicznego pojçcia inteligencji."
Kwartalnik Psychologiczny 2: 213-222. Witasek, Stephan. 1904. Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik. Leipzig: Verlag von
Johann Ambrosius Barth. Witwicki, Wladyslaw. 1925. Psychologja. Dla uzytku stuchaczow wyzszych zaktadow naukowych. Vol. 1 & 2. Lwow—Warszawa—Krakow: Wydawnictwo Zakladu Narodowego im. Ossolinskich.
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Translation Prevod
UDC: 159.9
On the Tasks of Humanistic Psychology
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from Polish by Filip Golaszewski Abstract and keywords prepared by Filip Golaszewski Bibliography edited by Filip Golaszewski
Abstract
The essay examines the theoretical basics and methodological framework of humanistic psychology, a psychological approach that investigates experiential wholes of higher order within humanistic reality. In contrast to non-humanistic psychology, which focuses on elementary lived experiences in isolation, humanistic psychology emphasizes the study of complex psychological phenomena as they emerge in relation to cultural artefacts, social relationships, and creative processes. The paper argues
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that humanistic psychology serves as an auxiliary science for the humanities, while maintaining methodological pluralism in its investigative approaches.
Keywords: humanistic psychology, experiential wholes of higher order, humanistic reality, understanding, cultural artefacts.
O nalogah humanistične psihologije
Povzetek
Esej obravnava teoretsko osnovo in metodološki okvir humanistične psihologije kot psihološkega pristopa, ki znotraj humanistične resničnosti raziskuje izkustvene celote višjega reda. V nasprotju z nehumanistično psihologijo, kakršna se osredotoča na izolirane elementarne doživljaje, humanistična psihologija poudarja študij kompleksnih psiholoških fenomenov, kakor se prikazujejo v odnosu do kulturnih artefaktov, družbenih razmerij in kreativnih procesov. Članek zagovarja mnenje, da lahko humanistična psihologija služi kot pomožna znanost za humanistiko in obenem 324 ohrani metodološki pluralizem lastnih raziskovalnih pristopov.
Ključne besede: humanistična psihologija, izkustvene celote višjega reda, humanistična resničnost, razumevanje, kulturni artefakti.
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[| 33]1 § 1. Programmatic investigations into challenges, subject matter, and methods of psychology are less rewarding than the study of concrete issues. Nevertheless, such investigations are important in an attempt to establish a new discipline, as they often lead to the discovery of new areas of ignorance, novel problems, approaches, innovative methods, and perspectives.
This essay concerns humanistic psychology, formulated forty years ago by [Wilhelm] Dilthey in his book, Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie [Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology] (Dilthey 1894 [1977]).2 The concept of humanistic psychology, which is influential mainly in Germany, underwent numerous transformations, primarily thanks to Spranger who is a disciple of Dilthey. In Poland, humanistic psychology has received minimal attention, in contrast to other approaches, such as [Franz] Brentano's and [Kazimierz] Twardowski's descriptive psychology, [Edmund] Husserl's phenomenological psychology, depth psychology, Gestalt psychology, and behavioristic psychology.
This essay adopts a polemical attitude, although it does not engage with any particular opponent. It introduces a polemic against the unjust 325 underestimation of humanistic psychology. There is one more reason for the polemical attitude adopted in my article. [| 34] The limited consideration of humanistic psychology in the Polish scholarly literature may result from
1	[This translation indicates original pagination directly in the text in square brackets; all page numbers refer to: Blaustein, Leopold. 1935. "O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej." Przeglqd Filozoficzny 38 (1-2): 33-57.]
2	Dilthey employed different terms for his psychology over time, such as: "Realpsychologie [empirical psychology]" (1865), "beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie [descriptive and analytic psychology]" (1894), and "Strukturpsychologie [structural psychology]" (1905). The term "geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie [humanistic psychology]" seemingly originates from Spranger (Seidemann 1920, 192-193), and [Richard] MüllerFreienfels (1929, 128). However, proponents of related tendencies existed both before and after Dilthey, developing independently of his influence.
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center, Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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the fact that humanistic psychology is a discipline of psychology, which is saturated with metaphysical assumptions.3 In what follows, I will attempt to consider relevant issues in a manner completely free from such assumptions, thus deliberately departing from the form, in which contemporary prominent representatives of humanistic psychology approach metaphysical problems.
This essay does not provide a survey of the views of particular representatives of humanistic psychology, nor does it claim originality. Rather than starting from the scholarly literature, it begins with the things themselves, but I still acknowledge that this essay has a debt to previous scholarly achievements.
§ 2. I begin my investigations with a description of the originally natural psychological whole, i.e., a lived experience or complex of lived experiences that would not be distinguished through abstraction, but rather "originally encountered." With this approach, the proper domain of humanistic psychology, its research focus, and central problems will come to the fore. In search of such a natural psychological whole, I encounter primarily the psychic 326 life of the human individual being—the stream of lived experiences, states of consciousness flowing continuously from birth to death. One isolates further wholes in a more or less artificial manner within this natural, original whole.4
Psychic life, which is a natural psychological whole, is most closely linked with human behavior. From a biological perspective, psychic life appears rather
3	Polish authors, by contrast, have produced numerous publications that belong to humanistic psychology as I understand it. Such publications include substantial fragments of [Wladyslaw] Witwicki's Psychologia [Psychology] (Witwicki 1925), [Stefan] Baley's Psychologia wieku dojrzewania [Psychology of Adolescence] (Baley 1931), certain of Szuman's investigations, and numerous others. Humanistic psychology in Spranger's conception received examination in Poland in connection with structural psychology (Kreutz 1933, 202; Wiegner 1933, 26). [Edward] Frauenglas provided a more comprehensive discussion of Spranger's views (Frauenglas 1929, 93 ff.).
4	One could object that periods of sleep repeatedly disrupt this wholeness. According to this view, the natural whole constitutes rather a stream of lived experiences, commencing at the moment of awakening and concluding at the moment of falling asleep. However, such a view does not appear accurate. Lived experiences do not cease to disappear during sleep. Moreover, their connection with lived experiences before sleep and those after awakening proves often to be remarkably intimate.
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as a part than as a whole.5 [| 35] A loose but equally essential connection occurs between the psychic life of a certain person and that person's products. It is impossible to overlook these connections even in purely psychological studies. Therefore, studies of psychic life consistently go beyond their required scope.
Now, I will consider more closely the psychic life of an individual human being, as it is given in his or her inner lived experience. A person constantly "experiences something"—sometimes perceiving aesthetically, contemplating a landscape or listening to music, other times thinking about a specific matter, seeking resolution to an unpleasant situation, making plans, creating or recreating something, undertaking professional tasks, and talking to another person. The lived experiences of a given moment arrange themselves in various ways, depending on what constitutes the intentional correlates of personal lived experiences: goals more or less clearly guiding someone at a given moment, what one attempts to achieve, what drives one, passions, or other inclinations—all of these factors are significant. The mutual relationships between lived experiences also vary: different aspects dominate, others serve merely as a psychological background, the focus of attention changes, different 327 memories become associated, and various dispositions and attitudes emerge. Let us think about what goes through someone's mind when casually listening to light music on the radio—the person enjoys the music aesthetically, feels relaxed, and allows thoughts to wander freely. Now, let us compare how the same person's mental state changes moments later when receiving a letter from a friend that deeply affects him or her, creates emotional tensions, and triggers an active response.6
5	I share [William] Stern's belief who writes as follows: " Uberall ist die Scheidung in einen psychischen Anteil und einen physischen Anteil etwas Sekundäres, oft lediglich zum Zweck wissenschaftlicher Betrachtung künstlich Isoliertes." ["Everywhere the division into a psychological part and a physical part is something secondary, often artificially isolated merely for the purpose of scientific observation."] (Stern 1928, 194; Saupe 1928, 194.)
6	The discussion was precisely about human lived experiences in a "certain moment." This obviously does not refer to a temporal moment, but to what Germans call "psychische Präsenzzeit [psychic presence time]," through which lived experiences that actually occurred sequentially in time can be reviewed simultaneously (Erismann 1924, 119).
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The just described natural psychic whole, otherwise termed the psychic life of man in its totality, may become the subject matter of investigations. Researchers have studied the totality of psychic life by identifying major phases of inner life and their controlling principles, as demonstrated in Charlotte Bühler's book (Bühler 1933). However, psychology also distinguishes other wholes from different angles. Depending on the adopted viewpoint, the natural appearance of psychic life may be more or less distorted. [| 36] If one describes an individual human being's psychic life in terms of various presentations, feelings, and judgments, one certainly provides an accurate description. However, one will also move far from lived experiences. When one focuses on presentations, feelings, and judgments, one specifically mentions elementary mental experiences, which are originally given in wholes of higher order. Only a psychological analysis of these wholes reveals the elementary lived experiences within wholes of higher order. When a person listens to radio music or reads a letter, psychic actions connected with these situations are very complex;
328 only further analysis will reveal presentations, judgments, feelings, or resolutions. Furthermore, in psychological descriptions, one sometimes ascribes to correlates of mental lived experiences certain "anonymity." This kind of anonymity is in fact alien to mental experiences. When one claims that individual human beings subjectively present something, think about something, desire, decide, or investigate something, one provides an example of research that describes mental reality. A similar case occurs when one investigates connections between presentations of something and other lived experiences concerning this something. This [approach] often leads to the discovery of important and interesting laws. However, this type of investigation has to do with psychic life already modified in a certain way: it is stripped from concrete connections with the surrounding world. In reality, a person watches a film or looks at children playing on the beach. This person is not looking at anonymous "something" occupied by thoughts about the upcoming future or about just noticed strange behavior of foreign passers-by. Each time, the diversity of situations and intentional objects causes diverse lived experiences, despite the analogous composition of lived experiences. This diversity of lived experiences applies
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particularly to the class of simple mental lived experiences occurring at a given moment.7
One can distinguish various "levels" of psychological problems within psychology. Here, I have in mind the possibility of the multilayered character of psychological problems, whereby one of the layers is—as I believe—the real domain of humanistic psychology.
§ 3. I encounter chronological wholes [calosci chronologiczne] while looking within psychic life for further natural wholes of experiences. These chronological wholes are wholes of experiences focused together within a certain time period, such as the psychic life of a particular day or hour. Psychology has not yet systematically studied this type of psychological wholes. [| 37] This [approach] is more popular within literature. For example, novels may describe the stream of lived experiences of individual human beings during twenty-four hours of their life. The psychological study of such wholes would have limited significance. It could, however, be quite interesting to show how various psychological laws manifest themselves during one hour of psychic 329 life. According to psychologists, the most significant experiential wholes are those that neither accumulate within one time period nor occupy the entire psychic life. These experiential wholes stand out against the background of the entirety of psychic life as something relatively distinct, without losing their connection with this entirety.
A series of lived experiences that forms wholes (since those lived experiences are a partial cause of creating psychophysical products or even a complete cause of creating psychic products) should be included primarily in this group [of chronological wholes].8 Such experiential series include, for example, lived experiences related to writing an academic publication, painting a picture, or arranging a budget for an institution. These lived experiences need not follow
7	Lived experiences are given "anonymity" in psychological research also in the sense that lived experiences, artificially isolated from the totality of lived experiences, are treated, as if they constituted independent wholes and were not a non-independent part of the psychological life of concrete human individuals.
8	Regarding the concept of psychophysical and psychic products, see Twardowskis publication (Twardowski 1912 [1999]).
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each other directly; their entirety can consist of a series of smaller wholes that may be called "phases" of a given creative activity. These phases are separated from each other by longer or shorter breaks, yet they form an originally natural whole with non-adjoining phases in a manner that will be discussed further.
Other mental lived experiences form such wholes, because they connect with a receptive attitude toward a certain product; for instance, a musical piece, an academic lecture, a radio drama, or a film (Blaustein 1933, 5, 45 ff.). In addition, one can refer to the wholes of experiences that are connected with certain activities, behaviors, or actions that fall outside the categories of creativity or receptivity. Clear examples of this phenomenon include lived experiences connected with traveling, practicing sports, material ownership, etc.
There are also other sequences of lived experiences connected with either a) non-durable or b) durable social relationships. Those series of lived experiences form experiential wholes as well. In the first group, I include mental lived experiences connected with a chess game or house sale. Lived 330 experiences connected with friendship, child-rearing, [| 38] or the relationship between son and father or superior and subordinate, belong to the second group. Experiential wholes connected with relationships to God and to oneself are close to both groups (for example, religious lived experiences and others concerning self-sentiment, self-knowledge, self-assessment,9 and self-love).
Mental lived experiences form wholes not only through their connection with social relationships between individual human beings, but also between individual human beings and groups of people, human groups, societies, social organizations, and institutions. These wholes encompass human lived experiences tied to relationships with one's own country or foreign nations, family, political parties, and temporary groups, such as specific gatherings or circus audiences. Similarly, experiential wholes emerge from one's receptive relationships with various products. Beyond relationships with individual works—particular pieces of art or science—, I can identify relationships with entire categories of products. Mental lived experiences connected to music,
9 Muller-Freienfels rightly considers lived experiences related to one's relationship to oneself as a social product (Muller-Freienfels 1930, 154; Blaustein 1931a, 13-17).
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philosophy, and lyric poetry also form distinct wholes within a person's psychic life.
I have thus shown that, besides elementary experiences, psychic life includes various experiential wholes of a higher order [calosci przezyciowe wyzszego rzgdu],10 which are composed of elementary experiences. These are experiential wholes that either partially cause the emergence of psychophysical products or completely cause the emergence of certain psychic products. Additionally, there are wholes connected with people's receptive attitudes toward certain products, with permanent and temporary social relationships, with people's relationships with groups of other people as well as groups of products, and others. A psychologist who observes psychic life discovers these wholes and analyzes them to uncover their components, but does not construct them from individual elements.11
§ 4. Let me examine some properties of the experiential wholes of higher order more closely. [| 39] I have already stated that the lived experiences contained within experiential wholes of higher order need not constitute the 331 entirety of psychic life during the time periods when they occur. This point requires no detailed explanation. When a cinemagoer follows events on the screen with intense attention, she can simultaneously notice many things happening around her in the audience. A cinemagoer might also experience taste sensations while eating chocolate. Someone giving a public speech may recall, during the talk, an urgent letter previously prepared. The lived experiences that constitute a particular experiential whole of higher order need not be accumulated within one continuous time period. Inner experience shows that the way of how non-consecutive phases combine into a natural whole contains nothing mysterious. Memory allows a person, experiencing certain things at a given moment, to recall temporally distant, but closely
10	In order to distinguish elementary wholes from different types of wholes, I use the term wholes of higher order, because elementary experiences are also wholes. The totality of an individual's psychic life could be called an "experiential whole of the highest order."
11	Analysis, as opposed to construction, as a method of humanistic psychology is by Dilthey emphasized in: Dilthey 1894, 168-169 [1977, 51-52].
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related lived experiences. Memory "revives" the necessary beliefs, feelings, desires, and resolutions. The necessary attitudes and dispositions are activated at that very moment. The aforementioned process creates a natural connection to the previous phase of a given creative activity. Let us consider a translator who works on a dissertation written in a foreign language, and who interrupts his or her work to read a newspaper. When the translator returns to work after the break, lived experiences related to newspaper reading fade. Other lived experiences that constitute a continuation of the pre-interruption lived experiences appear again. The dependence of temporally distant mental states, as Erismann (1924, 125) emphasizes, is given directly.
I have said above that one can distinguish various elementary experiences within the psychological wholes. Generally, some of these elementary experiences dominate, and give the whole a clear [emotional] coloring. Sometimes, as Dilthey emphasizes, emotions and acts of will appear, as if they serve intellectual lived experiences. At other times, intellectual lived experiences serve emotional experiences. Different coloring characterizes lived 332 experiences during conversations on theoretical topics. Coloring is different also in conversations that constitute "scenes of jealousy."
Experiential wholes of higher order undoubtedly possess the property of intentionality. However, this is not true in the same sense as applied to simple psychic acts. The lived experiences that are parts of the experiential wholes of higher order are connected with objects through common intention. [| 40] This common intention sometimes aims toward artificially isolated objects of single acts, but often involves intentional objects of experiential sequences that form separate wholes or are connected in other ways. Spranger terms these wholes "intendierte komplexe Gegenstände [intended complex objects]" (Spranger 1918, 361). Such complex object correlates of experiential wholes include theatrical spectacles, political factions, and sets of events, such as social revolutions and scientific theories.
The psychological wholes, which are the objects of my investigations, also constitute teleological connections of lived experiences. The lived experiences an inventor has while working to improve a technical product serve goals that are more or less conscious and arrange themselves accordingly. The same applies to a merchant's conversation with a goods recipient about a transaction.
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It also applies to sightseeing in a foreign country or a subordinate's relationship with a superior. As the preceding examples show, teleological character belongs not only to creative-type experiential wholes. It also belongs to the receptive types corresponding to social relationships, etc.
With the above in mind, I want to emphasize that such experiential wholes remain under the overwhelming influence of a given person's basic tendencies, which provide those experiential wholes with a teleological character.12 Experiential wholes are shaped under the influence of humans striving to satisfy drives toward happiness. In the entirety of a person's life plan—according to [Alfred] Adler's terminology—, they play the role of means to master life. There is always an aim or duty governing one's psychic life in a given period (Driesch 1929, 50). Factors guiding psychic life are discovered not through psychological descriptions of elementary experiences, but through the study of experiential wholes of higher order. The study of experiential wholes of higher order reveals their influence on shaping human psychic life and demonstrates how striving for positive self-feeling and increased striving for power manifests itself in creativity or social relationships. It also shows how desires for aesthetic 333 experiences and feelings of knowledge find expression in receptivity, etc.
[| 41] Phases of a certain experiential whole of higher order, temporally distant from each other, remain under the influence of the same basic tendencies that constitute another link between temporally distant lived experiences. A lover who meets again with his or her beloved after work that absorbs all thoughts remains again under the influence of the same feelings and desires that shaped their relationship at the previous meeting. The present meeting thereby becomes, from a psychological viewpoint, a natural continuation of the previous one.
When I look more closely at experiential wholes of higher order, I notice the multiple genetic relationships that connect their parts. Lived experiences while
12 "Sofern die Teile in der Struktur so miteinander verbunden sind, dass die Verbindung Triebbefriedigung und Glück hervorrufen, Schmerzen abzuwehren geeignet ist, nennen wir sie zweckmässig." ["To the degree that the parts are so linked together in the structure that their combination is capable of satisfying the instincts, of giving rise to happiness and averting suffering, we say that this nexus is purposiveness."] (Dilthey 1894, 207 [1977, 88].)
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reading a second volume of the novel depend significantly on lived experiences while reading the first volume. The impression made on a backpacker by new landscapes depends partly on his or her lived experiences during previous trips. Genetic conditioning between temporally distant phases of the same experiential whole of higher order is generally stronger than that between the current phase and the immediately preceding phase belonging to another whole. A reader's experiential course during a novel's second volume depends more on earlier lived experiences from the first volume than on, for instance, an exchange on summer resort stays that took place before one started to read.
The claim presented above does not exclude a certain dependence of lived experiences on mental situations. This situation is determined not only by the object of lived experiences to which they refer and by the basic tendencies guiding a person's psychic life, but also by other factors, such as echoes and remnants of recently past lived experiences belonging to different higherorder wholes. Other factors include passing attitudes, such as the moods of a given hour or day. The course of lived experiences connected with family 334 dinner exchange is at least initially under the clear influence of moods evoked in the morning by professional work. A cinemagoer's reaction to a film is conditioned not only by stimuli provided by the screen and accompanying music, but also by the viewer's lived experiences during the given day. The mental situation also depends on various non-mental factors affecting psychic life at a given moment—the set of which may be called the "non-mental constellation" ["konstelacja pozapsychiczna"]. Multiple factors should be considered, including geographical, historical, biological, and especially social factors. The course [| 42] of lived experiences in a certain situation is shaped differently, depending on whether a person is at a given moment alone or in the company of others. If someone is accompanied by others, the course of their lived experiences depends on the number of people and the relationships between them. For example, it is well known that a person in a mass thinks less independently and critically. Convictions lose their stability and become more influenced by emotions and wishes, whereas individual impressions and feelings grow increasingly one-sided and intolerant. Individual differences become leveled and affect gains in strength. Furthermore, one witnesses a range of intensified behaviors: excessive self-confidence, irritability,
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wildness, increased courage, readiness for sacrifice, heightened activity, and impulsiveness.13 People work more intensely in well-organized groups. People's experience of beauty changes, depending on whether they are with friends or by themselves. Students often act differently toward teachers depending on whether other students are watching. Also, the common lifestyle of human groups—customs, habits, language, thinking patterns, technique, and art— shapes experiential wholes of higher order. After all, human life occurs along certain "social tracks" (soziale Geleise), as [Richard] Muller-Freienfels puts it. Lived experiences of courtship have varied across different historical periods and cultures, and continue to differ among people from various countries and social classes. Muller-Freienfels correctly observes that people in different life situations play various roles that society expects. How differently the experiences and behavior of the same person—say, a high official—are shaped in the office, in the family circle, or at a social reception (Muller-Freienfels 1930, 18, 225 ff.)!
It is not the investigations of elementary experiences and their laws, but the psychological investigations of experiential wholes of higher order that 335 fully reveal the dependence of lived experiences on mental situation, along with the dependence of mental situation on external factors. I have already mentioned several factors as examples. This is yet another proof of the need for, and benefit of, investigations of such wholes in addition to investigations of elementary experiences.
In conclusion, with this descriptive characterization of experiential wholes of higher order, it would be good to focus on some circumstances emphasized by Dilthey. These wholes and their phases are most often accompanied by a sense of their value and importance for psychic life as a whole. Lived experiences arising from friendship [| 43] are more important than those derived from activities, such as listening to radio broadcasts. However, the evaluation of one's past, present, or future lived experiences does not always remain unchangeable. Perhaps in the future, experiential wholes that were insignificant at the past moment of their experience will,
13 See [Theodor Paul] Erismann's arguments on the psychology of masses in the collective publication already cited (Erismann 1928, 293 ff.; Saupe 1928, 293 ff.).
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in memories, be felt as immensely important in the totality of life. For instance, the first exchange with someone I will eventually marry. When young people write their first verses, they experience unusual tension and feel that these moments have great weight, but as adults they evaluate these lived experiences as insignificant life episodes. The experiences that people anticipate, to which they attach considerable attention and which they desire passionately—will prove to be disproportionate in relation to their expectations, whether exceeding or falling short of what was expected. In general, from the point of view of various experiential wholes of higher order, individual lived experiences may have different values and play various roles in life. The youthful lived experiences of a future novelist, connected with someone of the opposite sex, may prove insignificant for the formation of this novelist's family life. Nevertheless, the same youthful lived experiences, considered from the point of view of the novelist's creative development, may possess considerable vital weight.
As a summary of the above descriptions, I would hold that experiential 336 wholes of higher order are characterized by continuity, even when they consist of phases that are temporally distant from each other. Experiential wholes of higher order are characterized by an intentional directedness toward particular objects, a teleological character, and genetic connections among the lived experiences that compose them. Such wholes depend on fundamental human striving, mental situations, and the extra-mental constellation. Moreover, experiential wholes of higher order usually have distinct coloring, depending on the type of lived experiences that dominate them. Furthermore, experiential wholes of higher order are accompanied by a sense of essentiality and importance for psychic life. I would not exclude the possibility that a closer examination would reveal more properties of experiential wholes of higher order. I am actually inclined to think this is what will happen.14
14 Prof. Roman Ingarden rightly drew my attention to one such view. According to Ingarden, the essential property of lived experiences lies in their connection
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[| 44] § 5. Experiential wholes of higher order constitute the proper domain of research within humanistic psychology. It is humanistic, because it studies the psyche of an individual human being living within humanistic reality— his or her lived experiences in relation to the elements of this reality. I must therefore focus on humanistic reality and its elements.15
The reality studied by the humanities or humanistic reality is identical to natural reality. Humanistic reality is the entire real world, which is considered from a special, anthropocentric viewpoint. The viewpoint consists of the fact that the world concerns the humanities, only insofar as it is humanity itself, human products, the material in which they [i.e., human beings] create, and a more or less direct cause of their history. This special perspective also grants certain components of the real-world privileged position in the humanities. The position consists of the fact that components of the real world interest these sciences for their own sake, not merely because of their connection with something else being at the center of research.16 These components
with a person. The task of humanistic psychology, thus, should be to grasp lived experiences as "discharges" of a person. As follows from the above arguments, I consider experiential wholes of higher order as something artificially isolated from the originally natural psychological whole. This whole constitutes the psychological life of a concrete human being, most closely connected with that person's behavior. However, experiential wholes of higher order can be distinguished against the background of psychological life as separate wholes. Such wholes are much clearer and more distinct than elementary experiences. When examining experiential wholes of higher order isolated for research purposes, one should not forget their connection with the totality of human life. This totality exerts an essential influence on their course.
15	I analyzed in detail the concept of humanistic reality and its components in a lecture entitled "O rzeczywistosci, badanej przez nauki humanistyczne" ["On Reality Studied by the Humanities"] delivered in 1933 at the meeting of the Warsaw Philosophical Society. See the abstract in Ruch Filozoficzny 13 (Blaustein 1935/1937).
16	Earthquakes, climate, sea, and similar phenomena do not possess this privileged position in the humanities. Such phenomena interest the humanities only in terms of their influence on the history of certain human communities, on clothing types, the development of trade, and so forth. The privileging of certain components of the real world does not exclude the study of others that seemingly diverge from human affairs. Such elements may at a certain moment enter the orbit of the humanities. The fact remains that individual human being, as the axis of humanistic reality, constitutes a psychophysical being connected with the world of nature. Dilthey rightly emphasizes in Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften [Introduction to Human Sciences] that the humanities concern facts of nature to a
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are primarily human individuals and their groups. Among human groups, I distinguish unorganized and organized groups. Organized groups include (Berman 1932, 293 ff.): [| 45] (a) societies (such as nations and generations) and (b) institutions as well as social organizations (such as states and political parties). Both types of groups are organized, but the first is organized rather semiconsciously, whereas the latter is organized more consciously. They both possess a certain structure, but the first type of structure emerges naturally from shared properties and experiences. The second type of structure is established in earlier or later developmental phases through durable conventions. Members of the first group act the same way. because they have shared mental lived experiences. The uniform action of members of the second type of group usually results from the deliberate division of individual functions for realizing the entire group's tasks. Both types of human groups contain facts that Dilthey (1922, 83-84 [1989, 132-133]) identified as foundational to societies. The foundational facts are the sense of solidarity arising from common conditions, and the relationship between domination and dependence. However, in groups 338 of the first type, the sense of solidarity comes to the foreground. In groups of the second type, the relationship between domination and dependence is prominent. Second-type groups, with a transparent division of functions, also have more clearly defined leadership structures and corresponding obligations.
Individual human beings and human groups form the very center of humanistic reality and are surrounded by products of the most diverse kinds. Even natural products, which humanity adapts to its needs and transforms into useful objects, can be considered human products. Domesticated animals or agricultural products serve here as examples. To an even greater extent, other utility items are human products. These include machines, tools, equipment, and buildings—for which nature provided only materials and which one usually calls "products of human technology or human civilization."
Another type of human product consists of psychophysical products, to which individual human beings provide the functions of representatives in the psychological sense. Those products are used as the imaginatively reproducing
large extent (Dilthey 1922, 6, 17 [1989, 58, 69]). The humanities are based on the knowledge of nature.
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objects (pictures, sculptures), schemes, symbols, or signs, equipping them with a certain sense or meaning (Blaustein 1930; 1931b, 56, 106 ff.). In this way, people created and preserved The Battle of Raclawice,17 Sir Thaddeus,18 scientific claims, religious dogmas, legal orders, and similar works. Groups of such products include art, literature, science, [| 46] law, religion as a set of dogmas, tradition as a group of nameless statements, and folklore as a set of folk proverbs and legends. They all are included in the group called "human culture."
Among both products, to which humans gave utility object functions and those to which they gave a certain sense or meaning, I find products possessing the property of arousing aesthetic feelings and to which this property was consciously given. However, yet another type of products—those deprived of utility purpose or meaning—is created to satisfy aesthetic needs. Certain arrangements of colors, spatial forms, and sounds belong here, such as those found in certain types of plastic arts or music (Ossowski 1933, 9 f., 17 f., 35 f.).
Human products also include so-called human customs and habits. These include ways of preparing and consuming food, cultivating land, exchanging goods, ceremonies, and entertainment. All these customs constitute types of actions of 339 individual human beings or human groups, often repeated traditionally under specific conditions. These human products can also be combined into groups. Religious ritual or social etiquette, for instance, form groups of such customs.
Previously, I discussed organizations and institutions as collectivities [zbiorowiska] that possess durable, crystallized structures usually established by conventions. These structures also constitute human products. Examples include here democratic state systems, capitalistic economic systems, and hierarchies of administrative authorities.19
Among various human products, I distinguish between individual human beings' products and human groups' products, as well as collective products.
17	[Blaustein refers here to a painting commemorating the winning battle of the Polish army under the leadership of Tadeusz Kosciuszko with Russian forces in Raclawice in 1794. Blaustein could be referring specifically to Jan Matejko's painting from 1888 or a more famous one by Jan Styk and Wlodzimierz Kossak from 1894.]
18	[Blaustein refers here to Adam Mickiewicz's epic poem, Sir Thaddeus, or the Last Foray in Lithuania.]
19	These structures are the subject matter of sociological research, theory of state, social economics, and related disciplines.
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Individual products include specific technical discoveries, Rafael's paintings, and Shakespeare's dramas. Collective products include customs, folk poetry, and economic structures, as well as all groups of collective products and some groups of individual products. Civilization, science, law, language, art (not only folk art), etiquette, and religious ritual therefore also are collective products.20 [| 47] It is also appropriate to draw attention to the circumstances, in which complexes of products form further complexes, whereby a certain hierarchy emerges. Such a complex is, for instance, civilization, which is a complex of complexes of functional objects, certain customs, and habits. Humanity involves complex human groups. Culture is a complex of such complexes as science, religion, music, etc. Products and their complexes unite into larger complexes on the basis of various points of view. When a chronological point of view is applied, a complex, such as ancient culture, can be obtained. By creating complexes of products according to their individual or collective creators, one can obtain complexes, such as the creativity of Mickiewicz or Dutch painting. Creating them according to kinds, one shall obtain 340 complexes, such as civil law or mathematics. Products of certain or different kinds with certain common properties also form further groups. Thus, for instance, Gothic style is a common property of works of Gothic architecture. Romanticism, understood as a group of products, involves products unified by certain common properties, such as poetry, painting, music, and philosophy.21 One might object that events are also elements of humanistic reality, in addition to individuals, groups of individuals, products, and their groups. However, events are processes that take place on the basis of objects mentioned
20	Among collective products, [Adolf] Berman aptly distinguishes two further groups: 1) those that constitute the conscious and purposeful product of collective actions, such as statutes, 2) groups that are expressions of common psychological contents. These result from mutual influences of community members on each other, but not from organized actions. Examples here are as follows: customs, folk poetry, linguistic forms, and similar phenomena (Berman 1932, 301).
21	By considering various viewpoints simultaneously, one may be able to examine such a formation as medieval Polish literature. As Dilthey emphasizes, the scope of various ensembles varies. The scope of languages or customs remains rather regional. In contrast, art, ethics, and especially science spread throughout the world. They are not limited by the state borders or religious nations (Dilthey 1922, 72-76 [1989, 121-125]).
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above as privileged components of this reality. These kinds of events include the behavior and actions of individual human beings and human groups. Among them is such behavior and action whose result is the product, change, or disappearance of certain products or their groups. Events also form groups. Revolution, war, educational reform, development, decline, flourishing of economic systems, and religious movements present examples of groups of events. Humanistic reality is described by the humanities (especially historical reality) as a tangle of events when considered from a dynamic viewpoint. The humanities describe humanistic reality as a tangle of processes taking place on the emerging, changing, and disappearing components of this reality.22
[| 48] § 6. The individual human being lives in humanistic reality and relates to its components. Individual human beings relate to themselves and other people, their various groups, various products, and sets of products. Additionally, individual human beings relate to processes as well as to groups of processes. In this context, experiential wholes of higher order appear within psychic life. These wholes include lived experiences, which are the cause of 341 created products, connected with receptive attitudes toward them; they are the basis of permanent and non-permanent social relationships, and other types of lived experiences. Experiential wholes of higher order are the primary subject matter of humanistic psychology.
Conversely, non-humanistic psychology is practiced when studying (a) lived experiences in relation to the elements of everyday world, which are not captured as components of the humanistic world, but because of their physical, chemical, or quantitative relationships (Spranger 1926, 177), or (b) generally in abstraction from their object correlates, appearing in these investigations completely anonymously. Thus, Wundt-style studies concerning sensory impressions or Brentano's theory of presentations [understood] as the psychological basis of other lived experiences do not belong to [the field of] humanistic psychology. Psychological studies that examine scientific or artistic creativity, play, discipline, patriotism, readership, cinema viewing, and similar
22 Alongside the dynamic viewpoint, one uses static and typological approaches within the humanities (Blaustein 1935/37).
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topics are part of humanistic psychology. In humanistic psychology, one deals with the integration of lived experiences, with their experiential wholes of higher order. In non-humanistic psychology, lived experiences are studied first and foremost in isolation from other lived experiences.23 Humanistic psychology does not aim at studying the laws of dependence of psychic lived experiences upon physical stimuli. Nor does it study the regular connections of elementary experiences that are common to everyone, regardless of their characterological properties and the environment in which they live. However, humanistic psychology includes studies of lived experiences in relation to human physiological properties, if the discovery of connections between psychic life and bodily constitution sheds light on experiential wholes of higher order. The studies of [Ernst] Kretschmer or [Claude] Sigaud shed more light on this [issue], while Spranger's position strikes me as incorrect. After all, according to studies by Kretschmer or Sigaud, bodily structure has an impact on creative and receptive inclinations, dispositions, and ways of relating to [| 49] others. Therefore, bodily structure has an impact on experiential wholes of 342 higher order, as they are examined by humanistic psychology.
Both humanistic and non-humanistic psychology share a common focus: human psychic life. However, the simplicity or complexity of lived experiences results in the multilayered character of psychological problems. These factors enable one to investigate psychic life at various "levels" ["poziomach"]. Because lived experiences connect both to physical stimuli and to important elements of humanistic reality, they can be studied from multiple viewpoints. In this way, humanistic psychology may emerge as an autonomous discipline of psychology or an autonomous research program. It would benefit abundantly from the results of other disciplines and support them generously with its own results. A complete understanding of psychic life can be achieved only through multi-perspectival analysis.
23 Nonetheless, given that non-humanistic psychology sometimes adopts non-atomizing and holistic methods, a reference to isolation may be insufficient to distinguish humanistic and non-humanistic psychology.
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§ 7. It is insufficient to determine the actual tasks ofhumanistic psychology24 by simply defining experiential wholes of higher order—whose object correlates are components of the humanistic world—as the proper domain of research. Several important questions arise here. Does humanistic psychology study experiential wholes of higher order in their typical forms that are common to all people? Or does it focus on forms that are common to people with specific characteristics— certain professions, temperaments, education levels, genders, and in particular developmental phases? Theories thus far and scientific practices have resolved this dilemma by acknowledging that humanistic psychology considers and should consider all the mentioned perspectives.25 The first perspective raises the most doubts. Is it possible to study experiential wholes of higher order in the form, in which they occur in a "typical human being"—as Dilthey puts it?26 I believe that humanistic psychology must understand the term "typical human being" differently than non-humanistic psychology does. When studying laws governing elementary experiences or the connection of lived experiences with physical stimuli, the psychologist states that facts occur in principle in all people, regardless [| 50] of the characterological differences that exist between them. The 343 case differs from experiential wholes of higher order that relate to the elements of the humanistic world. Individual differences between people cannot be ignored, since those differences play a significant role in the formation of experiential wholes of higher order. One cannot, for instance, describe the psychology of a cinemagoer, without indicating that it concerns a person with a typical lifestyle. Film shows that are viewed for the first time by uncivilized [niecywilizowane] people, evoke entirely different reactions. Thus, humanistic psychology sets aside only more subtle differences, such as education level, gender, and disposition, and understands by the term "typical human being" an adult civilized human
24	The research field in humanistic psychology obviously includes, alongside given experiential wholes of higher order, corresponding psychological dispositions, such as patriotism, religiosity, laziness, discipline, etc.
25	See, for example, chapters 8 and 9 of Dilthey's Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie [Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology] (Dilthey 1894 [1977, 94-117]).
26	Regarding descriptive and analytic psychology, Dilthey notes: "Sie stellt diesen Zusammenhang des inneren Lebens in einem typischen Menschen dar" ["It describes this nexus of the inner life of a typical man."] (Dilthey 1894, 152 [1977, 35].)
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being. These differences constitute the research field in differential [rozniczkowa] and developmental humanistic psychology. As examples of topics in these specialized fields, one can refer to the psychology of women's relationship with politics or the psychology of self-assessment in adolescence.
One might ask whether humanistic psychology studies the specific way of manifestation of experiential wholes of higher order in a concrete human being, against the background of his or her individual personality? One might also wonder whether phenomena, such as Goethe's drawing creativity in childhood, Mickiewicz's self-assessment, or Napoleon's relationship with women, belong to humanistic psychology? I believe that the answer to these questions must be negative. All of the problems mentioned above belong to particular disciplines of the humanities. Their development should benefit from the achievements of humanistic psychology concerning children's drawing creativity in general, self-evaluations in human beings generally or among eminent people, and similar topics. Conversely, the psychology of poetic creativity can benefit from in-depth examinations of creativity in Goethe, Mickiewicz, and other poets, drawing on 344 these individual cases as inductive material for psychological generalizations.27
[| 51] § 8. Humanistic psychology does not study all experiential wholes of higher order that refer to humanistic reality components, but only
27 Referring to the arguments in § 4, Prof. [Juliusz] Kleiner rightly drew my attention to an important fact. By studying experiential wholes with discontinuous phases, psychology approaches the literary image of the human soul. According to Prof. Kleiner, this fact reveals something significant. Contrary to widespread beliefs, science created a preparation [preparat] of reality, while art was closer to truth. However, I believe that the difference between a humanistic psychologist and a poet remains significant. The same applies to the difference with a connoisseur of people. A connoisseur of people can understand others intuitively. This understanding extends to those with whom connoisseur deals directly or indirectly through people's publications or publications written about those people. If connoisseur is a poet, he or she additionally possesses the gift of subjective expression. In poetry, the poet expresses lived experienced and imagined psychological experiences. The poet also possesses the ability to poetically shape fictional or dramatic characters. These characters possess a clear psychological profile and rich psychological life. A psychologist, on the other hand, can be called only a person who formulates general truths concerning the human psyche or the psyche of certain types of people. Furthermore, these observations must be based on constantly controlled scientific methods (Blaustein 1932).
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those experiential wholes that are particularly interesting to humanistic disciplines, for which humanistic psychology serves as an auxiliary science. Thus, humanistic psychology focuses on phenomena relevant to pedagogy, political history, cultural history, and similar fields. From this perspective, the psychology of religious or artistic creativity, the psychology of governing people or learning are particularly interesting for humanistic psychology. Humanistic psychology is not in a different position than other disciplines of the humanities, since disciplines, such as historical disciplines, basically make selections of people, products, and events, to which they pay special attention.
Humanistic psychology serves as an auxiliary science of various disciplines of the humanities. It provides the key to understanding humanistic reality and mainly its central axis—the human being. Within the humanities, one is interested in concrete human beings and their relationships with certain products, with other people, and their creative processes. Conversely, humanistic psychology provides the humanities with the basis for understanding concrete human beings. It explains, for instance, what the relationships of humans in general or humans of certain types to others depend on. This field of psychology 345 describes people's relationships with their own or the others' products, and examines how individual human beings depend on their environment, along with similar matters. The idea of humanistic psychology arose from the need to establish psychological foundations for the humanities, and its historical development reflects this originating purpose that was a priori ascribed to it.
Humanistic psychology serves as a key to understanding, not only individual human beings, but also human groups and their products. I believe, however, that the psychology of human groups and products is essentially the psychology of individual human beings. When I study, in a psychological manner, human groups, I examine the common properties of their members, the lived experiences commonly shared by them, and the influence of individuals on the group and the group on individuals. But the proper research field is always the individual psyche. This includes its formation in a mass and arranged collective, its kinship with other group members, and not some mystical collective psyche. The situation is similar here to the psychology of products. Humanistic psychology is not concerned with analyzing and interpreting products, which are of interest within the theory and history of literature, art,
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customs, the state, [| 52] and similar fields. However, humanistic psychology provides a psychological foundation for investigations carried out in those fields. Humanistic psychology studies the processes of creativity, receptivity, the manifestation of common lived experiences of human group members in more or less consciously created works, and related phenomena. Similarly, the psychology of human groups provides the humanities (addressing human groups) with general claims. For instance, the psychology of human groups provides claims that concern the typology of leaders and their influence on organized and unorganized groups, the emergence and spreading of mental epidemics, factors that integrate or destroy group cohesion, and similar matters. On the basis of general claims, the psychology of human groups enables one to understand concrete historical events, the influence of certain historical figures on their societies, the development of certain religious or political currents, as well as the flourishing and declining of certain institutions and social organizations. Finally, it should be noted that humanistic psychology can play not only the role of auxiliary science in relation to other disciplines 346 of the humanities, but also with regard to praxeology in Kotarbinski's sense (Kotarbinski 1929, 452 ff. [1966, 375 ff.]). Praxeology is based on purposeful work aimed at shaping reality. Pedagogical psychology, in some parts, can serve as an example of a part of humanistic psychology that functions as a praxeology in this very sense (Baley 1933, 309; Blachowski 1933).
§ 9. The preceding analysis, intended to explain the tasks of humanistic psychology, requires some additional remarks. The task of a scientific discipline is to study its field from certain viewpoints, and according to certain methods. I must, therefore, emphasize a few remarks about the methods of humanistic psychology. Among the representatives of humanistic psychology, there is a widespread belief that humanistic psychology is understanding [rozumiejqca] psychology, i.e., it is characterized by a specific method: so-called understanding.28 This position does not seem correct to me. Humanistic
28 Understanding can be understood differently, yet this issue would exceed the scope of the present essay. For this reason, I assume that there exists understanding of oneself, other people, and products as a scientific method, without examining here the question of whether these are different methods or variations of one method.
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psychology can and should use all methods that can contribute to our knowledge [| 53] of the objects under consideration. Thus, introspective and retrospective descriptions, psychological analysis, understanding of oneself and other people, [understanding of] products, interpretation of products, experiments, observational studies of behavior, questionnaires, statistical methods, and comparative methods can be utilized by humanistic psychology. Thus, both methods based on so-called insight (einsichtige Methoden)29 as well as inductive methods can fulfill this task (Erismann 1924). Müller-Freienfels emphasized that humanistic psychology in Dilthey's and Spranger's approach is the most distant from the objective attitude among all subjective approaches within psychology. Its proponents stress the fundamental differences in both methods as well as results, and they avoid any connection with the findings of objective psychological approaches (Müller-Freienfels 1929, 125). The present study adopts a different attitude. The difference between humanistic and non-humanistic psychology lies in the problem setting. This difference lies rather in the dimensions and viewpoints, from which psychic life is considered within the two psychological schools, and not in different research 347 methods. There is no good reason to reject any method that can contribute to solving the issues that humanistic psychology sets for itself. And thus, when studying lived experiences connected with creative painting, behavioral observation is useful; when the psychology of theatergoers is studied, statistical methods are appropriate; when examining self-assessment, questionnaires are the right choice; when investigating children's musical sensitivity, one should use experiments. Conversely, it seems correct to say that, because humanistic psychology examines experiential wholes of higher order that are intentionally directed at humanistic reality and its components, humanistic psychology's predominant methods include inner experience (introspection
29 This approach is justified also in light of, as I believe, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's view on the division of sciences ("Logiczne podstawy nauczania" ["Logical Foundations of Teaching"] (Ajdukiewicz 1934, 51 f.). According to Ajdukiewicz, the humanities are disciplines that employ three types of ultimate premises. These are directly a priori claims, claims directly based on experience, and claims directly based on understanding certain statements. Humanistic psychology, as one of the humanities, is therefore not based exclusively on understanding.
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and retrospection), description and psychological analysis, understanding of oneself, other people, and their products.
When Spranger describes the methods of humanistic psychology, he claims that there exists a priori knowledge about [| 54] what can coexist simultaneously in a certain person and what cannot. This view is somewhat accurate. "[D]as wichtigste Apriori des Verstehens"—is, according to Spranger—"in dem Wissen um die mögliche Koordination und Subordination der geistigen Grundakte" (Spranger 1918, 391).30 I do not share Spranger's view that knowledge of the possible coordination and subordination of the basic psychic acts concerns a priori certain knowledge. However, I believe that accurate generalizations based on the introspection and understanding of others play a significant role in humanistic psychology. An example of such a generalization is the question of which lived experiences or mental dispositions can coexist in the same person and which cannot. Notably, inner experience provides a more valuable means of understanding experiential wholes of higher order than does studying elementary experiences, which are harder to access through introspection.
348 According to [Hans] Driesch, understanding psychology is not psychology, but rather a preparatory tool that enables one to collect rough material for further studies. In terms of value, it equals descriptive biology—for example, anatomy—, at best, it can be considered systematic biology (namely, characterology) (Driesch 1929, 124-125). I do not know whether Driesch would also apply his view to humanistic psychology, which employs all methods. I do not contradict Driesch's position. However, whether humanistic psychology can be considered characterology does not affect its methodological validity, provided that the results of humanistic psychology are accurate and useful for the humanities and for understanding the human psyche.
§ 10. In these investigations, I have relied on many points related to the views of humanistic psychology's main creators—Dilthey and Spranger. Already in the course of preceding examinations, certain differences were noted, including the case of methods or the case of studying connections between psychic life
30 ["[T]he most important a priori of understanding [lies] in the knowledge of the possible coordination and subordination of the basic psychic acts."]
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and bodily constitution. However, the most important differences are rooted in the desire to avoid certain concepts usually used in the theoretical field of humanistic psychology. For instance, Spranger's humanistic psychology is permeated with the theory of objective spirit. It is burdened—as Karl Bühler emphasized—with the sin of accepting causal relationships between ideal and real objects (Bühler 1926, 513). The objective-spiritual world is built— according to Spranger—from supra-individual theoretical content meanings (Bedeutungsgehalte). These must constantly actualize anew in subjective lived experiences of understanding (Verständniserlebnisse). Through these actualizations, [| 55] as Spranger writes,
[...] erhalten sie den Charakter von geistigen Wirkungszusammenhängen und werden somit zu historischen Wirklichkeiten, die in der Mitte zwischen den überindividuellen ewigen Ideen und den individuellen zeitlichen Subjekten stehen. Sie bestimmen die einzelseelischen Strukturen, in die sie hineingreifen, und motivieren ihr geistiges Verhalten dadurch, dass Bedeutungen subjektiv adäquat und inadäquat verstanden und Werte zu subjektiv erlebten Triebkräften	349
werden. (Spranger 1926, 186.)31
Without going into ontological disputes about whether such claims as just quoted can be justified at all, I believe that psychology will proceed properly by not burdening its research and considerations with such assumptions. Similarly, I have above avoided the distinctions between soul and spirit (seelisches und geistiges Subjekt, seelische und geistige Akte [soulful and spiritual subject, soulful and spiritual acts]) (Spranger 1918, 371; 1926, 183) and the concept of supra-individual subjects (Spranger 1918, 293). I am convinced that they are by no means indispensable for humanistic psychology. The above concepts were eliminated here because of the danger of introducing harmful
31 ["[T]hey obtain the character of spiritual effect connections and thus become historical realities, which stand in the middle between the supra-individual eternal ideas and the individual temporal subjects. They determine the individual spiritual structures, into which they intervene, and motivate their spiritual behavior by the fact that meanings are subjectively adequately and inadequately understood and values become subjectively experienced driving powers."]
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and unnecessary hypostases. In contrast, basic concepts of German humanistic psychology—such as sense or value—are avoided rather because of their unclarity (Sztejnbarg 1933, 94-98). I do not rule out that after numerous and difficult semantic analyses, it would be possible to introduce, for example, the term "sense" for academic usage and that it should be done. However, I believe that tasks of humanistic psychology can be defined without using this term.
§ 11. To conclude, the originally natural psychological whole is the stream of consciousness, the psychic life of an individual human being. When I examine psychic life, in order to notice further relatively natural wholes, I encounter, among others, experiential wholes of higher order. Experiential wholes of higher order are partial causes of creating psychophysical products or complete causes of creating psychic products. Such experiential wholes are connected with receptive attitudes toward certain products or groups of products, with durable or non-durable social relationships, with human relationships with groups of people, and similar phenomena. Experiential wholes of higher order 350 are characterized, among other things, by continuity, even if they consist of temporally distant phases. Such wholes are characterized by intentional reference to certain objects, [| 56] teleological character, genetic connections of constituent lived experiences, dependence on basic human tendencies, mental situations, and non-mental constellations. Experiential wholes of higher order usually possess clear [emotional] coloring, depending on the types of lived experiences that dominate them. When one experiences such wholes, one is also accompanied by a sense of importance and awareness of their significance in one's own psychic life. The described experiential wholes of higher order remain closely dependent on the totality of someone's psychic life, forming integral parts of that larger whole.
Experiential wholes of higher order, whose object correlates are components of humanistic reality, constitute the proper research field of humanistic psychology. This psychology is "humanistic," precisely because it studies the psyche of individual human beings who exist within humanistic reality. Humanistic psychology examines lived experiences arising against the background of people's relationship to the elements of humanistic reality—that is, to the self, others, groups of people, and various human products as well as
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groups of these products—, to processes that affect them, and to groups of these processes. Conversely, I apply non-humanistic psychology, when I would like to study lived experiences in relation to elements of the surrounding world that are not grasped as components of the humanistic world, but are instead considered for their physical, chemical, or quantitative relationships, or generally examined in abstraction from object correlates. In non-humanistic psychology, lived experiences appear completely anonymous. The common research area—human psychic life—connects both types of psychology despite the variety of viewpoints, from which psychic life is considered. Humanistic psychology and non-humanistic psychology complement and mutually condition one another.
General humanistic psychology examines experiential wholes of higher order in their typical form, characteristic of all adults, civilized people, whereas differential psychology examines experiential wholes of higher order in the form of people of a certain defined character, a certain gender, etc. Finally, developmental psychology examines such wholes in their characteristic shape taken during specific developmental phases. It is not, however, the task 351 of humanistic psychology to study the specific way of manifestation of the experiential wholes of higher order in a concrete historical person against the background of his or her personality. Humanistic psychology does not actually study all experiential wholes of higher order that are related to components of humanistic reality, but rather it focuses on those, which are particularly interesting to various disciplines of the humanities, for which humanistic psychology serves as an auxiliary discipline. Humanistic psychology plays the role of an auxiliary science by providing general propositions concerning the psyche of the human individual, its various types, its development, its lived experiences against the background of group life, [| 57] processes of creativity, receptivity, etc., in relation to products. Such knowledge facilitates the psychological understanding of the subject matter of the humanities.
Humanistic psychology uses all methods known to psychology. Thus, it uses mainly intra- and retrospective descriptions, psychological analysis, self-understanding, understanding of others, understanding of products, and interpretation of products. It also uses experiments, observations of behavior, questionnaires, statistical methods, etc. It does not abandon any method
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352
that can facilitate knowledge of the subject matter. Among other things, very probable generalizations concerning what lived experiences and mental dispositions can coexist side by side, and which cannot, play a significant role in humanistic psychology.
The above approach to the tasks of humanistic psychology is based on numerous points of its classical representatives, i.e., Dilthey and Spranger. It diverges in many others. This difference is motivated by the premise that one should avoid certain ambiguous concepts or concepts loaded with metaphysical assumptions.
Bibliography | Bibliografija
Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz. 1934. "Logiczne podstawy nauczania." Encyklopedia
Wychowania 2 (1-2): 3-73. Baley, Stefan. 1931. Psychologia wieku dojrzewania. Lwow—Warszawa: Ksi^žnica-Atlas.
---. 1933. "Zadania psychologii pedagogicznej." Encyklopedia Wychowania 1 (5-6): 305-348.
Berman, Adolf. 1932. "W sprawie przedmiotu i podzialu psychologii spolecznej."
Przeglqd Filozoficzny 35 (3-4): 289-313. Blaustein, Leopold. 1929. Das Gotteserlebnis in Hebbels Dramen. Berlin: Verlag Reuther & Reichard.
---. 1930. Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studyum zpogranicza psychologii i estetyki. Lwow: Wydawnictwo Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie. [Partly reprinted in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wyborpism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 40-68. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 1931a. O ocenie samego siebie w wieku miodzienczym. Poznan: Poznanskie
Towarzystwo Psychologiczne. ---. 1931b. Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne. Badania z pogranicza psychologji i estetyki. Lwow: Nakladem Przegl^du Humanistycznego. [Partly reprinted in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 69-91. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 1932. "Goethe jako psycholog." Przeglqd Humanistyczny 7 (4-5): 349-364. ---. 1933. Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego. Poznan: Poznanskie
Towarzystwo Psychologiczne. [Reprint in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 92-127. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 1935/37. "O rzeczywistosci badanej przez nauki humanistyczne (autoreferat)."
Ruch Filozoficzny 13 (5-10): 143a-145a. Blachowski, Stefan. 1933. "Wyniki psychologii pedagogicznej." Encyklopedia Wychowania 1 (6-7): 349-398.
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Bühler, Charlotte. 1933. Der menschliche Lebenslauf als psychologisches Problem. München: Beck.
Bühler, Karl. 1926. "Die Krise der Psychologie." Kant-Studien 31: 455-526. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1894. "Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde
Psychologie." In W. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 5, 139-240. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
---. 1922. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
---. 1977. Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding. Trans. by R. M. Zaner
and K. L. Heiges. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. ---. 1989. Introduction to Human Sciences. Selected Works. Vol. 1. Trans. by R. A.
Makkreel, M. Neville, and F. Schreiner. Oxford: Princeton University Press. Driesch, Hans. 1929. Grundprobleme der Psychologie und ihre Krisis in der Gegenwart.
Leipzig: Felix Meiner. Erismann, Theodor. 1924. Die Eigenart des Geistigen. Induktive und einsichtige
Psychologie. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. ---. 1928. "Massenpsychologie." In Einführung in die neuere Psychologie, ed. by E.
Saupe, 293-317. Osterwieck—Harz: A. W. Zickfeldt Verlag. Frauenglas, Edward. 1929. "Odrodzenie metafizyki a podstawy humanistyki."
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 7: 93-120. Kotarbinski, Tadeusz. 1929. Elementy teorji poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii
nauk. Warszawa: Gebethner i Wolff. ---. 1966. Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Trans. by O.
Wojtasiewicz. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Kreutz, Mieczyslaw. 1933. "Nowe kierunki psychologii." Encyklopedia Wychowania 1 (3-4): 185-230.
Müller-Freienfels, Richard. 1929. Die Hauptrichtungen der gegenwärtigen Psychologie.
Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. ---. 1930. Allgemeine Sozial- und Kulturpsychologie. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. Ossowski, Stanislaw. 1933. Upodstaw estetyki. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Kasy im. Mianowskiego.
Saupe, Emil (ed.). 1928. Einführung in die neuere Psychologie. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
Seidemann, Walther. 1920. Die allgemeine Psychologie der Gegenwart und ihre
pädagogische Bedeutung. Leipzig: Julius Klinkhardt. Spranger, Eduard. 1918. "Zur Theorie des Verstehens und zur
geisteswissenschaftlichen Psychologie." In Festschrift Johannes Volkelt zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. by Ernst Bergmann, Paul Barth, and Bruno Bauch, 357-403. München: Beck.
---. 1926. Die Frage nach der Einheit der Psychologie. Berlin: Sitzungsberichte der
preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Stern, William. 1928. "Personalistische Psychologie." In Einführung in die neuere Psychologie, ed. by E. Saupe, 192-202. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
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Sztejnbarg, Dina. 1933. "Zagadnienie indeterminizmu na terenie nauk humanistycznych." Przeglqd Filozoficzny 36: 94-98.
Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1912. O czynnosciach i wytworach. Lwow: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne.
---. 1999. "Actions and Products (1912)." In K. Twardowski, On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy, ed. by Johannes Brandl and Jan Wolenski, trans. by Arthur Szylewicz, 103-132. Amsterdam—Atlanta: Rodopi.
Wiegner, Adam. 1933. O istocie zjawisk psychicznych. Poznan: Poznanskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciol Nauk.
Witwicki, Wladyslaw. 1925. Psychologja. Dla uzytku stuchaczow wyzszych zaktadow naukowych. Vol. 1 & 2. Lwow—Warszawa—Krakow: Wydawnictwo Zakladu Narodowego im. Ossolinskich.
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Translation Prevod
UDC: 801.73
Review of Ingarden's The Literary Work of Art
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from Polish by Filip Golaszewski Abstract and keywords prepared by Filip Golaszewski Bibliography edited by Filip Golaszewski
Abstract
The translation presents Blaustein's examination of Ingarden's ontological theory of literary works as developed in Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931). Literary works are analyzed as four-strata structures comprising linguistic sound formations, meaning units, represented objects, and schematized aspects. They are characterized as purely intentional creations with non-independent beings, founded on ideal concepts and subjective operations. The review examines how readers achieve an understanding of
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literary works and gain access to their ontological foundations. Blaustein discusses epistemological concerns about the accessibility of ideal concepts to readers and addresses the multiplication of metaphysical entities. An alternative approach based on linguistic directives and sentence systems is presented, in order to preserve intersubjective identity without metaphysical commitments. The study discusses Ingarden's approach to literary theory, particularly with respect to the multi-stratal structure of literary works, and examines the underlying ontological assumptions.
Keywords: work of art, literary work, ideal concepts, multi-stratal, four-strata theory.
Ocena Ingardnovega dela Literarna umetnina
Povzetek
Prevod predstavlja Blausteinovo obravnavno ontološke teorije literarnih umetnik, kakor jo je Ingarden razvil v svojem delu Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931). Analiza 356 literarnih del razkriva, da so štiriplastne strukture, ki jih sestavljajo jezikovne zvenske tvorbe, pomenske enote, predstavljene predmetnosti in shematizirani videzi. Karakterizirati jih je mogoče kot čisto intencionalne stvaritve z ne-neodvisno bitjo, utemeljene na idealnih pojmovanjih in subjektivnih operacijah. Ocena obravnava vprašanje, kako bralci lahko dosežejo razumevanje literarnih del in pridobijo pristop k njihovih ontološkim temeljem. Blaustein pretresa epistemološke zagate glede dostopnosti idealnih pojmovanj za bralce in se dotakne pomnoževanja metafizičnih kvalitet. Z namenom, da bi ohranil intersubjektivno identiteto dela brez metafizične zaveze, predstavi alternativni pristop, zasnovan na jezikovnih smernicah in stavčnih sistemih. Študija obravnava Ingardnov pristop k literarni teoriji, zlasti z vidika večplastne strukture literarnih del, in pretresa njene ontološke predpostavke.
Ključne besede: umetnina, literarno delo, idealna pojmovanja, večplastnost, teorija štirih plasti.
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[| 98a]1 Roman Ingarden. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft. Halle, Max Niemayer, 1931. XIV + 389 pp.
[| 98b] The question of what a literary work actually is belongs to the most fundamental problems for the theory of knowledge within literary studies. Ingarden's publication is a large-scale attempt to address this question.2
In the opening chapter, Ingarden limits his analysis to examples from literary fiction, and investigates whether literary works should be understood as real or ideal objects. A literary work does not constitute an ideal object, because such a work arises at some point in time and perishes at another, changing throughout the period of existence. Therefore, a literary work is not a timeless object. Furthermore, the view that a literary work is psychical leads to a series of absurd consequences, for instance, undermining the identity of the concrete literary work. Finally, a literary work is not a common-sense object of presentation, according to which the object of presentation is a psychical component of the psychic life of the author or reader. (Ingarden erroneously believes that the intentional object of representation is commonly understood 357 in this way; however, the transcendent character of the intentional object in relation to experience has been emphasized for many years). The problem of the mode of existence of a literary work thus remains unresolved.
Proceeding to consider this problem, Ingarden holds that his investigations will concern exclusively an accomplished literary work, without examining its genesis, ways of knowing it, and possible attitudes that readers may adopt
1	[This translation indicates original pagination directly in the text in square brackets; all page numbers refer to: Blaustein, Leopold. 1935/37. "[Review of] Roman Ingarden. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft. Halle, Max Niemeyer 1931." Ruch Filozoficzny 13(5-10): 98a-102a.]
2	[See Ingarden 1931 [1973].]
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center, Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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toward it. Ingarden is thus interested exclusively in questions related to the ontology of the literary work, and not to the psychology of creativity, theory of knowledge within literary studies, etc. According to Ingarden, the scope of the literary work excludes the experiences of both, the creator and the reader, as well as the realm of objects and states of affairs that may serve as real models for the objects and states of affairs "appearing" within the work.
[| 99a] A literary work involves multi-strata products, and various strata form an organic whole. This whole consists of the following strata: a) linguistic sound formations, b) meaning units, c) represented objects, and d) schematized aspects. Considerations presented in the second chapter analyze individual strata of the literary work and the role of each in its totality.
Linguistic sound formations that constitute the first stratum of the literary work, should not be identified neither with sound material nor with individual concretizations; linguistic sound formations are therefore not real. These formations are also not ideal objects that exist independently, since sound formations arise and change over time under the influence of various real 358 conditions. Linguistic sound formations are rather typical sound formations that appear identically in numerous individual concretizations.
The meaning units—the meanings of words, sentences, and sentence complexes—, which form the second stratum of the literary work, are products of subjective operations. They exist neither in the form of real, concrete, experienced psychical "contents" nor in the form of ideal meanings. Word meanings are rather partial actualizations of corresponding ideal concepts that exist autonomously, and are, thus, as Ingarden puts it, seinsautonom. Due to this actualization, something new undoubtedly arises that lasts longer than given subjective operations: meaningful content of a sentence or a sentence complex. Ideal concepts are not components of these formations, but constitute, alongside subjective operations, a second foundation of their existence. The fact that both of these existential foundations are transcendent in relation to this stratum of the literary work, and that ideal concepts serve the creator as a model for components of actualized sentences means that literary work possesses heteronomous existence, and is, thus, seinsheteronom. An object that exists heteronomously does not possess the foundation of its existence in it itself, but in an object that exists autonomously. Whoever accepts [| 99b] the
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heteronomous existence of sentences must also accept all foundations of their existence, including ideal concepts.
The third stratum of the literary work consists of purely intentional correlates of meaning. Among these, Ingarden distinguishes primary intentional objects from derivative intentional objects. The former are correlates of intentional acts of consciousness, and the latter are correlates of meanings that also possess derivative intentionality. Derivative intentional correlates of meanings, deprived of direct contact with experiences, are only skeletons, schemas of primary intentional correlates of those experiences.
The fourth stratum consists of the so-called schematized aspects, which are idealizations of concrete, flowing, transitory aspects in experience. Schematized aspects are only skeletons, which are schemas of imaginative aspects, in which objects belonging to the third stratum of the literary work are grasped. Elements of the literary work also include "inner aspects" of one's own mental events and character traits. (The concept of these inner aspects is one of the less clear elements in Ingarden's publication.)
On the basis of the above characterization of individual strata, it becomes 359 clear that Ingarden considers the entire literary work to be a purely intentional object possessing non-independent being. Given this intentional character of the literary work, Ingarden believes that his publication contributes to solving the problem of idealism and realism. Transcendental idealism claims that real objects are formed as purely intentional. An evaluation of idealism, therefore, requires examining the structure and the mode of being of purely intentional objects, which include literary works. However, in The Literary Work of Art, Ingarden does not draw consequences from the results of his investigations for the idealism-realism debate.
In analyzing the individual strata, Ingarden examines not only their nature, but also their role in the overall structure of the literary work [| 100a] as well as their interdependence. It is impossible to exhaustively review the numerous results of these considerations. As an example, we can note that the stratum of linguistic sound formations provides external support and expression for other strata, and fulfills the important function of "revealing" the literary work to the psychical subject; the stratum of meaning units intentionally determines the third stratum and influences the fourth stratum; the fourth
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stratum enables intuitive grasping of objects from the viewpoint of the third stratum, etc. Each stratum brings its own distinctive material to the literary work, and constitutes its own aesthetic values, while all together, especially the third stratum, contribute to the emergence of "metaphysical qualities," such as sublimity, tragedy, etc., which manifest themselves in situations and events, and are neither features in the ordinary sense nor properties of psychical states. The manifestation of these qualities, along with the polyphonic harmony of the aesthetic values of the individual strata, creates the distinctive aesthetic value of a literary work. (The concept of "metaphysical qualities" is a less clear concept in Ingarden's publication.)
Ingarden addresses a wide range of related questions when examining individual strata. We thus find in this book analyses of rhythm, sentence melody, etc., semantic investigations of names, function words, verbum finitum, sentences and sentence complexes, their correlates, etc. Questions discussed in connection with the third and the fourth strata are addressed below. The second chapter concludes with an examination of the meaning and sequence, 360 in which parts of the literary work follow each other.
The third chapter distinguishes literary works from theatrical works, cinematic pieces, pantomime, and scientific works. This distinction is based on the thesis that all these objects lack one or more strata of the literary work, whereas certain new strata appear within them. Furthermore, Ingarden discusses the "life" of the literary work in its concretizations and its transformations due to changes in these concretizations. These concretizations are distinguished by Ingarden from the psychical [| 100b] experiences of the reader during reading, although these concretizations exist—unlike the literary work—only as long as given experiences exist.
Ingarden's main objection to psychologistic theory is the impossibility of explaining the intersubjective identity of literary work on the basis of this very theory. The intersubjective identity of the literary work depends on the intersubjective identity of its meaning stratum; all other strata depend on this [intersubjective identity], except for the stratum of linguistic sound formations. In order to justify this intersubjective identity of the meaning stratum, Ingarden accepts some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, particularly a) the existence of ideal concepts and b) the heteronomous existence of meanings
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as products of subjective operations (these products—as we already know— arise through subjective operations, but after creation, meanings continue to exist, even if they are not thought of by any subject); c) the ability to understand ideal concepts, since only through grasping the content of ideal concepts can readers of the literary work identically actualize the meaning of the sentence that the creator gave it, which is the actualization of given ideal concepts; d) the possibility of knowing an identical literary work, even if a reader—similarly to the creator—can grasp the literary work only in some concretizations, and these concretizations—as Ingarden admits—differ from each other and usually inadequately realize the literary work, adding to it a series of things that the creator did not intend.
It seems that the epistemology of literary studies would encounter significant difficulties, if such an approach were based on Ingarden's conception. Even if we accept that there exists a heteronomous system of meanings, while the subjective operations that created it no longer exist, and grant that this heteronomous system is identical owing to its foundation in ideal concepts, the following question remains: how will the reader, who is given only concretizations, access 361 this system? To what ideal concepts will the reader refer to in case of dispute with another reader? In addition, in what kind of a cognitive act [| 101a] does this grasping of ideal concepts occur, and what is the cognitive value of these acts? Until Ingarden develops a satisfactory epistemology to accompany this ontology of literary work, the adopted assumptions may give the reader the impression of multiplying entities, regarding which one does not yet know how to determine whether they exist or not.
Many readers will use Ockham's razor as a criterion for resolving their doubts. However, such readers will have to find another way to preserve the intersubjective identity of the literary work—unless the reader abandons the intersubjective identity of the literary work, accepting all those consequences that Ingarden denounces as absurd and skeptical. These consequences, when applied to academic theories, lead—according to Ingarden—to the abandonment of the possibility of intersubjective science.
A different approach might preserve the intersubjective identity of the literary work without requiring these metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. We accept that a literary work is simply a system of sentences in
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a particular language created through the subjective operations of the author and fixed in writing or some other medium. When the reader focuses on this language and understands the sentences, she intentionally grasps the fictional world that is designated by these sentences. The identity of the fictional world, as grasped by various readers, is guaranteed by the identical form of sentences given to them, and by the fact that, when focusing on a given language, readers understand these sentences according to the same directive. If these directives fail, different interpretations of given sentences or sentence complexes arise, but, on the whole, all readers grasp the same fictional world, since directives can fail only in rare cases of ambiguity, etc. From this standpoint, one has to distinguish the stratum of signs (linguistic sound formations or their visual artefacts) from the stratum of meanings, which the reader does not normally grasp, because the reader intentionally and directly grasps [| 101b] the stratum of objects. Some of these objects are sometimes given in terms of aspects.
However, despite doubts raised by Ingarden's views concerning the nature and mode of existence of individual strata, his book contains a wealth of 362 valuable contributions and subtle observations in respect to questions about individual strata of the literary work and their mutual relations. These include investigations concerning the stratum of linguistic sound formations, analyses of the role of the aspect stratum in the literary work, remarks on "truth" within the literary work, distinguishing a literary work from the theatrical work, cinematic work, etc., and explanations of the meaning of the sequence of individual parts of the literary work, among others. The semantic and ontological considerations are especially extensive and could constitute a separate treatise. Therefore, semantic and ontological considerations require separate evaluations.
Among Ingarden's most interesting observations are the illuminating investigations devoted to the stratum of objects represented in the literary work. The results obtained by Ingarden regarding the quasi-reality of these objects and regarding the time and space, in which these objects are located, regarding the temporal perspectives and the role of the so-called center of orientation reveal significant similarity between literary objects and imaginative objects. Ingarden's approach points to a deeper kinship between belles-lettres and plastic arts, theater, cinema, etc., as distinguished from architecture and music.
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Evaluating the book as a whole, one can state that Ingarden wrote an interesting book of fundamental significance for this field of research. He consistently developed one of the possible positions, and traced its consequences to the smallest details. Ingarden overlooked almost no questions along the way and perceived the most subtle differences. Regardless of the above-presented reservations regarding Ingarden's ontological views, one has to hold that his book deepens, to a high degree, our knowledge of the structure of the literary work [| 102a] and its strata, especially by emphasizing its multi-stratal character and the implications that follow therefrom.
Bibliography | Bibliografija
Ingarden, Roman. 1931. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft. Halle: Max Niemayer Verlag. [Reprint in: Ingarden, Roman. 1965. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Mit einem Anhang von den Funktionen der Sprache im Theaterschauspiel. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.] ---. 1973. The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature. Trans. by George. G. Grabowicz. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
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Translation
Prevod
UDC: 159.9
The Imaginative Work of Art and Its Way of Manifestation
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from German by Filip Borek Abstract and keywords prepared by Filip Borek
Abstract
The text distinguishes three modes of aesthetic presentation: perceptual, imaginative, and signitive, with a particular focus on analyzing the imaginative mode of manifestation of a work of art in contrast to the other two. In the case of imaginative perception, there are three objects to be distinguished: depicting, imaginative, and depicted objects. Unlike the object of simple sensory perception, which exists within the spatiotemporal reality of the observer, the imaginative object does not appear
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in this reality. Instead, it exists as something quasi-real rather than genuinely real. The text argues that imaginative perception differs not only from simple sensory perception, but also from signitive perception—such as the perception of literary work of art, which renders its proper object in a non-intuitive way.
Keywords: aesthetic experience, aesthetic perception, sensory perception, imaginative presentation, signitive perception.
Domišljijska umetnina in način njene danosti
Povzetek
Besedilo razlikuje tri moduse estetske prezentacije: perceptivnega, imaginativnega in signitvnega, pri čemer se z vidika kontrasta z drugima dvema posebej osredotoča na analizo imaginativnega modusa manifestacije umetnine. V primeru imaginativne zaznave je potrebno razlikovati tri predmete, in sicer: prikazujoči, imaginativni in prikazani predmet. V nasprotju s predmetom preproste čutne zaznave, ki obstaja znotraj 366 časovno-prostorske resničnosti opazovalca, se imaginativni predmet ne prikazuje v njej. Namesto tega obstaja, ne kot nekaj dejansko resničnega, temveč kot nekaj kvazi-resničnega. Besedilo zagovarja mnenje, da se imaginativna zaznava ne razlikuje zgolj od preproste čutne zaznave, temveč tudi od signitivne zaznave, kakor je to tudi pri zaznavanju literarne umetnine, ki svoj pravi predmet predoča na neintuitiven način.
Ključne besede: estetsko izkustvo, estetska zaznava, čutna zaznava, domišljijsko predstavljanje, signitivna zaznava.
Leopold Blaustein
[| 245]1 In a receptive aesthetic experience, there are three ways, in which objects manifest themselves. Natural phenomena, products of arts and crafts, architecture, "abstract" [ "gegenstandlosen"] sculpture, and most works of music are perceived [wahrgenommen] and aesthetically enjoyed on the basis of this perception [Perception].2 Works of art, such as paintings and sculptures, stage plays, movies, radio dramas, etc., are presented imaginatively. In turn, literary works of art are the object of signitive perception. These three types of aesthetic perception are not always rigorously distinguished, because one usually pays more attention to aesthetic enjoyment than aesthetic perception. The latter, however, does affect the relation between the subject of aesthetic enjoyment and its aesthetic object, as well as the constitution of the aesthetic object itself.
In particular, the difference between perceiving [Wahrnehmung] and the imaginative grasping of aesthetic objects is often overlooked. We see a sea, [| 246] and it evokes an aesthetic pleasure, as does a Gothic cathedral. In this sense, we see a picture as a colorful canvas, a marble figure, an actor, or a play of lights and shadows on a cinema screen. However, these are not the primary objects of aesthetic enjoyment. What we enjoy aesthetically are, rather, the landscapes, objects, and 367 people imaginatively depicted in them. The bearer of aesthetic value becomes two-layered. The object of pleasure or displeasure is not only the actress, but also the character of the drama, not only a complex of colors, but also an imaginative sea, not only a marble statue, but the body of a Greek goddess, not only a play of light
1	[This translation indicates original pagination directly in the text in square brackets; all page numbers refer to: Blaustein, Leopold. 1937. "Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise." In Deuxième Congrès International d'esthétique et de science de l'art, eds. Paul Valéry, Paul Claudel, and Victor Basch, 245-249. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan.]
2	[Blaustein distinguishes between "Wahrnehmung" and "Perzeption," with the former being a subclass of the latter. Due to the difficulty of conveying this distinction in English, I render "Wahrnehmung" as "perceiving" and "Perzeption" as "perception." In order to avoid ambiguity, I occasionally refer to the original term in certain passages.]
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center, Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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and shadow, but the plot of a movie. In this case, there are different sources of aesthetic pleasure, because the perceived object refers to another, makes another object intuitively present, and both can have aesthetic value.
The intention of the subject of aesthetic enjoyment who uses the depicting object as a "transitional object" can, however, go in two directions. On the one hand, it can be directed toward the depicted object—a portrayed face, a painted landscape, hence an object that is intended as truly existing, which may have served as a model for the artist. On the other hand, it can be directed toward the imaginative object that manifests itself to the enjoying subject "in" the picture, "on" the stage or cinema screen. The imaginative object is no longer the object of perceiving. Every object of perceiving is to the right or to the left of the spectator's body, more or less far from it.
The imaginative objects are neither to the right nor to the left of the spectator, neither far from nor close to it. Generally, there are no spatial relations between these objects and the objects surrounding the spectator in the real world. The same applies to temporal relations. A cinemagoer does not 368 think that the character in a movie was killed at the same time as a person sitting next to him [| 247] coughed, nor earlier or later. The imaginative objects exist in spatial-temporal relations only with other components of their imaginative worlds. There are as many imaginative worlds as there are pictures, sculptures, stage plays, movies, etc. In the case of aesthetic perceiving, its object is also isolated from the surrounding world or the whole surrounding from its wider world. The isolated fragment remains, however, a part of the spectator's surrounding spatiotemporal world. The admired mountain lies in front of someone; the mountain peak is further away from someone than the forest situated on the slope. This distance is calculated on the basis of one's real body and not on the basis of a center of orientation projected into the invisible fragment of the imaginative world, which is not intuitively presented. An imaginative mountain is experienced by the spectator as an alien body, with a clear awareness that the subject and object of aesthetic experience belong to different worlds. This also explains the lack of any deception or illusion on the part of the subject of aesthetic enjoyment who does not, for instance, feel the need to actively interfere with an imaginative storyline, in order, e.g., to prevent an assassination attempt.
Leopold Blaustein
In the case of perceived aesthetic objects, there is an overarching thesis about the reality of the world, even if we do not make an explicit judgment about its real existence in the aesthetic experience. When I admire a city hall or an island, I grasp them as components of the real surrounding world. The imaginative objects on the canvas, stage, or cinema screen are experienced solely as quasi-real. The positing of the world as real is not even [einmal] neutralized in respect to imaginative objects; it encompasses these objects, only insofar as we interpret the canvas or an actor as something existing in reality, as well as the objects depicted in them (even if not as existing hic et nunc). Correspondingly, on the side of the subjective experience, this means [| 248] that we judge the perceived aesthetic objects, as well as depicting and depicted objects, while in the case of imaginative objects, we only make assumptions [Annahmen].
Other properties of the imaginative way of manifestation of aesthetic objects result from their comparison with the signitive way of manifestation. As demonstrated by R[oman] Ingarden in his groundbreaking analysis of the literary work of art, the signitive way of manifestation is not more complex. 369 The layers of word sounds, meaning units, depicted objectivities, and their aspects form an intimately connected whole [innig verbundenen Ganzen]. Each and every one of them contributes specific value-qualities that, in polyphonic harmony, create the aesthetic value of the literary work of art. While the most fundamental layer of the literary work of art, i.e., word sounds, manifests itself in perceiving, the layer of depicted objectivities is constituted for the reader on the basis of signitive acts.
There is an essential difference between the polyphonic harmony of value-qualities that stems from different layers in the imaginative and signitive ways of manifestation of a work of art, respectively. In the former, the aesthetic values are "connected-with-one-another" ["Miteinander"], while in the latter they form a "side-by-side" order [ "Nebeneinander"]. The beauty of a perceived actress has a decisive impact on the beauty of the imaginatively grasped character in a drama; the beauty of the colors covering the canvas impacts the beauty of the painted landscape. In contrast, the aesthetic value-qualities of the objects depicted in a literary work of art have no impact on the value-qualities of the word sounds. The specificity of the respective layers is much
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less sharp in the case of the signitive way of manifestation. In the case of the imaginative way of manifestation, the perceived [| 249] sense-qualities serve to constitute both the depicting and the imaginative object, whereas, in the signitive way of manifestation, they are used solely to construct the layer of word sounds. For this reason, the imaginative objects are given also intuitively, while the depicted objectivities of a literary work of art are given solely in a non-intuitive manner, i.e., signitively, whereby they can (though do not have to) be made secondarily intuitive [sekundären Veranschaulichung] due to phantasy presentations [Phantasievorstellungen].
370
Translation Prevod
UDC: IStumpf
Carl Stumpf
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from Polish by Witold Plotka Abstract and keywords prepared by Witold Plotka
Abstract
The text is a posthumous tribute to Carl Stumpf. The text summarizes the main points of Stumpf's philosophy and psychology by tracking the main phases in his philosophical development. The text introduces the notions of phenomenology and eidology.
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Keywords: Stumpf, descriptive psychology, experiments, phenomenology, eidology.
Carl Stumpf
Povzetek
Besedilo je postumni poklon Carlu Stumpfu. Povzema poglavitne poteze Stumpfove filozofije in psihologije, tako da prikaže temeljne faze znotraj njegovega filozofskega razvoja. Besedilo spregovori o ideji fenomenologije in eidologije.
Ključne besede: Stumpf, deskriptivna psihologija, eksperimenti, fenomenologija, eidologija.
372
Leopold Blaustein
[| 33]1 The recently deceased Professor Carl Stumpf belonged to that group of philosophers who, despising any construction, love concrete research and are skeptical of the machinery of systems. Referring to a certain statement by Dilthey, Stumpf included himself among those scholars whose dream is to open paths of scientific research and to die at the end of a long life in the midst of a research journey. As it happened, Stumpf was granted his wish by benevolent fate. After all, he lived to old age, and only a few years ago was rushing to the lecture hall of the University of Berlin, a youthful spring in his step, despite the fact that already in 1921 he had reached retirement age.
Born on April 21, 1848, he was mainly interested in music, and only reluctantly devoted himself to theoretical university studies. As for many other great figures of philosophy at the turn of the two centuries, for Stumpf, a meeting with the Socrates of our time, Franz Brentano, triggered a revolution in his views and way of life. However, the work of the young scholar was also influenced by Lotze and the physicist Wilhelm Weber. In 1870, he obtained his habilitation degree in Gottingen, and three years later he took the chair in Wurzburg. In 1875, he started working on his Tonpsychologie and thus entered 373 the field, in which previously divergent musical and scientific interests were harmoniously combined. He was, as he put it, an "outsider" at that time. An exception among German philosophers, he did not write any textbooks or other compendia, fleeing as often as possible from his desk to the laboratory. After all, he wanted to be a "specialist" like the representatives of other sciences, and not the architect of a new philosophical system with potentially original theories or at least original terminology. It should be noted, however, that as a university lecturer in Wurzburg he took into account all disciplines of philosophy, and he
1 [This translation indicates original pagination directly in the text in square brackets; all page numbers refer to: Blaustein, Leopold. 1937/38. "Karl Stumpf." Polskie Archiwum Psychologii 10 (1-4): 33-34.]
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center, Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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did the same in Prague, Halle, Munich, and Berlin, where he was appointed. In Berlin, he finally found his permanent field of activity, setting up a well-equipped Psychological Institute. While strongly supporting the development of experimental psychology, he also cared for the philosophical education of his students; in the spirit of Brentano, in particular, he did not consider conducting experiments to be the silver bullet of psychology. In Berlin, apart from acoustic work, he was involved, among other things, in child psychology, talented children, and the explanation of the "clever Hans" scandal, which initiated animal psychology in the form that would be continued on a large scale by W[olfgang] Kohler, Stumpf's student.
In his work, Stumpf focuses on metaphysics, theory of cognition, ethics, aesthetics, logic, philosophy of nature and [philosophy of] the humanities, music theory, and history of philosophy, [| 34] albeit mainly psychology and phenomenology. He considers phenomenology to be the science of sensory phenomena, and psychology as dealing with psychic functions. He differentiates between these functions and their products, which are 374 examined in the so-called "eidology." He was enthusiastic about "microscopic" psychology, i.e., analysis of elementary psychologic structures; he was against James's-Lange's theory of feelings, and against introducing to psychology the concept of unconscious psychologic functions; he welcomed Gestalt psychology developed by his students. Thanks to the wealth of his serious and fruitful research endeavors, he was at the forefront of the development of the twentieth-century psychology.
Translation Prevod
UDC: 159.9:1
On Apprehending Aesthetic Objects
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from Polish by Witold Plotka Abstract and keywords prepared by Witold Plotka Bibliography edited by Witold Plotka
Abstract
The study concerns the main elements of the aesthetic experience of both ordinary objects (e.g., a sunset) as well as artworks (e.g., a painting, a sculpture). These experiences are described as intentional, thus as directed toward their objects. It is argued that aesthetic experiences depend on the kind of objects apprehended; one experiences static and dynamic objects differently. Generally,
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aesthetic experiences are essentially temporal and function to constitute their objects. The study differentiates reproducing (e.g., oil on canvas), imaginative (e.g., objects seen in a painting), and reproduced (e.g., a city depicted in a photograph) kinds of objects. The structure of, and relations between, these objects are to be examined, including the imaginative character of space and time, which are inherent to works of art.
Keywords: aesthetic object, aesthetic experience, spots of indeterminacy, imaginative world, phantasy.
376
O dojemanju estetskih predmetnosti
Povzetek
Študija obravnava osrednje elemente estetskega izkustva tako navadnih predmetnosti (npr., sončnega zahoda) kakor umetnin (npr., slike, kipa). Tovrstna izkustva Blaustein opiše kot intencionalna, se pravi, usmerjena k lastnim predmetnostim. Zagovarja stališče, da je estetsko izkustvo odvisno od vrste predmetnosti dojemanja; statične ali dinamične predmetnosti namreč izkušamo drugače. Estetska izkustva so nasploh bistveno časovna in funkcionirajo tako, da konstituirajo svoje predmetnosti. Študija razlikuje med reproducirajočimi (npr., olje na platnu), imaginativnimi (npr., predmeti videni na sliki) in reproduciranimi (npr., mesto prikazano na fotografiji) predmeti. Raziskati je potrebno strukturo teh predmetnosti in odnose med njimi, pri čemer je potrebno upoštevati tudi imaginativni značaj prostora in časa, kakor pripadata umetnini.
Ključne besede: estetska predmetnost, estetsko izkustvo, mesta nedoločenosti, imaginativni svet, fantazija.
Leopold Blaustein
[| 3]1 I.
Distinctive experiences, called "aesthetic experiences," sometimes interrupt the main course of our mental life, connected with the struggle for existence or life-power. Such experiences occur, for example, when we hike in the mountains, when we look at paintings or sculptures, when we participate as spectators in theater or film shows, when we listen to music or a radio play. The fact that aesthetic experiences are, as it were, isolated islands in the stream of our experiences often makes us experience them as a rest. After all, during aesthetic experiences we forget about our worries and life aspirations, "we live in the moment"—as the Polish aesthetician Stanislaw Ossowski (1933) writes—and not in the past or the future. This restful nature of aesthetic experiences may suggest that they do not require intensive mental effort from us. However, such a view would be completely wrong. This rest does not always consist in the absence of experiences, in "silence" in mental life, but often in one's activity of a different kind than that which is connected with the struggle for existence or life-power. For example, a person [| 4] who is 377 worried, obsessed with anxiety, usually pushes it out with her thoughts about something else, yet not with thoughtlessness; a tired person often rests by changing her duties. Similarly, aesthetic experiences, although we experience them as resting or relaxation following hardship, demand considerable activity, sometimes even extraordinary mental dynamism from us. It is by no means the case that it is enough to look at a beautiful landscape, listen to good music, or see a beautiful film for aesthetic experiences to arise. It is true that aesthetic experiences are primarily passive experiences, an apprehension, a
1 [This translation indicates original pagination directly in the text in square brackets; all page numbers refer to: Blaustein, Leopold. 1938. O ujmowaniu przedmiotow estetycznych. Lvov: Lwowska Biblioteka Pedagogiczna.]
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center, Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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perception of aesthetic objects. In addition to the perception of an object, we can also identify here rich reserves of experiences, in which we react to what is given to us in perception. Feelings predominate among them, judgments, e.g., in the form of aesthetic evaluations, occur less frequently, and acts of will appear very rarely. Nonetheless, it is not only in these reactive components of aesthetic experiences, but also in the perceptual ones, in those, in which an apparently exclusively passive reception of the aesthetic object takes place, that the activity of the person aesthetically experiencing them is revealed. That this is actually the case is to be proven by the following studies. However, we will not provide such evidence for all aesthetic approaches in general, but for their individual types.
II.
Many objects that awaken aesthetic experiences in us are given to us perceptually. A sunset, the sky before a storm, and thus natural phenomena, 378 slender church towers [| 5] and magnificent bridges, and thus architectural products, beautiful vases, costumes and other products of artistic industry, bird calls and various musical pieces—all these objects that are perceptually given arouse delight or give us pleasure that arises with their perception. Among these objects, we should distinguish static and dynamic ones. The former include buildings, mountain peaks, etc., and the latter include the human body when dancing, running, working, airplanes in the air, and musical pieces.
Is it sufficient to passively perceive objects, in order to reveal their aesthetic value? Let us first consider this question in relation to objects at rest. Walking down the street, I notice a beautiful building. I do not usually look at it from the place, from which I first saw it. On the contrary, I approach and move away, I seek the most favorable points of view, from which the beauty of the viewed object is fully revealed to me. I have to look at some objects from the side, from above, from below, in order to capture their most beautiful view. This is well known to anyone who wants to capture such a view in a photograph. Sometimes, the object of my aesthetic experience is of a large size. I can see it at a glance or look at its parts. Thus, I look first at some of its fragments, then at other ones; I return to fragments I have already seen; I remain in contemplation
Leopold Blaustein
of individual parts for as long as I like. Sometimes, I change something in the object so that it provides me with a fuller aesthetic pleasure; I overlook its deficiencies or supplement something with my imagination. When perceiving an aesthetic object, I must therefore be extremely active, if [| 6] I wish to see it in all its beauty, if I do not want to overlook any of its values.
But this is not the end of the observer's activity. It is known that we cannot simultaneously observe with the same intensity all the objects that appear in our visual field. What we focus on comes to the foreground, as it were, and the rest becomes only the background of the object perceived attentively. This whole, composed of the main object and its immediate background, is usually isolated in aesthetic experiences from the further surroundings, thus obtaining a whole that is closed in itself. All these factors show the active role of the person experiencing aesthetically.
What kind of object we see depends, therefore, on how we look at it. The object is not simply "found" by us; on the contrary, we participate to some extent in its formation, its "constitution" as an object of given aesthetic experiences—as some aestheticians would put it. Various people looking at 379 the same object may see it differently. Some may see all of its aesthetic values, others may notice some, and others may not apprehend any. The object may be constituted differently by each viewer. They perceive it in different ways. Not everyone will notice that the contours of the building they are looking at harmonize with the lines of the landscape or create a synchronized rhythm with the neighboring houses; only some will look at the mosaic so closely as to notice its intricate finishing in detail or the regularities, [| 7] according to which the colors and spatial shapes are arranged in it.
It would be possible to provide further arguments in favor of the observer's activity in the context of static aesthetic objects, but the above line of reasoning will probably suffice. Only some of these arguments can be used with respect to objects in motion. After all, when I see, for instance, a running horse and enjoy its sight, I cannot remain in contemplation of a certain aspect of its movement for an endlessly long time or return to observing a phase of running that has already passed. But there are other circumstances here that make the constitution of aesthetic objects partly dependent on the observer. The perception of a dynamic object consists in the ongoing apprehension of the
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object as it progresses in time, in the successive perception of its component parts while simultaneously grasping the structure of the whole. Thus, for example, when listening to a longer piece of music, it is enough to pay attention to something else for a certain time, i.e., to overlook certain parts of the melody, in order to apprehend the structure of the whole differently or not to apprehend it at all. The constitution of a dynamic aesthetic object also depends on the way, in which the already past parts are kept in "living memory"— as the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden puts it. One can also perceive all the phases, all the components, but fail to apprehend the transitions between them and their aesthetic values. Anyone who observes a sunset on the high seas from the deck of a ship can aesthetically delight in each of the phases of this magnificent spectacle, but at the same time one can overlook the aesthetic values hidden in the slow transitions from the brightness of day through twilight to the complete [| 8] darkness of night, and [other values hidden] in the richness of the shades of color that are revealed in these transitions.
Thus, both in the perception of static as well as of dynamic aesthetic objects, the 380 aesthetically experiencing person is active and actively determines the constitution of the object. What she sees and hears depends not only on the properties of the perceived object, but also on the course of the perceptual process.
III.
A separate examination is required to account for such artworks as paintings, sculptures, theater and film shows, and radio plays. At first glance, it would seem that these objects are also given to us perceptually, because we see or hear them. However, a closer analysis of the states that occur here convinces us that, when we perceive such works, we are dealing with a specific psychological situation, different from that, in which we perceive landscapes, buildings, human bodies in motion, etc.
When we look at paintings or sculptures, when we observe what is happening "on" the stage or "on" the cinema screen, we see certain objects. Analyzing our experiences in these situations, we come to the conclusion that there are two possible, fundamentally different mental attitudes here. The first attitude comes into play when, following the action of [George Bernard] Shaw's drama Caesar
and Cleopatra in the theater, I think about Caesar—a man who died long ago and about whom history informs me. The second [attitude], in turn, occurs when I think about this Caesar over there who is speaking to the Sphinx. In the first [| 9] case, I am thinking about the reproduced object, in the second about the imaginative object. The reproduced object can be an element of the spatio-temporal, real world that surrounds us, but the imaginative object cannot. This claim requires a more detailed justification.
Let us begin with spatial properties and relations. There is no doubt that imaginative objects are not devoid of [these properties]. If we were to describe what we see in the painting by the famous seventeenth-century Dutch painter Jacob Ruisdael, depicting a riverbank and a windmill, the description would be full of spatial terms. After all, in Ruisdael's painting, some objects are higher, others lower, some behind the windmill, others in front of the windmill, some closer, others further away, some to the right, others to the left. Real objects that I perceive appear to me in exactly the same way. However, a closer analysis shows a significant difference here. The part of the world around me that I currently perceive is filled with a certain number of spatial objects. My body 381 is among them. Let us suppose that I get bored in this part of the surrounding world. So, I leave. After a while, I find myself in a completely different part of the world, filled with completely different objects. However, one object that was there is and must be here as well. It is my body, and I cannot escape it, despite my best efforts. Thanks to this fact, my body has a central meaning in my understanding of spatial relations. Something is behind something, whereas something else is in front of something, other things are to the left and others to the right, [| 10] depending on where my body is situated. In describing Ruisdael's painting, we would say that the building in the background is higher than the house to the right. In the painting, it is lower, but I take into account the fact that the building with the turrets is further away from me than the house to the right. Here, however, one thing worries me. If a certain object stands in spatial relation to another, in this case to my body, then it must also stand in spatial relations to others that are in the same space as my body. The river, the bank, the windmill are, therefore, not only in front of me, but also in front of my chair, to the left of the ashtray, to the right of the watch. Above them, I see the sky, and below the sky is the ceiling, below it lies the calendar.
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It seems odd and simply absurd to me that I hesitate whether I should not rather give up the claim that objects seen when looking at the painting are in some spatial relation to me. In front of me, there is, to be sure, a photograph, i.e., a piece of paper with such and such colors, but the colored spots on it lie next to each other, nothing is closer or further, nothing is a river, a bank, or a windmill. I am indeed in a difficult situation, because I see before me a river, a bank, and a windmill. However, I find a way out of this situation, realizing that the river, houses, bank, boats, are indeed grouped in front of my body, but not in front of the self sitting in the chair at the desk, but as if projected into that world that reveals itself to me when looking at the paining. I am there, although invisible; I can even define the place, to which I am projecting myself. I "find myself" in this [| 11] part of the riverbank that I can no longer see, in the place where a photographer or painter would stand, wanting to photograph or paint the objects I see. I am not as large there as I currently perceive my body, but almost as tiny as those peasant women walking along the riverbank, smaller than the pen, with which I write. And it is precisely 382 because I project myself in this way—unconsciously, by the way—that I see the windmill as bigger than me, although compared to my body sitting on the chair, it is much smaller. This body of mine, projected over there onto a part of the riverbank that is invisible to me, stands in no spatial relation to my body sitting at the desk. And, in general, the spatial world, in which those boats and houses are located, which I see when looking at the painting, has appeared as an alien or unwanted visitor in the space surrounding me, having no relations to it. It is not 20 cm or 200 km away from my chair. It would be different if I were thinking not about the imaginative object, but about the reproduced one. Then, I could perhaps decide, based on knowledge I have acquired elsewhere, that this windmill stands or stood so many miles away from me, in some distant country. However, we are interested at the moment in the world of imaginative objects. There are as many of these worlds as there are paintings, photographs, film images, etc., and none of them stands in spatial relation to that one, enormous space, in which both my desk and that distant country are located.
The same applies to imaginative objects that occur individually. Let us consider the example of a sculpture of a young man running. We can clearly
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see [| 12] that this young man is heading in a certain specific direction, toward a certain precise goal, but who among us would locate this goal in the spatial world that surrounds us? It would be absurd to claim that the sculpted figure is heading, for example, toward the door where tickets to an exhibition are sold. This young man is heading to some place in some imaginative spatial world that is not given to us. The nature of his movements indicates some unrealized space, and it creates a certain pointer to some unfulfilled imaginative world. Of course, we are talking about the sculpted figure, not the mass of marble, which is in the same room as my body. Sculptors felt this, and for this reason they placed their sculptures on pedestals that seem to elevate the sculpted figure beyond real space. Frames have a similar function in the case of a painting, likewise darkness around the cinema screen, or a curtain in the theater. The rising of the curtain perfectly symbolizes the transition of our focus on the real world to a focus on the imaginative world. Evidence of our experience of the division between imaginative objects and the spatial world, in which we live, is also the fact that sometimes we consciously and with the help of special means strive to eliminate this divide, that is, to destroy our more or 383 less conscious sense of the boundaries of both worlds. Examples include wax figures without pedestals in panoramas, and panoramas in general. However, all these means simply fail, and disturb our aesthetic experiences. Anyone who visits, for example, the Raclawice Panorama in Lvov, easily points out where the imaginative world [| 13] begins and where the real sands and bushes end. Imaginative objects lie somewhere beyond and above our spatial world. And here lies the source of that sense of rising above the reality of life in the aesthetic experience of works of visual art, theater, and film.
The same holds for time in the imaginative world. The time, in which imaginative objects come into being, endure, and pass away, is not the time of the real world that surrounds the viewer. It would be absurd to ask whether the imaginative event watched on the cinema screen, stage, picture, etc., takes place at the same time when the lady who watches it takes her lorgnette to her eye or whether it is followed by the closing of the gates of the cinema, theater, or museum at night. It would be absurd to claim that Hamlet saw the ghost of his father when my neighbor ate a third piece of a candy in a row. Thus, just as imaginative objects do not stand in spatial relation to the real world that
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surrounds us, they are not connected by temporal relations to the events of this world either.
Imaginative objects are, therefore, neither in our time nor in our "space." However, they are deceptively similar to real spatial and temporal objects, they are quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal, which does not exclude certain differences, e.g., in the flow of time passing in the real and imaginative world. Despite this deceptive similarity, we realize that the imaginative, quasi-temporal and quasi-spatial world is not part of our world; we are not at all deceived in our aesthetic experience. If the viewers were deceived, they would be in a rush to grab an umbrella in the last act of [Stanislaw Wyspianski's] The Curse, [| 14] facing the approaching storm. Othello would not kill Desdemona, because the spectators would betray the trick of his cunning subordinate. When on the cinema screen a train is going straight toward the spectator, the goer does not fear for her life; when at the fringe of the cinema screen a ship partially disappears, the goer does not look at the walls for the rest of it. The sense of distinctness of imaginative "artistic reality" does not abandon her for a moment.
384 The peculiarity of the imaginative object will become even more evident if we examine the concept of the reproduced object in more detail. As far as reproduced objects are concerned, to which our intention is directed when looking at portraits, photographs, film weeklies, scientific films, etc., any explanations are unnecessary. These are, of course, people, things portrayed, photographed, etc. These objects are now (or were once) objects that really exist, [they are] elements of the real spatio-temporal world that surrounds us. However, it would be wrong to assume that this is a characteristic or at least a common feature of all reproduced objects. For I can also be directed in my mind toward the reproduced object when I look at a painting of a knight's castle that has never existed anywhere, painted by an artist solely from phantasy. This happens with "naive" people who perceive images of the most bizarre monsters as painted from nature. For this reason, the perception of imaginative objects, not perceived as real and not located in our space, is a privilege of people with a certain level of culture, as, for example, travelers [| 15] who took part in the first cinema performances in exotic countries could observe this for themselves. Reproduced objects are, therefore, characterized—in contrast to imaginative objects—by the fact that they are perceived by us as real components of the
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spatio-temporal world, in which they once existed or still exist and in which we live; it is irrelevant whether these perceptions are objective and correct. Moreover, it is enough for us to locate reproduced objects as really existing somewhere in real space and once in real time, and it is not necessary to determine the place and time. I can also perceive a reproduced object by looking at a photograph that reproduces a view of the sea, although I do not know what kind of sea it is.
Imaginative objects must be carefully distinguished not only from those that are reproduced, but also from those that are reproducing. A reproducing object is an actor, a canvas covered with pigment, a screen with the phantoms covering it, a marble figure, etc. When I look at 10 photographs of a person I know, I have 10 reproducing objects lying before me, and with their help I can grasp 10 imaginative objects, but only one reproduced object.2
Similarly, when listening to radio plays, we are directed toward the imaginative world. When we hear the sound of a telephone ringing, we do not think that [| 16] someone is calling in our real world, when listening to an exchange, we do not have the feeling of eavesdropping on people speaking 385 "seriously." It is not important whether we believe that the songs of birds we hear, for example, are originally made by birds or skillfully imitated. Because even if we believe in the authenticity of the sounds, we do not believe in the existence of the world, in which they are heard. Real objects that we consider to be the sources of sounds, i.e., people, telephones, etc., we perceive as objects that reproduce or represent someone [or something] else. In this way, not only do people become actors, but also inanimate objects [are as if actors]. In this way, new worlds are constituted for the listener, alien to the real world that surrounds her and not related to it in time or space. The situation is analogous to that of viewing paintings, sculptures, theater, or film shows. The only difference is that in those cases, imaginative perception is based [solely] on visual or on [both] visual and auditory perceptions, while in the case we discuss now, it is based solely on auditory perceptual images.
After drawing the above distinctions, we can now consider the forms of activity of the recipient of a work of art with respect to one's imaginative
2 Cf. Blaustein 1930.
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perception. It is not necessary to discuss in detail that most remarks made on the influence of the course of perception on the constitution of an aesthetic object can also be applied to imaginative perception. The point of view, from which the work of art is seen, the series of perceptual experiences, their duration, the repetition of some of them, etc., also play a major role in [| 17] imaginative perception. The distinction between static and dynamic works and the way they are perceived retains its importance in this area as well. However, in imaginative perception, there are new sources of the recipient's influence on the formation of the work of art in one's perception. They lie in the possibility of freely changing attitudes. For instance, a cinemagoer focused exclusively on the world of imaginative characters and events, absorbed in the plot, may completely overlook the aesthetic values of the reproduced object. In this way, the arrangements of artistic forms appearing on the cinema screen, their order, the way some disappear and others appear, the pace, at which this happens, the possible rhythm of changes on the screen escape the goer's attention. When, on the other hand, the goer focuses for some time on the reproducing object, 386 follows the arrangement of artistic forms, notices the proper synchronization of movement and sound, is aware of the charm of the world in black and white colors, etc.—the object of one's aesthetic experience becomes richer, and thus acquires new values. And once again, it is justified to say that in aesthetic experience the object appears equipped with certain aesthetic values, but the quantity and type of these values that reach the consciousness of the person experiencing them depend not only on the mind-independent properties of the object, but also on the course and type of perception.
Nonetheless, the attitude adopted with respect to a reproduced object can also enrich the aesthetic experience. An attitude when looking at paintings that depict the martyrdom of those exiled to Siberia gives the viewed situations the charm of heroism, which enriches the work of art with new values, and the aesthetic experience [is combined] with new experiences, e.g., with a sense of sublimity, etc. [| 18] It seems, therefore, that only when the object is perceived in all three attitudes, of course with the predominance of the attitude toward the imaginative object, does the imaginary work of art reveal itself to us in the fullness of its features and aesthetic values.
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IV.
It is known that we owe many aesthetic experiences to literary works of art. Until recently, little thought was given to what a literary work of art actually is. Is it maybe a set of symbols printed on paper? Probably not, because in that case there would be many [specimens of] Sir Thaddeus3 and not just one, as we are inclined to believe. Or maybe Sir Thaddeus is a set of [Adam] Mickiewicz's thoughts and other experiences from when he was creating this work? These thoughts, however, are long gone; they have long ceased to exist, and we are inclined to say about Sir Thaddeus that it exists to this day. So maybe Sir Thaddeus is a set of thoughts and other experiences of the readers of this work? In this case, there would be many [specimens of] Sir Thaddeus, and very diverse ones, because this work was read many times, and the experiences of various readers (or the same reader when re-reading it) were undoubtedly different.
This difficult problem was brought to the attention of aestheticians and literary theorists by the Polish scholar Roman Ingarden. However, he was not 387 satisfied with merely raising this issue, but attempted to solve it. According to him, a literary work of art is a multi-strata product, in which four strata must be distinguished. The first is the stratum of verbal sounds, the second is the semantic stratum, built from the meanings of sentences [| 19] that are included in the work, the third is the stratum of represented objects, the fourth is the stratum of schematized appearances, in which the objects represented in the work are manifested. Thus, a literary work of art includes both verbal sounds, represented by written signs, and linguistic meanings of words and sentences, created from these sounds, the world of fictional characters and their surroundings, and the appearances of these objects, with the help of which we can visualize them, even though they are only described to us, not shown or otherwise visually given. There is an integral connection between the strata of a literary work; they create an integral whole. Insofar as a literary work of art is a valuable artwork, each of its strata potentially contains specific
3 [Blaustein refers here to Adam Mickiewicz's epic poem, Sir Thaddeus, or the Last Foray in Lithuania.]
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aesthetic values, and the aesthetic values of all the strata produce a particular polyphonic harmony of the aesthetic qualities of the entire work.4
Roman Ingarden distinguishes a literary work from its individual concretizations, which arise during individual readings of the same work. Sir Thaddeus is, therefore, a single and unique literary work of art, and its concretizations are numerous, because this work has been read countless times. In a literary work of art, there are many "spots of indeterminacy," especially in the stratum of objects represented and in the stratum [| 20] of appearances. When describing characters or inanimate objects, for example, the poet cannot and does not want to enumerate all their features. The reader can, therefore, for example, imagine the main character of the novel in detail in one way or another, as long as she attributes those features that the author of the novel clearly mentions. In the concretizations of a literary work of art, the spots of indeterminacy are "filled in," but not all of them and not always in the same way.
From this compact presentation of Ingarden's theory of a literary work of 388 art, it follows that the apprehension of a literary work of art is a very complex experience. After all, the reader must perceive written signs and expressions, understand the meaning of words and sentences, think about the objects represented in the work, sometimes imagine them in relevant appearances, and bind these strata into a whole—and apprehending the idea of the whole requires certain experiences on the part of the reader. Ingarden writes about the influence of the complexity of the perception of a literary work on its concretization as follows:
The multitude and variety of experiences and acts that we must perform almost simultaneously when reading a work means that we do not live in all of them equally actively and perform them with equal perfection. As a result, various details of the work's construction undergo more or less significant distortions in the individual phases and strata of concretization: certain details are omitted or "overconstituted," ("overdeveloped"—a photographer may say), or on the contrary exaggerated, or ultimately wrongly reconstructed, etc. The one-sidedness of the
4 See Ingarden 1931 [1973a] and Ingarden 1937 [1973b].
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reader's imaginative type, for example, entails significant deformations
of the stratum of aspects, insensitivity to [| 21] certain aesthetic
qualities impoverishes the concretization of the work by them, the lack
of ability to empathize with the mental life of the people presented in
the work changes the content of the stratum of objects, etc. It is not
possible to go into detail here, but it is certain that all these changes
are reflected, or at least can be decisively reflected, in the polyphonic
set of aesthetically valuable qualities and can distort the concretization
of the work as an object of aesthetic experience. An important role is
played here by changes in the reader's attention, the instability of its
center, limited divisibility, etc. The direction of attention, the degree of
its concretization, etc., is only in relatively few cases determined by the
structure of the work itself (or its individual phases), while in general,
the state of attention changes independently of the properties of the
work. As a result, not all the details and strata of the work appear equally
clearly. Once, another time, we perform an act or experience with greater
attention, and in tandem with this, we are as if first to one stratum, then
to another, while the remaining strata are present to us only peripherally
and are vaguely outlined. We are most actively immersed in grasping the	339
objects presented in the work, and least clearly aware of the properties of
the semantic stratum of the work... As a result, in the individual phases
of its concretization, the work manifests itself in a kind of perspectival
foreshortening, in the skewing and exaggeration of some strata (in
this case, the stratum of objects), and in the miniaturization of others.
Something similar occurs here as in the faulty photographing of larger
objects with an inclined [| 22] camera positioning or when the positions
of objects in relation to the camera differ significantly.
Quite the opposite foreshortening arises—so to speak—in the "philological" way of reading a work. It occurs among readers for whom the main interest is the so-called "author's language," that is, the language, in which a given work is written, or the ways of expressing oneself, the structure of sentences, the types of relationships between them, surprises and stylistic ornaments, etc. Philologists generally delight in all this. For them, the value of a work is primarily determined by what occurs in the semantic and sound strata. On the other hand, what appears in the remaining strata, as well as the polyphonic arrangement of strata and aesthetic qualities occurring in them, is of subordinate importance to them, and what is more, it does not very often come to a lively constitution in the concretization of the work. The
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polyphonic harmony of the work is, therefore, disturbed, it is distorted into a "perspectival foreshortening" that is incompatible with the work. Certainly, not every work is distorted to the same extent in philological reading. There are works whose language stratum dominates other strata in terms of its particular structure and aesthetic values, and which consequently demand a "philological" way of reading. But in general, such works are rather a kind of exception in literature. They are also a symptom of a certain decadence or baroque. Read with the stratum of objects in mind, they turn out to be empty and poor both in their "ideological" content and in the polyphony of aesthetic qualities. Other works rich in this [| 23] polyphony will never reveal their proper, artistic face to us in a philological reading, impoverished in perception by precisely what is essential to them.
Perhaps these examples will suffice to explain what I have in mind when I speak of the "perspectival foreshortenings" of a literary work, which flow from the complexity of its perception. (Ingarden 1937, 61-63.)5
390 This is not the only source of the dependence of the concretization of a literary work of art on the reader. Another, and a very important one, is the "filling in" by the reader of the above-mentioned spots of "indeterminacy," with various readers specifying these spots differently.
In the aesthetic concretization of a literary work, its spots of indeterminacy... can be filled in various ways, depending on the course of the aesthetic experience or on the various abilities of the reader, such as his interest, type of imagination and scope of phantasy, sense of objective consequence, psychological sensitivity, subtlety of feeling, ability of emotional response, type and degree of ethical culture, etc. At the same time, each difference of indeterminacy has a certain influence on the whole of the concretization, although it may be more or less significant for its aesthetic value. Various cases are possible. Sometimes, failure to fill in one important place of indeterminacy or filling it in a way that is inconsistent with the work or finally inappropriately
5 [This quotation comes from the original Polish version of Ingarden's book, The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. For the revised and enlarged version, see Ingarden 1973b, 90-92.]
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matched to the other elements of the concretization destroys or at least [| 24] significantly spoils the qualitative arrangement occurring in it. Sometimes, on the contrary, the deliberate failure to fill in some place of underdetermination or, what is more, filling it in such a way that it seems—as it is usually said—not to be in the "author's intentions" results in the removal of some unnecessary dissonance or increases the uniformity of the qualitative arrangement and thus contributes to increasing the aesthetic value of a given concretization. Of course, there may also be other cases. (Ingarden 1937, 213-214.)6
In the cited works of Roman Ingarden, the reader will find numerous further arguments in favor of the claim that the same literary work of art can be differently understood, depending on the course of the reader's experiences, which of course determines a richer or poorer apprehension of its aesthetic values. A full apprehension of the work and its aesthetic values, therefore, requires great activity and the skills of the reader. Lacking that means, for example, that some readers of masterpieces will not perceive them as masterpieces at all. Their poor perception means that the literary work of art loses its beauty, its charms, and 391 therefore is not a masterpiece in the given concretizations.
V.
In the studies so far, we examined three basic types of aesthetic perception: receptive, imaginative, and signitive. And thus, the perception of a literary work of art is called "signitive," because its basic component is [| 25] the conceptual understanding of signs, expressions. In each of these types of aesthetic perception, one who experiences aesthetically determines—as we have stated—the formation of the object of their experiences. This happens not only for the reasons already considered, but also for many others, and we will briefly examine the four most important arguments.7
6	[Again, this quotation comes from the original Polish version of Ingarden's book, The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. For the revised and enlarged version, see Ingarden 1973b, 368-369.]
7	Mieczyslaw Wallis-Walfisz writes about one of the most important [reasons], not included in this study, in his text entitled "O rozumieniu d^zen artystycznych w
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An object given perceptually, imaginatively, or signitively can fulfil the role of a symbol, it can represent some other symbolized object. A skeleton symbolizes death, a ploughshare—peace, a fox—cunning, etc. Peace and war, justice and freedom, youth and old age, times of day and year—these are examples of objects that are often symbolized in art and literature. However, an aesthetically experiencing subject may overlook the symbolic function of the perceived objects. For instance, one is delighted by the beautiful figures sculpted by Michelangelo, but does not apprehend the times of day that they symbolize; one looks with pleasure at [Zofia] Stryjenska's well-known paintings, but does not apprehend the seasons of the year that they represent. Or one is aware of the symbolic role of certain figures or other objects, but interprets them idiosyncratically. In the sculptures by Michelangelo, one viewer may see symbols of morning, day, evening, and night, and another [may see symbols] of the awakening, blossoming, and waning of human life. One can [| 26] also apprehend the symbolic meaning of the object, but not exhaust it in its entirety. For example, one who apprehends a sleeping figure, 392 sculpted by Michelangelo, as night, may not apprehend the mask lying next to it as a symbol of dreams. All these circumstances create a new source of the active determination of the experiencing person on the formation of the object of their aesthetic experiences.
Memory plays an important role in the aesthetic perception of dynamic objects. For instance, we must keep in a certain way the previous phases of a film or a literary work of art in our memory, if we are to apprehend the compositional values of the entirety of the work of art. Sometimes, we recall these previous phases in a completely different way than we perceived them originally; for example, the previous phases of a film perceived visually, yet only briefly and in a conceptual way, or a radio play perceived auditorily with the help of visual images. Such and other transformations in recalling previous phases of a dynamic object are examples of the active influence of a person on their aesthetic experiences.
dzielach sztuki [On the Understanding of Artistic Aspirations in Works of Art]." See Wallis-Walfisz 1935, 295-321.
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Another source is the use of phantasy in aesthetic perception. Phantasy plays a threefold role in the perception of aesthetic objects. It often supplements perceived objects, e.g., fragments of a film's action, which are not displayed on the cinema screen, or the "continuation" of the imaginative world revealed in them, but which is invisible in the images. Those watching [Artur] Grottger's Sign, for instance, often present imaginatively to themselves that the unseen man who knocks on the window of the cottage is calling for a fight. [| 27] Phantasy, however, can not only supplement perception by adding things not given in perception; it can help to illustrate given things as well. For example, when reading a literary work, we often present imaginatively to ourselves characters and events given to us only conceptually, and many listeners of radio plays have as if a psychic television apparatus, because things perceived auditorily are simultaneously apprehended in visual creative images. Finally, phantasy adds to perception the dreams loosely connected with it, which— as the Polish aesthetician Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz writes—give a certain additional aesthetic value to some works of art.8 These associated dreams are no longer a component of aesthetic perception, but they determine, for 393 example, the apprehension of the mood of a painting or a poem. It is clear that the use of phantasy in aesthetic perception in all three forms mentioned above can significantly influence the constitution of the aesthetic object. This can take place in a way that is beneficial or detrimental to the apprehension of the aesthetic values of the object.
Finally, one more factor is worth noting. Objects of aesthetic experiences are often mental entities or things that are, admittedly, devoid of a psyche, but "spiritualized" by us. Perception of such objects requires, among other things, empathizing with the states and mental experiences they express. The degree of subtlety of empathizing with an alien psyche determines, therefore, the understanding of the expression of a face "on" the screen, the voice of a character in a radio play, the statement of a character in a novel [| 28], etc. One who experiences aesthetically may possess this ability to empathize to various degrees, and the accuracy and richness of their perception of mental states and experiences depend on this fact. This is a rich source of their active influence
8 See Tatarkiewicz 1935, 393-405.
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on the formation of the object of aesthetic experiences, while, for example, overlooking or misinterpreting what this object expresses is often at the same time overlooking its essential aesthetic values.
VI.
The above studies lead not only to the justification of the thesis given at the beginning, but also to certain thoughts of a practical nature. Since in aesthetic experiences the object appears as equipped with certain aesthetic values, and the quantity and type of these values that reach the consciousness of someone who experiences them depend not only on the objective properties of the object, but also on the course and type of perception—it is up to us, and not only the creator of beauty, how much of the beauty of nature and art we will absorb, how much of it we will notice, how much of it we will feel. The aforementioned Polish aesthetician, Stanislaw Ossowski, coined a fortunate term for our sad contemporary reality in this respect. He speaks of "aesthetic 394 color-blindness," which is so widespread today. Treasures of beauty, once created, have been accumulated in libraries and museums, a dense network of theaters and cinemas mediates, like radio, in the dissemination of beauty, and mass tourism makes it easier for us to see the beauty of nature—and yet, most often we pass by beautiful things insensitive to their charm, like a colorblind person [| 29] who does not notice colors. We hastily consume good and bad books, artistic and average films, without noticing the merits of some and the deficiencies of others, we climb mountains, counting the time it takes to climb, not contemplating the ever new views that are revealed to us, in cars we pass the most enchanting corners of the world, only glancing at some of them, which are destinations "famous for their beauty." Beauty loses nothing because of such consumption, but the life of someone who is aesthetically color-blind, someone who often seeks joy where only its illusory appearance tempts and passes by such sources of joy that can generously bestow lasting emotion on oneself, is impoverished.
Bibliography | Bibliografija
Blaustein, Leopold. 1930. Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studyum zpogranicza
psychologii i estetyki. Lwow: Wydawnictwo Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie. [Partly reprinted in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 40-68. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] Ingarden, Roman. 1931. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft. Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag. [Reprinted in: Ingarden, Roman. 1965. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Mit einem Anhang von den Funktionen der Sprache im Theaterschauspiel. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.] ---. 1937. Opoznawaniu dziaia literackiego. Lvov: Wydawnictwo Zakladu
Narodowego Imienia Ossolinskich. ---. 1973a. The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. Trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and
Kenneth R. Olson. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. ---. 1973b. The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature. Trans. George G. Grabowicz. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Ossowski, Stanislaw. 1933. Upodstaw estetyki. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Kasy Imienia
Mianowskiego, Instytut Popierania Nauki. Tatarkiewicz, Wladyslaw. 1935. "Skupienie i marzenie." Marchol 1 (3): 393-405. [Reprinted in: Tatarkiewicz, Wladyslaw. 1986. O filozofii i sztuce, 167-175. Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.] Wallis-Walfisz, Mieczyslaw. 1935. "O rozumieniu d^zen artystycznych w dzielach sztuki." Przeglqd Filozoficzny 38 (4): 295-321. [Reprinted in: Wallis, Mieczyslaw. 1968. Przezycie i wartosc: Pisma z estetyki nauki o sztuce 1931-1949, 80-105. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie.]
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Translation Prevod
UDC: 159.9:1
On the Perception of the Radio Play
Leopold Blaustein
Translated from French by Hicham Jakha
Cross-checked with Polish in cooperation with Alicja Jakha and Filip Borek
Polish fragments translated by Filip Borek and Alicja Jakha Abstract and keywords prepared by Hicham Jakha Bibliography edited by Hicham Jakha
Abstract
Blaustein explores the phenomenon of listening to the radio play. The idea put forth by the author is that the radio play engages perception, treating the latter in a broad sense. Perception is not necessarily restricted to seeing; rather, it is understood as being cross-modal, as involving different senses. The main sense involved in the case of radio plays is hearing, which enables one to listen to the radio. Radio listeners are drawn into radio plays as media of hearing. Instead of vision, listeners engage their "acousion," a
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term coined by Blaustein to capture the perceptual distinctness of hearing; acousion is the auditive perception of radio plays. Listening to a radio play is a lived experience or a psychic phenomenon, precisely due to the activeness of acousion. Listeners do not only passively perceive or hear auditive data. They also engage their imaginative faculties, presenting to themselves, mentally, the world of the action; by so doing, listeners enable the act of listening. According to Blaustein, presentations, even imaginative ones, are basic. By listening to a radio play, the listener imaginatively presents the world of the action to themselves, as if they were watching a theater play. However, going beyond the realm of presentations, other factors are examined, e.g., the listener's focus is turned into the world represented—the world within—, which is given to them via auditive data and dialogue.
Keywords: perception, hearing, listening, aesthetic experience, radio play, imagination.
O zaznavanju radijske igre
Povzetek
398
Blaustein obravnava fenomen poslušanja radijske igre. Predstavi idejo, da radijska igra zadeva zaznavanje v širokem smislu. Zaznavanje se namreč ne omejuje samo na gledanje, temveč je multimodalno, vključuje različne čute. Poglavitni čut v primeru radijske igre je sluh, ki nam omogoča, da prisluhnemo radiu. Poslušalce radijske igre pritegnejo kot mediji sluha. Namesto vida je nagovorjena poslušalčeva »akuzija«; Blaustein termin vpelje zato, da bi opredelil zaznavano posebnost sluha: akuzija je avditivna zaznava radijske igre. Poslušanje radijske igre je izkustvo oziroma psihični fenomen natanko zaradi aktivnosti akuzije. Ne gre za to, da bi poslušalci samo pasivno sprejemali avditivne podatke. Spodbujene so tudi njihove imaginativne sposobnosti; sami sebi mentalno predstavljajo svet dogajanja in tako omogočajo dejanje poslušanja. Po Blausteinu so namreč predstave, tudi imaginativne, temeljnega pomena. Ko posluša radijsko igro, si poslušalec imaginativno predstavlja svet dogajanja, kakor da bi gledal gledališko predstavo. Onkraj okrožja predstav Blaustein obravnava tudi druge dejavnike, npr.: poslušalec se osredotoča na predstavljeni svet - svet znotraj igre -, ki se mu daje s pomočjo avditivnih podatkov in dialogov.
Ključne besede: zaznavanje, sluh, poslušanje, estetsko izkustvo, radijska igra, domišljija.
Leopold Blaustein
[| 1 (1938), 105 (1939)]1 Introduction
All works of art that are created by humans—ancient or modern—: paintings, musical works or works of literature, theater shows, films, are considered to be objects of [scholarly]2 interest and observation for the psychologist and aesthetician—an interest that never ceases. Until today, there remain many problems that are insufficiently explored: the structure of artworks, the manner, by which the spectator, reader, or listener reacts, are but a few examples. There is an affinity between the radio play and the aforementioned works of art, of which it is considered to be the youngest. All the more so that it belongs to the domain of problems that have hitherto been ignored by us.
The present study aims to examine a number of these problems. The novelty of the topic under examination is due to the fact that, until today, this field has hardly been explored. Consequently, this study can only shed some light on the problem in question, leaving it in need of further clarification.
In particular, the following psychological problem will be the main point that will interest us the most: how do we perceive the radio play?3 [| 106 (1939)] 399
1	[This translation is based on two versions of the text: Blaustein, Leopold, 1938. O percepcji stuchowiska radiowego. Warsaw: Polskie Radio Biuro Studiow; and: Blaustein, Leopold. 1939. "Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques." Kwartalnik Psychologiczny 11: 105-161. The main title follows 1938; in 1939 the title reads: A Study on the Perception of Radio Plays. The original pagination is indicated directly in the text, using square brackets, with a note about the version of the text, i.e.: (1938) or (1939).]
2	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
3	I call the ensemble of [lived] experiences, operated by the reception and conception of the radio play, "perception" of the radio play and not "observation," which is aimed at entertainment or aesthetic experiences and does not seek to scrutinize the radio play. I do not class the following as perceptions of the radio play: emotional or intellectual reactions, aesthetic emotions, emotions that have nothing to do with aesthetics (e.g., religious or patriotic emotions), [| 106 (1939)] judgments that assess the radio play, the
This translation is a result of the project supported by the National Science Center, Poland (SONATA BIS, project no. 2021/42/E/HS1/00108): The Philosophy of Leopold Blaustein in Context: Brentano, Gestalt Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School and Early Phenomenology.
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Nevertheless, in the course of considering this problem, it is impossible not to go above and beyond the framework of the psychological problem. Our deductions will be based on two fields of inquiry: psychology and aesthetics.
At the beginning of our considerations, we are going to observe the acoustic creation of the radio play: the noises and sounds. We are going to determine in what way they are presented to the listener, and what role they play in the listener's constitution of the fictional world [| 2 (1938)] of characters and [events].4 Here, a question arises: what is the listener's imagination?5 How did the term "theater of imagination" earn the right to be employed in Poland? Following these considerations, the ensuing topic will be the expression of psychic states and [lived experiences],6 as they are attributed to the characters of the radio play, and their perception by the listener. Since the radio play is a dynamic work of art and not a static one, it can be followed through the evolution of a series of successive phases, and, as this evolution makes headway, the listener embraces the whole through the perception of the integrated parts. The next task of our considerations will be to acquaint ourselves with the 400 perception of the radio play in its dynamic process. Not every perception of an artwork or of some other aesthetic object is its aesthetic perception. We are going to reflect upon what characterizes the perception of the radio play as an aesthetic object. [Finally, in the appendix we will consider (lived) experiences7 related to the radio play from the point of view of social psychology.
Over the course of our discussion, it will become apparent that the outlined task needs to be somewhat limited. Some radio plays, e.g. musical ones, require separate considerations.]8 [| 3 (1938), 107 (1939)]
reflexes imposed on the listener, and the desires that are awakened within him.
4	[In 1939: "facts."]
5	[In 1939, added: "What is the role of this imagination?"]
6	[In 1939: "phenomena."]
7	[In 1939: "experiences."]
8	[In 1938, this fragment is omitted.] The present work was written thanks to the kind assistance of Bureau des Studios de la Radio Pol (Polish Radio's Studios Office). I cordially thank K[rzysztof] Eydziatowicz and M[aria] Zebrowska. I am indebted to them, having benefitted from their numerous observations. The present study appeared first in Polish (1938) as a publication of Bureau des Studios (Studios Office).
Leopold Blaustein
§ 1. The acoustic material of the radio play and the manner of its apprehension
Sensations, as experienced by the hearer with the aid of the radio device, are exclusively the observation of noises and sounds that constitute the given [material]9 of the radio play. As it is known, according to the opinion of some people, noises and sounds should not only be the point of departure, but also the goal of the radio production. According to these people, without resorting to dialogue and action, the "acoustic kitchen" may suffice for the creation of [aesthetically valuable]10 radio plays. According to others, sounds and noises are only entitled to a secondary role as an "acoustic backstage" for dialogue and action. The first group of people [| 108 (1939)] proclaim that speech introduces a foreign element into the radio play, that of the theaters. Others affirm that language has finally found its true sanctuary, where it can reign without being rivaled by visible objects. Above all, this whole controversy will perhaps shed
The French version—translated by L. M. [?]—differs [| 107 (1939)] from the Polish in that it has been abridged, and the chapters treating the reception of radio plays from the standpoint of social psychology and summarizing the practical conclusions have been omitted. [See the "Appendix" and "Practical Conclusions" translated by Filip Borek from Polish.] The following publications dealing with radio literature have been of tremendous help to me (although the perception of radio plays is treated only briefly therein): Les Bulletins du Bureau des Studios (the Studios Office's Bulletins); the publication of the Radio's Library, entitled Theater of Imagination [Teatr wyobrazni], W[itold] Hulewicz's study (1935), as well as the voices of numerous discussions. The work of R[ichard] Kolb: Das Horoskop des Hörspiels (1932); the work of Kurt Paque: Hörspiel und Schauspiel (1936). I have also benefited from R[oman] Ingarden's 1937 book, O poznawaniu dzieia literackiego [On the Cognition of the Literary Work of Art]. However, I have mostly relied on my own studies, presented, inter alia, in my 1930 dissertation, Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studium z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki [Imaginative Presentations. A Study on the Border of Psychology and Aesthetics], as well as my conference paper entitled "O roli percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym [On the Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience]"; the paper was presented during the 3rd Polish Philosophical Congress (Blaustein 1936), and it was published in Przeglqd Filozoficzny [The Philosophical Review] (Blaustein 1937b [2011]). I shall treat the ensemble of problems concerning aesthetic perception in my work, Die ästhetische Perzeption, which will appear in Volume III of Studia Philosophica. [The last sentence is absent in 1938.]
9	[In 1939: "creation."]
10	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
401
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some light on a distinction that should be drawn with regard to the matter at hand. We will express our opinion on this matter at the end of this study.
The noises and sounds that are to be introduced into the radio montage are certainly not [pure]11 sensory data, which would not be conceived as the voices of living beings or inanimate objects. However, the authors of such radio plays do not want to compete with the composers of musical works. They wish to create something that would not even resemble the music of the program; something, which illustrates storms, the din of machines, the voices of animals, etc., making use of appropriate rhythms, sonorous colors, and harmony. Radio montage does not illustrate these objects with the help of music, the sounds of which would resemble them, which would suggest the association of the corresponding ideas; rather, it introduces directly "in person" [the rippling of the river],12 the tumult of combat, the din of machines and engines, the sounds of factory and ship sirens, church bells, telephone signals, [the sound of glasses,]13 the din of crowds, the cadenced step of a marching column, etc.—So, these sounds and noises will be perceived by the hearer as if they were emitted 402 by the movement of these objects, etc.—Likewise, their montage [| 4 (1938)] could [not]14 be compared to a multi-colored mosaic or to some painting that lacks elements of meaning.
But the montage of such ["objective"]15 noises and sounds can be of two kinds: combined by the sounds and noises of different objects, of a chaotic composition, yet pleasant to the ear; or it can imitate in a synthetic manner the ["acousion"]16 of an evening at [| 109 (1939)] the countryside, the nightlife in the streets of a big city, of the movement of a [port],17 of work in industrial workshops, of a miliary parade, etc. In the second case, a certain "coordinated" world of objects is constituted for the listener.
11	[In 1939, this emphasis is omitted.]
12	[In 1939: "the rustling of the waves."]
13	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
14	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
15	[In 1939: "—supposedly emitted by objects—."]
16	[In 1939: "sonorous vision."]
17	[In 1939: "fort."]
Leopold Blaustein
A new [moment]18 introduces speech into the radio play. It is not that speech incorporates man into this world of objects. [After all,]19 other sounds and noises could reveal the presence of man, e.g., the sound of steps, the cracking of a whip, the inarticulate cries of laborers at work, whistling, laughter, etc. But speech needs to be understood with the help of ideas. Therefore, the perception of such a radio play can no longer rely solely on auditive observations. When speech is heard more frequently, it renders the radio world "homocentric," since it surrounds man—or a greater number of people—with all the other objects that we hear. Articulated speech does not only require that its sound be perceived, but also requires that its meaning be grasped. In addition, speech excludes[, due to the limited attention span of the listener,]20 the simultaneity of other noises or other sounds. Thus, speech acts in an invasive manner, pushing them [other noises or other sounds] into the background. [Melody or music can join in as a new factor.]21 If it is dominant, it brings forth a new type of radio play, a type that differs from the one discussed above.
Leaving the explanation of the term "imaginative" to further deductions, we distinguish—on the basis of the considerations above—four kinds of radio 403 play:
1.	montage radio plays, non-imaginative,
2.	montage radio plays, imaginative,
3.	imaginative and "homocentric" radio plays, which can also be simply called: "dramatic radio plays," and
4.	musical radio plays. [| 5 (1938), 110 (1939)]
In all these plays, the sounds and noises constitute the given material in a perceptive manner. However, during the perception of imaginative radio plays, the constitution of fictional worlds takes place on the basis of these auditive impressions or [observations].22 In the following, we will turn our attention to the said constitution.
18	[In 1939: "element."]
19	[In 1939: "However."]
20	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
21	[In 1939: "Melody or music can join the voice as a new factor."]
22	[In 1939: "experiences."]
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§ 2. The constitution of the radio play's imaginative world
Richard Kolb compares the radio to a naval captain's megaphone. According to him, it is only a technical means, thanks to which noises, sounds, and voices reach us from a greater distance, beyond the range of our hearing. This opinion is correct, but only inasmuch as it appertains to radio reports, e.g., of solemnities, matches, and other sporting events.
When it comes to the reception of radio plays, the case is different. When we listen to events taking place simultaneously with the reception, we perceive the noise of an approaching train, the cheers of a gathering at the station, the sounds of an orchestra, etc. On the basis of our [auditive perceptual images],23 we further believe that a train is approaching, that a crowd is greeting the arriving dignitary. It is true that we cannot see these events with our own eyes, but we situate them in the real, ambient world, a world with time and space. We do not doubt that these events took place simultaneously with our movements, executed, e.g., for the sake of perfectioning the reception, and that 404 they took place in a location, which is a definite number of kilometers away from where we are.
The matter is altogether different during the reception of radio plays. This difference does not concern the authenticity of noises and sounds. It is not an essential thing if we believe, e.g., that the voices of birds that we have just come to hear [| 111 (1939)] are emitted by real birds or skillfully imitated. This is the case, because, even if we believe in the authenticity of noises and sounds, we do not believe in the existence of the world where they resound. While hearing [the telephone's ringing, we do not assume that someone is calling us in the real world];24 the noise of a departing train does not convince us that a train has departed in reality; while listening to a conversation, we do not have the impression of being indiscrete. We conceive of the real objects—which we treat as the source of sounds and [| 6 (1938)] noises, people, telephones, etc.— as objects that reproduce, imitate someone or something else. In this way, not
23	[In 1939: "auditive experiences."]
24	[In 1939: "the sound of an electric bell, we do not suppose that someone is ringing the bell in our real world."]
Leopold Blaustein
only people, but also inert objects become actors. Thus, for the listener new worlds are constituted, foreign to the real world surrounding us, and with which no analogy obtains, either in terms of space or time. The same is true when we look at paintings, sculptures, films, or theater [performances].25 The difference lies solely in the fact that in these cases, imaginative perception is based on visual, or auditive and visual, observations, whereas in the situation that interests us it is solely based on auditive [perceptual images].26
Nonetheless, we cannot be content with the vague assertion that, due to a specific disposition, the listener perceives noises and sounds, as if they were coming his way from a specific and concentrated imaginative world; that he links them to fictional objects and not to real objects. The constitution of the imaginative world seems to be less mysterious when it comes to the viewer [of paintings].27 He attends a theatrical or cinematic representation, or he sees paintings; the theater, the cinema, and the painter all operate with two-dimensional or three-dimensional objects, [| 112 (1939)] can imitate nature, have perspective at their service, etc. Another thing appertaining to the radio listener is that he perceives and observes a purely [acoustic]28 material. Thus, 405 we must pay attention to this. We already know that by perceiving sounds and noises, we objectify them. We, therefore, hear them as the voice of a man, the ringtone of a telephone, etc. In our conception, the man and the telephone are objects that are always found in space, due to which their intentional conception leads us automatically to the conception of the space where these objects are found. [| 7 (1938)] A series of circumstances joins this, which contributes to the imaginative space of the radio play being constituted in
25	Compare the ideas expressed in the present work with the summary of the [Paris] conference [see Blaustein 1937a].
[In 1938, Blaustein writes: "For readers who are not familiar with my 1930 or my 1935/36 works, the above statements and numerous others appearing below may not be sufficiently clear. Therefore, I will allow myself to quote in the appendix at the end of the work some fragments of the aforementioned publications, which will probably eliminate these difficulties. See the 'Appendix' on p. 71."] [See the "Appendix" below.] [Fragment translated by Alicja Jakha from Polish.]
26	[In 1939: "auditive experiences."]
27	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
28	[In 1939: "auditive."]
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the listener's consciousness. The most important of these circumstances are: the distance of the microphone and the movement of people and objects that emit the noises and sounds, on the basis of which the listener experiences the impression of these objects' proximity or distance; he believes that they are getting closer or farther. While looking at a painting or a photograph, we unconsciously situate ourselves within the imaginative space precisely as occupying the position—which is invisible on the painting or the photo— where, were the photo or the painting to be "enlarged," [the painter would stand or]29 the camera would be placed. Similarly, during the perception of the radio play, we transport [ourselves]30 to where the microphone would be placed. Thus, we measure the distance from a certain place within the fictional space, and not from a place in the real space where our body resides, nor from the place where the microphone (studio) is actually found. In this way, the imaginative space obtains its center and depth, which in a radio play is—on all sides—more unlimited than a painting or a film. Due to such a center, it is also possible, in principle, to grasp the direction, from which the voice comes. But 406 this is a rather rare case. That said, even in everyday life, we often make errors in identifying the direction, from which an invisible object's sound reaches us. [| 113 (1939)] Were a dog to perceive the radio play, its imaginary space would be better fixed with regard to its directions; and a cat would be able to grasp with better precision the distance of a voice's source. Therefore, the right side and the left side are in principle lacking in the space of the radio play, as long as we do not visually imagine the imaginative world. The voice itself—or any other sound—also reveals to us if we are in a closed space, e.g., in a room where our voice reverberates against its walls, or in an open space, e.g., in the mountains.
The fictional space that the listener constructs does not remain in an indeterminate state. The various noises and sounds already fill it with concrete matter. The ticking of the clock can be heard; the knock on the door; the closing of the window. These noises inform the listener [| 8 (1938)] that "he is" in a lodging; other sounds and noises inform him that he is in a café crowded with
29	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
30	[In 1939: "ourselves mentally."]
Leopold Blaustein
fellow customers or at the opera before the curtain is raised. The text of the dialogue may contain other indications, so that the listener handles—as one might say—a plan of a [schematic, situational plan].31 The middle of the spatial world grouped around the center possesses yet other conjectural parts. The departing train does not fall down a precipice; it advances and follows a certain path; the hurricane rages somewhere just outside the little house, reached only by the rustling of trees bent by the wind, rain, and hail beating on the roof.
When the place of the action is changed, a new spatial action place is constituted in the same manner as the first, but its proximity to, or distance from, the first can already be conceived. The listener knows that the two places of action are part of the same imaginative space. A similar thing occurs in a specially interesting case, when the listener grasps two places of action, simultaneously, e.g., during a telephone conversation between two people. Regarding what we have just stated, it is [| 114 (1939)] noteworthy that the frequent change of the action place must have certain limits. The radio play lasts only for 30 minutes; constituting a new place of spatial action requires a certain amount of time, albeit very little. By contrast, it takes much less 407 time to constitute the previous place of action when the action returns there. Furthermore, as [Kurt] Paque judiciously remarks, when perceiving the radio play, it is less a matter of whether the conception of the environment is exact. One could obtain it mainly with the aid of [descriptions],32 which would go contrary to the radio play's nature. The "atmosphere" that governs in this environment is of more importance. We consider a clock's ticking as revealing the silence and solitude of a certain house; the noise of intense manual labor; a cafe's laughter and brouhaha—the atmosphere of joy prevailing [amongst guests].33
It is with ease that one constitutes the duration of time within the imaginative radio play. We hear all sounds and all noises in a certain temporal succession, [| 9 (1938)] sometimes several of them simultaneously. By this means, successive events' duration of time, which makes up the radio play's
31	[In 1939: "general schematic."]
32	[In 1939: "definition."]
33	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
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action, is constituted in a natural way. If it is a montage radio play, then the measurement of time within the imaginative world can be [faster]34 than the spectator's ambient world. In a "homocentric" radio play, where speech and dialogue play a dominant role, this disproportion disappears, just like in the sound film compared to the silent film. However, [speaking too fast makes understanding more difficult].35 Therefore, the dynamism of action cannot be derived from the [speed]36 of dialogue, but from its substance, from the rapidity of psychic metamorphoses [happening in connection to the developing conflict expressed by the dialogue].37 The parallelism of time's flow in the real world and the imaginative world of the radio play disappears when the radio play is composed of scenes, between which long intervals occur; scenes symbolically separated [| 115 (1939)] by a gong stroke. The listener grasps these intervals as belonging to the time, through which the action passes.
Some people demand unity of time within radio plays. They are mistaken. The listener has no difficulty conceiving a more or less long interval. This does not require any special mental speculation on his part. It seems that here— 408 from a psychological point of view—one can grant the authors of radio plays a much bigger liberty than the one appertaining to the change of place, especially if the place of action requires a more exact definition. Rather, the dynamism of the action imposes here certain limitations, since an action that is [taking too much time]38 can lose its dramatic character and become epic. But, from the perspective of the listener's perceptive faculties, nothing prevents that, within 30 minutes of listening, weeks, months, and even years of the imaginative time of the radio play elapse, provided that the [temporal movement]39 is marked by intervals.
According to [Georg] Simmel, hearing grasps only the present, [| 10 (1938)] whereas the eye grasps the past as well. In effect, humans' facial expression and
34	[In 1939: "vivid."]
35	[In 1939: "too much volubility renders the response almost incomprehensible."]
36	[In 1939: "vivacity."]
37	[In 1939: "illustrating the conflict that is taking place, a conflict expressed by the dialogue."]
38	[In 1939: "too verbose."]
39	[In 1939: "duration."]
Leopold Blaustein
the state of surrounding objects reveal to the eye traces of past events, while auditive data expire and disappear, without leaving any traces. After the end of a fight, its visually perceptible traces can be seen, whereas the noise of its tumult lasts no longer than the fight itself. But this "presentism"—should it be permissible to employ the neologism coined by W[alter] Auerbach from the Latin "praesens" (the present indicative)—this "presentism" characterizes the radio play. Obviously, the past, which is already known, that with which evolution acquaints us, as well as the expected future events, all envelop the perceived present. (This will be revisited in § 5.)
Despite this, the aforementioned "presentism" is even more characteristic of the radio play than it is [| 116 (1939)] of the theatrical drama. It is not only derived from the specific structure of [all]40 dramas, but also from the purely auditive perception of the radio play. These circumstances are the reason why the "memorative and perceptive" attitude41—thus termed by R[oman] Ingarden, often in application to a film or a novel—is not seemingly applicable to the reception of a radio play. Technically, it is possible to perceive events emitted in an earlier period of time, after having already perceived the emission of events 409 pertaining to later periods—psychologically speaking, such a reception is "indigestible." [Another thing is,]42 the listener can be accustomed to a number of things.
With regard to the problem of [time in the radio play],43 it is still necessary to inquire whether the broadcast of a radio play and its reception must be
40	[In 1939: "grand."]
41	"In this attitude, the events that are basically spoken of in the past form are presented to the reader as if in the present. The reader, led by the text, in a way, 'travels' into the past and, with the time distance reduced to the possible minimum, becomes a witness to the events presented. A special attitude is created within the reader—if I may say so—of memory and perception: the time distance is reduced to such an extent that the reader's transference into the past allows him to grasp the events presented in the work—about which he is currently reading—as if from the point of view of the same time phase, in which they take place. Reading the work, we 'flow'—to put it figuratively—with the passage of time presented in the work." (Ingarden 1937, 88.) [See also Ingarden 1973, 125-126.] [In 1939, this footnote is omitted.] [Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.]
42	[In 1939: "It is true that."]
43	[In 1939: "imaginative time."]
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simultaneous. [| 11 (1938)] This appears to be essential when it comes to the [perception]44 of radio reportages, for non-simultaneous reception denies the listener the impression of participation, of "bearing witness" to the events heard. By contrast, it is rather insignificant whether the broadcast and the reception of imaginative radio plays are simultaneous, since the listener feels in any case that the time of the imaginative world and the time, in which the movements of his own body are executed or where his own thoughts evolve, are not simultaneous.45 The simultaneity of the broadcast and the reception of a radio play [may be, however, desired for other reasons, namely because of the social contact between the listener and the actor].46 Nevertheless, only when the reception is simultaneous can the listener consciously observe [| 117 (1939)] in a direct way the actor's work, effort, and success, when they are occurring.
In the previous section, we have mentioned that man can play a role not only in a homocentric radio play, but also in a montage imaginative radio play, albeit a different role. The listener deduces from the substance of words 410 or the situation, in which certain sounds and noises are produced, who pronounces these words or causes these noises; e.g., a waiter, a newspaper carrier, a conductor, a marching military commander, a cart driver, or an anonymous man from the crowd. This is how the imaginative world of the radio play is populated, but with poorly-individualized characters, and whom the listener does not have to cognize or discern. These characters are, as one might put it, elements of a certain environment. Their role is the same as that of rustling trees, singing birds, clinking glasses, [rattling carts],47 etc.
44	[In 1939: "reception."]
45	Obviously, if the listener's imagination is prepared and disposed to perceive reproduced objects, the simultaneity of the broadcast and the reception ceases to be insignificant. [In 1938: "This is how I explain the interesting fact that Dr. Zebrowska brought to my attention."]. Dr. M. [?] Zebrowska drew my attention to the following fact: some listeners of a novel, broadcast via the Polish Radio, have demanded that the season and date [in 1938: "day of the week"], cited in this novel, be in accord with the real date. This interesting fact explains to me the above-mentioned problem.
46	[In 1939: "may still be desired with respect to the social contact of the listener and the actor."]
47	[In 1939: "cars whose rolling can be heard."]
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On the other hand, in a homocentric radio play, beside the aforementioned characters, some characters stand out in the foreground; the environment only serves as a background to their fates. We will also discuss the means, by which the [internal]48 world of these characters, [| 12 (1938)] their states, and their psychic [lived experiences]49 are constituted for the listener. Now, what interests us is the question, how these characters are constituted as such; how it is that the imaginative world is populated by them, as if they were certain individualities. Obviously, it is carried out in such a way that the voices of these characters, as well as the sounds and noises that we relate to them, occur more frequently and more distinctly than the sounds and noises from the "background." We are soon informed by the dialogue who each and every interlocutor is. The difficulty is that one then has to recognize each character by his voice and possibly by the content of the response; recognize them instantly [| 118 (1939)] as soon as they start speaking again. This is not an easy matter. In a response to the survey conducted by the Polish Radio concerning the means of facilitating the listeners' understanding of radio plays, we encounter curious postulates. For example, a listener writes: "instead 411 of the radio announcer, each person who plays a role must introduce himself, say his role, [surname,]50 pronounce a few words, so that the listener may [familiarize himself with]51 the voices of the actors. If actors whose voices do not resemble each other cannot be selected, the names of the roles should be repeated more often in the text." In the survey conducted by the English BBC, the radio's listeners propose that the actors be announced before and after the broadcast of the play [in the order of their appearance].52 The listeners further demand that the names be repeated more often in the course of the action. These statements demonstrate how difficult it is to orient oneself amongst characters. This difficulty is characteristic of the perception of radio plays. In the theater and the cinema, the exterior and the costume of the action's heroes do away with such difficulties. In a novel, the author repeats,
48	[In 1939: "psychic."]
49	[In 1939: "experiences."]
50	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
51	[In 1939: "discern."]
52	[In 1939: "as they appear in front of the microphone."]
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without scruples, the name of his heroes a thousand times. We cannot do this in a radio play, for fear that the dialogue will become unnatural. Similarly, it is impossible to realize the aforementioned desiderata of the Polish Radio's listener; the aesthetic values of the radio play would be lost. In practice, these reported perceptive difficulties of radio listeners resulted in a postulate of a very limited number of people. This postulate is correct, but not without restriction. As I have already pointed out, the difficulty does not lie in [| 13 (1938)] orienting oneself with respect to who is talking at a given moment, but rather in recognizing and identifying in the radio announcer someone whom we have already met. Indeed, we do not need to recognize all the characters in a radio play. [| 119 (1939)] It is not necessary to distinguish the episodic roles, belonging rather to the background, which serve to characterize the action's heroes; the respective capacity of the listener toward them is considerable. The desideratum to limit the number of people must be applied only to the foreground characters, if their voices do not resemble those of the secondary characters, and if they have an analogous role; i.e., 412 if the dialogue or the situation reveals to us at the moment who they are. By counting on such directives, we will not go too far in depopulating the world of imaginative radio plays, hinder the creative liberty of their authors, and overwhelm the listener. In contrast, it is difficult to determine precisely, from the point of view of the listener's perceptive "capacity," the maximum number of the foreground characters. Nonetheless, the frequent reception of radio plays infallibly sharpens the ear and perfects the faculty of recognizing voices. Since the circumstance (as we will see motivated psychologically) that the radio play is of a relatively short duration is added to this psychological viewpoint, the desiderata to introduce a small number of primary characters appear to be entirely justified.
We have just discussed above the problem of how the imaginative world of the radio play is constituted, a world having its own time, whose space is filled with inanimate objects and inhabited by men (and possibly by animals). But we have not taken into consideration the role that can be played by the radio announcer, and which he often plays. We have not done so, because the announcer is disapproved of in this role; the majority of theoreticians of radio plays also disapprove of him in this function. Let us add to this discussion some
Leopold Blaustein
observations based on our previous considerations. In one of the responses to the Polish Radio's survey, we read that the [lengthy]53 announcements and commentaries made by the [| 120 (1939)] announcer ruin the effect of the radio play. [| 14 (1938)] In principle, this opinion is correct. But the announcements made before the beginning of the radio play [and the commentaries]54 made during it must be treated differently here, e.g., those made during the interval between scenes. The first case could still be tolerated, though with considerable restrictions; the other must be absolutely rejected. After all, the radio announcer is not a man of this imaginative world; his appearance, or rather the sound of his voice—when the listener was already disposed [to]55 the imaginative world—his voice, I claim, destroys this disposition and requires that the perceptive attitude of the listener be changed twice: the listener must [transport]56 himself from the imaginative world into the real, i.e., into the one that reproduces it—and vice versa. The description of heroes, events, or the environment presents an illusory profit, all the more so, since the constitution of the imaginative world via description does not conform to the fundamental character of the perception of the radio play. On the other hand, 413 the announcement of the announcer preceding the beginning of the radio play, before the listener is ready to depart the real world and pass over to that of the imagination, does not have this disadvantageous result. In spite of this, one should rather avoid the announcement, since one can do without it. It is in truth the creator of the radio play who has sinned by clumsiness, having falsely imagined that the action's heroes, as well as its environment, must be defined with the same precision as in the theater.57 We know that a literary work, especially its objective sphere, possesses—to use Ingarden's term—many ["indeterminate" spots]58.59 [| 121 (1939)] They [indeterminate spots] do not
53	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
54	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
55	[In 1939: "to transport himself into."]
56	[In 1939: added.]
57	When the author of the radio play does not take into account this circumstance— e.g., out ofpiety for the poet [in 1939: "author"] ofthe radio masterpiece—, the listeners are forced to demand the inclusion of "narrators," as in the BBC survey.
58	[In 1939: "indefinite passages."]
59	These are spots, which, although not defined by the author, are "definable," and
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disappear entirely, even if this work is concretized as a drama for the stage; which does not cause any harm to the aesthetic values of the drama performed in the theater, nor to the radio play—richer in "indeterminate spots." After all, [| 15 (1938)] a schematic plan where the action is situated is sufficient for the perception of the radio play; I will attempt to prove that it is superfluous to [imagine]60 precisely the image of this phantastic place of action. Similarly, the exterior of the characters is rather indifferent to us, the psychic life of heroes of a homocentric radio play being put in the forefront. We will speak about this again. Any comment pertaining to the objects that we cannot "hear," which cannot emit a voice, introduces an alien element of a visual nature. Finally, the comments bring about the "reproduction" of the fictional world, based on the description and the opinion that one has of it. This means of constituting the fictional world is completely foreign to the perception of the radio play, a perception that is—as one might say—perceptive and is principally composed of imaginative [images],61 and not of [concepts].62 And even when the listener's [lived]63 experiences are mixed with concrete presentations, they serve above 414 all to make the sentences of the dialogue comprehensible, i.e., directly the speech, and not the descriptions. This constitutes an essential difference, if the dialogue is really dramatic, and not the improper form of a merely epic description. Thus, different considerations of a psychological and aesthetic nature are opposed to what the radio announcer contributes to the constitution of the imaginative world of the radio play. [| 122 (1939)]
Although this constitution is carried out in an organic, involuntary manner, and which the listener does not realize, it is not easy. It takes a certain effort and above all the concentration of the listener who is not accustomed to grasping
their precise definition can be accomplished by the "recipient" (Ingarden 1937, 7) [see also Ingarden 1973, 13].
60	[In 1939: "represent."]
61	[In 1939: "representations."] In the work already cited, Imaginative Presentations (Blaustein 1930), I have attempted to motivate the necessity of admitting the existence of imaginative representations, where imaginative objects seen "on" some painting, screen, stage, etc., are placed; they must be given a place next to perceptions or next to those that our imagination or our memory suggests to us.
62	[In 1939: "concrete [sic!] representations."]
63	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
Leopold Blaustein
environments, characters, and events based uniquely on acoustic data. The statements of the listeners prove this. We shall discuss this in our following deductions.
In order to conclude these considerations on the constitution of the imaginative world of the radio play, we must ask the question whether this constitution must be [| 16 (1938)] accomplished during the reception of all radio plays (obviously besides those of the first type that we mentioned). The answer to this question must be affirmative. When we consider the world that is revealed with the help of the microphone and the receiving device as real; when we conceive of it as a component of the ambient world, a certain number of kilometers away from us, simultaneous with our movements, then we are dealing with the receptive attitude toward the reportage, not toward the radio play. A reportage of solemnities, bicycle races, or tourism is not a radio play and is not a creation of radio theater. Its principal purpose is to give information, to provoke various emotions that are not in the realm of aesthetics, e.g., patriotic emotions, and at the most—incidentally—to provoke an aesthetic sensation. In such reportages, we also encounter moments of a conscious composition of 415 its purpose, especially when the elements are condensed, but the receiver does not have the sensation that the objects are reproduced by the radio play. On the contrary, he believes in the presence of these objects in a manner that is directly perceptive. Where there is a lack of "reproductive objects," where there is no representation, obviously the imaginative world cannot be constituted. When we transmit an [authentic]64 wedding of mountaineers, the wedding [| 123 (1939)] of [Ivan and Olena],65 this is a reportage; but when [Ivan, Olena],66 and other authentic mountaineers themselves [represent]67 this wedding, this is already a radio play. Therefore, it depends on the announcement of the radio announcer and the attitude of the listener. One can imagine a situation, where the listener—listening to the broadcast only from the middle—does not know at a certain point or for some time whether he is perceiving a radio play or a reportage. This is also why at the beginning of a radio play, [and not of a
64	[In 1939, this emphasis is omitted.]
65	[In 1939: "Jean and Hélène."]
66	[In 1939: "Jean, Hélène."]
67	[In 1939, this emphasis is omitted.]
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reportage,]68 the gong is heard. The sound of the gong plays a role similar to that of the curtain in theater, of the frame of a painting, of the base of a statue, and of the darkness, which surrounds the screen. This sound of the gong is like a demarcation of the limits of the imaginative world, which, as a "foreign body," has found itself in the real world.
The fact that the imaginative world is constituted during the perception of the radio play does not prevent such a receptive attitude of the listener, [| 17 (1938)] which I have called elsewhere the "disposition to perceive the reproduced objects." We encounter this disposition while listening to historical radio plays or, e.g., those of folklore. Then the listener, aware that the radio play reproduces a past or contemporary fragment of the real world, can create convictions for himself that are related to the reproduced objects, by relying on the perception of the imaginative world.
In the above-mentioned considerations, we have not studied the part that imagination plays when the imaginative world of the radio play is constituted. We will now occupy ourselves with this.
416
§ 3. "Theater of imagination" or "radio theater"69
There are very widespread designations and apparently adequate to the objects after which they are named; subjected to a critical analysis, they raise considerable doubts. [| 124 (1939)] The term "theater of imagination," already established by usage in Polish radio terminology, seems to be one of these designations. Is this term, employed to define radio plays, accurate? This merits reflection. Because designations often become programs or in the very least act as programs directing practical action in a certain direction, they should be subjected to revision from time to time.
In talking about the "theater of imagination," we are undoubtedly characterizing it from the perspective of its listener, and not from that of its creators or reproducers. [After all],70 from the first point of view, the
68	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
69	The following arguments were published in excerpts in Blaustein 1936. [In 1939, this footnote is omitted.] [Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.]
70	[In 1939: "Nevertheless."]
Leopold Blaustein
theater could also claim the right to employ this designation for its [stage theater].71 Perhaps, the [intention]72 of this term is to highlight the role played by imagination in the experiences of the listener, a role, which seems to be far more important than that of the theater or cinema spectator. But it is not known whether this is a psychological fact or whether it is rather a question of an aesthetic postulate. [| 18 (1938)] Is radio theater a "theater of imagination" by virtue of its perceptive structure or must it be so, if the recipient is to obtain a full aesthetic sensation? Let us examine these two possibilities.
First of all, we must establish the meaning of the term "imagination." It is frequently used in lieu of "phantasy," hence in the sense of a disposition toward [creative]73 images originating neither from perception nor from memory. In speaking of the theater of imagination, one doubtlessly wishes to emphasize the role of these images in the [lived]74 experiences of the recipient of the radio play. These [creative]75 images are marked by the parts of the radio play that are successively perceived, and which play a role analogous to that of the [creative]76 images that are born when we read a novel or a poem. The role of these images 417 consists in illustrating the objects and events described in the literary work. But this role is played during the reading [| 125 (1939)] not only via the images owed to phantasy, but also via [reproductive ones—suggested by memory].77 We can apply these deductions to the recipient of the radio play. When the action of the latter takes place amidst a café's hubbub, the listener can imagine this café with the aid of his phantasy; or else represent it to himself as a familiar café, hence with the aid of his memory. Apparently, the term "imagination" in the expression "theater of imagination" must not be construed solely in terms of phantasy [—the disposition to productive imagination]78, but—in a broader manner—as a disposition to non-perceptive images [in general, that is, both
71	[In 1939: "shows."]
72	[In 1939: "tendency."]
73	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
74	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
75	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
76	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
77	[In 1939: "those suggested by memory."]
78	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
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reproductive and productive images]79.80
Therefore, the problem that interests us will be defined thusly: [whether the perception of a radio play takes place in fact and always with the essential participation of reproductive and productive images, [| 19 (1938)] respectively] whether the perception of a radio play should take place for aesthetic reasons with the live participation of these images?]81
Let us consider what the listeners themselves say about this. In response to the survey of the Polish Radio, 98 persons hold that they imagine the action well, as well as the characters taking part. There is no reason to distrust these introspective statements. But is it always so, and with all the listeners? It is true that in the survey there are no responses noting the impotence of imagining the characters and the action. But this lacuna is not proof that all the listeners illustrate the action of the radio play thanks to their phantasy. Admitting one's incapacity is not a pleasant thing, and the designation "theater of imagination," widespread in Poland and used by said survey, has created the suggestion that during the perception of the radio play imagination normally 418 takes part. It seems to the listeners that the "theater of imagination" requires the collaboration of the listener more than the other arts; thus, confessing that one is not able requires a certain effort. And yet, in the responses, there is no shortage of proof that not everyone succeeds in illustrating the action visually; e.g., numerous [| 126 (1939)] statements reveal the difficulty, with which many listeners illustrate the action. Twenty persons write that they imagine best [when they know the performing artists from stage, cinema, or at least from photographs].82 Two persons propose candidly that the actors
79	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
80	In this sense, E[stera] Markinowna has recently proposed using the word "imagination" in her 1932 article. We can read there, among other things, that "the more vivid someone's imagination is, the more vividly they recreate in their memories images experienced in the past, and the more vividly they experience images created by phantasy." [In 1939, this footnote is omitted.] [Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.]
81	[In 1939: "do non-perceptive images really and always participate in the perception of the radio play? Respectively]: Should these images play a lively part in the perception of a radio play with regards to aesthetics?]
82	[In 1939: "when they see on the stage, screen, or photo the artists who created the roles."]
Leopold Blaustein
be popularized: that the local theater arrange tours of the troupe; or that the actors appear on the screen; finally, that their photos be published in the Radio's periodicals: "this will create a [certain]83 illusion that the action is taking place before our eyes." This statement clearly proves, as is suggested by the term "theater of imagination," that some listeners go to great lengths to transpose radio theater—hence acoustic—into visual theater ("before our eyes"). One person, in response to the question: what will make it easier for listeners to understand radio plays?, advises: when announcing the characters, we describe [| 20 (1938)] their appearance, their age, and the period, in which they lived. Eight persons [highlight]84: to help the listeners' imagination, they should be introduced to the place of the action before the listening begins; two persons write: we would do well to "slip in discreet information about the place of the action, about the situation, [which helps a lot in imagining and experiencing the play]85.["]86 Numerous interviews conducted with listeners have confirmed the supposition that for the perception of a radio play, representations owed to phantasy, or those based on memory, are indispensable. Some say that the constitution of certain details of the imaginative world, aided by [reproductive 419 or productive images],87 is sufficient for them; the rest is vague, like a schematic sketch. Illustration with the aid of phantasy is continuous in some; in others, interrupted and fragmentary. Some people find that images, slowly transforming, become clearer and clearer as the listening develops. Numerous people claim outright that they have no visual experiences [| 127 (1939)] during the perception; it is uniquely like a schema, a plan of a situation. In analyzing positive confessions, criticism is of an absolute necessity, not only in relation to the suggestion of the term "theater of imagination," but also in relation to the ambition of listeners. A psychologically very interesting circumstance comes into play here again. In particular, it often happens that images originating from phantasy arise, but later, when one remembers the radio play after the perception. Many people remember more easily visually, even if they had
83	[In 1939: "certain optical."]
84	[In 1939: "propose."]
85	[In 1939: "which helps enormously to imagine the evolution of the play."]
86	[In 1939, Blaustein does not close the quotation.]
87	[In 1939: "non-perceptive images."]
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observed using a different sense, especially hearing. This also explains certain errors, which are quite common in the depositions of witnesses: they frequently believe they have seen things that they had only heard. However, such a double visual transposition is sometimes misinterpreted by listeners, who take it as proof that the illustration can actually be simultaneous with the reception of the radio play.
Concluding the analysis of the listeners' statements, it is very likely that for the perception of a radio play [| 21 (1938)] the auditive perceptions of such noises and sounds as the electric bell, the whispering of the wind, the words and sentences spoken by the radio play's characters, as well as the understanding of these words; to which may be added—but not absolutely—visual images, coming from these characters, from their surroundings, and from the events, which occur in the imaginative world of the radio play, are sufficient. The appearance of such images or their absence depends greatly on the kind of the listener's imagination. If he has the memory of the eyes, their appearance is more likely than if he possesses the memory and phantasy of the auditive 420 kind. Nevertheless, people who have the memory of the eyes themselves know that the visual images appear only from time to time, are fragmentary, vague, and do not create a continuous visual illustration, [| 128 (1939)] an illustration of the auditive action that we are in the process of perceiving. The listener of a radio [telephone] conversation knows that [two friends are talking on the telephone];88 that they are far from each other; he understands their conversation, although he does not [represent]89 their appearance, nor the expressions on their faces, nor the devices near which they are standing, etc. The term "theater of imagination" contains the principle that each listener possesses a psychic televisual device. If this were the case, the perception of a radio play would be exhausting for many listeners, since it would require a considerable psychic effort on their part. By contrast, according to others, "psychic television" is not a consequence of effort, but of the involuntary "optic" conception of the substance of the sentences heard, just as there are people who, while reading, believe they hear the sound of the words read; or,
88	[In 1938: "that at one device a bankrupt person is speaking, at the other his friend."]
89	[In 1938: "imagine."]
Leopold Blaustein
when listening to the reading, believe they see the graphic form of the word.90 [Here is the testimony of a listener who experiences [| 22 (1938)] this sort of automatic visual illustration while perceiving a radio play:
As for me, I simply cannot believe that someone, listening seriously to a radio play, would not imagine everything that he hears. Sure, there may be gaps and pauses between one image and another, but we always have to imagine something during a radio play. After all, these ideas, the vivid depiction [zobrazowanie] of the individual words we hear— description of characters, objects, places—and the entire action, come to us completely without our will and agency. At least I never try to produce any images in particular. And I must say that these images form a continuous chain, with almost no breaks. During the radio play, I see not only every movement of the acting person, their way of speaking and gesturing, but even such details as eye color, hairstyle, details of clothing and surroundings, etc. I even remember that during one of the last radio plays entitled The Watch, I saw quite clearly that the old watchmaker was unshaven, and that he had a grey beard. I did not know why, but at that moment I found him very likable because of his beard. The next	421
day, I noticed that my father had the same unshaven, gray beard. Then I understood why the character of the old watchmaker seemed likable to me. It was quite easy to imagine the setting of the radio play, The Watch. I immediately remembered a watchmaker's shop, where I had been twice, three months ago, when I had dropped off and picked up a watch. On both occasions, I had to wait; the first time, I found another client [jakiegos goscia] in the shop and had to wait my turn; the second time, I had to wait for my watch to be adjusted. While waiting, I had the opportunity to observe my surroundings, that is, the shop and the studio [pracownia], and at the same time the master watchmaker talking to some gentleman, and the young man who was sitting near the display window, repairing a watch. Strangely enough, everything was just as I later heard it in the radio play: a long and rather narrow room [local], from which a door led to the watchmaker's apartment. On the counter were watches in display cases, intended for sale. Even
90 Sometimes, knowing the background of the action or one of the actors suffices for stimulating the "psychic televisual device" because a detail, rendered mentally visual, requires that its surrounding be completed via phantasy.
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coal carts often passed through the street next to the shop; the shop is located on Grodecka Street. So, it is no wonder that the image of that shop immediately came to mind. But the strange thing is that for quite a long time, I did not realize at all that this image was just a reminder of something I had seen. Perhaps, I did not think about it at the time. But after a while, I realized it quite clearly. Right from the moment the image of the master watchmaker came to my mind, I thought that I had seen this man before in my life. I stopped at this statement, because the rest of the story had taken hold of me. I realized with complete clarity that the old watchmaker in the radio play was identical to the watchmaker I had visited three months earlier, at the moment when the watchmaker was talking about opening the watch case. Today, I understand why back then I recognized that the image of the old watchmaker was a faithful reflection of the man I had already seen. While waiting at the watchmaker's, I saw him open a display case on the counter and take out a watch,91 showing it to the customer. However, I associated the figure of the watchmaker's assistant with a certain person who has nothing to do with watchmaking. Perhaps, this was because, while at the watchmaker's, 422	I could not see the face of his assistant at all; he was sitting, bent over
his work [| 23 (1938)], facing the store window and with his back to me. I had one longer break in my mental images in the radio play, The Watch, namely from the moment the watchmaker's assistant leaves the shop until the arrival of the old watchmaker's sister-in-law at his house. Although the assistant's later story allows us to imagine his life to some extent, these images were not as continuous and coherent as the previous ones.
Today, I am impressed by another radio play entitled, Underground, by Ernst Johansen, translated by Gustaw Morcinek. Here, too, imagining the action did not pose any major difficulties for me, mainly because I visited a coal mine on a tour, and apart from that I have read a lot of Morcinek's books, the subject of which is precisely coal mines and life there. I must admit, however, that during this radio play the images were much less vivid and detailed than during The Watch, although I also saw many details and small things. My imagination also conjured up images of objects and activities that the author does not mention, e.g., an elevator descending at breakneck speed down a shaft, a factory siren
91 [In 1938, Blaustein underlines this fragment; I italicize it.]
Leopold Blaustein
from which a sharp cone of compressed steam emerges, indicating that the siren is whistling at a given moment, a worker pumping air into a pipe with the help of some large pump, similar in shape to a bicycle pump (!); more or less plausible images.
I have quoted this testimony at great length, because it comes from the strongest visualizer I have ever met in my interviews, and it describes well the process of creating phantasy images based on memory during perception.]92 And yet, for these listeners, the "televisual device" functions best when the reproductive images are there, ready, and awaiting them [the listeners]. They cannot produce them by themselves, ["purely"],93 their attention being concentrated on perceiving the continual development of the dialogue. For yet another type of listeners, the following opinion is characteristic:
While listening to the "theater of imagination," [I experience the content without having specific images of the actors or decoration].94 These are just general images, as one might say, background images, e.g., the dialogue takes place in Paris; I see general images: the Eiffel Tower,	423
the Panthéon, the Champs-Élysées, etc.
This listener has only incoherent images, associated via the place of the action, but which are not linked with the development of the said action.
Perhaps a certain analogy—albeit very [distant]95—will clarify the role that I grant [| 129 (1939)] (by referring to the statements cited above) to imagination during the perception of a radio play. [Johannes] Volkelt writes about the "complementary phantasy" that functions when we look at paintings. [| 24 (1938)] According to Volkelt, when a painting depicts a biblical, legendary, or historical subject, we only understand it when—along with the depicted moment of the action—we also make present to ourselves, with the aid of phantasy, the phases preceding this moment, and those following it. As
92	[In 1939, the fragment on pp. 22-23 (1938) is omitted.] [Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.]
93	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
94	[In 1939: "I do not concretely represent the actors or the décor."]
95	[In 1939: "weak."]
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Volkelt himself points out, this can happen without damage to the aesthetic [experience],96 not only with the aid of images due to phantasy, but also in an abbreviated and vague manner with the aid of "[presentations]97 concerning the significations." During the perception of a radio play, imagination is also such a "complementary phantasy" of the [observatory],98 auditive perception and the comprehension of words and sentences; this complementary operation may be strong and visual in some, in others "foggy," schematic, and even [signitive].99 M[elchior] Wañkowicz writes that the fashion of illustrating the texts is outdated. According to this author, the illustrator will never create what phantasy has suggested to the reader. To illustrate the text is to impoverish and narrow the reader's [lived]100 experiences. Similarly, films founded on a novel often disillusion us. Does this prove that the phantasy of a reader with average intelligence is richer than that of the illustrator or creator of these films? Not at all. Such a conclusion would be implausible. From the facts cited, it follows only that the illustrations or the films are poorer [concretizations]101 than what is announced by our schema due to phantasy. The reader has the 424 feeling that the heroine is of admirable beauty, and the palace is of fabulous sumptuousness. But his phantasy does not make him imagine the face of the heroine, nor the furnishing of the palace. When the painter or the director concretizes them, and their work does not meet the spectator's expectations, a disillusionment ensues. It is the same with a radio [| 130 (1939)] play. In the survey of the Polish Radio, some listeners claim that the theater of imagination offers them more than the real theater, since they can imagine everything as it suits them. In reality, they think rather that the people and the background are precisely such and no other, but they do not see it in distinct images, coming from the phantasies. In their imagination, the heroine's eyes and hair color are to their idealization, but it is doubtful if phantasy concretizes her face to [| 25 (1938)] the point that one can paint and admire it afterward as before.
96	[In 1939: "impression."]
97	[In 1939: "representations."]
98	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
99	[In 1939: "purely conceptual."]
100	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
101	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
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Now, we are going to raise the following question: is illustration with the help of visual imagination a condition of the perception of a radio play—a perception having an aesthetic value? In a word, must one see the content of the hearing?
A controversy may arise out of this subject, as there is one pertinent to the subject of reading novels and other literary works. For instance, according to Volkelt, those passages from novels, which cannot be transposed into phantastic images, must be reduced to a minimum, as having no aesthetic value. Th[eodor] A[lexander] Meyer maintains the opposite; according to him, all the qualities of poetry consist in the fact that everything real has been destroyed in it, it has no need to be completed by phantasy. Other authors are more conciliatory. For example, [Stanislaw] Ossowski believes that the feeling of possessing the power to represent concretely the objects described suffices for the descriptions to arouse aesthetic [lived]102 experiences. In resolving this question, it must be taken into account that we most often read only once and fast; such a reading—as [Max] Dessoir remarks judiciously—does not suffice even for a partial schematic illustration. Moreover, when we read with the greatest mental tension, the [phantastic vividness]103 is almost non-existent. 425 In reading in this way, one can experience an aesthetic experience; but it must nevertheless be admitted that [| 131 (1939)] during a purely conceptual perception, the perceiver does not grasp all the aesthetic values of the object that evokes the experience; one grasps only some of them. [The sources of these values, as Ingarden has shown, are many in the perception of a literary work; to become aware of some of them, conceptual perception—in which the text is understood—is sufficient, while others require additional, derived ideas.]104 In any event, during the reading of literary works of art, aesthetic experiences based purely on conceptual perception are possible and frequent.
Similarly, during the perception of a radio play, the receiver can have aesthetic experiences, despite his imagination not being active during this perception.
102	[In 1939: this fragment is omitted.]
103	[In 1939: "mise en relief!']
104	[Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.] [In 1939: "As Ingarden has demonstrated, many values are revealed during the perception of a literary work. We will only mention the conceptual perception, due to which one understands the text; the others demand supplementary, non-perceptive images."]
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The listener of a radio drama can perceive it in the way the spectator perceives in theater events that are [| 26 (1938)] happening backstage; he only perceives the noises, hence it is a purely auditive perception. To aspire to a different state of things on the part of the creators of radio plays does not seem to me to be either right or useful. This would be the result of a lack of faith in the art of perceptibility, and the desire to supplement this perceptibility with visions that the listener would have created. The history of film has taught us that the silent film, as an "art of pure visibility," was no less valuable—from an aesthetic point of view—than the sound film. Why should it be any different with the "blind" radio play? Perhaps the listener of radio plays, at first accustomed to the visual theater of stage and cinema, tried to supplement what he had just heard with the aid of imagination. But later, the very conditions of hearing diverted him from it, without much damage to the aesthetic experiences offered by hearing. The aesthetic values of a purely auditive nature, as well as the expression of the psychic states and [lived]105 experiences of the characters of the radio play with the help of acoustic means are rich and self-sufficient. [| 426 132 (1939)] It is true that technology tends to replace the radio play—[which is] purely auditive—with television, but it does not do so for aesthetic reasons. The experiences concerning the "blind film" already prove that the auditive world is rich in aesthetic possibilities, of which the hearer becomes aware only when the sense of sight is not functioning. One can refer to the struggle of music connoisseurs against the free associations of visual images, which derive from it, and which sometimes arise during a musical hearing; they divert the hearer's attention from the real acoustic values of the music. Our deductions here are not [inconsistent]106 with those of Ingarden who in his thesis on literary works emphasizes the great importance of representing the appearance of objects in a concrete and actual manner during reading; from an aesthetic point of view, the perception of the work gains a lot from this. Already during the perception of a radio play, the auditive appearances are actualized, and yet have the same rights as the visual aspects. Moreover, the visual appearances represented with the aid of phantasy—imperfect, not satisfying expectations,
105	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
106	[In 1939: "aligned."]
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not very expressive, not very "alive," and often banal—[| 27 (1938)] are of a dubious aesthetic value.
What conclusion can we draw from these deductions, if we find them correct? In my opinion, two [conclusions]. One is of a practical nature, the other terminological. The first conclusion: [the creator]107 of a radio play can create possibilities for the listener; he can even encourage them, but he must not assume that the listener's visual imagination is really active; this is neither possible in all people nor indispensable from an aesthetic point of view. Therefore, Kolb is right in criticizing the "Horbuhne" ["acoustic scene"], the costumes of radio plays' actors, etc. The actor must play for the listener, and not for the spectator. But, in order to be natural, he must not neglect mimicry nor gestures in acting. The states that he has to express—the whole of [| 133 (1939)] their expression—must be natural, only then will the timbre of the voice have the sound of true frankness. (K[rzysztof] Eydziatowicz underlines its importance.) Already in creating it, the author of the radio play must "hear," not see the action, as Paque judiciously remarks. In a radio play, it is not a question of, as some people suppose, imposing the author's vision 427 on the listener, but of exciting the "acousion" of the imaginative world that the author has "created." The second conclusion: the designation "theater of imagination"—a designation that misleads people—must be renounced and replaced with another, e.g., "acoustic theater" or "auditive theater," which would be more motivated from a psychological and aesthetic point of view. However, the term "radio theater" seems to be the best, being neutral, neither imposing nor excluding psychic television.108 [| 28 (1938)]
107	[In 1939: "the activity of visual imagination during perception is desired; the creator."]
108	W[itold] Hulewicz rightly emphasizes that radio theater is a theater for the blind, in which the visual moment is missing. He also rightly criticizes the excess of the sense of sight and the decline of the sense of hearing of the 20th-century man. "Walking around a strange city," writes this author, "in a singing forest, in mountains full of a million voices, or by the sea, we can then tell what we have seen, but almost never what we have heard." In view of such a position, it seems inconsistent for this author to use the term "theater of imagination." After all, stimulating the listener's mental television and pulling him away from purely auditive data will not improve his sense of hearing.
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§ 4. Expression of psychic states and lived experiences
Already in the montage radio play we find the expression of psychic states and [lived]109 experiences, but it is in the homocentric radio play where the expression occupies center stage. In representing the life of a man, the radio play cannot—as the novel, the cinema, and even the theater do—show us all the wealth of facts that constitute the life of the individual; it also cannot slowly reveal to us his character by showing us the behavior of this person in various situations of his life. Thus, the radio play chooses several of the most characteristic situations, in which this person expresses himself and reveals his character and psychic states. The time available being very limited, it is impossible to show visually the hero's manner of being or even to describe it; the need for this individual to speak directly; the conciseness of his statements, imposed by the brevity of the allotted time; [| 134 (1939)] a nuance of sensitivity in the voice—also of absolute necessity—, all of this makes the radio play offer us, more often than his way of being, the psychic experiences of the 428 man; thus, we observe mainly the inner life of the heroes. The poverty of the "acoustic kitchen" makes it difficult to sketch more distinctly the background, the environment, and the other characters, whereas the literary work, the theater, and the screen not only show us the hero, but also the entirety of his entourage. The brevity of time and the scarcity of means limit the possibility of representing the ambient world of heroes and their manner of being in the homocentric radio play. But this scarcity is equilibrated by the richness of the means expressing the hero's psychic phenomena. Although these means are narrowed, offering only auditive data, and although we neither see the face nor facial expressions, nor gestures, these means—as we shall see—are up to their task.
Such means of expression in the radio play are: the human voice, the articulated speech, and the dialogue composed of these words. The meaning of the sentences (uttered by the author or the characters of a literary work) acquaints us with the psychic state and structure of the heroes. In a [| 29
[In 1939, this footnote is omitted.] [Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.]
109 [In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
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(1938)] visual work of art (painting, sculpture), it is the appearance that acquaints us [with the psychic state and structure of the heroes]; on the stage and on the screen, it is the appearance of the person, his way of being, and [the way and sense of his speech; in a radio play, the manner or meaning of statements are almost exclusively taken into account].110 Beside the sounds and noises that create the background of the action—street noises in a city or a village, which permit us to orient ourselves in the situation and its changes (telephone ringing, noise of a door closing)—, beside the sounds and noises that reveal the demeanor of the person (e.g., footsteps, coughing), we can also produce expressive noises and sounds, expressing certain psychic states (punching on the table surface, noise of a glass breaking in an anger fit), and especially crying, laughing, yawning, moaning, etc. [| 135 (1939)] But a more essential signification than these expressive noises and sounds appertains to the particularities of the voice and the manner of speaking. The voice may seem to us "fatigued," "apathetic," "lively," "energetic," "soft," "decisive"; it may—independently of the meaning of the uttered words, but in rapport with the situation—reveal worry, fright, dejection, excitement, 429 upheaval, anger, concern, despair, love, amazement, admiration, humility, [embarrassment],111 joy, compassion, contempt, etc. Equally expressive can be the cry, the whisper, the singing, the pathetic, learned, "warm," [exaggerated]112 speech; or one speaks in a normal voice, but in such a manner, as if the speech came with difficulty, as if the "abnormal" manner were "restrained" and stifled. The voice also reveals to us the age, the sex, and the temperament of the character [of a person]; his speech makes us appreciate the degree of his culture.113 In addition, the voice can inspire sympathy or antipathy in the listener; for instance, a "soft" or "harsh" voice, "harmonious," hoarse, and the like. [| 30 (1938)]
110	[Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.] [In 1939: "the genre and meaning of his words that offer us these pieces of information."]
111	[In 1939: "confusion."]
112	[In 1939: "affected."]
113	After we have associated a voice with a dramatis persona, it will be difficult for us to recognize it in another radio play, as another individual. Moreover, listeners do not like it when well-known artists interpret the roles. This was discussed in the BBC survey.
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Speech—a material of dialogue—also exercises expressive functions due to its "emotional characters," as Ingarden has defined them. There are, however, coarse, pathetic, sentimental, harsh, caressing words. The choice of words can reveal to us constant traits, or the character's temporary psychic states.
But in the expression of the effects produced on the heart, the senses, and the mind, the most important role is the one played by the spoken dialogue. I emphasize that it must be spoken, because read dialogue (and the listener often knows whether the actors are reading or speaking) loses its expressive function, [directs the listener's attention to the presenting objects, not the imaginative ones, makes aware the actor as a presentation of the dramatic character, and kills the feeling of directly listening to his confessions].114 [| 136 (1939)] In short, we must avoid anything that foregrounds the sound—as such—in the listener's perception; this prevents the latter from directing all his attention to the imaginative world. This is why verses [as in poetry] are not desired in the radio play. Savoring the rhythm and the melodious speech does not allow one to grasp the situation and concentrate on it. If the role 430 of dialogue is important in the radio play, all the more important is the part played by conception115 in the ensemble of perception. This [perception]116 is comprised of numerous elements; one discerns in it the perceptive images of the auditive material, the imaginative images of the fictional world and, possibly, representations originating from phantasy, or those which our memory suggests to us; in addition, we find there multiple conceptions, with the aid of which one accomplishes the understanding of the words and sentences uttered by the characters of the drama. But beyond this understanding, one can—due to separate [lived]117 experiences—penetrate the psyche of another, understand this psyche, its structure, and states of all kinds. The uttered words and sentences reveal to us not only the thoughts of characters, [but also]118
114	[Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.] [In 1939: "reveals that a dramatis persona is presented by an actor and destroys the illusion of listening to the confessions of this someone 'in person."]
115	[Emphasis mine.]
116	[In 1939: "conception."]
117	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
118	[In 1939: "but also their sensitivity, as well as."]
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their emotional states. Nonetheless, as [Witold] Hulewicz emphasizes, "it is in the dialogue that human sentiments are expressed, antagonisms are at stake, the dynamics of life overflow there." Dialogue can be replaced by monologue, inasmuch as the latter does not lack the [| 31 (1938)] dramatic element, if the individual speaking struggles with himself or with someone else, in a way that can arouse the interest of the listener (e.g., telephone conversations of a bankrupt man with friends and acquaintances, whose answers we do not hear, or "The Apology of Socrates"). Obviously, creating such a monologue requires a higher art than writing a dialogue with analogous values.
Besides such expressive factors as noises, sounds, voices, words, dialogue, and monologue, there is still one more, [| 137 (1939)] rendering possible the expression of psychic states. This factor is the music that accompanies the action. In my Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer (Blaustein 1933), I spoke more thoroughly about its role: how music interprets the [lived]119 experiences of the heroes of the screen; that there is an affinity between the music and the screen as a means to express feelings; what the difference between the music and the film as a means to express feelings is; 431 what influence music has on the psyche of the cinema viewer; what factors facilitate the association of film and music; finally, what the value of the program music as a musical illustration of the film is.120 Such particularities as the superiority of the emotional sphere over the intellectual in cinema— pointed out by Ingarden—, the subordinate role of speech in both film and music, etc., render the association of these two arts psychologically natural. It is an altogether different matter in the homocentric radio play, where dialogue plays an [important]121 role, revealing not only the struggle of feelings, but also that of thoughts; revealing them much more clearly than do the meager
119	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
120	The issue of the role of music in film was taken up by Dr. Z[ofia] Lissa who developed it in her recently published book Music and Film (1937) in much greater detail, but in a related way, since it is based on the theory of the imaginativeness of the film world. Numerous interesting statements made by this author allow their application to considerations of the role of music in the radio play, which, however, I was unable to do since the completion of this discussion. [Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.] [In 1939, this footnote is omitted.]
121	[In 1939: "real."]
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432
enunciations of the film. The latter presents [emotional events and states],122 which were their consequence; while the intellectual reflections that accompany these events and feelings are [| 32 (1938)] indifferent to it [the film], these intellectual reflections are, on the other hand, important for the radio play. The film is perceived with the help of sight, and the music with the help of hearing of the spectator, but the attention of the latter is so concentrated on visually grasping the images on the screen that he hardly hears the music; nevertheless, although relegated to the background, it operates discreetly and becomes a perfect "interpreter" of the feelings that film characters must be experiencing. By contrast, during the perception of [| 138 (1939)] the radio play, both speech and music are solely intended for hearing; when simultaneous, they harm each other. In a report, [Jan Emil] Skiwski expresses himself thusly about what we have just said:
Music on the radio absorbs us much more strongly; its importance is much greater than in the theater. There, where we are condemned only to sound—where the (musical) sound struggles with the voice—, music has the upper hand. Simply because it is noisier. It flatters the ear and, perhaps more importantly, tires less our memory and attention.
[Juliusz] St[efan] [?] Petry is also opposed to the simultaneity of speech and music. The victory of music in this occurrence is not dangerous for such a radio play, where the action serves as a framework for the music.
However, when the radio play is neither an opera nor radio operetta, but a drama or comedy, the role of music must be limited; it must only be restricted to setting the appropriate mood for the listener and putting him in such a disposition that he is in agreement with the atmosphere of the action place, e.g., with that of a ballroom or a revue. Music can play this role perfectly; not only can it evoke a [presented]123 feeling, as the theater or radio play does, but also a real feeling. Music that expresses longing and nostalgia evokes a longing mood in us. The very feeling [(or its presentation)] of longing expressed via facial expressions on stage, on screen, or in a painting, or perceived during
122	[In 1939: "the events and the states of sensitivity."]
123	[In 1939: "represented."]
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listening to a radio play [only awakens our understanding].124 When an imaginative character is jealous, despised, etc., its appearance awakens in the spectator analogous feelings, only if the spectator himself was in the past or is presently in an analogous situation. On the other hand, thanks to music [| 33 (1938)] real feelings are born, e.g., joy, although the actual and real situation of the spectator or the listener barely disposes him to it. We have already talked of the spectator's/listener's body being transported into the imaginative space [| 139 (1939)]: it is the attraction of the music that transports the spectator into this imaginative world; the spectator is influenced by it, the atmosphere of the ball envelopes him, intoxicates him; listening to Strauss's lively waltzes, he would like to dance, just as if he were attending this ball that he sees on the screen in person or whose mere echo reaches him, due to the radio device.
In addition to the function of "attracting" the listener into the atmosphere of the action's place, one can also, within certain limits, illustrate the psychic states of the heroes through music, e.g., by making them play an instrument, hum a song. Nevertheless, this method should be employed moderately, firstly because of what we have just listed above, and secondly because of the short 433 duration of the radio play; this appears to be all the more necessary since the prolonged perception of music could necessitate the reconstruction of the action place, this not being presented visually and simultaneously in a continuous manner, as for example on the stage or in the cinema.
In evaluating the expressive force of acoustic speech, which expresses psychic states, we must take into account certain important circumstances. First of all, it must be considered that the voice's expressive values are more striking when the person speaking is invisible. Focusing one's attention entirely on acoustics makes hearing more sensitive and impressionable; it then captures the most imperceptible nuances. An interesting statement made by Wañkowicz bears witness to this. During a radio conference he had listened twice in a row to [Stefan] Jaracz and [Wojciech] Brydziñski who played a fragment of a radio play. Having fixed this radio play, it was repeated on the steel ribbon field by the loudspeaker. But as soon as Wañkowicz heard Jaracz again, without seeing the
124 [In 1939: "will leave us indifferent, even though we have understood them (feelings)."]
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artist's facial expression, his impression was more vivid. "His laughter so sad and so dreamy, his [| 34 (1938)] voice so tragic and so dark, interrupted by this little laugh—[armor of life]125 [| 140 (1939)]—no, it was not so striking when we listened to Jaracz in person." Thus, both psychological reasons (conditions of perception) and technical reasons (the microphone, the loudspeaker) are the reason that nowhere are the subtleties of speech better felt than during the reception of radio broadcasts. We can risk this comparison here: it is like when we reproduce on the screen the enlargement of a face, we can then better observe the subtleties of its facial expressions.
The exclusivity of auditive impressions during the reception of a radio play not only increases the [perceptive and emotional sensitivity]126 of the listener, but also his disposition to sensitive reactions, to feel the feelings expressed by the imaginative characters. Hearing crying makes a stronger impression than seeing tears. It is a known fact. There are people who kill the mute fish themselves, but they send to the butcher the animals that show their suffering by screaming. Recently, I witnessed two accidents: from the first, the child 434 came out safe and sound, but his tears and the scream of the terrified mother produced a very strong impression on the passers-by gathered there. The second accident was fatal, but, as the unfortunate child did not cry and there was no one there from his family, [to bear witness to the accident,]127 the assembled crowd showed much less emotion. A voice trembling with emotion always impresses more than a sad or happy face. A sudden cry, of which we know neither the cause nor the motives, attracts our attention and makes us flinch. Now, we feel different emotions so strongly during the perception of a radio play, because we perceive their expression with the help of hearing. [| 35 (1938)]
Let us also note a circumstance, which characterizes the perceptions of radio plays: To sympathize with the misfortunes of imaginative characters, [to commune with them,]128 [or] to be penetrated by their feelings plays a [| 141 (1939)] much more important role during this perception than during the
125	[In 1939: "a mask."]
126	[In 1939: "perceptive and emotional impressionability."]
127	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
128	[In 1939: "to commune with them through joy or through pain."]
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perception of shows in the theater, on the screen, in a novel, etc. There are two reasons for this: first, the psychic life of the heroes is placed in the forefront, thus directed toward the "interior" of the psyche; the "introverted" disposition of the radio play, which enlarges the scope of the [lived experiences],129 with which the listener must be penetrated. Second, these psychic states are communicated to the listener immediately. This immediacy lies in the fact that the psychic states are communicated to the listener at the very moment when the imaginative character experiences them—most often expressly. By contrast, on the screen it is the gesture and the involuntary facial expressions that inform us about the hero's psychic states.
This great part that the listener takes in the [lived experiences]130 of the heroes of the radio play has doubtlessly suggested to Kolb to advance an original thesis. According to him, the action of the radio play does not take place in front of the listener but within him.131 Our considerations on the constitution of the imaginative world of the radio play can easily demonstrate that Kolb's assertion is false. The actor's voice is not "entkorperf ["disembodied"], as Kolb expresses it; we perceive it as the voice of someone, the voice of an imaginative 435 character. This character and his surrounding world are neither in our spatial reality nor in our psyche, but in their [specific]132 imaginative world. It is in front of the listener transported into this world that the action takes place, and not in front of the real body of the said listener. [| 36 (1938)]
In principle, we do not project ourselves into the given character or into all the characters in the action; we do not identify with them. It is only a communion of feelings, [| 142 (1939)] more or less like those we encounter in daily life, in contact with our loved ones, who communicate their [lived
129	[In 1939: "impressions."]
130	[In 1939: "fortunes and misfortunes."]
131	After having precisely determined the state of things in the theater, Kolb (1932, 39) writes: "Anders vor dem Mikrophon und Lautsprecher; hier läuft die Handlung nicht vor dem Hörer ab, wie im Film oder Theater, sondern in ihm. Auch die Personen entstehen in ihm. Er schafft sie dem Dichter nach, in sich, mit seinen eigenen, schöpferischen Kräften." A few pages later we read: "Die entkörperte Stimme des Hörspielers wird zur Stimme des eigenen Ich." (Kolb 1932, 55.)
132	[In 1939: "own."]
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experiences]133 to us directly. Moreover, in the theater and in the cinema, the action does not take place in front of the spectator's real body. Kolb may have a correct idea—only expressed incorrectly—in asserting that empathizing with the hero's [lived]134 experiences plays a great part in the whole perception of a radio play.
The expression of [lived experiences]135 is associated with the question of how the receiver becomes aware of them. By listening to the statements of people who speak about themselves and by observing their way of being, we [perceive]136 these statements as an intentional or involuntary expression of [lived experiences].137 We sometimes perceive intentional expressions with confidence, that is, we recognize their conformity with the [lived experience];138 sometimes, we react in a skeptical manner, that is, we recognize their nonconformity with the [lived experience];139 finally, sometimes in an interpretative manner, that is, we [assume]140 the conformity of the intentional expression with the [conscious lived experience],;141 but at the same time we admit that unconscious motives are hidden therein. Being disposed 436 in a skeptical manner, we do not believe in the frankness of expression. By confronting an oral utterance (or another acoustic manifestation, e.g., an exclamation), accompanied by facial expressions and gestures, we decide that the first was not frank. The listener of a radio play is deprived of this possibility. Can the listener, therefore, evaluate the frankness or the dissimulation of the expressions relating to [lived experiences],142 when he is given only the intentional expressions, with barely mentioning the involuntary ones, with which he could confront them? [| 143 (1939)] To a certain extent, certain
133	[In 193): "impressions."]
134	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
135	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
136	[In 1939: "sense."]
137	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
138	[In 1939: "psychic phenomenon."]
139	[In1939: "lived fact."]
140	[In 1939: "admit."]
141	[In 1939: "psychic phenomenon."]
142	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
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subtle nuances of the voice (e.g. ironic, [exaggerated/dramatic]143) may reveal that the utterance is [insincere],144 but this does not concern fully intentional and knowingly masked dissimulation. As it seems, one thing decides whether the listener can recognize the frankness or insincerity of the statement. The character of the person having already been formed, its conformity or nonconformity with the utterance reveals to the listener whether the latter is frank or dissimulated, and whether it conforms or not to the image of the character given. [| 37 (1938)]
Having established this fact, one may express yet another doubt. Does not the brevity of the radio play make it impossible for the listeners to form such an image? Usually, we recognize the characteristic features of other characters by generalizing our conclusions; namely: 1) the repeated [phenomena],145 relating to the disposition, respectively] toward the inclinations of the individual; 2) the profession and the origin of the latter (which can give rise to many errors); finally, 3) the physiognomy. Judging from the physiognomy we can read there wit, stupidity, presumption, pride, docility, etc. When a young person's face is tense, wrinkled, or furrowed, we recognize that this person is embittered; 437 radiant, joyful, calm eyes, or slow movements make us recognize a balanced person. Finally, information about the individual (information of a vital necessity to know the character of the novel) contributes to the listener being able to form the image of the given character.
However, we are deprived of information about the heroes of a radio play; the radio announcer—as we already know—is not supposed to give us any. We cannot deduce our conclusions from the [physiognomy]146 that we do not see; nor from the profession, nor from the origin of the individual; the author cannot create schematic characters, without individuality, uninteresting, and not realistic enough. As we know only a few facts and phenomena, it is difficult [| 144 (1939)] for us to conclude how the characters are disposed toward them; much less than, for example, in a stage drama five times longer.
143	[In 1939: "affecte."]
144	[In 1939: "concealed."]
145	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
146	[In 1939: "face."]
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Does the listener not imagine the character of the heroes in the radio play? Does he not know them at all? If this were the case, creating a dramatic conflict on the radio, based on the diversity of human characters, would be very difficult. Fortunately, this is not the case. Two main difficulties prevent us from knowing others—and also oneself: the versatility of man as well as the lack of characteristic situations, which would help reveal the characteristic traits of this man; such situations, which would be a real test of [| 38 (1938)] character strength, etc. Isadora Duncan writes in her memoirs that only those people whom life has spared from truly strong temptations are virtuous; or those who, focused in one direction, have not had time to look for something else in life. This opinion is exaggerated, but there is a correct idea: man (and even more so his entourage) can have an erroneous opinion of himself for decades, until this real "test of character" opens his eyes. But if we are talking about the heroes of a radio play, these two difficulties do not exist. On the contrary, the radio play, constrained by the brevity of its duration, has an action composed of one or more 438 unusual and rare situations, which reveal to us better the particularities of the heroes' character than a long observation of their monotonous life would. Moreover, since the character of a radio play is not epic, its heroes are represented in a specific phase of their life, in which they remain true to themselves and hardly change, unless "in our eyes" or rather "in front of our ears" a breakthrough takes place in the hero's psyche.147 Thanks to these circumstances, it is possible to know the heroes in such a short period of time, especially since [| 145 (1939)] both the voice and the manner of speaking possess certain characterological peculiarities. The perception of radio plays teaches the listener to grasp with the ear the peculiarities of character, and to judge the man on their basis; listening alone makes us distinguish a cyclothymic, simple, natural, [unforced],148 talkative, easily confiding in others, from a schizothymic, secretive, taciturn, controlled, cold [in communication], stiff, and unnatural.
147	[In 1939: "they are withdrawn, unless the hero undergoes a psychological crisis during the listening."]
148	[In 1939: "without affection."]
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During the perception of a radio play, [lived experiences and psychic states]149 are—this time explicitly—"expressed" only by acoustic means. But this fact does not prevent the listener from knowing these [lived experiences]150 and structures of the characters who experience them. [| 39 (1938)]
§ 5. Perception of the radio play during its evolution
Unlike painting and sculpture, the novel and the stage or cinematographic spectacle are dynamic works of art; the radio play differs from the first and resembles the second. Its perception can be accomplished in a certain longer period of time, and in the phases of which the particular stages of the action are revealed. The perception of the radio play requires that attention be concentrated for a fairly long time, which is hardly easy.
In everyday life, we see and hear simultaneously. It is quite rare that we see something without hearing it, and it is even rarer that we hear something without seeing it.151 In the theater and in the cinema, we see and hear simultaneously. While watching the silent film, we hear [| 146 (1939)] the 439 musical illustration. Listening without seeing is more difficult than seeing without listening; listening—except for music—even demands a fairly great effort from us. Likewise, listening to a radio play attentively and for a long time is not an easy thing. When focusing attention on something requires effort, that attention often ends up on something else. That is why hearers who strive for attentive listening make special preparations to create the necessary conditions. Different opinions in the survey mentioned testify to this: "Before the play is broadcast, I lock myself in my room, so that no one disturbs me," or: "The family circle surrounds the loudspeaker; collected, in silence, all listen... It is forbidden to speak." Nine listeners note that the radio play is more demanding than the theater. During the radio play, one must "focus" and "grasp every word," otherwise the listener's interest wanes. On the other hand,
149	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena and states."]
150	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
151	"Unser Ohr"—Kolb (1932, 23) writes—"ist völlig ungeschult ohne den visuellen Eindruck längere Zeit nur dem Wort zu folgen. Wir sind daran gewöhnt, dass unsere Aufmerksamkeit wenigstens durch den Gesichtsausdruck oder die Geste des Sprechenden wachgehalten wird."
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[62 persons]152 say that during a radio play they can listen and observe better than [| 40 (1938)] in the theater; the visual element being excluded, neither the view of the stage nor the conversations, nor the coughing of the neighbors [in the theater], distracts the listener's attention. Is there a contradiction amongst these opinions? Apparently, there is none. Concentrating one's attention during the perception of a radio play is much more difficult than in the theater, not for external reasons, but because the psychic action—exclusively listening—is not a common usage; it must be exercised for a fairly long time. On the other hand, the result of this necessary effort to concentrate attention, so that it is static and not dynamic during the perception of a radio play, this result, I say, is better than in the theater, because the solitary man can rather ensure tranquility in his surroundings, and the lack of visual objects does not distract attention, absorbed by listening.
Darkness is often desired: "I close my eyes or turn off the light, and, focused, I take part in the whole evolution [| 147 (1939)] of the drama," writes one person in the survey mentioned. This opinion is repeated 30 times. I have also heard it 440 frequently during oral interviews. Listeners even demanded that the broadcast of the plays be carried out in the evening. Various reasons explain this desire for darkness. The conditions then can be better for creating phantasy images, if it is with their help that someone illustrates the radio play. Darkness can also serve to concentrate attention, as in the theater or the cinema. The habit acquired during these spectacles can, without doubt, contribute to this.
Attention, strained during listening unidirectionally and marked by the impossibility of proceeding at will from things seen to those heard—and vice versa, soon tires the listener. In the theater, in the cinema, and during the perception of a radio play, the attention of the receiver is directed by the creators of the show or the radio play; but in the theater or cinema the listener still has quite a lot of freedom, being able to look at the secondary characters, the background, etc. In contrast, during the perception of a radio play, the freedom of the listener disappears completely; the presentism of the radio play and the small extent of the sounds perceived by the listener [| 41 (1938)] contribute to the latter soon becoming tired. That is why a radio play cannot
152 [In 1939: "other persons."]
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last longer than about thirty minutes—according to the standard adopted in Poland. Certain peculiarities of attention, necessary for the perception of the play, impose the brevity of radio plays. It is known that attention can be trained; therefore, it is highly probable that the person who often perceives radio plays will, with time, be able to perceive much longer radio plays without difficulty. Apparently, the BBC has obtained such results. In its survey, the listeners affirm that a broadcast should not last more than an hour, with household occupations not permitting attentive listening for longer. As Shakespeare's works cannot be thus shortened, so that their broadcast can [| 148 (1939)] last an hour, the listeners propose introducing a short interval, like during symphonic concerts.
Obviously, limiting the duration of the radio play to avoid the weakening of attention or even its total distraction, caused by the fatigue of the listener, will not suffice. Several people have told me that they do not listen to this kind of broadcasts, which tire them too much; and as they are seeking relaxation, these people rather prefer music. In order to remedy this, it is above all necessary to make the action as interesting as possible, which can be achieved by a pace 441 specific to the drama; short intervals, filled by music, and the creations of the "acoustic kitchen" put in the foreground will make listening less tiring. However, listening to and understanding articulated speech require the greatest effort—short intervals facilitate repeated effort. As we know, speech and music must not be simultaneous; instead of relaxing attention, this simultaneity tires it even more. On the other hand, the acoustic backstage diverts from attentive listening to the dialogue less than music; it also detaches attention less from articulated speech than do [| 42 (1938)] the sets in the theater and other optical data of the spectacle, as [Wladyslaw] Zawistowski judiciously points out.
Focusing one's attention on the perception of purely acoustic data tires one relatively quickly; nevertheless, this concentration also has its advantages, as has been pointed out by Hulewicz. Radio requires neither mask nor costume, nor facial expressions, nor light, nor visual décor—notes this author—, it acts on the listener in a centripetal manner, concentrating his [sensitivity]153 only on the content of the speech. Let us add that it also concentrates this sensitivity
153 [In 1939: "impressionability."]
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on the psychic life, of which the speech is the expression. Thus, radio facilitates and provokes the "introverted" attitude. [| 149 (1939)]
Concentrating attention not only facilitates an accurate perception of the phase of the moment itself, but also facilitates retaining in memory the already elapsed phases of the play. When we observe something in passing or with a minimum tension of our mind, representing it ex post requires special remembering of [lived experiences].154 The listener, absorbed in the perception of the phase of the moment, in listening and understanding, simply lacks time for such [lived experiences].155 The perception carried out with such concentrated attention, as well as the short duration of the radio play, make it much easier to retain in the "live memory" the elapsed, already perceived phases, than this is the case in the theater, in the cinema, or while reading a novel. This "live memory" is—according to Ingarden—like the imprecise and peripheral [lived experience]156 of an event, of the realization of something, at certain moments of the existence of something, which is not present to us "in person." Thus, one can do without those [lived experiences].157 Therefore, 442 they rarely occur, for example, when—in order to understand something better—we compare the current utterance of the dramatic character with the previous utterance. We must also observe the difference between the way of remembering and the way of perceiving. For instance, when we see something, we most often remember it visually, using quite faithful, visual, reproductive images. Remembering all [| 43 (1938)] the phases of the play in a homogeneous way is almost impossible, especially for listeners who are not audile. Of course, we know from many experiments that we remember less things heard than things seen (e.g., we forget words more quickly than objects or pictures). Besides this, the listener's disposition is not directed toward the words themselves, but toward their meaning; he also remembers [| 150 (1939)] the elapsed phases of the radio play not only in a "summed," "abbreviated," or "condensed" manner, but also rather in the form of conceptual representations
154	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
155	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
156	[In 1939: "sensation."]
157	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena, which consist in remembering something in a distinct way."]
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than of auditive reproductive images. The summary way of remembering the past phase is connected with the possibility of representing fragments in detail and of developing the details that were previously remembered in a condensed form. This development is carried out in many listeners with the help of a double visual transposition, which has already been discussed. However, in everyday life, it is difficult for us to remember not only the meaning of longer utterances, but also to recall these utterances word for word, and to grasp the tone in which they were pronounced. Few sentences, and only the most expressive ones, remain "in our ear." For the cinema spectator, remembering the past phases of the action is quite another thing. The cinema session does not last very long, although it is two to three times longer than that of the radio play. The "live memory" also plays a major role for the cinema [viewer],158 but the development of details takes place primarily by suggesting to the memory images akin to those seen recently.
Regarding the function of memory during the perception of a radio play, it should be noted that the role of discernment is greater than that of recollection. Discerning has a real importance in the constitution of the following phases 443 of the imaginative world, and particularly of the characters who populate this world.
In the radio play, we have [—as Ingarden claims in the case of drama in general—]159 a continually renewed "now," constantly surrounded not only by the past, but also by the future, not only by accomplished events, but also by those that are [| 44 (1938)] announced. Among the constitutive elements of perception, the expectant attitude of future events is remarkable. [The greater the listener's tension, the stronger the expectations.]160 During the perception of a radio play or other dynamic works of art (novel, [theater] spectacle, film) two attitudes are [| 151 (1939)] possible: the contemplative attitude, which makes us savor the present phase, and the expectant attitude, which makes us await with a strong tension of mind what the next phase holds for us. Obviously, the second attitude is rather accentuated when the dramatic knot is already
158	[In 1939: "listener."]
159	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
160	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
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formed, and its denouement approaches. The different motives discussed above, having to do with the tension of the attention of the receiver, especially by means of maintaining the tension, force the radio play to give the action a lively pace. Paque demands that the listener be interested from the beginning of the dramatic action, and that this high tension be maintained at a peak level throughout (unlike a theater performance, which only occasionally introduces culminating points). Paque also demands that the scenes be short; that there be continual changes; that there be contrasts of the opposing characters; finally, that the construction of the whole play and of each of its scenes be dynamic. [He allows for a momentary slowing down of the tempo only to enable the listener to feel this tempo, to sensitize him to the intensification of this tempo.]161 Finally, Paque calls for short intervals, which are essential for the listener, so that new [lived experiences],162 following each other quickly, can form. It must be considered that the listener can neither accelerate nor slow down the pace of perception, nor interrupt its phases, just like the spectator at the theater or the cinema. The situation of the reader differs from theirs. Thus, the listener 444 cannot "regulate" the pace of events—too fast for him—by a slow motion or interrupted perception. Therefore, undergoing the dynamics of the action, it is not easy for him to take a contemplative attitude, so he takes an expectant attitude. [| 45 (1938)] This seems even more characteristic for the auditive receiver [of the radio play] than for the cinema or theater spectator. However, some restrictions apply here: the first concerns entertaining radio plays, whose action is not dynamic; the second restriction concerns montage radio plays, which are not homocentric, [| 152 (1939)] during the listening of which the contemplative attitude is especially frequent. Finally, our assertion concerns only the first listening, because at the second and subsequent perceptions of the radio play—already known—the contemplative attitude is characteristic. The consequences of this assertion, consequences that the aesthetic perception of the radio play undergoes, will be discussed below.
161	[In 1939: "He only admits a momentary 'slow motion' pace, so that the listener can realize the speed of this pace and become impressed, when it is intensified again."]
162	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
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The question of intervals during the broadcast of a play has a certain relation to the question we have just discussed. These intervals, as we know, do not depend on the perceiver, as, for example, during the reading of a literary work. These intervals are much shorter than those in the theater; they ward off reflections, prevent the "return" to the real world, etc., but they are accentuated more strongly than in the cinema. They indicate the end of one phase of the action, the beginning of the next, and give the signal that one must prepare for the perception of a change in the place or time of the action. These intervals are extremely short; they last as long as the sound of a gong. The sound of a gong may be preceded by a short silence, but this silence, as a boundary, is not sufficient in itself, for silence does not have one single meaning. It can just as much indicate an interval in the dynamic development of the work of art (e.g., darkness or light on the screen), or a silence in the imaginative world (e.g., silence in silent scenes in the theater). The lack of longer intervals is due to the impossibility, in the case of a prolonged interval, of forcing the listener to adopt a new attitude toward an imaginative world, while retaining in the live memory the elapsed phases. These reasons are more important than the short 445 duration of the radio play and the lack of time. This is precisely what explains why radio plays do not consist of acts lasting 20 to 30 minutes, separated by a [| 153 (1939)] longer intermission. The same psychological facts impose, it seems, the unity [| 46 (1938)] of action proposed, among others, by Hulewicz. This author is opposed to plays, in which several actions intersect and happen in different places. Nevertheless, it is necessary to make the restriction that frequent listening can probably create a disposition, making possible the perception, even of such radio plays. In short, the many peculiarities of the radio play, which seem to result from its "essence," are—in fact—only the result of the perceptive capacity; in my opinion, it can undergo a modification through training, as the reception of the radio acousion of the world becomes, from early childhood, a frequent phenomenon in the life of man. Obviously, provided television does not interrupt this evolution; an evolution, educating those who see how to feel the world aurally, as if they were blind.
The aforementioned considerations dealt with the following questions: how to maintain the tension of the mind in the listener; how to remedy his fatigue; how to engrave in one's memory the events and statements "which collapse
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into the past," or rather the expectant attitude, instead of the contemplative attitude of the listener during the perception of the radio play in its dynamic development. In these considerations it was also a question of the reasons, which stand in the way of cutting the play with the help of longer intervals. We should also emphasize one more important circumstance: beside the perception of the radio play, there are also phases [of the pre-perception],163 which precede the perception, and [the phases of the post-perception],164 which follow it, and they can be joined to the whole of the [lived experiences]165 of a higher order; a whole that is connected with the perceptive attitude, taken during the broadcast of the radio play. The phase, which precedes perception, has a considerable influence on the course of the perception, because our psychic phenomena always depend [| 154 (1939)] not only on the impressions we experience, but also on our expectations, hopes, and fears that we have associated with these impressions. Moreover, the listener defines these expectations in a varied manner. This depends on the subject: whether it is completely new, unknown, about which one can only risk assumptions based 446 solely on the title or on some press advertisement; or whether it is a literary subject [| 47 (1938)] broadcast on the radio. Obviously, to [constitute]166 the imaginative world, understanding the action of the [lived experiences]167 of the heroes is easier in the second case—but the receptive sensitivity is weaker, and here is why: [the listener's aesthetic experience]168 is [undoubtedly]169 distracted by the continuous comparisons and the gaps he feels, completing the indeterminate spots with the help of knowledge, drawn from reading or from the theater—perhaps contrary to the intention of the creators of the radio play, who had not made an abridgement of another work, but had created a new work of art. When literary works are adapted to the screen, the perception of such a film is similar to that of a radio literary work. The phase [of the post-
163	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
164	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
165	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena".]
166	[In 1939: "form."]
167	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
168	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
169	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
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perception]170 is important, because it creates the possibility of apprehending the synthetic whole of the play. While apprehending this whole, many details emerge and present a different aspect than they had during the perception; a complete understanding follows; one perceives the structure of all the successively perceived phases of the play, which makes it possible to experience new aesthetic emotions; to reflect on what the character of the individuals was, the idea of the play, and the outcome of the dramatic conflict. Radio does not take into account the role of the post-receptive phase in the whole of psychic phenomena by allowing the radio announcer to speak at the very moment when the action is over. So, [Franciszek] Pawliszak is right to call for a moment of silence, or a little music, at the end of the listening. [| 155 (1939)]
§ 6. Perception of the radio play as an aesthetic object
It might seem that we are dealing with the aesthetic perception of the radio play always and only when this play is a work of art. However, this condition is neither absolute nor sufficient. In order to establish that such a play has no 447 positive aesthetic values, an aesthetic perception is nevertheless also necessary; on the other hand, the fact that the object of perception possesses aesthetic values is no guarantee that the listener will notice them. On the contrary, [| 48 (1938)] "aesthetic color blindness"—if one may use Ossowski's term—, the consumption of the work of art itself, instead of its aesthetic perception,171 is a very frequent occurrence.
In the analysis of aesthetic experience, aesthetic psychology has paid little attention to aesthetic perception—a real element of [aesthetic] experience; said psychology being mainly interested in the emotions, which result from this perception. [Aesthetic experience]172 is not only an emotion arising from a passive, purely receptive perception of the object, but a [lived experience]173 actively forming its object; on this psychic phenomenon depends, which values
170	[In 1939: "after perception."]
171	Among others, this was demonstrated by the BBC survey. The majority of its listeners only seek entertainment in radio drama productions; they show no interest in the values of a radio play, in a play written especially for radio, etc.
172	[In 1939: "Aesthetic emotion."]
173	[In 1939: "psychic phenomenon."]
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will reach the consciousness of the perceiver, and which he will not notice. We will apply these general assertions to the perception of the radio play, which alone interests us here.
Is perception only a consumption of the radio play, or its aesthetic experience? This depends on the kind of perception of not only the objective values of the play, such as style, depth of the "presented" psychic life, [| 156 (1939)] dynamism of action, [harmony of the acoustic backstage with the dramatic situation or the mental state of the heroes],174 etc. To perceive the values of the play, to complete the auditive data—something that is indispensable—, and to feel through the acoustic material the imaginative world and that of [lived] psychic [experiences]175 also depend on the kind of perception. The collaboration of the receiver that is absolutely necessary during every aesthetic perception and exceptionally important during the perception of a radio play, is more the work of the receiver than the construction of the cinematographic or stage world. In non-imaginative montage plays, the aesthetic experience depends only on the hearer's sensitivity toward the values of the sphere of 448 noises and sounds. Whereas during the emission of [| 49 (1938)] imaginative [radio] plays, the aesthetic experience depends on the manner, in which the imaginative world is constituted and constructed; how the listener completes the spots of indeterminacy; how he illustrates (visually—if possible); on the listener being in intellectual community with the heroes; on understanding their psyche.
There is still a whole series of conditions; they are not indispensable, but capable of multiplying sources of aesthetic emotions. The most important of these conditions is the sensitivity of the listener toward the "structure" of the play. Thus, the listener can notice that the acoustic sphere provides in an excessively skillful way the clues for building the imaginative world, that it perfectly "sketches" the background of the action. The listener can also be delighted with the perfection, with which the expression of experiences and psychic states is accomplished, thanks to the voice, the tone, the choice of words, and the construction of sentences; he can admire how the dramatic
174	[In 1939: "harmony of the acoustic backstage of the heroes."]
175	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
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situations of the play—so few in number, in spite of the fact that the events are well condensed—perfectly represent the dynamism of certain processes of life, of certain struggles, etc. We perceive these values of the radio play as such [| 157 (1939)] (and not only the values of the radio imaginative world), when we are disposed to perceive not only the imaginative world, but also, from time to time, the reproducing object. However, too much concentration of attention on the reproducing strata of the play, for example on the stratum concerning the senses,176 leads to the decomposition of the imaginative world, and to the [disappearing]177 of aesthetic experiences, which arise from the perception of the values of this world, even such experiences, as e.g., the tragedy of certain situations, the depth of dramatic conflicts. [| 50 (1938)]
To be disposed to perceive the imaginative world is the most important condition for obtaining an aesthetic perception of a radio play. This condition, although indispensable, is still insufficient. With such a disposition one can only achieve the consumption of the radio play. This latter case occurs when the listener is disposed to perceiving only the evolution of the action; when the latter interests him as enigmatic, and the listener is only interested in learning 449 the sequel and its definitive outcome. Such a consumption is complete color blindness, blindness, or rather stupidity, since all the moments, in which we concentrate our attention during the aesthetic perception, pass unnoticed. One may not even notice the states of psychic [lived experiences],178 just like a reader with a dull mind, who, while reading a novel, skips the descriptions of the inner struggles or the reflections of the heroes, seeking only the denouement of the plot. Apparently, the radio play is particularly disposed to pure consumption, devoid of aesthetic emotion and supported by a perception full of "gaps." Consumption does not require the complete understanding of the object of perception, as aesthetic perception requires. [| 158 (1939)] The listener, therefore, follows the line of least effort; he reluctantly makes the effort
176	The homocentric radio play consists of four strata, namely: 1) acoustics, 2) meanings, constructed from the sense of the sentences uttered, 3) imaginative objects, and 4) appearances of said objects; just like a literary work, except for "imaginative" objects.
177	[In 1939: "weakening."]
178	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
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necessary to take advantage of all the clues that construct the imaginative world. He constructs only what is absolutely necessary to observe the evolution of the action. The indispensable rapidity of the development of the action favors this disposition. Besides that, the values of the particular spheres of the radio play impose themselves less on the listener than they do in the cinema or in the theater, our eye being more trained in aesthetic perception than our ear (apart from listening to music). Developing the feeling of aesthetics would be a fine task. This question requires special consideration.
In connection with the remarks we have just made, it must be emphasized that between the pure consumption of the radio play or other work of art and the aesthetic [lived experience],179 there is a whole series of intermediate forms; these forms are perhaps a phenomenon, which actually occurs most frequently. On the other hand, [| 51 (1938)] when the listener listens to the broadcast of a play a second time, it is the aesthetic perception which predominates; curiosity having been satisfied, this perception serves to provoke aesthetic feelings, [rather than feelings of knowledge].180 What we have just said relates 450 to the circumstance already noted, that during listening to the broadcast for the second time, the contemplative attitude replaces the expectant attitude. Nevertheless, it must not be supposed that during the first listening, the contemplative attitude can never take place. But the short duration of the particular moments of the radio play action causes the unrealized desire to prolong the constituent parts of the perception and is transferred to the whole as a desire that the perception of the object of the impression be prolonged as much as possible. However, the perception of a radio play is a long-term, evolving process, which, while grasping the structure of the whole, embraces the object as time passes. Now, the contemplative attitude does not manifest itself [| 159 (1939)] during the perception of the play by the desire that the perception of the constituent parts of the play last as long as possible; but by the desire for as prolonged a perception as possible of the whole radio play, constituted of these constituent parts, and succeeding one another.
In the considerations we have just presented, we have not distinguished
179	[In 1939: "perception of its psychic phenomena."]
180	[In 1939, this fragment is omitted.]
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passive perception from active and creative [lived experiences],181 completing this perception and supporting it during the constitution of the aesthetic object. On the contrary, we have affirmed that aesthetic perception thus feels the object, that this feeling makes the object undergo a modification, that this object ceases to be "intangible." Aesthetic perception itself, so it seems, is to a certain extent active and creative, which does not change its fundamental character of receptivity, of the faculty of feeling, which distinguishes it from purely creative, productive, and non-receptive lived experiences. Creative phenomena consist mainly of images due to phantasy or [| 52 (1938)] conceptual representations; receptive phenomena are based on perceptive or imaginative images. After all, the object of perception is "there"; it is not the listener who has "created" it. But the listener completes it involuntarily during the course of perception; without this completion, aesthetic perception is impossible or it is felt as incomplete. On the other hand, the receiver has neither the consciousness of creation nor the intensified feelings, which are always the consequence of an inventive act. The creative moments of aesthetic perception are the result of the involuntary, as one might say, automatic activity of the sensitive receiver. This 451 is especially true of the receiver of the radio play who, not having the temporal perspective182 in the choice of spatial points of view—or rather listening—, has even [| 160 (1939)] less awareness of his collaboration than, for example, the reader of novels or an individual who looks at paintings.
[At the end of these considerations, we will touch upon another issue of a more general nature, but also important for the perception of the radio play. Receptive aesthetic lived experiences occur in psychic life in two forms. Firstly, as secondary components of experiential wholes of a higher order183 of various types, and, secondly, as separate experiential wholes. In the first case, we are dealing with what Dessoir calls an aesthetic reflex, consisting of direct, certain—according to Dessoir—even instinctive liking or disliking.
181	Ingarden, on the other hand, seems to contrast the active-creative and perceptual lived experiences. [In 1939, this footnote is omitted.] [Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.]
182	It is Ingarden who introduces and explains the notion of the temporal perspective. See Ingarden 1937, 73-101. [See also Ingarden 1973, 105-143.]
183	I explain this term in Blaustein 1935.
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In the second case, we should speak of an aesthetic experience. An aesthetic reflex may occur within the whole of an experience, related for example to a conversation with another person, to a business transaction, to scientific research, and this happens when the aesthetic values of an object unexpectedly and involuntarily catch the eye, arouse astonishment, and suddenly drawing attention to them [|53 (1938)] causes a disruption of the "normal" course of lived experiences at a given moment. Such an aesthetic reflex can become—as Ingarden describes in detail—the beginning of a new lived experiential whole, an aesthetic experience, but it can also pass without any further development, when non-aesthetic interests are so strong that they do not allow the currently lived experiential whole to survive. In the first situation, the aesthetic reflex can be called—following Ingarden—an "initial emotion," with the reservation, however, that it includes not only emotion, but also perception.
An aesthetic experience does not have to arise solely as a continuation of an aesthetic reflex. In a museum, in a theater, in a cinema, in a concert hall, on a tourist trip, when starting to read a literary work of art or with the beginning 452 of the perception of a radio play, another state occurs, preceding aesthetic experiences, namely the state of their expectation. This expectation is expressed both in the area of perception and in the area of emotions. We try to take the appropriate position in relation to the object that is to provide us with an experience; we take the most convenient point of view; we approach it or move away from it; we sharpen our vision with the help of appropriate glasses; we concentrate our attention on what our sight or hearing will provide us with; we detach ourselves from the world around us; we initiate a new lived experiential whole of a higher order; we consciously interrupt the previously experienced one; we isolate the object of aesthetic experience; we possibly adjust ourselves to the imaginative world. In the area of emotions, we experience a joyful state, resulting from the belief that we will experience new aesthetic emotions or repeated ones that were already experienced through this object. Sometimes, this state of expectation and aesthetic experience preparation may occur as a result of an experienced aesthetic reflex, as a state of expecting further excitement from an object that unexpectedly gave us an initial emotion. The expected aesthetic experience may [| 54 (1938)] or may not appear; it may not be complete; it may lack—despite the appropriate perception and constitution
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of the aesthetic object—aesthetic emotion. It may appear with less intensity than expected, e.g., when we perceive the same or a similar aesthetic object for the nth time, when the advertisement or announcement was exaggerated. Too high an expectation is detrimental to the emergence of emotions—that is why, for example, premieres of second plays by authors whose first play was a great success are missed; women who are too famous for their extraordinary beauty are not liked, and so on.
We have described the mental states involved in this in some detail, because one of them, namely the state of expectation, usually occurs before the reception of a radio play. Well, Ingarden speaks rather negatively about such states. "In the mechanized conditions of today's life, however, we have 'hours of practice' planned even for aesthetic lived experiences; we go to the theater, to concerts at specific times, prepared in advance and set that now we will experience aesthetically [...]. The mechanization of life here, too, is a demoralizing factor." (Ingarden 1937, 134-135, fn. 1.)184 It is difficult to agree with this negative view in relation to those aesthetic experiences that require a focus on the imaginative world, and, therefore, also to those experienced 453 in relation to a radio play. On the contrary, the attitude of expectation favors the constitution of the radio play as an aesthetic object. If, when opening the loudspeaker, I did not know that a radio play was the one that was being broadcasted, I would treat the broadcast as a reportage, and then I would not be able to access the aesthetic experience. The perception of a radio play, and even more so the aesthetic perception of a radio play, requires, as we have seen, numerous and external conditions—very different from the usual— and attitudes of the recipient's psychological dispositions that this attitude of expectation and preparation for an aesthetic experience is indispensable, or at least useful. Another thing is that [| 55 (1938)] as a result of these expectations, the initial emotion—as Ingarden rightly writes—"sometimes either does not appear at all or, having appeared, is deprived of that primary, original force and freshness" (Ingarden 1937, 135, fn. 1),185 which it possesses when it occurs with a certain surprise or a sudden revelation. However, I believe that reducing
184	[See also Ingarden 1973, 193-194, fn. 18.]
185	[See also Ingarden 1973, 194, fn. 18.]
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the force of the initial emotion does not have to weaken the whole aesthetic experience.]186
Conclusion
This concludes our considerations, devoted to the perception of radio plays. These studies have revealed a rich problematic from the point of view of psychology and aesthetics; this problematic arises at the moment when perception arouses our theoretical interest. The conclusions of this study will doubtless require completion and modification, and namely for several reasons. First, the perceptive capacities of the radio listener undergo modifications as they are perfected. Second, the radio play itself is at the beginning of its development; it can take forms hitherto unknown. Finally, the results of numerous interviews and surveys can impose changes based on the opinions of a multitude of listeners. Our deductions will achieve their goal if they draw attention to the existence of these problems and give the 454 impulse to the systematic examination of these problems by more numerous groups of observers. Perhaps the Polish Radio Studio Office will want to organize them.
Concluding this study, we will express our opinion on the problem raised at the beginning of our considerations. To reduce radio plays to montage radio plays would be regrettable. As we have seen, the radio play provokes many [lived experiences]187 in the listener, and there are rich possibilities for them. Montage radio plays could impoverish them. These possibilities, so rich, can be exploited only by the perception of such a radio play, in which, besides the feeling of the acoustic material, one arrives at the constitution of the imaginative world as well as at the knowledge of the world of [lived experiences] undergone by characters in the drama. [| 161 (1939)] This does not deny the fact that imaginative or non-imaginative montage radio plays possess their specific aesthetic particularities, which [| 56 (1938)] are revealed in all their fullness, thanks to the fact that they are neither homocentric nor
186	[This fragment, i.e., 1938, 52-55, is omitted in 1939.] [Fragment translated from Polish by Alicja Jakha.]
187	[In 1939: "psychic phenomena."]
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imaginative. Also, from an aesthetic point of view, we must grant them equal rights.
[| 56 (1938)] Appendix: Solitary listener or radio audience?188
As W[itold] Hulewicz once wrote, "radio teaches people to be lonely." This author claims that the radio audience is not a crowd [masa], but a countless number of individual listeners or at most small groups, gathered around the loudspeakers, whether as a family or in a clubhouse. According to R. Kolb, radio—and particularly the radio play—leads not to the collective [zbiorowego], but only to the individual lived experience. Paque emphasizes that, in comparison to the theatrical play, the radio play appeals only to a world of the individual listener.
This fact, emphasized by the aforementioned authors, should be examined in light of social psychology,189 in order to draw some practical conclusions. Although the issue concerns the reception of artistic radio programs in general, it is also relevant in the context of the perception of the radio play.	455
According to numerous social psychologists, for instance [Georg] Simmel, A[loys] Fischer, and others, aesthetic experience is typically a non-collective, isolated, individual psychic lived experience. It is often cited as a counterexample in discussions of [Scipio] Sighele's or [Gustave] Le Bon's so-called "law of summation of affects in the crowd."190 However, if we examine the actual state of affairs without normative bias, the issue [| 57 (1938)] appears different. Certainly, there are "isolated aesthetic experiences." At times, several people may simultaneously have some aesthetic experiences, and yet these experiences are not "joint" lived experiences in the sense of social psychology. However, it is unquestionable that isolated aesthetic lived experiences may be
188	[Translated from Polish by Filip Borek. "Appendix" and "Practical conclusions" were published only in 1938.]
189	The general claims of social psychology used in the following discussion are drawn from the works of [Vladimir] Bekhterev, Berman, [Gustave] Le Bon, MacDougall, [Theodor] Erismann, [Aloys] Fischer, [Willy] Hellpach, [Ludwik] Krzywicki, Simmel, [Gabriel] Tarde, and others.
190	According to this law, the more people experience the same affect in the same place, the stronger this affect becomes.
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influenced by communities of people or by other individuals. Also, we often deal with aesthetic experiences, which are "joint" psychic contents of the (smaller or bigger) group members' consciousnesses. Contrary to the views held by numerous authors, aesthetic experience is not an exception. Like all other lived experiences, it may be influenced by other individuals or entire groups; it may take the form of a "joint" lived experience; it may be shaped in its quality, intensity, and duration by other people. It is more of a rule than an exception—especially in our modern era, which tends toward collective aesthetic experiences. One symptom of this tendency is, for instance, the attempt to create an artificial audience gathered around the microphone. This tendency is often explained by the decline of a more individual form of life within the family—such as existed, for instance, a century ago in [Artur] Schopenhauer's time, when solitary life was comprehended as perfection. In contrast, today, people spend much of their lives in various forms of social communities. Both work and leisure now tend to take on a communal character—a general tendency also driven by the desire to experience aesthetic pleasure.
456 While considering the issue raised by Hulewicz and other authors, we ask whether one should attempt to ascribe a collective character to the aesthetic impression [doznanie] of the radio listener—especially in light of the widespread attempt to create an artificial radio audience.191
[| 58 (1938)] We begin our discussion with a description of typical collective aesthetic experiences, namely those of audience members who are gathered in one place. The simultaneity of their lived experiences alone does not suffice for the emergence of collective lived experiences. Spectators or listeners must share their mental states with others—either in the form of remarks, facial expressions, or gestures. It is irrelevant whether this happens deliberately to inform others about one's lived experiences or simply as an expression of one's mental state. The emergence of the audience, therefore, takes place not through the common object of the aesthetic impression and the shared emotional attitude toward this object, but rather through a certain degree of mutual
191 Of course, this issue is only a fragment of the rich and very interesting problems that arise when we begin to analyze the question of the experience of radio programs from the perspective of social psychology.
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influence among the group members. This influence is not equally strong everywhere. In this respect, we can compare, for example, cinema and theater. A recipient of a movie screening is much more isolated from other spectators than a theatergoer is. The cinemagoer connects with others almost exclusively through laughter in response to a situation's or character's humor. The darkness of a cinema hall disconnects the cinemagoer from the crowd, hiding from him the faces and reactions of other spectators. By contrast, in a theater, we sense more through applause, etc., the approval or disapproval of the play by the audience—and thus we are more subjected to the power of suggestion than in the cinema. In a cinema hall, the number of spectators is almost irrelevant to us. In the theater, however, the empty seats are discouraging not only for the actors, but also for the spectators, whose sensitivity is heightened when the hall is filled to capacity. While the theatrical audience quickly becomes an unorganized community, it is a united community for the duration of the play. The presence of people from the beginning to the end of the play, common expectations, experiences, emotions, and reflections in the form of applause or laughter; intermissions, during which we can observe amused, moved, or bored 457 faces of other spectators; the awareness of how actors view all the [| 59 (1938)] spectators as recipients of the play—these are the main factors responsible for uniting the theatrical audience. Usually, these factors are absent with regard to the cinema audience. That the spectator remains under the enormous influence of other spectators in the field where their reactions always reach their consciousness—namely with regard to laughter—is supported by the observations of the American psychologist Mrs. [F. E.] Lange:
The author went four times to see the same play during one summer and measured the duration of every burst of laughter with a timer. It turned out that during all four performances, there were exactly 137 bursts of laughter. Every episode that made people laugh during the first performance was also the source of laughter during the subsequent ones. The differences in the duration of the bursts of laughter for each episode were less than one second. There was one episode, during which all four audiences laughed equally for exactly eight seconds. When a fragment was played again as the encore during all four performances, the audience laughed again at the same episodes, the same words, and gestures as the first time, but the duration of laughter was halved.
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During the entire play, there was only one instance when the burst of laughter lasted longer than ten seconds; and after this episode, the bursts of laughter lasted longer than before. This episode was the critical moment, when—as actors say—the audience was "warmed up." (Zawadzki 1935/36, 100.)
An individual reading of this comedy or its individual reception through a loudspeaker would not result in such "standard" reactions. How the audience collectively behaves is an important factor affecting individual members of the audience who take part in this behavior. Naturally, what is usually at stake is collective behavior, not deliberate [| 60 (1938)] collective actions. Such actions are possible as well, but they are rare (for instance, a deliberate tribute during an actor's jubilee or deliberate collective catcalling of a play). In respect to collective behavior, we should include not only such "ventings" ["wyladowania sig"], such as laughter and applause, but also silence—the act of refraining from making any noise—, which also has suggestive power, as 458 it shows that the audience is moved by the perceived work of art. Yawning deserves a separate mention—it easily triggers involuntary imitation and negatively affects the course of aesthetic feeling. Therefore, the behavior of collective audiences becomes a source of mass suggestion, i.e., contagion by the state of the environment. Let us now consider the modifications, to which aesthetic experiences are subjected due to this contagion.
From the earlier discussions, we should understand the great importance of attention for aesthetic perception. The attention of the individual who is a member of the audience is unquestionably dependent not only on the value of the perceived object and the individual idiosyncrasies of the recipient, but also on the behavior of the audience. Collective aesthetic perception makes the attention of individuals more stable or unstable, depending on the behavior [of others] in the environment. Changes in the domain of sensitivity and aesthetic evaluation are even more significant. The audience is rarely homogeneous, because the presence of individuals of both sexes is not without significance. As is known, women are more emotional than men in the sense that weaker impressions suffice to move women emotionally. In the case of the collective aesthetic experience, there is also the influence of younger people or young audiences on older recipients who are already less sensitive and more indifferent
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to certain aesthetic values, and vice versa—the influence of more sensitive people on aesthetically-blind young people. Also, from time to time, the whole audience waits for the reaction of some experts, critics, or [| 61 (1938)] other authorities, such as the king, who may be present at the performance. Under such various influences, the initial aesthetic emotion may fade or an affect— which is falsely apprehended as an aesthetic affect—may emerge. When in the crowd, a person thinks less independently and critically, as evidenced by the hastiness of the judgment of the large audience. The reason for this, as explained, is also the increased feeling of the audience's power as judges in comparison to individual recipients. Applause or aversion from the audience is suggestive, because they are categorical, decisive symptoms that do not imply any motives and are impulsive expressions of feelings.192 In the crowd, the individual lacks resistance; one is easily caught up in the so-called "mood" of the audience or in the absence of such a mood. It seems that, in the realm of aesthetic evaluation—where there are no objective criteria—the power of suggestion is particularly strong. The uncertainty of those having aesthetic experiences, the fear of embarrassment, humiliation, and lack of proper aesthetic education— 459 all these factors make it harder to resist the aesthetic evaluations performed by strangers. As is known, the lack of knowledge and opinions in a certain field makes people more vulnerable to suggestion in that field.
Let us comment on other circumstances that strengthen the power of suggestion in the collective aesthetic experience. In the crowd, as well as in the aesthetic attitude, the individual will fades away, although for different reasons. In both, there is one-sidedness [jednotorowosc] and one-directedness [jednokierunkowosc] of thinking and feeling. Last but not least, the state we experience in the aesthetic attitude is—like sleep, tiredness, etc.—an abnormal state, in which we lack the sobriety that characterizes the periods of our lives when we are fighting for survival.
[| 62 (1938)] Obviously, not all members of the audience must succumb to the power of suggestion. As is known, we are not always affected by the mental
192 As the research of the American scholar H. Clark shows (see Zawadzki 1935/36, 103), it might not be without importance whether one sits in the front, middle or back rows.
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state of others. Sometimes it is quite the opposite—we may reject it; someone's aversion may be pleasant to us, someone's affection may make us grumpy, etc. Such examples of counter-suggestion depend on the attitude of the particular individual toward the audience. Someone who comes from the province and does not feel confident among the big-city audience will likely not resist the power of suggestion. Rather, it will be an expert who is aware of their desires and who despises the crowd. A peculiar situation arises, when the audience is divided into two hostile groups with no common emotional basis—hence, no collective desire for certain sensations or sensitivity toward them. Let us imagine the audience at a contemporary music concert, consisting of both its supporters and its detractors. In this case, our claims regarding the influence of the audience on the aesthetically experiencing individual will not apply unconditionally. However, under regular conditions, this influence is very strong. In some cases, the influence is limited to the application of certain forms of social facial expressiveness within the field of aesthetic lived experiences. What I have in mind is a particularly common self-delusion (someone feels 460 they are entranced by the aesthetic values of the object of perception, while in fact, they are moved by something else; or the so-called "pretending") where someone does not admit publicly that they did not experience any aesthetic emotion during the perception of the object of experience. However, the audience's influence may affect the course of the lived experiences themselves, not only their external manifestations. It may induce new types of phenomena (e.g., seeing beauty), change the intensity of lived experiences (e.g., weakening delight), or even modify their quality. Something that is not liked by the spectator might begin to be liked by them through the power of suggestion coming from the environment. The fact is that, due to collective perception, aesthetic emotions may become so incredibly strong in people who are less sensitive that they become more "homogeneous" among the members of the audience and more likely to find their external expression [| 63 (1938)] than in the case of individual perception (especially, when a lack of approval is involved). The reactions during collective experiences also become more extreme. On the other hand, there is a decrease in the capacity for more subtle impressions because of a simplification and "coarsening" of affects, an increase in intolerance, etc.
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By and large, from the very moment the recipient finds themselves experiencing in a community of people, their aesthetic impression is not dependent solely on their sensitivity and the value of aesthetic objects but largely also on the environment's reactions (even if a counter-suggestion is at play). One also has to remember that the power of attraction of every collective experience is not only the experienced object, but also the exaltation, which emerges in the environment. Especially in our modern times, people look for collective exaltations in all aspects of life (cf. the passion for watching sports games), and the object of exaltation becomes even less important than the exaltation itself. People are attracted and gripped by collective raptures, delighted by the possibility of abruptly expressing their inner states without the control of critical observers. It leads us to the important question of whether in the case of collective experience the authentic aesthetic impression ceases to exist. Maybe the modern aesthetic-blindness is nothing but a symptom of the fact that people nowadays have neither the desire nor the patience to have isolated aesthetic impressions, and it is questionable whether in the case of the collective impression we really experience emotion induced by aesthetic values 461 or, rather, take delight in the communality of impression itself.
Unquestionably, radio possesses the power to make people feel lonely during aesthetic impressions. But radio does not always use this power. It creates an artificial audience around the microphone. It transmits the frenetic applause of the concert or theatrical audience. Through the medium of the radio announcer, it assures the listener that the program is being listened to across the whole country, and it enables the speaker to communicate their personal affects to the listeners; to put it briefly, the radio [| 64 (1938)] engages the listener—despite unfriendly circumstances—in a vast radio audience.
The attitude of this study is more descriptive than normative. For this reason, I do not intend to decide whether it should or should not be like this. Rather, I intend to explicitly formulate the problem, which should be clearly recognized by those in charge of radio stations. If they want to contribute to the aesthetic education of the audience, they should use the aforementioned methods of inducing emotions in listeners carefully. If they want to engage the listener in the program, they should use the methods often and perfect them. In fact, in some theaters (e.g., in Bayreuth), there are attempts to resist
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the negative influence of the audience by a conventional restraining of its expressions, by forbidding applause, etc.
Someone might object that our discussion is pointless, because there is no spatial contact between the members of the radio audience. However, such contact is not necessary here, since there are means to communicate the reaction of the audience to the individual, separated listeners. A study on, for example, an audience reading a journal has already shown that spatial contact is not necessary for the constitution of such a community of recipients, which has the power to affect.
193
[| 65 (1938)] Practical conclusions
The aims of this study are research-focused [badawczym] rather than practical. Nevertheless, if its claims are sound, several practical conclusions can be drawn. The most significant of these are outlined below:
1.	For psychological and aesthetic reasons, the term "theater of imagination" 462 should be replaced with another expression, e.g., "radio theater."
2.	The creator of the radio play can provide opportunities for the listener's visual imagination to become active during the experience of a piece; they can encourage the listener [to go] in this direction, but should not assume that such imaginative activity will in fact occur. This is neither possible for everyone nor—for aesthetic reasons—strictly necessary.
3.	The radio play can reveal to the listener the aesthetic value of the world as apprehended through the acoustic dimension of the latter. In order to achieve this, the author must hear the plot of the drama during the creative process rather than see it. The performers [odtworcy] should likewise aim not to impose the vision of the drama's imaginative world on the listener, but rather to induce the "acusion" of that world.
4.	The range of lived experiences that can be evoked by the radio play is vast. These possibilities are fully realized only within imaginative and homocentric radio plays (musical radio plays are not considered here). This does not contradict the fact that the montage, imaginative and even non-
193 [Translated from Polish by Filip Borek.]
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imaginative radio plays possess their own unique aesthetic qualities, which are fully revealed, precisely because they are not homocentric (or are not even imaginative in nature). From the aesthetic point of [| 66 (1938)] view, they are equally legitimate.
5.	If the creators of the radio play do not appeal to the listener's visual imagination, they can only assume that, in the listener's perception, the space of the drama has its own center and infinite depth in all directions. However, they cannot assume that this space possesses a defined left or right side. The listener, in turn, can perceive the distance and direction, from which the voice originates, and thus become aware that different voices are coming from different locations. The spatial dimension of the radio play should be established at the beginning of the listening experience through characteristic noises and sounds, along with a few subtle clues in the dialogue. In the case of the radio play, what is essential is not a precise depiction of the environment through detailed description, but rather the apprehension of its "atmosphere."
6.	Too frequent changes of setting in a short radio play are not advisable, as establishing a new spatial segment requires additional time, even if only brief. 463 It takes less time, however, to re-establish a setting that the plot returns to.
7.	In the imaginative world of the radio play, the passage of time may proceed at a faster rate than in the listener's surrounding reality. In the homocentric drama, however, where human speech plays a central role, such temporal disproportion is impossible.
8.	The requirement of unity of time is not necessary. Shifting to a new, later period in the storyline presents no difficulty for the listener and does not demand any special mental effort. The limitations in this respect stem not from the listener's perceptual abilities, but from the need to maintain narrative dynamism. A plot that stretches over too long a timespan may begin to take on a more epic, rather than dramatic, character. [| 67 (1938)]
9.	Radio announcers' announcements and commentary during the program should be avoided for both psychological and aesthetic reasons. While such announcements made before the start of the radio play do not carry the same drawbacks, they too should be avoided, as they are, after all, unnecessary.
10.	The purely acoustic nature of the radio play gives it a distinctly "presentistic" ["prezentystyczny"] character. The "recollective-perceptual"
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attitude, commonly used in film or literature, is psychologically less digestible for the radio listener.
11.	The simultaneity of broadcasting and reception, which is essential in radio reportage, is less important in the case of the radio play. In the latter, what matters most is the establishment of a social connection between the listener and the actor. What can hinder this connection is the awareness that a device [e.g., a steel recorder] mediates between them.
12.	Due to the listener's perceptual limitations, the requirement for a limited number of characters in radio play is valid—but under certain conditions. The difficulty lies not so much in recognizing who is speaking at a given moment, but rather in recognizing a familiar character in the current speaker's voice.
13.	Episodic characters—those who remain in the background and serve mainly to highlight the traits of the main characters—do not necessarily need to be recognized individually. The listener's perceptual capacity in relation to such secondary figures is relatively broad.
14.	A closer analysis of the means available to the creators and performers 464 of the homocentric radio play reveals that they are limited, when it comes to
presenting the characters' external world and behavior, but exceptionally rich in expressing their inner psychological lives. The "introverted" nature of the radio play facilitates its impact on the listener. [| 68 (1938)]
15.	Since only acoustic sensations are involved, the listener becomes more sensitive not only to the subtlest nuances of timbre, but also emotionally—because the acoustic expression of lived experience has a stronger impact than visual data. This, in turn, makes it easier for the creators and performers of the radio play to lead the listener to empathize [emocjonalnego wspólzycia] with its characters.
16.	The simultaneity of the spoken word and music should be avoided due to the perceptual difficulties it creates. In a non-musical drama, the role of music should be limited to introducing the listener to the appropriate mood, to "connect him with the atmosphere" of the setting. It may be used sparingly to illustrate certain mental states of the characters. However, it should be employed only briefly, as prolonged exposure to music may prompt the listener to reconstruct the setting anew.
17.	Listening without seeing (particularly when it comes to music) is challenging. The one-directional nature of attention during the perception of
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radio play, and the difficulty of switching easily between what is heard and what is imagined or perceived, quickly leads to listener fatigue. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to: a) limit the duration of the radio play, b) ensure the plot is as engaging as possible, attracting the listener's attention and reducing mental effort, c) incorporate short intermissions, such as musical pauses or moments that highlight elements of the "acoustic kitchen."
18.	The analysis of how listeners recall earlier parts of the radio play reveals that creators should not assume a clear, distinct recollection of past scenes— particularly not in the form of acoustic reproductions. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is the following: dividing the plot into separate "acts," including long intermissions, and lacking plot cohesion are not advisable. [| 69 (1938)]
19.	In the perception of the radio play, both a contemplative and an expectant attitude in the listener are possible. The latter is more common and, due to the challenges of listening, more advisable. The contemplative attitude, which is more desirable from the aesthetic point of view, can be achieved, for example,
by encouraging the listener to re-listen to the drama, when it is broadcast again. 465
20.	For the sake of the overall image [wyobrazenie] induced in the listener by the radio play, perception alone is not enough; the pre- and post-perceptive phases are also essential. The broadcasting of the drama must aim to properly influence the listener's experience during these phases, for example, by awakening the right expectations before the broadcast, incorporating a silent pause, or using appropriate music after the drama ends.
21.	The reception of the drama—even if it has great aesthetic value—does not suffice for its aesthetic perception by the listener. Aesthetic color-blindness is also present in this domain. Gaining a clear understanding of the conditions for the aesthetic perception of the radio play and providing proper educational influence on listeners may help eliminate the consumption of artistic dramas in favor of a deeper aesthetic impression. The listener of the radio play should be educated in a similar way to how one educates the recipients of literary works of art, musical pieces, theatrical plays, movies, visual arts, and so on.
22.	If radio wants to contribute to the aesthetic upbringing of its listeners, especially if it aims to teach solitude during aesthetic experiences, it should use attempts to create an artificial audience around the microphone, as well as
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similar measures, in moderation. However, if radio seeks to attract the listener with its program, regardless of whether it induces an aesthetic or any other experience, such measures should be used frequently and in perfected manner. [| 70 (1938)]
23. The listener's perceptual abilities improve over time. Such changes result from specific pedagogical measures or frequent listening. Over time, they can enable the extension of the duration of radio plays, the inclusion of more main characters, and so on.
Bibliography | Bibliografija
Blaustein, Leopold. 1930. Przedstawienia imaginatywne. Studyum zpogranicza
psychologii i estetyki. Lwow: Wydawnictwo Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie. [Partly reprinted in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 40-68. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 1933. Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego. Poznan: Poznanskie
Towarzystwo Psychologiczne. [Reprint in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 92-127. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] 466 ---. 1935. "O zadaniach psychologii humanistycznej." Przeglqd Filozoficzny 38 (1-2): 33-57.
---. 1935/36. "O imaginatywnym swiecie sztuki." Miesiçcznik Literatury i Sztuki 2 (89): 243-249 [Reprint in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 128-135. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 1936. "Czy naprawdç 'teatr wyobrazni'?" Pion: Tygodnik Literacko-Spoieczny 4 (42/159): 5. [Reprint in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 197-200. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 1937a. "Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise." In Deuxième Congrès International d'esthétique et de science de l'art, Paris, 1937, ed. by Paul Valéry, Paul Claudel, and Victor Basch, 245-249. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. ---. 1937b. "Rola percepcji w doznaniu estetycznym." Przeglqd Filozoficzny 40 (4): 399-408. [Reprint in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2005. Wybor pism estetycznych, ed. by Zofia Rosinska, 136-144. Krakow: TAiWPN Universitas.] ---. 2011. "The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience." Trans. by Monika
Bokiniec. Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2): 235-243. Hulewicz, Witold. 1935. Teatr wyobrazni. Uwagi o siuchowisku i literackim
scenarjuszu radjowym. Warsaw: Biuro Studiow Polskiego Radia. Ingarden, Roman. 1937. Opoznawaniu dzieia literackiego Lvov: Wydawnictwo
Zakladu Narodowego im. Ossolinskich. ---. 1973. The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. Trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
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Kolb, Richard. 1932. Das Horoskop des Hörspiels. Berlin: Max Hesses Verlag. Lissa, Zofia. 1937. Muzyka i film. Studium z pogranicza ontologii, estetyki i psychologii
muzyki filmowej. Lvov: Ksiçgarnia Lwowska. Markinöwna, Estera. 1932. "Wyobraznia a fantazja." Polskie Archiwum Psychologii 5 (4): 431-434.
Paqué, Kurt. 1936. Hörspiel und Schauspiel. Eine Dramaturgie. Breslau: Ostdeutsche Verlagsanstalt.
Zawadzki, Bohdan. 1935/36. "Ze wspölczesnej psychologii amerykanskiej." Polskie Archiwum Psychologii 8 (2): 97-112.
467
In Conversation
V RAZGOYORU
Review essay Recenzijska razprava
UDC: 171
An Odyssey into the Ethical Self
In Conversation with Laura Colombino's Kazuo Ishiguro and Ethics
Maigorzata Holda
University of Lodz, Institute of English Studies, Department of British Literature and Culture, Pomorska 171/173, 90-236 Lodz, Poland
malgorzata.holda@uni.lodz.pl | ^
The thing is to stalk your calling in a certain skilled and supple way, to locate the most tender and live spot and plug into the pulse. (Dillard 1994, 66.)
Kazuo Ishiguro and Ethics (Routledge, 2025) is a highly nuanced, original, and riveting exploration of the philosophical dilemmas pertinent to Ishiguro's fictional imaginings. Illuminating the emotional basis of human moral quandaries, the book focuses on a thorough examination of the human condition (conditio humana), our attitudes toward responsibility, pride, loyalty, respect, and the pervasive vitality of love and friendship we desire, but oftentimes are unable to fully appreciate and understand. Weaving scrupulously conducted close readings of Ishiguro's novels and philosophical investigation, Colombino's work is a one-of-a-kind, extensive survey of the ethical underpinnings of Ishiguro's fictional world(s). The study captures his
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unique ways of expressing what it means to be a human being in the profound sense of transcending oneself, growing, and becoming, and, thus, also what it means to be attentive to the Other. Colombino rightly argues that ethics is not a subsidiary topic for Ishiguro. On the contrary, it constitutes the very axis, around which his fictional worlds revolve.
Although in the recent past, Ishiguro's fiction has already run a wide gamut of interpretations using an ethical lens—the most frequent ones being cosmopolitical (cf., e.g., Stanton 2006) and posthumanism ethics (cf., e.g., Mattar 2022), as well as the eco-ethical perspective (cf., e.g., Gresil and Rivas 2024)—, Colombino's book is a real tour de force of an impassioned dialogue with Ishiguro, who can be named as an ethics-oriented novelist, since his works potently reveal how people struggle to find an answer to a daunting question of what the right course of action is in the often complex and problematic circumstances. The adorable diversity of the philosophical standpoints, from which the book views Ishiguro's novels—Martin Heidegger's and Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism, Hannah Arendt's gloss on responsibility, Georg W. F.
472 Hegel's phenomenology, Walter Benjamin's aesthetics, Plato's ethics and moral psychology, Adam Smith's philosophy of morality, or Martha Nussbaum's recent musings on the presence of philosophy in literature, to name the most thoroughly investigated—, attests to Colombino's genuine interest in interrogating philosophical ideas contained in his fictions. While she offers detailed analyses of topics of empathy and fiction, or truth and fiction, her approach goes far beyond cognitivism and literature, exhaustively articulated, for instance, in the recent works by Gregory Currie (2020) or Michael Mack (2012). Her methodology is decidedly far more reaching and more inclusive. Although Colombino does not name her investigation a hermeneutic one, the reader might venture to view her thorough, insightful, and multifaceted study as a stimulating instance of hermeneutical thinking in its wide-ranging scope and comprehensiveness.
The book contains five chapters, each devoted to one of Ishiguro's major works. The "Introduction" already reveals Colombino's penetrating insights into the subtle fabric of ethics as enacted in the fictional day-to-day existence in Ishiguro's creations. The neatly constructed chapters are rounded up by a coda, in which one more time Colombino emphasizes the intricacies and
Maegorzata HotDA
conflicting nature of moral choices. As she asserts, throughout the course of events in Ishiguro's fictional imaginations, his protagonists are repeatedly preoccupied with moral claims that are put on them, and their lives are destined to "the realisation of a higher moral principle—be it professional excellence, friendship, caring, justice or peace" (Colombino 2025, 1). The issue of self-transcendence, as Colombino explains, appears to be the leading ethical demand that can be discerned in the entirety of Ishiguro's fictional realizations.
Dealing with the narrative of The Remains of the Day in chapter one entitled "What Is a Good Life? The Remains of the Day as an Aporetic Dialogue on Dignity," Colombino proposes an intensely resounding axiological viewpoint. She reveals how portraying his protagonist as going through the meanders of subjective preferences and beliefs, Ishiguro strives to pinpoint the importance of a coherent system of values, which would enable one to live an ethically meaningful life and the following of which more than often is thwarted by one's misguided sense of propriety, dignity, or dutifulness. Depicting the sorrowful reality of the novel's protagonist—Stevens loses his inner, true self while acting out the role of a perfect butler—, Ishiguro awakens us to better apprehend the 473 pressures and dire consequences of the misconceptions surrounding life spent in service and duty. Colombino guides us through Ishiguro's knotty fictional reality, in which the irrevocability of time, regret, loss, as well as the power of the unspoken, and the moral choices dictated by the erroneous sense of decorum and respectfulness sensitize us to more deeply understand the gravity of the human predicament. She contends:
In the emotional and moral tug of war between loyalty and self-definition, belonging and pursuit, it is the latter drives that seem ultimately to prevail. However unwillingly undertaken, Socratic questioning leads Stevens to an anagnorisis, whose effect is so painful as to become "destructive" (Ishiguro in Hunnewell n.p.): "[m]y heart was breaking" (RD 252), he admits grief-stricken. (Colombino 2025, 56.)
As Colombino argues, in Ishiguro's fiction, the axiological perspective tightly interlocks with the ontological one. She writes:
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On the one hand, they [Ishiguro's novels] are tied to the existential condition of being in the world, which acquires a distinctively Heideggerian quality of thrownness from The Unconsoled onwards. On the other hand, they aspire to the good, in the Platonic sense that includes a form of virtue and excellence, or the possible, which, for Heidegger, betokens one's "ability-to-be" (Seinkonnen) more than one is [...]. (Ibid., 5.)
Colombino chooses this two-fold angle of vision to be the guiding thread for her survey of Ishiguro's two novels, The Unconsoled and When We Were Orphans, in chapter two. She perfectly renders Ishiguro's preoccupation in those two texts to embody the truth about a human being as a homo viator seeking the meaning of life. Ishiguro's characters feature as physically and mentally journeying through their convoluted realities. In their existential and emotional choices, anxiety and responsibility interweave, and the missed opportunities of living a better life call for reconcilaition with oneself and the outer reality. Colombino enhances our understanding of Ishiguro's thought-474 provoking juxtaposition of idealism and life's banality and harshness, often tinted with a nostalgic desire to return to the past, which is viewed as blissful and fulfilling.
As she ascertains, the poignancy of the reality Ishiguro places his characters in compels them to embark on a journey to search for the moral order and integrity associated with the good old days. She argues:
Once they [Ishiguro's characters] are grown into adults aware of the harsher world, these characters feel the impossible desire to restore the harmony of their earlier days; however unrealisable their objective may be, their idealistic quest sustains their moral being. Theirs is more than just a praiseworthy, touching, sometimes even heroic ambition; it is a moral imperative to "build [a] good world" (WWWO 308). (Ibid., 1.)
Nostalgia serves as an important tool to embrace the feelings that lie dormant, but the expression of which can bring at least a temporary relief to the wounded human being. The suffering human being (I'homme souffrant)1
1 For the notion of l'homme souffrant, cf. e.g.: Ricoeur 1986; Wiercinski 2013; Holda 2020.
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in those two immensely nostalgic novels is the centre of Ishiguro's attention. Ishiguro's embodiments of woundedness and childhood trauma inspire Colombino to investigate the intricate interweavings between responsibility, justice, and vulnerability. She writes:
The culture of trauma and the ethics of woundedness, that is, the Christ-like embracing of suffering as a form of self-definition, inspire the creation of the two protagonists, Ryder and Christopher. [...] they [Ryder and Christopher] are caught in the destructive and self-destructive dilemma of opposing allegiances—their responsibility towards their family, on the one hand, and the community, on the other. (Ibid., 89.)
The interlocking character of vulnerability, capability, and accountability effectively connects this chapter of her book with the following one.
Chapter three, examining Never Let Me Go, is an impressive admixture of insights based on Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity and his notion of thrownness (Geworfenheit), the ancient Greek conceptualization of the soul, the postmodern sense of existential void, and posthumanism theories. This 475 part is an enthralling interrogation of the fundamental questions of mortality, dignity, and human identity, which Ishiguro so intriguingly exploits via the narrative revolving around technological advancement (cloning). Colombino perceptively discerns Ishiguro's engaging, if paradoxical blurring of allure and fear, when he portrays an individual human life determined by the dictates of society. She argues that Never Let me Go reveals the reality of not-being-at-home in the world. Using the Heideggerian lens to interpret the novel appears to be a weighty choice. Analyzing the protagonists' sense of homelessness— their profoundly felt inadequacy and loss—against the backdrop of Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) yields interesting results that enlighten our understanding of the preciousness and fragility of human existence. Colombino signals the significance of the Heideggerian reading of this novel very early in her study:
In Never Let Me Go, it is precisely the acute consciousness of this temporal limit that gives meaning to the last phase of the clones' life, during which they gain a greater authenticity in their interpersonal relationships through friendship, love and caring. (Ibid., 5-6.)
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Being-in-the-world—alongside Heidegger's other seminal terms, such as being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode), being-there (Dasein), being-at-home (Heimlichkeit), attunement (Befindlichkeit), and care (Sorge)—constitutes the central theoretical stance Colombino chooses to employ in her outstanding interrogation of Ishiguro's thematization of human vulnerability and the destruction of individual freedom.
Although she references highly relevant literature in the context of her Heideggerian reading of the novel, it is a bit surprising that she does not refer to Brian Willems's Facticity, Poverty and Clone. On Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go (2010), an important work in the field, with which she might have found many points of convergence. At the same time, however, it is worth noting that Colombino's employment of Heidegger's philosophy exceeds the ramifications of one chapter in her book, and, thus, her insights and conclusions take on a special added value of cross-sectional examination of the novels she looks at. She ascertains:
476	[•••] central to my argument is the fact that, in Being and Time,
Heidegger describes our existence as one of "thrownness," in the sense
that we are thrown into the world without having asked to be [• ].
Ishiguro's narratives offer memorable images of this arbitrariness which lies at the core of our existential condition: from Kathy's feeling of not being at home in the world after leaving Hailsham, through the series of unpredictable, alienating environments into which Ryder is catapulted, to Klara's final forlornness in the Yard, where she is discarded and left to "her slow fade" [•..]. (Ibid., 4.)
It is worth noting that, through extensive use of Heideggerian philosophy, Colombino efficaciously navigates an explication of Ishiguro's profound epitomizing of the heterogeneous reality of our being-in-the-world.
Colombino's interrogation of the question of vulnerability, addressed in light of Heidegger's philosophy of facticity, is enriched with an analysis of an impressive assortment of the perspectives of other thinkers, such as Emmanuel Levinas, Giorgio Agamben, and Judith Butler. The insights from those theories fit very well the book's delineation of the varied forms of vulnerability explored by Ishiguro and pinpointed by Colombino: existential, biopolitical, and ethical.
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Remarkably, the seminal issues of human finitude, fragility, and susceptibility in Never Let Me Go, discussed from already diverse philosophical positions, are rounded up by the use of Plato's philosophy no less important for a far-reaching understanding of the novel. The essence-existence distinction, the interlacing of ethics and biopolitics and, above all, the subject of philia find an important place in Colombino's laying out of how Ishiguro's satiates his novel with philosophical ideas. The resonances with Plato's The Republic and Lysis constitute a vital part of Colombino's erudite reconnaissance.
As she claims, in Never Let Me Go, Ishiguro creates a mythopoesis inspired by Plato. Interestingly, the mythopoetic elements in his fictional writings extend beyond the confines of this narrative. The novel discussed in the subsequent chapter potently fits into the paradigm of mythopoesis lavishly used by Ishiguro in his oeuvre. Chapter four entitled "Ethics, Myth and the Narrative Voice in The Buried Giant" is a superb scrutiny of Ishiguro's employment of myth to display how ethical choices can be validated. This part of the book takes on the quality of an intimate journey that helps us find the answer to the ethical question Ishiguro poses through the narrative of The Buried Giant— 477 the moral conundrum of whether recollection or oblivion is more desirable when we attempt to overcome trauma. Colombino notices that the novel's protagonists epitomize the gains and losses of remembering and forgetting, and highlights Ishiguro's flair in developing an enticing philosophical stance of the constructive role of forgetting via the use of myths and tales.
The choice of the next novel examined in the book seems to be dictated precisely by Ishiguro's growing interest in conveying his ideas through the titilating power of mythical narratives. Chapter five, "The Soul's Desire for the Good: Heliotropic Mythology and Anamorphic Mirrors in Klara and the Sun is a fine example of Colombino's apt handling of Ishiguro's recurring use of mythology; this time, it is heliotropic mythology, cogently exploited with the backdrop of utopian ideas. Posing the query whether important human values, such as beauty, excellence, and virtue, can last in a society where reproduction and perfection are the highest and crowning achievements, Ishiguro's narrative yields to the exquisite power of revisiting a somewhat similar topic in Never Let Me Go. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, understanding is never a mere repetition, but is always productive (Verstehen ist kein nur reproduktives, sondern
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stets auch ein produktives Verhalten; Gadamer 1986, 301). The productivity of reiteration results for Ishiguro in creating an outstandingly engaging novel on a timely issue of Artificial Intelligence and the most challenging and disturbing question of what would become of our humanity, of our unique unrepeatability and the innermost, core value, if it were possible for AI to break the doom of our finite being-in-the-world and make us immortal? The eponymous character's deep longing for the sun as life-nurturing and life-sustaining serves as a metaphor for people's pursuit of the good, which manifests itself in the beauty and benevolence of human relationships, in friendship and love, and the sense of an unfailing hope that transcends human solitude. Crucially, Colombino vividly shows how Klara and the Sun evokes the sharp opposition between the tempting artificial continuance of human existence and the distinctive human character.
Colombino skillfully investigates Ishiguro's dramatization of the contrast between the essence of what it means to be a human being and the mere technological replication of our humanity as the beguiling, yet foreboding result of innovation. Her analysis of this prescient, but pervasively alarming 478 issue is deeply rooted in the recognition of Ishiguro's imagery derived from the ancient myth of the goddess Persephone, Dante Alighieri's Divine Comedy, and even American realist paintings. Colombino's analytical approach to Ishiguro's rendition of the novel's central theme—the fight between light and darkness— is never cursory. It is a deep, superabundant dive into the exceedingly nuanced reality Ishiguro creates, in order to embody the complexities of our human condition and the ongoing fight between good and evil. This chapter effectively demonstrates Ishiguro's ingenious creation of Klara as having dual properties, that of transparent glass and of a distorting mirror. The glass motif reconnects Klara and the Sun to Never Let Me Go, serving to emphasize a whole range of existential, ethical, and emotional intricacies. Colombino writes:
If the glass window, in Never Let Me Go as in Klara and the Sun, lures us with the promise of wholeness and bliss, the mirror returns to us the image of our humanity, with its loneliness but also its need to bridge the chasm between individual solitudes. (Ibid., 178.)
Throughout her book, Colombino emphasizes Ishiguro's inimitable way of creating circumstances that are a real challenge to the characters' values
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and systems of beliefs. She is preoccupied with the manifold ways, in which Ishiguro addresses the complexities of human agency and moral responsibility, often presenting the characters' failures and the eroding consequences of their wrong ethical choices. Moral responsibility is understood in his narrative worlds as an existential response, which is engrained in our human search for meaning. In their quest for meaning, his characters often use highly elliptical, evasive language, which blurs and distorts the truth they appear to believe in. Colombino indicates that Ishiguro's narratives reflect his belief in "our universal moral urge to strive to become more than we are, to achieve something greater that may lend dignity to our existence and, more generally, our desire for the good" (ibid., 9).
Colombino's urbane style of writing and convincing argumentation challenge our deep-seated convictions and invite us to reflect anew on our human predicament. Her book is an exceedingly welcome position, which profusely and elaborately clarifies how moral choices impact both individuals and communities. This is a guiding idea of her entire book, which is strongly indicated in the "Introduction":	479
The theme of choice is extensively articulated in Ishiguro, ranging from Stevens's abdication of responsibility to the excessive sense of duty felt by both Ryder and Christopher (the protagonists of When We Were Orphans), on whose shoulders the task of saving an entire community or even the whole of humanity seems to rest [...]. (Ibid., 6.)
One of the major strengths of Colombino's book is its vivid and stimulating account of Ishiguro's powerful and subtle defense of the human subject's uniqueness against the allurements of technological advancement. Filled with invaluable insights on the relevance of ethical values in today's world and the irreducibility of the human being, the book opens new avenues in the exploration of Ishiguro's fictional imaginings. The universal questions related to ethics, asked by Ishiguro and investigated by Colombino, draw our attention to the unflagging interest of us human beings in resolving the dilemma of what it means to live a good life.
At this point it is worth noticing that Colombino does not refer to Paul Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics, which might have served as an
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energizing philosophical perspective, from which Ishiguro's embodiments of ethical dilemmas could be examined. It is a bit of a pity, since Ricoeur's writings on ethics (see, e.g., 1986, 1995) might have shed an additional important light on our understanding of Ishiguro's works. Ricoeur's often-cited words—the call to "live a good life with and for others in just institutions" (1992, 172)— are an immediate point of connection with Ishiguro's insistence on searching for an answer to the question of a good life. On the other hand, though, it should also be emphasized that Colombino eschews any direct revisitations of the extant readings of the ethical backdrop of Ishiguro's oeuvre, which is a conscious and thoughtful move. In her considerate, but not overloading manner she references Yugin Teo's Kazuo Ishiguro and Memory (which employs Ricoeur's theory of memory), one can recognize the rationale behind her attempt to elude stepping into an area that has already been thoroughly explored. In addition, it is worth accentuating that the seeming shortcoming of not devoting more space to a Ricoeurian reading of Ishiguro has been remedied with the genuinely broad range of other philosophical voices Colombino uses 480 to highlight that the fundamental nature of the ethical quandary lies at the very heart of human inveterate striving to self-understand (Selbstverständnis) and to understand the reality around. This unwavering desire, which testifies to our existence as existentia hermeneutica and existentia interpretativa, prompts us to search for a deepened and context-informed understanding of our being-in-the-world.
Employing a whole array of philosophical perspectives, in order to display Ishiguro's profound interest in ethics as the foundation of our human existence, Colombino organizes her material in a punctiliously methodological and effective manner. Her book is a timely call on us to review the values we live by. It comes as a rare gift amidst the present-day chaos, geopolitical anxiety, and the weakening of the solid ethical ground, on which we can stand. This disciplined and illuminating study aptly shows that the author Colombino is fascinated with takes us on an engrossing journey to face the complexities of our existence as moral human beings. She convinces us that the great ethical issues are never obsolete and do not dissolve under the pressures of the skyrocketing pace of scientific development, or political and social changes on the macro-and microscale. Choosing the perspective of ethics, she powerfully attests to
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the possibilities of revisiting great philosophical systems and standpoints that offer edgy and well-timed lessons, with which we should never get weary. The selection of texts for inspection clearly demonstrates Colombinos splendid capacity for comparative study, with the result that it is never obtuse or flattened.
In sum, this stylish interdisciplinary book is an irreplaceable contribution to contemporary ethics, trauma studies, intercultural studies, philosophy of literature, and philosophy in literature. It is a captivating read that provokes us to stretch our imagination and reflect anew on the issues of dignity, responsibility, pride, loyalty, and the depth and importance of human relationships. This magnificent work of literary criticism does not make us lose for a moment the delight of immersing ourselves in the beauty of discourse that is both demanding and highly rewarding.
Bibliography | Bibliografija
Colombino, L. 2025. Kazuo Ishiguro and Ethics. New York—London: Routledge. Currie, G. 2020. Imagining and Knowing. The Shape of Fiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dillard, A. 1994. "Living like Weasels." In Reading the Environment, ed. by Melissa
Walker, 63-66. New York: W. W. Norton. Gadamer, H.-G. 1986. Gesammelte Werke. Vol. 1. Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und
Methode. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck. Gresil, J. S., and V. A. Rivas. 2024. "Posthumanism in ecofeminist literature:
Transgressions in Kazuo Ishiguro's Klara and the Sun" New Techno-Humanities 4 (1): 33-40.
Holda, M. 2020. "L'homme agissant and Self-understanding: Pamela Sue Anderson
on Capability and Vulnerability." Text Matters 10: 7-24. Mack, M. 2012. How Literature Changes the Way We Think. London—New York: Continuum.
Mattar, N. 2021. "Language and Betrayal: Posthuman Ethics in Kazuo Ishiguro's
Never Let Me Go." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 23 (4). Ricoeur, P. 1986. Fallible Man. Revised trans. by C. A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press.
---. 1992. Oneself as Another. Trans. by K. Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
---. 1995. "Love and justice." Philosophy and Social Criticism 21 (5-6): 23-39.
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Stanton, K. 2006. Cosmopolitan Fictions. Ethics, Politics, and Global Change in the Works of Kazuo Ishiguro, Michael Ondaatje, Jamaica Kincaid, and J. M. Coetzee. New York—London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203959312. Teo, Y. 2014. Kazuo Ishiguro and Memory. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wiercinski, A. 2013. "Hermeneutic Notion of a Human Being as an Acting and
Suffering Person." Ethics in Progress 4 (2): 18-33. Willems, B. 2010. Facticity, Poverty and Clone. On Kazuo Ishiguros Never Let Me Go. New York: Atropos Press.
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Besedila je potrebno oblikovati takole: pisava Times New Roman; velikost 12 pik; razmik med vrsticami 1,5 pik (opombe - velikosti 10 pik - z enojnim razmikom); 0 pik razmika pred in za odstavkom; robovi 2,5 cm; leva poravnava celotnega teksta. Med odstavkoma naj ne bo prazne vrstice, temveč naj bo naslednji odstavek naznačen z zamikom vrstice v desno (za 1,25 cm). Avtorji 488 naj pri pisanju ne uporabljajo deljenja besed in naj se izogibajo posebnemu ali nenavadnemu oblikovanju (npr. rabi različnih pisav, okvirjanja, številčenja ipd.). Opombe in tabele je potrebno v besedilo vnesti s pomočjo ustreznih urejevalnih orodij programa MS Word. Uporabljane naj bodo izključno sprotne opombe, ki naj bodo označene z zapovrstno oštevilčenim nadpisanim indeksom in levostično postavljene takoj za ločilom ali besedo.
Naslov, podnaslov in poglavja rokopisa je potrebno pisati krepko, medtem ko se za poudarke in vstavke tujih izrazov ali fraz ter za naslove navedenih knjig in revij uporabljajo ležeče črke. Z dvojnimi narekovaji - v tipografski obliki, značilni za izvirni jezik besedila - se označuje naslove člankov, objavljenih znotraj revij ali zbornikov, in dobesedne navedke. Enojni narekovaj naznanja gradivo, znotraj navedka označeno z dvojnimi narekovaji. Daljši navedek (40 ali več besed) je potrebno izločiti v samostojen odstavek z dodatnim desnim zamikom (za 1,25 cm) in s prazno vrstico nad in pod njim (brez narekovajev, velikost pisave 10 pik). Izpuste iz navedkov, njihove prilagoditve ali vrivke vanje označujejo oglati oklepaji.
Obojestransko stični pomišljaj se praviloma uporablja za nakazovanje številskega obsega (npr. 99-115) ali časovnega obdobja (npr. 1920-1970),
Navodila
medtem ko obojestransko nestični pomišljaj naznanja prekinitev miselnega toka ali vrinjeni stavek (npr.: »[...] tako - denimo - Aristotel pravi [...]«). Podaljšani obojestransko stični pomišljaj (—) je značilen (predvsem) za angleški jezik. Stični vezaj (-) se lahko, v skladu z ustaljeno rabo, zapisuje med sestavnimi deli zloženk, pri kraticah ipd.
Avtor prispevka naj pri sklicevanju na vire in literaturo upošteva znotrajbesedilni način navajanja v skladu s pravili Čikaškega stilističnega priročnika (The Chicago Manual of Style). Kazalka v okroglem oklepaju neposredno za navedkom prinaša priimek avtorja in letnico objave, ki jima sledi z vejico razločeno napotilo na stran znotraj citiranega dela, npr.: (Toulmin 1992, 31); (Held 1989, 23); (Waldenfels 2015, 13). Bibliografski seznam na koncu besedila naj vsebuje vse navedene enote, urejene po abecednem vrstnem redu priimkov avtorjev, kakor je razvidno iz spodnjega primera:
Held, Klaus. 1989. »Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit.« V Phänomenologie im Widerstreit, uredil Otto Pöggeler, 13-39. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Toulmin, Stephen. 1992. Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: The 489
University of Chicago Press. Waldenfels, Bernhard. 2015. »Homo respondens.« Phainomena 24 (92-93): 5-17.
Samo izjemoma je mogoče, po vnaprejšnjem dogovoru z glavnim ali gostujočim urednikom revije, uporabiti drugačne načine navajanja.
Pričakuje se, da bodo avtorji predložili dosledno in skrbno pripravljen rokopis brez tiskarskih, slovničnih in stvarnih napak. Avtor nosi odgovornost za vsebino besedila, predanega v obravnavo za objavo pri reviji Phainomena.
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Objavljene številke | Previous Issues
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4 Franz Brentano in začetki fenomenologije 5-6 Intencionalnost in jezik
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11-12 Platon
13-14 Heidegger
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82-83 Selected Essays in Contemporary Italian Philosophy 84-85 Geneologies 86-87 Prizma 88-89 Virtualities 90-91 Notice 92-93 Open Forms 94-95 Respondenca 492 96-97 Naznake
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130-131 Human Existence and Coexistence in the Epoch of Nihilism 132-133 Transitions | Prehajanja
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Human Existence and Coexistence in the Epoch of Nihilism
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