This study explores the reasons behind the poor operational performance of the Russian armed forces during the initial phase of the Ukraine war (2022–2023). The key finding contends that the poor performance of the regular armed forces of Russia in the Ukraine war was due to the Russian military reforms of 2008–2020. These reforms dismantled the old Soviet models of combined and joint operations and, in its place, created a model of ground warfare entirely based on light and mobile infantry battalions. The reformed forces gained a major advantage in mobility and maneuverability, but once Ukraine's defenders neutralized that advantage, the Russian units turned out to be incapable of generating successful combined arms operations. The Russian high command did find a fix to the failed operational design, and by 2023, the Russian ground forces reverted to the old Soviet operational art

Rights

URN

URN:NBN:SI:DOC-KTWWLIDN

COBISSID

247099907

DOI

10.2478/cmc-2025-0004

Added

28.12.2025

Metadata

Citation

APA:

Tchantouridze´, Lasha (2025). The return of deep battle. Sodobni vojaški izzivi, volume 27, issue 1, str. 37-55, 124. URN:NBN:SI:DOC-KTWWLIDN from http://www.dlib.si

MLA:

Tchantouridze´, Lasha. "The return of deep battle." Sodobni vojaški izzivi volume 27. issue 1 (2025) str. 37-55, 124.
<http://www.dlib.si/?URN=URN:NBN:SI:DOC-KTWWLIDN>

The return of deep battle : reforms and counter-reforms in the russian militaryVrnitev globoke bitke : reforme in protireforme v ruskih oboroženih silah

The return of deep battle : reforms and counter-reforms in the russian military
Vrnitev globoke bitke : reforme in protireforme v ruskih oboroženih silah