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BETWEEN CULTURE AND POLITICS: DILEMMAS OF THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUALS

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Abstract: *The article deals with the role of intellectuals on former communist societies from Central and Eastern Europe, particularly their dividedness between spheres of culture and politics. The intellectuals were the ones who plays crucial role in the process of dismantling of communist regimes. However, the circumstances have changed substantially since then what poses question of what role should be assumed by them. Should they return to their standard activities (creating art, performing scientific research) or should they still try to play a public and thus a politically relevant role? The author claims that public or even political engagement of the intellectuals is still needed. However, thy have to be able to separate their professional and political activities.*

Key words: *intellectuals, culture, communism, transition, Central and Eastern Europe*

1. Introduction

The so-called 'Revolutions of 1989' which led to the final collapse of the communist regimes in countries in the Eastern part of Europe cannot be understood without being familiar with the role the intellectuals played in them (which is why some – perhaps in a somewhat exaggerated form – refer to them as the “revolutions of the intellectuals”). Timothy Garton Ash, an English scholar with excellent knowledge of Central and Eastern Europe and a witness to the events of the time, describes: “To be sure, the renewed flexing of workers' muscle in two strike-waves in 1988 is what finally brought Poland's communists to the first Round Table of 1989. To be sure, it was the masses on the streets in demonstrations all other Eastern European countries that brought the old rulers down. But the politics of the revolution were not made by workers or peasants. They were made by intellectuals: the playwright Vaclav Havel, the medievalist Bronislaw Geremek, the Catholic editor Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the painter Bärbel Bohley in Berlin, the

conductor Kurt Masur in Leipzig, the philosophers Janos Kis in Gaspar Miklos Tamas in Budapest, the engineering professor Petre Roman and the poet Mircea Dinescu in Bucharest. History was outdone Shelley, for poets were the acknowledged legislators of this world" (Ash 1990, 136).

But the circumstances have changed substantially since then. The old political-ideological corpus has fallen apart and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have undertaken a journey on the long and in many respects uncertain path of social transformation. We can claim that they are undergoing the 'Europeanisation' process, both regarding formal integration into the EU's institutional framework (what is for countries from East-Central Europe completed) and content-wise, acquiring and enacting fundamental cognitive and behavioural standards characteristic of developed European societies. And what is the place the intellectuals occupy or should occupy in these processes? Should they return to their standard activities (creating art, performing scientific research) or should they still try to play a public and thus a politically relevant role? And what is with their relationship with these processes in the sense of the relationship between the national and the global (European)? Are intellectuals simultaneously both the protagonists of the European in the national space and the protagonists of the national in the global (European) space?

2. Intellectuals and intelligentsia – the problem of knowledge holders

The notion of intellectual which can often be found in both scientific and everyday vocabulary no means defines a specific phenomenon. It is often mistaken for some other notions, especially the notion of the intelligentsia, since the two are used practically as synonyms in everyday speech. Some sociologists (Manheim, Konrad and Szelenyi) also equate these two terms and use them to describe the holders of a higher education. For others, the intelligentsia is a broader notion of the group of educated people; and the intellectuals are a subgroup of the intelligentsia with their own attributes, especially those concerning their relationship to society, such as a critical orientation, a sense of responsibility and personal risk.

There are two dimensions individual authors addressing the treatment of intellectuals as knowledge holders focus on (with varying accents of course). The first concerns the cognitive capabilities of the individual and treats them as the key factor making an individual an intellectual; the second sees the intellectual as a social function and thus as a position which varies from one

society to another. But certainly, the position and role of intellectuals depends on the cultural historical context within which certain intellectual traditions emerge and consequently define the intellectual and his or her actions.

Ron Eyerman discerns three categories relating to the 'people of knowledge'; intelligentsia, intellectuals and professionals. They are all based on human cognitive capabilities, above all on the capability for conceptualisation and the use of reason (Eyerman 1994).

Intelligentsia is a notion with a Russian origin and refers to the group within the developing Russian bourgeoisie which started to emerge at the time of the reign of Tsar Peter the Great. Members of the intelligentsia shared a high level of education and a pro-Western cultural orientation and a sense of a mission to introduce modern Enlightenment ideas into the generally backward feudal society. But there was a great gap between them and the people, so some, for instance Dostoevsky, accused them of being uprooted in the sense of a radical disconnection from ordinary Russian people, their values and traditions.

The term intellectual emerged in France at the end of the 19th century in reference to the so-called Dreyfus affair. It had a negative connotation at first and referred to a group of respectable public figures, writers and thinkers (Émile Zola, Anatole France, Émile Durkheim etc.) who spoke up against the abuse of authority. In doing so, they decisively shaped the European, mostly French, tradition of a confrontation between people of reason and culture with the ruling elite.

The mentioned notions emerged in different cultural and social contexts. The intelligentsia marked a group of the 'cultivated' in their relation to the uneducated masses on one hand and barbarian authority on the other. On the contrary, intellectuals emerged in a society where the contrasts were not so drastic and the 'higher' culture extended over broader social strata. However, both were supposed to represent more than a mere community of educated people since they were not only united because of their spiritual work but also because of their moral mission: not only creating culture but also defending it.

In contrast to the first two notions, the notion of professionalism is a product of modern industrial society and is connected to intellectual capacities as a means of performing everyday professional activities, thus a means of survival. Individual and instrumental use of the mental capacities characterise the professional (his/her work has a market value), and not any critical and public engagement (ibid. 26).

The question of knowledge and its holders is especially relevant in the context of contemporary (post)industrial societies with their characteristic devaluation of classical industrial work and the ever growing emphasis on various service activities and production based on highly expert work – what was referred to with concepts such as the ‘new economy’ (see, for example, Hübner 2005). Thus, the so-called cultural capital, i.e. the capability of individuals to master special languages, cultures, techniques and their respective skills, is becoming ever more important. Some sociological theories argue that this process is leading to changes in the social structures of these societies. Two examples of this are Gouldner’s theory of the ‘new class’ (Gouldner 1985) and Bell’s theory of the ‘knowledge class’ (Bell 1991), both presupposing the shaping of the new social group (class) is based on the mentioned cultural capital (education) and its own mentality or ideology. (Gouldner speaks of the so-called ‘culture of critical discourse’ which is based on a relatively ‘situation-independent discourse’ within which everything and everybody should be open to criticism, and thus rejects the reference to the authority and the social position of the speaker).

But the notion of the intellectual cannot be used to describe the entire strata of highly educated people; on the contrary, people defined as intellectuals represent a minority of these strata. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, for instance, defines intellectuals as those people who deal professionally with the creation, training and spreading of theoretical knowledge, ideas and symbols (Etzioni-Halevy 1985, 9). People who only transmit or use the knowledge are not included among them. According to these criteria, members of the same profession can be intellectuals or not. For example, a physician inventing new treatments is an intellectual while his colleague who merely uses these methods for his treatments is not. However, sheer expertise in a specific area which is expressed through the possession of knowledge and its creative use does not make one an intellectual. He is defined as an intellectual by their social role, their relation to social problems and their public engagement. To be considered as an intellectual, one must interpret general problems using their scientific cognition and skills. We could claim that the intellectual is in a paradoxical situation being, on one hand, a sceptic and a critic of the existing values and the state of mind and, on the other, their creator.

When defining the public character of the actions of intellectuals, one necessarily comes to the question of their relationship with politics and politicians. Debates concerning this topic date back far in time. In his book *La Trahison Des Clercs (The Treason of the Intellectuals)* from 1927, Julien Benda fiercely criticised those intellectuals who had entered the political

arena and consequently helped mobilise political hatred. By doing this they had, according to him, abandoned the traditional role of intellectuals as safeguards of the mind and reason against sensuality and passions; they had become the ideologists and messiahs of various civic religions, and thus the agitators of political passions (Benda 1997).

The political engagement of intellectuals and artists within Western culture has a rich history and its consequences have never been univocal. As much as intellectuals have often sensitised the public to key social problems regarding issues of freedom and human rights, they have also frequently contributed to their limitation by co-operating with various extremist ideological endeavours.

3. The role of intellectuals in dismantling communism in Central and Eastern Europe

During the last two decades, the intellectuals (mostly including people from the arts and humanities) in the area of Central and Eastern Europe played very important social and political roles. The characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia, as presented above, have also characterised intellectual circles in other countries in the region. The main one was the feeling of a general social mission in the sense of the development and modernisation of backward societies, along with the related need for public actions, is it the 'enlightening' of the masses in the form of education or direct political engagement. The more undeveloped a country was, the bigger the gap between the educated elite and the uneducated masses (Bozoki 1999, 1). In the countries of the Central Europe, where there have been greater possibilities for professional development since the beginning of the 20th century onward, there has also been a fair number of intellectuals who have 'stuck' to their fields of expertise, in addition to those who were socially engaged. Meanwhile, intellectual elites in the Eastern and South-east parts of Europe have represented some sort of social and cultural enclaves from which social reformists and protagonists of both leftist and rightist radical movements have evolved.

Another moment that has characterised the role of the intellectual elite in this space needs to be mentioned. Namely, it is characteristic of the Central European space to be populated mostly by countless nations which did not have a special historical constitutional tradition and/or whose destiny was exposed to manipulation by their bigger neighbouring nations and whose national existence was constantly unclear; something they have always had to strive for. With the absence or weakness of their own political

institutions, it was culture mostly literature) which represented the basis of maintaining their national, and its elite was the main holder of national ideas and struggled for national self-constitution (whose final goal was almost without exception a state of its own). Milan Kundera gives a good example of this when he wrote: “The upheavals in the Middle Europe were not supplied by newspapers, radio and television – the media. They were prepared, designed and carried out by novels, poetry, theatre, film, historiography, literary magazines, human comedies and cabarets, philosophical debates – the culture” (Kundera 1984, 3466).

This role of intellectuals was also maintained during communism. Control over all of society by the ruling party elite and its branches typified communist rule. Namely, its goal was to create a ‘new’ society in accordance with the dogmas of the ruling Marxist-Leninist ideology, and thus it had to control all key social areas. Intellectuals in these circumstances, like other members of the highly educated strata, found themselves in various positions in the opposing ruling elite. Despite the once influential thesis by Konrad and Szelenyi about the ‘road of intellectuals to power’ (Konrad and Szelenyi 1983) which was supposed to happen in the phase of ‘mature socialism’ when the intelligentsia was to become the dominant social class and take over the leading position in all key segments of society, including politics,¹ most intellectuals were nowhere near positions of social power. But it is a fact that only a small share of them were actively opposing the regime and co-operating in undermining the monopoly of the ruling party elite.

This minority consisting of active opponents of the regime could be categorised as non-conformist marginal intellectuals. Their actions are often referred to by the concept of dissident and they are referred to as dissidents. But the notion of dissident is narrower since it is not only characterised by clear opposition to the regime but also by a repressive attitude to members of the opposition, whereas all those actions not fitting into the context of the ruling ideal and normative complex or overtly opposing it could be called non-conformist, and thus automatically placed at the social margin. The inability to access political power is common to both; and it is worth noting that the boundary between the two was not as sharp since non-conformism in certain circumstances could quickly become dissident behaviour.

Most non-conformist intellectuals came from cultural, mainly literary circles. The reason for that lies in the nature of this sphere or the nature of

¹ It is worth mentioning that the two authors define intelligentsia in the broadest sense as a group of people with a university education.

cultural – mostly artistic – production which requires a relatively free flow of information. Namely, art is based on mechanisms of the imagination, i.e. the free play of ideas, and thus it does not stand external – especially ideologically motivated – interventions. We could even claim that the world of art is some sort of a special reality.² But it is not independent of the external world since it uses elements of everyday reality as ‘material’ for its ‘processing’. In this way, truths unpleasant for the regime concerning the state of social reality could be articulated through artistic discourse. This was a common practice in communist societies where the position of artistic – especially literary – works was, given the absence of political and media pluralism, one of the main sources of independent information, unfiltered by the ‘ideological state apparatus’.

Non-conformism which had its focus in the field of culture – where an important role was played by various cultural magazines – shaped a relatively regime-independent sphere which became the generator of criticism of the existing system. But in order to successfully confront the ruling apparatus it was necessary to exceed the non-conformism which was limited to smaller groups of intellectuals through mutual connection and organisation. These kinds of engagement initially took the form of social opposition, labelled by György Konrad as ‘anti-politics’ since the aspirations of the majority of its protagonists were not focused on the struggle to gain power (Konrad 1988).

In the context of the ever growing sterility of the regime which was incapable of fending off social challenges and the related decline of people’s trust, the influence of independent intellectuals, their ideas and concepts grew stronger. It was realised over time that the essential social changes need an autonomous political organisation. Thus political counter-elite were formed that was capable of pursuing its social change programme in an organised and systematic way. But certain anti-political moments were still maintained, a fact expressed in the numerous forms of resistance against the Western patterns of political, mainly party, actions (see Havel 1990). That is why various mass democratic movements such as the *Civic Forum* in the Czech Republic, *Public against Violence* in Slovakia, the Slovenian Democratic Union in Slovenia in which people from the cultural sphere played an important or even leading role, emerged before any classical political

² Thus the phenomenological theory of Alfred Schutz considers art as one of the independent areas of meaning, with a characteristic cognitive style and the mutual harmony and compatibility of experiences according to this style, which enables it to achieve the “accent” of truth. For details, see Alfred Schutz 1971.

parties. (This is even the case with the Polish *Solidarity* which was originally a trade union).

It should be noted that the independent intellectuals were a heterogeneous group. Indeed they were united by the opposition against the 'iron grip' of the communist regime, their striving for civil rights and respect of the principles of civil society. But there were substantial differences in their world views and the pertaining perceptions of the development of society and their own role in it.

4. The position and dilemmas of intellectuals after the democratic transition

By successfully dismantling the 'ancient regime', the structural conditions emerged for establishing the Western type of social organisation with a parliamentary democracy and a market economy as its key components. The independent and critical intellectuals who shaped this concept ideally thus, in the new circumstances, found themselves in a dilemma regarding their (future) attitude to politics. These dilemmas concerned concrete political engagement dilemma, whether to join a specific political party and perhaps participate in government or to remain politically free, as well as the general social critical stance on whether to follow the social happenings or withdraw to one's own field of expertise. These decisions made by intellectuals varied, but in no case was their position unproblematic.

Many leading opponent intellectuals actually occupied the key positions in politics and the ruling structures after the victory of democratic forces. We may claim that politics intellectualised itself in the new circumstances since most of the leading positions among politicians of the new democratic parties and the renewed parties were taken over by more educated people. Thus in the newly elected 1990 Hungarian parliament 90 percent of the representatives had a university diploma, and half had a Ph.D. According to Konrad and Szelenyi, the intelligentsia shaped the new political speech which was founded on the mentioned 'culture of critical discourse' (Kempny 1999, 154).

Yet the position of intellectuals in politics was in many ways problematic and contradictory. The origin of this lies in the nature of the political sphere which requires a different way of acting than in the cultural sphere which the intellectuals had been accustomed to. According to Daniel Bell, culture and politics are two spheres in which adverse 'axis principles' are detectable in contemporary society, i.e. different behaviour and various techniques and norms of legitimisation (Bell 1996). The axis principle of (democratic)

politics represents legitimacy, i.e. the authority of the ones ruling approved by the ruled ones. This principle is realised through formal mechanisms which presuppose equality, and the decision-making takes place according to criteria of formal rules and consensus, subsequently enabling the basic tasks of political order to be realised. In contrast, the axis principle of culture is represented by the self-realisation of the individual, i.e. his/her existential self-fulfilment or self-confirmation. This is the core of the conflict between the roles of an intellectual and a politician. George Schöpflin describes this conflict in the following way: "While the intellectual is supposed to interpret the circumstances and develop future alternatives by criticising the present time, the politician's task is to integrate the opposing interests by compromises, to blur the boundaries and evade the public" (Schöpflin 1992, 522). Some intellectuals were quite successful in politics but had to adapt to the basic principles of political actions (and thus represented the political and not the cultural elite). But many of them continued to act individualistically despite being representatives of the authorities, and relied more on their spiritual and moral capital (acquired by being opponents of the former regime) than on formal rules and authority. Some typical intellectual characteristics, such as a critical attitude and an unconditional commitment to finding the truth, turned out to be somewhat inappropriate predispositions for tactfulness and compromise making which are essential for success in politics. Even political parties deriving from some sort of intellectual associations had no long-term success in politics without first changing their form.

On the other hand, the 'depolitisation' of intellectuals in the sense of their withdrawal from political institutions meant a denunciation of the power to decide on the strategic orientations of society. The 'weight' of their word has fallen drastically since the fall of communism which had been the main subject of their criticism. Their courageous stand against the regime, the source of their moral authority, has slowly faded into oblivion, and for some the public presence of former dissidents has even been disturbing since they, with their pose, were a living witness to the conformism and the opportunity of the majority. Moreover, the legacy of anti-intellectualism must be mentioned. It derived mainly from the ideology of the former regime and was a consequence of the undeveloped political culture; it has also been often expressed in post-communist times. These are the reasons for the substantial discomfort about the new circumstances felt by the majority of intellectuals which has led some to withdraw into privacy and others into uncompromising criticism of the new state of affairs and related deformations. Hence some analysts believe that non-conformist intellectuals

somehow belong to the losers of transition or at least to the 'losers among the winners' (Bernik 1999) because their gains were presumably much smaller than those made by other segments of the educated strata (which deserve significantly less merit for the democratisation processes). Namely, the political regulation of material resources in the new circumstances was mainly replaced by market regulation in relation to which the former non-conformist intellectuals, mostly coming from the social sciences, the humanities and culture, are in a much weaker position than others (e.g. economists, lawyers etc.).

Despite the correctness of the some of the above assessments, theses on intellectuals being the losing social group in the new circumstances are disputable or at least exaggerated. They can be perceived as such only if their ambitions were to occupy the position of the new political elite or to somehow play a role of a 'collective nation leader'. But such a role is in no way in line with the structure and principles of contemporary society. Namely, these are defined by two basic sets of processes: functional differentiation and culture-value pluralisation. Functional differentiation presupposes the functioning of various social fields in accordance with their own principles, i.e. autonomy – autonomy which was limited by communism, similarly as all undemocratic forms of social organisation (Makarovič 2001). Autonomy which represents the freedom of intellectual actions is now ensured, at least in an institutional sense, and this undoubtedly represents a big – we could even say essential – gain for the intellectual sphere. And pluralisation which is an element of the democratisation process is leading to a change in relations among the intellectuals themselves. The worldviews of the various groups of intellectuals who gathered around some magazine or society which were strongly personally or ideally connected during communism, started to differentiate. Thus, various combinations and alliances are emerging on the intellectual scene, characterised by an explosion of differences and 'autopoetics'. The removal of ideological pressure undoubtedly enabled the manifestation of differences in thought and the free flow of ideas, along with the consequential individualisation of intellectual work, with the accompanying pluralism of artistic genres, forms and theoretical concepts which is certainly an enrichment of the cultural space.

But this 'normalisation' of the situation concerning the social placement of intellectuals does not mean their public engagement is unnecessary or even unwanted. Or, if we return to the above dilemma: just as the traditional role of Eastern and Central European intellectuals as the moral and political leaders of the nation is not in accordance with the postulates of

contemporary plural and functionally differentiated society, nor with the principles of a liberal democracy (where in principle everyone has equal chances of political leadership), the withdrawal of intellectuals into privacy, behind the walls of carefully delimited professional fields, does not help strengthen democracy in any way. The place of the social engagement of intellectuals is in the public and civil society sphere. Namely, a formal political transformation in the sense of the establishment of democratic institutions is a necessary but not also a sufficient condition for the successful democratisation of post-communist societies. A strong, dynamic and plural civil society is also needed which can act as a partner of the political elite in setting social goals and shaping policies in various fields. We can say that the relationship between the state and civil society is reciprocal. The existence of legitimate power and a legal state is a condition for the development of civil society. On the other hand, the civil-norms-compliant state organisation requires control – including by civil society and an independent public.

5. Intellectuals and European integration

Irresolution about the national and the global has characterised Central and Eastern European intellectuals throughout modern history, including irresolution about obligation to their nation, whose guides they were supposed to be and for whose political emancipation they strived for, and an affiliation with the broader (Western) European civilisation framework in which many of them were included through contacts with Western intellectual circles. In the middle of the 19th century, differentiation and in some places even polarisation occurred based on the ideal-worldview differences between the pro-Western intellectual elite and the elite which advocated proper national cultural traditions. There were well-known splits between the ‘Westerners’ and ‘Slavophiles’ in Russia, between the ‘populists’ and ‘urbanists’ in Hungary, or the ‘proto-chronists’ and ‘anti-chronists’ (like in the two other cases this was a split between traditionalists and pro-Westerners) in Romania (Bozoki 1999a; Culic 1999).

This duality continued in communist times. On one hand, one of the goals of most critical intellectuals was to establish national originality and sovereignty or to protect it against the uniformisation pressings of the communist ideology and liberate it from the USSR hegemony (in Slovenia this role was played by the forces of Yugoslav unitarianism). On the other hand, they strived for the recognition of ‘universal’, i.e. European, civilisation standards. Thus the very thing that inspired the actors of opposition

movements at the end of the 1980s was the Western ideology of a liberal democracy.

The establishment of the societal model characteristic of Western Europe is today the consensually accepted aim of most post-communist Central and Eastern European countries, and the goal of the new political elites is to lead their countries 'back to Europe' (Tomšič 2011). In the context of European integrations – especially the European Union – a question arises of what role Central and Eastern European intellectuals can play in this process. This is linked to a broader question of connections in the European area, mainly resolving intercultural contrasts and the possible shaping of a common European identity. Some theoreticians, such as Karl Mannheim (1978) and Zygmunt Bauman (1984), consider intellectuals as the one social group which can, due to its unrestrainedness to class (Mannheim uses the term 'free flowing intelligentsia'), act as a mediator between the various social strata (classes) and also, due to its cultural openness and sensibility, as a mediator of information and ideas between one's own culture and those of others. But an adequate combination of cosmopolitan (European) values and a sense of belonging to and obligation towards the national community are necessary to be able to perform the latter successfully. Namely, the lack of the mentioned values can quickly lead to national (or some other) exclusivism which may result in seclusion and isolation from the developed world, and in extreme cases in violent conflicts and bloodshed. (One example of this is the role many Serbian intellectuals played in encouraging the great Serbian expansionism at the end of the 1980s which resulted in the bloody tragedy in the territory of former Yugoslavia). But the insufficient rootedness of the intellectual elite in the national sphere can lead to its alienation (recalling Dostoyevsky's criticism of the traditional Russian intelligentsia), and consequently to the impairment of national intellectual resources and their development potential.

We can claim that culture itself plays an important role in the context of contemporary integration trends. While the European integration process is unifying the various systemic fields (the economy, politics, and defence system), culture is the one that enables the preservation of individual national identities as well as the European identity itself, whose main characteristic is precisely cultural pluralism. "In broader sense this means culture in general, and in a more narrow sense, specifically literature as the one moment which is, due to its very medium, the holder of the most profound identity" (Virk 1993, 159). The value of culture lies in its individuality and the power of its creative potential since this represent the assurance of its place in the mentioned social-historical context. It depends

on the creativity of intellectuals as its holders, their ideal, scientific or artistic innovation and the capability to launch their 'products' in the global European space.

But the role and importance of intellectuals from former communist bloc countries are not only limited to their own countries, i.e. connected with assuring their existence in the European framework. Many of them – also or mainly the former protagonists of political non-conformism – are actively included in European scientific, artistic and intellectual networks, and as such actively participate in essential dilemmas regarding Europe's future (the question of EU enlargement, the European constitution, a common European identity etc.). Due to their past experiences with the non-democratic regime which helped them develop a sensibility for detecting the whole range of abuses by power holders and the determination to fight for the preservation of individual and national freedom, they are the ones who, beyond doubt, have a vocation for (co)shaping the united and interconnected but plural and open Europe.

6. Conclusion

Systemic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe is still unfinished process. If installation of institutions of democratic political system was carried out in rather smooth and unproblematic way (at least countries from Central Europe), transformation in other fields are more prolonged and complicated. This particularly refers to establishment of the rule of law and development of civil society. Malign practices like clients, corruption, rent-seeking and other abuses of power are widespread in the region. In some case, we can even speak about the 'state capture' where informal centres of power that mostly derive from former regime structures exert extraordinary influence in decision-making process and thus maintain their 'inherited' privileges.

In situation where institutions of the rule of law do not perform their functions, the control over power-holders from the side of civil society is indispensable. In order to assume this role, engagement of autonomous intellectuals is crucial. Different cultural and intellectual activities are constitutive part of civil society. Normal functioning of society as a whole needs public sphere (with mass media) that is 'captured' by political and/or business interests. Although intellectuals do not possess monopoly over 'trust and justice', they are due to their cognitive and moral qualities qualified to become leading protagonists of the independent public. This holds especially for those who proved their critical stance in former

communist regime. To assume this role, they need to remain credibility among their compatriots also in the political and social circumstances. Of utmost importance for them is to draw as clearly as possible the line between their professional or cultural activities on one side and potential political engagement on the other. This means that in the case of the later, they have to avoid 'masking' political and ideological statements with intellectual authority. Furthermore, their credibility rests on ability of critical distance toward every ruling elite, regardless its political 'colour'.

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LARGE SCALE LAND DEALS AND WOMEN IN RURAL COMMUNITIES IN NIGERIA: PARADOX OF A DEVELOPMENTAL PARADIGM

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Abstract: *The study examines large scale land deals and investment in Nigeria with a focus on women in rural communities. Large scale land deals as a development paradigm is recommended within the context of globalisation. Hence, promoters of globalisation argue that land deals and investment is a tool for poverty reduction and promotes sustainable agricultural and rural development. In the light of this assumption, development paradigm which emphasises privatisation and liberalisation of land adopted by the Nigerian government is seen as the solution to economic development. The paper thus examines this theoretical assumption and made comparison with empirical evidence from case studies of large scale land deals and its impact on rural women. The study involves exploratory analysis based on the perception of rural women drawn from six purposively selected rural communities. Findings reveal that argument in favour of large scale land deals and investments do not support the lived realities of rural women in Nigeria. In reality, it reinforces differential access to economic opportunities thereby exacerbating further inequalities. The study advocates that the Nigerian government should develop an inclusive policy model based on affirmative mechanism that would provide incentives that favour large scale land deal, at the same time conditionality should be attached for women in rural areas, to have some measures of control over land resources.*

Keywords: *globalisation, large scale land deals, liberalisation, Nigeria, privatisation, rural women.*

1. Introduction

Large scale land deal is a developmental paradigm that explains the liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of land and natural resources.

It explains global acceleration of large scale annexation of arable and marginal land as well as natural resources in the rural areas for food, agro-fuel production and investments in agro-business. In Nigeria it further explains the application of Land Use Act of 1978 to acquire large expanse of land resulting in significant land grab in the rural areas. The premise upon which this policy is advocated is that large scale land deal is a tool for poverty reduction and promotion of sustainable agricultural and rural development (Deininger and Byereee 2011). Arguments in favour of this assumption emphasise five major channels through which large scale land deal can be beneficial. The channels are; supports and opportunities for small scale farmers through contract farming which is also known as out-growers scheme, generation of massive employment in the host community, payment of compensation leading to human and infrastructural development, providing access to markets and technologies for local producers and creation of wealth through investment facilitation, increase in local and national tax revenue (Deininger and Byereee 2011).

This assumption is rather too sweeping as it generalises the profoundly diverse positive impact of large scale land deals while ignoring the plethora of circumstances, culture, nature and situations of the different countries, regions and segments of rural societies the world over. By implication the policy will present different opportunities and risks to the different segments of the world societies. Nigeria society is largely made up of rural communities. Agriculture account for 45 percent of Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is the main source of rural livelihood. About 90 percent of Nigeria's food is produced by small scale farmers with 44 percent of male and 72 percent of female per household respectively and they cultivate less than one hectare of land (IFAD 2009, 5-7). In 2011, it was estimated that 80.2 million (49%) of Nigeria's 162.5 million people are females and 54 million of Nigeria's 80.2 million women live and work in the rural area, where they provide 60-79% of the rural labour force (Gender in Nigeria Report 2012, 6-9). From the above, rural women represent a high percentage of the rural population and play essential roles in a wide range of activities in the rural economy.

However, it is pertinent to note that despite the unique position occupied by rural women in terms of their participations, numerical strength, roles and contributions to the rural economy, their plights are often insufficiently addressed by national development strategies and western development paradigm. It is trite that all too often their contributions to rural development and the economy is poorly understood and underestimated. Consequently, their challenges receive little or no attention. This happens to

be the lot and predicament facing rural women in Nigeria in relation to the so-called new opportunities supposedly offered by development paradigm that encourage large scale land deals. Land and natural resources are crucial to the livelihood activities of rural women in Nigeria. However, it is important to note that questions concerning women's land right as well as the power dynamics relating to access and control of land and resources are yet to be resolved in most rural societies in Nigeria. In spite of the above government is allocating arable land in rural areas without putting in place measures to strengthen women control over land and natural resources. It is pertinent to ask, how then will women in rural communities benefit from large scale land deals and investments.

Attempts to analyse the dominant trend in large scale land deal by foreign and domestic investors in developing countries has generated a vast amount of literature. Oxfam (2011), Visser and Spoor (2011), Borrás and Franco (2011), Anseeuw (2012), Sommerville (2011), Cotula (2012), McMichael (2012) in their various studies reported diversities in the range of deals which took place in various continents or states where the studies focused on. Cotula (2012), Zommers (2010) associated land grab with globalisation and issues relating to food and biofuel production and rent extractions. Other literatures such as Attah (2013), Pedlowski (2012) Adnan (2013) examined responses and protests from land grabbing. Attah (2013) examined land grabbing in Nigeria and responses. He noted that resistances and protests have been the response to land grabbing activities in most states in Africa. However, the Nigerian case is mixed, as it presents unsuccessful resistance in some instance and in others there is no resistance as land grab is celebrated because of the promised benefits articulated by the government in response to the World Bank Agenda.

The World Bank Report carried out by Deininger and Byerlee (2011) gave a historical context of land deals using 30 countries as case studies. The study, while acknowledging similarities to historical trends, noted that the current large scale land acquisition is undeniably peculiar. The finding of the report is in line with findings from other studies that observed enormous large scale land acquisition going on around the world. In agreement with GRAIN's (2010) view, the findings of the study collaborate with other findings that arrived at the conclusion that large scale land deals present opportunities and risks. Case studies confirmed that in most cases benefits from land deals and investments do not live up to expectation as anticipated while in some other cases land deals and investments make the local people worse off because investors are taking advantage of weak governance and legal protection, failure to articulate, implement and enforce environmental

laws (GRAIN 2010). Unfortunately, the report which provides new and solid evidence about large scale land deal failed to acknowledge the differential impact land deals and investment will have on rural women. Although Few case studies and a few larger empirical studies such as Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014; Behrman et al. 2011; Amanor 2012; Kachika 2010; Dzodzi and Golah 2010 addressed gender dimension of land deals. Their studies present evidence using several recent case studies on the impact of large scale deals on women. However, most of these case studies did not address the issue of rural women in Nigeria. Given that rural women and the region they live in are not homogeneous, it is crucial to examine the impact of large scale land deal on rural women in Nigeria.

The rationale for paying attention to the issue of rural women in Nigeria is derived from the fact that evidence based on rural women's perception is critical to understanding the impacts which large scale land acquisition have on rural women. Given the critical role rural women play within the rural economy, and in national development, a closer investigation of what they do and how development policies aimed at large scale land deals might affect them could serve as a useful indicator for understanding the sustainability of their livelihood and to explain the paradox of the current western model developmental paradigm in Nigeria in particular. The study therefore through theoretical and empirical analysis examined the impact of large scale land deals on women in rural communities in Nigeria. The theoretical analysis involved using documentary sources in reporting trends of large scale land deals in Nigeria from 2004 until 2014. The empirical analysis was based on the application of the theoretical assumption to evidence from case studies. The last section took a theoretical discourse on the paradox of the western model developmental paradigm.

2. Methodology

Given the nature of the study and the need to gain insights into the perspectives of rural women, the study was carried out through a descriptive qualitative survey design. States in Nigeria were clustered into two Regions i.e., Northern and Southern Regions. The purposive sampling technique was used to select one state from each of the regions. The states selected are Delta and Kwara. Delta State is located in the Southern part of Nigeria and lays approximately between Longitude 5000 and 60.45' East and Latitude 5000 and 60.30' North with 80% of the population living in rural areas (Delta State Fact File 2012). Delta state was selected due to

intensification of large scale acquisition of land in the rural communities for the establishment of Free Trade Zone and Export Processing Zones, large scale commercial farms, and acquisition of land for oil and export related activities. Kwara state is located in Northern region of Nigeria and lay between Latitude 7, 45 N and 9, 30 N Longitude 2, 30E and 6 25 E with 70 percent of the population living in rural areas. Kwara state was selected due to significant appropriation of Farm sites and farmlands of the local people by the state government in order to provide large tract of arable land required for commercial farming.

Six communities were selected by purposive sampling according to areas where significant large scale land deals had occurred. The communities selected are Abraka, Ogidiben, and Okpai in Delta State and Shonga, Iwo and Iponrin in Kwara State. A sample size of 30 women was selected, 18 women were interviewed while two Focus Group Discussions was held comprising of 6 women each. In addition to the use of secondary data, primary data was collected directly from the affected population through in-depth interview and Focus Group Discussion. Triangulation method was used for cross checking account from the in-depth-interview, Focus Group Discussion and secondary data. Using the interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) all interviews were transcribed and descriptively analysed.

3. Trends of large scale land deals in Nigeria: 2004-2014

The intensification of large-scale land acquisition pursued by the Nigerian state under the rubric of the Land Use Act of 1978 has become more pronounced in the rural areas reinforced by privatization and liberalization policies of globalisation. The acceleration of large scale annexation of arable land in the rural areas for commercial agriculture, establishment of Agro businesses, creation of Export Processing Zones and oil exploration activities such as pipeline constructions, access roads, flow stations and camp sites for oil workers were as a result of the following factors; First is the liberalization and opening up the economy to private foreign investment in line with World Bank, IMF, and WTO development strategy. Second is the need for Nigerian government to revitalize their agriculture for economic growth under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and thirdly, the declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa adopted by Heads of State of the African Union in July 2003 (Kachika 2010, 16).

Although large scale acquisition of arable land for investment is not new in Nigeria, the intensification of globalisation process has brought change in

the trend, scale and character of land use competition. Under contemporary globalisation, local land use is changing and is increasingly driven by demands for products that are part of commodity chain in response to global foreign direct investment in agriculture and natural resources extraction. Before global acceleration, local human needs and local capital are the determinants for land use. However with the demand from the international system resulting to intensification of global interconnections, Foreign Direct Investment and foreign capital are now important determinant of land use (Friis and Reenberg 2010, 2). What is new and different from the previous acquisition of land is that first, the major players are private sector such as transnational cooperations, states, and international institutions. Secondly, it has resulted in large scale commercial development in which cash and food crops are produced for the world market with most of the imports directed to investing countries. Thirdly, there is shift from food crops to high value crops such as basic cash crops and agro fuel crops.

In the World Bank report by Deininger and Byerlee (2011), from 1990-2006, there had been 115 projects involving 793 Areas (1,000ha) and 1,500 medium size (ha). This compilation according to the report relied on data collected from 26 out of 36 states in Nigeria (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, xxxiii). Following the return to democratic rule in 1999, the Nigerian government adopted the policies of privatization and liberalization of land as a developmental strategy for rural development. The recent tide of privatization of land and resources began in 2004 with large scale acquisition of land by foreign and local investors for food, cash crop and high value crops for agro fuel production. According to Attah (2013), the Kwara state government in 2004 invited commercial farmers from South Africa and Zimbabwe for a feasibility mission which culminated in the appropriation of 200,000 hectares of land for agricultural investment. In related cases other lands deals have been reported across Nigeria (see Table 1 for trends and scale of land deals in Nigeria from 2004-2014). Common features of large scale acquisition of land in Nigeria involves (a) the use of the Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978 to appropriate large expanse of land. (b) Scale of land deal ranges from 50 to 400,000 hectares of farmland with a minimum of 25 years lease term. (c) Although foreign and local investors are involved in large scale land deal, there is the increasing involvement of foreign investors than local investors. (d) There is the increasing use of private-public partnership model arrangement between state government and private investors. (e) Memoranda of understanding of land deals between government and investors are often based more on the interest and needs of the investors rather than on the state's strategic consideration for investment. As such

government are committed to provide choice land to investors which in some cases results to eviction of local people from their ancestral homes. For instance, due to acquisition of farmlands 1,289 local farmers were evicted from Shonga district of kwara state (Attah 2013, 6). Similarly, 30,000 small holder farmers were evicted from their farmlands in Ogoni area of Rivers state (Social Development 2013, 1-2) while the case of Kebbi state involved the eviction of 5,000 local farmers from the farmland (Farmland.org 2014).

Table 1: Trend and Scale of Land Deals in Nigeria

Name /Company	Project details	Size of land allocated (ha)	Location/local government area	Source
New Nigeria farm	Crops, dairy and poultry	13,000	Shonga, Edu LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
OLAM Nigeria Limited	Rice processing and out Growere scheme	20	Patigi, Patigi LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Coga Farm Limited	Cultivation of cassava, maize and jatropa plantation	6,000	Fallah, Moro LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Grill flour Mills Limited	i rice processing factory ii paddy rice production	50	1 Tsaragi, Edu L.G.A 2Echi-Wada, Patigi LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Africa Chicken Farm limited	Integrated poultry production	615	Iponrin, Ilorin East LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)

Lix-konti Ranch & Industries Ltd	Cultivation of crops such as maize, soybeans seeds, groundnut and to build vegetable oil mill	756	Ejidonagri, Moro LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Kwara Greens Limited	Production of vegetable and flowers	50	Oro-gbangba, Asa LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Jan-Kasal Company	Industrial starch, ethanol and glucose syrup.	5,000	Ndanaku, Patigi LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
ZJS International Company Ltd	Cultivation of arable crops such as maize, rice, soybean	5,000	Ehchi-Wada, Patigi LGA II Akunyun/Faje, Asa LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Dawacorn International Ltd	Cashew processing plantation	3,000	Oke-Ola Oro Irepodun LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Tunslaq Nigeria Ltd	Production and processing of cassava, maize and establishment of feed mill	500	Agbeyangi, Ilorin East L.G.A	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Dana Foods LTD	Rice farming and growers scheme	11,000		Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Full valve farms	Integrated farming	5,000	Alasoro, Ifelodu LGA	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)

Green country Ltd	Crop production, livestock/ animal husbandry and agro-forestry	1,000		Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Integrated energy project Tenoil petroleum and energy service		150.44	Efurum_Ugheli road Delta state	Vanguard Nigeria Newspaper 2013, 60
Chinese firm	High quality cassava flour nucleus farm	6,000	Abraka, Delta state	Daily trust newspaper, August 2013, 29
TRANS4mation Agritech (T4M)	Rice	10,000		Otive, (2012)
Delta state government	Establishment of free trade zone	2,3337	Koko L.G.A Delta state	www.nepza.gov.na/free.asp
NEPZA	Establishment of free trade zone	2,506	Ogidigbe, Delta State	www.nepza.gov.na/free.asp
ARC petroleum	Industrial business park	329	Delta state	www.nepza.gov.na/free.asp
Shell B.P	Otorogu gas plant	500	Iwherekan, Utorogu, Delta state	Field report 289
TRANS4mation	Mechanised rice, cassava and fish farming	10,000	Abia state	Otive (2012)
TRANS4mation	Mechanised rice, cassava	30,000	Nine Nigera Delta States	Otive (2012)

	and fish farming			
Dominion farms limited. Okalahomon U.S.A	Rice farming	30,000	Gassol L.G.A, Taraba State	farmlandgra b.org
Ollam international, Asian agribusiness	Rice	6,000	Nasarawa	farmlandgra b.org
South Africa investors	Mass agricultural production	5,000	Edo, Enugu and Benue	farmgrab.org
Dangote Groups of Companies	Sugarcane plantation	33,000	Sokoto state	farmlandgra b.org
Dangote groups of companies	130,000 for sugarcane/ 120 for rice and horticulture crops	250,00	Six states in Northern Nigeria with most of the projects in Kano state	farmlandgra b.org
Chinese firm	Mass agricultural production	Undisclosed	Kebbi state	farmlandgra b.org
Union De Iniciativa S.A de C.V Mexican company	Banana plantation	2,000	Ogoni communities, Rivers State	Social development integrated centre (2013)
South korea and united Arab Emirates commercial farmers	Food production	400,00	Nigeria	Friis and Reenberg (2010)

Source: compiled by author from sources cited in the table

Apart from large scale land deals for food production, there have been acquisition of lands for agro fuel crops and production in Nigeria (see, Table 2 for list of land acquired for bio-fuel and diesel investments in Nigeria). Adopting the agro-fuel regime, The Nigerian government through its National Petroleum Corporation has launched four large scale ventures covering 900,000 hectares of land in some selected states (NNPC 2007, cited in Attah 2013). Also, foreign and local investors have also embraced the agro fuel regime and acquired land for the production of high value crops (see Efanodor 2015, 65).

Table 2: Land allocated for Bio-fuel and Bio-diesel Investments in Nigeria

Company	Country	Land acquired	Crop type	Source
NNPC	Nigeria	200 square kilometres	Sugarcane	Friends of the Earth and Europe Report 2010, 32
NNPC	Benue, Gombe, Jigawa and Kebbi	20,000ha	Sugarcane	Friends of the Earth and Europe Report 2010, 32
NNPC	Edo, Anambra and Ondo	20,000 ha	Cassava and sugarcane	Friends of the Earth and Europe Report 2010, 32
NNPC		20,000	Palm oil plantation	NNPC (2007) cited in Attah 2013
NNPC	Ebenebe and Ugbenu communities in Akwa	15,000	Integrated cassava plantation and Ethanol plant	Odogwu (2012) cited in Attah 2013
NNPC / Kogi state government	Okulese in Ose L.G.A Ondo state	500	Caasava ethanol project	Ebenezer (2008) cited in Attah (2013)

NNPC/Kogi state government/ International Trans oil corporation of U.S.A	Odogwu, Ibaji L.G.A Kogi state	31,000	Ultra modern sugar factory for the production of ethanol agro fuel	Aruwa (2011) cited in Attah (2013)
Viscount Energy China	Nigeria		Sugarcane plantation	Friis and Reenberg (2010)
Kwara Casplex Limited	Nigeria	30,000 ha	Cassava	Friends of the Earth and Europe Report 2010, 32
NNPC	Nigeria	11,000 ha	Cassava	Friends of the Earth and Europe Report 2010, 32
Global Biofuels Limited	Nigeria	11,000 ha	Sweet Sorghum	Friends of the Earth and Europe Report 2010, 32
NNPC	Nigeria	10,000ha	Cassava	Friends of the Earth and Europe Report 2010, 32
Global Biofeuls Limited	Nigeria	30,000ha	Sweet Sorghum farm	Friends of the Earth and Europe Report 2010, 32
Jatropha Farmers development foundation	Nigeria	5,000ha	Jatropha	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Future Energy LTD	Nigeria	9,369	Jatropha	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
EnviroFriend -ly Energy LTD	Nigeria	10,000	Jatropha	Ariyo and Mortimre (2011)
Wilmar Nigeria Limited	Nigeria	5,561	Oil palm	farmlandgrab.org

Source: Friend of the Earth and Europe Report (2010, 32) with update by author.

4. Argument in favour of large scale land deals and women in rural communities in Nigeria

Large scale acquisition of land is associated with globalisation of resources that is taking place within the context of accelerated globalisation process. Globalisation policies as a paradigm of development emphasise liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. Proponents of globalisation assert that the integration of all countries into the global economy is seen as a veritable solution to their economic growth and development. As such, the implementation of the policies of globalisation is seen as the best policy option to world prosperity. In line with this development paradigm, according to Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako (2007, 7) in 2003 a National Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was put in place in Nigeria. NEEDS is seen as a reform programme in response to the development challenges of Nigeria. It is said to be based on home grown strategies. However, NEEDS corresponds with the policies and theories promulgated by IMF/World Bank and WTO, promoters of globalisation (NEEDS, 2004). NEEDS therefore seeks to foster Nigeria's integration into the world economy. According to Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako (2007, 7) the key element of achieving the above include privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation programme. It is expected that the private sector investment will supply sustainable poverty reduction, wealth creation and employment generation (NEEDS 2004). Privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation form the core of the market base economy and private sector driven economic system which the Nigerian government has adopted since 1986.

Similarly, the World Bank Report by Deininger and Byerless (2011) argued that large scale land deal is a tool to promote sustainable agricultural and rural development as it can support small holder farmers through contract farming which is also known as out grower scheme. At the same time large scale land deals can be beneficial through four channels; payment of compensation that can lead to social infrastructural development, generating employment, providing access to markets and technology for local producers and increase in local and national tax revenue (Deininger and Byerless 2011, xxxiii). As such large scale land deal is seen as a vehicle for sustainable poverty reduction. Consequently, the World Bank developed an Agenda that was tilted towards encouraging and contributing to large scale land deals and investments that will yield result that are sustainable and equitable (Deininger and Byerless 2011). In the Report, the core of the World Bank Agenda is assisting countries reduce poverty and hunger through increasing agricultural activities and productivity. The execution of

the World Bank Agenda lies in its contributions through; the provision of information, assisting countries in building strong institutional capacity, and supporting investments with fund (Deininger and Byerless 2011). Base on these arguments the paper examined the impact of large scale land deals on rural women in Nigeria using evidence from Delta and Kwara States where significant land grab occurred.

4.1. Evidence from Delta and Kwara States, Nigeria

4.1.1. Generation of employment

Evidence from field report indicates that rural communities in Delta state where most forest and farmland appropriation for large scale land Investment which made way for oil and gas gathering in terms of employment, pipeline and construction projects are mainly masculine in nature and needed expertise, and skilled workers as such women in the communities where these projects are on-going lack the expertise and skills needed for the project. Therefore, they are not visible beneficiaries of opportunities created by project execution by multinationals in terms of employment, technological and human resources development. Similarly, in Kwara state where rural women gained employment from investment in large scale commercial farms they often work long hour under unhealthy environment with a low income wage. In the communities studied, employment from large scale land deals are often few, temporary and seasonal. As such it comes with uncertainty about income generation. At the end of the seasonal job, women return to their homes to contend with their traditional source of livelihood during the remaining part of the year. Due to the seasonal character of the employment opportunities, it is difficult to bring about lasting change in the status of rural women. Meanwhile in rural communities some investors rely on mechanised production while few investors rely on mixed labour and mechanised system. Some of the women stated that most wage labour opportunities associated with land deals went to men. Where employment is given to women, they are assigned tasks that exclude them from activities that may involve better payment, less strenuous and less dangerous. Were investors rely on mechanisation and agricultural technology for production, local evidence suggests that women where yet to move with this trend because most of the rural women do not have the necessary skills, access to social network and information. They also lack capacity and asset for technological advancement. Hence opportunities brought about by commercialisation did not favour women. The implication of the above for rural women is that as the nature of

specialisation is shifting from relatively unskilled activities, to skill intense activities they might lose out as many of them are not educated and do not have the necessary skills.

4.1.2. Opportunity from contract farming

As regard new opportunities for contract farmers, in some cases women in rural communities do benefit from contract farming. However, local evidence indicates that most contract farming is predicated on existing power relations in households which are often controlled by male household heads. In most cases, investment model adopted by investors involves collaboration with local farmers. Due to lack of recognition as potential farmers rural women usually lose out. Contract farmers for many crops are predominately male, due to their predominance in land ownership. Investors base their contract model on the unified system of household headed by a male household. Women contribute substantial amount of labour but they are not recognised by contract model. This model ignores the reality that household is made up of male and female members, with diverse responsibilities, needs and interest. Contract farming does not take into consideration these intra household gender dimensions. Local evidence indicates that women are often not compensated by male household contract holders for providing labour. For instance in all the communities studied in Kwara State, contract farmers are predominately male because of men's predominance in land ownership. In this case, wives of male contract farmers contribute to labour on the contract farms, leaving women with little or no benefits. In Delta state some rural women in farming community of Abraka were engaged in contract farming in their own right while others posited that their engagement in contract farming led to dispute between them and their husbands who when the contract farming was becoming profitable began to lay claim to land allocated to them, and income derived from the production of crops, thereby challenging women's traditional sphere of control. In reality, since women have limited access to productive resources such as land, they tend to benefit less as few of them are contract farmers in their own right.

4.1.3. Payment of compensation

With regards to benefits from payment or lease of land, local evidence shows that women bear a disproportionate share of the negative impacts of large

scale land deals. In the study area women are excluded and not consulted in any consultation processes on land deals. This is because women are not typically included in local governance structure in most rural societies because of the lower status ascribed to women in most communities. Available evidence indicates that where compensation is paid for land acquisition, since land is managed by men, the main beneficiaries are male household head rather than women. In some instances, communities are promised to be allocated smallholder plots in return; however most communities are yet to receive such plots as promised. It was only in Shonga a community in Kwara state that smallholder plots were allocated but this was done through existing patriarchal norms by relying solely on male community leaders to help get smallholder farmers. Women in this community posited that they were not listed individually rather allocation was based on the model of unified households controlled by a male household heads.

5. Paradox of a developmental paradigm

Development entails using productive resources of the society to improve the living standard of the people. Contrary to the arguments in favour of large scale land deals, local evidence from the study communities in Nigeria reveals that from 2004-2013 there was little evidence of positive benefit and change among rural women in relation to large scale lands and investments. The promised benefits that have been well articulated by investors and the government in compliance with the World Bank agenda have not been able to generate sustainable benefits. Large scale land deals have resulted to loss of land and resources which rural women are depended upon but also it is gradually leading to loss of land tenure use right formerly enjoyed by rural women. Findings from local evidence shows that developmental policies aimed at privatisation and liberalisation of land and its market leading to large scale acquisition of land will not promote sustainable development as it concerns rural women livelihood.

This is because, first, the developmental paradigm in favour of large scale land deals ignores the diversity of rural women, their lived realities and livelihood activities. Consequently, no sufficient attention and serious attempt was put in place by promoters of large scale land deals to clearly identify the plight and core agenda of rural women and shape policy formulation around that agenda. Rural women's access to land resources is necessary for ensuring sustainable livelihoods and is a key to poverty

reduction in rural areas. Unequal access to critical resources limits the potential of rural women to benefit from large scale land deals and to ensure sustainable livelihood. The positive impacts which large scale land deal would have had on rural women are circumscribed by other factors because the Nigerian government failed to domesticate development policies within the lived realities of the various groups in the communities. Although rural women experienced new opportunities and relationships with large scale land deals, it is increasingly difficult for them to support themselves and their households with such opportunities as these opportunities still depend on factors such as access to productive resources and asset including skills, capital, land and education. According Gender in Nigeria Report (2012, 20), data from the National Bureau of statistics, Core Welfare Indicator Survey of (CWIQ) 2003 shows that about 13% of rural women owned land compared to 7.2% in its 2006 study (see table 3 for details of the 2006 survey). It is pertinent to note that rural women provide 60%-79% of Nigeria's rural labour force but from CWIQ 2006 survey, men own land five times more than women.

Table 3: Distribution of land ownership by gender in Nigeria.

Sector	Female %	Male%
Total	7.2	38.1
Rural	8.5	46.1
Rural poor	10.1	49.5
Urban	4.5	22.4
Urban poor	5.9	28
Zone		
North-East	4	52.2
North-West	4.7	50.1
North-Central	7.9	41.2
South-East	10.6	38.1
South-West	5.9	22.5
South-South	10.9	28.3

Source: CWIQ (2006) cited in Gender in Nigeria Report (2012, 20)

Over the years, according to GRAIN (2010) the World Bank through its lending, policy advocacy and recently, its agenda towards contributing to large scale land deals has been promoting market-based approaches to land management. The market-based approach entails the conversion of land customary rights into marketable titles including the disengagement of the

state, and legal reforms for land markets to function (GRAIN 2010). It is pertinent to note that the Nigeria government embraced liberalisation policies without its corresponding obligations. For instance, It is expected that liberalisation of land tenure will increase women's access to land and resources. However, local evidence from the field work points to the fact that rural women have not been able to benefit from the promise of changing tenure system because privatisation and liberalisation of land is still based on patriarchal system and interact with existing power relations and gender inequality in which rural women are the most vulnerable group. Nigerian government embarked on liberalisation of land tenure without reforming the existing land use Act.

Under contemporary globalization, approach to liberalisation of land ought to be based on the market system in order to guarantee equal access to land. However, this is not the case in Nigeria, where liberalisation of land is being pursued by the state under the rubrics of the Land Use Act of 1978 whose approach is based on administrative system rather than market based system. According to Nnadi et al. (2012, 98) section 1 of the Land Use Act of 1978 vests ownership of land within the territory of each state in the federation on the state governor. In accordance with the provision of the Act such land is to be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians (Nnadi et al. 2012, 98). Furthermore, under section 6 and 36 of the Act, customary right of occupancy was granted to the local government in respect of rural lands and should be administered in line with existing custom and native law. Existing customary and native laws discriminate against women in land matters such as land right and administrative rights. The expansion and liberalisation of land market through privatisation based on the administrative based system of the customary land tenure system still put men on hegemonic advantage as family and community heads who administer customary land right. They will continue to dominate the control and management of land resources in rural areas. As such the much desired hope of ensuring equality of access to land resources for women under liberalisation of land tenure is utopia for rural women in Nigeria.

Promoters of large scale land deal fail to monitor the performance and adherence to institutional policy framework which is needed to yield positive results. The World Bank in its Agenda policy institutional framework listed five areas that are relevant towards investment that will yield results which are sustainable and equitable for rural development. These are: 1 rights to land and natural resources. 2. Transfer of land rights should be based on user's voluntary and informed agreement. 3. Acquisition

process should be transparent; involving all stakeholders. 4. Mechanism should be put in place to ensure technical and economic viability. 5. Environmental and social sustainability should be protected. (Deiningner and Byerless 2011, xi-xii). Similarly, according to the Social Development Integrated Centre (2013, 10), in 2012 the committee on World Food Security (CFS) endorsed set of global guidelines that are intended to help government protect the land tenure rights of local people. According to Social Development Integrated Centre (2013) the guidelines process started with the United Nations under the auspices of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in 2009 and the process was finalised by World Food Security led intergovernmental negotiations. According to CFS cited in Social Development Integrated Centre (2013, 10), the guidelines recognise that investment by private and public sectors are essential for food security and rural development, but it recommends that government at the same time should protect land tenure rights of local people from risk that large scale land deal might generate.

Field reports showed that in most cases transfer of land rights is not based on the holder's voluntary and informed agreement. In four out of the six communities studied, rural women explained that their communities were not consulted before the forceful appropriation of their farmland while in the other two communities, land title holders were coerced into surrendering their customary holdings with the explanation that investments from land deals will bring development to their communities. Furthermore, payment of compensation has always been untimely and in most cases compensation is not paid at all. The Human Right Watch (1997, 77) noted that the Nigeria land Use Act, onshore and off /on shore laws allow the government to expropriate land for the oil industries, local and foreign investors with no due process protections for those whose livelihood may be destroyed. The petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land use act of 1978 of Nigeria did not stipulate clear benchmarks as to what should be paid as compensation. Section 77 of the petroleum Act stipulate:

»that an oil operator pay to landowners, such sum as may be fair and reasonable compensation for any disturbance of the surface right and for any damage done to the surface of the land upon which mining is being or has been carried on and shall in addition pay to the owner of any crops, economic trees, buildings or works damaged.«

Since there is no specified method of assessing compensation for buildings or farmland, structure and crops, compensation payment is usually not based on market value. As such both oil multinationals and state government traditionally pay for land value and physical structure base on

what they did fit and not market value which ought to be the basis of valuation. Appropriate mechanism was not put in place to ensure that investments from land deals benefit the local population and generate the needed employment. In Kwara state out of 2,771 local people that were displaced, only 120 persons were provided with farmland in the 3,540 hectares in Shonga community that was set aside for farmers whose land were acquired. On the issue of social corporate responsibility, the result has been mixed. In Kwara, the state government, as part of its obligations to the commercial farmers, provided infrastructure such as borehole water, electricity, access roads, upgrading of schools and the establishment of training centres. However, the situation in Delta state was different as communities where land was appropriated for expansion of gas facilities lamented that the gas plant located in their community is strategic in electricity supply, yet the community is in total darkness while there is constant light in camp site and housing unit of the company.

In summation, both the promoters of large scale land deals and the government policies of privatisation and liberalisation of land, lack gender sensitivism as they did not take into account the challenges rural women face in access to productive resources. Policies put in place by the Nigerian government to regulate investment promotion and control overland and natural resources tend to consolidate male dominion over women. Consequently, in reality, development paradigm such as privatisation and liberalisation policies leading to large scale land deals in relation to rural women's lived realities and livelihood sustainability is a paradox as the policy framework reinforced differentiated access to economic opportunities thereby exacerbating further inequalities.

6. Conclusion

Despite the argument in favour of large scale land deals with features of employment, opportunities for contract farming as well as income from paid compensation, prevailing development paradigm framework are skewed against rural women. Evidence from the lived realities of rural women in the communities studied showed that women bear the disproportionate share of negative impact of large scale land deals. Instead of generating sustainable benefits, large scale land deals contribute to further loss of land and resources and left rural women who have limited access to these resources worse off. Findings from the fieldwork can be summarised as follows; first, traditional customary land tenure use rights formerly enjoyed by rural women on land allocated to them is being eroded by large scale land deals.

Secondly, large scale land deals have been accompanied by concentration of land in favour of men and those who assert ownership such as family heads and community leaders at the expense of women who have no access and use rights. Thirdly, employment opportunities from large scale land deals for rural women are often few, temporary or seasonal, as such; it comes with uncertainty about income generation for sustainable livelihood. Fourthly, contract farming is often mediated through existing power relations of household controlled by a male household head as such women benefit less than men from contract farming as few women are contract farmers on their own right because most rural women lack access to productive resources. Lastly, the positive impacts large scale land deals would have had on rural women is being circumscribed by other factors. Inability of women to benefit from large scale land deals and investment was as a result of inequalities in access to land and resources. The root causes of these inequalities lies in the socio-cultural norms, perpetuated in government policies in relation to the above proactive efforts need to be made to address gender imbalance

The study therefore recommends the following; the Nigerian government should develop inclusive policy model that while it provides incentives favouring large scale land acquisition, conditionality should be attach to investments that provide for rural women in order to ensure wider economic benefits from large scale land deals. Secondly, policies should incorporate objectives and targets that address rural women's access to resources and should be supported by implementation system that include affirmative measures for rural women. Thirdly, the realities of women situation should be incorporated within the framework of national development policies in a comprehensive manner. Fourthly, land reforms leading to more equitable patterns of ownership are indispensable for increasing women participation in productive development. Finally, mobilization of women as equal partners in all developmental process needs the priority attention of policy makers. It needs to be recognised that development policies designed to ensure equity and full participation in society should give priority to raising social and economic status of women in rural communities.

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THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: WHY IT FAILED IN ITS OBLIGATION TO LIMIT GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS (GHG) EMISSIONS.

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Abstract: *The United Nations conscious search for solution to numerous problems plaguing the modern society, among which is the issue of global climate change results in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol by the General Assembly (GA) in December 1997, with the primary objective to reduce the industrial emission of greenhouse gases(GHG)/effect, the main culprit of climate change. The Protocol prescribed ways to achieve its goal and specific responsibilities was apportioned to the individual countries to fulfill, based on certain conditionality (common but differentiated responsibility), such as average of 5.2 percent cut in GHG emission to take effect from 2008-2012, using emission levels of 1990 as baseline. But it appears the effort was frustrated by certain factors. In view of this, the paper examines the Kyoto Protocol and why it failed. Through the review of documents and analysis of data from secondary sources, the paper opined that the Kyoto Protocol had been a source of unrelenting controversy among states in the comity of nations. The controversy was centered essentially around the question of the reality of climate change, the social, economic and political implications of the Kyoto Protocol among others. These controversies have so far affected the Protocol, especially to achieve it primary objective.*

Keywords: *Kyoto Protocol, Environment, Climate Change, United Nations, Environmental effectiveness*

1. Introduction

For decades the degrading state of the world environment that is pointed to human activities has called for international cooperation through the United Nations (UN) to surmount the impending disaster predicted by scientist that awaits the world especially as a result of Climate Change. A scientific body otherwise known as the Inter governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that is commissioned by the United Nations to assess the impact of climate change on the environment reported that it is one hundred percent sure that climate change is due to human activities, the global temperature rise associated with the change could cause ice-base land in the Arctic region of the earth to melt and if it eventually happen will cause average Sea Level to rise, which have the capacity to inundate most Island states and low land region of the earth. The report also indicates that the change can intensify tropical storms, flood and drought, as well as facilitate the breeding and spread of disease vectors.

In recent times, most of the media reports indicate that much of the natural disasters that have caused fatal harm to the environment as well as man are related to climate change. For instance, the tropical typhoon that led to the death of many people and the destruction of properties in Philippines, the India and Pakistan heat wave and many more other disasters were all associated with climate change (CNN.com 2015). Hence, the widespread call for reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emission, the main culprit of global warming and climate change. In the wake of these calls, the UN mobilized its members for talks in different international fora on how to reverse the trend and consequently prescribed rules to regulate the emissions of GHG's into the environment, so as to stabilize the climatic system and promote global environmental security, thus the choice of a legal framework known as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.

The Kyoto Protocol is by nature a combination of legal and technical devises adopted in 1997 and took effect from 2008- 2012. Instead of relying solely upon its standard command and control feat, the Kyoto Protocol incorporates several innovative, practically cost effective ways to attain its GHG's emission reduction goal. The flexibility was expected to reduce the total cost of obtaining the desired emission reduction. But in practice, the flexible approaches among others became constraints to the realization of the Kyoto Protocol objective. Hence, enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol became perplexing problem.

One would have expected that since all countries stand the chances of being affected negatively one way or the other by climate change when it eventually occur to welcome any attempts to nip it in the bud. Unfortunately,

they did not receive the news with all pleasure. In spite of the mounting social-political pressures from concerned individuals, NGO's and IGO's to stem the tide of global warming, the Kyoto Protocol could not achieve the desired result; national responses remained clouded with controversy. The key actors remained divided along the line of their interest on the issues. One would ask, did the Kyoto Protocol which attempt to avert climate change which has the potentials of causing physical damages to them and the environment, where their survival is based, failed; why then did countries oppose it?. Besides, there are significant questions about the relationship between policy statements and outcomes. It is against this backdrop that this article assesses the Kyoto Protocol and why it failed to achieve its desired result.

2. Global Warming and Climate Change: Theoretical Discourse

Basic knowledge of geography provides us with the understanding that climate is a regular pattern of weather conditions of a place. As part of regular weather conditions of the Earth, sunlight (one of the environmental resources enjoyed by man as well biodiversities) warms the earth's surface (ecosphere) during day time (creating greenhouse effect) and beginning from evening through the next sunrise, the heat radiates back to space and the earth surface cool down slowly at night, a process known as terrestrial radiation (Getis, Getis, Bjelland and Fellmann 2011).

The warming and cooling process of the earth is regulated according to IPCC (2010) and Getis et al. (2011) by certain natural gases which are present in the earth's atmosphere, otherwise known as Greenhouse gases (GHGs), among which are Carbon dioxide (CO₂), Nitrous Oxide(N₂O), Methane(CH₄) and others. These gaseous chemicals according to Getis et al. (2011) and Bjelland, Montello, Fellman, Getis, and Getis (2013) enabled the Earth's ecosphere to maintain a minimum temperature range of fifteen and thirty-five degree Celsius that is optimal for life to thrive on the earth's. Hence, for everything to be normal for man and his environment there must be constant balancing of the elements that make up the Earth system (Getis et al. 2011).

However, human civilization has changed this delicate relationship. According to Eugine (2004), IPCC (2007); Getis et al. (2011) and Bjelland et al. (2013), human related activities such as the burning of fossil fuels(oil, gas, coal and wood), deforestation, digestive system of ruminant animals, and production of certain synthetic chemicals among others were widely

adjudged are responsible for releasing large quantities of these heat trapping gases into the atmosphere.

IPCC (2007) expressed concern that the GHG's absorb much of the earth's infrared radiation from the Sunlight and prevent it from escaping back into space. So the higher the GHG's are concentrated in the earth's atmosphere, the greater the amount of infrared radiation absorption and consequently the warmer the globe and consequence of climate change. United States Energy Information Administration (2012) as cited in Bjelland et al. (2013, 436) ascertained:

»that yearly carbon emissions from fossil fuel consumption in 1980 was over 18 billion metric tons and reached over 30 billion in 2009. Carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have seen an increase from about 280 ppm(parts per million) at the beginning of the industrial revolution to about 392ppm in 2011.«

Therefore, climate change is an observed deviation of world climatic conditions from existing patterns which is influenced by anthropogenic (greenhouse gas) interference with the world climate system, thereby resulting in many negative consequences for man and the human environment (Solomon, Hsiang, Marshall Burke, and Edward Miguel. 2013; World Bank 2013).

3. Evolution of Global Climate Change Issues

Prior to the formation of the UN in 1945 and subsequently the convoking of the first conference on environment titled the UN Conference on Human Environment in 1972, a Swedish scientist, Svante Ahrrenius, had in 1896 projected that emission from fossil fuel consumption (the driver of modern industrial economy) has doubled the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide, and as a result of the doubling, atmospheric carbon dioxide might raise mean temperatures of the earth by 4 to 6 degree Celsius. He therefore warned that carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions could lead to global warming.

About 79 years later, talk of global warming and climate change became prevalent, especially in the 1970s, as this previously obscure field of ecological science was brought to wider public attention by scientists' growing understanding of the earth's atmospheric system. The work of scientists, especially from institutions in the United States and UN agencies, such as World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Programme on Environment (UNEP), supported the claim. Work by scientists in Mauna-Loa, United States indicated an increase from 315 PPM (parts per million) to 331ppm in 1975. By 1979, the findings from the U.S

Academy of Science also underpinned the claim. According to Mehra, Mukherjee and Dutta (2012, 1):

»A majority of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid 20th century is most likely due to the observed increase in human -induced concentrations of pollutants, such as carbon dioxide (CO₂), Methane (CH₄) and nitrous oxide (N₂O), called the GHG's. The global increases in CO₂ concentration are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change(deforestation, agricultural land conversion), while those of CH₄ and N₂O are primarily find their origin in agriculture(water logging in paddy fields, ruminating bovine etc.) or other industrial activities.«

Indeed the scientific bodies, including the IPCC also predicted the negative consequences for the global environment, the home to man, when it eventually happened. As a result, several national and international forums, including Non Governmental environmental groups pressured a call concurrently, for international cooperation on the issue. Particularly, in 1979 the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), an intergovernmental regulatory framework sponsored the First World Climate Conference (FWCC) which was held in Geneva, from 12-23 February (Bodansky 2001, 2010, 2011). The conference expressed concern that continued expansion of human activities on earth may cause significant regional and even global climate change. The second conference held in 1985 reiterated this concern (Bodansky 2001, 2011).

Most of the scientists, the NGOs and agencies believed that something urgent needed to be done to avert global warming and climate change. Thus in order to give policy makers and the general public a better understanding of what researchers have learnt, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), an intergovernmental environmental regulatory framework pressured the UN to establish the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. The IPCC was given a mandate to assess the state of existing knowledge about the climate system and climate change; the environmental, economic and social impacts of climate change and possible response strategies.

The IPCC released its first assessment report in 1990, and it was approved after a painstaking peer review process by hundreds of leading scientists and experts. The report confirmed the scientific opinion on climate change. It also had a powerful impact on both policy makers and the general public and strongly influenced negotiations on the Climate Change Convention and subsequently the Kyoto Protocol. Based on the IPCC advise, the United Nations established a Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and entered into force in 1994, that set up arrangements

for sharing data among the states on climate change, developing national plans for controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and for adapting to climate change. According to the Mehra, Mukherjee and Dutta (2012, 3):

»The scientific community claims that with the stabilization of GHG's concentration to 450-550 parts per million (ppm) by 2050, the temperature increase could be contained to less than 2°C.«

In view of IPCC findings that the developed countries contributed more to historic share and perhaps present global emissions of greenhouse gases/effect, while the developing countries contribute less but they will be most affected by climate change, among other factors such as poverty and underdevelopment the UN Convention decided to allocate separate responsibilities to them, based on the principle that was christened "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC)". As a result more responsibility was placed on the developed countries under the convention to reduce their emission of GHG's and mitigate climate change.

However, the convention itself set no mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions for the developed countries and contains no enforcement mechanisms. Instead, it was considered morally binding. But, it provides for updates through yearly meetings of parties to the convention otherwise known as Conference of Parties (COP), where they would discuss and set mandatory emission limits. Subsequently, a protocol was negotiated (which set the mandatory emission limits which the developed countries must abide) out of the yearly meetings of the Parties to the Convention in Japan in 1997 and it was named after the city where the meeting was held as the "Kyoto Protocol". Therefore, the UNFCCC was stepping stone into a more definite action on global warming and climate change diplomacy.

4. The Kyoto Protocol

As the foregoing abundantly makes clear, the Kyoto Protocol is an outgrowth of the UNFCCC (WEFA, 1998). An amendment to UNFCCC became necessary when it was dawn on the parties that the UNFCCC can no longer deliver on the mandate of reducing GHGs emission on moral basis, especially on the scale that could avert climate change. Thus there was desire for the change of tactics. This urgent need for a review of tactics and strategies culminated in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, the Kyoto Protocol is a contractual arrangement with legal backings that prescribed limits on the amount of GHG's emission the developed countries must not exceed (Mehra,

Mukherjee & Dutta 2012). This is a legal obligation which implies that neither the Protocol nor its articles can be changed indiscriminately or its contents can be flouted without consequences for the offender.

On May, 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was initiated (UNFCCC), which was the first political move to solve the problem. Further move was the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in December, 1997, which was a definite one. The Kyoto Protocol basically sets varied emission limitation targets (average of 5.2 percent) below 1990 levels for the developed countries, which are binding under international law, to be achieved during the period 2008-2012 (Mehra et al. 2012). According to Bloch (2007), "while the 5.2 % figure is a collective one, individual countries were assigned higher or lower targets and some were permitted increases". The European Union countries were required to reduce emission on the average by 8 percent, United States by 7 percent, Japan by 6 percent and others on the average of 5 percent. Countries such as Australia, Iceland and Norway were given concession to increase their emission.

After successive five years of intense debates, that is in 2001, a compliance regime was agreed in Bonn- Germany, otherwise known as the Bonn Accord. Compliance system ensures that parties meet their commitments. It approve along with the legal commitment a list of flexible mechanisms such as Joint Implementation (JI), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Emission Trading, among others, to enable the parties implement their commitments in cost effective ways. While the fast growing developing countries such as Brasil, China and India were exempted from commitment (Sunstein, 2008). Instead the Kyoto Protocol proposes adaptation Fund that could be used to finance adaptation projects and programmes in the developing countries, perhaps to placate into taking definite action in future (UNFCCC, 2005). According to WEFA (1998, 9):

»The Kyoto Protocol contains no commitments for developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the developing countries did not agree on a voluntary process for reducing or limiting their emissions. In fact China and India emphatically opposed such voluntary commitments, saying that they would not bind their countries to GHG emission restrictions.«

So under the Bonn Accord, the UNFCCC secretariat was saddled with responsibilities to monitor countries actual emissions, amount reduced as well keeps precise records of emissions trades carried out. That is the registry system was charged to track and record transactions of parties under the mechanisms and keeps the records of international transaction in order to verify whether the transactions are consistent with rules of the

Protocol. Thus on the whole, the Kyoto Protocol was characterized by four key elements: internationally prescribed legal obligation for the developed countries, differing national target, no commitments for developing countries; and flexibility through market-based mechanism, such as tradable emission permit system to enable the parties fulfill their commitments in cost effective ways (Peason 2000; Barret and Stavins 2003).

Thereafter, with exception of the United States, the Kyoto Protocol was given ratification by about 191 countries and one regional economic bloc, the EU, as stringent UN intervention strategy to combat global climate change. The United States signed the Protocol, but remains the only signatory that never ratified the treaty, in fact she reject the treaty in 2001. The United States argued that emission cut would be damaging to its economy and the Protocol would not address the growing emissions from developing countries as China and India (Hovi Jon, DetlefSprinzand Guri Bang 2010).

India and China which were among the countries that ratified the Protocol were not obligated to decrease their GHG emissions. Thus they were among the countries that are not bounded in the Protocol, though they were allowed to sign. According to Bloch (2007, 1) “they were not obligated to decrease their emission at the moment, because they were not seen as the main culprit for emissions which began during the era of industrialization and they were not thought to be the cause of global warming and climate change of today”. He iterated that, “this is little odd given that China is about to overtake the U.S in emission”.

Given these circumstances, the Protocol suffered set back during the ratification. Due to U.S defection, the onus was now on Russia to ratify the Protocol, so as to meet the prescribed conditions for the coming into force of the Protocol, which required that 55 parties that contribute 55 percent of global GHG emissions must ratify it. Having realized her indispensability in bringing the Protocol to fruition, she decided to delay the process, as well as used the ratification as a bargaining chip to launched herself into the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which she had been denied for long. This procedural issue provided Russia the opportunity to block the ratification and delayed the protocol from coming into force on time.

Rather than ratifying the Protocol, Russia put up so many excuses, among which she claimed that she must be allowed to be a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) before she will agree to ratify the protocol. When the EU noticed the threat it pose to the Protocol, she quickly granted the Russia demand, she ratified the Protocol and it eventually came into force in 2005

having met all the relevant requirements and it took effect from 2008 through 2012. Australia delayed till late 2007 before she agree to ratify that is after it has been given concession of eight percent increase in her national emissions, rather than reductions. In 2011, Canada withdrew from the Protocol.

By April 2014, the data concerning the performances of the actors was officially published. The data indicated that, the 36 developed countries parties that were bounded by the Protocol surpassed their commitment by reducing their emission by 24 percent, although the GHG's reduction coverage of the Kyoto Protocol was not enough to reduce the global emission to the extent that can meet the goal of curtailing global warming below 2°C. According to Morel and Shishlov (2014, 1) "while positive, this achievement is due to emission reduction that has already taken place in economies in transition before 1997, which they say is up to 18.5 percent of the base year emissions". But they rather observed that the greenhouse gas/effect coverage of the Protocol was not sufficient to stop the growth of global GHGs emissions, the primary objective of the Kyoto Protocol, within the said period. Rather GHG's volumes in the environment are rising at a devastating rate without showing any sign of reduction. Besides average global temperature are rising correspondingly (IPCC, 2010).

A review of extent of enforcement of the Protocol revealed that many of the parties could not meet up with their emission reduction commitments. Apparently, majority of the Western Europe countries, with the exception of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Sweden and the United Kingdom, could not achieve their Kyoto target. Rather than reducing, countries such as Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand saw an increase in GHG emission, above their 1990 levels.

However, for countries of Central and Eastern Europe with economy in transition (EITs), there was really a large reduction in GHG emission. As indicated substantial reduction in GHG emission were found in Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. But most of these nations are former members of the Union of Soviet Social Republic (USSR) with centrally planned economy which have suffered serious economic distress as a result of the collapse of the Union since 1991 (Mehra et al. 2012). It is adjudged that the distress accounts for substantially lower levels of energy use and attending GHG emission. So the success recorded by these countries was not born out of genuine desire to implement the Protocol, but due to extraneous factors. Why then did the Kyoto Protocol failed?

5. Why the Kyoto Protocol Failed

When the plan to halt the threat of climate change through the use of the Kyoto Protocol was announced, the indication was that not all countries were pleased. Prominent among these is the United States and some of its allies who have vested interests and had invested much in GHG's emission related industry and had relied on it as the driver of their economy. Also included in this category is China and India among the developing countries that feared emission cut could affect the growth of their economy and demanded that they should be exempted from commitment. They took this unpleasant attitude towards the emission cut campaigns not because they hated sustainable environment, but for mere self-aggrandizement. As a matter of fact, many factors contributed to stifle the process.

Therefore, there were many reasons why the Kyoto Protocol failed in its obligation to compel the parties to limit their GHG's emissions. The first reason being that there is ambivalence of scientific proof concerning the seriousness of climate change. According to Kegley and Blanton (2011) major gaps in knowledge about the causes of global warming and climate change do exist. Global warming and climate change is considered by cynics as abstract science (Thomas and Fraser 1995; Awake2008). Thomas and Fraser (1995, 70) opined that there is disagreement among Environmentalist, Climatologists and politicians about the cause, speed and direction of climate change and on the need for drastic action.

In the same vein, Bloch (2007, 3) contends that "the science behind Kyoto was shaky due to limited availability of crucial data". Although many do agreed that the earth is warming but are not certain of both the cause and consequences. They argued though conservatively that human activities may be a factor, but not necessarily the primary one. Proponents believed that human activities are a major cause, but skeptics say that assumptions about the consequence are baseless.

It implies that the physical processes that underlie the global climate system are complex and not fully understood. As such interest groups tend to place their bias on the scientific data, such as that use to show why temperatures are rising. Rather they conclude that the possible causes of global warming include variation in sunspots and solar flares, which correlate with fluctuations in solar energy output. They emphasized that Earth orbits moves in cycles that take many thousands of years and that affect the planet distance from the Sun. The skeptics added that the climate change we are seeing today reflect these natural variations (Knickerbocker 2007; Kegley and Blanton 2011).

Moreover, the greenhouse gases/effect (GHGs) that were alleged to be causing the climate change are closely connected to vital sector of the economy in every country, such as agriculture, industry and energy production. Cutting down emissions of GHGs from these sectors will also require cutting down economic production's the basic source of human survival, in the face of ever growing world population, especially in the developing countries. All these contributed to further complicate finding solution to climate change problem and made it a strong challenge for international cooperation (Bjorkum 2005; Depledge 2005).

The number two reason is that there are differing national costs and benefits that will result from climate change and the Kyoto Protocol. Suggested effects of global warming by the IPCC indicate that the cost associated with climate change vary from region to region. Developing countries are thought to be more prone to the effects of climate change than developed countries because temperature increase is expected to be higher in the tropics and subtropics where most developing countries are located. In the same vein, they will experience the effect of Sea Level Rise (SLR), tropical storm, flood and draught that will in turn affect their agriculture, forestry and fishery which are the main stay of their economy. Meanwhile they have limited institutional capacity to adapt to climate change.

However, it is projected by IPCC that agriculture in the temperate region (where developed countries are located) will benefit from warmer temperatures, while higher temperatures, beside the consequences of thermal pollution or heat wave on the society will have a negative effect on agricultural production in the tropics. So these differences could influence negotiating positions or attitude of actors towards the protocol. It will even make the developed countries to foot-drag in ensuring sufficient participation and effective implementation of the Protocol.

Moreover, the projected damage from climate change is low in the developed countries and cost of the mitigation is high in those countries which can have serious economic implications for the parties that will implement the Protocol. For instance, the model produced by Nordhaus in 1993 as cited in Peason (2000) indicate that "efficient mitigation policy can yield benefits of about 270 billion US dollar when emission is reduced to a level where the ecosystem can thrive, but an attempt to stabilize emissions at 1990 will lead to a total value loss of 7 trillion US dollar". What this implies is that the immediate cost of mitigation is higher than the long term benefits to the industrialized countries who were obliged to enforce the Protocol (Tol 1998; Torney and Fujiwara 2010). This therefore could encourage countries to dilly dally in taking action, a trend that is presently

common in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. More than any other factor the high cost of implementing Kyoto may erodes any value that countries have for the treaty.

The costs associated with the policies remain a major concern in the policy debate. In light of this circumstance, Hovi, Skodvin and Aakre (2013, 140) were prompted to say:

»GHG's emission reduction on the scale necessary to solve climate change problem are very costly because almost all economic activities are associated with GHG emissions.«

In view of the foregoing, European Union (EU) council meeting held on the 22 of May, 2013, expressed dissatisfaction over the costs of implementing climate policy and its effect on their overall economy. With regards to that, states delegate (heads of state) declared that EU policy must promote competitive energy price and the need to put to complete use their indigenous energy resources, not limited to renewable energies but must include coal, nuclear power and shale gas. This policy statement invariably means that Europe is set to take unilateral decision that contradicts Kyoto treaty that specifies emission cut, with such implicit tendency not to discourage the use complete reliance on fossil fuel consumption, the primary GHG sources. Citing Kyoto implications for the EU overall economy, Germany parliamentary representative, Holger Kraemer said that rising energy costs and declining competitiveness of the European Economy has been the implications of following up with Kyoto Protocol and has been rated higher than apparently the un-enforceable global climate change mitigation ambitions. In addition, the head of a famous organization (Busesseurope) equally blamed the cost of mitigation, such as the Kyoto mechanism (emission trading system), renewable energy support programme and the structure of electricity markets, for the EU flagging economy.

According to Hovi et al. (2013), the point is well illustrated by Canada Environment minister, Peter Kent, who shows justification for Canada withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in the following way: the transfer of \$14 billion from Canada tax payers to other countries, the equivalent of \$1,600 from every Canadian family, with no impact on emissions or the environment. Given that actors will likely implement the least costly measures first, the cost of new measures tends to increase, which reinforces the tendency to free ride.

The number three reason why the Protocol failed is the possibility of parties outsourcing production to developing countries such China and India. China and India ratified the Protocol but because of the fact that they

are developing countries they were exempted from the legal commitment. According to Bloch (2007) the exemption of these countries “whether intended or coincidental has created a major loophole in the Kyoto Protocol”. Bloch stressed that “as a result of this loophole the west has effectively outsourced much of its carbon emissions to China and India.” Perhaps with the intention to hand twist the Protocol or perhaps to avert the restrictions placed on them by the Protocol and eventually the increase cost of production placed on the Western countries by the Protocol, companies have elect to shift their dirty industries to developing nations, which have no restriction on greenhouse gas/effect volumes they could emit. This shift negates Kyoto efforts to reduce global GHGs emissions, because firms are able to pollute freely in these nations.

As a result of the Protocol the goods produced in the developed nations become more expensive, China goods become comparatively less expensive. This is the prime reason why US refuse to ratify the Protocol and same reason that make Canada to withdraw. Consequently, developed nations that are bound by the Protocol now experienced a comparative disadvantage. The protocol might discourage production in these countries which can create unemployment, poverty and youth restiveness. In addition, energy costs will increase. That means that if the Kyoto Protocol is implemented, it will induce tax on carbon. Consequently, it will consume household income, lead to loss of million jobs and decrease living standards of the citizenry. This portrays the treaty to be dead on arrival.

The foregoing portend failure for the treaty as negotiators are no doubt are influenced by the state of global and national economy, their interpretation of the Kyoto Protocol and their view on the science of climate change, perception of fairness, belief about intergenerational equity, domestic political processes and national interests. So factors that influence negotiating positions vary from state to state. For instance, no politician will compromise his or her citizens’ prosperity for the sake of a global good, unless the agreement is seen as fair. In this case response to the treaty demand will be determined by domestic assessment of climate risks with regard to each country. Therefore higher vulnerability could likely result to more cooperative behavior and a more ambitious negotiating position, as seen in the case of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and developing countries, yet it cannot foster global consensus (Council of Europe 2013).

Therefore, countries opinion about the perceived costs of the Protocol in relation to domestic challenges is a source of worry. So carbon intensity of the economy is a case to worry about, especially when the cost of reducing emission to the individual economy is high. In that case, the political

influence of the national politicians and high carbon emitting industries are expected to truncate the Protocol, most especially when these industries are significant players in the different countries economy in terms of employment and foreign exchange earnings. As a result, diplomats and politicians engaged themselves in unending arguments that delayed taking action. The politicians were more concerned with their parochial national interest, what happen to their countries, their political ambitions of winning the next election and their political parties, than being concern with thinking in terms of what happen to the global environment.

The number four reason is that the living standard, culture and value system of the Parties to the Protocol are at variance. Climate change and efforts to resolve it involve all nations of the world, with divergent interests. But the countries of world differ in their culture and value system; ethical and philosophical, religious and belief system. They also differ in their political and economic system; some are capitalist states, some socialist, while others practiced mixed system. The differences are shown with respect to values they place on environmental resources. These differences shape states actor behavior towards perception of risk of climate change and efforts towards mitigation and control.

These differences in value system may truncate effort at reaching international consensus, as these factors demand that countries will negotiate, not impose, arrive at compromise, establish regimes and choose efficient enforcement mechanism. As such reaching an international agreement and enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol will not be easy. It could have been easy if all the nations were the same, but they are not. There are different parties to the Kyoto Protocol, with regards to: past, present and prospective emission; vulnerability to climate change; the cost of emission control; income levels and mitigation capacity, valuation of damage; willingness and ability to pay for control; and national capacity to formulate, implement and enforce regimes. Therefore, the foregoing factors promote the tendency for parties to abdicate their primary responsibility to the Kyoto Protocol.

The number five reason is that implementing the Protocol has far-reaching implications on the international political economy, exchange rates and competitive position of private and public industries powered by fossil fuel. Competition or struggle for power among states in the international system could also affect the protocol. Competitiveness among state actors is another factor, particularly in times of economic hardship which in modern times has taken much attention of politicians. So the continued need for economic growth in a stiff competitiveness in international system could

undermine effort at implementing the law. Similarly, the likelihood of continued economic difficulties in developed countries could lower the political confidence and undermine the financial capacity needed to deliver an international agreement (Council of Europe 2013). Equally, the position of key trading partners and competitors could also have much influence on a country's negotiating position. For example, Canada position has, to date, been closely aligned to the US, with whom it has strong economic ties, as members of North America Free Trade Association (NAFTA).

Given these factors, the Kyoto Protocol, besides the effects on economy and by extension national sovereignty was affected severely by free riding. For instance, the developing countries especially China, India and other emerging economy participated but refused to be part of legally binding obligation; the United States refuse to ratify the Protocol; Canada ratified but subsequently withdraw from the agreement; countries with economy in transition, such as Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and so forth participated with rather lenient emission control commitments.

The number six reason is that climate change offer opportunity for countries to tap the oil resources in the arctic region which was formerly impenetrable. Climate change affects Ice cap in the Arctic region of the Earth intensely, because the average temperature there has doubled as a result of global warming (World Bank 2010). This trend paved way for struggle among countries, which the primary reason is possession of the oil and gas reserves buried beneath the seabed under the Arctic ice, which formerly was impenetrable. Now climate change has made it accessible. Otherwise, the side effect of climate change has result in eco-politics over natural resources beneath the Ice among the five countries, Russia, Norway, Canada, United States and Denmark already laying claim to the resource-rich central zone (Kegley and Blanton 2011). Thus, the politics of climate change was demonstrated by Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States struggle for oil and gas deposits beneath the Arctic cycle glacier meltdown, as consequences of global warming.

Besides, the disappearing ice also offers the possibility of new sea routes between Europe and Asia, at least for part of the year, which significantly reduce the time it take to travel from Europe to Asia. Thus as global warming melts the Arctic ice, dreams of a short sea route to Asia, now known as Northwest Passage, have been realized. So as the struggle for who win the World new Great Game continues, with Russia Planting a flag on the floor at the North Pole, Canada, Denmark, and Norway talking tough and Washington wanting to be a player, so the Kyoto Protocol suffers total

neglects (Awake 2008; Hovi Jon, DetlefSprinz and Guri Bang 2010; Kegley and Blanton 2011).

The number seven reason is the issue of technology to mitigate climate change. The climate change convention and its Kyoto Protocol while apportioning responsibilities stipulates technology transfer from North to South, to enable the South fulfill their obligation. Therefore the developed countries were expected to meet full incremental cost and provide technology for mitigation measures adopted by the developing countries. This conditional statement appears to be very simple in theory, but it is very complex in interpretation and practice. What constitutes the agreed principle of technological transfer later becomes dispute and several disputes would be resulted in the international fora which could not be resolved because the developed countries viewed the introduction of new technology as a mechanical quick fix, of which, such highly sophisticated western technology cannot be introduced overnight in developing countries, nor could they be made to work in the absence of appropriate infrastructure, skill and institutional arrangements. All these are complex and also costly in terms of resources and time.

Lastly, the lack of Participation from Developing Countries is another issue that worked against the Protocol. Perhaps the most fundamental flaw of Kyoto involves lack of mandatory participation of developing nations. The treaty fails to impose legally binding emission reduction standards upon the developing countries, which encompass over 140 nations, while apportioning the responsibilities to mitigate climate change (Hovi, Sprinz and Bang 2010). Rather, the big industrializing countries such as Brazil, India, and China acting on behalf of developing countries insisted that measures to combat climate change should not infringe on their sovereignty, in particular, their right to develop economically. They argued that, since the North has historically been responsible for creating the climate change problem, the North should also be responsible for solving it.

Some proponents of the Kyoto argued that the developed countries, specifically the US and those countries of Europe, pioneered the use of fossil fuels during industrialization and therefore, created the current global warming predicament. They were quick to point that developed nations account only 20% of the global population yet emit 60% of the world's CO₂ (Easterbrooks 2001). Even more alarming, the US composes only 5% of the world population yet account for about 30% of CO₂ emissions. According to a per capita calculation, a Chinese person generates 1/10 of the GHGs emissions of an American. Ironically, the two major emitters, the United States and China were not cover by the Protocol. The US signed the treaty

but refused to ratify it, while China ratified it but was obliged to reduce her emission. In fact, both countries argued that is bad for their economy.

Nevertheless, even the most ardent supporters of Kyoto admit that the treaty cannot stabilize GHG's emission without meaningful participation of developing countries (which represents 80% of the global population (UNDP 2010; Kegley& Blanton 2011), as rightly advocated by the US and Its allies. This argument has been at center of effort to combat climate change. This make Kyoto Protocol in all ramifications to be adversarial as it involves parties (developed and developing countries) who are constantly in opposition and who made attack on each other. Eventually, as developing nations advance, their GHG emissions rapidly increased due to industrial development, which relies heavily upon high CO2 emitting fossil fuel sources, including coal. According to widely accepted projections, China has surpassed the US as the largest emitter, yet she was exempted from commitment. The benefits of controlling GHGs emissions appears weighted toward developing countries-they refused to take abatement cost burden due to their low incomes and development needs. Therefore, the actions of only about 36 developed nations could not have significantly reduced the trend of global climate change, while over 134 developing nations continue to exponentially increase GHG emissions.

Even though China's economy has been one of the fastest growing in the world, it is a top priority for the Chinese government to sustain the rapid growth. China is in any case a developing country and development and industrialization are its main priorities. Since the late 1970s when the economic reforms were launched, the 'legitimacy of the Communist Party has rested primarily on the pillars of nationalism and economic growth' (Economy 2001). Energy demands in China will continue to increase along the line of their expanding population and inadvertently the economic growth, which may have affected Kyoto ability to fulfill its mandate.

Therefore, examining deeply the major factors that push the Kyoto Protocol into the danger zone provides an insight into the interconnected complications why it does not work, including the trade-off in trying to provide for human needs and the ways the policy choices of individual government influenced the process and outcomes of the UN climate policy decisions. These imply that insufficient scientific knowledge, lack of consideration given to cost- benefit calculus to the individual countries, level of poverty and lack of resources, and unavailability of adequate technology raised policy questionsthat could spell doom for the Kyoto Protocol.

6. Conclusion

By all indications, this article highlights the major problems facing the United Nations today, especially on the area of combating the issue of climate change. The challenges of global climate change actually necessitated the intervention of the United Nations, which effort midwifes the Kyoto Protocol. However, events shows that the Protocol was left with inability to counter the dynamics of global warming, due to certain political and policy questions that are yet to be answered, as well as underlying factors: lack of scientific consensus on the seriousness of the issue; the differing estimated national costs and benefits that might accrue from climate change; variation in the living standard, cultural belief and value system of the Parties to the Protocol, especially the value they placed on the environment; and among others.

These identified factors might have really given rise to politics played during the formulation, ratification and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. This could make one to subscribe to the view of foreign policy analysts that no single category of causation can fully explain foreign policy decisions of nations, but rather, a number of factors could come together to codetermine the decisions that produce foreign policy outputs of states, especially those pertaining to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.

So, while answering the question as in why the Kyoto Protocol failed in its obligation to combat Climate Change, we went beyond a single factor explanation and reason in terms of multiple causes. For that, we identified cluster of reasons that exert influence on the choices that actors made, especially as they insisted on this or that when they tried to domesticate and implement Kyoto Protocol. The UN is therefore advised to do more, in the area of convincing states to see reasons to combat climate change. Policy makers are therefore implored to be proactive in taking decisions geared towards stabilizing the Climate.

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SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE AGING POPULATION IN POLAND AND EASTERN EUROPE

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Abstract: *The length of human life is a universally recognized indicator of overall health of society. In recent times, problems of old age and aging is the subject of social discourse, is present in the mainstream of medical, economic and even political. Population aging is one of the characteristic phenomena of the modern world. It is a process that leads to enormous transformations in many areas of life - politics, economy, culture, education, medical services, care, which in turn shapes our future. For the direct cause of the aging population should be considered past and current trends in terms of diversity, migration and mortality. Irreversible aging of European society needs to take effective action, not only in the medical area, but above all in the sphere of social policy, institutions, nursing care or entities activating-supporting seniors.*

Keywords: *age, aging, social policy, social support, institutional policy for elderly people*

1. Introduction

Aging of societies is one of the most characteristic phenomena of the modern world. It is a process which leads to major transformations in many aspects of life – politics, economy, culture, education, medical and support services and, therefore, it has an influence on our future. Past and present trends towards fertility, migration and mortality rate are the direct causes for the aging of societies. It is estimated that the elderly (65+) will constitute about 30% of the population in 2050. The demographic old-age threshold is measured according to the indicator used by the demographers of the United Nations and it is expressed by 7% of people aged 65+ relative to the entire population.

The process of aging of societies takes on a global character and, therefore, also in Poland, we can observe that the population of seniors is growing. This demographic phenomena is the process which encompasses all European countries. Aging of societies is one of the most characteristic

phenomena of the modern world. It is a process which leads to major transformations in many aspects of life – politics, economy, culture, education, medical and support services and, therefore, it has an influence on our future. The main reasons for a greater number of seniors relative to the overall number of people are: the decline in the birth rate, longer life-expectancy, lower infant mortality rate, technological and medical development, the growth in prosperity and better life quality. Prosperity is associated with better access to medical care and services, higher level and broader range of social services and better social and living conditions.

According to 2002 World Health Organization report, there are 580 million people aged 60+ living in the world. More than half of them live in highly developed countries. At present, the population of Europe is aging at a faster rate that it is growing. It is estimated that in 2020 the number of seniors will reach 1 billion and they will constitute 30% of the entire population (Steuden 2011, 16). Out of the entire number of seniors, 72% will live in developing countries. Nowadays, the number of people aged 60+ is nearly 70 billion in the EU, which constitutes one fifth of the entire population. It is expected that the average life-expectancy will continue to raise. This, together with the low level of childbirth, will affect the age structure of the population and will lead to the acceleration of the aging process of societies.

Apart from the numerous natural consequences of vitality loss and being less active in many aspects of life, there are also physiological changes which lead to many ailments and the development of disabilities of seniors. Growing population of seniors results in a greater number of people who are sick, disabled and who require medical, rehabilitative and nursing care. According to D.B. Bromley, aging is a set of changes in the structure and functioning of the body and in its ability to adapt. The aging process is an expression of the accumulated influence of changes which take place in constitutionalized predispositions of an individual and which depend on the environmental conditions. (Bromley 1969, 36) The highest rate of population aging occurs in countries with a high level of economic development (Japan, Italy, Sweden, Germany, France) and in post-communist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland)

Aging whole world, but soon the Old Continent, where the phenomenon commonly referred to as daddy boom is applied to population decline. Formed the so-called. „ Inverted demographic pyramid " where the population of the third generation is represented greater numbers than the generations of young people. Falling birth rates, extended life expectancy

and significantly increases the so-called. „ Ratio of old age ". Europe is aging demographically at least a century, and deformities in the population of the youngest and oldest continually subject deepened. At present, already in countries such as Sweden, Belgium, Greece, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, the share of people aged 60 years or more in the overall social structure exceeds 20%. Growing increase in the number of seniors results in numerous problems of collective and individual nature which affect all European countries. The main problems of the elderly are: difficult economic situation, loneliness, disability, poverty and marginalization. The purpose of this article is to show the problems of an aging population and old age in the context of current social and demographic transformations and institutional forms of assistance for seniors. It is assumed that the longer the average duration of human life is one of the important causes of aging, but it is also an indicator of a better condition of health of the population. Thus, assume greater need for institutional provision for the elderly, both in terms of entities operating in the medical sphere, as well as providing social support.

2. Seniors as a research category

Old-age carries a number of pilling social problems of pathological nature such as poverty, marginalization and limited access to medical and rehabilitative services. The exacerbation of those and many other problems, which result from the condition of European societies, poses a serious challenge for the direction of modern social policy in Europe.

Due to significant discrepancies in an individual speed of aging, lower physical activity, incidence and the change of employment and economic status, the source literature has not managed to establish any unambiguous criterion which would define the beginning of old-age and its periodization. For the majority of seniors the calendar age does not correspond with the biological age and it concerns such indicators as: health condition, satisfaction with the level and quality of life and social activity. The collectivity of elderly people forms a diverse population in terms of their medical, psychological, social and economic needs. This category of people requires taking effective actions in protecting the rights of seniors in the sphere of social policy and social work. The range of activities encompasses many aspects of social life, i.a., education, culture, health, work and the management of free time.

The needs of seniors and understanding old-age as a stage of life is a problem frequently discussed in the context of present social and

demographic transformation. The process of aging of societies takes far-reaching consequences in many aspects of social life, e.g., in social policy and social work. Old-age and aging are two closely connected terms where old-age is treated as one of the phases of human life cycle (of static nature) and aging is treated as a dynamic process. (Szarota 2004, 22-23). The source literature finds it very difficult to define old-age scientifically. It is often defined as the process of biological activity becoming lower with age. The essence of aging lies in tissues losing the ability of self-renewal and in the body losing the ability to self-adopt. Broadly speaking, old-age, together with accompanying changes, is the last stage of human life.

According to P. Bledowski, old-age is the stage of human life which, together with progressive psychological and physical changes, alters our social, economic and family status (Bledowski 2002, 63-64).

B. Szatur-Jaworska defines the process of aging in the following way: "demographic aging is the irreversible process (return to demographic youth is very unlikely) which does not have precedence in the history of a mankind. The process is very common and leads to a number of consequences in every aspect of our lives" (Szatur-Jaworska 2009, 51). The speed of aging varies depending on many individual, social and geographical factors. Seniors are present in every society and they comprise a diverse population in terms of their social, cultural, economic and health characteristics.

Both, gerontologists and geriatricians emphasize that longer lifespan results from the increasing awareness of health-oriented behavior and lifestyle, e.g. overcoming addictions, eating healthy diet, reducing the intake of animal fat and table salt as well as frequent consumption of fruit and vegetables. It is also emphasized that longevity results from low fertility rate, late maternity, promotion of physical activity and active participation in social life. Although longer lifespan is one of the most important reasons for the aging of societies, it is also an indicator of better health condition of people. It is estimated that the average lifespan will be increasing and this is already creating many unsettling repercussions, e.g. constant need for medical support for the third and fourth generation.

The source literature distinguishes stages of old-age which are connected with the biological condition of seniors as well as their ability to actively participate in social life. It needs to be noticed that each stage presented below poses different kinds of problems and requires different ways of fulfilling the needs of seniors (Szarota 2004, 23).

1. Stage of old-age between 60-69. This is so called early old-age which is often associated with the end of professional life.

2. Stage of old-age between 70-74. This is so called transitional age between early old-age and the age of limited mental and physical efficiency.

3. Period of old-age between 78-84. This is so called advanced old-age where great decrease of physical efficiency and general deterioration of well-being is assumed.

4. The age of 85+ which the source literature describes as “deep” old-age.

The World Health Organization distinguishes four stages of old-age:

1. Presenile age (between 45-59)
2. Early old-age (between 60-74)
3. Late old-age (75-89)
4. Longevity (90+).

Nowadays, both in Poland and in the developed countries, we are observing that the first stage of old-age is becoming longer due to increasing average of life expectancy. The process of demographic aging has encompassed the majority of European societies, including Poland. According to the EUROSTAT data, in 2030, so called demographic dependency ratio will reach 38.04% in 27 European countries and 35.98% in Poland (14th position in the report). Germany will be demographically the oldest (46.23%), followed by Italy (42.45%) and Slovenia. Ireland (24.63%) and Cyprus (27.44%) will be the youngest (Szatur-Jaworska 2009, 52).

Our society is considered to be demographically old and this creates a number of repercussions related to the necessity of fulfilling the needs of seniors. Because the majority of societies are aging, many scientific disciplines and areas of social life, including social policy and social work, have started to take greater interest in the problem of old-age. For social policy and social work the following demographic phenomena are important: “feminization of old-age”, internal diversification of population, the increase in the number of “old seniors” and singularization, i.e, the increase in the number of seniors running their household alone.

The demographic prognosis also shows that the process of aging will be accelerating at the fastest rate in the Southern and Eastern Europe – in relatively poorer regions of Europe. This may lead to dramatic differences in social and economic conditions of the countries and may result in social dissatisfaction and conflicts. Therefore, it is expected that active social policy will be introduced on an international scale.

3. Social policy towards the elderly

The importance of social policy towards elderly people results from the demographic changes taking place for the last 50 years in the majority of the European countries. The demographic aging of societies leads to a number of consequences. Poland, like many other European countries, is an aging country and this is manifested by a steadily growing number of seniors in the population. Modern societies are characterised by better life conditions, the development of medicine and continuing improvement of economic standards which, all together, increase life expectancy. In Poland, the situation of seniors depends entirely on their family situation where, in most cases, the elderly become recipients only. Feeling lonely and being dependent on relatives may lead seniors to the conviction that they are a burden to the family and it would be better if they stepped away to make the life of their family easier. Therefore, they decide to leave their family environment and look for institutionalized help. In Poland, a vast number of seniors find themselves in this position and it more often concerns women than men (similarly to the entire population of the world). Polish society is characterised by low population growth.

Aging of societies leads to many serious economic consequences due to the fact that lower number of people in the labour force has to provide for the growing number of pensioners. Relatively lower retirement age and longer life expectancy means that greater part of human life coincides with a period of retirement. Retirement is commonly regarded as the border of old-age over which people have excess of free time, no duties and a different social status. At the same time, they also feel isolated, lonely and useless. Therefore, one of the challenges of social policy is to organize lives of seniors who, by losing their family, social and professional contacts, have never been that lonely. Due to the increased mobility of people, seniors live without the support of the closest family members who, for economic reasons, live in other European countries.

In Poland, the number of the youngest citizens, who are regarded as a natural provision for the society, is also falling. For the last 40 years the number of seniors in the population of Poland has doubled – from over 8% to around 17%, and the demographic prognosis indicates that it will continue to grow (Worach-Kardas 2003, 403-404).

Many European countries face the same situation which proves that the aging of societies is a major demographic, social and economic problem. In order to guarantee adequate social and medical support to the elderly, European societies have undertaken a number of activities to give the right direction to social policy.

There is not one officially recognized definition of social policy towards seniors. In general, it is defined as the policy of looking after the interests of seniors. Moreover, it pertains to the needs and living conditions of seniors and it aims at improving their life situation. Taking interest in the needs of seniors allows to lay down programs for social policy which include such aspects as: health protection, employment of the elderly, equal rights when it comes to the income of older women, provision of support to the bedridden, social work, provision of adequate living conditions and institutionalized support as well as the improvement of the economic situation of seniors.

In this context, poverty is one of the major problems of old-age, especially in post-communist societies where the pension scheme was poor. Pension security scheme is one of the fundamental social elements which financially protects seniors in Europe and it is often called protection against old-age.

The term pension can be defined as long-term lifelong financial benefit provided to seniors after a certain age established individually by each country (Rysz - Kowalczyk 2002, 47). The right to pension is also protected by the European law, e.g., in the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers introduced by the European Community in 1989 (also called Social Card of the European Community). The Charter has to be observed also by Poland. According to the Charter, every retired person should be provided with the financial means to maintain adequate level of life. In the case when a person, after reaching the retirement age, is not entitled to receive pension or does not have any financial means, he or she should be entitled to receive social welfare allowance and in-kind assistance in case of sickness, adequately to their needs. Low pensions and sickness allowances do not allow to lead satisfactory lives, to buy all the necessary medication or to eat healthy diet which is very important especially in the case of old man's diseases (cancer, circulatory diseases, respiratory diseases, Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease or type 2 diabetes). Seniors, whose financial means are rather limited, very often decide to give up a lot of necessary conveniences which consequently leads to premature death characteristic for this age group (Błaszczuk and Rynkowska 2014, 68)

4. Institutionalized support and senior counselling

One of the important elements of international social policy towards seniors is undertaking activities in the area of institutionalized help and support programs. The European Social Card guarantees the right to

institutionalized help and makes support institutions responsible for the fulfilment of the needs of seniors (art. 12, 13, 14, 15).

It has already been pointed out that the demographic processes make it necessary to take substantial actions in the area of social policy towards the elderly. Nowadays, people live longer and seniors require increased support of family and various institutions which provide support and care services. Therefore, it is of vital importance to engage as many social policy entities as possible both - on governmental, self-governmental and private level, in the form of societies, foundations and support group. The list of the international support institutions includes:

- World Health Organization – responsible for the reduction of threats to human health
- FERPA – European Federation of Retired and Elderly People
- AGE Platform Europe
- EURAG – European Federation of Older Persons
- EUGMS – European Union Geriatric Medicine Society
- EPSO – European Federation of Associations for Elderly People
- EPDA – European Parkinson’s Disease Association
- MHE – Mental Health – Europe – prognosis for the improvement of mental health
- AIUTA – Association of Universities of the Third Age

The main objectives of those organizations are: the protection of the rights of seniors, the prevention of marginalization, care for the quality of life of older generation. Not only do they take care and provide support to the elderly but they also make seniors more active in various areas of life. These activities particularly include: the development of various forms of participation as well as the development of solidarity and intergenerational integration. For many years the necessity for the development of institutionalized as well as community support of the elderly has been emphasised. The experience shows that community support is cheaper and assures better integration of seniors with local communities. Despite steadily improving infrastructure of various support and care institutions, family remains the fundamental entity which provides adequate support to seniors. However, it requires support of professional social services and institutions. Therefore, the cooperation between social work and family care providers needs to be improved. Due to the fact that seniors require frequent hospitalization, the quality and the form of cooperation between social workers and social assistants in hospitals should also be addressed.

5. Conclusions

Social consequences of the aging of societies may be analysed on various levels of social life – on micro-level (family) on meso-level (local society) and on macro-level (the entire society). When analysing these consequences we need to remember about the changes that have already taken place or which are expected to happen in various social structures and institutions. Both, old-age and aging deserves the attention and care provision of various environments, especially in the aspect of support services. We need to remember that seniors form a specific community and have different needs, aspirations, health and social problems. The institutionalized as well as community activities towards the elderly can be successfully undertaken under the following conditions:

1. Due to diversified areas of senior activity, support should be based on a certain type of services adjusted to the intellectual and physical level of seniors
2. When addressing the dynamics of the process of aging, we should consider all stages of old-age because the hierarchy of needs, possibilities and interests of the elderly is changing
3. The prospect of placing seniors in social environment – their functioning in local community, cultural aspects, relations with family members as well as their neighbours
4. The implementation of support activities is regulated by a number of international documents which address the right of seniors to satisfactory life, the right to decide about themselves and to participate actively in public, social and cultural life.

Because the situation of the elderly is difficult, the direction and range of social policy activities is of vital importance. The state policy towards seniors focuses on two dimensions. On one hand, it emphasises the necessity to fulfil the needs of seniors, on the other hand, it tries to define the aims and the influence of each stage of life on the functioning of a person, e.g. by defining certain characteristics of old-age and threats resulting from them. The demographic situation in Poland is similar to that of other European countries, and therefore can be expected that the number of older people will be gradually increased. Demographic force change threshold of old age, extending the same age production, and this brings, in turn, increase the retirement age. An important issue, both in Poland and other European countries is a search for systemic solutions which would guarantee the elderly population proper place in society and create the conditions for a dignified life in a safe and friendly environment. Please note that due to the

deepening of the aging of European societies, seniors will increasingly require care and protection not only from the family. Due to demographic challenges associated with progressive change of balance between the generations, will not always be possible to provide support from the family. In terms of social policy and outreach activities should focus on in-depth investment for the development of institutional forms of support for seniors, eg.: senior clubs, universities of the third age, nursing homes, day centers of social assistance.

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HOW TO APPROACH A MIGRANT: A PSYCHOSOCIAL VIEW

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Abstract: *When a person migrates from his home country, especially if not by his own choice, she/he faces several severe psychosocial traumas. When entering a foreign country, a migrant is stigmatized, sometimes put into institutional care, deals with people from different cultural background and professionals who do not always understand a migrants' situation and are not familiar with appropriate interventions. In the paper we address these issues and discuss proper psychosocial treatment of the migrants. Improvements have to be done in two basic areas: education of professionals and destigmatisation. Education of professionals should include four basic things: general psychosocial guidelines for the proper approach to people with different cultural background, understanding potential issues in the origin country understanding potential issues in the host country and development of specific psychotherapeutic skills for treatment of migrants. Destigmatisation should be obtained with the change of the opinion and attitude of the social community in the hosting country, establishment of the social support and education and integration of a migrant into social environment of the hosting country. This approach will regain dignity of a migrant and control of their own life.*

Key Words: *migrant, psychosocial help, cultural background*

1. Introduction

Today, more than 60 million people worldwide and counting have been displaced from their homes, fleeing war or persecution. Much of the world began paying attention last summer, as waves of refugees poured from Syria, Iraq and other countries across European borders (Winerman 2016). Till March 2016 nearly half a million refugees passed through Slovenia. Volunteers were recruited without appropriate guidelines how to provide cultural appropriate psychosocial help. Refugees were not treated properly, with consequences on their legal status, social and psychological wellbeing. This is not a lonely case, often experts in the field are not appropriately educated, inhabitants of the hosting country are not well informed and

refugees and migrants do not integrate in the host country community. A story of a migrant described ahead is the result that we can see much too often.

“A woman, let’s call her Sheila had migrated to the United States several years ago from Brazil, during which time she felt she “had not accomplished anything” in her life. She felt a lack of purpose, as well as significant disappointment in herself for her difficulty with motivation. She felt ashamed for not having mastered the English language yet, stating, “I feel stupid.” She had attempted several times to engage in English classes, only to drop out in frustration. She had left most of her family behind in Brazil and planned, one day, to return home, but found her timeline extending steadily with every year she remained in the U.S. She had worked cleaning houses, sometimes three or four in one day, but had been unemployed over the past couple of years. She described feeling somewhat connected to a church community, but experiencing feelings of alienation, superficiality in her social connections, and intensely missing her family in Brazil. She also described living in consistent anxiety due to her undocumented status (Bessa 2016).

As we can see from the presented story, in emergencies, people may experience several individual psychological symptoms and reactions, such as depression and traumatic stress, but many, particularly when fleeing to another culture, experience suffering in spiritual, religious, family or community terms. The later is many times discharged and not properly treated in the process of providing psychosocial help. As stated by Birman et al. (2005) programs that provide services to people from different cultural backgrounds should emphasize the cultural competence, the capacity of providing help in ways that is acceptable, engaging and effective with multicultural populations. Namely, it is the culture that defines how to establish the relationship with a person, what is appropriate or suitable and what is not. In this manner it is essential for the field experts who provide psychosocial help to be aware of potential cultural differences and reject all the prejudices.

In the paper we will discuss the following areas that are necessary to address when providing adequate attitude toward migrants from different cultural background:

- a) Appropriate multicultural interventions of psychosocial help.
- b) Destigmatisation of migrants from different cultures in a hosting country.

2. Appropriate multicultural interventions of psychosocial help

Even though research shows that the acculturation process is far from standard, and that different individuals have vastly different approaches to relating to their host and native cultures (Berry 1997; Berry et al. 2006; Nguyen and Benet-Martinez 2007) we will nevertheless discuss some general guidelines that are usually appropriate to follow when providing psychosocial help to people from different cultural background.

When providing psychosocial help to refugees or migrants there are some specifics that service provider should pay special attention to and include them into this process. We will consider them within the following categories:

- 1) Psychosocial help general guidelines;
- 2) Potential issues in the origin country;
- 3) Potential issues in the hosting country;
- 4) Cultural sensitive psychotherapy.

As stated above, reader has to be aware of the topic complexity, individual differences, and nuanced blending of native and host cultures (Nguyen and Benet-Martinez 2007).

2.1. Psychosocial help guidelines

General guidelines are the ones that should be followed in any kind of psychosocial help. However, when dealing with people from different cultural background they are the ones that have to be even more emphasized, since many of the fundamental rights of the migrants and refugees in need are already violated. Besides, narrowed perspective of the expert might cause the omission of the important aspects that lead to inappropriate intervention.

To start with, making human rights an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of mental health and psychosocial programs is a must. All persons should have the right to be treated with dignity and respect, equality and without discrimination. Wherever possible, support should enable people to choose how they would like to do things in order to maintain a sense of dignity and personal control (Mental Health and Psychosocial Support for Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants on the Move in Europe, A multi-agency guidance note 2015). Loss of control over a person's life is usually the leading problem in all crisis. Therefore, self-reliance and personal control are very important in the process of crisis interventions. Sometimes, these basic human rights are not met, due to prejudices on conscious or unconscious level that lead to

discreditation of migrants on the level of human dignity. Sometimes human rights protection threats and abuses arise from the legal procedures as well.

Next, when providing help to people from the foreign countries appropriate language has to be used and therapist should not assume about the client's knowledge of a foreign language. Information that an expert provides should use everyday language and avoid using clinical terms outside clinical settings. Most importantly, words like 'traumatized', 'psycho-trauma', 'PTSD' to denote a whole population should not be used (International organization for migration 2015).

General guidelines of culturally sensitive social help also include relevant psycho-education that has to be provided to a client. Education of the migrants or refugees about their feelings, future, skills they will need etc., help them to understand the sometimes overwhelming feelings that naturally arise from the many stressors they face. For example, people may experience changes in sleep and eating habits or be easily irritated. It can be helpful to reassure people of the normality of many of these reactions and provide simple ways to cope with distress and negative feelings (World Migration Report 2015). Walker (1999) highlights the importance of taking a public health approach to building awareness and education among immigrant populations and isolated ethnic groups.

Overall, interventions should be culturally relevant and include culturally adequate interpretation. Any intervention should incorporate the emotional, mental, social, spiritual, and cultural dimensions in order to be psychologically effective, cross-nationally relevant, and humanely respective for such a unique and diverse population (World Health Organization, War Trauma Foundation and World Vision International 2011). This should not be taken for granted. Even when using standardized questionnaires there can be inappropriate questions inside for migrants from some cultures. For example: In the questionnaire Value of children 1 (Ataca and Kağıtçıbaşı 2015), which contains questions about the meaning of children for the (potential) parents questions about economic value of the children raised disapproval and offence in some, particular western countries which do not value children due to their economic value. On the other hand these questions were perceived as offensive also among Turkish people, yet for different reason. Many interviewees said, that if a child respects the family, there should be no doubt that she/he will help it as much as she/he can. This does not depend on the economic status, but on the family values (Ataca and Kağıtçıbaşı 2015). This is why it is essential to learn about the migrants' background culture and if possible, confirm the information collected by discussing it with local anthropologists or other cultural guides who have

extensive knowledge of local culture and practices. An expert should not be ashamed to admit she/he has no knowledge about something and should not be afraid to ask for information. Clients appreciate and take it as a demonstration of respect if their therapist admits to limited knowledge of the clients' culture and makes an effort to learn more (Rogers-Sirin et al. 2015). In this manner it is also very important to dismiss all the prejudices and respect the deeply held beliefs and traditions of clients, even if they are opposed to psychological principles from the "host" culture or do not share the culture's beliefs. Many migrants and refugees carry with them traditional mentalities, strict religious values, and old social customs, and may show inflexibility and rigidity out of fear of losing their identity and heritage (and being tainted by Western lifestyles). If a therapist is not open for different culture, individuals' and families' different behaviors and actions, arising from different cultural norms and values of the migrant, can easily be understood as a "poor fit" between their current environment and their resources (Miller and Rasco 2004, 376). There are several excellent examples of clinical care in which indigenous practices, beliefs, or rituals are incorporated into clinical services for war-affected individuals (Jaffa 1996; Schreiber 1995; Stark 2006). For example: "A former boy soldier said he felt stressed and fearful because the spirit of a man he had killed visited him at night". The problem was communal since his family and community viewed him as contaminated and feared retaliation by the spirit if he was not cleansed. Humanitarian workers consulted local healers, who said that they could expel the angry spirit by conducting a cleansing ritual, which the boy said he needed" (Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 2007). In the research of Rogers-Sirin et al. (2015) it was shown that multicultural openness helped migrants to develop insight into themselves and their current concerns. This does not mean that clinicians must demonstrate a blank acceptance of all behaviors and beliefs of clients from different cultures. For example, the enactment of cultural beliefs or behaviors that violate the rights or autonomy of others is an area in which psychologists may provide careful and thoughtful challenges to cultural traditions within the context of a positive therapeutic relationship.

When working with people from different cultural background, one should also have in mind, that experts who work in their field, often narrow their perspective of the problem. Thus the problem of the person in need is seen from one perspective only, not considering the problematics from the holistic point of view. Therefore field workers must not work in isolation but coordinate and cooperate with others. Treatment should include stakeholders at different levels (family, community, local and national NGOs

and government) who should understand their responsibilities. One should not forget, that the counselor or therapist alone is not enough to save all the migrant's or refugee's problems. Social support is crucial, therefore it should be strengthened. Volunteers who understand local culture, can provide a feeling that migrants are not alone, give them a piece of warmth they have lost and encourage them to resilience their life. A good example of the services cooperation happened on Sri Lanka in 2005 where Red Cross and Red Crescent successfully cooperated with the Sri Lankan Red Cross Society, making extensive use of local volunteers. All relevant staff and volunteers engaged by the movement were trained according to professional principles, including training in working with cultural resources to provide community support. The psychosocial issues were properly assessed and participatory systems for monitoring and evaluation were initiated, which has proven to be of a great value (Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 2007). It is also very important that helpers connect with each other and learn from the work others are doing, so that their work does not overlap, leave major gaps. Moreover, it is important to give migrants an access to information about their legal rights, education they need and different eligible services, so they know whom they can turn to when in need. An expert should try to connect a migrant with appropriate spiritual and religious practices or other cultural specific facilities which may be key factors in their resilience process. A basic, yet effective suggestion to experts is to develop a list of community resources, adequate for people from similar cultural background, which include physicians, social services, lawyers, volunteer centers, communities of faith, nurses and psychiatrists, pastors and clergy, various hotlines and public libraries, as well as classes for local language as a second language (when needed) and provide it to person in need.

Finally, mental health professionals working with clients from a variety of cultural and ethnic backgrounds must be aware of the complexity and exhaustibility of the acculturative process (Bessa 2016). They must also be willing to be lifelong learners, aware that cultural competence is never achieved, but is marked by curiosity and open engagement, rather than rigid generalizations about groups (Sue and Sue 2012). An important aspect of adequate psychosocial help is also the awareness of the potential burnout and the need for help of the experts themselves. Namely the situations experts are facing during helping people in crisis are extremely exhausting and many times traumatic as well.

2.2. Potential issues in the origin country and the journey

When experts face a migrant or refugee it is very useful to understand what the path she/he passed till the present moment is. These are some of the issues that might have appeared in the life of the client and have to be considered during help:

- Individuals might be fleeing from war, violence, and/or persecution, displacement, and be exposed to psychological distress and/or social stressors.
- Individuals might be victims of abuse at home. Experiences of fear, abuse, and other traumas before migration, have significant implications for mental health, and for areas to be explored and addressed in mental health treatment (Foster 2001).
- The migration journey itself. The journey and/or abuse by smugglers, is generally perceived to be frightening, often at night with cold and wet conditions, and with possible shipwrecks, near-drowning experiences, or witnessing the drowning of others (possibly loved ones) etc. (Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Situational Assessment 2016). “Luciana described the terror she felt, upon beginning her life in the United States, every time a plane flew overhead. She had made her way to the U.S. illegally by utilizing a “coyote” (a travel broker), traveling with a group of other immigrants. In addition to facing the risk of being detained or returned to her home country at any moment, she also faced the risk of losing thousands of dollars (that she did not have)—the fee charged to utilize a coyote’s services, which is often paid in part up front, the rest to be paid off upon arrival to the destination country, but which individuals are responsible for, regardless of whether or not they are deported at some point. Luciana also described the fear of sexual assault that haunted her throughout her migration journey, indicating a stranger posed as her husband for protection. For the first several months of her stay in the U.S., every time a plane flew overhead, she was afraid she would be identified as an illegal immigrant and deported. She reported avoiding leaving the house due to this fear, as well (Bessa 2016). In Ljubljana, Slovenia there is an interesting project called »Through the eyes of a refugee« conducted by Humantias association and cofinanced by the Slovenian Government Communication Office and European union. It includes an interactive theater game that illustrates the conditions refugees usually go through on their journey with the active participation of the visitor. The project is based on true stories,

dialogues and includes real refugees. Its aim is to understand what it is like to be a refugee and what they have gone through.

- Not all the problems are due to migration. Experts must check for any possible preexisting mental illness that require psychotropic medications for treatment.

2.3. Potential issues in the hosting country

When the migrants or refugees reach the final destination – hosting country, the problems are far from being over. Very likely, they will be facing the following obstacles:

- Uncertainty about how to address basic needs (e.g. food, clothing and shelter)
- Uncertainty about the upcoming portion of the migration experience: migrants, especially refugees cannot predict their short term future, which disable their settlement and normal life activities in connection with strong feeling of uncertainty and fear of their future.
- Value differences and differences in religious, spiritual or cultural practices might lead to intense stress with migrants
- Social stigma and the negative media representation of migrants and refugees, as well as experiences of racism, discrimination, and war trauma that are present in many countries can develop social tensions and contribute to additional stress and isolation of migrants and refugees. Many refugee women and girls feel particularly isolated and rarely leave their homes, often due to concerns over safety or lack of opportunities (American Psychological Association 2010).
- Separation from family members and/or social support networks which is even more important when speaking about children. Given that the presence of the parents can be an important protective factor for children and adolescents facing stress reactions in adverse situations, unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors may benefit from placement in a foster family or at least having families available for support and regular interaction. Displaced persons often search for news about loved ones. Help providers should do their best to get accurate information about them. If this can't be achieved, under no circumstances do not provide contradictory or misleading information, leading to more insecurity and confusion (American Psychological Association 2010).

Experts have to have in mind the situation migrants and refugees are facing and do their best to integrate their clients into the host country community. Nevertheless, the above mentioned should be incorporated in psychotherapy as well. In the following paragraphs cultural sensitive psychotherapeutic characteristic will be described.

2.4. Cultural sensitive psychotherapy

When migrants enter psychotherapy the cultural competence of the therapist they encounter likely has a dramatic impact on the counseling experience and how they view psychotherapy in general (Rogers-Sirin et al. 2015). When speaking about cultural sensitive psychotherapy we have to have in mind the following:

- I. Session structure and style;
- II. Session content;
- III. Therapeutic approaches.

2.4.1. Session structure and style

When a client is a migrant or refugee, the therapist has to keep in mind some specifics about the structure and style of the therapy. Within this scope it is important to:

- arrange the psychotherapeutic treatments dependent on the possibility of the follow up sessions. Psychotherapeutic treatment often requires multiple sessions, especially if heavy topics are to be opened. However, this cannot be fulfilled when people are 'on the move' as migrants often are. Therefore, therapeutic techniques need to be adapted to the fact that the first time therapists see a person may be the last. By encouraging clients to talk about difficult experiences that cannot be processed in a stable, clinical context, can be devastating. In general, multiple session psychological therapies should only be considered when the person is in a stable situation.
- take time to build an inviting relationship and a warm environment to establish rapport. It may include a preliminary time to talk about general matters with no pressing agenda or technical specifics and perhaps offering water or a refreshment etc.. Patience is very important for building rapport. Rogers-Sirinet al. (2015) reported that when therapists acknowledged their clients' initial hesitation in therapy and responded with patience and support, their clients felt respected and safe. Safety and confidentiality of therapeutic relationship should be reemphasized all the time, but especially at the beginning. Experts have to try to remember as much information as possible that a migrant provides (names, data, stories, etc.), as it is

taken as a matter of honor and respect for them. Respect and reliability is achieved also if an expert tells the client that he often deals with similar situations but takes each of these very seriously. The emphasizing of their individuality is very important since it is damaged with generalizing a sense of a person with the group of migrants or refugees.

- realize that most of the people who end up in counseling are not there by choice. They might have been referred to your agency by the national security or school or court or friends. Even most of those who seek counseling on their own may not be familiar with its many disciplines, procedures, and processes, and thus adequate introductions and psycho-educational hints at the start of therapy are essential.
- ask for permission before taking any notes or voice/video taping therapeutic interaction. Expert has to clearly explain the reason for that, and assure that it is just for the purpose of the therapy and will never be shared publically or legally with others. Remember that some migrants, especially from Arab countries may have a great mistrust in the whole psychological-psychiatric system.
- consider using revised culturally sensitive versions of classic measures (e.g., Tell Me a Story [TEMAS]), which is a revision of the Thematic Apperception Test (American Psychological Association 2013).
- use a more interactive style and movement. Distant and stoic therapists will not be effective with people from close knit and warm cultures and tight social backgrounds.
- model some basic and general disclosures, so that clients can follow your example. It can be beneficial if therapist shares some generic information about himself. The clients' trust will grow and their preparedness for disclosure will improve. That will bring you both closer together and greatly humanize the relationship (even though this may be discouraged in some theories or therapies).
- be prepared to involve other family members or friends into therapy who can serve as valuable support to the struggling client. We should not forget that the loss of social support is one of the main resilience factors that are reduced with migrants and refugees.
- ways of sustaining a program should be determined at every step of program planning. Displaced people may suffer from mental health problems for years after the emergency is over. Many people continue to suffer long after the relief agencies pull out from the

program, and the effects can be felt well into future generations. It is important to gain the support of the local health system, locally-based relief groups and any NGOs (The Johns Hopkins and Red Cross Red Crescent Public health guide in emergencies Second edition I 2008).

- Even if not trained before the provision of psychosocial help, expert has to try to get as much information and guidebooks or formulary as possible. A good example of such a material is an OPSIC Comprehensive guideline on mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) in disaster settings (2015).

2.4.2. Session content

Of course it is not all about the structure and style of psychotherapeutic treatment, but also about the appropriate content. If therapist does not follow the culturally sensitive psychotherapeutic guidelines in the content of his therapy, he might easily offend the client, lose his trust. The therapy is useless at its best, but more likely it even increase the migrants' or refugees' sense of being misunderstood, isolated and results in increased trauma, stress and lack of integration. That is why it is essential to include the following therapeutic principles:

- Do not generalize, as for example "All Arabs... Or all Muslims are...". Migrants lost their individuality per se. Do not encourage depersonalization with generalization within therapeutic statements. Therapist has to be aware that not all migrants are the same, on the contrary, they may be quite different.
- Use culturally sensitive communication:
 - o Be willing to speak slowly and simply with those with limited English or knowledge, even willing to work through an interpreter, which requires training and patience.
 - o Be careful not to debate sensitive matters, polarized topics, or obvious differences in religious doctrines, foreign politics, or cultural hierarchies, especially early in the counseling process.
 - o Avoid using direct labeling questions, and heavy terminology, such as "Have you been abused? Since when have you suffered domestic violence? Are you a battered wife? Why didn't you call and report your husband?" Clients may not understand them in the same as a therapist.
 - o Use culturally appropriate terminology and concept description. For example: In Syria, where concepts such as

'psychological state', 'psychological wellbeing', or 'mental health' are not commonly understood and often carry negative connotations, suffering is commonly understood as a normal part of life, and therefore, not necessitating medical or psychiatric intervention, except in severe and debilitating forms. Within clinical settings, people who are distressed may use indirect expressions when asked about their current wellbeing, such as 'I am tired', 'my psyche is tired'. This refers to a general state of ill-being and may stand for a range of emotional symptoms, but also for relationship difficulties. Such statements, therefore, need further assessment to understand what they mean for an individual within a particular context. Local expressions can be used to convey empathy as well as to explain and support interventions (Hassan et al. 2015).

- Refrain from using bodily gestures, non-verbal communication, or popular jokes that are only understood in your local context or society.
- Be careful with the interpretation of some behavior, thoughts or emotions. Sometimes field experts over-pathologize clients (Foster 2001), since they are not attentive to cultural and relational factors. Some experiences may be related to traumatic stress reactions (e.g., feelings of fear, discomfort, and alienation) and may potentially serve as barriers to treatment (Bessa 2016). Silence or lack of eye contact and personal response can be easily interpret as a psychological resistance. Rather there may be a cultural or linguistic barrier involved. A client speaking in a non-native language may exhibit detached affect while struggling to communicate effectively, which may be related to language difficulties, as well as relational factors; clinicians should avoid simply assuming "affective blunting" related to "more severe psychological states". Foster (2001, 166) states that, "the fear and frustration of not being understood—particularly when such high stakes as psychiatric hospitalization are involved—can be paralyzing for some". Similarly, the therapist has to be careful when interpreting the clients' excessive politeness, repetition of accounts, or agreeability as appeasing or non-genuine.
- Accept and respect the victim's version of the story and their evaluation of the situation as it will be expressed through their own cultural and religious lenses. Mental health practitioners working with refugees from Syria report that some clients struggle with

existential questions such as: 'How can God accept this happening to my family?', or 'Why does God allow others to kill small children and elderly people?' (Hassan et al. 2015). It is important, therefore, to assess what religious identity and practices mean for an individual. Accordingly the development of treatment goals should be a collaborative process in which clinicians share their perspective on the presenting problems while eliciting the clients' goals and hoped-for solutions as well.

- Discover any residual grief, loss, and bereavement along with any traumatic stress, unresolved tragedy, or lingering critical crisis. Often these coexist and overlap. Apply therapies for grief resolution and trauma mastery simultaneously. Often, clinicians focus on one or the other, and mostly on the trauma at the expense of grief (since bereavement symptoms are less pronounced and pressing) (Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Situational Assessment Needs, Services, and Recommendations for Support to Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants in Greece 2016).
- Avoid quick diagnosis and conceptualization. There are so many aspects and layers to consider, especially when working with cross-cultural cases compounded with various worldviews and multiple psycho-emotional factors.
- Empower clients before making major life changes or decisions. Assist them with developing internal strength skills for openness, flexibility, interaction with locals, and the exploitation of the external resources for integration within the hosting society and/or general culture at large. Capitalize on clients' strengths and resiliency. Most important is that clients feel safe, hopeful and connected to others in the community, that they have access to support and finally that they regain a sense of control of their life.
- If hostility and violence are present, or if sexual abuse has somehow been disclosed, assure the person or family that they are not alone, and the risks of disclosure are not as grave as they have thought, in order to calm their apprehensions and fears. When addressing aggressive behavior and domestic violence, carefully and sensitively weigh the pros and cons of seeking professional help, of reporting the abuse, of leaving the home, of legally separating from the offender, etc. Do not assume that the client should or will obviously choose to report, separate, or divorce. Often the misunderstanding and cultural stigma, the social blame and alienation, and the financial repercussions associated with such a decision could have

detrimental effects on the clients; and that must be delicately evaluated and worked through (El-Jamil and Abi Hashem 2015).

The above described content guidelines are valid for all psychotherapeutic approaches. However, each of the approaches uses its own specific theoretical base and techniques. It is a matter of debate if all the approaches are equally appropriate for treatment of clients who are separated from their cultural roots. In the following section we will present some views about the selection of the most appropriate psychotherapeutic approach when dealing with migrants and refugees.

2.4.3. Therapeutic approaches

When examining the appropriateness of a psychotherapeutic model for clients, research has demonstrated that factors such as clients' presenting problems, expectations, and levels of resistance each play a role in determining the most effective approach for a specific client, interactions with the larger society (Abo-Zena and Ahmed 2014; Norcross and Beutler 2008). Immigration history, generation status, socioeconomic status, religion, religiosity, the degree of connection to their cultural community and the degree of acculturation into new society are factors that may further influence clients' understandings of their presenting problems, levels of resistance and expectations of treatment (Abi-Hashem 2011).

In this section we will try to point out, what is beneficial and what are the shortcomings of particular approaches when dealing with migrants and refugees. Reader has to keep in mind the fact that each client has to be taken individually, with his/her own special needs and preferences and never generalize. Nevertheless, we will try to gather the opinions of experts and examples of good practices about the psychotherapeutic approach preference when dealing with people from different cultural background. Our focus will be on refugees from Arab culture.

Psychoanalysis

Even though one must consider the most appropriate approach according to individual preferences and needs of each client, we might say that in general when dealing with migrants from Arab culture, psychoanalysis did not prove to be the most successful approach. Namely, Arab clients' consider their doctors as one of an all-knowing authority and guide. As such, nondirective approaches such as psychoanalysis have not been recommended to accommodate their needs and expectations (Abudabbeh and Hays 2006). From a more theoretical perspective, Dwairy (2002) explained that the

intra-psychic conflicts central to psychoanalytic theory are not as relevant to Arab experience as are intra-familial conflicts, which more often define their core problems. For Arab migrants the feeling of shame when speaking about inner psyche may be particularly intense due to family values and expectations. Additionally, stereotypes may arise in the transference and countertransference experiences with Arab clients, which is at times further complicated by the clients' complex relationship with the host country and therapists to Middle East.

The Cognitive Behavior Therapy Models

Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) focuses on attending closely to the client's automatic thoughts in order to identify distortions of thought and beliefs that facilitate negative emotions as well as maladaptive behaviors (Beck 2011). Migrants, especially from Arab culture may value the concrete tools and strategies as well as the structure associated with between-session assignments (Sayed 2003). Therefore, CBT as a directive, problem-focused approach has been recommended to accommodate their needs and expectations (Abudabbeh and Hays 2006). Positive results were achieved also with using narrative exposure therapy, which employs behavioral methods. Positive outcomes may be increased when positive religious coping strategies are integrated into CBT with migrants from Arab culture who report high religiousness and find faith as a source of comfort (Abu-Raiya and Pargament 2010; 2011). Nevertheless, when using CBT migrants' thoughts must be examined in a culturally congruent way and without imposing the therapists' own beliefs (Abudabbeh and Hays 2006).

Family Therapy Models

The core of family therapy is its focus on context, complementarity, and circular causality. As such, each problem is viewed as based in a specific social context, in which each member of the system influences the other and problems are maintained by an ongoing series of actions and reactions (Nichols 2011). Family therapy removes the cause of the problem from a single member of the family and shifts attention to a larger systemic problem that may lie within the family dynamics or between the family and other systems. Intra-familial interactions are often major sources of struggle in the personal lives of migrant from Arab culture (Dwairy 2002, 2006).

System and family therapy is often appropriate for treatment of migrants or refugees since the immigration experience is a significant life transition necessitating a re-negotiation of the self. This often means a re-negotiation of one's role in the home, one's role in society, and even one's racial/ethnic

identity. Immigration experiences can also lead to significant shifts within family systems, sometimes leading to more egalitarian financial arrangements, occasionally leading to increased relational strain as partners, parents, and children acculturate at different rates and in different ways (DeBiaggi 2002; Hervis et al. 2009). Struggles can also arise between the family and the larger host country cultural system. For example, Jordanian American mothers living in the U.S. expressed feelings of guilt, confusion, despair, and persistent worry primarily around raising their children within a different cultural context (Pollara and Meleis 1995). Issues of identity and belonging to the host country society can also be stressful for adolescents, resulting in a tug of war between their longing for acceptance within new society and their loyalties to family and tradition (Nobles and Sciarra 2000). Consequently, family therapy may in fact be the most relevant intervention, especially for Arab migrants (Abudabbeh and Hays 2006), improving upon intra-familial dynamics and communication and bridging gaps between cultures and generations within a family (Sciarra 2011). Bringing family members into the therapy room may provide acknowledgement and respect to the family unit as a whole and to the important roles members play within the system (El-Jamil and Ahmed, In press).

When using this paradigm it is important for an expert to get an answer to the questions like: Where does this client fit into the culture of origin, family, and broader society? How does the client identify ethnically/racially/culturally? (Bessa 2016) Therapists must be sensitive and challenging when applied to migrant families about different aspects. To name a few:

- Due to different cultural values and tradition, concepts that are commonly accepted in the western culture, might be treated differently in other cultures. In the case of Arab families, boundaries among family members are often fluid. For example, what may be perceived as pathological enmeshment in the dominant American culture may be positively experienced as love, care, protection, and support in the Arab culture (Dwairy 2006), and thus can be viewed as a healthy and adaptive interdependence. Or vice versa, some Arab clients may view differentiation of self which is considered normal in western countries as distance, separation from the family or its betrayal.
- Preparedness for the disclosure of emotions and family roles are not the same in all the cultures. In traditional Arab families, family concerns are expected to remain private within the family (Dwairy

2002). This may influence therapeutic process. The husband in particular may disconnect from any process that he perceives may undermine his authority, and the wife may also not wish to expose problems related to her marriage. Similarly, the emotions of children may be considered secondary to family values and thus undermined by parents (Dwairy and El-Jamil 2015). Therefore, techniques taken from experiential or emotion-focused family therapy can be challenging because traditional Arab parents may find emotional expression in front of children or spouses difficult or threatening to their roles (Sayed 2003).

- Be aware of potential aspects of identity negotiation to be addressed in treatment, including gender role renegotiation and conflict, potential difficulties in relating to family members in the hosting country and in the native country, and potential feelings of alienation from family members, cultural group, and greater society (Bessa 2016).

So far, we have described the specifics of psychosocial help and potential issues that can arise within the work of experts on the field if they are not properly educated. However, the majority of their time migrants and refugees spend within the host country community. If they are negatively accepted among the local community and don't have an appropriate legal and other conditions for developing skills, that enables them to integrate to new environment, the psychological help itself will not be able to save their issues. In the following section we will write about what can be done to improve the inclusion from the social point of view.

3. Destigmatisation of migrants from different cultures and social inclusion in a host country and local community

Inclusion of the migrants can be achieved from different approaches: with the change of the opinion and attitude of the social community in the hosting country, with the help offered to migrants in order to develop skills that will help them to integrate in the host environment and with the reassurance of the social support and with the proper arrangement of the migrants' status, to name a few.

Change of the opinion and attitude of the social community in the host country can be achieved via media, education of the community and community care (deinstitutionalization).

Development of migrants' skills for better inclusion can be achieved with education of different skills including language, norms and values of the

hosting country. WHO is encouraging everyone but especially experts in the field to try to teach migrants skills that will enable them to include to local community of the hosting country (World Health Organization, War Trauma Foundation and World Vision International 2011). However, when it comes to practical application, these guidelines hit the rock. There are several reports, where migrants report about not having the opportunity to get included in the hosting community (24ur.com 2016; Sirin and Rogers-Sirin 2015). More precisely, recently, refugees in Slovenia complained, that they are isolated, no one teaches them the Slovenian language, they are not engaged in any kind of daily activity, which causes them depressive feelings. Further, when they ask the authorities to explain some things about their current status, the only answer they get is that they must wait. This triggers the feeling of abandonment, static situation and being in a prison despite the open doors. Therefore, there is plenty of room for improvement of these services.

Establishment of the social support can be achieved not only through antidiscrimination measures for host country native citizens, but also with inclusion of the other migrants which are already settled in the hosting country. They are the ones who understand their culture, their values and their needs. This is very important for a person to feel safe, empowered and loved and as such willing to enter at that time still a foreign world.

Migrants can also face a difficult situation if they can't get a proper status. They might have the skills, they might be accepted by the local community, but they cannot start their life if their formal status is not arranged. Many refugees would love to stay in Slovenia, continue a study, start a career, a family, but they cannot start their active role, because their status is not solved in many ways.

4. Conclusion

When people face an unbearable situation in their home country, such as poverty, hunger or even war and violence, they search for alternatives that would enable them live better. One of these alternatives is to leave their home country, whether as a refugee or a migrant.

When arriving at their final destination they are faced with a new culture and new issues that have to be overcome. This is everything but an easy situation. At first it is their responsibility to do their best to take the control over their life and adjust it to the new environment. However, they do not always get the opportunities to do so, even though they are entitled to proper treatment, as all humans in need are.

For the successful overcoming of the crisis situation and integration into the local community they need appropriate treatment from psychosocial experts and support of the new community. To provide help that will serve its purpose, experts have to be properly educated for helping persons from different cultural environments. This is not a onetime process, but rather a lifetime attitude towards their mission. The mission is to provide professional help to the persons in need, without any prejudices to different beliefs, values and differences. It is a difficult and exhausting task and that is why, experts have to pay attention to their health. Finally, it is of great importance, that experts spread the information, examples of good practice. Eventually this will represent a larger contribution, perhaps on a global scale, and that can be a very rewarding investment leading to improvements in cultural mediation and peace building.

As for the support of the broad community, everyone has to be aware of the fact, that each of us can face a situation which will exceed our personal resilience. Let us finish the article with the appeal to all of us, treat others as you would like them to treat you and appeal to media to encourage the realistic presentation of the migrants' situation. The education and dismissal of prejudices will help to integrate migrants and refugees into a new community. At the end, the coexistence is the only natural consequence of the current globalization of the world.

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